GJIA - 10.2 Trade on Trial

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Georgetown Journal of

International Affairs

in this issue:

Russia’s Industrial Woes Andrei Illarionov

Technology and the Hajj Shahed Amanullah

Somali Piracy and Maritime Terrorism Christopher Joyner

A New Global Balance of Power summer/fall

Rumu Sarkar

2009

The Role of the National Security Council

volume x, number

Anthony Lake

2

Trade on Trial with an introduction by

Marc Busch

The EU’s Protectionism Problem The Durability of Free Trade Modern Protectionism in the Trade, Integration, and Crisis Global Economy in Latin America E dmund A. W alsh S chool

of

F oreign S ervice

S ummer /F all 2009 • $9.95

usa

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Summer/Fall 2009, Volume X, Number 2

1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Trade on Trial 3

Introduction Marc L. Busch

This Forum explores the question of whether protectionism will increase as a result of the economic crisis. Will desire to protect domestic industries push governments to raise trade barriers? Or will the international institutions designed to forestall such a move prevail? Looking at both the mechanisms of trade and specific regional contexts, contributors address these questions from various perspectives.

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Imaginative Obstruction: Modern Protectionism in the Global Economy

15

Protectionist Pandemics?: The Durability of Free Trade

23

The EU’s Protectionism Problem

31

The Rise of the “Pink Tide”: Trade, Integration, and Economic Crisis in Latin America

Phillip I. levy

Daniel J. Ikenson

Meredith Kolsky Lewis

Jason Tockman

Politics&Diplomacy 41

The Unfulfilled Mandate: Gender Mainstreaming and UN Peace Operations Jacqui True

Implementing the mandates of UN Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on gender mainstreaming in UN peace operations will require a broader conception of international security encompassing socioeconomic equality and women’s human rights—a task for which the new U.S. administration may be ideally suited.

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Conflict&Security State Failure: The Responsibility to Protect Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

51

Anthony w. gambino

When states are unable to protect their own populations, an internationally accepted principle known as the responsibility to protect is supposed to apply. In the case of the Congo, this principle necessitates strengthening the international community’s role, particularly that of MONUC.

59

Keeping an Eye on al-Qaeda in Iraq Jonathan brookshire

U.S. efforts to combat al-Qaeda in Iraq are important not only for countering the destabilizing terrorist attacks directly committed by the group based in Iraq but also as a key part of the wider U.S. effort against al-Qaeda.

67

The Fearful Symmetry and the New Soldier: A New Global Balance of Power

Rumu Sarkar

The threat of Islamist terrorism has created a new global balance of power. The political dimensions of asymmetric warfare posed by Islamist-based terrorism create a need for the adoption of new strategies. The author argues for a strategy that involves the creation of a “New Soldier,” a soldier-diplomat who is flexible, highly educated, and capable of demonstrating compassion.

Culture&Society Hajj 2.0: Technology’s Impact on the Muslim Pilgrimage

75

Shahed Amanullah

Because of modern technology, the pilgrimage to Mecca is available to many more Muslims than could ever have made the journey before, but technology has also added new layers of distraction for faithful Muslims during this sacred experience.

Law&Ethics 83

Navigating Troubled Waters: Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism Christopher Joyner

This article explains why piracy is occurring off of Somalia’s coast, contextualizes how this piracy is affecting international stability, and offers recommendations for multilateral action to suppress instances of maritime violence off the Horn of Africa.

93

Private Military Contractors: Lessons Learned in Iraq and Increased Accountability in Afghanistan Karli Johnston

The use of private military contractors may be understood in terms of pragmatic policymaking, providing an effective and essential force-multiplier in the battle against terrorism, and ensuring security.

Cover & page 3 photo credits: Getty Images

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Contents

Business&Economics 101

More than a Catastrophe: The Economic Crisis in Russia andrei illarionov

After years of economic growth, Russia’s economy has taken a sharp downturn. This article analyzes the origins and development of Russia’s economic crisis through trends in its industrial output.

109

Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Cuba’s Fifty Years of Failed Socialism korok ray

Despite claims to the contrary by the Castro regime, the origins of Cuba’s economic difficulties lie not in the effects of the U.S. embargo on the island nation, but instead in the inefficiencies and market distortions caused by the regime’s socialist policies.

Science&Technology 117

The New Great Game: Water Allocation in Post-Soviet Central Asia Kai Wegerich

Competition over water use in Central Asia poses a threat to the region’s political and economic stability. This article examines the Soviet system’s impact on current water allocation policies and major water infrastructure projects in the region.

Books 125

A New Approach to Eurasia

Spencer P. Boyer and James D. Lamond

A review of Eurasia’s New Frontiers: Young States, Old Societies, Open Futures by Thomas W. Simons, Jr.

View from the Ground 133

Benevolence and Blunder: NGOs and Development in the Dominican Republic Sierra hawthorne

Development in the Dominican Republic, stalled by NGO dependence and government corruption, can be encouraged through a community participation-based model to improve social infrastructure.

A Look Back 143

The Role of the National Security Council Interview with Anthony Lake

Former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake comments on the evolution of the National Security Council as it rose to meet the challenges of foreign and domestic policymaking during the Clinton administration.

Summer/Fall 2009 [ iii]

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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Summer/Fall 2009 [ v]

Notice to Contributors

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Errata: In issue 10.1 (Winter/Spring 2009) of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Ellen Clarke, Rebecca Lindgren, Radha Subramaniam, and Kyle Sucher were unintentinally omitted from the publication’s masthead as being Layout Assistants.

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Editors’ Note

In the first months of 2009, the economic crisis dominated the world’s attention.

Unemployment in the United States hit a high not seen since the early 1980s.

Factory workers from Malaysia to France to China have faced increasing layoffs.

In early April, the G20 summit in London produced promises to boost IMF lending to stave off the global downturn. World leaders agreed to better regulate financial institutions, but they did not agree with President Obama’s and Prime Minister Brown’s plans to prioritize extensive economic stimulus packages.

Economic hardship provokes strong reactions. Anger and fear resonate, from the protests at the G20 summit to Congress’s attempt to reclaim AIG executives’ bonuses. In the inevitable rush to compare this downturn to the Great Depression, much has been made of the possibility that the crisis will lead to increases in protectionist measures—that in our panic, we will ignore the lessons of history and seek short-term domestic stability over the long-term benefits of open borders to increase prosperity. Trade on Trial takes a closer look at the question of whether protectionism will increase, and if so, how it will impact the U.S. and other economies. Our contributors offer insightful perspectives on what protectionism looks like today, how contemporary international institutions affect the formation of trade policies, and what we can expect to see in the coming months as governments respond to the economic crisis.

Economic issues loom large in other articles in this issue, including Korok Ray’s analysis of the disastrous effects of Cuban socialism and Christopher Joyner’s discussion of the causes and legal challenges of piracy off the coast of Somalia. While the world obsesses over new internet tools like Twitter, Shahed Amanullah reflects on the significance for Muslims of a technology-saturated hajj. And as the Obama administration passes its first months in office and continues to redefine how government agencies will work together, Clinton-era NSC Advisor Anthony Lake reflects on the role of that agency and its place in the foreign policy process.

Amidst the uncertainty of these times, we hope that this issue of the Journal informs and enlightens.

Carolyn Barnett

Eric Peter

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 ]

Forum Georgetown journal of international affairs

Trade on Trial Free trade has never been an easy sell. For all the elegance of the logic underpinning the case for open markets, protectionism often wins the day, especially in tough political times. The Group of 20 (G20) leading economies is a case in point.

Having failed to deliver on its November pledge to resist a protectionist response to the global recession, the G20 gathered in April to try again. Yet, aside from some open-ended statements about monitoring transgressions and the need to conclude the Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, the G20’s renewed pledge has largely unraveled over questions about whether anti-dumping duties, for example, count as protectionism. The worry is that, with international trade falling by a staggering 9 percent this year, the global recession is sure to drag if world leaders succumb to the politics of protectionism.

Like in the 1930s, beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies could undercut economic growth for years to come.

Yet, for both domestic and international reasons, the case for free trade resonates more loudly today than it did in the 1930s.

Domestically, firms in rich and poor countries are embedded in supply chains that reach well beyond the water’s edge, tempering enthusiasm for protectionist measures that can only increase their cost of doing business. Internationally, the

7 Imaginative Obstruction

Modern Protectionism in the Global Economy Phillip I. levy

15 Protectionist Pandemics?

The Durability of Free Trade Daniel J. Ikenson

23 The EU’s Protectionism Problem Meredith Kolsky Lewis

The Rise of the “Pink Tide”

31 Trade, Integration, and Economic Crisis in Latin America

Jason Tockman

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 3]

Introduction

three “Bretton Woods” institutions—the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and WTO—trace their origins to the desire of member countries to avoid a repeat of the Great Depression, and all are set to tackle new responsibilities in the current financial crisis, including with respect to trade. These factors put a different spin on things. For example, while it is worrisome that seventeen of the G20 countries reneged on their November promise to resist protectionism, the World Bank explains that the forty-seven measures imposed “have probably had only marginal effects on trade,” not least because the countries have little latitude, under WTO obligations, to raise more potent barriers to trade.1 Even the widelymaligned “Buy American” portions of the U.S. stimulus package will likely not play out as feared, given Washington’s desire not to run afoul of multilateral trade rules.

All this makes it more difficult to put in perspective the protectionist rhetoric we hear from the world’s capitals.

Take the November elections in the United States, for example. To win the Democratic primaries, and appease their labor constituents in particular, the conventional wisdom is that those vying for the ticket have to run against trade. Yet, even by this standard, the candidates outdid themselves. Hillary Clinton hit a mercantilist cord with her talk of “smart trade,” railed against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and called for a “time-out” on new free trade agreements. Not to be outdone, President Barack Obama promised to re-negotiate NAFTA under threat of exit, and to invest more than the Bush administration in

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enforcing U.S. rights under the WTO. Defying expectations, his stand on trade was no less strident upon entering the general election, especially with respect to NAFTA. This sold well, of course, to an American public already suspicious of trade. A March 2008 survey showed that 60 percent of voters were of the opinion that the globalization of trade was bad for the U.S. economy, versus 25 percent who thought it beneficial.2 Tapping this sentiment, those running for Congress followed Obama’s lead.

In the House, it was a slaughter, as “trade skeptics” unseated thirteen protrade incumbents and won twenty open contests, furthering a trend that, since 2006, has seen them make a net gain of seventy-two seats across both houses of Congress.3 As Daniel Griswold of the Cato Institute puts it, “This could be the most trade-skeptical Congress paired with the most trade-skeptical president since Herbert Hoover and the Republicans in 1930.”4 But things may not be so simple.

After all, President Obama has selected several key cabinet members who are decidedly pro-trade and announced his intention to ask for Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which would allow him to submit trade deals to Congress for a strict “yea” or “nay” vote, without amendment, thereby improving his negotiating credibility with foreign trade partners. Moreover, influential committee chairs have stated that pending free trade agreements with Panama and Colombia (among others) will soon be taken up as well. In an ironic twist of fate, the Wall Street Journal explains that, just as only Nixon could open up relations with China, “it may be that only a Democratic president,

Busch

Barack Obama, can save free trade amid today’s global economic upheaval.”5 So which is it: did the November elections and the global recession collide in the perfect anti-trade storm, as many fear? Or will the G20, swayed by the case for free trade and constrained by the institutions designed to liberalize it, avoid a repeat of the 1930s, as some suggest? The four articles that follow help frame this debate. At first glance, they all bet that protectionism will not win the day, but, as they say in trade negotiations, the devil is in the details.

Philip I. Levy’s article, “Imaginative Obstruction: Modern Protectionism in the Global Economy,” points out that today’s protectionism is not as simple to detect as it was in 1947, when the lessons of the 1930s informed the design of the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Levy distinguishes between intentional, incidental, and instrumental protectionism. Intentional protectionism includes those measures meant to discriminate between foreign and domestic goods or services, like a tariff or quota. By contrast, incidental protectionism has the effect of discriminating, but, as in the case of a health and safety standard, for example, may have been conceived to safeguard the public from antibiotics in seafood, which happen to be more common in certain imports than in others. Levy also chalks up anti-dumping suits under this heading, noting that this wildly popular measure is rooted in longstanding concerns for anti-trust, even though this link is a stretch today.

Finally, instrumental protectionism involves using trade measures to pursue broader foreign policy goals, such as

Trade on Trial

democratization abroad. Here, Levy wades into the heated debate over the role of labor and environmental standards in trade agreements, measures India has referred to as the “Trojan horses of protectionism.”6 The bottom line to this insightful article is that, while the topic of protectionism may strike many as familiar, the varieties of it are often anything but.

In “Protectionist Pandemics?: The Durability of Free Trade,” Daniel J. Ikenson argues that there is “too much at stake” for elected officials to give in to what he calls “protectionist pandemics.” Pointing to the efficacy of international trade rules and the economic case for market openness, Ikenson dismisses the view that we are on the verge of repeating the follies of the 1930s. That said, he warns that there is room for countries to be increasingly protectionist, and to do it legally.

Pointing to the difference between “bound” and “applied” tariffs, Ikenson notes that India could quadruple its average tariff and still be consistent with its WTO obligations. Other areas where trade rules may not deter protectionist impulses include health and safety standards, which have emerged as a preferred non-tariff barrier among governments. But Ikenson urges us to take heart, insisting that, even if this legal backsliding occurs, the result will be nothing like the Great Depression, especially if the United States rises to the occasion and provides leadership in keeping markets open.

In “The EU’s Protectionism Problem,” Meredith Kolsky Lewis shines a spotlight on the political economy of European protectionism.

The tension, she observes, is between

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 5]

Introduction

the national governments, which act on the demands of influential industrial constituents to maximize their electoral fortunes, and the leadership of the EU, which wants to minimize the cost (notably in agriculture) and negative consequences (in Europe and beyond) of this protectionism. Lewis insists that the WTO’s Doha round is in the best interests of the EU as a whole, not least because she worries that the multilateral system may be damaged by the onslaught of bilateral and regional free trade agreements, which extend super-MFN (or better than most favored nation treatment) to members over non-members, resulting in the kind of preferences associated with the 1930s.

Finally, Jason Tockman’s article, “The Rise of the ‘Pink Tide’: Trade, Integration, and Economic Crisis in Latin America,” looks to Latin America and asks whether the region’s leftleaning leaders—the “pink tide”—will turn away from open markets. His answer is no: for all the domestic rhetoric, the economies of the region are too dependent on trade, and increasingly interested in commercial ties with and market access to China, in particular. Tockman notes, moreover, that Latin America’s dismal experience with economic closure in the 1980s is a more recent reminder than the 1930s of what is at stake in this regard. Of course, to insist that the region’s markets will remain open is not the same thing as suggesting that Latin America will

embrace further liberalization. On the contrary, populist demands are bound to grow louder, and trade is easily scapegoated by regimes—both rich and poor—that have failed to deliver on promises of wealth redistribution.

Taken together, the four articles show the complexity of getting our hands around the problem of protectionism. As Levy muses, “Hardly a soul in political life wishes to be called a protectionist.” Most elected officials undoubtedly relish the fact that the measures they supply to their industrial constituents can be dressed up in other (non-trade-related) clothes. But for all this new complexity, the problem is fundamentally the same as it has been throughout history: protectionism is popular to peddle, but does not work as advertised. If there is a lesson to be learned from the 1930s or, in the case of Latin America, the 1980s, this is it.

The four articles conclude that we are not going to see the global economy shut down, and I concur with that assessment. But like the four authors, I suspect that we are in for a bumpy ride, for unlike protectionism, free trade has never proved an easy sell—least of all during tough political times.

Marc L. Busch is the Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy at the School of Foreign Service and associate professor in the Government Department, Georgetown University.

Notes

1 World Bank, “Trade Protection: Incipient But Worrisome Trends,” 2 March 2009, 1.

2 Wall Street Journal, 29 November 2008.

3 Public Citizen, “Election 2008: Fair Trade Gets an Upgrade,” 8 January 2009.

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4 Wall Street Journal, 29 November 2008.

5 Wall Street Journal, 10 March 2009.

6 World Trade Organization, Document WT/ MIN(01)/S10, 16 May 2003.

Trade on Trial

Imaginative Obstruction

Modern Protectionism in the Global Economy Philip I. Levy Hardly a soul in political life wishes to be called a protectionist. The epithet stirs up images of Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley agreeing in 1930 to undercut the world trading system in a misguided attempt to boost demand for American-made goods. Although the economic case is more subtle, there is a popular perception that their tariff hike served as a cause of the Great Depression that followed. In 1993, then-Vice President Al Gore actually used a photo of Smoot and Hawley to ward off Ross Perot’s criticisms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).1 The broad sense that explicit taxes on imports—tariffs— were ill-advised helped lead to a steady lowering of those tariff levels under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the years following World War II. The success of this reciprocal lowering of barriers, at least among developed countries, rendered many recent trade debates inapposite. At the time when Gore and Perot were debating NAFTA’s adoption, for example, U.S. average tariffs on Mexican goods were only 3.15 percent.2 The shift away from tariffs to new instruments of trade protection has posed challenges for the GATT as well. When

Philip I. Levy is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

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tariffs were the principal subject of discussion, negotiating rounds were relatively brief and deals came in rapid succession.3 The latest round, known as the Doha Development Agenda, was launched in 2001 and seemed to founder in the summer of 2008. The obscure catalyst for the failure—trig-

tion, and can stifle innovation.5 Aversion to protectionism is well founded in historical experience. We want to be able to call up those lessons when we see it. As few modern protectionists are eager to self-identify, though, it is useful to have a definition of protectionism that goes beyond Justice Potter Stewart’s

Protectionism is as harmful as it ever

was. It has just become more difficult to recognize. ger mechanism criteria for developing countries’ Special Safeguard Measures— demonstrates the extent to which modern discourse has moved beyond simple stances on tariffs.4 Yet there are commonalities between the debates of the 1930s and the debates of today. Behind an intricate apparatus like a Special Safeguard Measure lies a familiar intent—to favor domestic producers over their foreign competition.

An important challenge is to ask how the familiar concept of protectionism can be applied to modern terrain.

The World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT’s successor, has a relatively well-defined set of rules, but these represent political compromises among its negotiating parties across the aforementioned rounds. They are not designed to delineate which policies are protectionist and which are not. There are numerous explicitly protectionist policies—tariffs and quotas and import bans—that do not violate WTO accords.

Protectionism raises costs for consumers, draws resources into inefficient industries, encourages wasteful lobbying and rent-seeking, invites retalia-

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famous “I know it when I see it” take on pornography.6 In fact, we can come up with a definition that is more functional. The next section offers a definition and taxonomy of modern protectionism. The rest of the article follows that taxonomy, along with illustrations from modern debates.

There are inevitably gray lines, but we will attempt to turn up the contrast where possible. The underlying premise is that protectionism is as harmful as it ever was. It has just become more difficult to recognize.

Defining Protectionism. One

tempting approach is to define protectionism as anything other than advocacy of free trade. That simple approach quickly runs into difficulty in the modern trading world. Is it protectionism to require that imported food meet domestic safety standards? Is it protectionism to maintain a fixed exchange rate, which may make domestic goods look cheaper than foreign if the rate becomes misaligned? In each of these cases there is an evident benign motive that could drive the restriction. One can

Levy

also imagine motives that could transform these measures into protectionist tools. For example, a declaration that all foreign food is unhealthy and therefore barred from import would serve as a very effective means of agricultural protection.

Intent, then, will be a key to identifying protectionism, just as it is central to legal distinctions between inadvertent acts and serious crimes. At its core, the argument for free trade relies on the benefits of competition between domestic and foreign producers.

In David Ricardo’s canonical model of comparative advantage, England could make cloth relatively cheaply and Portugal was relatively efficient at distilling wine.7 Each could benefit by producing more of the good they could produce relatively cheaply. In this example, protectionism could characterize any policy that prevented English vintners from facing the full measure of Portuguese competition. Such policies might include tariffs, restrictive quotas, or royal grants of monopoly.

As a general matter, we will treat protectionism as the advocacy of policies that are intended to favor domestic producers over foreign exporters.

Specifically, three broad categories define most protectionist measures.

First, intentional protectionism encompasses measures that are explicitly intended to favor domestic industry over imports.

Second, incidental protectionism occurs when measures can be readily justified on other grounds but also have the effect of obstructing import competition.

Third and finally, instrumental protectionism describes a burgeoning set of policies in which trade actions are used as a lever to change another country’s policies.

Trade on Trial

Intentional Protectionism. In-

tentional protectionism ranks as the most transparent of the three categories. It includes the classic direct trade measures of tariffs—still widely used, particularly in the developing world— as well as quotas, which have remained common in agriculture. It also properly includes a range of increasingly popular measures that do not prompt the same public distaste as traditional protectionist methods.

The “Buy American” creed ranks as a significant yet veiled form of protectionism. In fiscal stimulus discussions at the beginning of this year, language was advanced that decreed projects could not receive the planned billions of dollars in federal funding unless they used domestic iron and steel.8 Vice President Joe Biden, in a contemporaneous interview, justified the approach: “I don’t think there’s anything that is anti-competitive or anti-trade in saying when we are stimulating the U.S. economy. The purpose is to create U.S. jobs…I don’t view that as some of the pure free traders view it, as a harbinger of protectionism. I don’t buy that at all. So I think it’s legitimate to have some portions of Buy American in it.”9 The “Buy American” clause was, in fact, not a harbinger of protectionism; it was protectionism. It explicitly favored domestic iron and steel producers over foreign competitors. The motivation to create U.S. jobs was indistinguishable from the motivation behind many traditional protectionist measures, including the infamous Smoot-Hawley response to an earlier economic crisis.

Another way to implement protectionism is through subsidies. A tariff can have the same effect as a tax on

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imaginative obstruction

domestic consumers combined with a subsidy to domestic producers, because it increases costs of foreign goods. For discussions of protectionism, the consumer tax component can be seen as either an unfortunate byproduct of the move to assist domestic industry or a useful source of finance. When a government forgoes the tax and provides a subsidy directly to assist an industry, this can have both the same protectionist intent and effect.

Not all subsidies would qualify as protectionism, however, and the dividing line has been a frequent subject of debate in international trade policy.

Consider, for example, a subsidy to college education. This may have the effect of lowering costs for domestic automobile producers by increasing the supply of engineers, yet a broad-based education subsidy would be neither industryspecific, nor would it likely be intended to provide any one industry with a competitive advantage.

The firm-specific auto subsidies that were granted to Chrysler and General Motors at the end of the Bush administration would qualify as intentional protectionism. The intent was to favor domestic firms over their foreign competitors, and Europe responded with threats of a case at the WTO. In rough outline, the U.S. action was similar to European support for Airbus, the subject of strenuous U.S. objections in the past.10 An auto import tariff would have had a different impact from the subsidy.

It would have additionally favored Ford, which did not request bailout funds, as well as foreign auto producers with U.S. plants. But there is no need for a measure to favor all domestic producers over importers to qualify as protectionist.

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Unlike a tariff, a subsidy does not raise the cost of cars relative to other goods. Like a tariff, the subsidy can push down car prices in world markets. This invites the imposition of foreign tariffs, as foreign producers argue that they face unfair competition.11

Incidental Protectionism. In-

cidental protectionism has all the impact of intentional protectionism, but it works indirectly. The announced goal of such a policy is not to discriminate between domestically produced goods and those produced abroad, but even a well-crafted policy can have exactly this effect. The question of intent becomes critical. If a legitimate public policy goal is pursued in a way that minimizes the discriminatory effect on trade, it would not qualify as protectionist. However, exempting non-trade policies from the protectionism debate would undercut efforts for trade liberalization.

One of the most controversial intersections of trade policy and regulation concerns public health and safety. Trade critics have implicitly linked open trade policies with the importation of tainted food and unsafe products. Despite this, non-discriminatory trade programs and legitimate public health measures are in fact compatible. A country can establish strong regulation to protect health and safety, and apply that regulation in an even-handed manner.

As an example, a country can require that toys be free of paint containing lead. Given the well-established harmful effects of lead paint, particularly on children, this is hardly protectionism in disguise. The incidental protectionism occurs when the legitimate application of a health measure is extended

Levy

to achieve a broader goal of favoring domestic producers over foreign. In response to instances of lead paint in toys from China, then-Senator Barack Obama in late 2007 favored a drastic response: “I would stop the import of all toys from China. Now I have to say, that’s about 80 percent of toys that are being imported right now.”12 He did not provide details on how such a ban would be carried out.

This was hardly the narrowest response possible to a legitimate public health concern. It would have been possible to require testing of toys, to ban sales from any producer with past violations, or even to ban painted toys. To fathom the scope of the broader proposal, consider a non-discriminatory domestic equivalent. The U.S. government could stop the sale of all processed agricultural products when there is a scare about salmonella in peanut butter, or the sale of all produce when e. coli is found in spinach. Such indiscriminate domestic measures would never be adopted, despite deep concern for public health. The collateral damage to safe

Trade on Trial

its beef over concerns about the use of bovine growth hormone (BST) and the threat of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, so-called “mad cow” disease). It has grappled with barriers to grain exports over the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).13 At issue in these cases was the legitimacy of the health concern. What happens if there is weak or no scientific evidence for a stated health concern and the resultant measure has the effect of blocking foreign products and protecting domestic?

When intent is the decisive factor, there may be no consensus on whether this crosses the line into protectionism. In a WTO dispute over the safety of biotech products, the dispute settlement panel found that the EU had not followed the principle of relying upon scientific evidence.14 Although the EU has claimed it is following the “precautionary principle,” the effect of the regulations in question was to bolster a regime of substantial agricultural protection.

Another form of incidental protectionism is anti-dumping. Anti-dumping policy allows countries to impose

The essence of incidental protectionism is

that collateral damage to foreign producers is seen as a feature, not a flaw. agricultural producers would be deemed unacceptable. The essence of incidental protectionism is that collateral damage to foreign producers is seen as a feature, not a flaw.

As in the case of subsidies, the United States has been on both sides of these debates. As an agricultural exporter, the United States has faced barriers to

tariffs to offset the sale of goods at less than fair value. In principle, this imposition of protection is justified on the same grounds as domestic anti-trust measures. It could be used to promote competition in an instance when the exporting country engaged in predatory pricing: a temporary price drop to wipe out competition and clear the way

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imaginative obstruction

for monopolistic behavior. In practice, however, anti-dumping policy bears little resemblance to anti-trust. There is sufficient discretion in the application of anti-dumping rules that it has become a relatively easy source of protection when a domestic industry is injured by foreign price competition.15 It has been frequently used to raise the domestic price of products such as steel.

Anti-dumping barriers can be more harmful than traditional tariffs both because they are less transparent and because they may reap no revenue if exporters raise their prices to avoid them.

A final example of incidental protectionism concerns the issue of currencies. This has been a particular point of contention with regard to the valuation of China’s currency. The allegation has been that the undervaluation of the Chinese yuan has kept foreign exports into China relatively expensive and China’s exports to the rest of the world relatively cheap. For the purposes of this discussion, the former allegation matters most. Is an undervalued renminbi a means of protecting domestic Chinese producers from foreign competition?

As with the other examples in this section, it comes down to a question of intent. There are well-established reasons why a country might wish to maintain a fixed exchange rate. These concern macroeconomic stability rather than trade protection. Once again, the question revolves around whether China’s intent in maintaining a misaligned currency is to preserve macroeconomic stability (the legitimate goal) or to favor its domestic industries (protectionism).

Instrumental

Protectionism.

The final category, instrumental pro-

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tectionism, occurs when trade is used as a means to an end, often in support of a foreign policy goal. If one country opposes the policies or actions of another, there are relatively few tools that the complaining country can practically employ to bring about change. The first country could try diplomacy, or even military force. In between these extremes are commercial options. Trade sanctions, or the threat of them, seem to promise a non-violent means of persuading other countries to change, though in practice their efficacy has been mixed.16 The use of trade actions as a lever to move other nations in their policies can be directly or indirectly protectionist. As with incidental protectionism, the intent is critical. If a threat is so successful that it is never implemented, then there may be no protectionist impact whatsoever, though bruised international relations may result. On the other hand, if punitive trade measures are linked to other actions that are sufficiently onerous that those other actions will never be adopted and the trade measures will persist, then there is a clear instance of instrumental protectionism.

An exceedingly common argument for protection is that there is no sense in unilaterally removing trade barriers.

In a world of reciprocal trade negotiations, such preemptive liberalization has been characterized as unilateral disarmament. Although the arguments for open trade generally do not depend on the purity of a trading partner’s policies, the stance of retaining barriers as bargaining chips allows the advocate of protectionism to sidestep questions of whether the barriers make economic sense. In a world of rapid trade rounds,

Levy

the delay entailed by holding out for a deal may be trivial. In more recent times, as trade deals are concluded only every decade or two, the argument for delay may have a substantial protectionist impact.

Instrumental protectionism played a very large role in the trade debates of the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign.

Barack Obama advocated the inclusion of stronger labor and environmental measures in trade agreements and publicly committed to withdraw the United States from NAFTA if Mexico and Canada did not agree to renegotiate NAFTA along those lines. This was based on the flawed premise that NAFTA had cost U.S. jobs.17 No evidence was offered that tighter standards would have an appreciable beneficial effect on any of the three countries, and Mexican officials vocally opposed any renegotiation of NAFTA. When such issues have arisen in WTO negotiations, developing countries have frequently objected that the imposition of high labor standards (e.g. a high minimum wage) in their countries would stifle their economic development and eliminate what few advantages they have over developed competitors with better infrastructure, more capital, and more productive labor. Historically, countries have raised their labor and environmental standards as they have developed.18 If the adoption of onerous and illadvised regulation is anathema to developing countries, then conditioning U.S. trade liberalization on such adoption is instrumental protectionism.

Here, as elsewhere, there are shades of gray. Proponents would argue that smaller countries, notably Peru, have been willing to accede to U.S. demands

Trade on Trial

in these areas. The recent history of global trade talks, however, strongly suggests that such demands would be disastrous for trade relations on the world stage. To decide whether such a disaster is proponents’ goal or an unfortunate byproduct of a well-meaning push for regulation would require an assessment of intent.

Conclusion. The world trading sys-

tem has grown substantially more sophisticated since its foundations were laid in the 1940s. The growth of trade has spurred prosperity, uncomfortable changes, and a new generation of critics.

International trade is not an end in itself; it is an instrument for encouraging commerce, raising living standards, and even promoting democratic change.19 It can be a delicate instrument, however, and the attempts to insert a spanner in the works have become increasingly creative. There is a popular misconception that the WTO is a monolithic organization dedicated to defending the status quo trading system.20 In fact, the WTO operates subject to the consensus of its more than one hundred fifty member states.

In November 2008, leaders of the G-20 nations met in Washington to address the global financial crisis. One of the most salient and widely-reported statements from the final communiqué read: “We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty.”21 To reject protectionism, we must first be able to recognize it.

This paper attempts to offer a viewer’s guide. The three kinds of protectionism described—intentional, incidental,

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imaginative obstruction

and instrumental—are somewhat stylized and do not provide a means to allocate policies indisputably into categories. Such a clear taxonomy is not possible, since the critical element of

intent will always play into the debate.

Instead, the framework offers an analytical structure for a world in which protectionism has moved beyond simple border barriers.

Notes

1 “Protectionism: The Battle of Smoot-Hawley,” The Economist, 18 December 2008.

2 Mexico’s average tariffs were substantially higher, though, dropping from 25 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 1999. Christine A. McDaniel and Laurie-Ann Agama, “The NAFTA Preference and U.S.-Mexico Trade: Aggregate-Level Analysis,” World Economy 26 (July 2003): 939-955.

3 World Trade Organization, “The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh,” Internet, http://www. wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.

4 Safeguards are measures that allow a country to temporarily re-impose protection in response to a surge in imports.

5 For scholarly treatments of the intellectual history of free trade and protectionism, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Boston: MIT Press, 1989); and Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

6 Justice Stewart said, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.

But I know it when I see it…” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), 197.

7 David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John Murray, 1817).

8 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, H.R. 1, §. 1110 (2009). There was a waiver provision if the use of domestic iron and steel costs would raise overall project prices by 25 percent.

9 Joseph Biden, interviewed by John Harwood, CNBC, 29 January 2009.

10 See the prospective discussion in Michael Moran, “Picking Winners: The Auto Industry Bailout May Trigger a Return to Protectionism,” Newsweek, 15 December 2008.

11 For global ramifications of the auto intervention, see Philip I. Levy and Michael O. Moore, “The Global Cost of the Auto Bailout,” The American, 19 February 2009.

12 Michael Falcone, “Obama: Stop Chinese Toy Imports,” New York Times, 19 December 2007.

13 For the bovine growth hormone example,

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see Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 202-209.

14 WTO, “European Communities: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,” Internet, http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm.

15 For analysis of the high costs of anti-dumping policy, see Michael P. Gallaway, Bruce A. Blonigen, and Joseph E. Flynn, “Welfare Costs of U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws,” Journal of International Economics 49, no. 2 (December 1999): 211-44. For analysis of how innovation in the application of anti-dumping has raised the level of protection, see Bruce A. Blonigen, “Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping Activity,” Canadian Journal of Economics 39, no. 3 (August 2006), 874900.

16 For a comprehensive assessment, see Kimberly Ann Elliott, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Jeffrey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Peterson Institute, 2007).

17 Philip I. Levy, “Doing a Job on NAFTA,” The American, 6 March 2008.

18 For a study linking environmental protection to stages of development, see Grossman, G.M. and Krueger, “Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement,” The Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Peter M. Garber, ed. (Boston: MIT Press, 1993).

19 For arguments about trade and democratic change, see Susan Ariel Aaronson and Jamie M. Zimmerman, Trade Imbalance: The Struggle to Weigh Human Rights Concerns in Trade Policymaking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Philip I. Levy, “Economic Integration and Incipient Democracy,” American Enterprise Institute, March 2008.

20 Philip I. Levy, “Does Trade Policy Matter?”

AEI International Economic Outlook no. 1, October 2008.

21 “Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” G-20 Summit Statement, Washington, D.C., 15 November 2008. Available at http://www. nytimes.com/2008/11/16/washington/summit-text. html?_r=3&pagewanted=all.

Trade on Trial

Protectionist Pandemics?

The Durability of Free Trade Daniel J. Ikenson The global financial crisis and economic contraction have inspired predictions of resurgent protectionism. Indeed, some governments have ratcheted up tariffs and other trade barriers already. Others are subsidizing or otherwise finessing policy to tip the scales to favor domestic “champions.�

Surely, many argue, the political temptation to indulge populist bromides will lead other governments to follow suit.

Despite the occasional backsliding, however, the world is unlikely to observe a major deviation from the trend toward trade and investment liberalization that has developed since the end of World War II. In fact, many governments are likely to respond to the downturn by reducing their trade and investment barriers unilaterally. Autonomous liberalization is a proven catalyst for the kinds of domestic structural reforms that facilitate economic growth. One of the reasons for the creation of the rules-based system of trade, under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, was to ensure that the scenario of spiraling, retaliatory protectionism of the 1930s never played out again. Through seven subsequent multilateral negotiating rounds to liberalize trade further, the creation of the World Trade Organi-

Daniel J. Ikenson is associate director of the CATO Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies.

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zation (WTO) in 1995, and into the present, that objective has been upheld.

The absence of rules in the 1930s meant that there were no proffered courses of action, no sources of adjudication or remediation, and no generally accepted limits to the actions governments could take in response to external economic policies. There were also far fewer domestic constituencies of any political consequence advocating against protectionism.

Consequently, there were no proven stopgaps to prevent the sequence of retaliatory tariff escalations that caused international trade to collapse and exacerbated the global depression.

Today we have the benefit of understanding the consequences of the actions taken in the 1930s. Although that understanding does not guarantee avoidance of past mistakes, we also have solid institutions and incentives to help steer policymakers away from the abyss. The rules governing more than sixty years of trade liberalization— including agreements about what is and what is not permissible policy—have fostered greater certainty and stability and thus more investment, trade, and economic growth. Today, the commercial and political appeal of protectionism is considerably diminished because most countries have established domestic constituencies that depend on a trade and investment environment that is open in both directions. Despite the global economic contraction and the occasional protectionist indulgence, a relatively benign state of trade relations is likely to persevere, and trade flows will start to grow again, provided the Obama administration and the U.S. Congress demonstrate a firm commitment to an

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open, rules-based system of trade. This combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic selfinterest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of any protectionist pandemics.

Resurgent

Protectionism?

WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy is worried about the specter of resurgent protectionism. It is perhaps his job to worry. His concerns are validated by the actions some governments have taken since the onset of the global financial crisis in September 2008. In a presentation before the WTO Trade Policy Review Body on 9 February 2009, Lamy cautioned, The fragile economic prospects of every WTO Member have become especially vulnerable to the introduction of any new measure that closes off market access or distorts competition. It is particularly the case for developing countries, because economic growth is so heavily tradedependent for so many of them.1 Mr. Lamy’s words were carefully chosen and reflect his deep understanding of the rights and obligations of WTO members. The system allows backsliding, but too much backsliding could foreclose prospects for recovery and subsequent growth, and encourage others to follow suit.

Despite the worries, the evidence cited to support a conclusion of resurgent protectionism is weak. A World Bank study published in March 2009 identifies forty-seven “protectionist” measures implemented worldwide between

ikenson

November 2008 and February 2009, which projects to about 140 measures per year. However, the report provides no information about the quality or intensity of those measures. There is no information about how consequential or meaningful or trade-distorting those

Trade on Trial

and policy observers across the globe are hypersensitive to any invocation of protectionism. In the current environment, a protectionist measure that would have been treated in the past as just another issue for trade diplomats to resolve is now assigned extraor-

A relatively benign state of trade rela-

tions is likely to persevere, and trade flows will start to grow again. measures might be. In any given year governments invoke policies that are directly or peripherally protectionist.

Sometimes those policies are significant enough to elicit complaints from other governments, and sometimes they are not; sometimes those complaints rise to the level of becoming formal disputes at the WTO, but usually they do not.

In the fourteen years since the WTO came into being, there have been 390 official disputes lodged. That is an average of 28 formal complaints about protectionism per year. On top of those 28 formal complaints per year are hundreds more complaints that domestic interests raise with their governments, which never become formal WTO complaints.

