GJIA - 3.2 Ethics in Conflict by GJIA (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs)

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Editors'Note

andthe Useof Force

BYTHE JOURNAL

Einance ThePanama Canal:0n the Movein the2lst Century A L B E R TA OL E M A NZ U B I E T AI N , TERVIEWE BD Y K A R E NE . B R E I N E R - S A N D E R S The administrator of the Panama Canal Authority discusses the fiscal, political, and security responsibilities of running the Canal-and the challenges ahead.

.--Conf lict&Security I u'

Freedom Operation Enduring andthe Futureof NATO

a n r a Nc o L L r N s

I I

S.ptember u and NAIO's invocation of Article 5 highlighted the changing nature of the alliance in the post-Cold War era.

Realities NavalStrategies Ambitions: TheContinental of Chinese Bluewater China's C H R I S T O P H ER R. B U L L O C K China's

geopolitical

position

favors a less aggressive naval strategy than many fear.

Posturing: A Roundtable Discussion Nuclear

F R A N K G A F F N E Y J, R . , J A M E S L I N D S A Y ,A N D J O H N P I K E ,M O O E R A T E DB Y M I C H A E L E . B R O W N Three

experts spar over key nuclear

issues for the twenty-first

century.

forTurkey In OldPera,NewChallenges

P A U LS K O C Z Y L A S An examination of the changes in one Turkish city offers insight into the cultural struggles ofTurkey as a whole.

FoodSupply on the Eroding0iversityof a Glohalized Reflections K . D U NG I F F O R D The globalization of "techno-foods"

is affecting food culture throughout the world.

187

Lawandthe U.S.Response to Terrorism International Spurring theWarhorse:

M A R KG I L L E S P I E

Should the laws of war or recent international the U.S. response to terrorism?

criminal laws provide the guidelines for

1,, RevisitingtheNationalSocialistLegacy

E R N S TS U C H A R I P A

Austria

resolves restitution

of assets to the victims

of the Holocaust.

But why so late?

Politics&D iplomacy II

| 'os i I t-II5

B r a n d i n gA m e r i c a u c u n R L E sSK U B A The United Statesmust use the tools of rnarketing to promote America's image abroad.

Relations Perspective Pakistani-U.S. after9/ll: A Pakistani Z A M I RA K R A M A Pakistani diplomat outlines recommendations for the development of closer Pakistani-U.S. relations in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September rI.

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r25 TheReverse BrainDrainand the GlobalDiffusionof Knowledge JEANM.JOHNSON

Are foreign students "walking away with the store" or creating economic opportunities abroad for the United States?

r33 TheDiqitalEconomy EDventure ESTHER D Y S O NI,N T E R V I E W EBDY T H EJ O U R N A L The former chair of ICANN in the world.

r4r I

shares her views on issues related to emerging technologies

TheSearchfor the RealIran Hossan' An AmeicanFami!'sJoumg Hometo lran Sanam F. Vakil reviews Terence Ward's Searchingfor

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Really Partof "OneChina"? Uighuristan: R I S HK I APOOR Contrary to the assertions of the Chinese governrnent, the ethnic minorities may not consider thernselves part of "One China."

of Xinjiang

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r4s TheGreatest HealthCrisisof OurTime B I L LF R I S T International

and local leadership is needed to stop the scourge of HMAIDS

in Africa.

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This issue is being released at a time when "conflict" is the one word that best describes the state of affairs in the world today. From Israel to Mghanistan, the world is at war. This state of conflict is not lim ited to bombs in caves and cafes. however; also at war are the very concepts that have defined and bound together the international system. The collapse of the Soviet Union. breakthroughs in advanced technology. and the processes of political and economic globalization have all contributed to the creation of a distinct dynamic in international affairs. Ethical questions are at the core of this new dynamic. A year ago. the world was focused on the polemic debate about the ethics of genet ic engineering. Now. after the traumatic events of September II. and amid conflagrations in the Middle East and South Asia. the focus of the debate has shifted to the ethical questions of war and intervention in the twenty-first century. What are the ethical pre rogatives of states when addressing international security threats? What are the implications of civilian casualties in conflict? How should non-state actors factor into our ethical calculations? What legal righ ts do these acto rs have? Many thinkers have considered these questions in the past-but their answers are prisoners of that past. in many ways inadequate in addressing the problems of the world today. As the world writhes and twists in the throes of change. our framework for understand ing ethical action must evolve in order to cope. In this issue of the GeorgetownJournal ofInternational Affairs. we examine a broad range of perspectives on ethics in international politics. The state of conflict that defines the world today requires us to step back and grapple with ethical dilemmas whose ramifications will echo into the futul'e.

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Irge/ownJournaloflnter_ iversity. The George Affairs, the Edmund ;ibility for the views

HEIDI AROLA

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G E O R G E T O W NJ O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A LA F F A I R S

'a t:

Ethfcsin

Coflict In the early rggos, the dynamic that had shaped international relations for four decades crumbled with the last pieces of the Berlin Wall. As a result, foreign-policy rnakers fumbled to orient thernselves in an increasingly unfamiliar world. A key force that has shaped international politics after the Cold War is globalization. Driven by incredible leaps in technology, globalization has, in the words of Thomas Friedrnan, "enabled each of us to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before."'New and improved technologies have broadened the world stage and lowered the barriers of entry to all kinds of players. Through the Internet and related technologies, for example, individuals and private groups-not just states-have the

Morali! Matters, Ethics andPouer Politicsin the War on Terrorism M A R Y A N NC U S I M A N OL O V E

I nternationalPolitia, Ethics, andthe Useof Force B R Y A NH E H I R

Ethicsand Interests R I C H A R DN E DL E B O W

America'sRoIein the World M A D E L E I NAEL B R I G H T

Summer/lalL 2Oo2

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I N T R OD U C TI O N

power to mobilize people and resources en masse. Combined with a breakdown of order in many parts of the world in the last decade, technological change and other aspects of globalization have enabled non-state actors to pose real threats in the international political arena. This newly-empowered set of players does not alwaysabide by the "rules of the game"-the rules of a world dominated by nation-states. States still seem confounded by such players as the al Qaeda terrorist network. In many respects, leaders lack a coherent framework for dealing with problems that fall outside of the traditional stateto-state schematic with which they are cornfortable. They face a quandary, Old rules, particularly those informal axiorns on how and when to intervene in conflict situations, have come into conflict with new realities. Just as new international actors have challenged nation-state-oriented conceptions of the international systern, states themselves have come under scrutiny in recent years. The definitions of what constitutes a state and the responsibilities a state must take for its people have becorne contentious. What do foreign-policy rnakers do when not just hlper-powered individuals but also states refuse to play by the rules of the game? Respect for sovereignty has always been the number one precept in foreign-policy making protocol. Yet, how should a state deal with a government like the Thliban? Indecision and the lack of an ethical frarnework rnay have led the West to stay out of Afghanistan for so long-a choice whose consequences we are witnessing today. The September tr attacks threw a wildcard into the deck, exemplifring the power and potential threat of certain

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non-state actors. In their aftermath, the dangers of turning a blind eye to human rights abusesand failed statesseem undeniable. As violence erupts around the world among myriad actors in myriad contexts, the ethical framework that has for so long defined international relations-one based on respect for state sovereignty-rnay no longer suffice. This Forum is about ethics in conflict. Where do ethics fit into our considerations of international conflict and intervention-both in terms of justification and execution? How can we reconcile the conflicts between old and emerging ethical perspectives on world affairs? Conclusions do not come easily, but our authors attempt to build a base frorn which to start. Maryann Cusirnano Love argrles that rnorality matters in combating terrorism. Moral judgements-about rights, injustice, and the legitimate and illegitimate use of force-underpin both the clairns of terrorists and the responses of the rest of the world. States deterrnined to control international terrorism must factor morality into their strategies, and must buttress their grrns and bombs with the power of global norms. Bryan Hehir examines the three strands of thought regarding ethical constraints on warfare. He highlights three politicalmoral problerns that policfrnakers will likely face in the corning years: decisions regarding nuclear policy, hurnanitarian intervention, and terrorism. Although recent events have highlighted the role of ethical issuesin world politics, Richard Ned Lebow rerninds us that ethics have been essential at least since the days of the Greels. Lebow contends that maintaining ethical principles-and doing so through dialogr-rearnong actors in a cornrnunity-is in the primary inter-

Ethicsin Conflict est of states.Without ethics, stateslack the means with which to cohere and determine their interests. Finally, in an interviewwith tl.eJoumal, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reflects on her experience as a key policymaker at a critical juncture in world affairs. She focuses especially on two ethical issues of continuing relevance: hurnanitarian intervention and

the promotion of democracy and U.S. values abroad. Leaders confront debilitating dilemmas when trying to decide whether and how to help in other parts of the world; Albright offers insights from her own experiences, and proposes sorne important steps for the future. "lnterview' Farther, Friedman, Cheaper, " The CeorgetounJ oumol of Inter88. notionolAffairs.r, no. 2, (Summer/Fall zooo),

Notes:

r Thomas

Faster, D eeper,

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Ethicsin Conflict

Mora

atters

EthicsandPowerPoliticsin the Waron Tercorism Maryann Cusimano Love

Since the September rr terrorist attaclc in the United States, many argrle that in war the United States must not let moral considerations over means constrain its pursuit of foreign policy ends. Al Qaeda fights dirty, so the United Statesmust be willing and able to respond in kind to defeat networks of global terrorism and protect U.S. citizens and institutions. As Thomas Friedrnan put it, "We have to fight the terrorists as if there were no rules."' This line of argu.mentation fundamentally misunderstands the nature of war against terrorism in an era of globalization. Ethical norms, including the constraints ofjust war theory, are not an obstacle but an integral and powerful tool in fighting the war on terrorism. Al Qaeda is fighting for its own rnoral ideas, against what its members perceive as the violation of the sanctity of Islamic holy sites by the presence of U.S. troops. Terrorisrn itself is a tactic that violates the moral prohibition against killing noncornbatants in order to generate a psychological reaction disproportionate to the physical damage it causes.Osama bin Laden and his network astutely use the tools of global media to broadcast their ideas, attract members, and generate sympathy for their cause. In response, the Bush administration attempts to build an international coalition around an antiterrorism norm.

Maryann C u s i m a n oL o v e ; . Associate Professor, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. Department of P o l i t i c sa n d C e n t e r f o r lnternational Social Development.

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The war on terrorism is an attempt to construct a global prohibitionary norm against nonstate actors tactically killing noncombatants. The war on terrorism is thus similar to the International Coali-

continue to "misunderestimate" the nature of the war on terrorism. The terrorist attacls of September rr were a direct result of the military superiority of U.S. armed forces. The lower

Ethics arg not oppos_ed powerpolirics,^and to_

but are an irnportan^t unde^rutilizbd tool of power in the war on terrorisrn, and rnust be embraced as such. tion to Ban Landmines (although the administration has clearly not presented its case in this light) in that both are efforts to build an international coalition to delegitirnize tactics that kill innocent noncombatants in international politics. Ethics are not opposed to power politics, but are an important and underutilized tool of power in the war on terrorism, and must be ernbraced as such. Ethics and just war theory $WT) are power politics assetsin helping to discredit the terrorists, assuage negative public opinion of the United States in the Arab and Muslim world, build international support for the war on terrorism, and construct a global prohibitionary norrn against terrorisrn.'

the possibility that an enemy can strike the United States conventionally on the battlefield, the higher the probability that opponents will pursue asymmetric warfare tactics, striking at targets of opportunity-from unprotected civilians, trade and transportation infrastructure, to other critical infrastructure. In responding to the terrorist strikes, the United States faces a target-poor environment, not knowing who or where the terrorists are. The terrorists, in contrast, face a target-rich environrnent. In the information age, the United States and its developed dernocratic allies have increasingly open societies, economies, and technologies. Through globalization, these open economic, technological, and societal infrastructures are actively accessible Nature of the War. I' a speechabroad. Homeland security and critical to the intelligence community after the infrastructure protection are thus necesrr September a t t a c k s , P r e s i d e n t sary but insufficient methods of curtailGeorge W. Bush noted in his idiosyning terrorist attacks. The United States cratic way that the terrorists had "miscannot prevent all terrorist attacksu n d e r e s t i m a t e d " t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , instead it must seek to curtail the number qnd lethality of such attacla, as there will had misunderestimated the U.S. public, and had misunderestimated him.3 always be more potential targets than However, even after September Ir, resources to protect them. The United many in the adrninistration, t h e States can seek to deter large scale attacls media, the punditry, and the public by protecting major targets so well that

the " Misunderestimating"

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terrorists will be compelled to go after compared to the actual damage done. softer targets, such as public buses or After the September rI attacks, the realrestaurants, as is the casein Israel. This is estate market for Manhattan s\scrapers the new face of U.S. containrnent policy plummeted. The idea that it could have against asymmetric threats. Because been anyone in a plane, on their way to asymmetric warfare is cheap and its work, or in or near a skyscraper, did means are easily available to a wide variety rnore damage to the U.S. economy and of individuals and groups, successagainst society than the initial damage done by al Qaeda would not rnake the United the planes on the buildings. Homeland from States safe security efforts to protect the United global terrorism. While U.S. military strength can lead groups to States at home and military efforts choose asymmetric terrorist tactics rather abroad address the physical damage terthan direct rnilitary confrontation, U.S. rorists can do. These efforts largely do rnilitary actions alone cannot protect not engage the terrorists on their real noncombatants from acts of terror. battlefield, the war of ideas. "MisunderUltimately, terrorisrn is a battle of estimating" the nature of the war on terideas more than a battle of competing rorism leads the United Statesto turn its militaries. Groups choose terrorism back on sorne of the most powerful tools specifically to try to compensate for their at its disposalr ideas, rnoral persuasion, small numbers and their military inferiand the ability to effectively craft a mesority with the power of ideas. Terrorism sageand disserninate it abroad. is a tactic used by groups with varying ideological agendas,but it is alwaysa tacPagan EthOS. Frustration leadsmany tic of asymmetrical conflict used by rnilitarily weaker parties. As noted above, to syrnpathize with Thomas Friedman's terrorism is the illegitimate use of force position, "We have to fight the terrorists against noncombatants in order to cause as if there were no rules. "5 a psychological reaction (fear, shock, Journalist and author Robert D. Kaplan makes a sirnilar argument. The panic) out of proportion to the magnitude of the attack in order to perpetuate harbarians are at the gate, and we must political or other goals.aThe reactions adjust our thinking about ethics and forthat terrorists are trying to provokeeign policy accordingly. The twenty-first fear, shock, panic, and attention to the century is marked by anarchy eroding the terrorists' views or goals-are the real islands of peace and prosperity of develweapons, regardless of whether grrns, oped democracies. Growing, violent, bombs, or airplanes are employed. Surpopulist rnovernents of the poor are disprise magnifies the psychological reacenfranchised from the benefits of the tion to a terrorist attack, and the media global economy. These angry groups amplify the message. The value of terexploit open democratic societies and rorists' victims depends on the symbolglobal technology to inflict great cruelty ism of the target and the esteem society from a distance. "The post-Industrial has for the victims. If the larger populaRevolution empowers anyone with a celtion empathizes with the victims of the lular phone and a bag of explosives. terrorist attack, the attacls will produce a America's military superiority guarantees disproportionate psychological reaction that such new adversaries will not fight

Just War Theoryversusa

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according to our notions of fairness: they will come at us by surprise, asymmetrically and at our weakestpoints, as they often have in the past. Asymmetry gives terrorists and cyber criminals their strength, since such adversaries operate beyond accepted international norms and value systems on a plane where atrocity is a legitimate form of war."o Kaplan con-

resort in self-defense to protect life, never aggressivelyfor mere military or political advantage, nor for vengeance or retribution. "Every military response must be in accord with sound moral principles, notably such norms of the just war tradition as non-combatant irnmunity, proportionality, right intention, and probability of success."s

U ltirnately, ter wisrn is ubattle of ideas rrrore than a battle of cornpeting rnilitaries. cludes that in warrior politics "Ieadership demands a pagan ethos," motivated by the pursuit of valorous, patriotic ends, and unconstrained by Judeo-Christian principles (including JWT) that the means of statecraft must respect the fundamental dignity of all hurnan life.7 Not everyone agreeswith this conclusion. As a rnernber of the International Policy Comrnittee, I helped advise the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in producing their staternent "A Pastoral Message, Living With Faith and Hope After September rrth." The bishops note, "In our response to attacks on innocent civilians, we must be sure that we do not violate the norrns of civilian immunity and proportionality. We believe every life is precious whether a person works at the World Tiade Center or lives in Afghanistan. The traditional moral norrns governing the use of force still apply, even in the face of terrorism on this scale."* They conclude that while military action rnay regrettably be necessary in response to the September rr attacks, it is not sufficient. Too often, force addressesthe violent symptoms of conflict without addressing the underlying roots. Force rnay only be used as a last

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lJnfortunately, many in the Bush adrninistration and the U.S. public are not syrnpathetic to the bishops' argrrments concerning rnoral constraints on the range of U.S. policy options. While the initial stages of the war in Afghanistan were conducted with attention to minirnizing civilian casualties, this rnay not be the case in future engagernents. If the United States expands its military conflict with Iraq, civilian casualties would be extensive. The battle for Baghdad would be nothing like Tora Bora; the Thliban and al Qaeda battles in the Afghan mountains were far removed from large civilian population centers, whereas tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians would be caught in the middle of atternpts to oust Saddam Hussein and could be used deliberately as civilian shields by Iraqi forces. JWT raises other concerns in taking the war on terrorism to Iraq: just cause and the lack of evidence linking Iraq to the September tt attacks, the problem of anticipatory self-defense, right intention, legitirnate authority, comparative justice, last resort, probability of success, and proportionality. But concern for noncombatant immu-

LovEEthicsin Conflict da's representation of events. In hourlong polling interviews of ro,ooo people in nine mainly Muslim countries that together account for half of all Muslims worldwide (Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabla, and Turkey), only rB percent of those polled believed Arab men carried out the Septernber II attacls; 6r percent did not believe Arabs were responsible." "ends justiOsama bin Laden and his followers MoralityMatters.The fy the means/pagan ethos" calculus is attempt to act as moral entrepreneurs, agents who act as reformers or crusaders wrong because morality matters in to change rules, out ofan ethical concern combating terrorism and especially in to curtail a great evil. curtailing al Qaeda. A Queda'r campaign shares rnany More than ten times as rnany Arnericansdied in automobile accidents last year c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a t r a n s n a t i o n a l than died in the September rr attacks.'o advocacy network, except of course Why do we spend billions to respond to t h a t t h e t e r r o r i s t n e t w o r k e r n b r a c e s the September rr attacls, while barely v i o l e n t a n d i l l i c i t t a c t i c s . acknowledging other innocents who died While governments have legal authority, before their time? It is not just the nurnadvocacy groups rely on moral authority. ber of victims that affronts us, but the way Generally, while states have greater miliin which they died, characterizing an act tary power... transnational advocacy netof violence as terrorism is inherently a works' strength lies in their idea power. moral judgrnent about the legitimate and They seek to occupy the only high ground available to them, the moral high ground. illegitimate usesof force. If they can succeed in redefining a probMoral arguments are also the basis of Iem as a moral issue, they will have a al Qaeda'scaseagainstthe United States. greater chance of prevailing, because They argue that the U.S. military presstates ... may not be able to speak credibly ence in Saudi Arabia desecratesthe land as bastions or brokers of morality. Reliof Mecca and Medina, despite the facts gious organizations in particular often have well-developed ethics and rich instiin military, the U.S. that Muslims serve resources which are useful to tutions, and that U.S. troops were invited in to advocacy networks... transnational protect Saudl Arabia from invasion, and Morally, religious organizations have are stationed far from these holy sites. l e g i t i m a c y s p e a k i n g o n m o r a l i s s u e sa n d a Bin Laden believesthat ideas matter, and treasure chest of well-developed ideas available for use by transnational advocahas conducted an active global media religious organicy networks. tctically, campaign to promote al Qaeda's norms zations can pool their power with other through video tapes, town hall meetings, religious and civil society groups, and use and activeoutreach to the Arab and Must h e i r d i r e c t p u l p i t a c c e s st o c i t i z e n s ( w h o lim press. Polls show these efforts are may be business or government decision succeeding. A troublingly high percentmakers) as well as their ability to attract media. Transnational advocacy networks, age of the Muslim world believes al Qae-

nity is more than a moral or legal nicety. The United Statesargues that terrorism, intentionally targeting noncornbatants, is wrong and demands an international coalition to curtail the practice.-Wecannot effectively lead or credibly persuade others to join an international coalition against terrorist killing of noncombatants while intentionally putting the lives of noncombatants at risk ourselves.

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Finally, al Qaeda also seeks to spread its moral norms, and thereby its revoas good preachers in order to mobilize lution, by establishing a network of 'Wahhabi their ideas.'' schools globally. Some of By attacking the United States, al Qaethese are used as recruitment channels to identify and train terrorists. Many da has attempted to open a new forum for politics blocked by the localArab gov- poor Muslim states such as Pakistan, unable to provide basic public educaernments. Margaret Keck and Kathryn "boomerang tion, welcomed the Saudi-financed Sikkink refer to this as the (schools educating students in pattern." "When channels between the modrcsscs state and its domestic actors are blocked, Wahhabi fundamentalist Islam).'a Later, many regretted giving a forum for the boomerang pattern of influence networks an exclusive, fundarnentalist version of characteristic of transnational rnay occur: domestic [groups] bypass Wahhabi Islam that warns of the danger of fraternizing with Christians and their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on Jews, often foments violence in their their states from outside." Al Qaeda, countries, and facilitates or sympawhich considers the Eglptian and Saudi thizes with terrorisrn. But by losing control of schools and primary educagovernments to be hypocrites who collaborate with infidels in the desecration tion, the governrnent had already sufof Islarn, seels to overthrow these gov- fered significant setbacks in the battle to define morality and the battle of ernments and replace them with a fundarnentalist Wahhabi Islamic theocracy that ideas. The leaders of al Qaeda underrules by its interpretation of Islarnic law. stand that morality matters, and have launched a global public diplornacy and But it does so by attacking the United States, believing the United States is a information politics battle against the better target than Saudl Arabia or Egypt. United States and U.S. allies-a battle Since Saudi Arabia is a closed society, that has largely gone unanswered. attempts to attack the Saudi regime might be brutally put down, and aI Qaeda's messagewould likely not make it past the Just as al Qaeda atternpts to build a globheavily state-censored Saudi media to the al base for its ideals, the Bush adrninisoutside world. More irnportantly, the tration is also attempting to spread globkilling of Muslirns through its rneans al norms. The Bush administration, however, is attempting to construct a would appear illegitirnate and irnmoral to the audience ul Qu"du addresses. global norm against terrorism with its Knowing that morality rnatters in what hands tied. The administration has they pose as a moral crusade, al Qaeda placed great emphasis on the military uses means which are morally acceptable prosecution of the war in Afghanistan at the cost of a billion dollars a month.'s It within the context of its brand of Wahis also actively courting international habi Islam. For example, a leading high school textbook used in Wahhabi schools support for expanding the war to remove warns, "It is compulsory for Muslims to Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. be loyal to each other and to consider the U.S. military support has also been infidels their enemy."'3 extended to fight terrorists in the PhilipIike others

who

can persuade

but

not

compel, must be good salespeople as well

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LovEEthicsin Conflict pines, Georgia, and Yemen. Political negotiations with government decision makers and international elites accompany these military efforts, along with economic diplomacy to curtail the financing of terrorism. But by emphasizing the military, political, and economic tools to prosecute the war, with little attention to the public diplomacy and moral tools, the United Statestries to construct global norms with a muzzle on the means to establish such norms. According to Edward S. Walker, former assistantsecretary of state for the Near East, "public diplomacy. . . hasbeen a critical missing link" in U.S. policy toward the Islamic world. "The basic reason we're not very effective," Walker said in an interview, "is

tion Centers to combat misinformation and disseminate the coalition's views of the war. However, as one senior administration official said, "One of the things that became clear to us as we began this campaign is that we had a real deficit in the Arab world to fight against. For so long, our basic, fundamental viewpoints have been absent. lThere is] an incredible deficit of understanding."'s Even within the Pentagon, where funding flows more freely, the information campaign has not gone rnuch better. The Office of Strategic Influence, created after September rI to drop leaflets and broadcast information in foreign countries, was disbanded after news leaks in February 2o02 created controversy over whether the office intended to spread along with its ProPamisinformation

we don't even try."'6 The ideaswar has been a Poor stepchild ganda efforts.'o to the rnilitary conduct of the war, in part The effort to establish a global prohlbibecausethe U.S. public diplomacy infranorm against terrorism requires tionary over degraded badly structure has been so Statesto effectively disseminate United the the years. Weakened by budget cuts throughout the r98os and r99os, the ideas, inforrnation, and moral messages. U.S. Information Agency was disbanded How have other global norms been established? Scholar Ethan A. Nadelmann as a separateagencyin r$$$ (after a constudied the creation of global prohibiHelms, certed campaign by SenatorJesse "a tionary regimes. How did powerful global rogue who called the Voice of America norms and international laws develop age.rcy")." Public diplomacy functions against slavery, pirac/, and trafficking in were folded into the State Department, and children for the purposes of women and fewer staff and were allocated The inadequacy of existing has prostitution? resources.While bin Laden routinely media access in the Arab world, the law enforcement measures against probBroadcasting Board of Governors discov- lems that moved easily over sovereign borders was a powerful incentive in the above ered in its study of media in the Arab "there casesas well as in the current war on termedia war certainlywas a world that rorism. However, equally important "is going on in the region, and that U.S. played the role of moral proselytism. The combroadcasting international pulsion to convert others to one's beliefs absolutelyno role" in it.'8 and to remake the world in one's own the that In response to criticisms United States was failing in the image image has long played an important role war, weeksafter military operations were in international politics."'' The proselytizing efforts of governments, acting in underway in Afghanistan, the White coalition with nongovernmental transnaInformaHouse opened the Coalition

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tional organizations, function as "transnational moral entrepreneurs.""

terrorism. To effectively prosecute this war, the United States must embrace, Moral argr,rments augrnent international not turn away from, our founding adherence to a regime, gr'ni^g it greater moral principles. These moral ideas, "moral and symbolic force...that cannot more than our smart bombs and special be defied lightly. ""'' forces, are the sources of U.S. power. Drawing insights frorn the successful The United States must not "misunefforts to create global prohibitions derestimate" the nature of the war on against slavery and antipersonnel landterrorism, but realize that it is fundarnines, Judeo-Christian moral argrr- mentally a war of ideas. The United rnents about the fundamental dignity of States must engage the ideas war by all human life are not a constraint on strengthening the institutional infrae f f e c t i v ea c t i o n i n t h e w a r o n t e r r o r i s m , s t r u c t u r e o f U . S . p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y , b u t r a t h e r t h e v e r y m e a n s t o m o t i v a t e , degraded frorn years of neglect and legitimate, explain, and justifr the effort anernic funding. Private sector U.S. to establish a global prohibition on teractors are masters of cornrnunications, rorism. The opponent of the United rnarketing, advertising, and diverse States shrewdly understands and uses the cross-cultural exchanges. U.S, governrnent efforts to effectively cornmunicate power of moral ideas, while the United States itself oddly attempts to construct a a n d b u i l d a c o a l i t i o n a b r o a d w o u l d b e enhanced by regrrlar, sustained cooperglobal moral norm against terrorism while keeping morality at arm's length ation, advice, and partnership with the frorn power politics. private sector. Finally, the United Rather than eschew our rnoral codes States must pay sustained attention to as a hindrance that the enemy also just war theory in the war on terrorisrn. avoids, we must embrace them as a Noncombatant casualties caused by strategic weapon of power politics. U.S. forces underrnine the important Ideas cornpel more completely than U.S. atternpt to build a global norm rnilitary force. When the arms are withagainst terrorist activities and noncomdrawn, ideas rernain. Long after the batant targeting. Given the nature of empires fall, their ideas continue. The global terrorism, unilateralism and f l e d g l i n g U . S . r e p u b l i c y i e l d e d f a r prirnarily military responses will not more power than its nearly nonexistent effectively combat the threat, so the arrned forces could project due to the United States must enlist the support of force of U.S. moral clairns-that all are others. Prohibitions against slavery and created equal, with inalienable rights to piracy took decades, but eventually suclife, Iiberty, and the pursuit of happiceeded. So might the war on terrorness. Rather than distancing ourselves i s r n , i f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d o e s n o t from this code, the war on terrorism squander international support by would be much more effective if it drew e n g a g i n g i n m o r a l l y q u e s t i o n a b l e on this touchstone to make the casewhy b e h a v i o r w h i l e a t t e m p t i n g t o c r e a t e a the tactic of terrorism is wrong and g l o b a l m o r a l n o r m . should be curtailed. The United States does not need to Editor's Note, adopt a pagan ethos to win the war on Copyright 2oo2. Maryann Cusimano I ^-.

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LovE Ethicsin Conflict NOTES r Thomas Friedman, "World War III," )feu hrfr T i m e s1 , 3 September 2oor. 2 While earlier versions of theJWT began with the Greelc and Romans, the Christian Augustinian tradition of JWT was developed in rhe lourth century. (Saint Augustine, City of God. translatedby Thomas Merton. NewYork, Modern Librarv Paperback Class i c s .2 o o o ) . J W T

rr "Improving

Our Image," The Montreol Cozette, 4 2 o o 2 , B 2 ; H o w a r d S . B e c k e r , o u f s i d e r sS ; tud_ i e s i n t h e S o c i o l o g o fD e o i o n c e( N e w Y o r k , T h e F r e e P r e s s , March

Ig63), r4B: Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global prohibition regimes:the evolution of norms in interna. tional society," Internotional Orgonigtion ++, no. 4, (Autumn I99o)' 482; Richard E. Neustadt, Presi,

constrainsthe the use offorce both ad bellum and in bello via several criteria, such as just cause; right intention; legitimate authority; compar-

dential Power and the Modern Presidents:The Politics of Leodershipfrom Rooseuelllo Reogon (New York, Free Press,

ative justice; Iast resort; probability of success; proportionality; and protection of noncombatants. For

Cusimano Love, "NGOs, People in Beyond Sovereignty: lssues for Glot"l " Agenda, 2d ed., (Wadsworth, forthcoming July 2c02).

more on JWT and the war on terrorism, see Maryann Cusimano Love. "Clobalization, Ethrcs and the War on Terrorism, " Notre DomeJournol of Low, Ethics,ond Public Polig, 16 (May 2ooa): ror-rr5. ! President George W. Bush, "Remarks to the CIA Workforce," < http, //w.

September cia. gov/cialpubl

26,2oor,

online at ic_affairs/speeches/archi

ves/2oo t,/bush_speech_og 2 62 oor.html> {. Maryann Cusimano Love and Manha Crenshaw, "Networked Terror, " in Bqond Sotereign!' Issues a Clobal for Agendo, Zd ed., (Wadworth' fo rthcoming July 2oo2). g Thomas Friedman, "World War III," "Meu hrl Iimer, I3 September 2OOI. 6 Robert

Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Wlgt Leadenhip Demondso Pogon Ethos (New York, Random House, 2ooI), g ro. dignity of all / Respect {br the fundamental human life and the.Just War Tradition are more than Judeo-Christian values. All the major world religions profess respect for human life, and most embrace

rggo).

12 Maryann

Power,"

13 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Actiuists BgondBorders (lthaca, Cornell University Press, 19g8), 12; Wahhabi high school textbook quoted in Martin Smith

and Lowell Bergman, "Saudi Time Bomb," PBS Frontline, November I5, 2oor, transcript on line at M.pbs.org. r{.

Maryann

Power"; Martin

Cusimano

Love,

"NGOs,

Smith and Lowell Bergman,

Time

Bomb," PBS Frontline, rg November transcript on-line at <w.pbs.org.>

People "Saudi , 2oor,

lg Mike A'llen and Amy Goldstein, "securitv Fu nd r n g To ps New B udget, " TheWahngton Post.2 A an I uary 2oo2, AI16 Edward S. Walker quoted in Robert G. Kaiser, " U . S . M e s s a g eL o s t O v e r s e a s , O f l i c i a l s S e e I m m e d i a t e

some parallel t"JWT. However, while the U.S. pop, lation today draws from diverse religious and cultural traditions, the lbunders of the United States

Need fbr Public Diplomacy," The WashingtonPon, rg October 2oor, Ar. t/ Senator Jesse Helms quoted in Robert G. Kaiser, "U.S. Message Lost Overseas: Officials See Immediate Need for Public Diplomacy," TheWuhington P o s f ,r g O c t o b e r 2 O O I , A r .

embracedJudeo-Christian values, which is why I single these out, as well as to contrast Kaplan's endorsement of an ends-oriented pagan ethos. 8 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. "A

18 Robert G. Kaiser, "U.S. Message Lost Overseas: Officials See Immediate Need for Public Diplo, macy," TheWashington Post, rg October 2oor, Ar. tg Mike Allen, "Fighting the Image War to Gain

Pastoral Message' Living with Faith and Hope After Il," November r+, 2OOr, online at nccbuscc. org,/sdwp/septr r. html > 9 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, "A

Muslim

September <http, /,/w.

Pastoral Message' Living with Faith and Hope After II, " November 14, 2OOr, http,//w. nccbuscc.org/sdwp/septrI. html ro U.S. outofatalitiestotolouerg7, ooo deathso1ear. IJ .S.

September

Department of Safety, National Highway TransportaSafety Administration. <http,//w_fars.nht s a .d o t . g o v / > . tion

Support,"

The WuhingyonPosl, r!

November

2OOr, A32. 2o Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Formally Disbands Offlce of Strategic Influence," The WashinglonPon, z6 February 2OO2. "Global nrohibition 2r Ethan A. Nadelmann, regimes: the evolurion of norm" in international society," InternotionolOrgani4tion 44, no. 4, (Autumn

r99o),48r. 2 2 I b i d . ,4 8 2 - 3 . 2 3 I b i d . ,4 8 3 .

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Ethicsin Conflict

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andtheUseof Force

Ethicq

Bryan Hehir I would like to sketch the architecture of an old argrrrnent, but it is an argument that must be rnade anew every day. It is as old as this city, Washington, D.C., indeed as old as the Peloponnesian War. Yet, it is still as current as the present set of questions facing the United States,the United Nations, and other nations of the world when addressing the decision to employ force. The question is: Is war sornething that is only fought and won or lost, or is war itself also something morally measurable? I would argue that from Thucydides until today, despite some resistance, people have alwaystried to rneasure the use of force as well as simply declare winners and losers. At the same time, the argument must be made anew because there is persistent skepticism about whether ethics and rnoral restraint have any role when the issue is the possibility of the use of force. In short, is ethics possible in war? As someone who has taught ethics and international relations for thirty years at Georgetown and Harvard, I have always begun rny courses by saying that anyone who investigates these issuesmust rernernber what Gandhi said. After his first tour through the West, when asked, "What do you think of Western civilization?" Gandhi replied, "It would be a good idea." That is the way I think most people think about ethics and interna-

Bryan Hehir is President of Catholic Charities USA and former Dean of Harvard Divinity School.

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tional relations-specifically ethics and war. While it would be a good idea, it is probably not possible. I will argue that it is both possible and necessary to think about the moral dimensions of the use of force. At the same time, this particular quandary raises sharply one of the difficulties in thinking about ethics and war. When I taught the course on international theory and practice in the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, I would alwaysbegin the course by asking students:

Essentially, I will examine this question in three steps: first, by looking at how one thinks about ethics and warinvestigating what the options are; second, by developing an argumentative framework for rneasuring war, at least in a rough sense; and finally, by looking at three challenges to this ethic that have arisen over the last fifty years. There are three classical positions on the ethics of war. The first is one that rnany people instinctively come to when

The instinctivereactionofrnany isto argue,that there is no way to view war within the rnoral unlverse. What makes the study of foreign policy and international politics different than the study of dornestic politics? Generally, their answer to this question was "the lack of a central authority in the international system"-since there is only a fragile set of international laws, and the international system is characterized by deep cultural and religious pluralism. So, when one talks about ethics in the international ''Whose sphere, the question remains, ethics?" Is it possible to articulate a set of normative standards that can cut across the deep and powerful pluralism of the international community? How does one approach this question? I am going to articulate an ethic that clearly has had a long history in Western thought, but that I believe is not confined to'Western philosophy. Among the many reasons it is not unique to Western thought is that this ethic has had a fair amount of influence in shaping international law, a law that many nations ascribe to, and is at least implicitly embedded in the UN charter.

