G E O R G E T O W NJ O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A LA F F A I R S
The Past,Present, andFuture of the Nation-State J O H NH U T C H I N S O N
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in Afrno Nofion-StoteTrojectorics R I C H A R DJ O S E P H
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state fllHtbn
Pluralism, Democrag,and Nation- Buildingin Israel YAAKOVKOP
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Nation-andStote- Building in Eurasia IAN EREMMER
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It's theRegme,Stupid'Thelntperatiueof State- Buildingin Afghanlstan M A R I NS T R I V I E C K I
Dealinguith Demotag andDiuersilt Ongoing efforts at sociopolitical reconstruction in Afghanistan and recent visions of a post-Saddarn Iraq have rekindled public interest in nation- and state-building. Debates over these issues.arenot new, but in the past they have been isolated from one another. For exampie, most discussionsabout state-building disregard the issue of nation-building (or cottftse the two). This Forum attempts to repair this rift by concentrating explicitly on the relationship between nation-building and state-building in multicultural societies. Such societies offer the rnost logical focus for connecting discussions over nationbuilding and state-building since the divergence of nation and state is most obvious and establishing convergence is also most important in thern. At the sarne tirne, rnore and more countries are increasingly confronting multiculturalisrn. This, in turn, has also fueled debate over the future of the nation-state itself.
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Some argue that the nation-state is loosing ground to supra-national identities and supra-state institutions because of globalization. Meanwhile, others point to civil wars and collapsing states as evidence that countries are actually being eroded by sub-national identities and sub-state institutions. In many places, the reality is that the nation-state is being challenged frorn above and below. However, the nation-state debate, and the broader discussion about political organizations in general, is fundamentally about legitimacy and representative rule. The ideal of the nation-state is essentially a belief in communal selfdetermination. The legitirnacy of the state depends on whether it effectively represents the interests of its people; and if these interests are held widely enough, we can rightly call the people who hold them a nation. In this sense,state-building is the crafting ofeffective rePresentative institutions while nation-building refers to strengthening social cohesion within a cornrnunity by identifying and developing shared interests. Whether the nation-state is being overcorne or undermined, the importance of identifying shared interests, achieving popular legitimacy, and effective democratic representation remains unchanged. The real issuesat the heart of "the state of the nation"-now and for the foreseeable future-are how to preserve popular legitimacy and representative rule in multicultural societies, in an age of globalization and transnationalism, and in the face of fragrnentation and localism.
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The answers lie in studying the interaction between nation and state, identity and institution. Studying each of these topics by themselves is itself difficult, and there is little consensus about the nature of state or the nation. But understanding the interactive relationship between nations and statesis a truly monumental task. To do this, we rnust: study the various forms of the nation-state that already exist, paying special attention to those with pluralist populations; understand the lessons they offer and the questions they raise; and then consider "new" ways of casting this relationship. The five articles in this Forum atternpt to do exactly this. Together they cover a wide range of the major issuessurrounding the "state of the nation," from the broader theoretical debatesabout the nation-state and waysof fostering trans-ethnic national identity to the role of econornics in nation-state building and the practical considerations of post-war state-building. However, this Forurn comes at a tirne when sorne are beginning to forecast the decline of the sovereign state, and others are questioning the usefulness of "nationalisrn" in understanding conternpo rary politics. The first prediction is prernature. Meanwhile, even if the latter observation is accurate, the irnportance of developing effective political institutions that have popular legitimacy and represent widelyheld values will never fade. Understanding the dynarnic relationship between institutions and identities, whether in the form of statesand nations or otherwise, will always remain essential to securing peace and stability.
Stateof theNation
theFutureof the ation-State John Hutchinson This article exarnines conternporary debates about the nation-state as a political model in the contemporary world. After discussing what we mean by the terms, "nation" and "national identity," I discuss the relationship between the nation and the state, and whether effective governance requires a national basis. Lastly, I explore whether federal rnultinational systems are viable alternatives to the unitary nation-states, and the irnplications of the European fJnion for the future of the nation-state dynamic in Europe.
John Hutchinson is Senior
Lecturer
in
Nationalism
in the
Department
of Gov-
ernment,
London
School of Economics and Political Science.
andNationalism. 0f Nations GlobalDimensions Many theorists of globalization predict the decline of the nation-state, classicallyconceived as a sovereign political community, territorially bounded, culturally homogeneous, and economically integrated. In their different versions they argue that the autonomlof the nation-state is mitigated by the growth of transnational institutions that have resulted in a pooling or loss of sovereignty. The identrltofnotionshas also been recast. The unlilelihood of large-scale war between great powers means the loss of the traditional mechanism of collective differentiation: an appeal to us versus thern. Global migration patterns and the international recognition of the rights of minorities mean that homogeneous national cultures are being pluralized
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and hybridized. The future entails either ern" reaction to the West, which culnew forms of cornmunity or weakened m i n a t e d i n t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n n a t i o n nation-states having to corne to terrns alisms of the twentieth century.'? with multiculturalism.' In practice, most nations are a combiThese discussions tend to be Western nation of civic and ethnic identities. Europe-centered (and I would argue are Even France, the classic civic nation, of limited validity even for the prosperous rests on a substratum of rnedieval myths "West"). The problern in Eastern Europe and memories, and Gerrnany, an archeand the Balkans is to contain the resur- typical ethnic nation, offers citizenship g e n c eo f n a t i o n a l i s m i n p o s t - c o m m u n i s t to categoriesof non-ethnic "territorial" states;in Africa to sustain collapsing state- Germans. The potency of the nation in nation structures; and in many parts of the modern world derives from its sucAsia, includingAfghanistan, to establisha cessboth as the engine of collective powcommon national identity as well as a sta- er and progress, and as the source of ble political order. In fact, globalization, unique identity and rootedness in a defined as an intensification of interconcontinuously changing world. But, like nectednessof the world's populations, is Kohn, rnany have claimed that ethnicity not necessarily inirnical to the nationis a transitional loyalty. For them, "modernity" will require a shift to a civic state. The diffusion of the national model from its European origins is itself community, based on artificially created another form of globalization. and freely willed mutual ties, that in turn What do we mean by the national offers the possibility of transcending model? I define a nation as a modern natio nality altogether. political community founded on the ideasof self-deterrnination, a consoliEffective Governance.Schorars dated homeland, and a distinctive vernacular high culture, but nationhood from very different perspectives have a l s o r e s t s o n t h e m y t h s a n d m e r n o r i e s argued that, in the modern world, cenof (generally) older ethnic communitralized states and national comrnunities t i e s . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n c o r n b i n e s e l e - are inextricably linked. Several thinkersm e n t s o f w h a t h a v e b e e n l o n g r e g a r d e d Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, and W.H. as rival conceptions of the nation, McNeill-have argued that nations are an " c i v i c " a n d " e t h n i c . " T h e c i v i c m o d e l unintended consequence of the rise of views the nation as a territorial comthe modern centralized territorial state, munity united by the cornrnon politiwhich itself was forrned in large part c a l w i l l o f i t s m e m b e r s , t h e n e x u s o f through war.3 Warfare from the thirw h i c h i s c i t i z e n s h i p . M e a n w h i i e , t h e teenth century onwards has encouraged a e t h n i c m o d e l c a s t st h e n a t i o n a s a q u a - growing centralization of adrninistration s i - k i n s h i p g r o u p , w h o s e m e r n b e r s in order to enforce or-der and extract taxu n i t e a s a c o m m u n i t y o f d e s c e n t , t h e ation; cultural unification as a way of core of which is a unique history and e n s u r i n g I o y a l t y ; a n d c o m p a c t a n d c u l t u r e . I n a n i n f l u e n t i a l t y p o l o g y , bounded terr-itoriesthat become "homeH a n s K o h n d e s i g n a t e d t h e f o r m e r a s lands." The French revolution gavebirth " W e s t e r n ," d e r n o c r a t i c a n d r a t i o n a l , to a union of state and nation by tying a n d t h e l a t t e r a s a n i r r a t i o n a l " E a s t - state legitimacy to rule by the people.
Nation-Building astheBasis of
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H U T c H T N S sotNa t eo f t h e N a t i o n Such approaches view the nation not just as the construct of states, but as the necessag)construct of states.In the rnodern period, stateshave used centralized control of the population, mass education, and conscription to create culturally
state. The nation is a surrogate religion, which ariseswith secularization and often builds on older religious identities. State centralization can help crystallize a sense of nationhood, but it is only one factor.s Although rnodern states can exert
The Frenchrevolutionsave birthtoa
union of state and nation by tying- state legitimacy to rule by the people. homogeneous nations, which in turn legitimize their existence. In his recent book, ContainingNotionalism, Michael Hechter argues that indirect forrns of rule, which allowed for considerable e t h n i c h e t e r o g e n e i t y ,w e r e t h e n o r m ( a s in Ernpire) before the rnodern period. Modern cornrnunications technology allowed statesto bypass local leaders and irnpose direct rule on their populations, and the age of ernpire was replaced by the era of nation-states.a But the implication is that if the centralized stateshould becorne outrnoded, as sorne globalization theorists believe, ethnically homogenous nations will cease to be necessary or (perhaps) viable. As a result, ethnic heterogeneity or forms of multiculturalisrn will becorne possible. In contrast, Anthony Smith and I maintain that nations are not explicable only by state necessities. The nation is a moral cornmunity that binds individuals into a "tirneless" society evoked by "unique" rnyths, rnernories and culture, so that they overcorne contingency and death. Religious institutions can be of great importance in clarifying the definition of national identity becauseof their deep social reach, often endowing a community with the sense of being chosen that inforrns the rnodern nation-
irnrnense power by rnobilizing their populations through efficient adrninistrations, educational systems,and economic alliances, they are tested to their limits by unpredictable political, rnilitary, economic, and ideological challenges. Throughout the rnodern period, states and populations have fallen back on prior ethno-communal rnoral and political resources in the face of unforeseen contingencies such aswar, econornic dislocations, large-scale international rnigrations, ideological challenges, and natural disasters. In short, nations are not the outcome of states; rather they are built on older ethnic identities, which often drive political development. o Either way, whether the weight is put on the political or the ethno-cultural dirnension of nations, the claim is that the centralized state Iegitimates itself by appealing to national loyalties in a disenchanted world. The question then is, if the ethnic materials are lacking, can the modern state build the nation? The answer is: not easily. Where there are few distinctive common mernories and tradit i o n s o n w h i c h t o b u i l d ( e . g . B e l a r u s ) .t h e process is likely to be long drawn. The more likely setting is a state that contains two or more ethnic communities within its borders. As Walker Connor pointed
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out many years ago, very few statesin the modern world are ethnically homogeneous, and the dark side of nation-building, when it entails the assimilation of ethnic minorities to the dominant culture of the state, is nation-destroying.T The failure of even the long established states, France, Britain, and Spain for example, to "eliminate" their national minorities demonstrates the power of ethniciry in the modern world, and the necessity for nation-states to come to terms with ethnic diversity. This is especiallyimportant now that the normative advance of democracy and human rights has reinforced the rights of minorities. Most states,however, continue to resist the territorial lossesthat accornpany ethnic secession, and in the final chapters of ContainingNofiono/ism, Hechter asksif new forrns of indirect rule can resolve the destructive conflict between the nationalisms of dominant and minority groups within the same state. Can nation-states be replaced by federal systems?
outsiders than European nation-states, but it also means that their relevance is lirnited for states whose rninorities are not diasporic but peoples settled on historic homelands (Catalonia, Waler). It Canada, the issue of Quebec is more analogous to these problems of tlpical multinational states. Here, the struggle to reconcile the Quebecois with what they see as an ever-increasing Anglophone hegemony looks as unpromising as attempts to harrnonize Fleming and Walloon within an increasingly decentralized Belgian state. In general, the track record of federations between peoples residing on their historic homelands is very mixed. Disintegration remains a possibility as we have recently observed with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. In Africa, where states were founded on colonial boundaries and govern ethnically heterogeneous populations, minorities too often regard federations as forms of c o n c e a l e dr u l e b y a d o m i n a n t g r o u p . It could be said that breakdowns of federalism result from the legacy of Nation-statO. l-l'..e are successfuldespotism (in Eastern and Southern f e d e r a t i o n s . A m o n g s t t h e s e a r e t h e Europe) or of colonialism. But, there are "New World" polities-the future-orisuccessfulliberal democratic federations, ented multicultural federations of the such as Switzerland, which has often been United States, Australia, and Canada. cited as a general rnodel rather than S o m e w o u l d d e n y t h e m t h e s t a t u s o f being a special case, After Versailles, n a t i o n s b e c a u s e i n p r i n c i p l e t h e s e nationalists who sought federation with c o u n t r i e s r e j e c t u n i t y b a s e d o n e t h n i c other srnall peoples as a way of defending descent in favor of a cornmitment to thernselves against neighboring great powers cited the Swissexample asjustifipolitical institutions. Unfortunately, t h e s e t o l e r a n t m u l t i c u l t u r a l m o d e l s cation for the creation of Yugoslavia and cannot be exported easily because they C"echoslovakia. However, the Swiss success has were founded by imrnigrants who had at some level rejected their homeland depended on distinctive factors, includs o c i e t i e s a n d w e r e w i l l i n g t o t a k e o n a ing a history of confederation dating new identity in a new "ernpty" land. from medieval times, given mystique by This "irnmigrant nation" identity its heroic defense against the Habsburg makes them rnore open to including Empire. Switzerland has a strong Ger-
Alternatives to the Unitary
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H U T c H T N SS oN t a t eo f t h e N a t i o n rnan core, and tendencies to internal However, others argue that the rise of the differentiation are rnuted by a cantonal European Union can be explained system not based on ethnicity and by instead as a new strategyby national elites crosscutting religious allegiances. Brento rnaxirnize their sovereignty amid globdan O'Leary argues that a necessary alization. Moreover, some see the Euro(though not sufficient) condition for a pean lJnion as a hybridization between viable federation is the control of the national and regional loyalties, the start of a process of replacernent of the national state by a demographically dominant nationality.' I would suggest that all by the European.'o
Very fgw states in thernod.ern world.are ethnicallv hornos'eneous and the dark side of natio n -buildir,.g"is natio n - destroyirg. effective statesrely on a dorninant ethnic core. This is true even for the United States, Australia, and Canada, who have rested on a founding ethnic culture of English (or English and French in Canada's case),which provided the initial basis of cohesion and continues to dorninate their public life.
The European Unionand the Nation-State.
That said.,theredoes
appear to be a trend toward regional devolution even in the rnost centralized statesof Western Europe: Great Britain, Spain, and France. Is it possible that, as Charles Tilly suggests,globalization rnay be undermining the organizational power of the centralized nation-state, and that this in turn means that ethnocultural hornogeneity is no longer required? Weakening central governments and cession of autonomy to discontented nationalities is the pattern in Canada and Belgium, and might mark the future everywhere.o Following Tilly, the European lJnion can be cited as a fundarnental revulsion againstthe national principle in the name of wider ( E.lrop eatt) civilizatio n loyalties.
The European lJnion (EU) can be seen as the latest in a seriesofatternpts to politically unite Europe as an instrurnent of national ambitions. In the modern period, France and German each attempted to establish a European power bloc as a global actor against imperial competitors. What is distinctive about the current project is the alliance of the forrner enernies, France and Gerrnany, and the voluntary agreernent of other European nation-states to pool their sovereignty in a supranational institution as an expression of a general revulsion against the national rivalries that nearly destroyed Europe. Still, EU politics can be explained by national rnotives. In rnost cases,support for the EIJ arose from a particular conception of national interest. For all rnember states, participation in the EU gives them status as joint decision-rnakers on the world stage,which is particularly compelling for small countries to which the Presidency periodically rotates. EU politics are also driven by the national interests of the larger states, notably France and Gerrnany. Strengthening the European Ljnion arose from the French desire
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to constrain a re-united Germany within a "European" set of economic institutions and German willingness to offer up its economic autonomy in return for admission of the former communist states, which helped stabilize its eastern borders and extend its influence. Nonetheless, the EU has a supranational as well as intergovernmental character, and its range of regulatory functions is steadily increasing. This suggests a Europe-wide federation may arise as an indirectefect of the competitive goals and fears of European nation-states, just as the nations of Europe themselvesarose in part as an unintended consequence of competition between royal dynasties.
identity the EU wishes to create is vague and contested. The European project is articulated by reference to an indefinite future-oriented lelos that represents a rejection of the past of national rivalries. In this it resernbles the United States, but the EU was founded by the elites of defeated nation-states and has at best a pragrnatic rationale, adrninistered by bureaucrats. Its defenders argue that the EU is a pioneer of a new form of democratic political community, which acknowle d g e st h e r e a l i t y o f m u l t i p l e a n d o v e r lapping locations of power and authority. The European Union liberates both dominant and minority
The stronger the EUleadership .qrows, the rnore it requires cultural power to rnobilize consent. Can a European identity be found that will eventually transcend national loyalties and underpin a European state? On the other hand, is the future likely to be based on an order that acknowledges the prirnacy of nationstates while regulating the respective powers of supranational and national institutions?" Or is the emerging EU sui a novel entity recognizing the mulgeneris tiple sovereigntiesof postrnodernity? The introduction of symbols such as an EU flag and anthem and the preoccupation with a European demos suggests the desire to create a European national community. But symbols in themselves have no efficacy unless they evoke a sense of a concrete collectivity. Whereas nations evoke heroic images of collective will, a concrete cultural comrnunity, and a sacred homeland, the "European"
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nations from their fetish of the nation-state. Moreover, a citizenship conceived in European terms would be less exclusive of immigrant minorities and compatible with the rnulti-cultural realities of contemporary industrial societies. However, this argument is open to two objections. First, this underestimates the degree to which national identities remain ingrained, and are capableof being re-ignited. The comrnitment of post-war Germans to a European democratic idealism did not interfere with the impetus to national reunification in IggO despite statements of alarm by European lJnion leaders. Second, this does not explain how an indefinite ideology can rnobilize European populations to collective action in crisis. Only a potent and def-
HUTcHtNSoN Stateof the Nation inite identity is capable of orienting and mobilizing collective action in order to overcome threats such as eruption of localized wars, Islamist terrorist threats, economic recessions, and the prospect of large-scale irnmigration. A negative anti-Americanisrn is not a sufficient binding force, and indeed could be dangerously destabilizing amid current world crises. The expansion of powers by the European lJnion intensifies a need to find some form of legitimacy and rnandate. To be successful,monetary union will require powers of fiscal coor-dination, and significant powers of taxation to distribute resources frorn richer to poorer regions of Europe as compensation for the loss of exchange rate adjustments. The stronger the EU leadership grows, the more it requires cultural power to mobilize consent.But it doesnot possess even a cornrnon language, let alone a bank of rnyths, mernories, and s y m b o l s t o c o n v e y a s e n s eo f b e l o n g i n g in a cornrnunity of sentiment. Judged by a range of measures, including electoral turnouts, the EU currently lacks popular legitimacy compared with its nation-state cornponents. The danger that the EU may collapse from its own contradictions is all the more likely asan elite-driven integration process gathers momentum despite the absenceof a substantiated European democracy that might legitimize the surrender of nation-state powers. Major gaps in popular opinion have already been exposed by ref-
erenda in France, Ireland, and Denmark. The incapacity of representative national institutions to regulate such central areas such as monetary policy and frontier controls makes it all too probable that grievances over unernployment, irnmigration, and r a c e a n d e t h n i c i t y w i l l b e e x p r e s s e di n populist direct action. COnCluSiOll. Nations are moral communities whose potency comes from what they prornise to their members, a sense of unique identity and meaning in the modern world. They are political units, galvanizing their rnembers to great collective sacrifice, most visibly in warfare. Although they are not derivatives of the modern state, the nation-state is still norrnally the rnost effective vehicle of their objectives. It is difficult to find effective governmental units that do not rest on a strong national core population. The problem is that such national bases are not easily constructed. Like other European innovations, such as dernocracy and industrial capitalisrn, the nation is still putting down roots in the rest of the world. Where there are no prior ethnic traditions on which it can build, the nation rnay well be a long time in forrning. The attempt of states to construct nations in popuiations with strong ethnic differences may well be divisive, generating secessionistnationalisrns. Federal rnulti-national systems seern to be rnore viable where there is a long history of rnutual trust between populations, and where identity-formation is not conceived as a zero surrl garne.
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NO T E S t See Montserrat Guibernau, the
Nation-state",
in
Hutchinson, eds., John (Oxford, Polity, zoor). 2 Hans Kohn, Macmillan, rg{.9).
"Globalization
Montserrat
Guibernau
and and
U n d e r s t a n d i n gN s t i o n a l i s m
The ldea of Nationa/rim, (New York'
of SociolPouer, Yol. 2, 3 Michael Mann, fie Sources Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, t994; W. H.
The PursuitoJ Power, Oxford, Blackwell, tg8,{.; Charles Ti'lly, "lntroduction" in Charles Tilly, ed-, The FormqtionoplotionclStates in WesternEurope(PrinceMcNeill,
t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,r ! / g ) . {, Michael Hechter, ContainingNationalism(Oxford, Oxford University Press,2ooo). g Arthony D. Smith, Ivlths and Menories of the Notion (Oxford, Oxford University Press, rg!g). 6John Hutchinson, "Nations and Culture" in M. Guibernau
and J. Hutchinson Nolionolism(Oxford, Polity, 2oor).
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eds.,
or Nation / Walker Connor, "Nation-building destroying?" World Politics,24 0972). B Brendon O'Leary, "An Iron law of Nationalism and Federation? A (neo-Diceyian) Theory of the Necessity of a Rderal Stootmll, and of Consociational Rescue," MtiomandJfofibnalrn, Volume ], Issue 3 (Zoor). g Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe
l{,g2-r!92" in John Comaroff and Paul Stern eds., Perspect iueson N otionolismond War (Amsterdam : Gordon
Breach Publishers, rggg).
IO For an excellent discussion of these and related issues, see Paul Gowers and Paul Anderson eds. (j-fre QuenionofEurope, London, Verso, rgg/). II For further discussion, see John Hutchinson, "Enduring Nations and the Illusions of European in Willfried Integration" Spohn and Anna Triandafrllidou,
eds.,
Europeonisation, National I dentities
U n d e r s t a n d i n g and Mgration: Chongesin Boundog ConstructionsbehpeenWedern and Eosternfurope (London : Routledge, 2oo2).
of International Affairs
Stateof the Nation
Richard Joseph A half-century ago, the mounting agitation for independent statehood in sub-Saharan Africa eventually forced colonial regirnes to transfer sovereignty to local governtnents. Over* throwing the colonial order has since proven much easier than replacing it with viable nation-states. In the evocativephrase of Sam Nolutshungrr, "out of the debris of failed colonialisms, unitary states and nations were summoned to emerge."' In rnuch ofAfrica, nationhood has lost ground to ethnic and sectional identities. The capacity of stateshas also been eroded by prolonged fiscal crises, corruption, ethno-clientelist politics, and the autocratic manipulation of dernocratic transitions. Anthony Srnith has argued that there is an "intricate relationship between state and nation which the rnisleading 'nation-state' omnibus terrn is liable to obscure."' Many scholars have pondered the likely nature of this relationship in rnultiethnic African territories. State-nations seerned to be the rnost appropriate trajectory in which, according to Otto Pflanze, the "idea of nation" develops within "the chrysalis of the state."3 Such an outcome in 'West Africa implied replicating the dorninant European and North American pattern where "common sovereignty provided common institutions and a comrnon political tradition frorn which emerged a sense of nationhood which transcended cultural differences. "a In other words, the new nations would follow the buildins of states.
Richard Joseph is John EvansProfessor of Political Science and Director
of the Pro-
gram ofAfrican
Stud-
ies at Northwestern University.
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However, as most African countries enter their fifth decade of political independence, the state-nation model is not the only one that has been followed. It is important to recognize the actual state/nation models that have been forged. In general, Africa displays what Alfred Cobban terms the "new medievalism" chalacterizedby cultural and political units existing in a multiplicity of forms and combinations.5 Will the new global order permit Africa to forego ernulating the "singular model" of the nation-state?oOr would African peoples continue to be severely disadvantaged by the failure to establishthe "political kingdom" advocatedby independence leader Kwame Nkrurnah of Ghana? A sarnpling of casesdemonstrates the persistence of the modernist ideal of the nation-state in Africa despite the medievalist reality of multiple, overlapping political forrns.T
Rwanda and Burundi exernplify Smith's concerns about the mirage of the nation-state.'o Hutu and Tutsi are not divided by language or culture, and intermarriage over several decades has attenuated racial demarcations. Yet these communities remain locked in mortal combat within the sarne territorial grid. All attempts to reconfigure the state so that it transcends and diffuses conflict between these communities have met with minirnal success.Tirn Longrnan has fervently argued that it is the state itself that is responsible for the great suffering of these peoples." Indeed, the conclusion reached by Makau Mutua is no longer an unorthodox view' "peace cannot come to Burundi or neighboring Rwanda unless the Hutu and Tutsi are s e p a r a t e db y a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o r d e r . " ' ' He argrres that the members of each comrnunity regard "the exclusive control of the state as an essential precondition to their sur-r,ivalas a people." In Burundi, considerable diplomatic and material resources have been invested in designing a power-sharing arrangement that would be backed by a significant South African security presence. Meanwhile, in post-genocide Rwanda, the hegemony of the minority Tutsi is protected by a military establishment that can contend with much larger neighbors. In these tragic countries, the state to nation path has been blocked by historical fears, while the nation to state path is precluded by unyielding opposition within Africa to the redrawing of post-colonial borders. The African country that has served as the greatest crucible for attempts to configure state and nation is Nigeria. Nigerian scholars regularly debate the country's unresolved "national question" and the "decomposition" of the state.'3Nige-
TheIdea of the Nation-State Persisand its Paradoxical tenCe. With the end of colonial rule, the African country that seemed to have the most unobstructed path in consolidating nationhood and statehood was Somalis overwhelrningly Somalia. shared the same language, religion, and cultural practices. After the Somali state collapsed in r99r, the country's clans and sub-clans increasingly assumed the attributes of territorial political organizations.E Paradoxically, in the rnidst of this disintegration, a model "nationstate" has ernerged in the former British colony of Somaliland in the north of the territory. Economic development, law and justice, and even a peaceful transition of government leaders in this proto-republic can be favorably compared with governance in most recognized African countries.e
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JosEPHStateof the Nation ria illustrates what has remained profoundly paradoxical in much of the continent: the tenacity of the nation-state ideal despite the profound failure to realize it.'a Olusegun Obasanjo, the former military ruler and now elected Pres-
Thgfe
Similarly, the more illusory the idea of the nation, the rnore firmly it is proclairned. "There seemed to be no argument of experience, of failure and bloody disintegration, [that] could challenge the presumption that the state that
iS a powerful attachmentwithin
African societliesto the idea of the nation-state. ident of Nigeria, provides a pertinent I had once decreed to exist, ought to conanecdote. During an attempted coup tinuetoexist."'8This"ought"forNolutd'â‚Źtat in April t99o, Obasanjo listened shungu is not just the normative standard intently to the radio broadcasts of the of the international systemof states,or of putschists. The rnoment they declared continental organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (now their intention to excise the northernmost statesfrom the federation is when African Union), or an aspectof the selfhe became convinced that their insurserving ideology of political and bureaurection would fail.'5 Crawford Young cratic elites. The attachment to nation a n d T h o m a s T u r n e l h a v e s i m i l a r l y and state, he argr.res,is steadily "repropointed to the surprisirrg strength of the duced in the consciousnessof the new idea of a Zairian/Congolese nation generations. For that reason, the incadespite the disappearance of a viable pacitation and disintegration of the state s t a t eo v e r m u c h o f t h e t e r r i t o r y . ' L pointed inexorably to its actual or Sam Nolutshungu wrestles with this atternpted reconstitution. "'o One unfortunate consequence of this conundrurn in his study of Chad, a country that has known rnore years of paradox is that rnany African states have violent conflict than peace. He explores been unable to overcome their weak nuances he believes other analysts have operational capacity. Jeffrey Her$st has overlooked. Nolutshungu suggests that demonstrated the difficulty of state conRobert.f ackson and Carl Rosberg's dis- solidation because of the inauspicious design of African territories and diverse tinction between ernpirical and juridical in Africa fails to take account dernographic patterns.'o However odd statehood the physical configr-,ration of African of the powerful attachment within African societies to the idea of the countries-such as Gambia's location nation-state. He refers to "the near along the banks of a river inside Senegalindestructibility of the idea of the post- they are treated as if divinely ordained, colonial state ... even when there seemed untouchable by hurnan hands. It took a to be no limit to the disintegration of its long war to carve out the state of Eritrea frorn Ethiopia. A subsequent war material organization and assets."'7Following Nolutshungu, it seems that the between these two countries in rgg8, more disabled the African state, the rnore greater in ferocity and in the nurnber of casualties than any other between two tenacious the cornmitment to restore it.
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T R A J E C T O R I E SI N A F R I C A NATION-STATE
African states, has reinforced the unwillingness to tamper with the nation-state ideal established by colonialism and sanctioned by anti-colonialism. Crawford Young has pointed out how few rebellious movements in Africa are secessionistin nature, or even demand a major reconfiguring of the national territory."' Even in Sudan, the main rebel movement-the Sudan People's Liberation Army-has only reluctantly admitted autonomy and independence as goals of its long struggle alongside its persistent dernand for changes in the national government in Khartourn and its Islamist policies.""
moderate leaders. However, high levels of corruption and a persistently poor econornic model have impeded the emergence of a developmental state. Moreover, the increasing provocation of inter-ethnic tensions for political gain, and the falsification of election results in 2OoO to maintain control of the island territory of Zanzibar, are tendencies that could fray Thnzania's fragile achievements as a nation and state.*a C6te d'Ivoire provides a striking example of how the building or dism a n t l i n g o f n a t i o n s a n d s t a t e sd e p e n d s critically on how a country is governed. During the early post- colonial decades, this West African country was DivergentTrajectories. noted for its political stability and ecowhut "." the factors that determine relative suc- n o r n i c g r o w t h . P r e s i d e n t H o u p h o u â‚Ź t cessesand failures in building nations Boigny, the dominant political leader and statesin Africa? Three factors stand f o r o v e r f o u r d e c a d e s , a d o p t e d a n out: the political articulation of ethniciaccommodative approach to various ty, the nature of governance, and the s e c t i o n a l g r o u p s , i n c l u d i n g l a r g e representative character of political instiimrnigrant communities frorn neightutions. Botswana has set the standard b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y B u r k i n a within Africa for national harmony, F a s o .D e s p i t e C d t e d ' I v o i r e ' s w e a k e c o effective governance, and democratic n o r n i c p e r f o r r n a n c e d u r i n g t h e r 9 B o s , i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n B o t s w a n a , s u c c e s s f u l this personalist regime fended off critmanagement of the economy can also be icism from outside, notably from the added to this list. A great advantage French government of Frangois Mitenjoyed by Botswana is the existence of t e r a n d , a n d a t h o m e f r o m p r o cultural groups that share comrnon democracy activists whose confrontastructures and practices. These groups t i o n s w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t g r e w essentially constitute "an ethnic core" i n c r e a s i n g l y v i o l e n t . " 5 T o d a y , n i n e that, according to Anthony Smith, proyears after Houphouâ‚Źt-Boigny's death vides the firrnest base for constructing a i n D e c e r n b e r 1 9 9 3 , t h e k e y i n s t i t u t i o n s nation-state."3 Although Thnzania has o f t h e I v o i r i a n s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g t h e been much less successfulin its econornarrned forces, are fractured. The ic pursuits, it has cohered as a nation Ivoirian nation has also split along despite its ethnic pluralism. Among the r e l i g i o u s , r e g i o n a l a n d e t h n i c l i n e s contributing factors to civil peace have primarily as a result of the xenophobic been the social-democratic ideology of c a m p a i g n s o f H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y ' s its single party and the benign rule of p o l i t i c a l s u c c e s s o r s . Ghana, C6te d'Ivoire's eastern neighphilosopher-politician, Julius Nyerere. Nyerere's successorshave been similarly bor, has followed a different path. After
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JosEPHStateof the Nation the overthrow of independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah, in 1966, the country experienced fifteen years of alternating military and civilian governments. From the end of r98r, Jerry Rawlings oversaw two decades of regime continuity despite rnany institutional changes, first as head of a military regirne until 1992, and then as President of an emergent dernocracy Although Rawlings until 2ooo. belonged to a minority ethnic group, the Ewe, he successfullycrafted multi-ethnic support for his military regime and then his party, the National Dernocratic Congress. In brief, the Rawlings era, despite its fierce political struggles, culrninated in a Ghana that boasted a revitalized state, disciplined security forces, constitutional institutions, and relative national harmony. Assuming progress can be made in overcorning the country's economic weaknesses,and rentseeking behavior is kept in check, Ghana can celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in 2 O a J a sa c o h e r e n t n a t i o n a n d s t a t e . ' 6 Lastly, with its long experience with representative institutions, Senegal has enabled its citizens to successfully navigate the transition frorn single-party rule to multi-party democracy. Although the country still contends with a protracted rebellion in the southern Casamance region, the Senegalese nation has enjoyed considerable coherence and continuity. Among the contributing factors are the lingua franca provided by the Wolof language and the support provided by Islamic sufi orders to secular state authority. The post-colonial history of Senegal has been marked by the vigorous resistanceof its long-serving government leaders, President L6opold Sddar Senghor and his successor,Abdou Diouf, to challenges to their political hegemony, while incrementally permitting greater
scope for civic and political freedoms. When the transfer of power to the main opposition party led byAbdoulaye Wade finally occurred in Zooo, the peaceful nature of this transition mirrored that of Ghana, simultaneously strengthening the state and nation.
Transforming Nationalism via RepubliCanism .one of the main lessons suggestedby this survey coincides with a set of arguments advanced byJtrgen Habermas.'7 Habermas ernphasizes the irnportance of the constitutional state, of republicanisrn and citizenship rights, in fostering a nation that transcends cultural identities. It is these ingredients of modern statesthat render thern both "self-restraining" and transformative of social relations."8 For Haberrnas, a nation rnainly conceived in terrns of sentirnent, history, and culture risks being regarded as an imposition by rninority sections of the population. Behind the "fagade of cultural hornogeneity" could lurk "the oppressive maintenance of a hegemonic majority culture."'e By contrast, a defining characteristic of the constitutional state is the fostering of a nation that substitutes "the universalism of an egalitarian legal community" for "the particularism of a cultural cornrnunity bound together by o r i g i n a n d f a t e . " 3 oI n H a b e r m a s ' f o r rnulation, the constitutional state eventually transforms the nationalisrn that "was originally the vehicle for its succ e s s ." ' ' T h e p a t h o f r e p u b l i c a n i s r n , human rights, and democracy yields "a cosrnopolitan understanding of the nation over and against an ethnocentric interpretation of the nation as a pre-political entity. "3" Haberrnas' arguments are worth citing at length because they run so counter to
W i n t e r / S p r i n gz o o 3
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N A T I O N - S T A TT E R A J E C T O R I E SI N A F R I C A
those increasingly prominent in African political and intellectual circles. Profound disappointments with state and nation have shifted the focus of debate towards an ethnic rnodel of political authority. In his classic formulation, Peter Ekeh distinguished two publics in Africa, one civic and the other primordial or cornrnunal.33 The civic oublic
political authority" in Africa-one based on the sovereign state and the other on traditional orders-as a major African contribution to constitutional government.37An important distingrrishing feature among African polities is whether republicanisrn, constitutionalism, and citizenship rights as defined by Habermas have been deepened or eroded. Siad
The mOre illus0ry theid.ea of thenation, the rnore firrnly it is proclairned. derives historically frorn the colonial authority and lacks norrnative force. The cornmunal public persists alongside the civic and is invested with rnoral authority drawn from traditional structures and practices. In his recent writings, Ekeh has virtually abandoned hope that the national constitutional stateproposed by Haberrnas would be realized in Nigeria. Instead, he contends that Nigerian ethnic cornmunities should assume civic and constitutional responsibilit i e s t h e m s e l v e s . 3Aac c o r d i n g t o t h e s c e nario Ekeh outlines, political authority would devolve, to the greatest extent possible,frorn national to sub-national entities. The prornotion of subnational identities as the basis for the reconfiguration of state and nation in Nigeria-an idea that is vigorously contested by the central government-has assumed a rnalignant form in the ethnic militias that have arisen in parts of the country.35 A quarter-century after Ekeh introduced his "two publics" formulation, the contrast has deepened between ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship.3o Richard Sklar has described the presence of two "co-existing sou.rcesof legitimate
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Barre in Somalia adopted divisive clan politics to defend his authoritarian regime after an early period of both effective and inclusive governance. Juv6nal Habyarirnana in Rwanda responded to an emergent trans-ethnic civil society by fostering Hutu xenophobia in his bid to overcome democratic challengers at home and T\rtsi insurgents on the periphery." Houphouâ‚Źt-Boigny's successorsabrogated the citizenship rights of rnernbers of the large irnrnigrant cornrnunities, and deforrned state institutions, such as the judiciary and armed forces, in their struggle to retain or capture power.te In the case of Kenya, hurnan rights activist, Gitobu Imanyara, states that "it is a rniracle that we have come this far without disintegrating" after, in the words of BiIl Berkeley, the deliberate fostering "of ethnicity as an instrurnent of tyranny" under President Daniel arap Moi.ao If this review is extended to other countries, such as Benin, Mali, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, it would dernonstrate that republican institutionalisrn has proven to be the most rewarding trajectory for Africa's "unfinished" nations a n d s t a t e s . a 'G o v e r n m e n t I e a d e r s i n
JosEPHStateof the Nation Senegal and Ghana manipulated state institutions to thwart the political opposition, but they refrained from wholly undermining these institutions thereby facilitating the consolidation of stateand nation. The situation in Uganda, by contrast, remains uncertain becausethe personalist and increasingly autocratic rule of Yoweri Museveni has stymied the emergence of a constitutional state. It is therefore not simply the hegemony of western political ideologies but Africa's experiential record that sustains the clairn that the republican and constitutional path is the most efficacious for fostering coherent nations and states. This observation reinforces the desirability of engaging political actors and cornmunities through open and democlatic processes.a' Although there are a multiplicity of nation-state trajectories that have been tried in Africa, the greatest political
progress has occurred in countries that pursued a "more abstract level of social integration in terms of the legal implementation of democratic citizenship."43 In an earlier study, I remarked that "the failure to establish a stable democratic p o l i t i c a l o r d e r . . . h a s d e e p e n e dN i g e r i a ' s predicarnent as a state and aspirant nation," a contention that applied to several other African countries.aa The state-nations that appear to point the way to a less turbulent future are those in which the authority of the sovereign state increasingly rests on an edifice of constitutional rights and privileges accessibleto all citizens. In a continent in which conflict and misrule are ever prevalent, greater attention should be devoted to learning how the precarious processes of nation and state-building can be simultaneously fostered through the entrenchment of a democratic political order.
N O TE S t Sam C. Nolutshungu, Limitsof Anorcly: Interuention o n d S t s l eF o r m q l i o n rn Clod (Charlottesville: LTniversity of Virginia Press, t996),
277. 2 Anthony D. Smith, "State-Making and NationBuilding," i n J o h n A . H a l l , e d . , S t o t e si n H i s t o r y (Oxford' Basil Blackwel'l, rg86), z3o.
3 Otto Pflanze, "Nationalism in Europe. r8{,8t87t," t39. See Philip D. Curtin, "Nationalism in Africa, 1945 196g," RerieuofPolitiu z8 (t966), t43r53. . { .P f l a n z e , " N a t i o n a l i s m
in Europe,"
rJg.
8 Anna Simons, "Somalia, The Structure of Dissolution,"
in Leonardo A. MllalOn and Phillin A. H uxtable. The AlriconStoteot a Criticollunrlure' Bcfueenbiin tegrationandReco nfgurofion (Boulder and Lon do n, Lyn ne Rienner Publishers, rgg8), S7 7g. 9 The Republic of Somaliland is in a position of enjoying
empirical
juridical
recognition,
statehood
while
denied
being
in contrast to the reverse situa-
t i o n f o r t h e m a j o r i t y o f A f r i c a n s t a t e s .F o r t h e d i s t i n c tion, see Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Wlry Africa's Weak States Persist," World Politics, 35 (t982)' r-24. In October 2oo2, yer another attempt
g Alfred Cobban, fie Nofion Stote oruJ National SelfDetermination(New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Compa-
was made to reconstitute the Somali nation-state in a
ny, 1969).
meeting of representatives of numerous
6 Smith, "State-Making, " 2!o. For a skeptical view of Africa's prospects, see "Still-Born Nationalisms" in Stanislav Andreski. The Africon Predicoment(New York,
Eldoret, Kenya.
Atherton
and Democracy
Press, t968).
ro Smith, "State-Making," tt
Remarks
/ According to Jeffrey Herbst, "the nation-state's dominance has become so total that it is often forgot-
ber t998.
ten that its current hegemony is really fairly recent. It
Partition,"
was not until the nineteenth centurJ that the postfeudal political
entities were converted into national states in Europe." "Global Exchange and the Future of Existing Nation-States,"
in Wolfgang Danspeckgru-
12 Makau Mutua, tJ include
on State. Market
Emory lJniversity,
Novem-
"The Tirtsi and Hutu
Need a
T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s3. 0 A u g u s t 2 o o o . The extensive literature on these subjects Rotimi
Confiict
T.
in Nigeria
Suberu. Federalism and Ethnic (Washington, DC, Llnited States
Institute of Peace Press, 2OOI) ; Abubakar Momoh and eds., fie Nctionol Qtestion in Ntgeria:Comparotiue Perepe ciiue s (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2 o o 2 ) ; an d' Kun-
ber, ed., The Self-Determinotionof Peoples:Communig, Nation o n d S t o t e i na n l n t e r d e l t e n d eWn ot r l d( B o u l d e r a n d L o n d o n ,
Said Adejumobi,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2oo2),
le Amuwo,
I5.
z3o.
at the Conference in Africa,
factions in
et. al., Federolisnand PoliticqlRestruauringinNigerio
Winter/Spring
2oo3
[I 9 ]
NATION-STATE TRAJECTORIES IN AFRICA
(lbadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books, 1998).
29 Habermas, "The European Nation-state," 289.
r{. Nigerian Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, westled with this paradox in his passionate critique ofthe
dicta-
A comparative study has now been written ofthe damaging consequences of "pathological lromogenization" by
torial regime of General Sani Abacha, The Open SoreofA Continent:A PenonalNorratiae of theNgerian Cnir (New York
Heather Rae, Stote ldentitiu ond the Homogenisotion of Peoples (Cambridge, Cambridge L)niversity Press, 2ooz). This
and Oxford,
term refers to strategies to establish state legitimacy and authority "through the creation of an ostensibly unilied
Crawford
Oxford
Young's
University reriew
of
Press, 19g6). See also book, "The
Soyinka's
Impossible Necessity of Nigeria, A Struggle for Nationhood," ForegmAfaus /g (November,/December 1996),
r39-r42. r$ These remarks by Obasanjo were made in various public meetings16 Craw4ord Young and Thomas Turner, fie Risecnd Decline of theTgiianStote(Madison' University of Wisconsin P r e s s ,r g 8 ! ) . r/ Nolutshungu,
"Limits to Anarchy,"
population." See Rae, !. 30 Habermas, "European Nation-State," 287. 3r Ibid, 288. 32 lbid, 287. "Colonialism and the Two Publics 33 Peter P. Ekeh, in AJiica, A Theoretical Statement," Comporoti'eStudiesin Socr! and Hinog fi (1975): 9I-II2. Ekeh's article is reprinted in Peter Lewis, AJfico,Dilemmaof Dedopmentond Cfrorge(Boulder and Oxford, WesMry Press, IggB), 44-
280-
r8 lbid.
63.
r9 Ibid, 283.
"Urhobo and the Nigerian Feder34 Peter P. Ekeh, ation : W}rither Nigeria?" Internet, http,//w.waado.
20 Jeffrey Herbst, Stctesand Powerin Afica' Comporatiue lesoru in Authoi! ond Control (Princeton. NJ, Princeton University Press, 2ooo). 2t Public lecture, Emory University, 2ool. 22 A'lthough peace talks now revolve around conduct ofa future referendum
the
in which the peoples of
the South would decide between autonomy or indepen dence, John Garang, )eader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), has throughout two decades of warfare rejected secession as the Movement's primary objective. 2J Smith, "State-making," 256-263. 2{ For a discussion of these tensions in Thnzania during the Nyerere era, see HenrT Bienen, "The State and Ethnicity, Integtative Formulas in Africa," in Don ald Rothchild and Mctor A. Olorunsola, State%rousEfinic Cloims' Aficon Poltg Dilemma (Boulder, Westview Press, I 9 8 3 ) , I I 3 I 1 4 . B i e n e n ' s a r t i c l e , a s w e l l a s s e v e r a lo t h e r s
o rg./O rgan izat io ns/UNA/GuestLecture-Ekeh. (Date accessed, October !oor).
ht ml
3g The Odudua People's Congress in Western Nige ria has fostered ethno-nationalism among the Yoruba. For the activities of the Bakassi Boys in Anambra state in Eastern Nigeria, seeNorimitsu Onishi, "Nigerian Militias Wield
Power Through Intimidation," The Neu York Iimes, 6 October 2OO2, 43. "ethnic citizenship" 36 I lirst heard the notion of advanced by Kenyan political scientist, Stephen Ndegwa. 3J Richard L. Sklar, "Af}ican Polities: The Next in Richard Joseph, ed-, Stote,Confict ond Democragin Aftco (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Generation,"
P u b l i s h e r s ,1 9 9 9 ) , r 7 5 - r 7 6 . -I-imothy Longman, "State, Civil Society and 38 Genocide in Rwanda," in ,Slafe,Corfd oncl Demovcrg in
in this volume, are still pertinent to the issuesbeing
Afro, !lg-!98. 39 This deveioprnent in C6te d'Ivoire is part of an
examined here.
unlbtunate
2$ For an excellent synthesis, see Dwayne Woods, "C6te d'Ivoire' The Crisis of Distributive Politics," in TheAJricon Stateat a Cit icalConj unclure, pp. 2 I 3 - 2 3 2. 26 One of the ironies of Africa's post-colonial history concerns the "wager" between the consenative and capitalist Houphoudt-Boigny
and the radical and socialist
Nkrumah
as to whose strategy would prevail. For years it appeared that the fbrmer had won the wager. Of the factos accounting for the reversal in forlune,
none seems
more significant than the contrast between Ghana's successful, and C6te d'Jvoire's, disastrous transition
lrom
trend in several Aliican countries. SeeJel'frey Herbst's cogâ‚Źnt analysis: "The Role of Citizenship
Laws in Multiethnic Societies: Evidence from Afiica." in State, ConJlictand Democrag in Alrica, 267 -283. 4o Bill Berkeley, "An Encore for Chaos?" Atlantic Mont$, (February 1996), p. J2. See also, DiridsondRule, Stcte-SporuoredEthnic Violencein Kenlo (New York, Hurnan Rights Watch/Africa,
r g gf).
4r This notion derives from Sylvester L. Whitaker, "The Unf inished State of Nigeria," Worlduiew 27 098+). 42 See Richard Joseph, "War, State-Making and Denrocracy in Africa, " in Mark R. Beissinger and Craw-
authoritarian rule to pluralist democracy after t989. fbrd Young, eds., Bgond State-C6is? Po:tcoloniolAJricaancL (Baltimore, LonHabermas, "The European Nation State Pod.Souietfuroia in Comporotiue Perepectiue 2/Jtrgen - Its Achievenrents and Its Limits," in Copol Bolakrishnon, don andWashington DC, \4'oodrowWilson Center Press Maffingthe Nation (New York and London, Verso Books, andJohns Hopkins University Press, 2oo2), 2+r-262.
1996),28r-294. 28 See Andreas Schedler, et al., Tle SeFflenrcining S t o t e (, B o u i d e r a n d L o n d o n , L y n n e R i e n n e r P u b l i s h e r s , lg!g);
and also Larry
Diamond,
Touard Corcolilation(Baltimore
Hopkins University Press, tggg), "Political Culture."
LZ o ]
DeuelopingDemocrag,
and London'
The Johns especia'lly Chapter 5,
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
See also, Julius Ihonvbere, "Towards the New Constitutionalisrn in Africa", Centre for I)emocracy and Deve'lPulrr g (London 2ooo). opment, Occosionol {,! Habermas, "European Nation-state," 286. "Autocracy, Violence and Eth{.{- RicharclJoseplr, nomilitary
Rule in Nigeria,"
in.AJrica,!99.
in Sfofe,ConJlictondDemotog
Stateof theNation
Israel Yaakov Kop Israeli society is highly diverse and heterogeneous-characteristics that can be traced to the way in which the country was formed. In rnost "irnrnigrant countries," a large nuclear population absorbed wavesof immigrants. In Israel, immigration itself created rnost of the core population. Irnrnigrants and their offspring make up the vast rnajority of the Jewish population and a significant majority of the population at large.' Therefore, state-building and the forging of a cohesive nation are naturally topics of utmost irnportance for Israel. The expression "nation-building" -uy sound strange when applied to theJewish people. After all, J.*ry is one of the oldest of peoples, and it has maintained its identity for thousands of years. However, I,9Oo years of exile took away one of the important shared fundarnentals of I. this sense, Israeli indepennational life-territory. dence in rg{.8 ushered in a new era in Jewish history and reintroduced the concept of nation-building. The main difficulty Israeli society has faced since independence has been to turn variousJewish immigrant groups and a significant Arab minority into a cohesive national unit. The complexity of integrating the Arab minority into society with all the accompanying political issues is obvious; however, the integration of rnassesofJews frorn various locations also pre-
Yaakov Kop is Director for
of the Center
Social Policy Stud-
ies in Israel.