Many of those complaints are resolved without need of formal adjudication, and some are just swept under the rug as inconsequential or politically inconvenient. Most of the incidences of protectionism observed lately are unlikely to become formal WTO complaints.

What is different today is not a discernible increase in protectionist measures, but the fact that the world economy is in recession and policymakers

dinary meaning. The popular media appears only too willing to contribute to the hyperbole. Here is how the Washington Post described the global flirtation with trade barriers in December: Moving to shield battered domestic manufacturers from foreign imports, Indonesia is slapping restrictions on at least 500 products this month, demanding special licenses and new fees on imports. Russia is hiking tariffs on imported cars, poultry, and pork. France is launching a state fund to protect French companies from foreign takeovers.

Officials in Argentina and Brazil are seeking to raise tariffs on products from imported wine and textiles to leather goods and peaches.2 Those measures have less foreboding interpretations than most readers are likely to conclude. The actions of Indonesia, Argentina, and Brazil are within their rights under the WTO agreements and will have very little impact on world trade. Because Russia is not a WTO member and often behaves outside of

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international norms, its actions should not be depicted as harbingers. Furthermore, the French government is no stranger to blocking foreign acquisitions of French companies. It did so on other occasions in recent years when economic conditions were rosier.

oping countries have within the rules depends, to some extent, on the differences between their bound and applied rates. If there is a large gap between applied rates and bound rates, then there may be plenty of room for backsliding and raising tariffs in response to a perceived crisis. For many developFlexible Rules to Strengthen ing countries the differences between the System. Since the establish- bound and applied rates are vast. ment of GATT in 1947, internationConsider India. Its simple average al trade rules have been updated and bound tariff rate is 50.2 percent, but expanded to cover most trade in goods its simple average applied rate is 14.5 between most countries. Those rules percent. The Indian government can are crafted in a way that encourag- almost quadruple its tariffs and remain es progressive trade liberalization but true to the rules of the trading system. also grant governments some flexibil- Brazil is similarly situated. Its average ity to manage the pace of liberaliza- bound rate is 31.4 percent and its avertion and to reinstate or raise bar- age applied rate is 12.2 percent. Facriers under certain circumstances. tors that affect members’ bound rates On the central issue of tariffs, the include level of development, duration WTO/GATT distinguishes between as a member of the WTO/GATT, and “bound” rates and “applied” rates of past negotiating positions.4 By contrast, duty. The bound rate is the high- the largest and most trade-intensive est rate of duty (per product catego- developing country, China, has far ry) that a member can assess against less room for backsliding. Its average imports, and the applied rate is the bound rate is 10 percent, and its averprevailing rate of duty (per product age applied rate almost matches that, category). Generally, the bound rates at 9.9 percent. The WTO restrictions of developing countries are much high- on China’s backsliding are similar to er than the bound rates of developed the restrictions for developed councountries. In other words, the highest tries. For example, the United States permissible tariffs in richer countries has little room to maneuver, because are much lower than the highest per- its bound and applied rates are both missible tariffs in poorer countries.3 3.5 percent. For the EU’s twenty-seven The WTO/GATT rules systemi- members the bound rate is 5.4 percally treat the economies of develop- cent and the applied is 5.2 percent.5 ing countries as more vulnerable to The system also allows for other forms so-called “transition costs”—the effects of temporary backsliding, which permit of rapid changes brought about by members to raise tariffs in excess of their increased trade and investment. Thus, bound rates, or even to ban imports they afford developing country govern- altogether. Members may impose tarments more latitude to respond to those iffs or quotas in response to injurious transitions. How much latitude devel- import surges or imports that have been

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ikenson

determined to be “dumped”or subsidized. Other loopholes allow import bans for health and safety, as seen in the bans on imports of beef suspected of containing mad cow disease or agricultural products that had been genetically modified. The various channels through which members are permitted to backslide have been used from time to time. Some see those channels as too tempting or too permissive. In the words of C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, “The WTO rules are very porous. If you simply say live up to your rules, you still have massive scope for what I call legal protectionism.”6

This is Not the 1930s. According to recent estimates from the highly regarded International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.7 Relative

Trade on Trial

of global trade decreased 66 percent between 1929 and 1934.9 So the potential negative effects today from what Bergsten calls “legal protectionism” is, after analysis, not that “massive.” Also, the likelihood that all WTO members will raise all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rate approaches zero.

Global trade would also not be significantly impacted if most developing countries raised their tariffs. Such measures surely would have an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners, but most developing countries are not major importers. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and China account for the top two-thirds of global import value.10 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who combined make up 2.4 percent of global imports) will not be the catalyst of a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s and have made various public pledges to avoid

The Indian government can almost quadruple its tariffs and remain true to the rules of the trading system. Brazil is similarly situated. to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade, this would be a significant decline.8 But the WTO is already projecting a 9 percent decline in trade for 2009 on account of contracting world demand. Furthermore, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, in the wake of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the value

protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. Of course, actions speak louder than words. President Obama publicly voiced concerns that the “Buy American” provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act could be viewed as protectionist or could spark a trade war. President Obama prevailed upon Congress

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to revise the legislation to stipulate that the “Buy American” provision would be applied in a manner consistent with the United States’s international trade agreements and obligations.

China’s Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang Zengwei announced in early February that the $586 billion Chinese stimulus plan would not include “Buy China” provisions. “Currently about 80 percent of products sold in the Chinese market are domestically produced, but a growing number of goods have to be imported from abroad,” announced the minister.11

ing for excuses to raise trade barriers.

Some countries have already begun to take action to reduce current trade barriers. In January, Mexico unilaterally reduced tariffs on eight thousand items accounting for about half of the value of its imports in 2007.

The average tariff rate in Mexico will drop from 10.4 to 4.3 percent over the next four years.12 Similarly, Brazil completely suspended tariffs on some capital goods imports on 4 February 2009, and reduced duties on items such as machinery and information technology products by 2 percent.13 Imports extend family budgets and The Broad Interest in Trade provide consumers with greater variety.

Openness. The WTO/GATT system This provides an incentive to local busiwas created in the first place to deter ness to improve quality and productiva protectionist pandemic triggered by ity. This is crucial to increasing living global economic contraction. It was standards. Thus, most WTO members created to deal with the very situation want to lower tariffs and move away from that is at hand. In today’s integrated protectionism. Moreover, local econoglobal economy, however, those rules mies are often reliant upon imports of are not the only incentives to keep raw materials, components, and capitrade barriers in check. With the advent tal equipment. Capital, both tangible and proliferation of transnational sup- and intangible, is becoming increas-

The present global contraction is

arguably the first major test of the WTO/ GATT system’s durability. ply chains, cross-border direct investment, multinational joint ventures, and equity tie-ups, the “us versus them” characterization of world commerce no longer applies. The low ratio of applied to bound tariff rates within the system indicates that members have a preference for openness and that the rules are not regarded as constraints to be defied. Members typically are not look-

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ingly mobile. Therefore, in order to improve changes to bring in investment and human capital, countries must implement policies that create a stable business climate with limited obstacles (administrative, logistical, and physical).

This includes reducing trade barriers.

India presents a useful example. The economy was basically closed prior to reforms starting in the 1990s. In 1985

ikenson

Trade on Trial

the average tariff rate on intermediate goods was a staggering 150 percent.

However, the rate had been reduced to 30 percent by 1997. According to a Princeton University study, as trade barriers were reduced, imports of intermediate goods more than doubled. Owing to these dramatic tariff reductions, prices fell. Suddenly, goods that India had once been unable to import could be accessed by Indian industry. This in turn allowed Indian manufacturers to cut costs and invest savings in new product lines. Liberalization, then, played an important role in India’s overall economic growth.14 India’s story is not uncommon, and indeed there are other such examples in the developing world. Most comprehensive trade reforms during the past quarter century have been undertaken unilaterally and without any external pressure because governments recognized that structural reforms were necessary and in their country’s interest.

According to the World Bank, between 1983 and 2003, 66 percent of reductions in weighted average tariffs were achieved through unilateral reforms.15

highest percentage of world trade. The United States inspired and shaped the WTO/GATT. Recent demand contraction in the United States has triggered a cascade of economic recessions around the world, particularly in export-dependent economies. Thus, U.S. actions— even signals that betray the direction of U.S. trade policy—are closely followed in other countries. The ongoing debate in the media and in Congress about the direction and conduct of U.S. trade policy has many people nervous.

However, despite the propensity for anti-trade rhetoric in the Democratic Congress and the campaign pledges of President Obama to review and possibly reconsider America’s trade agreements, the United States will remain committed to the trading system. There is simply too much at stake. Like businesses in other countries, U.S. businesses have become increasingly reliant on transnational supply chains. U.S. producers accounted for over 55 percent of U.S. import value in 2007, which included purchases of raw materials, components, and capital equipment used in their own value-added production processes. Furthermore, an open trade America’s Crucial Role. The policy is all the more crucial given that present global contraction is arguably 95 percent of the world’s population the first major test of the WTO/GATT lives outside of the United States. system’s durability. So the conventional If the president intends to fulfill his view that some presumed global pref- pledge of restoring squandered U.S. erence for protectionism will prove foreign policy credibility by acting in too much of a match for that system is a multilateral, internationalist mana bit defeatist. As long as the United ner, he will have to rein in his party’s States remains committed to the glob- unilateral and isolationist tack on trade al trading system, and remains will- and embrace the fact that trade policy is ing to continue in its leadership role, a crucial component of foreign policy. the system is highly likely to endure. Trade policy is the most important The United States has the world’s aspect of U.S. foreign policy for many largest economy and accounts for the countries. The failure of Congress to

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even hold a vote on the long-pending U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement is an affront to the Colombian government and people, and is arguably more offensive than Donald Rumsfeld’s reference to Germany and France as “Old Europe.” Congress’s refusal to consider the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement undermines the credibility of State Department claims that the United States intends

to be an engaged counterweight to China’s growing influence in Asia.

And provocative trade legislation that treats U.S. trade partners as adversaries will have to remain bottled up in committee lest America demonstrates it is of questionable fitness to resume its leadership role. An open trade policy is vital for both the U.S. economy and the restoration of U.S. credibility in the world community.

Notes

1 Pascal Lamy, “Presentation to the Trade Policy Review Body,” WTO 2009 News, 9 February 2009, Internet, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ news09_e/tpr_09feb09_e.htm.

2 Anthony Faiola and Glenn Kessler, “Trade Barriers Toughen with Global Slump,” Washington Post, 22 December 2008. Emphasis added.

3 World Trade Organization, World Tariff Profiles 2008, (Switzerland: 2008), Internet, http://www. wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles08_e. pdf.

4 See World Tariff Profiles 2008 for references to tariff rates. China’s relatively rigid situation stems from the fact of its late accession to the WTO, in 2001. It had to appease the wishes of many more established members to win approval for its own membership, whereas India’s relatively flexible situation owes to its longer standing membership and its participation in previous negotiating rounds.

5 Ibid.

6 Steven Mufson, “WTO Seeks to Curtail Protectionist Measures,” Washington Post, 6 February 2009.

7 Antoine Bouet and David Laborde, “The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round,” International Food Policy Research Institute Issue Brief 56 (December 2008),

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Internet, http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib56.pdf.

8 WTO statistics, Internet, http://www.wto.org/ english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/section1_e/i01.xls.

9 U.S. Department of State, “Smoot-Hawley Tariff,” Internet, http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1921_timeline/smoot_tariff.html.

10 WTO, International Trade Statistics (2008), Internet, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome. aspx?Language=E. 11 “China Rejects ‘Buy China’ Policy,” United Press International, 9 February 2009.

12 Office of the Economic Secretary of Mexico, “Mexico Launches a Phase Down Plan to Reduce Import Rates,” NAFTA Works, Internet, http://www. naftamexico.net/naftaworks/nw2009/Jan09.pdf.

13 Government of Brazil, Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber, Official Gazette, Resolutions 4 and 5, 4 February 2009.

14 Vidya Mahambare, “Trade Protectionism Cannot Fight Economic Crisis,” Rediff, 12 December 2008, Internet, http://in.rediff.com/money/2008/ dec/12bcrisis-trade-protectionism-cannot-fightcrisis.htm.

15 World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects: Trade, Regionalism, and Development,” 2005, 42.

Trade on Trial

The EU’s Protectionism Problem Meredith Kolsky Lewis Major economies are reacting to the global financial crisis with a number of similar strategies, including fiscal stimulus packages, corporate bailouts, and increased protectionism.

Many world leaders, such as President Barack Obama and former European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, are decrying protectionism and calling for markets to remain open. However, evidence of increased protectionism abounds in multiple guises, including escalating use of anti-dumping duties and countervailing measures, economic bailouts of strategic domestic industries and financial services providers, and incentives to buy locally manufactured or grown products.

This is not surprising. In times of economic difficulty, protectionist measures tend to increase. But if it is widely acknowledged that protectionism will ultimately cause more harm than good to both individual national economies and the global economy, why is it so common? This paradoxical behavior is not limited to the context of economic crisis. Trade negotiations frame trade-liberalizing measures in terms of “concessions� rather than opportunities. For the majority of trade deals, leaders and government representatives must fight numerous political battles to sell the agreements at home.

This article examines the risks of increased protectionism and explains why countries nonetheless resort to protectionist measures, focusing on recent developments in the EU.

Meredith Kolsky Lewis is a senior lecturer of international trade law at Victoria University of Wellington.

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In particular, it argues that while protectionism is harmful to an economy as a whole, the interest groups that benefit from protectionism are often more effective lobbyists than those that are harmed by the protectionist measures.

However, the WTO assists its members in guarding against those producers who seek protectionism. This defense is particularly crucial now as protection-

in society.1 Olson also noted that large groups such as consumers and taxpayers tend not to organize themselves to advocate for their common interests, which adds to the imbalance.2 Many industries have trade associations, unions, and other organizational structures that provide a forum to exchange information and develop strategies of mutual interest. Producers are there-

Although the EU is a highly integrated

customs union, it is not immune to internal political pressure. ist measures are, and will continue to be, on the rise as a result of the global financial crisis and contracting world economy. Examples, particularly from the EU, will be used to demonstrate the tensions between policies at a federal level (or in the case of the EU, union-wide) and the interests of subgroups such as subregional interests, or national interests in the case of the EU. The article concludes by stressing the dangers for Europe of failing to re-engage and conclude the WTO’s Doha round of trade negotiations.

fore in a position to form powerful lobbies which can then seek government protection. Politicians may perceive more pressure to respond to issues raised by well-organized, visible producer interest groups than to act for the benefit of largely silent consumers. Agricultural interests in the EU and manufacturing industries such as steel and automotives in the United States are prime examples of this.

An illustration of this phenomenon is the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EU devotes close to half of its annual budget to the CAP, Interest Groups and Producer which provides extensive support to Bargaining Power. Despite the a discrete and well-organized group, obvious harm to consumers, produc- European farmers. The CAP was origiers manage to obtain protection for nally designed in the early 1960s to themselves because they tend to be far reduce Europe’s reliance on imported better organized than consumers. In food. The CAP system of price supports, his important work on collective action, subsidies, and other payments, coupled Mancur Olson noted that as a result with high tariffs on imports, ultimately of the ability of relatively small groups resulted in vastly increased agriculturto organize themselves to act in their al production far exceeding domesown common interests, special interest tic needs and led to so-called “butter groups wield disproportionate power mountains,” “milk lakes,” and similar

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Lewis

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stockpiles of other foodstuffs. Export subsidies have also led to increased production and have enabled some of the surplus supply to be sold competitively on the world market. The CAP has been subject to intense criticism worldwide (as have been forms of U.S. agricultural support), with many condemning the assistance for inefficient first-world farmers at the expense of agricultural interests in the developing world.

In addition, EU leadership has sought to rein in the CAP due to its drain on the EU budget. While reform of the CAP has been underway for some time, progress is difficult. As described above, the inefficient farmers that benefit most from the CAP—particularly in France but also elsewhere—protest vociferously whenever cuts in their support are debated. While EU consumers would benefit from more open markets and the EU as a whole would benefit financially by eliminating the costly support programs, the benefits would be comparatively small on an individual basis relative to the losses that would be suffered by the producers. Therefore, it is an ongoing struggle to overcome the objections of the CAP recipients and further reduce the support provided. Agriculture has played a major role in the troubled—and now stalled—WTO Doha round of trade negotiations, with EU and U.S. farming interests pushing their governments to make as few concessions as possible.

with: the first is the agricultural and other producer interest groups within the various member states and the second is the governments of the individual nation-states to whom those producers are raising their demands for protection. Thus, today we see that EU member countries are increasingly responding to the economic downturn by acting in their own interests rather than that of the EU common market.

There have been overtures to domestic consumers to buy domestic products. For example, in the relatively liberal United Kingdom, there is much rhetoric in the supermarket sector advocating buying locally grown items and contemplating labeling on the basis of “food miles.”3 Even more strongly in Ireland, Minister of Finance Brian Lenihan beseeched Irish citizens to do their “patriotic duty” by shopping in-country rather than in Northern Ireland.4 EU member states have also focused on strengthening home producers at the expense of larger EU economic and trade integration. French President Nicolas Sarkozy recently proposed a 6-billion-euro bailout of the French auto industry. In February he said, “if we are to give financial assistance to the auto industry, we don’t want to see another factory being moved to the Czech Republic.”5 Germany has also sought to protect its auto industry, cutting non-wage labor costs on several occasions with the intent of preventing outsourcing and keeping factories Europe’s Competing Interests. in the country.6 Germany has had in Although the EU is a highly integrated effect for a number of years the concustoms union, it is not immune to troversial “VW law” which ensures that internal political pressures. On the the German state of Niedersachsen can contrary, the union has a double layer retain its stake in the Volkswagen auto of self-interested parties to contend manufacturer.7 In Italy, Prime Minister

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Silvio Berlusconi suggested that if an Italian company, Indesit, abandoned plans to relocate to Poland, it would be eligible to receive a piece of a 2-billion-euro state-aid rebate program.8 In contrast to these national leaders, the EU leadership is speaking out against protectionism and rejecting some calls for significant bailouts of national industries. Current EU President and Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek has decried the protectionist actions of member states, warning that If big countries continue to behave in a protectionist way, they will only repeat the scenario of the 1930s…The response of the eurozone countries to the financial and economic crisis deformed the joint project of the euro more than any other imaginable event. Most of the national states using the euro started breaking the common rules by their declarations as well as by practical steps, while the basic anchor of the whole process is to adhere to these common rules.9 Thus, Europe is experiencing tension between entrenched local interest groups and those who set policy for the union as a whole. This tension leads to what can be described as a prisoner’s dilemma. Any given country would likely agree that its citizens will benefit more if its trading partners’ markets are open rather than closed. However, any given country may also recognize that the best scenario would be for its trading partners’ markets to be open while it provides protection to its own producers. Unfortunately this kind of thinking, while eminently rational, will

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in the aggregate lead to the inefficient result of all countries protecting their own markets. This helps to explain why at the national level governments sometimes succumb to the temptation to provide assistance in the form of protectionism to domestic industries, and it also illustrates why international disciplines on protectionism are necessary.

By virtue of having joined the WTO and become subject to its rules, members have changed the payoff structure such that it is no longer as tempting to be protectionist because there are negative consequences to so doing. In particular, the WTO provides disciplines that limit members’ ability to impose certain types of protectionist measures.

However, the WTO rules can be financially costly and politically difficult for members to enforce against one another. This reality, and the fact that the Doha round negotiations have stalled, has led some countries to push the envelope in terms of protectionism, particularly given the economic downturn.

The temptation to engage in protectionism also exists in the context of free trade agreements and customs unions. Studies of regional integration in models of endogenous protection demonstrate that the shift to preferential trading leads to a concomitant increase in protection against those outside the trading area.10 Indeed, despite Topolánek’s anti-protectionist stance, the EU itself has occasionally succumbed to the temptation to have its cake and eat it too by providing protection domestically while taking advantage of markets that remain open elsewhere. The EU leadership announced earlier this year that it was reinstating an export refund program for European dairy farmers

Lewis

that had been suspended two years ago.

While termed an “export refund,” the program is essentially an export subsidy in that it provides payments to farmers that are conditional on exporting.

Export subsidies are considered to be the most trade-distorting of all forms of agricultural support measures because they fundamentally alter comparative advantage. When producers receive payments that are tied to their export activities they naturally elect to increase their level of exports in order to receive the subsidy. The payments lower the farmers’ costs of production and therefore permit them to sell at lower prices

Trade on Trial

to any interim agreements reached.

Instead, there will be no formal, binding agreement on any new liberalization measures until all of the negotiations have been concluded in the form of a completed round. Thus agricultural export subsidies are still permitted for now, though they are subject to disciplines set out in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

Whether or not the EU’s reinstated export subsidies breach the letter of these agreements is unclear; however, they unquestionably violate the spirit of the Doha round negotiations.

Europe is experiencing tension between entrenched local interest groups and those who set policy for the union as a whole. overseas than they would otherwise be able to. Producers in other countries who would be able to produce more efficiently and sell more cheaply than competitors in the absence of export subsidies now find themselves losing market share and receiving lower prices due to the influx of subsidized exports.

Agricultural export subsidies are particularly problematic because they have been employed historically by wealthy countries at the direct expense of agricultural sectors in developing countries. Agreement has been reached in the WTO’s Doha round of trade negotiations to phase out all agricultural export subsidies over a multiyear period following the conclusion of negotiations. However, because the Doha round is a so-called “single undertaking,” members are not bound

New Zealand and Australia, both of which export dairy products without resorting to subsidies, reacted swiftly and sharply to the EU’s actions.11 New Zealand Trade Minister Tim Groser registered his concerns with European officials, including European Trade Commissioner Baroness Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development Mariann Fischer Boel: I related our desire to see an early end to the recently reintroduced EU dairy export subsidies and of the growing concerns…that the EU action could lead to an escalation of trade protection. I also reminded ministerial counterparts…that G20 and APEC leaders last year had explicitly directed

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Trade Ministers to conclude the Doha Round of trade talks and not to resort to protectionist measures during the economic crisis.12

tion. In this context, it would be highly beneficial to restart the Doha round negotiations and find a path towards an agreement. The EU benefits significantly from the market access and WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy rules-based disciplines the WTO prohas also warned against a return to vides. The best way to assist European beggar-thy-neighbor policies: “There economies will be, as elsewhere, to is another spectre lurking in the mist open up markets overseas to provide which could make this already bad situa- more access for European products. tion even worse—the threat of a return to Nonetheless, the EU has its work cut the isolationist policies of the 1930s.”13 out for it. Individual members have Given that the European leader- fierce interests in protecting domestic ship is well aware of the dangers of constituencies—particularly the highly resorting to protectionism in the cur- subsidized agricultural sector—from furrent economic climate, and has even ther liberalization. The EU leadership denounced the protectionist measures will have to combat pressures emanating of member states, it is a bad sign for from individual members, however, or global economic prospects to see the the future will become even bleaker. The EU backsliding and reinstating one longer that the Doha round languishes, of the most pernicious forms of sup- the more members will continue their port available. It illustrates mounting pursuit of free trade agreements and tensions between the EU leadership other selective trading arrangements. and its single Europe objectives, and While the EU is itself a very large the increasingly nationalistic concerns and growing customs union, it may and demands of the member states. not fare as well long-term if individAt times it may seem politically neces- ual free trade agreements overtake the sary to provide relief on an EU-wide WTO in relevance. The United States basis, if only to forestall member states has engaged in preliminary negotiataking matters into their own hands. tions to join the Transpacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement Conclusion. Tim Groser, Pascal (TPP), which currently comprises Lamy, and Mirek Topolánek are cor- New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, and rect in their assessments. Protectionist Chile. Australia, Vietnam, and Peru actions will only lead other countries will also be a part of these negotiato respond with their own market- tions if they resume.14 Resuming and closing measures, which will deepen advancing the negotiations would reprecessionary trends. Governments that resent a savvy move on the part of the are implementing fiscal stimulus pack- United States to gain a foothold into, ages are doing the right thing; the and to help shape, the agreement that global economy needs to be spurred is likely to serve as the catalyst for a to produce more, not less, and the much wider Asia-Pacific free trade way to accomplish this is to provide area. If the United States and Asia incentives for growth and consump- join, Europe may be the odd man

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out. With this prospect looming, even distantly, Europe would do well to take the necessary steps to help get

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Doha going again. Getting the member states to buy into this plan, however, may prove exceedingly difficult.

Notes

1 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 127128.

2 Ibid., 165.

3 “Food miles” refers to the distance food has traveled from farm to plate.

4 Jamie Smyth, “Economic Crisis and Protectionism Threaten EU’s Single Market,” Irish Times, 17 February 2009.

5 Wolfgang Muenchau, “Europe’s Protectionism Trap,” Business Week, 16 February 2009.

6 Ibid.

7 Daniel Kramb, “Protectionism Rolls Through Europe,” The European Magazine, Internet, http://www. cafebabel.com/eng/article/1725/protectionism-rollsthrough-Europe.html (date accessed: 4 October 2006).

8 Smyth, “Economic Crisis and Protectionism Threaten EU’s Single Market.”

9 “EU Heavyweights Warned against Protectionism,” EurActiv.com: EU News, Policy Positions, and EU Actors, Internet, www.euractiv.com (date accessed: 10 February 2009).

10 See Arvind Panagariya and Ronald Findlay, “Political-Economy Analysis of Free-Trade Areas and Customs Unions” in Robert C. Feenstra, Gene M. Grossman, and Douglas A. Irwin, eds., The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 283.

11 New Zealand Trade Minister Tim Groser, Press Release, “EU Dairy Export Subsidies Disappointing,” Internet, http://beehive.govt.nz/release/eu+dai ry+export+subsidies+disappointing+0 (date accessed: 16 January 2009).

12 New Zealand Trade Minister Tim Groser, Press Release, “Trade Minister Expresses Strong Concerns over EU Dairy Subsidies,” Internet, http://beehive. govt.nz/release/trade+minister+expresses+strong+conc erns+over+eu+dairy+subsidies (date accessed: 5 February 2009).

13 Smyth, “Economic Crisis and Protectionism Threaten EU’s Single Market.”

14 The Obama administration has recently sought to delay all pending FTA negotiations. This is presumably merely to allow time to formulate policy and it is anticipated that the TPP discussions will resume.

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The Rise of the “Pink Tide”

Trade, Integration, and Economic Crisis in Latin America Jason Tockman The global economic crisis has clearly spread to Latin America: stock markets are falling, currencies are weakening, commodity prices and migrant remittances are in decline, and governments have begun to initiate new stimulus packages.1 Forecasts predict that the economic downturn in the region will deepen, leading to falling rates of growth, declining public revenues, worsening terms of trade, and expanding unemployment. Today’s difficult economic climate will reinforce Latin America’s growing tendency toward regionalist and socialist agendas, while simultaneously making it more difficult for states to advance post-neoliberal political programs. Recent momentum for progressive regionalist strategies—including the modest pursuit of redistributionist policies, expansion of cross-national cooperation in executing social programs, more assertive negotiations with foreign investors, and the periodic nationalization of firms of national importance—may be slowed by an economic environment that compels Latin American states to liberalize trade in pursuit of macroeconomic stability. Though the region can largely be expected to maintain open economies and avoid protectionism, few countries will take a renewed interest in policies of privatization, deregulation, and fis-

Jason Tockman is a PhD candidate at University of British Colombia and was director of international trade at the American Lands Alliance.

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cal austerity. A more likely course is a mixed strategy of regional cooperation through existing and new institutions, maintenance of current markets, and expansion into new ones.

This article will assess how trade and integration are addressed in existing regional accords, giving attention to how discourse and policies have shifted with the ascent of left-leaning leaders that some scholars have come to regard as a “pink tide.” It will then turn to an analysis of how those dynamics stand to be modified in light of the economic downturn. Ultimately, it will suggest that future research should evaluate the extent to which regional agreements and institutions achieve economic objectives, and how well they are able to attenuate the region’s profound social inequality and exclusion.

Regionalism, Trade, and Integration. Latin American coun-

tries have developed various regional arenas in which questions of trade and integration are negotiated and resolved, the most significant of which are explored in more detail below.2 In South America, the two regional blocs include the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community (CAN). Farther north, the Peoples’ Trade Agreement—Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA or TCP-ALBA) comprises six countries spread across South America, Central America, and the Caribbean.3 Countries in Central America and the Caribbean have likewise constructed blocs that include common markets and address trade and integration matters.4 Although many countries have signed bilateral and multilateral

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free trade agreements with the United States and others, these will be excluded from the present analysis because they do not further integration in terms of cooperative mechanisms and institutional structure in Latin America; moreover, the free trade arrangements are not wholly endogenous to the region and are thus less amenable to change by regional actors. Two institutions more relevant to this discussion include the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Bank of the South. The former seeks to further cultural, social, economic, and political integration of South America.5 The latter is intended to serve as an endogenous mechanism to fund development, infrastructure, and social programs in its seven member countries.6 Among all of these blocs and institutions in Latin America, three of the most important sites in which questions of trade and integration are presently contested are highlighted here: the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, and the TCP-ALBA. The Andean Community was founded in 1969, at a time that ideas inspired by the UN’s Economic Commission on Latin America involving importsubstitution industrialization, state-led development, regional integration, and dependency were highly influential in the region.7 Although some residual characteristics based on this earlier political economy orientation are still evident in the Andean Community’s structure and rules, today the community principally functions to eliminate trade barriers between member nations in a competitive free market framework.8 The Andean Community has served to increase intra-regional

Tockman

trade, although this entails only 8 percent of the community’s exports.9 In recent years, two divergent visions for the Andean Community have emerged, with Bolivia—and to a lesser extent Ecuador—proposing a pronounced shift toward cooperative forms of integration, for example, through the development of complementary production chains; meanwhile, Peru and Colombia have insisted upon maintaining a free trade orientation. This cooperativecompetitive tension is evident in both Venezuela’s withdrawal from the Andean Community and the stalled negotiations toward the creation of a bloc-to-bloc Association Agreement with the European Union. In the latter case, after five years of negotiation, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador have entered direct discussion with the EU as a means to bypass Bolivian objections.

At the present juncture, market liberalization remains the central feature of the bloc, and the community does not appear poised to take up Bolivia’s propositions.

The MERCOSUR bloc has served as an engine for expanding intra-regional trade.10 Between the bloc’s formation in 1991 and 2007, regional trade grew to 14 percent of the total exports from member countries.11 As in the Andes, the character of trade and integration is debated in MERCOSUR, at times strenuously, as indicated by Uruguay’s contemplation of a free trade accord with the United States. In recent years, discord around trade policy has been accentuated by conflicts over the asymmetrical structure of the bloc, dominated as it is by Brazil and Argentina.

Contestation sharpened further with the prospect of Venezuela’s ascension as

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a full member, which is now in process.

President Hugo Chávez has announced his intent to reform the bloc based on cooperative and complementary principles, declaring, “If MERCOSUR does not transcend the mercantile vision with which it was born…there will be no integration.”12 However, even more than the Andean Community, MERCOSUR remains largely as it was before the rise of Latin America’s “pink tide”: a regional locus of economic globalization. The dominance of Brazil in MERCOSUR, the influence of Brazil’s powerful business interests, and the associated macroeconomic orthodoxy of President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, have thus far prevented significant movement away from MERCOSUR’s free trade orientation.

Where the cooperative-complementary approach to trade and integration envisioned by Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales has found expression is in the TCP-ALBA, which has been developed as a vehicle to advance a political, social, and economic agenda frequently described by its advocates as a “socialism of the twenty-first century.”

The TCP-ALBA, which is more a series of interwoven protocols and joint declarations than a traditional rules-based trade bloc, seeks to establish a statist foundation for complementary development processes and chains of production. Rejecting the primacy of competition, the accord instead prioritizes cooperation and barter-like exchange of goods and services, yet one in which the greatest benefits are directed to the least-developed countries. By excluding from the TCP-ALBA many of the areas typically delimited in free trade agreements, such as rules pertaining

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to national treatment, investor rights, and the liberalization of services and capital, the accord allows members to employ a broad range of industrial and developmental policy tools like technology transfer, domestic employment and product content regulations, control of capital and prices, performance requirements, and support to infant industries. A key TCP-ALBA project is the establishment of bilateral and multilateral cooperative energy agreements—Petrocaribe and Petroandina— which combine Venezuelan investment, technology transfer, and low-cost oil and gas purchasing arrangements.13 Additionally, a proposal now being discussed involves the creation of a common currency for the group of countries, which Chávez has coined the sucre after the currency Ecuador dropped in favor of the dollar in 2000.

The case of Bolivia is particularly instructive, as it has been a signatory to the TCP-ALBA since April 2006 and has received from Venezuela hundreds of millions of dollars in nonconditional financial contributions and investment, as well as “purchase guarantees,” in sectors impacted by free trade arrangements: soy products and textiles. However, bureaucratic obstacles and the size of the Venezuelan and Cuban markets have limited Bolivian exports. Exports to Venezuela have increased by 15 percent per year since Bolivia joined the TCP-ALBA, from $170 million in 2005 to $200 million in 2006, and to $229.5 million in 2007.14 However, this increase has been outpaced by the total value of Bolivian exports to all countries. As a result, the Venezuelan market has actually declined in significance, from 6 percent to 5

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percent of Bolivian exports. If the TCPALBA has not translated to impressive results with regard to conventional trade indicators, it has impacted health and educational services; in particular, the influx of Cuban medical specialists and Venezuelan financial and technical resources has facilitated a substantial expansion of Bolivian social programs.

For example, Bolivia reported that as a result of the 1,744 medical personnel, the opening or significant expansion of 20 hospitals and 11 eye clinics, and medicine and equipment donated by Cuba, 2.96 million people received medical attention. Under Bolivia’s literacy program Yo Sí Puedo, Cuba and Venezuela have provided 30,000 televisions, 30,000 VHS players, 8,350 solar panels, and other resources to support the successful eradication of illiteracy.15 The improvement of medical services and diminution of illiteracy have won domestic support for the accord, especially among poor, working class, indigenous, and campesino (farmer) communities, as well as many local officials and some physicians.

Regionalism and the Pursuit of Markets. The promotion of trade

and integration within the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, and the TCP-ALBA represents a principal component of a mixed strategy that Latin American countries are pursuing to further social and economic development objectives; concomitantly, they are seeking to maintain existing markets and expand into new ones. Economic trends aside, a regionalist agenda will remain a priority, not due to the significance of intraregional trade, but because of regionalism’s interrelated

Tockman

meanings that imbue the discourse and practice of integration: a spirit of solidarity, assertion of sovereignty, expulsion of U.S. hegemony, and the rejection of neoliberalism. However, the ubiquity of trade delegations, meet-

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be well advised to remove the blinkers of a specific model of free trade and attempt to engage with Latin America on terms more acceptable to the region as a whole.”17 In terms of new markets, China stands

Leaders are cognizant that regional

markets alone are not sufficient to meet the growth and redistribution goals they seek. ings, and negotiations between Latin American countries and external trade partners strongly suggests that leaders are cognizant that regional markets alone are not sufficient to meet the growth and redistribution targets they seek. The United States and EU will continue to be important markets, and countries like Ecuador and Bolivia have indicated the desire to improve relations with the United States, hoping to maintain trade preferences under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA).16 However, a growing multipolar geopolitics in the region, with Brazil— arguably the region’s emergent hegemon—cooperating with a U.S.-defiant Venezuela, portends significantly less U.S. influence. This is reflected in the growing displacement of traditional mechanisms of U.S. “soft power”—the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)—by endogenous fora, namely UNASUR and the Bank of the South.

Though President Barack Obama has undoubtedly secured a new opportunity to re-engage with Latin America, Tomás Ayuso and Guy Hursthouse are correct to assert that “Obama would

out most prominently, but whether this new trade frontier represents a blessing or a curse remains to be seen. The volume and value of trade between China and Latin America has dramatically increased since the early 1990s, surging from $8.3 billion in 1999 to $102.6 billion in 2007.18 Targeting Latin America as a source of raw materials, China has established more than three hundred enterprises in the region, especially in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, principally in the steel, iron ore, oil, gold, and grain sectors, and is investing in infrastructure projects to facilitate transportation of these goods.19 However, as Guillermo Calvo, former chief economist of the IDB, highlights, the dramatic increase of primary product exports to China carries with it the risk of exacerbating the region’s inequality: “…unless [trade with China] becomes the basis for a broader definition of development, you risk ending up with enclave economies that benefit a small part of the population.”20 On the other hand, contraction in the Chinese economy as a result of the global economic downturn would diminish its demand for Latin America’s commodities.21 Declining

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exports to China, along with falling commodities prices, would compound short-term negative economic trends across Latin America.

Andean Community and MERCOSUR, the creation of a unified currency for TCP-ALBA countries, or the incipient UNASUR. In such a context, it is less feasible that Bolivia could blunt the Contending with Economic allure of a trade liberalizing Association Crisis. Latin American countries will Agreement with the European Union, likely respond to these economic chal- which has attracted not just Colombia lenges in several ways. First, many states and Peru, but most recently Ecuador. will take firmer positions vis-à-vis for- Similarly, Venezuela’s ambitions to eign investors and assert greater control reform MERCOSUR face an uphill over resources they consider to be of battle against influential industrial vital national interest. Secondly, several interests in Brazil that are committed to countries have rewritten constitutions a free trade orientation.22 It is difficult to secure greater state control of the to envision a significant departure from economy and pursue wider social inclu- the present trajectory. sion of indigenous peoples and other Latin America should, for the most marginalized groups; additional coun- part, maintain open markets and avert tries may follow Venezuela, Ecuador, prohibitive tariffs, quotas, and other and Bolivia, where new constitutions trade barriers, and countries will strive have won popular approval in recent to maintain macroeconomic stability, years. Countries can also be expected minimize inflation, and attract forto strengthen existing regional allianc- eign investment. Several factors milies and expand collaboration on social tate against a protectionist path. First programs that seek to address econom- and foremost, the painful memories of ic inequality and social exclusion. As hyper-inflation, economic stagnation, with the spread of economic crises, an and rising unemployment and poverty ideological contagion is also evident in rates during the “lost decade” of the Latin America. With regional coopera- 1980s are a constant reminder that tion and prioritization of social con- autarky is not an attractive option and cerns gaining currency, more countries that fiscal responsibility is paramount. may align themselves with Venezuela, Likewise, no Latin American counincluding potentially adhering to the try perceives that it has accumulated TCP-ALBA, as one strategy of con- the capital and technological capactending with economic difficulties. ity to endogenously drive its developEl Salvador, Ecuador, Paraguay, and mental or industrialization ambitions.