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they think about the topic of morality and war, and that is the belief that they are totally separate. In other words, the instinctive reaction of many is to argr-r.e that there is no way to viewwar within the rnoral universe. The rnoral response is to resist war on all counts-resist it personally by refusing to participate, and resist it in principle on the policy level by argrring that those who decide to go to war should acknowledge that they are involved in a terribly immoral act. Those who subscribe to this view are often criticized by those who argue that if you hold this first position, you are willing to turn the world over to unscrupulous people and that those who are willing to go to war will in every case ultimately govern those who are not. But the nonviolent position is not that simple. People who hold to the principles of nonviolence argrre that they are prepared to resist injustice, but are only prepared to resist it up to the point where they must take another's life. Despite the near inevitability that nonviolence is the

HEHTR Ethicsin Conflict minority position, it still retains a long and distinguished heritage. The second option is, in a sense, the mirror image of nonviolence-what some have labeled the classicalrealist position. Now, not everyone who is a realist is going to hold to my characterization of the position. Still, there has been a variant of the realist position-both philosophical and political-that holds to what I arn going to say. It is embodied in Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War; Michael Walzer identifies it in his widely read book, Justand UnjunWar. In this extensive moral treatise, when the Athenians corne to their much weaker adversarieswho they are about to engage in battle, the Athenian generals corne for one last conversation and essentially say, "Come now. Let us have no talk about justice. Let us talk about the world as it is." In short, they advocated realisrn, purporting that in this world, the strong do what they will and the weak what they must. This is the realist position. Now the irnplicit argurnent here is that there is room for moral restraint in life, but there is no room for rnoral restraint in war. The nature of war, the stakesof war, and the dynamic of war are such that rnoral restraint does not belong in this context. While the implicit moral condition for realisrn allows for morality in life, morality in war is different. Like the nonviolent position, the position of classical realisrn as one finds it in the Athenians' argurnent places war outside the moral universe. We now have two positions that place war outside of rnoral rules. The first says that war is never to be justified, and the second that we should not even try to justifr war, as it is an impossible task. The third option argues that some uses of force are morally acceptable, but not

all wars are morally exempt. This condition says that the phenomenon of war, which involves large-scale systematic killing of hurnan beings, can fit into a moral framework. It contrasts with the nonviolent position, which says it is impossible to find moral justification for any conflict, and is also distinguished from the realist position, which argues that it is too sirnple to saythat war is normal state behavior. How can one argue that some use of force is morally acceptable, but not all? The essence of this arg\r.ment is that the morally acceptable use of force must always be lirnited. It must be limited in purpose, as not all purposes are justifiable; lirnited in rnethods, as not all means are morally acceptable; and limited in its intent, as warfare rnust be animated by justice, not hatred. The argument begins with a presumption against the use of force. It begins to fit war within the moral universe by placing a burden of proof on anyone who says, "I will now take life as a political option." The burden of proof is on the person, institution, or state that chooses to act in this manner. Beginning with a presumption against the use of force means that in the norrnal understanding of life, war and force are not to be used as instruments of the political processes.A presumption, however, does not carry the same force as an absolute moral rule. Absolute moral rules say, "never, in any circumstances." A presumption is less than an absolute moral rule-presumptions admit exceptions. An exception is a defined set of circurnstances where the normal mode of behavior is overridden by another higher moral argument or principle. So, while you will begin with a presumption against force, you do not have an absolute rule. Why? Because under certain circumstances it becomes

Summer/fall 2OO2

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clear that you cannot preserve fundathe when question, in the modern era, it mental human rights and basic justice, is the means question that is so hard to unless you are prepared to use force. answer. If war is to be morally acceptThese circurnstances define the excep- able, you rnust adhere to certain criteria. tions to the presurnption. The first criterion is that you may go to The second step in the argument war against an aggressor, but you rnay requires defining the exception that not go to war against a whole society. The allows you to override the presumption distinction here is that not everyone in against the use of force. Three questions society is grrilty of aggression even if the must be answeredr Why can you use state itself is. Therefore, not everyone is force? When can you use force? And how open to attack. Some raise the objection can you use force-under which circumthat modern war does not allow this disstancesand by which methods can you use tinction, becausewhen the state goes to it? The "why" question addresses the war, everyone within that state is at war as purposes that are morally acceptable and well, and thus everyone is a target. In argues that the use of force rnust be limevery society, however, there are always ited on-ly to the achievement of those jusgroups sr.ch as the very young and the tifiable purposes. taditionally, these very old who rnake it irnpossible to justipurposes have been that you can g.oto war fr attacking a whole society because these to protect life that is under attack, and populations are clearly not aggressors. more recently that you can go to war to So, that is the first question: How do you correct systematic, large-scale abuse of preserve the rule of civilian immunity? human rights. A still rnore complicated The second criterion of means, which argr,rmentcan be made that you can go to arises only after the first is being war to overcome any regime that makes it observed, holds that the use of force impossible to live in human dignity. So, rnust be proportionate-here again a you can go to war to protect life, to presenseof limits holds. vent systematic violation of human It still must be demonstrated that this rights, and to overcome regirnes that ethical framework is acceptable across perpetuate massiveinjustice against their time and space for determining the purown citizens. pose and rnethods of war. It is my argrrThe "when" question warns that even rnent that this ethic is a framework that when you have a justification that would has taken flesh in every age. However, this merit the use of force, you still need to is an ethic that is r,600 years old, and answer other questions such as, "Who has during those t,600 years the world has the right to say now is the tirne to go to moved through very different political war?"; "Who has proper authority to systems: empires; medieval versions of declare war?"; "What is the inner logic or politics; the rise of the sovereign state in intent of the policy?"; and "Is the logic of seventeenth century; and very particularthe policy really to end the killing and the ly in the world of the late twentieth cenviolation of human rights, or is the logic tury, the charter of the United Nations of the policy something else?" and its regime of law. Finally, there is the "how" question. This ethic has faced three rnain chalEven with a justifiable moral reason, and lenges over the last fifty years, the chaleven if you can satisfr the conditions of Ienge of ethical constraints in a nuclear

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HEHrREthicsin Conflict age, questions of humanitarian military intervention, and the rise of terrorism. The challenge posed by the advent of the nuclear age was literally a revolution. For an ethic that says the only morally acceptableuse of force is one that is limited, the nuclear age ushered in the threat of unlirnited use of force. By definition, the overall impact of nuclear weapons is unlimited. The revolutionary character of the nuclear age can be surn* marized as follows, After r,$oo years of debate, there was a certain consensus-at least in the Western world-regarding

fifteen weeks addressing these arguments in my Georgetown classes.The challenge was to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in every possible way without eroding the function of deterrence. How could one reconcile rnorally defensible targeting and effective deterrence? Deterrence remained the overarching concern for twenty-five years, and then -We all of a sudden the Cold'War ended. went through a period of what I would of nuclear call the "relativization weapons"-nuclear weapons rnoved toward the edge, rather than being the

rnad.e N uClear Stf ateg! hasdeliberately civilians the targets of war via the thebry of deterrence. how one thought about war, politics, and ethics. A consensus was formed by two unlikely allies, one a fifth century African saint and the other a nineteenth century Prussian general. The Prussian general was Clausewitz; he argued that war was an extension of politics by other means, and as such was rationally defensible. The fifth century African saint, Augustine, said war was a rnorally defensible activity. Together they frarned an argument about limited war. The nuclear age has threatened to blow apart what Augustine and Clausewitz argrred many years ago. The ethical response to the use of force in the nuclear age has had to respond to both a qualitative increase in destructive capabilities of weaponry and the challenge of constructing nuclear strategy. Nuclear strategy has deliberately rnade civilians the targets of war via the theory of deterrence. This has resulted in a great debate over the last thirty years. I used to spend

center, of the strategic agenda. In this first decade of the new century, however, the nuclear debate is reviving. Proliferation is now a big question-not only proliferation by states,but also proliferation by non-state actors. There is also the debate about the new policy regarding the U.S. nuclear posture; proposals are being rnade which could blur the line drawn over four decades between nuclear weapons and all other conventional uses of force. The prevailing hurnanitarian rnilitary intervention debate in the r99os was radically different frorn the debate that took place during the Cold War. Throughout the nuclear age, there was a belief in the need to sign as many agreementsaspossible limiting the use of force. In the r99os, however, rnany of us who had spent substantial time articulating limits on the use of force found ourselves pressuring states to endorse the possibility of using it. This brought us back to the classicalargument

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about morality and wart that there are situations when all other means have failed and when the failure to use force would result in a vast human cost. In the r99Os, we moved from setting limits on war to attempting to push states to accept their responsibilities regarding the need to use force. This was dramatically different frorn the nuclear age, whose challenge was to prevent catastrophic violence. For hurnanitarian military intervention, the challenge is how to prevent chaos inside the boundaries of a state where rnassive human rights violations are occurring. The new debate forced us to become familiar with such narnes as Bosnia, and Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo. In each of these cases,concerned states faced a rnajor characteristic of international politics-the principle and rule against intervention. In the r99os, we found ourselvesgrappling with the fundamental problern of jurisprudence. The problem was that while you can make a moral argrrrnent that something should be done to prevent massive violence or genocide, the legal argument ruled out intervention in almost all cases,unless authorized by the UN Security Council. This problem of international jurisprudence has not gone away. I believe that the answer to the problem requires a recasting of the nonintervention rule. We need to maintain it against great power intervention, since it is a principle of order that is necessaryfor world powers, but humanitarian military intervention is not a great power problem. The presumption against intervention should still be respected, even in questions of humanitarian military intervention, but there are times when it should be overridden by exceptions. The primary exception is genocide. However, we have seen killing that would be classi-

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fied as lessthan genocide that still justifies humanitarian military intervention; for example, ethnic cleansing is not genocide, but it still warrants action. So ethnic cleansing, genocide, and also responding to failed states qualifr as caseswhere there is an international responsibility to intervene. It would certainly take a longer argurnent to play out each of these exceptions, but these are the basic caveats I would draw out. Ultimately, I would relativize the nonintervention principle while maintaining the presumption against great power intervention. That brings us to the third challenge: terrorism. Terrorisrn is a product of this decade; however, like intervention, it is hardly new in international politics. These days, it is a larger problem and an especially serious one because of failed states. Terrorism is often carried out today by transnational actors rather than states. International politics and ethics have prirnarily focused on states.While it is possible to talk about a terrorist state, the predominant problern is transnationality rather than state sponsorship. In the end, I believe that it is important to look at questions of cause, authority, and rneans. I would rnake a distinction between terrorism occurring within a stateand terrorism that is transnational in within a state is a character. trrorisrn complicated problern for the state involved. In these cases, other states should adhere to the nonintervention rule. In other words, I do not argue that all forms of terrorism justify international action. Transnational terrorism takes on the character of aggression, however, which makes it distinct. So, in the caseof the September rr attaclc, there was cause to respond-not cause to respond in order to avenge the past, but cause to respond to deter future acts.

HEHrREthicsin Conflict There is also the notion of authority. In responding to a transnational issue, one must think beyond national authority. Once again, there is an ethical argument that says one has the right to defend oneself against attack. There is Article gr of the UN Charter that gives the states this right. On the means question, in responding to terrorisrn, you have to distinguish three things: the terrorist group, which is transnational in nature; the state in which terrorists reside; and the civil society of the state. To say that you have the right to respond to transnational terrorist groups that penetrated a state does not necessarily mean you have the right to respond against the state in question with force-and in no case can you justifr a reaction against or an attack on the civil society surrounding it. So, in the present campaign in Afghanistan, the United States needs to consider the rneans question. I

would also drawvery clear lines regarding the argument for any further action beyond Afghanistan. Intervening elsewhere requires a new debate from the ground up; this is particularIy the case in deciding upon action in Iraq. There may be a casefor intervention precisely to address weapons of mass destruction, but the implications of the case go far beyond Iraq, setting precedents in world politics that could be very difficult to control. Ultirnately, in this first decade of the twenty-first century, the old argument of the ethics of the use of force must be exarnined anew amidst the three distinct political-rnoral problems of war that we f a c et n u c l e a r p o l i c y , h u r n a n i t a r i a n intervention, and terrorism. All three must be addressed, and presently none are settled questions. Editor's

Note: This

Father Hehir's

piece is an edited

renarks

transcript

before the Georgetom

Lead-

ership Seminar on March Ig, 2oo2.

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Richard Ned Lebow In the Western world, there is a widely accepted distinction between public and private morality. We consider it wrong to lie, but commonly acknowledge that a diplornat is an honest man who lies in the interest of his country. But how do we feel about leaders who lie to their own people in the narne of national security, or actively support murderous dictatorships because they are anti-communist or protect Arnerican interests? Is every action defensible if it enhances national security or the national interest? How do we know what these actions are? Is the distinction between public and private morality a necessaryone in a world where hostile forces plot our destruction? Or is it merely a convenient rationalization for unscrupulous and self-serving behavior? Realism purports to answer these questions, or at least provide a framework for thinking intelligently about them.' While the realist school has multiple strands, its adherents generally acknowledge a core set of assurnptions. First and foremost, realists believe that the anarchic character of the international environment makes international relations a self-help system in which survival ultimately depends on a state's material capabilities and alliances with other states.' This does not imply a world of constant warfare, but only the recognition, according to Robert Gilpin, that "there is no higher authority to which a state can appeal for succor in times of trouble. "3

RichardNed Lebow is Director of the Mershon Center and Professor of Political Science, History, and Psychology at Ohio State University.

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There is nothing naturala!,ou_tpeople acting on the basis of individual self:interest. Most dismiss ethics as a form of weak sentimentality that has no business in the affairs of states. Formulated this way, there is no way to adjudicate between competing claims of ethics and security. The demand for ethical foreign policies is rebuffed by the assertion that physical security is the essential precondition for the kind of society that allows the pursuit of the ethical life.a The counterarg'ument that one cannot produce or sustain an ethical society by irnmoral rneans provokes realists to retort that international politics does not allow this kind of luxury. The controversy quickly returns to its starting point. But are the irnperatives of security really at odds with the canons of ethics? Is hard-nosed self-interest the most efficient way of protecting one's interest in an intensely competitive world? If ethical behavior is found to be more conducive-or perhaps even essentialto national security, the advocates of reolpol;ttkwould find their logic challenged from within. In this article, I contend, poceThucydides, that interests of individuals and states presuppose identities, and that actors can only develop identities through membership in societies.All functioning societies in [urn resr on some ethical foundation. Accordingly, ethics enables identities and interests. It follows that maintenance of the principles of justice that sustain societies is a primary interest of all actors, including states.Thus, ethics do play an essential role in international politics.

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Sucha Thingas an Individual ACtOf? There is nothing natural about people acting on the basis of individual self-interest. Individual identity is historically conditioned, took millennia to emerge, and has been regarded as unnatural by rnost people for most of its existence.5In traditional societies, individuals have alwaysbeen tightly integrated into communities, defining their identities in communal terms. Individuals do not lack a concept of self, but the concept of self is relationally defined as the sum of socially assigned roles. Persono is the Latin word for mask, and describes the outer face that one presents to the community. The face defines the self in others' eyes and in one's own mind's eye. During the heroic age of Greece, the oiftos(household) was considered the natural social unit; it was gradually replaced by the poLs (ciry). With this shift, identity also came to be defined in terms of the city. Until the end of the fifth century, Greeks had no conception of individual self-interest. Ernile Durkheim astutely observed that the individual replaces the collectivity as the object of ritual attention in the course of transitions from traditional to modern societies. And indeed, from Rousseau oD, Enlightenment and romantic ideologies tend to emphasize the uniqueness and autonomy of the inner self.6The Enlightenment created a vocabulary that, while recognizing tensions between inner selves and social roles, nevertheless encourag'espeople to cultivate and express their inner selves and original ways of being. As products

LEBow Ethicsin Conflict of this ideology, we tend to take for most gold medals in the Olympic granted that our desires, feelings, and games, or controls the military use of choicesare spontaneous and self genspace is really asking other states to e r a t e d , b u t t h e r e i s g o o d r e a s o n t o accept those criteria as the appropriate believe that they are, in large part, determinants of status. s o c i a l l yc o n s t i t u t e d . Standing and wealth can enhance These limitations are most visible in security, but they can also be pursued at traditional societies where identities are its expense, just as the single-minded not differentiated from social roles and pursuit of security can bankrupt a counidentities, but they affect modern society try (e.g., the Soviet Union) or underas well. In the l/iod, Achilles must choose mine its standing among its allies and key between an early death with honor or a third parties (e.g., the United States). long, peaceful life-his choice of a hero's Throughout history, political units have death reflected the values of his culture. devoted at least as much effort and We, too, rnodel ourselves on "heroes" resources to standing as they have to who personifr our cultural values-for security.e Much of the competition example, those who are affluent, imporamong the European great powers from tant, or athletic. Our inner selvesand the very beginning of the modern state associateddesires may be just as socially systern was a struggle for rank that was a determined as were Achilles's. continuation and outgrowth of dynastic This argument finds resonance at the rivalries. During the Cold War, the Soviinternational level. The realist model of et lJnion and the United States engaged society holds that the anarchy of the in an acute and often dangerous compeinternational systern creates a state of tition for influence in Europe and the nature. Thus, statesrnust maxirnize powThird World. Initially part of their er to enhance their security. Other realrespective quests for security, seeking ists consider security only one of the ends influence eventually becarne a game of its of foreign policy. In an influential own played for reasons of status. book, Robert Osgood defined the Modern society's emphasis on individn a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t a n d t h e g o a l s o f ualism and free choice creates an s t a t e c r a f t a s s e c u r i t y , s t a n d i n g , a n d entrenched predisposition to exaggerate wealth.T All of these goals are ernpty the uniqueness of the inner self. But categories that must be fllled in by uniqueness can only exist as distinction, concrete concepts. so identity is relational by definition. Even over the course of the last cenModern people need each other as tury, great powers have conceptualized benchrnarks against which to define security quite differently.8 Their conthemselvesand to acknowledge, praise, or ceptions have reflected the understandvili$ their individuality and achieveings and practices common in the comments. Kant captured this tension nicely munity of nations at the tirne. A state's when he observed that each person seeks "standing" is a relational concept by "to achieve a rank among his fellows, definition, and depends on outside val- whom he cannot stand, but also cannot idation. A statewhose leaders assert it is stand to leave alone."'o Inner selvesand "numero uno" because it has the highindividual identities cannot exist distinct est gross domestic product, wins the frorn society because membership and

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participation in society-or its rejectionare essentialto the constitution of the self. The conventional description of modern society as a collection of individuals is mistaken. The U.S. Bill of Rights and Constitution, lluintessential Enlightenment projects, take the individual as their unit, as does the American legal system. The courts have even extended this concept to corporations and other groups like trade unions who, for legal purposes, are treated as individuals. As an important reflection of how we see ourselves,our laws and legal decisions expose a gap between self-image and reality. In practice, neither the United States nor any other developed country has ever been anything close to a society of autonomous, egoistic individuals. Sociopaths aside, all of us are embedded in a web of relationships that start with families, friends, and personal and business partnerships. These relationships extend out to include some mix of social, sporting, civic, and professional groups, and may go beyond this to religious, ethnic, and national identifications. Relationships and the loyalties they generate give our lives meaning and direction. They not only constitute the cement of community, but they also teach us who we are. As psychologists have documented well, we have multiple identities, and rnany of these identities are collective in the sense that we equate our well-being with that of others." The most compelling proof that the world is not composed of autonornous actors is the behavior of people who actually separate themselves from social ties. For Greek playwrights, the individual freed from the bonds of family and community was something of a consuming trope. These individuals all behaved in ways that were destructive to themselves.their families. and the societies of

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which they were once part. Thucydides casts the city of Athens as a tragic hero whose power and hubris led it to break free from the traditional web of relationships and reciprocal obligations that bound cities to one another and restrained their foreign policy goals. Having severed these ties, Athens pursued a policy of unlimited expansion that led to loss of empire, defeat, and near stosuat home. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Stateshas gone part way down the same perilous path in that it has increasingly indulged in narrow and often selfdestructive self-interests at the expense of the community that enables its identity and ultimately sustains its influence. The Clinton and Bush administrations have refracted almost every important foreign policy decision through the prism of narrow self-interest. In its first year in office, the Bush administration acted against the coordinated efforts of many of its closest allies, and often a sizeable portion of the world community, on fourteen issues ranging frorn its unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty to its scuttling of the r9g) Kyoto Protocol intended to forestall global warming.'" In Spring 2oo2, the United Statesimposed steel quotas to the angerof its principal economic partners; and the White House has begun talking about using limited-yield nuclear weapons in future combat situations. The United Stateshas the power to "go it alone," and its leaders,with the apparent backing of Congress and the electorate, have no compunction about doing so even on issueswhere no serious national interests appear to be at risk. A culture of selfishness seems to have become more pronounced in the United States. ManyAmericans seeno reason for

LEBowEthicsin Conflict taxes, and oppose programs that may benefit society but do not have any immediate payoff to themselves. Americans tend to justify selfishnessby placing the individual and his or her narrowly constructed self-interest at the center of

national relations. First, one must define "ethics." In modern discourse, we distinguish between morality and ethics. Morality derives from morolis, Cicero's rendering in De Fatoof the Greek word ethikos. For fifth and fourth century

A CUltUfe 0f seHshness seemsto have becorne more pronounced in the United States. the analytical world. It makes this type of selfish behavior appear to be a reflection of the natural order. By doing so, this atomistic orientation becomes partly self-fulfillins.

Greeks, ethifros was the set of character traits that inclined people to behave as they did.'a Today, we think of ethics as an external code to which people should conform independent of their dispositions. We distinguish ethics from law, since law may not alwaysrepFor the Greeks and many modern resent ethics. The modern usage of philosophers, cooperation and ko[nonnia ethics transforms it from an expression (the civic project) are an expression of of our identities into an objective and our innofesense of sociability. Humans often formally constituted set of rules. are political animals, as Aristotle so aptly For the most part, I use the terrn in the put it, and we are driven by our instincts Greek sense-restoring the connection in realto associatewith others order to between ourselves and our ethics helps ize our own needs and potential.'3 Rela- to finesse an otherwise unresolvable tionships and the commitments they metaphysical problern of understandentail are not simply instrumental rneans i n g t h e s o u r c e o f e t h i c s . My above critique of rational choice to selfish ends, but important ends in their own right. Rational and instinctive suggestsa strategyfor addressing this cenprocesses are mutually reinforcing. We tral problem of moral philosophy. become who we are through close associ- Enlightenment scholars rejected the ation with others. Our interests depend Aristotelian conception of telos(ultimate on identity, and identity in turn depends end by design). Without telos,the accepton community. Deprived of an identityed benchmark for assessing good in Hobbes's purpose for the state of empirical terms disappeared. Philosonature-we becorne more or less identiphers from Kant on have struggled to cal, and our only interests are the fundabuild an alternative, metaphysical, founmental requisites of survival, food, clothdation for ethics, but have failed because ing, shelter, and sex. Identity confers there are no incontrovertible "first prininterests becauseit gives us social purpose ciples" from which to start. Atternpts to for and allows base such systemson feeling and customs differentiation. This argument has important implicacan all be challenged for being arbitrary tions for the dilemma of ethics in interand culturally biased. It may be possible,

Interests,0rder,and Ethics.

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however, to root ethics in observable empirical regularities. This was the approach of the pre-Aristotelian Greeks for whom primordial world experience, mediated by language, was the foundation for all philosophy. Having discussed the definition of ethics, we can address my key proposit i o n : B e c a u s eo f t h e c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g interests, identity, and community, ethics rnust underlie interests. The argurnent is ontological. Interests require identity, because the latter confers social purpose. But identity is a form of differentiation, without which people would not have particular social interests. Identity in turn is impossible in the absence of community. Here, a double process is at work. Communities construct identities through their values and s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e s ,b u t t h e y a l s o e s t a b l i s h the hierarchies on which individual differentiation depends. A,lrnost by definition, comrnunity must rest on sorne conception of justice that establishes at least a theoretical equality among its mernbers, without which hierarchy would be unacceptable-in other words, cornmunity requires an ethical foundation. Most of the world's religions and ethical traditions describe this equality as an outgrowth of philio (affection) that people develop toward each other. Such affection appears to be both a natural attribute of our s p e c i e sb u t a l s o s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e s u l t s from our rational faculties. Reasoning in reverse, it follows that all of usstates as well as individuals-have a strong, evenprimary, interest in maintaining community and the principles of justice on which it is based.

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these empirical-philosophical foundations to the specific ethical order of societies is an altogether different matter. It has proved impossible to establish first principles on which ethical systerns can be based. Ethical orders must develop within societies and become legitirnized through practice over the course of time. There is nothing organic, natural, or mystical about ethical orders, but at any given tirne they represent the culmination of a cornplicated historical process. They are the result of a rnultitude of decisions by people, acting unilaterally or collectively, with consequences that none may have intended or envisaged. These orders sanction certain pathways for attaining or justifying one's goals, and by doing so create incentives for people to use thern. Well-trod paths give the appearance of being natural, and in turn help to legitimize and rnaintain the orders that created thern. Classicalrealistsrecognized this truth. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, and Morgenthau believed that ethical orders and the pattern of social relations they sustain rnust be open to renegotiation, and that such renegotiations are essential from tirne to time-especially in the afterrnath of destructive w a r s a s s oc i a t e d w i t h processes of rnodernization. After upheavals of this kind, it is often impossible to turn the clock back and restore the old order. Rather, components of that order rnust be fused with new elements and legitimated through a c o n s u l t a t i v e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s .T h u c y dides was fully aware that the political system of Athens was the result of a Iong history of constitutional engineering, and that the reforms of Solon. Cleisthenes. and Pericles had

LEBowEthicsin Conflict all been efforts to adapt the political systemsto changing circumstances.'5 None of the classical realists said very much, at least directly, about the process by which social orders should be renegotiated. For this, we rnust turn to their conternporaries, Socrates considered dialogue the appropriate rnethod for constructing social and political orders, and he sawbenefits in it that went beyond the prospect of reaching a consensual decision. The free exchange of ideas arnong friends and the give-and-take of dialogue strengthened the bonds of friendship and respect that were the foundation of comrnunity. Such a process might even be possible-indeed, all the more essential-in a society in which individuals had become increasingly autonomous. Plato's depiction of Socratesencouragesus to understand his life as a dialogrre with his pofts, and his acceptance of its death sentence as his final commitment to maintain the coherence and principle of that dialogue. The ernphasis on dialogue has been revived in the twentieth century, and is central to the thought and writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jtirgen Habermas. Haberrnas's "critique of ideology" leads him to propose a coercion-free discourse that departs frorn hurnan praxis.'6 For Gadamer, dialogue "is the art of having a conversation, and that includes the art ofhaving a conversation with oneself and fervently seeking and understanding oneself."'7 It is not so rnuch a rnethod as it is a philosophical enterprise that puts people in touch with thernselves and others and reveals to them the prior deterrninations, anticipations, and imprints that reside in their concepts. It enables people who start with different understand-

ings to reach a binding philosophical or political consensus. for Gadamer-as for Community Thucydides, the Greek playwrights, and others-is based on the play of shared language.'8 Charles Thylor associates "the genesis of the human rnind" with language and communication of all kinds. The developrnent of our critical faculties and all wisdom come therefore through dialogue.'s Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us that even solitary reflection rnost often involves imaginary, albeit sornetirnes unconscious, dialogues with others in which we struggle to establish ourselves and our ideas.t" Nevertheless, dialogue in international affairs-and cooperation in turn-is possible only once people recognize that it is in their interest. This recognition is not brought about so rnuch by external constraints and opportunities, as some realists rnight argue, as it is by introspection and inductive learning. Reason and experience bring sorne of us-some individuals and states-to a deeper understanding of our interests. At every level of interaction, from personal relationships to civic participation, we become willing to forego short-terrn gains to sustain these relationships and the longer-terrn and rnore irnportant rewards they make possible. Mewed in this light, the cooperation seen in the emergence of the European cornrnunity, the end of the Cold War, and the survival of NAfO represents a triurnph of higher-order learning. American foreign policy in the Clinton and Bush administrations, by contrast, represents a retrogression to an earlier, less sophisticated, and largely counterproductive way of thinking about ourselvesand the world.

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NOTES t See Frederick L. Schuman, InternationolPolitiu: An Introduction to the Wstern Stale Slstem (New York, McCraw-Hill. I933; E. H. Carr.-fie TuenjYeori Crbis,

Theory

I9I9-Ig3g:

W. Austin,

An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York, St. Martin's Press, r952 [r g46J) ; Hans J. Morgenthau, PolitrcsAno ng Nations, The StnLgJefor Pouer and Peoce(New York, Alfred A. Knopf, r948).

(Cambridge, Henri

go: Nelson-Hall, tg86), pp. j-24.Marilynn Brewer, "The Social Self, On being the Same and Different at the Same Time," Peroonolrgand SociolPgcholog Bulletin,r./, (t99r), pp. +75-+82t Marilynn Brewer and Norman Miller,

University Press, 2OOr), p. r6. Clobol Political Econony, p. 17. Walrrz, TheoA 3 Gilpin, of Intemational Pofitn, p. rrJ, offers a more extreme

Marilynn

of the differences between domestic and international life, "In international politics force senes, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one." "Ethics, Interests and Foreign {, Chris Brom, Policy." in Karen E. Smith and Margot Light, Ethicsind Foreign Polig (New York, Cambridge Llniversity Press, 2ool), PP. r5-33, correctly points out that all sophisticated variants of realism see states as egoists in the last resort. but recognize that enlighteneJself-interest is not necessarily incompatible with a concern for principle and the common welfare. It is only what he calls "pop realism" that conceives of interests in terms of narrow

Mochtpoiitifr.This

is an issue to which

I shall

return. g During the fifth centurf B.C., the individual achieved an identity in Athenian law, but it remained poorly defined. 6 Romantics went a step further and rejected obedience to some general moral law in favor of being "true to oneself. " For Hegel, the "authentic"romantic was a "beautiful soul," pure in its inwardness and uncorrupted by modernity's divisiveness. Phenomenolo gl, (BB), C, (c); Robert E. Norton, TheBeoutifulsoul, AeslheticMorolilt in the Eiglkenth Century (lthaca, Cornell University

Press, r ggg). / Robert E. Osgood, Foregn Relotions(Chicago,

Idealsond Self-lnterestin Amerlca's of Chicago

Press,

tgg!),pp.g-6. B All the great powers have been concerned with foreign attack and occupation, but at different times in their history have sought to acheive that goal by means of military alliances (France from preventing

isolation (the United States bet*een autarchy (apan and Germany in the

r87o to r94o), the

wars),

IgJos), and economic, political and military integration (France and Germany after rg{,g). g Oran Young, "lnternational Regimes, Toward a New Theory of Institutions, " World Polttiu 39 (October 1986), pp. rc4-22,

also contends that states are status

maximizers. IO Immanuel

Kant,

IdeolTouardo UniuersalHistog, I

8:2O-2I. II

IS Z ]

Henri

Tajfel,

Humon Croups and Social Cotegoies.

GeorgetownJournal

of International

Affairs

/nfergroup fielcfions (Pacific

Grove, BrooksStuart Kaufman, Modern Hotreds,The Symbolic Polititso[ Ethnc lVar (lthaca, Cornell Unireisity Cole,rgg(i);

Press. 2ooI);

Richard Herrmann,

Thomas Risse and ldentities in Europe and the Institutionsof the European[-Inion, forthcoming. Brewer,

t2 In December 2Oor, rhe United States officially withdrew from the r9/z Antiballistic Missile Treaty, gutting the landmark agreement. This is the first time in the nuclear era that the United States renounced a major arms control accord; In July 2oor the U.S. walked out of a London conference to discuss a rg94 protocol designed to strengthen the 1972 Biological 'Toxin and (ratified Weapons Convention by l{4 nations including the United States) by providing for on -site inspections. At Geneva in November 2 ool, U.S. Undersecretary of StateJohn Bolton stated that "the protocol is dead," at the same time accusing Iraq, Iran, North

Korea,

Libya, Sudan, and Syria ofviolatbut offering no specific allega-

ing the Convention

tions or supporting evidence; InJuly 2ooI, the Unite d S t a t e sw a s t h e o n l y n a t i o n t o o p p o s e t h e U N A g r e e ment

to Curb

the International

Flow of Illicit Small zoor, the United States was not reelected to the UN Human Rights Commission, after years ofwithholding dues to the UN (including curArms.

April

renr dues of $z++ million) and after havins forced the UN to lower its share of the U N budget f.Jm 25 ro 22 percent.

In the Human Riehts Commission, the United States stood virtually alone in opposing resolutions supporting lower-cost access to HMAIDS drug:, acknowledging

a basic human

right to adequate a moratorium on the death penalty. The International Criminal Court (ICC) Treaty was signed in Rome inJuly r9g8, and approved by I20 countries, with 7 opposed (including the Unitfood,

University

University Press, r98r); "The Social Identity

Tu.rner,

of Intergroup Behavior," in S. Worchel and (eds.) Pgx1ro1o, oTlntergroup Relations(Chica-

N. Waltz, Theog of Internotionol Politics 2 Kenneth (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, lg/g), pp. lo!o{; Robert Gilpin, Clobal Politicol Econory1, Understonding the Internotionol Economic Order (Princetonr Princeton

characterization

Cambridge

Tajfel andJohn

and

calling

for

ed States). It set up a court in The Hague to try political leaders and military personnel charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. In October 2OOr Great

Britain

December

became

2Oot,

the {2nd nation to sign. In Senate aqain add-ed an a military appropriaiio.s bill that rhe U.S.

amendment to would keep U.S. military personnel jurisdiction of the proposed ICC;

from

obeying the

The

Land Mine land mines, was sigrred in Ottawa in rggT by r22 nations. The United States

Treaty, banning December

refused to sign, alongwith istan, Iran, Iraq, Metnam, dent Clinton

Russia, China,

India, Pak-

Egypt, and Turkey.

rejected the Treaty, claiming

were needed to protect South Korea's "overuhelming military

Presi-

that mines

Korea against North advantage." He stated

LEBowEthicsin Conflict "eventually"

that the U.S.

would

this

was disavowed

promise

comply,

in 2006;

President

Bush

August 2oor. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997, for contolling global warming was declared "dead" by President Bush in March 2Oor. In November 2oor. the Bush administration shunned negotiations in Mar-accord, rakech (Morocco) to revise the mainly by watering it down in a vain attempt to gain U.S. approval. In May 2ooI, The United States refused to meet with European Union nations to discuss, even at lower levels of government, economic espionage and electronic surveillance of phone calls, e-mail, and faxes (the U.S. "Echelon" program). The United States refused to participate in talks sponsored by the Organization Development

for Economic Co-operation and (OECD in Paris, May 2oor) on ways to

crack down on off-shore

and other tax and moneyhavens. In February 2oOI, the United States refused to join rz3 nations pledging to ban the

laundering

use and production mines.

anti-personnel

In Septenber

2oor, the International

drew from bringing Africa.

t63

together InJuly

2ool,

bombs

and

the United

States with-

Conference

on Racism,

countries

the United

Durban,

South

States was the only

country to oppose the International

Plan for Cleaner

Energy,

sponsored by the G-8 group of indusrial nations (United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, Gernany, France, Italy, UK). In October 2oor, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution,

for the tenth

consecutive year, calling for an end to the illegal U.S. embargo of Cuba, by a vote of 167 to 3 (the United States, Israel, and the Marshall Islands in opposition). States. refused to comply. In Novenber

The United

2 o o l , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e sf o r c e d a v o t e i n t h e U N C o m mittee on Disarmament and Security to demonstrate its opposition

to the Comprehensive Test [Nucle".] Ban Tieaty. Signed by 164 nations and ratified by 89 including France, Great Britain, and Russia; signed by President Clinton in 1996 but rejected by the Senate in 1999. The United States is one of thirteen countries that have nuclear weapons or nuclear power programs

that

have not

November,

the United

sponsored

the

reduce worldwide I3

Aristotle,

ratified

the

Treaty.

Also

States scuttled the negotiations

World

Health

Organization

use of tobacco. Politicr, I253a3O

contrasts

human

beings to other gregarious animals, and rZ52bZ8r253a39 on the city (politeio) asbeing necessaryto allow people to fulfill their purposes as human beings. 14 Maclntyre, Afer Vrtue, 38. r g S o l o n ' sr e f o r m s ( c . 5 9 4 - 9 3 B . C . ) a n d t h o s e o f Cleisthenes (5ro-5oo B.C.) made every Athenian a freenan and citizen. The restriction of the powers of the Areopagus Council in 462 had the effect ofvesting political authority in the assembly ecclesia). By S3r, large numbers of citizens took an active role in government through participation in the assemblyand the courts (dikasteria) where they sened asjudge and Jury. 16 Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness cnd CommunicatiteAclion, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry W e b e r N i c h o l s e n ( C a m b r i d g e , M . L T . P r e s s ,r g g o ) ; J . D o n a l d M o o n , " P r a c t i c a lD i s c o u r s ea n d C o m m u nicative Ethics," in Stephen K. White, ed., TheCambidge Componionto Hobemas (New York, Cambridge University Press,rggg), 143-66. t/ Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey," in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The Philosoplyof Hans-CeoryCadamer (Chicaso: Open Court, rgg/), pp.3-63.Qrote on 33. 18 On Gadamer and dialogue, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, TruthondMethod,znd ed. rev., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York, C r o s s r o a d ,I 9 8 g h g 6 o l ) , a n d " P l a t o a n d t h e P o e t s , " in Dialogueand Diqlectic,rans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, Yale University Press,r98o), 39-72; Robert Sullivan, PoliticolHemeneutics, The Ear! Thinkingof Hans- CeorgCadomer(University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, rggo); Georgia Warnke, Godamer, Hermeneutics, Trodition, and Reoson(Stanford, Stanford University Press, Ig8/); Hans Herbert Kogler, fie Pouerof Diologue,CriticolHemeneutics ofer Cadamerond Foucoult, tans. Paul Henriclson (Cambridge, M. L T. U n i v e r s i t yP r e s s ,I g g g I l 9 9 z J ) . rg Charles Taylor, The Ethicsof Authenticr!(Cambridge, Haruard University Press,rggl) 20 Miklrail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoeulo'sPoetiu ( M i n n e a p o l i s , U n i v e r s i t yo f M i . n e s o t u P r . s J , r 9 8 4 ) , Michael Holquist and Katerina Clark, MikAcilBckfrtin (Cambridge, Haruard University Press, r98{,); James Wertsch, Voices of theMind (Cambridge: Haward University Press,rggr).

S u m m e r / F a l2l o o 2 [ 3 3 ]

Ethicsin Conffict

MERICA'S

ROLE IN THE WORLD Madeleine Albrighton demouag-buildingand interuention GJ I A: In the I99Os, what was different about the U.S. approach to humanitarian intervention? That is, did the end of the Cold War change when and where the United States chose to intervene?

M a d e l e i n eA l b r i g h t is currently

Mortara

Distinguished

Professor

in the Practice of Diplomacy School

A L B R r c x r ;T h e C o l d W a r c l e a r l y s o l i d i f i e d b l o c s . A l s o , I think we paid less attention to what was going on inside each country because we wanted them to be on our side. We did that, and so did the Soviets. In that regard, I think that there was a different approach to howwe looked at countries individually. We also saw the Communist bloc as monolithic for a Iong time and therefore we did not see differences within those countries. We also shut our eyesto some of the issues that were going on within countries that were "on our side. "

the Michael

and Virginia

at the

of Foreign

vice, Georgetown versity,

Previously,

served as Secretary State and United Permanent

SerUnishe of States

Representa-

tive to the United Nations

under

Presi-

dent Clinton.

After the end of the Cold War, I think that as a result of a real explosion in the information revolution, we also knew a great deal more about what wasgoing on inside each country. What I would call the "CNN factor" in many ways opened up areas and made it harder for a country such as t h e U n i t e d S t a t e st o a v e r t i t s e y e s . cJIA: Increasingly, humanitarian aid workers are being targeted in conflict situations. Right now, there is a big debate in the developrnent world about rnilitarizing aid missions in

Summer/Fallzoor [35]

A M E R I C A ' SR O L E I N T H E W O R L D

order to protect the workers and ensure that the aid is distibuted properly. What is your take on this? A L B R T G HF Ti:r s t o f a l l , I t h i n k t h a t a i d workers are in a unique position of really trying to help these people. One of the issuesthat was much talked about when I was involved was whether aid workers' neutrality is an issue. Ultimately, aid workers have a job to do, and I think that it is important for us to remernber that, in the end, it is all about people and their suffering. I happen to think that it is appropriate for the military to provide security for aid workers. It is very hard to ask people to go in and put themselvesin a cornpletely insecure situation. Some-

almost every instance of international intervention. Given these circumstances, do we need a new strategy of humanitarian aid? A L B R r c n r ,I t h i n k w e h a v et o k e e p o u r e y e on the ball, which is the suffering of the people involved, rnany ofwhom are completely innocent and just happen to be in the way of conflicting priorities of leaders or various political groupings. So, I do not agree with the idea that aid perpetuates conflict. Conflicts are perpetuated for other reasons, mostly to do with the leadership circles that would not be taking the responsibility of feeding their people under any circumstances. Take, for exarnple, Saddam Hussein, who

One Of the hard partsof beins a policymaker is that very ' rarely do you have otily d.,.e d'ecision to make. times, though, it is difficult to marry the two-like in Sudan, for instance-where it may not be possible to really protect them. And many aid workers are kind of rnodern-day missionaries, who thinkand rightfully so-that they have something they have to do nonetheless, and thev sacrifice a lot. cJIA: There is some evidence that aid perpetuates conflict by helping not only the innocent civilians but also the warring parties. And, on the same note, some argue that by S"i^g aid, donors are removing the responsibility of civilians from the shoulders of the sovereign nation or the warring party, allowing them to invest their resources exclusively in the conflict, which can prolong the fighting. Such dilemmas emerge in

t36]

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of International

Affairs

could care less about his people, and if there were not assistance being given, nothing would be done for them. So, I think he is one of the good examples of this. I believe that there probably are different waysto structure assistance.People often feel that aid does not go to the right people, or it gets diverted, or it is corrupted or something like that. I think there alwaysare reasons to look at ways to change how assistanceis given, but I do not think that one could argue, at least I cannot argue, that it perpetuates conflicts. GJIA; What are some specific suggestions you would make to restructure the way we distribute aid to prevent the different parties that are actually causing the conflicts and hurting their own people from

r N r E R V r EEwt h i c si n C o n f l i c t manipulating the more genuine and benevolent efforts of the international community?

dilemmas of leadership where you have a limited amount of information and you have to make important decisions?

A L B R T G HS To : mething that has to happen-and Iraq may show the difficulty in this-is separating the program from the political leadership so that aid is given to nongovernmental organizations or international bodies or somehow so that they do not get credit for it. But this is very hard to do, even under the best of circumstances. Let's take a place like Burma, where Aung San Suu Kyi told me that she was concerned that some of the assistancecoming in through the UN was in fact helping to support the regime. On the other hand, she could see that the presenceof UNICEF or UNDP lUnited Nations Development Prograrnme] was actually helpful to the people. There are no very good, clear answers to this. I think the best thing to do is to separate it out so that it obviously does not go through the political leadership. It is better if aid is distributed through NGOs or international organizations.