Winter/Spring Zoo3 [2 1]
N A T I O N - B U I L D I NP GL, U R A L I S MA, N D D E M O C R A C IYN I S R A E L
sents problems. The Jews who gathered in Israel not only came from all over the world but also brought totally different life styles-as evidenced by language and culture, and by rnore trivial features such as cuisine and clothing. The instinctive tendency was to attempt to conjoin the disparate immigrant groups or to use the historicalJewish term, to "ingather the exiles." This approach is closely associatedwith David Ben-Gurion, independent Israel's dominant, first leader. The original approach of the authorities at all levels wasto pour all immigrants into a standard "Israeli cast." They did not succeed; life proved to be stronger. While, in the past, attempts to impose a culture simply did not work, it is simply unacceptable today given the irnportance of political correctness.Today, the prevailing approach is a pluralistic one that seel.s to reconcile unity and diversity. Parenthetically, Israel is not alone in making this effort; it is conventional in many societiesaround the globe." Israeli society has three competing and complernentary long-term goals. First, there is the effort to build a cohesive, functioning nation; second, the attempt to tolerate particularistic preferences of different subgroups; and third, the desire to maintain its democratic foundations. Efforts to cope with these three challenges are overshadowed by an overarching mission to defend itself against a continued threat against its very existence.The dynamic problems created by these three goals express thernselvesin a variety of ways, but especiallyin the following tensions. The first tension setstheJewishness of the Israeli state against its democratic nature. A second tension lies between the need to build a cohesive nation and
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the preferences of individual groups, which are both ethnic and ideological. A tenuous relationship between religion and state, and between different inter'Jewpretations of what it means to be ish" marks a third tension. And a final tension is the increasing coincidence of ethnocultural and socioeconomic divisions. While Jews and Arabs generally confront each other over the tensions between Israeli dernocracy and Jewishness, the other three tensions'generally involve debates within the Jewish cornmunity, between Ashkenazim and Sephardirn, immigrants and veterans, and religious and secular groups. However, it is irnportant to recognize that Jews and Arabs are also increasingly divided along socioeconomic lines; nevertheless, this is often seen as an outgrowth of the larger debate over inclusivenessin aJewish, democratic state.
TheArabMinorityin a "Jewish, Democratic State."when British rule ended in Ig{8, "British Palestine" was divided between Jews and Arabs by what became known as the Green Line according to a tJN resolut i o n . I n t h e f i r s t t w o d e c a d e so f I s r a e l i independence, Arabs who preferred to remain in Israel were an isolated national minority on the economic, political, and social fringes with negligible influence on political and social developments. Twenty years later, the after-effects of the 1967 war facilitated direct contact between Israeli Arabs and those on the other side of the Gleen Line (the West Bank and Gara). This thrust Israeli Arabs into a unique situation: they shared citizenship with Israeli Jews but nationality with Arabs. For Israeli Arabs, their nationality \r'asan obstacle to a full Israeli
KoP Stateof the Nation identity while their Israeli citizenship prevented their full rnernbership in Arab - Palestinian movernent. The encounter with West Bank and Gaza Arabs heightened and radicalized the national consciousness of Israeli Arabs, especially among the educated elites. In the political domain, Arab citizens have becorne increasingly inclined to organize in separate parties. In the early Iggos, the electoral ascent of these parties allowed them to forrn a political bloc that thwarted the possibility of establishing a Right-wing government. Moreover, the Rabin governrnent was able to pass the Oslo accords in the Knesset largely because of its Arab members. In this sense,the Arab population is no longer a marginal and irrelevant player in decision-making processes. Instead, it has becorne a meaningful factor in the political rnobilizations of the two large party blocs, Likud and Labor. Arab voters gained additional influence during the institution of direct elections for the prerniership. Arab voting, or more appropriately abstention, patterns did much to defeat Shimon Peres in rgg6, as they chose to cast unmarked, plain white ballots. This recurred with even greater irnpact in the 2OOI elections. Recently, there has been a rising demand for the rernaking of Israel from a Jewish democratic stateinto "a state of all its citizens." However, this clashes with the very essence of Jewish statehood (especially with an ArabPalestinian state alongside of it). Moreover, it is becoming a major obstacle to the collaborative building of an Israeli nation that balances democracy with limitations that stem from its underlying raison d'6tre.
TheEthnicDivide-WthinJewry. The second combination of goals that seemson a collision course is the building of a cohesive nation while at the same tirne respecting the preferences of large, distinct ethnic groups. This collision is epitornized in the social status of Sephardim (Jews of Asian-African origin). Accounting for alrnost half of the Jewish population, the Sephardim are by no means a rnarginal group. The vision of "ingathering of the exiles" never rnaterialized because of an ethnic gap that refuses to close, even though it has narrowed. The initial barriers have left a distinct irnprint that is now reflected in socioeconornic inequality between Sephardirn and Ashkenazirn (Jews of European descent). Disparities in economic resources,social status.and schooling between Ashkenazim and Sephardim also becarne visible and charged in the r96os and r97os. The c u m u l a t i v ef r u s t r a t i o n g a v er i s e t o p r o t e s t rnovernents, including the prominent Black Panthers. Throughout the years, attempts were made to establish a partisan political carnp that would advance the particularistic interests of the Sephardi cornmunities. These attempts usually failed. As an alternativetheir representatives preferred to fit into the existing party constellation, sometimes using the hardships of the Sephardim to leverage their political advancement. This changed when ethnic estrangement feelings among the haredimled to the creation of Shas-a Sephardi horedi rnovement-in the r9B4 election campaign.3 Over the next fifteen years, Shas becarne increasingly successful, and in the I999 elections, it garnered seventeen Knesset seats and became the thirdlargest parliamentary party. In the
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Ig9os, Shas,which came into being as a protest against the Ashkenazi haredim, became pronouncedly Sephardi-ethnic. Most of its constituents are religious or semi-observant Sephardim disillusioned with the promises of both Likud and Labor. lmportantly, most of the public
enced considerable downward econornic mobillty. Those with higher education levels found this especially distressing. Against this backdrop, Russian immigrants developed an umbrella association that eventually evolved into an ethnically based political party.5The immi-
theArab The C0mplexity Of intesratins minority into society. . . is obiious;however, .
I
t\
'
l-T
the
f
of Tewsfrorn various integration of masseis locafions also presents pioblerns. represented by Shas, unlike the Ashkenazi haredi sector, is fully engaged in Israel's social and economic systems. Most Shasvoters enroll their children in public schools and not in separateinstitutions that Shas has established. This is evidently indicates that Shas's horedism embodied only to a limited extent among its constituents even though they choose to identify themselves with the movement. More recently, the tension between has different Jewish comrnunities become intertwined with the migration ofJews from the former Soviet lJnion, who within less than a decade have becorne Israel's largest population group. The social integration of this immense population may prove to be decisive for the cohesion of Israeli society. The "direct absorption" policy exposed them to market forces during the first and most critical phases of their integration.a This caused a great deal of distress, both at the physical level-in terms of their ability to meet their own basic needs-and at the psychological level. Many immigrants acceptedjobs of lower occupational status and experi-
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Georgetown Journal of International Aflairs
grants' electoral potential was first discovered in the rgg2 Knesset elections, when the parties of the Left replaced those of the Right. Although the imrnigrants contributed only three or four Knesset seatsto the victory of the Left, they were perceived as the main contributors to this victory. This perception gave thern a sense of political clout that was translated into real political power in the 1996 election carnpaign. As they continued to amass power, the immigrants rnoved rather quickly from social marginality to a firm position in the sociopolitical center. It is difficult to predict whether the preservation of a distinct "Russian" community within Israel will last. There is a possibility that this community will gradually carve out a meaningful position in Israel's forrnative pluralistic-sectoral structure, at least in the rnedium term. It is not clear how this will affect their identification with the Israeli collective and their Israeli identity in the long run. To make sure that the trend heads in a positive direction and with sufficient intensity, more efforts to settle their social and economic problems are needed.
xop Stateof the Nation
Democracy?-Rel Conditional i- to rnarital
status, Israeli law invests halakha
giOn and Statg. Another tension (rabbinical law) with binding legal status between Israeli democracy andJewishness forJews. 7Additional statutesenforce reli'Jewish revealsitself when one reads religious norms, such as partial observanceof 'Jewish." Israel's religious" instead of the Sabbath in the public domain on all gious-secular division reflects ideological Israelis, and ensure the provision of reliand cultural differences, and debate over gious servicesby the state. The transforthe status of religion in Israel concerns mation of halakhainto binding law in casthe very definition of Jewishness: can es of marital status for allJews has created inconsistencies between the definition of Jewish nationality and Jewish religion 'Jew" Historically, be separated? it is generala for the purpose of the Law of ly agreed that Jewish identity in the R e t u r n a n d i n t e r m s o f o t h e r i s s u e s( * a r D i a s p o r a w a s d e f i n e d i n r e l i g i o u s riage, divorce, burial). terms. However, the secular revolution When immigration authorities exarnin the West and modernist national ine prospective immigrants' eligibility to thinking c r e a t e d n e w i d e o l o g i c a l move to Israel, they deterrnine applicants' options. Incorporating m o d e r n i s t Jewishnessby applying a very lenient test.8 national content into Jewish identity In regard to personal status, however, facilitates a Jewish affiliation that is not more stringent religious rules apply. necessarily related to religion. HowevC o n s e q u e n t l y ,w h e n i m m i g r a n t s t u r n t o er, since the Law of Return-which stipthe religious establishrnent to settle their u l a t e s t h e r u l e s o f i m m i g r a t i o n i n t o personal affairs, many encounter serious Israel-is based on the irnmigrant'sJewdifficulties. Amidst the resulting severe ish affiliation, a full separation of relitension, there have been cases where gion and state in Israel is problernatic. immigrants who were victims of PalestinPublic controversies over religious ian terror were not given a Jewish burial, issues in Israel are as old as the state despite their Jewish self-identification, itself. Legislation that imposes religious due to official intransigence. Such clashnorms on the public at large has aggra- es, irrespective of how they are resolved, vated social tension by evoking charges invest the conflict among goals on the of religious coercion among secularist religion-state axis with great intensity. circles. In contrast, various rulings of At the sarne tirne, rising fundarnentalthe Supreme Court have infuriated isrn arnong OrthodoxJews has prompted religious groups, especially haredi. parts of this cornrnunity to lean increasControversies over affairs of religion ingly toward cultural and social segregaand state focus largely on constitutional tion. When segments of the religious and legal issues. Still, Israel's rnanage- population went on a broader offensive, ment of the religion-state relationship large allocations of state resources to the is not rnerely a matter of constitutional Aaredisector led to a secular counterprinciple; it is a question that resurfaces reaction. This, in turn, served to rein many practical concerns. ignite basic controversies that had been Due to the highly problematic and dorrnant before the rise of Orthodox political nature of separating religion and political influence. The most conspicustate, Israel has not asyet managed to draft ous manifestation of the counter reaca constitution.u In all matters pertaining tion was the impressive performance of
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the Shinui Party in the 1999 elections. Shinui, which had been on the verge of dissolution, obtained six Knesset seats largely due to an aggressiveelection campaign that centered on the slogan, "Stop the haredirn from taking over the country. " Therefore, even in Israel's sixth decade of independence, the relationship between stateand religion, andJewish ethnocultural and religious identity remains problematic.
Disparities Economic andTheir Ethnic Incidence. Thereis much
was too high, and perhaps the nationbuilding process should have been given higher priority. The regional-development process also fell short of expectations. Peripheral towns were left behind and hardly benefited from the economic prosperity that central parts of the country enjoyed during part of the last decade. I t s e e m st h a t t h e s e r e g i o n s a r e c o n t i n uing to pay for planning errors that were rnade in the IgsOs. Notably however, there have also been some successesin the past decade, as some development towns such as Yoqne'am and Migdal ha-'Emeq have found their way to prosperity by sirnultaneously taking in immigrants from the former Soviet Union and attracting entrepreneurial business activity, especially in high-tech industries.
evidence that demarcation lines of social gaps tend to coincide with ethnic divisions, i.e., the lines that separateJews from Arabs, Sephardirn frorn Ashkenazim, immigrants from veterans, etc. In other words, socioeconornic disparitieswhich exist in every society-reinforce ethnic separation in Israel. The overlap Totat sesrebetween socioeconomic disparities and ConcludingRemarl(S. making nationlack any interaction among of ethnic divisions are gation-the building much harder to achieve. lJnforgroups-is inconsistent with social tunately, this has been the state of affairs c o h e s i o n . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e 'existence and recognition of lines of i n l s r a e lf o r q u i t e s o m e t i m e . diversity are not necessarily adverse to Israel's great challenge at the dawn of the twenty-first century is to reverse the s o c i o - n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y ; i n f a c t , s u c h trend towards increasing economic gaps. lines sornetimes facilitate coexistence. One rnanifestation of the gaps in recent T h i s i s t r u e w h e n t h e a c t i o n s o f o n e years has been severe unemployment, group do not drastically harm neighrnembers boring groups, either because the especiallyin towns inhabited by of weak population g:roups. Economic group lacks the strength to cause such policy in the second half of the r99os h a r m o r b e c a u s ei t d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f r a i n s pursued price stability, almost to the from doing so. To achieve such a situation, the various groups must be exclusion of all other goals. Even though aware of the minimum requirements it accomplished much in this regardamong high-inflation countries, includof the nation at large, and the nation's ing Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey, only leaders must act in a way that respects the groups' particular needs. In this Israel managed to almost fully curb inflation-Israel paid for this dearly in terms m a t t e r , i t s e e m s , I s r a e l i s o c i e t y m u s t of growth and unemployment. Evidently, still pass five difficult tests. 'Jewish First, on the and democratic Israel's economic leaders may not have realized that the social cost of this poiicv state" axis, the willineness of the Arab
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KoP Stateof the Nation sector to integrate in the Israeli society, and the state's willingness to facilitate it, will be put to test. This requires that Arabs accept the basic fact that Israel is a Jewish state. This acceptance lies at the core of the comprornise embodied in the
religion that they come to know rnost intirnately are the hurdles that religion officials place in their path when they apply for certifications to rnarry, divorce, etc. Third, with respect to the religionstate relationship, it will be necessaryto
ich ic disparities-wh Socioeconom exist in every society-reinforce a
in seDaration I
ethnic
T]-t
ISTAEI.
partitioning of Palestine into two contiguous national identities, one Jewish and one Arab (or Palestinian, if they so prefer). In turn, theJewish rnajority and the central governing institutions will have to invest the terrn "democratic" with rnore meaningful content. Most importantly, it will have to rnake an effort, not only to narrow the economic and social disparities, but it will also have to acknowledge the Arabs' sectoral, not just personal, needs. This rnust include an increased sensitivity to the problernatic dual identity of Israeli Arabs as Palestiniansand Israelis. Second, to further the nation-building process, the integration of immigrants frorn the former Soviet Union into Israel'sJewishpopulation at large must be enhanced. The rnelting-pot approach is dead, but its alternative is not the forrnation or preservation of barriers between ethnic groups. Importantly, the immigrants came from a country where authorities had brutally severed relations withJews abroad and stifledJewish life for seventy years. The lack of Jewish culture among the irnrnigrants is unlikely to resolve itself automatically. LJnfortunately, "Russians" who wish to retrace their steps to mainstrearn Judaism encounter only obstacles. The aspectsof the Jewish
keep both poles of the relationship separate and concurrently related. As issues like the irnposition of Sabbath observance by public policy are continually being litigated in the courts or irnposed by adrninistrative measures, the selfperceived victirns are showing rising signs of opposition. In these rnatters, the "status-quo approach" is steadily eroding in both directions and will r e q u i r e m o r e s y s t e m a t i ct r e a t m e n t . o W i t h i n t h i s g e n e r a l t o p i c . p r e s s u r et o correct the distortion concerning the ultra-Orthodox population group, whose young do not serve in the army and rnany do not participate in the labor force, will rnount. Fourth, one of the pillars of democracy is freedorn of association, especially in the forrn of political parties. In this respect, Israel appears to suffer frorn an "excessof democracy."'o The profusion of parties not only impairs the efficiency of governance, but also helps to create social fissures. In the rggos, election rules were changed to allow for direct election of the prime minister, but this only strengthened various splinter parties. Deliverance, it seems,will not come from any form of technical change, but from a more comprehensive educational and public effort. Destabilization of gov-
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erning authority is a grave and present rnenace to democratic rule. Fifth, strengthening of civic society is meant to create a complernent, not an alternative, to government. Civil initiatives are proliferating in Israel, especiallyin the defenseofpersonal rights, quality ofgovernance, and the environment, to name only a few. The great test in this matter is whether the two sides, civil society and government, will have the wisdom to regard each otler as partners and not as rivals. These issuesare by no means sirnple, and they are further cornplicated by the need to cope with a continual security threat-a daily burden that few countries have to endure. Some consider the security factor a catalystthat can strengthen the nation; others view it as a weakening
agent. Either way, it is a factor that will continue to impact Israeli society and its nation-building process for sorne time to corne. On the positive side, Israel has already passed major parts of these tests quite successfully, overcoming sorne social obstacles while constructing an advanced econorny at the same time. There are good reasons to look towards the future with optirnisrn that Israeli societywill maintain the delicate balance between preserving unique group identities and forging a cohesive society. Author's Note: This artic'le is based on a project on the "Challenges Confronting Pluralistic Societies" jointly sponsored by the Center lbr Social Policy Studies in Isracl and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, and a subsequent book (co-authored w i t h R o b e r t L i r a n ) t i t l e d . S ! r e k i n g T o g a h e r , TI h ' rea e hE x p e r imentin Plurolism.
NO T E S t A c c o r d i n g t o t h e A n n u c l S t o t i s t i c o l A b s t r o c t 2 o po ul b lished by the Central Bureau ofStatistics the accumulated direct contribution of net immigration to the population growthwas approximately {2 percent. The remaining $8 percent is attributed to natura'l inclease. This is, of course, an underestimate since the immigrants themseltes also contributed a major part of the natural population growth. See "Annual Statistical 'Iable Abstract 2ool," Shnaton 2.2, 53 http://w.cbs.gov.il.
Israel was established. This declaration refers to the 'Jewish country as a state in the Land of lsrael which will guarantee complete equality of social and political rights without regard to religion, race or sex." The Supreme Court in its major rulings has used this declaration in the way that other countries use a constitution. / The same applies to Christian, Muslim, and other faiths in lsrael, all of whose marital nlatters are determined by their respective religious authorities.
2 See for example the manil'est of the group organized byAmitai Etzioni and others, http,//w.gm.
enable and benefit
edu/-ccps/DWTJ.html
way). In order
3 Outside Israel, the Haredi community is commonly referred to aslJltra-Orthodox, a term that dis-
used, as an act of historical .justice, a counter nrirror of the Nuremberg Laws (r935), i" which the Nazis
tinguishes Haredim fro m other religi o us gro ups. This
d e f i n e d s o m e o n e a sJ e w i s h i f o n e o f t h e g r a n d p a r e n t s wasJewish. 9 The "status quo" remains non-formalized and is more of an underlying perception that encourages a
definition
fails to convey fully their uniqueness with-
in Israeli society. For example, they are exempt from compulsory military sewice and, by and large, do not parucrpate in the labor force 4 As opposed to the previous, more organized method which referred the immigrants to "public absorption centers" for a limited, transition period. $ The Russian immigrant group grasped relatively quickly the importance anism
to
of organizing a political mech-
represent their
rights. Other
immigrant
8 The
intention
was to create a law that would
all Jews (defined in the widest to do so, the criteria set in the law
dialogue between the religious and the secular in mat'T'he ters of State. term itself is found ftequently in political written
discourse. The source of it is a document in October
1947, even before the establish-
ment of the independent
state, by a prominent religious leader. See Yoel Rappel, "Religious and Secular Relations in the Brst Year of Statehood, " ldon (r988) '
g r o u p i n g s h a v e n o t b e e n s o f a s t o r s u c c e s s f u li n t h e i r
r3r.
attempts to become politically active and significant.
ro See S. N. Eisenstadt, Porodoxesof Democrog' Fragli(Washington, DC, The !t, Continui! ond Chonge WoodrowWilson Center, rggg).
6 A Declaration of Independence was signed on May r,[. rg,[8 at the convention
I e B]
u,here the State of
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Stateof theNation
in Eurasia Ian Bremrner The United States's increased interest in Eurasia over the past year has added confusion to an already rnuddled debate over nation- and state-building in the region. In particular, U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan drew global attention to what and who a post-Thliban regirne would look like. But the Bush Adrninistration's blanket caution over "nation-
l a n B r e m m e ri . President of the Eurasia Group,
and Senior
Fellow and Director Eurasia World
Studies
of
at the
Policy Institute.
building" in Afghanistan blurred the crucial difference the former between state-building and nation-building' concerns developing institutions of governance; the latter concerns developing a shared identity. Putting the issue this way suggestswhy states are usually easier to build than nations. Identities generally take time to develop; they cannot be easily "built" frorn scratch. On the other hand, institutions are concrete and constructing them is more a rnatter of effort. Of course, establishing institutions does not mean they will automatically be legitimate or effective, and this is why the real question concerns neither state-building nor nation-building per se, but the relationship between the two. Can states and nations be built simultaneously? Is a senseof nationhood necessaryfor effective state-building or is effective governance necessary for a sense of nationhood? Does pursuing either state- or nation-building help or hinder the pursuit of the other?
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After the collapse of the Soviet (Jnion, the countries of Eurasia were suddenly confronted by these questions and others. How did these countries build their
orny, can occur without the help of state institutions. Markets do not emerge from thin air: Genuine markets require statesto establish and enforce the rule of
While bOth natiOn- andstate-building can take plq.g without one another, neither is very succ6ssfulamid econornic stagnation. states? Was nation-building a priority, and did it subvert state-building? And how did nation-building and statebuilding interact with economic reform and recovery? The answersto these questions are of both theoretical and policy interest, especiallyin a post-g/tr world.
law. While econornic change can take place in the absence of full-fledged national identities, reforrns are easier to irnplement and manage when they are legitimized by national-that is, communal-support. Not surprisingly, the complex relationship between nation, state, and economy has had a direct irnpact on the frorn history know that both states stability of countries. According to the We and nations have ernerged without one Lehrnan Brothers Eurasia Group Stability Index (LECSI). th" -ort stable another. In general, the experience of Western Europe reflects the rise of countries in East Europe include Huns t a t e s b e f o r e n a t i o n s , w h i l e n a t i o n s gary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Croatia-all generally existed before states in East- of which are more or less robust states, ern Europe. Thus, France existed as a h a v e s t r o n g n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s , a n d functioning econornies. Azerbaijan, state long before the French nation came into being. Meanwhile, Estonians Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, each shared a common identity long before of which are creaky states with complex Estonia emerged as a state. Although or weak identities and even weaker neither phenomenon is a precondition economies, lag behind. for the other, states can facilitate the No country develops in a vacuum, rise of nations by influencing socializa- especially in today's highly interdepention processes,and existing nations can d e n t w o r l d . T h o s e c o u n t r i e s w i t h help the emergence of statesby provids o u g h t a f t e r e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s ,e s p e ing thern with legitimacy. cially energy resources, invariably enjoy Both statesand nations affect and are a better relationship with the West, and affected by economic reform; neither particularly the United States. Councan be easily constructed during eco- tries of sorne strategic irnportance to the nornic misery, where simple survival is U . S . - l e d w a r o n t e r r o r i s r n a r e a l s o especiallylikely to be snccessful.Howevthe order of the day. It is similarly diffihow imagine drastic econornic er, Western support is not necessarily cult to reform, especially toward sornethi.ng as beneficial to state- and nation-building, or even to stability in general. In institutionally complex as a market econ-
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Stateof the Nation BREMMER some cases,excessiveattention from the West can afford leaders the flexibility to skew these processes, and actually set back progress towards building effective s t a t e sa n d g e n u i n e n a t i o n s .
and Thjiks did not share as significant a s e n s eo f n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y . Last but not least, the post-Soviet stateswere also left with different potentials for economic growth and reform. Once again, the Balts were especially advantaged, having acquired rnany marSoviet Collapse. Sincethe Soviet ket-oriented skills even during Soviet collapse left different countries in very tirnes. None of the other republics had any experience with free rnarkets, but different positions, it should come as litRussia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan had tle surprise that post-Soviet reconstruction has varied greatly in Eurasia. While substantial proven oil and gas reserves, rnost successorstatesemerged with miniwhich carne to play an important role in mal state institutions, four republics were their developmental strategies. Despite all these differences, countries exceptions. Russia, which served as the center of the Soviet totalitarian state and in this region still shared several similarempire, had numerous governmental ities. First, ail of the post-Soviet states have had to build statesand reforrn their institutions, and an effective, well-trained elite. The Kremlin's writ may not haveleft economies; second, rnost have also had Moscow, and regional governments were to create a national identity to underpin both weak and rambunctious, but some- their statesand provide them with legitimacy; and third, both of these processes thing of a genuine state did exist in Rushave been deeply affected by Russia'spresia. Sirnilar institutions were left behind in the Baltics-Estonia, Latvia, and eminent position in Eurasia. Lithuania. By the Soviet collapse in r99I, The major fault line has been between Russia and the rest. Having suffered had managed to evolve rudimentary they state apparatuses,which given their small through Russian irnperialism and Soviet hegernony, many of these countries cast size, also proved capable of actually runn i n g t h e c o u n t r i e s . O t h e r S o v i e t themselves rnainly in opposition to Rusrepublics enjoyed no such advantages, sia, both in terrns of national identity and ernerged independent with alrnost and state sovereignty. In turn, Russian has been strongly nothing in the form of state institutions. nation-building There were also substantial differdefined in terms of its past glory, which ences in terms of national identity. For necessarily irnplies asserting some degree a variety of historical reasons, virtually of superiority over non-Russians. Russian state-building has also involved an all ethnic Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Armenians, and Georgians had a atternpt to use its dominant rnilitary, clear and consensual sense of who they economic, and demographic position to maintain some degree of control over were and where they came from. Meana n d Eurasia, the so-called "near-abroad. " while, Russians, lJkrainians, Moldovans had varying degrees of national identity; some parts of their Some countries expected-and have populations had a strong sense of identity, others did not. Azeris, Belarusans, faced-little dlfficulty with nationKazakhs, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, building. Those at the forefront of the
NationsandStatesafterthe
Estonia,Latvia, Lithuania.
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perestroifraera independence movements, such as the Estonians. Latvians. and Lithuanians, quickly consolidated their nations. Indeed, for these countries, national identity was far more advanced
one third of the population, mostly Russians and Russian speakerswho reject its claims to sovereignty and long for Soviet times. In turn, corruption and weakness of state institutions has ham-
SinGethe SOvietcolapseleft different countries in very different positions. . . postSoviet reconstniction has viried greatli in Eurasia. than the incipient state. Local challenges to the broader national identity remained, especially Russian and Russian-speaking minorities. But the principal problem was to ensure that local institutions could rnanage cornplex societies and economies. Over the last decade, these countries have largely focused on irnproving their political and economic performance. have been On this count, their successes irnpressive, and all three countries are set to join the European LJnion in late 2oo4. These econornic successeshave, in turn, been critical in making oftenrestrictive ethnic policies palatable to their Russian and Russian-speaking inhabitants. Ukraine had. a considerably Ukfaing. larger and more dispersed population. lJkraine's population has significant regional, Iinguistic, and cultural differences, frorn the Russia-oriented industrial southeast to the more traditionally Ukrainian west. This cornbination of a weak state and disjointed nation has hobbled both state-building and nation-building in Ukraine. The Ukrainian state continues to face dubious legitimacy among more then
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pered efforts to create a common identity and overarching loyalties between the country's tJkrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking [Jkrainians, and Russian-speaking Russians. Last but not least, weak state institutions and national unity have irnpaired economic reform. Necessary reforms would require closing down rnuch of the eastern and southeastern rust belt industries, which would disproportionately disadvantage Russians and Russian speakers, further underrnining both state- and nation-building efforts. ljkraine's relations with Russia and the 'West reflect these complexities. Ukraine's elites desire integration into European structures, such as the European lJnion and NATO; however, they dare not risk alienating their Russian and Russianspeaking populations, and annoying Russia. As a result, early Ukrainian foreign poliry had for the most part been characterized by a difficult tension-a simultaneous desire to remain on good terrns with both the West and Russia. Most recently, with instability around President Kuchma and integration into international institutions appearing increasingly distant, Ukraine has moved closer into the Russian orbit.
BREMMER Stateof the Nation
Armenia,Georgia,Moldova.
Black Sea through Georgia has helped ameliorate matters by promising the With highly developed sensesof national identity, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldocountry economic resources with which to pay for its turmoil. va all shared the sarnetask of constructing Not surprisingly, these internal comstates on the rubble left behind by the Soviet collapse. None had any particular plexities have affected these countries' economic advantages, and all faced relations with Russia. Armenia, which debilitating interstate ethnic struggles has traditionally looked to Russia as its that only deepened their crises and cornpatron and protector, continues to do so. Georgia, in contrast, seesRussia not plicated state-building efforts. just in an as a potential hegemon, but as a Armenia becarne ernbroiled arrned struggle with Azerbaijan over its country that is directly promoting secesArmenian-populated o f sionist movements within its territory province and even prepared to intervene if the Nagorno-Karabakh even before r99r. The conflict remains unresolved today, e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e C h e c h e n c o n f l i c t and remains a drain on Arrnenia's eco- d e r n a n d s u c h a m o v e . M e a n w h i l e , nomic resources, a focus of nationalist Moldova, whose sovereignty and exismobilization, and an irnpedirnent to a tence is threatened by Russians, Russian speakers, and the Fourteenth Arrny, shift from external policy to rnuchneeded domestic reforrrr. similarly seesRussia as a major threat. After independence, Moldova quickly descendedinto genuine war with Russians B e l a f U S . T h e s t a t e so f C e n t r a l A s i a , and Russian speakers inhabiting the left bank of the Dniester River. The self- Azerbaijan, and Belarus had a fundastyled tans-Dniester Republic was horne mentally different problem, the nation and still itself was a rnuddle. Tlarist and Soviet to Russia's Fourteenth A"-y, rule together had uprooted societies and remains beyond Chisinau's forrnal control. Econornic rnalaise and incornplete cultures, arbitrarily drawn borders, and Moldocreated fixed, definable nationalities with state building continue to plague va, and, as the 2oor electoral victory of Western-style institutions. Moreover, their leaders had, alrnost without excepthe Cornmunists showed, discontent with tion, come from the communist party the current state of affairs is deep. G e o r g i a ' s c i r c u m s t a n c e s r n a y b e apparatus, and inherited the political even worse than those of Armenia and trappings of a state. Yet no sense of legitimacy came to these leaders alongMoldova. Three of its regions, arnounting to sorne half of its sovereign territoside independent rule. Here, nationin rebelconfronted the state open b u i l d i n g w a st h e p r i o r i t y . ry, Without existing legitimate institulion and have been effectively beyond central control at different times. tions to guide thern, the new leaders confronted the problem of how to Confrontation with the Ossetians in t h e n o r t h e a s t , t h e A b k h a z i n t h e ensure authority. Although there was no lack of democratic langr.ragearound the northwest, and the Ajars in the southnewly created governments, nationwest placed Georgia's state- and nation-building efforts on hold. An building was a foreign process. These oil pipeline connecting Baku to the leaders have all addressed this problem
Central Asia, Azerbaijan,
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similarly, with perhaps one exception. President Niyazov of Tu.rkmenistan has occupied one extreme, single-handedly building a cult of personality that has subsumed the national identity of the entire country. Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Heidar Aliev of Azerbaijan, and Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus have also chosen to build autocracies that, besides supposedly building states (in the manner of many of Europe's interwar leaders), are also supposed to serve as foci for national identity formation. Only Kyrgyz President Akaev has sought a more open, even-handed rule, but even here the temptations to move towards a consolidated authoritarianism have been high. All these countries have also had significant difficulties implementing econornic reform, and their weakness as both nations and statesis largely accountable for this. But Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, have substantial energy reservesthat have begrrn generating considerable incomes for their governments. Will this wealth also foster state- and nation-building? Oil, as history shows, can be a rnixed blessing for states by creating seerningly boundless wealth while also pr-ornoting the formation of top-heavy, overly bureaucratized states that appear strong, but are in fact quite brittle. Equally important, oil wealth tends to increase economic inequality and social tensions, which hinder nation-building. Not surprisingly, these countries have had ambivalent relations with Russia (with the notable exception of Belarus, which has effectively tied its fate to Moscow). As a rule, they have promoted nation-building at the expense of local Russians and Russian speakers,many ofwhom emigrat-
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ed in the rggos. Meanwhile, although these countries have actively atternpted to develop strong institutions, most of them have had to accept some degree of Russian hegemony, including the stationing of Russian troops and border guards on their territory.
Russiaand the Russians. The biggest question is the state of the Russian nation itself. Shocked and confused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, within which they enjoyed the exalted status of the "leading" nation, rnany Russians turned to nationalism as a substitute ideology. Although Russian nationalism could have had disastrous conselluences, the worst possibilities did not materialize. Most importantly, Russians in the "near abroad" did not pose a real challenge to nation- and state-building efforts in the newly independent countries of Eurasia-a side-effect of Russian nationalisrn that could have engrrlfed the entire region in conflict. Newly empowered nations were expected to create ethnically homogenous states, relegating Russians to backwards position, and Russians were expected to resist. Yet alrnost without exception, the Russian question proved to be a dog that didn't bark. In many states,the Russiansproved too fragmented, or had too few resources to rnake a difference. Sorne made the best of their new situation; others left for Russia. In places where Russians were a majority of the local population, such as parts of Latvia, Crimea, and northern Kazakhstan, they organized. However, they proved ineffectual; most Russians in the Balts saw better economic opportunities where they were than in neighboring Russia, and opted into the new system, however comparatively difficult.
B R E M T i TsEtR a t e O ft h e N a t i O n Equally important, Russia chose not to get involved in the Russian issues of other countries. Instead, it chose to employ primarily economic leverage to ensure a close orbit to Russia and left internal politics to the discretion of local leaders. Even more encouraging has been the fact that President Madimir Putin has given up the idea of Russian expansionism, allowing the United States to base troops in neighboring states (Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic), closing down bases in Vietnam and Crrba, and effectivelyaccepting that the Russian nation will pursue regional interests. There has also been an aggressiveside to Russian nation-building, particularly inside the country. This has found its strongest expression in Chechnya, which has also becorne the most serious challenge to Putin's rule. Relatively unkno*n prior to his election, Putin made his way to the presidency largely because of his tough line on the Chechen conflict, and the promise of quick victory. Several months after his election, he indeed declared victory. However, the downing of a military helicopter with over roo Russian casualties in mid-2ooz, followed by the Chechen occupation of a Moscow theater in October, has mobilized an already hardened Russian sentiment against Chechnya. In some waysanalogous to the U.S. war on Iraq, many criticize the Russian president's handling of the conflict, but few are prepared to suggest alternatives and President Bush himself recently recognized Chechnya as a domestic issue. Still, for the first time since he assumed power, Putin's rule faces a legitimate challenge. If he fails to respond firmly to the Chechen challenge, he risks looking weak; if he
responds too strongly, he risks alienating a war-weary population. Such is the delicate balance between nation-building, s t a t e - b u i l d i n g .a n d e c o n o m i c s .
Eurasia'sChallenges after The events of Septernber rr, 9lll. 2OO2 rnay or may not have changed the world, but they had a profound impact on many of the statesand nations in Eurasia. For the past decade, U.S. involvement in Eurasia was dominated by two contradictory policies: rnaintaining a friendship with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and bringing Caspian energy reservesto market through a new East-\Mesttransit corridor that bypassedRussia. After 9/rr, U.S. policy towards Eurasia shifted dramatically. creating tremendous opportunities for the countries of the region. Rather than rernaining a marginal part of the world where regional powers fought a "New Great Game," Eurasian politics are now driven by shared global interests and consensus. Two factors are particularly critical to the recent redesign of Eurasian politics. First, the foundation of a new U.S. alliance with Moscow, based on longterm shared security interests (in the Caucasus,Central Asia, South Asia, and China), has created a link between U.S. interests and those of Eurasia's most dominant country. Second, the United States's new security interests have reversed the economic and political disparities created in the region by energy politics. Coincidentally, the countries most important to the U.S.-led war on terror (Afghanistan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan) were those that had the fewest natural resources and were among the poorest in Eurasia. International attention-especially direct security support, stepped up economic
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aid, and diplomatic engagement-had been sorely lacking in these countries. The consequences of recent U.S. interest in Eurasia have been mixed. On the positive side, rnany of the countries now receiving closer attention from Washington- Afghanistan, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic-have been sorne of the least opaque economic systernsin the
been relegated to Russian influence. More importantly, democrary and ethnic tolerance may lose out across the region if the United States chooses to overlook domestic problerns in exchange for support for its war on terrorism. One thing is certain: Should these countries be drawn closer into Russia's orbit, state and nation building in all
Westernsupport iS notnecessaTily beneficial to state- and nation-building, even to stability in general. region. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan, which has been considerably closed to economic reforrn, has moved to privatize the country's cotton industry, support development of small and mediurn enterprise, and regrrlate trade-significant surprises given deteriorating economic openness and investment climate in neighboring Kazakhstan. Perhaps the most stabilizing post-9/rr relations developrnent is friendlier between the United States and Russia, and the tacit agreement on a division of Eurasia into spheres of influence that seems to be in the worls. Russia appears willing to permit the United Statesaccess to the CentralAsian states(and to a lesser extent Georgia) as allies in the war against terrorisrn. Whether or not this bodes well for democracy and human rights in Central Asia, it surely bodes well for state- and nation-building in that region. International attention has not been without road burnps. Ukraine has been transformed frorn strategic significance, as an ally of the United States and counterbalance against Russia, into strategic irrelevance in the new geostrategicenvironment. Belarus and Moldova have
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three will be affected. Belarus is likely to lose all sense of a distinct identity, and its state rnay increasingly become a province of Russia. lJkraine's diverse population could well be polarized into pro- and anti-Russian components, a developrnent that will not only underrnine nation building but possibly also de-legitimize the Ukrainian state in the long run. With an already fractured population and weak state-building efforts, Moldova's fate will likely be similar to Ukraine's. Meanwhile, the Eurasian states still have a considerable distance to travel to make their economies attractive to international investment. Afghanistan has reclairned its position as the world's leading supplier of narcotics, and Prirne Minister Karzai's position rernains tenuous. The United State'sinclusion of Iran in the axis of evil and continued comprehensive U.S.-led sanctions handicap econornic development in the country. However, an increasing likelihood of regime-change rnay drarnatically impact this situation. More generally, the downturn in the global economy has not helped rnatters, and has decreasedinterest in ernerging markets worldwide. The
BREMMER Stateof the Nation Iy. Economic opportunities and reforms may not be a panacea, but they do appear to be a necessary part of state- and nation-building. and What the states. nations. economies of Eurasia will look like ten years from now is difficult to predict. An C O n C l U S i O n . E u r a s i a ' s e x p e r i e n c e s impressive feature of the complex dynarnics of state-building, nationsuggest important lessons for the future building, and economic reform in Euraof the region, and about the general relasia over the past decade was that they tionship between state- and nationwere largely peaceful and internally building. Most significantly, while both processes can take place without one rnanaged. As a result, Eurasia was stable. another, neither is very successful amid Armed conflicts and ethnic tensions were not unknown, but state-building economic stagnation. The future lools and nation-building proceeded in a most prornising for countries like Estonia. Latvia. and Lithuania that have used more or less orderly fashion. The U.S.led war on terrorisrn brings with it great national legitirnary and effective institueconornic and political opportunities, tions to irnplernent economic reforms. Moreover, these countries have been able but it also delivers thern unequally. At the sarnetime, the era of Eurasian isolato buy off their Russian minorities. Meanwhile, both countries with strong tion and independence is unequivocally national identities, like Arrnenia and over. The future of Eurasian countries Georgia, and countries developing are now inextricably linked to broader strong state institutions, like Kazakhstan p o l i t i c a l , s t r a t e g i c , a n d e c o n o r n i c dynarnics. Only time will tell how they and Uzbekistan, have had difficulties respectiveaffect the region's future. and nations will developing states
strategic irnportance of petroleum may also have a double-edged impact on the energy-producing states of Eurasia, enhancing their wealth on the one hand, but reinforcing authoritarian rule and widening incorne gaps on the other.
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It's the Regime,Stupid in Afghanistan TheImperatiue of State-Building Marin Strrnecki The source of the global terrorist threat lies not only in a shadowy international terrorist network but principally in the support and protection afforded to terrorists by radical regirnes. It is only when these regimes are replaced by rnoderate and civilized statesthat the threat of international terrorism will begin stateto abate. Therefore, the issues of nation-building, building, and postwar political reconstruction becorne as irnportant an elernent of war as the exercise of conventional rnilitary power. Nowhere is this proposition more evident than in Afghanistan, the first target in the war against terrorisrn.
Marin Strmecki i' Senior Vice President and Director
of Pro-
grams at the Smith Richardson tion,
Founda-
and has written
and lectured widely on Afghanistan
since the
I98os.
MilitaryStrategywithouta PoliticalComponent. Immediately after 9/rr, senior U.S. policymakers gave little thought to dovetailing the United States'srnilitary strategy with a political strategy to create a moderate and pro-Western postwar state in Afghanistan. President Bush, irnpatient to strike back at the United States's enernies, adopted an approach limited to destroying the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda command and support structure in the country. As a result, senior U.S. policymakers struck a strategic partnership with the NorthernAlliance. Alongwith its support for the Northern Alliance-a coalition of warlords and militant Islamist groups-the United States also recruited other war-
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lords, many of whom had a despotic in the Interim Administration, appointpast, to challenge the Thliban in the ing Hamid Karzai only to the nominal s o u t h a n d t h e e a s t . O t h e r g r o u p s , chairmanship. All effective power in Kabul was concentrated in a narrow including the moderate Rome Group king clique of ethnic Tajiks from the Panthat was organized around former jshir Valley led by the defense minisZahir Shah, were largely ignored. ter, Mohammed Qassirn Fahim. Using The drawbacks of this short-term its control of the military, police, and strategyof toppling the Thliban and withintelligence services, this faction drawing without reestablishing order threatened and coerced potential became quickly apparent to rnany policypolitical opponents. makers, especiallysince U.S. abandonSi* rnonths later, the Northern ment ofAfghanistan in rgg2 contributed Alliance continued its power grab at the Taliban. At sarne rise the of the to the
a frarnework The United StateS lacks for thinking about th,e place,of post-war reconstructlon
ln rnilltary
time, the task of rooting out al Qaeda comrnitted the United Statesto a significant, continuing counterinsurgency campaign. The partnership with the Northern Alliance created problernatic consequences for both state-building a n d t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c yc a m p a i g n . Despite President Bush's calls for restraint and broad-based processes to create a new government, the Northern Alliance quickly seized Kabul and began establishing rule. Meanwhile, many Northern Alliance commanders and warlords in northern Afghanistan went about exacting ethnic and political revenge.In the siege ofTora-Bora, warlords affiliated with the Northern Alliance allowed hundreds of al Qaeda leaders, including Osarna bin Laden, to escapein exchange for bribes. At the Bonn Conference, U.S. policymakers, still seeking a quick exit, essentially ratified Northern Alliance control of the governrnent by giving its leaders control over all of the "power" ministries
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Plannlng. Loya Jirga. When it becarne clear that Zahir Shah, who was expected to appoint rnoderate cabinet ministers and wrest control frorn the militant factions and warlords, would be elected head of state, Fahim and the Northern Alliance threatened to roll out their tanls unless his candidacy was sidelined. Fearful of instability, the United States pressured Zahir Shah into rejecting any future role in government. Fahim then secured fully two-thirds of the cabinet seats for the NorthernAlliance, which rneant that the was even Transitional Adrninistration rnore narrowly based than the preceding Interim Administration. Thus, an irreconcilable tension has emerged in U.S. policy. On one hand, President Bush's rhetoric created a cornrnitrnent to establishing a moderate, liberal political order. Yet, on the other hand, the United States had brought to power a narrowly based regirne dominated by a Northern Alliance faction intent on monopolizing power.
s r R M E c KSr t a t eo f t h e N a t i o n
in Postwar State-Building
While the popular view of Afghan politics is dominated by images of endless Afghanistan shows that the United civil conflict, such strife was rare before rgJB. In fact, the previous half century States lacks a framework for thinking about the place of postwar reconstrucwas characterized by a high degree of tion in military planning. The rest of political stability and slow but steady t h i s a r t i c l e s e e k s t o o u t l i n e s u c h a political and economic developrnent. framework, and although it focuses The most stable and progressive period rnainly onAfghanistan, it offers broadwas the {o years of rule under Zahir er insights for political-rnilitary strate- Shah, during which Afghanistan adopted one of the rnost advanced constitutions gy in general. The framework is organ i z e d a r o u n d t h r e e k e y q u e s t i o n s : for a predominantly Muslim developing First, what is a reasonable and realistic country. Afghanistan had also developed a substantial technocratic and professional political-rnilitary U.S. objective? That is to say, what kind of a political regime elite, one grounded in modernism but s h o u l d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e ss e e k t o e s t a b - also rooted in Afghanistan's traditional lish? Second, who are the potential tribal and clan structures. Moreover, the local political-military allies and how overwhelrning rnajority ofAfghans practiced should they be handled duringthewar to a moderate version of Islarn, rejecting rada c h i e v el o n g - t e r m , p o s t w a r U . S . o b j e c - ical groups such as the Muslirn Brotherhood. This era of promising potential tives? Third, how should the United S t a t e s g o a b o u t r e c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e was cut short by the palace coup that c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c a l o r d e r ? M o r e o v e r , deposed Zahir Shah in rg)1, and cornhow should it balance the cornpeting pletely destroyed by the Communist imperatives of maintaining influence coup in rgl8 and the Soviet invasion in lgl9. Subsequently, a war of national over the character of the postwar political order with the need to involve local liberation engulfed Afghanistan through the rg8os, followed by a vicious cycle of groups in the political process? factional strife in the r99Os. U.S. policymakers should have asked , A f g h a n i s t a n . I n A f g h a n i s t a nthemselves what political forrnula had U . S . p o l i c y w a s h a n d i c a p p e d f r o m t h e produced the moderate and progressive o u t s e t b y a p o v e r t y o f e x p e c t a t i o n s . regime of Zalnft Shah, and how the UnitPolicymakers, equipped onlywith a cured Statescould adapt that formula to create a rnoderate, stable state. In this sense, sory knowledge of recent Afghan history, appeared to be guided by the belief that a the problem in Afghanistan was not one coalition government of warlords and of nation building. Afghans have existed as a nation for more than I,Ooo years, militia leaders supportive of the U.S. effort to rid their country of al Qaeda was and there was no need to createa common the best they could expect. However, a sense of identity. Although Afghans also closer examination of Afghanistan's soci- had ethnic identities as Pushtuns. Uzbels. ety and history would have revealed that tjiL., Turkornen, and so forth, the overpolicyrnakers could have aspired to the whelming majoriq, of the population also higher standard of helping to create a shared a senseof Afghan nationalism. It is revealing that none of Afghanistan's ethmoderate, pro-Western state.