Uruguay are likely candidates, as they Foreign investment from the private have all experienced a recent political sector and the expansion and diversishift to the left. fication of trade are seen as necessary On the other hand, a downturn to bring about economic and social may have a chilling effect on some of improvement. At the same time, timidthe more radical propositions, such ity toward bolder integration proposals as Chávez’s and Morales’s socialist- in the face of economic crisis is suginspired proposals to restructure the gested by MERCOSUR’s abandoned

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Tockman

proposal to create a regional currency, dashed out by financial crises in Brazil and Argentina in 1999 and 2001.23 What these considerations suggest is that the present downturn will engender more caution than excess in trade policy. Discourse is another matter entirely and it is foreseeable that some presidents will redouble their nationalist rhetoric to draw attention away from flagging economic conditions.

However, behind the veneer of words, even the more radical pink tide presidents understand that the success of their regimes depends upon maintaining macroeconomic stability.

On the other hand, other than those few countries that have already oriented themselves in the direction of more market liberalization, such as Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, not many are likely to reconsider policies of privatization, deregulation, and fiscal austerity. If the pink tide is not poised to turn a darker shade of red, neither

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able latitude in responding to economic difficulty. Indeed, many countries in the region have begun to enact stimulus programs, such as Mexico’s $54 billion recovery plan directed toward infrastructure, housing, and development projects, including a new oil refinery, and a series of Brazilian initiatives that includes $2 billion in loans to exporters and an expansion of public housing construction by one million units before the end of 2010.24 As of 2006, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela were the best positioned in terms of foreign reserve holdings, per value of imports.25 Venezuela’s $36 billion in reserves suggest that it has the capacity to sustain its role of TCP-ALBA underwriter for some time, although Chávez may be forced to reign in his petro-diplomacy, as well as spending on domestic programs, if international petroleum prices remain low.

Alternative scenarios in which Latin America re-embraces the Washington

If the pink tide is not poised to turn a

darker shade of red, neither does it appear to be a fleeting affair. does it appear to be a fleeting affair.

Furthermore, with North American and European countries implementing massive stimulus programs, re-regulating their financial sectors, and bailing out financial institutions, it is unlikely that domestic or exogenous calls for fiscal conservatism or deregulation would carry much weight.

The significant stock of foreign reserves that many countries have amassed provides them with consider-

Consensus, or conversely sets itself on a sharply protectionist or import-substitution course, are unlikely to materialize. In the case of the former, the unambiguous trend in the region is away from market fundamentalism, and it is unlikely that many of the region’s current leaders, or the populations that have elected them largely in response to the unfulfilled promises of neoliberalism, will accept that the way out of a new crisis is a return to that model, particu-

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 37 ]

The rise of the “pink tide”

larly at a time when it is being abandoned in the core economies themselves. Moreover, it would be difficult for most of the region’s presidents to justify a new round of IMF loans to their electorates, having advanced their political careers, at least in part, by railing against IMF loan conditionality, as have the present leaders of Argentina, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

especially from China, and a widespread understanding of the pitfalls of statist endeavors when fiscal stability is neglected. Though regional integration has produced modest economic outcomes, it promises to go farther toward addressing social concerns and improving the quality of life for many Latin Americans; moreover, it affords countries with a greater degree of autonomy to pursue their Conclusion. The leftward trend in developmental goals than the former Latin American countries reflects a economic model. As the global finanbelief held deeply and widely by elected cial crisis spreads to Latin American officials and large portions of their economies, one way in which countries populations that the free market experi- will respond is by building upon existments of the previous two decades failed ing regional alliances, yet diminished to address the dire social and economic resources will paradoxically constrain problems of the world’s most unequal the capacity of these blocs. Future region. Though the present pink tide is research could be productively directby no means irreversible, it is difficult ed toward evaluations of the capacity to envision a sea change unless coun- of the new generation of agreements tries experience an extreme economic and institutions—the TCP-ALBA, the downturn. Several factors suggest that Bank of the South, and UNASUR—to Latin America is well equipped to navi- spur economic development, as well gate away from such a crisis, including as to confront the social inequality significant foreign reserve holdings, and exclusion that has plagued Latin demand for the region’s commodities, America since the era of colonization.

Notes

1 I am grateful to Eric Hershberg, who provided insightful suggestions into early drafts of this article.

2 For an insightful discussion of the relationship of trade and integration, see Miguel Lora, “Morales, Castro and Chávez, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas and the People’s Trade Agreement for the Integration of the Latin American Homeland,” 10 July 2006, Internet, http://www.boliviasoberana. org/blog/_archives/2006/7/10/2096620.html (date accessed: 18 January 2009).

3 TCP-ALBA member countries include Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the island nation of Dominica; Ecuador participates as an observer.

4 Central American countries have come together within the Central American Integration System (SICA); Caribbean countries formed the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

[ 38 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

5 UNASUR signatory countries include all of South America, except the French department of Guiana.

6 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela signed the founding charter of the Banco del Sur on 9 December 2007 in Buenos Aires; see Mark Engler, “Latin America Banks on Independence,” In These Times, 22 January 2008.

7 The CAN member countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; Chile is an associate member.

After decades of CAN membership, Venezuela withdrew in April 2006, protesting Colombia and Peru’s negotiation of free trade agreements with the United States.

8 Miguel Lora, “Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (TCP): La Propuesta Boliviana para un Comercio con Justicia,” in Los Pueblos Andinos contra el Libre Comercio, Red Colombiana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio y el ALCA

Tockman

(RECALCA) (Colombia: RECALCA, 2006), 91-106.

9 Trade within the CAN grew from $553 million to $5.9 billion between 1990 and 2007. See WTO, World Trade Developments in 2007 (Washington, D.C.: WTO, 2008), Internet, http://www.wto.org/english/ res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its08_world_trade_dev_e.htm (date accessed: 31 January 2009).

10 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay were founding members of MERCOSUR; Venezuela is now joining as a full member. Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia hold associate member status, allowing them to participate in the bloc’s free trade area, but not its common market, common external tariff, or customs union.

11 Intra-MERCOSUR trade expanded from $4.1 billion in 1990 to $32.4 billion in 2007. See WTO, World Trade Developments in 2007.

12 Sarah Wagner, “Venezuela’s Chávez Prioritizes Cooperation over Competition at MERCOSUR Summit,” Venezuelanalysis.com, 21 June 2005, Internet, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/1204 (date accessed: 9 February 2009).

13 Petroandina includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and was established on 18 July 2005, in Lima, Peru. Venezuela and 14 Caribbean countries created Petrocaribe on 29 June 2005, in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela.

See Ministry of Popular Power for Energy and Petroleum, “Energy Union,” Internet, http://iiicumbrepetrocaribe.menpet.gob.ve/index. php?tpl=interface.en/design/Union_Energetica/ Petroamerica/PetroCaribe/Intro.html (date accessed: 11 February 2009).

14 Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, “Estadísticos: Exportaciones Bolivianas al 2007,” ¡Exportemos! 9 (2007): 12; Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, “Estadísticos: Exportaciones Bolivianas Gestión 2006,” ¡Exportemos!

20 (2007): 12.

15 For information regarding the medical, educational, and literacy aid Bolivia has received through the TCP-ALBA, see Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA, “Informe del Estado de avance del TCP-ALBA,” Ministerio de la Presidencia (2007); Agencia Boliviana de Información, “Bolivia Libre de Analfabetismo Cierra Brecha de Discriminación y Exclusion,” 20 December 2008, Internet, http://abi.bo/index.php?i=noticias_ texto_paleta&j=20081220220556&k= (date accessed: 23 January 2009).

16 Bolivia has pressed the United States to restore ATPDEA trade preferences, which were suspended by the Bush administration in December 2008 in response to Bolivia’s expulsion of U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg, who President Morales accused of collaborating with the regional autonomist opposition.

17 Tomás Ayuso and Guy Hursthouse, “¿Cambio?:

Trade on Trial

Latin America in the Era of Obama: An Early Reading on the Administration,” (Washington, D.C.: Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2009).

18 Xingmin Yin, “New Ways to Trade: Development between China and Latin America,” (Mexico City: 6-7 March 2006); Rhys Jenkins, Enrique Dussel Peters, and Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, “The Impact of China on Latin America and the Caribbean,” World Development 36, no. 2 (2006): 235-253; David Shambaugh, “China’s New Foray into Latin America,” YaleGlobal, 17 November 2008, Internet, http://yaleglobal. yale.edu/display.article?id=11615 (date accessed: 9 February 2009).

19 Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez, and Javier Santiso, “Angel or Demon? China’s Trade Impact on Latin American Countries,” CEPAL Review 90 (December 2006).

20 Gullermo Calvo, “Who Benefits from Trade with China? IDB América, interview by IDB, 7 February 2009, Internet, http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/ index.cfm?thisid=4337 (date accessed: 9 February 2009).

21 Mauricio Cardenas, “Can Latin American Economies Deflect the Financial Crisis?” interview

by Brookings, 22 September 2008, Internet, http:// www.brookings.edu/interviews/2008/0922_latin_ america_cardenas.aspx (date accessed: 9 February 2009).

22 Confederação Nacional da Indústria, “Ingresso de Bolívia e Venezuela será Monitorado,” 26 August 2008, Internet, http://www.cni.org.br/portal/data/pages/8A9015 D01BFCF5B9011C0079C32D4874.htm#Conteudo (date accessed: 15 March 2009).

23 Amalia Stuhldreher, “La Unión Europea y el Mercosur: Dos Bloques Regionales Buscan Fortalecer sus Vinculos,” Estudios Internacionales 130 (2000): 13-23; Mario E. Carranza, “MERCOSUR and the Endgame of the FTAA Negotiations: Challenges and Prospects after the Argentine Crisis,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2004): 319-337.

24 Diego Cevallos, “Economy - Mexico: Stimulus Plan to Curb Impact of Crisis,” Inter Press Service, 9 January 2009, Internet, http://ipsnews.net/ news.asp?idnews=45329 (date accessed: 3 February 2009); Sara Miller Llana and Andrew Downie, “Latin America Better Girded for Financial Crisis,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 October 2008, Internet, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1024/p06s01woam.html (date accessed: 3 February 2009); Tânia Monteiro, “Quero Construir 1 Milhão de Casas Populares até 2010, Diz Lula,” O Estadao, 11 February 2009, Internet, http://www.estadao.com.br/economia/ not_eco322210,0.htm (date accessed: 9 February 2009).

25 Comisión Económica para América Latina, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean: 2007 (Santiago, Chile, 2008).

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 39]

Politics&Diplomacy The Unfulfilled Mandate

Gender Mainstreaming and UN Peace Operations Jacqui True It is well documented that grave sexual and physical violence against women increases as a result of armed conflict. The large-scale rape of women and girls, for example, has been a military strategy in countless conflicts, most recently in the eastern portion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in the Darfur region of western Sudan.1 Displaced women and children in refugee camps and resettlement zones are also subject to rape, sexual abuse, early and forced marriage, and trafficking. Yet, after the conflict ceases, what is the impact of such graves abuses on women’s human rights?

The invisibility of violence against women during and after conflict creates or exacerbates gender inequalities, marginalizing women during post-conflict reconstruction and state-building. In some contexts sexual violence actually increases once fighting stops and the situation stabilizes.

Rape victims face social stigma and forced displacement, leading to impoverishment and further abuse, including intimate partner violence, the exchange of sexual services for food and protection, “firewood rape,” and sex trafficking.2 Abysmally, even international peacekeepers and staff responsible for humanitarian operations have themselves

Jacqui True is a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Auckland, New Zealand.

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The unfulfilled Mandate

committed violent acts against women.3 In some post-conflict environments such as East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq, few women have held decisionmaking positions in reconstruction or state-building agencies. Thus, although post-conflict activities should empower women, too often they do just the opposite.4 The major response to such endemic sexual violence during conflict—and marginalization following it—has been to incorporate a gender perspective in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. This policy strat-

violence as an instrument of conflict.

Although well-intentioned, these resolutions and wider gender mainstreaming efforts for UN peacekeeping operations have yet to alter the international reality that men both make wars and negotiate the terms of peace. A feminist perspective on war and security illuminates some of the reasons for this failure by observing how prevailing gender norms of masculinity and femininity perpetuate war-making. Common images such as male aggressor and female nurturer, or male warrior and female peacemaker, constrain efforts to

Emphasizing the need for “defense” legitimizes a militarized social order that valorizes the use of violence by either state or non-state actors. egy, known as gender mainstreaming, addresses gender differences and counters gender bias in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all policies and programs, including those related to international security and the macroeconomy.5 In 2000 the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, applying a gender perspective to international peace operations and security policy while also stressing women’s rights to equal participation in peace negotiations and conflict resolution.6 In 2008 the UNSC followed this with Resolution 1820, which re-affirmed this mainstreaming commitment and called for urgent state action and accountability to end the widespread or systematic use of sexual

[ 4 2] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

bring about sustainable peace and security. The hyper-masculine approach of military training, for example, prepares soldiers—both men and women—to fight and protect victims—women and children—by killing and suppressing “feminine” emotions associated with bodily pain and compassion. The experience of war and conflict also shapes norms of masculinity, explaining why soldiers so often behave violently against women at home once the conflict is over.

Feminists define peace and security not in idealized ways associated with women, but rather in broad, multidimensional terms that include the elimination of all social hierarchies leading to political and economic injustices.

Such a perspective focuses on the insecurity of individuals—marginalized and

True

Politics&Diplomacy

disempowered populations—and views military security as antithetical to individual security, particularly for vulnerable groups. Emphasizing the need for “defense” legitimizes a militarized social order that valorizes the use of violence by either state or non-state actors.

From a feminist perspective, putting Resolutions 1325 and 1820 into practice requires changing our conception of international security to incorporate not just military and political security but also human security for women, men, girls, and boys. Eliminating violence against women during periods of conflict and increasing women’s participation in peace processes following conflict depend on efforts to transform social and economic gender inequalities that constrain women’s participation and underlie their vulnerabilities.

Now is the time to bring about such change. The scale and the brutality of sexual violence during recent conflicts has focused political attention on long-term solutions, and the commitment of the new U.S. administration to protect women’s human rights will bolster the resolve of the UNSC and its member states to incorporate gender perspectives in UN peace operations.

1325 and 1820 on women, peace, and security represent the UNSC’s application of a gender perspective to international peace and security policy.

Prompted by considerable women’s movement activism, the UNSC issued Resolution 1325 in October 2000, recognizing the urgent need to respond to ongoing violations of women’s human rights in conflict and postconflict regions. Resolution 1325 calls for the integration of gender across UNSC policies and operations, including the need for equal participation of women in decision making, a gender approach to policy analysis, and sexspecific data and research on peacekeeping and peace-building operations. In June 2008 the UNSC passed Resolution 1820 to end sexual violence as an instrument of conflict. Chaired by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice while the United States presided over the UNSC, the council urged implementation of the secretary-general’s plan, which linked women’s protection and participation in the peace process to the maintenance of international peace and security. Four months later the council called on member states and international, regional, and subregional organizations to undertake Women, Peace, and Security. measures to increase women’s particiGender mainstreaming has increasingly pation and decision-making authority become the dominant approach among in conflict prevention, conflict resolustates and international institutions to tion, and peace-building.7 support gender equality objectives. It Although potentially revolutionreflects the global consensus reached in ary, how are these UNSC mandates 1995 at the UN’s Fourth World Con- implemented in practice? Resolution ference on Women in Beijing to make 1325 requires the UN Department of women’s relationship to men an inte- Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) gral part of all policymaking, including and member states to address genpolicy areas that appear to have little to der issues, particularly the elimination do with women or gender. Resolutions of violence against women within and

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across security sector and humanitarian-assistance policies. The UNDPKO must promote, facilitate, support, and monitor the incorporation of a gender perspective in its peacekeeping operations and country missions, requiring among other things gender training for peacekeeping operations and gender-sensitive demobilization programs for security and military personnel.

Building on Resolution 1325, Resolution 1820 seeks an end to sexual violence in conflict regions by considering appropriate steps to end such atrocities and punish their perpetrators. The UN secretary-general must bring evidence to the UNSC of sexual violence against civilians in conflict and post-conflict situations by 30 June 2009. In addition, he must report UN actions taken to implement the resolution and timely strategies to cease sexual violence and to measure progress toward its prevention.

Furthering these mandates, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) requested in 2004 that UN entities develop and implement gender action plans.8 As a result member states must adopt national and regional action plans that coordinate efforts to promote Resolution 1325 at all levels and across policy areas. These plans should designate specific measures, clear targets, and appropriate benchmarks for full implementation of Resolution 1325 by 2015. The Norwegian government’s action plan, for example, makes protecting women from genderbased violence a major concern of Norwegian humanitarian assistance, peace, and reconciliation efforts. Thus far, Norway has allocated more than $77 million to implement the resolution

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since 2007 and has even mandated that all developing country partners report their efforts to implement the resolution as well.

Yet, what progress has hitherto been made to end the culture of impunity concerning violence against women in conflict settings, and to what extent are women involved in critical decisionmaking processes? In many respects the UNSC resolutions represent a radical departure from past practices excluding women from security decisions; however, we have neither seen the impact of Resolution 1325 on the terms of peace negotiations nor collective action on gender mainstreaming resulting from Resolution 1820.

For example, in the DRC’s January 2008 peace settlement not a single woman was present at the negotiating table, despite the widespread occurrence of rape and other violence against women, and despite the passage of Resolution 1325.9 Women were neither consulted nor engaged in the process.

Thus, what explains this gap between the intended and actual implementation of Resolutions 1325 and 1820?

Power and Pathologies in Gender Mainstreaming. UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820 face serious implementation shortfalls. In part, these shortfalls stem from the flawed manner in which these resolutions conceptualize gender mainstreaming and international security. Furthermore, these implementation problems suffer as a result of institutional factors such as the power relations among states and UN agencies, bureaucratic delays, and deep organizational pathologies resistant to change—all of which undermine

True

mainstreaming efforts.

Gender mainstreaming, as represented in Resolutions 1325 and 1820, is not adequately feminist-informed, thus affecting the resolutions’ practical implementation. In these resolutions the meaning of gender mainstreaming is chiefly limited to the inclusion of women’s issues, such as “women’s role in peace-building,” “the protection of women,” and “women and girls affected by armed conflict.” Conceptually, at least, women and girls remain passive victims protected by male soldiers, militarized states, or their male representatives on the UNSC. Such victimhood denies women the agency extended by Resolution 1325, perpetuating the stereotype of women as nonviolent peacemakers and men as violent aggressors.

Resolution 1325 is also silent about the underlying gender roles that celebrate masculine aggression and condone violence against women, as well as the gendered socio-economic inequalities that make women more vulnerable during conflict and post-conflict situations.

The resolutions are also based on a narrow, traditional vision of state security that, in the context of UN peace-building operations, privileges physical security and electoral machinery over social and economic security.

This narrow vision impairs the ability of women to procure basic housing, food, health, and education. For instance, after the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Timor-Leste, the UN introduced a Transitional Administration (UNTAET) to govern the new nation from 2000 to 2002. Although immediately following the passage of Resolution 1325, UNTAET established formal legal and political institutions

Politics&Diplomacy

rather than addressing basic economic and social needs or human rights violations in the private sphere. The culture of impunity regarding violence against women was pervasive during the Indonesian occupation because women’s lack of access to economic and social rights greatly increased their vulnerability to violence. Under UNTAET, domestic violence against women remained widespread and frequent across society.10 In the context of the newly formed state, “[v]iolence within the family became a way for men to reassert their domestic power.”11 There are other post-conflict and reconstruction processes that mirror the situation in Timor-Leste.

Consequently, gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping missions has yet to bring about a real, substantive improvement in women’s material lives following conflict.

Power relations among states and UN agencies have also limited implementation of Resolutions 1325 and 1820. Most member states have yet to adopt national action plans for the implementation of Resolution 1325, and the prospect of collective action remains bleak, since no conflict country will likely produce a national action plan unless other conflict countries do so as well. Some conflict countries actually perceive these national plans as tools of rich donor countries applying conditionality to their development assistance, and in fact the majority of states that have already created national action plans are Northern, developed nations.

At the same time, competition among UN agencies and member states has affected Resolution 1325’s implementation, leading to unintended and often

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perverse consequences diverging greatly from the original intentions of gender mainstreaming. The UN is a complex and contradictory actor that may both advance and work against gender mainstreaming goals. This is certainly true in Timor-Leste, where the organization encouraged a gender perspective in

EAD outlawed gender quotas, eschewing them as anathema to “free and fair elections” and akin to the methods of communist countries. They in fact threatened to decline running TimorLeste’s first elections, ultimately influencing Timorese political elites, who subsequently changed their minds and

Economic opportunities and reconstruction programs must benefit women as well as men to address the economic and social dimensions of women empowerment. post-conflict peace-building yet simultaneously stonewalled efforts to mandate electoral gender quotas. In 2000 the East Timorese Women’s National Congress platform for action—influenced by the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference—sought female representation in the new state by requesting all decision-making bodies be comprised of at least 30 percent women. Rede Feto, the women’s umbrella organization, made the campaign for gender quotas its first priority for the constitutional assembly elections held in 2001.

However, the UN was internally divided over quotas. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the UN Development Program (UNDP), Resolution 1325, and the UN special advisor to the secretarygeneral on gender all supported quotas, while senior officials in the Electoral Affairs Division (EAD)—charged with administering Timor-Leste’s national elections—strongly opposed them. The

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supported UNTAET’s opposition to gender quotas. The decision to oppose quotas illustrates the complexity of UN bureaucratic politics: leaders at UN headquarters in New York and Geneva, and grassroots advocates working with individual UN agencies, may champion gender equality, but those actually tasked with its implementation can bring the entire process to a standstill.

These power dynamics and ideological differences undoubtedly explain some of the UNDPKO’s failure to implement gender mainstreaming policies and procedures. After the UNSC passed Resolution 1325, it took another four years of recommendations and consultancy reports before UNDPKO appointed the first gender adviser charged with integrating the resolution into UN peace operations policy.12 In their report for UNIFEM, Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf warned that “limiting this function to one person is setting them up to fail.”13 Moreover, only after cases of sexual exploitation and abuse of local women by UN

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Politics&Diplomacy

peacekeepers were publicized did the UNDPKO appoint gender advisers to handle these issues. Operationally, not until 2008 did all eighteen UN peacekeeping missions around the world have gender units supporting the participation of women in host countries and ensuring their contribution to peace processes. Gender units’ tasks include contacting local women’s organizations, promoting registration of female voters, training female candidates for campaigns and elections, coordinating gender mainstreaming across mission departments, and developing gendersensitive programs and training for UN personnel and local police. These tasks are a tall order for a single unit or person to coordinate. That gender mainstreaming is the responsibility of all staff, that gender advisers are the catalysts for mainstreaming, and that gender expertise should exist beyond gender units in peace operations—as Resolution 1325 mandates— have yet to become widely accepted.

build a policy consensus on violence against women and women’s human rights as international security issues.

This consensus must recognize the inherent social and economic inequalities that exist between women and men, identify culturally-embedded notions of masculinity as the root causes of violence against women, and mitigate the effects of women’s marginalization in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Such an approach calls for a systematic human security response backed by specific mandates, resources, training, and incentives. An example of this approach is the UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict initiative, under which twelve organizations currently collaborate. However, the UN should expand this mandate to embrace the protection and promotion of women’s human rights, including their economic and social rights, in UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions.

Another initiative seeking to broaden the definition of security is the March 2009 International Colloquium for Transforming Gender, Ending Women’s Empowerment, Leadership Violence against Women, and Development, International Peace, and Promoting Peace. Implementing Security, hosted by Africa’s first female Resolutions 1325 and 1820 remains a president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in major challenge for the UN, member Monrovia, Liberia. Bringing together states, non-governmental organizations eight hundred leaders including heads (NGOs), gender advocates, and wom- of state, ministers, CEOs, and commuen’s movements. Given the aforemen- nity leaders, the meeting represented a tioned obstacles, actors must pursue unique effort to achieve progress toward both tangible and intangible solutions Resolution 1325’s implementation. that address the gap between the theory Many governments lack the politiand practice of gender mainstreaming cal will to end the culture of impunity in UN peace operations. Only then can concerning violence against women. they hope to improve women’s situa- Societies worldwide must do more tions in conflict and post-conflict set- to document violations of women’s tings. human rights in conflict and postOne major intangible solution is to conflict settings and to collect data

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The unfulfilled Mandate

on their causes and consequences for peace and reconstruction efforts.14 This data collection is also a precondition for Resolution 1820’s implementation, which requires the UNSC to monitor sexual violence and the actions taken to eliminate it, including regular and systematic reporting by peacekeeping missions. Expanding global indicators, such as the UNDP’s Gender Development and Gender Empowerment Indexes, to include statistical indicators of violence against women would allow the UN to rank nations so that donor countries, international organizations, and civil society actors could reward or censure particular nations based on their practices.

Alongside these intangible solutions, the UN can readily implement tangible ones to address the bureaucratic shortcomings of gender mainstreaming in peace operations. Best practices should be identified and adopted across UN peace operations to reveal which practices may best protect civilians, prevent sexual violence, and empower women to participate in peace processes. Collaboration among UN agencies is one practice that deserves particular attention. Concerning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, for example, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees’ community development approach, along with UNDPKO’s focus on physical security and gender-based violence, may together yield insights on the fundamental challenges and contributions of women and children IDPs.15 Such practices should inform current and future mission planning as well as the training of UN peacekeeping personnel. Increasing the numbers of female peacekeepers, police,

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and uniformed military personnel with experience in addressing sexual violence would build confidence in local communities by presenting the UN as a civilian organization—not a military occupier—invested in the long-term well-being of these communities.

To overcome the economic, social, and cultural obstacles preventing women’s participation in decision making, their representation must be deliberately cultivated, whether through establishing a quota system, mandating targeted consultations, or strengthening the local policy machinery concerned with women’s rights. Civil society representatives for women should work to redefine the new human security agenda and ensure its implementation.16 Women’s active participation in the peace process means more than placing women as observers in decision-making settings or running a few token women candidates in elections. To help overcome local or international officials’ resistance to increasing women’s participation, member states could use peace mediation and talks to publicly shine a light on negotiating groups who are or are not engaging women in the peace process, as required by Resolution 1325.

Engendering Human Security.

Above all, implementing these two resolutions—and the human security perspective underlying them—will require UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions to alter aggressive constructions of masculinity in societal, state, and military institutions. Economic opportunities and reconstruction programs must benefit women as well as men to address the economic and social dimensions of women empowerment.

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Ultimately, recognizing the economic and social aspects of security is crucial to protect women’s physical security and ensure sustainable peace in postconflict settings. Only the UN has the multi-dimensional capabilities—security, human rights, and development work—to realize this broader, longlasting conception of human security.

Nevertheless, key member states such as the United States must provide political and practical support to ensure these UN mandates’ efficacy.

There are indications that the new U.S. administration will support an expanded role for the UN in international affairs. Observers hope that President Barack Obama will make women’s human rights a key part of his foreign policy. President Obama has already committed the United States to supporting the UN Population Fund, an agency whose portfolio includes gender equality and conflict resolution activities.17 Moreover, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who made an influential speech at the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference, is in a position to bring greater attention to gender mainstreaming efforts in UN peace operations. She could help

Politics&Diplomacy

ensure that the UNSC makes greater progress toward implementing resolutions on women, peace, and security in the UNDPKO, as well as influencing the department to further its intergovernmental diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and reach political settlements.

The gender mainstreaming mandates of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820 remain significant, despite the challenges of implementing them successfully. They have drawn international attention to gross violations of women’s human rights in conflict and post-conflict settings and have expanded the debate on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. But actors such as the UN, the United States, and other member states must do much more to implement these resolutions in places like the DRC and Darfur. Approaching international peacekeeping through the frameworks of human security and women’s human rights, and addressing the underlying structures of socioeconomic inequality that fuel violence against women, would do much toward realizing the deeds and not just the words of these important resolutions.

Notes

1 Liz Kelly, “Wars Against Women: Sexual Violence, Sexual Politics, and the Militarised State,” in States of Conflict: Gender, Violence, and Resistance, Susie Jacobs, Ruth Jacobson, and J. Marchbank, eds. (London: Zed Books, 2000).

2 Sexual violence against displaced women collecting fuel has become so common that camp workers in Darfur abbreviated the phenomenon to “firewood rape.” UN Population Fund, “Dispatches from Darfur: Caring for the Ones Who Care for Others” (New York: UNFPA, 2007).

3 “UN Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct,” Washington Post, 13 March 2005; Save the Children Fund, No One to Turn To (London, UK: Save the Children Fund, 2008).

4 Cheryl Bernard, Seth Jones, Olga Oliker, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Brooke Stearns, and Kristen Cordell, eds., Women and Nation-Building (Stanford: RAND, 2008).

5 UN Economic and Social Council, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women (New York: United Nations, 1996).

6 In this article “peace operations” include both UN peacekeeping missions and UN post-conflict, peace-building administrations.

7 UNSC, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” 29 October 2008, (S/PRST/2008/39), http://www.diplomatie.be/en/.

8 UN Economic and Social Council, “Review of Economic and Social Council Agreed Conclusions

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1997/2 on Mainstreaming the Gender Perspective into all Politics and Programs of the United Nations System,” Resolution (E/2004/L.14), 8 July 2004, Internet, http://www.peacewomen.org/news/1325News/ Issue45.pdf.

9 Stephen Lewis, “Beyond Firewood: Stopping Violence against Women in the Developing World,” First Annual Julia Taft Lecture, Women’s Refugee Commission, New York, 8 December 2008.

10 Nina Hall and Jacqui True, “Gender Mainstreaming in a Post-Conflict State: Toward Democratic Peace in Timor-Leste,” in Gender and Global Politics in the Asia-Pacific, Katrina Lee-Koo and Bina D’Costa , eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 163165.

11 Tracy Fitzsimons, “Engendering Justice and Security after War,” in Constructing Justice and Security after War, Charles V. Call, ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007), 351-353.

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12 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Internet, http://www.peacewomen.org (date accessed: 23 March 2009).

13 Elizabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-Building (New York: UNIFEM, 2002), 68.

14 Cheryl Bernard et al., Women and Nation-Building.

15 Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Room to Maneuver: Lessons from Gender Mainstreaming in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (New York: Women’s Commission, 2007).

16 FemLINK Pacific, Women, Peace, and Security: Policy Responses and Solutions for our Pacific Region (Suva, Fiji Islands: FemLINK Pacific, 2008).

17 UN Population Fund, The State of the World’s Population 2008: Culture, Gender, and Human Rights (New York, United Nations, 2008).

Conflict&Security State Failure

The Responsibility to Protect Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Anthony W. Gambino The Democratic Republic of the Congo faces acute humanitarian, political, and military crises in its eastern provinces.

At the heart of these emergencies is the inability of the state to fulfill its most basic obligation to its citizens: protecting them from harm. In particular, the government of President Joseph Kabila has failed to end the longstanding suffering of the population, which continues to be subjected to horrific massacres and brutal sexual violence. Due to the ineptitude of the Congolese Army, President Kabila has had to invite the militaries of both Uganda and Rwanda—his former enemies—onto Congolese soil in recent months to help defeat rebel armies. Two rebel groups—possessing different origins and motivations, but sharing a common proclivity for murdering innocent civilians—continue to destabilize eastern Congo. First, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, slaughtered nearly one thousand Congolese in late 2008 and early 2009, after Ugandan troops entered the country to hunt down the group.1 Next, Rwandan troops crossed the border into the Congo in January to arrest renegade militia leader Laurent Nkunda,

Anthony W. Gambino was the director of the USAID mission for the Congo from 2001 to 2004. He is now an independent consultant on international development and foreign policy.

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who is responsible for countless atrocities. As of early spring 2009, it appeared that members of his National Congress for the People’s Defense (CNDP) would finally lay down their arms. Rwanda’s stated aim in sending troops to the Congo was to defeat its enemy, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). This is a rebel

had been planned with the intimate involvement of the United States.4 In its dying months, the Bush administration chose to work unilaterally with those who sought to weaken MONUC. When states are unable to protect their own populations, an internationally-accepted principle known as the “responsibility to protect” is supposed

If the new administration concretely

demonstrates its support for MONUC by providing desperately needed logistical support, such leadership is likely to encourage other countries to become more involved in the peacekeeping activities. group led by Rwandan Hutus, some of whom participated in the 1994 genocide. However, after the Rwandan Army withdrew in late February, the FDLR rapidly reverted to its brutal practice of murdering Congolese civilians.2 The Congolese Army has failed to stop these massacres. But the UN peacekeeping force—the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, known by its French acronym MONUC—has also been unable to protect the population. Although the largest peacekeeping force in the world, and now authorized to deploy over twenty thousand soldiers and police, MONUC did not play a major role in either the Rwandan or Ugandan military operations. In fact, Rwanda and the Congo initially denied information to MONUC about their plans.3 The New York Times revealed in early February that the Ugandan and Congolese operation against the LRA

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to apply.5 In the case of the Congo, this principle necessitates strengthening the international community’s role, particularly that of MONUC. The Obama administration needs to reassess the U.S. approach to the Congo and towards MONUC. The mission has a clear mandate, strengthened in December, to protect the country’s civilian population. U.S. policy should place a greater focus on protecting the civilian population in the context of the responsibility to protect. If the new administration concretely demonstrates its support for MONUC by providing desperately needed logistical support, such leadership is likely to encourage other countries to become more involved in the peacekeeping activities. The protection of civilians and the Congo’s transition to a more stable democracy depend to a great degree on a high level of international engagement, led by the United States.

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Conflict&Security

Congo in Transition. MONUC because they had a clear, realistic miswas initially authorized by the UN Security Council in the late 1990s to monitor a shaky ceasefire. At that time, the Congolese government, allied with Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, was fighting two rebel groups, one allied with Rwanda and the other with Uganda. MONUC’s role morphed over time as circumstances changed.

In late 2002, the various Congolese groups agreed to form a transitional government that would prepare for future elections. During the transition, from 2003-2006, MONUC took on the role of the key outside guarantor of the new government’s success.

This period was marred by coup attempts and other outbreaks of violence. Much of the abuses and instability occurred in regions of the eastern Congo, which possess astonishing mineral riches. Rebel groups were active in the region. For example, in 2004, Nkunda and his militia overran Bukavu, the capital city of South Kivu province, despite MONUC’s presence.

Despite these challenges, reasonably free and fair elections took place during 2006. MONUC’s strong role in supporting the transition was one of the most important reasons. During the elections, the international community placed heavy diplomatic pressure on the Congolese government so that its army stayed in its barracks, rather than abuse civilians. This enabled the MONUC force of seventeen thousand to focus its energy on the various militia groups operating in the Congo, sending messages that it would intervene to prevent these groups from undermining the elections. During this time, MONUC forces were motivated and active

sion where success could be measured.

After the installation of the new government in late 2006, UN Security Council members, including the United States, initiated counterproductive discussions on how rapidly MONUC could begin reducing its forces and withdrawing from the Congo. The United States, other Western countries, and the Congo all agreed in effect that the installation of a democratically elected government marked such a watershed that a high level of outside engagement was no longer necessary. This fiction was useful to international donors, including the United States, because it implied that they could turn their attention— and resources—elsewhere. It was particularly valuable to the new Congolese government, which resented what it saw as inappropriately interventionist actions by the international community.

The West’s disengagement and the subsequent actions taken by the Congolese proved disastrous. The Congolese government lacked the ability to govern a country as large as the United States east of the Mississippi. With no effective army or civil service and lingering resentments harbored by those with guns, the situation rapidly deteriorated.

In early 2008, the various Congolese warring parties signed an agreement to set up an internal process whereby the Congolese government and the militias would negotiate rather than fight. In practice, this agreement created breathing space for Nkunda’s militia to rearm, regroup, and go on the offensive.

When Nkunda’s more capable forces overran the Congolese Army in late 2008, both sides committed massacres against civilians, sometimes with

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MONUC units based nearby taking no action.6 In one dramatic case, one hundred fifty Congolese were killed by the CNDP in the village of Kiwanja, with MONUC troops based only a few hundred meters away. The man most responsible for the massacres, Jean-Bosco Ntaganda, a war criminal under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC), has gone on to become an important Congolese military commander.

At this time, MONUC began to drift, having lost the clear sense of purpose it had during the transition period. It seemed obvious that MONUC should support the democraticallyelected Congolese government. Yet what should MONUC do when the Congolese army attacked Congolese militias or, worse, unarmed citizens?

Ban Ki-moon appointed former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as his special envoy for the Congo.

In December, the Security Council renewed MONUC’s mandate for one more year, clarifying that MONUC could use all its tools, including military force, to protect Congolese civilians.

The Security Council could not have been clearer in its mandate for MONUC for 2009. In the relevant resolution, it “[r]equests MONUC to attach the highest priority to addressing the crisis in the Kivus, in particular, the protection of civilians…”7 Yet, even as MONUC’s new mandate was approved in New York, the Congolese, Rwandans, Ugandans, and even the United States took dramatic actions that further harmed Congolese civilians and undercut MONUC’s authority. The helplessness of the Congolese state in the face of More Authority, Less Influence. Nkunda’s CNDP (and, farther north, While these dramatic events were occur- the LRA) led directly to the governring in eastern Congo, the UN Security ment’s decision to invite both Rwandan Council took actions to strengthen both and Ugandan troops into the Congo— MONUC and its diplomatic engage- without the involvement of MONUC. ment in Central Africa. MONUC’s In December 2008, Ugandan troops previous mandate, which expired at entered northern Congo to try to hunt the end of 2008, had given MONUC down members of the LRA. The next roughly seventeen thousand military month, thousands of Rwandan soldiers personnel. It also provided broad crossed into eastern Congo to confront authority to protect civilians, maintain the FDLR. The LRA, with perhaps stability, participate in the disarma- hundreds of fighters, and the FDLR, ment and demobilization of foreign with six thousand or more Congolese and Congolese armed groups, and pro- and Rwandan fighters, have been mote reform of the security sector. responsible for massacres and horrifIn relatively quick succession, the ic violence against girls and women.8 UN made three important decisions.