ALBRTGHT O:f a l l t h e i s s u e st h a t I d e a l t with, the one in Rwanda was the most troubling and searing in terms of knowing what the effect ultimately was and that the international community did not take action. Yet, ex post facto, it looks a lot clearer than it did at the time. The situation needs to be set in the context of what was happening in other parts of the world-what was happening in the Balkans, what had happened in Somalia, and Haiti. One of the hard parts of being a policymaker is that very rarely do you have only one decision to make. Also, very rarely is the decision made in one big step; it is usually incremental. On Rwanda, it was a highly complex situation with the government, the Hutus and the Tu,tsis power-sharing, creatingvarious problerns even before anyl.hing was visibly happening. The forces that were in there were basically powerless. Even if we had decided that we needed to send in a peacekeeping force, it could not have happened fast enough to stop the killing. So there are a lot of "ifs." I went to Rwanda and saw the killing fields, which, in this case, were churches. The role of the Church wasjust terrible; going to the women's jail and seeing nuns there was one of the most shocking things for me. So I think it was like a volcano that exploded so rapidly and the plans had obviously been laid earlier. I actually do not think we could have stopped it-though, in many ways, I would feel better if we had tried more. It was one of the more difficult episodes because I was an "instructed ambassador," as it is called, and I did not like my instructions. I got them changed a

cJIA: Some observersbelieve that had the United States supported putting a moderate-sizecontingent of U.S. or international troops into Rwanda early in the killing process, genocide may have been precluded. Others think that at the stage when such an intervention would have been effective, we could not gauge that the killings were actually a governmentsponsored campaign of extermination. How did you, and how would you say a leader in general, resolve this kind of problem, of gauging intentions, and gauging what the U.S. or international mandate for action should be, when the potential consequences of inaction are so grave. Essentially, what are the ethical

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little bit. but. no matter how much I would have gotten them changed, there was no force ready to go in that could have gone in there quickly enough. One of the issues that people need to think about is how you can have forces that are ready that can deal with something like this, without giving the UN an army, which I am opposed to.

ern democratic nations can help to promote a climate that allows for that kind of choice. It is my belief that we actually are all the same, and that, given an opportunity, people will choose to make decisions about their own lives. It begins with people deciding which crops to plant, or which school to send their children to, or how to run their neighborhood. The more that they make those decisions, the c J t r: Moving on to the issueof democramore they want to make them on a higher cy promotion. First of all, what defines a and higher political level. That is what I democracy? Does the United States have believe. I have a very special view of the United States. We are a special country a moral obligation to help countries democratize: if so. what can Western and I used to say that we were an indisnations actuallydo to promote democrapensable country, and I believe that; I just do not believe that we are indispensable tization? Finally, what is the United States's national interest in dernocracy alone. That is a distinction that I would make between myself and the people that prornotion? are in power now. So, I think that we do A L B R I G x tW : h e n w e s t a r t e dt h e N a t i o n a l have an obligation, because of everything Dernocratic Institute (NDI) in the early that we have, to try to help other countries '8os, and I was the vice chair, we had very have the climate where democratic choice i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n s a b o u t w h a t is possible. Now, in order not to just be viewed as defines a democracy. A lot of people said elections, and that may be true, but not a goo-goo, I think that it is in the U.S. totally, since many of the dictatorships national interest because we know that have elections, and they vote themselves democracies do not go to war with each in by gg.g percent or whatever. One of other, and that the United States is much more comfortable in an internathe things that I think defines a democracy is the existenceof a legitimate oppositional system where other countries are tion party that actually has the possibility dernocracies. It is not sirnple, because of winning the second election. So, there just look at our problems with Europe, rnust be a loyal opposition that has a voice but we are not afraid that they are going and has a structure that allows it to functo shoot us. I also think that it is in our tion, whether it is within a recognized national interest to see countries where legislative branch or in a power-sharing people are working freely within their agreement or sornething like that. So systernsand are not discontent and lookthere are many waysto define democracy, ing for ways to overthrow their governbut, practically, that has been a very use- ments or to go outside of them, as the ful kind of criterion for me. discontented act now. Some saythat democracy is just a WestcJlA: What concrete steps would you ern thing, and I do not think it is. For me, democracy is never an imposition; it is a propose that Western nations take to choice. What has to happen is that West- prornote democratization?

tS8]

GeorgetownJournal of InternationalAffairs

TNTERVTEW Ethicsin Conflict A L B R I G x TT' h e r e a r e a l o t o f d i f f e r e n t waysof doing it. The National Democratic Institute of which I am Chairman of the Board, is one avenue. It basically provides the technical assistance for democracy and, at the invitation of countries, goes in and helps them set up their campaign without choosing a side. So, helping the electoral process is one way. Assisting countries to develop legal systemsis another, because ultirnately the rule of law and choosing the right judges helping countries is important-also develop an educational system is a way too. There are endless ways, without

law, and maybe you will get fake or rigged elections if you try to put the institutions in too early. A L s R r cn r , W e l l , I t h i n k t h a t w e h a v et o b e aware of what is going on in these countries and tailor our programs a little bit, but I do not thinkwe should talk down to them. I am often asked to list the things that I arn proudest of, and actually there are quite a few, but one is the thing that 'Warsaw in the surnmer of we did in 2ooo: the Comrnunity of Dernocracy. It showed that. first. there are certain elements that are general to democracy, but

I happen t0 U.tievethat pressinsfor hurnan rights is central to Arnericai forei{n policy. deterrnining the content, to provide the structure and the process for countries to have all the institutions that are a part of democracy. This includes a free press, an educational system,an election system,a judicial process, and legislative and executive branches. So, we can look at everything that we have here in the United States that can then be transmitted through government programs, through nongovernrnental organizations, or exchange prog:rams. Other democratic countries also provide models, and NDI brings all these experiences together. GJrA: Do you think that we are keeping the right time frame in mind? I know a lot of criticisrn comes from the fact that some of our aid programs and some international economic institutions' programs are linked to having elections within a certain timeframe. Do you think that maybe these timeframes are too short? It takes time to develop the rule of

also that democracies needed to help each other when they are under stress, and it is important to look at best practices in terms of what has worked in one place or another. I think that, sornetimes, conditionality on aid can be both useful and harmful at the same time, so it is hard to generalize. For instance, in Yugoslavia, we conditioned our aid on their turning over a number of indicted suspectsto the war crimes tribunal. And it worked! They are going to do it. It also worked on March 3I, 2oor-it is what really led to the arrest of Milosevic. So, there are times that setting dates on things worls. There are other tirnes when we do expect too much and in some ways undermine what we are trying to do by making things happen too fast. One of the things that I have been interested in is what I call "post-euphoria dernocracy, " where people thought it would happen very quickly, whether in Central or Eastern Europe, or in Latin

S u m m e r / F a l lz o o z

[3 g ]

A M E R I C A ' SR O L E I N T H E W O R L D

America, and because there was no democracy dividend to ordinary people, they got discouraged with democracy. So, I think it has to be done on a paced basis,andyou cannot have a cookie-cutter approach. cJrA: On a different tack, what do you think of the idea that there is an inherent contradiction in the way that the United Statespressures countries like China and North Korea to reform their humanrights records and increase certain liberal aspects of their regimes, while largely turning a blind eye to human-rights vioIations and religious persecution by the governments of countries like Uzbekistan and SaudiArabia? How do you think that this contradiction can be reconciled in terrns of governrnent policy?

record and that the way that they were dealing with their Muslim population was going to ultimately hurt them. And when I went to Saudi Arabia, I made it a point to talk about women's rights. So, I did not let resistance stand in my way, but I do think that, again, there has to be a realistic approach to what can and cannot be done. You have to look at each country individually without Iosing your principles, and I made it a point of always making ours very clear, even if they did not \^/ant to hear them. e .lr a: Finally, what role do you believe the United States should play in Afghanistan in its transition from Thliban rule?

ALBRTGHT F:i r s t o f a l l , I a p p l a u d w h a t President Bush did, and I think he responded properly after September rI, A L B R I G H TA:g a i n , y o u c a n n o t j u s t h a v e although it was pretty evident what had to the same approach everywhere. There be done. I certainly supported the are people who think that focusing on bombing campaign and what was done human rights is a "rnoralistic" foreign about fighting terrorism. What has to policy and that it is too soft. I think it is happen though now is that we cannot just a very realistic approach because we win the war, we have to win the peace. I understand that when human rights are know that there is kind of a sense that honored a country is stronger, and, if nation-building is a four-letter word. you look at it purely from a realpolitik However, it is very important for us to point of view, it enhances regime stabilunderstand that the structure of ity. It may not in the transition process, Afghanistan, which never was very firm, but it does ultimately make for rnore sta- has been totally destroyed, and that we ble regirnes, and that is in our national need to help the transition government interest. I made it a point during my try to figure out how to rebuild institutenure in government to raise human tions and reconnect with the people, and rights issues wherever I went. It rnight that can only be done with American not have been a message that everybody assistanceprograms. I also think that we wanted to hear, and I might have not need to have a larger peacekeeping force made it as equally publicly in each counthere, and that it would not hurt if the try. However, when I went to UzbekUnited States were a part of it instead of i s t a n , f o r i n s t a n c e , I m e t w i t h t h e the way that it has separated itself. Also, human-rights groups. When I met with the peacekeeping force needs to have a President Islam Karimov, I told him that larger mandate than just Kabul; it has to I thought they had a lousy human-rights be throughout the country. The other

[ + O]

Georgetown Journal

of International

Affairs

T N T E R V t EEWt h i C Si n c O n f l i C t

part that I have disagreed with totally is this sensethat the military should do only 'Wherever I traveled with military things. the American military, whether it was in Haiti or in the Balkans or wherever, they Iiked doing things to help the population-rebuilding schools and helping to protect people and children if they went to school. Somehow the press always finds the one soldier who misses his mother, who wants to come horne and does not think what he is doing is very rnilitary. The people I met thought that helping the local population was valuable. The American military these days is still the toughest fighting force in the world-we proved that. But we can also be a humane force on the ground and try to help in the transition process, because I think, again frorn a purely realpolitikapproach, we cannot afford to have another vacuurn in Afghanistan. So, I think we should play a very active role there. We spent mi//ionsof dollars

bombing them, so I think we can spend some in putting them back together. Although, I have to tell you, I am reading a book about Afghanistan called l-he GreatGame,and it is the most complicated part of the world. It is unbelievable. It is amazing and horrendous in terms of its climate and its geography and topography, and it has been crossed and crisscrossed, and people have been murdered there for hundreds of years, so it is very, very hard to understand. I never underestimate the difficulty of these things. I think one of the problems when you have not dealt with a situation first hand is that it all looks rnuch simpler, but there are rnany, many dimensions. I think the people back at Georgetown who know rne will agree that I believe in a very activist American policy because that is what makes Arnerica and Americans the safest-not just sitting back and letting the rest of the world worry about itself.

Summer/Fall zooz

l4tl

Buslness &Finance THE PA,^\TA MA On the Move in the 21st Century

CA N A L Ah[iii.,H",H:[irl;'t; On Decernber 3r, 1999, the United Statestransferred control of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian government, ending an era of American ownership, entitlement, and protection. There exists little debate regarding the enormous economic, strategic, and political value of the Panarna Canal, especially in its still vital role as a link between the seas.At the sarne tirne, however, uneasinessand controversy have framed the issuesof control and ultirnate authority of the canal and probable econornic lossesdue to the U.S. departure. All of this has led to a kind of ambivalent "Yankee, don't go horne yet" syndrorne.' Nervous voices continue to question whether Panarna has the will and the talent to defend as well as operate the canal, to maintain political and fiscal responsibility, and to pursue the necessaryeconomic and technological advancementsto be a viable manager of the canal without prejudice or rnalice toward other countries. There are also those who contend that, by enhancing the capability and versatility of the waterway and the surrounding territory, encouraging private enterprise, and pushing for development and rnodernization, Panama rnay shed the alleged model of state socialism

Alberto Alemiin Z u b i e t a w a sp r e v i o u s l yt h e A d m i n i s t r a tor of the Panama Canal Commission,

U.S. federal government agency. t998,

Since

he has been

Administrator Panama

of the

Canal Author-

ity, the new Panaman ian agency that assumed

responsibility

for the waterway.

Karen E. BreinerSandef

s is Associate

Professor of Spanish & Hispanic School

Studies in the

of Foreign

Ser-

vice and the Department of Spanish & Portuguese town

at George-

Llniversity.

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and break-even operational policies applied to the canal in the past. Panama Canal Adrninistrator Alberto Alern6n Zubieta talls with t}:'e Georgetown Affiirs about the manJoumal of International agement challenges he faces and the direction he has plotted for this "gateway

Your academic qualifications and your lifetime career experience are anchored in industrial and civil engineering. At this point, and thinking in terms of the responsibilities that your position entails, do you consider yourself more of an engineer or more of an administrator?

to the world." GJrA: Mr. Alemdn Zubieta, there are those in the United States, and indeed in Panama, who continue to speak out against the return of the canal to Panama. Some protest out of patriotic indignation, others do so out of the fear of either political realignrnent of power in the hemisphere or of worsening economic hardship. After all, B,5oo U.S. military personnel and approximately 2,ooo civilian workers and their families had to exit Panama in the last stagesof the transfer, producing an economic and social hole that must be difficult to fill. Do you note this attitude or any sentiment of concern or anxiety at the present tirne? A L E M AzNu B r e r r : N o , I d o n o t . T h e w i t h drawal was gradual, and in any case, many of those who worked for the Panarna Canal Company and tJren the Panama Canal Cornrnission were Panamanians. Those workers have continued in their positions, and this has allowed for an orderly and smooth transition. cJIA: In fact, you are a prime exarnple of this. Appointed in igg6 as the adrninistrator of the Panama Canal Comrnission, a federal agency of the United States Government, and then in rgg8 as the administrator of the newly formed Panama Canal Authority, you worked both the positions simultaneously until turnover to guarantee continuity and as seamlessa transition as possible.

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ALEMAN Z U B I E T A :M u c h m o r e o f a n administrator. I have a lot of fun in engineering, but my responsibilities are clearly administrative. GJrA: What kind of changes have taken place around the canal since the transfer of ownership? A L E M A Nz U B r E r A : T h e f o r r n e r r n i l i t a r y post, Fort Arnador, has undergone quite a transformation. A marina has already been developed at one end of the site, and a very large, first-class hotel has just been inaugrrrated. There are plans to build a rnuseurn there as well. So you can see that we are catching up to our schedules and rnoving along nicely with our plans. Then there is old Fort Howard, which has become an immense international airport, and Albrook air station which has becorne the local airport. But it is important to take into consideration not onlywhat is happening inside the old military areas of Panarna, but also in many other sectors of the city. For instance, the airport in Paitilla was moved to Albrook, and now Paitilla has been converted into a very large, private shopping mall. This represents an excellent investment and it demonstrates how we are able to move components of the infrastructure and develop them in different parts of the city. Yes, there is a recession and it is being felt; there's no doubt about it. Just the same, last year the Panama Canal earned

tNTERVtEB WU S i n e S SF&i n a n C e

approximately $Z3o million in terms of direct payments for the Republic of Panarna; that's about $8o million more than the canal provided the Panamanian National Tieasury in any previous year. In fiscal year 2oor (October r, 2ooo to September 30, 2oor) Panama Canal toII revenues totaled $SZg.S million, and approximately rg,$OO vesselstransited the canal. Perhaps in the past the U.S. military was putting these kinds of earnings into the informal economy, but now the money goes directly to the governrnent and to the formal econorny. One needs to consider not just what is earned, but where the rnoney flows and what it does.

the market, and we need to present the canal in certain ways. Before, these things were not issues.There was no marketing. Basically, if a ship appeared, it would go through the canal. c,rIr,Talking of traffic on the canal, has the direction always been one-way at any given time becauseof the size of the locl<s? And when the waterway is enlarged, will you be able to send ships through simultaneously in both directions? ALEMAN Z U B T E T AT:h e C a n a l i s n o t a problem; movement is east-west, as well as west-east. And, yes, the Gaillard Cut

I think that in Pananra thereweredoubtseveryonehad doubts in r$$8 and r999-about whether we hu4 t\e c-apacityto run the Canal. I didn't have such doub^ts. I think that in Panama there were doubts-everyone had doubts in rgg8 and Iggg-about whether we had the capacity to run the canal. I didn't have such doubts. Not on the operation side, because I was administrator of the canal under the United States, and the people who were working there are still working there. So nothing has actually changed in that respect. However, we are changing the mentality and the organizational culture of the place, and that is going to take time. c,lr r; Thking care of the canal, the enormous task of maintenance and modernization, requires that you think outside the box. ALEMAN Z U B T E T AE: x a c t l y .W e k n o w w e have to compete. we need to understand

widening program, which was recently completed very soon, will allow for virtually unrestricted two-way traffic for all vessels throughout the length of the waterway. e .lr n ' About a year and a half ago, a study was undertaken and a project was planned to create another set of locls. Has anything happened? ALEMAN Z UBr E r A : ' W ea r e c u r r e n t l y s t u d y ing this plan. It is called the "third set of locks;" I don't know why it is called that because the canal already has three sets of locks. Basically, we are creating one more lane, but this is nothing new. Most people do not know that the United Stateshad a full set of plans and actually started building the extra set of

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l o c k s i n I g f g , b u t t h e p r o j e c t w a s to do with that discovery. I rnet with the vice presidents of the cruise lines and stopped in r!{2 because of the war. Of explained that we recognized that we were course that project was different from a prirne tourist destination, and I asked the one we are working on now. The United States had intended to put one specifically what the lines wanted, what we bigger lock-one more lane-near each could do to attract more of their busiof the existing locks. They started exca- ness, and how we could all work together to rnake it better. vation and spent about $70 rnillion, but the project was stopped in r!{2 because of the war effort. Then the plan was GJIA: There really isn't enough tirne never pursued because the idea had allocated by the cruise lines for their passengers to disernbark and explore been more of a rnilitary strategy than anything else-to be able to move the when the ships dock near Panarna City a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s t h a t c o u l d n ' t p a s s for refueling and reloading after the transit. At best, the passengersgo down through the locks of the canal.

to We haveto competâ&#x201A;Ź,weneed. understand the rnarket, and we need to present the Canal in certain ways. c J I A: How has the ratio changed between cargo ships and cruise ships that rnake the transit? ALEMAN Z U B T E T AC: r u i s e s h i p s a r e a n industry that represents a srnall percentage of the volume that goes through the canal. However, it has increased some. I would saythat cruise traffic has increased proportionally as the cruise industry has grown as a whole. Nowadays, the ships are bigger; they're beautiful ships, and I love to see thern go through the canal. The Panama Canal is the second most important destination of the cruise industry: the first is Alaska, then come the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. When cruises are advertised with Canal passage, they alwayssell out quickJy. What is really happening now is that the tourist industry, and specifically the cruise industry, is discovering Panama, and I must say that I have had something

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to the dock to buy molosfrom the Kuna Indians and srnall items frorn other stands set up hastily nearby for each cruise ship's arrival. But that's all, and the cruise ships continue their journey with no meaningful exposure or contact with Panama and its people by the cruising public. ALEMAN zuBrErA: My country has done something interesting-sornething unique in the Caribbean at least. Panama has proposed to the cruise industry that it will pay for every passenger that disembarks at the Port of Panama City. The hope is that the tourists will be induced to stop longer and experience more of Panama City and the surrounding area. A cruise port is being developed in Arnador that will allow passengers from the 2$O cruises that now transit the Panama Canal to disembark and enjoy a day in Panama.

t N T E R V t EBW u s i n e s sF&i n a n c e GJ r A: In all the literature, the term that is used for the Panama Canal Authority is "autonomous agency." Yet, all eleven

ALEMAN Z U B T E T AT: h e C a n a l , a s i t i s defined in the Constitution and the l-aw, is the inalienable patrimony of the board members are appointed by the nation. As such, it can neither be sold, President of the Republic. How transferred, mortgaged, nor in any way autonomous is the Panarna Canal levied or alienated. The Authority runs Authority? Can you really separate the and manages the patrimony; all the land Authority from politics in the country? and property that comprise it are registered under the Panama CanalAuthority. ALEMAN Z U B T E T AW : h e t h e r o r n o t t h e Unlike the Panamanian government's canal was actually going to be apart frorn control of all other governrnent assets,the party politics was one of the big worries Authority has the right to handle the revbefore the transition. I think that we have enues related to the canal and to make the created a very interesting rnanagement decisions for it. For example, the system that is different from other gov- Authority decided to return to the government-owned agencies in many ways. ernment sorne property that was located One factor is that our charter is part of in ports and near ports. We have that the Constitution, so even if the governpower, but the government does not. ment wanted to change the law, it would first have to change the Constitution, cJIArThere was a lot of controversy at one and that is very difficult to do. In fact, the point-I think it has died down now-as to approval of the constitutional article that who was running the canal, whether it was covers the canal required the efforts of Hong Kong, whether there were various two successivegovernments. foreign governments. . . c.lla: Just the same, in terrns of privatization and developrnent, for example, the government can, and will, make those kinds of decisions. ALEMAN Z U s r E T AN : o, it cannot. And that's what is interesting. There was a recent change to the Constitution that details how the canal is to be managed. It states, for instance, that it has to be run for profit, and that is totally different frorn the way the United States ran the canal. It is no longer a break-even enterprise, nor is it budget-driven. It has to be efficient, safe, reliable, and profitable. Another important factor is that the government has given the canal its own patrimony. c J I A : W h a t d o e st h a t m e a n ?

A L E M A NZ U B T E T AT: h e P a n a m a C a n a l Authority, an autonomous Panamanian government entity runs and rnanages the canal. We have financial autonorny. That means that all the income of the canal stays with the canal. In fact, we decide what our capital investrnents are going to be; what money we will put into the rnaintenance of the canal; the payroll; and any reserves to be established, perhaps for accidents. Then, at the end of everything, as any company, we take out a certain amount of money for depreciation. So, we have control of all rnatters, just like any corporation. There is another advantage built into our system of management: the dividends are not distributed the year the profits are made; the government is paid the year following any profit earnings.

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'We

are not part of the government budget; we have an independent budget and our own procurement system, we also have our own labor system, and, while strikes are forbidden in the canal, we have our own expeditious method of resolving labor problems and disputes. There is a tribunal of five people who are appointed by the president, and that tribunal decides such issues. The sarne is true for the union: if it has a dispute with us and we cannot resolve it, we all go to arbitration and that's the end of it. e lrn: This all sounds very well thought out. But of course, there were years of planning to establish these structures and systems.

cl I a: During the two years since December Jr, r99g and the final U.S. withdrawal, there have been relatively stable conditions in Panama under President Mireya Moscoso. What if the country were to return to more volatile times such as under Omar Torriios or Manuel Noriega? A L E M A izl u r r e r n : W e l l , t h a t w o u l d b e rather difficult because we don't have a military regirne any longer. iADiosgracias! There was a verl strong military presence in Panama for quite a long period. Each time that Arias was taken down, for example, it was at the hands of the police or the military. In fact, in most Latin American countries, presidents still need the okay of the military in order to govern. Costa Rica became very stable when it elirninated the military, and we are glad to be rid of the militarv as well.

ALEMAN Z U B T E T AC; e r t a i n l y . W e w o r k e d on these plans from 1994 to 2oOo. And again, how have we managed to remove the canal from party politics? There are But there is a new police force in some very important mechanisms in place GJIA: just Panarna now, and September tr has for this purpose. One is that we go to brought into focus the whole question the cabinet and to the assernbly only for the approval of the budget. The cabinet of terorism and violence once again. can ask all the questions it likes, but it What about terrorist cells operating in Panama's about cannot modify the budget. Only the canal P a n a m a ? W h a t response to the United States in terrns Authority can make modifications through the Board of Directors. Once the of the coalition against terrorisrn? budget is approved by the cabinet, it ALEMAN z u B r E r A :I t h i n k t h e r e s p o n s eo f moves to the assembly, and the only options for the assembly are to approve Panama has been very straightforward. the budget or reject it. If the assembly We are very much with the United States on this. However, the canal has always rejects it, then the prior year's budget been politically neutral and open to all applies, but with all the modifications countries that wish to use its services. needed for the capital improvement of During the CoId War, Russian and the canal. So basically, the budget cannot be played with; it cannot be sabotaged. Cuban ships routinely made the passage. The same applies to other issuesrelated to Even in the case of armed conflict or declared war, ships from competing the operation of the canal-decisions on armies and navies, and their troops, are personnel and procurements are done through regulations, and the regulations free to utilize the waterway. We don't take sides;we maintain neutrality. are approved by the Board of Directors.

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tNTERVtEW B u s i n e s s &F i n a n c e GJrA: But coalition support is going to cost money, and the cornmitrnent of Panama means that the country runs a g:reater risk of terrorism directed against it, and more specifically against the canal-not just your everyday, normal kind of risk.

two away. But then the floods carne, and the canal was saved from its first forced closure ever. nleuAHZUBTETA : at iswhywe areproTh ceedingwith deepening Gatirn Lake so we can have more water reserves in case of another drought. We did just that in rgBg when we suffered from 11Mfro; the Gatirn was deepened and we were able to better rnanage the water at that time.

ALEMAN Z U B T E T AI n: f a c t , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of the Panama Canal is the principal responsibility of the Panama Canal Authority. If we need to put rnore effort a n d m o r e r e s o u r c e si n t o p r o t e c t i o n , w e GrIn: How is the dredging progressing? can do it. A s I u n d e r s t a n d i t , t h i s i s a c o n s t a n tc o n This is not party politics, but state cern, especially through the narrowest politics. For exarnple, when Panama portion of the passage,the Gaillard Cut. becarne a rnember of the World Trade Organization, that affected the things r l e u A N z u B r E r A :I t i s g o i n g v e r yw e l l . W e we do and the way we do them. But the actually finished dredging the Gaillard way we tackle those things is the indeCut, and we cornpleted it way ahead of p e n d e n t d i m e n s i o n o f o u r o p e r a t i o n . I t schedule and under budget-about $2oo is like having a corporation in which the rnillion under budget. That is a big administration defers to the board of accornplishrnent, I would say. directors, and the board rnakes the d e c i s i o n s .I n t h e c a s eo f a r n a j o r i n v e s t - e;Ir: Aren't there significant ecological rnent, the board had better go to the risks involved with such a project? In s t o c k h o l d e r s . O t h e r w i s e , b o t h t h e Florida, for exarnple, much of the water board and the management run the risk was siphoned off and darnned to take care of being thrown out of office. Some of agricultural needs. Due to misguided people say that the canal should be water management and abuse of Lake rnanaged just like any other rninistry. Okeechobee as a resource and a recourse, But no, the canal is run with a different the watershed started to dry up, and those rnentality; it is a business. in charge had to reverse rnany of their project decisions in an effort to restore erIa, There is a saying: "elhombrepropone2the wetlands and water levels. DiosdiEone"fman proposes and God disposesl. I remember you taiking about a l e u A r z u s r E r A : B u t t h e y w e r e d r y i n g creating additional dams and lakes espe- out the Everglades, and that is a very cially in the west. In t998, for the very different story because it is a different first time, there was grave concern in type of wetland. The technology is Panama due to a severe drought. It much improved even beyond that used almost closed the canal because the on the Hoover Dam, which is a great extremely low water level was barely suffidarn that has created many benefits. cient to supply the locks. The decision to The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) close the canal seernedto be onlv a dav or

is also an organization

that rnanages

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water in diverse ways. In fact, I went to the TVA and looked at a project of theirs that involved darnming a river, which created water-quality problems, and in turn caused the fish to disappear. The TVA responded by creating a system to put more oxygen into the river-actually more than nature had provided before the dam project. This goes to show that there are things that can be done. You have to think outside the box; there are waysto do things better than in the early IgOOs.

important that I am not a member of any political party. I think that, institutionally for Panama, it is more important to maintain the canal apart from party politics, and I would be doing a big disservice to my country and to the canal if I started using the canal as a platform for running politically. I think that I should focus on the things that I am charged with doing. I do not have any political interestswhatsoever. I hope that when I finish with the canal and go back to my private life, I will be able to play golf and work to reduce my handicap, which unfortunately is going up because I don't have the time to play enough to work on it.

cllr: Finally, in terms of administration, you worked first with the Panama Canal Commission, then with the Panarna Canal Authority as part of an overlap transition, and now you work exclusively with the Panama Canal Authority. Do you have any aspirations for a political position in the future?

c,lr a, Thank you very much, and the best of luck to you with your enormous responsibilities to the canal as the destination for thenew rnillennium... and also with your golf handicap.

ALEMAZ i l U B I E T AN: o n e w h a t s o e v e rI. a r n very happy with what I am doing. It is

Notes: r. Terri Shaw, "Pssst, Sefror, Want to Buy a Canal?," TheWoshinglonPost, 2/June 1993, C3.

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0onfllct&Securlty andtheFutureof ATO Brian Collins The U.S.-Ied military action inAfghanistan in resPonse to the attacks of September rr raised a nurnber of irnportant issues regarding the future of the NorthAtlantic teaty Organization (NATO) and the relationship between the United States and its transatlantic allies. On Septernber r2, NATO invokedArticle g-the mutual defense clause of the Washington Treatythereby cornmitting NATO to help defend the United States from the perpetrators of the attacks. Shortly thereafter, NATO sent seven of its Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, crews, and ground support personnel to assist in the air defense of the United States. In addition to demonstrating NAIO's rnilitary resolve and buttressing the political declaration of Article g, the deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft also freed up U.S. aircraft for Operation Enduring Freedorn in Afghanistan. NATO also provided blanket air rights for U.S. aircraft, accessto bases and ports, and other non-cornbat support. However, NATO did not lead Operation Enduring Freedorn, nor did it develop the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed to Afghanistan in the wake of the American rout of the Thliban. The Europeans expected more of a say in the planning and execution of operations since the alliance

B r i a n C o l l i n s i sa Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force and a faculty member of the National War College in Washington, D.C. Previously, he worked on NAIO issuesfor the U.S. Joint Staff, and served in Germany

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had stood firm with the United States after the attacls. Since the understanding for fifty years had been that the United States would come to the aid of Europe and lead its defense, it was only natural to assurne that Europe would play a large role if the United States was attacked. However, this was not the case;the United States preferred a coalition involving NAIO rnernbers but not NAIO itself. European rnernbers of NAIO asked whether this American unilateralisrn portended the end of the alliance. Americans vigorously denied this, and argued for a broader conception of NAIO. Nevertheless, Operation Enduring Freedom was a landmark event becausethe United States chose to use a loose coalition instead of the NATO alliance, a decision that revealed an emerging U.S.-NAIO relationship in which the United States consults with NAIO on security issues but acts outside the alliance structure when it is in America's interest.

Whythe UnitedStatesDidn't Turn tO NATO. In the aftermathof

sensus on how to interpret the Washington teaty in the post-Cold War world. For example, although the treaty does not place explicit restrictions on NAIO operations in a geographical sense or require United Nations approval for its operations, many rnembers have conceptual difficulty expanding NATO's role beyond the alliance's immediate periphery, especially in the absence of UN mandates for such operations. Consequently, rather than get embroiled in discussions regarding the legality of NATO participation in Afghanistan, the United States sidestepped the issue and worked with its allies outside of official NATO channels. The mutual defense clause is now particularly open to interpretation. Article $ states: The

Parties agree that an armed

attack

against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them

all, and

consequently

they

agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, . . . wiII assistthe Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, suchoctionas il deemsnecesorl,including

the use

Septernber II, the United Stateswanted of arrned force, to restore and maintain the the forrn of a coalition, but not the subsecurity of the North Atlantic area.' stance, for several reasons. First, the In the Cold War era, when there was a attackswere on Arnerican soil, and conthe States had lead sequently United to clear adversary and contingency plans for the response. Although citizens from surprise attacks, the presumption was scores of countries were killed in the that NAIO would respond as a whole. AII attacls, it was clear that the United States, national combat units integrated into the its people and its homeland, was the NATO military structure in Europe intended victirn. Therefore, a response would immediately come under unified to the terrorist attacks did not automatiNAIO comrnand when any member was cally involve NATO. Ultimately, there a t t a c k e d . N A T O , n o t i t s i n d i v i d u a l rnembers, was to lead the operations, and was no direct link to Europe. Consulting NAIO would have been unrealistic, and the expectation was that all mernbers no American administration would have would rneet their cornmitments. waited for NAIO to form a response. Today, there is no obvious adversary, NAIO was also not the United States's and there are no longer standing NAIO first choice becausethere is no clear condefense plans. In the aftermath of Sep-

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colLrNSConflict& Security tember tI, there was room for the NAIO allies to explore different interpretations of Article g. For example, the alliance might nominally invoke Article g, and then deem that no further action was required or provide limited NATO assets likeAWACS to the state in need. Alternatively, the alliance could invoke Article $, then plan and conduct NATO-Ied, alliance-wide operations. It is possible for a NAIO rnember to agree to invoke Article $ and consent to NATO military operations, but not provide its own forces for planning or operations. An aIIy may also support Article 5 but provide the bulk of its support bilaterally, and not through NATO. This concept, often identified as a "coalition of the willing," iswhat happened during Operation Enduring Freedom. Eventually NAIO must addressthe issue of how and when to cancel an Article $ commitment. The assignment of NATO AWACS to the United States was a novel approach. During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, NATO members, not NATO itself, participated in the U.S.-led coalition. However, NAIO did deploy the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) to southeast Turkey to dissuade Iraq frorn attacking Turkey, and the AMF remained under NAIO command. However, during Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO A\MACS were under U.S. command. In a marked change, NATO provided common assetsto a member for its individual defense. In addition to concerns about treaty interpretations, the United Statesdid not want to be hindered by NAIO's consensus decision-making process. Numerous debatesspawned by the NATO-led war in Kosovo clearly indicate that the United States has doubts about the efficacy of NAIO-led military operations. The slo-

gan "war by committee" is pejoratively used to describe the battles fought between the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the NATO North Atlantic Council, the NAIO Military Comrnittee, and policymakers in Washington over the conduct of the combat operations. Both retired general Wesley Clark and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson recently defended NAIO's leadership of the Kosovo campaign and made the case that NAIO should be playing a larger role in the "war against terrorism. "' However, American policyrnakers clearly believe that "the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission." The fear is that otherwise the mission will be reduced to the "lowest cornmon denominator"-a reference to NATO's decision-making process, which relies on consensus.3 The perceived technology gap between the United States and other members of NATO is another argument against NATO involvement in Afghanistan. Without the United States, neither NATO nor most of its individual members has the capability to project meaningful power outside of Europe. Few U.S. allies have substantial air-refueling aircraft or long-range, strategic air transport capability, and none have long-range bombers. To participate in Operation Enduring Freedorn, NATO aircraft would have required basing rights in the region and air-refueling support. They would have competed with U.S. aircraft for ramp space without bringing additional combat capabilities. Furthermore, NAIO member states are poorly provisioned with precision-gr-rided munitions for their aircraft; and command, control, comrnunications, cornputers, and intelligence (C4I) has been a problem since

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first cornbat missions over NAfO's Bosnia in the mid-rggos. With the exception of the United Kingdom, rnost NATO allies lacked the capabilities

European states also tend to emphasize solutions to the technology gap within NATO that do not involve large defense budget increases.There is some

Thgre iS n0 clearconsensr-rs on how to i_ntg1p_ret teaty the Washington Cold War world. required to operate in the initial air and special-forces carnpaign in Afghanistan.

Implications for the Futureof NATO, The percent of GDP that NAIO member statesallocate to defense budgets has been gradually declining from {.9 percent at the end of the Cold War to 2.$ percent now. The European members are at 2.O percent with many below that figure, while the United Statesis at 2-! percent.a In terrns of pure dollar outlays, the United Statesspends roughly twice the defense budgets of all the European members of NATO combined. The proposed $48 billion increase in U.S. defense spending alone is larger than the largest defense budget inWestern Europe. As a superpower, the United Stateshas historically budgeted a militarT force capableof worldwide action. Today, only the British and French have retained s o m e c a p a b i l i t yf o r f o r c e p r o j e c t i o n o u t side of Europe. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet threat, NAfO has expanded its membership, but its European membels are hesitant to expand beyond Europe. It is not clear whether even the United States would want NAfO, and indirectly the European (Jnion, to broaden its conceptual area of military action, and it is doubtful that the European members of NATO could take on such a role.

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in the post-

discussion in Europe, for- exarnple, of national militaries moving into "niche rnarkets," where srnaller countries rnight give up fielding a rounded military force and instead invest in specific capabilities. NATO, or the European lJnion, would collectively have all the required capabilities, but individual armies would not. This scheme would reinforce NATO's consensusdecision-making process. Another low-cost solution frorn the European perspective is for the United Statesto increase its technology transfer and industrial cooperation.5 However, U.S. defense contractors do not relish the idea that they should assist their European cornpetitors by providing thern with hard-won technological innovations. Nevertheless,industrial cooperation occasionally produces glimmers of optimisrn, as with NATO AWACS and European F-r6 purchasesin the past. Finally, sorne Europeans emphasize cornbining aircraft or ships into European units and using a European procurement system.oThe consolidation of Europe-wide rnilitary capabilities could produce some short-terrn efficiencies, but the processwill be politically complex, and it does not solve the long-term issue of raising funding for the procurement of new defense technology. For example, Gerrnany has developed a plan for a European Air tansport Command, but

coLLtNSConflict& Security it is expectedto take a decadebefore it can be fully realized. In the meantime, Germany is having difficulty funding its planned purchase of seventy-three yetto-be-developed Airbus ,{4oo transPort aircraft. The problem is the same whether the forces are allocated to NATO, the European Union, or both. As European defense budgets remain relatively flat for the next severalyears while the U.S. budget increasesdramatically, the technology gap will continue to widen. Of course the technology gaP is not the only factor constraining the U.S.-NAIO relationship. The United States does not want to deal with the NAIO decisionrnaking processwhen planning or executing combat operations that are vital to lJ.S. interests, nor does the United States want to get bogged down in peacekeeping and nation-building roles afterwards. For the most part, European members of cannot participate in U.S.-led NAIO combat operations, and they do not want to do peacekeepingalone. The mantra in the Balkans is "in together, out together" at least partly because Europeans need Arnerican firepower supporting thern if a crisis erupts. Additionally, the Europeans do not want to put thernselvesin a position where the United States can criticize their actions from the outside. Nevertheless,the United States provided more than Bo percent of the aircraft and flew approximately 80 percent of the strike sorties in Kosovo because fewAllied aircraft could deliver precision rnunitions.T However, Europeans provide 8o to 8g percent ofthe peacekeepers in the Balkans today, and the European Union is the largest financier of post-war reconstruction and developrnent in the Balkans. If this were to become the norrn, it would be a "niche market" scheme on a grandiose scale, and the

United States would have no reason to complain about a capabilities gap since the European allies' prirnary purpose would be to provide peacekeeping and forces that would not nation-building require compatibility with high-tech weaponry and combat concepts. Such a division of labor bodes ill for NAIO since it would lirnit the voice of EuroWhile the pean states within NAIO. United Statescould still act alone across a range of potential military options, from combat to peacekeeping, the rest of the alliance could not. Consequently, Europe's dependence on the United Statesand the potential for U.S. unilateralisrn would increase. Given that decision-rnaking by consensus is a non-negotiable tenet within achieving a consensus rnay NATO, as NATO become more difficult enlarges. Consequently, it is also likely that using coalitions of the willing will becorne more comrnonplace. Such coalitions rnay forrn either within NATO when all allies agree to an operation but not all want to participate, or outside of NAIO when there is no NATO-wide consensusfor an operation. For example, currently only twelve of nineteen allies participate in NAIO AWACS program, and the prospective European Air tansport Cornmand will not include all nineteen NATO members either. In addition, NATO's future force structure will be based on a series of potentially mobile headquarters with pools of custornizable forces instead of fixed units subordinated to one command. Such constructs will allow all NATO to condone an operation without requiring the full participation of all its rnembers. Conversely, it places rnore of a burden on the participants, but potentially gives them more Power

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O P E R A T I O NE N D U R I N GF R E E O O M A N D T H E F U T U R EO F N A T O

since the operation might not be possible without them.

COnClUSiOll.In rhe future, NAIO will still serye as a source of political support and as a pool from which to draw operational support as well. However, it is clear that NATO's European members are not ready for independent or worldwide operations. For the foreseeable future, the practical division of Iabor seems set with the United States leading the high-end combat tasks and most of the other NATO allies takine on

peacekeeping and nation-building missions. The United States will continue to consult with its NAIO allies, but it will prefer to use coalitions of the willing, firrnly under its own command, rather than deal with NATO's cumbersome decision-making process and technological shortcomings.

Author's

Noter The opinions,

ommendations

conclusions,

expressed or implied

solely those of the author

and do not necessarily rep-

resent the views of the National the U.S. Air

and rec-

in this article are

Defense University,

Force, the U.S. Department

or any other U.S. government

of Defense,

agency.

NO T E S r NATO Handbook. (Brussels' Informalion

and

NATO

Press, zoor),528.

Office of (emphasis

added) 2 Wesley K. Clark, "Neglected Allies." TheWahinglon Posf,r February 2oo2: p. A25. George Lord Robertson, "Speech at the 38th Munich Conference on Security Policy." 3 February 2oo2, refieved 13 Februar), 2oo2 from< http,//w.securityconference.de/konferen > zenlreden/rede.asp?id=8r&sprache=eng3 Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Remarks of Deputy

Secre-

tary of Defense Wolfowitz

(zoor)156, 18 Dec 2oor), retrieved 6 March nato .int/ do cw/ pr / Zoorlpo I 2 oo2 from : <http rw. tg6e.htm>. g Robertson, "Speech at the 38th Munich ConDPC-z

ference "Global

on Security Policy." Rudolph Scharping, Security - New Challenges, New Strategies,"

3 February <http,//w.

retrieved 6 March 2oo2 from: securityconference - delkonferenzen/rede n/rede.asp?id=88&sprache=eng>. Edmund Stoiber, "Speech at the 38th Munich Conference on Security 2oo2,

at the 38th Munich Conference on Security Policy." 2 February 2oo2, retrieved 13 February 2oo2 from: <http,,/,/w.secu-

Policy," 2 February 2oo2, retrieved I4 Februar),2oo2 <http, //w. securityconfe rence. delko nferenzenlreden/rede -asp ?id = /r&sprache= eng> .

rityco nference. delkonferenze g&sprache=eng>

ence on Security Policy."

n/reden/rede.

asp?id= 6

Data Relating to {, "Financial and Economic NATO Defence: Defence Expenditures of NATO (NATO Press Release MCountries (r98o-zoor)."

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from,

6 Stoiber's "Speech at the 38th Munich / Benj amin S. I:mbeth. Air Pouer. (Ithaca, Cornell

2r3-2r+.

