GJIA - 8.2 Megacities

Georgetown Journal

GeorgetownJournal of

International Affairs

of International Affairs

Megacities

SUMMER/FALL

Crime Poverty Governance

2007 VO L U M E V I I I , N U M B E R 2

also in this issue:

Culture Environment

Celebrity Diplomacy Turkey Eyes Iraq andrew f. cooper david cuthell Maximizing Microfinance Quenching our Global Thirst holly lard & james f. klausner, nate mitten isabelle barres & brad ingram UPC Symbol here

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Summer/Fall 2007 • $8.95 usa

GeorgetownJournal of

International Affairs

Summer/Fall 2007, Volume viii, Number 2 1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Megacities 3

Cities will be home to over half the world's population by 2030, giving them an unprecedented political, economic, and cultural power. The speed and magnitude of urban growth also forebode the presence of massive, intractable slums; demographic floods of migrants; environmental decay; and unforeseen challenges in governance and planning.

The uncertain boundaries, faltering structures, and ultimate sustainability of today's megacities are global concerns. From Rio to Lagos, Beijing to Moscow, this Forum explores how megacities are poised to influence and transform the new century.

5

Poverty and the Periphery: Cities in Latin America and the Former Soviet Union ALLISON GARLAND, MEJGAN MASSOUMI, BLAIR A. RUBLE & JOSEPH S. TULCHIN

13

Criminal Networks in Urban Brazil BRYAN MCCANN

21

Greening the Red Cities: Sustainable Development in China JINGJING QIAN, BARBARA FINAMORE & CONNIE CHAN

31

A Lagos Thing: Rules and Realities in the Nigerian Megacity OKA OBONO

39

The Urbanization of Everything: Governance Challenges in Southeast Asia GIOK LING OOI

Business&Economics 47

Through a Continental Lens: Making More Out of the North American Trade Platform DAVID EMERSON

The United States and Canada can build on past bilateral trade success and overcome new security challenges to ensure future global competitiveness.

55

Maximizing Microfinance HOLLY LARD & ISABELLE BARRES

In order for microfinance to continue to serve the poor, the current attitudes and expectations need to be realigned with empirical realities.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ i ]

Conflict&Security 63

Turkey Eyes Iraq DAVID CUTHELL

Witnessing the suffering of its ethnic compatriots in a region to which it has historical claims, Turkey may be prompted to intervene in Iraq’s Kurdish north.

71

Balancing Act: Australia’s Strategic Relations with China and the United States ADAM C. COBB

Australia can avoid being squeezed by the great powers in the Asia Pacific region by leveraging its natural resource endowments and becoming an indispensable energy partner.

Culture&Society 81

De-Arabization in the Gulf: Foreign Labor and the Struggle for Local Culture ANDRZEJ KAPISZEWSKI

As Asians now outnumber Arabs in foreign labor, governments in the Persian Gulf are takings steps to protect and promote Arab culture.

89

Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad: Virtual Battlefronts from Iraq to the Horn of Africa HANNA ROGAN

Since 9/11 the Internet has become the new frontier in the fight for hearts and minds in the Muslim world.

Law&Ethics 97

Crime Without Punishment: The Litvinenko Affair and Putin’s Culture of Violence EDWARD W. WALKER

The Litvinenko affair offers deeper insights into the political culture of contemporary Russia.

107

Accountability for Atrocity: Lessons from Rwanda GERALD GAHIMA

The Rwanda case holds many lessons for post-conflict societies in search of lasting peace.

115

Between Global Governance and Human Rights: International Migration and the United Nations ANTOINE PÉCOUD & PAUL DE GUCHTENEIRE

Recent international dialogue on migration suggests its ascendance on the global agenda, but major barriers to multilateral action will be difficult to overcome.

[ i i ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Contents

Politics&Diplomacy 125

Beyond Hollywood and the Boardroom: Celebrity Diplomacy ANDREW F. COOPER

Celebrity diplomacy is shaking up traditional notions of diplomacy, with Hollywood types bringing the buzz and business executives supplying the bite.

Science&Technology 133

Quenching our Global Thirst JAMES F. KLAUSNER, NATE MITTEN & BRAD INGRAM

Meeting increasing water needs across the globe requires creative solutions on both sides of the supply and demand equation.

Books 141

The Islamic Republic’s Dilemma MANSOOR MOADDEL

A review of two recently released works on Iranian society and its nuclear ambitions: Conversations in Tehran and Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions.

149

Dinner and Détente: Nixon’s Cold War Diplomacy VICTOR FIC

A review of Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World.

View from the Ground 153

Trauma and the Trials of Reconciliation in Cambodia J. ELI MARGOLIS

The UN Special Tribunal for crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is finally underway, but whose interests do the trials really serve?

A Look Back 163

Financial Firefighting: The Future of the IMF INTERVIEW WITH DAVID LIPTON

The former Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs reflects on the evolution of the global financial system.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ i i i ]

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

EDITORS-IN-CHI EF MANAGING EDITORS

BUS INESS MANAGER DES I GN MANAGER

FORUM EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS BUS INESS&EC ONOMI C S EDI TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C ONFL I C T&S E CUR I TY ED I T ORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS C U LT U R E & S O C I E T Y E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS L AW & E TH I C S E D I T O R S EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS POLITI CS&DIPLOMACY EDITORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS S C I ENC E&TE CHNOLO GY ED I TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANT BO OK REV I EW ED I TORS EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS V I EW FROM THE GROUND ED I TOR EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS A LOOK BACK EDITOR EDI TORI AL ASS I STANTS D I RE C T OR OF C I RCULAT I ON DIRECTOR OF FINANCE DIRECTOR OF MARKET ING D IREC TOR OF ADVERT I S I NG D IRECTOR OF STAFF SERV I C ES D I RE C T OR OF C AMPUS RELAT I ONS BUS INESS ASS I STANTS

ART & PHOTO EDI TOR DES I GN ASS I STANTS

ADV I S ORY BOARD

UN I VERS I TY C OUNC I L

Candace L. Faber, Samantha J. Yale Dorothy Chou, Alfia Sadekova, Daniel J. Smith, Jordan D. White Robert Williams Donald F. Burke, III Aditya Deshmukh, Margaret Lee Megan Abbot, Alexandra Burguieres Raj Salooja, Vali Shokrgozar William Allen, Wilfredo Jorel Guilloty, Jessica Yu Anand Prakash, Whitney Shinkle Lisa Andivahis, Eliza Keller, Evgenia Ustinova Erica Alini, Carrie Barnett Scott Chessare, Zina Sadek Sawaf Nicole Cordeau, Christopher Stucko Sara Osborne, Anish Savani Robert Cooper, Paloma Gonzalez Kristin Larson, Katherine Townsend Jacob Comenetz, Harsh Pandya Steve Hamilton Stephanie Renée Morris Elizabeth Hanna-Owens, Julianna Lynn Nagy Stephanie Gilbert Drew Peterson, Karolina Dembinska-Lemus Alexander C. Hart, Jane J. Yu Grace Moon, Jeffrey Pan Cathy Li Tom Carroll Natalya Skiba Zhimei Luo Emily Rose Lindsey Louise Purdy Nicholas Bunker, Gregory Burie, Lisa Domme, Eleni Fischer, Kevin Hartnett, Yvonne Mejia, Andra Mocanu, Emily Osterkamp, Kevin Shiiba, Anastasia Stepanova Claudia Naím Donna Harati, Christopher Svetlik david abshire, susan bennett, h.r.h. felipe de borbón, joyce davis, cara dimassa, robert l. gallucci, lee hamilton, peter f. krogh, michael mazarr, fareed zakaria anthony arend, richard brahm, michael e. brown, daniel byman, james clad, chester crocker, herbert howe, christopher joyner, charles king, carol lancaster, donald mchenry, daniel porterfield, howard schaffer, george shambaugh, jennifer ward, casimir yost

[ i v ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs would like to thank the following sponsors Christiane Amanpour, Cable News Network Patrons Committee Chair

DaimlerChrysler Corporation Fund Corporate Founding Sponsor

Patrons Mr. Thaddeus T. Beczak Mr. and Mrs. Philip Bilden Mr. Kevin Broderick Ms. Teresa A. Canida The Richard Lounsbery Foundation Mr. Paul Pelosi Mr. Wolfgang Sch端rer Ms. Caroline L. Scullin

Friends Ms. Meredith Ann Campanale

To become a sponsor, contact Katerina Kulagina, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Patrons Committee, 301 ICC, 37th and O Streets NW, Washington, DC 20057.

Telephone (202) 687-5359 Email: kyh@georgetown.edu.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ v ]

Notice to Contributors Articles submitted to the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs must be original, must not draw substantially from articles previously published by the author, and must not be simultaneously submitted to any other publication. Articles should be around 3,000 words in length. Manuscripts must be typewritten and double-spaced in Microsoft™ Word® format, with margins of at least one inch.

Authors should follow the Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed. Articles may be submitted by email (gjia@georgetown.edu) or by U.S. mail; those sent by U.S. mail must include both a soft copy on a compact disc and a hard copy. Full names of authors, a two-sentence biography, and contact information including addresses with zip codes, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, and e-mail addresses must accompany each submission. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs will consider all manuscripts submitted, but assumes no obligation regarding publication. All material submitted is returnable at the discretion of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.

The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (issn 1526-0054; isbn 0-9704346-7-7) is published two times a year by the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 301 Intercultural Center, Washington, DC 20057. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, DC. Annual subscriptions are payable by check or money order. Domestic: $14.00; foreign: $22.00; Canada: $16.00; institutions: $39.00.

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Subscriptions Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service 301 Intercultural Center Washington, DC 20057 Telephone (202) 687-1461 Facsimile (202) 687-1571 e-mail: gjia@georgetown.edu http://journal.georgetown.edu

All articles copyright © 2007 by Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University except when otherwise expressly indicated. For all articles to which it holds copyright, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service permits copies to be made for classroom use, provided the following: (1) the user notifies the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs of the number and purpose of the copies, (2) the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs are identified, (3) the proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy. Except when otherwise expressly provided, the copyright holder for every article in this issue for which the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs does not hold copyright grants permission for copies of that article for classroom use, provided that the user notifies the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs are identified in the article, and that proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy.

For reprinting permission for purposes other than classroom use, please contact Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Permissions, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 301 Intercultural Center, Washington, DC 20057. Telephone (202) 687-1461. Facsimile (202) 687-1571.

The views expressed in the articles in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs do not necessarily represent those of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the editors and staff of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, editors and staff of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Georgetown University bear no responsibility for the views expressed in the following pages.

[ v i ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Editors’ Note

The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs emerged from an era obsessed with globalization. With this issue, we shift our attention to the local impact of powerful global forces.

Nowhere do the global and the local come together more prominently than in the world’s megacities. A century and a half after Marx first decried the consequences of urban industrialization, which threatened to flatten a round world, the authors in this Forum show what happens when global forces descend upon the complex urban terrain. Governing the megacity requires specific, local solutions to broad, universal problems—from economic displacement and environmental upheaval to criminal networks and cultural malaise.

Other articles explore the local impact of international trends. Andrej Kapiszewski shows how migrant workers are redefining culture in the Persian Gulf, Edward Walker exposes the culture of violence in Putin’s Russia, and David Cuthell addresses Turkey's potential irredentist interests in northern Iraq. This “glocal” approach also comes through in the perspectives of our authors themselves, who come from places as varied as Norway and Nigeria.

This issue also presents opportunities to learn from the past. In our books section, you will find a review of recent publications on Iran coupled with a timely review of the Mao-Nixon summit—a landmark event in U.S. diplomatic history that offers insights into how the United States could better conduct its foreign policy today. In Law & Ethics and View from the Ground, you will find two pieces that question national approaches to facing historical trauma, using Rwanda and Cambodia as examples. In Look Back, former Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs David Lipton reflects on his long career in the rapidly changing world of global finance.

As always, the Journal has reached beyond the headlines, exploring today’s challenges and offering solutions to persistent global issues. We are proud to end our tenure as editors-in-chief with an issue that reflects the scope and depth of policy problems that we confront at the School of Foreign Service. We thank the authors, our dedicated staff, our supporters, and you our readers for helping us in this endeavor.

Candace L. Faber

Samantha J. Yale Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 ]

Forum

Megacities

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Cities will be home to over half the world's population by 2030, giving them an unprecedented political, economic, and cultural power. The speed and magnitude of urban growth also forebode unprecedented problems, particularly the presence of massive, intractable slums; demographic floods of dislocating and relocating migrants; environmental decay; and unforeseen difficulties in governance and planning. The uncertain boundaries, faltering structures, and ultimate sustainability of today's megacities are global concerns. From Rio to Lagos, Beijing to Moscow, this Forum explores how megacities are poised to influence and transform the new century.

5

Poverty and the Periphery: Cities in Latin America and the Former Soviet Union ALLISON GARLAND, MEJGAN MASSOUMI, BLAIR A. RUBLE & JOSEPH S. TULCHIN

6

Criminal Networks in Urban Brazil BRYAN MCCANN

7

Greening the Red Cities: Sustainable Development in China JINGJING QIAN, BARBARA FINAMORE & CONNIE CHAN

8

A Lagos Thing: Rules and Realities in the Nigerian Megacity OKA OBONO

9

The Urbanization of Everything: Governance Challenges in Southeast Asia GIOK LING OOI

Winter/Spring 2007 [ 3 ]

Megacities

Poverty and the Periphery:

Cities in Latin America and the Former Soviet Union Allison Garland, Mejgan Massoumi, Blair A. Ruble, and Joseph S. Tulchin This year, for the first time in history, a majority of the world’s people will live in cities. Global population growth will continue to concentrate in urban centers of the developing world, which will absorb more than two billion new residents over the next two decades. The pace of urbanization far exceeds the rate at which basic services can be provided, and the consequences for the urban poor have been dire. Global poverty has increasingly become an urban phenomenon. The challenge to academics and policymakers is to better understand the process of urbanization and the needs of local populations by recognizing the opportunity to harness the energy of urban diversity and growth as a positive force for human development.1 Urban poverty must be solved by crafting policies that promote inclusion in urban communities and avoid or reverse processes that do the opposite—making access to urban services more difficult for vulnerable elements of the population.

It is now widely accepted that cities have become the engines of state economies and powerful symbols of national culture.

Urban economic activity contributes to the majority of GNP in both developed and developing nations.2 The dynamism of cities—where political energy, economic activity, and social interaction are concentrated—will continue to attract a steady flow of migration. According to the latest UN research, there are currently 191 million international migrants in the world, drawn increasingly to urban areas by the promise of economic

Allison Garland is a program associate for the Comparative Urban Studies Project at the Wo o d r o w W i l s o n International Center for Scholars.

Mejgan Massoumi is a program assistant for the Comparative Urban Studies Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Blair A. Ruble is the director of the Kennan Institute and chair of the Comparative Urban Studies Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Joseph S. Tulchin is a senior scholar in the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 5 ]

POVERTY AND THE PERIPHERY

opportunity.3 Yet jobs for these migrants are largely in the informal sector, where pay is low and working conditions are poor. Migrants are most often forced to settle in housing that is spatially isolated from the city, left without access to basic services or infrastructure and marginalized from the mainstream.

The process of globalization exacerbates social inequalities, which in turn compound the pressures of migration and rapid urbanization. As cities engage directly with the global economy, the gap widens between those who benefit from international competition and those left behind. Particularly for urban systems emerging out of isolation and economic autarky, the opening of markets and reduction of state control over the economy has translated into a steady hollowing of the urban middle class. The shifts in labor markets that accompanied globalization drove much of the urban working class into poverty. Concurrently, structural adjustment programs instituted in the 1980s and 1990s dramatically reduced state and local services to protect vulnerable city residents in much-needed areas of health, housing, education, and employment. The creation of a new class of urban poor tied to the entry of cities into global markets has been most visible in the cities of Latin America and the former Soviet Union.

In both regions, immigration into cities has become a major issue. Traditionally, migration from rural to urban areas within the territorial nation-state had been the norm. Today, as part of the globalization process, cross-border migration has brought large sums of people into the cities of both Latin America and the former Soviet Union. Differences in language, race, ethnicity, and religion compound efforts to form [ 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

urban communities that cope with and are capable of absorbing the urban poor.

While these regions cope to meet the needs of new and old forms of poverty, central states have devolved responsibility for social development to weak and under-funded municipalities. With enthusiastic support from multilateral development banks, policy makers embraced economic and political decentralization in the 1990s as a tool to improve services and strengthen democracy by bringing decision making closer to the citizen. Local governments, however, lack the institutional capacity as well as the tax base to deal with the physical and social disintegration of cities that had once enjoyed some degree of opportunity and egalitarianism. In place of equality and well-being, we have seen growing polarization and a surge of “divided cities” that are essentially two cities in one.

Poverty in Latin American Cities. Latin America is the most

urbanized region of the developing world, with more than 75 percent of its population living in cities. By 2015 that number is expected to rise to 81 percent.

While Mexico City and São Paulo will reach “metacity” status in the next ten to fifteen years (with over 20 million inhabitants, they will far exceed the 10million-inhabitant threshold for a “megacity”), much of the region’s urban growth will occur in small and intermediate cities.4 As the region faces this tremendous growth, it is under increasing pressure to confront urban poverty. Poverty is still viewed as a predominantly rural phenomenon even though 60 percent of the region’s poor live in cities and one-third of the region’s urban population lives in

GARLAND, MASSOUMI, RUBLE & TULCHIN

slums. Formulating policies that deal specifically with urban poverty and its inherent challenges will prove crucial.

Excluded from the formal economy and isolated from supportive social networks, new migrants to cities in Latin America must adjust to dependency on income for goods and services. Residents of slums and shantytowns on the urban periphery are cut off from crucial city services, including transportation, water, sanitation, and healthcare. Hazardous conditions in squatter settlements raise

Megacities

problems of the poor have become localized in these divided cities.

Urban crime and violence, however, have seized public attention and have become focal points of the political agenda. With the highest rates of violence in the world, Latin America’s crime is primarily concentrated in urban areas, and the urban poor are once again disproportionately affected. The chances of being the victim of homicide for a young inhabitant in the urban periphery of Brazil’s largest cities are thirty times

This year, for the first time in history, a majority of the world’s people will live in cities.

serious health issues for recent migrants and the intergenerational poor so common in Latin America. Overcrowding and environmental degradation make the urban poor particularly vulnerable to the spread of infectious disease. They also suffer disproportionately from “new” chronic and degenerative diseases of modernization, such as cancer, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, and mental illness, brought on by changing lifestyles and environmental stress. Statistics often mask the severity of the conditions. When disaggregated, data reveal sharp urban health inequalities and differences within levels of access to services.

Diseases virtually absent in the official city are epidemic in squatter settlements.

A study of São Paulo found that infant mortality rates are four times greater in poor areas of the city than in the most privileged zone.5 Capturing the attention of wealthier communities—necessary to drive large-scale public health initiatives—has proven difficult, as the health

greater than for a middle-aged man in a middle-class neighborhood.6 Those with resources have responded to crime with private armies, walls, and gated communities, spatially dividing the city by setting the wealthy apart. The resulting inequality and exclusion fuel the cycle of urban social disintegration.

For many, globalization and economic restructuring have bred disappointment and unrealized expectations. The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and the recessions of the 1990s resulted in a drop in real wages and disappearing savings for Latin America’s urban middle class, hardest hit by these changes. Shifts in the labor market resulted in the loss of pensions and healthcare tied to employment in the formal sector. Just when the working class needed public safety nets the most, the deterioration in services and infrastructure—a product of the shrinking state—contributed to further exclusion within the urban community.

Forced to find low-paying and insecure Summer/Fall 2007 [ 7 ]

POVERTY AND THE PERIPHERY

accumulate in the past. The consequent process of slow degradation accelerated as hyperinflation devoured lifetime savings.

Many longtime city residents were driven away from prestigious central-city neighborhoods by a burgeoning private housing market.

In many ways, the pre-liberalization middle class suffered the greatest decline in status and purchasing power relative to Russia’s other urban residents. Mirroring the situation in Latin America, workers in the former Soviet Union—mainly city dwellers—lost access to formal and informal mechanisms that offered social protection from poverty. As select cities were swept up in the accelerated flow of capital, information, goods, and people, the region’s urban working class was left behind, vulnerable to market forces for the first time and marginalized from the benefits of globalization.8 Simultaneously, groups of city dwellers who had been relatively impoverished in Soviet times— such as temporary workers and unskilled laborers—became more visible, as the Poverty in the Former Soviet Soviet state’s efforts to hide social probUnion. The transformation of Russian lems collapsed along with the system. As urban poverty during the 1990s bears the former Soviet Union engaged with striking parallels to similar issues facing the world economy, its cities saw a Latin America. When Russia attempted shrinking middle class replaced with new to impose a liberal economic regime on and more salient forms of urban poverty. the ultimate closed economic system, a By the mid-1990s virtually every RussSoviet middle class consisting of profes- ian city except Moscow suffered populasionals in state institutions and top-level tion losses that, when combined with industrial workers in state enterprises soaring unemployment rates, added to suddenly found itself thrown into a com- the picture of urban decline. Faltering petitive marketplace with little or no rel- health care, psychological depression, evant experience. While the transforma- and the ravages of rampant alcohol tion took place on a much larger scale in addiction, trauma, heart disease, and Russia, the processes at work look suicide all increased as life expectancy remarkably similar to those taking place plummeted in an unprecedented decline in Latin America. Both regions saw once (from 63.5 years to 58.6 years for males state-supported groups forced to live off and from 74.3 years to 72.1 years for whatever assets they had managed to females between 1991—the year of the jobs in the informal sector, many of the “new poor” have moved from their middle class neighborhoods in city centers to live in less expensive neighborhoods in the periphery. Across the region, historically heterogeneous cities that were once among the safest in the world have changed. Highly visible inequalities and the spatial polarization of income groups have contributed to a heightened sense of “relative deprivation” within Latin American cities, breeding social tensions and compounding the process of exclusion.7 As society becomes increasingly segmented, inequality and a lack of opportunities for social advancement threaten the sustainability of Latin America’s urban areas. The challenge for policy makers is to find ways to incorporate vulnerable groups into the urban community. This includes promoting access to existing services, such as the labor market, and creating channels of communication that facilitate participation of citizens in the urban community.

[ 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

GARLAND, MASSOUMI, RUBLE & TULCHIN

Soviet collapse—and 2001).9 Overall, the Russian population declined by about 4 million, or about 2.7 percent, in the decade between 1991 and 2001. This general reduction in the country’s population occurred even as approximately 3.3 million immigrants moved into the country during the same period.10 Similar to Latin American cities, urban areas in the former Soviet Union saw an increase in violence-induced deaths by suicide, murder, traffic casualties, and alcohol intoxication during the economic transition of the 1990s. Studies link Russia’s rise in violent death rates, particularly the increase in injury and intoxication mortalities, to the economic crisis.11 According to estimates, crime rates in Russia increased two to three times in the decade that followed 1991. Like in Latin America, crime, cor-

Megacities

lion in 2005—Moscow’s dominance of Russian financial markets has increased along every dimension possible.13 Indicators of economic success, however, have been offset by growing rates of poverty, skyrocketing inequality, and the increasing displacement of all but the rich from prestigious neighborhoods in the central metropolis. As in Latin American cities, the global generation of wealth in Moscow has not been shared, but rather has contributed to growing intracity disparities that breed social tension.

Moscow increasingly resembles megacities of the developing world in terms of spatial segregation, stark urban inequalities, and in the scale of urban challenges.

Beyond Moscow, Russia’s urban challenge centers on the inability of cities to adjust to the post-industrial market by creating jobs that can sustain the middle

Global poverty has increasingly become an

urban phenomenon.

ruption, and violence are now at the top of the public agenda, threatening to undermine faith in democratic governance. Rising crime rates have been linked to the social polarization of contemporary Russian society. In 2003 there was a twenty-eight fold difference between Russia’s richest and poorest residents. “This striking discrepancy is obviously shocking to a population that was accustomed to an ideological commitment to equality.”12 Nowhere else are the alarming urban trends of social polarization, violence, and alcoholism more evident than in the capital city of Moscow. Along with its growing population—from approximately 8.8 million in 1989 to over 10.4 mil-

class. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, major industrial centers have been losing population and increasingly resemble rust-belt cities with anemic job markets that fail to satisfy local demand for employment.14 More generalized demographic and health challenges throughout the Russian Federation, such as an increase in age-specific mortality rates, amplify the negative implications of post-industrial urban decline.

As in Latin America, the arrival of migrant communities has transformed urban social, economic, and governance systems. Increasing mobility among migrant populations both enriches Russia’s depressed urban areas and challenges their municipal authorities.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 9 ]

POVERTY AND THE PERIPHERY

Recently, the World Bank reported that the Russian Federation has become home to the second largest number of migrants in the world after the United States.15 Russia’s emergence as a major destination for immigrants on a global scale suggests some of the ways in which the collapse of the Soviet Union has altered the world urban system.

Russia’s small number of growing cities serves as a magnet to both internal and transnational migrants. The western Russian cities of Novisibirsk, Kazan, Rostov-na-Donu, and Volgograd have grown as a result of internal migration, transnational immigration, and a steady flow of displaced persons from conflicts in the Caucasus region. As capital of a newly independent Ukraine, Kyiv similarly has continued to grow in population and economic activity. Three southern and central Russian cities of approximately 1 million in population—Kazan, Volgograd, and Rostov-na-Donu—have attracted migrants fleeing conflict regions in the Caucasus (both from

problem, however, authorities have proved more concerned with macroeconomic stabilization than with alleviating urban poverty. At the outset of 2007, Russia had the third-largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, behind only the People’s Republic of China and Japan.16 In 2006 it completely paid off all its Soviet-era Paris Club debt, including compensation to creditors for interest payments lost as a result of the early repayment. These decisions may be positive for Russia’s long-term growth, but there are concerns that some of those funds should be dedicated to povertyreduction strategies implemented at the local level rather than solely to macroeconomic matters.

Toward a Policy of Inclusion. The

urban experience in the former Soviet Union and Latin America signals both the growing pressures on cities placed by excluded and marginalized populations and the need to ensure that these groups—not just the elite—become bene-

Globalization and economic restructuring have bred disappointment and

unrealized expectations.

Chechnya within the Russian Federation and from the conflicts in the independent states of the South Caucasus). In all these cases, local officials struggle with how best to incorporate newly arriving migrants into community life.

Two decades ago, Russian and Soviet cities were excluded from discussions of the urban future. Now, they too face the potential difficulties posed by the arrival of migrants who often require extensive state assistance. Despite the growing [ 1 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ficiaries of urbanization and globalization. Efforts to improve the lives of the urban poor must take a holistic approach to the many dimensions of urban poverty, looking beyond insufficient income to address standards of living, access to basic health, education, transportation services, and inclusion within urban communities. Isolation and despair have found an outlet in crime and violence, posing a particular threat to weak democracies; there is thus a growing realization

GARLAND, MASSOUMI, RUBLE & TULCHIN

that economic and political stability rest on recognizing the importance of urban inclusion.

Effective urban governance can be used as a powerful tool to deal with urban growth, poverty, and inequality by allowing for popular participation in decision making, creating connections between civil society and government, and ultimately fostering the articulation of a common vision for the city. Local governments must incorporate cohesion and inclusivity into urban policies to foster diversity, tolerance, and equity. Building inclusive cities means providing opportunity for all urban residents to access material, political, and social resources, and

Megacities

will foster a sense of responsibility and belonging that will ease pressures of urban planning and management.

Creating a context in which the greatest number of citizens has access to services, rights, and political autonomy requires a reconstruction of current social and political relationships. Urban inclusiveness must be based on concrete and tangible prospects in addition to access to possibilities for upward mobility. Governments at all levels must recognize the globally viable benefits of urban diversity and the positive role of participatory decision making in the creation and maintenance of today’s urban environments.

NOTES

1 UN-HABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2006/7: The Millennium Development Goals and Urban Sustainability: 30 Years of Shaping the Habitat Agenda (London and Nairobi: UNHABITAT and Earthscan, 2006).

2 UN-HABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2006/7, 46 3 UN-HABITAT, “Cities—Magnets of hope. A look at global migration problems,” Habitat Debate 12, no. 3 (September 2006), 2.

4 UN-HABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2006/7, 6, 4.

5 Edmundo Werna, Ilona Blue, and Trudy Harpham, “The Changing Agenda for Urban Health,” Preparing for the Urban Future (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996), 203.

6 Claudio Beato, “Medo e criminalidades nos centros urbanos brasileiros” in Participación ciudadana y percepción de inseguridad en América Latina, eds. Jessica Varat and Allison Garland, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Latin American Program Special Report, August 2006, Internet, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/LAP_August.pdf (date accessed 1 April 2007), 8.

7 UN-HABITAT, “Uruguay Maintaining Social Equity in A Changing Economy,” State of the World’s Cities 2006/7, Internet, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDS P/IB/2001/09/28/000094946_01092004004781/ Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (date accessed: 1 April 2007), 144.

8 Lisa M. Hanley, Blair A. Ruble, and Joseph S. Tulchin, Becoming Global and the New Poverty of Cities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005).

9 Goskomstat Rossii, as reported in Timothy Heleni-

ak, “Russia’s Demographic Decline Continues,” Internet, www.prb.org (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

10 Ibid.

11 Victoria Semenova et. al., “Rise of violent death rates in Russia as a consequence of the economic crisis,” Disease Prevention and Health Promotion 4 (2000): 3-5.

12 Yuriy A. Voronin, “Crime, Corruption, and Violence: The Threat to Democratic Governance in Contemporary Russia” in Crime and the Threat to Democratic Governace, eds., Allison Garland, et. al., (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003), 16; Natalia S. Gavrilova, et. al., “Patterns of Violent Crime in Russia” in Ruling Russia: Law, Crime and Justice in a Changing Society, ed., William Alex Pridemore (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littkefield, 2005), 117.

13 “Russi: City Population: Cities, Towns & Provinces,” Internet, www.citypopulation.de/Russia.html (date accessed: 1 April 2007). Population figures on Moscow are notoriously imprecise in part because the city extends well beyond its political boundaries, in part because of the rapid movement of short-term workers in and out of the city, and in part because of residency restrictions which force many residence underground. Popular estimates by 2007 often placed the population of the city closer to 13 million.

14 Ibid.

15 Ali M. Mansoor, Migration and remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2007), 25.

16 International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” Internet, www.imf.org (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 1 ]

Megacities

Criminal Networks in Urban Brazil Bryan McCann Brazil’s megacities are under siege from within. Criminal networks formerly content with control over isolated slices of turf have demonstrated an ever-greater willingness to choke off the economic and social life of the city at large whenever it is in their immediate interests. Brazil’s security apparatus—chiefly its surprisingly timid federal investigative bodies and its corruption-plagued state police corps—have proven unable to adapt to this transformation. In consequence, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are at the leading edge of a crisis confronting many megacities across the global south, driven by the mismatch between increasingly flexible transnational criminal networks and corrupt local security forces.

One of the most farcical episodes in Rio de Janeiro’s ongoing crime wave helps illustrate the phenomenon. In November of 2006 a well-organized team of bandits disguised as policemen stole a van full of toy guns from a film crew. The crew had been shooting scenes for a “shoot ‘em up” called Tropa de Elite (Elite Troop) in Morro do Chapéu Mangueira, a favela overlooking the glamorous beach neighborhood of Leme. Filming in such a location was only possible due to the payment of an unspecified sum to the local neighborhood association in Chapéu. Having filmed from midnight to four a.m., the crew was heading home on the main access road when bandits in a passenger car forced their van to the side of the road. In a choreography increasingly familiar to residents of the city, the

Bryan McCann is an associate professor in the department of history and director of the Brazilian Studies Program at Georgetown University.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 3 ]

CRIMINAL NETWORKS IN URBAN BRAZIL

crew was waved out of the van and onto the road, guns thrust in their faces. The bandits sped off in the van, newly armed with a few dozen assorted dummy rifles and thirty real guns that had been altered to make them suitable for film purposes but not for firing live ammo.

The obvious suspects were the local crew chiefs of the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) or CV, the criminal network that controls access to both Chapéu and many other favelas across the city. The film producers who negotiated shooting rights with Chapéu’s neighborhood association knew that this criminal network was the silent partner in the deal. What they were truly negotiating was not the right to disturb the normal comings-and-goings in the neighborhood, but a guarantee that they would not be hassled by the gang. The president of the neighborhood association traded this implicit assurance for a donation to the association’s coffers and the equally unspoken promise that the filming would not violate the favela’s functional autonomy.

These unspoken deals have been so reliable in the past that many observers did not believe the local gang could have been involved in the holdup. Fernando Meirelles, director of Cidade de Deus (City of God), the Oscar-nominated 2002 film about drug wars in a notorious favela, had also filmed a successful TV series in Chapéu. “I can’t believe it was someone from the favela,” he argued, “because we never had any problem.”1 Several public intellectuals with experience in Rio’s favelas echoed this sentiment.

But the investigation led inexorably to Jony Paulo Gomes de Oliveira, chief of the Chapéu gang, and his regional supervisor Robson Roque da Cunha, who [ 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

allegedly approved plans for the holdup via mobile phone from his cell in a maximum-security prison. Subsequent tapped phone conversations corroborated this theory. The temptation of a van full of dummy guns—no good for firing, but useful for holdups—was apparently too much for the CV to resist, deal or no deal.

The episode, with its life/art/life imitations, a deal gone bad, and misguided expert opinion, reveals much about the changing landscape of crime in urban Brazil. The social contract alluded to by Meirelles, wherein public officials and representatives of private interests trade tolerance of petty crime in return for local peace, was never very stable, and is now decidedly a thing of the past.

Engaged experts nonetheless continue to react as if it should be revived rather than abandoned. They attribute its decline solely to general social inequality, rather than to the increasingly rapacious tactics of Brazil’s criminal networks.

These observers believe that the local cells of large criminal networks are interested primarily in selling drugs to willing buyers, are only loosely connected to each other, and mostly want to be left alone. However, abundant evidence suggests the contrary; drugs are no longer the primary source of income for these networks. Their leaders are increasingly sophisticated in the organization of large-scale plans, and they are stepping up violence in order to seize more turf.

Brazil’s security forces and the general population must comprehend this evolution. Establishing security for the citizens of Rio and São Paulo depends on a successful confrontation of the networks.

Strategies of Urban Terror. This past year, 2006, will be remembered as

MCCANN

an explosive one, when Brazil’s principal criminal networks demonstrated their ability to bring the ebb and flow of life in its two largest cities to a halt. In the last days of the year, CV staged a series of exemplary actions across Rio de Janeiro, sending its low-ranking soldiers into the streets to burn and loot. This wave of violence showed the flexibility and coherence of network strategy—the actions were centrally-spurred, but not centrallyplanned. They happened with near simultaneity, but the destruction they reaped was unpredictable and superficially chaotic. Gangsters threw grenades at police stations, fired on kiosks in drive-by shootings, burned cars, and set fire to an interstate bus, killing eight passengers and wounding numerous others.

The rampage yielded nineteen corpses.

Experts searched for a motive and came up with no convincing explanation.

The most popular theory suggested that the attacks were a warning to incoming governor Sérgio Cabral, who took office on 1 January 2007. But Cabral comes

Megacities

and prison guards, who have booted the criminal networks out of a string of favelas on the city’s periphery. The militias hold this turf through intimidation and resort to the same tactics favored by the networks themselves, including extorting protection money from local businesses and extracting profit via monopoly provision of services like van transportation and pirated cable TV. The networks and the militias are clearly engaged in a violent turf battle, though no single event could have precipitated the December attacks.

The most convincing theory is that the CV simply wished to show its muscle to the city at large. This would intimidate the low-ranking officers of the security apparatus who would bear the brunt of any crackdown on crime as well as the working-class population of the neighborhoods where the networks are most thoroughly entrenched.

The attacks echoed a similar wave in São Paulo in early May, carried out by the reigning network of that state, the

These gangs developed in the vacuum

created by tacit concession of prison administration to powerful prisoners. from the same party as the outgoing governor, and his most explicit campaign statements on the issue of crime merely decried police use of the caveirão, a tanklike military defense vehicle, in Rio’s favelas. His election suggests continuation rather than disruption of the state’s failed security policies.

A slightly more convincing theory suggests that the attacks responded to the growth of defense militias, comprised mostly of off-duty policemen, firemen,

Primeiro Comando do Capital (First Command of the Capital), or PCC. As in Rio, the network showed its ability to shut down the city for several days with a wave of drive-by shootings and bus burnings. Those attacks were supposedly prompted by the transfer of PCC leaders to more isolated prisons, and by threatened denial of prisoner demands in the state’s maximum-security facilities. Such demands included permission to ship in dozens of televisions for the World Cup Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 5 ]

CRIMINAL NETWORKS IN URBAN BRAZIL

prisoners. State and federal authorities have been late and ineffective in responding to their control of prisons.

The most pathetic line of public debate following the May attacks, for example, concerned whether cell-phone companies should block transmission waves near prisons. Removing cell phones from prisoners was never considered an option likely to succeed.

Both networks have created or co-opted non-governmental organizations to guarantee this status quo. Nova Ordem, for example, is ostensibly a prisoner’s rights NGO in São Paulo, but is widely acknowledged to be a legal arm of the PCC. Its officers were recently indicted for money laundering and kidnapping and are implicated in the kidnapping of a television reporter last August.

Outside of the prisons, hemispheric links with guerilla factions have strengthened the organizational capacities of the PCC and the CV. Mauricio Norambuena, a Chilean kidnapper and longtime captain in the communist militant organization Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, was arrested in Brazil for his The Nature of the Beast. To grasp participation in notorious kidnappings. this situation, one must step back from He subsequently shared a cellblock with the immediate demands and look at larg- Marcos Herbas Camacho, who is better er patterns. The CV and the PCC are known as Marcola, kingpin of the PCC, run from prisons. Both organizations and credited with helping to organize the started as prison gangs, later spreading network’s successful kidnapping ring. their tentacles to sectors of urban crime The CV, meanwhile, has relied on such as drug trafficking, car theft, bank Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolurobbery, kidnapping, stick-ups, shake- cionárias de Colombia (FARC) for downs, and protection rackets. These cocaine supply, tactical advice, and the gangs developed in the vacuum created by occasional hideout for a crime lord on tacit concession of daily internal prison the lam.

Brazil’s networks have also learned to administration to powerful prisoners, keeping with longstanding Brazilian tra- exploit the rhetoric of these revolutiondition. They grew from the practice of ary allies, issuing manifestos demanding commingling petty thieves, organized social justice and blaming urban violence mobsters, and revolutionary political on the police. The standard CV graffiti and the continuation of traditional leave for well-behaved prisoners on Mother’s Day and other family holidays. In previous years, up to 30 percent of prisoners had failed to return following this customary indulgence, leading prison officials sensibly to suspend the gesture. Given that these frequently-conceded demands for unusual comforts coexist with overall prison conditions that can only be described as hellish, they are difficult for outside observers to take seriously. Nevertheless, every media organ in Brazil reported the May attacks as, to a large degree, a response to threatened luxury concessions in São Paulo’s prisons.

While this coverage reveals the extraordinary public profile of the networks— they can hardly be considered “underground”—it fails to reckon with the implications of changing network strategy. The violence of 2006 does not merely allude to prison transfers and luxuries; it shows the growing leverage the networks exercise over nearly every aspect of the economic life of Rio and São Paulo.

[ 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

MCCANN

tag includes the initials PJL for “Paz, Justiça e Liberdade” (Peace, Justice, and Liberty), although it is difficult to credit the notion that an organization that runs a highly lucrative kidnapping ring is interested in social justice. The revolutionary rhetoric of the networks resonates enough with reality in Brazil that it successfully obfuscates network tactics. Many politicians are corrupt, police tactics are often shockingly violent, and prison conditions are deplorable; denunciations of these phenomena can pass for sincerity in certain circles. In the wake of the São Paulo attacks, Caros Amigos, a magazine influential among left-wing intellectuals in Brazil, ran a special issue on the PCC, including an article on “the ideas of Marcola,” that emphasized his indictment of the corrupt system.

In practice the CV and the PCC are dedicated to exacerbating poor conditions in and outside Brazil’s prisons.

Wretched prison conditions may have allowed the initial growth of the PCC and the CV, but the networks now actively produce such conditions in order to maintain their power over inmates. In May of 2006, for example, a PCC riot reduced a prison in Araraquara, São Paulo to ruins. Following the riot hundreds of prisoners, grouped in a tiny recreation yard, scrabbled among themselves for food delivered by airlift and arranged critically wounded colleagues in a circle in the center of the yard, where they waited days for relief.

Outside the prisons, the tactic of burning buses seems designed primarily to make life more difficult for the working-class residents of the urban periphery. Bus burnings also help to drive customers to semi-legal van operators, a rapidly-expanding sector of the public transportation matrix in Brazil’s major

Megacities

cities, and one in which both major criminal networks are heavily involved.

The vans prove no safer, as they are not designed for mass transportation, rarely inspected, and frequently in violation of traffic laws. But alternatives are decreasing, as bus companies deliberately abandon dangerous, money-losing routes in peripheral neighborhoods and limit themselves to central routes.

The consequences for these areas are predictable—higher prices, more violence, no official accountability, and an ever-constricting range of opportunities for local residents. Again, the previous existence of such conditions facilitated the initial growth of the networks that now act to produce these conditions anywhere they are not yet present.

Neither Episodic Nor Systemic.

Changing network strategies have produced a grotesque catalogue of notorious urban crimes, particularly in Rio. To earn front-page status in that city, a crime must be truly spectacular, involving famous names or particularly gory details. These crimes typically dominate headlines and public discussion for a few days, until they are replaced by a new instance of depravity. A survey of recent headline-grabbers makes for an impressionistic but revealing picture of changing criminal patterns. In April of 2006, Rodrigo Netto, lead singer of the popular rock band Detonautas, was killed by teenage carjackers who believed he was insufficiently acquiescent in pulling to the side of the road. In August of 2006, André Costa Bordalo, a nineteen yearold Portuguese tourist, was stabbed to death on Copacabana beach at 8:30 on a sunny morning because he resisted surrendering his knapsack to a thief. In November of 2006 Ana Christina Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 7 ]

CRIMINAL NETWORKS IN URBAN BRAZIL

Johannpeter, the glamorous wife of a wealthy industrialist, was killed at a stoplight in the upscale neighborhood of Leblon. When Johannpeter saw an armed thief approaching her window, she attempted to remove her watch to hand it over, and her car rolled forward.

The teenage gunman shot her in the head and fled on his bicycle. In December of 2006, Ellen Gracie, President of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court, was carjacked on the highway between Rio’s international airport and the city center. (Gracie was unscathed.)

Such episodes tend to be treated in two

acting autonomously within the scope of these networks, have communicated to their soldiers that they are to escalate immediately to mortal violence. In this light, the death of the Portuguese tourist, for example, takes on different implications. His killer, twenty-three-year-old Claudeci Bezerra, told police that he had recently moved to the favela of Babilônia, which overlooks Copacabana beach, and had spent the night preceding the attack snorting cocaine. The CV controls access to Babilônia and does not normally welcome young, able-bodied drug abusers as new residents in the neighborhood

To earn front-page status, a crime must

be truly spectacular, involving famous names or particularly gory details. distinct registers, the episodic and the systemic. In the episodic register, they are treated as isolated incidents—the kind that can happen in any unruly city but seem to happen more frequently in Rio. They are often described with a surprising lack of irony as fatalidades (fatalities), a usage that emphasizes that such events are dictated by fate. This explains why they disappear so quickly. Meanwhile, in the systemic register, they are analyzed as consequences of Brazil’s notorious inequality, of its violent history, of the pervasive presence of handguns, or of the contradictions embedded in Brazil’s constitution.

Neither account is particularly revealing. In contrast, when analyzed as clues to the constantly evolving strategies of criminal networks, they suggest clear and alarming trends. The Rio networks are currently emphasizing car theft and stick-ups as both revenue sources and intimidation tactics. Local crew chiefs, [ 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

unless they are already soldiers in the network. Nevertheless, not a single media organ in Brazil pursued Bezerra’s links to the CV. Within four days, coverage of the crime had ceased entirely.

The CV almost certainly did not order Bezerra to stab a tourist in broad daylight. But his actions nonetheless bespeak the network’s current strategy of opportunistic street crime accompanied by extreme violence. When one looks between the episodic and systemic registers, this pattern is apparent enough that it would seem to require no explicit confirmation. Yet explicit confirmation exists.

In December of 2006 Robson Roque da Cunha, planner of the dummy rifle heist, was released from prison for a Christmas visit with his family. Roque da Cunha, affectionately known as Caveirinha, or “little skull,” was in the middle of a kidnapping sentence and clearly

MCCANN

implicated in ongoing criminal activity, but his indulgence was nevertheless granted. Not surprisingly, he failed to return to prison and returned instead to his position as active commander of the CV crew in the Pavão-Pavãozinho favela.

Within a month, police investigators discovered that Roque da Cunha had ordered his soldiers to increase stick-ups in the area to boost revenue. Three months later, in late March 2007, Roque da Cunha was gunned down in an alleged shootout with the police in another CV neighborhood across town. Citizens of Rio have learned to treat such shootings skeptically, as they often amount to extrajudicial assassinations, with no greater effect on network power.

In another city, Roque da Cunha’s orders to step up street crime might have made front-page news. In Rio, they took back seat to the latest horrific crime. On 7 February 2007 a band of carjackers in a working-class neighborhood on Rio’s north side forced a sedan to the side of the road and waved its occupants, a mother and her two children, to the sidewalk. One of the children, a six-yearold boy, was unable to get his seatbelt open. The bandits sped off in the car nevertheless, with the six-year-old hanging out the driver’s-side rear door. They dragged him four miles across the city, zigzagging in a vain attempt to shake his body loose. They abandoned the car with

Megacities

what was left of the boy’s corpse still hanging from the seatbelt.

The members of the gang were arrested over the following days. Their leader, twenty-three-year-old Carlos Eduardo Toledo Lima, had already been arrested six times. In November of 2006 he began serving a one-year sentence for theft, in an “open regime,” which permitted him to leave during the day and return to jail at night. In late December he failed to return to jail, but no steps had been taken to locate him. The carjacking, reaching a new level of pointless cruelty, horrified all of Brazil. In the first few days after the crime, it was treated primarily as a particularly shocking, deeply disturbing episode. Systemic interpretations began shortly thereafter.