Further complicating the situaIn November, the Security Council tion, the Bush administration unwiseapproved a request by UN Secretary- ly decided to unilaterally support the General Ban Ki-moon for an addi- Ugandan operation in the Congo. The tional three thousand soldiers and United States should have collaborated police for MONUC. Also in November, with other states working to bring secu-

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rity to the Congo. Furthermore, the administration should have been more concerned about the abuses committed by the LRA and designed an effective strategy to bring Kony before the ICC, where he is under indictment as a war criminal. When the Ugandan Army failed to capture Kony, the response from the LRA was easy to predict.

It went on a spree, massacring nearly one thousand Congolese civilians.9 Similarly, once the Rwandan Army withdrew from northern Congo, the FDLR began to massacre Congolese civilians.10 By early this year MONUC was scrambling to establish effective collaboration

Conflict&Security

crisis-to-crisis management approach, rather than implementing a steady, overarching strategy. After the success of the 2006 election, the administration naively hoped that it could put the Congo in the “success” column. When that proved illusory, officials lost interest until the Congolese government’s disastrous military action against the CNDP in 2007 created another crisis. The United States, reacting to this failure, then pushed the Congolese and others into various flawed agreements.

Desperately searching for a final “win” in the Congo, President Bush and his assistant secretary for Africa,

A central organizing principle for the

Obama administration’s support for MONUC should be the responsibility to protect. with the various armies engaged in the Congo. In the far north, where the Ugandan Army operates, MONUC only has small, scattered outposts of soldiers and civilians. In early February 2009, after two months of Ugandan military activity, Médecins sans Frontières accused MONUC of failing to protect civilians from brutal attacks and multiple massacres by the LRA.11 The MONUC spokesman angrily rejected the charge. But the fact remains that nearly one thousand Congolese civilians died, despite MONUC’s central mandate to protect Congolese civilians.

The episodic attention of senior Bush administration policymakers to the Congo, along with their penchant for unilateralism, undercut their own initiatives. The Bush administration treated the Congo as a problem requiring a

Jendayi Frazer, agreed to a secret collaboration with the Ugandan military to capture or kill LRA leader Kony.12 By the time it became known that the United States had supported the operation, President Bush was no longer in office.

New Priorities. The ultimate

objective of U.S. policy should be a peaceful, stable, and democratic Congo. This goal, however, remains distant. In the near future, ensuring that the Congo is peaceful requires the protection of Congolese civilians. The Congolese state is clearly incapable of doing this at present. Therefore, a central organizing principle for the Obama administration’s support for MONUC should be the responsibility to protect.

In this context, MONUC’s role takes on a special importance and urgency.

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To prevent further massacres, MONUC must reorganize itself in eastern Congo to better protect the civilian population. As additional troops arrive in the course of 2009, MONUC should redeploy more of its troops into troubled rural areas of eastern Congo, with specific rules of engagement designed to protect civilians. While MONUC’s mandate has long permitted such rules of engagement, various contributing countries have been unwilling to agree to their adoption. These troops must be willing and able to take aggressive action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent large-scale abuses.

If radical strategies, such as regrouping civilians in particular areas, are

The international community has a responsibility to protect civilian populations from violations of international humanitarian law when states are unwilling or unable to do so. But this commitment is only as effective as the willingness of all nations, large and small, to take concrete action. The United States takes this responsibility seriously.13 Ambassador Rice also is aware that if the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo fails, this will produce important negative repercussions beyond the Congo. If MONUC fails, it is highly likely that the Congo will not sustain its movement towards democratic stability.

Beyond Africa, failure of the most expen-

sive and extensive UN peacekeeping operation would strengthen the pessimists who oppose UN peacekeeping. required to protect the population, then those strategies must be implemented.

In those instances when MONUC is unable to protect civilians, it must at a minimum ensure that abuses are made public and corrective actions taken.

The Obama administration should take the lead in supporting MONUC, rejecting the Bush administration’s unilateralist, episodic approach.

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice knows Central Africa well and understands the importance of maintaining stability and promoting democratic progress in the Congo.

In her first speech to the Security Council, she discussed the suffering of civilians in the Congo and stated,

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If this occurs, continuing instability in the Congo will have important political and economic effects on Congo’s nine immediate neighbors. Beyond Africa, failure of the most expensive and extensive UN peacekeeping operation would strengthen the pessimists who oppose UN peacekeeping.

In the short-term, the Obama administration should provide logistical support to MONUC. For example, the secretary-general reiterated in late January that he had received “no commitments or expressions of interest regarding the remaining air assets (one C-130 and eighteen utility helicopters).”14 The Obama administration should find ways to be responsive

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to these requests. If the United States shows greater interest in supporting MONUC, that leadership is likely to encourage other countries to become more involved. Such support should, of course, be in addition to the substantial economic, humanitarian, and military assistance the United States already provides. For fiscal year 2009, the administration plans to provide approximately $100 million in assistance, not including humanitarian aid. Beyond this, the United States contributes approximately $250 million each year to the operations of MONUC through its overall contributions to UN peacekeeping.15 The Obama administration should begin a dialogue with other concerned nations about providing the logistical and intelligence support MONUC requires. The details of what the United States is best positioned to provide should come out of such a discussion, rather than from unilateral decisions.

While MONUC’s overall ceiling of twenty thousand troops and police is an arbitrary number, the real issue is not the actual troop level. What is important is ensuring that MONUC forces have strong leadership, are effectively supplied, and have detailed missions as to how each unit is to act to protect civilians. Once units are given specific orders and the wherewithal to meet them, they should respond with the same spirit and energy that was seen during the run-up to the 2006 elections.

Conflict&Security

Protecting civilians will also require finding more effective ways to end the threats posed by the FDLR and the LRA. Again, MONUC’s involvement is essential to this; unilateral actions by the Congo will not succeed. The United States should engage with the Congolese so that future operations fully include MONUC and are designed to protect civilians. In the longerterm, the United States should join with other like-minded states in supporting a multi-year strategy to build up key units of the Congolese Army.

This difficult task must be accomplished prior to MONUC’s withdrawal.

In order to reach an acceptable level of security, stability, and democratic governance, the Congo will require many years of active, sustained support from the international community. The Obama administration should recognize the necessity of a long-term commitment and work towards these goals by supporting a robust MONUC presence. Protecting Congolese civilians must become a higher priority, both for the new administration and the international community. This also will require strong U.S. support for the next scheduled national elections in 2011, in which MONUC should play the key role of outside guarantor. The Obama administration’s engagement on these issues would make positive results much more likely. The lives of thousands of Congolese depend on it.

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Notes

1 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Armed with Little but Resolve, and Defending a Hollow Village,” International Herald Tribune, 19 February 2009.

2 Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Rwandan Rebels Slaughter Over 100 Civilians,” 13 February 2009.

3 Jina Moore, “Rwanda-Congo Move Isolates UN Mission,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 January 2009.

4 Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels,” New York Times, 6 February 2009.

5 In 2005, the UN General Assembly endorsed the responsibility to protect, which requires the international community to protect a country’s citizenry when their government cannot.

6 Lydia Polgreen, “A Massacre in Congo, Despite Nearby Support,” The New York Times, 11 December 2008.

7 UN Security Council, Resolution 1856, 22 December 2008.

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8 John Prendergast, ENOUGH Project, testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee for State and Foreign Operations, 12 March 2009.

9 Lydia Polgreen, “A Massacre in Congo.”

10 Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo.”

11 Médecins sans Frontières, “DRC: MSF Denounces the Lack of Protection for Victims of LRA Violence in Haut-Uélé,” 4 February 2009.

12 Lydia Polgreen, “A Massacre in Congo.”

13 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative, on Respect for International Humanitarian Law, in the Security Council, January 29, 2009,” 29 January 2009.

14 UN Security Council, “DR Congo: Letter Dated 27 January 2009 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 27 January 2009.

15 Henry L. Stimson Center, “Keep the Peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 23 March 2007.

Conflict&Security

Keeping an Eye on al-Qaeda in Iraq Jonathan Brookshire The Obama administration plans to withdraw the bulk of U.S. forces from Iraq. It plans to do so slowly over the course of 2009, then more quickly after the Iraqi election at the end of this year, falling to a force below fifty thousand by mid2010. This is an appropriately slow withdrawal that gives the administration sufficient flexibility should the situation in Iraq worsen. Although Iraq has improved dramatically, it is distinctly possible that it will not continue improving. It is essential that the United States not let the popular desire to give up on Iraq color or prejudice the understanding of U.S. interests that require continued involvement in Iraq.

There are three indispensable U.S. interests in Iraq— humanitarian, strategic, and counterterrorism—all of which were sharpened by the American invasion in 2003. The United States has a humanitarian, moral obligation not to let the country it invaded slide into genocide and civil war.

The United States also has a strategic interest in Iraq as an ally in which a great deal of U.S. credibility has been invested; the internationally unpopular initial invasion was bad, but a withdrawal that leaves a collapsing Iraq would be worse.

However, this article focuses on a third interest: the United States must ensure that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a daugh-

Jonathan Brookshire is a senior intelligence analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency.

He has ten years of experience as an analyst including two deployments to Iraq.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the views of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.

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ter organization of al-Qaeda, which thrived in the instability following the invasion, does not increase its activity as American forces leave Iraq. U.S. efforts to combat AQI are important not only for countering the destabilizing terrorist attacks directly committed

ernment with bin Laden’s efforts to expel non-Muslims to create an organization with worldwide aspirations.4 In its geographic history, al-Qaeda demonstrates considerable flexibility as well.

Conceived in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has since relocated to Saudi Arabia,

It is essential that the United States not let the popular desire to give up on Iraq color or prejudice the understanding of U.S. interests that require continued involvement in Iraq. by the group based in Iraq but also as a key part of the wider U.S. effort against al-Qaeda.

Sudan, Afghanistan again, and now, Pakistan.

However, al-Qaeda is most dangerous for its ability to galvanize dispaAl-Qaeda. The 1989 defeat of the rate individuals and organizations from Soviets in Afghanistan was a defining across the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda moment, solidifying in the minds of exploits and empowers other extremist bin Laden and others the potential of groups, adopting their local grievances, lightly-armed fanatics. The defeat of not unlike the communist revolutionthat superpower was essential for the aries of the last century. The result is formation of al-Qaeda because it proved what the RAND Institute called the aljihadists could be successful.1 In fact, Qaeda “nebula,” a set of ideologically driving the Soviets from Afghanistan is reinforcing groups. As Angel Rabasa part of al-Qaeda’s founding mythol- et al. argue, “The scope and dimenogy. It is a heroic myth that sustains the sions of the al-Qaeda nebula are both will of the members and inspires sup- broad and complex. Ties among these porters.2 groups run the gamut from logistiAs Lawrence Wright explained in cal and financial support to combined his seminal work, The Looming Tower, al- operations and joint strategy meetQaeda is a hybrid of Saudi and Egyptian ings.”5 Combating the daughter moveterrorists present in Pakistan during the ments is essential to the struggle against jihad against the Soviets.3 Osama bin al-Qaeda today, and the most promiLaden and Ayman al-Zawahiri formed nent of these is in Iraq. an organization more dangerous than the sum of its parts alone. Al-Qaeda is Iraq Today. Though it faces many remarkable for its ability to reconcile challenges, Iraq is currently stabilizing different priorities, melding Zawahiri’s and the Sunni insurgency is weakendesire to overthrow the Egyptian gov- ing. This is largely due to the surge of

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additional U.S. troops and change in tactics from the heavy-handed methods favored in the early years of the war to the focus on counterinsurgency doctrine throughout the country in 2007.6 But it was accompanied by the concurrent rise of the Sons of Iraq and shortly thereafter the stand-down of the Shi’a militias. The Sons of Iraq, also called “Awakening” movements, are especially important to countering the insurgency because they are Sunni Arabs, too.

Originally based in Anbar Province, but eventually spreading to other parts of Iraq, with U.S. help they organized themselves explicitly to fight AQI. The government of Iraq (GoI) is also strengthening, a turning point being its operations in Basra in March 2008, where the government demonstrated its capability by confronting Shi’a militias.7 And although it represents only a fraction of the total, over two hundred thousand refugees returned to their homes in Iraq in 2008, according to a report by Human Rights Watch.8 In January, Iraq enjoyed provincial elections with minimal violence and greater participation by Sunni Arabs.9 Sunnis boycotted the previous elections, giving rise to provincial leaders who were amenable to the central government, but not representative.10 The current Sunni Arab participation in the Iraqi provincial government directly challenges AQI by establishing an alternative venue for Sunni aspirations. AQI cannot easily claim to be the protector of the Sunnis, as it has done in the past, when there are legitimate, empowered Sunni political parties. Sunni participation in elections is also essential to the long-term goal of political reconciliation in Iraq. The

Conflict&Security

Shi’a-dominated GoI needs provincial leaders who reflect the actual populations of the provinces.

The number of terrorist attacks in Iraq is falling. AQI is responsible for most of the remote car bombs and suicide attacks that take place in Iraq.

Those incidents fell dramatically over 2007, from highs above one hundred a month at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007 to approximately forty in December 2007. Since then, the decline has been more modest, with numbers only falling over the course of 2008 to a monthly average of thirty.11 So the attacks are still subsiding, but the rate of the decline has slowed.

Nevertheless, that is good news.

Better news is that the negative impact of these attacks on the stability of Iraq is substantially diminished, too. In 2006, terrorist attacks threatened to help topple the Iraqi government. Many thought the situation unrecoverable and Iraq destined for chaos. That is what AQI hoped to achieve, as the group thrives on instability. But now the threat of civil war has receded. Iraq’s majority Shi’a population barely reacts to the occasional terrorist atrocities, like the 11 February attack on a Shi’a pilgrimage south of Baghdad that killed dozens.

During the height of the emerging civil war in 2006, similar attacks were followed by waves of counterattacks by Shi’a militant groups against Sunnis.

Another example is the second attack on the Askariya Shi’a shrine in Samarra in June 2007 that did not spark retaliation the way the first bombing did in February 2006.

Iraq has stepped back from civil war, and the Sunni insurgency has wound down, but it does not mean that AQI

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is defeated. Iraq’s progress does work against AQI, though, because where the government is demonstrably failing, the terrorists could claim to offer Sunnis protection against Shi’a militias. Ending the civil war in Iraq has fed a virtuous cycle where improving government stability gives Sunnis an alternative, which in turn deprives AQI of potential supporters, reducing the terrorist group’s capacity to destabilize Iraq.

Qutb. Pakistan is an important safe haven and Afghanistan is a nearby active battlefield, but to al-Qaeda’s longterm goal of radicalizing Sunni Arabs in support of a caliphate, events outside the Arab world simply do not offer the same immediacy.

In addition to being an Arab country, Iraq is in the center of the Islamic world. The advantage al-Qaeda enjoys by being associated with a jihad in the heart of the region is large. AQI’s struggle in Iraq has brought probWhy Iraq Matters to al-Qaeda. ably thousands of foreign fighters from AQI is a distinct but critical part of al- across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Qaeda. It is a daughter organization, and Europe to participate in jihad, but al-Qaeda’s most dangerous one, according to documents captured from conducting dozens of suicide bombings AQI.14 Al-Qaeda understands how every month. It is also the al-Qaeda essential this is for its ultimate goal of offspring that in 2005 and 2006 came radicalizing the wider Islamic world. closest to actually establishing an al- Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian-born Qaeda freehold; not staying under the second-in-command of al-Qaeda, recTaliban or some other group’s protec- ognizes what advantages Iraq offers. tion, but actually al-Qaeda–controlled He was intensely interested in AQI’s territory. The New York Times describes impact on the al-Qaeda movement. In AQI as a “homegrown extremist 2005, Zawahiri sent a letter outlingroup,” but that misses the role it plays ing strategic guidance to Abu Musab in the larger al-Qaeda movement and al-Zarqawi, AQI’s founder. Zawahiri the intimate connections between AQI repeatedly congratulated AQI on havand al-Qaeda leaders.12 Abu Musab al- ing an advantage no other al-Qaeda Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born found- movement has—fighting in the heart of er of AQI, ran a training camp in the Islamic world.15 Zawahiri believed Afghanistan before 9/11 and in 2004 that the “battles on the periphery,” bin Laden publicly named Zarqawi al- including in Afghanistan, were just groundwork for the essential struggle Qaeda’s leader in Iraq.13 Although al-Qaeda’s leaders are in taking place where al-Qaeda’s struggle Pakistan, the movement is focused on really mattered, Iraq.

Thirdly, Iraq is a much richer counthe Arab world, making an active jihad battlefield there invaluable. Al-Qaeda try than Afghanistan, making it a more is a largely Arab movement with few advantageous place for any organizanon-Arab members. It looks to Arab tion. Iraq’s annual per capita GDP ideological forefathers from the four- is $4,000; Afghanistan’s is $800.16 teenth-century scholar Ibn Taymiyah And much of Iraq’s oil is produced in to the twentieth-century Islamist Sayyid northern Iraq, where AQI has lately

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been focused. It is worth more for alQaeda to exercise influence over Iraq than Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda relies on an aura of inevitability.17 Al-Qaeda would have people believe its success was guaranteed by God, and its accomplishments earn it more recruits. Osama bin Laden made this explicit in his December 2001 address. Explaining how the 9/11 attacks strengthened his terrorist group, he used the analogy of people always preferring to follow a strong horse instead of a weak horse.18 By this he meant that when al-Qaeda demonstrated its strength, it was further strengthened by winning over supporters from among

Conflict&Security

Current Challenges. Two immi-

nent events in particular could give AQI a chance to rebound. On 1 February, the United States began transferring detainees from U.S. to GoI custody.

This was part of the security agreement between both countries that went into effect at the beginning of the year to give the GoI more authority.20 The U.S. military will transfer to Iraqi custody up to fifteen hundred detainees a month, many of whom are former terrorists or insurgents. Though the Coalition has procedures in place, some of the detainees may go free if the Iraqi government cannot find grounds to prosecute them.21 Released terrorists could

Whether the cause is tension between

Kurds and Arabs, an ineffective leader, or a gridlocked parliament, a balkanized Iraq would not be strong enough to suppress AQI. the uncommitted. Bin Laden and Zawahiri have made numerous public statements in support of AQI, most recently bin Laden’s on 14 March which called for “backing the Mujahidin in Iraq with everything they need.”19 They have invested their prestige in AQI’s success.

Al-Qaeda’s best hope for Iraq is a rapidly waning U.S. presence and a strengthening AQI. If the United States leaves Iraq in desperation, it offers alQaeda, through AQI, a replication of its victory over the Soviet superpower.

The United States cannot afford to have the al-Qaeda movement invigorated by successfully defining the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as defeat.

bolster AQI’s ranks. Additionally, as part of the continuing transfer of authority to Iraq, the United States has been handing control over the Sons of Iraq groups to the Iraqi government.

These groups were essential to the fight against AQI in 2007 and 2008, but the GoI has reservations about armed Sunni groups and plans to move most of the Sons of Iraq to non-security work.22 Hopefully the rapidly improving Iraqi army and police will be able to take over the work of the Sons of Iraq.

Further down the road, however, Iraq may present even more opportunities for AQI. The future of the Iraqi government is far from certain. Many skillful correspondents have examined

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these pitfalls; the epilogue of Thomas Ricks’ The Gamble is particularly concise and informative.23 Although the dangers come from many directions, the results usually fall into one of two extremes: an Iraqi government too weak to combat AQI or a central government that is so domineering that it drives disaffected Sunni Arabs back into AQI’s arms.

Whether the ultimate cause is tension between Kurds and Arabs, an ineffective leader, or a gridlocked parliament, a balkanized Iraq would not be strong enough to suppress AQI. On the other hand, it does not matter if Moqtada al-Sadr, Prime Minister Maliki, or a military dictator runs an Iraq that brutalizes Sunni Arabs; sympathy for AQI could expand.

Iraq Requires a Continuing U.S. Presence. The U.S. presence in Iraq is necessary to continue mitigating those challenges. The Obama administration’s plan envisions a force in Iraq after 2010 that is still able to conduct counterterrorism missions as well as train and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).24 Those counterterrorism missions have been essential in the fight against AQI.25 While the ISF continued swift improvement in 2008, it is still not capable of conducting the full counter-insurgency mission in Iraq without the United States. Iraqi security personnel continue to rely on U.S. logistics, fire support, communications, close air support, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and planning.26 By the 2010 deadline, the ISF may indeed be ready to take over the full counter-insurgency mission, but if it is not, the United States should

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not rush to draw down at the expense of allowing the insurgency to return.

It is true that early on, aggressive U.S. actions did exacerbate the insurgency in Iraq, but at least since the tactical changes in early 2007, American troops have been effective at reducing violence. Unfortunately, much continuing opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq still clings to the outdated view that U.S. troops are a negative influence in Iraq. The Center for American Progress, for instance, continues to argue that Iraq would be better off without U.S. troops, arguing that their presence “creates a distinct set of incentives for political actors that directly work against the reconciliation that U.S. diplomats try to promote.”27 In fact, the U.S. military presence helps contain political rivalries in Iraq.

Despite dramatic improvements in the efficacy and legitimacy of the Iraqi government, factionalism still presents many challenges. The American military acts as a good faith negotiator.28 During last summer’s standoff between military forces from the Kurdish regional government and those of the central Iraqi government, U.S. military officials prevented the parties from coming to blows.29 Additionally, the U.S. military is a guarantor of minority rights in Iraq and a hedge against coups aimed at seizing control of the Iraqi government. Without the U.S. military, Iraqi factions may be much more prone to raise militias to assert their political rights or to protect themselves from other militias.

The U.S. military’s positive impact has only increased as Iraqis have come to realize that the United States does

Brookshire

Conflict&Security

not intend to exert long-term control over Iraq. The U.S. military presence is in fact viewed favorably by many Iraqis who fear a return to chaos if they depart.30 When then-Senator Obama visited Anbar in July 2008, the assembled tribal leaders asked him not to pull out of Iraq. 31 By 2010, the government of Iraq may request that the United States stay longer. If that is the case, the Obama administration should seriously consider the request and reconsider the strategic value of U.S. investment in Iraq.

that its decision-making is independent of terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda will portray even cutbacks in U.S. troop strength short of full withdrawal as defeat. The United States needs to make reductions in line with progress on the ground in Iraq and never under fire from escalating terrorist attacks.

The United States still has many important objectives to achieve in Iraq before departing. Making AQI irrelevant by continuing to support Iraq is an important victory over the al-Qaeda movement. The United States has Conclusion. No matter what the put monumental resources in Iraq; outcome of its involvement in Iraq, it should take the time to see the the United States should emphasize resources serve it as fully as possible.

Notes

1 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Vintage Books, 2006).

2 The defeat of the Soviets in the Afghan jihad is essential to al-Qaeda’s formation because of al-Qaeda’s historically inaccurate view of the conflict.

Bin Laden’s Afghan Arabs, volunteer fighters from across the Arab world who came to Afghanistan, were ancillary to the fight. It was primarily Pashtuns from their tribal areas on both sides of the AfghanistanPakistan border who beat the Soviets.

3 Wright, The Looming Tower.

4 Ibid., 146.

5 Angel Rabasa et al., “The Global Jihadist Movement,” 2006, Internet, http://rand.org.

6 Frederick W. Kagan, “The Endgame in Iraq,” 15 September 2008, Internet, http://budget.house. gov/hearings.

7 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 286.

8 See 2008 Human Rights Watch: Iraq, 25 February 2009, Internet, http://www.state.gov.

9 James Warden, “Iraqis Festive on Election Day,” Stars and Stripes, 1 February 2009, Internet, http:// www.stripes.com.

10 “Iraq’s Winning Vote,” Washington Post, 4 February 2009, Internet, http://washingtonpost. com.

11 See Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (9010 Report to Congress), 21, Internet, http://www. longwarjournal.org.

12 Rabasa et al., “The Global Jihadist Movement.”

13 Lee Hudson Teslik, “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8 June 2006, Internet, http://www.cfr.org. Dan Murphy, “In Iraq, a clear-cut bin Laden-Zarqawi alliance,” Christian Science Monitor, 30 December 2004, Internet, http://csmonitor.com.

14 See Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), Internet, http://ctc.usma.edu.

15 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 11 October 2005, Internet, http://www.globalsecurity. org.

16 “The World Factbook,” CIA, Internet, https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ index.html.

17 In this respect, too, al-Qaeda’s viewpoint is much like communism, which preached that the dictatorship of the proletariat was historically inevitable.

18 “Transcript Reveals bin Laden’s Terror Planning,” Independent, 14 December 2001, Internet, http://www.independent.co.uk.

19 “Osama bin Laden’s Public Statement of 14 March 2009,” Internet, http://nefafoundation.org.

20 ”U.S. begins releasing detainees under Iraq pact,” Stars and Stripes, 5 February 2009, Internet, http://www.stripes.com.

21 Andrea Stone, “Some Worried About Detainee

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Keeping an Eye on al-Qaeda in iraq

Transfer to Iraq,” USA Today, 25 January 2009, Internet, http:///www.usatoday.com.

22 Greg Bruno, “Finding a Place for the ‘Sons of Iraq,’” Council on Foreign Relations, 9 January 2009, Internet, http://www.cfr.org.

23 Ricks, The Gamble.

24 “President Barack Obama at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,” CBS News, 27 February 2009, Internet, http://cbsnews.com.

25 Ricks, The Gamble, 286.

26 See Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (9010 Report to Congress), iv, Internet, http://www.

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longwarjournal.org.

27 Brian Katulis, “Iraq’s Political Transition after the Surge,” Internet, http://www.americanprogress. org.

28 Ricks, The Gamble, 272.

29 Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “Security Standoff In Iraqi City,” National Public Radio, 22 September 2008, Internet, http://www.npr.org.

30 Karim Hilmi, “Many Iraqis Fear ‘Hasty’ Withdrawal,” MSNBC, 27 February 2009, Internet, http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com.

31 Ricks, The Gamble, 300.

Conflict&Security

The Fearful Symmetry and the New Soldier A New Global Balance of Power Rumu Sarkar The Cold War era locked the United States and the Soviet Union into a political and military standoff based on the grim possibility of nuclear warfare leading to mutually assured destruction. The two superpowers were polarized not only in terms of their underlying ideology and means of governance (democracy vs. communism) but also in their means of economic production (capitalist-based free market economy vs. state-led socialism). Although the political and economic approaches of the former superpowers were strikingly dissimilar, it created the overarching “symmetry” of these two actors, the two most powerful nation-states at the time.

The contradictions contained within socialist regimes eventually led to their collapse, but the peaceful lull that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was shattered on 9/11. We now find ourselves in the second stage of the “asymmetry” posed by global terrorism acting through non-state actors such as al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups.

Asymmetric warfare is not new, but has existed as long as unconventional tactics have been used to counter the overwhelming conventional military superiority of an adversary.

Asymmetric warfare uses unconventional means which may,

Rumu Sarkar is an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University and the senior legal advisor to CALIBRE Systems, a defense consulting firm. She is a specialist in public international law.

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in the current context, include terrorist attacks, weapons of mass destruction, guerrilla warfare, cyber attacks, and information warfare. The “asymmetry” of these warfare tactics tends to even out the relative imbalance in size, tactical approaches, and objectives of the adversaries. Powerful nation-states (not just the two former superpowers) are now threatened by nebulous terrorist groups that have no organized center, armies, or formal governance structure.

The next stage that we are moving towards, in my view, is the “Fearful Symmetry.” The idea of the Fearful Symmetry is based on a poem by the English romantic poet, William Blake, who published Songs of Experience in 1789 that included the poem, The Tyger:

prompted by a fundamental change from the mere tactical level of posing asymmetric threats by global terrorists to an overarching psychological dimension where both sides instill fear in each other. The asymmetric threat of global terrorism is no longer confined to conflict zones with specific military engagements underway, but now affects civilians in every walk of life.

Global Fundamentalist Islamist-Based Terrorism: One Size Does Not Fit All. It is

important to make a very basic distinction between Islamic-based separatist (or secessionist) movements that employ terrorist means and the so-called global fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorist movement. For example, the Philippine and Kashmiri separatist moveTyger Tyger, burning bright, ments (along with Hamas in Palestine In the forests of the night; and Hezbollah in Lebanon) are localWhat immortal hand or eye, ized “terror-based” movements that Could frame thy fearful symmetry?1 perhaps may be narrowly viewed in the same light as the Basque separatNot only are we intimidated by ter- ists in Spain, the Irish Republic Army, rorist acts (an obvious outcome since the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or the that is their aim), but it appears that Chiapas rebels in Mexico, to cite a few many Islamist terrorists are also fearful examples of terrorist groups who also (if not actually terrorized) by the per- have discrete political objectives and ceived threat posed by Western ideals goals.2 In contrast, other fundamentaland institutions. In other words, the ist global jihadist movements are more ideas of universal suffrage, representa- closely aligned in principles and tactics tive government, participatory democ- to the Red Brigade in Italy, which has a racy, respecting the rights of women more diffuse political agenda of revoluand religious and ethnic minorities, tionary change through violent means. and free market economic practices and A significant underlying theme that institutions are deeply problematic for unites the examples of Islamic-based Islamist terrorist networks and opera- separatist movements discussed above tives. is the failure of the state as an instituThe transformation from asym- tion of governance to create an ordered metric threats posed by global terror- society. A second failure that can no ism to the Fearful Symmetry is being longer be ignored is the failure to hold

[ 6 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Sarkar

state leaders accountable to their own people. Thus, the failure of the state may be viewed as being twofold—both in terms of governing and in being governed. Indeed, if these Islamic-based separatist movements are responding to the failure of state-led governance by seeking to establish new political entities (whether nation-states such as Pal-

Conflict&Security

of hatred.”3 This ideology empowers its adherents through loathing and the single-minded pursuit of disruption, terrorism, and destabilization of Western-styled economies. Its actions largely feed off the despair, disempowerment, and disenfranchisement of frenzied young Muslims.

Global jihadists have no interest in

Islamist terrorists are also fearful (if not actually terrorized) by the perceived threat posed by Western ideals and institutions. estine or some other form of autonomous self-governed unit), then perhaps hope still remains that they have not abandoned the structure of the state altogether despite its many failings. As a result, a state-centered solution is preferable as it is geographically contained, and fits within the generally accepted and familiar constructs of international political relations and diplomatic dialogue. It is certainly far less threatening than the “asymmetric threats” posed

by Islamic fundamentalist-based global terrorism.

nation-building as such, and tend to use ungoverned or ungovernable territories such as Waziristan and Afghanistan in an opportunistic way. If permitted to govern (following the Taliban model), however, the imposition of tribalistic structures does not help alleviate poverty, nor does it provide for effective political governance. This type of rule tends to exacerbate existing structural problems of political governance and economic growth. In fact, this is a recipe for continued marginalization and failure. It is foreseeable that the deepening human misery caused by Global “Jihadism.” While it the failure to address the basic human appears that Islamic-based separatists needs of its population will lead to a have responded to the crisis of the state further collapse of the societies where in a secularized fashion using violence fundamentalist Islamist-based global as a means to gain political power, terrorists establish a foothold. global “jihadists” (for lack of a better On a deeper level, the so-called “ideterm) have adopted a very different ology of hatred” fundamentally miscourse of action. Certain commenta- understands man’s acquisitive nature. tors have noted that in response to the From an outsider’s point of view, failure of modernity and its accompa- much of the furious hatred of Islamic nying ideological foundation, al-Qae- fundamentalist jihadists seems to be da has developed a more profoundly based on envy and deep mistrust of religiously-influenced “new ideology Western economic successes, political

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dominance, and cultural hegemony— its luxury goods, in fact. However, the ultimate luxury good is the freedom of choice: the freedom to choose and to take risks to support those choices (as institutionalized by the genius of capitalism) is the supreme freedom.

Deliberately choosing (and imposing on others) the “unfreedom” of having no or few choices that are dictated by religious leaders or tribal warlords does not constitute real empowerment.

Indeed, far from disempowering other nation-states, global terrorism acts to disempower its own adherents by cultivating despair and a lack of hope for the future—or simply the belief that tomorrow will be better than today.

While this ideology claims to be faithbased, it mocks faith-based values that are universal in nature.

If, on the other hand, Islamic-based global terrorists have not fundamentally misinterpreted man’s nature and are willing to kill for it and, more importantly, to die for this state of “unfreedom,” then we are all lost. They have, in effect, created a new kind of human being that is impervious to the values of human civilization, not the least of which is the regard for the sanctity of human life. In fact, the systematic indoctrination of a creed of violence and the uncompromising repression of human creativity affecting all spheres of life may create a terrifying new sensibility that implicitly encourages a wanton disregard for human life. There truly is no real response to someone who is willing to die, when we clearly are not.

One response to consider is the introduction of alternative cultural values such as tolerance, respect, acceptance, and peaceful conflict resolution.

[ 70] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

These efforts, if undertaken, should be directed to all Islamic-based extremists not by outsiders but by members of their own community to start with. A constructive dialogue needs to be put in place and should be aimed not only at Islamic separatist-based movements but at global jihadists as well. Providing alternate courses of action (particularly through creative, non-violent means) may be a useful starting point to help them think differently—but merely providing job opportunities certainly will not be enough in light of the fact that the newest recruits are already well educated and employed individuals. Of course, the first question that will need to be answered for them is, “Why pursue this course of action?” What do terrorists (or would-be terrorists) have to gain by participating in belief systems and structures that no longer have any validity for them? This loss of faith and the disaffection that they feel is very real and needs to be addressed. But this remains, at least for now, an openended question.

A New Soldier. A second level of

engagement with global jihadists is to create a “New Soldier” for the battlefield of the Fearful Symmetry. This battlefield encompasses far more than actual theaters of war—it is a war that is also being fought in the battlefield of public perception. In this psychocultural war, empathy demonstrated by the New Soldier may be far more important than wielding arms. The New Soldier must exhibit the highly subjective qualities of compassion, wisdom, and heightened intuitive and perceptive abilities that will enable him or her to navigate in unknown cultural, linguis-

Sarkar

tic, and emotional terrains. In other words, shaping perceptions should be elevated to a form of art.4 Arming and protecting the New Soldier fighting the Fearful Symmetry means training the soldier, marine, and airman in the new weapons of war: empathy, compassion, and cultural understanding. By building tactical intelligence based on the soldier perceiving his surroundings in ways that are intuitive as well as psychological will best protect him. Teaching wisdom and perceptive decision-making in the military leaders of tomorrow will also help them forge new political and military alliances and build indigenous armies from the ground up.

Creating and Recruiting the New Soldier. For this New Soldier to win on a tactical level on the battlefield of the Fearful Symmetry, he will need to learn new skills from different disciplines such as history, languages, sociology, and psychology in order to navigate unfamiliar cultures and emotional terrains. Further, these new soldiers will need to be deployed in smaller units; they will need to be trained to move seamlessly from traditional warfare with a conventional enemy, to combat irregular threats, to provide humanitarian assistance. Additional time will be required, not only to effectuate these profound changes to soldiering, but also in order to train soldiers in intuitive decision-making and wisdom.4 (This recommendation, of course, assumes that intuition and wisdom can be both taught and learned.)

If this intuitive tactical and strategic military approach is fully adopted

Conflict&Security

and implemented by American military forces and its allies, does this mean that these forces will ultimately win the Global War on Terror (the Fearful Symmetry)? The outcome is uncertain, but if we can learn to face global terrorists’ unrelenting, deadly, and uncompromising hatred and commitment to our violent destruction—and respond with empathy, compassion, and intuitive decision-making on the battlefield—this may be the greatest lesson that human history has to offer. In fact, I would argue that this new non-linear, intuitive soldiering will assimilate the best of Eastern and Western traditions including, arguably, those lessons from Islam that teach empathy and compassion.

Indeed, creating and cultivating a corps of the New Soldier is an extraordinarily difficult undertaking, and one to which most national standing armies and military establishments are unwilling to commit. While it is not certain if broader non-military interventions in the securitization, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction process is forthcoming, it is clear that military forces (whether unilateral or multilateral) are the first actors in conflict and post-conflict situations. Therefore, I would argue that the need for the New Soldier, whether acting for unilateral or multilateral forces, is a necessary agent of stability and, paradoxically, of change.

Ultimately, I would argue that the corps of the New Soldier should reside within multilateral armed forces and peacekeeping units such as the UN, NATO, the EU, the African Union (AU), and the G8’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral

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program that will create a self-sustaining peacekeeping force of seventy-five thousand largely African soldiers by 2010.5 The concept of the New Soldier may also be relevant to the Africa Counterinsurgency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, and other military and paramilitary programs in Great Britain, France, Spain, India, Indonesia, Morocco, the Philippines, and other countries.6 By this, I mean that the New Soldier should form a cadre of soldiers that operate within and that are fully under the command of existing multilateral forces.

Multilateral and regional peacekeeping forces are better suited to fighting the wars of the New Soldier since such forces are predicated on multilateralism based on multilingual and multicultural approaches. Indeed, a RAND study points out that multilateral peacekeeping forces have added credibility, lower operating costs, and more access to seasoned professionals who have experience in handling crises created by collapsed states.7 Thus, rather than creating conflicts with standing national

ment for reformulated and new military interventions with much broader goals in mind may need to be negotiated and agreed upon by the members and participants. The political implications are quite far-reaching, and this needs to be part of the paradigm shift not only for the U.S. military for its long-term sustenance, but also for other national and multilateral militaries that are also being strained by the demands of insurgencies and global terrorism.

