GeorgetownJournal of
International Affairs
IN THIS ISSUE
Pondering Primacy An Interview With
Richard N. Haass
Afghanistan Prospects for the Future
Lakhdar Brahimi
Less is More U.S.-Arab Military Relations
Michael Donovan
SPECIAL: Technology & IR Roundtable
BorabyBoom BabyBust? FORUM CONTRIBUTIONS ON:
UPC Symbol here
HIV/AIDS and Instability in Africa Demographics and Russian Security Population and Power in East Asia
E d m und A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
S u m m e r / Fall 2003 • $ 7.95 u s a
Forum G E O R G E TOWN J O U R NAL O F I N T E R NAT I O N AL AF FAI R S
BorabyBoom BabyBust? Only 35 years ago, in 1968, both the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Population began funding family planning activities. Anyone who thought of a link between population and international affairs at the time focused almost exclusively on rapid population growth. The entry of international organizations and bilateral donors into the field of family planning programs was controversial—many questioned a government role in such a personal and value-laden area. Rapid population growth was a security concern because the Coale-Hoover Growth Model predicted that economic growth would be restricted by rapid increases in population size caused by high fertility and lowering mortality rates. The resulting economic stagnation and decline, in the face of ever increasing demands by a growing population, were seen as a recipe for massive political, economic, and social instability in the developing world. Providing
Introduction CHARLES KEELY
A Corrosive, Not Explosive, Threat: HIV/AIDS, Demographic Change, and Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa DAVID GORDON
Too Few Good Men: The Security Implications of Russian Demographics JULIE DAVANZO, OLGA OLIKER, AND CLIFFORD GRAMMICH
Population, Society, and Power: East Asia’s Future K.S. SEETHARAM
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INTRODUCTION
knowledge and modern contraceptive supplies for family planning appeared to be a realistic remedy for reducing rapid population growth and increasing possibilities for economic growth. The development of population programs (read programs to provide family planning services) has a rocky history. On the international political level, there have been UN Population Conferences every ten years since the first in Rome in 1964. The first conference was basically a scientific meeting of about 600 scientists discussing the global demographic situation. The three subsequent UN meetings in Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo were gatherings of government delegations discussing population policy, still
the one child policy with the conviction that its population growth rates were unsustainable. They announced an unreasonable target of keeping total national population below one billion. Indira Gandhi’s government in India was brought down by what was perceived by many citizens as an over-vigorous sterilization campaign. The United States, once a vigorous supporter of family planning programs and the major donor to them, came to the meeting questioning the correctness of assumptions that population growth was detrimental to economic development. Equally important, however, was the issue of abortion and its role in efforts to control population growth. The U.S. government
The development of population programs
has a rocky history.
with a primary emphasis on reproductive issues. At Bucharest in 1974, many developing countries, along with Communist countries, questioned the usefulness of population programs. Marxists insisted that population growth would not be problematic in a socialist state while developing countries were more focused on the motivation of donors than Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideologies. In the words of the Indian delegate, they proposed that development was the best contraceptive. They saw pills, intrauterine devices, and condoms as cheap substitutes for aid, investment, and access to markets. While many supporters of the family planning movement were shaken, they continued on. Ten years later, there seemed to be an about face by many when governments met in Mexico City. China came to adopt [ 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
announced that it would no longer support organizations that provided abortion information and services—a move that came to be known as “the Mexico City policy.” During this period there were also increasing questions and criticisms raised by women’s health advocates and advocates for women generally. They felt that women bore the brunt of family planning and were treated as ciphers in programs that over-emphasized statistical measures, such as fertility rate targets, family planning adopter targets, and contraceptive prevalence rate targets. The information necessary to make informed choices, the safety and side effects of an array of methods, the balance between maternal mortality and contraceptive targets, all came in for severe questioning. Advocates claimed that the focus
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
needed to be shifted towards reproductive health, including maternal and child health, the education of girls, and women’s access to earning opportunities. By the time the 1994 UN conference was held in Cairo, most governments had adopted the perspectives of activists from the developing world and advocates of women’s rights. The rationale for population control and “traditional” family planning as mechanisms for achieving certain economic goals were widely perceived as too instrumentalist. Meanwhile, there was an increasing sensitivity to the burden placed on women under such population policies. Consequently, there was a general re-conceptualization of “family planning,” with a shift away from target-oriented thinking to a focus on women’s reproductive health and life opportunities. Implicit in this approach to population policy was the presumption that if women were given the appropriate information, a number of safe choices, and the opportunity to take control of their lives through education and access to job opportunities, they would make wise decisions about child bearing and family size themselves. In effect, externalities of individual choices, in an appropriate environment, would obviate the problem of rapid population growth, as prior experience in developing countries showed. This remains the essence of population policy as the possibility of another UN population conference in 2004 or 2005 continues to be discussed. This history of international population policy should provide some perspective for the issues discussed in this issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. For the past several decades, the role of population in international affairs revolved around finding ways of containing what came to be coined the “popula-
tion bomb.” Population and international affairs today, however, means something much, much more and encompasses many more issues than ever before. The fact that some regions of the world are concerned about population aging and decline while others are struggling with population younging and growth is an indication of how far we have come. But, issues such as HIV/AIDS, population and environmental pollution, population and economics, refugee flows, trafficking in people, and internally displaced persons are all deeply embedded on the international agenda today. The fact is that we have moved away from a single-issue approach to population and international affairs toward a much richer analysis of the nexus. This interest in complicated accounts of international affairs is related to the broader prominence given to “soft” issues, such as population, as distinguished from the “hard” concern of balance of power security studies in international affairs scholarship today. The end of the Cold War, and the decreased threat of global nuclear war and the increased salience of state-building and stabilization that came with it, provided space and direction for focusing on other issues. And although 9/11 and the rise of global terrorism may once again marginalize “softer” issues, a sense of perspective and balance is necessary. As the articles in this issue illustrate, the relationship between soft power issues, like population dynamics, and “hard” power concerns is complicated. In some places, like Russia, inattention to changing population patterns may gradually evolve into serious security issues. In many parts of Africa, this has already happened, with changing demographic trends lying at the root of social Summer/Fall 2003 [ 5 ]
INTRODUCTION
and political crises. Meanwhile, other regions confront population problems that are neither debilitating nor likely to foster “real� security threats. Two things are clear: different regions face different population problems of differing gravity, and while these challenges call for various economic, social, and healthcare initiatives, few, if any, are likely to require primarily military solutions. The topics analyzed herein do not exhaust all the important demographic challenges prevalent in international relations. Debates continue to rage among
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demographers and economists about the impact of various population pyramids on healthcare and welfare systems, economic productivity, and the even balance of power as well as about the solutions to these issues. However, while this Forum is not a definitive encyclopedia on population and international affairs, it is an excellent introduction and solid addition to a continuing conversation. Charles B. Keely is Donald G. Herzberg Professor of International Migration and Demography at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
A Corrosive, Not Explosive, Threat HIV/AIDS, Demographic Change, and Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa David Gordon The HIV/AIDS epidemic is profoundly altering the demographic picture of Sub-Saharan Africa in ways that are likely to undermine societal and economic structures at the household and community levels. In the long term, these trends will likely diminish state capacity, and perhaps, stability.1 The disease is reducing population growth rates, shortening life expectancy, skewing age and sex structures, and increasing infant and overall mortality rates throughout the region. It is attacking economically-productive age groups, producing large numbers of orphans, undermining the family structure and the social fabric of local communities, and driving many into poverty. The most affected countries will be threatened by the loss of skilled professionals, the erosion of civil society, the decay in the state’s ability to implement policies, and reduced economic growth; thereby rendering relatively fragile states even weaker. The deterioration in the quality of life could also undermine state legitimacy and contribute to civil violence and political disorder. Development, democratic institution building, and security are likely to be negatively impacted, especially in those states that lack the political will to respond to the crisis. However, these negative projections do not predestine Sub-Saharan Africa to a grim future. The consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic may be mitigated through a combination
David Gordon is Director of the Office of Transnational Issues at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
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of aggressive African leadership initia- enough data to assess the extent of HIV tives, effective partnerships with civil infections. In Angola, where testing is society, and continued global financial restricted to the coastal zones, prevalence support. rates are most likely underreported, as data from surveillance sites in neighborThe Scope of the Epidemic. ing countries close to Angola’s southern AIDS is the leading cause of death in and eastern borders suggest higher infecSub-Saharan Africa, and an overwhelm- tion rates. ing majority of the victims are adults in the most productive age group. Accord- Eroding the Human Resource ing to the United States Census Bureau, Base. Sub-Saharan Africa’s HIV/AIDS 9 percent of the region’s population epidemic is dramatically changing demobetween the ages of 15 and 49 are HIV graphic patterns in affected states. High positive.2 The spread of HIV/AIDS has mortality rates are driving precipitous been most severe in seven southern declines in life expectancy throughout African states—Botswana, Zimbabwe, the region. Lifespans in many states have Zambia, South Africa, Namibia, Swazi- already been reduced by 10 years, and land, and Lesotho—where prevalence they are expected to decline another five rates reach to more than 20 percent years by 2010. Even where prevalence among adult populations.3 Almost all rates have been comparatively low, as in states in Sub-Saharan Africa report Nigeria, significant reductions in life prevalence rates in excess of 5 percent for expectancy—more than six years by their adult populations. The number of 2002—have occurred. AIDS mortality victims continues to rise, and the scope has also reversed the progressive reducof the HIV/AIDS crisis is likely to expand tions in infant mortality rates that considerably if, as experts project, coun- occurred during the 1980s and early tries with relatively large populations like 1990s. The negative impact on child Nigeria and Ethiopia are hit hard in the mortality has been highest among those next wave of infections.4 countries that had significantly reduced The extent of the spread is possibly child mortality due to other causes.5 In even greater than reported. Data con- the absence of progress in preventing straints throughout most of Africa pro- mother-to-child transmission, the child vide an incomplete picture of affected mortality rates in 2010 will continue to populations and their distribution. The be significantly higher with AIDS than capacity of states to record demographic they would have been without AIDS. information is quite limited; South All the countries affected by Africa may be the only country in Sub- HIV/AIDS are experiencing distortions Saharan Africa to have a nearly compre- in their age and sex structures. AIDS hensive registration of deaths. Moreover, mortality generally peaks between the the massive displacement of people and ages of 30 and 34 for women and 40 and the disruption of social and government 44 for men.6 The concentration of AIDS systems in places like the Great Lakes deaths among the adult populations is region—the area encompassing Uganda, reshaping population pyramids. Severely Tanzania, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, affected states can expect a pronounced and Rwanda—make it difficult to collect reduction in the 40-and-older age [ 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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groups; this will decrease the number of old-age dependents in the coming years. Sex ratios are also beginning to be skewed. At the end of 2002, UNAIDS estimated that 58 percent of all HIV infections in Sub-Saharan Africa were among women, and this ratio is continu-
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
regain lost income, which jeopardize their education and future. The loss of primary income earners has resulted in a rapid increase of poor and destitute families in affected regions. In Kenya, one study found that the death of an adult from AIDS caused
Limited state capacity to effectively
combat the crisis places much of the responsibility for dealing with the epidemic at the household and community levels. ing to grow. Increasing evidence suggests that men are looking for even younger female partners. In many rural areas, HIV infection rates are three to five times higher among young women than among their male counterparts. This trend is an especially troubling development in a region where females grow an estimated 70 percent of the food.7
Dealing with the Crisis. Limited state capacity in effectively combating this crisis places much of the responsibility for dealing with the epidemic at the household and community levels. The debilitation and loss of productive agegroup members place additional strain on the household’s ability to survive, as well as on community resources. “As households lose their breadwinners, livelihoods are compromised, and savings are consumed by the cost of health care and funerals,” their capacity to produce and purchase food will be greatly diminished.8 The burden of care, subsistence, and income generation falls frequently on children and the aged. Children are often removed from school to take care of ill family members or
household income to fall 68 percent in rural areas and between 47 and 66 percent in urban areas.9 Africa’s already fragile agricultural sector is particularly at risk. Two-thirds of the populations in the 25 most affected African countries live in rural areas, where agriculture is the primary source of household income and subsistence. An estimated 7 million farmers have died of the disease since 1987, thereby slashing the region’s capacity for food production and hampering the transfer of farming knowledge from generation to generation.10 The growing number of AIDS orphans poses a particular challenge. By 2010, 20 million African children are likely to have lost one or both parents to AIDS. Extended family frequently take on the burden of caring for these orphans, but “as the number of orphans grows and the number of potential caregivers shrinks traditional coping mechanisms are stretched to the breaking point.”11 Moreover, the large numbers of uneducated, unemployed, and poorly socialized youth place an additional burden on the community. These youth populations increase the potential for Summer/Fall 2003 [ 9 ]
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violence and crime, especially in areas where urbanization and migration weaken traditional structures, and in conflict zones where they may be recruited as fighters. Few countries have mechanisms in place to provide the needed social support for children who are orphaned or made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS. Consequently, many look primarily to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).12 Formal and informal local organizations are being stretched to the breaking point by the loss of key personnel and increased demands from the growing HIV/AIDS crisis. The epidemic is claiming great numbers of teachers, doctors, community leaders, and others who form the backbone of civil society, the national health sector, and education systems. In Zambia, teachers have been dying faster than new ones can be trained.13
Weak States Become Weaker? The effects of the epidemic on state capacity are less clear than the repercussions on the household and local communities. However, evidence suggests that it will probably be increasingly difficult for states to effectively implement the policies and maintain the legitimacy necessary to cope with the wide-ranging impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Weak states are likely to become even weaker as the progression of the disease and limited capacity of the state reinforce one another. Most Sub-Saharan African countries already suffer from ineffective governments and lack the infrastructure and human resources necessary to effectively address health and social problems associated with the disease. Governance measures indicate that 34 of the 47 countries in the region either stagnated at a relatively low level or became significantly worse during the period of 1997–98 to [ 1 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
2000–1.14 A recent UNAIDS report cites limited financial and human resources as an impediment in the implementation of multi-sector strategies to fight the disease, noting particularly the constraint posed by the limited capacity of the nonhealth sectors.15 The ability of the government to effectively implement policies and provide services is likely to decline as the epidemic deepens and revenues are lost, resources are diverted, and more of the region’s relatively small group of trained and experienced elites, bureaucrats, professionals, and skilled government workers are infected or drawn away to care for the sick. Determining the extent of the impact on government effectiveness, however, is difficult. HIV/AIDS is but one of many variables that affect a state’s performance. Efforts to measure a reduction in effective governance are made more difficult by the time lag between HIV infection, full-blown AIDS, and death; the lack of accurate reporting on vital statistics in the region; and the supporting role performed by many churches and mosques, NGOs, and other groups. These factors can often mask the deteriorating state performance. One of the most visible and early signs of decline in state performance occurs in the security sector. HIV prevalence is considerably higher among some SubSaharan African militaries than among their civilian counterparts. This occurs because of their age and sex structures, mobility, frequent absences from families, and tendencies toward risky lifestyles. “Ministries of Defense of some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa report HIV prevalence averages of 20 to 40 percent in countries among their armed services and rates as high as 50 to 60 percent where HIV/AIDS has been present for more
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than a decade,” according to UNAIDS.16 No direct correlation between high HIV prevalence in military forces and performance in battle has been established. However, the generally high rates of infection, particularly among hard-toreplace officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers with specialized skills, may diminish the combat readiness and capability of military forces, thereby increasing the risk of instability. The implications for security go beyond the state level. The effects of high HIV prevalence are also likely to negatively impact international and regional peacekeeping operations, as recruitment of forces becomes more difficult, military effectiveness is reduced, and soldiers become vectors for the further spread of
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
ulations. A recent global study of public attitudes, conducted by The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, indicates that AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming a significant concern. “AIDS and disease” was identified as the most important of national problems by respondents in eight of the ten SubSaharan African countries surveyed.20 Although HIV/AIDS to date has only become a “hot button” political issue in South Africa, it is fast moving onto the public agenda in a number of Sub-Saharan African states, including virtually all of the highly affected southern African states. The inability of the leadership of these countries to curtail the spread of the disease could in time translate into a political liability.21 Indeed, in a survey
Countries will be threatened by the loss of
skilled professionals, the erosion of civil society, and reduced economic growth—thereby rendering relatively weak states even weaker. HIV.17 Infections and deaths among police forces have also been high. McPherson reports that approximately 75 percent of the deaths in the Kenyan police force can be traced to HIV/AIDS,18 while in South Africa an estimated 25 percent of police forces are now infected, according to Price-Smith.19 State legitimacy is often measured by the degree to which a government pursues policies supported by their populace, or –particularly in non-democratic countries—how well they meet the general custodial needs of their population. The legitimacy of states is likely to erode with their failure to address important issues or provide necessary services to their pop-
taken in seven southern African countries with prevalence rates of over 20 percent, respondents in the most democratic states—South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia—placed HIV/AIDS among the top three most important problems facing the country.22 Opposition parties, unions, and civil society in South Africa are becoming increasingly strident in their call for government action, especially with regards to the provision of anti-retroviral therapy for HIV-positive pregnant women.23 HIV/AIDS is also affecting economic growth and development. The loss of personnel, productivity, consumers, and investors is reducing the profitability of Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 1]
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The roughly 10-year-long progression of the disease allows for time in which interventions can mitigate its impact. African businesses. Although difficult to measure, studies have attempted to estimate the macroeconomic impact in countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa where the epidemic is most serious, and found probable reductions in GDP growth rate between 0.5 and 2.6 percent per year.24 Experts at the World Bank and Harvard University have projected that GDP declines are triggered at 5 percent and 15 percent prevalence rates. At 5 percent HIV/AIDS prevalence, the economic effect remains minor; however, at 15 percent, it rises to a level equaling losses to GDP of more than 1 percent per year. While this trend may not be significant in any given year, it can equate to a tremendous loss over a 10 to 15 year span.25 Rising HIV/AIDS rates are also likely to reduce foreign investment and place additional costs on companies already operating in the country. Potentially one of the most alarming consequences for Africa’s future is the negative impact from the high prevalence rates in southern Africa, a region with relatively well-developed infrastructure that has been considered a “growth pole” for the wider continent. Infection rates have also been high in other “growth pole” states, such as Kenya and Ivory Coast, with relatively dense transportation infrastructures and higher levels of economic activity that attract migrant populations.
potential for political instability and slow democratic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The crisis is exacerbating conditions that breed violence and conflict, poverty, the breakdown of traditional social structures, economic underdevelopment, and the struggle for power and resources. The decaying quality of life may contribute to the loss of state legitimacy and foster vulnerability to serious political crises. A CIA-sponsored task force on political instability has investigated the causes of state instability in 138 cases over a 46-year period that ended in 2001.26 Its findings suggest that the level of infant mortality, which is rising as a result of the HIV/AIDS crisis, is a good indicator of the overall quality of life. High levels of infant morality strongly correlate with an elevated degree of political instability. High infant mortality has a particularly strong linkage with the likelihood of state failure in partial democracies, which now account for more than a third of the governments in Sub-Saharan Africa.27 Furthermore, the disease is likely to exacerbate income inequalities in ways that could promote criminal activity and—as in South Africa where these inequalities largely mirror racial lines— inter-group hostilities.28 The severe social and economic impacts and tolls of HIV/AIDS on the political and military elites and middle classes of African countries are likely to intensify the struggle for political power Increasing Vulnerability to and for control of scarce state resources Instability. In the long term, the as well. This ensuing internal struggle HIV/AIDS crisis is likely to increase the will hamper the strengthening of strong
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Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
civil society and other essential under- recognized as providing potential for pinnings of democracy. This will increase reducing new infections, such as sexually pressure on nascent democracies in the transmitted disease (STD) control, volregion by adding to economic misery and untary counseling and testing (VTC), political polarization.29 mother-to-child transmission prevention (MTCTP), and antiretroviral drugs Stemming the Spread. The rough- (ART). One recent study, which modly 10-year-long progression of the dis- eled the impact of interventions in ease—from HIV infection to full-blown averting new HIV infections, suggests AIDS to death—allows for time in which that between July 2002 and June 2015 interventions can mitigate the impacts of prevention-only interventions (STD, the disease. With an estimated 90 percent VCT, and MTCTP) could avert 1.5 milof Sub-Saharan Africans still HIV/AIDS lion new cases of HIV in South Africa free, however, it is hardly surprising that alone.31 In addition to aiding in the much attention will be focused on halting reduction of new HIV infections, ART the spread of the disease through pro- programs are likely to reduce the numgrams geared to prevent new infections. ber of maternal orphans under the age The Ugandan experience in driving down of 18 too, by extending the lives of HIV the country’s adult infection rate from 12 positive parents. percent in 1995 to 5 percent in 2001 sugThe absence of political will, the gests a complex set of epidemiological, paucity of strong leadership, and poor socio-cultural, political, and institutional state capacity are major constraints in the elements that are likely to play important now two-decade-long fight against the roles in checking the disease. Although epidemic. These problems must be overspecific HIV/AIDS strategies will differ come, if the battle against HIV/AIDS is from country to country, elements of the to be won. Strong leadership is imporUgandan policies are likely to be effective tant for the commitment of resources in many national contexts. These concen- and to help to remove the stigma attached trate on approaches such as: high-level to HIV/AIDS, which has impeded prepolitical support; a multi-sector vention and treatment. The bold leaderresponse; decentralized planning inter- ship of Uganda’s President Museveni was ventions that address women, youth, stig- a driving force in that country’s aggresma, and discrimination; implementation sive response to the disease. “The counof culturally appropriate communication try’s HIV/AIDS problem remains signifon behavior change; active involvement of icant, but Museveni has had success in his religious leaders and faith-based organi- relentless campaign to change behavior zations; voluntary counseling and testing; by urging people not to have sex with emphasis on sexually transmitted infec- multiple partners, publicly acknowledgtion (STI) control and prevention pro- ing the threat posed by AIDS, de-stigmagrams; and a decrease in multiple sexual tizing the disease, and decentralizing partnerships and networks.30 HIV education programs down to the vilPredicting the epidemiological and lage level.”32 The government in Senegal, demographic impacts of various inter- which has also been engaged in an ventions is difficult. However, several HIV/AIDS program since 1986, is credprevention and treatment programs are ited with limiting the spread of the disSummer/Fall 2003 [ 1 3 ]
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ease in that country. The infant mortality rate in Senegal is among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even strong leadership cannot ensure the effective implementation of a program if the state lacks institutional and bureaucratic capacities. Working to alleviate these shortcomings through initiatives designed to develop leadership and support capacity building could be an important first step toward facilitating the development and implementation of effective strategies and programs. Part of the success of Uganda and Senegal can be attributed to both their governments’ capacities to coordinate NGO efforts and resources.33 Efforts to develop civil society are also essential. Researchers such as Alan Whiteside have also noted the importance of civil society in combating the disease. Civil society, although fragile, has played an active role in the political and economic advances in a substantial number of African countries in the last 10 to 15 years.34 Halting negative demographic and epidemiological trends will require a
multifaceted approach that addresses the constraints impeding effective implementation of prevention, treatment, and care. The international community and affected governments face overwhelming pressures to finance treatment, prevention, and care, including the costly efforts to find an effective vaccine. They will be challenged to ensure that adequate attention is also focused on removing some of the longstanding obstacles to the effective realization of prevention and treatment programs. Efforts to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic will necessarily require substantial resources from the international community. With President Bush’s commitment of additional resources promised in his January 2003 State of the Union speech, the outlook on global funding for HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention is more positive than ever before. Author’s Note: All statements, opinions, policies, and positions expressed herein are solely those of the author. They have not been approved by and are not necessarily reflective of the policy or position of the author’s employer.
N OT E S
1 State capacity, also known as governance, involves a state’s performance—the ability to implement policies effectively—and its legitimacy—the ability to justify itself and its policies to its people. 2 Karen A. Stanecki, “The AIDS Pandemic in the 21st Century,” U.S. Census Bureau, draft report for the XIV International Conference on AIDS, Barcelona, Spain, July 2002. 3 The spread of the disease in the southern African region was facilitated by the relatively welldeveloped transportation and economic infrastructure and high population mobility. The ability of the southern African state bureaucracies and health systems to record vital statistics is better than in many Sub-Saharan African states—producing perhaps a more accurate picture of the extent of the disease in these countries than is true in countries with less effective states. 4 National Intelligence Council, “The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China,” September 2002. 5 Child mortality refers to deaths of children less
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than 5 years of age; infant mortality captures the number of deaths for children 1 year and under per 1,000 live births. 6 Stanecki, U.S. Census Bureau, 4–5. 7 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, “Rural women carry family sorrows and burdens,” Internet, http://www.fao.org/focus/e/aids/old/ women-e, 1997. 8 UNAIDS Fact Sheet, “The Impact of HIV/AIDS,” July 2002, 1. 9 C. Leighton, “The Direct and Indirect Costs of HIV/AIDS,” in S. Forsythe and B. Rau, eds., AIDS in Kenya (Arlington, VA: Family Health International, 1996). 10 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, “HIV/AIDS: a rural issue,” Internet, http://www.fao.org/focus/e/aids/aid1-e, June 2001, 1. 11 UNAIDS, “Waking up to devastation: Report on the Global HIV/AIDS epidemic,” June 2000, 27. 12 Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS, “Supplement to UNAIDS Regional Profiles: State of the Epidemic,” Internet, http://www.unaids.org/UNGASS/
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docs/UNAIDScompanion_0103_en.doc, 2002, 4. 13 Alan Whiteside, “HIV/AIDS, Health, and Education,” State of the Art: AIDS and Economics, prepared for International AIDS Economic Network’s Economics of HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries Symposium, Barcelona, Spain, June 2002, 27. 14 Based on Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, “The New Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset, 1997/98 and 2000/1,” World Bank Institute, 2001. 15 Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS, “Supplement to UNAIDS Regional Profiles,” 2. 16 UNAIDS Fact Sheet, “AIDS as a Security Issue,” July 2002, 2. 17 National Intelligence Council, “The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States,” January 2000, 33. 18 Malcolm F. McPherson, “Macroeconomic Models of the Impact of HIV/AIDS,” draft paper, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 2003, 6. 19 Andrew Price-Smith, “Pretoria’s Shadow: The HIV/AIDS Pandemic and National Security in South Africa,” Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Special Report 4 (2002), 24. 20 The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “What the World Thinks in 2002,” The Pew Global Attitudes Project. 21 Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: Reconciling U.S. National Security and Public Health Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 7. 22 Alan Whiteside et al., “Examining HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa through the eyes of ordinary Southern Africans,” Center for Social Science Research Working Paper No. 11, University of Cape Town, 2002. 23 Price-Smith, “Pretoria’s Shadow,” 26. 24 Robert Greener, “AIDS and Macroeconomic Impact,” State of the Art: AIDS and Economics, prepared for International AIDS Economic Network’s Economics
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of HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries Symposium, Barcelona, Spain, June 2002. 25 David Gordon, “Plague Upon Plague: AIDS & Violent Conflict in Africa,” United States Institute of Peace, 15. 26 Science Applications International Corporation, “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings,” forthcoming. 27 Based on the Polity IV dataset, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Internet, http://cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity, University of Maryland, 2002. The level of democracy for each country and year is assigned using a scale developed by Ted Robert Gurr that ranks states according to their procedures for open, competitive, participatory politics. 28 Price-Smith, 10. 29 National Intelligence Council, “The Global Infectious Disease Threat,” 32. 30 U.S. Agency for International Development, “What Happened in Uganda? Declining HIV Prevalence, Behavior Change, and the National Response,” September 2002. 31 Johnson and Dorrington in “The Cost and Benefits of Preventing and Treating HIV/AIDS,” a Treatment Action Campaign Fact Sheet, Internet, http://www.tac.org.za, February 2003, 3. In addition to averting mother-to-child transmissions, MTCPT programs include a voluntary counseling and testing component that can also significantly reduce the number of new infections among adults. 32 National Intelligence Council, “The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS,” 17. 33 United Nations Development Programme, “HIV/AIDS—A Government Challenge,” Bureau for Development Policy, Special Initiative on HIV/AIDS, July 2001, 1. 34 Alan Whiteside, “The Threat of HIV/AIDS to Democracy and Governance,” briefing prepared for USAID, 1999. Also see Gordon, “Plague Upon Plague,” 14.
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Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
Too Few Good Men The Security Implications of Russian Demographics Julie DaVanzo, Olga Oliker, and Clifford Grammich From the days of the Russian Empire until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sheer size and population of the territory governed from Moscow helped to guarantee its place among the world’s great powers. The U.S.S.R. was not only physically larger than any other country in the world, but it was also the third most populous for most of its history, behind only China and India. Such circumstances fed a legacy of Soviet gigantism and widespread views that a large population contributed to military strength. Times have changed. While the Russian Federation is physically still the largest state in the world, it is only the seventh most populous nation, trailing China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, and Pakistan. Moreover, recent and projected population losses caused by a number of deaths nearly double that of births will push Russia further down the ranks of the most populous nations. In the past decade alone, the Russian population has decreased by three million; over the next ten years, it is projected to decrease by another three million. By 2020, Bangladesh and Nigeria are projected to surpass Russia in population; by 2040, should current projections prove accurate, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mexico, and the Philippines will do so as well.1 Russia’s options for maintaining its security and stability are limited by its demographic circumstances.2 Russia is not the
Julie DaVanzo directs the Population Matters program at RAND and is a coauthor of Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation. Olga Oliker, a defense policy analyst at RAND, is the author of Russia’s Chechen Wars: Lessons from Urban Combat and the co-author of Assessing Russia’s Decline: Implications for the USAF. Clifford Grammich is a member of the RAND Research Communications Group and co-author of Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation.
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Table 1: Estimated and Projected Populations for the 15 Most Populous Nations in 2003, 2020, and 2040. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html (as of April 19, 2003).
only country to confront these problems, but it has fewer alternatives for mitigating the negative effects of population loss than do wealthier states. At the same time, Russia’s role in the world, its nuclear arsenal, and its geostrategic location make its security a concern beyond its borders, particularly in this age of interrelated transnational threats, such as organized crime, proliferation, terrorism, and trafficking in people and illegal materials.3
1987, the annual number of births fell to 1.4 million in 1993 and is now about 1.3 million. The annual number of deaths has generally been increasing since 1960, and is now about 2.3 million. The annual number of deaths has exceeded the annual number of births since 1992, resulting in cumulative natural population losses since then of nearly 9 million persons, although, as we will see, these losses have been somewhat offset by immigration.4 Ominous Numbers. At the core of The full impact of these staggering Russian population losses are a declining losses has yet to be felt. The difficulties of number of births and a rising number of supporting an aging population will be deaths. After peaking at 2.5 million in especially problematic for Russia in the [ 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
DAVAN Z O, O LI K E R, & G RAM M I C H
coming years. The pension-age population in Russia (males at least 60 years of age and females at least age 55) is currently about 30 million and is projected to grow to 37.4 million by the year 2020, or from 21 to 27 percent of the population. This aging population will be increasingly more difficult for the working-age population (males 15 to 59 and females 15 to 54) to support since the working-age population is projected to decrease from 91.4 million to 77.9 million, or from 63 to 56 percent of the population by 2020. Russian public health is another cause for concern. Between 1992 and 1994, Russian life expectancy fell more than two and a half years for females and nearly four and a half years for males. Neither has yet to recover completely. In 2001, Russian female life expectancy at birth was 72.3 years, while that for males was only 59.0.5 This difference—more than 13 years—is one of the largest in the world.6 Male life expectancy in Russia in 2001 was lower than that in Bangladesh (61.9), Egypt (65.3), Guatemala (63.6), Indonesia (64.4), the Philippines (64.2), and Vietnam (66.9), among others. Among males 15 to 64 years of age, mortality has been increasing since the mid-1960s, or well before the fall of the Soviet Union (Figure 1). While there have been some fluctuations coinciding with social and economic conditions (e.g., increased mortality in times of economic decline, decreased mortality coinciding with an anti-alcohol campaign in the mid-1980s), current mortality is not much different from what might be predicted from a long-term trend line (indicated by dotted line in Figure 1).7 Much of the increase in Russian mortality stems from the inability of the health system to control diseases prevalent in the
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
West, such as cancer, cardiovascular disease, and those stemming from alcohol and tobacco use. The most recent data show that the amount spent on health care for each Russian is only 3 percent the amount spent on health care for each American, while Russian working-age male mortality from external causes, many of which are related to alcohol use, is nearly eight times the U.S. rate, and that from circulatory and respiratory disease is nearly four times the U.S. one.8 Declining educational standards may aggravate the public health situation, given survey findings on the salutary effects of education on health (independent of the effects of income on health).9 More generally, the effects of declining education may also be felt for years to come. Since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Russia’s schools have suffered from chronic under-funding, causing large wage arrears for teachers and leading fewer workers to enter or remain in the field of education.10
Who Will Serve? An important and illustrative implication of these demographic changes is their impact on the Russian military. Whether Russia maintains a predominantly conscript military or moves to a volunteer force over the coming decades, its armed forces will continue to rely on youth—but demographic trends suggest a dearth of desirable soldiers in the future. The 15-to-24-year-old population in Russia—the population in or near military age—has actually grown since 1991, primarily due to a large number of births during the 1980s. This boom resulted in part from the many babies born in the late 1950s and early 1960s, who reached their childbearing years in the 1980s. It was also a result of pro-natal incentives that Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 9 ]
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Figure 1: Mortality Rates by Sex for Russians 15 to 64 Years of Age, 1965 to 2000. Sources: France Mesl , Vladimir M. Shkolnikov, V ronique Hertrich, and Jacques Vallin, Tendances r centes de la mortalit par cause en Russie 1965-1994, and electronic data diskettes (Moscow: Centre de D mographie et d’ cologie Humaine, 1996). World Health Organization Mortality Database, http://www3.who.int/whosis/mort/table1.cfm?path=whosis,mort,mort_table1&language=english (as of April 2, 2002).
included extended maternity leave and benefits for families with three or more children. While such policies boosted fertility rates temporarily, they were not enough to reverse the broader declining trend. As the number of births has fallen by about half in the past fifteen years, so the number of 15-to-24 year-old persons is expected to decrease by nearly half in the next fifteen years, or from 23.7 million to 13.5 million in 2018.11 Even with the current, temporarily high number of persons in or near military ages, the Russian military is facing problems filling its ranks. Not only is reporting for conscription call-ups low, but, by some accounts, large numbers of [ 2 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Russian draftees are deemed unfit for service because of poor health.12 For example, a Russian Defense Ministry official stated recently that not only are 31 percent of young men of conscription age unfit for service, but that 30 percent of the privates who do serve are subsequently placed under medical supervision—often due to being underweight.13 Members of the Russian military face many of the same health problems afflicting the general population. Comparing the mortality of Russian military-age males with that of militaryage males in the United States illustrates the health problems of Russia’s youth. In 1999, Russian males 15 to 24 years of age
DAVAN Z O, O LI K ER , & G RA M M I C H
had a rate of death (322 per 100,000) nearly three times that of U.S. males (116 per 100,000) of a similar age. Russian young male adult mortality is growing as well, nearly doubling in the 1990s (from 209 per 100,000 in 1990 to 351 in 2000). Russian young male mortality rates (Figure 2) are particularly high for infectious and parasitic diseases (the rate of death is nine times that for U.S. males 15 to 24), circulatory and respiratory diseases (four times the comparable U.S. rate), and external causes (e.g., accidents, homicide, and suicide—nearly three times the comparable U.S. rate).14 Contributing to the potential problem in the supply of soldiers is the reported ability of many Russian youths to avoid military service through bribing others to have their health declared too poor for
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
service. Those that cannot afford bribes or other mechanisms tend to be from the strata of society with less access to medical care—and thus in poorer health. Russian officials have also expressed concern about the deteriorating education of those whom they are able to muster into the military.15 Aside from the student deferments that traditionally allow those pursuing higher education to avoid the draft, those who can afford to supplement their public education with private tutoring or schools are also those who can afford to pay the bribes to keep their sons out of military service—leaving the military to choose from a less welleducated remainder.
What Is To Be Done. Immigration has somewhat helped allay Russian pop-
Figure 2: Rates of Death by Cause for Males 15 to 24 Years of Age in Russia and the United States, 1999. Source: France Mesl , World Health Organization Mortality Database, http://www3.who.int/whosis/mort/table1.cfm?path=whosis,mort,mort_table1&language=english (as of April 18, 2003).
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ulation losses. In 1994, for example, Russia had a natural population loss of about 870 thousand but net immigration that year of more than 810 thousand helped to limit the total population loss to less than 60 thousand.16 Conceivably, immigration could serve as a source of Russian population growth, but it is not clear whether Russia can attract the level of immigration needed to sustain its current population size. Historically, Russia has not been a destination for immigrants—before 1975, emigrants from the territory now comprising Russia exceeded immigrants by about 100 thousand per year—and in recent years annual net immigration has decreased to less than 75 thousand.17 By contrast, according to one estimate, Russia would have to attract more than a half million immigrants annually (or more than it
senior personnel. Russian women have a long history of military success, including as fighter pilots in World War II. They also appear as willing as men to fight for their country if necessary.21 Nevertheless, attitudes towards women in the military remain hostile in many ways. Women are a minute percentage of the officer class, and they are banned from a variety of roles, including, reportedly, senior ranks in the navy.22 A greater reliance on female military personnel would require significant cultural changes that will not occur quickly. Yet another option would be for Russia to make do with a smaller military, one that its shrinking population can better support. There are strong military and strategic arguments to be made that the Russian military force size is too large for its needs and its capacity, and should
Russia is likely to have an increasingly ineffective and inefficient military force. has admitted in nearly every year of its history) in order to maintain its current population size.18 Immigration could also raise new security concerns, particularly if that by non-ethnic Russians, which has been growing as a percent of all immigration, were to increase in total numbers as well.19 Alternatively, Russia could rely on more female soldiers. Currently, women are not subject to conscription in Russia, but they do constitute a growing proportion of contract soldiers. In March 2001, an estimated 100,000 women were serving in the Russian armed forces.20 Female enlisted personnel tend to serve longer than their male counterparts and are often deemed more reliable workers by [ 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
be downsized regardless of the numbers of young men available to it.23 Smaller, better-trained forces can in some circumstances be even more effective than larger forces, but would require greater capital and technology. Many European states have experienced declines in their military-age populations, but have mitigated this loss by investing more in capital and technology, both alone and in concert with allies. Even though security, demographics, and economics all argue for a smaller force, attaining that goal poses considerable challenges for Russia, which lacks the resources and alliances that could help it finance a substitution of capital and technology for troops. While it has
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plans to reduce its force to about threefourths its current size, and to better equip and train this smaller force, implementation of these plans has lagged (see “The False Dawn of Russian Military Reform” in this issue). There is broad opposition within the military establishment to any true reform, and little money in Russia’s budget to support it. Although the Russian military has already reduced its size considerably, it has done so without the comprehensive restructuring needed for greater effectiveness. Rather, the reduction has, to a large extent, been one of becoming an ever-smaller, everless-capable, ever-deteriorating shadow of the old Soviet force. This is in large part because, while reform would be cost-effective in the long term, it is expensive in the short term. The resulting dilemma means that Russia is likely to have an increasingly ineffective and inefficient force. Russia’s recent economic growth may lead to some improvement in this situation, providing more funding for capital investments that can support a smaller military. In order to effect real investment in the military, however, this growth must not only be sustained over the long term, but it must also be allocated to the military budget. To date, this does not appear to be happening. Even if Russia were to begin significant investment in its military infrastructure, it would take years, maybe even decades, for these investments to improve the capacity of its fighting forces. Meeting critical demands for health and social services could also constrain the funds available for defense. Even in the best scenario, Russia could find itself in a race between demographic decline and economic investment, hoping that no real security
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
threats emerge before it can build a more capable force.