A f g h a n i s t an . rn i ' e xp e ri e n ce in
Defining
0hjectives in
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nic g:roups sought to secede frorn the country over the turbulent past quarter century. The challenge in postwar Afghanistan wasto use this comrnon sense of national identity as the basis for creating a political system that provided an equitable and continuing role for all groups in the system. The term "moderate and broad-based government" became shorthand in policy circles for such an outcome. Before the Communist coup, the successof the Afghan state was based on (r) using the support of traditional s o c i a ls t r u c t u r e s ,s u c h a st r i b a l , c l a n , o r village leaders to legitimize the state, atrd (z) developing an educated technocratic elite that was connected to these social structures but was also rnodernist. The important political and social role of traditional social structure to political stability in this period should not be underestirnated. This structure commanded the allegianceand channeled the political participation of an overwhelming rnajority of the Afghan people. In fact, Zahir Shah's principal political role was managing Afghanistan's cornplex social and political relations, working to ensure that all groups were accorded proper status in the system and that all irnportant figures felt included in a process of consensual governance. During the past fifty years, the principal challengers to this traditional social structure have been a variety of factions advocating radical political or religious ideologies. The Communist party-the People's Democratic Parry of Afghanistan (PDPA)-attracted sorne support arnong intellectuals and students, while Soviet military training and assistanceprogr:ams enabled Moscow to recruit a network of officers loyal to the PDPA. In the rg6os
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and rg/os, a handful of Islamist cells associated with the Muslirn Brotherhood and funded by Pakistanappeared. Yet, none of these groups cornrnanded the support of anything more than an insignificant fraction of the Afghan people. All of this changed after the successful Communist coup in r9l8. The Soviet Union spent a decade fighting a losing effort to prop up its local ally. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Iran created m o r e t h a n a d o z e n r e s i s t a n c eg r o u p s , alrnost all of which were led by extrernist Islamist ideologues. After the fall of the Communists, these militant factions fell upon each other in a vicious civil war. The Taliban rnovernent ernerged frorn this chaos, and triurnphed with Pakistani support. Thus, the Communist coup fundamentally shifted the character of Afghan politics from a system that managed political relations within the traditional social structure to one based on violent cornpetition for power among foreignsupported radical factions. The challenge of recreating a stable, rnoderate Afghanistan lies in reversing this cataclysrnic shift, reopening the political processto Afghanistan's traditional social leaders while marginalizing the extremists and warlords who have ruled for the Past quarter century.
Selectingthe Right Local T h e s u c c e s so f p o s t w a r s t a t e Alligs. building depends on the wise selection of local allies during the military phase of operations. The simple truth is that those who are selected as allies during the fighting almost alwayshave a significant political advantage after the war. A serious mistake in choosing wartime allies will narrow postwar options or introduce intractable complications.
srRMEcKtStateof the Nation The disastrous consequences of pickence the process of differentiating strateing the wrong allies in Afghanistan was gic and tactical allies but three important evident in the rg8os, when Washington ones are readily apparent. funded a rnulti-billion dollar covert assisFirst, a strategic ally rnust share U.S. tance prog:ram for the Afghan resistance interests, values, and objectives.As U.S. to the Soviet occupation. Instead of policymakers thought about postwar
Thg Challengâ‚Ź in post-warAfghanistan was to use this cornrnon sense of nati5nal identity as the basis for creating a political system. thinking about the potential postwar order during the war, the United States blindly relied on Pakistan'sInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Ditectorate to manage the covert prograrn. As a result, ISI chose how much assistance various Afghan groups received, and provided the bulk of support to four fundamentalist parties: Hezb-e-Islami of Hekmatyar Gulbiddin, Hezb-e-Islami of Younis Khalis, Jamiate-Islami of Burhannudin Rabbani, and Ittihad-e-Islami Barai Azadi of Abdul Rasul Sayaf. These organizations were avowedly hostile to the United States and deeply connected to the international jihadist movement. Consequently, the fundamentalist parties, along with ISI, paved the way for the arrival of so-called "Afghan Arabs"-jihadists who came to Pakistan and Afghanistan for paramilitary training-and the formation of al Qaeda. To facilitate postwar state-building, the United States should have distingrrished between strategic and tactical local allies in its wartime strategy. A strategic ally is one that the United States would happily seeassurnea central role in the postwar political order. A tactical ally is a group that might provide some benefit to the war effort but that is either dispensable or undesirable in terms of postwar state-building. Many factors influ-
state-building, they should have put a premium on collaborating with groups that shared the United States'sagenda. Though this rnay sound obvious, the record of U.S. support for Afghan fundamentalist groups in the rgBOs suggests that the point needs to be rnade. Today, this rneans that the United States should develop a strategic partnership with those elernents of the traditional social structure, ple-war technocratic elite, and exile comrnunity who seek to r e c r e a t ea r n o d e r a t e , b r o a d - b a s e d , a n d participatory Afghan state. Second, a strategic ally must have significant social support. The value of partners varies directly with the popular support they command. If a principal local ally lacks broad support, putting it into power will mean that the United Stateswill have to buy political support or social peace frorn other groups to prop up its client. Moreover, the history of Afghanistan in the rg8os and r99os is a story of successivefailed attempts by foreign powers to sustain local clients with extremely narrow bases of support. Given Afghanistan's demography, mountainous geography, and traditionally weak centralism, any regime with a narrow social base faces almost inevitable political or rnilitary challenges.
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Third, a strategic ally must have expe- clerical regime in Iran. Moreover, Rabrienced leaders. The realities of power bani's earlier attempt to establish a dictatorship had destroyed virtually all of his dictate that the United Statescannot simuniversal support outside a few provinces. select that espouse political ply groups The only credit of the Northern Alliance concern for human rights and democracy as its principal allies. In Central and was its active forces in the field. Eastern Europe, dissidents with little or Given this background, the United no political experience came to power in Statesshould have adopted a united front "velvet revolutions" and govern effective- strategy, an approach well suited to hanly only because Cornrnunist parties were d l i n g a f l u i d r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n . dernoralized, Germany had become a This strategy calls for uniting all opponormal European power, and Russia was nents of the "main enemy" in a common front during the war while retaining conin internal disarray. Afghanistan's neighborhood and dornestic politics are not as trol over resource allocation. After defeating the main enerny, the leader of conducive to the rise of poet-statesmen. the alliance can shift the united front The United States has to take into account whether particular groups have against any rnember that threatens its obj ectives,pro gressivelywinnowing down what it takes to be effective allies in their the front to those g:roups that are fully specific political contexts. If U.S. policyrnakershad applied these reliable allies in the long term. In Afghanistan, the United States criteria when they were planning the war against the Thliban, they would have should have brought all anti-Taliban developed balanced ties between the groups-but principally the Rome Group Rome Group and the Northern alliance, and the Northern Alliance-into a unitrather than partnering exclusively with ed front to defeat Mullah Omar. Washthe latter. Organized by Zahft Shah, the ington should have regrrlated the rnilitary Rome Group sought to create a broadprogress of anti-Thliban forces by conbased, moderate state; had the capability trolling air striles and the distribution of of mobilizing rnost of Afghan society material and rnoney. As it did so, the (and substantial rnilitary po*e.) through United States should have made the had Rome Group its strategic ally because it traditional social structures; and capable, experienced leaders who had could mobilize the g:reatestrnilitary resisrun the country before r978. At the same tance to the Thliban and because it time, the political agenda, history, and offered greater prornise for postwar political reconstruction. It should have capacityof the Northern Alliance did not suggestthat the group would rnake a good brought the Northern Alliance along as a tactical ally, taking advantageof its forces strategic ally. Its political leaders-Rabin the field and offering it an appropribani and Sayaf-were Islarnic fundamentalists. In fact, both had been mentors of ate place after the war. In this way, the United Statescould have avoided a situaOsama bin Laden in the rg8os. Other tion where Fahim and his faction Northern Alliance leaders, including Fahim and the slain Ahmed Shah Masemerged from the war with a monopoly on force. Even if the Northern Alliance soud, entered politics through the Mushad won the race to Kabul, this approach lirn Brotherhood. The Northern Alliance had a close relationship with the would have allowed the United States to
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srRMEcKrStateof the Nation isolate Fahim, forcing him to compromise and share power. If the United States had understood the relative strengths of the various antiThliban groups and had adopted a united front strategy, the political setting for postwar state-building would have been dramatically better. Karzai has made a brave attempt to stand up to Fahim and to extend the reach of the central government against the power of warlords. However, in the absenceof political-military power, Karzai must rely on the United Statesto enforce his writ. Since U.S. policymakers are reluctant to intervene in the political competition and struggles of Afghan groups-fearing that choosing one side makes Arnericans targets of the other-Karzai has had a difficult time getting his orders to stick. It is still not too late to adopt a united front strategy to repair the damage. Given its vast resources and military power, the United States can peel away elements of the Northern Alliance from Fahim, a task made easier by his imperious conduct even toward his erstwhile allies. Factions and warlords can be induced to align thernselves with Karzai, which will then create a more balanced political situation to strike the deals necessaryto build new institutions. However, in terms of the general approach, it is more difficult to use united front tactics after the war than it would have been during the more fluid time of military conflict.
of the new government? Second, to what extent will the United States retain control over the various aspectsof reconstituting the political order (e.g. establishing political institutions, creating or reforrning the armed forces, promoting economic reconstruction) versus delegating those functions to international organizations or other powers? So far, the United States has adopted an awkward rniddle ground. On the one hand, the United States created enormous expectations among the Afghan people through the Bonn process. These expectations were palpable at the Loya Jirga, where elected delegates denounced radical factions like Rabbani'sJamiat-e-Islami and warlordisrn. On the other hand, the United States d i s a p p o i n t e d t h o s e e x p e c t a t i o n sb y f a i l ing to dismiss Fahim's threats and support the movernent to elect Zahir Shah as head of state. Delegates who had run real risks in opposing militia leaders and warlords were left to fend for thernselves. The United States created the impression that it would allow popular participation only if it rubber starnped a predetermined outcorne. At the same tirne, U.S. policy is handicapped by a lack of unified command. The initial desire to end U.S. involvernent quickly prompted policyrnakers to fragrnent control over postwar statebuilding' The United Nations controlled the Bonn process and the International S e c u r i t y A s s i s t a n c eF o r c e ( I S A F ) ' U . S . forces led the fight against al Qaeda and 0f def. The task of constituting the postTaliban rernnants; Germany began war political order requires the United training the new national police; the Statesto addresstwo important questions. United States was to train the Afghan First, to what extent will the United States armed forces; and foreign aid donors directly impose a new government of its created a patchwork of prograrns. Even own choosing versus allowing some form within the U.S. governrnent, there of popular participation in the formation appears to be conflicting jurisdictions on
Reconstituting the Political
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reconstruction. Some observersnote that the Department of Defense was tasked with reconstruction programs in northern Afghanistan, while the U.S. Agency for International Development controlled programs in the south. As a result of this apparent fragrnentation, the U n i t e d S t a t e si s i n a p o o r p o s i t i o n t o coordirrate its state-building strategy. In a sense,this resulted in the worst of both worlds. By not enforcing the Bonn process at the Loya Jirga, the United States lost a chance to use overwhelrning popular sentirnent to reduce its dependence on Fahirn. Consequently, U.S. policy remained hostage to Fahirn and his monopoly of military power in Kabul. Also, the failure of the United States to allow the delegates to elect Zahir Shah, their preferred candidate, created a profound crisis of legitimacy for the central governrnent and in turn, for U.S. policy. Many Afghan groups felt disenfranchised by the outcome of the Loya Jirga. With effective power still monopolized by a clique of Th.liksfrom the Panjshir Valley, it is not surprising that many Pushtuns, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others are disaffected. Because they constitute an overwhelming rnajority of the population, this discontent createsa dangerous political powder keg, the fuse of which could easily be lit by a rival regional power such as Pakistan. This places an extraordinary premiurn on handling the last phase of the Bonn process-the writing of the constitution and selection of the permanent governrnent-in a way that breaks Fahim's monopoly of power and enfranchises all of the groups in Afghanistan's diverse population. Fahim and his colleagues know that they will lose power if there is more popular participation in the shaping of the future governrnent. Consequently,
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Fahim and Islamists associatedwith Rabbani have every incentive to try and shortcircuit the process. The United States must be vigilant against any move to sabotage the process in the run up to the constitutional LoyaJirga and elections. It also must be prepared for a replay of the confrontation with Fahim if, as expected, he does not get the votes he needs.
C O n C l U S i O nI.n t h e m i d - r 9 9 o s ,a widely discussed journal article argued that superpowers "don't do windows." This was shorthand for the argument that the United Statesshould reserveits forces for rnaintaining the balance of power and fighting rnajor regional conflicts while avoiding the pedestrian tasks of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. This mindset carried over into strategic thinking on the war againstterrolism. The dorninant policy view was that the United States should destroy rogue regimes but should leave the task of cleaning up the postwar mess to others. As one Department of Defense planner told me, "It's our job to destroy the enemy and then move on. " The case of the war in Afghanistan shows that this perspective is both short sighted and counterproductive. In terms of eliminating al Qaeda in and around Afghanistan, a new Afghan government that consolidates the gains of U.S. military operations is necessary. If U.S.sponsored state-building fails in Afghanistan-if no new regirne capable of policing Afghan territory takes shape-al Qaeda will easily move back into Afghanistan from Pakistan. And, al Qaeda's presence need not take the blatant forrn of major training camps. Simply recreating a secure sanctuary for its command structures is sufficient to increase the threat of future terrorism.
,
srRMEcKtstate of the Nation Even in the longer term, successful state-building in Afghanistan is in the United States'snational interest. Just as the cold war was won as a result of the of Eastern political transformation Europe, the war against terrorism will be won by transforming the region from North Africa to Indonesia. This historical struggle will be a marathon, not a sprint, and each U.S. intervention should be designed to maximize the benefits ofregirne change in each case.Ifthe caseof Afghanistan turns out well-if the United States facilitates the creation of a moderate and broad-based government-it will have a major demonstrative effect in Iran, and will put the United States in a much better position to shape events in Pakistan. However, the United States's statebuilding policies have not maximized potential gains in Afghanistan. As long as Fahim and his Islamist colleaguescontrol the political process, the legitirnacy and
stability of the government will be precarious. Though some officials in the United Statesunderstand these problems well and are advocating major adjustments in strategy and policy, a consensus has not yet formed over the actions needed to facilitate the rise of a moderate, broad-based government. It is not too late to engineer a positive outcome in Afghanistan. However, the danger is that, as the clock on the final phase of the Bonn process ticls and as the patience of disenfranchised Afghan groups wears thin, the options for the United States will continue to dwindle. During the rgg2 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton's political strategist, James Carville, crafted the slogan, "It's the economy, stupid" to keep the campaign focused on this central vrrlnerability of the incumbent's record. In the war against terrorisrn, the Bush adrninistration would be well advised to adopt a similar focal point: "It's the regime, stupid."
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Buslness &Flnance zgns: Eoeing's Expanding-H-ori GlohalBusiness Operations Interview with Philip M. Condit If foresight and the ability to manage risk effectively are two of the rnost irnportant rneasures of a leader, then Phil Condit and his team at Boeing shonld take home top honors. Granted, the unprecedented post 9/rr global depression in comrnercial air travel has hit Boeing hard and is likely to persist well into 2ooJ-disturbing news for a cornpany with roughly fiftyfive percent of its business devoted to cornmercial aircraft rnanufacturing. However, the Boeing that entered the twentyfirst century is markedly different from the one that exited the twentieth, and is much more capable of both weathering the current slump and benefiting from the massive upsurge in military and defense spending.
Philip M. Condit i' Chairman Executive The
and Chief Officer
Boeing
of
Company.
GJIA recendy had the opportunity to sit down with Dr. Condit to discuss the challenges and opportunities Boeing now faces as a result of its mid-rggos transition, as well as some of the broader issues-ranging from business-government relations to foreign competition-that a global CEO rnust face everyday. o;In: Boeing has been significantly transformed since you became CEO in 1996. When did managernent start thinking about diversification and why?
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c-0r{Drr:Management first started having connection in the cabin or cockpit. Not thoughts of diversification in the earli only will this be a commercial service, it I 9 9 O s a n d b y r g g g o u r s t r a t e g yh a d p r e t _ will also facilitate critical communications ty much taken shape. It was based on the between pilots and ground controllers premise that without diversification. regarding passengerhealth, plane securi_ Boeing would be B5 percent commercial ty, and inclement weather, arnong other airplanes and 15 percent defense. 'We did things. Air Traffic Management is our not want to be that heavily dependent on initiative to develop serwicesand solutions the ryclic commercial airplane industry, for the safe and unconstrained growth of and it was apparent that a lot of our skilis the "W" air traffic control system. hur,. in commercial airplanes would be useful found that Global Positioning Satellites in the military arena. The problem was and military communication technolo_ that our defense program was too small gies applied to air traffic manaq.ement to rnake a real difference in that sector. could gr.eatlyenhance the current system Growing the business internally would and rnove it from a tactical to a more have been too slow, so we turned to strateg"icsystem. With a strategic system, mergers and acquisitions. The first piece you would know at the start of the dav was the acquisition of Rockwell's aero_ where everyone is, where they want to go, space business, followed by the merger and when theywant to get there. D"p"rid_ with McDonnell Douglas, and finally ihe i n g o n a n y n u m b e r o f f a c t o r s ,y o u c o u l d acquisition of a portion of Hughes. This more easily and dynamically adjust the diversification strategy wiil result in entire system, in order to avoid convective roughly a So/So split of our business weather for instance. The third is Boeing p o r t f o l i o b e t w e e n c o m m e r c i a l a n d Capital Corp., a financing *iti defense next year. Now this is partiallv around "o-purry $rr billion in assets,!o percent of the result of our growth in defense and which is now in cornrnercial equipment the overall industry growth post g/rr, other than airplanes. but it is also due to a slumping com_ mercial airplane industry. Of co.r..se. c J r A : Does Boeing's role as the United the two industries will swing back and States's t o p e x p o r t e r a d d a level of forth; there is nothing magic about burden or responsibility to your job? 5o/5o, and we are looking to build and grow some new business along the way, c 0 N0 rr: It certainly adds responsibility, but those two will probably be oo" co"" among other things. The title itselfdoes competencies for quite a while. not do much for me. You can hang it on the wall, but it does not brry G l r A : W h a t a r e s o m e o f t h e o t h e r b u s i - However, "rryihi.rg. given that we are the beneficia_ nessesthat you are looking to build? ry of extra-territorial income (ETi) to the tune of roughly $Z5o milhon a year, c 0 N0 r r: Well, there are mainly three: Con_ w e a r e d e e p l y i n t e r e s t e di n e x p o r t p o l i c y . ne;cron, Air Tiaffic Management, and Boe_ This issue revolves around u .rrbti" ing Capital Corporation. Connexionis a nuance in the'World Tiade Organization broadband data service for commercial (WTO) code. Becauseof the wa:y the code and military airplanes. It will give both was written, there can be no indirect tax passengersand pilots high speed Internet benefits associated with export. The
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Management first started having thoughts of diversification in the early 1990s and by 1995 our strategy had pret ty much taken shape. It was based on the premise that without diversification, Boeing would be 85 percent commercial airplanes and [5 percent defense. We did not want to be that heavily dependent on the cyclic commercial airplane industry, and it was apparent that a lot of OUI' skills in commercial airplanes would be useful in the military al'ena. The problem was that our defense progl'am was too small to make a real difference in that sector. Growing the business internally would have been too slow, so we turned to mel'gers and acquisitions. The first piece was the acquisition of Rockwell's aero space business, followed by the merger with McDonnell Douglas, and finally the acquisition of a portion of Hughes. This diversification stl'ategy will result in roughly a 50/5° split of our business portfolio between commercial and defense next year. N ow this is partially the result of our growth in defense and the overall industry growth post 9/n, but it is also due to a slumping com mercial airplane industry, Of course, the two industries will swing back and forth; there is nothing magic about 50/50, and we are looking to build and grow some new business along the way, but those two will probably be our core competencies for quite a while. CON 0 [T:
What are some of the other busi nesses that you are looking to build?
G J [A:
",Vell, there al'e mainly three: Con nexion, Air Traffic Management, and Boe ing Capital Corporation. ConneJion is a broadband data service fOl' commercial and military airplanes. It will give both passengers and pilots high speed rnternet
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connection in the cabin or cockpit. Not only will this be a commercial service, it will also facilitate critical communications between pilots and ground controllers regarding passenger health, plane securi ty, and inclement weathel', among other things. Ail' Tl'affic Management is OUI' initiative to develop services and solutions fOI' the safe and unconstrained growth of the air tI'affic control system. We have found that Global Positioning Satellites and military communication technolo gies applied to air traffic management could greatly enhance the current system and move it from a tactical to a more strategic system. With a strategic system. you would know at the start of the day where everyone is, where they want to go, and when they want to get there. Depend ing on any number of factors, you could more easily and dynamically adjust the entire system, in order to avoid convective weather for instance. The third is Boeing Capital COI'p., a financing company with around $II billion in assets, 30 percent of which is now in commercial equipment other than airplanes. GJ[A: Does Boeing's role as the United States's top exporter add a level of burden or responsibility to your job?
It certainly adds responsibility, among other things. The title itself does not do much for me. You can hang it on the wall, but it does not buy anything. However. given that we are the beneficia ry of extra-telTitorial income (ETI) to the tune of roughly $250 million a year, we are deeply interested in export policy. This issue revolves around a subtle nuance in the World Trade Organization (WTO) code. Because of the way the code was written, there can be no indirect tax benefits associated with export. The CONDIT:
United States taxes F tions on theil' incon considers an indirect company receives tax ETI through the Fon tion provisions of 0. regards it as an illegal since the Europeans
~-----------------
We are n(
does not fit building a It:
added tax, it is techni, pean fil'ms to receiv Obviously this is an l. very important to us, I tant to a lot of other we generally end up e the issue along witi Kodak. More genera has historically had firms in other indu products were self-d, put gas in them and t} selves-unlike an autol to ship. Thus, the ece to locate a plant abro< er for us. As a consec vulnerable to, and de] regulations of the Uni
Since governrr regulations have sue on your bottom line about effectively m ment relationships?
GJ[A:
\Vhen consiC not to entel' a debate we ask ourselves wheth, be willing to testify hefe issue. We are not goi: CON 0 IT:
IN T E R V EtWB u s i n e s & s Finance
United States taxes people and corporations on their income, which the WTO considers an indirect tax. So when a U.S. company receivestax relief for some of its ETI through the Foreign Sales Corporation provisions of U.S. tax law,the WTO regards it as an illegal export subsidy. But since the Europeans use a direct value-
underneath the radar and try to change things if we are not wilJ.ing to stand up in public and vocalize support for what we think is right. The next step is putting forward your ideas in a thoughtful, cohesive way. Our'Washington DC office is staffed by absolutely great people that understand the legislative process. They
Wg af e n0t soins to ars'uefor a policy if it
does not fit inio thd fundlmental cbnce|t of building a level playing field. added tax, it is technically legal for European firms to receive export subsidies. Obviously this is an unfair situation and very irnportant to us, but it is also irnportant to a lot of other U.S. exporters; so we generally end up carrying the flag on the issue along with Caterpillar and Kodak. More generally though, Boeing has historically had an advantage over firrns in other industries because our products were self-deliverable-you just put gas in them and they delivered themselves-unlike an automobile that you had to ship. Thus, the economic motivation to locate a plant abroad was much srnaller for us. As a consequence, we are very vulnerable to, and dependant on the tax regulations of the United States. cJrA: Since governrnent policies and regulations have such a large impact on your bottom line, how do you go about effectively managing government relationships? c0NDrr: When considering whether or not to enter a debate over public policy, we ask ourselveswhether or not we would be willing to testifr before cong:resson the 'We issue. are not going to run around
understand how the defense budget gets written and where the policies are shaped. In the end, it is al1 a matter of negotiations, and we will only consider entering a poliry debate if we can put together a case that we can defend in court. Recall the extra-territorial incorne issue for example, If our primary commercial cornpetitor was not advantaged by the way the WTO rule waswritten and somebody said that the ETI was going to be elirninated, I would have very little argument with that. Granted, I would miss the $z5o trilllo.t ETI benefit, but if it does not fit into the fundamental concept of building a level playing field then I cannot argue for it. GJI A: Have business-government relations become even more important now that defense and military products and services are a rnuch larger part ofyour business? c0NDIr:Yes they have; the U.S. Defense Departrnent is a huge customer of ours. It would be great if the procurernent process was based strictly on what is best for the U.S. government. The problem is that there are a lot of conflicting views about what is best and what is needed. If your voice is not heard at all, then you are not
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going to be selected. If your voice is heard, then maybe you can balance the scale, but you are probably not going to tip it over in your favor. For instance, we are currently in the middle of negotiations for the potential leasing of one hundred Boeing 767 tanlers. taditionally, the U.S. government hasnot been a leasee because it can borrow at a lower interest rate than anyone else and buy equipment outright. On the other hand, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan all used tanlers like crazy-tanlers that are on average {.r years old and in rnaintenance a third of the time. Given the current constrained budget situation and the $g billion dollars
should be deployed. For example, we have the contract to deploy explosive detection systemsin our airports. It is a joint venture with Siemens, and it allows us an opportunity to also talk about how we can both increase the security at airports while rnaintaining a level of speed and efficiency for travelers. GJIA: How has Boeing's international presence affected its ability to negotiate with foreign governments? -W-e coNDrr: are in the midst of a mental shift, from being an Arnerican company that exports to the world to being a truly
We afe in tn. rnid.stof a rnentalshift. frorn being an American cornpany that exports to the
worla to being a truly gtobal company. company. We currently have in Australia; we own employees 3,OOO Jg percent of Aero Vodochody in the Czech Republic; and we have close to r,Ooo people working in our design cJ IA: It is obvious that Boeing has a very bureau in Moscow. That allows you to strong interest in influencing trade weigh in on the policy debates in those countries respectively. I can go to the policies and the military procurernent Prime Minister in Australia and have a process,but Boeing has also been significantly affected by terrorism and the policy discussion because we are an Ausglobal war on terror. Is there any role tralian company. I can rneet with the for Boeing in the policy discussions Prime Minister of Russia or President Putin, and I just met with the President relating to these issues? of the Czech Republic when I was there a 'We h a v e Y e s n o . n o t a couple of weeks ago. Our ability to be colorr: and do role in deciding whether or not we part of a country and part of its econoshould have a war on terrorisrn; that is my gives us a voice in that country, which for our government to decide. However, is how you would expect it to be. we have enormous technological capaGJta: Are Boeing's foreign workers a bilities to offer in solving a wide range of problems, so we do help to identifr the r e s p o n s e t o d e c r e a s e d U . S . l a b o r best tools to use and deterrnine how they co mpetitiveness? in maintenance cost savings that you could gain from leasing, one can rnake a very good argument as to why the military should lease rather than buv the tankers.
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t N T E R V t EB WU S i n e s SF&i n a n c e c 0 NDI r: I am going to go way far astray on this one for a minute. I arn convinced that given the state of the U.S. economy, we have the opportunity to create an enormous number of new jobs. I also believe that we will likely destroy a nurnber ofjobs in the process.In general, the knowledge content of those jobs will increase as we move up the value chain. I expect that the relatively low value-added jobs will end up moving to placeswith low labor wages, as has happened in the apparel industry, in much of the semiconductor industry, and to a very small degree in our industry, but I think that that is almost inevitable. At the sarne time, we need to build a system that accommodates a number of new knowledge-basedjobs. We havea tuition-reirnbursernent program here at Boeing so that any employee can go to any accredited institution and we will pay for the tuition and books on any subject. Some employees will study in fields that are directly related to what they are doing here at Boeing, while others will study non-related subjects. For example, one of our security people is off getting a law degree. Some of the employees will end up leaving Boeing, while some of them will use their new capability inside Boeing. I think in the growing economy, particularly given the information revolution, these changes are going to happen and trying to hold them back is not going to change things. We need to prepare our people for these changes as opposed to seeing how many roadblocks we can put in the way of developrnent. There are a lot of people who would love to keep the status quo, but the world is dynamic and is going to change.
European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (Airbus' parent company) in the defense sector, on missile defense and helicopters. Why is it that there is room for cooperation in defense, yet nothing but rivalry with Airbus on the comrnercial side?
cororr,I think that there are a couple differentiating characteristics. One of thern is that there are only two companies in the cornrnercial sector. The other goes all the way back to the origins of Airbus. Much of the aeronautical technology that we have today came out of Europe. The Wright brothers were the first to fly, but just barely. The first jet engines were sirnultaneously developed in the United Kingdorn and Germany; the first jet transport was British; and the first small twin jet transports were French and British. Europe alwaysplayed a role in the front end of technology, yet the United Stateswas alwaysable to claim significant market share, which provoked a great deal of irritation in Europe. As an exarnple, the British built the tident three engine transport, and while they sold a total of a hundred, we sold some eighteen hundred J2Js.They were first, but we got the lion's share of the market. Eventually, European manufacturers brought all their piecestogether into one areaas a consort i u m a n d s a i d , " W e o r eg o i n g t o c o m p e t e with the United States in this market," and they were supported by enormous amounts of European taxpayer rnoney, with best estimatesin excessof $3o billion. A lot of the motivation wasbasedon the ideological notion that you cannot be a modern economy without competitive capabilities.That approach to the commercial sector produces a very differc.ltn: There has been some strategic ent competitive environment than c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n B o e i n g a n d found in the defense sector, where sys-
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ing the development of a very large airplane concept since that rnarket is too small to support two cornpanies. Airbus is still working on that project but our group pulled out after we decided that such a large airplane would not be economically viable. This conclusion was e .lIr: So is there pressure for cooperation coming from the United Statesand based partly on the fact that we believe E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t s t o i n s u r e s y s - roughly half of our large /{/s were not necessarily purchased because they were terns interoperability? the biggest planes at the time, but c 0 N DI T : I n s o r n ec a s e sy e s ,b u t n o w i t g e t s because they had the longest range. more complicated. The increase in the When we first started building them, the U.S. defense budget post 9/rr alone is only way you could fly long distances was bigger than all the European defense with four engines. Now technology budgets put together. It just places the allows us to build smaller long-range planes, and that is where we think the United States way off the scale. Also, market is going. relahave been European governrnents tively inefficient on big rnilitary procJrA: You mentioned growing the Air jects-our operations take a long tirne, but theirs take a uerylong tirne. While the Traffic Management business. Is there any hope for a globally unified air trafU.S. government wants to be interoperfic rnanagement system? able with its coalition partners, it would also like Europe to share more of the c o N D I r : I h o p e t h a t t h e a n s w e ri s y e s . I t financial responsibility of that initiative. On an issue such as missile defense, the raisessorne really interesting issuesabout United Stateswould like to see coopera- air space sovereignty and who would tion from both a political and econornic hold the reigns of a unified systern. Europe is struggling with these issues standpoint. However, the emphasis on cooperation and interoperability on the right now in trying to rnake Eurocontrol really work. It is extrernely difficult to other side of the Atlantic comes more frorn the private sector than from gov- pass off control of airplanes, especially when they are rapidly crossing national ernment pressure. borders, as is the case in Europe. It GJIA: Do you imagine that there is any would be like trying to run the U.S. systern with every state in control of its airroom for potential Boeing-Airbus cooperation on the commercial side space. I think the answer is that we will all try to find ways to make an integrated down the road, or would the regulatory global system that has checks and balauthorities prohibit it? ances to ensure that it is not misused c 0 N D I r : I t c o u l d o n l y t a k e p l a c e i n t h e from a geopolitical standpoint. forrn of a natural monopoly, meaning that the entire market is too small to c J I A: Assuming that the industry returns support two companies. We actually to historic growth rates, how necessaryis a better working air traffic control system? worked with Airbus for a little while durtems interoperability with our coalition partners is paramount. Interoperability is a very compelling justification for cooperation, but that is an over-simplified answer.
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tNTERVtEB WU S i n e S SF&i n a n C e c 0 N D I r :Y o u n e e d t o h a v e i t n o t o n l y f o r efficiency but also for added safety. Half of all commercial airplane crashes are what administrators call CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain), which means running a perfectly good airplane into sornething. Eventually we will be able to place a !-D map of the world into a databasethat records the position of every rnountain and hill, and we will know the location of the airplane to within inches. If we know where the airplane is relative to the ground then there is no reason someone ought to ever run into it. The systerntoday relies on voice comrnunication, which is error prone for multiple reasons, and rnistakes do happen. Ifyou are operating an airplane in the clouds over Thiwan or Mongolia and you cannot understand the controller, you are in deep trouble. A unified air traffic managernent system based on accurate and accessiblelocation data for pilots will both improve safety and increase capacity.
Boeing, we obviously would like to somehow be an important part of every major market, so my position on the Council, and to sorne degree rny PhD that I earned in Japan, open doors for me that might not otherwise be open. On the other hand, I took the position because I really do care about that relationship every bit as rnuch as I care about whether or not the business will benefit frorn it. 'What GJ r A: are the biggest challenges in finding new technologies and preventing them frorn languishing on the lab shelves?
c0NDtr: I think the hardest part is the paradigm shift required to identi!, potential innovations. You need to forget your ingrained mental models and preconditioned conceptual biases. In Phantorn Works, our advanced research and developrnent unit, we try to foster new ways of thinking. On the rnilitary side we try to determine what the rnilitary conflict of the future is going to look like. We are not just G,lrr: You are Chairman of the United going to build faster, higher-flying fightStates-China Business Council. What ers. Future military conflict wilI rely on kind of duties or responsibilities does u n m a n n e d v e h i c l e s , p r e c i s i o n w e a p o n s , that entail and does your position give data gathering, and satellite technologies. Boeing a potential cornpetitive advantage The challenge is to move frorn one idea to in China or in other Asian rnarkets? the next. It would have seemed as though carriage rnakers would be the natural next c o N D r r : T h e C o u n c i l i s a b o d y o f U . S . step to the automobile business, but they companies that are supportive of an econever rnade the transition. Out of the top nomic relationship with China and are twelve cornpanies at the turn of the last interested in developing that relationcentury, only General Electric is still ship, so there is not really all that rnuch around. GE is doing a little of what it did in terms of official duties or responsi- then, but it has developed rnany new cornbility. Basically, we are continually ask- petencies along the way. This ability to truing ourselves how to bring more comly innovate and think outside the current panies into China; what we and the othbusinesstrajectory is the hard part. er cornpanies are interested in; and how to find common ground arnong those GJ I A; Is there a particular technology in the interests. With respect to advantagesfor pipeline that you are most excited about?
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c0NDtr: Yes, inforrnation technology as it applies to what the military would call network-centric operations. Network-centric operations airn to make airplanes, tanks, armored vehicles, and satellites all part of an integrated, networked system. Understanding the architecture of this system is paramount, and we think that Boeing is particularly well positioned for this. It is
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clear that information dominates and changes everything. If Hitler had known that the Allies were going to land on Normandy instead of Calais, then D-Day would not have succeeded. What you know about your opponent and what you keep him from knowing about you is absolutely crucial. We think that this is where we can play a major role in the future.
Business& Finance
Eric Gardufr.o and FrankJ. Pietrucha For the 2Bo rnillion people inhabiting the area stretching from Rabat to Muscat, econornic prospects are grim. Arab scholars are frustrated with the region's lackluster performance in the marketplace. They worry that stagnant econornic growth and an exploding population could mean that significant unemployment will continue to plague the area for years to come. These concerned scholars argrre that it is not the historic burdens of colonial rule or a lack of natural resources that keep Arab countries frorn advancing. Instead, they argue that Arab countries have done a poor job of developing and using the intellectual resou.rcesthey have. The recently published United Nations Arab Human Development Report (UNAHDR) has identified a host of reasons why Arab econornic performance has floundered, ranging frorn regional conflict to the disenfranchisement of wornen.' Included high among the causes is the "knowledge gap" that the region is currently facing.' The Arab region, which led the world in scientific study in the Middle Ages, has done a poor job in recent times of developing new scientific and technological capacity, and effectively using the capacity it already has. If in fact the UNAHDR is correct in its assertion that, "development prospects for Arab countries are increasingly linked to the capabilities of their work forces and the
EricGardufro;s Program
Manager
at
the International Intellectual Institute,
Property a nonprofit
organization
dedicated
to promoting
sustain-
able economic through lectual
growth
sound intelproperty
law.
Frank J. Pietrucha is a communications advisor
with
extensive
international
experi-
ence.
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I N T E L L E C T U APLR O P E R T Y R I G H T SI N T H EA R A BW O R L D
quality of their intellectual capital," then this sort of poor policy decisionmaking must end.3 Indeed, the future economic status of the region will depend greatly on the ability of Arab countries to utilize the intellectual resources they possess, particularly when recent global economic trends are taken into accounr.
as movies, sound recordings, and books. These examples illustrate the rnain difference between traditional industrial economies and knowledge-based econornies.Unlike industrial economies, where value is measured primarily by output of physical products, the value in knowledge-based econornies is in the information, knowledge, and know-how that go into a particular good or service. It is this sort of intangible property that is the rnain driving force in knowledgeb a s e de c o n o m i e s . It is clear to many economists what the UNAHDR acknowledges' economic for all countries for the prosperity foreseeable future will increasingly be tied to how they transition to knowle d g e - b a s e di n d u s t r i e s . 5T h e r e i s a q u e s tion whether developing countries, most of which never achieved broad
of Economic ShiftingSources PfOSpgrit!. For much of the rwentieth century, economic prosperity for all countries was rneasured by their level of industrial developrnent. The number of factories, srnoke stacks, and a s s e m b l yl i n e s a c o u n t r y h a d w e r e w o r n Iike honor badges, displaying that nation's level of development to the rest of the world. However, over the course of the last few decades. the
The I ne TUtUfe futureeGOn0mlCstatusof the region
will depend ^the on the ability of Arab countries to intellectual resourcesthey possess. utilize composition of the leading econornies has shifted. This shift has been marked by a decline in the overall contribution of large-scale rnanufacturing industries that rely heavily on low-skilled labor, and a rise in the econornic importance of high-technology or " k n o w l e d g e- b a s e d " i n d u s t r i e s . a Knowledge-based industries are characterizedas those that produce goods and senrices that require highly-skilled and talented human resources to create, develop, or manufacture. Final products include new software programs and gene-based treatments for disease, but could also include media products that disseminateknowledge and culture, such
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industrial development, can meet the burden of such a shift at all. But despite the doubts these circumstancesmay engender, the growing irnportance of knowledge-based industries does present an incredible opportunity for developing countries to achieve neverbefore-realized economic prosperity. While wealth currently generated in rnany developing countries stems frorn tilling fields, excavating minerals, and pumping oil, governrnents have the transform opportunity to their e c o n o m i e sb y f o c u s i n g e c o n o m i c d e v e l oprnent strategies on building knowlexisting edge-based industries-using assetsto produce intangible property.
BUSiNCSS& FiNANCC G A R D U N o A NP DI E T R U c H A
Propertyas an Intellectual
costs and to gain profits. Without the rights provided by and nature, the creation of intangible properpatents copyrights, the economic incentive to create is destroyed through ty begins with talented and skilled human capital. Despite the fact that many Arabs price undercutting frorn cornpetitors who did not have to bear the burden of lack even prirnary education, the UNAHinitial development costs. DR points out that there are actually more Given the integral role intellectual scientifically and technically skilled workers in the region than there arejobs, a tes- property plays in the creation of intangitament to the underdevelopment of ble property, it rnakes sensefor all counknowledge-based industries. However, tries to focus their economic developon providing strong intelthis surplus of hurnan capital is all the ment strateg"ies more impressive considering that most lectual property rights and a legal system Arab countries have, for a number of to enforce thern. However, while acknowledging the irnportance of intelyears, also experienced a "brain drain" of skilled people to the United States and Iectual property, rnany developing counrnost Arab countriesE u r o p e , d u e t o t h e d i r n e c o n o m i c tries-including prospects skilled Arabs have at home.o have done little to integrate intellectual The key then for Arab countries that want property rights into their national ecoto pursue a knowledge-based economy is nomic policies. While there are a number of reasons behind this foot dragging, one to provide an environment that will accornrnodate and utilize the creativity of the chief reasons has been the suspect and ingenuity of their skilled citizens, and view towards intellectual property held by which will channel their skills into the many developing-country policymakers creation of intangible property and resr-rlt and so-called development activists. in econornically productive enterprises. As the UNAHDR suggests, incentives to support greater creativity and innovation must be established.TOne of the rnost measures to provide intellectual property rights go back centuries, few developing proven and effective means of encouraging creativity and innovation has been the countries regard intellectual property as a key component of their overall economintellectual properry rights systern. ic strategy. In fact, many developing Intellectual property rights have long countries have a negative view of strong been a chief mechanisrn by which leading economies have encouraged and intellectual property rights, perceiving them as only a benefit for developed rewarded innovation and creativity. Intellectual property rights, such as c o u n t r i e s . T h e y a r e s e e n a s a t o o l through which U.S., European, and patents and copyrights, give inventors, authors, and businesses exclusive eco- Japanesecorporations can impose a new kind of economic colonialisrn on thern. nornic rights to the intangible property This perception sterns in large part they create. With these exclusive ecofrorn nornic rights in hand, creators can take the heated trade battles that took their intangible property to rnarket, place when the United States and other developed countries began tying intellecwhere they have the opportunity to tual property protections to trade in the both recoup substantial development
Economic Catalyst. By its very exclusive economic
Assumptions Correcting about IntellectualProperty.Although
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late rg8os. This effort culminated in the inclusion of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as an associated agreement under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO).u During the negotiations over the TRIPS agreernent, developed countries, led by the United States, insisted that strong intellectual property rights be adopted by WTO member countries in order to protect the intangible property created in their countries frorn being pirated in othergenerally developing-parts of the world. In response, not only did many people in developing countries begin to perceive intellectual property as valuable to only the interests of developed countries, but they also began to see intellectual property piracy as an economic benefit and rneans of acquiring advanced technologies. Policymakers in developing countries and critics of the intellectual property system have further argued that developing countries should not clarnp down on pirates and counterfeiters because the intellectual property system raises prices of products and serviceshigher than what people in poor countries can afford.' While points raised by critics of the intellectual property systern have some truth to them, they are often shortsighted obseruations. The advocates of intellectual property piracy ignore the negative impact that intellectual property piracy has on a country. For example, as a result of piracy, governments in developing countries'lose out on critical tax revenues frorn the sales of pirated goods since they occur in the black market.'o Furtherrnore, governments of developing countries are also left unable to Protect consumers from untested, secondrate, or even dangerous products since there can be no regulatory oversight on
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black market goods." Lastly, there is the fact that organized crime and some terrorist groups have turned to intellectual property piracy as a source of funding.'" Besides enduring these direct negative effects, governments that condone intellectual property piracy also miss out on the econornic and social benefits that rnay be obtained when there is an effective intellectual property system in place. Studies have proven that multinational corporations, particularly those that produce intangible property, shy away frorn investing in countries that lack strong intellectual property rights.'3 By providing strong rights and enforcement of intellectual property laws, developing countries can encourage foreign direct investrnent that in turn brings them a greater level of technology transfer than piracy never will. More irnportantly, developing countries can use the intellectual property system to encourage the establishrnent of knowledge-based industries that are founded on their own cultural, technical, and scientific knowledge. Developing countries have a wealth of resources ,tpon which to build dornestic knowledge-based industries. From rich cultural expressions in the form of music, rnovies, and art to cutting edge research conducted in national laboratories, intellectual property rights can protect the underlying intangible property and facilitate the g:rowth of knowledge-based industries at home. Furthermore, the diffusion of knowledge encouraged by intellectual properry broadens the knowledge base and fuels even greater subsequent ingenuity and creativity.'1Far from the idea that intellectual property is somehow a new economic colonialism, intellectual property rights are a way in which developing countries can diversiS their
BUSiNCSS& F|NANCC G A R D U NA ON DP I E T R U C H A
economies and liberate thernselvesfrom dependence upon unstable natural resource and cornrnodities markets.
Gettingit Rightin the Arab WOf ld. MostArab countries have done poorly at integrating intellectual property rights into their national econornic policies, but some are beginning to realize the irnportance of intellectual property for their economic interests. Kuwait, for exarnple, has stepped up enforcement of copyright laws arnid clamoring by Kipco and other dornestic companies over rampant software piracy Egypt's that has hurt their businesses.'5 parliament recently passed a cornprehensive revision to that country's intellectual property laws. According to the Speaker of Parliarnent, the motivation behind this highly controversial legislative act was to promote, "Eg1pt's image as an investment-friendly haven in the Middle East."'oWhile Kuwait and Egypt are beginning to view intellectual property as a positive policy choice, the Kingdorn ofJordan is far ahead of both countries in this respect. Since his accession to the throne in rggg, Jordan's King Abdullah has taken an active role in stimulating the economy by strengthening economic ties with both regional and international trading partners. The provision of strong intellectual property rights has played a significant role in this strategy. For instance, in rggg, Jordan brought its patent and copyright laws in line with TRIPS standards, helping to pave the way for Jordan's accessionto the WTO that year.'7In 2ooO, Jordan agreed to sign on to the World Intellectual Property Organization's (WIPO) Copyright teaty, and its Phonograms and Performances Treaty. Jordan also adopted laws concerning data
exclusivity for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chernicals, all of which went a long way toward sealing a Free Tiade Agreementwith the United States.'u While a major impetus behind the adoption of new intellectual property standards was an enhanced trade position, intellectual property has also becorne a very important part ofJordan's efforts to build its own knowledge-based industries. Under King Abdullah's direction, Jordan has been working to establish itself on the "global Information Technology (IT) map," looking to spur development of an export-led IT industry.'e Efforts to help growJordan's IT industry include the creation of the REACH document-a cornprehensive strategic plan assembled by IT industry members, and the formation of the Inforrnation Technology Association of Jordan (Int@j)."" However, as Basseem Awadallah, head of the economic unit at the Royal Court identified, the "first 'right thing'Jordan did was to prornulgate and enforce world-class intellectual property rights legislation. ""' Jordan's new intellectual property rights, particularly the passageof a new copyright law in 1999 that brought software squarely under copyright protection, have laid an essential foundation forJordan's IT industry. Since the incorporation of rnodern copyright laws, software has led the growth ofJordan's burgeoning IT industry. In 1998, total salesof softw a r e a n d I T - r e l a t e d s e r v i c e s* e r e $ 2 2 . 3 rnillion. By 2oor, Jordanian IT cornpanies netted $r3o million in total revenues, over half ofwhich were generated through software."" Even start-up IT companies have been blossoming inJordan despite the current global industry slump, saysRa'ed Bilbessi, CEO of Int@j. From October through November 2oor,
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2$ new IT start-up cornpanies were registered at the Ministry of Industry and Tiade."3According to official figures, estimates place the nurnber of IT workers at a b o u t $ , O O O , " {f o u r t i m e s a s m a n y a s there were in rgg8."5 Given the importance software has within the IT industry, the government has taken great steps to improve copyright enforcement. Since 1999, software piracy has decreased from a staggering go percent to a more palatable/o percent."oln 2ooo, there were six copyright casesfiled with Jordanian courts, but since 2oor, more than J$o caseshave been fiied.'7 With rnodern intellectual property laws in place and a government willing to enforce thern, Jordan's IT industry has attracted investment frorn Jordanians, both inside the country and those doing business abroad, aswell as frorn large multinational IT firms like Intel and Microsoft.'o By 2 o o l , J o r d a n h a d a t t r a c t e d$ 6 o - i l l l o n dollars in foreign investment.'s
poliry. With assistancefrom organizations like the WIPO, the United StatesAgency for International Development, and the Jordanian Sociery for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, campaigns to educate business people and lawyers should continue to yield positive results.
Emhracing Intellectual Propefty.
K n o w l e d g e - b a s e di n . dustries,
which are driven by innovation and the production of intangible property, are central in the new world economy. The road to irnproved economic performance, in a marketplace where ideas are rnore valuable than tangible goods, rnust begin with mechanisrns that effectively protect and facilitate the cornrnercial use of intangible properrecognizes that, ty. The UNAHDR " Iintellectual property rightsJ are critical to the development of the individual and commercial incentive structure that drives innovation. "3' To
property The realization that intellectual protection is 3 . k.y cornponent of frituri: economic growth has reacheil many inJordan. The realization that intellectual property protection is a key cornponent of future econornic growth has reached rnany inJordan. As Thlal Abu-Ghazaleh, a prominent attorney in Jordan puts it, "many decades of absent or rninimal intellectual property protection in the Arab world has given us enough tirne to see that not protecting IP is not a solution."3oTo promote public awarenessof intellectual property's importance, the government, working primarily through the National Library, has been busy implementing an aggressive anti-piracy
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their credit, some policymakers in the Arab world, rnost notably in Jordan, have also recognized intellectual property's central role in spurring innovation and the effect that this will have on future economic growth. However, adoption of strong intellectual property rights throughout the Arab world will be difficult to achieve. With attention drawn to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, tension over future military action in Iraq, and the global "War on Terror" focused in Afghanistan, many Arab policyrnakers have understandably
GARouNo ANDprErRUcHn Business& Finance placed political and military concerns above economic ones. Further, there are many critics who continue to argr.rethat intellectual property rights hinder economic developrnent in developing countries. But discounting or ignoring the irnportance of intellectual property in the development of knowledge-based indus-
tries will prove costly for Arab countriesand indeed all countries in the world. Though certainly not a panacea to all of the region's difficulties, intellectual property rights can create the right environrnent to tap into domestic creativity and innovation, ultirnately paving the way to stronger Arab economic growth.
NOTES t Arab Humon DeuelopmentRepoft2oo2, United Development Future
Programme,
Generations,
Social Development
Nations
Creating Opportunities
Arab Fund for Economic [hereinafter "Arab Report"].
for and
2002).
2 lbid., 5. 3 Ibid.