The interventions that the New Soldier should initially focus on should be in providing (1) humanitarian relief; (2) securitization and stabilization; and, (3) conflict resolution and prevention. Ultimately, the New Soldier should create the backdrop for initiating a diplomatic dialogue to end hostilities and begin the peace and reconciliation process. Thus, the underlying articles of association of multilateral military forces such as NATO, the UN, and related organizations and units may need to be changed or overhauled to reflect the need and support for the New Soldier. This may mean broader

The Fearful Symmetry will only be re-

solved when and if the global terrorists themselves learn to love­–not us, but themselves. armies, perhaps it is time to examine taking a new approach by reinvesting in and creating new forms of militarized interventions to be undertaken by the New Soldier.

If this approach is adopted, it will mean that the underlying commitments, missions, and rules of engage-

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authorities, for example, to intervene internationally by regional military forces, where necessary. For example, the AU may be tasked with setting up peacekeeping forces in the Philippines.

Further, as a New Soldier is being created, the recruitment strategies may also need to be drastically altered. There

Sarkar

is significant concern that changing the focus away from the kinetic aspects of warfare to “softer” skills involved in conflict prevention and reconciliation as well as nation-building exercises will conflict with and demoralize existing military structures—after all, established militaries are built on a different set of skills and expectations. Therefore, perhaps a new track of a military career needs to be formulated and promulgated to attract the officers and other personnel who wish to develop the new skill sets necessary for the New Soldier.

Since the New Soldier has a different mission that is based on a different perspective and training, the underlying core curriculum of military schools may need to be changed significantly.

Retired military officers may wish to lead the effort in order to share their lessons learned and perspective with others, and help shift the military paradigm to include a different kind of soldiering by creating a different kind of soldier. As Secretary of Defense Gates put it, “New institutions are needed for the twenty-first century, new organizations with a twenty-first century mindset.”8 This may be the new challenge: to create the New Soldier, not in conflict with the soldier of today, but as a new and invaluable partner for the military of tomorrow.

Resolving the Fearful Symmetry. Creating a New Soldier is a criti-

Conflict&Security

cal step towards resolving the Fearful Symmetry. This soldier needs to demonstrate the highly subjective qualities of empathy and intuition along with a heightened perception of his surroundings, enabling him to move fearlessly in different cultural, linguistic, and emotional domains. Such a soldier needs to be both intuitive and wise— this means that different cultural values (especially within the military) will need to be cultivated in order to create this new kind of soldier.

Despite any efforts to create and deploy a New Soldier, the Fearful Symmetry will only be resolved when and if the global terrorists themselves learn to love—not us, but themselves. Only by giving up their destructive nihilism and replacing it with a sense of self-respect and the respect for others will the Fearful Symmetry truly end. This is quite a challenge, and there is no evidence that there is even a remote possibility that this challenge will be met.

By restoring hope, though, we restore faith in the belief that we can and must live peaceably together. The true leaders in the Fearful Symmetry are those who can inspire hope, faith, trust, and, finally, love. Only when we are able to live peaceably together will the promise of the future be restored to us. At that point, we may move past the Fearful Symmetry and welcome a new era of history that will begin when this one ends.

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Notes

1 William Blake, Songs of Innocence and Experience (Oxford University Press, 1970).

2 See F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/ October 2005): 62-76.

3 Khaled Abou El-Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Isla m,” Boston Review (December 2001/January 2002) available at http://bostonreview.net/BR26.6/ elfadl.html (date accessed: 15 August 2007). The author, the Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at UCLA, alleges that the theological premises of global terrorism derived from “the intolerant Puritanism of the Wahabi and Salafi creeds.” Salafism argued, according to the author, that the demands of modernity should be responded to by “a return to the original sources of the Qur’an and sunnah (tradition of the Prophet).”

4 Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, “Clausewitz and WW IV,” Armed Forces Journal (July 2006), Internet, http:// www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/07/1866019 (date accessed: 2 August 2007).

4 Ibid.

5 See Beth De Grasse, David Dickson, and

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Michael Dziedzic, “Global Peace Operations Initiative: Future Prospects,” United States Institute of Peace (21 October 2004), Internet, http://www.usip. org/newsmedia/releases/2004/1021_nbgpoi.html (date accessed: 11 September 2008).

6 See Daniel Volman, “AFRICOM: The New U.S. Military Command for Africa,” Concerned Africa Scholars, (8 July 2008), Internet, http:// concernedafricascholars.org/africom-the-new-usmilitary-command-for-africa/ (date accessed: 11 September 2008).

7 James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, comps., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), xxv, xxxvi, xxxvii-xxxviii.

8 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture” (lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007), U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/ speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (date accessed: 22 August 2008).

Culture&Society Hajj 2.0

Technology’s Impact on the Muslim Pilgrimage Shahed Amanullah For over fourteen centuries, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, known as the hajj, has been one of the focal points in the life of every Muslim. While there are many themes that permeate this annual event—unity among believers, atonement for sin, reflections on the origins of Islam—the core of the hajj is ultimately a reminder of a personal relationship between a believer and the divine. Stripped of worldly possessions, sleeping in tents on the fields of Mina, and wearing only two pieces of cloth, the hajj’s culmination on the Plain of Arafat is meant to evoke the Day of Judgment, when all humanly concerns are forgotten in the face of meeting one’s creator. For too many people, however, the shrill sound of a mobile phone pulls pilgrims right back into the real world.

In just a few decades, rapid technological advances throughout the Muslim world have spilled over into one of the world’s most sacred rituals. What once was literally the journey of a lifetime is now planned and purchased online with the click of a mouse. Dirt-floor accommodations and street food of questionable origins have given way to hotels and shopping malls built more to compete with tourist destinations such as Las Vegas than to facilitate the intensely personal, spiritual journey of the hajj. And Muslims—many of

Shahed Amanullah is editor-in-chief of the Web site altmuslim.com. He writes frequently on the challenges and opportunities facing Muslims today for the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other leading publications.

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whom come from countries with some of the world’s highest rates of mobile phone penetration—cannot resist the urge to share the excitement of the experience with friends and relatives through voice mail and SMS (Short Message Service).

While modernization has changed the face of the hajj, technology has

itself) and a timeless reminder of the central relationship between a Muslim believer, shorn of worldly possessions and distractions, and the divine. The simplicity of the event even extends to the garb that pilgrims wear—two plain white pieces of un-sewn cloth.

During the ten-day experience, up to three million pilgrims complete a series

In just a few decades, rapid technological

advances throughout the Muslim world have spilled over into one of the world’s most sacred rituals. also put this once inaccessible journey within the reach of millions who would not otherwise have had the opportunity. And with an ever-increasing annual attendance, hajj authorities are forced to look for creative technological solutions to logistical challenges.

Can an analog ritual like the hajj be enhanced through digital means? How can technology be used to facilitate the hajj experience and make it accessible to millions of Muslims without adversely impacting its spiritual nature? And can that very personal conversation a hajji (one who performs the hajj) is said to have with Allah survive amid the phone calls and Internet cafés?

Hajj: Then and Now. Few aspects

of Muslim life reach so directly into the earliest days of Islam than the hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage that is a central tenet in Muslims’ faith and meant to be performed at least once in a lifetime. At its core, the hajj is a commemoration of the origins of Islam (and monotheism

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of physically taxing rituals and movements—running between two nearby hills; circumnavigating the Kaaba, an extremely sacred cubical building; casting stones at pillars said to represent the devil; standing in contemplation on a vast plain; and ritually sacrificing a sheep. These acts represent key historical and spiritual events in Abrahamic history. As each day’s events are specified by tradition, there is no overt organizing effort behind the collective action—pilgrims silently perform the rituals in the daily order in which they have been performed for centuries, then dissipate once the rituals have been completed.

The hajj was once celebrated as the once-in-a-lifetime obligation it truly was—a momentous occasion for which Muslims spent a lifetime preparing.

The rigors of the hajj made it difficult for women and children to make the journey along with the men in the family. And aside from those with means or who lived nearby, the idea of some-

Amanullah

one performing the hajj multiple times seemed extravagant and unnecessary.

In the past half-century, however, the hajj has been transformed by the forces of globalization and modernity. As the hajj becomes more accessible physically and financially, Muslims from every conceivable demographic, educational, and economic background have permanently altered the way the hajj is organized, performed, and practiced.

Increasing numbers of pilgrims attend as many times as budgets will allow, and the number of female pilgrims has reached relative parity with men.1 Yet unlike the past, distractions are now everywhere. Pilgrims of the past were exhorted to exhibit sabr (patience) in response to the hajj’s physical ordeals. Sabr is now in order when one hears a constant cacophony of ringing mobile phones, which occurs despite official pleas to keep them on vibrate mode so that others can concentrate on their prayers. Visual distractions also abound, with familiar signage for Western brands such as Starbucks and Cinnabon beckoning worshippers to meet the needs of their bodies as well as their minds. And Allah help the Internet addict—access to e-mail and the Web continues to grow despite official discouragement.

Few can argue that the hajj of today, at least externally, resembles anything like the journeys of the pre-industrial age. Fewer still can argue with the fact that the application of technology to the hajj has helped make it safer, easier, and more accessible. But the true challenge that technology poses to the hajj is not in the means through which it is implemented, but in its effect on the overall spiritual experience. Modernization

Culture&Society

and technology have replaced one type of hardship (walking for miles through the desert) with another (dealing with growing crowds and distractions), and in this lies one of the new meanings of the hajj. What was once an exercise in determination and will has now become an exercise of focus, a challenge to Muslims to keep their thoughts on the divine and not be lured away by commercial trappings and communication tools that keep people tied to work and family back home.

Bringing Ease—and More Pilgrims—to the Hajj. Aside from

adding the ships that ply the oceans to the ships of the desert that had usually carried pilgrims to Mecca, the hajj changed little in its first thirteen centuries. In fact, as recently as 1950 there were only one hundred thousand pilgrims during the hajj, most of whom traveled by land or ship.2 By 1990, however, over 90 percent of pilgrims arrived on chartered flights, and those who came by land mostly used modern freeways.3 At some point in the near future, cars may not even be necessary, with high-speed rail and alternative people-mover systems in the works.4 The most obvious technological advances employed in the organization of the hajj have grown out of logistical necessity. A new field—hajj logistics—has emerged to enable increasing numbers of pilgrims to perform the hajj in comfortable conditions. A crucial aspect of hajj logistics is crowd control, made apparent by a series of deadly incidents due to overcrowding and trampling in the 1980s and 1990s that claimed thousands of lives.5 One particular ritual—the stoning of

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pillars, which represent the devil, along the Jamarat Bridge—is responsible for the majority of these deaths. “You have a vast number who want to carry out the stoning ritual at noon,” explains Bassem Haddad, an engineer tasked with upgrading the bridge. “Having 3 million people concentrated in one area creates an inherently dangerous environment.”6 While there are few analogies to this scenario that would suggest a possible solution, the dilemma was remedied by planners who noticed something interesting—the growing crowds of the hajj had begun to exhibit behaviors similar to the flow of water around obstacles.7 By changing the framework from one of crowd control to one of fluid dynamics, engineers were able to redesign the Jamarat Bridge to channel a greater flow of pilgrims safely.

The new multi-tiered bridge, partially opened in 2006, has to date accommodated large crowds without incident.

Many of the storied hardships of yesteryear have also been addressed to some extent through the application of technology. The extreme heat, especially on the plains near Mount Arafat where pilgrims must spend a full day, is now alleviated by water misters that cover acres of pilgrims with a cooling spray. Large structures such as the Masjid al-Haram, which envelops the Kaaba and shelters those running between the hills of Safa and Marwa, are now air-conditioned.

Even something as seemingly mundane as the water from the well of Zam Zam— considered holy by Muslims—is now purified, cooled, and pumped in vast quantities.

As other aspects of the hajj become apparent as performance bottlenecks and safety hazards, authorities are plan-

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ning other technological fixes, including the use of radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags to track pilgrim movements, Global Positioning System (GPS) devices in the hands of thousands of Saudi Boy Scouts to help guide wayward pilgrims, and a network of security cameras linked to a control center to enable rapid response to problems.8

The Changing Landscape of the Hajj. The hajj is often associated with

hardship. One of the central commemorations of the hajj is the recollection of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son for God. Physical difficulty— circumambulating the Kaaba (which becomes exponentially more difficult as the crowd circumference grows), sleeping overnight on the open plains of Mina, and running between the hills of Safa and Marwa—remains a key tenet of the hajj. But these hardships will inevitably be alleviated. The need to accommodate growing crowds has become the central concern of hajj authorities, who are sparing no expense in transforming the infrastructure of the hajj to something more akin to Disneyland than ancient Arabia.

Unfortunately, one of the drawbacks of the modernization of hajj infrastructure is the near complete destruction of historical artifacts, except for the Kaaba itself. The streamlining of the hajj has resulted in the destruction of nearly three hundred historical buildings over the past fifty years.9 In the place of ancient brick buildings, some dating to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, are modern shopping malls giving new meaning to the phrase “shopping mecca.” While the hajj has always been a place where commerce took place

Amanullah

among pilgrims, trade has usually been a secondary purpose, most often connected with the financing of the journey itself. Today, however, Mecca is a global marketplace in every sense of the word, and pilgrims—many of whom are traveling outside their home country for the first time—often take empty suitcases to fill with jewelry, electronic goods, and other items. The contrast between the austerity of the pilgrims’ garb—two plain pieces of white cloth—and the material excess being peddled across the street from Islam’s most sacred shrine has not gone unnoticed by critics, but it is an aspect of the hajj that is both expected by the modern pilgrim and tacitly encouraged by authorities.10 The hajj is often likened to a personal conversation with God. But technology has allowed hajj pilgrims to share this conversation with family and friends in real time. As pilgrims round the Kaaba, you can hear muffled conversations with loved ones back home, or mobile phones jutting high into the air to take a photo. “I am so happy,” commented one Egyptian pilgrim who was using his mobile phone to relay the sermon back to his wife at home. “It felt like both me and my wife were facing Allah together.”11 So while the hajj remains a very personal experience, pilgrims are feeling more open about sharing the experience with loved ones back home, which for some makes it a more meaningful experience. “At first, sending mobile phone photos struck me as rude,” explains Aamer Jamali, a recent pilgrim. “But when I stopped to think about it, if the motive underlying these phone calls to beloveds was one of intense respect and veneration, then what is wrong with that emotion mani-

Culture&Society

festing itself through a modern medium? Would anyone object to someone quietly writing a letter or sketching the scene in charcoal?”12 For the purist, there is much to dislike—water from the Zam Zam well now comes out of a tap and not a storied hole in the ground, glitzy distractions beckon the pilgrim back to worldly affairs, and historical buildings are razed to make room for sleek new facilities.

While there is significant debate on how—if it is even possible anymore—to preserve the historical atmosphere of the hajj, technology and modernization will continue to leave the experience barely recognizable to a pilgrim that participated only a few decades ago.

Open-Sourcing the Pilgrimage. One of the rituals of hajj con-

sists of running seven times between two hills named Safa and Marwa. This is meant to re-enact Hagar’s frantic search for water for her infant son.

Now, one pilgrim runs the route with his hand extended in front of him, a camera phone capturing the entire event on video for posterity.

The most significant impact technology has made on the hajj is not external, but rather on its internal spiritual nature. Technology has torn down the walls of mystique surrounding the hajj, both from within as authorities struggle with the problems of growth and overcrowding, and more significantly from without, as Muslims connect more viscerally with the experience and shape it to their desires.

Many significant changes have been driven by changing demographics and market conditions. It is telling that one of the strongest indicators for hajj

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participation, aside from income and literacy, is mobile-phone usage.13 Pilgrims are increasingly Internet savvy, planning and securing their hajj travel online, and can rate and review travel agents online, improving the agents’ quality and level of service.14 Coordinating groups of pilgrims, from families to tour groups, is now almost unthink-

story before the hajji has even returned.

Hajj authorities try to limit access to the Internet, but overwhelming demand for Web access and mobile data plans will likely prevail in the long run.

Hajj pilgrims are now able to control the experience of the pilgrimage in ways that were never possible before. For the pilgrims of old, the hajj was something

With today’s hajj being performed in relative comfort, it is easy to be lured into vacation mode rather than a state of worship. And there lies the struggle of the modern hajji. able without the use of mobile phones.

And while on the journey, pilgrims can reference downloadable portable document format (PDF) guides designed for viewing on mobile phones and track their movement via GPS devices.15 The first barrier technology broke was that of information. For centuries, the hajj was a storied journey to be recounted in person to eager relatives waiting at home, celebrated in folk paintings and mythologized in journal accounts.16 It was, by all accounts, a larger-than-life experience shrouded in mystery, with the stories only told by those few fortunate to have gone.

Reporting from the hajj—even by Muslim journalists—was frowned upon until recently, and Saudi police would confiscate cameras on sight.17 Today, however, Muslims not attending in person can perform the hajj vicariously through live hajj blogging,18 Flickr photosets,19 and streaming multimedia of the hajj rituals. Like many vacations these days, loved ones at home know the whole

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that you rode like a wave wherever it took you. There was very little control over the experience; you were told to prepare yourself mentally and physically to endure whatever challenges the hajj put in your lap. Transit fees were non-negotiable, accommodations were minimal, and few options were available other than to perform the rituals as directed. But as new channels of information flow began to open, first with inexpensive telephone communications and most recently with the Internet, pilgrims began to focus their purchasing and communication power to shape the experience, and Saudi authorities had little choice but to respond.

Today’s hajj is what it is because its attendees have shaped it that way, moving from accepting it as a timeless throwback to a historical event to an experience that meets the needs of modern-day Muslims, who have collectively decided that physical hardship during the hajj—or even perceived hardship such as a lack of Internet or

Amanullah

mobile phone connectivity—is a thing of the past. And a new culture of inquiry and information sharing brought about by the Internet age, driven by one of the fastest growing Web user bases in the world, has forced authorities to comply.

What Lies Ahead. Modernization

in general, and technology in particular, has and will continue to alter the face of the hajj, and not even the most conservative elements of Muslim society seem able to stop it. Islamic scholars need to contextualize this change and imbue it with meaning that is relevant to an increasingly sophisticated, educated, and connected umma (community). The use of technology can either make the experience transformative or simply garish and tacky. It is up to the community of pilgrims, as well as hajj authorities, to moderate its use for the greatest possible spiritual gain.

The hajj is meant to prepare Muslims for the Day of Judgment, when all will be gathered before God, and pilgrims must live that experience as if it were real. With today’s hajj being performed in relative comfort, it is easy to be lured into vacation mode rather than a state of worship. And there lies the struggle

Culture&Society

of the modern hajji.

Rather than looking at technology’s impact on the hajj as an irresistible force striking an immovable object, perhaps it is best to look at whether the new hajj can fulfill its role as a spiritual touchstone in new and unexpected ways. For example, sending text messages as one circumambulates the Kaaba may seem trite, but it has a powerful effect on the recipient that will linger until he or she is able to experience the event personally.

When I performed the hajj twenty years ago, I witnessed something that illustrated the profound impact that technology can have. An elderly pilgrim—perhaps one of those who still traveled by foot from a faraway land—stared in awe at a newly installed water faucet activated by an infrared beam. Clearly not understanding how it worked, he repeatedly moved his hand back and forth, turning the stream on and off. “Ya Allah!” (Oh, God!), he exclaimed in wonder, thinking perhaps that divine powers were at work in this holy land. Perhaps this is a sign that despite—or in this case, because of— technology, there are still opportunities for the mystique of the hajj to find its way into the hearts of the devout.

Notes

1 Robert Bianchi, Guests of God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 194.

2 Christine Huda Dodge, “The Hajj Through History,” Internet, http://islam.about.com/od/hajj/a/ hajj_history.htm (date accessed: 26 March 2009).

3 Michael Wolfe, One Thousand Roads to Mecca (New York: Grove Press, 1997), xxvi.

4 BBC News, “China to Build Mecca Rail System,” Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_ east/7883182.stm (date accessed: 11 February 2009).

5 Other causes of mass death have included fires in the crowded tent city of Mina and rioting in the wake of political protest.

6 Meed: Middle East Business Intelligence, “Hajj Logistics: Going with the Flow,” Internet, http:// www.meed.com/power/specialreport/2006/02/hajj_ logistics_going_with_the_flow.html (date accessed: 28 March 2009).

7 Taken from research done by G. Keith Still of Crowd Dynamics, Ltd. See http://www.crowddynamics.com/Workshops/CDL%20-%20MoH.htm.

8 Zvika Krieger, “Mecca’s People Movers,” Newsweek, 15 December 2007.

9 Laith Abou-Ragheb, “Developers and Purists Erase Mecca’s History,” The Age, 11 July 2005.

10 Abu Muneer Ismail Davids, Getting the Best out of al-

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Hajj (Pligrimage) (Houston: Darussalam, 2006).

A guide to hajj shopping begins on page 121.

11 Syed Faisal Ali, “Hajj Goes Better with Mobile Phones,� Arab News, 20 January 2005.

12 Aamer Jamali, e-mail communication with author, Maryland, 17 February 2009.

13 Robert Bianchi, Guests of God, 162.

14 Ratings of popular U.S. hajj tour packages are available at http://www.halalapalooza. com/sc.php?id=239.

15 Hajj e-books are available at http://www. islamicbulletin.com/services/hajj.htm. Windows Mobile software is available at http://

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www.soft32.com/download_161393.html.

16 A selection of hajj paintings can be found at http://www.slideshare.net/lawrencerlst/hajjpics-presentation.

17 During my own hajj in 1985, I was able to sneak a camera into the Masjid al-Haram, but could take photos only surreptitiously.

18 A live hajj blogging example can be seen at http://blog.kamranpasha.com/?cat=1.

19 Flickr is an online photo storage and sharing service. One such example can be found at http://www.flickr.com/groups/allhajj/pool.

Law&Ethics Navigating Troubled Waters Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism Christopher Joyner Pirates operating from Somalia have made the waters off the Horn of Africa the most dangerous in the world. In January 2009, the Piracy Reporting Centre in the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau released its annual piracy report, which indicated a stunning upsurge in unlawful maritime seizures over the previous year. In 2008, a total of 293 piratical incidents targeted ships worldwide—an escalation of more than 11 percent from 2007. Of forty-nine successful hijackings during 2008, forty-two occurred off the coast of Somalia.1 In November 2008, Somali pirates seized the Liberian-flagged but Saudiowned Sirus Star, making it the largest tanker ever hijacked.

The crude carrier was carrying two million barrels of oil valued at $100 million.2 However, all types of vessels with varying freeboards and speeds were targeted during 2008, including, on 25 September, the MV Faina, a Ukrainian freighter that carried as its cargo thirty-three T-72 tanks, rocket launchers, and small arms purportedly bound for Kenya.3 The hijacking of the MV Faina sparked an unprecedented naval response, as warships from the United States, India, Britain, France, Germany, China, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea rushed to join the anti-piracy campaign.4

Christopher Joyner is director of the Institute for International Law and Politics and professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

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This article explains why these acts of piracy are occurring offshore Somalia.

It then evaluates how this dramatic escalation in attacks both adversely affects international shipping and confuses the legal conception of piracy under modern international law. Finally, the piece offers some modest recommendations for multinational action that could contribute to suppressing

shipping in the twenty-first century is marked by violence, professional organization, and sophisticated planning. A dangerous trend has emerged over the past decade, namely the emergence of organized pirate gangs that can conduct multi-ship operations and use paramilitary tactics, with “mother” ships launching attack speed boats.

Four main pirate factions operate along

Gone is the era when pirates like Johnny

Depp’s Captain Jack Sparrow wore eye patches, fought with swords, and flew the Jolly Roger. the Somali coast, the most notable of which is composed of traditional Somali fishermen who operate near Puntland in northeastern Somalia and are known as the “Puntland Group.”5 Several factors have contributed to the recent escalation of piracy attacks off the Somali coast. Over the past decade, increased trade and globalization caused tremendous growth in maritime comEscalation of Somali Pirate mercial traffic. Annually, over 6.8 bilAttacks. Gone is the era when pirates lion tons of goods are moved across the like Johnny Depp’s Captain Jack Sparrow world oceans in a global trade system wore eye patches, fought with swords, valued at $7.4 trillion. At least 90 perand flew the Jolly Roger. Modern pirates cent of that worldwide trade travels by wear Ray-Bans, communicate by cel- ship at some point, and a considerable lular phones, and cut swiftly across the portion of it sails around the Horn of seas in high-speed skiffs. Most pirates Africa.6 More ships sailing the Indian are twenty to thirty-five years old, work Ocean sea lanes obviously provide more for themselves, and bribe port officials potential targets for pirates to attack. to allow them to use ports as bases of Second, there is the geo-strategic operation, as well as to bring captured problem of commercial vessels havvessels in for sanctuary while they nego- ing to pass through constricted choketiate ransoms with the ship owners. points along their shipping routes Somali piracy against commercial rounding the Horn of Africa. Near pirate attacks and maritime violence against commercial vessels and cruise ships in waters offshore the Horn of Africa. It demonstrates how the 1985 seajacking of the Achille Lauro and the subsequent legal quandary led to new agreements that broadened the rules relating to piracy and encompassed politically motivated terrorist attacks.

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JOyner

Somalia, there is the Bab el-Mandeb, which leads from the Indian Ocean, around the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea up to the Suez Canal. This narrow, often congested bottleneck requires that ships significantly reduce speed to ensure safe passage, which also enhances their vulnerability to sea-based attacks by pirate speedboats.

Third, the financial crisis has made piracy and other maritime crimes more attractive to offset falling wages, higher food prices, and increasing unemployment. Somalia remains one of the world’s poorest states, with as much as 73 percent of the population living on less than two dollars a day.7 Many Somali pirates are former fishermen whose livelihood improved during the 1980s from aid provided by Denmark, Great Britain, Sweden, Japan, and Russia. However, with the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the outbreak of civil war that year, and the intrusion of foreign fishing fleets, the fishing industry in Somalia collapsed, and many former fishermen turned to piracy. The domestic situation was further complicated by the involvement of Somali warlords who served as financial backers for the pirates.

Fourth, since 1991, Somalia has lacked a viable central government and is considered by many expert observers to be a failed state without any functioning governing authority. Given that condition, scant resources are available for allocation to maritime surveillance or for policing the waters along the country’s 1,876 mile (3,025 kilometer) coastline.8 No less aggravating is the fact that Somalia claims a two hundred nautical mile (nm) territorial sea, which translates into hav-

Law&Ethics

ing to monitor and patrol more than three hundred thousand square miles of offshore Somali ocean space for piratical activities. With no functioning government and a nonexistent coast guard, Somalia is incapable of defending foreign vessels sailing through its territorial zone from pirate attacks.9 Fifth, weak Somali coastal and port state security fosters other pirate activities in the region, such as theft of goods from ships in port or at anchor. With no operating official maritime policy presence at all— i.e., no coast guard, naval presence, patrol boats, defensive armaments, or staff training—the level of lawlessness in Somali waters is bound to grow.

Finally, the global proliferation of communication technologies and small arms allows Somali pirates to operate offshore with improved capabilities for attacking vessels with greater sophistication and more destructive firepower.

Somali pirates use mobile telephones and global positioning systems to locate target vessels and have timely access to light and heavy machine guns, automatic assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)—all of which are easily transported, uncomplicated to use, cheap, and durable. These technological developments undoubtedly contribute to the boldness and growing violence that have earmarked Somali piracy since 2001.10 Piratical acts in Somali seas have spawned harmful results. One is that shipping traffic through the Suez Canal will likely decline. This situation will depress revenues for Egypt’s canal by as much as 10 percent in 2009, while also driving up costs for transportation rates for shippers that opt to take safer, but longer, commercial transit routes.

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If shippers prefer to avoid the Gulf of Aden, a typical tanker voyage from Saudi Arabia to Gibraltar, which currently lasts six days, could double in duration, with a concomitant increase in fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Second, marine insurance rates for vessels plying those waters are rising, producing the residual impact of falling shipping company profits. Not only are profits reduced, but freight rates for vessels sailing the Gulf of Aden might grow by 25 to 30 percent.11 Third, the multinational flotilla of warships sent to the region to counter pirate attacks

Fundamental to that ambition is an agreed-upon definition of what is the crime, who are the offenders, and who may prosecute them. The core agreement pertaining to piracy is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS), which entered into force in November 1994.12 It is this instrument that contains the definition of piracy under contemporary international law. As provided for in article 101 of the 1982 LOS Convention, piracy is defined as all “illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation…committed for private ends

International criminal activities on

the oceans must today be considered a major threat to global prosperity. by the crew or the passengers of a private ship….” But the convention goes on to assert that naval piracy can take place only “on the high seas” or “outside the jurisdiction of any state.”13 While inclusion of a definition of piracy in the 1982 LOS Convention supplies an essential step towards suppressing that crime, in the case of Somalia the scope of the definition seems exceedingly narrow. For instance, the geographical limitation in the article 101 definition excludes acts of piracy committed in a state’s coastal waters, Piracy, Sea Robbery, or limiting piracy to acts committed on Maritime Violence? International the high seas or outside the jurisdiction criminal activities on the oceans must of any state. This poses a legal conuntoday be considered a major threat to drum in the case of Somalia, primarglobal prosperity. To counter unlaw- ily because that country claims a two ful pirate activities, legal means must hundred nm territorial sea, which is be available for redressing them. viewed by most legal commentators as

are preoccupied with that mission, imposing higher costs upon participating governments. Given the lucrative rewards from piracy, the persistence of political instability in Somalia seems likely, which will discourage serious efforts at strengthening governmental institutions that are prerequisite for combating local piracy. Furthermore, in terms of international law, the traditional legal definition of piracy is being muddled by its frequent comparison with the notion of maritime terrorism.

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joyner

unlawful since it exceeds by one hundred eighty-eight miles the permissible twelve nm territorial sea delimitation set out in article 3 of the 1982 LOS Convention.14 This leaves an overarching question: should the status of armed attacks against ships off Somalia’s shore fail to fully meet the definition of acts of piracy, can they still be considered criminal offenses under international law? The answer, clearly, is yes, and it can be traced to the hijacking of a cruise liner nearly twenty-five years ago.

On 7 October 1985, four heavilyarmed men representing the Palestine Liberation Front seized control of the Italian-flagged Achille Lauro cruise ship as it sailed from Alexandria to Port Said.15 A wheelchair-bound American was killed and his body dumped overboard. The vessel headed back towards Port Said and the hijackers agreed to abandon the liner in exchange for safe conduct and a flight to Tunisia aboard an Egyptian commercial airliner. Infuriated that a U.S. national had been murdered during the seizure, President Ronald Reagan ordered that the plane be intercepted by U.S. Navy F-14 fighters and forced to land in Sicily. Italian authorities took the terrorists into custody and subsequently tried them in Italy, where they were convicted of murder and unlawfully endangering the passengers and crew.

While the international media were quick to brand the seajacking of the Achille Lauro an act of piracy, it plainly failed the definitional test under article 101 of the 1982 LOS Convention. Only one ship was involved in the episode; the vessel was not seized for “private ends” or plunder through economic gain; and the cruise ship was not seized

Law&Ethics

on the high seas but in Egypt’s territorial sea. Since the attack on the Achille Lauro failed to meet the legal definitional test of piracy, a lacuna appeared in the modern law of the sea. Clearly an offense had been committed, but what was the precise breach of international ocean law? The upshot of this confusion was the need to formally articulate a new criminal offense under modern international law.16 The legal confusion arising out of the Achille Lauro affair prompted the International Maritime Organization in 1988 to draft a new instrument, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).17 The SUA Convention was designed to fill gaps in the 1982 LOS Convention and ensure that governments will either prosecute or extradite persons responsible for committing terrorist acts at sea. Under this instrument, state parties bind themselves to consider as offenses those acts which are “unlawfully and intentionally” committed by a person who “seizes or exercises control over a ship by force,” or performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship” that might “endanger the safe navigation of that ship,” or “destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship….”18 By more specifically detailing the definition of an illegal act at sea, the SUA Convention broadens the rules relating to piracy and, unlike the 1982 LOS Convention, it also encompasses politically motivated terrorist acts.

Furthermore, the SUA Convention applies to all vessels navigating through waters beyond the territorial sea of a state, in the lateral limits of its territo-

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rial sea with adjacent states, or when an alleged offender is found in the territory of some other state. It therefore covers considerably more ocean space than the piracy provisions in the 1982 LOS Convention, which are restricted to attacks against ships on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state.

In responding to acts of terrorism

matic would be for the ship owners to authorize distribution of weapons to the crews. However, most ship owners resist arming their crews due to the fact that ship workers are often unskilled and out of fear of the possibility that pirates will target crew members if they have weapons. Ship owners who are willing to spend more money to pro-

Any lasting solution for ending Somali

piracy rests in addressing the causes of that country’s internal political and economic instability.

tect their cargo could employ private security guards, such as Blackwater, to defend their vessels, though the record of such personnel as deterrents to piracy remains unclear.21 While governments have undertaken several tactics to combat Somali piracy, they have not addressed the fundamental problems at the root of Somalia’s instability.

The UN Security Council has adopted at least four prominent resolutions under Chapter VII peace and security provisions condemning Somali piracy, including authorizing sanctions aimed What Must Be Done? Individual at punishing Somali pirates. Even more shipping companies have adopted dif- significant, the Security Council strongly ferent deterrent tactics onboard their endorsed actions by Canada, Denmark, vessels. Some have resorted to manning France, India, the Netherlands, Russia, fire hoses, assigning round-the-clock Spain, United Kingdom, the United deck patrols, or even scattering carpet States, and other NATO forces to send tacks on deck to repel pirates. Some warships to the Gulf of Aden region to companies have installed non-lethal combat pirates and to assist in escorting electric screens with loudspeaker sys- World Food Program vessels sailing with tems which produce a screeching pitch food aid to Somalia.22 To these ends, so excruciating that it dissuades pirates by early 2009, at least thirty warships from boarding. Perhaps more prag- were patrolling an area approximating in recent years, the marine transportation industry sought to strengthen the SUA Convention through a series of amendments specifically criminalizing the use of weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of intimidating a population or seeking to compel action by a government or international organization.19 These amendments, now known as the 2005 Protocols, were adopted on 14 October 2005 by the Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties.20

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JOyner

2.5 million square miles. In addition, two multinational anti-piracy contingents are operating in the area.

There is the EU’s military operation known as EU NAVFOR, which commenced in December 2008, and there is a multinational group called Combined Task Force 150 that originally was deployed for counterterrorism efforts off the Horn of Africa.

In January 2009, the United States began operations coordinating a new coalition task force, designated as CTF-151, which is comprised of warships from twenty different navies.23 While these flotillas are certainly noteworthy, they have yet to demonstrate that they can stifle piratical activities off the Horn of Africa. Such international efforts may be impressive and necessary, but they are neither comprehensive nor sufficient as longterm solutions for arresting piracy offshore Somalia. These naval operations tend to be ad hoc and defensive in nature, and they fail to focus on remedying the political instability that allows piracy to flourish in Somalia. Moreover, strategies must be found for dealing with pirate detainees captured during an engagement, as well as for determining who may try them and what juridical remedies are required for prosecuting them.24 The bottom line seems clear: any lasting solution for ending Somali piracy rests in addressing the causes of that country’s internal political and economic instability. The presence of international navies may sometimes deter pirates, but navies are for fight-

Law&Ethics

ing wars; they are neither pirate chasers nor can they be everywhere all the time to suppress every piratical act.

Navies can assist in providing protection for the delivery of food aid, but that does not eliminate the threat of piracy for other commercial vessels.

At a minimum, an international coast guard fleet is needed that can defend more places, more often and bring law and order to seas offshore Somalia that now are governed by anarchy. Funding for recruitment and training for such a Somali-based coast guard might come from the shipping industry.

Finally, the critical ingredient for ending piracy attacks offshore Somalia is to find viable, realistic solutions for Somalia’s domestic instability. Undeniably, this instability is the main underlying cause of the rush by Somalis to engage in piratical acts.

There must be a realistic political settlement for Somalia, as well for the restoration of public economic stability in that society. Until these fundamental objectives can be secured, Somalia will remain a failed state, without law, order, and hope. It will continue to be a haven for maritime criminals and violent brigands.

The end of piracy offshore Somalia will depend substantially on how well these domestic displacements in that country can be managed and reversed by the international community as well as the domestic Somali community. This will no doubt serve to be a daunting challenge for the world shipping industry, the concerned international community, and Somalia itself.

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Notes

1 Piracy Reporting Centre, International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, Annual Piracy Report 2008: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:1 January-31 December 2008 (January 2009), 6. For Americans, the threat of piracy became starkly real on 8 April 2009, when Capt. Richard Phillips of the U.S.-flagged cargo ship Maerisk Alabama was taken hostage and held captive for five days by four Somali pirates on a drifting lifeboat. The high-profile rescue on Easter Sunday of Capt. Phillips and the killing of three Somali pirates by Navy SEAL sharpshooters on the U.S. destroyer Bainbridge dramatized the acute danger of Somali piracy on the high seas. See Mark Mazzetti and Sharon Otterman, “Standoff with Pirates Shows U.S. Power Has Limits,” New York Times, 9 April 2009, 1 and Robert D. McFadden and Scott Shane, “In Rescue of Captain, Navy Kills 3 Pirates,” New York Times, 12 April 2009, 1.

2 Borzou Daragahi, “Somali Pirates Suspected of Hijacking Giant Oil Tanker,” Los Angeles Times, 18 November 2008, Internet, http://articles.latimes. com/2008/nov/18/world/fg-piracy18 (date accessed: 27 February 2009).

3 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somalia Pirates Capture Tanks and Global Notice,” New York Times, 27 September 2008; “Navy Watches as Pirates Nab $3.2 M,” USA Today, 5 February 2009, Internet, http://www. usatoday.com/news/world/2009-02-05-ukrainepiracy_N.htm (date accessed: 26 February 2009); and Juliet Njeri, “High Stakes Remain on Somali High Seas,” BBC News, 5 February 2009, Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7872946.stm (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

4 In 2008, 49 vessels were hijacked, 889 crew taken hostage and another 46 vessels reported being fired upon. A total of 32 crew members were injured, 11 killed, and 21 missing and presumed dead. Guns were used in 139 incidents, up from 72 in 2007.

