GJIA - 7.1 Mobilizing Media

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Strong Medicine Pharmaceutical Patent Law

Mitul Desai

Money Talks China’s Revaluation

Shalendra Sharma WINTER/SPRING

Architect of Peace The African Union

JamesBusumtwi-Sam

2006 VO L U M E V I I , N U M B E R 1

Mobilizing Media forum contributions: Blogging in South Korea Egypt’s Media Deficit Chavez and Censorship Inciting Violence in Kosovo Exposing AIDS in South Africa

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Armitage on Iraq

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Winter / Spring 2006, Volume vii, Number 1 1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Mobilizing Media The media play a powerful role in international politics. They not only shape the public’s perception of global events, but they also influence domestic and foreign policy. The media can act as a potent tool in mobilizing governments to take action on issues such as HIV/AIDS and humanitarian crises. At the same time, governments can use media to get their political messages heard. Furthermore, the form and function of media evolve with the advent of news blogging, which creates space for political discourse and can be a means of mobilizing the masses. Public perceptions, politics, and the press form a cycle of influence, as each puts pressure on the next. To this end, our Forum explores the politics of the press.

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Introduction JOHN WALCOTT

9

Online Storytellers: Blogging in South Korea YONG-CHAN KIM AND KYUN-SOO KIM

17

Egypt’s Media Deficit ADEL ISKANDAR

25

Media Crackdown: Chávez and Censorship ROGER ATWOOD

33

Media in Conflict: Inciting Violence in Kosovo CLAUDE SALHANI

41

Exposing AIDS: Media’s Impact in South Africa MIA MALAN

Business&Finance 51

USAID Revisited RAJ KUMAR

To make foreign aid more effective, the United States must centralize its programs under USAID. Cover photo: AFP Photo/Jamal Aruri Winter/Spring 2006 [ i ]

59

Money Talks: Revaluing China’s Currency SHALENDRA D. SHARMA

Can the revaluation of the yuan strengthen the Chinese currency and close the trade gap?

Conflict&Security 65

Why States Choose Paramilitarism ARIEL I. AHRAM

When governments turn to paramilitaries to solve domestic troubles, it signifies not a descent into anarchy but rather an innovative means to solve persistent political problems.

71

Architects of Peace: The African Union and NEPAD JAMES BUSUMTWI-SAM

The AU can best contribute to sustained peace and security in Africa by taking a strong stand on domestic governance issues.

83

Demographics and Security in Maritime Southeast Asia BRIAN NICHIPORUK, CLIFFORD GRAMMICH, ANGEL RABASA, AND JULIE DAVANZO

Demographic trends in Maritime Southeast Asia directly affect security and U.S. interests in the region.

Culture&Society 93

Strong Medicine: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Compact with Society MITUL DESAI

The fight over Indian patent laws reveals the global perception of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.

Law&Ethics 101

Strengthening Protection of IDPs: The UN’s Role ROBERTA COHEN

Reform of the UN must include improved legal and institutional mechanisms to protect the internally displaced.

111

The Darfur Dilemma: U.S. Policy Toward the ICC JOHN STOMPOR

The Darfur genocide has compelled the United States to rethink its policy toward the International Criminal Court, but U.S. ratification of the Rome Treaty is no more likely.

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Contents

Politics&Diplomacy 121

Trouble in Paradise: Nepal’s Tryst with Insurgency and Despotism HARSH V. PANT

A political stalemate in Nepal requires international intervention.

Science&Technology 129

Nano-Diplomacy PETER SINGER, ABDALLAH DAAR, FABIO SALAMANCA-BUENTELLO, AND ERIN COURT

Nanotechnology will help developing countries, but only with a focused international effort.

Books 139

Islamic Reform or Designer Fundamentalism?

EBRAHIM MOOSA

Review of Tariq Ramadan’s Western Muslims and the Future of Islam.

View from the Ground 145

The Seeds of Social Inclusion: Reforming Education in Costa Rica ALEJANDRO J. GANIMIAN

Racism in Costa Rican education threatens the country’s democratic institutions.

153

Guinea: An Island of Stability?

SARAH BIRGITTA KANAFANI

Guinea’s stabilizing role in West Africa has exacerbated its own problems.

A Look Back 161

Armitage on Iraq: Applying History’s Lessons INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD ARMITAGE

Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage argues that success in Iraq requires U.S. support for the development of competent democratic institutions.

Winter/Spring 2006 [ i i i ]

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EDITORS-IN-CHI EF MANAGING EDITORS

BUS INESS DIRECTOR DES I GN MANAGER

FORUM EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANT BUS INESS&FINANCE EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C ONFL I C T&S E CUR I TY ED I T ORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C U LT U R E & S O C I E T Y E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS L AW & E TH I C S E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS POLITI CS&DIPLOMACY EDITORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS S C I ENC E&TE CHNOLO GY ED I T ORS BO OK REV I EW ED I TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS V I EW FROM THE GROUND ED I TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANT A LOOK BACK EDITOR EDI TORI AL ASS I STANT D IREC TOR OF ADVERT I S I NG D I RE C T OR OF C I RCULAT I ON DIRECTOR OF FINANCE DIRECTOR OF MARKET ING D I RE C T OR OF PUBL I C RELAT I ONS BUS INESS ASS I STANTS

DES I GN ASS I STANTS

ADV I S ORY BOARD

UN I VERS I TY C OUNC I L

Margo M. Huennekens, Lorin Kavanaugh-Ülkü Darcie L. Allen, Jean Poe, Andrew Reissaus, Samantha Yale Victoria L. Cheng Huoi K. Trieu Jan Cartwright, Maeve Townsend Diana Barbara Greenwald Brittany Baumann, Christine Estevez William Allen, Daniel Phillips, Shoshana Tischler Michael Boswell, Whitney Shinkle Grace Moon, Joshua Smith, Farooq Tirmizi Aaron Imperiale, Tiffany Summerfield Caroline O’Reilly, Alfia Sadekova Robert Alter, Dorothy Chou Rima Abushakra, Joe McReynolds, Matthew Weed Mithuna Sivaraman, Anya Yakhedts Aditya Deshmukh, Andrew Mok, Jessica Prusakowski Madison Abigail Jones, Anubha Verma Nicole Cordeau, Jeff Pan Elizabeth Hanna-Owens, Olivia Lynch, Stacey Spivey Sophia Castillo-Plaza, Carol Villarroel Christen Battipaglia Candace Faber Jordan White Robert Williams Garrett T. Schmitt Igor Khayet Shirin Sahani Samantha Bailye Robin Chan, Matthew J. Engler, Zhimei Luo, Lauren McCaskill, Yvonne Mejia, Andra Mocanu, Andrew Owen, Caitlin Poliner, Emilie Pradera, Julia Salo, Natalya Skiba Zara Sarfraz Ahmad, Sung Eun Kim, Genevieve Smith Kinney david abshire, susan bennett, h.r.h. felipe de borbón, joyce davis, cara dimassa, robert l. gallucci, lee hamilton, peter f. krogh, michael mazarr, fareed zakaria anthony arend, richard brahm, daniel byman, chester crocker, christopher joyner, charles king, carol lancaster, thomas o. melia, donald mchenry, daniel porterfield, howard schaffer, george shambaugh, jennifer ward, casimir yost

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Editors’ Note

In today’s world of ever-increasing access to information, the media play a more important role than in any other time in history. With new forms of communication—as well as increasing infrastructure supporting that communication—media now have the ability to act as a potent force in both the developed and developing world. Media—from newspapers to television to Internet blogging—help shape the public’s perceptions about issues as varied as health, humanitarian crises, and presidential elections. Public opinion then puts pressure on governments to act. The media are not only an active force, however; they are also reactive. A strong government can change the media’s coverage just as easily as media can shape public perception. The result is a cycle of influence: from the media to the public to the government and back to media again. The media have thus become a political actor.

This issue’s Forum captures the effects of this cycle by citing key case studies from across the globe. Yong-Chan Kim and Kyun-Soo Kim explore the impact of blogging on South Korean politics, while Claude Salhani details the media’s role in the Kosovar conflict. Mia Malan, writing on AIDS in South Africa, looks at how the media can affect social issues. Examining the influence that governments can have on the media, Adel Iskandar argues that the Egyptian government has suppressed the media’s voice, and Roger Atwood writes of media censorship in Venezuela.

These articles combine to create a rich picture of media’s emerging role in the international political landscape.

Other articles in this issue also capture the role of non-traditional global actors.

Ariel I. Ahram argues that paramilitaries are becoming increasingly common, with progressively more power. Peter Singer, Abdallah Daar, Fabio SalamancaBuentello, and Erin Court write that the scientific community may be able to achieve what international organizations and NGOs have long failed to accomplish: development for the world’s poorest nations.

Finally, this issue includes a special interview with former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who argues that competent, democratic institutions will be the linchpin for success in Iraq.

As always, this issue of the Journal explores not the topics of today or even of tomorrow, but the topics that will affect the world for years to come. We hope you enjoy what lies between its covers.

Margo M. Huennekens

Lorin Kavanaugh-Ülkü

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 ]

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Forum GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mobilizing Media 3

Introduction JOHN WALCOTT

9

Online Storytellers: Blogging in South Korea YONG-CHAN KIM AND KYUN-SOO KIM

17 Egypt’s Media Deficit ADEL ISKANDAR

25 Media Crackdown: Chávez

and Censorship ROGER ATWOOD

33 Media in Conflict: Inciting

At the same time as the American news media, already suffering from a series of self-inflicted wounds, confront a sobering array of economic, technological, and even intellectual challenges, the notion of a free, aggressive, and independent media has begun to put down roots in what heretofore had been stony soil.

That is a hopeful sign in a world that seems sadly in need of one. A free public square—literal, metaphorical, or virtual—where information, ideas, and opinions can be freely presented, tested, and challenged, is essential to the devel-

Violence in Kosovo CLAUDE SALHANI

41 Exposing AIDS: Media’s

Impact in South Africa MIA MALAN

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 3 ]

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opment of civil society, which in turn is essential to liberal self-governance.

In South Korea, Yong-Chan Kim and Kyun-Soo Kim report, distrust of traditional media, widespread access to broadband Internet connections, and new traditions of collective political action have given rise to a new breed of online “civic storytellers.”

“In South Africa,” writes Mia Malan, “public health battles—particularly those related to HIV/AIDS—are increasingly being fought on television news bulletins, front pages of newspapers, and radio talk shows.”

But if media that are free and independent—not just politically but also economically and intellectually—can promote transparency, democracy, and accountability, media that are enslaved, indebted, or intimidated are little more than megaphones for those in power. In Egypt, for example, Adel Iskandar describes how, despite some halting moves toward greater democracy that have been exaggerated by the foreign media, President Hosni Mubarak has kept most national television programming under strict state control and minimized the opposition’s television time and visibility.

“The involvement of the media… can yield both positive and negative results,” depending largely on how free and independent the media are and how responsive public officials are to public opinion, Claude Salhani writes in his essay on the role of the media in the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.

“Today, the media remain vital in politics as indicated in the common expression ‘the power of the press’,” Salhani says. Inflammatory and inaccurate reporting in the Albanian-language media served to inflame ethnic tensions [ 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

in Kosovo, and media neglect allowed the genocide in Rwanda to proceed, he notes. On the other hand, he writes, the media helped make possible a military action that helped save the lives of tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians by portraying NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo as justifiable and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic as a rogue. Salhani contrasts the international support for U.S. military action with the widespread international criticism of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq four years later.

It is hardly surprisingly then that democratic and non-democratic governments, NGOs, and even terrorist groups all seek to co-opt, intimidate, subjugate, or own the media, for the simple reason that invading other countries, governing, addressing problems such as AIDS and global warming, and fomenting revolutions are all easier if the media watchdogs are brought to heel and harder when they’re nipping at your heels.

No less a media maven than Ayman al Zawahri, Osama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant and heir apparent, reflected last July on the role of the media in a letter to terrorist leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq: “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our umma [the Islamic nation].” Al Zawahri also chided al Zarqawi for beheading hostages, not because it is morally offensive but because it looks bad on al Jazeera: “Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages.”1 The Bush administration has attempted to counter the terrorists by secretly paying Iraqi reporters to produce upbeat

WALCOTT

stories about American efforts there,2 secretly paying Iraqi newspapers to publish stories written by U.S. military personnel,3 and using Army psychological warfare specialists as public information officers.4 Within the United States, too, the U.S. administration has been feeding the mouth that’s supposed to bite it, producing fake news reports, a practice that the Government Accountability Office declared out of bounds, and paying conservative-friendly commentators to promote its policies.5 Russian President Vladimir Putin, apparently trusting less in market forces, has taken a more direct approach: charging his media critics with a variety of crimes, bringing virtually all of what had been an independent press back under the Kremlin’s thumb, and more recently turning his attention to requiring pesky NGOs to get government licenses to operate in Russia.

Roger Atwood documents the battle for control of the media in Venezuela, where laws enacted since late 2004 by the Venezuelan Congress, controlled by President Hugo Chávez and his party, “have sharply reduced the latitude with which Venezuelan media can report on political figures in their country…”

Atwood notes that legal scholars, editors, and free press advocates say the new codes in Venezuela have “created a pernicious climate of self-censorship among reporters that has already begun to affect the quality of coverage and public debate.”

In the United States fear of appearing unpatriotic after 9/11; the absence of strong political opposition to the Bush administration; a vigorous pro-administration drumbeat on the Internet, talk radio, and cable television; and some journalists’ reluctance to challenge officials for fear of losing access to them had

Mobilizing Media

a less severe censorship effect as the administration took the nation to war in Iraq. The New York Times, the country’s most prestigious news organization, published a lengthy apologia for its supine coverage of the Bush administration’s case for a pre-emptive war against Iraq, which featured bogus information that Times reporters and others accepted uncritically from administration officials and Iraqi exiles.6 Most other American news organizations failed to challenge even the administration’s most dubious allegations from Iraqi exile groups and defectors, including the claim that the secular Saddam Hussein and the Wahabi-extremist bin Laden were co-conspirators and allegations that Hussein had given a Kurd access to his secret WMD facilities.

Still, neither technology nor economics are on Mubarak’s, Chavez’s, or Putin’s side, and time may not be either. In Venezuela, as Atwood notes, “The new statutes, with draconian punishments for offenders, run contrary to the trend throughout Latin America of liberalizing press laws and widening space for debate and editorial opinion.” Today the globalization of the economy and the spread of new communications technologies, especially satellite television (which doesn’t respect borders or demand literacy) and the Internet (with its low barriers to entry), are altering the media landscape far more than the new technologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did.

In Egypt Iskandar finds: “The discrepancies in news programming between state and private, satellite media [such as al Jazeera] are so stark that it can seem as if two distinct realities are being covered.

This state of media schizophrenia is prevalent in many Arab countries. With audiences feeling increasingly estranged from their Winter/Spring 2006 [ 5 ]

MOBILIZING MEDIA

domestic media, there is the threat of state media becoming obsolete and negligible.”

Autocratic regimes such as China’s and Russia’s are discovering that choking the free flow of information and feeding the public a steady diet of propaganda no longer works as well as it did in the past.

What Mikhail Gorbachev learned at Chernobyl in 1986, the Chinese are learning with every new toxic spill, mine disaster, and labor uprising: The truth will get out, and the Internet provides new outlets for it.

In democratic South Korea, Kim and Kim write, “online storytelling among South Korean bloggers has functioned, in many cases, as a main channel of sharing alternative political views and as an effective means for mobilizing likeminded people for particular political and civic actions including voting, street protests, candlelight vigils, or contacting elected politicians or the news media.”

Moreover, even governments such as China’s that so far have managed to keep their domestic media on a leash have had a hard time figuring out how to participate in the global economy while simultaneously maintaining impenetrable barriers against imported news, information, and opinion.

But some of the same economic and technological forces that frustrate would-be censors elsewhere have begun to threaten the freedom and independence of the news media where it seemed to be most firmly entrenched—in the United States. The Internet is mentioned most often, but every new technology in the last 160 years—the telegraph, photography, the telephone, radio, television, cable, and satellite television—has provoked similar hand wringing. Like Simon Jenkins, we can take some comfort from the French por[ 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

traitist Delaroche, who upon seeing a photograph for the first time, declared: “From this day, painting is dead.”7 If the traditional media are not dead, however, they are ailing. The Internet’s ease of use and search functions offer an easier way to find cars, houses, and jobs— the three staples of newspaper classified advertising. Digital recording has raised new questions about the value of television advertising, and the growth of online news has given advertisers powerful new tools to measure reach and retention. In short, it’s no longer clear whether newspapers or television networks can generate enough revenue to pay for their newsgathering efforts.

“Like their counterparts worldwide,” Iskandar writes, “the Arab media struggle to balance their dual responsibilities of being fact-finding organizations and the importance of finding, and maintaining, audiences.” U.S. newspaper circulation is falling, and broadcast and cable news audiences are in similar decline. Newspaper and TV news demographics are even more discouraging: people younger than thirty generally don’t read newspapers or watch TV news, unless you count The Daily Show, and standard regression analyses by Knight Ridder and other media companies suggest that they are not likely to acquire the habit as they grow older.8 At the same time, an array of bloggers, some of them wildly partisan strangers to traditional concepts of sourcing and accuracy, have rushed into the vacuum that has been created by the decline of traditional news organizations, the stampede to entertain rather than inform, and the ethical and professional sins (not only of commission but also of omission) that have tarnished what the bloggers derisively call the “mainstream media.”

WALCOTT

The most pernicious and potentially dangerous line of attack on the American “MSM,” however, may be an intellectual paradigm shift rather than the technological or economic ones. In his book Confidence Games, Mark C. Taylor writes: “In recent years, American society has undergone a disturbing crisis of confidence in many of the institutions responsible for the country’s wellbeing. Priests, politicians, and financiers, as well as the press, media, courts, and schools no longer seem trustworthy… As fundamental truths and values faded and disappeared, it no longer seemed possible to be sure what was real and what was fake.”9 Here, courtesy of Eric Boehlert writing in Salon.com (and confirmed by the transcript), is an example of the battle between perception and reality in a Fox News discussion of the controversy over whether former CNN executive Eason Jordan suggested that American troops in Baghdad may have deliberately fired at journalists: Reese Schonfeld (a founder of CNN): “But remember that a U.S. tank rolled up in front of the Hotel Palestine, which is where all the journalists were, turned the turret around, pointed its gun, and fired up at the building.”

Brian Kilmeade of Fox News: “That’s what CNN reported.”

Schonfeld: “No, that’s what is reported. The guy from Reuters was killed, and a Spanish journalist was killed…”10 Mia Malan, in her essay on coverage of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, finds the truth distorted by a similar political lens. “When South African President Thabo Mbeki in the late 1990s began voicing doubts about the cause of AIDS and the efficacy of well-established Western treatment methods,” she writes, “the largely white-owned media’s

Mobilizing Media

criticism of his statements was branded unpatriotic and racist.”

The current American administration has displayed a firm grasp of the idea that perceptions dressed as fact can trump reality. In an October 2004 article in The New York Times Magazine, Ron Suskind quoted, alas anonymously, a senior advisor to President Bush who dismissed journalists because they live “in the reality-based community.” According to Suskind, the advisor said, “That’s not the way the world really works anymore. We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”11 As a result, he went on to say, the administration would always be one step ahead of journalists trying to catch up with its successive realities.

But as Taylor points out, financial markets, sound government policies and democratic self-government all require accurate information, not phony financials from Enron, bogus intelligence from Iraqi defectors, or even fake news from Jon Stewart.12 Perhaps, as some of the following essays suggest, it is time for the students of a free press to become the teachers. While the U.S. government provides journalists at home and abroad with questionable intelligence, in Lebanon the slogan of the nationwide uprising that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was two simple words, in Arabic and in English: “The Truth.”

John Walcott is the bureau chief for Knight Ridder in Washington, D.C. and adjunct professor in the Masters of Foreign Service program at Georgetown University. He is also co-author of the book Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism.

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NOTES

1 Ayman al Zawahri, "Letter to Abu Musab al Zarqawi," as seen on the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Website, Internet, www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf. 2 July 2005 (Date accessed: 4 July 2005).

2 The Editors, “The Times and Iraq,” The New York Times, 26 May 2004; Daniel Okrent, “The Public Editor: Weapons of Mass Destruction? Or Mass Distraction?” The New York Times, 30 May 2004.

3 Jonathan S. Landay, “U.S. Military Pays Iraqis for Positive News Stories on War,” Knight Ridder, 30 Nov. 2006.

4 Mark Mazzetti and Borzou Daragahi, “U.S. Military Covertly Pays to Run Stories in Iraqi Press,” Los Angeles Times, 30 November 2005.

5 Landay, Ibid.

6 Howard Kurtz, “Administration Paid Comment-

[ 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ator,” The Washington Post, 8 January 2005, A-1.

7 The Editors, “The Times and Iraq,” The New York Times, 26 May 2004; Daniel Okrent, “The Public Editor; Weapons of Mass Destruction? Or Mass Distraction?” The New York Times, 30 May 2004.

8 Simon Jenkins, “Under my Keyboard the Desk Shakes; the Bloggers are on the March,” The Times Online, 11 March 2005.

9 Knight Ridder, Inc. proprietary research.

10 Mark C. Taylor, Confidence Games: Money and Markets in a World without Redemption, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

11 Eric Boehlert, “Tearing Down the Press,” Salon.com, 2 March 2005, Internet, http://www.salon. com/news/feature/2005/03/02.

12 Ron Suskind, “Without a Doubt,” The New York Times Magazine, 18 October 2005.

Mobilizing Media

Online Storytellers Blogging in South Korea

Yong-Chan Kim and Kyun-Soo Kim Korea began the twentieth century as one of the poorest countries in the world. The “land of morning calm”—as European tourists called this small East Asian country at the turn of the century—was governed under colonial rule by its neighbor Japan for the first three decades of the century.

Immediately after gaining independence from Japan, Korea was stricken by the three-year-long Korean War. Divided and impoverished, the Korean Peninsula was in ruins. For about three decades, South Koreans suffered under the iron fist of authoritarian regimes. But the 1980s and 1990s, decades of rapid democratization, have given rise to a very different phenomenon: after enduring political, economic, and social adversity for the greater part of the century, South Korea has now emerged as one of the most dynamic democratic systems in the world as a result of its rapid economic development and dramatic democratization process. Once the land of morning calm, South Korea has now become the land of passion for true democracy.

The dynamic nature of South Korean democracy is most evident in the role of online civic storytellers—those who are both willing and capable to talk about civic issues online—in the restructuring of media and political environments. Based on the combination of rapid democratization and heavy

Yong-Chan Kim is an assistant professor at the Department of Telecommunication and Film in the College of Communication and Information Sciences, at the University of Alabama.

Kyun-Soo Kim is a doctoral candidate at the College of Communication and Information Sciences at the University of Alabama.

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ONLINE STORYTELLERS

investment in Internet Communications Technology (ICT) infrastructures during the 1990s, online storytelling among South Korean bloggers has functioned as a channel for sharing alternative political views. It is also an effective means for mobilizing like-minded people for political and civil action, including voting, conducting demonstrations, or engaging elected politicians in debate.

The purpose of this article is to discuss why online civic storytelling has been so influential in the Korean media and political environments. Rather than reverting to a technologically deterministic explanation (saying, for example, “the Internet offers technological capabilities to act in ways that were impossible with other old media”) or socially deterministic ones (solely based on such concepts as social capital or political efficacy), we argue that the combined effect of technological and socio-political factors can explain the unique experience of Korean online storytellers. We first demonstrate how Korean bloggers or “netizens” (a popular word in Korea to refer to active Internet users) have influenced the media and political environments.

Then, we discuss three types of important online storytellers in Korea: citizen reporters (or shi-min-ki-ja); amateur columnists (or non-gaek); and active, online news-readers (or daet-kul) who regularly share their comments on articles in the mainstream news media.

Lastly, we examine the socio-political, historical, and technological backgrounds that have contributed to building this unique, online civic environment in Korea.

1990s, Internet websites and blogs in Korea have become very effective in impacting policy, mobilizing people to collective action, and shaping public perception through the sharing and diffusing of civic and political stories. In several compelling cases bloggers have directly shaped and produced important political outcomes.

Blacklist campaign. In the general election in 2000, an alliance of about 500 civic groups in Korea published a “blacklist” of 164 politicians, who were described as “corrupt, lazy, and incompetent” and “unfit” to be in office. According to the National Election Commission, civic groups can legally develop and announce such blacklists of candidates. However, the law restricts the ways in which they distribute them: for example, it is illegal for civic groups to organize any kind of outdoor activities to distribute the lists, such as holding rallies and street marches, collecting signatures, or posting banners.1 So the civic groups had to rely on websites, bloggers, alternative online news sites, or discussion groups as their primary means of distributing the list. This blacklisting campaign appeared to be very successful; nearly 70 percent of the blacklisted candidates failed to get elected.2 Roh Samo as Political Fandom. During the 2002 presidential election in Korea, several online support groups for politicians emerged. The most active group was the Roh Samo (literally meaning “People who love Roh”) which, through a highly innovative website and advertising campaign, generated more than 200,000 supporters of Roh MooHyun, and raised about $7 million. Roh is now the Korean president.

Roh Samo began as informal online disOnline Storytelling and Offline cussions among like-minded bloggers Political Actions. Since the late and active Internet users concerned [ 1 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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about Roh’s failure to be elected in the 2000 general election. One of the participants in the online discussion suggested organizing a “fan club” to support Roh’s efforts to resolve the problem of regional sentiment. This message echoed in other netizens’ minds, and it transformed loosely connected discussion groups into a well-networked organization that later became critical for Roh’s come-back as the Korean president.

The influence of Roh Samo in Roh’s rise to the presidency went beyond raising money and cultivating supporters. In the 2002 presidential election a powerful ally of Roh withdrew his support at the

Mobilizing Media

structed to discuss and organize resistance against the congressional action.

These emergent online discussions led to physical demonstrations, such as candlelight vigils. Later, the Korean Constitutional Court rejected Congress’s decision to impeach, although it is unclear whether such collective resistance pressured the ruling.

Candlelight Vigils. During the summer of 2002, two U.S. soldiers were found innocent of wrongdoing for their actions during a combat exercise outside Seoul, when their armored transportation vehicle ran over two middle-school girls walking across the vehicle’s path. Under

In 2000 the launch of OhmyNews

transformed Korean news media, allowing citizens—rather than professional reporters—to write the stories. last minute. This could have been a fatal blow to Roh; however, his supporters, including the members of Roh Samo, were able to rapidly organize Internet blogs, news sites, discussion groups, Internet messengers, and text messaging to encourage young voters to vote, helping their candidate win.

Online storytellers also played a primary role in the March 2004 impeachment of President Roh. Korean opposition parties, which dominated Congress, charged the president with breaching Korean election law by asking for support for his party in the coming general election at a news conference. When Congress impeached Roh, new online discussion groups, blogs, websites, and web magazines (or “webzines”) were con-

the U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the United States had jurisdiction over the case, even though many civic organizations and, later, the South Korean legal department requested that the United States give up its jurisdiction. The U.S. verdict, pronouncing the two soldiers innocent, angered many Koreans. Again, bloggers and active Internet storytellers mobilized a series of protests against SOFA. One blogger’s online message suggesting a peaceful candlelight vigil in downtown Seoul was copied and recopied by other people and rapidly diffused through websites, blogs, and discussion groups.

On the date suggested in the blogger’s message, more than one hundred thousand people gathered in front of City Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 1 ]

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Hall in Seoul with candles to memorialize the school girls and demonstrate their resentment of SOFA.3 OhmyNews. In 2000 the launch of OhmyNews transformed Korean media, allowing citizens—rather than professional reporters—to write the stories. For the last five years, OhmyNews has “shaken up” mainstream mass media and politics in Korea.4 According to an experts’

online storytellers—citizen reporters, amateur columnists, and active news readers—who have challenged conventional approaches to journalism and politics in Korea.

Citizen reporters. As already discussed, OhmyNews developed and popularized the concept of citizen reporters. Several other online newspapers in Korea have since adopted a similar method to allow

The concept of citizen reporters has

blurred the boundaries between news sources, news writers, and news consumers. non-journalists to write and to share their news stories. News consumers, usually viewed as passive, now have acquired a space to actively talk about their own stories as “news,” be they gossip, personal experiences, local events, or neighborhood issues. The concept of citizen reporters has blurred the boundaries between news sources, news writers, and news consumers. As previous communication studies have demonstrated, citizens must have access to resources to discuss local issues in order for them to become active participants in civic activities.7 Even though the mainstream media have criticized the work of citizen reporters as low in quality and credibility, these grassroots stories seem to have real power to engage individuals, as both writers and readers, in the issues that they treat.

Amateur columnists or non-gaek. Non-gaeks (literally, “polemic writers”), or amateur columnists, are Korea’s counterparts of U.S. bloggers. These Korean bloggers Different Types of Online Storytellers. gather in joint websites rather than As we can see from the examples men- maintaining individual blogs. These nontioned above, there are several types of gaek sites have worked as alternative public

poll conducted by a prestigious Korean weekly magazine in 2003, OhmyNews was ranked among the six most influential mass media organizations in Korea, even ahead of many established media organizations, including several television networks.5 OhmyNews offers an online space for stories written by ordinary people, from university professors to students, medical doctors to truck drivers. Not only has it transformed the conventional way of thinking about what journalism is and who journalists are, but it has also changed the general perception of what are considered significant news stories. Most of the stories contributed by these citizen reporters are either news based on direct experiences or personal commentaries about current issues. When OhmyNews was launched, there were around 700 citizen reporters; in 2005, the number has increased to about 35,000.6

[ 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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spheres in Korea: once a non-gaek uploads his or her columns onto a website, a discussion starts among readers as they place comments on the site.8 Discussions on one non-gaek website often migrate to other non-gaek sites or to online newspaper sites such as OhmyNews. As some amateur columnists gain popularity among Internet users and begin to command a level of influence over their readers, the mainstream media cannot ignore them. One often finds the mainstream media covering the same issues discussed in popular, non-gaek sites.

Active news audience. Most mainstream media and online newspaper sites in Korea allow their readers to share comments on the stories and columns that they read. In most cases, readers’ comments are placed just below the news stories so that other readers can read both the articles and corresponding comments. With few exceptions, most news websites require those who wish to share their comments on an article to register with the website by giving their legal name and national identification number, primarily as a way to avoid liability. Some online sites such as OhmyNews allow readers to choose to comment either as registered users (i.e., writing comments using their own names) or non-registered users (i.e., writing comments using their online nicknames).

Since readers have been given the opportunity to publicly share their thoughts and feelings, a special group of people who function as “news critics” has emerged. They regularly visit news sites and share their comments, which are often very harsh and emotional. Their comments might be a clarification of the story through the use of additional examples, correction of factual or grammatical errors, or criticism of the story’s per-

Mobilizing Media

spectives. They are often followed by rowdy responses from other readers.

Although many of these online interactions among active news readers are far from rational and informed civic discourses and may silence other, less active readers instead of inviting their participation, this online opportunity to discuss news stories still offers an important space where one can observe other readers’ reactions and reflect on one’s own attitude and opinion toward the issues being discussed.

From Where Do These Online Storytellers Come? Why has the land of morning calm now become the place of upstart online storytellers? What are the factors during this unique civic environment where online storytelling influences mainstream media and politics?

Korea’s unique experience is due to the combined effect of two factors: highly advanced ICT infrastructure and strong, collective political efficacy gained in the recent democratization process.

Few countries meet both conditions: ICT infrastructure and collective political efficacy. Developed countries—like the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the Scandinavian countries—have advanced ICT infrastructures, but their citizens do not have the first-hand experience of taking part in restructuring their political system. Current generations of South Koreans, Filipinos, Russians, and Poles have actively participated in political reforms over the last two decades.

However, most of these countries lack ICT infrastructure. It seems that Korea is one of the few countries that has both the socio-political and technological resources necessary to incorporate the Internet as an effective tool for civic Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 3 ]

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participation.

South Korea is now a highly networked society.9 According to a white paper published in 2004 by the Korean Ministry of Information and Communication, South Korea has more than 30 million Internet users—62 percent of the total population.

Twelve million broadband lines have been set up on the high-speed fiber-optic backbone that networks the 144 major cities nationwide to serve the country’s 48 million people.10 Of the nearly 16 million Korean households, 78 percent now have a broadband connection, more than 4 times the home broadband penetration rate of North America.11 In addition to

Korea, was infamous for his anti-democratic, patriarchal style of rule. After his twenty-year-long dictatorship, he was assassinated by the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in 1979. After the death of Park, an overwhelming popular demand for “true” democracy emerged. However, another military group led by General Chun Doo Hwan forcefully suppressed the prodemocracy surge. College students, along with other political opponents and dissidents around the country, organized protests against the new authoritarian military regime. After remaining in the presidency for seven years, Chun and his

Korea is one of the few countries that has

both the political and technological resources to incorporate the Internet as an effective tool for civic participation. high-speed home Internet connections, there are thirty thousand Internet cafes, or PC baangs, in Korea, which offer fast Internet connections.12 On average, Koreans spend more than twenty hours a week surfing the Internet. Thus, Korea has met the first condition for civic use of the Internet: having a rich technological infrastructure that provides individuals with fast access.

Civic participation in Korea was transformed due to a period of dramatic political change during the 1980s. After a military coup d’état by General Park Cheong Hee in the early 1960s, authoritarian military governments ruled for about three decades. Ex-President Park, despite his well-acclaimed leadership in the economic development of South [ 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

successor surrendered to the protesters in 1987. Since then, and especially during the 1990s, a series of efforts have been made to democratize the country.

The Korean democratization process during the 1980s gave a sense of empowerment to individuals in their twenties and thirties who participated in political protests and experienced the dramatic political reform in 1987. Such political experience offered them a sense of the efficacy of collective action in producing political outcomes. These people, who shared similar political experiences, have been referred to as the “386-generation” (or sam-pal-nyuk-se-dai) because most of them are still in their 30s, stayed in college during the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s. The name also comes from

KIM & KIM

the IBM 38680 PC model, to emphasize that they were among the first generation who knew how to use a PC when graduating college. These political and technological experiences made those from the “386-generation” distinct from older Koreans. The “386-generation,” along with those in their twenties, forms the majority of people who actively use the Internet as a political tool to share political stories, to express political views, to discuss a variety of political issues, and to attempt to mobilize others to participate in political actions, including voting.

The influence of online storytellers on the Korean media and political environments was supported by public distrust of the mainstream media. Online storytelling is a means to provide the public with space to share their own stories in their own voices while bypassing suspicious middlemen, the mainstream news media. The Korean mainstream media are heavily criticized by young Koreans (especially those from the “386-generation”) for their partisanship and conservative content. Since the late 1980s, there have been civic movements to reform the media environment. These movements have evolved into more narrowly defined movements focused on boycotting a number of conservative newspapers. One example is anti-chosun movements, which are organized efforts to boycott Chosunilbo, the most popular and the most conservative newspaper in Korea.

Conclusion. Online civic storytellers have been active players in South Korean media and politics. Many important civic and political activities are a direct result of the work of citizen reporters, commentaries by amateur columnists, and active readers’ comments on news articles in the mainstream media. The growing phe-

Mobilizing Media

nomenon of amateur news storytellers in Korea is the product of rich technological and political infrastructure; almost universal connection to broadband Internet connection; and faith in collective political efficacy, which developed during the 1980s and the 1990s. Strong distrust of the mainstream media and the need for alternative media also explain the active role of online storytelling in media and politics. In short, the unique political, technological, and media environment in Korea has resulted in the use of the Internet for civic purposes.

What seems certain is that South Koreans will keep experimenting with the Internet as a tool for civic participation.

The younger generations, now in their twenties and thirties, will lead these experiments. They have gained collective political efficacy not only as a legacy from the preceding “386-generation,” but also from their own experience of having participated in civic and political activities facilitated by online civic storytelling.

With their own sense of political power, these technology-savvy young Koreans will continue to use the Internet and other new media technologies—such as mobile communication technologies—for civic and political engagement. However, this younger generation is also very different from the older generations in Korea, including the “386-generation,” in many respects. Recent polls have shown that they are more liberal and more individualistic, but also very nationalistic.13 This more open-minded post-Cold War generation has embraced two seemingly contradictory values: individualism and nationalism. It will be interesting to see how these young men and women in Korea will integrate these somewhat contradictory values with their access to new communication technologies.

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NOTES

1 Ji-Young Soh, “Civic Groups’ Blacklists Stoke Election Frenzy,” The Korea Times (12 March 2004).

I n t e r n e t , h t t p : / / t i m e s . h a n ko o k i . c o m / c g i bin/hkiprn.cgi?pa=/lpage/nation/200404/ kt2004041217425411950.htm&ur=times. hankooki.com&fo=print _kt.htm (Date accessed: 21 September 2005).

2 Sangwon Suh and Laxmi Nakarmi, “Revolt of the Citizens: A Blacklisting Campaign Shocks Lawmakers,” Asiaweek, 26. Internet, http://www.asiaweek. com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0211/nat.korea.main.h tml (Date accessed: 9 September 2005).

3 Sook-Jong Lee, “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the U.S.-Korea Alliance,” Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 20032004, 15-30.

4 Howard W. French, “Online Newspaper Shakes Up Korean Politics,” New York Times 152 (6 March 2003): A3.

5 Joo-Seop So, The Power of the Internet News [online], Sisa Journal, 2004, 783. Internet, http://www.sisapress. com/news/read.php?idxno=1707 (Date accessed: 1 September 2005).

6 OhmyNews, “The People’s News Source,” Inter-

[ 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

net, http://eng.ohmynews.com/articleview/article _view.asp?menu=c10400&no=153109&rel_no=2 (Date accessed: 1 September 2005).

7 Yong-Chan Kim and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, “Civic Engagement from a Communication Infrastructure Perspective,” Communication Theory.

Forthcoming.

8 Woo-Young Chang, “The Internet, Alternative Public Sphere, and Political Dynamism: Korea’s Nongaek (Polemist) Websites,” The Pacific Review 18 (2005): 393-415.

9 Manual Castells, The Rise of the Network Society. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000.

10 Ministry of Information and Communication, “Korea Internet White Paper,” July 2004.

11 Assif Shameen, “Korea’s Broadband Revolution,” Chief Executives, 197. Internet, http://www. chiefexecutive.net/depts/technology/197a.htm (Date accessed: 20 September 2005).

12 John Borland and Michael Kanellos, “South Korea Leads the Way,” Internet, http://news.com. com/South+Korea+leads+the+way/2009-1034_35261393.html (Date accessed: August 2005).

13 Lee, Ibid, 2003-2004.

Mobilizing Media

Egypt’s Media Deficit Adel Iskandar Cautious optimism pervades the Arab world’s most populous nation, as forthcoming political transformation seems inevitable. Egypt—one of the birthplaces of populist pan-Arabism—is at a historic crossroads. President Hosni Mubarak, the country’s “last Pharaoh,” took an unprecedented step this year by allowing the country’s first multi-candidate presidential election. Despite his victory in the 7 September 2005 elections, Mubarak’s underwhelming voter support (he was supported by only 18 percent of eligible voters) invited contention, increased his vulnerability to potentially fervent political criticism, and dissolved his public image as an infallible leader. The president’s electoral reform set a precedent in contemporary Arab political history, but lack of progress in liberalizing the state’s media apparatus ensures the election will be less than transformative. Although changes to Egypt’s press appear substantial in recent years, a vibrant media system that encourages civil society, civic participation, and political empowerment remains a distant mirage.

Adel Iskandar is an expert on Middle East media and co-author of Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network that Is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism. He monitored the state of Egyptian media in summer 2005.

Egypt’s Last Pharaoh? In a nation undergoing political

metamorphosis, the press should act as a reliable measure of progress. “Truth above power, and the nation above government,” the motto of Saad Zaghloul, the populist leader who defied British colonial rule and ushered in Egypt’s first Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 7 ]

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indigenous nationalist party (al-Wafd), has long served as a slogan for political dissent. However, now his words point more directly to the failure of the nation’s journalistic establishment. Many of the changes to the state’s media landscape over the past half century have been merely symbolic.

Some of Mubarak’s contenders, having drawn the attention of the Western press during the election, appeared to outsiders to pose a significant threat.

However, the foreign press tends to magnify the Egyptian opposition’s influence.

In fact, few Egyptians can name the nation’s twenty-one officially ratified parties. Without a radical remodeling of the Egyptian national media, particularly national television, this will continue to be the case.

Television is Egypt’s most pervasive medium, but with most national television programming under strict state control, the opposition’s televised time was minimized to ensure reduced visibility. Opposition candidates in the 2005 election received just enough airtime to suggest that contenders have a voice in Mubarak’s Egypt. Furthermore, the president’s ruling party (the National Democratic Party, or NDP) turned down an invitation to a televised debate between Mubarak and his opponents.

The minimal television time afforded potentially threatening candidates (Ayman Nour, of the al-Ghad party, and Nomaan Gomaa, of the New Wafd party) secured a significant buffer for the NDP, ensuring that electoral victory would remain within its reach.1 With deeprooted, institutionalized support for Mubarak’s NDP at all levels of the state, the president’s opponents stood little chance. Furthermore, in a country whose public has always feared government [ 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

retaliation against dissent and where the national press is rarely critical of the state, few citizens demonstrate active opposition to the regime. They are generally loyal to it, apathetic toward it, or, at most, suspicious of it.

The use of websites during the 2005 campaign was another perfunctory nod to the democratic process. It was vital for the regime to sustain the impression, both domestically and abroad, that Mubarak was campaigning in a truly contested race. Thus, the president for the first time appointed a campaign manager, began a campaign trail, and launched a website to support his candidacy. His opponents launched similar websites, but with Egypt’s low literacy rates and limited internet penetration, these sites were ineffectual at best, and mere publicity stunts for foreign observers at worst.

Paper Parties. There are three main

categories of newspapers in Egypt: national governmental dailies (kawmiya), official party dailies (hizbiya), and independent and privately operated publications (mustakila). The kawmiya newspapers include the big three dailies—al-Ahram, alAkhbar, and al-Gomhouria—and at least fifteen other weeklies, periodicals, and magazines. These state-run newspapers have impressive budgets and overpowering voices, while the opposition and the independent press suffer from limited funding, restrictive governmental licensing procedures, and occasional outright state intimidation.

Most of Egypt’s literate citizens reside in urban metropolises, and this reading population has made the three major dailies Egypt’s most popular newspapers for the last thirty years. Decades of monopoly have turned these newspapers into massive institutions with budgets

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rivaling the institutional grandeur of such publications as the New York Times and Washington Post. Their exponential growth, combined with their long history of infiltration in state institutions, has ensured that they attract the brightest and most eloquent political commentators.

Al-Ahram, which boasts the largest circulation in the Arab world, now operates a full-fledged university in cooperation with a consortium of Canadian colleges.

While Egypt’s opposition papers operate out of damp, single-suite offices and struggle to pay their employees, alGomhouria recently erected an extravagant multi-million-dollar building on costly downtown property.

While most of Egypt’s state papers exhibit clear and consistent political loyalties, a few have some editorial latitude.

The government’s foreign-language newspapers—al-Ahram Weekly (English) and al-Ahram Hebdo (French)—tend to be far more liberal and even critical of govern-

Mobilizing Media

the state in policy and approach, and those that distance themselves from the government and attack it on personal, rather than substantive, grounds. The former affirm the government line while posing as opposition, while the latter focus on moral scandals at the expense of policy issues. Both tend to detract attention from the regime’s failures and thus fall directly into the hands of Mubarak’s regime. They allow the administration to criticize the opposition press on the grounds of frivolity and obsession with negligible issues, and the opposition papers are also faulted for offering no meaningful alternative to the comparatively coherent government policies. The result is the absence of a true political spectrum: the opposition is left fragmented and vulnerable.

Still, the hizbiya papers as a group enjoy the second-greatest circulation. These include the primary party publications al-Wafd (New Wafd party), al-Ahaly (al-

Anticlimactic press reform laws have

produced sensationalist yellow journalism camouflaged as legitimate political opposition. ment at times. Their editorial freedom is protected by their predominantly elite and expatriate readership. Their smallscale distribution allows them to provide substantial coverage of the political opposition.

Press reform laws have produced sensationalist yellow journalism camouflaged as legitimate political opposition.

The mostly de-fanged hizbiya (ratified opposition) papers tend to fall into two categories: those that compete for the government’s favor and are aligned with

Tagammu party), al-Arabi (Nasserist party), and al-Shaab (al-Amal party). Over the past few years, al-Shaab has been a surrogate publication of the banned Muslim Brotherhood. Frequently harassed by the government, the paper has little public impact and a weak infrastructure. It employs a steady Islamist tone, focusing on Islamic military struggles in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Chechnya and is ruthlessly critical of Mubarak’s regime.

Prominent newcomers to the party Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 9 ]

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press include al-Ahrar (al-Ahrar party) and al-Ghad (al-Ghad, the newest opposition party). Al-Ahrar, supposedly an “opposition” paper, is published by the longdefunct al-Ahrar party, which endorsed Mubarak during the presidential race.