If Rio and São Paulo are to confront their raging crime problems, they need a more precise approach. This includes a security policy that will acknowledge and confront the changing strategies of the country’s two most powerful criminal networks. Until the command structures of these networks are broken, until local crews are cut off from prison leadership, and until network turf domination is broken, rather than conceded, the problems will only get worse. The networks have demonstrated their ability to evolve.

If the security apparatus cannot do the same, it will concede ever-growing portions of these cities to the underworld.

NOTES

1 Antonio Werneck, “Um Assalto de Cinema,” O Globo, 3 November 2006.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 9 ]

Megacities

Greening the Red Cities Sustainable Development in China

Jingjing Qian, Barbara Finamore, and Connie Chan Since opening its doors to the world in 1978 and implementing reforms to its central planning economy, China has experienced the fastest period of urbanization in its history. The percentage of its population living in cities increased from 18 percent in 1978 to 43 percent in 2005. Today, 560 million Chinese people—nearly double the U.S. population—live and work in cities.1 The total size of developed areas expanded 137 percent between 1990 and 2004, an expansion equivalent to adding one and a half New York Cities every year.2 The number of cities and towns in China also sharply increased, from 193 cities in 1978 to 662 in 2004.3 This rapid urbanization is partly a natural outcome of China’s breakneck industrialization and partly the result of government policy promoting development of small cities to absorb China’s huge rural “surplus labor”—people without enough land to farm. China is estimated to have as many as 150 million surplus laborers, one-ninth of its total population.4 Finding non-farming livelihood alternatives for these people has posed a constant challenge to the Chinese government, and urbanization has been regarded as one of the major tools to lessen enormous employment pressure. However, this massive rural-to-urban transformation and infrastructural expansion have created new pressures and complications of their own.

Jingjing Qian is a senior research associate and director of China Sustainable Cities Project at the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Barbara Finamore is a senior attorney and director of the Natural Resources Defense Council's China Program.

Connie Chan is a Beijing-based research fellow for the China Environmental Law Project at the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 2 1 ]

GREENING THE RED CITIES

This article examines the evolution of China’s urban development and related government strategies over the past three decades, reviews the environmental consequences of those strategies, and analyzes how China plans to continue its urban growth in the coming years with consideration for how that process can be more effectively managed along the principles of smart growth.

The Strategic Evolution of Chinese Urbanization. With a booming

economy and a population that is still 60 percent rural, China’s rapid urbanization likely will continue for at least another two to three decades. A summary of the evolution of China’s urban development will shed light on China’s current urbanization trend.

Every Chinese city is given an administrative designation: municipality, provincial capital, prefecture-level city, county-level city, or administrative town.

Cities are also often classified by population size or area, but these standards are used rather loosely. The general standard for grouping cities by urban population size employs the term “ultra-large city” for those with a population over 1 million, “large city” for cities with a population of 0.5 to 1 million, “medium city” for those with a population of two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand, and “small city” for those with a population fewer than two hundred thousand.5 For convenience, this article uses the same classifications but replaces “large city” with “second-tier city” so as to better differentiate the category from “ultra-large city.” The term “megacity” is used here to designate those with a population over 10 million.

About 10 percent of Chinese cities are ultra-large and megacities; 46 percent of

[ 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

cities fall within the middle segment, i.e. second-tier and medium cities; and the remaining 44 percent of cities are classified as small.6 In addition, China has nearly twenty thousand towns with formal governing bodies and population sizes ranging from several thousand to two hundred thousand.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s successive urban development policies have shared a common principle of discouraging the formation of very large cities.

Three principal reasons help explain China’s longstanding anxiety about controlling the size of its cities. First, managing massive rural surplus labor was an urgent concern in the 1980s, and existing cities had very limited capacities to absorb an enormous inflow of people. It was a cheap and quick solution at the time to promote dispersed small cities. Second, Mao’s opinion on the inevitability of war continued to influence China’s decision making. Distributing the population and important infrastructures across many cities rather than a concentrated few would reduce losses from military attacks. Third, Chinese policymakers and academics were wary of the social and environmental problems megacities caused in other developing countries.

Rapid development began in 1978, when China’s leader Deng Xiaoping embarked on a series of major economic reforms that initiated the fastest period of urbanization in China’s history.

Urbanization policy in this new era was first proposed at a 1980 national conference on urban planning and officially aimed at “controlling the size of large cities, rationally developing medium-size cities, and actively building small cities and towns.” Spreading small cities and towns all over China was intended to

QIAN, FINAMORE & CHAN

enable hundreds of millions of rural surplus laborers to find nonagricultural jobs near their original homes. A famous slogan at the time was, “Leaving the land but not leaving the hometown; entering factories but not entering cities.” Consequently, “township enterprises” mushroomed, which greatly contributed to private sector development but also led to widespread water and air pollution.

From 1982 to 1990 the number of cities in China increased from 236 to 456, and the number of county-governed towns grew from 2,664 to 9,322.7 Some of the “new” cities were merely

Megacities

system, established in 1958, a rural resident could not live and work in a city without a permit, which was very difficult to obtain for ultra-large cities. In a commodity-scant central planning economy, such a system, among other things, facilitated the distribution of food stamps and other basic supplies to urban residents.

By the end of the 1990s, some scholars began to question the wisdom of promoting small, dispersed cities, but most Chinese researchers and policy makers did not fully appreciate the environmental and land resource constraints of the

Today, 560 million Chinese people—

nearly double the U.S. population—live and work in cities. results of administrative name changes, from “county seat” to “city.”8 Such a quick conversion, albeit superficial, empowered these newly named cities to seek rapid expansion. As township enterprises and small cities increasingly led to environmental pollution and wasteful land use, China began to modify its urbanization strategy. The first Urban Planning Law of 1989 stipulated “strictly controlling the size of big cities, and rationally developing medium- and small-size cities.”

The restrictions on migration into big cities were not completely effective. For example, in 1986, Beijing set a population cap at 10 million for 1990, but quickly exceeded this number in 1988.9 The 1990s saw millions of “blind migrants”—farmers constituting a “floating population”—flowing into megacities as China’s Residence Permit System relaxed. Under the previous residence

“small city” urbanization approach.

Therefore, emphasis remained on a small city solution, although “developing regional urban centers” brought movement toward a more balanced strategy.10

The Environmental Impact of Urban Development. Although the

government’s strategy to control population growth in large cities succeeded in minimizing problems like urban poverty and shanty towns, its promotion of dispersed small cities led to environmental pollution of enormous proportions in large and small cities alike.

As numerous papers have described China’s air, water, and solid waste pollution in depth, this article will only briefly highlight them. Coal-burning has traditionally been the main source of air pollution in China, where, according to the World Bank, twenty of the world’s thirty most-polluted cities are located.11 Cen-

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 2 3 ]

GREENING THE RED CITIES

tral district heating and gas cooking have essentially replaced inefficient coal-fired boilers and stoves in larger cities, reducing coal-related air pollution; however, rapid motorization in cities, especially large ones, has increased pollution from car exhaust.12 Water pollution and water shortages are also serious concerns. Only six of China’s twenty-eight priority lakes and reservoirs are suitable sources of drinking water, according to 2005 state monitoring results.13 Additionally, preliminary investigations in 2005 showed some extent of pollution in 90 percent of the groundwater beneath Chinese cities.14 Pollution greatly intensifies China’s water shortage problem. Currently, over four hundred Chinese cities face water shortages, and one-sixth of them suffer from critical conditions.15 China has one-fifth of the world’s population yet only 7 percent of the world’s arable land, suggesting that farmland preservation should also be a central issue in urban development. Government policies favoring smaller cities have only accelerated the loss of scarce land resources as, generally, smaller Chinese cities have made less efficient use of land.

Small towns of fewer than ten thousand residents use two hundred square meters per resident, compared to sixty-six square meters per resident in ultra-large cities with a population of 2 million or more.16 Exacerbating the problem of land limitation, 6 billion tons of municipal waste have accumulated nationwide, occupying over five hundred thousand hectares of land.17 Garbage piles, the result of inadequate sanitation capacities, surround two-thirds of Chinese cities.18 As urbanization continues and lifestyle standards rise, generation of urban waste continues

[ 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

to increase by 10 percent per year.19

The Global Implications of an Urbanizing China. As the most pop-

ulous country in the world, China’s fastpaced urbanization has clear global implications. The most far-reaching of these are global warming, energy security, and biodiversity.

Global warming. The International Energy Agency recently projected that in 2010, China will surpass the United States as the world’s largest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter. Because China’s per capita CO2 emissions remain lower than the world average, there is great potential for the country’s continued growth in energy use and associated emissions, but also great potential to increase energy productivity through investment in more efficient technologies.

Rapid urbanization has greatly increased the use of energy in buildings, including consumption from heating, cooling, lighting, cooking, and electrical appliances. Rising living standards, particularly among China’s urban population, suggest that electricity consumption by home appliances will be a particularly large growth area. For example, air conditioners already account for one-third of the total power load in some provinces on hot summer days.20 Booming cities have also increased demand for energyintensive construction materials, such as cement and steel. The combined energy used by buildings and urban construction amounts to roughly 40 to 45 percent of the nation’s total energy consumption.21 The huge rise in urban private car ownership, from 2.3 million in 1998 to 10.7 million by 2004, has also contributed significantly to climbing CO2 emissions.22 If China’s urban develop-

QIAN, FINAMORE & CHAN

ment slips into the auto-dependence trap into which the United States has fallen, the country will not only grossly increase the transportation sector’s CO2 emissions but also face severe oil shortages.

Energy security. In 1993 China went from being an oil exporter to an oil importer.

Its dependence on foreign oil has only continued to grow since then, driven largely by rampant construction of new roads and highways and an explosion of private car ownership. In 1980 China used approximately 1.8 million barrels of crude oil per day; in 2004 it used 6.4 million barrels per day—an increase of more than 250 percent.

Although China’s growing appetite for oil and its outreach toward oil-rich countries in Africa and Latin America have given rise to international concerns over energy security, China has firmly rejected the notion that it poses an “energy threat” and argues its annual crude imports remain far lower than those of Japan or the United States.

Regardless, rapid urban expansion and sprawl are likely to intensify China’s thirst for oil, which will necessarily have geopolitical implications.

Biodiversity. The vitality and productivity of the world economy relies on rich biodiversity. With a greater variety of species comes many advantages, including increased selection for crops, more opportunities for medical discoveries, and a stronger ability of ecosystems to withstand and recover from disturbances and disasters. China has a great wealth of biodiversity, with 87,000 recorded fauna species and 30,000 advanced flora species.23 Among the world’s 640 endangered species listed by the United Nations, China is home to 156.24 Urban devel-

Megacities

opment without sufficient care for the environment has already damaged many of China’s biological resources over recent decades.

For example, at one time Beijing was surrounded by 15 percent of the nation’s total wetlands; by 2003 these areas had shrunk to a mere 3 percent of the national total.25 The number of native plant species in Shanghai has fallen rapidly, while the number of non-native plant species has greatly increased due to the construction of managed green spaces.26 These cases illustrate the severity of urbanization’s impact on biodiversity in the regions surrounding China’s megacities.

The Road Ahead: Helping Sustainability Prevail. Recognizing the

inefficient land use and waste of other natural resources that accompany sprawling, small cities, the Chinese government has begun to favor concentration of buildings and facilities in order to obtain economies of scale. This shift is clearly reflected in the eleventh National FiveYear Plan for Economic and Social Development (FYP). Unlike China’s previous FYP, which devoted no more than a sentence or two to urbanization, the eleventh FYP (2006-2010) dedicates a whole chapter to the issue. It states that China should “insist on coordinated development of large, medium and small cities and towns” and “actively and safely promote urbanization according to the principles of steady and orderly progression, land conservation, concentrated and efficient growth, and rational distribution [of cities].”27 While this is a welcome sign of the central government’s improved environmental awareness, the shift of preference to larger cities may motivate the leaders

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 2 5 ]

GREENING THE RED CITIES

of second-tier cities and medium cities to expand and upgrade administrative levels even more aggressively. If their past tendency to build needlessly wide streets, oversized squares, and disproportionate-

nese cities have the goal of becoming an “international metropolis,” while many small cities propose similarly grandiose goals.28 In the name of developing “international metropolises” and

Efforts to promote truly sustainable

urban development in China must target mid-sized cities. ly huge government buildings continues, the objective of pursuing resource-efficient and environmentally friendly urbanization will be greatly compromised.

This overzealous urban growth momentum can be attributed to two major forces. The first is economic. China’s tax system gives the lion’s share of tax revenue to the central government from major tax types, leaving local governments to collect revenue from only a few small tax categories. Several of these are linked directly to urban expansion, giving city governments a large economic incentive to promote land and property development. As China has no private land ownership, local governments have a constitutional right to take land from farmers for developments supposedly benefiting the public with little compensation in return.

The second driving force is political.

To seek promotion, many local government officials have focused on GDP growth at the expense of environmental degradation. City officials have a strong political incentive to undertake imageboosting projects and grand city plans, instating “special development zones,” “science and technology parks,” “university towns,” and “tourist resorts.” A January 2007 article reports that 183 Chi-

[ 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

“regional centers,” cities have been recklessly expanding and sprawling, breaking their growth targets far ahead of time. It is not uncommon to hear that a city “achieved” its twenty-year growth plan in just five years.29 To mitigate these two incentives, the central government needs to reform both tax structures and promotion criteria for local government officials. Initial efforts to hold local authorities accountable for environmental costs are underway. For example, China’s environmental protection and statistics authorities are developing a “green GDP” accounting method, which aims to integrate the costs of resource depletion and environmental impact into GDP calculations. This is a positive step forward, but more intensified efforts are needed in these areas.

Equally important is the need to improve city leaders’ understanding, knowledge, and vision regarding sustainable urban development. Environmental awareness has now reached a level where buzz terms such as “resource-efficient cities,” “eco-cities,” “livable cities,” and “green buildings” have become fashionable, but this has not necessarily translated into genuine comprehension and appreciation for the principles behind sustainability. Some government officials are beginning to strive for “green

QIAN, FINAMORE & CHAN

achievements,” but many of the projects they support may be no more than merely superficial “greening” jobs, such as building flower and grass beds with nonindigenous species or altering a natural stream into a canal.

Second-tier and medium cities, which are great in number, have more scope to expand than ultra-large and megacities and more economic resources to grow than small ones. However, urban planners and managers in these cities have less exposure than their counterparts in ultra-large and megacities to the most current environmental thinking and best practices. They also generally have fewer training opportunities. Therefore, international efforts aimed at promoting sustainable urban development in China should prioritize this middle segment of Chinese cities, while also not ignoring large and megacities. As many provincial governments currently plan to train local officials in public administration domestically and abroad, international environmental organizations can seek to capture these capacity-building opportunities and encourage urban planning and management officials to appreciate and pursue genuine sustainable urban development.

Sustainable urban development can be expressed well by the principles of “smart growth,” a concept, approach, and movement that has emerged and gained popularity over the past decade in the United States. Smart growth is an alternative to urban sprawl and car dependency. Several principles of smart growth are particularly relevant to Chinese situations and should form the main content of the training. They are: adherence to high-density urban development; emphasizing pedestrian-friendliness and walkable neighborhoods; building mul-

Megacities

tiple-mode transit systems; encouraging mixed land use and mixed building use; promoting efficiencies for all resources; preserving and valuing natural beauties; and involving residents and stakeholders in city and community planning and development.

Strategically targeting second-tier and medium cities to both curb inefficient growth and promote their adoption of smart growth principles will make significant inroads toward securing China’s sustainable future and protecting the global environment.

Conclusion. While modern China has

historically pursued a strategy of promoting the dispersion of small cities and towns while discouraging influxes into ultra-large and megacities, the central government has begun to recognize the devastating levels of environmental pollution and inefficient land use that have resulted from such policies. China is now changing its strategy to emphasize, instead, the clustering of cities and greater efficiency in land use.

Whether this new approach will induce real, sustainable urban growth in practice, however, will depend largely on how second-tier and medium cities—which comprise half of China’s cities—pursue growth. These cities have greater potential and room for growth than do ultra-large and megacities, while also possessing stronger economic abilities to expand than their smaller city counterparts. For these reasons, efforts to promote truly sustainable urban development in China must target mid-sized cities. While certain tax reforms and revisions to the government cadre’s performance evaluation criteria will be necessary to discourage growth for growth’s sake, it will be

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 2 7 ]

GREENING THE RED CITIES

equally important to build the capacity acquire a genuine comprehension of of leaders, planners, and managers in sustainable urban development practhe middle segment of Chinese cities to tices and to seek true smart growth.

NOTES

1 The source of the 1978 percentage figure is: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics Yearbook 2005 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2005), chapter 4, table 4-1. Available from www.stats.gov.cn; The 2005 percentage figure is from: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Bulletin on the Main Data from 2005 One Percent Sample Population Census (16 March 2006).

Available from www.stats.gov.cn (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

2 Fang Ye, “Chinese Cities have the Highest Percapita Developed Land in the World” (Wo Guo Cheng Shi Ren Jun Jian She Yong Di Ju Shi Jie Zhi Shou), Economic Reference, 13 March 2006.

3 Data for 1978 is from: 50 Years of New China: A Series of Analytical Reports (50 Nian Xin Zhong Guo Xi Lie Bao Gao) (Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 17 September 1999), no.3. Available from www.stats.gov.cn (date accessed: 1 April 2007). Data for 2004 is from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Yearbook 2005, table 11-1.

4 Many Chinese articles cite rough estimates that are between 140 and 200 million, depending on the reference years. One reference is: Xie Peixiu, “Estimate for China’s Agricultural Surplus Labor” (Guan Yu Zhong Guo Nong Cun Sheng Yu Lao Dong Li Shu Liang de Gu Ji), China Population, Resources and Environment 14 (2004): 53.

5 “Chongqing Municipality Urban Planning Bureau,” Internet, www.cqupb.gov.cn/ghyd/content.aspx?id=3359 (date accessed: 1 April 2007); “Hunan Provincial Bureau of Statistics,” Internet, www.hntj.gov.cn/tjabc/tjwd/200505230067.htm (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

6 Calculated from the database attached to the presentation by Da Zhu (World Bank Institute), “Strategic Study of Water and Wastewater Management” (Cheng Shi Shui Yu Wu Shui Guan Li de Zhang Lu Yan Jiu), PowerPoint presentation to a Chinese delegation in Washington, D.C., on 16 November 2006.

7 Yang Yunyan, “Study of China’s Population Movement and Urbanization” (Zhong Guo Ren Kou Qian Yi He Cheng Shi Hua Yan Jiu) in National Population and Family Planning Commission of China website, Internet, www.chinapop.gov.cn/rklt/rkyjhsyyj/t20040326_1510.htm (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

8 Ibid.

9 Du Wulu, “A City’s Population Size Should be Compatible with its Functional Development” (Cheng Shi Ren Kou Gui Mo Yao Yu Cheng Shi Gong Neng Fa Zhan Xiang Shi Ying), Beijing Social Science 3 (1997), cited in Yang Yunyan.

[ 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

10 Rongji Zhu (Premier of the State Council of China), “Report on the Outline of the 10th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development,” speech at the 4th session of the 9th Assembly of the People’s Congress of China, 5 March 2001.

11 World Bank, China Quick Facts, Internet, http:// web.worldbank.org (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

12 He Kebin, “Pollution Control from Vehicles and Fuel Quality,” powerpoint presentation, Tsinghua University of China, Beijing, 22 October 2005, 10, cited by Japan Automobile Research Institute, 2530, Karima, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-0822, Japan, Internet, www.jari.jp/pdf/rt2005/07he_ch.pdf (date accessed: 1 April 2007). Industrial production and coal use contribute 30 percent PM10 and fugitive dusts another 30 percent.

13 State Environmental Protection Administration of China, 2005 Public Report on the State of China’s Environment (Beijing, 2005), Internet, www.zhb.gov.cn (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

14 “Ninety Percent of China’s Groundwater in Urban Areas are Polluted - Pollution Control Plans under Preparation” (Zhong Guo 9 Cheng Shi Di Xia Shui Zao Shou Wu Ran, Fang Zhi Gui Hua Kai Shi Bian Zhi), China News Agency, 28 December 2005.

15 State Environmental Protection Administration of China, Urban Environmental Protection in China (Beijing: SEPA, 2005): 11.

16 Rao Guangming, “Co-development of City Economic Corridor based on Southwest China's Shape Growth Strategy,” (Ji Yu Gan Xing Tong Dao de Cheng Yu Zhu Yi Cheng Shi Jing Ji Zou Lang Gong Jian) Research on Development 1 (June 2006): 32-37.

17 “Garbage Dumps Surround Most Chinese Cities” (Zhong Guo Duo Shu Cheng Shi Xian Ru La Ji Wei Cheng Zhi Jong), Xinhua Net, 17 August 2006.

18 Ibid.

19 Jin Haobo, “Incineration Technology for Municipal Wastes can Play a Big Role,” (Da You Ke Wei de Cheng Shi Sheng Huo La Ji Fen Shao Ji Shu) Environmental Economics 3 (2005).

20 “Energy Consumption by Buildings Going up Every Year, Reaching 27.45% of National Total” (Zong Liang Zhu Nian Shang Sheng, Jian Zhu Neng Hao Zhan Neng Yuan Zong Xiao Fei de 27.45%), Beijing Business, November 2004.

21 David Goldstein and Robert Watson, “Transforming Chinese Buildings for Energy Efficiency,” Sinosphere (Washington, D.C.: The Professional Association for China’s Environment, 2002), 5.

22 Car ownership figures are from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics Yearbook 2005, (Bei-

QIAN, FINAMORE & CHAN

jing: National Bureau of Statistics, 2005), chapter 16, table 16-27.

23 Wang Changyong, “Status of China’s Species Resources and Important Measures of Protection and Utilization,” (Zhong Guo Wu Zhong Zi Yuan de Xian Zhuang Ji Qi Bao Hu He Li Yong de Zhong Yao Ju Cuo) World Environment 4 (1998).

24 Xiamen City Environmental Protection Bureau, Internet, www.xmepb.gov.cn/environment/10.htm (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

25 “Under Damaging Threat, Beijing’s Wetlands Need Urgent Protection” (Zao Dao Hui Mian Xing Po Huai Ya Li Ri Yi Zeng Jia, Bei Jing Shi Di Ji Dai Bao Hu), Beijing Morning News, 11 August 2003.

26 Zhao Shuqing et al., “Ecological Consequences

Megacities

of Rapid Urban Expansion: Shanghai, China,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, Special Issue - China’s Environmental Challenge: The Way Forward 4 (2006): 341-346.

27 State Council of China, Outline of the 11th Five-Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China on National Economic and Social Development (Beijing, 16 March 2006), Internet, http://english.people.com.cn/200603/15/eng2006 0315_250830.html (date accessed: 1 April 2007).

28 “183 Cities Want to become International Metropolis: Has Urban Planning become a Tool of Money Making?” (183 Ge Cheng Shi Yu Jian “Guo Ji Da Du Shi”, Gui Hua Cheng Quan Qian Gong Ju?) Outlook Weekly (Xinhua News Agency), 29 January 2007.

29 Ibid.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 2 9 ]

Megacities

A Lagos Thing

Rules and Realities in the Nigerian Megacity Oka Obono The classical notion of ‘citiness’ refers to certain profiles of infrastructure that are working as a system within a regulatory process. Lagos subverts this, and unfurls its own idiosyncrasies. No doubt about it, the city evolves pathologies that are polymorphous: it barely functions at half of its potential capacity and could routinely descend into a nightmare…1

Oka Obono is a senior lecturer in the Sociology Department of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

The word Lagos has a peculiar resonance for inhabitants and visitors alike, who associate it with several competing tendencies. On the one hand, it represents a virtual necropolis, replete with corruption, poverty, crime, and sprawling corpses. Paradoxically, however, this modern metropolis, the largest in Nigeria, is also celebrated for its life, ethos of hard work, ingenuity, and capacity for local technological innovation and adaptation. It is associated with industrialization, modernization, and bright city lights—a place of boundless affluence and economic and political opportunities. The city possesses a spontaneous intimacy which locals view as proof of its cultural authenticity, while the rise of ethnic militias and neighborhood vigilante groups speaks of the resistance of a besieged human spirit.

The inherent contradictions of Lagos are products of the tremendous social and cultural contestations underlying its existence and status as mega-slum and megacity—in that order.

They constitute the enigma and stigma of this megacity as an object of study for social demography and provide explanaSummer/Fall 2007 [ 3 1 ]

A LAGOS THING

tions for why its study can be so difficult.

One writer referred to this difficulty as “the complexities involved in documenting Lagos.”2 However, there is a source, system, and structure to these contradictions.

Demographically, Lagos is currently listed as the world’s sixth largest megacity and is projected to rank third by 2015.

Lagos Megacity Region is a study in rapid expansion. Lagos was the political capital of Nigeria until the creation of the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja in 1976 and the formal relocation of the seat of the federal government to Abuja in 1991.

Fifty-one of the fifty-seven Local Gov-

Africa. It is also inadequately funded.

The 2006 state budget was $650 million for its estimated 15 million inhabitants, compared to New Delhi’s $2.6 billion for its 13.8 million people.5 This underfunding leads to an overburdened metropolitan infrastructure and unmanageable human sprawls, inadequate housing and health care, traffic congestion, urban violence, a high crime rate, and social and economic exclusion that persist despite public-private partnerships that form the key points of government policy.

Over time, manufacturing plants moved to the city, bringing with them

The city is a bloated slum, undergoing

compulsive growth and degeneration. ernment Areas (LGAs) accredited by the Lagos State Government (LSG) are located within this region, which also contains four LGAs in neighboring Ogun State, extends ten kilometers beyond the Lagos-Ogun State boundaries, and is already encroaching into additional states.3 Lagos is a melting pot of numerous ethnic groups drawn from the West African sub-region. According to State Governor Bola Ahmed Tinubu, there are twenty-six hundred communities within it.4 Lagos is characterized by high volumes of immigration, high population densities, a migration-induced growth rate of 8 percent per year, an average household size of seven, poverty, tremendous concentrations of slums and squatter settlements, and a high youth unemployment rate.

Lagos is the financial, economic, and business capital of Nigeria and West [ 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

vehicles and people. By 1965, 32 percent of Nigeria’s total manufacturing plants were located in metropolitan Lagos alone.6 The average population density in metropolitan Lagos is twenty thousand per square kilometer. The annual population growth rate in Lagos State reached 9 percent between 1970 and 1980, or three times higher than the national average. Lagos Metropolitan Area, which includes fourteen LGAs, is occupied by over 85 percent of this total on an area that occupies only 37 percent of the land area of the state.

Lagos Governor Bola Tinubu describes this as the city’s “unmanageable sprawl.”7 The city is a bloated slum, undergoing compulsive growth and degeneration produced by the relative poverty of its surrounding regions and its own over-urbanization. City facilities are inadequate for its teeming population.

OBONO

Barely 0.4 percent has a toilet connected to a sewer system.8 Two out of every three residents do not have reliable access to clean drinking water, electricity, waste disposal, or roads. The growth of Lagos is driven by an encroachment momentum that does not respond to current urban development or social engineering strategies. Without development intervention, its population will remain poor and live in deplorable conditions, plagued by disease and environmental degradation.

The Contradictions of Lagos Society. The first European cities

emerged from conditions of rising prosperity or by reversing former states of poverty, providing institutional impetus for further growth and development.

This gave them sustainable conditions of affluence. Modern megacities, however— largely a phenomenon of developing countries—did not follow this sustainable trajectory. Lagos fits in this latter category.

Lagos’s prosperity peaked in the early 1980s, before military coups and difficulties with the IMF drove Nigeria into recession. This period coincided with increased perception and appropriation of the potential technological benefits of globalization, as new information and communication technologies became available. Communication with wouldbe migrants to Lagos became easier and facilitated further “inmigration,” or migration within national boundaries, due to its declining costs. But neither income nor city facilities expanded to accommodate these new entrants.

By the late 1980s, this deep economic depression had set in, complemented by a grave political crisis. The city was the epicenter for agitation against military

Megacities

rule, and one cannot separate its changing demographic characteristics from its emergent ideological discontents. Poverty and protest worked hand in hand, as the unemployed urban poor were usually foot soldiers in the struggle. What were typically conceived of as peaceful protests organized by middle-class citizens could be hijacked by “Area Boys.” This term describes bands of loosely organized, rootless hoodlums who harass residents and visitors with the aim of extorting money, cell phones, and jewelry.

As more poor people poured into Lagos, however, they were no match for their savvier, better-educated, middleclass co-travelers. The city became a bustling agglomeration of contiguous slums and metropolitan areas. In time, the value systems of Lagos’s blighted areas transcended their physical boundaries and were shifted about as land speculation by petit bourgeois, or minor property owners, dislocated residents on the socioeconomic fringe. The main drivers of these waves and whirls of movement are poverty and the clear lack of opportunity in the surrounding regions, but their patterns are repeated internally within the city’s limits.

Lagos encroaches on its suburbs and dislodges the poor. Many of its residents have been literally pushed to a life “under the bridge.” This creates traumatizing psychic conditions, what poet Odia Ofeimum probably had in mind when he wrote, “the more common assault on citiness is the untenable state of derelict slums sitting side by side with massive skyscrapers.”9 This ability to live right next to opposing social conditions is part of what is sometimes described as “a Lagos thing,” but the inherent violence and assault are undeniable.

The rapid expansion of the Lagos Summer/Fall 2007 [ 3 3 ]

A LAGOS THING

standing the social chaos of the city. It is improbable that the disparate ideas built into this adaptive bundle of norms could ever be digested or developed as one coherent whole in a setting so impersonal, apart from a shared emphasis on individual struggle and survival. Taken together, they grant expression to the predatory instinct and a mercenary worldview.

The systemic roots of Lagos’s crime and violence are linked in the final analysis to class positions, residential patterns, and the milieus that form around these Moral Order or Social Chaos? and other cultural realities. As a result, Most migrants first utilize kin networks Lagos maintains a disproportionate level and move in short physical steps and of crime. In spite of Lagos’s numbers, it social stages as they settle into the metro- is said that the inhabitants of the city can politan economy. They do not come to always tell first-time visitors at a glance. the city tabula rasa, but bring with them This carves out a highly vulnerable segcomplex norms, survival strategies, and ment of Lagosian society that is described worldviews acquired elsewhere. In Lagos, somewhat fondly but disparagingly as these norms and worldviews fail to coa- “JJC” or “Johnny Just Come”—what elselesce due to economic mismanagement where might be rendered as “Johnny and political instability—conditions that Come Lately.” It draws attention to the are generalized across the country. recency of one’s arrival to this megacity, Moreover, norms from the periphery are the naïveté to be expected in one’s attitransferred with each forced movement tudes and behavior, and ultimately the into metropolitan consciousness. Thus, fact that one is fair game for con artists. norms do not always drop from the top. One is constantly admonished to “shine Lower class and pre-urban norms can your eye”—to be alert for such manipulaand do modify core metropolitan value tions as well as more violent crimes. systems through the engagement of lineage networks and ethnic associations, “A Lagos Thing” Revisited. Curreligious-political affiliations, common rent records suggest that close to fifty commercial interests, and other by-ways people are killed each month in robbery by which such modifications and contra- attacks in Lagos State.10 Daring in execudictions are produced, maintained, and tion and gruesome in outcome, these transferred from one generation to the robberies reflect the failure of the state next. system at large to guarantee the safety and In Lagos, this mixture of ethnic security of its citizens. It has also given norms, lower class consciousness, and rise to neighborhood vigilante groups, internally derived Weltanschauungen, or ways ethnic militias, and private security outof seeing the world, produces a freak fits. In her article, “City Noted for Junmoral order that is crucial to under- gle Justice,” Titilayo Ibraheem observed megacity region indicates that migratory volumes will simultaneously decrease and increase, depending on the proximity of surrounding areas to the megacity epicenter. Inmigration decreases as megacity encroachment on neighboring states depresses migratory propensity in those areas. Conversely, this expansion in megacity territory attracts more migrants from farther away through expanded information networks and shortened social and economic distances to be covered.

[ 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

OBONO

that “recently, a new situation has been bothering Lagosians, corpses scattered all over the streets.”11 The article goes on to describe what Lagosians casually refer to as “necklacing,” a practice in which a car tire is strung around the neck of a suspected thief. The suspect and his tire are then doused in petrol and set ablaze right there on the streets. The resulting frenetic atmosphere is quickly replaced by a return to normalcy.

While such events may not necessarily be daily occurrences, they are nonetheless common enough to indicate the presence of serious pathologies in the Lagos system. Hard statistics are hard to

Megacities

the police officer in mufti do nothing? It is “a Lagos thing,” part of a complex of cultural contradictions. As urban development expert Manfred Konukiewitz notes, “the megacity is an abstract space,” beyond demographics and statistics.13 It is a context in which the development of ideas and cultural attitudes takes place.

The Rich Spin Their Wheels.

Swiftness in acting is an important expectation of Lagos society. Yet the frenetic pace of the city’s pedestrians is not reflected in its congested streets and standstill economy. For example, the city is noted for its infernal traffic jams, or “Go-Slows.” More than simple

Norms from the periphery are transferred

with each forced movement into metropolitan consciousness. come by, but the anomalies they point to are often so deep that they defy clear-cut explanations. Thus, in his article, “Corpses, Lights and Action,” Ayodele Arigbabu reflects on the rationale given by one local: “It’s too complex to explain in a few words.”12 The explanation for why necklacing takes place at all is more difficult and involves contentions with the contradictions of Lagos society. Lagos is a complex entity that subverts common expectations. It is not just its demographic size that makes it a megacity, but also its social and cultural contradictions. What accounts for the morbid casualness of necklacing? Why are the perpetrators and their observers able to watch the victim burn and twitch to death while holding heated discussions as to the nature of his offense before walking away? Why does

headaches of urban life, these “go-slows” exemplify a much wider social phenomenon. According to a 2005 Federal Road Safety Corps report, 22 percent of all vehicles in the country are located in Lagos. While the rich sit immobile in their cars, pedestrians can take commercial motorcycles, called okadas, which weave through traffic and reach destination more reliably, if a little more dangerously. The emergence of okadas represents the response of the Lagos lower class to the impact of structural adjustment on Nigeria’s workforce. Low income workers were hit hardest, and as their incomes fell, they were forced to seek less optimal modes of transportation.

At a time when the purchasing power of many Nigerians was considerably reduced to a point where privately owned taxis could not be maintained efficiently, Summer/Fall 2007 [ 3 5 ]

A LAGOS THING

2006, and the World Bank has identified nine of Lagos’s largest slums for upgrading with a $200 million loan. An estimated one million people will benefit from this endeavor, the largest single number of beneficiares in a project backed by the World Bank in Nigeria.

The solutions to Lagos’ mega-problems will not be found in money alone.

Since 1999 when the Obasanjo government came to power and ended fifteen years of military rule, millions of dollars have been spent on urban regeneration and crime-reduction projects. The results have been desultory. In the Lagos megacity region, solutions must be linked to the problems’ root causes: poverty, migration, spatial encroachment, and official corruption. These should be targets for intervention, but they may not always coincide in spatial terms. Thus, a broader contextualization is needed if interventions are to be sustainable.

Since Lagos simply will keep expanding, it is necessary to take preemptive action in the many “sending communities,” to replicate the conditions that attract migration to the city. Lagos must be perceived as a problem created by the problems of other areas. For instance, the unemployment of sending areas is a major source of high unemployment in Lagos. It is within this context that Lagos may be seen as absorbing and defining the nature of the social and cultural contradictions of its outlying areas and other sending communities. The solution to its problems must therefore take these communities into account. Limiting solutions to Lagos’s spatial borders without Looking Beyond Lagos. Efforts to paying attention to its trans-spatial develop the blighted areas of Lagos have dimensions is a reductionist strategy that not gone far enough. The Federal Gov- is not likely to make much impact or ernment inaugurated the Lagos megacity achieve sustainable results. A compreDevelopment Authority (LMDA) in July hensive, multi-site approach will both

the motorcycle replaced the taxis in many parts of the country, especially in Lagos.

Moreover, roads were in a state of disrepair, and available taxis could not traverse all routes. Since this period also witnessed the failure of the national air carrier, Nigerian Airways, and the entry of the now-defunct private airline, Okada Air—owned by businessman Gabriel Igbinedion—it was a natural popular response to rechristen the faster, more dependable commercial motorcycle.

However, thieves could also capitalize on these advantages by snatching bags while riding these fast-moving okadas. As a result, a 7:00 p.m. curfew has been placed on their use in Lagos City, and in Abuja there is a total ban.

Lagos is more than just a city or megacity; it is in its essential form a “spirit of defiance.”14 Everything that works can be subverted; everything that does not work can be converted to some other use. Lagos is a celebration of defiance against any and all constituted authority. In this, it is a quintessential postmodern megacity of the developing world. Its core attributes are poverty and residential slums. This results in part from the sometimes deluded confidence of many migrants that Lagos holds the key to their future prosperity. Systemic contradictions have led to a leveling of Lagos’s residents through the creation of alternative channels of power, including those that undermine the system. Despite these contradictions—and in part because of them—optimism and the promise of opportunity pervade Lagosian society.

[ 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

OBONO

stem rural-urban migration and reverse it by stimulating the early onset of return migration. In relation to this broader approach, strategies of resource infusion and upgrading of blighted areas within

Megacities

Lagos will prove viable. In addition, a preemptive effort to plan ahead in areas where the encroachment of the megacity is inevitable should be considered a significant part of this overall strategy.

NOTES

1 Ololade Bamidele, “Beyond Yellow Buses,” in Lagos: A City at Work, eds., Kunle Tejuoso and Weyinmi Atigbi, Glendora Lagos Project (Falomo, Lagos: Glendora Books, 2005), 14.

2 Olakunle Tejuosu, “Preface,” in Lagos: A City at Work, 9.

3 Ibid.

4 Bola Ahmed Tinubu, “Governance and Urban Development: Pre-requisites to Safeguard Social Cohesion,” Paper presented at the Mayors’ Forum on Emerging Megacities: Challenges and Perspectives, held at the German Museum of Architecture, Frankfurt/Main, Germany, 7-8 December 2006.

5 Ibid.

6 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UN-HABITAT), Evaluation of Relocation Experience, (Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1991), 76.

7 Bola Ahmed Tinubu, “Governance and Urban Development: Pre-requisites to Safeguard Social Cohesion.”

8 George Packer, “The Megacity,” The New Yorker, 6 November 2006.

9 Odia Ofeimum, “Imagination and the City,” Lagos: A City at Work, 38.

10 Alex Olise and Simeon Nwakaudu, “Robbers Kill 150 Lagos Residents in Seven Months,” The Guardian, 6 March 2007, p.7.

11 Titilayo Ibraheem, “City Noted for Jungle Justice,” Daily Independent, 12 February 2007, p. 11.

12 Ayodele Arigbabu, “Corpses, Lights and Action: Lagos in the Eyes of a Designer,” The Guardian Life 2, no. 21 (2007): 3-4.

13 Christian Much, Hermann Nicolai, Ulricke Ungewiss, and Julian Wiablinger, eds., “The World as a City, the City in the World – Globalization, Urbanization and International Politics,” Conference Summary Report, Federal Foreign Office’s Conference Series, Berlin, 6-7 April 2006 (Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2006).

14 Kunle Tejuoso and Weyinmi Atigbi, eds., Lagos: A City at Work, 11.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 3 7 ]

Megacities

The Urbanization of Everything Governance Challenges in Southeast Asia Giok Ling Ooi Though urbanization is a global phenomenon, urban population growth rates in Southeast Asia remain astounding. As the world’s most populous region, the implication of urban population growth in Asian megacities is breathtaking in numerical terms, even when the increase is only one or two percentage points. Urbanization in these countries has been stimulated by two key processes: First, major cities in the region have competed actively for global business investments. Second, concentration of infrastructural development in these major cities has made them even more attractive to migrant workers from rural areas and international flows. These rapid urbanization rates can have dire implications, resulting in struggles for the impacted city that vary based on its size.

For megacities in Asian developing countries—often the capitals—the biggest struggle appears to be choosing between infrastructure to meet basic urban needs and the desire to attract international business and economic growth. Cities large and small must cope with scarce financial resources and a lack of expertise at managing this rapid urbanization. But the sheer scale of population sizes in Southeast Asian countries and the rate of urbanization pose a major governance challenge to these megacities. Megacities in many developing Asian countries urgently need to balance their rapid population and economic growth trajectories with management of their social and environmental impacts. Governance is further challenged

Giok Ling Ooi is a professor at the National Institute of Education at Nanyang Technological University and an adjunct professorial fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, a Singapore think tank.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 3 9 ]

THE URBANIZATION OF EVERYTHING

by competing urges for decentralization and coordination across local, megaurban, and national scales. Striking a balance between growth and its costs— social and environmental—does not appear to have been an option for the burgeoning cities of Asia.

Scale and Size Matter. Asia is

experiencing some of the most rapid, dramatic growth rates in the history of urbanization, particularly in terms of population size.1 Estimates are that more than 60 percent of the increase in the world’s urban population over the next three decades will be in Asia. Among the twenty-three cities with populations of more than 10 million people, nine are in Asia alone. For megacities like Metro Manila in the Philippines, a 1 percent increase in population would mean one hundred thousand more people. For many Asian countries the annual growth rate of the urban population for the period between 2000 to 2015 is expected to be in the range of 2 to 3 percent, while in Laos the urban population growth rate is almost 5 percent.

Other countries, such as Singapore, are also receiving regional and international labor migration. A city-state with an entirely urban population, Singapore has seen a 9 percent increase in its migrant non-resident population in the period between 1990 and 2000, compared to only 2 percent among its local resident population.2 With no rural hinterland, this migration has been entirely a result of regional and international labor migration. Thus, international and regional migration in Singapore today account for more of urbanization than birth rates.

Economic Globalization — A Race to the Bottom? Mega-urban

projects have proliferated in the Asian region as cities compete with each other to attract international business investors and tourists alike. City governments have been highly engaged actors in the effort to draw global investors and travellers, competing for meetings, incentives travel, conventions, and exhibitions (MICE).3 Other projects have included the construction of theme parks, indus-

Striking a balance between growth and its

costs—social and environmental—does not appear to have been an option for the burgeoning cities of Asia.

Meanwhile, economic opportunities in these rapidly growing cities draw further population growth from migrants.

In some countries, such as the Philippines, the pull of cities is compounded by the push from rural areas where agricultural productivity has been falling or natural disasters like drought have forced farmers to look for employment in cities. [ 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

trial and business parks, waterfront developments, airports, and seaports.

Incentives offered to business have included cheap land, skilled labor with competitive wages, telecommunications, transport, and related infrastructure.

National governments endorse these efforts via national development plans and budgetary support. The bid to push

OOI

Megacities

Malaysian society into the twenty-first century led to the development of a Silicon Valley replica in the region of the capital city—Kuala Lumpur. Known as the Multimedia Super-Corridor (MSC), the area has a new capital city to promote e-governance as well as an urban center to provide services for the IT firms that the project aims to attract.4 Telecommunications infrastructure has received more attention than environmental services in megacities such as Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta. Higher-income cities such as Seoul and Singapore have undertaken substantive economic restructuring in order to remain competitive with major Chinese cities. Singapore’s latest mega-urban projects include investments in biotechnology and the development of “Biopolis,” a research and development center housing scientists, a variety of pharmaceutical firms, and two integrated resorts comprising shopping, hotel, and casinos.

The costs of such investment must be offset elsewhere.

Even the onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 could not bring all these mega-urban projects to a halt. Thus, the race for economic globalization among megacities in the Asian region continues and has set these cities on a socially and environmentally disastrous trajectory. As will be seen next, city governments are challenged to balance urban growth with social and environmental policies that can effectively address the wretched living conditions of large proportions of their urban populations.

dwelling population is found in Asia.

UN-HABITAT estimates that in 2001 Asia had 554 million slum dwellers, or 60 percent of the world's total.5 The sheer scale of population growth in urban areas has overwhelmed the coping capacity of most city governments. This is especially the case because these megacities are in some of the world’s poorest countries.

One of the many challenges facing rapidly urbanizing Asia is the inability to provide adequate housing and the related environmental infrastructure for clean water and waste management. In the Bangkok Metropolitan Region, most household, commercial, and industrial wastewater is discharged into the stormwater drainage system with no treatment or only pre-treatment.6 This has resulted in the pollution of waterways, including the largest river in the country, and incidences of water-borne illnesses. The first wastewater management plan for Bangkok prepared in 1965 required an investment of a few hundred million dollars. A meaningful level of wastewater management throughout the city today would cost more than $3 billion. As a result of lack of investment, most major urban areas have limited environmental infrastructure, and the costs of meeting these urgent infrastructure needs are tremendous.

Such challenges to infrastructural development are exacerbated by the haphazard nature of urban growth in most megacities. Given the rapidity of growth, urban development has been largely the outcome of ad hoc rather than planned Slums and Sprawl. Poverty is and systematic spatial transformation.7 urbanizing, and this is highly visible in In smaller capital cities such as Kuala the proliferation of slum dwellings and Lumpur in Malaysia, a new city has pracsettlements in Asian cities. The largest tically been built over the existing one.8 proportion of the world’s urban slum- But costs of land and congestion have Summer/Fall 2007 [ 4 1 ]

THE URBANIZATION OF EVERYTHING

inevitably driven businesses to the urban fringe and periphery, leaving the city centers behind.

The proliferation of slums and urban sprawl has spread beyond the city centers as well, fuelled by this development and the expansion of industrial and commercial areas in the periphery. This development has effectively expanded most of the largest Asian cities into mega-urban regions. These are usually major or capital cities such as Metro Manila. This Filipino national capital region is governed by the Metro Manila Development Authority, composed of fourteen city mayors and three municipal mayors. In Indonesia, Jakarta’s special capital region known as Jabotabek spans the neighbouring areas of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi. These outer urban areas in Tangerang and Bekasi are experiencing population growth rates of more than 6 percent annually, compared to 2.4 percent in Jakarta itself.9 Bangkok Metropolitan Region comprises fifty districts. Officially the population was 5.68 million in 2000.10 The estimate, however, is that the total population is closer to 8 to 10 million if the count includes daily work commuters as well as people who have moved into the city without registering a postal address.11 While the population density in the inner city area has been declining, that in outer areas of the metropolitan region has been growing and has practically doubled. Spurred on by the congestion in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region and attracted by available and cheaper land in the eastern seaboard area, urban development has leapfrogged and sprawled even beyond the mega-urban region.