Confer-

The Transfomotion of Americon Press, 2oo2),

University

Conflict& Security

TheContinental Realities of Chinese J{aualStrate$es Christopher R. Bullock The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) increasing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific has attracted the attention of other regional powers including the United StatesandJapan. China's leaders contend that hegemony and power politics still define the international system today.r As a result, they believe that China needs a modern defense establishment, high-technology equipment, and a pragrnatic strategy to attain its national security interests. This perception is accompanied by the development of a revised national strategy that envisions a shift away from the traditional "people's war" doctrine, toward a belief that future conflict will be local, quick, and politically decisive. The role of the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PIAN) in safeguarding China's security and promoting its interests is much more prominent in this new strategic outlook. Such unprecedented awarenessof maritime power has fostered the growth of a new set of Chinese naval theories, a rnaritime mentality, and above all, an appetite for blue-water power projection. The Chinese navy hopes to deploy a so-called "offshore navy" finhoi fangu) as soon as it is feasible and a "blue-water

C h r i s t o p h e rR . Bullock is a research associateat the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

navy" (luarylanghaijun)to operate in distant oceans by 2ogo.' Examination of PIAN's long-term goal of constructing an indigenous blue-water power projection capability has becorne a recurrent topic in Western academic, military, and policy cir-

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cles. The irredeemable complexity involved in understanding China's true military ambitions results from both PLAN's lack of transparency and its internal intricacies. Consequently, specula-

ferred strategyhas been a source ofdebate for students of military and strategic studies for millennia. By applying elements of both classical and contemporary theory concerning continental powers, this arti-

ChinesenavalstrategYi' inextricabty conditioned by the nation's geopolitical position. tions on Chinese regional intentions are commonly constructed by rnonitoring the nation's technological development, procurement trends, and fleet deployrnents. While such analyses can be enormously useful, an overemphasis on technological advancernents and procurernent policies suppresses disciplined theorizing about China's strategic vision for its rnaritime frontier. National poliry inforrns strategy, but it is strategy that guides rnodernization by outlining the configuration and projected use of the naval fleet. Over the past decade, China's military leaders and strategists have become increasingly vocal in describing P[AN's overall strategic direction. Under this vision, naval forces will contribute independently to strateg"ic and operational objectives by projecting power far frorn the continent. By adopting an evolutionary naval strategy, military planners hope that the Chinese navy will develop a globally deployable, combat-effective maritime force more quickly. Reference to the dorninating influence of geography in China's national strategy development is regrettably absent or given 'Western only token acknowledgrnent in literature. Chinese naval strategy is inextricably conditioned by the nation's geopolitical position. How geography theoretically contributes to a nation's pre-

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cle will show that geographical considerations matter to China and influence its maritime aspirations. China's ambitious naval modernization program will ultimately reflect the realities of a predominantly continental focus. Geostrategic concerns characteristic of a traditional continental power will constrain China's reliance on rnaritime power and the operational range of the Chinese navy.

Geopolitics and Continental POWef. Geography occupies a pararnount position in international relations and has a pervasive, though often subtle, influence on strategy development. In terms of military planning, geography is rnost commonly understood as territory to be protected and acquired, or as a theater of operations. It is at a higher level of analysis, or geopolitics, however, that geography has its greatest influence. Geopolitics involves the study of geography's influence on international relations and on the foreign and rnilitary policies of states.According to geopolitical analysis, size and location of a state are crucial determinants of national strategy and security planning. Commenting on the dominant position of geography in strategic formulation, Colin Gray frankly states, "all politics is geopolitics, and all strategy is geostrategy."3Not all strategists

BULLocK Conflict& Security and practitioners ag:reewith such a bold statement, but it illustrates the pervasiveness of geography in how a state determines its national strategy. Central to the debate, and most relevant to this analysis, is the theoretical division between continental and rnaritime powers. The particular characteristics of each environrnental concentration were first discussed in Halford J. MacKinder's rnonurnental essay,TheGeoPiuotof Histog.+While MacKinder's graphical prediction that technological advancesin land-based transportation would lead to the unassailable dominance of continental power failed to materialize, the observation that continental and rnaritirne stateshave distinct strategic focuses consistent with their geographic situations remains valid. Position. resources.Iandrnass, and population are key indicators in prescribing the environment most irnportant to a state's security strategy. U.S. naval strategistAlfred Thayer Mahan acknowledged that dependence on a particular environrnent is not a pure factor; rather, stateswill strive to obtain security in their preferred environment and atternpt to acquire a defensive capability in the other.5 Financial and geographical factors make acquiring sirnultaneous dominance in both environrnents extrernely unlikely, if not impossible. Above all, maritime power and the possessionof a national fleet are products of strategic geography. An essential prerequisite for a maritime-oriented strategy is that the country be insulated against the threat of overland invasion.6 At the same time, freedom from domestic instability is equally irnportant for a maritime focus since naval forces are poorly structured to address domestic instability. Not surprisingly, island statesare likely candidates to pursue a rnaritirne-focused strat-

egy. Technologically advanced stateswith tranquil borders and internal stability also often adopt maritime strategies. Clearly, the freedom of movement associated with seaborne maneuvering grants maritirne nations the luxury of meeting challenges to national security at the source, rather than waiting for it to reach its own shores. States that lack such characteristics have Iittle choice but to becorne continental powers, emphasizing land-based military forces. Spatial proxirnity to hostile or unstable countries demands that the bulk of security initiatives focus on securing the periphery. Geographical rulnerability absorbs limited defense resources and restrains the strategic flexibility cornrnon to maritime forces. For example, rnany pre-Ig{$ German navalistswere frustrated by the physical reality that Germanywas positioned between France and the Soviet ljnion. As mentioned earlier, domestic instability also cornpels many national governrnents to adopt continental or land-oriented strategies. Sorne statesthat seem to be prirne rnaritime candidates, like Indonesia or the Philippines, fail to move beyond coastal defense since a large standing arrny is necessary to maintain state unity. A state threatened at home does not have the luxury of engaging in arrned conflict abroad. The Asia-Pacific region is perhaps the most natural rnaritime environment in the world. However, the countries in this area are actually not maritirne in character.T This is especially true with China. Despite its large coastline and island claims, historically, the Chinese have had little concern for maritime power. From a geopolitical perspective, China has retained a distinctive continental tradition, and has lacked a true maritime rnentality. China's size and

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location have been crucial determinants in the way its political and rnilitary leaders think about strategy.8 Drawing its strength from its large population and landmass, China has historically relied upon continental power.s China's monolithic dorninance of the Asian continent strongly influences its entire military strategy. It is the only country to border east, south, central, and southeast Asia. Its central location and long, vulnerable borders have been the central concern of Chinese leaders for roughly 3,ooo years. The harsh geographic reality is that the very size and location that gives China strength also imposes its strategic weakness. The preerninent exogenous concern of Chinese military leaderswas to defend the Chinese heartland frorn serni-nomadic "barbarians" from the Northern Steppe and the Turkic empires to the west.'o Armored colurnns of soldiers crossing the northern border frorn the Soviet lJnion eventually becarnethe PRC's principle strategic concern until the mid-r9Bos. The PRC continues to retain a continental focus. Its leadership is concerned with the relative weaknessof some neighboring countries, and non-traditional security threats associated with drugs, organized crirne, legal irnrnigration, and internationally sponsored insurgency lie at the crux of Beijing's regional security concerns. More recently, the American presence in Central Asia and the potential for increased instability have fed concerns arnong the Chinese leadership over the accessibility of regional oil supplies. Domestic stability also remains a crucial problem for Beijing. Internal instability stemming from nationalist separatist movements among many minority groups and growing popular dissatisfaction have made domestic security the rul-

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ing Chinese Communist Party's principal concern-a task that a maritime strategy is ill-suited to accomplish.

NewMaritime MentalChina's ity. e.io. to the rggos, when restrictions that had harnpered strategic debate in China were loosened, Chinese naval strategy had been dominated by the concept of coastal defense. For over three decades, naval strategy was rooted in the judgement of Xiao Jingguang, an oldline infantryman and navy commander in the early rggos. "The navy should be a light navy, capable of inshore defense. Its key mission is to accompany the ground forces in war actions."" Xiao's directive concluded, "a combination of coastalsea guerrilla warfare and coastal anti-landing warfare will be the rnajor cornbat form for a future seawar. "'' The Cultural Revolution and the 1974 PIAN victory over a superior Vietnamese fleet reinforced the legitimacy of the tenets of this "people's war" doctrine in the rnaritirne sphere. From a geopolitical perspective, early PIAN strategy reflected a rational continentalist approach to preventing its maritime frontier frorn becorning an accessroute for foreign invasion. A combination of factors in the midrg8os facilitated the PRC's reevaluation of its maritirne forces. Changing perceptions about the character of rnodern warfare and new threats to its national security were chief among these factors. The leadership in Beijing concluded that the likelihood of invasion or involvement in a major war with a superpower in the near future was remote. As a result, the PIA has embarked on a prog:ram of peacetime defense construction to prepare for engagement in limited and local wars (iubu <han<heng) on the periphery of China. In addition to the emphasis on

BULLocK Conflict& Security Iimited war, the PIA appreciates that China's periphery extends beyond its borders to what it terms the "strategic frontier."'3 In contrast to a territorial frontier, the strategic frontier "defines the living space of a state and a nation, and contracts with the ebb and flow of the comprehensive national strength. " Consequently, the PIA realizes that it must secure a sphere outside its national borders. With the conclusion of bilateral treaties and the resolution of many landbased disputes with formerly hostile borderstates,the rernaining regional disputes are maritime in nature. According to two senior PIAN officers, "The seas have become the new high ground of strategic competition... [and] remain of crucial strategic value."'4 As the coastal area has become the most likely region for interstate conflict, it has also become the focus of China's strategic defense plans. There has been an unprecedented degree of strategic debate within the Chinese defense establishment about the use of naval forces. Steering the early debate and frequently acknowledged as China's preeminent naval theorist, Liu Huaqing is the father of PIAN's current naval strategy.Understanding what the concept of a strategic frontier meant for the maritime environment, Liu advanced an offshore defense strategy that moved beyond coastal defense.'5 He recognized that the widespread deployment of cruise missiles, aircraft carriers, and over-thehorizon weapon systerns necessitated a defense that engaged potential adversariesoutside the area of dispute and away from economically vital coastal zones.'6 Geographically, Liu argued for asserting a defensive barrier out to the "first island chain" ofJapan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, and the Greater Sundas, and for shifting this barrier outward to

the "second island chain" (the Bonins, the Marianas, Guam, and the Carolines) and beyond as the technology to do so became available.'7 The most probable catalyst for both local wars and a major confrontation with the United States is the remaining regional maritime challenges. Bernard Cole lists China as a party to six of East Asia's more than two dozen maritime disputes.'8 Taiwanese reunification with the mainland and a claim of exclusive ownership over the Paracel and Spratly Islands are currently China's most volatile territorial challenges. Both cases strengthen the role of the PIAN by calling for greater Chinese control of the seas. The maritime frontier is also economically important for China. This has led to Beijing's realization that maritime forces are essential for the "defense not only of its territory but also of its foreign trade routes, and for the exploration of offshore rnarine resources."'s Conservative figures estirnate that China has offshore petroleum reserves of roughly Jo to Qo billion barrels, whose extraction and protection is pivotal to China's national economic development."o A huge population also rnakes China highly dependent on fishing, so rnuch so that it was party to fourteen noteworthy fishing disputes with neighboring states between rgg{ and 1997."'Therefore, the PRC's outstanding maritime territorial disputes and economic considerations are important motives for the PIAN modernization effort.

The MaritimeStrategyof a Continental Power.Consciously or subconsciously, contemporarlr literature has tended to foster an unfortunate segregation between Chinese rnilitary studies and the strategic theories of geopoli-

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Beijing tS aCtiOnShave.qiven little ind.ication

that China has shifted away-frorrr a continental focus in its rnaritirne strati:gy. tics. Recognizing that China is and acts as a continental power contributes to our understanding of its naval modernization. Despite the lofty goal of blue-water power projection, Beijing's actions have given little indication that China has shifted away from a continental focus in its maritime strategy. On the contrary, Chinese actions reflect the strategy of a continental power with coastal interests. Several'Westernand Chinese scholars clairn that recent naval deployments illustrate PLAN's gradual progression toward blue-water capability. However, other evidence demonstrates that the focus of Chinese naval strategy is much less arnbitious. As one senior PLAN officer put it, "In a future war, the cornbat areas are rnost likely to be over the continental shelf and at the peripheries of the ocean econornic zones.""" PIAN is developing the capability to seize and control offshore areas, maintain comrnand over important sea channels adjacent to China, and conduct cornbat operations in areas bordering Chinese territorial waters."3 These are classic strategic objectives pursued by continental powers hoping to expand coastal defense. Norrnan Friedrnan believes that the very idea that an island chain is sornehow a barrier to invasion suggests the dominance of "a land-orientated mentality that bodes ill for Chinese naval development.""4 It is debatable whether Beijing, as heir to an ancient continental tradition, is farniliar with the type of abstract thinking required to understand the ambiguity and global perspective of a

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strategy focused on maritime power. Nevertheless, it is evident that China's new fondness for the maritime environment has shaped the irnpressive modernization efforts of PIAN. United StatesandJapanese naval operations are unlikely to be threatened by this modernization program for the foreseeable future. However, the Asia-Pacific region rnay be destabilized as smaller countries in the region becorne increasingly fearful of an assertive Chinese navy. As PLAN becornes rnore capable of exercising Chinese clairns over its maritime periphery, the U.S. navy's freedorn of action will become increasingly threatened. Defined in naval jargon as the "fleet-in-being," the very presence of a capable PIAN in the region will threaten American deployments and hinder U.S. strategic and operational options by making naval actions rnore hazardous in East Asia. Reviewing China's maritime blue-water arnbitions through a geopolitical lens reveals that China has not changed its historical dependence on continental power. -Western A number of navalists have said that Alfred Mahan's theory of maritime strategy--once equated with irnperialism by Mao Zedong-is alive and well in Asia. Mahan has not found a horne in the People's Republic of China, though. The theories of HalfordJ. MacKinder and other land power strateg'istsare a better foundation from which to analyze China's current naval strategy. China's maritime renaissancehas made it nothing more than a stronger continental power.

BULLocK Conflict& Security NOTES Qing (Manchurians). ro Nan Li, "The PIA's EvolvingWarfighting doctrine, Strategyand Thctics, r985-95: A Chinese Pers p e c t i v e , "4 5 O . II Ibid. r2 David Muller Jr. , Chinoosa MoritimePouer(WestStanford University Press,I994), 23o. v i e w P r e s s ,B o u l d e r , r g 8 3 ) , 2 0 5 - 6 . J Colin Gray, "Inescapable Geography," lournolof r! Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing, "On MarSlrol?gr'c Sfudier22, no. z/3 (June/September tggg): itime Strategyand the Marine Environment, " flionguo r6z. 4 HalfordJ. MacKinder, "The Geographical PivJunshiKerue fChino Militog Science]2 (May r99/): 8r, China'sNag quoted in Bernard Cole, fie CreotWollotSeo, ot of Histor),," Ceogrophical Joumcl 23, no. 4 (r9o4), enterstheTuen!-Firs7Centug (Annapolis, Naval Institute Alfred T. Mahan, Ihe Problereof'{sioond ltsEfectUponlnter(Boston, Little, Brown, rgo5), 62-3. P r e s s ,2 o o I ) , I 2 . notionalPolitia r{Jun Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters, The asStrategt Nouiesand $ Norman Friedman, Seapower Navy, SeapowerMentality and the South China Sea," Notional Interests(Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 17, no. 3 (September rg9{): Studies 2oor),23o. Joumolof Strategrc 6 Bernard Cole, "Asia at Sea," U.S."lforolInsiitute r 9 0 . (1997), 36. rg Jeffrey B. Goldman, "China's Mahan," U.S. Proceedings Proceedrngs r22, no. ! (March I 996), 45. NouolInstitute / For an examination of the impact that geography 16 Ibid. has had on Chinese strategy, see Michael D. Swaine r / C o l e , T h eC r e o t W oal lt S e o .I b i d . , ! o . and Ashley J. Tellis, InterpretingChina'sCrand Stroteg ( S a n t aM o n i c a , R A N D , z o o o ) . r8 Goldman, {.9. rg Nan Li, {.${.. 8 Charles E. Hawkins, "The People's Liberation Army Look to the Future," Jolnt ForcesQJroftert 25 20 You Xu and You Ji, "In Search of Blue Water (Summer 2ooo): 16. Power, The PIA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the t99os and Beyond," Strctegicond DefenceStudiesCentre 9 There havebeen a variety of'barbarian' peoples WorkingPopu no. 222 (December I99o), 6. along China's northern frontier that threatened China with invasion. On severaloccasionsthese tribes of 2IJun Zhan, Igo. 22 Ibid. nomadic steppe people were able to unite to threaten 2J Friedman, I//. China with conquest. Most notable were the conquest I bci.d . , r 7 8 . 2g Cole, TheCreotWallatSe dynasties of Jin (Jurchers), Yran (Mongols), and r People's Republic of China.WhitePoper,Chino'sNotional Defence in Zooo (BeUing, Information Office of the S t a t eC o u n c i l , 2 o o o ) . 2 J ohnW. Izu k ondXueLitoi.Chinai StrotgrcSeopower'The Politiuof ForceModemizolionin the Nucleorlge (Stanford,

Summer/fall 2OO2 tb3l

lict& Security Conf

$ttlt?[nu A R o u n d ta b l e D i scussion

Although the danger of a global therrnonuclear war dissipated when the Soviet lJnion disintegrated, the threat posed by nuclear weapons rernains monumental. The consequences ofjust one nuclear weapon exploding in a populated area are almost too horrifying to contemplate. Yet we live in a world with thousands of nuclear weapons and enough weapon-grade fissile rnaterial for thousands more. Nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and the possibility of interstate nuclear war are issues that have profound implications for both the security of the United States and the world in general. The United Stateswill play a pivotal role in the evolution of nuclear issuesas the twenty-first century unfolds. U.S. policies on issues such as nuclear arms control, nuclear testing, and national missile defense will tremendously affect the course of events. With this in mind, t}r^eCeorgetown Affoirs J oumalof Intemational and the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPRSS) convened a panel of distinguished experts representing a wide range of views on the future of U.S. nuclear policy. In the following transcript of that event, the three panelists first present their views on the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and then conclude with comments on missile defense.

Michael E. Brown is Director National

of the Security

Studies Program

and

for Peace

the Center and Security

Studies at

Ceorgetown

University.

Frank Gaffney, Jr. is President Center

of the

for Security

Policy, and is also a columnist

for the Wosh-

iKton Tines.

James Lindsay is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy StudiesProgram of the Brookings Institution.

John Pike is Director of GlobalSecurity. o rg.

-MichaelBrown

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G A F F N E yT:o h e l p s i t u a t et h i s d i s c u s s i o n , I think it is helpful to divide the universe of people who study nuclear weapons into three broad categories. The first category of people doesn't think the United Statesneeds nuclear weapons. Although I do not happen to agree with it, this is an estimable position. Its logic argues for eliminating our nuclear weapons capabilities, and encouraging others who rnight have them to do the same and those who might be thinking about getting thern to refrain from doing so. A second category includes those who recognize the reality of nuclear weapons: that there are nuclear weapons and that there will continue to be nuclear weapons. Although they recognize thatwe

that you need to be serious about a nuclear deterrent. Just having nuclear weapons does not give you a credible deterrent. I believe, and I think this cornrnunity of individual.s, which includes the Bush administration, also believes, that it is essential to take steps to ensure the safety, reliability, and effectiveness-and therefore the credibility-of our deterrent force. There are a number of irnplications that flow from this view. First and forernost, we need to test nuclear weapons, at least periodically. The simple truth is that nuclear weapons are arguably the most complex pieces of equipment ever designed by rnan. Part of that complexity is that these devices have microscopically srnall tolerances for

YOU need tO be seriousabouta nuclear deterrent. Jus! hqr.i+g nuclear weapons does not glve you a credible de"terrent. do need to have a nuclear deterrent, there are differing viewswithin this group about how rnany nuclear weapons we need. What is troubling about this second category is that some who hold this view believe that we do not need to worry about factors like the reliability of nuclear weapons, their safety, and our ability to credibly threaten to use thern. I find this to be an illogical, reckless,and untenable position. There is a third category, in which I find myself. This group believes that we do need nuclear weapons; there is no dis-inventing them. The world is unfortunately awash with nuclear technology. When I use the term nuclear weapons, I rnean everything from relatively prirnitive atomic weapons to advanced therrnonuclear designs. This third group believes

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changes in the character of materials, wiring systems,and other aspectsof their cornposition. When you put this kind of equipment in close proxirnity with radioactive material, it changes over time. Things become brittle or undergo physical changes that can affect how they perforrn. When we set out to design a deterrent force, we did so with a projected lifespan of about ten years. Most of our nuclear weapons are well past their design lives. Therefore, we have becorne increasingly unsure of how they would perform. This affects the credibility of our present deterrent force. Since without testing we cannot modernize our nuclear forces, we have prevented-for at least a decade-the lcind of irnprovernents to our nuclear arsenal that might enable it to adapt to changing threats. For exarnple,

RouNDTABLE cOnfliCt & seCurity we currently face deeply buried, very hardened facilities in Afghanistan, which are invulnerable to attack even by precision-guided conventional weapons. They are only vulnerable to nuclear weapons capable of penetrating sorne amount of earth and creating the proper shockwaves necessary for destroying these facilities. We do not have such a weapon in our inventory today. So, testing and enhancing our ability to rneet changing threats is an important Part of a credible nuclear deterrent. Having a nuclear weapons complex that can support the maintenance and design of new nuclear weapons is also an important part of a credible deterrent. This means we need both the hurnan and physical infrastructure necessary to ensr.rre the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of existing designs, and to introduce new ones. I believe credible deterrence also requires a sufficient number of nuclear weapons. President Bush concluded even before coming to office that we could get by with sornewhere between r,/oo and 2,2oo strategic nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, the Nuclear Posture Review that his administration conducted found that this was exactly right. I believe that this is too srnall a number. I do take some cornfort in the fact that the Bush administration's NPR recommends that we retain a number of nuclear weapons in a reseryeforce, rather than destroy thern. I think that this is a wise course of action. If you are going to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that are actively deployed, do not throw them away. In short, I generally support what the Bush adrninistration has done with the NPR. I think that, in contrast to the the Bush administration, Clinton administration is taking an adult, serious, and responsible approach to retain-

ing the number of nuclear weapons they thinkwe need to have, and is making sure that they constitute a credible deterrent. L T N D S A YG: i v e n F r a n k ' s c o m m e n t s , I should locate rnyself in his tripartite schema. If I understand him correctly, I belong in the second category-the irresponsible and reckless crowd. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is a very complex docurnent and our abiliry to talk about it is complicated by the fact that none of us has seen it. I think there are parts of the NPR that are quite laudable and pass a basic common sense test. Indeed, the NPR rightly argues that nuclear weapons cannot be dis-invented and that they are going to continue to play a role in Arnerican defense policy. There is also rnuch to like in what President Bush has said about nuclear weapons. He has stated that he is willing to reduce the nurnber of nuclear weapons and to move unilaterally to break the logjam in U.S.-Russian arms negotiations since he does not view Russia as an adversary. Yet, I still think that the NPR remains a flawed document. I am less worried about the NPR for the reasons that have garnered headlines-that it will end the Nuclear NonProliferation treaty, upset the United Nations, and enourage calls for using in nuclear weapons places like Afghanistan. Many of these concerns are both premature and overblown. My concerns with the NPR lie with those aspects that the Bush adrninistration has publicly touted. It seernsto me that the NPR falls short of the president's repeated pledges to leavethe ColdWar behind. Rather, the posture review embraces rnany of the fundamental principles of Cold War strategic planning. At best, the NPR represents a missed opportunity. If luck does

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not favor the United States, it may actually increase the dangers we face. I see three specific flaws in the NPR. First, for all the hullabaloo about deep cuts, the proposed cuts are timid. The NPR cuts a lot less than many people

weapons destruction or dismantling. Even so, we won't get down to I,7OO-2,2OO operationally deployed warheads until 2oI2. As late as 2oo7, the United States will still have about 7oo-I,2oo more warheads than it would have had if START

It SeemS tO rnethat the NPR fallsshortof tle-plglidgn!'s repeated pledges to leave the Cold War behind. would have preferred. The numbers that Frank noted, r,7oo-2,2oo weapons, were portrayed as a historic step by the White House back in the fall. The first thing to point out is that those numbers reflect an accounting trick that would make Arthur Andersen proud. Rather than counting all the warheads in the active inventorF as past adrninistrations did, the Bush White House changed the terrns of reference by talking only about operationally-deployed warheads. If you cornpare the Clinton and Bush nurnbers using the same counting rules, the Bush numbers are either at the same level or slightly above the Clinton numbers. One thing the president has not publicly addressed is why we cannot rnake deeper cuts. The United States and Russia are no longer enernies, China has only eighteen nuclear weapons, and I do not think Syria or Iraq or the rest of the Gang of Five are going to suddenly show up with hundreds or even tens of nuclear weaPons. Also, as Frank mentioned, we are not actually talking about destroying warheads. Many of the warheads that are retired will be put into a reserve force, which we can presurne will be fairly large. What the adrninistration is actually proposing is a grand de-alerting, not

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Il-the treaty that the elder George Bush negotiated-had gone into effect. Flaw number two: The NPR puts too much faith in the benefits of flexibility. Flexibility rneans being able to adjust our offensive nuclear force posture either up or down, both by nurnber and type, quickly, and as events dictate. This underlies the concept of keeping a reserye force. It also explains the adrninistration's refusal to agree to binding limits on force ceilings in talks with Russia. The Russians want an agreernent that delivers deep cuts that are verifiable and irreversible. When proponents talk about strateg'ic adaptability they only focus on the benefits without mentioning the costs. In the near term, budgetary realities are going to force the Russians to cut back no rnatter what. One thing to keep in rnind, though, is that if we get to have a responsive force, so do they. Now is it reasonable to think that a country that does not have the money to maintain its nuclear arsenal will have the resources to adequately secure its responsive force? I am not worried about the weapons in the American responsive force; I am worried about those in the Russian responsive force. Flaw number three: it seemsto me that the NPR seela to increase rather than reduce the role of nuclear weapons in

RouNDTABLE Conflict& Security American defense and foreign policy. My concern over this fundamentally separates me from Frank. You can see this in the NPR's support for using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats, and in its emphasis on developing more usable nuclear weapons. Rather than moving away from Cold War logic, this NPR is moving back toward it. Are more usable nuclear weapons more credible? The deterrent quality of nuclear weapons does not iie in their usability, but in other more contextual qualities like the issue at stake, its value to both sides, and perceptions about willingness to strike, which are not functions of usability but of the risk profiles of those in charge of nuclear weapons. Ultirnately, the only real bar to a presidential decision to use nuclear weapons is the nuclear taboo. For fifty years, strategists have been coming up with ideas on how to make nuclear weapons more usable, and more thinkable, but it remains very hard to come up with a scenario in which a president would use a nuclear weapon unless the United States were directly attacked. So, what should a post-Cold War nuclear posture look like? I think we need to go in the opposite direction of the NPR. Rather than increasing reliance on nuclear weapons-at least in theory, if not practically-the goal should be to minimize their role in American foreign and defense policy. This is not primarily for political or rnoral reasons, even though these are important, but for strategic reasons. The fact is that the United States enjoys unprecedented conventional superiority. The one thing that could undermine that superiority is the spread of nuclear weapons. It is in our interests to lock in our advantages.

The United States should reduce its arsenal to I,ooo strategicweapons, codifr force-cut agreements with Russia, destroywarheads,limit our non-strategic forces, and ratifr the Comprehensive Test Ban teaty (CTBT). There are real advantagesto testing, but there are costs as well. Chinese military planners would be very happy to see us begin testing again because this would open the door for renewed Chinese testing. Without testing, we cannot be sure of how well our arsenal will function, but this applies equally to all the other countries in the world. The point is that if we are going to have an intelligent, non-reckless, responsible discussion of these issues, we have to admit that tradeoffs exist. p r KE: At the risk of oversimplification, I would like to suggest a slightly simpler typology, dividing the world between those who see nuclear weapons as part of the solution and those that see thern as the problem. The seriousness of nuclear weapons was really brought home to me about twelve years ago when I was at a conference in Europe. I started in Dresden, which is a really interesting Gerrnan city because of the broad open spaces in the central part of the city. Then I went to Pragrre where all the buildings are close together, the streets are narrow and windy, and I was really struck by the differences between downtown Dresden and downtown Prague. The reason was that duringWorld War II, heavy bombers leveled Dresden but couldn't reach Pragrre. Ifyou go around central Europe, you can basically figrrre out what the range of the heavybombers was becauseon one side of the line, cities were completely destroyed and had to be rebuilt. and on the other. the cities remained in their pre-war state.

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RouNDTABLE conflict& Security tion of targets, and the world is a distressingly target-poor environment. The Chinese have just roo cities, a small nuclear arsenal and military infrastructure, and there is no chance of them launching a rapid counterforce attack against us. As you start looking at Syria, North Korea, and Iraq, there are just not that many targets for which we need nuclear weapons, and none of them would require being blown up within a tirneframe of minutes or hours or possibly even days. It is quite obvious then that Russia is still seen as an enemy and that the NPR is airned at the Russian threat. I do not think that we are going to be able to eliminate nuclear weapons any time soon. I am sure it is going to take us at least as long to clirnb down the nuclear mountain as it took to climb up. My fundarnental concern is whether or not we are walking in the right direction. Are we moving away from reliance on nuclear weapons, toward strategies that reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, and are we reducing the incentives for other people to possessor desire nuclear weapons? While we may be rnoving in this direction, we are not moving nearly as fast as I would like. BRow N' One of the issues related to nuclear weapons that has been in the limelight for quite some tirne now is missile defense. What are your thoughts on missile defense, and what should be its role in the United States's nuclear strategy? G A F F N E yI :f w e a r e i n t e r e s t e di n r e d u c i n g our reliance on nuclear deterrence, the capability to prevent attacks by missiles, which remain a serious if not growing danger in a world where both nuclear and delivery technology are proliferating,

is very important. My only criticism of the Bush administration is that it is not moving fast enough in this direction. LINDSAy:I've alwaysfound debates over rnissile defenses to be very disturbing because they tend to be conducted in a very theoretical way, as if you had a binary choice between defending or not defending. To me the real issue is what kind of missile defenses you build, what technology you use, and what the political fallout would be. The Bush administration's policy seems to be to spend a lot of rnoney on testing. I take their hesitancyas a positive sign because I see no evidence that they have any kind of systernthat works. In an odd way, President Bush's decision to Missile abandon the Anti-Ballistic (ABM) treaty has helped to clari$ the issue, because we have moved away from the theoretical debate and toward rnore substantive issues. I hope that we build a missile defense that works and sparks a rninimum amount of diplomatic and political fallout. p I KE: As far as I can tell, the money goes in one end and nothing cornes out the other end. We have invested in missile defense a multiple of the tirne and money invested in other programs that eventually did produce sornething, whereas nothing has come out of the missile defense program. For exarnple, there are many people who are enthusiastic about spacebased lasers, and the Bush administration's current plan is to have a flight test in about a decade. We have been working on this program for a quarter century now-since the Carter administrationand we are not one day closer to having this program operational than we were twenty-five years ago.

Summer/iall 2OO2

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time. This raises another point: Would a What would change my mind on this? situation ever arise where the president If Frank and all his friends had a little was not worried about nuclear retaliation picnic on the test-range during a live-fire test. The purpose would not be to test the because we had the peace shield? AnY sane president is always going to worry hardware but to test their confidence in not that it -ght not work. I think that missile the missile defense equipment. I do think they would ever do this, because defense programs will continue to absorb money, inspire China to build up its theywould be worried that the equipment might not work, because everything else nuclear arsenal, and cause India to put more effort into its long-range missile that we build worls some of the time-if prograrn in anticipation of the Chinese' we're lucky-but nothing worl.s all the

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0ulture&Soclety In OldPera,New for Turkey Challenges Paul Skoczylas All of the puzzles and problems of rnodern-day Tirrkey can be found in Thksim, the contemporary heir to the ancient Byzantine city of Pera that connected Europe with Asia. Here, ornate, European-style buildings housing western stores, restaurants, nightclubs, and wine houses coexist with Muslim family re$taurants, newly-renovated rnosques, and rnen working out of sheds. As middle classfarnilies stroll along the main thoroughfare, wearing the latest fashions and chatting about the newestAmerican and European filrns, villagers hawk cheap Asian textiles in the side alleys, Kurdish teenage boys sell stuffed mussels from large trays they carry on their backs, and gypsy children beg for money. The puzzles of modernity that confront the developing world are played out vividly in Thksim. Here, one can see the vision of a modern secular Turkey, outlined by the country's founder, Kemal Atatiirk, competing with the Islamist desire to regain Turkey's prominence as a leader of the Islamic world. This competition plays out arnidst a larger economic and political crisis that continues to plague the country. The successof the political system in providing a stable environment where Turks feel hope for the future may well determine the character of modern Turkey in the y e a r st o c o m e .

Paul Skoczylas i. a graduate

student

the Peace and Security Studies

Program

Ceorgetown

Universi-

ty. He was a Rotary International

Ambas-

sadorial Scholar and a Fulbright Turkey.

Scholar

He currently

works in Government Relations at the Heritage Foundation.

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Thepuzzles 0f rrrodernity

that confront the developing world are plai'"d out vividly in Thksim r'' A Quarteron the Vanguard. Ottoman times, tksim (the.t known as Pera) was a walled city across the Golden Horn-a shallow inlet of the Bosphorusfrorn the Sublime Port and Topkap Palace, the adrninistrative and political seat of the Ottoman Empire. Forrnerly a trading outpost for Europeans in the Byzantine era, Pera rose to prominence as a hub of commerce during the late Ottornan Empire as successive sultans granted trading privileges to European powers. Pera also served as a center for religious rninorities who acted as a conduit between the Ottoman Ernpire and European traders. As trade became more important, these religious groups wealthier became and developed close ties with their European co-religionists. They were the vanguard of the Europeanization of the Ottornan Empire, a process that embraced Christians, Jews, and Turks in the ruling elite, but left behind the village Turks and Arabs who constituted the rnajority of the ernpire. The renaissance of Thksim during the last century parallels the ernergence of Turkish nation-state. the Turkish nationalisrn arose as a political movement in opposition to outside powers. At the end of World War I, which the Ottornan Empire entered on the Axis side, the Turks found their empire divided up among European powers, with only a rump state left for ethnic Turls. Atatiirk drove out the European powers and secured the country's present-day borders as a homeland for Turks in the Turkish War of Indepen-

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dence. Although never implernented, the dismemberment of Turkey proposed by the teaty of Sevres infused Tirrkish national identity with a suspicion that foreign powers sought to dismember Turkey piece by piece. Known as the "Sevres Syndrome," this fear colors Turkish politics even today. Religious minorities, with their close historic ties to Europe, were viewed as agents of foreign powers. Indeed, underscoring this perception was the fact that many Ottoman rninorities openly supported the European occupation. The experience of having to expel foreign powers to secure a homeland provided a basis for citizenship in the ernerging Turkish Republic. In yet another chapter of the ugly book of twentieth century nationalism, the concept of was narrowly Tirrkish citizenship defined, leaving out religious and ethnic minorities. Turkey and Greece, each committed to a religious concept of ethnic nationalism, agreedto an exchangeof populations whereby Muslirns in Greece were forced to go to Turkey and Christians in Tirrkey were e*pelled to Greece. Nearly I.g million people were dislocated frorn places their families had called horne for centuries. Although there were exceptions to this rule, such as those accornodating Christians in Istanbul, riots destroying rninority-owned businessesand homes throughout Turkey in Ig!$ convinced most rninorities to leave. Of the few who remained, rnany were banished by Turkish prime rninister Ismet Inonu in 196{ on twenty-four

sKoczYLAs culture & Society hours notice, forcing them to abandon their homes and all their possessions. A walk through Thlaim provides the informed visitor with an eerie reminder of this legacy. The main street, a pedestrian walkway named Istiklal Cadessi, is lined with churches that are largely empty. Locals do not seem to question why there are so many churches in an area with so few Christians. Perhaps in a country filled with relics of the past, these churches seern no different than the Greek and Rornan ternples found along the Aegean Sea. Despite crurnbling facades and fading paint, one can still discern buildings designed to meet European tastes: art nouveaux, baroque, and Rornan revival styles are all prorninent. Although largely forgotten and neglected, these buildings nonetheless house the spirit of old Pera, a spirit rekindled by the industriousness of a new classof rural immigrants. A century ago, it would have been these villagers that would have been considered foreigners in their own capital city. Turks, Kurds, Laz, and people from the Hatay (a

residences ofEuropean traders, and they continue to lead two lives today. While the ground-floor warehouse areas have been transformed into srnall workspaces for tailors, leatherworkers, newsstands, and dry goods stores, the upper floors of many honshave been prized by entrepreneurs who have converted thern into sorne of Thksirn's best night spots. Hons reveal the brilliant contrast found throughout Taksirn. While the Turkish middle class dances the night away in trendy restaurants and clubs, the lower classeswork literally beneath their feet. The Turkish middle class-the keepers of Atatiirk's secular tradition-consists of professionals, small businessmen, and industry owners, who have built an impressive and lively infrastructure. Istanbul alone has over eighty Rotary Clubs and nurnerous business and industry associations.Avibrant, if sornetirnes over-the-top, rnedia keeps Turkish professionals inforrned. The children of the rniddle classoften attend schools like Thksim's GalatasargLrse, the renowned French langrrage high school, or Robert former Arab province) co-e to Istanbul College, founded by Arnericans. Taksirn from villages around Anatolia-Turkey's abounds with foreign-language schools, Asiatic wing, spanning frorn the Aegean and most rniddle class children can conon the west to the Iraq-Iran border on the verse in at least one foreign language. Although English is the most popular east. They work long days, sending rnonlanguage, Gerrnan is gaining in popularey back to their villages, trying to provide for their families, and hoping to rnake ity as ties between Turkey and Gerrnany and between Turkey and the European their fortune in what is known back in Anatolia as the "City of Gold." IJnion strengthen. Turkey is also horne to a growing numYou can find these men and wornen in the back streets of Thlsim selling snacks, ber of western stores. However, once servicing cigarette lighters, shining shoes, viewed as a sign of modernization, these expensive stores are increasingly viewed sharpening knives, and transporting with a degree of contempt. With the goods and people in large man-powered carts. More fortunate vendors occupy stores' high prices, and the Turkish cursmall spaces on the first floor of hons. renry in steady decline, fewer and fewer These rnultistory buildings once acco- Turks, even those in the upper-middle modated both the warehouses and ornate class,are able to frequent these stores. It is

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especiallyunsettling when these stores sell expensive items that are ,,Made in aarkl/:" The only way most Tirrks can afford labels like Benetton, French Con_ nection, and H&M is by buying imita_ tions for a few dollars per item from ven_ dors that line the siie streets_.ra.r.. also of the informal business ,h;;;;i;, rsustain Turkish textile workers. So who keepsthese stores in business? _. I h e a n s w e rl i e s a t t h e h e a r t of the dilem_ ma encountered by the liberalization of many developing economies. As Turkev economy, its weak politi.ul, :P:.": ,its ,;udrcial,and econo

Co_nsequently, members of the tradi_ . tional middle class who .rrpport J. Kemalist project have been irr.".u.lJJ ,. marginalized. The professional .lurpay taxes, confronr

innation (68, j.J;:Tll rates

";:11:

tng unemployment, and decreasing real wages,and watch helplessly the groi.h of tne crony capitalist class and the expen_ sive service sector that caters to them.

The ContinuingCrisis.rhomas

Friedman's booL Zh, Lexus andrh, Ol; i:; describesdomestic institutions as analo_ gous to an operating system on a com_ puter. To successfully ,,plug trnely ensure that they and into the their political global system," a country allies gain from the privatization needs to have a of state good operating system. A. Ir.k"y companies and industries. ;;g; As a result of into the global system, its weak do-..j. this incomplete economic liberalization, structu.resmarginalize those who follow many Turks have become extraordinari_ rne rutes, and leave behind ly wealthy through illegal the hard_ -.";. i;-;, working migrants who peddle good, on

r3', ;.";;;.;;';.?':J:iff[T:":.jl

Perhips f n El counpry$lredwitrr rerics ldps in of the

past, Ldeserted Ldeserted Christiair] Chri.ti"{ri

.lrirr"f,,â&#x201A;Źs sFFrn .h_rl;l;;; ;erii;;'rrn

F;*i i,",*1:rijfiiklrH ffii t"_pr.. {'rr round along the Aegean S"u.

these Turks who buy Mercedes_Benzes, the streets in a struggle shop in expensive stores, to make ends a n d p u s h meet. Without strong institutions to prime real estate in Istanbul to prices Promote capitalism, ensure fair growth, that compete with Su., F.u.r.{;;;: and enforce unifor Unlike- the professional middl" these elites are not progressive. "l;r;: They do dire political consequences. not invest in education fo" thei. chil_ D e s p i t et h r e e I M h b a i l o u t s dren, in the past foreign languages, ;" ;;; two years, no amount .speak of foreim aiJ port integration with E u r o p e . T h e y seems enough for Turkey to ou"..Jme realize integration woul; it, _that economic woes. The money ".o*;;: e s t a b l i s h i n gt h e r u l e o f l a w , buys onlv w h i c h w o u l d time without driving l,j th.eir ab.ility to exploit the sys- subsidizing a corrupt ".fo"*, lTX and ineffici..r,"if..i rem. I he Kemalist project ,u* of secularism tem. Under current conditions, the a n d m o d e r n i s m m e a n sl i t t l e p o or to them. will remain poor, the middle .lur, *ill

;;; ::T'.:.,TTil 11,,,i"i-,trr.

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Culture& Society sKoczYLAs decline in influence, and a mafia-style messageis clear: if the governrnent canelite will increase in wealth and power. not secure conditions for working people For things to change, Turkey's immato rnake a good wage, and if rnoderate ture democracy will have to undergo seriofficials continue to remain dishonest ous reforms. The political culture of and inept, the people will turn to more Turkish democracy has to catch up with radical means. institutional its trappings. Currently, As Tirkey takes on these challenges, the results will manifest themselves in political parties resemble cults of personality, where the leaders cannot be ques- Thlsim. If corruption continues and the tioned, much less replaced. They serve economy cannot stabilize, an unbridgeneither the country nor the people, but able gap will ernerge between the poor who work diligently on the lower floors of their own interests. Though mandatory voter turnout keeps numbers up at the the haru and the rich who dance above polls, voters do not have much faith that their heads. The pleasures of Talsim will they can build a better future by demandbe enjoyed by a few, while the many will ing more of their leaders. look on without hope for a better future. The desperation many Turks face has Politically, this frustration could fuel been demonstrated by an increase in the further gains among the nationalists and the Islamists, and extreme measures to popularity of fringe political parties-the Islamist Welfare Party received 2r percent gain some sernblance of rule of law and of the vote in the tgg$ general elections, justice could result. Those concerned while the nationalist National Action with the fate of Turkey look to Talsim Party received tB percent in 1999. The apprehensively for signs of change.

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Culture & Society

onthe Erodinglliv Refiections FoodSupply of a Globalized K. Dun Gifford Humans have always pushed to their horizons, and over the eons they have become this planet's only global species. In the last hundred years, the character ofglobalization has changed drarnatically, and the expansionary process that was once driven by tribes, peoples, or nations now belongs to multinational corporations. Because food and drink are essential for living, and all humans have an elernental, innate drive for them, food and drink is a useful eyepiece through which to exarnine the irnplications of globalization.

K, Dun Gifford i" President of Oldways Presewation & Exchange Trust,

Getting tO G lObal. Archaeologists and anthropologists often trace hurnan rnigration routes with reference to trade in foods. In ancient times, traders traveled back and forth on the spice routes across Asia, and with arnphorae full of wine and olive oil around the Mediterranean Basin. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European monarchs spent royal fortunes to send fleets acrossuncharted oceans in search oftreasure and spices. Through centuries of trade, food such as coffee, tea, chocolate, salt, sugar, and cod were carried over well-traveled land and water routes and became important global commodities. These and other "strange and exotic" foods traveled widely, were welcomed by different cultures, and were gradually assimilated into the cuisines of the importing societies.

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REFLECTIONS O N T H E E R O D I N GD I V E R S I T YO F A G L O B A L I Z E DF O O D S U P P L Y

Christopher Columbus's voyages of discovery compressed many of the elements of this creeping globalization of food into a single event-what is commonly called the Colombian Exchange. In 1992, the Sooth anniversary of Colurnbus's landing was the impetus for extensive exarninations of its consefor example, published quences. Newsweek, a special Columbus edition in which it concluded, " Colurnbus's voyageschanged the ethnic cornposition of two continents, revolutionized the world's diet and altered the global environrnent. His legacy is the Columbian Exchange, the crucial interrningling of peoples, animals, plants, and diseases between Europe, Africa and the Americas."' Through the Columbian Exchange, corn, tomatoes, and potatoes traveled from the New World to the old, while wheat, cattle, and apples traveled from the Old World to the new. These foods, unknown when they arrived in their new hornes, becarne traditional staples; they were ccculfurofed into the local cuisines. Steak is now quintessentially Arnerican, though cattle are native to Asia; spaghetti with tornato sauce is now quintessentially Italian, though tornatoes are native to South America. Today, this trend continues. People all over the world consurrre Australian and Californian wines, Evian and Perrier water pumped from wells in France, New Zealand lamb, and fresh Chilean raspberries. Grapes are flown to winter tables all over the Northern Hernisphere, and frozen American beef and chicken are shipped everywhere. Perhaps the most apparent aspect of the globalized food system is the proliferation of fast food chains. McDonald's sewes {$ rnillion people every day in 29,OOo restaurantsin r2r countries. In a

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year, that adds up to more than 16 billion meals." Burger King, Wendy's, Pizza Hut, and Kentucky Fried Chicken follow close behind.

Eating as an Eyepiece.Fast food is a complex term, becauseit has an "old ways" rneaning and an "industrial age" meaning. In the "oldways" sense,apples, pears, strawberries; oysters and clarns; carrots and celery; nuts and raisins; and rnilk and cheese are fast foods. Once gathered, made, or purchased, they can be eaten fast without a lot of fuss. In the industrial age, fast foods are bottled and canned, sugary drinks, rapidly prepared frozen foods, and quick meals sold at fast food outlets. Once purchased, they too can be eaten fast, The difference is that the "old ways" foods and drinls are more likely to be local and natural, while the industrial techno-foods and drinks are rnore likely to contain laboratory chemicals and come from factories. Foods and drinks of the industrial model are rnore likely to be in factotechno-foods-manufactured "fresh" ries, for up to a year, and determinedly uniforrn wherever in the world they are sold. They are truly "global." This second group of foods is proliferating rapidly today. Just as the ambitions and wealth of a powerful royal kingdom 5oo years ago triggered the Columbian Exchange and set off global dietary and cultural revolutions, the ambitions and wealth of modern international corporations have launched a second revolution, with more profound consequences.This is the "techno-food revolution," and its hallmark is global standardization.

Globalized Food,UniformCult Uf e.

Anthropologists have long

GTFFoRD Culture& Society argued that "to know what, when, how, and with whom people eat is to know the character of their society."3 Indeed, one can see that Italian restaurants have different foods and rituals than Chinese restaurants, for example. In turn, these are different from Mexican, Indian, Irish, or Moroccan restaurants. The foods, preparations, and preferences of different peoples are distinctly dissimilar. These culturally-rooted food habits or "cuisines" are irnportant markers that help to distingrrish cultures from

ences of local cultures. InJapan, McDonald's has experimented with such items as MacChao(Chinese fried rice), tsukimiboga (fried egg burger or "moon-viewing

burger"), rib burgers, shrimp burgers, and teriyaki burgers. In Korea, experiments include melon-flavored milkshakes,and in Mexico, burritos.5 Still, the restaurants and their offerings are recognizably western in every way. The proliferation of fast food restaurants is about more than the foods being sold. Regarding the remarkable successof fast food in China, where there are now one another. roughly 6oo Kentucky Fried Chicken is a retail revoT}ae techno-foodreuolution outlets, the president of a Beijing market lution intended to change what billions research firrn said, "Americans are sellof people eat and drink. McDonald's "global ing not just products but a culture, and it realization" and its calls this goal, is a culture that many Chinese want."6 it is well on its way to realizing it. As E. Schlosser notes in his book FastFood Global firrns selling techno-foods Nation, the chain opens roughly five new understand the inseparability of food and culture, and rely upon it to attract restaurants each day, at least four of which are outside the United States. their customers. To exarnine another part of this global Within the next decade, it hopes to double that number. As a brand narne, techno-food revolution, we rnust look at McDonald's is now more recognizable how globalization is changing the offerings in local markets where people shop around the world than Coca-Cola.a for food to cook in their horne kitchens. This revolution relies upon products Rather than the human-scale interactions that are standardized, pasteurized, saniand local variation of the traditional rnartized, and hornogenized. It deterrninedketplace, we increasingly see large chain ly reflects a one-size-fits-all rnentality. It stores with enorrnous volume and central makes no seasonal or geographic distinctions. Its logos and signs are the sarne the warehousing of stock that is reshipped to stores in many different locations. world over, even if they are printed in As they have done with the techno-food different languages. in fast food restaurants, global food corThese techno-foods and drinks are porations are standardizing everything on served in clean, well lit, conveniently rnarket shelves' yogurt, biscuits, frozen located places,and often have public bathvegetables and fruits, meat and poultry, rooms, a novelty in some countries. The dried grains, boxed cereals, cookies, service personnel are trained to be efficient, polite, and cheerful. The foods and crackers, and everything else in sight. Extending shelf life is the major initiative, drinks are hygienic, filling, familiar, and which is why shelves are crowded with predictable-and customers flock to them. Fast food companies have made some products that are "fresh" for a year, surely an oxfmoron. New strains of produce are efforts to accommodate the taste prefer-

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bred for durability and appearance rather than taste.With tomatoes, for example, we have seen the development and rnarketing of the "hard ripe."r A parallel initiative is frozen "convenience home meals" that are clones of the offerings in fast food restaurants. This "value-adding," which means selling fifty cents worth of food for $2.99 becauseit is "convenient," is very profitable. In the long term, these initiatives will shrink the range of the world's dizzying numbers of cuisines, reduce the varieties of fresh foods available in rnarkets, and accelerate the push to extinguish the fires of home cooking. Another impact of this techno-food revolution is in farrning. A rnuch srnaller pool of large producers increasingly controls production for local markets that was formerly in the hands of small growers. For exarnple, Mexican ag:ronomists and econornists worry that American agribusiness is a severe threat to the ability of srnall farrners in Mexico to sus-

can and other Latin populations at least since it was first cultivated $,ooo years ago, and has been central to their religion and cultures. Such rapid modernization creates great social dislocation in a developing economy.* The combination of these trends viewed through the food eyepiece reveals the extent to which globalization is marginalizing some of the core elements of traditional food cultures: local cuisines, local food markets, and local farrning.

WhatChancefor Changâ&#x201A;Ź? Se,,ror corporate executiveswho manage multinational food and drink corporations are fully aware of the controversies that the global techno-food revolution has stirred up about the dangers of globalization. Making the argument that "oftentimes the perception about global anger is somewhat different than the reality," Jack Greenberg, the chairman and CEO of McDonald's, noted that at the same tirne that several thousand protestors were

Globaltechno-foodcompanies are disrnissive of the issuesraised bvt [antiglobalization] protesters. tain themselves by growing corn. The remarkable cost efficiencies of heavilysubsidized American corporate farms and the workings of international trade agreements place American corn into the Mexican econorny at a lower cost than Mexican farmers can meet, creating not only a cultural shift in Mexico, but also an economic drain. Since NAFTA went into effect, imports of cheap corn from the U.S. have increased nearly eighteen fold, making up a quarter of the supply. Corn has been the staple food of Mexi-

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rioting at the rg99 World tade Organization meeting in Seattle, vandalizing multinational companies like McDonald's as a rneans to express their anger at globalization, rnore than r/! rnillion customerswere servedin McDonald's restaurants around the world.e These comments reflect a degree of candor and selfawarenessunusual among top-level corporate executives. They are also excellent evidence that the global techno-food cornpanies are dismissive of the issues raised by protesters.

G T F F o RCDu l t u r e &S o c i e t y It is clear that the techno-food revolution has by no means run its course, but is continuing on its seemingly relentless path. It is also clear that its standardized techno-foods have a strong appeal for consumers and are steadily eroding food cultures in every corner of the world, as they are intended to do. Whether this erosion of the richness of diversity arnong food cultures matters in the long run of history is not a sirnple question. Reaching for the horizon-the germ of globalization-is an indelible characteristic of hurnans; history is decisive about this. Today, electronic communications and air transportation continue to shrink the world and simplify the rnarketing of techno-food. It seems likely, then, that the techno-foods' global rnarket penetration will continue to erpand, and. as it does. distinct food cultures will continue to erode. This does not, however, imply that the techno-food revolution is sirnply a clone, or even a variant, of the Columbian Exchange. It is very different, both qualitatively, and quantitatively. The animals and plants of the Columbian Exchange were "imported" to new places, but there were no standards for the use of the new foods, no marketing studies, and no sales reports. No one was in charge, and so each local culture used the foods in its own way, essentially reshaping its own culture to adapt to these changes. In ltaly, corn becarne polenta, tomatoes were used in pasta saucescooked with olive oil, and coffee became espresso. But the foods of the techno-food revolution are under control, from farm to table. Foods are sold pre-packaged, preprepared, and standardized. As S. W. Mintz wrote in an article included in the "The rule is not that book GoldenArchesEast, all the foods must be the same. so much as

that those which ore the same must not deviate from the standard,The customers may not be predictable; but the foods for which the establishment is known ought to be. "'o This is the essentialmantra of the twenty-first century global corporation: control the standards, control the brand, and control the market. Atjunctures such as this, when it is perhaps futile to identifr finite cultural measures of whether globalization "matters," it is useful to find harbor in literature: "The ideal of a single civilization, implicit in the cult of progress and technology, impoverishes and rnutilates us," wrote Octavio Paz. "Every view of the world that becomes extinct, every culture that disappears, diminishes a possibility of life."

GlobalizedFood, Degraded NUtritiOn. I t i s f a r e a s i e rt o p r o j e c t a continued expansion in the global spread of industrialized techno-food than it is to project a reversal; no effective countervailing force to this process exists. But a developing oppositional current rnay be found in growing concern about the nutritional value of techno-food and its irnplications for hurnan health. In the last three years, national and international public health officials have raised alarrn about the rates ofincrease in weight gain and obesity. These increases were, until recently, noted largely in western countries, and ascribed to "westernized" diets and unhealthy declining physical activity. At the end of zoor, the U.S. surgeon general released a report titled "Call to Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity," saying that these conditions had reached "epidemic proportions" because 6t percent of U.S. adults and 13 percent of children and adolescents were overweight. "

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Will the awarenessof therapidgtobalspread of techno-foods, with their nd.qatiie nutriition profiles, be enough to counter-the trend? To put these figrrres into perspective, there are now twice the number of overweight children and three times as many overweight adolescents as there were in r98o. Without a reversal in this trend, the surgeon general warns, "obesity may soon cause as much preventable disease and death as cigarette smoking."'' This report repeats the conclusions of every prior study that has analyzed the reasons for weight gain over the last twenty years: "excess calorie consumption and./or inadequate physical activity,"'3 and that "it is also known that a healthy diet and adequate physical activity aid in maintaining a healthy weight, and arnong overweight and obese persons, can promote weight loss."'a Recently, rnany non-western, lesser-developed countries have shown sirnilar signs of impending problems with obesity, with the accompanying risls of diabetes, cancer, and digestive and heart disease. A dozen years ago the World Health Organization (WHO) recognized the likelihood of this epidernic, and identified its dietary cause: an excessofenergydense foods rich in fat and sugars, rather than complex carbohydrates.'5 WHO's description, in fact, aptly describes techno-foods' energy-dense

burgers, fried chicken, fried potatoes, fried onion rings, sugary drin}s, creamy shakes, cheese food (as opposed to cheese), and fried fruit desserts. It is difficult to locate complex carbohydrates in techno-food establishrnents: their bread offerings are made with highly refined white flour, which the body transforms into sugars almost as soon as it is eaten. The only evident fruits and vegetables in most techno-food establishments are the occasional leaf of iceberg lettuce, slice of tomato, or sugary fruit drink, and these are only token gestures when compared to real nutritional needs. This is, as the WHO report notes, a precise prescription for population-wide ill health. It is also a deep crack in the heretoforeirnpenetrable armor of the global techno-food revolution.

A Look Ahead. The importantquestions about the globalization of food are not whether food is being globalized rnore rapidly than ever before in human history (it is), nor whether culture diversity and richness are being eroded (they are). The key question is this' Will the awareness of the rapid global spread of technofoods, with their negative nutrition profiles, be enough to counter the trend?

NOTES t "When Worlds Collide," Neusueek, Special Edit o i n ( F a l l / W i n t e rr 9 9 r ) : I o . 2 "McDonald's First Quarter 2oo2 Update," on McDonald's web site. <htto,//w.mcdonalds.com./corporate/press/ffn anciaV2oo2/ ogzzzoozlindex.html>. 3 Peter Farb and George Armelagos, ConsumingPoss[ons:The Anthropologof Eating (New York, Houghton Mifflin, r98o), zrr. 4 E r i c S c h l o s s e r , F a n F o o d. l f a t i o n ( B o s t o n ,

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Houghton Mifflin, Zoor), 229 5 Personal knowledge and information from Eost:McDonald's in EostAsia James L. Watson, Colden Arches (Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press,Zooo), 163. 6 Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Buicks, Starbucls and Fried Chicken. Still China?," New fork Times,2g February 2oO2, A4. / M. Sheraton, Food Markets of the World, (New York, HenryAbrams, rg97), 25.

G T F F o RCDu l t u r e & S o c i e t y 8 Bernard Aronson, quoted in Tim Weiner, "In Corn's Cradle, U.S. Imports Bury Family Farms," ,lfeur Yo*Times,26February 2OO2: A8. 9 Serge Schmemann, "Where McDonald's Sits Down With Arab Nationalists." JVeuhrk ?imes.z Febr u a r y 2 O O 2 :A 8 . Swallowing ro Sidney W. Mintz, "Aftemord Modernity", in GoldenArcfiesEast'McDonold'sin lost,4sio, ed. James L. Watson, (Stanford, Stanford lJniversity

P r e s s , 2 o o o ) ,r g r . rr U.S. Department of Healt} and Human Sewices, TheSurgeon Cnnerul's Collto ActiontoPreoentondDeteaseOaerueigJtt (lV'ashington, DC, USHHS, 2oor): p. xiii. andObesrlt I2 Ibid., xiii. I3 Ibid., r. 14Ibid., r5. rg World Health Orgainz^Lion, Diet, Nutritionond the Preuention rggo : ro-rr. of Chron[cDiseoses,

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Law&Ethics

10urnal

ernational Mfairs

, ~

to PROTECTION

~es

)rld-

~s!

lccepting

3 issue.

length.

neet the

with the

1 articl es

.__.

S_p_urrin.g_the_War~D~S_~_._. International Law and the U.S. Response to Terrorism

Mark Gillespie The September II terrorist attacks and the subsequent military intervention by the United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan have spurred several developments in contempo rary international law that merit attention. The U.S. military response has generated several interesting international legal questions, including whether or not the United States is autho rized to use armed force in pursuit of the attacks' perpetrators and those who harbor them. Should the United States's actions be guided by international law relating to war or by the newer body of law dealing with terrorism? Should alleged war crimi nals be tried by military tribunals? Finally, are individuals detained on the battlefields of Afghanistan protected as prison ers of war under the 1949 Geneva Conventions'? The United States has faced these challenging issues during its response to the 9/r r attacks. A close look at the answers to these questions shows that contemporary international law is in the process of adapting to the changing nature of warfare wherein nonstate actors now play an increasingly devastating role. In its new war against terrorism, the United States has found that the laws of war provide a more useful approach to dealing with the terrorists than do the more recently created international criminal laws. As U.S. leaders continue to struggle with balancing the security of the nation on the one

Mark Gillespie

is a Defense Policy Con

su tant and was for

merly on the staff of the European Policy Directorate in the

Office of the Assistant Secretar-y of Defense for' International Security Policy in the U.S. Depanment of Defense. He was also Assistant PI'ofessor in the Depanmelll of History at. the United States Military Acade my at \Vesl Poin!.

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hand, and the basic human rights of those who seek to destroy it on the other, the choices made thus far reflect the fundamental justice upon which the United Stateswas founded.

The Legalityof UsingArmed Forceaqainst Terrorist 0rqanizations ln Contemporary lhternatiOnal

Law.

Recenttrends in

international law, especially since the inception of the United Nations Charter, have moved toward eliminating the use of force, or the threat of force, against other states. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states, "Atl Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposesof the United Nations."'This is undeniably the seminal principle of contemporary international law concerning the use of force; it has becorne customary law, binding on all states." This principle, however, is directed at state actors. The statelessnature of the al Qaeda organization led one international legal scholar to observe, "In general, the system established by the UN Charter, as with the bulk of public international [law], does not take cognizance of individuals and, as such, is not well-designed for responding to monstrous acts committed by nonstate actors."3 In international law, the focus has been on state-sponsored terrorism, yet paradoxically, Afghanistan appears to have been a terrorist-sponsored state. The enormous destructive power wielded by extreme terrorists (hereafter referred to as X-terrorists) is such a threat to the peace and prosperity of states that it has provoked war, a response normally reserved

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for other states. In view of this, another victim of the September rr X-terrorist attack is the precept that international law focuses almost exclusively on state actors. In theory, the UN Charter takes away a state's authority to use force, or the threat of force, to resolve disputes (Artlcle z(D), and transfers that to the Security Council via Article 39. Article Jg charges the Security Council with the task of determining "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recornmendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles {r and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."* Dld the United States, a perrnanent rnernber of the UN Security Council, therefore need authorization frorn the Security Council for its armed response to Septernber rr? Furtherrnore, did it receive that authorization? The answer actually appears later in the UN Charter, inArticle gr, which states: Nothing

the present

impair the inherent

Charter

shall

right of individual

or collective self-defense if an arrned attack occurs against a Member Nations, taken

until

of the United

the Security

Council has measures necessary to maintain

international

peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not

any way affect

responsibility under

the

the authority Security

the present Charter

and

Council

to take at any

time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.5

At the core of Article gr is the United States's inherent right to defend itself against an arrned attack; in order to prevent more attacks, no additional imme-

6tLLEsPtE Law&EthiCS diate authority is required beyond reporting one's actions to the Security Council. Observers who interpret Article 39 very restrictively might argue that a state may not use force in the absence of explicit Security Council authorization to do so, which could be made after the immediate threat to that state has ceased and the Security Council has had reasonable opportunity to assessthe situation. Others rnight quibble over whether the 9/rr attacks were technically "armed," since the airliners were not armed with military weapons.

being planned by the United States in response to the attacks. On September 28, The Security Council reaffirmed the United States's right to self-defense in Resolution 1373 that also included language reaffirming, "the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist a c t s ." 7 T h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l also required that all states comply with an extensive set of measures to cut off support to international terrorist organiza-

Thg laWS 0f *ur provid.ea more useful approach to dealing:^with the terrorists than do th6 rnore recently c-reatedinternational crirninal laws On the day following the X-terrorist attacks on 9/rr, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368 which explicitly stated that the Security Council recognized, "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter," and regarded "such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peaceand security." The resolution further expressedthe Council's "readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of Septernber II, 2OOI, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordancewith its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations."6 Through such language, the Security Council acknowledged the United States's right to take measures for self-defense and chose not to take any immediate overt action of its own. Most importantly, the Security Council chose not to prohibit any action

tions. Moreover, the Security Council once again chose not to express concern about the anticipated actions of the United States in response to the attacla. Although the United States was probably justified under Article gr alone, after the second Security Council resolution on September zB, the United States had additional evidence of authority under international law to take steps in its self-defense, including the use of armed force if necessary. The United States organized and led a coalition of UN rnember statesinto armed conflict in Afghanistan to pursue Osarna bin Laden, the al Q,aeda terrorist organization, and the Thliban regirne that harbored al Qaeda without triggering a negative response from the Security Council or the UN General Assembly. This ground-breaking precedent established that states suffering X-terrorist, nonstate-actor-

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sponsored attacks arejustified in using all proportionate means to defend themselves, including armed intervention in statesthat harbor the enemy terrorists.6

TheLawof Warandthe Lawof Anti-Terr0riSm. Arnongthemyriad challengesfaced by U.S. policymakers in responding to the September tI X-terrorist attackswas the decision about how to bring the perpetrators to justice. One option was to call the attacks acts of war and pursue those responsible under the laws of war. The other primary option was to follow the rnore recently developed body of international anti-terrorist law. Al Qaeda terrorists, such as those suspected of involvement in the August 7 , r 9 9 B b o r n b i n g s o f U . S . e r n b a s s i e si n Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaarn,Thnzania, have not historically been indicted as war criminals, but as terrorist criminals.e The question at present is whether or not to apply the sarne criteria to the perpetrators of the Septernber rr attacks.Should alleged terrorists in custody be tried by international tribunals such as the International Crirninal Tribunal for the forrner Yugoslavia (ICTY), domestic federal courts, or wartirne rnilitary tribunals? The conternporary international laws addressing terrorisrn, such as those embodied in the T"ky" Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the Hagrae Convention for the Suppression of Unla*{ul Seizure of Aircraft (r9/o), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlav{ul Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, rg7i, generally focus on aircraft hijackings. While these conventions might contain laws that affect the hijackings that initiated the September rI attacls, they are not well-suited to

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encornpass the use of airplanes and passengers as man-guided missiles to destroy civilian and military targets like the World Tiade Center and the Pentagon.'o Most recently, the United Nations has spearheaded the drive against international terrorism with the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (r997) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terroris.n (r999)." These last two conventions are perhaps the most relevant for the rnatters at hand. The first is irnportant because it covers the use of an aircraft as a bomb and has been in effect since May 2!, 2OOI, with the United States as a signatory. The latter convention is noteworthy because it lays the legal groundwork necessary for Security Council Resolution r!/f , which was drafted as a result ofSepternber II, to cut off aid to terrorist groups. The last two conventions rnentioned above contain langrrage indicating that international anti-terrorism crirninal law is rapidly evolving to provide states with valuable tools to shut down terrorist networks. It rernains to be seen how effect i v e t h e s el a w sc a n b e i n p r a c t i c e . In contrast to the recently created anti-terrorism law, the body of international law that deals with arrned conflict between state actors has been developed over rnany centuries. Such arrned conflict laws date back to the first systernatic treatise of the topic by Grotius in his (Dejure belliet pacis) Of theLau ofWor andPeace published in 1625 in the midst of the Thirty Years' War." More recently, the four Geneva Conventions of rg{.g and associated protocols sought to make warfare more hurnane and provide specific levels of protection for both legitirnate cornbatants and noncombatants. The United States is a party to these

G I L L E S P I EL A W & E t h i C S

attacks both abroad and at home.'6 The conventions and accepts those parts of tlne tlJJ Protocols Additional to the U.S. Congress has authorized the use of Geneva Conventions that reflect cus- force to defend Americans against the tomary law of war.'3 The Uniform Code war declared by bin Laden and his supof Military Justice is the judicial system porters.'7 Thus, acting in accordance with used by the United StatesArrned Forces the law of war is the most logical path to take, given that the X-terrorists have blafor handling criminal cases involving tantly committed war crimes. Military members of the military and encompassesviolations of the laws and customs tribunals are the normal entity for trying

tawis anti-teruorism International

rapidly evolving to provide stateswith valuable tobls to shut down terrorist networks. of war. The code also gives rnilitary cornrnissions and tribunals the authority to try persons for violations of the law of war, but not for other crimes unless authorized by Congress.'n An important question is whether the attacksby the X-terrorists amount to war crimes that, as such, can be cornpetently tried by military tribunals. A strong case might be made that the attack on the Pentagon was a permissible target according to the law of war since it is the national headquarters of the United States Arrned Forces. The X-terrorists' actions still constituted war crirnes, however, by kidnapping and causing the death of innocent civilians who were airplane passengers in the attacks. The attack on the World Trade Center is clearly a war crirne because it deliberateIy targeted civilians and caused disproportionate darnageto civilians.'5 The situation in which we currently find ourselves is unquestionably that of war, albeit an unprecedented one since our enemy is a nonstate actor seeking to use weapons of rnass destruction against us. Osama bin Laden's t!!8 fatwa declaration of war has been verified by costly

war crimes; therefore, they are appropriate for the X-tenorists. The next decision is to deterrnine whether it is best to set up international military tribunals like the ones held at Nurernberg where rnajor war criminals were tried in the afterrnath of World War I I o r t o h o l d m i l i t a r y c o m m i s s i o n so r g a nized solely by U.S. government authorities.'6 Some observers have suggested that an international criminal tribunal established by the UN Security Council along lines similar to the ICTYwould be more universally acceptable, especially to states that rnight have qualrns about handing over suspectswho would face the death penalty under a U.S. military cornrnission. This supposed advantage in gaining international approval, though, actually weakens the effect the trials rnight have to deter future terrorist actions since the rnaxirnurn punishment under an international criminal tribunal is only life imprisonrnent for even the worst crimes.'e Other critics of international tribunals have pointed out that very fewAmericans would be included in the court's cornposition, that the tribunal would be exorbitantly expensive,

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and that the court's establishment would risk revealing classified intelligence sources needed to convict suspected war crirninals. "o On the other hand, the most compelling argument in favor of the rnilitary c o m m i s s i o n u n d e r A m e r i c a n a u s p i c e si s that a balance can be struck to secure classified sources, witnesses, and court personnel, while at the same tirne permitting mostly-open proceedings for a full and fair trial. The procedures for military comrnissions that may be used by the United States contain exceptionally balanced provisions, including that the standard for conviction be "beyond a reasonable doubt," and require a twothirds vote of the comrnission. Irnposition of the death penalty would require a unanimous vote of all seven commission rnembers, and an autornatic post-trial process of appeal and review would be triggered."' In essence,a domestic military tribunal for handling war crimes is t h e m o s t s e n s i b l eo p t i o n .

Battlefield Detainees andThe GenevaConventions.If thewaron terrorism is really a war, shouldn't those captured on the battlefields be considered Prisoners of War (POWs) and be allowed the protection afforded by the Geneva Conventions? The novelty of being at war with nonstate actor X-terrorists initially produced a legal tempest over this issue when large numbers of Thliban and al Qaeda members were captured on the battlefields in Afghanistan and detained by U.S. and coalition forces. Public outcry soon called for classiling all the detainees as prisoners of war. Furtherrrrore, some critics demanded that the prisoners be accorded the POW protections of the Geneva Conventions unless a military tribunal judged on a caseby case

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basis that each individual detainee did not fit the POW category,'" As noted, the existing comprehensive international legal framework that protects captured civilians and combatants is based on the four Geneva Conventions of t949 and two additional Protocols. Both the United States and Afghanistan are parties to these conventions. Initial confusion over whether the Conventions apply to this case arose because the Thliban was not the internationally recognized government of Afghanistan. Any party to the convention, however, must treat its captives according to the Convention's regardless of provisions whether the other government is a party to the convention or not."3 A second controversy arose over the requirernent to hold tribunals to determine each captive's status if he were not going to be considered a POW. The storrn over this issue subsided when it was pointed out that there was no legal basis for this requirement. Article { of the Geneva Convention Relative to the teatrnent of Prisoners of War defines the categories and criteria an individual must meet in order to be considered a POW and to be protected as such. Article $ specifiesthat: The present Convention

shall apply to the

persons referred to in Article

{, from the time they fall into the power of the enemy

and until

their final release and repatria-

tion. Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands ofthe enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article enjoy the protection

such persons shall of the present Con-

vention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

The key point in Article g is that military tribunals are required only when

G I L L E S P ILEA W& E t h i C S there is doubt of whether or not a person meets the standards for membership in the categories specified in Article 4. Essentialcriteria to be considered a POW found in Article { stipulate that: Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including

those of

organized resistance movements, belonging to a Part)' to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer

corps,

including

such

organized resistance movements, fulfill the (a) that of being following conditions' commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that ofhaving a f;xed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying

arms openly;

(d) that of

conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."a

Members of the al Qaeda organization who are detained on the battlefield fail to

the United States have forced the world to view the actions of nonstate actors in new ways. First, now that a legitimate state (the United States)has successfullyused armed forces in attacking a nonstate actor for self-defense, the legality of using military force against nonstate actors has been fortified. Secondly, the U.S. attacls on the Thliban in Afghanistan have set an example to the world that states that do not actively prevent nonstate actors within their territory from violations against other stateswill be held accountable. The g/tt attacks have also spurred the creation of a new committee within the UN Security Council that will focus its attention on international tenorism. The avowed intention to obtain and use more potent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by such groups as al Qaeda requires more alert attention b v t h e c o m m u n i t y o f s t a t e s .T h e S e c u -

State aCtOrSare equallyculpable for the war crimes of nonstate ictois th& harbor. meet the criteria for both a fixed insignia, and, most importantly, do not conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. For that matter, the Taliban's armed forces do not conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.'5 In short, tribunals are only needed if there is doubt that the detained persons were members of either group.

Conclusions.

Tiaditionalinterna-

tional law has focused mainly on governing relations between states, and little on nonstate actors such as the al Qaeda terrorist organization. The 9/rr attacls on

rity Council's new committee would be wise to organize an international conference to address the advent of nonstate actors using WMD to threaten states and the international order. High on their list of priorities should be to clarifi the legal status of nonstate actors like X-terrorists, especially with respect to the protection of rights outlined in the Geneva Conventions. Despite the difficulty posed by the idea that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," those who target noncombatants and civilians are war criminals by definition and should be afforded only minimal rights under

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[93]

T H EW A R H O R S E SPURRING

international law. Similarly, the conference should codifr that state actors are equally culpable for the war crimes of nonstate actors they harbor. The armed response of the United States is appropriate under the state of war created by the g/tt al Qaeda terrorists attacks. Choosing to pursue the responsible X-temorists under the law of war is also fitting, given that exigencies of the battlefield in Afehanistan do

not lend themselves to civil criminal proceedings of peacetime. In the final analysis, "The manner in which we conduct trials under military commissions will speak volumes about our character as a nation, just as the manner in which we were attacked speaks volumes about the character of our adversaries.""6 Author's Note: The author would like to thank Anthony ClarkArend and Cheree L. Gillespie, Esq., for their asistancein the preparation of this study.

NOTES r

See Charter

the

United

Available from World [onli^e]. <http'//w.un.org/aboutun/charter/> Catherine

Lotrionte,

Nations, Wide

r945i

Web

at,

- See also,

"The

and Just War Doctrine Covert Responses to Terrorism," CeorgetounJoumalof InternationalAffalrs 3, no. r (Winter/Spring 2oo2): 8586 for an excellent discussion of contemporary international law on the use of force. The general aversion to the use of covert action, which the ruthor mentions in her article, echoes the views of many Anericans. Especially in the post-Viet Nam War era, ir has been

tion

of a course of action taken in self -defense by a article's date, the Security Council has

state. As ofthis

not chosen to do so in the case of the U-S. armed response in Afghanistan to the g-Ir attacks. of State, "Steps Thken To 9 See Department SeneJustice Kenya

in the Bombings of U.S. Embassies in and Tanzania", Offce of the SpokesmonFoct Sheet

released August {-, rggg. Available online at: < http, //w. state. gov/w/regio ns/africalfs_anniv_ steps.html>.

response is a last resort that should be avoided at all costs. In the post 9-IIera, that view not only seems to be waning, but a dramatic

ro SeeArnold N. Pronto, "Comment." TheAmerican Socie! of Intemotionol Inu Insigjts on Terorut Afiocks on the World Trade Center ond the Pentogon$t FredenckL. KrEs, September 2oor. Available online at: <http,//w.asil.orglinsights/

shift has occurred

in favor of using armed force as the mosr aPProPrrate resPonse. 2 See Louis Flenkin et al., Internotional Lou' Casesond Materials, Znd ed. (St. Paul, MN, West Publishine,

insigh//.htm#comment?

ry87).677. 3 SeeJohn Cerone, "Comment: Acts of War and 'Muddy State Responsibility in Waters', The Non" State Actor Dilemma, TheAmericanSociety of Internottonol

12 See Henkin et al., 665-666, for a discussion of the State of War in International [:w. The term "law of war" has been replaced in most modern usage with "law of armed conflict. " War itself has seen a succes-

Low Insghtson Tenori.;- Attockson the World Tride Center and the Pentogonfu Fndeick L ffrgr, Septenber 2OOr. Available online at, <http'//w.asil.org/insights/insigh/7.htn#com-

sion of assumed. nomsde guene over the last sixty years from the classic "declared war" of World War Two, to "police actions" of The Korean War, to international

widely thought

that a military

ment>,

limited

4 See UN Charter. \ tDlo.

far behind?

On September 12, 2OOI, the NorthAtlantic Council if it was determined that the terrorist attacks against the U.S. were directed fron abroad, they should be covered by Article g of the Washington agreed that

Treaty which states, "...an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. " / See United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1373, 2ool. Available online at: <http, //w.un. orglDocs/scres/2oo r/resr373e. pdf> . 8 Should the Security Council ever choose to take measures it deems necessary for maintaining interna-

t S+ ]

peace and security, it may preclude

GeorgetownJournal

"struggles for national liberation" and insurCan "peacefully challenged" be

gencies in Vietnam.

6 See U.ited Nations Security Council. Securitv Council Resolution t368, 2ool. Available online at, <http, //w. un. org/Docs/scres/zoo r/res t368e. pdf> .

tional

tt Links to these and other key international antiterrorist conventions are available online at, <http,//w.asil. org/terrorind.htm>.

of International

authoriza-

Affairs

Rights Watch, "Section r. Interna-

t! See Human tional

Law and

Armed

Conflict,"

the Treatment

of Prisoners in an Background Paper on Cenew Conuentions and PenonsHeld b1 U.S. Forces,2g January 2ooZ [online] . Available online ar' <http,//m.hrw.org/backgro under/usa/pow-bck-htm l{, See American Terrorism on Military

Bar Association,

and the law

Task Force on Report and Recommendations

Commissions,

4January 2OO2: 2-rr; see H. Taft IV, "Military Commissions: Fair Trials andJustice," U.S. Department of State Internaalso William

tional Information Program. Available online at: <http, //usinfo. state. gov/topical/rights/lawloz o326or. htm>. "Tribunals and the Events ASII lnsrgAts(December zoor).

rg See Ruth Wedgwood, of

September

IIth,"

G I L L E S P ILEA W& E t h i C S

Available online at: <httpr//w.asil.org/insights/insigh 8o.htm>.

See also, American

Bar Association,

I4 on page / for other war crines

note

that may have been

violated.

i=2oo2o225&s=shapiro>.

16 See Wedgwood, r/ See Public ljw

2. Io/-{o,

IoTth

(I8 September 2oor). l8 See generally documents International

Military

to the Agreement

Tribunal

of London,

Cong.,

Ist sess.

rg See Nancy

Soderberg,

the

Nuremberg

established pursuant

dated the 8th of August,

"The

United

Nations

Ceorgetoun loumol of Internotionol Joins the New War," Affors!, no. I (Winter/Spring 2oo2): r4g; see also Wedgwood,

Zo See Wedgwood,

2J SeeJohn Cerone, "Status ofDetainees in International Armed Conflict, and their Protection in the Course

1945, and the Charter ofthe Tribunal annexed thereto. Available online at : <http, //w. nizkor.org/hweb/ imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-o I/tgmwc- oI - oI - oI.html>.

r-3 for a concise yet inclusive federal, and nilitary

discussion of the international, tribunal

22 See, for exanple, Bruce Shapiro, "POWs in Legal Limbo," The Notion, February 2g, 2oo2. Available online at' <http'//w.thenation.com./doc. mhtml?

options.

2r See Department of Defense, OrderNo. t, (March 2I, 2oo2).

Military Commissron

of Criminal

Proceedings," ,4S/l /nsrghts(fanuary at: <http'//w.asil.org/

2oO2) :2.Available online insights/insigh8r.htm>.

2{ See Genwa Convention Relative to the teatment of Prisonen ofWar, Augut 12, r9{,9. Amilable online at: <http, / /w.yale. edu/laweb/avalon/lawofivar/gene%O3.htm>. 2$ See Darin R. Bartram, Lee A. Casey, and David B. Rivkin,Jr., "By the l:m ofWar, TheyAren't POWs," Wuhtngton Posf, 3 March 2oo2. The Taliban's lack of adherence to the [:ws ofWar raises interesting issues as to whether all its members

lack coverage as POWs.

Department of Defense 26 See Donald H. Rurufeld, Nm Briefing on Military Commissions, [online] March 2r, 2oo2. Available online at' <http,//w.defenselin-k. miVnewVMar2

o o2/ro32r2o

02 _to32 rsd.html>.

S u m m e r / F a l2l o o 2

[95]

Law& Ethics

Socialistegacy Experience Restitution: W J{oa? TheAustrian Ernst Sucharipa ForAustriato regaina pre- eminentplacein Europeit uasneuergoingto and pro$erous beenough for it to beconfrmedasa stable,democratic, thegap hadto beclosed member of theEU. It required onemoreelement' between the mlth and thereali! of Austria'srelatiorshipuith NaziCermaryyand the Awtrianpeoplehad to be confontedwith the histoical truth. Hella Pick, Gui$rVictim,London 2ooo.