The paper predominantly covers entertainment and sports, with a sprinkling of municipal affairs. Since al-Ahrar supports the privatization of most public sectors and a free-market economy, its support of Mubarak comes as little surprise. AlGhad is the official voice of its chief editor, Ayman Nour, who was a presidential candidate and longtime al-Wafd party member. The paper appears to have no comprehensive political agenda but instead focuses exclusively on the inadequacies and failures of the current regime while simultaneously boosting Nour’s public image. The pages of al-Ghad—the most prominent of the new party papers—are filled with sharp-tongued attacks on Mubarak’s government. One article in the 23 July issue described him and his family as “U.S. servants” and called for a popular front to defeat his “tyrannical and hereditary regime.”

The third category are the mustakila newspapers which include mostly unaffiliated and privately operated publications with various political leanings, including al-Maydan, al-Masri al-Youm, and al-Dostour.

Al-Dostour (The Constitution) is perhaps one of the only mustakila papers that directly addresses the government and Egyptian society. Produced by a group of young reporters, editors, and creative cartoonists, al-Dostour combines political satire with sharp, reformist commentary. The paper publicly demands explanations for corruption and attacks Egypt’s system of political heredity—with direct reference to Mubarak’s increasingly prominent son, Gamal. Al-Dostour is also one of the [ 2 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

earliest papers to publicly suggest names of presidential candidates. It has criticized Mubarak for taking credit for scientific and technological innovations in Egypt, reprimanded human rights and women’s groups for inactivity and disengagement, and denounced the United States for interfering in the Egyptian electoral process. One of the few papers concerned with Egypt’s minorities, alDostour features regular articles explaining the Coptic community’s political and social demands.

Egypt’s press “revival” has produced a plethora of opposition and independent publications that either support the political status quo or resort to careless, unconstructive bickering. As for the state media, reform has been a slow process.

The national press and mass media are run by sluggish institutions that only respond to threats of foreign-based accountability campaigns and audience loss. The opposition’s task has been to disrupt the giants of state media, with little evident success.

“Media Schizophrenia” and Egyptian Television. Egyptians

today live in two parallel media worlds.

This duality is evident on Egyptian television, where the contrast between nonstate and national channels is stark.

Unlike print media, where there is at least some criticism of the government, national television rigidly supports the regime and its party. Egyptian government television does little to disentangle the government as an institution from the NDP. And unlike its private competitors, state television is slow moving, under funded, and poorly presented.

Characterized by sloppy transitions, endless repetition of programming, and outdated entertainment content, the

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“medium of the people” appears hopelessly devoid of substance or style.

Officials in the Egyptian media are neglecting an important phenomenon.

When audiences watch several newscasts from competing stations with differing viewpoints, they are engaged in source comparison. Egyptian audiences, who access a variety of domestic, regional, and international media, have become particularly adept at deciphering political agendas. Overall, this has led to brand disloyalty for Egyptian state television. In my conversations with some of Egypt’s

Mobilizing Media

sion and radio stations, al-Jazeera has become one of the few venues for opposition groups to express their views on air. The de facto voice of dissent for the region, al-Jazeera has become a surrogate alternative press for nations in the Arab world.4 Until national media open up to the opposition, media schizophrenia is likely to continue.

Media schizophrenia has led to disenchantment on the part of Egyptian audiences. Unimpressive media content on national television, coupled with an overall distrust for the state, has led to

Principles such as objectivity, balance, and

fairness have long been neglected by a press that is loyalist, “agendized,” or profiteering. esteemed thinkers, writers, and intellectuals, I found a near consensus, regardless of political views and affiliations, that Arab satellite television has transformed audience perception of local politics.

The discrepancies in news programming between state and private (satellite) media are so lucid that it can seem as if two distinct realities are being covered.

This state of “media schizophrenia” is prevalent in many Arab countries.2 With audiences feeling increasingly estranged from their domestic media, there is the threat of the state media becoming obsolete and negligible.

Faisal al-Kasim—host of al-Jazeera’s popular and controversial talk show alItijah al-Muakis (The Opposite Direction)— accurately explained that private Arab television channels “have widened the gap between the governments and the people.”3 With the absence of viable alternative voices on the national televi-

audience skepticism, while exposure to satellite television has resulted in an increasingly sophisticated media audience. Scholar Mohammed Ayish has described this phenomenon as the “politicization of Arab viewers.”5 For instance, the national media rarely report what Egyptians are witnessing.

Growing economic disparity on Egypt’s streets is met with headlines about an economic renaissance. One fifty-threeyear-old physician told me that once, when he picked up his son from school in the bustling Cairo district of Bab El Louk, large antigovernment demonstrations had kept him in traffic for hours.

Once at home, he heard no mention of the demonstrations on national television. “How can I believe anything they say on Egyptian television if they’re not telling me what I saw with my very own eyes!” he exclaimed. Since then, he has turned to the satellite stations.

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Contextual Objectivity. Part of the tual objectivity. In Egypt the national

problem with most state-run media in Arab countries is the absence of coherent journalistic standards or ethics by which reporting is evaluated. Principles such as objectivity, balance, and fairness have long been neglected by the loyalist, “agendized,” profiteering press. Only since the arrival of foreign and regional satellite television have these standards been renegotiated.

Satellite television has created a sense of anxiety about the media climate in the Arab world. The Arab media, like their counterparts worldwide, struggle to balance their fact-finding responsibilities with the need to cultivate and maintain audiences. This struggle often culminates in a complication at the level of news reporting and presentation that I have described as “contextual objectivity.”6 Contextual objectivity is the dilemma which often results from strenuous attempts by news organizations to maintain independence and accuracy while tailoring coverage to the preferences of their respective audiences.7 While trying to report the news impartially, the Egyptian media—national, opposition, and independent—are always cautious not to offend predominant political, religious, and social values. In addition to the strict rules surrounding certain issues of national security—including criticism of the president and discussion of Coptic affairs—coverage is restricted with regard to particular social and cultural taboos.

News providers try to ensure that audiences perceive their broadcast as objective and factual. If the balance tilts too much in any direction, it is likely that audiences will be turned off by the news content.

Arab news organizations have had varying degrees of success in their attempts to strike this balance of contex[ 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

media have neglected the domestic opposition and censored any news that threatens the government’s credibility, thus consistently failing to deliver newsworthy information. Elevating context over objectivity has hurt their credibility immensely. On the other hand, the few satellite stations that broadcast dissent against the regional governments’ agendas are at times seen as overly ideological, and are treated with suspicion by Arab audiences. Al-Jazeera is the only network to fill the resulting void.

As the Egyptian media fail to maintain this delicate equilibrium, they are threatened with the loss of audiences. For years, the state press and television stations have privileged context over facts, in accordance with their audiences’ sensibilities.

While this may have sufficed in the past, Egyptians today are demanding facts and are holding the press accountable. The national media have not responded accordingly, leaving them hopelessly out of touch with their audiences.

Conclusion. One of the greatest

ironies of populist revolt in Egypt is that, as the government responds to foreign pressures demanding accountability, opposition parties maintain their domestic character by denying foreign funding and support. Mubarak’s administration prohibited independent election surveillance on the basis of unwarranted foreign meddling in Egyptian internal affairs, but many believe the elections were held in response to U.S. pressure. Nonetheless, the success of the Egyptian democratic experiment will depend in large part on the public’s perception of its domestic character, a prerequisite for authenticity. Thus, foreign intervention may derail

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this delicate process. The discussion of democratization by Kim Campbell and Sean C. Carroll suggests the greater impact of public action, rather than foreign intervention, on democracy in the region, claiming that the “Mossad and the White House” are not leading the Arab world toward democracy.8 As a result, it is imperative that the project of democratization remain indigenous since “only local actors can eventually fling [the door] wide open and walk through it.”9 For this reason, the United States must remain at arm’s length from the unique process now underway in Egypt. It must continue to acknowledge and complement positive developments, but from a careful distance.

Regardless of how it came about, Mubarak’s move to open up competition for the presidency is a step in the right direction. In a step that looks like democracy, Mubarak appears to have stirred the stagnant waters of Egypt’s

Mobilizing Media

political bowl, thus invigorating public activism and expression. Inadvertently, this has also allowed the sediment from the bottom of the bowl to rise to the top, revealing Egypt’s political dysfunctions.

Historically ignored issues—electoral irregularities, falsified voter registration, coercion of political contention, worsening labor conditions, rising unemployment, and widespread economic corruption—are now at the forefront of Egypt’s public agenda.

Despite incremental progress, Zaghloul’s slogan, “Truth above power,” remains farfetched in today’s Egypt. The NDP’s stranglehold on the media may be the last steadfast dam holding back the mighty stream of political activity and civil society in Egypt. Without an unhindered, unadulterated free press enshrined in the constitution and supported by an independent judiciary, this whirlwind is little more than a gentle stir in the murky bowl.

NOTES

1 For a detailed analysis of the political transformations of opposition parties, their popularity, ideological roots, and the judicial restrictions imposed on them by the state, see Ninette Fahmy, The Politics of Egypt: State-Society Relations (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002).

2 Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar, AlJazeera: The Story of the Network That Is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism (Boulder: Westview, 2003), 83.

3 Faisal Al-Kasim, “The Opposite Direction: A Program Which Changed the Face of Arab Television,” in Mohamed Zayani, The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media (Boulder: Paradigm, 2005), 102.

4 El-Nawawy and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 114.

5 Muhammed Ayish, “Political Communication on Arab World Television,” Political Communication 19

(2002): 151.

6 Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawawy, “AlJazeera and War Coverage in Iraq: The Media’s Quest for Contextual Objectivity,” in Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer, Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime (London: Routledge, 2004), 315–332.

7 Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar, “The Minotaur of ‘Contextual Objectivity’: War coverage and the pursuit of accuracy with appeal,” Transnational Broadcasting Journal, Internet, http://www.tbsjournal .com/Archives/Fall02/Iskandar.html (Date accessed: 7 September 2005).

8 Kim Campbell and Sean C. Carroll, “Sustaining Democracy’s Last Wave,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6, no. 2 (2005): 45.

9 Ibid, 46.

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Media Crackdown Chávez and Censorship Roger Atwood In December 2006 Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez will be seeking reelection in one of the most restrictive legal climates for press freedom in Latin America.1 Laws enacted since late 2004 by the Venezuelan Congress, where Chávez’s party and its allies hold a solid majority of seats, have sharply reduced the latitude with which Venezuelan media can report on political figures in their country and have strengthened the central government’s power to fine or imprison journalists and close down news outlets. The new statutes, with draconian punishments for offenders, run contrary to the trend throughout Latin America of liberalizing press laws and widening space for debate and editorial opinion. This article will review the new legal restrictions on the media, describe their effects so far, and offer some predictions as to their impact on debate in the upcoming presidential campaign and beyond.

One of the new laws’ key elements is a reform of the penal code to fortify so-called “insult laws,” which bar any potential criticism of high public officials. Another law dictates content on television and radio broadcasts. While the new laws appear aimed at encouraging reporters and opinion writers to restrain themselves in what they write or broadcast, the legislation also gives authorities wide discretion to punish–if

Roger Atwood was a Knight International Press Fellow in Venezuela in 2005. He is author of Stealing History and a Visiting Researcher at Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies.

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authorities choose–journalists and the news organizations for which they work.

Despite the newly restrictive legal system in which the media operate, Venezuelans still enjoy fairly lively political debate in the press and society. Legal scholars, editors, and free-press monitoring groups say the new codes, which came fully into effect in June 2005, have already blunted some of the harshest criticism of the government among opinion writers, however. More importantly, the laws have created a pernicious climate of self-censorship among reporters that has begun to affect the quality of coverage and public debate. The new restrictions have come into force in a context of growing intolerance of dissent by the government, following a long period of turmoil marked by a short-lived coup against Chávez, a sixty-two-day general strike, and a recall referendum that Chávez won handily, all since 2002. During those struggles, some mass-media outlets took an overtly anti-Chávez stand, with some television channels, for example, refusing to show pro-Chávez demonstrators while lavishing coverage on anti-government rallies. Supporters of the new laws say their objective is to force media owners to be more responsible and objective in their coverage, while critics say the laws go too far in restricting freedoms. At stake is how, and even whether, media in Venezuela will be able to fulfill the crucial role that media play in democracies everywhere: informing citizens and giving them the tools to debate government policies and priorities.

Gag Me with a Law. Insult laws or

“gag laws,” as they are also known, have a long pedigree. Only fifteen years ago, nearly every country in Latin America had some statute on the books prohibiting [ 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

disrespectful or abusive speech toward the president, high officials, or government institutions. Vaguely worded and seldom enforced, such laws generally posed few real barriers for the news media or public at large, at least during periods of civilian rule. They did, however, create a de facto privileged class of people–high public officials–who enjoyed stronger legal protections than everyone else. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) recommended the abolition of such laws in 1994 and most countries have since done so, including, most recently, Argentina, Paraguay, Guatemala, and Honduras. In those countries, high government officials remain protected by ordinary libel and defamation statutes, similar to those in the United States, which also protect ordinary citizens.

Venezuela’s current insult laws date from 1964.2 Although rarely enforced, these codes threatened jail for those who “offend in speech or writing or in any other way show disrespect for the president.”3 A long list of other high officials, including state governors and cabinet ministers, enjoyed similar protections but with lighter punishments for offenders.

In light of the IAHCR’s recommendation and international support to abolish insult laws, the Venezuelan Supreme Court took a nationalist tone in its ruling upholding the constitutionality of insult laws in July 2003, claiming that global calls to retire such laws do not apply to Venezuelan “reality” because they “act as a barrier to the abuse and disrespect of freedom of expression and those situations that endanger the State itself and that could affect the independence of the country.”4 Congress then passed a thorough reform of the Venezuelan penal

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code that took effect on 16 March 2005.

Insult laws and other statutes that could be used to restrict freedom of press and expression were strengthened and extended to more areas of society. The following officials were added to the list of authorities protected from offensive speech: members of Congress, the military command, and the national elections board. Virtually every prominent public official in Venezuela is now legally entitled to seek redress for any speech or text deemed offensive or disrespectful, whether true or not.

A potentially more significant change came in a new article, 297-A, apparently unprecedented in Venezuelan law, that criminalized the use of any media—text, broadcast, e-mail, even street pamphlets–by any person to spread “false information … that is intended to cause or causes panic in the collectivity or to keep it in a state of anxiety (zozobra).”

Offenders could receive jail sentences of up to five years—up to seven for civil servants who spread such information anonymously.

Media law experts say the law aims to intimidate the press. “Article 297-A promotes self-censorship, strengthens veracity as the previous condition for the release of any information, and affects the privacy of communications,” wrote two commentators, one a lawyer and the other a journalist.5 They and other commentators note that most opinion writing could be challenged as “inaccurate” if the person criticized does not like the opinion. Opinion is by nature a subjective judgment by the writer of someone else’s actions or statements. By enshrining the ability to challenge opinion in court with heavy fines for offenders, the law seems aimed at creating a climate inimical to the airing of any critical opin-

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ion. The determination of what constitutes “false” information and “panic,” and whether one had contributed to the other, is left to the discretion of a judge, thus facilitating the law’s use as a tool to suppress dissent at a time when the justice system, including the Supreme Court, is dominated by Chávez appointees.6 Other changes to the penal code include stiffer penalties for libel and defamation and a small but significant change in the definition of what constitutes an illegal public disturbance. In the 1964 code, a peaceful gathering or demonstration had to raise “the danger of a catastrophe” before it would be considered illegal. The new code threatens jail of up to ten years for any public act that raises “the danger of a serious accident (siniestro),” a vague and completely subjective definition that could include causing traffic jams. Even “shouting and other vociferations, including abuses of bells and other noisemaking instruments” are now punishable by fines.7 At first, the government gave few signs that it intended to enforce the beefed-up insult laws. Chávez’s chief spokesman, Information Minister Andrés Izarra, even told a visiting American reporter that he personally opposed them.8 Yet the plain intent of the reforms—to plant a self-censoring bug in the mind of every reporter, editor, and opinion writer working for an anti-government news organ—was not lost on the media or the public. “That is what is so Machiavellian about this law. It gets the news media to censor themselves so that the government doesn’t have to, and you start to see the effects: newscasts that don’t inform, fewer political programs, more entertainment,” said Teodoro Petkoff, editorin-chief of the Caracas daily Tal Cual, which is known for its bitingly satirical Winter/Spring 2006 [ 2 7 ]

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editorials against both government and opposition.9 Television and radio broadcasters pulled no fewer than three prominent political talk shows off the air.

If the goal was to encourage news organizations to silence anti-government rhetoric without resorting to the unpalatable task of taking them to court, it would seem to be succeeding.

In late July, four months after the reform took effect, the government signaled that it intended to make real use of its strengthened powers against the media. The country’s highest law-

editorial made no reference to any specific person but did mention the “delegitimization of the Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) and the courts.”10 Officials and politicians lined up to support the probe against El Universal. Among them was Izarra who, despite having expressed his opposition to such actions only weeks before, railed against “media low-lifes [who] devote themselves to defame, vilify and offend the reputation of people and then hide behind the freedom of expression.”11 The investigation, with the threat of fines for El Universal or a

The new law’s severe sanctions for violators

put broadcasters on notice that the government would be watching mass media content carefully and would use all of its legal leverage to influence it. enforcement official, General Prosecutor Isaías Rodríguez, announced a penal investigation against the daily newspaper El Universal and sent instructions to a lower prosecutor to begin gathering evidence for a lawsuit. The offense committed by El Universal, the prosecutor said, involved a short, unsigned editorial published on 25 July entitled “Justicia arrodillada” (Justice on its knees) that charged that the Venezuelan justice system had been politicized and made subservient to the executive branch. The editorial echoed opinions made by numerous opposition politicians and human rights groups, but Rodríguez charged that it violated Article 225 of the penal code (an article actually dating from before the reform), which barred offensive speech against major government agencies, namely his office. The [ 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

three-year jail sentence for its editors was pending for three months before it was finally dismissed by the Supreme Court in October.

Even if their application does not lead to judicial punishment, insult laws can seriously stifle debate when a government uses them to pressure media, as in the case of El Universal. In my conversations with more than a dozen Venezuelan newspaper editors in 2005, nearly all cited the penal code reform–with its potential for financial ruin for the newspaper, the reporter, or both–as one of the main reasons why they shied away from investigating reports of venality in government. Héctor Faúndez, a media law expert at the Universidad Central in Caracas, points out that the kinds of attacks that Tony Blair faced daily during his campaign for reelection as British

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prime minister would be illegal in Venezuela.12 A televised debate between Chávez and his election opponents seems impossible because television stations would be liable for any offensive statements uttered by the challengers about Chávez. The reverse, however, would not be true. Chávez and high officials are free to lob any accusation they choose against opponents, constrained only by ordinary defamation laws.

In addition to creating laws to chill media freedoms, the government has been steadily increasing its use of other backdoor methods to exert pressure.

One journalist was charged with violating state secrecy laws by reporting on documents given to her by a source, while an investigative reporter for El Universal was arrested on what appeared to be trumped-up charges of financial fraud.

In addition, a television news channel, Globovisión, known for anti-Chávez broadcasts during the 2002 coup but which later moved to recover balance and credibility, has been hit with huge fines from the national telecommunications authority, CONATEL, and the tax service for a variety of supposed infractions since 2002. Given these examples, it is reasonable to conclude that the government has embarked on a systematic campaign of legal harassment against media whose coverage it does not like.

“Social Responsibility.” Despite

the reinvigorated insult laws, the Chávez government’s main statement on the media has been its Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television, known as the Ley Resorte because of its acronym in Spanish. This complex, forty-four-page piece of legislation was enacted by Congress in December 2004, and its provisions came into effect gradu-

Mobilizing Media

ally over the first half of 2005. Its stated aim is to improve public access to broadcast media, encourage them to reflect the interests and needs of a wider cross-section of the Venezuelan public, and end the practice of showing sex and violence on television when children would be watching.

But the Ley Resorte went well beyond an attempt to rein in risqué entertainment; its provisions amounted to a sweeping and unprecedented intervention by the state in the content of broadcast news coverage. The law’s severe sanctions for violators put broadcasters on notice that, henceforth, the government would be watching mass media content carefully and would be using all of its legal leverage to influence it.

Under the Ley Resorte, all television stations must include ten hours of Venezuelan-produced programs (as opposed to foreign programs) per day, and five-and-a-half hours of those must be created by “independent national producers.” Who are these lucky producers?

The law carries a long list of stipulations— they cannot, for example, have any financial or employment relationship with the station where they broadcast—and they must register as independent national producers with the CONATEL.13 Furthermore, CONATEL’s directors are appointed by Chávez, thus giving the government a discretionary power over mass media content that it never had before.

These provisions amount “practically to a confiscation of [broadcast] space,” wrote two lawyer critics.14 The Ley Resorte includes page after page of requirements, ranging from news shows for teenagers to what kinds of news-archival material can be shown to the hours at which the national anthem must be broadcast. All are spelt out in Winter/Spring 2006 [ 2 9 ]

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minute detail. Compliance is monitored by “user committees” (comites de usuarios), private citizens whose job includes alerting authorities when a television or radio station has violated the law. The user committees are not groups of interested citizens who spontaneously gather in someone’s living room to watch television. To have any standing under the law, they must register with the governmentcontrolled CONATEL, thus giving the government another avenue to influence news content.15 A station would be advised not to run afoul of its user committee; if it were fined twice for infringing the Ley Resorte in any way during a

violation of the law, but the legal tools are evidently in place for the government to start doing so whenever it wishes.

Another arrow in the government’s fast-growing quiver of ways to manipulate news coverage is its frequent use of mandatory national broadcasts, or blanket broadcasts. On an almost daily basis, the government requires all stations, public and private, to break into their regular programming and transmit information as ordered by the government. This happens often while private stations are showing prime-time news broadcasts. Sometimes the information has news value, such as a speech by Chávez,

As Venezuelans look toward the presidential elections, the stark dichotomy in the quality of media news coverage will define how issues and candidacies are presented to the public. three-year period (for example, playing the national anthem at 1 a.m. instead of midnight as required), it could be shut down for seventy-two hours. Two more violations within five years after that would give the government the right to close a station for up to five years.16 The Ley Resorte has many supporters among young Venezuelan audio-visual journalists because it gives them unprecedented opportunities to create independent production units and get their work on the air. It has resulted in more and better news shows for children. But the harsh punishments meted out for any violation of the law suggest that its intent is less to reform the media than it is to bend it to the government’s will. So far, no media have been forced off the air because of a [ 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

but more often it is simply a commercial for a government initiative or event.

(One such superfluous broadcast was of Chávez attending Fidel Castro’s birthday party, the two presidents looking like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza as they toasted each other.) Blanket broadcasts became prevalent enough for the IACHR to mention them in its 2003 report on Venezuela, noting the “abusive and unnecessary use of this mechanism which, if used on a discretionary basis and to serve ends other than the public interest, could constitute a form of censorship.”17

Cooling the Rhetoric. Supporters of the Ley Resorte say that its true aim, like that of the insult laws, is to cool the corrosive rhetoric that contributed significantly to

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the polarization of society before the 2002 coup and 2004 recall vote. Editors and reporters at news outlets associated with the anti-Chávez opposition, including Globovisión, El Universal, and El Nacional, admit that they lowered their standards of balance and independence too easily during those years and have worked hard to regain them. By any measure, they have come a long way toward recovering credibility: news stories include all sides, and opposition newspapers regularly carry signed opinion pieces from Chávez supporters and appointees. The incendiary anti-Chávez language was mostly absent from the public sphere by the time the newly restrictive laws came into effect.

The same, however, cannot be said of government media. State-run television channels Venezolana de Televisión and ViVe remain abject propaganda services for the Chávez government, regularly attacking the president’s designated enemies and opposition figures in news reports while excluding dissenting opinions.18 Pro-government newspapers and the state-owned

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news agency Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias are little better. As Venezuelans look toward the presidential elections, this stark dichotomy in the quality of media news coverage will define how issues and candidacies are presented to the public. On one hand will be the establishment media, subdued and chastened by their behavior in the 2002-04 period and under constant threat of government legal action.

On the other hand will be the sycophantic pro-government media, employing the old language of rancor and derision without fear of legal retribution. This imbalance would seem to give Chávez and his supporters an important advantage entering the election campaign, as they will have many more tools, both rhetorical and legal, at their disposal than will the opposition in reaching the public through the mass media. And given past experience, they are likely to make full use of those tools. This may be a formula for Chávez to win reelection, but it is certainly not a formula for Venezuela to overcome the divisions of the past.

NOTES

1 The Paris-based media advocacy group Reporters sans Frontières ranked Venezuela at number ninety in the world on freedom of the press in the group’s 2005 survey. This placed it ahead of only a few countries in the region: Peru (116), Colombia (128), Mexico (135), and Cuba (161, and seventh lowest in the world). It should be noted that the first three of those countries earned low rankings largely because of physical attacks on journalists in the previous year: attacks which, although extremely serious, do not necessarily reflect the legal regime under which the media operate and to which this article refers.

2 Carlos Ayala Corao, “Las leyes de desacato en Venezuela,” in Venezuela: Situación del derecho a la libertad de expresión e información, Eds. Carlos Correa and Andrés Cañizález (Caracas: Espacio Público, 2005), 193.

Insult laws have been in force in Venezuela in some form since at least 1897, he reports.

3 Cited in Carlos Correa and Yubi Cisneros Mussa, “Las restricciones a la libertad de expresión y la reforma del Código Penal,” in Correa and Cañizález, op. cit., 185.

4 Sala Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Sentence 1,942, quoted in Ayala Corao, op cit., 203.

5 Correa and Cisneros Mussa, op. cit., 182. They include a useful, point-by-point synopsis on the modifications to the penal code related to the news media and freedom of expression. Translations are the author’s.

6 In late 2004, the Chavista-dominated Congress raised the number of Supreme Court judges from twenty to thirty-two, allowing the executive to name twelve of its loyalists as justices. The executive also filled five vacancies from the original twenty. Thus the government has engineered a majority for itself on the court.

These changes followed a ruling in late 2002 acquitting a group of military officers for their involvement in the 2002 coup against Chávez, a decision that angered the president and was also questioned by international human rights groups. Sweeping changes in the judiciary have continued since. In August 2005, the Chávezappointed president of the Supreme Court, Omar Mora, said the court had exercised its power to remove

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270 judges for “corruption” and other alleged crimes and planned to remove some 600 more. Juan Francisco Alfonso, “Mora afirma que 600 jueces saldrán del Poder Judicial,” El Universal, 26 August 2005.

7 Ibid., 182-83.

8 John Dinges, “Soul Search,” Columbia Journalism Review, July/August 2005, in which Izarra also said he would support a Venezuelan version of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. 9 Teodoro Petkoff, interview with author, Caracas, 29 April 2005.

10 “Justicia arrodillada,” El Universal, 25 July 2005.

11 “Izarra respalda acción contra el diario,” El Universal, 29 July 2005. “La canalla mediática se dedica a difamar, vilipendiar y ofender la reputación de las personas y después se esconde en la libertad de expresión.”

12 Héctor Faúndez, interview with author, Caracas, 28 August 2005.

13 República Bolivariana de Venezuela,

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Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión (Caracas: CONATEL, 2005), 18-20.

14 Margarita Escudero León and Ana Cristina Núñez Machado, “Comentarios críticos sobre la Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión,” in Correa and Cañizález, op cit., 231.

15 Ley de Responsabilidad Social, op. cit., 17.

16 Ibid., 39.

17 Organization of American States, InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela (Washington: IACHR, 2003), 177.

18 The government’s other major broadcaster is Telesur, a cable station that began transmissions throughout Latin America in July 2005 and 51 percent of which is owned by the Venezuelan government.

Argentina, Cuba, and Uruguay own the remaining 20, 19, and 10 percent, respectively. It shows mostly documentary films, but also has news and is less political than Venezuelan state television.

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Media in Conflict Inciting Violence in Kosovo Claude Salhani Given its reach, its power of advocacy, and its capacity to frame and influence political issues, the press is often referred to as “the fourth estate.” The term was first coined

by Thomas Carlyle, a Scottish essayist and historian, during the first half of the nineteenth century, and it suggests that the press was so influential in politics that it could almost be considered a fourth component of parliament (the French States General had three official estates). Today, the media remains vital in politics, as acknowledged by the common expression “the power of the press.” In a humanitarian crisis, the role of media becomes even more influential in impacting political decision makers. This was the case in Kosovo, a province of the former Yugoslavia, in 1999, when tens of thousands of civilians were kidnapped, raped, tortured, and killed in ethno-political violence pitting Serbs against Kosovar Albanians. The involvement of the media, however, can yield both positive and negative results.

Precisely how the media affect policy decisions—or do not affect them—when it comes to government action in a humanitarian crisis largely depends on how free and objective those media are. It also depends on how receptive politicians are to public opinion.

Claude Salhani is editor of the United Press International Intelligence Desk. He has trained Kosovar and Palestinian journalists in journalistic ethics and conflict avoidance.

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Media Success: The NATO With the arrival of international Intervention. The positive aspect of peacekeepers, Miloševic was eventually

the media’s influence on politics in the Kosovo conflict was that reports—some of them leaked to the press by official sources in an effort to sway public opinion in favor of military intervention— eventually led to international military intervention that prevented further bloodshed. Britain played an important role in the war in Kosovo by garnering North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support. The British government portrayed the bombing of Yugoslavia as a “humanitarian war.”

“From the top down,” one commentator has written, “the U.K. government committed its considerable media operations resources to the campaign and to the task of mobilizing international and British public opinion [in favor of the war].”1 By exercising its influence over public opinion, the international media succeeded in persuading decision makers to intervene in the crisis. This was achieved largely as a result of portraying the unfolding events in the Balkans as a “rescue mission.” Although intervention meant the use of military force, it was nevertheless portrayed as a justifiable cause, one that would serve the overall interests of peace.

During the Balkan war, the United States became actively involved in Kosovo.

It led a NATO bombing campaign on Serbian positions, then under the command of President Slobodan Miloševic.

The media largely supported the U.S. military involvement in Yugoslavia, an intervention that helped save the lives of tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Some critics of the NATO campaign, however, blame NATO’s intervention for inciting further acts of violence, including instances of “ethnic cleansing.”2 [ 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

arrested and remanded to the International Tribunal in The Hague, where he currently remains in custody.

The media played a major role in shaping American perceptions of the intervention in Kosovo as a “just war,” unlike the U.S. intervention in Iraq. The portrayal of Miloševic as a rogue leader accused of war crimes and encouraging ethnic cleansing, mass deportation of populations, and other atrocities helped garner public opinion against him.

Whereas the media generally showed support for a U.S./NATO intervention in Europe, the conflict in Iraq, overall, did not enjoy similar support. Outside of conservative media outlets that supported the Bush administration’s call to war, much of the rest of the world saw the U.S. troops in Iraq largely as “invaders.” In Kosovo, however, the United States was (and still is) regarded as a great liberator by the Albanian community in Kosovo.

For example, an avenue in the Kosovar capital, Priština, is named for former President Bill Clinton, and a colossal mural of the former president adorns the entire facade of a tall building in the center of the capital.

Media Failure: The March Incident. Despite the successes of the

media in provoking foreign military intervention in Kosovo, the effect of the media was not entirely positive. Five years after the intervention, inaccuracies in reporting and irresponsibility in the local media produced devastating results in what became known as the “March Incident.”

In March 2004, a banal occurrence— one could say even an accident—took place in Caber, a small, nondescript village in

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Kosovo, which, five years after the 1999 intervention, was a semi-autonomous region populated mostly by ethnic Albanians but administered by the United Nations.3 The March troubles began when four ethnic Albanian boys playing on the Serbian side of the village of Caber were scared away—some reports suggested, chased away—by one or more Serb adults and possibly a dog. The Albanian boys, all in their early teens or pre-teens, took flight and raced back toward the Albanian side of the village, separated from the Serbian neighborhood by the river Iber.

Mobilizing Media

by the Albanian-language press. In another example, one local news report stated that “almost all the citizens [of a nearby local town] are heading toward the village of Caber,”7 as unlikely as it would be that “all the citizens” would be heading towards that village.

According to reports by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Albanian media’s hypedup reporting seems to have led to massive and violent demonstrations and coun-

The media’s inaccuracies led to inciting

hatred, which in turn led to riots in which nineteen people were killed.

Unfortunately, instead of taking the bridge, the boys ran into the river, which was swollen by the spring rains. Three of the four boys were reported to have drowned.4 This should, in principle, have been the end of the tragic story, which should have only made it into the local pages of the province’s newspapers.

The Albanian-language media, however, instead of reporting the story as the sad accident that it was, blew it out of proportion, often misrepresenting the facts, with local newspapers calling the incident “a severe tragedy.”5 The drowning of a child is no doubt a tragedy, but it did not merit the front-page coverage it received, along with inflammatory reports that helped fuel the ethnic fires.

For example, the initial report of a “Serb who had a dog” was changed into the “dog chasing the children,”6 giving the story a new connotation. The surviving child was also the only eyewitness and was interviewed on Albanian television and

terdemonstrations. The Albanian-language media fanned the ethnic flames, often out of pure sensationalism though at times simply due to their inexperience.

It should be recalled that a free press in Kosovo only came about after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and it is still a novelty in the province.

The media’s inaccuracies led to inciting hatred, which in turn led to riots in which nineteen people were killed— eleven Albanians and eight Serbs; some 600 people were injured, thousands were evicted from their homes, hundreds of houses were destroyed, and thirty-five Serbian Orthodox churches were burned.

Given Kosovo’s mostly inexperienced media—as well as the repercussions that false reporting can have on a population where tensions are always just a fraction from exploding—the province’s press was already accountable to the Temporary Media Commission (TMC) well before Winter/Spring 2006 [ 3 5 ]

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the March events. The TMC is an oversight authority meant to regulate, monitor, license, and enforce a code of ethics for Kosovar print and broadcast media.

It is part of the OSCE, which, along with the United Nations, basically administers Kosovo until the province’s “final status” is decided—that is, until Kosovars either are granted full independence or are made to remain part of Serbia as an autonomous region.

The creation of the TMC was deemed necessary to prevent inflammatory press reports from igniting extreme sensitivities that still persist between Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo.

The press in Kosovo is indeed still very

ment officials to threaten or bribe journalists. In the West, the media usually influence politicians; in developing nations, it is typically the reverse.

Immediately after the March events, OSCE and UN officials blamed the Albanian media for inciting the violence.

The United Nations worried that the troubles would set back the democratization process by several years, thus delaying the province’s already slow march toward self-rule and possible full independence.

After conducting an inquiry into the media’s behavior, the OSCE issued a report titled “The Role of the Media in the March Events in Kosovo,” in which it stated, “Without the reckless and sen-

The March Incident is a case of politics

influencing the media, rather than the reverse. young, both in the sense of its institutions and of its members. Reporters as young as seventeen years old find themselves anchoring television shows and writing front-page stories. Priština’s sole university does not offer any journalism or media courses, and most members of the local press corps are self taught.

The major disparity between the Western media, which is (usually) independent and therefore able to frame its news objectively, and the media in the developing world is that politicians in the latter find it easier to manipulate the press, if they do not outright own it. The media in much of the developing world is frequently state run or directly affiliated with the state—if not owned and/or controlled by political parties. In other instances, it is not unusual for govern[ 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

sationalist reporting on 16-17 March, the events could have taken a different turn. They would not have reached the intensity and level of brutality we all witnessed or would not have taken place at all, for that matter.”8 As could be expected, the Albanian media rejected accusations lobbed its way, throwing the blame back on the “internationals”—the United Nations, the OSCE, and KFOR (the multinational military force composed of NATO and armed forces of several other countries, which is responsible for maintaining security in the province).

Agim Zatriwi was the general director of RTK, Kosovo’s only public television channel, which was singled out by the internationals for its handling of the crisis and for broadcasting erroneous

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reports that led to rioting and violence.

Zatriwi rejected the accusations outright.

He accused the internationals of failing in their mission to control the situation, provide protection, and prevent bloodshed.9 The OSCE report, while stopping short of admitting failure, pointed to the fact that “one has to acknowledge that free media is a novelty in Kosovo.”10 The fact that a free media was still “a novelty” became instantly evident when I arrived in Kosovo just a few weeks after the March events. As a direct result of the March crisis, the OSCE’s Democratization Department asked me to conduct a ten-day crash course for members of the Kosovar media on journalistic ethics and how to prevent a crisis from developing into a conflict.

Over the next ten days, I spent eight hours a day with some thirty-six Kosovar journalists, both Serbs and Albanians, in marathon sessions held in the restaurant-turned-lecture room of a crumbling hotel in the mountain retreat of Brezovica, about an hour’s drive from Priština. The overall lack of journalistic experience of the Kosovar press corps was immediately apparent.

Add to that the inexperience and the obvious ethnic biases (which they made no effort to hide), and the inevitable outcome of the March reporting becomes understandable. This is a case of politics influencing the media, rather than the reverse.

The inaccuracies in reporting the March incidents by the local media were documented by the OSCE and the TMC. Some local journalists even admitted—in private—that a few of their colleagues had indeed gone too far, exaggerating the facts.11 The erroneous reports so angered the international community that the issue was even raised

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during the 5 August 2004 UN Security Council debate on the disputed province.12 A question remains about whether lessons were learned.

The March Incident is a good example of how an irresponsible media can take a small incident; exaggerate the facts; bend the truth; play on people’s ethnic, nationalistic, and religious sensitivities; and incite hatred to the point where it erupts into uncontrollable violence.

Unfortunately, this was all too easy in a region where ethnic divisions still run deep, and memories of past atrocities, along with the thirst for revenge, run even deeper.

The Media’s Role in Times of Crisis. In times of conflict, the media’s

impact on politics is amplified; the media take on greater responsibility as the public reflexively turns to them for clarification, and at times even for direction. What is most people’s reaction when hearing of a major news story developing? Instinctively they turn on their radio or television or connect to an Internet news site. The more precarious a situation, the greater the media’s role has in a conflict and the greater is its impact on politics. An irresponsible media can lead to disastrous consequences, as was demonstrated by the Kosovo crisis.

The case of Rwanda provides an illustrative comparison with Kosovo, demonstrating not only the effect of a lack of international media but also the dire power of a local media that cooperates in genocide. Five years before the Kosovo intervention, in 1994, the international community failed to respond in Rwanda, where nearly one million Tutsis were hacked or bludgeoned to death by Hutu militias in just 100 days—a tragedy of Winter/Spring 2006 [ 3 7 ]

MEDIA IN CONFLICT

genocidal proportions. What accounts for this lethargy? One explanation may be found in the lack of attention from the international media—and therefore the lack of pressure on decision makers.

If media pressure for political action was not forthcoming, politicians were not likely to call for military involvement in a conflict in a far-flung corner of the world. “A combination of international editorial indifference and the physical dangers of visiting Rwanda meant there was virtually no international media coverage of the unending murder and terror producing about 10,000 deaths a day,” wrote Shaili Chopra.13 No press coverage meant that most people, particularly in the United States, were completely unaware of the ongoing tragedy.

During the Rwanda massacre, the local media—Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, nicknamed “Radio Machette,” and the Rwandan mass-circulated Kangura newspaper—incited ethnic hatred and genocide. Reports indicated that the radio station directed Hutu militiamen to locations where Tutsis were hiding. In Kosovo, unlike in Rwanda, the media distortion was not entirely intentional but was more the result of reckless reporting by journalists in the field and the lack of perception on the part of their editors back in the newsrooms. Still, both led to regrettable consequences.

A good illustration of the media’s impact on politics is demonstrated by the fact that it was only after the media became involved and alerted public opinion to the unfolding tragedy in Rwanda that politicians began to react.

The UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted three Rwandan media personalities of genocide and sentenced two of them to life imprisonment and one to thirty-five [ 3 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

years in prison. The tribunal reported that a bench of three judges had sentenced Ferdinand Nahimana, a founder and ideologist of the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, and Hassan Ngeze, editor in chief of Kangura newspaper, to life in prison for their involvement in the 1994 genocide.

Conclusion. The media and politics go

hand in hand; they live and thrive off one another, at times feeding off each other.

Although politicians may at times delight in berating the media, the truth of the matter is that those involved in politics would be voiceless without the press to deliver their message. Similarly, the members of the press liven up their newspaper and magazine pages and fill airtime on their news shows with political news. Politics, after all, is the bread, butter, and dessert of journalism.

A free and objective press is an essential element in a democracy, in which the media act as the watchdog of society and freedom. Journalists are a direct link between citizens and their governments.

In the case of Kosovo, the media influenced public opinion in a negative manner through its biased, impulsive, and erroneous reporting. This was compounded by negligence on the part of editors, who should have questioned the reporters’ work from the field. The lack of editorial control, combined with shoddy journalism, helped escalate the conflict to disastrous proportions.

While remaining cognizant of the fact that Kosovo’s press is still mostly young and inexperienced, the international community administering the province adopted proactive steps to correct the fault. The learning curve, however, is slow and tedious. But, then again, so is teaching and spreading democracy.

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Mobilizing Media

NOTES

1 Mark Curtis, “Blair’s Jaw Jaw Means War War,” October 2002. Internet, http://64.233.161.104/ search?q=cache:2EDYc9fX8-QJ:www.redpepper. org. uk/intarch/x-curtis-foreignpolicy.html+role+of+ the+media+in+garnering+public+opinion+for+kosovo&hl=en (Date accessed: 3 November 2005).

2 Ibid. The bombing of Yugoslavia was described as a “humanitarian war” even as it precipitated a humanitarian crisis and was launched by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President Bill Clinton, probably knowing that Miloševic would respond by starting a planned ethnic cleansing campaign.

3 While technically still a part of SerbiaMontenegro (all that remains of the former Yugoslavia), Kosovo has its own president, prime minister, parliament, and Supreme Court. The real power, however, rests in the hands of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Kosovo. That position is currently held by Søren Jessen-Petersen, a Dane, head of UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo), the organization that Albanian Kosovars hope will steer the province to nationhood within a few years.

4 It later appeared that two of the three boys may have survived, although this is a point the Albanian media helped keep unclear.

5 Miklos Haraszti,“The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo. Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe. Report by the Representative of Freedom of the Media,” 16 April 2004.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Claude Salhani, “Analysis: Kosovo’s Media in the Crosshairs,” 7 August 2004.

Internet, http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040807121454-2809r (Date accessed: 17 October 2005).

10 Miklos Haraszti, “The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Report by the Representative of Freedom of the Media,” 16 April 2004.

11 Claude Salhani, “Analysis: Kosovo’s Media in the Crosshairs,” 7 August 2004. Internet, http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040807121454-2809r (Date accessed: 17 October 2005).

12 Andrei Denisov, then Russia’s newly appointed ambassador to the United Nations, condemned “the inflammatory material” in Kosovo’s provincial media during the March Incident.

13 Shaili Chopra, “Role of Media in Covering Humanitarian Conflict,” South Asian Women’s Forum, 10 December 2001. Internet, http://64.233.161.104/ search?q=cache:4_S89lOx4hIJ:www.sawf.org/newedit/edit12102001/index.asp+media+coverage+of+rwanda&hl=en (Date accessed: 3 November 2005).

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Mobilizing Media

Exposing AIDS

Media’s Impact in South Africa Mia Malan HIV/AIDS is not just another medical condition like malaria, meningitis, or mumps. It has taken on a life of its own, a life that depends upon a multitude of vested interests linked to power, prestige, religion, and money.1 The news media’s reporting on this complex pandemic cannot be separated from these issues. Media coverage is mostly a reflection of the environment in which it develops and operates, and it can impact the fight against HIV/AIDS either negatively or positively. In South Africa public-health battles—particularly those related to HIV/AIDS—are increasingly being fought on television news bulletins, front pages of newspapers, and radio talk shows.

News reporting can have a significant impact on the public perception of HIV/AIDS in South Africa and on the government’s policymaking.

M. E. McCombs has argued that the media do not tell society what to think but rather what to think about.2 But I will argue that, in South Africa, the opposite is true. The news media have told the public what to think: that the government’s AIDS policies lack comprehensiveness; that antiretrovirals are effective and should be made available; and that the drug Nevirapine—the efficacy of which both the president and his health minister have publicly doubted—is essential in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.3 In this respect the news

Mia Malan is the Senior Resident Advisor for the Local Voices project of Internews Network in Nairobi, Kenya.

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 4 1 ]

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media, in combination with AIDS lobby groups, have made a significant contribution to civil-society pressure on the government around HIV/AIDS policy changes—in particular, regarding the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and access to antiretroviral drugs. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to explore the ways in which South Africa’s news media have used their power to shape the HIV/AIDS world; to gauge the effectiveness of the media coverage; and finally, to examine the complex factors that have influenced coverage in a country with one of the largest populations of people living with HIV in the world.4

president’s right to question these issues, while newspapers read mainly by whites generally referred to his statements as illinformed and irresponsible.

