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RomanCing the Globe. This isn't the first time the world has fallen in love with globalization. Despite what scoresof academics,politicians, and journalists would have you believe, globalization is not new at all. In fact, globalization happened before and ended in failure. It remains to be seen, however, whether the second coming of globalization will transform human relations and development on the worldwide scale it has alwayspromised to do or end as ignominously as the first.
TheStruggle for a NewInternationalism JOHNJ. SWEENEY
Saving the Poor-fromDevelopment AARONLUKAS
Greening Globalization H I L A R YF R E N C H
An IMF for theFuture HORSTKOHLER
Shadowoverthe Subcontinent nnaerNonAcHARyA ANDAMTTAV AcHARyA South Asia goesnuclear-a look at security.
BindMeUp,TieMeDown:Order,U.S.Power, andWortdInstitutions A N I N T E R V I EW WI T HG .J O H NI K E N B E R R Y Georgetown's own G.John Ikenberry speaks to theJournolabout international peace and order in the twenty-first century.
W i n t e r / S p r i n gZ o o t I l ]
fromVietnam MoralForce: Learning andthe HolocaustK E N N E T HJ . C A M P B E L L To effectively implement the lessons of the Holocaust, t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community must also implement those of Vietnam.
Will Argentina Dollarization: GoAll the Way? sANrAGouRrBE Argentina
serves as the stage for the dollarization
debate.
HumanRightsPolicytowardsChina JAcoBA. FrscH LackingPragmatism: A guide for U.S. policymakers looking at human rights in China.
Misi6nPosible: Returning Democracy to Peru WI T HA L E J A N D RTOO L E D O A N I N T E R V I EW A talk with the man who would be president. lntroduction
I
by Marc Chernick.
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89
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N e t w o r k D i p l o m a c y J A M T EF . M E r z L
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To face the challenges of modern diplomacy, U.S. foreign policy institutions must adopt a network model.
I I
t I I / zHANG China'sMilitaryGreatLeapForward?MrNG A look at China's attempts to bolster its strength in science and technology.
Foreign BadConnections? Ownership of U.S.TelecomsALANpEARcE The Germans are coming! The Germans are coming! Why this is a cause for alarm on Caoitol Hill.
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GeorgetownJournal
of International
Affairs
l Behind Every Photoa Photographer Markus Cleverley reviews Marinovich
and Silva's TheBang-BangCIub.
AnAlternative to Kick-Ass Diplomacy Joseph V. Montville
reviewsJohn D. Steinbruner's
Principles of Globalsecurig.
A Pacific Future Thomas W. Robinson reviews Blackwill and Dibb's America's,AsianAllionces.
A F r a g i l eP e a c e E y T H A N soNrAG A peacekeeper's reflectionson Kosovo.
T a l e sf r o m t h e C o n g o A L A Nw . L U K E N S Complete with rescuemissions,celebrations, and coupsd'etat.
COVEB GRAPHIC
BY KAORI
ARAMAKT
International
E D I T O R S . IN - CH I E F M E R E D I T H C A M P A N A L E JA IAN CHONG MANAGTT{G E 0 I T 0 R S J E S S EL E V T N S O N MARCARET_ROSETRETTER
E X E C U T I V EE D I T O R K A R I M C H R O B O C
A S S O C I A T EE D I T O R S H E I D I A R O L A , M A R l A N N E B E N E T , JUANA BRACHET, PAUL CHEN, ANNE CHIORAZZI, PHILIPPE DE PONTET, NATHANIEL HELLER, WILLIAM JOSIGER, A N T O N I U S K U F F E R A T I - ] ,J E F F L E A S U R E , NIKHIL PATEL,JENNIE RAAB, JOHN RUDY, DAVID RUSSO,HARRISON TYREE, JONATHAN WEISS, DANIEL YEUNG E D I T O R I A L A S S I S T A I { T SE L I Z A B E T H H A L L O W E L L , A L E X A N D R A H E R G E S E L L , LAN HOANG, SHEETAL KHERA, MARYA LINK, ANNE MURRETT, CAROLINE KWOK
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Winter/Spring 2oor
Just as the realities of the Cold-War dominated international relations between the rg$os and r98Os, globalization is a constant thread running through world affairs in the r99os and the early twenty-first century. At the onset of this new global politique, the world embraced the concept of a new order marked by increasing economic, cultural, and political interdependence. The emerging global system irnbued new hope. It appeared to promise peace, prosperity, and justice for all. Ten years on, any unconditional enthusiasrn that might have existed about a new, interconnected world has fi""led. Accompanying the expanding linls between peoples, polities, and economies, are mounting inequity, disenfranchisement of the poor, and environmental catastrophe. Yet the positive effects of increased interconnectivity are undeniable. Across the globe, real incomes are growing, the general quality of life is rising, an opportunities for developing countries and their citizens are increasing. This issue's Forurn exhibits the tensions inherent in conternporary world politics. TheJanus-faced nature of globalization raises questions of how best to ameliorate the evils of the newglobal systemaswell as promote and expand its benefits. G. John Ikenberry discusses the necessity of building institutions to ensure the stability of the current world order. Jamie Metzl points to the need for a new networked approach to foreign policy in a tightly integrated international environment. And Alan Pearce's article on the transnational consolidation of the telecornrnuniations industry illustrates the breaking down of state borders that characterizesa globalized world. It is far from decided whether the world will harvest the furies or reap the promises of increasing integration. Alan Beattie, Econornics correspondent for the linancioll-imes,recently wrote, "Debates on the benefts of globalization...are increasingly conducted with bottles and stones rather than journals and serninars." It is our hope that through thoughtful dialogue, the CeorgetownJoumal of IntemationalAffairs can play a small role in countering this trend-and, in doing so, bring a bit of coherence to this lively, chaotic, and sometimes violent debate. MnnnorrH CeuplNlrr
Jr hN CnoNc
W i n t e r / S p r i n gz o o r
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G E O R G E T O W NJ O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A LA F F A I R S
GlobalPolltlque This isn't the first time the world has fallen in love with globalization. Despite what r.o... of acadGlobe the emics, politicians, and journalists would have you believe, globalization is not new at all. In fact, globalization happened before and ended in failure. The first age of globalization was an affair as gilded, glamorous, and torrid as our own time. In the period between World Wars I and II, however, the romance with economic integration came to an abrupt end as governrnents bent to domestic pressure for protection from increasingly impoverished and disenfranchised domestic groups. It rernains to be seen, however, whether the second coming of globalization will transform human relations and development on the worldwide scaleit has alwayspromised to do or end as ignominiously as the first. In some circles, the infatuation with globalization has moved from an intellectual flirtation to an enthusiastic embrace of all that the rapturously freewheeling movement of goods, services,people, and money promises to T) Is.omaflclnt
.
The Stuggle for a New Internationalism J O H NJ . S W E E N E Y
l5
SauingthePoor-from Deuelopment AARON LUKAS
25
Greeni ng GIobal ization H I L A R YF R E N C H
33
An IMFfor theFuture H o R S TK O H L E R
W i n t e r / S p r i n gZ o o I [ 3 ]
INTRODUCTION
accomplish for rnankind. In the developed world, the potential gains from globalization have been recognized by a wide variety of interest groups and industries. Yet, Aaron Lukas's article argues that the opportunities are even greater for developing countries. By opening their economies and integrating with global markets, rnany developing countries have gained accessto the investrnent and technology they need to catch up with the rich econornies of the world. On the other hand, countries with less open economic systems and weaker institutional structures are being bypassed by globalization's tide. The great danger and fear in the developing world today is not of being swept awayby globalization, but rather of being left behind by it. At the sarne tirne, globalization's enthusiastshave called for increased commitment to its institutions to ensure that the affair develops into sornething truly significant and enduring. As Horst KohIer points out, developed countries need to do their part to make econornic integration work by opening their markets to some of the goods that developing countries produce most efficiently. For their part, developing countries need to deal with "homemade problems, including poor governance, corruption, and armed conflicts" to ensure that they are ready for a relationship that is healthy and sustainable for everyone. Not everyone, however, is convinced that globalization will not burn us again. As John Sweeney's contribution shows, in developed and developing countries alike there are growing misgivings about the distributional impacts of globalization. Indeed, critics of globalization in developed countries blame
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the process for the rising unernploym e n t r a t e s a n d d e c l i n i n g w a g e sa m o n g unskilled workers, while many in the developing world point to declining human development indicators as the result of globalization. Concerns have also been raised about whether globalization's institutions detract from the effectiveness and enforceability of existing environrnental treaties. As Hilary French's article indicates, a "greening" of international financial institutions must be complernented by an irnprovernent in the enforcement of existing international environrnental treaties, an upgrade of the UN's Environnent Programme into a World Environment Organization, and reforrn of the World Trade Organization. An understanding that the conternporary age of globalization could be rolled back in the sarne manner as the first underscores the magnitude of the debate unfolding between globalization's detractors and supporters. The fundarnental issue of our age rnay be whether globalization succeeds or fails in extending sustainable and equitable economic development to a critical mass of hurnanity. Undoubtedly, increased exchanges of opinion and vigorous debate about globalization and its consequenceswill be the first step to enlightened civic action and policymaking. Bridging the divide over globalization, however, will require a sustained commitment frorn mpiad parties at the national and international levels to constructive debate about how to ensure that economic integration truly gives rise to a more perfect world. E d i tOr'S N Ot e : The Ceorgetow nJ our nolof I nternational Alt'air s is indebted to Rosa Alonso i Terme, Visiting Professor of Government at Georgetown University, for her assistance in writing this introduction.
TheNewGlobal Politique
Internationalisrn John J. Sweeney Frorn the unruly streets of Seattle and Prague to the hushed suites of the World Bank, a conspicuous roar is becorning more audible by the day. Its messageis clear. The consensus on corporate globalization is unraveling. Its claims are questioned, its assumptions debunked, and its record exposed for what it is. -We Across the world, a reaction is building. are challenged to construct a new internationalism that allows for democratic development, public accountability, and the ernpowerment of working people acrossthe world. For if we fail in our efforts to reverse the dismal trends of our age, we will witness a reaction that could harvest the furies.
John J. Sweeney is President AFL-CIO.
of the He was first
elected president
in
r995.
There Is No AlternatiV0, Today's globalworldis too often painted as an inevitable product of progress and technology-the Internet, computers, jet planes, satellites-which have made our world a much smaller place. There is, however, another side to the tale. Globalization has been shaped less by the forces of nature or technology than by powerful corporations, conservativeideologies, and complicit or cowed governments. Conternporary globalization took its rnodern forrn from the corporate offensive and conservative movement that swept the West some twenty-five years ago, culminating with the accession to power of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Helmut
Winter/Spring 2ool
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T H E S T R U G G L EF O R A N E W I N T E R N A T I O N A L I S M
Kohl in Germany, and Ronald Reagan in the United States. Corporations enlisted conservative governments in Britain and the United Statesin an open war on labor unions. Corporations and banls lobbied to dismantle controls on capital, deregrrIate industries and currencies, and open doors to investrnent and trade. Mergers and acquisitions surged as corporations went global. Conservatives argued that government regulation and subsidies hindered markets and growth. Free markets, they said, would unleash faster growth, greater productivity, less poverty, and more dernocracy' From this consensus, the institutional framework for the global economy was established. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were transformed, enforcing laissez-faire notions of what became the "Washington
new possibilities beckon. Some countries have fared welL. Rntastic new fortunes have been created. Nonetheless, the promise of the globalizers-greater growth, less poverty, more democracy-is being called into question by the record of the last quarter-century. In reality, development has flagged. In both industrial and developing nations, economic development has been slower over the past twenty five years than in the quarter-century before. China is a notable exception-but China and the EastAsian "successstories" did not follow the Washington Consensus. China's currency is not convertible; its banking sector is nationalized; foreign investments and accessto markets are carefully controlled. In fact, there is no reg"ion in the world that has succeededby adopting the policies promoted or imposed by the Consensus," particularly in dealing with World Bank or the IMF.' the plight of indebted developing counWith slower developrnent has come ristries. Successivetrade rounds led to the ing poverty. The rggg UN Hurnan Develcreation of theWorld Tiade Organization opment Report statesthat the nurnber of (WTO), with its closed panels of "experts" persons subsisting below the international poverty line-the wage level belowwhich claiming the power to challenge national Financial regulation. deregulation a "rninimum nutritionally adequate diet unleashed huge flows ofshort-term capirequirements are not plus non-food tal that vagabonded around the globe, affordable"-has risen from r.2 billion in overwhelming existing foreign exchange rg87 to r.g billion today, and is projected regirnes. Developing countries were told to rise to r.9 billion by 2org.3 This poverty is accompanied by rising to adhere to the new imperativesinequality. "The assetsof the top three embrace free trade, deregrrlation, privatization, and liberalization-or be conbillionaires are more than the combined dernned to povertl. Developed nations GNP of all least developed countries and were askedto open their markets, liberaltheir 6oo million people," notes the ize their banking systems, cut back on Hurnan Development Report.a Worldwide, 34,ooo children under social spending to curb inflation, and get out of the way. "There is no alternative," the age of five die daily from hunger and Mrs. Thatcher proclaimed. preventable diseases. Two of five children in the developing world are "stuntThe RecordReveal€d. No*,aftera ed, one in three is underweight, and one quarter-century, we can see the results. in ten is wasted," reports the Food and New technologies transform our lives; Agriculture Organization.s Two hun-
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swEENEY TheNewGlobalPolitique dred fifty million children between five and fourteen-one-lluarter of all children in that age group-are compelled to work. When children work, the International Labor Organization reports, there is an over-crowding effect, and B5o milllon people earn less than a living wage or work less than they want.o Corporate concentration has reached unimaginable levels. Of the roo largest economies in the world, forty-nine are corporations. General Electric's annual gross sales are higher than Poland's GNP. Wal-Mart sells more than Malaysia produces. The sweatshopsof an earlier age have returned-to China and Mexico, but also to sections of Los Angeles and NewYork City.7 With slower development and rising inequality comes growing instability. Forrner World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz calls it a "boom in busts": Since the late rg/Os we have witnessed sixty-nine banking aswell as eighty-seven currency crises, culminating in the rg$8 Asian financial meltdown. While the economies hit hardest sometimes recover rernarkably fast, the people often do not. The Mexican crisis was short-lived for investors, since the United States arranged an emerg'ency $5o billion rescue package. But Mexican workers found their real wages slashed by Z$ percent. The share of the population living in poverty increased and small businesses collapsed by the thousands.s Increasingly, even the industrial countries are not immune to deep and prolonged crises. Japan remains mired in a decade-long stagnation. Russia, an industrial nation reduced to barter, is in Europe remains constant turmoil. mass unemployment. And in plagued by the United States, wages have yet to recapture ground lost over previous
decades. Real wages have decreased for nearly three decades and the poorest workers have lost ground. Parents find themselvesworking harder and longer in a good economy just to make ends meet.s Not surprisingly, protest is building. Across the world, workers are demanding basic rights. Protests against the WTO and the IMF attract not only the young and the idealistic. The best mindsNobel laureate Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, George Soros-challenge the laissez-faire platitudes of our time. Fast track trade authority gets blocked in Congress. International mobilization torpedoes the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. Internal and external opposition dooms a new round of trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization. Students rally on LI.S. campuses against global corporations that exploit workers abroad. Church groups lead the fight for global debt relief. Even companies like Nike have scrambled for cover, cobbling together codes of conduct to protect their reputations. While laissez-faire economists continue to defend their theories, people across the world are coming to their own conclusions. Leaders of developing countries refuse to go along with deals cut in back rooms to which they are denied access. Citizens demand that basic valuesbe protected-the rights to safe food, clean air and water, and accountable institutions. 'Workers demand international agreernents on labor standards and a fair share in the wealth they produce.
Alternatives from the Bottom UP. Contrary to the beliefs of Mrs. Thatcher and her acolytes, there are alternatives. Popular movements-so often besmirched as protectionist or' ignorant-are proposing reforms that
Winter/Spring zoor
[7]
T H E S T R U G G L EF O R A N E W I N T E R N A T I O N A L I S M
offer a coherent alternative. At the AFLCIO, we launched the Campaign for Global Fairness, working with our 13 million members here at horne and reaching out to workers across the globe. We asked ourselves' What is essential to reshaping the global economy? What is needed to ensure that working families across the world benefit frorn it? How can we protect values beyond that of profit? These are large and difficult questions. We know that answering them will require innovative ideas and new initiatives.Yet some of the essentialprinciples are already clear. We need a cornrnitment to global growth and development frorn the bottorn up. We need enforceable rules to regulate global competition in a way that values people and not simply profit. We need to redesign the international financial architecture to support real investment, not speculation, and to foster sustainablegrowth, not austerity. We do not claim to have all the answersor to know the complete agenda for reforrn. But we are joining with workers and citizens worldwide from a broad array of institutions to call for basic first steps. We call for forgiving the debt of the world's least developed nations, stepping up aid for basicneeds in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, increasing the accountability and transparency of multinational corporations, and enhancing labor rights in d e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r i e s .
Debt Rgl ief. Developing nationsmust not be forced into a race to the bottom by a trade and investment system in which they have no voice. At the WTO meeting in Seattle, the angry cries of the poor countries were just as stunning as the Drotests in the streets.
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In the current system, indebted nations must compete to attract foreign investment, increase exports, and decrease domestic demand. Often, under conditions imposed by the IMF, countries are forced to cut back on social support for healthcare, education, housing, and welfare. They are obliged to lower wages through devaluation, to turn to export-oriented agriculture or resource extraction, and to cornpete to offer rnultinationals the cheapest labor, the rnost disciplined workers, and the least regulation. All this to meet payments on debts that can never be repaid. Contrary to pundit talk, globalizatiort is not a win-win game. Nor is it a headswin, tails-lose game. In its current form, it's a no-win game. Only a handful of developing nations actually attracts significant investment. Presently, China sets the bottom-workers have no rights, the environment is afforded little protection, and wagesare barely at subsistencelevels. To cornpete, country after country lowers its own standards. Around the rnuchlauded free trade zones we witness the ernergence of cardboard cities, populated by underpaid laborers. Debt relief for countries committed to democratic reforrns and basic worker rights is at the heart of the new internationalisrn. Crippling debts have only one function-to force countries into exportled growth. Servicing them leads to cuts in education and healthcare, and ends in the shameful spectacle of the poorest countries transferring net resources to the richest. Developing nations rnust gain spaceto create their own paths to sustainable development and rnust not be forced into an ideological straightjacket.
BaSicNeeds.At theAFL-CIO, weare working to educate our owrr rnembers and
TheNewGlobalPolitique swEENEY to press the U.S. government to increase assistance around the world. We are encouraging the U.S. government to help in the vital areas of health, education, and basic needs. We must move beyond the demagogic and dishonest debate about how much of our budget goes to aid. Net official development assistance provided by the United States has fallen to about one-tenth of one percent of our GNP. Even under Ronald Reagan, it was double that percentage. Making matters worse, other industrial nations have followed our lead by reducing their assistanceaswell.'o Not only is aid minimal, but its distribution is highly unequal. Only one-fifth of the aid from the industrial countries goes to the forty-three least developed countries, and less than ro percent goes to meeting basic needs. According to the Hurnan Developrnent Report, the additional cost of achieving and maintaining universal access to basic education, healthcare, reproductive care for all wornen, adequate food, and safe water and sanitation is "less than four percent
basic needs. Yet this is only a first step in what must be a renewed effort to regulate currency and capital speculation and foster more sustainable g:rowth.
Transparency andAccountabilit!. Investing in workers and the poor, however, is not enough. Rather, their interests must be firmly entrenched in the new global economic and regulatory architecture. Global institutions should not merely be transparent, but also accountable. Developing nations cannot be left in the hall when critical deals are 'Workers, envicut in the back rooms. ronmentalists, and consumers should have a seat at the negotiating tables, too. With the growing reaction against the WIO, we need a full-scale review of the current global rules and their effects on working families. This requires that the process be expanded to include those who have been locked out. Global rules-whether voluntary or binding-should set floors on behavior, not ceilings on national regulation. We
DevelOpingnatiOnScannotbeleftin the hall when critical deals are cut in the back roorrrs. of the cornbined wealth of the 229 richest people in the world. "" Surely we must invest more in basic needs. One sensible way to increase the pool of public funds while decreasing the instability of the global economy is to tax destabilizing financial speculation. The AFL-CIO joins the growing movement calling for a tax on short-term speculation (the so-called Tobin Thx, named after Nobel laureate James Tobin) that might create a pool of public funding for
will push to hold global corporations accountable-by law, in negotiations, through pension fund investments-to sensible rules. Such regrrlations must not only adhere to internationally-recognized standards of behavior, but rnust also make organizations apply national standards and laws to their global activities. We can no longer allow multinationals to parade as agents of progress and democracy in the newspapers, even asthey subvert this at the workplace. Arguments
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now rage about whether regulation freedom from workplace discriminashould be global, national, or local. Our tion, and the right to organize and baris reshaping the sense that global econogain collectively. We do not need a new my must enlist energy and efforts at every consensus, but rather an enactment of level, with the ensuing contradictions the consensus we already have. sorted out over time. We will push for Worker rights are basic moral imperrules, as well as a atives. Forced labor is an abomination. enforceable global reassertion of national regulation and a Child labor is a challenge to modern resurgence of state and local initiatives. ethical standards. When ten-year-old We are working with a U.S. coalition children work twelve-hour days, it robs justice, labor, of environmental, social them not only of their youth but also of and human rights organizations to their future. Discrimination denies our ensure that basic U.S. right-to-know common humanity-and stokes the caullaws are applied to overseasoperations of dron of hatred that too often leads to American-owned c o m p a n i e s . T h i s violence. Empowering working people would empower workers and citizens to have a voice in their workplace is the across the world to know about the praconly way to ensure that their concerns are heard. Only the right to organize tices of U.S. subsidiaries, including toxic releases, pollution emissions, haz- and bargain collectively allows workers to ardous chemicals in the workplace, and gain a fair share of the wealth they proadherence to core labor standards. It duce. Only collective action can ensure would also require U.S. businesses to that their workplaces are safe. Worker rights are not simply moral disclose the narnes and locations of all subsidiaries or contractors abroad. We imperatives. Enforcing core worker rights is vital to sustainable economic growth. A will work with our fellow trade unions in Europe andJapan to seeksimilar legisla- half-century ago, the experience of the tion for their multinationals. Right-toGreat Depression and the brilliance of know legislation does not irnpose any John Maynard Keynes helped people regrrlatory systern on any country. It understand this reality. If workers were simply informs workers and citizens without a voice, corporations would vie to about practices that affect their very lives. exploit them. The production of goods It will be a test of the good faith of those and serwiceswould outstrip the ability of underpaid workers to buy thern. Henry who object to global rules on the environment or labor rights to see if they Ford understood he had to pay his workjoin in the effort to share inforrnation ers enough to buy the cars that they made. and empower citizens abroad." Critics argue that poor countries cannot afford the adoption of global Fair LaborStandards.No*uduy,,labor rights. They are deemed a luxury there is much talk of the need for a new of the rich or denounced as a backglobal consensus. One area where gov- handed form of protection. Former President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico businesses, and labor ernments, u n i o n s h a v e a l r e a d y e x p r e s s e d a said that those who claim to be concerned about workers in developing detailed global consensus is on fundamental worker rights-the prohibition countries often want to protect them of child labor and forced labor. the from development. Zedillo and others
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ace discrimina
rganize and bar
) not need a new
an enactment of
dy have.
sic moral imper
an abomination.
enge to modern
len ten -year-old
LOur days, it robs
youth but also of lation denies our ld stokes the caul DO often leads to ~ working people r workplace is the at their concerns right to organize y allows workers to ~ wealth they pro action can ensure re safe. not simply moral core worker rights onomic growth. A experience of the the brilliance of ~s helped people '. If workers were ations would vie to lduction of goods strip the ability of buy them. Henry d to pay his work ars that they made. poor countries option of global deemed a luxury mced as a back ltection. Former ~dillo of Mexico :laim to be con :s in developing to protect them edillo and others
SWEENEY
simply place blind faith in the conserv ative catechism that holds global corpo rations to be the champions of freedom and markets the engine of development. This has been patently false. Markets must be embedded in broad frameworks of social values and shared objectives. Markets are constantly engaged in "creative destruction," destroying old institutions, bankrupting old compa nies, and transforming old ways of liv ing while producing the new, the differ ent, the next wave. For disruption to lead to development, society must with stand some changes and find ways to widely share the blessings of others. In particular, society needs to support those who are displaced by moderniza tion and increase the education and training of successive generations. Without laws and social support, mar kets can wreak a terrible human toll. Rus sia shows the horrors that can accompany markets in a lawless society. In this regard, worker organization and worker rights are vital. Empowered workers are essential to limit corruption and to strengthen democracy. And if workers are empow ered, they are better able to share the blessings that they produce and invest them in the next generation. As Dani Rodrik, Professor of Inter national Political Economy at Harvard University, has shown, countries that empower their workers enjoy faster growth, experience fewer setbacks, and better withstand external shocks. In Asia, Korea and Thailand, countries in which worker rights are relatively well protected, recovered the fastest from the financial crisis. Indonesia showed how brittle even the most entrenched dictatorship can be.'3 A study of over seventy countries by Tom Palley, an economist at the AFL-CIO, revealed
The New Global Politique
that freedom of association is linked to higher wages, improvements in political governance, reduced levels of corrup tion, and improved income distribu tion. Countries that strengthened their freedom of association laws experienced stronger GDP growth and increased manufacturing output. Export growth slowed, however, probably as a result of increased domestic demand. If As Nobel laureate and development economist Amartya Sen says, freedom is not simply the end, but also the means of development. At the core of building democracy is defending core worker rights. The right of workers to organize independently is the most crucial among these. 15 In the words of Stiglitz, "Labor unions and other genuine forms of popular self-organization are key to democratic economic develop ment"-to bUilding the kind of world in which we want to live.'!; While developing countries' govern ments may have opposed worker rights, more than 100 union confederations across the globe endorsed the call to build worker rights into the World Trade Organization. This includes the most independent voices of the devel oping world-workers from Thailand, Chile, South Korea, and South Mrica. "We are not asking for the moon," said G. Rajasekaran, General Secretary of the Malaysian Trades Union Congress, "but very basic things. Worker rights that are already universally endorsed, but simply not enforced." Zwelinzima Vavi, General Secretary of the South African trade union confederation COSATU, says, "What we want [is to] link worker rights to trade rules to change the balance of forces for workers in the developing countries." Labor leaders like Vavi and Rajasekaran under-
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nations endorsed rnore generous debt stand that the cument order is not neurelief. To date, however, few countries tral to, but is activelyworking to undermine, worker rights, and that it atternpts other than Uganda, which has received a substantial arnount of aid, have actually to weaken workers' collective voice.'7 Finally, a word to critics who clairn that benefited. Debt burdens are becoming worker rights are a Western concept. To worse, not better. At the G-B summit in impose thern through the World Trade Okinawa in 2oOO, new targetswere established for health and education-but there Organization, the IMF, and the World is no indication that the resourceswill be Bank, they say,is rank imperialisrn. Ironically, the WTO forces countries to forthcoming to rnake thern a reality. The rewrite their patent and copyright laws to dangers of the growing digital divide gain fit U.S. specifications. It forces them to international recognition, but few rneasures to rneet the chalJ.engeare suggested. uproot traditional systems of farming. The IMF conditions loans on agreernents The WTO has announced that it rnust reform its procedures to increase "transto cut back on social protections, dismanparency" and accountability. But again, tle worker protections, and weaken environrnental regulations. Only when the there is no sign of reforms actually being issue is core worker rights do apologists implemented. Former teasury Secretary reveal a sudden concern for developing Robert Rubin announced that a "new architecture" was needed to reduce destanations' sovereignty. bilizing financial flows, but at best a little BegrudgingProgress.whenthe patching of the plurnbing has occurred. The IMF andWorld Bank have offered AFL-CIO registered its support for a new extensive self-critiques and prornised internationalisrn five years ago, the U.S. debate was still enthralled by globaliza- reforrns. but to date. little has been done. tion, free trade, and the conservative President Clinton argued that core workmantra. Since then, the argument has er rights and environrnental protection shifted dramatically. Now the World Bank had to be built into trade accords, but admits that poverty and inequality are then pushed through perrnanent mostgrowing worse and that its strategiesneed favored nation trading statusfor China in dramatic revision. The IMF has adrnitted an accord that mentioned neither. Even the simplest stepsmeet resistance. that its austerity packageswere counterproductive in the Asian crisis and that it When the Clinton adrninistration negotirnust find ways to "bail speculators in," ated a trade agreernent with Jordan that not bail them out. The world's bankers incorporated worker rights and environmental protection, the two governments, were shaken when the international financial systerncarne to the brink of col- Jordanian and U.S. labor federations, lapse in theAsian crisis. Leaders of devel- and theJordanian businesscommunity all supported the initiative-but the U.S. oping nations openly question the legitiimmediately macy and viability of the World tade business community 'Workers here and abroad announced it would try to block it. Organization. Yet, despite the resistance, the have rallied for core worker rights. Progress on reforms has been sluggish movement for a new internationalism is growing in strength and in confiat best. At the meeting of the G-8 in Cologne in 1999, the leading industrial dence. Its voice is heard both on the
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swEENEY TheNewGlobalPolitique streets and increasingly in the elite's conference halls. The Washington Consensus is not even the consensusin Washington anymore.
M inervats M irror. Theeffortto create a new internationalism is best viewed through history's rnirror. On March 25, r9rr, a fire started in a rag bin at the Tiiangle Shirtwaist Company in New York City. Hundreds of women sewed garments there. They worked ten to twelve hours a day, seven days a week. "If you don't come in on Sunday," read the sign posted in the factory, "you need not come back on Monday. " The fire swept through the eighth, ninth, and tenth floors, too high for fire ladders to reach. The doors to each floor were locked. The workers were trapped. Hundreds of young girls, their clothing and hair ablaze, threw themselves off window ledees onto the
huge rooms at the factory. They put together toys largely for Arnerican children' SesameStreet, Bart Simpson, and Muppet dolls, products bearing brand names like Fischer-Price, Hasbro. and Tyco and selling in stores like Wal-Mart and Toys-R-Us. In the fire, t8o workers perished and 469 were seriously injured. In a similar accident in Zhuhai, China, a year later, ninety-three people-mostly young women-were killed and 16o injured when a textile factory collapsed in a fire. These tragediesalrnost a century apart, but hauntingly alike-help us to locate where we are. The Tiiangle Shirtwaist fire took place in the last great era of globalization. The lJ.S. economy was in profound transition-shifting from agricultural to industrial, from local to national, frorn household enterprises to giant corporations. New technologies-the light bulb, the
The WashingtonConsensus isnoteven the consensus in Washin.gton anyrnore. streetsbelow. Their deaths, together with those of an additional t46 workers who remained in the blaze, ignited an outcry that gavebirth to the modern labor movernent. Yet it took decades-scarred by many lnore fires and many rnore tragedies-before sensible Iabor standards were enactedand enforced.'8 Alrnost a century later, globalization has rnagnified on a global scale the conditions that once sparked outrage in the United States.In tgg!, the worst industrial fire in history broke out at the mamrnoth Kadar Industrial Toy Company outside of Bangkok, Thailand. Three thousand workers, mostly women, some as young as thirteen, worked in
internal cornbustion engine, and the how people assembly line-transformed Iived and worked. Then. as now. technologies opened new possibilities. The luFrg of the transatlantic cables in 1866 reduced the time it took to communicate between London and New York from a week to a matter of minutes. The opening of the Suez Canal, the Panarna Canal, and the first Alpine tunnels transformed global transport. Britain, the leading power of the day, had nearly 40 percent of its GNP wrapped up in foreign trade. Corporations and financial housessought global investments and markets. The new economy was marked by great fortunes-and massive inequality and
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THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW INTERNATIONALISM
growing instability. Booms and busts, depressions, political turmoil, strikes, and protests wracked the industrial economies. In the United States, Social Darwinism, an extreme version of laissez faire doctrine, was the dominant ideolo gy. Property rights were protected. Work er rights were literally against the law. When workers tried to organize, they were met with court orders and billy clubs. The courts struck down fair labor standards, workmen's compensation, and workplace regulation as illegal restraints on trade or a taking of property. But the Gilded Age ended disastrous ly, disintegrating into war, depression, revolution, and militarism. That global order failed because it featured a race for colonies that exploited much of the world while fueling bitter national rivalries. It failed because it was based upon undemocratic systems of gover nance that locked out the views of the poor. I t failed because its Social Dar
winist economics generated harsh inequality and severe booms and busts. Not surprisingly, the disorder generat ed a backlash internally and externally, from the Right and from the Left. Now we face a similar challenge. Once again, a global system has been built by the powerful. Once again, it is generat ing protests from poorer nations whose voices go unheard, as well as from farm ers and workers across the world whose plight goes unheeded. And once again, a harsh laissez-faire ideology is generating inequality and instability. We are faced with a global challenge: Can we close the gap between global markets and human communities? Can we build global rules that make this economy work for com mon people? Or are we condemned to repeat history for not having learned from it? We will either build a new inter nationalism that works for everyone, or we are likely to reap a poisonous new reaction. The choice is ours.
NOTES I An overview can be found in Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights (New York, Touchstone, 1999). 2 See generally Mark Weisbrodt, Dean Baker, Robert Naiman, and Gila Neta, "Growth May be Good for the Poor-But are IMF and World Bank Policies Good for Growth?" Briefing Paper (Washing ton DC, Center for Economic·and Policy Research, August, 2000). 3 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999 (New York, Oxford, 1999) 3· 4- Human Development Report 1999 3· 5 Food and Agriculture Organization, "Jhe State of Food Insecurity in the World 1999 (New York. United Nations, t999) I!. 6 International Labor Organization, lMJrld Labor Report 2000 (Geneva, ILO, 2000). 7 For a summary, see John Cavanagh and Sara Anderson, Field Guide to the Global Economy (New York, New Press, 1999). 8 Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Fairness and the Washington Consensus," Council on Foreign Relations presenta tion, 6 March 2000.
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9 For detailed analysis see Lawrence MisheI. Jared Bernstei n, and John Schmitt, "Jhe State ofWorking America, 1998-1999 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1999). 10 Michael Dobbs, "Foreign Aid Shrinks, But Not for All," Washington Post 24-January 2001, A!. II Human Development Report 199928. 12 For a brief overview, see William Greider. "Clobal Agenda," Nation MagaZine 31 January 2000. 13 Dani Rodrik, The New Global Econo"2)' and Developing Countries, Making Openne.1S H0rk (Washington DC, Overseas Development Council, 1999). 14- Thomas Palley, "The Economic Case for Inter national Labor Standards, Theory and Some Evi dence," AFL-CIO paper (Washington DC, AFL CIO, 1999). 15 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York. Knopr. 1999). 16 Joseph Stiglitz, "Democratic Development as the Fruits of Labor," address, (Washington, World Bank, 20 January 2000), 23· 17 Mark Levinson, "The Cracking Washington Consensus," Dissent Fall 2000, 14-. 18 See Howard Zinno The Twentieth Century (New York, Harper Perennial. 1998) 36-39.
Aaron Ll
The WTO has t human rights a( making in the u nomic benefits Pi materialize.'
The institutiOl World Trade 0 bitter protests economic inte~ vi duals and or! cially the proteI tie-have turn! debate about de argue that the among nations ty reduction. ( claim that for from Western c tinued misery. is not surprisi "shrink or sink'
TheNewGlobalPolitique
f rom evelopment Aaron Lukas The WO has underminedhealth,safey and enuironmentalstand.ards, humanr$hts aduocagffirts anddemocraticaccountabiltlt in poligmakingin the U.S. and worlduide.At the sametime,the uauntedeconomicben$ts promised to deriue from the Urugug Roundhauefailed to materialize.' lpri
Aaron Lukas isan Analyst at the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the CATO Institute.
Wallach, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch
The institutional faces of globalization, most notably the World Trade Organization (WTO), have been the subject of bitter protests by opponents of increasing international economic integration. Recent high-profile actions by individuals and organizations opposed to globalization-especialiy the protests that disrupted the WTO meetings in Seattle-have turned popular attention to a long-running debate about development. On one side, economic liberals argue that the relatively free flow of goods and capital among nations is essential for economic growth and poverty reduction. On the other side, critics of globalization claim that for poor countries, trade with and investment from Western countries lead only to exploitation and continued misery. Given that negative view of globalization, it is not surprising that anti-trade activists are calling to "shrink or sink" the WTO.
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S A V I N GT H E P O O R _ F R O MD E V E L O P M E N T
In many ways, these are dark days for the protectionist union members and eclectic "globaphobes" who famously paraded through the streets of Seattle and stormed police barricades in Washington, DC and Prague. After losing a string of major Congressional votesfrorn permanent norrnal trade relations for China to freer trade with Africa to quotas on irnported steel-and after failing to disrupt the World BanVIMF meetings this summer, it is obvious that the anti-trade "movement" isn't as forrnidable as its cheerleaders clairn. In the big picture, globalization is alive and well. In the past half-century since the founding of the General Agreement on Thriffs and Trade (GATT), world trade has expanded sixteen-fold, rnore than twice the rate of output growth.
are gathering around a common endeavor: to save the people of developing countries-fro rn developrnent. "'
rn. Globalization andGrowth. anti-trade forces clairn to speak for the residents of poor countries, but workers there aren't so sure that they need saving. Many realize that the rernoval of trade barriers irnrnediately expands the range of choices for consumers and places downward pressure on prices, thus raising the real value of workers' earnings. Some note that foreign investrnent provides rnore jobs, new production technologies, infrastructure improvements, and a source of capital for local entrepreneurs. Businesspeople want access both to cheaper inputs and to vastly larger markets for their products. For most
for The anti-trade forceschirnto speak the residents of poor countries, but wbrkers there aren't so srl.re that they need saving. Perhaps rnost telling is that the antiglobalization message is falling on deaf ears in developing countries, which are resisting atternpts by their so-called defenders to link labor and environmental agendas to trade. As one Gabonese diplomat who was blocked frorn attending the SeattleWTO rneetings noted with disgrrst, " [The protestersl understand nothing, and are as remote from our problerns as you'd expect from middleclasswhites in Washington state." Mexico's outgoing president, Ernesto Zedillo, was even rnore darnning: "Forces from the extrerne left, the extreme right, environmentalist groups, trade unions of developed countries, and some selfappointed representatives of civil society
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people, however, the rnany and varied benefits of a liberal trade and investment regime can be boiled down to one very attractive proposition, Globalization spurs econornic growth, and growth raises living standards. That common-sense notion is supported by numerous studies that have found a link between the freedorn to conduct international transactions and economic growth. A well-known paper byJeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University, for example, found that developing countries with open economies grew by an average of 4.5 percent per year in the Ig/Os and r9Bos, while those with closed econornies grew by only o./ percent.
