GJIA - 7.2 Pledging Allegiance

Georgetown Journal

GeorgetownJournal of

International Affairs

of International Affairs

Pledging Allegiance nationalism and identity in conflict

articles including: Asian Federalism Russia’s Islamic Chall enge Second-Gener ation Immigr ants Ethnic Identity in the Balk ans Introduction by Charles King ALSO

in this issue:

SUMMER/FALL

Fifty Years of African Development

Callisto Madavo

2006 VO L U M E V I I , N U M B E R 2

China, Censorship, and the Internet

William Dowell

Common Values U.S.-Japan Alliance

plus an interview

Michael Green

with

Andrew Natsios

on Development and Darfur Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

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Summer/Fall 2006 • $8.95 usa

GeorgetownJournal of International

Affairs

Summer/Fall 2006, Volume vii, Number 2 1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Pledging Allegiance In this Forum we read between the headlines to take on a perennial issue: the role of national identity in violent conflict. Immigration, war, and other forms of social upheaval challenge existing community boundaries and show us how nationalism can be exploited in moments of crisis. As the United States struggles to define who is “American,” the Russian Federation works to tame its breakaway regions, various states in Asia seek ways of governing multinational states, and memories of the Balkan crisis shape perceptions of nationalism, the time is ripe for a new discussion of the challenges that national identity poses for the state. This Forum examines when the boundaries that define communities become the fault lines for violent conflict.

3

Introduction CHARLES KING

7

American Immigrants in American Conflict EDWINA BARVOSA

15

Nationalism and Policymaking in the Balkans NICHOLAS J. MILLER

21

Russia’s Islamic Challenge EDUARD PONARIN AND IRINA KOUZNETSOVA-MORENKO

29

The Federal Solution to Ethnic Conflicts BAOGANG HE

Business&Economics 37

Tear Down Those Walls: Agriculture, Development, and Trade Negotiations KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT

Developed-country tariff reductions offer great promise, but developing countries must prepare themselves to capitalize on the opportunities.

Cover photo: Sarah L. Voisin/The Washington Post Summer/Fall 2006 [ i ]

Conflict&Security 47

Common Values: A New Agenda for U.S.-Japan Relations MICHAEL GREEN

The U.S.-Japan alliance can be enhanced through bilateral defense consultation.

57

Coming Home Whole: Reintegrating Uganda’s Child Soldiers LOREA RUSSELL AND ELZBIETA M. GOZDZIAK

Successful reintegration of child soldiers into society must include psychosocial therapy.

67

Frozen Legacy: U.S.-Russian Strategic Nuclear Relations MARTIN SENN

Former patterns of East-West conflict continue to dominate U.S.-Russian nuclear relations.

Culture&Society 75

Growing Pains: Australia’s Adolescent Multicultural Policy GREGORY BROWN

Recent riots in Sydney challenge Australia’s title as an immigration success story.

83

The Changing Tide of Aid Provision ANISYA THOMAS

Without accountability to the victims of a natural disaster, humanitarian aid will never be effective.

Law&Ethics 91

Indicting Zarqawi for Genocide RAJ PUROHIT AND GOLZAR KHEILTASH

Can international humanitarian law take on international terrorism?

Politics & Diplomacy 101

Mission Not Accomplished BATHSHEBA N. CROCKER

The world must not declare success in light of recent elections in Haiti.

111

The Internet, Censorship, and China WILLIAM THATCHER DOWELL

Is China’s control of the media slipping or are Internet giants selling out for a share of the market?

121

Transforming Separatist Conflict RODD MCGIBBON

Civil society responses to the tsunami explain divergent paths of conflict in Aceh and Sri Lanka. [ i i ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Contents 131

Development and Darfur INTERVIEW WITH ANDREW NATSIOS

The former USAID administrator discusses the lessons of Sudan and the importance of transformational development.

139

Hamas, Israel, and the Prospects for Peace CASIMIR A. YOST

Recent elections have clarified the likely eventuality of renewed conflict with a third Intifada.

Science&Technology 147

Leading the Renewable Energy Revolution JOANNA I. LEWIS

China’s entry into the global renewable energy market may decrease costs and increase utilization.

Books 155

Opening Pandora’s Box: Alternative Illicit Trade Control JEFFREY MIRON

Review of Moises Naim’s Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy.

160

Assessing Fujimori’s Peru RACHEL K. BRICKNER

Review of Catherine M. Conaghan’s Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere.

View from the Ground 167

Missing in Action: Mass Male Migration and Mexican Communities CHARLES WRIGHT

Mass migration to the United States has had a distinctive impact on communities in Mexico.

A Look Back 173

Empowering Women: Ten Years after the Beijing Conference CAROLYN HANNAN

The director of the UN’s Division for the Advancement of Women reflects on the major achievements in the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women.

183

Marching to a Different Drum: The World Bank and African Development CALLISTO MADAVO

The key to the World Bank’s ultimate legacy may lie in Africa, the world’s poorest continent.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ i i i ]

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

EDITORS-IN-CHI EF MANAGING EDITORS

BUS INESS DIRECTOR DES I GN MANAGER

FORUM EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANT BUS INESS&FINANCE EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C ONFL I C T&S E CUR I TY ED I T ORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C U LT U R E & S O C I E T Y E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS L AW & E TH I C S E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS POLITI CS&DIPLOMACY EDITORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS S C I ENC E&TE CHNOLO GY ED I T ORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS BO OK REV I EW ED I TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS V I EW FROM THE GROUND ED I T ORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANT A LOOK BACK EDITOR EDI TORI AL ASS I STANT D IREC TOR OF ADVERT I S I NG D I RE C T OR OF C I RCULAT I ON DIRECTOR OF FINANCE DIRECTOR OF MARKET ING D I RE C T OR OF PUBL I C RELAT I ONS BUS INESS ASS I STANTS

DES I GN ASS I STANTS

ADV I S ORY BOARD

UN I VERS I TY C OUNC I L

Margo M. Huennekens, Lorin Kavanaugh-Ülkü Robert Alter, Dorothy Chou Candace L. Faber, Jean Poe, Drew Reissaus Victoria L. Cheng Huoi K. Trieu Jan Cartwright, Maeve Townsend Diana Barbara Greenwald Brittany Baumann, Christine Estevez William Allen, Daniel Phillips, Shoshana Tischler Michael Boswell, Whitney Shinkle Grace Aubrey Moon, Joshua Smith Daniel J. Smith, Tiffany Summerfield Caroline O’Reilly, Alfia Sadekova Henry Pistell, Matthew Weed Valeria Di Fiori, Joseph McReynolds Mithuna Sivaraman, Anya Yakhedts Aditya Deshmukh, Andrew Mok, Jessica Prusakowski Madison Abigail Jones, Anubha Verma Matthew Engler, Linda Ichiyama Nicole Phillips Cordeau, Jeff Pan Elizabeth Hanna-Owens, Olivia Lynch, Stacey Spivey Sophia Castillo-Plaza, Carol Villarroel Andrew Don, Christodoulos Kaoutzanis Jordan D. White Kathryn Vesey Robert Williams Garrett T. Schmitt Igor Khayet Natalya Skiba Robin Chan Zhimei Luo, Lauren McCaskill, Yvonne Mejia, Stephanie Mo, Andra Mocanu, Emilie Lis Pradera, Julia Salo, Simi Sonecha, Anastasia Stepanova Sung Eun Kim, Genevieve Smith Kinney, Drew Reissaus david abshire, susan bennett, h.r.h. felipe de borbón, joyce davis, cara dimassa, robert l. gallucci, lee hamilton, peter f. krogh, michael mazarr, fareed zakaria anthony arend, richard brahm, daniel byman, chester crocker, christopher joyner, charles king, carol lancaster, thomas o. melia, donald mchenry, daniel porterfield, howard schaffer, george shambaugh, jennifer ward, casimir yost

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Editors’ Note

From immigration rallies in the United States to separatist movements in Asia, competing identities often find themselves in conflict with one another.

Nationalism and identity can play both unifying and divisive roles. Groups that identify with each other are brought together, while those that see themselves as incompatible are often pushed apart. In the extreme, the ideas of nationalism and group identity have prompted unrest, rebellion, and even war. This issue’s Forum, Pledging Allegiance, analyzes how states and international actors can best respond when nationalism and identity become instigators of conflict.

Our Forum contributors offer an in-depth look at the intersection between these elements. Edwina Barvosa discusses second-generation immigrants in the United States, while Nicholas Miller examines the contentious role of nationalism in the Balkans. Eduard Ponarin and Irina Kouznetsova-Morenko analyze the role of religion in nationalist movements by looking at the interesting case study of Tatarstan.

Finally, Baogang He argues that federalism could present a solution to Asia’s ethnic conflicts.

Other articles in this issue discuss themes of conflict. Michael Green argues that with increasing tensions in North Korea and China’s growing predominance, a strong U.S.-Japan alliance is needed now more than ever. Casimir Yost analyzes the recent Palestinian and Israeli elections and makes recommendations for a path forward. And Bathsheba Crocker argues that the international community must intervene in Haiti if it is to avoid yet another collapse.

Finally, this issue also features the ever-important issue of development assistance.

Anisya Thomas looks at a survey of tsunami victims to chart a better path for crisis aid in the future. Callisto Madavo, former regional vice president for Africa at the World Bank, looks back at the past fifty years of aid to Africa. And Andrew Natsios, former USAID administrator, provides his thoughts on development and the situation in Darfur.

The world is changing, and so is the Journal. We feel honored to have led this dynamic and growing publication over the last year. We would like to extend our most sincere expressions of gratitude to our faithful readers, who have made this one of our most successful years ever; to our authors, who have consistently provided us with the most thought-provoking and insightful material; and to our staff, who have worked so hard to help us put this issue together.

Margo M. Huennekens

Lorin Kavanaugh-Ülkü Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 ]

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Forum Pledging Allegiance GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

7

American Immigrants in American Conflict EDWINA BARVOSA

15 Nationalism and

Policymaking in the Balkans NICHOLAS J. MILLER

21 Russia’s Islamic

Challenge EDUARD PONARIN AND IRINA KOUZNETSOVAMORENKO

29 The Federal Solution to

Ethnic Conflicts BAOGANG HE

“It affords a legislator little self-applause to consider that where there was formerly an insurrection, there is now a wilderness.”

That was Samuel Johnson’s verdict on the British government’s depopulation of the Scottish highlands in the 1770s, a ruthless reaction to what we would now call a nationalist insurgency. State methods have changed little in the last two and a half centuries. The rise of nationalist movements within the borders of existing states is often met with harsh responses, from ethnic cleansing to genocide. The international legal environSummer/Fall 2006 [ 3 ]

INTRODUCTION

ment in which nationalist claims are made has certainly changed; more than once over the last two decades, states have intervened militarily in other countries solely in order to protect the interests of minority groups subjected to the reprisals of sovereign governments. But the threat of nationalist mobilization and state responses to it continue to bedevil policymakers around the world.

In the 1990s both policymakers and policy analysts turned their attention to problems of nationalist violence. After the end of the Cold War, the logic went, the forces that had previously held nationalists in check were faltering. The end of communism in Eastern Europe and Eurasia; the global resurgence of religious and ethnic extremism; and the continuing problem of weak states and unstable regional orders in Africa, the greater Middle East, and Asia seemed to point toward nationalist disputes as a new threat to international peace and security. The disappearance of multinational federations, the intensification of territorial disputes linked to demands for national self-determination, and the rise of extremist parties professing loyalty to the national cause all seemed to point toward the irruption of nationalism as a central challenge at the turn of the twenty-first century. One need only trawl through a library catalogue or peruse an article database to find innumerable examples of the growing fascination with the national problem, among academics as well as among policymakers.

But there are two reasons to be skeptical about the growth of nationalism over the last two decades. One is the simple fact that ethnic and nationalist violence— large-scale civil wars and secessionist disputes, for example—has in fact declined since the end of the Cold War, not [ 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

increased. The end of superpower confrontation actually turned out to be a remarkably good thing for the incidence of sub-state violence, including for those conflicts drawn along ethnic or national lines. Peace accords brought an end to long-running civil wars. Nationalist groups renounced violence as sources of support from superpower patrons dried up. In fact, in only one region of the world—Europe—did nationalist violence increase in the early 1990s, which is one major explanation for why Europeans and Americans perceived the post-Cold War period as one of increasing global disorder. But even in Europe, by the end of the decade, the major venue for nationalism was the soccer field and the Eurovision song contest, not the once bloody battlefields of the Balkans.1 The second reason is the degree to which the term “nationalism” actually maps real phenomena. There is no doubt that the 1990s was a decade in which it became fashionable, as it were, to couch one’s own political ambitions and grievances in national terms. But that is a matter of how political elites marketed their activities, not necessarily a reflection of the real political, economic, and ideological drivers of violence. It is illustrative of the fickle nature of the national that, in many parts of the world, erstwhile ethnonational disputes are now sometimes cast as instances of “terrorism,” both by those involved in the disputes themselves and by the United States. It is not at all uncommon for the same political movement to have been called “communist” in the 1980s, “nationalist” in the 1990s, and “terrorist” in the early 2000s. In other words, how we label a conflict or its participants usually tells us more about the public relations skills of belligerents and the political proclivities of external ana-

Pledging Allegiance

lysts than about some essential feature of the dispute itself.

The essays in this issue of the Georgetown Journal contribute to a more complex understanding of how nationalism really works—or doesn’t—on the ground. In regional settings as diverse as post-Soviet Eurasia, the United States, and East Asia, the authors show that nationalist disputes can be quelled by creative institutional solutions—such as federalism— but that these same institutional innovations can sometimes create and fuel discontent. Immigrant and diaspora communities can both contribute to and undermine solutions to international conflicts. The resolution of disputes in one period can set up incentives for new conflicts down the road. As Nick Miller shows, the persistent view among Western policymakers that war in the Balkans was motivated by nationalism—whether “ancient hatreds” among ethno-national groups or the manipulative nationalist rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic—limited creative thinking about how to respond to large-scale violence. For Edwina Barvosa, nationalism is only one form of identity which competes in the marketplace of ideas with several others, including citizenship and ethnicity; there is no reason to believe, she suggests, that immigrant populations must display dual loyalties, even with respect to threats to their national or ethnic kin abroad. And federalism—one of the central ways of dealing with demands for autonomy in multinational settings—can be one of the sources of violent mobilization later on, as Baogang He shows and Eduard Ponarin confirms, in the cases of Asia and the Russian Federation.

For policymakers these essays do not offer easy solutions. But they do point to the fact that contentious politics is always more banal than we might believe.

Indeed, a recent quantitative study by two respected Stanford University political scientists found absolutely no basis for the idea that multiethnic or multinational countries are somehow more prone to social violence or civil war than other countries. In fact, the best predictors of conflict turn out to be things that are rather more pedestrian: having mountains, being poor, and having a high proportion of young men in the population.2 With plenty of places to hide, no jobs, and lots of bored young men on hand, countries are at risk of violence regardless of whether nationalism is part of the volatile mix.

The 1990s were in many ways the age of nationalism, but mainly in the sense that policymakers and analysts began to focus on one particular way of conceiving the world’s problems. As these essays show, however, there is often a deep and complicated politics at work in allegedly nationalist conflicts, as well as among peaceful immigrant communities in multinational states. Uncovering those complexities—and refusing to take nationalists and their opponents simply at their word—is the first step toward better policy.

Charles King is Ion Ratiu associate professor and chairman of the faculty in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His most recent book is The Black Sea: A History. He is currently writing a modern history of the Caucasus.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 5 ]

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Pledging Allegiance

American Immigrants in American Conflict Edwina Barvosa In the United States, where immigration issues continue to dominate the headlines, the question of immigrant loyalty is critical. Wearing the hijab, raising a Mexican flag in the streets, and speaking Korean at home with first-generation parents: are these signs of a failure to identify adequately with American identity? Do they potentially result in disloyalty to the United States? In times of violent conflict, would such immigrant disloyalty undermine American national unity and threaten the nation’s ability to realize its national interests?1 If we assume that identities compete with one another, then immigrant expression of origin-country identity is indeed a cause for concern.

Yet such a zero-sum conception of identity in general and of ethno-national identity in particular is ill founded. It fails to recognize that native-born children of foreign-born immigrants typically develop not one, but multiple group identities and loyalties. Such second-generation immigrants often have two or more ethnic identities, but generally only one full and primary national identity: an identity with the United States, the nation of their birth and long-term residence. This article looks at the multiple identities that second-generation immigrants have, and through which they are able to interpret and judge international conflicts with reference to both their American national identity and their ethnic identities. First, it

Edwina Barvosa is an Assistant Professor of Social and Political Theory in the Department of Chicana and Chicano Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 7 ]

AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN CONFLICT

defines the nature of immigrant identity in the U.S. context. Then it examines immigrant responses to conflict, differentiating between origin-country domestic conflicts and conflicts involving the origin country and the United States, for which the loyalty question is most

homogenous national identity in which immigrants would reap economic and social benefits by incorporating themselves into the American cultural mainstream. Incorporating immigrants on this assimilationist model required that immigrants assume only one identity: the

Immigrants who retained ethnic identities

were seen as insufficiently American.

identity of a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and monolingual Englishspeaker.2 In this assimilationist view, ethnic and national identities were understood as zero sum, in that immigrants who retained ethnic identities were seen as insufficiently American. Many regarded immigrant loyalties to be divided, such that they could not be relied upon to support the United States against their nations of origin in times of conflict.3 This assimilationist approach, however, ignored the often vital distinction Defining Immigrant Identity. between an “ethnic” (cultural) identity Two characteristics of second-generation and a “national” (political) identity. Of immigrants’ identities influence their these only the latter is generally based on responses to violent conflicts in the allegiance to a given nation-state as a disUnited States and abroad: the specific tinct legal and political system. This discontent of an immigrant’s multiple iden- tinction is important in a multicultural tities and the situational expression of society such as the United States, in that those various identities. The first of these, native-born immigrants, who have not the idea that second-generation immi- lived in their family’s country of origin, grants have a multiplicity of group identi- may learn their family’s ethnic culture ties, is an unsettling notion to those who without also learning and embracing the still accept classic assimilationist ideals. national political identity of their parEarly proponents of American assimila- ents’ foreign homeland. By conflating tionism envisioned that all immigrants to ethnic and national identity in the the United States would shed the cultural American context, and by asserting that identities of their countries of origin and ethnic homogeneity is necessary for that succeeding generations would not national political unity, assimilationists preserve those identities. Such assimila- have entrenched in American political tion, it was argued, would produce a culture the false view that persistent ethtroublesome. Finally, it concludes that retaining some ethnic origin-country identity can in fact facilitate loyal integration. When ethnic perspectives do dominate a second-generation immigrant’s judgments of political conflict, they do so primarily in the case of domestic, rather than international, conflicts—an understanding that might well calm the post9/11 fears of Americans and urge us to adopt a more open and less deterministic perspective on national identity.

[ 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

BARVOSA

nic diversity among immigrants threatens their loyalty to the American nation.4 A better alternative is to understand immigrant identities as involving acculturation rather than assimilation. Acculturation grants that immigrants may retain both their immigrant ethnic cultural identities and an American national identity with loyalty to the United States.

Assimilationism, in contrast, assumes that successful immigrant incorporation must always eliminate all immigrant ethnic identities.

Sociological studies reveal that many immigrant groups do defy assimilationist predictions by retaining ethnic group consciousness in significant ways.5 While this fact engenders alarm among nativists and assimilationists, continued ethnic group membership, including participation in the subeconomies of ethnic enclaves, can clearly play an important supportive role in immigrant incorporation into the United States. Recent studies of second-generation immigrants reveal that abrupt rejection of ethnic cultures tends to undermine, rather than aid, immigrant adaptation to the United States. Rapid assimilation frequently disrupts family cohesion and parental influence, and reduces immigrant resilience to entrenched U.S. patterns of racial and ethnic discrimination. The most effec-

Pledging Allegiance

nic group identification and continued participation in co-ethnic social and economic networks. Well-balanced acculturation fosters the kind of strong immigrant identification with the United States that is potentially important in contexts of violent conflict.6 Evidence of persistent ethnic identification among immigrants shows that many second-generation immigrants do in fact acculturate, rather than assimilate, to American society. Such acculturated immigrants understand and identify with both the dominant American culture and the American political system, while also retaining meaningful identification with their ethnic cultures of origin. Were such immigrant acculturation widespread, the result could be a multicultural society characterized and enriched by ethnic diversity, but also bound together as a nation by shared political ideals and practices.7 American national identity based on common commitment to shared political principles would be consistent with extensive ethnic diversity and could accommodate both increasing immigration and political globalization.

While such multicultural acculturation of immigrants does occur, the available evidence overwhelmingly indicates that in practice, second-generation immigrants do eventually “assimilate� to

A rapid rejection of ethnic cultures tends

to undermine, rather than assist, immigrant adaptation to the United States. tive path to successful immigrant incorporation, therefore, is not assimilation, but slow-paced acculturation to the United States combined with robust eth-

American culture and fail to retain immigrant ethnic identities. In a major study, 98 percent of second-generation immigrants surveyed spoke English well Summer/Fall 2006 [ 9 ]

AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN CONFLICT

or very well, and the longer their time of residence in the United States, the greater their preference for English.8 Moreover, while second-generation immigrants surveyed were fluent in American mainstream culture, they often had limited knowledge of their parents’ culture of origin and did not retain a meaningful immigrant ethnic identity. In addition, with the exception of the relatively few second-generation immigrants who had sustained transnational experience, most second-generation immigrants had little or no direct knowledge of or identity with any political system other than that of the United States.9 It is not surprising then that

torically have strongly supported U.S. war efforts abroad. Mexican immigrants were awarded more Congressional Medals of Honor than any other minority group during World War II. While they comprised only 10 percent of the population of wartime Los Angeles, Mexican immigrants accounted for 20 percent of the Angelinos who gave their lives in the conflict.11 Likewise, Latinos participated in high rates in the Vietnam War and are now overrepresented in the current war in Iraq (a fact also influenced by shortages in non-military employment). Immigrants have also supported the U.S. government in non-violent conflicts.

For example, Cuban

Second-generation immigrants’ ethnic and national identities lie with the United States; they are not only incorporated, but assimilated.

Americans have long championed American interests against the Cuban government. Moreover, despite stereotypes to the contrary, many Mexican Americans disapprove of uncontrolled immigration and do not automatically endorse the immigration policies favored by the Mexican government.12 On the whole, however, Latinas/os have not been significantly involved in American foreign policy, choosing Responses to Conflict. While the instead to focus on domestic civil rights specific content of American national issues. Were they more involved, they identities can vary from one person to would likely affirm American national the next, the national identities of sec- interests over ethnic group interests. A ond-generation immigrants often con- recent survey shows that a plurality of tain strong patriotic sentiments that Latina/o political elites believe that ethencourage their support for the United nic group interests either should not States during international conflicts. subvert American foreign policy interMexican-Americans, for example, his- ests (43 percent) or should forward

among second-generation immigrants “solid majorities of Vietnamese, Filipino, and Cuban children proclaim the United States to be the best country in the world.”10 In short, despite the personal and societal benefits of acculturation, the majority of second-generation immigrants are assimilated to the United States in both their ethnic and national identities.

[ 1 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

BARVOSA

those American interests abroad (24 percent). Of those surveyed, only 26 percent believed that Latino leaders should pursue ethnic group goals without regard for U.S. national interests.13 Latina/o public opinion also agrees that U.S. interests should receive privilege.

In a 1990 survey, a majority of the three largest Latino ethnic sub-groups indicated that they were more positive about the United States than they were about their countries of origin.14 In times of conflict, such deference to American foreign policy goals among immigrant elites and popular favoritism toward the United States will likely foster continued second-generation Latino allegiance to the United States.

In some cases, however, immigrant groups do raise ethnic-based challenges to American foreign policy in their countries of origin. Peaceful challenges, however, are nonetheless broadly consistent with U.S. national identity and with allegiance to the shared political practices of the American democratic system. In October 1991, for example, thousands of Haitian immigrants peacefully demonstrated in lower Manhattan to protest the exile of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the United States’s apparent support for a repressive regime. Such mobilization did not represent disloyalty toward the United States or a failing commitment to American democracy.

On the contrary, it constituted an exercise of American democratic freedom of assembly and the free political expression of a legitimate national interest in the well-being of other nations. As one political analyst has put it, “[A] MexicanAmerican who advocates politics that benefit Mexico is little different from a Catholic who advocates policies endorsed by the church or a member of Amnesty

Pledging Allegiance

International who writes to his congressman at the organization’s behest. There is no question here of disloyalty, only of interest and identities and of different modes of social contribution.”15 Calls by Haitian-Americans for U.S. support of democratic governance in Haiti therefore have been expressions of American democratic principles and were in keeping with loyalty to the United States.

Domestic vs. International Conflicts. The political expression of

immigrant identities often depends on the immediate situation. Domestic conflicts in countries of origin may sometimes awaken ethnic identities that are in other contexts politically irrelevant.

Different identities thus provide a “salient” frame of reference for thought and action only when particular political events make them relevant. In the context of Aristide’s exile, for example, many Haitian-Americans analyzed the conflict with reference to their ethnic group identities. In contrast, in the context of 9/11, those Haitian immigrants responded to the violence as Americans and New Yorkers.

In many cases of international conflict, national identities are the most salient and, given their typical content, tend to foster immigrant allegiance to the United States. In the context of domestic conflict, however, ethnic identities are often most salient for second-generation immigrants. Thus their responses to domestic conflict are strongly influenced both by their ethnic identities and by the way that their various identities were shaped by the process of incorporation into the United States. In some cases, immigrant national identity can become racialized in ways that significantly influence the responses of some second-genSummer/Fall 2006 [ 1 1 ]

AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN CONFLICT

eration immigrants toward domestic racial conflict and toward the United States itself. For example, in her study of West Indian immigrants in New York City, sociologist Mary Waters found that a majority of native-born second-generation immigrants identified strongly as

nities. In response, some in this group adopted an oppositional stance toward mainstream American political and social institutions, regarding them as part of an overall system of racial subordination.

Suspicion toward the public school system, for example, has further led some

Robust ethnic identification and group

membership can foster strong loyalty and commitment to the United States. either “Americans,” who disregard their ethnic heritage (42 percent), or as hyphenated “ethnic Americans” (31 percent), for whom ethnic identity is very important.16 For both groups, the American color line significantly influenced the formation of their identities as immigrants. West Indian immigrants who were fully assimilated identified with American blacks, but those who retained separate ethnic identities consciously distinguished themselves as West Indian in order to avoid the subordination associated with a being black American.

Most West Indian immigrants are recognized in the United States as racially black. In Waters’s study, the second-generation immigrants who identified themselves as West Indians viewed themselves as a separate social group, but those who identified themselves as Americans thus generally regarded their national identity as bound up with their racial identities as black Americans. Most were highly sensitive to the negative racial stereotypes of blacks in the United States and to the social norms that denigrate and subordinate blacks. They also generally considered racial discrimination to be prevalent in the United States and thought that it was likely to constrain their own opportu[ 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

American-identified West Indian immigrants to devalue education in general as part of their response to ongoing racial conflict.17 Such responses to racial conflict undermine the incorporation of those immigrants who are not highly ethnically identified, but are instead identified with racialized national identities.

In contrast, the ethnically identified West Indian immigrants studied interpreted and responded to domestic racial conflict somewhat differently. In order to avoid “misrecognition” as American blacks, these youth made conscious efforts to signal their ethnic identity through dress, cultural symbols, accented speech, and self-description. They often noted that they benefited from their ethnic identities in the form of increased job opportunities and better treatment by whites who regarded them as outside of the black mainstream. While some acknowledged the effects of racism on other blacks and their own risk of experiencing discrimination, many developed skeptical attitudes toward racial conflict.

As one youth put it, “Black Americans, they think that every little thing a white person does to a black person is discriminating. But an island person has a different view….We really don’t see any dis-

BARVOSA

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al of the studies cited in this article indicate, when immigrants have robust ethnic identities, they often interpret racial conflict as less damaging to them, in comparison to those immigrants who lack significant immigrant ethnic identity.

In such cases, retaining meaningful ethnic identity can help foster successful, upwardly mobile immigrant incorporation and strengthen immigrant loyalty and commitment to American society.

Policymakers and political leaders would do well to abandon old assimilationist notions that there is a zero-sum relationship between immigrant ethnic and American national identity. Secondgeneration immigrants with multiple identities may interpret and respond to various conflicts through various identities. In addition, immigrant interpretation of conflict is strongly influenced by their experience of incorporation into American society, including possibly undue hardships and hostilities. AntiConclusion. While immigrant experi- immigrant political discourse, nativist ences vary widely, second-generation legislation and public policy, racial proimmigrants in the United States fre- filing and other forms of racial and ethquently develop multiple identities. nic subordination, deep economic disThose identities typically include several parities, and harsh inner-city conditions ethnic identities, but only one national can all weaken second-generation identity: one with the United States, the national identity and commitment to nation of their birth and residence. In American political institutions.20 international conflicts, second-generaIn contrast, robust ethnic identification immigrants will generally reference tion and group membership can foster their national identities as Americans. strong loyalty and commitment to the When they do regard international con- United States, even under less than ideal flict in ethnic group terms, their political social conditions. Policymakers who thus interests will be largely expressed in a wish to cultivate the loyalties of immimanner consistent with the principles grant groups should adopt genuinely and practices of American democracy. welcoming postures toward immigrants.

In domestic conflict such as racial con- They should offer positive and supportflict, however, immigrant ethnic identities ive systems for immigrant incorporation often will be more relevant than national and encourage rather than discourage identities, unless an immigrant’s national the ethnic group identities that immiidentity is significantly racialized. As sever- grant communities can sustain.

crimination.�18 By embracing their ethnic identities as West Indians in order to distance themselves from the prevalent U.S. racial conflict, these immigrants tended to believe that they had significant opportunities in the United States and that they could succeed and escape racism through hard work and education.

Consequently, it was the ethnically identified immigrants in Waters’s study who were more strongly motivated to incorporate themselves into American mainstream society and to try to shield themselves from racial conflict. While such an approach is ultimately unlikely to ease racial hierarchies, it does represent a significant commitment among ethnic West Indians to American society as it is now constructed. Contrary to classic assimilationist views then, it is often an ethnic identity that gives native-born immigrants the motivation to invest themselves in American society.19

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NOTES

1 For a recent argument along these lines, see Samuel Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 221-256.

2 Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

3 Charges of divided loyalty have not ceased and appear to be common in some contemporary foreign policy circles. In a recent survey, for example, Latino/a foreign service officers remarked that they were often charged by white colleagues as having divided loyalties that privileged the interests of countries of origin against U.S. interests. See Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry Pachon, eds.

Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the Homeland?

(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 10-12.

4 While this emphasis on cultural homogeneity has its antecedents in the Western canon, it has been challenged by contemporary political philosophers.

For this development see John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill: Essays on Politics and Society, Ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,” in Theorizing Citizenship, Ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); and Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

5 For a study, see Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City, 2nd ed.

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).

6 See Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) in Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2001), 49-54.

7 Some political philosophers, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, have made this argument in order to reconcile the differences between multicultural and pluralist approaches to ethnic and racial diversity. See “Afterword: How Shall We Live as Many?” in Beyond Pluralism: The Conception of Groups and Group Identities in America, Eds. Wendy Katkin, Ned Landsman, and Andrea Tyree (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 243-59.

8 The statistical evidence of language assimilation is striking. See Portes & Rumbaut, Legacies, 118146, and Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary

[ 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Immigration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

9 For a study of transmigrants who develop multiple national identities, see Peggy Levitt, The Transnational Villagers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

10 Portes and Rumbaut, Legacies, 39.

11 Rodolfo Acuña, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Collins), 243244.

12 de la Garza and Pachon, Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy, 9.

13 Ibid., 29-30.

14 Ibid., 9. Interestingly, the Latinos surveyed also indicated that they felt more positively toward Great Britain than toward nations in Latin America.

15 Peter Schuck, “Plural Citizenships,” in Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe, Eds. Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 61-99. Schuck, an expert on dual citizenship, is referring especially to the political activities of dual citizens. He continues, “[l]imits to this can begin only at the point that any of these social entities, Mexico, the Catholic Church, or Amnesty International, become enemies of the United States ‘capable of doing her great harm.’”

16 See Mary Waters, Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 287-307.

17 Ibid., 307-315. Waters’s finding is consistent with survey results in which only minorities of Haitian and Jamaican children consider the United States to be the best country in the world. See Portes and Rumbaut, Legacies, 39. Portes and Rumbaut also find similar rejection of educational attainment in response to racial and ethnic subordination among some second-generation Latino immigrants, especially Mexican-Americans. See Legacies, 284-286.

18 Waters, Black Identities, 292.

19 Ibid., 311.

20 Based on CILS data, Portes and Rumbaut contend that the three most significant obstacles to second-generation educational achievement and upwardly mobile incorporation are persistent racial discrimination, growing economic inequalities, and the concentration of marginalized peoples within inner cities. See Legacies, 55. For data and analysis of the increasing shift away from mainstream identities to disaffected reassertions of immigrant ethnic identity among second generation immigrants, see 154-157.

Pledging Allegiance

Nationalism and Policymaking in the Balkans Nicholas J. Miller The recent death of Slobodan Miloševic has renewed interest in the Balkan nationalism of the 1990s. There is no better place to start a discussion of nationalism in the Balkans than with the architect of Yugoslavia’s violent collapse. Were the tragedies of the Balkan conflict the malevolent work of evil politicians or a logical and continuous—perhaps even inevitable—product of culture?

Policymakers and theorists rarely interact, yet they have used the same template in their attempts to understand Balkan nationalism. Some have argued that nationalism in the Balkans was ancient or even organic (the “perennialist” approach), while others have seen nationalism as an entirely modern, even artificial, product of manipulation by political elites. There are both policymakers and theorists in each camp, but most journalists and policymakers have put forth a tautological version of the perennialist position: “they are violent and nationalistic because they have always been violent and nationalistic.” Scholars rarely make this sort of claim.

Today, the most influential scholars of nationalism see national identity as an invented phenomenon, the result of conscious state policy designed to mobilize otherwise disinterested masses.1 This vision of national identity is equally problematic.

This paper will argue, as do a growing number of nationalism theorists, that national identity is neither wholly ancient nor

Nick J. Miller is the graduate director of the Department of History at Boise State University, where he teaches courses on Central and Eastern European history.

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ed nationalism. Policymakers were more likely to believe that the Balkan wars were the product of intrinsic tribalism. The Balkan people, overwhelmed by the violence of their own history and the revenge fantasies that history bred, could not be turned from their course until they had exhausted themselves.

Both approaches bore rotten fruit.

While the pessimistic perennialist view led to international inactivity during the early years of the Croatian and Bosnian wars, the optimistic modern approach Divergent Theories of Violent encouraged quick-fix interventionist Nationalism. In the context of the fantasies. It was common in 1992 or 1993 warring Balkans of the 1990s, the policy- to hear something like Radovan makers’ choice is easy to understand: Karadzic’s infamous statement that something “ancient” is something virtu- “Serbs and Muslims are like cats and ally impossible to confront. That which is dogs. They cannot live together in peace. ancient becomes too tough a nut to crack It is impossible.”2 Likewise, President Bill and therefore its own argument for inac- Clinton shrank from active intervention tion. However, among scholars, the after reading a charmingly inaccurate dominant, modernist school is a product popular travelogue that claimed the of theories about social construction and Balkans were seething with ancient historical memory, according to which hatreds.3 Some critics of U.S. policy people are incapable of resisting the per- argued passionately that if enough attennicious influence of the state and its tion and money were lavished on the charismatic leaders. These debates, while Serbian “opposition” to Miloševic, he they can be arcane, are hardly abstract. would be overthrown and all would The divide between the perennialist return to normal in Serbia. Another and the modernist schools became a example of the modernist approach was source of friction as the war in Bosnia the Dayton Peace Agreement, which raged. While the intellectual communi- would have (re)invented the allegedly ties in Europe and the United States multicultural Bosnia that existed before advocated intervention during the wars it was ripped apart by toxic nationalism. of the 1990s, the transatlantic policy- The general sentiment invigorating the making community just as strenuously interventionist side was that violent argued against such action. Most of the nationalism was foreign to the region, interventionist intellectuals believed the brought in and brought on by megaloBalkans were merely beset by bad politi- maniacs who recognized the mobilizing cians who needed to be overthrown. power of ethnic solidarity.

Intervention would return proper balIn the grand contest for the attention ance to their societies, which would have of the policymakers, a view of intransisuffered mightily, but only temporarily, gent nationalism, with roots as deep as from the plague of politically manipulat- history itself, trumped a modern view of wholly modern: it is fluid, but not endlessly so. On the one hand, it draws upon a large but finite reservoir of cultural images and symbols and historical facts and interpretations. On the other hand, conditions that prevail when nationalism rears up determine the nature of the nationalist event. Policymakers must shed their preconceptions and spend more time understanding the context of nationalism. Theory, in this case, has a lot to teach policymakers.

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MILLER

nationalism with no historical roots at all. Yet history betrayed the perennialists, who were unable to prove that the people of the Balkans had indeed been fighting for centuries, much less millennia. The modernists found it equally difficult to demonstrate that leaders like Franjo Tudjman and Miloševic were aberrations and that tolerant, democratic representatives of their people would emerge if such leaders were simply eliminated.

Alternative Approaches to Understanding Balkan Nationalism. Some commentators have con-

flated the schools. They have argued that nationalism is deeply rooted but eradicable. Once NATO intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo, political scientist Daniel Jonah Goldhagen called for a deSerbianization of Serbia, and another scholar noted in a typical editorial that “bombing may not be enough” to finish off extreme nationalism in Serbia.4 In both cases, the authors argued for occupation and for an equivalent of “deNazification” for the Serbs. Their conviction that nationalism in Serbia was so strong as to require extreme measures— bombing, long-term occupation, and “de-nationalization”—would seem to identify these authors as perennialists.

They and others like them certainly engaged in the type of demonization that characterizes the extreme perennialist approach. However, their faith in the ability of outsiders to recreate the Serbian people identifies them as moderns, for whom people are putty in the hands of a powerful manipulative force— in this instance, the West. Altogether, the fit is unnatural and any policy that followed from this approach, had it been applied, would have been exaggerated and, in fact, unnecessary.

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A better option is the “ethnosymbolic” approach of scholar Anthony D. Smith, who argues that, while nationalism as an ideology is modern, national identity is not. While national identity is old, it is not ancient and it most definitely is not organic. Instead, the past and the present interact in ways that will always conform to the nation’s cultural legacy, but the variety of manifestations of that interaction is enormous. Understanding the breadth of that cultural legacy is a critical and difficult task. We have faced many dilemmas of interpretation in the last century. How, for instance, do the legalistic, nonviolent “Yugoslav” Croats of the nineteenth century fit with the savage Ustaša of the 1940s?5 How is it that the Serbs who led the charge to war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s could also argue, with justification, that they have a democratic tradition and history? These dilemmas should not be taken as evidence of the irrationality of these peoples’ history. They can be understood, and the key is to understand the social, economic, and political context in which the given nationalist event occurs. In times of peace and economic stability, leaders can use cultural building blocks to create a multicultural ideal and a multiparty democracy, and even a collective identity.

In times of crisis, these wholesome images seem irrelevant. Whereas the peaceful image of one’s neighbor may be built on the memory of mutual commitments, the uglier image may be founded on the conflict that has scarred their shared history. Nations are often captives of ugly historical memories; we are bombarded with examples of this phenomenon, to the point that we might believe that historical memory is more important than reality. Nations have a range of historical experiences and memories, Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 7 ]

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and the positive can be tapped just as easily as the negative, if the will is present.

No Easy Answers: Formulating Creative Policy Responses to Violent Nationalism. The key to

understanding the play of nationalism in any context is to recognize that a range of responses is available to any nation, given varying conditions. Violent nationalism is, therefore, not a cause, but an effect. If policymakers accept that there are a variety of nationalisms and that they operate differently under various conditions, they need not fear—as the perennialists do— that change is impossible. Likewise, with a solid understanding of how nationalism works, policymakers can avoid advocating a change in leadership as a complete solution to violent nationalism.

Violent nationalism results from poor economic conditions, uncertain political transitions, or international instability, all of which were present in Yugoslavia following the death of Tito in 1980 and in the Balkans as a whole following the end of communism in 1989.

That a process so well known to historians as, say, the rise of the National Socialists in Germany should occur elsewhere is not surprising. If we can understand that changing economic conditions in Germany contributed both to the assimilation of Jews in the nineteenth century and to their murder in the twentieth, is it so difficult to imagine that the economic effects of the collapse of communism were equally destabilizing for the Balkans? Not really. Without the confluence of an economic crisis, a crisis of political legitimacy in the League of Communists, and an intellectual community that offered a novel nationalist framework for understanding those crises, we would not have seen

[ 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the type of nationalist excesses that plagued Serbia, Croatia, and the rest of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.6 The reorientation I suggest does not render any magnificent, silver-bullet solutions to the policy errors of the 1990s. It does, however, allow us to see where policy might have been more creatively and effectively formulated once the wars began in the former Yugoslavia.

For instance, there are many good reasons to have stayed out of the Balkans during the wars, but the region’s inherent violence is not one of them. The “ancient hatreds” approach served only to stifle discussion before it got started.

The honest response would have been that humanitarian intervention did not interest American or European policymakers. Yet, once a somewhat robust intervention was authorized, the war in Bosnia ended, demonstrating the fallacy of advocating inaction on the basis of Balkan intractability. The point is that engagement in the region can, in fact, effect positive change. Why rule it out by buying into the essentialization of the Balkans as hereditarily warlike?

Conversely, cutting the head off of an odious regime will do nothing to alter the current reality in the region.

Serbia’s military defeat in 1999 led to Miloševic’s electoral defeat in 2000; since that time, progress has been slow.

By 2000 the links between politics, crime, and security were so powerful that uprooting them was extremely difficult. Additionally, the rather instrumental nationalism that Miloševic embraced was much more heartfelt among his successors. The large demonstrations in Belgrade following Miloševic’s death in March 2006 proved that Serbian nationalism did not die with him.

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Conclusion. In the face of the easy but Serbia. Such an approach will not serve

facile solution, our task is to find a useful way of conceptualizing nationalism and its place in the Balkans. The way that I have suggested does not provide easy answers—it does not provide a series of tests that inexorably lead to good policy— but it does allow us to avoid superficial ones. During times of war or postwar

any purpose other than to keep the flame lit under the same simmering nationalism that provoked so much violence in the 1990s.

Instead, more attention should be given to rebuilding stable economies, even in the absence of sincere political reform. The key is to trust the culture

Violent nationalism results from poor economic conditions, uncertain political transitions, or international instability. reconstruction, the approach suggests that we focus less on eliminating “bad” leaders and more on working with creators and consumers of culture, for they are the ones who construct identities out of the pieces of the past. Furthermore, less emphasis should be put on demonstrations of our power and their weakness, such as the current demand for the handover of Hague indictees before progress can be made on assistance to

itself—after a judicious and most likely limited intervention from outside—to take advantage of the conditions for its own regeneration. Alas, such an approach demands the sort of patience and trust that powerful outsiders rarely evince. Western policymakers need to be prepared to reject easy answers: good policy requires an understanding of the historical, political, and economic conditions on the ground.

NOTES

1 For examples of the approaches discussed here, see Nicholas J. Miller, “Postwar Serbian Nationalism and the Limits of Intervention,” Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (2004): 163–169. For a thorough analysis of the varieties of nationalism theory, see Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (New York: Routledge, 1998).

2 Often cited. I most recently saw it on “The History Place: Genocide in the 20th Century,” Internet, http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/bosnia.htm (Date accessed: 2 February 2006).

3 The book Clinton read was Balkan Ghosts by Robert D. Kaplan. The story is recounted in Laura

Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, Inc., 1995/1996), 287–289.

4 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, “A New Serbia,” The New Republic, 17 May 1999; see also Charles Ingrao, “Bombing May Not Be Enough to Achieve Stability,” Los Angeles Times, 12 April 1999, B5.

5 The Ustaša were the organization that led the Independent State of Croatia during World War II. From that position of power, they killed tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies.

6 For a fuller argument, see Nicholas J. Miller, “The Nonconformists: Dobrica Cosic and Mica Popovic Envision Serbia,” Slavic Review 58, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 515–536.

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Pledging Allegiance

Russia’s Islamic Challenge Eduard Ponarin & Irina Kouznetsova-Morenko Two great global dramas—the international struggle against radical Islam and President Vladimir Putin’s strategies for consolidating control in the Russian Federation—are being played out in a place few Westerners have heard of: the autonomous ethnic republic of Tatarstan. With a population of nearly 4 million people, just over half of whom are Muslim Tatars, it could easily stay under the radar of non-specialists.

However, those interested in either of the great global dramas or concerned about the possible threat of ethnic uprisings to the cohesion of the Russian Federation would do well to examine further this tiny republic at the heart of modern Russia’s ideological and geopolitical concerns.

Tatarstan was at the forefront of nationalist mobilization in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Soviet Union came crashing down. From 1990 to 1993, against the background of political rivalries in Moscow (first between Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev, then between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament), the republic’s leadership enjoyed virtual independence. It consolidated its position vis-à-vis the federal government to win extraordinary concessions in a powersharing treaty between the republic and the federal center.

The republic’s leadership retained a substantial share of federal taxes for the local budget and ensured that local laws

Eduard Ponarin is a professor and chair of the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the European University in St. Petersburg.

Irina KouznetsovaMorenko is an assistant professor in the Department of History and Sociology at Kazan State Medical University.

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could sometimes supercede federal law.

Internally, it privileged those who were ethnically Tatar and proficient in the Tatar language. For instance, until recently, three-quarters of members of the local legislature (gossovet) were ethnic Tatars, even though Tatars formed barely a majority of the republic’s population. During Putin’s tenure, these powers have been slowly but surely eroded.

The republic’s laws that contradicted federal law have been abolished, fiscal discipline has been enforced, and the ethnic composition of the legislature has been revised in the Moscow headquarters of the ruling party, United Russia.

In fact, the federal center has regained the ground lost to several ethnic republics a dozen years before—Tatarstan being just one of them. While it is quite clear why Russian federal leaders would want to make these changes, it is not immediately obvious how they could do so without encountering substantial resistance from either the republic’s government or the popular leaders of the Tatar nationalist movement. This paper uses the example of Tatarstan to account for the ease with which Moscow has been able to consolidate control. It also examines the history of Islamic renaissance in the North Caucasus and considers the prospects of politicization of Islam in Tatarstan.

Stage One: A Game of Nationalism and Religious Authority. In the late 1980s, as the

Soviet grip on freedom of speech and political organization was loosening, nationally aware Tatars—and similar groups in autonomous republics such as Chechnya, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia— mobilized to raise the status of the republic and their native culture. Their efforts benefited from the rivalry between [ 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union, and Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, in the period between 1989 and 1991. After the Russian declaration of sovereignty on 12 June 1990, Tatarstan tried to elevate its status from that of an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation to that of a union republic within the Soviet Union, which would provide it with greater autonomy and even the possibility of post-Soviet independence. In 1990, in the context of this power struggle, Yeltsin suggested to the leaders of Tatarstan that they take as much independence as possible, keeping in mind that if that meant secession from Russia, the “decision will be final.”1 After the 1991 collapse of the USSR and the removal of Gorbachev from power, Yeltsin still had his hands full as he struggled with the Russian parliament and was not particularly concerned with the autonomy of other former republics.

Before the conclusion of a powersharing treaty with Moscow on 15 February 1994, Tatarstan enjoyed virtual independence, which the republic’s government (under the leadership of the experienced Communist bureaucrat Mintemir Shaimiev) used to consolidate its position vis-à-vis Moscow. President Shaimiev played a subtle game with the popular nationalist movement. On the one hand, he used it as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with Moscow over a power-sharing treaty to win more concessions by presenting himself as a nationalist leader. On the other hand, he had the vivid warning of Chechnya, where the leaders of the nationalist movement ousted and replaced old Communist elite such as himself.2 Eventually, Shaimiev was able to subdue and marginalize the nationalist move-

PONARIN & KOUZNETSOVA-MORENKO

ment and secure his grip on political power in the republic. Yet the status of the republic had been elevated; its standing started to resemble that of the union republics within the former USSR—all of which became independent upon the union’s collapse in December 1991.

Part of the nationalist revival of the late 1980s perestroika was a revitalization of Islam in Tatarstan. Islam was an important tool of the Tatar nationalist movement, reinforcing a distinct, Muslim Tatar identity and fueling demands for greater autonomy or independence. The most common approach at that time was

Pledging Allegiance

movement or the local government.

Moreover, this strand of Islam has recently exhibited some political ambitions—it is growing and increasingly independent. As of 1990 there were only 154 Muslim parishes in Tatarstan, most of which had formed after the start of Gorbachev’s reforms, and the majority of its fifty-five imams were uneducated in theology. In 1990 two secondary Muslim schools emerged in Tatarstan for the first time since the early twentieth century.8 The number of parishes has increased from 18 in 1988 to more than 700 in 1992.9 Those rapid changes were not

Islamic renaissance was an important

asset in the struggle to promote Tatarstan’s autonomy. to restore Islam as a conservative national tradition, a set of certain popular rites.3 At that time, Islam was not yet an independent political force. The national movement used Muslim symbols instrumentally to back up their political demands with claims of national authenticity.4 For example, the first public celebration of the feast of Ramadan in the capital city of Kazan on 16 April 1991 culminated in a procession of thousands of people to the Freedom Square chanting slogans of the nationalist movement.5 Islamic renaissance was an important asset in the struggle to promote Tatarstan’s autonomy.6 Since the mid-1990s, such public celebrations of religious holidays have faded away, becoming private and local.7 At the same time there has emerged a strand of Islam that is self-sufficient, independent of either the remnants of the nationalist

controlled by the government or even by the Spiritual Board of Muslims; according to Valiulla Yakupov, the current deputy head of that body, “almost half the mosques [at the time] were built without any licensing documents from any Muslim authority.”10 Foreign assistance coming from rich Muslim nations played an important role in bringing about the change. After the demise of the Council on Religious Affairs in Moscow (the Russian government watchdog organization), there was no scrutiny of the receipt and distribution of financial assistance from foreign Muslim countries, and Tatar clerics strived to tap into international financial flows.

Disagreement over the potential spoils led to a schism between Muslim Tatar nationalists and those who supported the mufti of the regional Spiritual Board, located in neighboring Bashkortostan.

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Stage Two: Shaimiev’s Power had overcome this threat by 1995. The Game. By late 1992 the Tatarstani lead- process was accompanied by a campaign

ership no longer saw the feeble federal center as a major threat to its power. The strong support Shaimiev received from the Tatar nationalist movement made him invulnerable to the ire of the federal president, even though Yeltsin would have preferred to remove him.11 Rather, Shaimiev saw the popular nationalist leaders themselves as the major threat to his power. As soon as he had secured a number of privileges for his republic by concluding a very favorable treaty with

against the mufti in the local press, including the government newspaper Watanym Tatarstan. Seizure of mosques and other premises by the supporters of the new Tatarstani mufti followed.

In January 1995 a congress of Tatarstani Muslims recognized the new status quo. However, the head of the newly established religious body, ‘Abdulla ‘Aliulla, soon found that the republic’s leadership would not tolerate independent political actors in Tatarstan.

Elimination of the nationalist

movement tipped the balance of power toward the federal center.

Moscow in 1994, his policies toward the nationalist movement changed. He continued to co-opt those nationalists whom he deemed less dangerous and sought to marginalize those he felt he could not trust. Among the latter happened to be the most popular nationalist leader Fauziya Bairamova, the chairman of the Ittifak (opposition) party and the 1990 Tatar Woman of the Year. Soft repression against her and her associates included the closure of her party office in Kazan in 1995 and its newspaper in 1996.

Likewise, Shaimiev wanted to ensure political control over the continuing religious renaissance. Once a local Muslim governing body had been established as an alternative to the board in Ufa, Baskhortostan, Shaimiev chose to support it. This was a potentially dangerous move, as the Ufa mufti enjoyed the support of many Tatar Muslims, but soft repression of those loyal to the Ufa mufti [ 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

His attempt to seize another mosque and a Muslim school in the city of Kazan in the fall of 1995 resulted in a criminal case against him. His position of leadership was shaken, but by initiating a rapprochement with the opposition nationalist forces, he strengthened his position.

In 1996 he became the head of the “Tatarstan Muslims” movement. In February 1998 he was replaced as mufti by another cleric who enjoyed Shaimiev’s support. ‘Aliulla, with the opposition nationalists behind him, condemned the elections, claiming that county-level government leaders handpicked delegates to the Congress and instructed them on whom they should support. However, by that time, all heads of the county-level government had become members of the local legislature. Under Shaimiev, Tatarstan had turned into one of the least democratic regions of Russia.12 In 1999 ‘Aliulla initiated a hunger strike to

PONARIN & KOUZNETSOVA-MORENKO

demand a change of the electoral law of the republic. Representatives of fifteen opposition parties and movements, including ‘Alliula’s own, organized a demonstration in his support and against the authoritarian rule of Shaimiev.

Meanwhile, the new mufti, ‘Usman Iskhakov, quickly consolidated his position of leadership, thanks to strong backing from the local government. He knew that his leadership depended on Shaimiev’s support. As the chairman of one opposition party writes: “[Iskhakov] was and still is an obedient tool of the authorities.”13 The domination of Shaimiev, a secular leader, in religious matters is exemplified by his personal choice of an imam for a newly opened grand mosque in Kazan in 2005.

Political loyalty of the current mufti won him a second reelection in February 2006, in spite of the rule that no more than two consecutive elections are permitted and even though local nationalists, including those co-opted in the government, unleashed a vicious campaign against him on the eve of the elections.14 It also allowed him to make a personal fortune of the money obtained from various foreign charities and remain unaccountable. Shaimiev’s power games had repressed Tatar nationalist opposition and consolidated leadership in the republic.

Stage Three: Putin’s Power Vertical. Under Putin the relationship

between the federal center and provinces such as Tatarstan has changed. Several consolidating moves from the center reveal the growth of unitary if not authoritarian trends: the center has demanded that local laws be brought into agreement with Russian federal laws; seven federal districts—each with an

Pledging Allegiance

authorized representative of the Russian president—have been imposed, bringing together several provinces; some rights of the local government have been cancelled; an increasing share of taxes must be paid to Moscow; and finally, local gubernatorial elections have been cancelled and the Russian president now has the right to disband regional legislatures.

People in those economically advanced or resource-rich ethnic republics such as Tatarstan have exhibited particular displeasure with the emerging political system. In addition to economic complaints, the political actors in such provinces also grumble against what they see as Moscow’s attempt to undermine their nationhood. Although there have been quite a few episodes in the past fifteen years when local elite did use ethnic and religious differences to advance their republic’s position in the federation— including some ten-thousand-strong demonstrations—and separatist ideas are still found in the local press, the republics seem to have given in for the time being. The current situation is that of a frail balance between local religious and nationalist activists, the local government, and the federal center.

The position of the ruling elite in Tatarstan is to protect and expand the powers of the local government. To quote Rafael Hakimov, a political advisor to President Shaimiev, “Ceding regional powers to the federal center was obviously a losing strategy; it has become almost a nightmare now.” Yet the end result of Shaimiev’s policies of the 1990s, when he subdued and marginalized the nationalist movement and secured his own grip on political power in the republic, was a political void. Although the status of the republic within the Russian Federation was elevated temporarily, elimination of Summer/Fall 2006 [ 2 5 ]

RUSSIA’S ISLAMIC CHALLENGE

the nationalist movement tipped the balance of power toward the federal center by the late 1990s. Consequently, it was hard for the republic’s leadership to rely on the power of nationalism when Putin started to revise the relationship between Moscow and ethnic republics such as Tatarstan.

The example of Chechnya was also important. Putin’s decision to fight the second Chechen war deterred Tatarstan’s leadership from rekindling nationalist mobilization. In trying to resolve the Chechen standoff, Putin chose a tough approach that did not cost him popular support. For Shaimiev, this made reinvigoration of the Tatar nationalist movement he had undermined a doubly dangerous strategy, as he risked the retaliation of both frustrated nationalist leaders and the consolidated center. Finally, the example of Chechnya was important for Shaimiev because it showed how a popular movement may oust regional leaders.

Being an authoritarian ruler himself, Shaimiev might regard Putin’s authoritarianism as a lesser evil compared to an unpredictable grassroots movement.

Radicalization of Islam and its Union with Radical Nationalism.

The emergence of radical Islam among a once thoroughly secular people is a recent phenomenon. On several occasions, Tatar leaders have used their Islamic identity for instrumental reasons on the global stage. Although ethnic Tatars still dominate in the local government, they remain marginalized and stigmatized beyond the boundaries of their ethnic republic. The lack of opportunities in Russia, plus an interest in boosting their status, prompts a search for useful contacts in the Islamic world. Islam in the secularized post-Soviet context is an important asset for Tatar leaders and may [ 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

prove instrumental for achieving their economic and symbolic interests. Some local companies have long-established businesses and business links in Muslim countries. The chill in U.S.-Arab relations is seen by some in Tatarstan as a lifetime opportunity to secure Arab money.

Emphasis on Islamic solidarity may be interpreted as a tool to ensure a privileged position in a world that has not yet been very generous to Tatars.

The pressure of the federal center to curb the powers of the local government may exacerbate the situation in the republic, even though the leadership is afraid of, and attempts to distance itself from, radical political Islam. Rather, the Tatar leaders would like to promote a modernized version of Islam compatible with Western civilization. Shaimiev’s political advisor, Rafael Hakimov, champions his vision of “EuroIslam” and emphasizes religious tolerance.

Addressing the discontent of some Muslim and nationalist leaders regarding the effort of the Kazan city government to return a famous Russian icon from the Vatican to Kazan, he advised them to reread the Koran: “All world religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have common roots.”15 When the gossovet chairman addressed the last World Tatar Congress in 2005, he never uttered the words “Islam” or “Muslim.”16 In general, secular nationalists co-opted into the local government perceive Islamic universalism as a threat to the Tatar national particularism. They sometimes accuse the current religious leaders of betraying the Tatar national idea for the sake of international Islam.

At the same time, the ruling elite of Tatarstan is anxious to bring expressions of Islamic identity under its control.

Currently, there are 14 Islamic schools of

PONARIN & KOUZNETSOVA-MORENKO

different levels in the republic, with 1,373 students total. Their official curricula do not always correspond to what is actually taught, while the manuals published under the authorship of local imams may camouflage texts of Middle Eastern ideologues. There are also an unknown number of unregistered schools. Furthermore, the effect of the initial penetration of fundamentalist ideas in the chaotic 1990s has been long lasting. Even the current leadership of the republic’s Spiritual Board of Muslims, in spite of its loyalty to Shaimiev, is suspected of having links with Middle Eastern fundamentalists, and many imams have fallen under foreign influence. According to Iskhak Lotfullin, the imam-hatib of a Kazan mosque, Arab and local radical Islamists, once they have bought a mosque out, organize prayers after their own custom.

He accused the current mufti of getting kickbacks from such deals and also said that “Mufti ‘Usman has made me an offer to pass my mosque to his men.”17 The leaders of Tatarstan feel that they cannot afford to lose control over this situation and therefore must cooperate with the federal center in their struggle with radical Islam. For its part, the federal center is happy to oblige, which results in crackdowns on Islamic zealots. For example, between November 2004 and January 2005, several dozen members of the international Hizb-ut-Tahrir alIslami party (the Party of Islamic Liberation) were arrested in Tatarstan.

Their local leader was internationally wanted Uzbekistani national Alisher Usmanov. Russian human rights organizations suggest that at least some of the cases were falsified and some evidence was obtained by means of torture. On the other hand, Shaimiev said in a recent

Pledging Allegiance

interview that there were real attempts to commit terrorist acts in the city of Kazan on the eve of its millennium celebrations in August 2005.18 The explosion of a gas pipeline near the town of Kukmor a year earlier is likewise attributed to an Islamic sect popular in the town.

Implications for Tatarstan—and for Russia. The opposition national-

ists took the crackdown on radical Muslims as a convenient opportunity to appeal to the republic’s Muslims. They turned the concept of Islamophobia into a political tool and suggested that this was just another attempt by the federal center to centralize the country. A joint appeal of two opposition parties reads, “Under the veil of struggle against terror and right before the eyes of the international community, the authorities of the Russian Federation are committing violence against the Muslim peoples [thus] realizing the Russian emperors’ colonial designs. . . It is clear that under the false pretext of the struggle with terror they want to eliminate [ethnic] republics and the very peoples of the republics.”19 Thus, as a side effect of this marriage of convenience between Moscow and Kazan, the balance of power has further shifted toward the federal center.

For many Tatars who are concerned with their national and religious rights, the most attractive ideology is a mix of religious and national ideas. In response to increasing control over them by both the local government and the federal center, a union of radical nationalists and religious radicals is an emerging reality. It is not unlikely that even mainstream nationalists may eventually support the union, provided a political opportunity. This could have a tremendous negative impact on the internal staSummer/Fall 2006 [ 2 7 ]

RUSSIA’S ISLAMIC CHALLENGE

bility of the Republic of Tatarstan.

But this scenario is not isolated to Tatarstan. Russia has witnessed similar scenarios across the North Caucasus region where Tatarstan is located. The political void Shaimiev has created seems to leave him no other way but to follow the general line of Putin—as have many other republics’ leaders. This is, perhaps, inevitable, so long as the only viable alter-

native frame of mobilization remains Islamic fundamentalism. While the Tatarstan case may not play out in exactly the same way in Russia’s other republics, it is a powerful example of what can happen when authoritarianism removes legitimate avenues for political mobilization.

This is an important lesson for Russia and the rest of the world as we face the great dramas of the early twenty-first century.

NOTES

1 Robert Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, Second Ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), 184.

2 Nail Mucharyamov, “Respublica Tatarstan II. Chronika Politicheskogo Processa (1988-1998),” in Regions of Russia: Chronics and leaders, ed. K. Matzuzato, Vol. 2 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center Hokkaido University, 2000).

3 Rafic Muchametshin, “Dinamika islamskogo factora v obshestvennom soznanii tatar XVI-XX,” in Sovremennyu natsionalnie processi v Respublice Tatarstan (Kazan, 1994), 111-113.

4 Suverennyi Tatarstan, Suverenizatsiya I dvijenye k natsionalno-kulturnoy avtonomii, Vol. 1 (Moscow: IS, 1998), 201–246.

5 Ibid, 238.

6 Rafic Muchametshin, Islam v obshestvennoi i politicheskoi juzni tatar Tatarstana v XX veke (Kazan: Tatarskoye knijnoe izdatelstvo, 2005), 122.

7 The only public component remaining is formal greetings published in the press on the occasion of a religious holiday. The Russian-language newspapers of Tatarstan sometimes totally ignore them. See Irina Kouznetsova-Morenko and Leissan Salakhatdinova, Islam v sredstvakh massovoi informatsii (Kazan: Izdatelstvo Kazanskogo gosudadstvennogo universiteta, 2004), 9-10.

8 Throughout most of the Soviet period the Tatar

[ 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

religious leaders got their education in Central Asia.

9 Rafic Muchametshin, Islam v obshestvennoi i politicheskoi juzni tatar Tatarstana v XX veke, 122.

10 Valiulla Yakoupov, Islamski component gosudarstvennoconfessionalnih otnoshenyi v Tatarstane v 90- godi XX veka, Dissertation (Kazan, 2004), 33.

11 Venera Yakoupova, 100 istoryi o suverenitete (Kazan: Idel-Press, 2001), 99-102.

12 Independent Institute for Social Policy, Social atlas of Russian regions, Internet, http://atlas.socpol.ru/portraits/tatar.shtml (Date accessed: 25 August 2005).

13 Ibragim Amirkhanov, “Kakoy mufty nam nujen?” Zvezda Povoljya, 9-15 February, 2006, 2.

14 See for instance, Damir Iskhakov, “Ugroza fundamentalizma v Tatarstane,” Zvezda Povoljya, 2-8 February, 2006, 3.

15 “Chitaite Koran vnimatelnee,” Vostochnyi Express, 4 August 2005, 5.

16 Zvezda Povoljya,, 2-7 September 2005, 1.

17 Vera Postnova, “Mecheti oboronyautsya ot vakhabizma,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 December 2004, 14.

18 “Islam trevogi nashei,” Zvezda Povoljya, 9-15 February 2006, 1-2.

19 F. Bayramova, M. Minachev, “The Address for human experts, mass media and word society,” Internet, http://www.azatlyk.com/news/news_264.html.

Pledging Allegiance

The Federal Solution to Ethnic Conflicts Baogang He Two thousand five was a watershed year in the contemporary history of Asian federalism. The formation of asymmetric federalism in Indonesia was marked by the granting of substantial autonomy to the Aceh people in the 2005 peace agreement. In the Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s 2005 State of the Nation address to Congress has accelerated the process of federalization. These two events point to fundamental changes in Asian governance with regards to minorities and ethnic conflicts.

Conflicts over ethnic homeland rule, the right to territorial autonomy, and even nation-statehood have been played out in Asia, where it has been debated whether federalism is the best system to reduce or contain ethnic conflicts. The international community has questioned whether the multinational federalism of Spain and Canada offers a successful model for Asia. It has also questioned whether underlying norms such as the right to territorial autonomy, the right to self-determination, and the right to remain unassimilated are universally acceptable.

In the 1940s and 1950s, many Asian countries attempted to build federal systems, but most failed very soon after.

Federalism was conceived as a form of political union between India and Pakistan and between Malaysia and Singapore. It failed, resulting in the partition of India and Pakistan and the

Baogang He is chair professor in International Studies, Deakin University, Australia.

His next work, Federalism in Asia, will be published in 2007.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 2 9 ]

THE FEDERAL SOLUTION TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS

secession of Singapore from Malaysia.

After these events, federalism nevertheless was introduced in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia. Indonesia became a federated republic of ten provinces in 1948, but this federation was short lived, since a unitary structure was firmly established.

China also rejected the Soviet type of federalism in the 1950s.1 In the first few decades following decolonization, Asian states, distrustful of federalism, attempted to build unitary and homogenizing nation-states. Now, despite failure, frustration, and obstacles, there have been calls for federalism in many Asian countries. The voice for federalism is much stronger in countries where there have been resistance movements from ethnic and religious minorities, secessionist movements, or civil wars—for example, in the Philippines, China, Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Even the former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew raised the question of whether Malaysia and Singapore could reunite as a federal entity one day.2 There are currently several stages of federalism in Asia. India is a well-developed federalist state that is often compared with the United States and Australia. The Philippines and Indonesia can be considered “incipient” or “infant” federalist states, since they are moving toward federal-style governance, although Indonesia may not accept the term. Hopes for federalism have been frustrated in Sri Lanka and Burma (Myanmar), classified as “failed federalisms.”3 Mainland China and Hong Kong have developed somewhat authoritarian but nevertheless quasi-federal institutions. Other nation-states that could consider federalism include Thailand, in order to address the aspira[ 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tions of Patani separatists in the south, and North and South Korea. This paper will examine how best to apply the federalist idea in Asia.

This paper will examine Asian federalism and argue that asymmetric federalism is the form most appropriate to deal with minority issues and the national identity question in Asia. It will briefly review Asian federalism, examine the debates on the Western models of federalism, discuss the relationship between federalism and the national identity question, and, finally, investigate whether and how federalism can reduce or contain ethnic conflicts.

The Mapping of Asian Federalism. According to the Blackwell

Encyclopedia of Political Institutions, federalism is “a form of territorial organization in which unity and regional diversity are accommodated with a single political system by distributing power among general and regional governments in a manner constitutionally safeguarding the existence and authority of each.”4 In this definition, the political structure is understood in part by the wording of the constitution. In order to analyze federalism in Asia, it is necessary to examine the constitutional definitions of power relations, bicameralism, constitutional courts, and autonomous rights.

Such analysis reveals that there are many approaches to federalism in the written constitutions of Asia. The 1948 Burma (Myanmar) constitution defines Burma (Myanmar) as “the Federated Shan States and the Wa States.” By contrast, federalism was written into the 1957 Constitution in Malaysia. India is specified as a Union of States in its 1950 Constitution. Although these states are defined legally as “federal,” the structure’s power to deal with polit-

HE

ical problems is through its practices, not just its laws.

A test case from India highlights the importance of constitutional principles, in particular the separation of judicial and executive power. This provision is in Article 50 of India’s constitution. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in any dispute between the Government

Pledging Allegiance

function of the system varies and needs to be further studied. India has two houses, the Council of States and the House of the People. Pakistan’s Federal Assembly is comprised of an indirectly elected, but largely advisory Senate and a popularly elected National Assembly. The Republic of the Philippines has a bicameral Congress, consisting of 24 elected sena-

Are underlying norms such as the right to territorial autonomy, the right to selfdetermination, and the right to remain unassimilated universally acceptable? of India and one or more states (Article 131). On 21 April 1989, the federal government dismissed the Janata Dal government of S.R. Bomma in Karnataka on 21 April 1989. Only after five years did the Supreme Court find that the central government had not ascertained the bone fides of the nineteen alleged defectors’ letters, and “acted in undue haste.”

Although such a ruling was unable to restore the already-dismissed Assembly to power,5 it demonstrated some separation of powers provided by the Constitution.

This example of law in practice reinforced the state’s federalist structure.

Another characteristic of a federal system is a second legislative chamber, which can promote national unity.

Members of the second house can bring and balance regional interests in federal politics, act as a check on executive federalism, and force the government to listen to the voice of minorities, which may soften a central government’s extreme position. In Asia several countries have developed bicameral legislatures, but the

tors and 250 representatives. In recent years, senators have been a driving force for the establishment of federalism in the Philippines.

These are the structures characteristic of Asian federal states, but it is even more important to examine how effective these structures can be in resolving political problems.

Competing Models of Federalism in Asia. The most important

debate is over what kind of federalism can successfully achieve autonomy, contain and reduce ethnic conflicts, and facilitate and promote democracy.

Regional (or territorial) federalism can be characterized as the universal protection of individual rights, the neutrality of the state with regards to different ethnic groups, the absence of an internal boundary for ethnic groups, the division and diffusion of power within a single national community, and regions rather than ethnicity being the basic unit of the federal polity. The federalism of the Summer/Fall 2006 [ 3 1 ]

THE FEDERAL SOLUTION TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS

United States and Australia are the models of region-based federalism.

The federalism of Canada, Spain, and Belgium are the models of multinational federalism, in which federal constitutions accommodate concentrated ethnic groups. An internal boundary is drawn to enable minorities to exercise minority rights and self-determination and to achieve ethno-national homeland.

Political philosopher Will Kymlicka defines multinational federalism as “creating a federal or quasi-federal subunit in which the minority group forms a local majority, and so can exercise meaningful forms of self-government.

Moreover, the group’s language is typi-

universal citizenship should be the basis for the federal unit. In practice, the state tends to pursue a mix of both if the force of ethno-national groups is strong.

The idea of federalism in Asia poses a set of interrelated questions about whether Asian states can or should follow the Western models of federalism. The American/Australian model of territorial federalism is stable, but many consider it to be largely irrelevant for Asia.7 The Belgian/Canadian/Spanish model of multinational federalism is relevant to Asia but inherently unstable. Those who believe that multinational federalism is unstable and problematic hold that by its very nature it promotes more contentious

The driving force for Asian federalism

comes from within—that is, from the threat to existing nation-states posed by internal groups. cally recognized as an official state language, at least within their federal subunit, and perhaps throughout the country as a whole.”6 In principle, multinational federalism seems much fairer than other systems in accommodating the desires and concerns of minorities.

The key distinction between regional and multinational federalism is whether the state recognizes the ethno-national groups’ right to territorial autonomy. In general, nation-states that opt for federalism pursue a style of regional federalism, in which different ethnics groups share a common citizenship in a civic homeland where two levels of governments share power. Ethno-national groups, on the other hand, demand exclusive self-rule by ethnicity. The contested issue is whether ethnic identity or [ 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

violence and is likely, eventually, to break down the state itself. Multinational federalism, by giving minorities pockets of majority power, undermines the ability of a democracy to function.8 Asian countries have difficulties in choosing between different Western models of federalism. It is unlikely for Asian countries like the Philippines and Indonesia to establish a regional federalism while rejecting multinational federalism. It is inevitable for some Asian countries such as Sri Lanka to adopt a form of multinational federalism with asymmetric characteristics in order to deal with ethnic conflicts. At the same time, it should be noted that multinational federalism has its limits in countries such as the two Koreas. If North and South Korea were to unify

HE

Pledging Allegiance

federalism. Federalism can be employed as a means of conflict resolution to deal with secessionism and ethnic division.

The driving force for Asian federalism comes from within—that is, from the threat to existing nation-states posed by internal groups. The national identity question—the choice between a separate political identity and a united national identity—constitutes a background condition for federalism. The challenge of constructing a federal polity in a multinational context is a difficult task for federalists. It is not clear whether federalism is capable of resolving such thorny issues as ethnic division entirely, but it can be used to reduce or contain them within a functioning political system.

The presence of national identity issues means that the most common form of federalism in Asia is hold-together federalism rather than bring-together federalism. Federalism in Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), and China (with regard to Tibet) is designed to “hold together” national unity. Bring-together federalism would apply to the reunification of China and Taiwan, as well as South and North Korea. It is much more difficult to achieve bring-together federalism than holdtogether federalism. States that struggle with national identity problems should therefore consider using federalism to hold their nationalities together before they become so divided that bring-together federalism is the only option.

Asian federal institutions are inevitably influenced by the national Asymmetric Federalism and the identity question, and federal instituNational Identity Question in tions have to be asymmetric to maintain Asia. In order to meet both the desire diversity and difference. To preserve for self-government and the need for diversity and difference, federalism must maintaining the unity of the state, Asian adopt differential treatment and asymcountries should adopt some form of metric policy so that the constituent units

in a federal polity, it likely would not be multinational.

The regional and multinational models for federalism have been debated in Sri Lanka. Whereas the government of Sri Lanka and its majority Sinhalese population are interested in a regional federal model combining shared and self-rule with limited autonomy for the Tamil Tigers, the Tamil Tigers’ own vision of federalism is a multinational one, offering them maximal autonomy.9 In 2001 the Tigers rejected far-ranging decentralization of power as inadequate and demanded in 2002 an interim local administration that would control police, judiciary, revenue, and land issues. At the same time, the right-wing faction of Sri Lanka’s SinhaleseBuddhist majority opposed the government’s decentralization plan.

Debate over regional versus multinational federalism may be conceptually too narrow in East Asia. The debate largely underestimates other models of Asian federalism; for example, Pakistan and Malaysia have developed illiberal federalism, in which federalism coexists with and even supports the authoritarian structure.

Quasi-federal practices were manifest in the history and contemporary practices of China and Japan where there were pragmatic recognitions of regional autonomy and sharing of sovereign practices. These two dominant forms provide the theoretical basis for most debate on whether and how other Asian states could transition to democratic federalism.

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THE FEDERAL SOLUTION TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS

of a federation do not possess identical powers—some should have special rights because of their social and political history.10 Accordingly, some aspects of federal government, such as the equality principle (which requires equal representation of states, provinces, and minority groups in the upper house of the legislature) might be limited and modified. The Western models of federalism—regional (territorial) federalism and multinational federalism—have not been widely implemented in Asia. Instead, a third type of federalism—asymmetrical federalism with key characteristics of regional autonomy—has evolved in countries such

some [constitutional] guarantee … of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere,”11 regional autonomy presents a possible Asian way toward asymmetric federalism in Indonesia, the Philippines, and even China.

Hong Kong enjoys a higher degree of autonomy than most federal sub-units.

For instance, Hong Kong has a separate customs territory and is able to participate in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements. In Indonesia quasi-federal institutions have emerged under the banner of regional autonomy. In the case of Aceh, Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD),

The attention of the international

community will be necessary to ensure that the transition to federalism does not itself produce more conflict between competing groups. as Indonesia, the Philippines, and China. This asymmetric form of federalism does not introduce wholesale Western federalization; rather, it is a piece-meal process that is more appropriate for Asia.

Constitutionally defined and guaranteed regional autonomy, designed to satisfy the desires and aspirations of one nationality or ethnic group, can be seen as a component in a federal structure (asymmetric federalism) or at least as a quasi-federal practice. Following political theorist William Riker’s minimal definition of federalism as “(1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in the autonomy of each government in its own sphere, and (3) there is [ 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the autonomy law, recognized the Aceh people’s long-sought religious sovereignty. The Acehnese may practice their Islamic laws (Shari’a). Under the NAD the Acehnese are entitled to receive 70 percent of the revenues from oil and gas.

Under the peace agreement in 2005, they may hold elections for a self-governing body. In the Philippines the 1987 Constitution provided autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao with legislative powers over administrative organization; creation of sources of revenues; ancestral domain and natural resources; personal, family, and property relations; regional urban and rural planning development; economic, social, and tourism development; educational policies; and preservation and development of cultur-

HE

al heritage. These practices have helped to quell violent nationalism where they have been implemented.

Can Federalism Reduce or Contain Violent Ethnic Conflicts in Asia? Federalism has provided a

mechanism for managing the national identity question in Asia. India’s federalism demonstrates that the federal state is capable of withstanding disruptive localism and promoting national integration through territorial devolution, the guarantee of personal security, and freedom of individuals to engage in economic and cultural intercourse across the regional borders.12 An illustrative case is the Mizos, who engaged in thirty years of violent struggle and insurgency for their independence from India. In 1985, however, the Mizos were granted full autonomy and their territory was recognized as the twenty-third state of the Indian Union. Now, 84 percent of the people of the state see themselves as both Mizos and Indians.13 Three factors contribute to the success of India’s federalism in containing ethnic conflicts. First, the claims of minority nationalities were based on language rights and therefore did not pose a life threat to the Indian state. Second, collective regional identity did not translate into exclusively ethnic-based national identity; rather, regional identity was compatible with the Indian citizenship.

Third, the central government was able to deal with internal suppression when one ethnic group dominated. Federal institutions provided countervailing measures to reduce the domination of any single ethnic group, and the center has been strong enough to protect civil rights in provinces and sub-provinces. Thus, the Indian example demonstrates that federalism can contain and reduce ethnic conflict.

Pledging Allegiance

Conclusion. While federalism contains

and reduces ethnic conflicts, ironically, the decision to move to federalism is often related to violence. In the international politics of national identity conflicts, there seems to be a hidden practice of rewarding insurgents. If one follows democratic and peaceful procedures, then the UN and the international community is unlikely to see a federal solution as the first option; however, if one takes up arms, the international community is more likely to favor the federal option and even the option of petition.

To minimize the violence that accompanies a transition to federalism, the international community should intervene to convince the parties to accept the federal solution. Indeed, it was international governments and nongovernmental organizations that organized peace talks for Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), and other countries. It was the international pressure against terrorism that forced the Tamil Tigers to give up their independence claim. The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and India declared the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a terrorist organization; and, in November 2001, LTTE’s leader Velupillai Prabhakaran withdrew his movement’s long-standing demand for an independent homeland in Sri Lanka.14 It was a decrease in international capital flow and tourism that led the Philippines to adopt a reconciliatory approach to the independence force in Mindanao. The war against terrorism has made security the top priority and decreased international support for independence movements. As a result, federalism as a means of maintaining national unity and satisfying the demands of minorities is increasingly appealing.

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THE FEDERAL SOLUTION TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The international community needs to resist any simplistic notion of federalism in Asia and remain open to alternative models. Asian countries will need to generate a dynamic blend of various elements, including traditional rule, authoritarianism, democracy, federalism, confederalism, and pragmatic concession. Furthermore, different situations will require these elements in different proportions, and a mix of regional, multi-national, and asymmetric elements of federalism will be desirable. For example, in Burma (Myanmar) there is a possibility that the military power holders will make a deal with minority nationalities without democratization or federalization. Some solutions may be based on a historical agreement which does not necessarily involve a federal constitution,

but nonetheless puts federal structures into practice.

Based on this analysis, asymmetric federalism is the model most likely to succeed in Asia. If all parties in Sri Lanka learn a lesson from the past failure, Sri Lanka is likely to follow the Indonesian path to make a peace deal and establish an asymmetric federalism.

However, the attention of the international community will be necessary to ensure that the transition to federalism does not in itself produce more conflict between competing groups. A sophisticated knowledge of the complicated working process of asymmetric federalism in Asia will help the international community to construct a federal order in which both the nation-states and ethno-national groups are satisfied.

NOTES

1 See also the failure of federalism in South America, the Caribbean, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland in 1953-1965, and in the British West Indies in 1958-62.

2 Liange Zhaobao, 29 January 2002: 22.

3 South Africa, Mexico, Nigeria, and a long list of other countries were treated as the failed federalism, but they have now achieved a certain degree of federalism.

4 Vernon Bogdanor, ed., The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions (Oxford: Basic Blackwell Ltd., 1987), 228.

5 Krishna K. Tummala, “The Indian Union and Emergency Power,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1996): 380.

6 See Will Kymlicka and Baogang He, eds., Multiculturalism in Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23-24.

7 For a discussion of the limits of the U.S. model, see Alfred Stapan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1999): 19-34.

8 In Québec, multinational federalism has fortified the minority French language at the expense

[ 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of English, the language of the national majority.

Rohan Edrisinha, “Multination 9 Federalism and Minority Rights in Sri Lanka,” in Will Kymlicka and Baogang He, eds., Multiculturalism in Asia, (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 261.

10 See Robert Agranoff, ed., Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesllschaft, 1999).

11 William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), 11.

12 Suri Ranapala, “Freedom as Response to Ethnic Regionalism,” in Ian Copland and John Rickard, Federalism: Comparative Perspectives from India and Australia, (New Delhi: Manohar Publisher, 1999), 111-136.

13 See Gurpreet Mahajan, “Federalism and Democracy: The Indian Experience,” the conference paper presented in the international workshop on federalism in Asia, Deakin University, 9-10 February 2006.

14 See Amita Shastri, “Sri Lanka in 2001,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, 182.

Business&Economics Tear Down Those Walls Agriculture, Development, and Trade Negotiations Kimberly Ann Elliott The formal name of the current round of international trade negotiations is the “Doha Development Agenda,” and conventional wisdom is that the key to bringing it its success is meaningful liberalization of agricultural markets by the rich countries. Most quantitative analyses show that agriculture is where the bulk of the potential gains from trade liberalization are because that is where the greatest barriers persist in the largest, richest markets. But would rich-country liberalization of agricultural trade be enough to deliver on promises to make Doha a “development round?”

Many developing countries, have a comparative advantage in agriculture, and many of the world’s poor live in rural areas. It is logical, therefore, that increased access to agricultural markets has emerged as a central issue in these talks. Developing countries—and groups within them—are diverse, and farm policy reforms in rich countries will affect different groups in different ways. While it is true that farmers stand to benefit from higher world prices for agricultural products, poor consumers could lose. Some countries may benefit from liberalization of rich countries’ agricultural sectors, while others may see their preferential access to developed markets erode. Many rural poor live in remote areas that are isolated from national, much less international, markets. Increased agricultural trade

Kimberly Ann Elliott, a research fellow, has been associated with the Institute for International Economics since 1982. She also holds a joint appointment with the Center for Global Development.

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would affect them very little.

Connecting the poor to markets and increasing demand for their products, including through exports, would indeed help to reduce global poverty, but increased market access alone will not be enough to achieve that goal in all cases.

Many countries, especially the poorest, also need to adopt complementary policies to create an environment in which the poor can grasp new trade opportunities and the losers are compensated.

To set forth this argument, the first section of this essay presents evidence on the nature of agricultural protection in rich countries and then on the size and distribution of potential gains from reducing it. The second section, discusses the relative levels of rich-country agricultural trade restrictions today and argues that, because such restrictions are high compared to those in other sectors, the agricultural sector holds the greatest potential for realizing gains from further

liberalization, as well as the need for complementary policies in poor countries to help manage the adjustment to more open markets. The final section concludes with prescriptions and recommendations for the future.

What is at Stake for Developing Countries? Agriculture is the key to the

current round of trade talks largely because previous negotiations failed to deliver significant reforms in this sector.

The Uruguay Round (1986-1993) created a framework for measuring and capping agricultural support, but it did little to reduce the level of either applied subsidies or trade barriers.

Together, the eight previous trade rounds reduced average tariffs on manufactured goods—excluding textiles and apparel—to the low single digits, and the end of the global quota system restricting trade in textiles and apparel left agriculture with no competitors for the title of most distorted European Japan United High-income Developing TABLE 1.1 Union States countries Countries sector in GTAPG* the glob13.9 29.4 2.4 16.0 17.7 Agriculture al econ5.2 9.7 9.8 7.5 17.0 Textiles and Aapparel omy.

T h e 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.9 9.0 Other Manufacturing data in 3.2 5.2 1.8 2.9 9.9 Total Merchandise Table 1.1 give a MacMap Adjusted** hint of 34.4 158.1 5.0 n.a n.a.

Agriculture the dis7.5 26.9 2.8 n.a. n.a.

Total Merchandise tortions *Import-weighted, against all exporters to global **Production-weighted, against developing countries agricult u r a l trade liberalization. The third section trade resulting from rich-country poliwill address the diversity within and cies. On average, applied agricultural among poor-country exporters and its tariffs in high-income countries are implications both for the distribution of roughly five times higher than the average potential gains from agricultural trade for merchandise overall and eight times [ 3 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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higher than that for manufactured goods other than textiles and apparel. An alternative calculation presented at the bottom of the table uses the same underlying data but utilizes production weights rather than import weights and focuses on exports from developing countries only. These adjustments to the analysis result in still higher levels of tariffs but a similar ratio between tariffs on agricul-

Business & Economics

these special tariffs also likely leads to underestimating the average applied tariff because the compilers of the dataset assumed that all exports eligible for preferential treatment received it. Numerous studies suggest otherwise.

Because of the above-average rates of protection, the agricultural sector offers the largest potential gains from further liberalization, even though it is a small

TABLE 1.2 (Billion dollars and percent) Cline (2004) Anderson, et al. (2005) 1997 2015 Static Dynamic

Base year Model type Estimated gains from global free trade (relative to national income and level) High-income countries (HICs)* Developing countries (DCs)

0.87% 1.09%

0.60% 0.80%

30% 55% 11% 34%

30% 63% 14% 23%

Share of global gains Captured by developing countries Resulting from agricultural liberalization Resulting from textiles and apparel liberalization Resulting from liberalization of other goods

tural products and total merchandise.1 None of these figures, however, include the effect of domestic or export subsidies, and they all likely underestimate the effects of tariff-rate quotas on imports. Thus, the low U.S. figures are misleading with respect to the overall level of support to farmers because the United States relies more on subsidies than trade measures to protect its agricultural sector. These figures also include detailed information on bilateral applied tariffs that take into account preferential arrangements, such as the EU’s “Everything But Arms� (EBA) program and the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act. Including data on

part of the global economy.2 Table 1.2 shows the results from two recent efforts to model the potential benefits of moving to global free trade. Although the overall level of benefits differs, the distribution of gains from trade and the sources of those gains are broadly similar in the two models.3 Both show developing countries gaining relatively more as a share of national income than high-income countries; and both show developing countries capturing about 30 percent of total global gains, roughly 50 percent more than their share of global income.

Both models also show that agricultural liberalization accounts for roughly 60 percent of the total, with the caveat that Summer/Fall 2006

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services are not included.

These studies, and others not discussed here, also find that most developing countries gain from a move to free trade, but that the distribution of gains becomes more uneven under some of the partial liberalization scenarios. A recent World Bank study of potential, relatively ambitious, Doha Round outcomes again finds that the majority of gains are from agricultural liberalization, with developing countries capturing about 20 percent of the potential gains they could reap from full free trade.4 Middle-income countries as a group gain the most from agricultural liberalization, with most of the gains, not surprisingly, being captured by competitive Latin American exporters.

Among many low-income countries, however, agriculture is not the major source of gains, with the important exception of sub-Saharan Africa. The Middle East and North Africa are in fact net losers in several Doha scenarios because many of these countries are net food importers. In scenarios with broader and deeper liberalization by the developing countries themselves, however, all regions reap overall net gains. Still, not all developing countries would gain equally from rich-country agricultural liberalization, and there are important challenges in translating increased access into meaningful opportunities for poor farmers.

population of developing countries lives in rural areas and works in agricultural activities, but the sector generates only 20 percent, on average, of developing countries’ gross domestic product. The ratios of agricultural sector employment and composition of GDP are even higher in low-income countries, where seven out of ten people work in agriculture and farming accounts for a third of gross domestic product. One consequence of this low productivity is that the poorest people in developing countries are likely to be rural dwellers. In a sample of 52 countries compiled by the World Bank, 73 percent of the poor lived in rural areas.5 Raising the productivity of the rural poor would therefore be the most effective means of improving living standards. But increased agricultural exports to more open rich-country markets—and reduced competition with subsidized exports from them—are also components of a pro-poor growth strategy.

Opportunities for Developing Country Exporters. Agricultural

policies in rich countries obviously affect global trade patterns and influence what developing countries are able to produce and export profitably. But climate; geography; the allocation of natural resources, including land and water; and their own policies also affect developing countries’ patterns of agricultural proDeveloping Country Diversity duction and trade. Most rich-country and the Need for Complementary agricultural production involves temperPolicies. Many developing countries ate products, such as grains, oilseeds, have a comparative advantage in agricul- dairy, and meat, while many developing ture, and increased agricultural exports countries are located in tropical latitudes can help them address balance of pay- that are better suited for a variety of ments problems, reduce debt burdens, goods not produced at all or only in very and import the capital goods and tech- small quantities further north.

Protected temperate zone products nologies they need to move up the development ladder. Overall, roughly half the make up over a third of developing coun[ 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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try exports. Traditional tropical products—such as cocoa, coffee, tea, spices, sugar, cotton, and other fibers—as well as

Business & Economics

ucts while reducing the share of traditional tropical products by nearly half, but low-income countries have had less

Agriculture is the key to the current round of trade talks largely because previous negotiations failed to deliver significant reforms in this sector. fruits and vegetables each make up roughly a quarter. Fruits and vegetables are one of the fastest growing export sectors, behind only “other processed food” and oilseeds and edible oils, with the latter two starting from much lower bases.6 Growth in fruit and vegetable exports is important because fruits and vegetables are one of the less protected and less subsidized sectors in the industrialized countries, at least through traditional means, and thus could represent an important opportunity for developing country exporters.

But these broad trends again mask important differences among developing countries. Middle-income countries have been more successful in diversifying away from traditional tropical products to more temperate products. For these countries the share of traditional tropical products has fallen from 40 percent in the 1970s to little more than 15 percent today, and fruits and vegetables now account for larger shares of total agricultural exports.7 And despite high levels of OECD protection for grains, meat, and other temperate products, these now make up nearly 40 percent of middleincome country exports. Low-income countries have also managed to increase exports of some of their temperate prod-

success in developing exports of the fastgrowing fruits, vegetables, and processed product categories.

More detailed commodity-specific data suggest a more promising picture for middle-income exporters and a more challenging one for low-income countries. At the more disaggregated two-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level, the dynamic fruit and vegetables sector is by far the most important export for middleincome countries, while the volatile coffee, tea, cocoa, and spices category still dominates for the low-income group.

For both groups, cereals are the second most important category, although most developing countries are net importers of cereals; vegetable oils are another of the temperate products that developing countries do export. In the case of the low-income countries, however, these exports are relatively concentrated and often not in direct competition with rich-country producers. The cereals exports are largely accounted for by rice exports from India, Pakistan, and Vietnam to other developing countries, while the vegetable oil exports are mostly palm and coconut oil from Indonesia.

Meat exports are also relatively important for middle-income countries, but threeSummer/Fall 2006

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whether countries have adequate infrastructure, credit markets, and domestic policies that enable farmers to respond to new trade opportunities. In addition, increased import market access in rich countries will lead to lower prices for consumers in those countries but higher prices elsewhere. Thus, some developing countries could suffer short-run losses as a result of higher food import bills or erosion of the benefits arising from preferential access to those protected markets.

While these concerns are valid, a careful look at patterns of trade and agricultural support suggests the impact of feasible reforms will not be as great as feared.

Some net food importers could become net exporters if world prices rose and market access for their products increased. Moreover, OECD estimates of producer support for agriculture show that dairy, sugar, and rice receive the highest levels of support and would undergo the largest price adjustments.

Of these, only rice is a staple commodity consumed regularly by the poor.

According to data from the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, more than 60 percent of daily calories in most developing countries come from cereals and starchy roots and less than 10 percent from animal products.8 The exceptions are Latin America and the Caribbean, which have higher per capita incomes than other developing regions and a more diversified diet. In sub-Saharan Africa, half of daily calories are provided by products that are little traded, principally sorghum and millet, local varieties of maize, and cassava. In Asia rice—which Challenges from Free Trade. The has one of the lowest ratios of trade to effects of rich-country agricultural liber- consumption of any commodity—is the alization on individual countries and on dominant crop, accounting for a third of the poor within them depend not just on daily calories in South Asia and half in what they produce and trade, but also on East and Southeast Asia.9

quarters are accounted for by Brazil, China, Thailand, and Argentina.

Moreover, pork and poultry, which the rich countries support less than beef, are important for all of these countries except Argentina.

In sum, for a combination of reasons, including both comparative advantage and the deterrent effects of trade barriers, key developing country exports are not those that rich countries support most generously. OECD liberalization of temperate products would help to encourage export diversification, especially among low-income countries that continue to be dependent on traditional tropical products. Substantial reductions in U.S. cotton subsidies are also important to many very poor countries, especially in West Africa, reduced intervention in other highly distorted commodity markets— including dairy, meat, and sugar—might have fewer short-run benefits than expected for developing countries as a group, particularly those at lower income levels. Meat and dairy are high-value products because they are relatively capital intensive and expensive to produce.

These exports also face standards related to animal as well as human health and safety. For some countries, potential losses as a result of higher staple food prices or preference erosion could offset some or all of the benefits from increased market access that mostly accrue to others.

And in the more dynamic fruits and vegetables sector, the more important challenge to increased trade is likely to be health and safety standards.

[ 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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The commodity of most concern in this context would therefore appear to be rice; the World Bank estimates that rice export prices could rise on a trade-weighted average basis by a third.10 But most countries in Asia are largely self-sufficient in rice as a result of deliberate government policies to stabilize domestic prices and promote food security.11 Moreover, a World Bank study of the rice market shows that, with global free trade in which developing countries also reduce their own tariffs on rice, average import prices for rice would 12 fall by roughly 15 percent. This study finds that the most likely losers from liberalization of rice markets would be importing countries that already have low tariffs and limited ability to influence prices, including Brazil, Turkey, the Middle East, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which are all middle or higher income countries.

Other World Bank estimates of the price effects of moving to global free trade in all products suggest average price increases for primary products of 6 percent and for food products of less than 3 percent.13 Rice prices could rise by 22 percent on average, with prices for wheat and other grains projected to rise by roughly 10 percent on average. Such price increases could have severe effects if imposed overnight. No one expects, however, that the result of the Doha Round will be complete global liberalization. Plausible price effects will therefore be far less in magnitude, and whatever liberalization is achieved will be phased in over a number of years.

Preference erosion is another challenge for some poor countries in trade liberalization scenarios, but a more limited one than the potential problems of net food importers. In agriculture, the ramifications of preference erosion would be more limited both in terms of

Business & Economics

the countries affected, which are often not the poorest, and the commodities involved. The likely limited effects of preference erosion are contrary to what might be expected, since average tariffs are much higher on agricultural than manufactured goods. Most sensitive agricultural products are, however, excluded from, or highly restricted under, the Generalized System of Preferences as implemented by most rich countries.

Many countries provide greater access to the least developed countries (LDCs), though the European Union’s EBA program is still delaying liberalization of sugar, rice, and bananas, and the United States has not yet committed to quotafree and duty-free access for all LDCs. Moreover, because poorer countries tend to have less administrative capacity and greater difficulties meeting the eligibility and rules of origin requirements for preferences, it comes as no surprise that a U.S. Department of Agriculture study finds that LDCs “do not appear to benefit from incentives provided by preferential programs.”14 In sum, preference erosion is primarily a bilateral issue between the EU and a small number of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries exporting bananas and sugar.15 And while the problems for these countries are potentially serious, they do not appear to be widespread enough to justify sacrificing the potential gains for the many other poor countries that would benefit from liberalization.

Finally, higher world prices resulting from rich-country agricultural liberalization would likely stimulate increased production and exports by farmers in poor countries with comparative advantage in those products—if the price signal gets to those farmers. Recent Summer/Fall 2006

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research at the World Bank indicates that border price changes do not always make it to remote areas where the costs of getting goods to and from markets are high.16 Government policies, such as overvalued exchange rates or monopsonistic state trading companies can also mute market signals. Unless these domestic challenges are also addressed, potential benefits from trade liberalization may not be realized.

Conclusions and Recommendations. For good reasons agriculture is

at the center of the Doha Round, but the full story is more complicated than the one often told. Rural development will be an important part of pro-poor growth in many countries, and increased trade opportunities can contribute to that.

From a practical perspective, agricultural liberalization is at the center of this round because access to rich-country agricultural markets is foremost among the deliverables that the developed world can still contribute to the negotiations.

To summarize what is at stake: 1) Estimates of the potential gains for developing countries from global free trade are large relative to global bilateral aid flows. 2) The developing country share of global gains from free trade is estimated at about 30 percent, or nearly 50 percent higher than their share of global GDP. 3) Most of the gains derive from agricultural liberalization because that is where remaining distortions are greatest. 4) The gains from a Doha Round agreement could be as much as a third of those

from free trade overall, but a quarter or less of that level for developing countries, depending on the extent of liberalization they achieve. 5) The gains are likely underestimated because they overestimate the losses from preference erosion, do not include services or trade facilitation, and do not include potential positive effects of trade on productivity.

Finally, the systemic consequences of a failed Doha Round are potentially far greater for smaller, poorer developing countries that are the primary beneficiaries of a system based on rules rather than power. Failure to reach agreement multilaterally would also accelerate trends toward bilateral and regional trade agreements that typically exclude these countries.

OECD liberalization is, however, only part of the answer, because it may not trigger a significant supply response in countries where farmers lack infrastructure, such as transportation links and storage facilities; access to inputs, including credit markets; and sensible national policies. Even substantial trade policy changes in rich countries are likely to produce disappointing results for the poorest unless the need for complementary domestic policy reforms and investments are also addressed. But, if both sets of challenges are addressed— market access in rich countries and supply constraints in poor ones—the longterm and dynamic gains from global free trade could lift between 100 million to as many as 400 million people out of poverty over the next decade.

NOTES

1 Import weights are commonly used for calculating average tariffs but can lead to underestimation because imports will be low or nil when tariffs are prohibitive. David Roodman, “Production-weighted Estimates of Aggregate Protection in Rich Countries toward Developing Countries,” Center for Global [ 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Development, Washington, DC, no. 66 (2005).

2 Many analysts believe, and the few empirical analyses that exist also suggest, that the benefits from services liberalization would be greater. But most models exclude services liberalization because the data on services is often incomplete and of poor quality.

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The quantification of barriers to trade in services is also in its infancy and subject to considerable uncertainty because of the difficulties in distinguishing market-improving and market-distorting regulations.

A few efforts to estimate the benefits from liberalizing services have been made, however, and they suggest the gains could be far larger than for agriculture. See Thomas W. Hertel and Roman Kenney, “What is at Stake: The Relative Importance of Import Barriers, Export Subsidies, and Domestic Support,” Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, ed. Kym Anderson and Will Martin (Washington, DC, and London: Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank, 2005).

3 For a discussion of the differences in the models and the results, see Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Looking for the Devil in the Doha Agricultural Negotiations,” CGD Brief (Washington, DC, Center for Global Development, 2005); and Antoine Bouet, “What Can the Poor Expect from Trade Liberalization?”

Opening the “Black Box” of Global Trade Modeling, Working Paper, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC (2006); and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, “Estimating the Benefits of Trade Reform: Why Numbers Change,” Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues, ed.

Richard Newfarmer, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).

4 Kym Anderson, Will Martin, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, “Market and Welfare Implications of the Doha Reform Scenarios,” Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, ed.

Kym Anderson and Will Martin (Washington, DC, and London: Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank, 2005).

5 M. Ataman Aksoy and John C. Beghin, “Introduction and Overview,” Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, ed. M. Ataman Aksoy and John C. Beghin (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005): 18.

6 Ibid.

Business & Economics

7 FAOSTAT-Agriculture, UN food and Agriculture Organization, Internet, http:///Faostat. fao.org/faostat/collections?subset=agriculture.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Projected export price increases for the different varieties of rice vary widely, from less than 10 percent for long-grain rice and as much as 91 percent on exports of medium-grain rice; see Eric J. Wailes, “Rice: Global Trade, Protectionist Policies, and the Impact of Trade Liberalization,” Aksoy and Beghin, op. cit.

11 Peter C. Timmer, “Food Security and Economic Growth: An Asian Perspective,” (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, no. 51, 2004).

12 Wailes op. cit, 187.

13 Thomas W. Hertel and Maros Ivanic, “Assessing the World Market Impacts of Multilateral Trade Reforms,” Putting Development Back into the Doha Agenda: Poverty Impacts of a WTO Agreement, ed. Thomas W. Hertel and L. Alan Winters (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).

14 John Wainio, Shahia Shapouri, Michael Trueblood, and Paul Gibson, “Agricultural Trade Preferences and the Developing Countries, Economic Research Service,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC, no. 6 (2005).

15 Preference erosion of a sort has been an issue in the textile and apparel sector since the Multi-Fiber Arrangement expired at the beginning of 2005.

Those issues are addressed in Debapriya Bhattacharya and Kimberly Elliott, “Adjusting to the MFA Phaseout: Policy Priorities,” CGD Brief (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2005).

16 Thomas W. Hertel and L. Alan Winters, “Poverty Impacts of a WTO Agreement: Synthesis and Overview,” Putting Development Back into the Doha Agenda: Poverty Impacts of a WTO Agreement, ed. Thomas W. Hertel and L. Alan Winters (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).

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Conflict&Security Common Values

A New Agenda for U.S.-Japan Relations Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi The U.S.-Japan alliance has undergone a quiet transformation in recent years, moving beyond ad hoc “alliance management” to establish a solid foundation for cooperation based on shared values and strategic interests. Given uncertainties about China’s growing economic and military power and mounting concerns about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the United States and Japan need this alliance now more than ever. During a speech in Kyoto last November, President Bush declared that the United States has common interests with Japan regarding economic and political freedom, interests that can be extended to other nations. These convergent values are the “glue” of the U.S.-Japan alliance; the question now is how to make them stick. The United States can start by encouraging Japan to advance values-based diplomacy to demonstrate the power of Japanese ideas, and establish a greater presence in humanitarian operations to express its readiness to put people forward to solve international challenges. Japan will also have to make the security relationship credible by following through on a commitment to implement proposed reforms. Furthermore, as economic powers committed to free markets, the United States and Japan should establish a new partnership on economic policy. By continuing to consult each other at high levels on the strategic principles of democracy, rule of law, and

Michael Green is senior adviser and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well as an associate professor of International Relations at Georgetown University.

Nicholas Szechenyi is a fellow and assistant director of the Japan chair at CSIS.

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an open economy, the United States and Japan can send a message that values matter, and that the international community is well served by a U.S.-Japan alliance that promotes them.

Naturally Aligned. The origins of alliance transformation can be traced back to the mid-1990s when a group of Pentagon officials including Assistant Secretary Joseph Nye and Deputy Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell bucked the Clinton administration’s hawkish trade approach to Japan to push for a “reaffirmation” and “redefinition” of the U.S.Japan alliance. Their efforts produced the 1996 Joint Security Declaration between President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that opened the way for a revision of the existing bilateral defense guidelines, enabling Japan to play a more active role not only in defending Japan’s home territory, but also in “situations in areas surrounding Japan.”1 Republican Asia strategists like Richard Armitage and James Kelly backed the efforts of Nye and Campbell, and during the 2000 election campaign Asia strategists from both camps cooperated to produce a bipartisan blueprint for Japan policy in the next term.2 The “Armitage-Nye Report” of October 2000 argued that it was time to break out of old mindsets and push for a more active security and economic role for Japan in the world. The report noted that Japan could no longer rely on “checkbook diplomacy” and should “recognize that international leadership involves risk-taking beyond its traditional donor role.”3 Addressing the U.S. government, the authors argued for an end to the traditional pattern of deciding strategy and then pressing Japan to deliver. The authors argued for including [ 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Japan at the beginning of every initiative to shape policy and strategy— a model of alliance management based loosely on the U.S.-U.K. alliance. It is hard to imagine the U.S. president trying to tackle a major problem in Europe or the Middle East without first consulting with the British prime minister. As such, the American president should act in Asia only after conferring with the prime minister in Japan. Some in the media misconstrued this rationale as an endorsement of a nuclear Japan, but the objective was for Japan to help shape common policies and not merely react to the dictates of the United States.

This strategy met with success from the first Bush-Koizumi summit at Camp David in June 2001. After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Prime Minister Koizumi was one of the first world leaders to recognize that this would be a long-term struggle against determined enemies and to resolutely tell the president that the free world must defeat terrorism. His words were accompanied by quick action.

Japan passed an anti-terrorism law, dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean, and generously pledged funds for reconstruction in Afghanistan. When North Korea revealed that it was developing a secret uranium enrichment program in October 2002, President Bush was adamant that the diplomatic response be multilateral and include Japan. It was Foreign Minister Kawaguchi who originated the Six Party formula with thenSecretary of State Powell. In regard to Iraq, the Koizumi government determined early and independently that Japan would contribute $5 billion to the reconstruction effort and then took the lead to pressure reluctant Gulf states to match this level (a reversal of the pattern

GREEN & SZECHENYI

in the 1990-91 Gulf War in which Japan paid less money but got more credit).

Finally, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) dispatch to Samawah, Iraq captured the attention and respect of the American and Iraqi people. A pattern had begun to emerge in which Japanese leadership demonstrated shared policy objectives instead of hastily arranged

Conflict & Security

instrumental in raising global awareness of the avian flu pandemic in 2005.

At this point, it is largely a given that U.S. and Japanese values have converged— an interesting contrast to the late 1980s and early 1990s when scholars on both sides of the Pacific wrote frequently of a divergence between the U.S.’s “global values” and Japan’s “Asian

A pattern had begun to emerge in which

Japanese leadership demonstrated shared policy objectives instead of hastily arranged responses to American initiatives. responses to American initiatives. This pattern of behavior was reinforced through regular meetings between Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and his Japanese counterparts in the “U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue,” in which diplomats met twice a year to coordinate long-term strategy.

Strategic cooperation between the United States and Japan manifested itself in a host of other economic and diplomatic efforts. The Economic Partnership for Growth, established in 2001, facilitated substantive bilateral dialogue on the central problems ailing the Japanese economy. In 2002 the U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue played a central role in orchestrating a cease-fire and peace process between the United National Party of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The regional core group for tsunami relief, announced by President Bush in December 2004, led the humanitarian response to that tragedy and benefited from close communication between Tokyo and Washington. Both countries also proved

values.” Although the United States and Japan are naturally aligned in addressing regional and global concerns, sustaining the cooperation will require deliberate attention from the top and broader discussion and participation by both nations’ scholars and media. A new bilateral agenda is required to sustain the momentum of recent years, and the United States must begin by encouraging Japanese diplomacy to reflect the common values that now guide the bilateral relationship.

Japan’s Diplomatic Weight. One

of the greatest variables in international relations today is the growth of Chinese power and influence. Although the United States is not seeking to contain China, and China is not seeking to confront the United States, there is little doubt that Chinese leaders would like to establish a bipolar concert of power in Asia in which Beijing can speak for “Asian values” and assert a virtual veto on U.S. action in the region. Japan’s strong diplomatic and strategic presence helps prevent this disSummer/Fall 2006 [ 4 9 ]

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advantageous situation from developing.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is a clear hedge against uncertain future Chinese action, but just as importantly, Japan’s model as a democratic nation engaged in beneficial

a whole. Japan has the potential power of ideas and should champion democracy, rule of law, and free markets throughout the region, at both bilateral and multilateral levels. This will ultimately help in the

Given China’s growing power and

mounting concerns about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the United States and Japan need this alliance now more than ever.

international work is exactly the kind of demonstration model the United States needs as it pushes Beijing to act as a more responsible “stakeholder” in the world. If Japan’s global role is influential and respected, this helps to cement international norms that the democratic world would like China to follow—adherence to the rule of law broadly, including political and religious freedoms and intellectual property rights. It is therefore critical that Japan develop a proactive strategy to sustain and increase its diplomatic weight.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued in a speech at Sophia University, Tokyo in March 2005 that Asia in the twenty-first century would be shaped by ideas and not raw power. Foreign Minister Taro Aso echoed this theme in a speech in December when he said that Japan would seek to be a “thought leader” in Asia. What are the ideas driving this diplomacy? Certainly, democracy, rule of law, and free markets must be central to Japan’s vision for Asia. Thus far, China offers only a vision of mercantile and military power and a promise of “noninterference in internal affairs.” This may appeal to the authoritarian regimes of Cambodia or Myanmar, but it is not the direction in which Asia is heading as [ 5 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

process of defining a regional agenda and a set of norms to which China will subscribe as it asserts its own growing role.

Japan has championed those values by partnering with the world’s largest democracy. India has been the leading recipient of aid from Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 2003 and has continued to develop its economic infrastructure as a result.

Prime Minister Koizumi and Prime Minister Singh met in New Delhi in April 2005 and broadened the bilateral agenda by introducing a series of initiatives under the rubric of the Japan-India Global Partnership. Foreign Minister Taro Aso made a follow-up visit to India in January 2006 and reiterated the importance of high-level dialogue in a bilateral, regional, and global context.

Japan has therefore moved beyond ODA diplomacy to engage India on issues including the investment climate, regional security, science and technology, and cooperation in multilateral organizations like the UN. Like the United States, Japan considers its relationship with India in strategic terms and will likely strengthen ties as the two countries seek greater roles in the international community. Japan and India have already

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demonstrated the benefits of multilateral coordination in their response to the 2004 tsunami, and are defining what it means to be a stakeholder through increased participation in regional and global initiatives. This should not, however, signify a containment strategy vis-Ă vis China. On the contrary, Japan and India, in collaboration with the United States, should encourage China to channel its growing power away from authoritarian tendencies and toward the values that would create a positive role for China as a stakeholder in the international community. The important geo-strategic effect of Japanese-Indian cooperation is one of norm-setting in the region.

A challenge for Japan and the stewards of the U.S.-Japan relationship is to select a regional forum through which to further promote a values-based architecture for Asia. If Japan is to successfully increase its diplomatic weight by spreading common values, the United States and Japan must adopt a cohesive approach to multilateral institutions in Asia. The realities of Asia are transPacific and the reality for Japan is that the U.S.-Japan alliance strengthens its diplomatic position in the region. Japan made a laudable attempt at community building at the East Asian Summit (EAS) last December, but that gathering created more questions than answers about institution building in Asia. Japan and the United States are better off revitalizing agenda-setting dialogues that already exist, most notably the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). In order to face pressing economic and security challenges effectively, the United States and Japan should promote a framework for dialogue that involves key players, addresses the most salient issues, and prevents redundancy. To do other-

Conflict & Security

wise would threaten to undermine the prosperity and security the region has worked so hard to sustain. It is also important that Japan push an agenda for reform, transparency, rule of law, and other common values in multilateral forums where the United States is not a member, such as ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, Korea, China).

In pushing for a values-based diplomatic strategy, Japan will have to better manage the historical legacies that drag down its leadership potential in Asia. A February 2006 BBC poll found that Japan is perceived as the leading provider of public goods to the international community. A majority of respondents in thirty-one of thirty-three nations said that Japan plays a positive role in the international community. The two nations that disagreed were China and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Under Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan has become a clear global player, but it must address the concerns of its immediate neighbors in Northeast Asia. There is no question that China and the ROK both have their own domestic complications and international agenda that make reconciliation with Japan difficult. Indeed, it is hard to see how the historical issues among these major powers will be resolved any time soon. Polling indicates that younger generations hold more negative perceptions about each other than did their grandparents who experienced war and occupation. Nevertheless, Japan must develop a comprehensive strategy to minimize the negative impact of history on Japan’s own diplomatic influence in Asia even as it continues building a well-earned reputation as a contributing stakeholder in the broader international system.

The world should expect to find Japan thoroughly engaged in the diplomatic Summer/Fall 2006 [ 5 1 ]

COMMON VALUES

challenges of our time. By increasing its diplomatic weight, Japan can enhance its reputation as a source of ideas and a purveyor of common values, developing a model for China’s integration into the international community and simultaneously solidifying a multilateral agenda for Asia. Such engagement must include visible responses to humanitarian needs that test the capacity of international cooperation and leadership.

New Roles and Missions. It is hard

to overstate how much the deployment of Japan’s GSDF to Samawah, Iraq in 2003 reinforced Japan’s global reputation as a player in international security. The GSDF mission will eventually be complete and they will be able to return home with honor while other forces, mostly air and naval, step up their role in the reconstruction of Iraq. Japan’s global weight, however, could become deflated if the GSDF does not participate in new missions elsewhere in the world. The international community has become used to seeing Japan play such a role, and could easily misinterpret the absence of GSDF missions as a Japanese retreat from international peace and security issues. As the Japanese government considers withdrawing its forces from Iraq, it should contemplate other humanitarian missions, whether in Sudan, Haiti, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, to demonstrate Japan’s willingness to move beyond foreign aid as the sole symbol of its national power.

The government must first do more to garner public support for Japan’s expanded role in world affairs. The Japanese people must realize the legitimacy and desirability of employing the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) overseas in humanitarian (and other) types of

[ 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

service. The world expects more leadership from a country with Japan’s resources and it should not waste opportunities to raise its profile. A case in point is the relief operation instituted after the recent mudslides in the Philippines. The JSDF should have been there to assist, but no such plans materialized.

It is hard to imagine the Japanese public opposing such an initiative, but the fact of the matter is that the mentality on the street does not mirror the progressive objectives of the leadership.

Unfortunately, legal obstacles could hinder progress toward a more involved humanitarian presence. An ongoing and contentious debate over a constitutional amendment promises to prolong an expansion of the JSDF mandate. Article 9 of the constitution essentially prohibits the use of military force to settle international disputes. In the past, legislators have capitalized on its vague wording to justify the JSDF and gradually introduce new roles and missions through special legislation, though many such laws become stuck in the Diet for domestic political reasons unrelated to national security. Utilizing the flexible interpretations of Article 9 that have favored the JSDF to this point, the next Japanese cabinet should make it a high priority to pass a comprehensive law that would allow the government to dispatch forces for humanitarian missions without having to pass separate laws for each contingency. Simplifying the approval process for JSDF missions would not only augment Japan’s unilateral contributions to international security, but could also improve the interoperability of the U.S.Japan alliance as the foundation of regional peace and stability.

Another uncertainty is Japan’s ability to carry out the missions for which it

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might request legal backing. The JSDF will have difficulty realizing its full potential without narrowing the gap between the proposed legal framework for JSDF missions and its implementation capacity.

Common logistical support capacity for peacekeeping and reconstruction has been achieved under the current framework, but more complicated humanitarian missions, especially those in other regions, could require more capabilities for airlift and logistical support than the JSDF can currently handle. Moreover, with a large portion of Japan’s defense budget currently dedicated to missile defense forces, policymakers must balance the desire for new roles and missions against fiscal and structural realities. This is a monumental task but one that Japan should tackle willingly.

Alliance Credibility. At this writing,

the United States and Japan are preparing to finalize the latest recommendations for alliance cooperation prepared by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC). The SCC issued a joint statement in February 2005 outlining common security objectives for the alliance and

Conflict & Security

on Okinawa (to be finalized in April 2006), and listing the specific roles and missions that should characterize bilateral defense cooperation in the future. The local government in Okinawa has steadfastly resisted the realignment plan and could delay its implementation. Furthermore, the legal issues and capacity problems noted above raise questions about Japan’s ability to fully implement the proposed changes to roles and missions.

These uncertainties must be addressed for the domestic and international credibility of the alliance to be sustained.

The United States is moving forward with global force posture realignment and cannot wait forever for Japan. The SCC agreement would reduce the U.S. Marine presence on Okinawa by 8,000, which would certainly reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. Failing to implement this agreement will cast doubts on the abilities of the United States and Japan to maintain a flexible and modern alliance. Similarly, the United States and Japan must complete the roles and missions review described in the October 2005 report and produce the unfinished statement of shared

A robust alliance will feature Japan as a

regional and global player in diplomacy and security, greater synergy in bilateral defense cooperation, and a renewed commitment to free trade and economic leadership. stressed the need to reexamine roles, missions, and capabilities to meet the demands of the new security environment. An interim report followed in October 2005, announcing an agreement concerning U.S. force realignment

strategic objectives. The U.S.-Japan alliance has always been strengthened by reducing the U.S. footprint in Japan while improving the interoperability and effectiveness of U.S. and Japanese forces.

A failure to follow through on both Summer/Fall 2006 [ 5 3 ]

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Mutual Security deals specifically with economic cooperation as a key strategic pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The discovery of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States in December 2003 and Japan’s subsequent refusal to reopen its market to U.S. beef exports brought bilateral economic dialogue to a halt and could diminish the momentum for reform that has contributed to increased foreign investment in Japan. The Economic Partnership for Growth (EPG) of 2001 constituted a solid framework to tackle key issues such as non-performing loans, deflation, and regulatory reform, but those talks have progressed slowly and leave room for doubt about a sustained commitment to economic policy dialogue going forward. As two of the world’s strongest economies and greatest proponents of international trade and investment, the United States and Japan must demonstrate leadership by establishing a new bilateral economic agenda on trade that reflects the challenges facing the global economy.

With multilateral trade negotiations at a standstill, the United States and Japan are pursuing bilateral free trade agreements to sustain the growth of their respective economies. Japan is accelerating plans to negotiate with members of ASEAN while the Bush administration has penned agreements with a variety of nations and is scheduled to begin discussions with South Korea this May. Given this trend and increased cynicism regarding the prospects for a successful conclusion to the Doha Round, Japan and the Economic Dialogue. The United United States should consider a bilateral States and Japan cannot afford to con- free trade agreement (or economic partcentrate solely on the diplomatic and nership agreement) of their own and do security components of the alliance. so quickly given that the president’s trade Indeed, Article 2 of the 1960 Treaty of promotion authority is set to expire in fronts would cause the bilateral relationship to sag and divert attention from the important diplomatic agenda Japan should pursue.

The alliance will also need to continue building constituencies that understand and support its purpose. In the mid1990s the Pentagon tried to revitalize the alliance at a time when opinions about the alliance in Japan were at a historic low following a September 1995 rape incident perpetrated against a young Okinawan girl by two U.S. sailors and a Marine. This very public and very tragic episode led to real soul-searching about the alliance in Japan and spawned a series of bilateral academic conferences and media investigations. This public bilateral discourse made the bureaucrats on both sides nervous, but ultimately deepened the support for the alliance. By 1996 public opinion about the alliance in Japan turned around. This reversal was assisted by Chinese and North Korean missile tests in the interim, but much of the turnaround had to do with the engagement of intellectuals in both nations in this broad public discourse. Over the past five years that public discourse has been missing, perhaps because the logic of the alliance is so compelling and the solidarity between the two leaders so clear. Nevertheless, the U.S.-Japan alliance will require some hard choices and possibly new directions in the years ahead, and the intellectual investment necessary to make the right judgments and to build the public support goes well beyond the capacity of the governments to handle alone.

[ 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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June 2007. Given concerns about American access to the Japanese market, any such agreement would naturally be contingent upon substantial progress in Japanese regulatory reform. The time is now ripe for the two governments to put trade back at the top of the policy agenda regardless of BSE and other irritants.

In order to complete a blueprint for Asia that is bound by democracy, the rule of law, and open markets, the United States and Japan should demonstrate the benefits of free trade and prove that transparency is the ultimate guarantor of prosperity.

The Course Ahead. There is a nat-

ural ebb and flow in relationships, and U.S.-Japan relations may have entered a period of relative equanimity with some

Conflict & Security

uncertainty about the future. This is precisely the time to chart a new course for the alliance that continues to champion the cause of political and economic freedom and serve as a foundation for international peace and stability. A robust U.S.-Japan alliance will feature Japan as a regional and global player in diplomacy and security, greater synergy in bilateral defense cooperation, and a renewed commitment to free trade and economic leadership. Bilateral strategic thinking now occurs in a regional and global context, and this trend should continue, thanks to a multitude of shared interests. The United States and Japan are positioned to guide the international community toward democracy and prosperity, and common values are the key to getting there.

NOTES

1 Security Consultative Committee, The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 23 September 1997, 1.

2 Michael Green was one of the authors.

3 National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, 11 October 2000, 7.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 5 5 ]

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Conflict&Security Coming Home Whole

Reintegrating Uganda’s Child Soldiers Lorea Russell and Elzbieta M. Gozdziak “There is not one family in the Acholiland that hasn’t had a son or daughter taken by the LRA [Lord’s Resistance Army] to be a fighter,” a young woman explained on the bus ride to Kampala.1 The LRA is charged with using the world’s youngest child soldier, aged five, as part of its rebel forces.2 Human Rights Watch estimates that over the past 20 years the LRA has abducted 30,000 children in Northern Uganda who were forced to serve as child soldiers.3 While attempting to bring down the National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by President Yoweri Museveni, the LRA has also committed many atrocities against their own community, the Acholi, including forced recruitment of child soldiers. Although there is no peace agreement in sight, many international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) hope to assist in bringing all the child soldiers home once the war has ended. As a result, numerous NGOs have created programs to assist in the rehabilitation and reintegration of children once they have escaped or been dismissed by the LRA. In some countries, such as Sudan or Colombia, armed conflicts have lasted for decades and result in cycles of violence that transcend generations. Violence and aggression are often the leitmotif of socialization processes of child soldiers, render them at risk for violent behavior, and make them an

Lorea Russell is a program assistant of the Emergency Response Humanitarian Media at Internews Network.

Elzbieta M. Gozdziak is a research director at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University.

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easy target for manipulation by unscrupulous guerilla leaders. Ostracized by their community, marginalized by lack of education and unable to find employment, former child soldiers may pick up arms against and become a threat to their communities. Well-executed demobilization programs can facilitate reintegration of child soldiers and create stable environments in which peace can take root. Psychosocial reintegration programs for former child soldiers are an important step in rebuilding peace and ensuring security; “psychosocial” has been defined as “the influence of social factors on an individual’s mind or behavior, and to the interrelations of behavioral and social factors; also, more widely pertaining to the interrelation of mind and society in human development.”4, While various reintegration program models may be appropriate in different circumstances, it is essential that they include some element of psychosocial programming for former child soldiers to prevent renewed conflict in these communities and enable their children to resume normal lives.

This article first examines the growing prevalence of child soldiers and the effects conflict imposes upon them.

The second section defines psychosocial programming and examines its role in reintegration processes before offering a critique of various psychosocial reintegration models in a third section.

Ultimately, this article argues that while various reintegration program models may be appropriate in different circumstances, it is essential that they include some element of psychosocial programming for former child soldiers to prevent renewed conflict in these communities and enable their children to resume normal lives.5 [ 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Child

Soldiers. Approximately

300,000 children are currently being used as soldiers in more than 30 armed conflicts around the world, including armed conflicts in Uganda, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. While most of those recruited are adolescents, children are being conscripted at younger and younger ages, both for direct and indirect participation in hostilities.6 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol) provide a strong legal framework for the protection of children in armed conflict and strictly prohibit the use of children under the age of eighteen as combatants.

In reality, however, the ability to enforce these laws and standards is limited, leaving children vulnerable to abuse.

Many factors complicate the enforcement of child soldier prohibitions. It is often difficult to verify if combatants are under the age of eighteen. Children may lie about their age, and military officials in need of combatants often conveniently “lose” paperwork related to the age of recruits. In countries where birth registration systems are nonexistent or rarely used, age verification may be impossible.

The intrastate nature of most contemporary conflicts further complicates this matter; rebel forces are not held to the same international legal standards as national militaries and are not signatories of CRC or the Optional Protocol.

Unsurprisingly, the majority of armed forces using child soldiers tend to be opposition and paramilitary forces.

Although Uganda has signed the Optional Protocol, the LRA in Northern Uganda is allegedly comprised of mainly abducted children, with estimates of over

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30,000 children having been abducted from their homes to serve as rebels fighting against the government of Uganda.

Additional factors contribute to the attractiveness of using children as soldiers. The proliferation of small arms, some of which are easily manipulated even by relatively small children, may have contributed to the increased recruitment of

Conflict & Security

out ahead of adult soldiers as minesweepers. These children wore necklaces with “keys to heaven.” It is estimated that nine out of every ten died on these missions.9 Not every child soldier sees the front lines. Children perform an array of auxiliary services. In addition to serving as porters, cooks, construction workers, or latrine diggers, they often carry out more

Ostracized by their community,

marginalized by lack of education, and unable to find employment, former child soldiers may pick up arms again. children for direct participation in conflict. In addition, some commanders reportedly prefer child recruits over adults because they view them as obedient, highly motivated, and dedicated. Very young children also lack a fully developed sense of right and wrong and are easily trained to be brutal soldiers. Manipulation tactics often rely on the notion of “duty” to lure children into battle and use drugs and alcohol to make them think they are invincible. Initiation rites and magic charms are also often used to manipulate children into believing that they are invincible. Before battles, commanders may pass out drugs that children consider to be magical. “The medicine was for protection. If a bullet hit you, it would bounce right off,” said Samson, a former Liberian child soldier.7 In Northern Uganda the LRA performs rituals that involve smearing oil and ashes on the children’s faces to protect them from getting killed.8 Finally, children are considered more expendable than their adult counterparts. During the Iran-Iraq war, thousands of Iranian children were sent

dangerous tasks such as spying, minesweeping, or guarding prisoners of war. These assignments are as treacherous as direct combat and can result in death or in forced participation in brutalities. It is not uncommon for child guards to be forced to kill adult prisoners if they try to escape or to prove their own loyalty. Girls may be pressed into domestic servitude, forced to provide sexual services, or become “wives” of older soldiers.

The Effects of Armed Conflict on Child Soldiers. The impact of armed

conflict on child soldiers varies both in range and severity of symptoms. The impact of war on child soldiers is far worse than the effects of war on adult combatants. Experiences in places such as Sierra Leone have shown that many adult combatants successfully reintegrate into society after disarmament, because they were socialized to civilian norms before the conflict. Social development of child soldiers, on the other hand, is often stunted by their early involvement in combat.

The long-term psychosocial effects of Summer/Fall 2006 [ 5 9 ]

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war on child soldiers can be devastating.

Service providers at a World Vision rehabilitation center for abducted children in Gulu, Northern Uganda, indicated that former child soldiers in their care experienced nightmares, insomnia, bedwetting, eating disorders, and difficulty concentrating, and exhibited behavioral problems when interacting with others.10 Some children became hostile towards others, resorting to violence to solve problems, while others became depressed

placed persons (IDP) camps is also reported to be very high; the majority of young men interviewed in one of these camps were inebriated.11 Despite the known adverse effects of war on child soldiers, their emotional well-being has received attention by the international community only in the last two decades. The 1986 UNICEF Executive Board Meeting agenda focused on NGOs’ growing concern regarding the psychosocial effects of war and other dis-

Social development of child soldiers is

often stunted by their early involvement in combat. and suicidal. Still others live in fear of punishment for their actions or being forced back into combat.

Girls who served as “wives” for other soldiers or were raped in refugee camps often exhibit unhealthy sexual behaviors.

At one extreme, some resort to granting sexual favors to accrue rewards, while at the other, some are fearful of any sexual contact. Many girls return home with children they bore in captivity and worry about being accepted into their communities of origin and about their ability to care for their offspring. In addition, child soldiers may have contracted HIV/AIDS or other sexually transmitted infections. The use of drugs and alcohol to help fortify child soldiers before entering battle has led to diagnoses of cooccurring addictions. At least one local NGO interviewed for this study indicated that alcohol and drug addiction were the most prevalent issues from which their participants suffered among all the problems identified during an intake process. Alcoholism in internally dis[ 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

asters on children.12 International recognition of this concern is reflected in Article 39 of the 1989 CRC, which obligates governments to take appropriate actions to promote the physical and psychological well-being of children, victims of “any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect, or dignity of the child.”13

What Is Psychosocial? There has

been much debate as to what the term “psychosocial” actually means. Some practitioners used the term interchangeably with mental health, while in fact these two concepts are quite different. Mental health deals primarily with the psychological needs that a person may have, while psychosocial describes the dynamic relationship between psychological and social factors—how each continuously influences the other. The psychological dimension

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Conflict & Security

includes those factors that affect emotions, behaviors, thoughts, memory, cognitive abilities, perceptions, and understanding.

The social dimension refers to altered relationships (loss, death, or estrangement); breakdown of the community and/or family structure; and damage to social, cultural, and moral values, practices, and institutions. Psychosocial programs become very important to humanitarian work when the indigenous social infrastructure that supports child development collapses during conflict. While practitioners may agree on a definition of psychosocial, the ways they operationalize the concept vary widely. In Uganda, for example, there was no agreement among NGOs interviewed as to what psychosocial programming actually encompassed.

ation that attempt to incorporate all four of the following fundamental aims: family unity, education and economic opportunities, engagement in creative and cognitive activities, community connection, and reconciliation. Best practice examples include vocational training aimed at whole families and communities, not just individuals, or traditional ceremonies to welcome former child soldiers back into the community.16 Derek Summerfield, an expert on children and conflict, notes that, “anything pro-family (including employment opportunities) and procommunity will help children recover a more positive social reality.”17 Efforts aimed at community strengthening should include the capacity building of indigenous institutions and leaders to facilitate successful reintegration of former Psychosocial Programming. At its most fun- child soldiers into the communities damental level, child-focused psychoso- through traditional ceremonies. In cial programming consists of activities Northern Uganda the International Resdesigned to advance a child’s psychologi- cue Committee (IRC) has sponsored tracal and social development.14 These pro- ditional Acholi reconciliation ceremonies grams are created to strengthen protec- to help welcome back abducted children. tive and preventative factors, to limit or Their support is of a material kind, usualcounteract the negative consequences of ly in the form of a goat or chicken that may a child’s involvement in harmful experi- be needed for the ceremony. Effective ences and/or environments. According programs provide opportunities for skills to Joan Duncan and Laura Arnston, training as well as community-based ecoauthors of Children in Crisis: Good Psychosocial nomic development as a means of not only Practices in Evaluating Psychosocial Programming, transferring practical skills to the child, but the fundamental aim of psychosocial perhaps more importantly providing them programming is to improve a child’s with ways to rebuild communities that they well-being by: restoring the normal flow may have been responsible for destroying. of development; protecting children from the accumulation of distressful and Psychosocial Programs as Part harmful events; enhancing the capacity of the Reintegration Process. of families to care for their children; and After peace agreements are signed and enabling children to be active agents in rebel forces demobilize, little attention is rebuilding communities and in actualiz- given to the reintegration of children ing positive futures.15 affected by war. For example, in the midEffective psychosocial programs employ 1990s the UN earmarked $34 million for holistic methods of healing and reconcili- disarmament, demobilization, and reinSummer/Fall 2006 [ 6 1 ]

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tegration programs in Sierra Leone; however, less than $1 million were dedicated to programs for the tens of thousands of children that constituted large portions of the fighting forces.18 There were no existing peace agreements that recognized the existence of child soldiers or had provisions for their reintegration into their communities of origin until the 7 July 1999 Lomé Peace Accord.19 Reintegrating children is not as simple as just sending them back home. Successful reintegration efforts not only allow children to resume their lives as best they can, but must also focus on preventing future conflicts by breaking children’s socialization to violence. Neil Boothby, a scholar of the impact of war and political violence on children’s development as well as humanitarian responses, once said, “I think it’s safe to say unless we’re able to break the cycle of violence, unless we’re able to focus on this teenage population specifically…it’ll be the teenager who picks up the gun and starts the next cycle.”20 Given the wide array of psychological and social effects of war on children, it seems logical that psychosocial programming should be a crucial component of any reintegration program. Initially, many programs assisting conflict-affected children focused solely on psychological distress, using a Western bio-medical model of trauma, including the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), to design institutional responses to the suffering experienced by waraffected children. This approach has often proven futile and received much criticism. One of the most vocal critics of the Western tendency to pathologize the experiences of children affected by wars, Summerfield, notes that the Western concept of trauma, with its accompanying labels of “traumatized” and “brutal[ 6 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ized,” can be harmful in that it creates stigma.21 Furthermore, adopting a “victim” identity does not contribute to the child’s ability to heal emotionally and successfully reintegrate into the community of origin. Emotional development is important, but a sole focus on emotional distress can lead to individualized approaches that fail to take important interactions with social, cultural, and spiritual elements in child development into consideration. A UNICEF workshop held in Nairobi, Kenya, in May 1997 recognized that psychosocial projects should affect “emotions, behavior, thoughts, memory, learning ability, perceptions, and understanding.”22

Critiques of Approaches.

Psychosocial

Diversity of Response. Organizations with different interpretations of psychosocial programming have created various responses. While one NGO may organize around religious beliefs, another may focus on vocational opportunities. It is important to coordinate the efforts of different organizations in order to address a wide array of needs without duplicating services. In Uganda the National Psychosocial Core Team was established in 1997 to “harmonize interventions and enhance coordination.”23 The Core Team includes the Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development; the Ministry of Health; UNICEF; UNHCR; and a number of NGOs such as Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO), World Vision, and International Rescue Committee (IRC). The Core Team meets once a month to discuss NGO and donor activities as well as governmental actions that may affect programming. In 1998 the Core Team carried out a study called the

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Northern Uganda Psychosocial Needs Assessment (NUPSA). NUPSA examined the problems and interventions in conflict areas to determine which strategies were most effective and where they brought about most change. One principal recommendation was the need to develop guidelines for training materials for psychosocial practitioners. These recommendations are included in the

Conflict & Security

service providers advocate for involvement of both the family and the wider community in rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers. Effective psychosocial programs take the fact that most children have proven to be incredibly resilient into consideration.

As early as 1943, a Freud and Burlington study observed the importance of family relations and community life to

Effective programs provide these

children with ways to rebuild communities that they may have been responsible for destroying.

Guidelines for the Development of children’s well-being. While the physical Training Materials for Psychosocial Sup- experiences (injuries, destruction of homes, etc) of children during conflicts port Providers & Practitioners. substantially influence their psychological Center-Based Approaches vs. Community- well-being, the disruption and separation Based Approaches. NGOs debate which of family or community relationships are psychosocial approach is most beneficial far more devastating. Children demonto former child soldiers: center-based or strate the innate ability to recover from community-based.24 The center-based the physical effects of war with few conseapproach argues that the trauma experi- quences, but their ability to cope is conenced by child soldiers requires special- tingent upon the social structures availized care in a specialized setting before able during and after the conflict. Overthey are reunited with their families. As all, research has shown that three factors indicated previously, however, the trau- enhance children’s ability to cope with the ma concept is problematic. Many practi- trauma of armed conflict: individual pertioners working with child soldiers and sonalities, supportive family and commuscholars studying the effects of war on nity environment, and external agencies children acknowledge that making trau- (such as NGOs) that function as support ma the focal point of the child’s experi- systems for strengthening and reinforcing ence and the center of the institutional a child’s coping efforts.25 response to his/her suffering neglects the Unsurprisingly, there are several difchild’s inherent resilience, resources ferent institutional responses to the rein(traditional beliefs, availability of family tegration of child soldiers in Northern and community, external agency ser- Uganda. World Vision International runs vices), and current life situation. Many two reception centers in Gulu for forSummer/Fall 2006 [ 6 3 ]

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merly abducted children (FACs).26 The Children’s Center uses a holistic approach, and their program consists of many components, including one-toone counseling and group therapy. Children are reunited with their families whenever possible and family members

formerly abducted children into mainstream learning environments.30 Ultimately, at least in Northern Uganda, there is a fine line between the two approaches; many programs attempt to combine the two. For example, IRC partners with a local organization operating a

Children demonstrate the innate ability

to recover from the physical effects of war, but their ability to cope is contingent upon the social structure available during and after the conflict. come to the center to begin re-establishing relationships. The length of time spent in the center varies depending on each child’s situation, but it is usually anywhere from three weeks to three months.

The UN as well as many NGOs favor community-based approaches. They argue that timely family reunification is crucial to the healing process and reintegration should happen in the community context. Summerfield posits that “the major thrust of humanitarian interventions must be towards the war-weakened social fabric of survivor populations, for herein lie the sources of psychological resilience and capacity for recovery for all.”27 The Association of Volunteers for International Service (AVSI), a wellknown international NGO in Uganda, is a strong advocate of community-based programs.28 Many of AVSI’s psychosocial interventions are designed to enhance capacity of local communities to assist their FACs.29 Towards this end, for example, AVSI has created a psychosocial training guide and course for teachers.

The course sensitizes teachers to the effects of war on children and promotes classroom techniques to help integrate [ 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

reception center for FACs in Northern Uganda.31 The center is a place of transition for the children. They receive medical care; trace and reunite with their families; and participate in psychosocial programs, including drama and music performances. After leaving the center, children can access community-based programs run by IRC. In addition to sponsoring reconciliation ceremonies, IRC provides vocational training, targeted income-generating activities, and educational support.

Beyond the center-based or communitybased debate, all organizations assert that community participation is essential at some point in the healing process. The table below shows the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches.32

Conclusion. These children’s wars

did not end in a day. Similarly, the process to successfully reintegrate child soldiers will be a lengthy one. If these children are ever to know complete peace, the international community must find ways to break the cycle of violence thrust upon these children. Psychosocial programming offers a holistic way to encourage child soldiers to

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engage in everyday activities as well as strengthen the community social structures needed to support the child as he/she undergoes the long process of reintegration. As one girl said, “I want

Conflict & Security

to be a grown-up to stop the war so we can go home.”33 The international community, as those grown-ups, bears the ultimate responsibility to help these children come home.

NOTES

1 Interview. Gulu – Kampala, 21 August 2004.

2 P.W. Singer, Children at War, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005).

3 Human Rights Watch, Uganda Campaign: What You Can Do, available at: http://hrw.org/campaigns/uganda/.

4 This paper is based on fieldwork carried out in Uganda in 2004 as part of a student research fellowship supported by the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) at Georgetown University with funding from the Mellon Foundation. Desk study carried out in 2005 augmented the data collected in Uganda. The research sought to determine the effectiveness of psychosocial programming for waraffected children in Northern Uganda.

5 Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, American Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

6 This paper is based on fieldwork carried out in Uganda in 2004 as part of a student research fellowship supported by the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) at Georgetown University with funding from the Mellon Foundation. Desk study carried out in 2005 augmented the data collected in Uganda. The research evaluated the effectiveness of psychosocial programming for war affected children in Northern Uganda.

7 Rachel Harvey, Children and Armed Conflict: A Guide to International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, International Bureau for Children’s Rights, University of Essex, available at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000044.pdf.

8 Human Rights Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia, Vol. 16, No. 2(A), February 2004.

9 Lotte Ladegaard and Hans Otto, Save the Children Denmark, Fighting for a childhood: About child soldiers in Uganda and their struggle for a life without war, 1999. This was further confirmed with interviews done with IDPs in Gulu in August 2004.

10 “The Gulf War: The Child Soldiers of the Ayatollahs,” The Economist, 17 September 1983.

11 Interview with psychosocial advisor, August 2004.

12 Interview with local NGO, Psychosocial Program Manager, June 2004.

13 National Academy of Sciences, Psychosocial Concepts in Humanitarian Work with Children: A Review of the Concepts and Related Literature, National Academies Press (NAP), 2003.

14 Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at: www.unicef.org.

15 Joan Duncan and Laura Arnston, Children in Crisis: Good Psychosocial Practices in Evaluating Psychosocial Program-

ming, Save the Children Federation, Inc., 2004.

16 Joan Duncan and Laura Arnston, Children in Crisis: Good Psychosocial Practices in Evaluating Psychosocial Programming, Save the Children Federation, Inc., 2004.

17 Based on research and interviews conducted in Uganda during June – August 2004, both in Kampala and Gulu.

18 Derek Summerfield. “War and Mental Health: a brief overview.” BMJ, Volume 321, 22 July 2000.

19 P.W. Singer, Children at War (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005).

20 Article XXX of the Lome Peace Accord, available at: www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.

21 P.W. Singer, Children at War (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005).

22 Summerfield, Derek, “Effects of War: Moral knowledge, revenge, reconciliation and medicalised concepts of ‘recovery.’ ” BMJ, Volume 325, 9 November 2002.

23 Joan Duncan and Laura Arnston, Children in Crisis: Good Psychosocial Practices in Evaluating Psychosocial Programming, Save the Children Federation, Inc., 2004.

24 National Psychosocial Core Team of Uganda, Guidelines for the Development of Training Materials for Psychosocial Support Providers & Practitioners, Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Health and UNICEF, 2002.

25 Although this is a debate throughout the world with reintegration programs for former child soldiers, much of these observations come from research and interviews conducted with various organizations in Uganda from June-August 2004, both in Kampala and Gulu. Also, it is important to note that the spectrum of psychosocial programs is Clinical to Centerbased to Community-based.

26 National Academy of Sciences, Psychosocial Concepts in Humanitarian Work with Children: A Review of the Concepts and Related Literature, National Academies Press (NAP), 2003.

27 Interview with WVI staff, August 2004. One center is for children under the age of eighteen, and the second is for those above the age of eighteen.

28 Derek Summerfield, “Conflict and Health: War and mental health: a brief overview,” BMJ, Volume 321, 22 July 2000.

29 Based on conversations with other international NGOs when discussing the differences between center-based and community-based psychosocial approaches for FACs. 30 Phone interview with AVSI staff in Kitgum, July 2004.

31 Lucia Castelli, Elena Locatelli, and Mark

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COMING HOME WHOLE

Canavera, Pyschosocial Support for War Affected Children in Northern Uganda: Lessons Learned, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2005 32 Interview with IRC, July 2004.

33 National Psychosocial Core Team, Guidelines for

[ 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the Development of Training Materials for Psychosocial Support Providers and Practitioners, Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Health and UNICEF, 2002.

34 Interview with night commuter, Gulu, 19 August 2004.

Conflict & Security

Frozen Legacy

U.S.-Russian Strategic Nuclear Relations Martin Senn In the post-Cold War era focus has shifted from the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation to more contemporary issues like ballistic missile defense, bunker-busting low-yield nuclear weapons, and nuclear prevention. There is a public perception that the bilateral strategic disarmament process is advancing. President George W. Bush announced that the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or Moscow Treaty), which obliges the United States and Russia to reduce their operationally deployed strategic warheads to a level of 1,700 and 2,200 respectively, “ended a long chapter of confrontation, and… liquidates the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility.”1 In fact, however, nuclear relations between the United States and the Russian Federation have changed very little.

This article argues that the amicable rhetoric and quantitative nuclear weapons reductions of the past fifteen years simply obscure the fact that U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear relations are still structured around old patterns of the East-West conflict. Sections one and two review bilateral strategic disarmament and outline current nuclear force levels and modernization efforts. The third section investigates nuclear weapons’ contemporary role in U.S. and Russian security and defense policies as well as each country’s attitude toward contractual

Martin Senn is a research assistant in the Department of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. He is a member of the International Security Research Group.

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disarmament. The final section traces additional underlying causes freezing the nuclear legacy of the East-West conflict.

Strategic Disarmament: Where Do We Come From, Where Do We Stand? Bilateral arms control/dis-

armament between the United States and Russia developed in three phases. The arms control phase started with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process in 1969. Early efforts to reduce the pace of the arms race were made possible due to the overall East-West détente and the development of U.S. and Russian arsenals to the level of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The SALT I treaties (May 1972) limited both offensive and defensive strategic weapon systems through the Interim Agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The prohibition of nationwide missile defense systems by the ABM Treaty sustained the mutual vulnerability of both powers and was a necessary foundation for limiting strategic defense platforms.

Neither the SALT I Interim Agreement nor SALT II halted the increase of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arsenals; nevertheless, this early phase built confidence between East and West and was a precondition for the later reversal of the armament process.2 The disarmament phase began in 1982 with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed office as General Secretary of the Soviet Central Committee in March 1985, he renewed the faltering détente between Washington and Moscow and paved the way for serious and successful reduction negotiations.3 In 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was the first treaty in which the two superpowers committed them[ 6 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

selves to reductions of nuclear forces.

Moreover, against the backdrop of the dissolving East-West conflict, the United States and the USSR were already engaged in informal strategic reductions of deployed warheads.

START I eventually established a legal framework for strategic disarmament. It obliges the parties to deploy not more than 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600 delivery vehicles and to destroy deactivated launch vehicles.4 Like the INF treaty, START I provided a complex verification regime intended to guarantee successful implementation with measures like the inspection of data and facilities.5 Overall, START I has been a very successful disarmament framework; between 1990 and 2006, Russia and the United States reduced their arsenals of deployed strategic warheads from about 10,000 each to 3,500 (Russia)6 and 5,521 (United States).7 Although START I marked a success, the strategic disarmament process soon entered the third and current structural crisis phase. In contrast to earlier disarmament crises which resulted from external conflicts (e.g. the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) or the inability to agree on treaty provisions, this structural crisis represents a considerable weakening of the overall value and substance of the disarmament process. Symptoms of this current phase include the drawn-out ratification process and eventual failure of START II, U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the signing and ratification of SORT. The troublesome history of START II (January 1993) was primarily a function of provisions like the prohibition of land-based missiles with Multiple

SENN

Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and the implementation schedule.8 Land-based missiles with MIRVs form the backbone of Russia’s nuclear forces; their prohibition would have required the deployment of more launchers with single warheads in order to maintain strategic parity with the United States, putting a greater emphasis on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Russian Duma rejected START II not only

Conflict & Security

gain military advantages.”9 The Bush administration adopted this skepticism regarding the CTBT and subsequently boycotted the CTBT conference in September 2005.10 The final symptom of the crisis was the 2002 establishment of SORT as the legal basis for strategic disarmament until 2012. SORT breaks with the former START disarmament process in several ways. First, it sets a limit of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads,

The fact that parts of the two nations’

strategic nuclear arsenals are still on hairtrigger alert is the most dangerous relic of the East-West conflict.

because of its substance, but also due to the domestic power dispute with Boris Yeltsin and as a reaction to the United States’s 1998 intervention in Iraq and Kosovo, which lacked UN authorization. In 2000 the Duma finally consented to ratify START II but explicitly connected its successful ratification and implementation to the validity of the ABM treaty. Although START II thus became Russia’s bargaining chip, it did not prevent the United States from cancelling the ABM treaty, the cornerstone of strategic arms control and disarmament for almost three decades.

The failed ratification of CTBT was primarily due to concerns “that the United States cannot maintain its nuclear deterrent without nuclear test explosions, that the CTBT is not verifiable and that, while the [United States] could be counted on to comply, other nations could test surreptitiously and

but it does not incorporate the destruction of decommissioned warheads–a provision in the proposed START III–nor the destruction of deactivated delivery vehicles–a provision of START I and II. In other words, SORT allows the hedging of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery platforms. Moreover, it leaves the composition of the strategic forces to the parties and does not prohibit MIRVs. After START I expires in 2009, reductions verification will rely solely on the relatively weak “Bilateral Implementation Commission” provided by SORT.11 SORT lacks interim reduction levels so that the parties are not required to comply with limits until the expiration date. Withdrawal from the treaty is allowed with written notification as an act of national sovereignty. Earlier treaties required the respective party to argue the case for withdrawal and demonstrate “extraordinary events… that have jeoparSummer/Fall 2006 [ 6 9 ]

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dized [the party’s] supreme interests.”12

Nuclear Planning and Modernization. Some argue that SORT’s brevi-

ty reflects a relationship based on openness and trust, making complex disarmament unnecessary. However, the fact that parts of the two nations’ strategic nuclear arsenals are still on hair-trigger alert is the most dangerous relic of the East-West conflict and the most obvious evidence of the continuing strategic rivalry. Accord-

resembled Soviet exercises simulating a nuclear attack against the United States, supports this estimate.16 Overall, Russia has initiated a modernization program aimed at increasing the robustness of its strategic nuclear forces. In addition to new land-based Topol-M (SS-27) systems and the planned modernization of the bomber fleet, Russia places great emphasis on extending its naval strategic forces. 17 New submarines and MIRV-capable Bulava

The perception is that having a nuclear

arsenal is the sole insurance against uncertainty. ing to the recent Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the range of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed nuclear weapons, which was incorporated into SORT, is “the lowest possible number consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations while maintaining a level that provides a credible deterrent.”13 A National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) paper estimates, however, that approximately 1,300 warheads are sufficient to “achieve high damage levels against Russian nuclear forces.”14 It can be assumed that a far smaller arsenal of warheads could defeat Chinese nuclear forces and various smaller nuclear powers.15 There are thus grounds to conclude that the future strategic nuclear arsenal will be primarily directed against Russia. Likewise, Russia’s proposal of 1,500 deployed warheads as limits for SORT and a similar calculation of the Russian National Security Council in August 2000 indicate that possible nuclear confrontation with the United States still drives Russia’s nuclear planning. The large-scale Russian maneuver of February 2004, which [ 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

SLBMs are intended to reduce the reliance on vulnerable land-based systems and to ensure Russia’s counter-strike and deterrence capability. The successful implementation of this armament program would eventually close a traditional gap between Russia and the United States, which rely on naval strategic forces.

Since 2001 Russia has repeatedly announced that it will develop hypersonic missiles and maneuverable warheads to penetrate missile defense systems. Allusions to these new technologies clearly indicate they are countermeasures against the missile defense efforts of the United States.18 Moscow has repeatedly argued that ballistic missile defense (BMD) is not deployed to protect the United States against attacks by pariah states but exists primarily to spy on and eventually weaken Russia’s strategic capabilities. Russia’s effort to overcome BMD shows that U.S.-Russian strategic relations are still characterized by suspicion and distrust.

Contemporary Roles of Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Contrary to

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expectations at the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons remain integral to U.S. and Russian security and defense policies. Indeed, the role of nuclear weapons has not been devalued, but rather partially revaluated.

U.S. Nuclear Forces: Ensuring Superiority and Freedom of Action. The U.S. posi-

tion as the sole global superpower and its proactive global foreign and security policies are likely to cause shifts in the balance of power, including efforts of major and smaller states to acquire and extend arsenals of WMD and ballistic missiles. Accordingly, the 2004 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces states that the nuclear forces of the United States will most likely have to cope with terrorists, pariah states, and major powers possessing WMD.19 There is little doubt that China and Russia fall into the latter category.20 China’s primary national goal is to become a powerful player on the world stage, and it sees nuclear armament as one of several means to achieve this end. To ensure superiority over China, the United States is likely to utilize the combination of deterrence and BMD. The possibility of a renewed hostile relationship with Russia–as a consequence of failing democratization or geostrategic rivalries–is still influential for U.S. nuclear planning. Overall, U.S. offensive and defensive strategic forces ensure strategic dominance, deter and prevent the emergence of smaller and potentially hostile nuclear powers, and provide a robust foundation for proactive global foreign and security policies.

Storing a hedge force (permissible under SORT) serves as further insurance that the United States could reach strategic

Conflict & Security

superiority relatively quickly. Considering Russia’s limited defense budget and its allocation of resources toward consolidation and modernization of its armed forces, it is highly unlikely to preserve a large-scale hedge force.21 Potential deployment against rogue states and terrorists is a comparatively new purpose for U.S. strategic forces, which are being partially adapted to these new missions through the development of bunker-busting, low-yield weapons.22 Aside from arguments that the so-called “mini-nukes” developments will encourage other countries to acquire WMD rather than to renounce them, Russia perceives these developments as a potential direct threat, requiring it to develop similar programs in response.23

Russian Nuclear Forces: Ensuring Balance of Power and Great Power Status. Despite the overall improvement of Sino-Russian relations, Russia still perceives China as a potential regional and global competitor. Military concerns regarding possible security risks of conventional arms exports and the fact that Russian exports to China have not included military nuclear technology reflect this lingering rivalry.24 Accordingly, Russia will likely keep its strategic forces at a level that guarantees a credible deterrence vis-à-vis China.

Russia’s major point of reference for nuclear planning has always been the United States. Keeping rough strategic parity with the United States is a core element of Russia’s basically reactive strategic policy because, like the United States, Russia still anticipates a possible confrontation and perceives U.S. strategic modernization programs as a potential threat to national security. Russia also relies “on nuclear weapons to compenSummer/Fall 2006 [ 7 1 ]

FROZEN LEGACY

sate for the deficiencies of the country’s conventional forces,” which have decayed dramatically since the breakup of the Soviet Union.25 Strategic weapons and announcements of their unsurpassed modernization are intended to underline Russia’s competitiveness in the field of high-tech armaments and mitigate past humiliations (like the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty) and the contemporary perception of a weak or backward Russia.

Russia’s strategic arsenal is a longterm instrument for national security, yet its deteriorating condition due to a recent weak economy and reduced military spending under Yeltsin has substantially weakened Russia’s position in disarmament negotiations.

Contractual Disarmament: No Common Ground. The SALT, INF,

and START I frameworks were driven by the mutual desire to contain the arms race for the sake of economic relief and the advance of détente as well as by mutual fears regarding the other’s willingness and capability to increase the armament efforts. Today, however, contractual disarmament reflects differing interests and attitudes.

U.S. skepticism towards legally binding frameworks is visible in the reorganization and reduction of the U.S. State Department’s arms control infrastructure.26 Disarmament treaties are not regarded as a valuable tool for binding others (e.g. the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), but as endangering U.S. national security by restricting the United States’s freedom of action. The lack of substance of SORT clearly reflects this aversion.

In contrast, Russia still attaches great value to disarmament treaties. Since

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maintaining strategic parity with the United States is of cardinal importance and its strategic forces have deteriorated, Russia prefers a legally binding framework to ensure parallel disarmament.

SORT demonstrates this asymmetry of capabilities between the two countries and the United States’s dominant negotiating position.

Freezing the Nuclear Legacy.

U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear relations are characterized by a structural crisis of disarmament and competition or even latent rivalry. This current and probable future situation is caused by the continued and revalued role of nuclear weapons as well as by changing attitudes and interests regarding contractual disarmament.

The major underlying factor actually freezing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War, however, is nuclear and strategic missile technology itself.

Nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles enable the delivery of mass destruction to virtually anywhere with little or no warning. These technologies remain prestigious objects of national strength and are not only valuable but comparatively affordable tools for deterring external intervention and blackmailing economic support, and nuclear technology has become the weapon of the poor, the isolated, and the threatened.

Therefore, it is very likely that nuclear and missile technology will spread to countries such as Iran.

Moreover, double standards plague the international position on nuclear proliferation. With the exception of China, all official nuclear weapons states (NWS) have reduced their nuclear arsenals, while simultaneously pursuing modernization programs envisioning nuclear weapons as an integral part of the

SENN

security policy toolbox. The NWS’s halfhearted implementation of the NPTdisarmament provisions renders it simply an instrument to regulate the behavior of non-nuclear weapon states. Moreover, relatively rapid settlement of the initial stir regarding India’s and Pakistan’s accession to the nuclear club in 1998, despite remaining outside the NPT framework, conveys a problematic message: once you acquire military nuclear power, others have to live with it.

Uncertainty is the greatest threat to today’s global strategic security environment; a nuclear arsenal is insurance

Conflict & Security

against uncertainty in the atomic age. A change in NWS attitudes regarding this argument necessarily precedes any changes in vertical and especially horizontal proliferation. Rather than questioning their impact as negative role models, NWS seek new targets and scenarios of deployment for their nuclear weapons, thereby freezing the old nuclear legacy and creating new legacies for future generations.

Author’s Note: I want to thank Sigrid Ruppe, Franz Eder, and Gerhard Mangott for their valuable advice.

NOTES

1 President Bush, Russian President Putin Sign Nuclear Arms Treaty, Moscow, 24 May 2002, Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-10.html (Date Accessed: 12 September 2005); see also SALT II never entered into force, but the United States and Russia fulfilled some of its obligations.

2 See Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA / London: MIT Press, 2001), 1920.

3 Due to the specific counting rules of START I, the number of accountable warheads may differ from the number of deployed warheads. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also became parties to the treaty.

4 For the text of START I see http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/ toc.html (Date accessed: 21 September 2005).

5 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen.

“Russian nuclear forces, 2006,” NRDC: Nuclear Notebook, vol.62, no.2, Internet, http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=ma06norris (Date accessed: 20 March 2006).

6 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen.

“U.S. nuclear forces, 2006,” NRDC: Nuclear Notebook, vol.62, no.2, Internet, http://www.thebulletin.org/ article_nn.php?art_ofn=jf06norris (Date accessed: 20 March 2006).

7 MIRVs are multiple nuclear warheads which are carried by a single ballistic missile and are designed to destroy different targets within a certain range. The equipping of ballistic missiles with MIRVs increases the likelihood of overcoming defense systems and inflicts greater damage on the enemy.

8 See Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 25-26.

For the text of START II, see http://www.state.gov/ www/global/arms/starthtm/start2/st2intal.html (Date accessed: 21 September 2005).

9 Daryl Kimball, “How the US Senate Rejected CTBT Ratification,” Disarmament Diplomacy 40 (1999), Internet, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd40/ 40wrong.htm (Date accessed: 27 February 2006).

10 See “U.N. Leaders Urge Nations to Ratify CTBT,” Global Security Newswire, 22 September 2005, Internet, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/print .asp?story_id=781BE648-5430-4C5A-B4B9030F8DE898DE (Date accessed: 23 September 2005).

11 See Wade Boese, “The Bush Administration and Verification,” Arms Control Today, April 2005, Internet, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_04/NA_Verification.asp (Date accessed: 28 April 2005).

12 “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” U.S. Department of State, Internet, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start2/strt2txt.html (Date accessed: 26 September 2005).

13 “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,”Joint Chiefs of Staff, Final Coordination (2), 15 March 2005, Internet, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/ policy/dod/jp3_12fc2.pdf (Date accessed: 23 September 2005).

14 Matthew G. McKinzie, et al, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change (New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2001), x.

15 A 2004 Department of Defense report estimates that by 2010 China could posses about sixty ICBMs that could reach the United States. See United States Department of Defense, “FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power,” Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Internet, http://www.dod.gov/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf (Date accessed: 4 October 2005), 37.

16 The exercise has to be seen also in the context of the forthcoming presidential elections. It was intend-

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 7 3 ]

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ed to strengthen the picture of Putin as a powerful leader of a strong nation. According to Pavel Felgenhauer, its main purpose was however “to test aging ICBMs and bombers”; see Pavel Felgenhauer, “Old ICBMs, Old Thinking,” Moscow Times, 17 February 2004, Internet, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/ stories/2004/02/17/009.html (Date accessed: 19 February 2004).

17 “Strategische Luftstreitkräfte von Russland werden grundlegend organisiert,“ russland.RU, 28 June 2005, Internet, http://russlandonline.ru/rupol 0010/morenews.php?iditem=7220 (Date accessed: 28 June 2005).

18 For instance, President Putin recently explained that the new strategic missile “will be virtually invulnerable, even to the missile defense systems being developed in some of our partner countries.” Quoted in “Russian Army to get Hypersonic Strategic Missiles,” Global Security Newswire, 28 September 2005, Internet, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/ print.asp?story_id=37A1AD69-46EF-4881-B6D196DF0E3A4F78 (Date accessed: 28 September 2005).

19 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Report of the Defense Science Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces,” February 2004, Internet, http://www. acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/fssf.pdf (Date accessed: 6 April 2004), 1-3.

20 See also Josiane Gabel, “The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons after September 11,” The Washington

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Quarterly, Winter 2004-05, 187.

21 See Gerhard Mangott, “Russlands Außenpolitik. Fähigkeiten und Optionen,” in Gerhard Mangott, Dmitrij Trenin, Martin Senn, Heinz Timmermann, eds., Russlands Rückkehr. Außenpolitik unter Vladimir Putin (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 60-61.

22 Although the bunker-buster program was cancelled by Congress, the administration may decide to reactivate R&D; see David Ruppe, “Energy Department Formally Ends Effort to Develop New Type of Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Warhead,” Global Security Newswire, 24 March 2006, Internet, http://www.nti. org/d_newswire/issues/2006_3_24.html#637FF44E (Date accessed: 29 March 2006).

23 See Mike Nartker, “Russia Views U.S. ‘MiniNuke’ Research as Threat, Experts Say,” Global Security Newswire, 22 April 2004, Internet, http://www.nti. org/d_newswire/issues/2004_4_22.html#BA93DA3A (Date accessed: 26 April 2004).

24 See Gerhard Mangott, “Russlands Außenpolitik. Fähigkeiten und Optionen,” 102.

25 Frank Umbach quoted in Steven E. Miller, “Introduction: Moscow’s Military Power,” in Steven E. Miller, Dmitri Trenin, eds., The Russian Military. Power and Policy (Cambridge, MA / London: MIT Press, 2004), 34.

26 See David Ruppe, “State Department Cuts Arms Control Bureau,” Global Security Newswire, 30 September 2005, Internet, http://www.nti.org/ d_newswire/issues/2005_9_30.html#37888BB9.

Culture&Society Growing Pains

Australia’s Adolescent Multicultural Policy Gregory Brown Notwithstanding many fits and starts, Australia is shifting rapidly from an Anglo-Celtic outpost to a Eurasian potpourri. The swing to nondiscriminatory immigration policies a generation ago has led to a massive ethnic transformation. A stroll through the center of any major Australian city reveals people from many different national origins, and increasing numbers of Australians view migrants as good neighbors who enrich and strengthen the national community. Thirty years of diversified migrant flows have left a sizeable impression on Australia’s population balance. Whereas, the Anglo-Celtic fraction of the population dropped 20 percent between 1946 and 2000, the overseas-born persons make up nearly a quarter of Australia’s population—a staggering number even when compared with figures from other high immigration-receiving states.1 For example, immigrants constitute around 15 percent of Canada’s population, while fewer than 10 percent of Americans were born elsewhere.

There are moments, including some very recently in Sydney, when increasing ethnic and cultural diversity stir political debate and contention among policymakers as well as the country’s rank-and-file. Riots in Sydney late last year highlighted the current tensions gripping the otherwise harmonious community. In order to understand the situation today, one must first

Gregory Brown is a research analyst for CENTRA Technology, Inc. and an adjunct assistant professor at the Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies at Georgetown University.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 7 5 ]

GROWING PAINS

fear that foreign labor would undercut wages, social justice, and national unity, and these restrictions were neither uncommon nor peculiarly racist. Many countries—including China and the settler societies of Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—were highly reluctant to admit cheap labor and culturally alien strangers whose language, work habits, and politics were radically differOpenness and Optimism Trans- ent than their own.3 When the Australian economy forms White Australia. Australia was not always such an open and tolerant required high levels of immigration that society. Since European settlement in the could not be met by northern Europe in late eighteenth century, immigration has the post-World War II era, migrants were been a hotly contested topic—how many brought in from Yugoslavia, Italy, and people to let in, whom to let in, and how Greece. A special dispensation was later to deal with them once they arrive. The granted to immigrants from the Middle combination of an island geography and East—Lebanon, Turkey, and Syria—who small population induced myths about were formally given the status of “honAustralians’ distinctiveness and worries orary whites.” By the time the White Ausabout invasion from more populous tralia policy was fully abandoned and neighbors. For generations, Australia replaced in the 1970s by an official muljealously guarded its borders to protect a ticultural policy that emphasized the fragile national identity and the self- rights of immigrants to retain their ethimage as a white workingman’s utopia nic and national backgrounds while free from Old World class conflict and embracing Australian citizenship and other European cancers.2 At least a dozen accepting obligations to key Australian nationalities were represented in the First institutions, positive social changes were Fleet in 1788, but New South Wales was a already underfoot.

For the past few decades, significant British society based on a radically egalitarian ethos where all non-Britons were numbers of Australia’s immigrants have folded into the core identity. For most of come from non-English-speaking counAustralia’s history, assimilation was the tries, and with their arrival the Australian official government policy guiding the mindset has shifted from the navel gazing of earlier generations—when Australians integration of immigrants.

Immediately following federation and felt isolated geographically and politicalthe establishment of the Australian Con- ly—toward a more outward-looking, stitution in 1901, Parliament passed the regionally interested perspective. The Immigration Restriction Act that estab- spectacular political rise and fall of lished the so-called White Australia Poli- Pauline Hanson, the leader of the concy as a solution for anxiety about the eco- troversial anti-immigration One Nation nomic and cultural effects of Chinese party, only reconfirms the increasingly immigrants. Immigration restrictions liberal nature of Australia’s nondiscrimduring the period were a response to the inatory immigration policies.4 When she examine the roots of Australia’s multicultural policies and attitudes. Only then can the domestic and international significance of the recent uprisings be pinpointed. On the whole—and in the face of counterproductive policies that exacerbate ethnic tensions—today’s Australia is a vibrant, tolerant, multicultural, and welcoming place.

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BROWN

entered Parliament in 1996 with an agenda to staunch the flow of “too many Asians,” Hanson did so as a populist outsider, shunned from the mainstream parties. This does not mean that Hanson’s views lacked all public resonance, but rather that her One Nation party and platform failed to generate enough passion and practical prescriptions to survive more than a couple of years.

For the most part, Australia’s various migrant communities have shown a determination both to preserve their cul-

Culture & Society

popular destination for working-class Sydneysiders from the city’s western fringe. More and more, those coming to the beach by train and car are of nonEnglish-speaking heritage. Among these various groups have been a few, often of Lebanese Muslim background, who regularly harass young women, pick fights with neighborhood boys, and unnerve local shopkeepers. The immediate trigger for mob violence was the beating of two volunteer lifesavers by young Lebanese-Australian men the previous

Overseas-born persons make up nearly a

quarter of Australia’s population—a staggering number compared with even other high immigration-receiving states. tures and to integrate into the existing political and social framework of their adopted country. The “fair dinkim”—or real—Australians today are as likely to claim Italian, Chinese, or Samoan heritage as they are a Welsh, Irish, or Scottish one. So much so that Australia has become a prime example of a highly successful multiethnic nation and state.5

week. When news of the assault spread through Sydney, locals hastily organized a rally to take back the beach.

Drunk and belligerent, the 11 December rioters draped themselves in Australian flags, scrawled jingoistic slogans on their chests, and slurred their way through the national anthem and “Waltzing Matilda.” White supremacist agitators infiltrated the crowd and encouraged We’ll Fight Them on the Beach- violence. Talk spilled over into action as es. But all is not rosy, and some Aus- large numbers of youths searched for, tralians still struggle to accept newcom- found, and then attacked wholly innoers. Recent events suggest that Australia’s cent men and women of “Middle Eastern vaunted multiculturalism is under strain. appearance” on the beach, in the streets, On 11 December 2005, at the height of and at the local train station. In one of the hottest summers on record, a response, hundreds of young Lebaneseriotous mob of thousands gathered in Australian men assembled outside a Cronulla—one of Sydney’s popular surf major mosque in the city’s west before beach suburbs—to protest about inter- driving to the beach to settle the score.

Sydney’s southwestern neighborhoods loping youth gangs.6 Cronulla is the only Sydney beach eas- witnessed an orgy of tit-for-tat violence, ily accessible by train, which makes it a including stabbings and arson attacks on Summer/Fall 2006 [ 7 7 ]

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churches during the next several days.

Sydney is Not Paris. Sydney is a key

testing ground for Australia’s capacity to integrate diverse migrant streams. It is Australia’s richest city, the main gateway for foreign capital into the country, the favored location for leading national and multinational corporations, and the preferred destination of more immigrants than any other Australian city.

Comparison of the Sydney riots with the October 2005 unrest in Paris is natural given their timing, although the association is misleading. Disaffected, minority Muslim youth started the mass rioting and violence in France as a protest directed primarily at the French state. The French model of migrant integration has thus far failed to address the demands of an alienated and idle underclass imbued with grievances about French colonialism in North Africa and the Middle East and aggravated by current events in Palestine and Iraq.

Australia also faces dilemmas with its Muslim population, but they are not the crises assumed by most spectators. That Muslim youth were party to the 11 December violence gives new life to anxiety about the potential threat to Australia posed by Islamism, but the direct connection between Sydney’s Lebanese gangs and transnational terrorism is specious. The unrest in Sydney’s suburbs took place without significant participation from any religious actors—there were no bearded agents provocateurs behind the revenge attacks.7 A more useful comparison is the July 2001 unrest in northern England that has now been overshadowed by the terrorist attacks in the United States later that year. The Cronulla riot and subsequent violence sounds like an echo of the battles between Anglo [ 7 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

youth and South Asian Muslim youth in the streets of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley. In both cases, young men from geographically and culturally divided communities interacted as they often do when there is little or no dialogue between them. In each case, outsiders from white supremacist and far-right organizations played key roles in fomenting the initial outbursts of violence. The riots in England and Australia also followed months or years of ethnic tension and widely reported crimes—both minority on majority and majority on minority.8 In knee-jerk fashion, many commentators in Australia and abroad initially attributed the cause of the violence in Cronulla and elsewhere to racial or ethnic discrimination—the customary variable of choice for significant segments of Australia’s intellectual class—against the Arab and Muslim communities. The ugly scenes of rioters attacking defenseless victims, so the story goes, merely pulled back the sheet of Australia’s racist undercurrent and persistent xenophobia.

Other pundits have blamed the Lebanese Muslim community, which, they claim, has made little or no attempt to integrate into Australian society.9 Both positions are partially accurate, but the conditions that led to the riots are so complex that assigning blame to only one side in the clash is pointless.

On the one hand, the segregation of Australia’s nearly three hundred thousand Muslims and more than two hundred thousand Arabic speakers is not nearly as deep rooted as either the South Asian experience in northern England or the North African experience in France.

In fact, segregation in Australia is typically voluntary and determined more by economic variables than by national ori-

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gin or language. Even though Prime Minister John Howard denies that “there is underlying racism in [Australia],” bigoted and xenophobic attitudes exist in measurable portions, as they always have in virtually every country.10 However, a constant cannot explain change. Precisely because they are so durable, the enduring racist or nativist attitudes held by a shrinking percentage of Australians are a poor explanation for the Cronulla riot.

On the other hand, only a minority of a fraction of Muslim youths from Lebanese extraction engage in the sort of thuggish behavior witnessed before and during the rioting. Lebanese Muslims, like other immigrants to Australia, arrive with hope for better economic opportunities; enhanced liberties; and safe, stable environments in which to raise their families.11 Sydney’s Muslim youth are generally not jihadists driven to violence by grand dreams of establishing an Islamic caliphate. There is no doubt, however, that a cultural problem exists that is at once both local and global, as exemplified by various specific cases.12 First, notorious cases of sadistic gang rapes by youths of Arab and Islamic backgrounds who targeted young “Australian”—Anglo-Celtic—women reveal the difficulties of countering juvenile gang crime and educating boys rather than inherent problems in Australia’s Islamic community. Second, youth culture in some sections of the Lebanese Muslim community centers around a manufactured alienation that manifests as a sense of superiority, hostility to other Australians, and a range of resentments and anti-social behavior. This includes opposition to Zionism, fear of racist hostility from mainstream society, anxiety about Westernization and the pressures of materialistic society, and

Culture & Society

underemployment. In fact, Lebanese troublemakers may be more integrated into Australian society than their religious peers or their parents, but because of either a “homeland hangover” or marginalization, they happen to assimilate to a less attractive “hoon culture,” in which young men believe that being an authentic Australian means bullying and using physical force. Third, no doubt the Anglo-Celtic rioters were themselves imbued with suspicions engendered by Islamic terrorism at home and abroad, a sentiment of white racism, and their own boorish “keg culture.”13 Social transaction costs, which are the “petty frictions in the humdrum business of daily life, the efforts and risks of learning and coordinating daily pursuits,” add up quickly; diverse communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel experiences that fail to overlap and promote any meaningful exchange.14 Given the ignorance of two ghettoized and self-segregated communities, it is surprising there is not more fear and hostility when they finally meet, especially when exploited by extremist groups and hardened criminals who are determined to foster divisions and undermine social order and community harmony.

Domestic Implications of Foreign Affairs. It is a perennial chal-

lenge to render domestic ethnic conflicts less virulent, and this is especially difficult when they are infused with international quarrels. Understandably, police and local officials in Australia are hesitant to recognize the significance of foreign or external factors in domestic interethnic conflicts and may prefer to define local incidents of violence between members of different ethic Summer/Fall 2006 [ 7 9 ]

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groups simply as isolated crimes. However, the once-solid line between domestic and foreign polity has substantially blurred in the wake of 9/11, and Cronulla is not only a local law and order problem. Events overseas and foreign policy choices have domestic implications regarding the settlement and integration of immigrants in Australia.

To characterize the Cronulla riots as simply a breakdown of law and order ignores the much larger cultural issues that undergird the problem.

The ongoing clashes within the Muslim world and between the Muslim world and the West have domestic implications for Australia and other societies that have adopted multiculturalism. Although the December 2005 riots were localized— other major Australian cities experienced nothing on the scale of the Sydney riots— regional and global frames are also useful for explaining the conflict. The Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005; the Australian embassy bombing in Jakarta in 2004; and Australia’s effort to deter illegal immigrants hailing from

needed only “a spark to ignite a multicultural debate.”16

Multiculturalism: Not Flawed, but Ineffective. Australia’s brand of

multiculturalism, like in other Western societies, requires that there is a shared sense of belonging based on common goals and core social values; respect for racial, ethnic, and religious differences; and acceptance of the reciprocal rights and obligations of community members working together for the common good.

None of this can be imposed by fiat—it is something that communities must achieve for themselves. But government can provide a lead in articulating a vision and taking the practical steps necessary to empower and support communities to turn the vision into reality.

State-driven multicultural policies were introduced in 1974 as part of a new Australian nationalism and an effort to minimize ethnic conflicts inherent in large-scale immigration. Commonwealth funding has provided support for a range of activities, such as the teaching

Sydney’s southwestern neighborhood witnessed an orgy of tit-for-tat violence, including bashings, stabbings, and arson attacks on churches.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran provide a valuable context for explaining the rising antagonism against Muslims.15 The best known chronicler of Australian multiculturalism, Mark Lopez, suggested before the riots that international events, coupled with growing anxiety regarding an increasingly visible Muslim minority in Sydney, were at a tipping point and [ 8 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of English and homeland languages, promotion and preservation of migrant and ethnic communities’ cultural forms, and the formation of pan-ethnic councils to both gather input from diverse sources and to better manage the integration of new migrants.

Whether Australia’s official multicultural policy provides a foundation upon

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which to resolve domestic ethnic conflicts is hotly debated. Andrew Theophanous, a former Australian member of parliament, suggests that multiculturalism serves as an instrument to reduce or overcome inter-ethnic conflicts that originate domestically or overseas through the “enormous power that its central doctrines of tolerance, respect for human rights and commitment to social justice have been able to exercise.”17 Critics of the policy warn about cultural relativism, weakened Australian identities, and the divisiveness that may accompany social pluralism.18 If a policy of multiculturalism is to add to national unity and social cohesion, the right to express and share cultural identity must accompany responsibilities to do so within the rule of law. This also implies a primary commitment to Australian national interests and fellow Australians. While Australian multicultural policy codifies liberal principles and in theory rejects any elements of cultures that contain notions of racial or ethnic superiority, the reality is that some ethnic and migrant communities will, and do, use the political space generated by the policy to defend ethnocentric distinctions and historical enmities, and to perpetuate these attitudes to their posterity.

In fact, multiculturalism puts the Australian state in the unsustainable position of being the chief target of ethnic discon-

Culture & Society

tent, the mediator of the non-negotiable, and the referee who is often seen by each team as playing for the other side.19 Instead of depoliticizing ethnic issues, official multiculturalism tends to heighten the politicization of ethnic contention. The very real problem, as evidenced in Cronulla, is that ethnic and cultural cleavages are potentially so explosive that the state sometimes loses the capacity and credibility necessary to control the conflicts.

The unity-through-diversity model of Australian multiculturalism provides useful political space for the airing of grievances among elites. But the violence witnessed during the Cronulla riots and their aftermath is a new facet of multiethnic Australia that can and should be anticipated and consciously managed.

The high ideals of tolerance and diversity under the umbrella of shared political and social norms remain unlearned by significant numbers of Australian youth.20 In this respect, Cronulla was a failure of leadership and an example of policy missing the very target audience most in need of it. Australia has proved to be a fast learner in the past. If it is to remain an immigration success story, Australia’s multicultural policy must mature quickly by exercising strong leadership and implementing forward-thinking immigration and settlement policies that take both local and global factors into account.

NOTES

1 Charles Price, “Post-War Immigration: 194798,” Journal of the Australian Population Association, 15, no. 2 (1998): 115-129.

2 Louis Hartz provides a provocative and still current review of Australia’s radical British culture and utopian ideals in his 1969 classic, The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964).

3 For completely different explanations of the reasoning behind, and continuing implications of,

the White Australia policy, see Keith Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2004) and Gwenda Tavin, The Long, Slow Death of White Australia (Melbourne: Scribe, 2005).

4 Christian Joppke, “The Resilience of Nondiscrimintory Immigration Policies: Evidence from the United States and Australia,” Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper No. 205 (2003).

5 J.J. Smolicz, “Nation-states and Globalisation from a Multicultural Perspective,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 4, no. 4 (1998): 1-18.

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6 For more information about the Cronulla riot, including several photo galleries, see the Web pages for the Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian from 1126 December 2005 at www.smh.com.au and www.theaustralian.com.au, respectively.

7 Note, too, that Australian Muslims reacted calmly after two Australian newspapers reprinted the Danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammed that ignited violent protests elsewhere.

8 Two reports released by the British Home Office thoroughly detail the causes behind the British riots in 2001. For more information see John Denham, Building Cohesive Communities: A Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London: Community Cohesion Unit, Home Office, United Kingdom, 2002) and Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team (London: Community Cohesion Unit, Home Office, United Kingdom, 2003).

9 For examples of both extremes, see Keith Windshuttle, “Why Australia is not a racist country,” Quadrant, 50, no. 3 (2006): 28-35.

10 The full text of Howard’s speech a day after the Cronulla riot is available on the prime minister’s Web site, http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/ Interview1723.html (Date accessed: 21 April 2006).

11 Lebanese Muslims suffer social disadvantages relative to other recent migrant groups in Australia.

Lebanese Muslim men, in particular, have disproportionately low levels of education and high levels of unemployment. Middle Eastern migrants also manifest greater insularity than other migrant communities as evidenced by extremely low out-marriage rates. See Bob Birrell and Ernest Healy, “OutMarriage and the Survival of Ethnic Communities in Australia,” People and Place 8, no. 3 (2000): 37-46.

12 Keith Windshuttle, “It’s Not a Race War, It’s a Clash of Cultures,” The Australian, 16 December

[ 8 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

2005.

13 Cronulla beach is the setting for the book and film Puberty Blues, a coming of age story that chronicles the darker side of surfie culture and its victimization of young women. See Kathy Lette and Gabrielle Carey, Puberty Blues (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1979).

14 Wolfgang Kasper, “Immigration, Institutions, Harmony and Prosperity,” Quadrant 45, no. 11 (2001): 6-10.

15 For example, the flashpoint for the 11 December disturbance was near the memorial on the beach to the local victims of the Bali bombing in 2002 which killed nearly 100 Australian tourists.

Seven of the Australians dead were girls from Cronulla.

16 Mark Lopez, “Reflections on the State of Australian Multiculturalism and the Emerging Multicultural Debate in Australia 2005,” People and Place, 13, no. 3 (2005): 33-40.

17 Andrew Theophanous, 1995. Understanding Multiculturalism and Australian Identity (Melbourne: Elikia, 1995): 209.

18 Australia’s multicultural model compares well with the various policy concoctions Western Europe has created to manage the absorption of guest workers and immigrants. Even the vaunted Dutch policy of broad multicultural accommodation and egalitarian welfare dispensations is failing miserably. See, for example, Jane Kramer, “The Dutch Model: Multiculturalism and Muslim Integration,” The New Yorker, 3 April 2006: 60-67.

19 David Brown, “The Politics of Reconstructing National Identity: a Corporatist Approach,” Australian Journal of Political Science 32 (July 1997): 255-270.

20 See, for example, Ien Ang et al., Connecting Diversity: Paradoxes of Multicultural Australia (Sydney: Special Broadcasting Service Corporation, 2006).

Culture & Society

The Changing Tide of Aid Provision Anisya Thomas The South Asian tsunami, which is estimated to have killed 230,000 and left 1.7 million people homeless, elicited an outpouring of sympathy and generosity from governments, corporations, and individuals around the world. The official figures estimate that $12 billion was raised, but experts agree that this is a conservative estimate and does not take into account the resources raised by small NGOs and other community and grass-roots groups. One year after the tsunami, traditional donors (usually governments of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan) as well as first-time donors began to ask about the effectiveness of the relief efforts and the impact of the money spent.

In anticipating and responding to the calls for accountability, a spate of aid evaluation reports have been released detailing the progress made. In addition to the standard accountability reviews by individual aid agencies such as Oxfam and CARE, a variety of multi-agency and independent reports are also emerging.1 However, the focus of these reports is accountability to donors. Although most of them speak to the critical importance of accountability to beneficiaries, most admit to have fallen short in this regard. As the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) has observed, “The lack of accountability to aid recipients is an acknowledged weakness of the internation-

Anisya Thomas is the managing director of the Fritz Institute, a nonprofit organization that addresses challenges and opportunities in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

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al relief system.”2 Nonetheless, these reports also freely acknowledge that “Wherever agencies have listened to the communities’ perspectives of their needs and allowed communities to shape the response, there has been a good impact.”3 For example, the village committees that were formed in Ampara, Sri Lanka, to advise Oxfam on water and sanitation needs ensured that the subsequent intervention designed by Oxfam achieved the intended outcomes of providing the community with adequate and appropriate water and sanitation systems.

Conversely, when agency perceptions of what was needed were used to guide the type of aid provided, or when speed and efficiency were the determining criteria— at the cost of community participation— the intervention was often a failure.

Yet, few aid agencies or donors have initiated or released systematic evaluations of beneficiary perceptions of the effectiveness or impact of aid. The CARE/Oxfam/World Vision report suggests that the current approaches and methodologies being used in the field are inadequate or too hard to implement. They recommend the exploration of alternatives to the traditional log frames, such as results-based management frameworks. Two other issues impeding the assessment of beneficiary perceptions include the practice of each agency creating its own reporting, which makes the study of beneficiaries prohibitively expensive, and the potential for damaging information to reach donors or the public.

The inability to engage beneficiaries in systematic evaluations results in a gap in the knowledge systems of organizations whose day-to-day business is providing aid. Without incorporating the perspectives of aid recipients, the lessons [ 8 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

learned are partial, and the true impact of the assistance cannot be assessed. To begin to address this gap, the Fritz Institute undertook a large-scale survey of the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance after the tsunami, across countries, across aid agencies, and across time.4 In this paper we briefly describe the study of beneficiaries and the methodology by which it was conducted and provide an indication of the results obtained. We then discuss the importance of engaging beneficiaries and provide recommendations for how the voice of the affected can be incorporated into improving disaster preparedness, disaster relief and rehabilitation, and evaluations of relief effectiveness.

Listening to People Affected by Disaster: The Fritz Institute Study. We conducted our study of fam-

ilies affected by the tsunami by gaining a better understanding of current relief and rehabilitation efforts in order to inform future efforts. The study was conducted in two phases over the course of 2005. The first phase, which was undertaken 60 days after the tsunami, surveyed 802 affected families from 100 villages in India and 604 families from 97 villages in Sri Lanka. Those surveyed were asked about their satisfaction with the content of aid that they received and the process by which it was distributed in the first forty-eight hours and sixty days after the disaster. The second phase, initiated 9 months after the tsunami, included 1,000 families from 93 villages in India, 800 families from 98 villages in Sri Lanka, and 500 families from the 5 most affected areas in Northern Sumatra, Indonesia. The focus of this phase was to assess the progress of the rehabilitation efforts. All the interviews were

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conducted in the local language by teams of trained interviewers.

The results of the first study indicated that families in both India and Sri Lanka reported relatively robust supplies of commodity aid (food, water, and clothing) but were less satisfied with services that they felt were critical, including searching for the missing and the dead and clearing debris. Many felt the

Culture & Society

in India and 78 percent in Sri Lanka.

Further, the return to normalcy was severely impaired by the loss of livelihoods. Eighty-three percent of the affected families in Indonesia had a decrease of over 50 percent of their family income, as did 59 percent of the respondents in Sri Lanka and 47 percent in India. When beneficiaries were asked to rate the quality of assistance provided by their own gov-

People complained about the mountains of used clothes that were sent, commenting that the clothing was in poor condition and culturally and climatically inappropriate. absence of such services led to further loss of life: “We feel at least some would have survived, if they were searched for in the first day itself.� At the 60-day point, despite the massive relief efforts, only 60 percent of the families reported receiving timely and adequate aid. Further, the recipients remarked on the inappropriate nature of some relief, particularly clothing. Both in India and Sri Lanka, people complained that the mountains of used clothes that were sent were in poor condition and culturally and climatically inappropriate. Overall, the relief efforts in India were rated much more highly, primarily because of the rapid and coherent response from the central and state governments, particularly the Tamilnadu government.

Nine months after the tsunami, the study showed that the two biggest outstanding issues were the lack of permanent shelter and devastating loss of family income. Survey results showed that in Indonesia almost 100 percent of the affected families were still living in camps or temporary shelters, as were 92 percent

ernments, local NGOs, and international NGOs, there were wide variations in their responses across the three countries.

Among aid agencies providing livelihood restoration, no provider in any country rated above average, although international NGOs were rated highest in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, while the Indian government was ranked highest in India. For shelter provision, once again international NGOs received the highest satisfaction rankings in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, while the scores of the government, international NGOs, and local NGOs were roughly equal in India.

Lessons for Governments: Preparedness. In retrospect, there is a consensus among governments and aid agencies that the tsunami relief effort in all countries achieved success on many levels. Within a short period of time, most of the affected were provided with food and shelter, and major health epidemics were averted. Yet, it is clear that several lessons can be learned from the massive relief effort and that continued attention

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must be focused on the effectiveness of the ongoing rehabilitation programs.

Our study found that the satisfaction with relief services in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami was highest in India, where the government played a significant role in the relief effort. In addition to being visible in most communities, the government coordinated the relief efforts, which provided coherence and coverage in a way that was not apparent in Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

One of the affected in Sri Lanka interviewed for our study, lamented, “Where was the government when all this happened?� In other words, the more prepared and proactive the government of the affected is, the more likely the affected will perceive the aid to be effective.

The lesson learned is that countries and regions vulnerable to natural disasters must have clearly defined and wellunderstood protocols for the authorities in the case of a disaster. When devising disaster preparations, governments need to consider the following questions: Who is responsible for the first response? How do the authorities of the city, state, and national governments interact? How should communities be prepared? Examples for South Asia detailed below highlight possible answers to these challenges.

Our survey also indicated that the aid provided to people affected by the tsunami in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India during the first forty-eight hours was overwhelmingly local, from private individuals and the local community. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, it is the local community, survivors, and neighbors that provide the initial life-saving assistance. Further, the strong social ties of families and communities also endow these first responders with knowledge of [ 8 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

where the most vulnerable are. Therefore, local preparedness is the key to effective disaster mitigation and response.

Bangladesh provides an ideal case study in preparedness. On 12 November 1970, a major cyclone hit the coastal belt of Bangladesh. An estimated five hundred thousand people were killed. Following this tragedy, the government of Bangladesh, with support from a variety of international donors, initiated a cyclone preparedness program. Central to the program were community-based disaster preparedness education, alert systems, and evacuation responsibilities. In April 1991 another major cyclone killed 138,000 people, even though the coastal population had doubled. By 1994 a cyclone of similar magnitude only claimed 127 people, and by 1997 a slightly smaller cyclone resulted in 111 deaths.

Despite compelling statistics such as in the case of Bangladesh, funds for disaster preparedness are difficult to obtain. Traditionally, development funds and humanitarian assistance funds come from separate budgets. Development funds are allocated to priorities such as education and disease prevention. Funds for humanitarian assistance tend to be event based and are provided in response to a disaster. In such instances the donors want their money to go directly to disaster relief rather than disaster preparedness.

As a consequence, disaster preparedness is often overlooked.

The lesson learned is that donor governments must reconsider their current patterns of funding humanitarian relief but be cautious not to invest inadequately in disaster preparedness. Given the important and life-saving role of the community, it is imperative that disasterprone areas implement preparedness plans that provide the community with

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tools and mechanisms that can be activated in the event of a disaster. Early warning systems, thresholds for evacuation, evacuation of schools and hospitals, clearly identified shelters with qualified personnel maintaining order and security, communication with first responders, and plans for addressing the injured and dead are some examples of preparedness plans that can be put in place prior to a disaster.

Lessons for Aid Providers: Incorporating the Intangibles.

Although there is no argument among aid agencies about the importance of incorporating the voice of the beneficiary, there is a practice of prioritizing speed and efficiency of response, which often results in significant decisions being made without the affected being heard. Although the scale and scope of the tsunami is not typical, the range of responses and interventions in the relief and rehabilitation efforts allow for reflections on current practice.

Culture & Society

ments, aid providers should attempt to inform the affected about efforts to find the missing, identify the dead, and provide dignified funerals. It appears that early interventions here can counteract some of the damaging stress and trauma that inhibits post-disaster recovery.

Second, 42 percent of the affected in Indonesia, 33 percent in Sri Lanka, and 20 percent in India believe that their lives will never return to normal. Yet many believed that counseling and other mental health services would facilitate their recovery. “With proper help,” remarked one respondent, “maybe the next generation will live without fear.”

Despite this, 71 percent of our respondents in Indonesia, 43 percent in Sri Lanka, and 23 percent in India said they were not able to obtain these services.

One lesson for the future is to explore ways in which the psychological care can be incorporated into relief plans. At a recent conference on lessons learned from the tsunami, Mr. P.C. Matthew,

The lesson learned is that countries and

regions vulnerable to natural disasters must have clearly defined and well-understood protocols for the authorities.

Our survey indicated that many of the affected were in various stages of shock after the wave of destruction tore through their homes. While they appreciated the food and shelter that they received, their immediate concern was for the missing and the dead. The questions that were foremost in their mind were, “Have they died? Were they found? Did they receive a rightful burial?” In light of these com-

president of the Madras School of Social Work, said, “The most urgent need felt by the children was a place to learn and play together; the most urgent need by the women was a place to cook the family meals; and the most urgent need by the men was the usual cash from the day’s fish sale to buy liquor.” In his view, the finding was a yearning to restore social structures that provided a sense of comSummer/Fall 2006 [ 8 7 ]

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munity. Thus, the international aid community should explore ways in which agencies can work together with local grass-roots organizations and the government to create a common roadmap for restoring the formal and informal social structures.

Third, aid providers should recognize that beneficiaries of their services notice the lack of coordination in logistics and distribution management upstream.

When aid came pouring into the affected areas, many providers were not able to mobilize transport to take supplies into the interior. As a result, supplies piled up, conveying the impression that there was excess supply and therefore dumping. As various agencies distributed distinct types of shelter and nonfood supplies, it raised issues of equity and led to beneficiaries “shopping” among the aid providers. The lesson learned here is that aid providers should work towards deriving common standards and protocols that will allow collaboration and uniformity in aid distribution. Back-room activities such as logistics and transportation need to be professionalized and, where possible, collaborations with the private sector should be activated to access local networks of warehouses, transport providers, and logistics services.

By incorporating the perspectives of the beneficiaries in the assessment, rescue, relief, and rehabilitation phases, aid agencies can provide more precisely targeted and effective aid. Various forms of beneficiary participation, including village committees, women’s groups, focus groups, discussions with community leaders, and local NGOs, were explored and experimented with by different agencies after the tsunami. Which strategies worked and under what circumstances? [ 8 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

How can disaster preparedness plans and schemas specifically incorporate the perspective of the community? These are issues that aid agencies must address in developing strategies for the future.

Lessons for the Relief Sector: Accountability to the Affected.

The Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Appraisal (ARRA), funded by The Asia Foundation and the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Indonesia, concluded that the local “community itself is the main monitor for the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh.

Therefore, their comments and complaints must be used to evaluate the performance of the service provider organization.”5 Without the perspective of the beneficiary, donors must rely on the anecdotal evidence provided by the aid agencies and aid workers. At best, such evaluations are incomplete; at worst, they might be biased and inaccurate. Additionally, without the beneficiary perspective, it is almost impossible for the sector to establish any standards or for donors to evaluate the overall performance of the relief effort across organizations. With each organization using its own tools, methods, and protocols to compile donor reports, comparability across organizations is lost. We recommend that the donor community seriously consider the use of objective, third-party organizations, unaffiliated with any aid providers, to collect data about aid effectiveness. By creating common tools and collection protocols, different local and international organizations can be used to collect the data that can then be centrally compiled and aggregated to derive comparable standards of effectiveness.

This will target the growth and funding of more effective agencies and the eventual

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demise of less effective ones.

Without a systematic evaluation of beneficiary perspectives over time and across humanitarian contexts, it is almost impossible to create an evidence base of what works and what does not, so that humanitarian relief organizations can continue to improve and evolve their approaches and methods. In referring to the importance of an evidence base for managing corporations, Stanford Business School Professors Jeffrey Pfeffer and

Culture & Society

Robert Sutton suggest, “We believe that managers can practice their craft more effectively if they are routinely guided by the best logic and evidence–and if they relentlessly seek new knowledge and insight, from inside and outside their companies, to keep updating their assumptions, knowledge and skills…”6 The same logic holds true for relief organizations in a context where the number of disasters and of people affected by disasters continues to grow.

NOTES

1 Tony Vaux et. al, Independent Evaluation of the DEC Tsunami Crisis Response (December 2005); John Cosgrave, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Initial Findings (December 2005): 13; Abhijit Bhattacharjee et. al, MultiAgency Evaluation of Tsunami Response: India and Sri Lanka (July 2005): 5.

2 John Cosgrave, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Initial Findings (December 2005): 13.

3 Abhijit Bhattacharjee et. al, Multi-Agency Evaluation of Tsunami Response: India and Sri Lanka (July 2005): 5.

4 Anisya Thomas and Vimala Ramalingam, “Lessons from the Tsunami: Top Line Findings,” http://www.fritzinstitute.org/PDFs/Programs/Find-

ings_Sept2605.pdf (San Francisco: Fritz Institute, 2005); Anisya Thomas and Vimala Ramalingam, “Recipients Perceptions of Aid Effectiveness: Rescue, Relief and Rehabilitation in Tsunami Affected Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka,” http://www.fritzinstitute. org/PDFs/findings/NineMonthReport.pdf (San Francisco: Fritz Institute, 2005).

5 The Asia Foundation and the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Indonesia, The Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Appraisal (ARRA): Complete Findings Report (2005): 2.

6 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, “EvidenceBased Management,” Harvard Business Review 84, no. 1.

(2006): 64.

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Law&Ethics Indicting Zarqawi for Genocide Raj Purohit and Golzar Kheiltash The latest attacks against Shiite civilians in Iraq under the direction of Al Qaeda point person Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi, coupled with a statement of incitement made by Zarqawi himself on 14 September 2005, should act as a warning to the international community that a campaign of genocide is potentially underway in Iraq. Zarqawi, often called the second in command for Al Qaeda after Osama Bin Laden, has become a key player in the religious power struggle in Iraq. A Jordanian, Zarqawi has utilized the war in Iraq as a sectarian battleground, deliberately stoking the already intense fire between the politically stronger Shiite majority and their embittered Sunni counterparts. In fact, for a number of months it has been apparent that Zarqawi has been coordinating attacks on Shiite groups in an effort to spark a broader sectarian conflict that could trigger a U.S. military pullout.

The leading international legal document that defines and prohibits the crime of genocide is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter, “Convention”), adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948. The Convention defines genocide as acts of violence “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Importantly, the Convention makes it unlawful not only to commit such acts, but to incite others to

Raj Purohit is a senior fellow at Citizens for Global Solutions.

Golzar Kheiltash serves as legal analyst for the International Law and Justice Program at Citizens for Global Solutions.

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INDICTING ZARQAWI FOR GENOCIDE

do so as well. In law, incitement is generally defined as “the act of persuading another person to commit a crime.”1 This article argues that acts of violence targeting Iraqi Shiites for which Zarqawi and his followers have claimed responsibility, in conjunction with statements made by Zarqawi himself, constitute genocide, the incitement thereof, and conspiracy to commit the same.

Furthermore, this article argues that prosecuting Zarqawi for genocide either instead of, or in addition to, terrorism offenses would be both practically feasible and legally, politically, and morally desirable. In setting forth this argument, the next section will describe the factual basis for such an indictment, highlighting those acts and statements from the past year that constitute evidence of genocide, incitement thereof, and conspiracy. The succeeding section will in turn discuss in greater detail the law of genocide, elaborating, among other things, the elements of the offense itself, the specific conduct prohibited by the Convention, and the legal concepts of incitement and conspiracy. The fourth section will then argue that indicting Zarqawi for genocide and related offenses offers certain advantages— legal, political, and moral—in comparison to indicting him for terrorism. To conclude, the last section will offer some recommendations and argue that the International Criminal Court would be one, and perhaps the most, appropriate forum for prosecuting such a case.

made clear that his Sunni organization, Al Qaeda of Mesopotamia, is behind at least some of the attacks on Shiites. Specifically, on 14 September 2005, a statement attributed to Zarqawi and broadcast on AlJazeera declared “all-out war” against Shiites, calling on Sunnis to “wake up” and fight the Shiite “infidels:”2

The Factual Basis for a Genocide Indictment.

[They are] the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom. We [Sunnis] here are entering a battle on two levels. One, evident and open, is with an attacking

Zarqawi’s Statements: Incitement to Commit Genocide. While it has been difficult at best

to identify the insurgents behind the attacks in Iraq, Zarqawi’s comments have [ 9 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of Two Rivers [Iraq] is declaring all-out war on the Rafidha [a pejorative term for Shiites] wherever they are in Iraq...You [Shiites] were the first to show hostility, so be warned: for by God, we will not have mercy on you…3 In the same speech, Zarqawi addressed Sunni men, saying: Your chaste and pure Sunni sisters…have been violated and their chastity has been slaughtered and their wombs have been filled with the bastards of the Crusaders [Coalition forces] and their malicious [Shiite] brothers. Where is your religion?

Zarqawi’s 14 September comments are not the first instance of his use of fiery rhetoric and inciting language against Shiites. In a letter dated 11 February 2005, for example, Zarqawi expounded at length on Shiites and their role in Iraq:

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enemy and patent infidelity.

[Another is] a difficult, fierce battle with a crafty enemy who wears the garb of a friend, manifests agreement, and calls for comradeship, but harbors ill will.… These [Shiites have been] a sect of treachery and

Law & Ethics

other Sunni insurgents have taken responsibility for over twenty-four attacks on Shiite mosques, markets, school teachers, low-wage workers, and other civilians in countless Shiite-dominated cities including Kadhimiya, Najaf, Samarra, Howaidar, Baquba, and

Acts of violence targeting Iraqi Shiites for which Zarqawi and his followers have claimed responsibility constitute genocide and the incitement thereof. betrayal throughout history and throughout the ages. It is a creed that aims to combat the Sunnis. And with all this, let the people of Islam know that we are not the first to have begun going down this road [of violence]. We are not the first to have brandished the sword.4

Baghdad.7 Indeed, a consistent wave of attacks against Shiite targets and civilians has taken place for the past 7 months, leaving the number of Shiites killed at roughly 1200 and over 1600 injured since the airing of Zarqawi’s statements.8 And while the escalation in civilian casualties is in itself deeply disturbing, it is the rationale put forward by Zarqawi that These statements invoke graphic is most relevant for international images and clearly call for the targeting of humanitarian law. The attacks, together Shiites by Zarqawi, and by extension, Al with Zarqawi’s claims of responsibility Qaeda of Mesopotamia. and call for a war of destruction against Shiites, raise the inference that the conAftermath of Zarqawi’s Statements: Attacks duct and state of mind elements of the on Shiites. Shortly after Zarqawi’s com- genocide offense are manifest. Such eviments were broadcast on the Internet on dence suggests that Zarqawi may be guilty 14 September, the number of Shiite not only of terrorism, but also of genocasualties of Zarqawi-sponsored attacks cide, incitement of genocide, and consignificantly increased. Indeed, hours spiracy to commit genocide under interafter the broadcast, 10 explosions rocked national humanitarian law.

Baghdad, killing more than 150 civilians, most of whom were Shiites.5 It was widely Applying the Facts to the Law. reported that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia—Zarqawi’s organization— The Law of Genocide. Under international claimed full responsibility for the humanitarian law, like under national attacks.6 Since the September assault in criminal law systems, offenses are comBaghdad, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and prised of various elements. These eleSummer/Fall 2006 [ 9 3 ]

INDICTING ZARQAWI FOR GENOCIDE

ments are generally categorized as elements of (1) conduct; (2) state of mind or “intent”; and (3) depending on the nature of the offense, surrounding circumstances. The international community recognizes the Genocide Convention as the leading source of law defining the crime of genocide. Article 2 of the Convention contains the conduct and state of mind elements of the primary offense of genocide; they are, respectively, “[k]illing members of the group” or “[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” and, regarding state of mind, doing so “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (emphasis added).9 Article 3 of the Convention, in turn, lists the prohibited conduct, including both the primary offense and its related crimes, which are “(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; and (e) Complicity in Genocide” (emphasis added).10

The Concept of Incitement. Historical precedents have largely defined the contours of the legal concept of incitement, which in the absence of direct evidence against Zarqawi for engaging in violent acts, may be most relevant in an indictment against him. The most recent precedent for incitement comes from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): to prove incitement, prosecutors have to show causation, which is defined as “a direct link between reports or speeches and murder.”11 Applied to Zarqawi’s activities in Iraq, a strong case can be made that his comments targeting Shiites on the Internet, followed by attacks against Shiites, amounts to incitement of others to engage in genocide. [ 9 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The use of incitement has been all too frequent in the past century. In 1921, for example, Hitler fiercely called for a calculated extermination against Jews: For us [Germans] there are only two possibilities: either we remain German or we come under the thumb of the Jews. This latter must not occur; even if we are small, we are a force. A well-organized group can conquer a strong enemy [emphasis added]. If you stick close together and keep bringing in new people, we will be victorious over the Jews.12 In the early seventies, a dictator soon to be known as Pol Pot used the same inciteful language to wage war against millions of Cambodians: “The enemy must be utterly crushed. What is infected must be cut out.”13 And in 1991 then Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used incitement to provoke a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Muslim Bosnians.

Incitement often entails the use of pejorative terms to describe the “enemy” and incite followers to commit genocide.

The most blatant example of the use of degrading terms as a means to incite genocide came in Rwanda in March 1994, where Hutu “hate radio” blared “You [Tutsi] cockroaches must know you are made of flesh. We won’t let you kill. We will kill you.”14 Three weeks later, a campaign of genocide ensued, lasting for 100 days and killing over 800,000 Tutsis.

Much like the Hutu hate radio, Zarqawi’s use of the highly pejorative Arabic term “Rafidha” to describe Shiites in his 14 September statement can accurately be characterized as an act of incitement. Rafidha means “rejecter,” or apostate.15 This term is particularly damning as apostasy is one of the most

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sacrilegious acts in Islam and is widely punished by death. Thus, by using this term, Zarqawi is in essence calling for the death of Iraqi Shiites who, by virtue of not being Sunni, are deemed apostates.

Greg Stanton, former State Department official and professor of Human Rights at Mary Washington College, has developed a useful framework for analyzing genocide and incitement. Stanton has formulated “eight stages of genocide” in an attempt to capture the acts and events leading up to and committed during and after a particular

Law & Ethics

In addition to his use of pejorative language, the number and nature of attacks against Shiites in Iraq also serves as a strong indication that Zarqawi’s inciting statements have likely resulted in the commission of genocide.

The Concept of Conspiracy. Separate but

related to the crime of incitement to commit genocide is conspiracy to commit the same under Article 3 of the Genocide Convention. While the Convention does not expound on the elements of conspiracy, the crime of

While the escalation in civilian casualties

is in itself deeply disturbing, it is the rationale put forward by Zarqawi that raises the most significant long-term concerns. group is targeted for extermination.16 According to Stanton, the third stage of genocide is “dehumanization.” Stanton explains that in this stage, One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group.17 Applying Stanton’s stages to Zarqawi’s statements on 14 September, it is clear that Zarqawi’s usage of the term Rafidha to describe Shiites amounts to dehumanization, and thereby arguably demonstrates genocidal intent.

conspiracy is generally defined as “an agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act coupled with an intent to achieve the agreement’s objective, action or conduct that furthers the agreement.”18 It is critical to note that conspiracy is a separate offense from the unlawful act that is the object of the conspiracy. Thus even if the unlawful act is ultimately not committed, the two or more persons involved can still be charged for conspiring to commit the act.19 Furthermore, while conspiracy and incitement share some elements such as the intent requirement, the two are separate and distinguishable offenses: conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons while incitement does not. In light of this definition of conspiracy, a strong argument can be made that Zarqawi can be Summer/Fall 2006 [ 9 5 ]

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charged with conspiracy to commit Does the Convention Apply to Zarqawi? genocide in addition to incitement to Some might argue that Zarqawi falls outcommit such crime. side the scope of the Convention. Their reasoning—not uncommon—is that Proving Incitement of and Conspiracy to international law is by definition law govCommit Genocide. Applying the standards erning nation-states, and not non-state and elements of the Convention to actors such as Zarqawi, and by extension, Zarqawi’s inflammatory statements, Al Qaeda. Recent developments in interclaims of responsibility, and the acts of national law, however, have made this violence related thereto, one can strong- argument untenable. For example, in ly argue that his 14 September statements October 2005 the International rise to a level where, at a minimum, he Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warshould have to defend charges of “direct rants for five of the senior leaders of the and public incitement to commit geno- Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel cide” and “conspiracy to commit geno- group in northern Uganda that has been cide.” Zarqawi’s declaration of war on committing war crimes and crimes Shiites satisfies both the “intent to against humanity under senior leader destroy” and “religious group” clauses of Joseph Kony for nearly twenty years. The the state of mind element required under issuance of an arrest warrant for Kony Article 2. In addition, taken together, clearly demonstrated that under the

Trying Zarqawi for genocide will send a

clear message to terrorists that their actions cannot evade justice and will be subject to the highest standards of international criminal law. the statements, claims of responsibility, and related acts of violence also arguably meet the threshold definition of incitement of genocide. The proximity in time between his call to war against Shiites and the acts of violence against them and his subsequent claims of responsibility for such acts suggest the requisite “causation” at the heart of the incitement offense. Likewise, the statements and conduct constitute circumstantial evidence of conspiracy to commit genocide, which, again, consists of an agreement between the accused and others to engage in genocide. [ 9 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

principle of individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law, individual members of non-state actor groups can be tried for crimes like genocide under international conventions and by international criminal courts and tribunals. It follows then that a genocide indictment for Zarqawi and other senior leaders of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia is clearly within the scope of the Genocide Convention. Futhermore, Article 4 of the Convention states that “persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitution-

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Law & Ethics

possibility that they risk a charge of “complicity in genocide.”

Third, making a genocide charge in a credible way may shift the thinking of individual members of the critically important Sunni minority. Their unhappiness with the political trajectory of post-Saddam Iraq may have made them reluctant to criticize or oppose The Benefits of a Genocide Zarqawi. However, they may be pushed to Indictment. Some policymakers, rec- confront Zarqawi more openly if they are ognizing the specificity of the genocide forced to face the prospect that a camcharge and the relative difficulty of prov- paign seeking the destruction of the ing it, may counsel that while a genocide Shiites may be starting in their country.

Last, from a moral standpoint, while indictment for an infamous terrorist is morally desirable, its legal and political criminal charges relating to terrorism significance is limited because Zarqawi would condemn Zarqawi’s role in terrorcould already face a plethora of terrorism ist acts against Shiites (and others) as charges if ever captured and brought to deplorable, these charges could not subtrial. Such reasoning, however, overlooks stitute for a criminal indictment of genoimportant differences between the cide. This is because genocide, unlike any other crime, requires the intent to extercrimes of genocide and terrorism.

Most importantly from the legal per- minate an entire group of individuals spective, genocide enjoys an articulated based on immutable characteristics such definition supported by a Convention as race, ethnicity, or religion. ratified by 133 countries, including the United States. In contrast, there is no Recommendations and Concluagreed-upon international definition of sions. terrorism, and the lack of such a definition could prove to be a convenient Recommendations. Regardless of whether a loophole for Zarqawi’s defense team in genocide charge is sought, the Secretary the case of a trial. Prosecuting Zarqawi General of the UN should take decisive for genocide would avoid the interna- action and at minimum authorize Juan tional ambiguity that surrounds the Mendez, the UN Special Advisor on the offense of terrorism.

Prevention of Genocide, to immediately Second, a genocide indictment—in investigate the situation in Iraq, issue a addition to terrorism charges—would public report, and detail specific recomhave a potential deterrent effect. That mendations working in collaboration is, while no evidence is available in the with UN Special Representative for Iraq public sphere, it is possible that Zarqawi Ashraf Jehangir Qazi. is receiving financial resources from It goes without saying that the credibilbenefactors living in third countries ity of a genocide charge is a key aspect of who may sympathize with his ideology or its potential legal, political, and moral cause. These individuals may be given success. Thus a central question pause if they are confronted with the becomes: if captured, where would

ally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals” (emphasis added).20 The Convention, moreover, “foresees a broad individual criminal responsibility by…prohibiting conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.”21

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Zarqawi be charged for genocide? One option would be to set up an ad hoc criminal tribunal–akin to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)–to try Zarqawi and those of his senior Al Qaeda members who have carried out attacks against Shiites in Iraq. This tribunal could be a purely international one such as the ICTY; a hybrid international and national tribunal such as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia and the tribunal in Sierra Leone; or a purely domestic tribunal run by Iraqi judges, lawyers, and international law experts.

Concerns of fairness, security, and witness protection would of course factor into determining the optimal choice of forum to try Zarqawi for genocide.

In light of such considerations, Zarqawi should be tried for genocide and related offenses by the ICC. Established in 2002, the ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed on or after 1 July 2002. One hundred countries, including all of Europe and most of Latin America, are members of the Court.

And unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which have limited mandates, the ICC is the only permanent criminal court capable of trying individuals. Because Zarqawi’s statements were made after 1 July 2002, the ICC would have jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, the Court would have jurisdiction notwithstanding its principle of complementarity. This principle states that the ICC will only investigate and prosecute when national courts are either unable to do so (for example, due to civil war) or are purposely shielding the accused from justice.

In the case of Iraq, a credible argument could be made that the country has yet to set up a truly functional and fair [ 9 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

judicial system to try Zarqawi. The trial of Saddam Hussein supports this conclusion: the resignation of judges, assassination of lawyers, and general mayhem that has plagued the Hussein trial makes the ICC a viable and more legitimate forum for trying Zarqawi. Thus, the ICC could try Zarqawi, so long as Zarqawi is captured in an ICC member country, or the ICC’s jurisdiction is invoked by the UN Security Council, either of which is a distinct possibility. While the Bush administration has shown staunch opposition to the ICC, to the great frustration of its ICC-supporting allies, the fact remains that the strict judicial process, procedure, and impartiality of the ICC make it a strongly qualified body to try Zarqawi for genocide. Indeed, despite its outward opposition, even the Bush administration has tacitly acknowledged the ICC as the most appropriate forum for trying war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In March 2005 the United States abstained from a vote to refer the genocide in Darfur to the ICC, thereby allowing the resolution to pass and granting the ICC jurisdiction over this very important case.

Conclusion. In 1946 the General

Assembly Resolution preceding the Genocide Convention invoked particularly strong language to articulate the singularly heinous and destructive nature of genocide: Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural

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and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law…22 The importance of a genocide indictment for individuals such as Zarqawi cannot be overstated. Aside from a moral standpoint, there is a strong legal and

Law & Ethics

political argument to be made that trying Zarqawi for genocide will not only provide an alternative venue for trying terrorists who engage in genocidal acts, but will also send a clear message to terrorists that their actions cannot evade justice and will, at the very least, be subject to the highest standards of international criminal law.

NOTES

1 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition.

2 “Al-Zarqawi Declares War on Iraq Shia,” Internet, http://www.aljazeera.net (Date accessed: 12 December 2005); “Iraq: A Nation Finds Itself At A Crossroads,” Internet, http://www.rferl.org (Date accessed: 12 December 2005).

3 Ibid.

4 [No Title], Internet, http://www.iraqcoalition. org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html (Date accessed: 12 April 2006).

5 “Scores killed in Baghdad blasts,” Internet, http//:www.gaurdian.co.uk (Date accessed: 12 December 2005); “Multiple attacks kill nearly 150 in Iraqi capital,” Internet, http://www.nytimes.com (Date accessed: 12 December 2005); “Iraq bombings and shootings leave 150 dead,” Internet, www.washingtonpost.com (Date accessed: 17 December 2005).

6 Ibid.

7 This information is gathered from the Guardian, New York Times, and Washington Post between September and November 2005. See, for example, “Iraq Suicide Bomb Blasts Kill 120,” Internet, http://www.news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4583232.stm (Date accessed: 17 December 2005); “Widespread Violence Kills Dozens Across Iraq,” Internet, http://www. nytimes.com/2005/11/20/international/midleeast/20 cnd-iraq.html?ex=1290142800&en=59a3d0a955a09 cac&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (Date accessed: 17 December 2005).

8 These estimates were derived from adding all of the casualties and number of Shiite injuries reported in key news sources from September 2005 through January 2006.

9 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/ html/menu3/b/ p_genoci.htm.

10 Ibid.

11 Internet, http://www.cjr.org/issues/2002/5/ rwanda-temple.asp (Date accessed: 17 December 2005).

12 Hitler’s speech to the SA at Munich on 9 September 1921, available at http://www.hitler.org/ speeches/11-09-21.html.

13 Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (2002), 110.

14 “Trial of Rwandan ‘hate radio’ organizers adjourned,” Internet, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ LAW/09/18/un.rwanda/ (Date accessed: 17 December

2005).

15 “Sunni body slams Zarqawi call for war on Shiites,” Internet, http://www.middle-eastonline. com/english/?id=14555 (Date accessed: 25 March 2006; “Terrorists unite to plot Iraqi civil war,” Internet, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,, 7374-1781036,00.html (Date accessed: 25 March 2006); “Welcome to civil war,”Internet, http://www. atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GI16Ak03.html (Date accessed: March 25, 2006); “Iraq on the slide: is there time to save it?” Internet, http://www. telegraph.co.uk/.../opinion/2005/09/18/do1801.xml&s Sheet=/portal/2005/09/18/ixportal.html (Date accessed: 25 March 2006).

16 Genocide Watch, Internet, http://www.genocidewatch.org/8stages2006.htm (Date accessed: 13 April 2006). The eight stages of genocide are listed below. Classification: All cultures have categories to distinguish people into “us and them” by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality . Symbolization: We give names or other symbols to the classifications; for example, we name people “Jews” or “Gypsies” and apply the symbols to members of groups.

Dehumanization: One group denies the humanity of the other group. Organization: Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility.

Polarization: Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction.

Preparation: Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity.

Extermination: Extermination begins and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called “genocide.”

Denial: The surest indicator of genocide, the perpetrators dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence, and intimidate the witnesses.

They deny that they committed any crimes and often blame what happened on the victims.

17 Ibid.

18 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Mikaela Heikkila, Holding Non-State Actors Directly Responsible for Acts of International Terror Violence–The Role of International Criminal Law and International Criminal Tribunals in the Fight Against Terrorism (Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 2002), 38.

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Politics&Diplomacy Mission Not Accomplished Bathsheba N. Crocker On 7 February 2006, Haitians went to the polls to elect a president for only the fourth time in the country’s two-hundredyear history. Rene Préval, a protégé of former President JeanBertrand Aristide, was declared the winner in an election marked by high voter turnout, allegations of fraud, mass street demonstrations, and several deaths. Préval inherits serious security, economic, and political challenges, which Haiti’s interim government, supported by a UN mission, could not effectively address during its two-year lifespan.

Haiti suffers from rampant insecurity, particularly in the capital’s urban slums, where gangs and criminals are largely immune to the efforts of Haiti’s struggling police force and UN peacekeepers. Over half the population lives in extreme poverty, and government institutions are largely moribund.

The interim government, which lacked credibility among Haiti’s 8 million people, was beset by familiar Haitian governance problems: corruption, ineptitude, and human rights abuses.

The international community has touted elections as the key to a democratic Haiti. Without altering Haiti’s fundamental institutional dynamics, however, elections alone will do little to improve the situation or to ensure that democracy takes root. Elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for positive change.

Bathsheba Crocker is deputy chief of staff to the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery. She previously co-directed the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and she traveled to Haiti in the spring of 2005.

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Haiti’s international friends will have to work with President Préval on three areas of critical importance: security, economic reconstruction, and governance and institutional reform. As other post-conflict situations demonstrate, all three are interlinked. Addressing them

ers must ensure that the 2004 plan for Haiti’s recovery is not an empty promise; and Haiti’s politicians and business leaders must back reforms that will rebuild institutions and tackle economic recovery. Only with sufficient commitment, resources, and buy-in from all players in

The real test will be whether Préval can

sustain the spirit of negotiation and compromise that led to the smooth completion of these elections. effectively will require sustained engagement by the international community on all three fronts, without which Haiti may once again be on the road to failure.

Haiti has a history of ineffective and corrupt governments and frequent but ultimately unsuccessful international interventions.1 Success in the latest intervention depends on a reinvigorated international focus and a real Haitian commitment backed by the United States as a more dedicated lead nation. The United States must actively shepherd Haiti policy from Washington, which wields considerable pressure over Haiti’s political and business elites; on the ground in Port-au-Prince, to ensure that Haiti’s leaders stick to commitments; and in New York, to keep the UN Security Council effectively engaged, ensuring the mission has a mandate that is drawn broadly, is funded adequately, and does not withdraw before the time is right.

The burden cannot rest on the United States’s or the UN’s shoulders alone: all donors must commit to the pledges made at the donors’ conference in 2004 and speed up delivery of assistance; stakehold[ 1 0 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Haiti’s recovery will the country start to address its security, economic, and governance ills. This article will present the recent historical context; analyze recent elections; and enumerate priorities for Haiti in achieving security, enhancing economic reconstruction, and strengthening its institutions.

Recent Historical Context. The most recent chapter of unrest in Haiti began in early 2004, when armed gangs made up largely of former members of Haiti’s now disbanded army (known as “ex-FADH”) staged a violent rebellion, seizing control of two key Haitian cities, Gonaives and Cap Haitien. Aristide resigned on 28 February 2004 and fled the country aboard a U.S.-chartered plane to exile in South Africa. For the next two years, an interim government governed Haiti, supported by a UN peacekeeping mission.

Upon Aristide’s departure, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a U.S.-led Multinational Interim Force, which was replaced after three months by the UN Stabilization Mission

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technical assistance and security. Despite an international outlay of $60 million for elections preparations, one observer noted that “the best you can say is that this [electoral] process has been a political, technical, logistical, and financial fiasco.”3 Originally scheduled for 6 November 2005, elections were delayed four times.

Haiti’s interim leaders finally stuck to the 7 February date, and the elections— which saw heavy voter turnout—were generally touted as successful, despite some violence at polling stations. But their immediate aftermath was messy, plagued by allegations of fraud that resulted in violent protests by Préval’s supporters, who were concerned that the initial vote count would not reach the 50 percent Préval needed in order to avert a run-off.

Eventually, prodded by strong international pressure, Haiti’s interim leaders and presidential candidates, the CEP, the UN, and the OAS brokered a deal under Elections. Elections are a procedural which Préval was declared the winner with device that sets ground rules for deciding just over 50 percent of the vote. That who rules, but they cannot fix Haiti’s cooler heads prevailed was crucial, as fundamental wrongs. Unless the newly Haiti was headed toward a worrisome spielected government, working with the ral into further violence. But the real test international community, makes a long- will be whether Préval can sustain the term commitment to address the insecu- spirit of compromise that led to the rity, economic inertia, and lack of capa- smooth completion of these elections.

Ultimately, the fundamental question is ble governing institutions, the latest round of elections will be remembered as how any government can gain real traction and capacity to provide security, tackle the another exercise in futility.

Efforts to hold elections were stymied socioeconomic crisis, and govern. Elecby logistical and technical problems, the tions will be critical to consolidating politsecurity situation, and a lack of political ical stability in Haiti, but they are only a commitment by the interim government means, not an end in themselves. Achievand certain factions of Haiti’s power ing stability will require that a committed elites. A Provisional Electoral Council and inclusive elected government, empow(known by its French acronym CEP) was ered by engaged international partners, established in early 2004 to manage the tackles the difficult challenges of rebuildelectoral process. The Organization of ing functional institutions to address the American States (OAS) oversaw voter reg- country’s deep-seated security, socioecoistration, with MINUSTAH providing nomic, and governance problems. in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the fifth UN mission in Haiti since the early 1990s.2 MINUSTAH is mandated to assist the transitional government in three broad areas: creating a secure and stable environment, supporting the constitutional and political process, and promoting and protecting human rights.

MINUSTAH deployed slowly and has been criticized for not being aggressive enough in combating the gangs that control Port-au-Prince’s slums. The interim government is also vulnerable to criticism, having failed after two years to garner legitimacy or credibility. That Haiti is a failed state in crisis is clear, but elections alone will do little to change that reality. The efforts of Haiti’s new government and its international partners after the elections will determine whether Haiti’s transition marks a fundamental shift in the country’s history.

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Security. After over a decade of UN gangs and reclaiming control of some ex-

missions had failed to stabilize Haiti, MINUSTAH entered in June 2004 with a mandate to secure and stabilize the country in support of the transitional government. By the end of November 2005, the mission boasted 9,006 uniformed personnel, including 7,265 troops and 1,741 civilian police.4 But MINUSTAH has not effectively addressed the public safety vacuum in Haiti. Its flawed response can be traced to two broad problems: MINUSTAH was slow to take serious action, either against ex-FADH elements or Port-au-Prince’s gangs; and its mandate and resources are inadequate.

Warring urban gangs in the city’s slums have posed the greatest threat to the peace: they are supported by factions considered loyal to Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party, anti-Lavalas groups, certain members of the business elite, drug traffickers, and other criminal elements.5 All have an interest in maintaining the current state of destabilization.

Members of the ex-FADH pose the other major threat. While no longer a serious military force, they continue to control certain areas outside the capital. As of early January 2006, an estimated fifteen hundred people had been killed since the beginning of the rebellion against Aristide, nine peacekeepers had lost their lives, and kidnappings were routine in Port-au-Prince.6 Haiti is also a major regional transit point for the drug trade, and Cité Soleil, one of the capital’s biggest slums, is overrun by drug-related crime and violence.7 Following a visit to Haiti by a UN Security Council mission in the spring of 2005, MINUSTAH began to take more concerted actions, including launching offensive raids against Port-au-Prince’s [ 1 0 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

FADH holdouts. This led to some improvement in security in 2005, but MINUSTAH has not permanently secured the most dangerous areas in the capital or re-take control in rural areas.

Although MINUSTAH has been criticized for its unwillingness to aggressively tackle insecurity, the mission is hampered by an inadequate mandate and a lack of resources.8 Mandated to work in support of the interim government and the Haitian National Police (HNP), it is in an untenable position. The HNP is seen as heavily politicized, corrupt, and anti-Lavalas. MINUSTAH has acknowledged HNP responsibility for arbitrary arrests and killings, and MINUSTAH’s affiliation with the HNP compromised the mission from the start.9 MINUSTAH faced a Hobson’s choice of either trying to assist a weak and unrepresentative interim government and a corrupt, feckless police force in providing security, or trying to impose security itself. Although the Security Council authorized the mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which allows for robust action against threats to the peace), it gave MINUSTAH a weak mandate, prioritizing a mission in support of the national government, rather than one that would assume control over certain functions. As a result, MINUSTAH became a third party between Haiti’s armed factions and elite power holders, unable to be a neutral peacekeeper and lacking the authority and resources to effectively enforce the peace. Nonetheless, elections will not resolve the underlying state of insecurity, nor will the HNP soon become any more capable of keeping the peace or trusted to do so. Thus, President Préval must agree to, and the Security Council

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must authorize, a continued international security presence that is mandated and willing to take concerted action to reform the HNP and confront and disarm Haiti’s armed factions.

Post-election security in Haiti will depend on meaningful implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) plan, something for which the interim government showed little interest.10 The government established a National Commission on Disarmament

Politics & Diplomacy

“the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.” Close to 80 percent of Haitians live in poverty, earning less than $2 per day, and around 50 percent live in extreme poverty, earning less than $1 per day. Half the population lacks access to clean drinking water, and only 28 percent has access to sanitary facilities; the literacy rate hovers at 50 percent; Haiti’s 5 percent incidence of HIV/AIDS is the world’s highest outside sub-Saharan Africa; and only 10 percent of the coun-

Haiti’s unemployment rate is around

50 percent, and 95 percent of employment is in the informal sector. try has access to electricity.13 Livelihoods are extremely vulnerable; Haiti’s unemployment rate is around 50 percent, and 95 percent of employment is in the informal sector.14 In 2004 Haiti’s interim government, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions agreed to an Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), which sets out priorities and strategies for Haiti’s recovery.15 The ICF estimated that Haiti’s immediate reconstruction needs total $1.37 billion. Donors pledged Economic Reconstruction. Hait- $1.08 billion at a July 2004 donors’ ians live “among the most squalid condi- conference, but they have been slow to tions on earth,” and prospects for stabil- disburse funds.16 Since then some ity depend on genuine economic macroeconomic indicators have improvement.12 Haitians’ circumstances improved, but basic human needs improved only marginally, at best, in the remain pressing. The International two years after Aristide resigned, with no Monetary Fund blames the failing economic recovery on the security situation, signs of sustainability.

A quick review of economic and social slow disbursements of international aid, indicators highlights why Haiti is called and a lack of capable institutions.17 in February 2005, but as late as October 2005, the Security Council was still calling for the DDR program to begin in earnest.11 Moreover, the DDR plan has focused on the two thousand or so ex-FADH soldiers who are in organized groups. But to neutralize destabilizing forces in Haiti, the program must also cover armed urban gangs. Without an effective and inclusive DDR program, both the ex-FADH and the gangs will continue to threaten the new government.

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Haiti’s economy should grow moderately over the next few years, thanks to international assistance, increased exports, and remittances (estimated to represent over 20 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic product).18 But growth depends on an improved security situation and a smooth transition of power after elections.

Moreover, the expected rate of growth will not be sufficient to pull Haiti’s poor majority out of its acute economic crisis.

Donors can help the new government solidify expected economic improvement in several ways. First, donor assistance must have a long planning horizon, recognizing that reconstruction needs will be serious well after elections. Second, donors must follow through on pledges in a timely manner to ensure adequate resources to implement the ICF and provide additional resources as necessary—including for MINUSTAH. Third, the United States and other lead players must press for a continued international role in security. Finally, donors can provide incentives for Haiti’s diaspora to return to their country to reverse the severe brain drain that sees its citizens and resources sent offshore.19

few other cities receive any benefits from public institutions, which are virtually non-existent in the rural areas. Judicial and penal systems are dysfunctional and perceived as utterly corrupt; the rule of law is not enforced.

The ICF calls for major governance and institutional reforms, and after his election Préval quickly acknowledged the centrality of building capable institutions to pulling Haiti out of its failed state status.21 Only by building indigenous capacity and strengthening institutions will Haiti be able to tackle its underlying, fundamental ills.

Moreover, the new government must commit to plans for a national dialogue and reconciliation process, which has stalled, as called for in Resolution 1542.

Scarred by decades of ineffectual and corrupt government and economic and social marginalization, Haiti’s poor majority is alienated from the political process.

Haitians need a stake in the political process, which will not come from voting alone. Without enhanced political dialogue throughout Haiti, and a concerted push for a national reconciliation process, Haitians will continue to feel marginalized from political life, and stability will remain Governance/Institutions. Ulti- at bay. At the same time, donors and the mately, any efforts by the newly elected government must focus assistance efforts Haitian government and its internation- outside Port-au-Prince and build comal partners to foster sustainable econom- munity level and civil-society institutions ic and security reform depend on and capacities in order to strengthen strengthened governance and economic Haitians’ ability to actively participate in institutions. Years of political misman- political and economic life.22 agement and corruption, along with inconsistent and inadequate interna- Conclusion. The last ten plus years of tional efforts, have led to the total failure international efforts in Haiti have of the Haitian state. At both the central wavered between aggressive engagement, and local levels, Haiti’s weak and corrupt under-resourced UN missions, and preinstitutions lack capable civil servants, cipitous withdrawals, allowing Haiti’s transparency and accountability, and woes to fester and leading to a continual resources.20 Only Port-au-Prince and a need for reengagement by the interna[ 1 0 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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tional community. The latest effort seems rife with familiar shortcomings, including a lack of dedicated international oversight. It is legitimate to question who is,

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political and economic engagement.23 And Haiti’s key donors must commit to continued political and financial engagement. In that regard, it is promising that

If the international community

declares mission accomplished, this latest intervention and round of elections will be remembered as merely another transition to nowhere. or should be, in charge of shepherding a more successful strategy after Haiti’s 2006 elections. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts elsewhere have shown the value of the “UN-plus” model, whereby a lead nation, intimately engaged in policy direction and operational leadership, helps to maintain the necessary attention in the Security Council and to ensure effective action on the ground.

When it comes to Haiti, no country is both as powerful to effect change and as concerned about the overflow of instability as the United States. But however important the United States deems stability in Haiti, its strategic (and domestic) interests will always mean a limited attention span, an argument for the UN-plus model. Washington must play the lead nation role by keeping Haiti a frontburner issue for the Security Council, and the UN must maintain an effective, wellresourced presence in Haiti for as long as needed. Regional powers like Brazil and Chile, which have played a key role in MINUSTAH, should demonstrate their leadership by sustaining the UN’s engagement and their own roles in the mission.

The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s next door neighbor, can also play an important role by signaling a desire for increased

Haiti’s partners have extended implementation of the ICF through 2007 and that the Security Council has expressed its intention to further renew MINUSTAH’s mandate after its current end date of 15 August 2006.24 Years of experience in post-conflict reconstruction have shown, first, that elections are not a guarantee for stability; second, that the various post-conflict reconstruction tasks—security, governance, economic and social wellbeing, and justice and reconciliation—are intertwined; and third, that success in reconstruction requires that national actors own the process. In Haiti, this will mean broad Haitian buy-in at the central and local levels and an effective government backed by capable, transparent institutions. The new Haitian government must commit to the fundamental security, economic, governance, and institutional reforms needed to pull the country out of its failed state status. The international community, in turn, must not declare mission accomplished on the basis of the 2006 elections. If it does, this latest intervention and round of elections will be remembered as merely another transition to nowhere25 in a country that has seen too many.

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MISSION NOT ACCOMPLISHED NOTES

1 Haitian politics have been generally violent and authoritarian since it gained independence in 1804.

Thirty despotic rulers led Haiti until the collapse of President Jean-Claude Duvalier’s regime in 1986. The country also has a long past with international interventions. The United States has sent military troops to Haiti three times: from 1915-1934, Haiti was under U.S. military occupation; in 1994 a U.S.-led intervention restored Aristide to power; and most recently, in 2004 U.S. troops led the Multinational Interim Force after Aristide’s departure, before the UN mission began. For more on Haiti’s history, see, e.g., Robert Maguire, “Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood 1896-1996,” Occasional Paper #23, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1996; Robert Rotberg, “Haiti: A Case of Endemic Weakness,” in Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Brookings Institute, 2003).

2 The Security Council passed Resolution 1529 on 29 February 2005, establishing the Multinational Interim Force. See S/Res/1529, 2004 at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/254/10/PDF /N0425410.pdf?OpenElement. This was followed by Resolution 1542, passed on 30 April 2004, which lays out MINUSTAH’s mandate. See S/Res/1542, 2004 at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/33 2/98/PDF/N0433298.pdf?OpenElement.

3 Danna Harman, “Haiti’s Elusive Polls,” Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 2006, quoting Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group.

4 These figures are drawn from the MINUSTAH website, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/facts.html. The Security Council increased MINUSTAH’s numbers in the summer of 2005 to provide additional security for the elections but expected the numbers to drop again after elections. See UN Security Council Resolution 1608, S/Res/1608, 2005.

5 See ICG, “Spoiling Security in Haiti,” 31 May 2005.

6 Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti Capital Paralyzed by Strike over Kidnappings,” Reuters, 10 January 2006; VOA English Service, “Security Council Calls for Prompt Elections in Haiti,” 7 January 2006; Mark Turner, “UN Police Chief Attacks Global Inaction in Haiti Drug Wars,” Financial Times, 18 January 2006; and ICG, “Spoiling Security in Haiti,” 4-5.

7 The mission was written so as to constrain offensive actions by MINUSTAH and CIVPOL except those in support of the HNP and the transitional government, complicating its ability to effectively enforce the peace. S/Res/1542, 2004, para. 7. Mark Turner, “UN Police Chief Attacks Global Inaction in Haiti Drug Wars,” Financial Times, 18 January 2006.

8 ICG, “Update on Haiti: Memorandum to Members of the United Nations Security Council Mission to Haiti,” 8 April 2005. Thomas M. Griffin, “Haiti: Human Rights Investigation,” 11-21 November

[ 1 0 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

2004, 31-32. Available at: http://www.law.miami. edu/ cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf.

9 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament Delayed, Justice Denied,” (July 2005): 4-7; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Country Report: Haiti,“ (November 2005): 17.

10 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2005/50, 18 October 2005.

11 Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti after Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History (February 2005): 83.

12 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), “Haiti: Bank’s Transition Strategy 2005-2006,” (November 2004): 4.

13 Ibid, 10.

14 The ICF covers four broad areas: political governance and national dialogue; economic governance and institutional development; economic recovery; and access to basic services. United Nations, European Commission, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), July 2004, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/ht. Originally intended to cover the period through 2006, donors recently agreed to extend its implementation through 2007.

Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2006/1, 6 January 2006.

15 After an October 2005 donors conference, it was reported that $600 million in donor funds had been disbursed, up from $400 million in June of that year. See EIU, “Country Report: Haiti,” 19. By the end of 2005, $780 million had been disbursed. See BBC, “Donor Community Pledges Help to Haiti,” 24 February 2006.

16 International Monetary Fund, “Haiti: Use of Fund Resource—Request for Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance,” 5 October 2005: 3.

17 EIU, “Country Report: Haiti,” 10.

18 On the question of the need to reform U.S. policy regarding diaspora populations of weak or post-conflict states, see Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security, “On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security,” Center for Global Development, 2004, 27.

19 Transparency International ranked Haiti 155 out of 159 countries in its 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index. Transparency International, 2005 Corruptions Perceptions Index. Available at: http:// www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/ surveys_ indices/cpi2005.

20 BBC, “Haitian President-Elect Pledges Dialogue, Zero Corruption,” 24 February 2006.

21 The ICF discusses the need for decentralization and participatory development, and it will be important to implement these goals. See ICF, 20-21.

22 France, Haiti’s former colonizer, and Canada, which boasts a large Haitian diaspora population, have also played key roles in maintaining focus on Haiti policy.

23 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1658, S/Res/1658, 2006 at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/

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UNDOC/GEN/N06/242/88/PDF/N0624288.pdf?

OpenElement. In a recent statement, the President of the Security Council recognized that addressing Haiti’s security, rule of law, and development challenges will require a long-term international engagement. See

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Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2006/7, 9 February 2006.

24 This phrase is borrowed from George Fauriol, “Haiti and the Democratic Experience,” in Worldviews for the 21st Century, vol. 2, no. 3 (2005): 5.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 0 9 ]

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The Internet, Censorship, and China William Thatcher Dowell Nothing illustrates the inherent absurdity of China’s efforts to control the flow of information better than the case of Shi Tao, a thirty-seven-year-old Chinese business reporter arrested in November 2004 and sentenced in April 2005 to ten years in prison. Shi Tao’s crime was sending an e-mail to a New Yorkbased Web Site; the e-mail, which was eventually passed around the Internet, included the text of a government warning that the return of a handful of dissidents who had witnessed the Tiananmen massacres might prove socially destabilizing. The memo, the government insisted, was top secret. Shi Tao argued, reasonably enough, that there was nothing particularly secret about the government’s opinions concerning political dissidents and Tiananmen anniversaries.1 Shi Tao’s arrest was not unusual. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates in its 2006 World Report that at least sixty political prisoners are now in Chinese jails because they revealed information on the Internet that the government wanted kept quiet.2 Reporters Without Borders claims that roughly forty of those prisoners are journalists. Suggesting that the Chinese government is in need of reform, without first obtaining official permission, is enough to warrant a hefty jail sentence. After a series of crackdowns during the summer of 2005, the government announced a new set of guidelines that ban unauthorized Internet discussions touching on “politics, economics, military affairs, foreign affairs, social and public

William Thatcher Dowell, currently based in Europe, worked as a correspondent for Time for more than twelve years and served as the magazine's Southeast Asia bureau chief from 1993 through 1995.

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site appeared to be happening. Instead of opening up China to free thought, the enormous attraction of the Chinese market appeared to be corrupting Western companies and enrolling American technological prowess in efforts to further limit free speech.

Before long, not only Yahoo!, but Microsoft, Cisco, and Google found themselves under intense scrutiny for allegedly aiding Beijing’s efforts to track The American Internet Giants down and control dissent. Corporate and the Chinese Market. In an readiness to sacrifice free speech in order editorial piece published on HRW’s Web to break into the lucrative Chinese marSite, HRW’s Asia correspondent, Brad ket was not limited to the Internet.

When Chinese authorities briefly Adams, notes that Chinese leaders “still remain afraid of their own citizens and closed Bing Dian (“Freezing Point”), the healthy diversity of news and views the investigative supplement of the which defines modern society.”4 Unlike popular China Youth Daily in January other arrests, which typically receive no 2006, and then demoted its editor national or international media cover- and chief reporter, the resulting scanage, Shi Tao’s case sparked interest dal led thirteen former party insiders because the Chinese subsidiary of a U.S. to write a letter of protest. The corporation, Yahoo!, had willingly pro- deposed editor’s crime had been to affairs, and fast-breaking events.”3 As I will show in this article, a number of American corporations dealing with the Internet entered the Chinese market convinced that modern communications would force Beijing into liberalizing. The promise of enormous profits appears to have enabled Beijing to reverse the situation, and to make U.S. corporations willing accomplices in Chinese repression.

Instead of opening up China to free thought, the enormous attraction of the Chinese market appears to be corrupting Western companies.

vided Chinese authorities with the evidence needed for a conviction. The Yahoo! subsidiary insisted that it was merely complying with Chinese law. To break into the burgeoning Chinese Internet market, Yahoo!, in 2002, had voluntarily signed China’s “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the China Internet Industry.” While many observers had expected the Internet to weaken censorship in China, the oppo[ 1 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

publish an article, “Modernization and History Books,” which discussed the foreign occupation of China at the end of the nineteenth century.5 But it is the concessions by U.S. Internet giants that have caught the public’s attention. Google has created a Chinese version of its search engine, Google.cn, which readily filters out Web Sites that Beijing finds politically offensive. Chinese Internet surfers looking

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for the words “democracy,” “freedom,” or “human rights” on Microsoft’s MSN network are directed to an error message that states: “This item contains forbidden speech.” Yahoo! has come under the greatest criticism so far for agreeing to turn over information to the Chinese police that has played a significant role in the conviction of dissidents. In October 2005, Yahoo! tried to extricate itself from direct responsibility by merging its Chinese subsidiary with a local Internet provider, Alibaba.com. Yahoo! holds one of four board seats for the combined company, and Alibaba.com handles day-to-day operations. The critical issue for all the search engines is whether they can maintain a network server in China.

Servers outside China tend to be extremely slow when connecting to the Internet in China. On the other hand, servers located in China are subject to police scrutiny.

For most American companies, the financial incentives for surrendering to Chinese regulations are simply too overwhelming to be ignored. On 23 September 2001, Mary Hennock, the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) online business reporter, noted that the networking-hardware company, Cisco, had earned roughly $1 billion from helping China build its Internet backbone. ChinaNex, a consultancy and Web site covering Chinese business, reported that although Cisco does not publicly divulge how much it earns in China, it was believed to have reached a peak of around $1 billion in 2001, but earnings dropped to around half that by 2004.6 One of Cisco’s problems in China was competition from a Chinese corporation, Huawei, which Cisco eventually sued for allegedly copying

Politics & Diplomacy

and reselling Cisco’s software. The case was eventually settled out of court.

The result of Cisco’s initial gamble in China was explosive growth. Writing in The Asia Times in August 2005, Tamara Renée Shie, who researches Chinese media issues at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, noted that in 1993 an estimated two thousand Chinese had access to the Internet. By 2005 more than 94 million Chinese were regularly connecting to the Internet. According to Shie, China has the largest number of cell phone subscriptions of any country in the world. It represents the world’s second-largest PC market, and has the world’s third-largest number of PC owners. The Chinese e-commerce market is expected to reach $6.5 billion by 2007.7

The Great Chinese Firewall. The

growth of the Internet has been so explosive in China that Internet boosters and pro-democracy advocates regularly predict that Beijing will ultimately lose its control over the Internet. That may happen eventually, but for the moment, Chinese authorities are proving unusually sophisticated at reining in the Internet’s freewheeling nature. A principal strategy has been to create a gargantuan intranet for most of China and to link this intranet to the World Wide Web through carefully filtered portals. The system is often referred to as “The Great Chinese Firewall.” The Chinese government is discovering that American software designed to protect children from pornography is ideally suited to political censorship. They are also learning that many American companies do not really care how their software is used, as long as they are paid handsomely for it. Human rights activists are increasingly concerned Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 1 3 ]

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that the ease with which Beijing has secured compliance from U.S. companies and the growing sophistication of its capacity to control dissenting opinion is serving as an example to dictatorships and totalitarian regimes in other parts of the world. The eagerness of the Bush administration as well as private employers to eavesdrop on Internet and telephone traffic has bolstered the Chinese government’s argument that it is only doing what is necessary to protect its own security.

Despite the obstacles, the adventurous Chinese individual who is willing to risk a jail sentence in order to obtain information blocked by the Chinese government can still find ways around censorship technology. The BBC’s Mary Hennock also reported that a company called Safeweb has developed anti-blocking software, dubbed “Triangle Boy.” According to Hennock, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) invested $1 million in the company and licensed Safeweb software for CIA use.8 The Triangle Boy system, and others like it, operates by using computers outside China to act as proxy servers, letting users in China access Web sites on Beijing’s blacklist. Although this kind of scheme can work for a limited time, skeptics question how large a segment of the public really wants to engage in a cat-and-mouse game simply to read material that may not be all that interesting to start with.

In an effort to appease the growing public demand for information on the Internet, Beijing has launched a rash of new Web sites. Chinese editor Xiao Qiang, writing in the China Digital Times in August 2005, noted that roughly 10 percent of the Web sites available to Chinese Internet surfers have been established by government agencies.9 In recent months, at least 150 new government-sponsored [ 1 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Web sites have recently appeared. Yet funneling prepackaged government propaganda through the Internet misses the point of one of the most exciting features of modern blogging, the spontaneity and experimentation that ultimately enables a population to express its imagination and to come into contact with new points of view that go beyond conventional stereotypes. In short, while Beijing is doing its best to create a uniform, well-behaved culture that will not make waves, the rest of the world is discovering resources that it previously never knew existed. That message has clearly not penetrated Beijing yet, and in order to control the more adventurous Internet surfers, the government has reportedly enlisted more than thirty thousand Internet spies who scan the Web for potentially seditious material.

Probably the most effective strategy Beijing has come up with is a cocktail that blends vaguely worded laws with an insistence that the individual is personally responsible for enforcing government edicts. The concept of what is criminal behavior changes with political fluctuations. Essentially, authorities are saying that they are not sure exactly what the crime is, but they will recognize it once they see it. The result is an overpowering tendency toward self-censorship.

Chinese Leaders Maintain Control. In the West these Chinese

machinations are often viewed as just another self-defeating series of gestures from a retrograde gerontocracy. But the leaders in Beijing clearly feel that they have reasons to be nervous. The government has historically acted out of fear that loosening its grip on its own citizens might mean losing the tenuous hold Beijing has over its immense population.

As Beijing sees it, the top priorities are

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stability and predictability, rather than creative diversity. This argument is not altogether unreasonable. The Chinese have had extensive experience with the damage that results from political anarchy, and they certainly know more about civil chaos than most Americans.

Obviously, the personal survival of political cadre, who fear that they are mentally and physically unable to keep up with the pace of modernization, is also a compelling factor. Arnold Zeitlin, a former

Politics & Diplomacy

strations were picked up by national media and were communicated across all of China, unleashing a firestorm of protests that threatened not only to spin out of control, but also to create unexpected diplomatic consequences.

A similar phenomenon occurred during the early stages of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic.

Because of censorship, the first news reports of the outbreak in Guandong Province were presented with a mandato-

Authorities are saying that they are not

sure exactly what the crime is, but they will recognize it once they see it. The result is an overpowering tendency toward self-censorship. head of the Freedom Forum Asian Center in Hong Kong, noted recently in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Briefs that, “Control is imposed not so much for ideological reasons as to protect the self interests of officials, or to ensure that the Party does not find itself embarrassed by its failures.”10 The Chinese Communist Party has, in fact, been learning from experience just how fast information can escape from its control. One phenomenon that Chinese leaders have encountered is “swarming”— the explosive phenomenon that takes place when communication creates an unexpected amplification of public response. When China encouraged protests against Japan’s refusal to fully acknowledge its role in atrocities committed during World War II, the regime in Beijing envisioned a few orchestrated demonstrations to send a signal to the Japanese.11 Instead, the initial demon-

ry positive spin. The epidemic was first dismissed as nothing more than a rumor, and later, as having already been brought under control. Chinese officials hoped to cover up the seriousness of the outbreak in order to protect their careers.

In contrast to the oblique, upbeat reports in officially sanctioned newspapers, a direct warning that the lethal epidemic had struck was spread by a Short Message Service (SMS) cell phone message. The Washington Post reported that an SMS message reading “There is a fatal flu in Guangzhou,” was sent out 40 million times on 8 February 2002, 41 million times the following day, and 45 million times the day after that.12 Largely as a result of the cell phone blitz, the media—and subsequently the Chinese government—were forced to admit the existence of the virus.

SARS turned out to be a watershed in China’s approach to the media. The Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 1 5 ]

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standard approach of denying that there is actually a problem backfired, and with enormous international consequences.

According to a report by the Congressional Executive Commission on China, the first mention of SARS came from health workers in mid-November 2002. By January 2003 there was panicked buying of drugs in pharmacies throughout Guandong, but local newspapers restricted themselves to reports that the outbreak was only a rumor and to claims by officials that the situation was under control. In February 2003 a Chinese newspaper published the first timid admission that the disease actually existed. This information was cloaked in an announcement insisting that the danger had now been eradicated. In fact, the casualties were to increase by more than 1,000 percent. As a result of Chinese government misinformation, the international community did not begin to mobilize an effective campaign to stop the spread of the virus until March 2003.

The first three months of government obfuscation gave the disease time to

for their own survival. Action was finally seen as critical to China’s economy.

Not only did the brief loosening of control over the news during the SARS epidemic gradually reverse course, but new regulations announced in September 2005 have tightened the noose even more. Under the latest set of rules, anyone who sends information out over an e-mail list—or anyone who even sends an SMS message to a group of mobile phones—must first declare him or herself to be a news service and must get official authorization.

Americans tend to see Beijing’s obsession with information control as another manifestation of anachronistic communism, but in fact, the Chinese were concerned with centralizing authority and maintaining the prestige of governing officials long before communism emerged as a political ideology. And Beijing is not alone. Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, who promoted Confucianism as an organizing system of values for modern Asia, was just as concerned about state prestige, and at times, equally

SARS turned out to be a watershed in China’s

approach to the media. The standard approach of denying there is a problem backfired—with enormous international consequences. evolve from an easily controllable problem that could have been solved by quarantine into a barely stoppable pandemic.

There was some speculation that, when the government did finally react to the epidemic, it was largely because foreign investors and businessmen had begun to cross China off their agenda out of fear [ 1 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

stern—although perhaps considerably more subtle—at intimidating the press.

Lee used to boast that he read The Economist magazine before it hit the streets in London, yet he did not hesitate to shut down distribution of the publication when it criticized his administration.

The most absurd case of censorship in

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Singapore involved an American university professor, Christopher Lingle, who had been teaching as a senior fellow at the National University of Singapore. Lingle had the temerity to write an opinion piece in the International Herald Tribune, in which he remarked dryly that some regimes in Asia silence their opposition by engaging in lawsuits intended to bankrupt the opposition financially.13 When Lingle was prosecuted by the Singapore government, his defense pointed out quite cogently that he had never actually named Singapore in his article.

Singapore’s attorney general responded that everyone knew that Singapore was the only country in the region that engaged in the practice. The International Herald Tribune finally agreed to pay a hefty settlement, and, like other American news media operating in Southeast Asia, it warned its reporters and contributors to be more careful the next time.

Although Hong Kong in the last days of British rule had a freer press, the Chinese Mandarins also exhibited distaste for the kind of public disclosure that is an integral part of Western democratic discourse. In the final days before the turnover of sovereignty in 1998, Britain’s outgoing governor, Chris Patten, tried to instill a British parliamentary concept of open debate aimed at achieving a working compromise on controversial pieces of legislation. The power brokers in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council resisted the notion.

They were, of course, angry at Patten for annoying Beijing, with whom they realized they would eventually have to create a working relationship. But another factor was a deep, underlying conviction that political differences were best worked out behind closed doors and then presented to the public largely as an

Politics & Diplomacy

agreement by consensus. To do otherwise seemed not only messy, but also seemed to detract from the dignity of the government.

What makes China different from other authoritarian Asian regimes is the degree and crudeness with which it imposes censorship, as well as the total lack of regard that Chinese leaders seem to have for world opinion. Whereas Western leaders try to spin the news, Chinese politicians seem to feel that they do not have to bother. In the meantime, the West appears divided in its assessment of the degree to which Beijing will be able to keep the information genie bottled up.

Censorship and the Implications for China’s Future. While a SARS-

like crisis makes everyone pay attention, many predict that the Chinese government is going to suffer economic retardation as penalty for stifling free discussion. At the moment, China’s booming economy is largely based on manufacturing products that the West—namely, the United States—has designed. As long as that trend continues, China is likely always to be in a secondary position. That could be a hard pill for the Chinese, who are desperately concerned about their prestige, to swallow. On the other hand, the fact that this imbalance may slow China’s growth could have advantages for both China and the West. For the Chinese, it would provide more time to adjust to the social and economic changes needed to become a modern power. For the rest of the world, it could provide added time to adjust to competition from what is likely to become the world’s leading powerhouse.

That is a best-case scenario. For the moment, the readiness of U.S. companies to surrender to pressure from Beijing has Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 1 7 ]

THE INTERNET, CENSORSHIP, AND CHINA

raised serious ethical questions. In February Representative Tom Lantos (DCA) and Representative Chris Smith (RNJ) held hearings in which all four companies underwent intense scrutiny about their motives. Congressmen Lantos and Smith then proposed the “Global Online Freedom Act,” which, if passed, would bar U.S. Internet companies from situations in which they could be compelled to turn information about users over to China.

Two earlier attempts by Representative Lantos to pass similar legislation had already failed. While the efforts of Congressmen Lantos and Smith are undoubtedly well intentioned, history may show that engaging China in on-going business ventures is likely to prove more effective at bringing about lasting change.

The experience of the past few decades in Asia suggests that political liberalization often follows economic development, rather than the other way around.

The first priority for most people is economic survival. Once their survival is secure, political freedom becomes the next objective. In fact, it is impossible to run an effective, decentralized, modern economy without some degree of political freedom. It is too easy for the disaffected to sabotage a technology-based society. In the end, it is more cost effective to make everyone feel that they have a slice of the pie, and democratic systems are designed to do just that. It may take

China some time to come to this realization, but the logic of the situation makes it extremely likely that the world will move toward a consistent set of values that are more or less recognized everywhere.

The Chinese will be under increasing pressure to adapt to a universal consensus or to risk being ostracized and left behind. How long the process will take is open to question. What does seem clear is that, while the Chinese struggle to adapt to the realities of their situation, the West needs to prepare itself for a world in which the Chinese will play an increasingly influential role. The debates over Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) have already brought that point home.

Although Westerners—especially Americans—are less than pleased at some Chinese practices, there is a general consensus that the Chinese have to be participants in the WTO in order for the organization to have any real meaning.

The trick will be to integrate China without compromising our own concepts of democracy, justice, and free speech. Before China’s ruling elite feels confident enough to give China’s people more freedom of expression, forwardthinking individuals like Shi Tao are likely to pay a heavy price. If the West is not careful to preserve its own values while doing business with China, it may find that it is paying a heavy price as well.

NOTES

1 Reporters Without Borders, “Information supplied by Yahoo! helped journalist Shi Tao get 10 years in prison,” Internet, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3? id_article=14884 (Date accessed: 6 September 2005).

2 “Human Rights Watch 2006 World Report,” Internet, http://hrw.org/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf (Date accessed: 2 April 2006).

3 The quotation from China’s new law was cited by Jack Krumholtz, Microsoft’s Associate General Counsel and Managing Director, Federal Government

[ 1 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Affairs, Microsoft Corporation during Congressional testimony on 15 February 2006. Jack Krumholz, Microsoft press release, Internet, http://www.micro soft.com/presspass/exec/krumholtz/02-15Written Testimony.mspx (Date accessed: 2 April 2006).

4 Human Rights Watch, Internet, http://hrw.org/ english/docs/2005/09/28/china11798.htm (Date accessed: 28 September 2005).

5 Details of the case are available at The International Freedom of Expression Exchange

DOWELL

(IFEX), Internet, http://www.ifex.org/en/content/ view/full/72367 (Date accessed: 2 April 2006).

6 ChinaNex’s report, Internet, http://72.14.203.

104/search?q=cache:xDy1SDhucZ8J:www.chinanex.co m/company/cisco.htm+ChinaNex+Cisco+&hl=en&ct= clnk&cd=1 (Date accessed: 2 April 2006).

7 Rhonda Hillbery, “Democracy and the Desktop,” CalTech News, Internet, http://pr.caltech.edu/periodicals/CaltechNews/articles/v36/democracy.html (Date accessed: 3 April 2006).

8 “Xiao Qiang: The Development and the State Control of the Chinese Internet,” China Digital Times, Internet, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/04/xiao_ qiang_the.php (Date accessed: 26 April 2005).

9 China Brief, volume 3, issue 14 (July 2003).

10 The protests were in April 2005. Japanese text books were the ostensible reason, but in fact, the protests were initially encouraged by the government

Politics & Diplomacy

in order to stave off what was perceived to be a U.S. effort to give Japan a seat on the UN Security Council.

The protests quickly went out of control and developed into a much bigger affair than the government had intended. By then, however, it was difficult to bring them under control. Refer to: Robert Marquand, “Anti-Japan Protests Jar an Uneasy Asia,” Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 2005. Internet, http://csmonitor.com/2005/0411/p01s04-woap.html (Date accessed: 2 April 2006).

11 John Pomfret, “Infecting the first line of defense,” The Washington Post, 12 May 2003.

12 The incident is described by Don Kirk in the National Review, Internet, http://www.findarticles.com/ p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n6_v47/ai_16864898 (Date accessed: 3 April 2006). Also refer to Christopher Lingle, “Smoke over parts of Asia,” International Herald Tribune.

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Transforming Separatist Conflict Rodd McGibbon Following the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, debates emerged in policy circles regarding its impact on longrunning disputes in Aceh and Sri Lanka. Aid workers quickly descended upon the two regions that had also suffered from decades of violent separatist conflict. The global humanitarian response raised expectations that the disaster might fundamentally alter the dynamics of the respective conflicts. This article examines the divergent paths that the conflicts have taken in Aceh and Sri Lanka after the tsunami.

By the end of 2005, Aceh was implementing a peace deal brokered by a Finnish organization, Conflict Management Initiatives (CMI), with support from the EU. The agreement was signed between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005. It resulted in a successful process of arms decommissioning, the withdrawal of non-local security forces, and the promulgation of a new law allowing for self-government in Aceh.

In Sri Lanka the Norwegian government had brokered a fragile ceasefire three years before the tsunami. Negotiations over a peace deal had also been launched but were abandoned in 2003 due to a lack of progress over core issues. Immediately following the tsunami, there was sound cooperation between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Rodd McGibbon is the manager of the UN Information Management Service at the UN Office for the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias.

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Eelam (LTTE). However, this cooperation soon gave way to a breakdown of the ceasefire. In contrast to the promising moves toward peace in Aceh, post-tsunami reconstruction in Sri Lanka resulted in renewed hostilities.

The tsunami’s main political consequence—and the one that most influenced the different outcomes in Aceh and Sri Lanka—was its impact on the strategic considerations of the combatants. The tsunami shaped the basic political calculus of governments and rebels, resulting in a breakthrough in negotiations in Aceh, and a breakdown in the ceasefire in Sri Lanka. These events show that vague notions of “disaster diplomacy”—the hope that humanitarian cooperation would break down the animosities driving the conflicts—were misplaced.1 The old cycle of violence returned to Sri Lanka in early 2005. Similarly, in Aceh at the peak of humanitarian activities, clashes continued between GAM and

three parts: the first part describes how Aceh made successful moves toward peace at the same time that Sri Lanka descended into conflict; the second section seeks to account for this difference in terms of the strategic calculations of the combatants; and the third part of this article critically examines how the participation of noncombatants outside the government—socalled civil society—might boost future prospects for peace.

Breakdown in Sri Lanka, Breakthrough in Aceh. Violence

between government forces and separatist rebels has plagued both regions since the 1970s and 1980s. In Sri Lanka ethnic tensions have been simmering since British colonial policy favored Tamil leaders over the Sinhalese majority. After independence, perceptions of discrimination among the Tamils by the Sinhalese-dominated state fuelled the emergence of Tamil nationalism. In

These events show that notions of “disaster

diplomacy”—the hope that humanitarian cooperation would break down the animosities driving the conflicts—were misplaced.

government forces. Eight months later, a peace deal was achieved. This occurred despite the lack of humanitarian cooperation between GAM and the government on the ground.

While the combatants’ strategic perceptions are central to explaining recent political outcomes in Aceh and Sri Lanka, a forward-looking analysis also suggests that other actors could play an important future role. This article is divided into [ 1 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

1983 full-scale communal violence erupted after government troops were killed by Tamil militants. Thereafter a brutal civil war ensued as the LTTE evolved into an armed movement conducting political assassinations and building up de facto political control over Sri Lanka’s northeast, despite largescale offensives by government troops.

In the Islamic stronghold of Aceh, a rebellion erupted in the 1950s based on

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demands for greater autonomy from the Indonesian government led by local Muslim leaders with popular backing.

While military force and a promise to grant greater autonomy in educational, religious, and administrative realms quelled the rebellion, the government’s failure to follow through on its promise deepened Acehnese discontent. The growing centralization of power and control over natural resources under the Soeharto regime during the 1970s and 1980s exacerbated tensions between Aceh and the central government. A small disaffected group emerged in 1976, the Free Aceh Movement, demanding independence. Cycles of government repression and indiscriminate violence increased the GAM’s popularity throughout the 1980s and 1990s. With the fall of the Soeharto regime, demands for a referendum reached a crescendo in 1999 with large-scale rallies across the province, as GAM openly agitated for independence and expanded its support base across the province. Following 1999, the conflict entered an intense period of violence as government forces sought to crack down on GAM activity and destroy its support base in the villages.

In recent years, the international community has been involved in efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of both conflicts. The Norwegian government brokered a peace deal with LTTE and the government in 2002, while the Henri Dunant Center (HDC), an international NGO, was invited by the Indonesian government to facilitate a cessation of hostilities in Aceh also in 2002. While Norway’s initiative resulted in a fragile ceasefire with little progress on peace talks, the HDC-facilitated process in Aceh broke down almost as soon as it had begun. It was in this context of faltering

Politics & Diplomacy

peace efforts in both regions that speculation emerged in the wake of the tsunami that the tsunami’s cataclysmic impact might fundamentally transform both conflicts.

In Sri Lanka expectations that the tsunami might lead to peace talks were heightened by early humanitarian cooperation, focusing on distributing critical relief supplies to LTTE-controlled areas severely affected by the tsunami. For the first six weeks of relief operations, hostilities largely ceased as the two sides worked together. As one writer suggested, the tsunami had opened up a “humanitarian space” that enabled the two sides to put aside their mutual suspicions.

It was not long, however, before assassinations and political violence returned to Sri Lanka. Signs that the ceasefire was coming under strain had been apparent for months before the tsunami. After the disaster, controversies and political posturing over donor assistance deepened tensions. Arguments emerged over the distribution of relief supplies and the development of an institutional mechanism through which to channel the enormous amounts of aid pouring into Sri Lanka. The violence began to escalate in February and climbed steadily throughout the year. While both sides maintained the pretense of a ceasefire, Sri Lanka was sliding back into civil war.

The conflict in post-tsunami Aceh followed a very different trajectory. As relief operations got underway, sporadic clashes between the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) and GAM occurred. The need to distribute relief supplies quickly resulted in relaxation of the repressive controls on the province. GAM members, who had been pushed into the mountains after more Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 2 3 ]

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tary operations against GAM in an offensive that would last for over eighteen months. TNI combined its military operations with a counterinsurgency approach aimed at separating GAM from its support base in the villages, which essentially isolated the rebels.

While GAM was coming under pressure, the government likewise could ill afford a prolonged escalation of the conflict. The renewed military operations were a growing drain on the state budget at a time when Indonesia was struggling to overcome a long-term economic crisis. As casualties mounted on both sides and civil liberties were curtailed, Indonesia’s standing as an emerging democracy was also challenged.

Furthermore, the enormous resources being expended on renewed security operations showed that military means alone could not eliminate the GAM challenge. The government’s draconian counterinsurgency tactics added to its unpopularity among many Acehnese, fueling further discontent toward the state. A political solution was required.

Following the tsunami, the moves toward peace were formalized through several rounds of negotiations that evenStrategic Calculations after the tually resulted in a key breakthrough— Tsunami. While Aceh had been GAM agreed to abandon its long-held plagued since 1999 by growing hostilities, demand for independence.3 This conSri Lanka had enjoyed several years of a cession was based on a strategic considerlong-held, but fragile, ceasefire. The ation by GAM that the tsunami had tsunami broke the status quo in both altered the balance of forces particularly cases, representing a tipping point for on the international front. The postpeace in Aceh but a return to hostilities tsunami recovery forced the government in Sri Lanka. to open up the province to thousands of international aid workers and journalAceh. In Aceh the tsunami followed a long ists, transforming the political and social period of intense conflict that had been environment. Since martial law had been increasing the costs for both sides. With introduced in 2003, the government the introduction of martial law in May had virtually closed off the province to 2003, the military had stepped up mili- the outside world. GAM leaders risked than a year of sustained military operations, were now able to move freely around the province. Skirmishes between GAM and TNI erupted as these groups repositioned themselves.

Continuing hostilities on the ground, however, were overshadowed by growing momentum in the negotiations between GAM’s leadership and a government team formed by Vice President Jusuf Kalla. After repeated rounds, the negotiations began to produce genuine compromise, resulting in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on 15 August 2005. The agreement included provisions on demobilization and reintegration of combatants, self-government, and human rights, resulting in a remarkable change in the security environment. Almost overnight, hostilities between GAM forces and the army ceased. International monitors from the EU and ASEAN monitored the decommissioning of GAM weapons and the withdrawal of combat troops and police from the province. The commitment of both sides in adhering to the agreement indicated that a major breakthrough had occurred.

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international opprobrium and even greater isolation if they were seen to be putting their own political agenda ahead of the massive relief effort attracting the world’s attention.

The GAM leadership also recognized that they could capitalize on the international spotlight being put on Aceh. The recovery operation provided an opportunity to secure international support for rebuilding Aceh and reforming the basic structures of governance that had sparked

Politics & Diplomacy

the EU and the no-nonsense mediation of Martti Ahtisaari, president of CMI, also underscored the international community’s stake in securing a peaceful resolution of the conflict.4

Sri Lanka. While the tsunami represented the tipping point in achieving a settlement in Aceh, post-tsunami relief activities resulted in growing hostilities in Sri Lanka. The fragile ceasefire signed between the LTTE and the government

The central factor in Sri Lanka was

growing fatigue on both sides over the so-called “no war/no peace” scenario that had prevailed since 2003. local discontent in the first place. GAM’s whole political strategy had revolved around internationalizing the conflict.

The presence of the international community ended Aceh’s isolation. It also gave GAM leaders their best opportunity to ensure an internally sponsored resolution of the conflict.

Shaping its negotiating posture, however, was GAM’s increasing recognition of the weak international position it occupied and the fear that it would be outflanked in the post-tsunami period.

No state recognized GAM’s claims to independence. The Indonesian government had stepped up diplomatic efforts in 2004 to have GAM prosecuted by Swedish courts for promoting terrorism and rebellion, adding to the pressure on GAM. As GAM became increasingly isolated, the government’s moves to seek a settlement provided GAM with an opportunity to compromise. The role of

in late 2002 was showing signs of strain before the tsunami. No progress had been made on a political settlement since 2003. By the time of the tsunami, government and LTTE leaders had gained few political advantages from either the stalled peace process or the cessation of violence.

As tensions rose over the distribution of tsunami relief, the failures of the peace process were exposed, and barely concealed tensions erupted to the surface.

LTTE leaders claimed that the government was channeling aid funds from Tamil areas to the Sinhalese majority in the south. For factions within the government, providing relief to Tamil areas raised serious anxieties about the extent to which the Tigers would gain political legitimacy from relief operations.

Sinhalese nationalist constituencies were staunchly opposed to giving any concessions to the LTTE, which they regarded Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 2 5 ]

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as a terrorist organization.

Amid such tensions, the establishment of a joint mechanism through which donor funds for reconstruction could be channeled, including to Tiger-controlled areas, became highly contentious.

Sinhalese groups remained suspicious of any initiative that could be seen as legitimizing an autonomous self-governing region in Sri Lanka’s northeast, a longheld Tiger demand. In June the PostTsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) was signed between the government and LTTE, although key elements were later ruled invalid by Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court. As these tensions over tsunami aid surfaced, the fragile ceasefire between LTTE and the government broke down altogether.

To understand the reasons behind this breakdown, it is necessary to examine the post-tsunami strategic calculations of the combatants. The central factor was growing fatigue on both sides over the socalled “no war/no peace” scenario that had prevailed since 2003. As tsunami aid poured into Sri Lanka, this uneasy status

minister, weakening the negotiating position of the government. This political instability severely limited the government’s ability to offer concessions to negotiators keen to capitalize on tsunami relief efforts as a way to renew peace talks.

Sri Lanka can be contrasted here with the strong leadership shown by the Indonesian government, which had a more stable political base from which to negotiate with the GAM. The election in November of a new president, Mahinda Rajapakse, known for his hard-line stance against negotiations with combatants, did little to boost optimism about the prospects for peace.

Third, the changing dynamics of international support represented the most crucial factor in shaping the perceptions of the combatants. Unlike the lack of international support for GAM in Aceh, in Sri Lanka the LTTE’s international standing was slowly improving after the ceasefire, with a further improvement after the tsunami. The LTTE had come under pressure in the months after 9/11. Having launched a

GAM has reviewed religious leaders, rights

activists, and other community figures as potential leadership rivals in the struggle to gain legitimacy among the Acehnese. quo could not be sustained. In particular, competition over resources and the contentions over distributing aid to LTTE-controlled areas exacerbated long-held frustrations over the ceasefire.

A second factor was long-held rivalries among the political elite, in particular between the president and the prime [ 1 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

twenty-year-old civil war, the LTTE had acquired a reputation for being the world’s leading proponent of suicide bombing. The U.S. State Department included the LTTE in its worldwide list of terrorist organizations. As a result, financial flows from the vast diaspora of Tamils outside Sri Lanka and India

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(some estimates put the figure at one million) came under growing scrutiny and pressure. Unlike the tiny Acehnese population living abroad, which is comprised mainly of itinerant workers in Malaysia, the Tamil diaspora includes highly successful business interests and professionals that can provide strong political and financial backing for Tamil nationalism. Pressures on this support base were one of the factors that account for the Tigers’ agreement to a ceasefire in 2002.

A final factor was the LTTE’s growing strategic parity with the government, underlined by the success in military operations, including the spectacular terrorist attack on Colombo’s main international airport in 2000. Thus the LTTE’s move to negotiate was shaped by its weakening international position as well as consolidation of its domestic power.

The LTTE’s commitment to the ceasefire eased international pressures after 2002, with its situation further improving after the tsunami. Unlike GAM, which did not exercise territorial control in any significant sense, the LTTE represented the de facto power over the northeast. Recognizing these territorial realities, donors promoted the establishment of the joint mechanism, essentially acknowledging the legitimacy of the LTTE’s involvement in the relief effort. While it still faced strong U.S. public criticism over growing violence, the LTTE’s territorial control over the northeast made it an indispensable partner in the relief and recovery effort, a fact confirmed by its chief role in negotiating the P-TOMS. The Tamils’ independent efforts at providing relief in Tiger-controlled areas underscored the strength of Tamil

Politics & Diplomacy

solidarity. The rapid mobilization of Tamil support across the world resulted in an impressive display of organization and discipline. The relief efforts were coordinated through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a humanitarian group close to the LTTE leadership.5 The TRO effort was contrasted with the government’s slow and poorly coordinated response. Such differences underscored the LTTE’s demands to establish a separate Tamil homeland. Taken together, such factors combined to remove the incentives for the combatants to maintain their restraint, pushing the Tigers and the government into renewed hostilities.

A Role for Civil Society? Notably,

the role of local civil society has been omitted as a factor that has shaped the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Aceh. Nongovernmental organizations and community leaders have largely been sidelined, and have thus played a limited role in the efforts to resolve the conflicts. The main impediment to civil society participation has been the suspicions of the respective combatants toward independent actors. GAM, for instance, has viewed religious leaders, rights activists, and other community figures as potential leadership rivals in the struggle to gain legitimacy among the Acehnese. The government and military, for its part, has long viewed NGOs as a kind of “fifth column” promoting a hidden separatist agenda. Under these conditions, civilian leaders became victims both of the violence perpetrated by the combatants and of the repressive measures the government adopted in response. In Aceh their ability to promote ideas in the public sphere was severely restricted by draconian laws that emasculated civil liberties.

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In Sri Lanka the role of civil society was circumscribed as a result of the conflict, but in different ways. In the Tamil strongholds of the northeast, the LTTE’s politico-military structure required strict loyalty to the movement and its organization, preventing the emergence of an active and independent civil society. Independent criticism in Tiger-controlled areas was met with a swift and violent response from the LTTE. In the south many NGOs and community groups were staunch Sinhalese nationalists that pushed a line of no negotiation with the LTTE. In this context, the negotiators preferred largely to limit their efforts to the combatants, as they did not want to derail the process by sacrificing negotiations for the principle of inclusiveness.

Despite the exclusion of non-governmental groups in both Aceh and Sri Lanka, there are compelling reasons to believe that greater civil society participation would improve the prospects for peace in both regions. Community leaders and NGOs can play a concrete political role in safeguarding the peace process in Aceh, in contributing to a circuit-breaker for the deadlock that has emerged in Sri Lanka, and in participating in the post-tsunami recovery process in ways that address the underlying grievances fueling both conflicts.

In Aceh a key role for civil society coalitions is to ensure that the Indonesian government implements the political settlement outlined in the MOU. The recent history of efforts to resolve the Aceh conflict underscores the risk of backsliding. The government’s offer of far-reaching concessions in the special autonomy laws for Papua and Aceh was subject to reversal when pressure on the government eased. In this [ 1 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

context, the emergence of strong advocacy networks will be crucial to ensure compliance with the MOU. Similarly, civil society will also play an important role in the 2006 elections for governor and district heads, one of the major provisions of the MOU. The participation of community organizations and other NGOs in voter education and election monitoring will help ensure that such elections, which are expected to involve GAM-supported candidates, are free and fair.

The peace agenda in Sri Lanka is many steps behind Aceh’s, and hence the civil society agenda centers less on safeguarding the peace than on halting the continuing violence. The main challenge is to get the parties together to recommit to a ceasefire and then to overcome the stalemate that has emerged over the demand for a Tamil state or self-governing region. This longstanding stalemate suggests that the peace process is in need of a radical redesign and that a circuit breaker is urgently required. Only by abandoning the focus on two-party negotiations and expanding the number of voices in talks over a settlement can negotiators recast current debates and reconfigure the balance of competing interests.

That is the surest way to break the protracted deadlock between the combatants. Bringing the views of a broad spectrum of civil society interests into the debate offers to inject new issues into the negotiations. By doing so, new opportunities for confidence building may emerge. The inclusion of noncombatants, Muslim leaders, and other neglected constituencies into formal and informal discussions could also reconfigure prevailing political alliances.

Civil society actors in Sri Lanka also offer alternative perspectives on core

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institutional questions related to the nature of the state and the devolution of power. The introduction of new ideas might loosen the current ideological deadlock between government adherents of the unitary state and Tamil leaders seeking their own homeland. Here the experience in Aceh could provide some valuable lessons, as the draft law on Aceh proposes self-governing arrangements but in the overall context of Indonesia’s unitary state. The fact that the draft law was the result of input from a range of civil society elements demonstrates the impact that more participatory processes can have in seeking a resolution to longstanding conflicts.

However, aside from resistance by the combatants to expanding participation, there are other reasons to maintain a healthy skepticism regarding civil society.

In such cases as a ceasefire or back channel political negotiations, a focus exclusively on the combatants is the most appropriate strategy. More generally, the diversity that defines civil society can often raise thorny questions over representation such as which leaders and organizations should be engaged.

This question has particular relevance to Sri Lanka, where many key community organizations and religious leaders, including Sinhalese nationalist elements, have blocked efforts at compromise and conciliation. These elements have automatically rejected proposals on political devolution as an attack on Sri Lanka’s unitary state. In fact, many civil society groups represent the most vociferous voices opposing compromise.

Bringing them in may well invite additional contentions in the process.

Furthermore, the weakness or isolation of some non-governmental organizations can often make them difficult and

Politics & Diplomacy

unreliable dialogue partners.

Another key difficulty is the management of the diverse demands from civil society, such as NGO advocacy over human rights. For instance, NGO promotion of the return of conflict-related internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Aceh will need to be handled carefully by the government and international community to ensure that IDP returnees do not provoke an upsurge in violence. The movement of IDP returnees has the potential to fuel local competition over resources and access to assistance that could exacerbate tensions in such an ethnically diverse region as central Aceh.

Widening demands could create an enormous reintegration challenge for the government. Pushing sensitive issues onto the political agenda too early, however, may risk overloading the government’s capacity to respond and destabilizing the peace process.

While civil society participation poses many challenges, the exclusion of such elements has had far more debilitating effects on securing and maintaining peace. The resistance of civil society critics outside the peace process in Sri Lanka has been an important impediment to concession making. Indeed, the exclusion of NGOs and community leaders from negotiations in Sri Lanka has long been considered a major weakness of the Norwegian-brokered peace process. The pressure imposed on the government by Sinhalese nationalists—represented by both major political parties, as well as community leaders and intellectuals—has derailed attempts to forge cooperation with the LTTE in the past. A realistic assessment of the next steps must be based on the recognition that excluding such voices from peace efforts does more harm than good.

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Conclusion. As I argued earlier, how- to pursue peaceful dialogue. Second,

ever, it is to the combatants, and not to local civil society, that we must look when explaining why Sri Lanka descended into conflict while Aceh made promising steps towards peace. A sense of fatigue with the status quo and the international dynamics that emerged following the tsunami resulted in shifting political strategies by both governments and separatist movements.

Local civil society played little role in inducing these shifts, which were generated by more powerful domestic and international forces. This conclusion, however, should be qualified by recognizing the impact that “global” civil society made on the Aceh conflict, as hundreds of foreign and local NGOs and other voluntary organizations in the relief effort opened up the previously closed territory.

Nevertheless, one of the key features of both conflicts was the narrowing of public space for civil society. Indeed, this may be seen as one of the most debilitating effects of protracted conflicts.

This leads to two basic conclusions that have broader application. First, we need to recognize the inherent limitations of civil society in conflict situations where the combatants have few incentives

when conditions do permit and incentives do exist, however, the promotion of peace should not only be seen as an absence of violent conflict, but an expansion of civic participation by groups and individuals previously excluded. The final part of this article explored the possibilities for civil society participation in Aceh and Sri Lanka. In both cases, it was clear that increased participation by civil society in recovery and reconstruction was crucial if Aceh and Sri Lanka were to capitalize on opportunities to transform the conflicts.

These two processes—namely postdisaster reconstruction and peace building—are inextricably linked. Indeed, the post-tsunami reconstruction represents an important opportunity to enhance participation in ways that break the monopoly of power exercised by the combatants party to the conflict. Only by promoting broader modes of participation will the reconstruction effort address the core grievances fueling the conflicts. The reverse is also true as the enormous investments being placed in reconstruction will only have a lasting impact if a sustainable peace is secured, be that in Sri Lanka or Aceh.

NOTES

1 See Sayyed Qassem Al, “Diplomacy and Humanitarian Disasters,” El Syassa El Dawliya Magazine, Issue 163, January 2006.

2 Jehan Perera, “Averting a Return to the PreTsunami Impasse,” National Peace Council, Internet, http://peace-srilanka.org/media_statements/current_situation/14,2,2005.htm (Date accessed: 15 February 2006).

3 For a comprehensive analysis, see Ed Aspinall,

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“The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?” Policy Studies East-West Center, 2005.

4 Martti Ahtisaari is a former president of Finland (1994–2000). In 2005 Ahtisaari, through his non-governmental organization CMI, successfully led peace negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government.

5 James Holkway and Jay Soloman, “In Sri Lanka, Aid to Tamils Deepens Political Tensions,” The Wall Street Journal, 11 January 2005.

Politics & Diplomacy

Development and Darfur Interview with Andrew Natsios On 27 February 2006 the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (GJIA) met with former United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Andrew Natsios to reflect on the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, and transformational development. Mr. Natsios served as administrator from May 2001 until January 2006 and has also served as Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance and Special Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan. From 1989 to 1991 he was director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID. Mr. Natsios is a graduate of Georgetown University and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where he received a master’s degree in public administration. He is currently Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and Advisor on International Development at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Andrew Natsios was the USAID administrator from 2001 until January 2006. He is currently distinguished professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and advisor on International Development at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

: We would like to focus on two topics, first the situation in Darfur and second development. How has USAID—as well as other humanitarian organizations—been reacting to the security problems in Darfur?

GJ I A

A N D R E W N A T S I O S : With respect to the security situation, it has been deteriorating since last October for a variety of reasons.

The first is that the rebel movements, the opposition to the

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national government, are atomizing, breaking down into smaller and smaller subunits. There used to be two principal rebel movements, the SLM [Sudan Liberation Movement] and the JEM [Justice and Equality Movement]. Those are now breaking down into smaller groups. Now, there is some—but not conclusive—evidence that the Sudanese government, the secret police, are using their funds to bribe various leaders of the African tribal community who are leading the rebellion, to break up into smaller groups deliberately to destroy the unity of command of the rebels.

They did the same thing in the south: they armed militias to attack the SPLM [Sudan People’s Liberation Movement] during the conflict there. In fact, there is a book that was written by Sadiq al Mahdi, who was the democratically elected prime minister in the 1980s. He wrote a book that was quite infamous in which he advocated four strategies to conquer southern Sudan. It appears the current government is using the same strategies in Darfur. The interesting thing is that Sadiq al Mahdi was unseated by a coup in June of 1989, and the government that unseated him is the government that is now in office and that is now prosecuting the war in Darfur; they appear to have taken his blueprint and moved it into Darfur.

The strategies that Sadiq al Mahdi advocated were: one, spread money around to cause chaos in the south; two, arm militias to cause intertribal conflict, which they did very successfully and caused hundreds of thousands of deaths; three, keep the war in the south and avoid letting it go into the north; and four, cause massive population displacements to destroy the tribal culture of the people of the south, which weakens their society and their cohesion. [ 1 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

They appear to be doing all of these things in Darfur as a tactic because they think it worked as a counterinsurgency measure in southern Sudan. The violence will get worse and worse until they stop doing this but also until there is a peace settlement in Darfur that includes the major tribal leaders of the major ethnic groups—the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa—and the Arab tribes that form the base of the militias that have been committing some of the worst atrocities (the northern Risigat tribe, for example).

The southern Risigat are opposed to the war and refuse to participate, and in fact, sometimes they protect the African farmers from attack by the Janjaweed militia.

Unless the traditional leaders are brought into the peace process and until they agree to some sort of political settlement, I do not think there is going to be peace in Darfur, no matter how many troops are sent in from the outside. NGOs [non-governmental organizations]; aid agencies like USAID; and UN agencies like UNICEF, the World Food Program, and UNOCHA [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] can do a remarkably good job at keeping people alive, and they have done that. But they cannot end the conflict, and we should not put a humanitarian band-aid on what is a political conflict. We should not put a humanitarian band-aid on what amounts to an organized campaign of genocidal violence as a cover for a counterinsurgency campaign on the cheap, as Alex de Waal, the scholar, recently said. : Would you suggest then that humanitarian organizations stay and, in addition, have the UN come in to try to broker the local peace process? It seems that the humanitarian organizations right now may be floundering.

GJ I A

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: Well, actually they are not floundering in terms of the work they are doing. The death rates in the camps were extraordinarily high at the beginning of the conflict, which is to say in 2004 and

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people live in camps, and we cannot keep people in camps forever. There has to be a settlement.

If the security situation continues to deteriorate and violence spreads more

If the violence spreads more widely,

then things could deteriorate fairly rapidly in the camps.

2005 in some of the camps, the death rates were seven or eight times the accepted level of an emergency—one death per ten thousand people per day. The death rates in all of the camps are well below one per day, which is probably lower than it is in the villages that have avoided the conflict. Life is very harsh for people in Darfur, even under normal circumstances with no conflict, because it is a very dry area, particularly in the central and northern part of the country. The ground is not that fertile except in the Jubulmara mountainous region. And as a result of that, people are very poor. And so the death rates are high normally.

They are very hardy people, but hardiness can only go so far under these circumstances, so when you put a catastrophic set of political events against this background of destitution, desertification, and collapse of livelihoods, then you have the potential for an enormous humanitarian disaster. The NGOs, UN agencies, and ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] have succeeded with the donor aid agencies like USAID and the Department for International Development [DFID] (the British aid agency) in lowering the death rates and avoiding a catastrophe. But two million

widely and the groups attack the relief effort, then things could deteriorate fairly rapidly in the camps. So it is important that we have stability while we are waiting for a diplomatic or political settlement.

Without security, the aid agencies cannot do their work. : What do you think about the U.S. proposal to have NATO intervene? You have said that a political peace agreement should be the number one priority.

However, in order to stop the killing, would NATO be the best option?

GJ I A

: Well, NATO is the most capable military force in the world in terms of a multinational force. The Africans have done a very good job, but the African militaries are not mobile militaries; they are not designed for combat over long distances. They do not have an enormous amount of equipment. Many of them are very fine soldiers, but that alone is not sufficient. There was an attack, and at least twenty African troops were killed by one of the combatant groups. So many of the African countries that have sent troops say we want our people to be better armed and we want more armor— armored personnel carriers and other things that can protect their troops,

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jobs, and get people back to their home villages so that they can be self-sufficient again. That is a development intervention G J I A : With any organization like USAID, there seems to be a gap between the type of being run by an emergency office because relief work occurring in Darfur, on the they realize that if you do not do that, you one hand, and real development assis- will be providing humanitarian relief fortance, on the other. How does a develop- ever. So that is the way in which USAID institutionally has connected relief and ment organization bridge this gap? development, by programming development interventions into its relief proN A T S I O S : This is a debate that has been going on since Fred Cuny wrote his grams, with considerable success.

There are people in the United famous book in the 1980s, called Disasters and Development, in which he argued that States who want us to just do humanithere is a disconnect between humanitar- tarian relief and not do development. ian relief as a discipline and long-term Humanitarian relief is much more development. What [Cuny] argued in that popular among the American people book—and what Mary Anderson and Peter than development is, and in my view Woodrow argued in Rising from the Ashes—was that is a myopic and almost an indefenthat it is possible to do development pro- sible position—because the fact is that grams in the middle of an emergency. For the only way to get people to recover example, in Darfur right now USAID from a disaster is to do development organized an effort to create a chicken programming. The way to reduce vulbusiness. We purchased a million chickens nerability to future disasters, to and hatched them through NGO grants, droughts, and to civil wars is through and women in the camps are now using development programs. them to create businesses. And of course these businesses are producing eggs, G J I A : You have said that USAID thinking which increase the protein content of has evolved from an emphasis on suspeople’s diets, and some of the chickens, tainable development to an emphasis on for a more prosperous person in the transformational development. What camp, are eaten. That has created a liveli- are the main differences between these hood or an income system: that is a devel- two concepts? opment program, even though it is in the middle of a terrible disaster.

N A T S I O S : I wrote an article last year in There has been a programmatic effort which I argued that there are nine princito deal with this over the years. I signed a ples of development that we should folmemo at USAID about a year and a half low. One of them is sustainability. If you ago, which created a new mandate for the start a project, you want at the end of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the project for it to be sustainable on its own principal responder for the U.S. govern- without any infusion of donor money. ment to foreign disasters in the develop- And that has always been and always will be ing world. Even though they are there to a USAID principle. Some of the other save people’s lives and to reduce suffering, principles include capacity building, they also have formally under this memo a accountability, assessments, and research. mandate to restore livelihoods, create We believe that talking about sustainwhich I think is a legitimate request.

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able development is not sufficient. It implies that the only important thing is that the project be sustainable once the funding ends. That is too narrow an objective for aid agencies and donor gov-

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poorest countries in the world in 1950.

There was widespread malnutrition. The country was a dictatorship. It required heavy funding from the United States. It now has its own foreign aid program. It is

Humanitarian relief is much more

popular among the American people than development, and that is a myopic and almost an indefensible position.

a middle class parliamentary democracy, a bedrock of democratic pluralism in Asia. It is an example to those developing countries that think that there is no hope. But nobody looking at South Korea now would believe how it was fifty years ago. However, what South Korea achieved is certainly not easy.

So what are the things you have to do?

One is you need to have sustained levels of economic growth. If you have no growth or negative growth, you will not have transformational development.

People talk too much about improving social services. Social services are an important part of development, but you can have a country that is well educated, with low death rates, low mortality rates, and good health, and people can still be G J I A : So how could a country achieve this desperately poor with no jobs, no livelitype of transformation? hoods, no income, and repressive governments. It is possible: there are govN A T S I O S : It is very difficult to achieve.

There are only maybe ten countries in ernments, Marxist governments, that the last fifteen to twenty years that have: have provided social services while people Chile, Costa Rica, Botswana, and are still desperately poor or where people Lesotho; earlier, Greece, Turkey, South even starve to death, as in the case of Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, North Korea—two and a half million Hong Kong, and Singapore all have had people starved to death in the 1990s. So transformational periods in their histo- you need to have sustained levels of ecory. South Korea was arguably one of the nomic growth over a long period of time. ernments and people from the South.

They should want to transform their societies so that they are developed countries that do not need any development funding or programs; the only way you do that is through transformation. And so we developed the notion of transformational development three or four years ago as a way to refocus the attention on the real purpose of international development: the purpose of international development is not sustainability, it is transformation. Sustainability is one of nine principles that help us achieve transformation, but it is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Transformation is the end.

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The only way to do that is through market reforms and economic liberalization.

Except for Hong Kong and Singapore, which are basically city-states, all of the countries that have developed successfully in the last forty years have done so first by developing themselves economically in the agricultural sector, through widespread large-scale increases in agricultural productivity that made them able to feed themselves and even export food. All of these countries did that first, and then they industrialized and grew wealthy.

The second condition for transformational development is moving toward a stable form of democratic governance that can provide public services, protect human rights, and have an orderly system of transfer of power from one government to another through elections and through multiple political parties and free press. The form of that democracy is different in different parts of the world.

South Korean democracy is not the same as Taiwanese or American; it has to be according to the traditions of the country.

But democracy and good governance we now know are an essential part of longterm transformational development.

If you have those two things, you can then provide education and health and other elements of social services in any civilized society. It certainly facilitates the development process to invest in primary education. South Korea and Taiwan both invested heavily in primary education, and they would argue that some of their success developmentally is a result of that.

We invested in primary education in the United States in the nineteenth century, and that facilitated the industrialization and increased agricultural productivity of the country.

So there are many examples of transformation occurring. But the two essen[ 1 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tials of transformation are one, economic growth; and two, good governance, the rule of law, and democracy. : You have said that “pure development, that is development abstracted from foreign policy concerns in the real world and the challenges it presents, is not likely sustainable over the long term, I fear.” What does this statement imply for development assistance to poor countries that might not have an overriding security or policy concern for the United States, like some African countries?

GJ I A

: Virtually every country in the developing world now does have a very important role in the American national security strategy. Why is that?

The developing world was a second, peripheral—but not central—battleground during the Cold War. Now the situation has reversed. Secretary Rice said this at Georgetown earlier this year. She said that we are shifting our diplomats out of Europe. She is going to put American diplomats in the developing world. Why? The headquarters for Al Qaeda in the late 1980s and early 1990s was in Somalia. Somalia has not had a national government in fifteen years. Then they were kicked out of Somalia, and where did they go? To Sudan, another failed state. Then they were kicked out of Sudan, and where did they go? To another failed state, Afghanistan. It is very clear that terrorist networks, human trafficking networks, criminal cartels, money laundering networks, narcotics rings, and all of the darker parts of globalization are linked together. I support globalization; I think it has done wonderful things for people and reduced poverty, but it has a darker side. Criminals can NATS I O S

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use the Internet. Just as the rest of us can use it for good purposes, it can also be used for evil purposes.

So we need functioning democratic states that can provide services and regulate their borders in order to combat

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interest to do it.

Many of the countries that have been most successful in the development process all bordered the Soviet or Chinese empire during the communist period. It was South Korea, it was Taiwan, it was

I believe fragile and failed states—with two

billion people living in them—are the central development challenge of our time. these darker forces. We now have a vital national interest in the success of the development processes in the developing world in a way that we never have before.

And I would argue that this is the case for Europe as well. It is more sustainable for the United States and Europe to argue that their aid programs are a national security priority, not just a nice thing to do for poor people in the developing world. We are not going to get foreign aid in huge amounts by simply saying that we need to support the Millennium Development Goals, and we need to support poverty reduction, which I certainly support; but it is not resonating among the American people. It never has.

I frankly think if you talk to Africans, they will tell you, “We would rather not be a charity case for the United States and Western Europe. We want to be partners because it is in our interest.” I talk with prime ministers, finance ministers, and foreign ministers, and they have said, “These lunatics are coming into our societies causing havoc. We do not want them here, and we need your help to build a functioning national state that combats these terrible forces.” So the Africans will tell you they want us to do it because it is in our

Malaysia, it was Thailand, it was Greece, and it was Turkey. The countries that succeeded were threatened by communist expansion. We helped them not out of charity, but because it was in our national interest to do it and in their national interest to do it. : You mentioned that developing countries do not want to be thought of as charity cases. There has been a lot of rhetoric lately about development including partnerships and participation. Do you think those concepts have actually been realized, or are they in fact just rhetoric?

GJ I A

: Well, if you talk to the Africans or the Latin Americans and ask them whether they think things have changed, they do not think things have changed.

They do not like to be categorized as failed states or fragile states. We have a category of countries in USAID that we developed, and the World Bank has similar categories, as do some of the European agencies, of fragile and failed states. I believe fragile and failed states—with two billion people living in them—are the central development challenge of our time. We are only now coming to terms with this problem.

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Hamas, Israel, and the Prospects for Peace Casimir A. Yost Palestinian and Israeli elections earlier this year replaced historically dominant parties and complicated the search for a negotiated peace settlement based on a two-state solution. On 25 January 2006, Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) candidates, running under the banner of the Change and Reform Party, won a decisive victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections, winning 74 seats in the 132-member parliament. A cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, filled with Hamas members and supporters, took office while refusing to recognize Israel and to commit itself to a negotiated two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as demanded by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Israel, and the United States. Members of the long-dominant Fatah Party refused to join the cabinet and formed the opposition in parliament, while continuing to control the presidency.

Israeli elections were held on 28 March 2006, and for the first time in Israel’s history neither the Labor nor the Likud parties came out on top. The recently formed Kadima party, headed by Ehud Olmert, won 29 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, ahead of both Labor and Likud, but requiring Olmert to seek coalition partners to govern and to implement his plan to withdraw Israeli settlers unilaterally from a large portion of the West Bank.

Casimir A. Yost is the director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and was a member of the international observer mission convened by the National Democratic Institute and Carter Center to monitor the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections.

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These elections have clarified, if not completely solidified, three emerging realities: a negotiated “land for peace” agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, if not impossible, is increasingly unlikely; the failure of Palestinian secular political leadership has given an opening to Islamists that may not be reversed easily; and U.S. foreign policy, while rhetorically forward looking, is increasingly disconnected from realities on the ground in Israel and the Palestinian territories. In these circumstances, the best outcome may be an unstable, begrudging tolerance between Palestinians and Israelis, but the more likely eventuality will be renewed conflict with a third Intifada.

Getting to 2006. The Oslo agreement in 1993 and the handshake on the White House lawn initiated a negotiation process, which culminated in late 2000

get to return to Israel proper except as tourists. Instead, he sanctioned terror to force Israeli decisions.

Israeli leaders too could not fully come to grips with their strategic choice—they wanted full peace but constantly hedged on full withdrawal to the June 1967 borders (with some necessary modifications). While peace negotiations proceeded in the 1990s, the Israeli settler population on the West Bank expanded.

At present, it stands at over 250,000 in 121 settlements, with 105 outposts scattered among 2.3 million Palestinians.

For too long Israelis and Palestinians lived with their respective myths. Israel’s “myths” included the following: 1. Israel could have absolute security, while Palestine would have to accept absolute insecurity in any final peace settlement. Under an agreement acceptable to Israel, there would be a permanent Israeli presence on the West Bank,

American foreign policy, while rhetorically

forward looking, is increasingly disconnected from realities on the ground. to early 2001 at Camp David in Maryland and in Taba, Egypt. When the negotiations ended, a negotiated two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was not achieved, and everyone had his or her own version of what went wrong.

Failure was rooted in Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat’s inability and unwillingness to translate his revolutionary past into statesmanship. It may be that Arafat never could come to grips with the reality that the only peace possible was one in which Palestinians of the diaspora would never [ 1 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

including in the Jordan Valley, in the form of settlements and military outposts. The June 1967 lines would be adjusted to accommodate major settlement blocs. The real argument between Israeli parties has been over the extent of this presence, not the presence itself.

2. A second Israeli myth contains the idea of Israel finding a Palestinian partner prepared to agree to Israel’s vision of a peace—a partner who would also have sufficient political power to deliver on such an agreement.

Palestinian “myths” included the

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following: 1. By playing the victim card or the terrorist card, Palestinians could engineer a full Israeli withdrawal to June 1967 lines and a viable Palestinian state. Palestinians hoped their visible oppression would lead to outside pressure on Israel to compromise or that terrorism would achieve moderation of Israeli views. Neither hope has materialized.

2. By holding out for maximum demands, Palestinians would improve their negotiating prospects and regain 22 percent of “historic Palestine,” a significant presence in Jerusalem, and a substantial return of refugees to Israel proper.

The peace process failed to close the distance between these myths except, perhaps, in the minds of technocrats at the negotiating table. The Palestinian “street,” including the substantial majority in the West Bank and Gaza under the age of twenty, never saw the promises of Oslo materialize into real improvements in their lives. Instead they saw settlement expansion, with its attendant Israeli military presence, and a web of restricted roads that increasingly encroached on their land and their lives. For Islamists the hope of regaining Jerusalem appeared to be disappearing. Meanwhile, the second Intifada, beginning in 2000 with its horrific terrorist attacks on innocent civilians, convinced a sizeable majority of Israelis that there was and would be no Palestinian peace partner.

The stark reality is that there has been no peace process since 2000. Israeli and Palestinian negotiations have lacked substance. The Bush administration, to be charitable, has been “otherwise engaged.” The “road map” for peace offered in a speech by President Bush on 24 June 2002 has been a mirage that has never become operationalized. The

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Quartet of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations has remained largely on the sidelines. A succession of U.S. envoys have parachuted into the region and quickly departed. The opportunity offered by Yasir Arafat’s death in November 2004 was largely ignored by all parties.

Palestinian terrorism drove Israelis to harsh counter-measures with terrible consequences for Palestinians, as captured by Amira Hass in an article in Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper: The regime of restriction on movement imposed by Israel on the Palestinians has crumbled the West Bank into dozens of closed or partially closed enclaves isolated from each other despite their geographical proximity. Permanent and mobile checkpoints, along with physical barriers of various kinds, fenced-off main roads, limitations on Palestinian traffic on east-west and north-south arteries, have cut off direct transportational links between areas of the West Bank.1 Some in Palestine’s Fatah and in Israel’s Labor Party remain committed to a negotiated peace process. However, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon formed a new party, Kadima, and staked out a new course for Israel—unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and most of the West Bank. The Gaza withdrawal was completed in September 2005. To safeguard its security and withdrawal, Israel began erecting a security barrier on the West Bank intended to separate the two peoples and stop most terrorist activity.

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in the Palestinian territories was but the latest in a sequence of popular Arab rejections of secular leaders, following similar successes in Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. The constant refrain among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, prior to the January legislative elections, was about the failure of Fatah to deliver—on peace, on security, and on essential services. Moreover, there was widespread agreement about the rampant corruption in the Palestinian Authority. The one thing the Palestinian Authority did deliver was a clean, well-managed election.

We can only speculate whether Fatah would have done better if Israel and the Quartet had stepped up after Arafat’s death and more fully “delivered” support to President Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen). He did not even receive any popular appreciation for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza—a withdrawal that many Palestinians credited to Hamas for forcing upon Israel.

What is clear is that Hamas out-organized Fatah in the elections. The Fatah vote was spread across multiple candidates. In the words of a Palestinian pollster, Khalil Shikaki, “Hamas won only 44 percent of the popular vote but got 56 percent of the seats. Fatah and its allies won 56 percent of the popular vote but got 43 percent of the seats.”2 Hamas is labeled as a terrorist organization by Israel and the Quartet—a charge Hamas’s record reinforces.

Hamas enforced a truce on its militants leading up to the January 2006 elections, but its party leaders show no inclination to amend their charter, which calls for Israel’s destruction. Hamas leaders, however, do talk of the possibility of a conditional “hudna,” or extended truce with Israel. [ 1 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The Palestinian people expressed themselves clearly concerning the failures of their secular leadership but less clearly regarding their enthusiasm for Hamas’s Islamic agenda. Despite the election outcome, the future leadership of the Palestinian people is in flux. There remains an uncertain division of authority between the office of Fatah, Abbas, and the Hamas-dominated Palestinian Authority government. Now, much depends on how Hamas’s success or failure is viewed by the Palestinian people. If Hamas is perceived as standing up for the rights and dignity of the Palestinian people against Israeli and Western oppression, it could emerge strengthened. If, on the other hand, Hamas is perceived by Palestinians as a barrier to a better future, the 2006 elections could well have been the party’s high-water mark.

Israel and Hamas. The Israeli gov-

ernment is determined to apply pressure on the Hamas leadership to recognize Israel, renounce violence, and commit itself to previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Israel has enormous leverage; all Palestinian exports and imports go through Israeli-controlled points, and Israel controls Palestinian water and electricity. With this leverage Israel has refused to transfer to the Palestinian Authority roughly $50 million in monthly tax receipts and customs duties it collects for Palestinians on Palestinian goods. It is seeking to apply significant pressure on the bankrupt Palestinian Authority, whose 140,000 employees face loss of salaries.

At the same time, Israel also faces challenges. Israel appears launched on a policy which specifically reverses the claims of supporters of Greater Israel to all the land to the Jordan River. The Olmert

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withdrawal plan requires anguishing choices including pulling back roughly 60,000 to 80,000 of 250,000 Israeli West Bank settlers into Israel’s major West Bank settlement blocs—hence the name “convergence.” Moreover, there are many uncertainties about the proposal, including how it will be financed, the extent of the withdrawal, and what residual military presence will be left in the abandoned parts of the West Bank.

Olmert has indicated that he is embark-

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tionary on Israeli-Palestinian issues for the last five years. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed surprise at the Hamas victory—which is only surprising because U.S. government employees and U.S. government-funded organizations are forbidden by law to talk to Hamas and its representatives.

There are two major inconsistencies in the U.S. approach to the Israel-Palestine dilemma. First, the United States pressed for elections in Palestine but is now

The reality is that the only peace possible is one in which Palestinians of the diaspora would never get to return to Israel proper except as tourists. ing on this radical course because demographic realities are forcing tough choices on Israelis. Shortly, there will be fewer Jews than Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

Olmert sees few good options. He holds out little prospect for a meaningful change in the Hamas position, noting that “they can’t just change their rhetoric.

They need to change their entire way of life, they need to change entirely their state of mind about Israel’s existence.”3 By embarking on this bold approach, Olmert is forcing tough choices on the United States, whose support he needs to implement the plan.

The U.S. Role. As noted above, U.S.

foreign policy has been rhetorically forward looking but practically disconnected from emerging realities with respect to the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Indeed, U.S. foreign policy has been largely reac-

embarked on a policy seeking to undo the results of those free and fair elections.

Steven Erlanger of the New York Times had a much quoted piece out of Jerusalem on 14 February 2006, in which he said, “The United States and Israel are discussing ways to destabilize the Palestinian government so that newly elected Hamas officials will fail and elections will be called again...”4 Although this story was quickly denied in Washington, Rice did travel to the Middle East seeking—with mixed success—support for a policy of squeezing Hamas by cutting off funding to the Palestinian Authority.

A second inconsistency in U.S. policy is its rhetorical commitment to the “road map,” leading through negotiations to a two-state settlement. The reality on the ground today is that neither the dominant party in Israel nor the newly dominant party in Palestine shares this commitment. Both sides speak of interim Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 4 3 ]

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arrangements. U.S. policy seems virtually irrelevant to facts on the ground.

These “facts” are that Abbas has been marginalized by all concerned, Hamas rejects negotiations, and Israeli leaders are embarking on unilateral policies which do not entail negotiations with a Palestinian partner.

Plan A for the United States, therefore, is to lean on Hamas until it revises or renounces its charter, recognizes Israel, and commits itself to the Oslo process. This is evidenced by Rice’s announcement, on 7 April 2006, that “the United States is suspending assistance to the Palestinian government’s cabinet and ministries.”5 The State Department identified several hundred million dollars in assistance that would be “suspended or canceled,” while noting that humanitarian aid funneled mainly through UN agencies would be increased. The EU announced similar cuts in funding.

It is not clear what Plan B will be when—as seems likely—Plan A fails. At best Plan A is a huge gamble on the

toric Palestine to the June 1967 borders.

What Comes Next? This is a tragedy

with many plots and sub-plots. Fatah and Hamas are locked in an internal Palestinian power struggle. Israel has a new coalition government with an uncertain mandate. The United States is preoccupied with other pressing challenges in the region, particularly in Iraq and Iran. Under the circumstances, the means through which and the level at which resources will flow to increasingly desperate Palestinians is unclear.

If Hamas does not succumb to pressure from Israel, the United States, and the EU, human misery will escalate in the territories as the Palestinian Authority crumbles. According to a recent article in Haaretz, “World Bank statistics show that if there is no dramatic change, 75 percent of Palestinians will be below the poverty line within 2 years. The current rate is 56 percent, compared with 22 percent in 2000.”6 James Wolfensohn, the Quartet’s special Middle East envoy, has warned that cutting off the salaries of

The United States pressed for elections in

Palestine but is now embarked on a policy seeking to undo the results of those free and fair elections. proposition that Hamas would rather cave in to pressure than fail. However, Hamas leaders may perceive that the rewards for changing its charter are too meager—Israel is unlikely to change its policies and move toward anything approaching what Palestinian politics require, a return of 22 percent of his[ 1 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

140,000 Palestinian Authority employees could have disastrous effects, stating, “If you don’t pay the civil servants, who themselves support 900,000 people, I’m afraid the frustration could reach a level where you couldn’t contain it.”7 Israel, faced with a catastrophe on its doorstep and the likelihood of renewed

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violence, may have no choice but to reimpose a full-scale military authority in the West Bank. Plans for disengagement would have to be put on hold. The security barrier would not solve this problem, and Israel would confront the full impact of the demographic implications of occupying land in which Jews are a minority.

U.S. policymakers somehow believed over the last five years that they had the luxury of time. They believed that the United States’s Middle East policies could remain consumed by Iraq at no cost to other pressing issues. They have not vigorously pursued the peace process since 2000, and the consequences of that inattention are now all too evident.

As with all difficult foreign policy challenges, there are three main options: breakthrough, breakdown, and muddle through. At this moment, option two appears the most likely, though option three is not impossible. There will be no breakthrough.

An “acceptable” Palestinian peace partner will not miraculously emerge from the spreading Palestinian chaos. Even if Olmert is successful in initiating his convergence plans, full disengagement will be unlikely and certainly no Palestinian leader can agree to unilaterally imposed borders.

The “muddle through” option would require both Israel and Hamas to back off from the brink. Hamas, operating in conjunction with Fatah, would have to

Politics & Diplomacy

decisively address Israel’s security concerns without explicitly renouncing its past positions. Israel, in turn, would have to ensure that resources are permitted to flow to the Palestinian people in order to avert a humanitarian crisis. Such an understanding between Israel and Hamas might, in time, lead to other more substantial interim arrangements. The possibility, as pointed out by Dr. Henry Kissinger in an article in the Washington Post, reminds us that “such a long-term interim understanding would build on the precedent of the Israeli–Syrian disengagement agreement, which has regulated the deployment of forces in the Golan Heights since 1974 amid disputes on a variety of other issues and Syrian failure to recognize Israel.”8 The U.S. role in this scenario would be relatively limited since U.S. law forbids government officials to speak to Hamas and prohibits funds from going to a party labeled as a terrorist organization.

Olmert will likely ask the United States to endorse his withdrawal plan. The devil will be in the details of that plan, but supporting unilateral actions by one party to the conflict raises serious questions about the U.S. role in this tragedy. On a central issue of U.S. foreign policy, the United States has largely taken itself out of the game and put its interests in the hands of players who have demonstrated only an ability to replace old myths with new barriers to dialogue and compromise.

NOTES

1 Amera Hass, “Israeli Restrictions Create Isolated Enclaves in West Bank,” Haaretz, 24 March 2006.

2 Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, “The Weapon of Democracy,” The New York Times, 15 February 2006.

3 Interview with Ehud Olmert, “Israel Should Not Be on the Forefront of a War Against Iran,” Time, 9 April 2006.

4 Steven Erlanger, “U.S. and Israelis Are Said to Talk of Hamas Ouster,” The New York Times, 14 February 2006.

5 Condoleezza Rice, “Statement on Palestinian Assistance,” Department of State, 7 April 2006.

6 Akiva Eldar, “UN Aid Workers: Gaza on the Verge of Disaster,” Haaretz, 4 April 2004.

7 Quoted in Steven Erlanger, “Bank Warns Palestinians of Bleak Year for Economy,” The New York Times, 16 March 2006.

8 Henry A. Kissinger, “What’s Needed from Hamas,” The Washington Post, 27 February 2006.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 4 5 ]

AD PAGE 146

Science&Technology Leading the Renewable Energy Revolution Joanna I. Lewis China is a particularly important place in which to examine the opportunities for renewable energy development due to the size of its current energy demand and its projected renewable energy market potential. In addition to promoting renewable energy development, China is committed to developing indigenous renewable energy technology industries, motivated by the economic—as well as the environmental—benefits these technology industries provide. Already a global leader in solar thermal technology manufacturing and in manufacturing small hydro and wind turbines, China also has burgeoning solar photovoltaic (PV) and utility-scale wind turbine industries. With newly enacted national legislation to promote the development and dissemination of these technologies, many of China’s renewable energy markets are just now beginning to mature. The entry of Chinese manufacturers into rapidly expanding global markets may drive down costs and increase the viability of renewable energy technology utilization worldwide, in both developing and developed country applications.

China consumes and produces more coal than any other nation in the world: two-thirds of its total primary energy consumption and three-quarters of electricity generation come from coal. Consequently, China is the second largest national emitter of carbon dioxide after the United States.

Because its energy consumption and carbon emissions are

Joanna I. Lewis is a senior international fellow at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service in the Science, Technology, and International Affairs program.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 4 7 ]

LEADING THE RENEWABLE ENERGY REVOLUTION

growing rapidly, China is expected to surpass the United States in these two categories sometime in the next few decades. Energy use has grown faster than GDP in China over the past three years, with coal comprising more than twothirds of the increase in primary energy supply over this time period.1 Although the Chinese government has historically promoted an energy development plan that relied on indigenous energy resources as much as possible, oil imports are now rising rapidly to meet new demand, stimulating increased energy security concerns.2 However, a substantial mismatch exists between the geographic distribution of China’s abundant coal resources and China’s major centers of population, industry, and economic growth.

Both the highest quality and highest concentration of coal reserves are generally found in the north, while the energy-hungry and economically dynamic areas of southern and eastern China only have about 5 percent of national coal reserves.3 These regional resource imbalances have played a role in triggering power supply crises. For example, seasonal fluctuations in hydropower have led southern China to increase its demand for coal-fired power in drought periods, precipitating a nationwide “power famine” or “coal rush.”4 In addition, the transmission of power over thousands of kilometers from the economically underdeveloped west and north to the major load centers of the east and south significantly adds to the cost of the electricity supply and also constrains the development of the power sector.

It is in this context that China has begun to pursue renewable energy options. Renewable energy technologies [ 1 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

can generate electricity in places where fossil fuels are scarce, promoting domestic energy security while reducing environmentally damaging emissions. Wind energy has proven to be a particularly valuable contribution to China’s energy mix by providing a cost-competitive option in regions where coal is scarce and electricity prices are highest—primarily along China’s eastern coast. Wind electricity prices, although higher than coal electricity prices, are competitive with electricity prices from new natural gas plants, new nuclear plants, and even hydropower plants when the power is transported over long distances.

China’s Emergence in the Global Wind Power Industry.

Wind is increasingly becoming a viable option internationally; although electricity generated from wind power currently represents only a half a percent of global electricity production, it is the fastest growing energy source in the world, with annual installations increasing at an average rate of over 30 percent per year for the past decade.5 Demand for wind power is projected to double over the next four years.6 China is part of this global trend of scaling up wind power; by the end of 2005 China had installed an estimated 1,260 megawatts, a more than 20-fold increase compared to a decade earlier.

However, even with these growth rates, wind power’s overall share in China’s electricity portfolio remains small, and this situation is unlikely to change. The 30 gigawatts of wind power capacity designated for development by 2020 in current government energy plans is small relative to the estimated 230 to 270 gigawatts of new coal power capacity and 200 to 240 gigawatts of hydropower

LEWIS

Science &Technology

capacity planned to be built over that environmental and health problems same time frame.7 Wind power’s share in stemming from China’s dependence on China’s entire electricity portfolio will coal and in some cases to promote rural likely increase from around 0.2 to 3 per- energy development. Simultaneously, cent between now and 2020 (projected China has been developing its own penetrations for other renewables are renewable energy technologies through domestic research and development illustrated in Figure 1).8 If wind power’s total contribution to programs. Wind power technology has China’s sizable energy demand is likely to been particularly successful in China remain small, why pay attention to due to excellent wind resources and China’s wind development initiatives? rapid technological improvements in the China, along with many other countries, domestic wind industry. The governis looking not only to expand its domestic ment has taken several steps to directly use of renewable energy, but also to devel- encourage local wind turbine manufacop the indigenous industries to serve this turing, including policies that encourdemand. Although wind may remain a small coal 2020 share of total large hydro electricity genersmall hydro ation in China, it 2010 natural gas still represents a nuclear demand for wind 2003 around 20,000 biomass wind turbines by solar 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2020, and current policies dicPercent Contribution to Electric Power Capacity tate that these Figure 1. China’s Electricity Generation Capacity: Current and turbines be made 9 Projected Shares of Renewables in China. The total installed capacity of wind globally (currently age joint ventures and technology transaround fifty-nine GW), is expected to fers in large wind turbine technology, as double before 2010.10 This projected well as policies that mandate locally made global demand is stimulating many wind turbines. Policymakers have also nations to look toward developing used differential customs duties to favor domestic wind technology industries, domestic rather than overseas turbine and China is aggressively using policies to assembly and have allocated public support its own domestic manufacturers research and development (R&D) supas they look toward competing in the port to wind power technology development. A series of government-run tenglobal market.

Over the past two decades, renewable ders known as “wind concessions” are energy technologies have been trans- expected to facilitate the development of ferred from several industrialized coun- about 3,500 megawatts of new wind tries to China in an effort to alleviate power capacity in the next four years, Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 4 9 ]

LEADING THE RENEWABLE ENERGY REVOLUTION

and locally produced turbines must be used. A National Renewable Energy Law that went into effect in January 2006 builds upon this concession program by mandating that a competitive bidding process be held for most large wind projects, and again, that turbines be manufactured locally.

The number of turbines being produced locally in China is growing at an even faster rate than that of total wind turbine installations. However, China is

bines in China could reduce costs by 20 to 40 percent, with early company reports supporting this estimate.11 Countries with lower wage rates such as India and China expect to be able to realize cost savings compared to their European and American counterparts through domestic manufacturing. This cost reduction is potentially significant for those turbine components that are particularly labor intensive, such as rotor blades.12 Many overseas turbine manufac-

A substantial mismatch exists between the geographic distribution of China’s abundant coal resources and its major centers of population, industry, and economic growth.

currently producing only a half a percent of the world’s wind turbines, indicating that Chinese companies are still a long way from being global industry leaders.

Danish and German turbine manufacturers still dominate the world market as they have for many years; however, there are signs that they are losing ground.

Spanish manufacturers have been gradually increasing their global market share, with the leading Spanish manufacturer recently surpassing the leading U.S. manufacturer’s sales for 2004. Indian manufacturers have also been rapidly expanding into the global market, including European markets long dominated by local companies.

Although wind turbines manufactured in China are smaller than the advanced turbines being sold in Europe and the United States, low cost remains the main attraction of Chinese turbines. Studies have estimated that producing wind tur[ 1 5 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

turers are shifting their turbine production facilities to China, currently spurred by policies mandating the use of locally made turbines in domestic projects, along with expectations of forthcoming cost savings.

Cost reductions are also likely to result from China’s contribution to cumulative global wind turbine production. Each doubling of wind turbine technology production is estimated to result in a 20percent decrease in the marginal cost of the technology.13 Chinese firms produced the world’s largest volume of small-scale (up to ten kilowatts) wind turbine generators in 2000, but only five companies in China manufactured grid-connected wind turbines in the range of 250 to 750 kilowatts. One to one and a half megawatt turbines are only under development.14 Growth in these areas, as well as in small-scale turbines, should drive down marginal costs.

LEWIS

Goldwind (Jinfeng) is the leading Chinese-owned utility-scale wind turbine manufacturer and has been the primary beneficiary of government policies that preferentially support the utilization of domestically manufactured wind turbines. Goldwind has captured between a fifth and a quarter of Chinese market share over the past few years, despite strong competition from the leading global wind turbine manufacturers. At the end of 2005, Goldwind turbines already represented about 17.5 percent of total wind turbine installations in China, and the company is rapidly expanding production. Moreover, in 2005 Goldwind installed 204 new wind turbine generators with a total capacity of 132.45 megawatts—their largest annual installation to date (up from 66 turbines totaling 39.6 megawatts in 2004).

However, production of turbines is currently limited by the company’s small size and limited manufacturing facilities.

Goldwind has produced more than 270 of its 600-kilowatt wind turbines. In 2004 it installed its first 750-kilowatt turbine, followed by another 63 machines in 2005. Goldwind is also developing a 1.2-megawatt turbine; its first model was just installed in Xinjiang in 2005 for field tests. Goldwind’s turbines are not yet fully made of locally produced components, although domestic content increases every year. Initially blades were a limiting factor for making locally produced turbines, but Goldwind now uses blades made by Baoding, a blade factory in eastern China.

As local content utilized in Goldwind turbines has increased, costs reportedly have declined. As a result, Goldwind expects that domestically produced wind turbines will represent an increasing share of wind turbine sales in China. The

Science &Technology

current policy framework promoting wind power in China suggests that this will most certainly be the case, due to the widespread use of mechanisms that directly promote the use of domestic wind turbines. As China’s domestic manufacturers mature, there is certainly the potential that these companies will move towards exporting their turbines internationally. China’s large-scale entry into wind turbine manufacturing could make wind power a more cost-effective option for countries around the world looking to leapfrog towards cleaner energy technologies.

China’s Experience with Solar Energy Technologies. China’s other

emerging renewable technology industries are building momentum as well— most notably the solar photovoltaic industry. Meanwhile, China’s more highly developed renewable energy technology industries are maintaining global market dominance. China is a global leader in manufacturing small wind turbines, small hydro turbines, and solar thermal technologies.15 China has extensive experience with basic solar thermal technologies and has the largest solar water heater market in the world. With an estimated 64 million square meters of installations as of 2004 and a projected installation of 270 million square meters by 2020, China’s utilization of solar water heater technology far exceeds that of all other countries combined (there are about 14 million square meters of installations in Europe and about 2 million square meters in the United States). The widespread use of solar water heaters in China has been tied to the unique opportunity for building-integrated technology. Although the solar hot water business was iniSummer/Fall 2006 [ 1 5 1 ]

LEADING THE RENEWABLE ENERGY REVOLUTION

tially developed in smaller towns and villages in the 1980s, China’s real estate boom, in combination with high-energy costs in urban areas, has resulted in the wide use of solar water heaters in newly constructed buildings. Importantly, consumer acceptance of this technology in China is also said to be quite high.16 China has the largest solar water heater manufacturing capacity of any country in the world. There are over 1,000 enterprises in China manufacturing solar water heaters, with 12 million square meters produced in 2003—double the number produced in China in 2000.17 Chinese solar water heaters are reportedly the most competitively priced in the world, and the industry employs some 250,000 people.18 As of 2005, China had installed about 75 megawatts of solar photovoltaics (PV), with over half being used for rural applications. Government plans aim for 450 megawatts to be installed by 2010 and 5,000 megawatts by 2020—including an 8-megawatt system in the Gobi desert that will be the largest grid-connected PV system of this type in the world.19 China’s domestic PV production has scaled up extremely rapidly over the past few years and is projected to grow by another 400 percent in the next 5 years.20 In 2001 China reportedly had 7 manufacturers producing 4.5 megawatts of PV cells, which represents a doubling of production from 2.1 megawatts in 1998, as well as about 1 percent of global market share. By 2005 China had the world’s third-largest solar cell production capacity, with 30 major Chinese solar cell manufacturers comprising about 30 percent of global market share.21 Tests of some Chinese-produced solar modules exported to other markets have raised concerns about [ 1 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

product quality, which could be attributed to the relative infancy of the Chinese industry.22 Currently, solar cell production in China—and around the world—is limited by the availability of silicon and wafers on the world market.23 Annual solar module production capacity in 2005 reportedly reached a high of 635 megawatts, up from around 100 megawatts in 2004. This number exceeds China’s cell production capacity, indicating China would need to import cells to maximize full use of its module production capacity.24 Cell production capacity in 2004 was about 70 megawatts. There are at least 14 companies in China manufacturing solargrade silicon and solar wafers, while Chinese production and export of solar-grade silicon grew by 50 to 100 percent in 2005 alone.25 Hundreds of other Chinese firms are producing ancillary equipment such as PV pumping systems, inverters, charge controllers, DC lights, and test equipment.26 It is estimated that $5 to 7 billion in capital investment was made in the solar PV industry globally in 2005, with a growing percentage occurring in China.27

Conclusions. The trend in China’s

renewable energy technology industries has been one of rapid growth. Some technologies, including small wind turbines, solar water heaters, small hydro turbines, and solar panels, are already being exported overseas. Chinese policies to promote renewable energy utilization over the past decade have had the ancillary goal of promoting renewable energy industry development, which has been realized successfully across most technologies. As China continues to grow and its demand for energy increas-

LEWIS

es, the domestic market for these technologies is substantial.

China’s domestic market opportunity gives indigenous producers the testing ground they need to develop the technology and production scale that permits them to become global technological leaders. Consequently, the emergence of more and more Chinese companies in global renewable energy technology markets appears to be inevitable. The effect that this emergence will have on lowering technology costs worldwide is still somewhat uncertain, but early evidence from the wind and solar industries suggests that it could be significant. In addition to cost savings that may be specific to the Chinese labor market or to domestic innovations, the entry of new manufacturers that play a significant role in increasing global technology production will drive down technology costs as they move further down the learning curve.28 China’s role in manufacturing many small-scale renewable energy technologies has already made the technologies more accessible to less developed countries where small-scale renewables have played an important role in rural development initiatives. In addition, China is rapidly expanding its nanotechnology research programs, which current studies indicate is likely to be a key area for new solar power technologies.29 Renewable energy technologies are not likely to displace conventional electricity technologies in the near term, but in certain regions, the penetration could be significant. Denmark gets about 20 percent of its electricity from wind power, and some German states as much as 15 percent. Offshore wind farm development, if it can overcome some technological and social obstacles, could make

Science &Technology

wind’s share increase even further. As energy security becomes an increasingly important issue, displacing fossil fuels has benefits beyond purely environmental ones. Many U.S. states are adopting renewable portfolio standards to force utilities to invest in renewable energy, not just for the environmental benefits, but also recognizing that a diverse portfolio can be the best hedge against volatile fuel price fluctuations.30 It is clear that there is an increasing role for renewables, and that much of this new demand will be met by technology manufacturers in emerging markets.

Until now, the most advanced renewable electric technologies have come from Europe, the United States, and Japan, but these countries risk losing market share if emerging economy-based manufacturers are successful in producing comparatively lower cost technology.

India is already technologically ahead of China in manufacturing utility-scale wind turbines, and Brazil is looking to expand its use of renewables with new national legislation.

China’s national renewable energy law may provide its existing renewable energy technology manufacturers with a signal of regulatory stability that is crucial to facilitating investments in new technologies. China’s prior experience with small-scale renewables, combined with a domestic policy framework that supports indigenous manufacturers in the newer technology industries, makes it especially well positioned to expand into these emerging markets. In summary, there are many signs that China’s renewable energy markets may be just starting to mature, and this is a phenomenon that other countries should be watching closely.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 5 3 ]

LEADING THE RENEWABLE ENERGY REVOLUTION NOTES

1 Jonathan E. Sinton, ed, David G. Fridley, Joanna I. Lewis, Yanxia Chen, Jieming Lin, and Nan Zhou, China Energy Databook, sixth revised edition (Berkeley: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, June 2004).

2 Gal Luft, “Fueling the dragon: China’s race into the oil market,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Internet, http://www.iags.org/china.htm (Date accessed: 30 April 2006); Downs, Erica Strecker, China’s Quest for Energy Security, RAND Corporation, Internet, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ monograph_reports/MR1244/index.html (Date accessed: 30 April 2006).

3 Sinton et al., 2004.

4 Qiu Xin, 2005, “China overhauls energy bureaucracy,” Asia Times, 3 June 2005. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GF03Ad01.html 5 Global Wind Energy Council data, various years.

Available at: http://www.gwec.net/.

6 BTM Consult, International Wind Energy Development, World Market Update 2004, March 2005.

7 Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook, U.S. Department of Energy, 2005; Yu Zhufeng, “Policy Study on Development and Utilization of Clean Coal Technologies,” in China National Energy Strategy and Policy Study 21, The Energy Foundation, November 2004. Available at: http://www.efchina.org/documents/11_Clean_Coal_Te chnology.pdf; Jonathan E. Sinton, Rachel E. Stern, Nathaniel T. Aden, and Mark D. Levine with Tyler J. Dillavou et al, Evaluation of China’s Energy Strategy Options, LBNL-56609, May 2005.

8 Projections are the author’s calculations based on published Chinese government energy plans.

9 Twenty thousand wind turbines assumes an average size of 1.5 MW per turbine; currently wind turbines installed in most large wind projects in China must meet a 70 percent local-content requirement.

10 GWEC, press release, 17 February 2006; BTM Consult, 2005.

11 W. M. Yu and G. Wu, “The Development of China’s Wind Turbine Manufacturing Industry and the Strategy of Goldwind Co,” Proceedings of the World Wind Energy Congress, Beijing, China, 31 October to 4 November 2004.

12 Soren Krohn, “Creating a Local Wind Industry: Experience from Four European Countries,” Helios Center for Sustainable Energy Strategies, 4 May 1998.

13 M. Junginger and A. Faaij, “A Global Experience Curve for Wind Energy,” Presented at the 2003 European Wind Energy Conference & Exhibition, Madrid, Spain, 16-19 June 2003.

14 Eric Martinot and William Wallace, “Case Study: UNDP/GEF Project for Commercialization of Renewable Energy in China,” Global Environment Facility, Washington, DC, 2003; UNDP/GEF Renewable Energy Project, Beijing, June 2003.

15 For wind “small” typically means turbines less than ten kilowatts. For hydro this distinction is less

[ 1 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

clear, but in China the term generally refers to turbines smaller than fifty megawatts.

16 Jean Ku and Debra Lu, “Transforming the Solar Market in China,” Proceedings of the 2005 Solar World Conference, Orlando, Florida, 6-12 August 2005.

17 Hua Li, “From Quality to Quantity. How China’s maturing solar thermal industry will need to face up to market challenges,” Renewable Energy World, January/February 2005, Internet, http://www. earthscan.co.uk/news/article.asp?UAN=323&SP=3325586 98736342450334&v=3; Hua Li, “China’s Solar Thermal Industry: Threat or Opportunity for European Companies?” Renewable Energy World, July/August 2002. Available at: http://jxj.base10.ws/ magsandj/rew/2002_04/china_solar.html.

18 Li, 2005; Eric Martinot, “Renewables 2005 Global Status Report. REN21-Renewable and Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century,” 2005. Internet, http://www.martinot.info/RE2005_Global_Status _Report.pdf.

19 Ku and Lu, 2005.

20 Johan Trip, “Enormous growth for Chinese PV Industry,” 13 January 2006, Internet, http://old.technocrat.net/article.pl?sid=06/01/13/1558218&mode=t hread.

21 Trip, 2006.

22 Arne Jacobson and Daniel M. Kammen, “The Value of Vigilance: Evaluating Product Quality in the Kenyan Solar Photovoltaics Industry,” Report delivered to solar industry stakeholders in East Africa, 2 July 2005, Internet http://www.humboldt.edu/~aej1/ aSiKenya_FinalReport_July2_05.pdf.

23 Trip, 2006; John Carey, “What’s Raining on Solar’s Parade?” Science & Technology, 6 February 2006.

24 Solarplaza, The Chinese PV Market and Industry, 2006, Internet, http://www.solarplaza. com/content/pagina/China%20Report%20Benefits/43439; Martinot, Eric, 2005 25 Trip, 2006.

26 Martinot and Wallace, 2003.

27 Martinot, 2005.

28 M. Junginger and A. Faaij, 2003; Robert M. Margolis, “Photovoltaic Technology Experience Curves and Markets,” Presentation at NCPV and Solar Program Review Meeting, Denver Colorado, 24 March 2003.

29 Worldwatch Institute, State of the World 2006 (New York: Norton & Company, 2006), 88; MIT Technology Review, “From the Lab: Nanotechnology.

New publications, experiments, and breakthroughs in nanotechnology—and what they mean,” September 2005, Internet, http://www.technologyreview.com/ NanoTech/wtr_14754,303,p1.html 30 Ryan Wiser, Mark Bolinger, and Matthew St. Clair, “Easing the Natural Gas Crisis: Reducing Natural Gas Prices through Increased Deployment of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency,” Report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, LBNL56756, January 2005.

Books

Opening Pandora’s Box: A Radical Look at Controlling Illicit Trade

and corruption. In extreme cases, it threatens to destabilize governments, as in Afghanistan and Colombia. Combating illicit trade requires hundreds of billions of dollars for enforcement expenditures, Review By Jeffrey Miron which nevertheless seem to have minimal Moises Naim, Illicit, New York: effect. Naim has a two-fold thesis that not only illustrates the nature and magnitude Doubleday, 2005, 352 pp. $26.00 of the problem, but also convinces the audience that something new and differMoises Naim’s Illicit is a fascinating book ent has emerged over the past several that brings together a vast range of trou- decades that needs to be addressed.

The first component of Naim’s thesis is bling phenomena. Naim discusses drug trafficking, the black market in guns, that illicit trade as it exists today is not just child prostitution, illegal immigration, about a small number of deviants commitbootlegged CDs, pirated software, trade ting crime; the illicit trade is simply interin endangered species, sale of black mar- national trade. The participants are not ket body parts, money laundering, and malcontents who flaunt society’s laws with more. In each area, he recounts horrific malicious intent. Rather, the purveyors in tales about how purveyors of these goods illicit markets are businessmen who are evade the law for profit, outmaneuvering motivated by profits. Consequently, so the best efforts of governments at every long as the profit incentives persist, the turn. With good reason, Naim argues that illicit trade will persist as well. Imprisoning this illicit trade is an enormous problem individuals presently engaged in illegal for modern society, generating violence activities will have only minor effects.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 5 5 ]

OPENING PANDORA’S BOX

This component of Naim’s thesis is beyond reasonable dispute. The motivation for the vast majority of those involved in illicit activities is economics; no more, no less. While they are indeed criminals under existing law, thinking of those who participate as fundamentally different from the common individual is neither accurate nor productive. The people who become major drug traffickers, however, are probably less risk averse, more willing to accept physical danger, and more entrepreneurial than the average person.

In different circumstances, their skills might have made them CEOs of major corporations. Those engaged in the illicit trade at lower levels are simply people whose opportunities to earn income in legitimate activities are poor, and thus they supplement their incomes with illicit activities when possible. Indeed, as Illicit emphasizes, the distinction between those participating in illegal versus legal trade is blurry; the vast majority do both.

The second main component of Naim’s thesis, and the part that is more open to debate, states that illicit trade is now, in nature and magnitude, different from what the world has witnessed before.

For example, Naim writes, “Changes in political and economic life, along with revolutionary technologies in the hands of civilians, have dissolved the sealants that governments traditionally relied on to secure their national borders. At the same time, market-oriented economic reforms that swept the world in the 1990s boosted incentives to break through these sealants—legally or otherwise.” Certain elements of this view are undoubtedly correct, but the broader message—that things are truly different now—requires careful consideration. The claim that illicit trade is growing in magnitude and scope is plausible. Good data are hard to [ 1 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

come by, however, and illicit traffic is hardly new. The validity of this conclusion is therefore difficult to evaluate.

The claim that technology has played a significant role in the spread of illicit activity is reasonable. Cell phones, e-mail, the Internet, and other aspects of the electronic revolution either facilitate certain kinds of illicit traffic or create the opportunity for that traffic. Cheap cell phones and beepers allow prostitutes to receive solicitations by phone, making it harder for police to target them; faster boats and high-tech surveillance techniques make it easier for smugglers to evade border authorities; pirated DVDs exist because DVRs are so cheap that anyone can go into the bootleg business. Of course, improvements in technology should mean that law enforcement officials also have more tools at their disposal. Nevertheless, it seems the traffickers often get better technology or acquire it sooner than government officials, perhaps due to bureaucratic delays in government processes. For example, while law enforcement officials get faster boats, drug traffickers get submarines. As such, technological advances may widen the gap between the illicit market and law enforcement.

As for the claim that economic reform has spurred illicit trade, Naim again raises a fair point. With increasing legitimate trade, hiding illicit trade becomes easier.

Similarly, when people and goods cross borders daily for legitimate purposes, it is difficult for authorities to ferret out the illicit components. It is important to remember, of course, that economic liberalizations have benefited millions, but they also facilitate illicit traffic.

Thus, the following arguments are assumed to be correct: first, that illicit activity is about trade, not crime; and second, that technology and more open bor-

MIRON

ders have facilitated this trade. As Naim ably illustrates, even the best-intentioned enforcement authorities face an insurmountable challenge in attempting to restrain illicit trade. The issue, then, pertains mostly to what an appropriate response from policymakers entails.

To answer this, a question that Naim does not ask must be addressed: why does illicit trade occur in the first place? It is difficult to assess possible policy responses without considering this issue. Illicit trade is as old as civilization; factors such as economic liberalization and technology do not explain its existence. Similarly, while illicit traffic may well have become more businesslike than in times past, economic motives have always been the key reason for this business, and history provides good examples of highly developed illicit enterprises (e.g. Al Capone during alcohol prohibition). Thus, something else must be the root cause of illicit traffic. It is difficult to assess possible policy responses without considering this issue.

Illicit trade is caused by government policies that prohibit or restrict licit trade. If drugs were legal, there would be no illicit drug trafficking, just a legal supply as with alcohol and tobacco. If prostitution were legalized, there would be no black market for such services, just market provision as with maid services or golf lessons. Without laws against copyright infringement, reproduction of books or CDs would be just another business. If taxes were lower, fewer people would bother to evade them. In the absence of anti-money laundering laws, the financial transactions now sanctioned by these laws would be ordinary financial transactions.

Were the trade in human organs legalized, multinational medical companies would coordinate the search for donors in poor countries and match them with recipients

Books

in rich countries. Without arms bans, guns would flow around the world in legal channels, just as they do currently in some countries. If countries did not restrict immigration, there would be no role for “coyotes” to smuggle poor Mexicans across the Texas border.

This view—that illicit trade occurs because of government policies—is indisputable, yet it might seem uninteresting because it is tautological. In addition, popular opinion holds that government should prohibit or restrict all the activities that now make up illicit traffic.

Set aside for the moment whether prohibitions of drugs, prostitution, guns, immigration, and the like are good policy.

What is clear is that a discussion of this issue is the missing piece of Naim’s analysis. The illicit nature of trade in these goods causes violence and corruption.

The reason for illicit activities is government policies that outlaw the activities.

The government has, at best, a limited ability to shut this traffic down, and the attempt to enforce these prohibitions costs hundreds of billions each year in enforcement expenditure and foregone tax revenues. It is impossible, therefore, to avoid the question: should governments adopt policies, like drug prohibition, that create illicit markets in the first place? The answer, for the most part, is no.

Consider the case of drug prohibition.

The standard arguments for outlawing drugs are, first, that consumers are myopic about the risks and therefore consume too much and, second, that drug use harms innocent third parties, such as the children of drug-addicted pregnant women. Although both arguments are routinely exaggerated, they nevertheless raise serious justifications for policy intervention. The critical point, however, is that no matter how much these arguSummer/Fall 2006 [ 1 5 7 ]

OPENING PANDORA’S BOX

ments might justify some kind of government intervention, they do not justify prohibition. Policy analysis must consider not only the potential benefits of intervention, but also the enormous costs of prohibition.

To begin, prohibition harms drug users. It hurts responsible drug users who forego drugs because of prohibition, in the same way alcohol Prohibition harmed social drinkers. Moreover, prohibition hurts irresponsible users who do not reduce their drug use under prohibition.

Such persons not only experience the detriments of drug use; they also risk arrest and imprisonment. Prohibition also compromises quality control, resulting in more accidental overdoses and poisonings.

Beyond harming drug users, prohibition harms the rest of the population as well. Because participants in illegal markets cannot resolve disputes with lawyers, they resort to violence instead. And because participants in illegal markets cannot address grievances with the government using standard means, there is a strong incentive for corruption. Thus two negative consequences of illicit traffic highlighted by Naim occur directly because prohibition forces drug markets underground.

In addition, prohibition has many other costs. Attempts at enforcement erode civil liberties and exacerbate racial tensions because drug use and sale are victimless crimes. Prohibition also raises drug prices, encouraging high “bangfor-the-buck” consumption methods like injection that spread AIDS and other bloodborne diseases. Prohibition of certain medicinal uses of marijuana and opiates causes the sick to suffer needlessly; enriches criminals because illicit profits are not taxed; complicates foreign rela[ 1 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tions, trade issues, immigration policy, and national security; spawns disrespect for the law; and diminishes personal accountability because branding drugs as so awful they must be outlawed provides an excuse for acts committed “under the influence.”

The bottom line on drug prohibition is that whether or not there are valid rationales for government efforts to discourage drug use, and whether or not prohibition has a major impact on drug use, prohibition generates numerous negative consequences and is almost certainly the worst possible policy for trying to reduce the harmful effects of drugs. A moderate sin tax—one that is not so high as to drive the market underground— accomplishes everything prohibition can with far fewer negative consequences. It also saves billions of dollars in enforcement costs and raises substantial tax revenue. This is exactly what most countries do for alcohol and tobacco.

This concept of charging a sin tax for drugs rather than prohibiting them can be effectively applied to other kinds of illicit trade as well. This is because prohibition of prostitution, gambling, and guns raises similar issues as prohibition of drugs. Generally, prohibition creates a black market in which violence and corruption are inevitable, enriches members of society most willing to flaunt society’s laws, increases concerns about quality, requires substantial government funds for enforcement, and fails to reduce the use of the targeted good or activity any more than a moderate sin tax would.

For a huge fraction of illicit trade, the solution is simple: legalize the good in question. Also, numerous other policies that cause illicit traffic should be repealed or modified. One good example is immigration restrictions, which give rise to the

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illicit traffic in human beings. Open borders for people would likely mean reduced incomes for less skilled workers in rich countries. But unrestricted immigration is both humanitarian, since those migrating from poor countries are far worse off than those harmed in rich countries, and globally efficient, since immigration allows a better match between the supply and demand for less skilled labor. Thus, unrestricted immigration makes more sense than the current policy, which is costly and ineffective.

Legalized trade of human body parts is another policy change that makes enormous sense. Many of the potential beneficiaries—rich persons in need of organs—are willing to pay huge sums relative to average incomes in poor countries. Thus, both sides of the transaction benefit, and bringing the trade above ground allows for reasonable regulation to protect the health of donors and ensures informed consent.

The illicit traffic involving patent and copyright infringement (medicines, movies, software, and the like) raises more difficult issues. Government protection of intellectual property is plausibly necessary to guarantee that producers reap a reasonable return; eliminating this policy might have negative consequences. Yet even here, scaling back government involvement could reduce illicit traffic. The U.S. government, for example, might take the view that enforcement of domestic patents and copyrights does not entail restricting imports of such goods; manufacturers can limit the incentives for re-importation on their own by setting high prices in other countries. This would erode, but hardly gut, the value of copyrights and patents, and it would shrink the scope for illicit traffic.

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The issue of child prostitution is challenging, as few would argue in favor of legalizing prostitution for children of any age. Allowing legal adult prostitution, however, would facilitate enforcement against child prostitution since it would stand out more readily.

Moreover, one reason children are forced into prostitution is that they are easily controlled in underground markets—this would be less relevant if adult prostitution were legal. Although legalizing adult prostitution will never eliminate the issue for children, it can help make it far less prevalent.

Across a broad range of illicit activities, it is not only feasible but desirable for governments to eliminate illicit traffic through the simple act of legalizing or otherwise deregulating the activities in question. This approach has two key arguments in its favor: it is the right thing to do based on a cost-benefit analysis of the feasible policy approaches, and it is the only approach that will successfully reduce illicit traffic.

Naim’s Illicit provides an incredible window into the seamy underside of trade and commerce around the world.

What it does not provide is useful answers about how to address the problems this illicit trade creates. The answers provided above will not meet with ready acceptance, but the question posed—should governments prohibit the things they now prohibit?—must be addressed by any effective answer.

Jeffrey Miron is a visiting professor of economics at Harvard University. He is the author of Drug War Crimes: The Consequences of Prohibition and is currently working on a new book, Pragmatic Libertarianism: A Defense of Minimal Government.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 5 9 ]

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As ses sing Fujimori’s Peru Review By Rachel K. Brickner Catherine M. Conaghan, Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005, 311 pp. $29.95.

Alberto Fujimori succeeded in dissolving Peru’s congress, rewriting the constitution, stacking the judiciary with supporters, and paying off much of the media, all for the goal of staying in power.

Catherine M. Conaghan’s book, Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere, is the remarkable account of the dismantling of Peruvian democracy during Fujimori’s ten-year rule (1990-2000).

At its best, Fujimori’s Peru is a page-turning political thriller, something few academic writers can boast of producing. It examines the power dynamic between the state and the entities that make up the public sphere. In particular, it highlights the ways that a too-powerful state can render the public sphere, and consequently democratic governance, irrelevant or non-existent. As such, it is a welcome contribution to the burgeoning literature on the challenges to democratic consolidation in Latin America and elsewhere and the importance of a vibrant public space in helping to achieve democracy.

In 1990 Peru was in crisis. The guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) was carrying out acts of terror and violence in both rural and urban areas, and the government seemed incapable of putting a stop to the group. Moreover, the economy was in shambles, with annual inflation reaching 7,000 percent.

Peruvians were ready for a change in leadership, and in that year’s presidential [ 1 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

election they threw their support behind Alberto Fujimori. Fujimori was a political outsider—before the election he had been the rector of the National Agrarian University of La Molina—a credential he trumpeted during the campaign. He presented himself as a man of the people, opting to drive a tractor or ride a bicycle during campaign appearances in contrast to his main rival, novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who preferred an armor-plated Volvo and bodyguards.1 Upon his election, Fujimori delivered: the leader of Sendero, Abimael Guzmán, was captured on 12 September 1992, and Fujimori’s program of neoliberal economic reform helped spur economic growth and rein in inflation.2 Fujimori’s goals, however, soon shifted to staying in power, and with the help of Vladimiro Montesinos, the head of Peru’s National Intelligence Service (SIN), he set about disabling democratic institutions in order to make it happen.

The first step in the process was Fujimori’s 1992 autogolpe, or self-coup, in which he dissolved Congress, disbanded regional legislatures, and shut down the Supreme Court and the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees.

As Conaghan notes, the 1990s represented a new era: no longer would the United States or Peru’s Latin American neighbors embrace an authoritarian government, even if it supported certain policy objectives. In this new era, democratic institutions had to be upheld, at least on the surface level. So, after the self-coup, Fujimori and Montesinos restored the facade of democracy, reestablishing important democratic institutions such as periodic elections, a unicameral legislature, and a new constitution. Moreover, they recognized the importance of maintaining the appear-

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ance of a democratic public sphere, including a free press. But they correctly reasoned that given Peru’s importance as a partner in combating narco-trafficking, the appearance of democratic institutions would be sufficient to appease international observers. The intention was to stay in power, and this meant subverting democratic institutions and the public sphere when they got in the way.3 Conaghan analyzes Fujimori and Montesinos’s dismantling of democracy and their eventual downfall through the lens of the public sphere. Borrowing language from German theorist Jürgen Habermas, she refers to the public sphere as a “wild complex,” the unregulated space outside of the administrative apparatus of the state in which the media, civil society, and other non-state public actors communicate ideas that can become the basis for public policy.4 Her aim is not only to show how this “wild complex” became a target of corruption and intimidation in the Fujimori-Montesinos reelection efforts, but also how it helped to bring Fujimori down in 2000, after a constitutionally questionable third run for the presidency.

The tremendous value of Conaghan’s work is how it illuminates the conception of democracy by focusing not just on the formal institutions of the state, or on the actions of citizens taking part in the public sphere, but on the importance of having a proper balance of power between the two. The state and the public sphere, Conaghan implies, are inextricably intertwined, and both are valuable to a democracy because each plays an important role in shaping the other. The case of Fujimori’s Peru illustrates this from two perspectives.

First, the public sphere is crucial to democracy; it is where different actors in

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the “wild complex” communicate their ideas about policy preferences.

Importantly, citizens also find channels for holding elected leaders accountable in the public sphere, whether through investigative reporting on the part of the media or through pressure from civil society organizations. And yet, a democratic public sphere cannot exist without the state. It is the state that makes and enforces the laws that guarantee freedoms of press, speech, assembly, and information—the freedoms that allow citizens to take part in the public sphere. Of course, the reverse is also true: by limiting those freedoms, the state limits citizens’ abilities to take part in the public sphere, to influence policy, and to demand accountability from political leaders.

In Peru Fujimori and Montesinos understood the importance of maintaining the appearance of a democratic public sphere in order to avoid international condemnation. As such, both the press and civil society organizations were able to operate relatively freely. Indeed, from the 1992 coup onward, the “wild complex” relentlessly brought to light unsavory details about the Fujimori administration and challenged the legitimacy of his leadership. The media, as Conaghan highlights, was a key player in this. For example, Peru’s leading paper, El Comercio, criticized the excessive executive power established in the post-coup constitution and diligently uncovered electoral fraud in the 1995 and 2000 elections. Acting on an anonymous tip, investigative reporters from the newspaper Sí discovered the remains of nine university students and one professor whom the military “disappeared.” Civil society organizations also played an important role in challenging the legitimacy of Fujimori’s rule. Foro Democrático Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 6 1 ]

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(Democratic Forum), for example, spearheaded a referendum campaign to overturn a law that allowed Fujimori to 5 run for reelection in 2000. Along with members of the congressional opposition, civil society organizations united in planning the Marcha de los Cuatros Suyos (March of the Four Corners), a major demonstration to protest Fujimori’s 2000 inauguration.

But the state shapes the effectiveness of the public sphere, and Fujimori and Montesinos always had a response that rendered these and other individual actors more or less ineffective in challenging Fujimori’s authority.

Montesinos bribed newspaper and television editors and publishers to print proFujimori stories and slander his opponents. When bribery did not work, media owners sometimes found their networks subject to surprise tax audits, or, in one case, their citizenship in jeopardy for engaging in acts damaging to “the public interest.”6 More importantly, Fujimori and Montesinos used the legislature, courts, and government offices to stymie civil society opposition. In response to the anti-reelection referendum, Congress passed a law requiring a minimum of forty-eight votes to approve a referendum. Since the pro-Fujimori caucus held forty-eight votes, this law prevented the referendum from having congressional support to move forward.

Fujimori and Montesinos overcame another legal challenge to Fujimori’s ability to run for reelection by encouraging Congress to impeach three members of the Constitutional Tribunal, thus rendering it incapable of ruling on constitutional cases. Moreover, Montesinos sabotaged the March of the Four Corners by hiring thugs to disrupt the march and paying the police to stand aside while vio[ 1 6 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

lence and looting raged. Conaghan’s study of Peru illustrates that the public sphere cannot be thoroughly understood without comprehension of how the state shapes the way it functions. The ability of the media or of civil society to influence policy, hold leaders accountable, and uphold their end of the democratic process depends to a large extent on the constraints imposed on the “wild complex.” In Peru these constraints were formidable, and consequently, democracy was weak.

The second important perspective is how the state is influenced by the public sphere; indeed, the power of the public sphere is considerable, even when freedom of action is very limited. Conaghan observes that “even relentless and sophisticated efforts to control the public sphere are never quite successful. People excluded from the public sphere find ways of being heard.”7 The implication is that the “wild complex” is nimble and adaptable, so it does not necessarily take a large-scale opposition movement to influence policy and bring about reform—even in an authoritarian regime. The state can severely limit the ability of citizens to use the public sphere to challenge leaders, but it cannot shut the public sphere out completely. When space within the public sphere does emerge, individual citizens, national and international civil society organizations, and the media will move quickly to fill that space and agitate for change.

So it was in Fujimori’s Peru.

Conaghan notes that until the 2000 campaign, Peruvian civil society was small, fragmented, and disorganized.

Nevertheless, she cautions that we should not discount the significance of myriad actors who made trouble for the regime, and in doing so helped to bring about its

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demise. Fujimori and Montesinos, aided by their supporters in Congress and in the courts, did their best to close off channels of accountability in the public sphere and the state. But not everyone could be bought; not every space for citizen action could be closed. The media that remained independent continued to uncover scandals that exposed the corruption and human rights abuses of the Fujimori regime. Groups within Peruvian civil society, like Transparencia (Transparency) and the Defensoría del Pueblo (People’s Defense), documented government abuses related to the 2000 election campaign. International actors like the Organization of American States and the Carter Center/National Democratic Institute served as observers in the 2000 election.8 In the end, an organized opposition to Fujimori’s reelection did come together under the leadership of Alejandro Toledo, Fujimori’s main opponent in the election. But what ultimately brought down the regime was yet another scandal reported in the media, this time a fiftysix minute video showing Montesinos bribing Congressman Alberto Kouri to support Fujimori’s coalition in Congress. This “wild complex” of actors—journalists, human rights activists, academics, and NGOs—was not an organized movement, nor was it operating free of government constraints, but it used the opportunities that were presented to call Fujimori’s legitimacy into question. The agitation of the “wild complex” ensured that the administration had no possible defense when the Kouri tape was made public. The lesson for academics and policymakers alike is not to discount the importance of the many spheres of citizen participation, for even a fragmented and constrained pub-

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lic sphere can still allow citizens to influence the government. Thus, understanding how democracy functions requires comprehension of the various actors in the public sphere, even when they face imposing constraints on action.

The great theoretical value of Fujimori’s Peru is what it reveals about the relationship between the state and the public sphere and the importance of a strong public sphere to a well-functioning democracy. The one real deficit in Conaghan’s work, however, is the theoretical and empirical development of the concept of the public sphere. Leonardo Avritzer, whose work Conaghan cites, defines the public sphere as a space for citizens’ discourse that lies between the state and the market (i.e., not encompassing the state or the market). Avritzer’s work attempts to shed light on the role of the public sphere in democracy in Latin America by focusing on human rights organizations, urban social movements, and election monitoring campaigns that are active in periods of democratic transition and consolidation. For her part, Conaghan defines the public sphere in terms of the processes of political communication and the sites of political communication that link society to the state.9 Like Avritzer, in Conaghan’s definition the state falls outside the purview of the public sphere, so it is surprising that her analysis concentrates heavily on legislative politics and the media, and less on civil society.

The media’s crucial role in the public sphere cannot be denied. Citizens rely on a free press to disseminate information to the public and to conduct the kind of investigative reporting that facilitates accountability. The important role that the independent media played in Peru in exposing the corruption and Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 6 3 ]

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human rights abuses of the Fujimori regime only underscores the continued importance of the Fourth Estate in a democratic public sphere. Arguably, given the rise of non-traditional media like weblogs, the media is an even more important part of this communicative element of democracy, because alternative information sources allow more individuals to participate.

Less clear, however, is the role of the legislature as part of the public sphere.

There is no doubt that understanding how Fujimori dismantled Peruvian democracy requires an analysis of his manipulation of the legislative and judicial branches of government. Indeed, Conaghan’s examination of the corruption of Congress and the courts is fascinating and important. Yet, as even she implies, the public sphere is typically understood as a space outside the state.

In all fairness, she justifies her focus on the legislature by emphasizing its “crucial role in connecting the public sphere to the state.”10 Nevertheless, in her empirical discussion, the legislature is presented as part of the “wild complex.” While this may be a theoretical quibble, it is an important one: in a democracy, the legislature plays a key role in holding executive leaders accountable, but the legislature is still a part of the state, and it is the role of the public to hold legislators accountable. It would have been worthwhile to be more explicit, theoretically and in the subsequent analysis, about the unique relationship the legislature has with the public sphere as compared to the media and civil society.

Moreover, although Montesinos’s corruption extended to the media, particularly by paying off editors to promote Fujimori and slander his competitors in the run-up to the 2000 election, [ 1 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the most egregious corruption took place within the state’s institutions. The 1992 self-coup, human rights abuses on the part of the military, and the numerous laws that were passed by Fujimori’s congressional coalition to block opposition efforts and stack the judicial branch with Fujimori supporters are just a few examples. The fundamental characteristic of Peruvian “democracy” under Fujimori was not so much “deception in the public sphere,” or even the weakness of the public sphere—indeed, it was ultimately the dogged, independent press that helped break the Montesinos corruption story that brought down Fujimori’s regime—it was the dismantling of the state’s democratic institutions by an overly powerful president.

Again, this fact seems to call for a more rigorous theoretical discussion of the relationship between the legislature and the public sphere, and of both with the Fujimori regime.

Despite this critique, Fujimori’s Peru is essential reading, not only for academics, but for students, policymakers, journalists, and anyone interested in democracy or Latin America. Indeed, its relevance certainly extends to our own democracy, for Fujimori’s Peru is also a cautionary tale of what can happen to a democracy when leaders are not held accountable by a separation of powers, a vibrant civil society, and a media active in the public sphere. The implicit message Conaghan sends is that citizens owe it to their democracies to look beyond charges of “obstruction” and “abetting the enemy” levied by those in power and examine the motivations for such rhetorical charges. After all, as the case of Fujimori so clearly highlights, one president’s “obstruction” is a citizen’s “accountability.” Democracy can only

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flourish when leaders are held accountable by checks from autonomous institutions within the state and from civil society and media acting independently in the public sphere.11 For developed democracies, Conaghan’s analysis underscores the importance of employing economic and political leverage to hold non-democratic leaders accountable. Fujimori’s rule as a dictator lasted for nearly ten years, and suffering admonishments from the United States and the OAS is an embarrassment, especially considering the hemisphere’s commitment to democratic governance. If we uphold the belief that democracy is a universal value, we

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must not stop pressuring dictators to implement democratic reforms, even when they are important allies on economic or security measures. There are many more lessons to be learned about democracy from Fujimori’s Peru.

Fortunately, Conaghan’s lucid and engaging writing style makes the book accessible and entertaining beyond academic circles.

Rachel K. Brickner is a lecturer in political science at McGill University. Her work explores the participation of unionized women workers in organizations that promote women’s rights in Mexico.

NOTES

1 Catherine M. Conaghan, Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 17.

2 Fujimori’s economic shock therapy, or “Fujishock,” as it is known, helped to reduce inflation (to 4.7 percent by 1992), spur foreign investment, and increase tax revenues. However, Peruvians were hard hit by the Fujishock. For example, higher consumer prices contributed to dramatic increases in poverty.

For discussion of Fujimori’s economic policies, see Bruce H. Kay, “‘Fujipopulism’ and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990-1995,” Jounal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 156, No. 2 (1996); and Susan Stokes, “Democratic Accountability and Policy Change: Economic Policy in Fujimori’s Peru,” Comparative Politics 29 (January 1997).

3 Conaghan, Fujimori’s Peru, 10.

4 Ibid., 12.

5 Under the constitution, presidents could not serve more than two consecutive terms. Fujimori had been elected twice, first in 1990 and then in 1995.

However, the Ley de interpretación auténtica (Authentic Interpretation Law) that was passed by Congress in 1996 stipulated that this law could not be applied retroactively, to before the 1993 constitution. As such, the presidential term beginning in 1995 would officially count as Fujimori’s first, allowing him to run again in 2000. This was a highly controversial law.

Ibid., 120-23.

6 Ibid., 150.

7 Ibid., 12.

8 In its final report, the Carter Center noted that the election process had failed to meet international standards.

9 Ibid., 11.

10 Ibid., 12.

11 For a discussion on the importance of accountability in defining democracy, see Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is...And Is Not,” in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed.

Larry Diamond and M. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

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AD PA G E 166

View from the Ground

Missing in Action Mass Male Migration and Mexican Communities Charles Wright On the playground at Zaragoza Elementary School in Cholula, Mexico, the teacher stopped answering questions and started asking them. When I started teaching these students, all between the ages of nine and twelve, they bombarded me with como se dices and asked how to swear in English. But soon recess time became sharing time as they told me their family histories. “I have a brother in Florida,” one said, followed by another girl who echoed a similar story, except it was her father who was in the United States. Wanting to hear more, I asked her if she has gone to visit him. “Nope, but I hope to soon,” she replied. Finally, I asked her when she had last seen her father, but she could not recall their last time together.

This conversation piqued my interest, so I talked to more children to see if it was an isolated incident. What I learned was incredible: most of the students had at least one male relative in the States.

That comment gave me pause, but I did not give it further thought until reading “Inside the Life of the Migrants Next Door,” an article in Time magazine. In the article, Mexicans in New York were questioning the worth of their journey to the United States. The article uncovered several social costs for these immigrants and challenges they faced on the road to a better life for themselves and their family. These challenges

Charles Wright is a a student in the Master of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University.

Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 6 7 ]

MISSING IN ACTION

tinctions exist between the social classes, all the families share common characteristics in spite of these socioeconomic differences. The father is the primary breadwinner of the family, while the mother is responsible for the household and children. Additionally, the nuclear and extended family demonstrates a distinct emotional and geographic closeness. Because of this close familial relationship, families take great responsibilMen, Migration, and Family. The ity for the overall welfare of their memUnited States is known as the land of bers. Family closeness is facilitated not opportunity. For many Mexicans, climb- only by economic necessity, but by celeing the social ladder means crossing the brations like Dia de los Muertos (Day of the northern border of Mexico in search of Dead) and the quinceañera (a girl’s fifopportunities not available at home. teenth birthday) that tighten family relaAlthough the majority of opportunities tionships. These times not only hold consist of physically demanding work, significance for the remembrance of financial allure erases reservations to family ancestry and the passage into leave home and family behind to under- womanhood, but also serve as an essentake the risky journey north. For this rea- tial vehicle to keep the family nucleus son tides of Mexican men have rolled tight. Even more, the importance of into the United States in order to change family-oriented activities for survival of their fate and that of their families. While its members increases as the economic away from home, the men send back wellbeing of the family decreases. their salaries through remittances to care Despite the immense value of the family for those left behind. Herein is the crux in Mexican culture, its prominent role is of the problem for Mexico’s most being endangered by the widespread important societal unit: does financial exodus of its male figureheads, and in prosperity mean a better life for the fam- particular, fathers. ily, or does the absence of fathers and other male figures have serious implica- Mexican Migration Trends. While tions for familial development? Seem- migration of Mexicans to the United ingly, the decreased presence of males in States is not a new trend, its makeup has the community affects future generations changed. Until the 1940s entire families of Mexican children by adversely impact- would transfer their lives north. After ing their familial social development and the coming of World War II and the educational opportunities. deployment of U.S. soldiers overseas, Having lived on both sides of the Rio the need for physical labor intensified.

Grande, I have observed Mexican cul- In 1942 the U.S. government created ture from different perspectives. During the Bracero program to allow Mexican these times my Mexican friends famil- laborers to supplement the dwindling iarized me with important cultural issues U.S. workforce. Because of the demandsuch as family structure. Although dis- ing nature of the work, the majority of could be serious barriers to Mexico’s development. Hence the question: do the benefits of the mass male migration from communities in Mexico to the United States outweigh the social cost of their absence? One key factor in answering that question is determining what the impact of the migration of male family members is on the upbringing of the next generation.

[ 1 6 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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Mexicans that committed were men. In the end, approximately a quarter of a million men came to the United States, starting a trend in which men travel to work on their own, leaving their families behind.1 Despite an increase in Mexican female migration to the United States to seek work or re-unite families, the current statistics still show that more males

View from the Ground

contribute to the decline of the family unit and place increased stress on those left behind.

“It takes a village…” As the

famous African proverb says, “It takes a village to raise a child.” If a family lacks present males, especially fathers, the ability of the community to train the

Despite the immense value of the family

in Mexican culture, its prominent role is being endangered by the widespread exodus of its male figureheads. are working in the United States than females. According to the 2000 Census Profile for Mexicans in the United States, males outnumber their female counterparts by approximately 1 million, with males accounting for 67 percent of the Mexican civilian workforce in the United States.2 While the problem might not seem daunting in terms of numbers, the increasing absence of males can be harsh on smaller rural towns and villages, where opportunity is scarce and the desire to migrate is high. Once one migrant demonstrates prosperity due to his work in the United States, large numbers will follow in his footsteps, leaving behind scores of families.3 The exodus hurts communities at their vibrant heart by robbing the community of young men with initiative and leadership.4 This same group also functions as a large part of the engine that physically drives the survival and improvement of the community.

Their importance is higher in rural areas where farming is the life force for both money and sustenance. Absentee men

next generation is hindered, forcing it to compensate by diverting energy and resources. The duty will then be passed on to the mother, changing the traditional role of Mexican women, particularly in rural areas. Traditional Mexican society sharply distinguishes the role of mothers and fathers. In most cases, Mexican mothers perform the role of household caregiver, while the father fulfills the duties of the breadwinner.

When Mexican men leave their families behind to migrate to the United States for better working conditions, the mother is forced to fill both roles.5 In areas lacking sufficient wage-earning jobs, handling both responsibilities becomes more complicated.

The compensation leaves behind enormous consequences. Although mothers sacrifice to keep the family functioning, the lack of a father figure disrupts an essential cycle of learning social skills. Men in Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City emphasized intimate family relationships over other social factors and admitted that their father was Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 6 9 ]

MISSING IN ACTION

the most influential person in their lives.6 Sociological wisdom also predicts that the presence of both parents enhances the social capital of children.

This social capital allows them to adjust into their roles in the family, community, and workplace.7 Although an abundance of sociological academic data exists on the impact of an absence of male figures as role models, single mothers in Mexico can readily attest to the difficulties of simultaneously raising children and earning a living. One Mexican mother summed up the frustrations that she had with her husband who had migrated to work, complaining that he was a father in name only, not presence.8 However, it should be noted that not all women are worse off from the departure of men. In many cases, they can take on new roles and assume responsibility for decisions affecting the social and economic wellbeing of their households.9

Education Dilemma. Education is

another area affected by male migration.

When mothers must perform the duties of both mother and father, the children must pick up a greater share of household responsibilities, thus detracting from the amount of time dedicated to schoolwork and attendance. A study published in 2001 by the Latin America and Caribbean Division Gender Sector of the World Bank showed that school attendance and years of schooling attained for youths aged twelve to fifteen was lower in cases where fathers were absent.10 Evidently, schools in Mexico reflect the social background of the students. At Zaragoza Elementary, the students come from simple backgrounds where it is not uncommon for families to prioritize work over education. In order to accommodate families as much as possible, two [ 1 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

school sessions are offered: one in the morning and one in the afternoon. This schedule is structured so that students can work and still make it to school.

Despite this leniency, parents and extended family continue to keep their children from attending class to assist in household duties. This is especially the case in families with absent fathers because the mother many times cannot fulfill all of her normal tasks alone.

Thus, the children must share the rest of the responsibilities by doing tasks such as babysitting siblings or running errands while they should be at school.

When the students recounted to me their weekend activities, the most common response was not playing, watching cartoons, or sleeping in late, but rather working with the family. The disparity in the levels of learning was also striking. Of course there are always differences in student performance, but in my mind the factor that separated the students seemed directly related to their home life. The students that excelled in class were often sent by their parents to extra classes on the weekends or had stronger parent participation in their weekly schooling. On the other hand, the attitude of children that were behind or showed little interest reflected a sense that education was not beneficial to them because their future was pre-determined by their family traditions. These factors exacerbate the problem of male migration by devaluing the importance of education. The equation is mere opportunity costs. When those at home see more compensation for unskilled labor in the United States than the reward of academic achievement at home, the choice is simple. Hence, migration is seen as a viable substitute for education, and children (especially boys) are less encouraged to value their school-

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work. Data on Mexican immigrants further reflect this trend. Census statistics show that slightly less than 50 percent of the Mexican immigrant population is over 25, and around half of these have less than a ninth-grade education.

Another 22 percent have not completed high school.11 These trends pose serious problems, and should they continue, they will severely affect the entire Mexican community.

These phenomena hold true for several Latin American countries and are well documented by organizations such as the World Bank, UNICEF, and prominent

View from the Ground

tinues to affect Mexican society. In 2005 remittances to Mexico totaled $20 billion dollars, essentially money for those left behind.13 In many cases, the male workforce returns seasonally, or families remaining in Mexico relocate to the United States, thus reducing the strain on the family as a societal unit. Additionally, Mexican programs such as PROGRESA have been successful in increasing educational levels. En Breve, a World Bank series of notes on lessons learned from its Latin America and Caribbean region, states that an evaluation of PROGRESA showed that it had increased

The mass migration of Mexican males is a double-edged sword that continues to affect society.

NGOs. For instance, laboring youth value work more than education, since it is considered essential to their survival. Particularly in rural areas, youth are needed to assist the family by working or staying home. Mexico’s programs such as PROGRESA (Program for Education, Health, and Nutrition) were created to encourage children’s school attendance and improve the education system. Such programs hoped to increase primary education completion rates and its effectiveness.

Mexico’s completion rate in 2000 was around 60 percent, and only 51 percent of the children could read at the end of primary school.12 However, PROGRESA and other measures’ effectiveness are jeopardized by the aforementioned trends within the family, which should concern the Mexican government.

Conclusion. The mass migration of males is a double-edged sword that con-

girls’ secondary school enrollment rates by 11 to 14 percent and boys’ secondary enrollment rates by 5 to 8 percent.14 Thus, those left behind are more educationally empowered and have expanded access to the job market. This opportunity allows individuals to be both caretaker and breadwinner. However, economic benefits and safety nets do little to counter the effects of mass male migration, and the Mexican family unit has suffered severely from it.

In a conversation with one Mexican student, he mentioned that the importance of family has decreased in Mexican society, an attribute which I believe derives from the work-inspired exodus of males from local communities.

Although no direct calculation can measure the impact of absent male family members and male role models in communities, the choice between financial empowerment through migration versus Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 7 1 ]

MISSING IN ACTION

remaining in Mexico for the sanctity of the family is portrayed nicely in the style of a MasterCard credit card commercial: “The value of remittances sent home to Mexico: $20 billion; value of spending time with your dad: priceless.” Does that mean I am anti-immigration?

Absolutely not. It simply means that the answer to the immigration problem cannot be fixed with temporary bandages

like building walls or disregarding law and procedure. The true solution lies in addressing the root causes of immigration. If the lack of jobs in Mexico or need for low-cost labor in the United States is the problem, then economic policies on both sides of the border need to be examined. Will the solution be easy? No, but tough problems call for tough solutions.

NOTES

1 Alma M. Garcia, The Mexican Americans (Westport, Connecticut: The New Americans, 2002), 30-31.

2 U.S. Census Bureau, 2002.

3 Nathan Thornburg, “Inside the Life of the Migrants Next Door,” Time, vol. 167, no. 6 (6 February 2006).

4 Gustavo Verduzco and Kurt Unger, “Impacts of Migration in Mexico,” in Migration between Mexico and the United States (Austin, Texas: Morgan Printing, 1998), 428-429.

5 Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero, Rodriguez de Diaz, and Maria Lucy, “Mexico,” in International Handbook on Gender Roles, ed. Leonore Loeb Adler (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 205-208.

6 Agustin Escobar Latapi, “Men and Their Histories: Restructuring, Gender Inequality, and Life Transitions in Urban Mexico,” in Changing Men and Masculinities in Latin America, ed. Matthew C. Gutmann (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003), 87.

7 Linda L. Lindsey, Gender Roles: A Sociological Perspective, Fourth Edition (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2005), 274.

8 Garcia, 105.

9 “2004 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Women and International Migration,” UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs

(Division for the Advancement of Women), Internet, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/documents/press-releases/WorldSurvey-Women&Migration.pdf (Date accessed: 6 April 2006).

10 Susan W. Parker and Carla Pederzini, “Gender Differences in Education in Mexico,” in The Economics of Gender in Mexico, eds. Elizabeth G. Katz and Maria C. Correia (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001), 29.

11 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000. Table FBP1. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000, Internet, http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp159/STP-159-Mexico.pdf.

12 Annababette Wils, Bidemi Carrol, and Karima Barrow, Educating the World’s Children: Patterns of Growth and Inequality (Washington, DC: Academy for Educational Development, 2005), 17 and 46.

13 Thornburgh.

14 Quentin Wodon, Benedicte de la Briere, Corinne Siaens, and Schlomo Yitzhaki, “Mexico’s PROGRESA: Innovative Targeting, Gender Focus and Impact on Social Welfare,” En Breve (Washington, DC: World Bank, January 2003), Internet, http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LACInfoClient.nsf/8d6661f6799ea8a48525673900537f95/5 21a68f9ae72fdb585256cc2007b395b/$FILE/Dec02 _Progressa_ENG.pdf.

Errata In Alejandro J. Ganimian’s “The Seeds of Social Inclusion,” published in Volume VII, Issue 1 of the Journal, the last sentence should have read, “But if a month of democratic education had done this much for him, I could not help wondering what it would do for Costa Rican democracy.” We apologize to the author and the readers for the error.

[ 1 7 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

A Look Back

Empowering Women

Ten Years After the Beijing Conference Carolyn Hannan In the context of the ten-year review of the implementation of the global policy framework, the Beijing Platform for Action, a historical perspective allows for a critical assessment of progress made and for the identification of not only the major achievements that should be built upon but also the gaps and obstacles that will need to be addressed in the years to come.

This article provides an overview of efforts to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women, highlighting the central role of the UN. It begins by outlining the importance of the four world conferences on women, organized between 1975 and 1995, as well as the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. It discusses the critical influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The article highlights the broader context of the World Summits in 2000 and 2005, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the work of the Security Council, and it discusses some of the challenges in moving forward.

Carolyn Hannan has served as director of the UN’s Division for the Advancement of Women since December 2001.

Six Decades of Work by the UN. The Charter of the UN established in 1945 endorsed equality between women and men as a fundamental human right.1 Initially, the UN focused its work on developing awareness of the status and situation of Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 7 3 ]

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women around the world and establishing legal measures to protect the human rights of women. By the mid-1960s, the UN had developed a strong focus on women’s role in economic and social development.

Efforts to increase equality between women and men and to facilitate the empowerment of women were significantly enhanced with the first UN world conference on women in Mexico in 1975 and the proclamation of the International Decade for the Advancement of Women from 1976 to 1985.2 Three more world conferences on women were organized in Copenhagen

has been particularly significant in the promotion of gender equality, development, and peace. In addition to providing a unique opportunity for exchange of experiences and good practices in the annual meetings of gender equality experts, the Commission has been responsible for organizing and following up the world conferences on women.

Initially the work on gender equality in the United Nations was carried out solely by the Commission on the Status of Women. Over the past decades, the Commission has played a critical catalytic role to promote attention to gender equality perspectives in other parts of the

Pressure from civil society is a crucial

factor in ensuring that states comply with international conventions.

(1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995). The world conferences set in motion a systematic cycle of research and analysis, goal setting, reviewing progress to identify achievements as well as gaps and obstacles, and renewing and expanding commitments.

The UN has played a major role as a catalyst for global change, particularly in the promotion and protection of the human rights of women, formulation of policy recommendations in critical areas, collection of information and statistics, and monitoring progress.3 The UN has been the political forum where much of the critical discussion has taken place and where important global decisions are made. The work of the Commission on the Status of Women, which held its fiftieth session and commemorated sixty years of work in 2006, [ 1 7 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

United Nations. Positive outcomes can be seen in the attention to gender perspectives in other functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), such as the Commission for Social Development and the Commission on Population and Development; in the work of the General Assembly on the human rights of women; as well as in the path-breaking work of the Security Council on women, peace, and security.

A crucial factor in ensuring that Member States comply with international policy commitments and human rights obligations at the national level is pressure from civil society. The world conferences increased the voice of women’s organizations in shaping the work of the UN. Women’s groups and networks have played a significant role in moving the

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A Look Back

global agenda forward, energizing the debates, and contributing to the increased visibility of gender equality issues. A great deal of the sustained attention and achievements at the national level has been due to their efforts. The increasing partnerships between governments and civil society, including representation of NGOs on government delegations at intergovernmental meetings, provide strategic opportunities to influence the direction of efforts on gender equality and women’s empowerment.

in the Platform for Action as a major strategy for promoting gender equality, alongside targeted activities for women.

Gender mainstreaming requires that attention be given to the contributions, priorities, and needs of women as well as men from the very beginning of planning processes in all policy areas in order to influence the direction of development. This ensures that gender perspectives can be identified and addressed in policy areas that had previously been regarded as “gender neutral,” such as the economy, infrastructure, and technoloA Global Policy Framework: gy. Gender mainstreaming requires that The Beijing Platform for promotion of gender equality is the Action. In 1995 States parties adopted responsibility of all actors across all polithe Beijing Platform for Action, which cy areas—and not simply a concern for remains the global framework for gen- gender specialists. der equality and empowerment of Convention on the women. The Platform consolidated and The further developed the consensus and Elimination of All Forms of commitment reached at previous UN Discrimination against Women. conferences. It outlined twelve priority Countries around the world have made areas for the advancement of women major achievements in the area of the and the promotion of equality between human rights of women over the past women and men, including poverty, three decades. Governments increasingly education, health, violence, armed recognize gender equality as an integral conflict, economy, decision making, part of universal human rights. Efforts to institutional mechanisms, human mainstream gender perspectives into the rights, media, environment, and the larger human rights framework have become more systematic. Many of the girl child.

The Platform for Action was a major gains in this area have been due to the breakthrough in several respects. It Convention on the Elimination of All established the responsibility of govern- Forms of Discrimination against Women ments for promoting equality between (CEDAW), which is now the second most women and men. It had a clear human ratified human rights treaty, with 182 rights perspective and a strong focus on States parties.4 the empowerment of women. There was The adoption of the Convention by also an evident shift from viewing equal- the General Assembly in 1979 was a ity between women and men as a watershed. The Convention was the first “women’s issue,” with increased atten- international legal instrument to clearly tion to the need for changes in the atti- define discrimination against women as tudes and behavior of men and boys. “…any distinction, exclusion or restricGender mainstreaming was identified tion made on the basis of sex which has Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 7 5 ]

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the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”5 The Convention calls for governments to take appropriate action in all fields “…to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”6 The Convention is comprehensive in its breadth and scope, and it transcends the traditional human rights framework by addressing civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of women, in both the public and the private spheres of life. Direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited, including laws, policies, programs, and conduct that may appear to be gender neutral but that nonetheless have disproportionate detrimental effects on women. The Convention offers an enhanced framework for achieving substantive equality, which requires not only the development of an adequate legal framework but also attention to its effective implementation.

The UN General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention in 1999, which was also a significant achievement for the human rights of women.7 The individual complaints procedure offers women an international avenue of redress for alleged violations of their rights under the Convention. The inquiry procedure allows a committee of twenty-three independent experts elected to monitor the implementation of the Convention to conduct inquiries into situations of grave or systematic viola[ 1 7 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tions in States parties. The fact that seventy-eight states now provide women this additional international remedy for their complaints attests to the willingness of governments to adhere to the terms of the Convention.

The Convention has been an inspiration for women in all parts of the world.

It has had a positive impact on legal and policy developments, leading to significant changes at the national level. It has facilitated the strengthening of provisions in constitutions, the establishment of commissions to review legislation and propose reforms, and the development of temporary special measures to enhance women’s participation in different spheres. Judges have increasingly used the Convention in their decision making.

The Convention has also been effectively utilized by NGOs as a benchmark for assessing the situation of women and as a tool for advocacy and activism.

Addressing the Scourge of Gender-Based Violence. Countries

in all regions of the world have increasingly recognized gender-based violence as a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.8 They have also begun to acknowledge that the problem requires a comprehensive response from governments and other stakeholders. Many countries have passed laws and adopted policies to combat violence against women, including domestic violence. Responses include actions to prevent violence, to prosecute and punish perpetrators, and to provide remedies and relief to victims. The UN will continue to play a critical role in this area, in particular through an in-depth study of all forms of violence against women, which will be presented to the

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General Assembly in 2006. The study will analyze the causes, consequences, and costs of violence against women, and it will provide examples of good practice in addressing gender-based violence.

Gender-based violence is exacerbated in conflict and its aftermath. Over the past decade women and girls have become prime targets of armed conflict

A Look Back

in peacebuilding; addressing human rights violations, which include violence against women; and ensuring attention to gender perspectives in reconstruction processes.

The vulnerability of women and girls to HIV/AIDS in many parts of the world, and particularly in Africa, can be directly linked to the relations

Although attention to gender equality

issues to date has not been adequate, the Millennium Development Goals do provide important new opportunities. and suffered its impact disproportionately, particularly as gender-based and sexual violence have become weapons of warfare and are one of the defining characteristics of contemporary armed conflict. As the majority of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons, women and children are also vulnerable to violence, even in refugee camps. In 2000 the Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, which was an important milestone in the work of the UN. It significantly increased attention to the impact of conflict and its aftermath on women and girls, including sexual exploitation and other forms of violence.

This resolution, which has been translated into more than seventy languages, has been used effectively by women’s organizations and networks around the world.

A detailed study and subsequent discussions in the Security Council have further strengthened the recommendations for action. These recommendations include increasing women’s involvement

between women and men as well as to persistent stereotypes about masculinities and about what is appropriate and acceptable behavior for women in relation to reproduction and sexuality.

Violence against women increases the vulnerability of women and girls to HIV/AIDS, including the removal of ways to negotiate safe sexual relationships. Many women and girls live in intolerable environments of fear–fear of the violence itself and fear of the consequences of not being able to make demands and protect themselves.9 The UNAIDS Global Coalition on Women and AIDS aims to create a global movement to more effectively address the causes of HIV/AIDS among women and girls and to mitigate the impact of AIDS on their daily lives. It calls for zero tolerance on violence against women and increased attention to the roles of men and boys.10

Commitments for the New Millennium. At the start of the new Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 7 7 ]

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millennium, world leaders assembled at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 and expressed their commitment to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women by combating all forms of violence against women and by implementing CEDAW.11 In the 2005 World Summit, world leaders declared that progress for women is progress for all and reiterated their resolve to eliminate discrimination against women.12 The UN developed eight MDGs on the basis of the internationally accepted development goals established over the past decade, including the Platform for Action. The third MDG is focused on gender equality and the empowerment of women, with indicators on education, employment, and participation in decision making. While it is important that one MDG explicitly addresses gender equality, gender equality perspectives must be identified and addressed in the implementation of all the MDGs, covering critical areas of poverty, health, education, and environment.

The framework of the MDGs has effectively mobilized governments, international organizations, and NGOs, and it has enhanced the focus on implementation and on reporting on internationally agreed development goals. Although attention to gender equality issues has not been adequate, the MDGs do provide important new opportunities for increasing the visibility of gender issues in national development planning processes. They also enhance monitoring and reporting of gender equality commitments, facilitate the development of alliances with new partners, and improve access to resources. A critical component of the success of the MDGs will be ensuring that civil society is adequately consulted and involved. [ 1 7 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Ten-Year Review of Implementation of the Platform for Action. In 2005 the UN carried

out a ten-year review of the implementation of the Platform for Action.13 Around the world, governments, regional organizations, and civil society groups commemorated this important anniversary.

Progress was noted in terms of policy change, legislative reform, and institutional development. Positive developments included the establishment of national policies and strategies for gender equality in almost all countries; increased diversity in the national-level mechanisms to promote and monitor gender equality (such as gender equality commissions, ombudspersons offices, and parliamentary networks); increased adherence to international and regional human rights mechanisms; increased attention to resource allocations through gender-sensitive budgeting; and improved efforts to engage men and boys.

The review clearly indicated, however, that the Platform for Action remains far from being fully achieved. While governments reported important gains in relation to each of the twelve priority areas in all regions, serious obstacles and challenges were also reported in every area.

Persistent gaps include low levels of women’s representation in decisionmaking discrimination in employment (such as occupational segregation and wage gaps) and stereotypical attitudes and practices, which hinder gender equality and empowerment of women in all areas of societal development. Countries in every region of the world reported violence against women, including domestic violence, as a major challenge. In some regions, countries noted disproportionately high poverty levels among women, and their insufficient access to economic

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resources. Governments also reported the devastating effects of conflict on women, particularly sexual violence. In many countries, women’s health, including lack of access to reproductive health services and high levels of maternal mortality, continued to give cause for concern. Countries reported high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among women and its devastating impact. Trafficking in women and girls was reported to be a

A Look Back

the same pace as the reform of policy, legal, and institutional frameworks. The prevalence of discriminatory practices and stereotypes represents significant obstacles to the achievement of gender equality. Allocation of resources for gender equality and empowerment of women remain woefully inadequate.

The 2005 World Summit, which took place six months after the ten-year review, provided important further

Despite the increasingly positive

rhetoric, the promotion of equality between women and men is not perceived as central to all areas of work on human rights, development, and security. concern to many governments.

Discriminatory laws govern marriage, land, property, and inheritance.14 While it is important to celebrate the achievements that have been made over the past three decades, it is necessary to remain alert to the persistence of structural inequality between men and women and the limited implementation of international commitments at a national level. Progress has been uneven and varies considerably from region to region; from country to country; and even within countries, where some groups of women face multiple forms of discrimination. Glaring disparities between policy and implementation remain, and the gap between international commitments and the reality of the lives of women is a cause for concern.

Attitudes toward gender equality and the empowerment of women among the general public and even within government bureaucracies have not changed at

guidance on priority areas for action, building on the Platform for Action.15 World leaders resolved to promote gender equality and eliminate pervasive gender discrimination through a number of strategic actions: eliminating gender inequalities in primary and secondary education by the earliest possible date and in all educational levels by 2015; guaranteeing the free and equal rights of women to own and inherit property; ensuring the secure tenure of property and housing by women; ensuring equal access to reproductive health; promoting women’s equal access to labor markets, sustainable employment, and adequate labor protection; ensuring the equal access of women to productive assets and resources, including land, credit, and technology; eliminating all forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls, including ending impunity and ensuring the protection of civilians; promoting the Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 7 9 ]

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increased representation of women in government decision-making bodies; and ensuring their equal opportunity to participate fully in the political process.

The Challenge of Implementation. The overall vision of gender

equality, development, and peace, established in the first world conference on women thirty years ago, continues to guide efforts today. The importance of the integral links between equality, development, and peace as the pillars of the work of the UN was reaffirmed in the 2005 World Summit.16 However, sixty years of UN efforts have not yet produced the desired outcomes. Despite the increasingly positive rhetoric, the promotion of equality between women and men is not perceived as central to all areas of work on human rights, development, and security. In the process of the reform currently underway in the UN, it will be critical to increase efforts to ensure that explicit attention is given to gender equality and empowerment of women, including in the proposed Peace-building Commission and Human Rights Council, as well as in the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of UN work in development, environment, and humanitarian activities.

The actions required for moving the gender equality agenda forward are well known–the challenge is ensuring effective implementation. An enabling environment needs to be developed by improving women’s education and health, as well as increasing their access to and control over opportunities and resources, such as employment, land, and economic assets. Efforts are needed to enhance women’s agency and leadership roles; protect and promote their human rights; and ensure their security, [ 1 8 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

including freedom from violence. The specific additional constraints experienced by women and girls in the contexts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, conflict and its aftermath, or natural disasters need to be explicitly addressed.

The marginalization of work to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment remains a serious constraint. Far too often, gender equality and women’s empowerment is still considered the responsibility of gender specialists rather than as a priority concern for all sectors of government and international organizations, such as the UN. Specific policies on gender equality and accompanying mechanisms—such as action plans, guidelines, and training programmes—have not had a significant impact on existing mainstream policies, processes, and mechanisms. Greater resources must be invested to ensure enhanced understanding of gender mainstreaming and the ways to ensure full implementation so that gender equality issues are identified and addressed, including through adequate resource allocation in all policy areas as priority issues.

The value of CEDAW as a critical accountability mechanism must be recognized, and new strategies must be developed to ensure its full implementation. The specificity of CEDAW within the human rights treaty body system must be retained and strengthened in the context of ongoing reform of the UN. The links between the normative processes (through CEDAW) and the policy processes (in the Commission on the Status of Women and other intergovernmental bodies) must be enhanced. The Platform for Action and the Convention are mutually reinforcing in achieving gender equality and empowerment of

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women.17 The policy frameworks of individual governments, the UN, other international and regional organizations, and NGOs must explicitly build on both instruments.

Conclusion. In the Declaration adopt-

A Look Back

that all UN intergovernmental processes build on the positive momentum created by the 2005 World Summit and the tenyear review of the Platform for Action.

The four world conferences on women organized by the UN, as well as the five- and ten-year review processes, have endorsed the centrality of the role of the UN at global, regional, and national levels in the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women. The high profile of the ten-year review of implementation of the Platform for Action in the Commission on the Status of Women in 2005 was an important indication of the continued importance attached to the Platform for Action as a global policy framework. It also highlighted the continued key role of the UN in providing a critical space for bringing together all stakeholders on promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women and systematically monitoring and reporting on progress. This entails a significant responsibility.

The Commission on the Status of Women should develop ways to increase the voice and contribution of women’s movements from around the world in the work of the UN and enhance its focus on nationallevel implementation to ensure that the work of the UN has a positive impact on the everyday lives of women and girls at country level.

ed during the ten-year review at the Commission on the Status of Women in 2005, States parties committed to ensuring full and accelerated implementation of the Platform for Action.18 This will require enhanced political will and greater visible leadership from top levels in governments and in international organizations, such as the UN; significantly increased allocation of resources, including through gender-sensitive budget processes at all levels; strengthened accountablity for all key actors; and improved monitoring and reporting on progress. Lack of data remains a serious obstacle in effectively measuring progress. A recent report from the UN Statistics Division provides an analysis of progress over the past three decades and highlights the major challenges faced in this area.19 The ongoing process of reform provides a unique opportunity for the UN to increase the attention to gender equality and the empowerment of women across the UN system. All parts of the system should have significant specific human and financial resources allocated for an enhanced focus on gender equality and empowerment of women as an integral Author’s note: The views expressed in this artipart of follow-up to the 2005 World cle are those of the author and not of the Summit. It will be particularly important United Nations.

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NOTES

1 Charter of the UN, Articles 1(3) and 8, signed 26 June 1945.

2 The UN and the Advancement of Women 1945 - 1996 (New York: UN, 1996), 85.

3 Carolyn Hannan, Promoting Equality between Women and Men in Bilateral Development Cooperation: Concepts, Goals, Rationales and Institutional Arrangements (Lund, Sweden: Lund University, 2000), 122-147.

4 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Adopted by General Assembly on 18th December 1979 (New York: UN, 1979).

5 Ibid, Article 1.

6 Ibid, Article 3 7 UN General Assembly resolution 54/4. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York: UN, 1999), 8.

8 CEDAW General recommendation 19 (New York: UN, 1992), para 1.

9 Carolyn Hannan, Women and HIV/AIDS (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Workshop on HIV/AIDS and

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adult mortality in developing countries, 2003).

10 United Nations, Global Coalition on Women and AIDS (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2003).

11 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/2.

12 UN General Assembly resolution A/60/L.1.

13 Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of the special session of the General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century” (New York: UN, 2005), 148.

14 Ibid, 2005.

15 UN General Assembly Resolution A/60/L.1.

16 In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (New York: UN, 2005).

17 Commission on the Status of Women. Report of the forty-ninth session (28 February – 11 and 22 March 2005) (New York: UN, 2005), 1.

18 Ibid.

19 The World’s Women 2005: Progress in Statistics (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2005), 165.

A Look Back

Marching to a Different Drum The World Bank and African Development Callisto Madavo The World Bank has been a catalyst in the enormous progress that has been made overall in global economic development, and in the fight against poverty around the world. Over the three decades I spent at the World Bank, I watched my employer transform from a relatively small, exclusive, and conservative bank into a world-class, inclusive development institution.

However, such substantial progress is tainted by the continuing difficulties in the development of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where a lag in progress poses a challenge not only for the people of the continent, but also for the stability and wellbeing of the international development community at large.

I worked in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as a sector economist, program manager, and country director before finishing my career at the Bank serving as the vice president for Africa—my home continent. While the World Bank has come to wield considerable influence as a center of development, research, and knowledge, its eventual contribution and success will depend on whether it can help Africa become an integral participant in the prosperity that is now spreading across the globe. To play this role in Africa, the Bank will require strong leadership as exemplified by Robert McNamara and James Wolfensohn, a broad-based and inclusive approach to development, and the capacity to listen and to learn. In this article, I

Callisto Madavo, a visiting professor at Georgetown University, held several senior level positions in the World Bank, including regional vice president for Africa.

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will look back on my career in the Bank to examine its role in the development of SSA and look ahead to what can and must be done in the years to come.

and South Asia. SSA, however, marched to a different drum, witnessing increases in both the poverty ratio and the number of poor at large.

Progress and Development since Better Understanding of the the 1960s. With the exception of SSA, Development Process. Equally which is still finding its way, the world has seen unprecedented progress in growth and wealth creation during the past four decades. We have seen the pervasive poverty of East Asia in the 1960s give way to the prosperity of the “tiger” economies of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and so on.

Overall, an annual increase in world per capita income was at its peak—at 3 percent —during the 1960s and remained above 1.5 percent through the remainder of the twentieth century.1 This growth and increased wealth have had a profound impact on the quality of life for many in developed and developing countries alike and have lifted many out of poverty. For example, between 1960 and 2000 infant mortality decreased from 140 to 52 deaths per thousand births, life expectancy increased from 43 to 64 years, and the illiteracy rate was reduced from 53 percent to 28 percent.

The poverty ratio in the developing world (those living on less than $1 a day) fell from over 50 percent in 1960 to about 13 percent in 2000, and the World Bank estimates that the number of poor people fell from 1.1 billion to about 650 million in that same period of time.2 Asia’s progress is remarkable and shows that, with few exceptions, development efforts worldwide have been largely successful in terms of improved incomes and quality of life, and the widening possibilities, opportunities, and choices for many. There were, of course, significant regional differences. East Asia registered dramatic progress, as did Latin America

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important during this period has been the significant evolution of development thinking and the accumulation of knowledge through research, policymaking, and development practices—including learning by doing and sharing knowledge across countries. In the 1960s modernization theory and the concept of the two-sector model (traditional and modern) held sway. Authors W.W. Rostow, Sir Arthur Lewis, and Ragnar Nurkse theorized that industrialization was the key to the transformation of traditional and backward agricultural economies into modern ones, and that accumulation and capital were the drivers of change. At the same time, the state was seen as an important instrument of transformation in developing countries.

The role of markets received little attention given that the preconditions for markets to flourish, such as human capital and adequate infrastructure, were largely missing. Consequently, the notion of a developmental state that could compensate for market failure became popular, inspired in part by the Soviet bloc.

I remember discussions within the Bank, however, about how the state-led planning model was not delivering results. In the 1970s and 1980s, as evidence began to emerge of “state failure,” especially in Africa, disillusionment increased among those of us who had been advocates of a strong state role in development. The result was a search for balance between the roles of the state and

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the market. Initially, the pendulum swung too far to the right under the influence of the conservative governments that had come to power in key Western countries and who were leading the global economy. Essentially under

A Look Back

oped countries) and the South (developing countries) that would support and underpin their implementation.

Non-state actors have also played a critical role in the evolution of development thinking, most notably through

While the World Bank has come to wield

considerable influence, its contribution and success will depend on whether it can help Africa become an integral participant in global prosperity. the control of the Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl governments, international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the 1980s spearheaded adjustment programs to roll back the role of the state in developing economies and to unleash the market. Fortunately, the pendulum swung back in the 1990s when a more balanced appreciation of the importance of markets anchored in conducive environments created by strong government action became broadly accepted.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the 1990s, a consensus began to emerge around the dual objectives of growth and poverty reduction. Prerequisites to growth, such as macroeconomic stability, transparency, peace, and good governance, became universally accepted. In addition, the world began to agree that growth alone was not enough: progress had to ensure that the poor themselves participated not as objects but as subjects of their own development. This thinking culminated in the Millennium Declaration of 2000, which defined the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and a partnership between the North (devel-

their advocacy in areas such as debt cancellation campaigns, increased overseas development assistance (ODA), and market access, as well as improved governance and transparency. Not only was development working in practice, but the development community’s understanding of the process, though a work in progress, had improved considerably.

The Challenge of Sub-Saharan Africa. With regard to these exceptional

advances in development and poverty reduction, sub-Saharan Africa has been left behind. There, per capita GDP grew by only 1 percent between 1950 and 2001, compared to 2.1 percent for the world as a whole and 3.3 percent for Asia, the world’s fastest growing region.3 Moreover, the growth momentum stagnated and declined from the late 1970s into the beginning of this century. Poverty, in terms of both ratios and absolute numbers, continued to grow such that today, Africa is the only region in which the number of poor people is rising, not falling. World poverty increasingly assumes an African face. In addition, stagnation and decline have taken a toll on Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 8 5 ]

MARCHING TO A DIFFERENT DRUM

gains that had been made in education, health, life expectancy, and infrastructure during the first decade of independence.

In many countries of SSA, health and education systems, infrastructure, and other institutions are in a state of virtual collapse. Civil services and universities such as Mekerere in Uganda, Legon in Ghana, and Ibadan in Nigeria that were the pride of Africa in the 1960s and the 1970s are now a shadow of their former selves. The refrain from many today is: what has gone wrong in Africa?

As noted, the picture was not always so grim. In the 1960s Africa’s prospects looked as bright as those of any other region of the world. Colonialism had come to an end and Africans everywhere imagined a future of possibilities: growing economies, improved standards, consolidation of hard-won freedom through the building of institutions and democracy. Per capita growth in incomes averaged 2.5 percent during the decade of 1960 to 1970.4 There were significant improvements in education, health indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy, and physical infrastructure. Overall, substantial progress was made in that first decade, before things began—in the words of African writer Chinua Achebe—to “fall apart” in the latter half of the 1970s.

At the time, the major debate in the World Bank concerned the causes of this decline. At the end of 1979, alarmed by the implications of failing economies, African finance ministers asked the Bank to prepare a special report on Africa, completed in 1981.5 While the report acknowledged that external factors such as terms of trade and drought, had contributed to the decline, it emphasized internal factors, including poor economic policies and the intrusive role of the state in the economy, which the report [ 1 8 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

claimed had undermined markets and squeezed the private sector. Moreover, Africa was living beyond its means and borrowing for consumption rather than investment. The prescription put forward by the international financial institutions was the bitter medicine of structural adjustment. This provoked a fierce debate between the World Bank and IMF, supported by key Western governments, and Africans, supported by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), other UN agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), some academics, and civil society. The Africans and their supporters argued that the adjustment programs: a) failed to tackle the underlying structural factors (human capital, infrastructure, production) that would lead to the transformation of African economies; b) imposed huge social costs on the populations, especially the poor; c) destroyed state capacity; and d) were of dubious efficacy. The UNECA went so far as to put an alternative framework forward and the relationship between the Bank and the UNECA became strained for many years thereafter.

As the debate raged on, adjustment programs continued to be forced on Africa, and the continent’s economies remained in decline. It was obvious to many Bank staff working on the frontlines that the bitter medicine did not work. A second Bank report on Africa published in 1989 embraced some of the arguments of the Bank’s critics, including the need to focus on the fundamental factors of development (human capital, infrastructure, production, etc.), while correcting the financial imbalances and facilitating markets.6 More importantly, the report articulated for the first time the importance of poor governance and weak state capacity in explaining Africa’s difficulties.

MADAVO

The second Bank report made the point that the seeds of the continent’s decline were sown during the apparent economic progress of the 1960s. The seeds lay in the creeping decay of the institutional, political, and social fabric. The educated and Westernized few who inherited the post-colonial states soon developed into a small elite with monopoly control over both political and economic power. The countervailing elements such as the military, political oppositions, and non-state actors were co-opted through patronage. This led to the emergence of

A Look Back

terms of trade did not always favor Africa.

Second, as the development crisis deepened in the late 1970s and 1980s, Africa became a ward of the international system, with the IMF, World Bank, and bilateral donors playing the role of school master. Furthermore, the efficacy of policies imposed on Africa by external actors was not always proven: in many instances Africa was used as a guinea pig.

So what of the future? Lately, Africans have asserted their leadership through, for example, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The interna-

Progress has to ensure that poor people

themselves participate not as objects, but as subjects of their own development. the neopatrimonial state, which provided neither effective nor clean governance.

Corruption became endemic. Put simply, in many countries the state failed the people for almost two decades. Only with the collapse of the Soviet Union did the wave of African democratization begin.

On the economic side, there is no question that poor domestic economic policies were pursued: macroeconomic imbalances, overextended state finances, and poor leadership. The good news is that since the late 1990s, significant progress has been made in instituting sound economic policies. The challenge is in the implementation, which requires a capable and well-governed state.

An equally important contribution to Africa’s crisis and decline was the fact that the continent’s leaders lost control of their development agenda. First, Africa was dependent on the vagaries of development in the global economy. The

tional community, led by the group of eight (G8) industrialized nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), is creating a partnership with—and not dictating to—Africa.

But Africa still faces a hard trek to development and freedom. According to the World Bank and IMF’s Global Monitoring Report 2005, while the overall outlook for growth remains promising for the world as a whole for the next decade, Africa will continue to lag. The World Bank projects that SSA will grow in per capita terms by an average of 1.7 percent (compared to 5.5 percent for East Asia) in the next decade. By 2015 the poverty ratio will remain at 38.4 percent (East Asia 0.9 percent) and the number of poor people at 340 million (East Asia 19 million).7 The hope is that with improved governance and leadership and continued support in terms of ODA, Summer/Fall 2006 [ 1 8 7 ]

MARCHING TO A DIFFERENT DRUM

debt relief, and market access, Africa can speed up its growth and improve on these projections. This hope is emboldened by the current condition of the World Bank, which has undergone tremendous transformation to place it in a strong position to effectively promote SSA development.

important part of the Bank’s mission. By the time McNamara retired from the Bank in 1981, the Bank had become a different institution: larger and more influential on the global development stage and well on its way to becoming the premier global reference center on development issues. It had also become more Changes at the World Bank. At the open, inclusive, and youthfully dynamic. beginning of the 1970s, the Bank was small Unfortunately, McNamara’s retireand conservative with a predominantly ment coincided with the ascension of the British and American staff, many of whom Reagan and Thatcher administrations in were ex-colonial officials—not the most the United States and the United Kingwelcoming environment for someone like dom respectively. Ultimately, the develme, coming out of racially segregated opment and poverty agenda was lost in the Rhodesia. Most of the Bank’s lending then weeds, sacrificed to market fundamentalwas administered through the Interna- ism—the new orthodoxy. The concern for tional Bank for Reconstruction and poor countries, especially the challenge of Development (IBRD), or what was known Africa, which McNamara had put front as the “hard window,” owing to its and center, was largely forgotten and in its requirements of more exacting demon- place were imposed structural-adjuststrations of credit-worthiness for loans for ment programs aimed at opening the hard infrastructure. The balance of the African economies to domestic and globBank’s business was in the form of credits al markets, and rolling back the state. from the International Development This interlude lasted almost twenty Association (IDA), the concessional win- years before the arrival of another charisdow, which lends mostly to poor countries matic leader, James Wolfensohn, who not in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the only energized the Bank but also sharpCaribbean. ened its mission and put the spotlight on The transformation of the Bank and its Africa. Wolfensohn was a transformarole began under Robert McNamara, who tional leader who inherited an institution assumed the position of president in that was, in many senses, drifting and 1968. He put forward a compelling and under severe attack from a coalition of

World poverty increasingly assumes an African face.

refreshing vision, in effect redefining development by stressing the importance of population control, education, health, and poverty reduction—in other words, people and their quality of life. Poverty reduction for the first time became an [ 1 8 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

NGOs and ideologues determined to leave development to the markets and the private sector. By sheer force of his creative personality, he restored the Bank’s leadership as the premier global development institution. He clarified once and

MADAVO

for all that the mission of the Bank was to reduce poverty and give poor people worldwide a voice. He promoted country ownership and leadership of development programs; successful, sustainable development could not be imposed from abroad. He addressed the issues that constrained growth and development: ODA flows; debt relief; market access; conflict; governance and transparency including corruption; and infectious disease, especially HIV/AIDS. The Bank itself became a more diversified, humble, and empathetic organization. Finally and particularly important to me, he brought Africa back as a Bank priority, demonstrating his own very strong personal belief in the resilience of Africa and its people.

Today, the Bank’s total commitments are about $20 billion a year, of which IDA accounts for over 40 percent, evidence of the institution’s growing service to poor countries. Africa receives about 50 percent of IDA commitments. The areas of lending have also expanded to include the social sectors, environment, and capacity building in addition to the traditional areas such as infrastructure. Research, knowledge, and learning have been significantly expanded. The World Bank I retired from resembles very little the World Bank I joined three decades ago.

Conclusion. In these reflections, I have attempted to make a few broad points.

A Look Back

First, I believe the World Bank’s understanding of development has evolved and matured through a process of learning from analytical research and practice.

Evidence from much of the developing world is that development works and has contributed to huge improvements in the quality of life and reduction of poverty for many. SSA has been the exception where progress remains uneven and inconsistent, posing a special challenge to the current development model. A stagnant SSA at the margin of a prosperous and integrating global economy would be a source of considerable instability. I have suggested that Africa can turn around, provided that the approach to the continent’s development is broader based, taking account of not just economic but also political and cultural factors as well. Africans themselves would need to take greater ownership and leadership in their own development. Finally, I have also suggested that the evolution of the World Bank into a premier and inclusive development institution puts it in a position to contribute to Africa’s progress provided it has strong leadership, embraces a broad and long-term view of development, and works with Africans as partners and subjects of their own development. Under Wolfensohn, the Bank began to move in this direction and it is my hope that it will continue to do so in the future.

NOTES

1 R.N. Cooper, Half Century of Development, Lessons of Experience, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005).

2 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001).

3 World Bank, Global Monitoring Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005).

4 T. Mkandawire and Charles Saludo, Our Conti-

nent, Our Future (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 1999), Chapter 1.

5 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981).

6 World Bank, Global Monitoring Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989).

7 World Bank, Global Monitoring Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005).

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