Reporting has not been entirely straightforward either. In some instances news stories have confused the public about the science of AIDS and have politicized the epidemic to such an extent that they have contributed to the racial polarization of the HIV/AIDS discourse.

Lost in the haze of confusion were issues examining how ordinary people were dealing with the disease.

Disasters Setting the Context: Conflict Fuels Media Coverage.

AIDS mirrors everything dysfunctional

The Politicization of AIDS. The in society—from prejudice toward

unprecedented politicization of HIV/AIDS in South Africa has shaped local journalists’ and news editors’ response to—and, in effect, South Africans’ understanding of—the epidemic. Media coverage over the past ten years has predominantly been characterized by the political conflict between the government and civil society regarding the rights of HIV-positive people. In return, the politicization of AIDS, coupled with the country’s apartheid history, has also framed responses by the government and the public to the media’s reporting about state policies.

When South African President Thabo Mbeki in the late 1990s began voicing doubts about the cause of AIDS and the efficacy of well-established Western treatment methods, the largely white-owned media’s criticism of his statements was branded unpatriotic and racist. Even journalists’ responses were divided: publications such as the Johannesburg-based daily The Sowetan, with its predominantly black readership, tended to support the [ 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

minorities to political quagmires driven by a hunger for prestige, control, and money.5 The news media flourish on such subjects of conflict, since death and suffering capture a larger audience than more mundane events. It therefore comes as no surprise that HIV/AIDS only began receiving substantial coverage in the South African media when a scandal of monumental proportions, known as Sarafina II, was revealed in the mid-1990s.

The then health minister, Dr. Nkosazana Zuma, spent $2.3 million of EU funding that had originally been allocated for AIDS prevention on an AIDS musical, Sarafina II—without the EU’s authorization. Moreover, the contract for the musical was granted to a well-known playwright without consultation or proper tendering procedures. Less important than the fact that the show contained almost no relevant AIDS prevention messages, much of the money could not be accounted for.6 With such negative publicity emerging in the largely white-owned media, and to

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a far lesser extent from the black-owned media, it was easy for the government to shift the focus of the criticism onto issues of race, commenting that the uproar over Sarafina’s funding stemmed from the fact that the playwright was black. The situation was complex for black-oriented newspapers since the Sarafina II fiasco appeared less than two years after the African National Congress (ANC) government ascended to power. Many black journalists had fought in the antiapartheid struggle along with high-ranking government officials including Zuma and then Deputy President Mbeki. To senior members of the former liberation movement, public criticism by their junior former “comrades” was deemed betrayal—not to mention insulting in the extreme.

When the newspaper City Press, which is read primarily by black South Africans, inquired about the whereabouts of the Sarafina funding, the health department lamented that it was “a pity that mainstream black newspapers” were “climbing on the white media bandwagon.”7 As a result of pressure from the EU, AIDS activists, and the media, the play was discontinued. And so the foundation was laid for the influence that the media and

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of public money; it rarely mentioned anything about the science of AIDS. The South African news media and its consumers knew very little about HIV and its consequences. AIDS was rather a disease associated with provoking issues of “disagreement [along racial lines, among others] or disharmony symptomatic of a country in transition.”8 In 1997 Mbeki unleashed a political storm when he and Zuma appeared to have played prominent roles in fast tracking the registration of a widely condemned “AIDS cure”—Virodene P058— and in convincing the state to provide covert funding for accompanying research. The drug contained a highly toxic industrial solvent that a team of Pretoria University researchers claimed could kill HIV. Again, the state dismissed critical media reports as antigovernment diatribes and, in this case, as being prejudiced against an indigenous African cure for AIDS. Reporting on Virodene, however, demanded a skill that the Sarafina II scandal did not require: a basic understanding of the science of HIV/AIDS. Yet most reporters lacked this type of scientific knowledge, and some journalists filed stories arguing that Virodene could

The news media, in combination with

AIDS lobby groups, have made a significant contribution to civil-society pressure on the government around HIV/AIDS policy changes.

AIDS activists were to have on government policies in the future. Reporting, however, focused on the accountability of government officials and the squandering

be a potential remedy for the devastating disease. This resulted in confusion, with desperate HIV-positive people arriving at the Pretoria-based offices of the soWinter/Spring 2006 [ 4 3 ]

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called researchers and offering themselves as guinea pigs for unauthorized and dangerous experiments.9 The racially divided milieu, of which the Sarafina II and Virodene episodes were part, set the context for future reporting on Mbeki’s and the government’s insufficient HIV/AIDS policies. The mainstream news media portrayed the state as lacking the political will and transparency to deal with the epidemic. This, in turn, eventually mobilized considerable support for AIDS lobby groups that fought to make treatment—treatment in which Mbeki refused to believe—accessible. In return, the government would brand any critical reports as anti-African and a “vile and vicious campaign against the head of state,” reflecting deep racial divides and constant conflict between civil society and the state.10

NGOs and the Media: Feeding Off Each Other. South African

AIDS non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the news media feed off one other; they cannot serve the public effectively without assistance and support from one another. The country’s strongest AIDS lobby group, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), has consequently played a significant part in educating reporters—and, by extension, the public—about the cause of AIDS and the available treatments. In fact, in many instances, it has dictated media coverage and South Africans’ understanding of HIV/AIDS. When Mbeki began publicly doubting the cause of AIDS and the efficacy of antiretroviral treatment, most local journalists had never heard of AIDS skeptics.

This was not because it was impossible to conceive of not “believing” in AIDS, but that some reporters had not even heard

[ 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of HIV! For many in the media, the science of AIDS was completely unknown and unfathomable territory. There was therefore a real danger of them giving South Africans incorrect information, which could expose the public to the risk of contracting a virus that the government had told them was harmless.

The TAC compensated for this lack of media knowledge. It scheduled media conferences to counter almost every incorrect government statement. At such events factual information was distributed to journalists and scientists, and knowledgeable doctors were made available for interviews.

In sharp contrast to this informed response were the Mbeki administration’s predictable reactions to criticism, its frequent unavailability to reporters, and its general uneasiness with the media. A growing, mutual sense of antipathy between the state and the media emerged; and, with the constant availability of the TAC, “a tone critical of the government came easily…. [T]he press did not so much jump, as [it] was pushed.”11 The majority of stories filed by journalists echoed the TAC’s messages, but public and media reaction was initially divided overtly along racial lines. On radio stations, such as Radio 702 (in Johannesburg), the talk-show callers were predominantly white, and one would hear people lambasting the president. In contrast, callers on Ukhozi FM (a Zulu station based in Kwazulu/Natal province), with almost exclusively black listeners, often supported Mbeki’s right to doubt internationally accepted fundamentals.12 Some editors believed that dissidents (those who believed HIV did not cause AIDS) and orthodox scientists (those who believed HIV caused AIDS) should both enjoy the right to state their case in

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the media. This was often not a case of attempting to be objective but rather one of “not properly understanding the issues at hand.”13 By this stage, however, a group of HIV/AIDS reporters with a reasonable understanding of HIV/AIDS science and a strong relationship with the TAC had emerged. Their newfound knowledge allowed them, to a great extent, to set the agenda in their respective newsrooms. And, when the president’s and health minister’s statements began to

Mobilizing Media

media therefore endeavored to convince the public that not everything said by the president was true.

Even though “mainstream” news media coverage generally supported the TAC’s views, some editors still afforded AIDS dissidents the “right to reply” in the form of letters and columns, resulting in opposing views being printed in the same publication. The TAC’s Mark Heywood has pointed out that “you can have responsible news stories, but when you continue to give space to other forms

South African AIDS NGOs and the news

media feed off one another; they cannot serve the public effectively without assistance and support from one another. negatively impact policy decisions (for instance, by reducing the availability of well-established treatments), even journalists who had initially defended the right to raise doubts about the cause of AIDS—such as the HIV-positive Sowetan columnist, Lucky Mazibuko—altered their mindsets: “In my mind there was a problem with him [President Mbeki] pushing ahead with poverty alleviation, but not providing treatment. I believed the two had to be done simultaneously.”14 As a result of media and activist-group pressure, the president has subsequently fallen silent—at least in public—about his dissident beliefs.

When state leaders disseminate inaccurate information, the impact of their words is far reaching. At best, South Africa’s news media could attempt to exercise damage control of the repercussions of the president’s statements. The

of reporting supporting dissident views, the damage prevails.”15 As a result, there are South Africans who still believe that AIDS is a fabrication of the white world in an attempt to control black Africa. As recently as 2003, a popular talk show host in Johannesburg received calls from listeners questioning the existence of HIV. Most South Africans, however, understand the cause of the disease—at least according to preliminary provincial studies—but there seems to be confusion about prevention methods such as the use of condoms.16

From Dissidence to Treatment: Pressure for Policies. One of the

great victories of AIDS activist group pressure, combined with news media coverage of the AIDS epidemic, was forcing the government to implement HIV treatment policies to which the health Winter/Spring 2006 [ 4 5 ]

EXPOSING AIDS

minister had previously been openly resistant. A primary campaign of the TAC was to pressure the state into providing the antiretroviral drug Nevirapine free of charge to HIV-positive pregnant women. Nevirapine reduces the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV by half and is widely used in the developing world. But the new health minister, Dr. Manto Tshabala-Msimang, argued that the drug was not safe. In 2001 the TAC took the government to court to force it to provide this treatment.

The court battle—eventually won by the TAC—played a big part in setting a public agenda, through the news media, on government policies around the prevention of mother-to-child transmission

erage of AIDS issues skyrocketed during the litigation: one study found that there were at least a third more front-page key messages published during the court case than there were a year later.17 The media— which had been provided with accurate information from AIDS activists—clearly supported the TAC and opposed the government with messages that Nevirapine was effective and that the state was being “stubborn.”18 The effect of the public’s perception of these messages could be seen in the high percentage (80 percent) of HIVpositive mothers who accepted Nevirapine treatment at pilot sites. The value of the South African news media’s reporting on the subject becomes espe-

The ability of interest groups to use the

media to influence policy agendas and public perception is greatly dependent on their understanding of “newsworthiness.” of HIV. The TAC, which is often compared with the militant United Democratic Front movement that fought the apartheid regime, had an exceptional understanding of what constituted “news” in the media’s view. The TAC created events—particularly vociferous protests—that the news media simply could not ignore. TAC protestors would, for example, march with placards emblazoned with highly inflammatory slogans such as “One dissident, one bullet,” which mimicked a controversial catchphrase coined by black radicals, “One (white) farmer, one bullet.”

Provocative actions like these ensured prominent media coverage. In fact, cov[ 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

cially clear when this rate of acceptance is compared with that of other African countries such as Botswana, where there was a very low take-up rate due to a widespread misunderstanding about Nevirapine and almost no constructive media coverage on the subject.

One of the counter-effects of the savvy media campaigns run by the TAC and its partners, the AIDS Law Project and the AIDS Consortium, was that alternative AIDS NGOs who did not use these methods were not heard in public. This created the inaccurate perception that South African AIDS NGOs and activists were not diverse. Also, because the media’s coverage was largely a response to

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the TAC’s activities (that is, it was reactive rather than proactive), the government and TAC were constantly played off against each other. This coverage fueled conflict regarding mother-to-child transmission policies; the consequence was that valuable stories about people’s everyday struggles with the epidemic were often ignored. Women and men affected by mother-to-child transmission issues were rarely featured, resulting in ordinary citizens having almost no voice in the media.19 A news media reception study has indicated that South Africans need to hear the personal stories of ordinary people living with HIV/AIDS in order to humanize the epidemic.20 A current challenge confronting the news media is monitoring the government’s implementation of Nevirapine programs, as well as the progression of the roll-out of antiretroviral treatment to HIV-positive South Africans. These stories are self initiated and are not necessarily a mere reflection of the efforts of activist groups. Efforts on these fronts will assist the state in the roll-out of treatment and will hold government accountable when political will is lacking.

Conclusion. News media coverage in

South Africa has played a prominent role in assisting AIDS activist groups to pressure the government to implement comprehensive treatment policies.

Simultaneously, journalists have closely monitored the state’s spending of public money as well as government statements about the cause of AIDS. The media’s ability to set agendas for policymakers is a strong reflection of the quality of interest groups’ interactions with journalists.

In the process a small core group of reporters have become activists in their own right—and subsequently have also

Mobilizing Media

become the subjects of government criticism. Freelance correspondent Charlene Smith was raped in 1999 and had difficulty accessing antiretroviral drugs used to prevent HIV infection in such cases.

Smith attacked the health minister personally in a newspaper article to which Zuma responded with a counter press release. Later Smith was also confronted

by President Mbeki, who chastised her for criticizing him.21 In addition, the government health spokesperson banned Lynne Altenroxel, a former reporter for the Johannesburg-based newspaper The Star, from a media conference. This followed the journalist’s highlighting of a letter in which the health minister had threatened Medical Research Council employees for leaking to the media an AIDS report with which she did not agree.22 Most in-depth coverage on HIV/AIDS in South Africa has been achieved by journalists who have chosen to specialize in the subject. However, due to the emotional stress and conflict that accompanies an intense focus on the disease, many of them have suffered burn-out. Some have abandoned the profession or no longer report on the news aspects of the epidemic. This has left reporting to a large pool of untrained journalists who are ill informed about the science of the disease.

In order to prevent burn-out, more journalists from a wider range of specialties must be consistently involved in reporting on HIV/AIDS, which is a complex issue, requiring a focus by senior reporters. Media training for specialist correspondents, who are not solely focused on the health beat, could result in a broader pool of journalists with the necessary skills to report accurately on the epidemic. Media fellowships, such as those offered by the University of the Witwatersrand, where Winter/Spring 2006 [ 4 7 ]

EXPOSING AIDS

HIV/AIDS reporters are afforded the opportunity to research the subject, should also be expanded.

In addition, practicing and former journalists have so far been accorded few opportunities to research the South African media’s coverage of HIV/AIDS. This represents a void that must be filled in the near future. Such research is at present minimal and has, by and large, been completed by communication specialists with extremely limited understanding of the basic functions of a newsroom. This has resulted in findings that have often proved inapplicable to such environments.23 Broad media coverage of HIV/AIDS in South Africa has been largely reactionary.

Such coverage can be attributed to a range of factors, including a lack of resources (time and money) at media houses and the politicization and complexity of the epidemic. Coverage needs to give

HIV/AIDS a human face in South Africa by increasing the number of personal stories told. The gatekeepers, allowing journalists the time and space for such stories, are editors. They should also be encouraged to undergo specialized training.

Finally, the fact remains that no story will be published or broadcast if it is not newsworthy. The ability of interest groups to use the media to influence policy agendas and public perception is greatly dependent on their understanding of “newsworthiness.” Because many AIDS lobby groups lack adequate media strategies, journalists have largely ignored them. There is therefore a grave need to increase the skills of local NGOs to work with the media. Perhaps this need outweighs the training of journalists at this stage—even though the relationships between South African journalists and NGOs are far more intimate than in many other African countries.

NOTES

1 Dr. Daniel Ncayiyana, cited in M. Malan, “The Scientific Politics of HIV/AIDS: A Media Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch (March 2003): 5.

2 M. E. McCombs, “Building Consensus: The News Media’s Agenda Setting Roles,” Political Communication 14: 433. Cited in G. De Wet, “Agenda Setting and HIV/AIDS News Sources, Implications for Journalism Education: An Exploratory Study,” Equid Novi 25, no. 1 (2004): 95.

3 N. Spurr, “Who Is Setting the PMTCT Agenda?

A Quantitative Content Analysis of Media Coverage of PMTCT in South Africa,” Johannesburg, Perinatal HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program, Research Fellow Paper, University of the Witwatersrand (2005): 10. Internet, http://www.journalism.co.za/images /upload/ja_research_spurr_PMTCTagenda.doc (Date accessed: 20 October 2005).

4 By the end of 2003, an estimated 5.3 million South Africans were infected with HIV—the largest number of individuals living with the virus in a single country. “UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic,” Internet, http://www.unaids.org/en/geographical+area/by+country/south+africa.asp (Date accessed: 29 October 2005). Some recent news reports, however, indicate that the number of HIV infections in countries such as Nigeria, China, and

[ 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

India may now be higher than in South Africa.

5 J. Nwokedi, cited in M. Malan, “The Scientific Politics of HIV/AIDS: A Media Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch (March 2003): 1.

6 I. Powell, “The Truth Behind Zuma’s Play,” Sunday Times, 3 March 1996.

7 V. Hlongwane, cited in J. Lengane, “Frozen,” City Press, 3 March 1996. Hlongwane was the health department’s spokesperson at the time.

8 T. Jones, as quoted in A. Finlay, “Conflict and HIV/AIDS in the South African Press: A Comparative Study (March–May 2002 and March–May 2003),” Johannesburg, Perinatal HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program, Research Fellow Paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 5 April 2004: 2.

9 At the time of the “Virodene Trials,” the author was the national health correspondent of the South African Broadcasting Corporation. This statement is based on her observations on reporting widely on the Virodene scandal.

10 K. Kelly and W. Parker, “Writing the Epidemic: The Role of the South African Media in Shaping Response to HIV/AIDS,” Center for AIDS Development, Research and Evaluation. Paper presented at the AIDS in Context Conference, Johannesburg, 4–7 April 2001.

11 A. Finlay, “Media Helped Win the Drugs Fight,”

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The Star, 6 January 2004. Internet, http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=225&ArticleId=3187 69 (Date accessed: 21 October 2005).

12 L. Mazibuko, cited in M. Malan “The Scientific Politics of HIV/AIDS: A Media Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch (March 2003): 94.

Mazibuko is an HIV-positive South African columnist.

13 A. Finlay, “Shaping the Conflict: Factors Influencing the Representation of Conflict around HIV/AIDS Policy in the South African Press,” Johannesburg, Perinatal HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program. Research Fellow Paper, University of the Witwatersrand (2004): 15. Internet, http://www.journalism.co.za (Date accessed: 20 October 2005).

14 L. Mazibuko, cited in M. Malan, “The Scientific Politics of HIV/AIDS: A Media Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch (March 2003): 95.

15 M. Heywood from the TAC, as quoted in M. Malan, “The Scientific Politics of HIV/AIDS: A Media Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch (March 2003): 109.

16 I. Jooste, “Reception and Recall of HIV/AIDSRelated News Texts in a Defined Poor Urban Community, Cato Manor in Durban,” Johannesburg, Perinatal HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program, Research Fellow Paper, University of the Witwatersrand (2003): 7.

17 A. Finlay, “Conflict and HIV/AIDS in the South African Press: A Comparative Study (March–May 2002 and March–May 2003),” Johannesburg, Perinatal HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program, Research Fellow Paper, University of the Witwatersrand (5 April 2004): 12.

18 N. Spurr, “Who Is Setting the PMTCT Agenda?

A Quantitative Content Analysis of Media Coverage of PMTCT in South Africa,” Johannesburg, Perinatal

Mobilizing Media

HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program, Research Fellow Paper, University of the Witwatersrand (2005): 10–11. Internet, http://www.journalism.co.za/ images/upload/ja_research_spurr_PMTCTagenda.doc (Date accessed: 20 October 2005).

19 N. Spurr, “Who Is Setting the PMTCT Agenda?

A Quantitative Content Analysis of Media Coverage of PMTCT in South Africa,” Johannesburg, Perinatal HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program, Research Fellow Paper, University of the Witwatersrand (2005): 8. Internet, http://www.journalism.co.za/images/ upload/ja_research_spurr_PMTCTagenda.doc (Date accessed: 20 October 2005).

20 I. Jooste, “Reception and Recall of HIV/AIDSRelated News Texts in a Defined Poor Urban Community, Cato Manor in Durban,” Johannesburg, Perinatal HIV Research Unit and Journalism Program, Research Fellow Paper, University of Witwatersrand (2003): 9.

21 C. Smith, cited in M. Malan, “The Scientific Politics of AIDS: A Media Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch (March 2003): 88, 97, 98.

22 L. Altenroxel, cited in M. Malan, “The Scientific Politics of AIDS: A Media Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch (March 2003): 107–108.

23 The only research that has been done by South African journalists, or researchers with a clear understanding of the functioning of a newsroom, to the best knowledge of the author, are studies by research fellows of the Perinatal HIV Research and Journalism Program at the University of the Witwatersrand. AIDS journalists are given fellowships to do so. There have also been Master’s theses of journalism and media study students at the University of Stellenbosch, University of the Witwatersrand, and University of Kwazulu/Natal.

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Business&Finance USAID Revisited Raj Kumar A new political consensus has taken hold in Washington, with both major political parties, both houses of Congress, and the White House all in agreement that foreign assistance is critical to American foreign policy interests. As a result, foreign aid has tripled in the past several years. At the lowest point in the 1990s, less than $7 billion was allocated annually for foreign aid; in 2004 the number reached $19 billion, and 2005 and 2006 appropriations are set to continue the upward trend.1 As U.S. foreign aid has grown, so too has fragmentation in the management and delivery of that aid. More dollars are increasingly spread across more programs, making coordination of U.S. foreign aid a growing challenge. Whereas the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) once managed nearly all aid funds, today at least forty foreign aid programs are administered in nearly every agency of the U.S. federal government.2 While USAID is still the main conduit for foreign aid, it is no longer the dominant force it once was.

The result of this proliferation of foreign aid programs and the fragmentation of U.S. foreign aid is difficult to measure because it is a relatively new phenomenon. Empirical evidence has shown that this fragmentation of foreign assistance in general creates inefficiencies and a lack of cohesive focus.3 Those in the international development and humanitarian relief fields have long understood that aid coming from many sources, each with its own priorities and requirements, can be counterpro-

Raj Kumar is President and co-founder of The Development Executive Group.

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ideals—a place where former hippies and “heartless bureaucrats” (as Senator Helms termed them) wasted taxpayer money on unnecessary projects in unimportant countries. Today, the situation could not be more different.

Nearly every major foreign policy challenge the United States now faces comes from a developing country. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, success depends as much on bringing electricity, water, and jobs to the people as on military maneuvers. The most significant Little Margin for Error. Within the nuclear threat comes from one of the U.S. government, foreign aid was long world’s poorest countries, North considered the domain of do-gooders, Korea—a country that has suffered mass sixties-era former Peace Corps volun- starvation in the twenty-first century. As teers with an admirable, if idealistic, wish debates rage over illegal immigration and for world peace and the end of poverty. the United States’s porous border, it is As a result, USAID was an agency apart, Mexican and Latin American poverty with its own culture and uniquely inde- that underlies the issue. Solving the drug pendent status. In the 1990s USAID’s problem will require alternative jobs for ductive, increasing transaction costs and imperiling aid effectiveness.

The new pro-aid consensus in Washington may be fleeting if taxpayers do not see results from the increased spending. Thus, it is imperative to develop a coherent U.S. foreign aid policy that unifies the management of all aid funds, reduces the number of programs, lowers the transaction costs of aid, and ensures all aid works together to achieve the same strategic objectives set by Congress.

Nearly every major foreign policy

challenge the Unites States now faces comes from a developing country. individuality became an albatross as Republican leaders in Congress, led by Senator Jesse Helms, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, tried to rein it in by making it part of the State Department and slashing its budget.

Former adversaries on the foreign aid issue now acknowledge that it is central to U.S. national security. For example, in the short introduction to the U.S. National Security Strategy document, the word “poverty” appears in four of eleven paragraphs.4 During the sixties, USAID was seen by some in Congress as a bastion of multiculturalism and progressive [ 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

thousands of rural poor in places like Colombia, Bolivia, and Afghanistan.

Poorer countries such as Venezuela and Nigeria are key to providing stability in the oil markets. China, a country with nearly 500 million people living on less than $2 per day, looms largest on the economic front.5 Economic growth, poverty reduction, and democratization across the developing world are more critical to U.S. national security today than perhaps ever before. The recognition of this reality has led to the new consensus on foreign aid.

That same recognition must now focus

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Business & Finance

firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—what I will refer to as the “Foreign Aid 500”—are involved in the project management and implementation of more than 50 percent of total global foreign aid funding. Many of these are familiar names, such as Save the Children and IBM. Most are not so familiar but are specialists in particular aspects of international development and humanitarian relief (for example, The Futures Group International specializes in health and population projects, including HIV/AIDS prevention projects; Checchi and Company Consulting assists countries in developing judicial systems and undertaking legal reform; and CAPMEX in Vienna builds and modernizes stock markets in developing countries). Beyond this “Foreign Aid 500,” there are tens of thousands of other firms and NGOs— some small and based in developing countries, others global companies who are only occasionally involved in foreign aid implementation.6 The advent of foreign aid with the How Foreign Aid Really Works. Marshall Plan sixty years ago and the Discussion of foreign aid usually focuses growth of aid spending since then have on a sea of acronyms for the many gov- spawned a global industry. The “Foreign ernment aid programs operating today, Aid 500” is a sophisticated group that as these programs provide the funding brings significant expertise and best and strategic direction for aid. ESF practices to bear on the most specific (Economic Support Fund), OTI (Office aspects of international development. of Transition Initiatives), TDA (Trade These firms and NGOs compete for a and Development Agency), and MRA pool of expert consultants who are (Migration and Refugee Assistance) are knowledgeable in reforming business just a few of the many federal government laws to meet World Trade Organization programs that dispense foreign aid dol- standards, building a judiciary system lars. The implementation of aid projects, from the ground up, or setting up however, is done almost entirely by pri- accounting software to manage thousands vate sector companies and non-profit of tiny microcredit loans. It is these organizations. expert consultants and the firms and The Development Executive Group NGOs that manage them that fundaestimates that approximately 500 major mentally do the work of development. on the management and delivery of that aid to ensure that the increased spending meets its stated objectives. The stakes— particularly in places like Iraq—demonstrate that there is little margin for error in developing an effective foreign aid strategy.

Even in countries that do not present immediate challenges to U.S. national security, foreign aid is indelibly linked to diplomacy, trade, and defense cooperation. For example, in Brazil—a huge trade market and an important player in global trade talks—the ability of the United States to improve its currently weakened image with the Brazilian people could be bolstered by a larger and more effective foreign aid policy. In such circumstances, allocating more foreign aid funds to Brazil is only part of the challenge; if the U.S. government can successfully implement urban sanitation or rural health projects, it may improve the U.S. image and have positive effects on other aspects of its relationship with Brazil.

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To be successful in this industry requires more than just technical sophistication with regard to implementing development projects. The first pre-requisite for success is the ability to compete for, win, and manage projects according to the specific rules and regulations of each foreign aid program. Hence the “Foreign Aid 500” must employ teams of home office staff who are charged with understanding the minutiae of each aid program’s rules in order to develop project and grant proposals that meet the basic requirements.

For example, some contracts require standard formats for consultant curriculum vitaes (known as “biodata” sheets) providing salary history; “authorized geographic codes” on contracts indicate country-oforigin requirements for procurement of goods and services under a foreign aid contract; and ES-6 rates operate as a salary cap on certain contracts. The home office staff must ensure that reports and invoices are filed appropriately and that each foreign aid program meets all applicable legal requirements. A look at the 1,923-page FAR (Federal Acquisition Regulation) demonstrates that this is not an insignificant task.7 When economists talk about the transaction costs of foreign aid, much of those costs are inherent in the business models of these firms and NGOs. They must focus much of their overhead costs on meeting the requirements of the aid programs that fund them. As the number of aid programs proliferate, so too do the specific requirements with which these firms and NGOs must keep pace, thus increasing their transaction costs.

Ultimately, those costs are passed on to taxpayers and result in a smaller portion of each foreign aid dollar reaching its intended project.

As a result, aid fragmentation and the [ 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

proliferation of foreign aid programs have a direct and visible impact on aid efficiency. The more programs, the more administrative burden placed on companies and NGOs working with those programs. Recipient governments are also overwhelmed by the wide array of donors who want to work with them. While companies and NGOs welcome the growth in overall foreign aid spending and the recognition of the importance of their work, too many are stretched thin by the fragmentation of their funding sources.

In November 2003 InterAction, a coalition of more than 160 NGOs including CARE, Lutheran World Relief, and Oxfam America, issued a report calling for a “full-scale review” of growing U.S. foreign aid in large part because of concerns about increased fragmentation.8 Continued aid fragmentation is, in effect, taking focus away from innovation and the provision of technical assistance, while leading to higher overhead costs and thus less efficient foreign aid spending.

The Perils of Program Proliferation. In a recent study of aid

effectiveness that ranked donor countries, including the United States, a critical factor included in the analysis was “project proliferation.” The study argued that when donor agencies fund too many small projects, they increase transaction costs.

On the other hand, larger interventions can benefit from an economy of scale that reduces overhead and transaction costs per aid dollar spent. On the measure of “project proliferation,” the United States ranked near the bottom of donor countries because, in essence, it funds too many small projects across too many recipient countries.9 In the United States two new multibillion-dollar programs born in just the past

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few years have created entirely new structures: the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Other smaller programs have grown within federal agencies with particular subject-matter expertise. Some foreign aid programs focused on the environment are run out of the Environmental Protection Agency, while others focused on health are run out

Business & Finance

opment.12 Within the U.S. federal government, long-term planning on a country-bycountry basis becomes difficult when funding is allocated by program. The result may be mismatched projected goals in terms of the total amount of foreign aid spent in particular countries. For example, if Congress determines that it is in the United States’s interest to aggres-

The advent of foreign aid with the Marshall

Plan sixty years ago and the growth of aid spending since have spawned a global industry. of Health and Human Services, for example. Funding for and relationships with multilateral banks like the World Bank are run out of the Treasury Department, while more than a dozen separate aid programs are run out of different divisions of the State Department. Today nearly every federal agency is involved in some aspect of U.S. foreign aid.10 The proliferation of U.S. foreign aid programs mirrors what is happening on the international stage. Recipient countries find it extremely difficult to plan a strategy to overcome poverty—there are simply too many cooks in the kitchen.

Cambodia and Vietnam each played host to more than 400 donor missions in 2003. It is difficult to imagine how either country’s government can effectively plan and implement a coherent development strategy when it must manage so many disparate donor interests and programs.11 In addition, a 2004 study showed that aid fragmentation leads to lower-quality bureaucratic governance of recipient countries because they are forced to compete with donor agencies for nationals who have expertise in devel-

sively pursue development in Afghanistan, it would be most effective to coordinate a long-term strategy specific to Afghanistan through a single management structure in the U.S. federal government rather than multiple separate programs that operate independently.

A Single Foreign Aid Structure.

The first requirement for improving the coherence of U.S. aid policy is centralized leadership. This means that all aid programs must report to a single office with direct responsibility for foreign aid.

It is not enough to coordinate aid among different agencies and programs; there must be leadership that can make hard choices about implementation and strategy and that can be accountable for success and failure.

The second requirement is a unified foreign aid policy. It is not enough to create central leadership if that office does not have a specific mandate from Congress. A unified aid policy would lay out the goals of the foreign aid program as well as the priorities and then allocate funding accordingly.

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The third requirement is more flexible foreign aid funding. Congress currently allocates funding by specific program and includes a rapidly growing number of earmarks. This is the wrong approach toward poverty and humanitarian emergencies, which require coordination with recipient governments, other donor governments and multilateral agencies, NGOs, and civil society. Foreign aid needs to be flexible in order to meet changing realities on the ground and to fill in gaps as they arise. This kind of flexibility, combined with a clear policy statement of foreign aid goals and centralized leadership, can result in better coordinated and ultimately more effective aid.

The reality within the U.S. federal government is that the agency most capable of managing a newly organized foreign aid program is USAID. Even USAID skeptics in the Bush administration realized this when they relied on the agency in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions. For all its faults, there is only one major repository of development knowledge in the U.S. government, and that is USAID. As a result, it makes the most sense to pull all U.S. foreign aid programs under the umbrella of USAID. Some unique programs might be better off retaining their own management structures—such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation—while others might be merged into USAID in cases where overhead costs can be reduced. Whatever the fate of each specific program, all should report directly to the USAID administrator. This will help to create coherent country-specific strategies that ensure various U.S. foreign aid programs are not working at cross purposes within the same country. It will also help coordinate U.S. efforts with those of multilateral agencies [ 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

and other donor countries. The USAID administrator would have the responsibility to work closely with those entities to ensure that aid is part of a comprehensive global strategy in each country.

Some aid programs should be transferred, in part or in whole, to multilateral agencies if those agencies can be more effective. A separate U.S. effort on HIV/AIDS, for example, is probably unnecessary when the Global Fund for HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis is operating effectively.

When it comes to the actual spending of foreign aid funds, there should be one procurement system and one set of rules for the companies and NGOs who implement development projects. The USAID administrator should be responsible for ensuring a transparent procurement system that acknowledges the critical importance of the private and NGO sectors and engages them as partners rather than just as contractors. USAID currently fails at some aspects of procurement transparency; for example, it does not provide a listing of the companies and NGOs to whom it awards contracts.13 Finally, it bears repeating that there are already two successful examples of cabinet-level aid officials—in Britain and Germany.14 Given the new size of the U.S. foreign aid program and its growing importance, it makes sense both to unify all programs within USAID and also to make the USAID administrator a cabinetlevel position. USAID should be at the table in an equal position to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State—to whom it now reports for guidance on overall foreign policy—when coordinating U.S. foreign policy, particularly to the many developing countries that currently pose the biggest challenges to our national security.15

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NOTES

1 Net ODA from DAC Countries from 1950 to 2003, Internet, OECD Development Assistance Committee website: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 43/24/1894385.xls (Date accessed: 6 November 2005). Also: OECD Development Assistance Committee, Preliminary Official Development Assistance (ODA) by Donor in 2004 (Washington, D.C.: OECD, 11 April 2005). Also: U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request, (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of State, 7 February 2005).

Note: ODA or Official Development Assistance is the most conservative measure of foreign aid spending. The U.S. international affairs budget is approximately 30 percent higher than what the OECD considers ODA because some military assistance, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism programs, as well as loans and consular activities, are not counted.

2 U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 7 February 2005). Also: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide: Department of State Publication 11202 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, January 2005).

3 OECD Development Assistance Committee, Rome Declaration on Harmonization: Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery, (Washington, D.C.: OECD, February 2003).

4 George W. Bush, Speech: “National Security Strategy,” White House, 17 September 2002.

5 According to the Department for International Development in the UK, there are 486 million Chinese living on less than $2 per day. Source: UK Department for International Development, “Country Profiles: Asia,” Internet, http://www.dfid. gov.uk/countries/asia/china.asp (Date accessed: 6 November 2005).

6 The Development Executive Group is a membership organization for the international development industry. Members include nonprofit organizations, corporations, and individual professionals working in

international development.

7 The Federal Acquisition Regulation is available online at www.arnet.gov/far.

8 InterAction, Foreign Assistance in Focus: Emerging Trends, An InterAction Policy Paper, (Washington, D.C.: InterAction, November 2003).

9 David Roodman, Center for Global Development, Index of Donor Performance, Working Paper 67 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 29 August 2005).

10 U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 7 February 2005). Also: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide: Department of State Publication 11202 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, January 2005).

11 Westman, Bo et al., OECD, Survey on Harmonization and Alignment: Measuring Aid Harmonization and Alignment in 14 Partner Countries (Washington, D.C.: OECD, 2005).

12 Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman, World Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 3186: Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 2004).

13 USAID no longer comprehensively publishes contract award information. According to the website of the USAID Ombudsman, the last year for which comprehensive contract award information is available is 1999. See http://www.usaid.gov/business/faqombudsman.html.

14 Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen, Brookings Institution, Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).

15 Similar themes and recommendations can be found in Jeremy M. Weinstein et al., Center for Global Development, On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 8 June 2004) and Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen, Brookings Institution, Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).

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Money Talks Revaluing China’s Currency Shalendra D. Sharma On 21 July 2005 Beijing made its biggest monetary shift in more than a decade by revaluing the Chinese currency, the yuan (also known as the renminbi): it reset the fixed value of its currency and dropped the fixed exchange rate, or peg, with the U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, the Chinese government has still set tight parameters on how much the yuan can rise.

While the United States, Japan, and the European Union have pressured China to institute further revaluations, Beijing has been reluctant to make more changes due to concerns that a currency appreciation would lead to slower export growth, higher unemployment, and, over time, a decline in foreign direct investment.

This article will explore the future of U.S.-Asian trade imbalances by examining how China’s central bank has managed the yuan exchange rate in the past. Second, it will analyze the significance of China’s undervalued yuan. Last, it will examine why further revaluations are needed and which outside pressures will affect China’s decision to revalue.

China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), is a government agency that oversees the banking system and is responsible for regulating the money supply in the economy, issuing currency, and managing the exchange rate. Central

Shalendra D. Sharma is Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Democracy and Development in India and editor of Asia in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security and Foreign Policy.

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banks regularly engage in international financial transactions called foreign exchange interventions in order to influence exchange rates. While in the current international financial environment some exchange rates float freely, fluctuating from day to day, most operate under a managed float regime. Specifically, under a managed float (sometimes also known as a “dirty float”), the central bank attempts to influence exchange rates by buying and selling currencies. Under a managed floating currency, the PBOC will keep exchange values, especially the dollar/yuan rate, from experiencing big shifts by resetting the value of the yuan at the end of each trading day.

In 1994 the value of the yuan was pegged to the U.S. dollar at a rate determined by the PBOC. Since 2000 it had been trading within the range of 8.27 to 8.28 yuan to the dollar. Now, Beijing has abandoned the peg and has moved to a system that links the yuan to a basket of currencies, effectively raising the yuan’s value by 2.1 percent. This means that, prior to the revaluation, $1 bought 8.28 yuan; following revaluation, $1 buys roughly 8.11 yuan. Clearly, the yuan will not float by a big margin but will appreciate—or increase its value—by a modest 2 percent by moving within a tight range of 0.3 percent against a group of major foreign currencies. Initially, the PBOC kept secret the basket of currencies, but it was speculated to include roughly a dozen currencies, including the dollar, euro, and yen. By not disclosing the basket’s composition, the PBOC could play with the exchange rate by changing the mix, giving dollars more or less weight as needed to keep rates from shifting too dramatically. However, on 10 August 2005, the central bank governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, provided more details on the meaning of [ 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the term “basket,” noting that the currencies in the basket depend on the amount of foreign trade China conducts.

Why Revalue Now? Arguably, over

the past two years China’s macroeconomic situation has become more conducive to the yuan’s revaluation. The GDP growth rate, which averaged between 7.1 percent and 8.8 percent from 1997 to 2002, accelerated to over 9 percent in the last two years. The undervalued yuan has also contributed to excessive credit growth and “overheating” because it has attracted large capital inflows motivated by expectations of appreciation, or the rise in value relative to other currencies. Overheating occurs when there is an attempt to raise consumption without simultaneous increases in production. Once demand for goods and services that are not supported by production rises, overheating will occur, often taking the form of a general increase in prices.1 Expecting an imminent rise of the yuan, speculators and China’s trading partners have poured tens of billions of dollars of “hot money,” or fluid portfolio capital, into the economy. The PBOC increasingly viewed these developments as inflationary, with the real threat of a hard landing, or recession. Having suffered through two recessions (1985 to 1989 and 1992 to 1994), when growth dropped sharply, the PBOC is hoping that an appreciation now will slow down the growth rate and help the country achieve a soft landing.

In theory, revaluation ought to make Chinese exports more expensive, thereby increasing imports and slowing down the growth of China’s GDP. However, this may not happen immediately, given the modest scale of the revaluation. More-

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over, the PBOC seems to have concluded that a more flexible yuan will likely ease the flood of hot money into China’s money markets and real estate. In the past this flow, along with export earnings that needed to be recycled back into yuan, placed huge strains on the PBOC. To maintain the peg, the PBOC had to intervene by selling yuan in exchange for foreign reserves. As a result, the volume

Business & Finance

reserves ($711 billion) to intervene in the markets and sterilize the speculative flows. How the PBOC will use its clout remains to be seen.

The revaluation underscores the PBOC’s stated long-term goal of building a managed floating exchange rate based on market supply and demand and of maintaining the yuan’s basic stability at a reasonable equilibrium. Moreover,

The reality is that the extent of the

revaluation is too modest, and the yuan is still undervalued. of foreign reserves jumped to over $100 billion in 2004—placing tremendous inflationary pressure on the economy.

The PBOC offset much of this pressure through policies that soaked up the excess liquidity associated with money inflows. Specifically, when too many yuan circulated around the money system, the PBOC withdrew the extra cash through sterilization, or issuing notes and bonds. However, it is not clear that sterilization will be effective over the long term because China’s domestic bond and capital markets (where longer-term debt and equity investments are traded) are relatively shallow. Of course, if sterilization fails to soak up the extra cash, the money supply could expand dramatically, igniting inflation and encouraging banks to lend recklessly, given that they have more yuan than they can effectively circulate. The reality is that the extent of the revaluation is too modest, and the yuan is still undervalued. Naturally, speculators will see a managed float as an invitation to pump more money into China and pull it out at a more favorable time. On the other hand, the PBOC has enough

Beijing also hopes that revaluation will better align China’s economy with the rest of the world and will head off rising U.S. discontent with the bilateral trade deficit, which reached a record $162 billion in 2004. While some believe that the new managed float will result in the value of the yuan being completely determined by market forces, the current revaluation is likely to fuel increased flexibility in exchange rates. Overall, this development means countries are not as likely to try to manipulate rates for trade advantages.

Placating the United States.

While China won plaudits from its major trading partners, senior officials in the Bush administration, U.S. Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey Graham, and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan claim that Beijing’s action is merely a first step.2 However, because the initial revaluation was so modest, it may not be enough to significantly reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China.

It is uncertain whether the appreciation will be enough to satisfy powerful U.S. senators and congressmen, as well as Winter/Spring 2006 [ 6 1 ]

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labor unions and U.S. business groups, including the influential American National Association of Manufacturers, who have been seeking a rise of between 10 and 40 percent. Many American manufacturers, as well as leading lawmakers in Congress, have long contended that the artificially low yuan puts U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage, contributing to the bankruptcy of U.S. companies and the loss of tens of thousands of American jobs. They claim that China’s currency is so undervalued—by as much as 40 percent—that it amounts to an unfair trade subsidy that has permitted a flood of cheap Chinese goods into the United States, while making American products more expensive in China.

As the U.S. trade deficit with China

chase of U.S. Treasury bonds and placed huge orders for U.S. goods.

Despite these efforts, in early May 2005 the U.S. Senate voted to consider a proposal to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on all imports from China unless it stopped inflating its currency. In midMay the United States decided to reimpose quotas on seven categories of clothing imports from China, limiting their growth to no more than 7.5 percent over a twelve-month period. In June 2005 the Bush administration finally warned China that it could be cited as a currency manipulator and could face economic sanctions unless it switched to a flexible exchange system.

Labeling China’s currency policies “highly distortionary,” the administra-

A more expensive yuan not only means

higher prices for Chinese goods but also greater pressure on U.S. domestic inflation. soared last year, the Bush administration came under increasing pressure to take unilateral action to address the problems associated with the artificial undervaluation of the yuan. Many lawmakers called for punitive tariffs on cheaply priced Chinese imports unless China revalued its currency.

Beijing has taken various measures to reduce China’s trade surplus with the United States, such as reducing the export rebate from 15 to 11 percent for textiles, clothing, shoes, and toys. Controls on foreign currency holdings for individuals traveling abroad were relaxed, and regulations on foreign currency retention by exporters were revised. The Chinese government dramatically increased its pur[ 6 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tion threatened to closely monitor China’s progress toward adopting a flexible exchange system.3 However, a revalued yuan could also spell trouble for the United States, considering that a more expensive yuan not only means higher prices for Chinese goods, but also greater pressure on U.S. domestic inflation. The result would be higher interest rates which could affect the real estate boom in the United States—currently one of the prime drivers of American economic expansion. There is also palpable concern that revaluation will not change the makeup of China’s $700 billion in foreign currency reserves, 70 percent of which are in dollar assets like U.S. Treasuries.4 China had

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kept the yuan from strengthening by plowing part of its trade surplus with the United States back into U.S. Treasuries.

Although China might sell some of those reserves and buy yen and euros, the PBOC will still need more U.S. dollars— the world’s most liquid currency.

Still, it is unlikely that the PBOC will orchestrate a destabilizing sell-off of its Treasury holdings, which could harm its biggest export market. Revaluation could affect interest rates by reducing China’s appetite for Treasury bonds. Specifically, if the Chinese government reduces the amount of dollars it holds in reserve—or slows the pace at which it buys dollars— the revaluation could raise U.S. interest rates. China uses U.S. government bonds to maintain dollar reserves. Holding fewer dollars would mean fewer bonds. If the demand in the bond market that is attributable to China were to be reduced, bond prices might fall and yields might rise.

Implications for Global Trade.

Although revaluation could help some U.S. manufacturers by making Chinese goods more expensive, it could be costly for others who do business in China. It is likely that the increased cost of Chinese production will benefit other Asian countries.