Further Security Implications. The problems of the military are illustrative of the broader security challenges that Russian demographic trends present—which extend far beyond the capacity of its military to maintain a credible and capable force. A shrinking workforce with declining health and educational standards bodes ill for Russian economic growth. Moreover, Russia today faces a wide range of threats, and the military is a possible solution to only a few of them. Transnational threats, such as drugs, crime, terrorism, human smuggling, and proliferation, are of global concern, but most of the states of the former Soviet Union, Russia included, have particular reasons to be worried. These states face these problems on a regular basis, as areas of operation for criminal groups, as possible sources of materials and human beings for illegal transport, and as routes for the transit of those people and materials. The very existence of the former Soviet states is threatened by the rising impact of these problems on economies and politics. Russia and its neighbors appear to recognize these emerging threats. Reportedly, Russia is cooperating with other post-Soviet states, as well as the European Union, to combat transnational terror and crime. The effectiveness of its measures, however, is questionable. Russian border controls and police along the nearly 20,000 kilometers of land borders (the longest border of any country in the world), much passing through sparsely populated areas, are weak, and reports of corruption are common.24 The demographic trends that will hinder the military in staffing its ranks are also Summer/Fall 2003 [ 2 3 ]
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likely to hinder police forces, border guards, and other services and organizations that must combat transnational and domestic threats. At the same time, weakening health and education sectors may make Russian youth more prone to the use of illegal narcotics, further feeding a growing HIV/AIDS crisis, and increasing the work of agencies that combat such trends—while further decimating the ranks of those who might staff such agencies.25 The result could be a cycle of decline that makes Russia dangerous not only to itself, but also to its neighbors and others around the world. Its failure to police crime, drugs, terror, and the weapons trade on its own territory will lead to the movement of these problems elsewhere. This is particularly critical given Russia’s nuclear capabilities and proximity to other states that have the potential to pose proliferation concerns. Further decline in police, border guards, and other internal security sectors could therefore be even more hazardous than that in the military. Unfortunately, Russian capacity for reform in these areas is also constrained. Little has been done to reform powerful internal security organs; in fact, these security services have gained influence during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Perhaps Putin’s presidency will mean greater central control and effectiveness for these organs. Absent reform of their structures and greater transparency, however, it is also possible that the continued strengthening of these groups will bring with it its own dangers, those of an increasingly authoritarian and secretive system.
Beyond the obvious danger they pose for Russia in defending its huge landmass, demographic trends may adversely affect Russia’s ability to respond to the rise and spread of transnational threats within and across its territory. This threatens the security of not just Russia’s neighbors, but of the entire global community. Moreover, this is a problem that goes far beyond whether or not capital improvements and modernization efforts in the Russian military keep pace with personnel reduction or not. Russia on its own can do little. While traditional security threats may be deterred through greater capital investment or increased reliance on weapons of mass destruction, transnational threats require not only a broader strategy within Russia, but also comprehensive cooperation with neighbors and others around the world. Such threats are not limited to one country, and neither can the response be. Russia, facing the pressure of its demographic challenges in coming years, will be particularly vulnerable. This means that the rest of us will as well. Russia will need assistance in the short term with responding to a range of transnational threats. It is in the interests of the United States and European states to cooperate with Russia in defining and implementing responses, as is already being done on export control and border integrity issues. Given the effects of health and education on Russian security and vulnerability, aid programs should be given priority for both humanitarian and security reasons. Finally, global recognition that Russian economic growth and development is in both the security and economic interests of its Issues and Options for Russia. neighbors and trade partners may suggest Russian demographic trends have impli- a more concerted effort on their part to cations far beyond Russian borders. help support Russian development. [ 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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All of these policies will have to be weighed against other priorities, of course, but their full security implications must be a part of that calculus. The fact is that if the United States and others do not help alleviate Russian problems, they, too, will feel their effects.
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
Author’s Note: The authors thank Brian Nichiporuk for his review and helpful comments. This article was written with the support of the RAND Population Matters program, which is supported by a grant from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The goals of Population Matters are to highlight the importance of population policy issues and to provide a more scientific basis for public debate over such issues.
N OT E S
1 U.S. Census Bureau, International Database, Internet, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html (Date Accessed: 19 April 2003). 2 See Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich, Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 3 See Olga Oliker and Tanya Charlick-Paley, Assessing Russia’s Decline, Implications for the United States and the USAF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002). 4 Goskomstat of Russia, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, annual; Current Statistical Survey 44 (31 March 2003). 5 Ibid. 6 World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2002, Internet, http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/ (Date Accessed: 19 April 2003). 7 France Mesl , Vladimir M. Shkolnikov, V ronique Hertrich, and Jacques Vallin, Tendances r centes de la mortalit par cause en Russie 1965—1994, and electronic data diskettes (Moscow: Centre de D mographie et d’ cologie Humaine, 1996). World Health Organization Mortality Database, Internet, http://www3.who.int/whosis/mort/table1.cfm?path=w hosis,mort,mort_table1&language=english (Date Accessed: 2 April 2003). 8 Health expenditure data are from World Development Indicators, annual (Washington, DC: World Bank Group). Mortality data are from World Health Organization Mortality Database, Internet, http://www3.who.int/whosis/mort/table1.cfm?path=w hosis,mort,mort_table1&language=english (Date Accessed: 18 April 2003). 9 Stephen Shenfield, JRL Research and Analytical Supplement 17 (17 March 2003), citing Nina L. Rusinova and Julie V. Brown, "Social Inequality and Strategies for Getting Medical Care in Post-Soviet Russia," Health 7, no. 1 (January 2003). 10 See Nick Holdsworth, "Staying Power: A Russian Tale," UNESCO Courier (2001), Internet, http://www.unesco.org/’courier/2001_02/uk/education.htm (Date Accessed: 2 April 2002). Also see Y. I. Kuzminov, S. A. Belyakov, E. L. Klyachko, and L. I. Yakobson, "The Condition and Prospects for Development of the Russian Education System," paper presented at the International Monetary Fund Conference and Seminar on "Investment Climate and Russia’s Economic Strategy," April 2000, Internet, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ seminar/2000/invest/pdf/kuzmin.pdf (Date Accessed:
2 April 2002). 11 Data on estimated and projected population by age for Russia and other nations are from the U.S. Census Bureau International Database. 12 Jeremy Brantsen, "Russia: Poor Fitness of Conscripts Points to Public Health Crisis," Johnson’s Russia List 6028 (17 January 2002). 13 "Only 69 Percent of Youngsters of Call-Up Age Fit for Service," BBC Monitoring (ITAR-TASS) (30 October 2002). 14 World Health Organization Mortality Database, Internet, http://www3.who.int/whosis/mort/table1.cfm? path=wh o s i s , m o r t , m o r t _ t a b l e 1 & l a n g u a g e = e n g l i s h (Date Accessed: 18 April 2003). 15 See Theodore Karasik, "Do Russian Federation Health and Demography Matter in the Revolution in Military Affairs?" in Michael H. Crutcher, ed., The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 2001). 16 Goskomstat of Russia, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 17 Ibid. 18 Replacement Migration (New York: United Nations Population Division, 2000). In only two years, 1994 and 1995, has net immigration to Russia exceeded 500,000 persons. See Goskomstat of Russia, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 19 In 1993, ethnic Russians comprised 76 percent of net immigration to Russia from other former Soviet lands; in 2001, they comprised 60 percent. See Goskomstat of Russia, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Also See Timothy Heleniak, "Russia’s Demographic Challenges," in Stephen K. Wegren, ed., Russia’s Policy Challenges: Security, Stability, and Development (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003). 20 "Women Rising Through Military Ranks," RFE/RL Newsline 5, no. 45, part I (6 March 2001). 21 "Ratnitzi," Armeiskii Sbornik (December 2000): 77–78. 22 "Rossiiskoy Armii Nuzhni Zhenshchini," Nezavisimoye Voynnoye Obozreniye (23 June 2000). "Russian Women Face Threat of Domestic Violence, Limited Choice of Professions," RFE/RL Newsline 4, no. 207, part I (25 October 2000). 23 See Oliker and Charlick-Paley, Assessing Russia’s Decline. 24 Of particular concern may be the 3,645 kilometers of border that Russia shares with China. There
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are some Chinese historical claims to territory now in Russia, and population density on the Chinese side is 15 to 30 times that on the Russian side, although the fears of some Russians regarding Chinese immigration exceed the reality. Regarding Chinese historical claims to Russian territory, see Frank Umbach, "Russia’s Strategic and Military Interests in North and South East Asia," in Crutcher, ed., The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of Millennium. On population density along the Sino-Russian frontier, see Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, "Chinese Demographic Expansion into Russia: Myth of Inevitability?" in Gregory J. Demko, Grigory Ioffe, and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, eds., Population Under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999): 137–148. On perception and reality of Chinese migration to Russia, see Mikhail Alexseev, "‘The Chinese Are Coming’: Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East," Center for Strategic and International Studies Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, Policy Memo 184 (January 2001), Internet, http://www.csis.org/ruseu-
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ra/ponars/policymemos/pm_0184.pdf (Date Accessed: 2 April 2002). 25 Current estimates of HIV prevalence in Russia range from 200,000 to 2 million, but all agree the disease is spreading rapidly. A National Intelligence Council analysis indicates prevalence may reach five to eight million persons in 2010, giving Russia an adult prevalence rate of 6–11 percent. The disease is also thought to be spreading rapidly through the Russian military. For more on present estimates and likely future prevalence of HIV in Russia, see David Gordon, The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, September 2002), Internet, http://www.odci.gov/nic/pubs/index.htm (Date Accessed: 2 April 2002). For more on HIV in the Russian military, see Sarah A. Grisin and Celeste A. Wallander, Russia’s HIV/AIDS Crisis: Confronting the Present and Facing the Future (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2002), Internet, http://www.csis.org/ruseura/HIV.pdf (Date Accessed: 2 April 2002).
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
Population, Society, and Power East Asia’s Future K.S. Seetharam Japan, South Korea, and China have reached a crossroads. During the next half century, they will move from a period of workforce expansion to significant workforce contraction. At the same time, their graying populations will require the shrinking workforce to shoulder the higher costs associated with the rapid aging of their populations. Although free-market economic policies with supportive governmental interventions were central to the region’s dynamic growth in the last half century, the region’s demographic changes have contributed importantly to the “Asian Miracle.” The current demographic shifts will produce just the opposite. As a result of the differences in the timing and the tempo of the transition from high mortality and high fertility to low mortality and low fertility, the three countries will each experience a different set of opportunities and challenges over the coming decades—but those differences will begin to fade around the middle of the century. For China and South Korea, the next two to three decades will be favorable for continued economic growth—whereas, for Japan, the outlook is rather bleak. South Korea will continue to benefit from an expanding work force and declining dependency ratios; its elderly population will increase only gradually. In view of its robust economy, such a situation could result in labor shortages. By contrast, China has high levels of unem-
K.S. Seetharam is a population and development specialist in the Emerging Social Issues Division of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand.
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ployment. The challenge for China, therefore, will be to exploit the opportunity afforded by the declining dependency ratios through policies that will improve human development, generate jobs, and absorb its large pool of unem-
growth, social progress, and demographic change. Most of East Asia’s population of 1.5 billion in 2003—representing about a quarter of the world total—live in China, Japan, and South Korea. The region has recorded phenomenal economic growth, with the GDP growth averaging 5–6 percent annually for much of the second half of the twentieth century. This rapid growth began with the post-war reconstruction and development of Japan and continued until the early 1990s. This was paralleled by South Korea’s rapid and sustained economic growth since the cease-fire on the Korean peninsula in the 1950s. With the opening of its economy to foreign investment nearly twenty-five years ago, the economy of China has also been growing at unprecedented levels. Social progress, manifested by the improved education and health status of their Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate (TFR) populations, particularly that of women, has been ployed in the urban centers. The picture remarkable in these countries. for Japan is different. It is already expeDuring the same period, the region has riencing rapid population aging and a witnessed an unprecedented transformashrinking workforce that, in the absence tion in its demographic scenario, characof migration, could adversely affect eco- terized by rapid improvements in life nomic growth and consequently the pro- expectancy and an unprecedented decline vision of social security and health care in fertility (see figure 1). The timing and services to its elderly. the tempo of changes have varied, however, among these three countries. The A Half Century of Progress. East transition to low fertility and mortality Asia has been the most dynamic and that began in Japan before WWII continvibrant region of the world since World ued thereafter. The decline in fertility War II, characterized by rapid economic and mortality in China and the Republic [ 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
of Korea that began much later in the those in the working ages declines as a 1960s has been more precipitous, taking result of declining fertility—for two to fewer than thirty years to reach very low three more decades at most, but economlevels. Continued increases in age at mar- ic growth afforded by demographic transiriage and an increase in female participa- tion has run its course in Japan. tion in economic activity could further China, Japan, and South Korea have depress the already low level of fertility converged toward a low-fertility, lowthat is characteristic of the region. mortality equilibrium. However, they
East Asia’s most daunting future
demographic phenomenon will be aging. The main pillars of this growth have been government-driven, free-market economic policies coupled with high rates of domestic savings. The demographic transition that followed, with or without deliberate government intervention, also contributed to this progress. Recent studies have indicated that the rise in the working age population (see figure 2) and the stability of dependency ratios that accompanied the transition to low fertility contributed to as much as a third of the economic growth in East Asia over the last fifty years.1 The rapid economic expansion, coupled with the decline in fertility in Japan and in South Korea in the past few decades, has generated greater savings, investment, and growth, making it possible for these countries to achieve a high capital-labour ratio, improve their human capital and, consequently, labor productivity. In Japan, the process has been more gradual and took years longer, while in both China and the Republic of Korea it has been very swift (though China took longer to reach this stage). Both China and South Korea can still benefit from the “window of opportunity”—a period during which the ratio of the dependent population (children and older persons) to
remain vastly different economically. Japan with a purchasing power parity (PPP) of $25,000 per capita is the most advanced, followed by South Korea, which has a PPP of $16,000. Despite the phenomenal growth of China in the past two decades, its PPP of $3,600 remains low, and poverty is high. Likewise, the labor market conditions within these countries are different. While Japan and the Republic of Korea have been experiencing labor shortages, labor supply in China is so abundant that the unemployment level is extremely high.
Diversity and Emerging Challenges. The region is entering a radically new era. Key developments will include: (1) decreasing population and labor force growth, leading to eventual declines; (2) an unprecedented increase in the proportion of the elderly; (3) a significant decline in the proportion of the working ages; (4) increased migration; and (5) a steady increase in the number of women among the elderly, the employed, and migrants. In short, the region is shifting from a period of declining dependency ratios to a period of increasing dependency ratios, from a period when the population was quite Summer/Fall 2003 [ 2 9 ]
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young to a period when the population is female participation rates in economic becoming older. These trends will pro- activity remain unchanged. In Japan, the duce major changes in East Asian soci- percentage of the population in the worketies over the coming decades. ing age group has already begun to The population of East Asia as a whole decline. In China and the Republic of will continue to increase slowly for anoth- Korea, it will begin to do so soon. Aging. The most daunting demographic phenomenon for East Asia in the future will be aging. The changing age structure of the population, brought about by declining fertility and mortality, will result in a rapid increase in the proportion and, within a few years, in the numbers of older persons in the population. Because women tend to live considerably longer than men, women will significantly outnumber men at older ages. With continuous improvements in life expectancy, the number of the very old will increase even faster in the not-too-distant future. Estimates by the United Nations indicate that the percentage of the population 65 years and older in Figure 2: Total and Working Age Population East Asia will increase from about 10 percent of er four decades before it begins to decline. the total population in 2000 to 25 perIn Japan, however, the population will cent by 2050 (see figure 3).2 This will begin to decline much sooner. Those of occur simultaneously with a decline in working age (15–64) will decrease along the working age population from 70 to the same path, although the decline will 60 percent of the total. In Japan, older begin sooner than in the rest of the pop- persons will exceed one third of the total ulation. This will eventually result in a population, while those of working age shrinking labor force, as long as male- will decline to one half within the next [ 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
50 years. Although the long term trend utilization of labor through policies supfor China and South Korea is similar to portive of migrants to urban areas. that of Japan, they will continue to benJapan has severe restrictions on the efit from the expansion of the working number of migrants permitted to work age population for the next two to three decades. The implications of the above trends for economic growth, savings, and investment, as well as for social needs including pension schemes and health care, will be staggering.3 In a region where the responsibility for caring for the elderly rests on females, increased female participation in economic activity will severely diminish traditional social safety nets. This is particularly detrimental given the increasing incidents of lifestylerelated afflictions, such as AIDS and lung cancer.4 For Japan, the threat is acute and of immediate concern. Migration. With globalization, characterized by increased international trade, flow of capital, and improved transportation and information exchange, migration is bound to increase with time. Migration corrects for labor market imbalances; in addition, it tends to keep a population “young.” Yet, migration policies are exceptionally restrictive in these three countries. South Korea restricts migration, but it is beginning to consider various new options for relaxing these controls—though it may fall short of granting residence and other rights, such as those the migrants to the United States and Canada enjoy. China, on the other hand, will not face a labor shortage for quite some time. Indeed, it can maintain and even accelerate economic expansion in the coming decades through further investments in human capital and better
Figure 3: Population Aged 0–14, 15–64 and 65+ and seek residence, and remains largely a closed society. Nor have the Japanese migrated in large numbers and assimilated with other cultures to make a significant impact on Japanese society. As a result, Japan, more than China or South Korea, finds it more difficult to allow assimilation into its society, thereby stifling migration-inducing policies. Without increased migration, Japan will lose out on the benefits countries such as Canada and the United States have enjoyed—increased fertility rates and a stable, if not growing, workforce. While estimates of the replacement migration required to keep the age structure in balance are staggering, Japanese failure to Summer/Fall 2003 [ 3 1 ]
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encourage migration will only bring consequences for the region’s economies about continued economic stagnation, if and societies. Japan’s economy, which has not precipitous economic decline.5 Solu- stagnated during recent years, could in tions such as investment overseas or pro- the future record at best only modest grams to resettle older persons abroad growth, mainly through increasing pro-
Japanese demographic problems will
contribute to South Korean and Chinese economic expansion.
could provide only a temporary reprieve, ductivity as a result of improved human because populations of many of the capital and technology, as well as returns receiving countries (e.g. Thailand) will from investments abroad. Further themselves begin to age soon and will be improvements in Japan’s human capital looking for investments abroad to keep are unlikely because the population of their economies from contracting. Japan enjoys high levels of education, health, and nutrition. The application of Women. Women’s status and participation new and emerging technologies will entail in economic activities and decision-mak- significant investments in training and ing will increase in the future in these retraining an aging work force. And, countries. Women in East Asia have bene- investment in the aged will not yield the fited from development, as reflected by benefits as investment in a younger poptheir improved health and educational ulation would, such as that which constatus relative to that of men. Yet, East tributed to the “Asian Miracle.” An aging Asian societies, by and large, remain male population will also aggravate the deteriodominated. The extremely high sex ratio at rating fiscal conditions of the Japanese birth (on the order of 115 or more boys to economy.7 Furthermore, investment 100 girls as opposed to the normal range abroad not only will face competition of 105–107 boys to 100 girls) in China from other newly industrialized and South Korea is another manifestation economies in the region, but also will of this deep-rooted preference, which yield lower than anticipated returns from could have disastrous consequences for such investment.8 family and society.6 As the new cohort of Japan will face more and more labor males and females enter their reproductive shortages unless women respond to the years, there will be a considerable shortage increased demand for labor. Options of women—a trend that will be aggravated such as increasing the retirement age as the age at marriage and the proportion would fail because new technologies remaining unmarried among women rise demand a workforce that is both young and women have fewer and fewer children. and qualified. Moreover, the lower wages demanded by younger workers would Policy Implications. Unless addressed remain more attractive to employers. through effective new policies, future Japanese women, though well educated demographic trends could have major and qualified, may not respond to the [ 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
S E E T H AR AM
demand for more labor unless a fundamental change occurs in their attitude toward work, particularly after marriage, and their employment becomes essential for families to maintain an acceptable standard of living. The current generation of young women is discouraged from seeking employment because they can rely on income transfers from their parents in the form of support for establishing a home, as well as inheritances. Yet, this situation is likely to change radically in the future as savings diminish with the aging population. Labor will become more expensive, and exports less competitive. Health care costs and other social service benefits will skyrocket as a result of increased longevity and the need for institutional care at a time when women, the traditional care-givers, will be forced to seek outside employment. An aging population will also contribute to “deflationary trends” in the Japanese economy. As in Italy, Spain, and other countries of Europe where populations are declining and aging, Asian land and property prices could begin to fall, particularly in rural areas, as a result of contracting demand. Relatively large Japanese demographic problems will contribute to South Korean and Chinese economic expansion. Given its large population size and enormous domestic market, China is poised for rapid economic expansion. This will be aided by the demographic “window of opportunity”—if China is able to craft forward-looking policies on education, health care, migration, and employment, in particular that of women. Inevitably, this will lead to a shift in the regional pow-
Baby Boom or Baby Bust?
er structure away from Japan to China. Japan will have to recognize this demographic imperative and will have to consider policies to encourage migration.9 Failure to do so would lead to the continued stagnation of the Japanese economy. As the New York Times has opined, restrictive migration policies in aging populations could lead to “longterm economic suicide;” nor do they bode well for society as a whole.10 While the prospects seem favorable for South Korea and China in the near future, these countries too must recognize the inevitability of rapid population aging and an eventual decline in their labor force. In order for these economies to remain dynamic, they must support policies that encourage migration or reverse the declining trend in childbearing. Such policies would slow the societal aging process and create a more heterogeneous, multicultural population that will remain economically vibrant into the distant future.11 The failure of these societies to deal with demographic problems would have a substantial impact on Asia’s other economies as well. A downturn in the Japanese economy would have a significant adverse impact on investments and trade among other countries of the region. It could also have adverse impacts on the economies of the United States and Europe, though some of this would be countered by the emergence of China as a major trading partner. Author’s Note: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of UNESCAP. Thanks are due to a number of my colleagues at UNESCAP, the editors, and my wife, who reviewed the draft and made valuable suggestions.
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1 David E. Bloom, G. Jeffrey, and C. Williamson, “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia,” World Bank Economic Review 12, no. 3 (1998): 419–456; Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asia: Changes and Challenges (Manila: 1997); and David E. Bloom, Conning David, and Sevilla Jaypee, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). 2 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision (New York: The United Nations, 2003). 3 Bhakta Gubhaju and Yoshie Moriki-Durand, “Below Replacement Fertility in East and South-East Asia: Consequences and Policy Responses,” Journal of Population Research (2003, forthcoming). Also see “Up go the doctors’ bills,” The Economist (15 March 2003). 4 Alan Lopez, “Mortality and Morbidity Trends and Poverty Reduction,” paper presented at the Fifth Asian and Pacific Population Conference, ESCAP, Bangkok, December 2002. 5 Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Aging
[ 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Populations? (New York: The United Nations, 2001). 6 East-West Center, The Future of Population in Asia (Honolulu: Hagadone Printing Company, 2002). 7 Rohit Gupta, “Japan, tick tick, tick,” Bangkok Post (24 March 2003). 8 David E. Horlacher and Landis MacKeller, “Population Ageing in Japan: Policy Lessons for South-east Asia,” paper presented at the South-East Asia Regional Population Conference, Bangkok, March 2002, to appear in Asia-Pacific Development Journal (1 June 2003). 9 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Kimberly, and Hamilton, Reinventing Japan: Immigration’s Role in Shaping Japan’s Future (Washington, DC: Automated Graphic Systems, 2000). 10 “Humanity’s Slowing Growth,” New York Times on the web (17 March 2003) (Date Accessed: 21 March 2003). 11 Ronald Skeldon, “The Populations of the AsiaPacific Region,” East Asia and the Pacific (Europa Publications, forthcoming).
Business&Finance Regional Trade and Cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean Robert Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal, Juan Jos Taccone Over the past twenty years, multilayered trade policy has been a core component of Latin America and the Caribbean’s structural reforms. The first step was a very substantial unilateral opening, illustrated in the decline of average tariffs from over 40 percent in the mid-1980s to about 12 percent today.1 This has been combined with a strategy of reciprocal opening through active participation in multilateral trade negotiations and regional integration initiatives. The latter have been especially prolific with nearly thirty regional trade and integration agreements being launched since 1990 and many more in different stages of negotiation. This opening contributed to Latin America and the Caribbean’s trade expanding faster than world trade during the 1990s. However, the fastest growth by far occurred in intra-regional trade, mostly linked to formal regional integration agreements that ranged from free trade areas to customs unions and common market projects in the sub-regions. In some agreements, such as Mercosur, the level of trade grew dramatically and reached relatively high levels of around 25 percent of total exports.2 While regional trade expanded markedly in the context of regional integration, so did cooperation in a broader sense of the
Robert Devlin is Deputy Manager of the Integration and Regional Programs Department at the Inter-American Development Bank. Antoni Estevadeordal is Senior Economist for the Integration and Regional Programs Department at the InterAmerican Development Bank. Juan JosĂŠ Taccone is Director of the Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL).
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term. Cooperation between governments can be defined as a mutual adjustment of policies to achieve an outcome that all prefer to the status quo. It requires some
national sovereignty. Fourth, they do not generally involve resource transfers among member countries. Fifth, the difficulty of negotiating non-trade issues is related to the very nature of such Figure 1: Strategic and Inter-related Pieces of the issues: whereas preferential trade Trade Agenda arrangements are Doha Development Agenda (2005) concerned with the removal of tradedistorting policies, cooperation in other economic areas as well as in Sub-Regional Agreements North-South Integration social and cultural CARICOM(2005) FTAA (2005) fields requires the Andean Community (2005) EU LAC (2005-2008) introduction of addiCACM USA - CACM (2004) tional policies, Mercosur USA - Chile (2003) which is more difMercosur - Andean Community (2003) ficult to deal with. Finally, a critical degree of subordination of the members’ mass of regional trade among partners acts sovereignty to the interests of the group. as a “hanger” on which other forms of Mutually-beneficial regional cooperation cooperation can be functionally draped. is possible in practically any single field of This article will explore the relationship public policy, ranging from security mat- between trade and cooperation, what we ters to environmental and labor standards, call the “trade and cooperation nexus.” and includes bundles of cooperation aris- The following section will outline the ing out of formal regional integration—a strategic pieces of Latin America and the form of cooperation itself. Caribbean’s trade agenda—the “wiring” Trade agreements are invariably the for the regional cooperation referred to point of departure for more comprehen- above. The third section will examine how sive regional economic integration for trade and cooperation can be linked into several reasons. First, trade can attract a “nexus.” Finally, the last section will look support from well-organized private busi- at some concrete examples of that nexus. ness communities. Second, unlike many other economic arrangements, the mutu- The Strategic Pieces of the Trade al benefits of trade agreements and their Agenda. The region’s trade negotiadistribution can be reasonably assessed ex- tions currently are staged on three major ante by participants and monitored and strategic fronts. First is the multilateral enforced ex-post. Third, trade agreements Doha Development Agenda(DDA) in accommodate nationalistic sentiments of Geneva. The second involves sub-regionsociety as they can be designed in ways that al common market building. The third initially involve only very limited loss of front is the pursuit of comprehensive [ 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
DEVLIN, ES TE VAD E O R DAL, & TAC C O N E
North-South free trade areas that seek to build reciprocal commercial links with industrialized countries (Figure 1). The importance of the DDA cannot be overemphasized. Through it, the countries of the region are negotiating market access to the world economy and improving rules for world trade and investment. Of special interest to Latin America is the removal of barriers and distorting measures in agriculture-related trade, an area where the region has a strong international comparative advantage. Peak tariffs, quotas, and subsidies for export and domestic support in industrialized countries greatly restrict agricultural trade and distort world prices. Bound tariffs of OECD countries for agriculture products are four times higher than those of industrialized goods. Meanwhile, trade-distorting subsidies are equivalent to $700 million a day, almost four times all official development assistance.3 Agricultural trade was the “orphan” of the GATT until the Uruguay Round, when it was put on the negotiating table for the first time. But progress in liberalization as such was modest and most of the real work must be done in the DDA. The word “development” in the DDA will ring hollow if major advances are not produced in Geneva in terms of eliminating measures that are restricting the region’s agriculture-related exports, and hence its development potential. Other critical areas in the DDA for Latin America and the Caribbean include public health issues in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement, such as access to generic drugs for national health emergencies; disciplines for contingent protection, such as anti-dumping measures; and regional rules, such as the incorporation of rules of origin in multilateral rules for regional integration.
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The second front involves sub-regional integration. Throughout the 1990s, sub-regional agreements were remarkably successful in achieving, relatively rapidly, the elimination of tariffs on sub-regional trade.4 However, advancing further on the road ahead has proven difficult. Some sub-regions have had their programs set back by macroeconomic and political problems in member countries; nevertheless, all share ambitious common market objectives. Thus, the past success of improving market access is now being overshadowed by the need to advance the agenda in other, more politically sensitive, areas that often impinge on national sovereignty. These areas include further elimination of non-tariff barriers, greater liberalization in services, further macroeconomic coordination, increased regional infrastructure coordination, and the completion of common external tariffs and customs unions. Progress is also needed in the strengthening of regional institutions and national counterparts, particularly in the areas of rule making, compliance and dispute resolution, technical secretariats, and standards setting. The third piece, North-South integration, would have been politically inconceivable fifteen years ago, but now has become a strategic focal point of action for the region. There are the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations, the negotiation of association agreements with the European Union,5 as well as bilateral free trade areas with the United States and Canada,6 and attempts by Mexico to link up with Japan in a regional agreement. These North-South negotiating agendas can be considered WTO “plus-plus” as they often go deeper than similar obligations at the multilateral level and because many of the issues being discussed are not even on the WTO negotiating table as of Summer/Fall 2003 [ 3 7 ]
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A critical mass of regional trade among
partners acts as a “hanger” on which other forms of cooperation can be functionally draped. yet (e.g., competition policy). However, due to strong asymmetries between the industrialized and industrializing countries, many of these agreements are quite challenging for the region. This is mainly because of the disparity between the respective capacities of the negotiating partners and the fact that most of the effective liberalization will have to take place in the developing countries, since the industrialized economies are already relatively open. The region’s strategic trade agenda is extremely challenging to manage. Each front has a very comprehensive and complex trade negotiating agenda. In addition, target dates for completing many of the negotiations on all three fronts are bunched in and around 2005.7 Nonetheless, each negotiating front has its own logic and benefits, and there are positive synergies among them; hence, picking and choosing among agendas is often not an option, requiring all fronts to move forward simultaneously. For example, the WTO regulates trade in the world market, supports non-discriminatory liberalization, and establishes some basic common rules for regional integration—the improvement of which will enhance the complementary nature of regionalism and the multilateral system. Also, many feel the WTO has better prospects than regional North-South agreements for advancing liberalization of so-called systemic issues, such as export subsidies, domestic support in agriculture, and in disciplining anti-dumping practices. Lastly, as the multilateral system [ 3 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
succeeds in reducing trade barriers, the pull of geography in trade patterns becomes more important and generates incentives for further regional integration initiatives. The benefit of sub-regional integration is that it is much more than trade, since common market projects are fundamentally political initiatives in which regional trade facilitates advances in broader strategic objectives among likeminded countries. These include export development and diversification, as well as providing outlets for goods that face inordinate international protection. Sub-regional agreements also facilitate treatment of non-trade related “neighborhood” issues that fall out of the purview of commercially-based multilateral arrangements, such as free trade areas and the WTO. Lastly, the deepening of common markets promises to enhance the member countries’ capacity to compete internationally and allows them to take fuller advantage of their opportunities in both North-South free trade areas and the multilateral system. Finally, the major benefits of NorthSouth integration agreements is that they help to secure and improve access to major markets, attract foreign investment, and lock-in policy reforms. By exposing the sub-regions to a broader spectrum of comparative advantage, these agreements also reduce residual trade diversion in sub-regional agreements. Moreover, North-South agreements often set new precedents for liberalization that migrate to the WTO negotia-
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tions, as was the case of NAFTA during mutual interest of the parties more quickthe Uruguay Round. ly and serve in practice as a solid beachhead for more comprehensive future The Trade and Cooperation cooperation. In this scenario, the relaNexus. Growing and mutually benefi- tionship evolves from trade (T) to a trade cial commercial interdependence among and cooperation nexus [(T) -> (T+C)]. partners typically induces demands for An opposite model involves agreements expanded economic cooperation, in where an initial framework of cooperation order to exploit more fully the revealed only (C) predominates until it reaches a advantages of a maturing regional mar- point where parties eventually launch a ket. Moreover, demands for non-eco- formal trade and integration agreement nomic and even political cooperation [C -> (T+C)]. arise from the social externalities generPost-World War II initiatives in Latin ated by closer economic ties.8 In effect, America and the Caribbean more or less the centripetal forces of trade among bear out the models suggested above. partners can be an effective handmaiden Agreements launched with an initial offiof deeper integration, whether planned cial framework, or objective, of “very deep or not. There is the contemporary exam- integration” have typically started out with ple of Western Europe, where growing a trade and cooperation nexus (T+C) built interdependence through trade has into the initiative. This is illustrated in the served to drive forward a political agenda Latin American and Caribbean “old” of certain partners for very deep integra- sub-regional integration schemes that tion and broad-based cooperation. As a were committed to developing a common result, regional market opening led the market, as well as the “new” sub-regional way to widening the scope of coopera- schemes such as the Andean Community. tion, or in the words of Garcia and The other extreme is shallow agreements Gl ckler, to “integration by stealth.” such as free trade areas that are “business While trade liberalization and non- only” (T) in their initial intent. NAFTA, trade cooperation can evolve indepen- the new bilateral trade agreements in dently, in many cases the two components Latin America, and the Latin American are closely related. One would expect that Free Trade Association (LAFTA) of the when economic integration is launched 1960s, are all examples. In contrast, with the far-reaching objectives of a com- Western Europe is a good example of mon market or more, the agreement will where deepening trade interdependence not only anticipate regional free trade, but through (T) evolved into comprehensive also systematic cooperation in trade-relat- (T+C). One also now observes increasing ed and non-trade areas, thus, creating a pressures on NAFTA partners to move trade and cooperation nexus (T+C). This from (T) to the direction of (T+C). The approach may save costs associated with movement from (C) to (C+T) is a less frenegotiations and the administration of the quently observed model; ASEAN is percooperation programs. However, it also haps the most outstanding example. entails the risk of getting bogged down Other scenarios can be found in with a large number of complex issues. recent inter-regional North-South iniHowever, a strictly “business only” free tiatives. Those agreements can be divided trade area may capture and bind the into agreements that only cover trade Summer/Fall 2003 [ 3 9 ]
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(T), agreements for cooperation without a trade component (C), and agreements that cover both preferential trade and cooperation simultaneously (T+C). In particular, there are three modern North-South plurilateral initiatives involving Latin American countries that are interesting variants of the (T+C) model: The Western Hemispheric Summit process, which we will review in the next section, the APEC process that includes a package of trade and nontrade cooperation initiatives, and the EU-bilateral Inter-regional Association Agreements, which propose the novel EU approach of a “single undertaking” that would systemically integrate several initiatives through political dialogue, cooperation, and reciprocal free trade under a single umbrella agreement. It is important to emphasize that in these initiatives, the two components of the nexus are mutually supportive. As an example, a reciprocal cooperation program which helps exporters of the partner countries identify trade and investment opportunities in the inter-regional market could provide an impetus to the trade negotiations and energize trade once an agreement is reached. Another example would be reciprocal cooperation in education and best practices, which is generally supportive of the development and trade objectives. Meanwhile, donor assistance type programs could, for instance, provide technical support to the developing countries in the negotiation and implementation of agreements, thereby ensuring more sustainable commitments and more effective participation. Likewise, cooperation that aids infrastructure development and democratic processes can help foster trade and investment. So there is no doubt that a trade and cooperation nexus is a desirable [ 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
objective in initiatives designed to deepen North-South relationships, although simultaneously advancing in both tracks in a comprehensive way can be extremely difficult at times, as the hemispheric initiative has shown. Experience suggests that the success of any one initiative depends on a number of conditions. There is a need, inter alia, to give priority attention to a limited number of programs at any one time; to have clearly identified objectives and work programs, quantifiable targets, political leadership in the particular program areas, capable national counterparts, and a support structure—including adequate technical, logistical, and programmed financial backing. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that an ambitious trade and cooperation initiative will have a higher chance of prospering if there is a dynamic trade component at its core that leads the way. Indeed, the forward momentum in the FTAA negotiations is a major reason for Latin America and the Caribbean’s continued interest in the broader hemispheric initiative, despite the poor performance of many of the cooperation programs to date. Likewise, the loss of momentum in APEC may be partially explained by weakness in the motivation and design of its free trade component. Finally, one of the major results of the proliferation of regional trade agreements in Latin America and the Caribbean and around the world has been the formation of the so-called “spaghetti-bowl,” a concept that is usually associated with the negative effects of regional trade agreements, especially due to the lack of transparency and complexity of overlapping trade rules (Figure 2). While we cannot dismiss the costs associated with the “spaghetti-bowl” in the region, we must also measure potential benefits. In the framework sug-
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Figure 2: The Spaghetti Bowl. Trade Agreements Signed and Under Negotiation in the Americas
gested above, the “spaghetti bowl” is a reflection of the revealed preferences by like-minded nation-states in search of their commercial and economic interests. In this sense, the explosion of regionalism may have created the infrastructure, or the wiring, for an effective provision of regional cooperation, or more generally, regional public goods.10 This view downplays the potential negative effects of the “spaghetti bowl.” The final “use” of this infrastructure for regional cooperation will depend on the complex outcome of a dynamic process that includes the politics of inter-state bargaining for the provision of regional cooperation. This will build on existing regional trade agreements and the degree of absorption of “minor” connections by larger ones; that is, the effect of larger trade agreements on pre-existing sub-regional and bilateral agreements.
In the next section we will review three major trade and cooperation nexus initiatives. First, two important SouthSouth initiatives: the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) and the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), which have emerged around trade agreements and correspond to the [(T) -> (T+C)] model. Second, we review the Summit of the Americas process that we have identified as a variant of the pure (T+C) model under North-South initiatives.
Some Recent Experience on Regional Cooperation. Just as regional trade and integration underwent unprecedented expansion in the 1990s, so too did regional cooperation in other areas such as peace and security, protection of democracy, institutional Summer/Fall 2003 [ 4 1 ]
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capacity building, infrastructure, and tourism, among others. Indeed, along with trade, cooperation has become a hallmark of a new regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP).