See ICC Commercial Crime Services, “IMB Reports Unprecedented Rise in Maritime Hijackings,” 16 January 2009, Internet, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imbreports-unprecedented-rise-in-maritimehijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

5 GlobalSecurity.org, “Pirates,” Internet, http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pirates. htm (date accessed: 28 February 2009); and Scott Baldauf, “Who Are Somalia’s Pirates,” Christian Science Monitor, 21 November 2008, Internet, http://www. csmonitor.com/2008/1120/p25s22-woaf.html (date accessed: 28 February 2009).

6 Rubrick Biegon, “Somali Piracy and International Response,” Global Policy Forum, 2 February 2009, Internet, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ somalia/2009/0201response.htm (date accessed: 28 February 2009).

7 World Bank, “Country Profile Somalia,” September 2008, Internet, http://web.worldbank.org/

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WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/ SOMALIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:367675~pagePK:141 132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:367665,00.html (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

8 Central Intelligence Agency, “Somalia,” The World Factbook (2009), Internet, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

9 Somalia has only three old gunboats at the northern port of Boosaaso, which reportedly are operated by a fifty-man paramilitary crew. Colin Freeman, “Somalia’s Coastguard Ready to Tackle Pirates,” 26 November 2008, Internet, http://www. smh.com.au/news/world/somalias-coastguard-readyto-tackle-pirates/2008/11/25/1227491548650.html (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

10 Peter Chalk, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States,” RAND Project Air Force (2008), 12-14, Internet, http://www.rand.org/ pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

11 “10 Undesired Results of Somali Piracy,” MarineBuzz.com, 5 December 2008, Internet, http:// www.marinebuzz.com/2008/12/05/10-undesiredresults-of-somali-piracy (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

12 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 14 November 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 436 (1994) [hereinafter 1982 LOS Convention].

13 Ibid., art. 101.

14 Article 3 of the 1982 LOS Convention clearly asserts that, “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.” Two hundred miles is viewed as excessive to a lawful twelve nm territorial sea.

15 The hijackers had been surprised by a crew member and acted prematurely. Holding the four hundred passengers and crew hostage, they directed the vessel to sail to Tartus, Syria, and demanded the release of fifty Palestinians then in Israeli prisons.

After being refused permission to dock at Tartus, the hijackers murdered a disabled American tourist, wheelchair-bound Leon Klinghoffer, and threw his body and wheelchair overboard. See Michael K. Bohn, The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of Terrorism (Potomac Books, 2004).

16 Christopher Joyner, “The 1988 IMO Convention on the Safety of Maritime Navigation: Towards a Legal Remedy for Terrorism at Sea,” German Yearbook of International Law 31 (1989): 230‑62; Malvina Halberstam, “Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy, and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety,” American Journal of International Law 82 (1988): 269-275.

17 Completed 10 March 1988 and entered into force 1 March 1992, International Legal Materials Vol.

JOyner

27 (1988), 668, 675 [hereinafter SUA Convention]).

18 SUA Convention., art. 3, paras. 1 (a), (b), and (c).

19 Douglas R. Burnett, Proposed Revisions by the Maritime Law Association, Committee of the International Law of the Sea, to the Current Piracy Provisions: U.S. Code Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure Chapter 81 – Piracy and Privateering (1993), cited in George D. Gabel, Jr., “Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an International Solution to Modern-Day Piracy,” Tulane Law Review 81 (June 2007): 1446, n. 124.

20 The requisite number of states have yet to ratify the 2005 Protocols; however, upon entering into force, these amendments will make it an offense to unlawfully and intentionally transport, discharge, or use against or on a ship: explosives; radioactive materials; biological, chemical, or nuclear (BCN) weapons; or hazardous or noxious substances and materials. The offense also extends to the transport of materials, software, or related technologies significantly contributing to the design, manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon. See International Maritime Organization, “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988” (2005 Protocols), Internet, http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686 (date accessed: 27 February 2009); Joint International Working Group, “Uniformity of Law Concerning Piracy and Acts of Maritime Violence,” Comité Maritime International Yearbook (2000), 415.

21 Blackwater reportedly is considering ambitious plans for a small fleet of two or three anti-piracy vessels, each able to carry several dozen armed security personnel ready to undertake any legal operation. See David Olser, “Blackwater Mulls Anti-Piracy Fleet,” Lloyds List, 22 October 2008, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2114503/posts (date accessed:

Law&Ethics

26 February 2009). In October 2008, Blackwater announced that its 183-foot ship, the McArthur, stands ready to assist the shipping industry as it struggles with the increasing problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere. See Jerry Seper, “Blackwater Joins Fight Against Sea Piracy,” Washington Times, 4 December 2008, Internet, http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2008/dec/04/blackwater-joins-fight-againstsea-piracy (date accessed: 26 February 2009).

22 Namely, UN Security Council Res. 1801, S/ RES/1801 (20 February 2008); UN Security Council Res. 1811, S/RES/1811 (29 April 2008); UN Security Council Res. 1814, S/RES/1814 (15 May 2008); UN Security Council Res. 1816, S/RES/1816 (2 June 2008); UN Security Council Res. 1838, S/RES/1838 (7 October 2008); and UN Security Council Res. 1846, S/RES/1846 (2 December 2008).

23 John Heilprin, “UN Group Charts New Course Against Somalia Piracy,” Yahoo Finance, 1 January 2009, Internet, http://finance.yahoo.com/ news/UN-group-charts-new-course-apf-14070800. html (date accessed: 28 February 2009); “Focus on Combined Task Force 151,” U.S. Navy, 27 February 2009, Internet, http://www.navy.mil/local/CTF151/.

24 Jurisdiction of a state over acts of piracy is primarily based on nationality or territoriality. That is, a “genuine link” must exist between a state and the ship or between the state and the waters where a pirate offence takes place. It would seem reasonable that if Somali courts are not willing or unable to conduct prosecutions of accused offenders, the responsibility for enforcement will mainly fall upon other governments whose warships are patrolling the waters off the Somali coast. See Donald Rothwell, “Maritime Piracy and International Law,” Crimes of War Project, 24 February 2009, Internet, http://crimesofwar.org/ onnews/news-piracy.html (date accessed: 29 February 2009).

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Law&Ethics

Private Military Contractors Lessons Learned in Iraq and Increased Accountability in Afghanistan Karli Johnston Private Military Contractors, or PMCs, are operating in unprecedented numbers in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and they have done so with little to no oversight or accountability until recently.1 Since the beginning of U.S. engagements in these countries, many questions and concerns have arisen regarding the legality and ethical propriety of American reliance on PMC forces, which many liken to modern-day mercenaries. Operating beyond the reaches of Iraqi civilian law, Afghani law, international law, and U.S. civilian and martial law, PMCs in these areas have enjoyed almost total impunity and have been involved in incidents mired with controversy.

Recently, great strides have been made in increasing the accountability and oversight of PMCs operating in Iraq.

However, such progress has been minimal in Afghanistan.

This is significant given that U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq over the next two years, but reports suggest that the Pentagon intends to reinforce its efforts in Afghanistan by increasing American forces to as many as sixty thousand troops.2 An increase in PMC presence of an unknown size will accompany this escalation. As such, the Obama adminis-

Karli Johnston is a PhD student in Georgetown University’s Department of Government.

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tration needs to ensure that PMC operations in Afghanistan are not neglected due to attention on the advancements made in Iraq. The administration must not allow these PMCs to operate with the same problematic levels of impunity that formerly existed in Iraq.

that occurred on 31 March 2004 in the city of Falluja. These events brought the phenomenon of PMC use into the public sphere through extensive media coverage. Yet, it is important to note that PMCs have been in operation for decades; what has changed is the scope,

Much progress has been made in increas-

ing oversight of PMCs operating in Iraq.

This paper traces the development of the use of PMCs and the underlying policy considerations—motivated by a need to reinforce the weakened Armed Forces, a desire to maintain potential unilateral capability, and the necessity of force-multipliers in a prolonged conflict—which have led to an unprecedented level of dependence on PMCs. It then describes the progress made in Iraq, which, coupled with actions taken in the United States, has created new legal frameworks that have increased accountability and oversight, thereby adding legitimacy to the use of PMCs. It will also offer a cautionary note regarding the de-politicization of war that the use of PMCs can cause and the potential consequences of this de-politicization, to further emphasize the importance of the developments made in Iraq. Finally, it will conclude with policy prescriptions to ensure that similar progress can be achieved in Afghanistan.

History and Justification of PMC Use. The contentious issue

of PMCs operating in Iraq has drawn significant attention in recent years, triggered by the ambush, mutilation, and murder of four private soldiers

[ 9 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

range of duties, and budget of these private armies. Estimates suggest that the ratio of military personnel to contracted personnel increased from 100:1 during the first Gulf War to 10:1 in Iraq by 2002, and it currently stands at approximately 1:1.3 Though exact numbers are difficult to obtain, estimates suggest that there are currently more than six PMC firms employing more than twenty thousand contracted personnel in the Middle East, including those that only perform military functions.4 Indeed, estimates trace the growth of the industry from annual revenues of $55.6 billion in 1990 to $100 billion in 2000, and experts project those revenues will reach $202 billion by 2010.5 One way increased reliance on PMCs can be understood is in terms of pragmatic policy. PMCs enable the United States to assert itself as almost fully independent from its allies. As Christopher Spearin notes in his extensive study American Hegemony Incorporated, many of the roles PMCs carry out are “representative of private actors usurping traditional allied state roles and upsetting traditional alliance dynamics.”6 Examples include DynCorp’s contract

Johnston

to develop domestic policing structures in Iraq and Kroll Associates’s contract to develop an Iraqi paramilitary force.

Spearin also points out that important government documents, such as the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), no longer stress reliance upon the military forces of allies. The United States has such capabilities that it does not need to rely upon allies, and it is also politically advantageous to avoid that strategy.7 The PMCs understand this political environment and exploit it by exaggerating the fissure between the United States and its allies. Anna Leander points out that advocates of the industry contrast PMC missions with public multilateral operations, emphasizing the “slowness and uncertainty of deployment of multilateral forces, [and] their inefficiency in operations….”8 Conversely, PMC forces are depicted as “hyper-efficient, low-cost problem-solvers coming to sort out the mess left by incompetent public armed forces.”9 In this way, by enhancing the number and capabilities of the standing armed forces, the use of PMCs serves as a pragmatic policy option when unilateral action is calculated to be more effective or efficient than dependence on allies who may not be willing or able to pursue American objectives.

Another pragmatic justification for increasing dependence on PMCs is the need for force-multipliers to support a dwindling standing army. Following the end of the Cold War, all the major powers made considerable military cuts.

James Taulbee explains that “without Cold War imperatives to justify initiatives and costs in blood and treasure, Western armies quickly pared their forces and commitments.”10 He further

Law&Ethics

notes that at this time the United States reduced its manpower by approximately 30 percent, and that by the end of the 1990s, the Armed Forces and their budgets had been downsized by about 40 percent. Subsequently, unemployed soldiers became a substantial source for PMC recruitment, while the majority of the Armed Forces became a “dinosaur” that officials sought to replace with an alternative that was “light, lethal and mobile.”11 As evidence of these massive cutbacks, during the first Gulf War the U.S. Army had seven hundred eleven thousand personnel; the current number stands at four hundred eighty-seven thousand.12 This trend of reduction is echoed in reports released by the U.S. Navy and Air Force.

The belief that PMCs are indispensable to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has become commonplace. Their proponents, such as James Kwok, view PMCs as critical for security and logistical support services, providing “an effective stopgap measure for the problem of overstretched conventional military forces.”13 Pentagon officials simply concede that “we don’t have that organic capacity anymore, so we’re forced to go to war with contractors,” and “there’s a recognition that we can’t be good at everything.”14 This rhetoric was evident in 2001 as then-Secretary Donald Rumsfeld initiated the shift to an increased dependence upon contractors, claiming to want to “liberate” the Pentagon from its own bureaucracy in order to “promote a more entrepreneurial approach,…to behave less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists.”15 This initiative was then echoed in the 2001 QDR, which stated, “Only those functions that must

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be performed by the [Department of Defense] should be kept by DoD. Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function.”16 The reliance on PMCs has become entrenched in every facet of defense planning, including budget, strategy, and execution of war, and it is unlikely that the Obama administration will change this trend. As a result, efforts for ensuring accountability and creating legitimacy for the use of PMCs in both Iraq and Afghanistan must be continued and strengthened.

Progress in Iraq. Much progress has been made in increasing oversight of PMCs operating in Iraq. This progress has been so great that the once-chastised “shadow armies” of President Bush have essentially disappeared from public view, even though PMCs are still operating in large numbers in both Iraq and Afghanistan. New efforts to coordinate plans between the Defense Department and the State Department through liaison officers, as well as daily briefings to the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNFI) regarding upcoming PMC activities, have helped to reduce the incidence of unwarranted and controversial PMC shootings, such as the slaying of seventeen Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square, Baghdad, on 16 September 2007. In addition, the recent establishment of MNF-I’s Armed Contractor Oversight Division to identify, track, and report all PMC-related incidents and maintain contact with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior has increased oversight of PMCs in the region dramatically. This progress is accompanied by the U.S.Iraq Pact that came into force in January 2009. Among other objectives, the [ 9 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

pact is expected to establish that PMCs now fall under the domestic jurisdiction of Iraqi law, significantly reducing the impunity with which they once acted.

Furthermore, an important legal precedent is being set in Washington, with the Justice Department’s indictment of five Blackwater guards who will stand trial in connection with the tragic events in Nisour Square. The guards are accused of voluntary manslaughter, attempt to commit manslaughter, and weapons violations; their trial offers the first case in which non-Department of Defense contractors could be charged under the Military Extraterritorial Judiciary Act.17 All this comes as President Obama reaffirms his commitment to bring U.S. troops back from Iraq.

De-politicization of Security.

Because of the cloaked nature of PMCs, the public is unaware of much of the work they do. Therefore, they remove the war from the public realm. In this sense, PMCs possess the power to shape the perception of the war domestically by disconnecting it from public concern to a disconcerting degree.

PMCs can be implicated in the depoliticization of security that ultimately perpetuates war as they move war from the public to the private realm. This is because “mystery, myth, and conspiracy theory surround them, leaving policymakers and the public in positions of dangerous ignorance.”18 This depoliticization is also a result of the Bush administration’s use of PMCs “to shield the full costs of war from scrutiny,” as contractor casualties and kidnappings are not listed on public releases and are rarely mentioned by media.19 The lack

Johnston

of publicity is largely because the Pentagon does not track non-military casualties. However, as of 2007, estimates suggest that there were 917 contractor deaths and 10,569 contractors seriously wounded in Iraq, and 75 contractor deaths and 2,428 seriously wounded in Afghanistan.20 These numbers surpass any single U.S. Army division and are higher than the casualty rates for the rest of the Iraq Coalition combined.

In addition, PMC contracts are not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests, so there are only approximations as to how many contractors are present in any given region.

As mentioned previously, secrecy is an essential aspect of a new form of war, one that is fought largely out of the public domain despite media efforts to

Law&Ethics

virtualization of war because, like precision weapons (the focus of Ignatieff’s work), they reduce the impact war has on citizens. Thus, we must ask, “If one side of a future conflict is shielded from the reality of war and its consequences, why should it continue to be guided by restraint?”22 And if our checks and balances on the initiation of war have decayed, then have our citizens become divested of their power to give consent?

Have they become demobilized?23 This may well have been one of the intended outcomes of the Bush administration’s reliance on PMCs, as a lack of involvement on the part of the citizenry grants an administration more flexibility and freedom to pursue goals as it sees fit.

To demonstrate this point one need only look at the example of the Viet-

Because of the cloaked nature of

PMCs, the public is unaware of much of the work they do. Therefore, they remove the war from the public realm. provide accurate accounts of the war.

This secrecy could have far-reaching implications in that it could cause the citizenry to become demobilized and apathetic to war as a result. To further this point, an extension of Michael Ignatieff’s argument regarding virtual war will be utilized. Ignatieff points out that in modern society, “War becomes virtual…With the end of conscription, it no longer requires the actual participation of citizens, [and] because of the bypassing of representative institutions, it no longer requires democratic consent.”21 PMCs contribute to this

nam War and the important role the mobilization of civil society played in bringing an end to it. Long American casualty lists, the draft, violence depicted by the media, and civilian casualties on television encouraged an anti-war movement manifested in student strikes, draft dodging, and largescale violent and non-violent protests.

Domestically, these actions created an unsustainable political environment that undoubtedly played a major role in Nixon’s decision to sign the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam. If PMCs

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lic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior, or their representative to identify issues concerning Department of Defense contracted [PMCs] actions, incidents, and procedures.”25 Finally, while the prosecution of the The Way Forward. While great five Blackwater guards sets an important strides have been made toward the reg- legal precedent for indicting individual ulation of PMC operations in Iraq, contractors, more should be done to further action needs to be taken to place legal obligations on companies for consolidate these important develop- training, controlling, and monitoring ments and see that PMCs operating in their personnel. At the very least, limAfghanistan are held to the same mea- ited legal liability should be placed on sure of justice. To this end, several rec- companies for breaches of internationommendations may be posited. First, al law committed by their employees.

U.S. government agencies should make Legal action against companies found a renewed effort to ensure strict com- breaching such obligations could take pliance with international treaty obli- the form of fines against the company gations that prohibit torture and other or directors, retraction of contracts, inhumane treatment. Such obligations imposed oversight controls, or even can be found in the UN Conven- imprisonment of directors found to be tion against Torture, Common Article intentionally circumventing the law.

Three of the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. Anti-Torture Statute, and the UN Conclusion. The use of PMCs may International Covenant on Civil and be understood in terms of pragmatic Political Rights. policymaking, providing an effective Furthermore, drawing on the achieve- and essential force-multiplier in the ments in Iraq, the Obama administra- battle against terrorism and ensurtion should see to the speedy develop- ing security for Americans, Iraqis, ment and deployment of the inchoate Afghanis, and, perhaps, the world. Yet Armed Contractor Oversight Direc- until PMCs operate within the law and torate in Afghanistan, which, like the are subject to oversight, they will not be MNF-I’s Armed Contractor Oversight a legitimate policy option. The Obama Division, would oversee the actions of administration must consolidate the PMCs. It would be tasked to “iden- improvements that have been made in tify all [PMC] incidents to include the Iraq, a precedent that is already being use of graduated force procedures and set in Washington, and ensure that weapons discharges” as well as track the similar steps are taken in Afghanistan. status of ongoing investigations involv- If the administration can accomplish ing weapon discharges by PMC per- these objectives, then it will be able to sonnel.24 In addition, the directorate maintain the pragmatic use of PMCs in would “maintain regular contact with a way that is congruent with perceived the Government of the Islamic Repub- American ideals and values. remain cloaked in secrecy and continue to act with impunity, a large part of the war being waged in Afghanistan will be sheltered from such public scrutiny, an essential source of oversight.

[ 9 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Johnston

Law&Ethics

Notes

1 The term Private Military Contractor is one of many appellations used almost synonymously to describe private forces active in combat. These appellations include Private Security Provider (PSP), Private Security Company (PSC), Private Military Contractor or Company (PMC), and the somewhat derogatory term mercenary. Among the subtle differences are that PSPs typically include a multiplicity of actors involved in offering a wide range of services, meaning the term PSP encompasses any non-staff, remuneration-based security provider. This is distinct from the term PSC, which implies a narrower range of hard security and protection activities. The term PMC further differs in that it usually refers even more specifically to private fighting forces. For the purpose of this paper, the term PMC is meant to encompass private hard security and protection providers who fulfill a combat role.

2 Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Statement,” 20 December 2008.

3 Christopher Spearin, “American Hegemony Incorporated: The Importance and Implications of Military Contractors in Iraq,” Contemporary Security Policy 24, no. 3 (December 2003): 26-47, 28; and Jeremy Scahill, “Bush’s Shadow Army,” The Nation, 15 March 2007, 2.

4 P. W. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 119-133.

5 Anna Leander, “The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 803-825, 806.

6 Christopher Spearin, “American Hegemony Incorporated,” 34.

7 Ibid., 35.

8 Leander, “The Power to Construct International Security,” 823.

9 Ibid.

10 James L. Taulbee, “Mercenaries, Private

Armies and Security Companies in Contemporary Policy,” International Politics 37, no. 4 (2000): 433456, 434.

11 Michael Ignatieff, “Virtual War,” in Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Toronto: Viking, 2000), 7.

12 Spearin, “American Hegemony Incorporated,” 28.

13 James Kwok, “Armed Entrepreneurs,” Harvard International Review 28, no. 1 (22 March 2006): 34-38, 34.

14 Nelson D. Schwartz, “The Pentagon’s Private Army,” Fortune 147, no. 5 (17 March 2003): 100103, 102-103.

15 Jeremy Scahill, “Bush’s Shadow Army,” 1.

16 U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” (30 September 2001), 53.

17 “Blackwater Employees’ Indictment: U.S. v. Paul Alvin Slough, et al.,” Internet, http://news.lp.findlaw. com (date accessed: 10 February 2009).

18 P. W. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” 1.

19 Ibid., 2.

20 Current statistics are unobtainable. These statistics are based on a July 2007 Reuters article, which cites U.S. Department of Labor statistics obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. Bernd Debusmann, “In Outsourced U.S. Wars, Contractor Deaths Top 1,000,” Internet, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/ idUSN0318650320070703?src=070307_1532 _DOUBLEFEATURE_doctors_held_in_plot (date accessed: 10 March 2009).

21 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War, 174.

22 Ibid., 163.

23 Ibid., 174.

24 Department of the Army, Army Contracting Agency, “ACOD Performance Work Statement,” Internet, http://www.fbo.gov (date accessed: 11 February 2009).

25 Ibid.

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 99]

Business&Economics More than a Catastrophe The Economic Crisis in Russia Andrei Illarionov Even after five years of impressive economic growth, Russia has been harshly affected by the recent economic downturn.

This article looks at the crisis through the lens of industrial output, noting dire contraction rates in many of Russia’s industrial sectors. While the decline in industrial output is more prevalent in some sectors than in others, the overall effect of such a decrease is nothing short of catastrophic.

The article presents a sequence of events and causes of the crisis that differs significantly from that offered by the Russian leadership, arguing that the timing of the decline in certain industries shows that the recession in Russia was not caused by recession in other industrialized countries. The Russian industrial output decline has also been blamed on the recent sharp decline in oil prices coupled with internal account shock, which this article will show to be false. The current economic plight of the Russian Federation, and the country’s industries in particular, is a product of a hostile economic situation and the specific domestic logistics of Russian industrial sectors.

Andrei Illarionov is a senior fellow at the CATO Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. From 2000 to 2005, he served as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief economic adviser and personal representative in the G8.

Erasing Five Years of Economic Growth. To call the current decline in Russia’s industrial output a “catasSummer/Fall 2009 [ 1 0 1 ]

More than a Catastrophe

trophe” is a clear understatement.

December 2008 was the sixth consecutive month of industrial decline. Six months, or two quarters, of uninterrupted output contraction secures the classic requirement for the onset of a recession. The monthly pattern of industrial decline in 2008 is summarized as follows: in 2008 Russian industrial output growth as a percent of the previous month was 0.1 percent in June, -0.3 percent in July, -1 percent in August, -2.1 percent in September, -3.9 percent in October, -6 percent in November, and a staggering -8 percent in December.1 The rates of output decline for November and December are the worst ones observed in recent Russian economic history. Prior to the current crisis, the record rate of industrial decline was 4.7 percent in December 1993. Last November the rate of industrial decline was 6 percent, 25 percent deeper than the 1993 rate. December 2008 set a new record with industrial output declining by 8 percent (compared to its November 2008 level).

This type of contraction, even when it is seen over the course of a year, signals an extremely acute economic crisis.

In December such a contraction happened not within a year, but within a single month.

The average monthly rate of output decline over the past six months was 3.6 percent, a rate that characterizes a quite sharp industrial recession. In annualized terms, the rate of Russia’s output decline in the last six months has totaled an unprecedented 35.5 percent.

The cumulative rate of industrial contraction from July to December 2008 was 19.7 percent. Such rates of

[ 1 02 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

decline have not been observed in the last two decades, including those of the harshest economic transformation crises—in 1992, 1994, and 1998. The only other time Russia experienced similar rates of contraction was during World War II—at the end of 1941 and in the spring and summer of 1942. At that time, however, it was caused by military occupation and physical disarray of the assets of production.

The level of industrial output in December 2008 was the same as it was in October 2003, the month of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s infamous arrest. The current recession has destroyed the fruits of the impressive Russian industrial growth of the last five years, which translates into almost 45 percent of the cumulative industrial growth since the August 1998 crisis.

It is important to note that despite the tangible growth after the August 1998 crisis, the level of Russia’s industrial output, even at its peak in summer 2008, was not at the level reached within the USSR in 1989. In June 2008, at its highest in ten years of industrial expansion, the level of industrial production was still approximately 15 percent lower than it had been in 1989.

Since output declined 20 percent in the last six months, the level of industrial production in Russia fell to the level of November 1993, or that of 1977. In other words, the current crisis has thrown Russian industry, in terms of physical volume, more than three decades back.

A Breakdown of the Decline.

While the current economic crisis affects all industries, the severity of its impact differs among them. A relatively

Illarionov

smaller contraction of output (annualized rate of decline less than 2 percent) is observed in the oil, flour, and animal feed industries. A more significant rate of decline (5 to 8 percent) is observed in the food, oil refining, power, and non-ferrous metallurgy areas. The crisis severely affects the timber, cellulose, papermaking, gas, glass and chinaware, chemicals and petrochemicals, construction materials, and light industries. The coal production, ferrous metallurgy, and machine-building industries are in a state of freefall (the annualized rate of decline is between

Business&Economics

41 and 61 percent). The rate of output decline seen in Russia’s machinebuilding sector is almost unbelievable, falling 42 percent in just seven months and at a 60 percent annualized rate.

In terms of output volume, Russia’s machine-building industry returned to either its September 2001, January 1995, or mid-1970s levels.

It is also important to note the duration of the current recession. Few sectors—the gas, coal, oil refining, glass, and chinaware industries—started to decline after August 2008, when their contraction could have been some-

Table 1: Russian Output Decline by Industry2

Rank Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Total Production Oil extraction Flour and animal feed Food Oil refining Power Non-ferrous metallurgy Light industry Timber, cellulose, and paper Gas Glass Construction materials Chemicals and petrochemicals Coal Ferrous metallurgy Machine-building

Duration of Contraction (months)

Decline in output from peak level (%)

6 21 6 13 4 12 12 23 13 4 3 9 12 4 10 7

-19.7 -1.1 -0.9 -5.9 -2.2 -6.4 -7.9 -32.5 -20.9 -7.2 -8.6 -25.6 -34.5 -16.2 -45.7 -42.0

Average monthly Annualized rate of rate of decline decline (%) (%) -3.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -1.7 -1.8 -1.8 -2.9 -3.2 -3.5 -4.3 -5.9 -7.5

-35.5 -0.6 -1.8 -5.5 -6.4 -6.4 -7.9 -18.5 -19.4 -20.0 -30.2 -32.6 -34.5 -41.2 -52.0 -60.7

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More than a Catastrophe

Table 2: International Snapshot of Industrial Output Decline Ranked by Annualized Rate of Contraction, November 20083

Rank

Country or Group of Countries

Duration of Contraction (months)

Decline in Output from Peak Level (%)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

India Italy EU (27) Great Britain United States EU (15) France Sweden Spain Turkey Poland Germany Kazakhstan Japan Russia Ukraine

0 27 13 13 10 13 13 10 13 12 9 7 1 9 5 6

0.0 -11.0 -6.8 -7.4 -5.7 -7.6 -10.2 -8.6 -14.2 -13.3 -10.4 -8.5 -1.4 -14.4 -12.7 -33.4

Average Monthly Rate of Decline (%) 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4 -1.7 -2.7 -6.6

Annualized Rate of Decline (%) 0.0 -5.1 -6.3 -6.8 -6.8 -7.0 -9.4 -10.3 -13.2 -13.3 -13.6 -14.2 -16.0 -18.7 -27.8 -55.7

observed in many other economies as well. As of February 2009, despite its far-reaching effects, the current crisis had not been observed in some corners of Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. India had yet to experience even a single month of industrial decline.

Periods of contraction observed in Kazakhstan, Armenia, Austria, Bosnia, Belarus, Switzerland, Croatia, Serbia, and several other European and former Soviet states are too short to claim the International Comparisons. arrival of a recession in their econoThe current economic crisis has mies. Furthermore, for the majority of affected not only Russia, as significant these countries the impact of a recesdeclines in industrial output can be sion is still significantly smaller than what attributed to the effects of the global financial crisis of late August to September 2008. For all other industries output began to contract long before August and September 2008.

Some sectors started to decline in November and December 2007, while others started to decrease output in early 2007. The timing of Russia’s industrial recession makes it almost impossible to tie it to the effects of the U.S. and global financial crises.

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Illarionov

what is currently going on in Russia.

Global economic centers such as the United States, Europe, and Japan are already in a state of industrial recession. However, the depth of their domestic industrial decline is visibly smaller than the corresponding impact in Russia—around 7 percent annualized decline in the United States and Europe and approximately 19 percent in Japan, compared to almost 28 percent in Russia. Moreover, the output decline in Europe started in November 2007, three months before it began in the United States (in February 2008).

This disproves the popularized contentions of Russian leaders that the global economic crisis initiated in the United States.

Ukraine is the only other country in the world with an economy of comparable size that experienced a more significant output decline than Russia.

However, a comparison of Russia’s situation with that of Ukraine brings up several issues. The data presented in Table 2 reflect the economic situation in November 2008. The trends for industrial activity in Ukraine and Russia, however, had distinctly diverged

by December 2008. In Ukraine, the output increased by approximately 5 percent while Russia’s output fell by 8 percent. As a result, the annualized rates of contraction in December as compared to November showed a decrease in Ukraine, from 33.4 percent to 29.9 percent, while it increased in Russia, from 12.7 percent to 19.7 percent.

Although the speed of output contraction in Ukraine is higher than in Russia, Ukraine’s industrial dynamics so far look more impressive than

Business&Economics

Russia’s. While from 1998 to 2008 industrial output in Russia increased by 80 percent, in Ukraine it grew by 117 percent. In 2008, Russian industries produced 11 percent less output than in 1991, while Ukrainian industries produced 12 percent more than in 1991.

Russia’s production in 2008 was 15 percent less than it had been in 1989, while output in Ukraine was 6 percent higher than its 1989 level.

A Homemade Crisis. The nature

of the economic crisis both in Russia and other countries does not support the popular claims of the Russian authorities and of some analysts on the causes, circumstances, and mechanisms of the current global and domestic crises. As of 2008, unlike many developed economies, the majority of emerging markets still maintained generally positive, though reduced, economic growth rates. Therefore, the notions that developed countries, particularly the United States, have caused emerging markets’ industrial contraction, and the developing countries themselves are not able to continue positive economic growth, are incorrect. It is far from perfect, but some level of decoupling is clearly observed.

The decline in industrial output in the world’s largest economies started before the sharpest stage of the U.S. financial crisis, which began in the second half of August and beginning of September 2008. In addition, and the decline in industrial output in the EU started earlier than in the United States. Therefore, the claim that the U.S. economy is the leading actor of the modern global business cycle is unsupported by the facts.

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More than a Catastrophe

Even more striking is the fact that the decline in industrial output in the United States started before the August to September financial panic and crash. The beginning of the U.S. industrial recession in February 2008 was clearly not fatal to the country’s GDP dynamics for at least two quarters, since the industry’s share in GDP is no more than 12 percent. Unlike industrial recession, the general economic recession, characterized by a fall in real GDP, started only in July 2008, not in December 2007 as the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) claimed, nor in February 2008 when industrial output started to contract.

Therefore, the claim that the U.S. production crisis was the result of the August to September financial crisis probably does not reflect the real sequence of events.

In Russia, recession in the transportation sector began in January 2008; recession in the investment sector began in June 2008; and a decline in industrial output started in July 2008. All of these events occurred before the U.S.

put decline even in early 2007, almost a year before the beginning of the industrial recession in Europe, a year before the beginning of the industrial recession in the United States, more than a year before the beginning of the U.S. recession in GDP terms, and almost a year and a half before the U.S. and global financial crises. Hence, the claim that the Russian crisis is the product of the U.S. and global financial crises is not supported by real facts.

Russia’s industrial recession did not start after the fall in global oil prices, nor was it caused by this fall. It started in July 2008 when global oil prices reached their historic record high both in nominal and real terms. Since the beginning of Russia’s industrial recession, global oil prices were almost 70 percent higher than they were throughout all of 2007, when the country experienced breathtaking economic growth of about 8 percent a year. Thus, the claim that Russia’s financial crisis is caused by the fall in global oil prices seems unsubstantiated.

The contraction in Russian industry

The only other time Russia experienced

similar rates of contraction was during World War II. and global financial crises began and had the opportunity to send negative messages around the world. Production in various sectors of the Russian economy started to decline even earlier—in late 2007, almost at the same time as the beginning of industrial recessions in many European countries. Some Russian industrial sectors noticed out-

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was and still is least pronounced in the oil extraction industry. By the end of 2008, the price of oil fell more drastically than that of any other commodity, product, or service. In contrast to this, the contraction of oil output was the most modest of all the industries. At the same time, output decline was much stronger in industries where prices

Illarionov

fell much less. Therefore, the claim that the state and dynamics of Russia’s economy (unlike, for example, fiscal position) are predetermined largely by the dynamics of global oil prices is clearly unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the variety of the industries’ responses to the economic crisis would seriously undermine the popular notion that artificial industrial diversification is desirable and necessary. Such diversification would require the over-taxation of the energy sector in order to subsidize processing industries.

An industrial recession in Russia started and still continues despite a very positive, though partially weakened, current account balance. Even in December 2008 Russia’s exports were 50 percent greater than its imports.

Therefore, claims that Russia’s economic crisis was caused by external current account shock as opposed to

Business&Economics

internal factors are simply incorrect.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the first six months of Russia’s industrial recession is that its current economic crisis seems more severe than that in many, if not most, other economies of comparable size and level of diversification. It is particularly important to note that almost none of the countries affected by the 2008 industrial recession have been energy exporters. So far, energy exporters demonstrate a much more modest degree of industrial decline, if any, than Russia. This means that the main reasons for Russia’s current economic crisis most likely lie not so much in general international conditions, and world price behavior in particular, but in Russia’s domestic specifics.

This article was translated from Russian by Julia Kosygina.

Notes

1 Data provided to author by the Russian Federation, Center for Economic Conjecture, 2009.

2 Institute of Economic Analysis’ calculations

based on data from the the Russian Federation, Center for Economic Conjecture.

3 Ibid.

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 0 7 ]

Business&Economics

Robbing Peter to Pay Paul Cuba’s Fifty Years of Failed Socialism Korok Ray For the fifty years of its existence, the Republic of Cuba has held a position on the world stage out of proportion to its 11 million people and $145 billion GDP.1 This is because Cuba is the last bastion of pure communism in the Western hemisphere, one extreme on the continuum of economic systems where a single party plans all economic activity, silences political opposition, and seeks to provide a broad social safety net. Although the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is often the focal point of popular debate, the main problem with Cuba is not the trade embargo, but rather the failed socialist policies of the Castro administration. These policies provide a vivid illustration of central planning gone awry in Cuba’s labor, housing, and agricultural markets. Fifty years after the revolution, Cuba is still poor and, despite their pure motives, the economic policies of socialism and forced income redistribution are squarely to blame.

Korok Ray is an assistant professor in the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. From 2007 to 2008, he served as a senior economist on the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers.

The Fusion of State and Market. In Cuba, the state controls a vast majority of economic activity. With the small exception of private restaurants and joint ventures with a handful of companies, there is effectively no private sector. The government is the largest employer, landlord, Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 0 9]

Robbing Peter to Pay Paul

and provider of social services on the island. The government also sets almost all wages and prices in the economy, ranging from the salary of a physician to the price of cigars to the rent for an apartment.

Consider the structural differences between a capitalist and socialist economy. In a capitalist economy, the corporation employs the individual, captures the worker’s output, and pays him wages. The corporation is an especially important entity in a capitalist economy, as it is a legal creature that is born, lives, and may die. In Cuba, the corporation has no official existence, nor do any of the markets (equity,

effectively two currencies in circulation in Cuba. The first is the Cuban peso.

The government pays its citizens in pesos, and, aside from in tourist areas, Cubans use pesos for their daily transactions. The other currency is the Cuban Convertible Peso, or CUC, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar. For years, the circulation of dollars was illegal on the island, even though dollars crept in through the informal market. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro opened up the island to tourism, which became Cuba’s major industry, and this brought more dollars. The shift to an emphasis on tourism is evident in Cuba’s economic data, which show that

Fifty years after the revolution, Cuba

is still poor and, despite their pure motives, the economic policies of socialism and forced income redistribution are squarely to blame. debt, venture capital) that surround the corporation. Thus, ownership in Cuba is limited, and more dispersed.

It is impossible to own shares of private enterprises because such enterprises are illegal. Instead, by virtue of passing their output to the government, all individuals effectively own a small share of the entire society. The relevant notion in Cuba is public, not private property.

Aside from the few private enterprises that exist, individuals do not have any claim to ownership of their output and are not exposed to taxation. This blending of public and private interests defines Cuba’s economy.

total expenditures on tourism in 2003 reached almost $2 billion.2 In 2003, the hotel and restaurant contribution to Cuba’s GDP reached 28.8 percent.3 Raul Castro, Fidel’s younger brother and the current head of state, has said the double economy is hurting Cuba.

This is true for two reasons. First, the peso is weak relative to the dollar: the exchange rate is twenty-three pesos to a single dollar. Second, Cuban citizens have uneven access to the dollar economy. Those whose goods and services are consumed by tourists have a disproportionate economic advantage since they will earn their living in a more valuable currency. This can distort incentives to The Double Economy. There are invest in human capital over the long

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Ray

term and therefore shift the allocation of capital and labor away from what is socially optimal. A Cuban taxi driver can earn as much from tips in a single cab ride as he could in a month from his salary paid by the Cuban government. While this makes the cab driver better off, it also provides incentives for young men and women to become cab drivers rather than doctors and lawyers, who have less exposure to the dollar economy. In most economies, skilled labor earns a higher return than unskilled labor because it is more productive to society. In Cuba, unskilled labor (the taxi driver) can earn more than skilled labor (the doctor) due to this uneven access to the dollar economy.