IB Letter from President WilliamJefferson Clinton to the Congress of the United States,.AgreenentBetueenthe
4 For a general discussion on this economic trend, see Magn us Bloo mstro m, et - al., C routh snd I nnouotionPoli ciesfor o Knouledge Econom1;Fspeiencesfom linlond, Sweden and Singapore (Oct. zoo2). 5 Arab Report, supra note I: 5. 6 Ibid.. 8.
RFACH
The
IT
Initiative:
L:unching
Services Industry,
Action
of
intellectual property and the TRIPS agreement into the Trade Organization
structure,
see Michael
P.
Ryan, KnowledgeDiplomog: Clobal Competitionond the Politicsof I ntellectuolProper! (r 998). g For a collection ofwork rights hinder
arguing that intellectual
the economic
development
developing countries, see Commission Property
r9 Sawalha,supra note I7. 20
8 For a general discussion on the integration
property
United Stotu of Americo ond the Huhemite Kingdom oflordon on the (8 IrtobluAmenl of o Free Trode Area, U.S. Newire Jan. 200r).
Sol'tware and
7 l b i d . ,7 .
World
Shakers, Thke a Look at Us Now," /ordonTimes (24 Dec. reprinted 2OOO), at http,//w.intaj. (Last visited fo Sept. netlnews/readnws.cfm?id=54
of
on Intellectual
Rights , Integrotinglntellectuol Proper! andDeuelopment
Polig(zooil.
Plan for H.M. King Abdullah [hereinafter "REACH Document"]. 2I Sawalha,supra notâ&#x201A;Ź t7. 22 Francesca Sawalha, "King Says ICT On Right 'Do tack, Prods A Public, Private Sectors to More,"' Times, reprinted at http://w.intaj. lordan net/news/readnqs. cfm ?id= 558 (Last visited 3 o Sept. 2oo?). 23 Francesca Sawalha, "Progress with IP not as Fast as Leadership, Private Sector Wish, But Outlook Remains
to See, "Mexico-Microsoft
Pirated Software Costs
Positive,"
at Jordon Times, reprinted ntaj. net/news/readnss.cfm?id= z 68 (Last
http,//w.i
Mexican Government $z5o Mill;or in Thxes," IFf Ngus Seroice,JtJan. 2oot See also, Karnjana Karn-janatawe, "Intellectual Property: Thai Government Would Bene-
visited 30 Sept. 2oo2). 2{. Sawalha, supra note 22. 25 Estimates placed the number
fit From Stronger Anti-Sof'tware
workers at approximately
payments of US $r34 Million Pod, rJ May rgg8.
Piracy Measures; Tlx
Possib'leby 2oor,"
Bcn3*oft
II For instance in China, an estimated I92,ooo died in 2oor due to counterfeit pharmaceuticals. Peter S- Goodman. "China's Killer Headache' FakePharmaceuticals," TheWashinglon Pon, 30 Aug. 2oo2, A(r. 12 Gordon Masson, "Interpol Forms Intellectual Property Rights Group," Billboard(ro Aug. 2oo2). tJ Edwin Mansfield, tion,
Foreign
Direct
"Intellectual Investment,
Property Protecand
Transfer," iFC Discussion Paper Number
Technology Ig (rgg4-).
t,[ For example. to secure a palent on a new invention, full disclosure ofthe underlying science and teclrnology is required
and is then made available to the
public. tg "Call {or Quick, Firm Actions," Kuaoit limes, (6 July 2o02). l6 "The Rights Way to Co," AIAhron (bJune Zooz). tJ Francesca Sawalha,'.Jordan's E-movers and
Jordan's Strategy and II (Mar. 2ooo)
A
I,250
of Jordanian IT in 1998. REACH Doc
ument, supra note 16, at 20. 'Biggest 26 Suha Ma'ayeh, "Piracy Single Threat' to IT Industry," lordonTimes (r Feb. zoor), reptinted at http,//w. intaj. net/news/readnews. cfm?id= 37 (Last visited 3o Sept. 2oo2). 2/ Letter from Tawfiq Tabbaa, Assistant Program Offlcer,
for
Cooperation
Arab Countries,
World
Development
Intellectual
Bureau
Property
fbr
Organi-
zation, to FranL Pietrucha, Media Specialist, Inrernational Intellectual Property Institute (rr Aug. zooZ) (on file with the International
Intellectual Pronertv
I n s ri t u t e ) . 28 "Computing (3t May zoo2).
Refbrrn,"
Middle Ead Econonic Dtgest
2g Sawalha, supra note 22. !o Thla Abu-Ghazaleh, IP RoodMop -TheWold . . . And (tanscript [/s, Address (r8 Feb. 2oo2) available at ht tp : // w.
ta gi. co m/n ews/speech esll B feb. h t m).
!r Arab Report, supra note I: 70.
Winter/Spring2oo3
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0onfllct&Securlty - u-ribe5?ropterGjviliansand-the Colombian Conflict T
TT
J ason nagen As countries around the world take up the anti-terrorist cause, some policymakersin the United Statesand abroad have come to view Colornbia's conflict in a singular light. While Colombia's history of violence has long been attributed to insurgents representing political grievances,aswell as the businessof drug trafficking, during the past year, the Colombian and U.S. governments have incleasingly characterizedColombia's security problerns as a matter of terrorists and criminals confronting a stateill-equipped to defend itself and establishauthority. New Colombian president Al.,u.o Uribe Velez haspromised to tackle Colornbia's terrorist violence and establishstate command over the nation's territory once and for all. His policies have been radical, but they are not entirely novel, not only do they jeopardize basic rights, but they could, in fact, provoke even more violence. As more countries crack down on terrorism and insurgency, often with outside aid, the Colombian casesugests that unchecked, aggressivesecurity measurescan have unpredictable and possiblyfrightening consequences. On August /, 2oo2, Uribe became the president of Colombia in the midst of this brutal conflict, which can be traced back decades.That conflict today has become a turf war fought by two leftist guenilla organizations againstthe Colombian stateand officially outlawed right-wing paramilitary organizations, which are often allied with the Colornbian armed
Jason Hagen ;. Associate Ibr Colombia at the llhshington Office
on Latin
America.
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forces. Inseparable frorn this clash is Colombia's prominent role in the international drug trade, its world leadership in kidnappings and assassinations, the internal displacement of r,ooo of its people per day, a murder rate ten times that of the United States, and irnpunity as old as the country itself.' The guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colornbia (FARC) and the (ELN) have National Liberation A"-y
wealthy and middle-class Colornbians who lack confidence in the state's security forces and legal systernto protect their interests, the AUC poses as serious a threat to Colombian civilians and their tenuous democracy as do the guerrillas. In their quest to fill the vacuum of state authority and to establish control over territory, all three groups carry out selective assassinations, cornrnit rnassacres,intimidate entire communities,
be Under this new plan,ci'ilianscould. participating tn the coriflict rnore than ever. their origins in the early r96os, while the United Self-Defense paramilitary (AUC), an umbrelGroups of Colornbia la organization, came together in t996. The U.S. State Department regards all three forces as terrorist organizations. The guerrillas' Marxist ideology has dimmed over the years as their political cause has become overshadowed by their military operations, which have often targeted civilians. In July 2oo2, for exarnple, the rB,ooo-rnember FARC announced that it would consider all of Colombia's r,o98 mayors and other municipal officials as rnilitary targets if they did not renounce their positions. The FARC is also in the process of accurnulating hostages for w h a t i t h o p e s w i l l b e a m a s s i v ep r i s o n e r exchangewith the government. Like the FARC, the 4,ooo-member ELN is involved in kidnapping, extortion, public bombings, and sabotage, all the while relying heavily on child soldiers. The paramilitary AUC has tripled in size since r$$8 and now counts as many as r5,OOO members in its ranks. Bankrolled by the drug trade as well as
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and forcibly displace unarmed civilians by the rnillions. Becausethe mushroorning conflict was largely confined to the countryside, urban Colombians have been able to ignore it for years. That detachrnent rnay be changing, however, as the FARC and the AUC have begrrn to recruit young people from shantytowns on the outskirts of rnajor cities such as Medellin and Bogotd." President Uribe came to power on a platform that promised to end the conflict by making it too expensive and painful for the grrerrillas to continue their fight, and ultirnately force them to the negotiating table. Uribe argrres that although civilians already bear the brunt of the violence, they rnust assume a more active role in security issues as an act of solidarity with the Colombian state. As part of this vision to provide so-called "democratic security" to embattled Colombians, Uribe has employed three strategies: creating special security zones by invoking emergency powers that enable him to rule by decree; training part-time soldiers to serve in areaswithout a police presence;
HAGEN Conflict&Security and forrning a one-million-person network of civilian informants. There are, however, serious questions regarding how democratic these methods are and how much security they will ultimately provide. Human rights advocates argue that sorne policies violate international hurnanitarian law by blurring the line between civilian and combatant. Instead of cooperating with the government, civilians under this new plan could be participating in the conflict more than ever. Some analysts,moreover, claim that the measures will not weaken subversive guerrilla elements, but that they may instead harm innocent and apolitical civilians with whom the insurgents quietly surround thernselves.3Such contingencies create a considerable risk of the measures turning sour, bringing unintended and punishing consequences to an already battered nation.
nalists. Two such zones have already been created; one of them is in the province of Arauca, where the U.S. governrnent is poised to send $9B million to protect an oil pipeline used by Los Angelesbased Occidental Petroleum. Aithough a state of internal unrest was last invoked in 1995, states-ofemergency are hardly new to Colombia. In fact, for rnost of the last fifty years, Colombia has been governed under various extraordinary measures. Critics argue that such measures have not stopped the guerilla insurgency or cornmon crime, but that they have instead led to serious human rights abuses by contributing to the rnilitary's preponderant role in matters of internal security. Last year's controversial "Security and National Defense Law" attempted to create areasvery similar to the Rehabilitation Zones, but it was struck down by the Constitutional Court in April hurnan rights Prominent 2002. groups, such as the Colombian Comrnission ofJurists, have condernned the latest law, calling it "unfocused, useless, and dangerous."4 Arnerigo Incalterra, frorn the United Nations High Comrnission for Human Rights office in Colombia, has also weighed-in against the zones. He has argued that they fail to distinguish between cornbatant and non-combatant, allow for little judicial control of the rnilitary, and grrarantee neither due process nor the presumption of innocence.5 President Uribe responded by saying, "Here, there is a lot of criticism when actions are taken to overcome the violence and a lot of silence when violence takes over everywhere in Colombia without anyone standing up to it."b Uribe is convinced that he can outrun the past,
Powers Emergency andDecrees. OnAugust rr, four days after his inauguration, President Uribe cited security concerns and declared a "State of Internal lJnrest." An ernergency power written into the constitution, this rneasure cedes unusually strong powers to the president, and allows the state to carry out arrests, searches, and wiretapping without warrants. One recent decree (*ZooZ) perrnits the creation of special areas-"Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones"-in which military commanders have certain judicial and police powers, overriding those of elected civilian authorities. Within these zones, the mobility of civilians is lirnited, individuals without personal identification can be held for twenty-four hours, censusesare conducted to determine where people work and live, and restrictions are placed on the presence of foreigners and jour-
Winter/Springzoo3 [ 6 7 ]
U R I B E ' SP E O P L EC: I V I L I A N SA N D T H E C O L O M B I A NC O N F L I C T
claiming that his policies are stronger than history's heary hand.
Peasant Soldiers. Duringthepresidential carnpaign, Uribe stated his intentions to nearly double the number of professional, combat-ready soldiers to rOO,Ooo; increasethe nurnber of police to 2oo,ooo; and eliminate the obligatory draft by 2oog. Yet, Colornbia is weathering the most difficult economic conditions since the r93os, and sufficient funds are currently unavailable for such plans. In order to quickly and cheaply establish state presence in lawl e s sz o n e s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t i s r e c r u i t i n g r5,Ooo "peasantsoldiers" through the norrnal military draft to support the regular armed forces by March 2oo3. After three rnonths of rnilitary training, all peasant soldiers will return to their hornetowns to act as soldiers during the day and spend nights under their own roofs. The governrnent b e l i e v e si t c a n t r a i n r o o , o o o s u c h s o l diers within four years.T According to Vice President Francisco Santos, who has been entrusted with designing the governrnent's hurnan rights policies, the peasant soldiers will function as "national guards" in {$o of C o l o m b i a ' sI , o g 8 m u n i c i p a l i t i e s( l 8 6 o f w h i c h c u r r e n t l y l a c kp o l i c e ) . E a c ho f t h e s e municipalities will have garrisons of roo troops, forty of which will be peasant soldiers. According to Santos, the government is evaluating whether these soldiers will bring their weapons home with them or whether they will leave them at the local garrison.o In either case, peasant soldiers will not enjoy the protection of rnilitary or police facilities when they are off-duty, making them more vulnerable than regular soldiers. In fact, becausetheywill serve in the towns where state Dresenceis weak-
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est, they could be exposing their families to attacksby illegal armed groups. Eduardo Pizarro, a prominent Colombian social scientist, has described these soldiers as "second-class conscripts" and "cannon fodder." He questions whether it is possible to professionalize the arrned forces while taking shortcuts like the creation of peasant soldiers. He points out that sirnilar efforts in Guatemala and El Salvador were the cause of those countries' worst episodes of violence.s Eduardo Cifuentes, Colornbia's Public Ombudsman-a state human rights institution independent of the governmentsays,"soldiers are trained to act collectively. They belong to units under a commander, they have protected institutional Iiving quarters, and they have perrnanent systems of prevention. If these peasant soldiers are going to be in their homes, it will be very difficult to organize an effective response in the case of an attack which, in a guerrilla war, is by surprise."'o
pe.Networkof Collabordtors. haps President lJribe's rnost arnbitious and most alarrning rneasure is the creation of an informant network of one million civilians, which will function as the eyesand ears of the police and rnilitary. This network is expected to work as a result of its sheer size. President Uribe asserts, "If we have one, two, or ten linformants], s,r"e they'd be killed. But if we have thousands or tens of tho,lsands, then they would stand together 'They'll and say, have to kill us all.""' According to news reports, there are already thousands of participants in the rnaj ority of C olornbia's provinces. Although the participants receive only a srnall stipend for helping with intelligence gathering, they could also receive
HAGEN Conflict&Security payoffs of up to $Z,5oo for particularly irnportant tips that prevent attacks or lead to arrests. Tens of thousands of dollars have already been distributed in a prograrn that the governrnent calls "Reward Mondays," which originally featured informants in ski masks receiving thick wads of bills from military commanders in live, televised, public ceremonies. These ceremonies, howeve r , w e r e s c r a p p e da f t e r a r o u s i n g p o i n t ed criticisrns frorn editorial boards, i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,a n d p o l i t i c i a n s . Antanas Mockus, the mayor of Bogot5, called these ceremonies a "grotesque spectacle," and he further stated his intention to prohibit the informant networks frorn operating in his city. Mockus a r g u e s t h a t a d d r e s s i n gt h e c i t y ' s s e c u r i -
Colornbian lexicon today. These militias were often created by landowners and right-wing politicians to kill and forcibly "disappear" political opponents and leftists, as they benefited frorn cozy relationships with local governrnents, the police, and the military.'3 In the past two decades, emerald mafias, drug traffickers, and cattle ranchers have also financed death-squads. While governor of Antioquia province in the rnid-rggos, Uribe was a proponent of legal rural security cooperatives called the Convivir. The Convivir allowed armed civilians to patrol and gather intelligence under the control of rnilitary comrnanders, and due in part to Uribe's support, nearly seventy were established in Antioquia. as were hun-
U f ibe iS COnVinCedthathe canoutrunthe ppt, clairning that his policies are stronger than nlstory s neavylland. ty problerns requires both professional dreds more nationally.'a By Uribe's own police and respect for international admission, however, illegal pararnilihurnanitarian law, and he maintains taries infiltrated the Convivir in Antiothat citizens should cooperate with the quia, and recently declassified docuauthorities not out of greed, but out of rnents confirm that high-ranking civic duty. Like many other critics, he Colombian military officers knew there also warns against double-agents who was a great danger of Convivir units would use the reward systern for their becoming pararnilitarT outfits.'5 own personal enrichment.'' It would be an extraordinary challenge Colombia has a troubling history of to avoid replaying that scenario today at civilians supporting miiitary operathe national level as a result of the parations, both legally and illegally. For militaries' explosive growh, budding decades, hundreds of private rnilitias sympathies frorn the middle class, and with varying local missions have conwell-documented links with elernents of ducted some variety of "social cleans- the Colombian military.'o The prospects ing" in defense of privileged citizens. for violence are all the more real given T h e m o s t n o t o r i o u s m i l i t i a s o f t h e Colombia's history of private retribution r94Os and 195Os, losprijaros, loscontrochus- and countless vendettas. People seeking meros,and laschulauitas, remain part of the revenge against others for personal rea-
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sons may label their enemies as insurgents, criminals, or terrorists in order to see them arrested or even killed. Mary Robinson, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights specificallycriticized Uribe's proposal to recruit civilians, calling it a clouding of the distinction between soldier and civilian. In a letter to Uribe on August 26, 2oo2, she wrote that s u c h m e a s u r e s" c a n c o n t r i b u t e , w i t h i n the context of generalized violence and a degradation of the conflict, to the civilian population becoming involved in military operations or exposed to risk situations." But Uribe and his cabinet refute such criticism by arguing that tackling terrorism requires civilian teamwork, and that the appropriate oversight procedures are in place to prevent the network from going awry. They clairn not only that Colombian institutions have changed, but also that citizens have accepted the rnoral challenge of enabling the state to do awaywith violence. Y e t , i t i s a l s o f a i r t o s a yt h a t C o l o m bians have an uneasy and unstable relationship with authority. A Colombian political analyst recently argued that the country needed a memoryeraser so that people could begin a n e w , w i t h o u t t h e b a g g a g eo f h i s t o r i c a l resentments and animosities. Months later, having forgotten her previous statement, she declared that Colombia needed a mernory-enhancer so that people could not forget, and would be forced to confront the horrors cornmitted by their own hands.'7 Senator Antonio Navarro Wolffan ex-guerrilla Ieader and former minister of health-seems to share her skepticisrn of a newfound sensibility o r h i s t o r i c a l a w a r e n e s si n C o l o m b i a .
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He argues that the network of informants "will wind up being armed," and that "nobody will be able to control one million armed civilians. They will wind up shooting their political enemies, the people they don't like, the rnan who gets their daughter pregnant. "'8 Indeed, there are indications that such will be the future of these programs. In the large cities, sorne of the nation's ISO,OOO already-arrned private security guards will play a special role in the networks. As Uribe has argued, "One thing is arming one million bandits. But it's another thing entirely to arm ordinary citizens, private security firms, neighborhood security groups, and civil defense organizations so they can support the military."'e It is worth rernernbering that the Convivir also began unarmed, but the government soon began illegally distributingweapons to its rnembers."o Defense Minister Marta Lucia Rarnirez has stated that there will be a "very ligorous" selection process to determine the participants, and promised that their narnes will be kept "absolutely confidential.",' But Vice President Santos has said that there will be no background checks on participants."" Given the country's d e e p - s e a t e dc o n f l i c t a n d t h e f a c t t h a t the irregular arrnies number roughly 37,OOO troops, a vetting process seems a minimal precaution to protect citizens from overzealous, corrupt, and violent participants. COnClUSiOll. President lJribe,s taste for bold security measures is understandable given Colombia's astonishins levels of violence. Ruling by e*ec,..,tiul decree, sending the poorest to the front lines of the war, assigning civilians
HAGEN Conflict&Security police duties, and granting the military additional police powers just might, as the government claims, rnark a turning point in the conflict. With a few unfortunate turns however, his measurescould also open the nation's oldest wounds and uncork Colornbians' most violent urges. The nation's bloodspattered history suggests that these security policies are difficult to control and are, in fact, part of the reason that Colombia remains so violent today. Colombians continue to mete out justice privately, thus underrnining the rule
of law and their own security. Without a professional police and military that truly respect human rights and a judicial systernthat addressespervasive irnpunity, Colornbia's conflict will only worsen. In the worst-case scenario, Uribe's "democratic security" project could morph into a slaughter on a scaleyet unseen in m o d e r n C o l o m b i a , s u r p a s s i n ge v e n i t s infamous mid-century civil war, a fifteen-year killing spree known sirnply as I a V i o l e n c itah a t l e f t 2 o o , o o o d e a d . I t i s , perhaps, that war's legacythat Uribe and all Colombians are still fighting.
NO T E S r There is a growing body of academic literature Colombian violence. Some of the best recent Eng)ish-language works include the following on
books, Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Peiiaranda, and G o n z a l o 5 6 n c h e z e d s . , l 4 o l e n c ei n C o l o m b i at l p o - 2 o o o : W o g i n gW o r a n d N e g o t t o t n g P e q c e . ( W i l m i n g t o n . DE, Scholarly Resources, zoor); Roldar, Mory, Blood ond Frre' La Violencioin Antioquia, Colombio, tg46 1953, (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2oo2); and Richani,
Nazih, $stems o/Volence, The Politicol Economyof Wor ttnd Peocein Colombio, (Alb""y, NY' SUNY Press, 2002).
"Taking Aim at the City," 2 Ste'en Ambrus, N e w s w e e k1, 8 F e b r u a r y Z o O Z . J o h n O t i s , " C o l o m b i a n C i t i e s N o w T i r g e t s o f W a r , " H o u s t o nC f i r o n i c l e t, r J u n e 2oo2. ScottWilson, "Urban Anti-Rebel Raid a New Turn
in Colombian
War,"
WoshingtonPost,2{, October "Colombian Cities Under
ZooZ. Tod Robertson, Fire as OldWar Thkes New Turn,"
DallosMornrng.lfeus,
to
"Campesinos
armados, " Semono, 30 August
2002. rI Frances Robert, "Colombian Leader Installs Citizen Spies," Miomi Herold,g August zooz. t2 "Encapuchados son grotescos," El Tiempo, tB September 2OO2. t3 See Rold:in, BloodorulFire. r{, According to the Colombian Defense Minister in August t997, there were 4I4 Convivir chapters throughout the country. That same month, according to the national
Convivir president, there were /28 units. Independent analysts claimed there were more than I,OOO, r5
The
Washington
National
Security
Archive of George acquires U.S. State Departthrough the Freedom of Informa-
University
ment documents
tion Act. See http,//w. t6 Watch,
See Amnesty
gu.edu/-nsarchiv/. International,
and Washington
Office
{- November 2O02. J Gustavo Gall5n of the Colombian Commission
tember
olJurists,
grounder/americas/colombia
interuiew with author,
Washington,
DC,
I? October 2oo2.
2oo2.
Available
e inritil de restricci6n de derechos." October 2OO2. g "Colombia Makes ex-Army Boss a Provincial
dor, 12 August 2oo2. tg Karl Penhaul,
ci6n," / 2002.
at http://hry.orglback- certification{.-htm.
r/ Colombian political researcher, intewiewwith author,
A s s o c i a t ePdr e s , I O c t o b e r
Rights
America,
Colombio Humon Rghts Certifcotion N Bri$ng Poper, Sep-
{. Comisi6n Colombiana deJuristas, "El decreto 2oo2 de 2o02: Un rdgimen desenfocado, peligroso
Governor," 6 "ONU
Human
on Latin
2oo2-
advierte riesgos por medidas de excepEI Espectodor,2 October 2oo2. "Campesinos armados." Senono, fO August,
8 Francisco Santos, interview with author, Wash ington, DC, 16 September 2OO2. 9 Eduardo Pizarro, "Los soldados campesinos: un adefesio," EITienpo, g September 2OO2.
Bogotii, April andJuly tgg8. tS "Armar civiles es una pdsima idea," Illspecto-
"Front-Runner's Tough Talk P l a y s B i g i n C o l o m b i a , " B o s t o nC l o b e, 2 2 M a y 2 o o 2 . 20 Wor Wthout Qtarter: Colombio snd Internotionol Humonitorion laro (New York' Human Rights Watch, I998 ). 2r "Red de informantes
cooperantes
se transforma
de las Fuerzas Armadas,"
en red de
ElTiempo, lo
September 2oO2. 22 Francisco Santos, interview with Washington, DC, t6 September 2oo2.
author,
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Conflict& Security
A Lost Chancefor Peace The Bicesse Accords in Angola Virginia
Page Fortna
In I99r, the cornbatantsin Angola's longstanding civil war signed a peace agreement. But the country was soon back at war in a conflict that would grind on for another decade. Three particular problems in the peaceprocess led to the failure of Angola's first "best chance for peace."' First, the peacekeeping mission was extremely limited, partly because the international comrnunity h o p e d t o k e e p p e a c ea s c h e a p l ya s p o s s i b l e . S e c o n d , i s s u e s of "spoiler" management were handled poorly due to the assumption that Uniio Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) would win the eiections and that the Movirnento Popular de Libertacio de Angola (MPLA) would not be able to contest the win by force. Third, elections were held before demobilization, eradicating any incentive that the electoral loser, Jonas Savimbi, had to end the war, thereby squandering the international cornmunity's only effective leverage. This combination of mistakes proved disastrous for Angola and added substantial difficulty to subsequent attempts to achievepeace. Eleven years later, the international community and the Algolan parties should reflect upon the f a i l e d p e a c e o f t h e p a s t i n o r d e r t o t a k e a d v a n t a g eo f S a v imbi's death and further the peace process today.
VirginiaPage Fortna
is Assistant
Professor
of Political
Science at Columbia Universiry. She is currently a Visiting
Schol -
ar at the American Academy
of Arts and
Scierrces.
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Bacltgroulld. contemporaryAngola
Th'". The PeaceAgreemeflt.
has never known stable peace; civil war tenets comprised the BicesseAccords, a cease-fire supervised jointly by the two erupted on the heels of the war of liberation from the Portugrrese. What started Angolan parties; the demobilization of MPLA and UNITA forces in order to as a three-way fight among rival nationalist groups ended as a war between the create an integrated national army; and governing MPIA, led since rg|g by Pres- rnulti-party elections. AJoint Politicalwas Cornrnission (CCPM) ident Jos6 Eduardo dos Santos, and Military established to oversee the peace process. UNITA, led byJonas Savimbi. The conIt consisted of representatives frorn the flict was primarily a struggle for control MPIAand UNITA, with the UN and the of the state and the country's rich oil, "Troika"-Portugal, rather the United States, diarnond, and mineral resources, as and the Soviet Union-participating than an ethnic or identity conflict.'The o b s e r v e r s .U n l i k e t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s i n conflict was expressedin Cold War ideological terrns: the MPLA espoused social- many other peacekeeping cases,impleism, and was backed by both the Soviet mentation of the Accords was primariljnion and Cuba, while UNITA took an ly the responsibility of the belligerents. The UN peacekeeping observation misanti-cornrnunist line, winning support sion, UNA\IEM II, was rnandated only from the United States and South Africa.3 In 1988, as Cold War tensions to monitor the progress of the Angolan waned, Cuba and South Africa agreed to process. Although the UN was eventuwithdraw troops and ceasernilitary activ- ally called on to play a rnore substantial ity in Angola. Within a few years, the role, it was severelylimited by having to stalemate on the battlefield, U.S. and work through the unwieldy CCPM. The Bicesse agreernent was a tall Soviet pressure, and Portugrrese mediaorder on a very tight timetable, allowtion induced dos Santos and Savirnbi to ing only 16 months between the signing sign the Accordos de Paz para Angola, of the Accords and elections. In that often called the BicesseAccords.a When the Accords were signed in May time the country, whose infrastructure was in shambles, had to demobilize rggr, Angola was not viewed as a particI5O,OOO troops, forrn a new army, ularly difficult peacekeeping case. This overly optimistic assessrnentwas a result extend governrnent authority to the one-third of the country held by of the previous success of the United frorn UNITA, and implement voter registraNations during Cuba's withdrawal Angola, external support for peace by tion and polling. Furthermore, rnajor components of the agreement had not the superpowers whose rivalry had dribeen fully resolved. A telling section of ven the war, and the non-ethnic, nonsecessionist character of the war. As t h e A c c o r d s e n t i t l e d " C o n c e p t s f o r Issues Still Pending between the GovAngola was rich in natural resources, it enumerated ernrnent and UNITA" was hoped that they would pay for much of the peace implementation. However, dernobilization logistics, specifics of creating a neutral police force, and this initial underestimation of the situadetails about who would setup the tion coupled with the failure of Angola's first real chance for peace, made subse- army. Quarrels over these details, especially the creation of the police force, quent attempts much more difficult.
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FoRTNA Conflict& Security quickly undermined trust and cooperation within the CCPM.s Meanwhile, technical difficulties, resulting from woefully inadequate time and resources, provided excuses for deliberate noncompliance by both parties.
ther the United States nor the Soviet Union viewed Angola as a high priority. The primary work of maintaining peace fell to the UN, even though it had played a minimal role in the negotiations. Both the peace accords and
The BicesseAgreemetlt*u. atallorder on a very tlgiht tirnetable. The president was to be elected by a majority of the people, while the National Assembly was to be elected through a systern of proportional representation. The Accords established a National Electoral Cornrnission consisting of UNITA and MPIA representatives to oversee the elections. UNA\aEM was later asked to help rnonitor these elections. In retrospect, rnany have argrred that a rnajor flaw of the BicesseAccords was the "winner-take-all" presidential contest, as opposed to a power-sharing arrangement.6 Both sides, however, sawthe elections as a chance to win at the ballot box what they could not win on the battlefield' legitimate power to rule Angola alone. Neither party desired to share power, and the United States, believing its proxy would win, did not push for it. Only when it appeared that UNITA rnight lose did outside mediators begin to press for power-sharing arrangernents.T
UN the Security Council gave UNAVEM II a restricted rnandate: strictly to observe the work of the CCPM, not to keep peacedirectly. Becausethe belligerents had protested against extensive outside involvement, UNAVEM's mandate was overly limited. The MPlAwas particularly touchy about sovereignty issuesand presumably feared a pro-UNITA bias on the part of the U.S. -dorninated international cornrnunity. UNITA, on the other hand, seemed to want to avoid a strong presence that would enforce the demobilization provisions of the agreement. The international cornrnunity, feeling the strain that new missions would irnpose, was all too happy with preserving peaceas inexpensively as possible.8 The resources provided for implernenting the Bicesse Accords were incredibly lirnited given Angola's vast size and the inaccessibility of most of the country. The initial r8-month allocation ImplementingBicesse.Externalfor UNAVEM II was $r32.3 rnillion for a involvement prolonged the war for country of 12 million people.e The rnission consisted of 35o military observers, years, but when it came time to imple126 police observers, an electoral diviment the peace, Angolans were left largely to their own devices. While sion of 4oo poll monitors, and a civilian there was support in principle from the staff of 2+2.'" Cornpare this with 4,650 Troika, its role on the ground was limtroops, r,50O police monitors, an elecited. Portugal was less active in impletoral team of 9oo, and the $368.5 million spent in about r year in Namibia, a mentation than in mediation, and nei-
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country with r/B the population of Angola. This lack of spending reflected the reluctance of those paying the bill rather than a genuine or realistic assessment of whatAngola needed. Implementation was behind schedule frorn the beginning. Beset with logistical and technical problems, the process was often deadlocked by disagreements between the MPIA and UNITA and further disrupted by the unwieldy rnachinery of the CCPM. Lack of accurateinformation on the nurnber of troops in each army hampered both planning for demobilization and its verification. The difficulties of deploying soldiers to rernote areas delayed the cantonment of the rnilitary forces. Lack of adequate food, tents, and supplies rnade it difficult to keep troops assembled. Many MPIA troops sirnply left the carnps. Secure storage of weapons was also a problern in rernote areas, where most buildings were grasshuts. Dernobilization tearns, spread thin and without essential resources, delayed the creation of the new arrny. A srnall, purely syrnbolic force was hastily sworn in the day before elections." Even with more resources, time, and planning, technical and logistical delays could not have been surrnounted in implernenting the Accords. The real problem was deliberate non-cornpliance. Technical difficulties provided cover for deception, although it soon became apparent that both sides were holding troops in reserve to contest an electoral defeat or in case the war resumed. Non-compliance by both parties fueled the other's suspicions, but UNITA was the worse offender. The governrnent had trouble getting and keeping troops at the new arrny carnps, in part because UNITA troops remained mobilized and ready to fight.
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Estimates indicate that the MPIA kept ro,ooo troops mobilized, while U N I T A k e p t J o , o o o . " T w o d a y sb e f o r e the elections, 6$ percent of MPLA's troops had demobilized, but only 26 had. UNITA percent of UNITA's tipped the security equation further in its favor by sending its personnel to areas forrnerly under MPLA control and hiding arrns caches to support an offensive. While intentions are difficult to gauge exante,UNITA's actions should have set off alarm bells. Why didn't the international cornrnunity react earlier to deal with UNITA?'' The irnplementers' assessmentof politics in Angola wasbased on the Cold War assumption that Savimbi would win in a democratic election. Believing its own rhetoric, the United Statesjustified sup"freedom fighters" porting UNITA struggling for democracy, and assumed that, without strong Soviet backing, the MPLA would sirnply wither away.'4 Under this assurnption, there was no reason to question Savimbi's intent: he would have no reason to upset a peace process that would put hirn in power. In rg9r, with the Soviet lJnion disintegrating, American views and assumptions became the dominant influence shaping the peace process. Meanwhile, a cornbination of limited resources for gathering inforrnation, including a lack of Portuguese-speakers, and the desire to rernain impartial made it difficult for UNAVEM to brand Savimbi a spoiler. Furthermore, growing evidence of UNITA's plans was also downplayed or ignored. There were plenty of indicators that the rnilitaries kept forces in reserve, especially those of UNITA. UNAVEM was aware of the discrepancy in demobilization rates, and of claims by UNITA defectors of 2o,ooo troops and arms
FoRTNA Conflict& Security cacheshidden in the bush.'5 Before the elections Savimbi stated that "if UNIfA does not win, then it rneans fraud."'o It was clear that he planned to contest the elections by force if he lost.'7 But the international community did nothing to alter this incentive to use force. Meanwhile, the electoral exercise in Algola was extremely well rnonitored and irnplernented. Given the short timetable and logistical obstacles, both the registration of about , { - . 8 6m i l l i o n A n g o l a n s ( 9 2 p e r c e n t o f those eligible) and the polling itself were rninor miracles. Elections took place without major incident on September 29-3o, I992, with 9r Percent o f t h o s e r e g i s t e r e dv o t i n g . ' 8 Becausepriority was placed on elections rather than on dernobilization or other aspects of the peace agreernent, implernenters stuck to the original deadIine for elections rather than the sequence on which the timetable was based, complete dernobilization with a single integrated army in place before the election. The purely symbolic creation of a new army the day before elections is indicative of the extent to which wishful thinking and a rigid timetable for elections took precedence over the substance of what was needed for stable peace. The MPLA won the legislative elections, with dos Santos taking just under $o percent of the presidential vote and Savirnbi 40 percent. Electoral law required a second round if no one achieved $o percent, but it was never held. As soon as he realized he had lost, Savimbi took up arms. His adherence to the cease-fire had hinged on the belief that UNITA would win the elections. Knowing the outcome, and with his army still intact, there was no reason for him to continue to respect
the cease-fire or to accept defeat. Yet, rather than taking action against Savirnbi, UNAVEM reduced its troop strength and hunkered down in Luanda.'eBy October, Angola had plunged back into a full-scale war. While the elections were the only part of the ran that peace irnplementation smoothly and on schedule, they clearly should have been delayed to ensure post- election stability. Although they could have postponed elections, both Angolan parties were anxious to hold a contest each thought it would win. Third parties did not press for an extension, nor was strong pressure applied to either side for failing to demobilize. Both UNAVEM and the toika were suffering frorn the "Tinl<erbell syndrorne, " as one British diplomat called it, hoping "that if they believed hard enough in the process and avoided criticizing the parties...the country's political transition would be successful."'oThe United States had little desire to point out UNITA's non-compliance, while the UN preferred rnaking "even-handed" criticisrns to avoid the perception of partiality."' This cornbination of wishful thinking, the desire to be seen as irnpartial, and U.S. bias, added up to a peacekeeping mission that failed to condernn flagrant violations of the peace agreement, which resulted in outright aggression. In retrospect, the policy looks like appeasement. The international comrnunity tried to cajole Savimbi into a series of negotiations between October rgg2 and March rgg!. The United States and the IJN eventually irnposed sanctions on UNITA, but only after Savimbi had cornpletely destroyed the peace process and overrun two-thirds of the country. Sanctions eventually helped the MPIA reverse UNITA's military gains.
Winter/Springzoog [77)
A L O S T C H A N C EF O R P E A C E
Even so, mediators held out the prospect of a power-sharing agreement to induce Savimbi back to the negotiating table. With the military tide turning against hirn, the promise of a role in the governrnent coerced Savirnbi into signing the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. The Lusaka agreement "fixed" a number of the problems of the BicesseAccords, moving away frorn winner-takes-all elections and deploying a much stronger IJN force. If this agreement had been implemented in rggl it might have worked. But the failure of Bicesse rnade peace in rgg{. much more difficult to obtain, and within a few years the Lusaka peace ag'reement fell apart.
Conclusioll. Blamefor the resumption of war in 1992 rests squarely on Jonas Savimbi's shoulders, but the international community could have managed the situation rnuch rnore effectively. The pathetic peacekeeping mission, biased assumptions about Savirnbi's electoral prospects, and failure to tie elections to full demobilization squandered Angola's best chance for peace. Some would argue that the subsequent failure of the Lusaka Accords shows that Savimbi was an intransigent spoiler; that nothing short of his electoral victory, a "Liberia solution," would have created peace.'" Nevertheless,things could have been improved in the first round. Had there been a serious verification presence with more resources, it would have been harder for the parties not to demobilize and the results of the first round of Accords could have been quite different. There would still have been an incentive for both sides to hedge their bets by maintaining mobilized forces, but their non-compliance would have been much more evident. By
t78 ]
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
insisting on dernobilization before elections, as was done in Mozambique, the international community would have given the belligerents a choice: disarm and participate in elections, or face international condemnation for failure to dernobilize. Instead they were allowed to have both a shot at winning the election, and a military hedge. Before the elections, peacekeepershad leverage. Had the United States been willing to pressure UNITA, this leverage would have been improved. Each side had an incentive to cooperate since both thought they could win legitirnate power. Although Savirnbi would probably still have thrown a tantrum upon losing the vote, had he been pushed to demobilize, he would not have been in a position to destroy the peace so easily. Instead, once Savimbi knew the outcome of the elections, he had nothing to lose by fighting. It becarne impossible to induce UNIfA to dernobilize peacefully or respect the cease-fire. By the time a stronger peacekeeping force and a power-sharing agreernent were arranged in I$${, it was too late. The failure of the Bicesse Accords condernned Angola to another ten years of war. The war would not end until Savimbi's death and UNITA's defeat in 2oO2. While generalizing from a single specific case is imperfect, the failure of the Bicesse accords suggestsseveral broader policy lessons. First, attempts at underfunding and overly-hurrying peace are likely to backfire. The costs of failure, both the physical costs of later attempts at peace in Angola and the darnage to UN credibility, outweighed the rnoney saved by sending a skimpy mission. The coststo Angolans of this failure were devastating. A broader lesson can be derived from the Cold War legacy that blinded
FoRTNA Conflict&Security the mission to the spoiler problern with Savimbi. Strict impartiality may not be necessary for successful peacekeeping; in fact the UN's atternpt to rnaintain a sernblance of impartiality at all costs probably contributed to the problem, but initial biases toward the parties obj ective and realistic prohibited assessments of the potential risks to peace. Assumptions about which side will win elections, and how the losing side will react need to be tested carefully. Anticipating potential spoiler problerns ahead of time is crucial to tackling them effectively.
Finally, elections should not be held before demobilization is complete. Elections held when both sides maintain the ability to fight is a recipe for disaster. They remove the peacekeeper's rnost effective leverage and leave the loser little incentive not to fight. A bigger, more adequately financed peacekeeping mission with a realistic timeline, a rnore objective assessmentof the incentives facing the parties, and an insistence that dernobilization precede elections might well have created stable peace in Angola. Instead, the country has suffered war for the nast decade.
NOTES t Pau'l Hare's book on the Lusaka Accords of I 9 g 4 i s e n t i t l e d A n g o l o ' sL o s tB e ' t C h o n cfeo , P e o c e( W a s h ington, DC' United States Institute of Peace,
r998). z Wi'l'lian Minter, Aportheid'sContros'An Inquig into t h e R o o t o J W o r i n A n g o l oo n dM o l o m b r q u e( o h a n n e r b u r g , Witwarersrand University Press,I994.), IO3-53 F e r n a n d o A n d r e s e n G u i m a r i e s , T h e O r i g i n s o ft h e Angolan Ciuil Wor' ForeignInteruent[onand Domestic Political St. Martin's Press, 1998). Conlicf (NewYork, 4 Josâ&#x201A;Ź Manuel Durdo Barroso, "CSIS Study Group on Angola, " (Washington, DC, Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2o February, rggr). g MargaretJoan Anstee,
8 Various State,
officials
Washington
at the U.S.
DC,
December tggt. Also see UN
Department
August
rggS
Document
and
of rr
5/22627,
20 May r99I. 9 UN Document3/zz6zl
Addendum t, 2g May II cost $r75.8 million over : R e u i e uo J 4 y e a r s . l J n i t e d N a t i o n s , T h e B I u e H e l m e t sA United Nolions Peace-Keeping,3rd ed. (New York; LlnitrggI.
All told UNA\IEM
ed Nations, 1996). ro United
Nations,
T h eB l u e H e l m e t s ,2 l g .
It Mnes, r/; Venincio, l2 Various
3{,officials at the U.S-
State, Washington
DC,
interview
Department with
author,
of 6
August rgg8; Vines, r/. Orphan of the ColdWor, The
r3 StephenJohn
Stedman, "Spoiler
Peace Processes," (rgg7).
One Hand Tied, Angoloond the Ulf, CIIR Briefing Papers (London, Catholic Institute for International
State and the Washington
The United I9g3), 5; Mois6s Venincio, Nations, Peaceand Transition: Lessons from Angolc, vol. 3, Instituto Papers (Lisbon: de Estudos Luminar
Relations,
Estratigicos e lnternacionais, I994). example, Anthony
Neglected Tragedy, The Return
W.
35. Pereira,
"The
to War in Angola,
TheJournolof ModernAfricanStudie3 s 2, no. r rgg2-3," (r994), I-28. For an interesting critique ofpower"Sorting M. Minter, out sharing see William
t{, Various
Problems in
Internotional Securij 22,
insideSfo2 ofthe Collapseofthe AngolanPeoceProcess,1!!293 (London, Macmillan, rg96), 69-7I; AlexVines,
6 See for
6
officials at the U.S. Office
no-
Department
on Africa,
2 of
inter-
view with author, Washington, DC, 6 August rgg8. See also Minter, "Sorting out Lessons". I5 Anstee, 52-3. r6 Quoted in Anstee, I5I. r/ Victoria Brittain, Death of Digni!' ll'cr (London, Pluto Press, IggS), 49.
Angola'sCfuil
18 United Nations, 2{!. r9 Anstee, 2!9.
Lessonsfrom the Angolan Elections." (Presented at the African Studies Association, November r994),
2o Quoted in Venincio, .{6. 2I Minter, Apartheid's Contras, g; Anstee, J//; Krpka, "Peacekeeping UN, 246. See also, Madimir
4, 9.
in Angola
7 Various officials at the United States Department of State and United States-Angola Chamber of DC,
Commerce,
interuiew
by author,
Washington,
6 August 1998. Also see Anstee, r49.
(UNAVEM I and II)," InternotionolPeacek e e p i n 4g , n o . r ( r g g 7 ) : 9 o . 22 In 1997, Liberians elected rebel leader Charles Taylor president to prevent him from
tinuing
con-
the civil war.
W i n t e r / S p r i n g2 o o 3 [ 7 9 ]
0ulture&Society Jewsin Armenia TheHfddenDiaspora Vartan Akchyan While the territory of Arrnenia has shrunk consistently, the Armenian rnap of the world has widened and now encornpassesalmost every single continent. A piece of Arrnenian culture lives and thrives in the most rernote areas of the world, while Arrnenia itself only houses approxirnately 30 percent of the global Arrnenian population. This dispersion gives birth to quests for personal identity among rnany Armenians in the Diaspora. Although Armenians are usually thought of as a single group, similar to the Jews, there are several subgroups that -Western Arrnenians rnake up the greater Armenian ethnicity. are comprised of the Diaspora while Eastern Armenians are comprised of Arrnenians in the Republic of Arrnenia. These two groups, in turn, include smaller communities of Armenians living throughout the world, such as North and South American Armenians, Australian Armenians, Iranian Armenians, etc. While these cornmunities have shared traits that are distinctively Arrnenian, there still exist important differences, which can be used as identity rnarkers to distingrrish arnong the various subgroups. This creates synthesesof identity based on national, religious, territorial, and ethnic characteristics. Is a person living in the United Stateswith an Armenian grandfaWho decides? Much about the ther really an Armenian?
Vartan Akchyan i. associated with Georgetown ty's Center
Universifor New
Designs in Learning and Scholarship.
He
directed a documentary {ilm Armenia, miered
on Jews in which pre
in New York
City inJune
2oo2.
Winter/Springzoo3
[B r ]
J E W SI N A R M E N I A
Armenian identity, both at home and abroad, remains unclear. Ambiguity and uncertainty are the children of such prescriptive labels, and when fantasy of the future and nostalgia
in order to function. His only presence in Armenia is through his English lanSuage,which is foreign to Armenia. Only when located in Canada is he seen as an effectively powerful and perhaps Armen-
M UCh abOUt thg attttenian identity,both at horne and abroad, rernains rr.nclear. for the past are conflated in the Armenian psyche after the traumatic experience of near annihilation at the beginning of the twentieth century, the present becomes further distorted-a mere fable. Currently, Armenian collective consciousness preoccupies itself with the shared collective rnernories of the past among a disparate and diffuse ethnic group of the present. It is important to note that, from the perspective of the Diaspora (approximately lo per-cent of Armenians in the world), an Armenian in Armenia is narnelessand faceless-she is merely a part of Armenia. As a result, Armenia itself becornes something less than real. It becomes a utopian idea without a strong foundation to support it, while it is this foundation that renders the group capable and the individual important. Otherwise, the individual is facelessand incapable, neither an actor nor a creator-a mere shadow. In Atom Egoyan's Calendar,for example, the Armenian protagonist of the film is, in effect, "dead" in Armenia. He is nameless and faceless, powerless and out of place. Visually, he is never present in Armenia. He is in his ancestralhorne, while the very Armenian environment and his presence there turn him into a stranger and "make him from somewhere else."' While recognizing that "he is from there," he is in need of an intermediary
IBZ]
Georgetom Journal of International Affairs
ian character. One that is able to overcome personal trauma (the loss oF his Arrnenian-speaking wife) by reducing historical, cultural, and religious baggage to a self-createdwall hanging (a calendar of Armenian churches) and by reconstructing and facing the reality of his loss through the presence of foreign-speaking women in his home, which represents his unconscious attachrnent to a fragmentary ternporal and spatial relationship with Armenia. Such complex identity searches, marked by dispersion and personal journeys of revelation, become the reference points of self-discovery and common ground for Diaspora Armenians, who look inward towards Arrnenia, andJewish Arrnenians, who look outward towards Israel.
Historic0verview of Jewsin Afmenia, Various Jewish communities have lived in A:-menia. Perhaps the first appearance of Jews took place in the first century BCE, when Armenian King Tigran the Great exiled thousands of Jews from the Holy Land to the Armenian Empire. The ultimate fate of this community remains unclear, but the works of Khorenats'i inform us that they first settled in the Armenian cities of "Artashat and Valarshapat."" While according to Khorenats'i's account the Jews were converted to Christianity, the
AKcHYAN Culture & Society Greek geographer Strabo claims that "the tribesmen and townspeople, except for those of Jewish and Greek birth, spoke the Armenian langrrage."3Since there are no clear historical accounts that recorded the fate of this particular comrnunity at a later date, we can speculate that they were either eventually assimilated into the Armenian culture or have abandoned Armenia. In particular, theseJews may have been the predecessorsof today's Zoks, who are often considered ethnic Arrnenian Jews.a As Rabbi Burshteyn claims, Unofficially, Zoks are the descendants of ancientJer,rswho lived on the territory of Arrnenia and later converted to Christianity. Today, they consider themselvesto be Arrnenians and their point of view is also shared by the Jewish world. However, I do believe that one day the world will know who the Zoks really arewhether they are a rnlth or reality.5 An
interesting account of possible in Armenia beginning in presence Jewish the seventh century cornes from Ya'qubi. The medieval kingdom of Khazaria existed from 65o to 1016when "the far eastof Europe was ruled by Jewish kings who presided over nurnerous tribes, including their own tribe: the Turkic Khazars. After their conversion, the Khazar people used Jewish personal narnes and spoke and wrote in Hebrew."o Ya'qubi writes that "the Khazars were they who conquered all the lands ofArrnenia."T Another community ofJ ewish converts living in Armenia is the Subbotnils-a community of ethnically RussianJewsthat escaped religious persecution in Russia and has found its home in Armenia on the shores of Lake Sevan since the begin-
ning of eighteenth century., Subbotnils are "The People of the Sabbath," a distinctively Jewish identification. Previously, the Subbotnil<swere considered a sect, "but in today's reality, after studying their experience, we come to an understanding that they are not a different sect at all, because the Torah constitutes the very basis of their beliefs, and there is nothing except the Torah."e Thus, the Subbotnik experience lacks notJudaism, but the cul'Jewishness." tural identity of They are ethnically and linguistically Russian. Although the early history of the Subbotnils has yet to be uncovered, there is some certainty that they carne to Arrnenia from three Russian cities: Thrnbov, Saratov. and Voronezh.'o They established their own srnall town in Armenia and narned it Yelenovka. An elder Subbotnik said, "Our ancestors had their own synagogue, their own Rabbi, and their own prayer books-which were translated frorn Hebrew to Russian. To this date we continue using those bools."" Many Subbotnils still live in Armenia and practice their religion freely, but lile their Armenian peers, most of the younger rnembers of the community have now left Armenia due to economic difficulties and have established themselvesin Russia, the birthplace of their late ancestors. Currently, the elder members are the only people who argue that there has been a continuity of the Subbotnik cornmunity in Armenia. As an elder Subbotnik suggests, "I was born here, and will most likely die here. Where else can we go? This is our homeland. We love our horneland. We love our Armenia."'" Historical evidence of another Jewish community in Arrnenia was found in rggJ with the discovery of a thirteenth centuryJewish cemetery in the Arrnenian highlands. According to Dr. Michael
W i n t e r / S p r i n gz o o 3
[8 3 ]
JEWSIN ARMENIA
Stone, a professor at the Hebrew lJniversity ofJerusalem and head of excavations at the site, indications ofJewish communities in Armenia have been vague and sporadic, "We didn't know that Armenia 'We had a Jewish community. saw a hint here or a word there, but nothing from this period."'3 The discovery of seventy tombstones inscribed in Aramaic with Hebrew letters, which date frorn the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, constitutes the first physical evidence of a Jewish community in Armenia before the nineteenth century. It is difficult to g.enerate an allinclusive picture of theJewish presence in Armenia due to the imprecision of some historical accounts and lack of validation by other available data. However, the available combination of historical accounts and archaeological findings, while certainly less than comprehensive and rnostly infrequent, provides for a modest window into the general history of Jewish presence in Armenia, but ultimately belies the clear indication of a strong and lasting relationship between Jews and Armenians characterized by intermarriage and c r o s s - c u l t u r a lp o l l i n a t i o n .
and a range of other Jewish programs. The fall of the Iron Curtain and the emergence of pluralisrn and dernocratization have, in turn, Ied to the awakening of Jewish identity in post-Soviet Armenia. It is important to note thatJewish presence in Armenia during the Soviet epoch was, to a large extent, transparent. Shared traditions, values, and aspirations in the two cultures broughtJews and Armenians together throughout the territory of the Soviet lJnion and, specifically, within Armenia. In addition, deep solidarity grew between the two peoples in the aftermath of the tragic events of the first and second world wars. While there was an influx of Jews into Armenia during the I94Os and through the rg$Os, a repatriation of Armenians from Europe and the Middle East was simultaneously taking place, makingArmenia home for the survivors of loth Armenian and Jewish tragedies. The factor rnost responsible for the integration of Jews into Arrnenian society, however, was the establishrnent of matrirnonial unions between representat i v e so f t h e t w o g r o u p s . D u e t o i h " . o - bination of these elements, Arrnenians no longer perceived theJews as outsiders, but rather as insiders. The uniqueness of Armenia's Jewry cannot be understood outside the R e a l i t y . D u r i n g t h e p a s t d e c a d ea n d a greater context of Armenian reality as a half, the people ofJewish origins living whole. Specifically, this reality comes to in Armenia have undergone a religious, l i f e i n t h e f u s i o n o f A r m e n i a n h o m e cultural, and linguistic renaissance. land with the Arrnenian Diaspora, After the collapse of the Soviet lJnion characterizing Jewish existence in and its unsl,ccessful attempt at creating A r m e n i a a s a p r e s e n c e o f o n e D i a s p o r a a unified conglomerate of peoples and p e o p l e i n a n o t h e r D i a s p o r a p e o p l e ' s religions under the umbrella of Comhomeland, which gives birth to a mulmunism, the first synagogueandJewish tiplicity of outlooks and frames of refSunday school to open in more than a e r e n c e i n t h e A r m e n i a n c o n s c i e n c e . century was establishedin the Armenian Interestingly, even with such dispersion capital. They offered Hebrew classes, and variety, being Armenian is to be in Shabbat services, holiday celebrations, a " c l o s e d u n i t , " s i n c e " A r m e n i a n n e s s "
Jewsand ModernArmenian
tS+ ]
GeorgetownJournal of International Affairs
AKcHYAN Culture&Society (analogous to 'Jewishness") does not provide any real windows of inclusion 'Jew apart from kinship. Similar to and Gentile, " there exists an "Armenian and Otar (foreign)" dichotomy, both of which are ethnic-religious identities forrnulated frorn and reinforced by the familial institution. Indeed, the modern Jewish presence in Arrnenia reproduces itself rnainly through intermarriages betweenJews and labeled in the Armenians-comrnonly
To the ground I bow in front of these people, who in this little village on top of the mountains, in the rniddle of their joyor.rsmoments, spoke of the suffering of the Jews. To those I bow, who in solernn silence listened to those words."'a Such e*pressions of solidarity and exchanges of feelings were characteristic of the relationship between Jews and Arrnenians. Even rnore, such mutual acknowledgements have elevated the relationship between the two groups to a level
PfOCeSShas beCOmernoreirnportantthan sagaclty. former Soviet lJnion as "the thundering merger." Stereotypically, this "rnerger" rneant a "union of parallels," in which two strong cultural groups with collective pain and confidence in their own ethnicity and religion came together to create a magnetic bond founded upon their similar paths. But, at the sarne tirne, there was an ironic distance stemming from their conscious awarenessthat a union of parallels was in fact irnpossible. This is illustrated by the experience of Russian-Jewish writer Vasiliy Grossman, who, in rg62, was dispatched to Arrnenia to write short stories about Soviet life in the peripheral republic. In one of his stories, he describes an incident at an Armenian wedding where an old Arrnenian veteran, after learning that Grossman wasJewish,drank a glassof vodka to commemorate the deaths of hisJewish friends duringWorldWar II. This sort of public display of sympathy and grief for the victims of the Holocaust was unheard of in the r96os. Grossrnan was so rnoved and affected by this gesture that he later wrote: "Never have I bowed in front of anvone.
often characterized as "unique and special, " as "enigmatic and rnystical."'5 Although physically close, Jews and Armenians are often far apart; but, despite their differences, their fates were strangely similar. Historical events turned these groups into sur-yivors and transforrned their continued existence from rnere subsistenceto an imperative of persistence and prosperiry into the future. "And the chain, the continuurn of this people's life was unbreakable," continues Grossrnan. "In it were united youth, old age, and sorrows of the dead. The continuum seemed firm and everlasting. Misfortunes. death. invasion did not break the chain."'o These words, while describirg Grossrnan's perspective on the Armenian people, are peculiarly characteristic of bothJews and Armenians. Sirnilar to the Jews, the Armenians have come to acquire a concentricity of history, of national consciousness,and of linguistic and religious difference. In contrast to other Christian churchesand akin to practices of Judaism-the Arrnenian Church has been historically
W i n t e r / S p r i n gz o o 3
[3 51
J E W SI N A R M E N I A
a non-proselytizing institution constantly struggling to maintain its own identity (even within Christendom), since, according to the writings of Elishe, spiritual and secular models parallel to and borrowed from the Maccabeeswere utilized to shield Armenian customs and culture from outside forces as early as in the fifth century.'7 Establishing an organized ethno-cultural framework is absolutely essential for a successful salvaging of the Armenian reality. "Go ahead, destroy this race...Seeif you can do it," suggests William Saroyan.'t Armenians have struggled throughout much of history in order to protect and maintain their social rnemories and way of life. They have struggled to such an extent that s t r u g g l eh a s b e c o m e a m a j o r c o m p o n e n t of their culture and identity. Who else extends an invitation to be destroyed so that they can rebuild again? Process has become more important than sagacity; it has become a deeply-
rooted trait of Armenian character to be extremely rational and irrationally whimsical at the same time, to live life to its fullest while rnanaging to fulfill the irnperative of survival. The fear of escaping the bliss of denial and thus confronting the traurna that suspends the choice-that-must-be-made and the action-that-must-be-taken prevents Armenian reality from transforrning from "process" into "choice/action." The fear of moving beyond this cycle(or pa.udox) is what "successfully" sustains continuity. Armenian reality has now entered the "domain of the closed circular palpitation which finds satisfaction in endlessly repeating the sarne failed gesture."'e The constant Armenian denial of its own historical trauma has to be derailed before Armenia, along with its Jewish cornmunity, can become a full member of the twenty-first century worid. Today, however, Arrnenian reality is a culture of fantasy, with a suspended present and a pressingly uncertain future.
NOTES r Calendar,dir. Atom Arsinâ&#x201A;Źe
Khanjian,
Arts/ZDF,
Egoyan, perf. Atom
and Ashot
Adamian,
Egoyan, Ego Film
Ig93.
Htstoryof the ArmenicnJ, trans. 2 Moses Khorenats'i, Robert W. Thomson (Cambridge, Haward lJniversity Press, r978), zg3. 3 David Marshall Lang, Armeniu: Cradle of CiuilQotion, znd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 126. 4 For more in{brmation about the Zolc, please refer to the documentary film entitled lews in Armenia: The Hidden Diaspora. Burshteyn, interview with 5 Rabbi Gersh-Meir author, rJuly 2Oot. 6 "Khazaria In{b Center, " http, //w.l<hzaria. com (Date Acce.red, z8 August 2oo2). The History of the Jewish Khoaors 7 D. M. Dunlop, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, lg54), Zo. 8 The author's personal inteniews with the Subbotniks yielded the I73os as the date of their ancestors' arrival in Armenia. g Rabbi
i 8 6 I
Gersh-Meir
Burshteyn,
interview with
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
author, IJuly 2OoI. to Yo'av Karny, Hghlanders:AJourne] to the Cqucosus rn (New York' Fanar, Straus and Giroux. Queslof |ltemog,
zooo),3o9. tt Intewiew with author, July 2oor. 12 Nacha Cattan, "Prof discovers remnants
of
buried Armenian
c i t y , " F r e e d o n ,1 8 J a n u a r f 2 o o 2 . l3 Vasiliy Grossman, Pouest',lassAc4i,Ocherfri(Mosk-
va: Vagrius, r998), 22o. r{. Dr. Igor Ulanovsky, June 2oOI. lg Grossman,
ZZl.
interview
Thken from
with author, "Dobro
t{.
Vam"
[Peace Be With You], an account of Grossman's journey to Armenia, t96z- 63. t6 Elishe, Histog ofVoulon and theArmenionWur (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard
lJniversity
Press,
r 9 8 z ) ,r 5 6 . I 7 W i l l i a m S a r o y a n , I n h o l e& E x h a l e( N e w Y o r k , dom House, 1936), +18. (London, r8 Slavoj Zizek, The PlogueofFantosies so, I997),30.
RanVet
Law&Ethlcs Is Therea Just Cause
for WarAgainst Iraq?
John Langan Critics of just war theory often ask if the proponents of the theory have ever been able to discern in advance whether a proposed war is just or not. Conscientious officials and military personnel, anxious that their actions rneet the test of justice, ask sirnilar questions of those of us who discussjust war theory as part of our academicwork. It is, of course, easierto dernand answers than to arrive at them, becausewars are necessarilycontroversial and are fought under conditions of ignorance and uncertainty. Hindsight is genuinely useful when it enables us to better understand the evolution of our understanding of a complex conflict and also the process by which we carne to form a moral judgrnent on a shifting reality. It is not reasonable to expect theories, however rooted in military history they rnay be, to dissolve the fog of cornbat. It is reasonable, however, to ask those who expound them to alert us to some of the morally troubling aspectsthat are likely to arise as we rnove frorn public deliberation toward the actual use of force. In contrast to the public discussion that preceded the Gulf War of r99r, there has not been much use of the language of 'just war" in the public debate or in the administration's argrrrnents that there rnust be an imrnediate regirne change in Iraq. A recent exception is the letter sent by Bishop Wilton Gregory to President Bush on Septernber rg, 2oo2.I will not cornrnent
J o h n L a n g a n ,S . J . , is Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor
of
Catholic
Social
Thought
in the School
of Foreign
Sewice
the Kennedy of Ethics
and
Institute
at George-
town University
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I S T H E R EA J U S T C A U S EF O RW A R A G A I N S T I R A Q ?
on Bishop Gregory's letter, which he sent in his capacity as president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and has an official authority and a political weight that a scholarly cornment cannot have. My own interest is in exploring certain questions that arise as we apply just war criteria to the current situation. In doing this, I am, of course, looking into a future about which our knowledge is quite limited. Although the precise way in which the war would be conducted has been the topic of vigorous speculation and of surprising leals, no one can speak with certainty as to how the course of a war will actually proceed. Many of the details of the present situation are unknown even to specialists on Iraqi affairs and U.S. military planning. The first requirement that any proposed conflict rnust meet is that there be a just cause for which the war is to be fought. In the absence of a just cause, there can be no just war, so this will always be the most fundarnental requirement. It is here that the administration's proposal to invade Iraq in order to bring about a regime change in Baghdad runs into its first serious dlfficulty. There can be no doubt that this proposal aims at morally worthy and politically important objectives. Both the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad and the removal of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenal oflraq are compelling and even urgent goals. They are, nevertheless, distinct goals and two of the questionsthat U.S. policymakers may have to resolve is whether one of them is more important and whether we would be content with the final situation in Iraq if only one of these objectives was actually attained. In the current situation, of course. the two objectives are intertwined, but both
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the ongoing debate and future policy decisions will be affected by the priority we give to one or the other. If, for instance, we place priority on the removal of weapons of massdestruction, as we have seemed to do in our efforts to get a positive resolution from the UN Security Council, we put ourselves under serious pressure to corne up with consistent policies for handling other countries which have or are on the verge of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The need for such policies has been underlined by the disclosure that North Korea already has a srnall nuclear arsenal. In particular, if Saddam Hussein makes seemingly serious offers to allow inspections, will we accept that he remains in power? These questions, however, should not lead us to deny the real benefits of removing Saddam Hussein and his weapons frorn Iraq. For just war theory, the question about any proposed use of force is not whether it leaves the world better off in some respect, but whether there is indeed a specificjust causefor a particular country or group of countries to use force against an aggressoror a potential aggressor. The potential harm can affect us, one of our allies, or a neighboring state. In all cases, whether they are in selfdefense, the honoring of the terms of a just alliance, or in the causeof collective security, there is a just causefor a war that is recognized by international law and agreed upon acrosspolitical and cultural boundaries. The nearly universal recognition of the need to expel Iraqi aggressors from Kuwait was rooted in the clear presence of a just cause for a defensive war. The harm that defensive rnilitary actions aim to prevent is normally inflicted by the armed forces of the aggressor countrJ, but we can also envi-
L A NG A N L A W& E t h i C S sion scenarios in which the harm is inflicted by guerrilla or terrorist groups. The harm must also be current. Harms inflicted in the past would not justify violent action now to undo thern, even though there may be a serious case for renegotiation of the issuesand for reparations for harm previously done. The harm done to citizens and residents of the United Statesby the terrorists of al Qaeda aided by the Thliban on Septernber rr, 2oor provided just cause for the use of force by the United States and its allies in the war against Afghanistan. But, in the absence of convincing linls between that attack and the activities of Saddarn Hussein's regime in Iraq. it does not constitute a just cause for an attack on Baghdad. The attacks on New York and Washington clearly dernonstrated America's vulnerability to weapons of massdestruction and probably created a broad willingness amongst the general public to use force against those who would harrn us or threaten our allies. But this is a psychological connection and not a rnoral argurnent founded on rational analysis. Sorne of the public staternents of the administration appeal to this connection, but rnany of them respect the difference between the harm actually done by the terrorists of September rr and the harm that has been done and may be done by Saddam Hussein. If one accepts that there has been no significant cooperation between aI Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regirne, then the issue of just cause revolves around the extent to which it is justifiable to anticipate or preempt an attack by Iraq against the United Statesand its allies, particularly Israel. A requirement that we rnust wait until an attack has actually begun seems unrealistic at a time when missiles can deliver destructive payloads within
minutes and when terrorists can launch Iethal surprise attacks. Some have clairned that the rnere possession of weapons of mass destruction by a rogue stateor by a terrorist group constitutesan intolerable threat to the security of the United States and its allies. It is clear that the acquisition and possession of such weapons indicates the presence of anxiety and hostility, and it is reasonable for a state that thinls itself to be the likely target of such weapons to take measures to defend itself. Indeed, lf the danger is grave and irnrninent, then the state rnay well be justified in attacking first. The question then is whether the Iraqi threat to the United States is grave and irnrninent at the present time. The consensus seerns to be that the Iraqi regirne possesses chernical and biological weapons, which could be used at any tirne, but that it does not now possess nuclear weapons and the delivery systerns that would allow them to be used reliably against the United States. It must be clear to all that if Saddarn ernploys weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors, Israel, or the United States, it would lead to massive retaliation and would initiate a series of events that would have to include his rernoval from power and the destruction of his regirne. At this point, the psychological and rnotivational differences between Saddam Hussein, a secularizing leader and opportunistic user of Islarnicist slogans, and the radical militants of al Qaeda are very important. A reasonable interpretation of these differences is that Saddam Hussein is likely to be deterred by the prospect of the complete destruction of his regime and by the comprehensive darnage that his country would suffer, whereas the prospect of death and destruction has a dernonstrated positive
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appeal to the most committed members of such organizations as al Qaeda, who are ready to seek martyrdom. Deterrence does not come with an absolute glrarantee of its effectivenessin preventing hos-
be directly self-destructive or driven by fanatical beliefs, it makes sense to deter hirn by drawing clear lines beyond which he must not pass, and by making definite threats about what will happen if he does
arefor WeaPOnS 0f maSS destruction
Saddarn both attractive and virtually unusable. tile or irresponsible acts, but it is thus far the most reliable rnanner that we have of avoiding conflicts between hostile and heavily armed powers' If deterrence is a reasonably reliable rneans of preventing Saddam Hussein frorn engaging in hostile acts against his neighbors, then it is rash to conclr-,dethat his acquisition of weapons of mass destruction will lead to their use. One exception to this would be the case in which our hostilitY towards Saddam and his regime is so rnanifest and intense that he concludes that his destruction is imminent and that he may as well take as rnany Arnericans and Israelis as possible with him. In this case, our threats rnay, contrary to our stated intentions, make the use of weapons of mass destruction more attractive rather than less attractive. Some observerspoint out that Saddam Hussein has not been deterred from rash and destructive actions in the past-his attacks on Iran and Kuwait being two exarnples.He is, as I argued at the tirne of .War, a "serial aggressor"' a rnan the Gulf who cannot be relied on not to attack or kill in the future. He is opportunistic; he wili take unwise risks; and he will attemPt to exploit divisions and uncertainties in the ranls ofhis potential adversaries. For all these reasons, it will be a positive moment when he is ultimately deprived of power. But, since he does not seem to
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so. We should also remember that the United States held ambiguous positions with regard to Saddam Hussein in the past because of our opposition to the Islamic regime in Iran and becauseof our failure to intervene to save the Shah's regime. These ambiguities have been eliminated and will not have the effect of diminishing the credibility of our threats to use force in suitable circumstances. This brings us to the point that our concern is not so rnuch to prevent Saddam Hussein frorn using his weapons of rnass destruction as to Prevent him frorn restricting our own freedom of action in the Gulf area and the Middle East. No reasonable person would give Saddarn a veto power over the actions of other powers in the GuIf region. However, the history of the Cold-War showsthat it is possible to live with heavily armed, hostile regimes and wait them out, since they have enormous negative factors in their internal composition. Weapons of mass destruction, however, could appeal to other regimes in the area. as an attractive means of preserwing themselves. A negative situation of regional deterrence could emerge similar to that evolving between India and Pakistan on the South Asian subcontinent. Despite this, there is still a casefor regarding it as less destructive than a full scale war to destroy Saddam's regime. It does not rely solely on a
L A N G A NL a w & E t h i c s potentially costly U.S. intervention in the area, for which the American public may not be ready. The conclusion I would draw is that weapons of mass destruction are for Saddam both attractive and virtually unusable. It is also not likely that he will atternpt to attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction through surrog'ates such as al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. He will not want to let those weapons of mass destruction pass out of his control. As long as he remains rational in the minirnal sense, he will not want to run the risk of detection in a scheme that would require hirn to have a high degree of confidence in the discipline of his confederates. In the aftermath of its successfuloperation of September It, al Qaeda might seem to qualify on these grounds; but given the conflicting viewpoints of the secular regime in Baghdad and the religious fanaticism of al Qaeda, it is difficult to imagine that Saddam Hussein would regard them as reliable allies to whom he could entrust the continued existence of his regime. Such a step, which would require trust in political groups not under his cornplete control, seems incompatible with the paranoia of his regime. If Saddam Hussein and his regime can be deterred, then from a just war perspectivethis would be the preferred policy. This does not mean that deterrence is a satisfactorysituation, only that it is better than a preventivewar. Affirming a policy of containment does not preclude fighting a war against Saddam Hussein if he disrupts an internationally authorized systern of inspections or if he assaultshis neighbors. Such a justifiable w a r a g a i n s tl r a q i a g g r e s s i o n( i f a n d w h e n it occurs) should not be fought as an unlirnited war without regard for civilian
casualties.Our exercise of force should not be measured by our capabilities, but by the military needs of the situation and by the moral requirement that we not directly target civilians and attempt to minirnize civilian casualties. A preference for containment over preventive war does not mean that we should give up our efforts to impose a system of inspections on Saddarn Hussein and a future without weapons of rnass destruction on Iraq. The inspections rnust be intrusive and coercive if they are to be effective. Both effective containment and war require the deployment of rnilitary forces and a credible threat to use them. But a policy of deterrence and containment rnoving toward regional disarrnament should be workable and is morally superior to an invasion of Iraq with the ensuing occupation of the country. Such a policy will have its own rnoments of danger, since al Qaeda will not appreciate the fact that we spared an Iraqi regime which they have their own reasonsfor despising. There is also the danger that the tedious task of maintaining inspections against a wily and determined foe rnay becorne laborious to the world at large and seem unduly harsh to those who lose sight of the c h a r a c t e ro f S a d d a m ' sr e g i m e . Adopting a policy of containrnent and deterrence means that we have to rnake a choice with regard to our objectives in dealing with Iraq. We give priority to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and we postpone the objective of effecting regime change. It is clear frorn the recent unanirnous vote in the UN Security Council that there is broad international consensus to disarm Iraq, while there is no such consensus to remove Saddam Hussein. The two objectives, however, are not neatly separable.
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As long as Saddam Hussein is in control of Iraq, there remains a possibility that he will continue to attempt to build an arsenal including weapons of mass destruction. Some members of the Bush administration have made it clear that they think there are strong reasonsto insist on
inspections, no rnatter how numerous and eloquent, would in themselveshave moved the situation forward to even a partial resolution. This is one of the widely recognized problems of deterrent systems in general, namely, that they rely on morally questionable
is a ThiS dOeS nOt rneanthat d.eterrence satisfactgry situation, only that it is better than a Preventrve war. both objectives. If we were to imagine a scenario in which Saddam Hussein is overthrown frorn within, we would still have the task of persuading the successor regime to accept serious lirnitations on its sovereignty with regard to the possession of weaponsof rnassdestruction. Whether it happens in one or in two stages, it seems that the Iraq of the future will be without weapons of rnassdestruction and without SaddamHussein. If something like this arg'ument is correct, then it seemsthat we lack a just cause for attacking Saddarn Hussein and that the use offorce is not a last resort in dealing with Iraq. But we encounter a certain paradox, which should make us both aware of the lirnitations ofjust war thinking and reluctant to fall into the cornmon trap of imposing a dichotorny on what is really a very fluid situation. For it seems that it is precisely by threatening the use of force, something which is not fully justified on moral grounds, that we have been able to focus both Iraqi and international attention on the imperative need to terminate Iraq's programs for acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It is unlikely that denunciations of Saddam Hussein and recriminations about his efforts to avoid and terminate
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threats. In the case of Iraq, there was reason to fear that the United States government believed that it would be advantageous to carry out the threats it was making and that it could implement these threats without exposing itself and its interests to serious damage. UN Security Council Resolution r++r expressesa consensus that the disarrnament of Iraq is preferable to war and that this is an urgent task which justifies the threat of force as an appropriate and necessarymeans. The first of these conclusions is now acknowledged as cornmon ground between the adrninistration and its critics; it restrains the rnore militant elements within the adrninistration. Recognition of the second conclusion is an important point gained by the administration. On the other hand, the threat of force will do little to prevent attacks frorn tenorist groups such as al Qaecla since they have a decentrali"ed and unstable center of command, and since key mernbers of these groups are willing to sacrifice their lives. Instead, foiling their plans requires that we have networks of communication and cooperation throughout the Middle East, aswell as reliable sources of human intelli-
L A N G A NL a w & E t h i c s gence. Such patterns of cooperative relationships necessitate that, in the long run, we are seen as reliable and fair partners, ready to use force when needed but not overly eager to destabilize the region by the intermittent application of overwhelming rnilitary might. The achievement of stability in the Middle East is a task that will require that we restore a perception of ourselvesas being even-handed in relation to the dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This is not a rnatter of abandoning the Israelis as our allies, which would be shameful and foolish, but of preparing the Palestinians to work with both the Israelis and ourselves on rnutually beneficial terms. Such a prospect may seern implausible given the present tragic circumstances of the conflict in Israel and the West Bank, but it is nec-
essary if Israel is to achieve genuine and reliable security, and if we are to have stable democratic allies in the Islamic world. In the long run, the war on terrorism, the effort to Drevent the proliferation and use of ..-,clea. weapons, and the resolution of the most acute political conflicts (among which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most directly relevant) are all directly related. Solving these problerns will surely be more feasible when the United States shows itself to be capable of both firrn leadership and genuinely collaborative action. The United States needs to recognize that the resolution of these grave problems requires that we avoid taking actions that seern attractive in a contrived emergency but that will undermine our ability to achieve peace, disarrnament, and justice in the long run.
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Law& Ethics
a Solemn Obligation Neglecting Nancy Paterson "You haven't asked about what I went through at the Izbica massacre," protested Sadik Januzi, an elderly farmer frorn Kosovo, at the conclusion of his testirnony at the trial of Slobodan Milosevic.' Mr. Januzi had corne to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Forrner Yugoslavia (ICTY or Tribunal) to affirm that Serbian forces killed over roo men in his home village. However, in an effort to speed up the trial, rather than let Mr. Januzi tell his story, the judges limited the prosecutor to asking a handful of questions and reading two brief summaries of Mr. Januzi's written statements into the record. Mr. Milosevic was then allowed to cross-examine Mr. Januzi." When Mr. Milosevic finished, the witness was excused. "Mr. Januzi, " said the judge, "we've got your staternent before us. We've seen what you went through. We've heard it sumrnarized. We'vebeen able to read about it. And that concludes your evidence. Thank you for coming to the Tiibunal to give it, andyou're free to go."t Such is the sad state of witness testimony frorn the victims ofwar crimes before the ICTY. It begs the questions: Are these witnesses really of such little value to this court? Is this what the United Nations had in mind when it createdthe tibunal in rgg3?
Nancy Paterson was a prosecutor New York
City
in for
eleven years, and worked
as a trial attor-
ney at the International Criminal
Tribunal
for the Forner Yugoslavia (lCT\'-)
{br
seven years. She is currently
working
as a
consultant
investigat-
ing fraud
and corrup-
tron.
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Waf CfinteS tf ials rnustadd.ress theneeds
of three key parties: the perpetrators, the victims, andihe corrrrn.tiritv affected bv the war. Frustrated in no small part by its inability to bring a diplomatic end to the conflict in Yugoslavia, the United Nations established the ICTY to bring to justice the perpetrators of the war crimes comrnitted in Bosnia and Croatia.a However, the UN did not stop there. Perhaps guided more by rhetoric than reality, and by the need to invoke the special provisions of ChapterWI, the Security Council laid out a wider mandate for the Tiibunal in Resolution go8 (rggg). In addition to bringing the war criminals to the dock, the Security Council announced that it believed that establishing the Tribunal would bring an end to the horrific crimes and "would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace."5 While most criminal courts throughout the world are designed to prosecute those responsible for heinous crimes, few, if any, are charged with the mandate to "contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace." taditionally, crirninal courts focus on providing a fair trial for the defendant to insure that his rights are protected. If, in the process, the systern also benefits the victims and the community, so much the better, but the focus is always on the defendant. Most lawyers, regardless ofwhat country they corne from and what judicial system they practice in, would argue that this is the only role appropriate for a criminal court. They would reject the concept that a court can and should serveasa forum to "contribute to the restoration and rnaintenance of peace." A court should strictly limit itself to its traditional legal role. There is no
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reason now to tarnper with the established system. The idea of providing justice for the victirns and for the country as a whole as a means to restore and maintain peace would be considered well beyond the traditional mandate of crirninal courts. However, while the reasons for conducting defendant-focused trials are valid and this is undoubtedly a lesscontroversial approach, the judges and other practitioners at the Tribunal cannot simply ignore the wider mandate given them by the UN Security Council. Confining the focus of a trial solely to the defendants without also considering the restorative effects the trial can have for the victims and the wider cornrnunity of war surwivors lirnits the court's ability to help restore and maintain peace. To fulfill their mandate, these international courts must put rnore effort into implementing a variation of the traditional crirninal court model. They must realize that the rnodern world is demanding more of them, and therefore they must look beyond the traditiorral views of a court's function. Even the United States Suprerne Court has confirmed this principle by noting, "For the Constitution to have vitality, this Court must be able to apply its principles to situations that may not havebeen foreseen at the tirne those principles were adopted."6 Since there are no precedents for such a mandate, just how does a new international criminal court go about restoring and maintaining peace? Restoring and maintaining peace requires that all those involved come to grips with the grim reality of the conflict.
P A T E R S OLNA W & E t h i C S This cannot be accomplished if the Tri_ e-rinternational criminal courts to accept bunal is confined to simply scrutinizing the goals of providing justice and helping the behavior ofthe accused. to restore and maintain peace, the judges W-ar crimes trials must address the must seethe value of providing this forum needs of three key parties: the perpetrafor the victims and for the public. How tors, the victims, and the comrnunity can this broader approach make their iob affected by the war. To accomplish this, asjudges easier? Simply put, what is in it the court must find a way to help the vicfor them? tims accept, understand, and verbalize First, the judges should consider the what has happened to them. The victims argument rnade by U.S. Supreme Court must be given an opportunity to articulate Harlan that holding public trials Justice and visualize their experiences. Anger brings many benefits. In his opinion in and sadnesshave to be expressedin u p,rbU.S. u. Isfes, Justice Harlan argued that lic arena -anything lesswill only frustrate conducting public proceedingsl-p"orr". the victims and increase their pain and the overall quality of testimony, can rnotidistress. If the individual victims of these vate reluctant witnessesto come forward, terrible crimes are not given ',their day in and "may move all trial participants to c o u r t , " h o w c a n t h e c o u n t r y a s a w h o l e perforrn their duties conscientiously. "7 accept what has happened, acknowledse Perhaps most importantly, holding public the pain and destruction that has beJn trials allows the public to scrutinize the caused,and try to move on? judges and other practitioners, and satisy Limiting witness testimony like that of t h e m s e l v e s that the legal authorities are Mr. Januzi might speed up the trials, but fulfilling their respJnsibilities in an in doing so the court is not only neglect_ appropriate manner.' ing its responsibility to the rrictims of the How can holding a public trial improve conflict, but it is also preventing the pubthe quality of witness testimony? Dr. lic, as well as the judges thernseives,iroJudith Herman. author of the seminal hearing the cornpelling stories the witbook, Trouma ond Recouery, asserts that nessescan tell. Lile the defendants and "public acknowledg"*.r,t of the truth is the victims, the wider community also more important than punishment of the n e e d st h e f o r u m o f t h e c r i m i n a l c o u r t t o perpetrators," for the victims of trauma, help it accept the extent of its responsibil_ includingvictims ofwar crimes.e By airing ity for what happened. The .o^rn-,rrrity the facts of what happened in a publil needs to try to understand how and why f o r u m , the wider community cancome to t h e w a r c r i m e s o c c u r r e d , a n d t o f a s h i o n a understand and acknowledge what happlan for preventing such crimes in the pened. This acceptance of reality illus_ future. Only by putting a face to the gentrates the potential healing powers of the eral suffering, by listening to the individsystem. Dr. Herman points out that, ual victim's pain, and by seeing the long"The response of the community has a term impact of the crimes on individuals, powerful influence on the ultimate reso_ can the public understand the senseless- lution of the trauma. " nessof the actsand the need to find alterIn order for the victirns to begin recov_ nativesto war. ering, they need to reconnect with the To get the tibunal, and, more specif- cornrnunity they feel has failed them. i c a l l y ,t h ej u d g e s o f t h e T r i b u n a l u . , j o t h Once the community accepts the facts of
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the crime, the community must act to hold the perpetrators of the crime responsible and then try to heal the injuries suffered by the victims. "These two responses-recognition and restitution-are necessary to rebuild the survivor's senseof order and justice."'o This focus on public acknowledgement and justice for the victims is of overriding significance to the survivors of war crimes.
the minds of the victims, the issue at stake is notjustwhat the defendant did, but also the action or inaction of bystanders. According to Dr. Herman, victims feel a senseof"betrayal by the bystanders" and it is this senseof betrayal that drives them to seek some acknowledgement of their suffering and pain." How can the courts insure that the quality of testimony grven by the victims is
In Of def f0l the victirnsto begin recovering, t^hey-ne.{ !o reconnect with the iornrnunity feel has failed them. In order to get the best testimony from the victims and improve the quality of the evidence, the judges need to appreciate the victim's point of view. The judges, as well as the lawyers and other court personnel, must accept that the victim's view of the court process does not correspond with that of the legal practitioners. The victims believe that the process is about them. If the judges tried to explain that the trial is about the defendant, most victims of war crimes would be incredulous. They would tell the judges that the court process is designed to give them a forum to talk about their pain and suffering, and to allow the judges, acting as representatives of the community, to acknowledge the facts of the crimes and to recognize the harm they-as victirns-have suffered. The international crirninal courts cannot hope to achieve their goal of contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace if they fail to address the victim's position. As Dr. Herman has pointed out, victims need to regain some power and control as part of their recovery. The timing and pacing of the narrative is central to the healing process. In
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the best that can be provided? One way is to treat the witnesses with respect and understanding. If the Tribunal did a better job of understanding the needs of the witnesses, both physical and psychological, they could implernent a better systern for meeting those needs. If the witnesses feel that the court cares about them, they will care about the court, and try to the best of their ability to help the court understand what happened to them, their loved ones, and their neighbors. A victim who feels that the court values their testimony, is willing to go to great lengths to hear their testimony, and appreciates the danger and intirnidation they may have experienced will be more motivated to speak fully and openly about what they experienced. The judges should also consider the unique opportunities that the international nature of a crirninal court such as the ICTY provides for broadening the impact of the criminal court system. An international criminal court provides a means for educating the worldwide community about the truth of what happened in armed conflicts; it is a means for edu-
PATERSON LAW&EthiCS
cating civilians and the military about what acts constitute war crirnes. Such knowledge may motivate governments and armies to change their conduct and behavior in future conflicts. Moreover, this knowledge reminds the world that wars are cruel and brutal exercises that scar not only individuals, but also entire villages, cities, and countries. Vivid accounts of war crimes rernind people that there is more to war than the photos on the evening news. Certainly, the simple act of providing a forum for victims to tell their stories will not, by itself, restore and maintain peace. However, if managed thoughtfully, it can move the process forward. {Jnfortunately, neither the ICTY or its counterpart for Rwanda (ICTR) has embraced this idea. Instead they havebeen bound to the traditional concept ofhow courts operate and what their roles should be, and they have rnade inadequate efforts to focus on the needs of the victims.'Worse still, now that both the ICTY and ICTR are routinely and sharply criticized for the painfully slow pace of trials, they have moved to restrict witness testirnony even more. Giving rnore voice to the victims of the war can also help the judges to better understand the elements of the crimes they are considering. To prove the defendant guilty, the prosecution must prove several elements of each crirne. When required to focus on the technical legal definitions of the elements, it is easyfor the judges to rniss the true significance of what they are actually considering. In the case of Slobodan Milosevic, the judges have to consider evidence as to whether or not Milosevic is responsible for torture, willfully causing great suffering, cruel treatment, and other inhumane acts.'" When decidingif Milosevic committed the crimes of cruel treatment or "inhumane"
acts, the judges have to determine if he intended to impair the physical, intellectual, or moral integrity of the victim. The judges have to decide if the defendant subjected the victims to indignities, pain, or suffering that are grossly out of proportion to the treatment expected by one human being of another. How can a judge deterrnine whether this happened to Mr. Januziwithout hearing in depth from Mr. Januzi? To sirnply read a cold, bland witness statement into the record, as is now the norm at the ICTY, cannot possibly be an adequate substitute for the simple, yet drarnatic and cornpelling testimony that often comes frorn victims. How victirns choose to articulate their suffering is what breathes life into the whole concept of judgrng and achieving justice. Givlng victirns an oppoltunity to tell their stories in public seems to be a sirnple concept Why do judges seem unable to accept the value ofthis approach? Perhaps the judges are reluctant to listen to this testirnony because, apaft frorn judicial economy, there is "an emotional labor to judging."'3 Hearing the details of brutal crimes and the effects of those crirnes on those who survive is an ernotionally draining experience from which judges are not immune. For judges who do not want to acknowledge or experience this emotional reality, it is much easier to brush aside the testimony of witnesses,to limit the details and specifics that come out in the courtroom, and to let others deal with that emotion. Ironically, while the judges try to push awaythe emotional irnpact of witness testimony, the victims thernselvescome to realize the restorative and healing power of a public reckoning.'4 Having worked as a Tiial Attorney at the ICTY for sevenyears, I know full well that the situation regarding victim witness testimony is much rnore complicated than I
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have been able to address in this short one of its top priorities for the future. article. I do not mean to suggestthat the To fulfill a mandate to "contribute judges, lawyers, and support staff at the to the restoration and maintenance of Tribunal have not tried mightily to p e a c e , " i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i r n i n a l c o u r t s address some of these issues. However, must view valuing witness testirnony not they have been thwarted by a myriad of as an option, but as an obligation. It is complex issuesthat are difficult to resolve. i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e t r i a l s b e p a r t o f a Nontheless, this is not an excuse. While healing process. Providing the oppormany overcoming the challengesof getting tunity for victims to tell their stories witnessesto court and providing them the n o t o n l y h e l p s t h e m h e a l a s i n d i v i d u a l s , opportunity to tell their stories is diffiit helps their cornmunities and councult, it is not impossible. Investigating and t r i e s t o h e a l a s w e l l . I t r e q u i r e s a d d i prosecuting war crimes casesare among t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s , t i m e , a n d e f f o r t ; the most difficult challengesany court and however, failure to accept this imporprosecutor's office can confront, but the tant cornponent of the trials will convery fact that these trials continue shows stitute another unjust "betrayal of the that these challenges have been rnet and b y s t a n d e r s ." A s w a r c r i m e s s u r v i v o r overcome. If the judges and prosecutors Bruno Bettelheim eloquently warned, comrnitted themselvesto givingvictims t.he "What cannot be talLed about can also opportunity to tell their stories in full, not be put to rest; and if it is not, the and strenuously enforced this commitwounds continue to fester from generment, this challenge can also be met. If a t i o n t o g e n e r a t i o n . " the existing tibunals cannot rneet this Author's Note: The views expressed in this article are challenge, at the very least the Internathose of Ms. Paterson and do not represent the views tional Criminal Court should make this o f t h e I C T Y o r t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . NOTES I Prosecutor u SiobodonMiloseuic,No. IT-oZ-54,
Trial
Chamber I Transcripts, Z4 April
2oo2. 3777 . focused only on
KLA 2 Milosevic's questions activity in the area and the shootings of Serb police officers and civilians. The witness was asked few questions about what happened to him, his lamily, or his neighbors. r SlobodonMlu,euc 3 Prosecutor {. In order to invoke the powers granted under ChapterMI, the Security Council had to find that the situation in Yugoslavia constituted "a tlrreat to international
peace and
security."
See U.N.
Charter,
Chapter J, A/!g Internet, http'//w.un.org/ (Date accessed' Overview/Charter/chapterT.html
7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 J u d i t h H e r m a n , M . D . , I r c u m c o n d R e c o u e y( N e w York, Basic Books, r9g2), 243. ro Ibid, 70. It Judith Herman,
conversation with author, for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, Brandeis University, tTJune 2Oo2. t2 See indictment, Prorâ&#x201A;Źcutoru. Slobodon Milosedc, (Bosnia-Croatia indictment), counts 8-r5, 23-2gInternational
Center
t3 See Herman. conversation. t4 "Recognizing the impersonality of law, the survivor is to some degree relieved of the personal bur-
2o November 2oo2).
den of battle. It is the law, not she, that must prevail. By making a public complaint or accusation, the sur-
! UN Security Council. {.8th Session. !r/gth Meeting. UN Security Resolution 8o8 (r993) on the
vivor defies the perpetrator's attempt to silence and isolate her, and she opens the possibility of finding
International
n e w a ' l l i e s .W h e n o t h e r s b e a r w i t n e s s t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o{'a crime, others share the responsibility for restor-
Yugoslavia
Criminal Tribunal (ICTY), 22 Februarl
for
the
Former
t993.
Internet. h tt p ,//www. o h r. i n t /o t h er - do c/ u n - re s (Date accessed: 2I bih/de{ault.asp?content-id=7irB November !OO2). 6 E s t e s v T e . x a s .3 B r U . S . 5 3 2 , 5 6 + ( r g 6 5 ) .
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ing justice. Furthermore. understand
the suruivor may come to
her own legal battle as a contribution
to a larger struggle, in which her actions may benefit. others aswell as herself." Tiauma and Recovery, 2Io.
Polltlcs&Dlplomac -
of mericain the $e_ Geodiplomacy Parag Khanna In all corners of the world-from rninistries in Latin America to elite London social clubs, from Gaza refugee carnps to the streets of Karachi-vocal, passionate, and sometimes violent resistance is being expressed against the United States's perceived hegernony. Whether the United States preserves or undermines stabillty, perpetrates or prevents violence, nurtures or hinders social and economic development, the United States'suniversal presence tends to invite backlash.' Regardless of whether one views this presence as legitirnate, September rl, 2oor unequivocally resolved any question of whether the United Stateswould engagewith the world or isolate itself frorn foreign cornmitments and "entangling alliances."
Parag Khanna is Advisor
on Global
Issues to the World Economic Senior
Forum,
and
Research Ana
lyst in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution.
The United States'sgeopolitical stature has been ascribed to its military rnight, econornic dorninance, leadership in the creation and management of multilateral institutions, and its cultural "soft power." During the Cold War, the symbols of American strength-from NAIO warplanes to product advertising-won allies and underrnined Soviet cornrnunisrn. With the end of the Cold War, the context in which these symbols are perceived has changed drastically. Today, U.S. rnilitary might is widely regarded as intrusive, its economic dominance as exploitative, its manipulation of international organizations as self-serving, and its cultural ubiquity as arrogant. If percep-
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tion reflects reality, an updated strategy the normative foundations of the postto cornmunicate the United States'smulWorld War II order has eroded, a comt i f a c e t e d c o m m i t m e n t s , g o a l s , a n d mon understanding of what principles
The United StateStS,r.riversat presence
tends to invite backlash. intentions is critical. But persuasive cornmunication by itself will be neither the foundation for more effective policies nor the savior of ineffective ones. In both redefining and reasserting itself globally, the United States must, engage i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n st o w i n s u p p o r t : fully recognize the world's contradictory views of the United States; express its policies coherently and consistently; and devise new diplomatic strategies, beyond coercion and propaganda, to understand and respond to the concerns of others. Moreover, these goals can be accomplished in a rnanner consistent with a realist view of the national interest. The new global context of world affairs is Geodiplomacy, the nexus of geopolitics and diplomacy. Geopolitics i s n o l o n g e r l i m i t e d t o s t a t e sn a k e d l y pursuing their self-interest. Rather, it encornpasses a wide range of actors frorn the private sector, civil society, the media, labor movements, and religious communities who influence decisions of global significance. Diplornacy today encornpasses official contacts far beyond accredited ambass a d o r s , a s e v i d e n c e d b y t h e e x i s t e n c eo f "public" and "track-two" diplomacies. Geodiplomacy is the result of this systemic transformation of world politics into a global political process.' Many new actors influence Geodiplomacy, and they are redefining norrrrs from the ground-,rp. If consensus on
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g'overn the emerging global polity is even more tentative. For example, the U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups."3 In January, however, Islarnic scholars put for-ward a different definition' "All acts of aggressioncommitted by individuals, groups or states against human beings, including attacks on their religion, life, intellect or property."a In the war against global terrorism, these scholars, whose support is critical to curb radicalisrn, have defined the United Statesas a terrorist state-an inauspicious start to a long campaign. Similarly, warfare has traditionally been understood as open and armed hostility between combatants of sovereign states. But a recent Chinese treatise suggested that war "transcends all boundaries and lirnits...using all rneans, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal rneans to compel the enemy -We to accept one's interests."s are no longer able to universally distinguish between terrorism and war, a precarious and unsustainable situation where both are ernployed in the name of anybody's j u s t i c e . bS o l o n g a s t h e r e i s n o v i c t o r y o n the sernantic battlefield in defining war and terrorism-and hence no mutual understanding of what we are fighting for or against-both the struggle against
KHANNA Politics&Diplomacy ening, not underrnining, international s o c i e t yi n t h e l o n g - t e r m . u Nurnerous examples confirrn that institutions international command respect frorn a substantial portion of the world, even in the United States, but current U.S. policy blatantly undercuts this respect. Rumblings of an unsanctioned invasion of Iraq have stirred suspicion arnongst even our closest allies. Yet, on September 12, 2oo2, President Bush urged the United Nations to take responsibility for enforcing its resolutions, so frequently violated by Iraq. This appeal stimulated speculation that, by addressing the world with consensusbuilding airns, President Bush may have even brought the United Nations closer to the United States.e Meanwhile, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asserted that national interest and the interests of an "illusory international community" are ever-conflicting.'o This is an a priori rejection of the very logic of diplomacy, of compelling others' intereststo conform to your own. How odd, then. that President Bush demonstrated the United States, g/rr is viewed as such implicit support for the interna"world changing", but in Europe it is tional cornrnunity by calling upon the United Nations to act authoritatively. viewed as "America changing." The It is important to recognize that rnay not always be satisUnited States fied with lengthy, consensus-driven Bush's multilateral appeal was not merely a rhetorical exercise. Rather, it negotiations, but there is a two-fold was essential to gaining support frorn international flouting danger in p r o c e s s e s : I t p e r p e t u a t e s t h e v i c i o u s key rnilitary allies in the Gulf. Days after cycle of their ineffectiveness, and it may President Bush's speech to the United h e l p t h o s e w i t h l e s s - t h a n - b e n i g n Nations, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, committed to intentions to undermine international allowing the United States to use Saudi law. In the arena of Geodiplomacy, if in the context of UN-mandated bases the United States is to win support from foreign governments, the rnedia, action against Iraq, a patent shift in Saudi posture. He ernphasized that a and citizens, it must first strive to achieve consensus on definitions and UN resolution meant that "everybody is obliged to follow through. "" It was ultiobjectives. It must make a bona fide c o m m i t m e n t t o c o n t r i b u t e t o s t r e n g t h - mately talk of a IJN resolution that aid-
perpetrators of hyper-violent acts and global perceptions of the United States's intentions will face a dim fate. Military victory is irnpossible in this conceptual battle. In the face of new ideological challenges,it would be fatalistic to ascribe the divergence of the United States'sworld-view from that of other nations as merely the product of power relationships which, by traditional realist logic, naturally generate balancing antagonisms.TThis approach also underestimates the humanistic and psychological dirnensions of power, the arenas in which public diplornacy seeks to advance the United States's global agenda. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States rnay well remain the rnost resented actor. However, by leading the world from within the framework of international institutions rather than as a unilateralist hegemon, it can accornplish long-term objectives while showing a "decent respect for the opinions of rnankind."
Diplomacy. r. A NewAmerican
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ed the United Statesin its quest for forward positions in the Middle East. The United States had originally asserted a policy of outright "regime change" in Iraq, but apparently President Bush's national security team conceded that cornpliance with UN resolutions should take precedence. Whether invading Iraq or fighting terrorists, the United States will need allies who consider it in their national interest to support American leadership of the international community. There is thus a logical, realist basis for U.S. engagernent with the international community. Applying the insight gained from the above experience rnore broadly, it should become more common for U.S. policymakers to build scenarios around international perceptions and responses to the United States's policy options into the foreign policymaking apparatus, a firm step in the direction of reconciling national interest with international norms." Though UN Security Council rnandates rnay not be a transcendent rnoral force, they remain the (current) legitimate mechanism for harmonizing interests of great and small powers alike. Even China and Russiathe two great powers rnost protective of their sovereignty-dernand that any military action againstIraq be sanctioned by the United Nations. The United States's r o l e i s t o l e a d i n f o r g i n g c o n s e n s u s ,n o t to remain rnired in short-term considerations. The adoption of UN Resolution I4+r, reflecting a United StatesF r a n c e c o m p r o m i s e o n w e a p o n si n s p e c tions in Iraq combined with the threat of force, represents a breakthrough in balancing American leadership with international consultation. In the long run, the United Statesactually has little choice but to seek interna-
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tional conseruus. Together, a global war against terrorisrn, a unilateral invasion of Iraq, and permanent commitments in Europe, Israel, and East Asia represent unsustainable military expenditures. They also bring lossesto American "ideological credit" incurred through "arrogant arrntw.isting."'r There is a false perception arnong American elites that "the United Statesremains the unrivaled leader of the world-the big power, which makes its share of rnistakes,butwithoutwhich nothing good happens."'aIn reality, the U.S. abstention from nurnerous international treaties and conventions means that much good in the world happens, not onlywithout, but also in spite of, the United S t a t e s . ' 5I r o n i c a l l y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s championed the notion of the International Criminal Court, but backed awayas legal ramifications emerged. By participating carefully in the drafting of charters, the United Statescould keep these institutions honest by preventing corruption of terms such as terrorisrn and war crime, thereby furthering the vital, cultural goal of delegitimizing global terrorism. However, President Bush's new Notiono/Secui! Strateg presupposes collective agreement on threat perception and legitirnate response. It overlool.s concerns that, in its intimations concerning Iraq, the United States is masking preemption in the language of prevention. Only a rnultilateral path will allow President Bush to win international support and make progress towards common understandings.
not Public fuhllc Diplomacy, RglatiOnS. Publicdiplomacy will only
be effective if an understanding of foreign cultures and ideas directly affects the policymaking process. Soft power should facilitate acceptance of Arnerican policies, not serve as their substitute. The
Diplomacy KHANNP Aolitics& United States cannot be perceived as fighting a public relations battle with the limited aim of avenging the terrorist attacksof September rr. Sadly, asjustified as the United States is in demanding punishment for all parties involved in planning those tragic attacks, g2 percent of respondents to an AI-Ahromsurvey felt that the United States "deserved it."'o Anti-American boycotts, and even terrorism, in the Arab world are symptoms of protest against American policies in the Middle East. Although the United States already benefits enormously frorn the commercial appeal of its cultural exports, "soft power" is no solution to geopolitical confl icts or interests.
In thew?l
They are like one-way streets. Effective cultural exchange, by contrast, depends on engaging others in dialogue."'o Fortunately, the American population is interested in such dialogue. In fact, it seems that the Bush administration's tone alienatesU.S. citizensjust as much as Al-Ahram's Middle Eastern respondents. Eighty percent ofAmericans support UN involvernent in any action against lraq, an internationalist reflex ignored by policymakers, whose election outcornes do not hinge on foreign policy American decisions. By ignoring instincts for fairness and equality, pollcymakers appear, as it were, lessworldly than the population they represent. Cit-
agains.t global terrorisrn, scholars,
whose suplpojft ls crltlcal to curb radicalisrn, have defined th e I-Ini1t ed States as a terrorist state. Current communications strategies are failing not despite but because of multinational communication companies who convey a consurnerist and decadent image of the United States. The adage may declare that advertising is only as good as the product being sold, but in this case,the product is only perceived to be as good as the advertising. The founder of Electroniclntifada.net, Ali Abunimah, has said, "People here really do feel that support for Sharon is wrong and that war against Iraq is wrong. No amount of spinning is going to change that. "'7The Cold War successof publicizing symbols of U.S. wealth and excess engenders in traditional, developing societies sentiments ranging from humiliation and en\y to resentment and anger. One observer noted, "advertising messagesin themselveshave so little bite.
izen exchanges-such as high school exchange prograrns and journaiistic exchanges between NBC and MBC (Middte East Broadcasting Corporation)-prove to be far more fruitful in building trust between cultures than overt propaganda strategies.They also act as a positive, durable springboard for improving cultural relations. This is undoubtedly the casewith Seedsof Peace, a program that began by bringing Palestinian and Israeli youth to summer carnpsin Maine to confront the "other. " These adolescents,the future leaders of their societies, usually leave as friends, rnore understanding of each other's views and less likely to perpetrate violence against each other. This is the true nature of public diplomacy' understanding root causes and addressing them through concrete programs.
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Furthermore, U.S. citizens lead the world in civic engagement, and in philanthropic and charitable giving. However, few resources are currently devoted to the tremendously irnportant task of encouraging U.S. involvement in promotion of global norms such as freedom of speech and human rights. More involvement would deepen U. S. exposure to the global processes that are the necessaryarchitecture for future world order. But the messenger is as important as the message.The United Statesis a long way from gaining the trust of Arab leaders and elites. Yet, their support and contact with domestic media and society
surely stimulate freedom of speech, but the diplomatic task of communicating American values and strategy among policymakers and influential elite around the world remains paramount. If the United States wishes to promote what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," it will have to make clear that "political and economic reform will be an integral part of the ongoing U.S. agenda with its Arab friends-a constant issue in diplomatic exchanges,a subject for congressional scrutiny, and a comp o n e n t o f U . S . a s s i s t a n c ep r o g r a m s . " ' o Let us remember that anti-American-
power Many may Want Arnericanwealth, 9_rprefttg., but few actually want to be the United Siates. would contribute far more to reducing hatred of the United Statesthan American efforts would. Winning the trust of citizens, political leaders, business executives, and the rnedia will accomplish far more in restoring confidence in the United States's relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds than current priorities, such as the lJnited StatesCongress' pledge of a $5oo million investment in a 2{-hour Arabic language satellite television station. Osama bin Laden's use of to fan the flames of anti-Amerol-Jaqeera ican hatred in the Arab world does not mean that a propaganda-dispensing U.S. satellite network will counter his successand win over disaffected A.r'abs. Would Americans trust Arab news if it were translated into English?'e A U . S . p o l i c y t o e n c o u r a g ei n d e p e n dent media in the Arab world would
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ism is widespread even arnongst our strategic allies, who rightly cornplain that they are overlooked in policy development and contacted only once decisions have been made. Analysts have attributed Gerhard Schroeder's salvaging of his election victory to his promise not to commit German troops to an invasion of Iraq, sanctioned or otherwise. The distinction between legitirnate antiArnericanism and political opportunisrn may be unclear here, but consider the response of German intellectuals to the widely circulated document "What We Are Fighting For," signed by sixty prominent U.S. social scientists and lawyers, "The inviolability of human dignity applies not only to people in the United States, but also to people in Afghanistan, and even to the Thliban and the al Qaeda prisoners at Guan-
KHANNA Politics&Diplomacy tanarno. Can we expect other nations and cultures to perceive the application of dual standards as anything but the -Western arroexpression of continuing gance and ignorance?""'
engages cultures and responds to c h a n g e si n t h e w o r l d . Americans with substantive understanding of different cultures around the world must take the lead in crafting policies sensitiveto both national interest and global perceptions. For instance, Qata.'s rnoderate foreign United States'sstruggle to define its role minister has stated that rebuilding relawith respect to other countries, international institutions, and foreign actors tions between the Arab world and the West will require compromise from clearly arnounts to more than a polite d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n a m o n g s t o l d both sides. Meanwhile, senior Amerifriends. An emerging scholarship can officials who repeatedly call for change and rnoderation in the Arab and points to the "paradox of Arnerican Islamic worlds consistently ornit any power, " the observation that globalizat i o n d i m i n i s h e s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' s mention of a commensurate need for the United States to soften positions ability to achieve its goals alone. The and demonstrate restraint. The United power of voices criticizing the United Statesis unique in that it is not a unified States will grow with rising inequality a n d t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f t e c h n o l o g y , society in which all elernents and sectors f o r c i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o c o n s i d e r share, and are prepared to make sacrit h e s e o p p o s i n g o p i n i o n s . H e n c e , t h e fices for, one common purpose. DeepUnited States, will increasingly need to er understanding of other cultures respectthe diversity of peoples, opinwithin the U.S. foreign policy establishi o n s , a n d r a t i o n a l i t i e s a c r o s s t h e rnent will allow it to rnore convincingly globe. Geodiplornacy irnplies a sizeable communicate why the United States's in the nurnber of cornplex, rnultifaceted interests often proliferation assertive groups, claims to legitirnacy, generate friction with global opinion. Fortunately, peace, democracy, and and sources of influence. free rnarkets are the foundations of a The success of Arnerican public new global orthodory to which rnost diplomacy-and therefore of its foreign policy-will depend on its capacity to states pay tribute, at least rhetorically. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e sh a s i n m a n y r e s p e c t s craft policies that contribute to longt e r m g l o b a l s t a b i l i t y a n d e q u a l i t y , come to represent or to promote these values. However, it cannot successfully engage in international institutions, force their internalization by all cultures and demonstrate respect for the world's rnany co-existing value systerns. The and societiesof the world. Cultures may existence of these rnultiple systems, change rapidly, but they cannot be changed by acts of policy.'3 For these some consurnerist, others value-driven, and still others ideological, underpins policies and values to be implemented the cultural basis driving the global shift universally, they must first be disassociated from the symbolism of the United toward Geodiplornacy. Feedback frorn States.Many may want the United States' d i p l o m a c y e f f o r t s s h o u l d b e public incorporated into policymaking to cre- wealth, power or prestige, but few actuate a searnlessdiplomatic apparatus that ally want to be the United States.
rhe Strategies. Geodiplomatic
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The United States's strategy should It should allow these therefore be memetic. ideals to spread on their own merits, not as part of an Arnericanization package. This would divorce them from the vicissitudes of foreign perception of the United States. The United States should claim neither to have founded nor perfected democracy. Instead, it should speak of democracy as an empowering system that satisfiesa fundamental hurnan desire for recognition and voice. The virtue of the free market should be its efficiency in generatingwealth, not the profits it brings to U.S. multinational corporations. The global "Generation Y" (ages rg-2l) should be a vehicle that carries this rnessage,not just its target. Youth today across the globe already share priorities and values more than any generation before. Youth need not have American political ideals imposed on them; rather, they should be empowered to adopt those which they hold to be right. A rnernetic strategl inherently takes into account the enormous technological advantagesthe United States possessesin the arena of communications technology. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt of the RAND Corporation have charted the shift from hierarchical to network-oriented systernsboth in science and society. They point to the emergence of a Noos'realm of the mind,' phere, a "global which may have a profound impact on statecraft," with a corresponding Aroopo/rtik, "undertaken as much by nonstate as by state actors, that emphasizesthe role of informational soft power" and serves as "supplement and complement to Realpoli-
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tih."'a The vast majority of infrastructural nodes constituting cyberspaceare located in the United States. Coupled with the continued dominance of ideas generated in U.S. universities and think-tanls, the potential for stronger cooperation between the diplomatic, scientific and academic spheresshould be explored."5 Even those who intuitively prefer traditional approaches to measuring and exerting power should recognize the fragility of the current approach. Countries where U. S. diplomatic presence is weak can become terrorist havens, and this lack of engagernent makes political solutions to tensions difficult. Furthermore, crippled diplomacy cannot deliver irnportant inforrnation on local conditions which over-stretched intelligence agenciesrequire. The first step in adapting U.S. diplomacy to continuously evolving global circumstances will be to ensure that the curr-ent operations of offices charged with shaping policy serve complernentary functions in both communicating the United States's policies and attempting to shape its global irnage. As the U.S. government begins to implement numerous strategies for communicating the war on terrorism and U.S. foreign policy more broadly, it should bear in mind the potent underlying cultural shifts that subtly, but noticeably, irnpact power dynamics in world politics. Author's
Note r The
author
p k h a n n a @ b r o o k i n g s .e d u .
welcomes comments
at
KHANNA Politics&Diplomacy NOTES r "Empire supports
is emerging
the globalization
today as the center that networks
of productive
and casts its widely inclusive net to try to envelop all power relations within its world order-and yet at the it
same time
deploys
a powerful
police
function
against the new barbarians and the rebellious slaves who threaten its order." Michael Hardt and Artonio (Cambridge, Massachusetts: HarNegri, Empire
! of
2oo2. States Department of State, "Patterns Terrorism
Global
http : //w.
OECD
Paris, Summer
United
sta te. gov / s/ ct/ rls /p gtrpt/2
[Under'line website-address](Date November 2oo2). {. Scott Macl-eod, "After the Fall,"
ber 2oo2). t!
Immanuel
Wallerstein,
"The Eagle has Crash
ForergnPolig, July/August 2oo2, 68 r{. Thomas L. Friedman, "Going OurWay,"
Landed,"
Neu
lorl Tines, r5 September
2o02. r5 The most recent examples include
Court,
Kyoto
Protocol,
Convention
International
the ABM Criminal
on the Rights of the Child
Mines. Convention on Anti-Personnel Outlook on g/rr; r6 "A Domestic
and
Seeing
oo o/2 4 r 9. ht accessed' 30 TIME Europe,
ed States, Bush
{. February 2oo2, p. 48. Unrestricted ! Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Warfare. (Beijing, PIA Literature and Arts Publishing House, rggg). 6 "The question ofthe
Internet, http,//w.cfr.org/Pub(Date accessed, !o Novem-
tt A11," A|-Ahron Weh! Online. r/ Jane Perlez, "U.S. Trying to Market Itself to YoungArabs," Neu Tor* Tines, 16 September 2oo2. r8 Victoria de Grazia, "The Selling of The Unit-
Internet,
2ooo,"
m
Reform,"
licDiplomacy-TF.html
Treaty,
vard University Press, 2ooo), 20. "Geodiplomacy," 2 Parag Khanna, Highlights,
for
Through
Style,"
New Tork fimes, 2g
Augrst
2oo2, WT( (4). 19 The Council on Foreign Re'lations Independent Thsk Force report concurs: "Certainly, negative attitudes toward the United States and its policies are
and
more intense in the Middle East, where many people
peace will find no real resolution; the force of the new imperial constitution will not be embodied in a
do not trust what we say because they feel our words
consensus that
definition
is articulated
in
ofjustice
the
multitude."
Hardt and Negri, 20. I Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Po1r9u R e u t l e u n, o . r t 3 ( J u n e { u l y 2 o o 2 ) . B "International society," as used by Hedley Bull in his classic TheAnarchrcalSocli?} (New York' Columencompassed and sub-
bia University
Press, rg//),
sumed norms
and actors beyond the international
community of states. gJulia Preston, "Bush's Step toward U.N. by Warm
Welcome,"
Neu TorI Tines, t!
Is Met
September
2002. to Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National I nterest. " Foregn Afais (an uatylFebrua ry 2 ooo). rr Todd S. Purdum, "Saudis Indicating U.S. Can lJse Bases if U.N.
Backs War," "Meu l'or| Tiner, 16 Sep-
tember 2O02. 12 A recent Council
on Foreign Relations Inde-
Task Force report further adds that public 'engagement' approach diplomacy should "adopt an
pendent
that involves listening, dialogue, debate and rela" "Public Diplomacy, A Strategy tionship-building...
are contradicted tolerance
by our policies, particularly by our
for autocratic
regimes that are our friends
in the region." Op. cit. 20 Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," Foretgn Afo i rs (l anwarl/February Z o 02). 2r "A World of Justice and Peace Would be Diffe re n t, " Fran tfu rter A //gcne t ne ly i I tltg, 2 M ay 2 o o 2 (ori ginally published as "Eine Welt der Gerechtigkeit und des Friedens sieht anders aus"). 22 Joseph S. Nye, The Poradox ofAmerican Poaer: Wb/ the World't Only Superpouer Can't Co h Alone, (Oxford, University Press, 2oo2). "The Inadequacy of 2J Michael Mandelbaum, A m e r i c a n P o w e r , " F o r er g nA f i o i r s( S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r Oxford
2oo2):6r-73. 2{ DavidRondfeldtandJohnArquilla, "W}'atIf There is a Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs?" United Diplomag Report,2g February SfoteslnstituleofPeaceVinual r999. 25 A strategic framework for public diplomacy w h i c h a r t i c u l a t e st h e p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s o f t h i s n e x u s is found in, Mark Leonard, "Diplomacy by Other Polig, September/October 2oo2. Means, " Foreign
W i n t e r / S p r i n g2 o o 3 [ r o 9 ]
Politics& Diplomacy
Federalismand Nationalismin
PolishEasternPolicy Tirnothy Snyder
As the European Union admits rnore and more statesof the former communist bloc, the eastern border of the European Union will overlap with a nurnber of other very i m p o r t a n t d i v i d e s , b e t w e e n m o r e a n d l e s sp r o s p e r o u s s t a t e s , between western and eastern Christianity, between states with historically friendly ties with the United States and those without. Integration into the European Union will become far more than a rnetaphor, as its borders will funct i o n l i k e t h o s e o f a s o v e r e i g ns t a t e . Where will the European lJnion find its eastern policy, its During the Cold War, West Gerrnany was the main Ostpolrtik? source of eastern policy, for good reason. A divided Germany then marked the border of eastern and western Europe. Today, Germany has been reunified, and soon the European Union will enlarge to include Gerrnany's eastern neighbors, rnost importantly Poland and Lithuania. The cold war lasted for two generations; the new divide between eastern and western Europe promises to last at least as long. Poland and Lithuania will soon become, and long rernain, the eastern marches of the European Union. Their ideas and initiatives are likely to guide whatever-eastern policy the European lJnion devises. What exactly their inclinations will be, however, is far from clear. The easternquestion persistedthroughout rnodern Pol-
Timothy Snyder;' Assistant Prol'essor of History at Yale University. His mosr recent book is Ile Recon.rtrucfion o/Notion.s,Polond, Ukroi ne, Lithuanio,qelarus,1569r999.
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FEDERALISM A N D N A T I O N A L I S MI N P O L I S HE A S T E R NP O L I C Y
ish and Lithuanian political history, from the founding rnoment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569 to its collapse, frorn the recreation of Poland and Lithuania in rgrB to the Second World War, and through the Cold War to modern-day European integration. Eastern policy has been an uneasy mixture of two distinct concepts: the creation of common institutions with neighbors, which I shall call federalism, and the incorporation of territory, which I shall call nationalism. In general, nationalism
TheUnionof Luhlin.t'-,the rg6os, the first important question about the structure of the Polish state anived along with the golden age of Polish civilization and statehood' How should Poland deal with its eastern neighbors? Luckily, the middle nobllity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who sought to secure for themselves the rights already enjoyed by their Polish peers, answered the question for them by supporting union. That union was established at Lublin in rg69; it wasthe final achievement of Polish King Zygrnunt II, who was the last member of
The tension betwe0flnationalisrn and federalism was overcome perfectly gnly once, in a grand strategyformulated in'the f97os. proved to be simpler but more risky, while federalist solutions were more complicated yet also more durable. The tension between nationalisrn and federalism was overcome perfectly only once, in a grand strategy formulated in the r97os that radically reinterpreted nationalist and federalist legacies. This strategywas based on the idea that Polish interests demanded the creation of Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian nation-states. However, the success of that eastern strategy has made it redundant since its application after r9B9 (along with other reforms) helped assure Poland's (and Lithuania's) accession to the European lJnion. Once this integration is complete, the entire eastern question will be posed anew, with different, and perhaps higher, stakes. As this historical realignment approaches, a review of traditional Polish eastern problerns and solutions is very much in order.
Irrz]
GeorgetownJournal of International Affairs
the Jagiellon dynasty. Upon his death, Polish and Lithuanian nobles asserted their right to elect his successor at the Great Confederation of Warsawin rglf . Although the words federalism and nationalism were not used at the tirne, the Lublin lJnion represents the first irnportant attempt at deciding between whether to create comrnon institutions with eastern neighbors or incorporate them into Poland. The Lublin union is quite properly remembered as an example of the first tendency, for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania retained its own administration, treasury, code of law, and arrny. However, the Lublin Union also involved incorporation. The Polish king demanded, and received, the southern provinces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, known as Bratslav, Kyiv, and Volhynia. While Lithuania preserved and developed its native institutions, Ukraine was wrenched from Lithuania and added to Poland. It
Politics&Diplomacy sNYDER became part of the Polish Kingdorn, with no special rights. Therefore, there was a differentiation in policy between Lithuania and Ukraine from the verybeginning. Instead of being a separate political entity, as Lithuania was and is, Ukraine becarne an undefined addendum, more a spacethan a country. Even so, the connection to Poland revived and rejuvenated Ukrainian civilization. The formation of a political union with Poland led to great sociocultural interrnixing. Confronted with new Polish religious thought and the achievements of Latin and Polish scholarship, the Ukranian Orthodox clergy launched a brilliant Renaissance and Reforrnation, characterized by cosmopolitan education and religious toleration.' However, every step Ukraine took towards the Polish rnodel of European civilization deepened the gaps between lJkrainian magnates and the rest of society. Rornan Catholicism and the Polish language unified the Ukrainian and Polish noblemen, but distanced Ukrainian noblernen from their own peasantry. Meanwhile, Ukrainian peasants were enserfed and irnpoverished as Polish and Jewish agents were brought in by the grain trade to organize the cultivation of Ukraine's fertile black earth. The Cossacks,Ukraine's special caste of free warriors, posed a special dilernma. Although they helped Polish and Lithuanian knights defeat Sweden, Muscovy, and the Ottornans, the Polnobility an took ish-Lithuanian v i e w o f t h e C o s s a c ks. ungenerous Although many Cossack officers were themselves nobles, the rank and file were mainly of peasant origins. Since noble landowners wished to keep the peasantson the land, they tried to limit the numbers of legal or "registered"
Cossacks. When the Cossacks were needed, higher numbers were allowed and pay was sent. In this way, the incorporation of Ukraine by Poland sharpened the incipient conflict between two native Ukrainian groups: the richest local boyars, who used Polish practices to become wealthy landowners, and the Cossacks, who grew in size thanks to peasantsuffering but were never integrated into the political system. This tension escalated into a full-scale Ukrainian civil war in 1648 after the provocation of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. After Khmel'nyts'kyi allied with Muscovy in 1654, his CossacLshelped Muscovy to make war on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The results were disastrous: nearly a third of the Commonwealth's inhabitants died in the war and associated calamities; official religious toleration was underrnined by a new suspicion of non-Catholics; and the Commonwealth itself began a fatal economic and political decline. This first atternpt at federalism had failed miserably. The internal Ukrainian tensions generated by the political union were too great to sustain. From the experience of early rnodern Poland-Lithuania, it seems that federations are inherently harder to manage than policies of incorporation. This is all the more true in tirnes of war, when the various parties concerned are more likely to be absorbed by prospects of irnrnediate gain and loss, and less inclined to negotiate complicated comprornises. The complexity of federal solutions places them at an inherent disadvantageto nationalist ones.
P i l s u d s k ia n d D m o w s k iJ. o z e r Pilsudski and Roman Dmowski, the two most important Polish politicians of the early twentieth century, articulated
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mutually exclusive ideas of Poland. Pilsudski was a federalist from the east, a socialist of noble origin who imagined Poland reborn in a federation with Lithuania. His Poland would be bound together by ancient traditions, the common senseof the Polish-speaking elite of whatever ethnic origin, and the generosity and effectivenessof a modern state. Dmowski, a stonecutter's son from central Poland, had an entirely different vision. He imagined a new Poland created from a rnodern Polish society. This society was built from the Polish-speaking peasantry, and was meant to match Gerrnans and surpassJews.Traditions and elites were important only insofar as they helped the masses to understand their common nationhood. The east was to be incorporated so long as its population could be absorbed into Polish culture." Polish eastern policy began anew in rgrg when Pilsudski marched his armies east to clairn the ancient territories of Lithuania. From Pilsudski's perspective, the Polish-BolshevikWar that followed was fought to create a new Polish-Lithuanian federation. In the end, however, his purposeswere thwarted not by the Bolshevila, whom he defeated, but by the Polish nationalists who negotiated the peace. Pilsudski was commander in chief of the arrny, but Dmowski's National Dernocrats dorninated the national assemblyand the peace delegation. They handed back eastern lands under Polish control to the Bolsheviks, including all of what Pilsudski imagined as the Belarusian canton of the federation. Meanwhile, Lithuanian leaders made clear that they had no interest in a federation. Pilsudski still controlledMlnius and its surroundings, which were to be the Central Lithuanian canton of the federation. Yet without Belarus and ethnic Lithuania, the whole idea of a federa-
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tion collapsed, and Vilnius was simply incorporated into Poland. In attempting to build his federation, Pilsudski was unable to overcome his lack of local allies. Popular support would have helped, but the peasantsandJews of traditional Lithuania saw no special reason why they should be governed from Warsaw. With time he might have made a better case, but tirne is precisely what war denied him. Most of aII, he lacked the support of Poles at home, many of whorn recognized that every eastern enlargement rnoved Poland to the political left, disturbing the delicate balance between right and left. The assassination of Poland's federalist President, Gabriel Narutowicz, by a right-winger punctuated the end of the federal ideas, and Pilsudski retired frorn politics-for a time. Yet Pilsudski had made a rnajor change to the nationalist canon. Ukraine, previously rnarginal, became central. After securing control of the West Ukrainian Republic provinces of L'viv and Galicia, Pilsudski allied himself in rg2o with the Kyiv state of Symon Petliura. Poles and Ukrainians fought the Bolsheviks as allies until the Tieaty of Riga, but this alliance was short-lived. With the Treaty of Riga, Poland agreed to recognize Soviet Ukraine and promptly interned its former Ukrainian allies. Pilsudski's hope to create a lJkrainian buffer state went unfulfilled; there waslittle he could do besides apologize to his Ukrainian comrades in arrns. Nevertheless, the precedent for a military alliance with Ukraine had been set. In r926, when Pilsudski returned to power by military coup, he remernbered his Ukrainian allies, and sent his friend and fellow federalist HenrykJ6zewski to govern the province of Volhynia, which was by far the rnost Ukrainian region in
s N Y D EP Ro l i t i c s & Diplomacy Poland. J6zewski, a veteran of the rg2o campaign who was a native of Kyiv and spoke Ukrainian, had grand plans for the revival of Ukraine within Poland. He returned Ukrainian education to the classroom, brought the Ukrainian language to the liturgy of the Orthodox Church, and ensured that loyal Ukrainian politicians were elected to parliarnent. Recalling his experiences in the Polish-Bolshevik War, J6zewski promised [Jkrainians independence in the future while working for their loyalty within Poland.3 Like Pilsudski's Lithuanian federat i o n , J o z e w s k i ' sV o l h y n i a n e x p e r i m e n t was doomed by a silent alliance of two nationalisrns. Ukrainian nationalists easily penetrated the non-governrnental organizations J6zewski sponsored, and exploited the relative freedorn of Volhynia. They were not satisfied byJ6zewski's limited reforms, and promised peasants more freedorn and rnore land. Once again, atternpts at federalisrn were easily undermined by these issues.If Volhynia was to enjoy land reform, why import thousands of Polish officers as colonists? If Ukrainian was to be taught in schools, *hy not create entirely Ukrainian schools? Meanwhile, Polish nationalists were hostile to the Volhynian experiment frorn the very beginning. After Pilsudski's death, J6zewski lost control over policy in Volhynia, and his experirnent came to an end in rg!8.
tions in Poland's east. Soviet deportation of old eastern Polish elites frorn 1939rg{r and Nazi racial policies frorn rg{rr9{{. both undermined any remnants of federalist traditions. After the Ukrainian-Polish civil war began in rg{.J, the idea of federal relations between Ukraine and Poland seerned absurd. Stalin recognized the prirnacy of ethnic nationalisrn when he chose to separate Poles frorn Ukrainians in tj{Q; meanwhile Polish communists used the achievement of ethnic homogeneity in Poland to gain popular support. It seerned federalism had disappeared from view, perhaps forever. Cornrnunist Poland, in any event, had no eastern policy as such, and the history of Polish power in the east becarne taboo. London Poles agreed with Stalin that the idea of a federation between Poland and its eastern neighbors was dead; they believed that Vilnius and L'viv were Polish cities that should be restored to Poland.a As early as r9+7, a lonely voice proposed sornething totally different. Jerzy Giedroyc, born in Minsk, was a federalist and an admirer of Pilsudski. Between the wars he understood national questions in terms of the survival of the Polish state, rather than the position of the Polish nation. Even during World W-ar II, he maintained contacts with Ukrainian colIeagues, and planned a forum for postwar discussion.5 Since Pilsudski had died in I935 andJ6zewski was irnprisoned in communist Poland (for his prewar policies, arnong other things), Giedroyc was left as the leading voice of the old federalist position. In rlSl, his monthly Ku/turo endorsed the notion that Poland's new eastern borders were acceptable, and that L'viv and Vilnius could be left with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Lithuania. At the tirne, this view was scandalous and
li73: Giedroyc andMieroszewsIti. f"auy, Volhynia is best remembered by Poles as the site of horrific ethnic cleansing by the Ukrainians. The Volhynian cleansing, which incited bloody Polish responses, was only one of rnany similarly terrible events brought on by the brutality of Nazi and Soviet occupa-
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largely ignored, and Giedroyc left it to his friendJuliusz Mieroszewski to explain the strategic logic. In rgl!, Mieroszewski began outlining an eastern policy for a future, independent Poland. In Mieroszewski's view, Russian and Polish nationalisrn would be the primary dangers to such a state. Imperialists in both W-arsawand Moscow would be ternpted by the lands between them-Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine-
tries between Poland and Russia. Like nationalism, it accepted that the only meaningful form of political existence was the independent nation-state. Its goal was neither a federation in which Poland would be the stronger partner, nor an incorporation of eastern borderlands, leaving the rest to Russia. Its goal was to create a band of durable nation-states between Poland and Russia, whose main function frorn the Pol-
The EuropeanUnion,tiketheLublin
tlnion, is rather an elite proiect, and its weaknessesreside in its laak <5fpopular support. and would likely make a deal at their expense. Mieroszewski thought that such a deal would poison Polish domestic politics, and ultimately doom the Polish state. To prevent this chain of events, he argrred that a future Polish state should recognize its eastern frontier with Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. Setting aside historic grievances, Polish statesmen should accept that an aggressive eastern policy was not in the interestsof Poland. Mieroszewski argued that the Polish opposition should announce in advance that it accepted these bordels. Moreover, the Polish opposition should help and encourage Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian independence movements. This meant accepting that LJkrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian national history and sentiments were equal to those among the Polish-a revolutionary concept. 6 In intellectual terms, this grand strategywas entirely new. It was neither federalist nor nationalist, though it drew frorn both traditions. Like federalism, it acceptedthe political reality of the coun-
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ish point of view was to resolve by their very existence all eastern questions and therefore prevent the Polish state from overreaching and falling into territorial traps set by Moscow. Although the Kultura eastern program was greeted at first with silence and skepticism, Mieroszewski's path-breaking rglJ article was widely disseminated over the next twenty years, became accepted by the Polish counter-elite created by the Solidarity rnovement, and was implemented after the rg8g revolutions. In the early years of Polish independence, the eastern prograrn worked poorly when applied to states that did not resernble nation-states (Russia and Belarus) and well with those that did (Lithuania and Ukraine). This eastern proglam allowed Poland to overcorne the challengesof a restive and revanchist Polish minority around Vilnius and of a historically-rninded Lithuanian government. In retrospect, it mattered most in relations with Ukraine. Just as Kulturahadprescribed, informal relations between the Polish and Ukrain-
sNYDER Politics&Diplomacy ian oppositions became formal relations original Kultura program was fulfilled, between an independent Poland and S k u b i s z e w s k i p r o p o s e d a p o l i c y o f Ukraine. Independent still- Soviet European standards, in which Poland Poland and Soviet Ukraine had resolved and its neighbors would agree to certain all their outstanding national and borEuropean norms of rninority rights in der questions in quasi-formal agree- t h e c o m m o n h o p e o f E u r o p e a n i n t e ments well before the end of the Soviet gration. Later Polish governrnents used lJnion. The rapprocltementbetween'Warsaw the country's relatively advanced posiand Kyiv achieved before December tion in the European queue to channel I99I was a major reason why the Soviet E u r o p e a n l e v e r a g e a g a i n s t e a s t e r n lJnion's disintegration was peaceful. By neighbors interested in integration. removing the Polish question from When Poland accedesto the European Ukrainian politics before it was even IJnion in about two years, these types of raised, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skustrategieswill no longer be possible, and biszewski and Polish diplornats fostered those who plan Polish eastern policy will c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n w e s t a n d e a s t find themselves in an unprecedented l J k r a i n i a n s , a n d b e t w e e n c o m m u n i s t position. What can we predict about a reforrners and opposition intellectuals. Europe in which Poland and Lithuania The Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation pool sovereignty with western neighbors moved from legal recognition to politiin 2oo{? Do traditions of federalism cal cooperation to historical reconciliaand nationalism offer any guidance? tion over the course of the rg$Os.7 On the surface, it rnight appear that Giedroyc and Mieroszewski created a joining the European lJnion irnplies a synthesis of federalisrn and nationalism continuation of federalisrn. Yet the that fit the international politics of the E u r o p e a n U n i o n , like the Lublin lJnion, is in fact arnbiguous on this postwar and post-Cold'War world. The intellectual achievernent of 1973 had score. To put the matter bluntly, the become a complete political successby European lJnion, like the Lublin r 9 9 4 , t h e S o v i e t l J n i o n h a d b e e n l]nion, will embrace Poland and Lithuaremoved from the map, and Poland had nia but in the rnain exclude the East arranged its relations with all of its new Slavs. The European Union, Iike the eastern neighbors. The central place of Lublin Union, is rather an elite proUkraine was gr,raranteed by the newly- ject, and its weaknessesreside in its lack forrned Polish-Ukranian axis, which may of popular support. In rnany policy very well be considered the great success essentials, rnoreover, the Polish choice of Skubiszewski'seastern policy. The new for Europe is rnore nationalist than policy, a blend of nationalisrn and federfederalist. To join the EU, in at least alism, had finally resolved the eastern one important sense, is like integrating question, at least for the time being. with a nation-state.8 The eastern policy of the rggos, while its goal was the preservation of Polish Fgderalist? F.o'., the rnid-r99os,s t a t e h o o d , a t l e a s t r e q u i r e d s e r i o u s S k u b i s z e w s k i a n d h i s s u c c e s s o r sw e r e engagement with neighbors to the east. In particular, Poland in the r99os fosgreatly helped by the prospect of European Union enlargement. After the tered human contact with its neighbors,
European Union:Nationalor
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signing a visa-free ag'reernent with Ukraine despite EU opposition. When Poland joins the EU, it alsojoins its border agreements.Poland's eastern border becomes the eastern border of the EU, and Poland's eastern neighbors become the eastern neighbors of the EU. Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian citizens will find themselves confronted with the hard external border of the EU, now dernarcated along the Bug rather than the
Oder. The scaleof this change, to come perhaps in 2oo4, is comparable to that of r9r8, rg{.9, or 1989. What should the response be? The inteilectual legacies of nationalism and federalism remain available for the interpretation, as they have since rg69. The traditions of the Lublin Union remain salient in a new world of E u r o p e a n U n i o n . T h e y a w a i ta n e w g e n eration of interpreters, diplomats, and citizens who relish a challenge.
NO T E S r
A
notable
Iakovenko.
recent
publication
is
Nataliia
Porolelnli Suit(Kyiv, Krytyka, 2oo2).
2 Very perceptive was Ksawery Pruszynski, MeiodInstytut ouoleni i entulasci (Warsaw, Panstwowy Wydawniczy, r99o [r9391), 627 -6++. Medrzecki, Wojeuoddwo 3 Consult Wlodzimierz 1988); Jan Kesik, uoltnskie, (Wroclaw, Ossolineum, Uniwersytelouforyl komendantc(Wroclaw, Wydamictwo tu Wroclawskiego, I995). 4 The causes,course and consequences of ethnic cleansing are treated in Timothy Snyder, Tle ReconNations:
struction
of
Belarus,
I569-1999
I r rB]
Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, (New Haven, Yale University
Georgetown Journal of International Af'fairs
P r e s s , 2 o o 2 ) ,t 5 4 - 2 r 6 . g Jerzy Giedroyc with Kryzsztof Pomian, Autobiografia na cztery rece(Warsaw,Czytelnik, 1996). 6 ConsultJuliusz Mieroszewski,''Polska'Ostpolit i k ' , " a n d " R o s y j s k i ' K o m p l e l sP o l s k i 'i U L B , " M a t e r i aly do relleksji i zadumy (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1 9 7 6 ) ,r r o - r z z , r 7 5 - r B 6 . / For an extended treatment of post-1989 eastern p o l i c y , s e e S n y d e r , R e c o n s t r u c t i o no f N a t i o n s , 2 ! 2 276. 8 PeterAndreas and Timothy Snyder, eds., TAe Wall Around theWest (Lanham' Rowman and Littlefield. zoor).
Politics& Diplomacy
evision Eytan Gilboa The discussion of the global news networls' effects on defense and foreign affairs policyrnaking has produced two oppositional arguments: news rnanagernent and the CNN effect. "News management" refers to the government's control of information and rnanipulation of the rnedia, rneaning that the media primarily functions as a tool for policyrnakers. Conversely, cornmentators employ the "CNN effect" to describe television coverage, primarily of horrific humanitarian disasters, which forces policyrnakers to take actions they otherwise would not have, such as military intervention. This phenornenon enables the media to determine the national interest and removes the power of policymaking from appointed officials. lJnfortunately, this binary focus has obscured the widely varied subtleties around and between these poles of analysis, deflecting attention frorn the actual effects of global news networks. Upon closer examination of decision-making, one finds that global rnedia has effects that exist between these polar extremes, which are less obvious, but highly significant. Policymakers acknowledge that 2{-hour global news coverage influences policyrnaking. Former Secretary of StateJames Baker identified three effects, the need to respond quickly to eventswithout sufficient time to consider options; the need to cope with television's attempts to determine the national
E y i a n G i l b o a; . Professor nent
of Govern-
and Communi-
cation at Bar- Ilan University
in Israel.
He wrote
this article
while
sening
as a fel-
low at the Shorenstein Center
on the Press,
Politics, and Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government,
Haruard
versity.
tot of ' Media ConlTict,
Uni-
He is the ediand
Framing
Issues, Policy
Making,
Shaping Opinions. (Ardsley, NY, Transnational
Publish -
ers,2oo2).
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interest; and, the use of global television for fast and direct communication with foreign leaders. According to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, global television coverage contributes to policymaking "because you know what's going on and there is a real-time sense about things." She noted, however, that "it makes you have to respond to events much faster than it might be prudent, because facts may come in incorrect, but you don't have time to put them in context, so you respond just to a little nugget of fact, and when you learn the context later, things change."' This article explores the negative effects that global teler.ision networks have on the policy process. These include' the creation of tight policymakirg deadlines; media dernands for immediate responseto crisesand events; the exclusion of experts and diplomats; diplomatic manipulations; the creation of high expectations; and partisan media. The article suggestsseveraltools that policymakers can use to meet the challenges of global news coverage.
Effect I: ForcingSnapDeciSi0nS. Scholars, officials, and journalists have expressed concern about the i m p a c t o f g l o b a l t e l e v i s i o n c o v e r a g eo n the pace of policyrnaking. The rapid speed of broadcasting and transmission of inforrnation often manipulates and acceleratesthe policy process. Over the course of the 2oth century, technology reduced the tirne needed to transmit information from weeks to rninutes. Official U.S. responsesto the construction and destruction of the Berlin Wall clearly demonstrate this time constraint. In r96r, President Kennedy had the luxury of waiting eight days before making the first offlcial LJ.S. statement
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on the construction of the Wall. In r9B9, President Bush felt compelled to comrnent less than eight hours after the destruction of the Wall. Historian Michael Beschloss argued that the speed of this coverage may force hurried responses based on intuition, rather than on careful deliberation, and that this may lead to dangerous policy mistakes." He wondered whether or not Kennedy would have had the time to carefully consider options to resolve the Cuban rnissile crisis if he had been under the pressure of global television. Kennedy had thirteen days to deliberate and to negotiate an acceptable agreement with the Soviets. President Clinton's press secretary, Dee Dee Myers argrred, "If that happened now, Bill Clinton would have about !o minutes, and ICNN reporter] Wolf Blitzer and everybody else would be standing out on the North Lawn of the White House dernanding action, or saying'the president is indecisive.' So I worry that the time allowed leaders in crisis to make good decisions is compressed. That's a troubling development. "3Veteran journalist Daniel Schorr agreed, "Think about the communication age we live in and the way nail-biting officials must make fateful decisions without time to think. And, ifyou are like me, you will worry a little bit when powerful people make snap decisions, trying to keep up with the information curve."a Political leaders thus face a serious dilemma' should they respond quickly at the risk of making a mistake, or should they take more time to deliver a better responseat the expenseofbeing seen as a confused or weak leader? Lloyd Cutler, counsel to President Carter, explained that if a president does not respond quickly to a crisis, the networks may report that his "advisers are divided, that
G T L B o AP o l i t i c s & D i p l o m a c y the president cannot make up his mind, or that while the president hesitates, his political opponents know exactly what to
of diplornacy: they represented their countries; they communicated their government's positions; they negotiated and
Thecommunication andand
inforrnation revolutions have subs.tantially eroded the diplornats' central I) OS1t10n. I
do."5 Leaders often tend to resolve this dilemma by providing sorne response rather than requesting additional tirne to think. Yet, an irnrnediate response creates problems of its own, in that a staternent on television becomes a policy commitrnent, which leaders rnay find difficult to reverse or even amend. Network pressure for an immediate response is not, however, always autornatic because it depends on the circumstances of the challenge or the threat. Despite the drarnatic coverage of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Septernber 2oor, the media pressure did not induce an immediate retaliation. In fact, President George W. Bush took the tirne necessaryto develop an appropriate response. It is also difficult to clearly correlate good decisions with the length of tirne available for policyrnaking. Great leaders may make the right decision quickly and others may make wrong decisions even when they have weeks to deliberate. However, in most cases,the more time leaders have to collect information and to deliberate, the rnore likely they are to avoid rnaking major mistakes.
Effect2= The Exclusion of Diplomatsand Experts.radi-
tionally, ambassadorsand state representatives dorninated several important areas
concluded agreements; they gathered inforrnation about the countries to which they were posted; and they recommended actions to policymakers at horne. However, the cornrnunication and information revolutions have substantially eroded the diplomats' central position in a l l f i v e a r e a s . oI n m a n y r e c e n t c r i s e s , global television coverage has replaced ambassadorsand experts as the source of critical inforrnation and evaluation on what is happening in the world. As one U.S. official acknowledged, "diplornatic cornrnunications just can't keep up with CNN."? Richard Haass has also complained "he could seean event or speech live on CNN at 2:oo p.rn., but he had to wait three hours or more before the CIA could deliver its own updated news and cornrnentary to the NSC [National Security Council] office."8 In response to these gaps, President Bush's press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, said that in many international crises, "we virtually cut out the State Departrnent and the desk officers ...Their reports are still irnportant, but they often don't get here in time for the basic decisions to be made." Bush admitted during the r99o-9r Gulf crisis' "I learn rnore from CNN than I do from the CIA."9 Sornetirnes, conventional diplornatic messagesdo not affect policymakers as strongly as televised images. Fitzwater recalled that durine the violence in
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Tiananmen Square they were getting reports and cables from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, "but they did not have the sting, the demand for a gove,'n ment response that the television pic tures had. "'0 Live coverage of world events, the dramatic appeal of pictures, and the pressure on leaders to quickly adopt policy to keep pace with the frenet ic schedule of television programming, challenge the foreign affairs bureaucra cy. They face this dilemma: how to effec tively compete with real-time informa tion provided on screen without com promising professional standards of analysis and recommendations. If for eign policy experts make a fast analysis based on incomplete informtion under severe time pressure, they might make bad policy recommendations. Converse ly, if they take the necessary time to care fully verify and integrate information and ideas, and p,'oduce in-depth reliable reports and recommendations, these may be irrelevant if policymakers have to make immediate decisions.
Effect 3: Facilitating Diplo matic Manipulations. Global television has created new opportunities for worldwide propaganda, misinforma tion, and diplomatic manipulations. Leaders may make what is described as a significant statement which is broadcast live on global television, expecting that their statement will gather enough strength to undermine and confuse the plans of their opponents. However, this option is a double-edged sword that opponents can also use to advance their goals. During the Gulf War, just before the beginning of the ground assault, Saddam Hussein made a statement deSigned to create the impression that he was ready to accept the allied conditions
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to end the war. Television anchors and reporters al'Ound the world quickly sug gested that the war might be over. Bush thought Hussein's peace plan was false but was worried that the Iraqi leader might snatch "a victory from the jaws of certain defeat. "II Baker and Bush felt they had less than 30 minutes to dismiss the Iraqi deal or risk the disintegration of the coalition fighting Hussein. According to journalist Timothy McNulty, Bush told the officials he assembled to deal with this challenge, "We've got to get on the air fast to answer all these people who either don't know what to do or want us to do something we don't want to do. "'~ Bush wanted to convey his administration's position to all twenty-six members of the international coalition confronting Iraq. Fitzwater said that the best way to transmit this information was through CNN because "all countries in the world had it and were watching it on a real-time basis. "'3In this particular case, both Hus sein's challenge and Bush's response played on global television, but Bush was the one who correctly identified the chal lenge and effectively neutralized it. Iraq later used a similar tactic more successfully in order to undermine U.S. policy. On Saturday, November T4, Igg8, Clinton authorized a military attack on Iraq in response to Iraq's defi ance of UN resolutions on the inspec tion and dismantling of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. U.S. bombers were already in the air when CNN broadcast a live statement from an Iraqi official who said his government had "positive ly" responded to an urgent letter from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, urging Hussein to readmit the weapons inspectors. The Iraqi official added that the Iraqi government had faxed a com mitment to that effect to the UN. If A
T
NSC official w, immediately calle Advisor Samuel informed ClintoJ While monitorin) Clinton consulted SOl'S and issued a, mission. Despite commitment, Hu ignore the United resolutions and demands for Iraq examples demonst manipulate global mine their oppone
Effect 4: Creat
tat ions. The higl
vision coverage ma for instant results diplomacy. Forme Spokesperson Jam~ impatience of the phenomena of the Three times a day, <J develop. And that c al impatience, when time ... are not given War, diplomacy, an· processes are especi time to complete. P instant results becor a failure to meet tt result in huge pul For example, Wolf the start of the Gulf in Powell because ,. remained was to parade. "'" Powell a~ tell Blitzer that, "TI a war, not the end ( quently, Blitzer m and tone of h is rep exchange exernplif and a successful re
GtLBoAPolitics&Diplomacy NSC official watching this report imrnediately called National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, who then informed Clinton of the broadcast. While monitoring CNN for details, Clinton consulted with his senior advisors and issued an order to abort the mission. Despite the renewed Iraqi cornrnitrnent, Hussein continued to ignore the United Nations' inspection resolutions and the United States's demands for Iraqi compliance. These examples demonstrate how leaders can manipulate global television to undermine their opponents' policies.
senior official. During the initial phase of NATO's operations in Kosovo, Secretary of Defense WilIiarn Cohen faced a similar challenge, "The pressure was on from the press to give us a day-by-day account ofhow successfulyou were today. And I think that builds a tempo into a campaign to say wait a minute, this is going to take sorne tirne."'7 Cohen's attempts to deal with this challenge were Iesssuccessfulthan Powell's. The pressure that global television exerts on policymakers to take action is particularly powerful in severe hurnanitarian crises. Dick Morris argues that occasionally failing to act in the face of horrific television pictures "quickly gives a president a reputation for weakness, i n e f f e c t u a l i t y ,a n d d i t h e r i n g . " ' u C l i n t o n faced this when television coverage of the war in Bosnia raised doubts about his policies, but he took the risk of not responding. He felt that the Arnerican public would not support intervention in this crisis. Conversely, Bush's perceived weaknessin r9B9 was a rnajor factor in his decision to invade Panama.'s The global war againstterrorism poses a new rnajor challenge to policyrnakers. Following the September rrth, 2oor terrorist attackson the United States,President George W. Bush declared that it would take a long period of tirne to combat this new breed of fundarnentalist Islarnic terrorism. He repeatedly cautioned the public not to expect rapid results and instead be prepared for a battle that would take years, possibly decades. The war includes the use of econornic and diplomatic measures that are less visually stimulating than traditional warfare, slow to produce results, and difficult to evaluate. How this situation will play out with the public rernains to be seen. Global and local networks
HighExpecEffect4: Creating tatiOnS. The high speedof globaltelevision coverage may create expectations for instant results in both warfare and diplomacy. Forrner State Department Spokesperson Jarnes Rubin said, "The impatience of the media is one of the phenomena of the 2{-hour news cycle. Three times a day, a new story line has to develop. And that creates an institutional impatience, where policies that require time...are not given their full fair view."'5 War, diplomacy, and other international processesare especially complex and take time to cornplete. Public expectations for instant resultsbecome dangerousbecause a f a i l u r e t o m e e t t h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n sm a y result in huge public disappointment. For example, WoIf Blitzer's reports after the start of the Gulf \Mar concerned Colin Powell because "it seems as if all that remained was to organize the victory parade."'o Powell asked the Pentagon to tell Blitzer that, "This is the beginning of a war, not the end of ball game." Consequently, Blitzer modified the content and tone of his reports on the war. This exchange exemplifies these challenges and a successful response to thern by a
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have already questioned the results of the war against terrorism and frequently pressed leaders to dernonstrate success. No wonder that National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice advised the media to recognize that, "world affairs is not a scoreboard where you keep daily score of winning and losing. ""o
threat's magnitude, on domestic considerations, and on the impact of the crisis upon the national interest. Media pressure is potentially more damaging when rnore than one policy is attractive. In such a situation, aides rnay have differing viewswhich are subject to change, and the president may be uncertain and need time for deiiberations in order to pr'esent an effective policy. National interest tiOnS. The expansion of news coverage should alwaysbe a key factor. In the case has made policymaking in defense and of Bosnia, policyrnakers were concerned foreign affairs ever more challenging. with the global media pressure for a milGlobal television rapidly transmits inforitary intervention in a hurnanitarian crimation, acceleratingdiplomatic commusis that did not serve the national internication and cultivating expectations for est. On the other hand, the media presfast results. The pace and accessibilityof s u r e a f t e r t h e S e p t e m b e r I r t e r r o r i s t global television applies pressure on polattacks and during the war in icymakers to r-espondeven more swiftly to Afghanistan was minimal because the world eventswhile crafting a messagethat U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d b e e n f e r o c i o u s l y is acceptableto a broad audience. Global a t t a c k e d , a n d n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t c o n television is a powerful tool that should cerns were paramount. Since the be used prudently becauseit can dramatmedia, like the government and the ically affect the outcomes of events. acadernic community, had failed to Global television coveragehas becorne highlight the threat posed by Osama bin an alternativemeans for leadersto obtain Laden, al Qaeda, and Islamic fundainformation and insight. The effect of mentalist terrorisrn beforehand, rnany more rapid diplomatic exchangeson the m e m b e r s o f t h e m e d i a f e l t a p r e s s u r e t o decision making process is particularly be patriotic by way of atonernent. acute in crisis situations. Valuable inforGlobal television coverage affects the mation and suggestions frorn diplomatic nuts and bolts of policymaking. It forces a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e s o u r c e s m a y a r r i v e t o o leaders to find waysto avoid an immediate late to influence decisions. When inforpoliry response and the appearance of mation does arrive on time, it competes leadership weaknessor confusion; refrain with televised images and reporting of from commitment to a policy subject to crises and foreign policy issues. Policy- subsequent review; include different makers must also consider the tone of appealsto domestic and foreign audiences coverage, and be aware of attempts by in a single messageikeep pace with media foreign leaders to undermine their policoverage without creating high expectacies through global television, primarily tions for overly rapid results; and main"breaking via the news" format that cretain policy at odds with television tone, atesfurther pressuresfor response. without alienating reporters and audiPolicymakers do not face the same ences. Meanwhile, if foreign affairs offichallenges in every international clisis. cers are to remain relevant, they must proMedia pressure varies depending on the vide solid information and recornmenda-
andRecommendaConclusions
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crLBoA Politics&Diplomacy tion for policy in time for consideration, and compete with video images that create a public sentirnent that may clashwith the chosen policy. There are no easysolutions, but the first task is to acknowledge the challenges that global media coverage presentsfor policymakers. Policymakers cannot eliminate the challenges of the global news rnedia, but they can limit their effect. Viewing the media as an enemy to criticize and discredit is not effective and may do more harm than good. The frequent clashes between Madeline Albright and reporters did not help U.S. foreign policy. The creation of offices for disinforrnation or global communication is also unlikely to help the governrnent to deal with networls. However, policymakers can cope with the challenges of global coverage. Some of these methods include, First, contingency planning in diplornacy and warfare must include a detailed comrnunication chapter outlining possible negative media effects and suitable responses. Experienced communication professionals and foreign affairs experts should jointly prepare and update this chapter for crises and events. Second, cornrnunication experts should be extensivelyinvolved in the planning phase and high level policymaking. The participation of communications experts in policymaking should become a standard operating procedure. Third, training methods for leaders and diplomats should be updated. Greater emphasis must be placed on properly handling the press, for
example through simulation exercises. For example, before making important policy statements and pursuing significant actions, communications experts should present leaders with likely key media questions and help them prepare persuasive answers."' Fourth, communications professionals can generate images of leade r s t h a t i l l u s t r a t et h e t i m e - c o n s u m ing nature of the decision-making process. For instance, they should distribute photographs of senior officials entering and leaving presidential offices in order to convey the idea that leaders are cautiously and seriously considering options. A visual image of the leader may be rnore important than his actual words. Thus, staternents made while vacationing or holding a golf club rnay create a negative image and should be avoided. Fifth, global broadcasts create information vacuums that polirymakers must quickly fill. Otherwise, journalists and opponents may prernaturely speculate upon and judge policies. A typical media vacuum a p p e a r sw h e n a n a n n o u n c e m e n t i s made regarding a rnajor policy speech the following day. An effort should be made to reveal the policy rationale or key points during the time between the initial announcement and the actual statement. Lastly, in the past, presidents invited influential editors and senior reporters to discuss complex foreign policy issues. In many cases, these talks were sufficient to thwart
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criticism. This practice is much less effective today, but it can still limit potentially adverse effects of news coverage. In addition to conventional strategic and diplomatic considerations, sophisticated policymaking requires a sensitive understanding of global media challenges, efficient communication
strategies, and the training needed for leaders. One of the most important principles of successful leadership and governance is the ability to adjust to changing circumstances. Leaders and institutions are more aware of the challenges of global television coverage now than they were a decade ago, but they still are a long way from addressing thern effectively.
NO T E S t
Madeleine
News Cycle, A
K.
"Around-the-Clock
Albright,
Double-Edged
Sword,"lnteroiew
tt by
Nicholas
George Bush and Brent Scowcro{t, A World (NewYork, Knopf, rgg8), 474-75.
Transformed
Kralev. Tlre Haruard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6 (Winter 2oor)t ro5. 2 Michael Beschloss, Presidents, Television, and Foreign Crres (Washington, D.C.: The Annenberg
op. cit., 7r. r3 Walter Wriston, "Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy," Foreign Afllirs (September/October rggT), 17+. r+ Samuel Feist, "FacingDown the GlobalVillage,
Washington
The
Program,
rgg!).
3 Bradley Patterson, Jt., TheWhite House Staff, Inside the WestWing and BeTond (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2ooo), r3o-3l. Effect: Edse-of-Seat {- Daniel Schorr, "CNN Diplomacy," Christian Science Monitor, z7 Nou.ber I998, II. g Lloyd Cutler, "Foreign Policy on Deadline," The Atlantic Communiry Quarterly zZ (Fall rg8+): ZZ4. 6 Eytan Gilboa, "Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework, " Communication Theory ro (August 2ooo)' 275-3o9. J David Hoffman, "Global Communications work was Pivotal in Defeat of Junta, " Washington 8
Timothy
McNulty,
"Television's
Impact
Morris,
The
New
Prince'
Machiavelli (Los Angeles,
Renaissance Books, 1999), 163. 19 Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the ljse of Force in the Post-Cold War Era, " in The New American Interventionism, Ed.
on
and
of International
18 Dick
Post,
Century Fund Press, r9g2), 7-8. ro James Hoge, Jr., "Media Pervasiveness,"Foreign Affairs (July/August rg94). r4o.
Ceorgetown Journal
York, Random House, r99!), go8. r/ William S. Cohen, Interview by Mawin Kalb. "Be Skeptical, But in a Crisis Give us the Benefit of the Doubt,"Tfte Harvard International of Journal Press/Politics, j (Spring 2ooo): 8. Updated
Diplomacy," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs rZ (Winter r993): 73 g Louis Friedland, Covering the World: International Television New Sem'ces (NewYork, Twentieth
I rZ6]
Media Impact," in The Global Cenrury, Eds. Richard Kugler and Ellen Frost (Washington, D.C., National Defense (Jniversity Press, 2oor), 715-716. 15 Dean Fischer, "State of Tension," American Renew (April 2ooo): 39. Journalism (New t6 Colin Powell, My American ;Iourney
Net-
2J August r99r, A(27). Executive Decision-making
t2 McNulty,
Affairs
for the Twenty
James Caraley (NewYork,
First Century
Columbia
University
Press,
1999),89-rr2. 20 Condoleezza Rice, "The Media-A Problem in Policy Making," Interview by Nicholas Kralev, Tle Haruard International o{ Press/Politics, j Journal (Srm-e.2ooo): BB.
Sclence&Technolo ? poligmaking Ten2ears of climatechange David M. Reiner Global climate change has been on the international environmental agenda for the last decade, but policymakers are still struggling to develop an effective solution to this looming problern. Clirnate change concerns are based on the idea that greenhouse gases (GHGs), ptod.,,c"d primarily from the burning of fossil fuels, accurnulate in the earth's atmosphere, trapping heat and causing global temPeratures to rise. Although a coordinated global effort to reduce ernissions is the preferred starting point, initial efforts to devise an equitable and cost-effective international regime to lower GHG emissions have yielded only mixed results. The most ambitious international regirne to be developed thus far, the Kyoto Protocol, suffered a severesetbackwhen the United States announced its withdrawal in 2oor' Ironically, U.S. intransigence enabled the European lJnion (EU) to rally support for the Protocol, and the agreement appears likely to obtain the signatures necessaryto enter into force. Russian ratification of the Protocol, anticipated for 2ooJ, will be key to its success.The paradox is that Russia'sparticipation and the United States'sabsencemoves the agreement from one requiring costly emissions reductions for most to one that can be accomplished with little real effort for some countries-though others will stiii have to enact costly domestic measures-and
D a v i d M . R e i n e ri . a post-doctoral
associ-
ate in the Laboratory for Energy ronment
and Envi-
at the Massa-
chusetts Institute
of
Technology.
In January he will be a lec-
zoo3, turer
in technology
policy at theJudge Institute
of Manage-
ment Studies, University of Cambridge.
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with very little overall environmental benefit. As the Kyoto Protocol nears the requirements for entry into force, there is a pressing need for a look backward at how we arrived at our current predicament, and a look forward to whether the current agreement can evolve into a truly global regime that brings about real reductions frorn all major emitters.
ago Looking Backward. A decade at the rgg2 United Nations Conference on Environrnent and Development (UNCED)-better known as the Rio leaders, includEarth Surnmit-world irg President George H.W. Bush, signed the UN Frarnework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Under industrialized nations the FCCC, agreed to a voluntary target to return G H G e m i s s i o n st o r 9 9 o l e v e l sb y 2 o O O . Wealthy countries also agreed to support transfers of technologies and financial resources to developing countries in order to facilitate ernissions reductions and help thern adapt to the adverse effects of clirnate change. The FCCC was given more teeth in 1997 with the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, which specified rnandatory emissions reduction targets for industrialized nations. To understand the Kyoto Protocol as it stands today, one rnust first understand the positions of member countries during the negotiations, as well as the politics behind and evolution of their emissions. A stylized view of the negotiations from rgg$ to 2ooo would be a three-sided contest between the EU, the United States and its industrialized allies-the so-called "Umbrella Group, " a n d d e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r i e s . The most aggressiveadvocate of action was the EU. Spurred on by a core group
IrZ8]
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Journal
of International
Affairs
of Green and Scandinavian environment ministers from Germany, France, Denmark. and Sweden. the EU's Council of Environrnent Ministers both led the lJnion's negotiating team and constituted its supreme decision-making body on climate change. Also, with Rio coming on the heels of the Maastricht accord in rgg2, the tirning of the negotiations defined the issue as an internal and external test of strength for the EU. Historical happenstance facilitated the EU's hard-line position. Becausethe EU member stateswere able to negotiate for a single target under a European "bubble," Europe as a whole was able to rneet its Rio target by virtue of German reunification and the British "dash to gas." The 2oo/o decline in German ernissions from overhauling East German industry and the roolo drop-off in Britian's ernissions owing to its shift frorn coal to North Sea natural gas barely offset rapid growth in emissions frorn economically vibrant countries such as Spain, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Excluding Gerrnany and Britain, EU emissions between rggo and 2ooo actuallygrew by 8%.' l f s t e a d yo v e r a l l E u r o p e a n e m i s s i o n s buttressed the inclination towards an aggressive negotiating position on the part of EU rninisters, then robust ernissions growth meant that other developed countries preferred rules that would easetheir burdens. Emissions for 2ooo in the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia exceeded r99o levels (and the Rio targets) by r{.2o/o, r r . 2 o / o ,r ! . 6 0 / o , a n d r B . Z % r e s p e c t i v e l y . ' At Kyoto, national circumstance and differing willingness to accept caps on emissions led Canada and Japan to accept relatively steep cuts of 6% below rggO levels by the cornrnitment period of 2oo8-r2, while Norway and Aus-
RETNER sCienCe&TeChnology tralia lobbied for +rol" and +8 % targets respectively (compa.ed to -B7o for the EU and -J7" for the United States). The Umbrella Group then spent the next four years lobbying for maximum flexibility in meeting its targets. The group's key dernands included accounting rules that expanded the scope of the agreernent to include the so-called "sinls" of carbon in forestsand soils, and the ability to seek lower-cost emissions
trade and perceived debates over trading rules or including sinks as a zero-sum game between domestic reductions and credits acquired abroad. By agreeing to fixed numerical targets before tackling the details, any credit gained fi'om abroad substituted, on roughly a one-toone basis, for any reductions needed domestically. Fearing the erosion of incentives to reduce dornestic carbon dioxide emissions, the EU strove to place
Russianparticipationandu.S.absence rnoves the [Kyoto Protocol] frorn one requiringe costly emissions reductions to one that ca^nbe accoinphshed with little real effort. reductions wherever they lay. The Protocol's text incorporated sevelal flexibility mechanisms including, (r) emissions trading acrossall CHGs; (z);oi.rt implernentation (JI) and the clean development mechanism (CDM), which provide emissions reduction credits for carrying out projects in industrialized or developing nations, respectively;and (3) a market-based system of international emissions permit trading. Liberal rules for these mechanisms were especially important to the Umbrella Group negotiators becausethey would allow developed countries to "buy" emission reductions at the lowest cost. The proposal for an emissions trading systernenvisioned the creation of permits for GHG emissions,which could be sold acrossbolders based on a single rnarket- determined world price. Becausethe Kyoto negotiations were structured around quantitative ernissions reductions, environmental groups and severalgovernrnentsdownplayed the possible efficiency gains from emissions
Iimits on the flexibility mechanisrnsduring the series of negotiating rneetings from Kyoto in Igg] until The Hague in 2ooo.3 The EU took a hard line on all matters that might undermine the integrity of the system, opting to walk away from a cornprehensive deal at The Hague with the outgoing Clinton administration. Rapid growth in the l-I.S. econorny and emissions throughout the Iggos, coupled with the inability to gain accounting and trading concessions from other Kyoto signatories, reinforced fears arnong conser-vative and business groups in the United States that accepting emissions reductions targets based on rggo levelswould be very expensive, For this reason, President George W. Bush announced in 2OOI that he would not submit the Protocol to the Senate for ratification. After U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto process, EU leaders set aside technical concerns over flexibility mechanisms in
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an effort to isolate the isolationist by demonstrating that progress was indeed possible in the face of the U.S. snub. In so doing, the previously hard-line Europeansoffered concessionstoJapan, Canada, and Russia on precisely the questions that had led to the failure at The Hague, using emissions trading and accounting rules to offset their Kyoto targets. The stringency of the overall Kyoto system depends critically on a country that is struggling to establish its own rnarket economy-Russia. Ironically, Russia's irnportance to the ernissions market stems from the collapse of its econorny (and hence its emissions) following the break-up of the Soviet Union. At Kyoto, Russia and Ukraine took on targets to meet their rggo levels by ZooB-Zor2, but as of 1996, Russian emissions were already lg% below rggo levels. Ukraine's emissions in rggS were fully go% below r99o. Both nations' emissions are expected to remain well below Iggo levels until long after 2oro.4 This means that, in addition to enjoying cheap reduction opportunities due to its inefficient and slowly reforming industrial sectors, Russia and other former Soviet bloc states have excessernissions permits to sell, which are derisively referred to by some as "hot air." Finally, developing countries were not part of the debate over binding targets for the first cornrnitment period, but since fast-growing developing countries such as China and India drive global emissions growth, they are inevitably central to the longer-term successofany climate regime. An additional driver was the U.S. Senate'spre-Kyoto Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which demanded developing country participation before the United States would ratifr a climate accord with binding reduction targets.
Ir3oJ
G e o r g e t o w n J o u r n a lo f I n t e r n a t i o n a lA [ [ a i r s
Instead of discussing commitments, progress in developing countries focused on assernbling emissions inventories, securing financial resources through the Global Environment Facility, and "prompt start" of the CDM.
LOOking Forward. Several keyelements will determine the actual and perceived successof the Kyoto Protocol, (r) the role of Russia and international emissions trading; (Z) the domestic prograrns industrialized nations are creating to meet their Kyoto cornrnitments; (3) future U.S. involvement; (4) and the path to drawing in developing countries. For the Protocol to corne into force, it must be ratified by at least gg nations, who together accounted for more than gg% of developed world carbon dioxide emissions in rggO. As of the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the FCCC (COP-8) in New Delhi, the Kyoto Protocol had been ratified by g5 nations.s Since bothJapan and the EU ratified in June 2oo2 on the eveof theJohannesburg Summit, the United States, which a c c o u n t e df o r 3 6 . r % o f r 9 9 o e r n i s s i o n s , does not constitute a veto by itself, nor would even a U.S. led bloc of Canada and Australia-two other countries where opposition is strong. Therefore, the entire agreement now revolves around Russia, which accounts for r J . { o / oo f t h e g g % t a r g e t . Russian hot air, U.S. participation, the world price for ernissions permits, and the need for dornestic ernissions reductions are intimately linked. Nevertheless, since few acknowledge the likely Russian windfall from emissions trading, many developed nations have begun the difficult process of designing dornestic measures that will, they hope, put them on the road to rneeting their Kyoto tar-
REr NERScience &Technology
)l inc S c;efaSt- g fOWin g developinscountries 0hina and India -drive drive glqbal olobal ernission c. as China chr ernissions su( su
tr tr;
o .h, they are inevigb[ central to the owt n ger-term successof a ilimate resime. reg
gets. The early efforts do not augur well. Most schemes reflect a misplaced belief in either voluntarism or the ability of subsidies to jump-start the emissions trading market. Many firrns and governments remain more comfortable with voluntary arrangernents to reduce emissions than binding targets. Britain's emissions trading market first required a lZr5 million enticement to encourage firms to sign up. By subsidizing capital costs or guaranteeing a high price, Germany, Spain, and Denmark have managed to install sorne rg gigawatts of wind power in the past few years. Nevertheless, according to the European Environment Agency, the surn of all such rneasures barely adds up to a credible effort to keep emissions at IggO levels by 2OIO, let alone reduce thern by an additional BoZ.o Outside the EU, there is even lessseriousness of purpose. Hoping to avoid binding measures, conservation and voluntarism still dominate, supplemented by often generous subsidies. Canada has asked its citizens to reduce personal emissions by one metric ton and Japan encourages measures such as limiting the duration of showers. It is possible to dismiss some early measures too lightly. Many nations have moved forward with critical experiments. Sub-national programs in the United States, carbon taxes in the Netherlands and Scandinavia, and emissions trading schemes in Britain and Denmark are all laudable and important first steps. Most
ambitious of all is the development of an EU-wide trading system for industrial emissions that would begin a trial period in 2oog and would come into being along with the international trading regime in 2OOB. Despite broad agreement on the need for action on climate change in Europe, the recent rightward tilt and ouster of leading environmental hard-liners in Denrnark and France would seern to dampen the enthusiasm for measures needed to actually accomplish the Kyoto targets domestically. Rightist governrnents pledge fealty to Kyoto, but they a r e l e s sl i k e l y t o i m p o s e s e r i o u s c o s t s o r disregard the concerns of industry over competitiveness.The infusion of hot air from the accessionof Eastern European countries and potential emissions trading with Russia will help the EU avoid rnany hard decisions. The United Statesis likely to carry out major initiatives in research and development, carbon capture and storage,and even renewables, but it has firmly signaled its distaste for binding commitments of the kind irnposed by the Kyoto Protocol. U.S. withdrawal arnounts to the largest potential buyer of ernissions permits exiting the market, leaves the supply of hot air alone roughly in balance with demand. This should causeprices of carbon emissionspermits to collapseto a few dollars per ton.7 With Russia's ability to control supply, prices could plausibly increaseten-fold, but the resultingworld
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price would still be relatively inexpensive.8Such a low world price will result in diminished interest in JI and CDM, since the rationale for overseasprojects was that there would be a significant shortfall of low-cost reduction opportunities at horne. While rnost major developing countries, including Mexico, India, China, South Africa, and Brazil, have ratified the Protocol, actual emissions paths vary significantly depending on circumstance. China has made remarkable strides by removing coal subsidies and economy-wide reforrns, thereby holding annual growth of carbon dioxide ernissions over the course of the r99Os to tY".'g By contrast, developing country ernissionsas awhole have grown at!.$o/o, or three times the rate of the developed world, while Indian emissions grew at 6.$% per annurn. Thus, Indian ernissions grew from being the size of Canada to the size of Canada plus Spain. While impressive, the averageIndian still ernits just {% of an averageAmerican. Eventual re-integration of the United States and other non-participants, and accessionof developing countries remain significant obstacles. Negotiation of the for second commitment period inevitably will provoke 20r3-2or7 dernands for both U.S. and developing country participation. It is difficult to envision the United Statesadopting commitments without some level of developing country participation, and it is even harder to imagine that poorer countries will assume comrnitments before the richest and largest emitter of all.'o Ironically, one possibility for reconciling Kyoto adherents and non-participants would be to take up the Bush adrninistration's call for emissions intensity targets that tie emissions to
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economic output, since fixed historical targets such those currently used in the Kyoto Protocol are wholly unacceptable to developing countries. The specific Bush target is not binding and merely calls for a slowing of the growth rate. While feeble for a wealthy country, the cornrnitments are in line with what the international cornrnunity might ask of poor developing countries with low levels of per capita emissions. European hostility towards any aspect of the Bush climate policy and the common Arnerican difficulty of ratifring international agreements-especially one touching on energy, consurner preferences, and national sovereignty-will rnake both developing country and American accession exceedingly difficult. As seen in the final Delhi Declaration at COP-8, even discussing developing country obligations is currently irnpossible." While dlfficult to envision, future cornmitment periods will be weak without the eventual expansion of the regirne to all rnajor emitters. Just beginning the discussion rnay take a decade or more. COnClUSiOll. Ten years after the signing of the FCCC, the 2oo2 World Surnmit on Sustainable Developrnent (WSSD or "Rio+ro") at Johannesburg offered the opportunity-Iargely missed-to assess progress on the Rio commitments and the ensuing Kyoto Protocol. So what has transpired? The past decade has seen rernarkable progress in building new institutions and moving clirnate change i n t o t h e p u b l i c c o n s c i o u s n e sas s a m a t t e r for serious dornestic and international debate. Scientific and economic analyses have offered new insights, and the sheer number of prograrns, and pilot activities attest to a clamor for solutions. In a few short years, GHG inventories have been
RETNER Science &Technology developed for almost every nation. Actual progress in reducing emissions, however, has been elusive and what passesfor climate initiatives are often simply relabeled or warmed-over policies used for other purposes: energy security, local air pollution, or international developrnent. For Kyoto to succeed,a daunting number of elements need to be put in place by emissions trading 2ooB-functioning systems. rigorous emissions inventories and review-with billions of dollars at stakeand public sensitivity to rising energy prices compounding the delicate balancing act. While a flawed start, the sheer volume of activities will produce considerable evidence of what makes for rnore and lesssuccessfulclirnate policy. U.S. withdrawal rneant that other nations confirrned their cornrnitrnent to Kyoto at the very highest level. Nevertheless, there remains a tension between the spirit and the letter of the Kyoto Protocol. For either Canada or Portugal to meet its target by buying Russian and Ukrainian hot air calls into question the entire exercise. Exclusive emphasis on rich country ernissions
caps discourages important efforts such as capacity building in developing c o u n t r i e s a n d I o n g - t e r m i n v e s t m e n t si n non-fossil energy sources in the face of looming gaps between current trajectories and Kyoto targets. Moving towards a regime that encourages substantial reductions in emissions and engagesboth the largest emitter, the United States, and the largest source of emissions growth, the developing world, will require better aligning effort and accomplishment. Thrgeted climate policies that will causeeconomic dislocation are essential, but the evidence does not support the facile conclusion that countries are ready to rnake serious sacrifices for a long-terrn problem. For the international climate regime to truly succeed, a path needs to be found to bring all nations aboar-d, including the United States, which has left the Kyoto framework, and developing countries, where most growth in emissions is likely to occur. The Hobson's choice seemsto be either hoping for consensusto somehow emerge or reconciling to perhaps decadesof divergent paths.
NO T E S I LINFCCC, municatioru
"Methodological
from
Issues. National com-
Parties included
in Annex
I to the
Convention- Report on national greenhose gtr inventory data fron Annex I Parties for I99O to 2ooo. Note by (lr October the secretariat," FCCC/SB/zoozllNF.z,
zooz). 2 lbid. "Supplementarity, 3 A.D. Ellerman and I. Sue Wing, an invitation to monopsony?" Enetgloumol 2I (2ooo),
7 William D. Nordhau, "Global Warming Economi a , " S c i e n c2e9 4 ( g N o v . Z o o t ) , t Z 8 3 - r 2 8 4 . 8 Mustal) H. Babiker, Henry D. Jacoby, John M. Reilly, and David M. Reiner, "The Evolution of a Climate Regime:
Kyoto
to Marrakech,"
g Energy
Information
29-59.
Lnerg Outlook 2ooz.
Administration, Intemotionol 4 Energy Information Energ Outlook 2oo?, Report DOE/EIA o484 (zooil,, 189, Table Aro. "Status of Ratifiution of the Conven5 UNFCCC, tion and Its Kyoto Protocol", (i8 October 2ooz), Report
r89, Tlble Aro.
FCCC/CPlz
oozllNF.
r. Available at, http,//unfccc. i ntl
resource/docs/cop8/r n fo l. pdf. 6 Robin Pomeroy, "EU will miss Kyoto target - top energy economist," Reuten,(4 October ZooZ).
EnuironmentolScierceand Polig
5 (June 2oo2): r95-zo6; M.GJ. Den Elzen, andA.P.G. de Moor "The Bonn Agreement and Manalech Accords' an updated analysis," RIVM Report 7z8oolor7 (zoot).
ro Richard "Reconstructing
B.
Administration,
Repon
DOE/EIA-o484
[ntemotionol (zooz),
Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener, Policy: The Paths Ahead," Pofu-y
Climate
/Vfoften,AEI-BrookingsJoint ies Report (Auglst 2ool),
Center Ibr Regulatog' StudoI-23.
tt "Summary of the Eighth Conference of the Parties Fmmework Convention 2J October - t November 2oo2," 12, ({. November 2oo2).
to the tN
on Climate Change, EnrthNe@tiohoreBulletin
W i n t e r / S p r i n g2 o o 3 [ I 3 3 ]
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Thtnktng St rategtcallt about Anti microbial Resistance Richard D. Srnith andJoanna Coast Not long ago, it appeared as if the great twentieth-century battle against infectious diseasehad been won by the "rnagic bullet" of antibiotics. lJnfortunately, celebrations have proved premature, and we begin the twenty-first century in retreat, as our once powerful antibiotics appear to be no match for the ingenuity of infectious "superbugs. " It has been observed as a natural biological phenomenon that micro-organisms can develop resistance against the antibiotics used to treat thern.'Although the development and spread of resistanceis a cornplex process that depends on many factors, genetic transforrnation of rnicro-organisrns into resistant strains is accelerated by the use of antibiotics.' These superbugs now present an ever greater challenge to public health. Diseases,ranging frorn rnild ear-infection and strep throat to rnalaria and tuberculosis, are all increasingly demonstrating resistance to the antibiotics used against them.3 For exarnple, in rggr alrnost half of the {,ooo tuberculosis patients arriving at New York hospitals were suffering frorn resistant strains, and one such strain proved resistant to eleven different drug treatments.a By rgg!, physicians were regularly trying six or more drugs in atternpts to treat tuberculosis.s Doctors in New York have even died frorn drug-resistant tuberculosis; a situation that is being replicated in cities across
R i c h a r dD . S m i t h is Senior Lecturer
in
Health
at
Economics
the School ofMedicine, Health Policy and Practice
at the Univer-
sity of East Anglia.
Joanna Coast i. in
Senior
Lecturer
Health
Economics
the University
at
of
Bristol.
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the United States, other \Mestern countries, and especiallyin the developingworld.o Resistancecreates serious health and repercussions. Patients economic infected with a particularly resistant strain are less likely to recover after the first antibiotic treatrnent. Such patients may require further exarninations and treatments, and for sorne, a cascadeof other drugs will be tried before the infection is eradicated. This generally rneans Ionger hospital stays, longer
the purpose of these strategiesis to either (r) prevent the emergence of resistance or (2) .ontuirt the trorumdssion of resistance once it has emerged. Presently, too much emphasis is being placed on tackling the transmission of resistant infection and too little is devoted to preventing its emergence. This current emphasis on transrnission addresses a short-term problern, but does not do enough to address medium and long-terrn problems. However, it should be noted that
probtem Resistancehas hecomâ&#x201A;Źa elobal
affecting both developing and diveloped countrles. absences from work, and undoubtedly higher medical coststhan for non-resistant infections.T In the mid-r99os, estirnates suggestedthat the health care costs associatedwith the treatrnent of antirnicrobial resistance (AMR) in the lJnites States were approxirnately $4-7 billion annually, or approxirnately O.S-tYo of total U.S. health care costs.sBeyond increased health costs, patients with extreme casesof resistant infection face a greater likelihood of premature death.e This is understandably causing professional, governrnent, and public concern. Indeed, the United States considers the potentially destabilizing economic and social effects of antimicrobial resistance, as well as its potential in biological warfare (especially in light of recent anthrax scares), sufficient to classifr antibiotic resistance as a national security risk.'o There are a variety of strategies that may be used to tackle resistance, such as reducing the use of antimicrobials, developing new agents, and isolating resistant patients in hospitals. In general,
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the goal is not to eradicate resistance altogether. Such a goal would require a significant-if not total-reduction in the use of antibiotics, and would irnply incurring significant rnortality and morbidity. Instead, the airn is to use available strategiesto optimise the balance between the use of antimicrobials and strategiesto help prevent the emergence of resistance to these treatrnents." Cooperation on a global level is also required to achieve this optimization of antibiotic use. Since AMR produced in one country soon finds its way to others, resistance has becorne a global problem affecting both developing and developed countries." Thus, strategies at a national level may be compromised by other nations' lack of action, implying that an international, as well as a national responseto AMR is essential.'3 The following sections outline the difference between the emergence and transmission of resistant infection; various strategies that rnay be used to address resistance;why strategiesaimed at con-
sMtrH& coASr science&Technology taining the transmission of resistance appear to take precedence over those designed to prevent its emergence; the importance of global collective action; and how this problem may be addressed from the global perspective.
It may seem obvious then that strategies focused on preventing the emergence of resistance offer greater longterm benefits than those responding to the transmission of already-resistant infections. Paradoxically, it appears that strategies to contain the transmission of resistant infection are more popular among policymakers than those to prevent its emergence.
vs. Transmission. Emergence Resistance to antibiotics develops over time along a sigrnoid distribution or "S" curye. Initially, there is a lag phase where the treatrnent is highly effective. Soon resistance begins to develop, and the of resistant organisms proportion increasesrapidly. After a period of time, resistance stabilizes and reaches an equilibrium level.'aFor example, resistanceto penicillin in hospital settings lagged during the rg{-os with resistances\rocketing from about t!{J to I96o, and stabilizing thereafter. The equilibriurn level of resistancemay range anylvhere from rooZ to go%, and is determined by a number of factors, including the relative fitness of resistantstrains, the genetic basisand stability of resistance,and the magnitude of the selection pressure.'5 The irnportance of resistance'sdevelopment pattern is that it is possible to affect both the rate of growth and the final equilibriurn level of resistance by preventing its emergence in the lag period. However, once an equilibrium level has been reached, antibiotic activity will be severely compromised, and only strategiesthat reduce the transmission of already-resistant organisms will be possible. Although in some casesresistance may fall once the use of antibiotics stops, in rnany casesit appears that once resistance is developed, it remains genetically encoded. The significance is that once resistance to a specific antibiotic emerges, that drug may never regain its previous therapeutic powers.
StrategiesAffecting EmergenceandTransmissiOn. Strategies intended to prevent the emergence of resistance include regulations and restrictions on the total usageof antibiotics, aswell as an ernphasison provider and patient education. Ensuring the optimal use of existing agents by focusing on drug administration, the rnagnitude and duration of dose, and improving patient adherence is another technique aimed at minimizing the emergence of resistance. Additionally, the development of vaccinesand alternative therapies increasesthe range ofavailable the requirement agents and decreasoes for antimicrobials. Once resistant organisrns have developed, they may be acquired through contact with food, animals, inanimate objects, or people. Typical strategies to reduce the transmission of already resistant organisms include hand-washing by rnedical staff, isolation of patients infected with resistant organisrns, and decontamination practices for hospitals. These techniques rely on early recognition of resistant organisms to decrease opportunities for transmission, and could be as extreme as limiting international travel to reduce the spread of resistance.In practice, not only is transmission extremely difficult to control, but such strategiesiogicaiiy mean that at
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least some people will suffer from resistant organisms. For this reason, a p p r o a c h e st h a t t a r g e t t r a n s m i s s i o n a r e likely to be inferior to those designed to control the emergence of resistance.'7 A focus on strategies to contain the transmission of resistance will lead to sub-optimal mid- and long-term outcomes since resistance rnay continue to emerge for all known therapies. At that point, there will be few, if any, effective agents to treat infections. However, in a recent systematic review of the literature, the body of published evidence indicates that most studies have been concerned with strategiesto contain the transmission of resistance, rather than to prevent its emergence.'o
already resistant organisms are therefore preferred to policies that affect the selection pressure for the development of resistance, the impacts of which rnay not be seen until the distant future. These two qualities of transmissionreducing strategies rnake them popular not only to poliryrnakers, but also to professionals.as both groups increasingly favor evidence-based medicine (EBM) and evidence-based policy (EBP). Under
EBM and EBP, strategies are accorded rnore weight the more rigorous the methods used to evaluate them and the stronger the outcomes of those strategies. Thus, strategies evaluated using rigorous experimental rnethods and showing statistically significant effects on health are prioritized above those with non-experimental design and outcornes that are less Strategies to tackle transrnission are easy statistically significant. lJnfortunately, this can be a self-perto evaluate, and generate quick returns; therefore, they are very attractive to petuating cycle. Strategies focused on politicians and professionals.It is far eas- containing the transrnission of existing iel to identify the current incidence of a resistance are easier to evaluate than resistant infection in a population and those preventing its emergence, and likely to show higher irnrnediate gains. These the impact that this infection has on their health than it is to predict how prevengains result in observable data, which facilitates subsequent evaluations and tion strategieswill change rates of future resistance. The essential difficulty in creates even more evidence of their sucevaluating strategies aimed at preventing cess, eventually leading to full impleemergence is the uncertainty that comes rnentation of transmission containrnent from predicting the future of a disease. strategies.In contrast, strategiesaimed at Second, reducing the transmission of preventing the emergence of resistance currently resistant infections will have will not generate irnrnediate, observable data, and evaluations will be based on the quicker returns on health and cost ofcare than reducing the future ernergence of modeling of future resistance. These resistance, where the effect may be softer evaluation techniques and the iniuncertain and many years away. Thus, tial lack of hard data limit the ability of even large absolute health or cost effects e m e r g e n c e - o r i e n t e d s t l a t e g i e s t o g a i n occurring in the future are considered the early research funding that is necesless significant than those occurring in s a r yp r i o r t o f u l l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . The implication is that over tirne, the the present-a phenomenon terrned "discounting" in economics. Strategies focus on containing the transmission of r e s i s t a n c er a t h e r t h a n i t s e m e r g e n c e that tangibly reduce the transmission of
is Targeted. WhyTransmission
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sMtrH& coAsr science&Technology a global resistance database, which nations would both contribute to and have accessto, could be extremely valuable in planning to deal with AMR.". The Health World Organization (WHO) has already attempted, though with limited success,to establish such a global surveillance database with WHONET." Global action is reouired here because,(r) the barriers to ..tublishing surveillance systerns are high, strategiesto preyent the emergence, or contain the transrnission, of resistance p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r p o o r e r n a t i o n s ; ( Z ) may be provided at the national level. surveillance produces benefits for othHowever, the increasing trend of glober countries which an individual nation alization means that the level of resis- d o e s n o t a c c o u n t f o r i n d e c i d i n g tance in any one nation is critically whether to invest in a surveillance sysinfluenced by that in others, and not tern; and (3) a global system requires merely its closest neighbors. comparable data of adequate quality." However, contrary to expectation, Second, mechanisms to encourage this prornotes inaction for two reasons. research and development (R&D) of new First, the prisoners' dilemma suggests antibiotic and alternative treatments should be promoted. R&D is often that a nation ought not invest in pree x p e n s i v ea n d t i m e - c o n s u m i n g t o c o n venting the emergence and containing duct, yet its results are relatively cheap to the transrnission of resistance when it irnportation may be undermined by the disseminate. Thus, international agencies could encourage, coordinate, and of resistance from other, less vigilant nations. Second, if other nations are standardize international research networks that would be able to undertake taking action to prevent and contain resistance, the incentive is again for a t r i a l s a m o n g g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i v e r s e nation to free-ride by doing little or patient groups and report strategy outnothing, since it can rely largely on the cornes to all nations. Although there has level of control generated by others. b e e n l i t t l e p r o g r e s s i n t h i s r e s p e c t , Both reasons create sub-optirnal interefforts are being made. For exampie, the for national situations attacking resis- WHO, in partnershlp with the WHO Collaborating Centre for Electronic tance, and they present the need to secnre global collective action in three D i s e a s e S u r v e i l l a n c e i n P a r i s , h a s recently established the Antimicrobial specific areas. First, cooperation is needed in the Resistance Information Bank (AR InfoBank) to provide accessfor policysurveillance of resistance, which promakers and health care workers to qualvides the fundamental data required to about drug resistance locate a resistanceproblern, monitor its ity information a n d and resistance networks.t3 t r a n s m i s s i o n , d i r e c t i o n o f growth, Third, measures to ensure the approtravel, and to deterrnine the impact of interventions intended to contain it.'e priate and rational use of existing antibiThe establishment and maintenance of otics must be adopted. Developed councauses levels of resistance to increase rapidly to their equilibrium level. At this point, containing the transmission of resistancewill be futile, if not irnpossible, as the majority of infectious diseasewill be resistant. Furtherrnore, the resulting impact on morbidity and rnortality is likely to be catastrophic.
Action.lr",t GlobalCollective
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tries should concentrate on constraining the overuse of therapies by regulating the administration of treatments for certain conditions, whereas developing nations should focus on gaining accessto the latest, least resistant therapies, which are often unaffordable.'a In order to ensure that therapies are widely available to
more, resistance is a global problem requiring a global response. Global cooperation in surveillance, the development of new antibiotics and alternative therapies, and the rational use of both existing and new antibiotics will be the rnost effective roure. In achieving these, we advocate that international bodies-and indeed national governrnents of lead countries: (r) engage in raising the global awareness
Resistanceis a growingprobtem; yetwe are focu_sing_on winning current battles as opposed to"the overall iar. The focus of this paper has been predominantly on antimicrobial use and resistancein humans. However, there is considerabie concern over the threat to human health from the use of antimicrobials in anirnals. Therapeutic doses to treat infection and sub-therapeutic dosages used as growth promoters lead to the developrnent of antimicrobial resistancein anirnals that may be transferred to humans."5This fact has significant implications for the development, containment, and prevention of resistance in humans, but these considerations and other more specific issues, such as the implications of intensive production techniques and economic incentives to agriculture, are beyond the focus of this paper.'b Resistanceis a growing problem that threatens to return us to the pre-antibiotic era, yet we are focusing on winning current battles as opposed to the overall war. Targeting the transmission of resistant infections is laudable, but it should not be at the expense of strategiesairned at preventing its emergence. Further-
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of resistance prevention and the interdependence of nations in achieving it; (Z) support the creation, monitoring, and enforcernent of national legislation and regrrlation rnechanisrns to ensure the production of prevention strategies; (3) facilitate the production and dissemination of information within and across nations; (4) udrro.ute international funding structures to assist in the implementation of strategies, since without financial ability, the cooperation and effective participation of developing nations will be undermined; (5) provide an agenda, funding, and coordination for research in the area of resistance to address knowledge gaps and i m p r o v e a r e a so f u n c e r t a i n t y . There are few naturally occurring incentives for this type of action where immediate gains are not realized. Therefore, active policy developrnent by international bodies and national governments is required to prevent the emergence of resistance and to ensure that antibiotics will still be effective in combating diseasesfor future generations.
sMrrHANDcoASr Science&Technology N O T ES r David Ashley and M. Brindle,
"Penicillin
resis-
tance in staphylococci isolated in a casualty department, " rlournolo/ ClinicolPatholog r 3 (196o), 336 - 3 38. Sub2 Standing Medical Advisory Committee Resistance (t998). Thepcth o/ Group on Antimicrobial Ieadraislonce. Department lications Unit,
PHLS
dale Avenue.
London
of Health, London.
Headquarters NWg
sDF. gov.uVsmac,/htm.
http'//w-doh.
The Pub-
Office,
6t Colin-
Also
available at
3 Paula Wilton, Richard Smith, Joanna Coast, Michael Millar, and A. Karcher, "Directly obsened therapy for multi-drug
resistance tuberculosis: an eco-
evaluation in the United States of America and South Africa, " The Internotionolloumol ofTuberculosisond Lung nomic
Drsece5 (eoor), rr37-rr42. ,! BarbraJ. Culliton, "Drug resistantTB may bring e p i d e m i c , "N c f u r ef g 6 ( r 9 9 2 ) , 4 7 3 . 5 M. Wenman, "Treatment of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis," NewEngJond 329 (r993)' Journolof Medicine
78+-79rnul6 Lee B. Reichman, Ttmebomb'Theglobalepidemicof resistonttuberculosis.(New York, McGraw Hill,
lar, "Super-Bugs,
ro3r-ro32. 8 American
Society for Microbiology,
"Report
of
the ASM task force on antibiotic
resistance,",4nfimicro6io/ Agents ond Chemotheropy SWlement (tggg), t-zJ.American Society for Microbiology, "Report of the ASM task force
antimicrobial
resistance within
antibiotic
the community
resistance be
the patient,
using simple
hospitals and models, "
mathematical
Philosophicol Trorcoctions of the Ro2ol Socie! of London !g{
( 1 9 9 9 )7' z r - 7 3 8 .
t! Roy Anderson, "The pandemic of antibiotic r e s i s t a n c e [ r . * s J , " N a t u r eM e d i c i n e5 ( ? ) ( r 9 9 9 ) , 1 4 7 - 9 . 16 Paula Wilton, Richard Smith, Joanna Coast, and Michael Millar, "Strategies to contain the emerresistance: a systematic review
gence of antimicrobial
of effectiveness a nd cost- effect iveness," Jo urnalof H ealth and Polig 7 (2) (2 o 02) : I I r -r I 7. S erilcesReseorch
r7 Ibid. r8 lbid. t9 Ian M. Gould,
"Stewardship of antibiotic
use
and resistance surveillance, the international scene," J ournal of H ospitolI nfections{ ! Supple me n t ( t g 9 9 )' S z 5 3
6o. 20 WHO,
ti-dng
20c-2). 7 Richard Smith, Joanna Coast, Michael Millar. "Over-the-counter antimicrobials' the hidden costsof op1 3 7 (r g 9 6) | resistan ce, " I our nol of AntimicrobiolC hemother
should
as a cost in economic evaluation?" Heolth Econ o n i c s5 ( 3 ) ( 1 9 9 6 ) ' z r 7 - 2 2 6 . "Studies of I4 D. Austin, and Roy Anderson, included
"Global Strategy fol the Containment
of Antimicrobial sation,
Resistance," World Health OrganiWHO/CDS/CSR/DRS/zoot.z
Geneva.
(zoor). 2I WHO.
"Surveillance standards for antimicrobial
resistance," WFIO, Genew. CDS/CRS/DRS zooo.2. (zooob) http,//w.who.int/emc/pdfs/CDSsurveillancer.pdf. 22 Richard Smith,Joanna Coast, "Global Respons Resistance," es to the Growing Threat of Antimicrobial Commissionon Mocroeconomiaond Heolth, l{orking poperWCZIJ (zoor). World Health Organisation, Geneva.
antibiotic resistance," Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy Supplement (r995), r 23. 9 S- Holmberg, S. Solomon, and L. Blake, "Health
w.
impacts of antimicrobial resistance," Reuieuof I nfeaiou Dreoes9 (6) (1987), 106 5 - 78. Io Central Intelligence Agency, "The global infec-
2 3 http ://oms2.b3e.jussieu.{VarinfobanV "Global Srategyforthe Containment of 24WHO, Antimicrobial R e s i s t a n c e ," W o r l d H e a l t h O r g a n i s a -
on
and economic
tious disease threat and its implications States," (1999).
for the United
cmhealth.org/wgz-paperr|.pdf.
(zoor). tion, Geneva. WHO/CDS/CSVDRS/zoot.z "Use of quinolones in food animals and 25WHO,
tI Joanna Coast, Richard Smith, Michael Millar, "An economic perspective on policy to reduce antimicrobial resistance, " SociclScience c nd Medicine46(r) (199 8),
potential impact on human health," Report of WHO
29-38.
see, "WHO global prin26 For more information ciples for the containment of antimicrobial resistance (Zooo) in intended for fbod, " animals
12 F. Fasehun, "The antibacterial paradox' essential drugs,
effectiveness and cost," Bulletin ofthe World Heolth (rggg), 2rr -216.
Orgonixtion77(:) r!Joanna
Coast, Richard Smith, and Michael Mil-
meeting,
WHO
Geneva,(Z-5
Health Organisation,
http, //w.who.
June
tgg8).World
Geneva.
int/emc/diseases/zoolwho-global-p
ri
nciples/index. ht.m.
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Making Warto Make theState
relations. The book questions the bellicose rnodel of state development. The bellicose model, built upon a stylized Reuiew b7David R. Mares model of European state-building, argues that the demands of fighting total Mrcurr- ANc c Cnr.rrrNo.BloodqndDebt,War war produce states that are capable of ond theNati.on-Statein Intin America.Universiextracting resources from society to {ight. ty Park: The Pennsylvania State lJniversiStatesunable to generate the resources to , oo2,329 pp. $45.oo cloth. t y P r e s s2 fight are elirninated along the way. As a byproduct of making war, stateswind up Centeno tacklesan old theme in internaproviding the public goods required for tional relations, the relationship between social and economic development. Jackwar and state capacity, or state-building. son and Rosbergused the African caseto Thucydides gaveus an answer in Pericles' dernonstratethe importance of historical funeral oration: Athens was strong and circumstances in understanding the link the envy of others becauseshe waspowerbetween war and state-building.r An ful in war, and she was powerful in war international system that delegitimized becauseher citizens understood that they conquest made it too costly for African were better off lf Athens was strong. powers to dismantle each other, while Centeno provides an updated version of c o l o n i a l b o r d e r s t h a t w e r e i n c o n g r u e n t this answer by critiquing the argurnent with tribal borders made leaders of these that war makes the state. Along the way he new statesreluctant to question the terriaddresses the developmental failure of tor-ial integlity of neighbors lest their own Latin American states and the "Long minority tribes raise the sarne issues at Peace" in Latin America's international home. The consequence was an absence
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of war and the survival of states incapable of providing the context for developrnent and stability. Centeno adds the Latin Arnerican case(e*cluding Central America and the Caribbean) to this literature. Centeno is at his best in the historical analysis of the dynamics of nation and citizen-making in Latin America (Chapters { and $, respectively). He weavesin and out of intra-elite conflict, rnaking an excellent casethat, cornbined with racial and class divisions, it produced a situation in the nineteenth and early twenti-
icantly fewer wars than Europe: three compared to eleven.2 The characteristics for determining whether these were the right type of wars are sometirnes contradictory. Latin Arnerican wars in the nineteenth century were less intense than in Europe, North Arnerica, the Middle East, and Africa as rneasured by the percentage of population deaths per year. But the mortality rates of war as an average percentage of the population killed were far higher, indicating that these wars were longer
an alternative The U.S. expef ignCeprovid.es explanation for weak states in Latin Arnerica. eth centuries in which those in control of the statedid not want a strong state. Centeno, however, has trouble sustaining the argrrment about the link between war and state-building. He argues that there were not enough wars, t h a t t h e yw e r e n o t t h e r i g h t o n e s ( l i r n i t e d rather than total *ar), and that the few wars that occurred came at the wrong time (they preceded the development of nation-states). B..t the numbers do not support this critique, nor are the logical conselluences of limited war inirnical to the development of state capacity. Following the standard view, Centeno argues that Latin Arnerica has a "lack of war experience." But the cornparisons of war occurrence across regions do not support that claim. In the nineteenth century, Europe had fifteen wars, and Latin Arnerica had seventeen. In the post-World War II period, Europe has had five wars, Asia five, and Latin America three wars. Only in the first half of the twentieth century did Latin America have signif-
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and deadlier. The intensity of twentieth century wars is significantly less than that for Europe, North Arnerica, and Asia, but similar to Africa and slightly less than for the Middle East and North Africa. The rnortality rates for twentieth century wars in SouthAmerica and Mexico, however, are higher than anlwhere else. It is hard to believe these figures, but Centeno's single paragraph discussion of thern sirnply clairns that Latin America's wars were "generally nonviolent." What about the argrrment that Latin America's wars came "at the w.rong tirne?" Following standard criteria, Centeno argues that "nation-states" were not created in Latin America until after rBBo. The wars Latin America experienced in the twentieth century were not total wars except for the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay.Yet, a short war that leads to irnportant losses of people, territory, resources, and syrnbols should stimulate the loser to increase state capacity. Were there disputes with major stakes in the twentieth century in Latin America? The
Books 2 , o o o - 5 , o o o H o n d u r a n d e a d i n t h e States only after World War I threatened 196g war would be the equivalent of the U.S. interests. Hatred may be less a cause U.S. losing Ioo,ooo-25o,ooo p e o p l e of war than a strategyfor fighting it. Staltoday. In r94r, Ecuador lost {.O percent in went from representing evil to "lJncle of the territory it clairned. Argentina in Joe" when the United States wanted an ally against Hitler; "the Hun" disapr98Z and Ecuador in rggg, engaged in wars over small territories with the knowlpeared after peace was signed. Centeno's critique of the argument edge that they would lose if they became that "war creates capable states" is contotal wars, and did so with overwhelming popular support at the outset. Disputes vincing, but not for the reasons he posover boundaries, fisheries, trade routes, tulates. The U.S. experience provides an and migration flows continue to plagrre alternative explanation for weak states in Latin America. U.S. nationalism is not the region. That state elites tried to losses is increase capacity after these clear based on shared experiences of war; rather it develops out of the definition of even in the case of Argentina's defeat in the Malvinas.3 That they failed is better the political community. For all its weaknesses in irnplernentation and willingexplained by factors other than the type or ness to accept injustices, the United tirning of war. Centeno argues that disputes in the States is defined by the Constitution. twentieth century could not produce war Individuals are willing to fight for the United Statesbecausethey see themselves because the elite and popular opinion asArnericans. That was true for Africandid not consider war a "feasible policy." had Americans before World War II and even But six wars did occur, two conflicts over goo battlefield related deaths, for Japanese-Americans during the war, irnportant arms races occurred in r$o6even while their families were in internrnent carnps. U.S. elites were divided r2 and in the r97os, and the elite did not from Independence through the Civil protest when military regirnes in Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina rnobilized War' Washington's army had trouble getting rnoney, supplies, and rnen, as less for war in 1916-18. The Militarized Interstate Dispute databasecontains over than half the population actively supthe New ported Independence; and 2oo instances in the twentieth century lend England refused to money Latin American states to when politicians, the federal governrnent or call up solwhether military or civilian, used milidiers, but lent money to England. Durtary force in their relations with neighing the War of rB12, Westward expansion bors. If elites and popular opinion both near civil war in "Bloody infeasible, leaders war to be produced believed " Kansas. Yet, the state continued to would not have rattled sabers.4 Another reason Centeno cites for the develop its capacity to govern and promote social and economic developrnent. alleged absence of war is that Latin The difference between North and Americans lack the hatred to fight their neighbors. But hatred is often developed South America's ability to overcome after war begins. The British royal farnily these obstacles, absorb immigrants, and educate them lies rnore in the creation of changed its name to the House of Winda limited state rather than in a state able sor only after war with Gerrnany; Ger"the Hun" for the United to "impose its will on a population," mans becarne
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which Latin Arnerican elites and Centeno prefer. Lastly, Centeno suggests that his analysisuncovers a "conundrum for policymakers" by pitting the requisites for international peace against those for internal peace and welfare. Latin Arnerican states do not make war because they are weak, and because they are weak their societiesand economies are underdeveloped. To strengthen these states would make developrnent more likely, but would also produce war. The dominant paradigm in international studies today, however, argues that democratic statesdo not rnake war against other democratic states,as well as that democratic statesare more likely to be stable and prosperous
than non-democratic ones. Centeno does not address why his pessirnistic view is more lilely than the democratic peace. Bloodand Debf presents an interesting narrative about state development in LatinAmerica. Centeno has added to the literature that questions the link between war-rnaking and state-rnaking. However, his argument remains within that paradigrn, only demonstrating that the link is historically conditioned, not inevitable. War can happen and weak states may result and survive. Fortunately, other scholars have pointed the way in which capable statescan develop without war. David R. Marcr Director
is Professor of Political Science and
of Graduate
Studies at the University
of
California, San Diego.
NOTES r RobertJackon and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's W e a k S t a t e " P e r s r s r , " W o r l dP o l n c ,3 5 ( r 9 8 e ) , r .
3 The Argentine decision to be the u.assailable ally of the U.S. under Menem ms designed to garner the
2 Militori<ed Inlerstote Dispute dato base, honih! Ieuel 5, revised version to I992. Author's addition of Croat*
resources and credibility to develop the Argentine (smaller but more eflicient) and nation.
ia-Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
See my discussi on in Volent Peoce'Militaripd Interstate BorgaininginLolin Americc, (New York, Colombia lJniversity
see Arie Kacowicz, /gnes oJ {, For more information Peacein the hvdWorl& South Americoond Wst Allica in Combar"of o t i u eP e r j t e c l i u(eA l b a n y ' S r a t e U n i v e r s r t y New York
Press.2oot).
P r e s s , t 9 g 8 ) . a n d M a r e s . V o l e n tP e a c e .
Ii+6]
and Ecuador-Peru.
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state
Viewfrom the Ground
Dissidents Hungary's Uncertain Sarah Atwood Somewhere off a tree-lined boulevard in Budapest, Hungary, I descend into an intimate cellar cafd ten minutes late. Anna greets me at the gate and shakesmy hand warmly. She is wearing a silver tank top, which droops fashionably over her tanned skin, set off by the diamonds around her neck. I apologize for being late, but she will hear nothing of it. "I arn sitting here 'Did and just wondering to rnyself, I say the street so that you can understand it, or what?"' she exclaims, waving away my apologies. We sit down and she lights a long, slender cigarette. "I am researching Hungarian democracy, you know," I begin, and ask her if she is satisfied with the state of her nation. She laughs bitterly, "This is not democracy, what we have here in Hungary." What then has been going on in the past thirteen years, if not democracy? In the spring and surnmet of 2oo2, I addressedthis and a seriesofrelated questions to the activeparticipants, advocates, and critics of a neo-dissident movement led by former Hungarian Prime Minister Vktor Orban. These inter-viewsindicate that the answer lies not in the democracy, but in the democrats. In the confounding period of uncertainty and transition since rggo, it has become difficult fol the citizens of the new dernocracy to separate fact from fiction, history from memory. Opportunist politicians have used this collective
Sarah Atwood senior Foreign
t. u
in the School of Seruice at
Georgetown
Universi-
ty. She studied in Budapest, during
Hungary,
Spring 2oo2.
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insecurity to further their own agendas, weakening the new democracy with nationalist rhetoric and populist "transition These promises. pains" associated with regime change become most apparent in the dynarnics of Orban's controversial "Go Hungary" rnovement.
ented SzDSz, which came to dominate the political left in the years following the regime change. Orben's Alliance of Young Democrats (n'lleS") sprung from student dissident groups and was considered a junior organization of the SzDSz. The Hungarian Party forJustice and Life (MIEP) cornered the extreme The CommunistLegacy.Hun- right with an anti-Semitic, nationalist gary, like the rest of Central and Eastern platforrn, and the Hungarian Socialist Europe, has no shortage of painful asso- Party (MSzP) evolved from the reforrn ciations with the last fifty years. After wing of the Communist party. World War II, the totalitarian regime The Socialists won a landslide victoinstalled by the Soviets gave way to a ry over the ruling MDF coalition in short-lived period of liberalization and r994, forming a government with their reform in iggf under Imre Nagy. This current coalition partners, the Alliance "reform era" culminated in a popular of Free Democrats. Orb6n then led his revolution in October rg$6, which was Young Democrats to triumph in 1998, suppressed by Soviet military forces after forming a coalition with the Hungarian days of bloody fighting. With the backing D e r n o c r a t i c F o r u r n . [ n A p r i l 2 o o 2 , h e of Moscow, J6nos Kr6'd6r forrned a new was defeated in a close race by Socialist candidate Pdter Medgyessy, who government reminiscent of the Soviete r a t e r r o r r e g i m e . I n 1 9 6 2 , K a d a r formed the current coalition governfamously reversed his hard-line doctrine rnent with the Free Dernocrats. By late with the admonition that, "[He] who is 2 o o 2 , t h e H u n g a r i a n p o l i t i c a l s p e c not againstus is with us." The late r98Os trurn had become bipolar, with the witnessed an unprecedented growth in Socialists dominating the left and the the number of informal associations, Young Democrats leading the right. clubs, and debating circles that formed nascent civil organizations and political There is no doubt that Viktor ment. parties, including the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Orban played a formative role in HunFree Democrats (SzDSz). Hungary was gary's transition to dernocracy. In the well-positioned to negotiate a regirne aftermath of the regime change from change in rg89, having made progressive cornrnunism to democracy in Ig$O, past steps toward political and economic libpolitical dissidents-Orbdn among eralization. Nonetheless, the afterrnath them-were placed in a unique position of the transition left Hungary saddled of power. Often seen as national heroes, with deep foreign debt and extensive they had become immune to the harsh demands for structural reform. scrutiny that inevitably awaited one-time The first national elections after the members of the Communist party and democratic transition granted an overeven leftist politicians. Orbrin hirnself whelming victory to the center-r-ight ascended to national renown in 1989 M D F w h i l e l o c a l e l e c t i o n s s e v e r a l when he was chosen to address a crowd months later favored the western*origathered at the cerernonial reburial of
The Man Behindthe Move-
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ViewfromtheGround Irnre Nagy, at which he made his nowfarnous demand that Russian troops leave his country. As the leader of FiDeSz following the regime change, he piloted the party on a steadycourse to the political right. Elected to the office of Prime Minister in rgg8 at the tender age of thirty-four, OrbAn continued his rightward path from on high. Those who knew Orban were familiar with his overarching goal of solidifying the cleavagesbetween left and right in Hungary's political spectrum-a goal he aimed to achieve whatever the cost. G6bor Demszky Budapest Mayor warned of Orbdn's "conservative, authoritarian tendencies, " and many international observers expressed concern as Orban grew progressively cozier with the nationalist right.I
tried to stay as far away as possible."2 Is it possible that a new model of grassroots participation and civic engagement will evolve from this mobilization? Could the movement actually signify a deepening of Hungary's democratic culture?
ttGo Hungary!tt H''gury's fearless leader entered dangerous territory while campaigning for re-election in April 2oo2, refusing to disassociatehis party from the anti-Sernitic MIEP for fear of losing them as a potential coalition partner. Faced with unexpected defeat in the first round of national elections, Orban made a desperate atternpt to rally support in the two weeks between the election rounds. In this interirn period, he waged a caustic carnpaign against his political "enernies" that shocked many Hungari-
Democracyis composodnotonlyof institutions. but also of beliefs and values. Still, Orbdn surprised onlookers by rapidly mobilizing a broad base of support for his movernent, drawing crowds of all agesat several mass rallies in his reelection campaign in April and May 2oo2. The rnovement's initial energy led some to predict t-hat, despite the antiliberal tendencies of its leader, this cloud might have a silver lining. "This type of mobilization doesn't happen easily in Central Europe, " remarked the director of one Budapest foundation, warning me not to disrniss the movernent as political indoctrination and nationalist appeals. "This is just a big contrast from twelveyears ago when it was not an accepted political value to stand up and be counted," he continued, "when people were wary of politics, and
ans. The core of Orbrin's rhetoric was a dogrnatic insistence that the left should not be considered a plausible political alternative, and that a vote for the Socialists meant a vote for a return to Communism. He assertedthat "the future actually consists of nothing but the past," appealed to Hungarians to "vote for the future," and degraded supporters of the Socialist party as "relics of the past" who lacked nationai pride.3 Ultirnately, his tactics backfired when the nationalist MIEP failed to gain the five percent necessary for representation in parliarnent, leaving FiDeSz unable to form a coalition. After this upset, Vil<tor Orb6n took to the streets to campaign anew, this time advocating that the ruling coalition be removed from power. What gave teeth to
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OrbAn's initiative washis call for groupswhich he likened to dissident cells active during the Communist era-to be formed around the country. Officially, these groups, which he dubbed "civic circles," were meant to bring together people concerned with maintaining an understanding of politics and staying abreast of current issues. Nonetheless, when asked about the concrete goals of the "Go Hungary" rnovement, Or-biin insisted vaguely that the movement was to be a political force capable of "amalgamating ideas, values, and noble objectives."He cited unity, solidarity, and the rnobilization of an "organized hinterland" in preparation for the local elections as the rnovement's most important priorities.4 Orben later focused his attention on protest efforts and calls for Prime M i n i s t e r M e d g y e s s y ' sr e s i g n a t i o n a f t e r the rightist publication Magar Nem<et published proof of the Prirne Minister's past as a counter-intelligence agent during the Kridrir regime.5 This strategy backfired when it was revealed that five of Orbdn's own Cabinet mernbers had been connected to the communist secret police. Medgyessy, adrnitting that he should have been "more unambiguous" about his past, insisted that his duties-guarding H u n g a r y ' s e c o n o m i c s e c r e t sa s a h i g h ranking official in the Ministry of Finance-were in no way crirninal. Most recently, FiDeSz representatives have focused their efforts on asserting that President Ferenc Mddl-as opposed to Prime Minister Medgyessy-should sign the European Union accession treaty, asserting that, because accession is a "national issue" that is "above party interests," the signatory of the accession treaty must "represent the wholecountry."6 Aboue all, this onslaught reveals
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FiDeSz's ongoing campaign to project a false image of the Hungarian state-an image corresponding not to its dernocratic present, but rather to its Communist past. In fact, the objectives of the "civic forces," as Orbdn often refers to his supporters, are actually strikingly undemocratic. Rather than working towards compromise or negotiation, the sole objective of his civic circles has been to destabilize the current g'overnment.
A Civic Initiative? r ,it downat a Iarge table with Anna and her translator, and both wornen silently peruse the sheet of prepared questions I have given to thern. Anna's translator brealcsthe ice by answering my question regarding the goals of the movement. "Our pur-poseis to reflect the lies of the present government, " she says."We want [Orban's] government back...We must force [the current leftist coalition] governrnent to acceptus...to acceptdernocracy,to accept the rules. We don't want anything bloody, or a revolution, or anything out of the frarne of legal means. But our country is divided, and we are being ignored." The discussion picks up as members of Anna's civic circle trickle in for the rneeting. Even though the large round table at which we sit represents a forum for discussing the future of democracy, each response is loaded with history and rooted in the past. The rnost basic concern of those present is that the regime change failed to bring about a genuine transfer of power. It is plain from their comrnents-a deluge of frustration, anger, and vulnerability-that this worry stokes the fire of painful memories. "We are going back to the sarne way it w a s b e f o r e 1 9 5 6 , " s a y so n e m a n , c o m paring the current government with the Communist regime. "There is one par-
ViewfromtheGround ty in this country-that is the Socialist p a r t y . I t i s p r e s s e do n u s . " "We are sick of the system!" another reports. "We are fed up with not being able to make our voices heard. No one even listens. What we are doing here is a civil rights movement. We are citizens of this nation, and things are done over our head. It is necessaryfor us to tell the government what we think they are doing wrong, necessaryfor the world to seewhat is going on. " "But what is the immediotearrn of the movement," I ask, carefully concealing my frustration. It seems that we are dancing aror-,nd the issues, that any reference to concrete grievances is some-
uncertainty, suspicion, and distrust that Orban has manipulated so effectively.
RhetoricversusReality."what makes the Socialists undemocratic, still, now, today?" I ask Tibor, the leader of another civic circle.T He responds, "The leaders grew up during communism; they were faithful to the system. They always think...in undemocratic terms. They don't know what r e a l d e m o c r a c y m e a n s ." "But isn't there more to politics now than either being a patriotic Hungarian or being a cornrnunist stooge?" I persist. "Is the right side the only side that represents the people?" I am atternpting to
it is While communism may begone, surely not forgotten. draw out of him the precise composition how avoided. There is an uneasypause in rny I realize or meaning of "civic forces," which seems that and the conversation, intirnately linled to a politicized version i m p r e s s i o n sa r e a c c u r a t e . "You know, the lcivic circle] leadof national identity or ethnicity. "Leaders of [civic circles] are afraid ers...will have a big conference soon and the national identity will fade as a that responds Anna's details," out the work rnoveresult of these forces," he responds. fact, the translator dismissively. In "What forces?" I ask. ment's only objectives seem to consist of "Communist, Post-communist, socialmobilizing as many supporters as possible and demonizing the current govern- ist, whatever you want to call them." He ment, a pursuit which by all objective waves his hand, indicating his indifference. "You know, the debate goes back to measuresseemsunjustified. So what civil rights are they seeking? rggo. FiDeSz wanted to build a political to finish the history that we had How are they being ignored? What is not tobularasa, at for so long, to end cornworking been If close we pay system? working in this The munisrn... problern is ideas. The attention, it becornes clear that the par[Socialists] never gaveup their Commuticipants are reworking and retelling their painful historT. It is telling that, nist past," he concludes, matter-of-factly, "and national identity must be prewhile Socialists are referred to as "old "the servedat all costs." enemies," particiCommunists" or In reality, the Socialistsfollow a pr-opants call themselves dissidents. Their Europe platform that hardly aspires to words expose the underlying culture of
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when it is so well recognized by politicians like Viktor Orb6n. Democracy is composed not only of institutions, but also of beliefs and values. Thus, when we say that democracy "takes time" to develop, we are really referring to the time it takes for people to accept a new core of assurnptions and values about the state and society in which they live. Many of Hungary's citizens are trying to believe in democracy, Hungary" movernent has been to dispartrying to believe that people and ideas age Orb6n's strategres and rhetoric, but can change. Mktor Orbdn hinders this acceptanceby convincing his supporters to recognize protesters' dernands for accountability. In July 2oo2, Medgyessy that they cannot trust in the present sitannounced that the governrnent would uation, and cannot believe in the dernohundred-day initiate a new prograrn that cratic state they see before their eyes. "History is rnade from within us," would enact measures to rnake the government rnore transParent and preOrb6n assertedin a speechas Prime Minister, cautioning his people of the dangers dictable. Despite theseattempts at reconciliation, Orbrin's movement has been of forgetting past suffering.8 "If we were reluctant to recognize even the basic to know nothing of history, then we would legitimacy of the Socialist governrnent. be like infants-unknowing, and therefore Hungary, like the entire region, has weak and defenseless."He tells thern that confronted formidable development the past is alwayswith them and that letchallenges in the short years since the ting their guard down might mean a regime change. The period of transition return to terror and oppression. "Histobrought both unanticipated economic ry is like an underground river," he says. hardship and a rnyriad of social ills that "If we are ignorant of its nature, it may strained citizens' patience. Now, instead easily wash away our lives. We might again of seeing these "transition pains" as a suffer the pain our forebears have already result of concrete structural and economsuffered, and cornrnit the sins already ic issues, Orb6n's followers trace their committed by those who came before us. " misfortune to the usual suspectsfrom a For the sakeof the nation, he implies, you bygone era: their own stateand its leaders. must preserve your fears and keep up the guard that you have built up over the in Danger?rtwouldbeyears. "Nothing should ever be effaced Democracy from the past," he admonishes. "Every easyfor us to explain awaythe unease of the objectives, policies, or leadership style of the Communist party. After his victory, Prime Minister Medgyessyset out a rnoderate hundred-day plan based on raising the living standard of Hungary's most disadvantaged groups. Notably, he continued a number of the previous government's programs that Orb6n threatened would be stripped away if the Socialistswere elected. The Socialists' response to the "Go
these citizens by telling ourselves that history is simply too close, democracy too young. But "transition pains" are only part of the story. It would be a mistake to think that this fear is without rneaning, to discount the power contained in this collective insecurity
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piece of it is important." Orbiin's message, however unfounded, is clear, the past is the present, and l am your future.
Dissenting Opinions. while orbdn gained a significant base of support at the outset of his movement, his followingwas
ViewfromtheGround by no means universal. As has becorne the operative rule of Hungarian politics, however, those not emphatically "for" argue steadfastly "against." "A large portion of lthose now in poweri glew up in the Kad6r regime, and even had promi-
Ku KIux Klan at the same time," she says.But is it purposeful alienation and neglect that has isolated the civic circles frorn mainstrearn politics, or simply their own refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the governrnent?
It iS Cleaf that what Hungariansreallywantis not new ideas, but new opp6rtunities. nent positions, " asserted one rnan I interwiewed.g "I wiU loan them rny trust, fand accept] that they have changed and are willing to accept democracy. Medgyessywants to serve Hungary, but a large part of society cannot accept democracy." A professor agrees, "There
"What can the civic circles do to work together with the government?" I ask Anna. Her "Ha!" she cries, "That is
the civic forces she represents have been handed a dual stigma, cast into the role of both oppressed and oppressor. "In Hungary, we are the black sheep and the
legacy" of distrust and suspicion inspired by the state'scoercive power, Hungary's governrrrent must ask citizens what they want and need to rise
irnpossible! There is no working; there is no compromise. We can't work with them; we don't want to, it is irnpossible." Momentarily, my eyes corne to rest in is no guarantee that one is good or evil, hers and I can see that any protest or furdepending on whether one [*as] in ot ther questioning will go nowhere. More Party." out of the lCornmunist] accurately,for Anna, any middie-of-theAnother worrran feared that the road argu.ment sirnply has nowhere to go. rnovement's anti-pluralistic n a t u r e Orbdn's effort to "sirnplify" the political would lead to problerns. "The danger is s p e c t r u m i n t o t w o o p p o s i n g c a m p s of the whole [rnovement] losing its rorson where former dissidents are presented as d'â&#x201A;Źtre after elections," she said. "The the right and the forrner Communists as danger is that, if there is only one person the left-Ieaves his followers with an 'the answer' after the elec- unequivocal disgust for their leftist "enewho knows tion, this goes against all that we believe mies" that shows no signs of abating. [should be part of]...a civil society."to " P e o p l e w i l l b e t i r e d , " c o n c l u d e d Visionsof the Future.At theend another academic. "This sort of mass of the day, it is clear that what Hungarm o v e m e n t c a n o n l y s u c c e e di n t i m e s ians really want frorn democracy is not of great crisis...If normal life is going new ideas, but new opportunities. on, if there is no crisis, it is very difSocialism instituted a planned system ficult to [maintail.] "" of governance, run by a closed politiWithin the civic circles, responses cal elite and enforced by the feared a g a i n s t t h e s e c r i t i c i s m s a r e f e r v e n t . s e c r e tp o l i c e , w h i c h a l i e n a t e d H u n g a r Anna is angry at the censure levied ians frorn their state and their counagainst the movement, reporting that trymen. To overcorne the "communist
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above this troubled past. Besides this, the democratic process should empower citizens, enabling and encouraging them to speak and act autonomously. The government must provide its citizens with the tools they need to rebuild their lives and regain trust in society. (Jnfortunateiy, the polarization of social life stimulated by the doomsday rhetoric of politicians like Orban has achieved the opposite. The supposed moral dichotorny cleaving left and right ensures that dialogue clings to party lines, bringing the practical value of Hungarians' newly-won freedorn of expression into This question. predicament has reawakened the culture of cynicisrn and distrust frorn the Communist era. Caught between a troubled past and an uncertain future, citizens of this post-Communist state are obliged to walk an ideological tightrope towards democracy.
The "Go Hungary" movement is neither an anomaly nor a positive sign of civic participation. Rather, it represents a crucial barorneter of the political clirnate in this new democracy. The rnost destructive aspect of this charismatic leader's extended carnpaign against his "enernies" is not what he has changed but what he has ensured wouid remain the same. By unleashing the ghosts of history, Viktor Orbrin has succeeded in rnaintaining the deep divide in Hungarian society, dredging up the culture of distrust, suspicion and dissidence that is the legacy of Hungary's communist past. For those interested in building democracy, the politics in Hungary provide a chilling reminder that, while communism may be gone, it is surely not forgotten.
.drfhor'r Notc: Names have been chmged anonlmity of contributon.
to protect
N O TE S t Peter Finn, "Hungary's Young For West Orb6n Plays HardAnd
'Tiger'
Strong Ally
Makes Enemies," Woh-
ingtonPod, 3o January 2OOo. 2 Interviewwith author, Budapest, Hungary, {-June 2002. Urges Cinc Forces to Prepare lbr 3 "Ex-Premier Local Elections, " Mogor Tduirotilrodo Rt, 16 June 2oo2. 4lbid. g "lnterior Minister Reports on Counter-IntelligenceDocuments," MagorTduiratilrodaRt,2rJune2OO2. 6 "Fidesz Says President Should Sign EU Treaty," BudobedSun,/ November
I t S+ ]
2OO2.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
/ Intewiewwith 2002.
author, Budapest, Hungary, 2gJuly
B Speech made byViktor the House of Terror ruary 2OO2. g Inteniv
Orb6n at the Opening of in Budapest, Hungary on 2,1,Feb-
with author, Budapest, Hungary, 2{ June 2O02. ro Interoiew with autbor, Budapest, Hungary, 2g June 2oo2. r I I n t e w i e w w i t h author, Budapest, Hungary, 2{. June 2oo2.
A I nnk Rack
What MuslimsWant In Afghanistan, andEIseuhere-D emocrog Thornas O. Melia If ever there were a country so devastatedand forlorn that democracy could be considered a luxury-to be pursued only after more rudimentary human needs were rnet-I expected that Afghanistan after the Thliban would be the place. After all, few countries have experienced comparable devastation frorn civil war, foreign invasion, natural disasters, and misrule over a twenty-five year stretch. None seemed more inhospitable to our notions of a rnodern liberal society, considering the gender apartheid that banned education for girls and work by women; medieval punishrnents for religious dissenters and cornrnon criminals alike; the destruction of the giant Buddha statues at Barnian as part of a bizarre campaign to erase from the country every last artistic rendition of the human face; and of course the hospitality shown to Osama bin Laden and his ul Qu"du henchmen. Surely there was more afoot here than a few Thliban zealots run amok. There could well be a broader cultural disinclination for democracy as we know it. Eminent scholars, of cor.rrse,have long explicated the ways in which Islarnic culture generally is not conducive to dernocratic practice, though sorne others have disputed this claim.I The experts had said that democracy ought not to be a high
Thomas O. Melia is an associate at the Institute
for the Study
of Diplomacy adjunct
and
professor
the Georgetown
in Uni-
versity School of Foreign Sewice
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priority of the international comrnunity in Afghanistan. In a widely read paper early in the year, two leading thinkers on strategies at dernocratization the Carnegie Endowrnent for International Peace had argued instead that a modus uiaendihad to be established with the warlords who had made common causew-ith U.S. forces to rout the Thliban. Any
government of Hamid Karzai. While I was confident I could do part of what NDI wanted-record and ampli$ the views of Afghans about Karzai, the king, the Thliban, and reconstruction priorities-I was also prepared to report back that democracy was neither well understood nor in g:reat demand. My findings could have ended up supporting the unappealing
The expeftS had saidthatd.ernocracy ousht not to be a hish priority of the international comrnunity in Alghanidtan. effort to mold the country into a democracy, wrote Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, would be not only "quite irnpossible in Afghanistan today, but fits only the wishes of a small minority of Westernized urban individuals ... very out of touch with their own society."z
conclusion that accommodation with warlords was the only srnart way to move the country forward.
Thg ReSear0h. The absence of reli-
able demographic data after so rnany years of dislocation, death, and destrucSo I went to Kabul last April fully pretion makes it difficult to conduct syspared to disappoint my friends at the t e m a t i c research opinion in National Dernocratic Institute for InterAfghanistan. At least a million people national Affairs, a non-governmental are believed to have been killed since rglg and severalmillion more have been organization devotedto the promotion of democratic institutions and ideas worlduprooted. In addition, hundreds of wide (After more than a dozen years at thousands of refugees were returning NDI, I departed in early 2oOr to join from abroad last spring, which not only Greenberg Qrri.tla.r Rosner Research, affected the composition of the populaInc., an international opinion research tion but also prompted massiveinternal f i r m ) . D e c i s i o n s a b o u t t h e c o u n t r y ' s movernent as returnees reclaimed their future were being made in Washington, former homes and dispersed squatters. Bonn, Brussels,T"ky", and other world Mainly for these reasons, we had already capitals-but ordinary Afghans were not decided to conduct focus groups rather than to attempt a national survey. Focus getting much of a chance to weigh in. Now NDI had askedrne to help bring that pergroups are qualitative, rather than quanspective to light on the eve of the "emertitative; they produce results in words This Loya a rather than numbers, and they do not was version of gency Jirga." the traditional Afghan gathering of elders require a scientific dernographic framework. Conducted and analyzed properbeing convened inJune 2oo2 with Unitly, focus groups yield vital insights into ed Nations assistanceto chart the counfuture and legitimize interim try's the the attitudes of a population.
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A LookBack
Focus GrouPs are structured small group discussions conducted @ a trained moderator to elicit opinions in a deliberately open-ended manner, so tlre researcher can measure intensitv and conviction (or uncertainty) as well as listen to the choice of words used unprompted bv participants to exPress t-heir.views. Focus_grou-ps do not constltute a reprâ&#x201A;Źsentative----or even a random-sample ofpeople
whose views reflect the opinions ofthe larger society. Indeed, participants are often recmited selectively, in order to create homogenous groups, as was the case in this proiect. Focus groups are homogeneous for two reasons, One is to be able to compare the riews of Pafi.icular segments of the population to others. Depending on the purpose of the this ".r."tch, cou-ld be men versus women, youngversus old, employed versus unemployed, or members of diff-erejrt geographic, political, religious or etinic communities. The other reason is to enhance the comfort level of participants by crâ&#x201A;Źating a group thrt is, to the extent practicable, composed of peers. Each person is thus more likely to feel everyone's opinion -r,,.", equally and that there is no need to defer to ot-hers in the group. This encourages frankness and participation.
Another constraint on our research soon became clear: five months after the Thliban had been driven from power, the shooting had still not stopped. Even in Kabul, where the British-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) tried to keep the peace, a rnilitary curfew rernained in effect. Two days after mv arrival at Kabul International Ai.po.t, an overnight mortar attack there oblieed the mightiest military in the *o"lJto divert Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's airplane to Bagram Military Air Base, go kilometers north of the city. In the week I arrived, substantial cash rewards were on offer for "a live foreigner"-presumably by rernnants of al Qaeda or the Taliban. While it was possible to 'W-esterners travel outside Kabul, were advised to do so only with proper safeguards, which were time-consuming and expensive. Security considerations, therefore, as well as limits on tirne and money, obliged us to conduct our research in the greater Kabul area. T h e n c a m e t h e m o r e p e d e s t r i a nc h a l lenges of organizing the project in an environment where virtually no public opinion research had ever been done and where people were still reacquainting themselves with free speech.s We
coached several university professors in proper techniques for recruiting participants, and required that they travel well beyond the outskirts of Kabul in order to find rural residents as well as city folk. Working through translators, I n e x t t r a i n e d s c h o o l t e a c h e r st o b e m o d erators for the groups and familiarized thern with the guidelines that had been developed in consultation with NDI. Each two-hour discussion would be conducted in the mother tongue of the participants-Pashtun, Dari (or the Hazara dialect), Uzbek, or Thjik. Then, as twelve groups were conducted over six days, rny translator and I obseryed discreetly from an adjoining room. More than one hundred men and women, three-fourths of them illiterate (a, ur" rnost Afghans) took part. I was prepared for some participants to be suspicious about who sponsored the research, but it turned out that none of them were concerned. They were simply delighted to be asked their opinions, something no one in authority had yet done in lib] erated Afghanistan.
FindingS. So what did we learn? In addition to noting the unrealistically high expectations about the LoyaJirga's
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SUppOft fOf d dernocraticforrn of g'overnment rs very strong across .Afghanistan's four principal ethnrc cornrrrunrtres. capacity to resolve the country's problerns, we gathered a great deal oftextured information about popular attitudes toward Karzai's governrnent, the international cornrnunity, and previous rulers-and recorded the intense fear and loathing most people shared for the Thliban.a Some of what we learned was not surprising. Pashtuns, for instance, are rnuch fonder of the old king, Zahir Shah (a fellow Pashtun), than are Thjiks and others. Wornen believe the most urgent problem facing the country is the dearth of housing, especially acute with so rnany refugees returning. People were grateful to the U.S. and the UN for driving the Thliban from power, though they were disappointed that promised aid to rebuild the devastated country had been slow to arrive. However, on two major thernes-dernocracy and warlords-what we heard was not consistent with what the experts had led us to anticipate. Support for a democratic forrn of government is very strong across Afghanistan's four principal ethnic communities-the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. Some people, especially illiterate wornen, hesitate to embrace the term "democracy" (mardrm
be held accountable. Afghans are also very keen about their right to free expression, particularly the right to criticize the governrnent without fear of retribution when it fails to deliver. M hauenot studiedat school,but I thtnk democragmeans freedom.(Young,illtter Pashtun ate woman) It meanshauingthe rightto criticizeandto not hauefear. (Middle-aged,high-school Tajikwoman) educated Practical!,of course,democragmeans free elections andfreedomof expresion.It means respecting euegone'srtghts.(ToungHozoro manwitha primag schooleducation)
Afghans also do not believe that there is any incompatibility between Islam and dernocracy; they believe they can and should have both. Indeed, the Koran was cited as authority for the notion that people should choose their rulers and everyone should be treated equally, regardless of their statusor religion. Sorne even note that in a democracy the right to worship in one's own way can be protected-and that this is a good thing. This appears to so/o9r)saying they are not learned enough be at least in part a response to the rule of to discusssuch things. Yet, by and large, the Taliban, whose cruelty and zealotry in A f g h a n s w a n t t h e i r c o u n t r y t o e n j o y uphoiding even the rnost rninor tenets much of what one normally associates convinced many people that not everywith dernocracy. They want to have an thing done in the name of Islam is just or elected government that is responsive to constructive. Whether or not they people's interests. They believe everyone thought so before the Thliban governed, should be equal under the law, and that ordinary Afghans today evince an appreeven high government officials should ciation for at leasta modicum of person-
Ir 5BI
Georgetown Journal
of International
Affairs
A LookBack al space in the practice of one's Islarnic faith. While it is not surprising that this would be the caseamong the beleaguered Hazara rninority, who belong to the Shi'ia tradition in this rnainly Sunni society, the sentirnent is also shared arnongst other ethnic groups as well.
go outsidewith bare bodies.(Toung, highHazaroman) schooleducated In the Wst, a womancandiaorce from her husbandin one minute.Here we stg with our husbanduntil the endof life. Wed.onot want to be like Westernwomen. (Toung, illiterate IJzbekwoman)
The Talibanhada uerypoor understanding of Islam. Insteadof doing thosethingsthat in Islam,thg wereobsessfng are obligations on afeu minor aspects of Islam,and treating themas supreme.(Toung,high-school HaTaraman) educated Somepeoplethinkthatto bein a demouag is to abandonIslam.But that is nottrue. It justmeans2ou hauea choice.Iflou want toprg fue times o da2,1oucan.(llliterate, middle-agedUzbekman) Democrag meansthat a personcan be Islamic.Whenit istimeto sql2our pralers, do that. Andwhenit is timefor relaxing,do that. Yourfoith is2ourown to liue.(llliterate, middle-agedPashtun Man) A t l e a s ta s o f t e n a s w o m e n , m e n c i t e the recent re-opening of schools to girls and of the workplace to women as signal accornplishrnents of Karzai's administration. At the sarne tirne, however, men and women both distinguish between a democracy consistent with their Islamic faith and the array of civil liberties that go with it-all of which they want for themselves-and what they understand to be the "excesses"of Western democracy, which are consistently described in terrns of licentiousness among and with regard to women. I do not like theWestern demouag because it is an extremism and it hasabandoned the middleroad. Wedo not want our sistersto
Democrogmoreorlessmeans Islom.Thg ore notopposite ofeachother.But nottheextreme democragof the Wstern countries ... in the Wst a womancando argtthingshewants,go atywhere.But Islamdoesn'tallow womento do so.(Middle-oged, illiterateTajik man) As for the other thing the experts had led rne to expect-an appreciation for the order established by warlords who had been the West's allies of convenience in the final assault against the Thliban-ordinary Afghans again expressed a different view. Men of all stations are very concerned about the international cornrnunity's failure to disarrn the rnilitias, as many believed was prornised in the Bonn Agreement. Occasional announcernents that arms were being decommissioned were not reassuring. Particularly striking is how rnany people used phases like "gunocracy" (t"forS soloy) or "rule of the cornmander s" (qumandansolcy) as everyday terms that needed no explanation. Karzaihasbegunto rebuilda destroled country. But... therearea lot of warlords dominoiilg in uariousplaces.Illiterote Poshfun farmerfrom Logarprouince) Themostdisappotntingthtng tsthe dominance of the warlord.s and thefact the Mujahaddin are actual! running the country. (Toung, high-xhooleducoted Hozoroman) Thewarlords and the'gun-ocrag' arewlg we
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needto hauethel-ayJirga and thatiswly we are tging in theLola Jirga to makethegouernmenta people'sgooernment.(Middleoged,illiteratelJ<bekman) Y t it turned out not to matter all that much what the people of Afghanistan want, or believe about dernocracy. More than a year after the Taliban were driven from power, and six months after the Loya Jirga ratified Karzai's government, little attention, and virtually no funding, has been devoted by major donors to the establishment of an accountable Afghan government. Sorne warlords have been brought into the Cabinet; others continue to control major cities. Their fiefdorns remain generally intact. Despite repeated pleas from President Karzai, ISAF still patrols only in Kabul, and the U.S. troops in the country focus only on the search for al Q,aeda. While the U.S. has allocated almost $B5o -iltlon to reconstruction and humanitarian relief efforts in Afghanistan, little attention has been paid to the building blocks of democratic government.S In a lengthy review of the Bush Adrninistration's accomplishments in the rehabilitation of mid- October, the Afghanistan in Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Andrew Natsios, sumrned up their dernocratization work: "In the dernocracy and governance area, we were instrumental in providing the logistics systems to transport people who were chosen for the LoyaJirga... we also had the radio station put in place so that ... almost the entire proceedings could be broadcast to the whole country. "6 That's it. Insiders joke the new Kabul-Kandahar highway is the "road to democracy" because$5 r.rillion allocated for democracy work was diverted to this project.
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GeorgetownJournal of Jnternational Affairs
Even when the Bush Administration finally overcame its aversion to "nationbuilding" in Novernber 2OO2, and Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill promised that the President would sign legislation authorizing $2.3 billion for Afghanistan,T dernocracy did not becorne a priority.8
The Wider Debate. Meanwhile, several studies appeared about the attitudes of Muslirns in other countries that seemed to echo rny findings from Afghanistan. New research examined Muslim attitudes frorn the Gulf, the Levant, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former republics of Central Asia. The underlying field research was conducted according to different methodologies. Nevertheless, the congruence of the findings is compelling: across the world, Muslims are as likely as people of other faiths to believe in the virtues of dernocracy as a political systern. They want systerns that respect individual rights and liberties in their own countries, euenu.,hi/e they are often averseto aspectsof Western culture (at least as perceived at a popular level in Islarnic societies). There are rnany obstacles to democracy in the Islamic world, but ordinary Muslim men and women want it as much as people anywhere else. For instance, national surveys in late 2oor in the Central Asian neighbors of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, places yet to experience rnuch democracy, seem to confirm the apt obsewation by Richard Rose that "(")u.^ if a country is ruled autocratically, those ruled may nevertheless hold democratic values."9 In both countries, where substantial Slavic Orthodox communities cohabitate with large Islamic popuiations, 6t percent of adults agree with the statement: Democrag mE haaeitsfaults,but it's betterthan argtotherform
A LookBack 2oo2 also found that the achievement of "civil and personal rights" is consistently the most important political issue overall.Ia While this research did not explore attitudes toward political democracy per se, it established that Muslims' views on important political issuesvary considerably, even as they consistently desire to enjoy universally understood civil liberties-liberties that are best safeguarded in a democratic systern. The most far-ranging and in-depth study looked at data frorn /g nations over six yea.s (r995-2oor), including nine predominantly Muslirn societies and 22 predominantly Christian Western nations. After a rigorous re-examiSimilar findings ernerge in sub-Sahanation of the accurnulated data, Pippa ran Africa, in places with very different Norris and Ronald Inglehart concluded cultural, economic, and political histothat "cornpared with Western societies, ries (including varying degrees of dernosupport for democracy was rnarginally cratic gover.ru.rce). In surveys that com(not weaker) arnong those slightly stronger Muslim and non-Muslirn populapared living in Islarnic societies. This pattern tions living alongside one another in was evident on three indicators: approval polyglot countries-Mali, Nigeria, Tanof the way dernocracy works in practice, zartia, and Uganda-Afrobarometer to support for democratic ideals, as well as researchers asked if democragtspreferable disapproval for the idea of strong govOverall, /r perarg other form ofgouernment. ernment leaders."IS The only gap that cent of Muslims, and J6 percent of nonMuslims, concurred. This led to the emerged, regarding support for reliconclusion that while "adherents of Islam gious authorities playing a role in politics, turned out to be "Iess a cultural in Africa occasionally display distinctive division between the West and Islam than political attitudes, they do not differ much from non-Muslims on the subject it is a gap between the West and many of democracy, and their differences do o t h e r t y p e s o f l e s s s e c u l a r s o c i e t i e s around the globe, especially in subnot always run in an anti-democratic direction."r2 When the Africans were SaharanAfrica and, to a lesser extent, in probed about what they most associate Latin Arnerica."t6 Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations" does in fact with democracy, Muslims cited civil liberties, especially free speech, twice as exist, they wrote-but not on matters relating to political systerns. Consistent often as they mentioned elections.r3 with my findings frorn Afghanistan, A Saudi Arabian-American collaborative effort that surveyed Arabs in eight N o r r i s a n d I n g l e h a r t c o n c l u d e t h a t "there is a substantial cultural cleavage.. . countries (Egypt, Israel,Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and in social beliefs about gender equity and t h e U n i t e d A r a b E m i r a t e s ) i n S p r i n g sexual liberation. "rT
of gouemment.These figrrres do not vary substantially by religion and, as Rose notes, are "much the sarne as in Latin Arnerica, Africa, Thiwan, and Korea, and higher than in the Russian Federation."ro The surveys also suggest that the rnore observant one is in eitherthe Orthodox or Muslirn faiths, the slightly lower lilelihood there is that one would agree democracy is better than any other form of governrnent. Rose concludes that not only is there a clear preference for democracy, but that "the evidence suggeststhat religion and ethnicity rnake less difference to political values than do ... education and economic well-being. "tt
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COnClUSiOn. Emerging amidst news accounts declaring anti-American hostility was rising in many parts of the Islamic wolld, these studies seem to suggest a nuanced approach to America's engagement with the Islamic world, especially on matters of political reform.18 The clear desire of Muslims to live in democracy should thus be viewed separately from their concerns about supposedly lax morals in the West. It should also be distingr.rished frorn opposition to U.S. policies(on Iraq or the P a l e s t i n i a n - l s r a e l ic o n f l i c t ) - i s s u e s o n
which there is more division of opinion than on the more fundamental consensus on the desirability of democracy. It will be difficult to enlarge democracy in Islamic countries, but ordinary rnen and women there hope it will happen. Notwithstanding the wide gulf that exists with regard to international policy and cultural preferences, therefore, it rnay be possible to identi!' common ground between the Islarnic world and the West on the saliency of democracy as a political system-if differences on other planes can be tlut aside.
NO T E S t
Those who
believe Islam and
democracy are
incompatible include Samuel P. Huntington, TheClahof Simon CiuilAotionsond theRemokingofWorld Order (NewYork, and Schuster, t996);
Francis Fukyama. "The Primacy of
"O'Neill. in Afghanistan, / Carlotta Gall, Promises to Push $2.3 Billion Aid Bill,""iVeu lorkTimes, Ig November 2OO2, 2I. 8 Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Plans a Redirection in Afghanistan,"
WoshingtonPo-sl 2o November
Culture," loumal ofDemotag 6, no. r (fanuary tggg): t-r4. The rnost widely cited argument to the contrary is
A(r).
John L. Esposito andJohn O. Voll, IslamondDemooog (NewYork, Oxford University Press, r996). 2 Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, "Rebuilding
9 Richard Rose, "How Muslims Mew Democracy' Evidence from Central Asia,"Journol of DemocraE't3, no. 4 (October 2992), lo5.
Afghanistan:
Fantasy versus Reality,"
Internet,
http,//www. ceip. org/files/Publicatio ns/Otta w a y L i e v e n R e b u i l d A f g h a n . a s p ' . ) f r o m= p u b d a t e ( D a t e
2oo2,
ro lbtd.
rr i6td,ro3. I2
"Islam,
Democrary,
and
Public Opinion
in
a c c e s s e d ,I D e c e m b e r 2 o o 2 ) . 3 The only research into Afghan attitudes conduct-
httpr//w.aflobarometer.org (Date accessed: r December /papers/AfrobriefNo3.pdf
ed during the Taliban years that ] am aware ofwas conducted by my former colleagues at Greenberg Quinlan
ler is a nascent effort to collect time series opinion
Rosner Research, Inc. in the summer of t999, as part of a global project for the International Committee of the Red Cross on attitudes toward the rules of war, report is based on both quantitative and qualitative data. "People including
on
\{ar,
the
Geneva Conventions.
Country
Report
That
Internet, Afghanistan," (Date accessed: I
http,//w.greenbergresearch.com December 2oo2).
4 Read the full report, "Afghan Perspectives on Democracy," Internet, httpt//w.accessdemocracy. o r g / N D I / l i b r a r y , /t 4 t t - a f - r e p o r t - o 5 2 8 o 2 . p d l ( D a t e a c c e r s e d ,I D e c e m b e r 2 o 0 2 ) . 5Wuhinglon Post,2{. November
2o02,
lead editori-
al 6 Andrew
Natsios, "Assessing the U.S.
Record,
Later,"
]nternet,
aei.org/past-event/confo2 http, //m( D a t e a c c e s s e d ,r D e c e m b e r 2 o o 2 ) .
t or 8a. htm
Afghanistan
Ir6z]
One
Year
GeorgetownJournal
of International Affairs
Africa," 2oo2).
Internet,
Based at the Llniversity of Michigan, Afobarome data
o n a c o n s i s t e n t b a s i s a c r o s ss u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a . I t h a s s o far reached only 12 countries, but it does represent the broadest such efibrt underuay at present.
n lbid,3. r{. JamesJ. Zogby. "W}at Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs and Concerns," Internet, http,//m-zogby. c o - ( D u t e a c c e s s e d ,r D e c e m b e r 2 o o 2 ) . I5 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Islam & 'Clash of Ci"ilizations' The s i s , " l n l e r n o t i o n a lJ o u r n o l o f S o c i o l o p ( l o r t h c o m i n g ) . the West' Testing the
Quotations taken from the draft found on P.ofessor Norris's webpage. Internet, http,//ksgnotesr. (Date II-I2 harvard.edu/people/Pippa-Norris, a c c e s s e d ,N o v e m b e r 2 o O 2 ) . 16 Ibid, t2. r7 lbid, 15. rBJane Perlez, "Anger at U.S. Said to Be at New H i g h , " N e u Y o r k T i m e sI,r S e p t e m b e r z o o 2 ,
A(23).