The Mesoamerican region has both potential in the form of cultural wealth, biodiversity, and its geographically privileged location, as well as significant lags in terms of its economic and social development. Such inter-relations lead to a series of positive and negative externalities that pose a challenge in terms of coordination in those cases in which collective and relational action with the international cooperation community is justified. The interconnection of Mesoamerica with the outside world takes place under suboptimal conditions, as the countries of the region do not take full advantage of their proximity to major markets to strengthen, among other things, their competitive position, participation by small and medium-sized firms, human development, and the potential for the sustainable use of their natural resources. The PPP emerged as a political mechanism for coordinating actions involving the approval and implementation of regional projects: “The objective of the Puebla-Panama Plan is to leverage the human and ecological wealth of the Mesoamerican Region within a framework of sustainable development that respects cultural and ethnic diversity.”11 In this context, the PPP defines twentynine seperate projects under eight Initiatives, including: (1) Sustainable Development, (2) Human Development, (3) Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Disasters, (4) Tourism, (5) Trade Facilitation, (6) Highway Integration, (7) [ 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Energy Interconnection, and (8) Telecommunication Services. The countries participating in the PPP consist of eight small nations: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Mexico. With regard to Mexico, most PPP programs involve only the nine Mexican states from its southern-southeastern region, while others, such as those involving trade, include all of its states. The PPP was formally launched in San Salvador in June 2001. Mexico’s cooperation with its Southern neighbors was led both directly and indirectly by trade. First, Mexico’s experience with NAFTA resulted in uneven growth and development within Mexico, as the North enjoyed most of the benefits and the south stagnated. The seeds of the PPP had its origins in Mexico’s interest to stimulate growth in the South by enhancing links with Central America through a wide range of issues, including infrastructure. The “wiring” for the initiative was prior free trade agreements with each country, which would service growth of trade and investment and in turn benefit from the non-trade links established by the PPP itself.
Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). IIRSA was created as a result of the mandate generated at the First Meeting of South American Presidents held at the city of Brasilia, Brazil, on August 31 and September 1, 2000. On that occasion, the heads of state agreed to promote the integration and modernization of the region’s physical infrastructure as an essential factor in South America’s economic and social sustainable development process, seeking to increase the global competitiveness of their economies.
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In this context, IIRSA is a multinational, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary initiative. Its multinational character is based on the participation of the governments of the twelve countries of South America (representing members of three sub-regional integration agreements) and of potential private investors at a regional and international level. It is multi-sectoral because it encompasses the improvement and modernization of infrastructure in three sectors: energy, telecommunications, and transport. And it is multi-disciplinary since it includes the coordination of plans and investments; the harmonization of, or rendering compatible, regulatory frameworks and the public or private financing of investments, all with proactive attention to the environment. Currently, the Initiative has begun work organized around eight Integration and Development “Hubs� and seven Sectoral Integration Processes.12 To date, major progress has been recorded in the joint work of the countries, marked by the creation of an institutional framework to support the Initiative, as well as by the identification of an extensive portfolio of infrastructure projects. Trade played a major role in launching the initiative. The seeds of this initiative emerged out of Mercosur (including associate members Chile and Bolivia) where intraregional trade exploded but was slowed by overwhelmed regional infrastructure and outdated regulatory arrangements. As an example, more than half of the time for land-based cargo travel between S o Paulo, Brazil and Valparaiso, Chile was due to delays at border crossings. Meanwhile, the Andean Community countries suffered similar infrastructure bottlenecks to their expanding intraregional trade. Moreover, Mercosur and the Andean Community
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were negotiating a free trade area between them where expansion of trade would depend very much on better regional infrastructure between the two subregions.
Summit of the Americas. The Summit of the Americas is a process of institutionalized meetings at the highest political level among the thirty-four democratic states. Their aim is to develop comprehensive hemispheric cooperation in strategic areas, including trade, democratization and human rights, terrorism, corruption and drugs, and infrastructure. The First Summit took place in Miami in December 1994 and produced a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action signed by all heads of state and government. National programs to support the Summit commitments are undertaken and reviewed by each country. Building upon the Miami Summit, the subsequent Summits in Santiago and Quebec expanded the scope of cooperation and adjusted the activities under each initiative. It is clear that the Free Trade Area of the Americas is the leading initiative in the area of economic integration and probably the most consistently dynamic component of the entire Summit process. The FTAA process has steadily advanced and far surpasses progress in other economic areas. Areas that are not directly related to economic integration for which a maturing Summit process has brought some progress are democratization, human rights, justice, combating drugs, the fight against terrorism, education and disaster management. Nevertheless, the overall process has had very uneven results due to the very broad number of initiatives and the heterogeneity of the countries involved; mandates that are not always easily quantifiable and subject to results-oriSummer/Fall 2003 [ 4 3 ]
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ented evaluation; lack of preprogrammed funding; and a tendency to add mandates before consolidating past ones. If the FTAA materializes in 2005, it should generate pressure for truly effective hemispheric cooperation in other areas of the Summit agenda. It already is generating pioneering programs in trade related capacity building. The next few years will be a very critical juncture for trade and the region’s structural reforms. The outcome of all these trade negotiations are enormously critical for the development prospects of Latin America and the Caribbean since
they will establish market access and rules that will regulate the private sector’s articulation with the world economy for decades to come. That is why good preparation is essential and now should be one of the highest priorities in the countries’ development strategy and budgetary allocations. Finally, as one can see from the above examples, such agreements can be a handmaiden for important cooperation on many other issues down the road. Author’s Note: The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Inter-American Development Bank.
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1 Robert Devlin and Antoni Estevadeordal, “What’s New in the New Regionalism” in V. Bulmer-Thomas, ed., Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001). 2 “Integration and Trade in the Americas: Periodic Note,” Inter-American Development Bank, Department of Integration and Regional Programs, Washington DC, December 2000. 3 “Beyond Borders: The New Regionalism in Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank, Report on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, Washington DC, 2002. 4 Devlin and Estevadeordal (2001). 5 Chile and Mexico already have agreements. 6 Already has agreements with Chile and Costa Rica. 7 “Beyond Borders” (2002). 8 Cooperation programs can be reciprocal or involve one-way transfers (technical assistance). An example of the first would be EU-LAC joint sponsorship of programs (in which both parties financially support the process) to bring the two regions’ investors together to expose market opportunities. An example of the latter would be the trade-related capacity building that is being undertaken in the FTAA Hemispheric Cooperation Program. 9 Alicia Garc a Herrerro and Gaberiel Gl ckler, “Options for Latin America in a Globalized World,” European Central Bank, Frankfurt, May 2000.
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10 The concept of “wiring” as opposed to a “spaghetti-bowl,” which tries to capture the positive effects of a proliferation of RTAs, was first introduced in Devlin and Estevadeordal (2002) with an analysis of the nexus between trade and cooperation in the context of the regional public goods literature. See Robert Devlin and Antoni Estevadeordal, “Trade and Cooperation: A Regional Public Goods Approach,” paper presented at the IDB-ADB-USAID Conference on Regional Public Goods, InterAmerican Development Bank, November 2002. 11 Declaration of the Summit of Tuxtla (2001), San Salvador. 12 Integration and Development Hubs: (I) Andean; (II) MERCOSUR/Chile; (III) TalcahuanoConcepci n-Neuqu n-Bah a Blanca; (IV) InterOceanic; (V) Porto Alegre-Asunci n-JujuyAntofagasta; (VI) Peru-Brazil-Bolivia; (VII) Amazon Multimodal Hub and (VIII) Venezuela-BrazilGuyana-Suriname. Sectorial Integration Processes: Normative Frameworks for Regional Energy Markets; Operating Systems for Air Transport; Operating Systems for Multimodal Transport; Operating Systems for Maritime Transport; Facilitation of Border Crossings; Harmonization of Interconnection, Spectrum, Technical Standards and Internet Universalization Regulatory Policies; and Instruments for the Financing of Regional Physical Integration Projects.
Conflict&Security The False Dawn of Russian Military Reform David J. Betz and Valeriy G. Volkov No institution illustrates Russia’s post-Soviet troubled times better than its armed forces. What was once the Soviet military juggernaut is now a shrunken and embittered shambles. Russians feel this deterioration in a very direct way because tragedies like the sinking of the Kursk submarine or the continuing debacle in Chechnya are widely reported, and many Russians still depend on the defense sector for their livelihood. On a more personal level, no Russian parent with a son nearing draft-age rests easy nowadays until an exemption certificate or deferment is obtained by hook or by crook. The crisis has also penetrated Western public consciousness in a crude but profound fashion: from Jack Ryan to James Bond, the “rogue” Russian general is a staple nemesis of Hollywood action heroes, only slightly less clich d than the Colombian drug lord or Islamic terrorist. The case for the reform of the Russian military has long been clear. The question is: why has so little been achieved thus far? And, in particular, why have the expectations that Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, would rebuild and reform the army from its currently appalling state come to naught? Virtually everyone in Russia agrees that the army is a mess and incapable of meeting the current threats, but there is no agreement as to what exactly those threats are or what strategic setting
David Betz is Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London. He is the editor, with John Lowenhardt, of Army and State in PostCommunist Europe (London: Cass, 2001). Valeriy Volkov is a veteran of the SovietAfgan war, and served in the General Staff headquarters. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 2001. He retired from the Russian army with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
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would best enable Russia to face them. Questions like “Where does Russia belong?” and “Who are its friends and potential foes?” have proven exceedingly difficult for the Russian politico-military elite to answer. Nor has the top military brass received much help in their search for answers; most people are content to leave the military alone to sort itself out. Russian society has been taught that it should not intervene in matters of the state, where specialized knowledge and secrecy are required. There is, moreover, no tradition in Russia of civilian defense experts, which means that there are few alternative sources of advice for decisionmakers beyond the “trade union of the generals.” Meanwhile, ever since army tanks and commandos brought an end to the parliamentary revolt against then-President Boris Yeltsin in October 1993, the Kremlin has been prepared to accept an army that resists democratic oversight, so long as it does not bridle at presidential control. Given the lack of consensus on a strategic outlook and the political will to impose one, and since the exercise of civilian oversight of the armed forces is narrow and opaque, Russian generals have considerable latitude to thwart decisions they do not like and to distribute the army’s scarce resources in the manner in which they see fit. The failure of military reform is symptomatic of a more general ailment: Russia’s dysfunctional system of civilmilitary relations. For more than ten years now, the Russian army has been like a stubborn victim with a gangrenous limb, agonizingly snipping off the worst bits while the infection spreads. In practice, the army receives just enough resources to prevent its complete collapse, but not enough to bring about [ 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
reform. The bottom line is that civilmilitary relations in Russia today are mutually unpleasant—a reality that precludes substantive reform. While soldiers need politicians primarily for money, of which there is never enough, politicians need soldiers only insofar as they advance a particular political agenda. Russia’s political machine sees the army as dispensable in this period of relative peace and stability. It is, therefore, content to leave the armed forces to struggle alone.
The “Putin Effect” on Military Reform. In late 1999 and early 2000, when Vladimir Putin rose from the ranks of obscurity to the height of the presidency, the fortune of the armed forces also seemed to be on the rise. In the wake of NATO’s enlargement, unilateral intervention in Kosovo, and the outbreak of another war in Chechnya, Putin’s Kremlin began to articulate ideas similar to those held dear by the army. Russia, although smaller than the USSR, still faced a complex of external and internal challenges including international terrorism and regional separatism inspired and supported by Islamic radicalism, NATO’s eastward expansion, and overall U.S. attempts at enforcing its hegemony. Putin’s supposedly new approach resounded with the military elite. He declared that the role and status of the armed forces needed to be upgraded, as the military and security services were integral to the foundation of a strong state. Putin’s affinity toward those in uniform, moreover, stood in stark contrast to the views of his predecessor. Unlike Yeltsin, who paid little attention to the state of the military and rarely referenced it, Putin’s dramatic change in rhetoric promoted optimism in the military. The
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new president appeared to be signaling his sympathy and respect for the security services. He visited fleets and garrisons, expressed genuine interest in weapons and equipment, and was, as it is colloquially said in Russia, “in the theme.” Much to the military’s delight, Putin soon backed his words with concrete actions. To this end, he enacted a new National Security Concept in January 2000, followed shortly thereafter by a new Military Doctrine in April 2000 and a new Foreign Policy Concept that July. Additionally, a package of various reform measures was
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operation in a Moscow opera house in October 2002, which culminated in the death of over one hundred hostages. This flurry of activity could suggest that the Kremlin is resolved to addressing the problems afflicting the armed forces. Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case. The most significant aspect of all of these documents and statements is how vague they are on matters of military reform. The Foreign Policy Concept makes no mention of military reform at all, while the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine speak of it only in the blandest of
The army receives just enough resources to
prevent its complete collapse, but not enough to bring about reform. passed in January 2001. In March 2001, a close confrere of Putin, Sergei Ivanov— a retired FSB lieutenant general—was appointed Minister of Defense. At the same time, a tough senior civil servant, Lyubov Kudelina, was brought over from the Ministry of Finance to manage the books of the Ministry of Defense.1 In November 2001, the General Staff was ordered to prepare a plan to “professionalize” the armed forces by 2010.2 To this very day, Putin continues to reiterate the importance of military reform in his public addresses. The latest mention of the state of the armed forces occurred at a meeting with junior officers on the eve of Defenders of the Fatherland Day (February 23, 2003). Before, he had spoken of the necessity of again revisiting the National Security Concept with a view to specifying how the military could contribute to antiterrorism efforts. That statement looked topical as it came right after a calamitous counter-terrorist
terms. It is difficult to define any “Putin effect” on military reform, even on the basis of the platitudes found in the foremost policy documents. While Putin and Ivanov have forced some hard decisions on the military, such as closing bases in Cuba and Vietnam, steering a more obliging course in relations with NATO, cooperating with American forces in the war on terror and acceding—albeit grudgingly—to a limited U.S. military presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, hardly a dent has been made in solving the serious structural issues facing the armed forces. Procurement of new equipment is practically at a standstill. Combat pilots log only a fraction of the annual flying hours that would be considered necessary in the West to maintain proficiency. Ships also do not sail enough due to a lack of fuel and spare parts. Large numbers of officers still live below the poverty line in poor and remote housing and, therefore, Summer/Fall 2003 [ 4 7 ]
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leave service at the first opportunity. The world of the barracks is still a Hobbesian dystopia where hazing, criminality, drug abuse, alcoholism, lack of discipline, and desertion are the norm. And the nightmare in Chechnya continues to simmer though the focus of operations may finally be shifting from counter-terrorism to reconstruction following the recent referendum in the region. The situation, to use the words of the Chief of the General Staff, Anatoliy Kvashnin, is “beyond critical.”3 While the military’s problems are manifold and complicated, the core problem seems clear: there is not enough money. If the Russian military is to have any hope of equipping itself with modern weapons, and training and maintaining itself in some state of combat readiness, then it will have to undergo major reductions in size, regardless of whether it is manned by conscripts or volunteers.4 This decrepit state of the military begs the question of who is responsible for it. To be sure, bureaucratic foot-dragging and obstruction by the army leadership has undermined efforts to reform the armed forces. It is clear that the generals—many of whom hold attitudes toward the West that have changed little since the end of the Cold War—favor maintaining an army similar to the USSR’s, only smaller in size. Yet, it is unreasonable to lay the blame for the dreadful state of the army squarely on the shoulders of the General Staff. Much of the blame for the military’s sorry state should be placed on Yeltsin— but it was Putin who inherited this system, and he was, therefore, expected to treat it. Notwithstanding his Machiavellian image, rarely has any leader had as little freedom to position himself as a statesman as Putin. Other than as an adherent to the [ 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
notion of “gosudarstvennost,” as the prosecutor of a new and—at least in 1999–2000— popular war in Chechnya, Putin did not have much of an identity of his own.5 Indeed, many perceived him as no more than a stooge of the Yeltsin family. Society was ready to embrace this ex-KGB man and Soviet nostalgian as a symbol of order, security, and stability, but beyond that, his intentions were an enigma. Putin’s interest in reviving the faded symbols of a strong state was an outgrowth of social and bureaucratic expectations placed on him at the beginning of his political ascendance. It is not necessarily the case, as his record is beginning to show, that this interest will remain the same as he matures as a leader.
Russian Civil-Military Relations. During the Soviet era, civilian control of the military was understood in a restricted manner focused on maintaining the strict subordination of the military to the Communist Party. The notion of “democratic civil-military relations” entered political discourse only after the collapse of the USSR, but it has remained to a large extent terra incognita for the politico-military elite to this day, discussed and enacted in a shallow and pro forma manner, if at all. Indeed, because Russia has a rich military tradition of its own with particular ideas about how the army should relate to civil society and how it should be employed as a tool of policy, the term “democratic civilmilitary relations” strikes many as alien— an unnecessary import with an overtone not of democracy, but of implied Western superiority.6 In this sense, the military has been able to resist the otherwise ineluctable logic of downsizing only because it has been able to exploit the reluctance of Russia’s civil-
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Much of the blame for the military’s sorry
state should be placed on Yeltsin—but it was Putin who inherited this system, and he was, therefore, expected to treat it. ian leaders to submit their defense policies to democratic scrutiny and transparency. Defense policy in Russia is rarely subject to the “reality check” of civilian oversight that usually makes policy in more transparent systems more effective. Take, for example, the recentlamentable failure of the experiment to switch the 76th Airborne Division to a professionally-manned model, as a result of alleged sabotage by the General Staff. True or not, it is hard to envision how this plan might have succeeded, or how the experience might have been relevant to the army as a whole, even if the General Staff had been in favor of it. There are simply not enough morally and physically fit young men in Russia willing to put up with substandard living conditions and the threat of death or injury in Chechnya or elsewhere, all for a monthly pay packet ranging from 3,000 to 4,500 rubles ($95–140). But, then again, even if such young men did exist in high quantities, there would not be enough money in the budget to pay them. To make matters worse, the term civilian “control” does not even translate well. The obvious Russian analogue, “control,” comes closer to the looser English term “monitoring,” and carries little sense of “management” or “direction,” which “control” implies in English. Though Russian history rings with the clamor of rebellion and revolution, it has never included military rule. This is, paradoxically, a part of the prob-
lem. Among the politico-military elite there is a simplistic view that civil-military relations are not a problem because there is no historical tradition or contemporary inclination towards a military coup d’ tat. Such reasoning misses the point that, while the army is under civilian control, it is also unguided. The president generally has the levers necessary to exert control over the army, whose leadership is bound to him by a mixture of professional loyalty and personal self-interest. In practice, however, the army is free from most interference, acting independently within certain broad guidelines. Thus, the pattern of civil-military relations in Russia is one that combines close political control of the military leadership with a lack of concrete political direction on matters of policy. The impact of this state of affairs in Russia’s current time of troubles has been to increase the sense of alienation of the rank and file—but not necessarily the senior leadership—from both civil society and government. Throughout the 1990s, the officer corps survived materially through a mixture of stoicism and petty corruption, and mentally by thinking of itself as the inheritor of true patriotism and as the legacy of the great Russian past. A rift exists between the bulk of the command and staff officers on the one hand, and a considerably smaller number of top military leaders and bureaucrats on the other. The president, along with his Summer/Fall 2003 [ 4 9 ]
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administration, has control over members of the second category because of his power over appointments and discharges, whether military or civilian. Therefore, when one points to the actions or failures of such officials it should be understood that they are still agents of the state executive. Secondly, the state—now effectively an embodiment of presidential authority—controls the purse strings. The relationship of the top military-bureaucratic leaders with the president and his administration should be seen as symbiotic and collaborative. But this symbiosis does not pertain to the army as a whole. Russian society as a whole feels alienated from military affairs and public interest in the armed forces is aroused episodically. Indeed, only when the Kursk submarine sunk with 118 of her crew in August 2000, when a Mi-26 helicopter was shot down in Chechnya with 110 men aboard, or when politicians reference particular issues like conscription or hazing does the Russian public seem to think twice about the state of their armed forces. In general terms, moreover, Russians’ interest in and knowledge of military reform is slight. The average person is scornful of the generals, whom they see as an integral part of the corrupt elite. At the same time, the travails of civilian life are such that, by and large, they do not lose sleep over the living conditions of servicemen. For most Russians, military reform is of little importance because, in their view, it is Russian society as a whole that needs a transformation.
Reform of What and What of Reform? There is an expression in Russian that goes “We thought we had hit bottom, but then we heard someone knocking from below.” What Putin seemed to bring to the army in the first years of his presidency was a sense that maybe there was no one knocking anymore, that things would finally stop getting worse. After ten years of disappointment, Putin’s accession was obviously a welcome change for military men, and morale did indeed improve. It is hard to escape the feeling, however, that the love affair between Putin and the military has ended, and that it has been replaced with the frustrated apathy of the past. Things may not be getting worse, but neither are they getting better. There is a hint of novelty to the current debate that dissociates it from the compromised approaches to military reform of the Yeltsin era—but it is only a hint. In essence, Putin’s approach to reform still looks rather like the decade-old reactive practice of redistributing available resources and reducing the size of the army without changing its underlying structure. This would suggest that while he has brought a new style to the role of commander-in-chief—one that is utterly at odds with the capricious and frequently drunken antics of his predecessor—he has not changed the inherent dysfunction of the system of civil-military relations that militates against real and substantive military reform. In other words, when Putin says “Reform! And this time I really mean it,” he doesn’t really mean it.
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1 The man she replaced, General Georgy Oleinik, is the subject of a long-running investigation into the misuse of as much as $450 million from the MOD’s budget. 2 The plan is expected to be ready in mid-2003.
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Recently, Ivanov announced the rather improbable estimation that professionalization would be achieved by 2007. 3 Alexander Golts, Yezhenedelny Zhurnal (18 June 2002).
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4 The budget can sustain probably less than half its current approximately 1 million troops. 5 The possession of “gosudarstvennost,” meaning strong “statehood” or “stateness,” is tied in the minds of the elite and mass alike in Russia with the presence of stability—a national historical preoccupation. There is a widely-held conviction that Yeltsin’s opportunistic “denial” of the state in the early 1990s led directly to instability, hardship, and ruin in most aspects of life. Similarly, many believed that the post-Soviet elite enriched themselves under a facade of democratic rhetoric in order to institutionalize the wealth and
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privilege attained by them under the status quo. Hence, when Putin arrived on the scene people were well-prepared to displace dashed hopes for democracy and feelings of socio-economic disparity and privation with the invigoration of “gosudarstvennost.” 6 An attitude perhaps reinforced by its association with NATO, which held it as a main criterion for membership of the Alliance and a key goal of the Partnership for Peace program. Russian anger at NATO expansion influenced their perception of the more abstract notions of transparency, accountability, and oversight of the armed forces.
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Less is More The Future of U.S.-Arab Military Relations Michael Donovan Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military presence has expanded in only one region of the world—the Middle East. Yet, some allies in the region increasingly view the U.S. presence in the Gulf as a political liability, and support has eroded for the mission for which it was originally designed. The expansion of the U.S. military presence in the region resulting from the recent invasion of Iraq has again put U.S. posture in the Middle East in the spotlight. The implications of regime change in Iraq for the future of U.S.-Arab military relations and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East remain far from clear. What is clear, however, is that a new set of problems and challenges will follow the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Most prominent among them are the risks inherent in a lengthy U.S. military occupation of an Arab state in the heart of the Middle East. Instabilities in the region will continue to require Washington’s attention. A withdrawal to an “over the horizon” military posture would be premature. But while some of the problems will necessitate a continued military presence in the region, others will be aggravated by that very presence. In the post-9/11 world, the old “bargain” Washington made with local regimes in support of the political status quo may no longer be valid.1 Security in the short term is no substitute for stability in the
Michael Donovan is a research analyst at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC.
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long term, and reform in the region may now have to be a U.S. priority. The U.S. military presence in the Middle East may complicate efforts at reform—even more so following the invasion of Iraq—but the departure of Saddam Hussein holds out the possibility of a more secure regional environment that could allow the United States to significantly reduce its footprint in the region. Doing so, in turn, would allow Washington greater latitude to encourage reform among its Arab allies. However, the greatest care must be taken to ensure that a reduced forward deployment does not lead to a reduction in forward engagement.
Expanding Presence. The United States’s bilateral ties with the southern Gulf states expanded after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but the U.S. military presence remained largely “over the horizon” with the notable exception of a strong U.S. naval presence in the Gulf itself. The continued containment of Iran and Iraq following the 1990–1991 Gulf War, however, required a sustained presence. To this end, the United States enhanced and expanded military ties with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Today, all of these countries host U.S. airbases and logistics facilities, as well as storage facilities for propositioned equipment.2 Even prior to the military buildup for the invasion of Iraq, force levels in the region had reached historic levels.3 By the standards of U.S. military bases elsewhere in the world, however, few of these facilities are enormous. The five to ten thousand U.S. personnel in Saudi Arabia prior to the Iraq invasion, for instance, hardly compare to the thirty seven thousand in South Korea or the seventy thousand in Germany. In many cases, [ 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
nevertheless, the U.S. presence is politically controversial and an increasing source of politico-cultural irritation.4 In Saudi Arabia, for example, popular displeasure with the U.S. presence requires Central Command (CENTCOM) to sequester its military personnel in isolated complexes seldom seen by the general population. Even in the moderate state of Kuwait, the public is highly ambivalent to the U.S. presence, and the government only grudgingly supports the basing of troops as insurance against Iraqi threats— that exist no longer.5 What became clear during the rampup for the invasion of Iraq was that, while some Arab governments cooperated quietly with Washington, they were loath to be identified publicly with U.S. military operations on Arab soil due to their continuing quest for legitimacy. The lack of democratic institutions in the Middle East and the rise of new media in the region have exposed the veneer of legitimacy upon which many of these regimes rest. These regimes have become highly sensitive to currents of public opinion, even if they do not always defer to it, and are obsessed with avoiding domestic unrest. Some governments have attempted to mitigate discontent by channeling it towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, which causes problems of its own. Another strategy has been to impose limits on how the United States can use its military assets stationed in the region. Even before the invasion of Iraq, the utility of the U.S. footprint remained questionable because this political sensitivity often translated into operational constraints. During the last decade, only Kuwait consistently allowed the United States to fly punitive strikes against Iraq in support of the no-fly zones from its soil. Concerned about growing popular
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resentment with Washington’s Iraq policy, gic outlook of the Middle East in a prothe Saudis placed considerable limits on found way, at least in the near-term. Iraq how the facilities on its soil could be used. will remain under the close supervision of The Saudis supported Operation South- the United States and the international ern Watch over Iraq. But Riyadh did not community for the foreseeable future.
The days of Dual Containment were numbered even before the United States invaded Iraq. allow U.S. planes to carry out strikes on Iraq, and imposed similar limits during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Though it is probably safe to assume that the royal family quietly acquiesced to the invasion of Iraq, cooperation was never overt. Although, access to Saudi facilitates and territory would have been an enormous advantage in the invasion, the Pentagon was forced to transplant much of its command and control capability to the Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar.
Changing Missions. The missions the U.S. forward presence in the Middle East is designed to perform have also changed. “Dual Containment,” the Clinton administration policy developed to deal with Iran and Iraq, largely drove U.S. strategy after the first Gulf War. But the days of “Dual Containment” were probably numbered even before the United States invaded Iraq. The containment of Iraq was becoming increasingly ineffectual and politically costly, and Washington’s efforts to isolate Iran were— and are—in some ways having the reverse effect. By the end of the decade, critics were charging that “Dual Containment” was more rhetoric than a viable policy.6 Looking forward, the conventional military threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East is likely to abate. The successful invasion of Iraq has altered the strate-
Though traditional grievances between Baghdad and its neighbors and regional rivals will outlive Saddam Hussein, Iraq is unlikely to pose the kind of egregious threat to regional stability it once did. Despite its inclusion in the “axis of evil,” Iran poses challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East that require responses beyond military containment. Economic factors, rather than revolutionary imperatives, now drive Iran’s foreign policy. Tehran has moved to improve its relations with the European Union and countries throughout the Middle East, with the notable exceptions of Iraq and Israel. Iran does not have the conventional force projection capabilities to threaten its neighbors significantly. The Iranian navy is facing near-total obsolescence and is unlikely to pose a challenge to the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf.7 Iran is not capable of fielding a conventional challenge in the Gulf region with which a combination of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and U.S. assets cannot cope. Nevertheless, Iran, like many other countries in the Middle East, has an acute sense of its own vulnerability, which has been compounded by the invasion of Iraq. U.S. military forces are currently stationed in or have some relationship with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kuwait, and the 5th Fleet patrols the Summer/Fall 2003 [ 5 5 ]
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Persian Gulf—the addition of Iraq to the list just about completes Iran’s encirclement. As a result, Iranian decisionmakers have undertaken a complex costbenefit analysis regarding the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Unfortunately, despite a perfect inspection record with the International Atomic Energy Agency, there is some evidence suggesting that Tehran may take steps to cross the nuclear threshold in the next few years.8 There are, nonetheless, some reasons to be encouraged. The disarmament of Iraq removes one strategic rationale for Iranian WMD programs. And a nascent, but meaningful, democratic experiment is yielding a generation of leaders who have less interest in the confrontational policies of Iran’s Islamic hardliners. It remains far from clear that bellicose rhetoric and military intervention are the best approaches to the challenges Iran poses. Rather, as General Anthony Zinni, former commander in chief of CENTCOM, argues, the key to nonproliferation in Iran is domestic political reform.9 Iran’s support for hard-line Palestinian groups and its WMD programs will continue to menace U.S. interests in the region, but tying the U.S. military presence in the region to an exaggerated perception of the Iranian threat will unsettle allies and may undermine the moderate political forces that will eventually bring Iran back into the international mainstream. Other challenges confronting security and stability in the Middle East will endure. The region is likely to remain as troubled as it is strategically and economically significant. A number of national and sub-national conflicts will continue to drive the proliferation of conventional arms and WMD. Each state perceives [ 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
itself to be surrounded by enemies, and many of the regional rivalries and conflicts overlap, linking other regions to the Middle East in one broad political-military theater.10 The many problems endemic to the Arab world that garnered so much attention after 9/11 remain fixed in place. Political oppression and economic marginalization have nurtured Islamic radicalism, while U.S. support for many of these regimes and Israel has led to a hardening of anti-American sentiment.11 The specter of Islamist terrorism has added a new dimension to the traditional threats emanating from “rogue states,” with potentially profound implications for the existing political order in the region. The U.S. military posture in the Middle East must adapt to this evolving strategic environment. Few of the United States’s allies, especially the GCC states, have made substantive progress toward integrating their defense capabilities. Economic constraints and political differences are likely to keep them dependent on the U.S. security guarantee for some time. Stability and counter-terrorism missions in Central Asia and, potentially, in Iraq will continue to require an U.S. commitment for the indefinite future. Washington, nevertheless, will have to balance the requirements of short term security with the imperatives of long term stability. In the wake of the invasion of Iraq, the United States may now find that its military posture in the region undermines the ability of its Arab allies to cope with the political, economic, and social changes the lie ahead.
And Iraq? Undoubtedly, the most dramatic change facing the U.S. military posture in the region will be the occupation of Iraq. Securing Iraq after the con-
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flict may require a force equal to that which originally invaded the country, and a mission to guarantee long term stability could require as many as 100,000 personnel for an indefinite period of time.12 The future remains unclear, and several contingencies are possible. Some media reports assert that strategists in the Pentagon are contemplating retaining a U.S. military presence in Iraq over the long term.13 These reports have been vigorously denied by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. A robust and prolonged military presence in Iraq might reassure Iraqis that their neighbors will not meddle and create an environment that fosters stability and political liberalization. It might also reassure Iraq’s neighbors that Baghdad’s territorial ambitions are permanently defunct.14 On the other hand, a sizable military presence could also prove to be, in the words of General Zinni, “a magnet for problems.”15 In the post-Saddam era, reducing troops levels elsewhere in the region only to garrison Iraq would likely substitute one set of political problems for another. Efforts to develop political pluralism in Iraq could have their own security implications. A government in Baghdad that reflects the will of the Iraqi people may not pursue policies that Washington favors. Anti-Zionism and territorial claims on Kuwait are facets of Iraqi nationalism that Saddam Hussein may have exploited, but did not create. Conversely, if Baghdad identifies closely with Washington’s interests in the Middle East, it may not pursue policies supported by the Iraqi population, calling into question the government’s potential for stability and broad-based legitimacy. An Iraq shorn of its conventional military capabilities and its WMD will require a security guarantee that will, in one form
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or another, have a substantial U.S. component. What is less clear is how long a democratic Iraq would wish to retain a U.S. presence. Iraq will continue to pose problems both for Washington and its allies in the region. Leaving Iraq before the country is stable and reconstructed could probably lead to a return to the internal and external violence that has been such a prominent feature of Iraqi political culture. But local outrage over a prolonged U.S. occupation of Iraq could lead to political retrenchment and fatigue elsewhere in the region as domestic pressure to dissociate from Washington mounts. This pressure will increase even further if the situation in Israel and Palestine continues to deteriorate. Under these circumstances, U.S.-Arab military relations could suffer substantially, with potentially profound implications for bilateral ties, joint exercises, and base access.
The Future of the U.S.-Arab Military Relations. A sustained military presence comparable to pre“Operation Iraqi Freedom” levels is likely to be a source of growing political discontent. The United States should minimize its profile in the region, while working to enhance the defense capabilities of its allies through a robust forward engagement and improved regional cooperation. With the departure of Saddam Hussein, a reduced U.S. footprint would be capable of coping with the residual conventional threats in the region without testing the political tolerances that have made that presence so controversial. In the Gulf, Bahrain and Qatar will probably be eager to retain U.S. bases, as they are more concerned with the potential threat from Iran than from Iraq. Summer/Fall 2003 [ 5 7 ]
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Bahrain and Qatar also hope that a U.S. presence will balance the dominant influence of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, even though their populations are subject to the same anti-American currents that flow through the rest of the region, the U.S. presence in these two countries is less controversial than elsewhere. Recent political reforms in both countries, lim-
economic, social, and political challenges on the horizon. Like the Saudis, other states in the region recognize that, in the post-Saddam era, the most prominent challenges to security are now internal. The challenge of preparing restive and traditional societies for the demands of globalization and social change will likely lead others in
Like the Saudis, other states in the region
recognize that, in the post-Saddam era, the most prominent challenges to security are now internal. ited as they may be, also demonstrate that the U.S. presence there is designed to support regional stability rather than the political status quo. Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, the United States may have little choice but to reduce the profile of its military presence. Even before the invasion of Iraq, there were indications that Riyadh might ask Washington to remove its troops for Saudi Arabia.16 The apparently mutual decision to do so came in late April, not long after the cessation of hostilities in Iraq. Speculation that the decision reflects a deepening rift between the two countries is premature. The United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to need each other and their long-standing security relationship, though troubled since 9/11, needs to be rehabilitated. A reduction in the U.S. presence in the kingdom will remove a major source of tension in the relationship, allow the two governments to cooperate more effectively on a range of issues including terrorism, and better position the Saudi government to manage the breadth of [ 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
the same direction as the Saudis. Even Kuwait may eventually follow suit as that government attempts to dissociate itself unpopular U.S. policies and actions. Nevertheless, a withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or any other state in the region must be accomplished in a way that will avoid the false impression that the United States is abandoning the country. The importance of maintaining and enhancing forward engagement cannot be overstated. A reduced footprint will require contingency access to a diverse and redundant array of logistical, headquarters, and deep-water transit facilities to accommodate a rapid deployment should the need arise. Wherever possible, propositioning arrangements should be preserved or even expanded. Every effort should also be made to preserve and enhance security assistance as well as advisory and training activities throughout the region. These arrangements will depend upon constant consultation with friends and allies and the rehabilitation of relationships that have, in some instances, been neglected or strained.
D O N OVAN
Other factors will play important roles in compensating for a footprint that could be reduced by as much as 40–50 percent in next few years.17 Over the long term, technological advances will improve U.S. force projection capabilities. In the meantime, alternative-basing concepts, including maritime pre-positioning, should be explored. Rotating forces throughout the region rather than permanently deploying them at fixed locations would help to reduce visibility and minimize political costs.18 Carefully coordinating the deployment of landbased airpower with the carrier presence in the Gulf will help to preserve capabilities while relieving the currently overworked naval presence. Where the U.S. military remains, business as usual will no longer suffice. The United States should make a concerted effort to educate local populations about the necessity and value of the U.S. presence or aid. More importantly, local governments will have to stand up and be counted when it comes to their own military ties with the United States. Too often, these regimes have relied on silence and authority rather than explaining the value and purpose of U.S. commitments to their countries.19 Doing otherwise encourages the belief that the true purpose of U.S. military ties is to support an elite few. Washington also needs to amend its approach to the Arab Middle East to include political, economic, and social reform as a strategic priority. A reduced military profile in the Middle East will allow Washington to achieve this reform more effectively.20 It is clear that these authoritarian and ossified political systems are ill-equipped to foster long term stability. Poor governance, dubious human rights records, and questionable
Conflict& Security
claims of legitimacy will aggravate the looming political, economic, demographic, and environmental pressures that will increasingly challenge these regimes. Just as the U.S. military presence in the region has been associated with the maintenance of the political status quo, the reduction of that presence could be associated with the measured expectation of reform. Finally, the Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to be the core issue affecting U.S.-Arab military relations.21 Washington’s efforts there, and the degree to which it is perceived to be an honest broker, will largely determine the extent to which relations with the United States are a political liability for Arab governments. U.S.-Arab military relations will continue to be negatively influenced by Washington’s inability or unwillingness to exert pressure to halt the construction of settlements or limit Israeli incursions.22 Arab governments do not require that the United States terminate its security relationship with Israel, but they do want evidence that Washington does not value it above all else. All of these governments hoped that Washington would have attempted to mitigate potential domestic backlash from “Operation Iraqi Freedom” by reinvesting its energy in the peace process prior to the invasion. The failure to do so has raised the stakes surrounding meaningful progress in the future. Many in Washington will be loath to give up hard-won access in the region. But, in the end, U.S. policymakers and military strategists may find that less is more when it comes to the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. With the departure of Saddam Hussein, short term security in the region will be enhanced. But threats to the long term Summer/Fall 2003 [ 5 9 ]
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stability of the region remain and military assets are of limited utility in addressing them. Much will depend on Washington’s success in rebuilding Iraq and the timeliness of the United States’s departure from that country. Circumstances could change quickly if Arab governments become convinced that the invasion of Iraq was not a one-time contingency, but, on the other hand, the first step in a plan to reshape the Middle East through military activism. In the meantime, a reduced presence in the region will allow Washington the latitude
it needs to encourage the kind of economic and political change that will foster legitimacy and better equip these governments to cope with the challenges that lie ahead. The United States cannot afford to completely withdraw from the region. But Arab populations and governments have become well acquainted with U.S. military capabilities. By replacing forward deployments with forward engagement, Washington can continue to ensure the security of its Arab allies while better acquainting them with American political values.
N OT E S
1 Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," Foreign Affairs 18, no. 1 (January/February 2002): 77. Indyk describes the bargain as follows: "Moderate Arab allies would provide the U.S. military with access to bases and facilities to help contain the ‘rogues’ and would support Washington’s efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict; in return, Washington would not exert significant pressure for domestic reform." 2 The U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet has been headquartered in Bahrain since 1995. Bahrain also hosts the Sheik Isa air base. Kuwait hosts the al Salem and al Jaber airbases, and Army camps Doha and Arifjan. In Oman, the U.S. maintains the Masnaah, Masirah, Seeb, and Thumrait airbases. In the UAE, there is a limited presence including an Air Force and Navy facility at al Dhafra and Jebel Ali, respectively. Qatar now hosts al Udeid air base and CENTCOM’s theater command center at al Sayliyah. There is a combined air operations center at Prince Sultan airbase and other facilities at Eskan, Saudi Arabia. The United States Air Force also maintains Incirlik airbase, Diyarbakir, and Batman airbase in Turkey. 3 Following the events of September 11, the United States expanded its military presence elsewhere in the CENTCOM region. In the early 1990s, Washington established a series of quiet training and advisory relationships with the newly independent states of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. These relationships were quickly capitalized on and a series of more permanent bases were established in preparation for operations to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. Beyond the several thousand troops now stationed in Afghanistan, "enhanced engagement" has led to a modest U.S. military footprint that includes four out of the five Central Asian countries. 4 The case of Saudi Arabia is the most extreme example, but it is nevertheless instructive. The presence of thousands of Western, non-Muslim troops in close proximity to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina is seen as heretical by some Saudis, including Osama
[ 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
bin Laden. Critics charge that a reliance on foreign troops highlights the vulnerability of the monarchy and suggests that the defense of the Kingdom has been mismanaged in view of the billions spent on weapons. In the eyes of the religious opposition, the U.S. presence calls into question the Islamic credentials of the monarchy. Consequently the western troops that remained in the Kingdom after the Gulf conflict did so in order to prop up an illegitimate government. 5 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), 191. 6 See Gary Sick, "Rethinking Dual Containment," Survival 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 5–32. 7 Hussein Aryan, "Iranian Naval Modernization: The Strategic Implications," Jane’s Intelligence Review 12, no. 9 (September 2000): 17. 8 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Iran’s Nuclear Ambition’s," Strategic Comments 9, no. 2 (March 2003). 9 General Anthony Zinni, interview with author, 11 March 2003. 10 For a discussion of the dynamics that drive conflicts in the Middle East, see Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991), ch. 2. 11 P.W. Singer, Time for the Hard Choices: The Dilemmas Facing U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, The Brooking Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, Working Paper No. 1 (September 2002), 4. 12 Michael O’Hanlon, "Shinseki Vs. Wolfowitz," Washington Times (4 March 2003), 19. 13 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in Iraq," New York Times (20 April 2003), 1. 14 Kenneth Pollack, interview with author, 11 March 2003. 15 General Anthony Zinni, interview with author, 11 March 2003. 16 Patrick E. Tyler, "Saudis Plan To End U.S. Presence," New York Times (9 February 2003).
D O N OVAN
17 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "U.S. Forces in the Persian Gulf," Strategic Comments 9, no. 3 (May 2003). 18 General Anthony Zinni, interview with author, 11 March 2003. For an excellent discussion of these factors, see Richard D. Sokolsky, "Beyond Containment: Defending U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf," Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (September 2002), accessible at
Conflict & Security
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_03.html. 19 Anthony H. Cordesman, "The U.S. Military and the Evolving Challenges in the Middle East," Naval War College Review 40, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 83. 20 Ibid. 21 General Anthony Zinni, interview with author, 11 March 2003. 22 Cordesman, "The U.S. Military and the Evolving Challenges in the Middle East.�
Summer/Fall 2003 [ 6 1 ]
Culture&Society Poland’s Uncertain Future: Politicized Religion and European Integration Piotr H. Kosicki On October 9, 2002, G nter Verheugen, the Commissioner for Expansion of the European Union, announced that Poland—along with the nine other countries of the so-called Laeken-10 group—had been officially selected to join the European Union in 2004.1 After a decade of reforms designed to keep pace with the other Laeken-10 nations, the only barrier between Poland and EU membership was recently eliminated in a domestic referendum held on June 8, 2003, in which a majority of Polish citizens voted to join the EU. Yet, the debate over whether Poland should join the European Union is far from over; significant moral and cultural concerns remain. Polish national identity has historically been intertwined with Catholicism, and, as a result, the sociopolitics of religion continue to shape decision-making.2 Wide acceptance of the Church’s place as defender of both religious and national identities has generated cleavages between the plethora of actors who define Polish Catholicism. Faced with potentially contradictory allegiances to the institutional Catholic Church, the media, political parties, and the Pope, Polish Catholics often lose sight of where religious authority ends and civil government begins. These moral-religious concerns demand serious consideration. Even within current EU member states, skeptics argue
Piotr H. Kosicki is a President’s Scholar in the Program in International Relations and the Department of History at Stanford University. He is the winner of the 2002 Gordon Craig Prize for Historical Writing.
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that the emergence of a Leviathan superstate has spurred moral decay. Both supporters and critics of Poland’s accession to the EU fear that membership might dilute the values traditionally associated with the national and religious identities of Polish society. Anti-integrationist groups go so far as to portray the European Union as an emerging amoral Orwellian entity. With the aim of separating legitimate concerns over traditional religious values from dogmatic rhetoric made under the guise of Polish Catholicism, the referendum may serve as an effective point of departure for reconsidering the role of the Church in Polish society.
Poland’s Return to Europe: A Question of Identity. The collapse of the Soviet-sponsored Polish People’s Republic in 1989, combined with the introduction of a pluralistic society, freemarket economy, and republican body politic, generated two main interpretations of the legitimate scope of the Church’s role in society. The debate over these interpretations continues to be a national stumbling block almost fifteen years later. Some Catholics believe both that the Church should provide spiritual guidance, but should avoid any discussion of sociopolitical issues—including EU accession—and that Poland should integrate into the European Union. In contrast, ultra-conservative Catholics expect the Church to speak in the name of the nation, to provide guidance in all realms of life, and to eliminate the need for individuals to consider theological and political issues themselves. Those taking this view staunchly oppose accession to the European Union on the grounds that it would interfere with the traditional role of the Church in Polish society, and cor[ 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
rode Polish morals. The middle ground between these interpretations is a work in progress. Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, head sociologist for Poland’s Office of the Commitee for European Integration, and Hanna Suchocka, Poland’s Ambassador to the Vatican, for example, argue that the Church should act as an agendasetter by offering guidance without appearing to interfere in Polish society. Yet, their balanced judgment is a rarity even among members of the elite.3 One of the few points that pro-integrationists and anti-integrationists agree upon is that a general identity crisis plagues Polish society. Whereas pro-integrationists tend to see this crisis as a symptom of a more endemic problem in the Polish ethos, anti-integrationists describe it as a temporary “sickness” from which Poland must cure itself before it even considers moving toward sociopolitical union with other nations.4 Suchocka and Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, former Secretary-General of the Polish episcopate, both chose the word “libertarianism” to represent the crisis currently afflicting Poland.5 Born of an overly-zealous desire to assimilate liberalism into a culture emerging from totalitarian oppression, libertarianism has arguably created a state of affairs in which individuals feel free to act entirely according to their own will, with no consideration of the moral repercussions. Yet, this brand of individualism has broader implications—including the degradation of fundamental social rules of order and justice. Although many proand anti-integrationists agree that a crisis of libertarianism exists, the contrast of their proposed solutions to the problem elucidates the conflicts that may precede— and follow—EU integration. This issue has proven to be central. If Poles have compromised their national
KO S I C K I
cohesion in an attempt to prove themselves worthy of “Western” status, as several prominent authors have argued, will EU entry only make matters worse, or will it force Poles to pull themselves together?6 Answers to this question vary even among pro-integrationists. Krzysztof Zanussi, a world-renowned film director, argues that integration into the European Union will weaken Poland’s ability to preserve its heritage.7 Yet, Zdzislaw Najder, former advisor to the Prime Minister of Poland, argues that the friction between Polish Catholic traditional values and the European Union’s liberal values may serve as de facto shock therapy, reforming Polish identity for the better.8 In contrast, antiintegrationists like Dr. Czachorowski, an assistant professor of ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin, suggest that, if Poland is indeed sick in that it has lost its sense of self, it is best to keep Poland out of the realm of potential contamination that is the European Union.9
Europe as a “Spiritual Community.” The unique way in which Pope John Paul II connects Polish Catholics with each other and to Europe as a whole offers a potential solution to this impasse. During the past fifteen years, the Pope has attempted to build a European sociopolitical framework based in part on Catholicism. In doing so, the Pope has raised the rudimentary question of what value system the EU intends to use as the basis for its future policy and development—a question other European countries have persistently avoided addressing. He argues that “there will be no European union unless it is also a spiritual community.”10 Such a community would reduce criticism of the European Union in Poland. If such a “community” were to develop, anti-integrationist fears of
Culture & Society
Poland’s contamination by the purported moral looseness of the EU would evaporate, and the shock therapy suggested by Najder would be far less austere—and more effective. Europe’s enthusiasm towards the possibility of celebrating her religious past, however, ranges from half-hearted to non-existent. Christian Democrats, especially in Germany and Spain, welcome the Pope’s support for European unification primarily for the political boost it offers them in the eyes of Catholic electorates.11 In contrast, Social Democrats seek to distance themselves from religious associations. Polish antiintegrationists cite the words of German President Johannes Rau, a Social Democrat, from the March 12, 2000, conference of Central and Eastern European presidents in Gniezno: Thus we need European values unaffiliated with religious beliefs, grounded in toleration and freedom of religion, in other words, that everyone might and should have a right to his own religion, but we cannot allow for there to exist a clerical superstructure in our continent.12 To anti-integrationists, the first clause signifies the beginning of the deteroriation of their Catholic values. Even Jozef Zycinski, the Archbishop of Lublin and a staunch supporter of integration, reacted strongly to Rau’s statement, arguing that it suggests that the Vatican poses a threat to the very values, such as brotherly love and social justice, that are fundamental to Catholicism.13 Rau’s condemnation of “clerical superstructure” illustrates the perception among many that the European Union Summer/Fall 2003 [ 6 5 ]
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intends to exclude Catholic values from any future European constitution. These fears coalesced when, on July 3, 2002, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution recommending that EU member and candidate states alike relax abortion restrictions “in order to safeguard women’s reproductive health and rights.”14 Polish anti-integrationists instantly seized on this statement as a portent of future EU intrusions into national social policy. Because the EU currently lacks a constitution that would
the Irish people’s final decision to ratify the Nice Treaty on October 19, 2002. Nonetheless, anti-integrationists continue to point to Ireland’s initial rejection of the Nice Treaty as a warning of the European Union’s tendency to infringe on traditional values in the name of “liberal” policy. The Pope and pro-integrationist Catholic thinkers have been troubled as well, and argue that formal recognition of the Christian origin of brotherly love and social justice is essential to prevent two
Anti-integrationist groups portray the
European Union as an emerging amoral Orwellian entity. delegate normalized authority over social matters, the EP’s resolution has no binding legal implications. However, it underscores two fear-inspiring trends for “traditional” Polish Catholics: (1) a growing proclivity in EU member states toward legalizing abortion in the context of (2) increasing powers of the EU bureaucracy on sociopolitical issues. The first trend has evolved independently of any official EU action, yet the drive toward at least partial legalization of abortion has succeeded in every EU member state except Ireland. Many Poles share the Irish concern over integration. Ireland’s initial rejection of the recently ratified Nice Treaty was due in part to fears that the treaty would enable the EU to force abortion legalization upon Ireland through a “back door.”15 Neither the treaty nor the EU acquis communautaire, however, hints at any such possibility. Realization of the irrelevance of “back door” considerations played a large role in [ 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
potential outcomes: (1) Europe falling into denial of its common foundation of Christian values; and (2) Europe treating Christian ethical standards, such as the sinfulness of abortion and euthanasia, as subject to the “postmodern relativization of good and evil.”16 In a society that values free speech, there is a fine line between postmodern relativization and juridical order. Indeed, Archbishop Zycinski, while tolerant of axiological debate, was quick to impose limits on “relativistic” discourse. In his harsh response to Rau’s statement, he argued that an EU value system truly “unaffiliated with religious beliefs” could result in a society similar to Hitler’s Third Reich.17 The Polish Catholic hope to attach a Christian foundation to the emerging EU axiology has historical roots—and is extremely important since it is a common element in both the pro- and anti-integrationist approaches.18 Pro-integrationists frequently raise the issue of the “Christian inspiration” of the EU,
KO S I C K I
emphasizing the religiosity of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, and Konrad Adenauer, the politicians who initiated the process of European integration in 1952. Dr. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz presents the following retrospective analysis of Schuman, de Gasperi, and Adenauer’s Christianity: The societies that pushed them onto the political scene were undergoing a time of reckoning with their national consciences .All three men were Catholics, but their value systems grew out of a broader, Christian axiological formula.19 That some EU countries have moved away from the Union’s Christianinspired beginnings has brought criticism from many Polish Catholics. Bishop Pieronek, for example, expressed regret that some EU lawmakers have begun to move in the direction of “law-making that fails to take into account Christian principles,” in response to the attempts to legalize abortion.20 Others, such as pro-integrationists R za Thun and Zanussi, feel comfortable praising Christians of western Europe for their ability to integrate Christian values into their societies, while Polish Catholicism remains stuck in its libertarian quandary.21 Whether the EU will embrace or reject the Christian values historically embedded in European society remains uncertain. The fear of losing national sovereignty has hampered the coordination of any EU-wide social policy thus far, and may well render a fundamental statement of principles either uncodified or, if codified, relatively generic. Nevertheless, the quest of Polish elites to prevent values from being compromised in open polit-
Culture & Society
ical debate will continue. Professor Alojzy Nowak captured the sentiment of the pro-integrationists: even if it enters as a “second-class” member state, Poland will have a far better chance of keeping axiological issues alive for all of Europe than if it were to reject EU accession.22 Unfortunately, balancing democratic juridical processes with a respect for the Christian values that form the foundations of European culture is one of the most difficult problems confronting the European Union today.
Conclusion. While sharing a common theology and obedience to the Pope, Polish Catholics diverge on the extent to which they should permit religion to enter into sociopolitical discourse. Proand anti-integrationist elites alike encourage discussion on the refocusing of Polish Catholic identity, but disagree on the context in which discussion should take place. In the eyes of prointegrationists, the EU will force Poland to confront itself, and such a confrontation is desirable sooner rather than later, since it will minimize the long-term confusion generated by globalization and libertarianism. On the other hand, antiintegrationists believe that Poland will not be able to correct itself through serious discussion unless it is able to set the terms of its own transformation, rather than being forced to adapt to terms imposed by the European Union. This debate illustrates the imperative for open discussion in a country where the threads of religion and nationality have been tangled by history. The legitimate concerns buried within politicized religious rhetoric may emerge if the Episcopate provides guidance without interfering in politics, and initiates a broad, propaganda-free discussion Summer/Fall 2003 [ 6 7 ]
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encompassing all of the various elements of Polish Catholicism. By demonstrating its ability to offer cohesive guidance while remaining open, the Church may be able to de-mystify rhetoric, bridge cleavages, and reforge its own role in Polish society. Author’s Note: The basis for the analysis in this paper is a small portion of extensive material collected in thirteen interviews with Poles in the fields of politics, the clergy, academia, the media, and the fine arts, to whom I wish to convey my respect and gratitude for
participating in this research. As the interviews were conducted in Polish, all quotations are in the author’s translation. It should be noted that these individuals come from the elite and are in some sense unrepresentative of the Polish population as a whole, given their greater levels of education, income, contextual information, and sociopolitical involvement. However, they represent respected authorities in the respective areas of Polish Catholicism and Polish EU entry. This article would not have been possible without the efforts of Mrs. Lidia Kosk, Dr. Danuta E. KoskKosicka, Mr. Andrzej J. Kosicki, and Professor Norman Naimark, as well as the generosity of Stanford University.
N OT E S
1 The Laeken-10 group consists of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 2 Norman Davies documents the intertwining of Polish national and Catholic identities in Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) and Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). The topic has also been the subject of recent research by Brian Porter (see “The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History,” Slavic and East European Journal 45, no. 2). 3 Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, interview by author, 3 September 2002. Hanna Suchocka, interview by author, 28 August 2002. 4 Marek Czachorowski, interview by author, 6 September 2002. 5 Tadeusz Pieronek, interview by author, 2 September 2002. Also, Suchocka, interview by author, 28 August 2002. 6 Marek A. Cichocki, interview by author, 23 August 2002. 7 Krzysztof Zanussi, interview by author, 29 August 2002. 8 Zdzislaw Najder, interview by author, 4 September 2002. 9 Marek Czachorowski, interview by author, 6 September 2002. 10 John Paul II, Speech in Gniezno, 3 June 1997. Reprinted in Henryk J. Muszynski, A Spiritual Europe (Europa Ducha), 7. 11 Jonathan Chaplin, “Christian Theories of Democracy” (1998). Accessible at: http://www.psa. ac.uk/cps/1998/chaplin.pdf, 8. 12 Johannes Rau, quoted in Diary of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, April 2001. Accessible at: http://www.senat.gov.pl/k4/dok/diar/61/6101.htm.
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13 J zef Zycinski, interview by author, 6 September 2002. 14 Anne E.M. Van Lancker, European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities: Report on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (6 June 2002). Accessible at: http://www2.europarl.eu.int/. 15 Brigid Laffan, “The Nice Treaty: The Irish Vote,” Notre Europe (Research and Policy Group, July 2001), 7. 16 Adam Boniecki, interview by author, 2 September 2002. 17 J zef Zycinski, interview by author, 6 September 2002. 18 “Axiology” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “the theory of value.” The word found its way into each of the author’s interviews. Individuals used it to convey a variety of context-dependent meanings that illustrate the paradox underlying any attempt to define the influence of religion on sociopolitical decisionmaking. The values that guide Catholicism’s influence are both an historically-established component of the Polish national ethos and an ambiguous matrix of emotional and spiritual propensities that manifests itself differently depending on the regime in power and the contemporary cultural spirit. 19 Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Return Path or Road to the Unknown? Poles’ European Dilemmas (Warszawa: Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1998), 33. 20 Tadeusz Pieronek, interview by author, 2 September 2002. 21 Krzysztof Zanussi, interview by author, 29 August 2002. Also, R za Thun, interview by author, 3 September 2002. 22 Alojzy Z. Nowak, interview by author, 9 September 2002.
Culture & Society
Assimilation and Struggle Maghrebi Immigration and French Political Culture Catherine Wihtol de Wenden The story of the French state’s relationship with North African immigration is both turbulent and complex. Migration from France’s former colonies in the Maghreb into the French metropole has affected myriad aspects of the French political calculus, from the two world wars, the internal conflicts of the working class, and the mobilization in the French homeland for Algerian independence to integration policies and Islam in France. Moreover, these flows of North African peoples have played a crucial role in the framing of public policy and in the socialization of immigrant cultures in France. Yet, North African (Maghrebi) immigrants form neither a homogeneous political group, nor an isomorphic cultural community. Indeed, the North African immigrant community continues to diversify with newcomers, elites, middle classes, and refugees from the Maghreb, as the second and third generations acquire French citizenship and, occasionally, break their links with their countries of origin. While a section of Maghrebis maintains invisibility in the social and political sphere, others fight for recognition. Most now play an ambiguous part, mixing traditional French republican values with Muslim community belongings. To elucidate the role of Maghrebis in French political culture, this article will first review the history and then explore the impact of Maghrebis
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden is Professor at the Center for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po, Paris.
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on French politics, as well as the con- immigrant groups. Until 1974, Maghrebi flicts emerging from their participation. workers had a high rate of turnover, sending remittances to their families and Historical Background. France has organizing their existence around their been a recipient of massive overseas places of work, hostel accommodations, immigration, particularly compared with trade unions with home country organiits European neighbors. Approximately zations (official or dissident), and visits 3.3 million immigrants live in France, to the coffee shop. Since 1974, the socioincluding 650,000 Algerians, 550,000 political situation of the Maghrebis has Moroccans, 200,000 Tunisians, and slowly changed. First, family reunifica500,000 “harkis” (natives of Algeria tion in France has tended to accelerate who helped France during the Algerian because workers have feared that France war and were French citizens), and would close its borders. Consequently, approximately one million second or from 1975 until 1982, non-European third generation French-born citizens of immigrants, a majority of them Maghrebi origin. Much of the first gen- Maghrebis, for the first time outnumeration was recruited after both world bered European immigrants. Second, wars to support the reconstruction of there has been an increase in migration France, mainly through work in mining from Tunisia and Morocco, much of it and industry. The “thirty glorious years” illegal, due to the decrease in labor (1945–1975) marked a period of heavy migration from southern Europe. reliance on cheap, migrant labor to fuel a Third, as a result of family reunification, resurgent domestic economy. Employers a second generation has begun to directly recruited in many of the former appear—many of whom were born in colonies (particularly in Morocco) for France. A proportion of the so-called workers in the agricultural and industri- “Maghreb” population has therefore al sectors. During the economic contrac- neither migrated nor ever had the legal tion and recession of 1974, however, the status of a foreigner. state gradually moved towards a policy of By the end of the 1970s, immigration tightened border control that reached its emerged as a political issue in which height in 1985–2000. During this time, North African immigrants and their chilthe mass influx of North Africans dimin- dren played the central role, especially ished and became limited to smaller through their use of hunger strikes. The groups of the population: the gentrified period 1981–1990 was a turning point for and the feminized—refugees from the immigrant issue in French politics. In Algeria and Tunisia, experts, seasonal the first half of the decade, politicians workers, workers under short term con- emphasized granting human rights and tracts, and trainees—as well as those seek- the freedom of association to foreigners. ing illegal entrance and work. But the March 1983 local elections saw the Immigration to France from the nationalist and xenophobic National Maghreb has been a gradual process Front gain significant electoral backing, throughout the twentieth century. The revealing that immigration had become a diverse social, economic, and political politically-charged issue. Social movepresence of North African immigrants, ments in 1983–1984 rose in response, however, has made them unique among stimulating new forms of political partic[ 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
DE W E N D E N
ipation among the second generation, who claimed both equal rights and the right to be different. Meanwhile, the extreme right hinted at the inability of the children of Maghrebis to integrate into society. Political debates focused on whether there could be an allegiance between French and Muslim culture. Some activists, such as the leaders of France Plus and SOS Racisme, gained access to the “Summits of the State,” while
Culture & Society
mobilization and segmentation of the Maghrebi community, particularly in the economic and political spheres. Sociopolitical mobilization by Maghrebi immigrants and their children has gone through distinct trends. Three are particularly important: 1) Immigrants as Foreigners. Migrant workers first became organized in relation to their country of origin in the 1960s and 1970s, with a focus on home country
Most Maghrebi immigrants mix traditional
republican values with Muslim community belongings. middle class elites emerged as mediators between the immigrant suburban groups and the beurgeoisie.1 The structure of the Maghrebi immigrant population, meanwhile, had been transformed into two readily distinguishable categories: an older and a younger generation. The older group, although still active, was increasingly threatened by unemployment in the automobile, steel, and mining industries. The younger generation consisted mostly of French citizens, who, in spite of many difficulties—among them delinquency, unemployment, insufficient vocational training, relative failure at school, and gender conflict—was more disposed to economic, socio-cultural, and political selforganization and integration into French culture than the older. This diversity also led to the confrontation of two other sections of North Africans in France: Between the marginalized second generation and the largely-professional cadre of newcomers and refugees. The diversity of interests among immigrant groups has caused increased
issues, sometimes with strong links to French or foreign unions. “Amicales,” official organizations headed by foreign governments, attempted to control their nationals abroad, such as the well-known Amicale des Alg riens en Europe, which disappeared only in the 1990s. Other examples include associations dedicated to the defense of foreign workers’ rights in France and opposed to the Moroccan regime, such as the Association des Travailleurs Marocains en France (ATMF). Today, the situation has changed, with a re-centering of some formerly opposing associations, which have now built more links to their countries of origin. The ATMF (now AMF), for example, is involved in co-development programs with Morocco. 2) Immigrant Children ( beurs ). In the 1980s, the movement of the second generation of Franco-Maghrebis generated new forms of struggle and participation. The fight against racism, the struggle for civic rights and for a new definition of citizenship stressing socialization based on plural belongings, the promotion of Summer/Fall 2003 [ 7 1 ]
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socio-cultural integration in the suburbs, and the mobilization against police and judicial discrimination all rose to prominence. Many Franco-Maghrebis became involved in local political life, and have been elected to municipal posts since 1989, when the civic association France Plus ran 550 “beurs” as candidates in municipal elections. About 150 succeeded in 1989, 1995, and 2001, but none achieved the rank of MP and only a few went to the European Parliament. 3) Immigrants as Mediators. Groups using the socio-political traditions of leadership from the colonial past, while exhibiting republican and secularized values, reappeared with the new urban policy of the 1990s. Characterized by their use of social and religious institutions for social peace, members of these groups are both more social and more local than the former civic associations, and are less covered by the media.
North African Immigration as a Political Stake. The emergence of North African immigrant activism has brought several challenges to the French political game. Most importantly, it has made citizenship one of the central issues in French politics. The theme of a new citizenship emerged in 1986 in response to the democratic crisis caused by the rise of individualism and the growth of collective identities contrary to the traditional French republican approach. Since 1985, Le Pen has led the charge against those he believes “do not deserve to be French”—spurring a national debate on the reform of the nationality code in 1987, as well as a reexamination of the link between nationality, citizenship, and loyalty. For the “beurs” associations, Le Pen’s instigation provided an opportunity to [ 7 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
call for a citizenship of residence, dissociated from nationality. The associations asserted that it was possible to be both French and Muslim. In the meantime, this public debate led many Muslim immigrants to embrace the dominant Socialist party in the presidential elections of 1988 (according to exit polls, more than 80 percent of the “beurs” voted for François Mitterrand). In the process, the "beurs" transformed themselves into a potent political force not to be ignored. Maghrebi immigrants have also challenged the place of Islam in French institutions. This issue gained widespread attention during the “headscarf affair” of 1989, in which there was an intense debate over the legality of wearing traditionally “Muslim” garb in secular locales, such as public schools. With four million Muslims, France has the largest number of Muslim residents in Europe. Most of them practice a quiet Islam: rural, popular, with little obedience to the five pillars of the religion, in addition to staunch opposition to practices imposed from abroad, especially Wahabi or Salafi fundamentalism. But Muslim identity in France is pluralistic indeed. For immigrants or “beurs” of North African origin, hard and fast identity boundaries do not exist. For example, although most Muslims celebrate Ramadan as a symbol of community belonging, few observe other obligations. Mixed marriages are frequent, especially among Algerians. As a result, one would have difficulty discerning the signs of a strictly “Islamic” vote in France. Neither during the Gulf War, nor during the present conflict with Iraq has there been distinct “Islamic-only” political mobilization. The 1,000 Islamic associations officially registered
D E WENDEN
in France are more involved in the institutionalization of French Islam than in the exercise of political influence. The political mobilization of ethnicity has become a heated issue, given the general lack of public support for the collective rights of ethnic minorities. Many French are reluctant to support increased multicultural programming given the exclusivity of Jacobinist values: secularism, formal equality, legal freedom, civic values of living together (fraternit ), with an exclusive allegiance to the state (patriotisme). Paradoxically, this model at once guarantees and is challenged by the right to be different, the pluralism of allegiances, the
Culture & Society
The turning point for the expression of multiculturalism was the 1980s, thanks to the freedom of foreign associations and to the emergence of "beurs" leaders focusing on the right to be different (SOS Racisme), the legitimacy of mixed identities (France Plus), and the dissociation of nationality and citizenship. Many leaders fought against racial discrimination and social exclusion while aiming to recognize ethnic and religious belongings. Others were subsidized by the public for their civic values, while they managed their associations in a multicultural manner. This contradiction was raised by Pierre-Andr Taguieff, who
For immigrants of North African origin,
hard and fast identity boundaries do not exist. plural citizenship model, intercultural relations, and the free expression of groups and minorities. North African communities, however, are often opposed to assimilation, integration (more used today in public policies), social cohesion (the term used by Jacques Chirac during the 2002 presidential campaign), republican and national citizenship (used by Jean-Pierre Chev nement), equality of rights (the French reference to the fight against discrimination), or the social contract of rights and duties.2 The second generation of North Africans is challenging both the republican and Muslim separatist models, leaving some room for ethnicity while respecting the republican frame in which they and their parents have been socialized: a "multiculturalisme la française"—a citizenship resulting from a permanent compromise in a neocolonial management of differences.
argues that pleading for the right to be different would lead to the exclusion of the descendants of North Africans, and would convince the extreme right of the impossibility of Islamic assimilation into French society.3 Most Islamic associations rapidly came to understand the benefits to be gained from accepting civic and republican values—mainly, the achivement of social peace. Some expressions of dissent, however, have begun to appear in relations with the police, as well as with the refusal of allegiance to French symbols, such as the denial of the French flag during a friendly French/Algerian soccer match in 2001.
Conclusion. France has, for some time, managed the immigration flows resulting from its colonial past with the complicity of ethnic and religious mediators, who essentially conceded to republican values. In the generations Summer/Fall 2003 [ 7 3 ]
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following colonialism, however, ethnic and cultural identity came more frequently from the representations and incentives of political parties and local public powers than from association leaders or locally-elected youth elites: they have been used to legitimize public policies such as the Arabe de service and are required to stick to multicultural aims in the republican frame—but not to apply for more ambitious and non-ethnic jobs or goals.
This ambiguous game in which the second and third generations play republican cards in their negotiation of identities is possible because Maghrebis have become the primary actors in shaping their own lives. They have been socialized into the French administrative culture and they increasingly know how to work within it. Ultimately, they set the tune for all French integration policy in a compromise that, in turn, continually redefines French identity.
N OT E S
1 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, and R my Leveau, La beurgeoisie, Les trois ages de la vie associative issue de l’immigration ( Paris: CNRS Editions, 2001).
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2 Dominique Schnapper, La Communaut des citoyens (Paris: Gallimard, 1995). 3 Pierre-Andr Taguieff, La force des pr jug s: Essai sur le racisme et ses doubles (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).
Law&Ethics Afghanistan Prospects for the Future Lakhdar Brahimi As we know from many peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavors over the past decades, ending conflict and returning peace and stability is an extremely difficult, complex, and uncertain process that requires steadfast commitment from the parties involved in the conflict as well as from the international community. After 23 years of war, Afghanistan is in the midst of this endeavor. Before looking ahead to the future prospects for peace in Afghanistan, we must first look backward to Bonn and the central agreement underpinning the peace process. With the fall of the Taliban in 2001, an opportunity emerged for the country to start on the long road back to peace. The peace talks convened at Bonn in November 2001 attempted to take advantage of that opportunity by capitalizing on the newfound commitment of the international community. The Bonn talks also manifested the deep yearning of most Afghans to return to peace. Building on this consensus, the Bonn Agreement defined a road map to peace, a process aimed at progressively achieving a more stable, legitimate government providing more justice, greater development, and lasting peace. No two conflicts are alike and every peace process needs to be specific to the particular circumstances of a conflict. The
Lakhdar Brahimi is Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Afghanistan.
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Bonn Agreement is even more specific than most. First of all, it had to accommodate the fact that, although fighting between military factions had come to an end in Afghanistan, the Taliban had not accepted defeat. It simply was not possible to have the Taliban present at Bonn; their cooperation with al Qaeda as well as their stubborn sheltering of terrorists precluded them from participating in the peace process.
ments of the Taliban government who may be willing to associate themselves today with the peace process. Allowing more political space to Afghans wishing to join into the peace process will reduce the number of people left outside with an incentive to destroy it. Second, the Bonn Agreement did not definitively fix the political or military terms of the peace. The institutions established at Bonn gave the Afghans a
If you ask an Afghan today about the one thing they lack most, he will tell you it is security. Without the presence of all of the conflicting parties, the Bonn Agreement was somewhat limited in that it could not initially accommodate the whole range of positions in the conflict. It has also become clear that some, if not all, of the most influential factions that emerged from both the war on terror and the Bonn Conference are still doing their best to monopolize power instead of to cooperate. Those who remember the years following the rise of the mujahedeen in 1992 know that similar attitudes led to the destruction of Kabul and then to the emergence and success of the Taliban movement. One year into the Bonn process, those who remember such lessons know that the chances for peace will only increase with the inclusion of a wider cross-section of Afghan political leadership than was present at Bonn or is present in the process now. There are many important constituencies that were not in attendance or represented at Bonn, and these groups should not be kept out of the process. There are also some individuals who were associated with less radical ele[ 7 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
strong framework by outlining a process that allowed for successively more representative government to be established. However, Afghans now have to chart much of the course of the peace process themselves, albeit with extensive international support. The initial interim power sharing arrangements were to be revisited in a loya jirga. The Loya Jirga held in June 2002 selected President Hamid Karzai to form the Transitional Administration. The Bonn Agreement formed the Civil Service and Judicial Reform Commissions to address fundamental institutional weaknesses left by years of war, and the Afghan Human Rights Commission was expected to propose solutions to the appalling human rights situation. Bonn also created the Constitutional Commission to prepare a new constitution to be adopted by another loya jirga in late 2003. Today, just a year into the process, the Government as well as these Commissions are in place and pushing forward. There are many encouraging signs. Over 1.5 million refugees and at least half
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a million internally displaced persons have returned home. Schools are functioning at an admittedly basic level (sometimes literally under a tree), generous funds from the international community are being applied toward myriad important goals, and no major outbreak of war has occurred. But the process is by no means assured. Peace remains precarious and the challenges ahead are great. Thus far, Afghans have been patiently allowing the new government time to establish itself, awaiting a “peace dividend” in the form of reconstruction and economic recovery, and suffering the lack of basic security while under the control of local military commanders. This year will be a critical one, which will reveal whether or not the peace process is fully entrenched. A number of parallel efforts must come together, including the creation of a new Afghan army and police along with the demobilization of existing forces, constitutional reform, initial preparations for elections, and the implementation of large-scale reconstruction and local development projects. Success in each of these areas will be dependent on making significant progress towards national reconciliation. Afghans from all regions must feel that their needs and concerns are taken into account, and that they can participate in public life if they choose. At the same time, each of these efforts also has the potential to disturb the current balance of power and unearth longstanding political tensions in Afghanistan.
done a great deal to bring stability to Kabul, and the U.S.–led coalition has helped prevent large-scale conflict from erupting. However, the average Afghan continues to live under the arbitrary— and often extortive—control of local military commanders, and must still worry about his land being confiscated and his family being safe on the roads. It is worth remembering that many Afghans welcomed the rise of the Taliban because it promised and largely delivered an end to such insecurities. Currently, the existence of numerous security forces undermines the authority of the central government and narrows the political space necessary for reform and participatory politics in Afghanistan. The United Nations has advocated for the expansion of ISAF since we believe that a relatively small number of troops could have a positive impact on security beyond Kabul. Unfortunately, the necessary support for this has not been forthcoming. Nevertheless, the international community has made extensive pledges to train and build a national army loyal to the government, and this may help resolve the situation over time. A decree signed by President Karzai in December last year provides the basis for the new multi-ethnic Afghan National Army; the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of all other forces; and the reform of the Ministry of Defense. The Afghan leadership and their international partners are now working hard to establish an institutional framework to implement this decree. The National Defense Commission, which brings Security and Reform of the together relevant ministerial departArmy. If you ask an Afghan today about ments and all major factional leaders, has the one thing they lack most, they will tell established sub-commissions for disaryou it is security. The International mament, demobilization, and recruitSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF) has ment for the new army. Summer/Fall 2003 [ 7 7 ]
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In the arena of elections preparation, it is
especially crucial to carefully balance Afghan ownership with necessary foreign assistance. Security in Afghanistan is crucial to the peace process, but achieving security will require much more than a new army. Police must be trained to uphold civil law and order; the judiciary must be reformed; and the cultivation and trafficking of drugs must be combated. These are all interdependent parts of the same challenge, and the international community has designated lead actors to help coordinate efforts with Afghan counterparts and gather resources from donors for each sector. The United States leads the army building effort; Germany heads the police training programs; Japan together with the United Nations works on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process; the United Kingdom has led drug control initiatives; and Italy has been instrumental in the justice sector. We meet regularly in Kabul to coordinate efforts, but we also seek to empower the Afghans by allowing them to define priorities and ensure that the institutions established are stable.
Constitutional Reform. This year will also be the year of constitutional reform. President Karzai has established a nine-member drafting committee, which has already done solid work in outlining the important issues and researching various constitutional options to deal with them. In the next phase, we expect the committee to be expanded to a wider, more representative Constitutional Commission. This summer, that Commission will undertake consultations [ 7 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
to hear the views and concerns of Afghans across the country in order to draft a constitution that better addresses the needs of the population. Afghans must feel a part of this process if they are to accept, respect, and protect the new constitution. Following the public consultation and discussions with constitutional experts, the Constitutional Loya Jirga will hopefully be held in October 2003. Here too, the process will not be without risk. Constitutional debate will bring forth fundamental debates about the state—federalism versus a unitary central government, the role of Islamic versus secular law, etc.—along with issues that deeply concern the general public, such as the role of women and minority rights. These are all issues about which sovereign countries and people are naturally protective. The constitutional process will need the assistance of the international community, both in terms of finances and legal expertise. However, we will have to be careful to preserve the perception and reality of a constitutional process that is fully owned and led by the Afghans.
Elections Preparation. In the arena of elections preparation, it is especially crucial to carefully balance Afghan ownership with necessary foreign assistance. The Bonn Agreement calls for elections by June 2004, and we are steadfastly working towards that ambitious target. Challenges to meeting that target include the lack of Afghan institutions capable of mounting an election, the complete absence of an electoral reg-
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ister, and confusion over the number of districts in the country. The respective strength of each ethnic group is another highly sensitive issue. For example, the Pashtuns claim to represent well over half of the Afghan population while others insist that they constitute fewer than forty percent. Many of the participants at Bonn felt that the issue of ethnic composition should be settled before the election through a UN-sponsored census, but that would take at least five years to complete. Yet another challenge inherent in the Bonn electoral timetable is the timing of the Constitutional Loya Jirga. If elections were to be held based on the results of this loya jirga, there would not be enough time to prepare for a June 2004 election. Therefore, President Karzai is considering preparing elections based on a specially drafted set of electoral laws that would apply only to the 2004 elections. This would allow the monumental tasks of voter education, registration, and ballot preparation to begin with ample time for thorough completion. Afghanistan will need the international community’s help to achieve these tasks. However, only the Afghan leadership will be able to craft the consensus required to produce this “once-off” electoral system in a manner acceptable to the Cabinet, civil society, and emerging political forces. Without this consensus, the eventual results of the election risk being contested.
processes, de-mobilized soldiers to have new means of income, and opium farmers to agree to switch to alternative livelihoods, Afghanistan’s economy must be revived. At the same time, economic progress will help to legitimize and strengthen new government institutions, and build incentives for rural Afghanistan to link with the center and remain involved in the peace process. Afghanistan will continue to depend on aid for some time, notwithstanding the government’s determination to become self-sufficient. Fortunately, donors recently reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan with many matching or increasing the amounts they pledged in 2002. This aid must now be used to generate employment and cash for work programs, build agricultural productivity, and invest in physical infrastructure. After two decades of war, the needs are vast and Afghans have high expectations. It will be a challenge for the government to manage these expectations, because even the $4.5 billion of aid promised cannot begin to cover the full cost of recovery, and people are naturally unhappy that their situations are not improving fast enough. However, I believe that if the Afghan government and the international community clearly explain what can and cannot be reasonably expected, Afghans will understand and take up the challenge to do the rest. They are a people well known in the region as hard workers and clever entreReconstruction and Recovery. preneurs, and what they ultimately need The political process in Afghanistan is set is a bit of assistance and enough peace to to accelerate, but economic recovery will complete the recovery themselves. be a precondition for the success of the various political processes that are Challenges Ahead. If Afghanistan underway. In order for refugees to can build a new army that can overcome return and participate in the political challenges by local forces, if basic civil law Summer/Fall 2003 [ 7 9]
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and order can be maintained, if a strong consensus underpins the new constitution, if a representative government can be elected, and if Afghans can reclaim their economic dignity, then the peace process might be said to be irreversible. That is a lot of ifs. And this uncertainty is compounded still more by the fact that this is not an uncontested project. I mentioned at the outset that the entire spectrum of political, social, and religious opinion was not represented at Bonn. I very much hope that President Karzai, who has shown great determination to open up the political arena to everyone, will succeed in incorporating those who support the peace process but feel they were not properly represented at Bonn. Such efforts at national reconciliation will be important given the political tensions that are bound to accompany the heavy agenda for 2003. At the same time, we know that some of elements outside the Bonn process remain against it, and that threat must also be addressed.
it signed a pact of “Good Neighborly Relations” with all of its neighbors, promising mutual support and noninterference.
Conclusion. Just over one year into the life of the Bonn peace process for Afghanistan, it is probably too early to draw any definitive conclusions. However, a few lessons are already apparent. Afghanistan was the first major peace mission after the publication of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, and a conscious effort has been made to implement some of its recommendations. Thus, the UN Secretary-General and his senior staff have tried to keep the UN Security Council informed of the situation in Afghanistan and strived to “tell the Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.” In Kabul as well as in New York, we try to describe reality exactly as we see it, and we are careful not to promise more than we can deliver. However, it has not
We cannot simply wish away complex
problems inherited from 25 years of conflict. There is no quick fix here. Sporadic, small-scale terrorist attacks have continued to occur in Afghanistan, and we know little about the ultimate intentions of the perpetrators. The continued presence of the international community will be necessary to deter those who might still wish to use violence to challenge the Bonn process. Afghanistan’s neighbors can also play an important role in protecting the peace process. Afghanistan’s intensive diplomatic efforts on this front reached a milestone on December 22, 2002 when [ 8 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
always been possible to avoid unrealistic expectations and consequent disappointment from both Afghan and international actors. A process like the one taking place in Afghanistan cannot conform to any mathematical, pre-established formula. Setbacks, hesitations, and false starts have to be accepted as part of the process; in fact, it is quite remarkable that the very tight timeline has so far been respected: The Interim Administration was sworn in on December 22, 2001; the Loya Jirga
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Commission was formed by January 22, 2002; and the Emergency Loya Jirga assembled by June 10, 2002 allowed the present government to take over from the Interim Administration at exactly the appointed time. All the commissions, including the Constitutional Drafting Commission, were established on time, and we hope that the Constitutional Loya Jirga will take place before the end of 2003 as required by Bonn. Of course, the Human Rights Commission is not yet in a position to address all the very serious abuses Afghan men and women still continue to suffer almost everywhere, let alone take on the equally serious abuses of the past. Likewise, the Judicial Commission has barely started to repair the total breakdown of the judicial sector after a quarter-century of neglect and devastation. The concerns of the international community for the Afghan people and the desire to see Afghanistan rapidly consolidate peace and build a working democracy are very welcome and commendable sentiments. The Afghan people wish to see these sentiments translate into lasting commitments to encourage and support their efforts as they strive to achieve these
Law & Ethics
very goals. However, neither the UN nor anyone else, no matter how sincere, may substitute themselves for the Afghans and solve the problems of Afghanistan for them. Throwing more and more foreign experts into Afghanistan will not solve these problems either. Lastly, we cannot simply wish away complex problems inherited from 25 years of conflict. There is no quick fix here. However, if the Afghan authorities and their international partners set realistic objectives; if the international community has the determination and patience to do what it takes to really help the situation; if, at the same time, we have the humility to realize that we are not wiser than Afghans about what is better for Afghanistan, then there is every reason for optimism. Only then can we reasonably hope that the international community shall effectively contribute to the stabilization of the peace process. Only then will the journey that started in Bonn on December 5, 2001 be successfully completed. Editors’ Note. This article is an edited transcript of the twenty-second annual Raymond Trainor Award Lecture sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University on January 27, 2003.
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The Militarization of Youth in Violently Divided Societies Observations on Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and South Africa. Marie Smyth The ability of both state and non-state actors to engage in armed conflict depends largely on their ability to recruit. As conflicts continue over time, armed groups rely on a continuing supply of young recruits. Recent studies have focused on the lack of compliance with age limits on recruitment, as set by international law, and the exploitation of children as child soldiers. Arguably more important, however, is the contribution of young combatants to the political dynamics of conflict, particularly the relationship between the military leadership and young combatants. Little attention has been paid to the role of young combatants in peace processes and settlements. Analysts have focused on less relevant individualistic factors, such as the psychological profile of a particular leader, in an attempt to assess the leader’s reliability or trustworthiness. However, an armed group’s ability to control its young soldiers is central to the ability of that group’s political and military leaders to uphold agreements and implement cease-fires.
Marie Smyth is Senior Fellow in the Jennings Randolph Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace and is on the academic staff at the University of Ulster and teaches at Smith College. She also serves on several boards and committees in Northern Ireland.
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Young Combatants and Society: Leone, where militias actually kidnap and Options for Young Combatants. forcibly conscript children, non-state The role that young people play in conflict depends on whether they can legitimately join an official, state-endorsed military organization. In some societies, young people, particularly young males, can enlist in the military. In those societies, conscription or enlistment is often characterized as a step that will “build character.” In some cases, conscription or enlistment is also advocated as a solution to the common adolescent problems of rebellion, misbehavior, or indolence. On the other hand, in societies where there is widespread resentment of official, state-endorsed military forces—such as the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland, the Palestinian communities in the Middle East, and townships in Apartheid South Africa—there appear to be two main ways for young people, predominantly males, to participate in broad insurgent movements. First, youth who are not formally recruited into insurgent militias or armies participate in political conflict by joining protest movements and popular insurgencies. As civilians, they attack state forces, riot, and engage in street violence. In all three locations— Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and South Africa—young people play informal roles as street fighters within broad insurgent movements. These young people manifest the collective resentment of their communities by engaging in street battles and throwing rocks, Molotov cocktails, and other missiles at their common enemies. The second way that young people, again predominantly male, are drawn into political conflict is through recruitment into insurgent militias or armies. Unlike some societies, such as Sierra [ 8 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
actors in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and South Africa rely on the willingness—in some cases eagerness—of youth to participate in armed conflict. In all three locations, insurgent militias successfully recruit large numbers of young males.
A Complex Relationship: Young Combatants and Their Families. The relationship between adults and young combatants within these insurgent communities is complex. Mainstream media coverage propagates the assumption that parents coach their children to take up arms, throw petrol bombs, or become suicide bombers. Adult community members generally tolerate the involvement of their youth in armed conflict. Occasionally they even actively support it. For example, young people who fought in the South African Defense Units described how their guns were bought by money contributed by each household in their township.1 Communities often see the youth’s militancy as a part of its defense against outside threats; thus, it is an articulation of the community’s interests. However, while adults in these communities may collectively condone youth rioting or participating in street disturbances aimed at the enemies of the community, few parents support or encourage their own children to become directly involved. Many children routinely go to great lengths to conceal their involvement from their parents. Young people in all three cases described how they covertly engaged in military training with nonstate groups and lied to their families about their whereabouts. Combatants describe climbing out of windows after
SMYTH
nightfall,2 or formulating alibis to keep their parents in ignorance of their membership in armed groups or militias.3 At one level, this concealment can be seen as adolescent defiance of parents’ wishes. However, at another level, it reflects the young combatants’ desire to keep their parents from worrying about their safety. The youth in these three regions found concealment was necessary for two reasons. First, security concerns precluded disclosure. Second, the young people
Law& Ethics
the local regiment, the Royal Irish Rangers. Military conscription in Israel currently ensures that all young people over the age of eighteen, except those exempted for religious reasons, serve two or three years in the Israeli army. As a result of conscription, young whites in South Africa followed a mainstream path and joined the state security forces. This military training of white South African youth served as a vital part of the Apartheid state’s defense.
Enlistment is advocated as a solution to
the common adolescent problems of rebellion, misbehavior, and indolence. anticipated that their parents would have attempted to prevent them from participating. In the case of young Palestinians, they also feared for their family’s safety given Israel’s policy of carrying out reprisals on the families of Palestinian combatants. It was common in these three locations for families to discover a son’s involvement in armed activity or his membership in an armed group only after his death or arrest.4
Official Military Organizations. The experience of youth in Northern Ireland, the Palestinian communities, and South Africa, sharply contrasts with that of youth in societies where enlistment in or conscription by an official, stateendorsed military organization is possible. These legitimate paths are available to the Unionist youth in Northern Ireland, the Israeli youth, or, in the past, the white South African youth. Considerable numbers of young people from the Unionist community in Northern Ireland volunteer to join the British Army, particularly
In all three dominant societies, youth have the option of building a career with the state security forces. This career opportunity provides youth motivated by patriotism or concerned about terrorism with an approved and conventional outlet to take up arms in defense of their community or country. A career path with the military or police also provides youth from these dominant societies with a legitimate route to achieving status and power within their society.5 Young people lawfully take up arms and assume authority over civilians, particularly civilians from “suspect” communities. When serving as military or police, youth that recently graduated from high school can demand compliance from a civilian who is many years their senior. In addition, youth culture incorporates notions of “coolness.” All youth strive to belong to the “coolest” military regiments or police units.6 Finally, societal rituals, such as parades and ceremonies, mark the attainment of higher status by new recruits, and parents Summer/Fall 2003 [ 8 5 ]
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describe their pride in having their offspring serve their country.7 Young Unionists, Israelis, and white South Africans have other routes into military roles besides conscription or voluntary enlistment in state forces. In Northern Ireland, these same young
and the declaration of the “War on Terrorism,” right wing militant groups are not perceived as constituting the same threat as the anti-state militias consisting of young Palestinians or Irish Nationalists. The peace process in Northern Ireland, specifically the state’s
Insurgent communities have developed
parallel, alternative processes of celebrating and honoring their youth by endorsing their actions through their culture of resistance to the state. people can join organizations of dubious legality within their communities, namely Loyalist militias such as the Ulster Volunteer Force or the Ulster Defense Association. Israeli youth in settler communities can join armed, militant gangs. Young White South Africans could become involved in white militias such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). In Northern Ireland and South Africa, there is evidence of some dual membership in the official state security forces and non-state militias or paramilitary groups. In Northern Ireland, for example, the criminal conviction of two members of the local British Army’s Ulster Defense Regiment for the murder of three Catholics in 1975, and the subsequent criminal conviction of other members for handing over security files to Loyalist paramilitaries, illustrate the links between Loyalists and the security forces in Northern Ireland.8 Certainly, a state’s attitude towards pro-state militias, or in the case of Israel, settler youth activities, is quite distinct from its attitude towards insurgent or anti-state militias, which the state regards as major threats. Particularly since 9/11 [ 8 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
differential treatment of the armed groups on each side, illustrates this difference in the perceived level of threat. As a prerequisite for political progress, the state demanded that the Irish Republican Army disband and decommission their weapons. Notwithstanding continued Loyalist killings, there is no such pressure for the Loyalist paramilitary groups to disband or decommission. Even in South Africa today, the state and society regard right wing violence as marginally threatening. Thus, not all youth involvement in political violence is equally problematic. Access to the legitimate right to bear arms depends on being born into the “right” community. In some cases, communities view youth participation in political violence as opportune, whether that participation occurs through an insurgent movement or in support of the sovereign state. For example, Israelis view anti-Palestinian violence on the part of young settlers as delinquent rather than politically motivated. Municipal workers are deployed to engage in diversionary work with these youth. The government does not reverse territorial incursions
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and extensions of settlements into Palestinian territory by young settlers. Thus, the government lends legitimacy to the young settlers’ actions by allowing the young settlers’ extensions of settlement to contribute to its own territorial expansion. States often overlook illegal or violent youth activity in popular insurgencies or pro-state militias. In condoning the behavior, the state renders it quasi-legitimate. Thus, the status that results from being celebrated as a legal defender of one’s community is available to some young people and their families and not to others through an accident of birth.
Insurgent Military Organizations. Insurgent communities have developed parallel, alternative processes of celebrating and honoring their youth by endorsing their actions through their culture of resistance to the state. Children socialized within this culture choose their childhood heroes and adolescent icons from an array of local martyrs and heroes. One child in Belfast’s Loyalist Shankill Road declared that he wanted to be an exprisoner when he grew up, illustrating how, in his community, combatants who had been imprisoned were regarded as people of high status. Similarly, in the Middle East, posters bearing the pictures of young people who had died as suicide bombers adorn many walls. In a globalized world of reality television where fame is valued for itself, being known and recognized is a route to status. Socioeconomic and political factors limit the ability of youth in these communities to achieve meaningful status. Burgeoning youth populations, due to relatively high birth rates, characterize the demographics of all three populations—Northern Irish Nationalist,
Law & Ethics
Palestinian, and Black South African. In addition, many of the political movements currently or recently associated with armed insurgence are located within communities characterized by socioeconomic deprivation. Some of these factors, such as deprivation, surveillance, and military occupation, affect the dominant communities—Northern Ireland’s Unionist communities, Israeli communities, and white South African communities—to varying extents. What distinguishes the Northern Irish Nationalist, Palestinian, and Black South African experience is the sense of being permanently trapped in a subordinate position. These youth have no legitimate alternative route to status or achievement that is compatible with the community’s identity and political aspirations. Furthermore, the political position of the community ensures that young people not only experience obstacles to the achievement of status for themselves, they also witness their parents’ failure. In all three cases, young people routinely witness the subjugation of their parents, particularly their fathers, to military surveillance and control. The witnessing of parental humiliation and subjugation creates a particular dynamic between the generations.9 Younger generations criticize the older generation’s political methods as too conservative, because the older generation fails to resolve the problems facing the community. Young people attribute the failure of their community’s cause to the political ineffectiveness of their parents’ generation as much as to the superior power or ruthlessness of their opponents. Consequently, young people tend to adopt more radical, combative, militaristic positions than their elders.10 Summer/Fall 2003 [ 8 7]
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Within insurgent communities, the community often relies on militarized youth as the first line of defense. Young street fighters outside of these insurgent groups comprise part of the armory of their community. These young petrol bombers, rock throwers, and rioters do not necessarily belong to any militia. Their role is to sustain the backdrop of popular agitation. The militias’ operations occur against the backdrop of popular agitation, contributing to a sense of legitimacy for their actions. Participation in street fighting provides these youth with enhanced political status within the community. It can also be an important introduction into adult paramilitary roles. Youth participation in combat is a feature of all three regions examined here. Not only do young people participate as combatants in political violence, but they also tend to be disproportionately represented among fatalities. Despite their role in hostilities, however, young people are rarely involved in peace negotiations.
Recognizing Young Combatants During Peace Negotiations. The exclusion of youth and the disregard for their role in a conflict has important implications for the viability of any agreement reached. Political negotiations and peace agreements are based on implicit assumptions about the ability of the signatories to ensure the compliance of their followers. Yet, on the streets of Northern Ireland after the peace agreement, political leaders have unsuccessfully pleaded with young rioters and street fighters to desist from violence. Similarly, the Palestinian Authority and individual Palestinian leaders would have difficulty ensuring the compliance of young Palestinians with any agreement to [ 8 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
cease hostilities. This difficulty arguably reflects the nature of youth militancy and the characteristics of involvement in popular resistance more than it reflects the credibility of any political authority. This has significant implications for those trying to understand the nature of cease-fires as well as the complexities of unilateral and bilateral policing and enforcement of such cease-fires. There has been a tendency, particularly evident with regard to the role of Republicans in Northern Ireland and Palestinians in the Middle East, to overestimate the cohesion and hegemony within the political group while overlooking factionalism and inner tensions. The political dynamics within these movements is influenced by the challenge that younger activists routinely pose to political leaders. Younger people within political groups make their own assessments and political judgments about any political “deals” carried out by their leadership. This in turn impacts peace negotiations and the implementation of agreements within peace processes. To add to the difficulties, formal settlements seldom acknowledge the role of young people in the political or military processes leading up to settlement. Moreover, formal settlements rarely ever include a subsequent provision for their role in peace processes. Only in South Africa has there been some kind of acknowledgement of their role in the fight for liberation, as manifested in the new constitution’s forward thinking provisions for children’s rights. At the same time, however, there is substantial dissatisfaction in some quarters in South Africa with the provision for former combatants. Internal contests within communities affected by war, such as factional competition or generational conflict, acquire
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Law & Ethics
renewed strength during transitional Consequently, South African society periods from conflict to peace.11 Issues contains a cohort of disenchanted forthat were present prior to the peace mer combatants who harbor anger at the process, such as youth’s criminal and government and their former comrades “anti-social” behavior and localized for failing to compensate them for their
Despite their role in hostilities, young
people are rarely involved in peace negotiations. efforts by paramilitary groups to “police” such behavior, acquire a new significance because of their potential to compromise the internal cohesion of parties to peace agreements. In addition, post settlement failure of demobilization, particularly the failure to demobilize and integrate young combatants, as is the case in South Africa, leaves young street fighters and former combatants without a place in the new society. As their formal education is often interrupted at a young age due to military engagement, the only skills these young combatants’ possess are often military-related. Therefore, they are seldom equipped to enter the workforce, even if jobs are available, which often they are not. Former combatants without any employment prospects, living in dire poverty, have described being offered money to carry out killings or operations on behalf of criminals in their community.12 Some resist. Many succumb, making the transition from political to criminal violence. In South Africa, the reintegration of substantial numbers of former combatants into the police or army was unsuccessful. Therefore, many live in poverty, marginalized, alienated from former colleagues who successfully integrated into the state security forces or who obtained positions in the government.
role in the liberation struggle. Disenfranchisement represents a substantial political failure with the potential to endanger peace and security in the communities that have suffered most under Apartheid. Parallels exist elsewhere. Successive reports on violence in North Belfast identify street violence—so-called “recreational rioting” by young people—as a key component of conflict in this area. The problem of youth violence has the “potential to destabilize other parts of Belfast and Northern Ireland.”13
Conclusions. Youth who perceive themselves to have been involved in combat, either as street fighters or as members of militias, and are not involved in peace negotiations, are likely to be disaffected as a result. To improve the success rate of peace deals, leaders must mitigate these problems of disaffection and, ultimately, gangsterism. To start mitigating disaffection and gangsterism, it is first necessary to identify and remedy the ways in which peace processes tend to politically disenfranchise former youth combatants. The capacity of political and military leaders of insurgent movements to marshal and lead their followers is pivotal to the successful negotiation and implementation of peace settlements. The sucSummer/Fall 2003 [ 8 9 ]
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cess of a peace process is predicated on these political and military leaders’ ability to command the loyalty of all their followers, especially of those youth involved
in militias. The inability of leaders to contain and manage violence can ultimately cause cease-fires to break down and jeopardize peace processes.
N OT E S
1 Former combatant in Defence Unit, interview by author, tape recording, Katlehong, South Africa, 3 September 2002. 2 Ibid. 3 Former combatant in Ulster Volunteer Force, interview by author, tape recording, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 12 August 2002. 4 Mother of suicide bomber, interview by author, tape recording, Ramallah, Palestine, February 2003. 5 Former Israeli Army Officer, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 10 March 2003. 6 Ibid. 7 Mother of Israeli conscript, interview by author, field notes, Tel Aviv, Israel, 19 January 2003. 8 Sydney Elliott and W.D. Flackes, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory, 1968-1999 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999). 9 Dr. Eyad El Sarraj, Director of Psychiatry, Gaza
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Community Mental Health Project, interview with author, Gaza, Palestine, 16 January 2003. 10 See M. Smyth and M. Scott, The YouthQuest 2000 Survey: Young People’s Experiences and View of Life in Northern Ireland (Derry: INCORE and the United Nations University and the University of Ulster, 2000). 11 Examples of factional competition include the conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress in South Africa or the feud between the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association in Northern Ireland. 12 Former MK Commander, interview by author, tape recording, Cape Town, South Africa, 10 September 2002. 13 R. Adams, J. Dunlop, and B. Toner, Report of the North Belfast Community Action Team (Belfast: Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2002).
Politics&Diplomacy Pondering Primacy Richard N. Haass You recently argued that states give up their sovereignty when they commit acts of genocide, harbor terrorism, or threaten global and national security. Are these the only times intervention is justified, or should the promotion of political reform in strategic regions be added to this list? GJ I A :
H A A S S : A lot depends on what you mean by intervention. I do not think that promoting political or economic reform is an appropriate use of armed intervention. The use of military force needs to be reserved for extreme situations. However, I do think we should promote political and economic reform towards openness through other tools, such as incentives, sanctions, economic aid, free trade agreements, and promotion of civil society, because it helps bring about a world that is likely to be more peaceful and stable.
Richard N. Haass is President of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State from March 2001 to June 2003.
G J I A : Do you see a tradeoff between promoting democracy and dealing with strategically important, non-democratic regimes? H A A S S : In the long run we have to promote democracy and economic openness. We have to take a gradual approach because states can get into trouble if they move too far too fast. However, there will also be those times—and 9/11 may well have been one of them—when we have temporary priorities, like fighting terrorism, and that may mean we have to form certain types of
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relationships with some governments that are fairly unsavory. I think you have to be willing to set those priorities, but over the long run you must introduce a prodemocracy dimension to your policy. Moreover, one of the things we are seeing now is that cooperation on counter-terrorism can become the opening wedge of
We understand that as countries become more democratic certain constituencies inside and outside their governments will have larger degrees of power. We are used to that. For example, we are used to the influence of agricultural lobbies in Western Europe and Japan. We understand what kind of impact they have
The United States has all this power, but power is not the same as influence.
a new relationship. It can actually open up and how that constrains what the governopportunities to do things like advance ments can do. It is just a fact of life that democracy and economic openness. we just take into account, and all I can say is those are the good kinds of problems to G J I A : Democracies often have a more have. They are much better than the difficult time than non-democracies in kinds of problems you would have dealconsolidating domestic support, espe- ing with non-democracies. cially on controversial issues. What does increasing democratization imply about G J I A : Regardless of the criteria, who the future of international relations? decides when a country is committing (or omitting) actions that justify intervenH A A S S : Growing democratization on baltion? ance is a good thing. There is a lot of evidence that democracies relate pretty well H A A S S : This is one of the central questo other democracies. We also just hap- tions of international relations today. pen to believe in them inherently and The answer is that there is no single existentially in terms of the quality of life source of authority or legitimacy. For and freedoms they deliver. So, if we have example, in the late 1990s, when the UN to pay a price in terms of increased diffi- Security Council refused to authorize an cultly navigating the day to day with intervention in Kosovo, I thought it was another country, that seems to me a price the wrong answer, and the United States worth paying. was right to take the issue to NATO. Countries have sometimes had to deal When the international community with the frustration of, say, our congress refused to act to stop the genocide in vis- -vis our executive branch and the way Rwanda in the mid-1990s, the United our constitution distributes treaty power, States and other countries were wrong to confirmation power, or the passage of stand aside and just to let the genocide go legislation. That hasn’t stopped other forward. I cite these two examples as evicountries from having close relationships dence that the United Nations is not yet with the United States, and I would say the at the point where it alone can decide same thing about us with them. what is legitimate and what is not. [ 9 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
H AAS S
Well then, who decides? Is it the United States or some other government? The answer is that you have to look at the case at hand and you have to try to make a case in the court of international public opinion. I believe you have to try to form as multilateral a response as you can. But the fact is that there is no world government or world supranational authority. So, you have to base your actions on norms. Moreover, when a government like the United States acts, whether in Iraq now or as we did in Afghanistan, or say against some genocide, it is important that they explain why it is they are doing what they are doing in terms of the principles that they are trying to uphold or defend. These decisions will inevitably be made case by case. So, we may decide that what we did in one situation was necessary, and we may argue against someone else doing it in a situation that they think is analogous. Sometimes you have to be inconsistent in foreign policy. Moreover, just because you may have the right to act doesn’t mean that acting is the smartest thing to do. In foreign policy, you always have to ask yourself not simply whether you have the right to do something, but whether it’s wise compared to all the other choices and tools available to you.
Politics& Diplomacy
meaningful role. The UN is not an independent entity and it does not have the sovereign personality of a state. So, the best way to build up the role of the UN is not to assign it more people or more money or more power, but to build consensus between its members. For example, the World Trade Organization is able to play a meaningful role in regulating world trade because there is a consensus among the principal trading states over these rules, not because it has enormous powers. The problem is that we haven’t reached that point in other areas of international politics. We simply do not have that kind of consensus about the proper means and ends of foreign policy. So, I think we have to accept a more limited role for the UN during this period. Meanwhile, we should try to build greater consensus, and expand on areas like cooperation against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and genocide where consensus already exists. The potential for the UN to play a meaningful role will grow accordingly. When you do intervene, for whatever reason, who is responsible for restoring sovereignty at the end of an intervention? Who receives this sovereignty, and might we have to redraw territorial boundaries to establish durable states?
GJI A:
It sounds like you would go along with the UN if it had greater legitimacy, H A A S S : There is no one mechanism or credibility, and capability. How can the model and there are all sorts of examples, UN achieve this? from Cambodia to East Timor, Kosovo to Bosnia, and Haiti to post-World War II H A A S S : The best way to build up the role Germany and Japan. I think a lot depends of the United Nations is to build greater upon how you got to that point, the scale consensus between and among the major of the problem, how much international powers. The UN can never be more than consensus there is to act. Restoring sovthe sum of its parts, and if the parts ereignty tends to be best if it is done fundamentally disagree, then the UN multilaterally because it gives it greater essentially is precluded from playing a legitimacy and acceptability. GJ I A :
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In terms of who we restore sovereignty to and how, you can do the sort of thing you did in Afghanistan, where originally you convened a meeting in Germany, which then led six months later to a loya jirga, which included key political figures in Kabul, and down the road you will hopefully have a progressively more open democratic process. In Iraq, we are taking a different, but not totally dissimilar, path. What I think matters is that you come up with a political process that is representative, seen as legitimate by the vast majority of the people, and increasingly provides avenues and mechanisms for their participation. At some point I believe there should be elections in that process, but not necessary at the beginning. You should also promote civil society and economic opportunity in order to develop a real society. That is the best protection I know against any sort of breakdown of order or over-concentration of power. But this process always has to be tailored in ways that take into account local traditions, local history, and the preferences of the local people. On the question about redrawing maps, I lean against that. That tends to raise at least as many questions as it purportedly would settle, and you don’t want to create one or two new problems in the name of solving one. If you are going to be adding territory to some place, it suggests that you are going to be taking it away from somewhere else. I think the key is less the redrawing of lines as it is trying to reconstitute political and economic life within and across lines. That is where issues of federalism come in. I just don’t see us where people were nearly 100 years ago after World War I, when they took out their atlases and started redrawing maps. Unless there was [ 9 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
consensus all around, I don’t think that is the way to go. There is obvious tension between state sovereignty and globalization, and you have argued that globalization requires regulation. How can we regulate globalization without undermining its benefits? GJ I A :
There is some tension between globalization and state sovereignty because many of the phenomena of globalization are transnational flows that cannot be controlled by governments. It is just a fact of life—neither necessarily good nor bad—that there are things that governments cannot control. On the other hand, governments are not powerless, and they can still do a lot to shape what goes in and out of their borders. What you obviously want to do is get governments to try and restrict the flow of the negatives of globalization—drugs, trafficking in innocent people, and terrorists—but to allow the positive things like the normal flow of trade, services, tourism, and legal migration. Governments need to work together to do just this because it is beyond the capacity of any single government. You end up needing a lot of cooperation between governments. For example, governments have to set up arrangements so that borders are open for tourism and businessmen and others but closed to criminals and terrorists, or where normal flows of investment take place but hot money flows and laundered money are restricted. In fact, you need to set up networks not just between governments, but also among international organizations, NGOs, and private companies to help manage transnational flows. HA AS S:
H AAS S
Politics& Diplomacy
G J I A : Related to that, what do you make assembling “coalitions of the willing to of post-9/11 tension between providing deal with the issue at hand?� for homeland security and protecting certain democratic and civil rights? H A A S S : Putting together coalitions of the willing, or coalitions of the able and willH A A S S : There has obviously got to be a ing, is in some way the natural response to balance between how you promote the what you have just outlined. We are movrights that make a democracy a democ- ing towards a period in history when relaracy and the need to protect against the tionships are more situational; where you things that undermine those rights. I are unlikely to have one-dimensional actually do not think there is a single relationships where all the arrows always right answer. 9/11 sent a message to the point in the same direction. We are likely leadership and citizenry of this country to find ourselves cooperating with a state that we might have to recalibrate this on some issues, opposing it on other balance. In light of the fact that the issues, and maybe just talking past one kinds of things the terrorists are able another on a third set of issues. and willing to do are so great and danWhat that suggests is that normal gerous, we may have to slightly constrain alliance relationships might not apply
We should not sit down and say a little bit of
genocide or just a few chemical or biological weapons are okay. That is ridiculous. or curtail some of our individual liberties or protections in order to get this balance right, but we are not talking about wholesale changes. The image I would use is one of a scale. We are not switching from fully democratic to non-democratic, but we are slightly adjusting the balance in the direction of greater law enforcement capabilities, slightly more capable filters of our borders, and so forth. Dealing with the same actors repeatedly and on a range of issues is a fundamental part of international relations. This allows actors to negotiate across several issues, but it also raises the possibility that fallout over one issue can spillover. How do you reconcile this with the Bush Administration’s approach of GJ I A:
because alliances acquire a degree of automaticity and universality that probably will not work in this period of international relations. The normal pattern will increasingly be one where a challenge comes along or is predicted and we put together a coalition of states and others who take a similar view and have some resources to bring to bear to deal with that challenge. Another challenge or opportunity comes along and we will put together a different coalition. So, you end up with shifting coalitions. The challenge for diplomacy is on one hand to make the coalition you put together as inclusive as possible and, on the other hand, when you have your inevitable disagreements, to work against spillover that would adversely affect other areas where cooperation is possible. Summer/Fall 2003 [ 9 5 ]
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For example, just because we disagree with a certain country on what to do about Saddam Hussein does not mean that we cannot still cooperate on the war on terrorism, in the WTO, or what to do about HIV/AIDS. We want to get to the point where we can disaggregate how we deal with these issues. Otherwise, if we insist that you are either always with us or you can’t be with us at all, we will likely find ourselves with very few partners. G J I A : Is there a concern that too much political capital might be expended on one challenge, alienating people on that issue, and creating spillover? For example, France has said it will veto reconstruction efforts largely because it did not see the war itself as illegitimate. H A A S S : We will see how that works out and, in any case, those two issues are somewhat connected. But I would be surprised if, for example, France suddenly refused to cooperate with us against HIV/AIDS. There is a natural understanding that you cooperate where you can. That said, you are asking a legitimate question because there is always the potential for spillover. Democratic governments may find their choices constrained by their own domestic politics if there is a sense of resentment. So, in individual cases we have to ask ourselves if something is a priority because sometimes you have to be prepared to compromise on some second-order issues if you want to get cooperation on first-order issues. Of course, it is always easier in theory than in practice because there can always be disagreement about what is a first- and second-order issue among the Executive Branch, Congress, and the American public.
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G J I A : You said that balancing power politics can be replaced by pooling of power as the number of states that share key ideas about how the world should operate increases. Will these ideas be developed through integration (cooperation, consultation, and compromise) or assimilation into a particular worldview?
I don’t see this as a case of classic horse-trading. I think there are certain things we should not compromise on. We should not sit down and say a little bit of genocide or just a few chemical or biological weapons are okay. That is ridiculous. I think we should be quite firm about an open trading system, support for democracy, and human rights. The best thing to do is to get others to see the natural attraction of those ideas. You cannot impose it on them. Other countries have to see the inherent attractiveness of these ideas and see how they are in their own self-interest. I’ll return to the WTO as an example: other countries and governments understand why it is in their self-interest to accept certain rules of the road in regulating trade. What we need to do is come up with ideas in other areas that are in everyone’s self-interest. It is often best to come up with some of those ideas in consultation with others, so we don’t just sit here in splendid isolation and pronounce. Global climate change, for example, is one place where we need more consultation. Others have come up with the Kyoto idea but we think that it is unacceptable and inherently flawed. There needs to be greater consultation to come up with a scheme in which countries might agree to self-regulate or constrain themselves on behalf of a greater good that they would benefit from. HAA SS:
H AAS S
In order to bring about integration, which is my goal, we have to come up with ideas that may not be universally attractive, but are widely attractive. We have to identify the ideas and institutions around which we can build a critical mass. In more and more dimensions of international life, what we have to do then is try
Politics& Diplomacy
mechanism for introducing changes into the ICC so our concerns about potential abuse of prosecutorial and judicial power are addressed. The current situation is not ideal for the people who are promoting these institutions or for us. There is also spillover to use the word used earlier. It is one of the things that clearly con-
It is not enough to simply find fault [with
a treaty]. You have to also say what it would take to fix it.
to come to some consensus, and where tributes to friction between the United we can’t do that, we have to ask ourselves States and the rest of the world. So, it is if we are better off alone, or if we might in everyone’s interest to bridge these difbe better off making certain compromises. ferences, and that is what consultations That is a question we are going to have ask should be focused on and answer on an individual basis. G J I A : So where do these alternative proG J I A : We’ve chosen not to join several posals stand? For example, when can we international conventions, such as the expect an American response to the Kyoto Protocol and the International Kyoto Protocol? Criminal Court. To what extent does our not signing these treaties affect our ability H A A S S : I cannot answer that. That is, as to shape international norms? we say, above my pay grade. But it is important when the United States disH A A S S : People here would say we did try to sents from some principle or arrangeshape them. We participated in the draft- ment that we don’t just say we disagree. ing of Kyoto and the Rome statute, but at When we disagree, it should only come the end of the day we couldn’t build a after efforts to try to forge a consensus we consensus around something we believed could live with, and failing that, I think it in. Or to put it another way, others built is incumbent upon us to come up with an a consensus around things we could not alternative very quickly and to try to build sign on to, and we made the decision that a consensus around that. So I hope that we were better off outside those arrange- we will come forward with alternatives to ments than we would be inside. Kyoto or a set of amendments to the I am hoping the day comes when we, ICC. To me, the complement to opting the United States, can come up with a set out of an international consensus is purof norms and arrangements in both these porting reasonable ideas around which areas, that there will be a post-Kyoto an alternative consensus has the potential arrangement on global climate change, to be built. It is not enough to simply and that at some point there will be a find fault; you have to also say what it Summer/Fall 2003 [ 9 7 ]
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would take to fix it, and try to build a democracy, significant progress on the larger consensus around the alternative counter-terrorism, and some progress than around the original. on counter-proliferation. So the answer is, there’s a lot of progress to be shown. G J I A : As director of policy planning, you Are we done? No. There are still big are charged with developing long-term areas of disagreement between us and strategy. Do you think the United States other countries about the use of force has used its supremacy wisely? and how to deal with some difficult cases, such as proliferation in North Korea or H A A S S : In some ways that is the central Iraq or Iran. So we have a ways to go. question of the day. The United States has It is too soon to answer whether we all this power, but power is not the same have used our primacy wisely. In some as influence. The questions are how do we cases, I would argue we have done well; in translate our power into something that is other cases, not as wisely as we might lasting and how do we get others to work have. But it is too soon to draw up a verwith us to tackle common challenges, dict; it is too soon for this administrawhether it’s terrorism or proliferation or tion, which is only slightly more than disease or promoting free trade. half- way through this term. It is too soon for the United States: it hasn’t even been I fall back on the idea that we ought to a decade and a half since the end of the be trying to build consensus around cer- Cold War. I would simply say in some tain principles and institutions. We have cases we can point to progress, and in made some clear progress on trade and some cases we cannot.
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Politics& Diplomacy
Prospects For Democracy in Iran Ladan Boroumand Is Islam compatible with democracy? Can a Muslim society like Iran ever become a secular democracy? For more than twenty years, Western democracies have favored an implicitly negative answer to these questions. Thus, their policy toward Iran was made up of a series of hesitant, inconsistent, and ad hoc decisions aimed at countering Iran’s terrorism in the world, while manifesting a total lack of concern about the tyrannical and oppressive nature of the Islamic Republic. Those who profess the incompatibility of Islam and democracy could rightfully refer to some theological and historical traits. Much of Islam’s history reveals the continuing influence of a founding prophet who made law, waged war, dispensed justice, and ruled his people. From these observations, one might be tempted to conclude that the secularization and democratization of Iran cannot proceed without confronting the religious order. This conclusion seems all the more valid, since the leaders of the Islamic Revolution claim to have restored a “pure Islamic order.” Yet, a closer examination of the history of the Islamic Revolution raises questions about the validity of these arguments. First, the theological and historical traits that seem opposed to democracy were similarly incompatible with the rise of the modern nation-state. Yet, these traits did not hamper its advent in traditional Muslim societies, such as Iran. Second, Iran’s putative return to Islam’s “original purity” was
Ladan Boroumand is Director of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, which promotes human rights and democracy in Iran. She is also Visiting Fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies and is researching the Iranian Islamic Revolution.
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possible only by means of a modern revolution. Lest this be thought a controversial point, it should be noted that the leaders of the Islamic Revolution themselves have openly acknowledged the modern nature of their endeavor.1 It is precisely this revolutionary phenomenon that poses a problem, since it finds no precedent in the words and deeds of the prophet. Additionally, Iran’s revolutionary regime is dismissed by high-ranking Shi’a scholars as utterly un-Islamic.2 In examining the prospects for democracy in Iran, 1 shall focus first on the inner nature of the Islamic regime, which is at odds both with Shi’a beliefs and Iran’s own history and traditions. The transformation of a traditional society into a modern nation-state and the collapse of this nation-state due to the Islamic Revolution have resulted in the advent of a modern Islamist totalitarian regime. The relevant question, then, is not how Iran can cease being a traditional Islamic polity, but rather how it can escape its current subjection to a version of modern totalitarianism. Iranian public opinion favors democracy, a system that Iranians see not as a foreign imposition, but as a common heritage of humanity. The overwhelming praise for modernity and democratic institutions based on human rights belies the fictitious dichotomy between Western democracy and Islamic democracy.
Islamic Revolution, a Variation of Modern Totalitarianism. The Iranian Revolution is the historic implementation of Islamist revolutionary ideology. The contributions made to the ideology by the Pakistani Mawlana Mawdudi, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, and the Iranian Shari’ati, among others, to the elaboration of this ideology are well known. These men did not receive a tra[ 1 0 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
ditional religious education but rather a modern one. They entered politics through their involvement in nationalist movements in their respective countries, and turned to political Islam as disenchanted militants. In Iran, Shari’ati is one of the main popularizers of revolutionary Islam founded on the Marxist philosophy of history.3 He combines the Koranic concept of the “Party of God,” or Hezbollah, with the Marxist definition of the Vanguard Party. Hence, throughout the 20th century, Islamic terminology has been influenced by modern totalitarian concepts and know-how. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the first eminent religious figure to abandon traditionalism and opt for this modern Islamist totalitarianism. It would be a mistake to interpret the Islamic Revolution as an outcome of Shi’ism, for the revolutionary Ayatollah was an innovator in religious affairs.4 Once in power, the one-time opponent of land reform and women’s suffrage became “progressive.” He launched a massive program of nationalization and expropriation. He recruited women for campaigns of revolutionary propaganda and mobilization. His policy of terror, revolutionary tribunals and militias, administrative purges, cultural revolution, and accommodating attitude toward the Soviet Union alienated the majority of his fellow clerics. But this also gained him the active support of the Moscow-aligned Iranian Communist Party, which subordinated itself to the Islamic regime from 1979 to 1983. According to the Iranian philosopher Dariush Shayegan, “It is not the revolution that was Islamicized to become eschatology; it is Islam that has changed into an ideology and has entered the realm of history to fight the infidels. By
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willing to oppose the West it has become Western.”5 The Islamic regime could not have drawn its dynamism from a distorted religious dogma. It owes its consistency to two potent and eminently modern myths: the myth of “the People” and the myth of “the Revolution.”
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By abolishing the notion of the free individual, totalitarianism also abolishes God’s transcendence. A totalitarian regime seeks to recreate man in accordance with its own truth, whether this truth is understood to be represented by the nation, by history, or by divine prov-
The overwhelming praise for modernity
and democratic institutions based on human rights belies the fictitious dichotomy between Western Democracy and Islamic democracy. In modern representative democracies, “the People” is an abstract category made of free and equal individuals. Once victorious, the Islamic Revolution promptly confiscated this concept, emptied it of its demographic content, and imposed upon it an ideological definition. Henceforth, the idea of “the People” did not refer to individuals; rather, it alluded to the official ideology. Whoever did not adhere to the regime’s ideology became, by definition, an “enemy of the people.” The very notion of individual rights was abolished by the victory of the concept of “the People” as orthodoxy. Ayatollah Khomeini, the self described “humble and sinful cleric” who wanted to protect the Shari’a against the assault of Western values, was transformed by this “revolutionary miracle” into an infallible authority that embodied both the Truth6 and the People.7 He ended up legislating for and on behalf of God. Khomeini did not hesitate to abrogate the Shari’a’s injunctions in the name of the regime’s overriding interests. A supreme leader whose will expresses the Truth in history is the common denominator of totalitarian regimes.
idence.8 Their desire to re-create man invests these regimes with a terrifying and devastating power. Their ideas of order and justice reveal the nature of this power. The negation of the juridical and moral person of the detainee indicates the denial of the concept of the individual.9 Revolutionary Islamic justice is founded on this denial; thus, the courts of the Islamic Republic reject due process. Due process embodies a different worldview, in which man is defined as an autonomous yet fallible being. The denial of due process is the rejection of this understanding of the human being. When the revolutionaries order the rape of young girls before execution, because virgins might go to heaven, they impose their temporal power and seek to enact God’s will by determining His judgment. Ultimately, through this act they abolish God’s transcendence. When these revolutionaries secretly decide to murder tens of thousands of prisoners set to be released because these individuals refuse to profess the regime’s ideology, the Islamists demonstrate their ambition to possess the individual’s soul and mind. By refusing to acknowledge their deaths, Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 0 1 ]
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the regime negates the existence of those who resist it in the name of free will and freedom of conscience.10 In sum, the Islamic Republic rebels against God’s will by denying the existence of the very individuals He created. Revolutionary Islamist justice is alien to the spirit of traditional Muslim jurisprudence. Rather, it is closer to that of the French revolutionary tribunal of 1794. The revolutionary character of the Islamist regime enabled Khamenei, the president of the Islamic Republic, who later became its Supreme Leader, to laud the achievements of the Chinese and North Korean atheist revolutionary regimes without contradiction. The president said that the elements that bring the Islamic regime close to North Korea are their common revolutionary character and anti-Americanism. The president publicly acknowledged the long and sincere collaboration and political relationship between the Islamic Republic and North Korea.11
Satan’s Twofold Figure. The West that the Iranian regime identifies with Satan is not, therefore, a geographical and cultural entity, for the Islamists owe most of the concepts governing their actions to Western thought. The regime’s anti-Western rhetoric is rooted in its rejection of liberal democracy in general, and human rights in particular. The Islamic Republic’s anti-Americanism is best understood as a reaction against a precise definition of the body politic. This definition admits no other truth than the existence of an autonomous individual pursuing his happiness. Not surprisingly, the failure of the revolutionary ideology and the fall of the Soviet bloc have created a major crisis of legitimacy within the Islamic regime. [ 1 0 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
This crisis has become a matter of public debate among the ideologues of the Islamic Republic. To analyze it they refer neither to Iranian history, nor to the canonical religious and political texts of the Muslim world. Instead, the regime’s ideologues try to make sense of their own situation by looking to the Soviet and Chinese experiences.12 Indeed, the regime’s cadres try to understand their own political identity by referring to the political literature of the modern West. Akbar Ganji, a middle-ranking official of the regime, is the emblematic figure of a generation of young Islamist militants. His intellectual itinerary is crucial in that it uncovers the erosion of the regime’s ideology. In his study examining the writings of major Shi’a jurisconsults, Ganji first shows the discrepancy between their traditional worldview and the experience of the Islamic Republic.13 He eventually refers to a long citation of Benito Mussolini on fascist ideology to explain Iran’s political system.14 For Ganji, the story of the Iranian Revolution is one of a faction identifying with the modern revolutionary left that allies itself with another faction inspired by European far-right revolutionary movements. A modern Islamist revolution was the outcome of this alliance.15 By reading Ganji one realizes that, in effect, the revolutionary regime was sustained for a decade by the Iranian equivalent of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.16 Only with the fall of the Soviet bloc did the pact dissolve, revealing the chronic tension between the reformist–left–and the conservative–right–wings of the revolutionary oligarchy. From this perspective, one can understand the title Ganji chose for the article that made him famous in Iran, “Satan is
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the First Fascist.” This title curiously the past twenty-five years, Iranian intelechoes the official rhetoric that identifies lectuals and public opinion have been the United States as the Great Satan. pondering the old humanist’s remark, These two depictions of Satan exemplify asking themselves why they rejected the the antagonistic dimensions of modern democratic option in 1979.18 political culture, liberal democracy, and The intelligentsia has begun to contotalitarianism. sider this issue seriously. The Iranian philosopher Dariush Shayegan analyzed Neither Western nor Islamic, the reasons for the elite’s failure in 1979. Democracy is Universal. We should The obsession with Westernization, he now consider the problem of the transi- says, completely alienated Iranian intellection to democracy. It is not Islam per se tuals during the sixties and seventies. He that prevents this transition nor is it the shows how anti-Occidentalism found its country’s traditions, which are no more roots in three Western schools of thought than a rhetorical illusion. Neither Islam inspired respectively by the French antinor traditions have been able to curb the modernist thinker Rene Guenon, the profound mutation that Muslim societies German philosopher Martin Heidegger, have experienced for two centuries. It is and the Marxist revolutionary ideology.19 instead the ideological and practical Shayegan argues that independent critical structure of totalitarianism that Iran must thought was not on the agenda of postabolish to make the transition to democ- 1945 Iranian intellectuals.20 racy. The question is: why did the Iranian The same radical questioning can be people favor a totalitarian option instead heard among the current Iranian politiof a liberal democracy in 1979? cal elite. In recent months, two authors The very generation staging the revo- seemingly representing opposite ends of lution refused the democratic option the political spectrum published major when it was given the chance by Shapur works in Iran and in the United States. Bakhtiar, the last prime minister under The first, Republican Manifesto, was written the Shah. A long-time social democrat by Akbar Ganji, a product of the Islamic who spent many years in the prisons of Revolution; the second, Covenant with the the Pahlavi monarchy, Bakhtiar used his People, by Reza Pahlavi, the pretender to platform as premier to urge his fellow the throne of Iran, who now lives in the citizens to organize political parties and United States. The former is heir to a form trade unions. He asked Khomeini violent totalitarian tradition, the latter to respect democratic principles and to to an autocratic one. Ganji criticizes vie for power not as a religious but a revolutionary thought and pleads for a political leader. Bakhtiar argued that a secular democracy founded on human legitimate leader should come to power dignity and human rights. Pahlavi through ballots, not through street deplores, perhaps too implicitly, the lack demonstrations and riots. When of popular participation during his Bakhtiar left office in February 1979, he father’s reign and calls for a modern and challenged his fellow citizens with a democratic form of monarchy based on poignant remark, “How strange, we the principles of inalienable individual offered these people freedom and rights and government by the consent of democracy, they refused to be free.”17 For the governed. Human rights and secuSummer/Fall 2003 [ 1 0 3 ]
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larism are the common denominator of both works. For more than twenty years, Iranians have experienced the absolute negation of the individual. Perhaps it is this very negation that has made them understand the existential relevance of modern individualism and human rights. For that reason, human rights are at the heart of today’s public debate in Iran. Lawyers, students, and university professors refer to human rights as a universal heritage, and the homo islamicus is a rare phenomenon. This is precisely what distinguishes the pre-revolutionary era from contemporary Iran. Students are eager to learn about democracy and to understand its premises. The following statement by the students of the University of Zanjan is one example among many: The Students’ movement should abandon sterile political strife (between reformists and conservatives). It should concentrate on theoretical questions to remedy its own weaknesses. It must focus on the study of key concepts such as democracy, republicanism, and human rights. This theoretical work must enable the student movement to take up the challenge of substituting a man defined by his duties by a man defined by his rights.21 For their part, the dissident Shi’a scholars advocate secular democracy in the name of Islam. The late Haeri-Yazdi rejected the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, establishing the body politic on an agreement between citizens, who collectively own the public space and their rulers.22 The citizens give mandate to their rulers. The popular mandate is [ 1 0 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
the sole legitimacy of the government.23 Haeri-Yazdi draws a dividing line between Mohammad’s function as a prophet designated by God and that of a temporal ruler elected by his people and approved by God. God’s approbation of Mohammad as an elected ruler is interpreted as God’s endorsement of the sovereignty of the people.24 In the same vein, Mohammad Motjtahed Shabestari, a well-respected theologian, argues in favor of a “state founded on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”25
In the Eyes of the West. Totalitarian regimes create and propagate fictitious versions of reality in order to hide their moral and political failures. If such propaganda remains unchallenged, totalitarian rulers can all too easily atomize their societies and isolate their citizens. Communism greatly benefited from the Western democracies’ ideological naivet . The Islamic Republic, for its part, has been able to survive for a quarter of a century by relying on the same stratagem. The West could help by challenging the official propaganda and acknowledging the demands of the Iranian people. This would be simple to do and would carry little or no risk. Yet it would probably give a huge moral and psychological boost to pro-democracy forces within Iran. For almost two decades, Western democracies viewed Iranians as believers mystically united by a supreme political and spiritual leader. The West refused to acknowledge that this false united front was made possible by and endured because of an exclusionary dynamic that pitted “insiders” against “outsiders.” The insiders were a small minority.26 The outsiders were the majority of the Iranian people who were kept at bay by a ruling
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elite using terror. Today, the regime promotes the idea of Islamic democracy and claims that this system embodies the will of the Iranian people. According to this regime, Islamic democracy–unlike Western democracy–is founded not on human rights but on virtue.27 To truly identify the will of the Iranians, however, one need only look at the demands that are most often put forward in the public debate: freedom of speech, assembly, and association; freedom of conscience and
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worship; the separation of religious authority from political power; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. These demands correspond to the model of a secular democracy, for which the Iranian people yearn. Author’s Note: I would like to thank Marc Plattner and Philip Costopoulos for their comments. This article is drawn from a conference on S cularisation, d mocratisation et monde musulman, organized by the Association française pour l’ tude de la M diterran e orientale et du monde turco-iranien hosted by UNESCO in Paris in November 2002.
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1 M. Motahari, “Islam and revolution,” Piramoun-e Jomhouri-e Eslami (1999): 139–141. 2 S. Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 156. 3 H. Dabashi, “Ali Shari’ati: The Islamic Ideologue Par Excellence,” Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1993): 102–146. 4 S. Amir Arjomand, “Traditionnalism in Iran,” From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (1984): 222–3. 5 D. Shayegan, Qu’est-ce qu’une r volution religieuse (Paris : Les presses d’aujourd’hui, 1982) 202. 6 H. Dabashi, 463. 7 A. Khomenei, “Second Sermon during the Friday Prayer April 21st 1989 (1/2/1368),” Jomhouri-e Eslami, 21 April 1989 (2/2/1368), 11. 8 R. Khomeini, Etela’at, 22 January 1982. 9 H. Arendt, Totalitariansm (New York: A Harvest Book, 1976), 153. 10 During the summer of 1988, the regime engaged in mass executions of prisoners who were previously sentenced to various prison terms. Thousands of prisoners were executed in few months; however the regime did not make these executions public. H. A. Montazeri, 355–6. 11 A. Khamenei, “Second sermon at the Friday prayer May 20, 1989 (29/2/1368),” Jomhouri-e Eslami, 21 May 1989(30/2/1368): 9. 12 See “The Chinese model (olgouy-e Tchini),” Norooz, 27 April 2002 (27/2/1381): 2. 13 A. Ganji, Talaqi-e fasciti az din va hokoomat (The fascist interpretation of religion and government) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1999): 7–8. 14 B. Mussolini, “fascismo”, in Enciclopedia italiana 14, 847–51 (1932). 15 A. Ganji, “Satan is the first fascist” (1999): 189–204.
16 For the admiration and ideological sympathy between Nazis and Communists, see Francois Furet “ the Past of an illusion” the chapter on Nazism and communism. 17 “The comments of Shapour Bakhtiar - The story of the Iranian Revolution” BBC World Service Persian. 18 See the monthly Payam-e Emrouz, FebruaryMarch 2000, 14; D. Shayegan, Le regard mutile, Schizophrenie culturelle : pays traditionnels face a la modernite (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988); M.R. Nikfar, Khoshunat, Hoquq-e Bashar , Jame’eh Madani (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1999); A. Ganji, Majma’ol Jaze’r Zendan Guneh, (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 2002); S.J. Tabataba’i, Zaval Andisheh Siassi dar Iran (Tehran: Kavir, 1996). The most brilliant form of this introspection could be found in A. Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran, a memoir in books (New York: Random House, 2003). 19 D. Shayegan, 1982, 129–138. 20 Ibid., 139–150. 21 ISNA (Iran Students News Agency) (10 October 2002). 22 M. Haeri Yazdi, Hekmat va Hokumat (Shadi Publishing, 1995), 216. 23 Ibid., 120–121. 24 Ibid., 151–4. 25 M. Mojtahed Shabestari, “Human Rights, the True Foundation of the Social Order,” Neshat (22 May 1999, 1/3/1378). 26 M. Rayshahri, “Discourse at Tehran University (Friday sermon), February 4, 2000,” Fatth (5 February 2000, 16/11/1378). For the point of view of the outsiders see A. Khamei, “The Iranian Insiders and the Iranian Outsiders,” Gozaresh 97-98 (March–April 1999, farvardin 1378): 67–70. 27 M. Khatami, Fear of Wave (Tehran: Simaye Javan, 1997): 154–5.
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Science&Technology Special: A Roundtable on Technology and International Relations New Tools and New Challenges Charles Weiss In late February of this year, as diplomats in New York were at loggerheads over Iraqi weapons inspections and a second UN resolution, a small panel convened here at Georgetown to discuss a cluster of interrelated communications and information gathering technologies—and the implications of these technologies on the current international system. Broadly titled “Technology and International Relations: New Tools and New Challenges,� panelists dissected three specific technologies: satellite newsgathering equipment, wireless communications handsets and networks, and commercial observation satellites. Less than a month later, television viewers around the world watched in amazement as journalists, reporters, and news editors put these tools to work in their coverage of the Second Gulf War. Twenty-four hours a day, viewers could watch live video coverage of front line bombings and firefights. Network commentators could complement live broadcasts with highresolution satellite imagery, allowing armchair generals at home the chance to view troop movements or conduct postbombing damage assessments. Compared to past conflicts, the information that was available during this most recent war, and the speed at which it traveled from the front lines to living rooms around the world, was truly astonishing. The following five articles examine some of the technologies that have allowed this to happen and the most significant
Charles Weiss is Distinguished Professor and Chair of Science, Technology, and International Affaris at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
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impacts that these technologies have had, and will continue to have, on the international system. But before we examine what Steven Livingston calls the “new information environment,” I would like to step back and outline how any new or evolving technology, not just communications or information gathering technologies, impacts the international system. It is useful to distinguish the impact of new technologies on four separate aspects of the international system: (1) its operational processes, (2) its substance, (3) its architecture, and (4) the information and perceptions on which it is based. The first of these four, the impact of technology on operational processes, such as the conduct of war, diplomacy, policy formation, propaganda, and crisis management, is the clearest and most direct. Relatively cheap, mobile, and userfriendly videophones often augmented by laptop computers, wireless internet connections, and even mobile phones, make it possible to establish broadcast capability quickly in previously inaccessible places. Multiple cable news networks now provide competing outlets for news dissemination, and remote sensing imagery—once a top secret intelligence product—is now available commercially from multiple sources. The resulting widespread dissemination of information constitutes an unprecedented challenge to the ability of governments to frame policy issues. It has empowered ordinary citizens and nongovernmental organizations to carry out their own independent analyses and challenge official conclusions and priorities. Second, innovations in information technology have had an important impact on the substance of international relations. They have introduced a variety of new issues into international fora, such as [ 1 0 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
technical standards of telecommunications equipment, control of global positioning satellites, privacy, censorship and content control, intellectual property, taxation, and trade regulation, to name but a few. Third, the architecture of the international system has been affected both by the changes in operational processes resulting from the Information Revolution and by the substantive issues to which it has given rise. These impacts are subtle but potentially far-reaching. As regards structure, it is still not clear whether new technologies will tilt the international system towards unilateral or multilateral approaches to governance. Clearly, many of the new issues presented by the Information Revolution derive from the global scope of telecommunications and cyberspace, and seem better suited to a multilateral approach, especially given that the statistics on the geographic growth and diffusion of the Internet indicate that Americans, and indeed English speakers, will soon become a decreasing proportion of Internet users.1 Some of these issues have already surfaced in diplomatic arenas or in cases before national courts, in which Internet-based activities that are entirely legal in one country—gambling, the sale of Nazi propaganda and paraphernalia, or even the spreading of democratic propaganda—have resulted in civil or criminal actions in another. These conflicts of laws raise complicated issues of coordination and harmonization that are likely to take many years to resolve. But many of these issues point in the opposite direction, away from multilateral solutions. First of all, the alternatives provided by wireless telecommunications technology have undermined much of the basis for the century-old multilateral
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regime centered on the International rather not take, whether these ideas are Telecommunications Union, a system democracy and freedom of expression, or designed to facilitate and perpetuate the those of radical Islam. control of government monopolies over These developments have inspired post and telecommunications. Second, counter-pressures by governments seekthe dominance of the United States in ing to restore some of the traditional many areas of information technology has aspects of sovereignty. The problem facled to substantial unilateral U.S. control ing such efforts is that information and over many aspects of information tech- communication technology is embodied
It is not clear whether new technologies will
tilt the international systems towards unilateral or multilateral approaches to governance. nology, especially those relating to the technical standards and governance of the Internet. Despite the fact that cyberspace is often supposed to be independent of geography and the nation-state, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which controls the directory that allows users to reach a desired website by typing in a plain language Uniform Resource Locator, is a creation of the U.S. government.2 New and evolving technologies have also altered many of the underlying concepts that form the architecture of the international system. Perhaps most importantly, new remote sensing and media technology have continued to erode the significance of sovereignty by increasing the permeability of sovereign states to information. This freer access to information and communication technology has contributed to the shift of power away from states, toward a variety of networks and other non-state actors, from advocacy groups to terrorist and criminal networks. It has also increased the importance of “soft power”—the power of ideas to press or even to force governments to take decisions they would
in commercially-available, user-friendly, and relatively inexpensive equipment. To be sure, governments can maintain their control over communications and information, but only at the cost of hindering—or in extreme cases, such as Myanmar and North Korea, entirely cutting off—the flow of information to and from the country, at great economic and social cost. This tension between the simultaneous but conflicting desires to gain the economic benefits from the free flow of economic information while controlling the flow of political information is being played out differently in various countries. Perhaps the most important case is that of China, which has taken advantage of its huge population, economy, and geographic area to funnel Internet and telecommunications traffic through a relatively small number of nodes that it hopes to monitor and control. In contrast, government efforts to control the free flow of information in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries are hindered by their relatively small size, their relative affluence, and the availability of alternative means of comSummer/Fall 2003 [ 1 0 9 ]
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munication, from dial-up connections to Internet Service Providers in other countries to the Qatar-based television network of al Jazeera.3 Fourth, the information revolution has had a major impact on the information, ideas, and perceptions on which the international system is based. The application of remote sensing technology has facilitated the monitoring and enforcement of a variety of international treaty regimes, including ones on the environment, arms control and human rights. For example, satellites have photographed pollution plumes in a variety of international bodies of water, nuclear facilities in North Korea, and mass grave sites in the Balkans. Modern communications media, fed by improvements in technology, have provided a flow of information that has altered popular perceptions of international issues ranging from terrorism to the environment to the wisdom of the U.S. intervention in Somalia. On the negative side, the media has also been used to spread messages of ethnic hatred in the former Yugoslavia and of genocide in Rwanda. To be sure, only a minority of these impacts on the international system result from technology acting alone.
Even the development and diffusion of the technologies themselves often owe a great deal to the action of external forces. For example, al Jazeera’s freedom to broadcast is the direct result of the Qatari government’s desire to open the country up to the challenges and benefits of globalization—to a much greater extent than many of its neighbors around the Gulf. The free rein of remote sensing satellites is traceable to the international regime reserving outer space for “open skies” and other peaceful purposes. Finally, as a result of a curious technological trajectory, many of the unique characteristics of the Internet, especially its relative immunity from censorship, are derived from the fact that it was originally developed as a military communications network that could survive a strategic nuclear attack. The effects of media, communications, remote sensing, and Internet technology on the processes, the substance, the architecture, and the ideas of the international system are synergistic. The overall result is an individualized, twoway, distributed system of information collection and dissemination that constitutes a major challenge to and opportunity for the international system.
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1 Brian Krebs “English No Longer Rules the Web,” Internet, http://www.bizreport.com/article.php?art_id= 2501&width=800 (Date Accessed: 21 May 2003). 2 This phenomenon constitutes an interesting convergence of international relations theory with the theory of innovation. Innovation theorists would call it a case of the imposition of standards by virtue of market dominance, much like the domi-
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nance of the Windows operating system for personal computers; political scientists, on the other hand, would call it the imposition of hegemonic power. 3 See Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
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Science &Technology
Diplomacy in the New Information Environment Steven Livingston For much of the last century, journalists and officials have been partners in a type of ritualistic exchange. Through briefings and press conferences, background interviews, press releases, and other institutionally-based interactions, reporters have usually gleaned information in sufficient quantities to report the news. In turn, officials have usually managed to maintain a measure of control over the direction of international affairs priorities and policies. The relationship has not always been amicable of course, as almost any State Department or embassy spokesperson can testify. But as a rule, and as thirty years of political communication scholarship show, overall policy priorities and objectives have been defined by policymakers. Research has found that institutionally-based descriptions of international affairs have formed the core of news reporting and public debate.1 As political communication scholars Lance Bennett and Jarol Manheim found in their analysis of news coverage of the First Gulf War, “As a practical matter, news organizations routinely leave policy framing and issue emphasis to political elites (generally, government officials).”2 This dynamic is almost certainly in the midst of a fundamental change. Advances in information and communication technologies challenge the dominant position of diplomats in international affairs news. Though still formidable, officials are more likely to find their
Steven Livingston is Senior Research Fellow at the Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the University of Washington.
assertions questioned, their premises challenged, and their objectives scrutinized by the news media and other organizations now empowered by the Internet, wireless telephony, and the information gathering capabilities of space-based satellite systems. “Media access to technology that was once the exclusive domain of governments,” writes Robert J. Kurz, “has changed the nature of who knows what and when, thus altering the terms of policy debate.”3 The new challenges now facing government officials come from two principle sources. First, advances in the technologies used to gather information from remote or otherwise inaccessible areas have created a more transparent information environment. Second, sophisticated political advocacy organizations have begun to use these technologies, often collaboratively with news organizations, to advocate specific policy positions.
The CNN Effect (Plus). The place to begin consideration of advanced information technology is with global real-time television. With the advent of CNN, U.S. foreign policy officials found themselves operating in a more complex and challenging information environment, one that extended beyond the three national network news broadcasts Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 1 1 ]
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and a handful of wire services and elite newspapers.4 As David D. Pearce noted in 1995, “Policies can no longer be presented to the public in the abstract. They are constantly measured against images on television—images that are instantly available, around the clock and around the globe.”5 Though correct in his general point, Pearce overstated the reach of global television at the time. Images were instantly available, but from only a limited number of places. Even CNN’s coverage of international events was usually limited to the Middle East and a few other major metropolises, such as London, Moscow, Hong Kong, and Washington. Only occasionally was this pattern punctuated by episodic attention to major catastrophes in less developed parts of the globe.6 Today, CNN and its competitors are able to reach beyond the typical handful of metropolitan areas and report news live from distant and previously inaccessible locations. Some of this is the consequence of advances in news technology, and some of it is the consequence of growth in the number of news outlets. The growing importance of al Jazeera offers a good example of this latter point.7 Al Jazeera first gained prominence in the West during the war in Afghanistan, a prominence that was underscored by its role in the more recent war in Iraq. In Afghanistan, al Jazeera caused considerable consternation to U.S. officials by broadcasting videotapes of Osama bin Laden. In response to this and the overall effectiveness of al Qaeda’s information offensive against the West, the United States and Britain established the Coalition Information Center, an around-theclock news center in Pakistan with offices in London, Washington, and Islamabad.8 [ 1 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
The Bush administration also asked U.S. television networks to stop airing bin Laden’s remarks, claiming that the tapes might contain hidden messages to terrorists cells in the United States. Even though the networks complied with the administration’s request, bin Laden’s words and images were still readily available on al Jazeera’s website, not to mention other news websites from around the world. Even without the Internet, satellite television viewers continued to have access to bin Laden’s remarks on al Jazeera and other foreign news networks. “As recently as a decade ago,” noted Seth Schiesel of The New York Times, “such an agreement between the government and broadcasters might have prevented Mr. bin Laden from communicating by television with any followers in the United States. No more. The global village simply has too many pathways.”9 The privatization of advanced communication satellite systems means that transmitting television signals from the Middle East—or anywhere else for that matter—no longer rests in the hands of a few entities easily swayed by government pressure. Instead, satellite operations are spread around the globe and use a variety of communication satellite systems. What is more, transmission equipment, used by news crews on the ground to link with these satellites now “[allows] television networks to deploy cameras and crew to remote areas more easily than ever before.”10 This last point is taken up in the following article by Jonathan Higgins. Today, global television is enabled by an astonishing array of devices that collectively reset the terms of debate in the foreign affairs arena. I call this the CNN Effect (Plus). The main point is that television news is less encumbered by logistical challenges when covering news in dis-
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tant or inaccessible locations. In the 1990s, television news coverage of remote locations required a significant commitment of money, time, and equipment. Though this is often still the case, there are now alternatives to this. Videophones, for instance, fit in overhead luggage racks on commercial aircraft, replacing the tons of equipment otherwise required for remote television transmissions. Furthermore, they avoid the regulatory requirements that limit other kinds of satellite communications. Indeed, as the Wall Street Journal recently noted of the technologies used by journalists covering a U.S. invasion of Iraq, “The prices of the gear, most of it available off the shelf, have fallen so far that even free-lance journalists can file video reports.”11 Likewise, the astonishing expansion of wireless telephony around the globe, described in this section by Dan Steinbock, has at least three important consequences for journalism and policymaking. First, cellular telephony allows journalists to tap into wireless networks, helping them coordinate their activities with one another and with editors back in home offices. Using their cellular telephones, journalists can file stories, check sources, and access data. Second, wireless telephony has come to play an important role in grassroots political mobilization efforts. Text messaging and conventional voice transmissions enable political activists to organize protests in a highly fluid, spontaneous manner—what some refer to as the creation of “smart mobs.”12 For example, the massive global protest rallies in opposition to U.S. war plans against Iraq were organized by a handful of small groups using email and text messaging.13 Finally, wireless devices serve as remote sensors, often reaching into unfolding events as they are happening.
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For instance, passengers aboard the hijacked aircraft on September 11 called both loved ones and authorities to report what was happening. Similarly, when Chechen rebels took control of a Moscow theater in 2002, several of the hostages, including at least two journalists, used their cell phones to report what was happening inside the theater. When Russian security forces pumped toxic gas into the theater during an assault on the hostage takers, one of the hostages reported events live over a Moscow radio station. More recently, the ability of wireless devices to take and send pictures has added to the capabilities of wireless devices to serve as remote sensor networks. In February, the BBC asked its worldwide audience to send in digital images taken with photo phones from anti-war protests held around the globe.14 As Editor & Publisher remarked, “the now-ubiquitous digital camera and the soon-to-be-ubiquitous photo phone are likely to increase the availability of images that a small photojournalism staff can’t get to, or are not in place to capture.”15 Perhaps no other imaging technology signifies this trend more than commercial, high-resolution satellites. Commercial reconnaissance satellites, discussed in this section by John Baker, Kevin O’Connell, and John Robertson, offer news media and advocacy groups the ultimate ability to take pictures of areas otherwise out of reach. In the last three years, the increased capacity of private firms to take high-resolution images from space has facilitated a revolution in reporting news from “denied access areas.” Using detailed satellite photographs, international news media organizations have reported on North Korean weapons facilities and labor camps, as well as Iranian, Iraqi, Israeli, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 1 3 ]
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facilities. U.S. military bases such as the Groom Lake complex in Nevada and the new Central Command headquarters in Qatar have also been photographed, analyzed, and described in great detail in news accounts and on websites.16 Though Higgins, Steinbock, and Baker discuss each of these technologies separately, it is important to keep in mind that they often operate synergistically. For example, in April 2001 a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft was forced to land at a Chinese airbase after it collided with a Chinese fighter jet. Space Imaging’s Ikonos satellite took the first independent photograph of the U.S. aircraft sitting on the runway at the airbase. Defense analyst John Pike captured the significance of the images in an interview with CNN. He said that Space Imaging’s ability to produce a series of images from a denied access area represented “quite a breakthrough in
craft, in what was the first-ever unauthorized live television transmission from inside China. Viewers around the world then witnessed Weaver’s arrest by Chinese authorities via videophone and continued to listen to her report events live with her cell phone for some time while in custody. Weaver also managed to conduct several interviews with newspaper reporters in the United States—journalists who had watched her arrest on live television just minutes before. In the EP3 incident, we see commercial remote sensing, communication satellite technology, and wireless telephony working together to pry open glimpses of events that would have been completely shrouded in secrecy just a few years ago. What effect will these trends have on journalism and policymaking? As a result of videophones, wireless devices, and remote sensing satellites, the emphasis in
Rather than setting the agenda, officials
will more often find themselves reacting to an agenda determined by others. satellite newsgathering, that we’re able to get the satellite imagery almost as quickly as the classified community is.”17 Pike’s point is the same as mine: there is a growing balance between official and nonofficial sources of information concerning international affairs. Groups and organizations outside of government now have access to quality information almost as fast as government officials. Videophones and cellular telephones also played a new role in the EP-3 event. CNN producer and correspondent Lisa Rose Weaver used a videophone to transmit pictures of the U.S. crew members departing China on a commercial air[ 1 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
journalism will probably shift more towards pictures for reporting the news. Indeed, the very definition of news may continue to shift to “that which is happening now and can be seen in pictures.” This is news as voyeurism. If true, this has political significance: News will tend to come from the streets and frontlines of battle, rather than from the traditional venues of institutionally-situated reporting of official pronouncements and descriptions. Whether this results in less control of the policy agenda remains to be seen. Certainly, the experience of the embedded reporters during the war in Iraq suggests that at least the Pentagon has
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adapted to the new information environment and has found ways not only to control it, but to even take advantage of it. Still, in other circumstances, it is easy to imagine that rather than setting the agenda, officials will more often find themselves reacting to an agenda determined by others empowered by an array of information gathering technologies.
Grassroots Intelligence. Information and communication technologies have reshaped the information environment. “This revolution is not simply an increase in the volume of information,” notes political scientist Bruce Bimber, “it is also qualitative, as information of all kinds becomes cheaper, its structure ever more complex and nonlinear, and its distribution far more symmetric than at any time in the past.”18 This idea is similar to what political scientists Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord describe as transparency, which Lord examines in greater detail later in this section. For much of the twentieth century, information, including intelligence, was costly to obtain and store; its distribution was highly asymmetrical; and, therefore, it was generally held by complex hierarchical organizations. In intelligence matters, the asymmetrical nature of the distribution of information was a product of both the technical means of acquisition (highly classified reconnaissance satellites and signals intelligence) and of a statutory mandate. As a result, news organizations and advocacy groups lacked access to information that would have allowed them to conduct independent technical assessments of remote or otherwise inaccessible circumstances. This is clearly less true today.20 Advanced information and communication technologies enable groups and organizations outside of the government
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to collect data, analyze them, and formulate their own perspectives and demands. GlobalSecurity.org, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Institute for Science and International Security, among other organizations, now have the ability to independently assess weapons programs, nuclear facilities, troop deployments, and other major developments using satellites and other technical means. Until very recently, policymakers enjoyed a monopoly on satellite surveillance data. This allowed them to either avoid public debate altogether regarding intelligence or national security issues, or to rely on a “trust us, if you only knew what we know” argument when debate could not be avoided. That monopoly has now been broken. Advocacy organizations can now say, “we do know what you know, or at least we know enough, and here is our analysis of the situation.” As a result, policymakers have lost a measure of control over the nature, timing, and content of foreign affairs debates. Last year’s disclosure of Iran’s nuclear facilities demonstrates the new balance of information and its affect on policy. On December 12, 2002, CNN reported that two nuclear fuel facilities were under construction in Iran. The facilities appeared related to the production of enriched uranium and heavy water. When an inspection visit by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December was rebuffed by Iran, David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), realized that the Bush administration would likely remain silent on the matter. Though the U.S. had known about the facilities for over a year, it “did not want to draw attention to Iran at a Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 1 5 ]
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time when it wanted to focus on Iraq, and when it wanted the rest of the world to focus on Iraq.”21 Disagreeing with this policy, ISIS and CNN developed a story using satellite images of the facilities taken by Digital Globe’s high-resolution satellite. Within days, the Bush administration was faced with a battle for control over the policy agenda.22 As Michael Gordon of The New York Times noted, “The new information on Iran’s program comes at an awkward time for the Bush administration, which is making final military preparations for a potential U.S.-led invasion to topple the government of Saddam Hussein—an action justified partly on grounds that Iraq is seeking to develop nuclear weapons.”23 Political scientist Daniel C. Hallin postulates that the power of the president is found in his ability to manipulate symbols. “The exercise of this kind of symbolic power naturally depends to a large
degree on the president’s control of the news.”24 But in an era of high-tech media, the Internet, and savvy advocacy groups, controlling information is more challenging, if not simply impossible. It is important to avoid the tendency to describe the emerging international information and policy environment in black and white terms, as either still controlled in a monopolistic fashion by officials or as completely free and uncontrollable. Either argument would be an oversimplification. Instead, we should consider general trends. The reasonable conclusion one reaches after considering the changes in the information environment described by the contributors to this special section is that technology is redistributing power to non-governmental and non-state entities. This is the major consequence of new information and communication technologies.
N OT E S
1 See Leon Sigal, Reporters and Officials: the Organization and Politics of News Making (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1973) and Steven Hess, International News & Foreign Correspondents (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996). 2 W. Lance Bennett and Jarol B. Manheim, “Taking the Media by Storm: Information, Cuing, and the Democratic Process in the Persian Gulf Conflict,” Political Communication, no. 10: 331–351. 3 Robert J. Kurz, “Congress and the Media: Forces in the Struggle Over Foreign Policy,” in Simon Serfaty, ed., The Media and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martins, 1991), 76. 4 See Steven Livingston, “Clarifying the CNN Effect” (The Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics and Public Policy, The Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996); Nik Gowing, “Real-time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions?” Working Paper 94-1 (Cambridge, MA: Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, June 1994); Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics? (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996). 5 David Pearce, Wary Partners: Diplomats and the Media (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Books, 1995) 21–22.
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6 Steven Livingston and David Stephen, “American Network Coverage of Genocide in Rwanda in the Context of General Trends in International News,” in Susanne Schmeidl and Howard Adelman, eds., Early Warning and Early Response (New York: CIAO, 1998). 7 Fouad Ajami, “What the Muslim World Is Watching,” The New York Times Magazine (18 November 2001): 48; Elaine Sciolino, “An Arab Station Offers GroundBreaking Coverage,” The New York Times (9 October 2001). 8 Elizabeh Becker, “In the War on Terrorism, A Battle to Shape Opinion,” The New York Times (11 November 2001). 9 Seth Schiesel, “Stopping Signals From Satellite TV Proves Difficult,” The New York Times (15 October, 2001). 10 Schiesel. 11 Emily Nelson, “Media to Employ High-Tech Gear Unavailable in 1991 Iraq Conflict,” Wall Street Journal (12 March 2003). 12 Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution: Transforming Cultures and Communities in the Age of Instant Access (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002). 13 George Packer, “Smart-Mobbing the War,” The New York Times (9 March 2003): 46. 14 Steve Outing, “Photo Phones Portend Visual Revolution,” Editor & Publisher (13 March 2003).
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15 Ibid. 16 See GlobalSecurity.org 17 “Satellite Images Show Web Browsers American Spy Plane,” CNN (4 April 2001). 18 Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 13 manuscript page proofs. 19 Ann Florini has straightforwardly defined transparency as the opposite of secrecy. Ann Florini, “The End of Secrecy,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1998).
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20 James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 69. 21 David Albright, telephone interview with author, 24 February 2003. 22 Glen Kessler, “Nuclear Sites in Iran Worry U.S. Officials,” Washington Post (14 December 2002). 23 Michael R. Gordon, “Inspectors in Iran Examine Machines to Enrich Uranium,” The New York Times (23 February 2003). 24 Hallin, 20.
Live Out of the Box Jonathan Higgins A decade ago, during coverage of the First Gulf War, television viewers began to witness the fruits of numerous advances in satellite newsgathering (SNG) technologies and the use of those technologies by the global news media. These developments gave audiences a taste of live events from the battlefield for the first time and fuelled an increasing appetite for immediate news, rather than days-old reports. The technology that enables newscasters to report events live was developed throughout the 1980s and is based on the SNG “uplink.” An SNG uplink is a transportable satellite ground terminal that can transmit material from remote locations, either live or from tape. The uplink can be packaged in either “flyaway” form for deployment by air or integrated into a truck for predominantly metropolitan use. Though “transportable,” the flyaway version of the SNG uplink consists of thirty to forty cases of equipment, includes a one to two meter diameter antenna, weighs up to 1,500 kilograms, and requires one or two highly-skilled
Jonathan Higgins is Managing Director of BeaconSeek Ltd., a company he founded in 2000. Prior to that, he managed the British Broadcast Corporation’s News Location Facilities Unit, the newsgathering engineering unit of BBC News. He is the author of Satellite Newsgathering.
technicians to assemble and operate. Thus, the logistics of transporting a flyaway around the world was, and continues to be, no mean feat. Apart from logistics, broadcasters had to manage additional challenges, such as the need to secure permission from sovereign nations to import and use the equipment, and the task of organizing a satellite route through which the transmission could be sent. In addition to the SNG flyaway, other less cumbersome live reporting tools have emerged over the past decade, and though they are not replacing the SNG flyaway, they are proving complementary to the existing armory of newsgathering tools at the disposal of reporters and executive news editors. These new tools are primarily based on the use of satellite telephones or “satphones” in the global Inmarsat satellite system.
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LIVE OUT O F THE BOX
Originally designed for maritime communication, the Inmarsat satellite system has now expanded to other market sectors, including newsgathering. The Inmarsat system consists of four geostationary satellites, with one above each of the major ocean regions, resulting in coverage across most of the Earth’s surface— except for the polar regions. A call from an Inmarsat mobile terminal can be either a standard voice or a high speed data call, and is sent directly to the closest overhead satellite. From there it is routed back down to a “gateway” station on the ground, which then transfers the call to the public phone network. Other factors have also driven the development of newsgathering technology to ever-smaller equipment. There has been the rapid development of PC technology through the 1990s, the falling cost and size of storage technology, and the burgeoning spread of the Internet— from an obscure instrument used by universities and military research organizations, to a universal tool that is highly accessible in the developed world and increasingly accessible in a number of developing countries. Running in parallel with these advances was the development of digital video compression, which began in the early 1990s in Europe and, by 1994, led to the introduction of highly-portable digital SNG systems. These digital systems, using a dedicated PC unit working in “store and forward mode” and antennas that were just nine-tenths of a meter, could store and then stream stories over the relatively low-bandwidth connection of an Inmarsat satellite phone, but not in real time. The principle of store and forward technology is that very large video and audio signals can be played from either a tape or directly from a camera [ 1 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
into a computer’s hard disk, where it is digitally sampled and stored. Once stored as a digital file, it can then be fed at a much slower rate over the low-speed connection of an Inmarsat data link. The file is then received at the studio on a corresponding unit, which can replay the piece in its entirety. The store and forward process was first used by the BBC to cover the activities of the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan in October 1996. The BBC used a new rugged and compact store and forward unit manufactured by Toko of Japan in combination with an Inmarsat “B” satellite telephone. These two pieces of equipment together enabled BBC journalists to send reports from virtually any location in the world and work unaided in the field without experienced satellite uplink technicians; however, live broadcasts were still not possible. While several other manufacturers produced store and forward units, the rapid development of twenty-four hour news channels around the world created an increasingly competitive need to come live from virtually anywhere, for any story. This next step in the evolution of mobile satellite newsgathering technology came in 1998, when the BBC and 7E Communications, a United Kingdombased technology company deeply involved in Inmarsat technology, conceived the videophone, which led to the production of the “Talking Head” videophone in early 2000. The Talking Head was designed for use with the Inmarsat GAN compact satellite phone to provide a “two-box” solution for live newsgathering. The Inmarsat GAN weighs about three kilograms and is the size of a laptop; the Talking Head videophone weighs less than five kilograms is about the size of a large lunch box. Both units are battery
HIGGINS
powered, and can be used literally anywhere that has clear sight of a satellite. The videophone was first used for a live interview with the Dalai Lama from his home in Tibet through the BBC News Online website in February 2000. The BBC continued to use the Talking Head unit throughout 2000 and other organizations, such as CNN, also began to buy units. However, the Talking Head was still relatively unknown until April 2001, when CNN used one to cover the return of 24 captured crewmembers of a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane on Hainan Island, China. Following this report, the Talking Head videophones rapidly became a “must-have” item for all U.S. networks, as well as television news agencies such as Reuters and the Associated Press Television News. The latter part of the 1990s also saw the rapid development of high-quality, lowcost domestic camcorders. These camcorders can produce excellent pictures at a fraction of the cost of broadcast television cameras. Reporters can be easily trained to produce good quality videos that can be further enhanced with inexpensive, off-the-shelf editing software installed on a laptop PC. Together, this powerful combination of inexpensive camcorders, laptops, videophones, and satellite phones, as well as the spread of the Internet, has meant that compressed video and audio files can be sent from almost anywhere. Accompanying the relatively rapid reduction in size of newsgathering equipment has been the reduction in cost, a phenomenon epitomized by New Delhi
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TV (NDTV), which won an “innovative use of technology” industry award in 2002. The station showed how a reporter with an hour of training, a $3,000 camcorder, a $2,000 dollar laptop running a $100 video editing package, a shareware video compression program, and access to a cyber-caf , was able to provide news reports tailored for NDTV’s audience from the 2001 World Trade Organization conference in Qatar. The latest developments in newsgathering technology include the introduction by Inmarsat in November 2002 of the BGAN terminal, which is a regional service that offers a fast, “always-on” internet connection from a tiny terminal. Though it is not suitable for live use, this $1,500 notebook-sized unit is set to reawaken interest in store and forward technology. Furthermore, a Swedish company called SWE-DISH has also produced a 35 kilogram suitcase-sized unit that can achieve high-speed (2 Mbps) connections via conventional satellites. How do news editors regard all of these developments? Clearly, advances in lowcost, efficient newsgathering equipment have greatly extended editorial capabilities for first-response coverage. But perhaps even more important is that the number of staff now needed to be sent to dangerous locations, and the associated costs, has been significantly reduced. Yet, even with all of these advances, one still finds that for periods of sustained coverage, the traditional flyaway is still the primary choice of news editors. This is mainly due to the fact that viewers will only tolerate lesser-quality videophone images for so long, when they expect high quality flyaway images.
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TOWARD A M OBIL E INF OR MATION SOCIE TY
Toward A Mobile Information Society Globalization of Wireless Technology and Market Evolution Dan Steinbock Upon his return from a trip to Germany in 1936, Paul Galvin, the legendary founder of Motorola, was convinced that war was inevitable. The impressive Autobahns, he said, “have not been built just for autos, they are war roads.”1 By 1940, the equipment manufacturer developed the first handheld two-way radio for the U.S. Army Signal Corps. While Motorola’s facilities were quickly converted to military engineering and production, Galvin prodded the defense forces to recognize the military potential of the wireless: I wonder how many of you realize the importance of radio as a deciding factor in who is going to win the war? What is it that gives the vicious efficiency to vehicles of destruction in modern mechanized warfare? It is radio. What is today revolutionizing aircraft, naval, and anti-aircraft tactics and strategy? It is radio and radar. It is our job—the industry’s job—to deliver these precious and important instruments.2
Dan Steinbock is Director of the Centre of International Business Research at the Helsinki School of Economics. He is also Senior Advisor at the Institute for Mobile Markets Research, and Affiliate Researcher at the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information.
have been central to international affairs and national security, from the U.S. Civil War and World War II to the tragedy of 9/ 11 and the current war on terrorism.3 The U.S. war in Iraq offered still another example of mobilization, specifically mobilization of the Internet, which, among other things, has rapidly transformed the nature of contemporary warfare: While many of the technologies in use in Iraq have been available for years, it is only now that a critical mass of them have come together to create a truly networked battlefield. The glue that binds the system is the so-called tactical Internet. Deployed in Afghanistan for the first time, the tactical Net is the computer interface used by soldiers to communicate and share information. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan logged on to a Web page and could read battlefield reports and view video feeds downloaded from the surveillance cameras in Predator drones flying overhead.4
After the war years, Handie-Talkies, WalkieTalkies, and other wireless offerings served as a bridge to Motorola’s early dominance in the commercial wireless business. At the same time, they reflected the critical role of mobile communications in emergency services and for defense purposes. Through the past century or more, Historically, mobile communications wireless industry leaders have not been [ 1 2 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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just technology leaders. From Guglielmo Marconi and wireless telegraphy to Nokia, Qualcomm, and multimedia cellular, wireless players have not survived when they pioneered new technologies but failed in market development, or vice versa. Through these decades, wireless success has been the function of technology leadership and marketing excellence (Figure 1).
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Technology Evolution: From Telegraph to Broadband Cellular. Through successive waves of wireless innovation, sustaining developments have boosted incumbent leaders. In the process, disruptive change has allowed challengers and new entrants to redefine competitive rules. In the early twentieth century, Marconi deterred his rivals with innovation and patents. In the early twen-
Figure 1
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ty-first century, Nokia relies on downstream innovation (global branding, segmentation, and design) to secure a choke point in the competition for the future. At the same time, new technologies have upgraded performance capabilities and cost-efficiencies, from the primitive precellular technologies to analog (1G), digital (2G), multimedia cellular (3G), and, eventually, broadband platforms (4G). With each wave of innovation, a new technology has been coupled with new and different markets. Historically, wireless markets have evolved as complementary layers, not as substitutes. Initially, military and emergency services built the wireless business, but the thrust has shifted from industrial services to business markets, and then from business markets to consumer markets. In the past two decades, the cellular platforms have contributed to rapid industry globalization.
Market Evolution: From U.S. Superiority to “Triadization.” After World War II, the United States was the critical country market for most industries worldwide. From the 1910s to the 1980s, the United States was also the core cluster and lead market in the wireless industry, but as economies in other parts of the world completed their postwar reconstruction efforts, U.S. dominance declined. Analog systems continued to thrive until the mid-1990s, but success bred complacency. With the triumph of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) in the 1990s, industry leadership migrated to Western Europe, service innovation shifted to Japan, and China took the lead in volume growth (Figure 2).
railroads, telegraph, and telecommunications played key roles in the technology revolution of the late nineteenth century.5 In particular, wireless innovations have played a critical role in military and information-intensive businesses, from mobile battle conditions during the U.S. Civil War to the rise of electric ticker services and the Dow Jones News Service for Wall Street’s financial markets.6 In the pre-World War I era, all early radio pioneers built their business models on navy contracts. Marconi’s first order was from Lloyds of London for communication to lightships.7 As a result of motorization and Prohibition, Detroit’s police department became a pioneer of the ground wireless (AM communications). In 1933, Edwin M. Armstrong, a brilliant electrical engineer and inventor, introduced a wide-band frequency modulation (FM) system that promised great advances in performance capabilities. As the U.S. military opted for FM, significant improvements were made in size, cost, performance, and reliability. Just as Paul Galvin had predicted, wireless devices provided a powerful military advantage during World War II. After the war, this advantage translated to commercial strategic advantages, specifically, the development of cellular tech nology by Bell Labs researchers in 1947.
The Cold War Era: The U.S. AMPS Triumph.
By 1945, the Federal Communications Commission began to explore spectrum allocations for multiple uses in a wide variety of industrial services. These “dispatch industries” included police and fire departments, forestry services, electric, gas and water utilities, and transportation The Glory Days of U.S. Leadership: From services, such as taxis, railroads, buses, FM to Cellular. In the United States, streetcars, and trucks. Such pioneering [ 1 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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Figure 2: The Cellular Era: Relative Worldwide Penetration by Regions and Era (1983–2000) Peak of Pre-Cellular Era (1983): Due to the relatively high but absolutely declining Nordic number initially, Western Europe still enjoyed the highest worldwide penetration (74%), aginst Asia-Pacific, primarily Japan (23%), and the United States (1.8%) in 1983. Peak of 1G Era (1991): In 1984, when AMPS was introduced in the United States, it soon achieved the highest relative penetration worldwide (48%), against Western Europe (40%) and Japan (11%). Peak of 2G Era (2000): By the end of 2000, Western Europe had the highest worldwide penetration (36%) versus Asia-Pacific (31%), and the United States (15%).
efforts gave rise to the first industrial and commercial wireless services.8 Around 1983—at the end of the pre-cellular period and amidst the transition to the 1G era—the United States continued to dominate wireless communications. Through the analog phase, a single standard called Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) reigned in the most lucrative country
market in the world. However, by this point, the commercialization of the cellular concept in the United States had taken more than 35 years, and the United States no longer enjoyed monopoly leadership in technology, development or commercialization.9 Since the late 1960s, the Nordic countries had cooperated in the development of a common standard, Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 2 3 ]
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NMT. In Asia-Pacific, Japan’s early lead quickly eroded as NTT—Japan’s national telecommunications operator—favored proprietary technologies rather than open specifications and was not allowed to compete in foreign markets because of esoteric regulations.
The Post-Cold War Transition: The EuroNordic GSM Triumph. Amidst the transi-
device. In 1983, there had been some 150,000 mobile telephones in the United States, but they relied on low-technology systems, had poor services, and could not expand due to a lack of available frequency channels. By the 3G transition, the subscriber base was close to 1 billion worldwide. Users relied on high-tech systems and enjoyed relatively sophisticated and moderately-priced services, which were still rapidly expanding in many markets.10 Amidst the 3G transition, early estimates indicate that the worldwide revenue for 3G services will soar from $1 billion in 2002 to $321 billion in 2010.11 Over the past few years, simple voice and content have emerged as the strongest service offerings, while Asia-Pacific has surfaced as the growth arena for wireless. Concurrently, CDMA—a new standard developed by Qualcomm—has become the core technology of the 3G era after substantial political maneuvering by key corporations and governments.12 Meanwhile, the Triad regions of worldwide wireless competition—North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific—have come to include China.13
tion to the 2G era in 1992, the United States was the most lucrative country market and had the largest worldwide penetration. With digitalization, rapid growth migrated first to the Nordic countries, then to Western Europe. As the European Commission made GSM mandatory in Europe, the regional wireless leaders—the Nordic vendors as well as a new generation of aggressive operators eager to challenge former national telecommunications monopolies—seized the new digital standard to extend their domestic advantages, first regionally and later globally. In Western Europe, the single GSM standard consolidated the fragmented markets; in the United States, multiple standards (TDMA, GSM, CDMA, iDEN) fragmented the consolidated market. The Toward A Mobile Information Europeans had learned from the U.S. Society. Because of accelerating finan1G success; Americans replicated the cial stakes, the coordination of the indusEuropeans’ 1G mistakes. try value chain has become an issue of international competitiveness, particuThe Competitive Era: The Worldwide CDMA larly in the most developed markets of the Triumph. Over time, the role of wireless Triad. In global competition, these technologies has shifted from safety to changing circumstances are reflected by basic needs, then to instrumental uses, the rivalry between two quite different and now finally, to expressive functions. In geographic and strategic groups. On the the pre-cellular era, a wireless phone was one side, European-based mobile leadconfined to emergency services. In the 1G ers, which originated from telecommuniera, the cell phone—more precisely the car cations firms, promote vertical industry phone—penetrated business markets, but coordination. On the other side, U.S.remained a household luxury. In the 2G based IT leaders, which originated from era, the handset became a mass consumer computer firms, struggle for horizontal [ 1 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
STEINBOCK
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integration. The Finnish Nokia is leading the Euro-Nordic mobile coalition, whereas Microsoft hopes to dominate the U.S.-based IT players. Strangely enough, the mobility revolution has evolved behind the spotlight of international affairs, diplomacy, and media, perhaps because the center of innovation is no longer in the United States—the primary arena of international media. Typically, pioneering studies of international affairs and media tend to ignore the role of the wireless industry.14 Even though U.S. foreign policy has been living in the information age for quite a long time, the information infrastructure policies of the Clinton-Gore era were designed primarily for the wired Internet in the early 1990s. The momentum for the wireless Internet came only five to ten years later. Indeed, the very logic of a “mobile information society” was initially crafted in Espoo, the suburb of Helsinki and the headquarters of Nokia, not in Washington, DC. As Nokia«s chairman and CEO Jorma Ollila and President Pekka Ala-Pietil of Nokia noted in 2000:
sumption worldwide. In 2003, the sales of handsets, according to leading market research firms, will amount to more than 400 million units worldwide, and an increasing proportion of these unit sales will include “camera phones.” With multimedia messaging (MMS) capabilities, these handsets have substantial implications for international affairs and media. Take, for instance, war reporting. More than three decades ago, Walter Cronkite’s reports from Vietnam forced the Nixon administration to formulate new policies for a changing media era. In the early 1990s, Peter Arnett’s satellite reports from Baghdad compelled the allied forces, the Iraqis, and international organizations to tackle the policy challenge of CNN’s real-time satellite images. But imagine future confrontations—including suicide attacks in the Middle East or a “dirty bomb” in a major metropolitan city—where mobile phone cameras will record anything, anytime, and anywhere to worldwide audiences in real time. Mobile media will enable these sounds, voices, and images only a few years from now. Indeed, the mobility revolution has We are at the beginning of someextensive implications for international thing very significant. Not just for media, journalism, and diplomacy not our company. Not just for our only in cost-efficiencies but also in difindustry. But for everyone. And for ferentiation and innovation. With all aspects of our lives. We are using international media and policymaking, the twin drivers of the Internet and the mobility revolution will escalate the mobility to break through the limtransition of bargaining power from its of time and place. These are very government elites to individual conpowerful forces...This is what we sumers. Over time, more than 1 billion mean by the Mobile Information citizens worldwide will gradually obtain Society.15 camera-phone capabilities, while handsets like Nokia’s 750 will be cloned in In the near future, mobile media—a global mass markets, resulting in highly individualized and interactive increasing performance capabilities for “trusted device”—will dramatically trans- lower prices. This handset along with form the existing patterns of media con- competing models from Motorola, Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 2 5 ]
TOWARD A MOBILE INFORMAT ION SO CIETY
Sony-Ericsson, Samsung, and others, will transform communications and the international media and pose extraordinary challenges to diplomacy. Instead of a CNN effect, which has been regional, decidedly centralized, industry-driven, top-down, and one-way, the effect of highly-individualized mobile media will be worldwide, exceedingly distributed, market-driven, bottom-up, and twoway. Therein lies the new challenge that government agencies, diplomats, and international media practitioners are about to face—a challenge that none of them may be prepared for. America’s military power enjoys unipolar superiority.16 However, there are
now cracks in the armor due to mobility. During the past two decades, U.S. wireless innovation has, at best, enjoyed parity with the core industry clusters (Nordic countries and Japan) and, at worst, fallen well behind. In the past, military technologies shaped mass consumer markets. Today, consumer markets shape military technologies. In the short term, this ensures substantial cost-efficiencies, differentiation, and innovation. In the wireless market, however, U.S. IT leaders are no longer the sole pioneers. Moreover, no single country can any longer dominate the entire industry value chain. Consequently, America’s military power is now strategically vulnerable.17
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1 Harry M. Petrakis, The Founder’s Touch: The Life of Paul Galvin of Motorola (Chicago: Motorola University Press/J.C. Ferguson Publishing Press, 1965), see Chapter 13. 2 Ibid., 159. 3 See Dan Steinbock, Wireless Horizon: Strategy and Competition in the Worldwide Mobile Marketplace (New York: Amacom Books, 2002); The Nokia Revolution (New York: Amacom Books, 2001); “Globalization of Wireless Markets” in Competition for the Mobile Internet, Dan Steinbock, ed. (Kluwer, Fall 2002). 4 See John Carey and Spencer E. Ante et al., “Point, Click...Fire,” Business Week (7 April 2003). 5 See Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), especially Part Two. 6 See Dan Steinbock, “Building Dynamic Capabilities: The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition: A Successful Online Subscription Model (1993–2000),” International Journal of Media Management 3–4, no 11 (2000). 7 See Gary A. Garrard, Cellular Communications: Worldwide Market Development (Boston: Artech House, 1998), Chapter 1. 8 Americans were not alone in developing the first mobile consumer markets (PMR, MTS, IMTS), but the pace of industry evolution was fastest in the United States. 9 Even though the cellular concept was first developed in the Bell Labs, U.S. players fell behind the wireless innovation during this decade. There were several reasons for these delays (compare Steinbock 2002, Chapters 3–4). 10 Ibid. 11 That implies annual growth of 37 percent and a
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steadily rising adoption curve. UMTS Forum (2002). 12 On the technological and political realignments of the 3G era, see Steinbock (2002), Wireless Horizon, Chapter 2. 13 In regional market shares, 1997 was a milestone year: North America lost its penetration leadership to Western Europe. Another benchmark followed in the summer of 2001, when the number of Chinese wireless subscribers exceeded the number of U.S. subscribers. 14 Taylor’s pioneering study ignores the role of the wireless, see Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1997). See also Wilson P. Dizard, Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Information Age (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001). On the information infrastructure initiatives, see U.S. Government, The National Information Infrastructure: U.S. Government, Agenda for Action (Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993). 15 See Jorma Ollila and Pekka Ala-Pietil , “Letter to Our Shareholders,” 1999 Nokia Annual Report, pp. 6–7. In 1995, the now defunct OTA released an important document on the U.S. wireless NII initiatives, but, for all practical purposes, this paper was ignored. At the end of 2000, President Clinton’s economic advisers made note of the critical economic significance of the 3G era, but this paper was too little too late. 16 Compare Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs: America and the World (1990/91); “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest (Winter 2002/3). 17 See Dan Steinbock, “The Threat from Within: The Unipolar Moment Re-Revised” [Unpublished Manuscript] (2003).
BAKER, O’CO NNEL L, RO BE RT SON
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Commercial Observation Satellites Dual-Use Technology in an Age of Global Transparency John Baker, Kevin O’Connell, and John Robertson Earth-orbiting satellites and manned John Baker is Technical Policy Analyst at RAND. spacecraft have been collecting images of Kevin O’Connell directs the Intelligence Policy the Earth’s surface for more than four Center at RAND. decades. Nonetheless, a major change is John Robertson is a Masters candidate in the Security occurring as high-resolution satellite Studies Program at Georgetown University. images become available for the first time to a broad range of states and non-state Several U.S. firms have received U.S. actors. This article examines some of the government licenses to build and operate policy issues that commercial observation their own commercial observation satelsatellites raise for U.S. policymakers, who lites. Despite some initial failures, two are concerned with both the potential U.S. firms are currently operating their benefits and risks of this dual-use infor- own imaging satellites. The IKONOS mation technology. satellite, owned by Space Imaging, Inc., became the world’s first operational Expanding Global Access. During commercial observation satellite in midthe Cold War years, the United States 1999. Another U.S. firm, DigitalGlobe, and Soviet Union were the only states Inc., launched its QuickBird commercial with access to high-resolution military observation satellite in 2001. Both satelreconnaissance satellites to help them lites collect high-resolution panchrokeep track of worldwide developments. matic (black and white) images at greater This situation fundamentally changed than one-meter resolution. At this resoafter the Cold War as the U.S. and Russ- lution, imagery interpreters can distinian governments allowed high-resolu- guish between objects as small as cars, tion satellite images to become publicly trucks, and aircraft. These satellites also available. These governments took sepa- collect multispectral (color) images at rate steps to declassify older military slightly lower resolutions, which are betreconnaissance images, such as the earli- ter suited for distinguishing between vegest U.S. CORONA satellite images that etation and soil types. Both U.S. firms are now publicly available from govern- sell their satellite images to a broad range ment archives. Even more important, of domestic and international customers. both governments authorized commer- Their global reach is extended through cial enterprises to sell high-resolution international partnerships with foreign satellite images. These steps fundamen- governments and private firms. Other tally opened the door to satellite imagery U.S. firms have plans to acquire their data, which is now available to a wide own imaging satellites, although most are range of users with few government making slow progress toward an initial restrictions. satellite launch. Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 2 7 ]
C O M M E R C I AL OBS ERVATION SAT E L L IT E S
A growing number of foreign imaging satellites are also expected to become available for commercial use in the next few years, further increasing the overall supply in the international market for high-resolution satellite images and imagery-related information products. For example, SPOT-5, a French civilian satellite, and the EROS-A1 satellite, operated by ImageSat International, an Israeli-led private consortium, are among the first non-U.S. sources of high-resolution satellite images. Along with more satellites from these companies, several other countries (e.g., Canada, China, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are working to launch new civilian or commercial imaging satellites, with plans to sell or broadly distribute high-resolution images. Unlike declassified satellite images, which have mainly historical value, the new commercial and civilian observation satellites offer various users detailed and timely information on human activities and natural developments occurring almost anywhere in the world. This new situation means that high-resolution images are not only available to almost all governments, but also to a potentially broad range of non-state actors, including the news media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and businesses.
Dual-Use of Satellite Images. There is still considerable debate over the potential risks and benefits of this new proliferation of satellite technology. Some observers believe that greater access to high-resolution satellite images is beneficial because it contributes to growing global transparency. This perspective holds that providing all governments, multinational organizations, and nonstate actors an additional information [ 1 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
source for global monitoring of potentially significant human and natural developments is a positive development. However, others have warned that potential adversaries will exploit this dual-use technology for less benign purposes, such as trying to gain an intelligence or military edge over neighboring states.2 The new generation of non-military imaging satellites is well-suited for supporting a wide range of civilian and commercial applications. Civilian uses include natural resources monitoring, disaster assessments, and general public planning. New types of commercial applications include planning for utilities, precision agriculture, and infrastructure assessments.3 In addition, high-resolution imagery offers novel types of users, such as NGOs, new opportunities for monitoring what is occurring in areas where governments or others might want to avoid public attention. Some current examples of “imagery activism� include revealing and assessing suspected sites of weapons of mass destruction in closed societies (e.g., Iraq, North Korea) or human rights concerns (e.g., images of North Korean labor camps or the urban devastation of Grozny resulting from Russian combat operations in 1999).4 Based on past experience, satellite images are likely to support future efforts at settling territorial disputes and monitoring compliance with confidence-building measures.5 As a dual-use technology, satellite imagery also is quite suitable for supporting military operations. During the First Gulf War, the United States took advantage of lower-resolution Landsat and SPOT civil satellite images to help analyze terrain and plan various military missions, while sharing these overhead images with its coalition partners. The
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new commercial and civil observation satellites produce images that are even more relevant to supporting military and intelligence missions because these satellite systems promise more timely delivery of higher resolution imagery data. Besides the United States and its allies, potential adversaries and regional rivals will be interested in using this new information tool. Aggressive states might exploit their unprecedented access to commercial and civilian satellite images to gain an information edge over regional rivals or to conduct operations against ethnic subgroups in their own countries. Some states might attempt to use such satellite images in monitoring the activi-
Science &Technology
U.S. Policy Implications. The information age has heralded an unprecedented flow of raw information, including satellite imagery data, across international borders. The growth of the Internet and affordable computing power has greatly facilitated the global spread of information products and tools, and the ability of the United States to control this flow is limited at best. If the U.S. government chooses to curtail and delay the flow of satellite technology and image products abroad, then foreign customers will simply look elsewhere. This will strengthen foreign industry and give greater encouragement to indigenous satellite programs, including imaging satellite systems.
Rather than trying to control the spread
of information technologies, the United States is in a better position to help channel information trends. ties of U.S. military forces. However, translating imagery data into a significant intelligence or military edge requires expertise, technology, and experience that are probably beyond the near-term capabilities of most countries considered threats to the United States and its allies. Aggressive non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, are likely to be less interested in satellite images than with other information technologies (e.g., cell phones and Internet communications) in performing their activities. Given that terrorist groups can often obtain more detailed and timely information on “soft targets� using ground-level reconnaissance or insider sources, they may not view satellite images as an important information source.
Realization of the inevitable diffusion of imaging technologies led U.S. policymakers in the mid-1990s to permit several American firms to develop and operate their own high-resolution imaging satellites.5 The new U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy released last month by the White House builds on this basic approach, although with greater recognition that U.S. federal agencies are a major customer for U.S. firms and with reforms on restrictions on the export of components, turnkey systems, and data. The success of this policy for U.S. leadership in commercial obvservation satellites remains to be seen.
Conclusions. Whether desired or not by policymakers, the information age Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 2 9 ]
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trends that help foster growing global transparency are unlikely to be reversed. The widespread accessibility of satellite imagery is emblematic of the diffusion of information age technologies, as well as institutional pressures for revealing information. Rather than expending efforts trying to control the spread of information technologies, the United States is in a better position to help chan-
nel information trends through technological leadership. In terms of satellite imagery, such policies should encourage global access to the diverse benefits of steadily improving commercial and civilian observation satellites while helping to limit the potential risks of hostile states or non-state actors being able to effectively use such satellite imagery data for their aggressive purposes.
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1 For background on the Corona imaging satellites and the imagery declassification process, see Robert A. McDonald, ed., Corona Between the Sun & the Earth: The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Bethesda, MD: The American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997); and Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998). 2 Good arguments for both perspectives are presented in Yahya A. Dehqanzada and Ann M. Florini, Secrets for Sale: How Commercial Satellite Imagery Will Change the World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000); and Gerald M. Steinberg, Dual Use Aspects of Commercial High-Resolution Imaging Satellites (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 1998). 3 Trends in the satellite remote sensing applications are analyzed in Kevin M. O’Connell, et. al., U.S. Com-
mercial Remote Sensing Satellite Industry: An Analysis of Risks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 23–64. 4 See the QuickBird image used in John Larkin, “Exposed—Kim’s Slave Camps,” Far Eastern Economic Review (12 December, 2002), 14–18; and the IKONOS image comparisons in “Campaign Poster,” The New York Times, Week in Review (26 March 2000). 5 For case studies on using satellite imagery for resolving territorial disputes in Central Europe, South America, and the South China Sea, see the various chapters in John C. Baker, Kevin M. O’Connell, and Ray A. Williamson, eds., Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND and ASPRS, 2001), 295–360. 6 The origins of U.S. policy are assessed in John C. Baker, Trading Away Security? The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Decision on Satellite Imaging Exports (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications, School of Foreign Service, 1997).
War and Peace in an Age of Transparency Kristin Lord Innovations in information technology Kristin Lord is Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor have changed the conduct of diplomacy. of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliot School of International Affairs of The George WashingSome opinion leaders theorize that these ton University. innovations also will have dramatic effects on war and peace and, more scope of their beliefs ranges from specifically, that the information age will intense optimism to measured hopefulusher in a more peaceful world. The ness that greater international trans[ 1 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
WAR AND PE ACE IN AN AG E OF T R AN S PAR E N C Y
trends that help foster growing global transparency are unlikely to be reversed. The widespread accessibility of satellite imagery is emblematic of the diffusion of information age technologies, as well as institutional pressures for revealing information. Rather than expending efforts trying to control the spread of information technologies, the United States is in a better position to help chan-
nel information trends through technological leadership. In terms of satellite imagery, such policies should encourage global access to the diverse benefits of steadily improving commercial and civilian observation satellites while helping to limit the potential risks of hostile states or non-state actors being able to effectively use such satellite imagery data for their aggressive purposes.
N OT E S
1 For background on the Corona imaging satellites and the imagery declassification process, see Robert A. McDonald, ed., Corona Between the Sun & the Earth: The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Bethesda, MD: The American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997); and Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998). 2 Good arguments for both perspectives are presented in Yahya A. Dehqanzada and Ann M. Florini, Secrets for Sale: How Commercial Satellite Imagery Will Change the World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000); and Gerald M. Steinberg, Dual Use Aspects of Commercial High-Resolution Imaging Satellites (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 1998). 3 Trends in the satellite remote sensing applications are analyzed in Kevin M. O’Connell, et. al., U.S. Com-
mercial Remote Sensing Satellite Industry: An Analysis of Risks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 23–64. 4 See the QuickBird image used in John Larkin, “Exposed—Kim’s Slave Camps,” Far Eastern Economic Review (12 December, 2002), 14–18; and the IKONOS image comparisons in “Campaign Poster,” The New York Times, Week in Review (26 March 2000). 5 For case studies on using satellite imagery for resolving territorial disputes in Central Europe, South America, and the South China Sea, see the various chapters in John C. Baker, Kevin M. O’Connell, and Ray A. Williamson, eds., Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND and ASPRS, 2001), 295–360. 6 The origins of U.S. policy are assessed in John C. Baker, Trading Away Security? The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Decision on Satellite Imaging Exports (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications, School of Foreign Service, 1997).
War and Peace in an Age of Transparency Kristin Lord Innovations in information technology Kristin Lord is Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor have changed the conduct of diplomacy. of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliot School of International Affairs of The George WashingSome opinion leaders theorize that these ton University. innovations also will have dramatic effects on war and peace and, more scope of their beliefs ranges from specifically, that the information age will intense optimism to measured hopefulusher in a more peaceful world. The ness that greater international trans[ 1 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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parency will improve political relations among governments. According to the optimists, information technologies provide more information about the capabilities and intentions of governments, a condition commonly referred to as “transparency.” Greater transparency has the potential to clear up misunderstandings between governments that have often led to conflict in the past. Increased transparency helps governments understand the non-aggressive intentions of their neighbors and aids conflicting societies in recognizing underlying values they have in common. Transparency also provides early warning of impending conflicts and allows outsiders to intervene before hostilities get out of hand. Unfortunately for the optimists, greater transparency is not the unmitigated good they suggest. While transparency may indeed promote international peace and security, its effects are complex and may even exacerbate conflicts. What is transparency exactly? Transparency is a condition in which information about governments’ preferences, intentions, behavior, and capabilities is widely available to the global public.1 It is a condition of openness enhanced by any mechanism that discloses information, such as the Internet, a free press, or open government hearings. In the realm of international politics, five factors in particular have led to the rise of transparency: (1) The Spread of Democracy: Between 1950 and 2000, the number of democracies in the world rose from 22 to 120.2 Democracies generally are characterized by a free press, public hearings, freedom of assembly, competing political parties, and contested elections—all of which facilitate the release of information to
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both domestic populations and observers worldwide. (2) The Widespread Availability of Information Technologies: Information technology is revolutionizing global communications, making it easier and cheaper to share information than ever before. As just one indication, there were 580 million Internet users in the world as of May 2002 and more than one billion users are expected by the end of 2005.3 (3) The Rise of Global Media: CNN, BBC, DeutscheWelle, and other twenty-four hour news networks provide nearly instant, real-time coverage of breaking news around the world. CNN’s ten U.S. and twenty-seven international bureaus deliver news to 78 million U.S. homes and to an additional 212 countries and territories.4 Viewers, distressed by what they see on these broadcasts, may pressure their politicians to act and end the suffering they see on television. (4) The Spread of NGOs: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are growing in both number and power. The Union of International Associations now lists over 15,000 internationallyoriented NGOs, and the growth of informal coalitions is outpacing the growth of formal organizations.5 (5) Increased International Requirements for Information Disclosure: International organizations often require their members to disclose information to each other and the global public in order to publicly identify, and sometimes punish, those who violate international agreements. Absent formal punishments, offenders may come under fire from other governments, as well as transnational or domestic interest groups. Although transparency benefits international politics in many ways, it is important to note that transparency can Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 3 1 ]
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exacerbate conflicts when states are truly hostile or have real conflicts of interest. In these circumstances, transparency underscores hostility and can even amplify it, making efforts at conciliation politically difficult. When publics on both sides of a conflict voice their animosity, public out-
U.S. military official told the Washington Post that the United States would not directly challenge Iraq if it seized Kuwaiti territory, saying, “We are not going to war.”7 President Bush announced in a televised statement on August 2, “We are not discussing inter-
Transparency can promote better
international relations, but it can also highlight and intensify differences. rage can spark a spiral of hostility that complicates diplomacy and may preclude a peaceful resolution. Even states with democratic institutions can find themselves trapped in cycles of hostile rhetoric, as in the 1898 Fashoda Crisis between Britain and France, and during the prelude to the Spanish-American War. In both cases, parliaments and newspapers on both sides fanned the flames of conflict, even as leaders tried to resolve the conflicts peacefully. Transparency’s effects on deterrence may also be counterintuitive. Greater transparency reinforces deterrence if it shows strength and resolve, but transparency can also invite aggression if it shows weakness or a lack of will. For instance, before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Bush administration sent Saddam Hussein mixed signals about the strength of U.S. support for Kuwait’s territorial integrity. A week before the invasion, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler noted publicly that the United States “does not have any defense treaties with Kuwait and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”6 Officials repeatedly stressed the absence of a formal obligation to defend Kuwait. One [ 1 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
vention.”8 These statements may have been directed at a nervous public, but they certainly did not help either to deter Iraq or encourage withdrawal after the invasion occurred. One hope for greater international transparency is that more knowledge about internal conflicts, especially those that might escalate to genocide, will allow outsiders to recognize and stop conflicts before they get out of hand. When early intervention doesn’t occur, publics will pressure their governments to respond to the crises they see on television. While both scenarios are possible, national interests and political considerations are still more influential in determining whether states will engage in preventive diplomacy and conflict intervention. To give an example, we now have ample evidence that the United Nations, as well as national governments like the United States and France, was relatively well informed about the 1994 genocide in Rwanda but chose not to intervene. Leaders feared the political consequences of losing troops in a distant conflict where no clear national interest was at stake. This was particularly evident in the United States, where the Clinton administration took heavy political fire for the vio-
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lent murder of eighteen U.S. Army Rangers in Somalia in 1993 and was reluctant to engage in a similar conflict. Despite regular newspaper reports of massacres in Rwanda, the American public did not pressure for intervention until the fighting ended in July—over 3 months into the crisis—and televised pictures of the ensuing refugee crisis moved them to action.9 Knowledge of the killings certainly did not guarantee action in Rwanda and greater transparency is unlikely to encourage intervention elsewhere if national interests are not at risk. As mentioned above, transparency promotes better international relations when it shows that societies share common views and values, but transparency can also highlight and intensify differences. Diplomacy is complex in the age of transparency because public opinion and political rhetoric are evident not just to the primary audience, but also to foreign citizens and their leaders, who may exploit differences in opinion for political gain. President George W. Bush’s sometimes harsh rhetoric before the 2003 war with Iraq may have been directed at Saddam Hussein and the American public, but American allies listened, too. This language, intended to show resolve and build domestic support for a war, contributed to a heated debate at the United Nations Security Council over how to deal with Iraq. Likewise, President Jacques Chirac’s critical rhetoric regarding U.S. policy towards Iraq was widely popular in France, but antagonized American leaders and many citizens. The risks of transparency outlined above should serve as a warning to leaders that belligerent statements have consequences and should not outpace policy.
Science &Technology
Publics and political players around the world are listening and reacting ever more quickly to what an official during the Fashoda Crisis called “brave words for public consumption.” With the spread of democracy, publics don’t just listen, they also have the political power to force their leaders to respond. The fact that greater transparency may sometimes exacerbate conflicts is no excuse for governments to control information. Excessive secrecy allows governments to avoid scrutiny, which can lead to inefficiency, abuses of power, corruption, and pure wrong-headedness. U.S. Senator Robert Byrd, when criticizing the secrecy surrounding tests of anti-missile defense systems, asked “Should this basic information be protected by the cloak of government secrecy? If the tests are rigorous and our anti-missile system is meeting our expectations, would it not be to our advantage to let our adversaries know how effective this system will be?”10 Conversely, if the tests showed the systems were not meeting expectations, Byrd argued, we would all have an interest in knowing this too. Secrets, in other words, may be counterproductive or held for the wrong reasons. Greater transparency, in sum, is not the unmitigated good that many of its proponents suggest. Transparency’s effects are complex and cross-cutting, especially in issues related to war and peace. Information-age diplomats must understand that increasing global transparency is transforming how governments interact with their publics and each other. Leaders and educated publics need to realize that while a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing, sometimes a lot of knowledge can be dangerous, too.
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N OT E S
1 Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 2 “Democracy’s Century,” Internet, http://www.free domhouse.org/reports/century.html, (Date accessed: 22 May 2003). 3 See Computer Industry Almanac, Internet, http://www.c-i-a.com 4 Wendy J. Williams, “The CNN Effect: The first 24-hour news channel has reshaped the TV landscape,” Boston Herald (28 May 2000), 6. 5 Quoted in Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
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6 “Missed Signals In the Middle East” The Washington Post (17 March 1991), W19. 7 Steven A. Holmes, “Congress Backs Curbs Against Iraq,” The Washington Post (27 July 1990), A5. 8 Miles Hudson and John Stanier, War and the Media: A Random Searchlight (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 214. 9 The New York Times printed 145 articles on Rwanda between April 7 and May 31 and The Washington Post ran 77; 25 and 14 of those stories, respectively, were front-page stories. 10 Senator Robert Byrd, “Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,” Congressional Record (25 June 2002), S5983–S5995.
Books
The Odd Couple Review by Christopher Hill Robert Kagan. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, 103 pp. $18.00 Charles A. Kupchan. The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002, 391 pp. $27.95 Given the solipsism of much of what passes as International Relations scholarship these days, it is a relief to come across two authors who set out to engage with major real-world problems and who can communicate beyond the academy. Both Robert Kagan and Charles Kupchan have produced books which, in Alexander George’s phrase, “bridge the gap” between intellectual life and the world of citizens and practitioners, not
least by being rooted in a knowledge of history, geography, and political thought and by displaying a capacity for empathy with the wide variety of human societies inhabiting our planet, which is essential if we are to understand international conflict. Anyone interested in the theory and practice of Euro-U.S. relations, or of modern foreign policy, would benefit from reading these volumes. Their lucidity also makes them accessible to students, who as Kupchan points out, are ever more rarely required to engage in serious thought about strategy, foreign policy, and diplomatic history—not so surprising in Sweden or Canada, but astounding in the great universities of the hyperpower. Their shared qualities, however, cannot disguise the differences within this academic version of Laurel and Hardy. Kagan’s book is short and somber; Kupchan’s large and cheerful. Kagan’s is an expanded essay, first seen in Policy Review (N0. 113, 2002), which immediately Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 3 5 ]
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drew the attention of think tanks on both sides of the Atlantic and was fallen on in a feeding frenzy for its sound-bite view that on strategic questions, “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Kupchan’s lengthier and extensively footnoted book will provoke reactions in a slower rhythm and reaches out more to the university market. Interestingly, both covers carry endorsements from Henry Kissinger, whose use of the word “seminal” indicates greater enthusiasm for the work of Kagan, which he believes will shape the discussion on European-American relations “for years to come.” The two sets of arguments presented in these two books are in some respects alternatives. One suggests that the European Union is a vibrant, evolving entity that already constitutes a major rival for the United States, and could be a serious adversary (or indispensable partner) in the future. The other sees the EU as having talked up its strength well beyond the point of plausibility, and as representing no kind of serious constraint on American power. The policy conclusions from these two interpretations naturally vary according to political taste. What is interesting is that both authors think that Europe’s world role is worth discussing. The obsession with the “Asia-Pacific century” has abated. It is worth outlining the two contrasting positions with special reference to the future, given the amount of futurology on view. Kupchan is especially bullish about what is likely to happen. Indeed, his constant assertions are a sign either of great intellectual self-confidence or of a weak argument, or both. His book, as its title suggests, is about far more than Europe, and its authoritative sweep through two centuries of U.S. foreign policy is its [ 1 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
strongest suit. Nonetheless, his basic argument requires Europe, and particularly the EU, to take center stage. According to Kupchan, the United States is in dire need, in the post-Cold War era, of a big strategic idea with which to make sense of itself and the wider geopolitical environment. Containment and bipolarity have never been replaced. Nor is this simply a matter of intellectual coherence; the United States has failed to understand that, through the cyclical processes of history, its time as the dominant force in international relations is drawing to a close. The new era will be one of multipolarity, with the United States hardly reduced to the post-imperial condition of Spain or the Netherlands in the eighteenth century, but still required to accommodate itself to emerging rivals and alternative sources of power. These rivals will include the obvious candidates of China and Russia, but may well also be embodied in a more united East Asia, and certainly a united, assertive Europe, organized round and through the EU. Kupchan’s modified realism (he believes in cycles but within a broad movement of evolution) leads him to state that the “central challenge of the future. . .will be the same as in the past— managing relations among contending centers of power,” of which Europe is bound to be one (Kupchan, xviii). History teaches us both that great power contains the seeds of its own decline, and that economic integration eventually produces political unity. Thus the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU will gradually gain strength through unity and the grafting on of the Security and Defense Policy initiated by Britain and France at St. Malo in 1998. The Euro, the rationalization of defense industries, the enlarge-
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ment process, and constitutional reform are all marching towards the point where Europe will not only have different interests from those of the United States, but will be able to assert them effectively. Policy circles in Washington may feel that they have something of a free run in international relations at present (al Qaeda apart), but this is a passing phase and they had better wise up to new realities on the horizon, which require multilateral cooperation, not as a moral good but as a strategic necessity. Robert Kagan agrees that the Europeans inevitably have different interests from their American partners, rooted in contrasting views of the world, but draws the opposite conclusion. For
espouse civilian power, to update the Melian dialogue. Since the world as a whole is still a dangerous place, other stronger entities will take a different view and shape the international environment, including Europe’s own region, by the direct use of power. Thus Kagan, like Kupchan, is a realist. The most he will concede to the Kantians is, with Robert Cooper, that some parts of the system may be permanently pacified and civil and do not require us to follow the logic of anarchy. But this only means that those of us half in and half out of such a paradise are compelled to practice the very “double standards” that so much of the world accuses us of. If we play by the kind of rules observed in the OECD
The obsession with the “Asia-Pacific century” has abated.
him, Europe is mired in a self-regarding Kantian “paradise,” where power is abjured, partly because of the region’s success in finally putting to rest the historic hatreds that cost so many millions of lives, but also because there is little alternative. Europe, whether in the form of individual states or the EU, cannot compete with the United States, despite the greater resources it disposes of on paper. This is because the member states are unwilling to spend more money on military force, and cannot agree to pool their resources. They largely rationalize this situation in terms of opposition to hard power in international relations and a belief in the importance of institutions, cooperation, conflict prevention, and the like. But in truth, theirs is a predictable philosophy born out of inferiority—the weak do what they must, and
world, we shall get screwed by those who do not share our values—or our advantages. The Europeans are being na ve if they think otherwise, but they can indulge themselves because they are able to free-ride on a U.S. security guarantee. There is a strong whiff of decadence in this portrait of the Europeans. To a European eye, both Kupchan and Kagan have a somewhat distorted view of Europe and the EU, if for understandable reasons. Interestingly, they both rather overstate Europe’s importance—Kupchan most obviously, but also Kagan, who represents the school of American commentators clearly stung by what are often insufferably-knowing criticisms of U.S. foreign policy. He is not so contemptuous of Europe as to be able to ignore it. Yet in the modern international system, the very success of Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 3 7 ]
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rendering Europe a conflict-free zone means that it is less a focal point for third states, and an unlikely source of international crises. That is why, after the relief at the bloodless dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it was such a shock to find a nemesis in the Balkans. Those crises surmounted, however, it is unlikely that Europe will return to being the cockpit of international relations in the near future. It is even more unlikely, pace Charles Kupchan, that the EU is on the brink of becoming a superpower. Let us discount the horrendous crash into the buffers represented by Iraq. The CFSP has fallen apart at times of high crisis before and it will again. Under conditions of the greatest stress, when controversial issues of war and peace are at stake, the greatest states may stumble, let alone a loose amalgam of 15 (plus 10) separate states with diverse historical traditions and domestic constituencies. But the CFSP will not be abolished because of the public spat over Iraq. It will continue with the Sisyphean task of trying to construct common positions and joint actions over a number of important and not always well-publicized problems, because no member state wishes to stand wholly alone, and because, in general, there are obvious advantages in hanging together. Where Kupchan is misguided is in his breezy assumption of linear progress, and in his interesting but somewhat facile analogies with the creation of the United States, the unification of Germany, and the splintering of the Roman Empire—with the EU seen as Byzantium to the American Rome. Given the extra problems the EU takes on, and at a heroic pace, it is a miracle that anything is achieved at all. Enlargement, a new defense dimension, [ 1 3 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
constant institutional tinkering, (with three treaties in ten years and another Intergovernmental Conference on the horizon), are all serious distractions to effective action on policy substance. To the extent that they represent change, it is usually of the “procedure as a substitute for policy” variety identified by William Wallace and David Allen twenty years ago. There is no sign that the wish and ability of states to defect from common positions is any less than it was at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, which enjoined them, hopefully, to act “unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.” Indeed, if anything, states like Germany, Italy, and Spain have acquired more assertive and distinctive national foreign policies than they possessed during the Cold War. The progress towards a common defense policy is indeed more rapid than many would have predicted five years ago, when Britain insisted on retaining the Western European Union as a bridge between the EU and NATO. But talk of a European army is still mere fancy, and no EU government would dare ask its electorate for the kind of increases in defense spending that would be required to fund even the first steps towards the capability of a superpower. The linked problems of British and French nuclear forces and their seats on the UN Security Council are too sensitive to raise, while the elements of supra-nationalism in foreign policy, minimal as they were, have now virtually disappeared through the triumph of inter-governmentalism, in the form of the European Council and the Council Secretariat, over the Commission and the supporters of majority voting. Kupchan either willfully ignores these developments in his determination to
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make the case, or is simply unfamiliar with them. The lack of references to serious academic analyses of the EU, its policies, and its institutions is certainly a weakness. Andrew Moravcsik’s book is cited but the argument not confronted, and the extensive work done on EU foreign policy by Roy Ginsberg in the United States and Wallace, Wessels, Nuttall, and many others in Europe is ignored. The same kind of ethnocentrism is present in Kagan’s book. Although, in many ways, he has a good feel for Europe, he relies too heavily on English-language sources, and in particular, on the Centre for European Reform, a Blairite think-tank in London. Furthermore, the grand scale of his generalizations allows little room for nuanced analysis of the range of European political opinion, from Christian pacifists to Greek nationalists, from Atlanticists to the Greens. If we bracket out the polemical aspect of his book, Kagan’s picture of the EU is nearer the mark than that of Kupchan. But whereas the latter goes too far in his enthusiastic projection of a perceived trend into the future, Kagan’s picture is too static. Like most realists, he does not make it easy to see where change comes from. Paradoxically, this is the more so because when explaining the EU’s failure to match its “amazing progress towards. . . integration in recent years” (itself a misreading) with equivalent unity in foreign policy, he slips into identity politics. Europe is no superpower, it seems, because we have rejected power politics and become born-again idealists, preferring the illusion that our own democratic peace is synonymous with international relations as a whole. Yet, if this is true, how do we explain France’s persistent belief that the United States must be balanced by a strong
Europe, and the recent willingness of Germany, not just Greece and Belgium, to go along with it? Kagan takes the view that “we have only just entered a long period of American hegemony,” and that the only strategy the Europeans have open to them is to try to “multilateralize” the United States (Kagan, 22). This is only true up to a point. Hegemony is not empire, and it involves constant negotiation over the form of international order with friends, neutrals, and adversaries. Multilateralism describes only process; more important are the underlying principles of international behavior and their sources. Even allowing for U.S. predominance—and especially given the fact that most Americans do not want to see their country exercise power in a brutal, selfregarding way—some new consensus will be necessary on key issues such as the exceptions to the presumption of nonintervention, the possession of nuclear weapons, the use of force, the governance of international institutions, and the rules of international economic life. If the United States attempts to decide these issues on the basis of hand-to-mouth unilateralism, it will come unstuck, for all its undoubted strength. This is where the Europeans come in. They will have different views on a number of questions, with the will and perhaps increasingly the confidence to oppose Washington on some of them. But at the same time, they have no wish to slip into an adversarial relationship with a longtime ally. The EU possesses considerable diplomatic and economic resources and is increasingly deploying these to effect in international institutions. If the United States could bring itself to accept that compromises on particular issues may be in its own long term interests, and that simply opting out of international discusSummer/Fall 2003 [ 1 3 9 ]
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sions is likely only to delay, and probably worsen, the resolution of any given problem, it would see that working with the EU can be a major advantage. This is not a
President Bush, the Europeans are left with three possible scenarios for coping with what they see as the bull in the china shop. First, they can swallow their reser-
If the United States attempts to decide
these issues on the basis of hand-to-mouth unilateralism, it will come unstuck, for all its undoubted strength. matter of “tying Gulliver down,” but of gradually attempting to extend the circle of civil, legalized international relations beyond the “post-modern paradise”— which by the way includes the United States, not just Europe. How many citizens on either continent have a clear idea of what life is like in the more dangerous regions of the world? Conversely, Europeans are just as vulnerable to the nihilistic anger represented by international terrorism as is the United States, and they have experienced it for longer. Washington needs to avoid creating a world-wide coalition of the resentful against itself, even if it has the power to defy hostility. Endless friction in foreign relations has a wearing, destabilizing effect at home as well as abroad. The worst scenario is one in which even the Europeans are so alienated that they are driven, Kupchan-style, into competition for the hearts and minds of the rest of the world. This is something, as Kagan points out, that the Europeans will do a great deal to avoid. They do not want to acquire superpower status, for a range of practical and moral reasons. Most Europeans do not even want the superstate that is its precondition. If the United States continues along the path currently being followed by [ 1 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
vations, and row along with Washington, on the calculation that the protection on offer compensates for the extra enmity incurred on a wider front by association with Uncle Sam. Second, they can continue along the path of Europe as a civilian power, perhaps a civilian superpower if they can increase integration and make better use of their soft power resources. This would involve accepting Michael Mandelbaum’s designation of “foreign policy as social work,” trying to ameliorate a system determined essentially by U.S. force majeure. Enlargement might make the EU into a more impressive geopolitical presence in the world, even if it still eschewed the build-up of a European militaryindustrial complex. Third, they can pull up the drawbridge and behave like a large neutral, not agreeing with Washington, but not opposing it, except perhaps in their own Near Abroad. In the post-Cold War world, Europe need have no fear that great power conflict in East Asia or elsewhere would lead to battles at home, and so they can safely sit on the sidelines over Korea, or Taiwan, and even Kashmir. They can try to avoid the worst of terrorism by behaving like Ireland or Sweden do today. This behavior carries the risk of all neutralism, that the bluff may be called and pressure exerted by aggressive
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outsiders. The EU is big enough to defend itself if roused, and if given sufficient warning, but it would have to gamble that the United States itself would not become actively hostile. That is the ultimate nightmare scenario, at present too unlikely to be worth worrying about. At the time of writing, the second of these options appears the most plausible path for the EU to follow, although the great challenges of enlargement and an uncertain international environment make it difficult to make a confident judgment. It is more possible than at any point in recent years that the European project might seriously stumble, and fall
back on being, as the German analyst Michael St rmer recently put it, “a customs union deluxe.” What is clear is that Europeans themselves need to do more serious thinking about the future international role of the EU, and its relationship to American power, of the kind on display in the vigorous treatments of Kupchan and Kagan. For whatever one’s view or preferences, the foreign policies of Europe and the United States are two sides of the same coin. Christopher Hill is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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View from the Ground
Between Representation and Reality A Moroccan Perspective on the Latest Gulf War Tara Marie Dankel As the second tower of the World Trade Center came crashing to the ground, I sat in the student lounge at Al-Akhawayn University in Morocco surrounded by Arabs and Americans united in horror at the images unfolding on the screen. When CNN cut to commentary, a friend turned to me with tortured eyes and asked, “Do you think your president will attack Iraq?” Her parents worked for the United Nations in the United Arab Emirates, she explained, and military action in Iraq would put them in danger. At the time, I found it difficult to make a connection between the devastating events of 9/11 and a renewed offensive against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. However, as another Gulf War finishes in the Middle East, her fears seem to have been well founded. Moreover, her concern highlights an obvious answer to the question of why Iraqis and other Arabs have shown such resistance to the “liberation” of Iraq from the clutches of the widely-anathemized Hussein. My experiences in Morocco indicate that, while Arabs condemn Hussein for his violent and oppressive regime, they also harbor intense suspicions regarding U.S. intentions in the region and unequivocally reject Western actions that they view as neoimperialist, even if that means supporting the Iraqi dictator. Like much of the world, Moroccans make a clear distinction between anti-Americanism and hatred of Americans. In the
Tara Marie Dankel is a a student in the Master of the Arts in Arab Studies program at Georgetown University.
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six months that I spent in North Africa, I spoke with myriad mothers, students, waiters, street children acting as impromptu guides, taxi drivers, and camel drivers, never once feeling threatened or endangered because of my nationality. I participated in discussions with Moroccans from all walks of life about religion, family, the perception of Arabs in the West, and cultural differences, such as relationships between the sexes, youth, materialism, and music in the United States. One might note that such open dialogue and curiosity about the West seems to contradict the atmosphere of hostility insinuated by massive protests against the last Gulf War—in which King Hassan II of Morocco allied himself with the U.S.-led coalition— staged in urban centers like Rabat and Casablanca. However, on the ground, one realizes that the man or woman chanting anti-U.S. slogans in the streets of Rabat is also the warm and welcoming stranger inviting you to dinner if you ever happen to be in the neighborhood. Due to the good/evil dichotomy created by government parlance and fostered by the media, Americans have developed the idea of the “good” Arab and the “bad” Arab. Good Arabs support the United States, share our values, and long for U.S. forces to free them from the yoke of tyranny and underdevelopment. Bad Arabs back autocrats like Hussein, reject American culture, and foment violence against Westerners wherever possible. Unfortunately, the divide is not so clear cut. Many of the people I met in Morocco understood, supported, and even participated in the protests against U.S. intervention in Iraq. When we broached the topic of U.S. foreign policy, Moroccans expressed incredible dismay at the short-sighted, jingoistic policies of [ 1 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
the West towards the Middle East, but harbored no specific enmities toward American culture or me as a representative of that culture. Again and again, upon learning of my nationality, Moroccans replied, “We are very unhappy with the actions of your government.” I cannot say I blame them. The reasons why a large number of Arabs rallied behind Hussein are complex and varied, but often pragmatic and tied to a pervasive sense of inferiority vis-vis the West. Unsurprisingly, few Arabs I spoke to readily extolled the virtues of Hussein. Ahmed, a good friend of mine, spent his childhood as a Palestinian refugee in Baghdad during and following the first Gulf War.1 A victim of malnutrition, violence, and repression, he was the first to enumerate the atrocities committed by Hussein against his own people. Nonetheless, Ahmed blamed the U.S. government as much as the Iraqi dictator for the suffering of the Iraqi people, citing the devastation wrought by the 1991 war and the ensuing twelve years of sanctions. Ahmed felt that the United States had abandoned Iraq after the last Gulf War, lending no support to opposition groups that could have toppled the regime, failing to rebuild infrastructure or industry, and weakening the spirit of the Iraqi people through sanctions. As a Palestinian—and this sentiment is more pervasive than most in the West would like to admit—Ahmed tied his opposition to U.S. policy to our unconditional support for Israel in its fifty-year long struggle with Palestine. Quick to note hypocrisy, Ahmed insisted that the United States had made no move to sanction Israel for its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza following the 1967 war, but readily committed to military action to remove Hussein from Kuwait in 1991.
View from the Ground
During the fall of 2001, Ahmed watched Israeli leaders use the rhetoric of the “war on terror” to pursue repressive, expansionist policies in the occupied territories; he could not help but wonder whose definition of terror counted. On one hand, the Bush administration demonized Hussein, while on the other it
a plan does not include citrus fruit, Morocco’s primary export. Such tariffs protect Mediterranean countries that produce competing goods and are in turn secured by the EU’s commitment to its common agricultural policy. The EU also tends to make economic agreements conditional on the extension
The divide between so-called “good” Arabs and “bad” Arabs is not so clear cut. called Ariel Sharon—who stood by while a Lebanese Christian militia slaughtered hundreds of Palestinian refugees in the early 1980s—a man of peace. Economic dependency is another facet of U.S. hegemony tied to neo-colonialism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. My Moroccan foreign policy class at AlAkhawayn, consisting of both Moroccans and Americans, provided an interesting insight into intra- and extra-Maghrebi policy. During our discussion of relations with the European Union, Adeeb, a master’s student whose father had served as an ambassador to Germany, spoke passionately about the EU’s refusal to deal with the Maghreb on equal terms. The colonial legacies of France and Spain keep Morocco closely tied to them economically. Given the lack of intra-North African trade, the Maghreb depends heavily on the European Union and the larger international community for development. Moreover, the EU has persistently used its economic strength, asserted Hassan, to keep Morocco in a position of inferiority. The EU has worked to reduce tariffs between itself and Morocco, culminating in a proposed free trade zone in 2010. However, such
of fishing concessions by Morocco to Spain, while at the same time discouraging the growth of an indigenous fishing industry—despite the fact that Morocco possesses some of the most plentiful fishing waters in the world. More globally, the structural adjustments imposed on Morocco and other Maghrebi countries by the IMF and World Bank in return for loans and development funds have succeeded only in expanding the chasm between rich and poor, leading to rampant instability in the cities and a decline in governmental legitimacy. Thus, as Hassan expounded on several occasions, the economic reforms, policies, and agreements imposed on the Maghreb by powerful players in the global market have kept the region weak and underdeveloped. Hence, the combined factors of neoimperialism, the failure of the ArabIsraeli peace process, and economic underdevelopment lead to the impression that the West seeks to promote its interests in the Middle East by keeping Arab states weak and divided. During one slow afternoon in Ifrane, Morocco, I sat with Ahmed sipping piping hot mint tea and discussing the impending military action in Afghanistan. We had just Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 4 5 ]
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attended a lecture by George Joff , British editor of the Journal of North Africa, who espoused the most severe antiAmerican sentiment that I had heard since arriving in Morocco. Joff berated the U.S. government for gross mismanagement of the “war on terrorism” and warned against “clash of civilizations” rhetoric. As Ahmed refilled my glass, raising the teapot high over my head to aerate the tea, he expounded on Joff ’s analysis of the situation, predicting that the Bush administration would use the war on terror to reshape Arab states to better suit its interests. At the time, Ahmed referred to the seemingly unshakable alliance between Bush and Sharon, but he could have just as easily been referring to military operations in Iraq. Like many Arabs, Ahmed felt that the mission of the United States in Iraq had not been accomplished during the reign of President George H.W. Bush and would therefore be completed during the administration of his son. This administration has gone to great lengths to convince the U.S. public that Iraq forced this war on itself through its duplicitous pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and collaboration with al Qaeda. However, documentation shows that President Bush planned the removal of Saddam Hussein for at least as long as my Moroccan friends had worried about it. TIME magazine reports that President Bush publicly intended to “take [Saddam] out” as early as March 2002.1 Horrified by the brutal excesses of Hussein’s regime and convinced that the Iraqi dictator had WMDs that could easily fall into the hands of terrorists, Bush succumbed to pressure from top officials such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, and set the ousting of Hussein as his goal. Since [ 1 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
then, the United States has worked overtime to prove to the rest of the world that Hussein does in fact possess WMDs and connections to terrorist organizations, therefore posing a serious threat to the security of the world community—a task that has yet to be achieved. The Arab world harbors no doubts about the illegitimacy of the conflict, as the masses show their discontent in immense demonstrations against symbols of U.S. power in their countries. These protests are incredibly reminiscent of protests against the presence of American troops on holy ground during the last Gulf War, the continuation of which was one of the primary reasons for Osama bin Laden’s radicalization and subsequent declaration of war against the government of Saudi Arabia. Even if the United States had used diplomacy effectively to gain legitimacy for this conflict, the “liberation” of Iraq would still have been viewed with mistrust by the Iraqi people and the citizens of the Arab world. Iraqis know what the last liberation of Iraq meant. After suffering under sanctions for twelve years, they fear another U.S. attempt to bring them peace and stability. This Gulf War may be the most popular war in the United States in several decades, but those suffering through the liberation remain skeptical. Furthermore, Arabs believe that the invasion of Iraq establishes a dangerous precedent for further unilateral regime change in the Middle East. The Bush administration is already talking about the dangers posed by Iranian and Syrian WMD programs. Connections to terrorist groups will be much easier to prove in both cases than they were regarding Iraq. The reported exodus of Iraqi leaders to Syria provides yet another reason for intervention. With international support
View from the Ground
no longer a prerequisite for military action, the U.S. presence is poised to balloon in the years to come. From the Arab perspective, such a presence will pose a number of problems. Beyond the obvious difficulty of non-believers occupying Muslim holy lands, a strong U.S. presence will surely enhance the sense that Arabs are incapable of solving their own problems, and require the West to impose freedom, democracy, and prosperity on their behalf. A number of Islamists in Morocco insist that a prosperous Muslim society
their people. In fact, U.S. support of corrupt, oppressive Arab regimes represents another leading cause for unrest and anti-American sentiment in the region. Morocco is an unusual exception to this rule. The Alawi dynasty holds wide legitimacy because of its historic right, ties to the Prophet, moderate level of economic growth, and legacy of political liberation. Yet, even in a relatively stable, moderate Arab state such as Morocco, the toleration of dissent is low and its security apparatus is strong. It is not unusual
Between the “bad” Arab and the “good”
Arab is a real Arab who opposes Saddam Hussein and those like him, but fears U.S. intentions and intervention in the region. must be built on Islamic, not foreign, principles. The push for democratization, beginning with the shining example of a newly-founded Iraqi democracy, will threaten the United States’s erstwhile allies in the region who are barely able to contain the anti-American sentiment currently exploding in their countries, and will probably require more—not less— repression of civil society in order to provide stability to their countries in the years to come. Thus, many citizens of the Middle East, particularly those living in countries slated for liberation, fear the repercussions of the United States’s unilateral takeover of Iraq. Speaking of Arab allies, one reason that the United States cannot understand the reaction of the Arab populace to the war in the Gulf is that Arab governments, which pledge their support to the overthrow of Hussein, do not genuinely represent the interests and aspirations of
to find paramilitary officers patrolling airports, key government buildings, and royal residences. In Ifrane, a royal retreat in the Atlas Mountains where the University of Al-Akhawayn is located, ten-foot-high barbed wire fences surround the king’s compound. American students were strongly warned that any breach of the perimeter fence could be met with sniper fire. Following 9/11, the king increased security throughout the country, arresting Islamists with suspected terrorist connections and increasing military visibility in possible sites of terrorist attack. This repression of dissent brings about a lack of responsiveness to the goals and interests of the general populace and, consequently, a misrepresentation of Arab sentiment by Arab governments to Western allies. Miscommunication is one of the most serious problems between the Middle East and the West. Arabs see the West as Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 4 7 ]
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aggressively thrusting its cultural values, economic institutions, and political structures on the Middle East in an effort to remake the region in its image. Interestingly, many of the Moroccans with whom I attended university accepted the pop culture of the West—they wore European clothes, spoke French and English, listened to American music, and got their news from CNN and the BBC. At the same time, these students vehemently opposed U.S. political and military influence in the region, responding to the war in Afghanistan with cynicism and mistrust, fearful of the extent to which the United States would go to win the war on terrorism, and saddened by the widely-negative representations of Arabs in the U.S. media.
The U.S. media cannot grasp that between the bad Arab and the good Arab is a real Arab who opposes Saddam Hussein and those like him, but fears U.S. intentions and intervention in the region. They worry that the United States will steamroll through the region, crush the strength of independent Arab states, and remake them in the image of the West. With a less-than-reassuring track record of nation-building, they fear that the United States will destroy Iraq and pull out the next day, leaving the Iraqi people in rubble and chaos. More than anything, they fear American intentions they do not understand. They know what life is like under a ruthless dictator; the future, on the other hand, holds no certainties.
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1 The names of everyday Moroccans in this article have been changed to protect their identities.
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2 Michael Elliot and James Carney, “First Stop Iraq,” Time 161, no. 13 (31 March 2003): 173–183.
A Look Back
Opening Markets in a Turbulent World Maurice R. Greenberg American International Group (AIG) has always been at the forefront of opening markets. AIG was born in China in 1919 and has since expanded into every part of the world. Time after time, AIG was the first company to identify opportunities in new markets and the first to introduce new products around the world. AIG companies were the first foreign insurance companies to enter Japan, South Korea, and many Southeast Asian countries. Our joint ventures in Central and Eastern Europe were the first of their kind in those markets. We were the first American insurers in many Middle Eastern countries. Beginning during World War II, AIG established a strong presence in Latin America, which had been traditionally dominated by European companies. We have introduced literally hundreds of new products to markets around the world that have been replicated by other domestic and foreign companies. Innovation is a way of life for us and we have always seen opportunity in markets that were too remote or too foreign for our competition. AIG is in the service business, but it was not until the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations that services were even considered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). I was serving at the time on the President’s Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations, and Bob Strauss was the U.S. Trade Representative. When we raised the topic of services, it was considered very strange since all previous trade negotiations had focused on tangible goods, things that you could touch
Maurice R. Greenberg is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of American International Group (AIG).
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and see. Although trade in services was first raised in the early days of the Uruguay Round, it did not get anywhere during those negotiations. Prior to the Uruguay Round, AIG took the lead in creating the Coalition of Service Industries—a group of U.S.based service companies, including American Express and Citigroup among others—to help lobby for trade in services to be negotiated. Today, trade in services is part of all trade negotiations, American service industries now have better access to foreign markets and enjoy protection in those foreign markets—and U.S. foreign policy has been furthered as a consequence.
that. All Asian countries are not the same, for example. Too many American companies fail to understand that, and pay the price for it. Fourth, you have to be persistent. It takes a long time to open a market, and you have to create and develop relationships in a country to do so. Too many companies just don’t follow that practice. Finally, you have to have the CEO out front. In many countries, their leaders do not want to talk to the second or third person in the company. They want to talk to the leader. It takes a lot of time and commitment to do that, and if you fail to do this, in most cases you will not succeed.
China. I first went to China in 1975,
Characteristics of a Leading soon after President Nixon made his Edge Company. What kind of char- historic trip. I believed that one day acteristics are necessary for a company that wants to be at the leading edge of opening markets? There are several things we at AIG have learned over the years that I think have helped us open markets and made us a leader in emerging markets. These five rules may be simple, but they are fundamental. First, you must know what you want to do. Too many companies—even American ones—just have a “me too” strategy. For example, if AIG is in a country, they think they should be there, too. They may not have developed their own strategy to ensure success in that market. Second, you have to have a long term view. You cannot go into a country for a short period of time. When companies do that, it causes tremendous problems. They go in, upset the local market, do not succeed, pack up, and leave. This does not go over well. Third, you have to understand the culture of the country. Each country has a different culture, and you must respect [ 1 5 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
China would join the world of open markets because 1.3 billion people cannot exist in isolation for long, and you cannot have a truly global trading system if China is not part of it. At some point, it had to change. In the insurance sector, China had only one company, the state-owned People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC). They were obviously not interested in competition, and posed a formidable barrier to our entry. When I first met with PICC in 1975, it was tiny. There were probably only about 200 people in the whole insurance industry in China. There was no need to insure anything because everything was government owned. But, as a result of that visit, we entered into a reinsurance arrangement with PICC. It was more symbolic than real, but it was a beginning. I made annual visits for several years, and in 1979 we created a joint venture called The China-America Insurance Company to insure trade between our
A Look Back
two countries. At that time, it was the first venture of its kind. This modest beginning led to the development of relationships with deputy prime ministers and State Council members, and soon this joint venture became a very important symbol to them as well. By the mid1980s, we opened an infrastructure fund in Chian, which quickly became a business in its own right, and began the first major real estate project in Shanghai with the support of Zhu Rongji, then mayor of Shanghai. After that, on all my trips to China, I stopped in Shanghai and met with him on one thing or another. On one of the trips he asked me if I would help create an International Business Advisory Council for Shanghai (IBLAC). I didn’t think it was possible to create what he had in mind, but I helped recruit CEOs from other companies around the world and chaired the first two meetings. Virtually
Jiang Zemin and Li Peng,” who was then Premier. Despite meeting with every member of the State Council and receiving the support of the Chinese ambassadors to both the United States and the UN, Li Peng was very difficult to see. Moreover, he did not even want to discuss the issue. No other foreign insurance company was even paying attention to China at the time, and no one thought there was a chance to get a license in China. But we persisted, and did everything we could possibly do to improve our relationships in China. For example, we purchased a set of window frames that had found their way to a Paris gallery after having been stolen from the Empress Dowager Pavilion in the Summer Palace during the Boxer Rebellion. We thought that it would be a very nice gesture if we could return them to China, so we had them authenticated by Chinese experts and then had them
It is a more difficult world in which to do
business today than at any time I can recall. every ministry in Beijing sent people to attend the meetings and listen to the advice that the Advisory Board offered Shanghai in its attempt to become a more modern city. Today, the IBLAC is a very important part of Shanghai’s infrastructure, and I remain a member. During that time, I kept pressing Zhu for a license to allow the sale of insurance in Shanghai. Although he finally agreed to try for permission, PICC blocked the license. Soon after that, Zhu became Deputy Prime Minister, and his advice was, “You have to convince everybody on the State Council. You have to talk to President
sent home. We did all kinds of things to convince the Chinese leadership that we were committed to China. When I was finally offered a hearing with Li Pen, I was in Europe, he was going to be in New York, and I was told that I could have just ten minutes with him. Although I was hesitant about the usefulness of a ten minute meeting, I decided to fly back to New York. The meeting lasted an hour and twenty-five minutes, and in addition to marketing our proposal, I assured him that AIG would not take out our dividends for at least ten years if granted a license. When I saw him in China two months later, the Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 5 1 ]
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first thing he said was, “I just approved your license.” That was 1992; it had taken some seventeen years since my first visit to China to get our first insurance license. To us, it was worth the wait because we thought China was a very important market to open. Since then, there have been many more successes and disappointments, ups and downs, but, over the long term, the efforts have paid off. Today, we are a major force in the insurance industry in China. The Chinese have learned a great deal from us and we welcome that. For example, all Chinese insurance agents have to take a test, as they should. For our agents, the pass rate is between 85 percent and 90 percent; for the industry in China it is probably between 35 percent and 40 percent. Because we train our people better, they do better, they make more money, and they live better. We set an example and a standard that is great for the country and great for the insurance industry. As China develops, obviously insurance becomes critical in almost every facet of life. Today, insurance is a growing business, but it took a lot of persistence and hard work. I cannot count the number of trips I made to China. When other foreign companies came in afterwards, decades afterwards, they believed they were entitled to the same treatment as the pioneer, but the pioneer should receive some benefits for being the first—because that first step is the hardest to take.
that a market economy was the best for the world. Insurance was on the agenda and I delivered a speech. During the meeting, I met the insurance commissioner from Romania. At that time the Iron Curtain was still up and Romania was a small, closed market with a state-run insurance company. We talked, and he was intrigued with AIG and what we were doing around the world. He invited me to come to Bucharest and I met with him on a trip to Europe. We had thought about doing something in Eastern Europe, and even though it was still behind the Iron Curtain, we thought we could plant some seeds for the future. We visited Poland and Hungary in addition to Romania, and put together a joint venture, but it was like the United Nations to get them together. They wouldn’t talk to each other but they would talk to us. We finally worked out an arrangement where the state company in each country would reinsure part of their business to a holding company. We put some of our own business in as well. We learned about their markets long before they actually opened. We built relationships and knowledge of what businesses were likely to develop in those countries once the Iron Curtain came down, which we believed would happen one day, and, of course, it did. Today, AIG has a variety of companies in each one of these countries, and they are doing very well. Again, we were years ahead of anyone else. Some of our comEastern Europe. In the mid-1970s, I petitors used to laugh at the amount of attended a Third World Insurance Con- time we spent trying to open these marference in the Philippines. It was a very kets. Now, they wish they had spent some negative conference, with heavy socialist of that time. overtones. I went because I wanted to make the argument that free markets are Japan. The last example I will give you better than closed-market economies— is Japan, which is our largest interna[ 1 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
A Look Back
tional market. AIG began operations in Japan almost the day after MacArthur landed there following World War II. The first licenses we received as a company were to insure the U.S. military and other assets the U.S. government had there. The Japanese are very good at finding ways of postponing decisions, but we finally got a non-life insurance license in the early 1950s. We built an organization and it flourished. Years later when we wanted to get a life insurance license, the Japanese argued that they had no need for another life insurance company in Japan, which was the largest life insurance market in the world. In fact, they doubted the Japanese would want to insure with an American life insurance company. The largest life company at that time was Nippon Life. We had a lot of help from the U.S. government and we finally got a life insurance license many years later. Even after that there was discrimination, and it was very difficult to get anything approved by the Ministry of Finance. But today, we are one of the largest life companies in Japan. In the late 1980s, the U.S. government began pressing Japan to liberalize its financial services industry. It culminated with a trip that President George H.W. Bush took to Asia, which I joined. It led ultimately to an agreement between the U.S. Trade Representative and the Japanese in 1994. The Japanese agreed to deregulation, but decided to deregulate the so-called “third sector” first because Japanese companies had no interest in it anyway, and then deregulate the first (life insurance) and second sectors (automobile, fire, and similar coverages) later. We did not quite agree with that since we already had a foothold in the third sector. The Japanese never believed that the U.S. would be firm enough in their
position to fight over this issue, but we were and the third sector was ultimately liberalized. This made a major difference to the consumer in Japan. On a recent trip to Japan, several bureaucrats and members of the Diet admitted that it was the right decision to liberalize the other sectors first, and the Japanese public has benefited dramatically as a result. You have to be persistent and difficult at times to get things done. The working relationship between the government and private sector is important. You have to work hand-in-glove and many times educate your own government on certain things. Too often they are not focused on the economic realities that drive businesses in a global world. Yet, the more global the world, the more these issues will arise. Unless you understand the economics out there—I call it “geo-economics”—you are not in tune with reality.
Closing Thoughts. It is a more difficult world in which to do business today than at any time I can recall. There are so many more risk factors—and insurance is a risk business. In addition to property, aviation, and the traditional risks that we understand, there are the newer risks of terrorism or war, currency crises, interest-rate risk, volatility risk, market risk, and health risks like SARS that profoundly affect markets. It is a tough environment, and now includes the accounting and regulatory risks. The global CEO today must deal with problems all at once that they never had to deal with before. It is worse than any time I can recall. But, we’ve learned to deal with problems as they arise, and every company has to do the same to be successful. For example, we operated in Pakistan for many years, but when the first President Bhutto came to power, he nationalized Summer/Fall 2003 [ 1 5 3 ]
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the foreign insurance industry, including AIG’s life insurance company, which was the largest foreign life company in Pakistan at the time, without even a conversation about compensation. Several months after President Bhutto came to power, he came to New York to try to convince the investment community to invest in Pakistan. I had a copy of his intended speech, and I went up to him before the speech and said, “Mr. President, if you make that speech, I will get up and say, ‘Don’t invest,’ unless we get compensated.” He called his aide over and we settled it that afternoon. We faced a similar situation in Peru, when President Fujimori’s predecessor nationalized Belco, a large ener-
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gy company that we had insured. As a result, we ended up paying out a major political risk claim. These are the kinds of things that are largely unpredictable, and you have to deal with them as they come up. It is part of being actively engaged in a market. So if you are going to do business globally, you have to be active. Problems are inevitable. Foreign countries do not always share our sense of values or have similar laws. That makes it challenging, but in the end it is worth it. Editors’ Note: This article is an edited transcript of the twenty-third annual Oscar Iden Lecture sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and the Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business.