GJIA - 8.1 Is Labor Lost

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Gaz Promises

of International Affairs

Russian Energy’s Challenge for the West

keith c. smith

Rehearsing Revolution Art & Politics in Peru

jill lane

South-South Partnerships An African Recipe for Growith WINTER/SPRING

steve booysen

2007 VO L U M E V I I I , N U M B E R 1

Is Labor Lost? forum contributions:

jehangir s. pocha charles s. shapiro timothy b. smith tamas reti

china venezuela france central & eastern europe

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Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

plus an interview with former president of poland Aleksander Kwasniewski

Winter/Spring 2007 • $8.95 usa

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Winter/Spring 2007, Volume viii, Number 1

1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Is Labor Lost?

3

Since the end of communism and the rise of globalization, labor movements have faced formidable challenges to their viability as a political voice for workers. Organized labor the world over has largely stagnated or been silenced in the face of state and international pressures. This Forum examines the state of workers and their politics and parties in four regions today to assess the challenges facing them and the effects felt in their country's polices at home and abroad.

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One Sun in the Sky: Labor Unions in the People’s Republic of China JEHANGIR S. POCHA

13

Stuck on the Streets: French Labor TIMOTHY B. SMITH

19

Venezuelan Labor Struggles To Find Autonomy CHARLES S. SHAPIRO

27

From Eastern Bloc to EU: Organized Labor’s Struggle for Relevance TAMAS RETI

Business&Economics 35

South-South Partnerships: An African Recipe for Growth STEVE BOOYSEN

Africa must use a consumption-based model and Chinese capital to overcome poverty.

43

Home-Grown Foreign Aid: Workers’ Remittances as a Form of Development Finance RAMKISHEN E. RAJAN

Workers' remittances are overtaking development aid as a source of external finance.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ i ]

Conflict&Security 51

Gaz Promises: Russian Energy’s Challenge for the West KEITH C. SMITH

The West needs to rethink its engagement with Russia regarding energy.

59

Six-Party Talks: Time for Change PAUL F. CHAMBERLIN

Engagement with North Korea is the best way for the United States to meet its national security objectives.

69

Countering Terrorist Financing: Lessons from Europe MICHAEL JONSSON AND SVANTE CORNELL

Europe's battle with national terrorist organizations can give us insights on al-Qaeda's financing.

Culture&Society 79

Rehearsing Revolution in Peru JILL LANE

The performing arts have enabled Peruvians to actively mobilize against Fujimori's authoritarian regime.

87

From Bread Dolls to Prostitutes: A Cultural Diagnosis of Post-Soviet Russia SLOBODANKA M. VALDIV-GLOVER

Postmodernism provides a cultural critique of nascent civil society in Russia.

Law&Ethics 95

Defying Double Discrimination PETER BLANCK, MEERA ADYA, AND MARIA VERONICA REINA

Women and girls with disabilities are often overlooked in the international arena, but the 2006 UN Disability Convention looks to reverse this trend.

105

Unequal Benefits JAY DRYDYK

When development causes human displacement, legal mechanisms need to be effective in protecting human rights.

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Contents

Politics&Diplomacy 115

The Hard Road Back to Soft Power PAMELA HYDE SMITH

Public diplomacy must be improved in order to combat historically low foreign public opinion of the United States, which threatens U.S. security.

125

Africa’s Third-Term Syndrome TUKUMBI LUMUMBA-KASONGO

Presidential third terms are symptoms of democratic transition in African states, and domestic and international actors should view them as indicators of the need for further reform.

Books 135

More than Regime Change CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER

A review of Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions by Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks.

View from the Ground 141

The Other Casualties WA’EL ALZAYAT

The recent war between Israel and Hezbollah has damaged the standing of moderate Arab governments, the UN, and the United States in the Middle East.

A Look Back 149

Two Decades of Democratization INTERVIEW WITH ALEKSANDER KWASNIEWSKI

The former President of Poland discusses democracy and the future of the European Union.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ i i i ]

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EDITORS-IN-CHI EF MANAGING EDITORS

BUS INESS MANAGER DES I GN MANAGER

FORUM EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS BUS INESS&EC ONOMI C S EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C ONFL I C T&S E CUR I TY ED I T ORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C U LT U R E & S O C I E T Y E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS L AW & E TH I C S E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS POLITI CS&DIPLOMACY EDITORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS BO OK REV I EW ED I TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS V I EW FROM THE GROUND ED I TOR EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS A LOOK BACK EDITOR EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS DIRECTOR OF FINANCE D IREC TOR OF ADVERT I S I NG DIRECTOR OF MARKET ING D I RE C T OR OF C I RCULAT I ON

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UN I VERS I TY C OUNC I L

Candace L. Faber, Samantha J. Yale Dorothy Chou, Jessica Prusakowski, Alfia Sadekova, Daniel J. Smith, Jordan D. White Robert Williams Genevieve Kinney Aditya Deshmukh, Margaret Lee Megan Abbot, Matthew J. Engler Raj Salooja, Vali Shokrgozar William Allen, Marc Janoff Anand Prakash, Whitney Shinkle Eliza Keller, Carlotta Minnella, Evgenia Ustinova Erica Alini, Kathryn Vesey Zina Sadek Sawaf, Carrie Barnett Nicole Phillips Cordeau, Christopher Stucko Sara Burton Osborne, Anish Savani Robert Cooper, Paloma Gonzalez Kristin Larson, Katherine Townsend Stephanie Ren茅e Morris, Lindsey Louise Purdy Elizabeth Hanna-Owens, Julianna Lynn Nagy Stephanie Gilbert Drew Peterson, Karolina Dembinska-Lemus Mary Sanderson Alexander Christian Hart, Jeffrey Pan Emilie Lis Pradera Zhimei Luo Natalya Skiba Daria Gage Kevin Hartnett, Yvonne Mejia, Anastasia Stepanova, Eleni Fischer, Greg Burie, Cathy Li, Lisa Domme, Tom Carroll, Andra Mocanu Donald Burke Donna Harati, Christopher Svetlik david abshire, susan bennett, h.r.h. felipe de borb贸n, joyce davis, cara dimassa, robert l. gallucci, lee hamilton, peter f. krogh, michael mazarr, fareed zakaria anthony arend, richard brahm, michael e. brown, daniel byman, james clad, chester crocker, herbert howe, christopher joyner, charles king, carol lancaster, donald mchenry, daniel porterfield, howard schaffer, george shambaugh, jennifer ward, casimir yost

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Editors’ Note

At a time when policymakers, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations dominate debates on the future of the world economy, the voice of one group is conspicuously quiet: labor. As economies globalize, politics remains local—and in this issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, we learn that labor has yet to find a way to advance its political interests amidst these two conflicting contexts.

Neither communist governments nor massive street protests have empowered the workers of today's world. In China, labor is the engine of enviable economic growth, but Jehangir Pocha finds that it gives without receiving benefits or protection. Timothy Smith argues that France's labor unions have achieved a range of protections at the expense of the unemployed. Ambassador Charles Shapiro describes how Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, with its patchwork of powerless labor groups, has silenced workers by selecting who can speak for them. And in central and eastern Europe, Tamas Reti discusses why accession to the European Union has improved wages and working conditions but has undermined the clout of labor organizations.

Labor is not the only player in search of innovative ways to influence politics. In this issue, Jill Lane examines how theater and photography have promoted national reconciliation in Peru. Steve Booysen encourages investment in Africa by less traditional players. Peter Blanck, Meera Adya, and Maria Veronica Reina consider how international law can give voice to women and children with disabilities.

As the foundations of power in the twenty-first century continue to shift, former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski discusses the continued importance of democratic ideals and institutions. While advocating reforms, he has hope that the UN can step up to new challenges and emerge as a powerful actor in the future.

The Journal continues to publish articles that strive to make sense of a world in constant change. Even as we go to press, the forces shaping these issues are in flux. We like it that way, and we hope you will too.

Candace L. Faber

Samantha J. Yale

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 ]

Is Labor Lost?

One Sun in the Sky: Labor Unions in the People’s Republic of China Jehangir S. Pocha There is an old Chinese proverb that holds there cannot be two suns in the sky, so there can be only one source of power in the land. It is an idea the Chinese Communist Party has embraced fully, leaving it congenitally opposed to any leadership or organization in China other than itself. It is hardly surprising then that the Chinese government is not ready to allow independent trade unions to exist because of their potential for creating political instability.

Labor rights remain the last frontier of change in China, and the Communist Party’s growing resistance to labor reform indicates that conditions for Chinese workers are likely to become worse before they get any better. This is a grim prediction for a country where independent trade unions are already banned and millions of workers go to bed every night in overcrowded dormitory rooms after having worked fifteen to eighteen hours a day in Dickensian factories where some workers are literally worked to death. This phenomenon has added a new word to the Mandarin

Jehangir S. Pocha is a Beijing-based journalist for The Boston Globe.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 5 ]

ONE SUN IN THE SKY

vocabulary—guolaosi—death from overwork. Global consumers have been shielded from knowing about the human cost of the Chinese products they purchase, as the press has been relatively tame in covering labor rights in China.

But post-reform China has always had a vested interest in keeping its workers controlled and compliant. Mostly this is because China’s export-led growth is the essential glue holding the country together, and cheap labor—along with market reforms, a disdain for intellectual rights, a disregard of the environment, and cheap capital from state-controlled banks—has been essential to that growth.

It was these five principles that allowed Chinese leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping

the development of competency, not just structural reforms alone. China’s environmental devastation has also forced the government to adopt more sustainable policies, and pressure from the West is pushing Beijing slowly but surely toward enforcing intellectual property rights.

Lastly, China’s decision to privatize and reform its banks means they can’t be used anymore to subsidize China’s gargantuan state-owned companies and loss-making public works projects.

Thus, China’s cheap and disempowered labor force is the country’s only remaining competitive advantage.

Despite the hype surrounding the swelling size and might of China’s new multinationals, few of them, if any,

Labor rights remain the last frontier of

change in China.

and Jiang Zemin, to offer global investors the unique combination of nineteenth century business practices and twenty-first century infrastructure that enabled China to attract more than $800 billion in foreign direct investment since 1979.1 But since China’s current President Hu Jintao came to power in 2003, much of the ground has shifted under his feet.

As China’s economy has matured and opened, greater reforms have brought diminishing benefits. Previously, like any closed economy, China’s tiny GDP surged with every small reform as fresh infusions of capital and a lowering of trade barriers allowed China’s artificially restricted businesses to bloom. But now, as China’s economy is poised for further growth in the middle of its development, that growth is increasingly dependent on [ 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

would be globally competitive if they paid globally competitive wages. None possess the technical capabilities, brand equity, and intellectual property rights that might allow them to dominate markets in which these labor-based cost advantages could be leveraged. With China’s economy booming, authorities are desperately trying to control further increases in rural incomes and industrial wages, as the latter went up 15 percent last year alone.2

Labor Policy of Hu Jintao. In this

environment, the idea of allowing workers the right to bargain collectively for wages and benefits frightens officials.

Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao spoke emotionally about enhancing workers’ rights when they first came to power in March 2003, but have since acted dispassionately, lim-

POCHA

iting labor rights. Initially, both leaders pressured companies to pay back-wages to millions of migrant workers. But beyond that, Hu and Wen have refused to make any meaningful structural improvements to China’s labor laws, even dragging their feet on the creation of a national minimum wage. Though some cities have instituted their own minimum wage in response to local pressures, those rates are so low that they are mostly meaningless. For example, Guangzhou in the southern Guangdong province, one of the major engines of China’s growth, set its minimum wage at about $100 a month.3 Privately, some Chinese officials confess their country is following a system of measured exploitation with historical precedence: The United States exploited slaves and immigrants; Europeans colonized entire continents for labor. As China cannot do either, its only option is to exploit its own workers and claw its way up the development ladder.

The morally cumbersome fact is that, economically speaking, they may have a point. Shanghai-based American architect Ben Wood says China’s current construction boom, which employs about 100 million people across the country and has turned China into the world’s largest consumer of steel and cement, would have been severely compromised without cheap labor. While a bricklayer in the United States earns about forty dollars an hour, his peer in China earns one dollar a day. This allows China to build grand buildings for only 20 percent of the cost in the United States.4

Organized Labor Responds. But Cui Zhiyuan, a professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing and a leading advocate of labor rights, says it is time for

Is Labor Lost?

people to understand that the seemingly enshrined injustices China’s workers have to cope with are not merely the natural fallout of market mechanics remaking a state-controlled economy, or an amoral attempt at development. “What we see if we really look is that in the name of reform, [corrupt officials] are looting China and the workers,” said Cui.5 Starting in the 1990s, thousands of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were bought at fire-sale prices by politically connected people who, in collusion with corrupt officials and banks, stripped the enterprises of their assets and fired all the workers, often without any compensation.

Last year, public anger over unpaid pensions, corrupt factory bosses, and officials cheating workers out of wages ignited many of the 87,000 public protests that rocked China, up from 74,000 the year before.6 Domestic activists challenging the status quo face increasingly harsh reprisals. At least twenty-four labor activists are languishing in Chinese prisons, according to the Dui Hua Foundation in San Francisco, which tries to keep track of political prisoners in China.7 One such activist, Shandong garment worker Li Xintao, helped fellow workers demand unpaid wages and benefits and was given a harsh five-year sentence merely on the charge of “gathering a crowd to attack an organ of the state.”8 Ma Kai, head of China’s National Development and Reform Commission and one of the country’s most powerful economic decision makers, says China’s economy is “not ready” to accept the formation of independent trade unions.9 He tries to mitigate the government’s labor record by saying it has already granted workers more rights, including Winter/Spring 2007 [ 7 ]

ONE SUN IN THE SKY

the right to sue their employers. Han Dongfang, a unionist with the Hong Kong advocacy group China Labor Bulletin, was expelled from China for trying to organize workers outside the state-run system in 1993 and admits that China does have better labor laws today than ever before, but these are rarely enforced.10 While even the most aggressive Chinese labor activists admit there are good people in the state-run unions, they say systemic constraints prevent officials from adequately representing workers.

The government still controls about half of the Chinese economy and most of the private entrepreneurs who control the other half belong to well-connected clans, such as those related to senior government or party officials. In this situation, official union representatives can endanger themselves by pushing too hard against established interests.11 Pang Qing Xiang, 60, a unionist who was jailed for nine months in 2003 after he and two colleagues, Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang, tried to organize workers in the northeastern Liaoying province to demand their pensions, says that the government has lost its ability to control corrupt officials: “Instead they try and control us.” Pang was jailed despite the fact that the factory manager he and his friends challenged was proven to have committed “irregularities” with funds meant to pay the workers. Though Xiao was released after serving about four years, Yao is still serving a seven-year sentence, and all three were beaten and abused while in custody. “To them we were nothing,” says Pang, “certainly not people who had a right to demand anything, not even pay.”12

Solidarity or WalMart? Zhang Bijian, an advisor to President Hu and [ 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

head of the China Reform Forum, says China is just not ready to allow independent trade unions because of their potential for creating political instability.

“No one knows where a union ends and a political party begins,” he says.13 Zhang’s words betray a common fear in China’s Communist Party that a Solidarity-type movement led by a charismatic leader like Lech Walesa could sink China into the same chaos that gripped Poland and the ex-Soviet Union in 1989.

Zhang’s argument is based on a global consensus that a gradually reformed China tomorrow is preferable to a politically unstable China today. But Han, the labor activist, says the argument that independent trade unions will automatically drive China toward democracy is a red herring. “In the United States in the 1920s, it was argued that trade unions would turn the country into a communist state, but it didn’t happen,” says Han. “Now ironically in China, they are saying trade unions will turn the country into a democracy… Unionists don’t want to change the system in China; we only want to help workers. If the government is really worried about being overthrown, they should realize the biggest threat to the Communist Party is the number of corrupt officials who are empowered in the name of communism, but doing worse things than the capitalists of eighteenth-century Europe.”13 Ding Ning Ning, director of social studies at the Development Research Center of the State Council in Beijing says the problem in China to some extent is one of “ideological reversal.” After clinging so tightly to Marxism, China is now trying to imitate American-style economics. “Capitalism is our system now; and to some extent, we may have gone too far in pursuing some policies,” he admits. “Some officials think making

POCHA

money, both for their area or province, and of course themselves, is what matters now. But we are taking corrective steps and [the state-controlled unions, united under the banner of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions] are doing a lot.”14 In fact, the Chinese government recently created a public relations blitz around its ability to force WalMart, a company notoriously successful in preventing its employees from unionizing, to allow a state-run union in its doors.

“Most foreign companies, and particularly local factories manufacturing for foreign companies, still push their employees to work extended shifts without pay,” says Han. Few allow workers to collectively bargain with management on issues like working conditions and wages, or give Chinese workers even a semblance of the rights enjoyed in the West. This March when the National People’s Congress (China’s rubber-stamp parliament)

Is Labor Lost?

seventy-two dollars), it forced them to work eleven hours a day, six days a week without overtime compensation. When the company ignored the workers, nearly one thousand of them rioted, and scores were seriously injured when the police intervened.16

The West Stays Silent. U.S.

politicians who stir voters by bashing China for taking American jobs typically neglect to mention the country’s lack of independent trade unions. Yet this distortion of free trade principles is one of the key reasons Beijing has managed to take 1.5 million jobs from the United States since 1989.17 Instead, they prefer to dwell on Beijing’s undervalued currency and its poor enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).

This is economically illogical. The bulk of China’s exports to the United States—toys, textiles, and cheap electronics—contain little intellectual property.18

The period of relying on leaders is

already gone. Today, slowly, people are understanding that they have to fight for their own future. tabled a new labor contract law, the U.S. and European chambers of commerce were the first to come out publicly against it.”15 In July, thousands of workers at the Merton Company in the southern Guangdong province that makes plastic toys for U.S. companies, such as Disney, Mattel, and McDonalds, petitioned their management for better pay, less forced overtime, and better working conditions.

Though the company paid workers the local minimum wage of RMB 574 (about

Further, China’s local value-added to exports has been calculated by the World Bank to be between 10 and 30 percent.

Thus, even a 20 percent upward revaluation in the RMB, demanded by many U.S. senators, would only raise prices of many Chinese exports by about 2 to 6 percent. Revaluation is, however, politically expedient. Calling for more labor rights undercuts the competitiveness of corporations. A stronger RMB and IPR protections benefit corporations who own patents and who could sell more of Winter/Spring 2007 [ 9 ]

ONE SUN IN THE SKY

establishment of new courts all over the country, and labor activists have been quick to use them to push the government toward obeying its existing labor laws.

Though the labor activist Han remains banned from entering China and the China Labor Bulletin’s website is blocked in China, he and other supporters have brought thirty labor rights cases to Chinese courts and have won most of them.

One case, in which they represented jewelry workers, even set a Chinese record for worker compensation of RMB 500,000 ($62,500). The jewelry workers had been fired after developing silicosis, a lung disease contracted by breathing mineral dust. Han’s success is partly rooted in the fact that he and his associates seek out “the most compelling cases” and focus all their efforts there.

“This way we can help only a few people but we can make sample cases and show people that laws can be very useful if you use them correctly,” says Han. “More importantly, through this legal battle we also provide the idea that workers should get together.”22 Small, grassroots actions such as these are about all Chinese labor activists can risk, given the forces arraigned against them. The tangible impact of their guerrilla litigation is small. For every thirty cases Han and other activists take up, The Process of Civilization. The hundreds of thousands of other cases are one crack in the Chinese government’s not even accepted by the courts. Of the grip on labor has come from China’s cases that do get filed, many languish in fledging legal system. Hu Jintao’s gov- musty files for years. The desperate litiernment has been trying to move the gants try to petition their representatives country toward republican constitution- directly every March when the National alism and rule of law to satisfy the natur- People’s Congress is in session, but most al desire of many Chinese for greater are ignored and many beaten by police. freedom, protection of basic rights, and In recent months there has been a crackstate restraint. The baby steps China has down on the public interest lawyers who taken in this direction have seen the fight these pro bono cases. Gao their high-value goods in China.

If Western officials have been disturbingly adept at sidestepping these issues, it is partly because they are loath to rock a system that has allowed Western corporations and governments to reap huge profits. A recent survey of 1,800 American businesses in China by the United States Chamber of Commerce in Beijing found that 42 percent of their profit margins were higher than their average worldwide margins.19 More significantly, the Chinese government, which benefits enormously from its labor-driven export economy, has invested almost $300 billion in Treasury bills.20 The government has also invested $500 billion in other U.S. securities.21 Thus, China helps fund the United States’s federal deficit and keeps American interest rates low. This in turn provides American consumers with cheap credit to buy more Chinese goods, beginning the cycle anew. This mutually convenient system, dubbed Bretton Woods II by economists David FolkertsLandau, Peter Garber, and Michael Dooley, has become a cornerstone of the global economy. China is critical to Bretton Woods II because it can invest mountains of cash in U.S. securities; one of the key reasons it can accumulate this cash is its ready access to cheap labor.

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POCHA

Zhisheng, one of China’s most prominent public interest lawyers, who also worked with Han, has been illegally detained by authorities since February, when he tried to orchestrate a rolling hunger strike to protest the beating of a colleague, Guo Feixiong.

Yet the efforts of activists like Han and Gao and the tales of their exploits whispered amongst workers are creating a discernable change in China’s mindset.

“The period of relying on leaders is already gone,” says Han. “Today, slowly, people are understanding that they have to fight for their own future.”

That is potentially seditious talk in the

Is Labor Lost?

minds of Chinese authorities, and like many who realize they are treading on thin ice, Han relies on an old trick to work his way back—he quotes Mao: “As Mao used to say, the evolution of history does not follow the will of individuals.

Historical developments happen either way. Today, China is living in a time of darkness but that does not mean there is no hope. Respect for people’s basic rights, limited work hours, decent compensation, better working conditions, laws that are enforced—all these things will happen because it is natural that they do. That’s just the process of civilization.”23

NOTES

1 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) & China: An Economic Research Study Series (Vol. 1) 1978-2005.

2 People's Bank of China (PBOC). Wage Report, 26 May, 2006.

3 Guangdong Labor and Social Security Department (LSSD). Press release, 1 September, 2006.

4 Ben Wood. Interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

5 Cui Zhiyuan. Interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

6 Wu Heping, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Public Security Press Statement, 20 January 2006.

7 Dui Hua Foundation. interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

8 Li Xintao. Interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

9 Ma Kai. Interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

10 Han Dongfang. Interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

11 Labor Rights Now. “Key Labor Activists Imprisoned in China,” Washington DC. Internet, http://www.laborrightsnow.org/chinaprisoners.html.

12 Pang Qing Xiang. interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

13 Zhang Bijian. interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

14 Ding Ning Ning. interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

15 Han Dongfang. interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

16 China Labor Watch, “Chinese Workers Manufacturing for McDonalds and Disney Outraged by Mistreatment.” 27 July 2006 17 The Economic Policy Institute, “U.S.-China Trade, 1989-2003.” Washington, DC. 18 U.S. Census Bureau, International Trade Statistics for 2005. Washington, DC. 19 U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, American Business in China White Paper #6.

20 Carolyn Bartholomew, Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Press Statement, 14 July 2005 21 Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve Chairman. U.S. Senate hearing, 16 February, 2006 22 Han Dongfang. Interview by Jehangier S. Pocha.

23 Ibid.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 1 ]

Is Labor Lost?

Stuck on the Streets French Labor

Timothy B. Smith Since the early 1980s, labor leaders in North America and France alike have held up Western European nations as humane, worker-friendly, civilized places. In particular, they have presented France as a country that makes time for the finer things in life, a place that treats workers with respect and provides decent wages, iron-clad job security, and long holidays—a cradle-to-grave welfare state. This view is no longer tenable.

As fires raged in suburban housing complexes across France in November 2005, the world watched in disbelief. The nation that gave birth to the ideal of solidarity was revealed to be racially segregated and rife with discrimination—officially opposed to the ideal of multiculturalism, but incapable of living up to its preferred goal of assimilating newcomers. Racked by chronic, long-term unemployment, the French electorate suffers further from disillusionment and polarization, home both to xenophobic right-wing political parties like JeanMarie Le Pen's National Front and to a strange brew of far-left splinter parties nostalgic for the economic wisdom of Leon Trotsky. Together, these extremist parties garnered 30 percent of the vote in the 2002 presidential election, with Le Pen alone winning five million votes.

Thus, France is gripped by a profound malaise and identity crisis. Politicians and social policy experts look elsewhere to see

Timothy B. Smith is an associate professor of history at Queen's University, Ontario. He is the author of France in Crisis: Welfare, Inequality and Globalization Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

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how to make a social market economy work. The challenge is to simultaneously support insiders—those currently employed—while still assisting outsiders: young people, recent immigrants, and others hurt by economic change. France, along with much of Western Europe, has failed to address this latter group.

Organized Labor Divided. The highly fragmented French labor movement is partly responsible for this problem. It is divided into six major unions polarized by doctrinal disputes and turf wars, five of which have had nothing constructive to say or do in the name of private sector job creation over the last twenty-five years. The one point of agreement is preserving the 2,500 page Code du Travail (labor code), which provides full-time workers an armor-like protection.

Parts of the French labor movement are still dominated by hard-line communists who dream of burning down the house instead of renovating it. The head of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), Olivier Besancenot, is even calling for a re-nationalization of privatized firms and a complete prohibition on firing current workers. Only the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT) has taken a moderate approach and accepted some government reforms.

The key divide lies between insiders employed with comfortable, secure, fulltime jobs and outsiders living on the margins of the workforce, unemployed or underemployed. The French public sector employs 25 percent of the workforce, compared to only 12 to 20 percent in other developed nations.1 Insiders work a thirty-two to thirty-five hour work week (depending on whether they are employed in the public or private sector), [ 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

have access to six to nine weeks of paid vacation, and enjoy the world's most generous public pensions. Outsiders, meanwhile, toil in part-time work or at fixedterm jobs and are denied the full panoply of social welfare benefits available to the insiders. It is no surprise that a recent opinion poll revealed over 70 percent of the French would prefer a job in the public sector over all other sectors.

Labor laws protect the jobs of union members, only 9 percent of the workforce, but make firms reluctant to hire newcomers. Organized labor wants to work less, defending the general thirtyfive hour work week and retirement at age sixty or earlier. The labor movement reluctantly tolerated the creation of a new, part-time workforce, but has refused to expose the majority of the workforce to greater flexibility. Where adjustments have taken place, the burden of reform is placed on vulnerable young workers.

As a consequence, this dual labor market persists. The French labor movement discredits change by associating it with the United States, the neoliberal flavor of the European Union, and globalization. It denies that the French social model comes at the expense of a large group of outsiders, leaving the French labor movement stagnant. This status quo, however, means life-battering unemployment and declining economic prospects for a large portion of the population. Opposing labor market flexibility for the majority is a way to avoid inequality, but the high, chronic, longterm unemployment and a dual labor market have come to constitute a new inequality in their own right.

This inequality was demonstrated dramatically in the riots of 2005. In the aftermath of these riots in suburban

SMITH

Is Labor Lost?

mative action programs as divisive and discriminatory. Likewise, Chirac told fellow leaders at a meeting in Hampton Court in 2005 that he sought Britishstyle full employment, but not if it meant adopting all elements of the British lifestyle. In his last annual 14 July television address, Chirac spoke of reducing economic inequalities, but warned that Danish- or Swedish-style legislation or programs could not work in France.

The consequences of this refusal to alter the status quo are felt primarily by French youth, who have a 22 percent unemployment rate, rising to 30 percent among those of North African descent. It is not the politicians alone, however, who reject available alternatives. The general public has demanded reform for two decades, yet has protested any changes that impose costs on them.

The resulting inaction has caused the working class to largely abandon its traditional political parties. Only 11 percent of French blue collar workers voted Socialist in 2002 (down from 42 percent Prisoners of Rhetoric. Today, one in 1988), while 30 percent of them voted need not hail from the right wing of the for the xenophobic leader Jean-Marie Le political spectrum to cast critical eyes on Pen and his National Front party. The Western Europe's political economy. remainder of the working-class vote With unfunded pension liabilities as went, for the most part, to the far-left large as World War I debts and no signif- parties: the Communists, LCR, Worker’s icant prospects for reform on the hori- Struggle (LO), and a handful of other zon, France, like Germany and Italy, radical parties. Only 14 percent of the remains in denial regarding its econom- unemployed voted for the Socialists in ic future. The government of Jacques 2002, but 38 percent of the unemployed Chirac and Dominique de Villepin has voted for Le Pen. Fifty years ago, the repeatedly acknowledged the challenges Communist Party was France’s secondFrance faces today, but has ruled out sev- largest party. In 2002, it won less than 4 eral policy options deemed incompatible percent of the total vote.3 with French culture, values, and its The Socialist Party, in return, has unique social model. abandoned its working-class roots, caterFor example, while the government ing instead to established civil servants has expressed concern about racial dis- and retirees. Such insiders have voted crimination, it rejects U.S.-style affir- overwhelmingly for the Socialist Party.

housing complexes, where 30 to 50 percent of youth are unemployed, one might imagine the public discourse would refocus on job creation, even if this meant asking the comfortably employed to accept pay cuts or reduced benefits. Facing low productivity growth in the service sector and other factors, no wealthy nation, even Canada, the United States, or Sweden, has emerged from the 1980s and 1990s without an income reduction for all workers except those immediately at the top. Yet the French labor movement remains fixated on salary increases for existing workers, and protection of their standard of living is at the top of the public agenda. This dissonance speaks to the labor movement's disconnect from this most pressing problem facing French society: mass unemployment. Not one French labor leader or politician has indicated to the public that wages are rising slowly due to these complex factors or the ripple effects of the thirty-five-hour law.2

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CFDT and LO, the two large communist-dominated unions dogmatically hostile to reform, also draw their power base today from insiders in the public sector and as a result are the leading organizers of street protests against reform legislation.

However, enough blame is present to be shared across the spectrum. The center-right Chirac/de Villepin government has, like its predecessors on the left,

Toward Today or Tomorrow?

France is at an impasse. It is fully aware that major reform is necessary, but fearful of it and distrustful of those who call for it. Reform will not occur until center-left politicians and labor leaders accept it and convince the public that France can become a more dynamic, business-friendly place without substantial increases in economic inequality.

France awaits a Jean ChrĂŠtien, a Bill

France is gripped by a profound malaise and identity crisis.

merely offered half-measure reforms without advanced public justification.

The government is a prisoner of its own rhetoric. Apparent solutions to France's problems—loosening up the labor market to create more service sector and other low-wage jobs, cutting payroll taxes that prevent job creation, and cutting red tape hindering entrepreneurship—possess an inherently Anglo-American ideological bent that has been disdained for two decades, rendering it difficult for the French public to accept.

Rather than open their hearts to the unemployed outsiders, insiders appear to want even more protection from the outside world. The more French politicians and labor leaders rail against the threat of globalization, the more the general public fears tinkering with the national model. The more the employed and pensioned middle class has to lose, the more fearful it is of losing it. Insiders are not likely to agree to reform, which entails sharing some of their wealth and welcoming outsiders into the club. [ 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Clinton, or a Tony Blair who will push for reform in an otherwise stagnant political environment, a leader who can convince the public that change might actually be good for the long-term prospects of the nation.

The labor movement calls for measures that will continue to protect insiders at the expense of immigrants, the unemployed, and the French economy at large. Over 95 percent of strikes are related to wages, job security, and pensions; when the public demands job creation, these jobs are in the public sector alone, like education and law enforcement. The private sector is rarely seen as a source of generating employment and national wealth.

Three decades of high unemployment have turned the labor movement into an essentially reactionary force, committed to the past and fearful of the future.

Ironically, the more the labor movement declines in numerical terms, the more powerful it becomes in real terms, most notably in the form of regular street

SMITH

demonstrations aiming to stop reform.

The labor movement derides the idea of creating the jobs of tomorrow since they fail to pass the test of solidarity.

Furthermore, the market is not trusted. Another recent opinion poll revealed that only a third of the French people have a positive view of capitalism, half the proportion of such respondents in China, a nominally communist country. A majority of French people prefer socialism to capitalism and the current president has said that capitalism is worse than communism. These sentiments are ironic given France’s unequivocal successes with capitalism. It is the world's fifthlargest economy and second-leading home of multinational corporations.

Beyond the posturing of politicians appealing to chauvinism and the overblown, fear-mongering rhetoric of labor leaders are real, concrete reasons for this climate of distrust. In the absence of Swedish-style job placement, job

Is Labor Lost?

ously general social benefits. The French model is unsustainable, mortgaged on the backs of future generations. France had balanced books in the late 1970s.

However, every social program introduced since the 1980s has been the result of deficit spending and has had precious little to do with job creation.4 This is not solidarity—certainly it is not solidaristic toward aspiring workers and future generations.

The Route to Reform. Neverthe-

less, the sky is not falling, and Western Europe is by many measures a far more stable environment than North America for well-paid workers and pensioners.

The problem is no one knows how long this stability will last. One can hold an optimistic view of Western Europe only by willfully ignoring the almost caste-like barrier between insiders with life-long job protections and outsiders who are unemployed or who toil in part-time

France awaits a Jean Chrétien, a Bill

Clinton, or a Tony Blair who will push for reform. retraining, and adult education programs, it is perfectly understandable that most French workers are afraid that a more dynamic labor market might not be in their best interests. In the absence of these social welfare policies, stable employment is the French laborer’s only reliable safety net.

The French model works wonderfully for about 60 percent of today's adult population—those who are either comfortably pensioned or employed—but it does so at the expense of the other 40 percent excluded from France's notori-

work or six-month contracts with reduced social benefits. One can speak of a European dream only if one ignores its endemic racial discrimination, rising political extremism, chronic structural unemployment, unsustainable pension promises, and intergenerational inequality of a sort unimaginable in North America.

President Chirac's likely successor as leader of the center-right, Nicolas Sarkozy, has noted that the French social model has failed the unemployed and the very people for whom the model is supWinter/Spring 2007 [ 1 7 ]

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posed to work. The son of immigrants, Sarkozy speaks for the outsiders of France—the unemployed, the young, the French children and grandchildren of North African immigrants. But his frank talk and law-and-order approach turns off many who may take to the streets should he be elected President and attempt to introduce more flexible labor market legislation.

Meanwhile, Ségolène Royal, the Socialist rival for the presidency in 2007, would face the same type of hostility—albeit on a smaller scale. She also claims to speak for France's forgotten people despite her party’s role in creating so many of the “excluded” in the first place. If elected, she would need to preside over an intellectual reckoning of sorts with the policy choices her party made, policies she supported as a young parliamentarian and later as a cabinet member. However, she has given little indication that she would reconcile her earlier legislation with her current platform.

The next French president’s challenge is to convince the French that change is not only possible, but that it is necessary to reduce unemployment and inequality. More of the same is not an option.

Royal must neutralize the far left wing of her party, just as Tony Blair did ten years ago. She must embrace freer labor markets, but reassure her supporters that she will do her best to compensate for the

added risks.

Whether it is Sarko or Ségo at the helm, reform must follow a carefully plotted and precisely timed path. French politicians should begin by increasing social spending of the redistributive sort and publicize it widely. Focus spending on the working poor. Invest billions of euros in active job replacement and retraining programs. Make sure that every single major city has several job placement centers up and running; this process might take a year or longer.

Then, and only then, squeeze inefficient spending in the public sector for funding. There is no need to worry about the EU's 3 percent deficit cap; it has been violated several years running and this can continue for one more year. Next, increase the income tax but decrease payroll taxes at the same time. Make job creation a less costly affair. Embark on a massive public relations campaign announcing that France is once again open for business.

Finally, loosen up French labor laws and cut bureaucratic red tape. Prepare the nation—intellectually and politically—for painful reforms. Ask the opponents of reforms for their alternative.

Once the anti-reformers have been disarmed, begin the process. And if the reformer relies on public transit in Paris, prepare an alternate route to work, as France faces the mother of all metro strikes.

NOTES

1 Dominique Andolfatto, ed., Les syndicates en France (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 2004), 24.

2 Sophie Pedder, “The Art of the Impossible: A Survey of France, October 28 2006.” The Economist

[ 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

381, no. 8501 (2006).

3 Eric Conan, La gauche sans le people (Paris: Fayard Press, 2004), chapter 1.

4 Pedder, op. cit.

Is Labor Lost?

Venezuelan Labor Struggles to Find Autonomy Charles S. Shapiro The Venezuelan organized labor movement, encompassing an estimated 1.8 million workers, struggles under the rule of President Hugo Chávez to achieve independence. The historically privileged minority of petroleum sector workers has been a drag on developing a robust labor movement broadly across society. Despite President Chávez’s rhetoric in favor of the poor, he has pummeled Venezuela’s labor sector into ineffectiveness by promoting the creation of parallel unions loyal to the government to undercut their traditional counterparts; by creating work cooperatives, whose workers do not enjoy the full range of labor rights; by asserting government oversight of internal union elections as a means of stifling union growth; and by unilaterally granting pay and pension increases while refusing to negotiate with union representatives. The opposition-led Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) greatly eroded its own standing through its direct involvement in the political crises of 2002 to 2003, particularly the two-month national strike which paralyzed formal business activity and galvanized Chávez’s support. Chavez used the pretext to fire 19,000 Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA) workers and assume direct control of the largest petroleum company in Latin America.

The Venezuelan labor movement is now split between the

Charles S. Shapiro is the principal deputy assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He was U.S. ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from February 2002 to September 2004.

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ailing CTV and the pro-Chávez National Workers Union (UNT), which itself is splintered into factions. This dichotomy is not, however, a fight between Chavez supporters and the opposition, as elements of both sides favor a labor movement free of government manipulation.

The international democratic community, including trade confederations, must reach out to both sides to promote respect for international labor standards that will benefit all Venezuelan workers.

A History of Politicization and Privilege. Before Chávez became pres-

ident in 1999, the union movement, like most Venezuelan institutions, was in crisis. It was split among many factions, perceived as corrupt, and dominated by unions representing petroleum workers, the highest paid blue-collar workers in the country. Chávez’s anti-corruption message appealed to the majority of Venezuelans, who had endured longstanding state neglect of the poor and rampant public corruption.

The power-sharing regime established in 1958 suborned most civil society organizations to the dominant political parties Democratic Action (AD, the social democrats) and the Committee for Independent Electoral Political Organization (COPEI, the social Christian party). AD has dominated the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers since 1944, when the dictatorship of Isaías Medina Angarita dissolved the majority-held communist faction of the labor movement.

Alternating power with COPEI until 1993, AD dominated Venezuela’s organized labor movement at large. That hold on power has degraded, however, as AD has failed to adjust to worsening poverty just as other upstarts like laborbased party Radical Cause (LCR) have

[ 2 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

appeared.

As in most Latin American countries, the public sector comprises the most powerful element of organized labor. In Venezuela, however, the petroleum sector is the touchstone for all labor agreements. Oil workers have historically won the most generous benefits, including salaries, job security, education opportunities, and pensions. At times, nonpetroleum civil servants, as well as workers in parastatal companies in the interior, have also held important sway within organized labor. While there are some important unions in the private sector, particularly in the auto assembly industry, these unions have never achieved adequate representation at the national bargaining table. This has left a high degree of expectation, if not an unhealthy sense of entitlement, among public sector unions; they would negotiate benefit packages, especially for retirement and severance, for which the government could not possibly have paid.

Venezuela’s labor movement has often looked to the government for quick solutions to labor issues. The country’s modern economic history is well known: boom in the 1970s, crash in 1980s, and malaise in the 1990s. Globalization requires a more modern workforce, but reforms that the CTV readily negotiated with the government have made conditions tougher on workers. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the CTV had lost touch with the average worker. Venezuela’s organized labor sector was badly in need of re-invention.

Enter Chávez: Conflict and Competition. Hugo Chávez took

office in 1999 with an eye to dismantling the union infrastructure that served the interests of the AD and COPEI political

SHAPIRO

parties, but not those of his “Bolivarian revolution.” Chávez’s stance toward the unions was that they had become corrupt, controlled by an oligarchic elite, and were appendages of political parties rather than representatives of the workers. He did not make labor reform a central pillar of his campaign, but did con-

Is Labor Lost?

government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) refused to certify the results, and later annulled the results outright in January 2005.

Stymied in its attempts to gain control of the CTV, in 2003 the Chávez administration encouraged a group of unionists to launch the National Workers Union

Chavistas oppose a consolidated labor

movement, just as they oppose the formation of strong political parties. sider the unions to be part of the political system that was “moribund” and beyond saving.

Calling for the re-foundation of the republic, Chávez convoked a constituent assembly, drafting the Bolivarian Constitution. Chávez used his new constitutional prerogatives to hold a referendum in December 2000 requiring all confederation- and federation-level leaders to resign and stand for direct election by workers—a deviation from past practice of senior federation leaders electing the national leadership. Although 77 percent of Venezuelan voters abstained, the government option won the referendum.

Chavez was supported by a segment of the population known as chavistas who oppose a consolidated labor movement, just as they oppose the formation of other strong political parties. Chavismo is built around an individual, not institutions. In the subsequent union elections held October 2001, however, the proChávez candidate garnered less than 16 percent of the vote, losing to Carlos Ortega, the incumbent CTV president.

Citing irregularities in the voting, the

(UNT) as a rival national labor confederation. It was hoped that this would entice unions to defect from the CTV. Nonetheless, the newly formed UNT was soon mired down in factionalism. Leaders were torn between unconditional support for the government and a new style of union activity that favored autonomy while generally supporting the chavista political agenda. While there are no reliable figures, estimates put the number of unions joining the UNT at more than six hundred, comprising the new “Bolivarian,” pro-government unions or syndicates that defected from the CTV. Numerically, this is a significant number of organizations, though there are no measurements of the number of workers these organizations represent.

At this point, the government shifted tactics and focused on an area in which it could directly pressure labor: collective bargaining agreements. Historically, the Ministry of Labor gave a perfunctory nod to bargaining agreements negotiated between unions and employers; now the ministry froze all agreements negotiated with CTV member unions. Once an Winter/Spring 2007 [ 2 1 ]

VENEZUELAN LABOR STRUGGLES TO FIND AUTONOMY

agreement was frozen, a parallel union affiliated with UNT would appear and quickly receive recognition from the Labor Ministry. The existence of competing unions necessitated a worker referendum to determine which union was authorized to negotiate with management. Since workers at the base were much more concerned about their salaries and benefits than political affiliation, and since UNT bargaining agreements were sailing through the ministry, the UNT picked up some important unions and federations.

At the same time, the government also promoted worker cooperatives as the ideal revolutionary form of labor organization. Under Venezuelan law, a group of workers can form a cooperative and receive government financing to establish its infrastructure and negotiate contracts for free with a state agency or private company. Labor experts estimate that on paper there are well over one hundred thousand cooperatives in Venezuela, but few appear to be functioning despite government subsidies. Of these, most provide services like trash pickup and road repair to states and municipalities. There are also allegations of corruption among cooperative leaders who act as conduits for government payments to workers.

Union leaders from both the UNT and CTV complain that these cooperative workers are not fully covered by Venezuelan labor law. They argue that while cooperatives may have a positive impact on employment figures, the net result is more workers enjoying fewer labor rights.

A third strategy the government employs against independent unions is in the area of internal elections. Despite a constitutional mandate for the CNE to oversee union elections, the electoral [ 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

authority has not facilitated the election of new union leadership. The law establishing the CNE assigns the body a technical advisory role in union elections, contradicting the direct oversight role granted by the Constitution. From 2005 to 2006, more than one thousand unions were caught in legal limbo while the CNE withheld certification of their internal election processes. While the CNE did in fact work in 2005 to significantly reduce backlog, this administrative catch-22 effectively inhibited union activity within the CTV and, to a lesser extent, UNT unions.

As a fourth and perhaps most effective strategy, Chávez grants minimum wage and pension increases without the participation of union negotiators. Once an annual announcement on Venezuelan Labor Day (May 1), these presidential proclamations have become more frequent and have selectively favored politically important groups like teachers.

These wage increases fall short of inflation and are granted as largesse, not as the result of collective bargaining. Union leaders from both UNT and CTV complain that by refusing to negotiate with unions, the government refuses to recognize the legitimacy of organized labor.

The increases, they say, are simply a product of Chávez’s “leader-people” model of governance, which purposely excludes intermediaries that might detract from the leader’s popular support. This direct link to the people—not mediated by unions or political parties— is a signature Chávez mechanism for maintaining his base. Chavez’s motivations, therefore, are political and not economic. By announcing the increases by fiat rather than through a negotiation process, the government makes organized labor increasingly irrelevant.

SHAPIRO

Is Labor Lost?

union, however, instead choosing to setAn Opposition in Freefall. The tle the nineteen thousand cases individuclumsy role played by CTV leaders dur- ally.

The discharged workers were blacklisting the December 2002 to February 2003 national work stoppage bears spe- ed from both domestic and overseas concial notice since the political gamble tak- tracting jobs in the petroleum sector en by the CTV leadership has hampered after the government warned private oil its effectiveness as a labor confederation. companies of retaliation should they hire Allied with the umbrella organization of any of the strike participants. Stories Venezuelan business organizations (the abound of highly trained ex-PDVSA Federation of Chambers of Commerce, employees working in the back offices of FEDECAMARAS), CTV president Car- private oil companies to avoid detection los Ortega launched an “indefinite” by government authorities.

In the end, the go-for-broke intransistrike in December 2002 demanding the resignation of President Hugo Chávez. gence of the strike leaders—openly and As petroleum production ground to a loudly allied with the political opposihalt, the nation experienced an econom- tion—cemented public support for the ic crisis as severe for the Venezuelan government and left the opposition cripeconomy as the Great Depression was for pled. The Venezuelan public was partic-

International organizations are only as

successful as the shame they can make a government feel. the United States.

The Chávez administration eventually broke the strike by spending $10 billion in Central Bank reserves to keep the economy afloat. In the ensuing months, the administration fired nineteen thousand PDVSA workers who took any part in the strike in violation of labor legislation, granting them immunity from dismissal. While the workers’ firings were still subject to judicial review, the government used National Guard troops to forcibly evict some workers from PDVSA housing and deny their children enrollment in schools serving oil workers.

Strike leaders formed a union for the fired workers called Equipetrol to press their claims against the government. The government refused to recognize the

ularly incensed that the opposition pushed the strike through the Christmas season, spoiling the holidays for millions. The Chávez administration effectively spun the crisis to the media and public as an attempt by economic elites, including PDVSA executives, to carry out a coup, aided by the CTV and FEDECAMARAS. Although Chávez emerged with record-low popularity ratings and faced recall, he rebounded with the launch of generous social programs known as the “missions.” As oil prices climbed with the start of the Iraq War, Chávez boosted his popularity through full bore social spending. Chávez ultimately defeated the opposition in the 15 August 2004 recall referendum.

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VENEZUELAN LABOR STRUGGLES TO FIND AUTONOMY

The International Labor Organization (ILO) determined in 2004 that the work stoppage was comparable to a general strike and that the Venezuelan government ought to have extended labor immunities to the strike leaders. Nevertheless, most of the leaders fled the country, among them Carlos Ortega, who fled in March 2003 but returned clandestinely in early 2005. Ultimately apprehended in May 2005 while gambling in a Caracas bingo parlor, Ortega was sentenced that December to sixteen years in prison for “civil rebellion” and

tile toward organized labor. Still others within the CTV propose a radical restructuring to a leaner organization capable of resisting the government’s relentless pressure tactics. This would likely require weaning the CTV from its current top-heavy organization.

UNT: Autonomy or Automatons? The government’s war on the CTV has had the associated effect of pumping up the UNT to a force on the verge of national influence. The Labor Ministry estimates that the UNT consists

Organized labor in Venezuela is close to extinction.

other charges related to his leadership of the strike. In August 2006, he escaped from prison and is at large—at the time of this writing, presumably in Venezuela.

In his absence, CTV Secretary General Manuel Cova has led the organization; but with workers generally fearful of retaliation for participating in an opposition union election, the road ahead is murky.

Today, the CTV is in the midst of a leadership crisis. Some CTV labor leaders argue that the confederation has involved itself so much in political fights that it has lost its ability to represent workers effectively. CTV executive committee member Froilán Barrios, who launched a short-lived presidential bid earlier this year under his Labor Movement party, has made repeated calls for reform in order to become more relevant to workers. Others argue that the CTV must develop a largely political profile in the face of a government implacably hos[ 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of 1.1 million workers. Even if this is an inflated figure, the UNT certainly rivals, if not equals, the 750,000 workers claimed by the CTV. Despite a tendency among the Venezuelan opposition to attack the UNT as chavista loyalists or exCTV opportunists, there are in fact several UNT leaders who value union independence over blind participation in the revolutionary process. Some UNT leaders espousing bread-and-butter union activism, such as collective bargaining agreements and growing union rolls, have indeed found themselves frozen out of the negotiating process just like the CTV. For three years the UNT has tried without success to elect a president from its diverse committee of “national coordinators.” Some of these coordinators rose to prominence through close associations with the Labor Ministry, guaranteeing that their unions received more government privileges. Other coordina-

SHAPIRO

Is Labor Lost?

tions such as the ILO are limited to a type of peer pressure and are only as successful as the shame they can make a government feel. In the case of Venezuela, the effect has been minimal.

International labor confederations need to give an objective assessment of the state of Venezuelan labor.

Venezuela’s populist social programs and rhetorical support for the poor have kept outside labor groups from denouncing the erosion of worker rights. The international community needs to assist the organized labor movement in Venezuela—the UNT as well as the CTV. This includes condemning government excesses and violations of ILO standards.

A Time for International Scruti- In addition, it should also include assisny. With Venezuelan labor at an impor- tance to independent unions, training tant crossroads, the international com- them how to organize, how to bargain munity must be ready to assist. The ILO collectively, and how to formulate policy should be commended for its watch over positions vis-à-vis the government and international labor practices in employers.

Venezuela for several reasons. First, the organization was quick to defend the Conclusion. Organized labor in CTV from efforts by the government to Venezuela is close to extinction. For their unseat it as the nation’s most representa- part, labor confederations must get out tive labor confederation at ILO annual of the politics business. The CTV and meetings. Second, the ILO’s Committee UNT must resolve their leadership crises on Freedom of Association effectively and get back to labor basics: expanding legitimized the national strike and called the union base, negotiating bargaining on the government to end its persecution agreements with employers, and advocatof strike leaders—which drew the Chávez ing policy positions that have workers’ retort of “Fry Monkeys!” a colorful best interests in mind.

Venezuelan expression of rebuke. Third, Thus far, President Chávez’s implethe ILO has repeatedly denounced the mentation of “Twenty-First Century government’s interference in union Socialism” has only weakened Venezueelections as violations of the freedom of lan institutions and civil society. Govassociation. Lastly, the ILO has sent sev- erning through a kind of democratic eral missions to Venezuela to investigate authoritarianism, Chávez controls all various allegations, including the firing state institutions—not only the executive of public servants who signed petitions but also the legislative and judicial from 2002 to 2004 to force the recall branches, the electoral commission and referendum against President Chávez in the various government watchdog agenAugust 2004. International organiza- cies, PDVSA and the other state-owned tors, such as Franklin Rondon, who leads the Federation of Public Sector Workers (FENTRASEP), have individual power bases as leaders of important sectoral federations. Still others are notorious for their radical communist stance toward worker organization. This mix of leaders, ideologies, and interests has so far impeded an agreed-upon electoral process for a UNT president. The UNT’s near future may well foretell the fate of independent organized labor in Venezuela and answer the question of whether the Bolivarian Revolution can tolerate an autonomous force within its ranks.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 2 5 ]

DOES FOREIGN POLICY EXIST?

corporations, and armed civilian militias, which take orders directly from the president’s office. Independent organizations—civil society, the Church, and political parties—are nuisances that

[ 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

detract from the president as the embodiment of the will of the people.

Whether it is the CTV or the more docile UNT, there is currently no room in Venezuela for independent labor.

Is Labor Lost?

From Eastern Bloc to EU Organized Labor’s Struggle for Relevance Tamas Reti Genuine democratic labor unions were established in the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE) after 1988, but their chances to effectively influence social transformation remained weak. Transition to a market economy has been a long process rife with crisis and social unrest and is best understood in three stages prior to accession to the European Union. At the start of this transition, labor unions had strong political rather than social credentials and had difficulty adjusting this image. Meanwhile, political parties and governments often made populist social promises to garner public support. Throughout the 1990s the relationship between government and labor often resulted in institutional weakness and confusion that has prevented organized labor from gaining a strong foothold in any of the CEE countries.

Accession to the European Union and entry in the eurozone demands the convergence of economic-monetary policy, but it is not a driving force in expanding European social values. Vast reforms are necessary, but unions do not have the strength to call for them. Thus, even with real wages rising, labor productivity increasing, and labor conditions improving, it remains an open question who, if anyone, can stop the degradation of social rights in central and eastern Europe.

Tamas Reti is a senior research fellow in the Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 2 7 ]

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Labor Under Communist Rule. interest representation with the unions’ Under communism, unions were completely controlled by the state-party administration. In an ordinary stateowned firm or government-financed institution, the management, local party secretary, and unions collaborated to increase planned inputs (capital, material, and labor) while trying to maximize planned outputs. Common interests of workers and management was part of the official rhetoric. Labor unions in the state-owned enterprises focused on administrating social funds and promoting worker morale. In conditions of acute shortage, unions also managed special distribution channels allocating durable consumer goods and socially funded apartments.

Classic trade union assets, meanwhile, such as collective bargaining, interest representation and protection, and the legitimacy of strikes, were absolutely lacking. Labor movements did participate actively in the 1956 Hungarian revolution and the Polish Solidarity movement of 1980. However, by and large, their focus was individual representation rather than collective action.

In the Soviet-type system, communist governments promised full employment, fixed prices, rising real wages, and social welfare—all of which proved to be untenable, leading to communism’s demise in the region in the late 1980s. New labor union power soon established itself as an explicit means of interest representation.

In fact, in the years following regime change, labor union democratization and the emergence of union pluralism became an engine in the introduction of a democratic system.

Democratic unions had their roots in Polish Solidarity, inherently an umbrella political organization that tied workers’ [ 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

political functions, leading to a duality in the unions’ role meant to create social and political legitimacy. However, the pursuit of workers’ interests while promoting market changes proved rather contradictory. As this contradiction reappeared throughout CEE transitional economies, the question was raised whether government or unions could best serve the interests of the worker.

Labor and Government’s Evolving Relationship. Although the pub-

lic supported transition to a market economy, there was no consensus about the proper mixture of market forces and government intervention, the rate and sequencing of changes, or the social costs of transformation. Without a roadmap or contemporary references, foreign influence on economic policy played a dominant role. Both the American-style neoliberal market economy and the European-style social market economy were viable solutions but neither was agreed upon.

Center-right conservative parties and neoliberal parties supported both rapid deregulation and labor force flexibility to increase foreign capital inflows to the region. In contrast, labor unions old and new favored slower, less painful changes associated with strong and active government involvement and an extensive social welfare agenda.1 These political positions, along with the government-labor relationship, evolved over the decade in three distinct stages.

The first stage in the evolution of the government-union relationship can only be understood in the framework of these turbulent years. The first democratic elections in central Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia)

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reflected the victory of the social market economy, with governments seeking to develop market forces while maintaining efficient control over subsequent distortions. However, deep and ongoing economic depression in the early 1990s plus high inflation and open unemployment led to the quick and unexpected deterioration of the social welfare state.

Labor unions were not prepared for such a radical crisis and witnessed a rapid decline in the level of unionization. A falling employment ratio, decreasing real wages, and weakening social services, coupled with structural changes like privatization, the entry of multinational corporations, and Greenfield investments into infrastructure, posed new challenges to labor. Since enterprise reforms meant improvement in corporate governance, massive layoffs and more rigorous labor conditions followed. As their political role was better

Is Labor Lost?

sectors. Government and business were eager to substitute union power with either political and social promises or new hiring policies. New, anti-union managerial behavior reduced and weakened employees’ interest representation by constraining their functions and intimidating workers who used unions as instruments of self-defense. Moreover, social legislation grew less helpful to union officials, who relied on everdiminishing levels of social protection and labor codes that remained largely disrespected.

Unions could still exert influence in this period on a macroeconomic level as evidenced in October 1990 by the “taxi blockade” in Hungary, where an immediate public protest to the newly-elected government’s gas price hikes marked the quickest disruption of the social peace any CEE country had ever experienced.2 The taxi blockade was a successful short-

Facing new pressures from the EU,

labor could not expect an outside anchor to strengthen its position at home. developed than their social function, unions could not respond due to poor infrastructure, low collection rates of membership fees, a lack of collective bargaining experience, and a shortage of organizational knowledge. Antagonistic rivalries between new and old unions over union assets and infrastructure further weakened their response, lessening public acceptance of unions as social actors.

Growing distrust in collective action marked a disadvantage to organized labor vis-à-vis the government and business

term public protest against a policy change and it raised the question whether social consensus was a precondition for market reform. Nonetheless, it remained apparent that labor unions had much more power on the macroeconomic level than in interest representation and negotiation.

The second stage of the governmentlabor relationship evolved during the mid-to-late 1990s amid medium-term economic recessions, rising unemployment, and consumer price inflation due to overvalued currencies, government Winter/Spring 2007 [ 2 9 ]

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overspending, protectionism, and superficial privatizations (Hungary in 1994-96, Czech Republic in 1997-99, and Slovakia in 1998-99). Governments proved themselves unable to combine significant market changes with the provision of social protection, but the role of unions and their relationships with governments remained ambiguous.

Popular dissatisfaction in this period led to regime changes in some CEE countries. The first post-communist ruling coalitions lost elections in Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary, and socialist or former communist parties took power facing the unpleasant tasks of monetary and fiscal stabilization. Major labor federations were closely connected with these parties and soon found themselves in the awkward position of either sup-

hit rock bottom in order to start more consistent and coherent economic policies. For example, the 1996-97 Bulgarian currency and banking crisis accompanied the government’s legitimacy crisis, and it required true democratic elections and the introduction of currency stabilization measures sponsored by the IMF to resolve these issues. Although the economic consequences were advantageous, the social costs were exorbitant and led to high unemployment and a large wave of emigration to the West.

The third stage of the governmentlabor relationship can be described as a pre-accession economic and social transformation. The ten CEE candidate countries began EU-accession negotiations in 1998 and 1999. By the early 2000s these economies had already

Western multinationals transferred

advanced production technologies, made heavy investments, brought new markets, and created jobs, but unfortunately they did not transplant Western social rights. porting necessary austerity measures to address these issues or opposing their political allies and protesting. In the end they supported the parties, but held facesaving demonstrations and strikes in strategic sectors—such as railway, energy, air traffic, and coalmining—which had the most mobilization and bargaining power.

The less reform-oriented Balkan economies of Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Yugoslav states experienced deeper and more devastating economic declines in this period, with exorbitant inflation and further deteriorations in public services. These economies had to [ 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

established the main structures of market economies, including currency convertibility, single-digit inflation rates, mostly privatized economies with emerging private sectors, functioning commercial banks, and modernized tax and legal systems. Economic policy gave priority to anti-inflation measures, openness to foreign investors, real privatization, and sustainable growth. EU accession negotiations followed the Copenhagen entry criteria, which require a functioning market economy, democratic institutions, and respect for minority rights, but place little or no emphasis on social transformation. Facing these new pres-

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sures from the EU, labor could not expect an outside anchor to strengthen its position at home.

Convergence to EU levels of economic development, whether real or nominal, was the most difficult part of the transformation. At the beginning of the decade, per capita GDP in CEE countries measured in purchasing power parity were less than half of the average EU member state. Governments addressed formerly neglected areas such as infrastructure, agriculture, employment, regional issues, and ethnic or minority issues—all important issues to the EU— but they hesitated in other areas, such as bringing public utility prices near the world-market level or making public services like higher education payable.3 Underfinanced and overburdened healthcare and pension systems also required major overhauling. Attention to social issues such as these was not a question of government courage but simply good public governance, and ignoring them had a cost. In Slovakia, while the government tried to reestablish international credibility by liberalizing the economy and deregulating the public sector, these measures led to a drastic cut in public expenditures that proved to be unsustainable, resulting in regime change in 2006.

During entry negotiations, the political orientations of the ruling governments were fairly mixed (center-right and center-left), but each faced pressure from the high social expectations of their populations. Rising expectations stemmed from unanticipated high costs of transformation, a larger number of losers than winners, rapid income differentiation, slow improvement in the standard of living, and increasing disappointment with regime change. Strong

Is Labor Lost?

social expectations of governments also accompanied low taxation morale and an underdeveloped sense of social responsibility. Governments used populist policies to appease this unsatisfied demand for faster social development. Use of political populism as an instrument to gain votes and react to changes in public polls varied across the region—used more in Hungary, for example, than in the Czech Republic or Slovenia. Still, from Poland to Romania, political parties increasingly made easy promises and offered quick fixes to maximize their short-term election results.

Labor unions and workers’ councils remained uncompetitive in this contest, unable to channel these social frustrations, despite giving up much of their political orientation and turning increasingly to more social union issues.

The rate of unionization has declined further with the erosion of labor rights.

Despite the adverse effects of nominal convergence, strikes and workers’ conflicts have been limited in their size and frequency. The general perception of labor organizations in the region remains closer to an Anglo-Saxon model than to Austro-German or DutchSwedish ones, meaning weaker social welfare and higher individualism in the workplace.

Thus, CEE social conditions today do not resemble those of the early 1990s.

Labor unionism at that time was overpoliticized and linked either to the postcommunist parties or to the conservative-liberal parties. Economic globalization, opening markets, large inflows of foreign direct investment, privatization, the dominant position of the service economy, and the illegal sector all led to the devaluation of unions. New democratic rights for workers brought an end to Winter/Spring 2007 [ 3 1 ]

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democrats and the liberal marketers lost in 2005, allowing anti-EU, anti-liberal nationalist parties to win the election based on large social promises to the people. The Slovakian situation is no better: in 2006, EU-friendly, marketoriented parties lost, and a coalition of alleged social-democratic populists came to power with support from the radical right, authoritarian left, and statedependent business groups. The recent Czech elections resulted in a stalemate, with genuine social democrats and civic democrats winning equal representation.

Grand coalition is not a viable option here due to sharp, personal animosities.

The Hungarian election presented a The EU and the Future. The situ- more clear-cut outcome: the winner was ation today does show some favorable the market-oriented, socialist-liberal developments. New EU member coun- coalition, while the losing center-right tries are presenting visibly strong poten- party was actually more state-intervential, with GDP growth about two to two- tionist, oriented toward redistribution, and-a-half times faster than that of the and populist. By fall 2006, however, old EU economies, though faster pro- Hungarian monetary and financial conductivity rise has always been an advantage ditions became unsustainable due to mandatory union membership and little understanding of the role and mission of these organizations throughout the decade. Western multinationals transferred advanced production technologies, made heavy investments, brought new markets, and created jobs, but unfortunately they did not transplant Western social rights. Foreign firms sought fewer labor regulations, more labor flexibility, and less social protection. As the public sectors go through major, delayed restructuring, employees’ positions do not look better in the medium term. In these sectors, labor continues to remain relatively silent.

Labor unions watch mostly from the

sidelines.

of late-comers. New members are also undergoing a disinflation process, despite not fully implementing necessary price adjustments in the utility sector.

High unemployment and low labor force participation rates continue to be major problems, however, since the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) does not stipulate employment conditions and the Lisbon Strategy for economic renewal and stability remains a reality on paper only.

The traditional division between leftist and conservative parties is blurring as well. In Poland, fragmented social [ 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

exorbitant fiscal and current account deficits. After a long delay, the government has determined to introduce painful austerity measures with the promise of radical reforms in the public sector.

Labor unions watch mostly from the sidelines. Public sector unions still have some mobilization power, but their capacity is not enough to prevent the necessary streamlining. Private sector union positions vary greatly depending on the industry or firm’s market situation. Unions continue to be almost

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nonexistent in the new service sector and in small- and medium-sized enterprises. Most foreign-owned corporations prefer no-union policies, although exemptions may arise if management realizes that social partnership may have benefits in reducing labor fluctuations and improving working morale.

In central and eastern Europe, there is a major need for far-reaching reforms, especially in the public sector.

The smaller countries such as Slovenia, Estonia, and Slovakia have better prospects of first joining the eurozone and giving up their monetary sovereignty. This will provide them with an umbrella against external shocks. The bigger countries, like the Czech Republic and Poland, have the more difficult task of implementing further fiscal con-

Is Labor Lost?

solidation that could meet with political resistance from the public.

However, the CEE economies’ social models are diverging from that of the European Union. Labor organizations at the time of accession are losing stature from their already diminished social and political significance. Social harmonization also is required to properly implement economic and monetary convergence and progress toward a more developed economic stage, but pressure for such convergence is not applied by the EU. Without this pressure and without strong labor unions, it remains an open question whether the inevitable rise in labor costs that come with the productivity increases and liberalized migration policies will ever result in a concurrent rise in respect for social rights.

NOTES

1 Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 508.

2 Ibid.

3 Daniel Gros and Alfred Steinherr, Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Planting the Seeds (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 362.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 3 3 ]

Business&Economics South-South Partnerships: An African Recipe For Growth Steve Booysen Two emerging Asian economic powers, China and India, are at the center of the African-Asian trade and investment explosion. This striking hallmark of the new trend in South-South commercial relations holds great potential for growth and job creation in the poverty-stricken sub-Saharan region.

According to the World Bank, Indian and Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown considerably, with China’s FDI in Africa amounting to $1.18 billion by mid-2006.1 What is taking place in China, India, and Africa is part of a broader trend in the world of rapidly-growing South-South investment and trade relations among developing countries, evidenced by the formation of initiatives like the India-BrazilSouth Africa (IBSA) alliance. Trade with Asia is producing affordable goods that are either being sold in Africa or exported to Asia. India-Africa bilateral trade has risen from $967 million in 1991 to $9.14 billion in 2005. Trade between China and Africa has quadrupled in the last five years to reach $40 billion in 2005.2 As World Bank Economic Adviser Harry Broadman aptly said, “This is allowing Africa to enter into this network of more sophisticated third-country global exports.”3 Could this be an opportunity for African countries, which have traditionally looked to the West, to turn to the East? If so, how does Africa become a more equal partner in an interactive develop-

Steve Booysen is chief executive of the ABSA Group and an honorary professor at the University of Pretoria.

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mental relationship, rather than being primarily reliant on development aid?4 This article will present a new perspective on South-South partnerships, focusing on what Africa can do for itself by learning from India’s development model and how Africa can benefit from

grew by 430 percent and has more than quintupled since then. It reached $24 billion in 2004, amounting to 6.3 percent of the extra-regional trade by states south of the Sahara.7 By 2005 China had bilateral trade and investment agreements with 75 percent of African coun-

The challenge is for countries in Africa to increase their capacity to attract and make good use of private investors.

Chinese investment. Africa needs to take responsibility and ownership for itself, partnering with other Southern states.

This requires establishing a dynamic relationship with countries outside the continent rather than being overly dependent on them for investment in and economic growth of the African continent.

China: A Partnership in the Making. Although it is an emerging

economic superpower, China continues to portray itself as a developing nation.

Chinese media emphasize the quasi-natural convergence of interests between China, “the biggest developing country[,] and Africa, the continent with the largest number of developing countries.”5 China’s increased involvement in Africa over the past decade is one of the most significant developments in the region.6 Of the wide range of Chinese activities in Africa, economic transactions provide the most powerful evidence of China’s growing relationship with the continent. Consequently, the rapid expansion of Chinese-African trade deserves particular attention. Between 1989 and 1997, bilateral trade volume [ 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tries.8 In 2005 China overtook the United Kingdom as Africa’s third most important trading partner—after the United States and France. Furthermore, China has signaled its willingness to negotiate a free trade zone with southern African states.9 In addition to the primarily commercial objectives of its export trade with Africa, the strategic value of China’s imports from the continent stands out, especially when natural resources are considered. China’s share of global demand for mineral resources such as aluminum, nickel, and copper varies between 76 and 100 percent.10 Similarly, China’s oil consumption will increase dramatically over the next three decades, as well as its reliance on oil imports, which accounted for 37 percent of its oil consumption in 2003.11 Africa’s resource-rich countries are in a position to provide an ample percentage of China’s requirements. Angola, Beijing’s most important African oil supplier, exported 117 million barrels to China in 2004, a 60 percent increase from the previous year.12 Perhaps the most striking element in recent Sino-African relations is the extent to which China has been welcomed with open arms by many African

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leaders. By offering their African counterparts a mix of political and economic incentives, the Chinese government is successfully driving home the message that increased Sino-African cooperation will inevitably result in gains for both sides. The power of this argument is enhanced by a subtle discourse which posits China not only as an appealing alternative partner to the West, but also as a better choice for Africa. China’s nonintrusive investment policies and approach make it an attractive partner for African governments.13 Chinese companies are also less risk-averse than their Western counterparts, approaching the challenging political and economic environment in many African states as an economic opportunity.

Although the Chinese conceptualize the emergence of South-South relations as a historic opportunity for African countries to escape the neo-colonial ties to the West, it is not evident that Chinese-African trade differs significantly from trade between Africa and Western partners.14 The structure of South Africa’s trade relations with China thus mirrors the wider problem of Africa’s unbalanced trade relations; some 90 percent of its exports to China consist of raw materials: ore ferrochrome, platinum, and diamonds.15 There is, however, some evidence that the economic activities of Chinese entrepreneurs can make a positive contribution to local development.16 African countries need to recognize that trade with China will not have a positive impact on their economies per se.

Chinese and African businesses are first and foremost economic contenders for investments and markets—in particular in labor-intensive and export-oriented manufacturing like textiles and clothing.

Business & Economics

This imbalance has the effect of Africa creating jobs in China while Chinese imports undermine job markets in Africa. While this is the result of legitimate market competition, it contradicts Chinese statements that enhanced Chinese-African interaction always results in win-win situations.17 That being said, China has taken steps to limit the negative impacts of trade, including its recent self-imposition of textile quotas in an effort to curb job losses in the South African textile industry caused by cheap Chinese textile imports.

India as a role model. Instead of

depending on trade with China to improve its fortunes, Africa should look to India and attempt to follow its path to economic success and development.

After three post-independence decades of meager progress, India’s economy grew at 6 percent per annum in just over two decades and at 7.5 percent per annum from 2002 to 2006—making it one of the world’s best-performing economies for a quarter century. In the past two decades, the size of the middle class has quadrupled and 1 percent of the country’s poor has left poverty every year.

While India has relied on the classic Asian strategy of exporting labor-intensive, low-priced manufactured goods to the West, Indian policymakers have also promoted its domestic market over exports, consumption over investment, services over industry, and high-tech over low-skilled manufacturing. As a result of this unique approach, the Indian economy has been relatively insulated from global downturns, showing an impressive degree of economic and political stability.18 India’s consumption-driven model is also more people-friendly than other Winter/Spring 2007 [ 3 7 ]

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development strategies. Consequently, inequality has increased much less than in other developing nations. Approximately one-third of GDP growth is due to rising productivity—arguably a truer sign of an economy’s health and progress than increases in the amount of capital, labor, or direct foreign investment.19 Africa is a continent of rich natural and mineral resources where labor is plentiful but underdeveloped. Agriculture accounts for 40 percent of Africa’s total exports and 70 percent of its labor force.20 Developing labor as a valuable resource would lead to an increase in services and the production of goods. The Indian model focuses on promoting domestic market growth, increasing consumption rather than foreign investment, and improving skills and services— all of which raise production. This strategy would lead to an increase in economic growth and infrastructure development. With these developments, African countries would increase domestic consumption and financially empower individuals, thus increasing economic growth both locally and globally. Rather than relying on foreign aid, Africa could develop endogenously. In this process, Africa must do more to mobilize its own financial resources by encouraging personal capital formation among the millions of Africans who are currently outside the financial system.

The improvement in Indians’ standard of living is a central element of India’s model. India has focused on education—specifically on math and science, which has driven the information technology (IT) boom in India. Indian entrepreneurs have shown vision and unbridled optimism in creating an explosion in the IT sector that is flowing to all parts of the economy.21 India’s [ 3 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

development strategy has also been fuelled by sector-specific growth. The wealth created in the IT sector has spawned a number of international players such as Infosys, Tata Consulting Services, and Satyam. These firms are not only leading the way in India but have also contributed significantly to global best practices in the sector.22 The presence of these global companies has contributed to the positive evolution of the legislative landscape and government policy. In transforming African economies, policymakers will need to emphasize rooting out corruption, improving education, reducing bureaucratic red tape, strengthening the rule of law, and providing greater protection for intellectual property. The importance of these reforms alongside economic development can be seen by India’s steady rise in global competitiveness, witnessed by its position ahead of China in the World Economic Forum’s latest Global Competitiveness Report.23 The two largest growth opportunities in Africa are infrastructure investment in the short term and retail growth in the long term. Economic growth enables a society to benefit from increases in production, revenue, and profits, and also encourages personal capital accumulation. A society characterized by a strong sense of ownership and property rights is a more stable society and in the long run is less dependent on foreign aid.24 The role of businesses and governments in defeating poverty revolves around economic growth through mobilizing capital, encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises, and developing intellectual and physical infrastructure. In addition, successful developing nations such as India have an enviable savings and investment culture among

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the rapidly growing middle class and even below the middle market. The concept of village banking has been successful in mobilizing the capital of individuals through high volumes of saving and loan activity for small amounts. Ways must be found to encourage savings and investment in Africa as the first step toward creating an ownership society.

If Africa is to develop a robust savings and investment culture, some practical issues will need to be addressed. First, the lack of official identification of millions of African citizens must be overcome.

The implementation of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) legislation requires banks and other financial system intermediaries to establish and verify the identities of citizens. This is difficult in remote villages and informal settlements where individuals have no proof of identification, no utility bills, and sometimes no street address. While a large number of potential account-holding Africans have income, they do not have a readily identifiable residence, which makes it difficult for banks to

Business & Finance

in determining terms of engagement with China. African countries are increasingly moving away from the perception of China as a threat to dialogue, strengthening the partnership and maximizing the opportunities arising from trade and investment with Asian giants.27 With the right institutions in place, Chinese investment in Africa could be harnessed for the benefit of Africans. China’s FDI potentially presents an opportunity for all Africans to develop their own personal capital and empower them to be become financially independent. It also assists Africans extend beyond the development curve of foreign aid and become self-sustaining.

The Chinese and Indian hunger for commodities is an opportunity that could create significant wealth and global champions in the extraction sector. By incorporating new technologies, African companies can differentiate themselves by wiring from the ground up to be more agile, more innovative, and more intelligent than their first-world rivals.

Although India built its current boom

Trade between China and Africa has quadrupled in the last five years. accept them as clients under the latest requirements of FICA and other global laws aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist funding.25 Nevertheless, African consumers must be encouraged to become owners so that financial institutions can mobilize their capital for further development and investment opportunities within the continent.26 One of the outcomes tabled at the World Economic Forum on Africa in June 2006 was to improve Africa’s role

around sector-specific strategies, particularly IT, Africa needs to develop solutions tailored to its own strengths. This creates a business climate that fosters innovation and growth.

African countries benefiting from increased demand for their natural resources should invest current profits in long-term priorities; projects focused on education, health care, and infrastructure are necessary for sustainable economic development. While primary Winter/Spring 2007 [ 3 9 ]

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school enrollment rates in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 83 percent in 2000 to 95 percent in 2002, the World Bank reports that an estimated 40 million children in the region still do not go to school at all.28 If Africa invests money earned today in producing engineers and software developers, the same opportunity to generate India-type growth in the IT sector may arise. It is essential for Africa to ensure that the education and skills necessary for other key growth areas are in place.29 In addition to educating its future workforce, Africa must also do more to retain current talent in order to sustain economic productivity and development.

The “brain drain” from Africa requires immediate attention. Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s Minister of Finance, estimates that seventy thousand professionals leave the African continent each year. As part of its efforts to curb the loss of professionals, the South African government has reached an agreement with the UK government that the British health service will not actively recruit South African medical staff. It is important for other African countries to take similar steps if Africa is going to develop itself.30

An African Recipe for Growth.

Any plan for creating a uniquely African growth strategy must first recognize forces that will propel change across Africa, such as economic growth, demography, democracy, the external environment, the non-governmental sector, conflict, and the African diaspora.31 Greater investments in education and health, accompanied by improvements and capacity-building of these services to Africa’s most underprivileged societies, are fundamental to African growth. Capable domestic leadership and [ 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

domestic reforms that encourage FDI, capital accumulation, and endogenous growth will help create the economic environment necessary for managing Africa’s many challenges.32 African governments need a continual stream of new ideas and dynamism if they are to drive the reform agenda. Africa’s private sector, traditionally marginalized, needs the space required to realize its full potential as an engine for growth and job creation.33 A dynamic private sector is essential for economic growth, serving as a source of energy and innovation and an important link to the international economy.34 FDI should be encouraged as a way of promoting economic growth through private sector competition. Of a total $135 billion of FDI in 2003, only $9 billion went to sub-Saharan Africa, and half of this went to only three oil-exporting countries.35 In 2004 Africa attracted about $12 billion in FDI, about 3 percent of the global total.36 The challenge, therefore, is for countries in Africa to increase their capacity to attract and make good use of private investors.

African countries themselves must drive economic thinking if the continent is to move from crisis management to sustained development.37 In this effort, the creation of an ownership society and the mobilization of African capital through the encouragement of personal capital accumulation at all levels of African society are undeniable imperatives.38 Within this framework, financial systems must encourage the right savings habits—even with small amounts of money—so that Africa can develop a culture of savings and investment across classes. If the total volume of all African wealth could be captured in the financial services net, it could help fund other pro-

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ductive assets. In the future, this would allow Africans to fund their own growth and development rather than being increasingly dependent on external sources of funding such as aid.

One way of promoting private sector growth and competing with the massive economies of the South would be for African countries to develop public-private partnerships that promote development. Robust public-private partnerships would demonstrate that African governments no longer distrust the private sector and that they are anxious to promote market forces. Another important step would be for sub-Saharan countries to move closer in their formal economic relations by creating a trade union to facilitate the free flow of goods, services, and people. Finally, and most fundamentally, Africa needs to create productive

Business & Finance

capacity within African countries.39 Learning from the Indian model and benefiting from Chinese investment in Africa, African countries need to realize that growth begins at home. By learning from India’s consumption-driven economic growth model, which promotes an ownership society and encourages personal capital formation, Africa can stimulate economic growth within Africa and

by Africans. Furthermore, China’s investment in infrastructure in Africa will increase production and increase exports, which will further stimulate economic growth and enable Africa to sustain development. The combination of the Indian consumption-driven model and China’s investment in infrastructure in Africa provides the African continent with its two biggest growth opportunities for future economic self-reliance.

NOTES

1 The World Bank, “Africa’s Silk Road: Africa Emerges as China and India’s New Economic Frontier,” Internet, http://www.worldbank.org (date accessed: 16 September 2006).

2 “India Seeking Closer Ties with Africa,” People’s Daily Online, Internet, http://english.people.com.cn (date accessed: 11 October 2006).

3 The World Bank, “Africa Emerges as China and India’s New Economic Frontier,” Internet, http://www.worldbank.org (date accessed: 16 September 2006).

4 While this article refers to the African continent as a unit subject for analysis, it is important to acknowledge that countries in Africa are in an increasingly diverse set of extremes, each with its own peculiarities—including material environments, social settings, and varying political and economic governance models.

5 China’s People’s Daily, 11 October 2000.

6 Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences,” Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 3 (2006): 459-479.

7 International Monetary Fund, “Direction of Trade Statistics 2005,” Internet, http://www.imf.org.

8 “World Investment Report 2004,” United

Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2004 9 China’s People’s Daily, 26 November 2000.

10 R. Kaplinsky, “The Sun Rises in the East,” 2005, Brighton Institute of Development Studies, Internet, http://www.ids.ac.uk.

11 Denis M. Tull, op. cit.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ian Taylor, “The ‘all-weather friend’? SinoAfrican Interaction in the Twenty-first Century,” in Ian Taylor and and Paul Williams, eds., Africa in International Politics (2004): 83-101.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Gucharan Das, “The India Model,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July 2006): 2-16.

19 Ibid.

20 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, “African Development Indicators 2005,” (June 2005): xxi.

21 Jim Goodnight, “Africa: Riding the Wave of China and India Investment,” World Economic Forum, Internet, http://www.weforum.org (date accessed: 15 September 2006).

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22 Ibid.

23 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007. (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2006).

24 Ibid.

25 Richard-Stovin Bradford, “Banks in Race to Verify Client Details,” Sunday Times, 2 May 2004.

26 Steve Booysen, “Investment Opportunities in Africa Extend the Development Curve Beyond Aid,” World Economic Forum, Internet, http://www.weforum.org (date accessed: 15 September 2006).

27 Denis M. Tull, op. cit.

28 The World Bank, “School Enrolments Rising as African Nations Reform Education Systems,” Internet, http://www.worldbank.org (date accessed: 6 July 2006).

29 Jim Goodnight, op. cit.

30 “How to Spend It: Making the Most of Aid,” Africa Economic Summit 2005, World Economic Summit, 2 June 2005.

[ 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

31 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “Africa in 2020: Three Scenarios for the Future,” Brenthurst Discussion Paper, February 2006.

32 Ibid.

33 “African Development Indicators 2005,” The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (June 2005): xxi.

34 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “Africa in 2020: Three Scenarios for the Future,” Brenthurst Discussion Paper, February 2006.

35 “African Development Indicators 2005,” op. cit.

36 The World Bank, “Seeing Africa as an Investment Destination,” Internet, http://www.worldbank.org (date accessed: 28 June 2006).

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Greg Mills, “Ten Things that Africa Can Do for itself,” Heritage Lecture no. 923, The Heritage Foundation, 27 February 2006.

Business & Economics

Home-Grown Foreign Aid Workers’ Remittances as a Form of Development Finance Ramkishen S. Rajan A notable trend in external finance to developing countries is the declining share of overseas development assistance (ODA), as the OECD countries have consciously cut back their concessional grants since the early 1990s.1 Most developed countries have failed to meet the UN’s suggested aid target of 0.7 percent of GNP in 1970.2 This foreign aid dilemma can be attributed to a combination of factors, including changes to the global political environment, removal of the political motivation for aid due to the end of the Cold War, desire on the part of donors to reduce fiscal deficits, and a general perception that aid has been ineffective at encouraging economic growth and reducing poverty.

While there still remains a great deal of aid pessimism, there is also increasing evidence of the effectiveness of foreign aid in many poor countries, where it can be effective at reducing poverty when combined with good domestic economic policy and institutions.3 Accordingly, it is important to focus on increasing both the magnitude and the effectiveness of ODA. The need to encourage creditor countries in the Asia-Pacific to raise their regional aid commitments is particularly acute given concerns that aid from the United States and other donors may increasingly be influenced by strategic and political considerations—the war on terrorism, financing the recon-

Ramkishen S. Rajan is an associate professor at George Mason University. He is also an adjunct fellow at RIS, a Delhi based think tank, and an adjunct faculty member in Economics at the Ngee Ann-University of Adelaide Masters of Finance and MBA Programs in Singapore.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 4 3 ]

HOME-GROWN FOREIGN AID

struction in Afghanistan and Iraq, etc.— rather than pure development and economic considerations. This has resulted in a significant reallocation of aid among potential recipient countries. For instance, aid to Afghanistan and its bordering countries—Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan— increased threefold, from $1.1 billion in 2000 to $3.7 billion in 2002.4 The United Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) is to reduce income poverty worldwide by about one half between 1990 and 2015.5 At a time of severely curtailed ODA, the question of where the external resources necessary for financing development in poor

acceptance that workers’ remittances constitute an important and stable source of financing.

Having maintained a steady and marked upward trend between 1995 and 2003, workers’ remittances have peaked to over $90 billion in 2003 compared to just over $50 billion in 1995. Workers’ remittances are now the second most important type of private external finance for developing countries after FDI (Table 1). Most discussions of worker remittances pertain only to the narrowest definition of remittances: “unrequited transfers.” Broader data coverage of remittances includes migrant transfers and the compensation of employees as

Workers’ remittances are now the

second most important type of private external finance for developing countries. recorded in the balance of payments statistics. The magnitude of remittances noted above is clearly understated. Insofar as migrants make payments directly to schools or international airlines on behalf of relatives or friends in their home country, or channel remittances via other means—such as non-resident rupee deposits in India—the full extent of remittance transfers is probably much larger than captured by available statistics.10 Significance of Worker’s RemitAsia’s share of workers’ remittances to tances. Although there is extensive lit- developing countries averaged almost 40 erature on all aspects of FDI, workers’ percent in 2002 and 2003, half of which remittances—which are the financial was sent to India and the Philippines.11 counterpart of the outflow of migrant The three main exporters of remittances workers—have generally received much are the United States, Saudi Arabia, and less attention by mainstream academics Germany.12 While India clearly domiand policy makers.9 However, this is nates as a destination for workers’ remitgradually changing with the growing tances (Figure 1), these financial flows are countries will come from remains.6 This is the key concern of the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development.7 As highlighted by the Monterrey Consensus, in an era of declining aid flows, international trade (export revenues), and private capital flows—particularly foreign direct investment (FDI)—worker remittances are crucial sources of financing for development.8

[ 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

RAJAN

more evenly spread out than private capital flows such as FDI.13 For instance, in 2001 the top ten recipients received 60 percent of total remittances to developing countries. This was below the share of the top ten recipient countries for FDI— almost 75 percent—dominated by China.

Equally important is the relative stability—or lack thereof—of the sources of finance. It is well known that during the crisis of 1997 to 1998, FDI in Asia remained relatively stable while debt and portfolio equity flows collapsed. FDI,

Business & Economics

workers’ remittances, and export revenue flows have the lowest variability, while debt flows (specifically short-term debt) are the most variable, followed by portfolio equity flows.14 This conclusion holds true whether we limit the analysis to the crisis-hit economies in Southeast Asia— Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines—or just to China and India.15 While FDI as well as other private capital flows tend to be procyclical—rising as the host country is doing well and there is general bullishness about the country’s

Table 1. Significance of Remittance Receipts to Developing Countries, 2002 (billions of dollars) All developing

Lowincome

Lower-middleincome

Upper-middleincome

Highincome

Total remittance receipts

88.1

25.7

44.5

17.9

44.4

As percentage of GDP

1.5

2.9

1.3

1

0.2

As percentage of imports

5.1

12.1

4.9

3.2

1.2

As percentage of domestic investment

8

14.6

5.9

14

35.7

As percentage of FDI inflows

66.2

388.9

49.2

51.3

8.4

As percentage of net official finance

250

-

-

-

-

Other current transfers 1

38

9

22

7

83

Remittance receipts and other current transfers

126.1

40.2

66.6

24.6

127.4

Total remittance payments

28

1.5

3.1

23.4

77.2

Excluding Saudi Arabia

12.1

1.5

3.1

7.5

77.2

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Note: 1) Other current transfers include gifts, donations to charities, pensions received by currently retired expatriate workers, etc. They may also include personal transfers by migrant workers to families back home.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 4 5 ]

HOME-GROWN FOREIGN AID

ly—China still has attracted far more FDI than India.17 Part of the difference in FDI flows to the two countries can be attributed to the relatively more aggressive rechannelling of resources by overseas Chinese to China compared to non-resident Indians (NRIs). The Chinese diaspora is said to invest ten to twenty times more in China than NRIs do in India. On the other hand, China has received relatively low remittances—about $1.5 billion annually from 1995 to 2003 (compared to $45 billion in FDI inflows), which was about one-eighth of India’s receipts ($8.8 billion annually over the same period compared to $3 billion in FDI inflows).

China and India. A comparison is Thus, when one combines FDI and often made between FDI inflows to Chi- remittances and makes the data on FDI na (Mainland) and India, both of which comparable across both countries, the have among the world’s largest popula- total financial contribution by the Chition of overseas migrants in absolute nese diaspora may not be significantly terms. Even if one discounts round- higher than that of NRIs.18 It is comFigure 1. Top 20 Developing Country Recipients of Workers’ Remittances, 2001 monly suggest12.0 ed that the 10.0 9.9 different 10.0 approach to 8.0 capital inflows 6.4 by the coun6.0 tries’ respec4.0 3.3 tive diasporas 2.9 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 is a function of 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 2.0 1.1 the economic 0.0 opportunities in both countries and economic characteristics Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003). between the tripping from Hong Kong (China) and two diasporas. However, a large fraction makes adjustments to differences in FDI of FDI in China—about one quarter—has data in both countries—Indian sources been invested in real estate while a signifseverely understated inward FDI though icant share of remittances tend to be adjustments have been made to it recent- devoted to land and housing purchases as In di M a Ph e xi ili co pp i Eg M n es yp or t, oc Ar co ab Re p Tu . rk e Le y b Ba an o ng n lad D om es h in J ica or da n Re n p E l ub Sa li c lva Co dor Ye lom m bi en a ,R e Pa p. ki sta n Br az i E Yu cu l go a d sla or via , Th FR ai lan d Ch Sr i na iL an ka

Bi l l i on s of D ol l a r s

prospects—the same may not be true of remittances. Remittances may be viewed as a self-insurance mechanism for developing countries, or as a form of philanthropy in that the overseas diasporas increase remittances when they are most needed, such as during periods of economic crises or natural disasters.16 The relatively low positive correlation between remittances and other private capital flows, along with their targeted nature (i.e. person-to-person flows), make remittances an important source of finance to developing countries. This stabilizing role was historically played by ODA.

[ 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

RAJAN

well.19 This “reinforces the suspicion that there is a not inconsiderable statistical

Business & Finance

competitiveness, over-consumption, reduction in labor supply and entrepre-

Figure 2.Top 10 Recipients of FDI Inflows in the Asian and Pacific Region, 2002- 2003 18.0 16.0

B il l io n s o f D o l l a r s

2002

13.6

14.0

2003

11.4

12.0 9.7

10.0 8.0

5.7

6.0

3.4

4.0

4.3 2.9

3.8

3.3

3.2

1.4

2.0

2.5

2.6 2.1

1.0

2.0

1.1

1.8

ssa lam

tan

ar u

az ak hs

K

un ei D Br

M ala ysi a

In or di ea a ,R ep ub lic of Az er ba i ja n K

na on g, Ch in a Si ng ap or e

Ch i H

on gK

Co u

nt ry

0.0

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 (New York and Geneva: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004) Note: 1) Ranked on the basis of the magnitude of 2003 FDI inflows.

overlap between remittances and FDI,” neurship, and delays in much-needed which suggests there is a degree of substi- policy reforms. A recent World Bank tutability between remittances and FDI.20 report on remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean has reached the folConclusion. Overall, remittances have lowing set of conclusions: been growing in absolute terms as well as Workers’ remittances have an overall positive in comparison to other sources of external finance, and they have shown them- impact on recipient economies. Remittances seem to selves to be a relatively stable form of accelerate growth rates and reduce poverty levels…It finance. There needs to be much more must be emphasized, however, that the impact of empirical work on the links between remittances on poverty and growth is in many cases, remittances and private capital flows, modest….[T]he impact of remittances on household specifically whether they are substitutes or welfare—for example, through higher savings, educacomplements and also between remit- tional outcomes, and increases in entrepreneurship— tances and growth.21 With regard to the often is limited to specific socioeconomic groups and latter, while most of the literature gener- varies considerably across countries. [T]he way counally holds a benign view on the growth tries benefit from remittances appears to be positively and development impact of remittance related to the countries’ own institutional and macroinflows, it has been suggested that remit- economic environments, so that countries that rank tances may actually hinder growth. At a low on these fronts should expect even more modest micro-level, there is a moral hazard impacts. If one also considers that remittances may problem in that remittance inflows pro- reduce labor supply and lead to real exchange rate vide less incentive for the remitter to over-valuation, it becomes clear that countries expeenter the labor force. At a macro-level, riencing large remittances inflows will also face conlarge-scale remittances could lead to a siderable policy challenges...22 “Dutch Disease” phenomenon of overvalued real exchange rates, loss of export To a large extent, the preceding conWinter/Spring 2007 [ 4 7 ]

HOME-GROWN FOREIGN AID

clusions would probably apply to ODA as well. Neither ODA nor remittances can be seen as substitutes for good governance, sound economic policies, or institutional and regulatory reforms.

Governments can and must play a proactive and constructive role to mitigate the potentially negative effects of such inflows so as to maximize the potential net benefits from them.

In the final analysis, there is no doubt that workers’ remittances have been and will continue to be an important and stable source of external finance for developing countries, and it is incumbent on policy makers to facilitate such flows. It is generally recognized that the

remittances business is extremely segmented and inefficient since few players dominate the market and charge high transaction costs. Remittances have hitherto largely been channeled via Money Transfer Operators (MTOs), post offices, ethnic stores, couriers, and other informal sources that are difficult to track. By establishing partnerships between retail banks with extensive branches and government post office networks, governments can reduce intermediation costs and encourage more players to enter the remittance business. Such measures may provide a significant fillip to this source of financing for development.

NOTES

1 The OECD refers to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, whose thirty members consist of wealthy, free-market countries that make up the large majority of donor nations.

2 Exceptions have been Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. While the United States has been the largest donor in absolute level, it spends just about 0.12 percent of its GDP on foreign aid (The Economist, 3 May 2003, 66).

3 The debate on the links between aid and growth has given rise to a voluminous literature in the area.

Notable recent papers include Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review 90 (2000): 847-868; World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Steven Radelet, Michael Clements and Rikhil Bhavani, “Counting Chickens When they Hatch: The Short-Term Effect of Aid on Growth,” Working Paper No.44 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2004); and Raghuram G. Rajan and Arvind Subramaniam, “What Undermines Aid’s Impact on Growth?,” Working Paper No.11657 (NBER, 2005).

4 World Bank, Global Development Finance 2004 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2004), Chapter 4. This source also offers a succinct overview of the dynamics of foreign aid to developing countries, prospects of increasing such flows, and their development impact in the future.

5 Income poverty reduction is not the only objective of the MDG to be realized by 2015. See http://www.developmentgoals.org.

6 We recognize, but do not discuss, the importance of internally-raised resources for development

[ 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

(domestic resources finance most of the investment expenditures in developing countries). For a more specific discussion on budgetary resource mobilization in Asia see Mukul Asher, “Budgetary Resource Mobilisation in Asia: Growing Complexity,” Economic and Political Weekly 38 (2004): 3639-3646.

7 Adopted at Monterrey, Mexico, on 22 March 2002. For details of Monterrey Consensus, see UN Secretariat, “Final Outcome of the International Conference on Financing for Development,” Note by the Secretariat, 15 February 2002. Some have used the term the “Monterrey development deficit” to highlight the insufficiency of financial resources to meet and surpass the MDG. 8 Debt relief initiative for the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), launched in 1999, remains a key component of the Monterrey Consensus. However, agreement was not reached on debt relief for middle-income countries. There are valid concerns that debt relief could lead to a reduction in the grant component of foreign aid.

9 Two caveats should be noted. There is an active debate on the economic consequences of out-migration of skilled workers (i.e. “brain drain” or “brain gain”?). Second, there is some evidence that skilled migration is associated with lower remittances than migration of unskilled labour. It is, however, unclear whether these differences are robust. Some of these issues are explored in Riccardo Faini, “Is the Brain Drain an Unmitigated Blessing?” Discussion Paper No.2003/64 (United Nations-WIDER, 2003).

10 Work is being done by the World Bank, individual countries and international agencies and others to enhance the quality of remittance data. See http://dev-

RAJAN

data.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Section6_1.htm#fc and World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 7. Detailed analysis of remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean is discussed in Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto López. Close to Home: The Development Impact of Remittances in Latin America, Conference edition, World Bank (2007).

11 As a share of GDP, remittances are particularly important to Tonga, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka in the Asian and Pacific region.

12 World Bank (2003), op. cit.

13 Remittances to India have kept its current account deficits at low levels, even registering surpluses in recent times despite large merchandise trade deficits.

14 Portfolio equity flows are the sum of country funds, depository receipts (American or global), and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors.

15 Ramkishen Rajan, “Financing Development in the Asian and Pacific Region: Trends and Linkages,” The Role of Trade and Investment Policies in the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus: Regional Perspectives, Consensus: Regional Perspectives, Studies in Trade and Investment, No. 55 (2005): 21-65.

16 Admittedly, we cannot say whether remittances are actually counter-cyclical as market considerations and signals also clearly play some role in remittance inflows.

Claudia Buch and Anja Kuckulenz, “Worker Remittances and Capital Flows to Developing Countries,” Discussion Paper No. 04-31 (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, 2004) and Andrés Solimano, “Remittances by Emigrants: Issues and Evidence,”

Business & Economics

mimeo (August 2003).

17 For a detailed discussion of the round-tripping phenomenon, see Geng Xiao, “Patterns of PRC's FDI and their Relations to Round Tripping,” Discussion Paper No.7 (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2004); Rahul Sen and Sadhana Srivastava, “Competing for Global FDI: Opportunities and Challenges for the Indian Economy,” (paper presented at the New Zealand Association of Economists Annual Conference, Auckland, 2003). India has recently altered its FDI statistics methodology to make it more internationally comparable by including reinvested earnings and inter-company loans.

18 Devesh Kapur. “Remittance: The New Development Mantra,” (mimeo, August 2003).

19 Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, “Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons for Other Countries,” Policy Discussion Paper No.02/3 (IMF, 2002); See Brown, 1994.

20 Kapur, op. cit.

21 Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp, and Samir Jahjah, “Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?” IMF Staff Papers 52 (2004): 55-81.

22 Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto López (2007). Close to Home: The Development Impact of Remittances in Latin America, conference edition, (World Bank): 57-9.

For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic impacts of remittances, see Hillel Rapoport and Frederic Docquier, “The Economics of Migrants' Remittances,” (IZA Discussion Paper No.1531, Institute for the Study of Labor, Germany, 2005).

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 4 9 ]

Conflict&Security Gaz Promises

Russian Energy’s Challenge for the West Keith C. Smith Gazprom’s January 2006 cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine was a much-delayed wake-up call for western Europe. This hostile act by Russia’s state-owned natural gas company revealed Moscow’s willingness to use its energy resources in a coercive fashion for political leverage in the region.1 Russian coercive energy control is an old problem for central European countries. Unfortunately, attempts by the EU’s new members to raise this issue in Western capitals have until recently been brushed aside. It is time to examine Russia’s recent sharp increases in natural gas prices and its increasing control over Europe’s gas pipeline systems. The long-term political and security significance of the Kremlin’s assertive energy policies warrants much closer study by western Europe, and certainly more cooperation with east central Europe.

In arguing that western Europe needs to move quickly to reassess its relations with Russia regarding energy policy, this paper will look at overarching threats to European energy security as well as specific case studies. The first section will investigate vulnerabilities of western European countries to Russian energy coercion. The German-Russian relationship will be evaluated as a representative case. The next section will inspect the ways in which western, central, and eastern Europe are in danger of becoming hostage to Russian energy policies, using the Russia-Ukraine case as a sample. The final section argues that the EU should take the lead in re-balancing the

Keith C. Smith is a former U.S. ambassador to Lithuania. He is currently a senior associate in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC and an expert on Russia and Eastern European energy issues.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 5 1 ]

GAZ PROMISES

state of Russia-Europe energy relations, when compared with that of OPEC, offering several recommendations for which, while using its oil strategically, corrective action. does not engage in the coercive use of differentiated prices to reward or punish Pipeline Politics and Western countries.

Over the past three years, Russian Vulnerabilities. Moscow’s “pipeline imperialism” dates back to 1990, when state-owned companies have been used Russia interrupted energy supplies to the to promote the Kremlin’s foreign and Baltic States in a futile attempt to stifle security policies. Moscow appears detertheir independence movements. From mined to use its energy clout to force 1992 to the present, politically-motivat- countries to sell their downstream facilied energy disruptions by Russia have ties to Gazprom or Rosneft. Ukraine, been carried out against all three Baltic Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania are all States (particularly Lithuania, but also being threatened with supply cutoffs

The Putin administration has made it

clear that it intends to use its energy export power to regain Russia’s Cold War influence around the world.

Latvia and Estonia), as well as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Georgia. The Putin administration has made it clear that it intends to use its energy export power to regain Russia’s Cold War-era influence around the world. Former Kremlin economic adviser Andrei Illarionov, who was pressured into resigning last December, has cited Russia’s increasing tendency to use energy as a weapon in its relations with other countries.2 This warning by a former Kremlin insider should be taken seriously.3 Gazprom’s recent takeover of the Armenian and Moldovan gas pipeline systems and its increased control of Ukraine’s gas pipeline to Europe demonstrate Russia’s willingness to use its considerable energy muscle to secure control of the energy infrastructure in neighboring states, even if more for political than for economic gain.4 Russia’s behavior is unique even [ 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

unless they allow Russian companies to take control of their refineries, port facilities, and energy distribution companies. EU ambassadors in Moscow were recently warned by Gazprom’s CEO, Alexei Miller, that Russia could divert natural gas from Europe to China and the United States if the company were not allowed more freedom to buy European downstream energy facilities. This statement was quickly followed by a similar declaration by President Vladimir Putin. Russia does not allow western firms the same degree of access to Russian facilities that its state energy companies have in Europe and the United States. Moscow’s threat to divert energy from Europe to China is not credible for at least another ten years because Russia’s energy pipelines are currently oriented toward Europe. Nevertheless, Moscow clearly believes that high world energy

SMITH

prices provide it with sufficient leverage over the West that it can pursue energy policies that are non-transparent and monopolistic.

A second threat to European independence is the monopolistic behavior of Russia’s energy companies. Moscow is determined to prevent any but a Kremlin-approved company from operating oil and gas markets in the region. For example, Gazprom, with the help of Germany’s Ruhrgas, exercises control over the gas facilities and pipelines in the three Baltic states, where it also has monopoly control of the domestic gas markets.5 The West has generally ignored Russian oil transport company Transneft’s refusal to allow Kazakhstan to supply oil to Lithuania’s Mazeikai Refinery through the Russian pipeline system.

Kazakhstan’s oil company has the legal right to ship crude oil to the Baltic coast, based on their transit agreement with Transneft approved in the autumn of 2005.6 In addition, three years ago, Russia stopped all piped shipments of oil to Latvia in an effort to gain control over the oil port at Ventspils. Meanwhile, Moscow is again attempting to prevent non-Russian companies from buying Lithuania’s Mazeikai Nafta Refinery and the port at Butinge, on the Baltic Sea. The Polish company PKN Orlen is buying these facilities, but Transneft has already signaled that it will not allow the shipment of Russian crude to Lithuanian facilities owned by a Polish company. The surprise was Brussels’ lack of reaction to Russian threats to the Kazakhs and Poles regarding Ventspils, even though Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania are EU members.

A third threat is Russia’s unwillingness to abide by the membership standards of international economic organizations.

The Russian pipeline monopolies of

Conflict & Security

Gazprom and Transneft have been given free rides in terms of the open-market requirements of the WTO and the EU’s own Energy Charter. The EU’s agreement with Russia on the WTO effectively gave Moscow’s increasingly monopolistic energy transport and production companies carte blanche to avoid following accepted Western business practices.7 The WTO agreement with the EU (not challenged by the United States) also allowed Russia to maintain a substantial trade advantage in industrial goods by keeping its domestic energy prices at a fraction of world market prices.

German-Russian Energy Relations. Western Europe has largely

ignored the security implications of greater energy reliance on Russia. It has been more interested in gaining investment access to Russian supplies and felt insulated because Russia’s pipeline politics primarily had been confined to east central Europe and central Asia. Recent developments in German-Russian relations are a testament to European indifference.

Russia stands to greatly increase its market share and its leverage in Germany and the rest of Europe through the construction of the undersea Northern Europe Gas Pipeline (NEGP). The construction of a parallel pipeline to the Yamal I line that runs through Poland, at a cost of $2.8 billion, would have been a much cheaper alternative to the NEGP, now estimated to cost $12.5 billion.8 In addition, the enlargement of the Yamal line would have given both central and western European energy consumers greater political and economic security.9 Instead, the increased costs of the NEGP will be passed on to Western consumers to the benefit of Russian and German gas Winter/Spring 2007 [ 5 3 ]

GAZ PROMISES

suppliers and the German banking community.

German energy policies have created significant anxiety among central Europeans concerning the West’s willingness to help protect their newly won sovereignty. Under the German-Russian agreement, Gazprom will be able to buy significant shares in Germany’s gas companies.10 This may allow Gazprom to veto shipments of gas from Germany to

agreement on the Baltic pipeline are not made, Germany may face an increasingly insecure neighborhood to its east. If Germany does not resist the pressures of its own national industries, it may eventually confront the same Russian control of its domestic energy markets that the former Soviet states are facing now. Germany, however, is more than an energy market and a source of bank financing.

Having Germany on its side in disputes

Western Europe has largely ignored the

security implications of greater energy reliance on Russia.

Poland. In the event of a dispute over price or availability, Russia can reduce or cut off the flow of gas. Additionally, the increased power of Gazprom could be used to stop the construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving plants in Poland, Latvia, or even Germany. How much more political influence will Moscow have in Berlin as a result of Germany’s growing energy dependency on Russia and Gazprom’s large ownership stake in Ruhrgas? Unless modified, the NEGP deal, involving only Russia and Germany, will give Russia’s state-run Gazprom a significant voice in Germany’s domestic energy policies and indirect influence over the gas markets in all of central Europe. The new government in Berlin, to the surprise of many central Europeans, appears to be supporting Gazprom’s aggressive ownership inroads into German gas and electricity companies. There are faint signs, however, that the Germans are beginning to see the risks of being overwhelmingly reliant on Russian energy.

If changes to the Schroeder-Putin [ 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

with the EU is important to Russia.

Today, no single country wields more influence in Moscow than Germany. The trade and financial ties between Berlin and Moscow are important for the sustained development of both nations.

Although many outside of Germany were disappointed with Chancellor Schroeder’s support for President Putin’s domestic policies, everyone recognizes the value to European security of a close, constructive German-Russian relationship. Germany should follow through on Chancellor Angela Merkel’s earlier promise to implement a German energy policy that takes into account the security interests of the Baltic States and Poland.

Europe as Hostage to Russian Energy. The bilateral approach of

Europe’s largest member countries enables Russia to conclude non-transparent business deals and effectively block EU efforts to bring central Asian resources directly to European markets.

Much of Europe’s energy relationship with Russia has for the past several years

SMITH

been directed by Germany, France, and Italy. These countries resist submitting to a common EU energy policy and generally deal with Russia bilaterally. The leaders of Germany, France, and Italy have too often praised President Putin’s democratic credentials while ignoring Russia’s democratic backsliding and coercive use of Russian energy power.

For example, Moscow’s “petro-politics” were only a side issue at the July 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg.

In addition to its lack of common policy, the EU has initiated no coordinated push to require that Russia open its energy market to foreign investors in the same way that western companies and markets are open to Russian investors. In the Putin administration and in Russia’s energy companies, former intelligence officers (siloviki) have a strong role in determining national energy policy. Former KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) officers sit on the boards of almost all the country’s major energy companies. A majority of them find the idea of a win-win energy deal with a Western company to be an alien concept.

Granting majority control to a Western energy firm is viewed by most former intelligence officers as a danger to Russia’s national security interests. Even the Western managers of TNK/BP are no longer permitted to see their company’s own seismic data.

Furthermore, the coercive pipeline policy of the Kremlin is arguably incompatible with WTO membership and with the EU’s own anti-trust and anti-competition laws. Considering the experience with China’s WTO membership, there are good reasons to doubt that Russia will let up its monopolistic pressure on central Asian gas shipments after it

Conflict & Security

has been admitted to the WTO. Demanding open and competitive energy policies by Moscow before WTO membership would be wiser than facing the same non-compliance issues experienced in trade relations with China.

Central European countries might also turn to NATO to influence Russian policy decisions. NATO members have historically used the Alliance to examine issues that go beyond narrow questions of military defense. Perhaps a member of NATO, like Bulgaria, should put the issue of energy security on NATO’s agenda as suggested by Poland. Gazprom is attempting to pressure Bulgaria into breaking a binding agreement on gas price and availability that would be in force until 2010.11 It is important for the EU to give this soon-to-be member state political support, perhaps using the forum of the Common Security and Defense Policy. Furthermore, Russian purchases of gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are designed to deny the West, including countries such as Ukraine, the ability to buy oil and gas directly from central Asia or at prices negotiated between producer and consumer, rather than working through Gazprom.12 So far, however, there is no sign that Brussels will intervene.

Russia’s political agenda uses gas prices to punish pro-Western governments. For example, Russia attempted to use its gas policies to penalize Ukraine in 2006.

Moscow was obviously surprised and displeased by the December 2004 election of Victor Yushchenko through the Orange Revolution and unhappy with his policies of moving Ukraine closer to the EU and NATO. This provoked Moscow into demanding revisions of the 2004 gas agreement that was written at Moscow’s insistence in order to support Winter/Spring 2007 [ 5 5 ]

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the presidential aspirations of proMoscow candidate Viktor Yanukovich. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would have demanded that Ukraine immediately pay “world market prices” for Russian energy imports if Yanukovich had taken power after the earlier elections. It should not surprise anyone that Gazprom’s decision to cut off natural gas came less than three months before crucial Ukrainian parliamentary elections.

The current Russian-Ukrainian agreement, reached in late October of 2006, only covers supplies for 2007.

Therefore, after one year, Russia can decide on the price for gas based on Kiev’s “performance” in following policies desired by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, statements out of Moscow clearly indicated that Kiev will be treated more “fraternally” in the future now that the Orange Revolution’s coalition is no longer running the country. Despite these statements, however, Russia insisted on a stipulation in the current agreement that the nontransparent company RosUkrEnergo continue as monopoly supplier of gas to Ukraine. Over the past thirteen years, Moscow has clearly signaled that its intentions are to control Ukraine’s gas pipeline system, just as it now controls the gas pipelines in the Baltic states, Belarus, Poland, Armenia, and Moldova.

Part of the Kremlin’s present strategy is to rapidly increase prices to weaken neighboring states with the expectation that they will build up large debts, be unable to pay for the gas, and ultimately have to cede control over their domestic pipelines to Gazprom or Transneft to pay for the arrearages. One can make a good case that Russia has the right to charge importing countries market prices and that it is in the long-term interests of [ 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

importers to pay world prices, thereby reducing Moscow’s political leverage.

However, the four-fold overnight price hike demanded of Ukraine last December would have brought Ukrainian industry to its knees and was not justified, particularly in light of the 2004 agreement between the pre-Yushchenko government and Gazprom.13 Examples of politically-motivated price adjustments were levied on Armenia and Moldova and currently are being attempted with Bulgaria, Belarus, and Slovakia.

Time for the West to Lead on Energy Policy. The EU should take

the lead to engage Moscow in addressing its inequitable energy policies. It should prioritize building a more secure network of electricity inter-connectors between the countries of western, central and eastern Europe. The EU could help marshal the international banks to help these countries modernize their pipelines. A “neutral” party might prevent the pipelines from being controlled by non-transparent Russian or national companies. Such a network would also increase competition in gas and oil transportation. All sides would benefit if Russia were to become more transparent and commercial in its foreign energy policies.

The West should be concerned with Gazprom’s move to monopolize all gas supplies from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. This monopoly position strengthens Moscow’s political leverage in east central Europe and substantially increases energy prices in all of Europe. If Russia is going to make substantial investments in new energy fields, it does need to have more security of demand in Europe. Security of demand, however, does not require Russian own-

SMITH

ership of downstream facilities in Europe.

The West needs to rethink its engagement with Russia regarding energy. The world does Russia no favors by ignoring the monopolistic and noncompetitive nature of this energy relationship. The EU should not allow Moscow to threaten the security of Europe, particularly of central Europe’s new democracies, through neglect or unwillingness to face down the new imperial mindset in the Kremlin. As famous Russian human rights lawyer Yuri Schmidt told audiences in Brussels in last October, “Yes, Russia needs something from you. It needs your silence, and it is ready to pay you for it, too.” It is not hostile to insist

Conflict & Security

strategic partner.

First, each set of actors should take steps to preserve European energy security. Central European countries can increase their domestic energy storage and create a welcoming and transparent environment for foreign investors. The West should press for reciprocal energy investment policies from Russia; Russian ownership in upstream and downstream operations should be limited to minority shares as long as the same situation exists for Western firms in Russia. The EU should insist that Russia ratify the Energy Charter and the Transit Protocol as a condition for WTO membership or an EU-Russian Free Trade Agreement.

Second, actors should promote the

Russia’s political agenda uses gas prices

to punish pro-Western governments. on reciprocity in Russian-European energy relations. On the contrary, such policies are designed to integrate Russia into the international economy and to create the conditions for greater cooperation across the board by Russia and Europe. The January 2006 wake-up call to the West represents an opportunity for those who want to see Russia build a modern, democratic state that is linked to Europe by mutually beneficial political and economic ties.

development of a sincere partnership with Russia. EU countries should avoid bilateral agreements that undercut the construction of new pipelines from central Asia that bypass Russia. The EU should share breakthroughs in energy technology with Moscow in exchange for a more transparent and competitive energy market.

EU member states must consider the following means of countering Moscow’s energy policies: • Prosecute Russian violations of WestRecommendations. In the long ern competition, anti-trust, and antirun, Western tolerance of Moscow’s monopoly laws.

• Include central and eastern Eurocoercive use of energy resources and pipeline monopolies is counterproduc- pean transit countries in all EU-Russian tive. The following recommendations energy dialogues.

• Cooperate with non-Russian gassuggest possible ways for Europe to ensure its own security and encourage producing countries to provide alternaRussia’s development into a genuine tive supplies of gas for east central Winter/Spring 2007 [ 5 7 ]

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Europe.

• Provide alternative, energy efficient technologies to central European countries.

• Construct pipelines outside Russian control.

• Create incentives to increase domestic and foreign investment in central European energy sectors.

The goal of EU policy should be to

help create a Russia can operate transparently and avoid excessive use of energy for political coercion. While critical to the interests of the United States and Europe, this would also be in the longterm interest of Russia itself. It would increase domestic living standards, bring Russia real international respect, and help build a more unified and secure Europe.

NOTES

1 Alex Rodriguez, “Russia Stops Natural Gas to Ukraine: Pipeline to EU Nations Could Be in Jeopardy,” Chicago Tribune, 2 January 2006.

2 “Russia: Putin’s Ex-aide Says He Quits Because He Could No Longer Speak Out,” BBC Monitoring, 30 December 2005.

3 “Russia’s Gas Contacts with Armenia Require Complex Approach,” RIA Novosti, 7 December 2005; “Moldova—Gas Debt Grows 98% to $496 Million in 2004,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, 29 July 29 2005.

4 Energy Intelligence Agency; country analysis briefs, Baltic Sea Region, March 2005. Internet, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/baltics.html (date accessed: 15 November 2006).

5 Valeria Korchagina, “Kazakhs Fume Over Lithuanian Oil Deal,” Moscow Times, 21 November 2005. “Transneft Stops Oil Transit from Kazakhstan to Lithuania,” Elta-Itar-Tass, 17 November 2005.

6 European Commission report on the EU – Russia Energy Dialogue, Internet, http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/russia/overview/i

[ 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ndex_en.htm (date accessed: 15 November 2006).

7 Ariel Cohen, “The North European Gas Pipeline Project,” Internet, http://www.harrimaninstitute.org/MEDIA/00491.pdf (date accessed: 15 November 2006).

8 “Poland Wants Expanded Yamal-Europe Pipe” Russia & CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, 1 December 2005.

9 “BASF, Gazprom Strengthen Ties, Deepen Cooperation in Energy Supply,” Agence France Presse, 11 April 2005.

10 “Bulgaria Refuses to Review Gas Contract with Russia’s Gazprom,” Agence France Presse, 6 January 2006.

11 “Gazprom Established Control Over All Gas Resources of Three Asian Republics,” The Russian Oil and Gas Report, 14 November 2005.

12 Daniel Kurdelchuk, Olexander Malinovsky, and Inna Novak, “A European Approach to Ukraine’s Gas Dilemma: Road Map to Solve the Dilemma,” Mirror-Weekly, International Social Political Weekly 49, no. 577 (2005).

Conflict & Security

Six-Party Talks Time For Change

Paul F. Chamberlin If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

- SUN TZU 1

North Korea undeniably demonstrated it was the world’s ninth nuclear weapons state by testing a nuclear device on 9 October 2006. Given the measure of U.S. success in containing North Korea’s nuclear program from 1994 to 2001, the test represented a major U.S. foreign policy defeat. This defeat suggests that current U.S. policy planners neither know North Korea and regional dynamics nor are aware of their own capabilities to produce a positive outcome. Not only does the test clarify that other states lack the influence on Pyongyang that Washington had presumed, it also suggests that the U.S. approach to North Korea, including the six-party forum, requires revision.

As this article was going to press, North Korea had agreed to return to the six-party talks, perhaps in December 2006.

While a successful conclusion is hoped for, this essay explains why undue optimism is not warranted and recommends a new U.S. approach. It begins by reviewing key developments,

Paul F. Chamberlin is a former U.S. military attaché to Korea and retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer who specialized in Korean affairs. He is an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and author of Korea 2010: The Challenges of the New Millennium.

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with the United States. Thus, one of North Korea’s stated objectives is to develop a peaceful relationship with the United States.

Personal relationships are essential elements of Korean culture, even at the North Korean Motives for highest levels of government. Incumbent becoming a Nuclear Weapons senior U.S. government officials have State. Certain cultural factors as well as not developed personal relationships Pyongyang’s stated rationale and percep- with key North Korean leaders, thus tions merit attention in evaluating North missing an opportunity to alleviate Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Pyongyang’s fears.

While North Korean rhetoric should not be taken at face value, neither should it be Pyongyang’s Rationale. North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of completely ignored.

Korea (DPRK), tested a plutoniumCultural Factors. Throughout history, sur- based nuclear device “…to prove its posrounding powers have fought to control session of nukes to protect its sovereignty the strategically important Korean and right to existence from the daily Peninsula. This has made Koreans increasing danger of war from the U.S.”3 chronic victims of great power rivalry, A foreign ministry spokesman also fueling han, paranoia, and xenophobia. asserted, “The DPRK's nuclear test was These three factors reduce North entirely attributable to the U.S. nuclear Korea’s sense of security. Han, defined by threat, sanctions and pressure.”4 including North Korea’s motives for becoming a nuclear weapons state. It then summarizes U.S. efforts to achieve its goals, including the six-party forum, and concludes with recommendations.

North Korea claims a nuclear deterrent is necessary if it cannot develop a secure protective relationship with the United States. one expert as “a kind of rage and helplessness that is sublimated and lingers like an inactive resentment,”2 is evident in North Korea’s behavior.

North Koreans—taught that the United States started the Korean War—seem to feel this burden more than South Koreans, who are protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and South Korea-U.S. mutual defense treaty. Feeling threatened by the most powerful nuclear weapons state on earth, North Korea claims a nuclear deterrent is necessary if it cannot develop a secure protective relationship [ 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

At the same time, Pyongyang claimed to remain committed to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula “through dialogue and negotiations.” A government spokesman said that North Korea would not need “to possess even a single nuke” if Washington were to drop its “hostile policy toward the DPRK” and develop commensurate confidence-building measures.5 To achieve their objectives, U.S. policy makers would be wise to address Pyongyang’s stated fears, of course taking its bluster, exaggerations, and false state-

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Conflict & Security

through 2000 because Pyongyang believed that Washington did not harbor hostile intent toward North Korea.

In October 2000 the White House accepted a special North Korean envoy “…to discuss nuclear… and other issues related to improvement of relations.”7 The two parties signed a joint commuU.S. Approach to Denuclearize niqué pledging “…to take steps to fundamentally improve their bilateral relaNorth Korea. tions.”8 The geopolitical context for this Developments through 2000. North Korea agreement was a general warming trend started a nuclear development program that began in June 2000 with a historic in the 1960s ostensibly to develop inter-Korea summit meeting and nuclear energy. Like Japan, South improvements in inter-Korea relations.

Korea, and even China, North Korea U.S. support for this communiqué lacks sufficient natural energy resources expired in early 2001. A series of preto meet current and envisioned needs. It ventable developments, highlighted by signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation the U.S. abandonment of the Agreed Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, but Framework in 2002, precipitated North undeclared construction of a reprocess- Korea’s 2006 plutonium-based nuclear ing facility to extract fissile plutonium test.9 from nuclear waste in the 1980s implied an effort to develop nuclear weapons. To Developments since 2001. North Korean constop this apparent attempt at weaponiza- cerns did not evolve in a vacuum. The tion, Washington supported an inter- Bush administration entered office in Korea denuclearization agreement, January 2001 with a tough “Anything But which was never implemented.

Clinton” approach. Revising U.S.North Korea provoked a nuclear crisis North Korea policy, including the in May 1994 that was resolved in October Agreed Framework, was a key goal. with the U.S.-DPRK Agreed FrameThe administration’s suspicions and work—also called the “Geneva Accord.” hard-line views of North Korea took The agreement certifiably froze North form in insulting and threatening behavKorea’s existing nuclear program, which ior, particularly after 9/11. President produced weapons-grade plutonium, Bush questioned the wisdom of South and promised its eventual dismantlement Korea’s “Sunshine” engagement policy, in exchange for U.S.-provided energy hitherto supported by Washington to and movement toward normalizing reduce inter-Korea tensions and move diplomatic relations.6 The Agreed toward peaceful unification of Korea as a Framework prevented the production of U.S. ally. He expressed loathing for potentially hundreds of plutonium- North Korea’s de facto head of state, based nuclear weapons for the eight years Chairman Kim Jong-il, and famously that it was in force. Moreover, North called him a “pygmy.”10 The administraKorea’s stated fear of foreign—specifical- tion cited North Korea as a reason to ly U.S.—aggression abated significantly review nuclear force sizing in the Nuclear ments into consideration. Effective U.S. foreign policy formulation would also consider North Korean perceptions and factors informing those perceptions.

This important background, generally absent from public discussion, is included below.

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Posture Review and implicitly favored “regime change,” probably exacerbating North Korean paranoia.11 As recently as October 2006, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations stated that the U.S. end objective was regime change in Pyongyang.12 The year 2002 was a watershed in U.S.-North Korea relations. In January the president described North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” along with Iraq

began reprocessing enough plutonium to build up to thirteen nuclear weapons by mid-2006. If this trend continues, North Korea could have enough plutonium for seventeen weapons by 2008.15 In January 2005 relations deteriorated further as the Bush administration named North Korea an “outpost of tyranny” and announced new policy to “end tyranny in our world.”17 Three weeks later Pyongyang announced it was a

The U.S. approach has precipitated—not prevented—nuclear proliferation. and Iran.13 He announced a “preemptive” war policy and began mobilizing U.S. public support for such a war against one of the three “axis of evil” countries: Iraq.14 After months of rebuffing North Korean requests to resume U.S.-suspended bilateral dialogue, Washington dispatched a delegation to Pyongyang in October to accuse it of pursuing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which, if true, would have violated the Agreed Framework.

Pyongyang responded ambiguously and suggested negotiating a solution, which Washington rejected.

In November 2002 the Bush administration decided to stop complying with two major Agreed Framework obligations: It suspended the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project and stopped shipping heavy fuel oil to North Korea, essentially scrapping the Agreed Framework.

North Korea responded decisively.

Pyongyang defrosted its previously “frozen” nuclear program and expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors in December. In January 2003 it withdrew from the NPT and [ 6 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

nuclear weapons state, a move that it hoped would deter U.S. aggression,18 if not also gain it negotiating leverage with Washington.

On balance, North Korea’s uranium enrichment activity merited U.S. attention. However, better consideration of Pyongyang’s possible motives and the debatable status of its suspected activity should have produced a wiser approach.19 North Korea’s suspected cheating should have been considered in light of U.S. tardiness in honoring some of its Agreed Framework obligations. The Agreed Framework’s LWR project—stipulated for delivery in 2003—was five years behind schedule; slow progress in improving U.S.-DPRK relations had been in a state of regression since 2001. Undoubtedly feeling tricked, North Korea’s desire to improve its leverage is understandable.

However, the Bush administration overreacted, making it more culpable for ensuing developments. The administration essentially eschewed constructive diplomacy, sustained its anti-North Korea behavior, and scrapped the Agreed Framework without implement-

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Conflict & Security

Korea, co-exist peacefully, and take steps to normalize relations. The United States asserted its intention not to attack or invade North Korea and its willingness to provide energy assistance to North Korea.21 Six-Party Talks. While Pyongyang was resurThe Bush administration officially recting its plutonium-prudcing nuclear endorsed the Declaration of Principles but did program, the United States in March not quell a continuing schism among 2003 launched a preemptive war against policy makers. The declaration asserted Saddam Hussein’s regime on question- North Korea’s right to peaceful uses of able grounds.20 Concerned that North nuclear energy, with all parties agreeing Korea might be Washington’s next target to discuss the provision of “light-water and fearful of the dreadful implications reactor” to North Korea “…at an approfor regional stability, Beijing, Moscow, priate time…”22 However, administraSeoul, Tokyo, and Pyongyang agreed to tion hard-liners immediately rebuffed participate in six-party government talks North Korea’s desire to develop peaceful with Washington to “denuclearize” North nuclear energy and promptly terminated Korea. Given this objective, paranoid the suspended LWR project. They reiterPyongyang was outnumbered five to one. ated that “all options remain on the China agreed to host the talks, which met table” to resolve the nuclear issue, preinconclusively three times between sumably including military options.

August 2003 and June 2004.

These factors undoubtedly discouraged The six-party talks reconvened in Sep- Pyongyang from permitting further talks, ing a credible alternative plan to achieve its nonproliferation objectives. Bottom line: the Bush administration empowered North Korea to become a nuclear weapons state.

A successful U.S approach would

transform the six-party talk forum into an executive, plenary forum…[and] improve U.S.-DPRK relations. tember 2005 and produced a six-point Declaration of Principles to guide further negotiations. Initially considered a major breakthrough, the Declaration stated that North Korea would abandon “…all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs…” and return to the NPT “…at an early date.” Addressing some North Korean objectives, the Declaration also included groundbreaking stipulations for the incumbent U.S. government to respect the sovereignty of North

but the real deal-breaker occurred in November 2005 after Washington initiated “financial sanctions” on a Macao bank for handling illicit North Korean financial transactions, including counterfeit U.S. currency.23 This was the last round of talks when this article went to press.

To improve its negotiating leverage in the interim, North Korea conducted a major ballistic missile test in July 2006 and the nuclear test in October. The Winter/Spring 2007 [ 6 3 ]

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likely goal was to signal to Washington and others that constructive diplomacy would be more productive than coercive diplomacy. The UN Security Council passed resolutions that condemned North Korea’s tests, but that did not erase the impact of Pyongyang’s message.

UNSC Resolution 1718 addressed the nuclear test consistent with Washington’s hard line approach. It called on North Korea to return to the NPT and to verifiably end all nuclear programs, and it required UN member states to impose severe sanctions against North Korea.

The resolution also demanded that Pyongyang resume six-party negotiations.24 North Korea called the sanctions a “declaration of war,” but agreed on 31 October 2006 to return to six-party talks.

Summary. While North Korea is implicated in the current standoff, no party is blameless. Asymmetric objectives among the six parties, especially North Korea and the United States, are a considerable part of the problem. Another is significant U.S. misunderstanding of North Korean and regional dynamics. Regrettably, the U.S. approach has precipitated—not prevented—nuclear proliferation.

The six-party concept is flawed in several respects. First, the parties have different primary objectives and priorities.

The United States wants to use North Korea’s neighbors to pressure it into submitting to Washington’s nonproliferation objectives. North Korea wants to assure its security and improve relations with the United States. Surrounding powers place a higher priority on maintaining regional stability, mindful that war could quickly produce millions of casualties while regime collapse could [ 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

produce countless North Korean refugees and a struggle for power with unpredictable consequences. Beijing has little incentive to help Washington achieve a major foreign policy victory at China’s expense in its area of influence.

Another flaw is U.S. policy to conduct sub-plenary talks with North Korea only within the forum’s physical confines.

While transforming North Korea into a non-nuclear weapons state is a more difficult challenge than before, it is not necessarily impossible. U.S. planners must acquire better knowledge of North Korea, regional dynamics, and U.S. capabilities to achieve success. While tough talk about “regime change” and a “military option” may impress American voters, it fuels North Korean paranoia and is counterproductive. A new approach merits consideration.

Policy Options and Recommendations. As this article went to press, the next round of six-party talks was anticipated by the end of 2006. The United States probably will continue its hard-line approach, Option I below. If success remains elusive, an alternative Option II is recommended to achieve U.S. objectives.

Option I: Hard Line. The Bush administration has preferred this approach to date.

Success seems unlikely, however, unless the administration reverses its antiNorth Korea rhetoric and behavior, plausibly addresses North Korean concerns, and persuades Pyongyang that Washington will uphold its end of any deal once Pyongyang gives up its leverage.

If Washington does not change its course, North Korea will continue to build a nuclear arsenal, convinced that it has made a wise choice to deter foreign

CHAMBERLIN

aggression.

Option II: Start Anew with Constructive, Comprehensive Diplomacy. The United States needs a new approach with new attitudes, objectives, and behavior that will achieve U.S. national security objectives through mutually beneficial, transparent, and verifiable agreements with North Korea.

The installation of a new House of Representatives and Senate in January 2007 could provide a face-saving way to start anew.

The new approach should include polite rhetoric and plausible confidencebuilding measures. It should address North Korea’s paranoia, xenophobia, and han as well as the range of Pyongyang’s concerns. It should induce North Korea to agree to become a nonnuclear weapons state, as coercive measures have been counterproductive. A precedent for such an approach is the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. Most importantly, the president

Conflict & Security

forum into an executive, plenary forum.

The adjusted forum would involve onand off-site sub-committee talks comprising two to five parties that would submit their proposed solutions to the plenary group for transparent endorsement. U.S. discussions should take place with the directly relevant party or parties in locations that are conducive to success.

Bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks, trilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)North Korea talks, and quadrilateral U.S.-North Korea-ROK-Japan talks are more appropriate for many topics than the six-party plenary format. The U.S. should accept North Korea’s right to peaceful nuclear energy once it certifiably complies with its IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreement and returns to the NPT. In this vein, the U.S. should agree to resume the Agreed Framework’s LWR project, provided Seoul and Tokyo concur. Washington should facilitate movement toward a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula that will

Patient U.S. efforts to develop a friendly

relationship with North Korea over time could dramatically enhance U.S. ability to achieve its strategic objectives. should fully endorse the new policy and discipline dissenters in his administration, including those who indicate that “regime change” is the U.S. objective.

Occasional statements to the contrary by the president are not sufficient to convince Americans, much less North Koreans, of Washington’s peaceful intentions.

A successful U.S approach would comprise two major policies. First, it should transform the six-party talk

include resolution of long-standing concerns.25 Second, the United States should improve U.S.-DPRK relations. Achieving U.S. national security objectives visà-vis North Korea is better accomplished through constructive engagement than confrontation. Reinforcing this history lesson is China’s resistance to U.S. confrontational measures that could destabilize its northeastern border region.

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Patient U.S. efforts to develop a friendly relationship with North Korea over time could dramatically enhance U.S. ability to achieve its strategic objectives in East Asia. A roadmap to normalize U.S.North Korea relations when North Korea returns to the NPT would be a feature of this strategy, and the U.S.China process would be a useful reference. Furthermore, a number of confidence building measures in the interim, including high-level meetings to build essential personal relationships are necessary. Specifically, the United States would dispatch a high-level special envoy to set this process on the right path, establish and sustain personal relationships with North Korean counterparts, agree to review North Korea’s status on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and assist North Korea’s application for membership in international financial institutions.26 Lastly, the United States would boldly consider strengthening the U.S. strategic position

in East Asia by expanding the U.S.-ROK alliance over time to include North Korea as circumstances warrant.27

Conclusion. North Korea would be

more likely to relinquish its nuclear weapons status if its leaders were proffered a solution that they believed would resolve their national security concerns.

Inspiring confidence in such an outcome is the fact that Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, Ukraine, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan have renounced nuclear weaponry, and that North Korea verifiably relinquished it from 1994 to 2002. What could be achieved with North Korea will never be known without a sincere effort to find a mutually beneficial solution.

The U.S. approach should heed Sun Tzu’s wisdom and seek agreements withNorth Korea that are mutually beneficial, transparent, and verifiable. “Starting anew” provides the best opportunity to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

NOTES

1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, written circa 500 BC; referenced version edited by James Clavell (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), 18.

2 Michael Breen, The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies (New Work: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 38.

3 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Moves Concerning Its Nuclear Test,” [North] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 12 October 2006, Internet, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (date accessed: 24 October 2006).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 PDF and HTML versions of the Agreed Framework were available online when this article was written: http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf, and http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:tdHfpajKP98J:www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFrame work.pdf+U.S.-NORTH KOREA+Agreed+Framework&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4.

7 “North Korea—Special Envoy Visit,” U.S. State Department, 5 October 2000, Internet, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fsnkorea_visit_001005.html (date accessed: 24 September 2006).

[ 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

8 “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué, October 12, 2000,” Internet, http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WAUSIAINFO.EXE?A2=ind0010b&L=uskoreakr&D=1&H=1&O=D&P=554 (date accessed: 19 May 2006).

9 Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “N. Korea Nuclear Test Employed Plutonium,” New York Times, 17 October 2006.

10 PR Newswire [re “What Bush Knew,” Newsweek, May 27, 2002], Internet, http://www.prnewswire.com/news/index_mail.shtml?ACCT=104&S TORY=/www/story/05-19-2002/0001730878&EDATE (date accessed: 31 May 31 2006).

11 “Nuclear Posture Review,” 8 January 2002, Internet, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/ policy/dod/npr.htm (date accessed: 16 May 2006).

12 “Changing Pyongyang Regime Remains Ultimate Goal: Bolton,” Korea Herald, 26 October 2006.

13 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, The United States Capitol, 29 January 2002.

14 President George W. Bush first articulated the “preemptive war” doctrine in his commencement speech at the U.S. Military Academy in spring 2002

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and then included it in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, 17 September 2002, p. 15. The concept remains part of the current version of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, issued in March 2006.

15 The stated maximum number of nuclear weapons that North Korea could make is a worst case assessment, according to David Albright and Paul Brennan. On 4 October 2006, The Washington Post reported, “U.S. intelligence officials have estimated [North Korea] could have as many as 11 [nuclear weapons].” This is an increase over previous statements attributed to U.S. officials this year that the potential arsenal could comprise six to eight weapons.

The “accepted calculus [among U.S. government officials for estimating the possible size of North Korea’s arsenal] is 1 per year,” according to a former U.S. government official familiar with the topic. David Albright and Paul Brennan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 2006; Anthony Failoa and Dafna Linzer, “N. Korea Pledges Nuclear Test,” Washington Post, 4 October 2006, A1.

16 Estimates for 1994-2002 are based on several CIA reports: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/ jan_jun2000.htm#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006); Attachment A, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2002.html#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006). The estimate for 2006 and 2008 is based on David Albright and Paul Brennan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid2006,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 2006.

17 President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Speech, 20 January 2005, Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html (date accessed: 4 October 2006) and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, March 2006, 1.

18 North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on 10 February 2006: “DPRK FM on its Stand to Suspend its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period,” [North] Korean Central News Agency, 11 February 2005, Internet, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (date accessed: 21 September 2006).

19 CIA reports from 2000-2003: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2000.htm#5 (date accessed: 24 September 2006); Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass

Conflict & Security

Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2002.html#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006); Attachment A, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2 002.html#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006).

20 The Bush administration’s stated rationale for attacking Iraq has been refuted. The International Atomic Energy Agency disputed U.S. assertions of an Iraqi nuclear program during a meeting of the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003, Internet, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml (date accessed: 16 May 2006). The U.S. 9/11 Commission Report (Barnes and Noble, 2004), 334, reported “no ‘compelling case’ that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the [9/11 al-Qaeda] attacks.…”

21 “Declaration of Principles,” Six-Party Talks, 19 September 2005, Internet, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2005/dprk-050920kcna03.htm (date accessed: 26 October 2006).

22 Ibid., section 1.

23 Sources include: background discussion with a former USG official; “Kim Urges Simultaneous Actions for Ending Nuclear Issue,” Xinhua News Agency, 12 November 2005, Internet, http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/talk6/148530.htm (date accessed: 4 October 2006); Leon V. Sigal, “An Instinct for the Capillaries,” paper presented at the Seoul-Washington Forum in Washington, D.C., 1-2 May 2006, 5, Internet, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060501_sigal.pdf (date accessed: 4 October 2006).

24 UN Security Council Resolution 1718, 14 October 2006, Internet, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm (date accessed: 14 October 2006). Section 6 states North Korea “…shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes…[emphasis added]” 25 For detailed suggestions on such a peace mechanism, see Paul F. Chamberlin, Today’s Korean Question: Establishing Peace on a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula, pending publication in a U.S. Marine Corps University Foundation book of proceedings of its conference, “The Quest for a Unified Korea,” conducted at Quantico, Virginia, 13 June 2006.

26 U.S. State Department’s list of states supporting terrorism, Internet, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (date accessed: 1 October 2006).

27 For additional information, see Paul F. Chamberlin, “ROK-U.S. Interests and Alliance in a New Era: A Prescription for Change,” Korea and World Affairs 29, no. 4 (Winter 2005).

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Six-Party Talks Time For Change

Paul F. Chamberlin If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

- SUN TZU 1

North Korea undeniably demonstrated it was the world’s ninth nuclear weapons state by testing a nuclear device on 9 October 2006. Given the measure of U.S. success in containing North Korea’s nuclear program from 1994 to 2001, the test represented a major U.S. foreign policy defeat. This defeat suggests that current U.S. policy planners neither know North Korea and regional dynamics nor are aware of their own capabilities to produce a positive outcome. Not only does the test clarify that other states lack the influence on Pyongyang that Washington had presumed, it also suggests that the U.S. approach to North Korea, including the six-party forum, requires revision.

As this article was going to press, North Korea had just agreed to return to the six-party talks. The next round is envisioned for 31 December 2006. While a successful conclusion is hoped for, this essay explains why undue optimism is not warranted and recommends a new U.S. approach. It begins by

Paul F. Chamberlin is a former U.S. military attaché to Korea and retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer who specialized in Korean affairs. He is an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and author of Korea 2010: The Challenges of the New Millennium.

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develop a secure protective relationship with the United States. Thus, one of North Korea’s stated objectives is to develop a peaceful relationship with the United States.

Personal relationships are essential elements of Korean culture, even at the North Korean Motives for highest levels of government. Incumbent becoming a Nuclear Weapons senior U.S. government officials have State. Certain cultural factors as well as not developed personal relationships Pyongyang’s stated rationale and percep- with key North Korean leaders, thus tions merit attention in evaluating North missing an opportunity to alleviate Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Pyongyang’s fears.

While North Korean rhetoric should not be taken at face value, neither should it be Pyongyang’s Rationale. North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of completely ignored.

Korea (DPRK), tested a plutoniumCultural Factors. Throughout history, sur- based nuclear device “…to prove its posrounding powers have fought to control session of nukes to protect its sovereignty the strategically important Korean and right to existence from the daily Peninsula. This has made Koreans increasing danger of war from the U.S.”3 chronic victims of great power rivalry, A foreign ministry spokesman also fueling han, paranoia, and xenophobia. asserted, “The DPRK's nuclear test was These three factors reduce North entirely attributable to the U.S. nuclear reviewing key developments, including North Korea’s motives for becoming a nuclear weapons state. It then summarizes U.S. efforts to achieve its goals, including the six-party forum, and concludes with recommendations.

North Korea claims a nuclear deterrent is necessary if it cannot develop a secure protective relationship with the United States.

Korea’s sense of security. Han, defined by one expert as “a kind of rage and helplessness that is sublimated and lingers like an inactive resentment,”2 is evident in North Korea’s behavior.

North Koreans—taught that the United States started the Korean War—seem to feel this burden more than South Koreans, who are protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and South Korea-U.S. mutual defense treaty. Feeling threatened by the most powerful nuclear weapons state on earth, North Korea claims a nuclear deterrent is necessary if it cannot [ 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

threat, sanctions and pressure.”4 At the same time, Pyongyang claimed to remain committed to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula “through dialogue and negotiations.” A government spokesman said that North Korea would not need “to possess even a single nuke” if Washington were to drop its “hostile policy toward the DPRK” and develop commensurate confidence-building measures.5 To achieve their objectives, U.S. policy makers would be wise to address Pyongyang’s stated fears, of course taking

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significantly through 2000 because Pyongyang believed that Washington did not harbor hostile intent toward North Korea.

In October 2000 the White House accepted a special North Korean envoy “…to discuss nuclear… and other issues related to improvement of relations.”7 The two parties signed a joint commuU.S. Approach to Denuclearize niqué pledging “…to take steps to fundaNorth Korea. mentally improve their bilateral relations.”8 The geopolitical context for this Developments through 2000. North Korea agreement was a general warming trend started a nuclear development program that began in June 2000 with a historic in the 1960s ostensibly to develop inter-Korea summit meeting and nuclear energy. Like Japan, South improvements in inter-Korea relations.

Korea, and even China, North Korea U.S. support for this communiqué lacks sufficient natural energy resources expired in early 2001. A series of preto meet current and envisioned needs. It ventable developments, highlighted by signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation the U.S. abandonment of the Agreed Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, but Framework in 2002, precipitated North undeclared construction of a reprocess- Korea’s 2006 plutonium-based nuclear ing facility to extract fissile plutonium test.9 from nuclear waste in the 1980s implied an effort to develop nuclear weapons. To Developments since 2001. North Korean constop this apparent attempt at weaponiza- cerns did not evolve in a vacuum. The tion, Washington supported an inter- Bush administration entered office in Korea denuclearization agreement, January 2001 with a tough “Anything But which was never implemented.

Clinton” approach. Revising U.S.North Korea provoked a nuclear crisis North Korea policy, including the in May 1994 that was resolved in October Agreed Framework, was a key goal. with the U.S.-DPRK Agreed FrameThe administration’s suspicions and work—also called the “Geneva Accord.” hard-line views of North Korea took The agreement certifiably froze North form in insulting and threatening behavKorea’s existing plutonium-based ior, particularly after 9/11. President nuclear program and promised its even- Bush questioned the wisdom of South tual dismantlement in exchange for Korea’s “Sunshine” engagement policy, U.S.-provided energy and movement hitherto supported by Washington to toward normalizing diplomatic rela- reduce inter-Korea tensions and move tions.6 The Agreed Framework prevented toward peaceful unification of Korea as a the production of potentially hundreds U.S. ally. He expressed loathing for of plutonium-based nuclear weapons for North Korea’s de facto head of state, the eight years that it was in force. More- Chairman Kim Jong-il, and famously over, North Korea’s stated fear of for- called him a “pygmy.”10 The administraeign—specifically U.S.—aggression abated tion cited North Korea as a reason to its bluster, exaggerations, and false statements into consideration. Effective U.S. foreign policy formulation would also consider North Korean perceptions and factors informing those perceptions.

This important background, generally absent from public discussion, is included below.

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review nuclear force sizing in the Nuclear Posture Review and implicitly favored “regime change,” probably exacerbating North Korean paranoia.11 As recently as October 2006, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations stated that the U.S. end objective was regime change in Pyongyang.12 The year 2002 was a watershed in U.S.-North Korea relations. In January the president described North Korea as

ary 2003 it withdrew from the NPT and began reprocessing enough plutonium to build up to thirteen nuclear weapons by mid-2006. If this trend continues, North Korea could have enough plutonium for seventeen weapons by 2008.15 In January 2005 relations deteriorated further as the Bush administration named North Korea an “outpost of tyranny” and announced new policy to “end tyranny in our world.”17 Three

The U.S. approach has precipitated—not prevented—nuclear proliferation. part of an “axis of evil” along with Iraq and Iran.13 He announced a “preemptive” war policy and began mobilizing U.S. public support for such a war against one of the three “axis of evil” countries: Iraq.14 After months of rebuffing North Korean requests to resume U.S.-suspended bilateral dialogue, Washington dispatched a delegation to Pyongyang in October to accuse it of pursuing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which, if true, would have violated the Agreed Framework.

Pyongyang responded ambiguously and suggested negotiating a solution, which Washington rejected.

In November 2002 the Bush administration decided to stop complying with two major Agreed Framework obligations: It suspended the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project and stopped shipping heavy fuel oil to North Korea, essentially scrapping the Agreed Framework.

North Korea responded decisively.

Pyongyang defrosted its previously “frozen” nuclear program and expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors in December. In Janu[ 6 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

weeks later Pyongyang announced it was a nuclear weapons state, a move that it hoped would deter U.S. aggression,18 if not also gain it negotiating leverage with Washington.

On balance, North Korea’s uranium enrichment activity merited U.S. attention. However, better consideration of Pyongyang’s possible motives and the debatable status of its suspected activity should have produced a wiser approach.19 North Korea’s suspected cheating should have been considered in light of U.S. tardiness in honoring some of its Agreed Framework obligations. The Agreed Framework’s LWR project—stipulated for delivery in 2003—was five years behind schedule; slow progress in improving U.S.-DPRK relations had been in a state of regression since 2001. Undoubtedly feeling tricked, North Korea’s desire to improve its leverage is understandable.

However, the Bush administration overreacted, making it more culpable for ensuing developments. The administration essentially eschewed constructive diplomacy, sustained its anti-North Korea behavior, and scrapped the

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ment to respect the sovereignty of North Korea, co-exist peacefully, and take steps to normalize relations. The United States asserted its intention not to attack or invade North Korea and its willingness to provide energy assistance to North Korea.21 Six-Party Talks. While Pyongyang was resurThe Bush administration officially recting its plutonium-based nuclear endorsed the Declaration of Principles but did program, the United States in March not quell a continuing schism among 2003 launched a preemptive war against policy makers. The declaration asserted Saddam Hussein’s regime on question- North Korea’s right to peaceful uses of able grounds.20 Concerned that North nuclear energy, with all parties agreeing Korea might be Washington’s next target to discuss the provision of “light-water and fearful of the dreadful implications reactor” to North Korea “…at an approfor regional stability, Beijing, Moscow, priate time…”22 However, administraSeoul, Tokyo, and Pyongyang agreed to tion hard-liners immediately rebuffed participate in six-party government talks North Korea’s desire to develop peaceful with Washington to “denuclearize” North nuclear energy and promptly terminated Korea. Given this objective, paranoid the suspended LWR project. They reiterPyongyang was outnumbered five to one. ated that “all options remain on the China agreed to host the talks, which met table” to resolve the nuclear issue, preinconclusively three times between sumably including military options.

August 2003 and June 2004.

These factors undoubtedly discouraged Agreed Framework without implementing a credible alternative plan to achieve its nonproliferation objectives. Bottom line: the Bush administration empowered North Korea to become a nuclear weapons state.

A successful U.S approach would

transform the six-party talk forum into an executive, plenary forum…[and] improve U.S.-DPRK relations.

The six-party talks reconvened in September 2005 and produced a six-point Declaration of Principles to guide further negotiations. Initially considered a major breakthrough, the Declaration stated that North Korea would abandon “…all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs…” and return to the NPT “…at an early date.” Addressing some North Korean objectives, the Declaration also included groundbreaking stipulations for the incumbent U.S. govern-

Pyongyang from permitting further talks, but the real deal-breaker occurred in November 2005 when Washington initiated “financial sanctions” on a Macao bank for handling illicit North Korean financial transactions, including counterfeit U.S. currency.23 This was the last round of talks when this article went to press.

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and the nuclear test in October. The likely goal was to signal to Washington and others that constructive diplomacy would be more productive than coercive diplomacy. The UN Security Council passed resolutions that condemned North Korea’s tests, but that did not erase the impact of Pyongyang’s message.

UNSC Resolution 1718 addressed the nuclear test consistent with Washington’s hard line approach. It called on North Korea to return to the NPT and to verifiably end all nuclear programs, and it required UN member states to impose severe sanctions against North Korea.

The resolution also demanded that Pyongyang resume six-party negotiations.24 North Korea called the sanctions a “declaration of war,” but agreed on 31 October 2006 to return to six-party talks.

Summary. While North Korea is implicated in the current standoff, no party is blameless. Asymmetric objectives among the six parties, especially North Korea and the United States, are a considerable part of the problem. Another is significant U.S. misunderstanding of North Korean and regional dynamics. Regrettably, the U.S. approach has precipitated—not prevented—nuclear proliferation.

The six-party concept is flawed in several respects. First, the parties have different primary objectives and priorities.

The United States wants to use North Korea’s neighbors to pressure it into submitting to Washington’s nonproliferation objectives. North Korea wants to assure its security and improve relations with the United States. Surrounding powers place a higher priority on maintaining regional stability, mindful that war could quickly produce millions of [ 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

casualties while regime collapse could produce countless North Korean refugees and an unpredictable struggle for power. Beijing has little incentive to help Washington achieve a major foreign policy victory at China’s expense in its area of influence.

While transforming North Korea into a non-nuclear weapons state is a more difficult challenge than before, it is not necessarily impossible. U.S. planners must acquire better knowledge of North Korea, regional dynamics, and U.S. capabilities to achieve success. While tough talk about “regime change” and a “military option” may impress American voters, it fuels North Korean paranoia and is counterproductive. A new approach merits consideration.

Policy Options and Recommendations. As this article went to press,

the next round of six-party talks was anticipated by the end of 2006. If the United States will continue its hard-line approach, I recommend Option I below.

If success remains elusive, an alternative Option II is recommended to achieve U.S. objectives.

Option I: Hard Line. The Bush administration has preferred this approach to date.

Success seems unlikely, however, unless the administration reverses its antiNorth Korea rhetoric and behavior, plausibly addresses North Korean concerns, and persuades Pyongyang that Washington will uphold its end of any deal once Pyongyang gives up its leverage.

If Washington does not change its course, North Korea will continue to build a nuclear arsenal, convinced that it has made a wise choice to deter foreign aggression.

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Option II. Start Anew with Constructive, Comprehensive Diplomacy. The United States needs a new approach with new attitudes, objectives, and behavior that will achieve U.S. national security objectives through mutually beneficial, transparent, and verifiable agreements with North Korea.

The installation of a new House of Representatives and Senate in January 2007 could provide a face-saving way to start anew.

The new approach should include polite rhetoric and plausible confidencebuilding measures. It should address North Korea’s paranoia, xenophobia, and han as well as the range of Pyongyang’s concerns. It should induce North Korea to agree to become a nonnuclear weapons state, as coercive measures have been counterproductive. A precedent for such an approach is the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. Most importantly, the president should fully endorse the new policy and discipline dissenters in his administra-

Conflict & Security

and off-site sub-committee talks comprising two to five parties that would submit their proposed solutions to the plenary group for transparent endorsement. U.S. discussions should take place with the directly relevant party or parties in locations that are conducive to success.

Bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks, trilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)North Korea talks, and quadrilateral U.S.-North Korea-ROK-Japan talks are more appropriate for many topics than the six-party plenary format. The U.S. should accept North Korea’s right to peaceful nuclear energy once it certifiably complies with its IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreement and returns to the NPT. In this vein, the U.S. should agree to resume the Agreed Framework’s LWR project, provided Seoul and Tokyo concur. Washington should facilitate movement toward a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula that will include resolution of long-standing concerns.25

Patient U.S. efforts to develop a friendly

relationship with North Korea over time could dramatically enhance U.S. ability to achieve its strategic objectives. tion, including those who indicate that “regime change” is the U.S. objective.

Occasional statements to the contrary by the president are not sufficient to convince Americans, much less North Koreans, of Washington’s peaceful intentions.

A successful U.S approach would comprise two major policies. First, it should transform the six-party talk forum into an executive, plenary forum.

The adjusted forum would involve on-

Second, the United States should improve U.S.-DPRK relations. Achieving U.S. national security objectives visà-vis North Korea is better accomplished through constructive engagement than confrontation. Reinforcing this history lesson is China’s resistance to U.S. confrontational measures that could destabilize its northeastern border region.

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could dramatically enhance U.S. ability to achieve its strategic objectives in East Asia. A roadmap to normalize U.S.North Korea relations when North Korea returns to the NPT would be a feature of this strategy, and the U.S.China process would be a useful reference. Furthermore, a number of confidence building measures in the interim, including high-level meetings to build essential personal relationships are necessary. Specifically, the United States would dispatch a high-level special envoy to set this process on the right path, establish and sustain personal relationships with North Korean counterparts, agree to review North Korea’s status on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and assist North Korea’s application for membership in international financial institutions.26 Lastly, the United States would boldly consider strengthening the U.S. strategic position in East Asia by expanding the U.S.-ROK

alliance over time to include North Korea as circumstances warrant.27

Conclusion. North Korea would be more likely to relinquish its nuclear weapons status if its leaders were proffered a solution that they believed would resolve their national security concerns.

Inspiring confidence in such an outcome is the fact that Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, Ukraine, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan have renounced nuclear weaponry, and that North Korea verifiably relinquished it from 1994 to 2002. What could be achieved with North Korea will never be known without a sincere effort to find a mutually beneficial solution.

The U.S. approach should heed Sun Tzu’s wisdom and seek agreements withNorth Korea that are mutually beneficial, transparent, and verifiable. “Starting anew” provides the best opportunity to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

NOTES

1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, written circa 500 BC; referenced version edited by James Clavell (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), 18.

2 Michael Breen, The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies (New Work: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 38.

3 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Moves Concerning Its Nuclear Test,” [North] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 12 October 2006, Internet, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (date accessed: 24 October 2006).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 PDF and HTML versions of the Agreed Framework were available online when this article was written: http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf, and http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:tdHfpajKP98J:www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFrame work.pdf+U.S.-NORTH KOREA+Agreed+Framework&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4.

7 “North Korea—Special Envoy Visit,” U.S. State Department, 5 October 2000, Internet, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fsnkorea_visit_001005.html (date accessed: 24 September 2006).

8 “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué, October 12,

[ 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

2000,” Internet, http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WAUSIAINFO.EXE?A2=ind0010b&L=uskoreakr&D=1&H=1&O=D&P=554 (date accessed: 19 May 2006).

9 Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “N. Korea Nuclear Test Employed Plutonium,” New York Times, 17 October 2006.

10 PR Newswire [re “What Bush Knew,” Newsweek, May 27, 2002], Internet, http://www.prnewswire.com/news/index_mail.shtml?ACCT=104&S TORY=/www/story/05-19-2002/0001730878&EDATE (date accessed: 31 May 31 2006).

11 “Nuclear Posture Review,” 8 January 2002, Internet, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/ policy/dod/npr.htm (date accessed: 16 May 2006).

12 “Changing Pyongyang Regime Remains Ultimate Goal: Bolton,” Korea Herald, 26 October 2006.

13 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, The United States Capitol, 29 January 2002.

14 President George W. Bush first articulated the “preemptive war” doctrine in his commencement speech at the U.S. Military Academy in spring 2002 and then included it in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, 17 September

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2002, p. 15. The concept remains part of the current version of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, issued in March 2006.

15 The stated maximum number of nuclear weapons that North Korea could make is a worst case assessment, according to David Albright and Paul Brennan. On 4 October 2006, The Washington Post reported, “U.S. intelligence officials have estimated [North Korea] could have as many as 11 [nuclear weapons].” This is an increase over previous statements attributed to U.S. officials this year that the potential arsenal could comprise six to eight weapons.

The “accepted calculus [among U.S. government officials for estimating the possible size of North Korea’s arsenal] is 1 per year,” according to a former U.S. government official familiar with the topic. David Albright and Paul Brennan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 2006; Anthony Failoa and Dafna Linzer, “N. Korea Pledges Nuclear Test,” Washington Post, 4 October 2006, A1.

16 Estimates for 1994-2002 are based on several CIA reports: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/ jan_jun2000.htm#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006); Attachment A, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2002.html#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006). The estimate for 2006 and 2008 is based on David Albright and Paul Brennan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid2006,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 2006.

17 President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Speech, 20 January 2005, Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html (date accessed: 4 October 2006) and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, March 2006, 1.

18 North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on 10 February 2006: “DPRK FM on its Stand to Suspend its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period,” [North] Korean Central News Agency, 11 February 2005, Internet, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (date accessed: 21 September 2006).

19 CIA reports from 2000-2003: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2000.htm#5 (date accessed: 24 September 2006); Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January

Conflict & Security

Through 30 June 2002, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2002.html#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006); Attachment A, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2 002.html#5 (date accessed: 25 September 2006).

20 The Bush administration’s stated rationale for attacking Iraq has been refuted. The International Atomic Energy Agency disputed U.S. assertions of an Iraqi nuclear program during a meeting of the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003, Internet, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml (date accessed: 16 May 2006). The U.S. 9/11 Commission Report (Barnes and Noble, 2004), 334, reported “no ‘compelling case’ that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the [9/11 al-Qaeda] attacks.…”

21 “Declaration of Principles,” Six-Party Talks, 19 September 2005, Internet, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2005/dprk-050920kcna03.htm (date accessed: 26 October 2006).

22 Ibid., section 1.

23 Sources include: background discussion with a former USG official; “Kim Urges Simultaneous Actions for Ending Nuclear Issue,” Xinhua News Agency, 12 November 2005, Internet, http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/talk6/148530.htm (date accessed: 4 October 2006); Leon V. Sigal, “An Instinct for the Capillaries,” paper presented at the Seoul-Washington Forum in Washington, D.C., 1-2 May 2006, 5, Internet, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060501_sigal.pdf (date accessed: 4 October 2006).

24 UN Security Council Resolution 1718, 14 October 2006, Internet, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm (date accessed: 14 October 2006). Section 6 states North Korea “…shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes…[emphasis added]” 25 For detailed suggestions on such a peace mechanism, see Paul F. Chamberlin, Today’s Korean Question: Establishing Peace on a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula, pending publication in a U.S. Marine Corps University Foundation book of proceedings of its conference, “The Quest for a Unified Korea,” conducted at Quantico, Virginia, 13 June 2006.

26 U.S. State Department’s list of states supporting terrorism, Internet, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (date accessed: 1 October 2006).

27 For additional information, see Paul F. Chamberlin, “ROK-U.S. Interests and Alliance in a New Era: A Prescription for Change,” Korea and World Affairs 29, no. 4 (Winter 2005).

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Countering Terrorist Financing Lessons From Europe

Michael Jonsson & Svante Cornell Until recently, terrorist financing has been an underdeveloped subject of academic inquiry and media reporting. With a few notable exceptions, an overwhelming majority of writing in the field followed the 9/11 attacks and focused primarily on two related questions—how al-Qaeda is financed and what can be done to disrupt their financing. Yet terrorist financing is not a new phenomenon. In Europe, both the United Kingdom and Spain have been fighting it for more than three decades. One European terrorist organization, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), has been “credited” with pioneering the kind of sophisticated financial networks that many of the world’s large and longest-lived terrorist organizations today use to sustain themselves.1 In spite of this, there has been little comparative research on terrorist financing. Such research is crucial to provide lessons on how best to combat terrorist organizations.

This article aims to review and compare Spanish and British experiences in countering terrorist financing. The first section describes the development of more diverse and sophisticated financing methods by the IRA and ETA. The second section analyzes the interaction between different financing strategies, violent operations, and the popularity of these organizations. Following this, the cost of counter-terrorism measures to Spain and the United Kingdom is contrasted with the economic damage that has been caused to the United States by

Michael Jonsson is a lecturer in the Department of Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden.

Svante Cornell is associate professor of Government and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University and assistant research professor at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, where he is also research director of the Central AsiaCaucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.

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al-Qaeda. The final section points out successes and limitations of countering terrorist financing. The conclusion discusses the applicability of such methods in devising policies to combat al-Qaeda.

income, with the remainder gained through kidnappings and robberies. The tax was levied on major businesses throughout the region and enforced through threats, kidnappings, and at times even murders. After Jose Maria Where the Money Came From. Korta—a symbol for resisting the extorDuring the 1970s many terrorist organi- tion—was murdered by ETA in 2000, zations financed their operations incomes from the “tax” rose substantialthrough fairly unsophisticated means, ly.5 The resulting insecurity drew both often relying primarily on violent crime, businesses and professionals out of the state funding, and diaspora support. The region, making the tax and its collectors IRA traditionally financed itself through profoundly unpopular among large segcriminal activities, including robberies, ments of Basque society. kidnappings, extortion, and illegal drinking clubs. The organization also Improving Business Strategies. received substantial economic support Over time, both the IRA and ETA from the Irish diaspora in the United dropped financing activities that were States via organizations such as Noraid. excessively unpopular or that involved According to some sources, diaspora excessive risk relative to average returns. funds accounted for up to half of its In 1983 the IRA kidnapping of British incomes during the late 1970s and early businessman Don Tidey ended in an 1980s.2 Between 1972-1975 and 1981- intensive shootout, during which Tidey 1987, the IRA received substantial sup- was rescued but an Irish policeman and port in money and weaponry from an Irish soldier were killed. This caused a Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya, which used major backlash in public opinion against the organization to target Britain. This the IRA and effectively forced the orgacooperation ended after an informer nization to give up kidnapping for ranfrom the IRA betrayed a large shipment som. Similarly, robberies were one of the of weapons in 1987, an act that delayed IRA’s major sources of income, with and diluted an operation intended to some IRA units even specializing in robbecome the “Tet offensive” of the IRA.3 beries to become self-sufficient.6 Over In Spain, the Basque independence time, the IRA gave up robberies as a movement Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) source of income as they yielded returns used similar criminal financing tech- too low to justify the risk involved, espeniques. Although they did receive some cially as the organization often ended up logistical support from ethnic Basques supporting the families of IRA members living in southern France, ETA enjoyed jailed in conjunction with failed robneither major state sponsorship nor sig- beries.7 ETA, which often took its cues nificant support from a diaspora. from the strategy developed by the IRA, Instead, the organization’s primary followed a similar course. By 1985, ETA source of income was a “revolutionary had stopped robbing banks as this was tax” that they imposed in the Basque judged to be too risky for the meager region.4 The proceeds amounted to returns it provided.8 The organization roughly half of the organization’s also made several million euros from [ 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

JONSSON & CORNELL

kidnappings over the years, but abandoned this tactic in 1997 because of popular backlash.9 Although ETA and the IRA lost support when their activities became increasingly violent, they gained support when government responses utilized excessive violence. For example, the

Conflict & Security

In order to professionally manage its finances, the IRA created a finance department in 1981 consisting of a finance director assisted by a few colleagues. Two senior members of Sinn Fein, the IRA’s political branch, earlier served in the IRA’s finance department, illustrating the artificial division between

Over time, both the IRA and ETA dropped

financing activities that were excessively unpopular, or which involved excessive risk relative to average returns.

the two wings of the organizations.12 ETA has a similar specialized department for managing its finances. The Basque organization also relied extensively on “middlemen” through which extorted businessmen could transfer money to the organization. For a long time, these important “logistical cells” were not effectively targeted by the police, but in June 2006 Spanish and French law enforcement arrested twelve people involved in the collection of the “revolutionary tax.” This operation was seen as a serious blow to the financial network of ETA and its success was largely due to cross-border cooperation between France and Spain. Even though the investigation was initiated almost a decade prior, at the time of the arrests the investigators still had not identified the relevant bank accounts being used.

The Terrorist Financing Evolu- This strongly suggests that the financial tion. One indication of the importance regulations that have been extended of terrorist financing is the creation of rapidly over the last few years were not units focusing exclusively on economic essential to the success of this investigaissues. Likewise, significant influence tion.13 often accrues to individuals who prove Over time, the strategy of both the IRA talented at obtaining financial resources. and ETA aimed to secure several separate

British government’s indiscriminate 1971 internment campaign galvanized support for the IRA among the Irish diaspora in the United States, laying the groundwork for an essential source of income.10 More drastically, a paramilitary organization called Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion (GAL) appeared in Spain in 1983 and started kidnapping and killing suspected members of ETA. Officially, GAL was financed by ordinary citizens fed up with paying the revolutionary tax. In reality GAL was funded and backed by the Spanish government. Ultimately, the organization killed twenty-seven people (nine of whom were not even members of ETA), weakened trust in Spain’s fledgling democracy among moderate Basque nationalists, and vitally strengthened ETA.11

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sources of income, generating high revenues at a low risk without causing excessive loss of legitimacy. Targeting wealthy countries that presented alternative sources of income, their financial strategies gradually departed from serious organized crime. The IRA moved to internalize and diversify its sources of income, thereby reducing its dependence on capricious external financing. Over time, the IRA came to rely more on “victimless crimes,” such as oil smuggling, tax and value-added tax (VAT) fraud, and money laundering. The latter decreased after the organization promised to quit organized crime in 2005.14 Allegedly, the IRA owns several businesses in Belfast and Derry and makes nearly $20 million from illegal activities and half as much from legitimate businesses and property development, sometimes facilitated by threats or actual use of violence. Some analysts believe that the

tions, cultural associations, and legal businesses associated with the organization’s political wing, Herri Batasuna.

According to a criminal investigation initiated after the Herri Batasuna was sued for supporting ETA, the organization received over 50 percent of its annual budget from grants. Between 1993 and 2002 the Spanish state and the EU sponsored these grants with the intention of furthering Basque cultural and language activities.16 For nearly a decade, the Spanish state inadvertently became the primary financer of its most dangerous enemy. This provided ETA with a substantial source of income and caused less resentment than the “revolutionary tax,” which the organization continued to collect but at lower levels.17 The drawback of this financing strategy was its vulnerability to exposure. When Herri Batasuna’s financing activities were revealed and the party banned, the ETA

Significant influence often accrues to individuals who prove to be particularly talented at obtaining financial resources. money generated by the IRA is used to shore up Sinn Fein’s political influence.

Meanwhile, the police and security forces seem reluctant to target these activities for fear of upsetting the fragile peace agreement.15 In Spain, ETA sought a form of financing which would cause less public resentment than kidnappings, robberies, or the “revolutionary tax.” After a significant portion of the organization’s leadership was arrested in 1992, ETA began to develop a complex web of organiza[ 7 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

once again reverted to dependence on the “revolutionary tax.” Senior analysts believe that one reason this scheme was not uncovered earlier was that state agencies hoped that participation in normal politics would moderate ETA over time and were thus slow to target Herri Batasuna.

It is important to note that whereas the Herri Batasuna political wing was channelling money to the militant ETA, in Northern Irealand the money flow went in the the other direction, from the IRA

JONSSON & CORNELL

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to Sinn Fein. This reflects the gradual shift of power from the IRA to its political wing. Today, the apparent unwillingness of ETA to stop collecting the “revolutionary tax” casts doubt on the organization’s sincerity to move from the current cease-fire toward serious peace negotiations.18

organizations that might be expected.

The IRA’s avoidance of significant drug financing is in striking contrast to the Ulster Volunteer Force, a loyalist terrorist group which split into two factions when one part of the organization refused to give up drug trafficking or declare a cease-fire.22 These cases indicate that lucrative criminal operations Drug Trafficking: Not a Major can undermine the original political Source of Income. The best evi- motivations of terrorist organizations. dence suggests that neither the IRA nor ETA have primarily relied on drug traf- The Cost Efficiency of Terrorficking as a source of income. There have ism: Moving into the 21st Cenbeen very few allegations against ETA in tury. Even small terrorist organizations this regard, even though some members have the capacity to inflict substantial may have dabbled in the trade at some damage upon their state opponents if point. For the IRA, the record is more they are well organized and well trained. ambiguous, but still points away from This is apparent in the rise of al-Qaeda, drug financing. By contrast, organiza- as the organization has been particularly tions based in less-developed countries, apt at maximizing the damage caused by such as the Kosovo Liberation Army and attacks that are relatively inexpensive to the Kurdistan Workers Party, have been organize. Before 9/11 al-Qaeda had an heavily dependent on drug trafficking to annual budget estimated at $30 million obtain funding.19 per year, mainly derived from non-state The IRA did engage in the drug trade donations from Saudi Arabia and the in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, but United Arab Emirates. Despite being this involvement led to such a devastating based in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is not loss of credibility that the organization believed to have obtained any significant withdrew from the business. The group funding from the drug trade and was has since embraced a zero-tolerance pol- actually financing the Taliban with $10icy against drug abuse and went so far as 20 million a year. Contrary to popular to fight drug traders in Northern Ireland belief, the contributions from leader through a campaign of knee-cappings Osama bin Laden’s personal wealth were and even killings. Altogether, this signif- also comparatively negligible.23 The icantly improved the legitimacy of the financial network constructed by algroup; renewing involvement in the drug Qaeda has been described as “the most trade at this point would likely devastate complex, robust and resilient money its credibility.20 There are, however, generating and money moving network recurring claims that the IRA receives a yet seen.”24 But of equal importance is share of drug profits indirectly and may the fact that, while operating at a budget be involved in the drug trade in other that was roughly comparable to that of the parts of the United Kingdom.21 IRA and ETA, al-Qaeda managed to Nonetheless, drug trafficking has not cause significantly greater damage.25 provided the kind of income for these Allowing for the inherent difficulties Winter/Spring 2007 [ 7 3 ]

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in estimating the annual budgets of terrorist organizations, some calculations indicate that the IRA inflicted costs on the United Kingdom that were 130 times as high as its own budget.26 A similar calculation for ETA estimates that the direct and indirect costs inflicted by ETA were some 370 times higher than the costs incurred by the organization itself, lowering the Basque regional GDP by some 21.3 percent.27 The results are even more striking in the United States. The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates that the 9/11 attacks cost $105 billion in New York alone.28 Given that the attacks cost the terrorists $500,000 to carry out, every dollar “invested” by alQaeda caused $210,000 of damage to the United States. Even when compared to al-Qaeda’s total estimated budget of $30 million, projected damages remain 3,500 times al-Qaeda’s investment.

Similarly, the London bombings in

land, and ETA targeted the tourism industry in Spain. Neither of them, however, utilized this strategy to the fullest extent possible, often restrained by their own unwillingness to cause large-scale casualties. Though the IRA did bomb the financial center of London in 1993, this was not a typical target selection for the organization.30 This financial aspect of al-Qaeda’s strategy, coupled with its lack of inhibitions toward causing large-scale civilian casualties, arguably make the organization significantly more dangerous than either the IRA or ETA. Bin Laden has several times referred to his strategy of “bleeding” the U.S. economy through the war in Iraq and attacks on American soil.31 The 9/11 attacks specifically targeted the World Trade Center, and a thwarted 2004 plot proposed simultaneously attacking New York City’s financial district, a business center in Newark, and

These cases seem to indicate that lucrative

criminal operations often undermine the original, political motivations of terrorist organizations.

2005, thought to have cost approximately $15,000 to plan and carry out, are estimated to have cost Britain around $3.7 billion.29 While these numbers should not necessarily be taken at face value, they indicate that al-Qaeda may be following a different, more efficient financial strategy than the IRA and ETA. Both ETA and the IRA pursued an economic agenda in their terrorist campaigns. The IRA killed several British businessmen to deter foreign direct investments in Northern Ire[ 7 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the offices of the World Bank and the IMF in Washington DC.32 This analysis mirrors a broader distinction between ethno-nationalist terrorist groups claiming to represent a defined and permanent population and transnational, ideological groups such as al-Qaeda. As one expert observes, al-Qaeda “fight[s] for a millenarian ideology rather than a discrete community.”33 This may be one reason for its lack of inhibitions against wide-scale civilian casualties, even within its own nominal community.

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Security Policy Implications. The Arab enterprises.”34 Similarly, the frustrating challenges of countering terrorist financing may—much like counterterrorism at large—tempt policymakers to adopt excessive measures that turn out to be inefficient or even counterproductive in the long run. Inspired by laws to combat money laundering, attempts

reduced standard of proof and the general sense of urgency may result in unfortunate mistakes such as the U.S. closure of the Somali money-remitting organization al-Barakaat. Freezing the organization’s resources is estimated to have cut remittances to Somalia by half

Financial regulations in and of

themselves are not enough to cut off terrorist financing. have been made to target terrorist financing through extensive financial regulations. But such policies involve considerable tradeoffs. Excessive regulations and many-fold increases in the filing of suspicious activity reports by financial institutions can create large backlogs, divert scarce intelligence resources away from more efficient methods, and impose major costs on the financial industry. Moreover, they may hinder much-needed remittances from reaching developing countries and infringe on individual rights and liberties.

Some of these trends are already in evidence in the U.S. campaign against terrorist financing. Banks and other financial institutions have strong incentives to increase their filing of suspicious activity reports but lack the classified intelligence needed to target these reports. They have increased their reporting more than four-fold, leading to lapses in quality and an excessive focus on Islamic and Arab enterprises and foundations. A number of prominent banks are even said to have adopted “internal policies that require employees to refuse interaction with Islamic and

but ultimately did not lead to criminal charges against any al-Barakaat participants.35 There have also been dramatic raids against respected Muslim leaders, creating discontent and fear amongst the Muslim minority in the United States.36 Taken together, these tendencies feed into a general feeling that Muslims are being mistreated by the United States at home and abroad. Meanwhile, radical Islamist cells that operate on very small budgets, often obtained through legal means, generate very few financial clues to distinguish their transfers from ordinary economic transactions. This finding was underlined in reports on both 9/11 and the 2005 bombings in London. A forceful state reaction to counter terrorist organizations, although understandable given popular pressures, does not always result in effective policy.

Fortunately, financial regulations are only one policy option for countering terrorist financing. Spain and the United Kingdom have scored some of their major successes using other methods.

First, targeting passive state sponsorship (in which a state allows a terrorist organization to raise funds and conduct logistiWinter/Spring 2007 [ 7 5 ]

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cal tasks in its territory without interference) through diplomatic channels was of great importance in both cases. Crackdowns on IRA fundraising by the United States and on ETA operatives in southern France inflicted serious damage on these organizations, comparable to the loss incurred by the IRA when Libya cut its funding.37 Similarly, a majority of the money raised for al-Qaeda came from Saudi Arabia, where significant changes finally seem to be taking place–though this seems primarily due to repeated alQaeda attacks on Riyadh, rather than pressure from the United States or other governments.38 Second, despite having sophisticated financial networks that have eluded blanket regulations, both the IRA and ETA have proven vulnerable to targeted counter-terrorist attacks on their financing. In 1987 the United Kingdom managed to end Libya’s funding of the IRA by having two infiltrators betray a major shipment of arms from Tripoli.

Similarly, a change in the Spanish law governing political parties led to the ban on Herri Batasuna in 2003 and significantly lowered the operational capacities of ETA at the time.39 None of these measures depended primarily on financial warfare techniques, but rather on “human intelligence” and a changed political approach.

Third, organizations that rely on external financiers are also dependent on the financier’s approval of their operational activities; both the IRA and ETA lost significant support after misguided operations. In this regard, al-Qaeda seems to have suffered some setbacks due to the attacks in Riyadh in November 2003 and April 2004.40 Other unpopular attacks—such as the Istanbul bombings that mainly killed Muslims in November [ 7 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

2003, attacks against wedding parties in Jordan, and other attacks against co-religionists in Iraq—may possibly be used to drive a wedge between al-Qaeda and its financiers. The potential of this tactic is exemplified by the behaviour of Louia Sakka, the suspected brain behind the Istanbul bombings, who felt obliged to shout during his trial that a subsequent attack (thwarted by Turkish security services) had been intended to target an Israeli cruise ship, not Turks.41 Fourth, issues surrounding financing have sown conflict within terrorist organizations, particularly if elements within the group are suspected of misappropriating funds. Promoting this type of internal strife, however difficult a proposition, might be a potential instrument that counter-terrorist entities could use to undermine the unity and cohesion within terrorist groups.

To conclude, countering terrorist financing has not been and likely will not be the silver bullet that some senior U.S. policymakers seem to have hoped. Insurgencies, such as the neo-Taliban movement in Afghanistan, require significant funding. In that specific instance, the rampant drug trade is especially influential, and there is much that the United States and its allies could do to target the insurgency through curbing the drug trade. Terrorism, especially transnational terrorism, requires relatively insignificant resources. Regarding non-territorial terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, one leading expert states accurately that “attacking their funding may slow down these organizations, but it will not kill them.”42 The United States has scored some successes against al-Qaeda’s financial network. Several members of the original financial committee have been captured

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or killed, and al-Qaeda funding seems to have decreased substantially. Potential donors are having trouble connecting with operative cells, and Saudi Arabia— the origin of much of al-Qaeda’s earlier funding—is cracking down on terrorist financing.43 Unfortunately, the fact that both the Madrid and London bombings were essentially self-financed by the independent cells (through drug dealing and legitimate employment respectively) illustrates that it will be extremely difficult to eliminate funding to al-Qaeda and affiliated groups any time soon.44 Whereas countering terrorist financing may be an efficient tactic to limit al-Qaeda’s operative ability in the short run, undercutting the legitimacy of the organization and its affiliates remains the only feasible long-term strategy.

The modus operandi of radical

Conflict & Security

Islamist groups, characterized by small budgets, a decentralized network structure, local self-financing and alternative money transmittal systems or cash couriers, implies that financial regulations alone are not enough to cut off terrorist financing. The experiences of Spain and the United Kingdom indicate that a range of policies, including international intelligence cooperation, diplomatic pressure, human intelligence gathering, and public relations campaigns, can be as useful in countering terrorist financing as the currently favored financial regulations.

Acknowledgements: This article was written within the framework of a research project on organized crime and terrorism funded by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, for which the authors are grateful.

NOTES

1 Steve Kiser, “Financing Terrorism – An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting al-Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructure,” (doctoral thesis, Pardee Rand Graduate School, 2004), 31.

2 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘green card’–Financing the Provisional IRA, part 1” Terrorism and Political Violence (Summer 1999): 8-12; James Adams, The Financing of Terror: How the Groups That Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money To Do It (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 136.

3 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Norton Books, 2002), 23.

4 Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terrorist Networks (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2005), 38; William S. Shepard, “The ETA–Spain Fights Europe’s Last Active Terrorist Group” Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 2002): 54-68.

5 “Dos millones al ano del ‘impuesto,’” Diario Vasco, 9 July 2006.

6 Moloney, 242; Horgan and Taylor op. cit., 1013.

7 One notable exception to this general development took place in December 2004 when the IRA netted around $50 million from a single robbery.

Jokingly referred to as the IRA’s “pension fund,” the potential revenue from cases like this is considered worth the risk and the negative publicity. John

Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘green card’ – Financing the Provisional IRA, part II,” Terrorism and Political Violence (Summer 2003): 3-4.

8 Florencio Dominguez Ibarren, ETA, Estrategia Organizativa y Actuaciones, 1978-1992 (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1998),140141.

9 Ibid. and “Dos millones al ano del ‘impuesto,’”op. cit.

10 Moloney, op. cit., 101-107.

11 Paddy Woodworth, “The War Against Terrorism: The Spanish Experience from ETA to alQaeda” The International Journal of Iberian Studies, vol. 3 (2004): 169-182; Shepard, 60-61.

12 Horgan and Taylor (2003), 8-11.

13 “Los carteros de ETA,” El Correo, 2 July 2006; “El etarra Elosua tenia en Luxemburgo una fundacion para blanquear dinero”, ABC, 7 July 2006; “La Policia desmantela la red de extorsion que ETA empleaba desde hace 20 anos,” El Correo, 21 June 2006.

14 Independent Monitoring Commission, no. 10 (2006): 13-14.

15 See, for example, “Spotlight Turns to Slick IRA Money-making Machine,” The Guardian, 19 February 2005.

16 Mikel Busea, “Consecuencias Económicas del Terrorismo Nacionalista en el País Vasco,”

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Documento de Trabajo, Instituto de Analisis Industrial y Financiero (IAIF), Universidad Complutense de Madrid, no. 53 (January 2006): 1718.

17 “Garzon ordena detener a otros dos presuntos intermediarios de la red de extorsion de ETA,” El Correo, 12 July 2006.

18 See, for example, “Simpatizantes de la banda recaudan dinero en calles y comercios,” ABC, 21 August 2006.

19 Jane’s Intelligence Review, no. 11 (2001): 25; Svante E. Cornell, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics,” Orbis (2001): 31-46.

20 William Tupman, “Where Has all the Money Gone? The IRA as a Profit-making Concern,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 1, no. 4 (1998): 32-40; Horgan and Taylor (2003), 40-41; Peter Neumann, interview by Michael Jonsson and Svante Cornell, London, 24 May 2006.

21 Kiser (2004), 58; Jane’s Intelligence Review, no. 9 (2002): 28.

22 Andrew Silke, “Drinks, Drugs and Rock’n’Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland– Part Two,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 2 (2000): 114-115.

23 John Roth, et. al., 9/11 Commission Staff Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission (2004): 19.

24 Rohan Gunaratna, “Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 61, as quoted in Kiser (2004), 62.

25 Estimates of terrorist organizations’ budgets are notoriously imprecise, but the budgets of the IRA and ETA have usually been estimated at $10-25 million (cf. for example Busea (2006),17; Horgan and Taylor (1999), 9-10; and Kiser (2004), 51-52. The current budget of ETA is, however, probably significantly lower.

26 Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm– Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland– Part One,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 4 (1998): 334.

[ 7 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

27 Busea (2006), 31.

28 General Accounting Office, “Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the 9/11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center,” 29 May 2002, 9.

29 “Economic Cost of Attacks Estimated at £2 billion,” The Independent, 18 July 2005.

30 Moloney (2002), 411.

31 Bin Laden’s speech was aimed at the American public before the 2004 elections and broadcast by alJazeera, 1 November 2004. Internet, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm.

32 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press 2006), 270.

33 Christophwer Swift, “The Two Faces of Militant Islam,” Asia Times, 12 July 2006.

34 Laura K. Donohue, “Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States,” Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 27 (Winter 2006): 399, 407.

35 John Roth, et. al. (2004), 81, 86.

36 Nancy Dunne, “U.S. Muslims See Their American Dreams Die: Since September 11 the Community Has Felt Threatened,” Financial Times, 28 March 2002.

37 See, for example, “Bombings in Spain Are Seen as a Sign of Basque Group’s Decline, Not Strength,” New York Times, 20 December 2004.

38 Council on Foreign Relations, “Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing,” Second Independent Task Force Report (2004): 5.

39 Moloney (2002); Busea (2006), 18.

40 Council on Foreign Relations (2004), 3-5.

41 “Turkey Charges Syria in a Plot To Blow Up Israeli Cruise Ship,” New York Times 12 August 2005.

42 Loretta Napoleoni.

43 Council on Foreign Relations (2004): 3-5; Professor Peter Neumann (2006).

44 “La Comision de 11 de Marzo,” (2004, 2005), 114; “Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th of July 2005,” United Kingdom Home Office (2006): 23.

Culture&Society Rehearsing Revolution in Peru Jill Lane Augusto Boal, a well-known Brazilian theater director, enjoys telling the story about the relationship between theater and politics in Latin America. In the mid-1960s when the political climate was increasingly hostile to the work of artists, Boal and his theater company set off for rural communities where their left-wing theater might escape the scrutiny of the censors.

Avowed “revolutionaries,� the actors drew on the aesthetic and politics of an agitprop theater. Drawn in bold, minimalist strokes, their tale championed exploited farm workers and exhorted them to reclaim their dignity by taking immediate action against their landowners. On one occasion the audience of campesinos (peasants) invited the actors to stay for lunch.

Over the meal, the campesinos came to a heated decision: that very day, they decided to take their rifles and machetes and head up to the landowners’ hacienda (estate) to claim their rights. They shared their plan with Boal, asking the actors to bring their weapons and join them in the revolt. While artistworker solidarity and grassroots mobilization were principal intentions of the play, the actors were dumbfounded.

Blanched with fear, Boal explained that they had no weapons since, after all, they were just actors performing a play. Horrified by his own hypocrisy, Boal swore to never again present or advocate anything on stage that he himself could not support offstage. Theater itself was not a space to orchestrate revolu-

Jill Lane is the coeditor of The Ends of Performance and is on the advisory board of the Hemispheric Institute of Performance and Politics at New York University.

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tion, he decided, but it could be a space er.3 While the rebel leader Abimael in which to rehearse revolution—to imag- Guzmán Reinoso was captured in 1992, ine and practice possible forms of action Fujimori continued to beat the anti-terthat could instigate social change. The rorism drum, systematically repressing goal of his theater was to shift the tradi- any form of opposition. His public tional role of the audience: Viewers indictment due to human-rights violawould no tions and corlonger be ruption finally passive witled him to flee nesses of a into exile in never chang2000. ing storyline Agitated by on a distant the Manchay stage. Rather, Tiempo events, in the “Theartists and ater of the intellectuals in Oppressed”— Peru were as his art has confronted come to be Fig. 1. A woman displays a photo of a disappeared relative in Ayacucho, with chalk n o w n — t h e 1984. From the exhibit Yuyanapaq. (PHOTO: VERA LENTZ) lenges and spectators would be encouraged to deter- difficulties familiar to other countries mine how the plot unfolds, thus becom- with histories of dictatorships, state tering actors themselves.1 ror, and a battered civil society. As Gustavo Buntinx, a Peruvian artist and theoPolitical Theater in the After- rist, remarked, a true demise of illegitimath of Peru’s “Time of Fear.” mate political power lies in the slow conBoal’s notion of political rehearsal has struction of consensus in every sector of become a key feature of Peru’s political society: “There is a cultural overthrow as theater and is considered to be one of the important and decisive as the economic, most important artistic responses to the political and military ones.”4 During the brutal civil violence that plagued the war, spaces for public discussion and country from 1980 to 2000. Known to expression were replaced by a vast netmany as Manchay Tiempo—a Quechua- work of surveillance to control and Spanish equivalent to “the time of fear”— manipulate all media outlets. Hundreds this phase in Peru’s history witnessed the of trained national intelligence operaarmed conflict between the Marxist- tives infiltrated and surveyed offices, Maoist group Sendero Luminoso (the Shin- universities, and other public venues, ing Path) and the military led by Presi- and numerous surveillance cameras lined dent Alberto Fujimori.2 Civilians were the streets and plazas. After such represcaught in the crossfire between the rabid sion, how could artists encourage people millenarian violence of the Senderistas (for to trust and re-occupy those spaces as whom revolutionary goals implied their own stages for active citizenship?

Akin to the civilian populations of “crossing a river of blood”) on the one side and the wanton violence of the mil- Argentina during its “dirty war” and of itary “counter-insurgency” on the oth- Chile under Pinochet, many Peruvians [ 8 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

LANE

in the 1980s and 1990s found it easier to relinquish their agency as citizens than to run the risks associated with opposing a military state. In Argentina, many opted for a “careful blindness,” deciding it was safer not to see or recognize the reality of

Culture & Society

those who perished.

The members of the Colectivo Sociedad Civil, the curators of the photo exhibit Yuyanapaq, and the theater company Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani all apply Boal’s notion of “rehearsing revolution.” They use

Theater itself was not a space to orchestrate

revolution, he decided, but it could be a space in which to rehearse revolution. political and military violence despite its palpable presence.5 How could artists cure such a purposeful blindness?

By 2000 Peru’s history of political crimes and its toll of disappeared citizens demanded recognition and justice. Like Argentina and Guatemala, Peru opted for the institution of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to document and analyze the causes and consequences of the war. Among the commission’s staggering findings was the number of those who died in the war. Contrary to previous estimates of 30,000 casualties, the investigation revealed that over 69,000 Peruvians—many of whom were found in unmarked mass graves—had perished in the violence. If these numbers themselves were shocking, even more confounding was the fact that no one had been aware of them. “What does this say about our political community?” asked Commission President Salomon Lerner Febres.6 The careful blindness that characterized daily life under a climate of terror had indeed turned into a long-term, collective amnesia. Politically engaged artists and intellectuals were faced with the challenge of joining the mission of the TRC to bring back the memory of the dead to a population which had long denied the experience of

performance as a means to advocate, rehearse, and practice forms of experimental citizenship for and together with a population traumatized by a past of political oppression.

Colectivo Sociedad Civil: Lava la Bandera, 2000. As Fujimori’s

regime became increasingly authoritarian over the 1990s and a meaningful political opposition failed to emerge, a number of visual artists began to explore the possibilities that thea t e r offered to express t h e i r political v i e w s . Fig. 2. Lava la Bandera in Lima, Peru.

A r t i s t i c (PHOTO: CARETAS) opposition produced powerful symbols that could challenge and disturb the official imagery of the state.7 Peruvian artists were determined to expose the chronology of malfeasances committed by Fujimori and to thereby bring down the

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regime.

In 2000 the artists of the Colectivo Sociedad Civil became the pioneers of Peruv i a n grassroots political activism.

On 9 April 2000, Fig. 3. Members of the Army at the airport in the day Jauja, Junín, transfer coffins to Lima holdafter ing the remains of 62 alleged members of the MRTA. (PHOTO: ANIBAL SOLIMANO) Fujimori’s fraudulent re-election to a third term, a group of visual and theater artists decided to stage a massive “funeral” for democracy at the doors of the National 8

halls of government. With this gesture, the artists reclaimed the flag—and with it their nation—by symbolically washing away Fujimori’s dirty practices. The ritual gained a new political significance when Fujimori’s corruption was finally revealed by judicial investigation. Before long, the artists were joined by hundreds of citizens in this weekly “participatory ritual of national cleansing.” Soon, many municipal government buildings across the country, and even some Peruvian embassies abroad, were inundated with a widening sea of freshly laundered flags.10 When Fujimori fled into exile in November of 2000, Lava la Bandera was largely credited with having provided a decisive structure to the civilian opposi-

After such repression, how could artists encourage people to trust and re-occupy those spaces as their own stages for active citizenship?

Electoral Office. The initiators filled the streets with thousands of crosses and candles, and laid to rest a large coffin at the feet of the Palace of Justice. Members of Lima’s artistic elite were among those present. The actors’ decision to participate as a collective entity signaled their commitment to “go beyond individual artistic vocation to prioritize the reconstitution, both factual and symbolic, of usurped citizenship.”9 Weeks later, the Colectivo Sociedad Civil returned to the streets. What started as a modest performance soon turned into a large-scale political event titled Lava la Bandera (Wash the Flag). They washed the Peruvian flag and hung it to dry in the Plaza Mayor, right outside the primary [ 8 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tion. Like Boal’s “Theater of the Oppressed,” their performances offered a context in which an otherwise passive public—the audience of Fujimori’s statecontrolled television or of the regimetouting radio— c o u l d Fig. 4. Original photo: Oscar Medrano, stage a Caretas Magazine Archive. Vilcashuman, revolu- Ayacucho, August 1982. (PHOTO: JILL LANE) tion. Minister Vladimir Montesinos called Lava la Bandiera “a cancer.”11 Washing the flag before the halls of

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Culture & Society

government meant rehearsing active parThe images of Yuyanapaq: Para Recordar, ticipation in public affairs in a setting such as figure 1, in which a woman cups where such performance had been rigor- her hands around the photo of her disously denied. Yuyanapaq: Para Recordar and appeared relative from Ayacucho in Sin Título: Técnica Mixta similarly represent 1984, serve as a testimony to lives lived the nation in such and lost, a spatial terms, but memorial for the dramaturgy those whose has changed. deaths were never These later prohonored, and a ductions focus on tenuous offer for the internal a future reconcilcoherence—or iation. The social lack thereof—of significance of the citizenry this photographic itself. If Lava la Fig. 5. A classroom at the University of San Marcos, in documentary lies Bandera rallied the Ayacucho, February 1989. (PHOTO: JAIME RÁZURI) in the fact that, as people to take up their role as citizens, the TRC stated, “[the] images don’t these productions ask those same citizens change, but the eyes that see them do.” to account for their failure to act in the Yet the setting is of no lesser imporlong years that preceded the return of tance: the exhibit is housed in a dilapidemocracy. dated Lima villa overlooking the Pacific.

Photographs paper walls without ceilings, Yuyanapaq: To Remember. Dur- hang above partially-tiled, sand-covered ing the course of its two-year process of floors, or sometimes replace walls or investigation, the TRC gathered a vast windows. Each missing wall or floor photographic archive to “document the seems to recall the absent memories of so sad legacy of the era of fear” culled from many Limeños (Limeans), who chose not public and private collections of over to act when they could have. One of the eighty newspapers, the army, police, very first images encountered by the pubchurches, human rights organizations, lic (figure 4) is enlarged to cover the and families. Of the 1,700-item image entire wall of a room missing the floor bank, the commission selected 200 pho- and the ceiling: it pictures a man carefultographs for Yuyanapaq: Para Recordar ly rolling up a portrait of elected Presi(Quechua and Spanish for “To Remem- dent Fernando Belaúnde. The picture ber”), an exhibition organized around a was taken in the ruins of the Town Hall of series of key events or areas of focus stud- Vilcashuman, Ayachucho in August 1982 ied by the TRC.13 After the presentation after an attack by Sendero Luminoso. The of the TRC’s final report in August image captures the symbolic end of civil 2003, the exhibit was set to travel society: the man rolls up the President’s throughout the country, particularly to image as the social infrastructure that those towns and cities that most suffered elected him is violently put under siege. human rights abuses. It was The man seems to mourn the “fallen” later installed in Lima, where it remained President as he folds away his image. Yet, at the same time, his careful retrieval of through 2004.

12

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REHEARSING REVOLUTION IN PERU

the image from the rubble implies a continued commitment to civil society in the face of brutal, arbitrary violence. Spectators are challenged to relate themselves to these images and the history they document. Like the man in the image before them, they stand in a ruined building, filled with debris created by acts of violence.

They too will have to choose whether and what to salvage from the ruins.

T h e ruined Fig. 6. Yuyanapaq exhibit, Lima, Peru. c o l o n i a l (PHOTO: JILL LANE) house in Lima can also be seen as a metaphor for the Peruvian nation. Yet the spatial setting of Yuyanapaq does not reproduce the textbook version of Peruvian geography, which neatly divides the nation into three regions—the European urban coast, the Amazon jungle, and the mountainous Andes. It was, in fact, the acceptance of this traditional division which allowed the relatively wealthier, white Peruvians of the coast to turn their heads away from the atrocities taking place among the country’s indigenous communities.

“Rehearsing” national memory in this case aims at prompting urban elites like the Limeños to turn from historically and spatially distant bystanders into a present and active public. The point of Yuyanapaq is not so much to teach what “really” happened, but rather to help the public recognize its own purposeful amnesia as a harmful, collective loss.

[ 8 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Sin Título: Técnica Mixta. Creat-

ed in 2004, Sin Título: Técnica Mixta (Untitled: Mixed Media) is another performance that reflects on the crisis of social memory. This theatrical representation rejects a clear narrative line as a metaphor for the difficulty faced by the Peruvian body politic in creating national memory of the Manchay Tiempo.

The setting of Sin Título is an empty room meant to be the empty warehouse where Peru might store its valuable objects before organizing and assembling them in a national museum. Sin Título, then, is a museum of the museum, a space in which pieces and shards of memory are stored before the selection process of national memory has effectively begun. These are fragments of memory that—like the snapshot tenderly cupped in the woman’s hands in Yuyanapaq—beg to be seen and held for future safekeeping.

The spectator of Sin Título then enters a disorganized museum: images, objects, puppets, and live bodies are scattered all around him. There is no seating area, clear itinerary, or map to guide the visitor from one installation to the next, nor any form of notation to explain to him the meaning behind what he sees.

Instead, these fragmented testimonies of 120 years of history are animated and juxtaposed through performance. To achieve this, the company built large platforms on wheels that could move the various episodes through the space. In the spirit of active citizenship, audiences are invited—or sometimes even required—to help the actors bring order to Peru’s “disorderly” history.

Conclusion. Sin Título treats memory like an atrophied muscle that needs a particular exercise—a rehearsal—in order

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to rebuild its strength. Like Lava la Bandera, the play Sin Título and the exhibit Yuyanapaq, prompt the public to take action. These works require the audience to take a stance—metaphorically but also literally — in order to be able to confront the past and present political crises of their nation.

In this sense, the artists’ message is relevant not only for those countries that share with Peru a common past of authoritarianism, but also for consoli-

Culture & Society

dated democracies, like the United States, that have recently been confronted by global terrorist threats. Peru is an important example of the negative effects that collective fear might have on the active role of the citizenry.

Peru, however, also serves as an important testimony to the significant or even essential role artists can play in safeguarding a space to practice and rehearse the values of a healthy citizenship.

NOTES

1 For comprehensive studies of this war, see Steve Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique, Peru: Time of Fear (London: Latin America Bureau, 1992). On the rise of Sendero Luminoso see Carlos Ivan Degregori, Ayacucho, 1969–1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso (Lima: IEP, 1990).

2 Ibid.

3 Abimael Guzmán, quoted in Gustavo Gorriti, “The Quota,” in The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics, (1995), 324.

4 Gustavo Buntinx, “Lava la bandera: El Colectivo Sociedad Civil y el derrocamiento cultural de la dictadura en el Perú,” E-misférica: The Journal of the Hemisferic Institute of Performance and Politics 3:1, (2006).

5 Diana Taylor, Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s “Dirty War” (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 119–125.

6 From the Final Report of theTruth and Reconciliation Commission, Internet, http://www.cver-

dad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/index.php 7 See Victor Vich, “Desobediencia simbólica: Performance, participación y política al final de la dictadura fujimorista,” E-misférica: The Journal of the Hemisferic Institute of Performance and Polics 1:1 (2004), Internet, http://hemi.nyu.edu/journal/1_1/vich.html.

8 Photo: Anibal Solimano, Reuters, reproduced in Yuyanapaq: para recorder. Relato visual del conflicto armado en el Perú, 1980-2000, (Lima, Perú: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003).

9 Buntinx, op. cit.

10 Ibid.

11 Cited in Buntinx, op. cit.

12 Photo: Jaime Rázuri, reproduced in Yuyanapaq: para recorder. Relato visual del conflicto armado en el Perú, 19802000, op. cit.

13 Information about Yuyanapaq: Para Recordar can be found on the website of the Comisión de Verdad y Reconcialición, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/, and in a related publication, Yuyanpaq: Para Recordar. Relato visual del conflicto armado en el Perú, 1980-2000, op. cit.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 8 5 ]

Culture & Society

From Bread Dolls to Prostitutes A Cultural Diagnosis of Post-Soviet Russia Slobodanka M. Vladiv-Glover Postmodernism is a peculiar label. It is not a chronological concept in that “post” does not designate something that comes after a period called “Modernism.” If “post” means anything at all, it signifies the “end of history” or “poste histoire,” which implies the demise of linear thinking about history as progress and human development as proceeding along a continuum.1 In fact, postmodernism is an umbrella term encompassing the thinking about culture in a post-industrial, heterogeneous consumer society, which has been described by the American critic Frederic Jameson as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.”2 Though it was not given a name at the time, Russian postmodernism emerged in the 1960s as a challenge to the stagnant and closed nature of Soviet society.3 It was the first manifestation of genuine cultural criticism since 1934, when socialist realism became the dominant method of cultural production in the Soviet Union, stifling all other approaches to cultural disciplines. In the wake of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost’ in the 1980s, postmodernism became the cultural paradigm of new Russia. Ultimately, postmodernism emerged not only as a cultural critique but also as a source of a new, postcommunist value system in Russia.

Slobodanka M. Vladiv-Glover is associate professor of Slavic, Comparative Literature, and Cultural Studies in Monash University, Australia. She is the co-author of Russian Postmodernism: New Perspectives on Post-Soviet Culture.

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The Development of Russian modernism came to play an increasingly Postmodernism. When postmod- important role in Russian society by fos-

ernism emerged as a recognisable cultural phenomenon in the West, spearheaded

by American pop art in the 1950s, Russia was still a totalitarian command economy.

However, immediately following Nikita Khrushchev’s ascent to party leadership and the commencement of de-Stalinization in 1954, Soviet Russian culture underwent its first thaw. This led to a relaxation of censorship and weakening of the official cultural policy’s grip in all spheres of cultural production. Yet the majority of new works either remained unpublished or were circulated only in typewritten manuscript copies. This muted and repressed form of Russian postmodernism, which remained in existence throughout the 1960s and the Brezhnev years of zastoi (stagnation), criticized the Soviet regime, signalling a return to the interrupted Russian culture of the 1920s that had radically questioned the Soviet ideology and value system.

In the mid-1980s, Russian postmodernism emerged from the underground to become what seemed like an overnight phenomenon, representing and at the same time addressing the society of contemporary Russia. Life in de facto exSoviet society (de jure after 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union) had at last caught up with art. The heterogeneity of postmodernism was now reflected in the fractured social fabric of the former Soviet monolith. In post-Soviet society, social heterogeneity was purchased at a high price: old Soviet institutions and support systems crumbled and the new society turned toward the capitalist United States as the new social model.4

Postmodernism as a Cultural Critique. Throughout the 1990s post[ 8 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tering cultural diversity in the public domain and by enabling an ever increasing number of voices—artistic and academic—to engage in open dialogue about Russia’s past and present. Despite the high human cost of Russia’s transition into a capitalist system, which still lacks the sophisticated social support structures of advanced Western societies, postmodern culture has touched Russian society en masse.

The spread of postmodernism is manifested in contemporary Russian mass media culture, offering the Russian public new television entertainment programs, popular sitcoms, and soap operas along Western lines. Popular entertainment genres like the detective novel and the blockbuster movie also form part of Russia’s new mass culture. But literary and cinematic works reminiscent of the classical culture of the nineteenth century or the avant-garde of the 1920s are also making their mark in Russian postmodernism. Young writers and cinema directors are emerging with sophisticated analyses of Russia’s Soviet heritage, the impact of the change of values on the country’s future, and the question of the survival of the postmodern cultural values of Western civilization as a whole.

Vladimir Sorokin. One of the most high-profile critics of post-Soviet Russia is the writer Vladimir Sorokin, a founding father of the “post-avant-garde,” as Russian postmodernism has been called from its more mature phase of the 1980s and onwards. Sorokin’s 1992 novel, Serdtsia chetirekh (Four Stout Hearts) is a “potboiler” about the conflict between morality and human desire, its plot involving self-mutilation, violence, excremental

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practices and explicit language.5 The post-Soviet public sensibility was scandalised by Sorokin’s literary subjects, which transgress all taboos. Because the programmatically transgressive works of European and Russian Modernism (1880s to 1930s) remained unavailable to the Russian public during the puritanical years of Soviet censorship (1930s to the 1980s), contemporary Russian society remains largely coy in its artistic taste. It is unable to handle Russian postmodernism’s more extreme challenges to the inherited Soviet values of beauty and truth which used to sugar-coat the harsh reality of the Soviet years through projections of a workers’ utopia of monumental artistic proportions. Sorokin does not

Culture & Society

places. Postmodernism in Russia has thus turned the new Russian society into “a culture of spectacle” similar to its Western counterpart, signalling that public taste is shaped by the lure of the successful “brand” rather than by an ideology imposed by Big Brother.6

Sorokin’s Four. In his latest film

script Four (2004), Sorokin confronted serious issues in post-Soviet Russian society by exploring the theme of human cloning.7 The film presents Marina, a beautiful twenty-something-year-old Muscovite, who journeys back to her native village near Saratov—the heartland of Russian folk culture—to attend her sister’s funeral. Marina ultimately becomes

The prostitute is perennially the carrier of an ethical attitude in Russian literature. avoid the reality of post-Soviet, capitalist Russia. With his transgressive subjects, he critiques ideological language, liberating it from the clichés of socialist realism and clearing the space for new meanings to be constructed in the future.

While appearing to emulate the writing of Tolstoy and Turgenev, Sorokin’s novels Roman and Norma, among others, are clever deconstructions of the culture that emerged from nineteenth-century Russian Realism. They literally bring the Russian grand narrative to a stop. From postmodern literature, Sorokin has graduated to new postmodern mediums of expression: film scripts and opera libretti. These reflect the general move of Russian postmodernism from book genres consumed in private to mass media genres consumed collectively in public

a part of a successful cloning experiment dating back to the late Soviet era on the eve of perestroika. Her village, where the four sisters originally resided, symbolizes post-Soviet Russian culture, exposing the destruction of Russian cultural memory and national identity, traditionally associated with Russian peasants.

Four is a sobering analysis of Russian social and cultural life in the early twenty-first century. Its themes are couched in a simple plot, in which the heroine Marina, a prostitute, meets various people on her journey. Like Marina, the other characters exemplify the legacy of the old Soviet social structure in its “new Russian” mutation. Marina and her sisters are not the only “mutants” in the plot. A piano tuner and a black market mafia man represent the postmodern Winter/Spring 2007 [ 8 9 ]

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transformations of the Soviet artistic intelligentsia and the Kremlin bureaucracy, respectively. Mutation forms the central metaphor of the film’s narrative through which the present meets the past in a self-critical re-appraisal of where postmodern Russia is in the present and where it is going in the future. A major insight of the film is that postmodern Russia has adopted some extreme features of Western consumerism without being able to mitigate its soul-destroying influences. Postmodernism’s diagnosis points to the confusion of social mores which has resulted from the demise of traditional folk culture and community values. While postmodernism is not an

“new Russia” without a cultural memory to act as an ethical compass to the terra incognita of post-Soviet life.8 Sorokin’s film is a critique of the degeneracy of the Russian narod (country folk), who represent the remnants of the late Soviet kolkhoz (collective farm) system. The rural Russian village was the foundation of what the nineteenth-century intelligentsia called narodnost’—a quintessential Russian national identity. In Sorokin’s postmodern village, the perversion of the local community and its slide into inauthenticity and formlessness is captured by the image of the communal activity of chewing bread into material for the making of giant carnival dolls. What might be con-

Postmodern Russia has adopted some

extreme features of Western consumerism without being able to mitigate its souldestroying influences. ideology and thus does not offer prescriptions for the future development of Russian society, the inferences to be drawn from postmodernism as cultural critique is that respect for national history (as opposed to crude nationalist ideology) and the restoration of cultural memory must be part of Russia’s cultural renaissance in a global capitalist world.

ceived of as a pre-Soviet, traditional Russian community is here represented by a grotesque devaluation of traditional artifacts and peasant labor. Instead of producing viable commodities (productivity was promoted particularly during the Soviet era as official policy but hid the grim reality of a failed centralized economy), the women in Marina’s village are engaged in the fabrication of bread dolls.

The Degeneracy of the Russian While it is difficult to see how this susVillage and Atrophy of Cultural tains the “new Russian” village economiMemory. The young prostitute’s jour- cally, there are obvious signs of prosperney to her native village provides a ity, reflecting the penetration of capitalglimpse into Russia’s new city and coun- ism into the depths of postmodern Rustry life. What this postmodern film por- sia. One of the peasant women has a new trays as a harsh reality is not the “new fur coat, all of the peasants eat well and Russia” with its capitalist system but Rus- drink vodka in great quantities, and all sia’s Soviet heritage, which has left the are housed in the communal hut with [ 9 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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adequate heating.

The bread dolls as a product of the village economy are a parody on peasant labor and productivity. They remind the Russian film audience of another parody, that of Nikolai Gogol’s novel Dead Souls, in which nineteenth-century Russia was represented as land whose economy ran on speculators (buying “dead souls” as phantom stocks in a phantom economy) and unproductive landowners.

Sorokin’s “new Russia” is similarly a phantom economy which runs on its own version of “dead souls”—an invisible, grotesque system of exchange powered by a “degenerate” populace reduced to basic instincts and deprived of dignity by an almost total black-out of cultural memory.

Sorokin’s Four paints a dark picture of Russia. The ugly post-industrial landscape alternates with images of neatly ploughed fields, sown with lush green grass—indicating the potential of the vast Russian lands for growth and development. However, while the natural potential is there, the Russian narod, who should have been the bearers of a Russian national ethos, are represented as a race of rogues, whose memory of their own national heritage has been erased by the kolkhoz mentality. Even the half-remembered, haphazardly performed funeral rituals and the traditional funeral banquet degenerate into virtual cannibalism and lewd carousing by an unsightly group of older Russian peasant women. The film concludes that there is no peasant culture left in Russia—the traditional peasant huts are in disrepair and the old village churches are in ruins. Vodka remains the only feature that creates some form of continuity between the “old” and the “new” in the Russian countryside.

Culture & Society

The Ethical Prostitute and the Cloning Metaphor. In this setting,

Marina represents a curious phenomenon. She is not degenerate, despite her profession. She is in fact ethical, as is the Russian youth in general, which include Marina’s sisters and her co-workers. The prostitute is perennially the carrier of an ethical attitude in Russian literature, from Dostoevsky’s Sonia Marmeladova to heroines in several “new Russian” novels, including Sorokin’s own Tridsataia liubov’ Mariny (Marina’s Thirtieth Love) and Viktor Erofeev’s Russkaia krasavitsa (Russian Beauty).

The difference is that in postmodern Russia, the prostitute is not an accursed outsider: Marina is a part of a new exchange economy, in which everything is legitimately for sale. While appearing to be the embodiment of a cloning experiment of the 1970s, invoked as a joke by the piano tuner, Marina and her three sisters (the “four”) constitute a multi-layered metaphor. On the one hand, they represent the culmination of seventy years of Soviet scientific social experimentation, focused on fashioning a new Soviet man and woman. The social engineering of the Soviet years ranged from forced collectivization to forced relocation of entire peoples (like the Kazakhs) into new homelands, as well as the eradication of false consciousness in the Soviet citizenry by way of political and cultural purges which were at their height between 1928 and World War II. However, since this Soviet experiment produced nothing but a stagnant culture, whose official productions in the 1970s appeared infantile to the Western observers, the piano tuner’s joke is in fact the truth: the Soviet experiment was a failure. The robust beauty of the siblings is more the product of the present social conditions of freedom and prosperity Winter/Spring 2007 [ 9 1 ]

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than of any defunct Soviet past.

While one side of the cloning metaphor represents a link to the Soviet past, the other side relates to Russia’s present and makes predictions about the future. The symbolism of the “four” sisters, as opposed to three or a pair of siblings, points to the concept of the multiple as an organizing structure, as distinct from a ternary or binary principle. In postmodern cultural theory, the multiple is identified as the organizing principle of all social formations. Thus the multiple, with its endless permutations and repetitions, grounds the heterogeneous

bread doll industry. Even in death, she directs the community’s productive labor as an absent presence. As an entrepreneur with mythical proportions, the dead sister also elicits ethical action on the part of Marina, who cancels a lucrative appointment with a client in order to attend her sister’s funeral. Thus the new myth of private entrepreneurship constitutes, according to Sorokin’s analysis, the ethics of postmodern Russian society.

The ultimate irony of the cloning metaphor of Sorokin’s film is that the Soviet experiment, accompanied by its gulag culture, lives on in post-Soviet

Vodka remains the only feature that

creates some form of continuity between the “old” and the “new” in the Russian countryside. structures of capitalist societies. As symbols of the multiple, Marina and her sisters carry the seed of a new community to come.9 This new community finds its ultimate bonding and ethical expression through commemoration of a dead sister. This indicates a radical change in the ethics of new Russian society. Instead of observing the traditional values of a social hierarchy headed by a father (for example a leader like Stalin, who was popularly called “Batiushka” or “Father”), Russia’s new civil society—at present still struggling against an archaic economy and social mores similar to those of Marina’s village—is prepared to honor “new gods” who are not gods at all. Marina’s dead sister represents this new approach to values as an act of personal engagement and enterprise. Marina’s dead sister remains the prime driver behind the village’s [ 9 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Russia. It is manifested through Russia’s unchanged totalitarian and unethical relation with its “other.” In the changed conditions of world politics, this “other” is no longer the West as it was during the Cold War. Western market economies are models which “new Russia” is emulating and into whose global practices it wishes to be integrated. But with regard to its Caucasian neighbors, Russia retains the mentality of an empire. This is made clear in Sorokin’s film through allusions to Russia’s war with its trans-Caucasian south.

The Prostitute as Symbol of “new Russian” Capitalism.

Marina’s profession shows that private enterprise is the new Russian social paradigm. Marina’s return to city life is symbolized by her donning of fashionable,

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expensive-looking high boots, once the trademark of the lowly prostitute. However, this prostitute is not a social outcast.

Marina is the symbol of the “new Russian” capitalist society, whose ethical compass points in the direction of the rural past in which the majority of Soviet folk were either living on the land or had come from the land since the revolution.

However, this rural Russia of the prerevolutionary forefathers no longer has anything to offer the younger generation of “new Russians.” Marina returns to the city to continue her trade in an honest and ethical manner—by being professional and disengaged, just as she was in the opening scene of the film following a night with clients. Sorokin’s film does not advocate a return to the past. Such a return would lead to nostalgia of the kind practiced by ultra-nationalist sub-culture groups, such as the radical proKremlin youth organization Nashi (“Ours”), or the even more marginal old communists. But the way into the future, according to Sorokin’s film, is also not optimistic. What “new Russia” has to offer its younger generation by way of opportunities are various forms of prostitution or bondage in a lawless environment, despite the outward structure of a free pluralist society. For example, the army seeks recruits amongst the prison population to run Russia’s post-colonial wars, including the war with Chechnya.

The pianist-turned-piano-tuner is arrested on a trumped-up charge and press-ganged into the army. The arbitrary arrest of the piano tuner is an example of the violence that can be unleashed against Russian citizens in the “new Russia.”

This unethical contemporary “new Russia” is the dangerous historical context of “young Russia.” The latter is sym-

Culture & Society

bolized by the well-formed and resilient young female heroine, reminiscent of the nineteenth century peasant ideal of beauty, and embodied here by the wellendowed “new Russian” girl. While this buxom, sexually active Russian beauty is the epitome of the “new Russian” desire—the desire for capitalist prosperity and the market economy (symbolically evoked in Marina’s imagined career in advertising)—the reality of the historical situation of the “new Russian” capitalism is the restricted economy of a shadowy underworld of dealing and wheeling, which has the potential of becoming a fiasco as social experiment, just like the Soviet one, through its excesses of consumerism.

Conclusion. Postmodernism performs

an essential function by enabling a critical self-appraisal by post-Soviet Russia, a society in flux; postmodernism’s cultural production provides Russian society with a critique of its past and present. The fact that a postmodern cultural critique exists and is accessible to all parts of Russian society through the mass media and popular culture is a good sign. It augurs well for the possibility of future reforms in Russia’s social and political life. What Sorokin’s film diagnoses are conditions in Russian society in its present historical moment. The overall effect of such critical self-appraisals, offered today in many examples of contemporary Russian high and low culture—e.g. in film and detective novels—is somehow breathtaking.

One wants to read on in order to see how this “new Russia” speaks, thinks, and breathes, and how it constructs a new reality through its own modern mass idiom and its new social role models.

Being a part of the global culture industry, Russian postmodernism is Winter/Spring 2007 [ 9 3 ]

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worthy of institutional and financial support. This can be implemented through participation in international prizes for art, literature and cinema, or allocation of scholarships for writers, directors, and artists in residence in American and other Western institutions. An emphasis on the development of cultural exchange programs would also help the civilizing

mission of Russian postmodernism.

While this mission is not a guarantee of the country’s future as a stable democracy and capitalist economy, it is an integral part of the checks and balances that a society develops through self-criticism and self-reflection. Russian postmodernism, understood as cultural critique, is thus an indicator of a healthy civil society.

NOTES

1 This phrase was popularized in Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992), which relies on Hegel’s philosophy of history, according to which the “spirit” (discourse) of Western Man entered a new epoch around 1800, transforming all past concepts of history, culture, and human identity.

2 Frederic Jameson, “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” New Left Review 146 (1984): 53-92.

3 Compare Vail and Genis’ analysis of the opening up of Russian society under the influence of American literature, in particular the prose of Ernest Hemingway, translated and published in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, in Pyetr Vail and Alexander Genis, “Strana slov:opyt sotsial’noi istorii 60-ikh gg” (The Country of Words: An Attempt at Social History of the 1960s), Novy mir 4 (1991): 239-51.

4 The old cultural organisations, like the Union of Soviet Writers, immediately lost their relevance.

Literature, art, and film came under the dominion of the market where they have remained ever since. This fact, in the short term, spelt the end of Russian literature as it was known through its nineteenth and twentieth century canons. All literary forms were up for renegotiation and experiment. An avalanche of new writing hit the literary market, albeit in much smaller print runs than were known during the Soviet era of Russian literature. To succeed, a “new” Russian writer also had to be published abroad, in translation. Only a few made it into the international book market in the 1990s, among them Tatiana Tolstaya, Vladimir Sorokin, and, to a lesser extent, Lyudmila Petrushevskaya. Even the Russian Booker Prize was not a guarantee of commercial success abroad nor was the Booker a watershed for the “best” postmodern writers since the Booker juries tended to have conservative literary tastes. Nevertheless, many young writers did receive the Small Booker repeatedly, notably Ludmila Ulitskaya.

5 Sorokin was one of the finalists for the 1992

[ 9 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Booker Prize but lost to his more conservative contemporary, Mark Kharitonov, whose fairly conventional novel Lines of Fate: Milashevich’s Trunk was the winning entry.

Four Stout Hearts was first published in Zurich’s Haffman Verlag, in 1993, under the title Die Herzen der Vier. It was published in Moscow only in 1994. Sorokin’s earlier novel, Marina’s Thiertieth Love, was also published in German as Marinas dreissigste Liebe (Zurich, 1991) and in French (1987, Paris, Lieu Commun) as La trantième amour de Marina.

6 Compare the analysis of Western societies as societies dominated by the need for public spectacle, in Guy Debord, Society of Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red, 1983).

7 The film was directed by Ilya Khrzhanovsky.

8 The diagnosis about the loss of cultural memory made by Sorokin in his film Four is confirmed in a recent academic study by the American Slavist, Laura J. Olson (University of Colorado, Boulder). Her monograph, entitled Performing Russia: Folk Revival and Russian Identity (New York and London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), finds repeated evidence of the absence of knowledge of folk customs and ritual songs, such as Christmas carols among Russian village people.

9 Compare Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi. (Minneapolis, London, 1987), 21. Multiplicity underlies a sense formation which is distinctfrom metaphor. Deleuze and Guattari call this formation “the rhizome.” “Unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point…It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency The rhizome is an a-centred, non-hierarchical, no-signifying system, defined solely by a circulation of states.” Multiplicity which engenders its atypical trope (the rhizome) underlies a free and multidimensional circulation of meanings. It provides an ideal model of the free market as a space of self-regulated exchange.

Law&Ethics

Defying Double Discrimination Peter Blanck, Meera Adya, and Maria Veronica Reina Women and girls are reported to be the largest group in the global disability population, and they have been historically subject to multiple types of discrimination. This article examines the 2006 UN Disability Convention aimed at protecting the rights of all people with disabilities, and in particular, its implications and specific provisions addressing the rights of women and girls. The convention stemmed from efforts initiated in 2001 when the General Assembly created an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to consider the need for a disability convention.1 Concurrently, a “Disability Caucus” comprised of representatives of the disability community from various allied non-governmental organizations formed and began interacting with the AHC; together, their work led to the 2006 UN Disability Convention.2 Although reliable world statistics are unavailable, the World Heath Organization (WHO) estimates that 300 million women and girls worldwide have some kind of disability.3 Research also demonstrates that women and girls with disabilities (hereinafter referred to as “women”) face double discrimination compared to men, since the prejudice they face is

Peter Blanck is a professor at Syracuse University and chair of the Burton Blatt Institute. This research was funded in part by grants from the Center for International Rehabilitation and from the U.S. Department of Education, National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research.

Meera Adya is director of research at the Burton Blatt Institute and affiliated faculty with the Department of Psychology at Syracuse University.

Maria Veronica Reina is a senior research associate at the Burton Blatt Institute .

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 9 5 ]

DEFYING DOUBLE DISCRIMINATION

based not only on their disability but also their gender.4 Women face this disparity in terms of a lack of access to equal education, health care, and employment, to name a few areas. Moreover, women with disabilities are among the world’s poorest.5 To eliminate discrimination against women, the UN and individual states acknowledge that immediate obligations and concrete measures are necessary. In the past, when national governments did not take steps necessary to implement antidiscrimination standards in domestic legislation and practices, international standards and commitments have served as catalysts for progress and change. To date, however, there are no binding UN agreements or treaties solely referring to the rights of women with disabilities.

Indeed, gender-neutral treaties have not fostered the implementation of measures that prevent discrimination against women with disabilities. Women with disabilities are largely neglected in the monitoring of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).6

advocated what was dubbed the "twin track approach.�7 Civil society members at the AHC meetings urged that the stand-alone article was necessary to raise attention for women with disabilities, but that this alone was not sufficient. They argued that such a convention should be complimented by a gender perspective throughout the document.8 The twin-track approach succeeded, and both perspectives were included in the final draft of the convention, agreed upon at the last session of the eighth AHC on 25 August 2006. The final draft of the convention incorporates both the specific article and gender mainstreaming throughout the convention.9

Article 6. During the negotiations at

the third AHC meeting, South Korea introduced a proposal that would require including issues affecting women with disabilities into laws and data collection to ensure special consideration of their unique situation. Paragraphs 15(bis)(c), (d), and (e) focused on protection of motherhood, right to work, sexual exploitation, abuse, and violence.

Kenya presented a similar proposal UN Disability Convention Proceedings. In 2004 Korea introduced a during the sixth AHC meeting.10 Other proposal for the insertion of a new arti- states and civil society organizations supcle related to disability in the prospective ported a stand-alone article to protect UN Disability Convention during the the rights of women with disabilities.11 third Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) meet- There are three core reasons for their ing. This proposal was fiercely debated, support of a stand-alone article:12 and discussions concentrated on whether and how to introduce issues of disabled 1. Visibility for Women’s Issues: Women with women and a gender perspective into the disabilities suffer from double discriminew convention. Perspectives varied from nation, but they are also often alienated establishing a specific article addressing at the social and legal levels. Women with discrimination against women with dis- disabilities have remained invisible in abilities to mainstreaming gender legislative and policy efforts at national throughout the convention. and international levels, without incluThe International Disability Caucus sion in the disability discourse or the [ 9 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

BLANCK, ADYA & REINA

women’s rights arena.13 A separate article on the rights of women with disabilities would be a key element in highlighting their special circumstances and the disadvantages they face as a group.

Law & Ethics

taken.14 In July 1997 the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defined the concept of gender mainstreaming as follows:

"Mainstreaming a gender perspec2. Comprehensiveness: A stand-alone article tive is the process of assessing the would lead to the recognition of human implications for women and men of rights and fundamental freedoms for any planned action ... so that women with disabilities, as well as a conwomen and men benefit equally sideration of women’s issues in the con...[the] ultimate goal of mainvention. It would generate a higher prostreaming is to achieve gender file for women-specific issues, thus equality.”15 achieving de facto equality of women with disabilities.

According to the Office of the UN Special Advisor on Gender Issues and 3. Cross-responsibility: Full implementation Advancement of Women, mainstreaming of the convention for all people with dis- does not replace the need for targeted, abilities requires the active involvement women-specific policies and programs as of national agencies in charge of pro- well as positive legislation.16 During the moting gender equality. A separate arti- AHC’s discussions concerning the article

Women with disabilities suffer from

double discrimination, but they are also often alienated at the social and legal levels. cle would ensure this and also solidify commitment to issues involving women with disabilities in these institutions.

on women, several actors, including the European Union, disagreed and suggested the incorporation of gender criteria in different general provisions (i.e.

The position ultimately adopted by the mainstreaming) rather than in one single AHC combined both a stand-alone arti- article.17 The rationale for their opposicle as well as gender mainstreaming tion can be summarized as follows: throughought the entire treaty—the “twin-track approach.”

1. Higher visibility: Provisions in favor of women with disabilities in articles of speGender Mainstreaming in the cial importance might lead to greater UN Convention. Gender main- recognition of the issue by those authorstreaming has been endorsed by the Bei- ities responsible for the implementation jing Platform for Action to promote of a certain article. gendering all policies and programs so that an analysis is made of the effects on 2. Concentration on specific areas for disabled women and men before decisions are women may better ensure action: More specific Winter/Spring 2007 [ 9 7 ]

DEFYING DOUBLE DISCRIMINATION

obligations will be more effective in producing results than very general statements of the right to equality of women with disabilities.18 3. Avoiding the isolation of a single article: Mainstreaming gender aspects into several articles would avoid separating women’s issues from those addressed by the convention as a whole.19

issues needed to be addressed: the multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination women and girls suffer on the basis of various characteristics—for instance, sex and nationality; risk of violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, both inside and outside of the home; and the need to incorporate a gender perspective in all efforts to promote the rights of people with disabilities.20

Gendered Articles in the Disability Convention. At the final meeting Article 3—General Principles. As an innovation of the AHC, states decided to gender some other articles, as the specific obligations contained in these articles would yield more effective results than simply making a general statement of the right to equality of women with disabilities. The following convention sections specifically addressed gender or sex specificities in the final draft: Preamble. Keeping in mind that that the Preamble of the Disability Convention plays an important role in determining

founded on recent practices in international law, the AHC included specific principles to lay the foundation for the interpretation and implementation of the disability treaty. Auspiciously, among these principles there is a specific provision that addresses the issue of gender equality.21 Article 8—Awareness-Raising. Stereotypes affect all people with disabilities, but especially women, as is documented in several studies and reports.22 In respond-

The abuse of women with disabilities has been the subject of several investigations… it is a problem of epidemic proportions. the object and purpose of the treaty— although it does not establish binding obligations—it is very important that it cover all people with disabilities, including women.

Although many sections are genderneutral, the preamble contains three gendered paragraphs referring to some of the key issues surrounding women with disabilities. The following gendered [ 9 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ing to these stereotypes, Article 8 aims to change negative perceptions and social prejudices through effective measures promoting disability awareness. Particularly regarding gender differences, the states will undertake measures “to combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices relating to persons with disabilities, including those based on sex and age, in all areas of life.”23

BLANCK, ADYA & REINA

Article 16—Freedom from Exploitation, Violence, and Abuse. The abuse of women with disabilities has been the subject of several investigations, and there is no question that it is a problem of epidemic proportions that takes various forms.24 In particular, women with disabilities are subjected to forced sterilization, abortion, and genital mutilation.25 In the United States, for instance, 62 percent of women with disabilities experience emotional, physical, or sexual abuse at some point in their lives. This rate is similar to that for all women, but women with disabilities reported longer durations of abuse and more difficulty getting out of the abusive situation. Women with disabilities are more likely to experience emotional abuse by attendants, strangers, or health care providers in both private and public settings.26 Many of the provisions in Article 16 dealing with protection, assistance, prosecution, and rehabilitation in situations of exploitation are gender neutral. Considerations of this article regarding gender include all types of exploitation, violence, and abuse. As a general principle for all mainstreamed services, protections and recovery services should be required to include disability, gender, and age-sensitive criteria. It also makes the establishment of children- and women-focused legislation and policies mandatory.

Article 25—Health. For women with disabilities, health is a major issue that highlights their considerable disadvantage. In the United States, for example, medical expenses are four times greater for people with disabilities than for the non-disabled population. One of the serious problems among women with physical

Law & Ethics

disabilities is low economic status, which is associated with the lack of medical insurance and, consequently, the loss of access to medical care and health services.27 Moreover, women with disabilities often do not receive adequate specialized health services, particularly maternal and gynecological care. Health care providers may also assume that women with disabilities do not participate in sexual activities, so they neglect to screen them for sexually transmitted diseases or even perform a full pelvic exam.28 Forced sterilization and abortion are also discriminatory practices applied to women with disabilities.29 Article 25 contains a number of gender-neutral components designed to protect and promote the right to health for people with disabilities. Some key issues include the prohibition of discrimination by the state, the medical profession, or by insurance providers; equal access to facilities; and the provision of specialized facilities and services geared to the needs of disabled people.30 This article requires health, including rehabilitation services, to be gender sensitive. However, civil society and other stakeholders did not succeed in including the express mention of particular aspects of feminine health such as family-planning, pregnancy, childbirth, and the post-natal period. This would have been inclusive of women with disabilities and protected them against any form of coercive treatment, including sterilization and abortion.31 Article 28—Adequate Standard of Living and Social Protection. As reported by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Disability, even in countries with a relatively high standard of living, people with disabilities Winter/Spring 2007 [ 9 9 ]

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are often denied the opportunity to enjoy the full range of economic, social, and cultural rights.32 In particular, women with disabilities are more likely to be poor or to have a lower standard of living than men with disabilities.33 Provisions that cover all people with disabilities take into consideration several aspects related to their standard of living and social protection: the right of people with disabilities to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, the right of people with disabilities to social protection, and the enjoyment of those rights without discrimination on the basis of disability.

Now there is a section (Paragraph 2, subsection b) that contains specific reference to woman and girls with disabilities as particular recipients of social protection and poverty reduction programs.

Article 34—Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Monitoring procedures are absolutely necessary in order to ensure the effective implementation of a Disability Convention. As in other implementation provisions, articles related to monitoring should include specific mention of gender issues in order to reflect the complexity and specificity of the discrimination suffered by women with disabilities.34 Discussions on international monitoring were intense, with most countries arguing for a treaty-monitoring body, which was finally agreed upon and regulated in Article 34 of the Draft Convention. Such a body should include experts with disabilities, among other members, to consider country reports on measures taken and progress made to meet obligations under the present convention.

There was agreement on provisions establishing the consultation with spe[ 1 0 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

cialized agencies and other competent bodies, including the ones founded by international human rights treaties. The convention will not make the submission of communications and complaints by individuals and groups compulsory, but ratifying countries could sign an optional protocol and allow such submissions to report on alleged problems.35 In the article, there is one specific mention of gender in the section dealing with the eligibility of committee members which calls for balanced gender representation.36

Articles that are not Gender Specific. Some governmental repre-

sentatives and civil society groups present at the convention negotiations advocated for gender mainstreaming in other neutral articles.37 However, this effort failed due to a lack of consensus. The most significant articles mentioned include:

Article 23—Respect for Home and the Family. Family rights are especially neglected when it comes to women with disabilities. A woman is perceived as unable to perform the roles of wife, mother, and homemaker because of her disability. In particular, prejudices against women with disabilities include the belief that they are unable to become biological mothers and raise children, which leads to limited access to pregnancy and maternity services. Additionally, they may lose custody of their children in divorce or have their children removed from their care by social welfare agencies, solely because they have a disability.38 Family rights were passionately debated during the Disability Convention negotiations. Common provisions of Article 23 include: measures to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities in all matters relating to mar-

BLANCK, ADYA & REINA

riage, family, parenthood, and relationships. The draft article recognizes the rights and responsibilities of people with disabilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship, and adoption of children. Additionally, the draft article looks to prevent concealment, abandonment, neglect, and segregation of children with disabilities, as well as to provide early and comprehensive information, services and support, and when needed, alternative care, to children with disabilities and their families.39 The inclusion of gender-specific provisions for a disability treaty would have guaranteed women with disabilities equal enjoyment of family rights and would have established gender-sensitive measures to enable women with disabilities to exercise their roles as wife, mother, and homemaker.40 Article 24—Education. Women with disabili-

Law & Ethics

and cultural patterns of conduct among men and women.42 In addition, a successful gendering of the article should have ensured that women and girls with disabilities are able to access and enjoy education on an equal basis and in a violence-free environment.43 Article 26—Habilitation and Rehabilitation.

Women with disabilities experience indirect discrimination in several areas of habilitation and rehabilitation.44 In 1996, for example, it was determined that in the United States fewer women received vocational rehabilitation services than men.45 The different provisions grouped in Article 26 require states to provide people with disabilities the tools needed to attain their maximum independence as well as physical, mental, social, and vocational ability and full inclusion in all aspects of life. According to women with

Forced sterilization and abortion are

also discriminatory practices applied to women with disabilities. ties do not enjoy the same right to education as other women. Studies conducted in the United States have demonstrated that women with disabilities have lower educational attainment than other women and men with disabilities.41 Article 24 includes provisions to ensure all students with disabilities enjoy the right to education on the basis of equality and non-discrimination. Disabled people's organizations at the AHC advocated for the inclusion of provisions that require gender-sensitive education at all levels so as to not perpetuate social

disabilities groups, an international treaty that protects the rights of men and women with disabilities equally should also prescribe gender-sensitive service and secure the enjoyment of habilitation and rehabilitation programs without discrimination based on sex.46 Their advocacy was partially successful as there is a mention of gender-sensitive rehabilitation services in the article on health.

However, habilitation and rehabilitation is more than a health issue, as was continually reiterated by national representatives and NGO participants.47 Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 0 1 ]

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Article 27—Work and Employment. Work and employment covers a particularly relevant area regarding gender differentiation for people with disabilities. Article 27 delineates protections and measures that apply to both the private and public sectors.

According to the International Labor Organization, “Women with disabilities are more likely than their male counterparts to be poor or destitute, illiterate or without vocational skills, and most of them are unemployed.”48 “When women with disabilities work, they often experience unequal hiring and promotion standards, unequal access to training and retraining, unequal access to credit and other productive resources, unequal pay for equal work and occupational segregation, and they rarely participate in economic decision-making.”49 Moreover, disability organizations report that women with disabilities are often subject to harassment at work and sexual exploitation.50 Various U.S. Census studies have determined that only about one-third of people with disabilities between twentyone and sixty-four are employed. When compared with those who are employed full-time, it is still only about one-third: For women with physical disabilities it is 30.7 percent, versus 69.2 percent for women without disabilities; employment for men with physical disabilities is at 33.7 percent, versus 83.2 percent for men without disabilities.51 Women with physical disabilities earn substantially less than men with physical disabilities or women without disabilities; they earn only 77 percent of the U.S. median income.52 Equal rights for people with disabilities to earn a living through freely-chosen work and without discrimination are [ 1 0 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the foundations of this article. Gendersensitive provisions would have ensured that women with disabilities enjoy their right to work on a basis of equality, including equal protective rights concerning pregnancy and maternity leave, and protection of women and men with disabilities from sexual and other forms of harassment in the workplace.53 Article 31—Statistics and Data Collection. Article 31 provisions contain measures to gather appropriate information, including statistical and research data, to enable states to formulate and implement policies in order to make the convention effective.

According to civil society and some states, a gender-mainstreamed article on statistics would have encouraged states’ parties to disaggregate all data on the basis of sex and ensure that the data provide information on issues that may affect women and girls with disabilities differently than men and boys with disabilities.54

Conclusion. Having been approved

under a draft form in August at the eighth session of its AHC, the final text of the convention is expected to be adopted during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. The new Treaty on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will constitute a historic achievement for the estimated 650 million people with disabilities around the world. While the convention does not create new rights, it specifically prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in all areas of life including education, work, and transportation. Certainly, the Convention on Disabilities will make a difference for a population that has been exposed to the most extreme denials and violations of the full range of human rights.

With respect to gender issues, the

BLANCK, ADYA & REINA

development of the Convention on Disability has promoted much reflection on the distinct population of women with disabilities and the disparate impact of discrimination they face. While advocates for women with disabilities may not see all the language they would like in this

Law & Ethics

convention, strong initial steps have been made. The future will require careful monitoring and data collection to assess the impact of this convention and to ensure that it equally meets the needs of all people with disabilities, including women and girls.

NOTES

1 National Council on Disability, Internet, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/history_process.htm.

2 Ibid.

3 World Health Organization, World Report on Disability and Rehabilitation, 2006, Internet, http://www.who.int/disabilities/publications/dar_world_report_concept_n ote.pdf.

4 Final Report. UN ESCAP Workshop on Women and Disability: Promoting Full Participation of Women with Disabilities in the Process of Elaboration on an International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Worldenable, 2003, Internet, http://www.worldenable.net/wadbangkok2003/recommendations.htm.

5 “DAWN Ontario Fact Sheet.” Disabled Woman Network Ontario. 2006, Internet, http://dawn.thot.net/fact.html.

6 Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener. Human Rights and Disability: The Current Use of United Nations Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability. (New York: United Nations, 2006), 116-117.

7 Proposals on inclusion of gender aspects in a specific article and other relevant articles of the UN Convention. Women’s IDC Update. International Disability Caucus, UN enable, Internet, http://www.un.org /es-a/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7docs/ahc7widc1.doc.

8 International Disability Caucus. “The Convention and Women with Disabilities: We Need the Twin Track Approach!!” UN enable. 14 August 2006, Internet http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ah c8docs/ahc8idcwomgen.doc.

9 “Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be Adopted Simultaneously with the Convention.” Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities Eighth session, New York, 1425 August 2006, Internet, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc8adart.htm.

10 Article 15(bis) - Women with Disabilities. Background Documents. Sixth Session. Comments, proposals and amendments submitted electronically.

Kenya. UN enable. United Nations, 2005, Internet, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata15bissscomments.htm#kenya.

11 Article 15(bis)- Women with Disabilities. Background Documents. UN enable. United Nations.

2005, Internet, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata15bisbkgrnd.htm.

12 International Disability Caucus, op. cit.

13 See e.g., Margaret A. Nosek and Rosemary B. Hughes, Psychosocial Issues of Woman with Physical Disabilities, Rehabilitation Counseling Bulletin 46, no. 4 (2003): 224-223.

14 Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, “Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality,” Rev. August 2001.

15 United Nations. Article 15 bis- Women with Disabilities. Background Documents. UN enable.

United Nations. 2005. op. cit.

16 Arnade Sigrid and Sabine Haefner, “Gendering the Draft Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities Legal Background Paper.” Disabled Peoples´ International.

Berlin, January 2006, Internet, http://v1.dpi.org/lang-en/resources/topics_detail?page=446.

17 Article 15 bis- Women with Disabilities. Background Documents. UN enable. United Nations.

2005. op. cit.

18 “Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be adopted simultaneously with the Convention.” op. cit.

19 Ibid.

20 Rannveig Traustadottir, Women with Disabilities: Issues, Resources, Connections Revised. Independent Living Institute, 1997, Internet: http://www.independentliving.org/do-cs3/chp1997.html; “Hidden Sisters: Women and Girls with Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region,” Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons, 1993-2002, Social Development Division, UNESCA. 1997, Internet, http://www.un.org/Dep ts/escap/decade/wwd3.htm; Szeli Eva and Pallaska Dea. “Violence Against Women with Mental Disabilities: The Invisible Victims in CEE/NIS countries,” Feminist Review 76 (2004).

21“Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be Adopted Simultaneously with the

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Convention.” op. cit.

22Margaret A. Nosek and Carol Howland, “Abuse and Women with Disabilities,” VAWnet Applied Research Forum. National Electronic Network on Violence Against Women. Revised February 1998, Internet, http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/ Research/VAWnetDocs/AR_disab.php.

23 Women’s IDC (31 January 2006) Response to the Facilitator’s Proposals on Women with Disabilities from 28/30 January 2006.

24 Women with Disabilities Health and Wellness Fact Sheet for Health Care Providers. New Mexico Department of Health. May 2003, Internet, http://www.health.state.nm.us/Women%20with%20D isabilities%20Health%20and%20Wellness%20Fact% 20Sheet.pdf#search='women%20with%20disabilities%20health'; Young ME, Nosek MA, Howland CA , Chanpong G, Rintala, DH. Prevalence of abuse of women with physical disabilities. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 1997; 78 (Suppl): S34S38.

25Demographics—Income and Poverty. Center for Research on Women with Disabilities, Baylor College of Medicine, 2006, Internet, http://www.bcm.edu/ crowd/?pmid=1584.

26 http://www.4women.gov/wwd/reproductive.c fm?style=module.

27 Arnade Sigrid . and Haefner. op. cit.

28 Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be adopted simultaneously with the Convention. op. cit.

29 Women's IDC (31 January 2006), Response to the Facilitator's Proposals on Women with Disabilities from 28/30 January 2006.

30 Persons with disabilities: 09/12/94. CESCR General comment 5. (General Comments). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Geneva, Switzerland 2001, Internet, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8 c12565a9004dc311/4b0c449a9ab4ff72c12563ed005 4f17d?OpenDocument.

31“Woman, training and work Gender! A Partnership of Equals,” (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2000), 115. In Inter-American Research and Documentation Centre on Vocational Training (Cinterfor/ILO), Internet, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/temas/gender/doc/pacto/ womdis.htm.

32 Women's IDC (31 January 2006) op. cit.

33 Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be adopted simultaneously with the Convention. op. cit.

34 Ibid.

[ 1 0 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

35Article 6 - Women with Disabilities, Background Documents,UN enable, United Nations, 2006, Internet, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata6bkgrnd.htm.

36 Traustadottir, op.cit.

Thomas M. Thomas M.J., Addressing concerns of women with disabilities in CBR, UN ESCAP Workshop on Women and Disability, 18-22 August 2003, Bangkok, Thailand. Worldenable, Internet, http://www.worldenable.net/wadbangkok2003/papert homas.htm.

37 Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be adopted simultaneously with the Convention. op. cit.

38 Women's IDC (31 January 2006) op. cit.

39 Center for Research on Women with Disabilities, Baylor College of Medicine, “Characteristics of the U.S. Population of Women with Disabilities,” 2006, Internet, http://www.bcm.edu/crowd/?PMID=1 330.

40 Women's IDC (31 January 2006). op. cit.

41 Ibid.

42 Demographics—Income and Poverty. op. cit.

43 Women's IDC (31 January 2006). op.c it.

44 Article 26 - Habilitation and rehabilitation.

Background Articles, International Disability Caucus, UN enable, United Nations, 2005, Internet, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata26sscomments.htm#childright.

45ILO: Report of the Director General, ILC, 67th Session, Geneva, 1981.

46 ILO: “Women Swell Ranks of Working Poor,” World of Work, no. 17 (1996), ILO Geneva.

47 Women’s IDC (31 January 2006) op.cit.

48 Characteristics of the U.S. Population of Women with Disabilities. op.cit.

49 U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, “Employment and Earnings by Disability Status for Civilian Noninstitutionalized Women 21 to 64 Years: 2000,” Internet,http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/c ps/cps10 4.html.

50 Women's IDC (31 January 2006) op. cit.

51 Characteristics of the U.S. Population of Women with Disabilities. op. cit.

52 U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, “Employment and Earnings by Disability Status for Civilian Noninstitutionalized Women 21 to 64 Years,” Internet, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/cps /csp104.html.

53 Women’s IDC (31 January 2006), op. cit.

54 Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be adopted simulteneously with the convention. op. cit.

Law & Ethics

Unequal Benefits

The Ethics of Development-Induced Displacement Jay Drydyk Development-induced displacement (DID) occurs when people are forced to abandon lands or relocate because of development. The term or its acronym may not yet be common parlance for the global public, yet large dam projects such as Three Gorges and Narmada have drawn the phenomenon to the world’s attention. Dam construction, along with urban development and transportation projects, displaced an estimated 10 million people annually during the 1980s.1 When the severity of the oustees’ plight came to light, it flatly contradicted the promises and rationale of the development enterprise: rather than alleviating poverty, the effects of displacement and bungled resettlement often exacerbated impoverishment.2 As these conflicts over DID played out in the global public sphere, a range of damage control policy responses were adopted. The World Bank, joined in the early 1990s by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), began developing guidelines to limit the negative effects of DID.3 They were joined later by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).4 Rights-based approaches were published in 1998 by The Brookings Institution and in 2000 by the World Commission on Dams (WCD).5

Jay Drydyk is an associate professor of Philosophy at Carleton University, Ottawa, specializing in human rights and development ethics..

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The issue is ethical: Is it not simply wrong to treat people in the ways that the displaced are treated? The policy responses seemed intent on “cleaning up” DID to make it morally respectable, yet rigorous ethical analysis of DID has been rare.6 The policy debates are bound up in two ethical dilemmas. If a project goes ahead, it may impoverish the people it displaces, but stopping it may perpetu-

to be harmed as a result. He urged us, therefore, to seek out the dilemmas inherent in DID and identify realistic solutions. Rarely do academics receive good advice from politicians, but as we grappled with the ethics and social science of DID, a focus on ethical dilemmas proved fruitful.

The first dilemma can be simplified as follows: If we do go ahead with a dis-

The best solution to these problems might

lie in prevention, rather than after-the-fact compliance mechanisms.

placement-inducing project, the oustees will be harmed; if we do not go ahead with it, the project’s intended beneficiaries will be harmed; therefore, someone will be treated inequitably, no matter what we do.

To resolve this dilemma, we might initally consider the first premise. Perhaps ways must be found to go ahead with a project without harming the oustees.

This line of thought forms the basis of some initial policy responses by governments and development agencies: minimize the extent of displacement and mitigate its harmful effects. Thus, the OECD guidelines of 1992 prescribed that “Involuntary population displacement should be avoided or minimized whenever feasible….”8 The Dilemmas. The first dilemma This solution can succeed only if the was suggested to my Indian and Canadi- full range of harms is recognized. Clearan research colleagues by a keynote ly, loss of land assets is not the only harm; address given by former Indian Prime even cash compensation can fail to Minister I.K. Gujral.7 He reflected that restore families’ capacity to make a living. many of the development decisions he Land-for-land compensation is also had faced in government were fraught often inadequate, especially in cases with dilemmas; no matter which policy where compensation land cannot be option one chose, someone would seem farmed using the same techniques or as ate poverty and inequality among the people it was designed to help; either outcome may be inequitable. If people can be resettled without their consent, their right to adequate housing with security of tenure is violated, while if their consent is required, others’ right to development is subject to their veto. The ethical success or failure of policy depends on how well it resolves these dilemmas in practice. The initial development bank policies to minimize displacement and mitigate its effects partially resolve one dilemma, but fail to untangle the other. Full resolution seems to point toward—and perhaps beyond— the more robust and demanding policies advocated by the WCD.

[ 1 0 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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productively as the land that was given up.

Involuntary resettlement can also impoverish people in numerous other ways, including joblessness, homelessness, marginalization (i.e. reduced productivity or income-earning capacity), increased morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, and social disarticulation (i.e. disruption of social, cultural, and business networks).9 If the risks of resettlement are fully recognized, then, resolving the ethical dilemma requires a policy shift from mere compensation to “rehabilitation,” or as it has been called more recently, “reconstructing resettlers’ livelihoods.”10 Consequently, the prospect of restoring the oustees’ livelihoods, if not enhancing them, seems to offer a way out of this first dilemma. But if no one is harmed, then there are no grounds for claiming inequitable treatment. However, the coercive dimension of displacement raises a new range of ethical questions.

If there were nothing wrong with coercively resettling people, then there would be nothing wrong with doing this to anyone, at any time. That, however, seems preposterous. If there were nothing wrong with coercively resettling people, then forced eviction ought not to violate international law—which it does.11 Moreover, if we focus on the kind of development that is ethically desirable, rather than undesirable, free participation stands out as one of its essential features.

In this second context, DID presents the following dilemma: If their consent is required, then stakeholders can, by their veto, block development for others; if stakeholder consent is not required, then DID is lacking in free participation; thus, DID offends either against equity or free participation and, either way, it is not the

Law & Ethics

sort of development that is ethically desirable.

This dilemma addresses an issue on which policy guidelines remain vague.

Treaty law holds that oustees’ “consent must be sought.” Seeking consent, however, is one thing and obtaining it is another. Treaty law holds that where development in the public interest is involved, it is not mandatory for the oustees’ consent to be obtained.12 Only the WCD has called for DID to obtain freely negotiated agreement by resettlers, while development banks vaguely require or encourage “consultation” or “participation.”13 Countless policy statements recommend that consent of resettlers be sought, but these statements are silent on when such consent must be obtained.

The lone exception concerns aboriginal and other indigenous peoples; in their case there is consensus that they must give free and fully informed consent.14 The first problem is that if their consent is required, rich stakeholders can block development opportunities for the poor, which is difficult to deny. There have been cases of absentee landowners taking leadership of movements resisting displacement, only to abandon them once they have pushed development agencies to pay a significant price1.5 This shifts our attention to the second dilemma: if consent is not required, then development is insufficiently free and participatory. Here, three questions arise. First, is there a way to involve potential oustees and other stakeholders as fully and freely as possible in development decision making, short of giving them a veto over other people’s development? Second, if such a scheme were in place, could we say that this development process is as free and participatory as it could be, within the bounds of equity?

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Third, would such a process not be as free as it ought to be? The dilemma can be solved if all three questions can be answered in the affirmative; in that case the power of oustees to control decision making would not be lacking, even if they do not hold veto power.

To find such a solution, we must seek out schemes that make development decision making as free and participatory as possible within the bounds of equity.

On DID, pathbreaking work in this direction was done by the WCD. The model they advocate includes stakeholder participation in decision making for five key points: assessing needs for a project; selecting among alternative ways to meet these needs; project preparation— including enforceable, contractual agreements protecting stakeholder interests in the areas of benefit-sharing, mitigation, compensation, development, and compliance; project implementation; and project operation.16 The requirement at each stage is that “demonstrable public acceptance of all key decisions is achieved through agreements negotiated in an open and transparent process conducted in good faith and with the informed participation of all stakeholders.”17 Prioritizing participation in this way would dramatically enhance inclusion and influence in development decision making for oustees and project beneficiaries alike. To resolve the dilemma, it must include some means to put equity constraints on free negotiation. For instance, how are stalemates to be resolved? In the absence of a dispute resolution mechanism such as arbitration, any party to negotiations holds veto power, which leaves our dilemma unresolved.

To its credit, the WCD calls for disputeresolution mechanisms to be agreed [ 1 0 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

upon at the outset. Within these processes, each party’s interests are given equal weight. From a judicial perspective, however, it is possible that they should not be given equal weight, since one party may face greater human risks than another.

Typically, as in the previously mentioned case of the Arenal dam, large landowners may have an interest in raising the price of compensation to expand their land holdings in other regions, while the campesinos have an interest simply in finding some new way to make a living once their current means of livelihood are flooded away by the dam. Equity is not well served by a negotiation or arbitration process in which these two interests are given equal weight. Instead, mediation and arbitration must have terms of reference that give priority to reducing and preventing hardships. This will give some advantage to the worst off, but only within the bounds of equity.

In light of this challenge, it may be thought that between participation and equity, equity must ultimately prevail.

The relation between the two, however, is actually quite reciprocal. While participatory mechanisms do need to be structured to favor equitable outcomes, equity is less likely to be achieved in the absence of participation.

Displacement in Action. The Jamuna bridge project, which is particularly memorable because it displaced people by literally sweeping the land from under their feet, illustrates this lesson on equity.

The World Bank website admits that “resettling and compensating people whose homes or livelihoods would be negatively affected by construction of the bridge … did not go smoothly.”18 Initial difficulties in identifying households that

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would be affected and entitled to compensation led the Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge Authority (JMBA) to contract out its social impact survey to the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), a large and established NGO.19 Based on this survey, JMBA prepared a “Revised Resettlement Action Plan” that recognized the entitlement of 15,000 households to compensation.20 These plans, however, ignored more than 75,000 inhabitants of the sandy islands known as chars. During favorable times, chars were subject to erosion, causing some to disappear altogether,

Law & Ethics

claim with the Inspection Panel of the World Bank. This claim presented evidence of char erosion and displacement that had already been caused by the channelized river and a grim projection of displacement yet to come, rendering as many as four to five thousand families homeless and without any source of income23 The Inspection Panel process had been established in 1994 in response to the controversy over the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada Dam) project, among others.

It enables people to file claims if they have been harmed by unlawful World

Rarely do academics receive good advice

from politicians, but as we grappled with the ethics and social science of DID, a focus on ethical dilemmas proved fruitful.

and making displacement by erosion a way of life.21 Even so, the rate and extent of erosion and displacement caused by the bridge project was extraordinary. In order to shorten the span of the bridge and stabilize the riverbed beneath it, the river was channelized by reinforcing its banks in 1994. However, this shifted and accelerated river currents, which made downstream erosion more rapid and less predictable. Chars that had been stable for decades were washed away in a matter of days, and some families had to make multiple moves as their new homes met the same fate as their previous dwellings22 The char dwellers’ cause was taken up by a local NGO, the Jamuna Char Integrated Development Project (JCDP), which tried to raise the issue with the developer, JMBA, and one of the project financiers, the World Bank. When attempts at dialogue failed, JCDP filed a

Bank financed projects. A successful request for inspection must establish both points: that policy has been violated and that the claimants have been harmed as a result. If these and other details of eligibility are borne out by a preliminary investigation, the claim is registered and a three-person panel may seek board approval to conduct a full investigation, the results of which would be reported to the Bank’s management and board.24 In more than a few cases, the board has been reluctant to approve investigations, which management has averted by proposing their own action plans instead.25 In the case of the Jamuna claim, similar evasive maneuvering was facilitated by JMBA. The management response announced that JMBA had adopted a “generous and simple” Erosion Flood Policy as the third and final phase of its Revised Resettlement Action Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 0 9 ]

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Plan: “The Policy provides that all persons, both owners and occupiers, on the riverbank and chars in the affected area who experience erosion for any reason will be compensated, and those affected by increased flooding due to the bridge will also be compensated.26 However, the Inspection Panel does not have an enforcement mechanism.27 Further events in the Jamuna case illustrate that where enforcement mecha-

Lessons from the Jamuna Bridge Experience. Clearly the char people were not treated equitably. Even after their entitlement to compensation was recognized in principle under the EFP, many remained unable to resettle and restore their livelihoods. They faced two barriers: compensation was poorly administered, and they lacked means of recourse by which they could rectify this to ensure that their entitlements were

In policy making, ethical dilemmas

should not be regarded as idle puzzles. nisms are weak, promises of equitable— much less, generous—outcomes are unreliable. The leader of the JCDP has argued that both the developer (JMBA) and the NGO (BRAC) evaded much of their responsibility for compensation by entrapping claimants in “a bureaucratic tangle.” They did so in part by imposing an egregiously “high documentation burden,” including original land records, and “in situations where those records were lost of destroyed by floods, BRAC did not accept government-certified copies or testimonials.” He adds that compensation was limited to erosion, not flooding, as initially promised; rigid deadlines combined with a lack of instruction on claim procedures resulted in few applications for 1998, 1999, and 2000; no compensation was provided for community facilities such as schools or mosques; and widows were not paid.

To address these problems, no further recourse was available to the char dwellers. When JCDP inquired, they were informed that “the Panel is no longer involved in the process.”28 [ 1 1 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

honored. The best solution to these problems, however, might lie in prevention, rather than after-the-fact compliance mechanisms. The char people may not have needed to seek recourse at the middle and end of the project had they been better represented within project decision making from the beginning.

The case vindicates several of the WCD’s recommendations, the first being stakeholder analysis and stakeholder forum. The WCD called for stakeholder analysis to be carried out from the beginning of project planning to support a consultative process leading to the formation of a stakeholder forum, which would then play a leading role in public consultations in two initial phases: needs assessment and assessment of alternative options.29 Had a stakeholder forum been activated at these stages in the Jamuna Bridge project, knowledge of its activities would have reached the char people earlier and given them a more timely opportunity to have their claims represented and recognized.

The WCD also called for negotiation

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and dispute-resolution procedures to be established with the participation and agreement of stakeholder groups and the stakeholder forum. Agreement should be reached with the particular stakeholder groups affected by each of the final project options, outlining guiding principles and criteria for compensation, mitigation, resettlement, development, and benefit-sharing.30 In the third phase, project preparation, negotiations would take place within this framework to develop mitigation, resettlement, and development action plans—with its own internal grievance procedure—along with a companion compliance plan.

Neither the char dwellers nor any of the hundred thousand people displaced by the Jamuna Bridge project agreed upon such a framework or guiding principles. As a result, neither JMBA, nor the Government of Bangladesh, nor the World Bank’s Dhaka office had any enforceable obligation to engage in dialogue or negotiations with them, and JCDP, finding this avenue closed, proceeded quickly to the Inspection Panel.

Finally, to pay for claims wrongly ignored or rejected by the developer, the WCD called for the establishment of an independently administered trust fund in cases where a government is the developer, and in other circumstances a performance bond. Perhaps more significantly, the WCD called for an independent review panel (IRP) to certify that all appropriate studies, consultations, and agreements are completed and fulfilled in each phase of a project.31 The next stage is not to begin until the first stage is approved.32 In the Jamuna case, had these procedures been in force, the project could not have trampled, stage by stage, over

Law & Ethics

the legitimate claims of the char dwellers.

Until those claims were recognized, negotiated, and arbitrated, the path from planning to preparation, construction, and implementation would have been blocked at one or more of the checkpoints by an IRP. A decision-making process structured along these lines would have created channels for input by which the char dwellers could have raised their claims more effectively and with a lower reputation cost to JMBA, the Bank, and the Government of Bangladesh.

Conclusions. In policy making, ethical

dilemmas should not be regarded as idle puzzles, as they can be highly instructive.

Clear policy guidance is offered by the dilemmas of DID: development decision making should be as free and participatory as possible within the bounds of equity.

Experience seems to show that three features are essential. First, stakeholders must be identified early on so that a continuing stakeholder forum can be organized to participate in needs assessment and selection among alternative options. Second, prior to final site selection agreement should be reached with stakeholder groups at each site on a negotiating framework and guiding principles that will lead next-stage negotiations over land acquisition, mitigation, resettlement, development, and benefit-sharing.

Third, a compliance plan should not only provide a financial basis for resolving and redressing grievances. It should also provide monitoring of decision making to ensure compliance of appropriate stakeholder-developer agreements, and a certification system should be established to prevent construction from running ahead of compensation. Participation is an essential prerequisite for equity in development.

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NOTES

1 A World Bank estimate, cited by Christopher McDowell, Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-Induced Displacement, ed. Christopher McDowell (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996).

2 Efforts to clarify and gain recognition for the specific ways in which displacement can be impoverishing have been led by Michael M. Cernea in particular, as well as other contributors to McDowell’s Understanding Impoverishment.

3 World Bank, Operational Directive OD 4.30 “Involuntary Resettlement” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); Organization for Economic Assistance and Development, Development Assistance Committee, Guidelines on Aid and Environment, No. 3, Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Development Projects lopment Projects (Paris: OECD, 1992).

4 Asian Development Bank, Handbook on Resettlement; A Guide to Good Practice (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1998); Inter-American Development Bank, Operational Policy OP-710, in Involuntary Resettlement; Operational Policy and Background Paper (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, October 1998).

5 Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, ed. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998); World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development; A New Framework for Decision-Making,” (London: Earthscan, 2000; downloadable from www.dams.org).

6 Dams and Development Chapter 7, “Enhancing Human Development: Rights, Risks and Negotiated Outcomes,”199-211.

7 CIDA-SICI Project Workshop: Economic Policy, Population Displacement and Development Ethics, India International Centre, New Delhi, December 15, 1999.

8 OECD, Guidelines, 6.

9 Michael Cernea, “Understanding and Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement; Reflections on the State of Knowledge,” in Understanding Impoverishment, 21-22.

10 Risks and Reconstruction; Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees, ed. Michael M. Cernea and Christopher McDowell (Washington. D.C.: World Bank, 2000).

11 Here I am merely drawing a moral analogy between DID and forced eviction. See Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; Annotations, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No. 32. (Washington, D.C.: The American Society of International Law, The Brookings Institution, 2000). The Guiding Principles are also available in English in Masses in Flight and in United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39,” Addendum, Annex.

12 Guiding principles, 6:1, 6:2c.

[ 1 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

13 OECD Guidelines, 4(c); World Bank (1990) OD 4.30, 3(c); ADB Handbook, policy paragraph (v), 101; IDB OP-710, 4; World Bank (2001) OP4.12, I.2(b) 14 This is based on ILO Convention 169, Article 16. See Guiding Principles, Principle 9.

15 William L. Partridge, "Successful Involuntary Resettlement: Lessons from the Costa Rican Arenal Hydroelectric Project," Anthropological Approaches to Resettlement; Policy, Practice, and Theory, ed. Michael M. Cernea and Scott E. Guggenheim (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1993), 351.

16 Dams and Development, 261.

17 Ibid., 215.

18 World Bank, "From Bridging the Jamuna to Bridging the Nation: Bangladesh's Bangabhandu Jamuna Multipurupose Bridge," in World Bank Group website, Washington. D.C., available 2005 from http://wbln1018.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/a22044d0c4877a3e852567de0052e0fa/0fe29d29808c1 5b98525687e0067b61f?OpenDocument.

19 Atiq Rahman, "Civil Society and Sustainable Development: Perspectives on Participation in the Asia & Pacific Region," in Approaches to Sustainability: Civil Society and Sustainable Development; Perspectives on Participation In the Asia & Pacific Regiontives on Participation In the Asia & Pacific Region, edited by Judith L. McCullough (New York: United Nations Development Program, n.d.), 8.

20 Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge Authority, "JMBA Completed Works," available from http://www.jmba.gov.bd/completed.html, 2005.

21 Maminul Haque Sarker, Iffat Huque, and Mustafa Alam, "Rivers, Chars and Char dwellers of Bangladesh," International Journal of River Basin Management 1, no. 1 (2003): 76.

22 Ibid.

23 JCDP (Jamuna Char Integrated Development Project), Submission to Inspection Panel; A Request for Inspection on the Effect of Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge on the Jamuna Char Inhabitants Multi-Purpose Bridge on the Jamuna Char Inhabitants (Dhaka:1996), 16.

24 Lori Udall, World Bank Inspection Panel, Thematic Review V.4 Prepared as an Input to the World Commission on Dams ld Commission on Dams (Cape Town: World Commission on Dams, 2000), 1-2.

25 Dana Clark, "Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel," in Demanding Accountability; Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panelel, edited by Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox and Kay Treakle (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 11-14.

26 World Bank, “Bangladesh; Jamuna Bridge Project (Cr. 2569-BD); Management Response to Inspection Panel,” September 20, 1996, 4), available October 20, 2005, at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf/WReport/.

27 Udall, World Bank Inspection Panel, 5; John Fox and Kay Treakle, “Concluding Propositions,” in Demanding Accountability, 285.

28 Majibul Huq Dulu, "The Experience of Jamu-

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na Bridge: Issues and Perspectives," in Demanding Accountability; Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panelel, edited by Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox and Kay Treakle (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 106-108.

Law & Ethics

29 World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development, 259-267.

30 Ibid., 267.

31 Ibid., 301-305.

32 Ibid., 262.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 1 3 ]

Politics&Diplomacy The Hard Road Back to Soft Power Pamela Hyde Smith Much of the world today views the United States negatively, considering it dangerous and unpredictable. Recent polling overseas confirms the continuation of the downward slide in global public opinion that gathered force with the 2000 U.S. elections and accelerated sharply in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq.1 Current approaches to building support for U.S. policies and American values, from the State Department’s worldwide public diplomacy to the Defense Department’s public affairs activities in war zones, have failed to reverse negative attitudes so severe that they thwart the United States’s ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Anti-American forces are taking advantage of the collapse of U.S. popularity across the globe, making anti-Americanism a national security threat.

The U.S. government should take a series of immediate steps to regain American credibility overseas. The Bush administration must revise some of its signature policies and moderate its style of international discourse in order to regain the goodwill the United States previously earned.

Much more emphasis on public diplomacy is essential. Additionally, Congress and the executive branch should use the next two years to restructure the apparatus of governmental soft power instruments, making them more effective and powerful.

Pamela Hyde Smith is a research associate and teaches a class on public diplomacy at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. She recently retired from the U.S. Foreign Service, having served as ambassador to the Republic of Moldova.

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America Is Down in the Polls.

The Pew Research Center’s June 2006 Global Attitudes Project demonstrates what other polls have been saying in recent years: world public opinion has turned ferociously against the United States.2 Favorable opinion has plummeted in nearly all countries surveyed in Europe, Asia, and especially the Middle East. The United States has never been as unpopular in Western Europe. Even in the United Kingdom 41 percent of those polled think the United States is a greater threat to world peace than Iran.

Most countries polled now view China more favorably than the United States.

In Turkey, a NATO ally country, only 12 percent of those polled have a favorable opinion of the United States—down from 52 percent in 2000.3 In Indonesia favorable opinion declined from 75

and violations of the Geneva Conventions to blacken the U.S. image. In the past, when foreign attitudes faulted the U.S. government, the American people still enjoyed favorable ratings, but this has been changing: between 2002 and 2005 favorability ratings of Americans fell in nine of twelve countries polled.7 As Roger Cohen memorably put it, the world has “stopped buying the American narrative.”8 A catalogue of further complaints completes the picture. World opinion faults the Bush administration for its unilateralism and preemption, unflinching support of Israel, and scorn for international organizations. The Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and its dismissal of the threat of global warming have been met with dismay by key Asian and European allies. Additional irri-

In not a single Muslim population

polled in 2002 did a majority believe that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks… percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2003, and it has risen to 30 percent today chiefly because of our tsunami assistance.4 In not a single majority-Muslim population country polled in 2002 did a majority believe that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks; these same majorities support Osama bin Laden and evince sympathy for suicide bombers.5 Across the globe people believe that the Iraq war makes the world more dangerous, and this perception undercuts support for the overall war on terrorism.6 American actions at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Haditha combine with U.S. renditions, defense of torture, [ 1 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tants include stingy assistance to the world’s poor in comparison with other wealthy countries and the slow and ineffective response to Katrina, which made the U.S. government appear less generous and even-handed than America claims to be.9 Reservoirs of goodwill built up over decades have evaporated, as has the worldwide sympathy felt for the United States in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Nevertheless the Bush administration portrays the United States as President Ronald Reagan’s “city on the hill,” radiating hope, high principles, fairness, honesty, and opportunity while

SMITH

spreading democracy. Many Americans agree, arguing that anti-American sentiments historically run in cycles and are part of any great power’s burden. However, the present antipathy toward the United States belies optimism and is unlikely to ebb without strong corrective measures.

What Influences National Image and Why Does it Matter?

A mix of factors shapes public opinion about another country: the country’s foreign policy, its soft power, its official public diplomacy, and individual experiences with that country.

A country’s policies exert the strongest influence; few foreign societies will approve of U.S. policies they believe to be against their own interests. In the Muslim world, for example, the U.S. war on terror is perceived to be directed against Islam and has exacerbated the anti-Western aspects of Islamic fundamentalism.10 Soft power, the concept created by Joseph Nye of Harvard University, is a nation’s ability to attract and persuade others in ways that conform to its ideals or objectives.11 Soft power is derived from values, culture, institutions, and behavior, which emanate from both society and the government. The United States accrued soft power during the twentieth century because it adhered to its founding democratic ideals; demonstrated its values through such programs as the Marshall Plan; and propagated its appealing culture and lifestyle, both commercially and through governmentsponsored programs and media such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. U.S. soft power was strongest in strategically important Japan and Europe, though the phenom-

Politics & Diplomacy

enon was global.

Public diplomacy, a much-debated adjunct to traditional diplomacy, seeks to understand, inform, engage, and influence foreign societies—friendly, hostile, and wavering—through a variety of information, culture, education, and advocacy programs. Public diplomacy, unlike “spin” or propaganda, succeeds when it accurately reflects and advocates a government’s polices and amplifies a nation’s soft power.12 U.S. government enthusiasm for public diplomacy, having waxed and waned during the last one hundred years, is currently tepid, leaving the enterprise under-funded and understaffed—yet charged with battling anti-Americanism almost single-handedly. Although the most expert public diplomacy in the world cannot alone restore a government’s image any more than a brilliant advertising campaign can sell an inferior product, robust public diplomacy is one of the essential and most cost-effective tools of modern diplomacy.

Personal experience with another country, gained through visiting or having contact with its citizens, can mitigate individuals’ opinions formed on other bases. State Department studies show that participants in U.S. governmentfunded exchange programs acquire much more positive views of the United States from their firsthand experiences.13 It follows that more such exchange programs, coupled with similar private-sector interchanges, would benefit the United States.

Overseas public opinion matters because it influences the decisions of governments, especially in democracies.

Few policies survive long without public support, as is evident from the way public antipathy in some countries toward Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 1 7 ]

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the war in Iraq is affecting government decisions about troop withdrawal.

Turkey’s refusal to cooperate with U.S. invasion plans for Iraq also shows how lack of support for U.S. objectives can work against the United States.

Public Diplomacy until Today.

From 1953 until its merger with the State Department in 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) conducted most of U.S. public diplomacy and amplified its soft power. Although never perfect, USIA earned a creditable record “telling America’s story to the world” through a hard-won alliance of broadcasting, cultural, educational, information, and advocacy programs.

USIA, with more overseas posts than any other U.S. government agency, was the largest public diplomacy operation of any nation ever, as well as the world’s largest publisher and a formidable broadcaster. A recent analysis sharply contrasts USIA’s effective performance during the first Gulf War with public diplomacy’s current failures.14 The decline began in the early 1990s when the executive and legislative branches decided that Cold War-era funding levels for public diplomacy were unnecessary and USIA suffered severe cutbacks and eventual elimination. The broadcasting function was peeled off and consolidated with other non-military U.S. government overseas broadcasters under the autonomous Broadcasting Board of Governors. The public diplomacy function has not fared well in the traditionalist State Department culture, nor has broadcasting prospered under its new umbrella.

A flood of studies in the last few years broadly concludes that public diplomacy’s ills since the merger include serious [ 1 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

deficiencies in strategic planning and in coordinating activities across the government, within the State Department, and between State and U.S. embassies.15 However, the persistent inadequacy of personnel and program resources to sustain basic outreach overseas remains the most serious problem. Congress allots approximately $630 million to State Department public diplomacy and $645 million to non-military broadcasting, which together total approximately 4 percent of State’s overall international affairs budget and 0.6 percent of the Pentagon’s budget.16 To put these numbers into context, the United States spends the same amount on public diplomacy as Britain or France, despite the fact that it is five times bigger than either and has much more serious credibility problems.17 If the United States were to spend as much per person on public diplomacy in the Muslim world as it did in Germany and Japan after World War II, the budget for these countries would be $7 billion.18 The number of U.S. public diplomacy officers, which reached 2,500 in 1991, has since been cut in half, with technology replacing much of their personal contact work overseas.19 During the self-inflicted demise of U.S. public diplomacy, other voices gained strength while the global environment evolved in ways that make public opinion more influential than before. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) became more vocal and new media deluged the wired world with information, drowning out government messages and out-maneuvering old-style communications. Hollywood’s influence grew much stronger: between 1986 and 2000 film and television exports increased 427 percent.20 Hollywood

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Politics & Diplomacy

overseas. Hughes has established a mechanism to coordinate public diplomacy across the government, especially between the State and Defense Departments. Finally, more officers now receive training in public diplomacy skills and key public diplomacy chiefs are able to participate in policymaking cirChanges under Karen Hughes. cles.

Although Hughes has been criticized Back at the State Department, President Bush’s close advisor is making modest for her lack of international savvy, her progress doing this administration’s campaign-style approach, and her focus toughest job. Since Karen Hughes’s post on projects instead of strategy, impleimages often portray the United States as violent and materialistic, and these images dominate global entertainment markets. Additionally, the Pentagon stepped into the public diplomacy vacuum, merging public affairs with “psyops” (psychological operations) in war zones.

Public diplomacy, unlike “spin” or

propaganda, succeeds when it accurately reflects and advocates a government’s polices. as under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs was left vacant for nearly half of President Bush’s first term, she had a great many pieces to pick up. Now over a year into the job, she has engineered several concrete changes.

From 2004 to 2006 funding for educational and cultural exchange programs increased by 25 percent in the Middle East and 39 percent in South Asia and funding for public diplomacy overall experienced an increase of 21 percent, although the number of officers remains unchanged.21 Rapid-response units were established in Brussels and Dubai, the latter staffed with a public diplomacy officer fluent in Arabic who appears on al-Jazeera and other Middle Eastern channels. Ambassadors may now publicly advocate U.S. policies directly to the press—a reversal of previous press-wary rules. The U.S. government has brought American Muslims, business people, and cultural figures into the job of spreading the United States’s message

mentation of these changes breathes some new life into public diplomacy.

According to one public diplomacy officer overseas, “We get our message out better now, thanks to Karen Hughes.”22 Other Bush administration changes include shifting funds from the Voice of America to new ventures like the Arabiclanguage Radio Sawa and the Persianlanguage Radio Farda, which broadcast pop music and some news and now attract sizable young audiences, as well as al-Hurra, an Arabic-language TV network which is now rated in the middle of the top one hundred satellite broadcasters in its region.23 Also, the State Department has transferred a handful of jobs and programs from Europe and Washington to posts in more contentious countries—although State remains unable to fill all its public diplomacy vacancies, especially with language-qualified officers.

Face the Music, Change the Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 1 9 ]

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Tune. A correlation appears to link at image abroad by treating other nations

least some of the rise of anti-Americanism with the decline of American public diplomacy. The United States would almost certainly have fared better if USIA’s shotgun marriage with the State Department never had happened, provided that the starvation diet allocated to USIA in the 1990s had been drastically reversed. But the revival of USIA would create an entity too Lilliputian to operate overseas or across or outside government with the clout required to address today’s crisis of confidence in the United States. Anti-Americanism is so harmful to U.S. interests that it demands the creation of a stronger, better mechanism.

Several steps by the U.S. government, combined with more vigorous support from the American public, can begin to reverse the damage to the U.S. image overseas. Karen Hughes’s most pressing task is to persuade the president of the need for rebuilding credibility, an effort that will fail without his buy-in.

Shifts in policy, the prime factor in forming public opinion, are the first priority. The Bush administration’s marginal retreats from its first-term doctrines of preemption and unilateralism have failed to mollify our critics or nullify the threat anti-Americanism poses to U.S. security. Consequently, further U.S. work within international institutions, treaties, and alliances will be helpful, along with conspicuous fair play in trade relations. The U.S. government must take responsibility for mistakes it has made, punish those at fault, and move to rectify the consequences. Reviving the U.S. role as honest broker between the Israelis and the Palestinians is also crucial. Ultimately, the U.S. government will bolster its [ 1 2 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

with renewed respect; listening to world opinion; and matching policy more consistently with American ideals and values such as fairness, the rule of law, human rights, opportunity, and humility.

To address the next priority, rebuilding soft power, the U.S. government should re-establish its good global citizenship by deploying American knowhow to solve global problems: fighting poverty, disease, tyranny, and environmental degradation as well as terrorism.24 Even where the United States finds few friends, American science, technology, medicine, and education earn respect and provide an entrée for expanded hands-on programs. In the Muslim world education of the very young is critical, given the depth of suspicion and misunderstanding.

Enhanced foreign assistance should be tailored to local milieux in order to leverage shared principles and help countries transform themselves rather than expecting them to transform in the U.S. image. People-to-people programs excel, demonstrating American diversity, generosity, and talent and exploding the deadly myths circulating about the United States, especially among people lacking personal experience with Americans.

Beef up Public Diplomacy. As its

third priority, the U.S. government must combat anti-Americanism with as much energy and capital as it dedicated to winning hearts and minds during the Cold War. During that time the United States funded 50,000 Soviets—and many more from Warsaw Pact countries—to come here on exchange programs, which together with American

SMITH

broadcasting helped win the ideological battle. Given the Islamic world’s estimated population of 1.2 billion, the United States should start building relationships with 200,000 Muslim students, professors, teachers, journalists, political activists, and other influential people, not handfuls here and there as at

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(NSC) deputy director responsible for strategic communications across government, including the Pentagon.

Within the State Department the office of the under secretary for public diplomacy needs budgetary, personnel, and planning authority over all public diplomacy functions and the go-ahead to cut

Anti-Americanism is so harmful to U.S. interests that it demands creation of a stronger, better mechanism. present. Public diplomacy, consequently, needs more funding immediately, at least ten times the amount now allocated.

Bigger budgets will mean far more public diplomacy deliverables: language-qualified officers on the ground; exchange programs; information programs; credible speakers discussing the United States “warts and all;” Englishlanguage teaching; cultural events; American Centers staffed with Americans; wide distribution of translated books and magazines; broadcasts in radio, TV, and new media; rapidresponse units; involvement of the vibrant U.S. private sector; the revival of public-opinion polling; and the creation of new programs to suit today’s times and places. The State Department must recruit more public diplomacy officers and train them quickly. Given the minuscule numbers of senior practitioners now in public diplomacy positions, State should season its staffing with experienced retirees.

Hughes should get the support she needs to strengthen her strategic planning and coordination process by heading it with a National Security Council

through State’s notorious red tape and let public diplomacy regain its agility.

Broadcasting requires further modernizing, streamlining, and closer coordination with public diplomacy; needed language services including English should be restored and unneeded ones— like the expensive broadcasting to Cuba that few can access—dropped. Senior public diplomacy experts must be better integrated into the policymaking process at State and the NSC, explaining the consequences proposed actions would have on world opinion.

Link Instruments of U.S. Soft Power. While these difficult, urgent

steps are taken to halt the damage to American credibility, structural changes should be initiated so that the next president can rebuild soft power on a more stable foundation. The State Department should retain the policy advocacy and information functions of public diplomacy, which should be married with the policy formation process, but public diplomacy’s long-term relationship building or “mutual understanding” programs should be divested from State. These activities–academic and Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 2 1 ]

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cultural exchange programs, speakers, and libraries–would benefit from joining the U.S. government’s other soft power efforts under the umbrella of a bipartisan supervisory board, thus forming a Smithsonian-like institution for outreach to overseas publics—the “Public Diplomacy Institute.”

A grouping of the State Department’s exchange programs, the Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development, the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Institute for Peace, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors would enable these activities to network with each other and NGO and private-sector partners at home and abroad. This bundling would greatly increase the clout of soft power work in Washington. The Institute should also coordinate with the soft power efforts of the Defense Department, the National Science Foundation, and other agencies.

Each entity within the Institute would retain its mandate and the academic, journalistic, or other norms that protect its work against politicization. Strategic decisions, however, such as how much money is spent on which activities in which countries, should properly fall to government officials appointed to the Institute’s supervisory board. The board should be headed by the State Department under secretary for public diplomacy (who must be high-profile like Karen Hughes) and composed of the heads of each agency in the Institute, together with outside experts appointed to ensure bipartisanship. Overseas, operational responsibility for policy advocacy and long-term programs would remain with foreign service officers, who would report to the State Department for the information and advocacy functions and to the appropriate agency in [ 1 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the Public Diplomacy Institute for the “mutual understanding” functions.

Incentives would be built into the plan so that diplomats would find service with the Institute as career-enhancing as at the State Department.

The Institute format resembles the approach to soft power taken by Britain, France, and Germany and builds on suggestions made in recent studies on public diplomacy. Removing the “mutual understanding” elements of public diplomacy from the policy-oriented State Department would link them less directly with the administration in power and more directly with the soft power of American society. By gaining scope, flexibility, and independence, the new Institute can restore America’s credibility at this perilous moment and during the decades it will take to reverse antiAmericanism. The new Congress should form such an Institute promptly, insisting that the administration use the time between now and the next presidential election for the complicated bureaucratic task of restructuring. That way, the winner in 2008 will have an effective mechanism for making soft power work for the United States once again.

An idealist might ask where U.S. priorities are if we do not try to promote peace and understanding before resorting to coercion and war; a pragmatist might observe that our military power is not delivering the outcomes we wish, so we better stop relying on it so heavily.25 Both could agree that ignoring the present crisis in American credibility will insure that the United States falters and fails in the twenty-first century. The United States can avoid this fate, however, if it embraces the recommendations outlined above to rebuild and wield soft power for its long-term benefit.

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NOTES

1 “America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” Internet, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf (date accessed: 13 June 2006).

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, 1.

4 Ibid.

5 Daniel Pipes, “Survey of World’s Muslims Yields Dismaying Results,” The New York Sun, 27 June 2006.

6 “America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” Internet, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf (date accessed: 13 June 2006), 1, 3 and 13.

7 Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, “Pushing back at U.S.,” The Baltimore Sun, 14 May 2006.

8 Roger Cohen, “As U.S. image free-falls, spin wobbles into ditch,” The International Herald Tribune, 17 May 2006.

9 The U.S. is next to the last in percentage of GDP allocated for foreign assistance; Samantha Power, “Fixing Foreign Policy,” Harvard Magazine, Internet, http://www.harvardmagazine.com/online/070642.ht ml (date accessed: 2 November 2006).

10 George Packer, “Fighting Faiths,” The New Yorker, 10-17 July 2006, 95.

11 For a full perspective on Nye’s thinking, see his book; Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

12 Jan Melissen, Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2005), Internet, http://www.clingendael.nl/cdsp/publications/? id=5920 &&type=summary.

13 For the State Department’s assessment of its exchange programs, see Internet, http://exchanges.state.gov/education/evaluations/.

14 Nicholas Cull, “US Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-1991,” Transnational Broadcast-

ing Studies Journal, vol. 15 (Spring 2006).

15 Susan B. Epstein and Lisa Mages, “Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations,” The Congressional Research Service (31 October 2005).

16 U.S. Department of State, “Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy,” Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy (September 2005): 9; and Shawn Zeller, “Damage Control: Karen Hughes Does PD,” The Foreign Service Journal 83, no. 10 (October 2006).

17 Joseph Nye, 77.

18 Walter R. Roberts and Barry Fulton, “Rebuilding Public Diplomacy,” National Strategy Forum Review (Spring 2004).

19 Helena K. Finn, “Perceptions of U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Interview by Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 September 2005.

20 Martha Bayles, “Now Showing the Good, the Bad and the Ugly Americans: Exporting the Wrong Picture,” Washington Post, 28 August 2005.

21 Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 3 May 2006.

22 Will Ostick, Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Panama, in a video conference with author, 19 October 2006.

23 Alvin Snyder, “America’s Arabic News Channel Gains Audience,” University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy, 10 October 2006. Internet, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/1993/.

24 For more on this theme, see Stanley Hoffmann’s article, “The Foreign Policy the U.S. Needs,” The New York Review of Books 53, no. 13 (10 August 2006).

25 For more on this theme, see Samantha Power’s article “Fixing Foreign Policy” in note #8 above.

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Africa’s Third-Term Syndrome A Trend Toward Authoritarianism or a Unique Form of Democracy?

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo Presidential succession is one of the most contentious issues in Africa. Although liberal democratic practices defined in the rituals of pluralistic elections have been expanding in Africa, this transition is being challenged by the presidential thirdterm syndrome. The prospect of a third term is frequently met with suspicion, as it generates intense debates and scrutiny by civil society and the international community. It also raises concerns about the main objectives behind this phenomenon within the context of political pluralism in Africa.

This article focuses on understanding the presidential third-term syndrome in relationship to the claims and values of multiparty democracy. It examines the historical context that gave rise to this phenomenon. Additionally, it analyzes current cultural and political conditions in Africa that continue to support and propagate the third-term syndrome despite some national and international criticism. By doing so, it explores the extent to which the rise of the presidential thirdterm syndrome reflects a deficit of African multiparty democracy. Finally, it considers the options available to the international community in addressing this phenomenon.

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo is professor of political science and chair of the Division of Social Sciences at Wells College in New York.

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Theoretical Propositions about Liberal Democracy. Historically, different parts of the world have produced their own democratic experiments. Yet despite these differences, liberal democracy can be broadly characterized by the following: respect for the rule of law, competition among individuals and organized groups, political pluralism, inclusive participation in the selection of leaders and policies, dynamic civil society, individual civil and political liberties, and constitutionalism.1 Regardless of its global desirability, liberal democracy cannot succeed if it is externally imposed.

Liberal democracy provides regular constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials, permitting the population to influence major decisions.

Constitutionalism sets forth the general laws and political guidelines about how to deal with the durability of elected citizens in their public duties. It regulates the government and citizens’ activities in order to limit abuses of power and to keep the system running.2 As Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first president, stated, “The nation’s constitution must provide the methods by which the people can, without recourse to violence, control the government.” 3 Most democracies have term limits in their constitutions. In some cases, there is a combination of a limit term, a nonlimit term, or non-democratic procedures. The term limit has advantages and disadvantages related to the performance of elected officials and to voters’ expectations. As Michael Smart of the University of Toronto and Daniel Sturm of the London School of Economics state: At first glance, term limits are a curious intervention into the polit[ 1 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ical process. The opportunity to serve further terms in office should be a powerful incentive for incumbents to pursue the policies that voters reward with re-election. A term limit denies voters this opportunity to reward or punish the incumbent for his behaviour once he faces a binding term limit.4 In short, the third-term syndrome is a valid political concept derived from the logic of liberal democracy. As such, it cannot be considered analogous with political dysfunction. Nor should we consider it separately from the structures of the African state and its political economy. Understanding this reasoning may help respond to the questions of how the concept has been used and for what purposes.

History of the Third-Term Syndrome. African states were not

built on democratic foundations. Of the thirty-six countries which gained independence in Africa through different means between 1956 and 1970, thirtythree became authoritarian at their birth or shortly after. Many of the first generation of elected African heads of state claimed to be the fathers of their nationstates. African leaders such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Nyerere of Tanzania, to cite only a few, felt they had national obligations and “paternal” duties to remain in power forever in order to unify their people and attempt to create “strong states.” They developed governing models that had no presidential term limits; most constitutions were mute on this issue. Power politics without term limits quickly engendered enormous political abuses that decreased citi-

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zens’ incentives to participate in the political process.

During the Cold War, the polarization of the world inhibited any possibility of the rise and expansion of both “centralized democracy” (socialist democracy) and liberal democracy models. Whenever these models arose in Africa, they became instruments of control and manipulation. Conflict between the superpowers facilitated a non-democratic Africa,

Politics & Diplomacy

ments in most parts of the continent resisted colonial laws, policies, and politics of exploitation. The combination of these struggles with political reforms led eventually to political independence.

By the 1990s there was an emerging high level of social consciousness among various groups and movements in Africa.

Many non-governmental organizations started to organize people on the issues of social and economic development; some

The third-term syndrome cannot be

analogous with political dysfunction. heavily armed and policed by the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective clients. By the 1970s and 1980s some of the most notorious dictators, including Idi Amin of Uganda, JosephDesiré Mobutu of Zaire, Marcias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, and Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo were firmly consolidated in Africa with military backing from the superpowers and economic support from international financial institutions. Both civil and political rights, the foundations of democracy, were limited and constrained by the dicta of the dominant global ideologies.5 The 1990s can be proclaimed as the starting point of a new wave of multiparty democracies in Africa. There has been a rise in various types of multiparty systems, an increase in activism within civil society, and a defeat of ruling-party candidates in Zambia, Benin, Senegal, and Ghana.

This is not the first time that civil society has been involved in political struggles in Africa. During the colonial era, various forms of popular and social move-

even developed alternative social and economic development programs. In the absence of reliable governmental services or viable functioning states, many sectors of civil society started to fulfill the functions of governments. In addition, these national civil societies started to become members of regional and international civil societies from which they gained financial and organizational support, as well as a human resource base that national governments were unable to control. These developments make the recent activism of civil societies different from that of the colonial period.

Since the 1990s the renewal of electoral democracies in Africa has produced new presidents, new prime ministers, and new representatives in parliaments and national assemblies. As of 2005 there were at least twelve retired presidents in Africa who had completed their constitutional terms and handed over power peacefully after elections. These developments are most encouraging.

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past that have led to the rise of third-term syndrome.

This syndrome may also be an outcome of a “political zombiism,” a voodoo kind of belief associated with the imagined supernatural role of an incumbent to remain in power.7 “Political zombiism” refers to the disposition of some African presidents or presidential incumbents to consult with traditional doctors such as voodoo priests, fetishists, or marabouts in search for super-institutional means to remain in power longer.8 The consultation with traditional religious institutions can be interpreted as a way of acquiring the blessing of the supernatural power in the process of running again for a political office.

Despite the problematic nature of such a proposition in practical terms, leaders like Mobutu, Eyadema, Nguema, and others have used these cultural arguments to foster their messianic political images.

Despite the above claims, the thirdterm syndrome has been viewed as part of Manifestations of the Third- a democratic process supported by some Term Syndrome. The rising inci- communities of citizens. To better dence of presidential third terms in the understand the source of this support, it post-Cold War era has caused concern is necessary to explore the relationship among African civil societies and the between the presidential third-term syninternational community. Some of the drome and the nature of the liberal apprehension originates from the history democratic structure in five basic African of African political leadership and the regimes: regimes with relatively strong structure of African states. In most cases popular/national bases; regimes with governments had been authoritarian but weak popular/national bases, but relawere either forced or persuaded by glob- tively strong elite cohesions; regimes with al changes to transition to democracy as a strong authoritarian military traditions mechanism of survival. However, many and norms; regimes with semi-democracurrent presidents have projected ele- tic or democratic traditions and pracments of authoritarianism and totalitari- tices; and regimes with strong clientelist anism in their policies. Another propo- bases but without popular bases or elite sition is that the transition to democracy cohesions.

Africa has produced some regimes has not been consistently democratic enough, and that it is the undemocratic with relatively strong popular bases. The practices and culture left over from the African National Congress, the South

be characterized as being in transition toward electoral or representative democracy. Other regimes are hybrid authoritarian regimes, with semi-permanent characteristics of police states with sporadic and/or pre-determined electoral processes. It is not clear whether these hybrid regimes, such as those of Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Idriss Deby in Chad, and Faure Eyadema in Togo are in any positive transition toward multipartyism. Many new regimes are neither democratic nor authoritarian. These regimes practice what has been called “illiberal democracy,” in which formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal authority but rulers violate the rules so strikingly that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards of democracy.6 Thus, the question of the presidential third-term syndrome has to be understood within the historical context of any regime.

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West African People’s Organisation, the Kenyan African National Union, the Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front, the Tanganyika National Union, the Convention People’s Party, the National Resistance Movement, and others have attempted to be both popu-

Politics & Diplomacy

movements but with strong elite cohesive bases in their centers can also produce incumbents who desire to change the constitution in their favor. The confidence in amending the constitution is based on imagined compromises among various elites that a constitutional change

As of 2005 there were at least twelve

retired presidents in Africa who had completed their constitutional terms and handed over power peacefully after elections. lar/national movements and political parties. Incumbents in regimes that have historically developed out of strong national liberation movements are likely to achieve presidential third terms because of claimed legitimacy in the nation-building process. With their centralized policy base these regimes are likely to have a high coercive capacity to repress opposition parties. In South Africa, for example, if Nelson Mandela had requested a presidential third term, an amendment to the South African Constitution would have been possible.

This did not happen, however, because the African National Congress saw itself as the ideological torchbearer of democracy.9 In other cases, like Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda, the ruling parties implemented token electoral reforms in response to a substantial degree of outside pressure. Yet because of state media control, lack of political participation by many ethnic and social groups, and a persistent high level of political corruption, elections have taken place in Uganda without any solid or significant democratic political culture taking root.

Regimes with weak popular/national

would be beneficial to the stability of the country and to nation-building. For instance, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI-RDA) produced a patrician kind of regime under Houphouët-Boigny.

Regimes of Americo-Liberians in Liberia had similar elite political characteristics.

Regimes with strong military traditions are also more likely to produce leaders who try to amend their country’s constitution in order to run for a third term. Some of these cases include Compaoré of Burkina-Faso, Mubarak of Egypt, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Lansana Conté of Guinea-Conakry, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana. These regimes reflect “autocratic multipartyism,” characterized by unfair and highly manipulated elections.10 They have produced what W. Alade Fawole of Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria, has called “voting without choosing” in the case of Nigeria.11 In May 2006 President Olusegun Obasanjo’s supporters claimed that he had done “good work of reform and Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 2 9 ]

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democratization� during his tenure and explored the possibility of a third term.

However, opposition to the amendment of the Nigerian Constitution was strongly expressed by the National Assembly, which even introduced a bill against it.

Opposition also came from several groups in civil society.

Regimes with semi-democratic or accepted democratic practices are less likely to support incumbents who may wish to amend the constitution to run for third terms because of the level of inclusiveness and openness in democratic debates. Benin, Ghana (after Rawlings’s second term), Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, and Senegal provide some illustrations to assess the behaviors of liberal democracies in this category.

However, leaders in these regimes can also manipulate events to remain in power beyond the end of their defined terms in office. Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, for example, might attempt to manipulate the constitution in order to extend his tenure even in his first term.

Regimes with strong clientelist bases (patron-client regimes) and strong centralized party apparatuses have also succeeded in producing and supporting the third-term syndrome. These regimes literally buy and control the votes in a more direct way without necessarily articulating a nationalist agenda. The emergence of a third term in this case is directly related to the quality of management of political and economic resources in a context of abject poverty. Within these regimes, military control of the public or civil society gives a superficial impression of stability and peace.

as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. Foreign petroleum companies support their national clients economically and politically through donations, taxes, limited and selective local investments, technological transfer, and other means. If foreign oil corporations could directly decide on the national political issues, they would prefer to continue business with the clients they know now than with those that national elections could bring to power tomorrow. Patron-client regimes tend to be stronger in countries with endowed natural resources than those with low factor endowments. It should be emphasized that one of the supreme objectives of states that produce oil is the focus on oil production, management, and marketization, while other policy goals are considered secondary. In general, political leadership tends to be more preoccupied with how to use oil revenues to consolidate its power base. These regimes cannot afford to alienate international market forces, and because of the nature of the product, they cannot be absolutely dictatorial.

As poverty deepens and government resources become scarcer in African states, the person or party who controls them is very likely to hold onto power.

Utilizing belly politics in its full pragmatism, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Paul Biya of Cameroon, and Eyadema of Togo succeeded in amending the constitutions in order to run for their third terms. Furthermore, in these cases political parties and the state tend to work in many ways like an extended family system. The person who has access to national resources is expected to share them with the close Clientelism and the Third Term. members of his/her ethnic groups. In Patron-client regimes are even stronger short, a president is a loyal member of an in petroleum-producing countries such ethnic group, a political party, and a reli[ 1 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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gious organization. The regimes in this category are highly personalized. They tend to use cooptation, coercion, and corruption as instruments of maintaining power beyond the end of prescribed term limits.

Patron-client political regimes have responded more significantly and consistently over the years to the imperatives of free market dogma and liberal democratic elections. For instance, they have implemented most of the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs’ (SAPs) recommendations in their various stages.

Several countries in this category have recently been celebrated as being “success stories” in good governance and accountability, community-based planning and health services, quality improvement in elementary/primary school, labor control, privatization, and in other sectors. With the exception of extremely poor countries like Senegal, most countries in this category have had an economic growth of between 3 and 5 percent annually.

The effect of the SAPs of the World Bank and the so-called stabilization programs of the IMF should be put in perspective. The main of objective of these programs, which began in the 1980s, was to make African states capable of paying back their foreign loans. The state’s political control of opposition parties and social and popular movements frequently facilitated implementation of the SAPs. Until recently, democracy and human rights were not part of the conditionality packages set up by the international financial institutions in the process of lending capital to African countries. As long as there was an appearance of regime stability, an adoption of privatization and a free market agenda, and the countries were capable

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of paying back some of their loans, the third-term practice was not raised as a serious problem.

However, the SAPs and the thirdterm phenomenon do not have any causal relationship. SAPs were born at a time of international bipolarity in which democracy mattered relatively little in international relations, especially in Africa. The third-term syndrome is mainly a political phenomenon associated with the dynamics of, and contradictions related to, liberal democracy and power struggles within African states during the post-Cold War era. It is an internally constructed phenomenon with domestic and international political and policy implications.

Policy Implications of the ThirdTerm Syndrome. No single factor

can fully explain why and how the presidential third term has arisen in Africa.

The rise of the presidential third-term syndrome is an outcome of the relationship between the dynamics of liberal democracy in a non-liberal political culture, strong executive traditions, clientelist management of scarce resources, and the fluidity of ethnic politics. Weak multiparty political culture and economic infrastructure, as well as strong ruling political parties, have also contributed to this phenomenon. The presidential third-term syndrome is thus located in the malfunctions of the structures of the African state and its lack of creativity as to how to deal with incumbents, including after they leave office.

The improvement of living conditions, the independence of civil society, the consolidation of societal trust and belief in political institutions, and the democratization of the state apparatus could help decrease the frequency of this

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syndrome. Constitutions, national assemblies or parliaments, and the ministries of national treasury and labor should clearly stipulate the retirement conditions of former African presidents and define what they would be qualified to do after leaving office. As argued above, the third-term phenomenon is a symptom of larger political and social issues in Africa. The phenomenon has both local and international dimensions, and a holistic approach is necessary to address it.

How should the international community react to this phenomenon?

International organizations and agencies, foreign governments, human rights organizations, international and regional research institutes, and policy centers should continue to support genuine democracy and democratic practices by working through close collaboration and partnerships with local and grassroots organizations. They should make sure that individuals and political regimes respect constitutions, and that any amendments to the constitutions that are not democratically verified and approved can be interrogated, challenged, or condemned by the international community. The existing tendency of inter-national organizations to work mainly with opposition parties and

movements has not been always productive. They also should work with the ruling parties as well as with local think tanks and organizations.

Finally, the third-term syndrome is also a phenomenon stemming from the influence of money in politics. International organizations, foreign institutions, research centers, and community organizations should persuade or convince international financial organizations and multinational corporations not to take sides in local elections. Changing the rules of the role of money in electoral politics is very likely also to contribute to strengthening democratic institutions and practices in Africa and to making the electoral process predictable, inclusive, and pluralistic.

In the fragile democracies in Africa, the third-term phenomenon can quickly become an instrument of power that can be hijacked for the advancement of personal, ethnic, class, or other interests.

Constitutional amendments to alter the legality of third terms should be made legally and technically complex by setting up multiple layers in the voting system and facilitating political inclusiveness.

This will avoid quick and simplistic resolution to this issue and clarify further its general objectives and policy implications.

NOTES

1 For further discussion on the concept of liberal democracy, see Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences with Democracy (London: Lynner Rienners, 1995); Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Tukumbi LumumbaKasongo, The Rise of Multipartyism and Democracy in the Context of Global Change: the Case of Africa (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998).

2 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

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3 Julius Nyerere, “Governance in Africa,” African Association of Political Science Newsletters, 3, no. 2, (MayAugust 1999).

4 Michael Smart and Daniel Sturm, “Term Limits and Electoral Accountability,” (paper presented at CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, Munich, Germany, 11 May 2003), 2.

5 Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, ed., Liberal Democracy and Its Critics in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2005).

6 Steven Levistsky and Lucian A. Way, “Autocracy

by Democratic Rules: The Dynamics of Competitive

LUMUMBA-KASONGO

Authoritariansm in the Post-Cold War Era,” (paper presented at Mapping The Great Zone: Clientelism and Boundary between Democratic and Democratizing, Columbia University, New York, 4-5 April 2003).

7 Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, 1998, op. cit., 2324.

8 For further information about the concept of zombie as used in this context, see Wade David, Robert Ferris Thompson, and Richard Evans Schultes, Passage of Darkness: The Ethnobiology of the Haitian Zombie (Chapel Hill:

Politics & Diplomacy

University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

9 Thiven Reddy, “The Congress Party Model: South Africa’s African National Congress and India’s Indian National Congress,” African and Asian Studies 4, no.

3 (2005): 287.

10 Steven Levistsky and Lucian A. Way, op. cit.

11 For further information about this concept, see W. Alade Fawole, “Voting without Choosing: Interrogating the Crisis of Electoral Democracy in Nigeria,” in Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, ed., 2005, op. cit.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 3 3 ]

Books

More than Regime Change Review by Christopher C. Joyner Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks. Can Might Make Rights?

Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 416 pp. $29.95.

Over the last five decades international legal literature has paid little attention to post-conflict situations and the ways in which the intervening power contributes to the restoration of public order and civil society. Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions goes far in filling that lacuna. It is neither a manual nor a primer on the ways and means for fixing broken societies after civil conflicts. Rather, the study provides a sensible, carefully conceived assessment of the problems confronting these war-

torn societies and weighs the possible legal, cultural, institutional, and political solutions that could facilitate the transition process, upheld by the rule of law. It does so by examining the post-conflict experiences of countries since 1993, drawing lessons from them for effecting norm creation, civil obedience, and political transformation.

Relevant, First-Hand Analysis.

The authors provide valuable insights, not only for international lawyers and scholars, but also for policymakers, diplomats, students, and journalists. In doing so, their analysis cannot help but bring to mind former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s admonition to President Bush in the summer of 2002 regarding the prospects for a U.S. invasion into Iraq: “You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people. You will own all their hopes, aspirations, and problems. You'll own it all.” Secretary Powell called this “the Pottery Barn rule: Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 3 5 ]

MORE THAN REGIME CHANGE

restore internal stability and order in these countries. This is in contrast to the colonial-era aims of gaining permanent sovereignty over territories or realizing long-term economic benefits by extracting natural resources. Notwithstanding their intentions, intervening powers often end up as de facto governments, overseeing the political, economic, and social recovery of these targeted countries. In sum, they are charged with fixing the societies that they have broken by intervention.

There is no question that in the aftermath of a military intervention, the reconstruction of a civil society administered by a democratic government constitutes a tall order for an intervening Great Power. Regardless of whether it is realized, these so-called “new imperialists” inherit the responsibility for restoring peace and public order in that broken state. More than that, however, they also become liable for re-establishing the rule of law, rebuilding the damaged economic infrastructure, protecting at-risk minority populations, selecting and Behind the Scenes: Humanitarian Intervention. The training local political leaders, and fosfundamental assumption underpinning tering acceptance of democratic instituthe study is that military interventions tions. As the authors repeatedly affirm, into developing countries by Great Pow- these are not easy tasks for any intervener ers, especially the United States, have government. become a hallmark of the post-Cold War era. Several episodes since 1993 support Complications of Aftermath. this contention: Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Looking back over the past two decades, Kosovo, East Timor, Liberia, Sierra the contemporary tendency of Great Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq. That such Powers to intervene prompts a number interventions will continue to occur of salient questions. What circumstances seems likely, irrespective of whether they legally justify military intervention by a are motivated by humanitarian reasons, powerful state or a multilateral coalition national security considerations, or into the affairs of another state? What geopolitical concerns. Interestingly, the roles do considerations of values, norms, authors suggest that these military inter- and legal rules play in establishing the ventions represent a new form of “liber- legitimacy of these interventions? How al imperialism,” a strategy that seeks to do the ways and means of such intervenYou break it, you own it.” In its lucid, coherent analysis, this study explains what attitudes, goals, and policies are necessary for the intervening state to fix that broken society.

This volume, which was six years in the making, is the end result of a project sponsored by the American Society of International Law. All of the authors are professors of law: Jane Stromseth and Rosa Brooks teach at the Georgetown University Law Center and David Wippman is Vice Provost for International Relations at the Cornell Law School.

This is not to suggest that the study is merely an academic, technical enterprise in international law—it is far from it.

Each of the authors has on-the-ground experience in the countries examined.

More significantly, all of the authors have practical experience confronting the problems posed by post-conflict situations, and they draw upon that background in analyzing the case situations and arriving at their conclusions.

[ 1 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

JOYNER

tions facilitate or complicate the ability of the new imperialism to accomplish its goals? What, exactly, is meant by the goal-value of “the rule of law” when it comes to restoring a civil society in these countries? How long may interveners remain in the target country and by what criteria do the intervening governments determine that the time has arrived for them to leave? While these are clearly difficult questions, they provide the intellectual foundation on which this book rests and the underlying ambition that guides its analysis: to ascertain which policies appear to work best for rebuilding the rule of law in post-conflict societies.

A key consideration regarding establishment of the rule of law is the lawfulness of the military intervention that made such circumstances necessary.

There is no doubt that given a UN Security Council approval, such military interventions would be permissible. But what if the Security Council opts not to act or every proposed action is stymied in the council by the veto of some permanent member? In an era when human rights are all too frequently abused, a logical contention might be that moral legitimacy and legal righteousness prompt some states to engage in humanitarian intervention to halt crimes against humanity in the country of concern. Or perhaps international permissibility stems from appealing to the newly emergent notion of “responsibility to protect”: to halt a government’s perpetration of genocidal atrocities against its own people. Even so, the bases for such action remain controversial among both government officials and internationallaw academics.

The situation is no less complicated regarding the exercise of self-defense

Books

against terrorist groups. Since the horrendous attacks by al-Qaeda on 9/11, the legal authority to intervene with armed force into states that give safe haven to terrorists has prompted the Bush administration to stretch the legal notion of self-defense into “preemptive selfdefense.” Even more troubling is the conjured-up concept of “preventive war.” This latter concept advocates the permissibility of one state to attack another if the former believes that the latter state will attack it in the future.

Such a notion seems to offer carte blanche to states to resort to armed force against one another on a presumption of potential harm, as opposed to a perceived threat that leaves no moment of warning or deliberation. The authors rightly conclude that the degree of success in rebuilding a post-conflict society might well come from the population’s perception that military intervention was necessary and therefore legitimate. In that respect UN Charter principles—and to a lesser extent humanitarian motivations— seem the safer grounds on which to rest a case.

Ingredients for Sustainable Security. As this study makes clear, the

blueprint for attaining the rule of law in a post-intervention society involves the creation of operational governmental structures, the adoption of electoral rules, and the creation of constitutional arrangements that permit the separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Yet there exists no standard template for post-conflict restructuring. Each conflict is marked by its own peculiarities, cultural conditions, and socio-political circumstances. Conflicts driven by ethnic hatred, societal distrust, and neighbor-against-neighbor Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 3 7 ]

MORE THAN REGIME CHANGE

violence create greater challenges in their aftermaths than those that are resourcebased. In every case, however, the most critical consideration for post-conflict reconstruction is the reestablishment of a secure domestic environment. Ensuring sustainable domestic security remains the sine qua non for ensuring societal stability and public order. Both of these make attainment of the rule of law possible.

In examining each of the major military interventions since 1993, the authors rightly conclude that the need for functioning police, courts, and prisons “is never greater than in the immediate aftermath of intervention.� Moreover, the sooner these civil institutions are put in place, the sooner the intervener can leave the country. One only has to view the present situation in Iraq to appreciate the dilemmas posed by the failure to achieve these conditions. Furthermore, the ingredients necessary for fixing the rule of law in these broken societies include the courts, legislatures, police, prisons, schools, and press. Accomplishing this, of course, depends mightily on the people in that country and the adequacy of their financial, political, and educational resources to make these processes function effectively.

Achieving Effective Governance.

Appropriately, the most extensive treatment in the study is devoted to problems attendant to judicial reform. How can fair, effective justice systems be constructed and strengthened in the wake of violent military intervention? The key to judicial reform is a synergistic approach that follows an ends-based understanding of the rule of law. The following goals should guide this effort: securing basic law and order; creating a government bound by law; sustaining equality before [ 1 3 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the law; creating efficient justice that is consistent; and protecting universal human rights for the general population.

As these goals imply, building a fair and effective justice system will depend on the political framework, civic culture, and popular support for such a system. In sum, the general population must believe in the justice system and trust that it will work to serve the goals embodied in the rule of law.

In addressing the question of how to define the rule of law, the authors strive to explain the notion in theoretical, philosophical, and sociological terms, as well as within the context of pragmatic institutions and human actors. The main lesson drawn from this is that if the rule of law is to be established in a post-conflict society, the intervening power must employ a synergistic approach that integrates processes of norm creation, cultural change, and transformation of government institutions. Once again, the authors remind us that there is no magic bullet for making these circumstances happen. It takes much hard work, patience, and collaborative efforts from both members of the occupying force and designated local political leaders.

In the aftermath of an intervention to halt genocidal atrocities, a profound dilemma arises: how can interveners promote reconciliation in that state while concurrently holding people who commit gross violations of human rights accountable for their actions? The authors suggest several options to address these needs. For one, international tribunals, such as in the case of Bosnia and Rwanda, might be created; for another, there is the possibility of creating hybrid judicial arrangements, as in the situations of Kosovo and East Timor. Perhaps truth and reconciliation commis-

JOYNER

Books

tutions, guided by the rule of law, will drain an intervening government’s time, political energy, and foreign policy attention. Consequently, while transition strategies might vary according to circumstances, the intervener must undertake effective planning and coordination of peace-keeping operations. As a neutral agency, it would seem prudent that the UN assume the leading role in organizing and implementing those plans. Resources and commitment also are requisite elements of successful postconflict transitions. Accordingly, efforts Culture Matters. Finally, interveners must be made by the intervener to coormust instill popular appreciation for a dinate efforts with non-governmental rule-of-law culture in post-conflict soci- organizations that furnish food, relief eties. That is, the general population aid, and medical supplies to facilitate the must come to realize the value of legal reconstruction of a society. Similarly, institutions and legal processes. To money and international interest must accomplish this, interveners must think be raised to ensure the prospects for sucless like lawyers and more like agents of cess; those objectives will require solicitasocial change. In this regard, interveners tion of donor governments and particimust practice through their actions the pant international agencies.

While all of the above are important messages that they preach to the people.

There must be accountability to punish factors in restoring legal order and pubwrongdoers among the intervening lic civility in post-intervention states, the forces; there must be transparency in most critical ingredient rests in the attitheir actions; interveners must be edu- tudes, values, and preferences of the cated in the language and culture of the indigenous population. They must society that they are trying to reform; and demonstrate the political will and the interveners should act multilaterally and genuine determination to make the collaboratively in implementing rule of transformation happen. Put bluntly, any law programs. Each society is different, form of government, democracy includand those disparities must be taken into ed, cannot be imposed upon them; the consideration by interveners when a rule people who are affected most must prefer of law culture is being introduced, tested, that type of government and must make dedicated efforts to make governmental and implemented.

This study leaves no doubt that creat- institutions, legal reforms, and the rule ing public order and political stability in of law function in their society. war-ravaged societies is likely to be a protracted, tedious, and expensive invest- Conclusion. This volume provides a ment for an intervening power. Over the much appreciated, well-balanced treatperiod of transition, the implementation ment of the difficulties of creating a ruleof sustainable democratic and legal insti- of-law culture in a post-conflict society. sions might be established, as occurred in East Timor and Sierra Leone, or special ad hoc courts could be set up, as in the case of Sierra Leone or the national trial of Saddam Hussein. Imperatively, while the pursuit of accountability for atrocities can strengthen justice systems and contribute to the rule of law, there must be a delicate balance to ensure that civic culture is maintained and passions are not inflamed by calls for justice or revenge. This, too, presents an obstacle that interveners must overcome.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 3 9 ]

MORE THAN REGIME CHANGE

It is a combination of theory, contemporary case examples, and practical recommendations. From this multifaceted analysis, noteworthy lessons emerge.

First, while focus on the restoration of domestic legal and governing institutions in a war-torn region is certainly necessary, it is hardly sufficient. A second lesson posits that the intervener state must also address more complex political, social, and cultural issues that affect a society’s genuine commitment to the social norms and political values associated with the rule of law. In this sense, a third lesson becomes clear: if the rule of law for underpinning a sustainable peace is to be attained, not only must careful planning and adequate resources be available from the intervening power, but there must also be ample vision and imagination. Given that political leaders who emerge in war-torn developing countries are all too often cursed by desires of self-aggrandizement and histories of ethnic mistrust, these commodities undoubtedly will be difficult to obtain.

[ 1 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

In the end, achieving regime change through military intervention in a state is far easier to accomplish than refurbishing the remnants of that state into a civil society that is governed by acceptable law, order, and juridical institutions. Accordingly, Great Power governments would be wise to consider the extravagant costs and long-lasting liabilities of such national adventures. One needs to recall no more than the United States’s recent experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq to substantiate this final point. Given this historical perspective, it is an admonition in contemporary real-world politics that all governments would do well to remember.

Christopher C. Joyner is professor of international law in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His most recent book is International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance.

View from the Ground

The Other Casualties

Lessons From the Sixth Arab-Israeli War Wa’el Alzayat Honey, We Leave in Two Hours. Saturday, 15 July

2006. I greet the cab driver at the entrance of the Cedar Land hotel, our home in Beirut for the past two weeks. He is on time and obviously in a hurry; there is a war going on, after all. I had spoken with Mahmoud earlier that day to ask him whether he would be making the Beirut to Damascus run in the coming days. Due to the escalating violence, he told me that he was making the trip in two hours—for the last time. I asked him to pick us up.

My wife and I had arrived in Beirut expecting to spend the summer working and exploring Lebanon and the neighboring countries. I was conducting research for a local non-governmental organization, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, on various civil society and political issues ranging from human rights to judicial reform. This was an especially important trip for me both personally and professionally: having been born and raised in Syria, returning to the Middle East after eighteen years of absence was something special. Little did my wife and I know that what had begun as an ordinary twomonth internship would turn into a roller-coaster ride through a major war. During our adventure, we would see firsthand the opportunities and disappointments of a region full of contradictions.

Wa’el Alzayat is a second-year graduate student in the Master of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University specializing in U.S. Middle East policy.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 4 1 ]

THE OTHER CASUALTIES

Aside from Lebanese and Israeli civilians, the thirty-three day war between Israel and Hezbollah left three main casualties in its wake. The first is Arab governments. Whether moderate or conservative, secular or religious, Arab regimes have been thoroughly discredited by the war. By failing to rein in Israel by capitalizing on their close relationships with Washington, moderate states such as Egypt and Jordan lost significant political capital among their citizens. For hardliners such as Syria, the war demonstrated that their high military expenditures were ineffective. Hezbollah, on the other hand, achieved with limited forces what no Arab army has been able to do in five major wars against Israel. The second casualty is the international community at large, and the UN in particular, which failed to dissuade the United States from toeing the Israeli line. The Arab public watched in disbelief as Lebanon was laid to waste while the international community stood by. The third casualty of the

future peace efforts.

With this in mind, it is incumbent upon the United States to act immediately to mitigate and hopefully begin to reverse some of the adverse effects of the war. In particular, the United States must reconsider its policy toward Syria. By reopening channels with Syria, Washington should make a concerted effort to convince Damascus to disentangle itself from the Iranian camp and seek other alternatives to settle its disputes with the Jewish state.

The City Has Gone Mad. It is iron-

ic to think of Lebanon as it was just before the war. If one had arrived in the middle of Beirut during the World Cup, one easily would have mistaken the downtown for a European or South American capital. Flags of participating nations adorned almost every storefront, hung from countless balconies, and fluttered over passing cars. The Lebanese, notorious for their heated political

What had begun as an ordinary two-

month internship would turn into a rollercoaster ride through a major war. war is U.S. leverage in the region. By discrediting moderate allies and shunning diplomacy in favor of military force, the United States has become a liability to even its closest allies. Most troubling is the convergence of American and Israeli policy under the oversimplified slogan of “fighting terror.” Together these consequences of the war point to a dangerous development in the region, as moderate forces are undermined, the chasm between Arabs and Israelis widens, and hardliners are encouraged to obstruct [ 1 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

debates, instead had only one question on their minds: “Who are you with?”

They did not want to know to which of the country’s seventeen religious and ethnic sects you belonged, but rather which team you supported.

For those familiar with the modern history of Lebanon, the excitement surrounding the World Cup may seem like a peculiar phenomenon. The Lebanese people, after all, experienced one of the world’s longest and most brutal civil wars.

From 1975 to 1991, over 100,000 peo-

ALZAYAT

ple died, 150,000 were wounded, and 17,000 remain missing. The Lebanese endured two Israeli occupations and one

by Syrian troops who overstayed their welcome by fifteen years.1 The most traumatic aspect of the war was the merciless bloodletting along sectarian lines that pitted town against town, city block against city block, neighbor against neighbor. Even after the civil war, one could sense that the Lebanese had not

View from the Ground

unprecedented stance against an enemy of Israel was based on the bet that, first, Israeli operations would be limited in nature, and second, the United States would ensure that things did not get out of hand. A more conspiratorial hypothesis suggests that these leaders hoped for a quick Israeli victory over Hezbollah, which they perceived to be an Iranian surrogate. Whatever their reasoning may have been, their assumptions were

The most traumatic aspect of the war

was the merciless bloodletting that pitted town against town, city block against city block, neighbor against neighbor. made their peace with one another. The celebrations surrounding the World Cup indicated that after fighting for so long over their differences, they were happy to channel their energy into a more benign rivalry. Nothing could have prepared them for what was to come.

“Uncalculated Adventures.”For

longtime U.S. allies in the region, Hezbollah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers was a dangerous escalation in an already troubled neighborhood. Despite the lack of a formal peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, the ambush of 12 July in the border region was unprovoked and premeditated. Eager to nip the problem in the bud and perhaps to isolate Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan gambled by publicly criticizing the group’s operation—and by implication siding with Israel. Riyadh issued a strong rebuke accusing Hezbollah of carrying out "uncalculated adventures."2 These Arab governments’

wrong. Lebanese infrastructure was severely damaged by the wide scope of Israeli operations, and the United States was incapable of or unwilling to exercise its influence over Israel, the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.3 The trouble for Arab regimes went beyond appearing to side with Israel against Hezbollah. The lack of a unified Arab strategy contributed to the war’s prolongation as much as did Israeli actions. As the war progressed, Arab governments could not present a unified front calling for an immediate end to hostilities. Instead, meetings of Arab leaders degenerated into the accusations and recriminations that have come to characterize such gatherings. It was not until the teary-eyed Lebanese prime minister rejected the first U.S.-French sponsored resolution that Arab leaders and officials agreed to advocate Lebanon’s case at the UN. This was on 7 August—more than twenty-five days after the war had begun.4 Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 4 3 ]

THE OTHER CASUALTIES

Moreover, Arab governments, notorious for their large military expenditures and their failures on the battlefield, were outdone on live television by a guerilla force of 5,000 fighters. To a person

for its immediate end. While the United States unequivocally proclaimed Israel’s right to self-defense, the international community was muted in its response and slow to take action. At the UN, which

Arab governments notorious for their

failures on the battlefield were outdone on live television by a guerilla force of 5,000 fighters. already holds a poor record when it comes to protecting Lebanese civilians during war, the Security Council stalled for over a month. This was mainly due to the United States’s refusal to support a call for a ceasefire. Countries that had recently supported the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution” against the Syrian occupation were conspicuously silent during this crisis. Even France, historically among Lebanon’s closest friends, failed to act to spare the country more destruction. It was not until it became apparent that Israel would not be able to defeat Hezbollah’s militia without a massive invasion force and large casualties that the UN stepped in. On 11 August, Resolution 1701 was unanimously adopted, ending the war and providing for the deployment of 30,000 Lebanese and UN troops along the border area.6 Missing in Action. Along with Arab Before the long-awaited ceasefire, governments, the war claimed the inter- hundreds of thousands of refugees desnational community as another of its perately tried to escape the war. However, casualties. During the early days of the the systematic bombing of roads and war, people in Lebanon did not believe bridges by the Israeli air force ensured that the world would sit idly for a month that evacuation efforts became a deadly before acting on their behalf. However, game of Russian roulette—as we learned not only was the war more serious than during our own escape from Beirut. Our most people had anticipated, it also taxi driver courageously wove his cab appeared that no one was willing to call through the mountains and sped across

watching the war on Al-Jazeera in Damascus, Cairo, or Amman, the war destroyed Arab leaders’ last shreds of credibility. As one retired Jordanian officer told me weeks after the war, “As long as these rulers continue to care more about their seats than their people, the humiliations will continue.”5 This sentiment is central to the general dissatisfaction in the Arab world today. Concerned with maintaining control, most governments have resisted genuine economic and political reform. At the same time, they have failed to prevent external actors from repeatedly interfering in the region. Therefore, the public perceives Arab rulers to be inept on two fronts: providing an alternative to the growing rise of political Islam and standing up to Israeli and U.S. hegemony in the region.

[ 1 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ALZAYAT

the Baq’a Valley, which separates Lebanon from Syria, in two and a half hours. It was an amazing feat, considering that he had to avoid major roads for fear of being targeted by Israeli planes.

His fears were not unfounded; not too long before our departure, a van carrying twelve people was incinerated by a missile in the Baq’a Valley. By the time we crossed into Syria in the early hours of Sunday, 16 July, more than 100,000 people had fled across the Syrian border.

Another 900,000 would flee or become displaced within the country by the end of the war.7 The international community clearly cannot be faulted for the outbreak of hostilities. For that, the blame lies squarely on Hezbollah’s shoulders. However, the UN’s inability to moderate Israel’s response—by quickly passing a

View from the Ground

strategic position during the vital early days of the conflict, when a real chance to rein in Hezbollah existed. Before thousands of people had to flee across the Syrian border and half of Beirut lay in ruin, people of different confessional denominations openly questioned the timing of Hezbollah’s operation and whether it was worth everything they had worked so hard to rebuild. Two thousand six had promised to be a banner year for tourism, foreign direct investment, a booming construction market, and returning expatriates ready to reinvest in their homeland. When the war started, people were angry at Hezbollah’s decision to act without their consent and then expecting them to pay a potentially heavy price. And what a heavy price it was.

The price tag for the war was well over $2.5 billion for damaged infrastructure

The head of Israel's Northern Command said, “This affair is between Israel and the state of Lebanon. Where to attack? Once inside Lebanon, everything is legitimate.” resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities—allowed the continuation of the killing of innocent civilians on both sides of the border. Even if the UN had attempted to pass a resolution, its efforts might have failed in the face of a possible U.S. veto. Thus the UN was rendered irrelevant, unable to exercise its mandate.

They Bombed an Airport but Missed an Opportunity. The third casualty of the war is U.S. standing in the Middle East. Ironically, the United States actually had a chance to improve its

alone. In all, 15,000 homes, 900 commercial structures, 400 miles of roads, up to 350 schools, 73 bridges, 25 fuel stations, 2 hospitals, Beirut International Airport, numerous ports, water and sewage treatment plants, and electrical facilities were destroyed, and some 130,000 more homes were damaged.8 Rather than capitalizing on popular sentiment against Hezbollah’s action, the United States further undermined its own popularity in the region by standing in Israel’s corner throughout the shelling, bombing, and blockading of the country, and by justifying Israeli actions Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 4 5 ]

THE OTHER CASUALTIES

as self-defense. For instance, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refused to call for a cease-fire in the early days of the conflict, giving the impression that the United States wanted the war to continue until Israeli objectives were met.9 While the United States was correct in supporting Israel’s call for the return of its soldiers and for the Lebanese government to rein in Hezbollah, it was wrong to support the disproportionate Israeli response that followed. In the absence of a clear Israeli military victory, the U.S. policy had two adverse consequences: it increased the popularity of Hezbollah and undermined pro-Western forces in Lebanon and the region at large.

The United States based its policy on the erroneous belief that military power alone would be sufficient to pummel the Lebanese people into turning against Hezbollah. This “sticks-only” approach may have worked had the bombing abated after the first few days to give the Lebanese a chance to absorb the severity of the situation. However, as days of bombing turned into weeks and the

the group’s popularity both within and outside of Lebanon.

Another consequence of Washington’s miscalculations was the discrediting of pro-U.S. forces within Lebanon, including the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. From the very beginning, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described the capture of Israeli soldiers as an “act of war” by Lebanon and claimed that Israel had been attacked by a sovereign country.10 Israel blamed the Lebanese government for the raid since it was carried out from Lebanese territory and because Hezbollah had two ministers serving in the Lebanese cabinet at the time. Israeli Chief of Staff Halutz said, “If the soldiers are not returned, we will turn Lebanon's clock back twenty years.”11 Moreover, the head of Israel's Northern Command, Major General Udi Adam, said, “This affair is between Israel and the state of Lebanon. Where to attack? Once it is inside Lebanon, everything is legitimate.”12 In response, Prime Minister Siniora denied having prior knowledge

As days of bombing turned into weeks

and the destruction intensified, most Lebanese began looking to Hezbollah as their only hope for protection. destruction intensified, most Lebanese began to view Israel, and by extension the United States, as the source of their misery while looking to Hezbollah as their only hope for protection. Thus by ignoring international calls for a cease-fire, both Israel and the United States missed an opportunity to settle the issue of an armed Hezbollah, and instead increased [ 1 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of the raid and stated that he did not condone it.13 In the end, the Siniora government was unable to either rein in Hezbollah or mitigate Israeli actions by capitalizing on its good relations with Washington.

One explanation for the U.S. position—shunning diplomacy in support of military force and siding openly with

ALZAYAT

Israel—is that the United States wanted Israel to destroy Hezbollah as much as Israel did. Therefore, the United States was willing to pay the high cost of damaged Lebanese infrastructure and to risk alienating its allies given that the mission was successful. However, the United States was mistaken in the belief that military power alone could deal with a prob-

View from the Ground

regard by about one-third of the country’s population, regardless of religious affiliation. Among Hezbollah’s followers, loyalty is directed not toward Iran, as most Westerners think, but toward Lebanon. This feeling is intertwined with loyalty to the ideals of Hezbollah and to its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. As a Shi’a delivery driver proudly told me a few days

The United States remains the sole

power capable of bringing the various adversaries in the Middle East back to the negotiating table. lem that was political in nature.

Hezbollah is an armed militia with proven military capabilities. The question of disarming the group is an internal Lebanese matter that external military intervention will only complicate.

While the slow movement of the Siniora government on this important issue is legitimate grounds for criticism, the sensitivity of the matter and the imbalance between the military power of the state vis-à-vis the militia required a cautious approach. A source of optimism before the war was the potential for a political settlement that institutionalized Shi’a power to be an answer to the disarmament problem. After all, Hezbollah is a political and social movement that relies on its arms to protect the Shi’a community’s interests, maintains an extensive web of social services, and has liberated Lebanese lands from Israel.

With this in mind, U.S. policy failure lies in the belief that Hezbollah was somehow distinct from the overall Shi’a community. While not all Shi’a support Hezbollah, the group is held in high

before the war, “The [civil] war was undoubtedly a sad affair, but some good did come out of it.” When I asked him to explain, he said that before the war, the Shi’a were second-class citizens with little economic, social, or political power. The war, he continued, “had taught the Shi’a to work together and gave them strength to accomplish great things, of which they are immensely proud.”14 Thus, the United States miscalculated when it thought that by simply defeating Hezbollah on the battlefield, the group would be broken for good. The Shi’a comprise approximately 30 percent of the Lebanese population, and Hezbollah’s supporters number in the hundreds of thousands.

In short, unless the United States was willing to allow Israel to kill one third of Lebanon’s population, its strategy was doomed to failure from the beginning.

All Roads Lead to Damascus.

The next Middle East war may involve a nuclear Iran, a nuclear Israel, or a chemical weapons-equipped Hezbollah. The danger for the main parties involved in Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 4 7 ]

THE OTHER CASUALTIES

this war is that they will learn the wrong lessons from it. The United States and Israel may think that better management and planning during the war could have led to success, while Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah may conclude that perpetual resistance is the only solution. This must not be allowed to occur. Despite its failures over the past summer, the United States remains the sole power capable of bringing the various adversaries in the Middle East back to the negotiating table.

It was U.S. involvement which, albeit belatedly, paved the way for UN Resolution 1701 to pass. To date, the United States has followed a strategy of isolation rather than engagement with Israel’s three main adversaries: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. However, this policy has produced few results since it leaves major stakeholders out of the equation. The most important lesson for the United States to learn from the sixth Arab-Israeli war is to engage with its adversaries in the region. A policy of engagement with hardliners such as Syria will be necessary given the fact that the most recent ArabIsraeli war has diminished the standing of both the United States and moderate, pro-U.S. Arab governments, and has highlighted how ineffective the interna-

tional community is in the region.

Instead of engaging all three simultaneously, a more realistic approach would be for the United States to begin with the party that is most susceptible to American overtures. The Syrian regime is concerned first and foremost with surviving.

Syria’s oil reserves will run out within ten years, and the government is desperately trying to liberalize the economy without prompting its collapse. It is also wary of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.15 The United States’s refusal to talk to Syria ensures the latter’s recalcitrance in recognizing Lebanese sovereignty, supporting militant groups, and aligning with Iran. By engaging Syria, the Bush administration can borrow a page from Nixon’s overtures to China as he sought to counter the Soviet threat. Acting now to engage Syria would mean removing a key supporter of Hezbollah and effectively forcing the militia to either moderate its stance or risk being geographically isolated. Given the United States’s desire to rein in Hezbollah and end Iranian regional aspirations, dialogue with Syria would go a long way in securing U.S. interests in the region and, perhaps, ushering in a new era of stability.

NOTES

1 Anthony Shadid, “Mothers Press Issues of War that Lebanese Want to Forget,” Washington Post, 2 January 2006, Internet, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/ 01/AR2006010101057_pf.html.

2 David Rising, “Arab Support for Hezbollah Grows,” ABC News International, 28 July 2006, Internet, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2 248195.

3 Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel: Background and Relations with the United States US Department of State,” CRS Report for Congress, 31 August 2006, Internet, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/72465.p df. p. 2.

4 Tom Perry, “Arab nations demand UN shift to

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end Lebanon war,” Reuters, 8 August 2006, Internet, http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/08082006/ 6/n-topnews-arab-nations-demand-un-shift-end-lebanonwar.html.

5 Interview on 8 August 2006. Amman, Jordan.

6 BBC News, 12 August 2006, Text of the UN Resolution 1701, Internet, http://new.bbc.co.uk/2hi/middle_east/4785963.stm.

7 International Rescue Committee, Internet, http://www.theirc.org/resources/lebanon-recoverybeings.html.

8 “Mideast War, by the Numbers,” Guardian / Associated Press, 18 August 2006 Internet http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,6022211,00.html.

ALZAYAT

9 “Turmoil in the Middle East: Violence: US Seen Waiting to Act on Israeli Strikes in Lebanon,” NY Times, 19 July 2006, Internet, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstrct.html/res=F40F11F83D5B0c7A8DDDAE089 4DE404482&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20To pics%2fPeople%2fR%2fRice%2c%20Condoleezza.

10 “Olmert: We Were Attacked by a Sovereign Country,” Ynetnews, 12 July 2006, Internet, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,740,L3274385,00.html.

11 Elise Labott, “Israel Authorizes 'Severe' Response to Abductions,” CNN, 12 July 2006,

View from the Ground

Internet, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast.

12 Ibid.

13 “Statement by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora,” The Manila Times, 17 July 2006, Internet, http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2006/aug/02/yehey/opinion/20060802opi7.html.

14 Interview on 7 July, Beirut.

15 International Crisis Group, “Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges,” in Middle East Report, no. 24, (Amman/Brussels, 11 February 2004), 11–14.

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 1 4 9 ]

A Look Back

Two Decades of Democratization Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski On 2 November 2006, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs met with former President of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski to discuss changes to the world system in the last two decades, particularly democratization, European integration, and economic growth in eastern Europe. Mr. Kwasniewski served as president of Poland from 1995 to 2005. Under his leadership, Poland joined NATO and the EU and developed a new constitution.

Aleksander Kwa sniew ski served as president of Poland from 1995 to 2005 and now holds the title of distinguished scholar in the practice of global leadership at Georgetown University.

GJI A: Let us begin with a few questions about Poland, where the economic and political system has changed dramatically over the past several decades. How has this affected Polish society and the way Poles see themselves and their role in the world?

Poland really started to change in 1989. Since then, we have achieved our main goals: we are in the European Union, we are in NATO, and we finally have democracy after almost fifty years of communist rule. We have a full-fledged free-market economy.

In my opinion, changes to mentality happen much more slowly than changes in politics, economics, and everything else. I think if you want to examine the main changes to social life in Poland, you must mention the following factors.

KWASN I EWSK I:

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The first factor is the spirit of entrepreneurship. The Polish people, from the very beginning, were very engaged in economic changes. We have a lot of small enterprises and family enterprises, which is one of the differences between Poland and some other central European and eastern European countries. In Poland, the spirit of business is very strong.

The second factor is the education boom in our young generation. When I was a student in Poland in the 1970s, we had no more than 350,000 students.

Today, there are many Polish universities, private and public, where more than two million students are enrolled.

Poland currently has more students per capita than Germany. The fact that young people understand that they will not have a chance to improve their lives without education is a good sign of development.

The third factor is Poles’ interest in

Are you concerned about the long-term effects of this phenomenon on Poland?

KWASN I EWSK I: I’m not very concerned about this. It’s a sign that Polish people are very active and dynamic; they are ready to move and look for jobs in European countries. I am not afraid of this movement of people within the EU framework because we decided to be a part of the European Union. We should speak about the European labor market, not the Polish labor market. I am sure that the majority of these young people working now in London, Germany, or France will come back to Poland.

GJ I A : As President, you completed Poland’s transition to liberal democracy and a free market economy. However, some critics claim that while Poland has made progress in moving toward a free

Democratization is a problem that stems

not only from the will of politicians, but also from citizens’ mentalities. social life. In the beginning of Poland’s changes in the years 1989 and 1990, we decided to decentralize the power by organizing local, elected authorities at the county, regional, city, and village levels. We found that many people were engaged in these local activities. They were interested in creating governing systems independent of the central government in Warsaw. : One consequence of Polish accession to the European Union has been a “brain drain,” or a large out-migration of skilled and talented Poles from their homeland to other countries in the EU. GJI A

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market, its political transition remains incomplete. What, if anything, keeps Poland from developing into a stronger democracy?

KWASN I EWSK I: Well, I think Poland is a quite strong democracy now. We started reforms in 1989, but our system works despite our relative lack of experience.

We have a parliament and elections. We have free media and an absolutely independent judicial system. We have local governments, and the state has been decentralized. We have firmly established the elements of a democratic state.

The main problem in Poland—and in

KWASNIEWSKI

all countries during transition—is that civil society is still developing. The second problem is lack of experience. Some tell me that the Polish parliament does not function as well as the British parliament. It’s true, but the British parliament has existed for hundreds of years while the Polish parliament has existed for seventeen. When I watch CNN and hear about the American Congress, I think that the Polish parliament is not much worse. You know, some in England say that it’s very important to work with democracy as if it is grass, like the courts at Wimbledon. You water, and then you cut, and then after 200 years, you have very good grass. I think 200 years is too pessimistic a prediction, but it takes time to have a good parliament and procedures, to develop a strong democracy rooted in people’s minds and public behavior.

A Look Back

a discussion helped enable real reconciliation with the Jewish community in Poland. And it was important for us—and for the younger generation in particular—to understand that in our history, we’ve had fantastic chapters and very dark chapters as well. : Would you advocate for Turkey’s acknowledgement of the genocide of Armenians in the beginning of the twentieth century as a precursor to reconciliation of their history?

GJI A

KWASN I EWSK I: I’ve told the Turks many times that if they want to be members of the European Union, they have to start a debate about the genocide. It’s a part of their history, and in my opinion, it is necessary to organize this debate among historians, intellectuals, writers, and artists, and facilitate discussion on this issue. Sometimes, in the history of our nations, we have tragic and very dark GJI A : One major decision you made while serving as president of Poland was chapters. We must debate these chapters, to apologize for crimes against the Jewish especially if they are so far in the past. people committed during the Holocaust. Speaking about historic events that took Did this change Poland’s role in Europe? place one hundred years ago is easier than speaking about history that took place fifty years ago, which is easier than KWASN I EWSK I: I apologized because it was a very dramatic and painful situation for speaking about recent history. Discussing us. Polish neighbors murdered hundreds the truth is very difficult, but necessary; of their Jewish neighbors—Polish citi- without truth, we are weak. zens. In one community, neighbors committed crimes against neighbors, GJI A : You have promoted EU accession people who had been close for hundreds not just for Poland, but among many of of years. Of course, it was very painful, your neighbors in central and eastern but it was necessary not only to organize Europe as a step toward democracy. What the commemorative ceremonies and to effect do you think EU membership has erect a monument, but also to explain on countries’ democratization? what happened and how it was possible. I decided to speak openly about it, and I KWASN I EWSK I: The European Union is was criticized. This discussion was very one of the most successful political protough, dramatic, and painful for Poland. jects in history. People like Alcide de But I think it was necessary for us. Having Gasperi decided to organize European

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integration as a cure for the devastation felt by Europe after the most tragic wars in history. Of course, this concept of European integration was limited because part of Europe was under Soviet rule. The European Union did, however, succeed in promoting economic cooperation, understanding among nations, and reconciliation.

Currently, the European Union is enlarging, and in my opinion, the question of further enlargement is Europe’s next historical decision. Today’s EU of twenty-five countries, including Romania and Bulgaria, is one of the centers of modern civilization. We have a total of almost 500 million people; the United States has 300 million. We have enormous potential with regards to democracy and technology.

Being in the EU means respecting the same values—the values of democracy, human rights, women’s rights, minority rights, etc. An enlarged Europe will have peace, security, and mutual respect. With further integration, we can end this epoch of tension and war.

a part of Europe now)?

GJ I A : Tensions between Europe and Russia appear to remain quite strong.

For instance, when Russia’s Lukoil was trying to buy an oil refinery in Poland, the majority of Polish people were against the idea. We have seen similar issues between Poland and Russia over Ukraine.

What is the nature of these tensions? Is Russia a European country, and what is its role in the European economy and politics?

KWASN I EWSK I: There is no question that Russia will have an important role in European policy. Russia is a big country connected to European history and tradition. In terms of business, Russia has gas and oil, and Europe needs gas and oil. I think the relationship should be, and will be, close and natural. The problem with Russia, I think, is that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a dramatic change. In the past fifteen years, Russia lost all of central Asia and the Caucasus— Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan—plus Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic GJIA: How much room is there for conStates, and Moldova. They lost one huntinued expansion in the EU? dred million people from their population.

KWASN I EWSK I: In my personal opinion, it This new Russian Federation has a is important to keep the EU open to new members, especially countries in the problem defining itself in this new Balkans and Ukraine. The decision on world. They want to be in Europe, and Turkish accession is a difficult one they are a European country—maybe not because Europe has to define what is in the sense of geography, but in the European. Are we European in the sense sense of history, tradition, and religion. of our borders, Christian heritage, and They may want to bridge the East and tradition? Or in the twenty-first century West, Europe and Asia. Perhaps they want do we as Europeans define ourselves as a to play a separate role as one of the continent open to many religions, many world’s superpowers, as a member of the cultures, and many people, including G8. The Russians’ main problem is that from the Muslim world—Turkey, Moroc- they find themselves in this new situation co, and Tunisia (because they are, in fact, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,

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KWASNIEWSKI

A Look Back

country. After the Orange Revolution, the process of independent statehood and civil society began to develop, especially in the younger generation. I’m sure that young Ukrainians increasingly understand that they are truly independent, have their own culture, and can play an important role in the world. Of course, it is not the United States, but there are fifty million inhabitants, which is greater than the Spanish population. It is a very strong and strategically located country.

But there is an even greater difference between Ukraine and Belarus. Ukraine only existed as an independent state in very short periods of its history, but Ukraine’s culture, language, and traditions are quite strong. When Ukraine gained independence, this historical heritage played an important role.

Belarus lacks such a strong identity because it was divided between Russia and Poland for a long time. Belarusians are extremely modest, friendly, and peaceful, and they are not as willing to fight for something as the Ukrainians and Polish people. This creates a political problem.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians tried to play a role in the region and found a good partner in GJIA: The collapse of the Soviet Union cleared the path for democratization in Lukashenko—who, by the way, is not Poland and other countries in the unpopular. He faces a very quiet opposiregion, but why has Belarus—neighbor to tion, and maybe it will remain quiet until both Poland and Ukraine—not gone he wins the election. But Lukashenko only has one ticket in the region—to down that same path?

Moscow. While the leadership of Ukraine can conduct business both with Moscow KWASN I EWSK I: To begin with, the difference between Poland and Ukraine is very and Brussels, Belarus has no other allies crucial. While Poland was under Soviet in Europe. influence within the last fifty years, we were never part of the Soviet Union. In GJI A : In 2005 Poland and Belarus withUkraine, education, media, and life were drew ambassadors from each other’s capvery Soviet-influenced even though itals, and Lukashenko does not maintain Ukraine was at the periphery of the positive diplomatic relations with

fighting between two identities.

Strong sentiments toward the Soviet Union still exist, exemplified by President Vladimir Putin’s statement that the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the biggest geo-strategic dramas in the history of the world. But for us in Poland—and other countries in the region—that is a totally unacceptable position, because the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the best events in history for us. It meant we could finally be independent from foreign rule.

Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and many other countries also became independent in that moment, after such a long time of oppression and limited sovereignty.

But there is a second approach to the question of Russia’s identity. Russia now has a chance to be democratic and create a civil society. In a thousand years of Russian history, this has never happened, but some liberals, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals speak now of a truly democratic Russia. Now that Russia is not so big and not so influential in the world, it can focus on creating democracy and civil society.

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Poland. Poland has often criticized Belarus for human rights abuses and supported Lukashenko’s opposition in previous elections. What must happen for the diplomatic situation to improve?

KWASN I EWSK I: First, Lukashenko needed a visible enemy to talk about during the elections, and it was easy for him to use Poland and the Polish minority in Belarus. However, this was senseless because the Polish minority is small to begin with and very loyal to Belarus. They are neither rich nor influential, normally living in poor places in Belarus. I think it was very artificial, but it was used tactically in the election campaign.

Because we were attacked, we reacted.

But now our policy is very clear. We are neighbors forever—before and after Lukashenko’s regime—so it is necessary for our people to have relationships.

Trans-border cooperation is important for business, for education, everything.

High-level visits are not as crucial.

Second, we are encouraging the EU to have a common policy toward Belarus, to put stronger pressure on it for human rights and the rights of minorities, and maybe to finally organize democratic elections in Belarus. One day Mr. Lukashenko will be replaced. In the meantime, most European countries do not have important relationships with Belarus. It is merely in the shadow of their relationships with Russia, which already have problems. As a result, many European countries do not put much pressure on Belarus. In my opinion, this is the wrong approach—false politics. But what should they do? Some of my European colleagues acknowledge that in order to have good contacts with Russia, they have to stay away from the issues of human rights in Belarus and so on.

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Third, and most importantly, young Belarusians should have the opportunity to study abroad. They should be given scholarships to study in the United States, the EU, and Poland—to spend time in democratic countries, seeing how democracy works and what market economies look like. I think one of Belarus’ problems is that people are not generally educated in the world, aware of how other countries work, open to new ideas and democratic values. If you ask me why Poland was so successful in its own transition, one of the answers is that even during communist times, we had a lot of contacts with the West. Many Poles visited the United States because of family ties, scholarships, or corporate sponsorship. I was here in 1976. We visited the West, and after such visits we could compare. It was then easier for us to differentiate good and wrong, future and past, which path would give Poland new opportunities and which was unacceptable.

Change in Belarus rests with its young generation. Our generation, lacking in heritage and identity and stuck in Soviet ways, cannot change things. But if the young people see opportunities for their country, they will be the ones who bring change.

GJI A : Do you believe that this strategy for developing democracy and civil society can extend to other nations, such as China, that have similarly experienced a hundred years of authoritarianism?

KWA SN I EWSK I: In my opinion, yes.

Because we have new technology, closer contacts between nations and between people, and no impediments to transportation or communication, I am sure that eventually, we will have democracy

KWASNIEWSKI

and civil society almost everywhere.

The problem in China is that you have a very dynamic free-market economy, but the political process lags very much behind. I sometimes get the feeling that the Communist Party of China plays some kind of supervisory role in their free-market economy. It is neither an

A Look Back

is unable to react to new challenges around the world because it is still entrenched in post-World War II concepts.

For instance, look at the permanent members of the Security Council. They are the winners of World War II. There are no permanent seats for Germany or

Human nature will drive the development of democracy and civil society. ideological force nor a political force. It is more of an administrative party that administrates—effectively, I have to admit—over the free economy. One day it will create a problem because you cannot develop a free-market economy without answering the questions of political pluralism, the party system, the role of the communist party in the country’s secret police, the importance of human rights, et cetera.

I have the highest respect for China’s ability to administer on such a scale; it is a huge and diverse nation, composed of many nations speaking different languages and dialects. But progress is making the development of civil society inevitable. Human nature, combined with new technologies and especially new methods of communication, will drive the development of democracy and civil society. What educated citizen would not be interested in participating in civil society?

GJI A : What role do multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, play in promoting democratization?

KWASN I EWSK I: Despite all the criticisms against it—many of which I share—the UN is an important organization. But it

Japan; there are no positions for regional organizations like the EU. Why does France or the United Kingdom have a permanent seat on the Security Council when the EU does not? Why was there an election between Venezuela and Guatemala when a seat for Mercosur does not exist? India is home to a billion people; why isn’t there a seat for India?

Strong reforms are needed. The nuclear weapons issues with North Korea and Iran are international problems that should not be decided by the United States alone. Maybe it is not only time for new reforms in the UN, but also time to show that this organization has new power, new chances to be active and solve the problems of the contemporary world.

The UN cannot do very much for democracy directly. Democratization is a problem that stems not only from the will of politicians, but also from citizens’ mentalities. Culture, dialogue, and the media can be more effective than political action alone. I believe in a very democratic and well organized world, but that depends on citizens, the young people in universities around the world. and not only on political institutions.

President Kwasniewski was interviewed by Dorothy Chou, Candace Faber, and Mary Sanderson.

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