While the U.S. dollar will weaken over time against the yuan, an appreciation of the yuan might be economically counterproductive for the United States. A sufficient fall in the value of the dollar would force most Asian central banks to sell their dollar assets. This would in turn dry up liquidity in the United States, raise interest rates, and increase inflationary pressure. Not surprisingly, the ever-cautious Greenspan aptly stated in June 2005 that there is “no credible

Business & Finance

evidence” that an increase in the exchange rate of the yuan relative to the dollar would “significantly increase manufacturing activity and jobs in the United States,” as some observers believe. Greenspan asserts that an increase in the value of the yuan would mainly “redirect trade within Asia” and the rest of the world.5 Since revaluation might make China’s exports more expensive in U.S. markets, Americans will have to pay more dollars to buy the same amount of Chinese goods. Yet, at this stage, the revaluation is too small to affect trade, import prices, or consumption. According to Greenspan, yuan revaluation would have “limited consequences for the overall U.S. imports as well as for U.S. exports,” since this revaluation only “affect[s] Chinese value added” and not the “dollar cost of intermediated goods imported into China.”6 Moreover, even if prices for Chinese goods do rise significantly, other low-cost producers will simply step in to fill the void, causing a shift in trade flows. Indeed, the main benefactors of the revaluation are likely to be low-cost manufacturing competitors in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, and Indonesia, rather than U.S. or European companies.

Finally, the most immediate beneficiaries of the yuan revaluation are commodities producers. China is the world’s biggest buyer of copper and steel, and it is the second-largest consumer of oil after the United States. China is partly responsible for the steadily rising oil prices in recent years because of the country’s growing demand for energy. As the yuan appreciates and oil prices become relatively cheaper, China will likely increase its oil imports, pushing world oil prices even higher.

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Revaluation on the Horizon? In Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, China

the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there were expectations of a sharp yuan depreciation. However, the Chinese government promised no depreciation. Instead, they increased control over the exchange rate to successfully maintain its stability. Indeed, Chinese policymakers are far more prudent than they are usually given credit for. Although the revaluation underscores their commitment to exchange rate flexibility, the extent of the revaluation may not be enough. It would be imprudent for China to introduce a free-floating regime without first shoring up its fragile banking system and deepening and broadening the foreign exchange market. A more substantial rise in the yuan will be necessary to address soaring trade surpluses that have sparked protectionist sentiment in the United States and to reduce inward flows of speculative capital.

Hopefully, the new managed float will allow the PBOC to gradually adjust the value of the yuan while maintaining an air of uncertainty and an edge over speculators. It is likely that the Chinese government may continue to revalue under pressure, especially since currency revaluation remains a key financial issue for the United States. According to Morris

needs to make a meaningful political “down payment” of a 10- to 15-percent appreciation of the yuan from its current level to restrain protectionist impulses in the United States.7 Still, Chinese officials insist on gradual increased flexibility of the yuan, which means that it is unlikely that they will readjust the yuan exchange rate as they did in July. Rather, according to the PBOC, China will only adjust the yuan’s floating band when the time is appropriate, based on its consideration of the markets, as well as the economic and financial situation.8 Since the revaluation of July 2005, the United States has continued to call for a stronger yuan. U.S. officials view the modest 2.5-percent revaluation of late July as an inadequate contribution toward reducing China’s huge external imbalance. With a stable current exchange rate and limited impact on Chinese exports and jobs, however, there seems little incentive to revalue further. Nevertheless, the United States remains optimistic that China will adopt future revaluations.

Acknowledgements: The author wishes to thank Kiran Torani and Gaurav Rana for their research assistance.

NOTES

1 In the case of China’s expanding investments, loans and rapidly rising real-estate prices are signs of overheating.

2 While praising China’s decision, both Schumer and Graham made it clear that they would renew pressure for tariffs on Chinese goods if China fails to do more to loosen its currency.

3 John W. Snow, testimony to the Senate Committee on Finance, Washington, D.C., 23 June 2005. No. JS-2505. Internet, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2505.htm (Date accessed: 10 August 2005).

4 To maintain its currency against the dollar, China has become a big investor in U.S. securities. China is the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities, with $243 billion in Treasuries at the end of May 2005, compared to $165 billion a year earlier. [ 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

5 Alan Greenspan, testimony to the Senate Committee on Finance, Washington, D.C., 23 June 2005.

6 Ibid.

7 Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, “China’s Revaluation Shows Size Really Matters,” Internet, http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?Re searchID=528 (Date accessed: 10 August 2005).

8 “Public Announcement of the People’s Bank of China on Reforming the RMB Exchange Rate Regime,” Internet, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english /detail.asp?col=6500&id=82 (Date accessed: 10 August 2005). See also: “Speech of Governor Zhou Xiaochuan at the Inauguration Ceremony of the People’s Bank of China Shanghai Head Office,” Internet, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500& id=82 (Date accessed: 10 August 2005).

Conflict&Security Why States Choose Paramilitarism Ariel I. Ahram In the summer of 2004, a new word entered Western dictionaries, drawn from colloquial Sudanese Arabic—Janjaweed, the devil-horsemen. It signified a phenomenon which suddenly caught the world’s attention: tribal militias rampaging through the Darfur region of northwestern Sudan, attacking villages and destroying the crops of agriculturalists, achieving a level of decimation that some observers called, without exaggeration, genocidal. While typically genocide is considered the domain of industrialized states capable of industrialized killing, the Janjaweed joined the Interhamwe of Rwanda, the Young Patriots of Cote D’Ivoire, and Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia on a growing list of paramilitaries to commit mass atrocities. While these militias are often seen as a symptom of state failure, this article will argue that they should instead be interpreted as a return to an earlier model of state-society relations in which local warlords, rather than being the state’s enemies, serve as its proxies, carrying out acts on the state’s behalf.

Ariel I. Ahram is a doctoral candidate in the departments of Government and Arab Studies at Georgetown University.

Paramilitaries and the Third World. The growing prominence of third-world paramilitaries brings into question the nature and function of states. Since decolonization, it has been widely assumed that new states would attempt to consolidate and centralize coercive forces into their regular army and police force. Sudan, however, is just one of a grow-

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ing number of cases in which the state itself takes the initiative to establish, equip, and surreptitiously direct parttime militias, redistributing military might back to civilians. Unlike the regular army, which is accountable to the ministry of defense, militias operate outside the realm of state accountability. Why would third-world states, jealous guardians of what little military prerogatives they have accumulated, relinquish the means of repression to nonstate actors?

Paramilitaries are actors within a system of organizations called parainstitutionalism. Parainstitutions occupy the space between direct agents of state security, such as the military and police, who uphold the sovereignty of the national territory, and opposition groups, such as rebel guerrillas, who aim to subvert and seize that sovereignty. Parainstitutions share attributes of both the state and the rebels. They are loosely and semi-covertly affiliated with the state, often created, licensed, and dependent on state organs, though they are distinct from them. They undertake the acts of intimidation and elimination which the central government cannot or will not assume directly.1 In other words, they are “loyalist” militias who mimic the methods and organizational structure of rebel groups, but with opposing objectives: not to seize the state, but to supplement it.2 Parainstitutions are not limited to any one region, but have become common in a wide variety of states around the world, both authoritarian and democratic. Parainstitutional arrangements between the state and the state-sponsored militia can be found in Colombia, India, Indonesia, Burma, Tanzania, and Iran. [ 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Lineages and Rationale of the Militia State. Militias developed

simultaneously with modern standing armies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when they existed as an auxiliary and sometimes substitute force. Eying the Swiss cantons as a model, Jean-Jacque Rousseau envisioned self-defense platoons raised from local free men as an alternative to the hierarchical, professional, and autocratic army of Louis XIV. Clausewitz noted the effectiveness of the Spanish “people’s war”—which introduced the English to the word guerrilla— against Napoleon. Socialists from Marx and Engels to Jean Jaures have always been enamored of the possibility of replacing the armies and professional soldiers with more democratic ranks of citizen-worker-soldiers. Yet when Trotsky took control of the Soviet defenses, he had to abandon attempts to reorganize the Red Army into a territorial militia. While few states have been able to predicate their doctrines of national defense entirely on decentralized part-time paramilitaries or “people’s armies,” the effectiveness of such structures in the application of violence should not be underestimated.3 Several factors favor paramilitaries over traditional militaries in handling low-intensity conflicts: their decentralized command structure, ability to use and apply local knowledge of conditions, and ability to innovate faster than the bureaucracy-bound regular army.4 Postcolonial states whose struggles for national liberation consisted of prolonged guerrilla wars tend to integrate militias as rear-guard insurgents against invaders and collaborators. Thus, regimes such as Mao’s China, Tito’s Yugoslavia, and both Sukarno and Suharto’s Indonesia created popular militias to guard against foreign infiltra-

AHRAM

tion and internal dissent. The fact that such forces are relatively cheap and flexible makes them attractive supplements to more thoroughly trained full-time soldiers, a strategy in evidence from Vietnam in the 1960s to Iraq today.

Beyond such strategic competencies, militias also serve as institutions of indoctrination. This task is particularly crucial for colonially created states which lack an ideological underpinning from their inception, as well as for regimes consolidating their rule following revolutionary turmoil. In Saddam’s Iraq, Khomeini’s Iran, and Qaddafi’s Libya, militias became mechanisms through which the regimes inculcated young men

Conflict & Security

Army determined that the Red Guards had gone too far in their campaign to eliminate the vestiges of capitalism, it had no trouble disarming and dismantling the forces of the popular vanguard.6 In order to effectively deter or thwart plots, militia units must be brought up to the level of fully professional fighting forces and kept closely tied to the regime by blood or belonging.7 Even states with no particular ideological attachment to militia warfare, however, have occasionally found themselves inventing militias as part of an antiinsurgency strategy. During the Dhofar War in Oman in the early 1970s, for instance, British military advisors

Socialists from Marx and Engels to Jean

Jaures have always been enamored of the possibility of replacing the armies and professional soldiers with more democratic ranks of citizen-worker-soldiers. with an emotional attachment to the leader and the cause. When protests broke out on the campuses of Iranian universities in 1999, it was the Basiji, the religious vigilantes, who attacked the protesters from the back of motorcycles using sticks and truncheons, not the regular Iranian army.5 Another reason states favor militias is that they often serve as counter-weights against potentially disloyal professional armies. Many regimes place their trust in so-called popular defense forces to protect them from overly ambitious military officers. In practice, however, militiamen have rarely been able to withstand the power of a regular army head-on.

When the Chinese People’s Liberation

equipped home guard units organized around tribal lines. These units succeeded in rooting out insurgents to a greater extent than the Iranian and British commandos. Subsequently, however, they resisted the re-imposition of the Sultan’s control.8 This illustrates another aspect of the logic of militia warfare: the ability of the state to use potentially disloyal elements and harness them to the state’s agenda. The danger is that providing militias with greater coercive might and legitimizing their local power base opens the door to militias co-opting that power for themselves.

The long-term conditions for development of a state’s capability to be both discriminate and effective in the appliWinter/Spring 2006 [ 6 7 ]

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after the fall of Suharto’s New Order, the army felt pressured to keep its hands clean. Thus, when the East Timorese renewed the call for secession in 1999, Jakarta covertly armed and directed socalled “ninjas” to terrorize pro-independence leaders. This strategy enabled the military to profess its compliance with international law.9 The United Nations report on the atrocities in Darfur details a similar situation in which local tribesmen were recruited by the Sudanese army and paramilitary Popular Defense Forces to inflict maximum damage on the population in Darfur while minimizing culpability of the leadership in Khartoum.10 The Burmese military junta added an interesting twist on this strategy in The Moral Hazard of Human response to the pro-democracy protests Rights. Ironically, the recent ascen- of 1988. By withdrawing the army and dance of global human rights norms and police forces from the streets of Rangoon the ability of international and domestic and freeing thousands of common crimcivil society to punish states for violations inals from prison, they gave the opposihave spurred the prevalence and visibility tion a Hobson’s choice: permit the furof state-sponsored militias as states look ther degradation in human security or for ways to both assert control and abide accept the reintroduction of the regular by international law. The Indonesian army to staunch the anarchy that the state cation of force depend on the historical legacies of state formation and the conclusion of a socioeconomic bargain between the state and its citizenry. States that are the direct products of colonialism are particularly vulnerable to parainstitutionalism because they lack such a bargain. Often times departing colonialists leave an army selectively recruited from “martial” minorities like the Sikhs or the Alawis. While nearly every new state has tried to expand its military ranks in the hopes of representing an inclusive civic ideal, when security is truly at stake, states often still rely on primordial identities and allegiances to motivate elite troops.

The danger is that providing militias with

greater coercive might and legitimizing their local power base opens the door to militias coopting that power for themselves. army may have perfected the mobilization of thugs and petty criminals into semiofficial paramilitary units for use against domestic opposition. From the brutal campaign against the Communist Party in 1965 to the suppression of the revolt in Aceh in the mid-1990s, these militias were ready auxiliaries to military actions.

Due to increased international scrutiny [ 6 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

itself had created.11 In all these cases, the regular military had proven ready and willing to attack the resistance head-on, without undoubtedly bloody results.

However, political calculations discouraged the direct confrontation between the state and opposition. The dissemination of human rights norms may have prevented some of the most flagrant

AHRAM

Conflict & Security

ized organs of surveillance, indoctrination, and intimidation. India, the most celebrated third-world democracy, finding itself mired in counterinsurgency A Return to Hobbes? The different campaigns in Kashmir, Assam, and elsetasks paramilitaries are called upon to where, has deployed a dangerous mélange perform lead to different structures of of private militias, federal police, local patrons and clients. Some paramilitaries constables, and intelligence services in are adjuncts of political parties, others addition to the national army to patrol its are organized around ethnic or tribal frontier regions. While this strategy has lines, and some are even less overtly kept the national territory intact for now, political, as in the notorious Balkans many assert that this situation endangers sports clubs which doubled as enforcers the civilian government’s long-term for local warlords. The common command and control of the application denominator among all of them, of violence.15 though, is a blurring of the traditional boundaries of state power and the dan- Descent into Anarchy or Unique gerous precedent that once non-state Solution? Whatever the circumstances elements are empowered to exercise vio- of their birth, the devolution of coercive lence on behalf of the government. It is violence to paramilitaries is extremely only a matter of time before they exercise difficult to reverse. New studies on the it of their own volition.13 origins of civil wars identify lootable Some states build paramilitaries, some resources like narcotics or diamonds as adopt them, and some have paramilitaries key economic foundations for predatory thrust upon them. For the weakest states militias. In Colombia, for instance, the of sub-Saharan Africa, lacking political AUC now moonlights as hired muscle for and military capacity and legitimacy, there drug cartels. The state must first engage was perhaps no escape from roving gangs in a peace process with itself—that is, with whose political agendas thinly veil the the AUC—before it can begin to negotipredilection for banditry, smuggling, and ate with leftist rebels. Even without these extortion.14 In Colombia paramilitaries added catalysts such as drug cartels, emerged in response to the government’s demobilizing state-sponsored militias is inability to provide the public with secu- a Herculean task. The very attributes that rity from leftist guerrillas. Rather than make militias so attractive and effective in stemming this vigilantism, however, the the first place—their amorphous web of Colombian government, with U.S. mili- command, interlinking networks of tary aid, attempted to harness the militias authority and coercion, and lack of brick to achieve its own ends. On the other and mortar barracks—give them hand, authoritarian states like Burma, resilience against state control.

However, this breakdown in state conIndonesia, and Iraq did not lack competent and brutal coercive power, but trol should not be mistaken for a descent doubted the reliability of both their mili- into anarchy, but rather as the introductary and their citizens. In order to control tion of novel solutions to persistent politthese populations, such states recruited ical problems. The demand for human militias that ultimately formed decentral- security is ever present, and non-state atrocities, but it also created incentives for states to employ parainstitutions to do their dirty work.12

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actors and home-grown militias are just one way to supply it. For instance, in 1994 the Tanzanian government deputized the sungusungu militias to hunt down cattlethieves with swords, bows, and cudgels.

These village militias are headed by local men elected by the village population and provide a lower-cost, more democratic, and more effective alternative to the corrupt and inefficient police force.16 Advanced industrial states have responded in contradictory ways to the same failures of traditional policing. On one hand, they have commissioned legions of centrally controlled shock troops to fight terrorism and other high-level crimes, but on the other hand they have allowed the proliferation of locally based citizens’ groups and private security firms to patrol city-blocks and even border crossings.

The growing prevalence of parainsti-

tutionalism presses Western policymakers into the all too familiar conundrum of choosing between the lesser of two evils.

Working to augment, rather than enervate, the military in the third world is anathema to those with memories of coups and brutal military dictatorships.

However, the alternative to building state military capacity in many cases is not empowerment, but devolution, whereby leaders find new, unofficial avenues by which to terrorize their citizens. Such parainstitutions are even less likely than state institutions to recognize the difference between combatant and civilian, legitimate and illegitimate targets and methods, or uphold other crucial norms of war. Bringing coercive power back into the sphere of legality is the first step to building a system of accountability and the rule of law.

NOTES

1 Robert H. Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 14.

2 For a further discussion of parainistutionalism, see Carlos Medina Gallego and Mireya Tellez Adila, La violencia parainstitucional: paramilitary y parapolicial en Colombia, (Bogota: Rodridez Quito, 1994); Adam Jones, “Parainstitutional Violence in Latin America,” Latin American Politics & Society, 46:4 (2004).

3 Adam Jones, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defense (New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976).

4 Sunil Dasgupta, “Understanding Paramilitary Growth: Agency Relations in Military Organization,” Paper presented at the Centre for International Relations, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, November 13-15, 2003.

5 Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 115:1 (2000): 83-4.

6 Juliana Pennington Heaslet, “The Red Guard: Instruments of Destruction in the Cultural Revolution,” Asian Survey 12:12 (1972): 1045; John Gittings, “The Chinese Army’s Role in the Cultural Revolution,” Pacific Affairs 39 (1966/67).

7 James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequence in the Middle East,” International Security 24: 2 (1999): 141.

8 Calvin H. Allen, Jr. and W. Lynn Rigsbee II,

[ 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 67-8.

9 Benedict Anderson, ed. Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Damien Kingsburgy, Power Politics and the Indonesia Military (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

10 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, http://www.un.org/ News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (Date accessed: 29 October 2005) 11 Federico Ferrara, “Why Regimes Create Disorder: Hobbes’s Dilemma During a Rangoon Summer,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47:3 (2003): 303.

12 Staffan Lofving, “Paramilitaries of the Empire: Guatemala, Colombia, and Israel,” Social Analysis 54:1 (2004): 157.

13 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the Nation-State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

14 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 46.

15 Sunil Dasgupta, “India: the New Militaries” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in Asia, ed., M. Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

16 Michael L. Fleisher, “Sungusungu: StateSponsored Village Vigilante Groups Among the Kuria of Tanzania,” Africa 70:2 (2000).

Conflict & Security

Architects of Peace The African Union and NEPAD James Busumtwi-Sam The African Union (AU) was officially launched in 2002 to foster closer economic and political integration among African states and to promote peace, security, and development on the continent. An elaborate new institutional architecture has been created, including the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), to provide a framework within which AU members would work with the major aid donors to link peace and security with socioeconomic development via the promotion of “good” domestic governance. The AU replaces the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the main continental organization in response to the perceived inadequacies of the latter. Yet what has really changed? Is the AU up to the challenges of achieving sustainable peace, security, and development in Africa? The call for “African solutions to African problems” does suggest a greater willingness on the part of African states to address problems of insecurity on the continent that should be supported. However, this goal can only be achieved through greater collaboration and coordination between the AU and sub-regional organizations in Africa, between these organizations and extra-regional actors including the UN, and through the formation of genuine partnerships between African countries and the major aid donors through NEPAD.

James BusumtwiSam is associate professor of political science at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Canada.

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and Uganda after decades of conflict; and a spate of democratic transitions in several other countries. The optimism was soon shattered by dramatic setbacks, including renewed fighting in Angola, the collapse of the state in Somalia, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and the gruesome maiming and killings in Sierra Leone. Although the initiation of new wars declined after 1996, this period saw African conflicts evolve in hitherto unseen ways. The regional scope of conflicts expanded as neighboring states abandoned their reluctance to cross borders; a new political economy of war emerged where factions turned to trade in high-value commodities (diamonds, oil, and timber) to finance their war effort; and embattled governments and corporations increasingly hired private militias and private security forces.1 The current situation in Africa presents a mixed picture. Fewer armed conflicts are raging within and across countries than in any previous decade. However, violence and insecurity continue to plague countries in West and Central Africa, in parts of East Africa, and in the Horn. Factional fighting and insurgencies of varying intensity continue in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and UganThe Historical Context. Political da. At a local level, low-intensity conflict instability and violence have been peren- and the threat of communal violence nial features of the African postcolonial remain a constant threat to civilians in landscape, which has seen over thirty several countries and regions including major armed conflicts since the early Nigeria and the Ivory Coast.2 1960s. Africa’s wars have assumed many Given this diversity in the nature and forms and have been accompanied by sources of African conflicts, it is hardly egregious violations of human rights and surprising that the measures taken to humanitarian law. The 1990s began achieve peace and security have been optimistically with the prospects for equally diverse. Primary measures peace in Africa brightened by the end of include mediation efforts, humanitarian the Cold War; the collapse of apartheid assistance missions, military force in South Africa; the return of minimal deployments in various roles, and the stability to Namibia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, imposition of sanctions. Secondary meaNeither the continent nor its conflicts are homogenous and therefore no single response is likely to be effective across a range of conflicts. Nevertheless, in general, insecurity and instability in Africa are rooted in problems of domestic governance and socioeconomic development. The main obstacles to the institutionalization of an effective peace and security architecture in Africa are political and normative. The key role for the AU lies not necessarily in overt interventions involving the deployment of forces but in articulating strong norms and developing a political framework legitimating responsible, representative, and responsive domestic governance in African states. “Good� governance and conflict prevention are two sides of the same coin. This is where NEPAD, with its focus on governance, plays a key role.

The argument is developed in three sections. The first provides historical context by briefly outlining historical patterns of insecurity and instability in Africa and the range of peace and security initiatives, the second examines the key challenges confronting the new AU-NEPAD institutional architecture, and the third assesses its ability to meet these challenges.

[ 7 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

BUSUMTWI-SAM

sures include programs to rehabilitate and reconcile war-affected communities and to demobilize and reintegrate soldiers, post-conflict reconstruction programs, initiatives to control the trade in “conflict diamonds,” various grassroots peace-building efforts, and numerous peace education and capacity-building seminars and workshops.3 Further complicating the picture is the wide range of actors involved including the UN, African sub-regional organizations including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), major multilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), former colonial powers

Conflict & Security

Africa’s economic crisis and its marginalization in the global economy, and the emergence of new patterns of warfare and insecurity on the continent. In September 1999 the OAU Heads of State and Government (its highest decision-making organ) issued the Sirte Declaration, which called for a new continental organization to replace the OAU. A two-year transition period was provided by a Constitutive Act in 2000, and the new Union was launched in 2002. Its main goal is to foster closer economic and political integration among African states, with the promotion of peace and security as a prerequisite for its development and integration agenda. The AU has an elaborate organizational structure loosely similar to the EU.5 Its most important security

Fewer armed conflicts are raging within and across African countries than in any previous decade. including France and the UK, major donors including the United States and the EU, some of the major international NGOs, and private corporations. All of these initiatives have been worthwhile but they are largely ad hoc measures lacking an overarching framework for achieving lasting peace and security in Africa.4 Can the AU and NEPAD provide such a framework?

institution is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), established in May 2004. It has fifteen members based on a formula that allows each of the five regions in Africa (North, West, Central, East, and South) to elect three members.6 The PSC is supported by the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) and the Political Affairs Department (PAD) of the AU Commission, which is the main administrative/implementing organ of the AU. In 2001 the AU officially announced The AU and NEPAD. The creation of the AU and NEPAD must be viewed in NEPAD as a program to provide a “new the context of important global and framework of interaction with the rest of regional changes that the institutions of the world…based on the agenda set by the OAU could not adequately African peoples through their own iniaddress––the end of the Cold War, the tiatives and of their own volition.”7 impact of globalization, the deepening of Under NEPAD African countries aspire Winter/Spring 2006 [ 7 3 ]

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to improve political and economic/corporate governance and peace and security, in return for increased development assistance from and trading opportunities with the major industrialized countries. At the core of NEPAD is an “enhanced partnership,” unveiled as part of the Africa Action Plan (AAP) at the 2002 Group of Eight (G8) summit.

African countries and their donor partners committed to an enhanced partnership based on a set of development outcomes, ostensibly defined by the African countries. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has emerged as the main instrument for ensuring “best practices” under the enhanced partnership.8 The APRM establishes a system by which African countries monitor each other’s progress towards desired outcomes.9 The goal is to set the standard for peer review sufficiently high that donorimposed conditions will be replaced by acceptance of the outcomes of the APRM process.10 How do these institutions and programs overlap with the agenda of achieving durable peace and security in Africa?

The answer lies in taking a more interventionist stance on issues that traditionally were considered within exclusive domestic jurisdiction. The main obstacles to institutionalizing an effective peace and security architecture in Africa are political and normative. Their sources lie in regional norms institutionalized in the OAU, which in turn were based on restrictive interpretations of the UN Charter, particularly article 2(4) on non-aggression and article 2(7) on nonintervention. The OAU was created in 1963 to consolidate decolonization on the African continent and to promote development cooperation among African states. It was primarily concerned with [ 7 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

protecting the political independence of the newly emergent African states, reflected in its emphasis on non-intervention in states’ domestic affairs and respect for the sanctity of colonially demarcated territorial boundaries.11 These norms may have succeeded in minimizing certain types of conflict in Africa to some degree, specifically interstate conflict fuelled by irredentism or other trans-boundary claims, but they also contributed to the initiation and intensification of other types of conflicts by legitimizing the preservation of the status quo and delegitimizing the grievances of disaffected groups.12 By insulating domestic governance issues and obligating the OAU to support whatever government claimed to be in control of a country, irrespective of how it acquired and exercised that power, peace and security initiatives carried out by the OAU and the UN tended to emphasize the preservation of the political and territorial status quo by opposing external aggression. As a result, little was done to address the underlying political and socioeconomic problems that gave rise to and sustained the vast majority of violent African conflicts. The diversity in the nature of African conflicts notwithstanding, most have their sources in domestic governance failures and socioeconomic decline.

Governance, as used here, refers to the processes by which authoritative decisions, policies, rules, and regulations are made on behalf of a society and to the outcomes of those processes. Good governance is responsible in the exercise of power and authority, representative of diverse groups and values, and responsive to changes in society.13 Most of the time governance involves the maintenance of an existing political, economic, and social order. Governance structures remain

BUSUMTWI-SAM

stable in so far as groups and individuals in society believe such structures reflect their values and goals. The real test of governance arises when changes are needed to meet new demands or deal with new problems. One of the keys to responsive and responsible governance is legitimate authority. Lacking legitimacy, political leaders use force to govern and maintain their rule. In effect, African governments have been excessively authoritarian because they have been insufficiently authoritative.14 When political leaders rely on force to rule, certain

Conflict & Security

through patron-client networks to build legitimacy and maintain their authority.

Scarcity and economic decline made these networks more corrupt and discriminatory and also undermined government authority.16 The economic crisis that swept the continent beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in increased poverty and inequality. The structural adjustment programs implemented as conditions for loans also imposed further austerity and economic hardship. As states shrank, their ability to regulate their economies and effectively

Despite the diverse nature of African

conflicts, most have their sources in domestic governance failures and socioeconomic decline. patterns of governance become institutionalized––stifling of dissent, extrajudicial police actions, human rights abuses, unaccountable bureaucracies, and so on––that accentuate conflict. Any significant internal dissent is viewed as representing a military challenge and as necessitating a military response. The absence of constitutional mechanisms for change in the governing institutions of many African states has meant that military coups and/or armed insurrections have been the main drivers of change.

Promoting equitable socioeconomic development in Africa is another crucial component in building good governance. Evidence suggests that instability and warfare in Africa are linked to declining economic conditions.15 Many African governments relied on the distribution of socioeconomic resources

mediate in the distribution of socioeconomic benefits was also reduced. Policy failures and institutional decay and atrophy caused by reduced resources further eroded government authority.17 In response to arbitrary and repressive leadership, discriminatory and exclusionary politics, and poor socioeconomic performance, groups in society became increasingly disaffected and reacted by withdrawing legitimacy from the state.

It should be emphasized that the focus on governance issues as a key source of conflict in Africa is not meant to preclude or diminish the influence of other important sources of conflict. These include external involvement in African conflicts including that of the superpowers during the Cold War, ethnic polarization, arms flows, failures of previous peace agreements, environmental degraWinter/Spring 2006 [ 7 5 ]

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dation and population pressures, and competition over scarce resources. However, these factors may be seen as underlying or permissive sources, providing the conditions that enable and constrain but do not determine political choices and outcomes, thereby making violent conflict more or less likely. Within the conditions

acquired knowledge to functioning institutional mechanisms where authoritative decisions are taken on required measures.20 Successful pre-crisis interventions are less intrusive, less costly, and reduce the need for military interventions. To be sure, developing institutional capacities to deploy forces in various

Too often responses to conflict in Africa

have been reactive and have focused on mid- or post-crisis interventions involving the deployment of military forces. created by these underlying factors, African political leaders do make choices that set the tone and character of political relations. And it is in these choices and outcomes that the sources of political violence and war are to be found.18 What types of interventions are needed to address these sources of conflict and insecurity? Too often, responses to conflict in Africa have been reactive and have focused on mid- or post-crisis interventions involving the deployment of military forces. More attention should be paid to preventing conflict through measures that address the kinds of political and socioeconomic problems outlined above. Conflict prevention seeks to anticipate and forestall the outbreak of violent conflict through timely interventions designed to eliminate or control the factors that lead to violence.19 At the core of conflict prevention is the development of an effective early warning system. Effective early warning requires that those monitoring potential crisis situations know what to look for, know which strategies to implement, and have the ability to connect [ 7 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

roles (for peacekeeping, enforcement, humanitarian intervention, or other purposes) is also required. But interventions involving the deployment of forces are largely ad-hoc and short-term measures that are only effective when underpinned by a coherent political framework that clarifies the operational mandates and goals of deployed forces.

Conflict prevention is inherently political; in Africa promoting good governance and preventing conflict are two sides of the same coin. The main challenge for the AU and NEPAD in developing the institutional capacity for peace, therefore, is to develop a political-normative framework, based on existing principles of international law, that provides a foundation for stable political relations and for managing socioeconomic change within and across African states. The goal is explicitly political––the creation and maintenance of responsive, representative, and responsible domestic governance. When specific strategies for conflict prevention such as mediation, confidence-building, and other forms of

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cy in a number of countries.22 The call for “African solutions to African problems” emanates from this newer generation of African leaders who appear determined to confront problems of governance and poor socioeconomic performance in Africa.23 Evidence of this determination to confront domestic governance issues is found in the AU Constitutive Act, which contains a commitment to only recognize and respect governments that come to power through constitutional means.

The act also includes explicit provisions for intervention to curb genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; for intervention to restore peace and order; and for sanctions to be imposed on member states for non-compliance.24 NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism takes this a step further. Through APRM African countries are in effect engaged in a strategic long-term common partnership, in which they are prepared to forego many of the traditional privileges of sovereign power, open up their domestic policies to scrutiny by their peers, and share many governmental activities with their neighbors. In so doing the AU-NEPAD nexus appears to have gone much further than any other international or regional organization in challenging traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty and non-interMeeting the Challenges? The AU vention.25 This apparent willingness to and NEPAD are integral parts of what confront domestic governance issues has been described as an African politi- represents a sea change in the norms of cal renaissance, demonstrated by the African diplomacy that were institutionexistence of more democratically elected alized in the OAU. However, questions should be raised governments in Africa today than in any period over the last thirty years. In the about the degree of commitment to last five years alone two-thirds of African confront domestic governance issues. countries have held democratic elections For example, the provision obligating (with varying degrees of fairness) with the AU to reject unconstitutional evidence of deepening formal democra- changes in government says nothing third-party intercession are placed within the multilateral context of the AU, strongly articulated norms on governance may help clarify the political bargaining situation by either supporting the side upholding the status quo or the side demanding change. This would reduce uncertainty and influence the behavior of conflicting parties in a more predictable manner. This strategy would also help overcome the limitations of past mediation attempts in Africa, where mediators acted in their private capacity or as representatives of states, by establishing clearly the parameters within which negotiations occur and insulating the process from the dynamics of local and regional politics in Africa.21 Instead of duplicating or replacing existing peace and security initiatives in Africa carried out by the UN and other actors, the AU-NEPAD framework would provide a basis for coordinating these initiatives in such a way that they retain their autonomy and dynamism but complement one another more effectively. The problem of institutional overreach and incoherence—a very real danger given the rapid pace at which new AU institutions and programs are being created—would thereby be reduced. The question is whether the AU and NEPAD are up to these challenges.

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about the character of existing governments.26 Hence while the AU resisted the attempted coup in Togo in June 2005, it has been silent on Zimbabwe. If the AU is to be relevant and avoid the pitfalls of its predecessor, it needs to move from rhetoric and legal formalism to concrete action on governance. This requires a clarification of the institutional interface between the AU and NEPAD.27 Although NEPAD is described as a program or “mandated initiative” of the AU, a degree of divergence exists between the two. Most notable is the fact that while most of the key AU institutions, except the PSC, have no explicit membership criteria, participation in NEPAD’s enhanced partnership is subject to meeting certain standards of governance and economic performance.28 The integration of NEPAD into the AU structure could result in one of two outcomes. It could encourage more African states to sign on to NEPAD’s peer review, thereby strengthening governance-related standards, or it could result in a weakening of those standards by those African countries with little interest in subscribing to a process of peer review. There are signs that the former outcome may be more likely. As of June 2005 twenty-three countries (out of fifty-three AU members) had signed up for the APRM.29 Some of Africa’s most influential states, including South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, and Egypt, are also among the principal architects of NEPAD and form its core group. This promises to reduce the old sub-regional rivalries that plagued the OAU. Furthermore, it could be argued that the very creation of the PSC in 2004, almost two years after the AU was created (the AU Constitutive Act of 2002 makes no mention of a PSC), is evidence [ 7 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of the growing impact of NEPAD.30 The criteria for membership in the fifteenmember PSC, unlike other AU institutions, explicitly require that members meet governance standards along the lines prescribed by NEPAD. NEPAD, however, is not without its share of criticisms. Of the three dimensions of governance included in NEPAD, economic/corporate governance has received the greatest attention thus far.

Critics charge that this is largely because economic/corporate governance is mainly technical, as opposed to the more controversial political governance.31 Questions are also raised about just how genuine a partnership between African countries and the G8 can be, with some critics dismissing it as little more than an “unequal partnership” that formalizes dependency relationships.32 Others question the claim that NEPAD is a “homegrown” African program in view of the limited space for alternative development paths in a contemporary global political economy dominated by a neoliberal orthodoxy and because NEPAD was designed, negotiated, and implemented by African leaders and their G8 counterparts with very little input from African community organizations and civil societies.33 These criticisms and concerns have merit and need to be addressed. The enhanced partnership at the core of NEPAD has the potential to redefine the aid relationship, provide real benefits to Africa, and therefore contribute to overall peace and stability on the continent.

For this enhanced partnership to work, however, mutual accountability of all development partners––G8 and African countries––towards development outcomes is required. It also requires greater participation by civil society. A genuinely

BUSUMTWI-SAM

enhanced partnership would entail some form of independent review on the donor side to ensure they live up to their commitments, not just on the African side.34 Also at issue is the quality of aid, African debt relief, and trade issues, including market access and agricultural subsidies. Different types of aid delivered in different modalities, combined with concerted action on debt and trade issues, would encourage more African states to sign on to the APRM.35

Conclusion. The implementation of

NEPAD and its integration into the AU holds the greatest promise for sustained peace and security in Africa by articulating a strong stance on domestic governance issues that are at the root of instability and insecurity on the continent.

For this to occur, a fundamental break from the past practice of unquestioning solidarity among African leaders is necessary. The AU and NEPAD also need to move away from top-down, state-centric approaches to security. There has been comparatively little input from African

Conflict & Security

community organizations and civil society groups. Greater participation of such groups is central to the good governance agenda, and their input is an essential ingredient in developing an effective continental early warning system.36 Despite its shortcomings NEPAD has kept Africa in the international spotlight.

Africa has been a key item on the agenda of every G8 summit from Genoa in 2001 to Gleneagles in 2005.37 This is no small accomplishment in view of the so-called “Somalia syndrome,” which saw Western states (especially the United States) withdraw from African conflicts in the wake of the 1993 disaster in Somalia, and the concerns expressed about the further marginalization of the continent in the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent “global war on terror.” African solutions to African problems do not—and should not—entail disengagement from Africa.

Building an effective peace and security architecture in Africa requires sustained commitment and support from G8 and other partners based on mutual accountability for outcomes.

NOTES

1 See James Busumtwi-Sam, “Sustainable Peace and Development in Africa,” Studies in Comparative International Development 37, 3 (2002): 91-118; J. Goodhand and D. Hume, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peacebuilding in the New World Disorder,” Third World Quarterly 20, 1 (1999): 13-26; Mats Berdal and D. Keen, “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications,” Millennium 26 (1997): 795818; W. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); and Greg Mills and John Stremlau, eds., The Privatization of Security in Africa (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2000).

2 See Progress Report by the G8 Africa Personal Representatives on Implementation of the Africa Action Plan. Gleneagles, June 2005, 7.

3 For a discussion of some of these initiatives, see J. Busumtwi-Sam, “Development and Peacebuilding: Conceptual and Operational Deficits in International Assistance,” in Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa, eds. Taiser Ali and R. O. Matthews (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 2004), 315-353.

4 Abdul Mohammed, P. Tesfagiorgis and A. de Waal. “Peace and Security Dimensions of the African Union,” African Development Forum (ADF) and Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Background Paper, 2002: 2-17.

5 AU institutions as of August 2005 include an Assembly, Executive Council, African Commission, Permanent Representatives Committee, African Parliament, an Economic and Social Council, and a Peace and Security Council. There are plans to create an African Court of Justice.

6 The PSC has been given considerable powers, serving as the standing decision-making vehicle for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. See AU, “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council.”

7 Article 48 of the NEPAD Declaration (Abuja, Nigeria, October 2001), Internet, http://www.nepad.org (Date accessed: 13 August 2005). NEPAD was an amalgam of three separate

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development programs initiated between 2000 and 2001: the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP) developed by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa; the OMEGA Plan developed by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade; and the Global Compact for African Recovery (GCAR) initiated by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), which incorporated the idea of peer review. See John K. Akopari, “The AU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 13, 3 (2004): 246.

8 The APRM provides for the establishment of an Independent Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP) to be responsible for the review and assessment process. For representation and balance, the IPEP consists of between five and seven members with at least one member from the AU’s major sub-regions–Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Africa.

9 The APRM broadly echoes the OECD peer review mechanism. It is a voluntary mechanism open to all member states of the AU. 10 Alex de Waal, “What’s new in the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’?” International Affairs 78, 3 (July 2002): 466; Akopari “The AU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa,” 246.

11 For more on the OAU, see J. Busumtwi-Sam, “Redefining Security after the Cold War: The OAU, the UN and Conflict Management in Africa,” in Civil Wars in Africa, eds. Taiser Ali and Robert O. Matthews (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 257-87.

12 As a testament to the resilience of these regional norms, it is noteworthy that in spite of the oft-noted arbitrariness of colonially demarcated borders only one African state has had its borders redrawn in the post-colonial period––the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1992.

13 This definition is meant to differentiate my use of the term “good governance” from the way it has been popularized (especially by the World Bank).

There is evidence of a maturation of the “good governance” discourse away from the earlier preoccupation with the technical and procedural aspects of governance (managerial efficiency, transparency, etc) to include substantive issues and outcomes (achieving poverty reduction, growth, etc).

14 For more on problems of authority and legitimacy in Africa, see Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); I. W. Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and L. Cliffe and R. Luckham, “Complex Political Emergencies and the State: Failure and the Fate of the State,” Third World Quarterly 20, 1 (1999): 27-50.

15 Recent World Bank-supported studies have used statistical methods to show that the risk of war in poor countries is strongly linked to three economic conditions––low incomes or the existence of widespread poverty, slow economic growth, and dependence on primary commodity exports. See P. Collier

[ 8 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000); and P. Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. (World Bank Development Research Group, Washington, D.C.: 2000).

16 See Patrick Chabal and J. P Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1997); and Clapham, Africa and the International System.

17 For similar observations, see Tim Shaw, “Beyond Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: What Links to Sustainable Development and Human Security?”

International Peacekeeping 3 (1996): 36-48.

18 Busumtwi-Sam, “Development and Peacebuilding,” 323.

19 Conflict prevention overlaps with peacebuilding, which is a longer-term strategy to prevent the recurrence of violence in the wake of armed conflict.

20 The AU is in the process of developing a continental EWS. See Jackie Cilliers, “Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa.” ISS Paper 102 (April 2005): 1-27 (Institute for Security Studies, South Africa).

21 Busumtwi-Sam, “Redefining Security,” 28081; Jerome Walker, “International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts,” Survival (Spring 1993): 102-17.

22 Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest (March 2005), 23-24.

23 See NEPAD Declaration; Terry M. Mays, “African Solutions for African Problems: The Changing Face of African-Mandated Peace Operations,” Journal of Conflict Studies (Spring 2003): 106-125.

24 Articles 4(h), 4(j), 4(p) and 23(2) of the AU Constitutive Act. 25 N. MacFarlane, C. Theiking, and T. G. Weiss, “The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?” Third World Quarterly 25, 5 (2004): 977–992.

26 A comparison of the Preliminary Draft Treaty establishing the AU with the AU Constitutive Act that was ultimately adopted raises some questions about the degree of commitment to domestic governance issues and reveals a possible source of divergence between the AU and NEPAD. Article 4 in the final AU Constitutive Act has removed explicit references to “the respect of individual and collective freedoms, and the holding of free and fair elections,” to “tolerance, mutual understanding and respect for the rights of persons belonging to minority groups,” as well as to “accountability and transparency in governance and combating of corruption.” See H. Melber, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development–Old Wine in New Bottles?” NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) June 2002: 186-209; Evarist Baimu and K. Sturman, “Amendment to the African Union’s Right to Intervene: A Shift from Human Security to Regime Security?” African Security Review 12, 2 (2003): 37-45.

27 NEPAD is headed by Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) that is supposed to report directly to the highest decisionmaking organ of the AU–the Assembly.

BUSUMTWI-SAM

28 de Waal, Ibid, 68-69.

29 These counties that have signed the Memorandum of Understanding are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition, Zambia has expressed its intention to accede. See “Progress Report by G8 Africa Personal Representatives,” 2.

30 Article 5(2g) of the PSC Protocol explicitly lists respect for constitutional government and the rule of law as criteria for membership. See J. Cilliers, “Peace and Security through Good Governance: A Guide to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism,” ISS Paper 70 (April 2003): 1-18; and J. Cilliers and K. Sturman, “Challenges facing the AU’s Peace and Security Council,” African Security Review 13, 1 (2004) 97-104.

31 de Waal, Ibid, 471-472.

32 For an overview of the debate, see Rita Abrahamsen, “The Power of Partnerships in Global Governance,” Third World Quarterly 25, 8 (2004): 14531467.

33 See Akopari, “The AU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa,” 247-48; Cilliers and Sturman, “Challenges Facing the AU’s

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Peace and Security Council,” 101-102; Sally Matthews, “Investigating NEPAD’s Development Assumptions,” Review of African Political Economy 101 (2004): 497-511; and Melber “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” 198-200.

34 Simon Maxwell and Karin Christiansen, “Negotiation as Simultaneous Equation: Building a New Partnership with Africa,” International Affairs 78, 3 (July 2002): 483.

35 Here, the best performers would have aid guaranteed for an extended period and channeled through budgetary processes, while other states that perform less well would have aid delivered through more conventional means.

36 African civil society groups have become more active in the APRM process. These groups were active in the recent review in Ghana, as well as in challenging the Kenyan government’s official submission.

37 Collectively the G8 has more than doubled aid to Africa since 2001, and G8 members have established new sources of finance for the AU peace and security architecture. For example, the EU has established an African Peace Facility with $250 million and the United States a $660-million Global Peace Operations Initiative that provides support to African operations. See “Progress Report by G8 Africa Personal Representatives,” 2-6.

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Demographics and Security in Maritime Southeast Asia Brian Nichiporuk, Clifford Grammich Angel Rabasa, and Julie DaVanzo With a population of about 325 million, Maritime Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore—is an area of significant economic and security interests for the United States. These interests are four fold. First, the United States seeks to maintain open sea lanes through the region, especially through the Straits of Malacca, through which much Persian Gulf oil is shipped to East Asia. Second, the moderate Islam practiced in the region can help offset radical Islamist movements elsewhere. Third, Washington seeks to prevent terrorist infrastructure from developing in the dense jungles of the region. And fourth, the United States needs to build strong strategic relationships in the region to assure access for American air and naval forces. This article analyzes how demographic factors are affecting the security environment of Southeast Asia and examines the resulting security implications for the United States.