This combination of challenges— poverty, environmental problems, and spatial sprawl into surrounding regions— [ 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

poses challenges to city governments already overwhelmed by the needs of global economic integration. City governments cannot finance both the development necessary to attract global investment and tourism and the infrastructure needed to provide for adequate homes and environmental management. As noted, city governments therefore must choose between developing infrastructure for business or for their local impoverished populations.

Governance and the Megacity.

Decentralization has been viewed as one of the best ways for cities to address this growing divergence of needs in public infrastructure and services. Yet decentralization within a rapidly growing megacity does not obviate the need for coordination. A case in point is the development of roads and public transport infrastructure by administrative districts within the megacity. Such public works often straddle several administrative districts and hence necessitate close coordination to ensure effective implementation of projects such as highways or mass rapid transit systems.

Coordination presents a major challenge in the governance of megacities.

Since the majority of these cities are effectively mega-urban regions comprising complexes of several authorities, many include numerous smaller municipalities with their own administrations.

Megacity governments are challenged with the task of decentralizing the powers of policy decision making and implementation, while at the same time coordinating across vast territories that are more urban regions than cities.

Often there are tensions between highly localized needs and those at the megacity or mega-urban regional scale.

OOI

Conflicts of interest pit local authorities against the megacity government in areas ranging from waste management to policing, sharing tax revenues, and local contributions to central treasuries in cities such as Metro Manila and Mumbai.12 Similarly, differences in needs within megacities divide civil society groups largely comprised of middle-class members from lower-wage segments of the population. In Singapore, for example, civil society groups work on agenda items like nature conservation while most low-wage citizens are more concerned with bread-and-butter issues such as bus fare hikes or increases in utility bills. Civil society groups in Metro Manila recently supported efforts to solve traffic con-

Megacities

to the exclusion of other needs such as conservation of cultural heritage.14 Civil society groups and other nongovernment stakeholders are often distrusted and— more often than not—excluded from policy decision making. As a consequence coordination among multiple stakeholders in urban government processes remains a major challenge for most Asian cities.

Coordinating a Decentralized Urban Government. Problems of coordination across the urban and national scales have not been faced by unitary states such as Singapore, effectively a city-state. Yet even in the case of Singapore, there are issues of coordina-

More than 60 percent of the increase in the world’s urban population over the next three decades will be in Asia. gestion by banning jeepneys (high-polluting makeshift buses) and itinerant street traders.13 However, these jeepneys provide affordable transport, while street traders comprised largely of the urban poor rely on such hawking for a living.

Above all, megacities must be able work in coordination with national governments. These relationships can be very difficult and highly politicized when local and national governments are led by different political parties, or even when leaders from the same party do not agree on policy goals and provisions. The support of central or national governments has contributed to coherent policies in cities like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. Such convergence of policies, however, can also imply strong centralized focus on economic development

tion among different agencies and authorities that are given the task of implementing and enforcing policies introduced by the state sector.

Singapore’s approach to urbanized economic development has been a rather unique blend of centralized policy decision making with relatively decentralized implementation. For example, cleaning up the river flowing through the citystate required the coordination of a host of implementation agencies from 1978 to 1988. At least a half dozen parties were included in the cleaning and redevelopment of land along the Singapore River.

Prior to this, whole households, together with a large number of cottage industries including pig farms and warehouses, had to be relocated from the banks.15 Relocation of these households and economic Summer/Fall 2007 [ 4 3 ]

THE URBANIZATION OF EVERYTHING

activities would not have been possible without the provision of alternative accommodation provided by public housing and industrial estate development authorities.

Following the cleaning, the Urban Redevelopment Authority, together with the Singapore Tourism Board, led the process of changing land use along the river’s banks. Singapore’s private sector was a key partner in this project. Civil society and resident participation were missing; as a result, few of the former small- and medium-sized enterprises or households formerly settled along the riverbanks have been able to return after the project’s conclusion. Indeed, the Singapore River is now a tourist belt largely removed from where most Singaporeans live—in public housing estates and new towns developed mostly outside the city center. The river, once considered the lifeline of this port city, has become one of many international “glamour zones” without which aspiring global cities would not be complete.

be economically competitive and the urban infrastructural development required for adequate standards of living.

The constant will be the rapid rate of urbanization due in part to large-scale migration—either from rural areas or lower income countries in the region—by people seeking better economic opportunities in cities.

Decentralization in governance remains important due to the size of these megacities, which are effectively mega-urban regions. Yet this requires careful coordination across different scales of government, from local to city and national levels. Such coordination presents serious challenges to governments that are politically or financially divided.

In cities where there is greater coherence in urban development, planning, and implementation, further challenges lie in the coordination and inclusion of multiple stakeholders. Without such coordination, there are areas of development that are either neglected or sidelined in the rush by cities to compete for The Future of the Southeast global investments and international Asian Megacity. Reversing the tourists. In considering the development uncertain fortunes and securing the pathways followed by Asian megacities, future of the Asian megacity requires a the question will be whether they can baltough balancing act between what city and ance the needs of their citizens with the national governments deem necessary to pressures of economic globalization.

NOTES

1 Population Reference Bureau, “Human Population: Fundamentals of Growth Patterns of World Urbanization 2004” (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 15 December 2004).

2 Singapore Department of Statistics, Singapore Census of Population 2000 (Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000).

3 Giok Ling Ooi and Brian.J. Shaw, Beyond the Port City – Development and Identity in 21st Century Singapore (Singapore: Pearson/Prentice-Hall, 2004).

[ 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

4 Tim Bunnell, “Malaysia’s High-Tech Cities and the Construction of Intelligent Citizenship,” in Theorising the Southeast Asian City as Text, eds., Robbie B.H. Goh and Brenda S.A. Yeoh (Singapore: World Scientific, 2004), 109-134.

5 United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1999 Revision, Data Tables and Highlights (New York: United Nations, 2000) ESA/P/WP.161.

6 Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asia (Manila:

OOI

ADB, 1997).

7 Boon Thong Lee, “Urban Development in Malaysia: The Case for a More Holistic and Strategic Approach to Urbanization,” in Urban and Peri-Urban Developments–Structures, Processes and Solutions, ed. Christine Knie (Cologne: University of Cologne Press, 2006), 4.

8 Boon Thong Lee, “Globalisation, telerevolution and cyberurbanization in Malaysia,” PROSEA Research Paper (Taipei: Academica Sinica, 2000).

9 Fu-Chen Lo and Yue-Man Yeung, eds., Emerging World Cities in Pacific Asia (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1996), 38.

10 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and United Nations Environmental Programme, Bangkok State of the Environment 2001 (Bangkock: Bangkok Metro-

Megacities

politan Administration and United Nations Environmental Programme, Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific, 2001).

11 Asian Development Bank, Asian Environmental Outlook 2001 (Manila: ADB, 2001), 9.

12 Aprodocio A. Laquian, Beyond Metropolis–The Planning and Governance of Asia’s Mega-Urban Regions (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).

13 Ibid.

14 William S. Logan, ed., The Disappearing ‘Asian’ City: Protecting Asia’s Urban Heritage in a Globalising World (Hong Kong: OUP China Ltd., 2002).

15 Giok Ling Ooi, “Centralized Approach in Environmental Management: The Case of Singapore,” Sustainable Development 2, no. 1 (1994): 17-22.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 4 5 ]

Business&Economics Through a Continental Lens

Making More Out of the North American Platform David Emerson Canada and the United States enjoy what is widely regarded as the world’s closest bilateral relationship. Their shared history and commitment to democracy have made the two societies among the freest and most open in the world. Joint efforts on the international stage—for example, in Afghanistan and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—are making the world a better, safer place. This close partnership extends to trade. Canada’s businesses and citizens rely on efficient access to the United States. They depend on a secure, efficient border that keeps trade moving freely, promotes mutually beneficial bilateral business interactions, and makes possible the many “human links”—the cross border partnerships, friendships, and family ties—that have defined the relationship for generations. Most of all, they value the jobs, wealth, and countless opportunities generated by close Canada-U.S. business ties.

Building on the deep commercial, and personal links that had drawn the two nations together for so many years, the idea of free and open trade was embraced with the 1989 CanadaU.S. Free Trade Agreement, followed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Since then, the two economies have become integrated and interdependent on a variety of levels and to a degree that would surprise even the pioneers of Canada-U.S. free trade.

David Emerson is Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Pacific Gateway in the Canadian Cabinet. He has served as president and CEO of Canfor Corporation, Canada’s largest producer of softwood lumber.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 4 7 ]

THROUGH A CONTINENTAL LENS

Partners in Prosperity. Since 1989 products and scientific breakthroughs two-way trade has tripled, and the largest bilateral flow of goods, services, people, and capital in the world is currently between these two countries. Border crossings provide a good snapshot of the relationship: 3.5 million trucks and over 200 million people cross the CanadaU.S border each year; over $1.4 billion in trade crosses it every day. In 2005, thirty-eight states counted Canada as their top export market. Michigan, for example, sold more merchandise to Canada—60 percent of its total exports— than to all of its other foreign markets

that can be applied throughout the world. The Canada-California Strategic Innovation Partnership (CCSIP) is an example of public and private sectors from both countries combining their science and technology expertise to move projects forward. Projects include sustainable energy and cancer research. For example, CANARIE, a non-profit Canadian corporation, and the Corporation for Education Network Initiatives in California (CENIC) have linked universities, research hospitals, and other facilities in both countries by super

Canada trades more with some individual

U.S. states than it does with entire countries. combined. Canada trades more with individual U.S. states like New York, Michigan, and California than it does with entire countries like Great Britain, France, and even Japan. In fact, 7 million American jobs rely on bilateral trade with Canada.

Export statistics only tell part of the story. It has also become clear that the bilateral business relationship is about far more than simply trading goods and products with one another. Businesses on both sides of the border—such as those in the automotive sector—have fully embraced the cooperative spirit of free trade and are taking steps to seamlessly organize their activities. Thirty-four percent of Canada-U.S. trade is now said to be “intra-firm,” or conducted within the same company.

This collaborative spirit extends to research and development efforts, with scientists and technology experts working closely together, developing innovative [ 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

broadband to conduct collaborative research in such areas as infectious diseases, to exchange data and research information, and to access knowledge generated across the globe.

Cooperation in the energy sector is another marker of the close relationship.

Some 20 percent of Canada’s exports to the United States do not come by air, rail, or truck; they come by wire and pipe. Canada is the United States’s largest energy supplier—from natural gas and electricity to uranium and oil. In 2005 Canada, the world’s largest uranium producer, provided the United States with more than a third of the uranium that fuels American nuclear reactors and approximately 85 percent of its natural gas imports.

Oil is an increasingly important part of the relationship. Canada’s oil industry is privately owned and market-based.

Canada’s conventional oil reserves are about 4.4 billion barrels, but oil sands

EMERSON

Business & Economics

da’s bilateral relationship with Mexico has blossomed, and Mexico has become Canada’s foremost commercial partner in Latin America. It is currently Canada’s fifth most important export market— with Canadian exports to Mexico up 30 percent to $3.9 billion last year—and an important destination for Canadian investment. According to the Mexican government, there are over 1,800 Mexican subsidiaries of Canadian firms, with a cumulative investment that reaches over $5 billion, putting Canada in fifth place among investors in Mexico. Canadian firms are active in a range of sectors, including banking, energy, urban transportation equipment, electrical equipment, electronics, printing, and auto parts.

Leaders of each country have clearly demonstrated their commitment to strengthen the Canada-Mexico relationship by increasing bilateral trade by 50 percent from 2005 levels and bilateral investment by 100 percent by 2010.

Ongoing work through the CanadaMexico Partnership (CMP) is a good example of efforts to reach this goal. The CMP is a forum involving a wide crossThe North American Partner- section of public and private sector repship: From Bilateral to Trilater- resentatives from both countries, dedial. Although Canada’s economic cated to promoting stronger links strength has long relied upon close links between countries at the commercial, to the United States, Canadians also rec- social, and political levels. Working ognized the importance of expanding groups are focusing on a wide range of this relationship, and sowing the seeds of issues, including energy cooperation, a larger, truly continental partnership— trade, investment, science and technoloone that would provide even more busi- gy, agri-food cooperation, urban susness opportunities for future genera- tainability, housing, and labor mobility.

Canada’s relationship with Mexico— tions. Through NAFTA, the two nations joined with Mexico to create one of the while much younger than its relationship world’s largest free-trade zones, making with the United States—is important to North America the world’s most pros- Canadians and one that is being nourished for the future. The respective leadperous continent.

Since NAFTA came into being, Cana- ers have already visited each other. Presiadd an additional 174 billion barrels, placing Canada second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of proven reserves. These oil sands are now producing 1 million barrels a day, and with the completion of planned investments, production should reach at least 3 million barrels a day by 2015. The largest foreign investors in the Canadian oil and natural gas sector are U.S. firms. In fact, American investment and expertise were key factors in the development of the oil and natural gas industry in Canada. Similarly, Canadian firms are significant investors in the U.S. oil patch.

Through the joint commitment to open markets, Canada and the United States are encouraging further investment in energy suppliers, infrastructure, and technologies in order to strengthen future energy security. Such investment translates the commitment to energy cooperation into a stable, secure, and sustainable North American energy supply for years to come. This high degree of cooperation makes Canada a proven, trusted, and secure energy partner for Americans today and in the future.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 4 9 ]

THROUGH A CONTINENTAL LENS

eration—in an entirely new light.

The North American relationship is an important platform for global success and it should be used to develop innovative ways to ensure that economies remain competitive. A unique opportuThe Competitive Challenge. nity presents itself to put the North Today, the North American relationship American partnership on a new trajectois more important than ever, providing ry. The close ties and partnership can be an exciting opportunity to transform the transformed into a competitive contistrengths of the respective bilateral rela- nental economy that will advance the tionships and create a trilateral, conti- wealth, prosperity, and innovation of nental economy that can compete in the North America. The three countries can set a global model for trilateral commerglobal context.

Global value chains, combined with cial relations and demonstrate how successive breakthroughs in information nations can work constructively through and communications technology, have their differences to spark new economic fuelled nothing short of a revolution in opportunities for their citizens. international commerce. Distances are shrinking, borders are being erased, and Toward a Secure and Competicountries are drawing their economies tive North America. Creating a closer together for mutual benefit. more competitive continental partnerThis collaboration for prosperity plays ship means working toward two interconitself out around the world: in North nected goals: making North America America; in Europe, with the expansion more economically dynamic and creating of the European Union; in Asia, with the a secure home for citizens. These twin Association of Southeast Asian Nations; goals are the driving forces behind the and in parts of South and Central Amer- trilateral Security and Prosperity Partica. Countries are increasingly embrac- nership (SPP). The SPP is a natural next ing cooperation with their neighbors. step for the NAFTA partnership, and They are doing so out of competitive one that responds to a range of twentynecessity and to advance their well-being. first century security and economic realThe benefits of free trade are convinc- ities. It is based on the principle that ing nations around the world to turn security and prosperity are mutually away from the crutch of protectionism. dependent and complementary, and With the fall of trade and investment bar- must be a cornerstone of efforts to create riers, countries are open to competition economic opportunities for citizens. and new opportunities. It is liberalizaCanadians understand that security tion that brings nations such as China, and a competitive, prosperous economy India, and Brazil to the fore. These must go hand in hand. Efforts under the countries are aggressively redefining what trilateral SPP of North America to estabit means to be competitive in the global lish a common approach to continental economy. They are challenging nations security are strongly supported because it to examine the commercial relation- is critical to protect North America from ship—and the level of continental coop- a broad range of potential threats. The dent-elect Felipe Calderón visited Ottawa in October 2006, and Prime Minister Stephen Harper attended President Calderón’s inauguration in Mexico City in December 2006.

[ 5 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

EMERSON

SPP also recognizes the need to ensure the efficient movement of trade across borders and to create an environment in which Canadian, American, and Mexican businesses alike can become more competitive in the global marketplace. To reach this goal, the SPP aims to reduce transaction costs for companies by strengthening regulatory cooperation.

There can be no acceptance of diluted health, safety, and other regulatory objectives. It is thus important that the standards are compatible across borders.

Opportunities to bring key sectors like energy, automotive, transportation, and manufacturing closer together must be identified in order to make North America a stronger force globally. North America’s share of the global market must be enhanced to ensure a rewarding and dynamic future for the people working in those industries.

In March 2006 another important step was taken with the formation of the North American Competitiveness Council (NACC), composed of representatives from the business communities of all three countries. The NACC is another source of concrete recommendations to make North American firms more competitive on a global scale.

Important competitive links can also be created outside North America. Given that Canada and the United States belong to many different free trade agreements, further efforts should be made to explore mutual opportunities outside the North American realm, and to also enhance the existing benefits under the NAFTA partnership. Canada believes that building these kinds of reciprocal linkages holds great promise for increasing trade both within the continent and around the world.

Business & Economics

Effective Borders. Any plans to

make North America more competitive must take into account border issues. For businesses and citizens alike, borders are the most visible symbols of the relationship. They represent not only the point where the two nations begin and end, but where the nations meet. Therefore, smooth, effective borders must be an essential component of a competitive North America.

Canadians and Americans alike have long prided themselves in having the world’s longest non-militarized border.

At a time when regions such as the European Union are reducing border controls to facilitate trade and prosperity, Canada and the United States have been moving in the opposite direction in recent years. In this age of continuous supply chains and just-in-time delivery demands, a “thick” border can be fatal.

Delays cost money and contribute to significant losses of jobs. Secure borders are a necessity, but the economic, social, and even familial intermingling that has bound the two countries together for the last 140 years must not be reversed. As the staggering number of annual bordercrossings prove, the lines demarcating places like Toronto-Buffalo, WindsorDetroit, Vancouver-Bellingham, and Plattsburgh-Montreal—not to mention the hundreds of smaller border communities for whom efficient border crossings have long been a fundamental part of everyday economic and social life—are the lifelines of this common prosperity and friendship.

Canada believes that any new bordercrossing measures—including the recently implemented Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, with its new passport rules for all travel to the United States— must be implemented in a gradual, flexSummer/Fall 2007 [ 5 1 ]

THROUGH A CONTINENTAL LENS

ible manner, particularly for land and sea travel. The shared border should ultimately bring the two nations together. If the border measures are not implemented appropriately, they will create a significant divide. Though security and prosperity go hand in hand, the challenges must be solved through collaborative efforts. This also underscores the importance of an effective transportation system. The smooth flow of goods and people across the border and throughout the North American space is essential to prosperity, especially for the growth of trans-Pacific trade with Asia.

With the rise of Asia as an economic force, North America’s own economic center of gravity—operating for so long

possible for shippers. This means continuing to improve border security and facilitation as well as deploying cuttingedge technology to make the border procedures as smooth and “shipper friendly” as possible. In the aftermath, importers and exporters will benefit from a fast, effective, and secure gateway connecting Asian and North American markets.

While trade needs to flow smoothly and effectively, so too do people. Strong “human” links are required to support North America’s ongoing drive to be a competitive force on the world stage. For example, there must be greater provision of temporary movement of business people across the borders. North American firms need the ability to move their per-

Canadians understand that security and a competitive, prosperous economy must go hand in hand. on a primarily North-South axis—is now tilting westward, toward the Pacific Ocean. This presents a remarkable opportunity to take the efficient continental supply chains that the nations have developed over the years and give them a Pacific orientation that will help capture more trade with Asia.

From a North American perspective, the endeavor to create an efficient transportation link, running from coast to coast, from Canada through the United States, and down to Mexico, has been excellent. Airports and coastal and inland ports are tightly integrated with road and rail connections reaching deep into the continental heartland. Just as efficient transportation links within North America are essential, it is critical that transportation links to Asia be kept as smooth, efficient, and cost-effective as [ 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

sonnel from country to country in a legal and secure environment. Efforts to work with professional associations in all three nations to ensure that qualifications and practices are recognized throughout NAFTA’s economic space must be continued. Close cooperation and flexibility are essential to building a diverse, welleducated, and mobile North American workforce based on legally-sanctioned immigration laws and regulations.

North America: Leading By Example. Despite the high degree of

interdependence and cooperation, there are areas in which Canada and the United States will disagree. This is only natural, even for close friends and trading partners. The longstanding CanadaU.S. softwood lumber dispute—the longest-running trade dispute in the two

EMERSON

countries’ history—is a good example of where disagreement can be overcome. In September 2006 a negotiated agreement finally put an end to this long-standing dispute, and provided a more positive trading environment that will help respective lumber sectors work together to create a more competitive North American lumber industry. As the agreement proves, nations can work through complex and sensitive issues and, building on a close history as neighbors and partners, create wealth and commercial opportunities bilaterally.

Canada deeply believes that NAFTA is more than exporting goods and services.

The agreement symbolizes a common commitment to free and open markets, trade liberalization, and a rules-based trading system. Disagreements should not prevent the members from working together toward common goals. At the World Trade Organization, for example, there are differences in the negotiating positions held by Canada and the United States. But the two nations share the same overall objective: a broad, ambitious outcome to the Doha Round as a means to secure economic growth and help citizens in developing nations find new opportunities and build better lives for themselves.

Efforts to promote these open, cooperative values are equally important from

Business & Economics

a hemispheric perspective. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has made clear his intention to re-energize Canada’s relationships throughout the Americas, with friends and partners in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America. The benefits of a competitive, open, and transparent economy are straightforward. Partnership encourages nations throughout the hemisphere to take full advantage of a world that is increasingly “open for business.”

Canada, the United States, and Mexico should embrace the limitless opportunities presented by an increasingly open and globalized world. There is a need to look to the future not through a narrow national lens, but through a wider continental one. Steps should be taken to create a more competitive North American economy in the years to come.

Achieving this goal will take time, energy, and imagination, and will entail strong political will in all three countries. At every level—political, commercial, and personal—Canada is committed to strengthening its relationships, working through the challenges to put North America on a successful trajectory for the future. Given that the NAFTA members are independent, rapidly growing nations, the opportunities for beneficial collaboration have never been greater.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 5 3 ]

Business & Economics

Maximizing Microfinance Holly Lard and Isabelle Barres The United Nations proclaimed 2005 “the year of microcredit,” and excitement about this new poverty alleviation strategy has been building steadily since. In 2006 Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their pioneering work in microfinance. In addition, a string of high-profile conferences like the Microcredit Summit in Halifax, Canada, and the European Microfinance Week, along with increased media exposure, suggests that microfinance—the supply of loans, savings, and other basic financial services to the poor—has emerged as the steady frontrunner in poverty alleviation strategies.1 Microfinance has captivated North American and western European audiences, international aid agencies, and private investors. Although there seems to be no shortage of success stories, should we believe the hype? Is microfinance really the key to alleviating poverty?

This paper revisits the critiques of microfinance posited by Hype or Hope: The Worrisome State of the Microcredit Movement and shows reasons for hope in the industry through concrete policy recommendations.3 The first section of this paper analyzes common Northern expectations of microfinance, looking specifically at how statistical data can be misused to overgeneralize claims of the positive impact that access to financial services has on poverty alleviation. The second section examines empirical evidence that demonstrates the true impact of microfinance

Holly Lard is a master’s candidate at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies with professional experience in microfinance.

Isabelle Barres is the strategic director of the Microfinance Information eXchange.

Summer/ Fall 2007 [ 5 5 ]

MAXIMIZING MICROFINANCE

on poverty. The conclusion draws upon achieve the greatest positive impact on obstacles presented in the preceding sec- the lives of the poor. tions and presents four substantive, In the abstract, microfinance is simstakeholder-specific recommendations. ple. A common expectation is that if you provide a poor entrepreneur with access Unrealistic expectations. Increas- to capital, either through savings prodingly, public donors and socially minded ucts or credit, that entrepreneur will be private investors are backing their faith in able to start a micro-business and earn microfinance with sizable capital com- an income. The income that micromitments. According to a Consultative business generates can be used to pay

Microfinance can reduce the vulnerability of the poor but it is not a poverty cure-all.

Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) estimate, 2006 public donor capital earmarked for microfinance will exceed $1.5 billion, and private investments should reach $500 million.3 Although the majority of the investments come from established donors like the World Bank, the share and diversity of private sector investors is growing rapidly: TIAACREF made a first investment of $100 million in the Global Microfinance Investment Program, AIG invested $5.25 million in a three-year partnership with ACCION, Citigroup Foundation pledged $500 million over five years, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has given over $17 million in grants.4 Moreover, Peter Wall, Executive Director of the Microfinance Information eXchange, Inc. (MIX) predicts, “over the next five years, the industry will see trends in commercialization and transformation to achieve greater scale of operations. This suggests annual financial flows will increase by multiples over current levels.5 The financial floodgate is opening, and practitioners are asking how this capital can be harnessed to [ 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

back the loan and purchase critical items for the household such as food, shelter, and clothing. This poverty alleviation strategy has several underlying assumptions: first, microfinance reaches the poorest of the poor and/or micro-entrepreneurs; second, the entrepreneur will fund their enterprise with the loan they received for that purpose; third, the entrepreneur will continue to reinvest in the business with profits; and fourth, as the profits increase, the entrepreneur will break the vicious poverty cycle by investing their profits in education and health services for him or herself and his or her children. It is widely believed, especially in circles outside of microfinance professionals, that access to microfinance will steadily increase the income, education, and health of poor households. How do these assumptions hold?

Assumption 1: Microfinance reaches the poorest of the poor. It has been widely proven that although microfinance has the undeniable benefit of reducing vulnerability, it is not the best tool for

LARD & BARRES

reaching the poorest of the poor. The majority of microfinance clients live at the poverty line, typically ranging from “moderate poor” to “vulnerable poor.”6 Microfinance institutions are not yet targeting the “poorest of the poor;” financial services rarely reach the bottom 1015 percent of the population.7 These “frontier markets” are often eschewed by microfinance institutions because of potentially high transaction costs and the perception that these markets cannot sustainably participate in the cash economy. There are still two and a half billion people who do not have access to financial services. Reaching these rural and urban vulnerable and extreme poor will require innovative methodologies that will reduce transaction costs.

Even when financial services reach microentrepreneurs, a closer look at assumptions 2 and 3 shows that these socalled “microenterprise loans” are often not used for investing in the business.

Money is fungible, and everyone— including the poor—has a variety of needs and enjoys the flexibility of deciding how best to allocate their funds.

Assumptions 2 and 3: entrepreneurs will fund and reinvest in their business. The Swedish

International Development Agency sponsored a comprehensive impact study that proved microcredit clients do not necessarily invest their loans in an enterprise. The study revealed that, “a large proportion of microcredit loans are being used for consumption-smoothing.”9 A study of the Grameen Bank in northern Bangladesh further illustrates this point, revealing that 34 percent of the loans from microcredit institutions were spent for household food consumption and 32 percent in repaying other microcredit loans.10 The misuse of

Business & Economics

the loans suggests that microfinance does not necessarily lead to the creation of microbusinesses and jobs. Nevertheless, it is important not to undermine the fact that the household income patterns of the poor can be erratic and unpredictable, and that the ability to access savings or credit can be just as vital as the ability to source capital to launch a microbusiness.

Assumption 4: As profits increase, entrepreneurs will break the vicious poverty cycle by investing their profits. The fourth assump-

tion is derived from the misinterpretation of impact assessments, which confuse correlation and causality. Indeed, since most microfinance professionals admit the limitations of current data, focus the analysis on what has been proven, and highlight what remains to be tested, the temptation to stretch the facts is high. While impact studies show a correlation between microfinance and improved social indicators, they fail to demonstrate a causal relationship between the two. The CGAP Focus Note 24 illustrates this common misleading use of statistics to exaggerate the povertyreducing capacity of microfinance.11 This is illustrated in Zimbabwe, where Zambuko Trust clients “found positive impacts on enrollment ratios for boys 616 years old from 1997-99 […] An impact study of a microfinance program in Uganda […] showed that client households invest more in education than non-client households.”12 In Uganda and Zimbabwe, although there is a correlation between microfinance and investment in education, there is not a causal relationship. Similarly in Ghana, Freedom from Hunger (FfH) clients increased their incomes by $36 compared to $18 for non-clients.13 Summer/Fall 2007 [ 5 7 ]

MAXIMIZING MICROFINANCE

This statistic implies that the use of a FfH product (credit and savings) in Ghana will increase a client’s income by 100 percent relative to non-clients. The FfH statistic, however, actually only shows that there is a correlation between FfH products and increased income. In addition, the relationship is not exclusively the result of the provision of financial services since the FfH lending methodology requires ongoing education in a variety of subjects for all clients.14 The increase in income could, in the end, be attributed to the education the clients received rather than to their access to the financial service.

Country- and institution-specific correlations do not make it possible to draw substantive, widespread conclusions about the impact of microfinance.

Notwithstanding the absence of comprehensive data, the media continues to publish articles that attempt to quantify the microfinance’s impact on a wide scale and, by generalizing successes, undermine them rather than promote them.

There is a surfeit of institution-specific statistics and headlines that draw correlations between microfinance and increases in income, health, and education for clients. While this data is important, it demonstrates the possibilities of microfinance at the institutional level; Northern expectations of social impact must be moderated. Aggregate statistics have not demonstrated sustained crosscountry social and economic improvements. A USAID study that assessed a variety of individual, household, and enterprise indicators in India, Peru, and Zimbabwe found that “no single [social] impact was found uniformly in all three countries.” 15 The microfinance industry has taken matters into their own hands, and many [ 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

individuals—from microfinance providers to social investors and supporting organizations—are collaborating to collect and analyze social performance data on a wide scale to provide more transparency and better tools for decision making. It is anticipated that social performance indicators will be collected on a wide scale basis in the near future for public dissemination. For example, some financial indicators on the performance of microfinance providers are currently collected and disseminated by MIX.

Reason for Hope. Despite the flaws

in the assumptions outlined above, the empirical evidence demonstrates a few already key achievements: microfinance deepens financial markets in developing countries and facilitates consumption, smoothing opportunities for poor households.

According to Director of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Elizabeth Littlefield microfinance “is about building financial markets that serve their poor majorities.”16 Studies show that microfinance is primarily used to diversify sources of income to help the poor cope with shocks. Monique Cohen, director of Microfinance Opportunities, underlines this idea: “microfinance for the client is not always about mini-enterprises, it is about survival.”17 The lives of most poor people, including both microfinance beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, are characterized by both negative and positive shocks. The ubiquitous microfinance success stories published in the media present an easy prescription for transcending poverty: take a loan, start a business, and use the profits to reinvest in human and physical capital. However, to cope with external events that disrupt income streams, poor

LARD & BARRES

people have traditionally sold off their assets or relied on friends and money lenders to pay the medical bills, buy food, and finance burial costs. The loss of income-generating assets such as a cow, bicycle, or house makes the poor extremely vulnerable. Each time a shock occurs, it becomes more difficult to obtain a productive asset, potentially condemning the poor to a life of poverty.

Microfinance provides access to credit and, depending on institutional charter and governmental regulations, to savings and insurance products, thereby reducing the need to sell off productive assets during emergency situations that could normally force a poor household into destitution.18 Microfinance expert Stuart Rutherford proved that even the poorest people have the capacity to save and that many indeed do.19 Microfinance may not be transforming every client into an entrepreneur, but it is providing poor people with more ways to prepare for and adapt to shocks.

Moreover, scholars have proved that the effects of microfinance decrease vulnerability.20 Microfinance institutions, especially those that offer a wide range of savings and credit products tailored to their clients, can help mitigate the severity of negative shocks, even if it is often an arduous trek out of poverty.

Policy Recommendations. Microfinance is clearly the new development buzzword; the general public believes that access to capital to start microenterprises will enable the disadvantaged to transcend poverty. The increasing credence in microfinance has been matched by investor and donor dollars. The World Bank alone poured more than $1.2 billion into microfinance-related projects in 2005. The IFC, the private sector arm

Business & Economics

of the World Bank, invested more than $421 million in 2006.21 According to industry leaders, donor and investor microfinance portfolios will continue to increase in the short to medium term.22 The sustainable growth and impact of the microfinance industry is, however, dependent on more than just money.

Microfinance can reduce the vulnerability of the poor but it is not a poverty cure-all. In addition, investment in microfinance, whether it is in technology or capital, must be prudently underwritten; the excitement and diversity of the new financial players may inadvertently result in a scramble to invest in microfinance institutions, regardless of their long-term financial outlook. Lastly, donor money should target ways to reduce obstacles in order to reach the segments of the population that still do not have access to financial services. Private investors, however, should direct money towards equity investments in order to support growth in the industry.

The microfinance industry has come a long way and needs to make the public aware of the results of current research.

Different levels of poverty require different types of services. While the poor need more integrated programs, the moderate poor need more microcredit. Public education about the real impact of financial services for poor people, through advertising campaigns and open debate forums, may cultivate realistic expectations and therefore long-term support for microfinance as part of an overall development strategy. It is necessary to realign the public’s perception of microfinance with practitioners’ experience.

Microfinance can indeed contribute to internationally recognized poverty aims, such as the Millennium Development Goals. However, without the public’s Summer/Fall 2007 [ 5 9 ]

MAXIMIZING MICROFINANCE

genuine understanding of the limitations of microfinance, it will inevitably be brushed aside and re-branded as yet another unsuccessful development fad.

As the excitement about microfinance continues to woo more investors, it is critically important that the type and quality of the investment remains foremost in the decision-making process.

Without appropriate due diligence, there could be a financial disaster, similar to the burst of the dot-com bubble, that could be detrimental to these developing financial markets. Already there are firms, such as Developing World Markets and Symbiotics, that use their industry experience to help investors who are unfamiliar with the new terrain become involved and invested in quality institutions.23 Hiring microfinance investment specialists may enable non-traditional investors to navigate the industry more

tage in financing the industry. The largely subsidized donor funds should continue to invest in “frontier concepts” and serve the poorer and more marginalized populations. The subsidized funds should focus on technology innovation and on the reduction of transaction costs and barriers to marginalized entrepreneurial groups such as rural women.

Public-private partnerships that encourage innovation—such as a partnership between the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Vodafone in Kenya and Tanzania—may provide an interesting way to involve private sector interest in high risk endeavors. DFID and Vodafone currently work together with local microfinance institutions to create a viable cell phone banking platform. Cell phone banking will reduce transaction costs for both the client and the institution by decreasing

Different levels of poverty require different types of services. safely. Moreover, access to quality performance data—regarding both financial and social performance—based on a wide range of microfinance providers will continue to be critical in informing microfinance funders. This increased transparency will help in funding decisions, segmenting the market, and designing appropriate products.

In addition to public education, public donors and private investors must adopt strategic investment plans in order to prevent a potential bursting of the microfinance bubble. Due to differences in return on investment requirements and differences between stakeholders, private investors, and public donors, each have a distinct comparative advan[ 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

transportation and paperwork costs.24 Although donor subsidized methodology and technology research is not a new phenomenon, it is important that donors continue to invest in microfinance until every segment of the population has access to microfinance.

The commercialization, transformation, and increasing transparency of the industry provide a rewarding opportunity for private investors. The Microfinance Information Exchange, for example, hosts a reporting platform called the MIX Market. The future growth of the industry is, however, dependent on private investors’ willingness to take equity positions in institutions. Although an equity investment can be more risky and

LARD & BARRES

Business & Economics

requires a longer-term capital commitment from an investor, it enables more substantial growth rather than creating solely debt. Internationally accepted microfinance regulations permit institutions to leverage a comparatively high 6 to 1 debt-to-equity ratio. While the number of equity investment groups is growing, the field is far from saturated. For example, while the MIX Market website lists 203 microfinance institutions in Africa, there is only one private equity investment firm—AfriCap—that is dedicated to African microfinance institutions.25 Private investment equity commitments are needed to ensure that the industry keeps pace with client demand.

finance to continue to serve the poor, the current attitudes and expectations have to be realigned with empirical realities. One must recognize the revolutionary achievement of microfinance: the practice can indeed sustain the livelihoods of millions by strengthening asset-building and shock mitigation capabilities of individuals. The industry is clearly growing, but the ability to reach the two and a half billion clients is dependent upon private capital equity commitments and donor funded frontier initiatives.26 The focus that the industry is currently putting into social performance monitoring and management should go a long way into providing a better sense of the most effective tools and policies to serve the Conclusion. Microfinance can help different market segments that the the poor. However, in order for micro- industry is targeting.

NOTES

1 “Consultative Group to Assist the Poor,” Internet, http://www.cgap.org/portal/site/CGAP/menuitem.b0c88fe7e81ddb5067808010591010a0/ (date accessed: 15 February 2007).

2 Thomas Dichter, “Hype or Hope: The Worrisome State of the Microcredit Movement,” Internet, http://www.microfinancegateway.org/content/article/detail/31747 (date accessed: 7 March 2007).

3 “Global Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization,” World Bank, Povertynet Newsletter, vol. 97 (2006).

4 “Microcapital Update. MicroCapital: on Microfinance and Microcredit Investments,” Internet, http://www.microcapital.org/cblog/index.php?/ categories/8-Investment-Funds (date accessed: 3 December 2006). “AIG Launches Multimillion Dollar Global Microfinance Innovation Program with ACCION at Clinton Global Initiative,” Internet, http://accion.org/media_press_releases_detail.asp_Q_ NEWS_E_280 (date accessed: 15 December 2006).

5 Peter Wall, interview by Holly Lard, Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc office, 11 December 2006.

6 Monique Cohen, “Impact and Poverty Issues in Microfinance,” Presentation for Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies microfinance class, 6 November 2006.

7 “Micro-finance as a Dilemma in Poverty Reduc-

tion: The Experience from Grameen Bank, Bangladesh,” Internet, http://www.cmfnepal.org/ artical.htm (date accessed: 6 December 2006).

8 Povertynet Newsletter.

9 Ranjula Bali Swain, “Is Microfinance a Good Poverty Alleviation Strategy?” Swedish International Development Agency, vol. SIDA4289en (2004).

10 CMF 2004.

11 Elizabeth Littlefield, Jonathan Morduch, and Syed Hashemi, “Is Microfinance an Effective Strategy to Reach the Millennium Challenge Goals?” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, vol. 24 (2004).

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 “Freedom from Hunger (FfH). Worldwide Programs,” Internet, http://www.freedomfrom hunger.org/programs/ (date accessed: 5 December 2006).

15 Donald Snodgrass and Jennefer Sebstad. Clients in context: The Impact of Microfinance in Three Countries (Washington: Management Systems International, 2002).

16 “What’s Next for Microfinance?” Internet, http://cgap.org/press/press_coverage55.php (date accessed: 16 December 2006).

17 Monique Cohen, interview by Holly Lard, Microfinance Opportunities office, 12 December 2006.

18 Monique Cohen, CGAP staff, and Deena Bur-

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 6 1 ]

MAXIMIZING MICROFINANCE

jorjee,“Helping to Improve Donor Effectiveness in Microfinance,” CGAP, vol. 13 (2006).

19 “Microfinance Gateway. Q&A with Stuart Rutherford: Ask the Experts No. 1,” Internet, http://microfinancegateway.org/resource_centers/savings/experts/_asktheexpertsno1 (date accessed: 15 December 2006).

20 Centre for Micro Finance.

21 World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects 2007.”

22 “Nobel Signals Growing Momentum of Banking for the Poor,” Huliq, 10 December 2006.

23 “Developing World Markets,” Internet, http://www.dwmarkets.com (date accessed: 10 Decem-

[ 6 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ber 2006). “Symbiotics,” Internet, http://www.symbiotics.ch/en/index.asp (date accessed: 10 December 2006).

24 “Making Microcredit Mobile, Department for International Development,” Internet, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/africa/kenyavodafone.asp (date accessed: 15 December 2006).

25 “Microfinance Information Exchange,” Internet, http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand. global.results.asp?token=&refreshSearch=demand&s0 wrc=AFRI&seDisc=all (date accessed: 10 December 2006).

26 World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects 2007.”

Conflict&Security Turkey Eyes Iraq David Cuthell The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has led to a dramatic reordering of life in Iraq and the surrounding region. Some of these changes were by design, others unintended. The decapitation of the Baathist regime under the dictatorial grip of Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti was intended. The widening Sunni-Shi’a divide within Iraq, although widely predicted by observers of the region and its history, was not. Unfortunately, those planning the invasion gave little thought to the possible destabilizing effects of an escalating Sunni-Shi’a conflict.

The prospect of the U.S. government choosing a side lurks as a potential nightmare that threatens to make regional and supra-regional problems of instability even worse.

While the Western media focuses on the communal frictions between the Sunni Arabs and the Kurdish population in Mosul and Kirkuk, the continued marginalization of the Iraqi Turkmen in the north raises the potential for an even greater, more dangerous conflict. This paper examines a little-recognized problem brewing in northern Iraq that has been long dormant but now threatens to come back to life: Kurdish oppression of the Turkmen population around Kirkuk. Continued persecution of the Turkmen may spawn Turkish interventions or even irredentist actions in the form of a military invasion, followed by direct or indirect administration of the Kirkuk region. This in turn may set off a wider conflict with implications for the region as well as for western Europe, cen-

David Cuthell is currently the executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies in Washington, D.C. He is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and Columbia University.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 6 3 ]

TURKEY EYES IRAQ

tral Asia, and the NATO Alliance itself.

It could also permanently diminish Washington’s political leverage in the region.

Turkmen are Turkish speaking people who have inhabited the region for over a millennium, living side-by-side with the Arab and Kurdish portions of the population. Despite being the second most populous ethnic group in northern Iraq, the Turkmen wield little or no political power. During the last five years the

Turkey, and the Iraqi Kurds.

Creation of an Idea. To better understand the background and potential dangers involving Turkey and the Iraqi Turkmen, it is useful to briefly examine two important historical threads. The first involves the origins of Turkish irredentism, a concept based on pan-Turkist ideologies originating in the Ottoman Empire and the surrounding region in the late nineteenth and early

Continued persecution of the Turkmen

may spawn Turkish irredentist actions in the form of a military invasion. political and economic status of the Turkmen has dramatically worsened.

This development has been virtually ignored in the West but increasingly commands the attention of the Turkish public.

This article will explore the historical connection between modern Turkey and the Turkmen of northern Iraq. It will examine the relationship between Turkey and other Turkic communities beyond its borders and explore how the social boundaries are drawn between Turks living in Turkey today and those living beyond the borders in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Based on these observations, this article will make the case that the current Iraqi Turkmen situation constitutes a far more dangerous problem than is currently understood and requires deliberate action by the stakeholders involved to diffuse the tension. Ultimately, the United States should adopt an active policy of diplomatic involvement, promoting negotiations between the Iraqi Turkmen, [ 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

twentieth centuries. The second thread follows the current predicament of the Iraqi Turkmen and their connections to contemporary Turkey as well as its Ottoman ancestor.

Irredentism is the annexation of one state’s territory by another state based on claims of common ethnicity or through prior claims of ownership. One of the first irredentist movements was the Megali Idea in nineteenth-century Greece, which called for the annexation of Ottoman lands in order to construct a greater Greek homeland encompassing Asia Minor, the Black Sea, and the Aegean Sea. Turkish notions of a larger Turkic nation developed much later, largely through the twin influences of pan-Turanianism and pan-Turkism.

Pan-Turanianism, while never as powerful as pan-Turkism, was largely the creation of the nineteenth-century philologist Arminius Vambery. According to Vambery, all the Turkic peoples of the world were united in origin and culture through their link to the land of

CUTHELL

Conflict & Security

interests. First, there has been a significant change in the regional dynamics since 1995. Landau’s 1995 study predates the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent power shift in northern Iraq. Second, Landau’s work focused exclusively on Turks in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the case of the Caucasian Turks, their proximity to Turkey in both geography and language was offset by their historical ties to Iran as well as the influence of the Soviet Union. This lack of emotional connection was demonstrated by the Armenian invasion and capture of the Azeri enclave of NagornoKarabakh in 1994, which elicited almost no material response from Turkey. Generally, discrimination against Turks across the former central Asian republics of the Soviet Union has generated little interest in Turkey outside commercial circles.

This disinterest contrasts significantly with the attention placed on Turks living in closer proximity to the current borders. In recent decades a number of events have stirred up Turkish public sympathy for Turks suffering persecution nearby. Most notably were the events leading up to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Turkish intervention was triggered by the growing intra-communal violence in Cyprus that had been escalating for some time and that disproportionately affected the smaller and less organized Turkish community. As the world stood by and weakly condemned the violence initiated by the Greek govThe Parameters of Irredentism. ernment and paramilitaries, TurkishTurkey’s historical adherence to a policy Cypriot casualties mounted and public of non-intervention would suggest that opinion in Turkey reached a boiling irredentist activity in northern Iraq is point. The Turkish invasion and partiunlikely. Nevertheless, I offer two rea- tion of the island created shockwaves sons why this history cannot sufficiently within NATO and brought universal explain Turkey’s current foreign policy condemnation from Western states. It

Turan, or most of the landmass we call Central Asia. Pan-Turkism originated among Crimean Tatars and Azeri intellectuals in response to the crushing embrace of Tsarist Russia. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this idea of a common Turkish identity gained currency in the dominions of the Ottoman Empire. This subject has been comprehensively discussed

by Professor Jacob M. Landau in two volumes: Pan-Turkism: A Study in Irredentism (1981) and Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (1995).

As the difference in the two titles implies, the forces of Pan-Turkism advocating irredentist impulses were moderated between 1981 and 1995, leading modern Turkey from focusing on potential territorial expansion to being more concerned with cooperation. This transformation stemmed from the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a number of independent Turkish states in Central Asia as well as Azerbaijan. The second book concludes by stating, “Political Pan-Turkism in Turkey remains, indeed, the goal of some ultranationalist circles in Turkey, but these are peripheral.”1 For Landau, Ankara’s pan-Turkism has been fleeting and offset by injunctions that Turkey stay within its borders and leave external matters to those outside the country. In short, the slogan of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s founding father, remains the watchword: “Peace at home, Peace abroad.”