LUKAsTheNewGlobalPolitique The same pattern held for developed freedom generally, including the freecountries: Those with open econornies dom to conduct international transacgrew by 2.3 percent per year while those tions. Second, contrary to the claims of the anti-trade forces, there is no eviwith closed economies grew by o./ perdence whatsoever of countries that have cent.3 Other studies, such as a rgg8 Ecofor shut thernselves off from global markets analysis by the Organization and prospered over the long term. nornic Cooperation and Development, Perhaps more clearly than anyrvhere in have found a growth gap of roughly twothe world, East Asia has dernonstrated to-one in favor of open economies.a One of the broadest measuresof eco- that rapid gains in hurnan welfare are nomic openness is in lconomicFreedomofthepossible when developing nations adopt an outward-oriented development stratWorld:2ooo AnnuolReport,byJames Gwartegy. Real per capita incorne in the region ney, Chief Econornist of the Joint Econornic Comrnittee of the U.S. Congress, has grown at an averagerate of{ to 6 percent per year since the r96os.6That comand Robert Lawson of Capital lJniversipares extrernely favorably with experiFreedomranks countries and ty.s Economic ences of developrnent elsewhere. From regions by their relative openness to 1960 to r99o, the top eight Asian international exchange.The report ranls on economies grew about three times as fast from zero to ten a scale countries on as Latin Arnerica and South Asia and five the basis of such factors as mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade as a tirnes faster than sub-Saharan Africa.T Moreover, the recent Asian financial cripercentage of exports plus irnports, nontariffbarriers, and total size ofthe trade sis-a product of foolish rnonetary policy, not globalization per se-appears to have sector. There is a clear relationship between per capita GDP and openness to presented only a ternporary obstacle to international trade and investment as these burgeoning economies. Even if the crisis had stopped all economic prog"ress rneasured by Gwartney and Lawson. for five years, these econornies would have that countries grown Developing have perforrned well above the world at the open-economy average have been averagefor the past three decades. industrial with the converging Such robust economic growth has econornies, while their closed-econorny translated into dramatically irnproved counterparts have tended to fall farther standards of living that are readily behind. No wonder "globalization" isn't observableto anyone visiting the region. such a dirty word in places that are sufSouth Korea in the rg6os, for exarnple, fering from a lack of it. C r i t i c s o f c r o s s - c o u n t r y c o m p a r i s o n s was comparable to many West African correctly point out that isolating the countries in terrns of econornic developrnent. Today its citizens enjoy effects of trade liberalization from othincornes on par with those in European er variables is rnethodologically daunting since reductions in trade barriers countries. Tiny Singapore, which has few natural resources, has transformed are frequently rnade in conjunction itself into a trade and technology powwith a host of other reforms. Two points, however, are crystal clear. First, erhouse. In China, per capita GDP has nearly quadrupled in just twenty years. there is an undeniable relationship As a result, an estimated 16o million rates and economic between growth
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people in China have emerged from absolute poverty, defined as per capita income below one dollar per day.t Since rglo, per capita food intake in Indonesia has risen from fewer than 2,rOO to more than 2,Boo calories per day. In I!12, nearly 68 rnillion Indonesians were living in what their government deemed poverty; by 1982, that nurnber had fallen to 30 million-a decline of g6 percent.e Up and down the Pacific Rim, active engagement in world markets and an openness to foreign investrnent have wrought breathtaking improvements in the lives of hundreds of millions of people-tangible progress that neither foreign aid nor protectionism have ever been able to match. Facedwith such successstories, critics ofglobalization are often forced to concede the pro-growth effects of econornic liberalisrn. But economic growth, they respond, does not necessarily benefit everyone. Instead, rosy GDP figures mask a darker reality. The rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer. As trade flows have increased, warns a Public Citi"en press release, "wealth inequality has grown within the developing countries. "'o The facts, however, tell a very different story. David Dollar andAart Kraay of the World Bank recently analyzed income data frorn eighty countries spanning four decades." They deterrnined that incornes of the poor rise approximately one-forone with overall g:rowth. In other words, the incomes of the bottorn fifth of wage in earners developing countries increased proportionally with the incornes of society in general as econornies grew. Thus, clairns to the contrary notwithstanding, globalization has not led to increasing inequality within poor countries. Dollar and Kraay
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conclude that openness to foreign trade and investment is as good for the poor as it is for the overall economy, and that trade's effect on the distribution of income within a country is "tiny and not significantly different from zero. "'' The link between economic openness and growth has become so obvious that developing countries over the past couple of decadeshave been opening their markets voluntarily, independent of any quid pro quonegotiations. Countries as diverse asArgentina, the Philippines, Chile, and Thailand have taken aggressiveunilateral steps toward integration into the global economy. Even the rnost traditionally closed economies are finally abandoning the failed autarkic rnodel of protectionism in favor of freer trade. Over just the past fewyears, India has reduced its average industrial tariffs from /r to 32 percent, Brazil frorn {I to 2l percent, and Venezuela from $O to 3I percent.'3 Tfre World Tiade Organization's own history illustrates the "bottom-up" popularity of trade liberalization. Establishedin rg{8, the GATT-the precursor to the WTOhad only twenty-three contracting parties, most of which were industrialized nations. Today, more than three-quarters of the WTO's r!6 mernbers are developing nations, and twenty rnore are eagerly waiting to join.'a
Jobs,Wages,and LaborStandafdS. It is an article of faith among globaphobes that the low-skilled jobs in the export industries of the developing world amount to exploitation of local workers. Globaphobes evoke irnages of "sweatshops" and laborthird-world intensive factories with hellish working conditions and slave wages to justify U.S. trade barriers against developingcountry imports. Shutting down those
LUKAsTheNewGlobalPolitique factories by any means necessaryis now a top priority of anti-free traders. In one recent high-profile example, students at the lJniversity of Pennsylvania, the tlniversity of Michigan, and Indiana University staged sit-in protests against the licensing of school logos to companies producing clothing in developing countries.'5Despite the good intentions of those students, such trade-reducing actions do nothing to help improve conditions in poor countries. It is certainly true that workers in the export sector of developing countries earn far less than their Western counterparts and often work in much harsher conditions. The proper comparison, however, is not between U.S. wages and developing countrf wages but between export-sector wagesin developing countries and other locally available opportunities. After all, it is not as though low wagesand poor working conditions are a creation of multinational companiesthat combination has been the rule throughout history. It is lamentable that nearly 3 billion people currently live on lessthan two dollars a day, but the critical question to ask is, why are the other 3 billion people doing better?'6 Globalization is an important part of that answer. Wherever new export industries have taken hold, there has been a rneasurable improvement in local incornes and working conditions. In rgg8, Edward M. Graham of the Institute for International Economics estimated the wages and salaries (not including fringe benefits, which generally averageabout 2$ percent of wages and salaries) paid to local employees of U.S. affiliate companies.'7 His results suggestthat although developing country employees of U.S. affiliates are indeed paid less than their developed-country counterparts, they are paid
significantly more than the average wage for the countrf where they live. In lowincome countries, for example, workers fortunate enough to gain employment with a U.S.-based company earn more than eight times the average per capita salary. For middle-income countries, such workers earn about three tirnes the averagelocal yearly wages. Anecdotal evidence supports Grah a m ' s s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s .F o r e x a m p l e , a recent survey of forty-eight U.S.based companies in China, conducted by the U.S. Charnber of Comrnerce in Beijing, found that respondents paid an average hourly wage of $5.25, excluding benefits, or about $ro,9oo per year.'t Similarly, workers at a Shanghai factory owned jointly by General Motors and the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation earn about $+.Sg per hour, including benefits but not counting generous perforrnance bonuses that can almost double take-home pay.'e While such wages are far below the average for a unionized autoworker in the United States, they are about three times higher than wages for comparable work at a non-U.S. factory in Shanghai and nearly eight times higher than the United Auto Workers' estimate that a "'good paying'factory job with a company like General Motors pays about 59 cents an hour" in China.'o Other research, such as that byJeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer of the University of California at Berkeley, has shown that trade, as distinct from foreign investrnent, also has a positive impact on developing*country wages. In a Iggg paper, the authors concluded that trade exerts "a qualitatively large and robust... positive effect on income." After analyzing data from r$O countries, they esti-
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mated that an increase in the ratio of trade to GDP by one percentage point can be expectedto raise income per person by between o.$ and 2 percent."' Both trade and investment affect the long-term production trend in developing economies, which also reinforces the gains to workers. Specifically, poor countries tend to move away from labor-intensive production as they scale the ladder of economic developrnent. The share of textiles and apparel in South Korea's exports, for example, grew from B percent in 1960 to 4,Opercent in r98o, but then shrank to 19 percent by 1993."" Today South Korea is known more for its exports of automobiles and electronics than its clothing, and average wages have increased dramatically. The benefits of creating a dynamic, export-oriented manufacturing sector are even more apparent when wagesare compared with those in Western countries. In r$6O, the average manufacturing job in a developing country paid just over Io percent of rnanufacturing wages received by workers in the United States. By rgg2, wages in those countries had risen to nearly Jo percent of U.S. rnanufacturing wages.t3In other words, as manufactured exports of developing countries have grown, so have wages in those countries-even in relation to U.S. wages,which have also risen. Foreign-owned businesses not only pay their workers more, they also provide a positive example of quality of life in the workplace. In fact, in the few high-pro'Western file cases in which companies were tied to labor abuses, those abuses were overwhelmingly cornmitted by indigenous firrns that were selling on contract. As awareness of worker mistreatment has grown, foreign-owned
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firms-and in particular, Americanowned firms-have actively taken measures to ensure that workers are treated humanely. Companies have established codes of conduct for their suppliers. Consider the Nike Corporation, which for years has been the company that globaphobes have loved to hate. After taking voiuntarl stepsto improve its procurement process, Nike hired forrner U.S. ambassadorto the United Nations Andrew Young to conduct an independent investigation of the cornpany's labor practices.taFocused consumer pressure, not blunt governrnent sanctions, was responsible for Nike's internal reforms. Zhou Latai, one of China's foremost labor attorneys who represents injured workers in the southern city of Shenzhen, puts it this way: "Arnerican consurners are a rnain catalyst for better worker rights in China. They are the ones who pressure Nike and Reebok to improve working conditions at Hong Kong- and Thiwan-run factories here. If Nike and Reebok go...this pressure evaporates.This is obvious."'5 Consider the caseof Hortensia Hernandez, who works for the Bull-D jeans cornpany in Gomez Palacio, Mexico.'6 She earns $ZO u day sewing jeans for export-not much by U.S. standards, but a top-notch salary in Mexico and triple what she was earning only three years ago. Overall, average wages in Mexico's booming export sector are 30 percent higher than those for jobs linked to the domestic market. Companies also compete to provide a comfortable working environment, offering such previously unknown perks as airconditioning, rnusic, and free lunches. Since the North Arnerican Free Tiade Agreernent (NAFTA) was signed in rgg2, Mexico has climbed from twenty-
LUKASTheNewGlobalPolitique sixth place to eighth place among the world's largest exporters, and in recent years, its exports have fueled growth rates of 4 percent."TThe resulting positive changes in Mexico's economy have been astounding. "NAFTA," saysJesus Reyes-Heroles, Mexico's ambassadorto the United States, "is the most important thing to happen to Mexico in the p a s t r o o y e a r s . . . . T h o s ew h o o p p o s e i t should come to Mexico."'8 Again, it is irnportant to remember that low wages, poverty, and difficult working conditions are not new to the developing world; they have always been the norm. No doubt there will always be horror stories about unscrupulous employers, just as such stories persist in this country. Globalization is not a panacea, but curtailing trade and foreign investment will only ensure that workers are forced into the non-exPort sector. For most people that rneans eking a rniserable living frorn small plots of land, or sometirnes worse. More than any govern-
Instead of closing our markets, we should be opening them further. No amount of aid rnoney or insistence on living-wage standards could match the benefits for poor workers that tariff-free access to Western markets could offer. That access would create jobs, reduce unemployment, put upward Pressure on wages, and even create a hospitable cliefforts. mate for labor-organizing Those are precisely the goals the antitrade movement is seeking. Ironically, the WTO's failure in Seattle was due not to fear of free trade on the part of developing countries, but rather to the reluctance of developed countries to fully ernbrace it. As Sri Lankan Commerce Minister Kingsley Wickramaraine noted, a large number of developing countries have "yet to find any rneaningful market accessopportunities for products of export interest to them."'s Unfortunately, Wickramaraine is correct. The United States and other industrialized countries continue to block imports
wasduenot The WTOtS failure in Seattle
to fear of free trade on the pa{t of developing countries, but rather to the^reluctance of* developed countries to fullv ernbrace it. ment program or aid package, the spread of free trade, free rnarkets, and investment across international borders by private companies and investors is proving to be the rnost effective anti-poverty measure the world has ever seen. The Seattle and Washington Protesters called for better working conditions in the developing world while denouncingthe policy thatwould most help bring such improvements about-free trade.
frorn developing countries, especially through abnormally high tariffs on textiles and clothing, an unfair antidumping regime, and quotas on various agricultural products.3o Such discriminatory protectionisrn persists despite promises made during the Uruguay Round of trade talls. In the WTO Agreernent on Textiles and Clothing, for instance, the United States pledged to phase out all textile and apparel quotas over a ten-year
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It iS COmfOfting to believethat.qovernrnents can sirnply legislate poverty out of e"xistence.
period, but as of t999 only r percent of developing countries should be thinking U.S. quotas had been elirninated.3' On of ways to facilitate globalization, not average,developing countries face tariffs attempting to stop it. manufactured on their exports that are The globaphobes are on the wrong nearly four tirnes the tariffs facing side of history. However, their claims exports of developed countries.3" Because often sound plausible and have a certain of that inequitable pattern of protectionsuperficial appeal. It is comforting to ism, Thomas W. Hertel and Will Martin believe that governments can simply legof the World Bank have concluded that islate poverty out of existence. Protecdeveloping countries would capture tionisrn has alwaysbeen an integral part around /$ percent of the world economof that siren song, promising an easy ic benefits from further trade liberalizapath to development. But protectionism tion in the manufacturing sector.33 has never made good on its promises. In the real world, it has been a willingness Wrong Side of History.Therewiuto liberalize economies and allow indinever be a rnagic formula for developviduals to freely pursue their own finanment or democratization. Yet the East cial interests-even across borders-that Asian experience is a powerful testament has actually lead to wealthier societies. to the rapid prog:ress that can be achieved That is a lesson that poor countries are when developing countries embrace the finally beginning to learn. basic tenets of globalization. The stakes In the past half-century since the are high. With the exception of countries founding of the GATT, the world econthat have embraced export-oriented omy has grown six-fold, in part because developrnent, the gap between the develtrade has expanded sixteen-fold. As oped and the developing world has been experience has shown, growth need not either stable or growing throughout most lead to the wholesale exploitation of of modern history. The free trade counworkers in poor countries. Instead, globtries are succeedingbecausetheyhave crealization makes it possible for more peoated outward-oriented econornies that ple to lift themselvesout of conditions of provide faster growth through exports and grinding poverty more quickly than was accessto foreign technology, capital, and ever possible in the past. It has and will productivity-enhancing imports. Those continue to rneasurably improve the lives who wish to improve the lives-both politof millions around the world, but only if ically and economically-of the citizens of we choose to embrace it. NOTES r See <http'//w.citizen.org/pctrade/gattwto/TestimoniesTo2o&%2oComments/Testimon.htm>. 2 Ernesto Zedillo, "Can We Take Open Markets for Granted?" Remarls at the plenary session,World Economic Forum, Davos, 28 January 2ooo, <http,//world.presidencia.gob. mxlPAGES/library/sp_Z
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Bjanoo.html.comp/child/stat/stats.
html>.
3 Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "Econonic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, " Brooli4g: Papere on EconomicActiti! no. r (1995). for Economic Cooperation and {, Organization Development, Opn M o*ets Motter(Paris, OEC D, 1998) 4o.
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t'
gJames Gwartney and Robert Lawson, EconomicFree2 r Jeffrey A. Frankel and D avid Roner, "D oes Trade Caue Growth?" Americanhonomic Rerieu 89.3 (June dom of theWorld:2ooo AnnuolReporl(Vancouuer. B.C., FraserInstitute, 2ooo). 1 9 9 9 ) :3 7 9 - 9 9 . . 6 Y. C. Richard Wong, "Lessons from the Asian 22 World Bank, Icsf .4sionMiracle ConfontingFean F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s , " C o t ol o u r n o l r 8 . 3 ( W i n t e r r g g g ) , 4 Gat-y Burtless et al., Clobaphobia, about Open lrcde (Washington: Brookings Institution, 39r. Crouth ond ] World Bank, fie last, sianMirscle:Economic Public Polig (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 19g 3) z. Mirade!!. 8 World Bank, Iost.Asian 9 Paul Krugman, "In Praise of Cheap Labor," Slate (27 March 1999). ''WTO to Report, Clinton Spin Cycle Unable to Clean WTO's Record," Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch PressRelease,2 March 2ooo, <http://w.citizen.orglpctrade/media/releaseo3o2oO.htm>. rr David Dollar and Aart Kraay, "Growth Is Good for the Poor," World Bank Research Group Paper March zooo, <http,//w.worldbank.org/research>, 12 Dollar and Kraay 5. t! Gumisai Mutume, "Developmentr The Jury Is Still Out, but for How Long?" Inter PressSewice r! February 2ooo. r{, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Polig Coherence Motlers(Paris' OECD. 1999/ 45. l5 Jay R. Mandle, "SweatshopProtestersMiss the (24 February2ooo). Primary Target,"JoumalofCommerce t 6 Wo rld Bank, ClobolEconomic Prospecls ondtheDeueloping Countris2ooo ('W'ashington,World Bank, 2ooo) 29. rJ Edward M Graham, "Trade and Investment at the WTO : Just Do It ! " Iauncfii4g Neu ClobolTrcdeTolls'An Action Institute for International Economics Special .Agznda, r 998):r5r. Report no. 12 (Septembe1 r8 Suney available at <http://w.amchamchina.org.cn>. tg Clay Chandler and Frank Swoboda,"ln Chinese Wages,A U.S. Bump," WuhingtonPon 23 May 2ooo. zo Quoted in Chandler and Swoboda.
1998)68. 2{ Stephen S. Golub, "Are International Labor Standards Needed to Prevent Social Dumping?" fincnce (December 1997), Zo. andDeaelopment 2g John Pomfret, "Dissidents Back China's WTO Entry," l46shingron Pod II May 2ooo. 26 MaryJor&n, "Mexicans Reap NAFTA's Benefits," Wchington Postr8 September 2ooo. 27 Joel Millman, "The World's Nw Tiger on the Export Scene Isn't Asian; It's Mexico, " WollStreetJournal 9 May 2ooo. 28 Remarksat a Cato Institute luncheon, / October r999. 2g David Thurber, "Globalization Dangers Still to Be Resolved,"AssociatedPressr.{ February 2ooo. !o SeeBrink Lindsey et al., "Seattleand Beyond, A WTO Agenda for the Ns Millennium," Coto Institute Trode Polig Anol2sisno. 8 (4 November rggg), <http ://w.freetrade.orglpubs/pa/tpa- oo8es.html>. It SeeJ. Michael Finger and Ludger Schuknecht, "Market AccessAdvances and Retreats: The Uruguay Round and Beyond," Paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Apri l r g g 9, 22, <hnp |/ /w.worldbank. orglresearch/ abcde/pdfs/finger.pdf>. !2 Thomas W. Hertel and Will Martin, "Would Developing Countries Gain from Inclusion of Manufactures in the WTO Negotiations?" Paper presented at the WTOAVorld Bank Conference on Developing Countries in a Millennium Round Secretariat,20-21 S e p t e m b e r1 9 9 9 , 3 . 33 Hertel and Martin 12.
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TheNewGlohal Politique
Hilary French In December 1999, tens of thousands of people turned out on the streets of Seattle to protest plans for a new round of global trade talks under the aegis of the World Tiade Organization (WTO). Some four months later, rnany of the same people reassembled in Washington, DC at the annual spring meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In September, the protestersresurfaced in Prague at the fall meetings of these institutions. As these eventsdemonstrate, the terms of public debate over globalization are rapidly shifting, with the powerful institutions governing today's global econorny increasingly on the environmental and social defensive. Globalization has become both one of the most contentious aswell as one of the rnost defining issuesof our time. Part of the controversy stems from the different meanings that the term "globalization" has for different people. To some, globalization is synonymous with the growth of global corporations, whose far-flung operations transcend national borders and allegiances.To others, it signals a broader cultural and social integration, spurred by masscomrnunications and the Internet. The term can also refer to the growing permeability of international borders to pollution, microbes, refugees, and other forces. Globalization is used here to refer to a broad processof societal transformation that encompasses all of the above, including growth in trade, investment,
H i l a r y F r e n c hi . Director of the Global Governance Project at the Worldwatch Institute and the author of Vonish ingBorders,Protecting thePlonetin theAgeof CIob(New York, oli.<otion W.W- Norton & Co.. zooo).
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An upsurge of trade and investment in travel, computer networking, and transnatural resource sectors such as forestry, boundary pollution. Collectively, these diverse processes mining, and petroleum development is have a large and growing impact on the threatening the health of the world's health of the earth's natural systems, aII forests, mountains, waters, and other sensitive ecosysterns.Forests are shrinkof which are coming under strain. Carbon dioxide levelsin the atmosphere have ing as the value of global trade in forest reached record highs, scientists are warnproducts climbs, from $29 billion in 196r to $r39 billio.r in 1998." Fisheries ing that we are in the rnidst of a period of are collapsing as fish exports rise, growmass extinction of species, the world's and ing nearly five-fold in value since rg/o to major fisheries are being depleted, reach $52 billion in 1997.3 water shortagesloom worldwide.
GlobalizatiOn is a powerfuldrivinsforce lehind. today'sunprec6dentedbiologrEal lmproslon.
Turning around these disturbing transnational environmental trends will strategy, require a multi-pronged including integrating environmental principles and values into the prograrns of international economic institutions; building a stronger international environmental infrastructure; and harnessing the power of new inforrnation and communications technologies to forge powerful cross-border political alliances between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors.
The rapid growth in the rnovernent of human beings and their goods and services has provided convenient transportation for thousands of other species of plants and animals that are now taking root on foreign shores. On any given day, some 2 rnillion people cross international borders, while 3,ooo to IO,OOO aquatic species are moving around the world in ship ballasts.aOnce "exotic species" establish a beachhead in a foreign ecosystem, they often proliferate, suppressing native species and imposing high economic costs. Chernical hazards are also being spread by globalization. Exports of pesticides have increased nearly nine-fold since rg6r, reaching $rr.4 billion in r99B.u The developing world is becoming home to a growing share of the hazard-laden petrochemical industry. In rg8o, rr percent of all chemicals were produced in developing countries; by 1996, this figure had grown to 18 percent.6 Much of this expansion involves joint ventures with multinational firms.
Environmental Globalization's Fallout.
while
economiststout
record-breaking increasesin global commerce in recent decades, the world's leading biologists are reporting more sobering statistics. The loss of living species in recent decades represents the largest mass extinction since the dinosaurs were wiped out 65 million years ago.' Globalization is a powerful driving force behind today's unprecedented biological implosion.
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FRENcH TheNewGlobalPolitique Approximately 4r percent of U.S. foreign direct investment in the Philippines in 1998 was in chemicals, as was 22 percent of such investment in Colombia.T Yet, just as globalization can spread environmental risks, the forces of glob* alization can also produce environmental gains, such as helping developing countries leapfrog to the cleaner technologies of tomorrow. China has become the world's largest manufacturer of energy-efficient compact fluorescent Iight bulbs in recent years, in part through joint ventures with lighting firms based in Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, and Thiwan.' India has become a major manufacturer of advanced wind turbines with the help of technology obtained through joint ventures and licensing agreernents with Danish. Dutch. and German firms.e Several countries are working to harnessthe global economy to protect rather than decimate natural wealth. Costa Rica is now a major destination for ecotourists, capitalizing on its rnoist cloud forests, sandy beaches,and dry deciduous forests. Many other countries have rnoved to tap into the booming international market for organic produce. Mexico now has some ro,Ooo organic farms on I5,ooo hect.aresof land, most of them run by small farmers.'o While coffee is their mainstay, Mexico's organic farmers also cultivate apples, avocados, coconuts, cardamom, honey, and potatoes. Unfortunately, the promising examples cited above continue to be exceptions rather than the rule in a global econorny that continues to destroy natural wealth at an unprecedented rate. Tipping the balance away from environmentally harmful activities and into more sustainable ones will require farreaching governance reforms that
channel globalization to protect, rather than to undermine, the ecological health of the planet.
Reformingthe WT0. An important place to start is with the WTO, which has earned the antipathy of environmentalists in recent years by suggesting in rulings frorn secretive dispute resolution panels that a range of national environmental laws and even the provisions of some international environmental treaties could constitute illegal trade barriers. In a case that particularly seized the attention of U.S. environmentalists, a WTO dispute resolution panel ruled in IggS against a U.S. measure aimed at reducing unintended sea turtle mortaiity as a byproduct of shrimp trawling." Sea turtles are both extremely endangered and highly rnobile, making international action to protect them a high priority. The provisions of the U.S. law in question closed the lucrative U.S. shrimp market to countries that do not require their shrimpers to use turtle excluder devices-sirnple but highly effective pieces of equiprnent that prevent turtles frorn getting ensnared in shrimp nets-or that do not have cornparable policies in place. Although the environmental effectiveness of the U.S. law was clear, both the initialWTO dispute resolution panel and a subsequent appeals panel concluded in rggS that the measure violated WTO rules.'" The legal reasoning of the appeals panel was an irnprovernent over earlier rulings, as it acknowledged that countries may in some circumstances be justified in using trade measures to protect global resources. Nonetheless, the panel took issue with the way in which the U.S. law was implemented, arguing that it was applied in an arbitrary manner that failed
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to treat countries evenhandedly. The bottom line was that implementation of the U.S. law would have to be changed in order to comply with WTO rules. At the same time the United Stateswas defending its turtle protection law at the WTO, it was taking aim at a European l]nion law that forbids the sale of meat produced using growth hormones. Since the law went into effect in the late rg8os, it has alwaysapplied equally to domestically-raised and imported livestock, and has thus passedthe WTO's bedrock test of non-discrimination. The EU insists the ban is not an intentional trade barrier, but rather a prudent response to public concern that eating hormonetreated beef rnight cause cancer and reproductive health problems. However, the hormone-hooked U.S. livestock industry was threatened by the law, which blocks hundreds of rnillions of dollars worth of U.S. beef exports, and it prevailed upon the U.S. government to take up its cause at the WTO. In February rgg8, a WTO appeals panel ruling upheld an earlier dispute panel ruling that the EU law violated WTO rules.'3 The panelists explicitly rejected the EU's defense that the import restriction was justified by the precautionary principle, a basic tenet of international environmental law that holds that lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing action in caseswhere there are threats ofserious or irreversible darnage. InJuly rggg, the U.S. governrnent imposed WTOapproved retaliatory sanctions on the EU for its refusal to adhere to the WTO rulingby changing its law, slapping Ioo percent tariffs on $116.8 million worth of European imports, including fruit juices, mustard, pork, truffles, and Roquefort cheese.'aThese sanctions are
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still in place and rnay soon be expanded, as the EU has so far refused to back down. These controversies demonstrate the need to amendWTO rules to buffer environmental laws from trade challenges. Among the priorities are clearly incorporating the precautionary principle into WTO rules; protecting consumers' right to know about the health and environrnental impact of products they purchase through safeguarding labeling programs ; recognizing the legitirnacy of distingrrishing among products based on how they were produced; providing deference to multinational environmental agreements in cases where they conflict with WTO rules; and opening the WTO to meaningful public participation.
Greening International Finance. After bringing the WTO to its knees, the protesters set their sights on the IMF and the World Bank. The prorninent role of both of these institutions in responding to the global financial crisis of the late I99os clearly dernonstrated their forrnidable powers, but also underscored the failure of both organizations to pay sufficient heed to the profound effects of their policies on the ecological health of recipient countries. Both institutions rnake controversial "structural adjustment" loans, in which countries receiving funds are required to implement a long and specific list of poliry changes such as cutting governrnent budgets, opening up to trade and foreign investment, and privatizing governmentowned enterprises. While these policies may help balance a country's booLs, they also often cause environrnental strains, such as drastic cuts in the budgets of already overburdened environment and natural resource rnanagement ministries or stepped up exports of natural assets
FRENcT Hh eN e wG l o h aPl o l i t i q u e such as fisheries and forests. For instance, environmentalists criticize the promotion of palm oil production for contributing to the decimation of Indonesia's biologically-rich tropical forests. They also attack the bailout plan for Indonesia in the wake of the Igg/ financial crisis as environmentally unfriendly.'5 On the other hand, structural adjustment programs can also be used to promote environrnentally beneficial policy changes. The negative impacts of the Indonesian package were somewhat counterbalanced by provisions requiring better forest management practices and policies in the country, including reducing land conversion targets to environmentally sustainable levels, instituting an auctioning systern for handing out concessions,and irnposing new taxeson timber sales.'6Although it rarely occurs in practice, adjustrnent loans can also be used to promote environmentally beneficial fiscal reforrns, such as cuts in environmentally harmful subsidies or the imposition of pollution taxes. Despite the clear links between economic and environrnental health, however, the IMF has long resisted the idea that environmental issueshave much to do with its traditional mission of helpirg countries weather short-term financial crises. On paper, the development-oriented World Bank has been far more open than the IMF to the idea that environmental concerns should be integrated into its lending, including structural adjustment. An internal review of more than fifty recent adjustment loans found that few loan agreements paid much heed to environment a l a n d s o c i a l m a t t e r s . ' 7 - W h e r e aas 1 9 9 3 Bank report found that some 6o percent of adjustment loans included environmental goals, a more recent
study concluded that this share had p l u m m e t e d t o l e s st h a n 2 O p e r c e n t . ' 8 Private lenders and investors also need to take steps to better integrate environmental considerations into their operations. Under a UN Environment Programrne (UNEP) initiative airned at encouraging such considerations, 162 private banl.s from {J countries signed the Statement by Banls on the Environment and Sustainable Development.'e The signatories underscore their expectation that borrowers must comply with "all applicable local, national, and international environmental regulations." They also pledge to update their accounting procedures to reflect environmental risks, such as the potential for chemical accidents or hidden hazardous waste durnps, and to develop banking products and servicesthat promote environmental protection. If financial markets are to reflect environrnental risks adequately, transparent information about corporate environmental performance is essential. The last several years have seen an explosion of interest in environmental reporting, including the launching of a Global Reporting Initiative spearheaded by the Boston-based Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies."o Under this initiative, corporations, NGOs, professional accounting firms, and the UNEP are working to produce a global set of guidelines for corporate sustainability reporting that will hopefully elevate environmental reporting to the same plane as financial reporting, rnaking it standard business practice worldwide.
Strengthening Sofar, Governance. the new rules of the global economy are mainly being set by institutions such asthe WTO and the IMF, where the mindset of
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traditional economists prevails and where the "rules" are for the most part airned at unshackling global commerce rather than harnessing it for the common good. However, forging an environmentally sustainable society is about more than econornics, and farsighted economics is about rnore than reducing restrictions on the movement of goods and money. Creating a global society fit for the twentyfirst century will thus require not only reform of econornic institutions, but also a strengthening of international environrnental institutions so that they can act as an ecological counterweight to today's growing corporations. Judging from the nurnber of treaties, environmental diplomacy over the past few decadesappears to have been a spectacular success. Environmental treaties alone nurnber more than 23o; agireement on more than two-thirds of thern has been reached since the first UN conference on the environment was held in Stockholm in t!J2."'These accords cover atrnospheric pollution, ocean despoliation, endangered species protection, hazardous waste trade, and the preservation ofAntarctica, among other issues. Many of these accords have led to irnportant results, such as the 8| percent drop in chlorofluorocarbon emissions from their peal in 1988 that resulted from the r9B7 Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion.'" The volume of oil spilled into the ocean has declined by 6o percent since t$BI, even with a near doubling in oil shiprnents in response to agreements forged by the International Maritime Organization.'3 Yet, even as the number of treaties climbs, the condition of the biosphere continues to deteriorate. The notoriously slow pace of international diplomary needs to be reconciled with the growing urgency of protecting the
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planet's life support systems. Environmental treaties have mostly failed to turn around today's alarming environmental trends because the governments that created them have generally permitted only vague cornmitrnents and lax enforcement. For the rnost part, governments have failed to provide sufficient funds to implernent treaties, particularly in the developing world. Ironically, environmentalists need to take a page from the WTO and push for international environmental commitrnents that are as specific and as enforceable as trade accords have becorne. One idea nowgaining political currency is to upgrade the UNEP into a World Environment Organization (WEO) on par with the WTO."a Although the UNEP has had sorne important successessince it was founded int!J2, it has suffered from meager resources and a limited mandate. Upgrading the status of environmental issueswithin the UN system is long overdue. Still, it is important that debatesover form do not distract frorn the ultirnately far more important question of function. A world environmental organization could serve as an umbrella organization for the current scattered collection of treaty bodies, just as domestic environment agencies oversee the implementation of national environrnental laws. In order to do so effectively, however, the treaties themselveswould need to stipulate strong enforcement capacities, and the WEO would need to be endowed with sufficient financial resources to catalyze innovative programs.
Networking tor the Environment. Tomorrow's international environmental institutions may turn out to be vastly different in character than the bureaucratic bodies that pre-
FRENcH TheNewGlobalPolitique dominate today. A nascent system of take hold. The organic agriculture cominternational environmental govermunity was an early pioneer. As far back as nance is now emerging from diverse the early rg7Os, it came together through quarters, proving that governance is no the International Federation of Organic longer just for governments. Agriculture Movements to stipulate conA particularly encouraging developditions that farmers must meet in order to ment in recent years has been the steady claim organic credentials.'7More recently, in rgg! the Forest Stewardship Council growth of the international non-governmental movement. The number of was founded to set standards for sustainNGOs working across international borable forest production through a cooperders soared over the past century, climbative process involving timber traders and ing from just r/6 in r9o9 to more than retailers as well as environmental organizations and forest dwellers.'6And a Marine 2o,ooo in rgg6."5 Empowered by e-mail and the Internet, environrnental activists Stewardship Council has now been have gradually organized themselves into formed to devise criteria for sustainable a range of powerful international netffsh harvesting."s For worls. example, the Climate Action Despite these promising developNetwork linls rnore than 2$O internaments, environmental destruction tionai groups and national organizations continues to outpace society's collective active on climate change, and the Pesti- response. Over the course of the twencide Action Network includes at least t i e t h c e n t u r y , t h e g l o b a l e c o n o m y $oO consumer, environmental, health, stretched the planet to its limits. The labor, agricultural, and public interest time is now ripe to build the international g'overnance structures needed to groups worldwide devoted to reducing use of hazardouspesticides."6 ensure that the world econorny of the NGOs are also forgrng innovative parttwenty-first century meets people's nerships with businesses and other stake- aspirations for a better future, but holders. One example is the numerous without destroying the natural fabric eco-labeling initiatives now beginning to that underpins life itself. NO T E S r American "National Suney
Museum
of
Natural
Reveals Biodiversity
History,
Crisis-Scien-
tific Experts Believe We Are in Midst of Fastest Mass Extinction April
in
Earth's
History,"
Press Re'lease, 20
t998.
z United Nations Food and Agriculture Organi'FAOSTAT zation (FAO), Statistics Database," electronic database, <apps.fao.org>, accessed 22 October t999.
tg98
figures are Worldwatch
estimates.
This
and
other
preliminary
data expressed in
dollars and deflated using the U.S. G.N.P.
Ig98
Implicit
Price Deflator, provided in U.S. Department of (July Commerce (U.S. DOC), Surugof CurrentBusiness
r999). Statistical Clerk, Fishery ! Sara Montanaro, Data, and Statistics Unit, FAO FishInformation, eries Department, Worldwatch
Rome,
Institute,
to Lisa Mastny,
6 September rg!g; bookof Fkheg Statrtics, {g (Rome, r9/8).
FAO, Yeor-
(NewYork, W.W. {. Chris Bright, lfe Outof Bounds N o r t o n & C o m p a n y . 1 9 9 8 ). 5 FAO, op. cit. note 2, viewed 3o November r 99 9 . 6 United Nations Industrial DevelopmentOrga(Mennization, InternationalYeorbook of IndustriclStotistics na: Iggg). (September 7 U.S. DOC, Sumg of CurrentSusiness r999/. 8 N i l s B o r g , I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o nf o r E n e r gy-Efficient Lighting, Berkeley, CA, e-mail to Moll y O ' M e a r a , W o r l d w a t c h I n s t i t u t e , r 2 F e b r u a r yr g g 8 , 9 R a k e s hB a k s h i , " C o u n t r y S u r o e y : I n d i a , " M n d (April r997). Directions ro Nick Robins and Sarah Roberts, UnlockingTrade Opportunities:CaseStudiesof FxportSuccess.;fi'om Deueloping Countries, prepared for the U.N. Department of Policy Co-ordination and Sustainable Development (London, International Institute for Environment
W i n t e r / S p r i n gz o o r
[3r]
GREENING GLOBALIZATION
and Development, rr Adam
Ig!8). "WTO
Entous,
Sea Turtle Protection I2
World
Trade
ofthe Enuironmenttgg6 Rules Against U.S. on
Law," Reuters 6 April (WIO),
Igg8.
Organization
United
States-lmporl Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Gereuu, Ie October r9g8). "EC Measures Concerning 13 WTO, Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)," Report of the Appellate Body (Geneva' r6January 1998). r4 "U.S. Imposes Sanctions in Beef Fight," y'feu f o r k T i m e sI g J u l y 1 9 9 9 . rg William Opportunityr
D. Sunderlin,
"Between Danger and
Indonesia's Forests in an Era of Eco-
nomic
Crisis and Political Challenge," Consultative Research Group on International Agricultural Paper (Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research, Ir September 1998). "Supplementary t6 Government of Indonesia, Memorandum
of Economic
and Financial
Policies,
submitted
ing Director,
16 March
viewed rg
October
op. cit. note I5. I/ Nancy Dunne, "World Bank,Projects'Fail'
P o o r , " F r n o n c i oTl i m e s2 4 S e p t e n b e r 18 World Bank, "The Evolution tal Concerns
in Adjustment
the
of Environmen-
Lending:
A
Review,"
paper prepared for the CIDIE Workshop on Environmental Impacts of Economywide Policies in Developing Countries, Washington, DC, 23-25 February 1993i Dunne, op. cit. note I7. r9 "19 New Signatories to the Financial Services I n i t i a t i v e s , " T h eB o t t o ml i n e , U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n ment Programme (UNEP) Financial Services Initiative newsletter, (Spring rggg); "New Signatories to
a Global Environmental OrganizaManogr'4g the World Economl' Fifu YeorsAfer Bretton W o o d s ,P e t e r B . K e n e n , e d . ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C , I n s t i -
tute for
International
Biermann
Economics,
and Udo
Igg{,).
E. Simonis,
Environment and Development ig Poperg (Bonn' Development
See also "A World
Organization,"
Pol-
and Peace Founda-
tion/Stiftung
Entwicklung und Frieden, June rggS). estimate based on Union of 2g Worldwatch International Associations, Yearbook of Internotional (Munich, O r g o n i 4 t i o n sl g g 8 4 g g g K.G. Saur Verlag,
r999/. <rw.cliNetwork, 26 See Climate Action matenetwork.org>, and Pesticide Action Network >. North America, <w.panna.org 2/J. Patrick Madden and Scott G. Chaplowe, For ALL Generstions' M oking World Agriculture More Sustoinoble,
(w.
Affairs
DE, Igg6;
Case for
Pornng. org> . estimate compiled from UNEP, 2r Worldwatch Regsterof Internationol Treotiesond Other .Agreements in the Field
of International
Twen-
1998.
proposal to create a global 2{ Fot a prominent environmental organization, see Daniel C. Esty, "GATTing the Greens, " Foreign Affairc (November/December rgg3), and Daniel C. Esty,
International
Georgetown Journal
Direc-
2! International Maritime Organization, "Marp o l - z g Y e a r s , " F o c u so n I M O ( O c t o b e r 1 9 9 8 ) .
t h e I n i t i a t i v e s , " T h eB o t t o m L i n e ,U N E P F i n a n c i a l S e r vices Initiative newsletter, (Summer rgg!). 20 For more information, see <w.globalre-
t g Z]
United
in r!g/ CFC production from UNEP, Dota Reporton Production ond Consumption of Ozone Depleting Substcnczs, 1986-t 998 (Nairobi, r999).
Frank
r999.
from
22 Sharon Getamel, Dupont, Wilnington, letter to Worldwatch Institute, rg February
"The
Iggg; Sunderlin,
rgg6),
Nations Treaty Collection, <w.un.org/Depts/Treaty>,
tieth Session, 13 November
tion,"
nal/np/loi/t999/o3t6gg.htn>,
(Nairobi,
United
the Environment: Report of the Executive tor, " prepared for UNEP Governing Council
doc-
to Michel
The
electronic database, viewed 9 March 1999, and from UNEP, "International Conventions and on Protocols in the Field of
Camdessus, IMF Managrgg9, <w.imf.org,/exter-
Fourth Review Under the ExtendedAgreement," ument
Nations,
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (Glendale, CA, OM Publishing, I9g/). 28
See
Forest
Stewardship
Council,
Stewardship
C o uncil,
fscoax. org) .
See 29 <w.msc.org>.
Marine
TheNewGlobalPolitique
Horst Kohler Much maligned and often misunderstood, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been described as everything frorn global capitalism's savior to the institutionalization of original the World Bank-has sin. In recent years, the IMF-like for grassroots and student moveemerged as a lightning rod ments protesting the environmental, social, and cultural implications of globalization. Indeed, a colorful group of protestors at Iast year's annual IMFAV'orld Bank rneetings depicthorse harboring the nefarious ed the IMF as a giant tojan multinational forces of Coca-Cola, Nike, and Microsoft. Since coming into office, Horst Kohler, Managing Director of the IMF, has attempted to address sorne of the more substantive concerns raised about the institution and present a coherent vision of how it can become the pillar of sustainable and equitable global development. Activeiy engaging its critics, Kohler describes the IMF not as the cold, anonymous, black hand of capitalism, but rather as the best hope for reducing poverty and encouraging discourse and dialogue on globalization.
Horst Kiihler r" Managing
Director
of
the International Monetary
Fund.
-}JIA
At the turn of the millennium, I see two major challengesto which the membership of the IMF must respond. First, international private capital flows have become a major source of growth, productivity, and job creation. However, they can also
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be a source of volatility and crisis. The crises of 1997-98 have heightened the awarenessthat the stability of the international financial system is an important international public good. Second, ten years after the end of the Cold'War, there are rnore opportunities than ever to promote a better world. Ideological divides have faded, and new technologies and the expansion of the rnarketplace have opened new horizons for shared prosperity. Yet, at the beginning of the new millennium, we are also aware of huge unsolved problerns. The most pressing of these is poverty, which is becoming a major threat for political stability in the world. In search of answers to these challenges, I would like to begin with a reflection by the philosopher Karl Popper, who wrote in IggI, "The open future contains unforeseeable and morally quite different possibilities. So our basic atti'What tude should not be will happen?' 'What but should we do to make the world a little better?"' Popper also said, "All life is problern solving." This is also my approach and how I see my role as Managing Director of the IMF. In rny vision, the IMF needs to achieve several objectives. First, the Fund should strive to promote sustained non-inflationary economic growth that benefits all people of the world. Likewise, the IMF should play a central role in ensuring the stability of the international financial system. We need to work in a complernentary fashion with other institutions established to safeguard global public goods. We must be an open institution, learning from experience and dialogue and adapting continuously to changing circumstances. In this vision, I see the IMF as integral to making globalization work for the benefit of all. This vision builds on an enhanced partnership with the World Bank, based
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on a clear sense of the complernentary missions of our two institutions.
In Search of a GlohalEthic.rti. with humility that I welcome Czech President Vaclav Havel's reminder to us to reflect upon the broader task to make globalization work for the benefit of all and to search for new sources of a sense of responsibility for the world. I fully agree that we need universally shared moral standards. Indeed, a global economy needs a global ethic. I am aware of the critical debate about globalization, and rnany of the questions raised are of concern to all of us. Y t I also want to be clear. If the IMF did not exist already, this would be the time to invent it. More than ever, globalization requires cooperation, and it requires institutions to organize this cooperation. With r83 mernbers, the IMF is a truly global institution, and its cooperative nature is an invaluable asset. We should all seek to preserve and strengthen this asset. Strengthening it requires trust in cooperation. This trust requires that the interests of all rnernbers are taken into account equally and that each rnember lives up to its responsibilities. Members need to listen to each other, and the Fund should see itself as a partner to its members and as a provider of help for self-help. Overall, the Fund's rnandate is directed to promoting the international common good. With this in mind, I felt it very important to use a good part of my first months in office to visit a wide range of member countries, especially in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. These visits left me with three main impressions. First, private initiative and democracy are spreading throughout the world. A fair judgrnent of the IMF should acknowledge that the
KoHLER TheNewGlobalPolitique Fund has contributed to this positive fundamental trend in the world. Second, there is broad recognition within developing and emerging market countries that there are often serious home-grown problems, including poor governance, corruption, and armed conflicts. The main responsibility for tackling these problems lies with the countries themselves.Lastly, I heard a lot of critical comments about the IMF. There is obviously a need for further change. Nonetheless, I was left with no doubt that developing countries value the Fund and that they srongly wish to continue working with it. Economic growth is not everything, but without growth, we get nowhere. Growth requires innovation, adaptation, and reform to be a permanent feature of societies. To a rernarkable extent-and notwithstanding severestrains and hardships-developing countries and transition countries have embraced this challenge. This process cannot be understood as a one-way street. Many industri-
better in line with the fundamentals o f the European economy.
The Needto SpeakUp. r dothink that the mandate of the IMF demands that the Fund speak up on both exchange rate and trade issues, which are relevant for stability and growth in the global economy. Estimates of the potential welfare gains for developing countries from a $O percent worldwide reduction in barriers to trade generally exceed $roo billion per year. Greater accessto industrialized country markets is key in the fight against poverty. A few months ago, the United States expanded duty-free accessto its markets for more than seventy countries in Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin. Just recently, the European Commission made a proposal to fully open Europe's markets to the forty-eight poorest countries for "all but arms. " I welcome these initiatives and urge further bold steps, particularly in the area of agriculture.
ECOnOmiCgr0wth i. ngt evelithing,but without growth, we get nowhere. aI countries have not developed enough of a senseof urgency to deliver their part of structural change to make globalization work for all. Industrial countries must recognize that it is both in their own interest and in the interest of the giobal economy to take a strong lead in opening their markets. They also must acknowledge the importance of balanced exchange rate relations between the major currencies. In this vein, I welcome the action taken by the European Cental Bank (ECB), together with other major central banl.s, to bring the euro
I am convinced that if the willingness of the developing and emerging market countries to tackle energetically their hornemade problems is combined with more determination in the industrial countries to reform and open their markets, we will create a win-win situation for all. The United Nations's objective of halving the share of people living in poverty by ZOt5 is achievable. To strengthen its efficiency and legitimacy, the Fund needs to re-focus. The Fund must clearly promote macroeconomic stability as a necessarycondition
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for sustained growth. To pursue this systemic issues and risls, particularly in objective, the Fund has to concentrate on global financial markets. We should also fostering sound rnonetary, fiscal, and pay increased attention in our policy exchange rate policies, along with their advice to issues of regional integration, institutional underpinnings and closely particularly through regional surveilrelated structural reforms. More imporlance. In its advice, the Fund should show tant than ever in the modern economy is respect for the cultural and historical trathe IMF's mandate to overseethe interditions of its rnember countries. Yet, at national monetary system and to ensure the same time, it must be candid in conits effective operation. This virtually veying its professional analysis and judgobliges the Fund to give particular attenment to member countries. The International Monetary and tion to systemic issues of financial markets, both domestic and international. Financial Comrnittee (IMFC) has To fulfill this task effectively, the Fund launched a wide range of measures to needs a better understanding and judgstrengthen the global financial architecment of the dynamics of international ture, particularly through improved data capital rnarkets and the operations of transparency, standards and codes, vulprivate financial intermediaries. In this nerability assessments,and the Financial context, I have established a Capital MarSector Assessment Program (FSAP), a kets Consultative Group in the IMF to joint initiative of the IMF and the World foster a regrrlar dialogue with the private Bank. Thking stock today, we can see that sector. The dialogue in this group will the international financial system is also be an important elernent of our stronger now than before the outbreak efforts to avoid crises. With the buildup of the Asian crisis. We should. however. further Fund of expertise, the should beware of complacency. Financial secquite naturally assume a coordinating tors in many countries are not yet as role among the various agenciesand fora robust as they need to be, and there is a dealing with financial markets issues. risk that high growth rates may weaken the momentum of reform. All members have to ask themselves how they can tUfe. My ambition is not to have more accelerate the implementation of these and more lending programs, but to place reforrns. I think it is in the interest of all crisis prevention and surveillance at the that the entire membership be fully center of the Fund's activities. For this, we involved and take full ownership of the must develop a culture in the Fund where initiatives in this area, member countries are eager to seek the I am very much aware of objective difFund's advice early and voluntarily. In ficulties emerging market and developing our bilateral surveillance, we need to countries can face in their capacity to implernent the various standards and place particular emphasis on identifying sources of external and financial sector codes developed by the international mlnerability and on helping our rnember comrnunity. We need to prioritize our countries cope with volatility in internawork, taking better account of the stageof tional capital flows. The Fund should furdevelopment of domestic financial sec'We ther develop its multilateral surveillance tors. should concentrate in particular with a focus on the early identification of on expanding the FSAP, a systematic and
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KoHLER TheNewGlohalPolitique comprehensive approach to fostering a sound and integrated international financial system.We also need to establish clearer priorities for our technical assistance and to ensure that it is better coordinated among the various providers. A Fund focused on promoting the stability of the international financial systern has to be pointed and rigorous in its assessmentof the appropriateness of exchange rate arrangernents in member countries. We also need to be able to reach clear conclusions about the right balance and sequencing between capital account liberalization and financial sector developrnent. i do think that the Fund has to be more involved in the discussion about the issue of the appropriate regulation and superwision of international financial rnarkets. I also see a particular need for further research and analysisin the Fund in this area. My discussionswith private sector participants, including those with the Capital Markets Consultative Group, have confirrned that the crisis-prevention work of the IMF and the efforts to strengthen the global financial architec* ture will bear fruit. However, we have to be aware that crises can occur again in an open and dynamic global economy. Our work should rnake criseslessfrequent and less severe. We should also promote financial sectors that are able to absorb shocl,s by fostering competition in the financial sector and diversity among financial intermediaries. In addition, we need to encourage private financial institutions acting in the global marketplace to continuously strengthen their capacity to assessand manage risk. For crisis resolution, the Fund needs to have efficient lending instruments and adequate resources to mount a credible resDonse to crises. As its resources are
limited, the Fund cannot be seen as a lender of last resort. Therefore, it was important to conduct a comprehensive review of IMF facilities. The outcome of this review clearly strengthens the catalytic role of the Fund and the revolving character of its resources. It demonstrates that the cooperative nature of the Fund is solidly rooted in its mernbership. With the set of differentiated, but streamlined and sharpened, facilities, the IMF is now better equipped to deal with crises and prevent contagion. There has been considerable progress in developing a framework for involving the private sector in the resolution of crises. The rapid return of private capital to a number of crisis countries underscores the sensibility of engaging the private sector constructively in both the prevention and resolution of crises. Private investors know that they must assurnefull responsibility for the risls they take. There is broad agreement that the operational framework for private sector involvernent should rely as much as possible on market-oriented solutions and on voluntary approaches.It is also undisputed that there may be exceptionally difficult casesthat call for more concerted approaches to involve the private sector. Discretion will always be a crucial element. Thus, a rules-based approach needs flexibility, although an overemphasis on judgment calls in case-bycase approaches certainly needs to be constrained. We need to explore further the rniddle ground between these approaches to make the framework operational. This requires further research and analysis to enable us better to assess the risls of possible spillover effects on other countries and more clearly understand the factors that deterrnine how fast a country regains rnarket access.
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We need to stick to conditionality in our lending operations, yet at the same time, work to enhance real ownership of programs. We have learned that the effectivenessof members in confronting their economic difficulties depends critically on the vigorous implementation of appropriate stabilization and reform measures. This comes only when the country's authorities are seeking to irnplement measures that they see as responsive to their needs and capable of securing domestic support. Therefore, I trust that ownership is prornoted when the Fund's conditionality focuses in content and timing predominantly on what is crucial for the achievement of rnacroeconomic stability and growth. Less can be rnore if it helps to break the ground for a sustained process of adjustment and reform. Moreover, program design must take into account the social dimensions of adjustment programs and the unique characteristics of each country. To foster ownership, the Fund should also explore alternative policy options in program discussions with mernber countries. This approach to strengthen ownership and streamline IMF conditionalitywill have to be well coordinated with the'World Bank. In this context, I welcorne and support the Poverty Reduction and Support Credit that the Bank is planning to introduce, and see it as a promising means of increasing the effectiveness of our joint work in the poorer member countries.
Reaching out to the Poor.r consider the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to be an innovative instrument in the Fund's efforts to rnake globalization work for the benefit of all. First, it aims at tackling poverty from its root causes,and second, its concessional character demonstrates practical solidar-
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ity with the poor. Disengagement from the poor countries is not only inconsistent with the mandate of the Fund, but will deepen the division of the world. It would run counter to the ambitions of the people in the poor countries and neglect their talents and potential. The contrary is necessary: namely, encouragernent and ernpowerment. The PRGF is also a key vehicle to help make the Highiy Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative a success. In no area is cooperation between the Bank and the Fund in the corning rnonths rnore critical than here. World Bank Chairman Jim Wolfensohn and I are deterrnined to bring the benefits of debt relief under the HIPC initiative to as many countries as possible as rapidly as possible. The ultimate test of the successof this initiative is how effectively debt relief contributes toward poverty reduction. I trust that the leaders of the poor countries themselves fully recognize the irnportance of sound policies and good governance. During rny visit to Africa, I senseda lot of bitterness about unfulfilled promises regarding official developrnent assistance (ODA). Indeed, the promise by OECD member countries was to provide ODA equivalent to o.7 percent of their GDP. Today the average ratio is O.24 percent. The difference between promise and delivery in U.S. dollar terms is $roo billion a year. I do think that governments in the rich countries must more actively galvanize public opinion in support of ODA. Clear evidence from the aidreceiving countries that aid is used effectively to reduce poverty will no doubt help in this regard. A real breakthrough in poverty reduction will be possible only if private saving and investment take firm root in these countries and if a much larger part of the
KoHLER TheNewGlobalPolitique savings generated in the world becomes available to them. In this context, credit is and will remain an important financing instrument for investment and is thus also crucial in any longer-term strategy to fight poverty. Therefore, we must not lose sight of the need to preserve and build a sound credit culture. Credit is derived from the l-atin word tedere. Crederemeans trust. And trust in creditor-debtor relations is indispensable for a sustained flow of investment capital to the developing countries and-in a wider context-for the long-term stability of an integrated international financial system. This highlights even rnore the need for steadywork on the ground to strengthen the institutional underpinnings for a productive private sector in the developing countries. Every day that passesunused for this work is a lost day in the fight against poverty.
An IMF for the Future.rherMF for the future should be a strong advocate of improved governance in all member countries. It is only logical that the Fund is receptive to callsfor increased transparency and accountability. There has already been a sea change in opening up to the public. However, we also have to recognize that there are areaswhere a frank and candid discussion will be hampered if it is to take place in public. The Fund has to strike a balance between openness and the rnernbers' desire for candid and confidential advice. Additionally, the Fund must explain itself better-what it is and what it does-particularly in prograrn countries. Thus, the IMF has to expand its dialogue with the public and reach out, not least to civil society at the regional and local level. However, this rnust not lead to a blurring of responsibilities. Illtimately,
The FUnd hur to strikea balancebetween openness and the rnernbers' desire for candid and confidential advice. Herein lies the rnain logic in the joint work of the IMF and the World Bank: to formulate poverty reduction and growth strategiesthrough a broad-based participatory process. For me globalization requires, not least, building problemsolving capacity at the local and regional level and giving the people help for selfhelp. Avery practical measure could be to bring together private investors, officials, and international financial institutions (IFIs) more systematically to discuss practical issues of the local investment climate. By fostering regional integration and business cooperation in developing countries, it is possible to further enhance help for self-help.
the Fund is accountable to the governments of its mernber countries. I sincerely hope that I will gain support for the future work of the IMF based on the vision I outlined. I see the discussion on changes in the IMF as a perrnanent process and consider it very important that these further discussions have their center within the Fund itself. The IMF can rnake a difference in long-term growth to benefit all people of the world. For this we have to be focused and concentrate, above all, on the stability of the international financial svstern. Editol's note: This article is adapted from an address to the Board of Governors at the Annual Meetings of the I M F i n P r a g u e , S e p t e m b e r2 6 , z o o o .
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Arabinda Ach arya & Arnitav Acharya In May 1998, India officially proclaimed itself a nuclear power by conducting a series of underground tests at Pokharan. The question in the minds of rnany strategic analysts at the time was whether, as a result of these tests, New Delhi would incur international political and economic coststhat would outweigh gains on the dornestic front. Now, with the benefit of hlndsight, it seems reasonable to argue that the coalition government has been vindicated if its goal was indeed to enhance India's strategic clout with a nuclear arsenal. The tests certainly have not diminished India's influence, and they might even have enhanced it. Indian policyrnakers, heartened by the Clinton administration's conciliatory stance,will be further encouraged by the attitude of the Bush administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell has acknowledged the "crucial importance of India" to the United Statesand New Delhi's "potential to keep the peacein the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. "'
Arabinda Acharya is Research Coordinator at the Center for Peaceand Development Studies, Bhubaneswar, India and ResearchAssociate at the University of Toronto-York UniversityJoint Center for Asia Pacific Studies.
Amitav Acharya is Chairman of the International Advisory Board of the Center for Peaceand Development Studies and Professor of Political Science at York University, Toronto.
It is clear, from the Pokharan nuclear tests aswell as followup measures taken to integrate weapons with delivery systems and comrnand and control capabilities, that India aims to develop its nuclear arsenal into a viable instrument of state power. The Pokharan tests were also the culmination of a decades-long effort to acquire nuclear capability as part of the doctrine of "recesseddeterrence," in which nuclear weapons can be rapidly deployed if required.' Persistent Indian defiance in the face of pressure by the United States and other
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Pakistan. China and India have competed with each other for influence at the regional level. India's nuclear weaPons program was initiated, at least in part, as a response to the Sino-Indian war of rg62-in which India suffered territorial Iosses-and China's own successful nuclear test of 196{. China accusesIndia of striving for regional hegemony and provides diplomatic and military suPPort to Pakistan. In recentyears, developrnents such as expanding Chinese influence in Myanmar, the deployment of Chinese naval forces to the Indian Ocean, and revelations of China's assistanceto Pakistan's nuclear weaPons program have heightened Indian concerns. It is in this context that, immediately prior to the Pokharan tests, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes described China as the "major threat" to to his country.6 Despite the absence of a long-term Indian strategy to counter Chinese influence, India has undertaken a number of rrreasureswith the Chinese threat in rnind. Development of the nuclearcapable ,4gniII intermediate-range ballistic missile, first successfullytested in April 1999, was explained bY Brahma Chellaney of India's National Security Advisory Board as the "missing link" in Anexam-India's nuclear deterrent against China, TheNuclearRationale. providing it with "the ability to strike ination of India's security environment the Chinese heartland."T The very fact for developing suggestspossible grounds that a second test of the Agni II (whlch nuclear weapons to address regional has a range of z,5oo kilometers and can security concerns. New Delhi promoted its nuclear weapons Program in response carry a one-ton nuclear warhead) cointo factors such as the rise of Chinese eco- cided with the visit of the Chinese Premier Li Peng to India inJanuary 2ooo nomic and military capabilities, the proliferation of nuclear weaPons and missile emphasizes India's need for self-assertion. As tlneTimesoflndiophrased it: "The systemsin the region, and general uncertiming [of the missile test] mal be puretainty over the post-Cold War regional 5 ly coincidental, though it may also send securityenvironment. India was particularly worried by the a message to Beijing which refers to 'major nation' in the South perceived security threat from China and India as a
developed industrial states to conform with the global non-proliferation regime demonstrates the importance New Delhi attaches to its nuclear Program.3 While India's nuclear tests have exacerbated tensions with Pakistan and China and complicated its nascent relationship with East and Southeast Asia, they have also enhanced India's negotiating power with the United States. At the outset, it may be noted that both the structure of and rationale for India's nuclear weapons Program distinguish India from other developing statesaspiring to acquire nuclear weapons' One characteristic feature of these states has been the conspicuous role played by the military establishment. Many of these statesare more concerned with obtaining nuclear status within the international cornrnunity than acquiring a viable military instrument. India was also unique in the degree of restraint it exercised following its initial nuclear test in 1974' Despite the need for further experimentation, India refrained from doing so until 1998, when it staged the Pokharan tests. This hiatus was due, in part, to the marginal role of the Indian military a establishment in policymaking.
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:lia have competed influence at the nuclear weapons it least in part, as a a-Indian war of :uffered territorial own successful :hina accuses India al hegemony and .d military support ears, developments inese influence in 'ment of Chinese ldian Ocean, and assistance to Pak lOS program have l.cerns. It is in this ately prior to the 1 Defense Minister cribed China as the is country. 6 :e of a long-term counter Chinese ndertaken a num the Chinese threat nt of the nuclear lediate-range bal :cessfully tested in iained by Brahma National Security : "missing link" in ent against China, Ie ability to strike d. "7 The very fact the Agni II (which cilometers and can ar warhead) coin . the Chinese Pre
in January 2000 for self-asser ia phrased it: "The test] may be pure ~h it may also send ~ which refers to ion' in the South
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Asia region, while China considers itself to be a global power. "8 India's relationship with Pakistan, though less asymmetrical than that with China, is no less worrisome. The ongo ing territorial dispute over Kashmir and Pakistani support for insurgent move ments within India are fueling a rivalry between the two threshold nuclear pow ers. It is noteworthy that the Pokharan tests were preceded by warnings to Pak istan to "roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir" and were quickly followed by the declaration of a "proactive" Kashmir policy that was targeted specifically at Pakistan. 9
India's Nuclear Doctrine.
While it is not clear what nuclear developmen tal path India will ultimately pursue, current plans call for the establishment of a "Minimum Nuclear Deterrent" (MND) .'0 This entails a "triad" of air-, sea-, and land-based launch platforms along the lines of the model provided by the nuclear superpowers. This is consid ered necessary for India's objective of developing a second-strike capable nuclear force." To this end, India has devoted considerable resources to the development of ballistic missiles, such as the Agni noted above. India is also nego tiating the purchase of a number of Mirage 2000D strike aircraft from France to serve as delivery platforms.'2 India recently claimed to be capable of pro ducing neutron bombs.'3 Since at least I997, India has also been exploring command and control systems for nuclear weapons.'+ The actual utility of India's emergent nuclear arsenal is a separate considera tion. Significant differences of opinion on questions related to the development of a nuclear capability and nuclear doc-
Conflict&Security
trine exist within the Indian policy com munity. These center around the issues of the size and structure of the nuclear arsenal, the level of alertness to be main tained, and participation in multilateral arms control arrangements such as the Conventional Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. It is possible to distinguish between "mod erates" and "hard-liners" on these issues . The former support the development of a limited nuclear deterrent sufficient to counter China and Pakistan, while the latter argue for the eventual development of a global capability that will enable India to strike at targets in the United States. Moderates envision a potential arsenal of sixty to I50 weapons, as opposed to the figure of upwards of 350 to 400 advocated by the hard-liners.'5 For the present, India maintains a "no first-use" doctrine.'6 Furthermore, India has proclaimed that it intends to conduct no further tests and will be satisfied with a limited nuclear arsenal for deterrence purposes. ' ) However, it now seems clear that India has thrown off all pretentions and has started to assert its nuclear capa bility in the open. Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman R. Chi dambaram told a meeting of scientists at the Bhaba Atomic Research Center (BARC) that "India is now a nuclear weapon state .... [The] completely suc cessful nuclear weapon tests at Pokharan on May II and I3, I998 ... gave us the capability to design and fabricate weapons ranging from low yield to around 200 kilotons." After taking office, the Indian Chief of Army Staff General S. Padman abhan remarked that it is his responsibil ity to "fine tune" India's nuclear strategy, doctrine, and tactics. According to Pad manabhan, "India's military is finally realizing the urgency to place firm
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nuclear weapon controls in place." However, there remain considerable uncertainties in India's nuclear posture over key issues such as employrnent strategy and the escalation dynamics of a preemptive strike.'8
India's nuclear status carries large hurnan and economic costs. For India to obtain second-strike capability, a reallocation of budgetary funds at the expense of other desperately-needed social programs is required. Environmentalist Darryl Monte argues that, "to brandish nuclear weapons and missiles [in India] smacks of seif-deiusion of the worst kind. "'o Sirnilarly, critics question whether going nuclear is the best way to realize India's stated objective of a more equitable world order. To quote Professor Amartya .Sen, India's Nobel laureate in economics, "Resenting the obtuseness of the established nuclear powers is not a good ground for shooting oneself in the foot." He argues that "abstinence in making and deploying nuclear weapons strengthens rather than weakens India's voice." Sen adds that "to demand that the Cornprehensive Test Ban teaty be redefined to include a dated program of de-nuclearization may well be among the discussible alternatives. But making nuclear bornbs, not to mention deploying them, and spending scarce resources on missiles and what is euphemistically called'delivery,' can hardly be seen as sensible policy."''
Limits and Costsof Nuclear Ambition.
Ind.ia's ernergenceas a
nuclear power has led to increased concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons and greater recognition of India's importance within the AsiaPacific security environrnent.'s Efforts to develop an extra-regional nuclear capability constitute a potentially destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region, and fuel concerns about a South Asian nuclear arms race. Contrary to the Bharatiya Janata Party claims of the (BJP) go"."nment, doubts remain as to the true extent of India's nuclear capabilities. There have been reports that the r99B tests involved weapon "devices," not fully-assernbled operational weapon systems. There is uncertainty as to whether India has indeed acquired thermonuclear capabilities; the device supposedly tested in rgg8 was a boosted fission device that did not achieve a thermonuclear burn. India does not appear to have the necessary infrastructure to conduct a sub-critical test. All that the country has managed to construct is an inertial confinement facility with one laser, which is not sufficient for producing the high temperature required for the purposes of conducting a sub-critical test. Nor can it afford to spend the $6 billion or so required to build one. The nuclear tests also did not generate enough data to facilitate computer simulation exercises as claimed, and thus may not have been sufficient to ensure a workable nuclear deterrent.
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Hgfe tO Stay. Ultimately,India may find its nuclear arnbitions constrained more by econornic realities than by external actors. With an estimated total price tag of $r]8 biltion at current prices, India may be unable to afford an arsenal of 35o to {oo weapons." At the same time, India has demonstrated its capacity to weather U.S.-led economic sanctions and suspension of foreign aid. According to the Indian Foreign Office, "Many of the legislated sanctions in the United States pertain to the erport of dual-use
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The absen0e Of f,rUyinstitutionalized doctrines and the uncertain comrnand structures add considerably to the strategic volatility of South Aia. technology, most of which is denied to India in any case."'3Nonetheless, India has sought to minimize the negative impact of its nuclear progr:am on its relations with the United States. It appears that India hopes to receive acknowledgement of its nuclear status by convincing the major powers of its intention to not conduct any further nuclear testsand to only use nuclear weapons defensively.'a Pakistan's response to India's nuclear program is predictably negative. Forrner Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Iaid on India "the responsibility for delivering a death blow to efforts at global non-proliferation. "'5 He further indicated that Pakistan would take steps to "contend with new realities, heightened dangers, and an irnrninent threat to our security."'o This was manifested in Pakistan's own nuclear tests shortly thereafter. The successor Pakistani military regime under General Pervez Musaraf maintains the sarnehostile stance towards India. With three wars since independence in rlQl and ongoing conflict in Kashmir, new offensives between India and Pakistan involving nuclear weapons have become real cause for concern. The international community remains wary of the low nuclear threshold in the region. Additionally, Pakistan faces the danger of becoming a "failed state" in the pursuit of nuclear symmetry with India. The absence of fully institutionalized doctrines and the uncertain command structures add considerably to the strate-
gic volatiliry of South Asia, making the region a dangerous flash point. While nuclear weapons and rnissiles are now a part of regional reality in South Asia, they need not be combined. The genuine security concerns of India and Pakistan can be met without overt deployment. Having carried out the tests, India need no longer have security worries about signing the CTBT. Washington and the international community should work to ensure that non-negotiable ultimatums by India and Pakistan be replaced by a genuine effort to understand each other's concerns regarding national security, regional proliferation, and global disarmament. Only such efforts can pull South Asia back frorn the nuclear brink. India's security policy continues to be officially described as "defensive deterrence" or "reactive defense." But if India is to gain international acceptance of its nuclear status, signing the CTBT will boost India's credibility abroad and put a major arms control treaty back on track. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has told Europe's political leaders that a nuclear India can be a vital player, not a troublernaker, in the global power balance. The country's nuclear capability is geared toward building a multipolar world. To this end, India has sought U.S. recognition of New Delhi's strategic vision, an act that could make New Delhi rnore receptive to U.S. diplo-
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matic efforts to stabilize the volatile strategic situation in South Asia. India has considered signing the CTBT by raising it in the Parliament as part of an effort to build national consensus. During his rneeting with former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Warsaw in June 2ooo, Indian External Affairs Minister "obligreiterated Singh India's Jaswant " p o l i t i c a l ation" to obtain consensus" on the CTBT issue and assuredher that India will be "moving toward it now."'7 Considering the European lJnion's (EU) criticism of India's nuclear tests two years ago, it is significant that the EU-India Joint Declaration on sensitive nuclear-related issues states that the "EU welcomes India's current vol-
untary nuclear moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and its willingness to rnove towards a dejure formalization of this obligation of the CTBT." For the United States, dealingwith the nuclear aspirations of India is a major challenge. The United States needs to address its non-proliferation concerns, which would be to ensure that both India and Pakistan accept a moratorium on producing and testing nuclear weapons, make them agree to a verifiable and transparent monitoring system, and end clandestine technology transfers. Achieving these results will pose a severetest for the Bush adrninistration, which has pledged to "deal more wisely with the world's largest democracy, soon to be the most populous country in the world."'8
NOTES r "India'of crucial importance'," fieBongko,tPost r9 J a n u a r y2 O O I : 1 2 . 2 M. Eshan Ahrari, "Growing Strong, The Nuclear Genie in South Asia," SecuriltDlologue !o.Q ( 1 9 9 9 ) '4 3 6 . 3 Samir K. Sen, "He Who Rides a Tiger: The Rationale of India's Nuclear Tests," Compcrctiue Strateg r8.z (Igg9), r3r. 4 Senr3z. 5 Address ofJaswant Singh, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, United Nations Headquarters, New York. Reprinted in TheIndianErpress ro June t998. 6 Ahrari {36. / Sadanand Dhume and Pramit Mitra, "Show of Reuieut62.t8 (zz April Strength," For EastemEconomic rggg), 16. 8 "Standingup to China," TheBonghokPon rgJanuary 2OOI: IO. g Ahmed Rashid and Shiraz Sidhva, "Might and Menace," ForEastem ErrnomicReuiew tGr. 29 (4 June r g 9 8), 28, and Nayan Chanda et al.,"The RaceIs On," Iorlat16r.z4 (rrJune 1998), 2r. emEconomirReoiew ro The (Indian) government is yet to formalize a competent command and control structure for its nuclear arsenal. "Overall ignorance" of nuclear issues underscored by "turf battles" between the b u r e a u c r a c y ,s c i e n t i f i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,a n d t h e n i l i tary had so far prevented a "clear cut enunciation" of nuclear command authority. "India's nuclear prowess remains on paper, official rhetoric." Rahul
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BedJ, TheAsian Age8 November 2ooo; !. rl Sadanand Dhume, "Choosing the Tlrget," For EaslemEconomicReuieu 162.97 (t6 September 1999)' 3o. 12 Rahul Bedi, "Indian Ties With FranceWill Soar With Mirage Buy," Jane's DefenceWeekly gz.g (r Septemb e r 1 9 9 9 ) :1 3 . 13 Rahul Bedi, "Rivals Claim Battlefield Neutron Capability," lone'sDefence Week! gz.g (r September t999),5. 14 Sen I33. I5 Dhume 30. 16 Bedi, "Rivals Claim Battlefield Neutron Capability," 5. 17Sen r34. r8 Sen r3a!. tg See Kusuma Snitwongse, "Geopolitics and Security in Southeast Asia and the Challenges of Globalisation," presentedto the Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies Thirtieth Anniversary Conference, Singapore, JOJuly to 15 August, 2ooo. 20 Darryl D. Monte, "After the Hangover," fie lndianEtpress !o May tgg8. of Indio13 August 2ooo. 2r TheTimes 2z Dhume 3o. r3 May 1998. 2! TheIndionExpress 2 4 . R a s h i da n d S i d h v a2 8 . 2gThelndianExpresr{. May 1998. 26 Quoted in Rashid and Sidhva 27. frprzss28June 2ooO. 2J Thelndian Z8 "India'of crucial importance', " TheBangkok Pon rgJanuary 2OOIt 12.
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Tl:'e Georgetown Journal of InternationalAffairs has the good fortune of residing in a tiny office amidst sorne of the biggest minds in international relations. One such neighbor, the highly creative thinker G. John Ikenberry, took the time to speakwith theJournalabout some of the major themes of his most recent book, AferVictory ,the status of security in Asia, and emerging threats to the PaxAmericana.
is Professor of Government and International Affairs at GeorgeG. John lkenberry town University and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is also author of After Victory:Innifufions,Strotgr'cRestraint,ond the Rebuilding of Orderofu Mojor Worc (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2oor).
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J 0 u RNAL; In Afer Victog,you write of victorious nations in hegemonic competition changing the international system to perpetuate their predorninant positions. What do you think is the most remarkable way in which the United States is attempting to do this after the CoId War? T K E N E E R RI ytTh i n k t h e u n i t e d s t a t e si s continuing to pursue the same kind of strategy it did during the Cold War and even before the Cold War. It is attempting to build an international environment that reflects its values and supports its interests. At the end of
attempted to create after successfully defeating their rivals? r K E N B E n n yw:h a t s e t st h e u n i t e d S t a t e s apart from other great powers is its use of institutions to build order afterWbrld War II. This differs frorn most great powers after wars. There is something really quite remarkable about the way that, betweer. rg+4 and 1992, the United States went about building order through multilateral, bilateral, global, regional, security, political, and econornic institutions. Exarnples include the United Nations (UN), NATO, the
Institutionshavehoth.'punded u.s.
influence and rnade U.S. powei lessworrisorne to other states,and this is unique in history. World War II, this involved establishing cooperative security pacts with other countries, building international institutions to facilitate joint managernent of economic and political problems, and prornoting in various ways the transformation of national regimes towards liberal democratic systems. After the Cold War, the United States followed the same garne plan by offering support for regional trade agreements such as APEC and NAFfA, and advocating NATO enlargement and the creation of the WTO. The United States continues to use its clout, this time somewhat less enthusiastically and with perhaps less dornestic support, to build a frarnework of liberal democratic cooperation after the Cold War. J 0 u R N A LH : ow is the current U.S.-led order different from the post-conflict orders that other great powers in history
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GATT, and others that have sprung up more recently, such as NAFIA. Ultimately, institutions have both expanded U.S. influence and made U.S. power Iessworrisorne to other states,and this is unique in history. This is where you rnight interject with, "Professor Ikenberry, 'Why does the United States do things differently?"' In the U.S. tradition, domestic institutions are created based on constitutional principles. As a republican political tradition, these institutions are seen to integrate peoples, regulate conflict, and divide and limit power. The United States has externalized these ideas into the world at large. At the heart of the U.S. secret to order-building is its democratic tradition. This provides the basis for its dernocratic institutions to secure credible commitments and restraints, which in turn allow its institutionalized order to operate.
TNTERVTEW Conflict & Security I argue that there are larger world order J 0 u RNAL: You saythe international order is is issues the States trFrg to create at stake in how the United States that United fundamentally benign and suggest that it thinls about international agreements is a relatively successful endeavor, but and rules. My messageis that building a there appears to be increasing dissatisfac- rule-based order is allowing the United Statesto stabilize world politics, preserve tion over U.S. domination in India, China, Russia, and, as some argue, Europe. U.S. influence, and prevent what would Do you think that such developments repbe the worst development of all-a strateresent deep underlying suspicions that gic backlash that will actively put counother nations have about the intentions tries, friend and foe, in a position of behind U.S. institution-building? trying to undermine the United States by building countervailing coalitions. I K E N B E R RY Ye: s , I a g r e e t h a t t h e y d o . That is not in our interest. More generToday, one can see exarnplesofbacklash ally, I do not think it is in the interest of against U.S. power, and it is not surglobal peace and security. What I arn sayprising given the extraordinary asyrn- ing is that as the United States debates metry of power in security, econornic, whether to sign the array of international agreements that have ernerged in the political, technological, and even culThis is something is tural areas. that post-Cold-War era and that will ernerge worrisome and is a development that in the future, order and the character of U.S. policyrnakersshould care about. In order in international politics should be rny view, U.S. policymakers should look weighed in the balance. back to the rg{os on how to pursue U.S. foreign policy goals in ways that J 0 uRN A L : C o u n t e r - b a l a n c i n g c o a l i t i o n s can overcorne sorre of these worries and aside, what are other rnajor threats that rnay undermine the current U.S.-dornstrategic dilemmas that ernerge frorn radical asyrnrnetries of power. inated order? J 0u RNAL: What steps do you suggest the r KENBERRy: I think the cument global sysUnited Statestake to face such backlashes? tem has utterly no clue about how to deal with major problems of the twenty-first T K E N B E R RW y :e l l , i n a d d i t i o n t o p a y i n g century: population growth, poverty, and environrnental catastrophe. More active the UN its dues, I think the United States should step up and sign the array imagination needs to be devoted to of international agreements and condetermining how existing institutions ventions that are out there. If not sign can be re-developed and redeployed to them as they are currently written, the deal with these issues. It is very difficult for U.S. foreign policy to really come to United States should attempt to constructively rewrite them in a way that will grips with those kinds of problems and make them a high priority because they allow it to sign on the dotted linewhether it is the Landmines Convenare more hidden and less strategic. tion, the Kyoto Protocol, or perhaps J 0 u RNAL: Do you see current institueven the Statute of the International Criminal Court. While one can debate tions, as opposed to new initiatives, as the specifics of each of these agreements, the primary tools to deal with the more
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hidden, less strategic problems facing the world?
T K E N B E R nTvh, a t i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t p r o b iern. In parts of the world, the problem is not moving beyond the state, the probTKENBERR I yt h: l n k t h a t w h a t s h o u l d n o t lem is getting to the state and building change is the search for rule-based legitimate g'overnance within countries. institutional cooperation. That logic That in itself is a global issue. Through should remain, even though the issues existing rnultilateral institutions and the change. Different states as well as the foreign policy of major states, statearray of non-governmental actors must building needs to be encouraged, and be integrated into the various instituforrns of stable, legitimate rule-hopefultional complexes. In that sense it is ly democratic-are necessaryand are, in a adaptation, but it does require statesto sense, a prerequisite for building order think more creatively about what kind at the regional and international levels. of partnerships they will form. Only then can effective mechanisrns for cooperation on economic, security, and J 0 U R N A LT;h e w o r l d o r d e r y o u d e s c r i b e social issuesdevelop. is essentially state- and institutionbased. Can this type of order be extendJ 0 u RriAL: How can the united Statesand ed to parts of Asia where institutions are the West as a whole avoid charges of culweak, or places in Africa where statesare tural irnperialism in their attempts at ineffective? state-building? I K E N B E R R yW: e l I , t h a t i s a c h a l l e n g e . I think that different regions will develop different institutions and governance rnechanisrns. East Asia does have some exarnples-ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC are regional prototypes that are potentially quite useful for tackling issues of econornic and security regulation and integration. In that sense,we are likely to see in Asia a repeat of the European experience. However, traditions are so different between these areas and the West that non-Western types of institutional arrangements have emerged and will continue to do so.
T K E N B E R Rsyt:a t e - b u i l d i n g i s n o t n e c e s sarily Western imperialism. Effective governance is something that nations and peoples universallyseekand appreciate. I do not think that state-building is where the West is overbearing. When it comes to specific economic and social institutions, that is where we meet the rub and where the West needs to be engaged in a dialogue over governance.
J 0 u R N A LW : ith your institution-based world order, there is a need for strong states to lead the move towards order and rule of law. Going back to East Asia, the main U.S. ally in the region, Japan, has been weakening over the past J 0 u RNAL: How about areas where states d e c a d e , w h i l e C h i n a , t h e p o t e n t i a l are too feeble to form functioning irredentist state, unhappy with the curnational institutions or implement rent U.S. -led order, appears to be domestic policies, much less participate growing in strength. How can the Uniteffectively in an institutionalized, ruleed Statesadvance its institutional order based international order? in this context?
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INTERVIEW cOnfliCt & seCurity r K E l , r B E R RTyh:e U . S . p r e s e n c ei n E a s t Asia through its bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea continues to be a source of stability. This is something obviously appreciated by U.S. allies, but to some extent, also by those who are not allies. There are alternatives to U.S. security leadership in East Asia that will not necessarily be outcomes that any state will favor-the re-ignition of security dilemmas, arms races, and unstable politics. It seems to me that the real key is to adapt the current systern and to try to build more cooperative security beyond the alliances. That will take a lot of time. In the final analysis, I think it
threats, while others present opportunities. However, ernerging threats wiII not be addressed and opportunities will not be realized without U.S. leadership. Furthermore, U.S. goals will never be achieved without effective partnerships with other states and groups. The good news is that the United States does have practices and instincts in favor of partnerships; these need to be encouraged and even institutionalized. J o u R N A L :F i n a l l y , w h e n p e o p l e t a l k organizations, about international irnages of resentment arise-Seattle, Washington, DC, and more recently,
istl'. Democratic accountability
insurance policy for the legitimacy of institutions. will take political change in China before one can imagine a more stable, cooperative, integrated security order. In the meantirne, the balancing effect that the hegemonic role of the United Statescreatesshould be maintained. J 0 URNAL: Against the backdrop of the current state- and institution-based world order, there is also the rise of what Thornas Friedman calls "super-ernpowGeorge Soroses ered individuals"-the and Osama bin Ladens-NGOs, and international criminal organizations that operate outside of the realrn of statesand institutions. How can the current liberal institutional world order address the challengessuch actors bring? I K E N B E R RIyt : s e e m st o m e t h a t t h e b a s i c principle is that new issues and actors constantly ernerge. Some present
Porto Alegre-Davos. There are many who are unhappy with the lack of accountability, transparency, dernocratic due process, and consideration for the interests of the underprivileged in international organizations that constitute the institutionalized world order you envision. How can international institutions respond to such criticisrns? IKENBERRT y :h e r e i s n o q u e s t i o n t h a t the United States needs to think about how institutions that have worked so well over fifty years can be opened to new actors and issues. The principle that can guide the search for new mechanisms is that of democratic accountability and community, which resonate deeply within our own political tradition. Democratic accountability is the insurance policy for the legitimacy of Institutions need to institutions.
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reflect underlying values and interests. Democratic community can provide shared faith and expectations about how decisions are made and power is
exercised that stabilize world politics. Democracy is the watchword for developing today's institutions for tornorrow's problems.
PREPARE FORYOURCAREERIN INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSAT THE
BMW CnnurER FORSnnnnAN ANDEUNOPHAN STUUHS .4.
at treorgetown S EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE The BMW Cnurnn FoR GERMAN AND EunopnRN Srunlns features an intensive, interdisciplinaryprogram of instruction in German and European affairs.It is designedto prepare students for professionalcareersin international business,government, or nongovernmentalorganizations,as well as for academiccareers.The Center offers a two-year professionaldegree,the MASTERoF ARTS IN GERMANAND EURoPEANSTUDIES.It also offersstudentsthe opportunity to pursuea Pfr.D. simultaneouslyin one of the participating academicfields: Economics,Cerman, Government (emphasison International Relationsor ComparativePolitics)and History. For more information about the Center and the School of ForeignService,visit our websiteat www.georgetown.edu/sfs/cges.
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0ulture&soclety Vietnam andthe Holocaust Kenneth J. Carnpbell Over the past quarter-century, the lessons of Metnam have nearly becorne a national obsession for an entire generation of Americans deeply scarred by that painful debacle. Following the loss of thousands of iives, untold military expense, and domestic upheaval, "no more Vietnams" remains a goal to which rnany Americans are committed. At the sarne time, remembering the lessonsof the Holocaust, a horror Winston Churchill once labeled history's "worst crime," has becorne a profound legal and moral obligation for the international community. For the American people and the rest of humanity, never again allowing genocide to go unchallenged remains a goal of highest importance. Herein lies a paradox of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era: The United States's reluctance towards overseas military engagement contradicts the objective to prevent the recurrence of genocide in places such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. For many U.S. policymakers, the lessons of intervention in Vietnarn and of the Holocaust seem irreconcilable. It is essential to realize, however, that the lessons from rnilitary involvement in Vietnam and the Holocaust ore mutually compatible. To effectively implement the lessons of the Holocaust, the international community must also apply those of Vietnam. In other words, the sole method for halting genocide
Kenneth J. Campbell is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International R e l a t i o n sa t t h e U n i versity of Delaware.
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is through credible threat or imposition of substantial and decisive military force by a third party. Genocide is not like other human rights violations, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian emergencies,or civil wars. More than half a century ago, the international community determined through the Nuremberg Principles and the Genocide Convention that ethnic cleansing is an international crime equivalent to aggression, for which the international norm of national sovereignty does not provide impunity.' Some critics of U.S. foreign policy over the last decade contend that a linger-
international rent order. Left unchecked, genocide can trigger massive migration, regional political destabilization, economic disintegration, chaos, misery, and war. In most UN missions, the method proposed for halting genocide is peacekeeping, as described in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A more effective and long-term solution, however, would be to evoke warfighting, the topic of Chapter VII. The United States'sexperience in the Vietnam War has resulted in a cautious approach toward the use of decisive military force. However, rather than
A lingeringttvietnamsyndromert hasat times prevented the United Statesfrom honorins --' -i- ln ''-D its rno'ral and legal obligation to halt
placessuchasB6snia,Hwand,a,and Itrl;:oe ing "Vietnam syndrome" has at times prevented the United States frorn honoring its moral and legal obligation to halt genocide in places such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. These critics point to an overly-strict adherence to the lessons of Metnam by U.S. foreign-policy makers who have adopted a zero-casualtydoctrine that lirnits the use of U.S. military force in most conflicts. In order to stop genocide effectively, they insist, the United States must overcome its obsessionwith Metnam and begin supporting the use of U.S. ground troops in robust United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations for humanitarian purposes. However, in this they are dangerously mistaken.
retreating into isolationisrn, the United States should heed the lessons of Metnarn while promoting its international leadership in order to contribute more positively to world peace and security. What are the lessons of intervention in Vietnam? While it is true that there are multiple versions, I suggestthe following cardinal lessons for which broad support can be garnered. The first and rnost important lesson is that using military force requires a clear and compelling purpose. In other words, a vital national interest must be at stake to warrant the risls to both rnilitary and civilian lives in war." Second, in a democracy, political Ieaders must convince the people to support a policy of going to war. For without the "essential domino" of public support, a war policy that is potentially costly in lives and national treasure is ulti-
TheStrategic Nature of GenoCide. The crime of genocide is a threat to the fundamental integrity of the cur-
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cAMPBELL Culture& Society mately unsustainable.3 Third, the essential nature of the conflict rnust be correctly identified, for the development of the strategiesand tactics necessaryto prevail in that conflict depends upon this first and most important of all strategic tasks.aFinally, a crucial lesson ofVietnarn is that morality matters. Despite what realist theorists and practitioners say, morality is vitally important in the political process of taking a nation to war.5 Realists identifr military and economic power as having central importance in international relations. They argue that morality, on the other hand, is irrelevant in world affairs. As George Kennan wrote in a r9B5 article in .For"There are no internationaleignAffairs, ly accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. governrnent could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles."6 This narrowly realist analysis, however, does not help us understand why a first-rate power lost a war to a fifth-rate power in Southeast Asia. By every measure of realist conceptions of national power-rnilitary might, economic power, population, land area, and physical resources-the United States dwarfed its Vietnamese adversaries.Yet America lost the Vietnarn War because it lacked a moral high ground in the conflict, a strategic weakness made rnore apparent by the revelations of the Pentagon Papers and the My Lai massacre.Arnerica's war policy in Vietnam was rendered insolvent by a moral-power gap.7
Vietnam contributed to their mishandling of genocide over the past decade. U.S. decision-makers faced clear and compelling evidence of genocide in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. Delayed intervention to halt these crimes against humanity reflects policymakers' perception of genocide prevention as a humanitarian rather than a vital national interest, largely because they underestimated the power of the moral irnperative to stop genocide. Only vital interests warrant U.S. military force, leading policymakers to assign the task of ending genocide the lowest level of priority in the U.S. use-offorce doctrine.E Furthermore, the misidentification of the nature of genocide has led decision-makers to include genocide in the category of internal conflicts for which they have adopted a peacekeeping strategy, complete with the operational constraints of neutrality, impartiality, and light weapons. Such an approach is inappropriate for dealing with mass-murderers and their victims. Consequently, the outcorne of this rnuddled strategy in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo was hurniliating failure for the United States,the West, and the UN. U.S. policymakers, rnisreading a U.S. public actually far less cynical than the policymakers thernselves, falsely assumed that public opinionwould not support the use of U.S. combat troops to suppress UN-certified casesof genocide, for fear of military casualties.eTherefore, U.S. policymakers neither framed the issue in terms of genocide, nor sought the support of the public for the suppression of it. In fact, they stretched the boundaries of cynicism by promulgating a policy of cornpletely avoiding the "g" word whenever publicly discussing conflicts they knew to be genocide. U.S. policymakers were afraid that if they mentioned this term too
Failure TheRootsof America's to Stop Genocide.whatdoesallthis have to do with the failure of the United States to halt contemporary genocide? The failure of U.S. political leaders to understand and apply the above lessons of
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often, they might trigger a landslide of political pressure to uphold solernn U.S. legal and moral commitments that they deemed lessthan truly vital.
The Caseof Rwandd.Theinternational community's tragic failure to stop genocide in Rwanda is a clear example of U.S. rationalization of disregard for moral imperatives. Despite early warning and ample evidence that genocide was being perpetrated in Rwanda in April rgg{, the UN Security Council, at the urging of the United States, refused to allow UN troops already on site to stop the killing. In fact, the Security Council withdrew most of the UN troops for their own safety. Subscribing to an artificial distinction between morality and national interest, U.S. foreign-policy makers decided that stopping genocide in Rwanda was not a vital (J.S. interest. This decision not to act was, in the words of the International Panel of Erninent Persons tasked by the Organization of African Unity to investigate the Rwandan genocide, "a function of domestic politics and geopolitical indifference.... The problem was that nothing was at stake for the U.S. ln Rwanda. There were no interests to grrard."'o A report on the Rwandan genocide by Hurnan Rights Watch concluded, "Those at the top lof the U.S. governrnent] had little incentive to go beyond their misconceptions to understand the situation. Rwanda was small, poor, rernote, and African-in their eyes, 'national irrelevant to the interest' of the IJ.S."" The failure of U.S. decisionmakers to identifr the prevention of genocide as a vital national interest rendered U.S. policy towards Rwanda aimless, ambiguous, and insolvent.
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Another mistake derived from a poor appreciation of the lessonsof intervention in Vietnam was the comparison of the Rwanda genocide to the chaos in Somalia. With the bloody October Iggg debacle in Mogadishu still fresh in their minds, political leaders in Washington tended to view the situation in Rwanda asjust another vicious internal war. They were burned in their efforts to carry out what was thought to be a righteous mission to feed the starving in Sornalia, and subsequently concluded-especially after the deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers-that "no good deed goes unpunished."'" The failure to distinguish between a civil war, in which both sides share the blame, and genocide, in which there are clear crirninal perpetrators and innocent victims, was a rnistake of the first rnagnitude. Miscomprehension of the nature ofthe conflict, aswasthe caseof U.S. policy with regard to Rwanda, will inevitably produce inappropriate strategiesand tactics. Instead of ernploying a strategy of enforcement in Rwanda under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the U.S.-led Security Council continued to employ a strategy of peacekeeping in accordance with Chapter \4, complete with an "observer" mandate, an "impartial" posture, and "light" arrning. The remaining 2/o UN peacekeepers in Rwanda were ordered to act as an "interrnediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire."'3This inappropriate strategy produced paraiysisin the face of genocide and made the United States and the LIN, through their depraved indifference towards the plight of the victims of genocide, accomplicesin t}e crime. Finally, U.S. decision-makers did not believe that the U.S. publicwould support another potentially costly intervention in a distant foreign land, even to stop geno-
cAMPBELL Gulture&Society
pf0hlem is not a lackof earlywarning., f hg but rather a lack of decisive action once warning ls grven. cide. Therefore, once more the White House instructed its officials not to use the "g" word when refening to the killing in Rwanda for fear of triggering a political outcry and the legal obligation to stop it.'a However, they badly underestimated the rnoral character of U.S. public opinion on this issue.According to aJuly rgg{ public opinion poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the university of Maryland, 8o percent of respondents said they would favor a U.S.-led intervention in Bosnia and Rwanda if a UN comrnission determined that genocide was occurring. In subsequent polls, whenever the crisis was properly defined as "genocide," high levels of public support emerged.'5 In the spring of 1994, if U.S. policymakers had better grasped both the lessons of Vietnarn and those of the Holocaust, the result would have probably been far different. With sound strategic vision, they would have perceived the halting of Rwandan genocide as a vital national interest. They would also have recognized the imperative of using or credibly threatening decisive force to stop it. Furthermore, the United States would have determined that a collective enforcement strategy was required to prevent this tragedy. Finally, decision-makers would have taken their caseto the nation and won strong public support for a principled policy, despite the risk of casualties.
PossibleSolutions?Moreoptimistic observersmight point out that U.S.
policymakers have made sorne recent gains in recognizing the irnportance of stopping genocide and developing mechanisms to do so more effectively. They might, for instance, point to President Clinton's apology in Kigali in rgg8 for the W-est'sfailure to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Alternatively, they rnight point to the White House's call in 1998 for the establishment of an international genocide early-warning system, so that the world can respond more quickly the next time genocide rears its ugly head.'oThey *rght also point to the UN Millenniurn Conference held in NewYork in September 2ooo, during which the nations of the world pledged to improve the UN's peacekeeping capabilities to respond to genocide. Finally, optimists might point to the repeated use of the "g" word in the presidential and vice-presidential debates during this past election year. All of these examples are indications of progress on the question of intervention. However, this progress is moving at a glacial pace, and what little progress there has been has failed to addressthe linchpin of this disturbing dilemma-the proper use of force. When the president apologized in Kigali, he neglected to mention what he would do differently the next time that genocide occurred in Africa. There was more than sufficient early warning in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, yet the international comrnunity still sat on its collective hands. The problem is not a lack of early warning, but rather a lack of decisive action once warning is given. UN peacekeeping operations strug-
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gling to address other kinds of internal conflicts can certainly benefit from increased resources, better intelligence, and improved coordination. However, given that peacekeeping is strategically inappropriate for the task of stopping perpetrators of genocide, better-supported, better-coordinated peacekeeping approaches to genocide will only produce better-supported, better- coordinated failures. Finally, presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 2OOO elections may have used the "g" word, but none dared to suggest that the task of stopping genocide be raised officially to the level of a vital interest in U.S. foreign policy. To have done so would have provoked a rnuch-needed, long-overdue national debate. The reality is that
the United States, and by extension the international community, is no more ready to stop genocide today than it was in I$$2, I994, or I998. At the end of the day, the lessons of intervention in Vietnam do not contradict the lessons of the Holocaust. On the contrary, if applied properly, they complement and reinforce each other. Decisive force, in the form of multilateral collective security, is required to stop the criminal perpetrators of genocide. Therefore, instead of getting over the Vietnam War, we need to better understand its lessons and employ them more effectively. If we do not succeed in this task, then what hope can we give to future generations that genocide wiII not be allowed to happen again and again?
NOTES r See Raphael Lemkin, "Genocide-A Modern the National Interest," ForeignAffaire Jr., "Redefining C r i n e , " F r e e W o r l4d ( A p r i l 1 9 4 5 ) , 3 9 - 4 3 a n d " T h e /8 (July/August 1999): 24. ro International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Genocide Convention at Fifty," United StatesInstiReport to the Organization of African Unity, 2g May tute for Peace Special Report / January 1999 ( w . u s i p . o r g > , a c c e s s e2d5 accessed 23 August ZOOO, 2OOO <w.oau.org>, June 2OOO. 12.32-r2.33. 2 Bernard Brodie, Wa. ond Politics(Ne* York, Macmillan, r9/3), especiallychapter one. II Alison Des Forges, LeoueNonetoTelltheStog' Cenocidein Rwando (New York, Human Rights Watch, rggg) 3 Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, Thelrory of Worked(Washington, DC, Brookings Vetnam'TheS1nem 6z+. 12 SeeMark Bowden, BlocftHcak Down'AStog ofModInstitution, rg7il 332. em Mr (NewYork, Penguin BooLs, rggg). 4 Carl von Clausewitz, On Wor (Princeton, NJ' P r i n c e t o nU n i v e r s i t yP r e s s ,1 9 7 6 ) 8 8 - 8 9 . 13 United Nations, TheBIueHelmets, A Reuiew of United g Michael Walzer, Justond UnjustWors'A MoralArgument NotionsPeocekeeping, Third Edition (New York, Departnent of Public Information, 1996) 347. llluslrolions, Second Edition (New York, with Historicol B a s i cB o o l s , r 9 9 Z ) . 14 Amnesty International, USA, "Forsaken Cries, T h e S t o r y o f R w a n d a ,E d u c a t i o nf o r A c t i o n . " ( S p r i n g 6 George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Pol1997)'3-4. icy," ForetgnAffairs 64 (Winter rg85)' 205-2r8. tg Steven Kull, "What the Public Knows that / For a discussionofthe concept of "strategicgap," n o l i gI o I ( W i n t e r I g g 5 see Walter Lippmann, U.S. Fore@ Polig' Shieldof the W a s h i n g o n D o e s n ' t , " F o r e g P (Boston: Little, Brom, rg{.!). rr3-rr4; Kull Destler, Misreodlngthe Republic also see and 96), Public'TheMyth of a Neu lsolotionism(Washington, D.C.: 8 See, for example, Madeleine K. Albright, "Use B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s ,I g g g ) . of Force in a Post-Cold War World," Address at the 16 See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador-atNational War College, National Defense University, Large for War Crimes Issues, "The United States: Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 23 September rgg3, Measuresto Prevent Genocide and OtherAtrocities," U.S. Deportment of StateDispotch 4 (2/ September rgg!): Address at the Conference on Genocide and Crimes 665-668. 9 See Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, Mkreodingthe against Humanity, Early Warning and Prevention, Holocaust Museum, Washington, DC, ro December Public,TheMlth of a.lfeu Isolotionism(Washington, DC, B r o o k i n g sI n s t i t u t i o n , r 9 9 g ) a n d S e e J o s e p hS . N y e . I998.
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Buslness &Flnance GoAll the Way? Santiago Uribe During the past few decades,trends in economic policymaking in Latin American countries have been almost as volatile as the economies themselves. Latin America has attempted import-substitution, orthodox austerity, fixed exchange rates, floating exchange rates, and countless other experiments in an effort to bring about economic stability. There have been plans that last for only months, and other rnore firmly entrenched ones, like the Argentine "convertibility" plan that has lasted for alrnost a decade. Yet, despite having tried almost every imaginable macroeconomic policy mix, Latin American policyrnakers are still far from reaching a consensuson the best way to ensure stability. One idea that currently enjoys very little popularity is that of rnanaged exchange rates. Following the Asian crisis, conventional wisdom suggeststhat the only two viable options are fuliy flexible exchange rates or credible fixed exchange rates, which Argentina's currency board attempts to construct. While it is unlikely that managed exchange rates will come back into fashion in Latin America unless we suddenly find ourselves in a world of severelyrestricted capital flows, fixed exchange rates, even in solid incarnations such as convertibility, are being tested once again. Even if convertibility falls out of fashion, there remains another alternative besides flexible rates: dollariza-
Santiago Uribe is a leading international
economist
who
focuses on Latin America.
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tion. This option is an accepted policy alternative for those who feel that nominal currency stability enhances social welfare and economic growth. Argentina currently serves as the stage for the dollarization debate. Despite its currency-control arrangernent, it has been bleeding "ese.ues-$4 billion in two months. Argentine asset prices have fallen sharply as international and domestic investors have
a year old, so its long-term successis still uncertain. Most other countries where the risk of hyperinflation or a payments crisis is smaller do not debate dollarization very intensely. Most observers agree that the probability of a devaluation in Argentina is low, as such an action would have potentially devastating effects on domestic balance sheets-rnost of which have substantial unhedged net dollar liabilities. Nev-
Argentinacurrentlyservesasthesta.qe for the dollarizatiort debate. Despite its clrrrency-control arrangement, it has been bleeding reserves. begun to doubt the future of the fixed exchange rate. Investors are concerned that Argentina is not competitive enough to generate the growth that is necessaryto service its obligations. One alternative that has been suggestedas a possible shield against speculative attacks is to dollarize the economy. If there is no domestic currency, it cannot be debased, and therefore investors cannot make a windfall profit from speculating against its value. Dollarization is a drastic step that involves purchasing the entire stock of domestic currency in circulation in order to replace it with dollars. Recently it has been seriously considered as a policy option only in countries where there is severe econornic and financial turmoil, such as Ecuador. While dollarization in Ecuador has resulted in greater economic stability (as evidenced by slowly recovering bank deposits, declining inflation, and recovering economic growth), the experiment is still less than
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ertheless, peso forwards show considerable currency risk (at the time of writing, one-month yields were quoted at rJ percent), and over 60 percent of bank deposits are dollar-denominated, implying that the econorny is already largely dollarized. Furthermore, interest rates on dollar-denorninated deposits and loans have been lower than those on peso-denominated instrurnents for the life of convertibility. Clearly, there is currency risk where there should be none. The result is a higher cost of capital and, consequently, slower accumulation of capital and economic growth. While it is difficult to attribute Argentina's recent disappointing econornic performance solely to currency risk (after all, currency risk also existed during the early boorn years of convertibillty), it is fair to say that without it growth would have been higher. The sluggish activity that has followed the rggg recession is raising doubts about the sustainability of Argentina's economic
URtBEBusiness& Finance policy regime. In particular, observers are questioning whether or not the currency board is consistent with the country's rapidly- growing indebtedness. Currently financial markets, the inexorable judge and jury of economic policymakers, are becoming impatient with Argentina. Investors have been steadily sellingArgentine assetsin recent months, driving stock prices down and driving bond yields up to the point where the government is considering canceling upcoming treasury auctions due to prohibitive financing costs. The results have been higher domestic interest rates and record-low consurner and investment confidence. According to a recent survey, only rr percent of Argentines expect econornic conditions to improve in the near future. Financial markets are demanding many things at once from Argentina: more competitiveness, less aggregate spending, and an improved government balance. The unfortunate consequences of this irnpatience are that the Argentine government and private sector rnust make higher interest payments on their floating rate debt, and they will find it more expensive to borrow and refinance existing debt. Higher interest rates also discourage consurnption and investment and therefore lead to slow economic growth, which only aggravates the problem by putting pressure on government finances. Argentina's interest rates are being affected by two distinct factors, both of which are pressuring them upward: currency risk and credit risk. Credit risk can be measured by the country spread (the premium at which Argentine sovereign bonds trade over comparable U.S. treasuries), but currency risk is more ambiguous. Part of the country-risk
spread is, after all, currency risk; it is clear that a devaluation in Argentina would increase the probability of private and public sector payment difficulties since most liabilities, domestic and foreign, are denominated in dollars. However imperfect, this attempt at dissecting the Argentine country risk suggeststhat the elimination of currency risk would likely help, and at best not hurt, the cost of capital in Argentina. Dollarization would largely remove cunency risk from the equation, leaving only country risk to pressure the cost of capital. This argument makes dollarization look quite tempting as an alternative. It is useful, however, to look more carefully at the differences between Argentina's currency board and outright dollarization. One important difference between a currency board and dollarization is that a currency board will always experience currency risk. A cunency board is, in essence, a firm prornise not to debase the currency. In the Argentine case, the promise is backed by the convertibility law of IggI, which statesthat the Argentine peso exchange rate will be fixed at one peso per dollar. However, the Argentine constitution gives its legislature the power to coin money, and to regulate its value in relation to foreign currency. While the currency peg is rnore credible in Argentina since debasing the currency requires a congressional decision, Argentines and foreigners know well that the decision could still be overturned, and they demand to be compensated for that risk. Dollarization effectively takes fixed rates to their farthest extreme, making it almost impossible to debasethe purchasing power of locals. In order for a dollarized economy to experience a devaluation, the g'oyernrnent has to actually con-
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vince citizens that they should hold its currency as a store of value. Of course, coercion is possible if the government declares it illegal to settle debts in foreign currency. However, the extreme difficulty that the government would encounter in trying to re-introduce a domestic currency substantially reduces (in fact, almost entirely eliminates) the so-called currenry risk. Dollarization, then, would simply tie the government's hands even further than a currency board in an attempt to ensure confidence. The choice ofwhether to dollarize comes down to whether the costs of dollari.zation outweigh the benefits of minimizing, though probably not eliminating, currency risk. One of the most convincing argrrments in favor of common currencies is that the elimination of currency risk encourages international portfolio diversification. The removal of currency risk will ease the economy's external constraint, as well as encourage foreign investment and hence invite capital inflows. If there is less risk of losing value due to a debasement of the currency
portionately on the country facing the shock itself, as its residents find that their depreciating currency loses purchasing power in world markets. A country that dollarizes will still need to ensure that its macroeconomic policies are consistent with solvency, both today and in the future. There is no guarantee that foreign investors will not want to reduce their claims on Argentine assetsat some point in time. After all, country risk will remain alive and well. Therefore, dollarization is no escapefrom the government-or private sector-budget constraint. In fact, dollarization leaves the country just as exposed to domestic shocks as ever, even if the costs of external shocks are more efficiently shared. If investors chose to lower their allocation of Argentine assetsrelative to the world's assets,the result would be a forced reversal of the current account deficit. Since the exchange rate is fixed, the only way to achieve this is by exporting rnore or importing less.The adjustment, unfortunately, would likely be very painful for
Dollariza+ion is no escapâ&#x201A;Ź rrorn the government-or
private sector-budget
while expected returns stay constant or possibly increase, a greater share of the world's assetswill be invested in the dollarized country. The effects of external shocks are distributed across borders. If countries share a currency and also have claims on each others' output denominated in that currency, then they will share in the loss associated with a shock specific to one country. With flexible exchange rates or non-credible fixed rates, the costs of the shock fall dispro-
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constraint.
the domestic econorny. At the moment, Argentina would need a trade surplus of $rr billion, or roughly { percent of GDP, in order to narrow its current account deficit to zero. The necessary adjustrnent is even more daunting considering the relatively small size of the country's export sector. A currency board and dollarization both help to circumvent the problem economists like to refer to as "time inconsistency." In short, the time incon-
URrBE Business& Finance sistency of macroeconomic policy is the temptation that policymakers feel to renege on their promises or stated policy objectives. For example, a government might be tempted to expand the money supply more than it promised in order to stimulate dornestic demand. The most cornmon solution to the problem of time inconsistency is to set rules for policymaking rather than allow for discretion. For exarnple, there are several Latin American countries, including Argentina, that have enacted legislation targeting the fiscal deficit. Since governments often view rules as made to be broken, frequently the rules are made into law to prevent corruption. Such is the casewith Argentine convertibility. A currency board severely lirnits the monetary authority's ability to finance government spending through rnoney creation. As long as the monetary authority prints currency, there will be seigniorage, the revenues the government collects from printing money. However, convertibility does not allow the government to print currency without backing at least 8o percent of it with foreign reserves. The fixed exchange rate introduces an automatic punishment if the government deviatesfrom its rules. If too much money is printed, the result will be higher inflation. People who want to protect themselves frorn this loss of value will start abandoning the peso in favor of foreign currency. As capital leaves Argentina, interest rates are pressured up and the central bank runs down its reserves. The process discourages spending and investment, and the economy slows as a result. The idea is that the government, knowing that its actions will be counterproductive, will shy awayfrom printing too much rnoney.
The inability to debase the currency forces the government's budget to be met almost entirely through taxation. Given the government's large stock of debt ($t4B billion or {g percent of GDP if you include Iocal governments), higher interest rates and country risk exert pressure on the government's fiscal accounts, and hence result in a higher tax burden. However, completely eliminating the domestic currency through dollarization will have its own costs.A recent IMF paper has estimated the cost of dollarization in terms of foregone seigniorage to be $r billion per year. This is approximately a fourth of the forecast budget deficit for 2Oor, but is only about 2 percent of total revenues. Moreover, some analysts have raised the possibility of seigniorage-sharing agreements with the U.S. Federal Reserve whereby Argentina would receive its share in the revenues that stern from printing dollars. In addition, there would be an initial $rg billion cost of purchasing the entire stock of domestic currenry. After this, the government wouid have no international reseryes in the traditional sense of the word. At present, Argentina has sufficient foreign reservesto purchase its entire stock of currency in circulation. Otherwise, it would be forced to borrow or run current account surplusesfor some time in order to accumulate reserves. Thus, one of the strongest arguments against dollarization is that the government's "exit option"-its ability to devalue the currency-should be kept open, even at the cost of currency risk. This view is pessimistic in the sensethat its adherents consider it too difficult for the economy to adjust through other mechanisms given political and social constraints. Argentina's rigid labor system,for example, keeps labor costsinflexible and therefore exposes the country to extended periods of hlgh
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unemployment, since deflation is the only way that Argentine prices relative to the rest of the world can decline and lead to a reversion to flexible rates. In the Argentine case, however, it is difficult to argue that a devaluation would be the preferred method of adjustrnent, since a devaluation would have a devastating effect on the public and private sectors' balance sheets. As rnentioned, over 60 percent of bank loans are dollar-denominated, as is most of the government's debt. A devaluation, then, would immediately increase the cost of servicing liabilities without any cornpensation (in fact, with a reduction) in asset values. The export-prornising benefits of a devaluation are also unclear since Argentina's export sector is very small, accounting for less than Io percent of GDP. Even if export growth were to double, the overall contribution to GDP would be small. While flexible rates are an unattractive option for Argentina, there are also valid argarments that suggest dollarization is a dangerous proposition. One of the strongest arguments against dollarization involves the rnonetary authority's ability to serve as a lender of last resort. Under dollarization, there will be no domestic authority with the ability to expand the money supply if banls are in trouble. While opponents of dollarization arg"ue that this puts the domestic financial system at great risk, supporters of dollarization claim that arrangements could be made with the U.S. Federal Reserve in order to circumvent this problern. On the other hand, in the United States, some opponents of dollarization argue that allowing foreign countries to dollarize would expose the U.S. Federal Reserveto liability in the event of the collapse of a foreign dollarized financial system.
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Dollarization was proposed as a serious alternative in Argentina by the previous administration, but the chosen policy of the current government, at least for the moment, is to maintain convertibility despite its cost. The governrnent has stated that it is willing to maintain the currency board systern,but it does not wish to eliminate the dornestic currency. Obviously, the decision to dollarize is very difficult when $r billion per year in seigniorage revenues could be involved. It could be argued, however, that the expenditure reduction of lower interest payrnents on dornestic and foreign debt, in addition to the possibility that government revenues would increase in other areas due to improved economic confidence, would more than rnake up for the lost seigniorage. Many questions remain, and their answers will be known only after the experiment is undertaken. For that reason, dollarizing the economy involves taking a risk. Although it seerns unlikely that the Argentine government will dollarize in the near term, it seernsjust as unlikely that the issue will go away. Argentina's best course of action would be to eliminate the rniddle-of-the-road approach-to either dollarize or devalue. As long as there is currency risk, it will rnake sense to try to minirnize it by dollarizing, as this benefits consurners, firms, and the government. However, there will always be a strong incentive to maintain domestic rnonetary autonomy, so that devaluation's "exit option" can be used if all else fails. Finally, the issue of patriotism remains. A national currency is one of the starkest symbols of autonomy and independence, and a country that dollarizes will therefore face stiff opposition frorn those who view the process as relinquishing self-determination. On this
Finance uRtBEBusiness& issue, it is worth noting once more that the dollar already plays a large and important role in the Argentine economy. A large proportion of Argentine assetsand liabilities are dollar-denomi-
nated, and Argentines can freely turn their checking accounts into dollars, all of which can be used to settle debts. It remains to be seen whether Argentina will go all the way.
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Law&Ethlcs Rights olicytowards China Jacob A. Fisch U.S. human rights policy towards China has failed. U.S. government efforts have not helped to improve human rights in China. Moreover, the policy has contributed to growing U.S.China tensions. As a result, U.S. policymakers face two fundamental challenges. The first is to craft a policy that induces substantive human rights progress in China. The second is to mitigate the pressuresof U.S. domestic politics, which continue to restrict innovative policy initiatives. Over the past decade, foreign policy towards China has shifted in name from "comprehensive engagement" to "strategic dialogue."' Despite the name change, the essence of the program has remained consistent: "Positive" initiatives seek to produce desired results through cooperative efforts. Sporadic but vociferous "negative" human rights critiques serye to qualify this otherwise non-threatening program. However, these critiques have functioned largely as fig leafs for U.S. politicians who privately place little faith in the effectivenessof such rhetoric. The public show has imbued Chinese and Americans with a misguided belief that human rights interests and engagement interests are inherently irreconcilable. This misconception has ossified and polarized the debate both within the United States as well as between the United States and China. Resulting tensions
Jacob A. Fisch *"r formerly
a Research
Associate
for Asia at
the Council
on For-
eign Relations currently Harvard
and is
a student law
at
School.
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have had a corrosive effect on U.S.Sino relations and harmed prospects for human rights progress in China. An abundance of scholarship has focused on whether an ideological divergence over the understanding of human rights, which is possibly culturally based, Iies at the center of the U.S.-China human rights conflict. This discussion is well-docurnented and I do not seek to add to it in this article. Instead, politically-contrived barriers present a more irnrnediate problem to U.S. hurnan rights policy towards China in particular and U.S.-Sino relations in general. A reorientation of the U.S. approach towards China, guided by the objective of loosening the present deadlock and rnoving the human rights dialogue from an antagonistic to cooperative mode, will be useful notw-ithstanding possible ideological disjunction.
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Social and Economic Rights are the pillars of the rights legal regime. The human Covenant on Political and Civil Rights provides for freedoms "to do" and "to
have"-freedorn to travel, to speak, to vote, to have due process of law. The Covenant on Social and Economic Rights defines freedorns "from"-frorn hunger, from poverty, from social oppression. Some regard the two covenants as overlapping and mutually supportive. Others see the two promoting potentially conflicting interests when applied within developing and economically-struggling nations. On one level, the U.S.-China hurnan rights conflict may stem from an ideological debate over these issues. Some suggest that China argues for a rnore context-sensitive, relativistic understanding of the hurnan rights regirne on the one hand, while the United States Declaration espousesa rrrore dogmatic interpretation iCt. rn" IJniversal COnfl (UDHR) was adopted on the other. Others contend that China of Human Rights stresseseconornic and social rights, while by the United Nations in rg{8. The the United Statesstressescivil and politiUDHR was fashioned not as internacal rights.5 Current arguments, however, tional law, but rather as a "cornmon towards which stress that ideology, while relevant, does standard of achievernent" all nations would strive." Political scien- not present the most immediate barrier tist and Chinese hurnan rights expert to progress for U.S. human rights policy Andrew Nathan describesthe UDHR as towards China. Rather, dornestic politics a "staternent of broad principles rather represents the rnost pressing concern. In the United States,the political clithan an enforceable code of conduct."3 rnate dernands that foreign policy be The "enforcement machinery" of international human rights law is derived defensible against human rights critifrom the covenants drafted on the heels cism. Consequently, China's hurnan of the UDHR.{ The covenants seek to rights record has become an oft-used define specific inalienable human rights weapon in both domestic and foreign policy debate. The "China stick" is used and restrict state power from infringing to attack political opponents for "softness on those rights. While most countries on China." Indeed, the human rights are signatories to the UDHR, governrnents have been more reluctant to sign issue has become a political football, kicked around in an effort to garner supthe variouscovenants.
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F r s c HL a w & E t h i c s port for issuesthat might have little to do with human rights directly. At times, the stick is used to curry favor with the many constituencies threatened by China's military or economic development or disrnayed by its oppressive political system. In such cases,political carnpscompete to display disgust for China's human rights situation, either becauseit is their political goal or because they wish to offset their support for trade policies with China. Conversely, political leaders driven by protectionist interests use China's human rights record to support their anti-trade agenda. As a result, human rights policy towards China has become a display of principles rather than a pragmatic effort aimed at eliciting tangible reform. Since the safestand simplest display of political morality in the United Statesis the advocacyof democracy, this advocacyhas come to define U.S. -China human rights policy. Americans may be ideologically averse to conceiving of rights development in any manner other than the abrupt and immediate adop-
political environrnent requires a prodigious show of principle, but is unintere s t e di n t h i s s o r t o f p r a g m a t i s m . In China, both leaders and citizens share a strong opposition to U.S. human rights efforts. Their reaction to the U.S. approach is complicated and understanding it requires a closer look at China's dornestic situation.
WhyChinaRejects U.S.Human Rights Policy. The survivalof the Chinese leadership and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rests increasingly on two factors. First, the leadership must ensure economic stability and growth. An economic crisis may lead to untenable levels of unemploym e n t , e x p o s e dc o r r u p t i o n , a n d , c o n s e quently, social unrest. Second, the leadership must be convincing in its clairn that it is fighting corruption, without inciting hysteria over the depth of China's corruption problems. The CCP has been unable to erase widespread evidence of cronyisrn and graft.
uman rightspolicytowads China
has be corrre a displ?y of princi ples ^at rather rt dirned eliciting than a,p rag,_matic^effo tangib Ie retorm. tion of some critical level of civil and political freedom. Furtherrnore, our political climate has precluded us from seriously considering the Chinese contention that the pursuit of social and economic rights might conflict with political and civil rights. We dernand that both sets of rights be protected, but do not go so far as to suggesthow to manage the consequences. The present U.S.
Thus, it rnust appear to be actively addressing the problem without allowing the entire tree to appear rotten.6 These dornestic concerns, paired with the cultural and educational background of individual leaders, inform the CCP's approach towards U.S. human rights policy. Four elements explain the leadership's perspective. First, Chinese leaders are influenced by a military philosophy
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rooted in traditional Chinese statecraft and ideology developed by CCP Chairmen Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Reflecting these influences, many Chinese military thinkers predict the decline of U.S. global dominance and conclude that China, as a rising power, will become the United States'snatural enemy.TThus, Chinese leaders oppose U.S. human rights policy, not merely because they are ideologically opposed to the U.S. interpretation of international law, but also because they perceive geostrategic value in remaining obstinate in the face of U.S. human rights demands. Second, Chinese leaders recognize that U.S. human rights interests are geared towards catalyzing China's democratization. They claim that dernocratization under present conditions would be destabilizing. Twenty years of econornic and social reforms have divested the center of substantial power. Corruption festers in an environrnent absent a viable rule of law, a free press, and other rnechanisrns of bureaucratic regulation. The situation is compounded by a corrosive ideological and spiritual vacuum left by the dissipation of Maoisrn. Provincial officials and entrepreneurs operate with impunity, often disregarding policy directives frorn the central government. As the CCP struggles to rnaintain authority, it views total and abrupt democratization as anathema to its interest in preserving national stability and cohesion. Conversely, leaders perceive strengthening central authority and control as necessary for the survival of the CCP. Third, the specter of the Soviet lJnion's disintegration and of Russia's economic collapse contributes to China's opposition to U.S. human rights demands. Chinese leaders attribute Rus-
[7o ]
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sia's economic collapse and political upheaval to Arnerica's "big bang" prescription for economic reform in the early Iggos. With this legacy as a backdrop, the leadership fears that lurking behind U.S. demands for democracy in China is ignorance of China's problems or, worse, a malignant desire to choke China's developrnent. They fear that the U.S. plan does not take into consideration the practical consequences of its policy prescription. -Western Finally, the appearance of involvement in Chinese internal affairs is particularly alarrning to leaders conscious of the imprint left by W-estern irnperialism on Chinese society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As China joins the Western-led international community, the leadership is wary of historical ddjduu. Generally, Chinese citizens are also resistant to U.S. human rights policy. As a practical matter, U.S. policy must generate a critical mass of support among the population. Yet the Chinese propaganda machine colors U.S. human rights poliry in a manner that generates strong opposition. Ming Wan, a China-born scholar and professor at George Mason lJniversity, notes growing antagonism from Chinese citizens in response to U.S. human rights policy: "ContrarT to the West'sperception that the Chinese government is an illegitimate regime that has survived solely by coercion, there is now considerable public support in China for the government." A survey conducted in tgg$ shows {r.6 percent agreed with the statement "I am proud to live under the current political (socialist) [src]s]stem, " while only f.J percent disagreed. Approximately {8 percent of those suweyed agreed with the statement "I respect the political institutions in China today, " and
FISCH
)se and political "big bang" pre ic reform in the legacy as a back fears that lurking for democracy in China's problems It desire to choke They fear that the ,e into considera nsequences of its
rance of Western ·e internal affairs is to leaders con t left by Western ese society in the Nentieth centuries. 'stern-led interna ~ leadership is wary
~ citizens are also n rights policy. As a policy must gener upport among the hinese propaganda uman rights policy rates strong oppo :hina-born scholar ;e Mason Universi gonism from Chi lse to U.S. human y to the West's per .ese government is that has survived 'e is now consider China for the gov onducted in 1995 'eed with the state ive under the cur [sic] system," while .agreed. Approxi )f those surveyed Lent "I respect the China today," and
only 5.5 percent disagreed. Finally, 62.8 percent answered "agree" to "1 think the basic right of citizens are (relatively well) [sic] protected by the Chinese political sys tem," while only 11.4 percent responded "disagree."8 Self-censorship, or even sub conscious denial, may factor into these figures. However, even if we subscribe to the notion that the Chinese would rather have a different system "if they only knew better," we must also acknowledge that it is the role of U.S. human rights policy to encourage the Chinese to see beyond the walls of their present sociopolitical box. At best, current U.S. efforts only rein force resistance. Undoubtedly, propaganda plays a major role in amplifying or even chore ographing the popular perspective. The 1999 mob attacks on the U.S. govern ment buildings in China following the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo were not entirely sponta neous. Propaganda resonates within the cultural memory of Western incursion and serves to ignite antagonism. Add to the mix the psychological stress of rapid social modernization and transforma tion. Unsurprisingly, the image of the United States, a symbol of the destruc tive modernity that invaded and dese crated China one hundred years ago, becomes a convenient object upon which to project fear and anger . The Chinese are caught between pride over their unique culture and tra ditions and a desire for modernity. The Chinese zeitgeist struggles to bury insecu rity over China's material backwardness by envisaging its developmental defi ciencies as reflective of cultural singular ity. In this light, China's egregious human rights problems are often ratio nalized as the product of a great and unique culture, one that places group
Law&Ethics
interest over that of the individual and values the strength of conformity over the divisiveness of free speech. Finally, Chinese citizens do not nec essarily recognize the extent of China's human rights problems. The Chinese are experiencing greater human rights, more freedom, and economic prosper ity. In the past ten years, average per capita income has grown markedly along with the overall standard of liv ing. Most Chinese citizens would agree that life today, on the whole, is better and more secure than it was twenty years ago. Yang Zhong, Jie Chen, and John M. Scheb II recorded that 61.8 percent of those surveyed strongly agreed that they "would rather live in an orderly society than in a freer society, which is prone to disruption."9 We must not discount the influence of the Cultural Revolution and, more recent ly, the Tiananmen Square incident on shaping this attitude. Stability and steady economic expansion have become prized in a society that only recently experienced severe upheaval.
Understanding China's Human Rights Problem. Apart from instances of political persecution-which are not small in number, espeCially with the crackdown on the Falun Gong cult this past year-human rights abuse reflects institutional instability and weak ness of the leadership, not an express national directive encouraging such behavior. Chinese leaders have made efforts to improve aspects of the human rights problem, but they are unwilling to go far enough, fearing that such efforts would lead to their political ruin. Generally, human rights transgres sions occur at the behest of low- and mid-level bureaucrats, police officials,
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and organized criminals. These wayward officials and criminals also represent the "legs" of the CCP and the power basessupporting the top leaders.'o Initiatives from the top have focused on curbing abuses by expanding China's legal administrative and procedural systerns. Yet, without an independent judiciary, the law is limited in its ability
external influences further weaken the coercive power of the government, and as corruption continues to wear away at the institutional solvency of the party framework, the central leadership will grow more insecure and will likely react with greater aggression towards perceived political threats. As the Party's own ideological credibility continues to
Humanrightstransgressiolts occur at
the behest of low- and rnid-level burearrcrats, police officials, and organized crirninals. to protect civil liberties. Additionally, leaders are unwilling to unleash widespread purges airned at cleansing the party of these malignancies, because they fear the consequencessuch actions would have on their own power and on the health of the party. Consequently, corruption in China thrives, wearing away at social and econornic stability." What emerges is the following paradox, Initiatives airned at curbing corruption have become a political and econornic imperative of the central leadership. However, until the leadership is willing to take the steps necessary to make the legal system effective-through the establishment of a free press and an autonornous judiciary, and by allowing the courts to interpret legislation and enforce bureaucratic accountabilitycorruption will be difficult to contain. As for human rights in the near future, it is likely that through international trade and exchange, China will become an increasingly open society. Civil society will invariably develop and the econornic, civil, and even political rights of the average citizen will expand. However, as market development and
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thin, it will likely seek to tighten its grip over movements that gain spiritual or ideological mornenturn because they will be interpreted as politically threatening. The crackdown on the Falun Gong is an example of the phenomenon, as is the continued arrest and persecution of certain religious practitioners. Thus, aspects of human rights in China will not likely irnprove independently in the short term, and consequently, U.S. policy that assumes "market forces" can erase all evils is rnisled.
Shapingan EffectiveU.S. AppfOaCh. Chinese opposition to the U.S. human rights modusoperandi begs the question: How can the United States recraft its policy so as to eliminate the Chinese'rgag-response" while concurrently supporting human rights development in China? At present, human rights policy towards China is overwhelmingly understood in both countries as consisting of criticism of China's civil and political repression. Such a perception would not be problematic except for the fact that it both indicates and perpetuates deadlock. While U.S. pressure was arguably useful
F t s c HL a w & E t h i c s in the early r99Os for extracting minimal concessions from the Chinese, this unilateral pressure has become increasingly unproductive and should be supplemented by alternative programs. Evidence does suggest that international efforts played some role in encouraging emphasis on human rights in China in the early rggos. Official sanctions, as well as a general loss of investor interest following the t989 Tiananmen Square massacre, cornpelled China to show evidence of reform. In r99r and 1992, China sent two official human rights delegations to the West and issued a series ofWhite Papers on human rights. In its section on China, the 1994 U.S. StateDepartment report on hurnan rights intimated that the international hurnan rights movernent had encouraged the Chinese government to begin accepting the international movement, "[Chinese] officials no longer dismiss all discussion of human rights as interference in the country's internal affairs. In r$$!, the Chinese government provided limited information about the status of several hundred persons believed to be imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs."'' In rgg!, China also formed a number of hurnan rights research centers, such as the Chinese Society for Human Rights. Finally, in 1997, it signed both the Covenant on Social and Econornic Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (although it has yet to ratifr either), besting the United States, which has yet to sign the former and has signed the latter, but only after attaching significant reservations.'3 It is unlikely that these positive developments would have occurred without external pressure. Therefore, this pressure should continue. Columbia University Law Professor Louis Henkin
states, "No one is prepared to say that human rights would be better without the forces for compliance generated by the human rights movement. "'4 Nevertheless, China's increased attention to human rights in recent years has exacerbated,not mitigated, the controversy. Although China has begrrn to develop hurnan rights institutions, it has used these institutional outlets to defend its practices and criticize U.S. efforts.'5 In 2ooo, the State Council in China released a hurnan rights report on the United Statesin response to what it perceived as an unbalanced U.S. State Department report on China's human '6 Co-opting the lanrights practices. guage of the international human rights regime, the eight page report proceeds to outline areas in which civil and political rights, social and economic rights, rights against racial discrimination, and rights of women and children were violated in the United States. The report charged the United States with "wantonly violating hurnan rights of other c o u n t r i e s . " I n d e e d , a t t a c k i n g U . S. hypocrisy has become a favorite theme of the Chinese media. While international hurnan rights pressure appears to have achieved a modicum of successin planting the seed of human rights in China in the early r99os, U.S. unilateral pressurehas generated within China increasing antagonisrn towards the United States and its human rights efforts. Such antagonisrn reduces the expansionary potential for human rights within China and harms U.S.-China relations.
PolicyPrescriptions.AsProfessor Nathan suggests,the United States must work to disentangle its human rights interests from its geopolitical interests.
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Americansmust hegintound.erstand
human rights as a nexus of intersecting rights ranging fioa political and civil rights Io s6cial and. economrc rrghts. In order to be successful,it must "internationalize" the movement. According to Nathan, "The United States should
political prisoners such as WeiJingsheng, Wang Dan, and, most recently, Bai Ling. However, groups that are concerned with other aspectsof human rights in China, separate human rights from democratization, focus on abuses that are illegal but that are currently blocked from adding their voices to the human rights under international law, and preempt the charge of cultural irnperialism by debate, might develop political capital framing the issue as one of cornpliance through a national discussion that broadwith international norms."'7 However, ens popular understanding of human rights. China's Ministry of Foreign due to the U.S. political climate, internationalizing U.S. efforts is, in reality, a Affairs outlines areas where China is thep o l i t i c a l " R u b i k ' s C u b e . " ' u E v e n i f U . S . oretically willing to cooperate with the human rights policy was more internaworld-human rights improvernent, envitionalized, the Chinese contention that ronrnental deterioration, depletion of Western interests have co-opted the natural resources, poverty and uneminternational regime will still remain. A ployrnent, population g:rowth, spread of multi-step processmight allow U.s. poldiseases, drug abuse, and international icy to work towards undoing these knots. crime.'s These are all valid human rights First, the United Statesshould start by concerns. Thus, we should not write this looking inward. The key is to spark a new offer offas a srnokescreen. national discussion in the United States Next, cultivating a more developed in order to generate an understanding understanding of human rights will press that the international human rights stan- politicians and pundits to speak to the specific issues, rather than simply to dard is distinct from our Constitutional hurnan rights perspective.We must devel- dernonize without nuance China as a human rights "violator." Thrgeted lanop a rnore expansive human rights vocabulary and widen our understanding of guage will be more constructive and less human rights. Americans must begin to caustic. Perhaps the general term "human rights" could be supplemented understand human rights as a nexus of intersecting rights ranging from political by language that both addressesspecific rights, such as the right to certain enviand civil rights to social and economic ronmental standards, as well as suggests rights. Of course, groups must continue mechanisms for ensuring those rights to voice outrage at civil and political human rights violations in China because (for example, rule of law). Third, the early goal should be to prosuch outrage helps build a moral standard duce a more rational discussion in the for the future. At the very least, outspoken criticism has been critical to the freeing of United States. or at least to shift the
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F r s c HL a w & E t h i c s domestic political calculus in a way that renders the "China stick" more cumbersome to wield recklessly. This shift will, to some extent, help to de-politicize the debate. Subsequently, such a shift in the domestic political landscape will provide politicians with political capital to supplement the negative hurnan rights critique with positive hurnan rights efforts. Then it would not be such a political liability to take what are presently unpopular positions, such as to support funding for the cash-starved"rule of law in China" initiative run through the State Department, or to support initiatives to cooperate with the Chinese on an official level to help with their disastrous environrnental problems. Accompanying an expanded conception of human rights, these efforts could be absorbed by the U.S. hurnan rights policy frarnework. Complementing "negative" policy with the addition of "positive" measureswould help the United Statesappear rnore ingenuous to Chinese observersand would help reduce the vitriol coming from both countries. Additionally, precise language would allow human rights policy to target areas in which China's record is poor, areas in which it has performed better, and areas in which the United States could help promote human rights developrnent through specific engagernent efforts or through negative critique. Finally, expanding domestic discussion from its present monolithic form would also make U.S. interest in hurnan rights a less appealing target for exploitation by Chinese propaganda. The visceral reaction towards U.S. efforts among Chinese would be dulled. Language that describes specific rights and mechanisms for ensuring rights is used currently by the Chinese government to refer to its own goals, such as
environmental improvement and legal development, but these concepts in China are not linked with U.S. human rights interests. In reality, however, these issues also represent the specific cornponents of U.S. human rights interests. Both the United States and China are talking about many of the 'We are simply lacking same problerns. the linguistic link. While it will be difficult to dissuade certain U.S. politicians and pundits from crudely chopping at the "red Communist dictators, " moderates must supplernent this attack with pragmatism. More specific language will be at the heart of a program to make U.S. human rights efforts more effective. The current holistic approach, which has as its goal the democratization and rnarketization of China, has politicized the debate so that it rings with bitter opposition. While democratization may be the only way to elirninate the rnost grievous hurnan rights problems in China, the Chinese leadership finds that opposing these pressures conforrns to its political needs. A more pragmatic approach on the part of the United States may shift this attitude among Chinese leaders, nudging it towards a platform of greater conciliation. A pragmatic approach aimed at piecemeal improvement would also ease an increasingly strained U.S.Sino relationship at a time when such tension is inhibiting virtually all foreign human rights efforts. With the right approach, the Chinese may welcome cooperative "human rights initiatives" in certain areas. To generate political capital for this approach, the United Statesmust begin a new domestic human rights discussion to develop a broader understanding of human rights among Americans. Some
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prominent figures are taking the lead. Former President Clinton suggestedthat the issues of child labor, basic working conditions, and the environrnent are all concerns for China's human rights interests."oClinton's outspoken bundling of these issues under the hurnan rights umbrella suggeststhat there is room within the U.S. political equation to allow for the development of a more advanced
understanding of human rights, and thus for a rnore pragrnatic human rights policy. But a greater number of politicians and policymakers must join the effort. They must recogrrize that their position on hurnan rights in China should serve not merely as a display of rnorality, but can and should be a rnechanisrn for substantively improving human rights in China aswell as U.S.-China relations.
NOTES t For a brief description of this history see Andrew J. Nathan, Chino in Tronsition (New York, Columbia University, tggT) 2+6-2+7. For a more in-depth history of China human rights policy during the Clinton
berg, Polg Makingin Cfrina (Princeton, New Jersey' Princeton University Press,rg88) {or-{,06; see generally Susan L. Shirk, ThePolit;col Ingc ofEconomtc Refom in China (Berkeley, University of California Press,
years, see James Mann, About Face:A Hbtory of Americo's Curious Relotionshipto Chinafrom Nixon to Clinton (New Yorl,
r993).
AlfredA. 2
Knopf,
Inc., 1998) chapters I5-t6. Henkin, ke Age of RiAts (New
Louis
Columbia University Press, Iggo)
York:
I9.
BasicBook,
Nathan and Robert S. Ross, fie Greof 3 AndrewJ. Woll and the Emp! Fortres: China's Search/or Securi!, (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, IggT) r79. 4 Henkin 2L g Repeatedly official Chinese statements stress the right to development (within the rubric of social and economic rights) as their principal concern; see "Speech byJiang Zemin at the Banquet to Celebrate '99 the Opening of the Fortune Global Fbrum in S h a n g h a i , " B e y i n g R e u i e w( I 8 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 9 ) , 8 . F o r analysis
of
human
rights
Henkin
152-53.
opposition
the
American with
civil
Note
penchant and
for
political
equating rights
see
also that there exists strong
to this dichotomy,
rr See Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman "Corruption, Culture and Markets," Culture (New York, Motfers, eds. Harrison and Huntington Lenz,
2ooo). Department of State, "China Human Rights Practices, 1993, " 3IJanuarl rgg4. 13 I intentionally do not record the release of r2 U.S.
prominent polilical prisoners. It seens imprudent to cite the release of prisoners as symbolic of human rights improvement. Releases are tightly tied to politicai negotiations and generally do not represent or effect a trend or change in perspective. 14 Henkin 29. rg See <http:/,/w.humanrights-China.org>, esp.
<http,//w.humanrights-china.org/en/devel-
for the Institute's
with many suggesting
ment's
that governments that claim to support social and economic rights over civil and politic do not do so in reality; for further discussion see: <http,//w.cceia.org/DlAl-Ocs.HTM> (as of z8
I999."
August 2ooo). 6 Thomas
Bernstein,
Lecture, Columbia
"Chinese
Polirics," Class
University, NewYork,
Pillsbury, / Michael Enrironment (Washington,
I999.
Chino Debotesthe Future Securi! D.C.: National Defense
University
Press, r99g) uiv. 8 MingWan, "Human Rights and Democracy," In
the Elesofthe Drogon, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling (Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Wang Inc..
1 9 9 9 )r o 9 . g MingWanro6. Io
tZ6l
See Kenneth
(as of 3 September 2ooo) response to the U.S. State Departon "China Human Rights Practices,
opment/file.d/98-r.html> report
t6 The U.S. State Department
report is published
annually and can be found at <http, / / www. state.
gov / www / global/ (as of 3 human-rights/hrp-reports-mainhp.html> September 2ooo). r/ Nathan, Chino'sTronsition 2+8 r8 See infra Section I. I9 This document can be found at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Web site: <http, //w. fmprc. gov. cn/english/dhtml/read. as (as of Z September p?forefather=oo2&pkev=> 2000). 2o President WilliamJefferson Clinton, speech at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
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Politics&DiPlomacy
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Returning Demoulg to Peru An interview with Aleiand"o Toledo ' Pres-identialCandidate, Pert Posible' Introduction bY M.rc Chernick' Professor of Government, Georgetown lJniversitY' Translated bY Marianne Benet'
OSl works in unpredictable ways' Democratization often Toledo last fall' he was in Wt"; *" ,pott with Alejandro fi"t legof a world tour to orgathe United States ot' thJ Alberto Fujinize support against Perut'iat'"President to Fujimori had won re election ,"".t. fu'orlths"eurlier' iir' what most observers believed a third term as presldent highly conelections' The results were *... ft"tatlent t e s t e d , a n d T o l e d , o , w h o i s p r o u d o f h i s i n d i g e n o uhistory sherpersonal up-from-the-bootstraps his ir"". remains "ta u pt''O ' from Stanford lJniversity' tiri, ttJ"a., in balloting of round first convinced that he won the candino which round' in iptti *"oo. After the first the required $o percent of than date officially won more round participate it' th" second votes, Toledo ttfir"Jto against and led massive demonstrations i"fi",t.g ""f appeared that despite the docFuiimori. At the time' it and public quest;regula'ities it' iht election ;;;; election and international tioning by national and govetnment States ;e United observers, i.,tltdi;;
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the Organization of American States (OAS), Fujimori would retain his grip on power and would sornehow manage to survive throughout all or at least a substantial part of his third five-year term. As can be seen frorn the interview, Toledo was preparing to wage a large, drawn-out national and international campaign. Although confident of his ultimate success,he expected that the campaign would take time. He was clearly prepared to assume the lonely and difficult road of the morally-tall opposition leader fighting the odds. Yet, only days after our talk, events hurtled past his carefully laid out plans. Following taped evidence of bribery and Fujimori corruption, unexpectedly announced his resignation and scheduled new elections. After fighting tooth and nail to thwart the constitution and secure a third term, Fujimori reversed course and declared that he was prepared to leave office. The change occurred when Fujimori's intelligence chief, Madimiro Montesinos, was caught on tape bribing an opposition congressrnan. Montesinos had long been viewed as the Rasputin of Peruvian politics. He was the rnan who knew where the bodies were buried and the treasures stashed. Although Montesinos had been closely allied to the United States and was viewed as a staunch ally in the "war on drugs," Washington turned sour on Montesinos following revelations in August 2OOO that he had orchestrated the sale of a large cache ofweapons to the largest Colornbian guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Arrnadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The United States's first instinct was to try to isolate Montesinos and protect Fujimori. However, when Montesinos stimulated an eventually-aborted coup
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after secretly returning to Peru from exile in Panama, it became clear that Fujimori could not stay in power without the network of authority that Montesinos commanded. When Fujimori announced his just planned resignation days after our interview with Toledo, the Peruvian opposition leader had already left Washington and was in France. Fujirnori's initial proposal was to overseenew elections and stay in power untilJuly 2OOI. However, events snowballed from there. His support eroded quickly and he soon faxed in his resignation while traveling in Asia. He then sought exile inJapan, rhe homeland of his parents. The president of Congress, Valentin Paniagua, was installed as interirn president and the presidential race was underway. The current rnoment is a critical one. Peru has a historic opportunity to rebuild the institutions of democracy after a decade of strong-man rule by Fujirnori. When Fujimori first carne to power in I99O, the country was mired in a brutal guerrilla insurgency and a severe economic recession. Fujimori won plaudits when he successfully confronted both challenges. He effectively defeated the Shining Path guerrillas and reduced the country's hyperinflation. In April rgg2, the citizenry approved when he assumed dictatorial powers and shut down the Congress in what becarne known as the auto-golpe(self-coup). By the mid-l99os, Peru was enjoying growth rates of rr to 13 percent. Fujimori easily won re-election in rgg$. But as the 2OOO election approached, Fujimori began to turn his accumulated presidential powers against opposition candidates, particularly through the use of the intelligence service controlled by Montesinos. The abuses provided an
TNTERVTE PW O l i t i C SD &i p l O m a C y
opening, and Alejandro Toledo skillfully and quickly mounted a credible electoral challenge to the regime in the last weeks of the campaign. Today, just two months before the special election scheduled for April 2ool, Toledo is leading in the polls. election system Peru's two-round encourages many candidacies, some of them frivolous. It also provides opportunities for dark horses to suddenly and unexpectedly emerge, as was the case for both Fujirnori in rggo and Toledo in 2ooo. Running second in the polls in the upcoming election is former president Alan Garcia who preceded Fujimori and left the country in a political and economically ruinous state. He is also dogged by charges of corruption. But political comebacks are not unknown in Peru, and Garcia represents a political party, APRA, that dorninated the political landscapefrom the r93os to the r98os. Yet Toledo has an undeniable strength. More than any other leader or movement, he directly challenged Fujirnori during the 2ooo election and then dedicated himself to building a national and international opposition movement in the name of restoring democracy. If he wins, the challenges he will face are straightforwardr Peru needs to rebuild the institutions of dernocracy, including the justice system, the Suprerne Court, the rnedia, the electoral system, and the institutions of democratic governance at the regional and local levels. Ten years of highly personalized rule under Fujimori have weakened democratic institutions and created a barrier to further econornic developrnent and democratic consolidation. At the beginning of the new century, Peru has been given another chance.
c H E R N I C KT : he recent Peruvian presidential election was characterized by fraud and criticized by the international community. Do you think that the international community's punitive actions and measures have been sufficient? r 0 L E D 0 :I t h i n k t h a t t h e r e i s c o n s e n s u s in Peru and in the international community that Peru has an illegitimate government that can potentially cause instability in the region. In light of this, my personal opinion is that the has not international community reacted with sufficient force, and routing its condernnation through the OAS probably dilutes its impact and justifies the presence of an illegitimate government for five rnore years. Nonetheless,from the point of view of Perri Posible and the dernocratic forces that I arn now leading, I believe that it would be a mistake not to continue the dialogue with the OAS. There are twenty-nine democratization points suggested by the high-level rnission presided over by Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and OAS Secretary General C es6r Gaviria. There is an enormous risk if tirne passes. The dictatorship will consolidate itself, and this sends the rnessage to other Latin Arnerican countries that lack strong democratic traditions that it is possible to change the constitution a s m a n y t i m e s a s n e c e s s a r yt o r e m a i n i n power by force against the will of the people in a new-styled dictatorship. This is no longer the classic dictatorship like Pinochet's, where two or three generals lead. Today we see a dernocratic face but a strongly dictatorial heart, and this is engendering in Venezuela, some temptations Ecuador, and probably Bolivia.
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c HERNI c x: Why has the reaction of the international community been so weak? Why haven't the OAS, the United States, and particularly other Latin American countries defended democracy more strongly in this case? r o L E D o : I t h i n k w e m u s t s e p a r a t ee a c h reaction, There is a non-interventionist arg'ument in Latin America with which I do not agree. I think that the non-interventionist concept does not hold up to a critical analysis because it contends that nobody should intervene in a country's internal affairs. This was lErnesto] Zedillo's argrrment in Mexico, based on
co-traffickers. And the United Statesleft in the hands of Fujimori's government, particularly in the hands of Madimiro Montesinos, the fight against narco-trafficking, although there are significant signs that they are involved in it. It is weak to assume that this government was the only one capable of succeeding, but I believe that the United States is starting to realize the nature of this regime. Thirdly, with respect to the OAS, it is an organization constituted by governrnents, and consequently it is quite politicized. The OAS needs to deliver results to send a messagethat its existence is justified. It is diluted and bureaucratic. More
DemOCfaCydOeSnOt hulrea nationality.It does not have borders, just as hurnan rights do not have colors. the Estrada doctrine.' I think it was Brazil's point as well. I disagree for the following reason. It is incongruent to argrre that we must globalize the economy, trade and finance, and cyberspace and telecommunications, but when it comes down to the concept of democracy to say that these are dornestic issues in which other countries should not interfere. I absolutely disagree because if there is one element that requires globalization, it is democracy. Democracy does not have a nationality. It does not have borders, just as hurnan rights do not have colors. What happens is that some Latin American countries want to reserve their right to change. With respect to the United States, I think that it has bought into the story that Fujimori would repay Peru's external debt and that he was the only one who could succeed in the war against the nar-
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than ninety days have passed since the Windsor Resolution in Canada and no results have come about. This creates impatience. In Peru we are in dialogue with the OAS, and I believe we should continue, but it is time to see results. We should send a strong messag'ethat ifwe do not see results, there will be frustration throughout the country, which could produce more instability. c HERNI c r: Returning to the role of the United States,what else could the United Statesdo to promote democracy and stop the consolidation of a dictatorship in Peru? roLED0; I lived in the United States for seventeen years and I know the strength of its democracy, but sometimes I find that the United States has developed a sophisticated strategy of incongruencies
DiPlomacy t N T E R V TP E oWl i t i c s & in government. In other words, there may be one position in the State Department and the White House that does not necessarily coincide with that of the Department of Defense. There are certain measures of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that do not coincide with the point of view of the CIA. Then, there are different voices within single organizations. I would like to see a more consolidated position. I would like to seethe United States-Congress, as well as the executive branch-exert Pressure on the OAS to engender democratic changes. Otherwise, the United States could potentially becorne a silent accomplice to new-styled dictatorships' I know that this is not the philosophy of the United States, but a timid reaction could tempt other countries to do the same, as in Venezuela. In my opinion, the United Stateswould benefit if it emphasizesto its neighbors in Latin America its strong support for democracy. And in the effort to democratize, we hope that at the Summit of Americas in Quebec, Canada, in April zoor, we will be able to evaluatethe advances in democracy, and that these dialogues lead to new elections in Peru. Today we lead the dernocratic forces in Peru jointly with civil society, and we will not make concessions in our plea for new general elections. However, I believe that Peru cannot have elections now, because it is first necessary to improve conditions by implementing democratic measures. For that reason' we have agreed to wait approximately a year, the time it would take to implement these measures. These measures will inevitably result in new elections for
embassy, in the Department of State, or in theWhite House to communicate your position that Peru must hold new elections, and do you think the United States would support your position? r 0 LED0: Perir Posible does have contact with them. In the next few days, we will talk to some senators and members of Congress. They know that we stand together in our efforts to democratize. I do not know if they are oPen to suPPorting new elections, but that is a right of the Peruvian people. The United States has questioned the elections. The OAS rernoved itself as an electoral observer, alleging that there was no grrarantee of a free and transParent election. Fujimori has maintained power by force. Consequently, I refuse to think that the United Stateswould resign itself to coexist with a dictatorship in Peru, because that would
make it an accornplice. Although we communicate with the White House and the U.S. Congress' we are working not only with the United States,but also with the European Union. I am traveling to France, Italy, and Israel' It is part of our effort to reach out to the international community outside of the OAS. I hope that the United Stateswill be responsible in defending democracy and will act in defense of Peru. In the case of the election of the president of the Dominican Republic, there was fraud. In the Peruvian case, the corruption was much more obvious because the OAS, in charge of observing the elections, withdrew from the process. The National Democratic Institute, the Carter Center, Transparency International, the Defender of the presidency as well as for Congress' del Pueblo),and the the People (El Defensor (Consejo por/o Pcr) also for Peace Council c HERNI c x: Have you been able to estabelections, the withdrew from observing Iish contact with officials in the U.S.
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and consequently, we could not participate. If they said that the conditions for free and transparent elections were absent and we participated in the second round of elections, we would have legitimized an electoral process that o priori was fraudulent. C H E R N I C TY: o u r m o v e m e n t i s n e w i n Peru. Have you been able to consolidate it? What views do you have about the next year in a country where the freedom of speech and organization are limited? Will you be able to challenge the government to demand new elections? T o L E D o :W e a r e o p e r a t i n g u n d e r v e r y restrictive conditions. As you know, the rnedia, television particularly, is basically hostage to the government. There are nine television channels, and eight of those are government-operated. Therefore, there are continuous attacks on the credibility of the leadersof the democratic forces, andwe have no way of defending ourselves. Secondly, we cannot travel freely because the -We intelligence service follows us. receive threats, amongwhich telephone threats are the rnost cornmon. It is difficult, but I can tell you that Perir Posible has decided to institutionalize itself as a political party. It is newly born, but fortunately the international comrnunity supports its consolidation. We have {83 departmental, provincial, and municipal committees.We havean ideology, a statute, and a code of political ethics. Although it is difficult to carry out institutionalization because of the restrictions imposed by the dictatorship, we have resolved to continue until we can return democracy, the rule of law, and freedom to Peru. The void of political parties in Peru is symptomatic of the country's institutional void. Fujimori's government has
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attained a monopoly of all the democratic institutions. It controls the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the constitutional tribunal, the national election tribunal, the media, and the armed forces. It controls everylhing and the United Statesknows it. That is what surprises rne. The United Statesknows and is cornplacent. I arn speaking in general terms becausethere are cong:ressmenwho are really putting it all on the line, but I think that the United Stateshas decided to side with the OAS. As Peruvians, we must institutionalize new political parties, which are conscious of the new challenges that a competitive world offers, but are also rooted in Peru's history. In the short term, we need a coalition, a united front for democracy-on which we are working. We have an agenda with seven rnain points. First, the creation of a united front for democracy. Second, we haveannounced a parallel government with a shadow cabinet that will analyze,evaluate,criticize, and pro pose policies in the econornic and social arenas regarding decentralization and the institutionalization of dernocracy. Third, we said we would walk the path of the OAS, but itwouldbe a rnistaketo place all our eggs in that basket. Fourth, we are working with the international community outside of the OAS. Our future tour is part of this effort. Fifth, we will continue to mobilize the interior of the country, particularly the provinces. This is especiallydi{fi cult because the National Intelligence Servicepersecutes us, plants people to sow violence and later blames us, but we will continue peacefi.rllyin our cause. Sixth, the washing of the flag is a deeply symbolic and peacefirl act. Every Friday at r PM, everycity in Perujoins in the act of washing the flag, which is soiled by the dictatorship. Finally, we also have a rninute of silence in the name of resistanceand the wall of shame. In effect, this is our agendaof
t N T E R V T EPWO l i t i C&s D i p l O m a C y work to be done. I loeow it is difficult becauseof the adverseconditions, but there is a firm determination not to surrender to a dictatorship.
PM, when the elections concluded, Peri Posible had 48./ percent of the vote and Fujimori {2 percent. It was the armed forces and the National Intelligence Service that ordered the nullification of the results and robbed us of an election. c HERNr c x: Do you think that other oppoThat is a fact. I have the firm conviction sition forces are willing to followyour parthat we can return democracy to Peru. ty in a coalition under your leadership? Peru will be neither healthy nor viable as r0 LED0:I arn an advocateforjoint leader- long as it is under an illegitimate government. As long as the government lacks ship. I have the job of institutionalizing lead Posible and now it is my turn legitimacy, it will engender division and Perri to instability. This instability drives away the democratic forces. I am not promotforeign and dornestic investment. And ing a presidential candidacy. I am not, for when there is no investrnent, there is no the moment, a candidate. I am committed to returning democracy, rule of law, economic growth. When there is no economic growth, there is no employrnent. and liberty. Countries can have deep differences, but worldwide events suggest When there is no ernployment, there is no income and no consumption. When that dictatorships do not leave by their own free will. No lone party has managed there is no consumption, there is no to rernove a dictatorship. In Chile's case, demand. Poverty is worsened. I have the firm conviction that soon as you might rernember, there was the for democracy; in Suharto's we will return democracy to Peru. FujiConcertaci6n mori is a wounded Asian kitten. If we Indonesia and in Marcos's Philippines, dernocratic forces had to unite. Political had participated in the second round parties can have differences, but there are elections, it would have been seen as a regular election. Today, Fujimori is comrnonalities: democracy and liberty. 'We now have differences butwe rnanage to being severely questioned by more than cooperate for the greater objective. I feel 50 percent of Peruvians and, as lou
No dictatprship hqs beeneasily rernoved. It has alwaysbeen complex. that Peru is mature enough to follow a path of unity in the name of democracy. c HERNI c r; Are you optimistic that you can return democracy to your country and that all the new initiatives will produce results in the next five years? r0LED0;On April gth, Fujimori's government robbed us of an election. At {
know, criticized by the international community and media. But the Fujimori of the year 2oOO does not have the same power to delude as the Fujimori of rgg2, when he led the auto-golpe.I ask the international comrnunity to remain firm because the Peruvian case is not Peruvian per se, It runs a dangerous risk of being contagious to the region. We might be witnessing a new style of dicta-
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torship that rnight undermine thirty the international community will show years of hard work toward democracy. more consistency between their disI am optimistic. I know it is a difficult course and their actions. route, but we will continue our peaceful struggle. No dictatorship has been easily removed. It has always been complex. Notgs r The Estrada Document is the classic Mexican O t h e r c o u n t r i e s ' e x p e r i e n c e s s u g g e s t doctrine of non-intervention which declares that states should recognize other states, irrespective of regime type this. I hope that the United States and or the policies of specific governments.
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Polltics&Dlplomac
Jamie F. Metzl As the forces of globalization and the information revolution transform international relations, U.S. foreign policy institutions remain hunkered down in outrnoded approaches and insular institutional cultures. Heavily subsidized, protected from cornpetitive pressures, and guaranteed a market regardless of the quality of output, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus at times seems rnore like a Chinese state-run conglornerate than a player in a global revolution. Yet market realities challenge U.S. foreign policy institutions' non-competitive behavior on a daily basis. U.S. foreign policy institutions must either reform or face increasing irrelevance. The lg{/ National Security Act established the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, laying the foundations for a national security structure that remains largely intact. This rigid command and control hierarchy, an offshoot of rg4os and rg5os organizational thinking, served the United States well -War during the Cold years when issues, and therefore resources, could be prioritized clearly. Although government hierarchies are neither uniforrn nor monolithic and often compete to advance parochial institutional interests, the overall system was, and remains, insular. Globalization and the information revolution are empowering decentralized networks that challenge state-centered hierarchies. These networks may be defined loosely as sets of
J a m i e F . M e t z l ,u National
former
Secu-
rity Council
and State
Department
official,
a Msiting
Scholar
the Carnegie
is
at
Endow-
ment for International Peace and an International
Affairs
the Council
Fellow at on For-
eign Relations,
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interconnected individuals who occupy analogous positions in institutional or social structures and create new community relationships that build upon, democratize, and magnifr existing social frarneworks. Although networks have alwaysexisted, proliferating inforrnation and cornrnunications technologies are rapidly reducing the economic and physical barriers that once limited network expansion. These decentralized networks are not necessarily always inclusive, but they are ultimately selfoptirnizing-the more appropriate peo ple they connect, the rnore useful and attractive the network becomes to others. Metcalf s law, named after Ethernet inventor Robert Metcalf, suggeststhat a network's value is the square of its rnernbers. Small network growth can therefore lead to exponential increases in effectiveness. Networks distribute influence and power across traditional boundaries, allowing powerful interest groups to form and re-forrn rapidly. The network is flexible and agile, constantly able to reconfigure itself to address new challenges. It allows ideas to compete and confers a competitive advantage on those most able to share. trade, and receive the most relevant inforrnation. Networks lower the cost of collective action, making large and disparate groups better able to organize and influence events than ever before. Because of these qualities, networls develop much faster than traditional hierarchies and place competitive stresses on traditional forms of organization. In the business world, competitive pressure has led to organizational revolution. In the governrnent sector, it largely has not. Government foreign policy institutions must rethink their conceptual models, institutional cultures, operating proce-
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dures, and basic self-understanding in order to respond to this challenge.
Networks TrumpHierarchies. Although states still have tremendous advantages in the international arena, dynamic networls are complicating and chipping awayat hierarchical state power. Networks of civil society organizations and second-tier states banded together to support an international ban on land rnines in rgg8. The network's vastness allowed these organizations to lobby governments around the world through a more effective, focused, and systematic publicity campaign than that of the United States, which opposed the treaty. Similar groups leveraged their expertise and contacts in support of establishing the International Criminal Court, even representing some smaller states in rnultilateral consultations. Dynamic networks have democratized access to power, reducing rnany of the advantages previously enjoyed only by states, the largest corporations such as IBM, and large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the Catholic Church and the International Red Cross. Although transnational rnovements like Zionisrn and the anti-slavery rnovement have existed for at least two centuries, advances in information technology have made coalition-building much faster and easier. In the new environment, power comes not only from the ability to fleld armies, but also from the capacity to coordinate diffuse actors. While states and other large actors once had a virtual monopoly on mass communications tools, any individual now has the power to communicate via the Internet with an almost unlimited number of potential collaborators. Spies and embassy officials who
n/lErzrPolitics&Diplomacy once had advantages in collecting and about analyzing relevant information foreign affairs are now often overwhelmed by the information gathered by civil society groups, investment banks, journalists, and corporations. Their reporting can be more timely, accurate, insightful, and useful than that of state actors. In short, the information revolution has reduced the transaction costs of communication and further democratized accessto information and knowledge, the key assetsof power. Governments have not yet come to of fully appreciate the redistribution power resulting from the rise of networls. U.S. State Department officials may look gleefully at other foreign rninistries and note that the United States is far ahead ofits perceived counterparts in responding to globalization and the inforrnation revolution. These officials, however, do not recognize that competition is not coming from other states,but from other forms of organization altogether. As power today is as rnuch about promoting ideas and norms of behavior as it is about projecting rnilitary might, the real struggle consists of projecting values, promoting interests, and ultimately setting the global agenda. Governrnents, corporations, and global constituencies of civil society organizations all dernand some level of influence in the international arena. If any one of these entities is less able to project its voice because of institutional limitations, then the values and interests of that entity will suffer. If, for example, governments and civil society organizations are not capable of making the best case for addressing global poverty or mass human rights violations, global corporations are unlikely to address these challenges on their own.
The competition between these entities is not zero-sum, but neither is it benign. Those organizations that best respond to new realities will be most able to advance their interests globally. In this competition, government foreign policy institutions face the same cornpetitive pressures as all other entities cornpeting for relevance and voice in the same space. But while government foreign policy institutions face competitive pressures similar to those confronting business and civil society organizations, government institutions are also fundamentally different from those organizations. The vertical accountability and centralized processes of government institutions make it possible to hold government officials responsible for their decisions and actions. Such accountability is present to a lesser extent in corporations and civil society organizations, since accountability decreasesin a distributed network. Since networks are able to bring together much broader communities to flexibly address problems in ways that hierarchies often cannot, networks will make the non-cornpetitive cornponents of traditional hierarchies seem increasingly inefficient, ineffective, and ultimately irrelevant. As this occurs, rather than abandoning democratic accountability altogether, governments must instead explore which of their functions can and must be transformed. If governments rnust behave rnore like networks but cannot fully participate in thern at every level, they need to determine what aspects of government foreign policy activity can be better networked. A state's foreign policy system can be broken into a number of discrete activities ranging from collecting data and processing it as intelligence to formulating, communicating, and implementing
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policies. Those functions that require the highest levels of accountability, particularly the decision-making functions, should retain hierarchical structures. There is no reason, howevâ&#x201A;Źr, that the dictates of accountable
requires both conceptual and organizational change. One prelirninary element of this transformation is language. The very term "foreign policy" attempts to differentiate between "domestic" and "for-
FOreign pOliCy iS not foreign.It is elobal-
both domestic and foreign sirnlltaneorlsly. decision-making should equally control intelligence, institutional learning, and communications functions, all of which would benefit enormously from a rnore networked model. By disaggregating the state foreign policy function into its component parts, it is possible to identify where greater integration into networks is feasible and desirable, and where the hierarchical structures of accountability can and should remain intact.
eign" in ways that make less sense in a globalized network environrnent. In this environment, dornestic actiyities have international implications, and participation in a network may be unchanged whether people are ten feet or ten thousand miles apart. U.S. domestic policies on issues such as telecommunications regulation, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, drug enforcement, crime, and taxation have major impacts abroad. Recognizing this, nearly every U.S. dornestic specialized agency now maintains an A N e t w o r k M o d e l . r n r n a n yoverseaspresence. Foreign policy is not ways, governments have always been foreign. It is global-both domestic and networks. Embassies across the globe foreign simultaneously. "Foreign policy" also suggeststhat the interact with local leadersand populations and report conditions back to state is in a position to make decisions capitals and to other ernbassies. Yet, and then translate those decisions into while these networks once made gov- coherent "policy." While this is the case ernment foreign policy officials more in sorne discreet areas, this term does not inforrned than their outside counterconvey the fact that a state's foreign poliparts, they now often make them less cy is only one part of a broader "global s o . T h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e n o n - g ' o v e r n - engagement" between societies. In this mental networks are broader, deeper, context, states, along with sub-state and more crosscutting than governactors, corporations, civil society organiment information networks. Governzations, business associations, labor ments must expand their thinking to unions, religious communities, criminal e m b r a c e t h e s e e x t e r n a l n e t w o r k s . organizations, and individuals, interact Because the conceptual space of a netand cooperate on a daily basis. work is giobal and does not fully respect The popular terrns "NGO" and t r a d i t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s , p r e p a r i n g "non-state actor" also miss the point of individuals to engage in this space distributed capabilities. Governments
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MErzLPolitics&Diplomacy once defined the spaceofglobal interaction, and other entities were defined by being outside of government. Today, however, this negative nomenclature does not recognize that corporations, civil society groups, and even individuals now share the stage and help set the global agenda. Governments and large corporations are more easily recognizable as global actors. Although alliances of civil society organizations and individuals are often temporary and issueoriented, these entities are just as meaningful, as they, too, represent pooled global constituencies. A shift in conceptual models rnust also be accompanied by new relationships among government foreign policy actors, as well as between these actors and global constituencies. Governments need to nurture their own internal networks and Iink them to broader networks outside of government. The U.S. governrnent, for example, has tremendous capabilities that are hugely underutilized due to bureaucratic isolation. Although committed government officials amassa great deal of useful inforrnation in a rnultitude of areas, the inadequacy of knowledgesharing and -managernent systemsdoes not facilitate the exchange of information across agenciesand hierarchies. Building a networked inter-agency communications model requires a comprehensive assessment of governrnent agencies'skills and capabilities, the results of which will be stored in a database shared by all governrnent employees. Best practices for all types of government functions should be catalogued and downloaded electronically. The management consulting firrn McKinsey and Company, for example, maintains a Knowledge Resource Directory (KRD) that lists experts around the world by
region and function. All McKinsey employees are expected to provide workrelevant knowledge to the directory and to answer queries from colleagueswithin twenty-four hours. Similarly, a United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID) employee dealing with farnine in Africa should be able to identify with a few clicks those individuals in all areas of governrnent with relevant expertise on the social, economic, political, historical, and developmental aspects of the issue. A diplomat seeking to have policies explained to Arab populations on an Arabic satellite television network should be able to identi$' easily all government employees speaking fluent Arabic. Currently, no such system exists. Developing these electronic capabilities requires enhancing computer systerns, making thern compatible between agencies,and training individuals to use thern. It also requires changing the institutional culture to reward outreach acrossagencylines, not just up the most immediate, narrow chain of command. Similar to what was dictated for the United Statesmilitaryby the r9B6 Goldwater-Nichols Act, advancement in any governrrrent agency should require a period of servicein other agencies. Although enhancing intra-governrnental coordination will take foreign policy institutions part of the way, establishing appropriate networked links outside of government will be truly critical to effectivenessand relevance. The primary impediment to this type of engagement is the culture of insularity and secrecy that pervades U.S. foreign policy institutions. This focus on secrecy developed in response to the competitive pressures of the nuclear arms race and the Cold War, but it has now far exceeded rational bounds. Protecting a widening sphere of
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so-called secretsand punishing those who comprornise them creates a culture of insularity and fear, in which the risks of venturing outside the safety of existing hierarchies often outweighs the perceived benefits. This isolation creates a system lesscapableof identifring and coping with ignorance. For instance, although the CIA and the State Departrnent have relatively small numbers of agents and political officers in Africa, the valuable inputs of civil society organizations on the ground are not adequately brought into the policy process. Government employees rnay once have been able to get by without being connected to these outside networls, but this is no longer the case.
share much of the rest. This type of sharing can lead to innovative partnerships with new actors. Governments, corporations, and civil society groups can come together in creative ways as the need arises. As with interagency coordination, this type of outreach to those outside of government should be highly incentivized. Participating in such networls will force dramatic change in government culture and organization. The global market punishes inefficient firms, exposing them to more focused competitors that can better perform any part of the larger organization's function. Large firms that once towered over their srnall-
Wh i lg g0vernm gnt decision-rnakers must know the ori.qrns of the information upon which th.y -arebasiig their decisio_ns,accorr.ntability should not be"purchasedat the cost of ignorance. While government decision-rnakers must know the origins of the information upon which they are basing their decisions, accountability should not be purchased at the cost of ignorance. Instead, an appropriate balance must be establishedbetween engaging the broad networks that contain enormous arnounts of critical information and developing and maintaining information collection and verification capabilities that can assess the accuracy of information received. Network engagement is a two-way process. Network members rnust share information in order to receive it. To participate, governments must determine what information is in severe need of classification and liberallv
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er competitors are today in a permanent state of change, atternpting to concentrate on what they do best and seeking to subcontract all else because perforrning any task less than optirnally creates competitive vulnerabilities. Sirnilarly, a disaggregatedview of foreign policy suggests that government institutions rnust focus on the aspectsof global engagement where they provide the most value added, and look for alternate mechanisms to accomplish other tasks. If, for example, the State Department provides the rnost value added in analysis, planning, and coordination, the Department should focus its energies on these essential functions and rely on others for administration, data collection, and implementation aspects.
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decisions based on networked information that brings together a wide array of perspectives and expertise. Coordinated planning and budgeting processescould then encourage various government agencies, all connected to their own networls and to each other at every level, to come together to identify future challengesand coordinate responses.
Networked Intelligence? rhe intelligence community may serve as an example for integrating a network model into an existing cornrnand hierarchy. In the current U.S. system, the Central Intelligence Ag"r.y (CIA) collects its own inforrnation and brings together reporting from other agencieswith open source materials to produce intelligence reports distributed to key leaders. The Defense Department and, to a lesser extent, the
ceptual models and boundaries. Although the old priorities no longer make sense, it is not possible for an intelligence agency to have the resources or maintain the expertise to respond to all of these potential problerns. The only way to even begin to lay the conceptual groundwork for coordinated responses to these problems is to reach out to a broad range of individuals and institutions both inside and outside of government-to create a network. A networked approach to intelligence would then seek to identi$ who within the governrnent rnight serve as primary nodes in an inforrnation-sharing network. These network participants would need not only first-hand knowledge of the given subject area, but also the trust of other members of the network. For inforrnation regarding humanitarian
The intelligencecommunityrnay serye as an exampl.efor integrat:+g a network'rnodel into an exi^sting comrrrand hierarchy. State Department also maintain highly developed intelligence agencies that collect and analyze their own inforrnation. This centralized intelligence function was appropriate during the Cold W-ar years, when the highest priority intelligence requirements, such as accurate information on Soviet troop deployments and nuclear weapons capabilities, were constant and predictable. In today's world, however, the range of potential threats is lirnitless-environmental, political, and economic issues take an array of forms in any number of regions, and the issues are often trans-functional and transnational, cutting across traditional con-
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conditions in the developing world, for example, USAID could becorne the lead gatherer of information, leveraging its close work with civil society organizations on the ground to do so. Information, however, would only be made available to USAID if it could establish that it wished to utilize the information exclusively for humanitarian purposes. Moreover, USAID would have to become a full, sharing rnember of the newly established network by providing relevant U.S. government information such as satellite imagery and political reporting back to other network members. The Treasury Department might play a similar role with regard to eco-
MErzLPolitics&Diplomacy therefore, become a much higher government priority. As the world's leader in developing electronic infrastructure, the United States must recognize the tremendous value of extending network infrastructure beyond the current limits of commercial viability to the world's poorest communities. Helping poor cornmunities find their voices allows thern to engage in diaIogue about the best ways of solving their public problems. This, in turn, helps address diplomaiplomats. D Public cy, the dialogue between governments and the global problems of underdevelopforeign populations, is also ideally suited ment and environmental degradation that, in today's world, are a much greater to a network orientation. Once champithreat to U.S. interests than, for oned by the now-defunct U.S. Informa(USIA), instance, Russian troop rnovements. As diplomacy public tion Agenry perceptions of U.S. hegemony will has sought to explain IJ.S. government activities to foreign populations and to underrnine these networLs if they are carry out polling and media analysis to perceived as tools of even greater U.S. influence, efforts rnust be made to educate U.S. decision-makers about foralso actively promote global diversity and eign attitudes and opinions. USIA indigenous Internet content. adrninistered critical people-to-people Open dialogue and the sharing of and cultural exchanges. This type of broad engagement between societies is ideas should be goals in thernselves.The more important now than ever before United States rnust support and facilitate becauseit builds the hurnan relationships such dialogue, even when it is critical of and cross-cultural understanding that are the United States. Providing a neutral platforrn even for critics of U.S. policies the key component of networls. Governrnents have increasingly recog- will be difficult to justify on traditional nized the irnportance of reaching out to national security grounds. By giving up that control and countering perceptions foreign populations. The network modof hegemonic aims, however, the United el, however, takesthis one steP further. It is no longer sufficient for governments States will benefit from increasingly coordinated, inclusive networked action to develop relationships with NGOs. to address some of its-and the world'sGovernments now have an overwhelrning interest in facilitating contacts between most difficult challenges. nomic and financial information, and the State Department with resPect to political information. The credibility of these organizations, however, would be fatally undermined if their actions were seen as a front for CIA operations. To address this problem, a transParent Coordination Civilian Information Group could be formed to pull together the information from these networks.
such groups. Enhanced transnational civil society and issue networls may challenge government authority in some cases, but more often they can serve as invaluable tools for sharing information, developing mutual understanding, and solving problems. Helping to build the infrastructure for these networls should,
And Milesto Go heforeWe Slgep. Institutional cultures and legacies do not change overnight, and it is important to recognize that making the shift from hierarchical to networked diplomacy is more difficult for government institutions than it was for IBM.
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On the one hand, government institutions can attract employees because they offer meaningful work and because lifetime employment guarantees compensate for lower wages. On the other hand, the entitlement system that governs rnany federal jobs makes finding new people with new types of skills and firing people with skill sets no longer relevant all the more difficult. Conversely, the short tenure of political leadership in all non-rnilitary agencies also fails to nurture powerful long-term constituencies for institutional change. The distribution of budgets for global engagement agencies across multiple congressional committees hardly facilitates coordinated budgeting and planning. Finally, the
in global electronic dialogue groups to inform follow-on action. Input from these rneetings and follow-on dialogues should contribute to a more transparent policy development process. Second, conscious efforts must be made to shift government institutional culture from a focus on secrecy, information hoarding, and hierarchy to a system of openness, innovation, and information sharing. This can be done by creating incentives and rewards for broader outreach, building technology networks that facilitate information exchanges between agencies and those outside of governrnent, creating programs for government ernployees to be seconded to corporations and NGOs,
Governments must chanqâ&#x201A;Źthe\\'a\,-thev
do businessto rnake their best v6ices heaid rn'a networked world. under-funding of these agencies severely harnpers even critical changes like upgrading computer systems to allow personnel to interact with counterparts in other agenciesand outside of government. More attention must be given to the funding issue if substantial progress in networking is to be made. Despite these challenges, however, much can be done to better embrace a networked global environment. First, because network diplomacy is by definition broader-based than traditional diplomacy, efforts rnust be made to identify and reach out to a broader constituency than ever before. Diplomats must hold public meetings both at horne and abroad to share ideas and build support for proposed action. Participants in these meetings should then be connected
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and establishing centers of innovation within governrnent. Governrnents should bring in new people from other sectors at all levels for flexible periods of time and encourage these new employees to maintain and develop their connections with forrner colleagues. Third, knowledge rnanagement should becorne a central focus of governrnent operations. Individuals should be required to input project sumrnaries and lessons into shareable databases, and knowledge-management training should be made a priority at all levels. Knowledge-management and institutional learning must become not only a responsibility, but a culture. Fourth, leaders of government institutions must be recognized and rewarded not only for responding to short-term
MErzLPolitics&Diplomacy crises but also for their contributions to the long-term health and effectiveness of their organizations. Management must be central to any government leader's job description, and private sector managers should be brought in where appropriate. As in all institutions, leaders must put forward a vision of change and then create new behavioral standards and norms that realize this vision. Certainly, the casefor governments is not entirely bleak. There are a number of information-sharing initiatives within the governrnent. Pockets of excellence and superb individuals can be found in many places. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, for example, has used its freedom frorn USAID's budgetary and bureaucratic controls to do extremely innovative work in postconflict countries. The CIA has begun building chat sites linking its analysts with pools of private sector experts. These initiatives, while an important first step, exist in spite of the bureaucracy, not because of it. These exceptions must become the norm. Although
networks are not a panacea and there is still an important role for hierarchical accountability, reaching out in new ways to new actors is not a quixotic option, but an urgent need that recognizes that governments can no longer achieve their goals alone. Governments play a crucial role in addressing some of the planet's most critical issues, from environmental protection to setting human rights standards to allocating resources and nurturing human development and individual security. Although entities other than states are now more central than ever before in rnost of these areas, governments must fully engage in a global dialogrre that allows different groups to work together to fashion the most appropriate responses to short-terrn crises and long-term challenges. Ifgovernments fail to internalize globalization's lessons, their ability to promote broad-based values and engage in this dialogue will dirninish relative to other actors. Governments must change the way they do business to make their best voices heard in a networked world.
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Sclence&Technolo GreatLeapForward? Ming Zhang China does not foresee any threat of a large military invasion of its territories in the near future. Nor is it preparing to engage in any major military conflicts overseas.Yet China is concerned with non-conventional security threats. Consequently, it has moved towards building comprehensive national strength centered on science and technology. What is the nature of the security enr.ironment perceived by China? Is China strong enough to defend against these perceived nontraditional security threats? While China has made a sound choice to base national security and development upon science and technology, the development of that very science and technology has posed formidable challenges that China has found hard to meet. Becoming a strong science and technology state has been China's dream for at least a century. While the government has stated this goal explicitly, critics of such a policy have not remained silent and successin achieving such a state will not be spontaneous but will depend on a realistic strategy. China's search for new security boundaries is only just beginning.
M i n g Z h a n g t sw i t h the Asia Research Institute
and has
authored
three books
and numerous
other
studies on Asian nomic
eco-
and security
policy.
New SeCUrityThreats. wt'rt. traditionalgeopolitical objectives, such as reunification with Taiwan, continue to be key components of China's national interest, other non-
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factors conventional, non-military B e i j i n g ' s s ecurity t o p p e d have also agenda as it enters the new century. Increasingly exposed to the outside world and strongly driven by new economies such as information technology, China senses the mandate to redefine its concept of security.
national government occurs, jeopardizing national political stability.3 When natural resource security is defined by quantity, diversity, and availability, China faces problems from both within and without. China's economic growth is virtually impossible to sustain absent sufficient resource supplies.
Natural ResourceSecurity.Financial Security.one chinese "Resource security is of utrnost significance to China," warns one official analyst.' In Igg!, China became a net petroleum importer and bought 9.2 rnillion tons of crude oil from overseas. In 2olo and 2o2o, it will import 260 million and 32o rnillion tons of oil, respectively.Some !O to 40 percent of Chinese domestic petroleum demand will have to be met by imports. Petroleum storage has also becorne an issue' Cornpared to the U.S. stockpile of ninety days worth of petroleum and Japan's sixty-day supply, China's petroleum stock can last only a week.^ China's total water resource volurne is 2,Boo billion cubic meters, ranking fourth in the world. Its water resource per capita, however, is only 2,3oo cubic rneters, about 26 percent of the world average.Water sources, plentiful in the south and scare in the north, are spread unevenly in China. A Chinese analyst points out that 3oo Chinese citieswere short of water in 1996-120 seriously so. Partially as a result of drought, 6o million rural citizens are living under the poverty line; rnany escape poverty only by migration. Nationwide, water shortage has led to production suspension and losses arnounting to millions of dollars annually. Because of the water shortage, friction among local administrations, regions, ethnic groups, and the
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analyst identifies the following key indicators in determining a country's financial influence: the acceptance of the its currency worldwide; country's amount of foreign exchange reserves; the scale of its domestic financial markets; its international financial centers and degree of financial influence; and the size of the financial industry as a Percentage of GDP. China is not financially strong by these criteria savein foreign exchange reserves,holding $r55 billion in 1999, second in the world.a Indeed, financial risk has become a real issue in China. Illegal financial conduct, bad debt, and the integration of China's domestic market within the international financial system have all forced China to the brink of a financial crisis. China was largely unaffected by the rggT-98 Asian financial crisis because it was a closed financial entity. Yet China's financial health was even worse than that of its Asian neighbors. Rampant corruption at every level from top leadership to local officials has left millions of Chinese yuan and foreign currencies unaccounted for. Arrest and execution of high level officials and the shutdown of major financial institutions have solved little. The systernstill waits to be transformed. Externally, China's financial security is a long-term concern. China needs to ready itself to compete with its foreign counterparts in order to reduce the
zHAN6Science &Technology impact of international financial turmoil. China still does not understand modern financial market operations, financial products, and managernent.
In particular, China needs to defend itself against "information colonialisrn. " With the uneven development of information technology (IT) in the world, some countries have emerged as the InformationSecurity.sincethe dominant players in the rnarket. Accordlate Iggos, information security has ing to current Chinese thinking, by monopolizing information become the top national security issue in resources China. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and industries, the advanced IT councalled on the whole nation to view the tries are attempting to penetrate, conarrival of the era of the "knowledge econtrol, and dump products in those counomy" both as a challenge and as an tries that are relatively bachward. Information colonialisrn can achieve the same opportunity. In June 2oOO, prominent figures in the General Equipment objectives that political, econornic, and Department of the People's Liberation military actions could in the past.7 (PLA) and the Xinhua News A"-y Despite the rapid growth of Internet Agency published an edited volume, users, China does not have an indigeXinxi Shidai (Wnning in the Information n o u s I T i n d u s t r y . I t s c o r n p u t e r c a p a c Juesheng
,4ge).This book elaborates on the powerful shock and enormous impact the information and electronic industry has had on world politics, economics, society, and national security. The book is a testamentto China's paramount concern about information security. 5 In the traditional Chinese national security paradigm, land, sea, and air were the "territories" to be defended. Now, the Internet has becorne a "fourth territory." In the Internet era, China's economic, political, and cultural sovereignty, and rnilitary security depend largely upon the effective administration of this fourth territory. Managing information is even more critical than managing flows of petroleum resources and is of the same strategic importance as air, sea, and land defense. National security is incomplete without sovereignty in the fourth territory.6
ity is only 8.6 percent of that of the United States. Moreover, /o percent of China's IT companies were facing bankruptcy or had to merge with other companies in 2Ooo.8 China is not in a strong position to defend its information security.
The Searchfor New Security Boundar ies. How does China respond to these new security threats? The Chinese g'overnment's answer is to build comprehensive national strength with a primary focus on inforrnation technology. The Chinese Academy of Sciences(CAS), the top national science and security body, has put forward rneasures to increase China's strength in information infrastructure, life sciences, genetic engineering, and other areas of science and technology. CAS
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does not believe that high technology can be imported or transferred to Chinaespecially the latest high technology. China wishes to develop its own self-sustaining high technology sector. Its goal is to be one of the top ten science and technology statesby the year 2OIO.s The best presentation of China's new strateg'yfor incorporating science and technology into its new irnage of national security is made by Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng of the PIA Military Academy of Sciences.A senior scientist, Huang identifies the following seven elements of national strength in his book/gnghe GuoliXinlun(NewTheoNationolStrengift) ' ry on Comprehensiue . Political shergth-po litical system, govern rnent quality, decision making and management, national cohesion, and political environment ; . Economic strengJh--econornic power, economic rystem,grossnational product (GNP), and foreign economic trade relatioru; . Science andtechnolog(S&T) strength-personnel quantity and quality, S&T investrnent, S&T equipment, and S&T system; . Nationaldefense sfrengthluantity and quality of defense forces, weaponry, defense science and technology, defense industry, defense concept, military theory, military orp.nization, and military training; . Culturaland educationa/ sfrengthluantity and qrl'aliry of teachers, scope and structure of education, level of national culture and education, and irnpact of traditional culture; . Diplomaticsfrength-foreign policy, foreign activities, international stance and attitude, and international contribution; and . Raource sheryth-natural resources, human resources,and information resources.'o According to Huang, if the United States'scomprehensive national strength is
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roo,Japan's is /o.8, Germany's 66.9, Russia's99.2, China's{9.9, andIndia's29.r. Huang makes seven recommendations to increase China's comprehensive national strength. First, he suggests establishing a national strategy of development and "general design headquarters" to coordinate the policy undertaking. Second, he recommends setting high information capability as a goal by 2OIO and concentrating on the development of electronic inforrnation technology. Third, Huang advocates establishing a strategy to build a strong China through science and technology. Fourth, he ernphasizesincreasing China's overall scientific and technological invention capability. Fifth, Huang favors a nationaI strategy to develop a knowledge-based econorny. Sixth, he suggestsbuilding a strong army through science and technology. According to Huang, by Zoro China should possessthe weapons systern and military technology that will enable it to win a high-technology regional war. Finally, he would establish a dernocratic scientific decision-making processin order to reach the goal ofsustainable development. Clearly, China envisions science and technology, particularly IT, as the key to its cornprehensive national strength. China was totally left behind when the West and other parts of the world entered the era of industrial revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Many observerspoint to this disconnect as the reason why the country suffered humiliation and invasion by strong powers from r8{o to Ig{g. They rnaintain that if China loses in the Information Age, the cost will be even greater than before." The IT revolution has particularly affected Chinese military affairs. Funda-
&Technology zHANGScience mentally, it was not warfare but the economy that drove the information Chinese military re-evaluation. Chinese PresidentJiang Zemin noted that developing the information economY and innovative thinking would be critical to China's development in the 2rst centu.y. H. stressedthat information is a key military factor in force building and warfare. According to Chinese military thinkers, high-tech weaPonry is the most important product of the information economy, and future warfare will essentially be a test of China's expertise in
nology development.'a Only o.9I Percent of China's GNP was sPent on Research and Development (R&D) in Iggo; that percentage dropped to o.64 Percent in IggJ. Developed countries spent more than 2 percent of GNP for R&D. Nearly ]o percent of China's R&D was financed by the government, whereasthe same percentagewas funded by the private sector in
the United Statesand Germany. How far is China from catching uP to developed countries' knowledge economies? According to Chinese estimates, China's development is forty years behind the United States. Chiinformation technologY.'' nese experts argue that if the current focus to Thus, China is determined (based on on science and technology, especially U . S . d e v e l o p m e n t i n d e x i n vestment, IT, in order to construct and defend k n o w l e d g e p r o d u c t i o n , storage, and flow) is roo, China is at new national security boundaries' only 26 percent of the American level.'5 Though IT is not the only security conAlthough many view it as the driving new cern, it is an integral part of all force behind the growth of comprehensecurity issues.Therefore, it is the corn e r s t o n e o f C h i n a ' s c o m p r e h e n s i v e sive national strength, the development of IT has been plagued by various probnational strength and security plans. Iems in China. These include lirnited investment sources (almost 6o percent of TeChnOlOg!.Chinamightbe on the all funding cornes from the governright track in seeking comprehensive ment); irrational distribution of the funds (almost 60 percent of all funding national strength. Yet China has not is earmarked for government R&D instiand been getting what it needs-science technology. The level of science and tutions); low productivity of the technology industry; low rate of conversion and technology in China is twenty to thirty application of scientific and technologiy e a r sb e h i n d t h e w o r l d s t a n d a r d ' C h i cal research; incompetent research perhas not yet na's agricultural technology sonnel; low level of technological import reached the U.S. level of the r96os; and inventive capability; and low quality the auto industry is barely at the U.S. I e v e l o f t h e r 9 6 o s ; s t e e l e n t e r p r i s e s a r e of national education''o China imports high technologY, but at U.S. levels during the r$6o-/os; had two problems in doing so. has it rail transport technology is at the E u r o p e a n , A m e r i c a n , a n d J a P a n e s e First, most of its budget is sPent on levels before the r96os; and rnanage- equiprnent, while only 20 percent goes towards technology. With key technoloment is more than twenty years behind gy remaining in the hands of foreign the advanced countries.'3 The private marketplace has barely companies, China's high tech enterprises cannot oPerate independently.'7 played a role in China's scienceand tech-
of Science& The Challenge
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Second, as observed by a U.S. specialist, even if China acquires advanced technology frorn overseas, China's civilian infrastructure is incapable of efficiently absorbing or converting it for Chinese use. China remains weak in hurnan capital, technological discipline, incentives, and institutions needed for technological progress.'u All these challenges have posed serious questions about China's strategy for comprehensive national strength. More accurately, there are fundarnental obstructions at the operational level of implementing this new national strategy that Chinese experts and authorities have noticed but may never tackle. First is the centralized science and technology developrnent system. While China perceives science and technology as the key to a strong state, the central government has not undertaken cornprehensive IT development on a national scale. Rather, the government has confined R&D to its affiliated institutions. One reason for such an approach is the central governrnent's lack of trust in local actors and the private sector. Another reason is that China has had a few confidenceb u i l d i n g s u c c e s s e si n c o n c e n t r a t i n g r e s o u r c e so n " n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t s , " s u c h as rnissiles, satellites, and nuclear weapons. On the whole, a centralized science and technology systernwill not provide China with a truly comprehensive national strength, but rather partial and limited achievements. The market must play a dominant role. Second, despite its ostensible enthusiasm, China has not consistently invested in science, technology, education, research, and development-elements that constitute a basic infrastructure for the energy, transportation, information,
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finance, and environmental sectors. This is a key reason why China continues to fall behind other developed countries. As a byproduct, "brain drain" is perhaps inevitable when China opens its door to the more developed world, and the situation will worsen if Beijing provides only lip service to science and technology. Incentives for both institutional and individual development must be in place. Third, national pride and honor rather than practical necessities often take precedence. What does "among the top ten science and technology statesin the world" really rnean for China? China is fond of rerninding the world of the rnany things it developed "first," and yet, for the past hundred years, it has contributed little to scientific and technological development. The Chinese governrnent is still allowing self-set objectives to trurnp sustainable growth and effectiveness. In the end, China prides itself on past science and technology breakthroughs, leaving the current science and technology gap with other countries unchanged.
Rethinking China'sNational Capahilities and Goals.china's science and technology-centered strategy for comprehensive national strength is poised to be the general guideline for Chinese national security over the next few decades. At the same time, critics of this strategy have made their voices heard in China. In an article entitled "Refusing to Catch Up," Mao Yushi lays out alternative strategies. He points out that all provincial and urban development plans in China focus on new high-tech industries. Mao calls this "unacceptable and misleading." Rather, hurnan and natural resources should be invested in con-
zHANGScience &Technology debate is open even to the outside world. Is China a strong power in the world? How fast can China develop? Is China's security environment satisfactory? Is the United States containing China? All of these issueshave been debated in China at both the public and official levels."' China's search for new security boundaries to fulfill the dream of a strong science and technology state is just beginning. China still does not seem to have a clear answer. Does the United Stateshave an answer, or at least the knowledge of what is really going on in China? Many think so, but an accurate understanding of Chinese national security is a more complicated task than most acknowledge. Over the past ten years, there have been many titles on Western best-seller In military affairs, Qiao Liang and lists dealing with China, addressing Wang Xianghui, two senior Chinese subjects from Chinese rnilitary threats to the collapse of (and rise of a new) colonels, produced a widely comrnented-upon book, Choo Xian flian (Warfare C h i n a . T h e s e w o r k s c o n t a i n g r e a t BgondRules).With regard to science and h y p o t h e s e s a n d p r e d i c t i o n s i n d e e d . Forward thinking is valuable, but a seritechnology, the book argr,resthat developing cutting-edge weapons could cause ous reading of the basic elements of Chinese national security today and how economic collapse. It warns that China each element will evolve tomorrow is should not spend itself into bankruptcy indispensable. While Americans have to fight battlefield wars with high-tech reached many conclusions about Chit h e weapons. Instead, according to authors, China could fight with whatev- nese national security today and in the future, the Chinese are still debating. er means it has, both rnilitary and nonWithout a full understanding of the rnilitary. It could, for exarnple, engage "asymmetrical s i t uation in China, it is irresponsible warfare" to strike in against vulnerable IT targets such as data t o c o m e u p w i t h p o l i c y r e c o m m e n d a 'Wang argue that tions. What this research suggests is networks. Qiao and China should not follow the Western that China is redefining its security path in either developing weaponry or b o u n d a r i e s , w h i c h a r e n o t m e r e l y defined in traditional geopolitical respecting the rules of war.'o terms. The best possible defense perOne positive aspectof a rapidly changceived by China is comprehensive ing China is that the government is not national strength. It would be prematrFrg to silence every different opinion on national development, especially those ture to determine whether or when concerning economic and security devel- C h i n a w i l l b e c o m e a s t r o n g s c i e n c e oprnent. Consequently, this vigorous and technology state. It would be a sumer goods demanded on China's market. "It is unrealistic," Mao Yushi writes, "to imagine that our country can surpass others in all fields." In order to reach the consumption level of other developed countries, China should depend on traditional industry rather than new high technology, he argrres. His bottom line is that rather than forcing the development of a high-tech econorny at the expense of other sectors, the government should allow the market to allocate resources and create a balanced econornic structure.'s Mao Yushi's provocative article sharply contrasts the official state strategy for national development. It criticizes the leadership's mentality as a caseof old Chinese "catch-up fever. "
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strategic mistake for the United States to unilaterally set the stage for inforrnation warfare, which rnay never occur between it and China. As China searches for its new security boundaries, it shares with other countries its
increasing national security vulnerability. The reality is that the building of Chinese comprehensive national strength will likely result in further security interdependence as much as in future security conflicts.
NOTES r
Gu
Shuzhong,
Director
of
the
Economic
Research Center, flionguo Resources Development Kene Boo (Chino ScienceNeus) 2 December 1998: 3. "Zhongguo Mianlin deJingji Anquan z ZhaoYin, ("China's Economic Security Problems") Menti," fltonguo Guoqing Cuoli (Chino National Conditions ond Strength) (February r 9 9 9 ), 3 r ; Zhao Zhiy rn and Yang Yuanhua,
! fltonguo $ngnian Bao (China fouth Dc$,) rg August r999, Internet edition. ro Huang Shufeng, Zong!,e CuoliKnlun(NeuTheogon OuerallNationolStrength)(Beijing, China Social Sciences P r e s s ,r g g g ) 1 2 - 1 3 . tr Zhao Hong and Guo Jifeng, fliishiJingji Huhuon Econom2 ls CollingUponChino)(BeUing, flionguo (Knouledge
Reforn Pressr9g8) r49. r2 "Forun on Studying Deng Xiaoping's Theory and Exploring the Features and Laws of Governing the Arm2 Military on New Terms," JiefangunBoo (Liberotion Dor!,)r Decenber rggS: 6. Research Center of the Internet edition; Econonic " Report on r3 Li Xuefeng, "Zhongguo Keji Heyi Buru Ren," State Economic and Trade Commission, ("Why Is China's Science and Technology Behind?") August Oil Reserves," Chinaonline 3 2ooo <http, //w. ondStrength) chinaonline. com >. fliongguoCuoqingCuoli(ChinaNationalConditions g Zhao, "Zhongguo April r9gg, 23. Mianlin de Jingji Anquan r4 L1 23. Menti" 32. r5 Li 23. Yin Zengqiang Jinrong {. Hu Jian, "Zhongguo t6ZhaoandCuo I54-161. Shili," ("China Should lncrease Financial Power") 17Li 2+. /tongguo Cuoging Cuoli (China Notronol Conditions and Strength) r8 Roger Cliff, "The Capacity To Deploy (Julyr999): r. g Wang Zhiyuan, Li Changwei, andJian Yan, eds., Advanced Military Technology, Institutional and Economrc, ond Organizational Factors," Instrtutional, Xrmi Shidoi(Wn In the Informotion,fut) (Be1itg, Juesheng Basisof Militory CopabJg, Proceedings of Orgonlzotionol Xinhua Press,2ooo). 'Wangluo Lintu'," the Conference Series, (Coliege Parkr University 6 Wu Jianguo, "Hanwei ( " Defend Internet Territo ry" ) J iefaq un Bao(People's Libof Maryland, November rgg|-March rggS) rggt March 2ooo, Internet edition. 230. erationArm2Doi!) 'Jujue 'Xinxi rg Mao Yushi, Ganchao," ("Refusing to / Chen Tieng and Huo Jing, "Guanzhu ( " W a t c h Catch Up") ft'ongguoCuoqingGuoll (Chlno NotionolCondithe Phenomenon Zhimin Zhuyi' Xianxiang," 'Information (September rggg): {. of Colonialism"') liefong"n Bao(People's tionsondStrength) Liberotion Ar47 Da$) 8 February 2ooo, Internet edi20 Qiao Liang and Wang Xianghui, ChaoXianflion (Worfor eBg ondRules)(Beij ing, PIA Art Press, r g g g ). tion. 2r "Zhongguo Shige Shijie Qiangguo ma?" (ls B fltongguoXimi Bao(Chino lnformotion "lfeos)2r April China a Srong Power in the World?), Seminar 2ooo; flionguo Booion Boo (China InsuranceNeu) z8 report, HucnqiuShibao(ClobolTimes) Zg August 2ooo. April 2ooo. "Zhanglue
Shiyou Shichang he Shiyou Jiaodian' ("Strategic Focus, Bixu Gaodu Jingjue," Market and Security") High AJert On Petroleum ft'onguo GuofongBoo (ChinoDefense"lferos)16 August 2ooo,
Anquan
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0wnership of U.S.Telecoms Alan Pearce What is wrong with Deutsche Telekorn (DT), France Telecom (FT), Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTI), and a host of other major international telecommunications and wireless cornpanies? The answer is that none of them has becorne fully privatized lile, for example, BT (formerly British Telecom) and Cable & Wireless (C & W). In other words, DT, FT, and NTT, along with many other state telephone companies, are still partially and even majority owned by their governrnents. Why is this important? It is significant because legislation that was on the verge of becoming law in the ro6th U.S. Congresswould have had the effect of severelylimiting the business flexibility and competitiveness of government- owned cornpanies like DT and NTT. Indeed, the legislation's intent was to make sure that the Federal Communications Cornmission (FCC) refused to permit either company from acquiring U. S. - owned telecommunications - information- entertainment (TIE) companies that it licenses. This is because both DT and NTI, aswell as many other telecommunications corrrpanies in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, are more than 2$ percent government- owned. Convergence, consolidation, competition, and globalization are the major characteristics of the burgeoning TIE industry. Yet foreign-owned companies that are not fully pri-
Alan Pearce i. Presidentof Information
Age Economics,
Inc.,
a Washington,
DC-based
research and
consulting
firm.
was formerly Economist
He
Chief at the Fed-
eral Comnunications Commission; Economist House
Chief
of the
of Representa-
tives Telecommunications
Subcommittee;
and Chief and Senior Advisor
Economist Policy
in the Offfce
of Telecommunications Policy,
Executive
Office
of the President.
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He added that he would "continue to oppose" transactions such as the VoiceStream-DT deal." The purpose of the current political is to derail Deutsche hullabaloo Telekom's proposed $4r billion purchase of VoiceStream Wireless Corp. of Bellevue, Washington, one of the nation's leading wireless telecommunications companies. And because congressional opposition is bipartisan and broadly based, there are allegations that that market. the politicians are suffering from xenoThe Bill, Directed solely at "foreign phobia and jingoism, accusations that they strenuously deny. governrnent" ownership of U.S. telecomThe Hollings bill had broad biparticompanies, munications-information The Foreign Gol ernment Investment Act san support in both the Senate and the of 2ooo was designed to prevent so-called House. Indeed, Senate Majority Leader "inforrnation age irnperialisrn. "' The priTrent Lott, who is opposed to the "ridmary goal of the bill, introduced by Sen- ers," initially supported Hollings and even co-sponsored a similar bill. Then, ator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings, was to Prevent the FCC from transferring wireless in an apparent change ofheart, he went licenses to companies owned 2$ percent along with former Senator Slade Gorton, who represented the state in which or more by a foreign government. In order to put the proposed legislation on a VoiceStream is headquartered. Accord"fast track," Senator Hollings added a ing to The New Tork Times,VoiceStream more than rider to a year-end spending bill that e x e c u t i v e s c o n t r i b u t e d $roo,ooo to the Gorton campaignand included a ban on foreign governrnent the Republican Party.3 ownership of U.S.-owned telecorn comIn spite of the pre-election jockeying, panies. An identical arnendment to the senior Capitol Hill staffers say that the appropriations bill for the Commerce, State, and Justice Departments had issue will not go away. Indeed, they predict that there is so much genuine feeling already been stripped. Although the "ridagainst foreign government control of ers" were omitted from the appropriations bills passed before Congress U.S.-owned TIE companies that legislarecessed,the messagewas clear, There is tion will be taken up again early in the wide support on Capitol Hill for legisla- rofth Congress.
vatized now fear that their business strategiescould be frustrated by powerful U.S. politicians. They take seriously the threat that legislation which was almost enacted in the Io6th Congress will be reintroduced in the Io7th. An objective analysis of the issues demonstrates that TIE cornpanies currently controlled by foreign governrnents do not pose a threat to the global TIE market or to American firms in
tion that prevents foreign governments from buying into American companies, even though the foreign governments in question are attemPting to privatize as quickly as the capital markets permit. Senator Hollings said that he was glad he "advanced an important discussion about privatization worldwide."
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How It All Begafl.InJuly2ooo, DT made a $55.7 billion bid (the stock rnarket collapse over the past eight months has significantly reduced the value of the deal) to acquire VoiceStream. At the time, DT was $B Percent owned by the German government.
PEARcE sCienCe &Technology Almost as soon as the proposed acquisition was announced, VoiceStream said that in an attempt to become a truly national wireless carrier, it would buy Powertel Inc., based in the south east, for $6.2! billion. This acquisition adds 727,ooo customers to VoiceStream's 2.7 million users. VoiceStream currently serves markets that are home to about fg percent of the U.S. population. With Powertel added, the combined cornpany would expand its reach to go percent. Before its latest proposed acquisition, VoiceStream had acquired Omnipoint Corp., based in suburban Washington, DC, and Aerial Communications Inc. of Chicago. VoiceStream uses Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), the same wireless technology standard that is dominant in Europe. By merging with DT, the combined company would have the ability to begin to compete globally. It is this potential for global coverage-and dominance-that apparently sparked the opposition on Capitol Hill. U.S. law already statesthat a company that is rnore than 2$ percent owned by a foreign governrnent cannot acquire an FCC-issued communications license. The Cornrnission also has rules requiring U.S. carriers to noti$ the FCC and to seek its approval before entering into affiliations with foreign carriers. Some might ask, "What's the problem?" The problern is that lawrnakers are afraid that the Commission would assert its authority to waive the restriction if it believes that allowing the deal would promote the interests of U.S. consumers. Since this seemed likely, legislation was quickly introduced in both the House and the Senate. The Hollings bill won quick support from Senator Lott, Senator Ted Stevens,
Chairman of the SenateAppropriations Cornmittee, and Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle. A bill introduced in the House by Congressmen John Dingell and Ed Markey closely approximated Senator Hollings's bill. Congressman Markey, perhaps in order to stem criticism, protested, "It is not protectionist. It is not driven by xenophobia." He added that by setting limits, the measure gives foreign governments greater incentive to privatize. + In a WashinglonPostarticle, Congressrnan Markey was quoted as saying, "The German governrnent has a significant stake in the successof one cornpany in their country. As a result, they have a substantial stake in the failure of everyone else."5 Key House Republicans also joined in opposing the merger, cornplaining that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) did not view government ownership of foreign telecommunications firms "as a priority." The House Commerce Committee Chairman in the ro6th Congress Thornas Bliley, House Telecommunications Subcornmittee Chairrnan Billy Thuzin, and Subcornrnittee Vice Chairman Michael Oxley, wrote "a strongly worded" letter to thenU.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefs\ demanding assurances that she was comrnitted to the "full and complete" privatization of foreign carriers, for example DT and NTT. The letter was triggered, in part, by the testirnony of forrner Deputy USTR, Richard Fisher, before the U.S. Congress on foreign ownership issuesin telecommunications and, in particular, on the substance of related legislation.6 The somewhat frantic legislative activity in the Io6th Congress prompted responses both in support of, and in opposition to, the House and Senatebills.
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The European lJnion warned that the legislation would violate U.S. commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on opening up telecommunications-information markets and permitting foreign companies to invest in dornestic carriers.T Both the EU and the Japanese governrnent said in writing that they would challenge the legislation before the WTO if it ever became law.' Michael Noll, a Professor at the University of Southern California who testified in support of the legislation, "strongly" opposed permitting foreign government-owned companies from acquiring U.S. telecommunications-information companies. He said, "Many of these countries, including Germany, have not privatized, and the governments own substantial portions of the carriers' stock. It's simply information age irnperialism... [Witho,rt such legislation] you're in essence allowing foreign governrnents to own public airways and public rights-ofway, and that's something national sovereignry says no to." Noll added that he prefers legislation that would ban foreign firms owned by as little as one percent by a foreign government from acquiring U.S. telecom licenses.n Both the Communication Workers of America and the U.S. Chamber of Cornmerce opposed the legislation. The Chamber of Commerce fears that, if passed,the legislation would violate commitments made in the Basic Telecom Agreement of the WTO and could possibly start a trade war.'" Perhaps in response to Congressional criticism, the German government wrote to the White House saying that the government stake in DT would go from $8 percent to zero, but did not specifr how Iong that would take. German Chancellor
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Gerhard Schroeder's foreign policy and security adviser, Michael Steiner, assured then-U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger in writing that Germany is committed to privatising DT and also to increasing competition in the telecommunications industry. " The Japanese Government, for its part, announced plans to sell one million of its shares in theJapanese telecommunications giant NTI. Japan's Ministry of Finance owns g! percent of NTT. NTT has had its own problems with the U.S. government. Early in 2ooo it agreed to buy Verio Inc., an Internet service provider and web hosting company, for $g.g billion, chump change by industry standards. The deal drew political fire because of fears that it could present a foreign espionage risk by giving NTT accessto U.S. wiretapping activities. The Federal Bureau of lnvestigation looked into the acquisition, along with U.S. teasury, State Department, and National Security Council officials. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which monitors the effect of foreign investments on national security, found that NTT had satisfied U.S. concerns. President Clinton refused Congressional requests to block the deal after NTT prornised that it would supplement Verio's operations policies and manuals with information on handling requests by law enforcement agencies,including security procedures to protect classified inforrnation." A second problem with N-I'I concerned the relatively high rates it charges competitors for accessto its local network inJapan. Former U.S. tade Representative Charlene Barshefsky averted a crisis when she negotiated an agreement requiring Nl[*T to cut its rates for accessby 20 percent over the next two years. The
PEARcE Science &Technology U.S. wanted an immediate 4r percent cut, while Japan proposed a 22.5 percent reduction phased in over four years.'3 But no one on Capitol Hill raised a voice in protest when BT bought Zo percent of McCaw Communications, which at the time was one of America's three largest wireless telecommunica-
tions, without any form of official or independent regulation. Most countries of the world have now agreed-willingly or otherwise-to adopt a U.S. -style model where nationalized companies will be privatized, although sorne more slowly than others. In addition to privatization, WTO member countries
different COuntrieSadOpteda compl.etely rnodel in bringils telecornrnunications and inforrnation servicesto their citizens. tions companies. BT was richly rewarded for its investment when the cornpany was later sold to AT&T (it is no* known as AT&T Wireless). Cable & Wireless was also given quick U.S. government approval when it agreed to purchase the Internet backbone capacity of MCI after MCI had been acquired by WorldCom. Both BT and C &W were government- owned entities until the Thatcher Government began to privatize both companies in rg8{. But as in all privatizations, the British government held stakes in both companies well into the rggos. In the case of DT, the privatization started rnuch later, though over tirne the Gerrnan g o v e r n m e n t ' s s t a k ew i l l d i m i n i s h . What is overlooked or deliberately ignored is that the vast majority of the world's countries adopted a completely different model in bringing telecomrnunications and information services to their citizens.While the U.S. decided to put its faith in the market, going initially with a regulated monopoly, AT&T, and then adopting the current system of regulated competition, most other countries had nationalized, integrated post, telegraph, and telephone administra-
must also establishnew independent regulatory rnechanisrns where none existed before, permit competitive entry (including cornpetition frorn foreign-owned companies), and agree to promote universal information age serwices.
What ShouldBe Done?with privatization, regulation, and competition being promoted throughout the worldor at least among the r38 WTO Members-what is all of the fuss about? This question can be addressed on severallevels. Is it wise to pass sorne sort of legisla* tion dealing with government-owned foreign telecornrnunications firms in the rolth Congress? Is existing policy sufficient to encourage rapid privatization? Does the United States have anything to fear from allegations of "information age imperialism?" Will the globalization and consolidation trend in the TIE industry continue, regardless of what happens with U.S. politics and policy? Is enacting legislation the smart thing to do? It would be unwise for the U.S. Congress to pass legislation along the lines of the House and Senate bllls in the ro6th Congress. It may also be foolhardy to re-introduce the legislation, as is
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being threatened, in the Io/th Congress. scrutinized NTI's acquisition of Verio. Legislation, if passed and signed by Competitors of VoiceStream can President Bush, would merely invoke oppose the merger by filingwith the FCC reprisals. Indeed, RickI-ane, the director or with the Department of Justice of e-commerce and Internet technology Antitrust Division. If they are not satisfor the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, fied by the public poliry processesavailfears that a bill would "severely curtail able to them, they can choose to file investment in the U.S. and possibly creagainst the merger in Rderal District ate a major trade war. "'a Court, although this can be costly and Is existing policy sufficient to encourtime consuming. age rapid privatization? In a word, yes. For its part, the U.S. governrnent can Even though the legislative effort failed lodge a complaint with the WTO in in the ro6th Congress, there are still a Geneva. The WTO, which is just five number of U.S. policy obstaclesto over- years old, has never wavered from its come before DT acquires VoiceStrearn. commitrnent to full privatization in the The first obstacle is FCC review and t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - i n f o r m a t i o n approval or disapproval of all mergers industry. However, those privatizations and acquisitions in the TIE industry. must be given time to unfold because of The FCC is required by law to considthe Iimited resources of many overseas er whether transfers of ownership are capital markets. in the public interest. The CornmisIs "information age imperialism" a s i o n c a n a l s o p l a c e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e real or irnagined threat? Information rnerger in order to maintain a regulaage irnperialism, if it is a threat at all, tory grip on the cornbined companies' is much rnore likely to be a U.S.-cre-
Informationageimperialism, if it isa
threat at all, is much rrrore likelv to be a U.S.created phenomenon than a legitinrate Europein or Asian threat. operations. Even state-level regulators get into the public policy implications concerning mergers and acquisitions and can impose conditions if deemed necessary. The U.S. government inter-agency task force known as the Committee on Foreign Investments, headed by the Secretary of the teasury, must also exarnine the merger in order to seewhether or not it poses any national security threats. It was the Comrnittee on Foreign Investments that
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ated phenornenon than a legitimate European or Asian threat. It is a fact that U.S. companies are the dorninant forces in the global TIE industry, with such dominance likely to continue well into the foreseeable future. It was the TIE industry, with its close ties to the Internet and the World Wide Web, that fueled the United States's economic resurgence in the rggOs. U.S. dominance is not limited to mega-corporations like Microsoft, Cisco Systems,
PEARcE Science &Technology AOL-Time Warner, Disney, AT&T, Verizon. SBC Communications. WorldCom, and Yahoo. It also includes the growing demand from overseasTIE companies for American management skills. Indeed, Grahame Lynch, the Group Editorial Director of Advanstar Communications, noted. "As Western Europe and developed Asia liberalize, American telecom executives are in hot demand. Both incumbent and competitive carriers in many international markets are keen to bypass the often-bureaucratic bent of their domestic executive ranks and hire sawyAmericans in their placs."'s All of this suggeststhat U.S. cornpanies are more than holding their own in a complex global competitive environment, and that they do not need the protection of the U.S. Congress.
Will globalization and consolidation continue regardless of the xenophobic and jingoistic murmurings on Capitol Hill? Absolutely. The next "foreign company scare" for the politicians might come frornJapan. NTT DoCoMo Inc., Japan's largest mobile telephone company, is said to have designs on severalU.S.-owned wireless carriers, including AT&T Wireless and Cingular, the newly created wireless venture of the BellSouth Corporation and SBC Communications, Inc.'6 So there is no problem to fix, and any potential concerns that could arise can be handled by the existing public policy expert agencies. As a result, the roTth Congress should back off. Xenophobia and jingoism have no place in U.S. politics, or in a modern, booming United States.
NOTES t See Professor Michael Noll of The Annenberg School of Communications, University of Southern California, as quoted in Wreless l4lee,t rr September 2 O o O :$ . (Washington, DC, Deuelopments 2 CurrentTelecom Paul, Weiss,Riftind, Wharton & Garrison, 2J October 2ooo) 2i and "Deutsche Telekom Gains In Bid for VoiceStream," TheNewYorkTimer2 7 October 2 ooo :
Weefr rr September 2ooo: 5. 9 See Wreless ro See WrelesWeekrt September 2ooo: 5. rr "Deutsche Telekom PurchaseMay SeeA Hurdle Removed," WollStreetloumal 2/ September 2ooo; and (Washington, DC, Paul, CurrentTelecomDeuelopment Weiss, Ri{kind, Wharton & Garrison, 29 September 2000) r-2. 12 "U.S. Panel ClearsN.T.T. Web Acquisition," c8. TheNeuforkTimes 16 August 2ooo: C4; and "Telecom 2!July ! "Communications Lobby Puts Full-Court Press Giant Stlll Reign inJapan," TheWashingtonPost on Congress," TheNeu fork Times24 October 2ooo: 2 O O O :H r . Ar. 13 "U.S.,Japan Reach Deal Over NTT," WollStreet { "TakeoverAdvanceslJnder Hill Fire," TheWash- ./oumolrgJuly 2ooo: Ar. inglonPon 8 September 2ooo: E3. t4 "l:wmakers Prepare Move Against Foreign Omership," WrelesWekrr September 2ooo: g. $ "Takeover By Gernan Firm Tests Free Trade," TheWoshinglonPost r! "Perils and payoff of telecon IPR; Industry / Septenber 2ooo: Er. 6 See AIan Pearce, "Curb That Xenophobia," Trend or Event," Ameico'sNetuorlr r$ Septenber 2ooor America'sNetwork I November 2oOo: 28. 6. 'VoiceStream 'Japan's Deal Could Clear Hurdle," USA 16 Mobile Phone Giant Is in Thlls on / Iodg 2/ September 2ooo, 38. Investing in U.S," The Neu YorkTimesWrld Business,r 8 SeeWireless Wee,t rr September rr 2ooo: g. November2oOO:WI.
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and Kevin Carter. Though they were ernployed by different news organizations, the Club members found strength Reuieu and support in one another while workfol Markus Cleverley ing in life -threatening situations. The images contained within this work Greg Marinovich and Joio Silva. The no doubt that these photojournalHidden War. leave Bang-BangClub, Snapshots a from N e w Y o r k , B a s i c B o o l a , 2 O O O , 3 2 o p p . ists were as daring as the world they covered was crazy. Like Forrest Gurnp, who $z6.oo. always seemed to be in the right place One could argrre that there is no longer a during significant historical moments, need for the fantasies of fiction after they found themselves present during many of the key events on South Africa's reading the accounts of these photographers put to paper. The physical and road to dernocracy (with occasional stints ernotional circurnstances of violence, i n S o m a l i a , B o s n i a , R w a n d a , a n d Sudan). At other times, however, these politics, and government conspiracy in which the authors found themselves are photographers found themselves caught almost too dramatic to be true; yet the in the crossfire of the daily and all-tooforty-plus startling photographs includcommon township violence. Marinovich ed within the book attest to their veracity. was wounded four times, risking his life "The Bang-Bang Club," as this informal to capture images on film. Of the four core members of the Club, two survived. group of South African photojournalists Ken Oosterbroek lost his life in the viocarne to be known, consisted primarily of lence, while Kevin Carter committed four work-related friends, among them Pulitzer Prize winners Greg Marinovich suicide. The two surviving mernbers,
Photographer
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Marinovich and Jolo Silva, narrate this account of the Bang-Bang Club, covering a period frorn about Iggo to rgg{. The work itself is not the most academic or scholarly of bools-by no means are the authors professional writers or political analysts. Nevertheless, the writing of Marinovich and Silva is honest and insightful. Moreover, it touches upon powerful lessons of hurnan morality.
At the appearance of anything remotely violent, the Bang-Bang Club was there to cover it. Members witnessed and photographed riots, shootings, killings, and much more. They were present as thousands of Zulu warriors marched down Khumalo Street, Thokoza, at the start of the so-called "Hostel War." They photographed policemen firing into the unarmed
Theirnages COntained*.itt-rinthiswork
leave no doubt that these photojournalists were as daring as the world they coveied was crazy. Haunted by the horrors they witnessed and by the friends that they lost, Marinovich and Silva confess that the often introspective work seryesas a catharsisfor themselves, if nothing else. Fortunately for us, their story is worth being told. It is a frank, first-hand perspective of a history that many know but only through the photos the Bang-Bang Club have taken. Marinovich was forced to flee South Africa for failing to appear in court for exposing pictures of township violence that he took. Upon his return he continued, with his friends, to follow the outbreals of violence between African National Congress (ANC) members and the predorninantly Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedorn Party (IFP), wherein an estimated r4,ooo people were killed. The authors speak out against the "peacekeeping" troops, who shot and killed Oosterbroek. They portray the "peacekeepers" as the primary instigators of the violence, supplying the IFP with arms (u fact later confirmed through the Goldstone Commission) and employing various tactics to create tension and instabilitv within the ANC.
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crowd at Boipatong after President F.W. de Klerk was chased out. They covered the funeral of Chris Hani, the fall of the Ciskei horneland, and the ANC-IFP clashes in Alexandria township, and they were first on the scene when the extreme right-wing AWB (Afrikaner 'Weerstandsbeweging, the Afrikaner ResistanceMovement) attempted to establish its regime in Bophuthatswana. The list goes on. Marinovich and Silva describe each of these events in detail as they communicate their account from a photographer' s perspective. TheBang-BangClubhighlights profound issuesofjournalism with which the photographers continually struggled. The authors incorporate moral questions of photojournalism as well as the impact their eyewitnessaccounts of violence had on their mental well-being. Which photos should not be printed because they are too gruesome to view? How will a photo affect public awareness?At what point does one put the camera down in order to lend a helping hand? Does witnessing an atrocity bring a moral responsibility to act?
Books These questions are clearly influenced by Kevin Carter's story. Carter's assignment in Sudan was a double-edged sword-what he saw and photographed washis claim to fame, but it also led to his undoing. He photographed a famished young child in Somalia that had a vulture by his side, waiting for the child to die. The received international photo acclaim, but also left the public wondering what the photographer did to help the child. The answer: nothing. Each day Carter washaunted by the burden of guilt he felt for not aiding the child. This weight, coupled with the stressof his job and a problern with narcotics abuse, left Carter an emotional mess. Not long after receiving the Pulitzer Prize for the photo, he took his own life. In contrast, Marinovich won the Pulitzer Prize for a photo he took of a burning man, whose aggny he had attempted to prevent. The Bang-Bang experience is almost larger than life. Though its members were perhaps partly on a crusade for fame and excitement, they also grasped the opportunity to make a difference in the world by creating snapshots of the hidden war. Not only do the photos evoke a powerful array of emotions, the words of Marinovich and Silva support an imagery that cannot be solely defined by film. Their words grasp the emotion, pain, and suffering of the artist. M a r k u s C l e v e r l e y i s a n A n a l y sa t t N . M . R o t h s c h i l d& Sonsin Washington,DC. A recentgraduatein International Politicsfrom GeorgetownUniversity,his najor interests affairs.
include
South African
politics
and contemporary
AnAlternative to l(ickAssDiplomacy Reuiew!lJoseph
V. Montville
John D. Steinbruner. Pinciplesof Globol Securilt. Washington, Brookings Institut i o n P r e s s ,2 o o o , 2 7 2 p p . $ r 8 . o 5 . John Steinbmner, Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and a Brookings mainstay for decades, opens and closes this meticulously researched and comprehensive study with references to former Senator Sam Nunn. The first comes in a report on a series of meetings in r99r, where security specialists and government officials wrestled with the threat to international security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation. A conclusion was emerging from the discussions that the traditional concept of international security through deterrence based on the confrontation of opposing military forces was, in itself, a major threat. The United States, its allies, and the rest of humankind would have rnuch greater security through a policy of reassurance based on collaborative rules designed to head off mobilization in response to perceived threats from an adversary. A policy of reassurance would entrench the advantagesof hotlines, confidence-building measures, joint exercises, and many other new cooperative relationships between competitors. Deterrence relies on a continuous threat. Reassurance would rely on restraining threats with persuasive, real-world data. Nunn remarked to his colleagues, "Well, you have human nature and all of history going against you there. What have you got going for you?"
Winter/Spring roor Ir r 5l
Books These questions are clearly influenced by Kevin Carter's story. Carter's assignment in Sudan was a double-edged sword-what he saw and photographed washis claim to fame, but it also led to his undoing. He photographed a famished young child in Somalia that had a vulture by his side, waiting for the child to die. The received international photo acclaim, but also left the public wondering what the photographer did to help the child. The answer: nothing. Each day Carter washaunted by the burden of guilt he felt for not aiding the child. This weight, coupled with the stressof his job and a problern with narcotics abuse, left Carter an emotional mess. Not long after receiving the Pulitzer Prize for the photo, he took his own life. In contrast, Marinovich won the Pulitzer Prize for a photo he took of a burning man, whose aggny he had attempted to prevent. The Bang-Bang experience is almost larger than life. Though its members were perhaps partly on a crusade for fame and excitement, they also grasped the opportunity to make a difference in the world by creating snapshots of the hidden war. Not only do the photos evoke a powerful array of emotions, the words of Marinovich and Silva support an imagery that cannot be solely defined by film. Their words grasp the emotion, pain, and suffering of the artist. M a r k u s C l e v e r l e y i s a n A n a l y sa t t N . M . R o t h s c h i l d& Sonsin Washington,DC. A recentgraduatein International Politicsfrom GeorgetownUniversity,his najor interests affairs.
include
South African
politics
and contemporary
AnAlternative to l(ickAssDiplomacy Reuiew!lJoseph
V. Montville
John D. Steinbruner. Pinciplesof Globol Securilt. Washington, Brookings Institut i o n P r e s s ,2 o o o , 2 7 2 p p . $ r 8 . o 5 . John Steinbmner, Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and a Brookings mainstay for decades, opens and closes this meticulously researched and comprehensive study with references to former Senator Sam Nunn. The first comes in a report on a series of meetings in r99r, where security specialists and government officials wrestled with the threat to international security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation. A conclusion was emerging from the discussions that the traditional concept of international security through deterrence based on the confrontation of opposing military forces was, in itself, a major threat. The United States, its allies, and the rest of humankind would have rnuch greater security through a policy of reassurance based on collaborative rules designed to head off mobilization in response to perceived threats from an adversary. A policy of reassurance would entrench the advantagesof hotlines, confidence-building measures, joint exercises, and many other new cooperative relationships between competitors. Deterrence relies on a continuous threat. Reassurance would rely on restraining threats with persuasive, real-world data. Nunn remarked to his colleagues, "Well, you have human nature and all of history going against you there. What have you got going for you?"
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M O N T VI L L E
At the end of the book, Steinbruner reports on a r999 Aspen Strategy Group meeting on the United States'srelationship with Russia and its implications for international security. The experts, including high government officials, were still very worried about the threat stemming from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a condition intensifled by further deterioration of Russian safegrrards and nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. There was a consensus that international security relationships
the rich and the poor. Each factor is influenced by the rapid rate of population growth. Sustaining the world's projected population in 20?g will require tripling energ'y and doubling food production while mitigating the negative environmental consequences. International security policy will not be able to endure as a stand-alone phenomenon. It will evolve in combination with the pursuit of global prosperity, the expanding need for social welfare, and the prevention or containment of
Principles0f GlobalSecurityreminds
me of one of those ased, hefty Christmas fruitcakes packed with rich ingredients. had to be transformed, but neither a plan on how to achieve it nor an agreernent that transformation was possible emerged. By this time, Sam Nunn had an answer. "We rnust reverse the course of history," he said. Principluof Global Secunltis John Steinbruner's weighty contribution to the task of transformation of international security relationships. The book assesses the technical and psychological problems posed by contemporary nuclear deterrence policy. It also offers practical solutions for reducing the threat of disaster by accident, confusion, or system breakdown. It analyzesthe rnissions of conventional forces and the assurnptionsof U.S. political planners about our rights as the sole remaining superpower. Many factors are forcing us to rethink international security concepts, including the runaway technological advances driving globalization, seriotrs transnational threats to the environment, and the increasing gap in income between
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political violence. These vast systemic changes will cause tension between the United States, China, and Russia, as the imbalance in current deterrence relationships becomes more apparent. The potential for nuclear catastrophe ten years after the end of the Cold W-ar rernains staggering. In rgg8, using only {o percent of its weapons capacity, Russia was capable of killing /g million Americans. The United States, rneanwhile, could kill 65 rnillion Russianswith only one-third of its nuclear arsenal. Even with expected reductions in nuclear forces on both sides, the potential for reciprocal holocaust remains stunning. In Prfncrples of GlobalSecurilt,Steinbruner is not proposing to dismantle the nuclear deterrent, but rather to downsize and reorganize the systemto rnake it safer. He offers his suggestions in a conceptual language that reveals his mastery of the arcane vocabulary of nuclear deterrence theory, an element that the non-specialist reader will find challenging.
Books Principles of GlobalSecuri! reminds me of relationships. Ultimately, Steinbruner's one of those aged, hefty Christmas fruitviews belong to an emerging conceptual cakes packed with rich ingredients. structure within which ideas of prevenThere is no way to indicate the rewards tive diplomacy and preventive defense awaiting the reader in a short review. are gaining some attention. These ideas There is intricate dissection of defense do not require us to love other people. budgets, technical data on the clutter of They only require us to be srnart enough satellite systemsin space, and the implito acknowledge the threat from weapons cations of this for space-based defense of mass destruction in a world racked systems. There is information on the with dernographic explosion, global epidispersal rates and killing capacity of demics, environmental degradation, biological pathogens, and, of course, and economic shock. With such an detailed tables with inventories of conunderstanding, we can begin to take ventional and nuclear weapons of many some prudent steps for our own safety. countries. But for all the technical disThis does not seern to be asking too cussion, there is a persistent vein of sen- much of Americans. And that is what sitivity to hurnan factors. John Steinbruner is asking of us. I am particularly grateful for Steinis Director of the Preventive Joseph V, Montville bruner's sensible approach to reducing Diplonacy Program at the Cente. for Strategic and Interthe danger of Russia'snuclear weapons. n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s . The author recognisesthe need to find a way to include Russia in the United States's security arrangements, much as it did with Germany and Japan after World War II. To succeed, the United Reuiew b7Thornas W. Robinson States and the industriaiized dernocracies will have to assist Russia not only in rnilitary security, but also in the painful Robert D. Blackr,yilland Paul Dibb, eds. America's,4,sianAlliances.Cambridge, The transitions necessaryfor the creation of a viable market econorny and functionMITPress, zooo, r43 pp. $45.oo harding democracy. cover, $17.g5 paperback. There is a tenacious school of thought in many think tanks and graduate securiSince the end of the Cold War, the ty studies programs advocating what I call United States has rested on its laurels, "kick-ass diplornacy." Its approach is both as concerns its overall security policy reflected in the structure and prograrns and its approach to rnilitary-related quesof deterrence policy and practice. Stein- tions in thevarious regions. The GulfWar bruner acknowledges that, traditionally, victory and the several interventions the United Stateshas needed an enemy in since, including recent operations in order to stayfocused on foreign affairs. It Kosovo, were seen as proof of Arnerican is not easy to envision a painless transimilitary invincibility. to international tion an community that With the fall of the Soviet Union, the includes mutually safe and sustained need for fighting a global conflict has disd e v e l o p m e n t , U . S . s t e w a r d s h i p , a n d appeared, leaving only the possibility of mature management of international one or two regional conflicts-together
Future A Pacific
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Books Principles of GlobalSecuri! reminds me of relationships. Ultimately, Steinbruner's one of those aged, hefty Christmas fruitviews belong to an emerging conceptual cakes packed with rich ingredients. structure within which ideas of prevenThere is no way to indicate the rewards tive diplomacy and preventive defense awaiting the reader in a short review. are gaining some attention. These ideas There is intricate dissection of defense do not require us to love other people. budgets, technical data on the clutter of They only require us to be srnart enough satellite systemsin space, and the implito acknowledge the threat from weapons cations of this for space-based defense of mass destruction in a world racked systems. There is information on the with dernographic explosion, global epidispersal rates and killing capacity of demics, environmental degradation, biological pathogens, and, of course, and economic shock. With such an detailed tables with inventories of conunderstanding, we can begin to take ventional and nuclear weapons of many some prudent steps for our own safety. countries. But for all the technical disThis does not seern to be asking too cussion, there is a persistent vein of sen- much of Americans. And that is what sitivity to hurnan factors. John Steinbruner is asking of us. I am particularly grateful for Steinis Director of the Preventive Joseph V, Montville bruner's sensible approach to reducing Diplonacy Program at the Cente. for Strategic and Interthe danger of Russia'snuclear weapons. n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s . The author recognisesthe need to find a way to include Russia in the United States's security arrangements, much as it did with Germany and Japan after World War II. To succeed, the United Reuiew b7Thornas W. Robinson States and the industriaiized dernocracies will have to assist Russia not only in rnilitary security, but also in the painful Robert D. Blackr,yilland Paul Dibb, eds. America's,4,sianAlliances.Cambridge, The transitions necessaryfor the creation of a viable market econorny and functionMITPress, zooo, r43 pp. $45.oo harding democracy. cover, $17.g5 paperback. There is a tenacious school of thought in many think tanks and graduate securiSince the end of the Cold War, the ty studies programs advocating what I call United States has rested on its laurels, "kick-ass diplornacy." Its approach is both as concerns its overall security policy reflected in the structure and prograrns and its approach to rnilitary-related quesof deterrence policy and practice. Stein- tions in thevarious regions. The GulfWar bruner acknowledges that, traditionally, victory and the several interventions the United Stateshas needed an enemy in since, including recent operations in order to stayfocused on foreign affairs. It Kosovo, were seen as proof of Arnerican is not easy to envision a painless transimilitary invincibility. to international tion an community that With the fall of the Soviet Union, the includes mutually safe and sustained need for fighting a global conflict has disd e v e l o p m e n t , U . S . s t e w a r d s h i p , a n d appeared, leaving only the possibility of mature management of international one or two regional conflicts-together
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with assorted "peacekeeping" duties and the rising question of terrorism-as perceived threats to American security. Most attention has been paid to the Middle East, Southern Europe, and East Africa as loci of such possibilities. And with North Korea's self-induced deterioration due to rapidly declining gross national product and widespread starvation, Washington rested easier even in Asia, where the United States retained real alliances and continued security guarantorships. In that region, the policy continued to be "forward deployment," "placesnot bases," "cornprehensive engagement," "defense guidelines rnodernization," and "transparency and confidence -building. "
ship between this state of affairs and the development of partnerships linking the United States and various Asian nations against the background of the region's high instability. Nonetheless, unease has recently crept into official thinking, amplified by a few scholars and analysts in the think tank world, generating a small but grow'W-ar ing literature on post-post Cold security relations, globally and in Asia. America's,Asian Alliances repres ents o ne co n tribution to this literature. The driving force behind the current debate is not only the realization that the United States cannot remain king of the hill forever merely through a few superficial changes in its pro-status quo policy, but Overall, the United States has not also that the facts on the ground are worried about the changing Asian secu- changing. Pressing issues include the rity equation, despite several disturbing challenge posed by China's growing trends. In Northeast Aia, such devel- power, Japan's gradual re-ernergence as oprnents include the near-war with a full-scale military power, the changing Pyongyang in I994 over nuclear nature of the Korean question, Southweapons, two direct Chinese military eastAsian stability, and the several South (the threats to Thiwan in rg94 and 1996 Asian issues centered around India. latter of which could have seen direct America's Asian Alliancesconsists of six American participation in Thiwan's short chapters. The Australian editor, d e f e n s e ) , t h e r e - e m e r g e n c e o f t h e Paul Dibb, writes on the Asian strategic Sino-Russian alliance against the Unitenvironment, and the American editor, ed States, and the general rise of ChiRobert Blackwill, recommends an "action agenda" for the United Statesin na's military power projection. Meanwhile, the exacerbation of the Kashrnir the region. The other chapters, with dispute between India and Pakistan, the one exception, are jointly authored: attendant nuclear weapons testsby both Stuart Harris and Richard N. Cooper South Asian powers, and the late-IggOs e x a m i n e t h e U . S . - J a p a n e s e a l l i a n c e ; economic crisis that engrrlfed much of Ralph A. Cossa and Alan Oxley comAsia have also undermined regional sta- m e n t o n t h e U . S . - K o r e a n a l l i a n c e ; b i l i t y . I n s p i t e o f t h e s ee m e r g i n g s e c u r i - John Baker and Douglas H. Paal conty threats, Asia has remained largely at sider the U.S.-Australian alliance; and peace, in part because of the PatAmeri- Philip Zelikow discussesgeneral aspects cono.Hence, incentives to make major of American "engagement" in Asia. in r99os changes the were lacking. Amer- These chapters sketch out some of the ica's,AsianAlliances,a joint Australianbasics of American security policies and American effort, analyzes the relationcommitments to its Asian allies, making
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Books this book useful for the undergraduate and those policymakers newly arriving in Washington for the new administration. (It is, in fact, to the latter that this book is mostly directed.) Missing, however, is a thorough treatment of the more extended aspects of America's Asian security policy beyond formal alliances. There is little discussion of the increasing policy fixation on China, the security guarantee for Thiwan, and Southeast Asian issues arising from the Asian economic crisis and centering on the future of Indonesia. Also absent is proper consideration of the many South Asian problems-Kashmir, dornestic stability in Pakistan, nuclear weapons, and the Sri Lankan civil war. An attempt to move beyond modest suggestions for maintaining the status quo is also lacking. The book fails to discuss what alternative security arrangements are possible for Asia. In particular, the book needs to address what will continue to keep the peace and tackle Korea, Taiwan, Chinese expansion, and the Kashmir issue, while allowing the United States to continue its role as the leading influence in the region. This work contains three tables comparing defense budgets and spending, military forces, and economic data.
While useful, these must be used with caution: Official defense budget figures are often suspect (witness the caseof China), and comparing military forces only in terms of raw numbers of troops means little. Further, economic data is not the only measure-and sometimes not the most important-of national power. There is some difference in emphasis between the Australians and the Americans. The former tend to view Asia as a collection of separate sub-entities, while the latter take a more holistic approach. Some of the most "advanced" writing on Asian security cornes from the Australians, including Dibb. But because of the editors' decision to have chapters written jointly, the creativity that comes from being on the periphery of the region is submerged by the rnore cautious American approach. On balance, however, this work's irnport is as a contribution to the ernerging debate over America's long-term national security policy and place in the twenty-first century despite its shortcomings. That debate has hardly begun, so any rneans that helps to focus attention is worthy of note. Thomas W. Robinson is Adjunct Professorin the National SecurityStudiesProgram at GeorgetownIJniversityand PresidentofAmericanAsian Research Enterprises.
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Eythan Sontag Flying over the Macedonian border and into Kosovo was surreal. From inside the Blackhawk helicopter, I saw sorne of the obvious signs of recent warfare, a bomb-mangled factory, smoldering houses, rnortar-pocked stores, and twisted vehicle wreckage. Much of the damage was clearly the result of NATO bombs, but some appeared to be the handiwork of retreatingYugoslav forces. For nearly two rnonths during the bombing campaign, I was part of a reconnaissance unit based in Macedonia that patrolled the border with Serbia. My brief glimpses into Kosovo and Serbia were through binoculars, from the outside. Now, as part of the first wave of NAIO peacekeepersto enter the province, we freely crossed the border under the authorization of the United Nations and observed the situation from within. The helicopter pilot dropped severalhundred feet in altitude, signaling his intention to fly nap of the earth-aviation lingo for hugging the contours of the ground at high speed. The phased withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo several days before did not mean that hostile paramilitaries or armed civilians had also departed. Given the unknown threat, our pilot was not taking any chances. As we swooped low, I compared the deep gorges and prominent mountaintops of Southern Kosovo to the topographic maps that I had scrutinized for hours just weeks before, uncertain then whether I-or any other peacekeepers-would ever see these
Eythan Sontag i' u student
in the
of Foreign
Ser-
graduate School
vice at Georgetown University. a B.A.
He received
in Economics
and French Davidson 1994.
from
College
After
in
spending
a
year in Paris on a Fulbright
fellowship,
seryed as a U.S. intelligence Korea
he Army
officer
in
and Germany.
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features up close. We sped north towards the American sector and I pondered the fact that in a few seconds I had passed over a frontier and into a country that for years was perceived as an enemy of the United States and a threat to European security. As a U.S. Army intelligence officer, I was responsible for a twelve-soldier analysis seotion whose primary rnission was to synthesize information from a variety of sources and translate it into 'We were finished intelligence products. American element of the part of the Kosovo peacekeeping force, dubbed KFOR that was charged with creating a secure environrnent in the province, including public safety and order. The force was also responsible for rnonitoring and enforcing compliance with the Military Technical Agreement, a staternent laying out the terms of the Yugoslav militarywithdrawal from the region, and the Kosovo Liberation At*y Undertaking, the plan by which the KlAwould voluntarily demilitarize and begin the transformation into a civil force. KFOR was a model of diversity, consisting of troops from over thirty counI tries, many of which were non-NAIO. communicated almost daily with intelligence counterparts from France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Britain. Though we encountered the usual array of cultural and lingrristic stumbling blocks, a common purpose and the spirit of teamwork easily bridged the differences. I participated in missions not only with officers from NAIO countries such as Greece and Poland, but also with Russian and Jordanian units operating in the American sector. Although Americans did not represent the largest peacekeeping contingent, it was clear that other KFOR contributing countries looked to
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the United States for operational, intelligence, and logistical support. Help was extended whenever possible-for supplemental ground forces, satellite imagery, or upgraded communications linla-and the United States assumed a low-key but indispensable leadership position in the KFOR effort. From an operational perspective, American participation was crucial in facilitating international collaboration and successfuladvancement of NAIO's goals. At the tactical or srnallunit level, a strong working relationship developed between American and foreign soldiers. Enduring similar challenges and frustrations created a feeling of carnaraderie amongst the peacekeepers and helped us to overcome the obstacles we faced at the outset of the rnission. When we occupied our sector in eastern Kosovo inJune 1999, following the seventy-eight-day air campaign, there was little information on the demography, local leaders, and recent history of the area. These were essential factors in establishing an intelligence baseline-a picture of the local environment that would help us to interpret and, more importantly, predict activity. It would be several weeks before a regular flow of information was established. Our were simply too busy patrols ground learning about and adjusting to an uncertain environrnent. National intelligence assetsand local sources, such as non-governmental organizations, did not yet have their feet on the ground. The immediate concern, then, was to establish some order to the state of lawlessness and insecurity that existed throughout the sector. Chaos was the buzzword in the first wee}s of the KFOR mission. Small villages appeared abandoned, and even the streets oflJrosevac, the largest city in the
ViewfromtheGround U.S. sector, were empty. Kosovar Serbs regarded us as a hostile, occupying force, and those Albanians who had not fled the province during the war were unsure if it was safe to reemerge. American troops considered both sides armed and dangerous. Gunfire and grenade attacks, sometimes aimed at us and sometimes between opposing ethnic groups, were daily occurrences. Frequently, we were
keep track of the number of fires, how they were set, and in which parts of town. Serb homes and businesses were almost exclusivelytargeted, and our patrols were spread too thinly to prevent every act of -We were disadvantaged both by arson. our lack of intirnate demographic knowledge of the town and by our equiprnent. Weighed down by almost thirty pounds of combat gear, it was next to impossible to
in the first wasthehuzzword Chaos
weeksof the KFOR rnission.
chase down arsonists who wore sneakers caught in the crossfire between two factions. Like in other parts of the Balkans, and carried only a fewbottles ofgas. The protective equiprnent every solweapons were a mark of social status in Kosovo, and their ubiquitywas a constant dier was required to wear was a mixed cause of concern. When the Yugoslav blessing. It provided an extra layer of u"-y ({) withdrew, it left hundreds of safety, but also appeared intimidating weapons in the hands of Kosovar Serbs, to the local populace. The volatility of telling thern that the rifles were their last the first months in Kosovo, marked by remaining defense against NAIO. In the firefights, sniper attacks, and indisgrenadings, created an uncertainty of those first weeks, Iocal c r i m i n a t e Serbs, fearing both Arnerican soldiers atmosphere of instability. toops were cautioned to take strong measures of and vengeful Albanians, fired indiscrimsecurity and conduct operations as if in inately at anyone approaching their enclaves. Eventually, they realized that cornbat. While this approach emphasized protecting our own forces, it lirntheir wariness of KFOR was unfounded. ited accessibility to the local inhabiTheir fear of revenge from returning tants. The heavily armed and protected Albanians, however, could not be disU.S. soldiers gave the irnpression that pelled-and with gooo reason. filtered to the situation was still quite unsafeAlbanians back As Kosovar the province or carne out of hiding, they e x a c t l y t h e o p p o s i t e p e r c e p t i o n w e returned to houses and villages that were wanted to project to both Serbs and Albanians. The cumbersome combat looted, burned, and desecrated. Their gear was not only a barrier against bulreaction was spontaneous and violentdestroy or kill anything Serb. From the lets, but also against establishing rapvantage point of Camp Bondsteel, the port and trust with civilians. InterestAmerican headquarters set atop a series ingly, the other NATO countries had less stringent uniform markedly of low hilltops overlooking lJrosevac, it facilitatmay have requirements, which was easy to see the hundreds of fires ed their interaction with the locals. burning in the town. At first we tried to
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The emphasis on "force protection," ensuring the safety of American soldiers, was a top priority of the early U.S. mission in Kosovo, but proved sornetirnesto be a hindrance to the successof operations. One of the most powerful deterrents against ethnically-motivated attacls was sirnply our presencein a potential hot spot. We had successwith the tactic of scattering platoon and cornpany-sized outposts throughout the sector. Concentrating thern in areas that were ethnically rnixed was also successful.When sorne of thesepositions were threatened, however, senior comrnanders preferred to remove thern entirely. Sensitive to the political consequencesof U.S. casualties, many senior cornrnanders put excessiveweight on protecting the force at the expense of more effectively halting ongoing ethnic strife. Patrols were still launched into these areas,but they could not replace the valuable reassurancethat a constant physical presence provided to all sides. What was the point of sending peacekeepersto Kosovo only to hunker down in isolated carnps behind earthen fortifications and razor wire? Our mission was to be asvisible as possible, to interact, and to rnake it known that we would not hesitateto intervene under any circumstance. As Urosevac burned, and the Serb population there plurnrnetted frorn a pre-war level of severalthousand to less than five, I wondered if we were truly providing a secure environment for all ethnicities, or simply slowing the inevitable. Straddling the fine line between projecting an image of force protection and security while not appearing overly threatening was a challenge in Kosovo. Peace support operations have broadened the scope of military employment, and brought with it the need to develop new sets of skills. The KFOR mission,
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like peacekeeping in Bosnia and elsewhere, tended to blur the lines between specific military responsibilities. Routine rnissions such as presence patrolsmaking ourselves as visible as possible to provide reassurance-or vehicle and personnel security checkpoints were as likely to be carried out by infantryrnen as by engineers or rnilitary policemen. Additionally, soldiers on the ground were sensitized to specific intelligence indicators, and became important information gatherers. Though -y primary function was to conduct intelligence analysis, I frequently participated in s e c u r i t yp a t r o l s a n d r e c o n n a i s s a n c em i s sions. This involvement not only helped me better understand the fluid environrnent in which we operated, but also helped expand the visible I-f.S. presence. The more our vehicles and troops patrolled the roads and villages, the greater the deterrence against ethnic conflict and crime. Ultirnately, though, neither our equiprnent nor the new roles and skills we acquired as peacekeeperscould completely prevent violent flareups of old hatreds. The process of retaliatory ethnic cleansing had begun, a diffuse and pervasive force that was never centrally directed, but was psychologically and culturally reinforced by the Kosovar Albanian majority. The United Nations mandate linked KFOR successwith rnaintaining a multiethnic and culturally diverse Kosovo. Whether or not this is even possible is still very much in question today. Over the course of rny six-month tour, a nurnber of incidents made me increasingly skeptical of its likelihood. One exarnple occurred in Zitinje, which before the war was a bucolic village that was roughly half Albanian and half Serbian. In the weeks
ViewfromtheGround preceding the NATO bombing, most of patrol near the Albanian town of DobrZitinje's Albanian population either fled cane when one of our vehicles broke the province or moved to larger enclaves. down. As we called for rnechanical supA U.S. Marine command post was estab- port, a crowd of children gathered, wanting to speak English, hold our weapons, lished in the village to prevent returning Albanian villagers from carrying out or collect American patches. One of the expected retaliation against their Serbian few English expressions every child knew neighbors. Despite our constant pres- was "Serb bad," a phrase often accornpanied by a slashing motion across the ence and healy patrolling, the entire SerZitinje was driven out neck. Less than a kilometer away from bian population of Dobrcane was the small Serbian enclave after two weels of steady arson, sniper fire, and grenade and rocket attacks perof Ranilug. The children, none older petrated by Kosovar Albanians. A sirnilar than twelve, proffered us their graphic fate befell Letnica, a small Catholic opinion of Serbs, pointing toward the Croatian community that resided in the village down the road. It was a scene I witAmerican sector. The enclavehad existed nessed repeatedly during rny tour in Kosovo, and it left rne feeling disheartfor one hundred years in the mountainened that even the youngest generation ous Mtina region before pressure from forrner members of the Kosovo Liberawas tainted by ethnic prejudice. The deeply ingrained distrust and intolerance tion Army forced residents to abandon that rnarks both sides of the ethnic divide their cornmunity and flee to Croatia.
One Of the few Enslishe)rpressions every '
child knew was "Serb b"ad," a fhrase often accornpanied by u slashing rnotion acrossthe neck.
KFOR was unsuccessful in stopping the will not disappear soon, and will most Albanian intirnidation, and our vision of certainly have important consequences rnaintaining an ethnically diverse Kosovo on the ultirnate status of Kosovo. Although United Nations Security seemed increasingly difficult to realize. My skepticisrn of attaining a multiCouncil Resolution 1244 acknowledges e t h n i c a n d h a r m o n i o u s p r o v i n c e w a s "the principles of sovereignty and terriincreased by the depth of the hatred that torial integrity of the Federal Republic existed between Albanians and Serbs. of Yugoslavia and the other countries of With few exceptions, Albanians considthe region," it is improbable that Kosovo will remain a Serbian province. The ered any gun-owning Serb to be a paramilitary and crirninal. Serbs viewed the animosity runs too deep, and many Albanians as culturally inferior and idle Albanians sense that NAIO occupation is a bridge to independence. In the year troublemakers. One incident in particular illustrated the pervasiveness of this and a half since peacekeepers first rnutual loathing. I was on a security arrived, no Yugoslav security personnel
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have come close to returning, although Resolution 1244 specifically allows for this eventuality. The prospect of such an occurrence in the near future is doubtful. The rise of relative moderates to power-Voj islav Kostunica in Yugoslavia and Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo-is promising, but hardly guarantees a peaceful or swift resolution to the most pressing issue, Kosovar independence. Indeed, while Mr. Kostunica appears to be an improvement over his predecessor, he is also a nationalist who has pledged to restore Yugoslav sovereignty. Mr. Rugova, on the other hand, demands full independence for the province, a sentiment universally shared by Albanians. Given these opposing positions, not to mention deep-seated ethnic antipathy, fresh memories of war, and the UN's "neutral" stance, it appears that Kosovo will remain, for the foreseeable future , a defacto international protectorate. Underlying the question of Kosovo's independence is the problern of how it will deal with ethnic minorities that still reside within its borders. Intirnidation of Serbs, Roma, and ethnic Turls persists. Serbs' freedom of movernent remains restricted, and Serbs continue to rely heavily on the collective security of KFOR-protected convoys and their own ethnic enclaves. Kosovar Serbs live in a besieged world that represents a way of life that is unsustainable in the long run. Mr. Rugova and his party, the
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Democratic League of Kosovo, must address these issues in conjunction with the international actors in the province if they want to build legitimacy and form the foundation of an independent governrnent. In the meantime, Kosovo's diplomatic status will remain ambiguous-technically a Serbian province, but in reality an autonomous, internationally protected entity. My experiences in Kosovo gave me a new perspective on the efficacy of military intervention in ethnic conflict, its justification, and its chances for success. Slowly the province is rebuilding, reforming its political structure, and dealing with its recent past, processesin which the United States figures prominently. Unlike the terrain maps I often scrutinized, the topography of Kosovo's future is not so easyto read. WilI it gain independence? What will be the role, if any, of peacekeepers? Can rnulti-ethnicity be preserved? How will events in neighboring Montenegro and the Presevo Valley irnpact the province? What are the chances of a "Greater Albania" and what would this rnean for security in the region? I now have the luxury of pondering these questions as a student of international affairs, sitting safely at rny desk. But I cannot easily forget that beyond all the strategizing and grand policy debatesthere stands a peacekeeper, on guard duty or patrolling, night and day, whose questions and concerns are equally pressing.
Alan W. Lukens I was on the International Staff of NATO in Paris when a call carne frorn the State Departrnent Personnel Office in Decernber rgg9. "Our consul in Brazzaville has died of a heart attack. Will you take his place?" A few weeks later I headed for Brazzaville, then capital of French Equatorial Africa, the largest consular district in Africa. Afrique Equatoriale Frangaise (AEF), as the French called it, was cornprised of Congo, Gabon, the CentralAfrican Republic, and Chad, and the area was tightly governed by the French governor general in Brazzaville, who had four governors reporting to him. In rgg8, President Charles de Gaulle called for a referendurn throughout French Africa to decide whether the He colonies would consider rernaining in "Ia Communaut|.." for His throughout the area, calling a vote. campaigned yes most nemorable speech in favor of this was rnade in Brazzaville, a city which de Gaulle held in the highest regard, as the AEF was the only group of colonies that had remained with the Free French in r94o. Having rallied the French in Equatorial Africa, de Gaulle becarne known as "l'Hommede Brazzauille."The referendum turned out to be a starnp ofapproval by 9g percent ofthe population in French Equatorial Africa. Only Guinea chose to It paid dearly for this reject the plan to stay in the Communautd. decision that led to a scorched-earth policy by the French and an open door to the Russians.
Alan W. Lukens was United Ambassador
States to the
Republic of the Congo (Congo -Brazzaville) from
1984 to 1987.
retired
Foreign
A
Seruice
officer,
Ambassador
Lukens
has since
served as a crisis-management
consultant
to
the State Department.
Winter/Spring zoor
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De Gaulle's approval of the plan in 1960 triggered the famous "Year of Independence" in Africa. In each French colony, the political frarnework had been put into place. A national assembly, a prime minister, and a cabinet were functioning-albeit under the sharp eyes of French governors and civil adrninistrators. The Mali Federation, which soon split into Senegal and Mali, was the first colony to achieve independence. Togo and Carneroon followed in the spring of 196o. The French planned to delay independence for the four Equatorial African colonies and for the Entente states of the Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and Dahorney (now Benin). French administrators kept telling Paris that these colonies were not ready for independence. Belgium's announcement that the Belgian Congo would assurne its independence on June !O, 196O sped up the independence process. The early years of "Congo ex-Belge," as it was known, are part of a different story, though its historywas inextricablybound to that of "Congo-Brazzaille." I was fortunate to be part of the U.S. delegation, under the leadership of Arnbassador Robert Murphy and Williarn Paley of CBS, that attended the independence day ceremonies of the Belgian Congo. We watched the parade on June !o, as King Baudouin forrnally turned the Congo over to the hastilyformed President of government Kasalrrbu and Prime Minister Lumumba. We winced as goose-stepping Flemish officers and non-commissioned officers pushed the Congolese troops of the Force Publique around, wondering how long that situation would last. Across the river in my tiny consulate covering the four states of Equatorial Africa, the French governor general and
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his many colonial civil servantsacted as if the Belgian Congo's new status would never affect them. One week later I was awakened at $ AM by a call from our new embassy in Leopoldville inforrning me that the Force Publique had mutinied against its officers and the Congolese were beginning to ravage the city. I was told to hurry to "le beach,"arrival point for the ferries, to meet American dependents who were fleeing the city. Boatload after boatload arrived. There were few Arnericans but many Belgians and other Europeans carrying as many of their belongings as they could. We found places in the consulate-on the floor rnostly-for our American refugees, and fed them all with supplies we had brought from home that were intended to last us two years. FinaIIy, the French officials reluctantly agreed to open up schools and other facilities for the horde of refugees. We sent one Pan Am plane off to Accra with Arnericans and managed to put others on charter flights to Europe. Washington ordered a large Air Force plane frorn Gerrnany to carry helicopters to Brazzaville but forgot to noti4/ the French. The French governor told me that he would not approve its landing, even though at that point it was only an hour away. I told him that such a refusal would cause a major hassle between Paris and Washington and that the French would be very embarrassed late r . H e f i n a l l y g a v ei n ( t h o u g h w i t h l i t t l e grace) in view of the fact that Njili, Leopoldville's airport, was closed and there was no other open airport within a thousand mile radius. Once the Air Force team arrived with its helicopters, we began a large-scale evacuation exercise.The American missionaries in the former Belgian Congo
A LookBack had been there for many years and could not believe that their neighbors would ever cause thern harm. Unfortunately, this was not the case.There were a number of murders before we could evacuate everyone. Through the missionary radio network, we were able to alert the evacueesthat the choppers were
asked for American help. AII communication was cut off between Leopoldville and the outside world except via walkie-talkie from our embassythere and my consulate in Brazzaville. Thus, I was instructed to tell Washington t-hat the Congolese wanted American troops as soon as they could corne.
OUf C0mmand p0st wason theoutdoor balcony of the consulate, and for the first and only tiine in rny life I commanded an Air Force rescu.e rn1ss10n. coming to pick them up. Our cornmand post was on the outdoor balcony of the consulate, and for the first and only time in my life I commanded an Air Force rescue rnission. In this operation, we rescued approximately roo Arnericans plus many Europeans. We found two Americans who had not left their villages in the Congo since 1933, with passports dating back that far. The next problem we confronted was moving all the refugees on, after providing them with money and proper docurnentation. By this time, having faced similar problems evacuating French nationals, the local French authorities were being more cooperative. In the midst of the chaos in Leopoldville, our new embassythere was trying to set up sorne sort of stable regime. The Belgians were so hated that there was no way that they could be called back. Other Europeans, especially the French, were not about to send troops, since they were afraid that the chaos -ght become contagious and spread to the new Contheir colonies. Fina\, golese regime under President Kasavubu
After some stalling, the State Department cabled me to send word to our ernbassy in Leopoldville that we would not send Arnerican troops and to suggest that the Congolese ask for UN assistance. A few hours later, via the sarne walkie-talkie arrangernent, I got an urgent reply, "Tell the Department to ask for the UN-we have the okay from the Congolese." I placed another urgent call to the Departrnent, but by some fluke I ended up with a Mr. Olson in Minnesota, who must still be wondering why he was told that the Congolese were waiting for the UN. Word finally got through, however, and that was the genesis of the UN presence in the Congo. Meanwhile, in Brazzaville, the political dynamics shifted quickly. De Gaulle knew that change was in the air everywhere in Africa and that he could not resist it. Independence had been granted to the Mali Federation, Togo, Cameroon, and now to the Belgian Congo. It becarne clear that the other French colonies could not be denied the same status. Several French political leaders rationalized that if the four states of West Africa that
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formed the Entente would join together, the resulting union would be more viable than four separate entities. The French governor general in Brazzaville, Yvon Bourges, who later became French minister of defense, pushed the idea of the Union de la Republique de I'Afrique Centrale (URAC) to an even greater degree; this also appealed to the political scientists at the Quai d'Orsay. Yet the idea never got off the ground. Each African chief of state wanted to be the leader and each wanted to have the national capital. The four stateswere too diverse. Gabon was the srnallestand richest and did not wish to subsidize the others; Chad was too remote and partially Islamic, unlike the others; and neither Congo nor the Central African Republic had the resources-human and naturalto lead the others. Thus, quite suddenly in early August, we heard that de Gaulle had decided to allow the four statesin West Africa and the four in Equatorial Africa to assume their independence. Our embassyin Paris, as well as the British and German ones, learned that this was merely a "domestic change," and a "corning ofage," and that the celebrations would only be rnarked by France and the eight stateswithout outside support. We also learned thatAndrd Malraux, Minister of Culture, had been given the job of representing de Gaulle, and that every forty-eight hours he would first visit one of the four Entente statesfor an independence ceremony and then come to our consular district with its now four different countries. It is worth remembering that this was the summer of 1960, when the Kennedy-Nixon campaign overshadowed all else. When told by the French that outside representation was neither needed nor welcorne. the United States
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and other countries readily agreed to just send their consuls to represent them. I drafted messages to be sent from President Eisenhower to the four new presidents. After many days of silence, the Department finally approved the messages without any changes. I took these messages, translated them into French, and typed them on officialWhite House stationary. At the ceremonies, the Africans had no intention of breaking ties with the French, especially economic and military ones, but having seen other African countries-particularly the Belgian Congo-achieve independence, they wished to follow suit. Their flags and national anthems became important symbols of their newly-achieved sovereignty. (When the Chadians askedrne for a suitable tune for their anthem, I almost sold thern on Princeton's "Old Nassau.") 'We were told on very short notice that a ceremony would begin every forty-eight hours, starting August rr in Chad and ending August r/ in Gabon. The French had two large planes-one for Malraux and the French bureaucrats, and another for the press. I askedthe French governor 'What about the foreign consuls? general, How should they get around?" When it became clear that the French were not going to help, and since no commercial flights were available, I asked rny friend General Sizaire, commander of all French troops in CentralAfrica, for help. He kindly offered his DC-3 to the consular corps. I was the senior representative, since I had been in Brazzavillelonger than the others, but the British, German, Portuguese, Belgian, and Republic of China officials came along aswell. The ceremonies were also arranged at the last minute. These included the lowering of the French flag at midnight and a patronizing speech by Malraux to the
A LookBack effect that "now you are twenty-one and quickly signed with each country permore mature, but don't breakyour ties to mitting French troops to remain and narning French colonial officials as your parents even though you have grown advisors to the new African ministers. up." After brief speechesby the African leaders and the pluyr.g of their national The prime minister of the Congo anthems, there was food, drink, and who became president on Indepenmuch dancing. In each case,I had a pridence Day was Abbe Fulbert Youlou, a vate interview with the new president, and defrocked Catholic priest dressed in I presented himwith President Eisenhow- luxurious Dior caftans. Other Africans er's greetings. I begged Washington to did not take him seriously, and the have some sort of present for each presiFrench humored him, knowing that dent, but nothing was done. Eventually, they would continue to run the show the United States sent a mobile ambuanyhow. The president of the National Iance to each country as a gesture, but it Assembly, Alfonse Massamba-D6bat, was so late that the effect was minimal. eventually pushed Youlou out in a I became charge d'afairesto each country bloodless coupd'6tat. instead of consul. I transformed our As the campaign at horne heated up, small consulate in Brazzaville into an Kennedy, deciding that notice should embassy by borrowing an embassy seal be taken of the new African nations, from Leopoldville, carting it acrossStansent Averill Harriman on a tour of the ley Pool by ferry, and installing it on our region. As Harriman was not on an building. Washington decided that the official U.S. mission, he came by himfirst ambassador would be in Brazzaville, self, and each embassy along the way reporting to him from Fort helped him as rnuch as possible. In with chorgds Lamy (now Njamena), Bangui, and Brazzaville, we called on President Libreville. This arrangement did not last Y o u l o u a n d o n M a s s a r n b a - D 6 b a t . long, however, as each country wanted its There, Harriman waxed at length on the "own" Arnerican embassy. Arnerican system, including separation
rnefor a suitable When the Chadians asked. tune for their anthern, I alrnost sold them on Princeton's "Old Nassau." The ceremonies were colorful and created high expectations among Africans that nirvana had arrived. In reality, however, little changed. French auto matically became g'overnors respectively French ambassadors and deans of the srnall diplomatic corps. They continued to occupy the same residences and the French troops remained. A pro forma agreement was
of powers, while I translated. Apparently, Harriman's message of dernocracy had not taken hold. Massamba-Ddbat took over the Congo in the aforementioned coup a couple ofyears later. In October, the Eisenhower administration, showing belated Republican interest in the area, decided that the Harriman trip had to be balanced by an official one. As a consequence, Ambas-
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sador Loy Henderson, then undersecretary of state, led a group frorn the State Department around the new African states.The Department had decided to set up a separate embassyin each of the four equatorial countries. For a while I would remain the sole American diplomat in the area. Henderson knew what he wanted in each country. His routine, which I translated, was to ask each president, "Would you like an Arnerican embassy in your country? If so, would you like a team of five or six officers and their staffs?" Of course, the answer was invariably affirmative. After each visit, Henderson instructed me to send a cable to \Mashington that the respective president had asked for an American ernbassywith six officers. Perhaps the most unique visit was in Chad when Ambassador Henderson asked President Tornbalbaye of Chad if he wanted an Arnerican ernbassy. After he agreed enthusiastically,we took a ride with the twenty-five year old minister of defensein a wonderful open Ig!$ RollsRoyce that had by some fluke arrived years before. As we drove along the Chari River, Henderson told the rninister, "These twenty-five acres you will reserve for the Arnerican ernbassy." After receiving an enthusiastic "oud," Henderson cabled the Department to saythat Chad had offered us a wonderful river site for the new embassy. After enduring constant harassment from the Russian-sponsored left-wing Congolese regime, the embassyclosed in r965, but was officially reopened in r98o Swing. I by Ambassador William returned as ambassador in 1984, finding, to my surprise, that rny old apartment on top of the embassybank building was now my office. At that point, the
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foremost problem was to convince thenpresident Denis Sassou-N'Guesso that opening to the West and turning away from the Soviets was in his best interest. There were still ]oo Soviet citizens there when I arrived, but their influence had decreased. The Congolese government was set up along Soviet lines, with a politburo, Communist party hierarchy, a hammer and sickle on the flag, and the "Internationale" as the anthem. Gradually, the Congolese distanced thernselves from Russia as they saw that their best interests lay with the West. When I left my post in r9B/, Soviet influence was waning. It was not until r992, however, that the Congolese threw off the remains of their Sovietstyle political system, reverting to their original flag and redesigning their governrnent along French lines. They dropped the title "People's Republic of the Congo" and became rnerely the "Republic of the Congo." T h e l a t e I 9 9 o s s a wa p e r i o d o f d e s t a bilization and unrest. A new election was projected for rgg|, but the different factions rejected the plan and ended up fighting each other. Most of the fighting took place in Brazzaville. Almost all of the embassies closed down, rnost foreigners fled, and the economy was in shambles. Sassou has since regained power and is hoping to see the United States reopen its ernbassy.This will not happen, though, until reparations are paid to restore our darnaged ernbassy buildings and security can be assured. As the longest-serving American diplornat in the area, and as one who has closely followed developrnents there, I find the saga of the past forty years in the Republic of the Congo discouraging. The Congo is a nation
A LookBack abundant with natural and human resources.Ifthese were put to good use, the Congo could become one of the more viable countries in Africa. I can
only hope that the Congoiese have learned the hard lessons of internecine warfare so they may begin to focus on the development of their country.
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