The current annual population growth rate of the region (1.38 percent) exceeds that for the rest of the world (1.17 percent).1 The region is also home to one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, nearly 200 million, with 177 million in Indonesia alone and a Muslim majority in Malaysia as well.

Brian Nichiporuk is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Clifford Grammich is a member of the RAND Research Communication Group.

Angel Rabasa is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.

Julie DaVanzo directs the Population Matters program at the RAND Corporation.

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Muslims are a minority in the Philippines and Singapore; however, the Muslim population is also growing faster than the total populations in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.2 The prominence of the Muslim population in the region makes the relationship between Islam and the state an important part of regional politics. This relationship has recently been marred by violence such as the terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta in recent years as well as the growth of radical Islamist organizations and parties, the emergence of extremist and terrorist groups, and separatist movements in Mindanao and Aceh in Indonesia. Such insurgency represents the greatest threat to security in a region where there is currently little risk of conflict between states.

While the religious characteristics are perhaps the most distinctive demographic features of the region, other demographic characteristics merit consideration as well. Demographic trends such as urbanization, migration, and population growth affect security issues confronting the region. These trends also shape available responses to security issues.

Urbanization and population dispersion can affect the nature and conduct of conflict by influencing its environment

or other powers). Demographic variables such as population age structure, particularly the number of persons of military age, can affect the nature of power in a state. Demographic changes such as migration affect the sources of conflict by increasing tensions between states or altering the domestic policies of a given state so that it becomes a security problem for its neighbors.

Urbanization: Shifting the Locus of Politics and Conflict.

Like the rest of the world, Maritime Southeast Asia is becoming more urban.

In 1980 just over one in four persons in the region lived in urban areas; in 2000 nearly half did.3 Jakarta and Manila are among the largest metropolitan areas in the world. Increasing urban populations mean the cities of the region will become even more important economic, political, and social centers.

As a result of urbanization, there has been a political shift in the region from traditional rural leadership to new types of urban leadership. In Malaysia, for example, Malay political organizations have been based in rural areas where Malays were more numerous, and ethnic Chinese have been more prevalent in urban politics, reflecting traditional dif-

As rural Malays have moved to urban areas

and traditional family and village bonds have weakened, Islam has grown as a source of political identity. (e.g., creating new areas of conflict) or instruments (e.g., diasporas seeking to advance the interests of their home states [ 8 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ferences in the distribution of the population. As rural Malays have moved to urban areas and traditional family and

NICHIPORUK, GRAMMICH, RABASA, & DAVANZO

village bonds have weakened, Islam has grown as a source of political identity.

Urban areas with ease of communications and concentrations of peoples with shared political experiences can facilitate revolutionary movements. The People Power movements of 1986 and 2001 in the Philippines as well as the Indonesian anti-government demonstrations of 1998 were all urban-based movements.

Urban areas, particularly those with universities, can be fertile grounds for new political movements in proselytizing, recruiting, and developing new leadership. In Indonesia the most dynamic Islamist political forces have been increasingly based in urban and university communities.4 The Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia), a university-based organization, provided much of the leadership and ideology for the Pan-Malay Islamic Party.5 The small but dynamic Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia, led by graduates of Indonesian and Western universities, originated in Islamic study circles at Indonesian universities.6 Operationally, the infrastructure of urban areas can provide cover and greater ease of communication for armed clandestine militants. Because cities have substantive and symbolically important targets and because news media are more concentrated and less likely to be restricted by government there, operations in urban settings can have a greater impact than those in rural areas.

Ethnic Diasporas: Transmitting Conflict? Diasporas to and from a

region can also affect the nature of conflict. In recent decades, diasporas have increased in size, visibility, and influence.7 More rapid and widespread longrange transportation has permitted larger

Conflict & Security

migratory flows. Improvements in communications and information technology allow leaders of these communities greater means to call attention to issues of interest in their home countries or to help their home countries or territories achieve political or military objectives.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines have a substantial number of nationals overseas and relatively high net emigration in recent years.8 In addition, there are more than one million Filipinos who work abroad—nearly all as contract workers—and return to the Philippines; more than one in four of whom work in Saudi Arabia.9 Remittances from overseas workers—estimated in recent years to be 0.6 percent of the Filipino GDP and 0.2 percent of the Indonesian GDP—constitute small but noticeable portions of the Filipino and Indonesian economies.10 Of particular interest for analysis of demographics and security, especially that relevant to U.S. interest in promoting moderate social and political movements in the Muslim world, is how diasporas may help transmit Islamic militancy to Southeast Asia. For example, Filipino workers returning from the Persian Gulf could, conceivably, bring Wahhabist beliefs and doctrines with them.

Beyond these returning workers, there are also longstanding Arab communities in the region, but the variety of influences on the Muslim community have led some to label it the least “Arabized” of leading Muslim communities.11 Individuals of Arab origin are, for the most part, well integrated into local societies. For example, the Hadrami (Yemeni) diaspora, numbering about five million in the region, includes a community whose wealth is among the greatest in the region, as well as persons who have served as foreign ministers in Indonesia and Malaysia.

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Still, the local Arab diaspora, particularly its newer elements, may serve as either a liaison or camouflage for Middle Eastern terrorists. Islamic radicals of Arab background in the region include the founders of Jemaah Islamiyah across the region and the leaders of Laskar Jihad and of the Front Pembela Islam (Islam Defenders Front) in Indonesia. The Yemeni diaspora could serve as a demographic “beachhead” for the radical Middle Eastern and South Asian Islamists seeking to infuse Malay ethnicity with Salafism and Wahhabism.

Population Dispersion: A Challenge to Weak Central Authorities. Wide population distribution and

varying population density can have security implications. Population density across Indonesia’s more than 17,000 islands is 109 persons per km2, but varies from 6 in Papua, the site of a separatist movement in extreme eastern Indonesia, to more than 12,000 in Jakarta.12 Population density across the more geographically compact Philippines is 255 persons per km2, ranging from 24 in Apayao province of the Cordillera Administrative Region to more than 88,000 in Navotas province in the National Capital Region.13 Such widely dispersed populations may facilitate campaigns of “ethnic cleansing” on sparsely populated islands far removed from central military authorities. Both the Indonesian and Filipino archipelagos have islands with ethnically mixed populations. If provincial political and security arrangements were to crack, ethnic cleansing campaigns by local radicals might succeed for two reasons. First, low population densities would prevent the target ethnic group from concentrating its self-defense capabilities in any meaningful way. Second, [ 8 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

long distances between such islands and major military concentrations would mean any government response to such campaigns would likely be slow. No Southeast Asian military has sufficient long-range capability to transfer its military forces rapidly by sea or air. The Indonesian Air Force, for example, has only 18 C-130 aircraft, a single Boeing 707, and a smattering of Cessnas for troop support, while the Filipino Army has only 2 squadrons of aging transport helicopters.14 Such equipment is clearly not sufficient for rapid transport of large numbers of troops to outlying islands.

The December 2004 tsunami illustrated how poor strategic mobility and geographically dispersed populations can hamper indigenous military responses.

Indonesian Kalimantan provides a recent example of how population dispersion and weak central government authority can facilitate ethnic cleansing.

Transmigration (discussed further below) to Kalimantan, including a half million Madurese migrants to West Kalimantan, first stirred conflict by displacing the indigenous Dayak population that depends on hunting and slash-and-burn agriculture. Periodic violence since 1996 has led to the deaths of hundreds and displacement of thousands of Madurese.

Settlement patterns also contributed to this violence. Though less densely populated than other areas of Indonesia, Kalimantan has ethnically mixed settlement patterns that prevented the Madurese from consolidating themselves into a few defensible enclaves, making them vulnerable to attacks by the majority Dayaks.

Perhaps even more importantly, the approximately 500 kilometers separating Kalimantan from the main Indonesian military garrisons on Java prevented rapid military intervention that could

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resistance by indigenous peoples to Jakarta’s integrationist policies.

Migration in the Philippines to Mindanao has likewise stirred conflict between ethnic groups. The population of Mindanao was 50 percent Muslim in the early 20th century before migration— driven by colonial and independent government policies for greater cultural, Migration: Igniting Conflict economic, and political integration of from Longstanding Divisions. the island with the rest of the archipelThe communal violence in Kalimantan, ago—helped reduce it to 18 percent as noted, has its origins in Indonesian today.16 Although there was little armed transmigration programs. Much of the conflict between Muslims and Christians communal conflict in eastern Indonesia before the mid-1970s, when the Nationand the southern Philippines has al Moro Liberation Front launched the occurred where the demographic balance secessionist struggle, these government has been altered by government-induced policies fuelled Muslim perceptions that internal migration. their community was endangered and Internal migration in Indonesia has thereby secession sentiment. In recent occurred spontaneously and as part of decades, a more Islamist insurgency government transmigration policies pur- movement, represented by the Moro sued by both Dutch colonial administra- Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), has tors and the independent government. mobilized an estimated 18,000 fighters.

The transmigration policy sought to Large-scale government offensives in have halted the violence. The situation was further exacerbated in 2001 by the fact that Indonesian military and security forces were overstretched fighting ethnic and separatist conflicts elsewhere, including those between Muslims and Christians in Maluku and the ethnic Acehnese uprising in northern Sumatra.

The local Arab diaspora, particularly its

newer elements, may serve as either a liaison or camouflage for Middle Eastern terrorists. transfer population from overcrowded islands such as Java and Madura to less populated ones, as well as to assimilate indigenous populations into the national mainstream. During its peak in the 1980s and 1990s, transmigration involved more than five million persons.15 In Kalimantan, Dayak animosity toward the newcomers was fuelled by the economic and social marginalization of the Dayak people under the Suharto regime. Such violence can be understood as a continuation and accentuation of

early 2003, and what appears to be a more pragmatic approach by new MILF leadership, have led to the resumption of settlement talks.

While the communal struggle in eastern Indonesia and the separatist insurgency in the Muslim areas of the Philippines have local roots, external parties have sought to promote a broader Islamist struggle. Al Qaeda has sought a role in Southeast Asia since the early 1990s by helping to establish the Abu Sayyaf Group and finance the MILF. Al Winter/Spring 2006 [ 8 7 ]

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tic wartime defense duties while an elite group handles more complicated operations of warfare or counterinsurgency.

The greater challenge for Indonesia and the Philippines may be developing the capital-intensive forces required to face extensive near- and far-term threats.

This conflict is highlighted by the July 2002 admission from the Indonesian Population Age Structure: Shap- chief of naval staff that no vessels were ing the Available Responses. How combat ready and only a few ships were are demographic variables affecting the less than ten years old. This leaves resources Southeast Asian states have to Indonesia unable to patrol its territorial confront security challenges? Tradition- waters and subject to the highest number ally, quantity has counted for a lot in of pirate attacks in the world.18 Funding security and military issues, leading shortages have also prevented the Filipino nations to raise large conscript armies military from developing the air mobiliand reserve forces to battle over extended ty needed to conduct effective counterinfronts. Military-age male youth cohorts surgency operations. Per capita military (i.e., 15-24) are projected to increase in expenditures in both these nations are each of these nations incoming years. In only a fraction of the global level. PopuIndonesia and the Philippines, these lation growth among youth populations cohorts far exceed the number of persons and concomitant demands for social in the current armed forces, who in turn spending, particularly on education and account for less than 0.5 percent of the health programs, could also limit funds total labor force (compared to just over for military investment.

1.0 percent in the United States).

Demographics pose several unique Today, many militaries may face a constraints to the power of Singapore. A tradeoff between investing in more per- nation of more than four million personnel or technology in order to main- sons on a landmass about three times the Qaeda’s ability to infiltrate the region was facilitated by participation of several hundred Southeast Asian volunteers in the Afghan War. Al Qaeda and its associated Southeast Asian group, the Jemaah Islamiyah, also placed a large number of instructors in training camps in Indonesia and the Philippines.17

It is only a matter of time before there is

a convergence between those with hostile intent and those with techno-savvy—where the real bad guys exploit the real good stuff.

tain their power. Developing states facing conflicting demands of domestic politics and military investment may create bifurcated forces dominated by low-quality infantry units for internal policing or sta[ 8 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

size of Washington, D.C., has, of course, no strategic depth. Through heavy use of conscripts—including nearly two-thirds of its military personnel—Singapore has built a military that is quite large in rela-

NICHIPORUK, GRAMMICH, RABASA, & DAVANZO

Conflict & Security

on urban terrain.

Though the region is urbanizing, Indonesia, the Philippines, and perhaps even Malaysia will still face security challenges in rural areas. The Indonesian and Filipino militaries already struggle to meet existing security challenges throughout their territory. The United States may wish to boost security in the region by providing sealift and airlift equipment and support. In particular, the United States should consider reorienting its arms sales in the region to emphasize air and sealift platforms for internal security forces and to deemphasize sophisticated systems (e.g., advanced fighter aircraft) that might provoke tensions between states. Transport ships and planes would help government forces squelch violence in distant provinces more rapidly.

More generally, maintaining the viability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), securing regional borders, and perhaps providing more development aid can help mainConclusions and Implications tain and improve regional security. for the U.S. The impact of demo- Washington should work hard to maingraphic variables on security in Maritime tain ASEAN as a viable diplomatic orgaSoutheast Asia poses several policy impli- nization and “firewall� against interstate cations for the region and the United conflicts in Southeast Asia. This would States. The continuing urbanization of allow regional states to focus more on the region means urban areas are likely to counterterrorism.

Improving customs and border conbecome more frequent sites of armed conflict. Urban areas that are home to trol services may help reduce the movemany recent migrants may in particular ment of insurrectionists from elsewhere, prove to be fertile ground for radical and particularly those seeking to take advanrevolutionary groups. U.S. military tage of demographic tensions. The forces that might be asked to undertake United States should therefore increase counterterrorism missions in Maritime support to regional border control Southeast Asia must therefore be fully authorities. Southeast Asian border trained in urban warfare. The Depart- control agencies could benefit from ment of Defense should consider estab- training by the U.S. Border Patrol. The lishing a training complex in the region United States could also provide devoted exclusively to military operations advanced border surveillance technolotion to its population, but one that may not be able to grow much further. Active and reserve forces comprise about threefourths of the population of male citizens 20-to-39 years of age (the ages of obligatory military service or annual reserve training). Immigration, which has boosted Singaporean population growth, could, theoretically, boost the numbers on which Singapore may base some of its power. Immigration may also, however, present its own challenges. Immigration has led to more rapid growth in the foreign population than in the native population (though foreign population growth has slowed recently).19 Among permanent Singapore residents, population growth and fertility rates are now lowest for the Chinese majority.20 (Singapore is the only nation in the region to have fertility levels below those needed for population replacement.) Such trends, should they continue, may limit the ability of Singapore to maintain a large well-integrated military.

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DEMOGRAPHICS AND SECURITY IN MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA

gies and database software programs allowing for rapid identification of international travelers in the region.

Development aid could help reduce tensions resulting from demographic changes, although the United States, if offering such aid, should consider several questions in targeting and selecting partners for aid programs. For example, given urbanization in the region, should development programs help nations alleviate poverty in increasingly isolated rural areas or should they address problems of urbanization? In dealing with the Muslim majority of the region, what further information is needed to identify appropriate partners for development programs?

Most of the implications and policy prescriptions above apply to the three larger nations of Maritime Southeast Asia, but others for Singapore merit attention as well. As the only urban state of the region and the only one whose population may not be able to yield its desired number of military personnel, Singapore has three options to maintain its military prowess: expand the population of persons eligible for military service, invest more in military hardware, or seek other security guarantees. Of course, the imperative for defense modernization in Singapore depends upon threats it perceives from its neighbors.

The options proposed here assume Singapore will continue to need a hedge

against the latent military power of Malaysia and Indonesia. Over the long term, low fertility in Singapore may limit how much the country can modernize its own armed forces. American policymakers need to consider how to address Singapore’s potential security concerns without unduly provoking Indonesia or Malaysia. Should Singapore seek continuing investments in military technology rather than personnel, it might pursue such investments as more F-16 fighters, guided missile frigates, and diesel submarines, though such acquisitions could threaten and thereby increase tensions with Malaysia.

In addition, the relationship between demographic variables and tensions involving the ethnic Chinese community bears further study. There is evidence that the presence of minority ethnic Chinese populations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and reactions to them can pose security challenges. The economic power of these communities can help ensure the economic stability of Maritime Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the United States may wish to encourage Southeast Asian governments to ensure the security of ethnic Chinese communities, as their continued presence will also support political secularism in Southeast Asia, thereby weakening the momentum of fundamentalist Islamic movements in the region.

NOTES

1 Authors’ calculations based on United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, New York, 2004.

2 Philippines National Statistics Office, “Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao: Nine in Every Ten Persons Were Muslims,” 15 July 2003.

3 United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, New York, 2004.

[ 9 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

4 Angel Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Adelphi Papers No. 358, August 2003; Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability, and Interna-

NICHIPORUK, GRAMMICH, RABASA, & DAVANZO

tional Migration,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992-93, pp. 91-126.

8 United Nations Population Division, International Migration Report 2002, New York, 2002.

9 Philippines National Statistics Office, “2002 Survey on Overseas Filipinos,” 23 April 2002.

10 Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp, and Samir Jahjah, “Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?” International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/03/189, September 2003.

11 Azyumardi Azra, Rector, Indonesian State Islamic University, Interview with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, June 2002.

12 Statistics Indonesia, “Population Density per Square Kilometer by Province,” 2000.

13 Republic of the Philippines, National Statistics Office, “Total Population, Number of Households, Average Household Size, Population Growth Rate and Population Density by Region, Province, and Highly Urbanized City,” 2000.

14 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, London: Oxford University Press, annual.

Conflict & Security

15 M. Adriana Sri Adhiati and Armin Bobsien, eds., Indonesia’s Transmigration Programme—An Update: A Report Prepared for Down to Earth (London: International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia, July 2001).

16 Samuel K. Tan, “The Socio-Economic Dimension of Moro Secessionism,” Mindanao Studies Reports No. 1, 1995, as cited in Amina Rasul, The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspectives on the Mindanao Conflict (Makati City, Philippines: Asian Institute of Management Policy Center, 2003).

17 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, especially pp.

13-20.

18 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.

19 Tan Yeow Lip, “Singapore’s Current Population Trends,” Statistics Singapore Newsletter, September 2002; Edmond Lee Eu Fah and Yeo Yen Fang, “Singapore’s Demographic Trends in 2002,” Statistics Singapore Newsletter, September 2003.

20 Singapore Department of Statistics, “Key Indicators of the Resident Population,” 2000; Edmond Lee Eu Fah and Yeo Yen Fang, “Singapore’s Demographic Trends in 2002.”

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 9 1 ]

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Culture&Society Strong Medicine

The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Compact with Society Mitul Desai India, as required by membership in the World Trade Organization, amended its patent act earlier this year to comply with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Of the many amendments to the law, the most significant will result in legal protection for pharmaceutical products, not just processes. This change, which prohibited the ability to make copies of patented drugs at low cost, has transformed India into the next great frontier for the global pharmaceutical industry. Several leading drug companies drawn by the large middle-class market and high-quality, low-cost talent pool are already expanding operations in India.

Resistance among the amendments’ critics serves as a microcosm of the global debates over patent protection and access to medical coverage that shape public perception of the pharmaceutical industry. First, in order to understand these connections, the global resentment towards intellectual property laws must also be understood. Second, the history of pharmaceutical companies and patent laws in India needs to be examined in order to understand the developed and developing world’s divergent outlook on the industry. Third, the industry must acknowledge the importance of public relations strategies and a global outlook. By taking these steps, the

Mitul Desai Senior Attorney Merck & Co., Inc.

is at

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STRONG MEDICINE

industry can positively transform its image in India and beyond, and in the process help reenergize U.S. global economic leadership.

unprecedented heights after notable cases in South Africa and Brazil.5 In 2000 thirty-nine multinational pharmaceutical companies sued to prevent the South African government from importResentment: A Global Epi- ing generic AIDS drugs for which the demic. Drug companies attract a level companies held patents.6 The drug comof scrutiny unlike any other industry. panies argued that such importation Critics focus their attention on issues would violate intellectual property rights regarding patents, or intellectual prop- and discourage important research. erty rights, and access to medicines. Furthermore, they said that they were Some attack the entire patent system, already providing “tier-pricing” for arguing that it leads to high drug prices drugs in South Africa.7 Protests and edifew can afford. Others criticize the torials criticizing the industry immediindustry’s insistence on including the ately followed. In the face of widespread TRIPS agreement in the World Trade criticism, the industry eventually Organization (WTO) system as an ill- backpedaled, offering the drugs for free advised move that improperly linked or at steeply reduced prices, but not intellectual property and international before causing lasting damage to its reptrade. Before TRIPS intellectual proper- utation. ty was largely unregulated internationalIn 2001 U.S. business interests per1 ly. In pushing for TRIPS’s enactment, suaded the government to bring WTO the United States employed what were action against Brazil for failure to revoke seen as heavy-handed negotiating tactics; a law allowing compulsory licensing of consequently, the very introduction of patents on products not made in Brazil.8 this agreement has left lingering resent- Although a technical violation of WTO ment in the minds of activists, academics, rules, the law was not actually being and the Indian government itself. enforced by Brazil.9 The matter was ultiEarly on, India expressed “serious mately settled, but the pharmaceutical reservations…about the relevance and industry further damaged its reputation utility of the TRIPS negotiations as long and empowered anti-patent groups in as measures of bilateral coercion and Brazil and elsewhere.10 threat continued [by the U.S.]”2 At the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, the U.S. Skepticism: India as the pharmaceutical industry and government Epicenter. This year’s introduction of were attacked by NGOs for having patent protection for products has included TRIPS in the WTO.3 Criticism proven to be the most consequential of TRIPS’s inclusion in the WTO has amendment to India’s 1970 Patents Act. also been leveled by economists who Under the original act, only patents for argue that forums like the World processes were allowed. This spawned a Intellectual Property Organization and large generics industry specializing in the Paris and Bern conventions are better circumventing patents to produce and suited for multilateral intellectual prop- sell drugs. In addition to providing cheap erty agreements.4 drugs for the domestic market, India Attacks on the industry grew to became the developing world’s supplier [ 9 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

DESAI

of high quality, affordable generics. What the United States saw as a violation of India’s TRIPS obligations, many in the developing world saw as a public health boon. Almost half the AIDS patients in Africa, Latin America, and Asia came to depend on India for affordable drugs.11 Despite the new law, Indian feeling toward patents, especially on pharmaceuticals, is sometimes still best captured by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s famous statement at the World Health Assembly in 1982: “The idea of a better-ordered world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents, and there will be no profiteering from life and death.”12

Culture & Society

technology,” including a strain of basmati rice and the pesticidal use of the neem tree. These patents were attacked as “biopiracy,” tantamount to stealing national resources and traditional Indian knowledge. Although the patents were eventually successfully challenged, these efforts reinforced the view that patents were a tool for exploitation, not innovation.

India and the developing world also argue that the U.S. stance on patent rights is a hypocritical one that ignores the United States’s own previous status as a developing country, when, immediately following the Declaration of

This one change, which ended the ability to

make cheap copies of patented drugs, has transformed India into the next great frontier for the global pharmaceutical industry.

Examining India’s history is key to understanding this sentiment. As early as 1856, India provided certain exclusive rights for inventions.13 Its attitude toward patents began to change in the 1950s and 1960s, however, when multinational drug companies came to dominate the Indian market with high-priced drugs.14 In 1970 70 percent of the Indian pharmaceuticals market was controlled by foreign companies.15 This led to the 1970 Patents Act, which eliminated patent protection for products.

By 1998 the pharmaceutical market in India was the complete opposite of that which precipitated the 1970 Patents Act, with Indian companies controlling 70 percent of the market.16 India’s skepticism of patents was only heightened by recent attempts to patent “indigenous

Independence, the government encouraged stealing European technology.17 Pharmaceutical companies should also be mindful that as India starts developing its own patented technology, and the United States moves from patent licensor to licensee, the U.S. perspective on free trade and patent rights may shift.

A deeper look at India’s new patent law reveals the real impact of the industry’s reputation. Media, public relations, and lobbying efforts began years before the law was enacted. A multitude of parties, including Indian and multinational pharmaceutical corporations, U.S. and international industry lobby groups, Indian generic drug companies, and NGOs all vigorously promoted their views through well-orchestrated campaigns to influence the Indian governWinter/Spring 2006 [ 9 5 ]

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The industry needs to develop a more effective strategy for engaging the NGOs and international news outlets, which increasingly shape the tone and substance of global trade negotiations.21 Instead of inadvertently fuelling more resistance through over-reliance on old, increasingly ineffective approaches, the pharmaceutical industry should craft a communications campaign that encourages voluntary, not mandatory, support for patent rights. This approach alone could build lasting, mutually beneficial change.

Though the American pharmaceutical industry cannot take back past mistakes, it can admit they happened. Until the industry’s self-perception more closely resembles its public perception, progress toward a more positive global image will be difficult. The problems need to be identified before they can be solved. To truly move the debate from old polarizations to a pragmatic solutions-based diaA PR Campaign. Most major U.S. logue, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry drug companies have undertaken signifi- should aggressively mount a retooled, cant public health initiatives throughout global public communications initiative.

The industry cannot continue to act as the developing world. In addition to discovering breakthrough medicines, such if the power of its good intentions as antibiotics and vaccines, American exempts it from public scrutiny. The pharmaceutical corporations have pro- current strategy appears to consist largely vided drugs, funds, and resources that of repeating the message that the industry have treated millions of patients and is an inherently “good” one that saves saved countless lives.20 These programs lives and needs patents to help recoup its are long-standing and cover a wide range significant research and development of diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuber- investments. This message is wearing culosis, malaria, hepatitis B, polio, river thin.

The new industry message should blindness, leprosy, and sleeping sickness.

Despite the U.S. pharmaceutical include a genuine statement of regret for industry’s best intentions, many have past mistakes and understanding of the come to view it as arrogant, stubborn, concerns of the developing world. insensitive, and unwilling to listen. The Whether through a single public declaraindustry must acknowledge this phenom- tion at a Global Health Summit, or enon through a thoughtful analysis that through multiple town hall meetings, seeks to understand these concerns and industry leaders must work to convey this message directly to citizens and leading their root causes. ment. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry and Indian business groups achieved their most valued objective: the introduction of patent protection for products.

Looking back, the resistance to American efforts enjoyed its own successes. In addition to allowing continued operation by generic companies who had been in business prior to 2005, India’s new patent amendment introduces five different clauses emphasizing that patents should not impede public health.18 Various “compulsory licensing” rules give the Indian government power to override patents in the interest of public health provided that “reasonable royalties” are paid to the patent holder.19 The provisions were enacted over strenuous objections from the U.S. industry, which now worries about their potential effect on patent rights.

[ 9 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

DESAI

NGOs. A compelling public relations effort will lead others to see pharmaceutical companies in a new light and, ultimately, will motivate developing countries and NGOs to work with them.

Since no amount of public communications can take the place of good policy, pharmaceutical companies should expand activities in two critical areas: research on less-publicized diseases and improving drug distribution infrastructure and management. Success on these fronts would improve global health and industry reputation. It would also give the industry more credibility when it argues that inadequate research incentives and poor drug distribution networks, not patent rights, largely impact medical treatment in the developing world. Public-private partnerships like

Culture & Society

ed areas, the industry should also consider supporting improvements to drug distribution systems in developing countries, either directly or through partnerships with venture philanthropy funds that loan money to local entrepreneurs.

These approaches would admittedly require a bold departure from the industry’s traditional philanthropy model, but the potential benefits make them worthy of serious consideration.

Forging Diplomacy and a Global Outlook. Drug companies should also

work with the U.S. government to positively manage the increased contact between U.S. and Indian officials and academics that has resulted from India’s new patent law. Generally speaking, these have been one-way conversations

The industry should expand activities in two critical areas: research on less publicized diseases and improving drug distribution infrastructure and management.

the Medicines for Malaria Venture and the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development are doing good work to spur research on developing diseases, but more needs to be done. The industry should enhance support of new nonprofit R&D organizations that focus exclusively on neglected diseases, such as the Institute for OneWorld Health and BioVentures for Global Health. The U.S. government can also play a role by incentivizing research on neglected diseases through minimum-purchase guarantees for drugs.22 To ensure treatments reach the affect-

designed to educate Indian business and government officials on U.S. practices.

This is helpful and appreciated by the Indian government. However, these interactions can and should be elevated to two-way conversations that will allow U.S. business and government representatives to sincerely listen to and understand the Indian perspective.

Most drug companies have sophisticated government affairs departments that effectively engage domestic and international government agencies. However, industry efforts at public affairs, particularly in the international arena, often fall Winter/Spring 2006 [ 9 7 ]

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short. To help change this, companies should consider hiring former U.S. government officials with significant diplomatic and international affairs experience to serve in high-level company positions; these individuals have the unique skills needed to develop and execute the worldwide communications strategies necessary to change minds.

Pharmaceutical company boards could also benefit from a more global perspective. Of the board directors for the five largest American drug companies, only one is from outside the United States, and none are from a non-Western country. For an American company, this is not unusual.23 It is not, however, entirely reasonable. In today’s global economy, an informed, international view makes good sense from both a public relations and business angle.

investments there. As Kamal Nath, India’s minister of commerce and industry, said earlier this year: “The question before pharma company CEOs the world over today is not: ‘Should my company go to India?’ but ‘Can my company afford not to go to India?’”24 India provides a unique opportunity for the industry not only to improve its bottom line, but also to restore its worldwide reputation. Strangely enough, one of the most innovative industries in business history has failed to innovate and find more effective ways to protect its most prized assets: global reputation and patent rights. However, with hard choices and a changed approach, it can start anew. If successful, U.S. pharmaceutical companies can further both the industry’s and U.S. interests. As U.S. pharmaceutical companies go to India in search of business opportunities, they should A Future through the Indian pursue parallel diplomatic avenues. With Example. The newly amended Patents the right strategy, the industry would not Act in India is leading multinational only improve its own international pharmaceutical companies to dramati- image, but also increase support for a cally increase their operations and more globally integrated economy.

NOTES

1 Bryan C. Mercurio, “TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-saving Drugs in the Developing World,” Marquete Intellectual Property Law Review 8 (2004): 211.

2 Note by the Secretariat, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 12-14 July 1989, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, MTN.GNG/NG11/14, 12 September 1989.

3 Jagdish N. Bhagwati “Don’t Cry for Cancun,” Foreign Affairs 83 (2004): 56-57.

4 Ibid; and T.N. Srinivasan and Suresh D. Tendulkar, “Reintegrating India With the World Economy” Institute for International Economics (2003); and Alan Beattie, “Beneath the Bureaucracy Lie Rich Rewards,” Financial Times, 26 September 2005.

5 James Kanter, “Roche May Allow Others to Make Its Flu Drug,” New York Times, 18 October 2005.

6 Amaro Gomez-Pablos, “South Africa in AIDS Drug Fight,” CNN, 9 March 2001.

7 Ibid; and Editorial, The Lancet, 357: 243.

8 Bruce A. Lehman, Keynote Address to Global

[ 9 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Public Policy Institute and Ecole des Sciences Politiques, 24 June 2004, Internet, http://www.iipi.org/ speeches/Paris0604.pdf.

9 Editorial, The Lancet, 357: 243.

10 Ibid.

11 Jean Lanjow, “The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: ‘Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering’?,” Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 26 August 1997.

12 Donald G. McNeil, Jr. “India Alters Law on Drug Patents,” New York Times, 24 March 2005.

13 “History of Indian Patent System,” Indian Patent Office website, Internet, http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/history.htm 14 Donald G. McNeil, Jr.“Selling Cheap ‘Generic’ Drugs, India’s Copycats Irk Industry,” New York Times, 1 December 2000.

15 Shubham Chaudhri, Pinelopi Goldberg, and Panle Jia, “The Effects of Extending Intellectual Property Rights Protection to Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian

DESAI

Pharmaceutical Market,” Columbia University Earth Institute, 10 December 2003, Internet, http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/chaudhuri1.pdf.

16 Robert Tancer and Srinivas Josyula “Investing in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry,” 1999, citing ORG-MARG Research Ltd., India Pharma Market report, Internet, http://www.thunderbird.edu/ pdf/about_us/case_series/a03990015.pdf.

17 “Thinking for Themselves,” The Economist 377 (2005): 14.

18 Bryan C. Mercurio, “TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World,” Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 8 (2004): 211.

19 Patents (Amendment) Act (2005) § 83.

Culture & Society

20 Ibid., § 84.

21 Frederick M. Abbott, “The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health,” The American Journal of International Law 99, no. 2 (2005): 317-359.

22 Michael Kremer and Rachel Glennerster, Strong Medicine: Creating Incentives for Pharmaceutical Research on Neglected Diseases, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

23 Joann S. Lublin, “Globalizing the Boardroom,” The Wall Street Journal, 31 October 2005.

24 Address by Shri Kamal Nath to Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England, 5 February 2001, Internet, http://commerce.nic.in/pr _archive.htm.

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 9 9 ]

AD PAGE 100

Law&Ethics Strengthening Protection of IDPs The UN’s Role

Roberta Cohen UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan drew attention to “the growing problem of internally displaced persons” (IDPs) in his 2005 report on UN reform, In Larger Freedom.1 Unlike refugees, IDPs do not cross international borders and thus have no wellestablished system of international assistance or protection.

IDPs, Annan wrote, “often fall into the cracks between different humanitarian bodies.”2 Despite this acknowledgement of the predicament of IDPs, nowhere in the 2005 UN World Summit document, adopted by heads of government in September, does it spell out how to improve the UN’s ability to address the plight of the twenty to twenty-five million people uprooted within their own countries by violence, ethnic strife, and civil war.3 UN reform must encourage greater national and international involvement with IDPs by promoting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, giving the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) a broader role with IDPs, and strengthening institutional and military arrangements to defend the physical safety of IDPs. The millions of people caught in the midst of violent conflict without the basic necessities of life present a political and strategic concern, not to mention a profound humanitarian and human rights problem, requiring international action.

Conflict and massive displacement can disrupt stability, turn

Roberta Cohen is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Co-Director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement.

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countries into breeding grounds for lawlessness and terrorism, and undermine regional and international security.

Whether in the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, or the Balkans, conflict and displacement have spilled over borders, overwhelming neighboring countries with large numbers of refugees and even igniting regional wars. Unless addressed, situations of displacement can create political and economic turmoil in entire regions.4 The need to design a more predictable and effective international system for “internal refugees” is critical because the overall international humanitarian response system is a thoroughly inequitable one. UNHCR attends to the needs of the world’s 9.2 million refugees, and a dedicated international treaty, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, sets forth their rights. In contrast, no organization has a global mandate to protect and assist the much larger number of IDPs, who are in far more desperate straits, when their own governments fail to do so. IDPs may be uprooted for the same reasons as refugees, but they receive markedly less international protection or assistance in most emergencies and, in some cases, they receive no help at all.

Sixty years after the Holocaust, it is time for the UN to act on the ideals upon which it was founded and to stop distancing itself from—or implementing halfhearted responses to—situations in which millions of people are forced from their homes by civil wars, deliberate governmental policies of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or even genocide. In his report on UN reform, Annan aptly affirmed that “the responsibility to protect” must shift to the international community when national [ 1 0 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

authorities fail to provide for the welfare and security of their citizens.5 Sovereignty, he wrote, cannot be allowed to serve as a barrier when the lives of millions of men, women, and children are at risk. The World Summit document also adopted the concept of necessary UN protection, though only on a case-bycase basis.6 The current period of UN reform offers an opportune time to strengthen the international response to situations of internal displacement and develop an international system that better protects people uprooted in their own countries.

Strengthening the Legal Framework. As a first step, the inter-

national community must reinforce the legal framework for the protection of IDPs. Eventually that might mean developing a legally binding instrument on the model of the Refugee Convention, but what is more urgently needed is the strengthening of the international usage of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the first international standards for IDPs.7 Introduced into the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998 by Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, the Principles set forth the rights of IDPs and the obligations of governments, insurgent groups, and other actors to protect and aid them prior to and during displacement as well as during return and reintegration. These Principles comprise a minimum international standard for the treatment of IDPs, and apply to those uprooted by conflict and persecution as well as those displaced by natural disasters.8 The experts who drafted the Principles deliberately chose not to propose a treaty

COHEN

to deal with the IDP issue. First, there was no governmental support for the development of a legally binding treaty on a subject as sensitive as internal displacement. Second, treaty making could take years, perhaps even decades, delaying implementation of urgently needed

Law & Ethics

such time as the international community is ready to adopt a binding instrument that “accords with the protection level set forth in the Guiding Principles,” the most promising approach remains expanding the usage of the Principles.9 Once a sufficient number of states have

Some argue that with a treaty, states could

be held more accountable, but this view overlooks the dangers that exist in moving too hastily to develop one. standards to address the situation of the millions of internally displaced people caught up in ongoing emergencies.

Third, sufficient humanitarian and human rights law already existed to make it possible to bring together in one document the provisions dispersed in a large number of instruments and tailor them to the needs of the internally displaced.

Some argue that with a treaty, states could be held more accountable, but this view overlooks the dangers that exist in moving too hastily to develop one. There is no guarantee that the affected states would ratify the instrument or observe its provisions. The process could become a pretext for watering down accepted provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law. There are a number of governments, including the current U.S. administration, which would like nothing better than to rewrite the Geneva Conventions and other provisions of international law to make them less forceful. Difficulties in the treatymaking process have led Walter Kalin, the current Representative of the Secretary-General, to advise that until

developed national laws and policies, a binding instrument could follow.

The Principles have proven to be an effective means for aiding IDPs. Over the past eight years, they have gained substantial standing and authority.

Resolutions of both the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly refer to them as “an important tool” and a “standard” for dealing with situations of internal displacement.10 The World Summit document recognizes them as “an important international framework for the protection of IDPs,” while regional intergovernmental bodies in Europe, the Americas, and Africa use them as a monitoring tool for measuring conditions on the ground. UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have translated the Principles into more than forty languages and provide training in them, while local groups around the world use them as an advocacy tool on behalf of IDPs.11 Most significantly, a growing number of governments are basing laws and policies on the Principles, which make them enforceable at the domestic level. In 2001 the govWinter/Spring 2006 [ 1 0 3 ]

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ernment of Angola based its law concerning the resettlement of the internally displaced on the provisions in the Guiding Principles; in 2004 the government of Peru adopted a law based on the Principles that provides material benefits to IDPs. Similarly, in Colombia the government announced more aid to IDPs in response to a Constitutional Court decision based on the Guiding Principles, while the government of Georgia brought its laws on voting rights into line with them. In Burundi, Liberia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, governments have based their national policies on the Principles, with gains reported for IDPs.12 To strengthen the standing of the Guiding Principles, Kalin is developing a manual for lawmakers to explain how to adapt them to domestic law.

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General’s reform report supports this initiative by urging member states to promote the adoption of the Guiding Principles “through national legislation.”13 Although the World Summit document does not include a specific call for national laws and policies, the integration of the Principles into the national legal and political landscape of nations with acute IDP problems will be a critical step toward building greater national responsibility toward IDPs. Developments at the regional level could also reinforce national action. The African Union is in the process of drafting a legally binding instrument on internal displacement based on the Guiding Principles while the Council of Europe is exploring ways to strengthen the Principles’ implementation.14 Both initiatives should serve to bolster the legal basis of the Principles, expand their standing and usage, and translate into [ 1 0 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

steps on the ground to improve conditions for IDPs.

Creating Predictable Institutional Arrangements. Expanding

UNHCR’s mandate to take on greater IDP protection obligations would be the most effective next step in improving the institutional arrangements for IDPs. UNHCR’s long experience with refugees makes it an obvious candidate for assuming a leadership role in situations where persecution and conflict also produce IDPs. Even if it does not take on all the millions displaced by natural disasters or development projects, it could assume a leading role in helping those uprooted by conflict and human rights violations.

Indeed, UNHCR is already engaged with protecting and assisting some five million IDPs, one-fifth of the world’s total.

Many prominent voices over the years have called for the enlargement of UNHCR’s mandate to include IDPs, but the idea has always triggered strenuous objections from other UN agencies unwilling to yield jurisdiction or resources to the refugee agency. More recently, however, opinion has begun to shift as it has been recognized that the “collaborative approach” is insufficient.

Under the current system, many different UN agencies on the ground are supposed to share the responsibility for protecting IDPs. UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Health Organization, the UN Development Program (UNDP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Organization for Migration, and a myriad of NGOs are expected to work together to meet the assistance, protection, reintegration, and development

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needs of the internally displaced. Their activities are coordinated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator at headquarters and by Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators in the field.

Nearly every UN and independent evaluation has found the collaborative approach deficient when it comes to IDPs.15 To begin with, there is no real locus of responsibility in the field for assisting and protecting IDPs. As former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard

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took until 2005 to deploy a mere three additional child protection officers. The agencies support coordination in theory, but no one likes to be “coordinated” in practice.

In response to these widely publicized deficiencies, the Emergency Relief Coordinator’s office in mid-2005 came up with a “sectoral” approach, under which the different agencies would be expected to carve out areas of responsibility based on their expertise and carry

Expanding UNHCR’s mandate to take on

greater IDP protection obligations would be the most effective next step in improving the institutional arrangements for IDPs. Holbrooke aptly quipped, “Co-heads are no heads.”16 There is also no predictability of action, as the different agencies are free to pick and choose the situations in which they wish to become involved on the basis of their respective mandates, resources, and interests. In every new emergency, no one knows for sure which agency or combination thereof will become involved. Whereas most rushed to South Asia to help those displaced by the tsunami, only limited international engagement is to be found in northern Uganda where tens of thousands of children flee every night to cities and villages to escape abduction and maiming by rebels. Nor does the Emergency Relief Coordinator have the authority to tell the powerful, billion-dollar operational organizations what to do. In Darfur, UNHCR declined to take on the management of IDP camps, while in Uganda, despite the coordinator’s pleas, UNICEF

them out on a regular basis in emergencies.

This approach, set to begin January 2006, was approved in September by the UN’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), composed of the heads of the major relief and development agencies, the Red Cross, and NGOs. UNHCR agreed to assume the lead for the protection of IDPs, the management of IDP camps, and emergency shelter for IDPs, a substantial enlargement of its role, and more encompassing than that of other agencies assigned to water and sanitation, nutrition, and early recovery.

Unfortunately, it appears that UNHCR will have to assume its new role with clipped wings. Annan’s reform report makes abundantly clear that the collaborative system will not be replaced; rather the onus of responsibility for IDPs will remain “under the global leadership of my Emergency Relief Coordinator.”17 This will require UNHCR to navigate a Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 0 5 ]

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cumbersome, collaborative system, reporting to Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators who in turn may have to report to special representatives of the Secretary-General. There will also be bureaucratic resistance to overcome.

According to a UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs/Brookings study, the “majority” of coordinators in the field are reluctant to support protection activities or “to advocate for the rights of the displaced in an effective and assertive manner.”18 Many of them view protection as “political” and likely to undermine the provision of humanitarian relief or even lead to their expulsion from the country.

There will be other hurdles as well.

Donors will need to be persuaded to provide increased resources for a greater

becoming irrelevant to today’s humanitarian emergencies if it ignores IDPs, who often outnumber refugees ten to one. Recently senior staff have begun to speak of a “predisposition” to help IDPs, while High Commissioner Antonio Guterres has clearly affirmed, “I don’t believe we at UNHCR can stay away from the problem.”19 If UNHCR actually begins to assume a lead on the ground with the internally displaced, it will be a welcome first step toward formulating an international response for IDPs, as predictable as the current one for refugees. Although each group of forced migrants has a separate legal regime—one being outside its country of origin and the other inside—operationally “it is neither ethical nor practical to distinguish between human beings

Providing food, medicine, and shelter to

internally displaced persons, while ignoring violent abuse, has led to the tragic description of the victims as the “well-fed dead.”

UNHCR presence in the field. Right now UNHCR is engaged with only 1.1 million of the 12 to 13 million IDPs in Africa, the continent most ravaged by conflict and displacement. UNHCR will also need to bring the “refugee movement” on board.

Some staffers joined by outside refugee advocates, dubbed “the fundamentalists,” have opposed most if not all UNHCR involvement with IDPs, on the grounds that the task would overwhelm the agency and undermine its core mandate of providing asylum for refugees. At the same time UNHCR’s leadership has become keenly aware that the agency risks [ 1 0 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

because of a border they may or may not have crossed.”20 However, it remains to be seen whether other agencies will actually cede to UNHCR the leadership role the IASC has given it. In the case of refugees, where UNHCR is the undisputed agency, the WFP, UNDP, and NGO “implementing partners” regularly assist it. But when it comes to IDPs, the collaborative approach is still the overarching framework, which means that other agencies will need to recognize UNHCR’s lead and reinforce it with their support. As Kalin has observed, “close cooperation between the different

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agencies and actors will be necessary” to ensure full protection of IDPs.21 But UNHCR will also have to assert its leadership role with the other agencies; otherwise, overemphasis on collaboration will lead to delayed and weak decision making, undermining protection.

Overcoming the Protection Gap.