Problems in the Cuban labor market also originate from the fact that the government sets the wages of all its workers and, guided by the egalitarian principles of socialism, it sets them close together. For example, monthly wages range from approximately four hundred pesos for unskilled labor, such as factory work, to seven hundred pesos for doctors.4 Though it is admittedly difficult to measure productivity in Cuba because the individual is not the residual claimant to his income and passes all of his output to the government, the income distribution is nonetheless far less variable than the distribution in productivity.

There are adverse economic consequences from compressing income distribution. While the policy of underpaying doctors and overpaying plumbers may have the benefit of creating a more equal society, it has the side effect of distorting the efficient allocation of labor. Like all forms of investment,

Business&Economics

human capital investment is sensitive to its rate of return; the higher the eventual returns tomorrow, the greater the incentives to invest today. Lowering the return on high productivity work and raising it on low productivity work dampens incentives for tomorrow’s generation of workers to invest in extensive education to take those skilled labor jobs. Also, if skilled workers can earn higher wages in market economies elsewhere, this gives them an incentive to leave the country, which is exactly what Cuban doctors have done over the last several years.5 While this form of global trade in labor is efficient because labor moves to its place of highest productivity, losing such skilled labor is detrimental to Cuban society. The government has dealt with this by placing severe restrictions on immigration rather than increasing wages for skilled labor nearer the market rate.

The U.S. Embargo. The United

States imposed its trade embargo on Cuba in 1962 and has maintained it, in some form or other, ever since.6 At its basic level, the embargo prohibits trade between the United States and Cuba. President George H. W. Bush signed the Torricelli Act before he left office, which prevents subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in foreign countries from trading with Cuba.7 President Clinton was allegedly planning on loosening the embargo, but backlash from the anti-Castro community in Miami led Clinton to sign the Helms-Burton Act of 1997, which allows American citizens to sue foreign corporations that benefited from Cuba’s expropriation of U.S. assets immediately after the revolution.8 President Bush added

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Robbing Peter to Pay Paul

additional restrictions on visits between Cuban Americans and their relatives in Cuba,9 which President Obama reversed in April 2009.10 The embargo is a form of economic warfare with its origins in the wave of anti-communist sentiment that pervaded the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. It is designed to block trade, starve the Cuban economy, and thereby incite the Cuban people to revolt and overthrow the Castro government. As both the Castro family and the embargo have been in place for fifty years now, the embargo clearly has not achieved its objectives. In fact, Castro has been able to use the embargo as a scapegoat for all of Cuba’s economic problems. Thus, rather than fomenting sedition among the Cuban people, the embargo creates hostility towards the United States.

Yet despite Castro’s claims, the embargo is not the primary source of Cuba’s economic failure. While the embargo prohibits trade with the United States, it does not isolate Cuba from the rest of the global marketplace. Cuba’s main export partners are China and Canada, which together account for 60 percent of Cuba’s total exports. Cuba’s main import partners are Venezuela and China, which account for 29.6 percent and 13.4 percent of total imports, respectively. Additionally, Cuba has exports of $2.4 billion, ranking 114 out of 226 world countries.11 Thus, Cuba does have access to a significant amount of global trade to stimulate economic growth, even though it cannot access the U.S. market.

fact is that there is no housing foreclosure in Cuba. Because the government serves as both landlord and employer, if an individual does not pay rent, the government can simply confiscate future earnings. Considering the extent of the housing crisis that currently plagues the United States, this is a benefit. But a major downside of government management of the housing sector is the inability to quickly respond to changing demand. In a market system, an increase in home demand causes prices to rise. Over time, these high prices induce more construction until this increases the supply of homes, eventually causes prices to fall. Governmentcontrolled housing, on the other hand, cannot make these adjustments if government officials are not monitoring demand on a daily basis. In Havana, an increase in population has increased demand for housing, yet the government has been slow to increase supply. In 2004, there was an estimated shortage of 1.6 million dwellings in Cuba.12 Multiple families live in singlefamily homes, waiting their turn for the government to eventually build them new houses. Families are also forced to live in outdated homes. According to a United Nations program in historic Old Havana, the area experiences almost two partial collapses every three days.13

Agricultural Markets. Agri-

culture remains a mainstay in the Cuban economy, comprising 4.6 percent of GDP and employing 21.2 percent of the country’s labor force.14 However, The Housing Market. Like many the structure of the Cuban economy markets, the government also domi- ensures that even this sector is not nates the housing market. One peculiar immune from inefficiencies. For some

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Ray

products, the government is the primary producer, and therefore the primary buyer, of a farmer’s output. For example, the government produces the infamous Cuban cigar, and to do so it buys 70 percent of the output of the country’s tobacco farmers.

For other goods, farmers sell their output directly on one of two separate agricultural markets, which means that food effectively has two prices on the island. The first market is called the “free market,” where farmers sell their output to distributors, who then sell the food according to market prices. This is similar to farmers’ markets elsewhere, in which farmers or suppliers quote prices and consumers are free to choose the quantities to buy based on those prices.

The government, however, has deemed the equilibrium market price too high, and therefore it has established a second market where the government enforces rigid price control. In this second type of market, the government caps the price of food below the equilibrium market price, so Cubans can have their choice in purchasing their groceries at two different prices.

These twin agricultural markets, of course, exhibit the classic symptoms of government price control. Because prices for farmers are higher in the free market, fewer of them enter the cheaper, second market. Consumers, on the other hand, rush to the cheaper market, so demand outpaces supply and shelves are soon left bare. The free market also attracts better produce that farmers know will fetch a better price. Any visitor to Cuba will notice the empty cupboards or long lines at the government market and the higher quality of produce in the free market.

Business&Economics

The only way the government could eliminate the excess demand created through a price ceiling would be through an agricultural subsidy in which the government buys food from farmers at above market prices and sells that food to consumers at below market prices, thus taking a loss on every transaction and forcing it to make up for this loss elsewhere in the economy. Even capitalist economies like the United States routinely subsidize their agricultural markets, but the critical point is that Cuba must pay for this subsidy by raising taxes elsewhere. Thus, Cuba needs to decide which of its markets are most competitive internationally and tax those in the strongest position to subsidize the weakest. While this form of income transfers between sectors of the economy is not without its own problems, it does lay bare the harsh truth that Cuba, like any nation, cannot prop up all its sectors at once.

Policies for the Future. The U.S.

embargo against Cuba is controversial both because it has levied a steep penalty on the Cuban people and because it has not moved the island any closer to democracy over the last fifty years.

On top of this, the embargo gives the Castro brothers a scapegoat for Cuba’s problems. Therefore, the United States should drop the embargo and allow trade with the island. That way, the Cuban people can see for themselves how much of their economic condition depends on trading with a single partner. Most likely, dropping the embargo will have a small economic effect on Cuba, but a large political effect. With the embargo gone, the Castro brothers would have no one to blame for eco-

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Robbing Peter to Pay Paul

nomic mismanagement but themselves.

The big gorilla in the room is not the embargo, as Fidel would insist, but rather the extreme socialist policies of the Castro administration. A good first step toward liberalization would be for Cuba to relinquish its socialist agenda by relaxing many of its arcane and unnecessary laws on all manner of political and economic behavior. This includes

ernment could effectively offer tax credits to farmers who supply food at low prices. This way, the farmer can keep a larger share of his output because he faces a smaller tax burden. In exchange, he can provide food at a lower price to consumers. There will be heterogeneity among the farmers, and the better farmers who are able to supply provisions at a lower price will benefit the

With the embargo gone, the Castro

brothers would have no one to blame for the economic mismanagement but themselves. laws that restrict mobility between town and country, laws that suffocate private enterprise, and laws that control prices and wages in various markets.

But this may be too large a step.

To his credit, Raul Castro has moved the economy toward free markets. For example, he has encouraged the reformation and revitalization of joint ventures between foreign companies and the Cuban government, which are the dominant mode of financing for the major international hotels that now populate parts of the island. Moreover, in his various speeches, Raul has encouraged farmers to produce more and urged Cuban citizens to work harder.

While this focus on domestic production is a step in the right direction, he needs to take more aggressive steps than mere political rhetoric. Cuban citizens, like all individuals, react to incentives, and therefore the Cuban government needs to consider individual incentives at the core of any adjustment to their economic policy.

In the agricultural market, the gov-

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most from this tax credit, forcing the inefficient farmers to exit the industry.

On immigration, if the government still wishes to restrict mobility between town and country, and between Cuba and other countries, it should at least allow citizens to buy their way out of the regulation. Immigration laws that restrict mobility are most onerous on the high productivity workers who cannot realize their economic gains. For example, the social cost of retaining a doctor in Cuba exceeds that of retaining a plumber. But if the best doctors could buy their way out of regulation, at least the government would earn revenue that it could allocate elsewhere.

This is superior to erecting rigid immigration rules that restrict mobility and keep people on the island by fiat.

In the labor market, the government should either get the market to determine the wages of Cuban citizens or, failing that, at least set wages that more closely approximate productivity. In the current system, Cubans lack incentive to work and produce, which is the heart

Ray

of economic growth. At least pegging these wages to their market equivalents in capitalist economies may be one way to approximate productivity measures.

The enduring paradox of socialism is the beauty of its idealistic objectives and the ugly reality of the society it creates. The key problem is that socialism neglects that unavoidable and essential feature of human nature, individual self-interest. While socialism’s vision of an equal and fair society is seductive, its neglect of the basic truths of human

Business&Economics

nature dooms the resulting society to economic failure. After fifty years, Cuba is a shining example of why socialism does not work, and serves as a sobering warning to governments around the world of implementing a system that seeks to institutionalize idealistic egalitarianism without acknowledging the inevitable role of self-interest.

The author would like to thank Leslie Balog, Tatiana Arencibia, and the staff of Global Exchange for helpful conversations.

Notes

1 Central Intelligence Agency, “Cuba,” The World Factbook, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html. The listed figure is at purchasing power parity. Cuba’s GDP is $55.18 billion at official exchange rates.

2 OneCaribbean: Caribbean Tourism Organization, “Cuba Visitor Arrival Summary,” Internet, http:// www.onecaribbean.org/content/files/2004cuba.pdf.

3 Ibid.

4 “Economía,” Granma Internacional, Internet, http://www.granma.cu/espanol/2009/economia1. html.

5 “Cuban Doctors Seek Path to U.S.” National Public Radio, 20 February 2007, Internet, http://www.npr. org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7492240.

6 Miguel A. Faria, Cuba in Revolution—Escape From a Lost Paradise (Macon: Hacienda Publishing, Inc., 2002).

7 U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,” Internet, http://www.state.gov/www/

regions/wha/cuba/democ_act_1992.html.

8 H. R. 927, Sec. 3, “To seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes.”

9 John-thor Dahlburg, “Cuban Americans Rush to Visit Kin While They Can,” LA Times, 30 June 2004.

10 Anthony Broadle, “Obama to Abolish Limits on U.S.-Cuba Family Ties,” Reuters, Internet, http:// www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE5326HV 20090404?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews.

11 Central Intelligence Agency, “Cuba.”

12 Eric Driggs, “Deteriorating Living Conditions in Cuba,” Focus on Cuba 59 (2004), Internet, http:// ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue59.htm.

13 Ibid.

14 Central Intelligence Agency, “Cuba.”

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 1 5]

Science&Technology The New Great Game

Water Allocation in Post-Soviet Central Asia Kai Wegerich Though experts once considered plans to increase the reservoir capacity of the Vakhsh River, an upstream tributary of the Amu Darya River, as necessary for integration into the larger water management infrastructure of Soviet Central Asia, these plans are now perceived as a threat to the interests of downstream former Soviet states. The construction of the Rogun Dam began in 1976 but froze after financial difficulties caused newly independent Tajikistan to abandon it in 1991. Since then, Tajikistan has revived the project, seeing it as a solution to its frequent energy shortages and dependence on other states for power. The hydroelectric dam, located on the Vakhsh River will, when completed, be the tallest in the world, generating concerns that it could limit the amount of water available for irrigation in downstream states. Uzbekistan recently countered a World Bank plan to provide funding to the Tajik government for the purpose of studying the feasibility of the Rogun project and investigate the possibility of setting up an international financial consortium, by “ratifying, rapidly and unexpectedly, two international conventions on transboundary water allocation (the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and

Kai Wegerich is an assistant professor of irrigation and development at Wageningen University in the Netherlands.

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The New Great Game

the United Nations Convention on the expansion of the irrigated area. These Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of projects included the construction of large pump stations in the Turkmen International Watercourses).”1 Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) to bring Historical Background. A con- water to the Kashkardarya and Bukhara sideration of the colonial history of provinces of the Uzbek SSR, the Karathe Soviet Union is essential to under- Kum Canal in the Turkmen SSR, standing this shift in perception. After and the Amu Zang pumping station assuming control over Central Asia in near the Afghan border.5 Soviet projthe mid-nineteenth century, Russian ects to control the flow of the Vakhsh authorities implemented agricultural River included the construction of the policies that encouraged cotton pro- Nurek Dam and the still-unfinished duction. The establishment of Soviet Rogun Dam in Tajikistan. The downpower after 1917 did not change the stream Tuyamuyun Hydroengineering economic specialization of the region. Complex was located within the terriIn 1950, Central Asia contained 5.4 tories of the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs, million hectares (ha) of irrigated land.2 providing water to both. The construcIn an effort to increase agricultur- tion of these shared structures reflected al productivity, Soviet leader Nikita a focus on regional integration for the Khrushchev launched the 1953 “virgin- greater benefit of the USSR as a whole. land” policy which his successors con- Authorities thus paid little attention to equitable water distribution among the tinued until 1985.

At the start of the Brezhnev period, individual SSRs. The USSR occupied a hegemonic government authorities believed that

Despite the 1992 agreement, nowhere

in the world is the potential for conflict over resources as strong as in Central Asia. the value of agricultural and animal husbandry output in the Aral Sea Basin outweighed the effects of environmental damage to the area.3 Officials identified direct losses in such sectors as fishing and fur trade while ignoring indirect losses and secondary effects.4 Irrigated land area thus continued to expand, rising to 7.2 million ha by 1975 and 9.4 million ha by 1989.

Large infrastructure projects in the Amu Darya Basin facilitated the rapid

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position vis-à-vis its weaker neighbor, Afghanistan. During water-sharing negotiations in 1977 in Tashkent, an Afghan delegation claimed 9 km3 of the river flow but their Soviet counterparts only offered 6 km3; the two sides failed to come to an agreement.6 As a result of the Amu Darya Basin’s closure,7 in 1987, the Scientific and Technical Council of the USSR’s Ministry of Water Resources determined water allocation quotas for the four Soviet repub-

Wegerich

lics sharing the basin and created the River Basin Organization (Basseynoe Vodnoe Ob’edinenie, BVO), which was responsible for managing and enforcing these quotas.8 Soviet authorities did not include Afghanistan in these negotiations and allotted it a meager 2.1 km3 of river use.

The Soviet water management system favored Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, ignored Afghanistan, and used Tajikistan as a water regulator. When administrative boundaries became national boundaries in 1991, the Central Asian states were left with unequal water-use quotas and a highly interdependent system of pumps, dams, and canals. In 1992, the governments of the five former Central Asian Soviet Republics met in Almaty, where they collectively agreed to maintain the basic principles of Central Asian water allocation that had prevailed under the Soviet Union. Following these negotiations, the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC) was set up to manage water allocation. David R. Smith argues that despite the 1992 agreement, “nowhere in the world is the potential for conflict over resources as strong as in Central Asia.”9 Many academics consider Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basin water allocation agreements to be ad hoc. The temporary nature of water allocation policies is also be seen in Decree 1110, which the USSR’s Council of Ministers issued on 19 September 1988. The decree “specified the minimum inflow to the deltas of the Amu Darya, Syr Darya, and Aral Sea to be: 8.7 km3 in 1990; 11 km3 in 1995; 15 km3 in 2000; and 20 km3 by 2005.”10 Shortly before the Soviet Union collapsed there was an attempt

Science&Technology

to reopen the basin again. The ICWC’s Scientific Information Center’s (SIC) Web site states, however, that the guiding principle of water management is the countries’ right to equitable and reasonable water use with regard to previous use.11 The Tashkent-based SIC thus appears biased towards Uzbekistan, portraying a different interpretation of Soviet water allocation policies in its publications.

While Uzbekistan appears to have a strong influence on the region’s water allocation, agricultural developments and water infrastructure projects in neighboring states, particularly in upstream Tajikistan and Afghanistan, could put the most populated and strongest military power in Central Asia in a weak position.

Water Use in the Amu Darya Basin. Terminating at the Aral Sea,

the Amu Darya originates at the confluence of the Vakhsh and Pyanij Rivers and shapes the Afghan-Tajik border. It measures 2540 km in length and has a catchment area of 309,000 km2, making it Central Asia’s largest river. Its vast drainage system extends through Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.12 Between 1990 and 2003 Turkmenistan’s agricultural area increased from 1,329,000 ha to 1,843,000 ha, and its total water use increased from 22,435 km3 to 27,958 km3. Likewise, by 1999 Tajikistan had increased the area of its irrigated lands by 200,000 ha with plans to increase it by an additional 500,000 ha by 2005.13 Reductions in funding for state

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The New Great Game

infrastructure in all Central Asian states have led to infrastructure deterioration and a loss of management control.14 It is therefore difficult for states to implement the current water allocation quotas. Agricultural strategies in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, aimed at creating self-sufficiency in the area of food production, have converted a number of cotton-producing irrigated areas to wheat crops—a development that could ultimately conserve water.15 According to official data, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not reach the waterusage limits outlined in the 1987 protocol, while Turkmenistan’s water demand remained stable. Nevertheless, unofficial data indicates that Uzbekistan’s water use exceeded water consumption limits defined in the 1987 protocol.16 Further research reveals that water is not equally distributed throughout the country, and as a result downstream provinces and districts in Uzbekistan are more noticeably affected by water scarcity than their counterparts further upstream.17 Despite the international focus on conflict over resources, agricultural expansion, and increased water use in the region, the director and the deputy director of the SIC claim that “conflicts in water management, operation, and allocation between the countries of the region have been avoided…[and] the volume of water used in the region has been reduced.”18 There is a difference, however, between official statements and informal interviews with national officials and experts. According a 2002 International Crisis Group (ICG) report, “Officially Uzbek and Turkmen representatives say they are happy with the implementation [of water alloca-

[ 1 20] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tion policies].”19 However, quoting the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), the report states that “Turkmenistan is thought to use as much as 30 km3 [of river flow]”—eight cubic kilometers more than the 1987 quotas allow. The ICG report also uses interviews with Uzbek water management experts and politicians from the Khorezm province and the autonomous republic of Karakalpakistan, both of which border the shrinking Aral Sea. Not surprisingly, these experts “complain that Turkmenistan takes too much [water].”20 Furthermore, according to the ICG report Uzbekistan claims that current water allocation quotas are unfair and favor Turkmenistan.21 Uzbek authorities argue that because of its much larger population and area Uzbekistan requires more water than Turkmenistan. It is unlikely that Uzbekistan would apply similar reasoning to a situation where it was forced to give water to Afghanistan, or that it would question the efficiency and economic viability of the pumping stations delivering water to the Bukhara, Kashkadarya, and Surkhandarya provinces.

Northern Afghanistan has only 385,000 ha of irrigated land. Though future irrigation projects in the region are expected to expand the irrigated area by a relatively small 32,870 ha and increase access to water by a further 99,500 ha, they will have a significant impact on Afghanistan’s total water demand.22 Assuming that the 132,370 sha of new irrigated land will be used for double-cropping rice and wheat, upstream Afghanistan’s water demand will rise to roughly 6.09 km3. Increased water demand and upstream diversion

Wegerich

will result in water scarcity downstream— increasing the potential for conflict over water use in the region.

Provision Structures of the Amu Darya Basin. Current water-

provision problems in the Amu Darya Basin stem mainly from Uzbekistan’s difficulty accessing water-provision infrastructure located in Turkmenistan.

This includes two pumping stations and the Tuyamuyun reservoir.23 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan began charging Uzbekistan a fee to use the land occupied by the pumping stations. Uzbekistan is also responsible for the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure, but border regulations and visa requirements make it difficult for Uzbek maintenance staff to move from country to country. The difficulties of maintaining vital infrastructure abroad have complicated plans to rehabilitate the infrastructure. Disagreements over whether Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan should receive international funding for the rehabilitation of the Kashkadarya pump station, for example, have delayed its actual construction. A similar problem could potentially arise as a result of the Bukhara pump station’s anticipated rehabilitation.

In upstream Tajikistan, the Nurek reservoir provides seasonal stream flow to the Vakhsh River. The average annual runoff of the Vakhsh River at the site of the Nurek Dam is equal to 20 km3.

During the summer flooding periods (April to August) in 2003 and 2004, water releases from Nurek provided around 20 percent of the total discharge measured at the Darganata metering station located near the Tuyamuyun

Science&Technology

reservoir complex. The Nurek Dam has a hydropower capacity of 3000 megawatt (MW) and long-term average annual hydropower production of 11.2 trillion-watt hours (TWh). Although in 1990, prior to its independence, Tajikistan exported 2668 gigawatt hours (GWh) and imported 3927 GWh, in 2002, after its independence, it exported 266 GWh and imported 1058 GWh.24 Furthermore, the existing electricity grid within Tajikistan does not extend to its northwestern regions.

In an effort to increase its energy output, Tajikistan plans to restart the construction of the Rogun reservoir (3600 MW) and the Sangtuda Dam (670 MW) in the Vakhsh River Basin.

The Uzbek government is very critical of the Rogun Dam,25 because it would put Tajikistan “firmly in control of the river.”26 It is unclear whether Uzbekistan is opposed to its construction in general or to a particular height for the dam,27 which could be Stage I (225 m tall, 2.78 km3 total design capacity, 1.92 km3 operational storage), Stage II (285 m tall, 6.78 km3 total design capacity, 3.98 km3 operational storage) or Stage III (335 m tall, 13.3 km3 total design capacity, 10.3 km3 operational storage).

It is unclear whether Tajikistan would use the Rogun Dam to support agriculture downstream, making it unlikely that Uzbekistan would support its construction up to Stage III. International financial institutions are also unlikely to support the Stage III construction of the dam without the consent of downstream riparian states.

Uzbekistan’s refusal to reach an agreement gave Tajikistan the impetus to ask Russia and Iran for financial support. Russia, however, was also opposed

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The New Great Game

dependent on Turkmenistan. Existing water provision infrastructure in Tajikistan currently has little influence.

The planned construction of the dam at Rogun, however, will cause downstream riparian states to depend on Tajikistan, making it a major player in the region’s competition over resources. Fearing these additional dependencies, Uzbekistan has actively opposed the Rogun project. Turkmenistan has remained strangely silent on the issue.

Realistically, only the Stage III construction of the Rogun Dam could be perceived as a threat to downstream agricultural interests. While the comResults of Water Allocation bined outputs of the Rogun and Nurek Strategies. Currently, Central Asia’s Dams would give Tajikistan sufficient riparian states and provinces are active- electricity for the winter while supplyly engaging in a strategy of resource ing water to downstream states in sumcapture, perhaps owing to poor man- mer, Tajikistan could also focus only on agement and deteriorated infrastruc- electricity production to gain the highture. As a result, water extraction has er economic returns. Thus, the vital increased without the renegotiation of question in assessing the threat posed Soviet agreements. The data provided by by Stage III construction is whether the BVO does not reflect this increase, Tajikistan will pursue maximum ecosuggesting that the BVO is limited in nomic gains or take downstream agriits ability to acquire data. Since even culture and subsequently the interests the SIC director highlighted the ad hoc of neighboring states into considernature of Soviet water allocation agree- ation as well.

Given the current lack of trust ments, it appears logical that riparian states, including Afghanistan, use more between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan it water than Soviet quotas allow. While is doubtful that Uzbekistan would supresource capture has had its strongest port even the non-threatening Stage impact on the Aral Sea, downstream II construction of the Rogun Dam. regions have also suffered the disastrous Furthermore, the absence of Uzbek effects of dry years. Rising upstream consent could lead to higher transmiswater use will decrease their water sup- sion costs for exporting or importing plies even further, making the renego- electricity. Thus even at Stage II, the tiation of outdated Soviet quotas neces- economic and political costs of the sary for ensuring the region’s stability. project will be very high. Only the Existing trans-boundary water pro- construction of a north-south transvision infrastructure in the down- and mission line through Kyrgyzstan to midstream Amu Darya makes Uzbekistan the north or Afghanistan to the south to constructing the Rogun Dam up to Stage III. Although Tajikistan might still be able to receive funding for the dam’s Stage I or Stage II construction, selling hydropower remains a concern. Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, is the center of the present electrical energy grid and Uzbekistan is now charging high transmission costs.

Recently, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan began exploring the possibility of a north-south transmission line, which would make Tajikistan independent from Uzbekistan’s energy-grid hegemony.

[ 1 22 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Wegerich

would enable Tajikistan to sell its surplus independently of Uzbekistan.

Nevertheless, because of its location and Soviet legacy of infrastructural

Science&Technology

integration, Tajikistan will remain partially dependent on Uzbekistan for other key services and commodities.

Notes

1 Bo Libert, Erkin Orolbaev, and Yuri Steklov, “Water and Energy Crisis in Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 6, no. 3 (August 2008): 9-20.

2 Tatyana A. Saiko and Igor S. Zonn “Irrigation Expansion and Dynamics of Desertification in the Circum-Aral Region of Central Asia,” Applied Geography 20, no. 4 (October 2000): 349-367.

3 Igor S. Zonn, “The Impact of Political Ideology on Creeping Environmental Changes in the Aral Sea Basin,” Creeping Environmental Problems and Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin, Michael Glantz, ed.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 157-190.

4 Ibid.

5 PA Consortium Group and PA Consulting, Transboundary Water and Related Energy Cooperation for the Aral Sea Basin Region of Central Asia (Washington, D.C., 2002).

6 Victor Dukhovny, interview with Kai Wegerich, 2008.

7 A river basin is referred to as “closed” when all its river flow is allocated to different uses.

8 James C. McMurray and A. Dan Tarlock, “The Law of Later-developing Riparian States: The Case of Afghanistan,” New York University Environmental Law Journal 7, no. 3 (2005): 711-763.

9 David R. Smith, “Environmental Security and Shared Water Resources in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” Post-Soviet Geography 36, no. 6 (1995): 351–370.

10 PA Consortium Group and PA Consulting, Transboundary Water.

11 Scientific Information Center (SIC) of the Interstate Coordination Water Commission of Central Asia, “Institutional, Technical and Financial Issues Facing the Irrigation Sector in the Central Asian Republics,” Consultant Report (1999), Internet, http://sic.icwc-aral.uz/index_e.htm.

12 Iran’s contribution to the flows in the basin is entirely in streams that end in the Kara Kum Desert, and cannot actually reach the Aral Sea. 13 Max Spoor and Anatoly Krutov, “The ‘Power of Water’ in a Divided Central Asia,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 2, no. 3-4 (September 2003): 593-614. International Crisis Group,

“Central Asia: Water and Conflict,” Asia Report Number 34 (May 2002).

14 SIC, “Institutional, Technical, and Financial Issues,” 1999.

15 Max Spoor and Anatoly Krutov, “The ‘Power of Water.’”

16 It is unclear whether the official or unofficial data is correct. Kai Wegerich, “Wasserverteilung im Flusseinzugsgebiet des Amudarya. Offene und verdeckte Probleme–heute und in der Zukunft,” in Integriertes Wasserressourcen Management (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Praxis überführen, Susanne Neubert, Waltina Scheumann, Annette van Edig, and Walter Huppert, eds. (Nomos Verlag: Baden-Baden, 2005), 201215.

17 Kai Wegerich, “A Critical Review of the Concept of Equity to Support Water Allocation at Various Scales in the Amu Darya Basin,” Irrigation and Drainage Systems 21, no. 3-4 (December 2007): 185-195.

18 Victor Dukhovny and Vadim Sokolov, “Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral Sea Basin,” UNESCO Technical Documents in Hydrology: PC-CP Series no. 11 (2003).

19 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Water and Conflict,” 21.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 David Rycroft and Kai Wegerich, “The Three Blind Spots of Afghanistan: Water Production, Irrigation Development, and Impact of Climate Change,” (forthcoming).

23 Kai Wegerich, Oliver Olsson, and Jochen Froebrich, “Reliving the Past in a Changed Environment: Hydropower Ambitions, Opportunities, and Constraints in Tajikistan,” Energy Policy 35, no. 7 (July 2007): 3815-3825.

24 World Bank, 2004.

25 Max Spoor and Anatoly Krutov, “The ‘Power of Water.’”

26 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Water and Conflict,” 23.

27 Kai Wegerich, Oliver Olsson, and Jochen Froebrich, “Reliving the Past.”

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 23]

Books

A New Approach to Eurasia Review by Spencer P. Boyer and James D. Lamond Thomas W. Simons, Jr. Eurasia’s New Frontiers: Young States, Old Societies, Open Futures. New York: Cornell University Press, 2008. 200 pp. $25.00.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 left fifteen successor states in the space once occupied by the former global power.

For centuries these civilizations of Central Asia—made up of peoples from numerous ethnic and religious groups—have been ruled by leaders of foreign capitals, including Mongol Khans, Russian tsars, and Soviet general-secretaries. These societies, while diverse, are united by the shared experience of being not quite Asian or European, and of struggling with the transition from Soviet rule to independence. As these nations have made the transition to independent states over the past two decades, they have faced serious challenges in their development of democracy, market economics, national identity, and civil society.

Diplomat and scholar Thomas W. Simons, Jr. provides insightful analysis of these challenges in his new book Eurasia’s New Frontiers: Young States, Old Societies, Open Futures. He explores the current relationships among the state, the economy, and civil society resulting from Soviet rule, the collapse of the

Spencer P. Boyer is the director of International Law and Diplomacy at the Center for American Progress, a Washington-based think tank.

James D. Lamond is a policy researcher at the National Security Network.

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a new approach to Eurasia

Soviet Union, and the destabilization that followed. The book is a valuable resource for those currently grappling with what approach the U.S. administration should take towards Eurasia.

While Simons does a sound job of explaining various possibilities for U.S.-Eurasian relations, the book would have benefited from a greater exploration of what the United States could reasonably expect from the U.S.Russian relationship in particular in the coming years. While there will certainly continue to be areas of disagreement between the two powers, a renewed focus on shared interests will be critical for addressing the international security concerns of both the United States and Russia.

Weak Civil Society. Simons

begins by arguing that civil society is anemic in the post-Soviet space. This is in large part a legacy of Soviet rule, under which the state centralized society, leaving individuals helpless against those in power. Soviet institutions and power structures created vertical chains rather than horizontal networks, where civic and political discussions “went up and down rather than side to side.”1 This system was a poor breeding ground for civil society and for developing the necessary foundations for citizenry upon independence.

Efforts to foster civil society in Eurasia have focused on aid to develop nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

This was an attractive system for the former Soviet states because it was cheaper, easier to manage, and less vulnerable to corruption than other forms of assistance. However, the state retained a large role, and in those countries where

[ 1 26 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the state was largest, it was difficult to foster sustained civic activity. This central role of the state encouraged dependency, even for civic organizers, giving rise in Central Asia to government-organized non-governmental organizations—or GONGOs. But despite efforts to create an active citizenship in Central Asia, civic participation remains weak. Participation rates in civic organizations are some of the lowest in the world. Simons argues that since Peter the Great, there have been attempts at top-down development, and compares it to the Chinese model of development. He states, “In the post-Soviet space, salvation cannot come only from below.”2 Simons correctly explains the weakness of civil society in Central Asia and does a thorough job explaining the root cause. This is a key point in his argument for why the United States must pursue an elite-based, state-centric approach to relations with Eurasia.

But his comparison of the Russian and Chinese models of development has an “apples and oranges” quality. China is the exception, not the rule, when it comes to development of authoritarian regimes. The rise of China is a true phenomenon, and its economy is diversified and based on multiple industrial sectors. Russia’s economy, on the other hand, is heavily dependent on one-sector export of natural resources—namely oil and gas. This dependence allows for growth only as long as energy prices are high, but as we saw, the Russian growth rate drops as global oil prices decline.3 As Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss note: For every China, there is an auto-

Boyer and Lamond

Books

major impediments to democratic reforms in the post-Soviet space. He states, “First, the post-Communist political class was overwhelmingly postSoviet: the bulk of its members had come of age and learned their political inclinations and habits in the Soviet system. Second, as an ideological replacement for Soviet Communism, the nation-state was everywhere surprisingly weak.”5 In Central Asia there were no uprisings or civic organizations like those that existed in Eastern Europe. So when independence came, there was no bottom-up force for change, and local elites sought ideological replacements for communism from various places.

Elitist Politics. Simons goes on “Sovereignty” was the dominant theme to argue that because civil society is so of the early years, and in many places feeble in Central Asia, politics in the it was tempting to use ethnic-based region largely exists as struggles among nationalism as a weapon in the fight for elites. These groups, entrenched within sovereignty.

While Simons’s observations are the existing power structure, compete with one another for resources and largely correct, he neglects to mention influence, leaving the public closed off the formation of groups that are, in fact, pushing for bottom-up change. to the political process.

In fact, the political scene was actu- Members of groups like The Other ally more open in the years immediately Russia—an unlikely left-right coalifollowing the collapse of the Union tion united by opposition to Putin’s of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), undemocratic moves—have been tarwhen political parties spread, parlia- geted by the government and restricted ments developed, and people took to in their ability to gather, protest, and the streets. These democratic impuls- run for office. es seemed natural after the collapse, but democratic reforms, like elections, The Fusion of Economics and are easier to introduce than long-term Politics. Many Central Asian states institutional transformations. This is must also clarify relationships between an important distinction that Simons the government and the economy. makes. Too often in Washington, defi- Simons closely examines this issue. nitions of democracy have centered on Deprived of the unifying ideology of elections while ignoring other institu- communism and not interested in a tions that are necessary for a sustained nationalism based on ethno-cultural and stable democracy. identities, Simons argues that postSimons argues that there were two Soviet elites have fought over economcratic developmental disaster such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo; for every authoritarian success such as Singapore, there is a resounding failure such as Myanmar; for every South Korea, a North Korea. In the economic-growth race in the developing world, autocracies are both the hares and the snails, whereas democracies are the tortoises— slower but steadier. On average, autocracies and democracies in the developing world have grown at the same rate for the last several decades.4

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a new approach to Eurasia

ics and access to resources. These two issues are needed to keep together the patronage networks on which political power depends. Arguing that Russian state interests and Russian economic assets are interdependent, Simons notes that post-Soviet history has led the countries of Eurasia to a dangerous point.

Immediately following Eurasian states’ independence, the concept of sovereignty became a dominant theme in the region. This resulted in the explosion of related declarations and movements across the region, which often had an economic subtext. The economic and political turmoil of the 1990s followed. By this point discussion of sovereignty was beginning to fade and competition for economic resources took hold as the object of political struggle. Meanwhile, Sovietstyle networks became even more vital as property was privatized.

During this period the oligarchs— refusing to pay their taxes and depriving the state of needed revenue—decided to fund then-President Boris Yelstin’s re-election. In return, they received property, but continued to ignore their tax obligations, keeping the economy in chaos. As a result the Russian state remained ineffective. Yeltsin’s own performance also deteriorated, and Russians came to associate a privatized economy with Russian state weakness and national humiliation. The 1998 economic crisis provided an opportunity for the state and the oligarchs to make a deal. The state would allow the oligarchs to keep their gains, but they would have to pay taxes and stay out of politics. This created a strong feeling that the weakness of the state was a

[ 1 28 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

result of the transfer of state property to private individuals, and that the way to restore authority was for the state to recover these assets.6 Vladimir Putin has benefited from and even fostered these feelings to justify authoritarian policies. In his 2007 address to the National Assembly, Putin said, To be frank, our policy of stable and gradual development is not to everyone’s taste. Some, making skillful use of pseudo-democratic rhetoric, would like to return us to the recent past, some in order to once again plunder the nation’s resources with impunity and rob the people and the state, and others in order to deprive our country of its economic and political independence.7 Rhetoric such as this has fueled the false belief that only through an authoritarian state can stability and prosperity be sustained in Russia.

Most recently, politics and economics have essentially merged, as Russia has sought to re-establish its sphere of influence. This can most clearly be seen with Russia’s use of energy as a weapon against its neighbors, directly affecting U.S. interests in Europe. Simons argues that a resurgent Russia and its failure to distinguish between economics and politics are dangerous not only for practical reasons, but because it implies that Russia is not ready to “join the global economy and the international community.”8 This is an important point. As the United States re-kindles its relationship with Russia, it will need to anticipate the potential impact

Boyer and lamond

Books

Moscow, making independent rule all the more difficult. Russians could also look back to pre-Soviet times for Identity in the Post-Soviet national discourse, while the counSpace. Simons moves on to explore tries of Central Asia had to start from different concepts of nationalism in scratch.

When examining nationalism in the post-Soviet space. In Eurasia, the concept of national identity is a com- Central Asia, Simons explores the defplex one. The Bolsheviks created eth- inition of a national identity based nic-based nationalisms, but they were on civic rather than ethnic values—an essentially virtual nationalisms, since issue that may forecast the potential these identities were not tied to any ter- for violence in the region. The variritory. Instead, identities were linked ous post-Soviet states have handled this to ethnicity and language. For example, issue differently. For example, in the about twenty-five million ethnic Rus- Baltic states the desire to join the West sians live outside of the country, while was vital in preventing discrimination about one-sixth of its internal popula- against their Russian minorities, since tion are ethnic minorities. The same is they were seeking a “European” level of civic citizenship. But in the other true for much of Central Asia.

Ethno-nationality in these circum- former Soviet republics, a civic, rather stances was not a strong building block than ethnic, definition was basically for nationalism. After the collapse of forced on all the new states because of the USSR, the successor states had to the size of the minority populations, build themselves with little conception the degree of mixing, and to a certain of national identity. Even in Russia a extent the shared Soviet heritage.

From religion to language, there are true nation did not exist before 1991. of Russia’s fused economic and political policies.

If a resurgent Russia defines itself by

its ability to influence other states, it may be tempted to test this ability.

The Russian Empire ruled over multiple nationalities and groups, while the Soviet Union was united under the identity of communism transcending nations. Russia did, however, inherit the state institutions of the USSR, while the successor states of Central Asia were not as fortunate. The institutions they inherited from the Soviet era were not designed for independent governing but rather for supporting control from

a number of concepts that may shape an alternative identity to fill the void left by the collapse of the USSR. Simons argues that the emptiness left by communism in today’s Russia is being filled by an ideology that is almost always defined exclusively in terms of restoring the state’s great-power status. Currently, and for the near future, Russians define their destiny in terms of the fortune and power of the Russian state.

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a new approach to Eurasia

If Simons’s analysis is correct, the implications are potentially dangerous but perhaps beneficial. If a resurgent Russia defines itself by its ability to influence other states, it may be tempted to test this ability. The RussianGeorgian war last autumn demonstrated Russia’s willingness and ability to test its power on its former satellites. However, Russia may also seek to influence more powerful actors, and the United States could provide a particularly attractive target. As the United States saw this past February when Russia likely influenced the Kyrgyz government’s decision to close the U.S. airbase at Manas, Russia has the ability and willingness to interfere with U.S. policy in places like Afghanistan. At the same time, Russia will continue to seek approval from the international community in which it hopes to play a leadership role.

In addition, Simons touches upon, but does not explore thoroughly enough, the issue of present-day racism and xenophobia in Russia. Amnesty International’s 2008 report noted that “[v]iolent racist attacks occurred with alarming regularity, mostly concentrated in big cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhnii Novgorod, where the majority of foreigners and ethnic minorities lived.”9 While Simons mentions that there are hate crimes against people of color, he does not fully explain why the rise of such crimes is not an indicator of pervasive ethnocultural nationalism.

U.S. Policy toward Eurasia. In the final section of the book, Simons lays out his vision for U.S. policy toward the region. He rightly recognizes the importance of Eurasia to U.S. interests [ 1 30] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

for global strategic stability and economic security. Russia in particular is a necessary partner on key global issues.

A 2006 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report points out that the three post–Cold War U.S. administrations have “all recognized that productive relations with Russia were one of the highest priorities of American foreign policy.”10 The author also strongly, and rightly, advocates for U.S. engagement with Russia. It is only by bringing Russia into the world community that the world can best help Russia become a twenty-first-century partner. Simons argues that because Russian identity is in part based on the state’s position in the world, Russians depend a great deal on the outside world for their own selfdefinition. Thus, the outside world has strong leverage over Russia, more so than it ever had with the Soviet Union.

This argument has strong merits, and most foreign policy experts would agree that engagement with Russia is an important part of any foreign policy agenda. As the CFR task force concluded, U.S.-Russian cooperation can help the United States to handle some of the most difficult challenges it faces: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tight energy markets, climate change, the drug trade, infectious diseases, and human trafficking. These problems are more manageable when the United States has Russia on its side rather than aligned against it.11 Central Asian countries will also be

Boyer and Lamond

vulnerable to outside pressures. Simons argues that the best way to tame ethnocultural or ethno-religious nationalism and encourage their civic alternative is to give these states the realistic prospect of joining international institutions that demand Western standards.

Engagement with both Russia and its neighbors is the best strategy for shifting the countries of Central Asia in a positive direction.

Simons’s main argument, however, is for a state-based policy approach to the region, saying, If the U.S. or indeed any outside partner is to maximize the democratic prospect in situations like Eurasia’s, where civil society is weak but where ethnic and racialist nationalism is still also weak, they need to focus much more clearly and consistently on today’s elites and the national state structure on which those elites overwhelmingly depend.12 While Simons’s insight and clarity are a welcome contribution to the study of the region, his expectations that the state will foster and promote civil society may be overly optimistic. His recommendation for a state-based approach towards Central Asia’s civic promotion assumes that top-down development can potentially create the conditions necessary for civic participation. This might be the

Books

case; however, when civic organizations depend on the state to the degree that they do in Eurasia, it is extremely difficult to create a true political dialogue or exchange of ideas. Such dependence can further perpetuate the centralization of state power.

Simons also points out that the NGOs that had the most success and received the most funding were usually connected to the state or a powerful family. Other scholars have made similar observations.13 Despite the strong influence of the state, Simons argues that there is still some political competition taking place. Yet, elimination of opposition groups and the success of groups like Nashi—a pro-Putin youth group— are the result of a concerted effort from leaders like Putin to eliminate organizations not fully loyal to the state, forcing independent groups to the margins.14 Finally, Simons could have utilized his extensive regional experience and knowledge to give readers a greater analysis of what Washington should want from a U.S.-Russian relationship over the next few years, particularly as the new administration attempts to reset relations. Simons’s observations on how U.S. policymakers think about Eurasia were compelling, but leave the reader without a full understanding of how the United States should balance pursuing common interests while preventing areas of disagreement from derailing its overall strategic objectives with Russia.

Notes

1 Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Eurasia’s New Frontiers: Young States, Old Societies, Open Futures (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 21.

2 Ibid., 33.

3 Lidia Kelly, “Slowing Russian Growth Brings StateAid Package,” Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2008.

4 Michael McFaul and Kathrynn Soner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 84.

5 Simons, Eurasia’s New Frontiers, 39.

6 Ibid., 71-72.

7 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Fed-

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eral Assembly,” (Marble Hall, the Kremlin, Moscow, 26 April 2007).

8 Simons, Eurasia’s New Frontiers, 90.

9 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2008: State of the World’s Human Rights (New York, 2008), 251.

10 Council on Foreign Relations, Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the U.S. Can and Should Do (New York: Council on

[ 1 32 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Foreign Relations, 2006), 22.

11 Ibid., 33.

12 Simons, Eurasia’s New Frontiers, 135.

13 Alfred B. Evans, Jr., Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundtrom, eds. Russia Civil Society: A Critical Assessment (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2006).

14 McFaul and Soner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model,” 73.

View from the Ground Benevolence and Blunder

NGOs and Development in the Dominican Republic Sierra Hawthorne I am in my underwear, waist-deep in water opaque with agricultural waste. I try to ignore the river stones gouging my bare feet and wave nonchalantly at strangers fording past on skeletal burros (donkeys) and those who have folded their slacks matter-of-factly over their arms as they struggle against the river’s current on foot. I am en route to Orégano Grande, a rural Dominican community accessible by hiking two kilometers along a dirt path and crossing the Yaque del Sur River on foot or by burro. My impromptu crossing guide is Onario, my guagua (a term used to describe any and all forms of motorized public transport) seatmate and new acquaintance who is visiting the community to buy a goat for dinner. He had the foresight to wear shorts.

Once I arrive, Orégano Grande’s mayor greets me with an unsolicited onslaught of requests. Though this community visit is for senior thesis research on hurricane risk management, the mayor associates me with my previous work as a project supervisor for the community development organization Amigos de las Américas (Amigos) and enthusiastically suggests potential projects for Orégano Grande. “We need a basketball court, a community clinic, sewing machines,” she lists on her fingers. “But most of all, we need a community

Sierra Hawthorne is a junior majoring in International Politics in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

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center where our community associations can conduct meetings.” Despite my insistence that Amigos is not currently operating in the community— and that I am no longer an Amigos employee—the mayor is convinced by my work experience and very foreignness that I have access to bottomless institutional coffers.

However frustrating, these expectations have been well earned by U.S. aid and involvement in the Dominican Republic during the past century. While

fathers.

NGOs and, more specifically, international development humanitarian organizations, have played an important though sometimes counterproductive role in the Dominican Republic’s economic development. While most of these organizations work with the best of intentions, the volume of NGO dollars has reduced demand for government efficiency and allocation of key services, in many cases paralyzing communal participation. While such a charitable,

The economic difficulties created by cor-

ruption are exacerbated by the Dominican government’s mismanagement and skewed prioritization of development projects. the United States spent much of the twentieth century meddling in Dominican politics through military interventions and private sector involvement, it has since supported political stability through economic aid for disaster relief and community development.1 U.S. and international aid has often been channeled through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), their presence evident in all forms of Dominican infrastructure. The street names in the city of San Juan de la Maguana show this: branching off of the main Independence Street are the Lions Club and Rotary International Streets, named for these organizations’ large monetary contributions to the city’s development.

Lions Club and Rotary International Streets share this privilege with streets bearing the names of Duarte and Mella, the celebrated Dominican founding

[ 1 34 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

handouts-based approach has proved ineffective and unsustainable in the Dominican Republic, a participationbased model targeting structural causes of poverty is sustainable and indeed empowering for communities. Plan Dominican Republic (Plan), one of the more active community development NGOs in the Dominican Republic, currently works in 170 communities in the country’s southwest region and has successfully employed a community participation-based model since 2004.

Using Plan as a case study, I examine the increased sustainability of participation-based models alongside the drawbacks of financial inefficiency evident in Plan’s administrative structure.

The Dominican Republic also serves as an ideal location to study NGO efficacy, as organizations are particularly active and concentrated in the coun-

Hawthorne

View from the Ground

were understaffed, undersupplied, and often ceased to function entirely when money stopped arriving for nurses’ salaries and medical supplies. Half-constructed aqueducts were abandoned by their well-meaning sponsors when the prices of materials increased beyond projected budgets or when more urgent projects diverted funds elsewhere.

Worse still was the sense of paternalism and pity often displayed toward Dominican community members by these organizations. In conversations with Dominicans on guaguas, at street corners, and between heaping plates of arroz y habichuela (rice and beans), I would mention the name of some sponsorship organization heavily involved in community development. “Ah,” my guagua seatmate or lunch hostess would sigh Trading Dignity for Dollars. of recognition, “Is that the organizaMy three months as a project supervi- tion that sends men to take pictures sor with Amigos de las Américas offered of the poor little sick children so that me an insider’s view of that NGO’s rich foreigners will send us money?” administration, while my subsequent They were frustrated and humiliated fieldwork forced me to confront the by the fact that organizations arrived to possibility that my prior work was part photograph and publicize the poorest of a well-intentioned but ineffectual runny-eyed children looking mourneffort to improve Dominican living fully over bellies bloated by malnutristandards through an outpouring of tion. What lay behind these barefooted American dollars. My work took me children were staggeringly beautiful to numerous communities that NGOs landscapes verdant with thriving banana tried to “develop” through large mate- plantations, local colmados (stores) blarrial donations and projects like schools, ing bachata music, and residents shoutclinics, and aqueducts. Unfortunately, ing above the ruckus to invite a neighfor such communities good intentions bor to dinner or a game of dominoes. translated into a sudden influx of cash The beautiful and boisterous Dominiand materials with little social capital, can Republic was ignored in favor of means, or communal will to sustain the its pitiful underbelly, so that foreign material projects. Soon after construc- donors would gasp at images of starving tion schools were vandalized and chil- children and respond with a beneficent dren were attending class seated on the shower of dollars or euros. Beneath floor because desks and chairs had been the brochures’ glossy compartmentaldamaged beyond repair. Rural clinics ization of poverty through snapshots

try compared to other countries in the region: 904 multinational NGOs worked in the Dominican Republic in 2000, while the nation’s 106 NGOs per million citizens outnumber the 89 NGOs per million citizens found in the rest of Central America and the Caribbean.2 Given the multitude and influence of these organizations, identification of best practice models is necessary to improve their role in supporting host government efficiency.

While examining the increased sustainability of programs operating under a participation-based framework, it is also important to examine NGOs’ potential for influencing government transparency and democratic institutions.

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and statistics lay the complexities of the Dominican Republic, blurred and diminished into just another part of the developing world.

The developed world’s compulsion to help the children pictured in those brochures has created a climate of resentment among beneficiaries, expectations that handouts will continue, and subsequent dependence on said handouts. In many places these attitudes have driven entire communities into developmental paralysis between surges of foreign cash.

In the community of Sabana Grande, local delinquents systematically vandalized and destroyed the community’s only primary school, which Plan had sponsored. In the four weeks it took for the vandals to enter unlocked classrooms, empty each room of its desks, and rip the children’s artwork from the walls, not a single community member stepped forward to prevent or repair the damage. The only lock on school property was still securely fastened around the front gate, rendered completely useless by a long-present hole in the fence. All locks on classroom doors had slowly disappeared, later reappearing on community members’ own doors or cattle gates, no one coming forward to replace them.

While it seems counterintuitive that community members would betray their own interests by failing to maintain their children’s only primary school, one community member expressed the rationale that has defeated so many good intentions in the Dominican Republic, the simple truth that a community’s collective passivity can triumph over million-dollar NGO projects: “It is because Plan should replace the locks.

This school is not our school. It is

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Plan’s school.” Plan’s construction of a primary school had not involved the community in the planning or fundraising process, leaving the community with no sense of ownership and thus no sense of commitment to the school.

The organization’s will to develop and empower the community through largescale monetary contributions had eroded the community’s sense of grassroots responsibility, impairing the project’s long-term success. Helping a community by simply funding the construction of a school was in fact training community members in passive receptivity. It fostered the belief that the community itself could not, and need not, contribute to its own development.

Plan International as Case Study. This community response was

common across Plan’s project sites.

As a result the organization dramatically shifted its approach from material donations to a child-centered, community participation-based model in 2004. Plan Dominican Republic, a subsidiary of Plan International, came together when Plan International began working in the Dominican Republic in 1987. Until 2004 Plan functioned by sponsoring large-scale development projects such as aqueducts and houses, as well as delivering milk and school supplies to sponsored children and their families. Since 2004, however, the organization has evolved to become a participatory development organization committed to targeting and alleviating the structural causes of poverty— such as social deficits in education and gender equality—rather than addressing poverty at the superficial level through material projects.

Hawthorne

Plan Dominican Republic focuses the bulk of its work at the local and municipal levels, employing hundreds of native Dominican facilitators, each of whom is responsible for maintaining ties with and supporting programs in communities. As implied by the title, a facilitator designs and fosters programs in communities, while training community members to carry out these long-term projects. Facilitators organize youth and children’s groups—as well as associations of young people committed to bettering their communities—and prioritize the discussion and promotion of children’s rights, education, cultural pride, racial and gender equality, good hygiene, small-scale community development, and volunteerism. Plan then works with these youth groups to disseminate this information by way of radio broadcasts, murals, press releases, book fairs, and dramas. In this way Plan simultaneously builds technological and creative skills while ingraining ideas crucial to community health and democratic institutional stability.

With Plan’s help entire communities have mobilized against child labor, gender violence, and corruption, while Plan-trained youth groups have earned funding for community development projects by soliciting local syndicates and applying for institutional grants.

In the three thousand-person community of Sabana Grande, the network of active youth comprises over eleven groups and seventy-five young community members. Sabana Grande youth successfully solicited syndicate funds for an aqueduct, which brought running water to the community for the first time. Energized by its success, the youth group solicited additional funds for an

View from the Ground

irrigation system, which would increase Sabana Grande’s agricultural production and income.

While Plan’s child-centered development approach has been successful, its facilitator-intensive organizational structure comes at a high price. Plan’s facilitators comprise the bottom level of a complex administrative hierarchy and are overseen by zone coordinators, program coordinators, provincial office managers, and national office administrators. Plan International devotes an astounding amount of money to the administrative support of this structure.4 What differs in Plan’s administration is the number of employees it has rather than volunteers. While the Red Cross, for example, has volunteers who implement almost all of its multilevel programs and devotes approximately 85 percent of its funds to project costs, Plan Dominican Republic has five provincial offices with close to one hundred employees each, as well as a national office devoted to administrative oversight and macro-level policy formation.5 Plan Dominican Republic has the highest number of paid employees of any of Plan International’s forty-five project countries. While Plan Dominican Republic’s provincial offices have over one hundred employees each, Plan International’s provincial offices in other Latin American countries have about fifteen. Additionally, Plan Dominican Republic’s facilitators work in two to four communities while Plan International’s facilitators in other Latin American projects work in about fifteen communities.

In February 2009, Plan underwent a massive overhaul at the national and

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provincial levels. The organization dismissed all facilitators and reduced provincial offices with over one hundred employees to seven paid employees.

It also eliminated zone coordinators, the next level above facilitators. Additionally, Plan merged its education and health sectors, while cutting other programs or placing them under the umbrella category of “general services.”

Plan’s participation sector remained, however, demonstrating the organization’s commitment to maintaining its participation-based methodology, even under complete administrative restructuring. With extensive budget cuts expected over the next few years, Plan’s employees hope that the organization’s reduced administrative costs will compensate for its diminished finances and allow its programs to continue.

Consequences of NGO Dominance. The dominance of NGOs

in the Dominican Republic’s development has resulted in a dangerous dependence on organizations for services that the Dominican government should provide. To fill in gaps left by the government’s under-spending on social programs, NGOs have largely managed health care for economically disadvantaged Dominicans, alongside family planning, AIDS education, primary education, and a substantial portion of disaster relief programs. In an interview with the elementary school director in Las Salinas, I discovered that heavy rainfall from Tropical Storm Noel in October 2007 flooded the school, destroying most of its teaching materials and half its concrete fence.

When the school director and a group of professors solicited the State Secre-

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tariat of Education for money to construct a drainage ditch to avoid future damage to the flood-prone school, the secretariat referred the community to petition an NGO to fund the project.6 As of February 2009, almost one and a half years after Noel devastated the school, the community was still desperately trying to find a donor to fund a drainage ditch before the hurricane season.

Such dependence has shifted focus away from citizens demanding basic services from government, creating the civilian and political expectation that foreign organizations will provide those services. Rather than soliciting local politicians for improved roads, renovation of school buildings, or running water, the most economically disadvantaged Dominicans are conditioned to approach NGOs. Low demand for government efficiency has also translated into a continued tolerance for corruption. In Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, the Dominican Republic received a score of 3 on a scale of 1 to 10; 1 being the most corrupt.7 President Leonel Fernández has faced increasing pressure to confront corruption in the police and armed forces; in the past six months alone, he dismissed more than 700 members of the police force and 535 members of the military for suspected involvement in the country’s drug trade.8 While Fernández’s crackdown drew international praise, it represented only one of many steps necessary to combat government corruption.

The economic difficulties created by corruption are exacerbated by the government’s mismanagement and skewed

Hawthorne

prioritization of development projects.

The problem with government-sponsored development in the Dominican Republic is not a shortage of public works projects, but rather choosing exorbitantly expensive and marginally beneficial projects over basic public services. In a country where rolling blackouts are common in the capital, Santo Domingo, water quality poses a

View from the Ground

political gain. Rather than operating in a transparent, centralized development scheme, politicians freely use development projects as bribes for constituent votes, often abandoning these projects after winning. Senator Ramón de la Rosa of San Juan, for example, enthusiastically promised a rural clinic to the community of El Capá before running for reelection and even demonstrated

Targeting the youngest sector of the

Dominican population may successfully instill social norms necessary for a thriving and uncorrupt democracy. public health hazard, few students are educated beyond elementary school, and millions of dollars have subsidized a subway system in that only serves a tiny fraction of Santo Domingo’s more privileged residents.9 The subway costs approximately $3 million to operate each month—one-third of which is covered by passenger fares—and requires an operating subsidy of $25 million for 2009 alone. The total cost of construction was roughly $699 million, which reallocated funding away from over two thousand small public works projects around the country.10 The fact that an extensive subway system requires a constant supply of electricity that cannot be supported by the city’s infrastructure— alongside the country’s existing public bus system, which is badly in need of repair—evinces the inefficiency of such government endeavors.

In addition to badly prioritized funds, members of the government also abuse development projects for

his commitment by hiring a private laborer to lay the building’s foundations the following week. After being re-elected, however, he abandoned the project. Almost a year later El Capá’s rural clinic remains a half-finished cement structure, crumbling along with the community’s faith in the promises of politicians.

With money lost to clientelism and corruption, the government also spends very little of its budget on social programs. The share of GDP devoted to health care—1.9 percent in 2004— is below the world average, as are its expenditures on education.11 Existing spending for social programs is often short-term and superficial, taking the form of subsidies for food, transportation, water, and electricity.12 The Dominican government’s inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption have left a vacuum for key services and development that NGOs have filled. The continued presence and intervention

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 39]

Benevolence and Blunder

fully instill social norms necessary for a thriving and uncorrupt democracy.

NGOs can thus focus on building social, rather than material, infrastructure.

Empowering communities to use available resources—grants and techniques such as forming civic organizations—will allow community members to pursue their own development as well as direct collective discontent towards achieving Policy Recommendations. pertinent political goals. A stronger Nevertheless, the relationship between civil society will also be a critical factor NGOs and host governments can in combating government corruption, change to one of mutual benefit, pro- as a unified and powerful populace will vided that NGOs use their influence be infinitely more effective in demandto pressure the government to crack ing institutional transparency and effidown on corruption and supply basic cient government spending.

The Dominican government must services to the Dominican people. The current economic situation is one that reexamine its spending priorities. It may facilitate a rapid transformation should devote a larger portion of GDP in effective mutual aid. The financial to basic services such as health care and crisis will force NGOs to conform to education, which most directly produce lower-cost operating models in order healthy, more productive, and thus to survive. With shrinking endowments empowered citizens. Though the govand reduced public donations, NGOs ernment’s budget is limited, its econwill be more hesitant to pour money omy has seen steady growth in recent into projects without community coop- years. Cutting waste due to corruption eration and involvement. An increas- and clientelism will free up funds for ingly constrained budget will also com- social programs. It is essential that the pel NGOs to reexamine their approach Dominican Republic increase oversight for corruption, and that the Fernández to development.

NGOs can most effectively support administration continue to prosecute human development, and ultimately corrupt officials within its ranks. While economic improvement, through ideas President Fernández’s 2007 dismissal rather than material projects. These of military and police officers involved organizations can empower commu- in the drug trade was an important step, nities to demand institutional trans- his administration must also address parency from their government and corruption directly affecting Dominifoster democratic values like human can citizens, such as the collection of rights, children’s right to education, bribes for basic services or the manipucivil engagement, and racial and gen- lation of critical development projects der equality. As demonstrated by Plan, to garner votes.

Corruption is entrenched in the targeting the youngest sector of the Dominican population may success- Dominican Republic, and addressing of these organizations, however, allow the government to limp along unchallenged and without undergoing the radical overhaul necessary to transform it into an accountable governing body.

In sum, the two form a perverse, symbiotic relationship with each party perpetuating the other’s role in an inefficient and ultimately harmful cycle.

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Hawthorne

it will entail a lengthy and painful process requiring multi-level review and restructuring. Government efficiency, corruption, and development are inextricably con-

View from the Ground

nected. NGOs and the Dominican government must together accept the burden of this challenge if they hope to improve the quality of life of all Dominicans.

Notes

1 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner Publishing, 1998).

2 World Resources Institute, “Environmental Institutions and Governance: Dominican Republic,” Earthtrends Country Profiles (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2002), Internet, http:// earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/ env_cou_214.pdf.

3 Plan International, Internet, http://www. plan-international.org (date accessed: 15 March 2009).

4 Rigoberto Mesa, interview with Sierra Hawthorne, personal interview, San Juan, Dominican Republic, 10 February 2009.

5 Sergio Rafael Vargas Puente, interview with Sierra Hawthorne, personal interview, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 27 January 2009.

6 Joel Terrero, interview with Sierra Hawthorne, personal interview, Las Salinas, Dominican Republic, 13 February 2009.

7 Transparency International, “Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Table

2008,” 10 January 2008.

8 Arthur Brice, “Dominican Leader Keeps Up Crackdown on Corruption,” CNN, 3 March 2009, Internet, http://www.cnn.com/2009/ WORLD/americas/03/02/dominican.drug.war/ (date accessed: 15 March 2009).

9 Ruth Roa, interview with Sierra Hawthorne, personal interview, San Juan, Dominican Republic, 9 February 2009.

10 “Santo Domingo Metro Enters Service,” Railway Gazette International, 30 January 2009, Internet http://www.railwaygazette.com/news_view/article/2009/01/9336/santo_domingo_metro_enters_ service.html (date accessed: 15 March 2009); “Spanish News: Santo Domingo Metro Opens Monday,” World Transportation News, 22 December 2008, Internet, http://grieve-smith.com/ftn/?p=19 (date accessed: 15 March 2009); small public works funding citation from Ruth Roa, interview.

11 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2008—Dominican Republic Country Report (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007).

12 Ibid.

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 41 ]

A Look Back The Role of the National Security Council Interview with Anthony Lake Anthony Lake served as national security advisor under U.S. President Bill Clinton from 1993 to 1997, contributing to the resolution of the Bosnian and Eritrean-Ethiopian conflicts. In this interview, Professor Lake comments on the evolution of the National Security Council as it rose to meet the challenges of foreign and domestic policymaking during the Clinton administration.

Anthony Lake is an American diplomat, political adviser, and academic.

GJIA: How would you describe the role of the National Security Council (NSC) during the Clinton administration?

LAKE: I think it evolved in the context of the general trend over the previous thirty-five years, seeing an increasingly centralized role for the NSC in the crafting of our foreign policy.

During the Clinton administration, the NSC became much more centrally involved in managing the policymaking process, both in offering advice to the president and getting more operationally involved abroad. In my first year as national security advisor I saw my role more as a coordinator than a policy pusher; my role shifted after the first year. This continued the thirty-five year pattern of increasing authority going to the NSC. Although powerful national security advi-

Summer/Fall 2009 [ 1 43]

The Role of the National Security Council

sors such as McGeorge Bundy (advisor to Kennedy and Johnson) initiated the development of this trend, the NSC became stronger because of changes in the world, going to the very definition of what we mean by national security.

In 1947, when the National Security Act unified the military, it also created the National Security Council.

President Truman resisted this, saying that the secretary of defense would be his chief national security advisor. This reflected a view of national security that was very focused on military issues.

Clinton was the first president who really saw the impact of globalization and the way all issues are deeply interconnected. Redefining national security to include economic and social components, as well as global warming and HIV/AIDS (which Clinton proclaimed a national security threat) means that almost every department in the government can and should claim some stake in decision making on most foreign policy issues. Human nature being what it is, no cabinet secretary is going to allow any other cabinet secretary to play the chief role in coordinating policy decisions on such issues. This coordination can only come from the White House. So there is an organic trend that requires the NSC’s central presence.

I saw this on China policy, for example. Early on, we had a highly competent assistant secretary in the State Department managing the mid-level inter-agency meetings on China, but these efforts were failing. This was because, as China’s economic importance grew, the Treasury Department was increasingly unwilling to have the State Department hold the meetings and frame the issues. So we moved these

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coordinating duties to the White House where I put them under my deputy, Sandy Berger.

Also, when you do not have a strong central coordinating function at the NSC, historically, mistakes are made— for example, the Kennedy administration and the Bay of Pigs. There was no strong central coordination, which is precisely why McGeorge Bundy became the father of the modern NSC system.

He offered to resign and then brought more power to the NSC. During the Iran-Contra scandal, the NSC did not have strong control over what the intelligence community was doing. Likewise, many have said that there was not a strong NSC presence in the run-up to the Iraq war—and again we paid a price.

GJIA: As national security advisor, what were some of the particular challenges you had besides centralizing the role of the NSC? What steps did you take to make that happen?

Lake: There were some real difficulties. One is that you essentially have two roles. The first role is to manage the foreign policy-making process in a way that makes sure there is a level playing field and that the president is getting the benefit of the advice of all of his senior advisors. The second role is to offer your own advice. You see the president every morning, so it is hard not to voice your own opinion. Striking the balance between giving your own opinion and allowing others to contribute is difficult. One way to fail at maintaining the level playing field is to be secretive about the advice that you offer and not transparent in what you say and do.

Lake

Another difficulty was determining the level of the NSC’s involvement in diplomacy with foreign governments.

When I arrived at my office during the transition meeting with my predecessor, Brent Scowcroft—who was a terrific national security advisor—there was a group of telephones on the table behind the desk which had direct lines to my counterparts among our major allies. That the phones were even there surprised me. Of course, as national security advisor, I would use them, always telling the secretary of state and secretary of defense what I was doing. I was initially surprised because this was a no-no in earlier days, at least in theory.

A Look Back

their prime minister could not go farther on an issue because of its impact on their country’s domestic politics. This is going to become even more important as the current global economic crisis creates a number of political impulses and constraints on diplomatic decision making.

I also found myself drawn into direct diplomacy on a number of issues, including Northern Ireland, where I talked to the leaders of various political parties and helped push through the visa to Gerry Adams, which did not thrill my friends in the British government. I did, however, talk to them as well, and we successfully worked towards

Many have said that there was not a strong

NSC presence in the run-up to the Iraq war— and again we paid a price.

The national security advisor did not do diplomacy. In fact, in a book that Leslie H. Gelb, I. M. Destler, and I wrote in the 1980s, we concluded that the national security advisor should not get involved in diplomacy.

But, only the White House can really combine the nation’s economic, political, and military interests and, with few exceptions, speak about the domestic political implications of high-level foreign policy decisions. This is a very important component of diplomatic relations. The same is true of executives in other capitals—only they can easily speak to the domestic politics of a decision.

I found that I would often talk to my counterparts about why the president was doing what he was doing and why

the ceasefire there. I traveled twice around Europe on Bosnia, discretely trying to sell the president’s approaches to mitigating the situation there. It was a failure the first time, a success the second time. I also traveled to Haiti.

One problem with engaging in this direct diplomacy, of course, is that it can undercut the authority of the secretary of state. This was one reason why I would try to avoid any publicity. On more than one occasion reporters or others would haul out the book from 1984 and say, “Wait a minute—this is what you wrote.” My answer was generally, “That was then, this is now.” My answer reflected changes in both the nature of the issues and the importance of domestic politics on each side, which traditional diplomats are not trained to

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The Role of the National Security Council

first term. There is always a temptation to let the immediate issue in your GJIA: Did any internal policy or polit- inbox rise above the most important. I ical struggles within the NSC affect its tried to resist this by concentrating on more fundamental issues like NATO operation? enlargement, of which I was an enthuLake: I disagreed with my colleagues siastic supporter, a number of trade on a series of issues such as NATO agreements, and diplomatic initiatives enlargement, Haiti, and Northern like those in Northern Ireland. Warren Ireland. Internal discord complicates Christopher did yeoman work on trying the NSC’s work because the Washington to make progress on the Middle East press corps is always anxious to find issue, allowing Clinton to come closer internal differences that it then both to progress than anyone since 1979. amplifies and exacerbates. Both Warren Christopher and I remembered the ter- GJIA: You mentioned some of the rible, often public struggles between the interactions you had with your peers State Department and the NSC in the and colleagues in the White House.

Carter administration and were deter- As national security advisor, how did mined not to repeat them. So while we you interact with secretaries of defense often disagreed, we were able to do it and state? How does the nature of privately and without rancor. The most that interchange transform with each difficult task was to keep our staffs from administration? taking the war outside.

Lake: For structural reasons I think GJIA: How effective were the foreign that the National Security Council staff policy strategies of the Clinton admin- has become more and more important and I think that will happen in istration? the Obama administration as well. Of Lake: It often was not pretty and course, personality is important. After a sometimes took longer than I would while I decided that it would be imporhave wished, but we did make progress tant to have breakfast every morning on many issues, such as in Bosnia. In with a few of my colleagues and lunch regard to Rwanda, I will always regret with a few as well just to talk through my own role, as well as that of my col- issues informally. We had a rule that we leagues and the international commu- would not make policy decisions there, nity in not paying enough attention to which would have short-circuited the the situation there. That being said, I formal process, but we helped set the think that especially after the first year stage for making the more formal deciwe cleaned up a lot of the problems sions later. that we had inherited. A number of hot issues—such as conflicts in Bosnia, GJIA: Going back to the media, Foreign Haiti, and Somalia—that we faced at Policy magazine’s March 2007 poll of the start of the first four years were the top international relations scholbetter controlled by the end of the ars ranked President Clinton as the talk about.

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Lake

fourth best foreign policy president— behind Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Nixon, but above George H. W. Bush and Wilson. What made Clinton such a foreign policy president? Do you think he evolved into this role?

Lake: He certainly evolved, though I should begin by saying that I would not agree that he was a better foreign policy president than Woodrow Wilson.

I think that he became increasingly successful largely because we all learned how to get better at our jobs, the president included. There is no perfect training to be president of the United States and you must learn on the job, which Clinton certainly did. When “it’s the economy, stupid” became the slogan of his 1992 presidential campaign, many assumed that he would not deal with foreign policy. That was overstated, but certainly his heart was more in line with the economic condition of the country and the plight of the many people who had been suffering in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I voted for him after meeting him because of his passion about the lives of American citizens. He was always, however, interested in foreign policy and quickly discovered that foreign policy issues are very demanding.

You can shape the agenda and timing on domestic issues far more easily than on foreign policy issues because things happen. I think it was Dean Rusk who said twenty-four hours a day someone somewhere in the world is making trouble; you cannot avoid foreign policy, especially as president.

After a year or so, the scheduling people were complaining that he was spending too much time on foreign policy despite their best efforts to focus

A Look Back

more domestically. They did an analysis of Clinton’s first year and a half in office and George H. W. Bush’s first year and a half in office and discovered that the number of meetings with foreign leaders, et cetera, was almost exactly the same even while the press wrote that he was avoiding foreign policy. The schedulers were unhappy with the result but I was very happy with it because it showed that, in fact, he was more engaged than reporters were writing.

GJIA: How has the NSC changed since your tenure? How would you like to see it evolve in the future?

Lake: I think that there was the hiccup during the first Bush term of having a strong national security advisor but not a strong National Security Council system, which led to a number of problems. The problem began to right itself in the second term, and I think that under Obama we will see that trend continue and result in a stronger NSC process that can integrate the political, economic, environmental, and military components, et cetera. I think that is the way that Obama likes to work: a strong secretary of state, but also a strong central coordinating system.

The increasing importance of policy integration has changed internal structures and is perhaps the most difficult problem in organizing the NSC and the White House. One measure of how the changes in the world affect policy is how you deal with international economic issues. If you treat them as foreign and let the NSC deal with them, you effectively combine foreign economic and diplomatic policies, but you might ignore their domestic implications.

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The Role of the National Security Council

If the domestic economic side of the White House deals with them, you miss the international dimensions. While he was running the National Economic Council, Bob Rubin and I devised

affairs, however, needs to stop at about that level. In my view, the NSC should not oversee the work of the intelligence community on a daily basis because that lends itself to having too much influ-

The greatest act of loyalty is to break the bad news to the president. People often forget that. a system modeled on how the Bush administration had integrated another such issue. By sharing staff on international economic issues, we ensured that we each were always involved. I told Bob that someday, doctoral dissertations would be written on why this system would fail, but we could not think of anything better. It actually worked pretty well. You could seldom smell the rubber burning from the White House because one or the other of us was not included enough in a decision.

GJIA: How successful is the NSC Office of Intelligence Programs in conducting day-to-day oversight of the intelligence community? Is there, in your opinion, an office better suited to perform that function than the NSC? Lake: Actually, the NSC provided the first intelligence priorities review and directions to the intelligence committee in 1994 or 1995. I think that it is very important that the NSC produce intelligence priorities reviews and directions because the intelligence community needs to know the president’s priorities in order to ensure that consumers are well served. The White House involvement in the intelligence community’s

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ence on what the intelligence community produces, and we have seen where that can lead.

GJIA: The DNI position was created upon the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report. Are the alleged problems in the intelligence community structural, cultural, or otherwise?

Does the DNI’s role adequately address the problem?

Lake: Unfortunately, it does not. The problem is that the Commission Report provided a halfway measure toward the reform we need. The intelligence community is structurally fractured—for example, between military intelligence and the CIA. The fracture is a good thing that should be cultivated when it comes to competing analyses because most intelligence community personnel report to the secretary of defense and not to the director of central intelligence (DCI). So, while the director of central intelligence was responsible for the intelligence community’s output, he did not have control over the two most important levers: money and personnel decisions.

The DNI essentially has the same responsibilities that the DCI had pre-

Lake

A Look Back

side of a policy struggle. Crossing that line not only makes the intelligence community look bad, it also makes the president suffer because he answers to the American people and ultimately bears the blame for consequent policy failures. Whether you are a member of the intelligence community or an official in the government, the greatest act of loyalty is to break the bad news to the president. People often forget that.

I always found it very useful to probe differences in opinions. There should always be differences. Samuel Goldwyn once said that “only an idiot would make predictions—especially about the future.” Of course people are going to differ on predictions about where Pakistan will be in six months or whether the Yankees, Red Sox, or Tampa GJIA: What advice would you give to Bay will win the American League East a policymaker about how to bridge the (Sorry, Orioles). There is no such divide between policy and intelligence? thing as certain intelligence. You can judge, then, the degree of certainty and Lake: I think the divide between pol- uncertainty by judging the differences icy and intelligence can be bridged in and probing them. For example, the a few ways. The intelligence commu- military intelligence community—DIA, nity needs to be aware of its consumers’ CIA, and the State Department’s Bureau long-term and short-term priorities. of Intelligence and Research—disagreed For example, after the first year or so, consistently over North Korea. On the I would have my assistant keep a list of occasions when they agreed, you could the things that we anticipated work- be more confident that their predicing on in the coming few days so that tion was going to be accurate. Finally, I could give a brief to the CIA the next above all, beware of all senior intelmorning on the type of intelligence that ligence officials who offer policy advice I would need. At the same time, every because their policy views will almost policymaker should avoid crossing the always interfere with their ability to dangerous line between letting the CIA offer objective analysis. know what the priorities are and trying to shape the intelligence to avoid Anthony Lake was interviewed by Eric Peter on 6 criticism or support your particular April 2009. viously while similarly lacking authority over money and personnel. In my view, the commission created another layer that has more responsibility than power, making its operation very difficult. I think that the fault lies not just with presidents for not trying to mitigate this problem, but also with Congress. Congress insisted on these reforms and supported them while failing to give proper authority to the DNI. This occurred in part because of the split within the Armed Services Committee, which can still oversee the Defense Department’s control over these resources, and the Intelligence Committee, which has nominal authority over intelligence. Welcome to Washington.

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