E r n s t S u c h a r i p ai s Director

of Vien

na and former

Perma

nent Representative

Austria to the United Nations. In 2ooo,

served in a pro-bono function trian

In recent years,questions relating to the Holocaust have resurfaced in public discourse in several European countries. Today in many European countries significant historic research is devoted to these issuesby a younger generation of curious historians in particular. In the fields of literature, theater, and film, the National Socialist era, its horrible crimes, and the wounds they have left on succeeding generations are spelled out in detail. Governments and businesses have organized cornrnissions to investigate and shed light on this part of Europe's past, and news reports on the Holocaust and its aftermath abound. Moreover, a number of governments have re-opened old, unfinished dossiersin order to arrive at comprehensive arrangements to provide a measure of justice to surwiving Holocaust victims and their heirs for property losses during the National Socialist regime. In most of these cases,

of the Diplo

matic Academy

as ChiefAus-

Negotiator

issue of property tution

on the resti

to victims of the

Holocaust.

S u m m e r / F a l lz o o z

Ig 7 ]

REVISITINT GH E N A T I O N A LS O C I A L I S TL E G A C Y

the United Statesgovernment has played an important, if not essentialrole, politically pressuring those governments involved and acting as an honest broker in negotiations. While the most recent efforts at restitution are not unprecedented, they are distinct from past efforts for a variety of reasons. First, they have occurred some sixty years after the commission of the Nazi era crimes. Second, they have been conducted within the context of a public discourse that encompasses a greater number of citizens than ever before, especially younger generations. Lastly, they constitute part of a genuine effort to provide closure and, at the sarne tirne, encourage future remembrance, historic r e s e a r c h .a n d o p e n d i s c u s s i o n . This essayseeksto present the particular Austrian experience in trying to overcome its National Socialist legacy.A short overview of the measures Austria undertook as the result of recent negotiations led by the U.S. government will be followed by an explanation of the slow process through which Austria confronted its National Socialist past, a process that stretched over five decades. This processwill then be exarnined in the context of the international system and the specific Austrian situation, thus highlighting the unique nature of the recent restitution negotiations. After eight months of intensive negotiations, Austria, the United States, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims, the Austrian Jewish Cornmunity, Austrian cornpanies, and important class action lawyers signed a joint statement onJanuary 17, 2?or. They agreed upon a package of measures intended to secure a final global resolution of all remaining claims against Austria and Austrian companies, related to the

tg 8]

Georgetown Journal

of International

Affairs

National Socialist era or World War II.' Together with other recent measures, in particular the humanitarian payments made by the Austrian National Fund" since rgg$ and the cornpensation for forced and slave labor issued by the Austrian Reconciliation Fund since its founding in October 2ooo,3 Austrian authorities and businesseswill have provided around $r billion in restitution and compensation in the last decade. This figure does not include substantive, though insufficient, restitution measures of previous decades.a Following the January 17, 2ool agreement, the first piece of legislation adopted by the Austrian parliament was for final compensation in lurnp surn payments of US$ 7,ooo for the loss of property (Austrian Federal l-aw Gazette (BGBI) I No. rr/2oor). This included the loss of apartment and small businessleases,household property, and personal valuables. A total of US$ rgo million was made available to this end. The second legislative act, the Federal l-aw on the Establishment of a General Settlement Fund (Austrian Federal law Gazette (BGBI) I No. IZlzoor), was intended to acknowledge moral responsibility for lossesand damages suffered by victims of the National Socialist regime by means of voluntary palments. The Fund will be endowed with US$ zro million plus interest, provided by the Republic of Austria and Austrian companies. This arnount will be made available thirty days after all claims in the United Statesagainst Austria or Austrian companies arising out of or relatd to the National Socialist era or World War II, pending as ofJune 30, 2oOI, havebeen dismissed. Applications for compensation will be accepted for loss or damage of private property in particular in the following categories: r) liquidated businesses,

s u c H A R r PLAa w & E t h i c s including licenses and other business the Registration and Annulment Acts, assets;2) real property, in the caseofpubseven Restitution Acts, the establishment licly owned property unless in remrestituof Collection Agencies for "unclaimed" tion has been granted; 3) bank accounts, assets, acts governing several funds for stocks, bonds, mortgages; 4) movable l u m p - s u r n compensation, and the property, unless such property losses are repeatedly amended and updated Vicnot covered by lump sum payments tims' Welfare and Social legislation. refened to above; $) insurance policies. These measures, however, constituted An Arbitration Panel has been estab- merely an incomplete attempt to render lished to examine applications for the justice to the victims. When we look back restitution of publicly-owned property. on these measures today, we see that they clearly did not meet the rightful expectations of Holocaust victirns. Before the LOng? Sixty-four yearsafter the Anschlussrg8os, many Austrians had difficulty (Austria's annexation by Germany in confronting their country's painful past March tg!8) and fifty-seven years after and its consequences. To a considerable Austria's liberation from Nazi dictatorextent, this can be attributed to the deciship by the Allied Powers, the Austrian sive will of the large rnajority of Austrians public is increasingly aware that even to completely break with their recent though Austria has recently admitted to past. This consensus, which enabled the its culpability for the crirnes of National reconstitution of the republic in 1945, Socialism, it has not done enough to was based first and forernost on the meet its material obligations to victirns strong belief that the Second Republic of that era.5 Sirnilar discussions in would be the antithesis of the National Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, ] Socialist dictatorship. The Austrian

Why HasIt TakenAustriaSo

Restitutionin Austriahadbeena sequence of inadequate and half-hearted efforts and elsewhere have caused the Austrian government to increasingly focus on compensating those whose lost assets during the Nazi era. Restitution in Austria had been a sequenceof inadequate and half-hearted efforts. When the Second Republic was first founded, it faced both crimes of unprecedented dimensions and a populace that included victims, perpetrators, and those who stood by and failed to stop t h e a t r o c i t i e st h a t o c c u r r e d . 6 Austrian restitution legislation was introduced as early as Ig{9. It included

post-war consensusincluded an absolute commitment to democracy, social partnership, and the negation of political repression. The era of National Socialism was considered one of tyrannical and oppressive domination by a foreign power, despite the fact that rnany Austrians had taken an active part in Nazi crimes. On October 30, 1943, the allied governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United Statescollectively adopted the Declaration on Austria, more commonly known as "the Moscow Declaration." They agreed that

Summer/Rllzooz

[99]

R E V I S I T I N GT H E N A T I O N A L S O C I A L I S T L E G A C Y

Thg majOf lty Of A.r.trian politicians ^exemptionused the "victirns' theorv" as a total ggy-legal or rrroral'responsibility to#ard Holoc"austvictlms. Austria, "the first country to fall a victim of Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated frorn German They domination." "...regard[ed] the annexation irnposed upon Austria by Gerrnany...as null and void..." and they "...declareld]theirwish to see re-established a free and independent Austria." However, in paragraph 3 of the Declaration, the Allies also reminded Austria that "...she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Gerrnany and that the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation." The theory that Austria was the first victim of the Nazis was of particular importance to nation-building, perhaps only second to Austria's status of permanent neutrality adopted in rg$g. This theory, based on the Moscow Declaration, had important implications for the way issues of restitution were handled.? For too long, the majority of Austrian politicians used the "victirns' theory"s as a total exemption frorn any legal or rnoral responsibility toward Holocaust victims. International lawyers and historians have debated, from a legal perspective, if Austria's Anschluss to the German Reich should be considered an annexation or occupation. Some authors such as Hans Kelsen,have adhered to the theory of annexation, which suggests that Austria ceased to exist as a subject of international law as Both theoof the date of the Anschluss.s

Irool

GeorgetownJournal

of International Affairs

from

ries assert that during the period of occupation/annexation by Gerrnany, between r9f8 and rg{9, Austria lacked the capacity to act on an international plane. In other words, since Austria was incapable of acting as a sovereign state under international law, it cannot legally be held responsible for wrongful acts, such aswar crirnes and violations of human rights, which were organized and carried out by the Nazi regime of the German Reich. These legal considerations, however, should not be understood as a means to absolve indiuidual Austrians of their responsibility for the atrocities of the Nazi regime or to negate the rnoral responsibility incumbent upon Austria. It cannot be denied that Austrians were among the perpetrators of the rnost heinous Nazi crimes; rnany others supported, or at least failed to oppose, Nazi persecution. The growing awareness of war-time wrongs in Austria and other countries has in recent years manifested itself not only in a rnore sensitive approach to the country's history, but also in a re-assessment of rnoral responsibility to the victims and their descendants. A r99r speech by the forrner Federal Chancellor Vranitzky in the Austrian Parliament was the first concrete sign of a break in the traditional taboo of silence. Signi$ing the adoption of a more critical (victims' view of the so-called Opfertheorie theory), Dr. Franz Vranitzky declared,

S U C H A R I P AL A W & E t h i C S

There were many Austrians the Anschlus,who supported

who welcomed the National

Socialist regirne, andwho helped to carry it [out] o.r many levels of the hierarchy. Many Austrians participated in the Third Reich's machinery of suppression and persecution,

some participated

first line...

even in

the

Even today, we cannot ignore

co-responsibility

for the acts of our citi-

zens. We stand up for all the facts of our historT and all the acts of our people, the good ones aswell as the evil ones, forwhich we have to apologize-to the survivors as well as the descendants ofthe dead.

In years since this shift in awareness, Austria has adopted a number of important rneasures. For example, it has rnade it easier for Nazi victims living atrroad to acquire Austrian citizenship, social security benefits, and pension payrnents. The most significant measure is the National Fund, which has disbursed quite significant surns to Holocaust survivors since its inception in rgg$. The adoption of these new measures culminated in the two historic agreements concluded on October 2+, 2ooO in Vienna and on January r/, 2oor in Washington on the issues of forced labor and property restitution, respectively. In his State of the Union Address on May lg, 2oor, Federal Chancellor Dr. Schiisselstated that these restitution and cornPensation rneasureswere : ...no

generosities...but rather a late... that the Republic of

acknowledgement Austria,

although it did not exist during

the time the National

Socialist atrocities

occurred,

injustice

comrnitted

reestablishment

after

its

towards many victirns by

delaying the restitution ofproperty

and by

not openly and clearly enough admitting to the co-responsibilitv

of its citizens.

He continued, "On behalf of the Republic, I want to admit to those injus-

tices in front of the victims and their heirs and ask them to accept our current efforts for belated justice." The question then is: Why now? Why did it take more than fifty-five years for the Austrian Republic to accept its moral responsibility? This question can be answered frorn both a elobal and an Austrian perspective: a) Amoreglobalapproach'TheAustrian experience, although perhaps particularly drastic, is not unique. Other countries have also taken a long time to shoulder full moral and financial responsibilitythe Swiss case is well known.'o Moreover, the day after Austria concluded the Washington agreement, France entered into a similar accord (again with the invaluable assistance of the United States). Other countries might still have to go through a similar process. For rnany years, and with increasing intensity, public discussions had been brewing about painful issues of the past, including Nazism. For exarnple, in his Dialectic,Theodor W. 1966 book Negatiue "Hitler has forced a new Adorno stated: categorical imperative upon humanity: to organize their thinking and their actions in a way that Auschwitz cannot be repeated, that nothing similar can happen." (break of civilizaThe ,{uilisotionsbruch tion) through the Holocaust" rernains the most important historic event for Europeans. It heralds a call to stand up for tolerance, support human rights, and work for the protection of the dignity of the individual hurnan being. The increased relevance of history is not confined to the phenomenon of the Nazi era and its crimes, but is witnessed also by the emerging construction of a pan-European remernbrance, facilitated in part by the process of European

S u m m e r / F a lzl o o z

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R E V I S I T I N G T HN E A T I O N A LS O C I A L I S TL E G A C Y

integration. Other events in European history such as the Armenian Genocide of r9r5, or even the Battle of Kosovo Polje of l!89, have resurfaced in the European collective mernory. One can also see an international development pointing in the same direction. There has been a certain globalization of history and the internationalization of "remembrances." The proceedings at the UN's World Conference on Racism that took place in September 2ooo at Durban are just the latest, and very pertinent, example of this development. At the Durban conference, colonial history and the issue of slavery in the United States were important issues. Negotiators worked to find a common langrrage to describe painful historic developments in a way that was acceptable to all participant states, thus creating a basis for "international remembrance. " Why this development? First, in rnodern Europe, we share to a large extent (*ith the obvious exception of Southeast Europe) a long stretch ofpeaceful developrnent. This fosters the contemplation of history and facilitates the advancernent of clairns even after long periods of tirne. Second, we have gained some ternporal distance frorn the events, allowing for a rnore accurate, less subjective assessment. Third, intergenerational changes have occurred, also on the side of victims, alleviating sorne of the psychological obstacles that have prevented the assertion of claims in the past. Fourth, archives have been opened around the world, partly due to the collapse of cornmunist regimes, but also because of the lapse of time and the adoption of more liberal policies. Fifth, the "Anniversary"/"Millennium" factor also came into play, since anniversaries lend themselves to retrospection.

I ro z J

Ceorgetown Journal of Inrernational Affairs

b) ThespecifcAustriansituation:As mentioned, Austrian acceptance of its past has been a painstakingly slow process. The belief that Austria was Hitler's first victim, as valid as it might be from a purely legal and "6tatist" point of view, has for too long blocked the road towards recognition of moral responsibility.'" For too long Austria has been a victim of the victims' theory. With the help of foreign influence, Austria has gained a more balanced view of its World War II history. During the "Waldheirn era," this was especially the case. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that the particular international situation Austria found itself in after the imposition of political isolation by its EU partners and others affected the decisions taken by the Austrian government in the last two years on the issues of compensation and restitution to Holocaust victims. Another irnportant factor facilitating the negotiations was the "class-action syndrome. " While the ernerging threat of class actions was not the single rnost determining factor leading to the recent measures of restitution and compensation, it no doubt prepared the ground for out-of*court settlements. An additional rnajor irnpetus toward negotiation was undeniably the rnoral and political persuasion of the United States.America must be credited for insisting on taking up the issuesof compensation for forced labor and seized property. The United States used diplomatic channels and a number of bilateral contacts to impress upon Austria and other countries the need to enter into these negotiations and conclude thern expeditiously. The nomination of Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Eizenstat, who in his role as the head of the U.S. delegation acted as the facilitator and chairperson of the negotiations, revealed a considerable

s u c H A R t p LAa w & E t h i c s amount of leadership on the part of the United States. Mr. Eizenstat provided invaluable goal-oriented assistarice. For Austrians, the negotiations were also inspired by their hope that solving these questions might heip to redress thil painful chapter ofAustria's past. The past had again and again clouded Austria's irnage abroad and very often cast a shadow on the various international humanitari_ an measures that it undertook, like the acceptance of some 2OO,OOO refugees frorn Hungary in 19g6, the help Aus"tria provided for the transit of half a million Jewish emigrants and refugees from the Soviet Union in the l9Bos, and the acceptanceof many thousands of refugees from the Balkans in the t99o.. NZo., importantly, I believe that the main factor leading to the negotiations was the sirnple fact that in today's closely-knit international community, no country can deny its moral responsibility and exclude itself from the example set by others.

restitution measurescould be considered adequate-both from the perspective of the time of their enactment and from today's perspective. In line with historical findings, Austria took the position that gaps and deficiencies did indeed exist and needed acknowledgment. At the same time, past restitution measures, although inadequate, had to be taken into account for the purpose of arriving a t a c o m p r e h e n s i v es e t t l e m e n t . Such "gaps and deficiencies" in previ_ ous measures occurred in particular in relation to "aryanized apartments" (where no compensatory legislative rneasure existed prior to the law passed in January ZooI), "liquidated businesses" (which as such were not the subject of restitution proceedings in the purl), u.rd compensation for "flight tax" and special levies on Jewish victims (ludenuermagensab_ gobe), where compensation was eranted only to a limited extent. Other imf,ortant issues concerned insurance policies. damage, and loss of p.op".ty d.ue to Unique Negotiations.Attaininsactivities of the Dorotheum (Austria's state_ restitution for victims of Nationa-i owned auction house, which, under the Socialism involved a unique form of National Socialist regime, acted as a pri_ negotiations where moral, ethical, and mary agent for the GESTAPO and put legal backgrounds were very specific and properties seized from Nazi victims up where claims, based on an assertion of. for public sale). legal responsibility, met with a prepared_ The measures agreed upon, and ness to assume moral but not legal, referred to above, attempt to deal with responsibility. The special features of the unresolved issues of Austria's recent restitution negotiations (and not National Socialist past. As a result of the only in the Austrian cus") included: a January- ZOOI agreements, surviving willingness to assume moral responsibil_ household members of Holocaust vic] ity for past acts;joint effort on all sides to tims whose rented apartments were tak_ establish the "historic truth;,' and pre_ en awaywere compensated with $7, ooo. paredness to recognize and ackno*l.de. Those whose businesseswere liquidated. guilt-at the very least for not having dea'lt who bore losses from discriminating tax with the issue adequately in the pasi. regimes, or who lost other property"not For Austria, a substantial part of the covered in the past will be compensated most recent negotiations was devoted to from the $Zro .nillior G..r".u^l Settledetermining the extent to which past ment Funds. A specific amount of the

S u n m e r , / F a l lz o o z

Itog)

REVISITING T H E N A T I O N A LS O C I A L I S TL E G A C Y

General Settlement Funds is also earmarked for compensation for insurance claims. In the caseof now publlcly owned property restitution in rem to the original owners will be examined. Finally, additional legislation was passed that increased significantly both the amount of healthcare payments to the elderly Holocaust victims living outside of Austria and other pension payments. Two independent three-member committees of lawyers, nominated jointly by the United States and Austria, are in charge of the detailed claims procedure. They are assisted by a substantial number of legal clerls and experts.

the restitution of assetsto victims of the Holocaust. The agreement constitutes a major contribution in coming to terms with the terrible Nazi persecution ofJews and other gr:oups. Like all nations, Austria has to live with its past: the deeds of all Austrians, bad or good, and the fact that Austrians were perpetrators, onlookers, and victims. One of the side effects of the negotiations, and perhaps one of their most important results, was the intensive discussion that they initiated in the Austrian rnedia. The high-quality, constructive, and in-depth media coverage accompanying the negotiations created a national dialogue on Holocaust issues. Consequently, especially within the younger generation, there is a fresh awareness of the issues involved-an awareness that augurs well for the future.

NOTES r For this and other important

documents

in Eng-

lish and German Foreign Ministry, Ministry-s

see the homepage of the Austrian <http,//w.bmaa.gv.at> and the Publication "Osterreichische MaBnahmen

zur Restitution

und

Nationalsozialismus,

Entschadigung

von Opfern

AuBenpolitische

des

Dokumenta-

tion 2OOI." 2 (w.

See the

homepage

the

National

Fund,

nationalfonds.

org>. "Enkchadigung 3 Hans Winkler, filr Sklauen- und /pangsorbeit im Dritten Reich - Dos ijsterreichischeModel." Osterreichisches Jahrbuch fiir Internationale Politik (Wien, Braumiiller, 2ooo). Autria's Meosuresof Restitution and { Ernst Sucharipa, C o m p e n s o t i o nf o r H o l o c a u s t V i c t i m s . O s t e r r e i c h i s c h e s (Wien: fiir Inrernationale Politik 2ooo. Jahrbuch Braumiiller, 2ooo), 75-95. g See "Austria's International

Legal Status between rgJS and Ig45 and Austrian Restitution efforts" on <http, //w.bmaa. gv. atlserice).

IlO4]

GeorgetownJournal of InternationalAffairs

6 Evan Burr Bukey, Hrtleri,4 ustria,PopularSentiment in theNai Ers, 1938-1945. (Chapel Hill, The lJniversity of North Carolina Press,2ooo). / Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheitund Freiheit.Staatsrertras, Neutralitiitund dasEndederOst-Wst Besoqung0sterreichs t g4l1 9 5 5 . ( W e n , B c i h l a u ,1 9 9 8 ) , r r - 2 8 . 8 Giinter Bischoi Ausfricin the FirstColdWar,tg45t955. The Leueroge of the Weak (London, Macmillan,

r99il, 52-77. g Hans Kelsen, Princrples of Intemotionallou (New York: Rinehart, l95Z), 26. ro Elazar Barkan, The Cuilt of Nations' No{ gold ond Surs Solidorg (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.). 88. tt Dan Diner, DosJahrhundeft uerstehen, Miinchen r999. 12 Hannes Androsch. The State of Affairs Sneech h e l d a t t h e O p e n i n g S e s s i o no f t h e 3 r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l Theodor Herzl Symposium, Menna City Hall, March 1 3 ,2 O o O .

Polltl cs&Dlplomacy Brandingimericag Charles Skuba Many Arnericans were shocked by the results of a Gallup poll conducted in nine Muslim countries in December 2oor and January 2oo2. The poll revealedthat most of the respondents considered the United States to be ruthless, arrogant, aggressive, and biased against Islamic values and against the palestinian people in particular; rnoreover, most thought that U.S. culture was a corrupting influence on their societies.' However, among officials within the U.S. governrnent, instead of surprise there is a growing realization that more emphasis needs to be placed on better cornrnunication with the people of the Islamic world, and with other global audiences as well. This view was already evident in ?oor, when the House International Relations committee held hearings that stressed the importance of irnproving public diplomacy. At the same time, Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed his desire to bring "people into the public diplomacy function of the [State] Departrnen_twho are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA [United States Inforrnation AS"r.t way to really branding foreign policy, branding the Department, marketing the Department, marketing American values to the world anJ not just putting out pamphlets."' The confirmation of former advertising executive Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy is part of this strategy. It is a strategy, though, that has not been universally well received. Journalists have jumped on Ms. Beers's

Charles Skuba i. an international marketing

brand

and adver-

tising consultant in Washington,

living D.C-

He was formerly Senior

Mce

Presidenr

at Saarchi & Saatchi Advert ising.

Summer/Fallzooz Ilo5]

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reported intention to bring "branding" to the State Department, dismissing her as an advertising huclster. The press has generally ridiculed the idea of branding in relation to foreign policy, describing it as a "mystical art" and "quasi-alchemic process," and criticizing what it views as being "slick rnarketing techniques." This disdain and suspicion of branding U.S. foreign policy is unfair and misleading. It

rnany opposing messages, some from overt enernies. The image of the United States abroad is also sornetirnes adversely affected by a complex media environrnent in which American entertainrnent and business rnessaging often disturb cultural sensitivities. There are rnany, in the Islamic world and elsewhere, whose perception of Arnerica is shaped greatly by these factors, causing them to hate or

Realistically,the issueisnotwhether or not to brand, but how to rnanage and rnarket

the U.S. brand. may stern not only frorn journalistic skepticism, but also from a widespread rnisunderstanding of what branding means and of the nature of the advertisingbusiness in which the very able Ms. Beers rose to the top. "Many people in Washington have experience in the no-holds-barred, rough-and-turnble, in-your-face arena of political advertising, " says Dick O'Brien, executive vice president of the American Association of Advertising Agencies. "They don't understand the disciplined, thoughtful, and measured businessof building brands."3 Realistically, the issue is not whether or not to brand, but how to manage and market the U.S. brand. Although the terminology may irritate many in the press as well as in the diplomatic cornrnunity, the United Statesis undeniably a brand, and one that means very different things to different audiences. In his article, "The Rise of the Brand State" in ForergnAffaIrs, Peter van Harn wrote, "We all know that 'America' and'Made in the U.S.A.' stand for individual freedom and prosperity."a However, this is just one view, and the American brand rnust also cornpete with

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of International

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resent the United States and what they believe it stands for. To better understand how professional branding practices could be used to improve the U.S. irnage abroad, it is useful to analyze how rnarketing professionals approach the concept and practice of branding, how it rnight be appropriate for U.S. foreign policy, and what is required to rnake it effective.

Defining Branding. To some, branding sirnply means advertising designed to create emotional irnagery usually associated with a business. To others, it means the creation of symbols that allow ready recall of the institution. In practice, however, the modern concept of branding is rnore complex and encornpassesthe holistic environment in which the brand exists, operates, and interacts with its rnany customers and stakeholders. Philip Kotler, the author of many leading marketing text books, d e s c r i b e sb r a n d i n g i n i t s g r e a t e r c o n t e x t : "The art of marketing is largely the art of brand building...Brand building [sicJ calls for rnore than brand image build-

sKUBAPolitics&Diplomacy tical industry analyses. The web site and e-mail helped to identify and create a dialogue with those identified as potential customers. This strategywas integrated with direct sales force and customer relationship management efforts. Thus, IBM transformed itself into the ultimate e-business at the same time that it prornised to help other businesses becorne e-businesses. The IBM campaign rnay be the best corporate example of a successfulglobal branding campaign in recent history. IBM leads all competitors in brand awareness and preference r e l a t e dt o t h e c o n c e p t o f e - b u s i n e s s . E The United States would not be the first government to use branding techniques. An exarnple of how branding can be applied by a nation seeking to influence another country's public opinion is the "Britain in Malaysia" campaign. Conducted since rgg8, the campaign airns to strengthen the cultural and economic partnership between Britain and Degree Branding." This is defined as Malaysia. As described in Paul Tempo"creating attention-getting messagesthat ral's "Branding in Asia," Britain began make a promise consistent and true to by identifring key target segments of the business, governrnent, and press comthe brand's image and identity. And munities, and then developed "a seriesof guiding actions, both big and small, that deliver on that brand promise. To every key rnessagescreated for each target audience." Each rnessageneeded to reinforce audience that brand has. At every brand four core brand values that were intendi n t e r s e c t i o np o i n t . A t a l l t i m e s . " u ed to represent "Britain in Malaysia"' Ogilvy's work with IBM since r99B exernplifies the concept of 36o degree innovativeness, dependability, professionalism, and stylishness. A special tag b r a n d i n g . W i t h a b u d g e t i n e x c e s so f $ l 'Just Between Friends," and a logo billion, IBM has invested heavily in a line, were also developed. Every participating global multimedia branding effort, British organization, which included the airned primarily at inforrnation technolBritish High Commission, the Britishogy executives, to equate the company "e-business."7 Malaysian Industry and Trade Associawith tion, the British Council, British AirNot only did the advertising communicate that IBM was all about e-business, ways, and the North West Arts Board, was required to use the campaign elements in but the company delivered on this promise through its products, serwices, its advertising and events in Malaysia. The campaign was intended to be a longemployees,web site, brochures, and ver-

ing. It ca1ls for managing every brand contact that the customer might have with the brand."5 This generally involves setting a focused central branding strategy and then clearly communicating to everyone in the brand organization what his or her role is in that strategy. While global ad agency networks link branding mostly with advertising, they also emphasize the role of the full spectrum of communications practices: public relations, direct marketing, brand identity, interactive marketing, custorner relationship management, and prornotion. Advertising has traditionally been the marketing practice that drives branding, but branding can also be driven by other instruments from the cornrnunications toolbox. In the case of public diplomacy, public relations is the most obvious primary driver. Beers's former cornpany, Ogihy & Mather, labels its proprietary branding philosophy and rnethodology "36o

S u m m e r / F azl lo o z

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Public diplomacy shouldernbrace professional rnarketing practices. term effort. Obviously viewing the campaign as successful,the British high commissioner remarkedt The values we have adopted will remain relevant well beyond 1998. As such, we shall be able to build on them in years to come to

present

Britain

an even stronger Malaysia....

image

Our failure to communicate

convincingly

our values and policies during the strategic reversal [since the end of the Cold War] partially explains the loss of public influence and

the

growing

anti-American

trends. We must now address this oversight and acknowledge our own misorganization of our public communication

resources.'o

By consistently

The United States's need to get its through messageout to foreign public audiences shall provide the strategic platform for the is increasingly obvious. Putting this issue successful presentation of all British activiin context, Chairman of the House ty in Malaysia.s International Relations Committee Henry Hyde explained the necessity for more targeted U.S. communications POliCy. Of course, the United. States abroad, can neither manage every contact it has I believe that half of our foreign policy is with every person around the world, nor missing...The U.S. has the unique capacihope to convince every public audience ty to simultaneously pursue a foreign polithat it is following the right policies. cy along two separate tracks: the first with However, it can do a much better job of the governments of the world, the second marketing itself, and this is where brandwith their peoples. Our relationship with these populations can provide powerful ing cornes in. leverage in our dealings with their ruling With the end of the CoId War, the regimes.... That then is the role I would set need to communicate American values for our public diplomacy: to enlist the overseasseemed much less urgent; conpopulations of the world into a common sequently, valuable strategic ground was cause and to convince them that the goals lost. Since the collapse of the Soviet they seek for themselves - freedom, security and prosperity - are the same as those Union, the United States Information that the United States seeks." Agency (USIA), formerly an independent foreign affairs agency within the To fulfill the role laid out by Conexecutive branch, was folded into the State Department, Voice of America gressman Hyde in a world of increasingly (VOA) experienced significant budget global media and communications, public diplomacy should embrace profescuts, and various public diplomacy prosional rnarketing practices. It must have a grams' budgets were reduced significantly. A recent panel report on "cornpremore comprehensive and long-term goal hensive strategic reform," sponsored by than just to overcome current challenges among Islamic audiences. It will also the Center for the Study of the Presidenrequire the use of the full spectrum of cy, opined' stressing why Britain is different and better the values we have identified,

in U.S.Foreign UsingBranding

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of InternationalAffairs

sKUBAPolitics&Diplomacy marketing tools, rather than traditional public relations alone. The United States has many superbly qualified and highly creative professionals in private industry to help in this task. This is not an argument for message over substance. Branding America must not be propaganda, but should be a clear and loud voice for American values, as well as a demand for smart and balanced policy. One of the basic principles of marketing and advertising is that you have to have a good product to make an effective, long-term brand sale. Great marketing will not sell bad policy. With the United States as the world's sole superpower and the ubiquity of the U.S. presence in the lives of people throughout the world, marketing Arnerican values is a necessary task, but one whose successstrongly depends on the United Statesmaking smart policy choices. Before we can brand America, we must know the answersto basic questions: What is the brand promise of the United States ,and to whom does it pertain? Is it a believable promise? Are our actions consistent with jt? These questions are fraught with multiple policy dilemmas. In testimony before the House International Relations Committee on Novernber 14, 2oor, Robert Wehling, the co-chair of the Ad Council Advisory Committee and former Global Marketing Officer for Procter & Gamble, testified: At P&G we learned over and over again never to exaggerate the claims for a product. If [consumers'] experience with the product does not meet or exceed their expectations, they won't buy it again. . . . Our actions must be fully consistent with our words. If we send messages to the Arab communicate

world

that

friendship

and peace, it won't mean an1'thing unless it's accompanied by a major humanitarian effort, a major push for a Palestinian State, and oth-

er similar

activities. If we aren't willing

deliver this kind

of effort,

we should

to not

release an advertising or PR campaign.''

BrandingPrinciples.There aresix key steps that America must take in branding itself to the outside world. t) Decidingupona straightforward,belieuable,and true brandpromise What the United States stands for needs to be defined and emphasized. The basic American values of freedom, tolerance, opportunity, and compassion will appeal to any audience with whomAmerica wants a dialogue. In her statement at the House International Relations Committee hearing on Public Diplomacy on October ro, 2oor, Ms. Beers stated, "This is a war about a way of life and fundamental beliefs in values we did not expect to ever have to explain and defend-such as freedom and tolerance."'3 Later, in her November '"We have to press conference, she stated, put forward something we might have all taken for granted, which is U.S. values... 'freedom' 'tolerance' words like and and 'diversity of human beings' are precious to us, and I don't think they're very well understood. In this day I would say we must renew our cornmunication on what we mean by such things."'+ With the United States's core messag'e strategy taking shape around these key values, it is critical that U.S. policy initiatives are substantial and consistent for the communications to be believable and effective overseas in the long-term. In other words, we rnust practice what we preach. Any efforts at "disinformation" as envisaged by those who supported the creation of the (aborted) Pentagon Office of Strategic Influence would be counterproductive.

S u m m e r / F a lzl o o z

IrogJ

B R A N D I N GA M E R I C A O

segmentation and pioriti4tion Chairman Marc Nathanson of the 2) Audience U.S. branding strategy must begin by U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors identi$ing, segrnenting, and prioritizing has identified a specific target for the new audiences exactly which present opporU.S. government's new Middle East tune and critical targets for messaging. In Radio Network: young mainstream eduhis book "All Consumers are Not Creat- cated Arabs under thirty and the emergingArab leadership.'' ed Equal, " former Ogl"y director of Differential Marketing Garth Hallberg wrote that marketers "must invest their efforts 3) Research and dialogue for continuouslearning and their budgets where they will produce When asked how to start a great camthe most return. The most valuable cus- paign, any marketing executive would tomers deserve special treatment to build immediately identify the need for good and retain their loyalty."'s The United audience research. Again, Mr. Wehling's States rnust therefore understand those words are apt: "Don't start writing rnespublic audiences who will be the most sagesbefore getting up to date research in desirable recipients of U.S. messaging each country regarding how people feel, intended to influence public opinion. why they feel that way, and what it would A start in this direction is recognizing take to change their rninds."'e the great diversity that exists globally. As Research must be ongoing and all Moufac Harb, Washington bureau chief cornrnunications efforts must be dedicatfor AlHgat newspaper, counseled' ed to constant learning. If the United States is truly cornrnitted to the dialogue, Now consider the Muslim world-r.z bilthis means active listening to the audilion people living in 60 nations. You canence and actually responding to their not win the war of ideas and inages here 'media concerns and needs. The policy implicawith a strategy of carpet bombing'. . . tions of a responsive dialogrre with the At the very least, the United States should tailor its messages for each country-not Arab world, given the harsh reality of the only for language but also for content. conflict between Israel and Palestine, and Within countries, the United States should the substance of Arab demands for its have multiple messages crafted to reach resolution, are proving too much for particular segmentsof society.'6 many in the United Statesgovernrnent to Mr. Wehling added to his testimony swallow. Dialogue cannot happen withabout messagingto "the Arab World", out openness to policy change. Just as there is no single appropriate message for all the countries in the region, there is probably

one message that's

right for all the people in a countrf. the most important

Picking

target audience for the

messages is critical. P&G's success in this region has principally come because of our focus on

women,

particularly

mothers.

That same focus may make sense in this case because surely the women of the region have had enough ofviolence

and bloodshed. A

secondary target might

well be Arab

men

described as educated and moderate.'7

I I ro J

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

programs {) Euoluing,$tnamicmesagtngand While basic values embody the brand promise, ongoing messaging content must be much more substantial and dynamic with specific objectives. Situations evolve and constantly change, as do people's views. If dialogue is truly desired, it should be progressiveand lead to a desired goal. Mr. Hallberg defines this concept in rnarketing terms: "This is all about a

sKUBAPolitics&Diplomacy mutual value exchange with information as value. Brands learn from customers and customers learn from brands. It's really a marketing curriculum. The challenge for the brand is to always remember its objectives and constantly move the customer along the curriculum."'o Mr. Hallberg's curriculum truIy applies to public diplomacy messaging and audiences. For example, if we want educators in Indonesia to become fair and honest in their teachings about the United States,we can develop a marketing curriculum with them in mind. Such a curriculum could be designed for use through a dynamic web site. Newspaper advertising or brochures distributed in Indonesian schools rnight attract educators to the web site. Through helpful and informative educational content, the web site would encourag'ethe educators to register and engage in e-mail correspondence with U.S. educators and U.S. culture and information officers. The U.S. government rnight send educational materials to the teachers, or invite them to participate in an exchange program.

clear objectives and then we must bring overwhelming force-the full range of communications [sic] resources necessary to achieve those objectives.""' The State Department must look at every medium and tool available. In some cases paid advertising in mass media might be appropriate. It depends on the specific objective involved and the context of the message. For exarnple, while a television commercial rnight not be the right mediurn for an ad promoting Arnerican values to a broad Muslirn audience, it rnight be very effective in prornoting U.S. friendship with a specific country if it promotes a significant event in that country. Also, when the United States delivers valuable inforrnation via a web site, like a presentation on Muslim life in America or information about U.S. prograrns, it c a n n o t a s s u m et h a t i t h a s i n s t a n t , b r o a d exposure." Rather, marketing is needed to alert viewers and readers and cause them to visit a web site or look for a specific publication. The greatest obstacle to media rnarketing on a global scale though is the very absence of advanced media in rnany g) Thefull rangeof marketingcommunications parts of the world. TV and Internet The U.S. State Department has always penetration rates are extrernely low in relied on public relations "spinning" most Asian and African countries. In and U.S. broadcasting as its prirnary fact, television news and the Internet are communications channels. Without the media of an elite, educated seg'rnent necessarily challenging this primacy, a of the population in many countries. branding assignment should have all While this is an argument in favor of communications tools available. The their use in efforts to reach selectededuissue is to get a compelling messageto cated audiences, it does mean, on the the right audience, whether that is an other hand, that reaching broad audiaudience of foreign journalists or a ences requires different tools. broader target. As John Leslie, Jr., Increased funding for the expanded c h a i r m a n o f t h e P R a g e n c y W e b e r use of rnore traditional media for U.S. *We Shandwick, told Congress: should messaging must therefore be a priority. heed the Powell Doctrine...and apply it The most powerful media available to now to communications, We must have t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n c l u d e V o i c e o f

S u m m e r / F a lzl o o z

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America aswell as other U.S. broadcasting efforts under the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), such as the new Middle East Radio Network. U.S. international broadcasting reaches over roo million people in sixty-one different languages and not only offers news, but also other highly appreciated programs such as courses in English instruction. One critical area for budget increases is in the marketing of American broadcasting prograrns. Less than one percent of the IBB's budget has been dedicated to rnarketing. This is ridiculous, as marketing is critical to increasing the penetration of VOA and the number of its listeners in many countries where there is already a lot of rnedia cornpetition. "3

terminology, Harvard Business School's Theodore Levitt wrote tellingly, "Keeping customers for an intangible product requires constant reselling efforts while things go well lest the customer get lost when things go badly.""a In opening hearings on "Rethinking

U.S. Public Diplomacy," Congressman Hyde stated, "It is by now obvious to most observers that the role of public diplomacy in our foreign policy has been too long neglected.""s The aftermath of September lt has shown the need for aggressive communications in a time of crisis. But a long-term, stateand marketing-driven of-the-art, approach will be necessaryin order for public diplornacy to be truly effective. When it is time again for government budget cutting, public diplomacy will Marketingdrluen database and collaboration tools again be vulnerable. This should be 6) Just as marketers use sophisticated grrarded against. Public diplornacy rnust databasetools and technology to profile, be consistent and enduring. In advocating the need for companies understand, and communicate with their most valuable custorners, the State to institutionalize branding responsiDepartment should do the same with its bility, David Aaker and ErichJoachimmany public audiences. The developsthaler wrote, ment of an accessibleand usable database The charge is to create a strong, clear, rich is dependent upon srnart rnarketing rules identity and to make sure that the implethat determine what criteria will best mentation g'roups, whether inside or outidentifr good candidates with whom to side the company, understand the identity. build a long-term relationship. When alternatives to mass-media advertis-

Institutionalization of Professional MarketingPractices. President Bush's cornrnitment to a longterm, multifaceted war on terrorisrn suggests that the United States is going to 'activist assume a role as an superpower.' Public diplornacy needs to become a long-term and sustained U.S. priority if the country is going to effectively function in this role. Leadership requires constant communication, not just in times of crisis. To return to marketing

I rr Z ]

GeorgetownJournal

oflnternational

Affairs

ing are driving the brand-building

process

or playing a substantial role, it is particularly important

to have a brand champion

the

authority,

ability,

ensure that the brand

and identity

incentive

with to

is delivered

consistently across multiple rnedia.'s

America must have a "strong, clear, rich and appealing" identity and more effective communication of that identity through professional marketing disciplines. To do this will require increased funding for public diplomacy and an

sKUBAPolitics&Diplomacy

rich havea"strong,glear, America must ,, and appealing ideretity and rnorJeffective

of that i$eltity through

coraununlcatlon

p ro fessional rnarketitg olsclPrlnes. institutional brand champion. Although the State Department rnight seem the obvious choice for its residency, other options exist. The Center for the Study of the Presidency recommendst it in the

Rather than compartmentalize State Department,

the public comrnunica-

tions strategy should seek to overarch the Departments

Health and Human

Commerce,

Treasury,

Services, and the trade

representatives, as well as other representatives of U.S. values and interests.... drawing especially on the creativity of the non-

sector. Perhaps we need to

governmental

give serious thought

to whether

some kind

or some new vehicle should be formed to achievesuch a goal." of public corporation

Wherever the authority wiII ultimately reside, it is paramount that a clear institutional leader be at the helm of this important new rnission in order for the messageto be consistent, credible, and compelling. And whether you call it "branding" or not, this entity must have the full power of rnarketing at its disposal.

NOTES t

Miranda

Opposed

Green, U.S.

"Islamic

Foreign

World

Policy,

FinonciolTimes, 26 February 2oo2. "The U.S.A. 2 Peter Carlson, Woman Charlotte

Strongly

Suroey Shows,"

Iic Diplomog. Heoings beforethe Commitieeon Intemotional ReloAccount,

Beers's New Campaign,

Getting the

TheWashinglonPosf, to BuyAmerica," 3t December 2oor, Cr. 3 Dick O'Brien, interoiew by author, Washington, DC, gJanuary 2oo2.

World

{ Peter van Ham, "The Rise of the Brand State," ForeignAffans, September/October 2oor. The 5 Phiiip Kotler, Kotleron Marketing(NewYork,

Brand Awareness Solutions Study," May 2oor. See <http,//w.itsma.com>. Bronding in Asia (New York, John 9 Paul Temporal, Wiley & Sons (Asia). zooo). lo Center for the Study of the Presidency, "ComE-business

" PonelReportfor the President

rr U.S. House. 2oor.

Conmittee

The Messoge [s Ameica:

on InternationRethinking U-5. Public

Diplomag . Hearingsbeforethe Commitieeon International Relations roTth Cong., the Honorable

2d sess. 14 November HenryJ. Hyde.

2oor. Committee on InternaThe RoleofPublic Diplomag in Supportofthe

House.

Relations.

Anti-Terrorism Compoign: Hearingsbeforethe Committeeon Inter notional RelotionsroTth Cong., 2d sess. ro October Charlotte Beers. See Statement by 2oor. <http, //w.house. gov,/international-relations/fcroo .htm>. g Press Center, at Foreign 2oor. See <http,//w.state.gov>. rg Garth Hallberg, AII Consumersare Not Creoted Equal (NewYork, John Wiley & Sons, 1995). Press briefing

t6 U.S. House. 2oor. Committee on Internatio naL Relation s. The Mesoge is America: RethinkingU. S. PubIic Diplomag.

2oor.

Renarks

Heoings before the Commitlee on International Relo-

t i o n sr o T t h C o n g . , Z d s e s s .r { , N o v e m b e r 2 o o r . mony of Moufac Farb. r/ See note tr. Testimony rB U.S. tional

o n d C o n g r e ' sS, e p t e m b e r 2 o o l . al Relations.

13 U.S. tional

Testi-

2oor.

November

Age, Leoding Notional AduertsersReport / Advertising 200r. "CXO Perspective, Professional SerB ITSMA,

preh ensive Strategic Reform,

Zd sess. t.{ November mony of Robert L. Wehling

tions roTth Cong.,

Free Press, 1999). 6 See <http'//w.ogihy.com>.

vices and

House. 2oor. Committee on InternaRelatio n s. The M e sageb Americo' RethinkingU. S. Pub-

lZ U.S. tional

House.

of Robert L. Wehling. on

Committee

2oor.

tsti-

Interna-

Relation s. The M esogeis Americo' RethinkingU. S. Pub-

Iic Diplomag. Hearlngsbeforethe Committeeon Internationol ReloCong., 2d sess. t.{. November of Marc B. Nathanson.

fions roTth timony

rg See note rr. Testimony 2o

Garth

Hallberg,

2ool.

. Tes-

of Robert L. Wehling.

telephone

interview

with

Summer/Fallzooz Irr3J

BRANDING AMERICA'

author, II January 2OO2. 2I U.S. House. 2oor. tional

Committee

Interna-

Relatio n s. The M esogeisAmerica' RethinkingU. S. Pub-

Iic Diplomog. Hearingsbeforethe Committeeon Intemational Rela2d sess. r{- November W. Leslie, Jr.

tions roTth Cong., mony ofJohn 22

2oor.

Testi-

at Foreign Press Center, See <http://w.state-gov>.

Press briefing

November 2oor.

Subcommittee on Interna2! U.S House 2oorand Human Rights, Committee on

tional Operations International

Relations.

sion,Budget,and Futurero/th

I I r4 ]

Internotional Broadcosting'Its MisCong.,

Georgetown Journal

rst sess. 28 February

of International

Affairs

2oor. Testimony of Marc B. Nathanson. 2{ Theodore Levitt, "Marketing Intangible ProdReuiew, ucts and Product Intangibles," HoruordBus[ness May-Juner98r. 2g See note II. Remarls of the Honorable Henry J. Hyde. 26 Erich Joachimsthaler and David A. Aaker, "Building Brands Without Mass Media," HoruordBusrReuiew, May-June I98r. ness 2/ Center for the Study of the Presidency, "Comrtfo r thePresident prehensive Strategic Refo rm " PonelRepo ondCongress, September 2ooL

Politics&Diplomacy

- [L S. Refationsafter -*kislani Perspective 9IIL=A Pal<istani Zarntr Akram The terrorist attacks of September II on the United Stateshave qualitatively transforrned Pakistani-U.S. relations. Pakistan has moved from the margins of U.S. foreign policy to center stageand has become a key player in the war on terrorism. This is a reflection both of Pakistan's pivotal geostrateg"icposition in the region and the Islamic world, and of the key decision made by Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to join the international coalition against terrorism. The evolving partnership between the United States and Pakistanhas the potential to mature into an enduring alliance that can contribute to peace, security, and prosperity in the entire region of SouthAsia. To reach the full potential of their relationship, the two countries will need to ensure a broadbased and sustained engagement in the future. Forty years of cooperation during the Cold War suggestthat such a sustained engagernent is possible; however, there are some challenges in the relationship that will need to be overcome. This article analyzes the diverse factors that will determine the contours of future Pakistani-U.S. relations: Pakistan's domestic dynamics, the Pakistani-U.S. bilateral experience, the war on terrorism, the future of Afg'hanistan and its implications for Central Asia, the triangular Pakistani-Indian-U.S. relationship, and the impact of the regional nuclear equation.

Zamir Akram is Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission at the Pakistan Embassy in Washingon. D.C.

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The conclusion proposes a roadmap for overcoming the challenges and benefiting from the opportunities of a closer Pakistani-U. S. relationship.

to abusesof power and the promotion of religious extremisrn. Despite this, the majority of Pakistanis have remained committed to democracy and to moderation in their faith. Religious forces have D o m e s t i c D y n a m i c s .P r e s i d e nnever t obtained more than 8 percent of Musharraf s decision to support the war t h e e l e c t o r a l v o t e i n a n y e l e c t i o n , on terrorism was not only dictated by including the most recent local bodies immediate national interest, but is also e l e c t i o n so f 2 o o r . 3

President Musharraf ts uir' isto revive the original vilion of a dernocratic and religiously rnoi,erate Pakistan. in keeping with the president's vision for a tolerant, progressive, and dernocratic Pakistan-a vision articulated by Pakistan's founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and shared by an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis. In February tg{,8, Jinnah declared, "Islam and its idealisrn have taught us democracy. It has taught equality, justice and fair play... Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State .... We havernany nonMuslims, but they are all Pakistanis [andl enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizen. "' Earlier, speaking to the Constituent Assembly on August rr, r9+7, he said to the Pakistani people, "You are free; you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has got nothing to do with the business of the State."" IJnfortunately, subsequent Pakistani leaders lost sight of this vision, especially since the rglos, undermining not just democracy in the country, but the true spirit of Islam. Religion became a tool of political manipulation, which gave rise

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President Musharrafs aim is to revive the original vision of a democratic and religiously rnoderate Pakistan. In his address to the nation on October I/, tggg, he said, "Islam teaches tolerance not hatred, universal brotherhood and not enmity, peace and not violence, progress and not bigotry."a Referring to dernocracy in the same speech he argued, "What Pakistan has experienced in the recent years has been rnerely a label of dernocracy not the essence of it. Our people were never emancipated from the yoke of despotism. I shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era ofsham dernocracy,but to a true one."5 Cornpelled to assumepower in October 1999 by the worsening national crisis, President Musharaf has embarked on a path of reforrnation in the country. He is attempting to check corruption, provide good governance, ensure rule of law, and rebuild national institutions. Another central area of focus is ensuring genuine grassroots democracy. Elections to local bodies were completed in August 2oor, and elections for national and provincial assernblies will take place by October 2oo2, along with a transfer of

AKRAMPolitics&Diplomacy power to the elected representatives, as like F-t6 aircrafts, for which Pakistan had already paid. mandated by the Supreme Court. Another critical objective for Pakistan Pakistanis viewed this policy as i s t o p r o m o t e h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , inequitable and discriminatory, as it especially through education. Reformsought to prevent Pakistan frorn developing a nuclear deterrent in response to ing the antiquated madrassa system would India's acquisition of nuclear weapons provide modern education along with religious instruction, thereby ensuring capability in tlJQ. Even worse, U.S. institutions never again nonproliferation policy did little to conthat these are tain the Indian nuclear weapons proused as breeding grounds for militancy and terrorism. This would ensure the grarn. The Indian nuclear tests of rgg8 underscored this failure and forced Pakstrengthening of rnoderate and tolerant istan to follow suit to demonstrate its own forces in the country. However, the president's ability to nuclear capability. realize his vision will depend essentially Bilateral relations also deteriorated as upon the successof efforts to revive the the United States disengaged from Afghanistan and the region, leaving the economy. Pakistan will have to break out its defense war-torn country to sink further into the of the debt trap and lower chaos of civil war, with multiple negative expenditure, the two iterns that account for more than 6o percent of the nationef{'ectson Pakistan. The Pakistani people al budget. To ensure this, Pakistan seeks felt betrayed. However, the history of bilateral economic growth and the reduction of regional tensions. The United Statescan engagement between the two countries over four decadescushioned the impact of play a critical role in both spheres to help Pakistan. these differences. Relations were not damaged irreparably, and cooperation The BilateralExperienGâ&#x201A;Ź. Arter continued in key areas. One such area of gaining its independence in Ig{/, Pak- cooperation was peacekeeping, and troops istan was an ally of the United States in from the two countries fought shoulder to shoulder in Sornalia, and served together the Cold War against the Soviet lJnion. The high point of this relationship was in Haiti and Bosnia, as well as in other the collaboration to support resistance to countries. Cooperation with regard to narcotics control and counterterrorism the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. also continued without disruption. Once this objectivewas achievedin t989, With the election of George W. Bush however, a number of factors caused the as president of the United States, a review two countries to drift apart. The United States started pursuing of U.S. policy toward South Asia and of relations with Pakistan through the sinsanctions policy was initiated in 2ooI, as a result of which efforts were made to gle prism of nuclear nonproliferation, as signified by the imposition of the revive relations with Pakistan. Numerous high-level exchanges took place during Symington and Pressler sanctions in the year, and the decision to waive October rggO.These sanctions not nuclear sanctions against Pakistan (and only denied Pakistan economic and military assistance, but also placed embargos upon military equipment,

India) was taken even before the tragedy of September rr.

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The War on Terrorislll. The"eisu

steadfast in its commitment to root out widely held but erroneous belief in the terrorism and "treat it with an iron United States that after September Ir hand."u Pakistanhas also deployed troops Pakistan had to be coerced to join the war along the Afghan border to apprehend on terrorism. In fact, counterterrorisrn and bring to justice over Ioo al Qaeda cooperation between the two countries members. At the same time, stringent had already been underway for more than measures have been taken to strengthen a decade. Thngible results of this cooperbanking and financial procedures to ation were the apprehension of terrorists freeze terrorist funds and to prevent including Rarnzi Yousuf, Arnil Kansi, their future use. However, while the United States has Siddique Odeh, and some of those responsible for the r99B attacks against the full support of rnany countries in its the U.S. ernbassiesin East Africa. After war against terrorism, if it is to keep tentr, not September President Musharraf sions within the coalition to a minimurn only condernned the terrorist attacks it must be mindful of several potential irnrnediately, but also offered Pakistan's areasof disagreement. "unstinted cooperation in the fight First, the United Statesmust recognize against terrorism."o Thus, when the Bush that ultirnate success against terrorisrn adrninistration asked for Pakistan's help cannot be achieved without addressing its in the war on terrorisrn, its request was root causes.In his Novernber 2OOI statecertain to be granted. rnent to the UN GeneralAssembly, PresI n O p e r a t i o n E n d u r i n g F r e e d o m , ident Musharraf ernphasized that the war Pakistan has shared intelligence with the on terrorism cannot be lirnited only to United States, permitted the use of its air cutting off the branches of this tree, but space, and provided logistical support also needs to deal with its roots.e including the use of three air bases.PresSecond, a clear distinction must be ident Bush emphasized the critical role drawn between terrorisrn and the legitiplayed by Pakistan in his remarks to the rnate struggle of peoples under foreign media on February 13, 2OO2, saying that occupation for their democratic right of "President Musharraf is a leader with great s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . C e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s courage and his nation is a key partner in have used the label of terrorisrn to malign the global coalition against terror."7 legitimate struggles, such as those of the Within Pakistan, President Musharraf Kashmiri and Palestinian peoples for has acted decisively against indigenous self-deterrnination, which are sancand foreign terrorist elernents, cracking tioned by UN resolutions. It is certainly down on seven groups that have been true that acts of terrorism have been involved in terrorist activities. Over cornmitted in Palestine and Kashmir for 2 , o o O a c t i v i s t s f r o m t h e s e g r o u p s , which both cornbatant parties are including their leaders, have been arrest- responsible, but Pakistan,which has itself ed, their offices have been sealed, and been a target of terrorisrn, has consistheir funds have been frozen. There has tently condemned those on both sides in been a backlash from these groups, which Kashrnir who have committed such terincluded the kidnapping and murder of rorist acts, as have the Kashmiri people Wall StreetJournal correspondent Daniel themselves. Branding all Kashmiris as P e a r l , b u t t h e g o v e r n r n e n t r e m a i n s terrorists, when rnany of them are fight-

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AKRAMPolitics&Diplomacy ing for their freedom using legitimate means, is one-sided. Similarly, describing terrorists with the adjective "Islamic" must also be avoided. Terrorism cannot be linked exclusively to any one religion, and it is not sanctioned by any faith. The tendency to label terrorists according to their Islamic background is counterproductive, as it breeds hatred and suspicion between different religious groups within societies and reinforces the impulses that have led to terrorism in the first place.

Afghanistan Asia. andCentral The United States needs to signal its commitment to sustained engagernent in Afghanistan. With a hostile India to the east, Pakistan has consistently sought a stable and friendly Afghanistan to the west to avoid having enemies on two fronts. Pakistan's Afghan policy has also been guided by the need to ensure the safe repatriation of 3 million Afghan refugees and end the inflow of terrorists, arms, and drugs into Pakistan. With this

TgrrOriSm Cann0t behnkedexclusively to ?ny ong re-ligion, and it is not sanctioned' by'any faith. Third, criticism of terrorism should not be restricted to individuals, groups, or non-state actors, but ought also to include governments that use terror as an instrurnent of policy. Terrorisrn must be condernned in all its forms and manifestations. As President Bush rightly pointed out, the use ofterrorist tacticsby governments as an instrument of policy is just as worthy of condemnation as is its use by non-state actors.'o Finally, the United States should not perceive diverse international issues through the single prisrn of terrorism. Such an approach would be self-defeating, and would undermine the international coalition against terrorism. The war against terrorisrn is currently the overriding concern of U.S. foreign policy, guiding its relations with the global cornmunity. However, there are issueson the international agenda, such as the continuing conflict in the Middle East and in Kashmir, that need to be addressedon their own merits, keeping in view their root causes.

achieved, steps could be taken towards opening trade linkages with Central Asia through Afghanistan. U.S. policy in the wake of September rr has provided Pakistan with an opportunity to bring peace and stability to its western border. Accordingly, Islamabad has supported the UN-brokered Bonn Process that is consistent with its own desire to ensure the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, end the internecine Afghan conflict, prornote a broad-based rnultiethnic Afghan g'overnment, and see Afghanistan establish friendly relations with Pakistan and other neighboring states. However, the interim Afghan government of Hamid Karzai faces daunting challenges from competitors within his own governrnent, rival warlords, and continuing ethnic and tribal divisions. To help ensure successfulimplementation of the Bonn Accord, the international cornmunity needs not only to provide funding for the functioning of theAfghan government and for Afghanistan's reconstruc-

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tion and rehabilitation, but also to ensure the security and effectivenessof this fledgling administration. In particular, the woefully inadequate size of the International Security Assistance Force, which currently consistsof approximately {,5OO troops, needs to be increased immediately, and the force must be deployed in all the problem areasofAfghanistan, not just around Kabul. Measures for ensuring s e c u r i t ya r o u n d t h e c o u n t r y c a n n o t w a i t for the creation of an Afghan army and police force. The United States has its own obligations. It must not withdraw from the country once its countelterrorism objectives have been accornplished. If it does, the gains in Afghanistan will quickly unravel. Even worse, Afghanistan would lapse back into chaos, underrnining regional security and enabling terrorism to rear its head once again. However, if t h e U n i t e d S t a t e sm a i n t a i n s i t s s u p p o r t for Afghan reconstruction, Pakistan and Afghanistan could become a bridge between Central Asia and South Asia and serve as a corridor for oil and gas pipelines frorn the energy-rich areas of Central Asia to the energy-deficient countries of South Asia and beyond. Since they control the shortest route to the sea for landlocked Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan can also greatly enhance trade linkages with this region. Such linkages could offer the United States multiple benefits, particularly in the opening up of alternative energ'I sources to the international cornmunity.

TheSouthAsianTriangle. c".,tinuing tensions between Pakistan and India, both nuclear powers, make South Asia the most dangerous place in the world and the most likely theater for a nuclear conflict. The ongoing military

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standoff between them is the latest manifestation of these tensions, and the dispute over Kashmir lies at the heart of the problem. So far, all bilateral efforts have failed to resolve the Kashrnir issue. The United Stateshas a direct interest in a durable settlement of the Kashrnir issue that would pave the way for peace and security in South Asia. Such a settlement would lessen the danger of a South Asian nuclear conflict with global rarnifications and open up the vast regional market for trade and investment. Moreover, the United Statesshould not ignore the Kashrniris' dernocratic right of selfdeterrnination or the rnassiveviolations of their human rights. As a result of its irnproving relations with both Pakistan and India, the United States, as the preerninent world power, is uniquely positioned to facilitate a resolution of the differences between Pakistan and India. While India is uneasy about stronger Pakistani-U.S. relations, Islamabad accepts Washington's position that its relationship with the two countries "is not a zero-sum garne."" Pakistan's only stipulation is that Indo-U.S. relations should not be advanced at Pakistan's expense. Indeed, Pakistan would welcome a rnore assertiverole by the United States in helping to build peace in the region. Such a U.S. role would have farreaching positive consequences for both bilateral relations with Pakistan and for American interests in South Asia.

The NuclearEquation.TheBush administration's waiving of nuclear sanct i o n s a g a i n s tP a k i s t a n( a n d I n d i a ) i n S e p tember 2oor has addressed Islamabad's concerns about discriminatory nonproliferation policies, especially the Pakistan-specific Pressler Amendrnent. The lifting of nuclear sanctions, the de facto

AKRAMPolitics&Diplomacy remain engaged in their dialogue on acceptance of Pakistan's (and India's) nuclear and security issues that can nuclear capability, and the abandonment prism as the strengthen stability in the region. of the nonproliferation means of determining bilateral relations will all continue to have a positive impact The September rr tragedy has acted as a on future ties. Moreover, having achieved a credible catalyst to revitalize Pakistani-U.S. relanuclear deterrent capability, Pakistan tions. Thus far, their counterterrorism concurs with the U.S. approach advocat- cooperation has achieved major successing nuclear restraint. It has unilaterally es. The critical decision made by Presicommitted not to conduct a nuclear test dent Musharraf to join the internationunless India does so and has proposed a al coalition against terrorism and the strategic restraint regime in South Asia, pursuit of his vision for Pakistan have added to Pakistan's significance as a pivenvisaging non-weaponization and nonotal country, both at the crossroads of deployment of nuclear weapons. However, nuclear restraint in South South and Central Asia and within the Asia is likely to be severely tested by the Muslim world. A convergence of interIndian implementation of their draft ests has emerged between Islamabad and which calls for Washington. Both aim to promote modnuclear doctrine, eration and tolerance among religious increases in fissile material stockpiles for nuclear warheads, the development of a and ethnic groups; defeat terrorism; and stability in ensure peace triad of delivery capabilities including submarine-launched ballistic rnissiles, Afghanistan; provide accessto the enerand the attainment of a missile defense gy resources of Central Asia; prornote c a p a b i l i t y . ' " I n d i a n p u r s u i t o f t h e s e the resolution of differences between objectives could spark off a strategic Pakistan and India, especially a settlearms race in the region, involving Pak- r n e n t o f t h e K a s h m i r d i s p u t e ; a n d encourage nuclear and missile restraint istan and perhapsChina. The Bush administration's own missile in South Asia. This present convergence of interests defense plans are also considered to have the potential to act as a possible catalyst between Pakistan and the United States for a regional arrns race. China may was underscored in President Musharrespond by increasing its missiles and raf s meeting with President Bush during warheads, which would prompt a reac- his visit to Washington from February r2-r4,2oo2, a follow-up on their meettion from India and Pakistan. ing in NewYork on November rO, 2OOr. Pakistan has developed an indigenous missile technology, partly in response to The two countries have now drawn up a road rnap for future relations, outlined Indian missile developments, and partly in the Joint Statement of November to, because the degradation of Pakistani air power, owing to earlier IJ.S. sanctions, 2oor and the Fact Sheet ofJanuary r!, has compelled its reliance on missiles. 2oo2.'3 Thken together, these documents form the structure for, and indicate the Nonetheless, Pakistan is willing to enter direction of, future engagement between into a regional arrang'ement that would the two countries. Apart from U.S. assisavoid a missile race with India. Meanwhile. Pakistan and the United States tance for Pakistan's economic recovery,

TheWayForward. Conclusion:

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The United StateSrnustlookbeyond. itswar on terrorisrn to its larger long-terrn'interests in the entire region of Sduth an? Central Asia. debt relief, and market access,Washington has pledged to support President Musharrafs plans for education reforms and democracy building. The two countries have also agreed to institutionalize their relations in various spheres by setting up a Joint Econornic Forum, a Defense Consultative Group, and aJoint Working Group on Law Enforcernent to cover counterterrorism and counternarcotics cooperation. Furthermore, they have identified science and technology collaboration and space cooperation as new areas of engagement. On regional and global issues, the two states agree that peace and stability in Afghanistan can be achieved through the formation of a broad-based, multiethnic, representative governrnent established through consensusarnong Afghans and under the auspices of the United Nations. They have called for dialogue between Pakistan and India to resolve the Kashmir issue in mutually acceptable ways, taking into account the wishes of the people of Kashmir. As a consequence of their shared concern over the global threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of rnass destruction, they have agreed on enhanced nonproliferation measures at the global and regional levels. The evolution of bilateral relations along these lines marks a significant shift from the one-dimensional approach that had characterized Pakistani-U.S. relations in the past. The two sides have expressedtheir deterrnination to pursue relations that are not a function of a

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third issue or country, but important in and of themselves. However, intentions and commitments have to be translated into actions. For its part, Pakistan will need to stay the course and adhere to President Musharrafs vision for the political, economic, and social reforrnation of the country, especially by containing religious extremists opposed to moderation and modernization. Externally, the president rnust continue to pursue peace, stability, and progress, especially with neighbors Afghanistan and India, but he needs responsive interlocutors. For the United States, the most essential requirement is that it rernains engaged and maintains its partnership with Pakistan, helping Pakistan in its reform agenda and assistingin building bridgesin the region. The experience of the Iggos raises doubts in the rninds of many Pakistanis as to whether or not the United States will remain engagedwith Pakistan after its war on terrorism is over, or if it will instead repeat the mistakes of the past and walk away frorn the region. A related concern is whether the United States will sustain its policy of helping the government of President Musharraf, especially with his policies for economic reform and revival, on which the very successof his vision for Pakistan depends. The successof Pakistani-U.S. cooperation, and especially the extent of the U.S. role, will also determine the prospects for peace and security in South Asia, which in turn would provide Pakistan and the rest of the countries in the

A K R A MP o l i t i c s &D i p l o m a c y region the political space for development and progress. Specifically, the United States must commit itself to the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan so as to enable reconstruction and rehabilitation. With regard to Pakistani-Indian relations, the prospects for peacewill depend as much on the responsibility and restraint demonstrated by Pakistan and India as on any commitment by the United States to help the two neighbors

resolve their differences, in particular over Kashmir. Watching from the sidelines will not help; the United States must assume a pro-active role. The United States must look beyond its war on terrorisrn to its larger long-term interests in the entire region of South and Central Asia.

Autlor's

Note:

those ofthe

The views expressed in this article are

author

and do not reflect the official pol-

icy or position of the Pakistani government.

NO T E S t Quoid-l-Aaom Muhammad Ali linnoh, Speeches and State(Karachi; mentsos Gouernor Ceneral of Pokutan t!J/-J8 Elite Publishers (P"t.) Lld., r98q), p.I57

9 United Nations CeneralAssembly. 2oor- g6th sess. Speech by President Musharraf, Io November 2ooL Io State of the Union Address. 2oo2. President

e op.cit., p.{6 3 Wilder, Andrew R., Elections ond Politicol Chonge in Pakistan'An Anolysisof Deteminonts of Voling Behouiour in the

G.W. Bush, 2gJanuary 2oo2.

P u n j o b ,t g T o - t 9 9 3 ,

Ph. D. Thesis, Fletcher School of

Law and Diplomacy,

Tufts University,

{. Speech by the ChiefExecutive eral Pervez Musharraf, I7 October Ministry

1996.

ofPakistan, Genlggg. (lslamabad.

and Media Development, of Pakistan), p.7 See <http,//w.fas.org/ news/pakistan-/r999/99t o r 7 - mushraf-speech. htm> 5 Ibid., p.3 or see <http,//w.fas.org/news/pakof

Information

Covernment

rI U.S. House. 2OOI. Committee on InternationU.S. Polig Touord South,4sia Afer the Tenoist

al Relations.

AttacksofSeptember tt' Heoringsbefore the Commitlee on Intemo^ tional RelotionstoTth

Cong., 2d-sss. 2g September by Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca- See < http'//w.house.gor/interg2 $. htm> national-relations/roccO 2ool.

Testimony

12 Draft

Report

National

Security

Advisory

Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August 1999. See <w.indianembassy.org,/policy/CTBT/nuclear-

istan/I999/99Iot/-mushraLspeech.htm>

doctrine aug-I7-I999.html>

6 President Musharraf. I2 September 2ooI. Statement on the terrorist attacl$ in New York and Wash-

dent

ington.

l3 Joint Statement on the visit of Pakistani PresiPervez Musharraf to New York, ro November <w.whitehouse.gov/news/releasSee 2ooI.

/ Remarls by President Bush, t3 February 2oo2. See lw.WhiteHouse. gov/ne*s/ release/ 2 o o 2/ o 2 /

White

2oo2o2I3-3html

Bush

8 Cutkin,

Steven "Pakistan vows hunt for killers of

Pearl", Wosfr in3tonTimes,2! February 2oo2.

es/2oot/tt/zootIIIo-7.htm>

2oo2.

House

after

in Musharaf See <m.white

and

es/zooz/oz/zoo2oz

Fact Sheet issued by the

the meeting

between

Washington,

Presidents

February

house.gov/news,/releas13- Io.html. >

Summer/Fall 2oo2

[123]

Sclence&Technolo GlobalDiffusionof l(nowledge Jean M. Johnson Students from developing countries who enter industrialized countries for doctoral education in science and engineering (S&E) and subsequently return home contribute significantly to the diffusion of scientific knowledge, a process that directly enhances world development. The increasing flows of such graduate students to wealthy nations and the high proportion that rernain abroad for employment have been well documented.' Far less quantified, however, is "reverse brain drain," referring to those who study and perhaps work abroad for a tirne, but ultimately return to their home countries. One issue with the reverse flow of foreign students after advanced S&E training in U.S. research universities is whether the United States is "giving awaythe store, " allowing the transfer abroad of its technology and manufacturing base. Some feel that "the American taxpaye. (both state and federal) is supporting extrernely expensive research universities whose main educational purpose is to train students from abroad" and that "we are putting our money and our best talent into training our economic competitors."" This would be a troubling scenario if it were true that our so-called competitors were "walking away with the store," reducing lJ.S. economic opportunity. However, this does not appear to be the case. In fact, countries that have attracted their students to return from

J e a n M . J o h n s o ni . a senior analyst at the National dation's

Science FounDivision

of Sci-

ence Resources Studies. O"er

the past twelve

years, she has conducted research and analyses on global

human

resources

for science and on inter' national

mobilrty

of sci-

entists and engineers.

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THEREVERSE B R A I ND R A I NA T ' I D T H E G L O B A L D I F F U S I O NO F K N O W L E D G E

the United States have often opened up economic opportunities for the United States through science and technology (S&T) partnerships. Furthermore, this reverse flow also benefits the United Statesdiplomatically by allowing America to demonstrate its leadership in enabling developing countries to advance their national scientific capabilities.

growth in China to a per-capita income level of $4,ooo would, following the examples of Thiwan and South Korea, create a heavy reverse flow to China.T Research presented here builds on the above work and begins to quantifr the reverse flow of scientists and engineers frorn the United Statesto Korea and Thiwan. Data indicate that return flows to

Countriesthat haveattracted their students to return frorn the United Stateshave qften ope+qd up econornic opportunities for the Uniled Statis. However, in order for students to return horne and contribute to national development, their horne countries rnust establish some necessary conditions for ernployrnent in S&E occupations in order to attract thern. Proactive prograrns and policies are often the rnost important appeal for expatriate scientists and engineers to return home and to apply their advanced training and research experience. Over the past three decades, research on return flow has considered an array of rnotivating factors. Robert Myers shows that social class and the financing method of an individual's graduate education influences the return flow of students.3a Paul Pederson's research on the decisions of Thiwanese students to return highlights the rnultiple factors of family, culture, free press, and dernocracy that attract expatriates.5 Hahzoong Song's research on reverse flows to South Korea emphasizes that educational and S&T policies aimed at attracting expatriates became effective when the economy started to develop.6 Finally, Y. Guo postulates that economic

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these countries are positively correlated with educational and S&T policies that helped set the conditions or expanded S&T careers. Additionally, contributions to S&T infrastructure and economic developrnent in both countries were linked to the return of expatriate scientists and engineers. After exploring these issues,this paper discussesthe irnpact of encouraging students to return to their own countries and the implications for U.S. scientific leadership and diplornacy. Finally, it suggests a revitalized science dimension of U.S. foreign policy that would facilitate reverse flows of scientists and engineers.

BaCkgrOul|d. the flowofforeignstudents into graduate science and engineering departments in the United States and other industrialized countries (United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Germany) is increasing. Factors that have fostered this flow include an increasing focus on academic research and declining college-age populations in all industrialized countries.8 Furtherrnore. the

JoHNsoNsCience&Technology recruitment of foreign S&E graduate students is considered to be of increasing importance if the United States is to maintain its academic research and development (R&D) efforts and its position asan innovation leader.eTherefore, foreign students have become, and will continue to represent, a significant proportion of doctoral-degree recipients in the United States and other industrialized countries. While the majority of foreign doctoral recipients in the United States and France plan to stay abroad for S&E careers, the decision whether to stay abroad or return home differs significantly by an individual's country of origin. For instance, a far higher proportion of students from China and India plan to remain in the United Statescompared to those from South Korea and Taiwan.'o This is because South Korea and Thiwan were successful at implementing educational and S&T policies that contributed to their national scientific capabilities. These programs and policies set the conditions for a relatively large return flow.

Southl(orea. Educational Policies.In the rg8os, South Korean universities dramatically expanded science and engineering departments to create a more highly skilled labor force. The resulting demand for more teachers opened attractive faculty positions in South Korean universities that expatriates returned to fill. At the same time, South Korea began to provide better laboratories and facilities for graduate study, in the hopes ofexpanding doctoral education and establishing a national capacity for design and innovation. Together, these policies resulted in a dramatic

increase in S&E degreesearned at South Korean universities. Between tgJ$ and 1998, the number of S&E bachelor's degrees grew seven-fold, from r2,8oo to 9I,3OO, those at the master's level rose from 9OO to I5,2oO, and doctoral d e g r e e si n c r e a s e df r o m 1 2 B t o 2 , 2 6 0 . " Another dimension of South Korea's educational poliry was the promotion of study abroad programs, intended to help students acquire cutting edge science training and research experience. The removal of once-tight overseas study restrictions and government-financed scholarship programs increased the number of South Koreans studying abroad. From rgBB to 2ooo, approximately r2,ooo Koreans earned Ph.D.s from IJ.S. universitiesin S&E fields,'" and during roughly the same period the number of Koreans entering U.S. graduate programs for science and engineering reached approximately g,Ooo per year.'3 Science & TechnologPolicies.In addition to S&E careers in academia, changes in South Korean S&T policies created new research careers in both government and industrial laboratories. In the r96os, the South Korean government established the Ministry of Science and Technology and supported the development of both the Korean Institute of Science and Technology and the Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.'+'s The military government provided continuity in funding public R&D, and created tax incentives to encourage industrial R&D. In the r97os, major corporations such as Samsung, Hy'undai, and Daewoo began investing in R&D facilities. Today, there are over 2oo such corporate researchcenters. To staff these new institutions, the South Korean government actively

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recruited overseasKorean S&E scholars. The government subsidized the moving expensesof returning scientists and engineers, and provided financial support for networking with overseas Korean professionals. The support allowed for the maintenance and updating of databaseson Korean scientists and engineers abroad, listing their sector of employment, their research focus, and teaching experience. Korea used these databasesto recruit for temporary and permanent positions by matching overseasexpertise with national needs. The Impact of SouthKorean Return FIow. The above educational and S&T policies implemented by the governrnent were necessary, but insufficient for large reverse flows of expatriate professionals. T*o other important factors were econornic growth and political stability. South Korea's econorny grew (in constant rgg6 U.S. dollars) from $9r billion in r9lg to $597 billion in 1999, representing an annual growth rate of 8 percent.'6 By the early rgBos, an irnportant threshold was crossed when South Korean income reached a per capita level of $4,ooo. After this point, recruiting policies began to truly succeed, as large nurnbers of expatriate scientists and engineers returned home to fill highskills positions created by the growing, technologically oriented economy. In the period frorn rgBB to 2ooo, 37 percent of those earning doctor"ttry al degrees reported that they planned to stay in the United States following their studies.'7In fact, Finn's research indicates that the actual stay rate of Korean doctoral recipients in the United States could be even lower. Of the nearly 2, ooo S&E field Ph.D. recipients frorn U.S. universities between rgg{ and Igg$, only

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2! percent were still employed in the United States in rgg6. This figure fell to only rg percent by t999, resulting in an B$ percent reverse brain drain of South Korean doctoral degree recipients.'8 The contributions of repatriates were particularly crucial for the developrnent of the South Korean semiconductor industry, established in the early r98os. Sarnsung was an initial entrant into the industry, and it was successfulby drawing skilled Korean workers from major U.S. firms like Texas and multinational Instrurnents. IBM. and Fairchild. Within a few years, the South Korean semiconductor industry was stable, and by r99o, it surpassed that ofJapan. South Korea is now the leading country in the serniconductor industry. Analysts estimate that the return flow of Korean scientists and engineers with R&D experience in serniconductors saved South Korea about ten years of catching up to U.S. cornpanies.'s

Taiwan. EducationalPolicres. Due to the expansion of higher education and investrnents in R&D, a similar model of return flow occurred in Thiwan. In the last three decades, educational policies in Thiwan greatly accelerated higher education in science and engineering. At the bachelor's level, the nurnber of earned degrees in S&E fields increased from rr,3oo in 1975 to 35,ooo in 1999. Graduate programs grew even faster, with the nurnber of earned master's degrees in S&E fields increasing tenfold, frorn g2o in r975 to 9,5or in Iggg, and the nurnber of doctoral degrees received at Taiwanese universities growing from 2r in r9/$ to 892 in rgg9.'?" Thiwan also sent students abroad for graduate training in science and engineering. In fact, historically, a majority

JoHNSoNsCienCe &Technology of Taiwanese doctoral recipients earned engineers, entrepreneurs, and executives their degrees overseas. However, due to and their counterparts in Thiwan. The the build-up of Thiwanese graduate progovernment built networls between these grams over the past three decades, fewer two communities, and when unable to graduate students ventured abroad durconvince expatriates to return permaing the rggos. By tggg, Bg2 students nently, encouraged temporary returns earned doctoral degrees in S&E fields at and transnational employment. CurTaiwanese universities while only /fZ rently, tiwanese managers, engineers, Taiwanese earned such degrees at U.S. angel investors, and venture capitalists universities. "' travel between Silicon Valley and HSIP, Between rgBB and Zooo, o v e r linking industries in the two regions. r3,ooo Taiwanese earned Ph.D.s from Seventy HSIP companies now have U.S. universities in S&E fields, and offices in Silicon Valley, and these conalmost half (48 percent) planned to stay tacts allow Thiwan, as a distant producer, in the United States. Their actual stay to upgrade its technological capabilities."5 rate was somewhat lower. Of the nearly ?,3oO TaiwanesePh.D. recipients frorn The Impact of TaiwaneseReturn FIow. Like U.S. universities in S&E fields from South Koreans, tiwanese scientists and 1994 to 1995, 45 percent were working engineers returned initially for faculty in the United States in 1996. And by positions in an expanded higher educaI 9 9 9 , o n l y 4 2 p e r c e n t w e r e s t i l l tion system that was aimed at creating employed in the United States."' national science and engineering graduate programs. In addition to the Science& Technolog Policies.Thiwan was improved educational sector, and at a proactive in developing an S&T lnfralater point in time, the pull of private structure that would encourage return industry recruitment was equally flow of its scientists and engineers. Thiimportant. In 1983, HSIP hired twenwanese scientists and engineers were well ty-seven Taiwanese from abroad; but by represented in Silicon Valley,'3 and by the year 2OOO, the cumulative growth of networking with these individuals, Taisuch hires reached over {-,ooo. The wan was able to emulate the Silicon Valmain industries employing these R&D ley model with the establishrnent of the professionals inclule iniegrated. cirGsinchu Science-based Industrial Park c u i t s , c o m p u t e r s , o p t o - e l e c t r o n i c s , (HSIP). The HSIP is a concentrated area precision machinery, telecommunicaof high-technology-oriented compations, and biotechnology."6 nies, representing a number of different The return rnigration of Thiwanese industries, and situated near top universcientists and engineers educated sities and research institutes. Thus, abroad was especially important in ThiHSIP provides highly skilled returnees wan's high-technology-fueled economwith private sector, commercial career ic growth of the late rg8os. By the end opportunities. "a of the rg8os, the science-based indusThe Thiwanesegovernment undertook trial park, HSIP, had 12r high technolother networking initiatives, such as its ogy companies, many of which were set support of meetings and conferences up by returnees. By the year 2OOO, the between U. S. -based Taiwanese scientists. number of companies had grown to

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289, and 39 percent of them were started by U.S. educated engineers, many of whom were frorn Silicon Valley."7 Overall, the Thiwanese economy grew, in constant 1996 U.S. dollars, from $52 billion in 1975 to $324 billion"8 in 2ooo, representing an average annual growth rate of B percent.'E Over roughly the same investrnent in period (I978-zooo), R&D increased 13 percent, from $67r rnillion to $9.3 billion."e Finally, U.S. receipts of royalties and license fees generated from Thiwan s exchange and use of

United Statesshould irnprove the flow of S&T information to other world regions, and consider greater international scientific cooperation with emerging regions. IJ.S. science agencies are taking sorne steps in this direction. The Director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) has encouraged the U.S. science community to become even further engaged in the world by elevating international science within the NSF and expanding mechanisms for cooperative research. The Department of State has begun to

South l(orea and Thiwan weresuccessful because they were able to create career .( opportunities for e)rpatriate scientists and

englneers. U.S. industrial processesrose frorn $2r rnillion in rg87 to $r4B rnillion in rgg/.3' This economic growth, R&D investrnent, and trade with the United States all positively track one another.

Conclusiolls. The reverseflow of South Korean and Thiwanese scientists and engineers contributed to the diffusion of scientific knowledge and to the development of their respectiveemerging econornies. South Korea and Thiwan were successfulbecause they were able to create career opportunities for expatriate scientists and engineers. Might other countries use this model of reverse flow? In general, yes, but it is principally applicable to those countries investing heavily in both higher education and S&T infrastructure. In order to aid this process of reverse flow, and thereby enhance the prospects of trade with developing countries, the

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revitalize the science component of U.S. diplomacy by sending "Embassy Fellows" frorn various U.S. science agencies to conduct I-to-2-rnonth assessrnentsof research opportunities within specific disciplines. In addition, the National Science Board (NSB) prepared a report titled Towarda More EffectiueRolefor the U.S. Gouernment in InternationalScience andEngneering. Some of its major recommendations are developing an overall strategy for coordinating the international actil'rties ofvarious federal agencies,and increasing collaboration with developing countries. Finally, the U.S. government has announced substantial increases in foreign assistance,including aid for science development programs. If implemented, these policies would facilitate reverse flow and contribute to both the scientific development of ernerging economies and the scientific leadership of the United States.The U.S. sci-

JoHNsoNscience &Technology ence community should become engaged throughout the world, mentoring former doctoral students in the establishment of laboratories, collaborative research, and faculty exchanges. The ro,ooo foreign doctoral recipients from U.S. universities

each year are the United States'snatural science partners. Facilitating their reverse flow would benefit U.S. scientific leadership, increase trade opportunities with developing countries, and add to the advancement of science worldwide.

NOTES I National Science Board. Scienceand EngineeringIndicotors2oo2. (Arling'ton, VA., National Science Foundation,2oo2). 2 D. Goodstein, "Scientific Ph.D. Problems," fie AmericanScholor6z (Spring r gg3), zr5-Zzo. 3 I f s o c i a l c l a s sg i v e s t h e s t u d e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n the home country, he/she will return after overseas study. Also, ifthe

government paid for the education abroad, the student generally returns (Myers r9/Z)see note 4. 4 Robert G. Myers, Educqtionand Immigrotion. (David McKay, Inc., rg/2). g Pedersen, Paul B. "The Reentry ofScientists and Engineers to Taiwan, R.O.C. after Study Abroad." Department of Human Studies, lJniversity of Alabama, Birmingham,

August r!96. 6 Song, Hahzoong. "From Brain Drain to Reverse Brain Drain: Three Decades of Korean Exoerience." Scrence, Technolog& Sociej, 2,

no. 2, (uly-becember

Doors 2ooo: Reporton Internotionol Educotioncl frchonge. New York, and special tabulations. 2ooo. I4 Students who entered this Institute could fulfill their military seruice with two summer 16 The

GDP

conversion

t8 M. Finn,

Stg Rotesof Foreign Doctorote Recipientsfom

U.S. Unioersitres t!!!.

Oak Ridge Institute and Education, Oak Ridge, 2oor. r9 See note 6-

Science

2I Ibid and see note I. 22 See note 18. 23 One-third

of rhe total employees in Silicon

Valley are foreign-born;

two-thirds

wanese.

ing, Washington, DC, 13 March 2oor. 8 See note r. 9 M.E. Porter and S. Stern, "The New Challenge to American Prosperity' Findings from the Innova-

ment,"

tr Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea. SfotlsticalYeorbook ofEducstion.Annual series. Seoul. 12 See note I. r3 Insrituteoflnternational Education (llE). Open

for

20 Ministry of Education, Republic of China. EducotionalStaiisticso/tfre Republicof China. Annual series. Thipei.

/ Y. Guo. "Overseas StudyWill Inevitably Lead to Integrating Chinese Scientists and Engineers into the International Community of Science." CIES Meet-

IO See note I.

exchange

I/ See note r.

born are Asian, and ofthe

on Competi-

uses official

rate.

1997).

tion Index." Washing'ton, DC, Council tiveness, I999.

resewe sessions.

Ig See note 6.

ofthese foreign,

Asian, 5r percent are Thi-

2{ Lwo, Yu-Ling and Wei-Jen Wang. "High-Skill Migration and Chinese Thipei's Industrial Developlnternolionol Mobil$ of the H$h!

Proceedings. June II-I2, 25 lbid.

Skilled. OECD

Paris, 2OOI.

26 lbid. 27 lbid. 28 The rate.

GDP

conversion

uses official

exchange

29 Thr R&D conversion uses purchasing power parities (PPPs), the preferred exchange rate for comparing international R&D. 30 See note I.

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[r 3 r ]

Science &Technology

The Digital Econolny

EDrenture An Interuieuuith EstherDyson

The impact of the "digital economy" is broad; it reaches all hurnan activities and all sectors of the economy. As consurners, business owners, employees, government officials, educators, and students, we have all been transformed by it whether we directly use the underlying technologies or not. Though the digital economy encompasses much more than the technology sector and Internet dotcoms, these two highprofile components of the overall economy and the astronomical growth that they experienced during the rggOs came to embody our future expectations. These expectations were tempered somewhat with the bursting of the technology bubble in late 2OOO, an event interpreted by most as an inevitable transition point that every new and revolutionary technology must experience. The initial period of rapid yet unsustainable growth has come to an end, replaced by the rnore modest expectations of a mature technology. Opportunities in the digital econorny have not disappeared altogether. Though certainly harder to come by, they continue to exist for high-technology entrepreneurs, corporations and their investors, and users. Esther Dyson, a leading information and communications technology investor, commentator, and policymaker, views emerging companies and emerging markets as golden

Esther Dyson chairs E D v e n t u r eH o l d i n g s , Inc., a global information

seryices company

that publishes a nonthly

Releoset.o,

technology

rePort.

and sponsors

two

annual

conferences.

She

recently

finished

a two-

year term

as founding

chairman

of ICANN,

the Internet tion

Corpora-

for Assigned

Names

and Numbers.

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opportunities. She manages an active investment portfolio of over fifty Internet- and information technology (IT)related startups, not just in the United Statesand-Western Europe, but in Eastern Europe and Russia as well. The future success of these companies will depend on numerous factors, but one fundarnental factor that has been taken for granted by the vast rnajority of Internet users is the proper functioning of the Internet itself. Ms. Dyson has been one of the few people not to take this for granted. As the founding chairman of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, or ICANN, Ms. Dyson has worked to ensure that everyone with vested interests in the global Internet community's successhas a say in the technical standards and managernent that will ensure its continued functioning.' In a recent interwiew with G/A, Ms. Dyson spoke candidly about the attitudes that drive technological innovation, the challenges of doing business in Central and Eastern Europe, and the problems with global consensus, connecting all these issues with the main focus of our conversation: the "digital economy. " GJ I A: In your words, what constitutes the "digital economy"? Dys0N: The digital econorny is ideally part of every company in every sector of the market. In the Iggos, the so-called "digital economy" was underpinning the total econorny not because IBM and Microsoft were doing well, but because the economy as a whole-their customers-was doing well due to increased productivity and competitiveness. Furtherrnore, the digital economy is more than just a company putting a

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computer in an office; it is the attitudes that go with it. Attitudes such as a willingness to try new things and listen to the ideas of younger people, an acceptance of innovation and changing business models, and a responsiveness to customers are all part of it. All of these things come along with the digital economy, and it is these attitudes, rather than just the technology, that really make a difference. As an exarnple,'Western Europe had accessto the sarnetechnology as the United States, but has not reaped the sarne benefits because the culture was not as open to it. In the United States, people say, "This is new, this is great!" without bothering to see if -Western it works before they adopt it. Europe is smugger, *ith the attitude "What we've got works very well, thank you." These are stereotypes, of course, but they have a strong basis in reality. 'Where c J r A: outside the United States do you see a culture that is open to technological change? Dys0N: Thke a country like Estonia, for example, which adopted a lot of technology wholesale and is now doing very well relative to its neighbors. In a lense, Central and Eastern Europe are more open to change than Western Europe. There are of course many people in Central and Eastern Europe who are not amenable to change, but there are also 'W-e those who say, "Gee, this is new. should try it and see if it worls. " c J r A: How model?

does Russia fit

into

this

Dys0N: Russia'sbasic problems are a lack of both a good cornmercial culture and management skills. What makes Russia

TNTERVTEW Science &Technology

The real pr0blgm withe-cornrnerce is the lack of trust and the assurnption that if you do businesswith a strangâ&#x201A;Źr, you are proba6ly going to be cheated still attractive, though, is the relatively large number of highly trained people; there is an abundance of engineers with good math and logic skills. What makes it challenging is that neither companies nor their customers know how to apply technology, and it is difficult to find skilled managernent. It may be easyto find people who know how to write software, but it is harder to find people who know how to use and support applications and understand businessrlrocesses. GJIA: How are you coping with these problems? D y s 0 N :F o r r n e , t h e y a r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Trying to fix these things is the real challenge, and ifyou can, you have a cornpetitive advantage. Overall, things are heading in the right direction. GJ r A: Who are some of the other players that you see taking advantage of the opportunities in Russia? D y s 0 NA : l l t h e b i g U . S . I T c o r n p a n i e sa r e in these markets-companies like Intel, Microsoft, and Sun Microsysterns, for example. cJIA: Which companies are best at capitalizing on these sorts of opportunities? 0y S0 N: Well, it varies from rnarket to market. I would say that both Oracle and Microsoft, while not being particularly

civic rninded, have done wonderful things for countries where they have invested because they have gone in there and trained people to use and sell their products. And, while not charitable ventures, they have fostered economic growth and econornic value not just for themselves, but also for people in those countries. cJIA: Recently there has been some concern over e-cornrnerce in Russia. Russian lawrnakers have advocated the rnonitoring of Internet and e-rnaii traffic for security reasons by way of a key-escrow system." Dys0N:The Russian governrnent has the sornewhat old-fashioned notion that security depends on keeping the bad guys out and keeping everything visible to the government, and that is not the right way to approach the situation. Various individuals and even other governments are trying to persuade the Russiansthat this is not the best way to foster a vibrant economy. The Russians will eventually figure this out. GJIA: Do you think a vibrant Internet econorny can exist in Russia with such governrnent regulation, or are the two rnutually exclusive? D y s 0 N :I t i s a l o t m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n that. First of all, almost anybody with a cornputer in Russia right now can be considered to be engaged in illegal activity because most computers use encrfp-

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tion that is not certified. So, it is just like a network of trust is already being built, the old days. If someone wanted to get but it inevitably takes time. you, it was pretty easy to find you doing something illegal. GJIAr Does the issue of trust become One of the first things to do is to more complicated when you are dealing change the distinction between civil use with people frorn totally different culand military use. Second, clearly the tures and societies? government should not pursue keyescrow. Not only is it wrong, it is also Dys0N:Yes, and that is why the promises unworkable. Success in e-commerce, of global e-commerce were somewhat however, goes beyond security and rnisgrrided. But global comrnunication transactions. It is not just about payand the ability to operate across borders ments. It is about communication with with people you do not Lnow is not a vendors, and it is about web sites and challenge specific to e-cornmerce. Those inforrnation and competition and sorts of complications occur with intertransparency. You can do an awful lot in national exchanges in any medium. e-cornrnerce without necessarily implementing transactions over the Internet; GJ I A: Do you seethe technology sector in the lack of credit cards and things like Eastern European countries, whether in that-which are impediments-is not as Estonia or Russia, as a key driver of the big of a problern as people think. The countries' economic reform and growth? real problern with e-commerce is the Or do you thinl these countries are lack of trust and the assumption that if going to have to look at other elernents of you do business with a stranger, you are their economy to lead them? probably going to be cheated. Therefore, things like reputation sys- DysoN:Again, I view technology as a key tems and dispute-resolution systernsare underpinning for every sector. The use going to be very valuable. Vatera, one of of the information infrastructure drives the companies that I am involved with, is efficiency, and the culture of the IT seclil<e eBay, but it operates in the Czech tor-its openness and transparency-are Republic and Hungary. One of the benekey factors. So, the question is not to fits we offer is that a custorner can go to rrreasure the revenues of the companies the site and see if the person he is dealing that sell IT, but to look at how effectively with has a good reputation through an their products and serwicesand attitudes online rating system. Payments are can penetrate the whole economy. It is accomplished in many different ways. The the culture that cornes roiththe computissue is knowing who you are dealing with ers; it is not the computers olone.It is all and generating trust, rather than payment part of a more general trend, and cerrnechanisms. Building a reputation can't tainly the technology sector and its peobe done overnight, though; it takes time, ple are leading a lot of it. so people need to be patient. Fortunately, a lot of companies are beginning to do e .lI a ' There has also been much concern business online, and people are starting about the integrity of intellectual propto get into the habit of sending e-mail and erty rights in Russia and Eastern Europe, working with others over the Internet, so specifically in the software markets. What

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tNTERVtEW science &Technology are some of the ramifications of these problems? Dy s 0 N: Piracy is definitely an issue, and it hurts Iocal developers as much as it hurts Microsoft and other companies. The local guys want Microsoft to be able to charge a lot so that they can charge somewhat less and still be successful. So it is not that these countries don't want good copyright protection. There are obviously a lot of people in these countries who steal software, but the problem is somewhat overstated. The fact that someone copied a piece of software doesn't mean that otherwise he wouldn't have bought it; it just rneans that otherwise he wouldn't have had it. There is certainly a proportionate revenue loss, but it isn't the 95 percent that you read about. These companies are learning, just as Western

that the problemwill diminish over time. The problem is never going to go away, but it is becoming lessof an issue. People in the IT industry tend to have rnore of a culture of honesty and transparency than perhaps people in other industries. It is not universal, but in general the people who come from academia and the technical sector tend to be rnore honest than people who "acquired" a large company through privatization. GJrA; Do you think that the ICANN model of a global, non-profit, privatesector corporation can be applied to other international regulatory bodies?' D y S o N :I d o n ' t s e e t h a t a n y t i m e s o o n . First, ICANN itself has to prove broadly successful,which it hasn't done yet. I was the founding chairrnan until 2ooo, and

Anytime too much po*eris concentrated in one group or body, y6r are at risk of abuse ot that power. companies are, that the way to get paid for your software is to provide support and to offer it as a service. There are many newbusiness models to take advantage of this fact. It is certainly harder to succeed in Central and Eastern Europe because the infrastructure isn't communications there. However, the culture is developing in these countries and people are beginning to pay for software. In fact, Microsoft has recently had sorne success in getting large users to pay up. Even if just companies and governments begin to understand that they need to pay, the infrastructure will get better. More people are getting online and you will find

now I just finished a stint on the AtLarge Membership Study Committee, an awkwardly narned group whose duty is to forge a consensus on the best rnethod for representing the world's Internet users as individuals within ICANN. We are trying to find a structure that would foster public input and improve representation of the public interest in its policy making. GJIA: A lack of public representation and public input has been one of the main criticisms of ICANN, correct? Dys0N: Yes, and even though it is a private organization, as it should be, it does have a public role and should have public

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accountability. ICANN has a limited but nonetheless important mandate. So it really does need a way to be accountable to the public at large. However, ICANN is not a model for many other things, because there are few things that really need global consensus or global policies. There are many things that can be decided locally. The lessworld government we have. the better. I think. So I don't see it as a wonderful model for most other things to follow. GJ I A: How should people respond to the trends of globalization that are increasingly embodied in international regulatory mechanisrns? Dvs0N:I think they should respond with local regrrlatory bodies, at least until human nature improves drarnatically. I arn speaking facetiously, of course, because I don't think it will. However, anytime too rnuch power is concentrated in one group or body, you are at risk of abuse of that power. Therefore, the more decentralized you can keep things, the better. Multilateral governance might be a goal for the United Nations, and for Europe, but there are a lot ofpeople who are not looking forward to a sovereign Europe, let alone world government, and neither am I. GJ r A: Do you ever seethe United Nations getting involved in anything like ICANN? Dys0N: I certainly could irnagine it, but that is what we are trying to avoid. The United Nations moves rather slowly. ICANN needs to be accountable to the

public-to people who understand what it does-rather than to people who were appointed by elected officials who know very little about domain narnes and the Internet. Nobody ever got into office becauseof their policy on domain names; therefore, ICANN must be accountable in a very specific way to people who know what it does, rather than governrnent officials. If you are working for the government, you probably have other concerns-and rnost likely not the ones that are particular to information technology. cJIA: How do you envision ICANN's future? DysoN: If it evolves successfully, it will remain a private body that sets a limited nurnber of policies by the consensusof its members, including representatives of the public. It will not affect people beyond those directly involved with the Internet, such as the providers of the infrastructure, the developers of the technology, and its users. Those policies are the only things that really need to be agreed on globally, mostly domain narne and address policies, so that you can reach anyrvhere on the Internet frorn anywhere else without fail. It has little to do with anything like content, freedom of speech, software piracy, what is appropriate for kids to see, or anything like that. ICANN's mission is to ensure that the dornain-name systernworls and that domain-name conflicts are successfully resolved. That is as far as it should go. And if it is successful, it will get a lot less press in the next few years, and will do its good work in relative obscurity.

NOTES t Formed in October

1998, the Internet Corpom(ICANN) is a

tion for Assigned Names and Numbers non-profit,

It38J

pri%te-sector

corporation

GeorgetownJournal

formed

by a

of InternationalAffairs

broad coalition ofthe Internet's business, technical, academic, and user communities-

ICANN

has been recog-

nized by the U.S. and other governments as the global

tNTERVtEW &Technology science consensus entity to coordinate

the technical manage-

ment of the Internet's domain name system, the allocation

of IP address space, the assignment of protocol

parameters, and the management of the root sener sys-

tem. See <http'//w.ionn.orglgeneral/fact-sheet.htm>. 2 A key-escrow encrlrption

system is an encryption

system with a backup decrJption

capability that allows

authorized persons to decr)?t cipher-text.

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TheSearch for theRealIran

media, and an energetic reform movement, Iran is ultimately controlled by "an unelected few [who] repress the Iranian Reaiew|l Sanam F. Vakil people's hope for freedorn."I Any promise of reform or progress towards change is TrnENcr Weno. Searchingfor Hassan: An Ameri- overshadowed by aggressiverhetoric from all sides. In their war on terrorism, Amercan Faml!'sJourng Home to lron. Boston: icans have forgotten the Iranian candle* Houghton Mifflin Cornpany, ZooZ, 336 light vigil in rnemory of the terrorist vicp p .$ z 5 . o o . tims and instead only recall images of fiery With President George W. Bush's first clerics chanting "Death to Arnerica," as was the caseduring the recent twenty-third Stateof the Union onJanuary 29, 2oo2, anniversarT of the Revolution. Again, we all hope for an immediate Iranian-American rapprochement has ended. Gestures find ourselvesat a stalemate. Terence Ward's Searching of good will in the aftermath of Septernber for HassantAn II and talk of collaboration in the narne of AmeicanFamr!'s Joumg Hometo Irantakes us to regional stability have evaporated. Thrgettask for such political stereotyping. His personal reflections on Iran have come ed for its opaque nuclear weapons projust in time to remind us of our common gram and sponsorship of militant Hezbollah and other anti-Israel terrorist groups, misperceptions and the realities of Iran's Iran is once again back on the hot list. As past,present, and future. In 1998, after an part of the "axis of evil," Iran is now in the almost thirry year absence,the Ward family returned to Iran on a mission to locate same league as Iraq and North Korea. Although it boasts a dernocratically elected their old housekeeper, cook, storyteller, wart healer, philosopher, and friend, president and parliament, a vibrant

Summer/fall 2OO2

t I4I I

VAKIL

Ward haS dOng us a sood serviceby remindine -

us that even "enernies" ha'nea huma.r fuce. Hassan. Documenting his overland journey from Shiraz to Tehran, through his reflections and encounters, Ward uncovers another country-the real Iran. In 196o, Patrick Ward, an American citizen, accepted a position as an econornic advisor to the National Iranian Oil Cornpany, rnoving his wife and four sons to Iran. Employing Hassan Ghasemi and his wife, Fatimeh, the Ward farnily came to appreciate Iran's rich culture, legacy, and history. It is through thern that Terence and his brothers learned of Iran's Zoroastrian heritage, which is celebrated on the first day of spring, known as the Persian New Year. It is through them that they discovered the prolific prose of Persian poets like H.afez,Rurni, and Saadi. Moreover, it is because of them that they traveled the disparate terrain from the lush mountains and villagesof the North to the deserts and ruins of the Persepolis and Pasargadae,grasping the rnagnificence of Persian history. In their decision to return to Iran, the Wards received no dearth of warnings ranging from U.S. State Departrnent officials who predicted possible captivity to travel experts who feared even worse. Undeterred, the Wards prepared for all obstaclesfrom fervent anti-Americanism to the dreary funeral-lile dress code and "like fashionable New Yorkers lthey1 packed black." Upon arrival, the search for Hassan seemed hopeless, for all they had to go on was the vague recollection of Ghasemi's small village, called Tudeshkt or Thdoosht. And when their driver and tour guide learned about their objective and anxiety over their search, he coun-

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seled, "Don't worry, rny dear friend. Even if you don't find hlm, something else will happen. In the end, you will find rnany Hassansalong the way." And find hirn they did, but not in his srnall village. He had rnoved to Isfahan, where he tended to his garden and his new life as a chef in a hotel restaurant. Yet, in addition to finding him, the Wards encountered rnany Iranians who shared the same sensibilities as the Ghasernis. Surprised by the continued warrnth and goodwill gestures toward Americans, the Wards were repeatedly invited into Iranian hornes throughout their journey. While driving through Ardakan, President Khatami's village, Mrs. Ward insisted on paying her respects to the president's family. As it turned out, the president, unlike the remaining clerical order, chose to live in hurnble surroundings. His house was open and unguarded like that of any Iranian family. It was through these encounters that they experienced the generosity and kindness of the Iranian people. With this glirnpse inside the heart and mind of the real Iran, theWards learned of the realities of the twenty year revolution. Iranians had fought to purge the country of the excesses of the shah, but yet again they had suffered as their liberties were repressed and opportunities vanquished. What befell them was a theocratic regirne that found legitimacy in a decade long war where the loss of human life was unbridled. The aftermath of the war left economic repercussions as well. With a population that has alrnost doubled in the past twenty-two years, unemplopnent is now rampant and

Books inflation uncontrolled. In the lingering dust of revolutionary fervor, what remains is an agitated youth with a bleak future. Despite this grim reality, Iranians have retained their sense of humor and purpose. As recounted by Firuz, one of the many hosts to the Ward family, "'The mullahs sit on their thrones and rnake promises. And their families get richer. Do you know the Iranian theory of relativity? It is special. All must go to relatives.' Then he leaned over us, speaking in a sotto voce. You know why the mullahs drearn in green? They love the dollar."' That's why Iranians are no longer accepting the status quo. Tired of the challenge of daily life, the people are demanding change, albeit in a slow and rnethodical way of their own. This is worth noting as a movernent undoubtedly unique in the Middle East, where coups are notoriously the quickest approach to ensuring a transfer of power and, for once, where people are experimenting within the confines of their constitution. The election of a moderate president, Moharnrned Khatarni, and his reforrn parliarnent, coupled with vibrant journalistic expression, is hope enough that the Iranian people are reviving their fight to achievewhat went off course in 1979. In highlighting the political realities, the Wards were also amazed by the many irnprovernents implemented since the shah's reign. "'Where are the beggars?' 'Where is the glaucomy rnother asked. rna, the rickets and polio? And where was the hopelessnessthat stripped all dignity away?Where was the despair we had seen ... when crippled children crawled up to a chauffer-driven Mercedes."' While the mullahs haveperpetuated the remnants of rnonarchical corruption, they also have attempted to provide basic arnenities and an improved standard of living. More-

over, in dispelling his family's original 'Ward misperceptions, offers his own for future advice travelers, especially Americans, "Expect to suffer from excessive hospitality" and to gain weight going from "one five-star meal after another." InSearchofHwson,asyet another anecdotal attempt to capture the beauty and mystery of Iran, succeeds in convincing the outsider of Iran's secret treasures. It also reveals the paradox of an anti-American regirne ruling over a pro-Arnerican population. But for the connoisseur, this book sheds nothing new except Ward's rediscovery of his childhood land. Even though he includes references to scholars like Harvard's Roy Mottahadeh and Sandra Mackey, Ward reveals his scholastic knowledge of Iran as being peripheral at best. Nonetheless, he rnanages to grasp the splendor and largessethat survived the country's turbulent history. He writest Walking in the darkness, I wondered about this country's

magnetism

and beauty, its

inner and outer faces, the duality offorces with equal weight that push and pull. These people, so long cut from

the world, pos-

sessed such acute insights. They their humor

offered

in healthy doses and a pro-

found friendship

that will conquer any who

encounter it. I thought of Hassan watering his tiny garden and wondered life-a

simplicity

about his

possessions, but

wealth of spirit. In the face of such civility and

refinement,

felt

ovemhelming

humility.

Published in the afterrnath of September rrth, Ward has done us a good service by reminding us that even "enemies" have a human face. Notes: r George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29,2oo2. Sanam F. Vakil is a Ph.D. candidate in Middle East Studiesat the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

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Uiqhurjstan:ReallyPartof "0neChina"? Rishi Kapoor Everything about this place does not belong. Not to China, not to tourists, not even to the people themselves.Some may call it the hinterland or frontier; it is a roc\ otherworld that passesfor Mars in my photographs. A trading post in the middle of the Old Silk Road, this place was rubbed by many different cultures and many different epochs in history-Chinese, Indian, Persian, Turkic, Russian, and British, among many others. Never belonging to one, it was free to resist patiently; like the barren rocky soil, this place was rubbed and worn, but never moving. Three of my classmatesand I flew from Beijing to spend our fall break in Kashgar. The plane in which we flew was unlike any other we had taken in China' a relic from the Soviet era, with tacky upholstery and a really high ceiling. Chinese signs were nailed into the wall above the lighted Russian ones. Only later would I realize how fitting this plane ride was for the place we were about to visit. Outside the window we saw round mountains in a desert, with heaps of snow seemingly dumped on them. What kind of place was this, with no bustle, no overcrowded cities, and no smog like the rest of China? The land was barren, for sure, but it was not dead. It wore everyone's face with wind and dust. After a few days, my skin became leathery, and I could never completely shake off the

Rishi Kapoort'. student at the School of Foreign Senice, Georgetown University. He studied in Harbin. China in Fall 2000.

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rocky powder from rny pants. The Uighur hospitality and the inevitable rapture of this dry and dreamy land was beginning to suckme in. This vast land from the Thklarnakan Desert and the Pamir Mountains to the hidden lakes and the fruit-bearing oases has been populated by Uighurs for more than 2,ooo years. Locals commonly refer to the area as Eastern Turkestan, or Uighuristan. Uighuristan was first acquainted with the Chinese centuries ago. Han Chinese invasionsinto the area began in ro{ B.C. Up until 75r A.D., the Chinese invaded six times, but controlled portions of the territory for only the first r$/ years of this 855-year tirne span. For the remaining /oo years, Uighuristan rernained free. Not war, but coexistence with the Chinese traders along the Silk Road dorninated the relationship during that tirne. But rnost Chinese do not know this history. On the way to the airport, we inforrned our cab driver that we were heading to Kashgar, China's westernrnost city on the Old Silk Road. "You may have difficulties in Kashgar," she warned. "They speak a different language, and they are uncultured." This was our first encounter with such blatant Chinese racism. Ironically, the Chinese are often the first to point out American racisrn while pontificating about the peaceful "one China." By Chinese standards, though, Uighurs may well be barbaric. They practice a "baclcward"religion, Islam, and eat with their hands-a sure rnark of savagery. How could these people ever live on equal terms with the glorious $,OoOyear civilization of China? One of the most surreal aspects of Kashgar was the bazaar. One need only visit the Sunday market in Kashgar,

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which attracts anlwhere from $o,ooo to I5O,OOO people a week, to know that the Old Silk Road never died. Here Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Uzbek, Uighur, Chinese, Thjik, and Pakistani traders converge in an orgy of buying and selling. Wide vacant streets were swollen with people. Nothing is absent in this Central Asian bazaar, fabrics, hand-made shoes, spices, peanut brittle, dried fruits, animal skins, Uighur knives, musical instruments, wornen with covered faces, women with bare faces, screaming children, hats of every sort, fine crafts, coats and of course, rugs. The visual array is matched only by the loud bustle and fragrance that overwhelm the senses.After a few minutes at the place, we lost all sense of direction and tirne. Thankfully, just as we decided to pry ourselves frorn the bazaar and explore m o r e o f t h e t o w n , w e c a m e a c r o s sa r e s i dent of the area narned Abdullah who was eager to show us around while practicing his English. First, he brought us to the animal market, which was teerning with carnels,mules, horses, cows, lambs, and sheep. People examined the animals, counting their teeth, checking how well they moved and how healthy they were. Butchers bought anirnals for their restaurants; farmers sold sheep; everyone haggled. This place never left the rnedieval era. I ater we ate dinner with Abdullah and his friend Thher. Abdullah shared his opinions about the Chinese. He wanted an independent and free Xinjiang. He whispered his strategy to us. "We will watch Tibet and Thiwan and Kashmir. When something happens in Thiwan, we will start pressing for our independence." He talked as if it were a great secret that was a true prophecy. The triumph in his smile as he tilted his head back said it all. The Chinese did not belong here.

ViewfromtheGround The Chinese named this territory the "Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" (XUAR) in r9$$. "Xinjiang" means "nel territory." The Chinese Communist Party consolidated military control over the region between rg{g and rggg, and has always kept a policy of repression to fight any "splittist" Uighur perpetrators-a term that recalls the hurniliation of foreign attempts to break up China in its time of shamer the nineteenth century. The narne "Xinjiang" had been given to the territory in 1884 under Manchu conquest, but between then and rg{g the Uighurs staged forty-two armed revolts and declared independence in Igg! and again in rg{{. The Chinese are wary about Xinjiang's attitude with good reason. Becauseof security interests ernbodied in the Thklamakan Desert's oil and gas

Soviet-style buildings with tiled walls 'were erected to house residents and provide more space for shopkeepers, but the 'Uighurs refused to live in them. Local time is a full two hours behind Beijing's, but in One China everyone must use Beijing time. But only financial institutions comply with the quirky rule. Such seemingly petty policies betray Beijing's apparent design to outnurnber the Uighurs in their own homeland, Historically, the province belongs to Central Asia, for the Uighurs are a Tu::kic people whose language, custom, and cuisine are very close to those of their newly independent neighbors' Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Thjikistan, and IJzbekistan. Currently, though, Uighurs make up a mere {/ percent (8.7 ..rilhon) of the population of Xinjiang, and the

H OW CaSUal One China \ rasto [Han th+Srgl, and how visceral the concept was to the Uighurs. reserves and in the nuclear testing sites, Beijing does not see Uighuristan's indep e n d e n c ea s a p o l i c y o p t i o n . However, Chinese interests have not changed the Uighurs' minds. Abdullah and Thher later took us to the new, and first, grocery store in town. They were excited to peruse the aisles. New and fancy foods were now available in Kashgar. And yet, there were no customers; Abdullah and Taher told rne it is because they sell only Chinese things. China is a different country and a different socia different civilization. ety-indeed, What logic is there in selling Chinese goods to Uighurs? Beijing's influence seems to be characterized only as coercion in Xinjiang.

Han Chinese constitute another {r percent (7.5 million), with a sprinkling of other Central Asian ethnicities making up the difference. As late as rggo, Han Chinese did not exceed a tenth of Xinjiang's population. Nowadays, the has been capital Ururnqi provincial effectively Sinicized, with an eighty percent Han population and with all the crude heavy industry and pollution of an eastern Chinese city. The government used its huge state-owned firms to erect Soviet-style cities, gobbling up land, bulldozing over Uighur livelihoods, and solidifring the steel structures of an industrialized future. This future has in store more foreign domination for the rugged province.

Sunmer/Fall zooz

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Nonetheless, the countryside remains largely non-Han, aside from the rnilitary outposts-the only places flying the red flag. These outposts reminded rne of colonial times when alien soldiers manned small forts over wide expanses of foreign territory. This irnpression was reinforced when I learned that the governrnent confiscated people's grrns after the last rebellion a few years ago. Now people worry about wolves eating their sheep. "But there is no way they can control all these rnountains." Abdul. another Uighur friend, noted wistfully. He told us of his brother, who made a living taking his animals to graze in the mountains in season and descended to warrn lodgings when winter came. With the advent of spring, he would head into the mountains again. He was a nornad. The Chinese are not as interested in life in the mountains. Abdul owned one of the two hotels in Thshlorgan, the last town on the Karkorarn Highway before entering Pakistan. It was not really a town, but more of a street with severalhouses on

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either side. It was situated in the so-called "Tujik Autonomous County," in a valley 3,ooo meters above sea level between snowcaps that jutted 6,000 rneters into the sly. The day we rnet Abdul he was forced to close a deal with the other, Chinese-owned, hotel; they bought his property. The Chinese keep moving in. "They don't even want to come here, but the government forces thern," Abdul larnented. "They are so dirty. They just throw their noodles and snack bags everywhere. And when you knock on their door, they ask who it is before they open it." The Chinese are not just foreign-they are uninvited. Arriving back in Harbin, China, I told a Chinese student about Uighur antipathy towards the Chinese what I had witnessed. "That can't be! IMe are One China," she responded nonchalantly while eating her noodles. How casual One China was to her, and how visceral the concept was to the Uighurs. All I could do was recornrnend she see the place for herself.

Crisisof OurTime Bill Frist Albert Einstein once said, "The world we have created today has problems which cannot be solved by thinking the way we thought when we created them." The crisis of HIV/AIDS is one of those problems. HIV/AIDS poses an enormous challenge to humankind. Believe me, I know about challenges, especiallymedical ones. Before my election to the U.S. Senate, I was a heart and lung transplant surgeon. An actual heart transplant operation lasts approxirnately five hours. However, the real challenge cornes afterwards, requiring tireless vigilance and imrnediate action to beat back every infection. I can reverse sorneone's destinywith a new heart. But if an infection does set in, an infection I cannot control, my patient may end up quitting work or dropping out of school. He may not only lose income to support his family, but also the energy to enjoy life with family and friends. In the end, everybody loseshope. All norrnal structure to life dissolvesashis world crumbles.Just like a patient with fatal heart diseasewho can either get better with appropriate intervention or who will die without it, need the world's assistance.Now is the victims of HMAIDS critical mornent to intervene to address the global pandemic of HIV/AIDS, the health crisis of our time. 'We are all aware of the devastating statistics of AIDS. Each year, a staggering 3 million people die of the disease-that is,

B i l l F r i s t ,M . D .i s the ranking

member

on both the Subcommittee on Public Health

and the Sub-

committee Affairs

on African

in the United

States Senate.

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over the next decade-a number equivaone person every ten seconds. Almost lent to all children living east of the Mistwice that many, $.! million, or two peosissippi. In Uganda, for example, over ple every ten seconds, become infected. This amounts to I5,ooo people a day. half the population is under fifteen. Even more tragic is that 6,ooo of those S k i l l e d w o r k e r s i n c l u d i n g t e a c h e r s , infected each day are youth between the health care providers, military personnel, and police are dying faster than they agesof fifteen and twenty-four.t can be trained throughout much of the From rny position on the Foreign African continent. African children are Relations Committee of the United StatesSenate, I have seen regions of the left without parents, without teachers, world where the scourge of HIV/AIDS is without role models, and without leaders, making thern susceptible to recruitdestroying the lives of rnillions. Particument by criminal organizations, revolularly hard hit is the continent of Africa where over /o percent of those infected tionary militias, and terrorists. AIDS is live. As ranking member of the Senate systematically destroying the fundamental pillars of entire societies. Foreign Relations' African Subcommittee, I have a commitrnent to increasing public awareness of the HfV crisis in Africa and, more importantly, to devel- The good news is that we know a lot about oping a strategy to combat and eradicate how to reverse this trend, starting with the cultivation of strong leadership at all the disease frorn the African continent levels. Leadership must start at the top. and the world. InJanuary, I traveled to EastAfrica and For exarnple, Ugandan President Yoweri witnessed firsthand the toll HIV/AIDS is Museveni has not been bashful about taking. The purpose of rny trip was speaking publicly to the citizens of his country about HIV/AIDS. Bakili Muluzi, twofold. First, I was returning to southern president of Malawi, opens every speech Sudan for the fifth time to participate in rnedical rnissionarywork. Second, I wantby encouraging his fellow citizens to join ed to witness firsthand the destructive efforts to eradicate the disease.These two irnpact that a single virus is having on an presidents help to eliminate the stigma often associatedwith the disease,thereby entire continent-not just on a farnily, comrnunity, state, or country, but on an encouraging education prograrns. Such leadership worl.s. Since the early entire continent. One of my stops was the r99os, Uganda has been successful in Kibera slurn in Nairobi, Kenya. One out of every five of the /go,ooo inhabitants reducing the rate of new HfV infections frorn Jo to only 6 percent of its populaof Kibera either has AIDS or is HfV-positive. As I walked the crowded pathways tion. President Museveni's actions illustrate how strong leadership from the top sandwiched between hundreds of thousandsof aluminurn shanties, I was arnazed is a key ingredient in making preventive prograrns work at both the lower echeto see only children and the elderly. The disease had wiped out the parents who lons of national government as well as at the community level. Each national secwere incidentally also the rnost productive including tor, agriculture, labor, segrnentof the population. finance, health, and education, can conAfrica is losing an entire generation. tribute unique expertise and resources to AIDS will orphan {o million children

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A LookBack For examthe fight against HMAIDS. ple, the ministry of education can develop programs that target the younger generation, teaching them how to avoid high-risk behavior. The labor ministry can resolve difficult employment issues. The ministry of finance can rnobilize national resources for AIDS prevention and treatment programs. Furthermore, political, ethnic, and religious leaders can coalescenational support and reduce

components the fight of against HIV/AIDS. In terms of testing, we need to increase investments in rapid HfVtesting kits and counseling for developing countries. Access to inexpensive and rapid HIV testing can help reinforce prevention rnessagesand guide further treatment options. Even in HlV-ravaged Africa, most of those who come in to be tested wiII test negative. This presents a missed opportunity to savecountless lives.

Many of the best id.eas comefrornthose working ir the trenches. stigmas attached to the disease. In the four countries that I visited-Sudan, Malawi, Uganda, and Kenya-progress was only made through the combination of political commitment and a comprehensive national strategy. Local cornmunity participation is also indispensable. As I saw in East Africa, many of the best ideas come from those working in the trenches. Great strides forward are being made through the hard work of community-based organizations, both religious and secular. These groups are essential to success. Putting these groups at the forefront of action on the ground is critical. Equally important is their access to funding which enablesthem to reach out to those who are most at need. In short, we must continue our efforts to unite the political, religious, and businessleaders of the world in an international cornmitment to provide financial and human resources to halt the spread and to help those afflicted with HIV/AIDS.

Treatment Enhanced 0ptions. Testing and treatrnent are also important

There are also new treatment options currently under research and evaluation. teatment with anti-retroviral drugs, for example, lowers the amount of virus in the blood, potentially decreasingthe risk of transrnission between mother and child as well as between two adults. Furthermore, the mere hope of some kind of treatrnent will encourage rnore people to be tested for the disease, which will decrease its rapid spread. Aside from providing medical treatment and nutritional support, testing centers becorne centers of hope for the cornmunity, a place where those struggling with HIV/AIDS can share ideas, support each other, and learn important coping strategies. When those who are infected receive even basic care, they live longer and healthier by avoiding opportunistic infections such as tuberculosis. They are then able to earn income and ensure a better future for their dependents. As we develop new, effective, low-cost treatment regimes, we can make an even bigger difference in extending life and holding families together. The prospect of new treatments and a possible cure

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provides comfort to the families and orphans, gr''nirgthem hope and dignity. Ultimately, we must find ways to balance prevention with support, care, and treatrnent options. We should seek to combine low cost pharmaceuticals with enhanced healthcare delivery systems. Securing funding for the human resources and treatments for HMAIDS, not to mention research and developrnent, continues to be a problem. This is one area where America can help.

of Funding.Th"unitQuestions ed Statesmust continue to encourage and empower coalitions of governrnents, rnultilateral institutions, corporations, foundations, scientific organizations, and NGOs to help fill the gap between the available resources and the unmet needs for prevention, care, and treatment. Each has unique contributions to make to the battle. Those in governrnent should seek ways to expedite these relationships and resources, through legislation if necessary. For exarnple, the United States should continue to lend support to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS and aid the Fund's efforts to garner continued financial and political support worldwide. The Global Fund was envisioned as a public-private partnership. Therefore, donations from governments to the fund are only part of the effort. Governments must take steps to encourage corporate, nonprofit, and private donations. Those of us in government should consider ways to rnobilize resources for the Fund by creating strong incentives for private sector and individual contri-

butions. This includes the development of dynamic methods of private support, such as non-cash contributions of pharmaceuticals and medical instruments, the provision of technical expertise, and the staffing of public health facilities. Overall, the United States is the largest bilateral donor in the fight against HIV/AIDS in the world today, providing half of all bilateral aid. However, we con and needto do more. Domestically, our nation's public health community is doing excellent work in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Our public health research programs for the disease are the most advanced in the world. We need to extend these efforts on a global scale. Both at home and abroad, I have witnessed a resolve to beat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In order to succeed, however, it is essential that the United States and other nations rnake a comrnitment to work together to eliminate the growing scourge. We must, within our national governrnents as well as across them, enlist all stakeholders in the fight. From the European lJnion to the UN and the World Bank, from political leaders to corporations and philanthropists, each of us has an irnportant role to play in the imrnediate future. As members of the hurnan race, it is not in our nature to turn away from great challenges. I have no doubt that, as nations and as citizens of the world, we will once again rise to the occasion.

Author's from

Note:

testimony

The

text of this article was adapted

by Senator Frist at the Senate Foreign

Relations hearing on February 13, 2OO2.

NOTES rJoint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and World Health Organization (WHO), AIDS Epidemic Update (Geneta, Joint United

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Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and World Health O r g a n i z a t i o n , D e c e m b e r2 o o r ) .