Providing food, medicine, and shelter to internally displaced persons, while ignoring violent abuse, has led to the tragic description of the victims as the “well-fed dead.” The expression may have originated in Bosnia in the 1990s, but it also applies to Darfur where there are more than 11,000 humanitarian workers on the ground, but fewer than one hundred with protection responsibilities.22 What is needed is a comprehensive approach that integrates protection with assistance and includes steps to defend the physical safety and rights of IDPs. This could include setting up early warning systems; insisting upon access to IDPs; deploying staff among threatened communities; developing strategies to protect women and children from rape and abduction; arranging relocations and evacuations; advocating for the protection of the displaced with governments and insurgent groups; and accompanying IDPs home to ensure their safety.

Only two international agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNHCR have the skills and experience to undertake a full range of protection activities for IDPs, and there are limits even to what these two agencies can accomplish. The ICRC does not generally become involved in situations of violence below the threshold of armed conflict and usually leaves when the conflict is over, and UNHCR’s

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involvement with IDPs has been limited by its refugee mandate. Now that UNHCR has agreed to assume a lead role in protecting IDPs, it should expand its partnerships with other agencies. In particular, OHCHR and UNICEF, which largely absent themselves from protection work, should be called upon to play active roles.

NGOs should also be encouraged to provide protection by following the example of the International Rescue Committee, Peace Brigades International, and others who have pioneered in this area. The greater engagement of international organization and NGO staff on the ground could create the “critical mass” needed to form protection coalitions and mobile protection teams in addition to creating a protection standby force for emergencies, steps often recommended but not yet implemented.23 UNHCR leadership will be sorely needed to coordinate this effort.

Close collaboration of protection staff with peacekeepers will also be needed because in some situations, protection is only possible through military and police action. Indeed, peacekeepers are increasingly being called upon by the UN Security Council to defend IDPs, facilitate the delivery of relief, create secure humanitarian areas, and enable IDPs to return home safely. Many perform well, but are not always given the mandates, troops, or equipment required to do the job. Political will, training, adequate numbers, and resources are all needed for peacekeepers to protect IDPs. This is particularly true in Darfur where lightly armed African Union (AU) troops and police, numbering no more than 7,000, with a weak protection mandate, have been expected to defend close to two million IDPs in an area the size of France.

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Strengthening the protection capability of the AU should prove essential not only for Darfur but for future emergencies in Africa. The slogan “African solutions for African problems,” however, should not be allowed to stand in the way of developed countries offering their well-trained, experienced, and more heavily armed troops for protection. At present, less than 10 percent of peacekeepers come from Western armies.24 As the Foreign Minister of Senegal pointed out, AU troops alone cannot stop the killing in Darfur; the joint action of the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), the AU, and the United States is needed.25 While plans by the EU for a standby force for humanitarian emergencies are encouraging, an international capability is needed because Western countries often refuse to become involved when their strategic interests are not at stake. Absent an international protection system, local wars can be expected to go on for decades, undermining the stability of countries, while donors spend large sums of money on humanitarian relief. Far more cost effective would be “strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly” to enhance international military capacity, as called for by the Secretary-General in his reform report.26 Heads of government at the World Summit urged only the “further development of proposals” to create such capacity. They did, however, ask regional organizations to “consider the option” of

placing their military capacity under UN standby arrangements and endorsed a standing police capacity, which if formed could prove valuable for protection.27 Stronger police and military capacity will of course need to be bolstered by international efforts at political solutions to resolve the conflicts at the heart of displacement.

Conclusion. Over the past fifteen

years, recognition has grown that people in need of humanitarian aid and protection have certain rights and claims on the international community when their governments do not act responsibly or where there is a disintegration of the state. UN reform must build on this trend, and address the tensions that exist between an emerging international responsibility to protect IDPs and more traditional notions of sovereignty that often obstruct humanitarian action. The Guiding Principles must be institutionalized within nations to ensure policies and laws that aid IDPs and intensive monitoring to ensure their implementation. As an international body, UNHCR must be given the authority and means to expand its role with IDPs, and international police and military capacity must be strengthened to defend their physical safety. A more reliable and predictable system for those trapped inside borders will require stronger legal, institutional, and protection measures from the international community.

NOTES

1 United Nations General Assembly, In larger freedom: toward development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc.A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para. 209.

2 Ibid., para. 210.

3 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, Resolution A/RES/60/1, 15 Sep-

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tember 2005, para.

132, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r60.htm 4 Kofi Annan, “Preface,” in Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: the Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, Washington DC: the Brookings Institution, 1998, xix.

5 United Nations, In larger freedom, para 135.

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6 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 139.

7 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc.E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 1998.

8 The US government never formally designated the survivors of Hurricane Katrina internally displaced persons, although President Bush at one point did refer to them as “displaced Americans.” Nonetheless, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement should serve as a framework for them, see Roberta Cohen, “Time for the United States to Honor International Standards in Emergencies,” Opinion, the Brookings Institution, 9 September 2005, and Frederic L. Kirgis, “Victims of hurricane Katrina are internally displaced persons, not refugees,” ASIL Insight, American Society of International Law, 21 September 2005.

9 See Interview with Walter Kalin, Forced Migration Review, vol. 23, May 2005, p.4; and Walter Kalin, “How Hard is Soft Law,” in Recent Commentaries about the Nature and Application of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, BrookingsCUNY Project on Internal Displacement, April 2002.

10 See UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/51, 23 April 2003, and General Assembly Resolution 56/154, 19 December 2001.

11 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 132.

12 Roberta Cohen, “The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: An Innovation in International Standard Setting,” Global Governance, vol.10, no.4, October-December 2004, 459-480.

13 United Nations, In larger freedom, para. 210.

14 Walter Kalin, “The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as International Minimum Standard and Protection Tool,” Refugee Survey

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Quarterly, 2005.

15 See United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, which reports on the results of four major studies on the collaborative approach, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/77, 4 March 2004, paras. 24-33. See also Susan Martin et al, The Uprooted: Improving Humanitarian Responses to Forced Migration, New York: Lexington Books, 2005, 112-120.

16 Richard Holbrooke, “A Borderline Difference,” Washington Post, 8 May 2000.

17 United Nations, In larger freedom, para. 210.

18 Simon Bagshaw and Diane Paul, Protect or Neglect: Towards a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and OCHA, November 2004, 4.

19 Interview with Antonio Guterres, Migration Information Source, MPI, 1 August 2005.

20 Kamel Morjane, former Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, ICVA Talk Back, Vol.7-2, Geneva, 30 March 2005.

21 United Nations, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons to the General Assembly, A/60/338, para.7.

22 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2005/411, 23 June 2005, para. 45 23 Bagshaw and Paul, Protect or Neglect, 10.

24 Marc Lacey, “U.N. Forces Using Tougher Tactics to Secure Peace,” New York Times, 23 May 2005.

25 Susan E. Rice, “Why Darfur Can’t Be Left to Africa,” Washington Post, 7 August 2005.

26 United Nations, In Larger Freedom, para. 112.

27 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 92-3, 170.

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The Darfur Dilemma U.S. Policy Toward the ICC John Stompor During the first U.S. presidential debate in September 2004, President George Bush, who was then running for re-election, pointedly reminded the audience that he had withdrawn U.S. support for the International Criminal Court (ICC), criticizing it as “a body based in The Hague where unaccountable judges and prosecutors can pull our troops or diplomats up for trial.”1 President Bush, in his first term, had actively opposed the ICC, authorizing the U.S. State Department not only to declare that the United States no longer considers itself bound by its signature to the treaty establishing the Court, but also to seek agreements with individual states and resolutions of the UN Security Council providing immunity from the ICC for U.S. nationals, employees, and contractors. The U.S. Congress followed the president’s lead, prohibiting cooperation with the ICC and authorizing the suspension of military aid and Economic Support Fund assistance to states that have not entered into immunity agreements with the United States.2 Each of these measures attempted to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC. While the United States pursued its policy of active opposition to the ICC, evidence mounted that the Sudanese army and its proxy militia, the Janjaweed, were committing serious humanitarian crimes of international concern in the Darfur

John Stompor is a Senior Associate of the International Justice Program of Human Rights First.

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region of Sudan. In September 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to Congress that an investigation found “[a] consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities (killings, rapes, burning of villages) committed by [Janjaweed] and Sudanese government forces against non-Arab villagers.”3 He further testified that the State Department concluded that “genocide has been committed in Darfur and the Government of Sudan and the [Janjaweed] bear responsibility.”4 In January 2005 the U.S.-supported International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur completed its report finding that “the Sudanese judicial system has proved incapable, and the authorities unwilling, of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur” and strongly recommending the immediate referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC.5 In response, less than three months after President Bush’s second inauguration, the United States refrained from vetoing UN Security Council Resolution 1593, which referred the Darfur crisis to the ICC, thereby marking the first instance that the Council had authorized the ICC’s jurisdiction to investigate and

accountability for the crimes that have been committed in Sudan . . . [T]here is a mechanism that many members supported in terms of doing that . . . the International Criminal Court. And so we abstained because we think it is very important that these crimes are prosecuted.”6 In May 2005 Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick went a step further, recognizing the importance of the ICC’s role in Darfur. He stated: “And so in a way, even though [the ICC] hasn’t proceeded to the investigation or . . . trial stage, it’s a useful deterrence against others and allows us to emphasize a tool about the need to stop the violence from . . . local militias to in-between government officials to high-level government officials.”7 The crimes in Darfur exposed the tension between the U.S. belief in accountability for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, on one hand, and the U.S. policy of active opposition to the ICC on the other. Political pressure in support of accountability and the absence of viable alternatives to the ICC exacerbated this tension. As a result, the administration found it was not in the

The grave crimes in Darfur exposed the

tension between the U.S. belief in accountability for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, on one hand, and the U.S. policy of active opposition to the ICC, on the other. prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher explained the U.S. vote by stating: “The United States believes very firmly in [ 1 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

United States’s interest to stand in the way of a Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court.

This dramatic turn of events should foretell the coming of a truce between

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the United States and the ICC. The United States has a commitment to support accountability for the grave crimes committed in Sudan, and in the Darfur referral the United States has consented to grant the ICC the mandate to pursue justice. A cessation of U.S. hostilities with the ICC, however, should not be confused with anything more, such as a movement toward ratification. An examination of the history of the U.S. relationship with the ICC and its reasons for allowing the Darfur referral reveals that fundamental issues prevent the development of closer relations. Moreover, the development of U.S. relations with the ICC is likely to be influenced by a number of complicating factors, including the form of international efforts to assist the ICC, legal developments at the Court, and U.S. counterterrorism policy.

The U.S. Relationship with the ICC: A History. The United States

participated actively in the negotiations to establish a permanent international criminal court following the International Law Commission’s submission of a Draft Statute to the UN General Assembly in July 1994. In fact, at the Rome Diplomatic Conference in June and July 1998, during which the Statute establishing the ICC was finalized, “the United States had a greater impact on the Statute than any other State, since countless provisions and aspects of the Statute were developed to reflect or accommodate its concerns and priorities.”8 Nonetheless, the United States, joined by only six other states, voted against the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC at the conclusion of the conference. An overwhelming majority of 120 states voted for its adoption. David Scheffer, who

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was the U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, explained the U.S. vote in testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee: I regret to report that certain . . . objectives were not achieved and therefore we could not support the draft that emerged. [T]he U.S. delegation certainly reduced exposure to unwarranted prosecutions by the international court through our successful efforts to build into the treaty a range of safeguards that will benefit not only us but also our friends and allies. But serious risks remain because of the document’s provisions on jurisdiction.9 The basis of U.S. concerns with the Rome Statute was that the ICC could exercise jurisdiction without a UN Security Council referral and thus do so outside the absolute control of the United States.10 In particular, the United States objected to the provision allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction in a case where the prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu, that is, opens an investigation without referral by the Security Council or a state that is a party to the treaty.11 To address continuing disagreement with provisions of the Rome Statute, particularly the grant of proprio motu authority to the prosecutor, the Clinton administration undertook a policy of limited engagement. It continued to participate in negotiations regarding the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and its Elements of Crimes and signed the Rome Statute on 31 December 2000.

Upon signing the Rome Statute, President Bill Clinton stated: “In signing . . . we are not abandoning our concerns Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 1 3 ]

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about significant flaws in the treaty. . . .

With signature . . . we will be in a position to influence the evolution of the court. . . . The United States should [also] have the chance to observe and assess the functioning of the court, over time, before choosing to become subject to its jurisdiction.”12 In contrast, President Bush chose a very different approach for addressing disagreements with the Rome Statute in his first term, which was influenced by John Bolton, the under-secretary of state for arms control and international security at the time. Under-Secretary Bolton advised the administration to “ignore the ICC in official U.S. statements, and attempt to isolate it through U.S. diplomacy, in order to prevent it from acquiring any further legitimacy or resources.

America’s posture toward the ICC should be ‘Three Noes’: no financial support, directly or indirectly; no cooperation; and no further negotiations with other governments to ‘improve’ the ICC.”13 This policy, however, is based on the assumption that the ICC could not serve the interests of the United States.14 It is the fallacy of this assumption that made such policy untenable for the United States in the face of the grave crimes in Darfur.

The Darfur Referral and a Changing U.S. Perspective. U.S. efforts to draw attention to gross human rights violations in Darfur quickly began to conflict with U.S. policy regarding the ICC. In January 2005, in the wake of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur strongly recommending that the Security Council refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the Bush administration faced a dilemma. It had declared that genocide had taken

[ 1 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

place in Darfur and had authorized the UN to task the Commission with considering how those responsible for the grave crimes in Darfur should be held accountable. Yet accepting the Commission’s recommendation would contradict the administration’s policy of active opposition to the ICC. The administration’s initial response to this dilemma was to forge ahead with its existing policy with regard to the ICC. Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes, began lobbying the representatives of key countries regarding the U.S. position on referral of Darfur to the ICC, stating: “We don’t want to be party to legitimizing the ICC.”15 As an alternative, Ambassador Prosper and other U.S. officials proposed that the Security Council establish a new temporary international tribunal, which would be based at the site of the UN-administered International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, located in Arusha, Tanzania.16 The U.S. response, in particular its alternative proposal, immediately encountered practical and political problems. A referral to the ICC was the most efficient means to ensure the grave crimes committed in Darfur would be investigated and prosecuted. Because the ICC was staffed and operating, it could rapidly begin an investigation and prosecution. In contrast, establishing a new tribunal would involve significant delay and expense. The experiences of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda suggested that it would take months, if not years, to get such a tribunal up and running. Also, unlike the already funded ICC, the U.S.proposed tribunal would require a new, substantial, and continuing financial commitment by UN member states.

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The U.S. proposal therefore failed to gain political support. The United States was unable to cultivate the backing of key European and African countries, the majority of which are parties to the ICC.17 The U.S. proposal also generated little domestic support. Polling data in February 2005 indicated that a bipartisan majority of 60 percent of Americans favored referral to the ICC rather than the establishment of a new temporary tribunal, even when it was suggested that the referral could “legitimize” the Court.18 Members of Congress, rather than rallying behind the U.S. proposal, urged the administration to assess all of the possible options for accountability, implicitly leaving open the possibility of support for a Security Council referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC. In early March 2005 a bipartisan coalition led by Senator Jon Corzine introduced the Darfur Accountability Act of 2005, which urged U.S. support for “prompt prosecution and adjudication in a competent international court of justice.”19 It also sought to require regular presidential reports to Congress on “the status of all possible venues for prosecution and adjudication . . . including whether such venues have jurisdiction, personnel, and assets necessary to promptly prosecute and adjudicate” the crimes committed in Darfur.20 These developments highlighted the inconsistency inherent in the U.S. position on accountability. By proposing a new Security Council-mandated international tribunal, the Bush administration had made known its commitment to prosecuting the grave crimes committed in Darfur; the administration had also confirmed its general support for prosecutions authorized by the Security Council. How, therefore, could the Bush

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administration justify its opposition to an ICC investigation and prosecution of crimes in Darfur?

Confronted with Darfur, the policy of active opposition to the ICC thus logically collapsed. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice concluded in early 2005 that declaring genocide but blocking referral to the ICC made no sense.21 Therefore, when France introduced a draft Security Council resolution referring Darfur to the ICC, the United States did not move to veto but instead negotiated. And when the United Kingdom introduced a modified version of the original resolution that provided the United States with exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals in African Union (AU) or UN-authorized operations in Sudan, the United States allowed the resolution to come to a vote. On 31 March 2005 the Security Council voted 11-0 to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States abstained.

Toward a New U.S. Relationship with the ICC. The United States has

yet to reformulate its policy regarding the ICC following the Darfur referral. State Department Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger III hinted at a nuanced U.S. relationship with the ICC in remarks at a conference on international law in San Remo in September 2005. In explaining the U.S. decision not to veto Resolution 1593, Mr. Bellinger said that the United States “recognized the need for the international community to work together to end the atrocities in Sudan and speak with one voice to bring to account the perpetrators of those crimes.”22 Around the same time in New York, however, the new U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, John Bolton, forged ahead in Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 1 5 ]

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active opposition to the ICC, objecting to all proposals to mention the ICC in the UN reform summit document.23 Such inconsistency is untenable and damages the U.S. commitment to support accountability for the serious crimes committed in Darfur. U.S. policy should be revised to bring those bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocities in Darfur to justice before the ICC. Resolution 1593 not only authorizes the ICC to prosecute those responsible for crimes in Darfur, but also states that the government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur must cooperate fully with the ICC. This resolution will require enforcement through collective efforts, and the United States is obligated under the UN Charter to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.24 In addition, there is U.S. public support for accountability in Sudan. A public opinion survey conducted in the United States in May 2005 revealed that 91 percent of respondents think that the United States should cooperate with the ICC to help bring to justice those accused of crimes against humanity in Darfur.25 In the absence of firm direction from the administration, members of Congress have already taken tentative steps in developing a new policy. In June 2005 a bipartisan coalition led by Representative Henry Hyde introduced the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act. The proposed legislation states that “the United States should render assistance to the efforts of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to bring to justice persons accused of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in Darfur,”26 notwithstanding the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, which generally prohibits U.S. support to the ICC, but allows for presidential waivers [ 1 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of the prohibition to prosecute nonU.S. nationals.27 At the same time, the proposed legislation expresses fundamental concerns about the ICC: a condition of U.S. assistance is the receipt of assurances by the Security Council or the ICC that “no current or former United States Government official or employee (including any contractor), member of the United States Armed Forces, or United States national will be subject to prosecution by the ICC” in connection with efforts to bring to justice those responsible for crimes in Darfur.28

Limits and Influences on a New U.S. Relationship with the ICC. Reflecting the interests and concerns expressed in the proposed Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2005, a new U.S. relationship with the ICC is likely to be motivated by support for accountability in Darfur, but restricted by fundamental disagreement with the ways in which the ICC may exercise jurisdiction.

Given all of the political and policy reasons for which the United States did not veto the Darfur referral, it must cooperate with the ICC. At the same time, there are no indications that a new U.S. relationship with the ICC will encompass a genuine movement toward ratification.

The United States remains opposed to the fundamental jurisdictional provisions of the Rome Statute, and changes to these provisions are unacceptable to the parties to the treaty.

Within these parameters a new U.S. relationship with the ICC is likely to be influenced by several factors, including the form of international efforts to assist the ICC, legal developments at the Court, and U.S. counterterrorism policy. To the degree that assistance to the ICC is coordinated by the Security

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Council, U.S. cooperation will be enhanced. The United States is obligated to assist the Security Council but not the ICC prosecutor or the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. The United States has also announced its expectation that “the Council will continue to exercise . . . oversight as investigations and prosecutions pursuant to the referral proceed.”29 Much depends therefore on the ability of the ICC prosecutor and Security Council members that are parties to the ICC treaty to transform the Council into a mechanism for coordination of assistance to the Court. Resolution 1593 offers an opportunity in this regard because it “[i]nvites the Prosecutor to address the Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution.”30 In June 2005 the ICC prosecutor briefed the Security Council for the first time, highlighting the important role of the Council in ensuring cooperation with the ICC.31 His next briefing of the Security Council was expected to take place in December 2005.

In addition, the United States will closely monitor the ICC’s application of the principle of complementarity, or deference to genuine investigations and prosecutions of national courts. U.S. critics of the ICC have publicly doubted that the Court will respect national jurisdiction.32 A new U.S. relationship with the ICC will thus be influenced by any determination made by the Court that it should proceed with a case because it assesses Sudan to be unable or unwilling to conduct genuine investigation and prosecution. Sudan did establish in early June 2005 a Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur.33 However, when

Law & Ethics

the ICC prosecutor briefed the Security Council later that month, he reported that there remains an “absence of criminal proceedings related to the cases on which I will focus.”34 A new U.S. relationship with the ICC will also be affected by growing U.S. intelligence cooperation with Sudan on counterterrorism matters. After 9/11 the government of Sudan, which had sheltered Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996, turned over key intelligence information on Islamic extremist operations and began to build a partnership with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.35 This partnership has continued, and as recently as March 2005, Secretary Rice communicated to the Sudanese government the administration’s desire for continued “close cooperation” on terrorism.36 Already there are major strains between the U.S. commitment to accountability and desire for intelligence cooperation. In April 2005 the CIA brought the chief of Sudan’s intelligence services, Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, to Washington for secret meetings on counterterrorism.37 The visit took place despite objections from officials at the Justice Department who discussed arresting General Gosh on charges relating to Darfur.38 As the ICC prosecutor and others uncover more information about responsibility for the crimes in Darfur, these strains are likely to increase.

Conclusion. In the face of the serious

crimes in Darfur, political pressure as well as the lack of viable alternatives to the ICC exposed the limits of active U.S. opposition to the Court. The administration therefore found opposition to referral of Darfur to the ICC not to be in the United States’s interest. This deciWinter/Spring 2006 [ 1 1 7 ]

THE DARFUR DILEMMA

sion should signal the end of active U.S. opposition to the Court. The U.S. commitment to support accountability for crimes in Darfur dictates that the United States should assist international efforts to bring those responsible to justice, even if that requires cooperation with the ICC. Fundamental disagreements with the Court, however, prevent U.S. movement toward ICC membership in the foreseeable future. The development of

less hostile U.S. relations with the ICC will be dependent upon the degree to which the Security Council coordinates assistance to the ICC’s efforts, the respect shown by the ICC for the principle of complementarity, and the balance struck by the United States between the priorities of accountability for violations of international law in Darfur and intelligence cooperation with Sudan on issues of counterterrorism.

NOTES

1 Commission on Presidential Debates, The First Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate, Debate Transcript, 30 September 2004, Internet, http://www.debates. org/pages/trans2004a.html.

2 American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, Public Law 107–206, title II (2002) (prohibits cooperation with the ICC and military aid to States that are parties to the ICC); Public Law 108–447, division D, title V, section 574 (2004) (prohibits Economic Support Fund assistance to states that are parties to the ICC and have not entered into an ICC immunity agreement with the United States).

3 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Written Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 September 2004, Internet, http://www.state. gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36032.htm.

4 Ibid.

5 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, 25 January 2005, Internet, http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/darfurreport.doc.

6 U.S. State Department, Daily Briefing, 1 April 2005, Internet, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ 2005/44132.htm.

7 U.S. State Department, Press Briefing on Sudan, 27 May 2005, Internet, http://www.state.gov/s/d/ rem/46922.htm.

8 Philippe Kirsch, QC and Darryl Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference” in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 2002, Vol. I, 90.

9 Statement of David J. Scheffer, ambassador-atlarge for war crimes issues and head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 23 July 1998 (“Scheffer Testimony”), Internet, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/statements/governments/USScheffer_Senate23July98.pdf.

10 William A. Schabas, “United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All About the Security Council,” 15 EJIL 701, 716 (2004) (“Essentially all of the other major concerns of the United

[ 1 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

States with the Rome Statute flow from the issue of Security Council deferral. If a permanent member of the Security Council can effectively block prosecutions, then the United States is in control. It could do this effectively and almost automatically under the ILC [International Law Commission] draft; it can only do it with difficulty, and without legal certainty, under the Statute as it now stands.”).

11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 13 and 15, Internet, http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statut e(e).pdf.

12 BBC News, “Clinton’s statement on war crimes court,” 31 December 2000, Internet, http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/1095580.stm.

13 John Bolton, “The Risks And Weaknesses Of The International Criminal Court From America’s Perspective,” 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 167 (Winter 2001), Internet, http://www.law.duke. edu/journals/lcp/articles/lcp64dWinter2001p167.ht m.

14 Ibid.

15 Warren Hoge, “U.S. Lobbies UN on Darfur and International Court,” New York Times, 29 January 2005, 8.

16 Pursuant to the U.S. proposal, the tribunal would share the same physical infrastructure as the Rwandan tribunal but would have its own statute, judges, and prosecutors. It would also be administered by the United Nations but in conjunction with the African Union. Ibid.

17 As of September 2005, ninety-nine countries have become parties to the ICC by ratifying or acceding to the Rome Statute.

18 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, “Large Bipartisan Majority of Americans Favors Referring Darfur War Crime Cases to International Criminal Court,” 1 March 2005, Internet, http://www.ccfr.org/ publications/opinion/Press%20Release.pdf.

19 Darfur Accountability Act of 2005, S. 495 20 Ibid.

21 Glenn Kessler, “Rice Mixes Tactics in Darfur Response: US Backs UN Probe, Not Court,” Washington

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Post, 31 July 2005, A06.

22 John B. Bellinger, III, United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the Application of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Refugee Law, International Conference, San Remo, 9 September 2005, Internet, http://www.us-mission.ch/ Press2005/0909BellingerIHLSanRemo-2.htm.

23 NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Press Statement, 16 September 2005, Internet, http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/ciccmediastatements/2005/UNICClang_16Sep05.pdf.

24 UN Charter, Chapter VII. 25 International Crisis Group, “Do Americans Care about Darfur?,” 1 June 2005, Internet, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/ horn_of_africa/b026_do_americans_care_about_darfur.pdf.

26 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 3127.

27 Public Law 107–206, title II (2002).

28 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 3127.

29 Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Acting U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on the Sudan Accountability Resolution, in

Law & Ethics

the Security Council, 31 March 2005, Internet, http://www.un.int/usa/05_055.htm.

30 UN Security Council Resolution 1593, 31 March 2005, UN Document S/RES/1593.

31 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo to the Security Council, 29 June 2005 (“ICC Prosecutor Statement”), Internet, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/ cases/LMO_UNSC_On_DARFUR-EN.pdf.

32 Lt. Col. Michael A. Newton, “Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” 167 Military Literature Revue, 20, 73 (2001).

33 Letter dated 18 June 2005 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the president of the Security Council, UN Document S/2005/403.

34 ICC Prosecutor Statement.

35 Ken Silverstein, “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, 29 April 2005, 1.

36 Ibid.

37 Ken Silverstein, “Sudanese Visitor Splits U.S. Officials,” Los Angeles Times, 17 June 2005, 1.

38 Ibid.

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Politics&Diplomacy Trouble in Paradise

Nepal’s Tryst with Insurgency and Despotism Harsh V. Pant Protesting in September 2005 against King Gyanendra’s participation in the UN General Assembly in New York City, Girija Prasad Koirala, former prime minister of Nepal and current president of the Nepali Congress, declared, “The days of kings are gone.” Articulating the desire of a majority of the Nepalese people, Koirala’s comment also reflected the success of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the virtual isolation of the Nepalese monarchy.

Nepal is witnessing one of the most successful Maoist insurgencies in recent times. The current turbulence began in 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal initiated a “People’s War” against the monarchy in an attempt to establish a communist republic. By failing to effectively counter the Maoist menace, the political parties of Nepal discredited themselves, giving King Gyanendra an excuse to take control from elected officials. In February 2005 the situation worsened when he suspended democratic rights in Nepal and the Nepalese army was called in to suppress the Maoists. The Maoist insurgency has spread to almost all of the seventy-five districts of the nation, taking the lives of more than 12,000 people so far.1 This article examines the current crisis unfolding in Nepal with a focus on the roles of various domestic, regional, and

Harsh V. Pant is a Lecturer in the Department of Defense Studies at King’s College London. The views expressed here are his own.

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international actors. It argues that so far the international community and the main regional player, India, have been lackluster in their responses to the unfolding crisis in Nepal. A major global initiative is necessary to prevent the emergence of another failed state. Following a brief overview of the crisis is an examination of the role of three major domestic forces in Nepal: the monarchy, the political parties, and the Maoists.

Only after understanding the domestic actors can the response of India, the most influential regional player, be used to situate the present crisis in a larger regional context. The article concludes with observations about the future trajectory of the Nepalese imbroglio.

Overview: A Saga of Weak Democratic Institutions. With 42

percent of its population below the poverty line, Nepal is one of the leastdeveloped countries in the world. With a total area of 140,800 square kilometers, it is also one of the smallest states in the world, sharing its borders with India on three sides. Until 1951 Nepal was an isolated medieval kingdom without the

Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, succeeded him in 1972. By 1990, however, popular demand for democracy had reached levels that allowed Nepal’s political parties to forcefully demand a democratic regime, which ultimately led to the establishment of a multi-party democracy in April of that year.

This second attempt at democracy also proved short lived. King Gyanendra dismissed the democratically elected prime minister in 2002 and took direct rule even as he continued to make pious statements about his commitment to multiparty democracy. The monarchy ruled Nepal either directly or by proxy with nominated prime ministers until 1 February 2005, when the king took the extreme step of reverting Nepal to absolute monarchy. He dismissed the coalition government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba, declared a state of emergency, and assumed all executive powers for the next three years, thereby converting a constitutional monarchy into an unconstitutional dictatorship.

The government placed many politicians under house arrest. Several provisions of the Nepali Constitution were also sus-

The king has systematically destroyed the

freedoms and political base of the political parties in Nepal, which has driven them into an implicit alliance with the Maoists. rudimentary infrastructure of a modern state. A brief experiment with democracy was cut short in 1961 when King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev overthrew Nepal’s first ever elected government and banned political parties. His son, King [ 1 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

pended, including the freedoms of press, speech, and expression; the freedom to assemble peacefully; and the right to privacy. In addition, the government implemented a policy of preventive detention, a further infringement on individual

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ties on the other, the king hopes to successfully fight on two fronts simultaneously. He believes the Nepalese are dissatisfied with all the major democratic political forces due to their long record of poor governance.

The king has systematically destroyed the freedoms and political base of the political parties in Nepal, which has driven them into an implicit alliance with the Maoists. He has presented the Nepalese political parties with a stark choice between his unconstitutional regime and “the terrorists,” as he likes to portray the Maoists. The king has become isolated, however, as parties have reluctantly sided with the Maoists over him. As a result, the king has had difficulties initiating any kind of political process to resolve the current impasse.

The people of Nepal are losing patience with the king and are increasingly braving police repression to voice their anger against the monarch. The king’s claim that he needs absolute power in order to quell the insurgents and to end government corruption no longer convinces citizens. The king canceled his UN General Assembly address in September 2005 because the international community, including the United States, no longer seems interested in supporting Domestic Actors. his crusade against the “Red terrorists.”

Fundamentally, the Nepalese monarThe Monarch. Despite the weakening of law and order, King Gyanendra is in no chy seems to have no plan to bring the hurry to restore multi-party democracy country back on track, even as the situain Nepal. He seems determined to keep tion on the ground is turning from bad power and to portray major elected to worse. Moreover, by exposing the political leaders as corrupt and untrust- Nepalese monarchy to day-to-day poliworthy. The king’s power, however, has a tics and power play, the king has weakthin, amorphous, and shrinking social ened the very monarchy that he intends base. He lacks legitimacy while depend- to protect. ing on the Nepalese army to maintain his Political Parties. Driven into a corner by rule. With the Maoists on the one hand and the democracy-seeking political par- the king’s intransigence, the major polit-

rights. Emergency rule has since been lifted, but the king continues to stifle the media with coercive laws and has yet to involve political parties in any meaningful process toward restoration of multiparty democracy. Political leaders and activists remain in prison, contrary to assurances given by the king to the international community.

The rising Maoist insurgency forms the backdrop for this political drama.

Over one-third of Nepal’s 24 million people live below the poverty line, and the gap between rich and poor has widened in recent years. The insurgents have drawn strength from this socioeconomic discontent among the masses and have exploited the shortcomings of the Nepalese political system.2 Although the king took control by claiming that only a strong, centralized government led by a monarch could handle the crisis effectively, the reality is that the king and the Maoists are inseparable twins, conjoined by a rigid feudal order, an extractive economy, and a political system that has no regard for human rights. Both the king and the Maoists have relied on the failure of democracy to bolster their claims to power.

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ical parties are tentatively seeking an alliance with the Maoists in order to take on the monarchy. Growing distrust of the king has prompted the two major political actors–the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist)–to adopt a resolution declaring their willingness to initiate a democratic republican movement. The mainstream political parties in Nepal traditionally subscribed to the idea of monarchy as an essential pillar of Nepali politics. Today, however, they seem prepared to accept the Maoist demand of rewriting Nepal’s constitution and eliminating the role of the king. Nonetheless, the political parties are wary of an open alignment with the Maoists. They do not subscribe to the violent methods employed by the Maoists, who have yet to disarm and have killed scores of prodemocracy supporters in the past.

Another problem facing the mainstream political parties in Nepal is the failure to focus on grassroots efforts in the Nepalese countryside. Fearing for their lives, leaders have allowed the Maoists’ ideological campaign to go uncontested in the interiors. Moreover, due to intense factionalism, major political parties in Nepal have been extremely ineffective in providing credible governance. Despite a number of elections and governments since 1990, no parliament has been able to complete its full term. The intense infighting among the political parties in the Nepali Congress gave first the Maoists, and then the king an opportunity to discredit the democratic forces of Nepal.

Now, under pressure from the king’s machinations, various political parties have united to fight for the restoration of democracy. They hope that the masses will rise in a popular campaign against [ 1 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the king, as they did in 1990. However, public support for their protests remains lackluster to date.

The Maoists. The Maoists seem to be the one actor “winning” in this protracted crisis. They are able to define the terms of the conflict and have taken the initiative away from the king and mainstream political parties. Maoist influence is at its peak, and they continue to experience rising successes.

The Maoist insurgency began in 1996, when the insurgents presented a memorandum of forty demands to the Nepalese prime minister. Their major demands included the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of communist rule as well as the abolition of the Indo-Nepal Mahakali Treaty of 1996 regarding the sharing of river water, electricity, and the delineation of borders.3 The insurgency arose in three districts and now has spread to almost all of the nation’s seventy-five districts. The Maoists enjoy vast support among the poor populace in the interiors of Nepal, who have been left out of the development taking place primarily in the Kathmandu valley. They have also exploited the shortcomings in the Nepalese political system that is dominated by the upper caste Hindus.

After the king took political power, the Maoist strategy has been to ask the political parties to join them in a united front against the monarchy. In September 2005 the Maoists unilaterally declared a three-month long ceasefire. However, they have also made it clear that they are not ready for negotiations with the king.

Instead, they plan to hold talks with the political parties and members of civil society in order to form a broad front against the king. The ceasefire is part of a

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calculated strategy that would enable the Maoists to militarily recover and consolidate, leading to a complete polarization of political forces in Nepal and forcing the political parties to join hands with the Maoists. In an effort to consolidate opposition against the king, the Maoists have publicly resolved not to harm civilians and have shown a willingness to talk to the UN or any other party interested in restoring normalcy and democracy in Nepal. Their refusal to disarm, however, has interfered with alliances with mainstream political parties.

The declaration of the ceasefire by the Maoists has placed the king in a quandary, as he cannot acquiesce to a ceasefire that will place the Nepalese security forces at a strategic disadvantage.

Politics & Diplomacy

a tiny landlocked state, Nepal enjoys a pivotal position in the South Asian geostrategic landscape, as it shares borders with two of the largest states in Asia—China and India. Thus, despite Nepal’s small size, it holds great strategic value for both China and India. Both countries have tried to maintain and increase their influence over Nepal, even as they have each tried to counter the other’s reach over Nepalese affairs.4 The current crisis in Nepal has also brought this regional competition into perspective.

India’s response to the king’s seizure of power has been full of contradictions and has resulted in a turbulent phase in Indo-Nepali relations. Although there were many indications that the king was preparing to take absolute control in

In this contest of wills between the king,

the political parties, and the Maoists, the Maoists clearly have the upper hand.

On the other hand, the Maoists have been successful in projecting themselves as greater votaries of peace than the king, and in countering the impression that they are “terrorists.”

In this three-cornered contest of wills between the king, the political parties, and the Maoists, the Maoists clearly have the upper hand. They have the tacit support of political parties and have successfully cornered the king. But this crisis is also unfolding in a larger regional and global context. India’s response to the crisis will be a crucial factor in determining how this saga unfolds.

Nepal, India allowed itself to be taken by surprise. India had urged the king to compromise with the political parties and warned that the Maoists were taking advantage of the prevailing state of confusion. India also continued to sell arms to the Nepalese army, however, which the king might have seen as a tacit endorsement of his increasingly authoritarian policies, encouraging him to pursue absolute monarchy.

India’s policy on Nepal since then has further complicated the problem. While India had earlier maintained that a constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy were the best options for the Regional Dynamic: India’s For- Himalayan kingdom, it now appears eign Policy Dilemma. Despite being open to the idea of finding an alternative Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 2 5 ]

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to the king. But internal divisions persist within the Indian government: some want to isolate the king while others opt for engagement.

India has so far maintained that it would resume military aid to the Nepalese army, which it suspended after the royal coup, only after the restoration of democracy. However, India is increasingly worried about China’s willingness to supply arms to the king, which could seriously compromise India’s strategic foothold in Nepal. China has not lost any time in using this vacuum to expand its own influence over Nepalese affairs.

Nepal’s monarchs have historically sought to balance India with China, and it is par for the course that King Gyanendra should seek military aid from Beijing to counterbalance Indian pressure.

There are reports of China supplying at least eighteen trucks of arms and ammunition to Nepal that include high explosive grenades, AK-series rifles, and rifle ammunition. China has also announced a number of economic and trade measures with Nepal, including a direct bus service from Kathmandu to Lhasa. China plans to enhance connectivity between Nepal and Tibet through fiber-optic links and energy pipelines, and by bringing the strategic ChinaTibet railways closer to Nepal.5 India is also concerned about the increasing numbers of Nepalese immigrants crossing into India as a result of the persistent violence and worsening economic situation in Nepal.6 Reports suggest that Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency, is trying to capitalize on the crisis by offering arms to Nepal. The ISI has long used Nepalese soil to carry out its anti-India operations, including smuggling, infiltration of terrorists, and circulation of [ 1 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

counterfeit Indian currency notes through the porous Indo-Nepal border.

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal has also had repercussions for the Naxalite rebellions in India, which have spread from around 125 districts to around 170 of the nation’s 602 districts, across 15 of the 28 states. Links between the Maoist uprisings in India and in Nepal have, in the last few years, led to the creation of safe havens and the extension of training facilities.7 Consequently, the Indian government faces a difficult choice. If it continues to provide arms aid to the Nepalese army, it would signal a lack of concern about the king’s abolition of fundamental constitutional rights and the suspension of democracy in Nepal. However, if India completely withdraws its assistance, it would not only strengthen the Maoists, but would also provide a power vacuum that China would only be too glad to fill.

Currently, the official Indian policy remains one of promoting greater cooperation between the king and the political parties to offer a credible fight against the Maoists. The crisis in Nepal, in more ways than one, has become a test case for India’s ability to effectively deal with a problem in its own backyard. India’s long-term ambitions to emerge as a “great power” will be assessed in terms of its strategic capacity to deal with the current imbroglio in Nepal.

International Community: Lackluster Response. The international community, by and large, has accepted India’s primacy in tackling the crisis in Nepal. While most major aid donors, including Britain and the Nordic countries, have decided to suspend military aid to Nepal, the United States has failed to do the same, justifying

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its response as support for the global anti-terrorism campaign. But even the United States is running out of patience with the king’s shenanigans. The U.S. Congress has made it clear that before any new American aid can be given to

Politics & Diplomacy

plagued by weak democratic institutions.

The UN has also been rather ineffective in dealing with the Nepal crisis, exemplifying once again its institutional inability to push recalcitrant actors into directions it advocates. It should take a

Linkages between the Maoist uprisings in India and in Nepal have, in the last few years, led to the creation of safe havens and the extension of training facilities.

Nepal, it must be convinced that King Gyanendra is serious about guaranteeing basic human rights. The UN has also called for a return to constitutional rule as soon as possible. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the international community has a larger strategy to deal with this crisis, apart from making routine calls for the restoration of democracy.

At a time when U.S. foreign policy is premised entirely on the advancement of democracy around the world, it would be hypocritical if the most powerful country in the world refuses to tackle the weakening of democratic institutions in Nepal.

Moreover, it would be a strategic mistake to ignore Nepal. China’s overtures toward the Nepalese monarchy and its willingness of help the Nepali military in crushing the insurgency will make China the most powerful global actor in Nepal.

China has ignored moves by the United States, European Union, and India to bring pressure on Nepal’s king by choking arms supplies. On the other hand, if the Maoist insurgents gain a permanent foothold in Nepal, it would be ruinous for the stability of the entire South Asian region, where the majority of states are

more active role in the resolution of the crisis as two of the foremost global concerns, state failure and terrorism, come together in Nepal. The people of Nepal remain wary about the international community’s trustworthiness, as its past commitment to democracy in Nepal has proven fickle. The international community must now restore that trust.

Conclusion. It would be a great tragedy

if Nepal were allowed to wither away as another failed state on the peripheries of global concern. Nepal is on the verge of economic collapse, aid agencies have withdrawn, and ordinary Nepalese suffer from crippling shortages of essential goods and services. In addition, the space for democratic political action has shrunk considerably: the Maoists have control of vast swathes of Nepal, and the Nepalese army is mobilized fully. In this increasingly militarized environment, mainstream political parties and civil society organizations find it difficult to be effective. While the people of Nepal are the worst affected in this conflict, they seem to have retained their trust in democracy as the best form of government, even as Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 2 7 ]

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they remain disappointed with democracy and with the behavior of politicians.8 King Gyanendra uses the long-festering Maoist insurgency as an excuse for dismissing the democratically elected government. But he himself failed miserably in bringing the conflict to any sort of a resolution. Indeed, the situation is worsening with every passing day as the king becomes more autocratic in his behavior. He has made peace more unlikely by attacking the moderate political center and by forcing the mainstream political parties into an alliance with the Maoists. His exclusive reliance on the military in dealing with the Maoists, even though it has long been obvious that there is no military solution to the insurgency,

has further exacerbated the situation.

The Nepalese army cannot defeat the Maoists, and the Maoists are not expected to be able to control Kathmandu; the result will be a military and political stalemate with no foreseeable resolution.

The fact that there is no meeting ground between the king and the Maoists reveals a political vacuum that can only spell more uncertainty and chaos in the days ahead. Public unrest in Nepal will not subside unless there is a new constitution and genuine democracy. The insurgents will have to be brought to the negotiating table by a legitimate representative government, which could tackle the underlying socioeconomic conditions that spawned this insurgency.

NOTES

1 Chitra K. Tiwari, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 187, Internet, http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper187.htm.

2 On the relationship between development and security in Nepal, see Stuart Gordon, “Evaluating Nepal’s Integrated ‘Security’ and ‘Development’ Policy,” Asian Survey 15, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 581-602.

3 The text of the Mahakali Treaty of 1996 between India and Nepal is available at http://wrmin.nic.in /international/mkalitreaty.htm.

4 For a detailed examination of Sino-Indian competition over Nepal, see Manish Dabhade and Harsh V. Pant, “Coping with Challenges to Sovereignty:

[ 1 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Sino-Indian Rivalry and Nepal’s Foreign Policy,” Contemporary South Asia 13, no. 2 (June 2004): 157-169.

5 Saurabh Shukla, “The Gulf Widens,” India Today, 19 September 2005.

6 Ibid.

7 S. Chandrasekharan, “Maoists Begin their Peace Offensive,” South Asia Analysis Group, Internet, http://saag.org/notes3/note275.html.

8 For details on a recent survey on the attitudes of Nepalese citizens regarding democracy, see Yogendra Yadav, “Nepalis want Democracy, not Monarchy,” The Hindu, 3 March 2005.

Science&Technology Nano-Diplomacy Peter Singer, Abdallah Daar, Fabio SalamancaBuentello, and Erin Court Innovations in science and technology have a critical impact in fields related to sustainable development, such as health monitoring, energy management, agricultural productivity, pollution control, food processing, and sanitation upgrades.

Calestous Juma, chairperson of the UN Millennium Project Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation emphasized that “it is inconceivable that the UN Millennium Development Goals can be achieved as planned by 2015, or even that significant gains can be made in meeting health and environmental concerns, without a focused policy for science, technology, and innovation.�1 The most recent addition to our science and technology toolkit is nanotechnology, the study, design, creation, synthesis, manipulation, and application of functional materials, devices, and systems through control of matter at the nanometer scale—that is, at the atomic and molecular levels.2 However, despite rapid advances of nanotechnology in fields such as consumer electronics and cosmetics, there is no coherent program linking nanotechnology to global developmental challenges.

Nanotechnology, if exploited appropriately, can bring tremendous benefits to developing countries. Our group at the Canadian Program in Genomics and Global Health has extensively studied the role of nanotechnology for the devel-

Peter Singer is Sun Life Financial Chair in Bioethics and Director of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics.

Abdallah Daar is Director of the Program in Applied Ethics and Biotechnology at the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics.

Fabio SalamancaBuentello is a Mexican physician and a member of the Genomics and Nanotechnology Working Group of the UN Millennium Project Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation.

Erin Court is a research assistant in the Canadian Program in Genomics and Global Health and a member of the Task Force.

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oping world. In collaboration with an international panel of experts, we conducted a foresight study in 2003, which identifies and ranks the ten nanotechnologies most likely to benefit developing countries in the 2003-2013 period.3 To evaluate the impact of these ten nanotechnologies, we mapped them to the UN Millennium Development Goals, a set of eight quantifiable development targets that all UN member states have committed to achieve by 2015.

The successful application of nanotechnology toward sustainable development challenges depends upon the skillful collaboration between nations, in particular between developed and developing countries, which we refer to as nano-diplomacy. This article will show that nano-diplomacy must go beyond international treaties and conventions in order to create bottom-up collaboration between governments, industries, civil societies, and academia in both the developed and the developing world. The success of linking nanotechnology to development applications also depends on how effectively developing countries address the issues of safety standards, intellectual property, and public engagement.

sent an encouraging picture. Our survey of nanotechnology activity in developing countries highlights many cases of successful partnerships between local industries and scientists and researchers to develop locally relevant nanotechnology products.5 For instance, nanotechnology has been a priority of the Chinese government since the late 1990s. Its national nanotechnology plan has strong funding from programs like the National 863 Hi-Tech Research and Development Plan and the Knowledge Innovation Program. China has also established numerous national centers for nanotechnology research and development, including one currently under creation at Tsinghua University, located near the Tsinghua Science Park.6 This Science Park is a national “innovation model” that links industry and researchers in order to accelerate and sustain innovation in strategic core technologies, including nanotechnology. As a result of its focused efforts, China has over 800 nanotechnology-related companies, and the country is a patent leader in this field.7 South Africa has also adopted a national nanotechnology strategy to address industrial and social priorities in the areas of health, water, and energy through a focus on nanotechnology Local Responses to Nanotech- applications.8 Thailand’s National Nannology. To address local needs, devel- otechnology Center, located in the Thaioping countries need a policy that is land Science Park in Pathumthani, is an focused on technology innovation, and not autonomous body under the governmerely technology transfer. As Forbes Maga- ment’s National Science and Technology zine publishes another year’s “Top Ten Agency and aims to apply nanotechnoloNanotech Products”—featuring foot gy for economic and human developwarmers, golf balls, and personalized ment.9 skin care—developing countries need Some have wrongly argued that nantheir own nanotechnology innovation otechnology will upset developing-counsystems to create products most respon- try export markets that rely heavily on sive to local priorities.4 agricultural products and raw materials Local nanotechnology initiatives pre- like rubber, since the demand for these [ 1 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

SINGER, DAAR, SALAMANCA-BUENTELLO, & COURT

primary commodities will decrease as nanotechnology produces cheaper laboratory-created substitutes. The result will be that nanotechnology will displace poor agricultural, factory, and mine laborers, among others.10 On the contrary, advances in science and technology have inevitably brought about the automation of manual tasks. Thus, the decrease in manual labor is a natural consequence of any technology, not just nanotechnology. In both developed and developing countries, the workforce has

Science &Technology

farmers, which represent a severe strain on a country’s limited resources. Since 2001 researchers from University of Brazil, the Federal University of Goiás, and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro have been developing nanomagnets for cleaning water contaminated by large-scale oil spills.12 The Chemistry Institute at Brazil’s State University of Campinas has been developing nanobiotechnology applications, including the use of nanoparticles in drug delivery systems.13 The India-based non-

Developing countries need a focused

policy on technology innovation and not merely technology transfer. necessarily adapted to the changes derived from successive waves of technology. Local innovation offers the best approach to maximize the benefits of nanotechnology for the developing world, and these potential gains warrant a more appreciative outlook toward nanotechnology’s role.

Local Benefits to Local Responses. Developing countries

derive unmistakable benefits from nanotechnology. First, nanotechnology’s advances will improve the welfare of the world’s poorest and sickest. For instance, agricultural applications of nanotechnology such as nanoporous zeolites can increase soil fertility and crop productivity, while novel devices like nanosensors can monitor crop health.11 Nanotechnology can protect against the devastating consequences of crop failure in developing countries, including malnutrition, famine, and displaced and impoverished

governmental organization (NGO) Nimbkar Agricultural Research Institute undertakes innovative science and technology programs to improve the quality of life of the rural poor in India and is currently investigating the use of nanoengines that operate on biomass-derived fuels to produce efficient and transportable lighting sources for rural communities. Once this technology is established, “cost reduction processes and creative financing mechanisms for its availability to rural poor can be designed.”14 Research in Thailand includes nanofiltration systems for water treatment and sanitation and the fabrication of prototype solar cells using nanoparticles as electron acceptors.15 Hence, nanotechnology can be employed to address local needs in developing countries.

Second, nanotechnology will also create more opportunities for local scientists and researchers and will help accelWinter/Spring 2006 [ 1 3 1 ]

NANO-DIPLOMACY

erate the transition of innovating developing countries toward robust knowledge-based economies. South Africa’s Department of Science and Technology has spoken of overcoming the “innovation chasm” in order to move away from technological dependency.16 This shift should move from the bottom up and should include a special emphasis on basic and interdisciplinary science education. The universities of Madras, Mumbai, and Kolkata in India have established a collaborative degree program in cutting-edge nanoscience and nanotechnology.17 However, the economic impact of nanotechnology will depend upon the economic development stage of a country. Comparatively advanced countries such as China and India have a greater critical mass for nanotechnology exploitation than less developed countries in South Asia and Africa. Given the limited resources available to each coun-

property (IP) for the development of nanotechnology, bearing in mind that patents from universities, companies, and the military might inhibit research and development efforts in less industrialized countries. With respect to IP rights, an inherent tension exists between providing incentives for innovation and promoting wide and easy access to the resultant technologies, especially if the technologies are important to save lives or to help large numbers of people.

While such issues are complex, it seems prudent to avoid undue concentration of resources in a few hands, as this leads to “patent thickets,” which actually impede research and development.18 Patent pools, patent clearinghouses, and opensource types of approaches that have been successful in the information technology sector may be solutions to prevent this problem. In the field of biotechnology research, the African Agricultural Technology Foundation has negotiated royal-

Nanotechnology will help accelerate the

transition of developing countries toward robust knowledge-based economies. try, the trick is to prioritize applications that promise the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people.

Challenges for Developing Countries.

The Challenge of Managing Intellectual Property.

Benefit-sharing between developed and developing countries in the commercialization of nanotechnology products is necessary. Consideration must be given to the best ways to harness intellectual [ 1 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ty-free licensing and sublicensing with technology patent holders from private companies, public-private partnerships, and NGOs to help developing-country research institutes access patented agricultural technologies.19 Successful nanodiplomacy must address the effects of IP regimes on the developing world.

The Challenge of Incorporating the Private Sector.

Private-sector involvement is a key factor in moving from knowledge to product.20 India’s national nanotechnology initiative

SINGER, DAAR, SALAMANCA-BUENTELLO, & COURT

Science &Technology

involves more than thirty research and development institutes to identify nanotechnology products with potential for commercialization. The private CranesSci MEMS Lab, located in the Indian Institute of Science, advocates the establishment of nanotechnology centres inside research institutes with seed funding from private companies. According to this institution, engaging local private enterprise in India’s nanotechnology research will strengthen domestic capacity, attract and retain highly skilled national and international researchers, and ensure the longevity of product-driven research centers.21 In Brazil the University of Sao Paulo established the incubator Nanocore Biotechnology22 as an on-campus spin-off company from a university group’s research on biodegradable nanoparticles for encapsulation of pharmaceutical agents. The South African Nanotechnology Initiative (SANi) aims to coordinate university researchers, industrial companies, and government-science councils to catalyze multi-sectoral nanotechnology advances.23

ardous exposure to nanomaterials in industrial and scientific workplaces. The main routes of internalization are inhalation, ingestion, and absorption.

Animal studies have found that inhaled nanoparticles can be selectively transported into the brains of mammals via the olfactory nerves.25 Another study has found that nanotubes can induce inflammatory lesions in the lungs of mice.26 While these studies suggest that nanoparticles may be toxic, animal models alone are not sufficient to predict risk effects of nanoparticles in humans.

Clearly, more and better information is needed to predict the effects of nanotechnology on environmental health and safety. A research group at the University of Toronto is currently monitoring developments in the toxicity of quantum dots, with the aim of creating a database of nanotoxicity studies and developing policy options for converging technologies. The Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology at Rice University is engaged in research on how nanomaterials interact with biological systems and affect biochemical and celluThe Challenge of Managing Risks to the Environ- lar processes.27 The International Counment and Human Health. Although nanotech- cil of Nanotechnology recently launched nology can contribute to human welfare, an online catalogue of scientific literaparticularly in developing countries, not ture on the environmental, health, and all of the effects of nanomaterials in the safety implications of nanomaterials so environment are known. For example, that researchers, industry, government nanoparticles could accumulate in dif- agencies, and the public can access the ferent organisms, become incorporated most current information for assessing in living tissue, and move up the food the safety of nanoparticles.28 Developing chain in a process known as bioaccumu- countries must have efficient and inexlation. A study on largemouth bass found pensive measuring and monitoring elevated levels of oxidative deterioration devices for workplace exposure to nanoof lipids in the brains of fish that were materials. Novel protective gear will exposed to water-soluble fullerenes, probably be necessary to avoid risks relatwhich are hollow carbon structures that ed to the handling of these substances. are used in many nanotechnologies.24 The Challenge of Managing Public Engagement.

Another concern is the possibility of hazWinter/Spring 2006 [ 1 3 3 ]

NANO-DIPLOMACY

Recent studies on the public perception of emerging nanotechnologies suggest that the public desires more information on nanotechnology’s promises and risks and wants increased testing on environmental and health effects.29 The studies encourage industry to listen to the public and to recommend mechanisms to integrate the public into national policy decision making. One way to increase public participation in science and technology is to convene citizens’ juries, representative of a diverse subset of the pop-

public outreach tool to foster greater social awareness regarding nanotechnology’s potential to improve lives in developing countries.

Overly apprehensive views and exaggeration of the risks can stall serious progress in nanotechnology and can diminish the health, environmental, and economic opportunities for developing countries. Addressing legitimate concerns and allowing developing countries to weigh the risks and benefits for themselves will allow responsible development

International treaties and conventions

may not be well suited to promoting the global benefits of a rapidly advancing field of science and technology. ulation, that then provide recommendations for the future direction and regulation of nanotechnology. One such effort is NanoJury UK, which brings together twenty randomly chosen people to engage in discussions of the societal impacts of nanotechnology and to provide a potential vehicle for the public’s views to influence policy decisions.30 Greater public information means greater preparedness to make rational assessments instead of relying on kneejerk reactions and gut feelings. Engaging youth in discussions of emerging technologies is key to developing an informed future voting population. In 2002 we developed Engage: Stem Cells, a curricular unit for Canadian high school students to debate the ethical and governance issues of stem cell technology. Based upon this highly successful strategy, we are currently developing NanoEngage, a [ 1 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of nanotechnology and will pave the way toward public acceptance. Nanotechnology should be given the opportunity to create real, tangible benefits for the developing world—such as for the 50 million people in Bangladesh at risk of arsenic poisoning and for the 4 million affected by the earthquake in Pakistan— before Michael Crichton’s novel, featuring life-destroying nanoscale robots, makes it onto the big screen.31

Components of Nanodiplomacy: The Role of Industrialized Countries.

Global Challenges. One way to accelerate the application of nanotechnology for developing-country needs is to summon the world’s best scientific minds to address grand challenges, using the model employed by the FNIH/Bill and

SINGER, DAAR, SALAMANCA-BUENTELLO, & COURT

Melinda Gates Foundation’s Grand Challenges in Global Health. A grand challenge is a call to arms for investigators to channel their efforts toward a specific scientific or technological breakthrough that will overcome one or more significant development challenges. An initiative entitled “Addressing Global Challenges Using Nanotechnology” could draw from the top ten nanotechnology applications we have already identified for developing countries to construct a plan of action for mobilizing the international community. Funding for this initiative could be tied to industrialized countries’ official development assistance programs, or it could be part of discrete funding for science and technology assistance.

Collaboration. North-South collaborations that link developed- and developing-country scientists, industries, and governments will not only facilitate the international harmonization of regulatory frameworks, but will also promote awareness of the needs and opportunities for the poor with respect to nanotechnology. South-South collaborations will become increasingly relevant as developing countries learn lessons from the successes and failures of other developing countries in building strong nanotechnology sectors.

Global Governance. A global strategy is needed to assess and promote nanotechnology for development. While traditional governance models tend to focus on risks and restrictions, a more holistic model should include a focus on innovation and the enormous potential of nanotechnology to address global challenges.

Among the issues to be addressed are the following: How can nanotechnology be

Science &Technology

used responsibly? Which applications ought to be given priority? What policies are needed to develop capacity and ensure that the benefits of nanotechnology reach those in greatest need? How should regulatory regimes be developed and implemented?

Choosing an appropriate governance model for mobilizing international action in nanotechnology is crucial.

International treaties and conventions may not be well suited to promotion of global benefits of a rapidly advancing field of science and technology. They are often slow to be negotiated and ratified and may suffer from poor adherence once they come into force. A flexible global network of representatives from government, academia, industry, and civil society could serve as a forum for international dialogue between the public and policymakers to shape institutional decisions and discuss policy options.32 Inclusive and equal participation of diverse sectors such as civil society and industry would facilitate collaborative strategies for managing risks in order to promote the global benefits of nanotechnology. Existing networks, public-private partnerships, and coalitions working to establish worldwide capacity in science and technology, including the InterAcademy Council and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could play a significant role in this global network.

Conclusion. Given the emerging global consensus on the role of science and technology as a critical instrument of development, industrialized countries should take the lead to ensure that its advances benefit both the rich and the poor. Indeed, science and technology is becoming an integral element of foreign Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 3 5 ]

NANO-DIPLOMACY

policy and international relations.

Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin has committed to devoting no less than 5 percent of Canada’s research and development spending to address developing-world challenges.33 In a 2002 speech to the National Academy of Sciences, former Secretary of State Colin Powell noted: “You don’t have to...be Secretary of State to survey the twentyfirst-century terrain and see that science and technology must inform and support our foreign policymaking in this challenging world that we live in.

Whether the mission is…creating conditions for sustainable development, or stemming the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, the formulation of our foreign policy must proceed from a solid scien-

tific foundation.”34 If industrialized countries were to leverage national nanotechnology assets into foreign policy, the developed world could ensure that domestic innovation benefits developing countries. In order to promote a global approach for the development of nanotechnology, a portion of public funds from industrialized countries should be marshaled toward areas of research relevant to less industrialized nations. Governments should also consider how to establish incentives for companies to commercialize products and services in the developing world to address local challenges. Nano-diplomacy is arguably one of the most important offerings developed countries can bring to the international table.

NOTES

1 The Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation was one of ten task forces commissioned to advise on the implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals. See the report, “Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development,” of the UN Millennium Project Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation, London: Earthscan, 2005, Internet, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/ tf_science.htm (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

2 1-100 nanometers, one nanometer being equal to 1 × 10-9 of a meter.

3 F. Salamanca-Buentello, D.L. Persad, E.B. Court, D.K. Martin, A.S. Daar, and P.A. Singer, “Nanotechnology and the Developing World,” PLoS Medicine 2, no. 5 (2005): e97. The top ten nanotechnology applications for developing countries are: energy storage, production, and conversion; agricultural productivity enhancement; water treatment and remediation; disease diagnosis and screening; drug delivery systems; food processing and storage; air pollution and remediation; construction; health monitoring; and vector and pest detection and control.

4 Josh Wolfe, “Top Ten Nanotech Products,” Forbes.com. Internet, http://www.forbes.com/investmentnewsletters/2005/01/12/cz_jw_0112soapbox.html (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

5 E.B. Court, A.S. Daar, E. Martin, T. Acharya, P.A. Singer, “Will Prince Charles et al Diminish the Opportunities Of Developing Countries in Nanotechnology?” Nanotechnology 4, no. 3: 3 (2004).

Also published in the online journal Nanotechweb.org. Internet, http://www.nanotech-

[ 1 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

web.org/articles/society/3/1/1/1 (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

6 “China to Set up Nano Science Center,” China People’s Daily, 25 March 2003. Internet, http://english.people.com.cn/200303/25/eng20030325_1139 47.shtml (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

7 “China’s Nanotechnology Industry,” MAIT eNews 59 (October 2005).

Internet, http://ma.mait.com:5050/newsletters/news137MAIT%20Country%20Intelligence%20eNews59.pdf (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

8 “National Nanotechnology Strategy: Nanowonders - Endless Possibilities, Volume 1, Draft 1.5,” South African Nanotechnology Initiative, South African Nanotechnology Initiative and the Department of Science and Technology, Pretoria, 2003.

9 NANOTEC, National Nanotechnology Center, Internet, http://www.nanotec.or.th/nanotec/eng/ index.php (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

10 “Down on the Farm: The Impact of Nano-scale Technologies on Food and Agriculture,” ETC Group, Winnipeg, 2004.

11 F. Salamanca-Buentello, D.L. Persad, E.B. Court, D.K. Martin, A.S. Daar, P.A. Singer, “Nanotechnology and the Developing World,” PLoS Medicine 2, no 5 (2005): e97.

12 Alexandra Ozorio de Almeida, “Responses to Questionnaire on Nanotechnology,” Internet, http://www.nanotec.org.uk/evidence/brazil.htm (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

13 Ibid.

14 Anil K. Rajvanshi, “Rocket Science for Rural

SINGER, DAAR, SALAMANCA-BUENTELLO, & COURT

Development,” January 2005, Internet, http://nariphaltan.virtualave.net/rocketscience.pdf (Date accessed: 3 December 2005).

15 See Prof. C. Visvanathan at the Asian Institute of Technology, Internet, http://www.faculty.ait.ac.th/visu /main_page.htm; and “Current Status of Nanotech in Thailand,” Internet, http://www.nanoworld.jp/apnw/ articles/library/pdf/19.pdf (Date accessed: 29 December 2005).

16 Pontsho Maruping, “South African Nanotechnology Strategy,” Presentation delivered on 11 February 2005. Internet, http://www.ics.trieste.it/Documents/Downloads/df2680.pdf (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

17 “Madras University to set up nanotech centre,” Nanomaker, 28 April 2005. Internet, http://www. nanomaker.ru/home.asp?artId=56 (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

18 Ted Sabety, “Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth?” Abstract for presentation given at the 1st Conference on Advanced Nanotechnology: Research, Applications, and Policy, Internet, http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/AdvNano2004/Abstracts/Sabe ty/ (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

19 “The African Agricultural Technology Foundation,” New Agriculturalist Online, Internet, http://www.new-agri.co.uk/04-6/develop/dev05.html (Date accessed: 29 November 2005). Also, see the African Agricultural Technology Foundation, Internet, http://www.aatf-africa.org/ (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

20 H Thorsteinsdóttir, U Quach, DK Martin, AS Daar, PA Singer, “Introduction: Promoting global health through biotechnology: An exploration of health biotechnology innovation systems in developing countries,” Nature Biotechnology 22 (2004): DC3-7.

21 Rudra Pratap, “Engaging Private Enterprise in Nanotech Research in India,” CranesSci MEMS Lab, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India. Presentation available at: www.ics.trieste.it/Documents/ Downloads/df2598.ppt.

22 See Nanocore Biotechnology, http://www.nano core.com.br/index.php.

23 See SANi, http://www.sani.org.za/.

24 Eva Oberdörster, “Manufactured Nanomaterials (Fullerenes, C60) Induce Oxidative Stress in the Brain of Juvenile Largemouth Bass,” Environmental Health Perspectives 112, no. 10 (2004): 1058-1062.

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25 G. Oberdorster, Z. Sharp, V. Atudorei, A. Elder, R. Gelein, A. Lunts, W. Kreyling, C. Cox, “Extrapulmonary Translocation of Ultrafine Carbon Particle Following Whole-body Inhalation Exposure of Rats,” Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health Part A 65 (2002): 1531-1543.

26 Chiu-Wing Lam, John T. James, Richard McCluskey, and Robert L. Hunter, “Pulmonary Toxicity of Single-Wall Carbon Nanotubes in Mice 7 and 90 Days After Intratracheal Instillation,” Toxicological Sciences 77 (2004): 126–134.

27 Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN), http://cben.rice.edu/.

28 International Council on Nanotechnology.

Internet, http://icon.rice.edu/research.cfm, (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

29 Jane Macoubrie, “Informed Public Perceptions of Nanotechnology and Trust in Government,” The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in partnership with the Pew Charitable Trusts. Also see Dietram Scheufele, “The public and nanotechnology: How citizens make sense of emerging technologies,” Internet, http://www.journalism.wisc.edu/~scheufele/ jnprscheuf.pdf (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

Pre-publication version. Forthcoming in Journal of Nanoparticle Research.

30 See NanoJury UK, Internet, http://www.nanojury.org/ (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

31 Michael Chrichton, Prey, (New York: Harper Collins, 2002).

32 E. Dowdeswell, A.S. Daar, T. Acharya, P.A. Singer, “Realizing the Promise of Genomics: Exploring Governance,” International Journal of Technology and Globalization, in press. Also see E. Dowdeswell, A.S. Daar, P.A. Singer, “Bridging the Genomics Divide,” Global Governance Journal 9 (2003): 1-6.

33 Government of Canada, Office of the Prime Minister (2004). Complete text and videos of the prime minister’s reply to the speech from the throne.

Internet, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=277 (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

34 Colin Powell, “The Intersection of Science and Diplomacy.” Remarks to the 139th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, 30 April 2002, Washington, D.C., Internet, http://www.nasonline.org/ site/PageServer?pagename=NEWS_address_04302002_ Powell_2002am (Date accessed: 29 November 2005).

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ADS PAGE 138

Books

Islamic Reform or Designer Fundamentalism?

Review By Ebrahim Moosa Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 272 pp. $45.00.

Europe’s Muslims have replaced the “Jewish problem” of “old” Europe. The recent misgivings of influential European figures about Turkey’s accession to the European Union and the prohibition of the scarf in French public schools only confirm such fears. If media reports are to be believed, Europe is becoming increasingly paranoid about Islam. Latent fears of the Muslim threat flared once again last year when a Dutch filmmaker’s use of Islamic symbols provoked a Moroccan to murder. Regular revelations about the presence of militant Muslim networks in European capitals only compound anxieties. At one level,

Muslims in Europe are confined to cultural perceptions that change in name only over time: the memory of the “Turk” of folklore has been replaced by the simple cipher of “Muslim”; the veiled woman of Orientalist fantasies is now the hijab-wearing female, and the red threat of Communism is currently embodied by the fanaticism of Muslim terrorism.

Spectacle is the word that comes to mind when social relations are formed only around images. Such confrontations powerfully reinforce a sense of impersonal relations, distance, and enmity.

In Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, Tariq Ramadan seeks to redress some of these negative Muslim images by proposing a blueprint for a “Western Muslim” or a “European Muslim” identity.1 Ramadan is from Geneva, where he combines the roles of a religious figure, a university professor, and a public intellectual. He enjoys wide popularity among Muslim audiences in Europe, North America, and beyond. In 2004, howevWinter/Spring 2006 [ 1 3 9 ]

ISLAMIC REFORM OR DESIGNER FUNDAMENTALISM?

er, the Bush administration barred him from taking up a position at the University of Notre Dame after certain American neo-conservative lobbyists objected to his presence in the United States. Ironically, he now serves as an advisor to Bush’s closest transatlantic ally, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and will be a regular fellow at Saint Antony’s College at Oxford University. Some critics believe that Ramadan’s pedigree renders him less appealing than the actual causes he defends. He is the maternal grandson of Hasan al-Banna, the early-twentiethcentury founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that spawned the Egyptian equivalent of the Islamic International. Other critics allege—without convincing proof or substantiation— that he is a protean figure.

What Ramadan forgot was that when dealing with the Muslim issue, Europe’s best minds regress, and sentiment in the United States does not lag far behind.

Many Europeans consider Muslims to be the new “barbarians,” and this attitude drives many to adopt positions of intolerance and xenophobia. Given the controversial Rushdie affair in the eighties, the recent affaire du foulard in France, and growing resentment of the Turkish immigrant community in Germany, it is often difficult to distinguish the mentality of many European intellectuals from that of the mob. The recent train bombings in Madrid and London have only exacerbated these tensions.

In Western Muslims, Ramadan ambitiously attempts to construct a narrative of reform that is internal to Muslim discourse. Armed with this approach, he believes he can provide the Western Muslim an entry point into the discursive framework of Western political and cultural life. While his paradigm is not [ 1 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

oblivious to the larger European political and cultural contexts, he rejects claims that there is a difference between Western and Islamic realities. Ramadan laments that such a “bipolar vision is widespread” and is critical of Muslims who bask in the intimidating power and legitimacy that their otherness produces.2 He dismisses such a simplistic vision as a decoy, and argues that the claims that justify it are boldface untruths.

Ramadan rightly asserts that the power such a skewed vision bestows on angry and disgruntled Muslims “is a pure illusion.”

Muslims only “isolate themselves, marginalize themselves, and sometimes, by their excessive emotional, intellectual and social isolation, even strengthen the logic of the dominant system whose power, by contrast, lies in always appearing open, pluralistic, and rational.”3 Incredibly, Ramadan follows this assertion with the claim that his analytic framework is apolitical. In light of this dispassionate approach, he refrains from addressing concerns about Muslim security and Islamophobia. To him these are secondary questions. Still, Ramadan’s views on this matter run counter to most of the critical literature that examines the place of Muslims in Europe.4 Ramadan rehabilitates ideas about Islamic reform that have been around for at least a century; why he has to warn his readers that his ideas will be “frightening” and “offensive” to some is anyone’s guess.

Claims that his meditations are radical because they are the product of careful “readings of the scriptural sources,” coupled with his study of the West, are even more inexplicable. The sum of his investigations leads to two “fundamental theses.” The first is an unbending advocacy of the universal principles of Islam against the corrosive influences of post-

MOOSA

modern relativism. The second is a desire to safeguard the intellectual and cultural independence of Western Muslims from the negative influences that emanate from non-Western Muslim social and cultural contexts.

Like nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury Muslim modernists, Ramadan uncritically equates notions of universality in Muslim thought with Enlightenment universality. Not only is such an equivalence questionable, but it also challenges his ringing allegiance to the “classical” tradition of Islam. Often Ramadan is unable to reconcile the contradictory implications of Muslim and Western universal claims. Indeed, his attempt at platitudinous reconciliation does not resolve the dilemma.

With refreshing clarity, Sherman A. Jackson, professor of Arabic and Islamic studies at the University of Michigan, notes that in their zeal for reform, Western Muslim advocates routinely engage in a number of false universals to illustrate the compatibility of liberal thought and Islam in an attempt to portray the latter as tolerant and pluralistic.5 The result of this process is something more than a homogenization of time, place, and experience. When read through Jackson’s critical eye, Ramadan’s book promotes “a chic, prestigious, and powerful universal,” but in the end is nothing more than a sophisticated form of “designer fundamentalism.”6 According to Jackson, endemic to the approach adopted by the likes of Ramadan and a generation of Muslim modernists is a “subtle civilizing mission that aims at obliterating one historical consciousness, without altering the history that produced it.” In doing so, reformist Muslims embrace another historical consciousness, namely that of

Books

Protestant modernity, without questioning its assumptions.

Appraising Western Muslims in light of existing scholarship (which Ramadan unfortunately ignores) quickly turns it into an extremely frustrating study punctuated by intellectual chasms. This book leaves the patient reader to infer its message and tempts the imperious reader to hurl it aside. The author provides no rationale as to why he uses the category “Western” versus “European” Muslim and what such terms mean in his lexicon.

One may ask whether there is a difference between “Western” and “westernized” Muslims. If so, what are the critical differences or similarities? Today, it is rare for Muslims to identify themselves as Eastern, let alone African, Asian, or Middle Eastern Muslim, without an explanation for such a label. The identity and location of westernized Muslims is also unclear; arguably, there are more westernized Muslims outside the geographical “West,” in places like Lebanon, Egypt, and India.

Not only do such elementary questions and possibilities go unanswered and unexplored, but after two hundred pages, the reader is left without an indication of what redemptive value “Western” Muslims hold for the “future of Islam.” Even a lay public will find little refreshing directive here, and if this is Ramadan’s manifesto for reform, then one surely hopes that he will not nail it to the doors of a mosque in Geneva or Paris as Luther did at a church in Wittenberg.

At best, his meditation should be treated as a homily where rhetoric gains primacy over ideas.

Islamic law has always been at the center of modern Muslim reform efforts and Ramadan wishes to add his voice to this debate. But in his methodology, there is Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 4 1 ]

ISLAMIC REFORM OR DESIGNER FUNDAMENTALISM?

nothing original or distinct from debates produced in “Eastern” Muslim contexts.

Muslim reformers from the late nineteenth century onward energetically reframed the vocabulary of Islamic law so that it yielded to at least two goals: first, that public interest (maslaha) reflect the ordinances of the Muslim scripture, the Qur’an, and the ethical teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna); second, that religion, life, intellect, property, and lineage be preserved above all as the cardinal ends of Muslim ethics. While public interest was a controversial doctrine in the history of Muslim thought, modern reformers recuperated it and elevated it to an article of faith, much to the chagrin of the Muslim traditionalists who follow a canonical tradition of juridical and ethical interpretation. If the traditionalist clerics (‘ulama) became doctrinaire in their adherence to socially constructed interpretations of the revealed law (Shari’a), their reformist counterparts became wedded to the unmediated authority of the revealed texts. This was part of a well-meaning purist turn to the text in search of fresh inspiration, and indeed the reformers believed that they had erected an unshakeable platform upon these two goals. Ramadan falls squarely within this camp.

The doctrinaire canonical approach of the ‘ulama, as well as the purist approach, are both modern iterations with scant respect for history. Early traditionalists had a more robust understanding of tradition and history. They acknowledged that the revealed texts were in a permanent conversation with multiple discourses of living traditions. In the latter, notions of time, place, and context mattered as much as the intent lurking behind the texts. In the absence of serious history, reformist and revivalist [ 1 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

adherence to the revealed text became an exercise in manufacturing imagined traditions. This is modern Islam’s protestant turn. Such a move clearly resonated with notions of modernist individualism, autonomy, and democratic authority, but was often at odds with the canonized historical traditions and practices.

Textualist or protestant versions of Islam often produce draconian legal dispensations with toxic social outcomes in the name of Islamic law, as a series of highly publicized spectacles involving Shari’a in Nigeria and elsewhere in the Muslim world have demonstrated.

While reformists, including Ramadan, have elevated the study of Muslim legal theory (usul al-fiqh) to preeminent status, in reality such gestures have had little more than a placebo effect. Legal theories were post hoc rationalizations for the varieties of Muslim juridical and ethical discourse in the past and were by no means proactive. Theory gave aspiring jurists the tools whereby they could legitimately derive moral knowledge from scriptural sources and engage the world around them. Contemporary reformists unfortunately settle with merely dusting off theories produced in the pre-modern period or selectively using some ancient threads in order to justify their reforms. In practice, this tendency does nothing but further the inchoate patchwork that Ramadan laments. Yet rather than providing an alternative, Ramadan perpetuates the existing pattern of eclecticism by rehearsing snippets of this debate with spare value added.

One example will suffice: in Western Muslims, Ramadan argues that there are limits to interpretation and that there should be complete fidelity to the revealed text, especially the explicit and unequivocal rulings contained in the

MOOSA

Qur’an. Among such teachings are the penalties of amputations for theft, flogging for fornication, and the Shari`a ruling of stoning for adultery. Therefore it is surprising to learn that, in an op-ed piece published in a Canadian newspaper, Ramadan called for a moratorium on these corporal penalties.7 While I have sympathy with his position, the flagrant contradiction of excising an explicit verse of the Qur’an renders his elaborate theoretical posturing pediatric nonsense. Ramadan, however, is not alone among contemporary thinkers who embarrassingly stumble due to their explicit allegiance to a “textual fundamentalism.”8 This example serves to illustrates the serious weaknesses that plague contemporary Muslim ethical and juridical thought of a reformist bent.

To his credit, Ramadan does encourage Western Muslims to learn about their political systems and engage in economic activity. But when it comes to ethical practices, he cannot make up his mind as to whether Western Muslims should follow the teachings as elucidated by the traditional ‘ulama, entrenched, as he puts it, in Eastern modes of thinking, or whether lay people should become autodidacts.

He also admirably struggles with the question of religion and the intolerant face of secularism in the West. As to the question of whether Muslims should seek out separate spaces in the modern West by forming private Islamic schools, Ramadan leans towards the negative, seeing little hope in such projects.

Ramadan is clearly grappling with some very complex and challenging issues, but one does not know what to think of his vociferous pronouncement that, “Islam is not a culture. Whether we like it or not, the essence of Islam is religious.” However, religion by necessity

Books

incorporates culture. Even more problematic, but characteristic of modernist designer fundamentalism, is Ramadan’s view that Islam is a “body of principles upon which are founded faith, spirituality, practice, and ethics.” It would not be an exaggeration to say that in such pronouncements Islam becomes the idolatry of principles. Prominent Muslim thinkers, including the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Persian thinkers Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and Nasir al-Din alTusi, the fourteenth-century Tunisborn social thinker Ibn Khaldun, and the eighteenth-century jurist and mystic, Shah Wali Allah of India, to mention just a few, would all probably turn in their graves if they heard such nostrums.

If anything, traditional renderings of Islam were acutely aware that one’s claim to religiosity is always embodied in practices that are deeply marked by culture.

The first articulation of Islam was distinctly and proudly Arabian, in the Arabic tongue, replete with an economy marked by the paucity of water and the plenitude of edible dates in semi-urban desert contexts. However, that did not mean that Islam was incapable of being replicated or transliterated into nonArabic cultures. Almost every major culture became a recipient of Islam. Both subtly and overtly its teachings shaped worldviews, languages, and practices while local cultures returned the compliment.

This cultural adaptation is exactly what legions of scholars throughout Muslim history accomplished so effectively in grounding new practices and values in Persian, African, European, and Asian contexts. Modern Islam’s problem is its abstractness and code-like form, a vocabulary developed largely in the bosom of modernity and shaped by the unmistakable twin influences of Enlightenment Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 4 3 ]

ISLAMIC REFORM OR DESIGNER FUNDAMENTALISM?

and Christian Protestant thought. This vocabulary has now become an obstacle to comprehending Islam. It creates interminable perplexities that promote “cultural schizophrenia” and often result in toxic practices and attitudes, since “facts” of religion are now elevated to the metaphysical status of “principles” for which some believers are ready to die.

The French political sociologist Olivier Roy pensively remarked that the “debate” about Islam in Europe is more accurately a search for a European soul.9 Even though demonstrable intellectual efforts towards the discovery of such a soul are still needed, Roy and Ramadan will hopefully concur at least on this

issue, since the latter believes that Muslims in the West carry an “enormous responsibility” for their own future.10 As long as such a future does not entail redemption for the rest of the Muslim world, few people will find the need to quarrel, although Ramadan’s solutions remain far from satisfactory.

Ebrahim Moosa teaches in the Department of Religion at Duke University and is director of the Center for the Study of Muslim Networks at Duke. He is the author of Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination (University of North Carolina Press, 2005) and editor of Fazlur Rahman’s last work, Revival and Reform: A Study in Islamic Fundamentalism.

NOTES

1 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 See eg, Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003); Tomas Mastnak, “Europe and the Muslims: The Permanent Crusade?” in The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, E. Qureishi and M.A. Sells eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

5 Sherman A. Jackson, “Islam(s) East and West: Pluralism Between No-Frills and Designer Fundamentalism,” in September 11 in History: A Watershed

[ 1 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Moment? Mary L. Dudziak ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

6 Ibid.

7 Tariq Ramadan, “Stop in the name of humanity,” Globe & Mail, 30 March 2005, A(21).

8 Ebrahim Moosa, “The Debts and Burdens of Critical Islam,” in Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism, Omid Safi ed. (London: Oneworld Publications, 2003).

9 Olivier Roy, “A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe’s Values?” ISIM Review 15 (2005): 6.

10 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 224.

View from the Ground

The Seeds of Social Inclusion Reforming Education in Costa Rica Alejandro J. Ganimian Incipient social exclusion threatens to undermine a 106-yearold tradition of peace and democracy in Costa Rica. Failure of the government to address growing xenophobia and prejudice in the country has left Nicaraguan, Dominican, and—on a lesser scale—Colombian economic migrants with no other option but to endure discrimination and seclusion from Tico ingroups.1 Over the past summer, which I spent teaching English at a public high school in the mountain village of San Isidro de Heredia, I realized how the “jokingly” racist comments that my students made in class actually reflected tangible divisions in society and questionable public policy decisions. To truly uphold its democratic traditions, Costa Rica’s best bet is to turn to “democratic education”: nurturing a shared national identity by virtue of being entangled with others and teaching people to trust in the idea of a shared project, not because of a fixed allegiance to a nation-state, but because of the dynamic realities imposed by globalization. The first section of this article will reconsider citizenship as identity through democratic education; the second will make the case for thorough education reform as Costa Rica faces serious new challenges to its democratic tradition; and the third section will focus on the exponential costs to Latin America’s longest-standing democracy should the reform opportunity be squandered.

Alejandro J. Ganimian is a senior at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he is majoring in International Politics and obtaining a certificate in Justice and Peace Studies. He volunteered at San Isidro de Heredia, Costa Rica, through the Global Crossroads Volunteer Network.

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 4 5 ]

THE SEEDS OF SOCIAL INCLUSION

Being “Civil” vs. Being “Civic.” not insensitive to them. After all, a conThe concept of citizenship as identity traditionally is tied to the relatively recent birth of the nation-state. Ever since its development, the idea of “one nation, one state” was to many an illusory—if not naïve—claim. The new states demarcated by the limits of the map of the modern world engulfed different peoples with disparate values, mores, languages, and religions. Therefore, it is understandable, but perhaps not logical, that states felt the need to resort to a new common denominator to meet the threat that pluralism posed to the idea of unity under one government. Citizenship became a means to define a group’s identity in terms of its relationships toward the state and toward other groups within the same territory, which today we understand as rights and duties. The state developed into the “bearer of the moral project,” the promoter of the overarching ethos enshrined in those rights and duties. Many have argued that education first was conceived to teach people to become citizens, to be part of (and to defend) that moral project.2 Education became, as bluntly put by Althusser, the “ideological apparatus of the state.” Such an approach to education bred an army of critics in the 1970s and 1980s, led by Pierre Bourdieu and Henry Giroux, who argued against the reproduction (i.e. the invention and perpetuation) of state power through culture. They demanded that citizens be empowered to think for themselves.3 Democratic education, in its various names and semblances (peace education, conflict-resolution education, critical thinking education) invites citizens to develop their own notions of what is right and wrong; these are independent from the state’s and other people’s notions, yet [ 1 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

solidated democracy should not gamble on homogeneity, but rather, should thrive on plurality. Citizens in a democracy need not share an identity on the basis of a particular ideology. (Indeed the world’s best consolidated democracies display a wide array of ideological nuances.) Our interaction with others and ability to make independent decisions based on multiple experiences make us true partners in a democratic project that is larger than everyone’s individual views. In the words of Melissa Williams, a leading writer on multiculturalism, “Preparing children to participate as citizens of a shared fate would emphasize teaching them to understand themselves as connected to others through a history that was not of their making, but as having the agency to remake those connections according to their own best judgments.”4 Costa Rica, Latin America’s poster child for democracy, has not yet taken any serious steps to reform its education system in this direction. On my first day at school, I was given the textbooks required for each class I was assigned.

These and other textbooks were part of what Minister of Education Manuel Antonio Bolaños Salas dubbed the Relanzamiento de la Educación Costarricense (the “Project to Re-launch Costa Rican Education”), an ambitious plan to revamp the public education system through some two dozen strategies that was outlined through Article 2 of presidential decree 31647 on 19 February 2004. The Relanzamiento included changes such as expansion of school enrollment, tighter and more periodic national assessment exams, and major curricular reforms that encouraged peaceful conflict resolution and solidari-

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ty with the community. This project seemed groundbreaking and unique within the region—yet I soon discovered the leaders remained too optimistic about the plan’s implementation.

After my first week in San Isidro, Ticos—both students and teachers alike— felt comfortable enough to privately

View from the Ground

claim that equality, tolerance, and democracy were traditional Tico values.

This public-private duplicity shows that the “re-launching” is not working, since students who are accustomed to learning by rote will not become more democratic simply because they are now memorizing readings about democracy. More

The bigotry and discrimination hiding

behind the “official” Costa Rican tolerance show how one can be publicly civil, and yet privately un-civic. approach me, the visiting Argentinean, and break into impromptu stand-up comedy shows mocking Nicaraguans (commonly referred to as “Nicas”), women, homosexuals, and blacks (mainly Dominicans or Jamaicans, who were brought as slaves to build the country’s railroads in the nineteenth century).

When I visited my students’ homes, the joke turned serious: many times parents would mention how migrants from neighboring countries (particularly Nicaragua) were ruining Costa Rica, taking jobs away from nationals and turning to crime by either smuggling drugs or mugging random passersby in San José.

In fact, the only employment Nicaraguans and other fellow migrants can find is harvesting coffee, a job that pays less than minimum wage even to the few Ticos who still want to do it. Additionally, no police records can bolster the assumption that migrants turn to crime any more than Costa Ricans.

In the meantime, while working inside the classrooms, students recited—almost word for word from their textbooks—the

important, the contradiction between the “official” Costa Rican discourse of tolerance and peace and the bigotry and discrimination hiding behind it also show how one can be publicly civil and yet privately un-civic.

Separate Is Not Equal. The irony

of the current situation is that Costa Rican history is indeed founded on the basis of an egalitarian tradition. Back in the sixteenth century, when Costa Rica was part of the Spanish Captaincy General of Guatemala, the small landowners’ relative poverty and the lack of a large indigenous labor force, coupled with the population’s ethnic and linguistic homogeneity and its isolation from the other colonial centers in Mexico and the Andes, contributed to the founding of an autonomous and de facto equitable agrarian society. (It is said that even the governor had to farm his own crops.)

The country also gained much of its welldeserved fame in 1899 when Costa Rica proudly became the oldest Latin American democracy. Only fifty years later, Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 4 7 ]

THE SEEDS OF SOCIAL INCLUSION

President José Figueres Ferrer abolished the army, making the country one of the few functioning democracies to have rescinded its military.5 The question is whether a nation historically so equitable and peaceful for Costa Ricans can remain so when ethnic and racial homogeneity fades.

Nicaraguan migration into the country began in 1979 with the triumph of the Sandinista revolution and reached its peak in the 1990s. Demographic studies reveal that 11 percent of Nicaraguan households have at least one person residing abroad. In Costa Rica Nicaraguans (estimated to be about 400,000) work and live alongside 3,500,000 Ticos.6 About 100,000 Colombian, Panamanian, and Peruvian refugees join them every year, constituting the remaining 25 percent of the foreign population that grows as fast as Tico birth rates decline nationwide.

Meanwhile, the “re-launching” of Costa Rican education is taking place without integrating an ever-increasing sector of the population. Although the primary enrollment rate in the country is nearly universal, 30 percent of the Nicaraguans in Costa Rica still live in abject poverty and cannot afford to send their children to schools.7 According to Article 78 of the National Constitution, education is “free and accessible to all.”8 Yet the cost of matriculation and school supplies render primary education unaffordable for many migrant families.

Secondary education thus becomes a privilege few migrants can enjoy, and tertiary education enrollment (currently in decline in Costa Rica) remains a “dream deferred.”9 At the Colegio where I worked, the handful of Nicaraguan and other foreign students who made it to high school were [ 1 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the object of everyone’s jokes and gossip in the hallways, as well as on the freshly paved roads of the prototypical modernizing rural neighborhood of San Isidro.

Students seemed to repeat verbatim at break time what their parents told me when I visited their homes. When teachers noticed me gasping at some of the students’ comments, they would reprimand them—yet they would privately legitimize such discriminatory conduct with a chuckle or sometimes even a follow-up joke.

Odds are, however, that neither the students nor the teachers were being hypocritical. It seemed that the students were playing the same “game of equality” that sociologist Bradley Levinson first observed in Mexican classrooms during a decade-long study.10 This game dates back to the days of the expansion of schooling to all citizens. In the 1970s and 1980s Latin American governments defended the idea of equality as the raison d’être for the massive expansion of schools, in spite of the remaining inequalities in income, gross gender disparities, and insidious ethnic and racial segregation. Levinson notes that by repeatedly pledging equality while at the same time witnessing a cruel reality, students eventually grew used to perceiving the “we are all equal” promise as a mere proposition of a right, rather than an imperative of true social justice.11 The claim of equality, then, has become a game everyone plays. In fact, these children’s teachers were actually attending high school when schooling was first made available to “everyone.” They were the first players of the game. Both generations have been taught to accept the claim of “equality for all” while living in a country that is unjust for many.

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View from the Ground

The Cost of Exclusion. The Costa International

Court of Justice, Nicaraguan Chancellor Norman Caldera called for a complete revision of the 1858 Treaty of Limits. If Caldera’s demand is met, he plans to ask for the devolution of the province of El Guanacaste, which was given to Costa Rica in the same bilateral agreement. To make matters worse, Nicaraguans are undergoing an internal crisis that might lead to the impeachment of the president and—of utmost relevance to Costa Rica— to the return of the Sandinistas to power. Costa Rica clearly cannot afford to turn its back on the Nicaraguans, either inside or outside the country, without risking an armed conflict and a spillover of the “Nica” social crisis. As the conflict escalates to unprecedented levels, it is becoming increasingly evident that both countries need to learn to not only live side by side but also to embrace (rather than consistently ignore) their interconnectedness through trade, migration, and common heritage.

Rican example illustrates almost too painfully how perilous it is to delegate the role of the “bearer of the moral project” to the state, for the sake of national identity and citizenship through ideological cohesion. If democracy requires pluralism because no individual idea can accommodate everyone’s needs, then we should start wondering why we still allow the state to have such a primary ideological role, instead of letting people decide what they are going to learn, in what context, and how they will do so. If we are truly committed to consolidating democracies, education reform should be a priority. In order to choose the best government, we first need to start thinking for ourselves—even if doing so means that we often may encounter opposition from groups larger than our own. Otherwise, we shall keep on playing the even more dangerous “game of democracy.”

The costs of playing these games are not only serious, but are also growing.

Recently, the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights reported that the Costa Conclusion. Democratic education is Rican government had been capturing not a panacea for all the problems in

The irony of the current situation is that

historically Costa Rica is founded on the basis of an egalitarian tradition. and returning Nicaraguans to their country, making them sign a form of rechazo voluntario (voluntary rejection). The two countries face rising animosity along the San Juan River, where armed Costa Rican police boats revived a seven-year border dispute that has triggered an increased Nicaraguan military presence in the area. Responding to the Costa Rican decision to take the dispute to the

Costa Rica, but it is a fair starting point to begin thinking about how Ticos plan to maintain a solid democracy over the long term. It is in the interest of Costa Ricans to start educating their children to develop skills, capacities, and virtues that will enhance both their initiative to enact change and their tolerance for diversity.

However, revamping the education system constitutes a massive undertaking Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 4 9 ]

THE SEEDS OF SOCIAL INCLUSION

and will depend largely on the willingness of the government to take a leadership role to implement reform. First, such an effort will entail major negotiations with both APSE and ANDE, the two largest teachers’ unions in the country, in order to form an agreement on how to raise the morality of the teaching profession while demanding better teaching standards from them.12 This means that there should be no place at school for a private-public duplicity that is legitimized

and teachers through decentralization; they foster equality both as a principle to be practiced inside and outside the school and as a criterion of education spending; and finally, they bring to bear the tenets of democracy, reduce the reliance on textbook-based teaching, and promote critical thinking. This package of reforms constitutes democratic education in action.

In the short term, a more feasible solution may come from the grassroots

Democratic education is not a panacea, but

it is a fair starting point to begin thinking about how Ticos plan to maintain a solid democracy. by the teachers’ own beliefs. Second, reform will require strenuous projects of decentralization to devolve decisionmaking power back to the schools, teachers, parents, and students, so that they too can choose what gets taught and the best way to teach it. Third, the revamping will require not only establishing clear standards to delineate a minimum level of quality of education but also linking those standards to clear consequences for the actions of both students and teachers alike, who should be held accountable.

Finally, successful reform will obviously require increased funding either from the private or from the public sector—or perhaps both—and an efficient allocation of those funds, so that spending on education is not focused on tertiary education. Such a bias in the distribution of resources would harm the poorest, who rarely reach the university level.13 These reforms are linked to democratic consolidation in three clear ways: they promote the empowerment of students, parents, [ 1 5 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

level. Nicaraguans themselves, together with other minority groups in the country, should begin mobilizing to let Costa Ricans know that they are citizens too, and to demand concrete policies of social inclusion. Generally, it is harder for the majority to exclude minorities when everyone’s lives are intertwined. Also, minorities would have an incentive to accept a common identity as Costa Ricans, since they would share the same benefits as other citizens.

One day in class, I paired Fernando, one of my most reserved Nicaraguan students, with a group of garrulous Tico boys for an in-class group discussion (an activity my pupils found completely alien, yet thoroughly enjoyable). After listening to the other four boys make jokes and talk about their plans for the weekend, Fernando coyly raised his voice and said, “Ey, nosotros somos un equipo!” (“Hey, we’re all a team!”). The other boys looked puzzled but immediately followed the instructions of their foreign class-

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mate and proceeded to begin the discussion. I looked at Fernando and smiled. I could not really tell if the boys were, once again, just “being civil.” But it was Fernando who was changing—not them. It was he who had reminded them that they constituted an equipo and that this condi-

View from the Ground

tion alone required working together.

Maybe Fernando had not thought about all this when he said it. But if a month of democratic education had done this much for him, I could not help wondering what it would do for Costa Rican democracy.

NOTES

1 Tico is a colloquial name for a native of Costa Rica.

2 Citizenship was never conceived as an innate quality. As early as 350 B.C.E., Aristotle had already outlined what would become the first criteria for citizenship. See Aristotle, Politics (Book I, Parts 1-2).

3 P. Bourdieu, and J-C. Passeron, Reproduction: In education, society, culture (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Productions, 1977) and H.A. Giroux, “Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education: A Critical Analysis” (Harvard Educational Review 53, 1983), 257-293.

4 M. Williams, “Citizenship as Identity, Citizenship as Shared Fate, and the Functions of Multicultural Education,” in Education and Citizenship in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities, eds., K. McDonough and W. Feinberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

5 Whether Costa Rica is the oldest democracy (or even one of the oldest democracies) in Latin America is a matter of debate. According to different criteria, scholars attribute this title to Colombia, Ecuador, or Chile. The dictatorial government of Federico Tinoco Granados (1917-19) in Costa Rica marred democratic development in the country, and José Figueres Ferrer led an armed uprising in the wake of a disputed presidential election in 1948. Yet it is difficult to argue that the abolition of the Costa Rican military in 1949 does not make Tico democracy unique.

6 J.C. Vargas, Nicaraguans in Costa Rica and the United States: Data From Ethnic Surveys (Translations of Spanish Version) (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005).

7 “UNICEF County Statistics (October 2005),” Internet, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ costarica_statistics.html#6 (Date accessed: 14 November 2005); and “Faces of Costa Rica website (October 2005),” Internet, http://www.facesofcostarica.com/ economics/nicaraguans.htm (Date accessed: 14 November 2005).

8 Compulsory Education Law Number 7676 of Costa Rica. July 23 1997.

9 “World Bank database online (November 2005),” Internet, http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats/ (Date accessed: 14 November 2005).

10 B.A.U. Levinson, We Are All Equal: Student Culture and Identity at a Mexican Secondary School, 1988 to 1998 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).

11 Many experts on education make a similar observation about Colombian students. See C. MedelAnonuevo and G. Mitchell, Citizenship, Democracy, and Lifelong Learning (Hamburg, Germany: UNESCO Institute for Education, 2003), 85-99.

12 Previous attempts by the Ministry of Education to link performance of teachers to increases in remuneration were blocked by the powerful teachers’ unions. See Comisión Centroamericana para la Reforma Educativa, Es Hora de Actuar 2003: Informe de Progreso Educativo en Centroamérica y la República Dominicana (PREAL: Washington, D.C., 2003).

13 For a thorough and comparative study that describes how other Latin American countries began to move in this direction, see M.S. Grindle, Despite the Odds: The Political Economy of Social Sector Reform in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 5 1 ]

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View from the Ground

Guinea

An Island of Stability?

Sarah Birgitta Kanafani “It takes three days to solve problems here, no matter what the problem. On the first day, the crisis hits; on the second there is chaos, riots, turmoil; and on the third day, everyone loses interest and things settle down.”

After my first week in Conakry, the capital of the small West African country Guinea, a young Guinean man explained his “three-day theory” to me. In a region that has become synonymous with gruesome civil wars fuelled by abundant natural resources and massive humanitarian crises, this theory seemed, to put it mildly, optimistic. Then again, Guinea is one of the few West African states to have avoided large-scale organized violence over the past two decades, despite the fact that it shares borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. Has Guinea been doing something right, or has it just gotten lucky? The recent history of West Africa confirms that Guinea is certainly not exporting security, and although the tiny nation of 9.5 million seems to maintain a relatively stable status quo, a closer look reveals a plethora of structural problems that threatens to shatter its fragile peace.1 West Africa is a classic “bad neighborhood” where internal conflicts rarely stay that way, instead seeping over borders along with refugees, militias, arms, and natural resources. While Guinea has managed to avoid civil war thus far, it has not been

Sarah Kanafani works for the American Refugee Committee in Guinea, West Africa.

She received her Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in May 2005, where she was a Managing Editor for the Journal.

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 5 3 ]

GUINEA

immune from the spillover effects of its neighbors’ conflicts. But since my arrival here, I have become increasingly convinced that the greatest threat to Guinea is Guinea itself. In addition to regional instability, the country currently faces a declining economy, weak governance, disenfranchisement of the citizenry, simmering ethnic tensions, and an uncertain domestic political situation. This combination of exogenous and endogenous threats means that all the pieces are in place for larger-scale violence in Guinea–all that’s needed now is a trigger.

Since I came to Guinea with the American Refugee Committee (ARC) to work with refugees from the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone who live in camps in Guinea’s Forest Region along the border with those countries, I figured I would have an upfront view of why Guinea has been kept safe from the region’s turmoil— at least so far. Indeed, refugees often reveal as much about the country to which they flee as the one from which they flee.

The large-scale influx of displaced persons into a country can lay bare infrastructural problems, the government’s ability to provide services, the strength of its economy, inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, and its ability to control its borders. While Guinea’s absorptive capacity for refugees, albeit with hefty international assistance, has been substantial—it has hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighboring countries—its own problems are becoming increasingly apparent. As more and more refugees repatriate and take with them the international presence and donor money that followed them in, Guinea will be left to fend for itself. Thus, while regional threats to Guinea’s stability are significant, its internal problems are more likely to prove the “three-day theory” untrue. [ 1 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Economic Crisis. Perhaps the most

visible structural weakness in Guinea is its worsening economy. In the past year, rice—the staple food for most citizens— has quadrupled in price, as has the cost of fuel, but without a commensurate increase in wages. Inflation is a whopping 26.3 percent, second only to Zimbabwe.2 Indeed, the inflation is palpable here; when I first arrived in Guinea the exchange rate was 4,000 Guinean Francs (GF) per U.S. dollar; two weeks later it was 4,200 GF per dollar, and it has been sliding ever since. For the average citizen, these increases in price have very real consequences—they mean the difference between eating and not eating, and between being able to afford public transportation to work or not. In addition, the younger generations are faced with an increasingly tough labor market.

As the economy declines, job opportunities become scarcer. Therefore, young people have no vested interest in the economic well-being of their communities, and often turn instead to illegitimate means of making a living. People are hungry and increasingly frustrated, and in the past few months, Conakry has seen sporadic rioting over rice convoys as well as an increase in both petty and violent crime. Low-level violence of this kind seems manageable, but if left unregulated it can easily mushroom into general civil strife, building on unrelated frustrations and security gaps. The path from human insecurity to national insecurity is a slippery slope, and the risk of fullblown organized violence is real.

Corruption and State Weakness.

Unrelated frustrations abound in Guinea. Like many of its neighbors, Guinea’s economic degeneration is due not to droughts, floods, or other external

KANAFANI

factors, but mainly to gross mismanagement and corruption. Guinea is rich in natural resources such as gold and diamonds and is home to the third-largest reserves of bauxite in the world. The land is fertile, and drives through the bush reveal banana trees growing like weeds and verdant rice paddies irrigated by the rainy season’s hefty downpours. However, Guinea is ranked 160 out of 171 countries on UNDP’s Human Development Index, and the EU has made aid conditional on the government’s ability to address corruption.3 Like its skyrocketing inflation, corruption in Guinea is visible everywhere.

Police officers line the streets, stopping unsuspecting motorists for fabricated

View from the Ground

lucrative business contracts and high government positions are doled out to friends and relatives of President Lansana Conté and his close allies. This pillaging of the state has left the government largely unable to provide basic goods and services to citizens or to maintain essential infrastructure. Electricity is sporadic, even in the rainy season when dams are full and hydroelectric plants function at capacity. Running water is absent from most of the country and is dependent on the rainy season. Roads and highways are in poor condition throughout most of the country and are worsening. Phone lines, both landlines and cellular, rarely work. Police forces act more as instruments of popular repres-

The path from human insecurity to

national insecurity is a slippery slope, and the risk of full-blown organized violence is real. infractions and readily accepting bribes from taxi drivers who figure the cost is worth the expediency it affords them.

During recent interviews for the director of ARC’s new Women’s Center in Conakry, we questioned candidates on whether they would allow friends to get away with skimming off the top, even for unassailable reasons such as feeding their families or buying school uniforms for their children. In tough economic times, the line between wanting to help friends in need and engaging in corruption tends to blur.

Petty corruption aside, the state is suspected of emptying government coffers for decades.4 Powerful businessmen, military officers, and government officials enjoy significant privileges, and

sion than as a source of protection. Over 75 percent of Guinea’s population is under the age of thirty-five (one is considered a youth until the age of thirty-five in Guinea),5 yet primary school enrollment stands at only 66 percent, with the literacy rate at a mere 35.9 percent.6

Uncertain Succession. A government’s inability to ensure basic services and infrastructure, as well as human security, is considered a harbinger of state failure. In Guinea the fact that state power is concentrated entirely in one person, the president, is another. This threat is all the more pressing because of President Conté’s deteriorating health.

Conté, who came to power after a military coup in 1984 and has ruled Guinea Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 5 5 ]

GUINEA

with an iron fist ever since, won another seven-year term in 2003 in elections broadly acknowledged to be rigged. Yet he suffers from acute diabetes and other undisclosed ailments, spending most of his time in his native village of Wawa, rarely making public appearances, and, according to some reports, slipping in and out of 24- or 48-hour comas.7 His incapacity might be manageable were he grooming a capable successor or allowing opposition parties room to maneuver politically. However, the opposition is kept in disarray by hostile laws and arbitrary penalties, and Conté has failed to devolve any decision-making power within his own party, the Party of Unity and Progress, even when his own ability to rule is minimal at best.

The press and analysts have been predicting Conté’s imminent death since the 1990s. Yet, like Guinea’s avoidance of civil war amidst collapsing neighbors, his longevity has defied the odds. The question, however, is not when Conté will pass away, but rather who will take over. According to the constitution, if the president dies before the end of his term, the president of the national assembly shall assume interim authority, and elections must be held within sixty days. However, few believe that this procedure will be followed. Many enterprising military, government, and opposition figures would like to grab the top spot, and they are liable to use any means necessary—whether that means a military coup, pitting opposition parties against one another, inflaming ethnic tensions, or other destabilizing methods. And even if the constitutional procedure is followed, sixty days is a grossly insufficient amount of time in which to organize nationwide elections in a country that has rarely held them. The current president [ 1 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of the national assembly, Aboubakar Somparé, may simply decide not to hold elections and instead keep power for himself. The recent unruly succession in nearby Togo should serve as a warning to Guinea to begin preparations for the post-Conté era, both in terms of immediate measures as well as long-term plans for elections and a transfer of power.

Legacy of Touré. Given these realities, one would expect popular frustration to be at an all-time high. Yet, Guineans have few outlets for their grievances. Guineans are often accused of political apathy, perhaps the source of the “three-day theory.” Most attribute this apolitical attitude to decades of oppressive socialist rule under Ahmed Sekou Touré from 1958 to 1984. In 1958 France gave all of its African colonies a choice: immediate independence with the cessation of all French economic support or continued French colonization and economic guarantees. Guinea was the only country that opted for independence, and Touré rallied Guineans under a nationalist banner. But any national unity he created was largely undone by the land seizures, police brutality, media censorship, and violent repression of dissent that characterized his twenty-six years in power. Thousands died while the rest of the population was scared into silence. That Guineans today are loath to act out of fear of adverse political consequences and are content to settle for less is hardly surprising.

However, this lack of political activism, rather than helping to maintain relative stability, is only setting the stage for greater instability in the future. Lack of political activity in Guinea should not be mistaken for consensus or absence of conflict. Any tranquility among Guineans

KANAFANI

is a negative tranquility–that is, the absence of outright conflict, but not the presence of a productive and vital public life.

Conflict is a normal and important process in any society, and perhaps even more so in developing or transitional societies, so long as it is not acted out violently. When expressed through debate, elections, and the free participation of political opposition groups, conflict contributes, directly or indirectly, to the strength of institutions, democratic processes, and economic development, and should be encouraged. Indeed, all societies need mechanisms for the resolution of disputes; the challenge is to find mechanisms that are constructive rather

View from the Ground

Guinea’s defiance of the French and the failure of other West African nations to follow suit was largely tempered by the aggravation of inter-ethnic tensions that occurred under Touré. Periodic bursts of violence, mostly concentrated in the volatile Forest Region, confirm that Guinean political tranquility is a thin veneer over deeper tensions. Indeed, Touré’s socialist policies blatantly favored his own Malinké ethnic group. After 1958 all land was declared public and was granted to farmers whose techniques were deemed the most productive; not surprisingly, this turned out to be the Malinké. Accordingly, the Malinké, who traditionally live in the northeast of the

Guinea’s “three-day rule” may in fact be

a sign of political weakness, rather than a mark of stability. than destructive. However, no such political outlets exist in Guinea. Not only are there few fora for open dialogue and debate, but Guineans have largely been denied a civic education. Having moved from French colonial rule, to a socialist dictator, to a corrupt autocrat, Guineans have been afforded little experience with participatory politics, voting, transparent governmental structures, expression of grievances, the role of public officials, and their responsibilities as citizens.

Accordingly, they have minimal capacity to prevent and resolve their own conflicts.

Guinea’s “three-day rule,” then, may in fact be a symptom of political weakness, rather than a mark of political stability.

country, moved into the Forest Region in the southeast, displacing the indigenous Guerzé from their farmlands. Resentment over such policies lingers today and frequently triggers small-scale violence in the Forest Region. In October 2005 fighting broke out between the two groups in N’Zérékoré, the Forest Region’s main city, triggered by a small dispute over the playing of music during evening prayer at a local mosque. The fighting left several wounded, along with significant property damage. The government’s response was, as usual, a strong military clamp-down. While this approach meant that fighting ended within the fabled three days, it left the underlying sources of conflict unreEthnic Tensions. Moreover, the solved. Guinean citizens are ill-equipped sense of nationalist pride created by to address these structural tensions and Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 5 7 ]

GUINEA

their proximate outcomes themselves, leaving violence as the only means of settling disputes. If one day the military is unable to quell such incidences, periodic acts of violence may become organized and widespread.

Armed and Ready. The danger of organized violence is sharpened by the existence of armed youth in the Forest Region. While Guineans do not have the means to manage their internal con-

Conclusion. In a region famous for brutal wars and dire humanitarian crises, Guinea has largely managed to stay out of the headlines. Indeed, when I moved from the United States, I found that many people had not even heard of Guinea and I had to specify countless times, “Not Equatorial, not Bissau, not Papua New—just Guinea.” According to regional experts, Guinea is the bulwark against neighboring civil wars—a peaceful country in a volatile region. But its prox-

Guinean citizens are ill equipped to

address these structural tensions, leaving violence as the only means of settling disputes. flicts, they do have the means to perpetrate it. In 2000-01 Guinea was a victim of cross-border attacks related to the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Part of President Conté’s response was to recruit, train, and arm young “volunteers” to defend the country. The youth were lured with promises of employment in the army once the immediate threat to Guinea was under control. However, Conté never followed through on his pledge, nor did he demobilize the youth. This has left Guinea with approximately five thousand armed, unemployed, and resentful ex-volunteers, with most concentrated in the Forest Region. An ARC survey revealed that over 80 percent of these ex-volunteers are prepared to take up arms again.8 With little or no education, a paucity of livelihood opportunities, little political voice, weak local conflict management capacity, and the proximity of extremely unstable countries, it is probable that these ex-volunteers will have a reason to do so sooner rather than later. [ 1 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

imity to the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire has left it subject to their effects. West Africa’s porous borders have made Guinea a hub for illicit arms trafficking, a home to militia training bases, and a destination for hundreds of thousands of civilians fleeing violence.

More importantly, the role Guinea has played in its neighbors’ conflicts has exacerbated its own structural problems— the worsening living conditions of the Guinean people, endemic corruption, a looming power struggle, the lack of capacity for conflict management, simmering ethnic tensions, and bands of armed and disillusioned youth. Refugee inflows have revealed the government’s inability to provide for its own people, while aid agencies support nonGuineans with free health care and education, skills training, micro-enterprise grants, and legal assistance.

The movement of arms and goods across Guinea’s borders has exposed the weakening of decision-making power at

KANAFANI

the top echelons of government. Conté’s inability to effectively control the military and the seven major refugee camps in the Forest Region have drawn international attention to ethnic rivalries and competition for scarce natural resources in the area.

No one wants to see Guinea go the route of its neighbors, but the tiny nation provides a strong example of the danger of maintaining a status quo, even one that seems to have kept it safe from widespread violence thus far. Indeed, Guinea’s tragedy is not explosive state failure, but rather its slow, steady decline.

However, just as I have become convinced that the greatest threat to Guinea comes from within, I have also become convinced that any change must likewise come from within. With international organizations drawing down their presence, the only way out for Guinea is an internal shock to the system. However, as outlined above, it is improbable that the current government will introduce anything more than cosmetic reforms. As long as Conté remains in power, the system he created is likely to persist, rein-

View from the Ground

forcing the corps of people who have a vested interest in the status quo, and undercutting the ability of those at the top who would like to make changes to do so. And while that status quo does not serve the interests of the vast majority of Guineans, they are ill equipped to effect systemic change themselves, having been denied the civic tools with which to demand such change.

This leaves Guinea with the grim option of waiting for Conté’s death.

Indeed, many Guineans, while not directly wishing for it, have told me that the president’s passing may be the only event capable of rousing Guinea out of its state of suspended animation, even with all the risks and uncertainties it brings.

But Guinea has waited far longer than three days for Conté’s death, and with each passing day, the amount of recovery that the country will face afterwards increases. Coupled with growing donor fatigue for internal conflicts in West Africa, it seems to me that, even if Conté’s passing does jolt Guinea awake, three days will not be enough to rebuild the country if it collapses.

NOTES

1 “CIA World Factbook: Guinea,” Internet, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gv. html (Date accessed: 26 October 2005).

2 “IMF World Economic Outlook: Building Institutions,” International Monetary Fund, September 2005, 220. Internet, http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/weo/2005/02/pdf/statappx.pdf (Date accessed 26 October 2005).

3 Stopping Guinea’s Slide, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 94, June 2005, 3-4.

4 Guinea: Living on the Edge, IRIN News, January 2005, Internet, http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/

guinea/default.asp (Date accessed: 22 November 2005).

5 Enquête Démographique et de Santé: Guinée 1999, Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération.

6 “CIA World Factbook 2005: Guinea,” (Date accessed: 9 October 2005).

7 Ibid., Stopping Guinea’s Slide, 6.

8 “Évaluation CAP sur la Prévention des Conflits dans la Région Forestière (N’Zérékoré, Yomou et Lola).” Survey conducted by Stat View International for the America Refugee Committee, July-August 2005.

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 5 9 ]

AD PAGE 160

A Look Back

Armitage on Iraq Applying History’s Lessons

Interview with Richard L. Armitage On 11 October 2005, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs met with former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to reflect on the war in Iraq and other aspects of current U.S. foreign policy. Mr. Armitage served as Deputy Secretary of State from March 2001 to February 2005. Prior to his time at the Department of State, Mr. Armitage served in various capacities at the Department of Defense, the White House, and in several appointed positions, including Presidential Special Negotiator for the Philippines Military Bases Agreement and Special Mediator for Water in the Middle East.

Mr. Armitage graduated in 1967 from the U.S. Naval Academy, where he was commissioned as an Ensign in the U.S. Navy.

He completed three combat tours with the riverine/advisory forces in Vietnam. He is currently president of Armitage International, a consulting firm that focuses on international business development and strategic planning.

Richard L. Armitage served as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2001-2005 and is now president of Armitage International, a consulting firm.

What do you think of recent comparisons between the War on Terrorism and the war on communism? Are there parallels between these two ideological conflicts?

GJ I A:

A R M I T A G E : People have been writing about transnational threats over the past decade or so. Since it is transnational you

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could make the case that this is a global conflict. In that regard, it’s very close to the [George] Kennan doctrine of containment, controlling communism wherever it sticks its head up. So I think there are those parallels [between the War on Terrorism and the Cold War]. What is lacking, and where the comparison fails, is that in the mobilization against communism, like the mobilization against fascism, we required the entire nation to be involved. People of my generation hid under their desks during air raid drills; we felt part of the struggle during the Cold War. And that’s what is missing here. The comparison breaks down because the nation as a whole has not been required to sacrifice.

administration and Congress have been reluctant to try to really mobilize people for fear it may weaken a political base. But I think that if you’re going to make this a great struggle against an “ism”—first fascism, laterally communism, and now terrorism, you have to make sure the entire American polity is part of the effort.

G J I A : Do you believe that the president is correct to define the terrorist threat as “Islamo-fascism”?

A R M I T A G E : I think that we have not come to grips with terrorism’s root causes.

I’m not speaking about poverty and things of that nature, but things of a much more psychological, and in many cases religious kind. I was one who thought that the War on Terrorism G J I A : On 6 October 2005, President Bush gave a speech at the National wouldn’t necessarily be very long, but as Endowment for Democracy in which he I’ve looked at it more and more, I’ve defined the War on Terrorism as a war come to the conclusion that this is against radical jihadism and laid out the going to be a very long, drawn-out reasons for fighting this ideology. Does struggle. Women are now more this represent a strategic shift in the involved in suicide bombings throughout the Middle East. We have seen the administration’s thinking? ideology spread to people who are actually citizens of the countries they plan A R M I T A G E : I don’t know if it’s strategic, but it’s certainly a more definitive enun- to attack—in Britain, for example. ciation by the president of why we’re These developments have brought doing what we’re doing. I didn’t think home to me that Osama bin Laden and there was anything dramatically new in the his colleagues might have been the easy

I think that if you’re going to make this a

great struggle, you have to make sure the entire American polity is part of the effort. speech. I believe you can see it as the beginning of an effort to really drum up political and national support for [the War on Terrorism]. I think that so far, the [ 1 6 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ones to take on, while the new adherents of jihadism are much more formidable–they are internet-savvy, language-savvy, culture-savvy.

ARMITAGE

How would you respond to the claim that the people fighting against the American presence in Iraq are not all jihadists? What role does nationalism play in all of this?

GJ I A:

Well, you’d have to ask those who are fighting. The soldiers who have stayed in Iraq have realized that there are several brands of fighters on the other side of the equation. There are Iraqi nationalists, but I believe that group is actually quite small. I think that there are more pan-Arab nationalists than Iraqi nationalists in that camp. Then, there are foreign jihadists, Ba’athists, and some Sunnis, who fight because they’re out of power and they’re scared to death that they’re going to be left high and dry without much access to the oil income. So, in my view, there are actually four different elements fighting in Iraq—nationalists, jihadists, Ba’athists, and some Sunnis.

ARMI TAGE:

A Look Back

we will have started to change the face of the Middle East.

What effects have 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had on your thinking? How have your views changed since you first advocated regime change in Iraq eight years ago, as a signatory to the Project for a New American Century letter to President Clinton?

GJ I A:

On 9/11 I was horrified at the loss of our countrymen’s lives. But for me, it had to be another day at the office, and I felt that I knew what I needed to do.

I think the actions of Secretary Powell and I in the wake of the attacks were exactly what American citizens wanted.

We got the Pakistanis on board quickly, efficiently, and that made a difference in our ability to fight in Afghanistan.

On the question of Iraq, I was one of those–am one of those–who think the proposition of removing Saddam HusG J I A : But how can we differentiate sein was eminently sensible. There were a between, for example, pan-Arab nation- host of reasons for doing so, none relatalists and jihadists? If the threat is ed to WMD: the threat to his own people, nationalism, that’s one thing. If the the threat to his neighbors, baiting his threat is Islamic radicalism, it’s another. neighbors. He had an association with Wouldn’t the two threats perhaps require terrorism, if only through the attempt at George Bush 41’s life during one of his different approaches? visits to Kuwait. There was a whole host A R M I T A G E : To some extent radicalism and of reasons for removing Hussein, and the pan-Arab nationalism center around the United Nations Security Council had same things. There are certain weak also spoken as one on this issue in sixteen regimes that are considered illegitimate or seventeen different resolutions. in the Middle East, and both a pan-Arab But the timing of it was one that I had nationalist and a jihadist would want to questions about, because I thought we unseat those regimes. In the short term, should resolve Afghanistan, let our soltheir aims are quite close together, and diers reconstitute, and then go on and clearly, their failure in Iraq will be a take out Saddam Hussein. The only difmajor setback for the agendas of each of ference in my thinking from the time I the four groups I’ve just mentioned. If we signed the letter and today is a matter of prevail in Iraq, as the president ardently timing, not of an end result. Mr. Clindesires, we will have done what he wants: ton himself has said that we should have ARMI TAGE:

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changed regimes, and that he wishes he had. But after 9/11, when we were already involved in Afghanistan, the better part of wisdom would have been to delay our attack on Iraq until we were more consolidated and had more troops available.

GJ I A:

To what degree did we break Iraq?

I think Iraq was already broken. It was held together only by the brutality of one man and his Ba’athist party, so I would say it was already broken. By allowing Iraqis of all stripes to give voice to their frustrations, we allowed the breaks and the fissures to be seen.

ARMI TAGE:

How did 9/11 impact the thinking of other policymakers in the United States, who perhaps previously were not convinced that it was necessary to G J I A : How deep are the breaks and fisremove Saddam Hussein and rebuild sures in Iraqi society? How can the Unitthe Middle East? ed States help to put Iraq back together again?

A R M I T A G E : Well, 9/11 was such a shock to the body politic and to the civilian citi- A R M I T A G E : The fissures are significant, as zens that we as a nation began exporting evidenced by the number of people our anger and our fear, instead of resorting to violence and the apparent exporting our traditional U.S. values of willingness to risk death in the internal optimism and hope. I think that for a fight for political advantage. The United time after 9/11, Americans were much States can help Iraq by helping to estabmore inclined to swagger a bit and say lish security, by developing infrastructhat since we’d been stung, we had the ture, and by engendering optimism that right to reach out and do whatever we a political process is underway that holds needed to do. That’s not sustainable in promise for better days ahead. But ultithe long run, because we need friends. mately the Iraqis must reach a consensus We need allies. We are involved in the in a fundamental way that the benefits of world beyond our two great oceans and living in a multi-ethnic and multi-reliwe’re involved in the world beyond our gious society that is free and democratic is juridical limits. And I think people are what they want. coming back to that realization.

G J I A : What do you think other nations in the Middle East should be doing to conG J I A : Why did we decide to attack Iraq at the moment that we did? What was the tribute to the effort in Iraq? decision-making process like?

A R M I T A G E : Those that are contiguous to Iraq should do more to close their borA R M I T A G E : Well, I can talk about the process of trying to consider all the vari- ders. Egypt is training policemen and ables, things of that nature, but in this some armed forces. Everybody is doing country we have one nationally elected something. The fact of the matter is that leader, and why he made the decision at it’s the Iraqis themselves who are relucthe time he did, I can’t say. But he clear- tant to have other countries in the Midly was not willing, as he said, to let the dle East more heavily involved. This is an storm clouds gather and to be struck Iraqi trait; they’re tough, tough-minded, again. So, he made the decision to strike. and somewhat ethno-centric.

GJ I A:

[ 1 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ARMITAGE

A Look Back

How did the Future of Iraq project capture U.S. post-war policy?

ments of Defense and State in these kinds of activities?

A R M I T A G E : We involved diaspora Iraqis, State Department officers, civilians, academics, and the Pentagon, both civilian and uniform officers in the Future of Iraq project. We did a study that tried to look at the post-war Iraq and what sort of

A R M I T A G E : The planning and execution of war is primarily the responsibility of our war fighters and the Department of Defense. I think there were some clear misjudgments, including the number of troops that would be required to secure

GJ I A:

For a time after 9/11, Americans were much more inclined to swagger a bit. That’s not sustainable in the long run, because we need friends.

things would be necessary. But one could question how good it was. General Eisenhower was once asked about the productivity of long-range planning, and he said, “Long-range planning is absolutely essential. Long range plans aren’t worth the paper they’re written on.”

Long-range planning requires looking at all the attributes and all the variables of any situation. If we say in combat that no war plan survives the first contact with the enemy, that would also be true of a post-war plan—it doesn’t survive the first contact with reality. But having looked at all the different situations out there, at least you have a road map which you could follow to some degree until you reach a fork in the road. I’ll let others judge the efficacy of the Future of Iraq project, but there wasn’t much that wasn’t considered in that project.

Do you feel the Department of State was marginalized in the planning and execution of this war? Is there a balance to be sought between the Depart-

GJ I A:

the peace after combat. The answer may lie in greater involvement from other agencies in the process as you suggest— but I also think the Defense Department needs to adapt culturally so as to embrace the missions found in the full spectrum of modern war fighting.

G J I A : How can other parts of the U.S. government be leveraged to help secure the peace?

Well, it depends on the situation. It initially has to be the military.

The State Department isn’t armed. We can’t bring order to chaos just by saying it, by sending some pinstriped diplomat out there saying, “Order! Order!”

You’ve got to have structure, and that requires military activity. The business of the Department of State and the UN Security Council is to build civilian infrastructure, but we still haven’t got a sufficient lowering of the violence to allow that infrastructure to gain traction.

However, since John Negroponte took

ARMI TAGE:

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over from Jerry Bremer, the State Department has been more heavily involved. And you saw his activities with the interim Iraqi government. You’ve seen [U.S. Ambassador to Iraq] Zalmay Khalilzad’s activities, trying to bring sense out of this constitution. So, while its abilities are limited, there is a big, heavy lifting job going on by the U.S. Department of State right now.

What do you think are the next steps for the United States? Is there anything that we need to change in our approach?

GJ I A:

Democracy, in and of itself, is insufficient to allow a nation to flourish. You have to have institutions on which to frame democracy that will permit democratic exchange between citizens and their government. That would lead me to believe that the biggest thing we should do is to spend even more time trying to build up the infrastructure, whether it’s oil, whether it’s police forces, or tax assessors, tax collectors, water, all of those things.

Because if you have those structures, then democracy makes sense. If, on the other hand, you don’t have competent

ARMI TAGE:

experiences in institution- and infrastructure-building?

In 1986 when Corazon Aquino came to power in the Philippines, both Paul Wolfowitz, who was the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, and I, at the time assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs at the Pentagon, led the charge for the removal of [President Ferdinand] Marcos and the peaceful transfer of rule to People Power in a rather remarkable cooperation with the U.S. Congress. After twenty years or so of Marcos’s rule, a significant change of government was brought about without a single death. Immediately, the U.S. Congress was very generous, and voted to send enormous amounts of money to Mrs. Aquino’s government. But that government lacked either the will or the institutions to bring about the economic changes which could have been brought about by that infusion of money.

To be sure, the Philippines, with its thousands and thousands of islands and many different languages, poses a difficult problem of governance. Never did the institutions of the Philippines flourish sufficiently to allow democracy to take

ARMITAGE:

We can’t bring order to chaos just by

sending some pinstriped diplomat out there saying, “Order! Order!” institutions, then you have a problem.

Democracy can’t be eaten. The enthusiasm that democracy brings can’t be taken as drink. And democracy will lie somewhat fallow.

GJ I A:

In your career, have you had other

[ 1 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

hold. Mrs. Aquino suffered several coup attempts—six or seven. There’s been very little done to relieve the hundred-year suffering of the people of Mindanao.

And hence, it’s a ripe breeding ground for the Abu Sayyaf group and other terrorist organizations. So it’s a great disap-

ARMITAGE

pointment that twenty years after the People’s Power movement, you still don’t have a Philippines which flourishes.

The parallel with Iraq gets back to institutions very clearly, and that’s why I say we ought to spend our time trying to develop competent institutions. There are several differences between Germany and Japan after World War II and Iraq today, but one of the biggest is that populations were homogeneous in Germany and Japan. In Iraq and the Philippines, they are not. Germany and Japan had competent bureaucrats who were not cronies. Iraq and the Philippines do not.

These are among the biggest differences.

We need to build institutions in order to have a flourishing democracy in Iraq.

A Look Back

comparisons between our experience in Vietnam and our current experience in Iraq. Can you share your perspective on that?

A R M I T A G E : Well, my good friend Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska has said that this is a bit like Vietnam because it’s a bit of a quagmire. But I think the dissimilarities are also quite pronounced. For instance, many of the institutions in the Vietnamese North were strong and were competent. In the South, they were more brittle and corrupt. But there was a government, and there were institutions, as far as police forces, security forces, tax assessors, tax collectors, which were available to file into the South and actually provide a structure on which to build a country. One of the troubles we’re havG J I A : You have been involved in making and implementing U.S. foreign policy ing in Iraq now is that there is no infrafor decades. Can you talk about your structure. There is no industrialized other experiences and how they have economy. There aren’t competent police forces and security forces to build up. influenced your thinking?

There were corrupt cronies.

Another difference between Vietnam A R M I T A G E : Well, first, it is important to make cold calculations of national secu- and Iraq is that the Iraqi insurgents thus rity and not let personal feelings get in far have no positive message to give to the the way. I spent a long time in combat in people. It’s only a message of fear. You Vietnam–almost six years–and having can disagree with the North Vietnamese become so close to the Vietnamese, I and the Communist message, but they found that my decision-making about had an alternative message and they prewhat was possible in Vietnam was skewed. vailed. So it seems to me there are at least It was affected by my personal relation- as many differences between Vietnam ships with Vietnam and the Vietnamese and Iraq as there are similarities. and my desperate desire to want them to succeed. Second, don’t start something G J I A : But isn’t there a message? One you’re not going to finish; that is, start of the most striking assertions of things slowly and only after garnering Bush’s speech [before the National sufficient political support. And third, Endowment for Democracy] was the be sufficiently armed and numerous to claim that these transnational Islamic assure that you can accomplish the entire jihadists want to build an empire to objective. reconstruct the Caliphate. Do you think the Iraqi insurgents are pushing that message?

G J I A : Many people have been drawing

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ARMITAGE ON IRAQ

Well, there was a very good article in [the 26 September 2005 edition of] Newsweek that was actually written in Afghanistan. Some reporter had been approached by a fellow on a motorbike who said, “Hi, I’m Mohammed, and I’ve just been in Iraq for the past month training on how to use VBIEDs [vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices] and IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and ambush techniques, et cetera. And I’m back.” And this fellow went on to describe how he’d been smuggled across [the Pakistani

ARMI TAGE:

Well, our goals are clearly the spread of democracy and human rights, and in that regard, every single post-war president has viewed the world to be safer and more humane if the United States was fully involved in the defense of human freedoms and human rights. So I think our goals have been remarkably consistent. In fact, though you may disagree, I would say that those goals have been consistent since the founding fathers. They believed passionately in the message of our revolution, which was very much democracy and human rights. I

ARMI TAGE:

I don’t think Iraq has a place on the

world stage, but getting it wrong in Iraq could affect the world. province] Beluchistan into Iran and across Iran by drug smugglers and delivered to jihadists in Baghdad. During his time with the jihadists, he said that he was so inflamed by their fight that he asked to fight with them against the Americans and against the Iraqi forces and was told by his mentors, “No—your job is to live, return to Afghanistan, and spread jihad.”

So there is a certain amount of professional military education going on, and you can assume that Iraq has become somewhat of a breeding ground for jihadists, whether they are Saudis or Afghans or whatever. If they hadn’t had Iraq, they’d have had to learn elsewhere–probably in Afghanistan.

think there is a great consistency there.

Some in this administration seem to view this philosophy as a departure from that of past administrations, and believe that we are responsible for some of the changes that are happening in the Middle East. I do think that, by being an example, we’ve helped to bring some changes about, and we certainly haven’t been an obstacle. But many of the changes that are taking place in the Middle East were underway before this administration came in. Jordan has had a national assembly since the late 1980s and King Hussein brought the national assembly of parliament into the country. Women have been allowed to exercise greater and greater freedom and rights in Qatar and in the United Arab Emirates long before G J I A : Could you talk to us a little bit more this administration came in. There is a about U.S. goals in the Middle East in Jew in the national assembly of Bahrain. general and how we are or are not achiev- There are women now in the Kuwaiti ing them? parliament. So there was a lot going on in [ 1 6 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ARMITAGE

these countries, long before this administration started talking about democracy and human rights.

Are there cases in which democracy would not be in our national interest?

GJ I A:

A Look Back

Canal, which is an artery for us–Pacific to Atlantic and vice-versa. That was too precious to allow it to fall to someone whose interests were not somewhat aligned with our own.

What is Iraq’s place on the world stage and what can we do to support it?

GJ I A:

Well, there certainly could be, because the phenomenon of democracy nowadays is that people are electing people who look a lot like themselves. So if you’re going to espouse democracy—and I think we have no choice but to do that, it is in keeping with the national character—you have to be willing to accept the outcome of a democratic election. You may not like that, but you have to put more emphasis on the process of democracy than on the outcome.

ARMI TAGE:

What happens when developments in other countries, democracies or not, are in direct conflict with our national interest? In which situations is it appropriate to use military force to effect political change?

GJ I A:

Generally, using the military to bring about political change in a democracy absent a casus belli would be inappropriate. I can’t speak to every situation. I’m for pre-emptive attacks if we know with assurance that something is about to happen. We did this in Panama, by the way. We used the U.S. military in Panama for political change when the elected government of the Panamanians was not allowed to take office. So we used the military there for political change, but it was change in the direction that the people had already indicated that they wanted to go. Plus, some of our citizens there had already come under threat. And, the equities were quite high because of the Panama

Well, I don’t think Iraq has a place on the world stage. It’s hard for me to see a country of twenty-three million people having the necessary gravity, the necessary weight to be a world player.

Clearly, we’re involved in a war of ideas, and the idea that countries should be able to pick their leaders is a worthy one. Plus there is a certain amount of oil that affects all of us–China, the United States, and all the nations of the world. If it [oil] were suddenly stopped up, there are neighbors to Iraq. Stability is important to us for economic as well as political reasons, but Iraq is a regional player, and doesn’t have a place on the global stage.

But getting it wrong in Iraq could affect the world somewhat.

ARMI TAGE:

ARMI TAGE:

What is the most surprising thing about how the war in Iraq has turned out so far?

GJ I A:

The most surprising thing is that we failed yet again to realize a basic historical lesson: only a soldier with a bayonet can take and hold ground.

Only a soldier with a bayonet can bend an enemy to our will. Not realizing that was the biggest mistake we made and is the biggest lesson to be learned.

Clearly we had enough troops to win a great victory, a speedy victory, and a very humane victory. We didn’t have enough troops to secure the peace.

This is self-evident.

ARMI TAGE:

Winter/Spring 2006 [ 1 6 9 ]

ARMITAGE ON IRAQ

What has kept us from learning that basic historical lesson?

GJ I A:

A R M I T A G E : I think it’s human nature and the desire to show that the present warfare was sort of transformed warfare. The problem is that it isn’t in our national character to want to have a lot of soldiers overseas. And one of the things I say in speeches a lot is that, notwithstanding the many, many military involvements that the United States has had since 1776 starting with the Barbary pirates overseas, we’ve never desired more than six feet of land necessary to bury our dead. The problem is that, while we need a significant force presence to accomplish our military goals overseas, it is not in our

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national character to want to have lots of soldiers far afield.

If it takes a soldier with a bayonet to bend someone to our will, what does it take to transform someone’s will?

GJ I A:

I think it takes a certain presence, but in the Iraqi situation, it takes the institution-building activities I was describing. In this case, you’ve got to find a way to make Iraqis the stakeholders in their own society. It goes back to the development of infrastructures that are both supportive of a central government and are also the instruments by which the central government’s largesse goes out to the people. And that’s what it takes.

ARMI TAGE: