GJIA - 3.1 Refugees by GJIA (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs)

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Editors'Note

This Forum marks-not celebrates-the anniversary of the Refugee Convention. Despite Progress during the past fifty years in protecting and assisting refugees, there continue to be far too many unprotected displaced persons in the world t" fi.,d cause for celebration. Refugee protection requires renewed commitment not only to humane treatment of those forced to flee their hornes, but also to new initiatives that address the causesof such flight and provide durable solutions for the displaced. AN INTRODUCTION BYSUSANMARTIN

TheRefugee Convention at Fifty E R I K AF E L L E R

Practicing at HomeWhatWePreach Abroad:FourLessons on Refugee Policy fromtheClintonAdministration E R I CS C H W A R T Z

International Refugee Lawin EastAfrica:An Evolving Regime K H O T IK A M A N G A

TheProtection of Refugee Women andChildren: LitmusTestfor International Regime Success W E N D YA . Y O U N G

Coffee Crisis: TheCasefor a Regulated Market J O H N M .T A L B O T

How much are you

to pay for a

cup o'joe?

Reaching fortheLight A N O R E S V E L A S C OI ,N T E R V I E W E DB Y C A R O L L A N C A S T E R A close look at Latin America's

economic

problems

and prospects.

Winter/SpringZooz Ii]

An Emerging for a NewWayof War: Synthesis Comhination Warfare andFutureInnovation J A M E SC A L L A R D A N DP E T E R FABER

A 27-pi...

tool kit for war in the twenty-first century.

Russia Asia:Facing andNortheast a Rising China

L E S Z E KB U S Z Y N S K I

Whether

it wants to or not,

Russia must look out its window

on the East.

GettingRealaboutGlobalHip Hop YVONNB EYNOE While rap music has been globalized, Hip Hop culture cannot b e .

TheJustWarDoctrine andCovert Responses to Terrorism C A T H E R I NL E OTRIONTE Old ethical insights still matter in a shadowy new world.

Democracy Close to Home:CitizenParticipation andLocalGovernance

ANDREW D ,S E L E E Decentralization can deepen dernocracy, but first it must overcorne several challenges. ro3

ParadigmShift : Japan'sForeignPolicyin the NewEra M A S A T O S H IH O N D A The Yoshida

Doctrine

is ailing.

What

comes next?

Rumsfeld Aimsfor theStars:AnArmsControlAlternative to the Pentagon's Plansin Space J E F F R ELYE W I S Weaponization will not prevent a Pearl Harbor in space.

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Where MeetsStatecraft Science D Y C H A R L E SW E I S S N O R M A NP . N E U R E I T E RI N , T E R V I E W EB The State Department

129

grapples with diplomacy

in the digital

age.

International Defenses Terrorism: Building against A Comprehensive Strategy GARETH EVANS Fighting global terror

r27

global cooperation.

America Defending J O S E P HC I R I N C I O N E

Biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons may be just the tip of the iceberg.

t+7 TheUnitedNationsJoinsthe NewWar N A N C YE . S O D E R B E R G On the ground

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and at the negotiating

table, the UN

must play a role.

Political Unraveling Chinese Culture Mark T. Fung reviewsJoseph Fewsrnith's ChinoSinceTionon^er' The Politicsof Transition.

r58

Defense without Diplomacy Missile Global Theresa Hitchens reviewsJarnesJ. Wirtz andJeffrey A. Larsen's Rockets'Red Clare' MissileDefenses and the Futureof World Politics.

MewfircmtheGround intheSands TheRedHerring of Sudan D E N I SD R A G O V I C Without peace, foreign aid obscures real solutions to Sudan's humanitarian

Reflections of anAlgerian Moslem: TheSeptember l1 Attacl(s andTheir Terrorism Historical Significance in the Fightagainst IDRISS JAZAIRY From'Washington to Algiers, we're in this together.

problem.

International

EDITORS-IN-CHIEFHEIDl AROLA, NIKHIL PATEL M A N A G I N G E D I T O R S C A S S A N D R AD O L L , C H R I S M C I N T O S H , M I C H A E L Y B A R R A B U S I N E S S M A N A G E RJ U L I E S H A H DESIGN MANAGERREO MATSUZAKI W E 8 / T E C H N O L O G YM A N A G E R E D W A R D Y U T A K A S U M O T O

F O R U ME D I T O R D A N I E L Y E U N G E D I T O R I A LA S S I S T A N T B R Y A N S H I N E U S I N E S S & F I N A N C EE D I T O R M A R I A N N E B E N E T E D I T O R I A L A S S I S T A N T S E R I C F I S C H E R , J E S S I C AJ U L M Y , P A T R I C I A K O C S O N D Y C O N F L I C T & S E C U R I T YE D I T O R P R A D E E PR A M A M U R T H Y EDITORIALASSISTANTS BAILEY HAND, ZACHARYLEWIS, EDWARDPRICE, THEODORE T, SENASU c u L T u R E & 5 0 C I E T Y E D I T 0 R J T L L T A NS A F E R EDITORIALASSISTANTS BRIAN MCTERNAN. CAROLYN REEVE. KATIE VEZERIS LAW&ETHICSEOITOR DREWTAYLOR E D I T O R I A L A S S I S T A N T SJ O S H U A B A N C R O F T , C A M I L L E E I S S , J O S E P H F L O R I O P O L I T I C S & D I P L O M A C YE D I T O R J O N A T H A N W E I S S EDITORIALASSISTANTSRICHARD BLANE, ALEXANDRA LANGLEY, SHAWN OAKLEY, J E N N I F E R S C H E C H T E R ,S E A N W E S T S C I E N C E & T E C H N O L O GEYD I T O R R O B E R T M A G Y A R HELLER, E D I T O R I A LA S S I S T A N T S NATHANIEL R.

KRAUSE,

JOHN

CHRISTOPHER VAN

HENDERSON,

MATTHEW

BENSCHOTEN

B O O KR E V I E W E D I T O R LISA GIHRING EDITORIALASSISTANT BOCDAN TERESHCHENKO V I E W F R O M T H E G R O U N DE D I T O R A N N E

CHIORAZZI

A L O O K S A C K E O I T O RJ O S E P H B . C R A C E , J R . E D I T O R I A LA S S I S T A N T NEIL GRACE G R A P H I CO E S I G N K A O R I A R A M A K I D E S I G N A S S I S T A N T SANH_THU NGUYEN,

YI_LINC

C O M M U N T C A T I O N LSI A I S O N S H Y K R A Y T M A N D I R E C I O R O F A C C O U N T I N GA N G E L A R O D R I G U E Z D I R E C T O RO F A D V E R T I S I N G H U I M I E N T A N D I R E C T O RO F C A M P U S / M E D I AR E L A T I O N S M E L I S S A C A R D I N A L D I R E C T O RO F E V E I { T S P L A I { N I N G S H E E T A L K H E R A KWOK D I R E C T O RO F M A R K E T I N G C A R O L I N E D I R E C T O RO F D I S T R I B U T I O I { H A E J I N S H I N LINH B U S I N E S SA S S I S T A N T S B I S T R A B A H A R O V A , PANJABI,

ANDRA

DUY

TAN

HOANG,

SITARA

KHOLI,

ASHWIN

TAUTU

A D V I S O R YB O A R D D A V I D A B S H I R E . S U S A N B E N N E T T . H.R.H. FELIPE DE SOnnON, JOYCE DAVTS, CARA DIMASSA, ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, LEE HAMILTON, PETER F. KROGH, MICHAEL MAZARR, FAREED ZAKARIA UNIVERSITYCOUNCIL ANTHONY AREND, RICHARD BRAHM, MICHAEL E. BROWN, J A M E S C L A D , C H E S T E RC R O C K E R , H E R B E R T H O W E , CHRISTOPHER JOYNER, CAROL LANCASTER, JOSEPH LEPGOLD, DONALD MCHENRY, DANIEL PORTERFIELD, HOWARD SCHAFFER, GEORGE SHAMBAUGH, JENNIFER WARD, CASIMIR YOST

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The GeorgetownJoumal of Internationar Affarruwas conceived at a historical fulcrum' the cold war outlook oriint"trrational relations that had once dominated thought and practice had been replaced by neblr_ lous uncertainty. The Journa|i mission was to address that uncertainty-not by recycling tired debates, but by harnessing old insights in innovative ways that would help to reveal and ...oli. the crucial issuesof the future. Every Forum-whether discussing religion and power, the impact of technolo$r, globalization, or bioteriorism globul infectious disease-has set out to explore a pioneering ".rd qrr"riio' in interna_ tional relations through a combination of iiriou.,d p..r.i..... drlwn from every perspective in the field. This issue,s io"rl^ on refugees advances theJournarstilr another step toward the realization of its vision. The ho*ors of september tr and their aftermath provide the first glimpse^of what rrraybe the defining international cleavagesof the twenty-first century, but they arro r"-erpose the fa"e oiu' ofte., overlooked problem, forced migration. As a byproduct of its two decadesof conflict, Afghanistan suffe.s the lu"got refugee ..rr* ,., the world. Its neighbor, pakistan, hosts over 2 million forced migrants, while Iran has become a refuge for some r.$ million. Throughout the world, a total of ZZ -ililon people live in limbo, uprooted from their homes, praying fo, u ti-" when they can return to their countries and rebuild their lives and. commu.ritr... 'with trenchant analysis and a careful reading of recent history, our Forum contributors assesswhere protection of refugees stands fifty years after the creation of the r95r UN Refugee CJnvention, and extract important lessons to aid the world community in its trek down the long road to protection.

Hrror Anou,

Nrxrrrr Pernr

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G E O R G E T O W NJ O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A LA F F A I R S

TheRefugee Conuention at Fifu E R I K AF E L L E R

PracticingatHomeWhatW Preach,4broad, Fourlzssons on RefgeePoligfromthe ClintonAdministrauon E R I CS C H W A R T Z

InternationalRefugee Law in EastAfrica' An EuoluingRegime K H O T IK A M A N G A

TheProtection of RefugeeWomen andChildren, LitmusTest International Re$me Success for

W E N D YA . Y O U N G

r(erugees f-rrE

Introduction by SusanMart;

L.NG R.AD To pRoTECTToN

This Forum marks the end of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN Convention relating to the Statusof Refugees.The 195r Refugee Convention is a product of its time that has endured for half a century. The horrors of World War II and the Holocaust\Merefresh in the minds of the framers of the convention. Few countries had opened their doors to the victims of Nazism, leaving millions to perish. In rg$r, displaced persons camps still proliferated across Europe-a harsh rerninder of the continuing legacy of persecution. At the same time, the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe produced still more refugees who were unable or unwilling to return to their home countries.

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I NT R OD U C TI O N

Although primarily focused on events in Europe, the Ig$I Convention, particularly as amended by its 196/ Protocol, established universal principles for the protection of refugees. Tfre Convention defines refugees as persons outside of their home countries who are unwilling or unable to avail themselvesof the protection of their own governrnents because they have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Signatory states agree that they will not return refugees to countries in which the latter have a wellfounded fear of such persecution (often

the UNHCR mandate, generally because the UN secretary general or General Assembly has requested the assistanceof UNHCR. This represents a small proportion, however, of the more than !$ million internal refugees, most of whom receive no protection frorn the international community. The work of the UNHCR certainly has not slowed down in its fifty years of operation. Although initially given only a three-year mandate and lirnited financial resources, UNHCR has proved invaluable in responding to what have become recurrent humanitarian crises. Frorn the Hungarian refugee crisis in referred to as a commitment to non1956 to the various outflows generated refoulement).The Convention does not by wars of liberation and surrogate Cold require states to admit refugees permaWar conflicts of the r96os, rg/os, and nently, but it setsout the rights of refugees r98os, to the horrendous ethnic conand the responsibilities of states toward flicts of the rggos, UNHCR has offered those who are granted asylum. It also assistance and protection to civilians identifies individuals who are not deserv- fleeing warfare, repression, and instaing of protection, relieving states of the bility. The current Afghan crisis is only obligation to protect those who have perthe most recent example of the persissecuted others, have cornrnitted particutence of forced migration. larly serious non-political crimes, or pose These refugee crises present continuing challenges to the international cornthreats to their national security. Although adopted to meet the chalmunity, as the four articles in this Forum lenges of r95r, the Refugee Convention describe. Erika Feller, Director of the has proven to be a living instrument for UNHCR Department of International Protection, begins her article by disprotection, not leastbecausethe situation it envisioned-people fleeing for their cussing recent international setbacksthat lives-continues to this day. The causes make protection of refugees all the more and places from which people flee may needed but difficult: the terrorist attacls differ, but they are no less cornpelling of September II; growing displacement in Afghanistan; continuing violence in than those of fifty years ago. At present, there are about r$ rnillion refugees under Colombia, Chechnya, and Angola; the mandate of the UN High Commisbreakdowns in peace processes in the sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Middle East; and the exploitation of international organization responsible human misery by traffickers of people. It for assisting and protecting refugees. is in this context that the reticence of About I rnillion persons in their own many countries-particularly the wealthy countries-refugee returnees and interones that have long urged compliance nally displaced persons-also come under with the convention-to admit asylum

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M A R T t NR e f u g e e s

seekersis all the more problematic. Feller describes UNHCR's efforts through the Global Consultations on International Protection to reinvigorate support for the r95r Convention and strengthen its implementation. Eric Schwartz provides a vivid picture of the dilemma faced by countries in adhering to their obligations under the Convention. He draws on his experience in the Clinton White House to analyze U.S. efforts to respond to flows of boat people fleeing a combination of persecution and poverty. Applying these lessons to the post-September rr world, he urges policymakers to ensure that refugee protection remains a key priority as they confront the threat of terrorism. Frorn an African perspective, Khoti Karnanga also raises the issue of balance between protection and security. He discusses legal initiatives taken by East African statesto incorporate the principles of the Convention into domestic law. Long known for their generosity toward the millions of refugees who sought protection on their territory, Thnzania, Kenya, and Uganda have responded more cautiously in recent yearsto increasing nurnbers of asylum seekersand their impactreal and perceived-on national security. Wendy A. Young focuses on a different but equally important aspect of refugee crises-how to provide for the physical and legal protection of refugee women and children. These two groups account

for about 80 percent of the world's displaced population. In keeping with the times in which it was written, the Refugee Convention does not explicitly reference gender or age in defining the reasons that refugees may be persecuted, nor does it lay out mechanisms to provide for the physical security of vulnerable populations. As Young describes, new grridelines and policies have been not always impleadopted-although mented-that fulfill the spirit of the Convention and help promote protection of refugee women and children. I purposefully stated that this Forum marks-not celebrates-the anniversary of Despite the Refugee Convention. progress during the past fifty years in protecting and assisting refugees, there continue to be far too many unprotected displaced persons in the world to find cause for celebration. Refugee protection requires renewed commitrnent not only to hurnane treatment of those forced to flee their homes, but also to new initiatives that address the causesof such flight and provide durable solutions for the displaced. It is hoped that this Forurn will stimulate new thinking and new approaches to what has been an enduring hurnanitarian problem. Susan Martin

Institute of the Georgetom Migration (ISIM), and

is Director

for the Study of International sewed as Executive Director on

Immigration

Reform

Research and Programs

of the U.S. Commission and

Director

Policy

at the Refugee Policy Group.

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Refugees

Erika Feller The year 2oor saw significant international setbacks. The world watched the events of September rI in New York and Washington with disbelieving horror. The hurnanitarian situation inside and around Afghanistan has noticeably worsened. Peaceprocessesin East and West Africa and the Middle East have broken down, and settlement efforts from the Western Saharato the Balkans have been obstructed. Violence grinds on in Colombia, Angola, and Chechnya. Tiafficking and smuggling of people for gain have proliferated, Ieading to an exponential increase this year in the exploitation of hurnan misfortune. The list is soberingly long. This is the context in whichwe commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the r95r UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In one form or another, human displacement is a feature of eachof these developments. The figure for refugees and internal displacement invoking the mandate of UNHCR rernains at 22 million. In the face of this, the hurnanitarian, human rights, and people-oriented rationales for the rg$r Convention are as strong as ever. The anniversary offers a timely opportunity to focus on the Convention, the role it currently plays,the challengesit faces, and the extent of its implementation. On the whole, the Convention has proved its resilience; its non-political character has been instrurnental in enabling it to operate in today's often highly-politicized context, and overall, respect for the Convention remains strong. That

Erika Felleris Director

of the

Department national United

of Inter-

Protection, Nations

Commissioner

High for

Refugees.

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THEREFUGEE C O N V E N T I O NA T F I F T Y

being said, it is also clear that implementation across the spectrum of the Convention's provisions is inconsistent and encounters many obstacles.

to the Refugee 0bstacles Gon-

protection may well prove a distant, elusive objective. For this reason, UNHCR pursues activities directed at promoting both physical and legal protection, where possible, in tandem.

VentiOn, A number of obstacles to the

andLegalChallenges. Structural

Convention are operational in nature. The sheer size of many refugee outflows can make individual identification of refugee status and the rights envisaged in the Convention purely impractical, at least in the first instance. Mixed population flows do not alwayslend themselves to management completely within the Convention framework. The daunting task of creating a measure of physical security for refugees, as well as for the humanitarian staff that protects and assiststhem, can in practice become the overriding protection objective, necessarily rendering long-terrn other aspects of protection envisagedin the Convention. Militarized camps are of particular concern since they endanger the security and lives of their inhabitants and the surrounding communities. Responsibility for separating, disarrning, and interning arrned elements, and taking other rneasuresto neu:ralize them, lies outside the scope of the Convention. The physical and social vulnerabilities of women. children. and elderly refugees have become a particular protection preoccupation as well. Physical security is the most visible of the protection problems confronting refugees. Nonetheless, it cannot be divorced from the more structural and Iegal aspectsof refugee protection, which the r95I Convention rnore directly addresses. Physical and legal security go hand in hand. Without laws in place, or at least a guiding framework of principles or benchmarks within which refugee problems should be addressed, physical

A number of structural and legal challenges confront the application of the Convention. First, the "integrationist" approach taken to the Convention's application has given birth to systems that, in some countries, are not well enough attuned to mass refugee arrivals, or even to processing large numbers of individual asylurnseekers. The length and cost of rnany state procedures for granting refugee status has led some governments to question the utility of the Refugee Convention. The fault here lies not with the Convention itself; the Convention does not prescribe the procedures for its own application. It is also carefully framed to define minimum standards without imposing obligations exceeding those that states can reasonably be expected to assurne. Second, defining who qualifies for protection poses problems. There is some discrepancy between Convention refugees for whom states have explicitly accepted responsibility and the broader classof persons within UNHCR's cornpetence. A consensus needs to be reached on such issues as whether or not the victirns of violence and persecution by non-state actors are entitled to protection as refugees, and whether the notion of persecution can be reasonably extended to protect women from gender-related violence. Among states, a general understanding of definitions and responsibilities is necessaryin order to introduce greater certainty of and accountability for protection.

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F E L L E RR e f u g e e s Next, the changed displacernent environment also contributes to problems not always fitting with the Convention framework. Flexibility in the Convention's application is called for anyway, consistentwith its purpose and its intent. Going beyond this, however, it is clear that the Convention does not cover all protection needs and has to be buttressed through the further development not only of international legal tools, but also of practical responsepossibilities.

RecentRoadbloclts.rni, lastpoint has a particular resonance in light of recent events. The I95I Convention does not extend protection to those who have committed particularly serious offenses. The prohibition on refoulement is lifted where persons are a danger to national security or where they are convicted of a particularly serious crirne. In the event that human rights provisions in other international instruments come into play to prevent return, this has no effect on the

fpoplOu"i.'edillesalty 9irnply ,bpcause does not delegitirnize their clairn. Furthermore, while there is a general understanding that more equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing arnong stateswould improve the political climate and asylum possibilities for refugees, in practice responsibilities are not well shared, and there is no system in place that effectively operates to ensure this. Thus, the incentives for burden-shifting, rather than burden-sharing, are more commonplace. The Convention is not specific on how burdens can best be shared, even though burden-sharing underpins its effective implementation. Moreover, at the international level there are complementary forms of protection-most notably human rights instruments-that strengthen the protection available to those meriting it, but also occasionally grant protection to those who do not. Unintentionally, this has left questions hanging over the institution of asylum, with public confidence eroded when persons who are clearly not entitled to refugee protection are nevertheless allowed to stay for human rights reasons.

proper working of the Ig$I Convention. The excluded still remain excluded, without any benefits of refugee status. The Convention, if properly applied, should not offer safe haven to criminals. Nevertheless, a number of states are currently examining additional security safeguards to build into procedures for determining refugee status so as to strengthen the guarantees offered by the exclusion provisions. UNHCR's hope is that any additional security-based procedural safeguards will strike a proper balance with the refugee protection principles at stake. It is unfortunate that the trend toward criminalization of asylum seekers and refugees seerns to be on the rise. While there are certainly sorne people in both categories who have been associatedwith serious crime, this does not mean that the majority should be damned by association with the few. Increasingly, asylum seekersare having a dlfficult time accessing procedures and overcoming presumptions about the validity of their claims in several states. These problems stem from their ethnicity or their mode

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a THEREFUGEE C O N V E N T I O NA T F I F T Y

ofarrival. Sirnply because people arrived illegally does not delegitimize their claim. Sharing a certain ethnic or religious background with those who may have cornrnitted grave crimes does not rnean that one is a criminal and should be excluded. UNHCR endorses rnultilateral efforts to root out and effectively combat international terrorism. At the same time, resolute leadership is called for to de-dramatize and de-politicize the essentially hurnanitarian challenge of protecting refugees and to promote bet-

refugee protection starts. It serves, together with its Protocol, as the most comprehensive instrument at the international level to safeguard the fundamental rights of refugees and regrrlate their status in countries of asylum. It is no more and certainly no less. It is not a rnigration-control instrument. It is not a bill of rights and therefore does not lay out rights and responsibilities without their proper lirnits. It does not provide a safe haven for terrorists. Moreover, it is not about additional burdens for states.

ReSettlement femainSirnperative, not least in the context of the Afghan refugee situation. ter understanding of refugees and their right to seek asylurn. Just like protection for those seeking asylurn, solutions for refugees also should not be made victims of September rr. Refugee resettlernent should not be put in jeopardy. UNHCR has been concerned about a disinclination on the part of sorne resettlernent countries to maintain their prograrns at promised levelsparticularly for certain ethnic groups. Resettlement remains imperative, not least in the context of the Afghan refugee situation. Continued support for resettlernent is crucial. For its part, UNHCR is maintaining its efforts to diversifr the number of resettlernent countries and strengthen its prograrns, frorn ernergency processing to more systematic and elaborate use of resettlement to create durable solutions for refugees.

Regarding the increasingly autornatic equation of "refugees" with "burdens," it is true that there are costs associatedwith hosting refugee populations, particularly for protracted periods in less-developed countries. But refugees do eventually go home. In caseswhere they do not, many refugees have proved a distinct advantage for receiving cornrnunities. History is replete with examples of refugees bringing skills that contribute to the societies and national economies receiving thern. A too-ready equation of refugeeswith burdens is not only misguided, but significantly distorts perceptions of the refugee problem and the needs to be addressed. In a refugee situation, the primary need to address is the human predicament of the refugee. The burdens that refugee flows rnay create demand sensitivity and an international response-as indeed the Ig$I Convention recognizes-but they cannot be allowed to obscure the fact that refugees present a humanitarian and human rights responsibility, not a burden to be kept at bay.

Backto theRefugee Convention. There are too rnany rnyths about what the Refugee Convention is and what it is not. For UNHCR, the Convention is where

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RefUgees FELLER A desire to return the Convention to 2oor, the ParliarnentaryAssembly of the its proper context and to promote a betCouncil of Europe in Strasbourg, and through the revised Bangkok Principles ter understanding of its strengths, its limitations, and its potential motivated the adopted by the Asian-African Legal C o n s u l t a t i v eC o m m i t t e e ( A A L C C ) i n i t s UNHCR to convene the Global Consultations on International Protection this annual meeting in New Delhi. Many ideas for strengthening implepast year. Refugee voices were also heard hostmentation were put on the table at these at the two important refugee forums rneetings. They range from a more regued in Paris and Rouen, France. UNHCR larized system of reporting and periodic is grateful for the support the Consultameetings of state parties to review impletions have received across the board, including most recently at a meeting of m e n t a t i o n , t o h a r m o n i z e d r e g i o n a l the Commissioners for Refugees frorn processesfor application of the Convention provisions. Irnproved monitoring the South African Development Community countries. The first ever rneeting and more active support for the of the SADC Commissioners took place UNHCR's supervisory role under Article on September 20 and 2r, 2oor, in a 3$ of the Convention are fundamental to region that has I.! million refugees and improved implernentation. A nurnber of ideas were also presented during the nearly { million internally displaced perGlobal Consultations Expert Roundsons (IDPs). The SADC Commissioners' table, which was held in Cambridge in endorsernentof the Global Consultations process,with an undertakingby the counJuly 2ool. Promoting a more creativeuse tries represented to participate at the of the Executive Committee forurn was in Meeting one of them. Overall, the challenge is to upcoming Ministerial find ways to strengthen implernentation December 2OOr, was most welcorne. At this Ministerial Meeting of State that add to, rather than dilute, the priParties, scheduled for Decernber 12 and macy of the voice and authority of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in I3 of 2oor, a Declaration will be adoptpursuance of the mandate that attachesto ed that reaffirms the centrality of the rggr Convention and its Protocol in the this office and that Article 3g of the international protection regime. It also Convention reinforces. emphasizesthe importance of the commitment of statesto proper and princiRegime, Clearly, there are challenges pled implementation of the Convention. The Declaration builds upon widespread to the overall regime that call for ways to endorsement of the Convention and supplement the protection it offers. The strengthened implementation throughGlobal Consultations process continues to be a source of ideas in this regard. At out the anniversary year in many fora. They include the Inter-Parliamentary the end of the process, which is currently scheduled for the middle of 2oo2, Union Council in Havana, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Heads of UNHCR intends to bring together the State and Government Summit in Lusaproposals that the Consultations have ka, the Organization of American States generated into what has already been (OAS) General Assembly in Costa Rica, labeled an "Agenda for Protection." The Agenda should serve as a guide to action the European Union (EU) in Brussels in

The Future of the Refugee

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for UNHCR and an inspiration for states,NGOs, and other protection partners in setting certain objectives for the years ahead. The responsibility for following up on the Agenda will be shared. It cannot bind the hands ofanyone. Elements of this Protection Agenda will be available to the Ministerial Meeting. The Global Consultations is a process with specific objectives and outcornes in mind. Reaffirmation of state support for the rg5l Convention as well as a clear commitment to its strengthened implementation will be one important outcorne of the process. An update of the on Proceduru UNHCR Handbook andCiteia for DeterminingRefgee Stotuswlll be a product of the expert roundtables; this should contribute to a better understanding and

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application of the Convention's terms. As regards the Agenda for Protection, implementation of the follow-up activities will take time, and will have to be programmed in a staged, possibly multi-year manner. Ultimately, the Global Consultations process has been motivated by the goal of furthering refugee protection, predicated on the realization that it is ever more a global concern. International refugee protection has been accepted as a common trust. Responsibility for such a trust must be shared by many, or it will be borne by no one. Editor's

Noter

The text is a modified

excerot of the

address made by Ms. Erika

Feller, Director

Department

Protection,

of International

second Session of the Executive High

Commissioner's

Program,

Committee October

of the

to the Fifty2ool.

of the

Refugees

WhatWePreach Abroad FourLessons Poligfrom theClintonAdministration onRefugee Eric Schwartz From the outset of the Clinton administration, senior officials struggled with how to respond to flows of boat people fleeing persecution and poverty and seeking refuge and resettlement in the United States. Whether involving Haitians, Cubans. or Chinese. the issue forced the Clinton adminis= tration to consider whether it would implement, close to home, the very policies of refugee protection that U.S. administrations had urged upon other nations for years. For example, the United Stateshad long encouraged governrnents of SoutheastAsia not to deny entry to Vietnamese boat people. Yet, when refugee influxes threatened U.S. borders, was the United States prepared to offer the same protection that it advocated?An examination of the Clinton administration's responsesto four casesof irregrrlar migration yields important answers, as well as lessons for policymakers concerned about effectively managing the tensions between the imperatives of refugee protection and law enforcement. While they had initiated planning for a new approach on Haiti, national security specialists advising then-Governor Clinton during the 1992 campaign had focused largely on issuesof "high policy, " such as the conflict in the Balkans and the future of NAIO. They never expected they would have to

Eric Schwartz is Senior

Fellow at the

United

States Institute

of Peace. He held various positions National Council

at the

Security between Igg3

and 2oor,

including

Special Assistant

to the

President and Senior Director

for Multilat-

eral and Humanitarian Affairs.

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become experts on shipboard screening of refugee applicants, construction of safe-haven camps in the Caribbean, or transforming the U.S. military facility at Guantanamo Bay from a naval base into a refugee camp. Such issues, however, quickly becarne major concerns for Washington. Initially, the greatest attention was focused on Haiti.

president-elect and Vice President-elect Al Gore, as well as advisers who would shortly become secretaryof state (Warren Christopher), secretary of defense (Les Aspin), national security adviser (Anthony Lake), deputy national security adviser (SarnuelBerge.), and administrator of the Agency for International Development (Brian Atwood). While the meeting, which the author also attended, ended with a commitrnent to promote the return of PresidentAristide, the conclusion on refugee policy was more ambiguous. Participants were sobered by analyses indicating that expectations in Haiti about a loosening of U.S. migration policy were running very high, and that a quick alteration of policy risked a presidential inauguration accompanied by massive boat departures from Haiti. In addition to the law-enforcement and political challenges of such potential outflows, the president's advisers were concerned by the possible loss of lives that could result from boat journeys in unseaworthy vessels. Even strong proponents of a more liberal rnigration policy had accepted that a change would not be immediate, and the Little Rock meeting ended with a decision to sustain the practice of direct return "for the tirne being," but without any clear indication of how long that would be. Although the president-elect directed that preparations be made to accornrnodate a change in rnigration policy over time (such as by stocking up the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station with supplies and making contact with other governrnents to request they provide refuge to Haitians), the administration's prirnary focus was the political situation inside Haiti. And while the administration made serious efforts to enhance IJ.S. resettlement opportunities for Haitians

fromHaitian Migration. Lessons In Haiti, migration pressureswere fueled by both the repression of a rnilitary regime and dire economic conditions. The first Bush adrninistration (rgBg-gg) had dernonstrated that Haitian migration could be controlled even in the absenceof political reform on the island. While the Bush administration had opposed the military coup against President Aristide in Iggr and urged the restoration of democracy, rernoval of the military regime was not a major foreign-policy priority for President Bush. In the absence of a winning strategy to establish a democratic government in Haiti, a critical question was how to prevent large-scaleemigration by boats. The answer was Executive Order r2Bo7, also known as the "Kennebunkport Order," issuedon May 2+,1992. The Order provided the legal basisto end screening for interdicted Haitians, and the Bush adrninistration instituted the controversial practice of direct return of asylurn seekersto Haiti. The Bush migration policy was condemned by candidate Bill Clinton, who vowed to reverse the policy and augrnent efforts to promote the reestablishrnent of the dernocraticallyelected government of Haiti. On January 5, 1993, President-elect Clinton's national security advisersgathered in Little Rock to deterrnine how to translate these campaign cornmitments into policy. Participants included the

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s c H W A R r zR e f u g e e s through authorized programs, the U.S. policy ofdirect return ofinterdicted boat people remained in effect.' In early rgg{, the political situation in Haiti remained unchanged and there were increasing calls from African-American leaders, among others, for a new U.S. government approach. The administration conducted a policy review, and on May B, tgg{, the president announced new political initiatives, including a tightened sanctions regime. The administration also named forrner congressrnan William Gray as special adviser on Haiti. Gray, a prominent African-American who played an important role in antiapartheid efforts in Congress during the I98os, brought great energy to U.S. efforts on Haiti, and his appointment signaled heightened U.S. resolve. The new administration initiatives also set the stage for the later U.S. threat to remove the military regime by force. Given what the president characterized as the declining hurnan-rights situation in Haiti, as well as the need to build domestic political support for the administration's new approach, the May 8 announcement also included a change in policy on refugee-processingprocedures. In particular, the president announced that Haitians departing Haiti by boat would no longer be returned directly, but would be interwiewed to determine whether or not they merited protection due to fear of persecution. If so, theywouldbe provided refuge outside of Haiti. If not, they would be returned." The administration could neither secure nor quickly implement sufficient commitments from other governrnents in the region to provide safe haven or resettlement for Haitian refugees, and the administration's initial disinclination to use the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station

to hold asylum seekersleft U.S. officials with two options in implementing the new policy' bring asylum seekersinto the United Statesor screen them on ships.3 Fearful that the forrner option would empty Haiti of much of its population, the administration chose the latter course. Even so, outflows quickly outstripped U.S. capacity to screen and return non-refugees, and the administration subsequently did adopt a safehaven policy, in which all boat people were given temporary refuge at Guantanamo, but were not considered for resettlernent during the crisis. This major shift in migration policy had been strongly recommended by specialists at both the State Department and the Departrnent of Justice. They argued that a safe-haven policy would provide greater protection for those who needed it, because nobody would be returned to Haiti against his or her will during the political crisis on the island. At the sarne time, the specialists contended that by eliminating the prospect of resettlement, a safe-haven policy would diminish incentives for boat departures for those who were leaving for primarily economic reasons. In other words, only those truly in fear of political persecution would leave if protection did not equate to resettlernent in the United States. At the senior level within the White House, there was skepticism that the suggested approach (*lth itr elimination of screening and return of non-refugees) would stem the outflows from Haiti, but in deference to the specialists, a decision was made to adopt the proposal. Ultlmately, the specialists were proven correct; the rnodification, and the elimination of the possibility of immediate resettlement in the United States, accomplished the dual objectives of ending

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large-scale outflows and sustaining basic protection. When the political crisis in Haiti abated, the majority of those who had been at Guantanamo returned voluntarily to Haiti. The administration then undertook a screening procedure at Guantanamo for the relatively srnall numbers who were not prepared to return to Haiti voluntarily. The U.S. experience in Haiti off.+s several critically important lessons on migrations that result from poverty and repression. First, so-called "pull factors"-the policies of refugee-receiving countriesare critical determinants of the behavior of those contemplating boat departure from countries mired in both poverty and repression. This point was demonstrated most graphically by the large reduction in outflows after President Bush instituted direct return in rgg2. (To put it bluntly: if you cannot get out, you will alrnost certainly stop trying.) In the same way, the Clinton administration's decision to continue to provide protection through a safehaven at Guantanamo broke the link between protection and resettlement, and reduced boat departures to a trickle. A second and related lesson is that it seems morally and politically acceptable to break the protection-resettlement link in migration emergencies. When the United Statesdid so in Haiti, it discoveredthat a little bit ofprotection goes a long way. In fact, rather than criticizing the U.S. government for suspending the resettlement option, the non-governmental community was supportive of a safe-haven policy. Third, if a government must break the linkbetween protection and resettlement, it ought to ensure that, when the situation in the country of origin is stabilized, those

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who fear return will have their claims heard. With thousands of U.S. troops essentiallyoccupying Haiti, itwas far from easyin late 1994 to convince senior U.S. officials that those Haitians refusing to return home were entitled to a casereview before being returned involuntarily. Protection advocateswithin the adrninistration prevailed, however, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service conducted a screening process. Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees objected to the specific procedures that the U.S. government employed, the case reviews did vindicate the basic principle that individuals clairning a fear of persecution ought to have their claims assessed. Fourth, addressing underlying political issuescan play a critical role in avoiding migration crises. This is true for at least two .reasons, Most obviously, enhancing the human-rights climate in countries makes remaining a more feasible oltion for those who might otherwise feel compelled to leave.In addition, taking measures to foster a new political environment dirninishes the likelihood of political controversy surrounding decisions to return asylurn seekers to their countries of origin.

Lessons fromCubanMigration. In the summer of 1994, in the midst of the Haitian crisis, the Clinton administration confronted a second significant irregrrlar-migration challenge from the Caribbean. This one involved Cuban boat people. At that time, and in the context of severeeconomic hardship and increased efforts by Cubans to depart by boat, Fidel Castro harshly criticized what he claimed were inadequate U.S. efforts to stem boat hijacking. Castro made it clear that he would no longer deter

s c H W A R TR z efugees efforts by Cubans to leave by boat; such departures escalated throughout August with thousands leaving each week.a In late August, the magnitude of the outflow compelled the administration to make the difficult political decision to end the long-standing U.S. policy to permit entry into the United States of all Cubans rescuedat seaby the U.S. Coast Guard. From that point on, interdicted Cubans were diverted by the Coast Guard

for Refugees (UNHCR), the United States instituted a ship-board screening procedure for interdicted Cubans in which those with credible claims to refugee status were to be taken to Guantanarno for interviews. Those deerned "refugees" would be neither returned to Cuba nor resettled in the United States, but resettled in third countries-an option chosen due to fears that a U.S. resettlernent plan for boat people from

Addressing Undef lying

politicalissuescan

pluy a critical role in avoiding migration crises. to a safe haven at Guantanamo Bay (though some were later moved to Panama), where the U.S. Department of Defense was rapidly preparing to house many tens of thousands of Cubans. At about the same time, the Clinton administration entered negotiations with the government of Cuba on an agreement, which was reached in September Igg{ and was designed to bring about safe,legal, and orderly rnigration. Under this arrangement, the United States agreed to legal migration of 2o,ooo Cubans each year, In return, Castro agreedto discourage irregular departures from Cuba. Pursuant to a May rggg follow-up agreement, the United States began to return Cubans interdicted at sea, and the government of Cuba committed itself to reintegrating returnees. The government of Cuba also agreed not to take action against returnees due to their attempt to leave Cuba by boat.s These agreementsstill left open the question ofjust how the United Stateswould deal with refugee claims made by Cubans interdicted at sea.After consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner

Cuba would encourage large-scale departures frorn the island. Many of the lessons sunounding the mixed migration frorn Cuba were similar to those learned in Haiti, but some were new as well. First, U.S. officials learned that ending a form of preferential imrnigration treatment waspolitically sustainable even when dealing with a strong dornestic political constituency. Cuban-Americans have traditionally supported the right of entry of all Cuban boat people. At the same time, many Cuban-Arnericans in Florida shared the concerns of other Floridians about mass rnigration and the resulting stresseson social servicesand law enforcernent. Moreover, some members of both Congress and the broader public questioned the fairness of preferential treatment for Cuban asylum-seekers. Second, the adrninistration learned that cooperation with governments of countries of origin can be a critical element in an overall effort to regularize migration.6 When dealing with a refugee-producing country, this can raise very tricky protection issues. In

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terms of preventing large-scale loss of life at sea and avoiding mass influxes of asylum seekers,refugee-receiving countries have a strong interest in encouraging source countries to crack down on migrant smuggling and discourage irregular departure. In urging authoritarian governments to irnplernent such efforts, however, refugee-receiving countries risk being complicit in denial of the right to seek asylum for those fearing persecution. Part of the answer is for countries of origin to end political controls on legal exit, and for refugee-receiving countries to expand refugee resettlement opportunities for those who are victirns of human-rights violations. In the end, there is no simple resolution to this very dilernrna that the difficult dilemma-a U.S. governrnent also confronted in the context of China.

MigraLessons from Chinese tiOn. For the Clinton administration, the issue of irregular boat rnigration from China first arose in early rgg! when U.S. law-enforcement officials detected several ships carrying large nurnbers of Chinese who were hidden on the vessels. The ships appeared to be moving toward the United States. In some instances, they were interdicted far from U.S. shores-such as in the case of a ship the merchant vessel The Eastwood, that the U.S. Coast Guard encountered in the Pacific and then transported to the Marshall Islands. In other cases,the ships rnanaged to enter tJ.S. waters.T Compared to the magnitude of U.S.Mexico border crossings, the nurnbers involved in these alien-smuggling incidents were small, but they were met with significant media attention and public visibility. The accounts of abuse connected with these operations were chilling.

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Migrants and their families reportedly pledged as much us $3o,ooo per person to criminal syndicates, and those who arrived in the United Stateswere forced to pay ofl"these debts in indentured labor.t After reviewing the issue at a special White House meeting onJune rr, 1993, the president issued Presidential Decision Directive 9 (PDD g) onAlien Smuggling. PDD 9 committed the United States to: first, strengthening U.S.-based law enforcernent against smugglers; second, cornbating srnuggling operations at their source, by working more closely with source nations, enhancing intelligence collection efforts, and promoting more rigorous standards for the flagging of ships and safetyof life at sea; third, working with other governments to interdict and redirect srnuggling ships in transit; and finally, modifying procedures related to the processing of asylurn clairns and return of non-refugees who smuggled into the United States. The Chinese alien-smuggling incidents provide insight into the relationships between law enforcement, immigration control, hurnan rights, and protection. On the one hand, U.S. administrations had historically pressed the Chinese to perrnit freedorn of rnovernent and ernigration. Moreover, the Clinton administration was concerned about the fate of returnees to China and had undertaken serious efforts to obtain information about those who had been returned from the Marshall Islands in the rgg! Ioslruoodincident. On the other hand, pursuant to the policies of PDD 9, administration officials were pressing the Chinese to undertake greater efforts to stern smuggling at the source, and to agree quickly to repatriation of their nationals. Because these conflicting objectives were both valid, a significant lesson frorn

s c H W A R r zR e f u g e e s the Clinton administration's experience with alien smuggling is the irnportance of policy coordination and integration. Effective action to deal with complex migration issues must be multifaceted. Tension between various policy goals is inevitable, but the key is to ensure that all bureaucratic actors, including personnel responsible for law enforcement, human rights, migration, and state and local governance, have a seatat the policy table, so that government agenciesare not acting at crosspurposes. For protection advocates, such policy integration should be a key objective,as it is often protection equities that are at greatest risk in rnigration crises.

tion's experience with asylum seekers frornVietnarn also presents lessonson the issue of return in the context of rnixed migrations. The lessons here are related but distinct from those in the prior cases, because Vietnamese boat people did not seek direct entry to the United States,but rather sought first to reach other Asian countries by boat, in the hope of subsequent transit to the United States. In r995 especially, the Clinton administration considered the situation of tens of thousands of Vietnamese asylurn-seekers who were living in refugee camps in Southeast Asia and had been deemed not to rnerit protection, but

Attempts to address irregular rnisration challenge,s.wlll only be successflil througlr enhanced.international cooperation. Another lesson from the alien-smuggling incidents is the importance of effective management of public affairs. Land-border rnigration presents far greater policy challenges to U.S. officials than smuggling by ships. Yet the irnages of Chinese nationals wading to shore were highly compelling and of considerable interest to the rnedia, Congress, and the American public. The challenge for first, to policymakers was twofold' demonstrate to the public a capacity to crack down on the criminality represented by the alien-smuggling enterprise, and second, to ensure that the threat was seen as a challenge and not a crisis. The administration's policywas more successful in addressing the first part of this challengethan the second.

were refusing to return voluntarily to Vietnarn. Many had ties to the United Statesand claimed to have been unfairly denied refugee status. Both the United Statesand governments in the region were reluctant to perrnit direct U.S. resettlement. The position of the United States (as well as the view of UNHCR) was that the UNHCR-supervised refugee-determination procedures that resulted in denial of refugee status for these clairnants had, on balance, been fair. Moreover, there was considerable concern that direct resettlement to the United States of the "screened out" asylum-seekers might stimulate further boat departures from Vietnam, and would be strongly resisted by the governments in Asia that were hosting the refugees. Nonetheless, several NGOs, memThe Clinton administra- bers of Congress, and Clinton adminis-

Lessonsf rom Vietnamese M igratiOn.

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tration officials believed that some review of the cases was merited. They argued that flaws in the screening process were not trivial, and that the historical associationsbetween many of the denied asylum-seekers and the United Statesjustified such reconsideration. In Congress, there were proposals for re-screening of denied asylumseekers by U.S. irnmigration officials, and direct U.S. resettlement from the countries in Southeast Asia. Such proposals, especially if reflected in legislation, risked creating expectations and unrest in the refugee camps. Thus, the administration adopted a plan, based on an NGO proposal, in which screenedout Vietnamese who returned to Vietnam from first asylum camps in Asia would be given the chance to interview for U.S. refugee resettlernent afer their return to Vietnarn.s After two years of

tlement, but also for other non-citizens who are in receiving countries but whose presence is not permanently authorized. These include temporary workers as well as those who have fled political violence and have been granted temporary protection in the host country.

Meeting the Challenqeof IrregularBoat Migratioh. The policy responses to these four casessuggest that the Clinton administration was both aware and responsive to the human rights of asylurn seekers in the cases of mixed boat migration. At the same time, its record was far from perfect, as lawenforcement and migration control did at times trump basic protection concerns. Perhaps more importantly, these examples offer some general lessons for future U.S. administrations. The lessons are likely to be relevant regardless of the

New threats justify ,'"* multilaterat

legal tools.

negotiations, Vietnam and the United States ultimately agreed on terms in tgg/. The program resulted in the resettlement of many thousands of boat people who would have otherwise been denied this option. As importantly, it helped to dirninish resistanceto return and may have also helped to prevent violence in the return process for the many thousands who did go back to Vietnarn. While this precise model is not likely to be replicated, the arrangement is a useful reminder of the need for creativity in the developrnent of plans to encourage voluntary return. Such creativity is necessarynot only in the caseof asylum seekers denied perrnanent reset-

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policy or tactical adjustrnents in U.S. immigration policy after the tragic events ofSepternber rr. ' Promoteinternationol cooperation and multilateralffi* on inegularmigrafionrssues. Attempts to address irregular migration challenges will only be successful through enhanced international cooperation. For example, the Clinton administration undertook a range of national measures on alien smuggling and trafficking. But it very quickly became apparent that unilateral efforts are only one component of an overall effort to address criminal activity relat-

scHWARrzRefugees ing to migration. Governments rnust work together to enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation, aswell as coordination on the range of issues relating to law enforcement. Also, as suggestedin the discussions of Cuba and China, enhanced dialogue and cooperation with refugee-producing countries-taking into account the delicacy inherent in that effort-must also be part of the equation. If irnrnigrant-receiving governments are to expect good working relationships with source countries on issues such as border management and alien smuggling, they may also have to demonstrate a willingness to consider immigration policies that take special account of developmental and humanitarian concerns in countries of origin. The events of September rr further underscore the irnportance of common international efforts in this area. Finally, new threats justiS new multilateral legal tools. One example is the UN Convention againstTiansnational Organized Crime and, in particular, its protocols relating to migrant smuggling, and trafficking in persons. These represent important steps in establishing rnore effective measures for collective action; they will help law-enforcement agencies ensure that criminals do not fall through the cracls of the international systernin a globalized world.

Addressing the dual objectives of protection and enforcement is an important theme of the casescited at the outset of this paper. One example of this thinking is reflected in the United States Victims of Trafficking and Molence Protection Act of 2ooo, signed by President Clinton.'o In addition to enhancing a range of law-enforcement authorities in the area of trafficking, this legislation contains a special provision to authorize legal imrnigration status for victirns of trafficking who are willing to assist in the investigation and prosecution of those who trafficked them. ' Resutminimal! suficientpoliciestowardineguIar migration.

Common international efforts to address irregular movements should not result in a reduction of refugee protection to the minimum standards permissible under international law. With the majority of the world's refugees in developing countries, which have far fewer resources than developed countries, harsh policies in the North have a clear demonstration effect in the South. In addition, harsh policies encourage potential clairnants to forego formal procedures, putting thern at greater risk of victimization by alien smugglers or abusive ernployers. For exarnple, while temporary protec' Creatiue!seek protection andenforce- tion is an appropriate mechanism in cirto integrate ment. cumstancesof crisis, it should not be terminated without opportunities for refugee-status for deterrnination those Serious efforts to craft enforcement measuresthat also promote refugee prowho desire it. Moreover, large-scale repatriations should only be encouraged after tection are not only appropriate in careful deterrnination that withdrawal of humanitarian terms, but also help to key migration ensure that constituencies temporary protection is justified. (including non-governmental organizaWhile stateshave an interest in ensuring that refugee claims are considered tions) will not oppose enforcement.

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without undue delay, expedited procedures must provide claimants with basic safeguardsagainst return to persecution. In the caseof interdicted asylum-seekers from Cuba, for example, the Clinton administration developed a detailed screening protocol. No such procedures are in place for Haitians, however." To be sure, there are varying views about whether it is appropriate to establish different procedures for different groups of interdicted boat people based on the conditions of the country of origin. But whatever one's view on this issue, there does not seem to be a formal U.S. governrnent process for establishing basic generic standards, and for considering where special procedures may be appropriate to ensure protection.

tion, the process of legalization can assist the governrnent in its efforts to account for resident non-citizens and discourage criminality against migrants-including abusive labor practices.

in Conclusion. At itsfifty-firstsession

October 2ooo, the Executive Committee of UNHCR endorsed a proposal to begin a Global Consultation with governrnents, refugee-protection experts, NGOs, and refugees. The stated goal of the Consultations is to "revitalize the international protection regime and to discuss measures to ensure that international protection needs are properly recognized and met."'3 At a time in which the process of globalization has encouraged increased worldwide migration (both authorized and irregrrlar), the Consultations have ' Do not abandon the prospect of long-termreset- helped to ensure that protection concerns continue to be prorninent in governrnent tlementin cases of irregularmigration. rnigration policy. In the wake of Septernber u, the As the circumstances of migration from Cuba and Haiti demonstrate, there irnrnigration control agenda has taken on may be good reasons to preclude the rnuch greater prominence for U.S. offioption of resettlernent in certain cials, as the Bush adrninistration seeksto instances. In rnany cases,however, reset- prevent entry of those who pose security tlernent is still a valid and even desirable threats to the United States. The recent course of action for several reasons. U.S. experience with irregular migration has demonstrated that law enforcement Despite the recent worldwide economic downturn, developed countries wiII need and refugee protection objectives can not to sustain high levels of immigration as only co-exist, but can also be mutually populations age in the decades to corne reinforcing. Nonetheless, this proposition is not alwaysself-evident. Thus, the and governrnents find themselves without a sufficient working-age population to challenge for policyrnakers will be to support retirees.'' In appropriate cases, exercise the creativity and perseverance adjustrnent of status for asylum seekers required to ensure that refugee protection rernains a key U.S. priority, and the who have arrived through irregular migration may be one of severalmeans to statesrnanship necessary to guide public opinion on these crucial issues. meet economic requirernents. In addi-

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s c H W A R r zR e f u g e e s NOTES officials ercanded the "in-coun-

t Adninistration

try refugee processing"

gram, Haitians who claimed apply for U.S. resettlement Haiti. Administration

Under

p.og.u*.

fear of persecution

could

facilities within

at U.S.

critics, however,

even with an expanded

this pro-

in-country

/ Between May and August of 1993, there were at leastfour such ships that entered U.S. ports. (Unp"bIishedJustice

argued that,

8 White

direct

Sheet, Alien

program,

Department House

of boat people was unacceptable. They e x p r e s s e dc o n c e r n t h a t m a n y H a i t i a n s w o u l d f e a r ( a n d

! Letter to USCC/Migration

be at risk of) reprisal if they applied for U.S. resettle-

blatt,

the option

of fllght

dures and logistical

that would

be used

These issues were still under

consideration and final decisions were in some measure dependent assistance from

on the results of U.S. other governments

requests for

in the region.

was due largely to the fear 3 This disinclination that Guantanamo would sene as a mag'net, encouraging large-scale departures from general opposition

Haiti,

as well as to the

of the military to the use of Guan-

tanamo for these kinds of non-military

activities.

Eric

and Refugee Seruices, Lionel

matter, the Coast Guard does relevant agencies of government if Haitian comes foruard with a claim for

appear to inform an interdicted protection,

and there does appear to be an apprecia-

within

the government

consistent with a rg72 Nixon

the incident, other

and thus did not seek to deport

legal action

against the alleged

had arrived in the United States). g Office of Multilateral and Affairs,

accounts of

National

Security

or take (who

assailant

Humanitarian

Council,

Migration

Accords, Joint Communique, September 9, 1994; Joint Statement, May 2, rggg. (or reaffirmed) 6 In this instance, "relearned" may be a better characterization. Metnamese

cooperation

For example, U.S.-

on the Orderly

Program in 1979 established an in-country tion-processing

alternative

to boat

Departure emigra-

departures

for

Vietnamese who had prior associations with the United States.

sheet -

ry.html>. II As a practical

founded

Cuban

States during

IO See Department fact Justice <http, //w.usdoj. govlcrtlcrin/traffickingsumma

on August 8. Based on information vivors, U.S. officials challenged

Rosen-

the war period.

tion

by sur-

Fact

developed a range of criteria (but not lim-

for entry under this program, including ited to) past association with the United

angered by the killing of {, Castro was particularly a Cuban Navy Lieutenant at Mariel during a hijacking provided

Press Secretary,

Policy, June r8, 1993. Schwartz from Shep Loman,

The administration

anangements

to ensure protection.

Office

Refugees International, and Dan Wolf, IAVAS, datedApril 26, 1995. (Author's personal records.)

by boat.

2 The President was not specific about the proce-

per-

Smuggling

return

ment at U.S. facilities in Haiti, and thus should retain

fact sheet in author's

sonal records.)

ensuring

against return

fear of persecution.

against summar), return,

the

importance

of a claimant

with

a well-

This general practice is administration

directive

but is not highly formalized.

12 See discussion of this issue in National Intelli"Growing gence Council, Clobal Migration and Its Inplications for the United States" (March 2ooI, NIE 2oor-o2D); and Commission of the European "Communication Communities, From the Commission to the Council a Community

and the European

Immigration

November 2ooo). "Global 13 UNHCR, tional Protection: EC/CC/oo/2,

Parliament On Policy" (Brussels,22

Consultations

Organizational 24

November

on Interna(Geneva,

Meeting"

2ooo),

NAC.96/944

para. z3(a). Global consultation documents, which address many of the issues in this paper, can be found at (w.unhcr.ch>.

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Internation

Africa:An Evolving Regime Khoti Karnanga Thnzania, Kenya, and Uganda, henceforth referred to as "East Africa," occupy 68z,9rz square miles-territory slightly larger than the combined area of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas.Aside from its sheer size, East Africa distinguishes itself for other reasons. Tbgether with the neighboring Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa, East Africa constitutes a major global flashpoint of forced migration. Collectively, these areas account for more than a quarter of Africa's !.{ million refugeesand asylum seekers. This paper first examines the general legal framework that determines the treatment of refugees in East Africa by looking at the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing CertainAspects of the Refugee Problern inAfrica, 1969 (he"eafter, the OAU Refugee Convention). Next, it presents a country-by-country analysis of specific legislative and policy responses, ultimately seeking to establish how and to what extent each country has abided by the instruments of international refugee law. Finally, it makes modest suggestions as to how the East African countries can more effectively and efficiently deal with forced migration.

Khoti Kamanga i. Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (CSFM), Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

TreatyPractice in East Africa. Thekeyto assessing EastAfrica's response to refugee problems is an understand-

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ing of the relationship between international commitments and domestic laws. The legal system prevailing in East Africa is essentially dualist, for international treaties to become operational at the national level, dornestic legislation is crucial.' For a treaty to becorne part and parcel of the laws of the land and consequently capable of being enforced, parliarnent

has exclusive jurisdiction over the refugees. Furthermore, the OAU Refugee Convention prohibits acts that are "likely to cause tension between Member states, and in particular by the use of arms, through the press, or by radio." Another rule of international refugee law that is reaffirrned in the OAU Refugee Convention underscores the "voluntariness" of repatriation.a

East Africa constituteSarnajor slobal

flashpoint of forced rnigration. rnust ratifr it and then enact an enabling legislation." In this convoluted procedure lies part of the explanation for the discrepancy between the relatively high number of treaties these countries have signed or ratified, and the paltry few treaties that have ever been accornpanied by an enabling legislation.

While many sections of the OAU Refugee Convention overlap with the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol, sorne go beyond the scope of the international regirne. Three additional obligations are worth pointing out. First, signatory states "undertake" to submit to the OAU Secretariat periodic reports on "condition of refugees; irnplementation of the Convention; and laws, regulations and decrees" relevant to refugees. Secondly, statesare duty-bound to "co-operate with the UNHCR." Finally, the "conflict resolution clause" designatesthe OAU Comrnission for Mediation. Conciliation. and Arbitration as the forum for resolving disputes related to the Convention's interpretation and application. Unlike the UN Refugee Convention, the OAU Refugee Convention eschewsany detailed focus on political and econornic rights of refugees. This has set a poor precedent for legislation in the region.

TheOAURefugee Convention. The preamble of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention commences with the recognition that the "United Nations Convention ofJuly 28, r95r as modified by the Protocol ofJanuary 3r, 1967 constitutes the basic and universal instrurnent relating to the status of refugees and reflects the deep concern of States for refugees and their desire to establish cornrnon standards for their treatment." Besides its comparatively more encompassing definition of refugees, the OAU Refugee Convention reaffirms both the "peaceful and humanitarian" nature of asylum and Another the rule on non-re;foulement.3 pertinent provision of the OAU Refugee Convention is the recognition that refugees must respect the laws of the country of asylum and that the country

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TanZania. The largest of thethreeEast African countries, Tanzania shares borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi. All of these countries are recognized as

K A M A N G AR e f U g e e s

major refugee-generating countries experiencing armed conflicts of varying intensity and, therefore, constituting a real security threat to the region. Even in this environment, Thnzania lacks a national refugee policy.s As regards Thnzania's responses to refugees, both in terms of legislation and practice, one can identifr two distinct periods.6 There was the de facto open-door policy of the I96os to the r98os, and the restrictive approach from the r99Os to the present.T The magnanirnity and tolerance of the era of the "open-door" policy sits awkwardly with sorne of the draconian provisions one finds in the law of that time, the Refugees(Control) Act, 1966.t From the I96os to the rg8os, refugees were given liberal recourse to group determination of status; land was allocated not only for housing, but also for farming; durable schools and hospitals were built for the refugees; and finally, the right to seek naturalization was extended almost universally. Yet the open-door era coincides with the period during which the Refugee (Control) Act of 1966 was in force. What accounts for the discrepancy between law and practice? How does one also explain the shift from a de facto open-door policy to a de jure restrictive regime? Compared to the Refugees (Control) Act of 1966, the rgg8 Refugees Act is legally more sophisticated, displaying sensitivity to international refugee law. Nevertheless, in practice, treatment of refugees after the rg98 Act has been increasingly restrictive. What accounts for these policy shifts and incongruity? Answers to this question are based in external as well as internal factors. Changing political climate, sliding economic fortunes, and the sheer magnitude of the refugee problem are all possible root causes.

From the Ig{os to the r96os, Africa was gripped by political struggles. The general public easily identified with those enmeshed in the conflicts, and hence syrnpathy and generosity towards refugees and freedom fighters was the norm. Whether by ministerial decree or prima facie recognition, group (u. opposed to individual) determination became the predominant means of processing applications for asylum. In contrast, current conflicts in the Great Lakes region do not draw nearly the sarne level of understanding and sympathy, as did the wars against "colonial rule" or "racist regimes." Besides the changed character of conflicts are equally changed socioeconornic conditions. While the population has continued to grow markedly, intermittent droughts, a debilitating national debt burden, and dwindling returns on exports pose awesorne challenges for the econorny. Combined with rnisrnanagernent and the conditions irnposed by multilateral financial institutions, countries like Thnzania have found thernselves on the UN lists of Least Developed Countries (LDC, and Highlylndebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Since the legendary "African hospitality" toward asylum seekof availability of ers is a function resources, the dire economic situation in Tanzania necessarily brought about a reconsideration of the open-door policy.s The changed political and socio-economic conditions in themselves might not have led to a policy shift had four other factors not come into play. First, the magnitude of mass influxes has drarnatically increased since the r98os.'' The resulting demographic imbalance and environmental degradation is not onlywell documented in study reports but was evident even to the unini-

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such negative developments as rising tiated residents in the refugee-populated areas (RPAs). Second, barriers against criminality, environmental degradation, destruction of (already fragile) infraasylum seekersare going up worldwide-a structures, diversion of human and development that has not gone unnoticed in countries such asThnzania." Third, and financial resources, and price distortions. Governrnental authorities thus feel presclosely related, is the view that the inter"shifting" is rather sured to reassert themselves. Since the national community "sharing" the burden of hosting unprecedented refugee influx of 1994, it than has become common to hear statements refugees to those countries unfortunate of this nature frorn parliarnentarians and enough to be located near refugee-genregions.'" Finally, erating government government officials alike.'5 The threat of a refugee influx can also officials in refugee-populated areas feel obliged to be seen as showing sensitivity be rnore direct. At the Regional Refugee Policy Worlshop, one official noted the to the members of their respective constituencies who must deal with the adverse perception that "generosities" such as impact of refugee presence. providing land for refugees would disThere are also severalsecurity concerns suade refugees frorn returning horne, lead to a demographic imbalance in favor that help explain the stricter refugee poliof refugees, promote the entrance of cies. Karen Jacobsen identifies the following security threats involved in refugee refugees into the governrnent as legislators, and create conditions in which crises: security of relief agencypersonnel, "refugees will ultimately consider taking security of refugees, security threats confronting cornrnunities residing in RPAs, charge of government" (as in the caseof and security threats posed by refugees to Banyarnulenge in the DRC).'u Many allege that the mass exodus of the host country.'3 The last two concerns are particularly relevant, as they seem to Batutsi refugees is associatedwith a desire lie at the root of shifts in law and practice. by the Bahima dynasty-purportedly To begin with, it is important to note that entrenched in Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda and attempting to grab power in in excess of 9o percent of refugees in Kigoin the Kagera, the DRC-to establish an "empire" tranTanzania are settled rna, and Rukraa regions of western Tanza' scending the current international fronnia. The remoteness of these areas with tiers. Two situations in the region may explain why this highly questionable pertheir poor infrastructure and communiception has gained currency. cation networks, coupled with stupefring The ruling elite in Burundi, Rwanda, numbers of refugees, cornplicates governance or "broadcasting of power" by the and Uganda are believed to be strains of the Bahirna peoples, which is then taken central government.'a to explain these countries' sympathy and A rnass influx of refugees, particularly support for the Banyamulenge of eastone which creates demographic imbalances, can bring about justified fears of ern DRC, who trace their roots to Rwanda. Proponents of the Bahima being socially, culturally, and even politiexpansionism theory also cite the erstcally overwhelmed in both the refugeernutual military assistancebetween and rest of the while the populated areas nation. Also, justifiably or not, refugee the ruling elite in Uganda and Rwanda as further evidence of a conspiracy. They presence has come to be associatedwith

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K A M A N G AR e f U g e e s note the conspicuous involvement of Rwandese refugees in the arrned struggle that brought the incumbent Ugandan administration into power in 1986, and the subsequent assistance Ugandan authorities extended to the Rwandese Patriotic Front's incursion and eventual takeoverof Kigali inJuly rgg+.'7 Those who believe in the Bahima conspiracy insist that it does not bode well for the security of the countries of the region, and hence advocatevigilance with respect to accepting Batutsi refugees. This argument must be taken with utmost caution. There has yet to be a sustained and coherent study supporting the Bahima expansionisrn theory and there are other factors that help to explain these trends short of Bahima expansionism.

TheRefugees Act of 1998.r"''-

authorities to "have regard" for international refugee law instruments. On closer inspection, one finds a number of shortcomings. For example, not only is the establishment of Councils or Village Committees based on the discretion of the Minister, but to become operational, they must obtain a "Certificate of Incorporation" from the Director of Refugee Services. Should the application for incorporation be rejected, then appeal lies with the Minister who may legitimately "vary the decision of the Director as he deems appropriate and the decision...shall be fnal" (emphasis added). Provisions relating to discretionary powers and finality of decisions by authorities litter the RefugeesAct of 1998."' Ultimately, The RefugeesAct of r99B irnplicitly recognizes a number of key "basic rights and fundamental freedoms" relevant to refugees. These include freedom of movement, the right to own property, and freedom of association. Yet, while doing so, the Act laces the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms with restrictions-raising questions about their practical utility to refugees.

zania's Refugeesof Act of r99B carries a more encompassing (but now antiquated) definition of refugees that was introduced by the 1969 OAU Convention.'8 The Act addressesa number of issues key to the promotion of the rights of asylum seekers and refugees.These provisions in a fairly bold manner facilitate the irnplemental(enya. Like her two fellow EastAfrican tion of Tanzania's treaty obligations states, Kenya is party to the I95I UN under international refugee law. The provisions in the rgg8 Refugees Refugee Convention, the Protocol of Act that deserve specific mention are 196/, and the t969 OAU Refugee Conthose pertaining to governance of vention. Kenya also represents a key desrefugee settlements and constitutionality tination for asylum seekers, particularly of orders emanating from authorities.'s from southern Sudan and Horn region The earlier provision sets the stage for countries such as Eritrea and Ethiopia.'' participatory, democratic governance In terms of specific responses to her obligations arising from international through the creation of "Councils" or 'Village Committees" to which will be refugee law, Kenya is in a classof her own. Despite an involvement with asylum elected leaders and representatives on seekers and refugees spanning nearly five principles of equality and universal suffrage, without discrimination based on decades, Kenya has neither refugee-specific legislation nor a national refugee sex, clan, tribe, nationality, race, or relig i o n . T h e o t h e r p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s policy. Kenya's legal framework is not

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based on consolidated legislation, but draws authority from a host of diverse statutory instruments."' This makes coordination difficult and severelyimpairs any legal determination of rights. More importantly, the country is denied the very institutional and legislative frarnework on which to implement its obligations under international refugee law. There does exist a draft of a Bill entitled "The RefugeesBill." It made its debut in rgg2, but overwhelming public antipathy and outright xenophobia toward refugees scuttled the legislative initiative."3 Fresh efforts were initiated two years later, but for similar reasons, the process floundered. The existing draft to which this paper refers was drawn in 2OOO. At the general level, in Kenya one finds legislative and policy shifts similar to those in Tanzania. This includes an aversion to local integration as a solution, ascendancy of individual over group recognition of status, and a tilt towards mandatory residence in carnps. But in other instances,Kenya's response toward refugeeshas been novel and bold. The retrogressive trend can be partly explained by the dramatic increase in the magnitude of refugee flows, the changed nature of conflicts, and the interplay of such factors as the proliferation of weapons, brutal inter-ethnic conflicts and local electoral politics.'a Under Secretary Waweru makes two significant observations."sHe contrasts the relatively modest numbers of asylum seekersin earlier periods with the "floods" of the I99Os, and also observesthat in those earlier periods, asylum seekerswere victims of either (sympathy-evoking) "colonial rule, " "apartheid" or "oppressive and barbaric regimes." In contrast, present day conflicts pose a knife-edge dilemma for the Kenyan government. Present day

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refugees are characterized by their violent opposition to their home governments. Offering protection exposesthe country of asylum to criticism for supporting subversive acts against a fellow Partner State, contrary to the t963 OAU Charter and 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. In Kenya, the initially rnodest nurnbers of asylum seekersdid not warrant the establishrnent of a permanent national body. The "manageable" volurne of business was such that it was common for "many refugees [to b"] local integrated," namely, to "secure employment in the public and private sector, put up business and also mix with rural fol}s" [sic]. atra even rnore, once integrated, the refugees "enjoyed the same rights with Kenyans on provision of serviceslike health facilities and education opportunities." "6 As in tnzania, drarnatic increases in the numbers of asylum seekers and the changed character of the conflicts help explain the ernergence of restrictive legislation and practices, or what Peter Kagwanja terms "rigid policy."'7 In Kenya, it has been shown that the insistence on having refugees reside in camps, as opposed to settlements and urban areas, and the mass disrnissal frorn the public sector of refugee professionals, were in Iarge part directly influenced by the overwhelming size of refugee flows and the related political and security challenges.'8 As Kagwanja surnmarizes, faced with "acute shortage of arable land, insufficient social services in the urban sector, deepening rural and urban poverty, and high rate of unemployment, Kenya can ill afford to play host to a large population of poor and dependent refugees.""s It is presumed that once the Refugees BiIl becomes enacted into law, it will occupy center stage in the regulation of asylum and administration of refugees.

K A M A N G AR e f u g e e s Given this assumption, it should be viewed as a benchmark for assessingthe country's responsesto its international obligations. The draft Bill is an elaborate document cornprising a substantive part A considerable part and two schedules.3o is of the draft Bill dedicated to institutions-National Council for Refugees, Refugee Appeal Board, Director for Refugee Affairs, Refugees Trust Fundand their functions. Curiously, unlike the Thnzania Refugees Act of 1998, the draft Bill makes no explicit rnention of the UNHCR. A second portion of the draft Bill consists of those provisions dedicated to the rights and duties of asylum seekersand refugees. Included is a provision for the rights of refugee women and children and an insistence on their "appropriate protection and assistance"that represents a significant innovation in approach. Despite theseadvances,there are holes. Contrary to Kenya's obligations under the I95I UN Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, there appearsto be little effort in the draft Bill to addressthe rights to education, work, social assistance,and health. The closest the draft Bill gets is the omnibus declaration that refugees and members of their I families "shall be entitled to the riehts and be subject to the obligations contained in (the r95r UN Refugee Convention, the rg6/ Protocol, and the rg69 OAU Convention)." Neither does the draft Bill provide for legal representation for asylum seekersor refugees-as is the case with the corresponding Ugandan draft-be it during oral interviews where the question of status is being deter- I mined, or at the appeallevel.3' These deficiencies notwithstanding, adoption of the draft Bill represents a bold step. The mere existence of a

refugee-specific statute is a welcome change. Even the government acknowledged that its absencewas a fundamental shortcoming.3" Further, the Bill has several promising aspects.First are the institutions envisaged under the terrns of the draft Bill. The limitations of the thinlystaffed Eligibility Cornmittee were dramatically exposed by the unprecedented refugee influx of early IlgI. In contrast to the Eligibility Cornmittee, which occupied the status of a mere "section" within the bureaucracy, the draft Bill provides for a "Directorate." This body will be relatively more independent and administratively superior. Thus, it will argrrably be entitled to more human, financial, and material resources. There is also provision for a Refugee Appeal Board to which one finds no analogy in the Thnzania Refugee Act of 1998. Granted, one may question the Board's independence, but an aggrieved person is also entitled to appeal to the High Court on a point of law, against a decision of the Board. Considered in its totality, the legal frarnework envisaged by the draft Bill places Kenya in a far better position to meet its obligations under refugee instruments than has thus far been oossible.

Uganda.

Like her EastAfrican sister

states, IJganda lacls a coherent national refugee policy. But unlike Kenya, Uganda has a refugee-specific statute in place, called the Control of Alien RefugeesAct of 196o (hereafter, the Act).3 While its existence is irnportant, it is distingrrished primarily by the fact that it is archaic. One observer summarized the Ugandan statute in the following terrns, "The Act neither provides for basic rights nor incorporates the provisions of the (UN Refugees Convention)." H" adds that

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Act. Drawn in IggS and revisedin 2ooo the Act "is also completely inconsistent and 2oor, its preambular section reads' with Uganda's Constitution lof r99gl " An Act to amendand consolidate thelaw relatingto and international human rights stanrefqeesto conformto internationalconuentions and dards."3aSuch a view is shared by another researcher, Abraham Kiapi, who obl$ationsin relationto the statusof refgeesand stresseshow "the Act treats refugees as their rightsand obl$ations,and to prouidefor the adminbtrationand regulationof refgee matters,and undesirable intruders rather than people in need of protection from prosecu- for other mattersconnectedwith the aboue" (emphasisadded). tion."35Also, its application is confined The envisaged statute seeLs to fulfill to "aliens" by which is rneant persons four objectives: first, to bring under one who are not Ugandan citizens or citizens instrurnent the varied and independent of the Commonwealth, effectively shutto pieces of legislation pertinent ting out asylurn seekers from the latter refugees; second, to ensure that these group of countries.36 laws correspond to rules of international Despite these concerns, there is a wellaw that are applicable to refugees; third, come discrepancy between the Act's preto ensure that refugees are granted the cepts and actual practice-a phenomenon rights to which they are entitled; and also observed in Thnzania and Kenya. For instance, Kiapi claims that whereas fourth, to provide institutions and procedures governing refugees. according to the law the decision to grant The second objective is particularly asylurn is the prerogative of the Minister, in practice, this function has been execut- interesting because it deals with Uganda's treaty obligations. For a duclisflegal sysed by a collegial body, the Refugee Eligitem, it is rnore than syrnbolic that the bility Committee, on which also sits a representative of the UNHCR.3? Likewise, Bill's opening staternent recognizes international law. It may create the conwhile the Act is explicit in its dernand for ditions for a progressive national judge to mandatory residence in camps, in practice, this requirement applies "only to seize the opportunity to apply the more spontaneous large influx of refugees," advanced and fair, but legally "alien," rules of international refugee law to while individuals whose asylum applicadornestic cases. Or it rnay provide the tions are successfulreside in placesof their choice. In addition, the enforcement of a avenue for the bench to advance the pronumber of provisions would preclude the motion of international refugee law by lending a favorable and forward-looking integration of refugees. Instead, the prac"local integrainterpretation of existing rnunicipal laws. tice has been to facilitate At the core of international refugee law tion" of refugees, including their absorption into the labor market, military, and are the principles relating to asylum, non-refoulement,protection, non-dispolice.3' I-astly, rarely have the authorities crimination, international cooperation, resorted to the draconian disciplinary or and durable solutions. It is heartening to police powers the Act confers.3s find provisions in the Bill recognizing the T h eU g a n d aR e f u g eBei l l .A n e w right of asylum and prohibiting refoulement, expulsion, or extradition.ao In a markedly Refugee BilI has been drafted which, if passedinto law, would repeal and replace novel development, the Bill also acknowlthe archaic Control of Alien Refugees edges"gender discriminating practices" as

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h*sare Containment andrestrictive

unlikely to reduce the mass influx of refugees into EastAfrica. a ground for granting asylurn.a' In another and no less important development, the Bill goes beyond the corresponding provision in the Tanzanian statute by requiring key national institutions to be guided by a broad spectrurn of legal texts and related instruments.a" While recognizing group determination of status, the Bill also contains the traditional clause that precludes persons who have occasioned serious violations of international law, including crimes againsthumanity, war crirnes, and crimes The prominence givagainstthe peace.+3 en to the UNHCR in the Bill also deserves noting, bearing in mind the obligation of states signatory to the UN Refugee Convention to cooperate with UNHCR's role both in this UN agency.++ the Appeals Board and the Eligibility Committee is of exceptional significance in promoting respect for the law. There probably exists no legislation in the region that adopts a laissez-faire attitude regarding the right of movement of refugees. Invariably, all tend to take a restrictive approach, motivated by a policy of "containment." The Bill is similar to other states' legislation. Nonetheless, it does demand that the restrictions be reasonable, non-discriminatory, and consistent with the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.a5 Like the Kenyan BiIl, the Ugandan Bill distinguishes itself by its specific provisions for the rights of refugee wornen and children.a6Finally, the Bili is distinct in the bold and consistent manner with which it addressesthe conventional solu-

tions to the refugee crisis, namely, local integration. Property rights are expllcitly recognized, as are the right to education, the right to practice one's profession, and the right to seek naturalization. IJnfortunately, the boldness with which the Bill addresseseconomic. social. and cultural rights is replaced with a distinct tirnidity and ambivalence in respect to civil and political rights. Refugees are entitled to the rights enshrined in such international human-rights instruments as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the rg8r African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and yet their "right of association" is confined to "non-political and non-profit making associations."aT Tanzania, Kenya, and. ConCluSiOn. Uganda, the East African states at the focus of this article, have responded to their obligations under international refugee law in a manner that illustrates boldness as much as ambivalence and timidity. First, none seerned to be in any hurry to either enact an enabling legislation or, in the caseof Thnzania, have the existing rg66 Refugee (Control) Act amended, following the adoption of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention to which all the East African states are signatories. None has a coherent national refugee policy. Second, over the years there has been a marked shift in legislation and policy, but also an incongruity between the letter of the law and practice. Third, the "shift" and the discrep-

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INTERNATIONAR L EFUGEE LAW IN EASTAFRICA

ancies seem to have their roots in the overwhelming increase in the numbers of asylurn seekersand the changed character of the conflicts that have given rise to increased refugee flows. As such, governrnents in the region increasingly view forced migration through the prisrn of national security. In Thnzania, this is evident in the fear of Bahima expansionism. Deteriorating economic conditions, and the evident impact of refugees on land and water resources, social facilities, and crime, explain why there has been a recoil frorn the opendoor policy that characterized East Africa before the Iggos. At the sarne tirne, containment and restrictive laws are unlikely to reduce the ]

mass influx of refugees into East Africa. The root causesof forced migration have to be identified and addressed. They include unjust political, economic, social, and cultural systems within refugee-generating countries surrounding Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. The successwith which the three East African statesare able to intervene and influence these factors will to a large extent determine whether or not large-scale influxes continue. No less important is the need for support from the international comrnunity to help resolve conflicts and share the refugee "burdens. " Finally, East African states should cornmit themselves to harrnonizing their laws and policies on forced migration.

NOTES t Peter Malanczuk, International Law (London, z Khoti

Kamanga,

.A,teAurst'sModern lntroduction to Routledge, r9g 7), 65-68. "The Rwandan Conflict and

the Genocide Convention: Implications for Thnzania, " 4i6icon feorbookfor IntemationalLau S iggil . 7 S-?8. the refoulementof an asylum 3 The rule prohibiting seeker to the country he or she has fled from. See Art. 33 (r) ofthe I95r UN Refugees Convention and Art. II (3) 1969 OAU Refugees Convention. "fthe 4 According to Art. V (r) of the 1969 OAU Convention, the "essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will." $ On November 30, 2oOI, the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (CSFM) of the University of Dar es Salaam presented to the Government of a study report funded by the European Union entitled "Review of Refugee-Related Policies

Thnzania

and Laws" on the basis ofwhich draw nationaI refugee policy.

the government

would

6 For details on responses to the Rwandese crisis of Rutinwa, "The Tanzanian Gov-

I994 see Bonaventure

ernment's Response to the Rwandan Emergency," Joumol of RefigeeStudres9 (1996), zgr and Odhiambo Anacleti, "The Regional Response to the Rwandan Energency,"

ibid.,

3I2. As regards repatriation pracRights Watch, "In the Name of Security: Forced Round-Ups of Refugees in Tlnzania," Ir tice see Human

f uly rg99), NewYork. / Addressinga RegionalRefugeePolicyWorkshop organized

by the Centre for the Study of Forced (CSFM), University of Dar es Salaam, rr, 2ooo, the Permanent Secretary of the Min-

Migration April

istry of

tg+ 1

Hone

Affairs,

Bernard

GeorgetownJournal

Mchomru,

of International

main-

Affairs

tained that Tlnzania

continues

to abide bv the "ooen

door policy." 8 Act No. Z of 1966. Because ofan error originatthe time of its enactment. the Act ii also referred to as the Refugees (Control) Act, 1965. For a ing from

critique see Toby Mendel, "Refugee law and Practice in Thnzania, " IntemotionalJ oumal of RejtgeeInu 9 (rS 9 7;., U. g Gaim Kibreab, "Local Settlements in Africa: A Misconceived Option," Journol of Refugee Studies Z

( 1 9 8 8 )4, 6 8 .

ro At the height of the Rwandese genocide of April-July 1994, as many as 25O,OOO refugees had streamed into Tlnzania within forty-eight hours such that by May the population stood at around Boo,ooo. II Seefor an example, RyszardPiotrovich, "FacinE U p t o R e f u g e e s :I n t e r n a t i o n a l A p a t h y Cer-"i ".d Sel- Help, " lnternotional Jo urnolof Refgeeloa, ro (r998), 4ro. 12 Guy Martin, "International Solidarity and Cooperation in Assistanceto African Refugees,BurdenS h a r i n g o r B u r d e n - S h i f t i n g ? , " S p e c i a lI s s u e .l n l e r n o tionolJoumal of Rejgeeloa (Sunmer 1995), 25o. r3 KarenJacobsen, "A Framework for Exploring the Political and Security Context of RefugeePopulatedAreas," ReflgeeSungQuorterJl 19 (Zooo), 2r. Another insightful work is Alex de Waal (ed), Wo fight:?;War and HumonitaianAction in,Afico (Trenton, NJ), Africa W o r l d P r e s s ,I n c . , z o o o ) , 7 5 - r o r . 14,Jeffrey Herbst, States ond Pouer in Afico, Co mparatiu e Irssons in Authoi! ondControl(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2ooo), r45-r52. Johnson Brahim, a Principal Refugee Officer has expressed himself in similar vein at a CSFM, University of Dar es Salaam Advisory Board Meeting, September r9g9.

K A M A N G AR e f U g e e S

r$ A typical example

would

recently given to parliament for

Home

Affairs

refugees from Burundi

be the

'assurances'

by the Deputy

Minister

response to the remark that and Rwanda "are neither hon-

est nor patriotic" and that in countries where refugees "had lived for long" and "acquired the citizenship" direct consequence was "conflicts". His response was was so "careful" on the question refugees citizenship that "for the last three

that the government ofgranting

years" not a single refugee had been registered as a citizen. See TheCuordion(Thnzania), 3r October 2oor, r. 16 Johnson P. Brahim, "Refugee Policy Framework' Thnzania's Experience," Regional

Refugee

April ro-r4, 2ooo. t/

paper presented at the

Policy Workshop,

Details of the

'Rwandese

Dar

es Salaan,

Connection'

can be

Ondoga ori Amaza, Museueni'sLongMorch (Kampala, Fountain Publishers, f om Gueilla to Statesmon r9g8), r4o - r{6. In an interesting episode the book obtained

from

lists incumbent

Rwandese president, General Paul Kagame, as a Ley leader (in fact chief of military Intelligence) of Museveni's National

Resistance Army.

t8 Act No. 9 of Igg8. Enacted by Parliament on November 5, 1998 it was assented to by the President onJanuary

24, 1999 and made operational

on April

15, 1999. rg Sections I9 and 2r (2) respectively. 20 They include sections 8, rz (6), 19 (5) G), 28 (r) and 35 (t). 2t U.S. Committee for Refugees, WorldRefigeeSurug 2oo1, U.S. Committee for Refugees Report, 889o. 22 They include the Citizenship Act, Immigration Act, and the Aliens Restriction Act. "Investing Peter Kagwanja, in Asylum, 2! Forced Migrants and the Mctctu Industry in IFP./'Izs Cohiersto (rgg8) 93. Also, Peter Nairobi," Mulei, "Refugee Legal Framework, Kenya's ExperiEthiopian

ence," Paper presented at the Regional Refugee PolicyWorlshop, Dar es Salaam, April Io-r4, 2ooo. 24 FECCLAI-iA,

Report of Eunenical Consultotion on

Smol/ Amr and Light WeaPorc in the Creat Inkes and Hom of ,Afico, Limuru

Conference

23- 2+, 2ooo. 2$ An under

Centre,

secretary, Nimrod

Kenya,

October

Waweru

made

at a Workshop on the these remarl<s in a presentation Review of Thnzania's Refugee-Related Policies and laws, Sheraton Hotel, March 30, 2ool. Similarviews at the Regional Refugee Policy

were expressed earlier

Workshop, April ro-r4, 2ooo.

26 Ibid. In contrast, see the peculiar economic integration of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugeeswithin the (Matatu) transport sector in Nairobi as discussed by Peter Kagwanja (footnote 23 above) 2| Kagwanja, ibid., 53. z8 Waweru. ibid. 2g Kagwanja, ibid. 'National Council for Jo The first is entitled 'Refugee Refugees'while the second bears the title Appeal Board'. Mulei justifiably questions whether the appropriate title for the later should not be the 'Refugee StatusAppeal Board.' !r Mulei, ibid., 4. !2 Waweru, ibid. 33 Chapter 64 of the Laws of Uganda. !{ Zachary Lomo, "The Role of Legislation in Promoting Recovery, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law and Policy in Uganda," Paper presented at the International Conference, InDRA, University of A m s t e r d a m ,A p r i l 2 r - 2 { , r 9 g g , 2 . 3! Abraham Kiapi, "The Legal StatusofRefugees in Uganda, A Critical Study of Legislative Insruments," inA.G.G. Gingyera Pinyoa (ed), Ugondoond the Problemof Refugus(Kampala, Makerere University Press, rgg8), 42. This was further confirmed by the deputy director, Refugee Directorate, Offfce of the Prime Mi n ister. Carlos Twesigomwein a presentation at the CSFM Regional Refugee Policy Workshop, Dar e s S a l a a m ,A p r i l I o - I 4 , z o o o . 36 Kiapi, ibid., 43. 3/ Kiapi, ibid., 49. 38 Kiapi cites the Police Force and the Military as examples. According to Waweru (zooo) Kenya also allowed refugeesto obtain employment in the public sector an arrangement that was formally rescinded following the massiveinflu of the early rggl and in the face of rising unemployment. ! g Uganda. C ontrolofAIienRefgeesAct,1g 6o. Sectio ns 2r, 22 ^nd 2J are ready examples. 4 0 I b i d . , S e c t i o n3 ( r ) . S e c t i o n4 0 . 4 r I b i d . , S e c t i o n4 ( d ) . 4 2 I b i d . , S e c t i o n3 9 . 4 3 I b i d . , S e c t i o ng ( a ) . 44 Ibid., Art. 35 of the rg5r UN RefugeesConvention45 lbid., Secion z8 (z). 46 Ibid., Sections 3r and 3o respectively. {,/ As provided under section 3I. See section 2/ (g).

Winter/Spring2ooz

[35]

Refugees

IlfreProtectiQn .gfRefug Women andChildren Regime LitmusTest Success for International Wendy A. Young 'Wornen

and children constitute approximately 8o percent of the world refugee population. Refugee experts, the United Nations community, and donor and host governrnents widely cite this statistic when they call upon the UN High Cornrnissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to irnprove its program for refugee women and children. Although women and children rnake up the majority of people forcibly displaced by arrned conflict and human-rights violations, their protection under the international refugee regime is advancing slowly. The evolution of legal protection extended to women and children, and the physical protection they are afforded while in refugee settings, have reflected this sluggishness. As the world community marls the flftleth anniversary of the rg5r UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention), it is critical that the needs and rights of women and children become a centerpiece in the continuing effort to improve refugee protection.' UNHCR must demonstrate consistent leadership, and statesmust comply with their obligations under the Refugee Convention to ensure that the rights of women and children are fully addressed.Meaningful protection of women and children will

Wendy A. Young i. Director

of Govern-

ment

Relations

U.S.

Programs,

Women's for

and

Commission

Refugee

Women

and Children.

Winter/Spring zooz

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OF REFUGEW E O M E NA N D C H I L D R E N THE PROTECTION

serye as a measure of the continuing successof the Refugee Convention. Promoting a gender- and child-centered agenda is both more important and more challenging at this rnornent when the world community is evaluating its successesin the refugee context. Approximately r{o countries have ratified the Refugee Convention, which embodies the right of refugees not to be forcibly returned to their homeland." Mass influxes of refugees continue unabated as more and more people flee

reflected in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrirnination against'Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).' Approximately 168 countries havejoined CEDAW, and the CRC is the most widely ratified hurnan rights treaty in history-only two states have failed to ratify it: the United States and Somalia.* Despite these advances, the challenge of fully integrating the human rights of refugee wornen and children into the international refugee regime remains.

Womenand childrellconstitute approxirnately 8O percent of the world refugee poPuratron. political upheavals related to rogue governrnents and guerrilla forces. More people than ever are on the rnove, some voluntarily and sorne forcibly. Large population movernents have heightened states' concerns regarding their sovereign right to deterrnine who is perrnitted to cross their borders and who is not. Despite obligations under the Refugee Convention, states have exhibited growing reluctance to host large refugee populations and irnplement expensive systems to determine refugee status. Moreover, they have shown intolerance for irregular rnigration as well as human srnuggling and trafficking. Countries find themselves balancing refugee protection and selfinterested rnigration policies-a delicate act that is often ineffective. The advancing recognition of the human rights of wornen and children forms an important backdrop to issues confronting refugee wornen and children. This recognition is most concretely

t38]

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of International

Affairs

This article will assessthe extent to which the rights and needs of refugee women and children are currently addressed by international refugee policy and practice. It will do so on two fronts. First, it will evaluate the degree to which the physical protection needs of wornen and children in refugee settings are being addressed. Next, it will examine the recognition of gender- and agebased persecution under refugee law, focusing prirnarily on legal developments in the United States. Finally, it will offer recommendations to the world community on how refugee wornen and children can receive better protectionboth physically and legally.

Physical Protection of Refugee Womenand Ch:ldrâ&#x201A;Źn.Undoubthas made significant edly, UNHCR progress, albeit only recently, in developing sound policies that promote the protection of refugee wornen and children. Largely in response to pressure

YoUNGRefugees from women's and refugee rights advocates and the I9B5 World Conference on Women, UNHCR issued its first Policy on Refugee Women in Iggo.5 The Policy was reinforced by the GuideIines on the Protection of Refugee Women (the Refugee Women's Guidelines) in rggr and the rgg5 Guidelines on Sexual Violence against Refugees' Prevention and Response (the Sexual Molence Guidelines).6 UNHCR also adopted Guidelines on Refugee Children in 1988 and Policy on Refugee Children in rgg!.7 It then issued the revised and updated Guidelines on the Protection and Care of Refugee Children in 1994 (the Refugee Children's Guidelines) and Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylurn (the Children Asylum Seekers' GuideIines) in 1997.' Together, these guidelines help field workers in all areas of refugee assistance identify the specific concerns facing women and children. They also recognize the intrinsic relationship between physical protection and assistance.Poor planning in assistanceefforts often inadvertently undermines the protection of women and children. 'Women's The Refugee Guidelines and the Sexual Violence Guidelines also promote the full inclusion of refugee women themselves in decision-rnaking and planning. The Refugee Children's Guidelines and the Children Asylum Seekers' Guidelines embrace the principles of the CRC, most fundamentally that the survival and development of a child is based on the primacy of the "best interests of the child" rule. The Guidelines also recognize the child's right to be heard and right to participate in decision-making, and the

child's right to be free from discrimination on the basis of national. social. or ethnic origin. Despite the laudable goals articulated in UNHCR's grridelines, irnplementation of the policies in field programs remains inconsistent at best. Ensuring the physical security of refugee women and children through special rneasuresis often neglected in favor of what officials unanimously perceive as more pressing dernands, such as food, shelter, sanitation, and health care. Refugee women's and children's needs and rights, however, are not adequately considered in programming within these sectors either. Refugee women and children pay the price for these inadequacies. They are more likely to suffer abusessuch as rape, sexual slavery,forced prostitution, forced marriages, abduction, and forced rnilitary recruitrnent. They often suffer higher rates of rnortality than refugee rnen do. Children are frequently deprived of educational opportunities, and women are left out of skills training and rnicroenterprise prograrns. Donor and host governrnents, UNHCR, and their irnplementing partners are not unaware of these problerns. Increasingly, the results of the lack of protection and planning for women and children are noted and docurnented by refugee and human rights agencies. The Women's Cornrnission for Refugee Women and Children alone has issued over forty reports assessing protection problems for women and children in refugee settings around the world. Reports from groups including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have also verified the failure to address the needs of women and children. This advocacy by outside actors is gradually building rnornentum for reform.

Winter/Springzooz

[39]

E O M E NA N D C H I L D R E N OF REFUGEW THE PROTECTION

In 2ooo, the U.S. and Canadian governments contracted the Women's Comrnission to conduct an evaluation of UNHCR's progress in implernenting the Refugee'Women's Guidelines. Scheduled to be completed by 2oo2, the assessmentwill be made through site visits to five refugee settings around the world, existing documentation from other settings, and interviews with offlcials at all levels of UNHCR and other implementing agencies.s At almost the sarnetime that the United States and Canada approached the 'Wornen's Comrnission, UNHCR itself contracted an independent tearn of consultants. Known as "Valid International," the group was hired to evaluate the extent to which UNHCR is effectively meeting the needs of refugee children, using the Refugee Children's Guidelines as the primary benchmark. The assessment has also utilized field visits and interviews to arrive at concrete recommendations for future UNHCR planning and programming.'o Together, these two studies should form a critical platform for improving the protection of refugee women and children. Donor governments supporting these initiatives have already indicated their desire to seeUNHCR act on recommendations resulting from the assessrnents. Senior rnanagers at UNHCR must take responsibility for systernatically implernenting any required changes in programming.

or she would be persecuted on the basis of one of these grounds in order to obtain protection under the Convention. Nothing in the debates accompanying the drafting of the Refugee Convention indicates that gender- or age-related human-rights violations were even superficially considered as rneriting eligibility for refugee protection. This oversight is not surprising, though; the Refugee Convention grew out of the experience of World War II in an era when women's and children's rights were neither widely discussednor embraced at the international level. Nevertheless, in much the same way that U.S. federal courts have debated the scope of constitutional protections encompassed in the U.S. Constitution and gradually have opened the door toward an expansion of domestic civil rights, so too has the international community massagedthe refugee definition to either expand or contract its coverage. Developed countries have engaged in much of this jurisprudential wordsmithing, as they are the states that actually have the resources to implernent refugee status deterrninations as implicitly envisioned under the Refugee Convention. The United States, European countries, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have taken the lead in the legal interpretation of the Refugee Convention. UNHCR has offered its grridance along the way. Recognizing gender- and age-related persecution under the Refugee Convention is a quandary for many states. States have sought to narrow the number of people whom they deem eligible for refugee protection, and thus limit their international obligations under the Refugee Convention. Yet the recognition of women's and children's rights has

Legal Protectionof Refugee Women and Childrâ&#x201A;Źfl. Articler or the Refugee Convention delineates five grounds for refugee protection: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a particular social group.An individual must prove that he

[+ o ]

Georgetown Journal

of International

Affairs

v o u N GR e f u g e e s opened the door to potentially large numbers of asyium seekers. Therefore, developed states,thus far, have been cautious in their acceptanceof claims to asylum related to gender persecution or age. They perceive inclusion of women and children as potentially opening the "floodgates" to a refugee influx of unacceptable proportions. This fear is without basis, since the vast rnajority of women and children around the world lack the resources or capacity to seek asylum in western countries. Adjudicators have generally considered gender- and age-related persecu-

had FGM, as practiced by the tribe, and oppose the practice."'' Despite the narrow interpretation, the Kasinga decision did lead to a wider acceptance of FGMrelated claims in the United States. Refugee experts expected that the Kasinga precedent would lead to wider recognition of gender-related claims based on other forms of abuse. The BIA itself, however, threw the judicial equivalent of cold water on these expectations in 1999 when it denied asylum to a Guatemalan woman who had repeatedly experienced honific dornestic violence at the hands of her husband, but was denied

Developedstatâ&#x201A;ŹS,thusfar,have been cautious in their acceptance of claims to asylum related to gender per3ecution or age. tion claims as falling under the "membership in a particular social g:roup" category. This category has historically been interpreted in a flexible manner to capture claims that do not fall neatly into the categories of race, religion, nationality, and politicalopinion The United States has adopted this approach, which has generated tremendous controversy and unclear legal guidelines. In rgg6, refugee advocates heralded a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA, the highest U.S. administrative judicial body to consider immigration cases) that granted asylum to Fauziya Kasinga. The young Togolese woman was given asylum based on her fear of female genital mutilation (FGM) in her home country." In its effort to limit expansion of U.S. refugee law, the BIA defined the social group in ryoung women of the question as only Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe, who have not

protection by the Guaternalan authorities.'3In a decision known as "R-A-," the Board found that while the respondent was credible and certainly experienced abuses that rose to the level of persecution, her argued social group"Guaternalan women who have been involved intirnately with Guatemalan male companions who believe that women are to live under male domination"-was not a cognizable group. The Board also found that the woman's husband was not motivated to persecute on the basisof the proposed social group.'a The R-Adecision instigated a tremendous outcry from refugee and women's rights activists, as well as from mernbers of Congress. In response, former attorney general Janet Reno vacated the BIA's decision with orders to the Imrnigration and Naturalization Service to issue regulations to address the issue.'s At the time of writing, these regulations

W i n t e r / S p r i n gZ o o Z [ 4 r ]

W O M E NA N D C H I L D R E N THEPROTECTION OF REFUGEE

for Statescannotendorsorespect wornen's and children's hurnan iights on one hand, and then ignore their protdction needs when those rights-are violated. had not yet been finalized, and the state of the law has remained in flux.'u A few other asylum countries, most notably Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdorn, have been less circumspect in their handling of gender-related claims. Britain, for exarnple, opened the door to gender itself being considered as a social group in a caseknown as "Shah, " but narrowed that finding only to the nationality in question-Pakistani.'7 No country to date has rendered a blanket decision identifring gender as a defined social group, choosing instead to combine gender as a key attribute with other qualifying factors such as nationality. Generally, however, the trend is toward recognition of gender persecution as a basis for refugee protection. South Africa, for exarnple, has incorporated gender as a recognized social group into its own law, although implementation rernains to be seen. UNHCR has weighed in on individual cases.It has also issued policy guidance on gender persecution clairns that suggest that women rnight constitute a social group, but has stopped short of sounding a trurnpet call for such universal recognition.'8 The recognition of age-related claims is even less developed. In the United States, it has only been in recent years that children's clairns have been considered under the social group category. At this point, the BIA has yet to issue a precedent decision addressing children's claims. Nonetheless, decisions by lower-

I42l

GeorgetownJournal

of International

Affairs

level immigration judges and unpublished BIA decisions have signaled that jurisprudence on children's claims may follow a srnoother path than genderbased clairns. Already, sorne children have been granted asylum for being child brides or street children, or for having been abused, forcibly recruited into a gang or army, or exploited as a child laborer. Others have gained asylurn for having been persecuted due to sexual orientation or mental disabilities.'s Interestingly, in lgg$ and r99B, the Immigration and Naturalization Serr.ice itself has issued both gender guidelines and children's guidelines establishing non-binding standards with which adjudicators are to strive to cornply in their handling of wornen's and children's asylurn claims."o The guidelines represent an important yardstick against which to gauge progress. Refugee advocates continue to press the United Statesto live up to these standards. COnClUSiOn. As the Refugee Convention passesits fiftieth year, the international cornrnunity rnust ernbrace an agenda that actively ensures full protection of refugee wornen and children. Failing to do so will result in providing protection for the minority while leaving the most vulnerable outside the reach of the refugee regime. It will also represent a tremendous hypocrisy: states cannot endorse respect for women's and children's human rights on one hand, and

Y o U N GR e f u g e e s then ignore their protection needs when those rights are violated. With this in mind, the international community should take the following steps:

forum offers UNHCR a unique opportunity to present a platform of action on behalf of women and children.

to embracewomen 3) Encourageadjudicators t) Moue the UNHCR guidelinesaddressing the and childrenas recognizable socialgroupsunderthe protectionneeds of womenand childrenfrom mere refgeed$nition. polig into practice. The refugee definition should be interpreted to recognize violations of the UNHCR is facing a serious budget rights of women and children as defined deficit as donors fail to contribute funding. the CEDAWand the CRC, and to accomConsequently, by promised modate the protection needs of refugee agency has indicated that it will have to make difficult choices and curtail prowornen and children. The fiftieth anniversary of the Refugee gramming in key sectors and regions. While the current High Commissioner Convention has offered the internationhas stated his commitrnent to continue to al comrnunity a significant opportunity p r o m o t e t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f r e f u g e e to renew its commitment to protection of refugee wornen and children. In June women and children even in the face of budget shortfalls, the agency must 2OOr, a young African refugee wornan its efforts to improve proactivelyenhance addressed a session of the UNHCR Global Consultations. She shared the gramming on the ground for wornen and children. It must also recognize that conclusions of a group of refugee women assistanceprograms, which are the most who had convened for their own consullikely to take a funding hit, play a crucial tation in the prior week to assessthe state in of the world's refugee women. The young part protection. wornan observed, to specifcal!testtherecil Implementprograms In our consultation, we talked of theWomen's Commission's eualuaommendations about legal status and the quality of tion of the implementation of theReftgeeWomen's Women talked about how Intemational's eualuation of the asylum. Guidelines andValid rnen often dominate and the implementation of theRefgee Children'sCuidelines. women's voices and experiences are The international community, with the lost...We hope that refugees will be recognized as people who have leadership of UNHCR, must maximize human rights. We all hope that this the use of these two evaluations. In 2Oor, in recognition of the fiftieth anniversary energy will turn into something positive. W'e hope that the experiof the Refugee Convention, UNHCR launched a seriesof international "Global enceswe share with UNHCR will be able to change a lot of things. We are the progressmade Consultations" to assess asking you to help us refugee and critical challenges that remain in women to have our voices heard.'' refugee protection. In 2oo2, the consultations will devote significant time to This is a request the world should not examining the protection issues that will ignore. confront women and children. This

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OF REFUGEE W O M E NA N D C H I L D R E N THE PROTECTION

NO T E S r Convention Relating to the StatusofRefugees z8 ( e n t e r e di n t o f o r c e 2 2 July rggr. t8g U.N.T.S. Igo April r954). 2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ifre Stole of the World\ Refgees (New York, Oxford University Press,2ooo), 23. ! Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 18 December Ig/9, r24g U.N.T.S. rJ (entered into force ! September

r98r). Conoention on theRtght:of theChild20 November 1989. )O( U.N.T.S. )O( (entered into force 2 September rggo). { "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination on-line, against Women," <http ://untreaty.un. org/EnglisVChapter-iv/treatyg.a sp> (date accessed,5 Novenber 2oor). "Convention on the Rights of the Child," on(date line, http,//w.unicef.orglcrclcrclhtm accessed,5 Novenber 2oor). 5 Polig on RefgeeWomen,UN High Commissioner for Refugees(Geneva: r!go). of Refugul4lomen,UN High 6 Cuidelines on theProtection Commissioner for Refugees(Geneva, t99t). Senal Violence,AgairctRejgees, Cuidelineson Preuentionond for Refugees High Commissioner Response,UN (Geneva, rggg). j

Guidelineson Rejryee Ciildren, UN sioner for Refugees (Geneva, 1988). Polig on Refigee Children, UN for Refugees (Geneta, t993).

High

Commis-

8 Refgee Children, Cuidelineson Protectionond Ccre, UN for Refugees (Geneva: Igg{). Cuidelineson Policiesond Proceduresin Deoling with Unoc-

g Women's

l+ +l

Commission

High

Januaryzooo). 19 See Christopher Nugent and Steven Schulman, "GivingVoice to the Vulnerable, On Representing dren,"

Detained

Immigrant

l n t e r p r e l e r R e l e o s e s7 8

and Refugee Chil(October 8, zoor),

r583-84. Commissioner

High Commissioner

componiedMinorc SeekingAylum, UN for Refugees (Geneva: rgg/).

Children, "UNHCR Guidelines on Protection of Refugee Women, A Ten-Year Review of Progress" (report forthcoming). ro Valid International, "Independent Evaluation of the Impact of UNHCR's Activities in Meeting the Rights and Protection Needs of Refugee Children" (report forthcoming). rt In re Kosingo, Interim Decision 3zl8 (Board of Immigration Appeals, r996). 12 Kasinga, supra note 14, at 13. r J M o t t e r oR f - A - , l n t e r i m D e c i s i o nJ , ! o f ( B o a r d o f Immigration Appeals, r999). 4 R-A-, supra note 18, arr4-2r. 15Janet Reno, Attorney General, ExecutiveOrder 2 3 7 9 - 2 o o r ( W a s h i n g t o n ,D C ' J a n u a r y I 9 , 2 o o l ) . 16 "Asylum and Withholding Definitions," ProVol. 65 (Washington, DC, posed Rule, Fed*olRegister, December 7, 2)oo). tl lslam(A.P.)u. SeretoryofStatefortheHomeDeparlment, Reginou ImmigrotionAppealTribunaland AnotherEr Porte Shoh (A.P.),z All ER 545 (House of Lords: rggg). t8 UN High Commissioner for Refugees,"Position Paper on Cender-Related Persecution" (Geneva,

Commissioner

for Refugee W'omen and

GeorgetownJournal of International Affairs

Aglum Adjudicoting 20 Considerations for AglumAdjudicators Claimsfrom Vfomen,Immigration and Naturalization Service (Washington, DC' May 26, 1995). Aglum Clcims, Immigration Guidelines for Children's and Naturalization Seruice (Washington. DC, D e c e m b e rr o , 1 9 9 8 ) . 2r Statement of A.G., UNHCR Global Consultations (Geneva:June 28, 2ooI) (identity withheld).

Business &, Finance

Protection of of Progress"

lent Evaluation in Meeting the Lgee Children" 278 (Board of

:403 (Board of

<ecutive Order

19, 2001). nit ions. " Pro

;hington, DC:

fome Deportment. her Ex Porte Shah 999)· fugees, "Posi ion" (Geneva:

>Leven Schul ,: On Repre efugee Chil r

Co~xisis,-----The Case for a Regulated Market

John M. Talbot

2001),

~ud;cating~lum

'Jaturalization

j). Immigration ngton. DC:

bal Consulta . withheld).

You may not realize it, but there is a severe crisis in the world coffee market. While the price of your latte, your pound of Starbucks, or your can of Maxwell House may not have gone down much, the world market price for green (unroasted) cof fee has fallen by two-thirds since 1997. For the estimated 10 million small farmers around the world who produce about 70 percent of the world's coffee, the results have been devastating. Thousands of coffee farmers in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua have abandoned their farms and headed to the cities in search of food, or headed north with hopes of finding work in Mexico or the United States. At the end ofJuly 2001, cof fee farmers in Colombia blockaded major highways across the country, warning that unless their debts were cancelled, 80,000 of them would lose their farms because they would default on their loans. In Kenya, farmers who have been los ing money on coffee production have replaced their coffee trees with subsistence crops.' The proximate cause of the crisis is a glut of coffee on the world market, but the roots of the crisis go back much farther, to U.S. and World Bank policies in the 1980s that produced a situation of chronic oversupply. Since the mid 1990s, this oversupply has been exacerbated by the emergence ofVietnam, which surpassed Colombia last year to become the world's sec-

John M. Talbot is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Colby College in Waterville. Maine.

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colony in Surinam, and the French sent some seedlings to their colony in Martinique. From trees propagated in Surinam, some seedswere later sent to Brazil, where the first coffee wasplanted in tJ2J . Frorn the one tree that survived the trip coffee gradually spread to Martinique, through the Caribbean and the rest of l-atin America. Most of the arabica coffee trees now growing in I-atin America are direct descendants of a few seeds from Java. Around r9oo, some seedsfrom the Caribbean were planted in East Africa, where coffee is thought to have originated. Robusta coffee, a different speciesthat produces lower-grade coffee, was also spread by French and Dutch colonists through Central and West Africa and South and Southeast Asia." The legacyof colonialism is clear frorn this history. Coffee spread around the world because colonists searching for ecological niches that would produce are coffee carried it to more than fifty a beverage good origins of coffee as unclear, but by the fifteenth century, the countries. As Sidney Mintz has shown, sugar, along with coffee, tea, and cocoa, Arabs in what is now Yemen cultivated and drank it. From there, it spread becarne irnportant sources of colonial power for Britain, as well as essential through the Arab world to Constantinofirst tasted consurnption items for the growing ple, where European travelers industrial working class.3In Britain and it. By the early r6oos, it had been introduced into Europe, and coffee houses other European powers, coffee and tea spread rapidly through Italy, France, gradually replaced beer and wine as working-class beverages. Tea won out as England, and the rest of the continent. the preferred beverage in Britain, due in An Indian pilgrim to Mecca, who smuglarge part to the British East India Comgled out a few seedsand planted them in pany rnonopoly and the fantastic revMysore, eventually broke the Arab enues that the British colonial state was monopoly on coffee cultivation. Later, from able to derive from the trade.a This in the Dutch took a few seedlings southern India and planted them inJava. turn led to the United Statesbecoming a A Dutch botanist carried several seeds coffee - drinking country when the British from these trees in Java and grew a few atternpt to extract revenues from the tea trade to its American colonies spurred coffee trees in a greenhouse in Amsterthe colonists to revolt. When the coffeedarn, one of which was presented to Louis XIV as a grft. The Dutch sent some producing countries achieved independence, they were already locked into roles seedlings from Amsterdam to their ond largest coffee producer. The coffee glut is likely to continue for another few years, until supply is brought back into balance with demand through the ruin of hundreds of thousands of small coffee growers and the devastation of the economies of a number of countries that still depend heavily on coffee exports. This article traces the roots of the current crisis and proposes a solution. The main argument is that the free market does not work for coffee. Due to the economics of coffee production, an unregulated world coffee market produces wide price fluctuations, which create brief windfalls followed by devastating periods of low prices like the current one. The solution to this problem lies in creating a regulated rnarket that can maintain a rough balance between supply and dernand.

rhe A BriefHistoryof Coffee.

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rALBorBusiness& Finance as suppliers ofgreen coffee to their former colonial masters. The United States quickly became the world's largest coffee-consuming country, and Latin American countries, led by Brazil and Colombia, became the world's major suppliers. Following World War II, as Europe rebuilt and the U.S. and Japanese economies grew rapidly, for the demand coffee increased.As a result, coffee production expanded in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. By the late rggOs, this expanded production exceeded demand, and prices fell. The United States, faced with the threat of communism spreading

exporting countries. The quotas were periodically adjusted as market conditions changed. The coffee-importing countries enforced the quotas by collecting certificatesof origin for all imported coffee and rejecting any over-quota irnports. A series of four ICAs were in force for rnost of the period from 1962 to r98g, during which tirne they stabilized, and probably raised, world market prices.6 The governments of both producing and consuming countries saw the agreements as a form of economic aid frorn the developed consuming countries to the lessdeveloped producing countries. By rg89, however, when the fourth ICAwas due to

Whenthe coffee-producing countries achieved independence, they were already locked into rolep as supplier's of green co'ffbe to ^rriasters.

their forrner colonial

through Latin America, and Europe, faced with a similar threat from anticolonial movernents in its African and Asian colonies, agreed to participate in a plan to regulate the market. This plan followed the outlines laid out by the Havana Charter-signed, but never ratified, by the United States as part of the effort to set up a multilateral post-war world order led by the United Nations.5 The plan wasembodied in the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), an agreement between coffee-producing and coffee-consuming countries first signed in 1962. The ICA set up a system of export quotas to manage the market. To keep world market prices within an agreed-upon range, the agreement designated an overall quota for total world exports and divided it among the coffee-

expire, the Cold'War rationale that had supported the ICAs was crurnbling. The outgoing Reagan and incoming Bush adrninistrations considered the ICAs inconsistent with the free-market policies of the Washington Consensus. U.S. intransigence caused the negotiations for a fifth ICA to break down, and the regulated market expired inJuly 1989. Meanwhile, several other developrnents had converged to create a chronic oversupply of coffee. First, beginning in the late rg7os, Colombia and the Central Arnerican countries, with funding from USAID, began to "technify" their coffee production. They replaced the traditional way of growing coffee-under shade and inter-planted with food crops-with new high-yield varieties of coffee planted in monocultures under direct sunlight. Like

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other Green Revolution crops, this new coffee required high levels of fertilizers and pesticides. While this method had some damaging ecological consequences, it sharply increased coffee production.T Second, in 1975, a major frost in Brazil, the largest producing country, caused a severe coffee shortage that raised world rnarket prices to record highs by rgl/. During this extended period of high prices, coffee growers planted millions of new coffee trees, but since coffee trees take three to five years to bear fruit, they had no immediate effect on coffee prices. By the early rg8os, the combination of these factors had created a world level of production that exceeded total world demand. Enforcement of ICA quotas, however, averted a price crash. Countries that were producing consistently above their quota levelswere forced to store the excess production. The third development contributing to oversupply was the debt crisis of the 198os, which resulted in World Bank- and IMF-imposed structural adjustrnent programs in many developing countries. One cornponent of these prograrns was strong pressure on countries to increase their exports to ensure a source of revenue that would allow thern to serwicetheir debts. Despite existing quotas, some countries increased hoping that their coffee production, expanded production would help them gain a larger quota share. Other countries began to produce coffee as a new source of export revenues. This only added to the oversupply situation. Upon the expiration of the ICA in 1989, a flood of stored coffee was released onto the world market, and prices fell by 50 percent within six months. Prices stayed low through rgg2, and producing countries lost an estimated $ro to 12 billion in export revenues over this period.

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Low coffee prices causedwidespread economic devastation, Ieading in some cases to political and social chaos. In Rwanda, where coffee accounted for Bo percent of total exports, for example, the resulting economic crisis was a key factor in igniting ethnic tensions that led to the genocide. In Chiapas, Mexico, low coffee prices helped spur the Zapatista uprising. And in the Colombian coffee growing regions, which had alwaysbeen relatively prosperous, guerrilla groups began to gain a foothold for the first tirne as small coffee growers were driven to economic ruin8 As these events were unfolding, World Bank policies rnade the problem even worse. The Bank had generally not pressured countries to liberalize their coffee sectorsduring the rg8os, even when it was forcing the liberalization of other sectors of their econornies. The Bank left the coffee sectors alone because of the ICA, which required producing statesto regulate their coffee sectors in order to meet their obligations under the quota system. After the ICA collapsed, however, the Bank moved to end state intervention in coffee production. In some countries. where state marketing boards had skimmed a large percentage of the world market price, liberalization was initially good for growers, who now received higher prices for their coffee. These growers responded by planting more coffee, however, adding to the oversupply. lJnfortunately, liberalization also removed the buffers that had protected small coffee growers frorn the wildly fluctuating prices of the world market. In rgg{, two frosts in Brazil created a temporary coffee shortage, interrupting the period of overproduction and low prices. This led to higher world rnarket prices and increased coffee planting. By Igg{, Vietnam, which had been a mar-

rALBorBusiness& Finance ginal coffee producer until the late rg8os, was already the second largest Asian producer, behind Indonesia. As the frosts drove prices up, Metnamese growers responded with a massiveincrease in coffee planting. When this coffee began to hit the world market in 199/-8, coffee prices went into a downward spiral.

TheCasefor a Regulated Market. Economists argue that a free, unregulated market ensures that cornmodities will be produced as efficiently as possible. The market rewards efficient, low-cost producers and eliminates inefficient, high-cost ones; consumers benefit from low prices. While the ICA quotas were in effect, economists argued that they were distorting the market, holding world market prices above their "equilibrium" level, rewarding inefficient producers, and leading to misallocation of productive resources.The quotas were responsible for the chronic oversupply situation, they proclaimed. If this were true, then twelve years of an unregulated market since rg8g should certainly have eliminated the inefficient producers and brought supply back into balance with demand. Why hasn't this happened? The chronic oversupply, as we have seen, was causednot by the quotas, but by U.S. and World Bank policies. The free market argument doesn't apply to the world coffee market, for two reasons. First, the argument assumes factor mobility; it assumesthat capital and labor can be moved easily out of inefficient sectorsinto more productive activities, so that supply responds quickly to price signals. Coffee, however, is a tree crop. Coffee trees do not bear fruit for three to five years after planting, so supply responds very slowly to price. In the absence of market intervention. this

results in recurring price cycles. If world market coffee prices are high, growers plant rnore coffee, but this has no immediate impact on the market. Since prices remain high, growers plant even more coffee, sowing the seeds of a glut on the market three to five years later. As this new coffee comes onto the market, prices fall because of oversupply. Coffee trees, however, continue to produce, and since growers have sunk capital in these new trees, they continue to pick the coffee. Oversupply and low prices thus persist for several years, until prices fall below the costs of production. Growers then stop maintaining their trees, and production declines slowly. As prices remain low, and growers are unable to pay back loans, they may lose their land, abandon their farrns, or plant other crops. Eventually, this lowers supply, raising coffee prices. Supply, however, tends to fall too low, because more trees are taken out of production than is necessaryto balance supply and demand. Thus, new shortages arise, initiating a new cycle. The decline in production during the Iow-price phase of the cycle does not involve the simple rnovement of labor and capital out of coffee production, as suggested by the economists' abstract rnodels. The prolonged periods of low prices wreak havoc on the lives of small coffee-growers and their families, many ofwhich have produced coffee for generations. Because2$ rnillion people-small farmers and their families-depend directly on coffee production, Iow prices can also cause economic disaster in developing countries heavily dependent on coffee exports.s This happened in the early Iggos, and it is happening again during the current coffee crisis. The second reason that the free market argument doesn't apply to coffee is

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that an oligopoly of giant coffee companies dominates the major consuming rnarkets, and uses its market power to distort prices. Five large coffee traders account for over {o percent of all coffee imports into the major rnarkets: the United States,the European lJnion, and Japan. Four giant conglornerates control over 60 percent of coffee sales: Nestle, Philip Morris (Maxwell House), Sara Lee (Superior, Chase and Sanborn, MJB, H i l l s B r o s . ,a n d C h o c k F u l l o ' N u t s ) , a n d Procter and Gamble (Folgers).'"Consolidation of rnarket control by these cornpanies is the reason that, while the world market price for green coffee declined by rB percent between r9/g and rgg!, the retail price of coffee in the United States rose by 2{o percent." While green coffee prices have fallen by two-thirds since Igg/, retail coffee prices in the United States have decreasedby only about onequarter.'' The unreg'ulated market has given us the worst of both worlds' high coffee prices for consumers, and economic crisis for coffee g'rowers. The tree-crop price cycle has characterized the unregulated world rnarket. While the market was regulated by the ICAs, however, the highs and lows were smoothed out. The quotas generally forced producing countries to store some of their production; during ternporary shortages, this coffee could be immediately releasedto dampen price increases. During tirnes of oversupply, prices were maintained at a level that allowed small growers to stay in business. Looking back over the past fiftyyears, it is clear that regulated markets have benefited coffeeproducing countries and individual coffee producers. Market regulation has stabilized prices, providing a more steady income for producers. The percentage of the retail price ofcoffee that has returned

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to the producing countries and the percentage that has returned to the g:rowers have both, on average,been higher under regulated markets than under deregulated ones.'3 In short, regulated markets have rneantfairerprices for coffee producers. Coffee can only be profitably grown in certain ecological zones that lie between the topics of Cancer and Capricorn. Most of its consumers live in the temperate developed world, and cannot grow their own coffee. Coffee is grown in so rnany countries because Europeans, who developed a taste for the bean, planted it across their colonial empires. These regions were integrated into the world econorny as coffee suppliers, but they have found it exceedingly difficult to break out o{'this role. I argrrethat, given this history, coffee drinkers in the developed world have a responsibility to see that coffee growers are fairly compensated for their efforts. The free market clearly has failed to achieve this, and a regrrlated rnarket is needed.

for Renewed Outline Regulation. The most important goal of a new regulatory regime for coffee would be to end the oversupply situation and stabilize supplies. World demand for coffee is relatively stable and unresponsive to price. The problem is to bring potentially volatile production into rough balance with stable dernand, and production controls are the best long-term solution. Export controls worked relatively well in the r96os, but in the r98os, they couldn't prevent the overproduction driven by U.S. and World Bank policies. Ideally, total world production would be set at a level slightly above total consumption, so that some coffee could be stored to cover shortages when the next natural disaster strikes. Excess production could be

rALBorBusiness& Finance managed through a systern of export controls or a centrally-managed coffee stockpile. Although export controls did not work in the Ig8os, they would be effective in combination with production controls. Once the controls are in place, production could be gradually increased to keep pace with slowly increasing world consumption. Allocating production among producing countries would be the most politically challenging task in a new ICA. It would be difficult precisely because coffee is a key crop and source of livelihood for so

costs and earn a reasonable profit. Growers could then be encouraged to invest this profit in improving the quality of their coffee and in adopting ecologicallysustainable production practices. The higher prices for producers that would result from controls could be taxed to provide an adjustment fund so that production of different fypes of coffee could be changed in response to changes in dernand for these types. New countries that wanted to start exporting coffee could buy a share of the global quota by contributing to this fund, and this rnoney

Begullted marl(ets hur,.'''eantfairerprices

for coffee producers.

many people in developing countries, and each government would want to maximize its economic benefits by having a larger quota. Production controls would necessitate a cutback of production in participating countries, and financial assistanceto manage the transition. Cutbacks in coffee production should not take the form of "diversification" into other related crops, such as cocoa or tea, which are also in oversupply on world rnarkets as a result of World Bank and IMF pressures to expand exports during the r98os and r99os. Rather, production controls should probably be extended to some of these crops as well. ICA members would have to agree upon a price range for the world market price of coffee that would be both reasonable for consumers and fair for producers. Since world demand can be predicted fairly accurately, total world production and exports could be set so that the market balancessupply and demand at a price that allows coffee growers to recover their

could be used to phase out comparable production elsewhere. The rnajor consuming countries would all have to participate in and enforce this regime so that very little coffee could be sold outside it. Most of the ideas proposed here have been included in sorne forrn in some previous ICAs; others, like production controls, have been discussedin previous negotiations. Are the major consuming countries likely to agree to re-regr.rlate the world coffee market? The European statesandJapan were prepared to agree to a new ICA in 1993, but the United States again blocked an agreement. Japan and the European countries generally provide much higher levels of official development assistancerelative to GDP than does the United States. Recognizing the seriousness of the current crisis, they would probably agree to a new regirne to aid producing countries. The United States, and the transnational coffee giants that have considerable influence over U.S. policy, would be the major obsta-

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half times the world rnarket price), have cles. Nevertheless, a combination of collective pressure from coffee-producing been growing rapidly since it was introstates,aswell as from U.S. citizens, could duced in the United States in r9g8; it convince U.S. policymakers to acquiesce already has a small but significant market to renewed regulation. share in Europe. Consumer pressurehas forced Starbucls and Sara Lee to begin U.S. consumers have already responded overwhelmingly in suweys that they offering Fair Tiade coffees. Pressure by would be willing to pay more for clothconsurners and citizens who understand ing if they were g"uaranteed that it wasn't the devastating effects ofthe current crimade in sweatshops.'+They may also be sis could change U.S. government poliwilling to pay more for coffee if they cy to support a new ICA. Something could be assured that their money was must be done to help the millions of coffee growers and coffee workers whose going to support small farmers and their families. Sales of Fair Trade coffee, for lives are being destroyed by the free marwhich coffee growers are grraranteed a ket, and to prevent the social disintegraminirnurn price (now about two and a tion that is likelv to follow.'5 NOTES t O*fam, "The Coffee MarLet - A Background S t u d y ." 2 o o r . < h t t p , / / w . p e o p l e . c o r n e l l . e d u / p a g e s /cel5/OxfamReport.pdf>; Robert Collier, "Mourning Coffee," SonIroncisco Chronicle, 2o May 2oor, final edition; MaryJordan, "Coffee Glut and Drought Hits Nicaragua; SandinistasGain in Campaign as Hunger Sweeps Rural Areas", I4loshington Post, ! September 2oor, ffnal edition; Agence France Press,July !r, 2ool; Mark Stevenson, "ln Latin American, Coffee Bust Brings Ruin to Small-Scale Farmers, Spurs Exodus," .AssocictedPress, 28 July 2ool; Chris Tomlinson, "Stuggling Kenyan Coffee Growers Wonder Where All the Money Goes," ,4ssocioted Pres, 2! July 2ooI; Margarita Martinez, "Police Clash with Colombian Farmers,".Associoted Press, r August 2oor. Scien2 Gordon Wrigley, Cofee(Esse*, Lo.g-^n tific and Technical, rg88). of Sugorin ondPower'ThePloce 3 Sidney Mintz, Sueelness (NewYork, Penguin Bools, rg85). ModernHistoy of Porodise' A 4 Ibid.; Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Tastes SoclalHistoyof Spices, Stimulants and lntoicants(New York, P a n t h e o n ,I g g 2 ) . g Bart Fisher, TheInternationol A Stu$ Agreements, Coffee in CoffeeDiplomag(New York, Praeger, 1972) ; Christopher Brown, The PoliticalAnd SociolEconomlof Commodi! Confrol(NewYork, Praeger, r98o). 6 There was no agreement in force between 1972 and 1976, and the export quotas were suspendedduring 1986-/ . / Robert A. fuce andJustin R. Ward, Coffee,Conseruation,ondCommerce in theWstemHemi$here(Washington, DC, Smithsonian Migratory Bird Center and Natural ResourcesDefense Council, 1996).

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8 Manuel Castells, Shujiro Yazawa, and Emma Kiselyova, "lnsurgents Against the Global Order," BerkelgJournalofSociolog 4o (1995-6), 2I-gg; Luis Alberto Lopera and Herogenes Ardila D., "Cafe, Otra Vez se Alargo la Crisis," EI Tiempo(Bogota) 17 April 1994; Mark Pendergrast, Uncommon The Grounds' Histoy of Coffee andHou itTransfomedOur World(New York, B a s i cB o o l s , r g g g ) . g Oxfam, "The Coffee Market," op. cit. ro Robert Fitter and Raphael Kaplinsky, "Who Gains from Product Rents as the Coffee Market Becomes More Differentiated? A Value-chain Analys i s , " l D S B u l l e t i3n2 , n o . 3 ( z o o r ) , 6 9 - 3 2 . rrJacques Morisset, "Unfair Trade? The Increasing Gap betweenWorld and Domestic Prices in Commodity Markets during the Past 2g Years," WorldBank E c o n o m i c R e d1e2u. n o . r ( 1 9 9 8 ) , 5 o 3 - 2 6 . 12 Statisticsfrom the International Coffee Organization, (w.ico.org>, and the U.S. Department of fabor, Bureau of l:bor Statistics,<http,//stats.bls.gov>. t3 John M. Talbot, "Where Does Your Coffee Dollar Go?, The Division of Income and Surolus A l o n g t h e C o f f e e C o m m o d i t y C h a i n , " S t u d i e siionm paratiae Intemationol Deuelopment 32, no. r (t g g 7), 56 - gt. rr{ Edna Bonacich and Richard Appelbaun, Behindthe Inbel, Inequoli! in the Ins Angeles Apparel Indunry (Berkeley, University of California Press,2ooo). 15 "'Cause Coffees' Produce a Cup with an Agenda," USATodol,26July2oor; "P&G EschewsFair Trade Coffee Offered by Some Sellers," Assoclated Prâ&#x201A;Źrs,ro 'Justice October 2ool; Deborah James, and Java' Coffee in a Fair Trade Market, " NACU Report on theAmericdr34, no. Z (September/October 2ooo): rr- r4.

Business & Finance

Kwrt h

xgh t

A ndresVelasco,interviewed b y Car olLancaster

In the face of the recent global economic slowdown, Latin American countries have found it increasingly challenging to attain economic growth. The econornic effects of the U.S. recession have rippled throughout the region, which was already plagued by fiscal problems, financial contagion stemming from Argentina's crisis, and ongoing problems with corruption and poverty. These recent events corne after a decade of Washington Consensus reforms whose results have been mixed at best. As a consequence,the debate has intensified as to how Latin American countries should confront both new and old economic development problems. While countries such as Chile and Costa Rica have had visible successes,crisesthroughout the region illustrate the continuing challenges facing policyrnakers in the region and in international financial institutions. T}ae Ceorgetown Journalof IntemationalAffairshad the pleasure of interr.iewing Dr. Andres Velasco, Sumitomo Professor of Finance and Development at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, to discuss the impact of structural reforms in Latin America, the regional economic outlook in the face of an Argentine default, and the effectiveness of the IMF in promoting economic growth and preventing financial collapse in developing countries. Dr. Velasco, a native of

Andres Velasco i. Sumitomo-

FASID

Professor tional

of Interna-

Finance and

Development

at Har-

vard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

He is

affiliated

with

National

Bureau

Economic

the of

Research in and the

Cambridge

for Applred

Center

Econonics

at the Uni-

versity of Chile.

C a r o l L a n c a s t e ri s Director

of the

Master

of Science in Foreign Servjce (MSFS) program

at Georgetown

University.

Her

prior

positioDs include Deputy ofthe

Administrator U.S. Agency

for International Development Deputy retary African

and

Assistant

Sec-

of State for Affairs.

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Chile, offered his insights into the causes ofrecent financial crises and suggested innovative policies that inay help avoid thern in the future.

economy with weak commodity prices, and a longer-term trend of smaller capital inflows-the outlook is pretty grirn indeed.

c l t n; The slowing world economy and the IJ.S. recessionhavebeen deepenedby the September rr attacks. Until then, consumer spending had been the rnain factor keeping the U.S. econorny afloat, but levels have confidence consumer decreased since the attacks. In addition, cornrnodity prices are low, external demand for L,atin Arnerican exports is low, portfolio and foreign direct investrnent in Latin Arnerica have decreased, and Argentina is ernbroiled in crisis, potentially causing financial contagion throughout the region. In this context, what is the near-term economic outlook for Latin Arnerica?

GJIA: What impact will Argentina's default have on other emerging markets? Will it cause financial contagion, or has the rnarket learned to differentiate between countries and regions?

VELAs c 0: The outlook for Latin America in the next year or so is disrnal. This is because of three factors. The first is instability and uncertainty arising frorn Latin America itself, rnost notably from Argentina, but also from Brazil. The second is the downturn in the world economy that will hit Latin America hard. The downturn in the world econorny will not be long lived-it could be over by the end of 2oo2. Nonetheless, the next twelve rnonths or so will be tough for the region, especially for coffee producers, who have been bruised by the entry of new large-scale producers like Vietnam. The third factor hitting Latin America today is the sharp fall in capital flows to the region. This did not begin with September rI, but with the Asian crisis of rg97-8. When you put it all together-local uncertainty, a downturn in the world

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v ELAs c 0: I think ,fr"t ,^r".will have an aftershock, but not a huge one. Why do I say that? Why is Argentina likely to be different frorn Mexico? Mexico suffered a quick, sudden, and unanticipated shock, while Argentina's crisis has been in slow motion. People have come to expect it, and the financial world and Latin Arnerican governments have spent the last six, ten, or twelve rnonths preparing for an Argentine crisis. The prices of currencies and interest rates have long reflected the expectation that Argentina would go belly up. While the Argentine crisisis serious business and I do not want to minirnize its irnportance, I do not think that we will wake up tomorrow and find a meltdown of markets in the region. cJIA: What do you expect to be the engine of growth for Latin Arnerican countries in the next five years? How will they find capital? What will pull them out of the economic downturns? v E L A s c o 'T h e r e i s n o s i n g l e a n s w e r t o this question. For some countries, exports will clearly be the way out. That is happening already in countries closer to the United States. In countries that participate in NAFTA or the Caribbean Basin Initiatives, there has

u s i n e s sF&i n a n c e t N T E R V t EBW been an export revolution. Mexico is the prime exponent of this, but the Dominican Republic is not too far behind, and Costa Rica-with Intel and a few other high-tech companies-is also an example. As the U.S. economy grew quite quickly, there was almost boundless demand for new exports frorn some of these countries. It is important to note that these are not just cornrnodities or low-tech goods. Many are brand new products that these countries had never sold before. For example, Mexico has a boorning auto industry and Costa Rica has a software industry. Neither was there a decade ago. For most of the countries in the region, without a question, exports are the way out. For some of the larger, more inwardlooking countries such as Brazil and Argentina, exports will play a role, but l e s so f o n e . T h e m e d i u m - l e r m g l u e s t i o n is, can the countries in South Arnerica go through an export revolution like the one that we have seen in Mexico or the Dominican Republic? Chile has gone part of the way, but other countries have not. And even Chile is finding it hard to rnake the transition from exporting things like fishmeal, forest products, and fresh fruit to thines that have more value added. e .lt r; Moving on to the issue of incorne inequality in Latin America' Since Latin American countries adopted neoliberal reforms in the rg8os and I99os, income distribution in Latin America has increased and the region now has the highest incorne inequality in the world. What role do you think neoliberal reforms played in this expansion of income inequality?

v ELAs c 0; Is it true that Latin Arnerica is a highly unequal region? Yes, it is. Is it the rnost unequal region in the world? This depends on how you rneasure it. Africa is rnore unequal according to some definitions, but not according to others. Not all Latin Arnerican countries are sirnilarly unequal. Latin Arnerica is heterogeneous in rnany respects, and income inequality is one of thern. A country like Uruguay is pretty egalitarian, while Brazil and Guatemala are not. We should be careful before we talk about Latin Arnerica as a single entity in this respect. While Latin Arnerica is unequal, it is not correct to assertthat the region has becorne sharply rnore unequal recently. It is even rnore of a stretch to clairn that recent changesin inequality are the direct effect or consequence of neoliberal reforrns. There are three things to keep in rnind in this respect. First, income d i s t r i b u t i o n c h a n g e sv e r y s l o w l y a c r o s s the world. This is true for Latin America, the rich countries, Asia, et cetera. The Gini coefficient, which is the most cornmon index of income inequality, has hardly rnoved in Latin Arnerica for the last fifteen to twenty years. It went up slightly in the rg8os during the debt crisis, and fell slightly in the ear'ly I99os as countries were beginning to recover. The Gini coefficient has probably risen slightly over the last five years, when growth has slowed again; but, again, theseare tiny changes. It is hard to make assertions about a big trend in one direction or the other. Second, incorne inequality has slightly worsened in the world over the last fifteen years. This has very little to do with

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neoliberal reforms or trade, but probably has to do with technological change. The advent of new technologies tends to reward those with skills to the detriment of those that do not have the skills. There has been a slight worsening of income disparity, particularly of the gap between skilled and unskilled labor throughout the world-even in the United States. Despite this trend, Latin Arnerica has not done too badly. It has basicallystood still. Third, where do the neoliberal reforrns come into play? The truth is that there is not rnuch evidence to this effect, and what evidence exists is highly mixed. Sorne reforms, such as the sharp decrease in inflation, are good for incorne equality since inflation is a tax that the rich can

make the IMF more effective, or is it by nature too slow to keep up with the market? How effective do you think the IMF has been in prornoting economic growth and preventing econornic collapse in the region? v ELAs c 0: I think the IMF could be more effective. But to be rnore effective, the discussion over its role has to be reoriented. Washington has been obsessed recently with the wrong question: too rnuch lending by the IMF, which allegedly encourages rnoral hazard. Many politicians are saying that the IMF is too ready to bail out countries, encouraging those countries to misbehave. This is exactly the wrong reading of the situation.

If Latin AmeriCa begins to as'ain, "that srow there is reason to believe can dirninish.

indqualit!

First ofall, there is very little evidence evadebut the poor cannot. Other poli- ] cies, like privatization, may have been bad that the countries' problems have been induced by moral hazard. You would for equality, not so much of incorne but of wealth. It is probably true that some have to be pretty $azy to be the leader of measures of wealth distribution have a country, and bankrupt your country or become more concentrated, but we do risk bankrupting it simply because you not have the data to prove it. think the IMF or U.S. Treasury will To summarize, we should be careful corne to the rescue. before coming to extrerne conclusions. Secondly, if too much lending and too Latin America is unequal, but it is not many bailouts to bond holders were the necessarilybecorning more unequal. If problem, then you would seea lot of bond Latin America begins to grow again, lending in emerging markets. But nowadays that is not what you see. Whatever litthere is reason to believe that inequality can diminish. tle capital is still flowing to Latin Arnerica is direct investrnent, not bond lending. Rather than too big and too lax, the GJrA: In your article entitled "Time to " "the IMF is too IMF is too small and too slow. Many of Repave, you suggestthat small and slow to offset the tens of bilthe crises today are crises of confidence, lions of dollars that traders can rnove with based on self-fulfilling pessirnism. the strike of a key." Is there any way to Investors begin to bet against countries

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t N T E R V t EB WU S i n e s s F &i n a n c e and currencies. Interest rates g'o up, the currency depreciates, and the country finds itself in dire straits. Sooner or later, the pessimism is vindicated and the country enters a crisis. Many of these crises of confidence could be avoided if we had at the international level what rnost countries have at the domestic level-that is, a lender of last resort that can step in during crises of confidence and offer liquidity. That is what the Federal ReserveBank did in the summer of t998, when Long-Term Capital collapsed,and after the September II attacks.What the Fed does on the domestic level, however, nobody does at the international level. So, it is no surp r i s e t h a t w e s e ea l l t h e s ec r i s e s .

book to try to regain competitiveness without touching the one to one parity to the dollar. Looking back, there can be no question that those strategiesfailed. So, I think it is now tirne to move from plan A to plan B, and plan B involves the abandonment of the parity. My colleague Ricardo Hausmann at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government has suggestedthat Argentina should float its currency, and should also convert its international and domestic debt from dollars to pesos. I think that is a very good idea; it is one element that could put Argentina back on the road to recovery.

cJIA: But is the Argentine crisis just a matter of self-fulfilling pessirnism? Isn't Argentine policy also to blame?

V E L A S C 0 :I t h i n k A r g e n t i n a s h o u l d f l o a t

GJ[A: So you think Argentina should devalue instead of dollarizing?

its currency. cJ IAr Since middle-incorne

v E L A S C 0A: g a i n , I t h i n k t h a t m u c h o f t h e international discussion has been misguided. If you read the international pressfor the last six rnonths, the focus has been on Argentina's alleged fiscal misbehavior. The perception has been that Argentina has borrowed too much, that it has too large a deficit, and that this is the root ofArgentina's problems. I think this is perfectly wrong. Argentina does have a deficit, but the deficit is mostly there because of the humongous interest payments Argentina has been forced to rnake. At those interest rates, even Switzerland would go broke. What is the solution for Argentina? More loans at cheaper interest rates are part of the story. But changes in other areasare also key. I am obviously thinking of the exchange rate. For the last decade, but especially for the last three years, Argentina has done everything in the

countries are

capital-scarce, it seems logical that they borrow

capital

from

abroad

their national economies.

to develop

If they do so,

however, they may become prisoners the wishes of the

international

capital

markets. How can capital-scarce rniddleincome

avoid this catch-22?

countries

vELAsco, That is a good question. There is no one answer. Let me rnention

a few

First, we need better

rules

possibilities. internationally,

or we need internation-

ally some of the same institutions have domesticaliy,

that we

one of which

is the

lender of last resort.

Second, we need other kinds of debt. Today, the bulk of loans to emerging markets are denominated in dollars. This leaves borrowers with very little flexibility. Most importantly, they cannot use the exchange rate to adjust when they suffer a bad shock, because with

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dollar loans, the devaluation rneans a sharp increase in the repayment value of those loans. It would be better for borrowers and lenders if loans to emerging markets were denominated not in dollars, but in either domestic currency or perhaps units of their exports. It would be much better if Venezuela could borrow oil bonds instead of dollar bonds, or if Chile could borrow in copper bonds, or if Colombia could borrow in coffee

is very hard to go from having no copper bonds, or no coffee bonds, to having a lot of them overnight. The sarne is true for Chilean peso bonds, for instance. So, the World Bank, for example, could take the lead. The Bank has done a little bit in this regard, but not enough. For instance, it has issued bonds in indexed Chilean pesos. This helps create a rnarket for indexed Chilean pesos, and if Chile wants to

What is the solutiotlforArgentina? More loans at cheaper interest ratts are part of the story. bonds. Think of this last example. Today, the price of coffee is low; Colombia would not have to pay a lot of dollars on its debt. If tornorrow the price of coffee goes up, then Colombia pays rnore dollars on its debt. This means that when tirnes are good, Colornbia pays a lot, and when tirnes are bad, Colornbia pays little. That makes Colornbia a rnuch safer place. cJ r A: Do you think denominating debt in terms of units of export cornrnodities is a viable option in the rnediurn-terrn? v E L A s c 0 'I t h i n k s o . I t m i g h t n o t h a p p e n , however, without sorne help frorn above. By above, I mean the international lending institutions and probably the U.S. Treasury. Markets do not grow incrementally. You do not want to be the first to issuea particular security, becausenobody may want to buy it. Buyers of bonds look for liquidity. If you do not want to hold the bond anymore, you want to be able to turn around and sell it to sorneone. It has to be a well-established market already. It

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issue such bonds in the future, investors will be able to say, "Sirnilar bonds have been in circulation for a long time. There is a rnarket for them, and there is a benchmark interest rate with low risk. I know how to price these bonds, they are nice to trade, and I will buy some." Without that official push, that initial help, these markets may never develop. GJ I A: Some experts argue that Latin America rnay be able to leapfrog stagesof technological developrnent to catch up with developed countries. Costa Rica may be an exarnple of that. How important will technology be in the overall economic developrnent of Latin Arnerica? And what is the Iikelihood that Latin America will leapfrog these technological stages? Is this a relevant issue? v E L A s c o ,W i t h o u t q u e s t i o n , t e c h n o l o g y has a role to play. Countries can move up the technological ladder. Mexico and Costa Rica have done it. But we should think of technology broadly. Technology is not simply information technology,

t N T E R V t EB WU S i n e S SF&i n a n c e software, or high-tech goods. The rnost important role of technology is making current exports, or exports not much different from our current ones, more competitive. Here is an example. We do not think of fruit exports as being technologically advanced. Nonetheless, one of the reasons why Chile is able to sell its peaches, nectarines, and grapes to every deli in Boston, Washington, and New York is that there have been massivetechnological advances in designing containers and methods for preserving the food while it is being transported across the world. New software has been developed to track the production of fruit, inventories, and shipments from fields to delis. There has also been genetic innovation in designing new varieties of fruits and vegetables by crossing old varieties. All of this is technology. It is not Silicon Valley technology, but it is technology nonetheless. I think that in the application of new technology to old products, we might find the most immediate payoff for Latin America and other rniddle-incorne countries. G J I A :N o w t h e b o n u s q u e s t i o n o n C h i l e , As you know, Ricardo l-agos campaigned for the presidency on a platform based on "growth with equity." Does this third way exist? If so, what characterizes it and how successfulhas Lagos been in irnplementing it? v E L A S C 0I: a m n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y k e e n o n first, second, or third ways.A better distinction is between those countries that do things well and those countries that do things poorly. Chile is a country that has done things well for the most part, not only in the last two years, but in the last eleven years since dernocracy

returned. The cornbination of a market economy with openness to international markets and international trade, plus very prudent fiscal policies and a more targeted and aggressive set of expenditures aimed at health and education, all have largely paid off. Chile used to have poor when democracy $ million returned in I9go. The poor are only 2 million today. Per capita income doubled in Chile over the rggos. So, the overall thrust of Chilean policy over the last decade has been, without a question, the correct one. Recently, things have become more difficult for two reasons. Reason nurnber one is simply the world economy. Since r99B or so, asI rnentioned earlier, capital flows to Latin America have fallen sharply. This makes the life of small, open economies like Chile's much harder. Secondly, rnany of the reforms that Chlle put into place in the rg8os and the early rggos have paid off, but the additional growth that Chile got out of those reforms is beginning to run out. Reforrns do not give you higher growth forever. They give you a spurt of growth that may last for four, five, six, or sevenyears, but probably no more than a decade. Chile now has to invent new policies and corne up with new schemes to achieve the kind of growth and poverty alleviation that it achieved over the late rgBos and rnuch of the r99os. That is proving a tall order indeed. Sorne progress has been made in some areas. Chile is in the rnidst of carrying out a very important judicial reform that will sharply cut the time it takes to get your average case tried. It has extended the school day and the school year, so children will spend a lot more tirne studying than they did

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before. In other areas. such as health. things have been much tougher politically and technically. The Chilean congress and the Chilean government are

struggling to design the appropriate reforms. But while Chile is moving a little more slowly today, I think it continues to rnove forward.

1 2 m o n t hi n t e r d i s c i p l i n aprryo g r a m mien E u r o p e aann di n t e r n a t i o n as lt u d i e s( l a w ,e c o n o m i c s , p o l i t i c sh, i s t o r y )L. a n g u a gter a i n i n gi n E n g l i s hF,r e n c hG, e r m a na n do t h e rl a n g u a g e s . E n t r a n ceex a mi n V i e n n ao r a t A u s t r i a nm i s s i o nasb r o a d . A p p l i c a t i o nd e a d l i n e A : p r i l2 0

Mesrnn oF ADVANCEDINtnnNenoNet Sruorcs programme Worldr. 2 semester interdisciplinary in English on Dlntegrating Europein a Changing : a r c h1 5 A p p l i c a t i o nd e a d l i n eM

ANDAusrRrANsruDIEs Suuunn Counsr rNTHEGrrunn IANGUAGE politics, language training withworkshops onAustria's 4 weeks of intensive German history culture. August5-30,2002. economy, lune15 Application deadline: Information and rcgistfation: Favtritanilâ&#x201A;ŹBe 1$, 100 Wien Tel,+43-l-5OS72 72-120/ Fax+43-l-!O4 22 65 ingrid.eidler@dak-vienna.ac.at

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na.at

appropriate e is moving a : think it con

Conflict&'Security

s for aNew Way of War

_-An~me~g~~_~)11ihesi

Combination Warfare and Future Innovation James Callard and Peter Faber ~,

economics, ges.

nging World«.

LJDlES

ditics,

>matische lemieWIEN flnuflUoUOna.l$cudiel

In the wake of the preCislOn air attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September II, many demanded that the United States "change everything" in its approach to national security. While this reaction is under standable enough, we in the United States must be careful to not let it overwhelm us. We must continue to frame the events of September II within their proper context, and not the other way around. In particular, the United States needs to think deeply about how it will transform its military and what forms of innovation it will pursue. In the latter case, the United States must be particularly careful to distinguish between true and false innovation. True innovation not only changes existing balances of pow er, it also helps construct positive, "user-friendly" strategic environments for those who innovate. In order to avoid the pit falls of innovating in a vacuum, however, it is important to remember a number of points. First. true innovation is, to some degree, a reciprocal or bilateral process where opponents develop and improve their capabilities in reaction to one another. Second, examining and evaluating an opponent's possible innovations and countermeasures must be an integral part of such a reciprocal innovation process. Third, the time

James Callard is a colonel in the U.S. Air Force and currently serves as a professor of national security policy and military strategy at

the National War Col lege. He recently served as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Division of the Direc torate of Strategic

Planning at Headquar ters, U.S. Air Force.

Peter Faber is a colonel in the U.S. Air Force and currently leads the Strategy and Policy Division of the Directorate of Strategic Planning at Headquar ters. U.S. Air Force.

Winter/Spring 2002

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AN FMERGING S Y N T H E S I SF O RA N E W W A Y O F W A R

needed to develop counterrneasures is By using UnrestictedWarfare as a foundausually much shorter than the time needtion, this article will atternpt to illustrate ed to develop an innovative concept, that traditional definitions of military technology, or approach in the first place. power are not only passe, but are also In contrast to each of these points counterproductive exercisesin nostalgia. about true innovation, there are three Innovative thinking about the American major forms of false innovation that Way of War requires adoption of a new rnust be avoided. Inertialinnouation tends to strateg"icapproach that goes far beyond align itself too closely to the lessons mere force of arms and military power. Iearned from the past. It builds on past To support this general theme, we will s u c c e s s e s ,a n d e i t h e r m i n i m i z e s o r {irst describe the innovative approach to ignores the counter-innovations being conflict advocated in UnrestictedWarfare. developed by real or potential adverNext, we will use a fictional China-Thiwan saries. Detachedinnouation, in contrast. scenario to illustrate how this approach ordinarily occurs "in the dark." It lacls might play out. Finally, we will highlight proper knowledge or perspectiveofposthe types of military innovation that the sible opponents and environrnents, and United Statesshould avoid and pursue. In even "friendly" developments by others. each case, the messageshould be clear, if Finally, uulnerable innouation is too exposed. the U.S. military is going to pursue true It willingly ignores the asymmetric innovation, rather than its false cousins, it counterrneasures being developed by must be prepared to cope with combinaactual or potential adversariesofa countion warfare strategies, as practiced by try who are well aware of that country's hostile statesand non-state actors. own conceptual, technological, or organizational advances. The debate over which type of innovation the U.S. rnilitary should pursue is past, strategists classified war according critically relevant. One possible option to three prirnary characteristics, goals (defend/attack), rneans (nuclear/confirst appeared in early rggg within a controversial Chinese text entitled U nrestrictedv e n t i o n a l ) , a n d s c a i e ( s t r a t e g i c , o p e r a Warfare'Assumptions onWar and Tactiain the'\e tional, or tactical engagements). In the of Globaliaation.' Broadly speaking, the r 9 9 O s , h o w e v e r , t h e U . S . r n i l i t a r y authors of Unrestricted Warfore-Colonels increasingly ernphasized a fourth cateLing and Wang Xiangsui of the gory: the forms of war. In particular, Qiao People's Liberation Army-wanted to the U.S. Departrnent of Defense "emancipate" the rninds of military offi(DoD) stressedfour dominant forms cers from the bondage of traditional of warfare that it expected to pursue in thinking, primarily by challenging dated the future: informationwarfore; precision ideologies and strategies. As a result, uarfore (which features information their text offers a new, upgraded theory p r o c e s s i n g , s t e a l t h y , r e m o t e , a n d n o n of war-C ombination Warfare-that aims c o n t a c t a t t a c k s , a n d s p e e d , a c c u r a c y , to reconcile and adapt the "asymmetric" and limited casualties); joint operations: principles first developed by Sun Tzu and militagt operationsother than uar (MOOTW). over 2,OOOyearsago with the "postmodRecognizing the growing ern" hybrid warfare of today. importance of different forms of war

Combination Warfarein the Twenty-FirstCentury.rn the

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CALLARD & F A B E Rc O n f l i c t & S e C u r i t y w a s a n i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t u a l d e v e l o p - used, and the relative weight given to these m e n t i n t h e I g g O s , b u t t h e h o r i z o n o f bundles, can change with circurnstances, this newfound focus remained too and therefore create additional problerns close. It illustrated that when it came for a defender. Basically, Combination to identif,ing just how rnany forrns of Warfare is "polyphonic warfare" becauseit warfare the United States might conseeks to overwhelrn others by assaulting f r o n t a n d u s e i n t h e f o r e s e e a b l e them in as many domains or spheres of future, DoD was not thinking truly activity as possible. It creates sustained, "out of the box." and possibly shifting, pressure that is hard Colonels Ling and Xiangsui, however, to anticipate. had another view. They argued that future The United States practiced Combiconflicts would become increasingly nation Warfare both episodically and "civilianized" because traditional and unsystematically during the I99Os, espe"combatants" would nontraditional cially against Iraq and Osama bin Laden. exploit at least twenty-seven different types It appears that the latter are earnestly of warfare at any one time on a "horizonbeginning to practice this form of wartal" level (See Figure r). Although these types of war may look Figure r. Combination fMarfare, "ro,ooo familiar enough, what is unfa" Methods Combined as One" miliar is the growing ability to "A better means used alone will not prevail over multiple means used together" mix and match thern in unpreceA B O V E - MI L I T A R Y M I L I T A R YF O M R SO F NON.MILITARY dented combinations and at difFOI\4RS OFWAR WAR F O M R SO F W A R ferent times. Likewise, CombiNuclearwar{are Fioancialwarlare C u l t u r aw l ariare nation Warfare, unlike previous war{are Trade w&rfafe Diplonlaticwar{are Networkwarlare methods of warfare, both affects B i o / c h e m i c a l w a r f a r e E c o l o g i c a lw a r f a r e ronomicaid 1irarfare I n t e l l i g e n c ew a r f a r e and draws on virtually all spheres Space warfare warfar6 P s y c h o l o g i c a lw a r i a r e of human activity. It has this ion warJarel$aiction l^iadarâ&#x201A;Ź T e c h n o l o g i c a lw a r { a r e G u e r r i l l aw a r f a r e Smuggling warfare capacitybecauseit relies on miliTerrorist warlare ldgologitat wartarâ&#x201A;Ź Drug warfare tary, non-rnilitary, and abovewa(late ForcedpopqlationshirlS/migration F i c t i o u s / fa b r i c a t i o n w a r t a r e military rneans to promote or prevent, expand or localize, and vitalize or neutralize various threats. In fare against the United States. However, short, purely military options represent for Cornbination Warfare to work most only one part of Combination Warfare, effectively, it must mix and match methand do not necessarily take precedence ods not only "horizontally," but "vertiover other means. They are like a "Lego" cally" as well. In particular, it must use piece that can be used, together with other pieces, to build a more complex and therefore bewildering threat. By employing as rnany of the forms and types of conflict outlined in Figure r as -Warpossible, actors using Combination fare can bedevil an opponent with evershifting, multi-dimensional assaults. Worse yet, the types of conflict bundles

supra-national,supra-domain,supra-means, and suprc-tier combi nations. A supra-nationalcombination refers to the combined use of national. international. and non-state organizations to pursue a particular goal. Alphabet soup organizations such as the UN, EU, ASEAN, OPEC, APEC, WTO, IMF, and World Bank, for exarnple, constitute a growing

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worldwide system of power, to which great power politics increasingly will yield. Thus, victory or defeat will not depend exclusively on state-versus-state testsof strength. Some nation-states have already begun to borrow or invoke the power of supra-national, muiti-national, and non-state players to redouble and expand their own influence. If this trend continues, supra-national combinations rnay eventually be a country's most powerful weapon in accornplishing its national- security goais. in turn, draw Supra-domaincombinations, from military, non-military, and abovemilitary forms of warfare. They represent a departure from the past when armies first collided in a two-dirnensional geographical space. Eventually, cornbatants added sea and air operations

fare may be an especially attractive component of this vertical type of Combination Warfare because it can pit itself against civilizations as a whole. The second basic element of suprcnon-military forms of domaincombinations, warfare, extends our understanding of war to each and every field of human activity. These types of conflict can include financial warfare. trade warfare. resource warfare, economic warfare, legal and moral warfare, and media warfare. Finally, above-rnilitary forms of warfare can include cultural, diplomatic, and psychological warfare, which broadly airn to assimilate those who have different views through the use of "soft power," direct negotiation, or intimidation. Other types of above-rnilitary warfare can include technological and

Warfarâ&#x201A;Ź,anwhine In Comhination and everyhing can and should be cbnsid"ered a weaPon. to this dornain, and they now include space and information operations as well. But is operating in these five dornains sufficient unto itselP Sorne Chinese strategists, for instance, consider ecological warfare an especially powerful rnilitary form of war espeto use in supra-domain combinations, cially since so many nations are striving for rapid economic development. Activities in this category could therefore range from burning oil fields to "accidental" chemical spills, to manipulating "natural" meteorological and seismic events (i.e. triggering earthquakes, and altering temperatures and precipitation and sunshine patterns). And as we saw on September II, new-era terrorist war-

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research and development (R&D) *arfare, which could involve setting industry standards, creating "user-friendly" monopolies, and investing in rnultiple R&D strearns or leap-ahead technologies that improve one's ability to respond to another's asymrnetric strategies. Similarly, srnuggling warfare can be used to undermine economic order and stability via the distribution of counterfeit currency, and fictitious or fabrication warfare can be used to counterfeit political or military strength for economic and deterrence purposes. In addition to supra-nafionalwarfareand the military, non-military, and abovemilitary forms of supra-domainwarfare, there are two additional categories of

cALLARD & FABER Conflict&Security

Visualizinq Combination Warfare:A Chi-na-Taiwan Example.

vertical warfare to consider I supra-means which orchestrate all availcombinations, able means (military, non-rnilitary, and There above-military) to carry out operations, ar:..d supra-tier combinations,which dovetail the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict into a single campaign. Again, the desired effect of these vertical combinations is to create a complex set of threats that either deters or overwhelms an opponent. Not only can the practitioners of Combination Warfare horizontally mix and match at least twenty-seven types of war, they can also simultaneously "package" thern within as many as four supra-level combinations at the same time. The overall benefit of this approach is to use different forrns of national power as "playing cards" that one can deliberately shuffle together to create a "winning hand." This diversity of options also allows players to "stack

are many ways that non-state actors, like Osama bin Laden, might use Combination'Warfare, but its potential utility in interstate squabbles should not be forgotten either. Consider the possibility of a future Chinese regime executing a fait accompli strategyto co-opt Taiwan politically. In this scenario, the Mainland might initially fabricate a national emergency-via media warfareover Thiwanesesovereignty. In particular, it might stage either pro- or anti-integration demonstrations in Thipei that deliberately turn violent (diplomatic

warfare). A sacred patriotic duty to restore order over "Chinese" territory then becornes imperative (cultural, ideological, and moral warfare). In response, the Chinese initiate subrnarine exercises around tiwan and "encourage" cornmercial shipping to avoid the area, essentially closing shipping lanes and adversely affectingAsian and Western stock markets (economic and financial warfare). Finally, the Chinese military might direct several dozen Backfire Bombers and perhaps 2oo Su-2/s against Taiwanese air-defense sites (conventional

the deck" by carefully selecting which cornbinations wiII most favorably accomplish their objectives. To realize the above strategy, however, it is necessary to develop new-concept "weapons" that go far beyond the military realm. In Combination Warfare, anything and everything can and should be warfare). At this point, however, the considered a weapon-from an intenrnarket crash to a debilitating Chinese could stop. Holding back their tional stock cornputer virus. Like Osama bin Laden, airborne and arnphibious forces, they Warfarebelieve might use psychological warfare merely to the authors of Unrestricted that new-concept weapons should be threaten an invasion of Thiwan, thereby creating overwhelming psychological closelylinled to the lives of common people, and capable of delivering massive, pressures in the diplomatic warfare that war-lile effects aimed not just at combatwould follow. The outcome they desire, ants, but also at entire populations. This after all, might not be a military victory, is obviously a controversial element of but a political capitulation. This largely "horizontal" scenario is Combination Warfare. Whether or not the United Stateswants to travel down this more than plausible and is not a particularly complex example of Combination potentially illegal and immoral path, others inevitably will, as the terrorist attacks Warfare. We could envision a scenario that used inter-governmental organizaof September rI demonstrated so well.

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tions and non-state actors to apply further pressure on Thiwan. The point is that any number of combinations of horizontal and vertical strategiescould be used to achieve the sarnegoal.

rnilitary, military, and non-military forms of war together on an ad hoc basis against some of its adversaries in the I99os. Against lraq, for example, it combined diplomatic, psychological, intelligence, conventional, sanctions, Iegal, and media warfare at different tirnes, and prior to September II, it combined network, intelligence, terrorist, financial, and legal warfare against Osarna bin Laden. Nevertheless, these instances were exceptions to the rule and not necessarily overt strategies. In fact, the United States has yet to codify Combination Warfare in the American Way of War. As David Broder recently observed in The WashinglonPosf, no one expected an Arnerican president to unleash air attacks against Afghanistan and simultaneously send food and medical supplies to its people." Well, why not? One obvious reason is that we are still encurnbered by "old think," and current U.S. war-fighting strategies and doctrine have yet to ernbrace Combination'Warfare. And yet, this is not to say that innovative thinking about warfare has not already occurred. The Asian emphasis on circurnlocution, indirection, and Sun Tzu-like methods that create rnental dislocations and disruptions, and thereby psychological defeat, have already been explored-and in sorne cases employed-in the context of American "soft power." Nonetheless, rnuch work remains to be done. In the case of Combination-Warfare, U.S. political and military leaders need to not only recognize that it is a strategy being used against them, but they also need to formally adopt it as the new Arnerican Way of War, particularly since no one else in the world can mix and match its "vertical" and "horizontal" elements like the United States can. To

Implications of Combination Warfarefor the UnitedStates. Since Septernber rr, Arnerican assumptions about future warfare have taken a giant step toward mirroring those of our actual and potential foes. For example, we now understand that rningling military and civilian technologies (i.e., .rearweapon-grade anthrax and commercial airliners) will occur in unprecedented ways, thereby obscuring the face of war and, by extension, rernoving its restraints. In this context, while rnilitary "hardware" -soldiers, weapons, and battlefields-will rernain irnportant for rnost countries, previously civilian activities increasingly will provide the "software" for future conflicts. In particular, the increased irnportance of dual-use technologies like micro-processing, realtirne satellite cornrnunication, and GPS navigation will further blur the separation between battlefield and non-battlefield activities, and will continue to endow whole categories of economic, scientific, and cultural life with a military significance that they previously lacked. This trend then begs the question, "Is Combination Warfare new?" The answer is yes. Historically, operations structured much like those in Combination-Warfare were limited to the mutual efforts of likeminded states,particularly in the rnilitary sphere. There were few simultaneous uses of vertical and horizontal forms of warfare, nor of "hard" and "soft" power by interlocked supra-national, national, and non-state actors. As suggestedearlier, the United States did bundle above-

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C A L L A R&DF A B E R c O nlfi c t& s e C u r i t y adopt this strategy, however, the United Statesmust take at least three steps: It needs to create "conductors"-via hybrid professional security education, and not exclusively through academic or military education-who can harness and direct multidisciplinary teams to deal with the global security needs of today and tomorrow. It needs to realign personnel patterns and organizational structures while rnaintaining its asyrnrnetric strengths and

Finally, the United States as a country must openly debate and reach some consensus on the purpose of the profession of arms. A host of issues must be addressed' Combination Warfare will dramatically expand the tool kit of options, but who is ultimately responsible for competency in employing this warfare and defending the country against it? Is it now a joint responsibility of U.S. intelligence organizations, law enforcernent agencies, and military? If

The United Stat0S canno lonserlirnitits definitions

of rnodern warfare to foirce of arrns

and military power. competencies. Aerospace power, light and lethal ground forces, and integrated command, control,.intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (CzISR) capabilities will rernain the dominant tools of U.S. rnilitary power. However, the relative value of military power itself will decreasein relation to other forrns of soft power. As a result, the number of personnel in the rnilitary should decrease, whiie the number of securityrelated State Department and intelligence community specialists should grow. Additionally, since managing resentment may be America's greatest challenge for the future, DoD needs to restructure its global military commands to project influence at less risk, but with enhanced credibility. For example, regional military commanders (CtNCs) could be replaced by regional ambassadors supported by military staffs. The management of peace and war would therefore retain a proper element of civilian control, which is crucial to the successof Combination Warfare.3

so, how will the United States manage its impulse to convict versus its impulse to destroy? How will the United States recognize the difference between domestic and international problems, deal with "interrnestic" issues, and much more?

Conclusioll. TheUnitedStates canno longer lirnit its definitions of rnodern warfare to force of arms and military power. Instead, it faces a new strategic -Warfare. challenge, Combination Combination'Warfare relies on "ro,Ooo methods used as one," on the "civilianization" of war, and on "new-concept" weapons that, in the eyesof sorne, should target populations rather than militaries. Given the likelihood that the United Stateswill face different forms of CornbinationWarfare in the future, a nurnber of questions remain. Is the United States sufficiently organized and prepared to use this forrn of warfare-not in the de facto way we used it in the Iggos, but in a systematic, formalized, doctrinally-accepted way for the future? At the same time, is

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the United Statesprepared to parry its use by others? Indeed, just how able are the United States and its allies to deal with various combination warfare scenarios? Finally, is the United States producing the leaders, both civilian and military, that have the necessary "vocabulary" to properly apply this forrn of warfare and defend the country against it? The

answers may be hard to come by, but the national security of the United States depends on them.

Author's

Note:

ommendations

The opinions,

solely those ofthe resent

and rec-

in this article are

authors and do not necessarily rep-

the views of

Department

conclusions,

expressed or implied the

of Defense,

U.S.

Air

Force,

or any other

the

U.S.

U.S. govern-

ment agency.

NOTES r Colonels Qiao Ling and Wang Xiangsu, UnrestictedWorfore'Assumptions on WarandTactics in theAgeof Cloboliation (PlA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February rggg). 2 David S. Broder, "Wonders Of a New World," TheWoshinglon Post,14 Ocr 2oor, 87.

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3 See Eliot Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue, The Theory and the Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the lJse of Force," in Peter D. Feaverand Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiersand Ciailians-TheCiuil-Militar"'t Gabond AmericanNationalSecui! ( Cambridge MA, MiT P..r., 2oor) 429-458.

Conflict & Security me by, but the United States

Inclusions, and rec ied in this article are not necessarily rep \ir Force, the U.S. other U.S. govern

~equa\ Dialogue' The Military Relations and :eaver and Richard H. -The Civil- Military Gap and ridge MAo M IT Press,

__Ru_sstLan.lLtiorlbEasLMia...__: Facing a Rising China

Leszek Buszynski Russia is a country struggling to claim its inheritance from Soviet and Tsarist times as a "great power," but the economic and political basis for that claim has largely disintegrated over the past ten years. While Russia retains a nuclear weapons capability, and a significant arms industry, it is sadly lacking in the economic and financial capacity indicative of national strength in today's world. Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have attempted to restore Russia's pride and self-esteem as a global actor, and to reclaim a position of influence that has been historically Russian. In Northeast Asia, Russia has sought confirmation of its global status and a polit ical balance against unilateral U.S. action, particularly in terms of ballistic missile defense (BMD). This policy objective brings Russia closer to China. Russia has also sought broader relations with the Asia-Pacific region by improving ties with Japan, developing greater influence in the Korean peninsula, and seeking closer economic ties with other East Asian states as well as markets for the products of its defense industries.' Reality, however, is another matter. Russia faces the loom ing specter of a rising China, a continued impasse in relation to Japan, and constrained relations with other Asian actors which may portend the gradual but inevitable erosion of its regional position.

Leszek Buszynski is a professor at the

Graduate School of International Relations at the International University ofJapan.

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Chinain RussianPolicy.Sincesia the collapse of the Soviet lJnion, various domestic actors in Russia have stressed the inescapable importance of China for a weakened Russia. For the leadership and the presidential apparatus, China is a source of balance against the overwhelming influence of the United States, and a state whose cooperation is essential for Russia's security. China is a natural ally against the West for Cornmunist-leaning members of the Duma and the Eurasian ideologues. For the military, a stable relationship with China ensures border security in the east and a rnuch needed rnarket for the defense industries. Border security alone would ensure China a prominent place in Moscow's scale of priorities. A border agreernent with China was concluded in May rggr, and President Jiang Zernln of China signed a border dernarcation agreement

opposed "the tendency towards unipolarity through the power and economic dornination of [the] U.S., and the weakening role of the UN."3 During Putin's visit to Beijing in July 2ooo, China and Russia's mutual concern over U.S. BMD plans was placed at the top of the agenda. Putin vaguely linked U.S. BMD plans to Russian defense collaboration with China, and agreed withJiang to begin negotiations on a treaty of good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation.a That treaty, signed when Jiang visited Moscow in July 2oor, was, according to the Russians, intended to ensure predictable and balanced relations between the two powers.s The Russians noted that Jiang was the initiator and surmised that the Chinese leader wanted to cement ties with Russia before a new generation of leaders unfarniliar with Russia emerged in Beijing. The

Variousdomesticactotsin Russia have stressed the ineq:capable irnportance of China for a weakened Ru^ssia. with Yeltsin when they rnet in Moscow in April 1997. The agreement left the disputed status of three river islands for subsequentnegotiations." The two states' propensity to cooperate on security issues is reinforced by mutual support for each other's territorial integrity in Thiwan and Chechnya. Moreover, Russia and China share a concern over IJ.S. global hegemony, which prornpted Yeltsin and Jiang to declare a "strategic partnership" in April rgg6. Putin authorized a revision of Russian foreign policy doctrine, announced by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov onJuly Io, 2ooo, in which Rus-

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treaty rnay offer sorne protection against changing attitudes in Beijing, and to this extent, Russia benefitted.6 Nonetheless, the treaty may also allow China to use its relationship with Russia as leverage in its own disputes with the United States. As a major rnarket for Russian weapons, China has supported Russia's defense industries in a time of collapsed dornestic demand. Some industries such as the Sukhoi aircraft design bureau are now dependent on the Chinese rnarket. Russian arms exports to China have included the following sales' the rgg2 sale of twenty-six SU-Z7s and another twentyfive later as part of a currenry/barter deal;

BUszYNsKr Conflict&Security a licensing agreement, concluded in 19g6, for the manufacture of 2oo SU2|s over five years; the sale of two Sowemenny destroyers with 3M8o Moskit anti-ship cruise missiles (otherwise known as SS-N-ZZ Sunburn), the first of which was delivered to China in December 1999, the second of which was delivered inJanuary 2OoI; and the r9g/ saleof four Kilo classsubmarines. In addition, a contract was signed in 2ooo for the purchaseof twenty SU-3oMK rnultipurpose fighters. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji of China also recently expressedinterest in four to six A-$oE Beriev advanced radar aircraft to replace Israel's planned sale of the Phalcon AWACs system, which was blocked by the United States in July 2ooo. Other possible purchases include two additional Sowemenny destroyers and six more Kilo classsubrnarines. Russia's arms sales to China, particularly the Sukhoi advanced aircraft, the submarines, and the destroyerswith their Sunburn cruise missiles, will strengthen China's ability to act against Thiwan and IJ.S. carrier groups. In the past, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued assurances that the Asian balance of power would not be disturbed by Russia's arms sales, but commercial interests have apparently taken priority. Moreover, Russia's strategic interests are affected as China is equipped with Russian weapons that the Russian rnilitary itself cannot afford. Within the Russian security establishment there is concern about the possibility that Russian weapons rnay be used against Russia itself in the future. Moscow takes comfort in the fact that Russian weapons have thus far been deployed in theaters far removed from the Russian border near Thiwan or the South China Sea. There is concern for the future, however, as revealed by the

prolonged debate in the Russian Defense Ministry over the decision to sell the multi-functional SU-3o to China. Within the ministry, there is a demand that arrns salesto China be linked to the modernization of Russian forces along the Chinese border.T

Deadlockin Japan. Toavoid excessive dependence on China, Russia has attempted to develop a relationship with Japan, but these attempts have stagnated over the Northern Territories/southern Kurile islands dispute. Russian presidents have been constrained by domestic politics from offering concessionstoJapan in a way that would break the logjam, particularly as Russians fear that doing so would set a dangerous precedent for other claimants to Russian territory. During an August Iggf meeting with Prime Minister Ryrtaro Hashimoto of Japan, Yeltsin impulsively declared a commitment to conclude a peace treaty withJapan. TheJapanese were opposed to the conclusion of a peace treaty without a corresponding resolution of the territorial dispute as a precondition. As a result, Yeltsin created a "nightrnare" for officials of both countries since it was mutually understood that the Russians simply could not deliver on their promise.E Putin backtracked on Yeltsin's rash prornise inJuly 2ooo by proposing that the two sides conclude an "interim pact" instead of a peace treaty, and that they should aim at "long term goals" for a resolution of the dispute.s TheJapanese were disappointed by Putin's behavior and Iamented the passing of Yeltsin, whose personal relationship with Hashimoto and characteristic unpredictability held out the hope of progress over this issue. Putin's cold calculation made progress lesslikely in theJapanese view.'o

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Russiahasqttemptedtodevelop a relationship y,hJapan, have stagnated.

but these attempts

Putin has returned to the 1956 decla- cerned thatJapan may develop a security ration according to which Moscow was role under the 1997 revised defense prepared to return two out of four guidelines with the United States, and islands toJapan. T"ky" believesthat this rnay cooperate in U.S. theater rnissile declaration is a first step toward the defense (TMD). Although Russia and return of all four islands, but Putin China have different objectives inJapan, if they were to cooperate, Moscow's regards it as a final solution." During his visit to Tokyo in September 2ooo, dependence on China would increase. Putin affirrned that Russia would abide has by all past agreements, including the The l(oreanPeninsula.Russia 1956 agreement, which was the first also tried to expand its role in East Asia tirne that the Russians acknowledged the by attempting to influence the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula. agreement in recent territorial negotiations. He also proposed that both sides This poliry of using Korea againstJapan has roots in Tisarist times, when Russian sign an interirn treaty of peace and amity, while theJapanese called for a terripenetration of Korea triggered the torial dernarcation north of the islands. r9o4-5 war with Japan. Under Yeltsin, Russia atternpted to discard North Korea Such a move would be tantarnount to Russian acknowledgernent of Japanese as an abominable rernnant of Russia's Stalinist past, and moved to strengthen sovereignty. Putin's resort to the Ig$6 agreernent relations with South Korea. But Russia changed little and sirnply extended negoquickly discovered that its attraction to tiations within familiar parameters.'3 the Southwas its cloutwith the North and When Putin andJapanese prime minister that the voluntary surrender of influence Yoshiro Mori met in Irkutsk in March with the North entailed a loss of influ2oor, they could agree at least that the ence in the South aswell. Russiansbitterly larnented their exclusion frorn the rg$6 agreement was "a basic legal document" serving as the "starting point" for U.S.-North Korean framework of October 1994, which terminated the North's the peaceprocess, which was the first time that the validity of the rgg6 agreernent nuclear defiance of the international community and passedthe initiative over was confirmed in writing. There was no target date for concluding a peace treaty, Korean affairs to the United States.'aThe and the negotiations were inconclusive.'3 United States and China becarne the To deal with the impasse, Russia has major actors in the Korean peninsula, dernonstrated an inclination to use the and Russia was excluded from the negorelationship with China to induce Japan tiations over its future in the four-party talks-which included the United States, to postpone a resolution of the territoriaI dispute or accept a compromise. For China, North Korea, and South Koreatheir part, the Chinese have been conthat began in New York in March 1997.

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BUSzYNSKT Conflict & Security Putin has since announced that Russia would play a more active role in the Korean peninsula, with the intention of expanding the number of countries participating in the dialogue process from the current four states to six, or to a region-wide dialogue.'5 To qualifr for entry into the dialogue process, Russia had to dernonstrate influence over North Korea without allowing itself to be manipulated into an unwanted defense of Pyongyang because of the rg6r treaty between the two countries. Since I992, the Russian Foreign Ministry has sought a replacement or revision of this treaty, and negotiations were accelerated after North Korea's launch of the Thepodong-r missile in August i998. A new treaty of friendship was ready by March tggg, but signature was delayed until Igor Ivanov's visit to P y o n g y a n gi n J a n u a r y 2 o o o . ' 6 T h e d e l a y was caused by disagreernent between North Korea and Russia over whether and how to modify the 196r treaty.'7 While Russia sought a new treaty altogether, North Korea saw no need for a revision. Meanwhile, the two countries were also deadlocked over nuclear issues.Russia insisted that North Korea observe the moratorium on missile launches that it had promised to the United Statesin September rggg, while Pyongyang demanded a nuclear guarantee from Russia in exchange. The 2ooo Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation was finally negotiated because of mutual concerns over U.S. TMD. The new treaty included no reference to mutual defense and only obliges both states "not to conclude any treaty or agreement with a third country nor join in its action or step if they stand against the sovereignty, independence and terri-

torial integrit)' of any of the parties."'8 After the signature of the treaty, North Korean defense minister Kim Il Cholvisited Moscow in April 2ooo, revealing renewed interest in Russian weapons on the part of Pyongyang. A framework agreement on cooperation in the defense industry and military equipment was signed during this visit, according to which Russia would resupply the North with weapons and parts.'s Reports indicate that Russian weapons deliveries to the North have resumed with the transfer of 3,ooo Igla portable missile systerns."o Putin has succeeded in reviving Russia's relationship with North Korea, and in July 2ooo, he became the first Russian leader to visit $ongyang. Kim Jong Il reciprocated by traveling to Russia inJuly to August 2OOI. Kim used the occasion to expresshis resentment against theJapanese, who refused to accept his conditions for normalized relations, indicating a rnutual dissatisfaction with Japan." Moscow has similarly attempted to develop influence in South Korea by expanding rnilitary sales. In r!g6, Seoul accepted the idea of taking delivery of Russian weapons as partial payment of a $I./ billion loan extended by South Korea when diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union in I99o." The Russian deputy defense minister, Nikolai Mikhailov, visited Seoul in May r99B to promote Russian weapons in this connection, specifically by offering three Kilo class submarines and S-3oo surface-to-air missiles."3The South Korean navy rejected the plan to purchase the Kilo submarines because of logistics and telecommunications corrrpatibility problems; however, Seoul has accepted delivery of other Russian weapons including T-8oU battle tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, Metis

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anti-tank missiles, and Igla portable missile systems."aRussian weapons are not popular within the South Korean defense establishment, but Seoul has no other choice than to accept a wider variety of weapons systemsin payment of the loan. Other weapons under consideration for transfer to South Korea include transportation aircraft, hovercraft, and refueling aircraft."5 Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" of engaging North Korea, declared in rgg8, promised Russia greater influence in the peninsula. Kim's engagernent policy required the endorsement of both China and Russia, thereby holding out the prospect of restoring Russia's role in the

by his Korean counterpart that the South's participation in the U.S.-sponsored TMD, against which Sergeyevhad spoken, was not on the agenda.*7When Putin visited Seoul in February 2oor, he obtained President Kim's support for the rJJ2 ABM treaty, which the Bush administration has attempted to revise. A joint staternent issued at the end of Putin's visit stated that, "The Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea agreed that the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability and an irnportant foundation of international efforts on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.""* The South Korean Foreign Ministry subse-

RuSSia haS heCOmâ&#x201A;Źrnored.ependent on China to support its global and reigional role. reconciliation processbetween North and South. Kim visited Moscow in May rggg to obtain Russian endorsernent of the engagement policy, at which time the South Koreans stressedthe irnportance of Russia'srole in the Korean peninsula.'6 Kirn's rapprochernent with North Korea. China. and Russia also created strains in Seoul's alliance relationship with the United States. South Korea could not succeed in engaging North Korea while it was identified with \Mashington's TMD, to which China and Russia were openly hostile. South Korea will continue to face this dilernma of harrnonizing the various interests of the rnajor actors on the Korean peninsula as long it pursues the Sunshine Policy. Consequently, the South has attempted to distance itself from U.S. TMD. When Russian defense minister Sergeyev visited Seoul in May ?ooo, he was told

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quently explained that approval of the ABM treaty did not entail opposition to TMD, that the United States had been consulted over the joint statement, and that it was reviewing its position toward TMD but had not opposed it."e In any case, the revival of Russian influence over the South is largely dependent on the progress of Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy, which may not be sustained. The Sunshine Poliry has been subjected to much criticism from conservativesin the South, who have accused Kim of making excessiveconcessions to the North. The issue compelled the resignation of Unification Minister Lirn DongWon and five Cabinet members on September 4, 2oor. Moreover, China, not Russia, has emerged as the major beneficiary of the engagement policy and has positioned itself to have closer relations with both North and South Korea.

BUSzYNSKT Conflict& Security For North Korea, China offers a model of reform and developrnent, while Russia is regarded as a negative exarnple. Kirn Jong Il visited Shanghai inJanuary 2oor to examine China's market reforms firsthand-a similar version of which rnay be introduced in North Korea with Chinese encouragement. China holds a similar position in relation to the South and was South Korea's first export market in 2ooo. China's expanding econorny offers South Korea a promising alternative stimulus to a receding Arnerican econorny. Russia has been a secondary beneficiary of the Sunshine Policy, and its role in the Korean peninsula has been subordinated to that of China.

C O n C l u S i O n S .R u s s i ah a s b e c o m e rnore dependent on China to support its global and regional role. As China increases in econornic and military strength, that dependency will become rnore obvious. For a seriously debilitated Russia, China has become more important as a stabilizing influence for the security of its eastern and southern border regions, as a rnarket for its defense industries, and as political support againstthe United States.Although Russia has atternpted to balance its relationship with China by expanding relations with Northeast Asia, it has made little headway. Efforts to irnprove relations withJapan have stagnated over the territorial dispute. Although Russia has revived ties with North Korea, and now has also establishedrelations with South

Korea, its role on the Korean peninsula is secondary to that of China. Russia has attempted to establish a significant position of influence in Northeast Asia that would confirm its self-image as a "great power," but finds itself behind China in regional affairs. Some within Russia now believe that European or U.S. support will be needed to mitigate the consequences of Russian dependence upon China. China's surprising rise and Russia's decline may transforrn the way we view Northeast Asia. In recent history, Russia was strong, and China weak; now there is the prospect of a role-reversal. Within Russia, concerns have been raised about the future of its far-eastern territories, the habitable parts of which were acquired when China was weak. Russia's far east has a population of 7 million, and its Soviet-era industries were established for strategic rather than economic reasons and are unlikely to survive rnarketization. The region cannot support itself economically, and would become more dependent upon Chinese business and Chinese labor for survival. The fear expressedin Moscow is that within ten or fifteen years the region could be absorbed by China and lost to Russia.3oIf this carne to pass, Russiawould disappear as an EastAsian regional power, let alone a global one, and the world would face a much-erpanded Chinese power commanding vast industrial, financial, and natural resources. Sorne in Russia do not consider this scenario a far-fetched one.

NOTES r Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov reported on {, September 2ool that Russiawould surpassthe UK and France in 2ool to become the world's znd Iargestarms seller after the US and predicted that sales may reach $6 bllllon annually. Salesof aircraft would constitute some 65-7o% of the total. See Xodiolree Europe/Radio liber!, [henceforth RRE/RF] No. 168, 6

September 2oor [on line at w.rferl.org/newsline] 2 It was agreed that the 2,444 river islands in the IJssuri, Amur and Argun rivers would be split between both

sides according

the Thalweg

principle

which the main channel was considered as the border. Three

islands

were

still

disoute.

Khabarovsk and one in the Argun

two

around

river.

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3 "Kontseptsiya neshnei politiki rossiiskoi federatsii," Nelcrisimgro Gorctc, rrJuly 2ooo. Gornostaev, "Prezident otpravilsya v 4 Dmitrii

tJ latedga,2o J uly 2ooo. t8 loponTimes, l February 2ooo, Yurii Golotyuk "Koreiskim raketchikam poverili na slovo, " Iatestfa, t2

Aziyu, " "lfezouisingta Gweta, r g July 2ooo. g According to the terms of the featy

February 2OOO. t Q J o p a n T i m e s , 3 0A p r i i 2 o o l . 2o "Russia Selling Man-Portable

both sides

are obligated not to enter into any agreement which "the national security and territori-

would jeopardise

al integrity ofthe

and in the event ofthe

other"

threat

of aggression against either the two will immediately consult. Svetlana Babaeva, Ekaterina Grigor'eva, "Drugaya geometriya," Ioenla, t'/ luly 2oot6 Sergei Luzyanin, "Kitai i Rossiya podpishit noryi dogovor, " Nezoaisimo1aGa4to, t{ Jwly 2oot.

2I In an interview, Kim administration from

threat North's

Kim

gram. Korean

Nye otdast, esli bi dazhe khotyel. A on nye khochet, " NetouisimaloGozeto,2 September 2ooo. g J o p o n T i m e sr, S J u l y 2 o o o , 4 A u g u s t 2 o o o .

dorozhim

10 lryestia,Ig August 2ooo. "Vomashchenie Ir Vasilii Golomin,

k podarky

Khrushcheva."

Izgestla,2g October 2ooo. t2 JaponTimes,20 February 2ool. Russian Deputy Loslukov claimed that the

Foreign MinisterAlexander r9g3 Yeltsin-Hosokawa

declaration

which

identifies

IlJong

fabricating

North

Korea

sovereign right

/ Dmitrii Koptev, "Interes s oglyadkoi," Iaxnfo,8 December 2OOO. "Otdast li Putin Tretyakov. Ostrava 8 Mtalii Yaponii?

Missiles

North Korea," USDefense.com,2o March (w-usdefense. com/articles/ma12 OO I > .

accused the Bush missile

a so-called and

2ooI,

emphasized

the

to develop a missile pro-

accused Japan of crimes against the and stressed that if Japan moved

people

away from

the hostile politics of the past then a renewal of the relationship would be possible. "My koreisko-rossiiskoi

druzhboi"

Rossisftgo

Caaeta,2l luly 2oor. 22 "Zavse nado platit," Iatenlto, 18 May 2OOO. See 2 ! K o r e aT i m e s ,2 ! M a y r g g 8 , < w . h k . c o . k r > . also Shim Dae Hoon, "Russia Returns", For.toslernfconomit Redeu, I3 January 2OOO. 2{ See"More Russian Arms to Arrive for-Debt Payment," Koreo Herald, Io (w.koreaherald. co. kr> .

in WeaponsMarch

Ig99

25 Ibid, 6 February 2oor. z6 See Joint Statement from Kim Dae Jung's meeting with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow 28 May 1999, in "Korea, Russia agree to strengthen mutually comple-

the issue. /apan limes, t December 2ooo. IJ Putin said at Irkutsk that the t956 agreement was "one of the agreements that forns the basis of our

mentary relations," KoreaHerald, 29 May 1999. 2 / " Z a v s e n a d o p l a t i t , " I a t e s t l o ,1 8 M a y 2 o o o . 28 Patick Tyler, "Moscow finds Unlikely Ally in

The Japanese side wanted to of negotiations but the

Seoul," /nlemolionolHeroldTribune,28 February 2oor. 29 Ibid, see alsoJohn Burton, "South Korea crit-

all four islands as subject to negotiations be scrapped.

Losyukov

the 1956 agreement return

repeated

would have to

that Russia accepted

on the understanding

that the

of two islands would be the final resolution

bilateral

relationship."

set a date for a continuation Russians were understood

reluctant,

that Morl

perhaps

because it

would soon step dom

was

as Prime

Minister. /opan Times,27 March 2oor. 14 l.uestia,2g October 1994.

16 The Russians had expected to conclude Grigory

Karasin

Friendship,

visited

Deputy

Pyongyang.

Good Neighborliness,

approved during

t 76]

1999 when

Foreign The

the new Minister reaty

and Cooperation

this visit. JaponTimes,19 March rggg.

Georgetown Journal

M i s s i l e D e f e n c e , " f i n o n c i o ll i m e s ,

Seoul and Pyongyang then would

rg See Putin's interview withJapanese news organizations in Moscow, Jcpan Trines,rSJuly 2ooo treaty in March

icizes U.S. National

During the visit Putin offered 28 February 2ool. financial support for a railway that would link the

of International

Affairs

of was

go to the Chinese border where it would link up with the Trans Siberian railway- It would Korea

to Europe

toriya

Sokolova,

cut freight

deliveries

from

South

by twelve to twenty-five days. Vik"Drugaya polovina Korei," lpesfya,

28 February 2oor. 3o Andrei Piontkovskii,

"Kitai

isimglaCweta, I4 August 2OOr.

neowatim

i' Ne<au-

0ulture&Soclety Global ip Hop Yvonne Bynoe Magwinepromoted its conThe cover of a recent NewTorkTimes tents with the eye-catching blurb, "Explaining Hip-Hop to the Thliban."'The story, written by a hurnanitarian aid worker in Afghanistan, dealt with the cultural contradictions that exist in that isolated, war-torn country. The author recounted, "I 'hip-hop recited lyrics' at the request of the young Afghans, 'about who wanted to know the African people with black skin in Arnerica' who sing, but without rnusic, like shouting. "' This article showed that despite being in the backwater of the world, in a country where televisions, rnovies, and rnusic were banned by the government, these young Afghans could easily call up cornrnon stereotypesabout BlackAmericans. The author indicated that he tried to explain the rnisconceptions, but he lamely conceded, "There is only so rnuch that can be translated frorn one language to another, from one culture to another."3 This points to a basic premise: unless one has at least a working knowledge of Black Americans and their collective history, one cannot understand Hip Hop culture. While rap music has been globalized, Hip Hop culture has not been and cannot be. Anyone can be taught the technical aspectsof deejaying, breakdancing, writing graffiti, and rhyming, or can mimic artists' dress or swagger, but the central part of Hip Hop culture is the storytelling and the information that it imparts about a specific group of people. The experiences of

Yvonne Bynoe is President of Urban Think Thnk, Inc. u rDan I nt nK\w. Tank.org), which publishes Doulo,Thelournal of RopMusicand Hip Hop Culfure,the first scholarly publication on the subject. She is currently a fellow at the DuBois Bunche Center for Public Policy at Medgar Evers College, City University of New York.

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of U n leSSOne haS.. .workinsknowled.,qe Black Americans and their cdllective hi-story, ' one cannot understand Hip Hop culture. Black people in America-coupled with their beliefs, customs, language, and style-continue to fuel what is called Hip Hop culture.a Hip Hop culture is indeed based on irnprovisation and adaptation, but these creations are based in turn on a Black American perspective and understanding of the world. Therefore, if international artists are selectively taking parts of Hip Hop culture and reconfigrrring them to fit their own histories and experiences, without understanding the framework in which the cornponents developed, how can these new cultural expressions still be called "Hip Hop?"

U n d e r s t a n d i n gC u l t u r e . T h e chief issue relating to the supposed globalization of Hip Hop culture is whether it can be transported and adapted beyond the United States. Are the permutations of Hip Hop culture developed abroad rnerely branches of the original tree, or do they actually constitute new cultures in that their own right? Undergirding query is the question of whether Hip Hop culture can legitimately exist divorced frorn general Black Arnerican culture and history. According to rnusic journalist Kevin Powell, "A hip-hop head is not someone who listens and copies the rnusic, lingo, fashion, and dance. It is sorneone who knows and appreciates its history, going back to the Negro spirituals of the plantation."5 In our contemporary world, physical nations are no longer the parameters for establishing a "culture." Nonetheless,

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culture presupposes that there are agreements within a group of people about how life is lived. In his book Media,Communicailon, Culture' A Clobal Approach, Richard Lull says, Years ago Rayrnond Williams (1962), succinctly defined culture as "a particular way of life" that is shared by a community and shaped by values, traditions, beliefs, rnaterial objects, and territory. Frorn this perspective, culture is a complex and dynamic ecology of people, things, worldviews, rituals, and daily activities and settings. It's how we talk and dress, the food we eat and how we prepare and consume it, the gods we invent and the ways we worship thern, how we divide up tirne and space, how we dance, the way we work and play, how we make love, the values to which we socialize our children, and all the other many details that rnake up eaerydg /f . Understood this way, culture is "our way of doing things" and it reveals who we are as well as who we are not. Culture makes available the frarnes through which we know ourselvesand others, providing coherence for cultural rnernbers while marking differences.6 Hip Hop culture, therefore, is not rnerely an entertainrnent vehicle, but an expression founded in history, common understanding and experience, and traditions, as well as racial and socioeco-

BYNoECulture & Society nomic realities existing in Arnerica. Thus, purchasing a rap music CD, going to a rap music concert, or donning the latest "urban" fashion does not alone rnake one part of Hip Hop culture. At best, such actions rnake one a fan of rap rnusic. Moreover, if culture relates to the everydaylives of its members, then having common language,history, customs, and rnores rnay play a larger role in the development of a culture than rnerely engaging people whose only commonality is being of the same race or sharing a sirnilar socioeconornicposition Many people find the concept of a "world culture" abhorrent, since it smacks of cultural imperialisrn whereby one dorninant entity irnposes its beliefs, values, and style on everyone else. However, the so-called globalization of Hip Hop culture does just this. Rather than allowing youth around the world to create their own cultural identities, the United States has exported its own for their use. Youth around the world are different and have varied backgrounds, interests, concerns, and challenges.As the Geto Boys said, for the oppressed,"The World is A Ghetto." But it is also evident that frorn nation to nation, not all ghettos are the same.7 Although the chief tenets of Hip Hop culture are unity and inclusion, in light of real differences among youth around the world, it seems irrational that a cultural expression that was born and bred in the United States and heavily emphasizes Black Arnerican vernacular and American references can speak for everyone, regardless of the arnount of cajoling and stretching that is done to it.

City. It reflects a corning together of African-American, Caribbean-American, and Latino-Arnerican cultural traditions, all of which have roots in Africa. Hip Hop is not an inherently political expression; however, social cornrnentary continues to exist in even the rnost crass rap rnusic cornpositions. Rap music in its fullest expression, as distinguished frorn the narrow spectrum of caricatures prornoted by rnainstrearn rnedia, provides insight about how a large number of young Black Arnericans live, talk, socialize, and think about thernselves and the United States. For enterprising Black and Latino youth, Hip Hop culture initially served as cornrnunity entertainrnent for those whose had been shut out socially and econornically by rnainstrearn entertainment venues. Subsequently, Hip Hop events that incorporated competitive dancing, music, and art were held outdoors in parla, on the streets, or in local cornrnunity centers and clubs. The Zulu Nation, founded in r973, was the umbrella organization for Hip Hop culture.' The founder of The Zulu Nation, forrner gang leader Keith Donovan, took the narne Afrika Barnbaataa, which rneans "Affectionate Leader." As part of the Zulu Nation, rival "crews" abandoned their weapons and began to battle each other creatively for neighborhood supremacy. Hip Hop culture has four elements: MCing, the story telling or "rap" component; DJing, the rnusical cornponent; B-Boying, the dance cornponent also known as breakdancing; and aerosol art, the visual component, also known as graffiti.s Although B-Boying and aerosol art gained sorne rnainstrearn prorninence CUltUfe. Hip Hop culture is a subset in the I9Bos, the rap cornponent was the of Black American culture that devel- easiest to comrnodiS, and therefore has oped in the early rg/os in New York becorne the rnost rnarketed aspect of Hip

The Development of Hip Hop

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Hop culture. Thematically, rap music borrows from African-American folklore, adopting the stock characters of the outlaw, the trickster, and the hero. Moreover, braggadocio, a key ingredient of rap music, can be traced back to African-American folktales. Rap music and Hip Hop culture developed for almost a decade before reaching mainstream cornrnercial radio with the release of "Rapper's Delight" in rg/9. Moreover, most of rniddle America would still not experience rap music until the debut of the cable television show /b/ MTV Rapsin 1988. The initial airing of Yo!MTV Rcpscame fifteen years after the founding of The Zulu Nation and the inception of Hip Hop culture. MTV's one-dimensional depictions of urban Arnerica would become the prototlpe of what is marketed as "Hip Hop."

government policy of racial apartheid ended, and Nelson Mandela was inaugurated President of South Africa. South African youth who had fought apartheid and had lived by the slogan "I'll have liberation before education" found that they were not academically or financially equipped to take advantage of the opportunities now afforded to Black citizens. Many young Black South Africans soon became angry and frustrated after realizing that having a Black-led government would not substantially improve their lives. In the "new South Africa," about 6o percent of all music heard on South African radio cornes from outside of South Africa, with the majority imported from the United States.'oIn this clirnate, a new rnusic called ftzooitohas emerged. While there is some dispute over kwaito's exact roots, there is no arguing that it emerged out of a young, urban Black AhfOad. When one rationally exam- experience in post-apartheid South "Hip ines Hop" around the world, one is Africa. It is norrnally agreed that kvraito actually analyzing the various ways that developed in the early Iggos when local American rap music has been adapted to Black rnusic producers started experiother languagesand cultures. Essentially, rnenting with a mix of slowed-down rap is a creative vehicle that allows people house grooves (initlally Chicago house to tell their unique stories in their own music and later London house). internaways. But international interpretations of tional R&B, and South African rhythms "Hip Hop," more often than not, are and baselines. Kwaito is a brassy mixture based on ill-informed notions about the of street-inspired vocals-a rnixture of United Statesin general, and about Black English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Pedi, Sotho, Americans in particular. This can be and Xr.osa slow-tempo beats often known seen in the examples of South Africa, as isdcomto-andplenty of fun\, rhythmic Cuba, andJapan. grooves, rnost of which are electronically generated. Kwaito is a homegrown music South Africa. The decadebetween that speals for the disenfranchised youth. rg/6 and rg86 was the most decisive and The name "kwaito" rnay trace back to a violent in the long war against apartheid. r95os Sophiatown gang called AmoIn rggo, Nelson Mandela was released kwaito-a name derived from the Afrikaans from prison after serving twenty-seven word ftu.'ooimeaning angry. Thandiswa ("Red"), lead singer of the group Bongo years for his activities with the African National Congress (ANC). In rgg{, the Maffin, compares kwaito to Hip Hop in

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BYNoECulture & Society the United States, saying that it is "more than just a music genre, it's a whole subculture."" It seems, however, that much of the kwaito sub-culture is based on Arnerican images. Many Black South African males treat American rap artist Tupac Shakur as an icon, calling hirn a "real nigger." For young Black South Africans, Tupac epitornizes the young Black Arnerican rnale-the renegade, the outlaw. Although their grasp on Black American history is shaky, as is their understanding of the volatile terrn "nigger, " young South Africans seeAmerican

effects of tourism or police harassment of Black Cubans. Fidel Castro's revolution took place forty-two years ago, and with the introduction of socialism came the official abolition of racial discrimination. Some Black Cubans, however, feel that equality is su\ective in their country. Julio Cardenas of the group RCA (Crazy Raperos de Alamar) has been quoted as saying, "There should be a consistency of freedoms."'a Published reports indicate that Afro-Cubans make up approximately 6o percent of the total population, yet senior rap artists like Tupac as examples of Blacks governrnent posts are largely held by white who have wrested status and money from Cubans. Moreover, slurns like Alamar, a a governrnent that had previously denied massive housing development a few rniles these things to them. In a somewhat miseast of Havana, is horne to IOO,OOO to guided way, the luxury and defiance 3oo, ooo mostly Afro-Cuban people. Like in the United States, "Hip Hop" depicted by some Black American rap artists provide hope and inspiration to in Cuba is an urban and mostly Black disgruntled South African youth who phenomenon. Alamar is considered the share a similar racial history. birthplace of Cuban "Hip Hop," perhaps because its higher elevation allows it CUba. Although Cuban police closed the best reception of Miarni television down rap shows in the early Iggos, Fidel and radio stations. In r98o, the Sugar HiIl Gang song "Rapper's Delight" came Castro was the first world leader to formally support rap music. In rgg/, at the to Cuba, as did B-Boying. Rap rnusic, Cuban Rap Colloquium, the question however, spread slowly through Cuba in was raised, "Is rap revolutionary or the rg8os becausernost people were not able to collect albums. In rgg2, Paris counterrevolutionary?" In I999, Cuban rninister of culture Abel Prieto answered becarne the first rap artist from the the question by officially recognizing rap United Statesto perform in Cuba, and a as a valid and important part of Cuban reported 2oo,ooo people attended the culture." As a result, the previously event. In Cuba today there are over 4oo underfunded Cuban Hip Hop Festival rap groups; the artists spit lyrics over received an estirnated $5o,ooo worth Afro-Cuban beats. According to rapero Maigel Entenza of goods and services frorn the Cuban government that year.'3 Some Cuban Jaramillo, "Rap music expressesthe truth government officials are still wary of el in the ghettos."'5 Music producer Pablo rop, seeing it as a possible threat to Herrera clarifies that Cuban rap music is national stability. Raperosoften level unique: "We have our own things to criticism at society and at individuals say...It's not about copying American rather than at the government. Some .up."'u Nevertheless, although rnany rap artists rap about the deleterious Cuban rap artists decry "gangster" rap in

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favor of messagesabout social improvement, others do fabricate experiences with guns, violence, and drugs in an attempt to mirnic American rap artists. Efforts to irnitate American rap artists often fall flat. In rggg, Cuban artistsDos X came to the Cuban Hip Hop Festival and addressed the crowd with, ".Wassup nigger motherfucker! Shit motherfucker bitch! Yeh man represent motherfucker nigger!"'z Similarly, a few years before, Cuban rap artists had as the refrain to their rap tribute to Malcolm X, "Malcolm, we wanna be just like you, nigger, a nigger like you."'' In published reports, after Black Americans in the audience objected to the use of the word "nigger," a heated debate ignited. Cubans reportedly became defensive, rather than acknowledging to Black Americans their error in using the term. While Cubans may have been correct to question America's exportation ofrap records containing the racial slur, they did not bother to ask themselves why sorneone, in Cuba or elsewhere,would utter English words that they do not understand and have not bothered to define. Pablo Herrera stated, "What rnakes Cuban hip-hop Cuban is simply that it's being made by Cubans. They are talking about our society frorn the perspective of people who were born and raised in Cuba during the socialist revolution..."'s This distinction is at the crux of the argument against the notion of "global Hip Hop. " Japan. Japan may be one of the most homogenous countries in the world. Perhaps it is for this reason that its citizens are socialized to be resistant to foreigners. IJnfortunately, the lack of personal contact between the Japanese and people of other racesand cultures has fostered many

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misconceptions and stereot)?es in Japan about foreigners, particularly Black Americans. Moreover, Japanese politicians are renowned for their bigoted cornrnents that seern to appear every few years. The rnost notable statement was rnade severalyears ago by formerJapanese prirne minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who said that the United States is in an inevitable intellectual decline because there are "too rnany Blacls and Mexicans there." Ironically, despite the lack of contact with Black people, and widespread prejudice against them, "Black" is in vogue in Japan. It is popular to use stereotypical depictions of Black people on everything frorn clothing to department-store rnannequins. Most Japanese people who wear shirts with "pickaninny" images on them are probably not aware of how deeply offensive their shirts are to Black Arnericans. The imported irnages that the Japanese receive of Black Arnericans are prirnarily those of athletes, rap artists, or Los Angeles street gangs. Therefore, many people inJapan honestly believe that being of African descent autornatically ensures sports supremacy, intellectual inferiority, criminal tendencies, and sexual prowess. The "Black" craze seerrrsto have little to do with real Black people, but instead with fetishized notions of characteristicsBlack people are presurned to possess. In a country where people of African descent are a negligible portion of the population and English is not widely spoken, how can Hip Hop culture flourish? Ironically, while rnost rap music features Black artists dealing with life as "outsiders" in America, the popularity of "Hip Hop" inJapan is basedon itsAmericanness. According to the cognoscenti, rap rnusic came toJapan in the I98os with American rap artists like RUN DMC, and

BYNoECulture & Society was advanced by "T"ky" Old School" artists. Rap music, however, was not generally recognized in Japan until about Igg{ or 1995.At this time, hardcore supporters of "Black culture" and "Hip Hop" invested in dreadlocked hairstyles. They also frequented tanning salons and purchased expensive skin darkeners. "Blackness" became a fad to be consumed, without the obligation of learning about or understanding Black people. Therefore, whileJapanese youth are becoming more Westernized, most have no increased insight into the significance of the Black Arnerican experience to Hip Hop cul-

necting thread of "global Hip Hop." What is often omitted from the chronicles of Hip Hop culture is that it also represents the resilience, creativity, and intellect of young BlackAmericans. Hip Hop culture also reveals the political ideology of young BlackAmericans and their general acceptance of Arnerican idealsincluding capitalism. Eschewing the concept of the globalization of Hip Hop culture should not be construed as cultural chauvinism, but rather as a recognition that Hip Hop culture deservesto be seen in its fullest light, encompassing its historical and social precepts.

Ironically,whilefirost'.ap rnusic

features

Black artists dealine with life as^" outsiders" in Arneric_a,the pgpuTarity of "Hip FIop" inJapan is based on its^Ainericahness. ture; for rnost Japanese, "Hip Hop" is symbolic of American renegade chic. Japanese youth who have had more substantial exposure to Arnerica and BlackAmericans may still not understand all of the intricacies and politics, internal and external, of Hip Hop culture, but the cultural exchange has rnade thern reevaluate injustice in their own society. The next step forJapanese youth is to use their adaptation of rap rnusic to develop a cultural model that reflects their own unique society and history.

In our rnodern world, cultural borders are porous. Young people like KheIi Fiadjoe are becorning rnore the norrn. The Togolese piano prodigy enjoys the NBA, Russian poetry, rap artists like Tupac, Biggie (U.S.), and MC Solaar (France), as well as Conglolese soukous, Nigerian reggae, Ivorian mokosso,and European classical rnusic. True cultural exchange, however, proposition;

is not

an a la carte

it requires at least a mod-

icurn of understanding of a given culture and the people who create it. Thus, while "rap" as a creative tool is portable and Conclusion. In so rnanyaccounts,adaptable, it belittles Hip Hop culture to writers portray Hip Hop culture as rising continue to insist that as a cultural entity from the bowels of New York City. it can be disassociatedfrom its roots and Although Hip Hop culture developed in dissected at wiII. Like any other cultural rough terrain, it is a mistake to equate it entity, Hip Hop culture should be solely with deprivation and pathology, appreciated, studied, and respected for which to a great extent is the only conwho and what it represents.

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NOTES Vertigo, A Last Road r John Sifton, "Temporal Through Premodern Afghanistan, " -AleruTo.*Times Mogoaine(go September 2ool): 48-5I. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. {. America

States. Agard, "Keyin Powell on Hip-Hop 5 Kami-Leigh Being Black in America." Ogw Informer, and http,//w.dac.nec.edu/onp/archive/2ooolmarch/L evin-powell.htm 6 James Lull, Media, Communication,Culture,A Globol University Approoch, end fd. (New York, Columbia Press, 2ooo). 7 Geto Bovs. "The World is a Ghetto." on album Records, rgg6. The Resunection.Rap-A-Lot/NooTrybe Seeolso War. "The World is a Chetto." on album fie Worldtso Chetto.Avenue Records, Igl2 8 See http,//w.zulunation.com/history g Youth had limited training or access to instruthe New York City public school systhis era. As a result, they ingeniously Initially there began to use (z) LPs as the foundation. were no rap music records- Deejays used various genres: rock, soul, reggae, techno, etc. to provide "break ments through

tems during

for accompaniment massive speakers, as well as "rapover music are Caribbean imports. In places B-Boys

and nusical

MCs. Conceptually, ping"

like Jamaica, home of Hip Hop legend, DJ Kool Herc, "sound systems" and "toasting" have been pop-

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Style elements

of B-Boying

are

martial art copoeiro as well as to the Brazilian Asian martial arts movements, popularized in films. "The In May 2ool, rap artist KRS One introduced, traced

Redefinitions in this essay refers exclusively to the

United

beats" for

ular for some time.

Hop

culture."

that expanded the key elements of Hip The additions, t) Beat Boxing - The

study and application

of body nusic

i.e. human

beat

box; 2) Street Fashion - The study and appiication of sreet trends and styles; 3) Sfeet Language - The study of street conmunication, {) Street Knowledge The study and application of ancestral wisdom and universal law. See,http'//w.templeo{hiphop.com ro Interviews with representatives of Metro and Kaya FM in South Africa,

March,

2oor.

rr Steve Wright, " Kwaito, South Africa's Hip Hop." CNN Online. http'//g.cnn.com/SHOWBIZlMusic/g go6/o9/kwaito.wb/ gJune 1999. 12 Danny Hoch, "La Revolucion Embraces HipHop-With Fidel's Blessing," VillogeVoice(g October r999)'r94. r3 Ibid. I4 Brett Sokol, "Rap Thkes Root Where Free Arts & Leisure Expression is Ris\," TheNewforkTimes, (3 Septenber 2ooo):28. r5 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Hoch, I94. r8 Ibid. 19 Sokol, 28.

Law&Ethlcs Responses Covert to Terrorism Catherine Lotrionte It is in war that the greatest occasion exists for both political and rnilitary leaders to plead necessity, to argue that they have no choice, that what they do is necessarily irnposed upon thern by military imperatives. Particularly in the case of legitimate self-defense, certain acts of war are justified that would not be under other circurnstances. Today, as the United States responds to the evils of terrorism, it is useful to start with an 'just examination of the war" doctrine and its applicability to the current U.S. foreign policy process.' In the United States, covert action has historically been lrrlnerable to public attack. Many Americans see spying as a dirty business and intervention in the internal affairs of other nations as inconsistent with their professed principles of nonintervention. Nonetheless, others believe that if the United Statesis to protect national interests,both at home and abroad, and fulfill its international responsibilities in a harsh environment where terrorism is part of the international comrnunity, it has little choice but to engage in such covert activities. Today, terrorism adds a new level of gravity to this debate. A close look at the doctrines of just war and natural law, the historical role of covert action in U.S. foreign policy, and the substantive failure of international law to provide explicit norms regulating covert action helps put this controversial

Catherine Lotrionte is Assistant Counsel ral

General

for the Cen-

Intelligence

and Adjunct

Agency

Professor

in rhe Securit), Studies Program

at Ceorgetown

University.

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and emotionally-charged subject into perspective, while also suggesting a set of ethical guidelines for action. The natural law approach and the just war doctrine afford an imrnensely useful set of principles that can help guide policyrnakers in answering the question of when the United States should resort to covert operations. As history has demonstrated, we cannot escape reliance on human judgernent, and judgement will depend on howwe view our place in both history and the international community, in addition to our responsibilities in the world. At tirnes, this has involved the nation in painful dilemmas, as it often tries to do two quite different things simultaneously. It strives to adhere to certain principles and values that often conflict with the means necessaryto protect its security and advance its interests. The decisions we rnake about covert action will ultirnately reflect the interaction between our estimates of the dangers we face and the values we hold.

of force as a dispute resolution mechanism.3 Article Z@) of the UN Charter expressesthe key prescription in international law regarding the use of force. This article declares that: [a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the integrity or political territorial independence of any state, or in any other rnanner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.a The reference to "force" rather than war is significant because it covers situations in which violence is employed but falls short of the technical and dornestic legal requirements of the state of war. While sorne international scholars have interpreted "threat or use of force" to rnean both armed and non-arrned force,5 most have refrained frorn extending this interpretation beyond armed intervention.u Indeed, the primary purpose of the forrnation of the United Nations was the prevention of war,7 a fact that is evident frorn the legislative history captured at the Conference at San Francisco in r9{!.8 Frorn this point of view, the UN Charter prohibits intervention within the context of armed force, and does not comment on rnore subtle forms of intervention that do not involve, at the very least, the threat of force.s The UN Charter was intended to outlaw war as well as all lesser uses of force including the threat of force; however, the language used is adrnittedly ambiguous.'o There is continuing debate arnong scholars as to whether the words of Article 2(4) should be interpreted restrictively," so as to permit force that would not contravene the clause, or as reinforcing the primary prohibition."

International Contemporary Law on the Useof Force.rn ig{9, the United Nations Charter laid the foundation of a "new world order" after the Allied victory in World War IL The UN Charter established the United Nations Organization to rnaintain international peace and security, as well as to prornote friendly cooperation among nations in solving international econornic, social, cultural, and hurnanitarian problems. The UN Charter prescribed the international norms outlawing the threat or use of force-the principal norms on which the new order stands.' The UN Charter was originally designed to allow states to peacefully resolve their disputes and prevent the use

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The line separating improper, illegal intervention from legitimate interference is quite difficult to draw. While most scholars agree that dictatorial interference violates international law and that mere diplomatic contact rests well within the realm of permitted behavior, those attempting to distingrrish between legal and illegal activities sturnble when more subtle forms of intervention are at issue. Does providing financial support to an established rival political party violate any international norrn? Is the provision of funds "coercive" as the word is generally used in the UN resolutions? Does providing propaganda in another country violate any international norrn? Would this be "coercive?" Or is this support for dissenting groups rnerely creating "rnore speech" within the domestic forum, thus ensuring that citizens of the country rnake more informed decisions and have a wider range of choice?

Policy Action. Foreign andCovert Throughout American history, the role of secrecywithin foreign policy has been dictated by perceived threats against national security. The collapse of SovietAmerican cooperation late in World War II convinced U.S. foreign-policy rnakers that Soviet comrnunisrn posed a critical challenge to U.S. security. The development of the Cold War and the withdrawal of European colonial powers fromAsia made it clear that the United Statescould not avoid a much deeper involvernent in world politics than had forrnerly been the casein times of peace. The United States lacked not only a foreign policy adequate to cope with this new situation, but also the government institutions necessaryto develop and carry out an effective policy. Institutions and procedures had to be establishedto enable

the president to bring together key U.S. officials who dealt with the various aspects of foreign poliry to consider the relevant facts, weigh alternative courses of action, make the necessarypolicy decisions, and see that they were carried out. The result was the National Security Act of r9+7," which created the National Security Council (NSC) to help the president forrnulate foreign policy, and established the Department of Defense as a step toward unification of the armed forces. This act also created the CIA.'a U.S. leaders concluded that the United States needed an organizatfort capable of perforrning certain foreign policy functions that fell short of war yet went beyond traditional instrurnents of diplomacy. The authority granted to the CIA "to perforrn such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may frorn time to time direct" has been used as the statutory authorization for covert actions. In t947, the CIA's general counsel determined that the CIA could undertake covert actions if directed by the NSC and if Congress appropriated funds for such activities.'s Since 19/6, the CIA has also relied on specific authorization contained in successiveexecutive orders issued by presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan to conduct covert actions.'6 Fifteen years later, in the rggr IntelligenceAuthorizationAct,'7 the IJ.S. Congress redefined "covert action" more specifically as "activities of the United StatesGovernment to influence political, rnilitary or conditions econornic, abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publlcly, but does not include...activities the prirnary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence..."'8While some comrnenta-

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The natUt0 of rnost"covert"o 1)eratlons largely rnisundersto o d. tors have attempted to restrict the use of the term "covert actions" to describe only those actions that specifically involve coercion of some form,'e most authorities do not adhere to this definition.

foreign leaders"aor to finance pararnilitary armies to replace objectionable foreign governments,ts such "covert operations" receive the greatestpublicity. Much of the public, therefore, associatesthe terrn with activities widely viewed as nefarious"6and contrary to dernocratic values. L a w . International H o w d o e s It was at the height of U.S. concern about the threat of international comcovert action fit within the international legal framework of international law? As rnunism that President Eisenhower analyzed above, before a country or the appointed a panel to make recommendainternational community can use Article tions regarding covert political action as z(4) as a legal basis for sanctioning an an instrument of foreign policy. The activity, it must determine if that activity panel, named after its chairrnan, Generconstitutes "force" as defined by the alJirnrny Doolittle, included the following statement in its report: Article. Arguably, the scope of Article "arrned The force."'" 2(4) prohibits only It is now clear that we are facing an general acceptance of the view that the implacable enerny whose avowed terrn "force" in Article Z(D indicates "armed force" has caused most scholars objective is world domination by to neglect to consider, "What is force?"'' whatever rneans and at whatever Nevertheless, in order to include covert costs. There are no rules in such a regime action in an international garne. Hitherto acceptablenorms of human conduct do not apply. If the designed to govern "explosive effect(s) with shock wavesand heat, "'" this is not a U.S. is to surwive, long-standing Arnerican tangential question. concepts of "fair play" The nature of rnost "covert" operations rnust be reconsidered. We must is largely misunderstood. The typical develop effective espionage and "covert action" does not involve the threat counterespionage servicesand rnust learn to subvert, sabotage and or use of military force against foreign destroy our enemies by more clever, states,"3and many do not involve "coer* rnore sophisticated means than cion" of any sort. The widespread rnisunthose used against us. It may become derstanding is not all that surprising, necessarythat the American people however, as rnost "special activities" remain unknown to the public. Those be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamenthat are "leaked" and judged by the media and allotted significant press coverage tally repugnant philosophy."T tend to be only the most controversial. Although this approach may initially While only a tiny fraction of CIA operations have involved efforts to assassinate appear radical, in the context of the

Legality of Covert Actionunder

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times, this approach was consistent with several schools of thought in international affairs that laid the foundation for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The first is the "realist" tradition of international affairs, which traces its origins from the Greek historian Thucydides through the philosophies of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Rousseau to rnodern theorists such as Realists Morgenthau and Niebuhr. in interemphasize the primacy of power national affairs, and exclude morality and law from foreign-policy making."8 During the Cold War, realists supported the need to use covert action against cornmunisrn either because they believed that the exceptional circurnstances of the times required it or because they judged that it was simply one of the rnethods that statesused to struggle with each other. As the quote from the Doolittle report indicates, however, the authors of the report were uncomfortable with the "repugnant

U.S. policymakers are likely to still consider covert action a necessaryforeign policy tool. Thus far, the United States has responded to terrorisrn with both overt and covert military operations. What frarne of reference, then, should replace the Cold War frarnework that has shaped covert action policy since the founding of the CIA? And how should covert action policy be used in response to these new threats?

and TheNaturalLawApproach of Just War Doctrine. Thewritings

Saint Thomas Aquinas provide an especially important and authoritative source for an exarnination of natural law. For Aquinas, "natural law" refers to the rnost basic prescriptions of rnorality and practical reason. They are known as laws because of their prescriptive character, and as natural becausethey are innate to hurnan understanding. Natural law is grounded in those desirable activities necessary. that perfect and fulfill human beings. deerned they philosophy" These activities include such things as Although covert action was recognized as knowing reality, relating to others an important and necessaryU.S. foreign policy tool, the United States never decently, and staying alive and healthy. Aquinas'sjus was defined as "that which is abandoned its rnoral traditions. just in a given situation." Berlin Wall and fall the the of Since According to the natural law tradition, the dissolution of the Soviet ljnion, the law and political decision-making, insorealist thought that forrned a compelling rationale for both military and far as they are human activities subject to rational control, are essentiallyrelated to covert action in the early Cold War period has dissipated. Best evidenced by moral principles and norrns. Because recent events, the United States still they serve to implernent and create those faces a dangerous world, arguably a cornponents of a rich and full communal existence that rnorality demands we rnore uncertain and dangerous one respect and political society exists to pro\Mar in which the the Cold than that of enemy was clearly defined. The new mote and protect, the goals of political world order is filled with hostile states decisions, including the law, are essentially moral. Politics and law establish and non-state actors, violent terrorist conditions for the peaceful and just purand the narcotics trafficking, attacks, o f w e a p o n s o f m a s s suit not only of the necessitiesof life, but proliferation also those that contribute to life's full destruction. In such an environment,

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flourishing and perfection through science, religion, pluy, and excellent achievement. Still, most laws and policies are not simple projections of the rnoral norrns which demand respect and concern for worthwhile human activities. Invention and decision are necessary to implement these moral purposes and rnake moral objectives concrete.'s Consequently, political leaders need the virtue of practical wisdom to properly fulfill their social role. Of course, there is no gr.rarantee that they will have it, but

and choice impossible, then there are grounds for excuse but not justification. Thus, the natural law tradition resolves conflicts between morality and political necessity in favor of morality. Aquinas specified three conditions for the decision to go to war: the action rnust be ordered by proper authority, the cause must be just, and the authority must have a right intention of promoting good or avoiding evil.3' Other authorities have subsequently added three additional criteria: action involving force must be a last

Thenaturallaw traditioltresolves conflicts between rnorality and political necessity in favor of rnordlity. insofar as their decisions are cornpatible with rationally-derived moral principles, their authority rernains. Theorists of natural law believe that political leaders rnust rnake prudent decisions that take into account the possibilities for effective action and the interests of the polity for which they bear responsibility. But the possibilities they consider and the interests they prudently pursue rnust be evaluated by rnoral standards. While theorists of natural law recognize the circumstantial pressures faced by politicians, they refuse to regard such circurnstances as justification for actions contrary to the moral law. A political authority rnay feel compelled by such necessities, but necessities cannot justify immoral actions, for these necessitiesdo not ordinarily make the consideration of morally-acceptable alternatives impossible-and if deliberation and choice are possible, then it is possible, although difficult, to choose to follow the moral law. When necessities do make deliberation

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resort, and all peaceful alternatives rnust have been exhausted; there rnust be a reasonable probability of success; and the damage created by war must be proportionate to the injury it is designed to avert or the injustice which occasions it.3' Once these conditions are met, the belligerent is subject to two further constraints in seeking his military objectives: his actions must be directed against the opponent, not against innocent people, and the means of combat must be proportionate to the just ends envisioned and must be under the control of a cornpetent authority.3" The first of these constraints has been further refined, under the "principle of double effect," to encompass situations in which injury to innocent parties is unavoidable. Aquinas formulated the principle as follows, There is nothing to hinder one act having two effects, of which one only is the intention of the agent,

LorRroNrELaw& Ethics while the other is beside his intention. But moral acts receive their species from what is intended, not from what is beside the intention. as that is accidental.33 Thus, under this principle, a belligerent may be justified in permitting incidental evil effects if there is good reason. The conditions governing this, however, are held by rnost comnentators to be exceedingly strict. For example, the action taken rnust not be evil in itself; the good effect, and not the evil effect, rnust be intended; and the good must not arise out of the evil, but both must arise simultaneouslv from the action taken.3a

Relevance of the NaturalLaw Approachand the Just War Doctrine Action.wrut to Covert do these theoretical and philosophical doctrines have to do with covert action and its role in responding to terrorism? Terrorisrn kills ordinary citizens and no defense is afforded. These people are killed sirnply to instill fear. Terrorism is associatedwith the demand for unconditional surrender and tends to rule out any sort of compromise settlement. For policymakers deliberating over possible responses to such acts, a standard for selection of just covert actions can be developed by analogy with the longstanding efforts to differentiate just from unjust wars with special attention given to the criteria of just cause and proportionality.35 Just cause and proportionality constitute the formal aspectsof natural law and can be applied to a broad range of situations where one must harm another, in the form of punishment and political, economic, or military intervention. It would appear that a framework based

upon the tenets of the natural law approach and the doctrine of just war could be useful for evaluating covert actions that result in economic dislocation, distortion of political processes,or manipulation of information because these causesuffering or moral damage, as war causesphysical destruction. The just war doctrine is equally relevant as it poses key questions' Is the operation directed at a just cause, properly authorized, necessary,and proportionate? Is it likely to succeed, and how will it be controlled? Is it a last resort, a convenience, or merely an action taken in frustration? Each of these questions has many facets. Just cause:Exactly what are the objectives of the operation? Is it defensive-to repel an identifiable threat-or is it intended to redress a wrong, to punish a wrongdoing, or to reform a foreign country? What specific changes in the behavior or policy of the target country, group, or individual is sought? Junintenfion: What will be the likely result in the target country and in other foreign countries? How will the United States or the international cornrnunity benefit? How can successbe determined? Proper authoi!: Who has reviewed the proposal? Are there dissents? Was there a deliberative review process that was effectively implemented? lost resort, What other policies have been tried? Why have they not been effective? Probabili! o;f success, What is the likelihood that the action will succeed? Are there differing views of the probability of success?How does the view of disinterested observers differ from that of advocates or opponents? Proportional$, What specific methods are being considered? Does the proposal envision the use of lethal force, sabotage, economic disruption, or false information?

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Why are these methods necessary? Do they mimic those used by the adversary, or are they potentially more damaging or disruptive? If so, what is the justification? Drscnminationand controltWhat steps will be taken to safeguard the innocent against death, injury, econornic hardship, or psychological darnage? If some damage is inevitable, what steps are being taken to minimize it? Natural law's approach to practical wisdom recognizes the difficulties of incorporating changes in the world with

maintaining a credible ability to use force, through intelligence collection, covert action, or other means, is an important aspect of deterrence and international peace and security. Undeniably, the massive darnage to the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and U.S. commercial airliners, involving a horrible loss of life, were "armed attacks" against the United States, thus allowing for forcible measures of self-defense against the perpetrators, even under the most conservative reading of the UN

IntervgntiOn iS nOt prirnafacieirnrnoralor unlawful sirnply because^it is covert. the political leaders' responsibility for practical judgement. General moral norms often fail to determine what particular sort of society certain world leaders should seek to fashion. Other leaders rnust, according to the doctrine of natural law, act as rnorally as possible in response. That action will depend on a variety of contingent factors, including the technological and political potential for mutual aid and cooperation. The casuistry needed for practical judgement must take these factors into account. For that, reasonable human decision is needed, and this in turn requires the practical wisdom of leaders. This acknowledgment of contingency reflects that the natural law tradition, though a rnoralist approach to political and international decisions, affords political leaders the discretion they need to do their job. COnClUSiOn. The strengthening of international order requires the control and reduction of the use of force across international borders. In addition,

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Charter and the strictest definition of "use of force." The prevention of future terrorist attacks appears to necessitatethe use of covert action. In the realm of covert action, however, where an act could be interpreted as intentionally causing a destructive effect within the sovereign territory ofanother state and as an unlawful use of force according to Article 2(4), the.e is a need for a higher level of scrutiny within the approval process on behalf of the state conducting the covert action. The United States intervenes in the affairs of foreign countries in a variety of ways that clearly pose political and ethical questions. Still, such intervention is not prima facie immoral or unlawful simply because it is covert. Individuals will inevitably disagree as to whether or not the ends justiS the means in particular circumstances. Policymakers may agree as to whether a proposed intervention is necessar7, judicious, and well conceived. What is required is a senseof proportion and a determination not to

L O T R I O N TLEA W& E t h i C S be unduly influenced by short-term considerations. Even SenatorJ. William Fulbright, in an article attacking many of the CIA's activities and their corrosive effects on American values, says that rules of this processcannot be rigid, "We are compelled, therefore, to lay down a qualified rule, a rule to the effect that the end almost never justifies the means, that our policy must alrnost always be open and honest and made in accordance with constitutional procedure."36 While these qualities may be difficult to gain and hold, the guidelines suggested in the article will provide policymakers with a useful tool to use during this decision-rnaking process. These suggestedguidelines will not end controversy regarding covert action, nor will they guarantee that inappropriate or unethical actions will not be taken in the future. Furthermore, a process based on

the just war doctrine will not reassure those who oppose covert action in all forms. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that covert action is likely to remain in the arsenal ofstates for the foreseeablefuture, the guidelines suggestedhere, grounded in the principies ofjust war doctrine and natural law, help put this debate into perspective. Reforming the process along the lines suggestedwould signal that the United States discriminates between the soldier who fights a just war and the terrorist that prosecutes an unjust war. In short, such reform would show that the United States is concerned with issues of right and wrong, and not merely with power.

Note:

Author's Anthony

Clark

made during

The Arend

author for

the preparation

would

thank

assistance and comments ofthis

study. The views

expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position

alone

of the U.S.

government.

N O TE 5 'just

I For an exhaustive analysis ofthe war" theoTns Neruur Lew TuoruoN ry see E.B.F. Mrocuv, A N DT E E T n E o r y o r I N r E r N e r r o x a r R u u r r o N s ( t 9 7 ! ) . 2 SeeLours HrNr,*, Merrrrars 88+ (tggg).

INrrxrerroNar

Lew, Cases lNp

Intemationol Inu, The Right of 3 See Oscar Schachter, Stotesto UseArmed Force, 82 Mrcu. L. Rev. t6zo, 162o

(r984). 4 ^9ezDinstein, iqbrd note 3, at 84. I See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Cenerol Internotionol Low and the Inu

of the United Notrons, in lJNrrrp Pnocrss 4-5 (1956)

NerroNs,

TrN

Yrers Lrcer

6 SeeQuincy Wright, Subuersiue Intenention, 54 Ar. J. Ixr'r L. 52r, 529 (r960). 7 Seeid. 8 SeeRifaat, supro note 6, at r2o. ! see Report ofthe Intemationol Inw Commissionto the Genr23, I23-I33, e r a l A s s e m b ! ,2 Y . B . I N r ' r L . C o . . ' N U.N.

Doc. A./CN.4/SER.A

Io see OsccrSclrochter,The R$ht ofStatesto UseArmed Force, 82 Mrcs. L. Rev. 162o (rgB4). tt See,e.g., D.W. Bowrn, NATToNALLew t5z (t998).

Serr-DrruNcr

rN lNrrr-

I 2 S e eB r o w N r r s , s u p r a n o t e r r , a t 2 6 8 . r3 National Security Act of 1947, ch. 34.3, section Io2, 6r Stat. 495, 497-99 (1947) (codified as amended at go U.S.C. S 4o3 (1982)). r{ For a history of the events leading ation of the CIA,

seeJ. Rrxrucu,

to the cre-

Tur AceNcv'

Tar

Rrsr eNoDecrrNr or rsr CIA 37-ttt (t987). r $ S e e J .O r u e N , P u s r o r u r r a r S r c " r c " e r p D r c e p rroN 2II-I7 (I98o). rG SeegenerallyExecutive Order No- IIgo5, 3 C.F.R. 90 (rg77) (Ford); Executive Order No. I2o36, 3 C.F.R. rr2 (r979) (C".t..); Executive d 5o O r d e r N o . 1 2 3 3 3 , 3 C . F . R . 2 o o ( 1 9 8 2 ) , . e p . i n t ei n U.S.C. S4ot (t982) (Reagan). I/ Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year r99r, Pub- L. No. roz-88, rggr U.S.C.C.A.N. (ro5 S t a t . )4 z g . r 8 5 0 U . S . C . A . S4 r 3 b ( e ) ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 19 See,e.g, Comment, TheLegal$of CouerlActionUnder Internat[onol Contemporag Inu, t It Reze LJ. I39, r4r

(ts84). 20 SeeBnowxrrE, supro note II, at 5f3. 2r SeeSchachter, suprd note +, at 1624. 22 SeeBrowxrrr, Jupro note II. 2! W. Mrcnarr RrrsueN &Ja.rs urrNc

Covrrr

AcrroN,

Porrcres or Covrrr er aro Avrnrcar

Pmcrrces.

CorrcroN Asroeo Lw rZ8 (r9gZ)

E. Berln, Correxrs.

RrcueNo

IN Irre*NerroN-

2 { S e eE x e c . O r d e r 1 2 , 3 3 3 , p a r t 2 . I I , 3 C . F . R . , r 9 8 z C o m p . r e p r i n t e d i5no U . S . C . S 4 o r ( r 9 8 8 ) . 2 $ S e e ,e . g . , l o u N H a r r Ty: CoNsrrrurroNer uara at k (1993).

E.*, War aro Rrsporsrarrr-

LrssoNs or VrerNeu aNo rrs Arrrr-

26 SeeRrrsveN & Bexrn, rupro note 86, at 4g-5o. zl Reportofthe SpeciolStud2Group (Doolinle Committee) on

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of theCentralIntelligence,!en9,lo SeptheCouertActiuities t e m b e r I 9 5 4 ( e x c e r p t s )i n T u r C t N r u r I N r r r u c r N c r AceNcv, Hrsrorv aNp DocuvrNrs r44 (William M. L e a r y ,e d . , r g 8 4 ) . Reolismin 28 SeeJack Donneliy, Tuentieth-Century T u o r r r o r s o r l n r e r N e r r o r e rE r u t c s 9 3 ( N a r d i n a n d Mapel, eds.,I99z). 2 ! S e ei d . a t q . 9 5 , a . 2 . q. XL, 3o SeeThomas Aquinas. r-2 SummoTheologjoe a. r Qg4z).

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!r SeeNational Conference of Catholic Bishops, (Washington, U.S. Catholic Confie Chollenge o/Peoce f e r e n c e ,1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 2 9 - 3 2 . J2 SeeAquinas, suprdnot 96, at q. XLI, a. r. 33 Id. at q. XLIV, a. VIL !{ See Prcv Reusrv, Wln aNp Csrtstt^N CoNs c r r N c r4 / - 8 ( r 9 6 9 ) . lj Seeid. 36 SenatorJ. William Fulbright, W MutNotFtg!,tfrre uithfire,Tsr NEwYorxTivrs MacazrNr,April 23, 1967.

Polltlcs&Diplomac

andLocalGouernance Citi<enParticipation Andrew D. Selee Recent studies of democratization have focused on the wave of democratic transitions that have occurred in the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia over the last twenty years. Equally important, however, is a second, related wave of decentralization that has been taking place around the world as countries extend political authority to local governrnents. Often this entails unprecedented local government elections and the transferal of significant policy responsibilities, econornic resources, and, in sorrre cases,fiscal authority. According to one estirnate, sixty-three out of the seventy-five countries with populations over $ million have undergone a rnajor process of decentralization since 19Bo.' Increasingly, local governmentsincluding municipalities, cities, states, and provinces-are the political spaces in which citizens interact with their government and make demands for a wide range of services, from health care to social welfare to education. Local governrnents in many countries have moved beyond being merely adrninistrative arms of the national government to being vibrant spaces of policy formation and political competition' Decentralization processes vary greatly among countries, and sometimes even within them. Overall, strengthening local authorities appears to have contributed to greater governnent accountability to citizens, increased civil society participation, and substantial policy innovation. As a govern-

Andrew D. Selee is Senior

Program

Associate

in the Latin Program

American

the Woodrow Center

and a Ph.D.

candidate Studies

Wilson

in Policy

at the Univer-

sity of Maryland.

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ment becomes closer to its people, citizenshave more opportunities to become engagedin the political process. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s e sa r e n e w i n many countries, however, and local governrnents face a learning curve in the exercise of their new responsibilities." In many cases, central governments have been reluctant to decentralize too rnuch responsibility to local governments, or have built in controls that reduce local governments' decisionmaking capabilities. Decentralization may also exacerbate existing inequalities among regions, or help strengthen undernocratic and corrupt local practices.Democracy is uneven in many countries, and giving greater authority to local governrnents may sometimes perpetuate authoritarian enclaves.Moreover, decentralization may

motives of the central government play a key role in the outcomes of the decentralization process. While decentralization may be used as a strategy for irnproving democratic governance, it can also be a means for the central government to shirk responsibilities that it no longer wants. These different reasons may produce divergent and contradictory outcornes.

TheOrigins of Decentralization. No single factor adequately explains the wave of decentralization that has swept the world in the past twenty years. Nonetheless, initial results from two studies indicate that the trend is linked to dernocratic transitions and the reorganization of the state in the rg8Os and I99os. The economic crises of the r98os and early I99os, which led to

Elites, _concerned for theirpotiticat

suryival, decentralized governrnent structures to preserve their influencE. exacerbate inequalities between a country's wealthier and poorer regions if rnechanisms are not implernented to balance out these differences. Three factors must be addressed if decentralization is to contribute to improved democratic governance in developing countries. First, institutional designsfor decentralization influence how resources and responsibilities are distributed and whether local governments are accountable for their actions. Second, the nature of existing power relationships greatly influences outcomes, and may help determine who benefits and who is excluded as local governments gain strength. Third, the

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increased poverty in much of the developing world, forced a reappraisal of the belief that a strong central state could promote growth through integrated national development. National governments were also forced to reduce their expenditures and functions in response to rising deficits and pressure from international organizations. Facing the discontent of citizens with the economic crises, many national governments sought to open up new avenues of political participation at a local level in order to legitimize their rule. Movements for democracy and human rights increasingly questioned the notions of a top-heavy state and

Politics&Diplomacy sELEE centralist political ideology, and sought Bank, and other international financial new channels for political participation institutions pressed governments in the at the grassroots level. developing world to reduce their national In each country, the path to decentralexpenditures by attaching conditions to ization has had its own particular charactheir loans. It does not appear, however, t e r i s t i c s . D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s e si n that international organizations actually Africa, the Philippines, Brazil, South promoted decentralization as a policy or influenced specific decisions to decenand Argentina have begun within the context of negotiations over a transition t r a l i z ei n m o s t c o u n t r i e s . to democracy. Those in Mexico and, to a During the rgBos and r99os, substanlesser extent, Venezuela have taken place tial civic movements ernerged in most as part of the political opening of an countries that pushed for greater democracy and government accountability. exclusionary democratic regime. And still others have been influenced by peace Elites, concerned for their political surprocessesat the conclusion of a civil war, rival, decentralized government strucas in Guatemala. tures to preserve their influence. In these cases, decisions to decenTABLE r: Decentralization in Seven Countries trahze have been Year Lcal Government rnade during negotiOtficials First Etacted ations among politiIteratiYo negotiations arnong I political partlâ&#x201A;Źs, civil smisfy . cal party elites rather 27 states,l fed. district than as a result of 5 , 5 5 9m u n i c i p a l i l i e s grassroots demands or the imposition of international organizations. This has 23 states,1 {ed. districl significant implications for the nature decentralized of arrangements. Since S o u r c e r W i l s o n C e n t e r P r o j e c l o n D e c e n t r a l i z a l i o n ia d d i t o n a l d a l a l r o m S h a h i d B u r k i , G u l l e r m o P e r y a n d W , l l i a m D i l l i n g e i B e y o n d t h e C e n l e r : D e c e n r a l i z i n qt h e S t a i e , W a s h n q t o n , D . C . : W o r l dB a n k ,1 S . elites are often suspi' M e x i c o h a s h a d e l e c t i o n si o r m ! n i c i p a l a n d s t a t â&#x201A;Ź q o v e r n m e n t ss i n c e 1 9 1 7 hi o w e v e r o, n l y o n e p a ( y w o n a m o s l a l e l e c t o n s u n i r l1 S z " B r a z i l a n d A r g e i i i n a h a d e l e c t e d g o v e r n m e n l su n i i l 1 $ 4 a n d 1 9 7 3 '.e s p e c t v e l y w h e n m i l i l a r y d i c l a t o r s h i p sa b o l i s h e de l â&#x201A;Ź c t e d s u b n a t i o n a lo o v e r n m e n t s . cious of granting E l e c t i o n s w e r ep e r m t i e d i n s o m e B r a z i l i a nm u n i c p a l i t i e s s t a d i n qi n l h e l 9 T 0 s , b u t c o m p e t i lo n w a s i i g h t y c o n t o l l e d a n d n o t a l l o w e di n l a r q e r c t i e s a n d s l a t e local g'overnments too much power, this has limited the extent to which reforrns Although civic movements generally did can be effective, aswill be discussedbelow. not press for decentralization directly at At the same time, grassroots rnove- the outset of the process, many becarne ments and international organizations advocatesfor it at a later date.3 have helped shape the processes in Decentralization should not be seen as important, if indirect, ways.The ideologan isolated proposition, but rather as an ical shift among international organizaiterative process. Most decentralization tions toward a belief in a small central processeshave begrrn as a result ofspecific circumstances at a point in tirne: government encouraged experimentation with decentralization. The IMF, World dernocratic transitions, political open-

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DEMOCRACY C L O S E T OH O M E

ings, or conflict resolutions. Once local governrnents acquire authority, however, civil society associations, mayors, governors, and district officials often become the greatest advocatesfor increased local control. In rnost countries, this has led to periodic renegotiations over the extent and nature of local governrnent authority. In these negotiations, civil society organizations play a more important role, particularly in countries where these groups are well established and have important rnobilization capabilities.

the federal government to provide rnany social services. Sirnilarly, in the Philippines, states, cities, municipalities, and baranga3ts (neighborhood units) spend alrnost half of governrnent revenues and assurne responsibility for everything frorn h e a l t h c a r ea n d w e l f a r e s e r v i c e st o n a t u r al resource managernent and agricultural programs. The central government transfers 40 percent of its budget according to fixed forrnulas that consider population, area, and special social needs. States have gained considerable authority to levy taxes, and profits from Decentralization in different countries federally-owned resources are shared often takes on very different characterisamong the different levels of administics. In Brazil, for exarnple, state and tration. municipal governrnents control over a At the other extrerne, Mexican states third of government expenditures and and municipalities spend around Jo percent of total government resources, and TABLE Authorities, Expenditures, and Degree are dependent on of Dependence of Local Governments federal transfers for e o{ Lcal Govomments Local Government National €wernmenl Counlry D@i€1q Makirq A{thqity) Expenditures* TfansfeB** 9r percent and 7I Mexico Education(medium).Healthcare 30oo StaG, fi% (medium), SocialWbHar€ Social WbHar€ |(llmtted), percent of their budMuniclpalities64% i (medium), L"I{ r4r4Stql!u,I respectively. gets, gs7"+ Guatemala Municipal $ervices (high), 6ff ist 2 0 %( m u ni c ip a l ) l1% are mand Although local govprouinc"i Zf"l"('1S7" Ven ez ue la Pr"i*"u SS% 9%municipalit s2.4y" ernments have much Health(high);s@lal rellare (limit€d); 37% Btazil Strtes 17ila ' education(limited);municipalwr latitude for MrrnitiFalltles.6.?oli greater v i c a s( h i s h ) - 'making decisions than Hmlth (hlgh),education(high) Argentina i P.ri,1*" ?0% they had twenty or , drcaiim M u n i c i p asl e r v i c e s( h i g h ) e 34% S*,tf, atri* (medium) fi% even ten years ago, Philippines All Subnational67.5% many of the resources transferred from the national S o u r c e r W i l s o i C e n t e r P r o j e c to n D e c e n t a z a t o n ; a d d i t o n a d a l a f r o m 8 u r k i , P e i r y ,a n d D i l l i n g e r ,B e y o n dt h e C e n l e r : D e c e n l r a t i zn g t h e S l a i e , 2 m ; a n d governiiomWordBank'sFiscalDecentra zatonDatabase(availablealwwwl.woildbafk/p!blicseclor/decenratization). ' L o c a l g o v e r n m e n et x p e n dt u r e s ment-especially for a s a p e r c e n t a g eo f t h e l o t a l p ! b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e s . " N a l i o n a g o v e r n m e n t t a n s l e r s a s a p e r c e n t a g e o l e x p e n d i t u r e s o f l o c aq o v e r n m € n t s . education and social well'are-come with are responsible for rnost aspects of stipulations that limit the discretion of healthcare, education, and social policy, local governments. Local governrnents infrastructure, and urban planning. thus rernain dependent on policy deciStates have a lirnited but growing sions at the national level. authority over taxation, although they South Africa's local governrnents also also receive considerable transfers from have limited, though growing. autono-

WhatLocalGovernments Do.

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sELEEPolitics&Diplomacy ments, where political competition exists and basic citizenship rights are guaranteed (this is not always the case, o f c o u r s e , a s w i l l b e d i s c u s s e db e l o w ) . Local governments also appear to invest more in public goods when political competition exists, helping to break down patronage networks.5 Decentralization has led to considerable innovation in mechanisms to ensure greater citizen participation in governance. Participatory budgeting mechanisms require that rnunicipal governments be accountable to citizens for their actions and expenditures. The best DeepeningDemocracy.creatingexarnples of this are in Brazil, where several municipal governments hold annuand strengthening elected local authority al neighborhood meetings during which improves governance by enhancing the budget priorities are set for the year. government's accessibilityto averagecitiThe following year, the municipal govzens, and by providing opportunities for ernments are required to hold public local and regional innovation. The cremeetings to account for their expendiation of a decentralized, elected government rnultiplies the number of elected tures.6 Mechanisms for participatory positions available, disperses leadership, planning in municipalities are also incipient in South Africa and Mexico. and creates more points of encounter In the Philippines, laws mandate the between the state and society. In l-atin Arnerica alone, one study estimates that creation of local development councils, health boards, peace and order councils, the number of local government units with elected authorities has gone from and other significant bodies that represent civil society. These participatory 3,ooo to 13,OOOsince IgJJ.a Although mechanisms have been successful in this increase is no grraranteeof better gov(since local elected officials may some rnunicipalities, although they are ernance more often the exception than the rule. be controlled by party hierarchies or national leaders), it does indicate a disGuatemala has had some success with persion of power in countries that were developrnent councils that have included non-partisan citizen representatives. previously governed by authoritarian regirnes. In Mexico, the democratization Decentralization has spawned a variety of local governments (under an otherwise of other participatory rnechanisms to s e m i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n s y s t e m ) a l l o w e d engage civil society, business, and govopposition parties to win municipal and ernment actors in joint decision-makirg. In Brazil, local health services, stateelections incrementally, which erodwhich are highly decentralized, require ed the hegemony of the one-party state. Evidence suggests that local governan oversight committee that includes representatives of the state, the general ments are more accountable to their c o n s t i t u e n t s t h a n n a t i o n a l g ' o v e r n - public, and serwice providers. In the my. Regional authorities administer around a third of public resources, but these are largely transfers from the national government with specific conditions. Provinces depend on national government transfers for $O percent of their budgets, and their authority is circumscribed by an anangernent known as "concurrence," that allows the national government to set policy jointly with the provinces. While municipal governments have greater autonomy and raise rnost of their own revenue, they have far fewer resources with which to work.

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Philippines, government investment projects require an oversight committee with representation from civil society. In South Africa, local school councils include representatives of the teachers, parents, and school administration. These participatory mechanisms are secondary institutions that cornplement representativedemocratic structures, such

strengthen local authoritarian structures. Complacency, inadequate institutional arrangements, and the uneven distribution of political power across societies often undermine the effectiveness of the decentralization process. One of the serious limitations is a lack of real authority devolved to local governments. In many cases, national

i zationcreates Whiledecentral opportunities for dernocratic innovation, it niav also reinforce undemocratic political ^ lea6ers and local powerbrokers. as municipal councils and elected rnayors. While they are not a substitute for representative dernocracy, they play a critical role in developing a new relationship between society and the state. They give citizens opportunities for involvement in politics and encourage citizen vigilance of government decision-making. Participatory rnechanisms also create spaceswhere citizens can debate priorities, negotiate community conflicts, and have direct contact with elected authorities. Secondary institutions are not always effective, however. Elected authorities rnay choose to ignore them, citizens may be distrustful of participating, and civil society organizations rnay be too weak or co-opted by opportunistic politicians. In many cases, however, these institutions open new avenues for political contestation, public dialogrre, and accountability.

TheLimitsof the Local.wnrr. better prornotes decentralization democratic governance, it also has serious lirnitations and rnay exacerbate inequalities, encourage corruption, or

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political leaders are skeptical about empowering local governments, and thus restrict their rnargin to operate. In Mexico, Guatemala, South Africa, and elsewhere, national governrnents have used strict conditions on resource transfers to reduce the margin of authority that local governrnents have to make prograrn decisions. Policy is then set primarily at the national level, even when local governrnents irnplement the prograrnrnatic action. In some cases,local governments lack the necessary capacity to assume new responsibilities in areas where they have had no previous experience. Moreover, disparity in the capacities of local governrnents within the same country limits the ability of the state to decentralize. Larger and wealthier localities generally have more people with the skills, knowledge, and training to execute new responsibilities. They also have a range of resources, including access to universities, that smaller and poorer localities lack. Some countries have developed nuanced responses to this problern. Mexico and

sELEEPolitics&Diplomacy Brazil, for example, have decentralized parts of their healthcare system at different rates to states and municipalities according to their readiness to assume new responsibilities. 7 Local governments also have different capacitiesto generate their own resources. In Argentina, the city of Buenos Aires raises g2 percent of its own annual budget, while some less economically endowed provinces raise only rO to 20 percent. Most countries use a cornbination of locally-collected taxes and transfers from the national government to fund provincial governments, with the latter being rnore important in rnost counfies (as noted in Table 2). Decentralization schernes try to balance the needs of different localities by transferring more resources to regrons that have fewer possibilities of raising local revenues. Nevertheless, the formulas often fail to address the economic disparities that exist. In Mexico, sorne of the wealthier states receive two to three tirnes more federal transfers per capita than sorne of the poorest states.8Similarly, in Brazil, the wealthier center-west states receive twice as much per capita in social expenditure transfers as the poorer northeast. Finally, and perhaps rnost importantly, democracy is uneven in most countries. Some regions may be highty democratic while others are plagued by authoritarian power structures. Thus, while decentralization creates opportunities for democratic innovation, it may also reinforce undemocratic political leaders and local powerbrokers.s Civil society is itself uneven in most countries. Civic organizations and social groups may be better able to take advantage of opportunities for participation in some localities than in others. Decentralization may therefore lead to different patterns of

democratization across localities and social groups depending on the nature of local power relationships.

COnClUSiOll, The relationshipbetween the trend toward stronger local governments and democracy can be summarized by three broad findings. First, decentralization provides opportunities for increased citizen participation, better accountability, and innovations in dernocratic governance. In the countries discussed here, more citizens arâ&#x201A;Ź now involved in the policymaking process than before. Second, despite these positive outcomes, serious shortcomings remain. Decentralization under certain conditions may exacerbate inequalities and perpetuate authoritarian regimes. Third, the different outcomes that decentralization produces are generally a result of the uneven distribution of power and resources across societies, and the motives of national political leaders. These findings suggest that decentralization in the developingworld may deepen dernocracy when it overcomes several challenges. The first challenge is to find institutional arrangements that balance delegation of authority to local governrnents with accountability of the central government. The second is to develop more equitable schemesfor resource generation and distribution among local governments to ensure equilibrium among the poorest and wealthiest regions in a country. The third is to reward and replicate innovations that strengthen local democracy, such as participatory budgeting and oversight councils. The final challenge is to strengthen organizations of civil society-especially those of the poorest sectors, to take advantage of the emerging opportunities for citizen par-

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ticipation, and to press for more equitable institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, the specific nature of these challenges,just like the processesof decentralization themselves, will vary substantially from country to country.

Luis Linares Mascareno Marcus

Note:

research projects

This

at the Woodrow

well as comparative the

text.

The

LatinAmerica and includes

is based

paper

first

data from project

is supported

two

Center,

studies cited in in

decentralization

by the Tinler

researchers from

region, Yemile Mizrahi

Wilson

other on

upon

Foundation

five countries

in the

and Leticia Santin in Mexico;

Melo

Catalina

and

The

Rezende

and

Adriana

the work in South

all

papers presented

S. Tulchin

Philip

by the perspec-

Kihato

indebted

on decentralization

these workshops.

and

Angeles and Francisco Magno I

researchers for their

Tulchin,

supported

and Caroline

and Leonora

and toJoseph

Brazilr

Clemente

includes a cross-regional

Philippines.

workshops

project,

and Asia. I have drawn from

of Steven Friednan

Carlos

Gonzalez in Venezuela;

Flavio

second

Ford Foundation, tive from Africa

the

Puente in Guatemala;

Smulovitz

Argentina.

Africa Author's

andJesus

and Rosa Amelia

Oxhorn,

these

at two recent

at the Wilson

and Philip

I would

Center,

Oxhorn

who led

also like to thank Joseph David Crocker, and Craig

Fagan for reading and commenting

on this article.

NOTES r K.S. Lee and R. Gilbert,

DeuelopingTounsandCities' Adjustment,"

Lessonsfrom Bra<rl and the Philippines, Washington, DC, World Bank, I9gg. Please note that I have used the term "local government" to refer to all subnational including those that are strictly local governments, (municipalities and cities) and those that are regional (states, provinces, departments).

Comparatiue Poilticol Studies,vol. 33, no. 4,, May 2ooo. 6 This process is described for Porto Alegre, Brazil in Rebecca Abe r s, Inuentlng Local D emouog' GrassrootsPo[lticsinBra{I, Boulder,

/ Another quite difficult

Lynne Rienner,

key element

2ooo.

of capacity-though

it is

to define and even harder to measure-

2 A few countries, such as Brazil or Argentina, had strong local governments until the rg6os (Brazil) and early rg/os (Argentina), but these were brought under

is social capital, the shared norms

central

degree of social capital was the key variable accounting for its degree of success in decentralized governance in Italy (Making Democrag Worft, Princeton: Princeton

government

dictatorship. Philippines,

control

during

Several other South Africa,

long

countries,

periods such

as the

and Venezuela, had local

appointed by the central government or had very weak (and e"clusionary) representative structures. Mexico actual has

government

units that were administratively

had regular elections for local governments

since I9I7,

but only one party was usually allowed to win and can-

Italy,

Robert

Putnam

University

Press, r$$J).

ies

suggested

have

izens begin According

to nobilize

and 3r- In a few cases, such as the Philippines Venezuela, civil society organizations played a more

one line of this argument,

ments but even in these cases, their influence

was ini-

than that of local mayors and

contribute

to the construction

of govern-

agencies may

of social capital. For Fox ("How

see Jonathan

Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico, " WorldDeuelopm e n i ,V o l . 2 { , N o . 6 , t 9 9 6 ) . 8 Ward, Peter M. and Mctoria emmentin Menco, Austin:

ro2.

Bank

work

or non-governmental

izatlon Bri$ng.lfotes, Washington,

World

together.

specific social struggles,

disasters, or the conscious

reformers

governors and other political actors. .{, Litvack,Jessie, andJessica Seddon, eds. DecentrclD.C.,

several recent stud-

to solve problems

to this arg'ument,

natural

tially less determinant

In a study

a province's

capital is not an quality of a locality, but may develop as cit-

immutable

nent

local govern-

that

social

! Manor, James, IAe Political Economl of Democratic Decentrolilation,Washington, D.C., rggg, especially p.

strengthened

found

However,

that

didate selection took place at the national level.

direct role in demanding

and practices that

allow people in a locality to work together.

Enrique

Cabrero

Mendoza,

E. Rodriguez,

with

Neu Federalismand StoteGou-

IJniversity

of Texas, rggg,

Institute, 2ooo, pp. 16-I7. $ Among studies that address these issues areJean-

9 Richard Snyder presents a incisive analysis of these differences in "After the States Withdraws,

Paul Faguet, Decentralilotionond locol CooemmentPerfomance,

Neoliberalism

Rome'

Regimes

FAO,

rgg/;

Stuti

Khemani,

Deentrolilation and

and Mexico,"

Accountoblll!' AreVoten More V$lont in lnml thon In Notional EIec-

Eisenstadt,

tions? Washington, DC, World "The Subnational Remmer,

Mexico Studies, rgg9.

I ro Zl

GeorgetownJournal

Bank, n.d.; Politics

oflnternational

and Karen Economic

Affairs

Subnational in

Wayne

Authoritarian Cornelius,

Todd

and Jane Hindley, eds., Subnctiono/Politia ond DemocratiTotion in Meico, La Jolla, Center for U.S.-

Diplomacy Politics&

Polig in theJ'teuEra Japan'sForeign Masatoshi Honda Following the September rr terrorist attacks, Japan swiftly announced its "seven-point plan" and enacted the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law. Japan learned a crucial lesson from the international reaction to its tepid resPonse during the Persian Gulf War; therefore, it was prepared to play a more active role this time. National expectations of action frorn the popular Prime Minister Junichiro Koizurni also spurred the rapid response. The puzzling question is whether Japan's reaction is merely an ad hoc manipulation to steer clear of accusations that it shirks its international responsibilities, or an indication that it is on track to become a "normal"

Masatoshi Honda is Adjunct Associate Professor ofJapanese Politics and Foreign Policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Senice, Georgetom University.

country-a country that is fully engaged in dealing with rnajor transnational crises.If the latter is the case,thenJapan's reaction to the attacks should be recognized as one of the most significant and active steps it has taken in the post-World War II era. This will not only affect U.S.-JaPanese relations, but will also influence the balance of power in East Asia. A new Japan, that acts decisively under its restrictive constitution rather wringing its hands represents a major shift in domesticJapanese politics. Japan's unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 granted the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) the authority to determine the shape of the post-war Japanese government. The SCAP aimed to make

Winter/Spring 2e62 [ ro 3]

P A R A D I G MS H I F T

sions turned to burden-sharing arrangeJapan "a Switzerland of Asia" by constraining rearmament through Article 9 ments, fewJapanesebelieved in the necesof the new constitution and by making sity to reinforce the SDF. the hurdles of constitutional revision Although Doctrine the Yoshida difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. remained a fundamental component of The geostrategic rivalries of the CoId Japanese foreign policy, there were a few War led the United States to pressure debates before the early rglos onJapanJapan to contribute to the regional secu- ese security poliry, between the neutrality rity arrangement. But Shigeru Yoshida, school and the alignment school.' then theJapanese prirne minister, resist- Nonetheless, due to continued economic ed, referring toJapan's new pacifist congrowth and social stability, these argustitution and the immediate need for rnents never reached full stearn, and posteconomic rehabilitation. Yoshida began warJapan has tended to stick close to the a gradual rearmament by converting the statusquo. The Yoshida Doctrine became National Police Reserve to National a common thread running through all Safety Forces, and, in rgg{, establishing post-war policy considerations. the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). He kept The Persian Gulf War was the first security costs to a minirnurn, however, opportunity forJapan to recast its image and only created the SDF as a bargaining in the international arena. In the late chip in the search for more economic r98os, Japan was in the rnidst of the soaid. Finally, under the terms of the Unitcalled "bubble economy." It was a period ed States-Japan Security Treaty, Japan when rnarnrnonism swept the nation and was obligated to forgo all international the Japanese were paralyzed in foreign security arrangements in exchange for policy and crisis managernent. Consernilitary U.S. protection. The resulting quently, as the r98Os drew to a close, "Yoshida Doctrine," which prioritized Japan was not yet prepared to change economic growth over security, became gears from the Yoshida Doctrine. It was the dominant principle of Japan's fordifficult for the Japanese to divorce eign policy for nearly half a century.' themselves from an approach that had For the United States, political and brought a long period of peace and economic stabilization of Japan was prosperity, and it did little until pro(outside imperative for making the country a bulvoked to action through goiatsu wark of capitalisrn against communisrn. A pressure). In the end, Japan took the defense build-up byJapan was not neces- middle way between domestic and U.S. sary for the United States as long as it demands, and contributed $r3 billion to could keep its basesand forces inJapan. the Gulf War operation. As Japan grew into an economic superAt the time, Prirne Minister Toshiki however, friction developed Kaifu power, was widely reviled for his indecibeMeen the two countries. Faced with an siveness. But it is hardly surprising that enormous trade deficit, the United States sorneone of his generation, haunted by began to bash the non-reciprocal wartime trauma and steeped in the ideolalliance. The resentment centered on ogy of the Yoshida Doctrine, would be so what it saw asJapan's huge investment in reluctant to engage militarily. It would an ever-expanding economy by "free ridtake a younger leader frorn a different ing" in security. But even when discustime to think outside of the framework

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HoNDAPolitics&Diplomacy created by those powerful forces. The generational shift in fact is, a crucial element in the transformation of Japan's foreign and security policy. This gradual process began with the plea by Ichiro Ozawa, the de facto president of the ruling party during the Gulf War, forJapan to diversifr its contribution to international crisis management beyond mere " checkbook diplornary. " It was difficult for Japan to overcorne the longstanding belief in "one-nation pacifism." In October rggo, the LDP

for its financial assistance was "shock therapy" enough to lead the nation to contemplate the eventual need to contribute more than just checks. If the lggg system is defined as singleparty dominance by the LDP, then the system finally collapsed when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost power for the first time in 1993. If the 1955 system is defined as a foreign policy struggle within the frarnework of the Yoshida Doctrine. however. formation of a nonLDP coalition governrnent led by Mori-

the It was diffic|lt foLJapanto overcorne

longstanding b elief in "6 rie - nation pacifisrn. " governrnent submitted the International PeaceCooperation Bill, but it foundered and died. Public polls suggested that more than half of the Japanese population opposed sending troops abroad. Aside from its financial donation, Japan only rnanaged to send mine sweepers to the Gulf after the end of the war. Following the pacifist constitution and the for nearly four Yoshida Doctrine decades,Japan has acted tirnidly in military affairs. Finally, inJune rgg2, Japan enacted a law dispatching troops to join a UN peacekeeping operation.3 There was neither philosophy nor principle behind Japan's "international to the Gulf War-it was contribution" merely a safeguard against becoming an outcast in the world. The greatest shock came after the war's conclusion, when Japan \,vasnot listed in the widely disseminated advertisement published by the government of Kuwait in gratitude to its international saviors. Finding its contrialtogether unacknowledged bution rnental turmoil. Disregard brought great

hiro Hosokawa was the beginning of the end. The Socialist Party, which also joined the coalition, was still suspicious of the policies of previous administraunder the 1955 system, tions-indeed, the party's very existence rested upon continued adherence to the pacifist constitution. It was not until the chairman of the Socialist Party, Torniichi Murayama, became prime rninister that the rg55 systern associated with foreign and security policy finally changed. Once the Socialists officially adrnitted the Yoshida Doctrine, the debate over Japan's post-war foreign policy underwent a subtle yet significant shift. The polarization between the neutrality and alignrnent schools in the Diet became a thing of the past after Murayama took the prerniership and the Socialists finally crossed the Rubicon. Electoral reform of the F{ouse of Representatives also accelerated a review of the Yoshida Doctrine. Under the multirepresentative electoral system, the LDP had to run numerous candidates from the same district in order to obtain

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a majority in the House. This electoral system intensified intra-party rather than inter-party competition. Campaign promises focused on gaining subsidies from the central government. Pork-barrel politics were an indispensable tool to candidates seeking reelection. Neither foreign policies nor security policies were argued arnong LDP candidates. Since it was possible for each candidate to win the election by acquiring approximately I5 to 20 percent of the electorate, raising regional or local issues rather than nationwide issues was much rnore effective in gaining votes. The merits of the multi-representative electoral system in a highly centralized governrnent could not be denied, but the system also kept politicians from bringing up policies that were of interest to the nation as a whole.a The impact of introducing a new electoral system-single-seat constituencies cornbined with proportional representation-is not yet fully understood. Elections have become a cornpetition between party policies rather than struggles between candidates offering narrow, local benefits. Candidates must now addressall kinds of issues, including foreign and security policy. Campaign prornises also must now include rnore national than local issues. Furthermore, electoral reforrn reduced the over-representation of rural districts. This led candidates and parties, especially the LDP, to appeal to independent voters in urban areasrather than those with narrow, local interests. Also, decentralization and deregulation are changing candidates' concerns. These reforms, coupled with the end of the Cold War, make it more likely that the present coalition government will see eye-to-eye with the opposition on foreign policy alternatives.

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Electoral reform has led to a small revolution in politics. The goal of political reform is to encourage political initiative in the policy-making process. To put it another way, it is to weaken the power of bureaucrats and strengthen the involvernent of politicians, especially the prime minister and the ministers, in the policymaking process. Thus, electoral, parliamentary, and adrninistrative reforrns were all necessary for the larger goal of political reform. In addition to the monurnental electoral reforms, the Diet passed a law to promote vigorous debate in arnong politicians parliament. Bureaucrats are not allowed to answer questions at the Diet any rnore. Mirroring the British parliament, "question time" was also introduced to clarifr each party's attitude toward policies. Earlier this year, several key adrninistrative reforrns came into effect under the title of "governmental reorganization." The consolidation of twenty-two ministries and agencies into twelve rninistries was a symbolic reforrn. At the sarne time. however. the Cabinet and the National Government Organization Laws underwent revision to rnake topdown rnanagernent by the prime minister and the rninisters easier.s The prime minister also becarne responsible for proposing policies directly to the Cabinet. Koizumi's strong leadership has roots in the recent structural changes in addition to his widespread popularity. Furthermore, he is now attempting to revise the constitution to introduce direct election of the prime minister. The rninistries have also been given broad new powers. Ministers must take on full responsibility for any major policy proposals emerging frorn their ministries. To support the minister, the new positions of senior vice rninister and par-

H o N D AP o l i t i c s & 0iplomacy liamentary secretary were created. Such political initiatives are strengthened by getting the right people into the right places and keeping thern there. Economic blunders, piecemeal policies, and numerous scandals inside bureaucracies have acceleratedthe power shift inside the government. While bureaucrats continue to play an important role, they are becoming increasingly subordinate to politicians. This has placed elected politicians at the helrn of the ship of state. Thus, the Gulf War, the end of 1955 system, and the recent poiitical reforms have combined to bringJapan into a new rnindset for creating foreign policy. These three steps have led to the end of the paralysis of the various parties that existed since the enactment of the Ig!$ system. Major parties becarne responsible for key national policies. Leaders

will the fault lines between parties appear? One thing is sure: Japan is seeking political rehabilitation and the restoration of full sovereignty for the first 'World tirne since the end of War II. A national consensus is forming in favor of a rrrore active role in issues of transnational security. When the anti-terrorism bill was first proposed, it garnered a majority approval rating from theJapanese public, although there is still strong resistance to actually sending troops to c o m b a t s i t u a t i o n sa b r o a d . 6F u r t h e r m o r e , partly to bolster Japanese nationalism, theJapanese flag and anthern were legally recognized as national syrnbols in tggg. That Koizumi's controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine this surnrner received little criticisrn inJapan owed as much to the sentiment behind this rnovement as it did to his popularity.

f oreign The demand for an active

policy, ^policy, -Washingto-n" not a reactive "look- to

is gaining stre.r$h. While parties search for new identicannot merely follow the Yoshida Doctrine anymore and hope to be reelected. I ties, generational change continues to Bureaucratscannot be the source ofnew affect Japanese politics and politicians. ideas. While the press and academia have Diet rnembers aged sixty and above tend tried to define a new axis that will polarto hold a negative view ofJapan's vigorize parties, none has been found yet. ous political and military activities. On Some say "reforrn-resistance" will be the the other hand, younger Diet members new axis, while others argue that policies are inclined to support a more active will tend to rnerge, and parties will role forJapan in world politics. In fact, become indistinguishable frorn each there is more ag'reement on this issue other under the current electoral sys- among young politicians of different tem. Indeed, at debatesbetween Koizuparties than there is between old and mi and Yukio Hatoyama, the leader of young mernbers of the sarne party. The new g'eneration, however, is not aiming the Democrats, it is easier to find similarities than differences. to revive pre-war nationalisrn and miliWhat will be the next point of contarism. Instead, it hopes to restore tention inJapan's foreign policy? Where Japan's full sovereignty, and remove the

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shackles that prevent it from contributoutcomes of this school of thought, coning fully to the efforts of the internatinued action along this line might lead tional community. Japan to put stronger pressure on the The recession of the last decade also Pentagon for greater engagernent in c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e n e w n a t i o n a l i s m Japan. The increasing threat by China movement. In the post-war period, eco- and North Korea rnight encourage more nomic growth was a source of Japanese genuine partnership between the United pride and identity. As long as its econoStatesandJapan. my expanded,Japan maintained a strong The other camp emphasizes multilats e n s e o f s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e a n d s e l f - eral cooperation. Though stopping short respect, and political nationalisrn was of contradicting the United States outnot an issue. Economic nationalism was right, Japan may place a higher priority equated with nationalisrn itself. The colon its relations with other Asian counlapse of the bubble econorny, however, tries and choose to take more initiative in c a u s e d w i d e s p r e a d u n e a s e a n d p e s - international action through economic sirnisrn. The decline of economic aid and peacekeeping forces under the nationalisrn paved the way for the rise of control of the United Nations. The political nationalism. United States-Japan Security teaty will

FOf Japan, self-deterrnination will not corne quickly or easily. In the new political clirnate, a new axis dividing political camps is emerging based on the debate over how independent Japanese foreign policy is to be from that of the United States. The demand for an active foreign policy, not a reactive "look-to-Washington" policy, is gaining strength. Japan is enhancing its political independence, and it is not unusual for Tokyo to say "no" these days 'Washington. to various requests frorn The new dichotomy can be described as a struggle between the bilateral and multilateral schools. The bilateral school basically advocatesa continuation of post-war United States-Japan relations by reinforcing the SDF. The Igg/ review of the principles of United States-Japandefense cooperation was based upon this view. Although it is too early to predict the long-term

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rernain intact, but the reduction of U.S. bases and forces might becorne a condition for future negotiations that would affect its status.Japan rnight stresscollective security involvement under the lead of the United Nations rather than collective self-defense with the United States, and burden sharing will be sought not with the United States but with international society at large. Finally, this alternative might encourageJapan to seek the renewed trust of its Asian neighbors. These changes are not without their critics. There are sorne Diet members and citizens, especiallyin the older generation, who insist on the continuance of the post-war formula of minimum military commitment. They emphasize that the twenty-first century should be the era to finally bring to fruition their vision of the constitution-strict paci-

HoNDAPolitics&Diplomacy fism accompanied by disarmament. Even in the LDP, a conservative party, there are Diet members who were prudent in legislating counter-terrorism laws in order to limit the direct involvement ofJapanese troops. This is one of the reasons why Japan did not dispatch Aegis destroyers for anti-terrorism action. For them, the Yoshida Doctrine is still a fundarnental principle. For Japan, self-determination will not come quickly or easily. The progress of the past decade has been remarkable, but the debate rernains strictly within the bounds of the present constitution, which prohibits Japan from playing a more active

role on the world stage. Reinterpretation of the constitution is reaching a saturation point thatwill be difficult, if not impossible, to push past without invalidating the document itself. Nonetheless, in FYZoo5 the ResearchCommission on the Constitution, established in each house of the Diet, will draft a report for the first time. The outcome is unpredictable. Japan might choose to keep the status quo. The new axis may not divide into political camps so long as the LDP is in power. But if current trends continue, we may see a major change in the shape ofJapan's foreign policy and its irnpact on the world at large in the near future.

NOTES t See, for example, Kenneth B. Pyle, TheJapon(Washington, Edition DC, The

ese Qtestion, Second AEI

Press, r996),

especially

chapter

eight

and

nine. z Edwin O. Reischauer, TheJoponeseTodg (Vermont & Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle. 1988), 35I-69. 3 As a result, Japan has sent troops to Angola, Salvador and Golan Heights. To cancel the freezing and join the PKF has Cambodia,

Mozambique,

taken up for imperative ber II terrorists attack.

discussion after the Septem-

{. For electoral reform, see Gerald L. Curtis, The Ingic of JoponesePolitics(New YorL, Columbia University Press, rggg) : especially chapter four. Reforn of the 5 The Basic Law of Administrative was enacted in June 1998 and Central Government became effective January 2oor. As for former basic see Bradley Richardson, structure, lapanese Democrag (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1997)' chapter five. 6 According percent support

to ,4sohiShimbun 16 October 2ool, 5I the bill and 29 percent oppose it.

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RumsfeldAinrs for the_Stars An ArmsControlAlternatiue to thePentagon's Plonsin Space

Jeffrey Lewis In IggB, the United States Space Command (SPACECOM) releaseda long-range plan that outlined a new operational concept. "Global Engagernent (GE) is the cornbination of global suweillance of the Earth (see anything. anytime), worldwide missile defense, and the potential ability to apply force from space," the Spoce CommondLongRangePlan explained. "At present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with national policy. GE provides a plan that will provide alternatives to civilian leaders if a decision is made that this capability is in the national interest. "' That decision may be about to happen. Warning of a "Space Pearl Harbo r, " the Commission to /ssessUnitedStatesNational SecuriltSpoce Management and Orgont<ation, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld until his nomination as secretaryof defense, advocated the acquisition of capabilities for "power projection in, from, and through space." The norninal explanation for this sudden support for expanding the military's role in space is the United States's increasing dependence on satellites. "Space, you're well aware, is increasingly at the center of our national and economic security," argued current chairrnan of theJoint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers in t999. "We have a deliberate, balanced, measured approach in mind to deal with these issues. You'll ftnd it all outlined in ISPACECOM's] long range plan... ""

Jeffrey Lewis is Graduate

Research

Fellow at the Center for Jnternational

and

Securit)'

Uni-

Srudies,

versity of Maryland College

Park.

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The SPACEC0Mapproachrests onthe questiotgb^l. prernise that space dominance can p^rotectU. S. iatellites. The SPACECOM approach rests on the questionable premise that space dominance can protect U.S. satellites. Although the United States may be able to deny other countries accessto space, defending its own satellites against the unrestrained development of anti-satellite weapons is impossible. Arms control, however, could constrain offensive capabilities, giving satellites a sporting chance. Although the Pentagon believes that anti-satellite prograrns arnong potential adversariesare inevitable, China-the Pentagon's usual suspect for a linked its antipeer cornpetitor-has satellite efforts to U.S. plans to deploy rnissile defenses. Policymakers now have to decide whether satellites are best protected by technology or arrns control.

Department of Defense communications are carried on commercial satellites. During Operation Allied Force, nearly {o percent of U.S. rnunitions relied on satellite guidance. In addition to supporting critical rnilitary operations, satellites perform strategic missions such as verifring arms control ag:reernents, monitoring troop build-ups, and detecting missile launches. These functions stabilize international crisesby providing assurancesthat neither side is about to launch a surprise attack. Soviet intelligence gaps during the rgSJ "war scare" contributed to planning for worst case scenarios in the Kremlin that brought the superpowers much closer to nuclear war than Washington realized for many months.3 Since each side tends to assurne the worst about the other in the absence of About 6o0 operational satellites curcontrary inforrnation, the data provided rently orbit the earth, representing an by satellites usually reassures antagonists investment of several hundred billion and reduces pressures to escalate a condollars. The plurality these of satellites flict. The United States shared satellite belongs to either the U.S. government or data with India and Pakistan during a IJ.S. cornmercial interests. Overall, the IggI crisis over Kashmir to demonstrate Federal Aviation Administration estithat neither side was rnobilizing for war. rnates that the commercial space industry Former CIA director Robert Gates later more noted contributes than $6r billion to the that the revelation eased tensions, U.S. economy each year. containing a crisis that otherwise might The U.S. military relies heavily on have spun out of control. Although satellites provide substantial satellites to perform many missions, including communications, navigation, support to military operations, it is worth w e a t h e r m o n i t o r i n g , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , noting what activities are not conducted and missile guidance. Vice Admiral in space.Satellites are not currently capaHerbert Browne, deputy commander in ble of attacking targets on the ground or c h i e f o f U . S . S p a c e C o m m a n d , e s t i - other satellites in space, beyond the sort mates that 6o percent of routine of traffic accident that could occur in the

U.S. Reliance on Satellites.

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RUMSFELD A I M S F O RT H E S T A R S

United StatesNational Secun! SpaceManagement and Organi<ation.After concluding that space was "a top national security priority," the Rumsfeld Cornmission recommended organizational changes in the administration of U.S. national security spacepolicy. Upon his confirmation as secretary of defense, Rumsfeld rnoved to irnplement many of these changes, including designating the Air Force as "executive agent" for national security spacepolicy. In addition to seemingly benign organizational changes, the Rumsfeld Commission recommended that the United States develop the technical capabilities to ensure (J.S. accessto spacewhile denying that accessto U.S. opponents in the event of conflict. "In order to extend its detenence conceptsand defensecapabilities to space," the Commission wrote, "the U.S. will require development of new military capabilities for operations to, from, in and through space."a Although the Rumsfeld Cornmission stopped short of advocating the pursuit of specific weapons systems, several Cornrnission members testified before the Senate Armed Services Cornrnittee that they believed the logic of the report dictated the presenceof some weapons in orbit. ASAG, for example, would be the principal means to deter attackson U.S. satellites and, if necessary, destroy an opponent's space capabilities. The Rumsfeld Cornrnission rejected suggestions that these "space dorninance" missions would spur potential adversaries to acquire ASAIs of their own, asserting that potential adversaries would develop anti-satellite weapons in any case. The Commission did not consider arms control options that might also mitigate that threat, except to warn against "agreements intended for one

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purpose that, when added to a larger web of treaties or regulations, may have the unintended consequences of restricting future activities in space." During his testimony, retired U.S. Air Force general Ronald Fogelman drew a sharp distinction between arrns control and the solutions supported by the Commission. "We, as a comrnission, believe very strongly that one of the biggest threats to future space capability may be the unintended consequences of well-intentioned people signing up to certain treaties and restrictions today that in and of themselves seem to be very innocent, " Fogelrnan noted. "And as you go down the road, they could end up tying our hands in ways that would very much limit our ability to continue to be dorninant."5

Technological Solutions. Executing the vision outlined in the Rurnsfeld Cornrnission recornrnendations requires a range of new capabilities to defend and deter attacls against U.S. satellites. The reality, however, may be less encouraging, for there are good reasons to believe that it will usually be easier to attack satellites than it will be to defend thern. Leaving deterrence aside for the moment, defending satellites against unrestrained developrnent of anti-satellite weapons rnay be an impossible task. Although an anay of passivedefenses can be constructed, such as rnaking satellites more robust and rnaneuverable, the economics and engineering challenges of satellite design and launch, as well as the principles of orbital dynamics, favor the offense in space. As already noted, satellites begin at a considerable disadvantagebecause of the properties of their orbits. The predictability enables opponents to perforrn what the Department of Defense calls

LEWrsScience&Technology "scheduling"-intercepting

a satellite at a predetermined time and place. ASATs enjoy the advantage of specialization. Although satellites designers must balance trade-offs between defenses and the primary mission of the spacecraft, ASAI designers build satellite killers for a single mission. For example, maneuverability of a satellite is dependent merely on the ratio of its engine and fuel to its payload-a ratio that will always favor anti-satellite interceptors that rely

acquisition of many spare satellitesand a significant enhancement of U.S. space launch capabilities. Even if the United States could reconstitute downed satellite constellations with little delay, the economics of exchanging satellites for a salvo of anti-satellite interceptors does not seern promising. Faced with the daunting challenge of employing passive defenses, space weapons proponents argrre for active defenses-"anti-anti-satellite" weapons,

Technology alonecann0tprotect our assetsin space. on just a few pounds of explosive or for those keeping score at home. Techbuclshot to be effective. Making satellites nological innovations of this sort, withmore rnaneuverable or robust rneans out accompanying organizational and adding weight-an expensive proposition doctrinal changes, are rarely decisive.6 at $2o,ooo per kilograrn placed in orbit Instead, the types of functions installed on an expendable launch vehicle. in "space grrards" are likely to lead to the The lopsided exchange ratios are magdeployment of large nurnbers of counnified by another disadvantage to termeasuresand increased lethality. defense. Since the attacker selects the The prospects for successfullyextendmode of attack, satellitesrnust be defending U.S. deterrence into space are ed against all choices available to the equally discouraging. The unprecedentattacker. Many satellite defenses, howev- ed dependence on satellitesby the U.S. er, compete with one another. For exarn- Armed Forces leaves the United States ple, defeating a co-orbital interceptor with more to lose frorn the loss of space requires hardening a satellite and adding assetsthan its opponents. Moreover, the fuel. This will add size, rnaking the satel- military satellitesorbited by other counlite a larger target for direct ascent tries tend to have shorter-life spans, weapons that are too fast and destructive r e p r e s e n t i n g a l e s s s e r i o u s i n v e s t m e n t . to be defeated by hardening or rnaneuNot only would the Chinese military be verability. Miniaturizing satellites and willing to trade meager Chinese space distributing functions across a network assetsfor U.S. ones, it seemsreasonable requires that the constellation fly in forthat they would prefer a situation where mation, compromising maneuverability. neither side had space assets to one The Pentagon could also enhance where both did. This preference would national satellite production and launch be more pronounced for countries like capabilities to quickly "re-constitute" Iran-countries with no satellites but lost satellites.This would require prior plenty of ballistic missiles.

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This is not to say that we should forgo defensive measures, but rather that tech nology alone cannot protect our assets in space. Defensive deployments will need help. As one participant in a conference sponsored by the now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment noted, "If the United States is truly and genuinely that dependent on a few satellites, 1'd just like to know what the hell DOD [Department of Defense] plans on doing about it, because in the absence of any ASAT arms control, the problems are only worse."7

Arms Control Solutions. If defen sive deployments in space cannot keep pace with offensive developments on the ground, then some measure of restrain ing offensive capabilities needs to be found to even the playing field. The most obvious mechanism for restraint is a ban on the destruction of satellites, support ed by bans on the testing and the deploy ment of space-based weapons and ground-based ASATs. Such an agree ment might also include separation requirements or "keep-out zones" to prevent the deployment of space mines, as well as protocols for on-orbit inspec tions and confidence-building measures. During the 1980s, several groups, including the Union of Concerned Sci entists, prepared similar draft treaties that outlined these basic principles. Currently, the government of the Peo ple's Republic of China is circulating a working paper outlining elements of an agreement concerning the "prevention of an arms race in outer space" (PAROS) at the Conference on Disar mament (CD) in Geneva. 8 Opponents of arms control argue that these treaties cannot be verified because surface-to-air missiles, manned cap sules, and even the space shuttle all have [116 1 GeorgelownJournal of International Affairs

some residual anti-satellite capability. Although true in a strict sense, oppo nents of such a ban seldom differentiate the threat posed by the residual capabil ity of these systems and past ASAT tests from the threat posed by unrestricted development of anti-satellite weapons. The residual threat posed by existing systems is quite limited. First, the existing ASATs were designed and tested only in low earth orbit. Although many impor tant satellites are located in low earth orbit, many other important systems are safely out of range in medium earth orbit and geo-synchronous orbit. Some sys tems in low earth orbit might be moved to slightly higher orbits as imaging and electronic intelligence capabilities improve. The need to clandestinely conduct illicit anti-satellite programs would impose substantial constraints on the functionality of the systems. Adversaries would have little confidence in ASATs that have not been tested, given the abysmal record of Soviet and U.S. ASAT tests. The most basic ASAT systems need to be distributed in multiple locations to attack satellites in different orbital planes-but too many interceptor sites would increase the risk of detection. The ASATs easiest to develop in secret would also be the most easily defeated by simple defensive measures. For example, if China were to attempt to use its Shen zhou space capsule to ram aU. S. satellite, the attack would be constrained by the limited window for launch of a co-orbital intercept and the slow ascent of the cap sule. These constraints would give a tar get ample time to take evasive action. Although defensive deployments will have difficulty keeping up with unre strained offensive developments, under the constraints imposed by arms control

measures, the deploy sufficien sorts of "cheap an agreement deterrence in s States would r break-out capal

Ballistic Mi Space Wea

catch? In this ca nese PAROS pn The Chinese d~ [are] directly an in accomplishi veiled reference plans. Any arm: weapons in spac resolution of tr missile defense ( Beijing fears could enable th< duct a disarmir Washington subs sis over Taiwan. ' of pre-emptive n nese govern me "Since [China's] bility is based on are not any nati systems among United States de] limited or full-sc render China [sic ity impotent."9 China's strate! nuclear deterren a few missiles attack-is particu sile defenses. "VI NMD, the Amer ry about the Cr few Chinese n u missed out in th( against China,"

LEWrsScience &Technology measures, the United States could deploy sufficient defensesto defeat these sorts of "cheap shots." Moreover, such an agreement would enhance U.S. deterrence in space because the United States would retain the most capable break-out capability of any country.

Ballistic MissileDefenses and Space Weapons. so what's the

tor of the Beijing-based Institute of Science and Public Affairs. "The deployment of a [stc] NMD system would provide the American public with an illusion that the several surviving retaliatory Chinese ICBMs would be intercepted by the NMD system [as declared and designedl. If the Americans tended to believe that a first nuclear strike plus a [ri.J NMD ry.tem would be able to disarm the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability, the U.S. could become incautious in risking nuclear exchanges with China in a crisis."'o lJ.S. negotiators in Geneva have dismissed Chinese attempts to raise negotiations on the "prevention of an arms race in outer space" in the CD as cynical and obstructionist. Although U.S. negotiators are particularly unreceptive to Chinese efforts to link NMD and PAROS, the two issuesare inherently connected. First, statesthat are threatened by U.S. missile defensesviewASAIs as a principle rneans to defeat the system. The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is essential to provide global coverage for NMD, as well as high-resolution discrirnination to distinguish decoys. Consequently, "ASAT approaches might also be tempting" to defeat NMD, as one prominent Chinese acadernic adrnitted. " Second, other countries expect the United States to eventually expand missile defense deployments into space. The U.S. administration clearly statesthat the current deployment architecture is only prelirninary. Although "ground-based

catch? In this case, the catch in the Chinese PAROS proposal is rnissile defense. The Chinese draft bans "subsystemsthat larei directly and indispensably involved in accomplishing battle missions"-a veiled reference to U.S. missile defense plans. Any arms control agreernent on weapons in space will also require some resolution of the question of national m i s s i l ed e f e n s e( N M D ) . Beijing fears that rnissile defenses could enable the United States to conduct a disarming first strike-offering Washington substantial leverage in a crisis over Taiwan. "China is facing the risk of pre-emptive nuclear attack," one Chinese government official observed. "Since [China's] nuclear revenge capability is based on the scenario that there are not any nationwide missile defense systems among nuclear states, if the United Statesdeploys NMD, no matter a limited or full-scale one, itwill, in effect, render China [sic] second-strike capability impotent."s China's strategic posture-a minimum nuclear deterrent designed to sneakjust a few missiles through any nuclear attack-is particularly vulnerable to rnisNMD is the appropriate way to start," sile defenses. "Without the backdrop of explains Gregory Canavan, a scientist at NMD, the Americans would alwaysworLos Alarnos National Laboratory, "its about the Chinese retaliation with a intrinsic weakness to decoys, nuclear ry few Chinese nuclear weapons that are effects, and submunitions could be rnissed out in the first U.S. nuclear strike exploited by sophisticated threats, even in against China," contends Li Bin, directhe hands of unsophisticated rogues.""

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RUMSFElD AIMS FOR THE STARS

From a technical perspective, Canavan concludes, a successful boost-phase mis sile defense system "implies a mix of bas ing modes with ground-based intercep tors stationed near the known threats and a thin space-based layer." Space-based ballistic missile interceptors would be excellent anti-satellite weapons, as well as obvious targets for potential adversaries. Finally, the NMD ground-based interceptor will provide the V.S. Army with an effective anti -satellite weapon against adversary space assets in LEO. The NMD exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and the army's kinetic energy anti -satel lite weapon are so similar that Boeing's program manager for national missile defense told the Senate Armed Services Committee that ASAT and NMD tests ought to be counted together because "that's the same type of vehicle, same type of intercept velocities. "13 The current missile defense architecture would enable intercepts at altitudes between 200 Ian and at least 1,100 Ian-high enough to reach most satellites in low earth orbit. The inextricable link between NMD and ASATs will force the V nited States to consider constraints on the deployment of missile defenses if it desires meaning ful restrictions on the deployment of weapons in space. An assessment of the advantages and dangers posed by deploy ing progressively more capable missile defense systems exceeds the scope of this essay. But one may notice that the themes dominating this discussion of the weaponization of space-the choice between relying on technology or treaties, the balance of offense and defense, and so on-also dominate the missile defense debate. In missile defense, as well as space policy, decision makers have a choice to make between technology and arms control.

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Conclusion.

The Rumsfeld Commis sion and SPACECOM represent a dis tinct approach to defending assets in space with U.S. military might. Never theless, given the advantage accorded to the attacker in space, this approach is shortsighted. Arms control can play a critical role in ameliorating the disad vantages suffered by the defense. The Chinese PAROS proposal in Geneva is a good place to start negotia tions. Skeptics will suggest that the Chi nese proposal on PAROS is insincere. The possibility exists that the Chinese gov ernment is merely seeking to undermine V.S. deterrence in space, obstruct negoti ations in Geneva, or indefinitely delay the development of missile defenses. Opening PAROS negotiations in Geneva, however, will reveal these moti vations at little cost to the United States. The CD has been deadlocked for years, while the SBIRS program is behind schedule and plagued with technical problems. The United States has a surfeit of time to discuss "rules of the road" for the military use of space. The Bush administration has, at least publicly, expressed an interest in calming foreign fears about missile defense and gaining Chinese and Russian acquies cence to V.S. missile defense deploy ments. Support from Beijing and Moscow may prove vital to gaining the support of some of our allies, such as Denmark, who host early warning radars and ground-relay stations. The Danish foreign minister has already conditioned Danish support for NMD on approval by Russia and China. The Bush administration will have to discuss PAROS with China to achieve these goals. Washington may be able to entice China to accept a limited NMD that employs space-based sensors in

exchange for ; deployments in defense techno warning inform" Of course, th, fail to forge a cc includes China. fails, it will be no succeeds in negol

USSPACECOIv

USSPACECOM Vision for <

2 Richard B. Myers Space Control." (Pn States Space Foundati April <httpJlwww.peterson., 3 For a review of I contributed to the 198: Fischer. A Cold IMlr Con" I ntelligence Central In 4- "Report of the I States National Secut Organization",( 2001) 5 "U.S. Senator 1 Hearing On National And Organization." F. March 2001), np. 6 Andrew F. Krepil The Pattern of Military ] (AutumnlWinter 1993 "Innovation, Past and F (Summer (996), 51-60 7 Arms Control in ~ (Washington, DC, U.S. ogy Assessment, OTA-l

LEWrsScience &Technology exchange for restrictions on future verifiable agreement, the United States deployments in space, accessto missile will enjoy a political solution to the vuldefense technology, or shared early- nerability of U.S. space assetsthat is far more secure than the technological soluwarning information. Of course, the United States may also tions advancedby SPACECOM. In a final fail to forge a consensus in the CD that irony, such an agreement, by enhancing includes China. But if the United States protection of U.S. satellites,would greatfails, it will be no worse for the effort. If it Iy benefit any future missile defense syssucceedsin negotiating an acceptableand tem that relies on space-basedsensors. NOTES r USSPACECOM, Long RongePlan' Implementing Vision USSPACECOM for 2o2o, 5c. 2 Richard B. Myers, "Implementing ourMsion for Space Control," (Presentation before the United States Space Foundation Colorado Springs, CO, J April 1999),

sible Elements of the Future lntemotionol lcgol Instrument on the (6 Prerention of the Waponiaotion of Outer Spcce, CD/r645 un. org/Depts/dda/Adviso June 2 oor) : <http'//w. ryBoard/pdf/cdr645.pdf>. g Fu Zhigang "Concerns and Responses, A Chi-

<http, //w.peterson.af.miVusspace,/speecht!.

nese Perspective on NMD/TMD,"

htm>.

faiiures 3 For a review of how Soviet intelligence contributed to the 1983 "war scare", see, Benjamin B. Fischer. AColdWor Conundrum(Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency, I997). to Assess United { "Report of the Commission States National

Security,

Space Managenent

Organization",( 2oor) | 17. 5 "U.S. Senator Wayne Allard Hearing And

National

Organization,"

(R-CO)

and Holds

Space Management (28 FDCH Political Transcripts Security

March 2oor), np. 6 Andrew F. Krepinevich,

"Caralry

to Computer,

The Pattern of Military Revolutio ns," The Notionol Interest, (Autumn/Winter rgg3/rgg4); Williamson Murray, "Innovation, Past and Future,"/oint.Force Qyorter! no- tZ (Summer 1996), 5I-60. / Arms Control in Space, Workshop Proceedings, (Washington, DC, U.S. Congress, Office of Technolo g y A s s e s s m e n t .O T A - B P - l S C - 2 8 .

May Ig84), 4r.

8 People's Republic

of China Working

Paper, Pos-

ConsultationonNATO

Nuclear Polig, .lfationol Missile Defence & Alternote Securij Arrongements, (Ottawa, Canada, September 28-3o 2ooo) ro

np. Li

Bin, The Impact of the US NMD on the Chinese NucleorModernkaf ion, (April 2 oo r) : <http : //w. pughtm> . wash. org/reports/rc,/rc8e. rr Shen Dingli "A Chinese Perspective on National Missile

Defense," Institute for Energy and EnyiResearch (2o February zoor) . "Space-Brcd 12 Gregory H. Cmw, Misile Defere md Stability, " (paper prernted at the Amual Genenl Meetronment

ing of the Amerim <http,//w.aps-pub.

Philomphical

Society, April

2ooo),

com/sta-mrs/m.pdf>.

r! Dr. John B. Peller, Mce President and NationDefense Program Manager at Boeing, "Senbefore the Senate Armed Services Committee. al

Missile

ate Armed Missile

Services Committee

Defense,"

February rggg)

FDCH

Holds

Hearing

Political Transcripts

On (24

W i n t e r / S p r i n g2 o o z I r r g ]

&Technology Science

Where

Meets

CIENCE

HECRAFT Norman

P. Neureiter,

interviewed by Charles Weiss

In the past fewdecades, advancesin scienceand technologyhave revolutionized the waysin which statesdefine and pursue their goals. International relations is no exception. Frorn controlling the spread of diseaseto encouraging the spread of information, foreign-poliry makers rnust continually contend with issuesthat require a firm grasp of this rapidly changing field. Government often lags behind the rest of society when it comes to understanding the impact of scientific trends, however, and the foreign policy community in particular has tended to see such things as being outside of its realrn of responsibility. In order to close this gap, the State Department acquired its first full time scienceadviser in September 2ooo. Over the past year, Dr. Norman Neureiter has built relationships with the private sector, created ties to the scientific communities in Russia and India, and looked at ways to keep Foreign Service officers on top of important scientific developments, among other things. He has worked on getting better information technology to embassiesaround the world-and making sure that the information stayswhere it belongs. In short, his work has been

Norman P. Neureiter isthe first Science nology

and Techto the

Adviser

Secretary

of State, a

post that he has held since September 2ooo.

Prior

to his

at the State

position

Department, Neureiter

Dr.

was Vice

President

of Texas

Instruments

Asia.

Charles Weiss is Distinguished

Pro-

fessor and Director the Science,

Technolo-

gy, and International Affairs

Program

Georgetown

Universi-

ty. Prior

to that, he was

the first

Science and

Technology the World

Adviser

Bank.

Editot's Note: Dr. Neureiter is the hewy Memorial Lecturer for 2oor of the Ednund A. Walsh School of Foreisn Service Program in Science, Technology, and International Affairs.

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At thg hgart of the departrnent, at the regional desksand the rei'ional bureaus, there is

,r.ry httle scientifice{perIise. sure proof that science now lies at the core of U.S. foreign policy interests. This fall, Dr. Neureiter sat down with Affiirs to the Ceorgetown Journalof International reflect on his experiences after his first year in the post, the current state of the sciencesat the State Department, and his plans for the challenges ahead. cJrA: Why does the State Departrnent need a science adviser?

department in order to deal with the issues of the twenty-first century. GJIA: How do you intend to make these changes? NE UR E I T E RA, k e y p a r t i s b u i l d i n g a n o u t reach network to the scientific community so that we can draw some of them into the picture, ask them for advice, and hold roundtables. But our most irnportant job is simply bringing more people with science backgrounds into the department. Last year, the department had scientific interns for the first time. We also had more AAAS (Arneri-

NEu REr rE R, That wasbrilliantly laid out in a study done by t}re National Acaderny of Sciences(NAS).' In it, they examined the sideen statedgoals of U.S. foreign policy, and found that thirteen of the sixteen goals can Association for the Advancernent of involve science,technology, or health. But Science) fellows in the departrnent, and looked when you around at the depart- we have our first fellow from a profesment and what had happened to science sional society. Furtherrnore, we are dishere in recent years, it becarne obvious that cussing a prograrn proposal whereby we really did not have adequate numbers professional scientists frorn universities of people equipped with relevant back- could come to work for a year or two in grounds to effectively address these issues. various capacities. Of course, there are There are some real pockets of strength in money issues, there are organizational issues, but we are working on all of that. science within the departrnent, particularly in environmental issues, arms control, I think that by having people in the sysand our geographic unit. Nonetheless, at tem, we will be able to gradually change the heart of the department, at the regionthe culture of the department, and recal desls and the regional bureaus, there is ognize that science and technology are very little scientific expertise. The State very irnportant and relevant. FurtherDepartrnent has a culture of history and more, it \^rill help put scientific facts international relations, and as one former behind some of these broad political and science adviser to the president said, it is foreign policy issues. one of the most "technophobic" cultures around. On that basis, there was a feeling c J I A: How do you pick your issues? that we did need to strengthen our capaNE UR E r r E RM , y b a s i cm e t h o d i s t o l o o k a t bility, so one of rny key roles is to upgrade the scientific and technical literacy of the the issueson hand and then select two or

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tNTERVtEW science &Technology three that seem to be inadequately addressed. For instance, I took on the United States-India Forurn, a proposal that had been around for the past three years to create a science and technology forum for improved and intensified relations between the United States and India. Also, we are trying to deal with the death of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Structure (created by the joint U.S.Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation), in the hopes of getting something started again, because I think that our present bilateral cooperative relationship with Russia is very important for our longterm future relations.

GJ I A: Are you in the position to make scientific recommendations to the secretary of state on specific issues?

N E U R E T T EYno' u d o n ' t m a k e p o l i c y i n a n institution like this by whispering in the secretary's ear. There are twenty-two bureaus in the department, and for specific issues, we often set up a special council to address matters. For instance, we set up a space policy council to deal with all of the relevant issues relating to space policy. I was actually picked by the eleven bureaus that are involved to be the chairrnan of this council, because I was a neutral party among all their interests. But this council must also interface with the National Security Council on the cJIA: What are some of the curent issues whole complex of issues around space with which you are dealing? and spacepolicy. Again, things do not get resolved by whispering in the secretary's NEUREITER W: e g e t i n q u i r i e s o n a ear. They get resolved by working the systremendous range of issues. One that tem, by looking at the papers, by having we are getting very involved in now is rneetings, by trying to reach consensus, cyber security. The adrninistrative and and then, if you cannot reach consensus bureaucratic challenge is the fact that at the various bureau levels, you have to the State Department is not driving the escalateit. If you cannot reach consensus cyber-security process for the U.S. govamong agencies, then it eventually goes to ernment. On the other hand, there is a the deputy secretaries' level for discusmajor international dimension to it. sion and resolution, and if that fails, it Now, with these latest terrorist attacks, goes to the president as a split decision. we have discovered that the departrnent chairs the Intergovernmental Working cJIA; How does the role of the science Group on Counter-Terrorism. There and technology (S&T) adviser to the State are co-chairs from the Department of Departrnent compare to that of other Defense, Department of Energy, and countries' S&T advisers? the FBI, but the State Department really set up this committee and chairs it. N E U R E I T E RI n: g e n e r a l , w h a t h a s h a p So we are making links through that pened in the world, especially since the group to the outside, particularly end of World War II, is that the U.S. through the NAS, which we have not investment in S&T across the board has done before. This also responds to the made it pretty much the leader, so we NAS's desire to help the government tend to be the rnodel for others. Grantwith what has becorne the frightening ed, the research committees are highly issue of terrorism. developed in both Europe andJapan, but

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the Japanese structure is somewhat different than our own, and only recently did they create an office that is something like our own Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). At least in this area of scientific advice, I think Arnericans have generally tended to lead and the others have tended to follow. cJIA: How does your experience in the private sector help you in this job? N E U R E I T E nW: h a t p r i v a t e s e c t o r e x p e r i ence does is give you an additional mer-

YOU dOn

GJIA: How do you deal with the mix of government and business aspects in the scientific issuesthat face the department? N E U R E I T E RI n : this administration, "public-private partnership" sure is a winning phrase. The more an idea is framed within the public-private partnership context, the greater its chance for success. It's really not a problem, but you do have to be careful of conflicts of interest, so there are lots of rules. You shouldn't be rneeting with just one person from industry, you should rneet

mal(e policy in an institution like

this by whispering in the decretary'r ear. it badge on your resume. In other words, it's another kind of experience that you had and from which you benefited. I think that rnany governrnent people are a little in awe of the private sector, which they shouldn't be. But they are somewhat afraid at tirnes because they don't know as many people, and they don't know how to approach thern. So I think I bring the ability to recognize the strengths and the weaknesses,the power, but also sometimes the narrow-rnindedness, of the private sector. I know where to go to find people that can help us, and when we need to draw on these people for advice, I feel cornfortable doing so. The second part is that there is an efficiency and a need for efficiency in the private sector-the administrative support, the functionality of computers, and so on-that puts government to shame. So having had that experience in the private sector, one can at least be a voice, if not a force, for improvement in those inefficient areas of government.

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with several, and there are rules on how much a meal can cost if someone else pays for it. All of these restrictions are there to avoid undue influence and conflicts of interest. But the industry side of so rnany of these areas is very irnportant, and if you're not interacting with that segrnent of the population, then you're just rnissing something. GJIA: Is the State Department irnproving its use of inforrnation technology? N E U R E I T E RI t, w a s r e m a r k a b l y b a d f o r a Iong time, but we are trying to irnprove things. Secretary of State Colin Powell has managed to reverse the past trend of a shrinking budget for the department this year, so he did get a couple hundred rnillion dollars to start the process of upgrading the computer systems across the board. All of that is underway, not just here inside the department, but also around the world, which is very costly. There are countries where even if you

tNTERVtEW science &Technology upgrade internally, unless you build a dish on top of the embassy,you will not have a link to the outside world. The secretary is determined that we will have, within a reasonablelength of time, Internet capability on every desk in the department and around the world. Early on, he gavea speechto the entire department and said that he lived on the Internet. So now that we have a secretary who really uses a laptop daily, the most important step needed for the cultural change has already been taken. cJrl: Do you think our science attache prograrn should be revised? N E U R E I T EY n 'e s , a n d I h a v e a l o n g - t e r r n plan for that. The major question at hand is whether the old rnodel, where we put people from universities in as science counselors at our embassies, is the right rnethod, or whether the present model, where we have more senior Foreign Service officers with some science background assigned as attaches, is the right one. My model, I think, is a mixture of the two. What we need is a continuous infusion of people from outside for short-term assignments, between one to three years. We have our first S&T adviser now in Australia, a wornan from NASA, and so NASAhas contributed her and is paying the expenses. But we also need more people with scientific and technical backgrounds, who don'twant to be bench scientists, coming into the Foreign Service. Lastly, we need increased training for those who are already in the Foreign Service and don't have much of a science background. That is why we are doing more training at the Foreign Service Institute, with the help of AAAS. On most newspaper front pages, our work has been obscured by the war in

Afghanistan, but there was a period before September rr when you would literally pick up The New York Timesand every third article on the front page related to all of these technical issues, whether it was stern cells, cancer research, infectious disease, AIDS throughout the world, the energy problem, or the global warming problern. Every one of those issues regularly features in the daily news today, and unless people are somewhat comfortable with and have a little bit of background in those subjects, it becomes very difficult to be an effective diplornat, because those are the things that people are talking about globally. GJ I A: What future issuesdo you see coming down the pipe that aren't on the immediate agenda? N E U R E I T E RT: h e N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Council (NIC) released an unclassified report this year titled "Global Tiends 2OI5."'The report stated that the government does not have the ability to predict the future fifteen years frorn now. But the report did define seven drivers that the committee believes will shape the world by 2otg. One of them is science and technology, which has four subcategories that they consider critical' information technology, nanotechnology, material science, and biotechnology. These will irnpact trade, security, terrorist threats, and defense capabilities. And certainly, space is a big issue. You can begin to get an idea of future space policy implications frorn the report released by the committee formerly chaired by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 'Where GJrA: would you like the department to be in the next five years?

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N E U R E I T E nI ; w a n t a c o m b i n a t i o n - o f a more scientifically-literate Foreign Service and a continuous influx of shorterterm people from the professional scientific cornmunity-broadly arrayed throughout both the bureaus in the State Department and our embassiesabroad. I think it's important that we establish some momentum in that direction. There are people on Capitol Hill who will be very supportive of this rnove. There are also people in the department who I think would ag:ree.As you get to questions about careers, such as how narrow the top of the pyramid is and the "selection out" process if you are not

promoted within a certain time period, you get into complications about making careers for scientists in the system. So, when we are trying to recruit people with more scientific backgrounds into the Foreign Service, we ask ourselves, "Gee, will we be able to lay out a career path where these people can work as scientists?" Presently, we don't have a scientific track, but I think a scientist can build a very satisfactory career here, and at some point transfer and become a more senior econornic or political officer. With this background, there's no reason why he or she could not become a deputy chief of mission or an ambassador.

NO T E S r National

Research Council,

The PeruosireRole of Sci-

ence, Technolog, and Heolth in Foreign Polig' Imperatiuesfor the D eparlmentof State, (Washington, DC, National Academy Press, rggg).

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2 "Global Tren& With Nongovement

2or5' A Dialogue About the Futw Experts," National Intelligence

Full Council, text an be 2ooo. <http,//w.cia.gov/cia,/publiotions/globaltrendsZo15

found

at >.

aNew Facing

Along with so rnuch else, our understanding of what the world was and where it was going was shattered by the events of September rr. Now the international cornmunity must redefine threats and determine how to face them. To that end, the Georgetown Journalof IntemationalAffaIrshas assembled a set of authors who identiS alternative visions of the future and recommend new courses of action. Joseph Cirincione foresees a future that will bear little resernblance to the past. He saysthat the attacks are a warning to Arnerican foreign-poliry makers that the nature of threats to national security is changing, and that U.S. foreign policy must "redefine, reassess, reorient." Nancy Soderberg agrees that a reorientation is necessary, and emphasizes the need for the United Nations to take an active role in the battle against terrorism and its underlying causes. The current suPPort for rnultilateralism, she says, must be strengthened and sustained. In the final piece, Gareth Evans examines how such a multilateral effort can address the root causesof terrorist attacks and bring the perpetrators to justice. TheJourncl hopes that these articles will advance the debate over how to forge new policies to meet the great challenges that have risen as a result of the tragedy of September rt.

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A"laing International t D efenses againstTerrorism Strateg A Comprehensiue G A R E T HE V A N S

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nr\r"dingAmeica J O S E P HC I R I N C I O N E

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BuildingInternatlonal Terrorisnt Defenses against Strateg A Comprehensiue Gareth Evans It is not easyto grasp the appropriate responseto Septernber tr in rneasured, analytical terms. On a single day, the United States suffered more casualtiesto terrorism than Israel and Ireland have suffered in fifty years. It would hardly be surprising if this had induced, in public and official reactions, either total paralysis or a blind, uncontrollable rage. It is a measure of the maturity of the United Statesthat the reactions to date deterhave overwhelmingly been of a different kind-jritty, mined, but controlled and, reassuringly for the rest of the world, multilateral rather than unilateral. In both official and public responses,there has been a good grasp that terrorism involves an enemy harder to define than any previously fought, in a war unlike any other. Official and Public responses to the event have emphasized the need to engage in a war unlike any other in order to overcome an elusive and unconventional enemy. The computer-literate generations have understood quickly enough that what is involved here is not so much any clear-cut hierarchy, but multiple groups operating like the discrete but interconnected nodes of an electronic network. Those less computer literate have been able to grasp a more traditional rnetaphor, as enunciated by Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, among others. As

Gareth Evans i, President of the International

Crisis Group.

He seryed as Foreign Minister from

of Australia

1988 ro r996.

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Musharraf puts it, individual terrorists are like the leavesofa tree, andjust as easily replaced, while terrorist organizations are like its branches, separate but connected to the larger organism-able to be chopped off, but likely to grow back again so long as the tree has roots. The virtue of this metaphor is that it conveysa senseof the complexity of the task and the need for patience over the long haul. It is not so evident that a clear consensus exists on the question of just where.in respondingto terrorism, conflict prevention and resolution fit in. There is some acknowledgernent that terrorism has roots, and that at least one of them involves the conflicts and policy issuesthat generate grievance. But there is a considerable reluctance to follow the reasoning through, and squarely confront the implications of it for American foreign policy. Even to raise the issue of the relevance of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the lingering grievances left over from the Gulf War-to suggest that addressing conflict issues more constructively and successfully might be at least part of an appropriate response strategy-is to walk on eggshells. "ltou want to reward the terrorists, " you will be told; you are accePting that there was something defensible or legitimate about their actions. You are "blaming the victirn." The only way to move the debate forward in a rational fashion is to put the whole issue in its proper context, and to make crystal clear what is being argued or 'We suggestedand what is not. do have to address the conflicts and policy issues that generate grievance, but only as one of five linked but conceptually distinct kinds of objectives that must be pursued sirnultaneouslyif the response to terorism is to be effective.

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Some of the objectives are in real tension with each other, and it is not easyfor any government to get the balance rightsteering a tight course between overreacting, in a way that is counter-productive, and under-reacting, in a way that is unresponsive to the public mood. For the most part, the right balance is being struck at the moment, and if U.S. anger and shock can continue to be channeled as productively as they have been so far, the terrorists' triumph will be short-lived. A massive atternpt to expose Arnerica's r,rrlnerabilities will have served only to prove its extraordinary strengths.

Strengthening InternalSecurity. The first necessary element of any response is overwhelmingly internal in c h a r a c t e r .S o m e o f t h e i s s u e sa r e p r a c t i cal' how can we physically protect ours e l v e s ?A i r l i n e a n d a i r p o r t s e c u r i t y a r e obviously crucial, but the sound we are hearing all over the United States right now is not only of cockpit doors but stable doors being cornprehensivelybolted. What we all really need to be worrying about is the next generation of attacks' chernical, biological, or nuclear weapons deployed city-wide-threats that we have barely begun to fathorn. There are also obviously important issues of principle involved in whichever course of action the U.S. government takes. Congress has started to wrestle with the question, "how much liberty can the governrnent take away in the narne of security without sacrificing the very character ofthe nation that the attackers have set out to destroy?" Internal responses cannot be wholly insulated from external ones, sorne kinds ofinternal responseshave a capacity to resonate beyond the country in a way that can either help or hinder the

EVANSFacinga NewThreat publicly so far, it may not be enough to convict him in a'W'esternor international court, but it would certainly be enough to bring him before one. Although a considerably higher evidentiary hurdle has to be jumped before an all-out war is launched on a sovereigrr country, the case is also compelling for targeted action against those of Afghanistan's Thliban have clearly leadership who and unasharnedly continued to protect Osama JUStiCe. There canbe no doubt about bin I-aden and his followers. The second constraint is that the America's moral and legal right to take action rnust be proportionate. In particirnrnediate action-including robust military action-against the perpetrators of ular, killing and maiming the innocent the September rr crimes and those who has to be avoided at almost all costs. If it is not, not only will the present coalition aid, abet, or shelter them. In internaextremely fragile at its of the willing-still tional law, the self-defense provision in Islarnic edges-collapse, but the West will Article gr of the UN Charter is itself sufjust create a whole new generation of ficient justification. What is crucial, however, is that there people hating it. It is impossible to overstate the pointbe a continuing acknowledgement of the constraints that rnust apply in taking such which the Bush administration clearly action-not just as a rnatter of law and perceives-that, above all else, neither the short-term response against the Septemmorality but of hardheaded national selfber II perpetrators nor the long-term interest. There are two constraints in particular that United States' friends and war against terrorisrn generally can be allies, and a great rnany voices within the characterized as a crusade against any particular brand of religion. Similarly, it United States, have been properly emphasizing as necessary to ensure the is critical in the present context that any rnilitary action directed against the Thleffectiveness both of the short-terrn action against the perpetrators of the iban leadership be characterized as just that-and not as a war against Afghanistan September rr attacks and the long-term and its people. The unprecedented fight against further such acts. First, the targets of the action must be delivery of food aid and humanitarian credibly identified. The stronger the relief while the bombs are still dropping response, the stronger the evidentiary is a legitimate way of making that point. The further precautionary note is that, foundation has to be if the support of friends and allies is not to fall away, and with all the attention focused on destroyif a generally ing the Thliban, just as much should be even more importantly, devoted to how a new governrnent can be cooperative international enforcement constructed frorn the ground upfront against terrorism is to be maintainable in the future. The caseagainst Osama whether through the mechanism of a 19o bin Laden has been made strongly jirgo convened by the former king or othenough for these purposes: as presented erwise-that wiII be more credible and larger cause. It is crucial in this context that policymakers remember (which to their credit they have done so far) that this must be a war against deeds, not beliefs; and that there are huge downside risks, in terms of winning the sustained cooperation of other countries, in engaging in any form of negative religious or racial profiling.

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successfulin addressing the country's and region's problems than its predecessors. This point leads naturally to the third major objective, which addressesthe crucial role of the frontline states.

There is one important negative constraint here, which the International Crisis Group has been emphasizing in the context of the Central Asian republics, and in particular tJzbekistan' whatever the short-term benefits of active cooperation, it is not wise to uncritically The first line of international FUtUfe. embrace regimes whose principles and rnust in methods are alien to the valueswe are trybe the countries of oridefense ing to protect. There are plenty of govgin of the terrorists themselves. The CIA, FBI, and U.S. military can never be ernrnents and authorities only too happy as good as the Thliban (had it wanted to to crack down on dissent of any kind for regime surr.ival purposes, but it must be be), or Saudi Arabia or Sudan before it, in dealing with Osama bin Laden. The remembered that frustration with repressive local leaderships has fueled Mossad and the Israeli Defense Force-as much of the terrorist problern. Sorne of tough and competent as they rnay be-can never be as effective as the Palestinian the tough-minded leaders of the former Authority in cracking down on the fanatSoviet republics of Central Asia have ics of Harnas and other extremist groups. borne down heavily on moderate Islamic Neither the Indians nor anyone else can rnovernents and political opposition generally, and are only too keen to have the possibly be as good as the Pakistani governrnent and military in curbing, if they support of the West in continuing to do chose to, the terrorist fanaticism that so. But in the process they have produced a whole new movement that is becoming continues to tear apart Kashmir. rnore and more genuinely extremist, and To strengthen these international defenses, you have to build the capacity the danger is that the movement will and. above all, the will for these counbecome stronger still. It is in the context of building sustaintries and authorities to act. Intelligence has to be provided, financial supply lines able international defenses against terrorisrn that tackling the so-called root broken, logistic support offered, and cornrnon strategies systernatically purcauses of terrorism-including addressing unresolved conflicts and political sued. Building networls to combat terrorism-through building the necessary grievances-has its most immediate and obvious relevance. The point is simply capacity and will in all the relevant counthat if the United States wants strong tries concerned-is a huge policy challenge for the West to meet by whatever local action against terrorism, it has to go combination of carrots and sticks all-out to create environments in the required, taking into account the neces- countries in question that foster more sity for the responsewe are encouraging community support for cracking down on terrorisrn, and in which insecure govto be intelligent and measured, not counterproductive. An excellent start ernrnents like that of Pakistan, and many was made in this respect in the first weeks others in the region, will feel more conafter September rr, not least in Pakistan; fident in doing so. And that in turn means that the United States rnust adopt the challenge will be for the new international defenses to be sustainable. strategies designed to address the prob-

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evarusFacinga NewThreat lem at the source-the policy issuesthat it knows generate grievance, and the social and economic conditions that it knows generate despair.

Conflicts andPolicy Issues that GenerateGrievance.so farasthe motives for terrorist action are concerned, it is obvious that no simplistic connection can be drawn between redress of political grievance and terrorist threat reduction. Clearly not all terrorist violence is based on this kind of grievance, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular rnust not be seen as the root of all Islamist extremisrn: the World Tiade

do this is not to reward terrorist behavior; it is to answer it. My judgment is somewhat affected by my role as head of the International Crisis Group, an organization dedicated to preventing and containing deadly conflict. But our strong belief is that the task of fighting terrorism cannot be separated from the task of preventing, containing, and ending conflict. All too often the places that generate terrorism-along with drug trafficking, and health pandernics, and refugee outflows, and international environmental disasters-are shattered societies where grievance, greed, repression, poverty, and prejudice

Thg firSt line of internationald.efense must be in the countries of origin of the terrorists themselves. Center and Pentagon attackswere clearly have, in various combinations, fed violence, despair, and extremism. Think being planned at a tirne when optirnism a b o u t t h e I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n p e a c e not only of the Middle East and Central Asia, but also of Northern lreland, processwas at its height. But at the same tirne, there can be no Sudan, Colombia, and the Caucasus.In doubt that backward steps in this and none of these conflicts, nor a dozen others, has the conflict stayedlocal. other peace processesdo inflame sentiment in the streets, and rnake it that It will not be easy to win dornestic much harder for governments in these consensus on all of this. Many Ameriregions to crack down on dornestic tercans already say, "this is what we get for rorism and cooperate with the West. To sticking our noses into so many problems around the world that are not our begin to drain the swamp in which terrorism breeds, there has to be a major business." Another variation on this effort made to addresssome of the avoidtheme has been spelled out in crystal able sources ofgrievancer the unresolved clear-and, to rny ears at least, extremely conflicts and policy issuesthat help create disconcerting-terms by Robert Kaplan the environment in which terrorisrn can in a recent interview: flourish. There must be a renewed cornThese attacks mean the end of mitment to address the kind of condiWilsonian idealism. Bosnia, Kosotions that heip to create individuals able vo, Rwanda are all off the charts, to believe that killing thousands of civilis heroic. To ians not only acceptable, but assignedto the sepia-toned rggos.

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Lil<e it or not, what seem so often to be dirty little wars in faraway places are indeed America's business.

We can only afford to do good works abroad when security at home can be taken for granted. The answer that Kaplan and people reacting like him must hear from their leaders is that, like it or not, what seem so often to be dirty little wars in faraway places are indeed America's business and that of the whole international commu nity, because of their often global impact. To try and address these conflicts and crises is not a matter of Boy Scout good deeds, of doing good works abroad; it is a matter of hardheaded national and domestic security interest.

Social, Economic, and Cultural Issues that Generate Grievance. Any comprehensive response to terror ism has to address the reality that not all the festering grievances that breed ter rorism have a foundation in unresolved conflicts, or other policy issues of this kind. Clearly, a significant part of the story is a blind hatred of modernity; of the impact of globalization and the greater interaction and interdependence of countries; and of the new cultural cur rents associated with globalization, par ticularly those relating to greater freedom and opportunity for women-all of which are undermining old family, social, economic, and governmental val ues and institutions. The unhappy reality is that the United States is the natural international target of this kind of resentment. Like a mag net, it attracts the hatred of those who

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feel deprived. The U.S. role in the glob al economy, its perceived political influ ence, and above all its perceived cultural influence everywhere mean that trouble is bound to hound it. This is the hardest of all the underly ing causes to address, not least because the phenomenon of globalization and everything that goes with it is so obvious ly irreversible, and because the cultural dimensions of it are so obviously attrac tive to so many people. But even though there are no easy answers, part of the response must be to try to gradually diminish the envy and sense of both absolute and comparative economic disadvantage that are signifi cant parts of the problem. There must be a sustained effort to improve social con ditions, to reduce disparities of wealth, to create increasing economic opportunity, and above all to create more and more educational opportunity. The United States needs to respond to social and economic deprivation in oth er countries with thoughtful and gener ous development assistance proposals, and the it has an enormous capacity to do so, even in economically stressful times: foreign aid is now down to an interna tionally embarrassing all-time low of 0.1 percent of GNP. Again, this is not a mat ter of good works appropriate for the good times when there is less to worry about internally. It is a matter of the hardheaded pursuit of national interest. It is no coincidence that the countries from which most terror appears to have sprung have been those with collapsed or

faltering economi people have no w~ great disparities of lation at large feel! of being beneficia erating bonanza of no iron law that gl

EVANSFacinga NewThreat faltering economies, where either most people have no wealth at all or there are great disparities of wealth, and the population at large feels left out, with no sense of being beneficiaries of the wealth-generatingbonanza of globalization. There is no iron law that greater wealth or educa-

tion will diminish hatred of the WestOsama bin l-aden is himself living proof of that. But there is every reason to believe that, as one part of the kind of comprehensive response strategy sketched out here, they can only help create a safe and prosperous international community.

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I Joseph Cirincione September rr will forever change the way Arnericans assess national security threats. The two-front war waged in Central Asia and in airports and mailroorns across the United States will transform our defense and proliferation policies. How fast and how far the transforrnations will extend will depend a great deal on how honest we are about correcting the mistakes we all made before the attacks.

JosephCirincione is Director of the Non - Proliferation Project

at the Carnegie

Endowment national

for

Inter-

Peace in

Washington,

D.C.

RedefinitiOnS. The destruction of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon should force a redefinition of what we mean by weapons of mass destruction. For decades, proliferation experts have concentrated on preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. They focused on the weapons that nations had created during the Cold War, fearing that others might build them aswell. In addition to the technical and financial barriers to developing these horrific weapons, generations of leaders constructed legal, political, and diplomatic barriers through the treaties and agreements of the internatio nal non-proliferation regime. The bitter irony is that the regime worked. While there are still gaps in the treaty regime, on the whole, it made it very difficult for anyone to acquire one of these weapons. Four decades after President John F. Kennedy feared that fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five nations would soon have nuclear weapons, there are only eight nuclear-weapon states in the

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world. Decades after the United States and the Soviet Union perfected and proliferated enough chemical and biological weapons to wipe out all hurnan life on the planet, global treaties have banned both types of weapons and destroyed large parts of the Cold War arsenals. However, now the United States must also face threats of an entirely different nature. The September rr terrorists killed thousands, not with chernical, biological, or nuclear agents, but with aviation fuel. This terror carne low-tech. The terrorists studied flight manuals, not physics.

deaths have been few, but the fear and disruption have been significant. How, then, are we to define the new dangers faced by the United States? The war may get worse. Just as the global audience watched the horror of September II unfold, with one terrible event followed by an even worse catastrophe, the scattered anthrax rnailings rnay presage a more deterrnined assault. If, as some intelligence officials believe, the anthrax attacks are the work of dornestic extremists, not al Qaeda, then Osama bin l,aden's second act is still to corne.

The Septernberl1 t..rorists killed thousands, not with chernical, biological, or nuclear agents, but with aviation fudl. Instead of building missiles, they used prirnitive knives and turned our technological rnarvels against us. No one expected such an attack. When the bioterrorist attack that many had long feared finally carne, it too was not what experts had predicted. On October $, someone sent anthrax-laden letters to Congress and the news rnedia. They either did not understand the sophisticated dispersal mechanisms needed to cause mass casualties frorn anthrax, or they simply did not care. In this case, the attack was less disastrous than had been feared. After all, delivery mechanisrns for biological weapons are well known. By the tirne President Richard Nixon terminated the U.S. biological weapons program in 1969, the U.S. Army had successfully weaponized and stockpiled anthrax and other agents in hundreds of bombs, bomblets, spray tanks, and assorted rnunitions.' These terrorists used envelopes. So far, the

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The most devastating of all possible weapons-a nuclear bornb-rnay be the least likely to be used. It is still possible, however, that a group could have stolen or bought nuclear rnaterials or even a small, tactical nuclear weapon from the stockpile of thousands of such weapons still in Russia, or that Iraq may have constructed a crude device and provided it to the al Qaeda network. Such devices could be smuggled in by boat, plane, or truck. Presented with such a variety of sirnple, yet effective, methods of delivery, few experts still seriously believe that such a bomb will come on the tip of a ballistic missile. Chemical or biological attacls on U.S. forces or on the U.S. homeland are a real possibility. Terrorists could strike with potent agents, which are easier to make or obtain than nuclear weapons, and utilize improved delivery mechanisms. Reports of terrorist interest in cropdusting planes are ominous, but hurnans may not be the only targets. Terrorists

c t R t N c t o NFEa c i n a g N e wT h r e a t could attack America's agricultural production by scattering wheat smut or similar agents, which could kill a substantial portion of the U.S. wheat or corn crop. Attacks do not have to be catastrophic to causeserious disruption. Car or truck bombs at crowded malls could kill dozens and deliver a mighty blow to the U.S. econorny. Additional attacls on critical buildings could follow these strikes, resulting in casualties as g:reatas, or greater than, those of the World Trade Center disaster. This last issue is worthy of serious study. The collapse of the World Trade Center should teach us that we need to expand our definitions of weapons of mass destruction to include conventional attac}s that could cause rnasscasualties and disruptions. There are 60,000 chernical plants in the United States. A saboteur could turn one of them into an American Bhopal (the town in India where an accident at a ljnion Carbide pesticide plant released a deadly gas cloud that killed 5,ooo). A trained nuclear engineer could set off a chain reaction at one of the nation's rO3 nuclear power plants, or an airplane could target the plant, triggering a nuclear disaster far worse than those of Chernobyl or Three Mile Island. There are 9,3oo "high hazard" dams whose collapse would cause many human casualties and widespread turmoil. Fifty thousands trucks carrying hazardous materials travel on Arnerica's highways each day; the explosion of a gasoline or chlorine gas truck could kill hundreds. "E-terrorists" could attack some of the twenty-four government computer networks that the General Accounting Office recently found to be inadequately protected, including those of the Departments of Defense and Tleasury.

Or computer hackers could simply disable power grids, wreaking havoc in countless American cities. These are not traditional proliferation problems, but they are now serious national security issues. They cannot be addressed through traditional diplomatic or military rneasures. By acknowledging that our definition of weapons of mass destruction rnust now also include what I would call "conventional weapons of mass destruction," we are forced to expand our definition of national security and change what we mean by national defense. These new threats do not replace traditional proliferation problems; they add to them. This, in turn, has serious irnplications for our national threat assessmentsand how we allocate our national defense resources.

RgasSeSSment.A majorreason why the United States was-and still is-so unprepared for terrorist attacks is that national threat assessmentsfor the past few years have consistently pointed policyrnakers in the wrong direction. Partisan political bickering over the past decade distorted U.S. lntelligence and defense assessrnents, fundarnentally rnisleading and misdirecting national security resources.t The two best known threat assessrnents cornpiled before September rr are those prepared by the two commissions chaired by current secretary of defense Donald Rurnsfeld. In rgg8, the Reportofthe Commusfonto ,Assess fhe Balllstic MissileThreat to the UnitedStates warned that the lJnited States faced an urgent threat ofattack by ballistic missiles that could be fielded by a hostile state "with little or no warning." In January 2oor, t};'e Reportof theCommissionto ,Assess United StatesNationalSecuilt Space Manogement and Organilation warned just as omi-

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We need tO expand o,r' d.efinitions of weapgrs of rnassdestruction to include conventional attacks that could cause mass casualtiesand disruptions. nously that the United States risked a "Pearl Harbor" in space unless it irnmediately launched an expansiveand expensive effort to deploy new generations of sensors, satellites, and weapons in space. Together, the reports fortified the conservative national security vision and heavily influenced political debate, threat assessments,and budgetary priorities over the past three years. Accordingly, until September rr, the top national security priority of the Bush administration had been the developrnent and deployrnent of a national rnissile defense systern. Budgeted at over $8 billion per year, missile defense is by far the single rnost expensive weapons program in the defense budget. Senior officials and members of the cabinet made it their top agenda item in countless meetings with NAIO allies, Russia, and China. Just a few rnonths before September rr, five cabinet members, including National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, traveled to Moscow solely for the purpose of persuading the Russian leadership to acquiesce to a revision of the Anti-Ballistic Missile teaty. As Maureen Dowd wrote in TheNewTorkTimes on September g, "Why can George W. Bush think of nothing but a missile shield? Our president is caught in the grip of an obsession worthy of literature. "3 It is fair to ask whether the September attacks could have been prevented if senior officials and summit meetings

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had addressed cooperative efforts to defend against terrorisrn rather than missiles. While reports on rnissile defense and space received overwhelming official and media attention, similar reports and warnings about asyrnmetrical threats and domestic terrorism were Iargely ignored. Experts have warned of the dangers for years, particularly after the 1993 attack on the World Tiade Center, which came close to collapsing the buildings with conventional truck bombs. The Commission on National Security/2rst Century, chaired by for-Warren rner senators Gary Hart and Rudman, warned in February 2oor that "the United States will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on the American homeland, and U.S. military superiority will not entirely protect us."a The commission members are now a hot item, but at the time they struggled for attention. Sirnilarly, in December 2OOr, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorisrn Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction released its second report. The findings warned, "a terrorist attack on some level inside our borders is inevitable and the United Statesmust be ready."5The commission specifically found an urgent 'national' need to "craft a truly strategy to address the threat of domestic terrorism-conventional, cyber, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclearfrorn the perspective of deterrence, prevention, preparednessand response."u

c t R t N c t o NFEa c i n g a N e wT h r e a t Over the past ten years, numerous expert reports have warned that a terrorist group might try to buy or steal nuclear materials-warnings now eerily echoed in reports that al Q,aeda operatives have tried to acquire uranium. In January 2OOr, a special commission chaired by former senator Howard Baker and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler urged the administration to triple the money spent on securing and eliminating Russia's nuclear weapons and materials. At a meeting of experts in Washington, D.C., Cutler ernphasized that, "Our principal conclusions are that the most urgent unmet national security threat for the United Statestoday is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nationstates,and used against American troops abroad, or citizens at home."7 These concerns were noted in some official threat assessments.In February 2oor, Admiral Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told Congress that he feared "a major terrorist attack against United States interests, either here or abroad, perhaps with a weapon designed to produce mass casualties" over the next twelve to twenty-four rnonths.8 But the prediction was lost in a long list of other concerns. These clashing threat assessments often provoked debate between Democrats in Congress and the Republican administration. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Comrnittee, stated in one such exchange, I'm also concerned that we may not be putting enough emphasis on countering the most likely threats to our national security and to the

security of our forces deployed around the world, those asymmetric threats, like terrorist attacks on the USS Cole, on our barracks and our ernbassiesaround the world, on the World Trade Center, including possible attacls with weapons of mass destruction and cyberthreats to our national security establishment and even to our economic infrastructure .s Adrninistration officials defended their assessmentsand budget priorities by arguing that the government was appropriately addressing all threats. But it was clear where the priority lay. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued: But when I think about it, what is different about the two lterrorism and missile defense] is, number one, we have some capability against the terrorist threat today....We have no ability to protect ourselves against ballistic missiles. And secondly, and this is the reason we have no ability - or part of the reason we have no ability to protect against ballistic missiles, we have a treaty prohibiting us from doing so.'o The day before the attacls, Joseph Biden, chairrnan of the Senate Foreign Relations Cornmittee, prophetically warned of an exclusive focus on missile defenses in a speech at the National Press Club." He cited theJoint Chiefs' support of his view that a strategic nuclear attack "is less likely than regional conflicts, or major theater wars or terrorist attacks at home and abroad." If we spend billions on missile defense, he feared, 'We will have diverted all that money to address the least likely threat while the real threats

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come into this country in the hold of ship, or the belly of a plane or are smuggled into a city in the rniddle of the night in a vial in a backpack. " Sadly, he can now add, "in a kamikaze attack."

try has now developed the collective desire and demand to prepare for future bioterrorist attacks. Nor is this a trivial undertaking; it will require billions of dollars in new federal expenditures. The initial budget skirrnishes are already ReOrientatiOn. Overthepastdecade beginning. President Bush has sent there have been repeated efforts to Congress a bill that would provide millions of dollars to stockpile vaccines expand the range of what is included in the term national security to include new against anthrax and smallpox, but the concepts like global warming. These bill stipulates nothing to improve the health service infrastructure. Senate efforts chewed up pages ofjournals, but never rnade a dent in national security Democrats are insisting that the governbudgets. This will be different in the wake ment provide rnoney for new staff, of September rr. Now the redefinition is training, and detection equipment to happening on the ground, in events that the clinics and hospitals that are the first are affecting millions. line of defense against infectious disOne measure of change is to realize ease. Democratic initiatives will likely that, since Septernber rr, hundreds of succeed as the popular acronym "ER" men and women in uniform have died. becornes widely identified with "EmerThey did not wear military uniforms, gency Response." but served in fire departrnents, police The government will also face new departments, and the postal service. The demands to protect critical infrastructure front lines of this conflict have moved. such as dams, power plants, and airports. More precisely, there are two front lines: This will cost billions rnore and could Afghanistan and Arnerica. It is not at all create entirely new federal serwices-to clear that the greater effort is the one improve airport security, for example. coordinated by the Pentagon. The presFrom where will the money come? While ident quickly recognized this new reality we struggle with budgets, decades of and created the Office of Homeland experience gathered in global efforts to Security to coordinate the domestic batconstrain the spread of the traditional tle. Headed by former Pennsylvania gov- weapons of mass destruction can provide ernor Torn Ridge, it is likely that this some policy grridance. office will grow in stature and authority The first line of defense must be to over the coming years. Arnericans supreduce and prevent the threats at the port the military strikes in Afghanistan, source. For chemical, biological, and but they are much rnore personally nuclear weapons, existing treaties and engaged in the defense of their homes, organizations are well-suited for the job offices, and airports. and now need to be strengthened. The Health has also become a national president should immediately implesecurity issue. The government's briefment the recommendations of the Bakings on spores and antibiotics received er-Cutler report to acceleratethe elimieven more attention than the briefings nation and securing of Russian nuclear on targets and strike aircraft. This is not weapons and materials." The country needs, in the words of the report, "an a momentary phenomenon. The coun-

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ctRtNctoNE Facinga NewThreat enhanced response proportional to the threat." The largest obstacle to building a nuclear bomb is acquiring the twentyfive kilograms of highly-enriched uranium or eight kilograms of plutonium necessary for the weapon's core. There are over r,OOO tons of such fissile material in Russia, much of it inadequately guarded. Under current efforts, it will take sixty years to secure all Russian nuclear materials. Clearly, current prograrns must be bolstered and accelerated.

weapons facilities. Reconsideration of the administration's position or proposals for a tougher inspection regime are now in order. With the current level of anxiety, negotiations that might take years under normal circumstances rnay be adopted within rnonths if the United States puts its forrnidable diplomatic muscle behind them. The United States rnust also reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. "The whole world has been turned

When the time comesto usernilitarv force, th.^United Statesmu.st have the rilght weapons for the job. The Baker-Cutler commission recommends that the United States "secure and/or neutralize in the next eight to ten years all nuclear-weapons usable rnaterial located in Russia and prevent the outflow from Russia of scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction." Similarly, now is the time to drastically reduce the nurnber of deployed nuclear weapons in both U.S. and Russian arsenals. The fewer weapons that exist, the lower the chances of theft or diversion of materials or weapons. Reducing U.S. arsenals also increases U.S. leverage in encouraging other nuclear-weapon statesto reduce their arsenals. The United Statesalso needs the ability to inspect other nations for the presence of weapons outlawed under international law. Earlier this year, the Bush administration unfortunately rejected a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention that would have provided for rigorous international inspections of suspected biological

upside down" by the September rr attacks, saysRichard Meserve, Chairrnan of the Nuclear Regrrlatory Commission, which oversees commercial security rneasures for nuclear-power plants. "We have to re-exarnine our entire capability to withstand a terrorist attack."'3 Corbin McNeill Jr., chairman of the Exelon Corporation, saysfuture nuclear power plants should be buried, leaving "no vital components above ground." 'a It may also rnean that we should not build thern at all. We will face sirnilar decisions on how, or even whether, we should build other new facilities such as skyscrapers, darns, and chemical plants. All must now be evaluated in terrns of minimizing vulnerabilities, not just costs. Critical to preventing future terrorist attackswill be expanding and institutionalizing the exchange of information among the intelligence services of key countries-and, some would say, within our own national intelligence community. The United States is now gathering information from countries whose

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cooperation would have been unthinkable a few months ago, including Iran and Syria. Exchanges extend beyond military and intelligence collaboration. The war on terrorism is being fought, in large part, not by traditional military means but by agencies that fall under the purview of states' interior ministries: domestic law enforcement. customs, treasury, immigration, and investigative agencies. This cooperation requires careful maintenance of the unprecedented international coalition against terrorism constructed by President Bush. Realistically, however, efforts to prevent and reduce threats will not be enough. The United States must also be ready to respond to future attacls. This will require capable military forces and a strategy suited to the new face of warfare. Military forces, and the willingness to use them, may serve as a deterrent to any nation with weapons of mass destruction, but may not deter suicidal subnational or transnational terrorist groups. When the time comes to use military force, the United States must have the right weapons for the job. Jarnes Roche, the secretary of the Air Force, struck the right chord when he spoke out against buying more B-2 bornbers. Though these planes were featured extensively in media footage of the airstrikes on Afghanistan, they must fly over two days to drop bombs that can be more efficiently delivered by other, closer aircraft. Roche said, "I have yet to find a general who sayswe need more B-2s."'5 He called instead for fast, rnobile minibombers that can hit moving targets, and for upgrades ofthe sensors and data networls that link aircraft. But response is much more than a military matter. The anthrax envelopes are a wake-up call to the dangers of a serious bioterrorist event. A public health infra-

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structure that can detect and respond to attacls, treat the injured, and contain a disease before it becomes an epidemic should be part of a broader "first response." The third report of the HartRudman Commission concludes t Managing the consequences of a catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland would be a complex and difficult process. The first priority should be to build up and augrnent state and local response capabilities. Adequate equipment must be available to first responders in local Procedures and communities. guidelines need to be defined and disseminated and then practiced through simulations and exercises.'6 Reorienting U.S. national security and proliferation policies requires policymakers to take homeland defense seriously. The commission members point out that prevention and protection corne first, that "U.S. foreign policy should strive to shape an international systernin which just grievances can be addressed without violence," and that "verifiable arms control and nonproliferation efforts must remain a top priority." COnClUSiOll. This should be a rnornent when experts and political leaders come together to compromise on individual agendasfor the sakeof a unified response to those who attack the United States. It should be possible for the United States to pursue missile defense research while redirecting defense funds to airport security, emergency managernent, and counter-intelligence operations. It can carefully monitor rogue nations while also focusing on major transnational terrorist groups. It can revise treaties where

crRrNctoNE Facinga Neh/Threat necessary,but still reinforce internationaI alliances to isolate those who operate beyond the pale. It can pursue and punish those responsible while attempting to

resolve the underlying conflicts and conditions that breed terorism. Redefine, reassess,reorient. This time, Americans must take the warnings seriously.

NOTES r The weapon thought the

Et33

cluster

bomb,

most likely to be used was

536 biological bomblets, each containing 35 milliliters of a liquid suspension ofanthrax spores. A small explosive charge would, upon impact, turn the liquid into aerosol to be inhaled by the intended victims. At the time the program was disnantled, the United States held in storage some 40,oOO liters of anti-personnel biological warfare agents and some 5,OOO kilograms of antiagriculture

M.cerp.org/npp.

holding

agents. All

were destroyed. The Soyiet if not larger, program. Former

8 Mce Admiral

Thomas

R. Wilson,

Defense Intel-

ligence Agency, before

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, / Februar;,2ool. g Senator Carl Levin, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, DJfe.se Strategy Review, with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Staff

and

Chairnan

General

of Shelton

Hugh

the Joint Chiefs of DC, , Washington,

first deputy director

June 2I, 2OOI. ro Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Hearing of the Senate Arned Services Committee,

hundreds ofanthru

M i s s i l e D e f e n . s e ,J u l y r / , Z o o I . F o r F i s c a l Y e a r 2 o o 2 , federal government budgeted to $r.7 billi"n combat weapons of mass destruction temorism, as

Union

had a similar,

of Biopreparat, Kenneth Alibek, testified before the U.S. Senate that the Soyiet orogram employed over 60,ooo people and stockpiled smallpox

and

weapon formulations and tons of (http,//w.fas.org/irp/con-

plague

gress/t998-ir/alibek.

htm).

the

part

of a $9.7 efforts overall.

billion

budget

for

anti-terrorism

"Making Sense of Missile z SeeJoseph Cirincione, Defense, " Foreign Seruice Journal, November 2 ooo, and "Assessing the Assessnent, The rggg Intelligence

tr Joseph R. Biden, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the 2lst Centur),: Defining Our Interests in a Changing World," National Press Club, Washington DC, ro

Assessment of the Ballistic MissileThreat," Non-Proliferation Review, Spring 2ooo, both available at: w.ceip.org/npp. 3 M. Dowd, "His Magnificent Obsession," T[e.A,?o

September 2oor. I2 H. Baker, L. Cutler and U.S. Secretary of energy Advisory Board, "AReport Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia," (lV'ashington, D.C., Department of Energy) January 2ool, p. 2. Available at http://M.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/D O ERussiaThsklorceReportor r o o r. pdf. 13 "Suddenly, Small Gaps in Nuclear Security

T o r k T i m e ,g S e p t e n b e r 2 o o r , p . A 2 3 . { United States Commission on National Securityl2 rst Century , Roadnopfor Notionol Securi!: lmperatiue for Change,tg February 2OOI. g Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism

Involving

Weapons of Mass

Destruction, SecondAnnuol Repoft: Touord a Notionol Strotegt (Rand C o rporat io n : Washingron fo r C ombatingTeronim, D. C., zooo). Available at, http, / /w. ceip. org/files/ proj ects/npp/pdf/mdterror2. pdf. 6 Ibid. 7 L. Cutler, SecurityThreat,"

"The

Greatest llnmet National Proliferation Brief, Vol.4, No. r,

DC; Carnegie January 30, 2ooor(Washington, Endowment for International Peace). Available at,

Look Like Chasns,"

Wall SreetJournal,

October

r/,

2OOr, P. r. 14 Ibid. "Air

15 G. Schneider, chase of More

B-2s,"

Force Chief Opposes PurThe Washington Posi, October 24,

2oor, p. EI. 16 U.S. Commission

on National Security/2rst Road Map for National Security, Imperative for Change, (Washington, D.C.) March eoor. Century,

Available

at:

http://m.mipt.org/srchnatl-

strato32 72OOrc.html.

W i n t e r / S p r i n g2 o o 2 [ r 4 5 ]

Facing a NewThreat

JoinstheNewWar Nancy E. Soderberg The events of September rr have brought the United Nations to the forefront of the fight against terrorisrn. Among the thousands dead are citizens of eighty-one countries, bringing home to us all the global nature of this threat. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in his speech opening the UN's week-long debate following the attacls, "Terrorism will be defeated if the international community surnmons the will to unite in a broad coalition, or it will not be defeatedat all." But is the UN up to the task? The United Nations has no army of its own, and depends on rnember states for financial support. It takes its instructions from a disparate group of r89 states in the General Assembly and fifteen in the Security Council (UNSC). But it can be a persuasivemoral voice, a tough rnonitor of compliance with the demands of the international community, a catalyst for humanitarian aid, and a builder of consensus.With the right kind of support, the United Nations can make the difference in winning or losing this "NewWar." So far, that support has been lacking. The terrorist attacksin NewYork and Washington sparked a r8o-degree turn from the previous arrns-length approach to the United Nations taken by the Bush administration and Congress. Within a week of the attacks,John Negroponte was

Nancy E. Soderberg sened

as Ambassador

the United 1997-2ool. rently

Nations, She is cur-

Vice President

Multilateral

Affairs

the International

for of

Crisis

Group.

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confirmed as ambassador to the UN and was hard at work. Congress paid $582 million in back dues, and the administration sought and received United Nations Security Council authorization for the broadest and strongest anti-terrorism measure in the UN's history, UN Security Council Resolution r!/J. Done right, a new partnership can make great strides in the fight against terrorism, and can help rebuild a post-Thl-

it will be put to the test. Resolution r!/g is unprecedented in its scope. It cuts off all sources of support for all terrorist groups everywhere. It eliminates financial support by freezing funds, financial assets,and econornic resources of those who commit or attempt to cornmit terrorist acts. It denies safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. It demands that those who participate in the financing, planning,

Successwill rgquire anrrnd.erstand.ing of what the UN can do-and what it cannot. iban regime. But successwill require an understanding of what the UN can doand what it cannot. UN member states will have to rnake a serious, concerted effort to crack down on terrorist networks and their financing. Through leadership, the UN will need to help states have the political courage to join the war. The UN must adopt a realistic approach to its role in Afghanistan. There rnust be a new firrnness to deal with Iraq's ongoing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (IMMD). And the Bush administration will have to rethink its approach to major UN efforts, such as those on global cooperation on global warming, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and arms control. Each of these issuesdeservesa closer look if the UN and the United States are to successfullywage a new war on terrorism.

preparation, or perpetration of terrorist acts be brought to justice. And it calls for full exchange of information regarding terrorist action or movement. To be serious, the UN Security Council will have to press for implementation of the resolution and overcome its poor record of enforcing sanctions. The UN now has the chance to do it right. Resolution 1373 setsup a committee in the Security Council to rnonitor the irnplementation of the resolution. The very able permanent representative frorn the United Kingdom, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, chairs the committee and has circulated guidelines for cornpliance. Tough issues lie ahead, including building a consensus on what constitutes terrorisrn-a difficult taskwhen one nation's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Thckling the financing of terrorism and ending the provision of safe haven will Resolvedagainst Terror. Evenalso prove to be difficult challenges. Moving statesbeyond lip sen ice to the with the best secretary general ever, the United Nations is only as good as the New War will require skill, persistence, resolve of its member states. With the and guts-from the UN itself and from its passage of the historic UN Security Ieading mernbers. To be effective, the Council Resolution rll! in September, committee must have a full-time profes-

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SoDERBERG Facinga NewThreat si.onalstaff, travel to troublesome regions to investigate compliance, and, above all, transgress a long-standing diplomatic tradition at the UN' It must publicly name the violators. The committee must also guard against efforts by member statesto misuse the committee to score political points at home. For instance, bringing the Palestinian-Israeli debate into the committee through a series of charges and countercharges will only senr'eto undermine the fight against terror. Instead, the committee ought to be a serious forum in which member states can pool resources to cut offall resources from terrorists. The UN also offers an unparalleled bully pulpit with a truly global reach. The secretarl general should use it to send an unequivocal messagethat the actions of Osama bin Laden are blatantly unIslamic. He can rally support behind Muslim and Arab stateswith the courage to oppose terrorism and lend their full support to the UN efforts. He can help statesturn over key information and suspects in this New War. As he did in calling for one-half billion dollars in aid for J.g million Afghans at risk, the secretary general can help ensure that innocent men, wornen, and children do not suffer from the consequences of the coming New War. His top humanitarian aide, Undersecretary General Kenzo Oshima, has traveled to Pakistan and Iran. Member states professing concern about cirrilians will have to meet his appeals for help. The UN's rich collection of conventions and protocols on terrorism, twelve in all, offer key tools in the fight. Member statesmust move to sign, ratifr, and implement them. These instruments date from 1963 and address a variety of threats, including aspectsof airline safe-

ty, protection of diplomatic personnel, the taking of hostages, protection of nuclear materials, rnaritime navigation, plastic explosives,and suppression of terrorism and its financing. The UN has a pivotal role to play in redoubled efforts to counter the very real threat from weapons of mass destruction. One shudders at how much more terror and death would have followed had the planes of September rr carried chemical or biological weapons. Now is the time to secure universal adherence to and compliance with the Chernical Weapons Convention, and to work to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention with a new inspection system to help detect and deter cheating. Reports that the Bush administration is rethinking its earlier rejection of the protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention in the wake of the anthrax attacks here at home are welcome news. Lastly, the establishment of an ad hoc international crirninal tribunal by the UN Security Council along the lines of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) should be considered, as proposed by Harvard Law School professor Anne-Marie Slaughter.' Such a court could put on trial alleged terrorists until the planned International Criminal Court becomes operative. Given the political tensions surrounding the issue of terrorism, some nations rnay find it more palatable to hand suspects over to an international court than to a U.S. national court.

Afghanistan. g.roreSeptember rr, it was inconceivable that the Bush administration would push for "nation building" and encourage the United Nations to do it. Now, however, the world is a very different place. The United Nations is

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rightly skeptical that the conditions for most discussed in the corridors in New successwiII exist anytime soon-it learned York and Washington is that of Cambothe hard way in Bosnia, Rwanda, and dia, which in October Zoor marked the Somalia that the IJN cannot succeed tenth anniversary of the Paris Conferwhere there is no peace to keep. ence that ended the war there. Like CamThus, the first step will be to secure a bodia, where King Sihanouk helped stable peace in Afghanistan. But that is bring legitimacy to the power sharing no easy task. The Thliban shows no sign deal between his son and the Khmer of negotiating its departure, and the Rouge, Afghanistan has a monarch who Northern Alliance will not likely be able may be able to unify the warring factions. to take over the country. U.S. policy But Carnbodia's population is half that of appears to have evolved from one Afghanistan, and is geographically onedesigned to break the Thliban's ability to third its size. Even so, the two UN opersupport the al Qaeda network into one ations in Cambodia-the United Nations designed to overthrow the Taliban Advance Mission in Cambodia (ulrtr419regime. There is a real possibility of IC) and the United Nations Tiansitional increasing the role of U.S. ground Authority in Cambodia (UNIAC)-cost troops. The war may take months or $r.6 billion over two years, involved more to succeed. But until its comple23,5oo military and civilian personnel, tion, the IJN cannot take up a significant and resulted in seventy-eight fatalities. role in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will prove to be an even In the post-tliban era, the plan with tougher challenge. The international the most currency is that once the Thlcommunity should prepare for a longer

The UN cannotsucceed*h.'e there isno

peaceto keep.

iban are convinced or coerced to leave Kabul, the forrner Afghan king, Mohamrned Zahir Shah, will convene a Iola jirga-a traditional council of tribal leaders-to form a Supreme Council. The international community, under the newly-restored UN Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, would help to bring the various parties together. The UN would then be asked by the Supreme Council to help administer the country. The UN has vast experience in administering governments in transition. It has won wide praise for its efforts in East Timor, and brought Kosovo to the election in November 2ool. The model

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and more expensive engagernent. But if any lesson is to be learned from international policy over the last decade regarding Afghanistan, it is that abandoning Afghanistan is a mistake. With sustained U.S. leadership, there ought to be the will to stay engaged this time around. The other key challenge for the international community will be deciding whose armed forces will keep the peace in Afghanistan. Even with a peace agreement, conflict likely will continue in parts of Afghanistan. Any peacekeeping force would have to be prepared to take enforcement action if necessary. Historv has shown that the UN is not

S o D E R B E RF Ga c i n qa N e w T h r e a t

capable of such a mandate. Another solution must be found. A force of tens of thousands, maybe a hundred thousand, may be needed, perhaps for many years. Statescontiguous to Afghanistan that have backed various factions in the past-China, Pakistan, Iran, Thjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-would not be considered neutral. states would probablY Non-Muslim spark a backlash. It will certainly be years before a unified Afghan force could do the job. One option that is gaining support is to build a coalition of Muslim states, invited by the new SuPreme Council; this plan could well fit the bill. Led by Turkey, such a coalition could include Morocco, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Jordan, and others. The troops would also have the support of the Organization of Islarnic States and the blessing of the United Nations Security Council. But as Mr. Brahimi has Pointed out, Afghans have a long history of opposing foreign troops on their soil. It is unlikely that they would invite troops in, particularly before they have had the chance to flght it out among themselves in a postThliban era. And Turkey, Morocco, and others fear repeating the experience of the rOo,ooO Russian trooPs who spent a decade fighting Afghans and suffered r5, ooo casualtiesbefore withdrawing. It may be, in fact, that there is no viable option for an international peacekeeping operation inAfghanistan. In this case,the international community would have to rely on training and advising Afghan security forces who would take over the task. Such an all-Afghan force could take years to establish. If this is the course ultimately chosen, the UN's job

ture Osama bin Laden and break the back of his patrons. But the current military campaign can only succeed if a plan is in place to enforce the peace. Unless there is a decision soon on how to keep the peace, the UN ris}s being set uP to repeat the mistakes of the last decade.

We do not yet know who is Ifaq. behind the series of anthrax attacls following the events of September rr. But they do bring to the forefront the need for strict control of biological and chemical weapons, and call for a renewed effort to rein in Iraq, the world's most notorious producer of biological, chemical, and nuclear weaPons. In the decade since former U.S. president George Bush successfully built an international coalition and secured UNSC authorization for the use of force against Iraq, the Security Council consensus for demanding Iraqi compliance with its demands has evaporated. Saddarn Hussein has flouted the sanctions, and failed to take full advantage of the tens of billions of dollars made available for him to care for the Iraqi people. He has cynically worsened the suffering of the Iraqi people in an effort to get sanctions lifted rather than cornply with the dernands of the Security Council resolutions. And with French and Russian complicity, he is succeeding-despite the real threat that he presents. While international support for sanctions against Iraq have crurnbled, Iraq's WMD program remains a serious threat to U.S. interests. Since rg9l, UN inspectors have uncovered the existence of an offensive biological warfare program and the chemical nerve agent VX. According to a 1999 Security Council disarmament will be made all the more precarious. panel report, the United Nations Special These are tough issues to address in the midst of a military campaign to caP- Commission (UNSCOM) has confiscat-

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ed missiles, chemical warheads, 88,ooo chemical munitions, over 600 tons of weaponized and bulk chemical weapons agents, and some 4,ooo metric tons of precursor chemicals." It has also uncovered Iraq's biological weapons program and destroyed several biological weapons production and development facilities, as well as twenty-two tons of growth media for biological weapons production. The report's stark conclusion has failed to receive the attention it warrants: "Iraq possessesthe capability and knowledge base through which biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volurne." In the nearly three years since the UN inspectors left Iraq, Saddam Hussein certainly has attempted to continue these prograrns. The only question is how successfulhe has been. Despite this clear threat, some rnernbers of the international community openly breach the UN sanctions. Member states regularly violate sanctions on Iraq, including states that sit on the Security Council. Thus, U.S. policy toward Iraq has become one of containment through rnilitary means, rather than sanctions and inspections. U.S. and British warplanes routinely bombard Iraq as it threatens pilots enforcing the no-fly zones. It is a stunning testament to the talents of these pilots that none have been lost or taken hostage. When it took office, the Bush adrninistration worked with the United Ki.gdom to develop a new approach to sanctions that attempted to put the propaganda burden back on Hussein's shoulders, and, more importantly, to get inspectors back on the ground in Iraq. It involved new "srnart" sanctions that would lift sanctions on goods entering Iraq but rnaintain a list of sanctioned items on all military and duel-use items,

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such as high-powered computers and advanced telecommunications equipment. The proposal would maintain the existing escrow account into which Iraqi oil revenue is deposited, and would try to regularize Syrian, Turkish, and Jordanian smuggling. Saddam Hussein would have to allow inspectors back into Iraqthe most effective way to prevent WMD programs there. After a valiant effort that brought even the reluctant Chinese on board with the plan, it faltered last summer because of Russian objections. To date, the issue does not appear to have been high on the agenda of the discussions between U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin. But the threat of weapons of rnassdestruction has taken new proportions in the wake of September II and the anthrax attacls in the United States. The Bush administration rnust put the issue of Iraq high on its agenda with the Russians, and work to resurne arms inspections in Iraq.

The Way Forwardis Engagement. Septernber rr ended the Bush administration's unilateralist approach to pursuing its interests. The president and his advisers-most of whom viewed the world through a Cold War lens now seem to have a better understanding of the fact that the threats of the twenty-first century can only be overcome by united efforts by the United Statesand its allies. As it rnoves forward in the fight against terrorism, the adrninistration will have to review its approach to a host of international issues. Over the course of 2oor, the administration withdrew U.S. support from a range of international treaties addressing such pressing issues as global warning; nuclear, biological, and conventional arms control: and the creation

SoDERBERG Facinga NewThreat of an international criminal court. But such actions risk undermining support frorn key allies in the war on terrorism. The Bush administration reviewed whether it was possible to "unsign" the International Criminal Court treaty. In March, it rejected the accord reached by IJ8 other nations on the Kyoto Protocol limiting ernissions of greenhouse gases. But attitudes seem to be changing. The administration's threats to abrogate the ABM Treaty appear to have been tempered by the need to work with Russia on the New War. And, having rejected last spring a protocol that would create a policing mechanism for the Ig7? Biological Weapons Convention, the administration now appears to be taking up serious review of how to move the Convention forward.

Facing the Soviet threat in the aftermath of World War II, the United States embarked on a multidimensional strategy to contain its enemy in the east. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his successors understood that such a threat could only be challenged in cooperation with our allies. Institutions such as NAIO, the UN, GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank gave a multilateral framework to the daunting challenge at hand. Today's challenge will require sirnilar efforts to work with and galvanizethe international community. The United States must face the challenge of international terrorism using a combination of its military, economic, diplomatic, and financial tools. Unilateralism and a misconstrued definition of national interest will only hamper it in this important endeavor.

NOTES t Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Terrorism FinonciolTimes, 12 October 2ool.

andJustice,

2 Final report of the panel on disarmament and and future ongoing monitoring and verifica-

current

tion issues, 2/ March 1999.

Winter/Springzooz

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Chinese Unraveling Political Culture

accornplishments are typically rnolded into an enduring legacy-this is understood as the model, at least. During this T. Fung Mark Reuiew Congress, however, we witnessed Presi! dent Jiang Zernin's protege suffer an JosErn FrwsurrH. China SinceTlananment unusual defeat. Zeng Qinghong, an alternate rnernber of the Politburo and The Politicsof Transition. New York' Carnthe rnain architect ofJiang's policies, was bridge University Press, 2oor, 332 pp. not elevated, as rnany had expected, to p a p e r . c l o t h , $ 2 r . 9 5 $Sg.gS full membership in the twenty-one member Politburo. As a full mernber of At the September zoor Sixth Plenurn of the Politburo, Zeng would be poised to the Fifteenth Party Congress, members becorne one of seven members of the deliberated the course China would folPolitburo Standing Comrnittee, the low in the coming Sixteenth Party Confrom the main decision-making body in China. gress one year later. Weary turnultuous years of the Cultural Revo- Was Zeng Qinghong a rnere casualty in a lution and the Tiananrnen Square political skirmish or syrnbolic of somemovement, no single Chinese leader was thing grander-Jiang's inability to leave his irnprimatur on Chinese politics? likely to predominate their future direcDuring the latter part of Jiang's rule, tion. Even so, the politics of the generational transition in leadership were China's formal accession to the World Tiade Organization was on track and the manifested in what was not said as much International Olympic Committee chose leadership The of task as by what was. Beijing to host the 2oo8 garnes.Jiang's and change in China promotion r e m a i n s a t r a d i t i o n a l o n e . P r i z e d now famous July r, 2oor speech opened

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Fewsmith exp0sâ&#x201A;ŹSthetabyrinthine dynarnics of Chinese dornestic bolitics, the rising swell of nationalisrn, urldthe interaction betwden intellectuals and the state. Communist party doors to entrepreneurs. China appeared to be on the verge of becorning "modern." At the same time, however, politics is a strange anirnal in contemporary China-discerning predator and prey is difficult. How far China has come in the past twelve years and how much further it must go are the central questions for Joseph Fewsrnith in China SinceTiananmen' The Politicsof Transition,his thorough and revealing exarnination of the ebb and flow of Chinese politics since rg8g. Fewsrnith exposesthe labyrinthine dynamics of Chinese domestic politics, the rising swell of nationalisrn, and the interaction between intellectuals and the state. He describes the political reincarnation of Premier Zhu Rongji, who lay on his political deathbed as recently as April 1999 after failing to secure aWTO agreernent during his visit with President Bill Clinton of the United States. His political career also appeared harnpered by the fallout from the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May Iggg. The anti-corruption campaign launched by Zhu Rongji against Lai Changxing in 1999 had Jiang Zemin's full blessing. By prosecuting an individual who ran a rnultibillion dollar luxury goods and oil srnuggling operation with connections to a string of high-level cadres, Zhu was able to reassert himself into the lifeline of Chinese politics as the prime graft fighter. Fewsmith goes on to argue, however, that the campaign

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threatened to underrnine the very political continuity thatJiang sought becauseit exposed the friends and families of the political elite. To understand China today requires understanding the aftermath of June {, 1989, when Deng Xiaoping's prestige in the Cornmunist Party declined precipitously. While Deng still rernained the final arbiter of authority as the pararnount leader, he would use his position rnethodically and cautiously, seeking more consensus and balance within the political hierarchy than he did before. According to Fewsrnith, this led to Deng's installation of Jiang Zemin-party secretary of Shanghai, China's largest city-as the "core" ofthe next generation ofleadership. Jiang's ascent was rnerely a matter of a process of elimination. A symbol of steadinessand incrementalism, Jiang represented neither a tilt toward conservatism nor toward reform. If anything, he was responsible for shutting down certain publications for fear of instigating political instability. " [JiangJ was thus acceptable to the leading figrrres in the Party, and that in itself was an important qualification for leadership," observes Fewsmith. In behavior not unlike Jiang's today, "Deng clearly tried to relax the political atmosphere by responding to the popular sentiments that had underlain the Tiananmen demonstrations, by t+ng to play down ideological tensions, and by ameliorating international tensions to the greatest extent possible."

q!e!q With China's newfound wealth came intellectual fecundity, the results of which resulted in some opposition to Jiang and those people associatedwith pro-Western reforms. The intellectual influence on Chinese elite politics was particularly keen during the last decade as an outgrowth of consensus-basedpolitics. Fewsmith provides us a fresh understanding of the new ideological trends in the midI99Os, when we saw the rise of a "new authoritarianism" and neoconservatism that butted heads with liberal intellectuals. These neoconservatives argued for greater political freedoms, not less. Both schools pointed to the economic dynamism of the Four Tigers (Hong Kong, tiwan, South Korea, and Singapore) as the rationale for their position. "New authoritarians hoped to use the power of the state to break through these obstacles and push marketization forward," Fewsmith writes. Deng's reforms now enjoyed relative consensus, so the national debate in China was no longer a clear-cut one between reformers and conservatives.Instead, it was a battle over the best means to achieve the end of economic successand political stability. Among Fewsrnith's many gifts is his ability to provide an unerring understanding of China's political culture. He argues adroitly that during the IggOs, an unprecedented sense of meandering within the intellectual circles emerged. "It was not just that comrnercialization presented intellectuals with a profound crisis of identity but also that intellectuals began to disintegrate as an identifiable group. Despite deep divisions among intellectualsthroughout China's modern history, there was never any doubt about intellectuals as a distinct social category with a sense of self-identity and group ethos." Part of the reason. Fewsmith con-

tends, is that Chinese society has become more international and trade-focused, both aided by the rise of information and discourse on the Internet. Even to this day, China seemsto thrive in a political culture of contradictions, or maodun.So it is no surprise that Rwsmith identifies a rise of counter-reformers at a time when China's econornic might is apparent. These counter-reformers are concerned with the costs of financial success: unernployrnent, crime, and social ills, among others. But another strain of thought, espoused by the neoconseryatives, was particularly virulent in the early to mid-rggos. This group rejected Francis Fukuyama's American triurnphalist claim of the coalescing of world forces in favor of neoclassical liberalisrn and the "end of history." Furtherrnore, Fewsrnith notes that when Anthony l-ake, Clinton's first national security adviser, gave what would become known as his "democratic enlargement" speech titled "Frorn Containment to Engagernent," rnany Asian intellectuals, including those in China, scoffed at these pronouncements as Arnerican hubris. On the cusp of a new century, Fewsmith found that conservatism and nationalism lurked and fed off popular opinion and elite sentiment. As public opinion changed, so too did Jiang's response to those within the party. We learn how important the Fifteenth Party Congress was to the viability of the party and hence for Jiang. He became bolder and struck out on his own to implement 'Jiang ZerninThought," which was essentially Deng Xiaoping Thought with an eye toward economic reform. Jiang managed to demote Li Peng by shifting him to the National People's Congress, while Li maintained the number-two position in the all-powerful Politburo Standing

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Committee. Jiang was reliant upon the leftist conservativesfor his political support, but as they died off, the need becarne greater for Jiang to develop his own base. Enter Zhu Rongji, who becarne the premier, a positionwhich traditionally is second in the power hierarchy. By the end of 1997, Jiang could breathe a sigh of relief, as he had performed an institutional high-wire act that left many powerful nerves frayed but had avoided a political catastrophe. "In short, the Fifteenth Party Congress was an irnportant milestone in the Party's developrnent: the first time power had passed fully from the revolutionary generation to a postrevolutionary generation. Moreover, it had done so smoothly. Jiang had survived frorn an irnprobable beginning to become'core' of the Party in reality." Fewsmith's examination of China's body politic is superb in its clarity and conciseness. It sounds a clarion call that China's cornplex layers of domestic politics, internecine Politburo battles, all wrapped not-so-neatly in the intrigue of intellectual, elite, and popular sentirnent, provide uncertain footing for China's political development. Mark T. Fung is a Ph.D. candidate in China Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies atJohns Hopkins University.

Missile Defense without

Glohal Diplomacy Reuiew ! Theresa Hitchens

Jerurs J. Wrnrz eNo Jnnrnrv A. Lrn.srn. Rockets'Red Glare' Mbsile Defensesand the Futureof World Politiu. Boulder' Westview P r e s s ,2 o o r , g 6 8 p p . $ 2 8 . 5 o .

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For several years now, it has been nearly impossible to have a rational debate in Washington about missile defense. Like abortion or gun control, discussion of the issue quickly devolves into a nearly theological dispute between opponents and proponents. An objective analysis is quite difficult when every aspect of the debate-including the science-is refracted through a polarizing lens. Because Rockets'RedGlare' MissileDefenses and the Future of World Politics avoids this approach, it should be commended. By avoiding the temptation to devolve into polemics, it exposesnew insights into the rnissile defense debate. Rather than debate the question of whether the United States shou/dmove ahead with missile defense developrnent, each of the ten authors were asked to assume that the decision had already been made. Their task was to consider the international political ramifications of different approaches in how that decision would be implemented-through cooperation with Russia (or China) or unilaterally; within or outside the auspices of the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; and based on a rninimalist or maximalist approach. This rnatrix approach provides a conceptual framework that allows readers to compare the possible r e p e r c u s s i o n so n U . S . a n d g l o b a l s e c u rity identified by the contributors. Most importantly, the concept is focused on the wide-ranging and systernic changes to the international environment likely to be set in motion by U.S. development of missile defenses. The simple recognition, highlighted in Wirtz's introduction, that the ABM teaty's presence has created a strategic context for interaction among stateson a -Wirtz global scale is profound. notes:

HITCHENS

Missile Defense without

Glohal Diplomacy Reuiew ! Theresa Hitchens

Jerurs J. Wrnrz eNo Jnnrnrv A. Lrn.srn. Rockets'Red Glare' Mbsile Defensesand the Futureof World Politiu. Boulder' Westview P r e s s ,2 o o r , g 6 8 p p . $ 2 8 . 5 o .

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Books "Alter the treaty significantly, and this Roberts thoroughly explores how China's worldview, its domestic upheavals, global strategic context will change." And while it may be possible for U.S. and its suspicions of the United States policymakers to agree on what changes causeBeijing to have a fundamentally hostile view of rnissile defenses."U.S. nationthey would like to see from a deployment of missile defenses, it may not be so easy al missile defense fuels the perception that Washington is bent on denying China its to avoid unintended or unpredicted consequences around the globe. It is rightful place in the sun as a rising great glaringly apparent that the U.S. missile power. In Chinese eyes, NMD confirms fears of encirclement and containment, defense debate up to this point has failed especially if combined with theater systems to recognize this critical reality. inJapan, South Korea, andThiwan." Tirnothy Hoyt, in his thoughtful Roberts persuasively arg\res that Washchapter on South Asia, aptly summaington policymakers are mistaken to conrizes: "American deployment of nation-

' Rockels Red G lare is noteworfhy dueto

i_tslargely successfulatternpt at a-nobjeirtive ' discus"sionof missile deferi.sepoli.y. al missile defense will affect regional stability around the globe-a consequence often overlooked or ignored by contemporary analysts." This potential for far-reaching and unpredictable fallout from any U.S. deployrnent is highlighted by Hoyt's analysis of the South Asian reaction, as well as by Bradley Roberts's provocative chapter on China. Hoyt argues that a U.S. missile defense program could have both direct and indirect effects on South Asian regional nuclear cornpetition. While the many potential negative ramifications to U.S. nonproliferation goals for the region could be avoided if the United States decides to take a cooperative approach to escaping the ABM teaty and deploying missile defenses, Hoyt stresses that the "single most important factor in determining South Asian responses to U.S. NMD [national rnissile defense] deployments will be Chinese actions."

tinue to dismiss these Chinese concerns in the belief that China's nuclear rnodernization program-long planned and already begun-will be little impacted by a U.S. deployment. Instead, China's strategic planning would be fundamentally altered, according to Roberts, even if a U.S. prograrn is preceded by a U.S.Russian agreement (whlch Beijing would view as a "sell out" by Moscow). Taken together, these two chapters highlight the need for U.S. policymakers to consider more seriously the Asia angle in decisions about both missile defenses and strategic-arrns control policies. Another fundarnental theme, rightfully highlighted in I-arsen's conclusion, is the importance of tying missile defense to an active program of global diplomacy. "The lJnited States must recognize the critical importance of diplomacy in assuaging the fears of allies and adversaries facing even a minimal U.S. missile defense deployment decision." A deci-

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sion to deploy missile defenses will funedged by Larsen in his conclusion, where damentally alter today's strategic status he notes that "most observers agree that quo. That fact alone frightens those who national missile defense will enhance must react to this change. U.S. power projection capabilities" espeCertainly, every author in the regioncially in the short-term. But analystsdisal response section notes that there is agree about the long-term political and nothing to be lost, and possibly very strateg"icconsequences. much to be gained, by a cooperative and It is this concern over a changing secudiplomatic attitude by the United States. rity environment in the coming decades This leads the editors to conclude that a that seerns to play a rnajor factor in unilateral decision to abrogate the ABM Larsen's conclusion that U.S. security Treaty to pursue a maxirnalist missile might best be served by a decision to likely defense approach is to undercut postpone primarily land-based options, U.S. security. while exploring a boost-phase, sea-based While rather densely worded in theosystem, possibly in tandem with Russia. retical language, the chapter on the RedGlare is noteworthy due to Rockets' future of arms control by Julian its largely successful atternpt at an objecSchofield hits the nail on the head, the tive discussion of missile defense policy; goal of missile defense deployment, like unfortunately, there are also places that of arms control, should be to help where it falls short. One of the book's teate a stable, secure international enviweaknesses is that it gives the overronrnent in the future. His argument whelming irnpression that rnissile fixes on the link between rnissile defenses defense is necessary and inevitable, and and arms control and nonproliferation that the ABM Treaty as it stands is, at a 'What measures, stressing: is missing is a m i n i r n u r n , n o l o n g e r s e r v i n g U . S . vision of how U.S. policymakers hope to interests. This bias is rnost clear in the use arms control and national missile f i r s t s e c t i o n o f t h e b o o k , w h i c h i s defense to shape the future international unfortunate since that section-on the security environrnent. " history of the treaty and missile defensThe idea of shapingthe future through es, and recent political, military, and an integrated mix of tools is key. Missile technological developments affecting defenseis but one potential tool in comthe regime-ought to be the most objecbating missile and weapons of mass tive. IJnfortunately, both the chapter destruction proliferation, and how it fits on the origins of the treaty by Kerry M. or does not fit with other approaches Kartchner and that on the changing must be clearly delineated by U.S. polipolitical and military environment by cymakers. Diplornacy is a tool in and of Robert Joseph make clear that these itself, but also a rnethod of applying othauthors see the ABM Treaty as no longer er tools to the problem. in U.S. interests, if ever it was. The bulk of the essays suggest that, Joseph, in particular, seernsto go out unfortunately, there is a disconnect of his way to criticize the strategic between short-term advantages and approach of President Bill Clinton as not potential long-term costs and benefits of only flawed, but dangerous. His essay missile defenses-even one undertaken reads more as an effort to rnake the case with Russian accord. This is acknowlthat the missile defense debate has already

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Books been won by right-thinking proponents, rather than as a wide-ranging review of the political and military landscape shaping current thinking. Joseph's essayconcludes, "The words of Article I and their meaning are very clear; ... the ianguage makes evident the need to confront the contradictions between today's imperative to defend America's population against ballistic missile attacksfrom rogrre nations and the underlying strategic rationale of the treaty." The use of the word "imperative," for example, highlights the rhetorical bias inherent in the essay. The final chapter in Part I, Denis Ward's description of the changing technological environment, while highly informative and detailed, also suffers from what could be interpreted as a prornissile defense bias-although perhaps it is simply technological optimisrn. Ward understates the continued technical challenges to any and all missile defense systems, while sornewhat overstating the missile developments of concern. Ward's chapter also hlghllghts another of the book's weaknesses,a failure to discuss in detail the role of theater missile defenses. Ward himself provides a good overview of the developrnent of such systems,including important information such as the fact that the Arrny's Theater High Alti(THAAD) Defense tude Air was "intended to counter the rnost capable theater class missile existing in the early rggos, China's CSS-2, with a range of around 3,ooo kilometers." He also does a good job explaining the closing of the capabilities gap between theater and strategic missiles over time, and the

issue's importance in considering how to proceed with the ABM teaty. Elsewhere in the book. however. there is little discussion of how theater missile defenses might be integrated with a continental U.S. system, or of the role they might play in diplomacy. There is also little focus on the unmet theater missile threat to U.S. forces abroad-one that is not being addressed even as the United States concentrates on national missile defense. Perhaps this is inevitable because of the focus on the three national missile defense scenarios set out in the editorial framework, but more focus on theater defenses could have been integrated into the various chapters, particularly those on the regional effects. Rockek'RedGlare is well worth reading for policymakers and students of missile defense, although it is certainly not a primer for beginners. Benefitting from the book requires some up-front knowledge of the debate, the technology involved, and the global security environment. Most importantly, the book provides a needed public service by shining a spotlight on the irnportance of a global approach to any analysis of the costs and benefits of missile defense. "This book points out the dangers of making short-sighted policy decisions that fail to take into account either current international reactions longer-term or systernic conseq u e n c e s , " s t r e s s e sL a r s e n . H i s c o m m e n t illustrates this book's utility precisely.

Theresa

Hitchens

is Senior Advisor

at the Center for

Defense Information.

Winter/Springzooz

Ir6 r]

TheRedHerringin the Sandsof Sudan Denis Dragovic Recently, I have begrrn to question the reasons that led me to accept a job as a foreign aid worker in Sudan. Although I played a positive role in rebuilding East Timor as an aid worker, many people told me that I would be disheartened by the Machiavellian maneuvering of domestic and international players in Sudan. I doubted them. I was interested in aid, not politics. Yet they spoke the truth. Looking back, life in Sudan was surreal. Due to the longevity and sheer size of the hurnanitarian disaster, personal priorities and perspectives have become warped. We erected camps to house displaced persons forced to flee frorn carnps built only a few months earlier. We provided medical relief only to see the same patients returning with new wounds. We distributed seedsand tools to a farming community unsure of who would control the land in the next harvesting season. Despite forty-six years of on-again, off-again conflict since Sudan gained independence, influential dornestic and international leaders refuse to recognize that peace is a prerequisite to alleviating human rights violations and humanitarian disasters and to freeing the people of Sudan to prosper in their own right. With each newgovernment in Khartoum orWashington, confidence of imminent peace pervades the air. But like the governments before them, they deem the path toward establish-

Denis Dragovic, 2oOO

of the

graduate

Master of Science in Sewice (MSFS)

Foreign

program

at Georgetown

University,

acted as Field

Coordinator Sudanese

for the

offices

International Committee

of the

Rescue from

2ooo

to 200r.

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DRAGOVIC

ing peace-littered with domestic obsta cles-too tough to trek. As rapidly as the confidence wanes, bravado takes its place; calls to arms are supported by propagan da founded on righteousness. Thus, money continues to flow discreetly to bel ligerents year after year; misinformation and propaganda muddle reality, confus ing the media and misleading policymak ers. Peace, once again, is placed on the back burner. The result is an estimated 2 million deaths attributed to the conflict and the world's largest internally dis placed population, over 4 million people. The war that became all too familiar to me began in the 1880s with the rise to power of the self-proclaimed successor to the Prophet Muhammad, the Mahdi. British defeat at the hands of the Mahdi in 1885 signaled the first of many clash es between proxies of the two civiliza tions. In 1898, the British, together with the Egyptians, re-conquered Sudan and continued to rule until independence, which was hastily arranged for 1956. During the first half of the twentieth century, the British ruled using a "one country, two systems" approach. While the British acknowledged the local lead ership of the north, the south was "pro tected" from Islamization and the northern Arab rulers. Many Sudanese told me that this distinction led to their current predicament. Their isolation and lack of development during the first half of the twentieth century placed them at a disadvantage when negotiations for independence began. The civil war that tainted the nation's first sixteen years of independence began in 1955, a year before indepen dence was achieved, and continued until 1972 when a promising but fragile peace was achieved through the Addis Ababa agreement. Peace lasted for just over a

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decade until the economic and political situation began to worsen. The govern ment, fearing a coup, searched for sup port from opposition groups and even tually embraced the Islamic movement. A marriage was brokered; the bride's gift, Sharia law, was presented; and upon consummation the Addis Ababa agree ment was lost, bringing about much resentment, concern, and fear. In early 1983, the I05th Battalion in Bor, having been ordered to transfer to the north, rebelled and formed the basis of what later became the largest of several oppo sition movements, the Sudanese Peo ple's Liberation Army (SPLA). Over the years, other groups emerged, including southern groups fighting for the gov ernment and northern groups fighting alongside the southerners. I arrived in Sudan in late February of the eighteenth year of the civil war and quickly set about the tedious task of obtaining the obligatory entry visa, stay permit, work visa, and travel permit before traveling south to my posting. The dry season was reaching its peak, bore holes were parched, creeks lay in places where maps indicated rivers were sup posed to flow, and few if any of the famous Mrican flora and fauna were vis ible. Wau, capital of western Bahr-el Ghazal state, became my home for the next several months. It was the largest and most secure of the three enclave towns in which my responsibilities lay; the other two, Raga and Aweil, were simply govern ment outcrops within a sea of opposition territory. In 1998, Wau made interna tional headlines when fighting displaced an estimated 70,000 people and mortal ity rates reached 300 per day. Since then, the situation has improved. Although many of the camps remain, the displaced population has decreased by half and the

problem t dependenc As a fie], ble for cc Rescue Co the field wh local staff t the offices April, I visi time. Thro Foundatior tion of a health pro~ local minis! been with 0 I of the year. tants worki brought ou few drugs, ; or rusted, i opportunit) working wit ing, health,

Basic

much 1 and nc

tion; and I ment. I felt; thing worth ing is certair During 1 apprised of ments as clo southwest of as I had de' the town an< astic about r in Raga. At just that-ru It wasn't activity in th

ViewfromtheGround problem that remains is one more of dependency than hunger or disease. As a field coordinator, I was responsible for coordinating the International Rescue Committee's (IRC) prograrns in the field while simultaneously training the local staff to assume the management of the offices upon rny departure. In late Ap{1, I visited our Raga office for the first time. Through the support of the Packard Foundation, we began the implementation of a greatly-needed reproductive health program in conjunction with the Iocal rninistry of health. The hospital had been without a doctor since the beginning of the year. Four of the five rnedical assistants working in the hospital had been brought out of retirement. There were few drugs, and the equipment was blunt or rusted, if available at all. This was an opportunity to build local capacity by working with the people; offering training, health, and family planning educa-

May, the SPIA attacked and seized Daeim Zubeir, a town ninety kilometers from Raga and r9o kilometers fromWau. Over the next two weeLs, one town after another fell along the road between Daeirn Zubeir and Raga. Fearing being caught in the crossfire or falling victim to tribal genocide, most wornen and children fled northward toward South Darfur state, choosing to rernain within government territory. Most men stayed, believing that an attack was unlikely or wanting to protect their property and ward off the aggressors. Raga at the tirne was already home to thousands of internally displaced people who had fled their homes due to fighting or drought. Of these people, there was one group estimated at 6,ooo displaced Sudanese from South Darfur who mainly hailed from the Rezigat tribe-a people who had reason to fear the approaching SPIA because of their tribal association

Basichumancompassion ectipsed the

much talked - ab out divide b etween so^utherners and northerners. tion; and providing drugs and equipment. I felt as if we were beginning sornething worthwhile. But regrettably, nothing is certain in Sudan. During the rniddle of May, I was apprised of unusual SPIA troop movernents as close as fifteen miles south and southwest of Raga. The news worried rne, as I had developed an appreciation for the town and its people and was enthusiastic about my program, office, and staff in Raga. At the same time, rumors are just that-rumors. It wasn't long, though, before rebel activity in the area was confirmed. In late

with the Murahaliin.t This group; including wornen, children, and infants, had anived only a few months earlier, after having fled south on foot for a month. I had met these people during myvisit to Raga. They had arrived hungry and sick, with few iterns in hand. I was saddened that these people, who had just begun to establish themselves in Raga, were again forced to flee. This time, though, I doubted that theywould sunive the return journey.2 OnJune 2, the longest-running civil war in Africa came to Raga. One of our staff described the event:

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and community leaders-were enthusiastic and alwayssent a full retinue of highranking officials. There was also a genuine interest arnong attendees to participate, listen, and learn. The Raga military Ieadership's reaction to the idea was sirnilarly positive. I was even asked to send a copy of the Geneva Convention in Arabic. Unfortunately, circumstances did not permit me to do so. During the day of the attack, those remaining of the approximately 2g,OOO residents of Raga fled the town. The The SPLA, according to the residents wornen and children who had left earlier were separated from the men. It was of Raga, was equipped to an unprecedented level. Rocket-propelled grenade not until a month later that some of these families were reunited in the interlaunchers were common, every soldier nally displaced persons' (IDP) camps of wore a fresh uniform, and newjeeps with El Fardos, IJrn Herona, and Gemezah, rnounted multi-barrel rocket-propelled l a u n c h e r s w e r e in South Darfur State, 4oo kilometers p r o m i n e n t . grenade (a Arnong the attackerswere sorne khoa.,o,7c to the north. The increased fighting in western word referring to white-skinned forBahr-el-Ghazal state led all expatriate eigners). It's unclear who the foreigners and Khartourn-based staff in Wau to were; they could have been war interns (during the war in the Balkans, the leave the area. Once safelyback in KharCroatian arrnies had an entire battalion toum, we established an ernergency response tearn to assessthe need for an that consisted of foreigners), rnercenarintervention to fill the gaps in the ies, or military advisors who came with humanitarian relief operation already the new hardware. The SPIA quickly moved into Raga, underway. Our team set out from Kharoverwhelming the mere Boo soldiers and toum on an arduous 2,5oo kilometer, the ad hoc Sudanese government militia. three day driving tour of Sudan. Along Only a few weela earlier, I had met with the route, provincial leaders offered us lodging in their houses and provided us the same military leaders of Raga who now fled west. During our meeting, we with food and drink. Cornrnunities discussed the possibility of broadening throughout Sudan mobilized to help the our human rights training program in people of Raga. Drugs were being sent, Wau. The prog:rarn consisted of four clothes collected, and money raised. three-day seminars covering AIDS preUpon arrival at El Fardos, a srnall town of less than 5,ooo people and the location vention and treatment, gender rights, child rights, and basic rights and freeof the only government sanctioned camp doms. The positive reception to this pilot at the time, we found that the host comrnunity was providing food and water to program in Wau was unexpected. The the new arrivals already numbering in the upper echelons of the targeted g:roupsthousands. Basic human compassion the military, police and prison officers, In the morning, the SPIA overcame the government's outer defenses and rnoved their artillery to the airport runway lying about a kilometer and a half from the rnilitary barracls and separated by a river. At about nine o'clock in the morning the shelling began, the grain mill next to our office was hit; the mango tree that I lay under during the heat of the afternoon was felled by rnachine gun fire.

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ViewfromtheGround eclipsed the much talked-about divide between southerners and northerners. Immediately, we began to search for our staff and friends. It was not long before we found a few of our colleagues. Their cornposure when we discussed the preceding events left me bewildered. They had not a tear in their eyes or a quiver in their voices; it was as if it had happened so many times before. A sad realization dawned upon me-they had lost the anger and fear associated with what they had gone through. Why? Because this is what it meant to live in southern Sudan. The often forgotten result of such a rnilitary success by the western backed "liberation" movernent, such as the one

reality continues to be ignored and interventions based on false perceptions remain unchallenged, there will be little hope for change. Although the war began partially as a response to the Muslim Brotherhood's increased influence within the government, it subsequently developed a life of its own. tibal wars between southern groups caused rnore deaths during the r99os than did confrontations with the governrnent. Fiefdoms ernerged, run by warlords fighting for the highest bidder. Oil corrupted the cause of both sides and undermined any moral high ground that might have previously existed. Factionalisrn and fear in the north forced three of the four main Sudanese politi-

The hOpg 0f rnilitaryvictory rnustbe supplanted by a desire io embi'ace diplornacy. described above, is population displacement. In this instance, 3O,OOO people lost their hornes and ran in fear for their lives. The question that stuck in rny rnind after meeting with these people was, "If 'liberation' army, the SPIA represents a why did practically the entire population of Raga, Daeim Zubeir, and other towns run in fear?" DuringWorld.War II, when Paris was liberated frorn the Nazis, the streetswere lined with cheering Parisians. When the Americans landed in Kuwait, people began to return. Why were Raga's streets empty when the SPLA moved in? The question undermines all the notions I held before I arrived; it contradicts the arguments of Washington lobbyists who portray the war to congressmen, senators, and the media as a conflict between Black and Arab, Christian and Muslim, north and south, or good and evil. If the

cal players of the past quarter centuryDr. Hasan al-Tu,rabi, two-time president Sadeq al-Mahdi, and Ahmad alMirghani-into prison, exile, and cooperation with the SPIA, respectively. The attack on Raga was perpetrated for rnilitary goals, but for what specific ends, it is difficult to speculate. Some suggestthat the recent activitywas directed at surrounding the oil field producing areas in Unity state to the northeast of Raga; others propose that the intent was to secure areas in Bahr-el-Ghazal where other precious resources have been found. Still others speculate that it was a feint designed to draw troops and forces away from an attack on Wau. The residents of Raga, though, believed that the rnove was driven by historical tribal tensions, and the government propaganda rnachine was quick to manipulate

Winter/Springzooz

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DRAGOVIC

these fears for their own ends. People described the attack upon Raga as the Dinka, the largest of southern Sudan's tribes and the main source of recruits for the SPIA, attacking the homeland of a former tribal enemy, the Fertit tribe. For most of the residents with whom I spoke, this perception was reason enough to flee. Nearly 3o,ooo of the estimated 35,ooo residents of Raga and Daeim Zubeir, the two largest towns takforces of the en by the "liberation" SPIA, fled toward government held areas of South Darfur, Wau, and Aweil. The misunderstanding and misrepresentation of a war that is tribal at its roots has resulted in the loss of countless opportunities to initiate peace through rnediation. The most prorninent international responsesconcentrate on eradicating abductions of women and children, the enlistment of child soldiers, and arbitrary imprisonment or farnine. Such efforts ignore the strong causal linls between the war itself and these problerns. Never has there been a war without hurnan rights violations and humanitarian disasters. Without recognizing this and acknowledging that, first and foremost, peace needs to be brought to Sudan, all other interventions are mere red herrings, distracting attention from the reality on the ground. At this juncture, there is little reason to hope that a substantial reassessmentof the lopsided intervention strategy will occur. Foreign governments appear intent to continue their support for either the rebel movement or the Sudanesegovernment through a variety of means, from the openly biased supply of arms, to the more subtle, but equally important, organizational capacity-building. These same international actors, however, designate money to humanitarian agencies

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for food relief and displacement camps to aid civilians on the other side. These actions leave aid workers like myself wondering what motivates the conflicting policies. By providing aid, are politicians in Washington, Brussels, and Riyadh helping to end the humanitarian crisis or simply fueling the war? In early October, I left Sudan, passing the management of the IRC's Sudanese field offices to the capable hands of the Sudanese.At the time, neither side of the conflict had used the attack upon the World Trade Center as a rallying call for their domestic causes.Nevertheless, lines in the sand were being drawn. Fundarnentalists were exhorting their followers to prepare for a war against the nonbelievers, while the Khartourn government, deterrnined to avoid a return to its pariah status of the early- to midnineties, was sending zero-tolerance messages.Within the first week after the attacks, deadly clashes erupted on the streets of Khartourn. The Public Order Police prevailed in the first confrontation, but at a high price: a nurnber of anti-Arnerican protesters were killed. The outcome of this internal struggle will undoubtedly influence the future direction of Africa's longest-running civil war, as \ rill U.S. actions toward Sudan in the coming months. At the present tirne, when governrnents and people throughout the world, including those of Sudan, are attempting to look beyond their previous differences and are reaching out to offer their condolences and friendship, a unique opportunity has arisen. The situation is ripe for a change in policy. The hope of military victory must be supplanted by a desire to embrace diplomacy. Otherwise, the people of Sudan-regardless of race, religion, or color-will continue to suffer. Victo-

ViewfromtheGround ries on the battlefield are cause for celebration for some, but to others, they are only occasionsto mourn, as each soldier's step forward further entrenches hatred,

misunderstanding, and distrust among the people of Sudan. There will be little respite for the Sudanese until, first and foremost, peace is brought to their land.

NOTES r The

Murahaliin are government mercenaries to attack southern villages on horseback wielding machine guns and raping, killing, and pillaging

knom

everything children

before

them,

in the process.

often taking away women

and

2 After visiting all of the areas within governmentheld territorT to which the Internally Displaced Persons had fled and not having seen them or heard of their fortune, I fear that these people were killed during or after the attack.

Winter/Spring2oo2

[I6g]

A LookBack

TheSeptember tt Attaclts andTheirHistoricalStgnifcence in the FightagainstTerrorism .

TI T I0rrss JazaLry

Misconceptions about Algeria's decade-long fight against terrorism and about Islam have led to unnecessary hurnan losses and to wrong policy conclusions in different parts of the world before and to a lesserextent after September rr, 2OOI. I hope some personal thoughts of mine may help, however marginally, to clarify the debate on these issues. My experiences with terror in my horne country-and also in the country where I now reside-have left rne with some powerful irnpressions regarding what went wrong in the past and how we can work together for a more successfulfuture.

ldrissJazairy is Algerian Ambassador to the United States.

TheAlgerianExperience with Terrorism.president Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria was one of the first heads of state in the world to address a rnessageof support and sym pathy to President George W. Bush on the very day of the September rI attacks.He then joined the international effort to combat terrorism and clamp down on terrorist financial assetsabroad. No wonder. Algerians know only too well what it means to be the targets of terrorism. For an entire decade, the nation has had to single-handedly deal with its own terrorist scourge. Its previous

Winter/SpringeooZ I I7 r ]

JAZAIRY

calls for a world response against terror fell on deaf ears, much like the unheeded call for help made by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in the League of Nations warning the world against fascism as early as rgJ6. Though its population is one-tenth that of the United States, in just ten years, Algeria has been subjected to ruthless terrorist attacks which have led to lossesof life and rnaterial damage equivalent to twenty-five times those incurred as a result of the attacks launched against the'World Tiade Center (WTC) on September It. One would be hard pressed to find another country in the Arab region or in the Islarnic world that has had to pay as high a price asAlgeria for working toward justice, freedorn, and democracy. Contrary to popular belief, the interruption of the r99r parliarnentary elections did not precipitate the violence in Algeria. Violence erupted across the country before the vote due to the inciternents of religious-curn-political zealots who alleged that all people intending to vote against them were apostates and could therefore be killed. These fanatics also declared that, if elected, they would suspend democracy, a concept allegedly alien to Islam. Consequently, the interruption of the electoral process, while regrettable in principle, made it possible to preserve the long-term goal of establishing a stable democracy.

A Welcome Evolution of U.S.

expressedwas that there was a $O percent chance that the government would fall within three to four years in the wake of an Islamist takeover,I This position was consistent with that of the Reagan adrninistration, which had previously supported radical multinational groups of political Islamists in Afghanistan in order to oust the Soviet Union frorn that country up until the end of the eighties. It turned out that the very same groups, championed by Osama bin Laden, then redeployed their Algerian volunteers in Algeria itself in order to accesspower through large-scale killings of innocent civilians under the guise of a distorted vision of an Islamic society. These are the same groups that turned against the United States in the attack of September rr. The attention now given by President Bush to the threat of world terrorism, which obviously knows no borders, is to be welcorned. It corrects the U.S. position with regards to Algeria, ceasing to consider political Islamisrn as a possible option for our nation. I would also like to note that it is fortunate that U.S. officials no longer invoke the expression "crusade against terrorism, " a term that would have excluded by definition the involvement of Moslem states in the international effort now under way, as it evokes a past clash of civilizations that lay at the heart of the original medieval Crusades.

Policy over Timâ&#x201A;Ź. In theyears fol-

Not a Clashof Civilizations or

lowing that interruption of the electoral process, the U.S. adrninistration was of two minds as to whether it should accept this decision to suspend the elections or whether a chance should be given to political Islarnism in Algeria. At a Congressional hearing in 1994, one view

ValUgS. In a very real sense, then, the term "crusade" fosters the impression that Islam and the-West are embroiled in a battle of good versus evil, a ludicrouslycompressed representation of a disorderly reality that cannot be pigeonholed or strapped down in this way, as our two

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A LookBack cultures have merged seamlesslyfor centuries in the ocean of history.z Too much has been made out of the differences in values between the West and Islam. Neither Islam nor the West is monolithic, and each is enlightened (and back\^/ard) in its own way. Islamic societies are in need of irnprovements, yet so are those of the secularWest. For example, in terms of the ernpowerment of wornen, many Islarnic countries rnay be ahead of Western states. Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Turkey all currently have or have recently had wornen as heads of state or government, while the largest'Western

of conscience rather than a reduction of the faith to a civil and a penal code by the state. This would represent a move from "catholic" to "protestant" Islam, to use the expression of professor Mohamed Arkoun.4 On the other hand,'Western secularism is relative. Originally, the separation of church and state in the United States was a political move to assert the American identity through severing linls with the Church of England, rather than an outright commitment to secularism. Thomas Jefferson himself believed that one of the basic school books across the

Neither Islam nOrtheWestis rnonolithic,

and each is enlightened (and backrvard) in lts OWn WaV. I country has never had a wornan president. W-omen also had the right to vote in Afghanistan and Iran decades before they did in Switzerland, where universal suffrage did not exist until r97r. Indeed, I also dispute the idea that the principle of secularisrn is a dividing line with Islarn. Consider the United States, a so-called secular nation whose percentage of the Moslern population is sirnilar to that of Christians in a Moslem country like Senegal. Of the last three presidents of Senegal,one has been Christian and another has a Christian wife. Can one imagine the reverse in.Washington? Doubtlessly, Islarnic societies still have a major problem in what is called the "rnanagement of the sacred,"3which under Shiisrn is controlled by the clergy and under Sunnism is de facto controlled by the state.Ajump into modernity would require an internalization of the sacred by each individual as a matter

country should be the Bible. Also, Congressbegins each day with a prayer. Finally, many of the presumed differences between Islarn and the West are the result of ideological and ethnic stereotypes. President George W. Bush has stated that the U.S. responseto September rr targets neither a country, nor a people, nor an ethnic or religious group. Indeed, it would not be fair to identify networks of radical terrorists with a particular population such as Arabs or Moslerns. Terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon that exists to different degrees and in different forrns in rnany countries, including the United States, Ireland, Spain's Basque country, Corsica, India, Peru, and Columbia, as well as in the Moslem world. This fact is often overlooked, however, in favor of the stereotypical Islamic terrorist. One does not equate terrorism with the United States just because Timothy McVeigh blew up the

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Islamicsocieties still nu"earnajor proble*

"rnanafert.e.rt of il,what is called the

the sacred.

federal building in Oklahoma. Nor is it likely that an Arnerican of Irish descent will be prevented frorn boarding a plane becauseof the sound of his name. One rnust rernember the wave of antiSemitisrn which targeted the Jews and culminated in the state-sponsoredatrocities leading up to World War IL Though not comparable with the forrner, one must also be mindful of the impact of Roosevelt's Executive Order 9o16, which was issued after Pearl Harbor to authorize the internment of Iro,ooo innocent American citizens or r e s i d e n t so f J a p a n e s eo r i g i n . The international community must ensure that the tragedy of the WTC, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania crash does not unleash a further abornination in the forrn of a new wave of anti-Semitism and hatred. Onlythis tirne, the world must look to protect not the descendants of Isaac,but the descendantsof his elder brother Ismail, the Arab people. The repeated broadcast on September I2 by several world television news agencies of footage showing a Palestinian wornan and a few kids celebrating, eating sweets,making V signs, and pulling facesat the camera does not bode weII for the future. The cornrnentator said the people were rejoicing about the U.S. tragedy, thereby breeding hatred againstArabs worldwide. This overshadowed the irnpact of an outpouring of sympathy from Arab governrnents and teeming millions across the entire Arab region, as well as from the Organization of the Islarnic Conference, representing Islarn throughout the world.

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Anti-Semitism is an evil that will not bear containrnent. If it is tolerated for one Sernitic subgroup like the Arabs, it will spread to encompass all Serniteswithout exception and contaminate ethnic relations worldwide. Therefore, President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft deserve cornrnendation for clearly drawing the distinction between Moslerns and those who blaspheme God/Allah by comrnitting evil in his narne. The president rightly underscored the fact that the terrorists are traitors to their own faith.

A Religionof Peace.rt is both dangerous and wrong to view Islarn as a religion of terror. Prejudice, vilification, and instability are the only possible results. Nothing exists in the Holy Koran that lends support to violent extremism. The Koran indeed refers specifically to extrernists who stray from the true teachings of their religion, and indicates that one should not pity thern when they are exposed to retribution: "Is he then (of those) to whom the evil of their conduct is rnade alluring so that they look upon it as good. For Allah leaves to stray whorn He wills and grrides whom He wills. So let not thy soul go out in sighing after them, for Allah knows well what they do" (g5'B). The prophet Muhammad himself (p.b.u.h.)s warns us against the evils of fanaticism, explaining that "religious extrernisrn has brought disaster on those who came before you" (.eported by Ibn Abbas). He also said, "A believer

A LookBack remains within the scope of this religion as long as he does not kill another person illegally," that is, outside direct military confrontation. Islam is not a religion of violence as the media tends to convey, but a religion of moderation. As the Koran says:"Thus we have made of thee a Nation of the middle ground that ye rnight bear witness of people" (z't4g).In this context, bearing witness rneans exercising tolerance and being even-handed. The Prophet (p.b.u.h.) gave the following instructions to his troops before combat, "Do not be excessive,do not kill a child nor a wornan nor an old person nor a person who is secluded in his hermitage. Do not burn a fruit tree nor cut trees, nor demolish structures." So I ask, if this cannot be done in wartime, how could it be tolerated in peacetime? Islam remains the religion of peace in spite of the biased translation ofJihad as "Holy War," which evokes irnages of a modern-day Crusade. Its true meaning is "the exertion of effort" or "straining

nine narnes of God. Traditionally, "peace" is used in the greeting used for both Moslems and non-Moslems alike.

TheNeedfor an Even-Handed ReSpOnSe. As military action againsr the Thliban government and the terrorist g'roups it harbors extends to the whole of Afghanistan, one should meditate on these words of the Holy Koran' "And if ye punish, let thy punishment be proportionate to the wrong that has been done to thee...for Allah is with those who restrain themselves and those who do good" (r6,rz6).

The Islamic religion does not recognize collective punishrnent as it forbids that anyone be held responsible for another person's action. "Do not" says God in the Koran, "impose the burden shouldered by one on the shoulders of the other" (r7,r5). The fate of the civilian population in Afghanistan during this tragedy is certainly worthy of compassion, and the irnpending humanitarian crisis should be a major source of concern. Fighting terrorisrn is a complex, longtowards an objective." terrn task involving a multiplicity of The Greater Jihad is the one to be instrurnents in the diplomatic, financial, waged against our own moral weaknesses and intelligence fields, aswell as both new and traditional forms of military action. and selfishness.The LesserJihad, which There is also a need to address the ciris the resort to a just war, can only be invoked to overcome schism in faith, to cumstances that have promoted the "propensity for violence" of certain popprotect believers from oppression, or to react to outside aggression.Jihad cannot ulation groups throughout the world. To analyze this increased "propensity for be used to exercisemilitary domination of one people over another, to exact violence" is not to seekto justif, or excuse it, but to eradicate its underlying causes. revenge, to colonize others, or to force alleIn broad terrns, resentment, frustration, others to change their political giance. As soon as legitimate objectives and despair breed violence. Violence are achieved or when the enemy express- lools for an ideology to legitimize itself. es a desire for peace,Jihad has to stop or A lunatic fringe then emerges from this it becomes an unjust war. process of social fermentation, instruThe root of the word Islam itself is mentalized by evil minds concerned only "peace," which is also one of the ninetywith power, not the soul.

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Some current causes of frustration and despair are internal and relate to the labors of countries whose populations live in poverty and who are the targets of exclusion; they also relate to countries whose economies are in transition. These nations have to put their act together, but are also in need of external supPort' Among other causesof violence is the perceived double standard applied to the Palestinians and the rest of the world by rnajor powers on such issues as hurnan rights and the right to statehood. The Palestinian Intifada is correctly confined to its territory, but all Moslems in other parts of the world share frustration due to the stalernateand to what they perceive as blatant injustice. The maintenance of sanctions in the Middle East that hurt innocent people and not their leaders exacerbate the problem. Terrorists use this frustration as fuel to propel themselvesinto positions of power. Despite these far-reaching frustrations, the overwhelrning majority of countries, friend and foe alike, stood by the United States in condemning these atrocities. This valuable social capital, thus acquired by the United S t a t e s ,s h o u l d b e p r e s e r v e d t o c e m e n t a long-overdue, broad international effort to combat the scourge of terrorisrn. Islarn and the West should not regress to a state of mutual suspicion. After all, we belong to one and the

same civilization: human civilization, a rich blend of diverse cultures and values that have accumulated over time. By building on the unanimous condemnation of violence while learning from its causes, by understanding the and difference between terrorism legitirnate resistance to foreign occupation, and by combating forces in adopting and implementing a UN convention against terrorism, the outcorne of the war on terror rnay truly be a victory for everyone. People in the United Stateshave given a lot more thought to reality in the Arab and Moslern communities than to stereotFpes. This will help dispel the misconceptions to which I have referred, thus avoiding tJreir awesomeconsequences. I attended a meetingbetween the president of my country, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and U.S. president George W. Bush on Novernber $, 2oor. I was gratified and inspired by their cornrnon vision and shared resolve to cornbat terrorism through involving the United Nations in a world-wide response to what is, in effect, a global challenge. President Bush's staternent in the world body on November rO, 2oor eloquently confirrned the cornrnitment of the United States to making the UN the centerpiece of the civilized world's response to the evil that threatens it. This bodes weII for our cornrnon future.

NOTES r Committee on Foreign Relations-Hearing before the Sub-Conmittee on Africa, March 22, rgg4 p.37 2 Edwd Said, "Adrift in Similarity," Al-AhrumWek! (w.ahram.org.eglweek(Ir-r7 Octobe. zoor), ly/ zoor/ 555/ inds.htm>.

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3 Mohamed Arkoun in personal conversations. 4 Conference given at the Library of Congress on

the

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