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 6 5 ]

TURKEY EYES IRAQ

did, however, stop the bloodshed and restore an uneasy peace.

Subsequent persecution of Bosnian Muslims and Bulgarian Turks in the 1990s also produced strong feelings of sympathy in Turkey. However, neither case produced the same level of public sympathy or support as the Turkish Cypriots. In the Bosnian case, a lack of proximity combined with a non-Turkish-speaking population prevented Turkey from reaching a threshold for intervention. In the Bulgarian case, the criteria of proximity and language were met, but the level of coercion, both economic and cultural, never reached sufficient intensity to merit intervention.

These cases suggest that no Turkish irredentist or interventionist activity will take place absent certain factors. First, Turks need to feel a significant level of identification with those living outside the border. This critical level of identification or solidarity seems to be based on an historical connection with the community and, more importantly, on a common language. In this context, the Turkish language should be understood to refer to the western Turkish spoken within the old borders of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century.

This excludes the Bosnians, Montenegrins, and Albanians, as well as central Asian Turks. It includes Turkish speakers in Bulgaria as well as pockets of Turkish speakers still found in Greece and the Balkans.

Second, real interest will be generated only with an elevated level of violence.

Day-to-day discrimination is not enough to propel Turks to demand action.

Instead, a certain level of hostility must be specifically directed against a Turkishspeaking public. This explains why Turkey was willing to risk an all-out war [ 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

with Greece in its intervention in Cyprus. Press reports of the massacre of innocent women and children, with whom most Turks felt a connection, prompted action by the Turkish government, overriding concerns of sanctions or worse.

The Cyprus intervention, however, cannot be labeled irredentism. While the Turkish Government helped to set up the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)—unquestionably a client state recognized by virtually no other country—there has never been any suggestion of Turkish annexation of Northern Cyprus. Instead, the creation of the TRNC has served as a means for maintaining the peace and forcing the Greekcontrolled portion of the island to negotiate a secure peace for those Turks living in the north. That this has not happened is the subject for another paper. Instead, it is important to recognize that, in the case of Cyprus, the two necessary conditions for Turkish intervention existed: the population was both Turkish-speaking and subject to intolerable physical violence.

Turkish Iraqis Today. This brings us to the current situation of the Turkmen in northern Iraq, where the two necessary conditions for possible intervention exist. The Turkmen population in northern Iraq, especially in Mosul and Kirkuk, has been subjected to widespread harassment and violence. Their political leader Saadetin Ergeç has been the target of several assassination attempts, most recently in early February 2007.2 The Turkmen policy of general quiescence to the Saddam Hussein regime left them in bad stead with the larger and more militant Kurdish population. The U.S.enforced no-fly zone protected the

CUTHELL

Kurds and allowed them to develop political and economic power, largely at the expense of the Turkmen and Arab populations in the region. Kurdish fortunes also increased after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The Kurdish armed forces under the Talabani and Barzani factions successfully portrayed themselves as allies of the Americans, securing relative peace in the north and allowing the Americans to focus their efforts elsewhere.

The active collaboration between the Kurdish militia and the American forces in northern Iraq cemented the dominance of the Kurdish forces in the region and simultaneously marginalized the non-Kurdish populations. Sunni Arabs can call on the support of other Sunni Arabs from across the region to stave off Kurdish dominance; Turkmen cannot forge a similar alliance. Instead, their only natural ally in the region is Turkey.

However, this alliance has been held in check by the existence of a large Kurdish population residing in the southeastern provinces of Turkey and northern Iraq.

Memories of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) insurrection that followed the first Gulf War are still fresh in Turkey, a war which produced tens of thousands of civilian and military casualties and cost the Turkish economy billions of dollars.

This combination of factors largely prevents a Turkish move into Iraq or possible annexation of Iraqi territory.

Nonetheless, the Turkish government has another possible rationale for using military force and considering de facto annexation: reclaiming historical territory. The Mosul province, including the city of Kirkuk, was taken from Turkey by the British at the time of the Lausanne negotiations in 1923. This theft was made worse when the League of Nations recog-

Conflict & Security

nized the state of Iraq in 1932.3 Turks continue to believe that Mosul should be Turkish. This belief is based on the fact that Turks constituted the largest portion of the population at the end of World War I. A second and perhaps more important factor in any possible Turkish calculation is oil. Kirkuk sits amid one of the largest oil fields in the world, with reserves estimated as high as ten billion barrels. To put things into perspective, the Kirkuk field accounted for half of Iraqi oil production before the war. It has a majority Turkmen population. Should Turkey occupy Kirkuk in order to redress Kurdish persecution of the Turkmen, it would acquire a tremendous windfall of oil reserves, something it lacks. Further, the inclusion of up to three million Turkish-speaking Turkmen could constitute a loyal population in an otherwise chaotic and unstable region. The danger, however, is quite clear. Should the Turks invade and set up a client state, they risk generating a massive Kurdish backlash.

Further, they would also incur the wrath of the European Union and most probably cause a permanent rupture in European Union accession negotiations.

Prospects for Turkish Action.

There are serious challenges associated with Turkish involvement with Iraqi Turkmen, but the potential dangers may still be mitigated. Iraq’s continued slide into total chaos might make an intervention in the name of stability palatable.

Should the referendum calling for Kirkuk’s incorporation into Kurdistan succeed and generate more bloodshed, the United States might even encourage Turkish intervention in an effort to bring stability to the region through a forced separation of Kurds, Turkmen, Summer/Fall 2007 [ 6 7 ]

TURKEY EYES IRAQ

and Arabs. A resurgence of PKK attacks within Turkey raises the possibility of a preemptive strike on the former PKKcontrolled refugee camp at Mahmur which could serve as a pretext for a wider intervention. At a time when U.S. military forces are over-stretched, a limited and surgical intervention by the Turkish military would likely go unchallenged,

instantly and ubiquitously. Effective television coverage can be used to mobilize public opinion specifically to justify a Turkish intervention. Second, the electorate is currently frustrated and angry due to a combination of continued European hostility toward Turkey’s accession into the EU, as well as the United States’s perceived destabilization

Should Turkey occupy Kirkuk, it would

acquire a tremendous windfall of oil reserves, something it lacks. especially if it waged under the auspices of neutralizing terrorists such as the PKK in addition to protecting civilians.

Remarks by Turkish politicians and in Turkish media serve as a possible barometer for predicting the likelihood of Turkish military action. Recent statements by Turkey’s foreign minister as well as members of Parliament underscore Ankara’s heightened sensitivity to the plight of the Iraqi Turkmen in the Kirkuk region.4 In addition, the number of articles and publications laying out the basis for Turkmen claims to a major role in the political and economic affairs involving Kerkuk has been steadily increasing.5 A parallel series of articles in Turkish print media explore the potential for Kurdish militancy in northern Iraq, encouraging a possible Turkish intervention to prevent an autonomous Kirkuk controlled by Kurds.6 Similarly, meetings such as the Working Group on Minorities workshop, held in Geneva during the summer of 2005, have raised awareness of the Turkmen issue in both the West and in Turkey.7 Two additional factors merit consideration. The first is that news travels [ 6 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of Iraq. For these reasons, a strike against certain Kurdish groups in the Kirkuk region to protect the Turkmen might enjoy great public support.

Conclusion. The U.S.-led invasion of

Iraq has produced an increasingly assertive Kurdish agenda in the north. In the Kirkuk region, long a stronghold for Turkmen, Kurdish intimidation and threatened annexation into a Kurdishcontrolled region has rekindled Turkish concern. While Turkey has eschewed any irredentist actions since its founding in 1923, current conditions may be sufficient to cause the Turkish military to take such actions. The necessary preconditions have been met: perceptions of harm to a population with close cultural and linguistic ties. Adding to the combustibility of the situation are the potentially legitimate historical claims to the region and the major strategic and economic benefit to be gained from the intervention.

While outright annexation is unlikely, a lengthy period of military occupation might be followed by a referendum.

While this is not likely at present, the

CUTHELL

potential disruptions and damage that might accrue from Turkish intervention warrant considerable care and attention on the part of the United States. In light of this, the United States should step up its diplomatic efforts to protect the Turkmen in northern Iraq and assuage Turkish concerns about their kin. Kurdish participation in this process is crucial because of their dominant position in the North. Though they may be an endeavor fraught with peril, U.S. or UNmediated negotiations between Turkey

Conflict & Security

and the Iraqi Kurds may prove to be the best means to secure an equitable position for the Turkmen, though Turkey may have to make concessions toward Turkish Kurds to close any deal. In the final analysis the United States must not take the relative stability and peace in this region for granted. Increasing U.S. engagement now by promoting dialogue between the Iraqi Turkmen, Turkey, and the Iraqi Kurds may militate against an escalation of tensions that all involved parties could do well to avoid.

NOTES

1 Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 222.

2 See the Turkish newspaper Zaman’s English language version, Today’s Zaman (www.todayszaman.com).

3 David C. Cuthell, “Kemalist Gambit,” in The Creation of Iraq, eds. Reeva Simon and Elanor Tejarian (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

4 In a speech delivered at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, D.C. on 7 February, 2007, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül stressed the potential danger surrounding Kurdish efforts to pack an upcoming referendum calling for incorporation of KirkukKirkukKerkük into Iraqi Kurdistan. In this

speech and others delivered by Turkish Parliamentarians Turhan Çömez and Orhan Diren in both New York and Washington, D.C., a potential intervention in Iraq was justified based on an historical interest in Iraq as well as an effort to thwart the possible dissolution of Iraq arising from a Kurdish land grab.

5 Ershad Al-Hirzmi, The Turkmen and Iraqi Homeland (KirkukKirkukKerkük: KirkukKirkukKerkük Vakfi, KirkukKirkuk, 2003).

6 Bill Park, “Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for U.S. Policy,” Parameters (Autumn 2004).

7 Working Group on Minorities, “The Turkmen of Iraq: Underestimated, Marginalized and Exposed to Assimilation” (Geneva, 2005).

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 6 9 ]

Conflict & Security

Balancing Act

Australia’s Strategic Relations with China and the United States Adam C. Cobb The Chinese have driven a wedge into the very axis around which Australia’s geostrategic world rotates—the U.S.-Pacific alliance system. In the process of satisfying its voracious appetite for energy, China has negotiated close to $100 billion worth of natural gas and uranium contracts, buying it significant leverage over Australia’s future responses to China’s foreign policies.1 They calculate, correctly, that Australia’s interest in venal short-term gain will triumph over strategic considerations of national interest. The rapid growth of Chinese investment in Australia should concern the United States.

While Washington is preoccupied with war in the Middle East, it is losing control of its relationship with one of its most reliable partners in the Pacific.

While the U.S.-Australian alliance is currently at its zenith, Washington should be wary of taking old friends for granted.

Changing Australian priorities in the Asia Pacific region reflect a shift in the regional balance of power that will affect the United States’s future power and influence. This paper outlines the nature of the changes occurring in the Sino-Australian relationship and by implication the challenges for the United States’s alliances in the region. Australia is increasingly caught between its historic alliances and geographic trading partners. This paper argues that in order to navigate a secure path between competing great powers, Australia must cultivate good relationships with all the major players. It suggests that

Adam C. Cobb is a professor in the Department of Warfighting Strategy at the Air War College in Alabama. He is a former senior defense adviser in the Australian Parliament.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 7 1 ]

BALANCING ACT

commodities. The shift to new trading partners is noteworthy. Japan, China, and South Korea have already displaced the United States as Australia’s top trading partners, with China rapidly ascending to the top of the list. China has recently negotiated energy deals with Australia spanning the next twenty years and valued at over $100 billion. These Australia’s Bond with the Unit- deals include contracts to develop oil, ed States. Economically and strategi- natural gas, and uranium.4 Given that cally, Australia matters to the United Australia’s GDP was $711 billion in States. Australia is one of the world’s old- 2005, it is easy to appreciate just how est democracies and most stable dramatically China’s rise will affect Auseconomies. It is the world’s thirteenth- tralia, its place in the world, and its relalargest economy, with the sixth-most tionship with the United States.5 traded currency. It is also a key trading Australia also has been an important state with almost 40 percent of its Gross strategic partner in U.S. foreign policy.

Domestic Product (GDP) dependent on Australia is arguably one of the United international trade.2 Not only is the States’s most reliable allies. It willingly United States currently the largest inter- followed the United States’s lead in national stakeholder in the Australian World War II, the Korean War, the Vieteconomy, Australia is the eighth-largest nam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq source of foreign direct investment in the War, as well as in interventions in SomaUnited States.3 But this relationship is lia and Afghanistan. Australia is the Australia’s security will be best served if no single great power has a monopoly stake in its abundant resource base. Just as Switzerland positioned itself as an indispensable player in twentieth-century global finance, so should Australia position itself within the twenty-first century Asia Pacific energy market.

The Australian government continues

to think that it can have its cake and eat it too. under challenge. In recognition of this, the United States and Australia recently negotiated a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which is anticipated to add billions of dollars to the bilateral trading relationship and cement already very close ties.

Australia is now in its fifteenth consecutive year of growth—the longest period of economic expansion in its history.

Most recently this growth has been underwritten by a resources boom driven

by India and China’s rising demand for [ 7 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

southern anchor of the U.S. alliance system in the Pacific and is a partner in the unique UK-USA intelligence sharing agreement, which involves coordination of and cross-participation in intelligence activities between Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States. Diplomatically, the two countries work cooperatively on a variety of initiatives within APEC, the WTO, and the UN. The security aspect of the U.S.-Australian relationship is based on strategic

COBB

Conflict & Security

Canberra might find itself in a real dilemma.

For a variety of global and local reasons, this situation emphasizes Australia’s emerging Grand Strategy dilemma and may become untenable sooner than is widely anticipated. While Australia’s key trading relationships have rapidly changed from historic partners (Great Britain and the United States) to geographic partners (China and India), its security dependency remains fixed in its history and extant demography and culture. Prime Minister John Howard has said that he does not see a conflict between Australia’s strategic military alliance with the United States and its strategic trading alliance with China. In the short term he might be right, but a long-term perspective suggests that this assumption might prove dangerous.

Tensions over Taiwan may precipitate the very choice Prime Minister Howard dismisses. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, when asked how Australia would balance commitments to China and the United States if the potential conflict over the future status of Taiwan should A Relationship Not Set in Stone. arise, stated that “military activity elseSuch a relationship is not invulnerable. where in the world, be it in Iraq or anyWhen New Zealand insisted on a nuclear where else for that matter does not autofree zone around their islands in the matically invoke the ANZUS Treaty.”6 1980s, the United States reacted bitterly The validity of this statement is quesby cutting ties. While the initial sting of tionable. Article IV of ANZUS makes this rejection has passed, there remains a clear that the treaty can be invoked for rift in the U.S.-New Zealand bilateral attacks “on its armed forces, public vesrelationship, especially in Washington. sels or aircraft in the Pacific.” Thus a Australia has yet to so upset the United conflict over Taiwan could enable the States, but Australia’s evolving relation- United States to invoke the treaty if the ship with China might soon place Can- United States were materially engaged in berra in a position of having to choose the conflict. More importantly, between its security alliance with the Howard’s statement exposed the inner United States and its economic ties to thinking of the Australian cabinet. HavChina. If the reaction to New Zealand’s ing never faced a decision to choose independent streak is any indicator, between its own strategic protector—the calculations made during World War II. On 27 December 1941, with British-held Singapore soon to fall to the Japanese, Prime Minister John Curtin declared, “Without any inhibitions of any kind I make it quite clear that Australia looks to the United States, free from any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.” That statement and the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty) alliance that followed have been at the center of Australian foreign and defense policies ever since.

The ANZUS treaty was brokered in 1951 when the United States offered Australia and New Zealand a mutual security treaty in exchange for signing a peace treaty with Japan. The Australian government invoked ANZUS as recently as 9/11 as a sign of solidarity with the United States. The fact that Australia, which was not attacked, invoked the treaty without U.S. solicitation speaks volumes both for Australia’s sense of kinship with the United States and its outrage against the United States’s attackers.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 7 3 ]

BALANCING ACT

United States—and their potential great power rival—China—the Australian government continues to think that it can have its cake and eat it too. Prime Minister Howard has said that he “felt that it was not necessary to choose between our relationships with Asian countries, and […] North America—to choose between our history and our geography.”7 Retreating from ANZUS in this way signals that perhaps a choice has already been made.

Of even greater concern, the otherwise occupied Australian and U.S. governments appear to have been blindsided

by Chinese attempts to weaken their historical alliance. Where the Australian government really falls short in its relationship with China is that it is not oper-

China is already the world’s secondlargest consumer of primary energy after the United States. Energy security is critical to China’s future.8 Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) will play an increasingly important role in the Chinese economy, particularly as a cleaner alternative to coal. In 2001 consumption of gas was just 4 percent of all energy consumption in China, and demand is currently still met entirely by domestic sources.9 However, Chinese natural gas consumption is expected to grow by 12 percent annually, which will quickly exceed domestic capacity. Chinese officials estimate that by 2020, 50 percent of their gas needs will be met from offshore fields, but that is likely an optimistic forecast.10 Similarly, ABARE estimates that Chinese electricity

While Chinese energy security is a

double-edged sword, China holds the handle. ating according to a grand strategy. One inhibiting factor contributing to this is the election cycle, which prevents central planning from extending much beyond two years. The problem is not limited to the public sector. The vast majority of Australian corporations project just three quarters ahead (let alone ten years).

The Chinese, on the other hand, tend to take a long-term approach. In many respects they have no choice. The sheer scale and rapid transformation of their economy dictate a commitment to strategic thinking that is beyond the Australian tradition.

consumption will rise 11 percent in 2004 alone. Currently China imports about 20 percent of its crude oil requirements, and this is conservatively expected to double by 2020.11 Such phenomenal growth in energy use in such a short time frame will have all sorts of security consequences for China, the region, and the global economy. Indeed, Australian exports of metals, ores, and minerals to China doubled between 2000 and 2005.12 But energy security is a double-edged sword for China. On one hand, China’s sheer buying power permits Chinese influence to reach deep into the polity of energy Fueling the Dragon. According to supplier states such as Australia, presentthe Australian Bureau of Agricultural ing all sorts of new dilemmas. For examResearch and Economics (ABARE), ple, in the not too distant future the Aus[ 7 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

COBB

tralian government will need to find good reason to justify supporting the United States over China on the issue of Taiwan. Cultural affinity and intelligence sharing is one thing; $100 billion worth of single-commodity trade in a rapidly expanding bilateral trade relationship is another matter entirely.

On the other hand, China’s rapidly growing dependence on external energy supplies presents an increasingly strong lever with which to influence Beijing.

Knowing this, the Chinese are consciously trying to avoid the trap of relying on too few sources for its energy needs— a problem that has until recently plagued the United States. The implications of these dilemmas has frequently flowed through the United States into the broader global political, economic, and strategic environment, not always with the most predictable or beneficial results.

While the Middle East is no longer the main supplier of U.S. energy needs, having been supplanted by Venezuela and west Africa among others, the United States remains dependent on hostile states for its supplies. The Chinese are diversifying in an effort to avoid this problem, but as their needs increase, tensions might develop between Beijing and its major suppliers.

Complicating the picture, the impact of manipulating China’s energy supplies to gain influence over Beijing would likely carry negative consequences for the whole global economy. China’s exportled growth makes it dependent on global markets, while U.S. dependence on Chinese financing of U.S. public debt leads to the economic equivalent of mutually assured destruction. Thus an effort to pressure China that results in a downturn in their economy might be counterproductive. Moreover, the likelihood of a

Conflict & Security

concert of supplier nations agreeing to use an “energy weapon” tactic against China is highly doubtful. In short, while Chinese energy security is a doubleedged sword, China holds the handle.

A Challenging Road Ahead. One

thing is certain: in the longer term, the potential for strategic miscalculation grows as increasing scarcity of supply of energy resources is reflected in higher prices. So too does the temptation for future third-party competitors of China to pressure or attempt to gain control of the sources of China’s energy supplies and the sea lines across which they are transported.

These possibilities present an even greater potential threat to Australia in the long term. Australia is already in a very uncomfortable position between the two giants of the Asia Pacific. The juxtaposition of the visits of Presidents Hu and Bush to Canberra in 2003 is symbolic of Australia’s future role in the region.

Over those few days, there was a sense that Australia was previewing the passing of an old order and the birth of a new. Today, Australia retains cultural affinity with the United States but will soon have much stronger economic relations with China.

In the next thirty years as Australia’s demographic composition changes to reflect recent migration patterns, Australia’s axiomatic cultural affinity with the United States may also weaken. Consequently, increasing pressure will be placed on instruments like the FTA with the United States to keep pace with the coming benefits of an FTA with China.

The uncertainty of the post-Cold War era has given way to surprise as the dominant characteristic of the post-9/11 international system. Old alliances are shifting and new balances are taking Summer/Fall 2007 [ 7 5 ]

BALANCING ACT

shape. In an age of surprises, what might initially appear to be “wild card” events will continue to occur with some regularity. Consequently, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to envisage an erosion of the Sino-U.S. relationship. If a conflict arose the United States might seek to gain an advantage over China by manipulating its energy supplies. Based on current energy consumption trends in both China and the United States, this proposition is not as wild as it may initially appear. Mussolini once admitted to Hitler that had the League of Nations extended its sanctions to cover Italy’s energy imports, “I would have had to withdraw from Abyssinia within a week.”13 Indeed, U.S. attempts to influence China through energy is growing in direct proportion to China’s energy consumption trends. Such a development would place Australia, as a key China supplier, in a very difficult position.

Under certain circumstances the United States could well view its vital national interests in contradistinction to Australia’s and vice versa. Remember the Suez crisis. If the U.S. president could undermine his allies during the height of the Cold War, it is not too hard to imagine a future U.S. administration, free from such geopolitical constraints, breaking ranks with Australia under the auspices of protecting U.S. national interests. If history is any guide, rejecting such a hypothetical out of hand would be dangerous.

Revisiting Australian Security.

Currently the Australian Defense Force (ADF) cannot adequately defend the geographically dispersed high value targets represented by the oil platforms of the Northwest Shelf against a mediumlevel conventional or asymmetric threat. [ 7 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

In order to ensure protection, Australia would have to respond to U.S. wishes for two essential reasons. First, the current force structure modernization program being conducted by all three services of the ADF is making Australia dependant on high-end U.S. military technology, such as the Aegis destroyer, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) fighter, Wedgetail airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The United States has used such dependencies in the past to manipulate states—the recently lifted arms embargo on Indonesia is a case in point. Second, the JSF in particular is not well-suited to the Australian theater due to range and payload limitations. Seventy-five combat aircraft require at least twenty-five air-to-air refuelling aircraft, not the fleet of five currently on order. Without adequate air refuelling capabilities the Royal Australian Air Force will have great difficulty mounting adequate monitoring and combat sortie rates in the number required to realistically protect the highly vulnerable oil and gas infrastructure off the remote northwest Australian coast.

But there is a solution. The following idea suggests the beginnings of a grand strategy for Australia that may facilitate a secure path between the two giants of the Asia Pacific Rim. Australia should seek to use its position as a supplier of diminishing energy products to become to the Asia Pacific in the twenty-first century what Switzerland was to Europe’s financial scene in the mid-twentieth century: indispensable. Demand for energy is only going to increase over time. Adopting a security through energy doctrine would position potential competitors in a strategic relationship of mutual need and

COBB

thus mutual dependence.

This strategy, of course, depends on there being enough gas to go around.

The Gorgon gas field, situated eighty miles off western Australia, is reported to have 365 billion tons of proven gas reserves.14 The first of three reported deals between China and Australia is reportedly worth up to $25 billion and will involve a projected three million tons of LNG a year for twenty-five years.15 Clearly, Gorgon has the capacity to meet this obligation. While the substance of subsequent deals has yet to be revealed, they are rumoured to be no larger than the first deal, which appears to be proceeding as agreed. This should leave plenty of Australian reserves to attract its other strategic partners.

In pursuit of this new strategy, Australia should target the United States, China, and India because of their strategic weight and military capabilities. These three countries would make up the first tier of a triangular balance of power.

One side of the triangle, China, is already falling into place. India and the United States, the other two countries with the foreseeable military capability and potential strategic intent to strike Australia’s maritime resource base, must be encouraged to invest equally in the long-term future of Australian energy supplies. This same approach can be applied to second-tier Chinese competitors, such as Japan and Korea. These countries are unlikely to significantly affect Australia’s ability to supply China; they will, however, be able to apply pressure in other ways and in the final instance against Australian LNG carriers traversing the shipping lines to China.

The security through energy doctrine should involve a two-pronged approach. The Australian government should use diplo-

Conflict & Security

macy to ensure that the United States and India understand their own strategic and commercial interests in energy engagement with Australia. The challenge is for Australian diplomats to persuade these giants that participating in this triangular balance of power is indeed in their interests. However, the Australian government can offer incentives—competitive price and tax structures come to mind— to sweeten the deals for these potential partners. By offering deals on commercially attractive terms to all strategically important bidders, the Australian government can diversify the customer base of its gas exports while building the foundations of this new doctrine.

The public money spent on locking China, the United States, and India into Australia’s supply chain would return considerably more on its investment, economically and strategically, than spending the same amount spent on new military capabilities. This is not to say the ADF should continue its current capability trajectory, but the tasks asked of the ADF will likely be much less taxing and require fewer resources if the security through energy doctrine is adopted.

Conclusion: First Signs of Implementation. The first- and sec-

ond-tier strategic energy dependency triangle system is not as far fetched as it might initially seem. Indeed, the Howard government has already tentatively approached at least one of the other firsttier partners. During John Howard’s visit to the United States in June 2004, he met very briefly with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to discuss a proposal for an Australian LNG terminal off the Californian coast. Howard told the Governor and the American press that LNG shipped from the North West Summer/Fall 2007 [ 7 7 ]

BALANCING ACT

Shelf could supply up to 15 percent of the energy needs of the world’s fifth biggest economy, the state of California.

Schwarzenegger reportedly was “interested” in what he had to hear but to date nothing firm has come of the meeting.16 There is much to be gained in that relationship. ABARE reports that U.S. total natural gas imports will rise from 17 percent in 2006 to 48 percent by 2012.

“U.S. imports of LNG are therefore projected to increase from around 12 million tonnes[sic] in 2006 to around 50 million tonnes by 2012.”17 Australia is well placed to participate in the growth of that sector and should assist industry in gaining a greater share of the U.S. market as well as lobby Washington on behalf of exporters. The FTA with the United States should greatly enhance Australia’s opportunity to access this lucrative market.

While the Schwarzenegger meeting is a step in the right direction, much more needs be done at the national level to

impress upon U.S. strategists and policy makers the stakes involved in doing business with Australia. Similar long-term diplomatic and economic efforts should be initiated in India, South Korea, and Japan. Indeed, this initiative should be the long-term core objective of Australian political and economic diplomacy until all parties are inextricably locked into the energy triangle. No other strategy will better protect Australia’s security and prosperity into the twenty-first century.

Australia has a choice. It can be played

by China against the United States and eventually India and vice versa, eventually suffering the same fate as other small pawns in the great strategic game. Or Australia can use its advantage vis-à-vis the three giants of the Asia Pacific Rim and let them play each other. In this way Australia can remain a close, respected, and vital friend to one and all. It seems there is more to Switzerland than great skiing, chocolates, and fondue after all.

NOTES

1 Geoff Hiscock, “Australia, China Sign Uranium Deal,” Internet, http: //www.cnn.com/ 2006/WORLD/asiapcf/04/02/australia.china.uranium/index.html (date accessed: 30 March 2007); Geoff Hiscock, “Australia wins huge China LNG deal,” Internet, http://www.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/08/08/aust.chinalng.biz/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007); “Gas deal extends China Ties,” Internet, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/24/apec.special.hu.agreements.reu t/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007); John Garnaut, “$25bn deal out of pipeline and into reality,” Internet, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/08/19/ 1092889282017.html?oneclick=true (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

2 In 2005 the International Monetary Fund ranked Australia seventeenth in GDP per capita. See “2005 IMF GDP per capita rankings (published 2006),” Internet, http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/portal/pls/portallive/docs/1/8135701.pdf/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

3 The World Economic Forum 2005 Global

[ 7 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Competitiveness Report placed Australia tenth. See “Nordic countries and East Asian tigers top the rankings in the World Economic Forum’s 2005 competitiveness rankings,” Internet, http://www.weforum.org/en/media/Latest%20Press%20Releases/PRESSRELEASES182/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007). The latest statistics show that exports accounted for 18.2 percent of Australia’s GDP and imports 21.2 percent.

See Australia Economic and Trade Statistics (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, July 2005): 2.

4 Embassy of Australia, Australia and the United States: Enduring Partnership, June 2003. See also Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “United States of America,” Internet, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/ us/us_brief.html#betr (date accessed: 29 March 2007).

5 Hiscock, “Uranium Deal;” Hiscock, “LNG deal;” Garnaut, “$25bn deal.”

6 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia Fact Sheet,” Internet, http://www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/fs/aust.pdf (date accessed: 29 March 2007).

COBB

7 Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Media Conference, Beijing, 17 August 2004, Transcript,” Internet, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2004/040817_ds_beijing.html (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

8 John Howard, “Australia's International Relations: Ready for the Future” (Address to the Menzies Research Centre, Canberra, Australia, 22 August 2001).

9 “China’s energy demand to provide more export opportunities for Australia,” Internet, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts42904.htm/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

10 Ibid. See also “China to become promising LNG market by 2020,” Internet, http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/94033.htm/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

11 Ibid.

12 “LNG deal to boost trade links between china, Australia,” Internet, http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/94225.htm/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

Conflict & Security

13 “Australian Dollar Rises on View China’s Growth to Boost Exports,” Internet, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=100000 81&sid=arAb099QAbTg&refer=australia/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007). For more information, see Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia-China Free Trade Internet, http://www.

Agreement,” dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/facts/mining.html (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

14 Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil and War (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 24.

15 Ibid.

16 Hiscock, “LNG deal.”

17 “Howard and Schwarzenegger talk hot air,” Internet, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/03/1086203541380.html?from=mor eStories/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

18 “Abare – Australian commodities: March quarter 2007,” Internet, http://www. abareconomics .com/interactive/ac_mar07/htm/energy.htm/ (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

errata In issue 8.1 of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, an error was produced in the final version of Paul Chamberlin's article, "Six-Party Talks: Time for Change." In the section on "Policy Options and Recommendations," the second sentence should have read: "The United States will probably continue its hard-line approach, Option I below." The author does not in any way endorse the hard-line approach.

The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs sincerely regrets this error.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 7 9 ]

Culture&Society De-Arabization in the Gulf

Foreign Labor and the Struggle for Local Culture Andrzej Kapiszewski The Persian Gulf is a region of immense strategic importance.

Its oil resources and frequent military conflicts have kept world leaders’ attention riveted on the area. For scholars, however, the region is noteworthy not only for its geopolitical significance, but also for the potential it holds for comparative sociocultural inquiry into the process of nation-formation and the internationalisation of its workforce.

The increasing influence of Western culture in the Gulf monarchies, comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, is readily apparent; Western skyscrapers and automobiles, as well as American films and fast-food restaurants, increasingly dominate the ethnoscape. The deluge of foreign workers that has occurred over the last half century in the region, however, has received less attention. In many countries, this influx has accompanied a concurrent process of Asianization: hundreds of thousands of Asian workers, who do not speak Arabic or wear dishdasha— the long-sleeved, ankle-length robe traditionally worn by men in the region—populate the largest cities in the Gulf today.

This article focuses on the both the causes and the implications of the influx of foreign workers to the region. Specifically, I argue that despite attempts on the part of governments in the region to slow or halt those transformations, the changing composition of the region’s labor force has led to a series of sociocultural changes.

Andrzej Kapiszewski is the director of the Department of Middle East and Far East Studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland, where he is also a professor of sociology.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 8 1 ]

DE-ARABIZATION IN THE GULF

The article begins by briefly reviewing the dynamics of the labor market in the Gulf monarchies, describing the overwhelming presence of foreign workers. It then outlines some of the significant cul-

feeling that doing so debased their social status. As a result a significant influx of foreign workers has ensued.

The importation of workforce was the main thrust of the dramatic population

The move to “de-Arabize” the workforce has never been the official policy, but has occurred in practice.

growth in the Gulf monarchies and led to the domination by foreigners of the local Arab population. The combined population in the Gulf monarchies grew from four million in 1950 to forty million in 2006—one of the highest rates of population growth in the world. Moreover, toward the end of 2004, up to 12.5 million foreigners lived in the Gulf monarchies, a full 37 percent of the region’s total population.1 In the United Arab Emirates (UAE) foreigners account for over 80 percent of the population, while in Qatar they represent 70 percent of the population, and in Kuwait they make up The Gulf Labor Market. Since the 64 percent. Only Oman and Saudi Aradiscovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula bia maintain a relatively low proportion in the mid-twentieth century, the politi- of foreigners; they make up about 20 and cal entities of the Persian Gulf have 27 percent of the population, respectivetransformed themselves from traditional ly.

The influx of foreign labor has other sheikhdoms into modern states, necessitating a dramatic evolution of the work- unique characteristics. First, unlike in force. Three factors initially limited Western countries where foreign workers domestic responses to the labor impera- have generally complemented the tives generated by oil-related develop- national workforce by filling lower-status ment. First, the necessary knowledge and jobs, in the Gulf monarchies foreigners skills were alien to the local population. now dominate the labor force in most Second, religious norms and tradition sectors of the economy and in the govprevented local Arab women from work- ernment bureaucracy. Second, the gening outside the home. Finally, native der balance of the workforce in these Arabs soon began to consider themselves countries is changing; while the aforea privileged upper class and were unwill- mentioned religious restrictions contining to fill non-white-collar positions, ue to prevent many local Arab women

tural and socio-economic consequences of the de-Arabization of the work force, including the social instability that mistreatment of foreign workers has contributed to and the effects of the presence of foreign women in the workplace, and discusses the ramifications for local Arab values, education, and language. The following section analyzes the form and effect of government policy responses to the influx of foreign workers and its cultural implications. The article closes by offering some suggestions for undertaking further inquiry.

[ 8 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

KAPISZEWSKI

from gaining employment, many foreign women and Asians, in particular, have joined the workforce, often employed as domestic help.

A final dynamic relates to the national composition of the workforce. Foreign workers now constitute approximately 70 percent of the labor force in each Gulf monarchy. In Qatar and the UAE, almost 90 percent of workers are foreigners.2 The national composition of the foreign workforce has changed significantly over time. At the beginning of the oil era, most foreign workers came from poor neighboring Arab states, particularly Yemen and Egypt. Soon after, Arab refugees fleeing political turmoil in their own countries, especially Palestinians, swelled the ranks of foreign Arab workers. In addition, some Indian, Pakistani, and Iranian traders and laborers came to the Gulf owing to the ties their countries had long maintained with the region. Initially these Arab workers were welcomed because of their linguistic, cultural, and religious compatibility with local populations.

State authorities and the business community eventually became more open to Asian workers for various political, economic, and sociocultural reasons.

Gulf governments began to worry that non-local Arabs would spread radical social and political ideas. In particular they feared the popularization of secularist, leftist ideas such as the abolition of monarchical rule, the elimination of borders “imposed by Western imperialists,” the concept of a single Arab nation in which labor would circulate freely, and the idea of sharing oil-generated revenues among all Arabs.3 Asian immigrants, on the other hand, appeared to pose less of an ideological threat. Moreover, they generally tolerate lower wages,

Culture & Society

are easier to lay off, and are considered to be more efficient and easier to manage than Arabs. They are likely to leave their families at home, whereas Arab immigrants usually bring their families to the Gulf with the hope of settling there permanently, an alternative that is unacceptable for the monarchies.

The move to “de-Arabize” the workforce has never been the official policy, but it has occurred in practice. While in 1975 Arabs accounted for approximately 72 percent of the foreign population, by the early 2000s they had slipped to approximately 32 percent.4 Concurrently, the Asian population has grown and there are now twice as many Asians as there are Arabs in the foreign population, including approximately 3.3 million Indians, 1.7 million Pakistanis, and several hundred thousand each from Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.5

Social and Cultural Implications of the Foreign Presence. With

regard to political consequences, host governments worry that the presence of the large populations of migrant workers may pose a threat to the stability of the monarchies. Gulf governments have anticipated that such groups could eventually demand citizenship and further political rights in an effort to join the group of privileged “locals” entitled to the benefits of the welfare state. A further concern was that they might turn upon to their hosts and act as a “fifth column” for the benefit of foreign powers.

Economically, the presence of foreign workers offers obvious benefits for the monarchies by providing individuals for the basic workforce as well as specialists to compensate for the limited number of nationals who possess relevant skills and Summer/Fall 2007 [ 8 3 ]

DE-ARABIZATION IN THE GULF

work ethic. Foreign labor also stimulates domestic consumption of goods supplied by local merchants and boosts property markets. On the other hand, the easy availability of foreign labor has removed the pressure on young local Arabs to take on available jobs, leading to rising unemployment among young nationals.

The foreign workforce is a substantial drain on hard currency. In Saudi Arabia migrant workers send annual remittances estimated at $16 billion to their home countries, and in the UAE annual remittances have been quoted at $22 billion.6 Inter-group conflicts. Foreign workers in the Gulf states are often mistreated.

According to James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, foreign workers often toil in abhorrent conditions and are “denied justice and their basic humanity,” turning them into a “time bomb waiting to explode and unleash riots like those that rocked France [in 2006].”7 Foreign workers have periodically engaged in protests, which have contributed to social instability. In October 1999 for instance, a mass riot involving hundreds of Egyptian and Kuwaiti workers took place in Kuwait. At its root was the inadequate working and living conditions of illegal Egyptian laborers. In 2005 low-paid Asian workers also staged demonstrations, some violent, in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar to protest the untimely payment of salaries. In March 2006 hundreds of construction workers, mainly from South Asia, went on a rampage in Dubai, UAE, to protest harsh working conditions, low or delayed pay, and general lack of rights. Religious matters can also be a source of conflict. For example, Muslim and Hindu Asian workers clashed several times in the UAE in the 1990s, following the destruction of the [ 8 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Ayodhya mosque in India.

Westernization. Perhaps the most visible social impact of the foreign influx in the Gulf states is Western-style economic development. As local Arabs have increasingly traveled abroad, sought education in the West, and spent holidays at properties they have acquired there, they have developed an appetite for some of the aspects of the foreign culture. As a result, at the turn of the century the major cities in the Gulf maintain a strikingly Western outlook. Except for mosques and the typical local dress that some individuals continue to wear, most visible aspects of culture are foreign.

Modern infrastructure marks most cities.

American fast-food outlets, as well as Asian restaurants, have become more popular than traditional restaurants among local Arabs. Western films and music and lifestyle shows, easily accessible via satellite television, have larger audiences than most Arabic programs.

American films shown in Gulf cinemas also draw larger audiences. Shops are stocked with non-local products, and these countries now import practically everything they consume, from foodstuffs and clothing to raw materials and equipment to plants and livestock.

Changes in traditional forms of social life. The presence of foreigners and Westernization has profoundly changed the local Arab culture. Traditional social cultures are slowly disintegrating. As a result of urban settlement, Bedouin group life has largely disappeared; tribal systems for settling disputes have been replaced by courts and majlis (gatherings and discussions) have been supplanted by new forms of social communication, such as the telephone and the Internet. Wedding celebrations are now held at five-star hotels, rather than in family homes.

KAPISZEWSKI

With increased wealth, many national families have begun to hire foreigners as domestic help. This change has promoted passivity among national women with respect to parenting, and foreign nannies increasingly play the role of the ersatz mothers for local Arab children.8 A study undertaken in the UAE, for instance, found that each national family has on average two maids; most of them are Asian, only half of them Muslim, and less than 1 percent are Arab.9 Mixed marriages have also become more prevalent in recent years, especially among local Arab men who chose to marry foreign women and thus avoid the high dowries required for local marriages. Such unions often generate intrafamily linguistic barriers, and some

Culture & Society

school instructors come from non-Arab Western countries, do not speak Arabic, and are non-Muslim. The teaching programs they introduce often stress ideas and values alien to nationals. Anthony Duke pointed out, “As foreign students often dominate peer groups, UAE students learn attitudes, behavior and values from them. This leaves them confused and disoriented as to the ultimate source of administration and authority in their country.”12 Further, mosque preachers, who are often on the state payroll but are frequently hired from abroad, have been known to offer teachings that promote political notions that the governments of the Gulf monarchies find unacceptable.

Emancipation of local women; mistreatment of foreign women. Members of local conserva-

There are now twice as many Asians as

there are Arabs in the foreign population. suggest that they also result in children being raised in a “foreign” way. Moreover, the majority of such marriages seem to end in divorce.10 Challenges to traditional values. More fundamentally, many perceive that traditional values of the Bedouin people, the forefathers of modern Gulf Arabs, are eroding. Values such as courage, self-reliance, generosity, faithfulness, an interest in aiding the weak, and a love of freedom have been undermined by growing individualism; conspicuous consumption, self-promotion, speculation, and personal interests are now pursued at the expense of community needs.11 One of the cited challenges to traditional values is the lack of national cadres of teachers. Many primary and secondary

tive circles and fundamentalist Islamic clergy are particularly concerned with the Western-inspired changes in the status of women. Their emancipation has been perceived as a direct threat to the existing social order. The practice of women driving cars, which is forbidden in Saudi Arabia, is worrisome as this “severely subverts the principle of female seclusion and undermines the hegemony of men over women.”13 In recent years, rulers of most of the Gulf monarchies have made a number of gestures to support the position of local women in society; local Arab women have been nominated to ministerial positions, and female citizens have been granted suffrage. Nevertheless, the emancipation of women remains problematic as it usually angers radical antiSummer/Fall 2007 [ 8 5 ]

DE-ARABIZATION IN THE GULF

government Islamist forces and inflames social and political tensions.

At the same time, many foreign women, namely Asian domestic laborers, have been mistreated by local Arabs. This has generated international tensions. For example, the sexual harassment of housemaids by local employers, especially in Saudi Arabia, has led the Filipino government to introduce a ban on the migration of women under the age of twenty-one. A similar ban was introduced in Nepal. In Indonesia, the mistreatment of women in the Gulf states has been viewed as a national “embarrassment” and led to calls for the government to stop sending housemaids altogether.

Toward bilingualism? The Arabic language has started to lose ground in the Gulf.

Some smaller monarchies have even resorted to bilingualism. The English language has become the language of business communication and Gulf colleges and universities are increasingly introducing American or British curricula and are teaching courses in English.

Growing numbers of national children entering school have difficulty with the Arabic language since they are being reared by Asian nannies. At the same time, nationals have experienced problems communicating with foreign professionals who do not speak Arabic. Difficulties have arisen, for instance, in obtaining medical services in hospitals where most nurses are Asian. Moreover, finding that in “semi-government agencies the Arabic language has deteriorated to unacceptable levels,” Abdullah Mograby from the Emirates Center of Strategic Studies and Research has concluded that “the country’s national identity is now seriously under threat.” For the scholar, the “promotion of a bilingual society is [ 8 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

dangerous and runs against the national interests and security of the UAE.”14

Policy responses.

Measures to limit the number of foreign workers and secure jobs for local Arabs. While regional leaders recognize the economic benefits that the foreigners bring, they also recognize the potential threats these workers pose. Initially, policies were intended to “rotate” the workers or otherwise limit the duration of their stay. The authorities in Gulf monarchies introduced sponsorship systems, requiring foreigners to have a local sponsor in order to be employed or to open a business, imposed restrictive requirements for visa acquisition, limited the duration of their stay, and placed curbs on naturalization.

These measures, however, have not brought about the expected results.

Employers preferred to keep workers who had already gained local experience rather than train new laborers, and loopholes in immigration laws and corruption in the immigration system often made it possible for them to do so. Over time new tensions in the labor market emerged. Of particular concern was the unexpected rise in unemployment among nationals due to the saturation of the public sector, where most nationals work, and their inability or unwillingness to compete in the private sector, where salaries are usually lower, the hours longer, and the demands greater.

In response, governments have introduced various programs that have been referred to as “Saudization,” “Omanization,” and “Emiratization” to nationalize the workforce. Such programs entail the reservation of some professions “for citizens only,” the introduction of employment quotas for local Arabs in certain professions, the implementation of wage

KAPISZEWSKI

subsidies and state retirement plans for citizens undertaking employment in the private sector, and the imposition of charges on foreign laborers to make their employment less competitive. In Saudi Arabia and Oman, foreigners are increasingly banned from a large number of professions. In Saudi Arabia, one of the reasons why granting women the right to drive has become a subject of debate is because it would eliminate at least a hundred thousand jobs held by foreigners who are currently employed as private drivers. At the same time, large efforts have been made to improve the education and training of local Arabs to make them more competitive with foreigners in the private sector.

Believing in the efficacy of coordinated action, some monarchies have embarked on regional initiatives. During the Gulf rulers’ summit in Manama, Bahrain in December 2004, a proposal was submitted to limit the period a foreigner can work in all Gulf states to six years. The policy remains in the proposal stage, but has been a focus of discussion since the summit. In turn, Saudi Arabia announced that it would seek to reduce the number of foreigners in the Kingdom to a maximum of 20 percent of the resident population by 2013 (from the current 27 percent).

Measures to preserve social and cultural patrimony. Gulf governments have begun to perceive the negative consequences of the de-Arabization of their populations.

During the October 2004 meeting of the Gulf labor ministers, Bahraini Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Majeed Al-Alawi warned that “non-Arab foreign workers constitute a strategic threat to the region’s future” and that it is necessary “to save future generations from having their culture lost.”15

Culture & Society

Governments have implemented policies specifically aimed at limiting the negative social and cultural impact of exposure to Western culture and of the presence of foreigners, particularly of Asians. Some of these policies have dealt specifically with education and language.

National women have been urged to join the teaching profession to replace foreign teachers. School programs have been changed to stress the value of local traditions. The Kuwaiti parliament has reintroduced the separation of sexes at the Kuwaiti national university while the UAE’s Ministry of Education has mandated that all classes from the fourth grade onward be single-sex and taught by teachers of the same gender as the students. In the UAE, instruction in Arabic has become compulsory in all private schools, including for non-Arab foreigners, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has established an association to promote the use of Arabic in the country.

Other policies have been directed toward communications and marriage.

Efforts have been undertaken to make local Arabic television programs more attractive for viewers and to confront alien cultures that contradict Islamic values. The Saudi Chamber of Trade and Commerce has started demanding that all correspondence from foreign companies operating in the Kingdom be in Arabic. The government of Dubai imposed a special fee for using non-Arabic names for shops and companies.

Some countries made efforts to limit the number of mixed marriages; Saudi Arabia and Qatar even forbade marriages with foreigners. In Oman today only older nationals can marry foreign women. Several countries have also established a special fund to assist Summer/Fall 2007 [ 8 7 ]

DE-ARABIZATION IN THE GULF

nationals with meeting the high costs of dowries and other expenses associated with marrying local Arab women.

Conclusion. This article offers an

overview of the dynamics of the labor market in the Gulf monarchies, outlining how foreigners have come to dominate national workforces. It has described the various consequences of the denationalization of the workforce and has examined the nature of government responses to the influx of foreign workers. Specifically, the article has demonstrated the social and cultural results of the Westernization of life and the deArabization of the workforce in the monarchies of the Persian Gulf.

This study raises a series of intriguing questions and points to several dynamics that are ripe for future inquiry. Is the further spread of Western culture inevitable in the Gulf monarchies, or will the massive foreign presence eventually cause a “cultural backlash” that will ulti-

mately strengthen local Arab identity and contribute to the preservation of local traditions? What will the labor market look like in the Gulf states in the future and to what extent will the “Asianization” of the workforce continue? How will each of these dynamics and outcomes differ among the Gulf monarchies? Will Arab-Asian encounters in the Gulf generate dynamics similar or different to those associated with the integration of immigrants in Western Europe and the United States?

The Persian Gulf region will likely retain its geopolitical importance, as well as its allure for scholars. Studying the countries of the region can thus lead to significant cooperation and diffusion of knowledge between politicians, businessmen, and academics. Tracing the relations between labor market dynamics, cultural change, and policy choices in the Gulf should be an important axis in a broader cooperative project among representatives of these communities.

NOTES

1 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab vs. Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries” (paper prepared for the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development, Beirut, Lebanon, 15-17 May 2006).

2 Ibid. See also: Ugo Fasano and Rishi Goyal, “Emerging strains in GCC labor markets” (working paper for the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2004); “Migrant Communities in Saudi Arabia,” in Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Workers in Saudi Arabia (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 2004), Internet, http://www.hrw.org/ (date accessed: 26 January 2006); “GCC Secretariat Report” (Riyadh: Gulf Cooperation Council, July 2002), Internet, http://gcc-sg.org/ (date accessed: 26 January 2007).

3 Andrzej Kapiszewski, National and Expatriates: Population and Labor Dilemmas of the GCC States (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2001), 123.

4 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab vs. Asian Migrant Workers.” All of these numbers are estimates only , as precise data are not available.

5 Ibid.

[ 8 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

6 Majed Al-Bassam, “$16 Billion Remittances,” Arab News, 26 March 2004; “UAE and India sign labor pact,” Gulf News, 14 December 2006.

7 Habib Toumi, “Six-year Contract Proposal for Expats Draws Flak,” Gulf News, 24 November 2005.

8 Anh Nga Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 206-7.

9 Gulf News, 20 October 1994.

10 “The Price of Marriage,” The Middle East (March 1996): 38-9.

11 Mouza Ghubash, “Social Development in the United Arab Emirates,” in Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates, eds. Edmund Ghareeb and Ibrahim Al Abed (London: Trident Press, 1997), 288.

12 Ibid.

13 Anh Nga Longva, 196.

14 Gulf News, 16 March 1998.

15 “Gulf States to Cut Dependence on Foreign Workers,” Middle East Online (2004), Internet, http://www.middle-east-online.com (date accessed: 26 January 2007).

Culture & Society

Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad

Virtual Battlefronts from Iraq to the Horn of Africa Hanna Rogan Since the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the U.S.-led War on Terror, the media has become an increasingly important battlefield between the West and the global jihadist movement.

Both sides of the conflict acknowledge the media’s importance. According to al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our umma [community of Muslims].”1 Likewise, the 2006 U.S. Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review stated that “victory in the long war [on terrorism] ultimately depends on strategic communication by the United States and its international partners.”2 In less than two decades, the global jihadist movement has established a pervasive media presence, moving quickly from print to satellite broadcasts to the Internet. The mid-1990s information revolution in the Arab World and the simultaneous growth of Islamic political activism and extremism provided the backdrop for this new development. Despite the fact that al-Qaeda’s leadership predates the information age, the group has embraced the advantages of the new communication technology, creating a global and, to a certain degree, anonymous

Hanna Rogan is a visiting fellow at the Terrorism Research Center and a member of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), where she works with the Transnational Radical Islamism Project. She has held various positions in the Norwegian Defense, among them officer in the Norwegian Army/ KFOR, Kosovo and instructor at the Norwegian Defence Intelligence and Security School.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 8 9 ]

ABU REUTER AND THE E-JIHAD

reach. Operational security is critical to the way the jihadists use media. As the bounty on bin Laden’s head increased, he stopped giving interviews to Western and Arab media and quit using satellite-based communication. Today, he rarely appears even on jihadist-produced and -distributed media broadcasts. Other prominent members of the global jihadist movement, however, continue to make frequent appearances in the news. Moreover, the phenomenon of a jihadist online media, which saw a peak in Iraq under the guidance of al-Zarqawi, is spreading to new regions, including the Horn of Africa.

This article analyses the global jihadist online media landscape; it examines a number of media establishments, such as those affiliated with the al-Qaeda leadership and with insurgents in Iraq, and moves on to the revitalized North African media scene and new developments in the Horn of Africa. It explores the news distributed by these media outlets and seeks to determine the role of new media within the global jihadist movement. The article argues that the jihadist online media, similar to traditional media in times of war, promotes the goals of intimidating the enemy, legitimizing activities, and propagating support.

Unlike traditional media, it also fulfills the need for education and internal communication and contributes to the creation of a virtual community of likeminded individuals. The impact of the jihadist media on the general public is difficult to assess. While opinion polls generally show that only a minority in both the West and the Middle East supports the al-Qaeda movement and its ideology, it is unclear where that minority finds its inspiration. However, the abundance of media issuances circulating [ 9 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

on the web and the many discussions they generate on jihadist forums are important indicators. Keeping in mind Sun Tzu’s maxim, “know your enemy,” opponents of jihadism should also take a careful look at the media jihad in order to better understand an increasingly important aspect of global jihadism in the twenty-first century.3

Afghanistan: The Jihadist Media Authority. In Afghanistan,

the production of printed magazines supporting the Afghan-Arab mujahideen (Islamic guerilla fighters) had long been a characteristic of the jihadist campaign.

Bin Laden’s movement, today referred to as al-Qaeda, early established a Media Committee headed by a jihadist with the catchy nom de guerre Abu Reuter. The Media Committee was mainly in charge of handling traditional Western and Arab media, and an online media presence was primarily established through the appearance of the multi-media company as-Sahab (the Clouds) in 2001. Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, the alleged mastermind behind the 9/11 and other al-Qaeda attacks, claimed that he was “the Media Operations Director of as-Sahab […] under Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.”4 This statement, in addition to the fact that asSahab is the producer of the entire body of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri audio and video tapes, demonstrates how much authority the media organization has within al-Qaeda. As-Sahab also promotes other prominent jihadists to the public and produces documentary-like films about the jihadist movement as well as operational videos from Afghanistan.

Its productions are known for their technological sophistication, cinematic effects, and unique footage, as well as for efforts to reach a Western public with

ROGAN

translations and subtitles in foreign languages.

As-Sahab’s operational videos, serialized in “Pyre for Americans in Khorasan [Afghanistan],” depict jihadist attacks on Western troops in Afghanistan and seek to propagate the movement by boosting morale among its supporters. The alQaeda leadership speeches, however, seem to have a number of strategic goals of communication, including propagation, legitimization, and intimidation.

Propagation of the movement appears as a recurring topic in bin Laden and alZawahiri tapes. Particular political situa-

Culture & Society

trates a steady growth in publications until 2005, with respectively six, eleven, twelve, and sixteen issuances a year.

There was an explosive increase in 2006, which saw a total of fifty-eight distributed tapes.5 It seems that 2007 will also become a banner year: seven al-Zawahiri tapes have already been published as of mid-March. It is worth noting, however, that bin Laden has remained silent since July 2006.

Bin Laden’s latest media speech was dedicated to the Muslim umma in general and the mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in particular. While bin Laden did not

The conflict in Iraq has been the catalyst

for the general surge in the number of jihadists online media outlets observed since 2003. tions, for example in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia, urge the umma to participate in the jihad in different regions. Indeed, many of bin Laden’s and al-Zawahiri’s comments are linked to international political events, including the U.S. elections in 2004, or, more recently, the secret CIA prison imbroglio and the conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Perhaps the most important goal of communication is legitimization of the movement and its activities. This is articulated through religious justification and by presenting the movement as a rightful resistance group within the context of Islamic history. Finally, when addressing the West, the goal seems to be to warn and remind of the truce offered by bin Laden and ignored by the West— certainly a form of intimidation.

A statistical analysis of as-Sahab’s issuances from 2002 until 2007 illus-

mention the “jihad of the pen” in his statement, both Iraq and Somalia are already fronts for media jihad. Iraq has been a jihadist online media stronghold since 2003. As for Somalia, it is the most recent source of jihadist Internet news.

Iraq: a jihadist online media success. The conflict in Iraq has been the catalyst for the general surge in the number of jihadist online media outlets observed since 2003. Abu Mus’ab alZarqawi, the leader of al-Tawhid walJihad (Monotheism and Jihad, later alQaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq]), took the crucial step of mobilizing computer-savvy allies to fight against the U.S. occupation. His use of media benefited the propagation of the jihadist movement globally and also promoted the recruitment of foreign fighters to his ranks. Al-Zarqawi’s first communiqué Summer/Fall 2007 [ 9 1 ]

ABU REUTER AND THE E-JIHAD

appeared on a jihadist web forum in April 2004, amidst a flurry of other audio-visual propaganda, including video clips of military operations and photographs of suicide attacks. In particular, al-Zarqawi gained notoriety for videotaping beheadings of foreign and Iraqi hostages. While this practice spread to other groups in Iraq, al-Zawahiri reprimanded al-Zarqawi for these gruesome tapes. The rebuke stemmed from concerns about the reaction of their supporters: “...the general opinion of our supporters does not comprehend that [it is justified], and this general opinion falls under a campaign by the malicious, perfidious and fallacious [Western] media.”6 Al-Zarqawi himself appeared openly in only one video, in April 2006, less than two months before he was killed by U.S. forces in Iraq. By that time, he had already transferred authority to the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), an umbrella organization for a number of jihadist insurgent groups in Iraq. One of the main administrative activities of the MSC was the maintenance of a blog that posted daily statements about military operations effected by its partner groups.

The site also had links to newly released jihadist videos, ranging from amateur recordings of ambushes to technologically sophisticated audio-visual material.

In October 2006, the “Islamic State of Iraq” was announced on the web, with support from “al-Qaeda in the land of the two rivers [Iraq],” the MSC, and other insurgent groups. This new “state” soon established a Ministry of Information, and al-Furqan Media Establishment was announced as its official multi-media agent. The Ministry of Information releases regular news reports from the provinces of the “Islamic State of Iraq” as [ 9 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

well as other religious, political, and strategic messages.7 Examples include comments on the Baker-Hamilton report, calls for revenge on specific “crusader” operations in Iraq, and judgments by the state’s Sharia court. Al-Furqan Media has produced videos of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. The quality of these videos is increasingly high and rapidly approaching the technological sophistication demonstrated by as-Sahab.

In addition to the media war from within Iraq, other jihadist media organizations without a specific national affiliation have focused on the cause of their compatriots in Iraq. These groups provide, among other things, educational material to the already multi-faceted media jihad. Media outlets such as the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and al-Fajr Media Center have issued copious religious lessons, military training manuals, and, recently, a new periodical entitled “The Technical Mujahid” that focuses on Internet security and the use of software. Other interesting online publications include the “Know Your Enemy” and the “Foreign Pen” series. Focused on the importance of understanding the enemy’s society and its political and intellectual trends, these include, for example, translations of American academic texts and policy recommendations for countering the Iraqi insurgency.

Finally, by offering support and advice to the Iraqi mujahideen, these outside media groups contribute to the creation of a virtual, global community of jihadists.

A New Focus: North Africa and the Horn. Over the last year, the al-

Qaeda leadership has clearly articulated an effort to incorporate a new and more distant geographical area, North Africa

ROGAN

and the Horn, in the global jihadist community. Speeches by bin Laden and alZawahiri have repeatedly urged mujahideen to “go to Sudan” and “defend Islam in Darfur,” or to “support [your] brothers in Somalia.” The Islamic State of Iraq also called for “Muslims to stand with the brothers in Somalia” in December 2006.8 In parallel, a prominent al-Qaeda ideologue released a document entitled “The greatest hopes of doing Jihad in Somalia.”9 In Kuwait, the well-known radical cleric Sheikh Hamid al-Ali issued a fatwa (legal decree issued by an Islamic religious leader) for “jihad against the hateful Christian Ethiopia.”10 This period has also seen a revitalization and new role for the jihadist media in Algeria, a country suffering from a protracted Islamist insurgency.

In a September 2006 as-Sahab interview with al-Zawahiri entitled “Hot Issues,” the joining of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) with al-Qaeda was announced. A few days later, the leader of GSPC, Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wudud, responded in an Internet-issued statement, confirming GSPC’s incorporation into al-Qaeda. This development culminated in January 2007, when the group announced a change of name from GSPC to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib. Around this time, the Algerian Islamist group launched a wave of attacks, all properly documented by the group’s media organization. The best-documented attack was the “Bouchawi raid” on Halliburton subsidiary employees in Algeria; the videotape depicted the attack and preparations for it, including manufacture of explosives and physical and electronic (Google Earth) reconnaissance. Other important media issuances from GSPC include an ideological video

Culture & Society

speech by Abd al-Wudud, “We are coming,” which was issued in January 2007.

It contains three messages: one to the Emir of al-Qaeda, bin Laden, requesting guidance; the second to the Algerian President Bouteflika, with advice on sharia governance; and the third to Muslims of Algeria, urging them to join and support the mujahideen. Al-Wudud justifies the jihad in the “war on Islam” waged by the West, links the Algerian cause to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine, and sends his greetings to the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia.

Somalia, indeed, makes a fascinating study in the evolution of online jihadist media activity. Last year’s calls for support to the “brothers in Somalia” by prominent jihadists were first picked up by members of jihadist forums and instigated widespread Internet chatter. The forum members provided general information about the country and the situation of Muslims there, which finally manifested itself in a “Comprehensive file on Somalia.” It is a slide show presented as an electronic textbook—with information about Somalia’s geography, history, religions, ethnicities, and languages—published online by the Media Jihad Brigade. A propaganda film was also released by al-Fajr Media Center, entitled “Apostate Hell in Somalia,” that contains interviews with Somali jihadists, training of fighters, preparation for attack, and actual operations. While this video was distributed to Arabic language jihadist websites, the language used in the film was Somali. However, the visual propaganda ensured that the basic message of the film was not lost. Since the start of 2007, more Somali groups have entered the online media arena. An establishment named the Friends of Somalia Brigade operates an Arabic lanSummer/Fall 2007 [ 9 3 ]

ABU REUTER AND THE E-JIHAD

guage website where it communicates attacks by Somali resistance groups, such as the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of Hijrateen, the Youth of alQaeda Organization in Somalia, and Somalia Liberation Brigades. These groups have claimed responsibility for attacks and threatened African Union (AU) forces, and the latter recently pledged allegiance to bin Laden. Other

from Iraq and the African continent.

Calls for participation addressed directly to a group of people, such as the message to Muslims in Algeria, seek mass recruitment, but the call has little value without the ideological and political message that accompanies and legitimizes it. Thus, ideological material contributes to both propagation and legitimization of the movement. Yet, the most powerful legit-

Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have repeatedly

urged mujahideen to “go to Sudan” and “defend Islam in Darfur.” supporters of the Somali “brothers” include the Mujahideen Brigades in Eritrea, which have issued a short video with clips of ambush operations and photographs of Somali martyrs killed in southern Eritrea.

Sudan and the conflict in Darfur have not generated the same level of online jihadist media activity. Repeated comments by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri from April to October last year— “encouraging the mujahideen and their supporters to prepare to manage a longterm war against thieves and Crusaders in western Sudan”—resulted in emerging interest in Darfur on the jihadist web forums, as in the Somali case.11 However, no other online media presence seems to have established itself in Sudan so far.

imizing force is media material offering opinions of Muslim clerics, such as the one by Hamid al-Ali on Ethiopia, or the rulings by the Sharia Courts of the Islamic State of Iraq. Finally, intimidation of the enemy is evident in the stated threats against the AU peacekeepers in Somalia or in the extremely violent beheading scenes from al-Zarqawi.

It is worth noting, however, that little of the jihadist online media material reaches the enemy public. Due to the illicit nature of the jihadist movement, websites that contain its messages are not easily accessible. Password protection and frequent changes in the URLs of jihadist sites—a result of both jihadist security measures and Western counter-terrorism efforts—do not allow for wide readership. Moreover, despite an increasing Strategic goals of communica- effort to translate media material into tion. The strategic goals of communica- Western languages, most of the material tion mentioned in the above analysis of is still available only in Arabic. Finally, as-Sahab, the al-Qaeda leadership’s some of the detailed religious references media outlet, emphasized three main may be too unfamiliar to a Western readpoints—propagation, legitimization, and er. This indicates that the main target intimidation. These are also recurring audience of the jihadist online media themes in the media material distributed campaign is Muslim, Arabic-speaking, [ 9 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ROGAN

Culture & Society

taining this unity is imperative to the preservation and enlargement of the movement. The concern about public opinion, evident in the al-Qaeda leadership’s rebuke of al-Zarqawi’s appalling media campaign in Iraq, is therefore comprehensible.

Al-Qaeda also acknowledges the possible influence of other, “deceptive” media. Despite the internal debate that surrounded al-Zarqawi’s beheading scenes, his media campaign was generally perceived to be a success within the global jihadist movement. One particular reason for this success was the attention alZarqawi’s videos received in the West, which is normally not the case with jihadist media issuances. While statements by the al-Qaeda leadership previously drew vast media attention, mainstream Western and Arab audiences now seem inured to the numerous alZawahiri speeches that have been broadcast recently. The continuing media silence of bin Laden may therefore be interpreted not only as an operational security measure, but also as a strategic choice for increased publicity in future media appearances.

Finally, while the idea of a media war between the West and the global jihadist movement is widely acknowledged and debated, the actual content, structure, and strategies of the jihadist media camConclusion. The jihadist online media paign remain largely in the shadows. This campaign is not so much directed at the article sheds light on some aspects of the enemy—the West and Arab “apostate” campaign, but as the media jihad regimes—as it is at supporters and poten- becomes an increasingly important comtial followers. These supporters, numer- ponent of a hostile strategy against the ically speaking, are a marginal group in West, it merits further exploration.

Arab and Western societies. They never- Additional research and close monitortheless represent a powerful current that ing is required in order to determine the finds much of its strength and capacity in actual effects of the jihadist use of online a sense of unity across borders. Main- media outlets and to reveal important

and perhaps already sympathetic toward the movement. However, a general desire to reach a Western audience is emerging.

This trend is exemplified by a strategic document circulating the jihadist web in August 2006 entitled “A Working Paper for a Media Invasion of America,” and a September 2006 video message called “An Invitation to Islam,” narrated in English, with Arabic subtitles, by American convert to Islam Adam Gadahn, also known as Azzam al-Amriki.12 Yet given that the jihadist online media campaign so far primarily addresses an internal audience, it is perhaps not so surprising that three additional strategic goals of communication seem to be present in media jihad: education, internal communication, and community building. First, instruction manuals and “know your enemy” guides seek to elucidate and educate supporters of the movement. Second, several jihadist branches communicate internally through online media, though not exclusively this way, including al-Qaeda leadership and GSPC, and bin Laden and forum members interested in Darfur. Third, these communicative exchanges across borders and their messages of support, advice, and solidarity contribute to the creation of a sense of a global jihadist community.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 9 5 ]

ABU REUTER AND THE E-JIHAD

characteristics of the jihadist movement.

The West, like the jihadists, needs to “know its enemy.” Only educated and

well-informed Western policies can reduce the power and threat of global jihadism.

NOTES

1 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, intercepted by American intelligence,” Internet, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english (date accessed: 22 March 2007).

2 United States Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Internet, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report2006 0203.pdf (date accessed: 22 March 2007).

3 Sun Tzu, Art of War, China, 6th century BC. Arabic translation widely distributed on the jihadist web forums.

4 U.S. Department of Defense, “Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024,” Internet, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN100 24.pdf (date accessed: 20 March 2007).

5 “Intel Center. Al-Qaeda Messaging Statistics (QMS) v. 2.9,” Internet, http://www.intelcenter.com/QMS-PUB-v2-9.pdf (date accessed: 15 March 2007) 6 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, intercepted by American intelligence,” Internet, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english (date accessed: 22 March 2007).

[ 9 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

7 The provinces announced to be part of the “Islamic State of Iraq” are Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, Nineve, and parts of the governorates of Babel and Wasit.

8 Ministry of Information of the Islamic State of Iraq, “The Islamic State of Iraq calls Muslims to stand by their brothers in Somalia,” Internet, www.w-n-n.com (date accessed: 10 January 2007).

9 Lewis Atiyat Allah, “The greatest hopes by doing Jihad in Somalia,” Internet: http://www.w-nn.com/ (date accessed: 10 January 2007).

10 Hamid al-Ali, “Jihad against the hateful Christian Ethiopia,” Internet, http://www.halali.net/m_open.php?id=252ccd52-e52f-1029a62a-0010dc91cf69 (date accessed: 10 January 2007).

11 Osama bin Laden, “Oh, People of Islam,” AsSahab Media, April 2006. Internet, http://www.alfirdaws.org/vb (date accessed: 5 June 2006).

12 Najd al-Rawi, “A Working Paper for the Media Invasion of America,” GIMF production, 11 August 2006, Internet, http://www.alfirdaws.org/vb (date accessed: 10 January 2007).

Law&Ethics Crime Without Punishment

The Litvinenko Affair and Putin’s Culture of Violence Edward W. Walker In the spring of 2004, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman published a much-discussed article in Foreign Affairs arguing that Russia had become a “normal middle-income country.” Russia’s economy and political system were certainly flawed, the authors asserted, but these flaws were “typical” of countries with a purchasing-power-parity GDP per capita of around $8,000, such as Argentina in 1991 and Mexico in 1999. “[A]ll democracies in this income range,” they asserted, “are rough around the edges: their governments suffer from corruption, their judiciaries are politicized, and their press is almost never entirely free. They have high income inequality, concentrated corporate ownership, and turbulent macroeconomic performance. In all these regards, Russia is quite normal.”1 The claim that Russia is a normal middle-income country is looking rather less plausible some three years later. Argentina in 1991 was not the world’s largest exporter of gas and the second largest exporter of oil; Mexico did not attempt to use its energy resources to intimidate its neighbors or restore its rightful place as a great power on the world stage; and neither had a citizen attempt to sell weapons grade uranium to private buyers on the international black market. Every middleincome country is of course unique, but—to paraphrase

Edward W. Walker is the executive director of Berkeley University’s Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 9 7 ]

CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT

Orwell—some are more unique than others.

Preoccupied with the unfolding catastrophe in Iraq and the crisis in the Middle East, the Bush administration has paid little attention to Russia during its second term. President Putin’s recent speech in Munich, in which he used unusually blunt language to criticize the United States for having “overstepped its borders in every way,” has reminded Washington that Moscow is becoming increasingly assertive in opposing the American approach to waging the “war on terror.” There are, likewise, growing concerns about Russia’s increasingly muscular diplomacy in western and central Europe. But the issue that has captured the public imagination and highlighted the darker side of Russian politics and business practices more than any other was the murder in London last November of Aleksandr Litvinenko, a former Russian intelligence officer and vehement critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is safe to say that the so-called “Litvinenko Affair” has become the most intriguing, disturbing, and politically significant “espionage” case since the end of the Cold War, with all the intricacies and ambiguities of a Le Carre novel.

At present, the investigation into Litvinenko’s assassination has reached a dead end—indeed it is unlikely that either its immediate perpetrators or those who planned it will ever face trial in Britain or Russia. Nevertheless, the affair has done great harm to Russia’s already tarnished image in the West. It also highlights a major shortcoming of what in many respects has been a remarkably successful Putin presidency—the failure to establish not just the rule by law in Russia but rule of law as well. Regardless of who killed

[ 9 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Litvinenko or why, there is still a great deal of lawlessness and arbitrariness in Russian political life despite Putin’s early commitment to what he characterized as the “dictatorship of law.”

The Litvinenko Assassination.

Litvinenko died of radiation poisoning in a London hospital on 23 November 2006 after falling gravely ill the night of 1 November. His doctors initially suspected a rare bacterial infection, but they soon concluded that he was suffering from radiation poisoning. Medical specialists were initially unable to identify the type of the radiation; however, after the Health Protection Agency turned the case over to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, scientists concluded that Litvinenko had been poisoned by a massive dose of polonium210.2 Hours before Litvinenko died, British officials made this finding public. The implications were dramatic. Polonium210 is a rare, expensive, and extremely toxic alpha emitter. By weight, it is reportedly some 250 million times more toxic than cyanide—if swallowed, inhaled, or injected, a particle smaller than a speck of dust can be lethal. It is also extremely difficult to handle because of a tendency to seep through non-welded seals. Polonium-210 is not produced in the United Kingdom, and Alpha-emitters cannot be detected by radiation detection devices installed at airports, making it relatively easy to fly the material into London from abroad. Finally, most of the world’s production, and the great majority of the world’s stockpile of polonium-210, are in Russia. As a result, it appeared highly likely that the polonium-210 that poisoned Litvinenko originated there.3

WALKER

To date, many of the facts surrounding the case have not been made public or are unknown to the investigators themselves. Scotland Yard has apparently concluded, however, that there is sufficient evidence to charge Andrei Lugovoi, a former officer in the FSB, Russia’s domestic intelligence agency, with involvement in the murder. Lugovoi, along with a second leading suspect, Dmitrii Kovtun, had arranged to meet with Litvinenko at the Millennium Hotel in central London on 1 November 2006 when the poisoning apparently took place.4 There are also reports that investigators have at least one more suspect, a “Fourth Man,” present at that meeting whom Litvinenko described prior to his death and asserted that he had been introduced to as “Vladislav.” In yet another wrinkle to the story, a poisoning attempt or perhaps some kind of practice

Law & Ethics

garch and regime critic now living in asylum in London. Yet because the Russian constitution prohibits the extradition of citizens under any circumstances, domestic prosecution in Russia seems to be the only way that Lugovoi or any other Russian citizen living domestically could be held responsible for the murder.

It is very unlikely, however, that the Russian government will pursue the case even if it receives compelling evidence from Scotland Yard. Instead, Moscow appears to be encouraging, if not orchestrating, a disinformation campaign aimed at directing investigatory attention away from Lugovoi and Kovtun. Russian officials also seem unconcerned about creating the impression that they have little interest in a serious investigation but instead wish to use the case to harass Putin’s critics abroad and offer up a host

Most analysts in the West have concluded that the perpetrators of Litvinenko’s murder likely had some kind of ties to the Russian state. run may have taken place prior to the meeting at the Millennium Hotel.

Scotland Yard passed its case file to the Crown Prosecution Service in late February 2007. If indeed it concludes, as reported, that there is sufficient evidence to bring charges against Lugovoi and possibly Kovtun and the Fourth Man, the British government will have to decide whether to request that Moscow extradite the suspects to Britain. There has been speculation in the Russian press that Moscow might agree to exchange Lugovoi for Boris Berezovsky, the Russian oli-

of red herrings. In January 2007 Moscow refused to grant a British investigatory team that had arrived in Moscow full access to suspects or witnesses. After the British investigators returned to London, Moscow submitted a lengthy request to London asking that Russian investigators be granted permission to conduct numerous interviews and searches in the United Kingdom.5 Among those Moscow is insisting on interviewing are some of Putin’s most vocal critics, including Berezovsky and the representative of the Chechen resis-

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 9 9 ]

CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT

tance movement, Akhmed Zakayev.

Identifying the immediate killers and prosecuting them is only the first part of the mystery, however. Politically, the key question is who organized the assassination and why. There has been a great deal of speculation in the Russian and Western media in this regard. One theory is that the perpetrators were acting on their own because of some private grievance against Litvinenko—for example, a business deal involving organized crime gone wrong or a desire to prevent him from revealing a secret. Another is that the killers were agents of Berezovsky or some other foreign-based “enemy” who wished to sour relations between Moscow and the West or even bring down the Putin government. In both of these cases, however, it is very difficult to see how the killers could have obtained polonium210 or why they would have chosen to use this exotic and dangerous substance.

Most analysts in the West have concluded that the perpetrators likely had some kind of ties to the Russian state.

One possibility is that Litvinenko was killed by a rogue element within Russia’s “power ministries” (the FSB, the SVR, the Interior Ministry, etc.) who was intent on silencing a harsh critic of the Russian government and a “traitor” who had turned on the intelligence services and fled the country.6 Others suspect that the killers were direct agents of the Russian state who were acting, with or without Putin’s knowledge, on orders from above. Again, the primary motive could have been silencing an “enemy of the state.” But it is also possible that someone in the Russian state wished to silence a man whose use of kompromat (compromising material) against Russian businesses or public officials was obstructing major Western investments in Russia of hun-

[ 1 0 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

dreds of millions or even billions of dollars.7 The affair continues to receive extensive coverage in the British press, where it is frequently described as the first act of nuclear terrorism in history. It is accordingly a major political problem for Downing Street. Should British investigators produce conclusive evidence that the plot was orchestrated by an individual or a group within the Russian state, it will be very difficult to see how London can carry on business as usual with Moscow.

As The Economist put it, “British diplomats’ biggest worry is not that Scotland Yard will be flummoxed, but that it might succeed.”8 The same might be said of diplomats in other European Union member states and in the United States.

Putin and the Dictatorship of Law. While the Litvinenko Affair pre-

sents Western governments with a major political dilemma, for Western publics it has highlighted the unsavory aspects of Russian politics and business practices.

That there is serious speculation in the Western media and fears in Western foreign ministries that Putin may have ordered the assassination of a political enemy on British soil (and one who had only months earlier been made a British citizen) suggest the extent of Western distrust of Putin and the Russian political and business classes.

Since becoming Russia’s president in 2000, Putin has made his historical mission the strengthening the Russian state, both internally and internationally. To that end, he has embraced three key slogans that capture the essence of his statebuilding project: the establishment of a “dictatorship of law;” the restoration of the “verticality of power;” and more recently, a defense of Russia’s “sovereign

WALKER

democracy.”

Arguably, Putin has had considerable success in achieving the objectives suggested by the two of the three slogans. He has restored “the verticality of power” by centralizing authority at the federal level through a series of institutional reforms and new policies. During his first term, Putin focused on “legal unification.”

Regional and local governments were gradually and successfully pressured to change their constitutions, charters, and laws to conform to federal law.9 He also established seven federal “super districts,” each with its own presidential representative charged with ensuring compliance with federal law, particularly on budgetary matters. A new federal law was adopted that precluded the heads of Russia’s regions from serving in the upper body of the federal legislature, the Federation Council, while another law gave the Russian president the power to dismiss regional executives and legislatures for violations of federal law. However, Putin’s most dramatic move came during his second term, after the horrific attack on a school in Beslan by Chechen terrorists in September 2004.

Arguing that the threat of terrorism meant that the country could no longer afford divided executive power (“We were weak, and the weak are being beaten”), he sponsored a law giving the president the right to fire regional leaders and appoint their successors, albeit subject to the approval of local legislatures. The concentration of power in the office of presidency has also been enhanced by Putin’s success in creating a popular pro-presidential party, United Russia, which now dominates the Duma and has affiliates in all eighty-nine federal regions.10 The more recent campaign for “sovereign democracy” has already been

Law & Ethics

touched upon. The weight of the campaign, it should be noted, is on sovereignty, not democracy, and it primarily concerns Russian foreign policy rather than domestic affairs. Above all, it is directed at consolidating and deepening Russia’s liberation from the “external management” by the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. government that had characterized the Yeltsin era. It also reflects a consensus in Moscow that foreign policy should be driven by a very traditional understanding of realpolitik and the unapologetic pursuit of Russia’s national interests. Moreover, it is clear that the principle of sovereign democracy is not understood in Moscow as a general one— that is, it does not preclude Moscow from interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors. On the contrary, the consensus view is that foreign policy should be directed at establishing what Anatoly Chubais, head of United Energy Systems (UES), referred to as a “liberal empire,” by which he meant political hegemony over Russia’s neighbors created through economic power.

Where Putin has had much less success, however, has been in pursuit of the “dictatorship of law.” His embrace of this slogan does not imply a commitment to what is generally meant by the “rule of law”—that is, where the law not only serves as the foundation of the state but stands above, and constrains, political leaders. Rather, the primary interest is in “rule by law,” or a regime where law constrains the citizenry and bureaucracy but not necessarily the political leadership.

Certainly Putin’s generally successful effort to unify Russia’s legal space has contributed to rule by law. But the campaign to centralize authority also undermined the rule of law when the legislature violated the constitution by granting

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 0 1 ]

CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT

Putin the power to appoint regional executives.11 Putin has also failed, despite episodic lip service, to commit seriously to a crackdown on corruption. Russia remains one of the world’s most corrupt countries—middle income or otherwise— according to most measures. His reassertion of state control over television news, as well as the pressure that many Russian print journalists feel to engage in selfcensorship, makes it even more difficult to combat official malfeasance.

Putin has taken other steps that undermine the rule of law in Russia,

bole) in regard to judicial independence, “Any official can dictate any decision in any case.”12

A Political Culture of Violence.

Perhaps the most important contribution Putin has made, deliberately or otherwise, to political arbitrariness in Russia has been his tolerance of an increasingly entrenched culture of violence in Russian political life. Occasional political killings characterized the Yeltsin era, but most contract murders in the heyday of the “wild capitalism” of the early and

Besides his image of competence,

discipline, and steely-eyed firmness, Putin has an aura of ruthlessness, particularly in dealing with political enemies. including a tendency to use the courts for political purposes. It is safe to say that the vast majority of those who accumulated great wealth in Russia in the Yeltsin era did so, to one degree or another, illegally. As a result, they are vulnerable to political blackmail, which allows Putin significant leverage over them, as he can order prosecutors or tax authorities to investigate those who offend him, shut down their businesses, or imprison them. This is precisely how he managed to “tame” Russia’s famous oligarchs.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the onetime oil giant Yukos, is now in a prison in Siberia, while Berezovsky and Gusinsky have avoided the same fate by fleeing abroad. Others have gotten the message and remain politically quiescent. As a former Supreme Court judge, Tamara Morshchakova, told Putin recently (doubtless with some measure of hyper-

[ 1 0 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

mid-1990s were motivated by financial gain, involved organized crime, and had private businessmen as victims. Today, business killings have been replaced by political killings as Russia’s most sensational crimes. The most notorious case occurred on 7 October 2006, three weeks before the Litvinenko assassination. Anna Politkovskaya, a courageous journalist whose writings exposed the atrocities and human rights violations being carried out by federal forces and their local allies in the Chechen conflict, was shot dead on the doorstep of her Moscow apartment building. Three weeks earlier, Andrei Kozlov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Central Bank and initiator of a campaign against Russia’s “dirty banks,” was killed as he was leaving a Moscow soccer stadium. In mid-January 2007, the police announced that Alexei Frenkel, head of a

WALKER

collection of banks that are suspected of specializing in money laundering, was arrested for ordering the hit. Other victims of what look like political killings include Valentin Tsvetkov, the governor of Magadan oblast; Sergei Yushenkov, a liberal member of the Duma; and Viktor Dorkin, mayor of the city of Dzerzhinsky.

There have also been a number of failed political killings. For example, in March 2005 Anatoly Chubais, the UES head, was the target of a botched assassination attempt.13 On 24 November 2006, the day after Litvinenko’s death, Yegor Gaidar, the one-time acting prime minister and, along with Chubais, the person most associated with Russia’s “shock therapy” economic reforms of the early 1990s, became violently ill during a trip to Ireland. Upon his return to Moscow, he published an article in the Financial Times claiming he had been poisoned.14 Putin has contributed personally to Russia’s culture of political violence through his leadership style. Besides his image of competence, discipline, and steely-eyed firmness, he has an aura of ruthlessness, particularly in dealing with political enemies. To this end, he is able to draw on his background as a KGB officer with a black belt in judo. Tellingly, his most famous quip came during a 24 September 1999 press conference when he bluntly stated, referring to the “anti-terrorist” campaign in Chechnya: “We'll follow terrorists everywhere. Should we catch them in a shithouse, we'll kill them in a shithouse.” Last year, in response to the abduction and execution of five Russian diplomats in Iraq, he ordered Russian special services to hunt down and “destroy” the killers. He then persuaded the legislature to adopt a law giving him

Law & Ethics

broad powers to order the military and special forces to carry out measures directed at the “minimalization” (minimalizatsiia) and/or “liquidation” (likvidatsiia) of persons involved in terrorist or extremist activities.15 A second law defined extremism very broadly to include not only efforts to overthrow the government or constitution, but also acts of mass-disorder, hooliganism, and slandering of the president. For obvious reasons, Russian dissidents at home and abroad fear that these laws will be used to target them as “enemies of the state.”

Perhaps Putin’s most lasting contribution to the culture of political violence has been his extensive recruitment of former members of the security services and armed forces (the so-called siloviki) into political leadership positions during the his presidency. In a recent study, Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of the Center for the Study of Elites in Moscow, concluded that 26 percent of leading political figures had served in the KGB or its successor agencies.16 A study by two Western scholars determined that siloviki in the “national leadership, government, regional elite, and upper house of parliament” had increased by 45 percent in the first four years of the Putin era.17

Is Russia “Normal”? Putin is cer-

tainly not the pro-Western liberal that many in Washington hoped he would be when he arrived in office, but he remains extremely popular in Russia. As Perry Anderson noted in a recent contribution the London Review of Books, he “is the most popular national leader alive today.”18 In part, his popularity can be attributed to his personal attributes. He has also offered years of competent and toughminded political leadership to a Russian population exhausted by the upheavals of

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 0 3 ]

CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT

the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. Most importantly, however, he has benefited politically from Russia’s booming economy. Since the financial crisis of 1998, GDP growth has averaged some seven percent per year (GDP per capita has risen even faster due to Russia’s declining population), while average real wages have doubled since 2000. His successor may have a much tougher time if growth rates decline and rising expectations of material improvement are disappointed.

The regime will face a serious test when Putin’s constitutionally-mandated term limit arrives in 2008. He appears to be grooming two members of his administration to succeed him. Dmitri Medvedev, a relatively youthful and charismatic deputy prime minister, is widely seen as a moderate who is relatively independent of the siloviki. Sergei Medvedev, who served in the KGB with Putin, is viewed as a silovik who is committed to statism domestically and tough-minded realpolitik abroad. It is also possible that Putin will support some as-of-yet unknown alternative candidate.

Regardless, whoever becomes the next Russian president will be burdened by having to follow an extremely popular

predecessor as well as by having to find a role for Putin that does not undermine his own authority.

Moreover, it will be very difficult for the next president to reverse current trends and establish a real “dictatorship of law” in Russia, let alone a rule of law, even if he chooses to make that a priority. Once it becomes endemic, corruption is notoriously difficult to contain, a rule to which Russia will prove no exception. Russia’s political elite now includes many tough-minded siloviki who view the law primarily as an instrument for maintaining order rather than for constraining political leaders. Despite Putin’s popularity, the Russian public is deeply cynical about politics and politicians—the latter are assumed to be entirely selfinterested and ruthless—but it nevertheless demands much from the state, above all order and economic security. If those public goods are provided by less than legal means, so be it. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that the lawlessness, arbitrariness, and political violence in Russian political life that have characterized the Putin years will be significantly reduced under a new administration.

NOTES

1 Andrei Schleifer and Daniel Treisman, “Russia: A Normal Country,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004): 20-38.

2 See also “Focus: Cracking the Code of the Nuclear Assassin,” The Sunday Times, 3 December 2006.

3 Russian security services are also reported to have used polonium-210 for various purposes and to have conduced research on polonium for use as a poison (see, for example, The Daily Telegraph, 16 December 2006). A contribution to Gazeta.ru posted on 18 December 2006 asserted that sources in the “power structures” had suggested that the polonium-210 that killed Litvinenko came from a secret FSB installation in the Moscow known as NII-2 (Nauchno-Issledovatel’skom Institute-2) and that it was originally produced in a government reactor in Sarov.

4 Evidence that the poisoning took place on 1

[ 1 0 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

November at the Millennium Hotel and that Lugovoi and Kovtun were involved is compelling. Litvinenko reported that he felt ill for the first time that evening; traces of polonium-210 were found at numerous locations where Lugovoi and Kovtun were present prior to the meeting, including the planes that brought them into London; some ten employees of the Millennium hotel tested positive for polonium210 contamination; and British investigators reportedly identified a teapot at the hotel with extremely high levels of polonium-210 contamination.

5 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 12 January 2007.

6 It is clear that many members of the security organs in Russia consider Litvinenko (who, along with Berezovsky, Zakaev, and others members of the antiPutin Russian émigré community in London, is said to have formed an anti-Russian terrorist cell) to be

WALKER

enemies whose deaths would be a good thing for Russia and a case of justice served. Indeed, there are reports that FSB officers have used Litvinenko’s portrait for target practice.

7 See, for example, the 16 December 2006 BBC interview with Yuri Shvets. Shvets, a former KGB major living in the United States, believes that Litvinenko was poisoned because he was in possession of a dossier incriminating an unnamed senior figure in the Kremlin. The dossier had been prepared on behalf of a British company that was considering a major investment in Russia, and its contents led the company to decide against the investment.

8 “Fool’s Errand: The Litvinenko Affair,” The Economist, 7 December 2006, 60.

9 Robert Sharlet, “Resistance to Putin’s Campaign for Political and Legal Unification,” in Public Policy and Law in Russia: In Search of a Unified Legal and Political System, eds. Robert Sharlet and Ferdinand Feldbrugge (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2005) 241-250.

10 Andrew Konitzer and Stephen K. Wegren, “Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation: United Russia As the Party of Power,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 36, no. 4 (2006): 503-522.

11 Article 61 of the Russian constitution states unequivocally: “A citizen of the Russian Federation may not be expelled from the Russian Federation or extradited to another state.”

12 Gazeta.ru, 11 January 2007.

Law & Ethics

13 Pavel Bayev, “Corruption in Putin’s System Becomes Murderous,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 21 September 2006.

14 Yegor Gaidar, “How I was Poisoned and Why Russia’s Political Enemies Were Surely Behind, The Financial Times, 7 December 2006. Interestingly, Gaidar claimed that probably “some obvious or hidden adversaries of the Russian authorities stand behind the scenes of this event, those who are interested in further radical deterioration of relations between Russia and the west.”

15 Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 29 July 2006.

16 Cited in Peter Finn, The Washington Post, 12 December 2006. See also Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Steven White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs 19, no. 4 (2003): 293. Finn reports that Krystanovskaya believes that if one examines “unexplained gaps in résumés, unlikely career paths, or service in organizations affiliated with the KGB, the figure is actually 78 percent.” This latter figure strikes me as highly speculative and probably a gross exaggeration.

17 Sharon Werning and David W. Rivera, “The Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois,” Post-Soviet Affairs 22, no. 2 (2006): 134-136. It should be noted that the authors conclude that the extent to which the Russian state is populated by siloviki has been exaggerated by, among others, Kryshtanovskaya.

18 Perry Anderson, “Russia’s Managed Democracy,” London Review of Books 29, no. 2 (25 January 2007).

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 0 5 ]

Law & Ethics

Accountability for Atrocity Lessons from Rwanda Gerald Gahima One of the most remarkable aspects of the Rwandan genocide has been the government’s efforts to address it. The government wants to serve justice for victims, to demonstrate that these crimes can no longer be tolerated, and to provide a sense of closure for the country as a whole. These many goals mean that the government needs to employ a range of accountability mechanisms. One mechanism would not be sufficient to address the extent of the crimes committed or the needs and expectations of reconciliation.

The Rwandan government has drawn on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, country-level prosecutions, and local, informal courts known as gacaca to pursue a comprehensive peace. These mechanisms, however, each have their own shortcomings. The Rwandan government debated how accountability could be best secured and addressed concerns of timeframe, scope, and the appropriate role of domestic versus international prosecutions. The government had to balance the need for justice with the need for national stability. In the end, the example of Rwanda shows that accountability cannot promote the rule of law or ensure durable peace unless the core causes of conflict are addressed and resolved. The Rwan-

Gerald Gahima is a judge at the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of BosniaHerzegovina and was a Senior Fellow in the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program at the U.S. Institute for Peace from October 2005 to January 2007.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 0 7 ]

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITY

combination of both. The time frame was also a concern, and there were disagreements within the government regarding how far back the country should go in seeking accountability. The scope of accountability was yet another challenge. The government could not simply prosecute the masterminds of the genocide, but going after everyone who had participated was impossible. The Fixing a Broken History. Rwanda government had to balance the need to has a long history of gross human rights demonstrate that these crimes would not violations.1 The victims of this violence go unpunished with the need for longhave been largely, but not exclusively, term social reconciliation.

Rwanda’s response to the genocide was members of the Tutsi minority. In 1994 hardliners within the government decid- shaped by several factors. The horrific ed to derail the implementation of the nature of the violence, large-scale particArusha Peace Agreement by organizing a ipation in the genocide, and the manner genocide of the Tutsi minority and mas- in which the conflict ended all shaped the sacres of moderate Hutu politicians.2 government response. The horrendous The genocide occurred in the context of nature of the genocide made non-judia civil war between the government and cial mechanisms such as a truth commisthe Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). This sion politically impossible, at least in the war and genocide claimed more than a short term. Consequently, Rwanda optmillion lives.3 Hundreds of thousands ed for the approach of prosecuting all more were victims of horrendous crimes, perpetrators. These prosecutions have including torture and sexual violence. been undertaken by three parallel but The organizers of the genocide lost the complementary processes: trials by the war, and the genocide came to an end in International Criminal Tribunal for July 1994 with the victory of the RPA.4 Rwanda (ICTR); prosecutions before the The RPA itself committed widespread ordinary criminal courts; and proceedabuses during and after the genocide.5 ings by the gacaca. Rwanda’s policy Since 1996 the RPA has also been accused requiring accountability on the part of all of atrocities against Rwandan refugees in perpetrators was only possible because the predominately Tutsi rebel army was the Congo.6 In the aftermath of the genocide, the able to defeat the organizers of the genogovernment of Rwanda and the interna- cide and to form the new government. tional community were of the same view: that there should be accountability for Domestic Accountability. Rwanda the atrocities.7 But the Rwandan leaders initially tried deal with the genocide had several issues to consider as to what through trials in the ordinary court sysform the accountability process should tem.8 Special Chambers were created to take. There was debate over whether the handle genocide cases.9 Legislation govmost appropriate response was prosecu- erning genocide trials divided suspects tion, non-judicial mechanisms or a into four categories. The persons who dan experience suggests that post-conflict areas need democracy before they can see full national reconstruction. An inclusive political system is a critical means through which to address the root causes of conflict—a prerequisite for durable peace and stability. Accountability is only one element of the process of national restoration.

[ 1 0 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

GAHIMA

bore the greatest responsibility, placed in the first category, would bear the full weight of the law. The rank-and-file perpetrators would receive more lenient treatment, depending on the degree of cooperation with judicial and law enforcement agencies. The law excluded capital punishment for all except Category 1 offenders and sought to expedite trials and to establish the truth through a guilty plea and confession program.10 The ordinary courts were ultimately unable to cope with the huge genocide caseload. In 1999, Rwanda decided to transfer the bulk of the genocide caseload to the gacaca. Gacaca have jurisdiction to

Law & Ethics

open debates about addressing the grievances of all victims; the government has unilaterally imposed its own version of the events of 1994 and of prior history.

The attempt to prosecute and punish all perpetrators is unprecedented, overly ambitious, and has occasioned abuses against suspects, some of whom have been in detention for a decade or more.

The accountability process has been selective and partisan, overlooking human rights violations committed by the victors.

A major facilitating factor in the accountability process could be Rwanda’s transition to real democracy. Although

Accountability cannot promote the rule of law or ensure durable peace unless the core causes of conflict are addressed and resolved. try all persons who participated in the genocide except those who were among the leadership that planned and supervised it or who were responsible for particularly heinous crimes, including sexual violence.11 Gacaca judges are lay people, elected by the community. The government’s rationale for this shift was that the gacaca would expedite the resolution of the genocide caseload, help end impunity, promote national unity and reconciliation, and empower Rwandan society to resolve its conflicts through a system of participation based on Rwandan custom.12 It is estimated that these traditional courts will try more than 750,000 suspects.13 The idea behind the gacaca process is to demonstrate at the community level that human rights violations against other citizens have legal consequences.

The country, however, has not held

the RPF promised democracy when it came to power in 1994, they have yet to deliver. Rwanda is a one-party regime in all but name. The RPF exercises exclusive control of all machinery of the government. The constitution vests absolute authority in the president and does not contain any checks and balances on his or her power. The legislature is a rubber stamp for policies adopted in private by the RPF party leadership, and the judiciary is subject to the control of the executive. The government is a minority regime that excludes the majority of the population from political participation.14 It exercises zero tolerance of opposition.

Media outlets are either state controlled, co-opted, or constantly under siege.

Rwanda is once again a repressive state where people live in perpetual fear, and conflict is continuously on the horizon.

Armed insurgents are still waging war

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 0 9 ]

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITY

painful death. Vulnerable survivors, lacking the support of their murdered relatives, lead lonely and destitute lives punctuated by social relations that are so violently ruptured that a recurrence of similar atrocity seems virtually inevitable.

These thousands of individual realities must be carefully thought through when creating accountability structures, an unfortunate shortcoming of efforts to date, which have narrowly focused on prosecutions at the expense of wider The Limits of Judicial Account- social healing.

The international community cannot ability. Rwanda’s experience dealing with the legacy of the genocide and other afford to rely exclusively or even princihuman rights abuses offers some lessons pally on justice to deter atrocity. The to other societies that may have to deal threat of future prosecutions alone does with the aftermath of atrocity. First, cur- not protect communities at risk. There is rent mechanisms of accountability are urgent need for effective mechanisms for not effective; they do not prevent future preventing conflict and intervening to atrocities. Neither the work of the ICTR prevent or stop atrocity when conflict nor Rwanda’s own domestic trials have cannot be averted. deterred widespread human rights violations in the Great Lakes region or other The Pitfalls of Externallyparts of Africa. On the contrary, judging Imposed Justice: Lessons for by the record of Rwanda’s military and the ICC. The ICTR and ICTY have security forces in the region since 1994, demonstrated the capacity of legal instiexisting mechanisms would appear to tutions to enforce international humanhave had relatively little or no impact at itarian law. However, the tribunal expeall on ensuring respect for human rights. rience has taught that many states are Accountability mechanisms can never often reluctant or unwilling to provide undo or sufficiently compensate the the assistance required to conduct thorharm that is visited upon victims of ough investigations or apprehend susatrocities; the primary lesson from pects. The Security Council has never Rwanda’s accountability processes is that taken any firm action to sanction a state no form of justice can ever be adequate to for non-cooperation with either of the make up for the suffering and loss expe- two UN tribunals. In the past, the cooprienced by victims of atrocity. Justice, in eration of some uncooperative states has whatever form, remains wanting when we only been obtained as a result of prescome face to face with the reality of lives sure, applied more often than not by the that can never be brought back. Victims United States. The reluctance of the suffer from physical and psychological international community to censure wounds that last forever. Many victims of states that fail or refuse to cooperate with rape and sexual violence are infected with international tribunals is a major probHIV/AIDS and condemned to a slow and lem the International Criminal Court

against the Rwandan state from sanctuaries in the Congo and the Hutu middle class that was ousted from power in 1994 remains largely in exile. Rwanda may be at peace internally, but it is a peace maintained by force of arms.15 In this context it is not surprising that the majority Hutu population questions the legitimacy of the government, which is controlled by a clique of military officers from the minority.

[ 1 1 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

GAHIMA

(ICC) will have to contend with, especially given the United States’s stance towards the court. Parties to the Rome Statute will have to devise strategies for ensuring the cooperation of states.

The ICTR proceedings demonstrated the operational challenges and potential for lost credibility in the face of hostility from a key state. The tribunal relied upon the government of Rwanda in order to carry out investigations and to have access to witnesses. At the same time, it was expected to investigate and prosecute abuses by the RPA, the so-called “special investigations.” The government not only refused to cooperate with the investigations; it occasionally adopted measures that brought the court’s work to a halt to compel the court to abandon the investigations altogether. As a result, the ICTR has not been able to prosecute any case against members of the government.

The challenge the ICTR faced in balancing its dependence on Rwanda with the need to preserve its independence and impartiality is likely to confront the ICC in future.

The ICTR and ICTY have not been universally embraced by publics in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. These mechanisms were adopted as an act of political contrition to ease guilt over the failure to prevent or stop avoidable atrocities. As a rule, tribunal proceedings have been too removed from the societies they were meant to help to be meaningful. Their main preoccupation has been a desire to meet the expectations of their international constituencies, not to be accountable to the victims. International tribunals have not afforded a local share of the ownership of their work. They come across as inefficient, overbearing, and uncaring negations of the right of post-conflict societies to have a say on

Law & Ethics

issues that matter deeply to them. Even the independence and impartiality of the proceedings have sometimes been questioned, as the handling of RPA cases and the NATO bombings of Serbia have demonstrated. Furthermore, their impact in deterring atrocity, the raison d’etre of their existence, is still a matter of serious debate.

In light of this history, international tribunals can be expected to attract significant skepticism or even opposition in the foreseeable future. Attitudes about them will not necessarily change for the better with the advent of the ICC, in spite of the efforts that its creators made to address some of the shortcomings described above. Building a sustainable constituency for the ICC in precisely the very locales where its services are likely to be required will be a challenging task for the international community.

The Domestic Context of Accountability: Social Restoration. Rwanda’s experience illustrates

how the form of political transition impacts the nature, scope, and outcome of accountability processes. In political transitions that have been preceded by the military victory of one of the parties, and where the victors have not embraced democracy, the mechanisms of accountability are likely to be imposed from above rather than emerge as a result of broad national consultation; they are likely to be along partisan lines; and the likelihood of accountability by the victors is minimal.

Genuine reconciliation, peace, and stability in any society emerging from conflict can only be assured if the society is able to deal with its past in a manner that is fair to all the parties to the conflict. It offers an opportunity to bring to

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 1 1 ]

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITY

justice exiled criminals over whom the country could never get custody. International criminal justice may not always be effective, but where it is, it provides the only credible opportunity for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing such crimes that states are unwilling to pursue.

The failure of Rwanda’s legal system to address allegations of human rights violations attributable to the RPA demonstrates the need for a permanent, independent, impartial, and effective international criminal court to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by officials who still enjoy the protection of their states.

The futility of partisan or discriminatory accountability mechanisms is evident

investigate and prosecute human rights violations by their own officials, the only way to have these crimes addressed would be for the international community to exert pressure upon the responsible governments. Unfortunately, as the response to the human rights situation in Rwanda, the DRC, and in other places such as Darfur has shown, the international community is always reluctant to confront abuses by governments that remain in power.

There are many reasons for, and consequences of, this reluctance. Principles are often compromised for the sake of political expediency, and indeed, unwillingness to confront the previous Rwanda government for its human rights abuses

The primary lesson is that no form of

justice can ever be adequate to make up for the suffering and loss experienced by victims of atrocity. led to the genocide. Yet by not taking a stand on issues of human rights and good governance in contemporary Rwanda, supportive governments of countries like the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands ignore the seeds of tomorrow’s conflict and bloodshed. In light of the continuing reluctance of the international community to press abusive governments on human rights issues, civil society needs to devise strategies that are The International Community more effective at pushing governments of and Human Rights. Although democratic states to make human rights a international criminal justice remains an key element of their foreign policies. imperfect solution, in many cases it will have an important role to play in secur- Building Democratic Culture. ing justice. In the absence of political will Societies seeking to reckon with the vioon the part of national authorities to lence of their past need to devise combi-

in the Rwandan accountability regime, which focuses exclusively on the genocide against the Tutsi. Its failure to address abuses against the Hutu has adversely affected its credibility and potential impact. Accountability is only beneficial if it can help to establish a historical narrative to which all victims can relate, a narrative that acknowledges the suffering of all victims.

[ 1 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

GAHIMA

nations of mechanisms that are suited to addressing the specific challenges they face. National prosecutions are the ideal.

However, non-judicial responses may in certain situations make a critical contribution to the process of national reconstruction. At the very least, however, leaders bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocity must be brought to justice.

Accountability mechanisms are only useful if they address the concerns of all victims in a fair manner. National mechanisms will not always provide a satisfactory response to atrocity. International criminal justice, imperfect as it is, still has an indispensable role to play in the global framework for protection of human

Law & Ethics

rights and maintenance of peace. Critically, accountability mechanisms are unlikely to have lasting impact in protecting human rights and ensuring peace and stability unless the fundamental causes of conflict in each society are addressed and resolved. An inclusive and democratic society is better able to devise the most appropriate responses to mass atrocity, which will be most likely to engender genuine healing and reconciliation, knitting together the social fabric that was destroyed by conflict. Building a genuinely democratic culture offers the only long-term solution to the challenge of protecting human rights, preventing conflict, and sustaining peace.

NOTES

1 Rene Remarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praegar Publishers, 1970).

2 Alison Des Forges, Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch/International Federation for Human Rights, 1999); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers Ltd, 1995).

3 Republique Rwandaise, Ministere de L’ administration Locale, de L’Information et des Affaires Sociales, “Denombresement des Victims du Genocide.” Rapport Finale (Kigali, November 2002).

4 The Rwandese Patriotic Army was the military wing of the rebel movement known as the Rwandese Patriotic Front (the RPF).

5 Des Forges; Prunier.

6 Report of the Secretary’s Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Document S/1998/581.

7 See UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted on 8 November 1994.

8 Organic Law No. 08/96 on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of

genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990.

9 Article 19.

10 Article 14, Articles 5-7.

11 Organic Law No. 16/2004 Establishing the organization, competence, and functioning of Gacaca courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994.

12 See http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/ EnObjectives.htm.

13 See press interview of Domitilla Mukantangazwa, Executive Secretary of National Service for Gacaca Jurisdictions, The New Times, 15 July 2006.

14 Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” African Affairs 103 (2004): 177-210.

15 Organization of African Unity, Rwanda, The Preventable Genocide (Addis Ababa: Organization of African Unity, 2000); Christian Aid, “It is time to open up: Ten years after the genocide in Rwanda, A Christian Aid report on government accountability, human rights, and freedom of speech.” London, March 2004.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 1 3 ]

Law & Ethics

Between Global Governance and Human Rights

International Migration and the United Nations Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire International migration is characterized by a paradox: it is by nature an international process, but it is largely governed through national and often unilateral policies. Despite the complexity of migration patterns and the number of countries involved, there is very little cooperation between states. Several migration-related initiatives have nevertheless been initiated in the last decade, particularly within the United Nations, with the aim of achieving greater coherence between states’ migration policies. This article describes some of the most important of these and argues that while multilateral discussions over migration issues are to be welcomed, they should focus more on human rights. Using the case of the UN Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights, this article will demonstrate that despite the recent attention focused on migration, acceptance of international law instruments protecting migrants remains limited. The reluctance to protect migrants’ human rights not only raises moral problems, but also jeopardizes the potential success of migration governance; only a secure rights-based framework can lead to fair, efficient, and long-term answers to the challenges raised by human mobility.

Antoine Pécoud is programme specialist in UNESCO’s Section on International Migration and Multicultural Policies.

Paul de Guchteneire is the chief of UNESCO’s Section on International Migration and Multicultural Policies.

He was previously director of the Steinmetz Archive for social science data in the Netherlands and president of the International Federation of Data Organizations.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 1 5 ]

BETWEEN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Toward a Global Governance of states are preoccupied with the surveilMigration? States’ migration policies, lance of their borders and the develop-

while designed at the national level, have an impact far beyond their borders. The United States and the European Union, for example, are reinforcing their southern borders; this in turn has transformed former transit countries (Mexico and Morocco respectively) into de facto destination states, as migrants heading north stay there for some time while trying to cross the border clandestinely. In turn, these nations are reinforcing their own borders further south—between Morocco and Mauritania and between Mexico and Guatemala. Similarly, some of South Africa’s most qualified workers are leaving the country, driving it to recruit from abroad to compensate for these losses.

The complex and far-reaching consequences of national migration policies thus generate profound migration management concerns that call for multilateral coordination.

Migration is currently characterized by unacceptable violations of migrants’ physical integrity and dignity, highlighting current policies’ failure to ensure respect for fundamental human rights.

Examples abound: irregular migrants encounter extremely dangerous conditions, and a significant number of them lose their lives trying to reach destination countries. Once there, clandestine migrants live and work in precarious conditions that favor discrimination and exploitation. Professional smugglers and traffickers, sometimes connected to mafia-type businesses, prosper on migrants’ desire to cross borders. This puts the asylum system under pressure, as refugees are suspected of being economic migrants circumventing migration restrictions. These tragic outcomes take place in a context where most destination

[ 1 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ment of tight, but inadequate, migration policies. In many countries, public opinion, far from displaying sensitivity to the difficult situations migrants often endure, shows a strong aversion to migration.

These examples of the shortcomings of the current migration system, both in terms of governance and human rights, suggest that migration should be cooperatively “managed” rather than unilaterally “controlled,” and that efforts are required to strengthen the capacity of states to address migration challenges.

Some observers have gone as far as to propose the creation of a World Migration Organization (WMO), which would handle migration flows in a way comparable to the World Trade Organization’s mandate in the field of international trade: support multilateral negotiations; reach agreements over the dimension, direction, and nature of flows; and ensure the proper implementation of these agreements.1 Others have spoken of new institutional arrangements and management regimes, which would promote a harmonization of migration policies and facilitate coherent and concerted responses to migration challenges.2

International Initiatives. Without going as far, the international community has launched a number of initiatives that move in this direction, albeit timidly. This goes back to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, organized by the UN in Cairo, where discussion of international migration raised considerable controversy. In the years following, the UN considered but eventually rejected organizing a conference dedicated specifical-

PÉCOUD & DE GUCHTENEIRE

ly to migration. Migrant-receiving countries feared a North-South divide over migrants’ access to their states and labor markets. After years of wrangling, the UN General Assembly decided to organize a “High-level Dialogue” on migration—a less ambitious event, but still the most important conference ever held at the international level on this issue.

This conference took place in September 2006. High-level officials from more than 120 countries took the floor

Law & Ethics

of Sweden and Switzerland launched the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Composed of nineteen experts, the Commission was created to promote a comprehensive debate among governments and all other actors involved in migration policy, through meetings and hearings organized around the world.4 Its 2005 report provided an overview of the key issues that emerge with international migration and outlined principles to be followed in

Clandestine migrants live and work in extremely precarious conditions that favor discrimination and exploitation. and discussed a variety of issues, including the migration-development nexus (remittances and the role of migrants in developing their country of origin), the role of poverty and under-development in migration, return migration, movements of the highly-skilled labor, patterns of migrant integration, gender and migrant women, irregular migration, trafficking, migrants’ rights, and migration policy and governance.3 Practically speaking, the main outcome of the Highlevel Dialogue was the establishment of a Global Migration Forum. This forum is to be organized by states (i.e. not by the UN system) and to provide governments with an opportunity to discuss issues related to migration; it will not be a venue for interstate negotiations, but will enable an exchange of views on some of the policy issues raised by migration. Belgium offered to organize the first forum, which is scheduled for Brussels in July 2007.

Other related initiatives took place concurrently. In 2003 the Governments

addressing them.5 It dealt in particular with the UN system and the way it could better address international migration.

One recommendation called for the establishment of an Inter-agency Global Migration Facility “to ensure a more coherent and effective institutional response to the opportunities and challenges presented by international migration,” a formulation that could be interpreted as coming relatively close to the WMO-related proposals mentioned above.6 The GCIM recommended the immediate creation of a high-level institutional group to pave the way for such a facility, leading to the establishment of the Global Migration Group (GMG), which would comprise the UN agencies active in the field of migration as well as the International Organization for Migration.7 These initiatives have placed migration on the global agenda. Migration has been an issue fraught with sensitivities, as states saw migration as one of the few remaining fields in which they could fully exer-

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 1 7 ]

BETWEEN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

with a much harsher attitude toward refugees or unskilled migrants. By contrast, other countries have no such history and are keen on maintaining a kind of ethno-cultural homogeneity. Not surprisingly, citizens of these countries feel threatened by migrants: Germany, for example, has long maintained that it is not an immigration country, despite the factual evidence to the contrary; only in the late nineties did it rethink this official position. Similarly, countries such as Japan or South Korea struggle to preserve their highly valued cultural homogeneity, even when economic development and labor shortages call for increasing migration flows.8 Still others have a history of emigration and are experiencing an uneasy transition to the status of immigration country. Throughout the postwar economic boom, millions of Spanish and Italian citizens emigrated to other countries, but now these two countries are home to migrants from all over the world. Ireland and Poland are also attracting migrants after having sent peoMigration and National Diversi- ple to the New World for much of their ty. This search for a consensus is clearly history. In yet another situation is a difficult task, as states have very differ- Argentina, a country shifting from a hisent histories and attitudes toward migra- tory of well-accepted immigration from tion. Even if migration affects many Europe to its current status as a magnet countries simultaneously, their reactions for migrants from neighboring Latin could hardly be more varied. Some American countries, who are less welcountries owe their very nature to previ- comed. Given these very different conous immigration waves and have long texts and traditions, attitudes toward perceived themselves as destinations for migration differ widely among countries. people of very different origins. For Even within Europe there are deep difexample, the governments of Australia, ferences, and the EU is struggling to Canada, New Zealand, and the United achieve a consensus on this issue. DifferStates have policies to attract migrants on ences among integration policies are still the basis of explicit and clearly-defined greater: in the immigration countries criteria. Openness to receive migrants mentioned above, newcomers are that fall within these parameters is hardly expected to eventually become full citicontested, even when this process coexists zens, whereas Gulf states’ policies privicise their sovereignty. The international community has now begun to discuss some of the questions raised by migratory flows, although the discussions do not include binding commitments. As the September 2006 conference at the UN suggests, the current stage is one of dialogue rather than negotiation. States are supposed to exchange views, listen to each other, and explore the prospects for reaching agreements on migration-related issues. In other words, the challenge is to find some kind of consensus between states. As in all fields of international cooperation, very little can be done in the absence of an agreement over a few core principles. The GCIM report can be understood as a first comprehensive attempt to draft a list of principles that should be followed by all states. While to some observers these principles remain vague enough to accommodate almost any migration policy, their very existence is nevertheless an indication that despite a lack of implementation, states are seeking common principles.

[ 1 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

PÉCOUD & DE GUCHTENEIRE

lege the recruitment of large numbers of short-term labor migrants, often banning the presence of their family members and keeping them apart from the host population.

The search for a consensus is exacerbated by states’ diverging interests. Sending regions are often keen to maintain connections with their emigrants, for reasons ranging from controlling their influence on domestic politics to attracting the vital economic contribution of their remittances and investments. States such as India, Haiti, and Turkey have

Law & Ethics

exchange platform, creating and supporting networks of policy makers in charge of migration issues in different countries, which would engage in openended and informal attempts to coordinate policy choices. This is similar to the way the EU initially functioned, thus suggesting the potential of a bottom-up approach.9 According to this approach, discussions should start with consensual issues on which agreements will be easier to reach. Such issues include improving data collection to provide policy makers

Migration should be cooperatively

managed rather than unilaterally controlled. drafted policies to facilitate emigrants’ financial investments and political participation. The health systems and economic development of very poor countries, especially in Africa, are threatened by the departure of their skilled citizens, which benefits receiving countries. In other words, migration creates winners and losers such that reaching a consensus on principles for migration policies also implies achieving a compromise between states’ interests.

It is therefore unrealistic to assume that all states will eventually adopt similar immigration (not to mention integration) policies; migration is too deeply rooted in each country’s history and nature to be dealt with in the same way throughout the world. It follows that a top-down approach to global migration governance, whereby a supranational body would provide states with binding principles in terms of migration policy, is unlikely to succeed in the near future.

Instead the UN should serve as an

with accurate information, understanding how migration can foster development, and fighting trafficking and human smuggling. Other issues, such as normative instruments concerning immigration law, border control policies, or compulsory returns and expulsions tend to be too controversial and should therefore be postponed to later stages of discussions. Indeed, even though migrants’ rights are formally discussed, little progress is done in this field, as illustrated by the current status of the UN Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights.

The Migration-Human Rights Nexus. The United Nations Interna-

tional Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) is the most comprehensive normative instrument in international law to protect migrants’ rights.

It was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1990 and entered into force

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 1 9 ]

BETWEEN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

in 2003. The ICRMW stems from the very nature of human rights, which are not only universal and indivisible, but also inalienable—they cannot be denied to any human being. In this sense, migrants, no matter what their status, deserve the full protection of fundamental human rights. Although these principles are enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, they have yet to be fully realized.9 Moreover, states often apply these rights only to nationals. In response, the three decades between 1960 and 1990 saw the elaboration of specific international human rights instruments, including the ICRMW. Migrants’ vulnerability to human rights abuses stems from different

Migrants are further vulnerable because they are outsiders in the countries in which they live. They often lack fluency in the local language, are unfamiliar with the host country’s legal and administrative system, are detached from traditional sources of support such as family and social networks, and are exposed to ways of life they may find foreign. Even legal migrants may be unaware of their rights and, as non-citizens, have little impact on policymaking. Their economic contribution, although often crucial, remains largely unrecognized by the host population, fuelling the stereotypical image of welfare-abusing migrants. One consequence is the xenophobia and racism that has penetrated

Migrants are often perceived as “less

deserving” than citizens, as if only citizens should have access to the full enjoyment of human rights. sources. All too often, migrants perform so-called 3-D jobs—dirty, dangerous, and difficult. In economically advanced societies, there is often a dual labor market in which a core of permanent and well-paid workers are complemented by a large number of less-skilled temporary or contract workers, among which migrants are overrepresented. Thanks to migration, national workers have been able to refuse unattractive jobs, allowing them to enjoy better living and working conditions but also creating a structural need for migrants. Migrant workers are often appreciated by employers because they can be readily hired and fired, thus smoothing the cyclical peaks and troughs of sectors like agriculture and construction.

[ 1 2 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

mainstream political and public discourses in many countries, creating a context that is extremely unsupportive of migrants’ rights.11 In this context, the ICRMW is a powerful tool to address migrants’ vulnerability. It views them as not only workers, laborers, or economic entities, but as social entities endowed with rights. It recognizes them as a vulnerable group, defines the responsibility of the international community to protect them, and most importantly, outlines the basic human rights of irregular migrants. The Convention thus represents a tool to help states draft fair migration policies. It is worth emphasizing that this is not only in migrants’ interest: granting rights to migrants is indeed the best way to avoid

PÉCOUD & DE GUCHTENEIRE

the establishment of an underprivileged sub-sector of the population subject to exploitation and misery, which would create a downward pressure on the wellbeing of the whole population.

Accepting Migrants’ Human Rights. Despite these arguments, the

ICRMW suffers from a marked lack of international interest: only thirty-six states have ratified it and no OECD countries, except Turkey and Mexico, have done so.12 This is in sharp contrast to the other human rights instruments mentioned above, which have all been ratified by over 150 states. This also diverges from the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which (perhaps because it was elaborated shortly after a major world crisis) provides widely accepted protection to refugees. Moreover, despite the above-described initiatives on migration policy, acceptance of the Convention has not progressed significantly.

In other words, the issues of migrants’ human rights seems to be too controversial to be successfully dealt with within the international community.

This is disturbing, especially because one of the core mandates of the UN is precisely the promotion of human rights—an objective enshrined in the International Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter.

The main reasons behind states’ reluctance to adopt the ICRMW are political and may be related to the specificity of the place of migrants in host societies.13 Migrants are often perceived as “less deserving” than citizens, as if only citizens should have access to the full enjoyment of human rights. Unlike women and children, migrants are not yet recognized as vulnerable groups that should

Law & Ethics

benefit from targeted human rights treaties, but are rather viewed with suspicion and even hostility. There is an almost ontological characteristic of migrants that is specific to non-nationals: while women and children are understood to be in need of protection simply by being, migrants only become troublesome by virtue of being here, in the destination country. It is thus assumed that migration is voluntary and that, consequently, if migrants are unhappy with the conditions in the receiving country, they can and should go back home. In other words, people accepted into another country should be grateful for this privilege and cannot claim further rights.

Such beliefs, which amount to negating the legitimacy of foreigners’ access to fundamental rights, display a profound lack of understanding not only of the complexity of the migration process, but also of the very nature of human rights. Indeed leaving one’s country (and therefore becoming a migrant) is recognized as a human right by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 13(2) states that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” It follows that the exercise of this right to emigrate should not lead to a deterioration of one’s access to human rights.

Non-nationals should enjoy human rights in the same way as nationals do.

But irregular migrants in particular, who are powerless and subject to removal and prosecution at any time, lack access to fundamental rights. Their living and working conditions are extremely precarious. While this would seem to call for increased protection, the reality is that they encounter even more barriers to the realization of their human rights. Irregular migrants thus embody an extreme

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 2 1 ]

BETWEEN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Cooperation between states would therefore benefit from drawing more substantially on this instrument. Moreover, respect for human rights is a condition for addressing and resolving the tensions that migration generates between and within states. The movement of people creates winners and losers and human rights may mitigate this effect, for example by reducing migrants’ exposure to socio-economic vulnerability.

Finally, respect for human rights is necessary to ensure participation in migration management policies. As illustrated by the example of people Governance and Human Rights. migrating irregularly to take 3-D jobs in States facing the challenges of interna- destination states, migrants are unlikely tional migration cannot afford to view to respect rules that they perceive as overhuman rights as a controversial issue to ly oriented toward receiving countries’ be avoided or postponed to a later stage. interests alone. By committing themTrue, improved migration governance selves internationally to respect migrants’ may eventually reduce migrants’ vulnera- rights, states could create the necessary bility to human rights violations. But in climate of confidence and fairness that the meantime, many migrants will have will ensure the cooperation not only of suffered. Thus, immediately putting other states but also of migrants themhuman rights at the center of the discus- selves. Perhaps less intuitively, a rightssions is a moral imperative and a condi- based approach may also be the best way to address host populations’ concerns tion for successful policy making.

Human rights provides a platform for over migration. In societies where people agreement on core principles that tran- have different interests and socio-culturscend national specificities and interests; al backgrounds, guaranteeing fair access in this sense, the Convention is about the to rights for all is a condition that will search for consensus described above, as smooth the tensions and potential conit attempts to bridge the gap between the flicts that may arise. In a world in which diversity inherent in global migration more and more people are on the move, patterns and policies and the need to ignoring migrants’ rights will seriously universally treat migrants according to a jeopardize the welfare of not just core set of rights-based principles. migrants, but of all human beings. case for the universality of human rights: their very existence represents a challenge to state sovereignty and their access to rights requires states to adopt a cosmopolitan view according to which they must protect the rights of people they did not want to let in. This is straightforward according to human rights logic, but very difficult from a political perspective.

Indeed, a major argument against the ratification of the ICRMW is that granting rights to clandestine migrants would encourage irregular migration, thus further undermining state sovereignty.

[ 1 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

PÉCOUD & DE GUCHTENEIRE

Law & Ethics

NOTES

1 Mehmet Ugur, “The ethics, economics and governance of free movement,” in Migration Without Borders: An investigation into the free movement of people, eds. Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), 65-95.

2 Bimal Ghosh, “Managing migration: whither the missing regime?” in Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, eds. Migration without Borders. An investigation into the free movement of people (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), 97118.

3 For documents pertaining to this conference, see www.unmigration.org.

4 For an overview of the GCIM activities, see www.gcim.org.

5 Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action (Geneva: GCIM, 2005).

6 Ibid., Recommendation 33.

7 The GMG is currently composed of ten members: International Labour Office (ILO), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Bank.

8 Nicola Piper and Robyn Iredale, “Identification of the Obstacles to the Signing of The United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All

Migrant Workers 1990: The Asia Pacific Perspective,” Asia Pacific Migration Research Network Working Paper No. 14, 2004.

9 Kathleen Newland, The Governance of International Migration: Mechanisms, Processes and Institutions (Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration, 2005).

10 The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the two major covenants covering the broad definitions of political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights (the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

11 Fernand De Varennes, “‘Strangers in Foreign Land’–Diversity, Vulnerability and the Rights of Migrants,” UNESCO-MOST Working Paper 9, 2002.

12 The following countries have ratified the Convention: Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, and Uruguay.

13 Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, “Migration, human rights and the United Nations: an investigation into the obstacles to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 24, no. 2 (2006): 241–66.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 2 3 ]

Politics&Diplomacy Beyond Hollywood and the Boardroom Celebrity Diplomacy

Andrew F. Cooper The ability of personalities such as Bono, Angelina Jolie, and Bill Gates to gain access to world leaders is becoming increasingly recognized if not fully understood by the international affairs community. Through their activism on the world stage, a self-selected cast of celebrities have begun to have a significant impact on policy, shaping the agenda on a range of global humanitarian issues. Traditional modes of state-centric diplomacy face dual challenges of legitimacy and efficiency.

The challenge of legitimacy is caused by the quantitative increase in and normative claims vis-à -vis new actors in the international arena. The challenge of efficiency is posed by the compression of time and space in the information age. In the post-Cold War period opportunities have emerged for a different type of transnational advocate—a role that movie stars, musicians, and CEOs have rushed to fill on an individual basis. These stars have become ascendant diplomatic actors in a global system that is open to their inclusion in ways that very few would have anticipated even fifteen years ago. The increased activity of celebrities as champions of global humanitarian issues raises some fundamental questions for statecraft and its practitioners: How seriously should celebrities be taken in world affairs? Whom do they represent and to whom are they accountable? Can celebrities be diplomats?

Andrew F. Cooper is associate director and distinguished fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation, and Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, Canada.

He is the author of Celebrity Diplomacy (Paradigm Publishers, forthcoming 2007).

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 2 5 ]

BEYOND HOLLYWOOD AND THE BOARDROOM

Diplomacy is often thought to be the domain of an exclusive club of elites, comprised of seasoned veterans of the formal Foreign Service establishment.

Yet the three constitutive dimensions of diplomacy—communication, representation, and reproduction of international society—can certainly be addressed in

matic language. The site of diplomatic activity is decidedly unconventional.

Instead of resident embassies and communiqués, their platforms of choice include interviews in a wide cross-section of new as well as old media sources and mass performances via staged events.

The typical celebrity diplomat is polit-

The increased activity of celebrities as champions of global humanitarian issues raises some fundamental questions for statecraft and its practitioners. the activities of non-state actors.1 The Latin root of ambassador (ambactiare) translates as “to go on a mission.”

Successful contemporary diplomacy requires a sense of purpose, an ability to interact with high-level state officials, and a global reach. Within these parameters, diplomacy can accommodate the agency of celebrities who have become passionately engaged with issues on an international scale. Their ability to get their message heard by both the masses and the elite means that they are engaging in the kind of widespread communication that underpins successful diplomacy. The global capabilities of celebrity diplomats should not be undervalued or dismissed.

Profiling the Celebrity Diplomat.

Celebrity diplomacy is, at first glance, a public phenomenon very different from the largely insulated and secretive world of mainstream diplomacy. An element of entertainment and even spectacle is built into the activity. The mode of operation is decidedly populist in style, and the accompanying messaging is cast in colloquial and sometimes markedly undiplo[ 1 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ically outspoken and often tied to a single cause—from the thematic, like debt relief, human rights, fair trade, and disease, to the territorial, such as the crisis in Darfur and oppression in Myanmar (Burma). Their initiation into this role is done without any extensive apprenticeship; few among these celebrities have any academic or practical training in the workings of diplomacy. Lacking any formal accreditation or experience, they often look to other role models or established organizations for guidance.

There is no doubt that celebrity diplomacy comes in various forms. Perhaps most visible are the glamorous enthusiasts streaming out of Hollywood. The lead on this sort of activity has been taken

by Angelina Jolie and, by extension, her partner Brad Pitt, yet the roster of film stars who have become identified with international problem solving goes well beyond the “Brangelina” phenomenon.

A longer list includes actors across a wide spectrum, from the charming George Clooney and Nicole Kidman to the highly focused Richard Gere to the more abrasive Sean Penn and Vanessa Redgrave. Their activism can range in its

COOPER

Politics & Diplomacy

ical of their industry. They are given the chance to lend their voice, stand for something meaningful, and affect real change in the world. On top of their invitations to the Oscars or the Grammy Awards, events like the World Economic Forum (WEF) or the Live 8 concert might be added to their social calendar.

But the perk that distinguishes the best known of the Hollywood stars in their role as celebrity diplomats is their frequent organizational attachment to the United Nations. What unites stars like Audrey Hepburn and Angelina Jolie across the generational divide is their ties to UN specialized agencies. Hepburn built up her stellar reputation as a celebrity diplomat via her activities as a Goodwill Ambassador for UNICEF. Jolie is now a Goodwill Ambassador for the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

These links provide Hollywood stars with clear advantages in terms of both credibility and their ability to expand their personal networks. When they travel, they do so with the benefit of a UN blue diplomatic passport. In the field, they can sometimes gain access to local decision makers with much greater ease than traditional diplomats. In New York they have benefited from the support of the top tier of UN officials, including former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, a leading advocate of the UNHollywood connection.3 With attention, however, comes risk.

For the UN the risks come in the form of potential embarrassment by association.

The Perks and Pitfalls of Some movie stars, however prominent, Celebrity Diplomacy. Hollywood did not come up to Audrey Hepburn’s celebrities stand to gain quite a bit from standard in terms of their deportment or their participation in celebrity diploma- level of commitment. Sophia Loren, for cy. Among other things, their “diplo- example, brought fame and glamour to matic� role offers them the opportunity her role as UN Goodwill Ambassador at to break away from the trivialities so typ- the end of the 1980s, yet this persona intensity and audience, from a subtle mention on Entertainment Tonight to a large-scale international marketing project like ONE: The Campaign to Make Poverty History.

There exists yet another important stream, one which matches this ability to create hype with tangible outputs and compounds the challenge for the traditional guild of diplomats. This is the materially rich and highly innovative cohort of business celebrities located not just in Los Angeles but in Seattle, Omaha, London, Atlanta, and other places far from the geographic sites usually associated with diplomacy. Corporate elites such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Richard Branson, and Ted Turner bring innovative stature and business acumen to the tackling of global humanitarian issues. Traditional diplomats do not carry the same influence or mobilize material resources as easily as these corporate elites. Institutions of global governance do not enjoy the level of autonomy, flexibility of mandate, and access to funds that are typical of private foundations sponsored (or led) by such business celebrities. Some perspective on the degree of this structural power can be captured when one considers that the yearly dispensation of grants by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (some $1.55 billion in 2005) is on par with the annual budget of the World Health Organization, which is around $1.65 billion in 2007.2

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 2 7 ]

BEYOND HOLLYWOOD AND THE BOARDROOM

heard. The celebrity that the business elites enjoy comes in sharp contradistinction considering the power attached directly to their material wealth.

Bringing together the “buzz” of Hollywood and the “bite” of substantial corporate philanthropy within a collaborative network harnesses the potential of both groups.

Bridging the gap between Hollywood types and corporate elites is Bono—the archetypal celebrity diplomat. As lead singer of U2 and co-founder of DATA (Debt, AIDS, Trade, Africa), Bono not only has star status and a captive audience, but also strong financial ties and connections with many of the political and corporate heavyweights of the world.

With a little help from Bono’s negotiating skills, DATA has received a number of grants ranging from $250,000 to $500,000 for general operating costs from the Gates Foundation, with a larger sum in the amount of $2.25 million awarded in 2003 for a three-year program to support education on African AIDS and debt relief.5 In terms of advocacy and/or forms of public diplomacy, Bono and Gates have used the WEF at Davos, Switzerland, as a site of choice, Building a Sustainable Hybrid where Angelina Jolie, Richard Gere, and Network. The most successful celebri- Sharon Stone have also been featured ty diplomats are those who network with participants. In 2005 Bono and Gates their peers and with elites. This is accom- appeared in what can be cast as a Davos plished largely by leveraging their “super group” along with former U.S. celebrity status to access the sites of diplo- President Bill Clinton, British Prime macy, such as UN conferences, and to Minister Tony Blair, and Presidents other diplomats, especially world leaders. Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and However, the sources of power possessed Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria.

There is evidence of an emerging,

by Hollywood enthusiasts and the business entrepreneurs are starkly divergent. loose network of celebrity diplomats and Movie stars have the power of attraction the circulation of some key advisors withto the media and the public at large, in this network. For example, one of the using press conferences, billboards, and closest advisors to Angelina Jolie is megaphone politics to get their causes Trevor Neilson, her philanthropic and translated poorly when she entered the diplomatic realm. Loren was immediately criticized for her inexperience.

Reporters pointed to her arrival at her UNCHR appointment ceremony in a brown Rolls Royce that matched her fur coat as evidence that she was out of touch with the plight of those whom she was to represent.4 For celebrities, these risks mean adhering to a conformist norm that often grates with their assertive personalities. The early UN ambassadors appeared content to work within an accepted script. But some of the celebrities that followed have been far less compliant and less willing to attach themselves to one organization. One classic case of this clash came in the challenge to the UN’s position on Tibet through Richard Gere’s activism, in which he publicly advocated positions that went beyond the UN’s official stance. Another has been the push against the boundaries of accepted behavior for a UN Goodwill Ambassador, best demonstrated by Harry Belafonte in his scathing public criticism of President George W. Bush and the war in Iraq.

[ 1 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

COOPER

political adviser, who has worked with DATA and as the director of public affairs for the Gates Foundation. There is also a common pursuit of new recruits into the network. When George Clooney and Brad Pitt searched for guidance on how to become celebrity diplomats, they went to Bono and DATA. Likewise, Bono has had extensive contact not only with

Politics & Diplomacy

overblown, viewing it as a faddish activity that lacks credibility. Other forms of negative portrayal, however, target its more serious implications. In the United States, the main source of criticism for celebrity culture comes from the political right and is tied into the image of a radicalized Hollywood.7 But this line of attack is inward-looking, viewing the phenom-

Celebrity diplomacy is a public

phenomenon very different from the largely insulated and secretive world of mainstream diplomacy.

Bill and Melinda Gates but also with Warren Buffett and his family.

Reportedly Bono was the first person Buffett phoned to tell about his extraordinary gift of over $31 billion to the Gates Foundation.6 The success of this network relies on its hybridity. If it is the glamorous Hollywood entertainers who dramatize the need to do something about specific issues (the buzz), it is the corporate celebrities who provide the material resources and mobilizing model to push forward with an issue-specific delivery (the bite). Together, these two forces can project a powerful diplomatic presence.

The sustainable potential that exists for celebrity diplomacy will come increasingly from those who bring a balance of public notoriety and financial means.

The Polarized Backlash against Celebrity Diplomacy. The surge of

involvement and interest in celebrity diplomacy has brought with it concern and controversy. Some critics of the Hollywood face of celebrity diplomacy argue that this phenomenon has become

enon exclusively through the prism of U.S. domestic politics. Outside of the United States, the criticism is embedded in a larger set of concerns about the (mis)direction of global activism. Voices of the left in the United Kingdom have been particularly vigorous in their denouncement of the intrusion of celebrities (especially those with close business ties) into global affairs. Far from being seen as a benign set of activities, the celebrity diplomatic enterprise is cast as a dangerous endeavor. One implication of the re-routing of mass action on such issues as poverty and debt into the mainstream is a certain legitimization of the status quo.

An offshoot of this criticism from the left expresses concern and frustration over the very attractiveness of celebrity diplomacy. In providing a new vehicle for a counter-consensus, it defuses, drains, or even suffocates more radical forms of protest and political mobilization.

Because of its ability to act as a magnet for attention, any success of this form of celebrity activity comes at the expense of alternative voices, not only from the Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 2 9 ]

BEYOND HOLLYWOOD AND THE BOARDROOM

North (the anti-globalization or social justice movements) but also those from the South. On a collective level, it has subordinated substitute sites such as the World Social Forum (WSF), while on an individual level it has enhanced the status of stars from the North over the fortunes of those potential celebrity entertainers from the global South.

More recently, controversy over the question of credibility has spilled over into criticism of benefits and the transparency of these “good deeds.” Foremost among them is Bono’s championing of the Product (RED) brand. Although this project is still in its infancy, the core notion behind it involves a portfolio of companies contributing a percentage of sales from select products bearing the (RED) mark to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS in Africa. But the (RED) campaign is built around big-ticket commercial products such as Apple’s iPod, Emporio Armani sunglasses and watches, and GAP clothing, the returns of which (even as a percentage of profit on these goods) are sparing. Each iPod Nano (RED) sold, for example, brings in only ten dollars (or 2 percent of the digital audio player’s retail price) to the Global Fund. While AMEX’s (RED) credit card donates 1 percent of accumulated charges, AMEX declines to reveal whether any of the interest on outstanding balances would be donated.8 And now, as the campaign begins to settle its balance sheet, there are questions as to (RED)’s sustainability.

Newspaper headlines have been reporting that Bono’s pet project is spending more than it has made.9

of celebrity diplomacy featured here as valuable as it is novel? Few of celebrity diplomats’ activities or modes of behavior mesh easily with what is usually referred to as traditional diplomatic culture. The biggest gap is on the criterion of representation, where there is no basis for seeing any of the celebrity diplomats as members of a formalized guild of diplomats.10 Unlike official diplomats, it is hard for celebrities to make the claim that they speak for a constituency, whether defined as a cause or people.

Many fail also on the criterion of civility, with an air of impatience with diplomatic niceties. What, if any, value-added do these actors bring to the repertoire of diplomacy and global affairs? And how wide and deep does this value extend?

Quite self-consciously, official diplomatic culture has been developed without the formation of solid links to domestic society. The language of estrangement, or in a more convoluted fashion, disintermediation, has been increasingly invoked to describe this state of disconnect.11 Traditional state-based diplomats vie to project enhanced forms of advocacy directed at multiple audiences. Yet their skill set often lags in the ability to get and use effectively this form of wider access. Their comfort zone is generally far better attuned to dealing with other members of their own professional guild than in reaching out to grab public attention. They still prefer operating through inter-governmental modes of operation rather than extended networks.12 Enter celebrity diplomats. The toptier movie stars engaged in global affairs have no such limitations, and often Changing the Rules of the channel their activities through Oprah, Game? But aside from controversy and Anderson Cooper, People magazine, and criticism, there is an important question HELLO!, among a wide array of other underlying this phenomenon: is the type outlets. The presence of Hollywood [ 1 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

COOPER

celebrities gives a more accurate depiction of the diverse character of what is included in today’s definition of diplomatic activity.

The other face of the innovative stature and scale of wealth—business celebrities—provides added weight. The initiatives pushed by the Gates Foundation need to be examined far more critically than they have been up to now, but its efforts cannot be dismissed as mere froth on the international stage.

When Bill and Melinda Gates visit front line health facilities or take part in international forums with respect to these initiatives, they receive treatment akin to top-tier state leaders. This new breed of diplomat has the capacity not only to be vocal but to act with massive influence.

The challenge presented to traditional diplomats therefore comes from dual fronts, with a need to respond to the hard face of business celebrity diplomacy as

Politics & Diplomacy

forum will come under repeated challenge by the sustained power of the celebrity network. If this club does not make good on its commitments to health, debt relief, and development assistance, this challenge will escalate year to year.

Lasting Presence. The emerging forms of celebrity activism on the world stage highlight the adaptive quality of diplomacy. With their defined sense of purpose, ease of access to world leaders, and truly global reach, a growing list of celebrities are not only blurring but effectively breaking down the traditional barriers within the diplomatic establishment. The lasting presence of Bono and Bill Gates at the WEF and their numerous podium appearances with presidents and prime ministers lends credence to their strength of networking as a concerted tool of influence. Their power of dis-

Few of celebrity diplomats’ activities or

modes of behavior mesh easily with what is usually referred to as traditional diplomatic culture. much as the softer, more glamorous face of Hollywood celebrity diplomacy.

Traditional diplomats, including ambassadors, state officials dealing with international dossiers, and foreign ministers, are going to be under pressure to deliver results that match the ones called for by celebrities. The most obvious established site where this pressure for better results will continue to be felt is in the domain of the G8, where the club style of that

course, with an eye to persuade and shape debate among elite decision makers and mass audiences, intersects with a marked capacity to mobilize vast material resources. Celebrity diplomats certainly do not provide the answers to the array of global problems on their agenda, but their combination of buzz and bite provides them with enormous capacity to redefine both the priorities and mechanisms of diplomacy.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 3 1 ]

BEYOND HOLLYWOOD AND THE BOARDROOM

NOTES

1 Christer Jönsson, “Global Governance: Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation and Recognition,” in Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds., Worlds Apart?

Exploring the Interface between Governance and Diplomacy (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, forthcoming).

2 See “Fact Sheet: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,” Internet, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ MediaCenter/FactSheet/ (date accessed: 28 March 2007); and “WHO: Engaging for Health: A Global Health Agenda,” Internet, http://www.who.int/about/finance/en/index1.html (date accessed: 28 March 2007).

3 James Barron, “Hey, Like They’re on a Mission for the UN,” New York Times, 25 October 1998.

4 Philippe Naughton, “Sophia Loren becomes goodwill ambassador for Refugees,” Reuters, 18 November 1992.

5 The Gates Foundation made this donation to DATA on 17 May 2003. See “Grants: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,” Internet, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/globalhealth/otherinitiatives/advocacy/gra nts/grant-28711.htm (date accessed: 28 March 2007).

6 Bono, interview by Andy Serwer, “CNN In The Money,” CNN, 5 November 2006, Internet, http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0611/04/cn nitm.01.html (date accessed: 28 March 2007).

[ 1 3 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

7 See, for example, “Do Dems take policy points from Hollywood,” The O’Reilly Factor, 13 September 2005.

8 A breakdown of each product’s donations is available at the Product Red website: http://www.joinred.com.

9 Alan Beattie, “Spend, Spend, Spend. Save, Save, Save,” Financial Times, 27 January 2007.

10 For some recent views on the representative function of official diplomats see Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy: Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 3rd Edition (New York: Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005).

11 George Haynal, “DOA: Diplomacy on the Ascendant in the Age of Disintermediation,” Fellows’ Papers, (Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2001-2). Available online at: http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/200102/haynal.pdf.

12 On some of these more general challenges see Ann Florini, The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Andrew F. Cooper, John English, Ramesh Thakur, eds., Enhancing Global Governance: Towards A New Diplomacy? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002).

Science&Technology Quenching our Global Thirst James F. Klausner, Nate Mitten & Brad Ingram With 1.1 billion people lacking access to safe drinking water, and over twice that lacking improved sanitation, the need for safe and reliable freshwater infrastructure and resources is imminent.1 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) calculates that within the next twenty years approximately one-third of the world’s population will suffer serious water scarcity problems. While populations and their freshwater-intensive activities are steadily growing, freshwater resources are fixed in quantity by hydrologic cycles. A finite supply with increasing demand will inevitably lead to water scarcity problems.

Due to uneven distribution of and access to freshwater resources, the Middle East, northern China, northern India, the Mediterranean, western Australia, and the western United States are facing freshwater shortages. Many smaller regions such as island communities suffer water shortages as well. The impact of these shortages includes social, political, and economic tensions between stakeholders; loss of natural ecosystems; and disease and starvation in severely impoverished areas. This paper argues that the best way to address water scarcity problems is to devise comprehensive solutions that address both the supply and demand sides of the issue. It will start by characterizing the growing global water crisis as an issue of unsustainable demand. It will then posit a number of strategies to reduce demand, including collaborative water manage-

James F. Klausner is a professor in the Department of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering at the University of Florida.

Nate Mitten is a second-year graduate student in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Florida.

Brad Ingram is a fourth-year Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering undergraduate student who has been involved with diffusion driven desalination research.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 3 3 ]

QUENCHING OUR GLOBAL THIRST

ment, best-practice sharing through education campaigns, and reuse policies.

It will then address the question of expanding the supply of freshwater, discussing the opportunities and challenges facing implementing current desalination technologies. Finally, it will conclude by reminding policymakers that cooperation among various stakeholders is crucial when devising sustainable policies to adequately address this growing crisis.

Food and Electricity Demand Water. Irrigation and industrial devel-

opment are driving the increase in water demand, though other factors are involved as well. Globally, freshwater withdrawn for domestic and industrial use has quadrupled between 1950 and 1995, and that withdrawn for agriculture has approximately doubled.2 The enhanced demand is moderately driven by direct uses, such as drinking water and sanitation, and is strongly driven by indirect uses, such as irrigation for food production and industrial processes.

Irrigation accounts for 70 percent of

growth and increased consumption of water-intensive crops, however, could limit freshwater supply for food production. Inadequate water management policies and wasteful practices have lowered water tables in regions that currently pump groundwater faster than aquifers can recharge in many major world regions. Poor irrigation practices have damaged soil and ecological systems, resulting in reduced water quality.5 The unchecked growth of these practices will reduce the availability of freshwater.6 One model developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute forecasts increases in world grain prices of up to 120 percent by 2025 due to a water supply insufficient to meet agricultural demand.7 Although global freshwater use for industrial purposes is second to irrigation, it can account for up to 60 percent of water usage for some high per capita income countries.8 Industrial water uses include thermoelectric and hydroelectric power production, chemical processing, waste transport, and manufacturing of consumables. For example, cooling water

Irrigation and industrial development are driving the increase in water demand. global freshwater consumption; in some countries it surpasses 90 percent.3 Today there are approximately 630 million acres of irrigated land worldwide, nearly five times the area of land irrigated at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Should the trend continue, 2025 will see the amount of irrigated land increase by another 65 percent. Irrigation has greatly improved agricultural yields and stabilized food production.4 Population

[ 1 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

for power production accounts for 39 percent of the U.S. freshwater withdrawal.9 The U.S. water demand for energy production could double by 2030 due to a parallel growth in population and per capita energy usage.10 China, another significant energy consumer, is finding that often there is not enough water to meet the demands of rising energy production. In response to freshwater shortages, China will utilize more air cooling tech-

KLAUSNER, MITTEN & INGRAM

nologies in their rapid construction of new power plants, despite the increased cost and slightly reduced power production efficiency.11 Besides conventional thermoelectric and nuclear power production, some alternative energy technologies also require significant freshwater usage. The relative water requirements of energy production must therefore be included as criteria when evaluating alternative energy solutions. For example, ethanol and biodiesel production require very large quantities of freshwater when the feed crops, such as corn and soybeans, are grown on irrigated farmlands.12 Brazil has made a large investment in the production of ethanol; its success is partly due to the vast quantities of irrigation water that can be pulled from the Amazon Basin. However, cellulosic ethanol produced from rain-fed feedstocks, such as switchgrass and agricultural wastes, could enable biofuel production with little to no irrigation requirements.

But even these methods require significant quantities of water for refinement and processing.

The cumulative effect of increased irrigation, population growth, and industrialization worldwide has resulted in steady increases in freshwater demand.

In a world economy where the freshwater supply is flat and possibly dwindling, immediate action is necessary to mitigate the regional water shortages and facilitate cooperation amongst neighboring consumers.

Questioning Demand, Improving Management and Efficiency.

Reducing freshwater demand requires more prudent management of the existing supply through a watershed approach. Improvements in water use

Science &Technology

management and efficiency through informed collaborative approaches, education, and reuse are the primary avenues to accomplishing reduced demand.

Water resources that cross political boundaries present classical government cooperation problems. Effective collaborative practices require that all water use sectors within a particular watershed work together to meet each other’s needs while also protecting the natural ecosystem. Ultimately, this watershed approach requires a monitoring capability for each watershed and end-user in order to gauge where the water is coming from and how much is being used for each application. Additionally, qualitative monitoring is essential throughout the system to understand both natural trends and human impact on water quality.

Once the watershed is monitored and understood, modeling techniques can be used to predict and prepare for potential water scarcity and quality issues.13 For instance, the TIGER Initiative, launched during the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, is designed to aid twenty countries in Africa, where the hydrological network is one of the world's least developed. The program focuses on using innovative technologies for monitoring water resources in order to overcome water-related problems and mitigate a general water-information gap.14 The European Union Water Initiative was also launched at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. It is a partnership focusing on improving coordination among diverse stakeholders worldwide via a watershed management approach.15 Another method of reducing demand involves educating users about effective conservation techniques. For example,

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 3 5 ]

QUENCHING OUR GLOBAL THIRST

food security will increasingly be dependent on irrigation and freshwater availability. However, many farmers do not have the education to implement best practices in irrigation, nor do they have the awareness or capital to invest in more water efficient technologies. Such an information gap is evident the world over throughout all water use sectors; thus there exists ample opportunity to educate people to improve conservation and use water efficiently. Water and food security experts are starting to address this gap.

For example, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research is a collaborative network that consists of fifteen research institutes located around the world. Its members conduct research in partnership with farmers, scientists, and policymakers to help alleviate poverty and increase food security, while also protecting the environment.16 More such groups are needed to spread best practices to communities that require them most.

Education programs and smart public policy can achieve the desired results.

Between 1969 and 2003, advances in efficiency and adoption of better management practices have led to improvements in irrigation water use in the United States. Several voluntary federal programs offer farmers education and financial assistance to implement better technologies and practices. Of note, irrigated acreage increased by over 40 percent while total water applied increased by only 11 percent, revealing that overall irrigation efficiency had increased.17 These improvements are primarily due to several factors: maximizing rain-fed agriculture production, more appropriate regional crop selection, using low-pressure spray systems and micro-irrigation rather than the more

[ 1 3 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

wasteful flood irrigation methods, and making more informed decisions about timing and longevity of water application. More improvements would likely follow wider adoption of these technologies and practices through increased education and incentives.

The energy sector is another area where efficiency improvements can impact the demand for freshwater. For example, new closed-loop cooling systems for thermoelectric power production only withdraw 5 percent of the water used by traditional open-loop systems.

Still, while withdrawal is much less, these power plants actually consume slightly more water than their counterparts and are more expensive to build. Other advancements such as dry-cooling systems offer significantly lower water usage but are currently larger in size, more costly, and reduce the power-production efficiency.18 Finally, development of certain renewable energy sources such as wind and solar technologies may be useful for diversifying the energy production options while reducing the demand for freshwater.

Another important strategy to mitigate demand is to substitute the traditional freshwater supply with reclaimed water.

Industries and communities have heavily invested in wastewater treatment technologies in order to meet the restrictive discharge limits placed on wastewater effluents and therefore are trying to recover part of the treatment cost. For example, nearly 80 percent of water used for the industrial sector in Japan is currently recycled.19 As freshwater supplies have become increasingly limited, there has been greater acceptance of reclaimed wastewater as a supplement or replacement for a wide variety of other applications. Mawson Lakes in southern Aus-

KLAUSNER, MITTEN & INGRAM

Science &Technology

product water and ultra high-salinity water called brine. The purified water is suitable for most domestic, commercial, agricultural, and industrial uses. While increasing the supply of freshwater is an attractive goal, it will not be easy to do.

High energy consumption, large capital costs, and brine disposal are several challenges confronting freshwater production. Reductions in energy consumption and maintenance requirements are the primary focus of improving desalination technologies, while brine disposal remains a major challenge faced by almost all desalination processes. The reject brine must be reintroduced to the environment, a process that poses ecological challenges. Because the different technologies have various advantages and drawbacks, selecting the most appropriate process depends on the Expanding Supply: Freshwater context in which it is implemented.

The leading membrane technology, Production Technologies. Effective resource management, conservation reverse osmosis (RO), is attractive for strategies, and reuse are only three ways areas where its high capital cost is easily of addressing the growing demand for offset by its lower energy requirements freshwater. The fourth important strate- when compared to thermal desalination.

tralia uses recycled water for non-potable domestic activities such as watering gardens, washing clothes, and flushing toilets.20 Additionally, landscaping and agricultural irrigation, power plant cooling, wetland habitat restoration, and groundwater recharge can utilize reclaimed water.21 Understanding that everyone lives downstream will improve management of existing freshwater resources through a collaborative watershed approach. Policies that incorporate the needs of the general public, the private sector, and government to substantially reduce the demand for freshwater should be encouraged. Through collaboration, education, and creative policy, governments and individuals can boost conservation and efficiency.

Saudi Arabia has historically been a leader

in using desalination technologies to meet the growng freshwater demand. gy lies in the utilization of technologies that increase freshwater supply. Desalination, the primary focus of freshwater production technologies, is the process by which dissolved salts, minerals, and particulates in water are removed and the water is treated to a consumable level.

The most commonly used desalination technologies are membrane and thermal.

All desalination systems convert run-off, brackish, or sea water to low-salinity

RO is scalable from small home systems to large-scale plants that can produce enough freshwater for entire regions.

The drawback of RO systems is that they are maintenance-intensive and require substantial effort to maintain performance and prevent fouling. Still, in 2005, the VID Desalination Company consortium opened the largest reverseosmosis seawater desalination plant in the world, at 26 billion gallons per year,

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 3 7 ]

QUENCHING OUR GLOBAL THIRST

in the Mediterranean city of Ashkelon, Israel.22 RO technologies are also used extensively in island economies and in southern European nations bordering the Mediterranean Sea, such as Spain.

The second type of desalination is thermal distillation, a proven and widely used technology.23 The basic premise of thermal desalination systems is the evaporation and subsequent condensation of water vapor. In addition to demineralization, the distillation process reliably removes bacteria, viruses, and dangerous heavy metals such as lead, arsenic, and mercury.

Although reverse osmosis plants are more numerous, thermal systems presently account for over 65 percent of the world's freshwater production.24 Thermal distillation is widely implemented because it is economically competitive with RO when used in tandem with heat supplied by thermoelectric power plants, a process called cogeneration. The multi-stage flash (MSF) process requires little pre-treatment or maintenance, is reliable, and is simple to operate when compared to RO, increasing the attractiveness.

Thermal desalination technologies are predominantly used in the Middle East in areas rich with fossil fuel resources and thermoelectric power generation. One of the largest thermal desalination facilities in the world is the Shoaiba Desalination Plant located in Saudi Arabia. Phase 2 of the plant has an installed capacity of approximately 40 billion gallons per year. The country uses desalination to meet 70 percent of its drinking-water requirements, as well as supplying water for major urban and industrial centers. Saudi Arabia has historically been a leader in using desalination technologies to meet the growing

[ 1 3 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

freshwater demand from population growth and industrialization.25 Hybrid desalination systems that combine a thermal distillation process, an RO system, and a thermoelectric power plant have numerous benefits over standalone or cogeneration systems, including a water-cost reduction of 17 to 24 percent.26 Employing different degrees of integration, these hybrid systems can meet the power demand while producing freshwater with various combinations of heat and electricity. One of the first such hybrid systems was installed in 1989 by the Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) of Saudi Arabia. The advantages include flexibility in operation, less specific energy consumption, lower total construction costs, increased water recovery, and more versatile matching of power and water needs.

Current research focuses on optimizing different integration schemes so each component gains maximum benefit from the other in order to increase the overall plant efficiency and reduce economic costs.27 Other emerging thermal technologies such as Humidification Dehumidification (HDH) are also being developed to utilize waste heat from a power plant, cogeneration plant, or other industrial processes.28 Desalination processes powered by renewable energy (RE) are necessary for the development of a sustainable economy. Benefits include reduced fossil fuel usage and accompanying reductions in greenhouse gas and particulate emissions. The primary renewable energy sources for thermal distillation are solar and geothermal. For membrane technologies with higher electrical requirements, solar photovoltaic and wind power are viable candidates. The title of the 2005 International Solar Energy Society

KLAUSNER, MITTEN & INGRAM

conference, Bringing Water to the World, is indicative of the interest in using solar energy resources to produce freshwater.

By 1998 there were 100 known wind and solar powered desalination plants within 25 countries, but most of these are intended for demonstration purposes, not activation.29 Yet plans have been recently announced for the development of Australia's first solar-powered desalination plant near Port Augusta in South Australia. The project combines solar thermal power generation with a desalination capacity of approximately 1.5 billion gallons per year, with possible expansion to 12 billion.30 At this time RE-driven desalination only accounts for 0.02 percent of worldwide desalination capacity.31 This is primarily due to a lack of technological maturity, large capital costs, variant nature of RE sources, and lack of experienced technical support. However, there is reason to believe that RE will account for a greater amount of the energy provided for desalination as increased investment leads to technological development.

The variety of differences in desalination technologies—reverse-osmosis, thermal distillation, and hybrid systems— give water management policymakers some flexibility in designing policies to expand the water supply. When creating their own solutions, policymakers should

Science &Technology

look to past successful projects for guidance. Saudi Arabia’s desalination efforts may be a potential model for other countries and regions experiencing chronic water shortages, and their experts may prove to be great assets across the globe.

Balancing Supply and Demand: Cooperation Among Stakeholders. Increasing global demand for fresh-

water due to growth in population and usage intensity has put pressure on finite freshwater resources and threatens food security, public health, sustainable development, economic prosperity, and the health of the ecosystem. The potential impacts of rising shortages and a possible global water crisis provide sufficient incentive for coordinated action.

Increasing freshwater supply through the advancement of freshwater production technologies is one part of the solution.

But demand can be reduced through improved management strategies, conservation efforts, reuse, and increased efficiency, especially in irrigation and power production. Evidence shows that leadership, new approaches, and cooperative action among governments, utilities, agriculture, industry, academia, and the general public will facilitate the steps forward required to mitigate pending water challenges in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1 UNESCO, “Water for People, Water for Life,” Internet, http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr1/ (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

2 Mark W. Rosegrant, Ximing Cai, and Sarah A. Cline, “Global Water Outlook to 2025: Averting an Impending Crisis,” Internet, www.ifpri.org/pubs/fpr/fprwater2025.pdf (date accessed: 28 March 2007).

3 UNESCO, “Water.”

4 Rosegrant et al., “Global Water Outlook to 2025.”

5 Ibid.

6 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2005).

7 Rosegrant et al., “Global Water Outlook to 2025.”

8 UNESCO, “Water.”

9 Wayne B. Solley, Robert R. Pierce, and Howard A. Perlman, “Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 1995,” U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1200 (1998).

10 U.S. Department of Energy, “Energy Demands on Water Resources: Report to Congress on the Inter-

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 3 9 ]

QUENCHING OUR GLOBAL THIRST

dependency of Energy and Water“ (Washington, D.C., 2006).

11 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “Mission Statement: APP Clean Energy Trade Mission,” Internet, http://www.export.gov/china/trade_events/APP_Clean _Energy_Mission.pdf (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

12 Chris P. Cameron, "At the Crossroads: A Study of Energy-Water Interdependencies" (paper presented at the annual conference of the National Association of Environmental Professionals, Albuquerque, N.M., April 2006).

13 National Science and Technology Council Committee on Environment and Natural Resources, “Strategic Plan for US Integrated Earth Observation System” (Washington, D.C., 2005).

14 “The TIGER Initiative,” Internet, http://www.tiger.esa.int/pdf/TIGER_Imp_Plan_06.p df (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

15 “The EU Water Initiative,” Internet, http://www.euwi.net/index.php?main=1 (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

16 Consultative Group on International Agriculture, “Who We Are,” Internet, http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

17 Keith Wiebe and Noel Gollehon, eds., “Agricultural Resources and Environmental Indicators, 2006 Edition,” Internet, http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/arei/eib16/Cha pter2/2.2 (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

18 U.S. Department of Energy, “Energy Demands.”

19 Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Water Resources in Japan (Tokyo: Japanes Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, 2005).

20 Anna Hurlimann and Jennifer McKay, “Urban Australians using recycled water for domestic

[ 1 4 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

non-potable use—An evaluation of the attributes price, saltiness, colour and odour using conjoint analysis,” Journal of Environmental Management 83 (April 2007): 93-104.

21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Guidelines for Water Reuse,” Internet, http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/pubs/625r04108/625r04 108.pdf (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

22 Alon Tal, “Seeking Sustainability: Israel's Evolving Water Management Strategy,” Science 313, no.

5790 (25 August 2006): 1081-1084.

23 United Nations Environmental Programme, “Global Environment Outlook 3” (New York, NY: United Nations, 2004).

24 Ibid.

25 “Water Technology – Shuaiba Desalination Plant,” Internet, http://www.watertechnology.net/projects/shuaiba/ (date accessed: 27 March 2007).

26 A.M. Helal et al., “Optimal Design of Hybrid RO/MSF Desalination Plants Part II: Results and Discussion,” Desalination 160 (2004): 13-27.

27 Osman A. Hamed, “Overview of Hybrid Desalination Systems—Current Status and Future Prospects,” Desalination 186 (2005): 207-214.

28 James F. Klausner et al., “Innovative Diffusion Driven Desalination Process,” Journal of Energy Resources Technology vol. 126 (2004).

29 E. Delyannis and V. Belessiotis, “A Historical Overview of Renewable Energies,” (paper presented at the Mediterranean Conference on Renewable Energy Sources for Water Production, Santorini, Greece, 1996), 13–17.

30 World Health Organization, “The Right to Water, Health, and Human Rights,” Publication Series 3 (2003).

31 ”Solar-Powered Desalination Plant Leads the Way,” Ecos, no. 134 (December 2006/January 2007): 4.

Books

The Islamic Republic’s Dilemma The Limits to Domestic Tyranny and International Trickery Review by Mansoor Moaddel Shahram Chubin. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, 244 pp. $32.95.

Jean-Daniel Lafond and Fred A. Reed. Conversations in Tehran. Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2006, 224 pp. $ 19.95.

The Islamic Republic has used every instrument of repression— surveillance, harassment, exile, imprisonment, and murder of political dissidents—to uphold a corrupt and nepotistic system of abso-

lutist clerical rule. It faces stiff resistance from dissident intellectuals, political activists, as well as the general public; the regime’s control over the country's vast economic resources has brought the ruling cleric only 15 percent of popular support, report Jean-Daniel Lafond and Fred A. Reed in Conversations in Tehran. The Islamic regime has also employed every means of deception in order to hide an illegitimate nuclear program, underpinning its ambitions to dominate the region and establish a hegemonic power in the Islamic world—a central theme in Shahram Chubin's Iran's Nuclear Ambitions.

These two books differ sharply from one another. They address different audiences and tackle varied issues, and the concerns raised in one book are hardly discussed in the other. Nonetheless, they share one common theme: the “otherness” of Iranians. For Lafond and Reed, this otherness is a reflection of a people’s struggle against Western hegemony and attempts to reassert “claim to Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 4 1 ]

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC’S DILEMMA

its own specific codes and references.”1 Although it has produced a revolution that is now dead and a reformist movement that is defeated, this struggle is still continuing, and Conversations in Tehran sketches its discursive dimension. For Chubin, on the other hand, this otherness is more narrowly conceived, reflecting the destructive attitudes and behaviors of a clerical regime that after twentyseven years has not made up its mind about whether “it still rejects the international system and seeks to overturn it.”2 Both volumes are interested in regime change. Lafond and Reed truly yearn for the day when Iranians succeed in liberating themselves from both domestic authoritarianism and foreign dictation.

For Chubin, this change is necessary to bring the regime in line with the rest of the world. But he warns that engagement versus regime change is a false dichotomy. Instead, he prescribes the former as a prelude to the latter.

Except for these broad similarities, there is a world of difference between the concerns of Lafond and Reed, on the one hand, and those of Chubin. Lafond and Reed are ardent enthusiasts of the underdog, passionately defending the Iranian right to self-assertion against Western colonial pretensions. Chubin takes a completely different approach. He aims to advise Western powers on the best way to tame the clerical regime for the sake of international security. The divide between the two books, however, parallels the gulf between the political discourse and demands of the Iranian public for a better life and the desire of the international community for a safer world.

Reading Conversations in Tehran leaves one with little sympathy for the Islamic Republic and arouses one’s suspicion about its nuclear program. In a series of interviews conducted in 2004, filmmak[ 1 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

er Jean-Daniel Lafond and writer Fred A. Reed capitalized on the friendships that they “slowly… [and] patiently” built with the country’s intellectuals and political activists over the years.3 These interviews provide a unique occasion for readers to reflect as these thinkers address some of the key political and cultural issues facing their faith and their country: the reform movement, the goal and function of power, the form of government, the relationship between religion and politics, and the status of women.

The political discourse that constitutes these interviews revolves around a failed revolution—how Khomeini’s successors betrayed the revolutionary goal and “hastened the country’s downward spiral into… violence and oppression”—the reform movement that attempted to set it right, and the Iranian people’s continued struggle for a prosperous society and democratic government.4 Key elements of this discourse are the privileged status of reason in religious exegesis, emphasis on dialogue, gender equality, and the creation of a democratic individual. The interviewees stressed that although religion constitutes a principle facet of the nation’s identity, it must be interpreted and understood in terms of the yardstick of reason.5 The religious origin of clerical absolutism is suspect, for it is as much rooted in Islam as it is in the theory of Iranian monarchy.6 Clerical absolutism, however, must be dismantled through peaceful means; Iran needs no bin Laden.7 Women’s movements and their various trends are also featured in the book.

Among these stories, notably, is one of a hairdresser turned political activist and educator who serves as a remarkable example of grassroots women’s activism.8 The interviews also unlock one of the most remarkable demographic shifts of

MOADDEL

modern times, illuminating the role of the women’s network in Iran’s striking fertility decline in the 1980s.9 Finally, the authors’ narration is peppered by such acute observations as the mixing of seduction and self-flagellation in the Shi’is Ashura rituals during which the male flagellants seized the “opportunity to impress the young ladies who lined the sidewalks.”10 In Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Shahram Chubin offers an alarming assessment of the motivations driving the clerical regime toward nuclear capability, particularly in light of the plundering of the country’s resources and the trampling of human rights. The regime has declared peaceful intentions in pursuing its nuclear program; but how could one trust anything the regime says when it has treated its own people so inhumanely?

Chubin concurs: “it is not Iran’s acquisition of sensitive technologies per se that is of special concern, but the nature of the regime in Tehran.”11 Chubin, however, is not referring to the regime’s domestic policies, but rather its sponsorship of terrorism abroad. The author

Books

which it has never paid a price.12 The author tackles one of the most difficult security concerns facing the West—the clerical regime’s “quest for the full fuel cycle, which would put it within months (if not days) of a weapons capability.”13 To achieve this goal, says Chubin, the regime has exploited international circumstances, including the U.S departure “from the reciprocal obligation that had been the core of the WMD (weapons of mass destruction) order in the Cold War era,” its declining influence and credibility since 2003, and the debacle in Iraq.14 By increasing its revenues, the surge in oil prices also contributed to the regime’s intransigence.

Both books are engaging, each contributing to an understanding of different aspects of the Islamic regime. Yet both contain inadequacies. Chubin’s assessment, despite its detailed, analytical focus, is still a partisan report on the regime’s nuclear program. He argues that “the pattern of Iran’s clandestine procurement over the past decade had long convinced the United States in particular of Iran’s weapons ambitions.”15

The regime’s control over the country's vast economic resources has brought the ruling cleric only 15 percent of popular support. cites examples such as the regime’s support for Palestinian extremists, its involvement in the Marine bombings in Beirut in 1983 and in Al Khobar in 1996, and the “provision of sanctuary to Al Qaeda elements escaping from Afghanistan in 2002-2003”—all actions clearly against U.S. interests and for

Chubin does not independently verify this assertion. He eschews entertaining the possibility that the Islamic regime, despite its poor human rights record at home and support for terrorism abroad, may not be so close to achieving a nuclear-weapons capability. An independent assessment of this capability is all

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 4 3 ]

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC’S DILEMMA

the more necessary, first because, as Chubin admits, “Iran denies having intentions to acquire nuclear weapons.”16 Second, given the dismal failure of Western intelligence regarding the presence of WMD in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, analysts must maintain a critical attitude toward U.S. intelligence.

Likewise, the Iranian regime’s support for terrorism is almost entirely based on evidence provided by the U.S. government, which is often insufficient.

A more serious problem with Chubin’s monograph, however, is its preoccupation with narrowly-conceived technical and security concerns. There is no serious analysis of the political and cultural dynamics within the clerical regime that drive its ambitions to obtain nuclear weaponry. The motivating factors the book cites with ad hoc reasoning—the lessons of the long and costly war with Iraq, the need for domestic legitimacy, and the quest for international status that cements the division between hard-liners, reformists, secularists, and religious conservatives—are hardly convincing.17 The Islamic Republic was responsible for the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war following the liberation of Khorramshahr nearly two years after the Iraqi invasion in 1980, and it continued the war for another six years with the expansionist objective of overthrowing Saddam Hussein and establishing an Islamic government in Iraq. When the tide of the war changed to the Iraqi advantage, Ayatollah Khomeini saw no better alternative than to “drink the chalice of poison” and accept a ceasefire with Iraq. Thus the contribution of the war to a constructive diplomacy would be something quite different from what Chubin intends; the regime’s nuclear ambitions in the face of resistance from the international community are much more likely to fail than [ 1 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

succeed. The quest for status and legitimacy as the regime’s motivating force can hardly be measured and rigorously assessed. Finally, Chubin does not contemplate that the cleric’s unchecked desire to perpetuate its stranglehold on power could be the most important, if not the only, motivating factor behind the country’s nuclear ambitions.

While Lafond and Reed’s Conversations in Tehran is somewhat biased, its partisanship is committed to the Iranians’ right for individual liberty and democratic freedom. Overlooking the relevance of what the regime does internationally is a serious weakness that cannot be easily forgiven. Their conversations are almost totally devoid of any reference to the issues surrounding the Islamic regime’s behavior that has concerned Western governments since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. They fail to explore the degree to which the regime’s support for terrorism and its nuclear ambitions have entered into the minds of both its supporters and opponents. What is worse, their uncritical admiration for a certain U.S. citizen turned Muslim terrorist— known as Hassan Abdulrahman—borders on irresponsibility.18 Moreover, they do not consider the implications of Abdulrahman’s preference for incarceration in an “imperialist” United States over freedom from prosecution in an un-free Islamic state.

Furthermore, Lafond and Reed’s disapproving portrayal of U.S. foreign policy appears a bit anachronistic and irrelevant to the concerns of the people they interviewed. They often make such unsubstantiated assertions as to the existence of “a secret deal between Rafasanjani’s men, including Mehdi Karoubi [who became speaker of the Parliament under President Khatami]… and clandestine operatives of the American

MOADDEL

Republican Party.”19 The authors also claim that the reformist ambitions not only challenged the interests of the regime, but also those of the United States, which had envisioned another outcome: to impose “market democracy” in the former colonial world.20 Such overtly anti-American attitudes, which may resonate well with the regime, hardly serve the Iranians’ quest for democracy. The anti-Americanism espoused by Iranian intellectualism during the prerevolutionary period shaped the discursive context that promoted the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and served the clerics’ monopolization of power in the post-revolutionary period. At this critical juncture, Iranians are not lacking in

Books

Israel” as a daily ritual at elementary schools, religious gatherings, and official rallies; and spread lies about American society and its government around the world, the American response has been surprisingly mild. The Clinton Administration tried to establish a rapport with the reformist politicians. President Clinton went out of his way in trying to meet with Iran’s reformist President Khatami, during the latter’s stay in New York City to address the UN. Frightened by the prospect of a possible U.S.-Iran rapprochement, the Supreme Guide instructed President Khatami to refrain from even shaking hands with the U.S. President. Khatami, lacking the backbone to stand up for the democratic

One cannot automatically presume that

Iranian nationalism will provide the necessary force to effectively democratize the religious regime. anti-Americanism. The Iranian regime has done all it could to keep reminding the obedient faithful that “death to America” is the slogan of the day. Lafond and Reed should have paid closer attention when one of their reflective interviewees blamed Marxism for their defective pre-revolutionary understanding of politics and pointed to the competitions with Marxists that prompted the Muslim students to seize the U.S. Embassy in Tehran—an excessive political act for which Iran paid dearly.21 Considering the fact that the regime, from its inception, has lurked behind anti-American and anti-Western ideology; introduced the bizarre and infantile slogan of “death to America, death to

rights of his people, duly complied.

These shortfalls notwithstanding, there is still little in Conversations in Tehran (and for that matter in Iran’s revolutionary experience) that demonstrates a people’s efforts to lay a “claim to its own specific codes and references.” In fact, such ideologues as Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Shari’ati, Jalal Ale-Ahmad, Ayatollah Taleqani, and others have been illequipped to recover the necessary codes and references from the country’s legendary tradition and historical experience in order to build a distinctly Iranian political order that is free from both domestic authoritarianism and Western hegemony. Ayatollah Khomeini’s political project, in addition to reducing

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 4 5 ]

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC’S DILEMMA

women to the status of second-class citizens, reconfigured the very system of royal power he overthrew into another in the institution of clerical absolutism. The present Muslim fundamentalist-turned reformists have now realized that the Western ideas of gender equality, democracy, governmental transparency, and systems of checks and balances that they had once rejected were not all that bad.

Although the strengths of Conversations in Tehran are the weaknesses found in Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions and vice versa, the absence of a connection between the two works corresponds to a real impasse between the concerns of the Iranian public and its dissident intellectuals and those of the international community. The Iranian public, while overwhelmingly rejecting Islamic fundamentalism and its terrorist offshoots, cares deeply about the issues that affect daily life—including economic scarcity, political corruption, and a lack of democratic freedom. The Western governments, on the other hand, are not concerned with how Iranians live their lives, but rather problems of terrorism and security.

It is fortunate, however, that there is a de facto alignment of purpose between the domestic forces favoring democratic change and the international coalition for nuclear non-proliferation in Iran.

Bridging this gulf is thus necessary in order to seize the opportunity for democratizing the Islamic Republic and for convincing the ruling elite to abandon its nuclear program. The regime of clerical absolutism is illegitimate, as evidenced by attempts on the part of the ruling clerics to tamper with the Iranian constitution following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. They revised the constitution to give absolute power to the

[ 1 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Supreme Guide and then promoted Ali Khamenei from hojjatul-Islam, a middle-ranked cleric, to Ayatollah without having the necessary scholarly credentials, thus violating the scholarly standard set by the time-honored tradition in historical Shi’ism. Finally, through an illegitimate election, Ali Khamenei became the occupier of the position of Supreme Guide. Nevertheless, Iran is experiencing a surge of nationalism and a growing support for democracy and gender equality, as is demonstrated by the values surveys carried out in 2000 and 2005.22 One cannot, however, automatically presume that Iranian nationalism will provide the necessary force to effectively democratize the religious regime. As the success of Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections demonstrates, the ultra-conservatives can skillfully merge nationalism and populism with Islamic fundamentalism in order to solidify power and mobilize the public in support of their nuclear program.

Therefore, the challenge for both the Iranian public and the genuine proponents of non-proliferation is to realize that their concerns are all linked to the same reality—the problem of the Islamic regime and its exploitation of power. The Iranians’ desire for a better life and more democracy and tolerance in politics cannot be separated from the international community’s hope for a more peaceful and less reckless partner. The longer this disconnect persists, the longer the current regime remain in power.

Mansoor Moaddel is a professor of Sociology at Eastern Michigan University and a research affiliate at the Population Studies Center, Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan.

MOADDEL Books

NOTES

1 Jean-Daniel Lafond and Fred A. Reed, Conversations in Tehran (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2006), 13.

2 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 1.

3 Lafond and Reed, 15.

4 Ibid., 9.

5 Ibid., 94.

6 Ibid., 165. I have also argued that Khomeini’s political discourse and theory of velayat-i faqih, far from being an inevitable reflection of the Shi’i conception of political authority, was produced in oppositional relations to the ideology of the Pahlavi monarchy in the pre-revolutionary period. See Mansoor Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), chapter 11.

7 Ibid., 60, 174.

8 Ibid., 124-128.

9 Ibid., 122.

10 Ibid., 30.

11 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 10.

12 Ibid., 52-53.

13 Ibid., 4.

14 Ibid., 3.

15 Ibid., 45.

16 Ibid., 29.

17 Ibid., 18-19, 28.

18 A Muslim convert, Hassan Abdulrahman (born David Theodore Belfied) assassinated a former Iranian diplomat, Ali Akbar Tabatabai in 1980 at the request of his Iranian contact. He then fled the united States and took refuge in Iran.

19 Lafond and Reed, 33.

20 Ibid., 102.

21 Ibid., 187.

22 The data amassed for these surveys, which were carried out in Iran in 2000 (n=2,532) and 2005 (n=2,903) derive from face-to-face interviews.

Accordingly, the percentage of Iranians who described themselves as “Muslim above all” declined from 62 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2005. Adherence to national identity is much higher among educated Iranians, particularly those in major cities. See Mansoor Moaddel, “Approaching Modernity: Iranian Attitudes toward Religion, Gender, Democracy, and Individual Identity,” a paper presented at the biannual conference of the International Society of Iranian Studies, August 2006.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 4 7 ]

Books

Dinner and Détente

and diplomatic achievements of Nixon's visit in Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed Nixon’s Cold War Diplomacy the World. She correctly highlights the visit as an achievement for both parties, citing Review by Victor Fic their uncommon vision, skill, and determination.

Margaret MacMillan. Nixon and MacMillan’s cardinal point is that the Mao: The Week that Changed the World. new relationship would help the United New York: Random House, States enlist the Middle Kingdom's 2007, 432 pp. $27.95. countervailing power so that the embattled young republic could defeat a certain In February 1972, President Richard marauding socialist giant in the zeroNixon found himself curling his fingers sum Cold War. Meanwhile, the Chinese, around chopsticks while dining on Chi- finding their Great Wall ineffective nese delicacies like three-colored egg, against the Soviets’ high-tech belligershark’s fin and sweet rice. With him in ence, hoped that diplomatic relations Beijing’s Great Hall of the People were with Washington would deflect Moscow's one thousand Chinese and American threats. The book adds much-needed luminaries, there to facilitate his pio- depth to current debates as to whether neering journey to "Red China" to forge China's rise is an opportunity, a threat, or both for an encouraging, but someSino-U.S. detente.

University of Toronto historian and times unnerved, West.

The author expertly portrays the peraward-winning author Margaret MacMillan succeeds in penning the first sonality traits and idiosyncrasies of the book-length account of the personalities major players. MacMillan conveys Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 4 9 ]

DINNER AND DÉTENTE

Nixon's occasional raging vulgarity and insecurity, but also his iron will and keen talent for diplomatic negotiations. His controversial national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, is depicted as a skilled negotiator and an adherent to the school of classical realism.

Chinese panjandrum Mao Zedong's life is traced in a succinct, engrossing chapter. The young Mao, enraged at China's decline, hacks off his ponytail to symbolize his rejection of orthodoxy and then turns into a Marxist revolutionary at the vanguard of a guerrilla war. Along the way, he decides that his top priorities are the accumulation of his personal power and the satisfaction of his libido; his mistresses were honored to contract venereal disease from the Great Helmsman.

MacMillan tepidly embraces recent controversial research, which castigates much of the Maoist heroic record for being as spurious as the fake Rolex watches sold on the streets of Shanghai.

MacMillan effectively reviews Washington’s and Beijing’s paths toward becoming post-war adversaries, and rues lost friendlier alternatives. For example, the Yugoslavian maverick Tito snubbed Moscow and courted the West. Could American hardliners have cultivated proud China? Unfortunately, Chinese leaders had never visited the United States and instead offered their people a self-interested ideology of anti-Americanism.

This book contradicts the notion that détente was inevitable because structural forces mandated it. Even as the various leaders talked, the author asserts, the negotiations might have failed. Therefore, her praise for trans-Pacific leaders who embarked on those historic steps toward cooperation is apt. Chinese officials agreed to let the Americans visit and [ 1 5 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

both sides were determined to achieve a concrete success, if only because public failure would embarrass all parties.

The seminal factor driving SinoAmerican negotiations was their mutual fear of the USSR. Beijing, a former Soviet ally, would now partner with Washington to help execute the latter's strategy of containment and intimidation. Both countries were unnerved when the Soviets invaded Prague in 1968. The Chinese, in fact, worried that their own regime, condemned as "revisionist" in the birthplace of socialism, was now in Russian crosshairs. After bloody clashes with Russia over a disputed island occurred in 1969, Mao decisively opted to receive Nixon.

Meanwhile, the Americans needed China to pressure Hanoi to end the Vietnam War and to add a creative dimension to Washington's grand containment strategy. MacMillan credits Nixon, not his then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, for his shrewdness in recognizing that, following the aforementioned 1969 island clash, the hour for a calculated U.S. risk had arrived. This set the stage for Nixon’s visit to China. Since the Americans were on better terms with both Communist giants at this point in history than China and the USSR enjoyed with each other, Washington became the pivotal player that could lean one way or the other to exploit the tensions between the two powers and extract concessions from both.

MacMillan asserts that Kissinger originally proposed a defensive alliance to China, but neither party sought such close ties. China wished to posture itself as a free country before the Third World audience it presumed to lead; moreover, the painful, even casualty-ridden breakdown in the "eternal" Soviet marriage

FIC

must have discouraged Beijing from another matrimonial commitment. In fact, Mao told Nixon at their first meeting—in which the former held the latter's hand for a full minute–that he preferred dealing with conservatives. The rightists, Mao believed, were China's ideological antipodes, but were practical and honest, while leftists were duplicitous. Mao was subtly criticizing the now-reviled socialist USSR while also hinting that he would not trust any other country a second time. Certainly, Beijing has wisely spurned all ties that fenced it in since the mid-1960s.

MacMillan astutely observes the role of cultural and diplomatic symbolism.

For instance, Beijing insisted that Chinese pilots fly Kissinger in his American jet from Shanghai to the Capitol. The unstated messages of this episode could have been that China was smartly whisking the milestone event ahead, or that Kissinger, regardless of his global clout, was in Beijing's hands. Remarkably, the pilots spurned the use of high-tech navigation gear in favor of hand signals, indicating how far China had fallen behind in the technology race during the antimodern Cultural Revolution.

Despite the tensions between Washington and China, when Zhou praised Nixon at their banquet, the former graciously referred to the President as a Chinese guest. Traditionally, Beijing publicly insisted that dignitaries formally request their visit so that the Chinese could then pose as superiors condescending to an inferior by granting the trip. Given the huge publicity surrounding the dinner, the general sentiment was that Nixon was given a cordial welcome as an equal; however, MacMillan suggests in her conclusion that the Americans may

Books

have conceded too much by giving into Beijing’s demand that Chinese pilots fly the President back to Washington.

Nixon's China visit was also important for enhancing his administration’s image. As the President dined in the Great Hall, images of the event were beamed back, live, to the United States.

This diplomatic mission was a muchneeded exercise in softening his image.

Until then, Washington’s Asia policy was dominated by images of B-52s pounding Vietnamese targets. The sight of Nixon walking along the Great Wall demonstrated that Washington could be smart, agile, and cooperative. MacMillan recalls that a Gallup poll showed ninety-eight percent of its respondents approved of Nixon's trip, rallying behind it and avoiding the nettlesome issues that could have derailed the signing of the Shanghai Agreement, especially the emotional subject of Taiwan. Mao's peasant army had pounded Chiang Kai-shek's U.S.supplied nationalist forces off the mainland to Taiwan in 1949. Ultimately, the Shanghai agreement saw China and America pragmatically opt to agree to a broad détente and to postpone the question of Taipei's final status—Mao insisted it could wait a hundred years.

The copious personal anecdotes provided in the book also suggest that the Chinese and Americans displayed decency and mutual respect. The wealthy visitors donated their Xerox machine when they realized that the Chinese manually copied all of their documents. Beijing rented a facility to its foreign counterpart for a low cost, initially baffling the Americans, who had insisted on paying more.

MacMillan controversially concludes that while Sino-U.S. détente certainly paid dividends in helping America win

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 5 1 ]

DINNER AND DÉTENTE

the Cold War, the "China card" carried less value than the Americans had expected, particularly when Beijing pressured Hanoi to agree to peace talks with Washington. MacMillan should have elaborated more on this. Moreover, she oddly failed to mention that the Sino-American fresh start deterred the chance of a second Korean war, as Beijing would constrain its client in Pyongyang. It also reduced Sino-Japanese hostilities and was the diplomatic prerequisite for Deng Xiaoping's modernizations.

MacMillan's readable and informative book will certainly educate those interested in Cold War history and Sino-U.S. affairs. The work also gives credence to the realist contention that effective manipulation of the balance of powers on a global scale is the path to peace.

The weakest aspect of MacMillan’s work, however, is that it does not look ahead. Will the United States view the dramatic breakthrough of the 1970s as a success if China exploits the open U.S. market and procures its technology to empower itself while remaining a dictatorship? Some warn that Beijing's enduring core value system glorifies China as an ancient power that is reemerging after a period of decline. This prediction is based on a long-term grand strategy with China on top, Japan below, Korea and Vietnam bowing down to China, Taiwan incorporated, and the United States eased or booted out of Asia. Is China using America to vault over America? In addition, what of the realist's contention that sovereign states in an un-policed world seek power? Might the Nixon-Kissinger team's realist overture backfire within its own analytical framework?

As for the future, Sino-U.S. détente

[ 1 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

must be preserved for regional and world peace and for China’s continued modernization. Washington and Beijing should create and institutionalize an official Sino-U.S. body that spans trade, security affairs, human rights, and cultural exchanges, and which chaperones ties above daily vagaries for the long term.

Americans must understand that while they won several European wars, their record in Asia is one win (Japan), a tie (Korea) and then a loss (Vietnam).

Washington must also insist that Tokyo cease its distortions of the war as they offend and provoke China. Meanwhile, Beijing must understand that Washington's favor is needed to keep Japan in check and to educate China's young entrepreneurs.

Above all, lasting friendship requires a Chinese democracy with native features; most realists agree that liberal systems are transparent and peaceable. Singapore's proposed model of soft authoritarianism or guided democracy might not be feasible for China with its massive urban-rural split. Washington should encourage Indian theorists, with their ideas of keeping their gargantuan, complex country free, to share ideas with their Chinese counterparts. Beijing simply must realize that it needs a fifth level of modernization—liberal politics—if it expects true good will: Americans will co-exist with a weakening dictatorship or a growing democracy, but not with a single-party state which refuses to accurately report its escalating defense budget.

Victor Fic is a Canadian freelance journalist.

He is currently a broadcaster with CBS News radio in Seoul, Korea.

View from the Ground

Trauma and the Trials of Reconciliation in Cambodia J. Eli Margolis We sat on a balcony overlooking the Tonle Sap River, waiting for lunch. An occasional breeze would dispel the intense summer heat and brush aside my companion’s cigarette smoke.

Charles McDermid, a reporter for one of Phnom Penh’s English-language newspapers, paused often while speaking, and the clouds of smoke quickly returned. “Show trial or no trial is the catch phrase that’s going around.”A few days earlier, I had stepped onto the burning tarmac at Pochentong International Airport, eager to see for myself the Cambodia I had been researching from the cubicles and libraries of Singapore’s Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies. Once on the ground, however, I found myself more confused than assured.

What I heard was not what I expected. My high-flying enthusiasm for Cambodia’s new war crimes tribunals was losing altitude fast.“Is this going to be justice?” asked the reporter. “Is this going to be a show trial? And is what’s achievable worth doing? That’s what a lot of people are asking now.”1 His doubts resonated with my own.

At every level, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, as the trials are officially known, are billed as an undertaking for the Cambodian people. As I discovered, however, the trials may benefit ordinary Cambodians the least.

Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party

J. Eli Margolis is a master’s candidate in Georgetown's Security Studies Program, expecting to graduate in 2008. The research for this article was conducted at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (now the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations) in Singapore and in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 5 3 ]

TRAUMA AND THE TRIALS OF RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA

(CPP) benefits politically from the trials, the international community assuages a guilty conscience, and human rights advocates can claim justice. But the trials risk re-traumatizing those who actually lived through three years and eight months of brutal Khmer Rouge rule. To my surprise, I realized that better governance—especially improvements in education and health care—may be needed more than transitional justice. Helping the Cambodian people continue to recover from the trauma of the Khmer Rouge period may have nothing to do with courtrooms and everything to do with strengthening a nearly non-existent mental health sector and establishing a history curriculum that covers the genocide.

The Khmer Rouge on Trial. The

Khmer Rouge seized control of Cambodia in 1975. Under a communist banner, the organization instituted a radical program of reform. They banned money, marriage, and religion. Soldiers murdered intellectuals, emptied cities. By the time a Vietnamese invasion forced the group into insurgency, the Khmer Rouge had killed between 1.7 and 2.2 million people—approximately one in four Cambodians—through starvation, overwork, and murder.2 Addressing this past has been a struggle. The first attempt occurred in 1979, when Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities brought survivors to testify in front of a group of international lawyers.

Under Vietnamese guidance, the trial’s verdict was a foregone conclusion. With crowds pressing at the doors, the judge sentenced Khmer Rouge leaders Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to death in absentia.

Unexpectedly, a second trial came in 1997. After nearly twenty years of insur[ 1 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

gency, the remnants of the Khmer Rouge mutinied against their leader. Too feeble to walk, Pol Pot sat and listened as his former troops denounced him. Cameras captured the event for an international audience. At the end of this “trial,” the former leader retreated to his hut, where he lived out the rest of his life under house arrest.

Today, the Cambodian government and the United Nations are partnering to put the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders on trial once more. The $56.3 million undertaking is expected to take years, tap hundreds of staff, and require sorting through thousands of documents. In the end, a mixed panel of international and Cambodian jurists will issue a ruling, redefining Cambodian history in the process.

In practice, the trials have run into a number of problems, causing many initial supporters to take a close second look. Among others, the government appointed Ney Thol, an army general with a record of denying defendants rights, to the trial’s judiciary. Responding to criticism, Prime Minister Hun Sen lashed out, likening his critics to “perverted sex-crazed animals.” In November, Ky Tech, president of the Cambodian Bar Association, threatened reprisals against cooperative local lawyers and demanded an end to foreign participation.3 In the final days of 2006, Human Rights Watch complained that “political interference has brought the whole process to a screeching halt.”4 Even more recently, Joseph Mussomeli, the U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, expressed his own doubts, saying that “the only thing worse than no trial is a trial that is a farce.”5 As my lunch companion noted, whether or not the Extraordinary Cham-

MARGOLIS

View from the Ground

mental health NGO Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO), assured me that they are reflective of contemporary Cambodian society. “I think we must say that Cambodia, [the] Cambodian people, the Cambodian society has been Healing the Cambodian People. traumatized by the Khmer Rouge and the Those who argue for a tribunal or truth war after that.”10 commission often claim that such collecTrauma, however, comes in different tive effort will heal Cambodia’s trauma- levels, and can subside over time. As I listized society. After the initial UN agree- tened, Dr. Chhim went on to compare a ment to hold the trials, the journal Far survivor’s consistently high level of anxiEastern Economic Review praised them as “the ety to a glass that, once filled, can never best chance yet for Cambodians to final- be completely emptied. Even slight agitaly gain closure on the time of the Killing tion can raise the trauma over the rim Fields” and hoped for a “full cathartic once more. After two decades, the genoeffect.”6 The idea that trials will lead to cide is now, he said, “a kind of half-trauhealing is simplistic.7 While pursuing ma and, once people have experienced justice and “closure,” the trials may another trauma, [it’s] just like putting instead re-traumatize and destabilize a the water into the glass again. And then it people that has had two decades to recov- becomes easily full.” Because of their er. Cambodian society may be trauma- experiences, “the people have all kind of trauma, kind of existing trauma” that tized, but it is also stable.

There can be no doubt that conflict makes them particularly sensitive. To the has traumatized Cambodian society. In doctor, Cambodia is a land of half-full addition to extremely high rates of glasses, waiting to be filled once more.11 depression and post-traumatic stress disBut Cambodian society is far from order (PTSD) among refugees, reports paralyzed. Authors May Ebihara and Judy suggest widespread and lasting trauma in Ledgerwood argue against portraying those who stayed behind.8 In a 2002 Cambodia as “a nation of the mentally study, two psychologists noted “the obvi- unbalanced.”12 For whatever reason—the ous psychological suffering of the popu- somatization or social sharing of pain, bers will be merely a third show trial is a pressing question. Looking deeper, though, I found myself guided by a different, related, question: exactly whose interests do these trials serve?

The trials may benefit ordinary Cambodians

the least.

lation.” They found that 28 percent of Cambodians had experienced PTSD and that 11.5 percent battled major depression. A frightening 13.7 percent had attempted suicide.9 Such reports shocked me. But Dr. Sotheara Chhim, a Cambodian psychiatrist and the director of the

the “astonishing fortitude, resilience, courage, and endurance” of the population, or the influence of Buddhism or traditional healers—the majority of Cambodians remains able to function.13 One study phrased it rather smugly: “It is interesting to note that many CambodiSummer/Fall 2007 [ 1 5 5 ]

TRAUMA AND THE TRIALS OF RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA

ans […] are able to function in their social and occupational milieus despite their high rates of psychological and physical distress.”14 Kang San, a program coordinator at TPO, phrases it differently: “To be honest, as a Cambodian, I think most Cambodians are more concerned about their daily life and the future of their children.” In Cambodia, a certain level of trauma is “normal.” As another author writes, “people have coped.”15 Despite the sickening memories, survivors are moving forward.

The war crimes tribunal may derail this progress. By pushing the past back into newspapers, radio broadcasts, and conversations, the trials run the risk of re-traumatizing Khmer Rouge survivors.16 Memories long buried will surface. Leaning forward, Kang San warned me against this. “When the Khmer Rouge trial really happens,” he said quietly, “people will think back to the past and then the memory may come back, and then they may become re-traumatized again.”

“When we talk about this,” he went on, “about the killing…it makes people remember the time when they were living, the time when they lost their sibling, lost their father, their husband, and then they may not be able to sleep properly.

They may,” he closed, “have nightmares.”17 A survivor himself, Kang San drifted off. The stale air remained quiet for a time. I recalled the horror stories of electrocutions, tortured confessions, starvations, paralyzing fear, and outright murder that I barely had been able to read. I began to question the assertion that trials really would benefit the Cambodian people.

sions surrounding the trial have focused on their political rather than psychological implications.18 Advocating trials immediately after a successful coup in 1997, Prime Minister Hun Sen suggested his newly deposed rival be added to the docket.19 Arguing for trials in the Hague, an opposition party asked that Hun Sen be tried. Celebrity and ex-king Norodom Sihanouk—a former ally of the Khmer Rouge—has taken every conceivable position.20 Ultimately, as historian Peter Maguire notes, the tribunal “will depend on the political will of one man, Prime Minister Hun Sen.”21 Balancing internal party conflict with international pressures, the prime minister has succeeded only in dragging his feet. But that may have been what he wanted. Politically, Hun Sen has used the tribunal as a profitable distraction from domestic troubles.22 Seeking to draw attention away from his 1997 coup and subsequent purges, Hun Sen latched onto the recent arrest and jungle trial of Pol Pot. Caught on tape, the arrest was an international sensation. Approving secret, extrajudicial killings with one hand, he pounded loudly for war crimes accountability with the other—deftly using Cambodia’s past to defray scrutiny into its present.

The prime minister’s actions were not all irony and political instinct, however.

After the coup, he hired the American law firm Porter, Wright, Morris, and Arthur to help rebuild his image. Their recommendation was that “Hun Sen should immediately begin leading the charge to bring the Khmer Rouge to trial before an international tribunal.”23 It was a fortuitous distraction from internal problems.

Regular delays extended tribunal Contemporary Political Motives.

From the beginning, however, discus- negotiations, increasing their distraction [ 1 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

MARGOLIS

value. Whenever attention started sliding to human rights, non-transparent governance, or corruption, Hun Sen could reinvigorate the negotiations. Anette Marcher, writing in the Phnom Penh Post, described the prime minister’s stalling: “One small step forward, a long pause, international pressure to continue the process, then another hesitant step, another delay and more pressure from the outside.”24 When, in 2002, a frustrated Kofi Annan withdrew from trial negotiations, Peter Maguire was not surprised. “It seemed,” he noted, “that Hun Sen might simply be using the trial issue as a public relations distraction, like he had in 1998.”25 But the prospect of a tribunal offered more than just a distraction. It enriched Huh Sen’s CPP. China, reluctant to have its staunchly pro-Khmer Rouge history advertised internationally, lavished gifts and aid on the ruling CPP in an attempt to influence policy. Others in the international community, such as the United States and Japan, made the opposite noises, but gave just as freely. By wavering between the two, Hun Sen brought mil-

View from the Ground

strong popular demand; Hun Sen understands that the vast majority of the Cambodian people support the idea of a trial.28 Where delay gave him profitable distraction, the tribunal gives him amnesty and political currency. Whatever their effect on the Cambodian people, the trials appear to benefit the ruling CPP.

Internationalizing Cambodian Rights. McDermid spoke strongly and

bluntly about the tribunals: “I think it’s more for the general public of the international community,” he said. “In a way, it’s being forced down [Cambodians’] throats.”29 Later, as I wandered the orderly streets which connect Phnom Penh’s myriad NGOs, I remembered his comment. As I surveyed the international organizations’ well-kept houses and thick brick fences, it did not seem so farfetched.

Evangelically optimistic after the end of the Cold War, international human rights organizations, activists, and scholars embraced the idea of a war crimes tribunal and worked to support it.30 Often

With crowds pressing at the doors, the

judge sentenced Khmer Rouge leaders Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to death in absentia. lions of dollars to his party and government.26 Now underway, the tribunal serves two political purposes. First, the trials are certain to place blame on only a handful of people, implicitly exonerating others.

To former Khmer Rouge like Hun Sen and senior members of the CPP, remaining off the list of defendants is important.27 Second, the trials answer a

genuinely altruistic, this loose group— once dubbed “Human Rights International”—has nevertheless benefited from the tribunal.31 By the time Hun Sen’s calls for a tribunal grew loud enough to be distracting, many international actors had already established themselves in Cambodia. The United States was among the most active. The Cambodian Genocide Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 5 7 ]

TRAUMA AND THE TRIALS OF RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA

Justice Act in the United States led to a State Department-funded Yale University project. While documenting Khmer Rouge atrocities, the Yale group informally connected a network of government organizations, NGOs, scholars, activists, and interested Cambodians.

When his mutinous soldiers dragged Pol Pot out of hiding and into the nightly news, this informal network pressed for accountability. The effort was not without success. The media covered the story extensively, and Pol Pot even appeared on Ted Koppel’s Nightline.32 Scholars from the emerging field of transitional justice, seeing Cambodia as a potential case study, speculated on whether a truth commission might be better than a tribunal.33 Human rights NGOs issued constant commentary. The UN reveled in its relevance. In Cambodia at the time, Maguire recalls that, “both the UN and many NGOs [had] a vested interest in the ‘success story.’ Both groups had bills to pay, and by the 1990s human rights was an industry.”34 Hun Sen’s calls for trials found a very receptive international audience.

Now underway, the tribunal continues to benefit this network of international organizations, activists, and scholars.

From the Washington Post to the Christian Century, journalists keep the story alive.35 Scholarly publications roll out at an increasing rate. NGOs alternately praise the trials as a landmark and condemn them as below international standards.36 The United States, after having supported the Khmer Rouge for a decade, now looks redeemed. And, after several failures to stop genocide, the UN is able to claim that no one can escape justice.37 Across these groups, the trial also eases what one observer dubbed “the white

[ 1 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

guilt burden.”38 In an editorial, the New York Times opined that “it should not be surprising if victims of atrocities come to see international justice as an expensive exercise in allaying Western guilt for failing to act in time.”39 Whether driven by guilt or altruism, “Human Rights International” has nevertheless benefited from the tribunal.

Rewriting history and providing answers. As the CPP keeps clean while

championing a popular cause and international observers use the tribunal for their own ends, everyday Cambodians— the prahoc (a traditional Cambodian fish dish) hawkers and motodup (motorcycle taxi) drivers—risk losing the psychological balance they have forged over the past two and a half decades. Of everyone involved, they may benefit the least from this new attempt to create justice.

Nonetheless, polls show that the Cambodian people are in favor of the trials.40 Their reasoning, however, is important— they seek convictions as a means and not an end. Sitting across from Cambodian psychologists, aid workers, and history professors, I heard them explain their desire for trials with a simple question: “Why?” As the Cambodian scholar Craig Etcheson phrases it, “When one probes beneath the surface public attitudes in favor of a tribunal, what most often comes out is not a wish for retributive punishment, but rather a desire for answers.”41 In providing those answers, current historical understanding and research in Cambodia is failing. Born after the Khmer Rouge, over half the population of Cambodia cannot explain what happened because high school history books ignore the period.42 The subject is taught only at the university level, and

MARGOLIS

then by just a few. After a long and dusty motodup ride west of the country’s capital, I spoke with two of them. Vong Sotheara, a warm and soft-spoken history professor, noted the political perils of teaching so sensitive a subject.

“When we teach the students, especially the events that led to the persons who are powerful today, we have to refer to other [foreign] researchers. Professors are expected to conduct research, but we have to be careful.” Often, he is less a lecturer than a guide. “I ask them to read.

And then I just guide them.”43 Another history professor, Sombo Manara, was less direct. Though the professor emphasized academic freedom, his class structure exhibited the same aversion to implicating active politicians.

Eschewing lectures, he sends students off to interview survivors. When they return, he guides the group discussion. “Please, discuss in class,” he tells his students.

“But outside of class, be careful.”44 Cambodia’s history curriculum is shackled by political and social pressures; as recently as September, a professor was arrested for writing a text critical of the CPP.45 This curriculum needs strong reform before it can provide the answers Cambodians seek.

View from the Ground

The country’s mental health sector is no more able to provide answers. Now a nation of nearly 14 million, Cambodia only has twenty-six psychiatrists and eighty psychiatric nurses.46 Organizations like TPO shop around innovative programs, but cannot find funding. Sadly, this seems to be nothing new. One doctor told the Far Eastern Economic Review that, historically, “the vast majority of Cambodia’s mentally ill went untreated.”

As the tribunal throws the past into the present, such negligence merits serious concern.

Whatever risks they pose, and whomever they aim to benefit, the trials cannot be stopped now. But just as the trials will continue, so should efforts to help Cambodians achieve a more tangible and long-lasting justice. As a complement to the trials, improvements in mental health services and history education would go a long way toward addressing deeper concerns about trauma and answering the burning question “Why?” In the flurry surrounding transitional justice, international supporters must not lose sight of the importance of good governance. In Cambodia, it may do more for ordinary Cambodians than the trials themselves.

NOTES

1 Charles McDermid, interview by Joshua Margolis, Foreign Correspondents’ Club, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 3 August 2006.

2 These numbers are estimates. Yale University’s Cambodia Genocide Program uses 1.7 million, while Cambodian scholar Craig Etcheson believes the number is 2.2 million. For a discussion of various estimates, see Craig Etcheson, “Digging in the Killing Fields,” After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 107-28.

3 Marwaan Macan-Marker, “Cambodia: Political Flashpoint Flares Over Genocide Tribunal,” Global Information Network, 28 November 2006.

4 “No Justice in this World,” Economist 381, no.

8509 (2006): 102.

5 Anthony Faiola, “Victims of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Fear Derailment of Trials,” Washington Post, 2 February 2007, A(10).

6 “Putting Monsters on Trial: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge,” Far Eastern Economic Review 166, no. 24 (2003).

7 Harvey M. Weinstein and Eric Stover, “Introduction: Conflict, Justice, and Reclamation,” in My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, eds. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 126. On truth commissions as an incomplete source of “healing,” see Beth Rushton, “Truth and Reconcilia-

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 5 9 ]

TRAUMA AND THE TRIALS OF RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA

tion? The Experience of Truth Commissions,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 1 (2006): 125141.

8 On refugees, see Grant N. Marshall, et al., “Mental Health of Cambodian Refugees 2 Decades after Resettlement in the United States,” JAMA 294, no. 5 (2005): 571-9; J.D. Kinzie, “The ‘Concentration Camp Syndrome’ among Cambodian Refugees,” in The Cambodian Agony, eds. David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1987), 33253; and Robert Turnbull, “The Sorrow Of War,” Far Eastern Economic Review 162, no. 28 (1999): 32. On survivors, see Francis R. Abueg and Kevin M. Chun, “Traumatization Stress among Asians and Asian Americans,” in Ethnocultural Aspects of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues, Research, and Clinical Applications, eds. Anthony J. Marsella, et al. (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1996), 289-91; Henry Kamm, Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1998), 14-15; Grant Curtis, Cambodia Reborn? The Transition to Democracy and Development (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 112-13; and May Ebihara and Judy Ledgerwood, “Aftermath of Genocide: Cambodian Villagers,” in Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 285.

9 W.A.C.M. van de Put and Maurice Eisenbruch, “The Cambodian Experience,” in Trauma, War, and Violence: Public Mental Health in Socio-Cultural Context, ed. Joop de Jong (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2002), 104105.

10 Sotheara Chhim, interview by Joshua Margolis, the Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 3 August 2006.

11 Ibid.

12 Ebihara and Ledgerwood, 285.

13 John Marucci, “Sharing the Pain: Critical Values and Behaviors in Khmer Culture,” in Cambodian Culture since 1975: Homeland and Exile, eds. May M. Ebihara, et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 129-40; Kamm, 14; Ebihara and Ledgerwood, 285.

Nhong Hema, et al., “Psycho-Social Problems and the Use of Community Resources in Cambodia,” Paper presented to the International Conference on Khmer Studies, Royal University of Phnom Penh, 26-30 August 1996, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Maurice Eisenbruch, “The Ritual Space of Patients and Traditional Healers in Cambodia,” BEFEO 79, no. 2 (1992): 283-316.

14 Abueg and Chun, 291.

15 Willem can de Put, “An Assessment of the Community in Cambodia,” unpublished paper, Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1997.

16 Seth Mydans. “Now Prozac Battles Dark Dreams that Khmer Rouge Left,” New York Times, 16 February 2006, 4; Turnbull, “The Sorrow of War.” 17 Kang San, interview by Joshua Margolis, Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 2 August 2006.

18 Craig Etcheson, “The Politics of Genocide Jus-

[ 1 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tice,” in After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 141-66.

19 Peter Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 137.

20 Etcheson, 146-48.

21 Maguire, 196.

22 In meetings with his party, Hun Sen has emphasized this use for the tribunals; see Etcheson, 163; “Judgment Day for Pol Pot,” New York Times 30 July 1997, A(18).

23 Quoted in Maguire, 140.

24 Quoted in Maguire, 168.

25 Maguire, 177.

26 Etcheson, 162-66.

27 Etcheson, 141-44.

28 Though not all scientific, a number of surveys strongly suggest that the vast majority of Cambodians would like to see a trial. See Penh Buntheng et al., “Survey on the Khmer Rouge Regime and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 2004,” Khmer Institute of Democracy, Internet, http://www.bigpond.com. kh/users/kid/KRG-Tribunal.htm (date accessed: 10 September 2006); Suzannah Linton, Reconciliation in Cambodia (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2004); Etcheson, 142.

29 See note 1.

30 The phrase “evangelical optimism” is from Maguire, 5.

31 Quoted in Maguire, 5.

32 Maguire, 136.

33 Susan Cook, director of Yale’s Cambodian Genocide Project, reflected that her program might be acting as a sort of truth commission and Jaya Ramji, a Yale student, openly advocated for one. Susan E. Cook, “Documenting the Cambodian Genocide,” Internet, http://www.fathom.com/feature/35577/ index.html (date accessed: 10 September 2006); Susan E. Cook, “Prosecuting Genocide in Cambodia: The Winding Path Towards Justice,” Internet, http://www.crimesofwar.org/tribunmag/cambodia_print.html (date accessed: 10 September 2006); Susan Cook, “Genocide Justice Doesn’t Just Depend on UN,” Bangkok Post, 3 March 2002, p.

4; Jaya Ramji, “Reclaiming Cambodian History: The Case for a Truth Commission,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 24, no. 1 (2000): 137-59.

34 Maguire, 30.

35 Paul Jeffrey, “Forgetting Pol Pot,” Christian Century, 13 December 2005, p. 8.

36 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both questioned the legal validity of a mixed tribunal. “Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Tribunal Must Meet International Standards,” Human Rights Watch, Internet, http://hrw.org/english /docs/2002/ 12/19/cambod4481.htm (date accessed: 10 September 2006); “Cambodia: Fair Trial and Due Process Are Not Up for Negotiation,” Amnesty International, Internet, http://web.amnesty.org/library /Index/ ENGASA230062003?open&of=ENG-KHM (date accessed: 10 September 2006).

37 Etcheson, 161.

38 Maguire, 16.

MARGOLIS

39 “The Killing Fields,” New York Times, 6 July 2006, A(20).

40 See note 29.

41 Etcheson, 150.

42 Simon Montlake, “Cambodia Keeps Lid on Dark Past,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 2003, p. 6; Ben Kiernan, “Coming to Terms with the Past: Cambodia,” History Today 54, no. 9 (2004): 1619; Richard Sine, “Cambodian Schools Only Starting to Tell of Khmer Rouge,” Boston Globe, 24 March 2002, A(8).

43 Vong Sotheara, interview by Joshua Margolis at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, Phnom Penh,

View from the Ground

Cambodia, 3 August 2006.

44 Sombo Manara, interview by Joshua Margolis at Manara’s residence, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 3 August 2006.

45 Martha Ann Overland, “Scholar in Cambodia is Jailed Over Book,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 22 September 2006, A(44).

46 Population estimate from “Cambodia,” Internet, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ geos/cb.html (date accessed: 10 September 2006).

Numbers of mental health professionals from Mydans, “Prozac Battles Dark Dreams.”

47 Turnbull, 1999.

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 6 1 ]

A Look Back

Financial Firefighting The Future of the IMF David Lipton On 30 March 2007, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs met with David Lipton, former Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, to hear his thoughts on the challenges that the global economy has weathered in the last two decades and how they can inform our understanding of today’s world. After working at the International Monetary Fund for eight years, he helped several transition governments transform their economies into functioning market economies and held several positions at the Department of the Treasury, where he was a key official in the Korean financial crisis.

David Lipton served at the U.S. Treasury from 1993 to 1998 in various positions, finally as under secretary for international affairs.

He is currently a managing director and head of Global Country Risk Management at Citigroup.

We would like to begin by hearing your thoughts on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). How has its role evolved over the last twenty-six years?

GJIA:

LIPTON: I

came to the IMF in 1981, at a time when—like now— there didn’t seem to be country crises on the horizon. The IMF had only a handful of lending programs, and people were saying, What’s the IMF going to do? It has no job. It’s not lending money to anyone.

Of course, the Latin American debt crisis arrived in 1982, and the IMF ended up at the center of the effort to resolve the problems of the decade. It was forced to innovate and develop mechanisms to align IMF lending and commercial bank debt Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 6 3 ]

FINANCIAL FIREFIGHTING

restructuring, and in time to promote debt reduction. It was a challenging time for the IMF as it struggled to keep up with the complexity of the over-indebtedness of some members, despite the lack of established mechanisms for resolving debt difficulties.

My own direct involvement at the IMF ended in 1989, and Jeff Sachs and I started working as economic advisors in Eastern Europe. It was a very exciting time— Jeff and I went to Poland to advise the first Solidarity government without any previous, in-depth experience with the Polish economy. We knew what a communist economy looked like, but never thought about the difficulties of converting a state from communism to capitalism. When we arrived, we realized that almost everything had to be changed. We worked first with the Solidarity economists and then with the first finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, to devise what came to be known as “shock therapy.” In the course of that experience, we

Latin American debt crisis redux—this was something entirely different. Turning a communist economy into a capitalist economy had never been attempted.

One Russian economist quipped, “It’s easy to turn an aquarium into fish stew.

It’s hard to turn fish stew into an aquarium.” But that was the challenge Poland faced.

Once again, the IMF had a role to play. The IMF had grown accustomed to Poland’s communist leadership and at first blush the senior IMF executives viewed the new Solidarity leaders as uneducated and unreliable, so they were wary of working with them. But Balcerowicz came to Washington for the annual IMF meetings in September 1989 with a coherent plan. It described what Poland was willing to do—shock therapy—and made a request to the West for help with Poland’s huge financing needs. He got the attention of the State Department, which wisely realized it was important and timely to try to bring eastern Europe back

One must wonder whether popular

discontent with American leadership might make it harder to put together a multilateral effort. found we had to reexamine and discuss even the most fundamental subjects; the simplest things about ownership, property rights, and macroeconomics had to be studied, explained, and decided. Not only was Polish industry antiquated and oriented toward Soviet economic priorities, but Poland had also developed huge macroeconomic imbalances that led to unpayable external debt, galloping inflation, and currency collapse.

It was clear to us that this was not the [ 1 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

into the fold. And once the U.S. government got behind this, the IMF realized they had some work to do.

The IMF came to Poland thinking, Well, we know how to solve problems. We did the Latin debt crisis. But this wasn’t the Latin debt crisis. The IMF had a lot to learn, which is the case whenever a part of the world falls into crisis. The world is forever serving up new challenges; a crisis never happens the way it happened before, because then, someone would see

LIPTON

it coming and prevent it. In this particular case, it was the challenge of turning fish stew into an aquarium amidst hyperinflation, and a population that was not prepared for all the change and dislocation that was needed. With the exchange rate depreciating rapidly and inflation running at 50 percent a month, the IMF acceded to the Solidarity government’s approach, which was to stabilize and liberalize abruptly. That involved letting all controlled prices free while anchoring monetary stability by fixing the exchange rate and backing the new parity with an exchange stabilization fund. Over the next ten years, the IMF helped apply these lessons to the rest of central Europe, and in time, to Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union.

A Look Back

posed a large set of new questions. How do you create fifteen countries out of one? How do you create fifteen banking systems and monetary systems? Who uses what currency? How do you deal with the debts of each? I think the IMF misjudged some of those questions early on, especially in the area of monetary affairs. The “M” in IMF is monetary—and they still didn’t get it right in their first at bat.

GJIA:

In what ways?

LIPTON: For a time, they backed the continued use of the ruble across the entire zone, as well as various other arrangements among countries concerning their monetary relations. Those arrangements ended up impeding other countries from stabilizing and moving on to resolve other issues. To be fair to the IMF, some of GJIA: What role did you, Sachs, and the IMF play in the economic transitions of Russia’s problems were just plain diffithe former Soviet countries, and would cult. In the Russian Federation, there was rampaging inflation and for a couple of you consider these efforts successful? years and never a strong enough attempt to get it under control. This was not fulLIPTON: In late 1991, Jeff Sachs and I began advising the first reform govern- ly the IMF’s fault—the reformers may ment of what soon came to be the newly have taken over the government, but the independent Russian Federation. In central bank of Russia remained in the some ways, Russia was like Poland, and in hands of former communists who other ways, it was completely different: it undermined the reformers’ efforts day was a huge country with a continental by day by doling out credit to sustain economy spread over eleven time zones, dinosaur state enterprises at the risk of nuclear weapons, and the self-image of a stoking up inflation. So the IMF had a superpower. It was poorer than Poland tough hand to play, but they did not play and had spent seventy years in commu- it well enough.

But in time, the IMF figured it out. nism rather than forty, so essentially, the people had no memory of capitalism. They did help Russia to stabilize by 1996.

Poland had small enterprises that were They helped in a number of the other allowed to continue under communist former Soviet Union countries—Ukraine rule, and a preserved culture of traders and various others, a number of which and commerce. On the other hand, Rus- became successes. For a number of reasia, from an economic standpoint, was all sons, Russia had a financial crisis in 1998 and has since developed into a complex fish stew and no fish.

The breakup of the Soviet Union energy-based economy. It has some of

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 6 5 ]

FINANCIAL FIREFIGHTING

the institutions of capitalism, but it has not discarded some of its earlier traits, including the strong government influence over business that it has had since the 1800s. My main point here is that the IMF had to learn by doing, but it eventually figured out what to do.

GJIA:

Chronologically, we’ve now come to the late 1990s and the Asian financial crisis. From your vantage point at the U.S. Treasury, what went wrong there?

LIPTON:

In 1996, like today, the global economy seemed fine. There were weak spots that worried some observers in Latin America, but the crisis occurred where people least expected it: Asia.

The four “Asian Tigers”—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—had been growing rapidly for decades and the progression of their economies seemed promising. People were writing books about the Asian miracle. Ironically, South Korea had just joined a group of advanced countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in December 1996. By all the standards the IMF used for economic health at the time—budget deficits, debt, growth rates, and openness to international trade—the Asian countries were the over-achievers.

And suddenly, it all fell apart.

By this point, I was at the Treasury Department, not really focusing on Asia because we had just had the peso crisis in Mexico. With a period of calm, we in the G7 were trying to put forward a positive and helpful agenda for the world. I was involved in various other issues and projects like the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC). But all of a sudden, things started to crumble in Asia. It took the Treasury Department [ 1 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

and the IMF a while to realize that this was something very, very different. This was not the Latin debt crisis, and this was not transition. The problems were arising in a maturing set of emerging market countries. They had done a lot of the right things, but it turned out that they had clung to some of their own special approaches and practices that had never been a problem, but ended up undermining their economic success. To put it in a phrase, it was “crony capitalism.”

I think that Korea is the best example of the problem. For thirty years, Korea did most things right. It was open to trade, it educated its population, and it maintained sound public finances. But over time, Korea developed a peculiar business culture: the government was very close to the banks, and the banks were very close to the enterprises. Those relationships had directed resources through banks and to companies. It all worked well when government direction helped bring a lot of people into the industrial economy and helped expand the country’s industrial capacity, but as the economy matured, this structure became corrupt in that economically unsound decisions were being made.

GJIA:

What exactly were the economic policies of the Korean government that led to its crisis?

LIPTON: The big companies became heavily indebted, with debt-to-equity ratios of about 8 to 1, whereas a more normal level might be 2 or 3 to 1. The government made it possible for businesses to fall into this quagmire because it convinced the banks to lend them the money. This practice was part of a development strategy that had been successful, but it came to be excessive. There were confrontations with

LIPTON

strong labor forces, which resisted wage cuts and layoffs, so businesses did not have the flexibility to deal with emerging problems. The government had been effective in fostering growth, but it was less successful in recognizing sensible limits to business expansion and it never permitted enough competition to allow market discipline to dictate limits. Problems in companies became problems for lenders, and some of the banks grew insolvent as a result of their bad loans. No one did anything about it, so the problem simply worsened.

Although these fundamental problems developed over a couple of years in the mid-1990s, no one was focused on these economic strains until Korea’s problems became more acute. You see, Korea’s growth seemed strong, and its reputation was that it addressed its own problems.

But Korea’s financial system turned out to be its Achilles’ heel. As their banks needed more money to lend to bankrupt companies, they resorted to borrowing foreign currency through offshore branches. In mid-1997, the foreign banks that had lent to those offshore branches began to worry about getting repaid and began withdrawing their

A Look Back

these withdrawals. Again, the problem was the cozy relationship between the government and the banks, and the undesirable operations it fostered. In trying to help the banks and avoid alarming the markets, they were not transparent about the costs and dangers. Korea reached the end of its plank when they realized they were running out of reserves and the withdrawals were not going to abate.

GJIA:

Tell us, from your perspective, how the crisis unfolded, and how the IMF and the U.S. Treasury decided to get involved.

LIPTON: Thailand was the first country to fall into trouble, in 1997. Indonesia’s followed later that year. As that was happening, the market started focusing on these problems in Korea, but no one really knew in October of 1997 how big the problem would become.

The IMF started dealing with the problems in Thailand and Indonesia, again not realizing that unique factors were in play that made these crises unlike the Latin debt crisis or the communist

The IMF’s job is to cope with the everchanging nature of financial crises. money. When the Korean banks needed foreign currency to honor these withdrawals, they purchased the funds from the central bank, which essentially lent to them out of its foreign exchange reserves.

The central bank utilized an accounting method that disguised what was essentially the depletion of their foreign exchange reserves and continued to report $28 billion of reserves on its books, although almost all of it had been used to honor

transition. The case of Korea brought many of the new factors to the surface in a dramatic fashion: this was not a crisis about deficits and debt, but it involved issues regarding relations among government, banks, and companies. All of that “crony capitalism” required that the IMF get involved in a whole new set of issues, most of which it was unfamiliar with.

We at the Treasury encouraged the IMF to deal with the new issues, and Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 6 7 ]

FINANCIAL FIREFIGHTING

fail at a great cost to the creditor governments and to the integrity of the IMF. From the beginning of that meeting, Kim Dae Jung said, “This is not an IMF problem, it’s our problem.” He was an outsider who had just become president, so he was not really part of the establishment. He believed that the problem was with how Korea had designed and implemented its economic policies, and he knew it was time for a change. He also understood that he would never get his people to follow if he had kept saying this was an IMF-imposed effort. It was a critical political choice on his part to take responsibility for the crisis and to set out to change his country’s economic policies.

The IMF program helped with a range of nontraditional issues. The crisis involved new factors, and the IMF GJIA: How did you deal with that surapproach evolved yet again. That is its prise? job, and it did that; for instance, to meet the transition challenges of Poland and LIPTON: We spent our Thanksgiving alternating between dinner and conference Russia, new tools had to be invented, calls, figuring out what in the world to do such as exchange stabilization funds and about this. In the end, the economic privatization.

My main point is that the IMF’s job is program that the IMF and Korea put together was unconventional in a num- to cope with the ever-changing nature of ber of respects: Korea had neither a big financial crises. In the case of Asia, a budget deficit, nor a lot of sovereign number of new topics were on the agendebt. The issues the IMF dealt with were da, such as improved bank supervision, restoring confidence in the Korean increased transparency, and the developfinancial system and convincing foreign ment of capital markets to provide banks to stop withdrawing money from greater competition in financial sectors.

In the case of Indonesia, the IMF became offshore branches.

I went to see President Kim Dae Jung involved more deeply in politics than it on 18 December 1997, a Monday. He had before, because they came to view the had been elected the Thursday before. influence of President Suharto and his My mission from Robert Rubin, then family over banks and companies as a key Secretary of the Treasury, was to go figure factor that undermined stability of the out if they really intended to embrace the rupiah. Although many people were very changes proposed in the IMF program. uncomfortable with the IMF’s nontradiRubin was clear: he wanted to help, but tional role in these cases, it had to address he would not back a program that would the core of the problem. Once the key

together we learned a number of new lessons. With Korea, the Asian financial crisis reached a critical point. Because it was such a key economy in the region and because the United States had security interests and military personnel there, we feared that a financial collapse in Korea would be detrimental to U.S. interests and could set off a financial contagion that might affect all of Asia and damage the whole international financial system.

The Korean crisis dropped on our lap at the Treasury when the Korean central bank called the U.S. Federal Reserve on the day before Thanksgiving of 1997 to confess: We basically have no international reserves left and will probably run out in a few days. That was a bit of a surprise.

[ 1 6 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

LIPTON

issues were resolved, the crises were eventually put to rest.

GJIA:

What major challenges does the IMF face today?

LIPTON: We are now in a very different world. The Asian financial crisis was ten years ago. Over those ten years, the global economy has changed tremendously. It is more integrated, and the role of emerging markets has become much more prominent. The entry of hundreds of millions of people into the global economy in India, China, and elsewhere, has changed competitive pressures, global supply chains, and links in a fundamental way.

Finance has also evolved and become more sophisticated. Markets have figured out risk-spreading and risk-sharing mechanisms, credit derivatives, and other forms of derivative contracts that make it possible to finance riskier ventures.

And for various reasons, we have had a period of ample global liquidity, with plenty of resources to finance growth and investment. The IMF is forecasting nearly 5 percent global growth this year, which would be the fifth year of the most rapid growth of global output that we have seen in three decades. International trade growth has been about 8 percent. My job at Citigroup today is head of what we call country risk management. Throughout the business world, people are feeling “gung-ho” about global business prospects and tend to say, “What risks?”

GJIA:

What does that hubristic attitude toward risk signify for today’s economy?

LIPTON:

As Larry Summers likes to say about the present situation, “All we have to fear is the lack of fear itself.” Today, we

A Look Back

have increased financing of riskier activities at very low interest rates. On the plus side, activities that could not be privately financed a decade ago can now be financed. A lot of that is made possible by the tools that allow us to spread those risks out in ways the market can bear. But at the moment, we do not know whether the returns being paid for these risks are sufficient. Providers of capital—banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and other lenders—may eventually feel as though they have been a little too liberal with the money and decide to pull back. This would create problems. We know how banks do their lending, transfer money, and settle accounts that turn bad; it is through a process that is supervised by a regulatory apparatus that works pretty well and was improved a lot because of the Asian crisis. But securities markets and the cast of characters engaged in securities trading are changing so rapidly that many of the new products are less understood and less carefully examined.

If people now focus on the risks that capital markets potentially pose, they might suddenly realize how complacent they have been in providing capital, grow more fearful, and want to get out. Of course no one really knows when and if this will ever happen. We do not know what the next crisis will look like. All we know is that it will differ significantly from those we faced in the past.

So, once again, with a strong global economy and complacent capital markets, the IMF is under-employed, not lending to many countries, and finding that its business model and role in the world are once again coming under question.

GJIA: If a crisis were to emerge today, would the IMF be prepared to deal with it?

Summer/Fall 2007 [ 1 6 9 ]

FINANCIAL FIREFIGHTING

which capital market trading is large in it, it worked hard to learn the lessons of comparison to any resources the IMF the Asian crisis and ensure that its mem- might devote to stemming capital flows.

In principle, that’s not a new probbers embrace those lessons as well. The institution now helps countries improve lem. In the Latin debt crisis, concerted banking and security supervision, adopt lending was a way to get banks involved. codes of good conduct, and increase In the transition cases, the IMF could not transparency. The IMF has invested time provide stabilization loans for everyone, and energy in achieving a better under- so governments got involved in bilateral standing of financial and securities mar- lending. And in the Asian crisis, there ket issues than it had in 1997 and 1998. were new mechanisms for adding bilaterThe IMF staff has improved its under- al and private financing to IMF packages. standing of the capital markets, including But, the capital market proliferation of the new players and products so promi- players, products, and amounts may make the next crisis more complex and nent today.

But is it prepared? It is most likely that expensive to deal with. the IMF is not prepared in one important sense: its own financial resources. GJIA: But financing has always been just Of course, we need to acknowledge that it one element of crisis resolution. How is not clear what the next crisis will be, would the features of today’s global capiand therefore, it is not clear what financ- tal markets impact coordination efforts? ing might be needed to resolve it. But, the amounts of money flowing around LIPTON: The fact that there are so many the world are huge compared to the players and products complicates the resources that the IMF has in place. Put solutions to these problems. In the simply, the IMF is like a big credit union. 1980s, Bill Rhodes at Citi, the dean of All the member countries put in their the banking community at the time of the LIPTON: Probably not. To the IMF’s cred-

Progress will probably not be made until the next crisis.

money, and if someone has a problem they can pull some money out. While the IMF increases the size of it financial pool from time to time, the growth of the global economy and global finance has outstripped the growth of the IMF’s resources. China’s international reserves alone are more than three times the quotas of all IMF members taken together.

The size of member country imbalances is large compared to IMF resources. And one can certainly imagine a crisis in [ 1 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Latin American debt crisis, could call up the relevant banks, get everyone around a table, and start negotiating. During the Korean crisis, when it was important for the foreign banks to stop withdrawing their money, it was possible for a small group of bankers to convene a group to do that. It is not clear who would convene whom if there were a big problem in the global capital markets tomorrow. If one of the derivative markets had a problem, it is not clear who to call to get it resolved,

LIPTON

and it is not clear what role the IMF could play. Although the IMF would surely be called upon to do its part, the international financial community would need other players as well from governments, central banks, and the financial markets themselves. The IMF might not know exactly what to do on day one, but we will probably count on the IMF once again to help figure it all out.

As a repository of so much experience, knowledge, and wisdom on how to deal with countries facing global macroeconomic problems, the IMF will undoubtedly be a critical player in any crisis resolution effort.

GJIA:

What about the politics of all of this? The technical ability to coordinate financial markets is one thing, but isn’t political capacity also critical?

LIPTON: For decades, it was important to have multilateral approaches to dealing with problems. I worry that the political and geopolitical issues of this decade have undermined that spirit of cooperation, especially for the United States. Many governments have been alienated by the United States’s conduct of foreign policy, and many across the globe view the United States much more negatively than it did in the 1990s, when the United States played a key role in resolving a number of financial crises.

If something were to happen today and the United States would need to bring together the international community to do something controversial and difficult, would people willingly cooperate and follow? I’m not sure what the answer is.

Even our traditional partners, the Europeans and the Japanese, would have qualms about following a U.S. lead.

When I went to Indonesia in March of

A Look Back

1998 to work with the Indonesian government, we had what we called a G3 group made up of myself, my counterpart from the German Ministry of Finance, and my Japanese counterpart from the Ministry of Finance, and we all worked together. That can probably still happen because finance ministry people still cooperate well on a number of key issues. But if a need arises to do something controversial, something that would require putting together financial contributions from a number of actors and force hard and public political choices, one must wonder whether popular discontent with American leadership might make it harder to put together a multilateral effort than it used to be.

Cooperation is key, and I think there is an interaction between geopolitical allegiances and economic ones.

GJIA: It seems that there is another challenge to global cooperation in times of crisis, however, and that is the shift in the weight of the global economy away from the G3 economies and the United States’s traditional partners toward the G20 and the developing world at large.

How does that shift affect international cooperation?

LIPTON:

The G7 isn’t what it used to be.

The seven countries represent every year a more modest part of the global economy. For that reason, we started a larger group in the 1990s which has since morphed into the G20, bringing a range of emerging market countries into the policy dialogue. It was a first effort to expand policy coordination to a larger group. I thought that was both important and inevitable. There were a number of reasons why it was time to start engaging a broader set of country officials, includSummer/Fall 2007 [ 1 7 1 ]

FINANCIAL FIREFIGHTING

ing the talents and knowledge of developing country issues they brought to the table. But that grouping may prove to be too large to be practical. While it is doing some important things, that large group cannot replace the G7.

There is still a lot of G-geometry to be done to get to some set of countries that is better equipped to deal with international economic and financial issues at the political level apart from the IMF. That group will certainly include some of the big countries from the emerging market category, and it should. That progress will probably not be made until the next crisis, because no one wants to lose influence or control over the agenda when it is just a theoretical proposal.

Major structural changes are easier to make when the house is burning and you need to invite the guy with the fire engine. It is unfortunate, but that is probably the way it will change.

inflations—an era where the combination of out-of-control budgets and central banks that would finance them led to episodes of hyperinflation—is basically over. Monetary policy is always important, and the IMF should continue advising countries to make sure their monetary policies are sound, but monetary policy is not the likely source of future instability. Most emerging market countries are managing macroeconomic policy well and are building sound institutions that will serve them well. A stronger budget, lower debt, an independent central bank, and supervisory authority, as well as a floating exchange rate, mean less vulnerability to economic shocks.

But we do not know what the next economic crisis will look like, nor can we predict how countries or the international community will be able to respond well. The most important lesson from the last two decades is that crisis management requires flexibility. But looking back over the last two-and-a-half GJIA: What have we learned from these crises and what have we yet to learn? Are decades, the IMF and the global commuthere other sources of economic instabil- nity have adapted to changes and learned how to fight new fires, even in the middle ity that we should be considering? of them.

LIPTON: I think that around the world, monetary policy is being managed much better than it ever was before, and it is David Lipton was interviewed by Dorothy Chou, not so much an issue. The era of hyper- Candace Faber, and Jane Yu.

[ 1 7 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs