GJIA - 9.2 Dynamics of Dissent

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Realizing Rights mary robinson Tamil Tigers Diaspora peter chalk

International Affairs

Chechen Beauty francine banner The Trouble with Turkey michael m. gunter

Dynaofm i c s Dissent

SUMMER/FALL

forum contributions:

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haider mullick Pakistani Youth

VO L U M E I X , N U M B E R 2

tristan mabry Ethnic Politics jules boykoff International Media roland bleiker Global Justice shaazka beyerle Women & Power UPC Symbol here

david steinberg Saffron Revolution

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Editors’ Note

Forum: Dynamics of Dissent 3

Introduction Today's methods of dissent—sometimes peaceful, often violent, and usually controversial—take many forms in the ageold quest for social and political change. Globalization has become an ever-present force of transformation, affecting how opposition to the status quo arises and how people express their opposition. Technology and trade liberalization provide citizens with immediate access to information that shapes how they voice their dissent. At the same time, traditional factors—ethnic, economic, religious—continue to be a source of tension, provoking dissent in numerous ways. This Forum examines the evolving dynamics of contemporary dissent. While keeping an eye on dissent’s consistent themes, such as the exclusion of minorities and debates over non-violent tactics, this Forum also explores the effects of new forces, from the Internet to the WTO, on how people experience and confront marginalization.

Examining the dynamics of dissent allows us to better understand how changes will continue to unfold as our diverse world becomes ever more integrated.

5

Towards a Civic Culture: Student Activism and Political Dissent in Pakistan HAIDER A. H. MULLICK

13

Who are the People? Why Ethnic Politics Matters TRISTAN JAMES MABRY

23

The Dialectic of Resistance and Restriction: Dissident Citizenship and the Global Media JULES BOYKOFF

33

The Politics of Change: Why Global Democracy Needs Dissent ROLAND BLEIKER

41

Courage, Creativity, and Capacity in Iran: Mobilizing for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality SHAAZKA BEYERLE

51

Globalization, Dissent, and Orthodoxy: Burma/Myanmar and the Saffron Revolution DAVID STEINBERG

Politics&Diplomacy 59

The AKP Catalyst: Progressive Islamists and Ambitious Kurds MICHAEL M. GUNTER

The newly elected AK Party looks to cement its authority over the Turkish Military and its Kurdish citizens through progressive reforms and EU membership.

69

What Can Iraq’s Neighbors Contribute?

DANIEL SERWER

While Iraq may be in desperate need of friends and help from its neighbors, the United States must first define its role and timeline for being there and then open the door for Iraq to accept that help.

Cover & page 3 image credit: iStockphoto.com/Felix Möckel

Summer/Fall 2008 [ i ]

Culture&Society 77

Mothers, Bombers, Beauty Queens: Chechen Women’s Roles in Russo-Chechen Conflict FRANCINE BANNER

The bodies of Chechen women symbolize the dichotomy of tradition and modernity in Chechen national identity.

Conflict&Security 89

Airpower: The Flip Side of COIN COL. DANIEL F. BALTRUSAITIS

By failing to integrate airpower into the core military doctrine for counterinsurgency, U.S. forces risk planning operations without a full understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of service capabilities.

97

The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka PETER CHALK

An integral part of the LTTE Support structure is the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, which serves as a critical lifeline by providing international political recognition and monetary support

Law&Ethics 105

Citizenshp in the Making GUSTAVO GORDILLO

A retrospective analysis of legality the 2006 election and Lopez Obrador presidency in Mexico.

Science&Technology 115

Internet in China: The Road Ahead JAMES MULVENON

China’s struggle to use information technology for economic growth while avoiding its political consequences.

Books 121

East Asian Optimism PETER BOETTKE

David Kang explores the role of China as a harbinger of cooperation and harmony in East Asia, in spite of its geopolitical power and its rapid emergence.

127

Old Paradigms, Challenging Realities, New Interpretations JOSÉ A. MONTERO

Parag Khanna delivers an account of the current contest among America, Europe, and China through the lens of the subjects of the contest—the “Second World.” [ i i ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Contents

View from the Ground 133

American Muslims and the Use of Cultural Diplomacy HAFSA KANJWAL

Today, American Muslims are in a unique historical position to transcend reactive public relations, and engage in constructive cultural diplomacy to create a cohesive and accessible American Muslim identity.

141

As Hazy as Ever, the Cross-Strait Status Quo LIN FU

“Cross-Strait” relations and the Taiwanese identity are ever in a state of flux, as China’s ascension attracts Taiwan economically but repels it politically.

A Look Back A Look Back 149

Realizing Rights INTERVIEW WITH MARY ROBINSON

Former President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner Mary Robinson provides her unique perspective on issues ranging from migration to human rights to trade.

J.G. SHIELDS

President Sarkozy is setting out to undertake much needed reforms in France, but his success will depend on factors both within and beyond his own control.

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Editors’ Note

Resistance and dissent by the citizen in order to overcome hardships, attain freedoms, impose beliefs, or develop recognition has been a facet of civil society for centuries.

Discord against the status quo has been expressed by means that have been bloody, through revolutions, civil wars, insurrections, coups, and uprisings as well as bloodless, through protests, marches, petitions, boycotts, art, media, and education. While the fundamental objectives of dissent remain fairly consistent throughout the centuries, the voices and modes of resistance continue to change.

The Dynamics of Dissent attempts to examine movements of dissent in the 21st century. This Forum finds that most chronicles of resistance are never uncomplicated.

Modern day movements of dissent are deeply rooted within historical and traditional foundations that have evolved into complex forces for social and political change.

Moreover, today’s dissident movements are shaped by the amplification of technology, globalization, and mass media.

In particular, this Forum will delve into the complexities of a dissent movement by examining it in its various forms and settings across the globe. Our Forum contributors take a look at youth movements in Pakistan, female rights movements in Iran, and religious and lay movements in Burma. All three of these sites have served as hotbeds of opposition and subsequent suppression in the recent past. Moreover, the Forum examines some of the fundamental mechanisms of resistance, such as ethnicity and nationalism, and the role of the media. It also argues for the necessity of dissent in a global democratic context.

Indeed, this entire Issue boldly confronts the various forms of conflicting struggles for recognition by disparate parties across the globe. An exclusive interview with Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner reveals her views on human rights and justice with respect to such issues as trade, immigration, development, and war. Peter Chalk examines the role of the Tamil Diaspora as a global support structure for Tamil recognition. The newly elected AK Party in Turkey seeks recognition and authority for its survival over a secular Turkish military.

Chechen women as mothers, beauty contestants, and suicide bombers struggle for recognition of a distinct Chechen identity, argues Francine Banner. Finally, China utilizes information technology to seek economic recognition while stifling the political, according to James Mulvenon.

As it has in the past, this Journal will continue to recognize the most significant and relevant concerns of its time and give voice to the issues that influence the economic and social conditions of communities across the world. As its Editors, we are truly proud to have taken a part in this endeavor.

Aditya C. Deshmukh

Alfia A. Sadekova

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 ]

Forum GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Today's methods of dissent—sometimes peaceful, often violent, and usually controversial—take many forms in the age-old quest for social and political change.

Globalization has become an ever-present force of transformation, affecting how opposition to the status quo arises and how people express their opposition. Technology and trade liberalization provide citizens with immediate access to information that shapes how they voice their dissent. At the same time, traditional factors—ethnic, economic, religious—continue to be a source of tension, provoking dissent in numerous ways. This Forum examines the evolving dynamics of contemporary dissent. We see how informed students in Pakistan organize to provoke change; Iranian women launch innovative campaigns to i n c re a s e

DofDissent ynamics

5

their political and legal status; the mass media use a variety of techniques to frame public attitudes toward dissident movements; Buddhist monks in Burma/Myanmar harness their religious legitimacy to debunk a repressive junta; the anti-globalization movement fosters a global democratic disposition; and nation-states struggle under the pressures of ethnic heterogeneity. While keeping an eye on dissent’s consistent themes, such the exclusion of minorities and debates over non-violent tactics, this Forum also explores the effects of new forces, from the Internet to the WTO, on how people experience and confront marginalization. Examining the dynamics of dissent allows us to better understand how changes will continue to unfold as our diverse world becomes ever more integrated.

Towards a Civic Culture: Student Activism and Political Dissent in Pakistan HAIDER A. H. MULLICK

13

Who are the People?

Why Ethnic Politics Matters TRISTAN JAMES MABRY

23

The Dialectic of Resistance and Restriction: Dissident Citizenship and the Global Media JULES BOYKOFF

33

The Politics of Change: Why Global Democracy Needs Dissent ROLAND BLEIKER

41

Courage, Creativity, and Capacity in Iran: Mobilizing for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality SHAAZKA BEYERLE

51

Globalization, Dissent, and Orthodoxy: Burma/Myanmar and the Saffron Revolution DAVID STEINBERG

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 3 ]

Dynamics of Dissent

Towards a Civic Culture

Student Activism and Political Dissent in Pakistan Haider A.H. Mullick From the struggle for independence in the 1940s to the subsequent strives for democracy against dictatorships, young Pakistanis have shaped political dissent through student activism.1 Student unions fed student activism with eager recruits from all major public and private universities and post-high school Islamic seminaries, or madrassas. They acted as important bridges between campus politics focused on student life and national politics related to political parties. With various ideological and political inclinations, student unions followed a similar path of political dissent for nearly forty years— starting with peaceful protests and ending in convulsive spasms of violence in reaction to the curtailment of civil liberties. In defiance of the 1984 ban on student unions, thousands of young Pakistanis marched for the independence of the judiciary and media in 2007, when President Pervez Musharraf imposed a state of emergency. If the government continues to infringe upon civil liberties, today’s student activists could follow a similar course of peaceful to violent dissent. Avoiding such a perilous outcome must be at the center of any American-aided Pakistani youth policy.

Although today’s student activists have different solutions for the political, economic, and security dilemmas of Pakistan,

Haider A. H. Mullick is an adjunct research fellow at Spearhead Research, Pakistan, and recently completed research at the Brookings Institute’s Foreign Policy Studies Program.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 5 ]

TOWARDS A CIVIC CULTURE

After an alleged coup attempt, CPP was banned in the 1960s, and NSF found a new partner in the Peoples Student Federation (PSF), the student wing of the socialist Pakistan Peoples Party.2 Together, they peacefully protested for democracy against the military regime of General Ayub Khan and competed against other student unions, such as the student wing of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami-Jamiat-Taleba (IJT).

Salman Kureshi, a progressive student activist from the sixties, recalled, “Repelled by the bombast of the Ayub regime’s ‘Decade of Development’ propaganda of October 1968, student revolt erupted…students were joined by the labor unions, lawyers…seeking democracy, fundamental rights, provincial autonomy, and an end to the Ayub regime.”3 By the late 1970s, the NSF and PSF had split because then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, founder of the Pakistan Peoples Party, was not socialist enough for NSF. General Zia-ul-Haq orchestrated a successful coup, imprisoned Bhutto, and later surreptitiously influenced the Supreme Court to hand down Bhutto’s death sentence. While Past Student Unions and Politi- student activists were brutally tortured cal Dissent. Over the last sixty years, under Zia’s regime, especially after he five major ideologies have to varying banned student unions in 1984, the degrees shaped the formation, opera- death of Bhutto forced many PSF memtion, and evolution of student unions in bers to join Al-Zulfikar, a militant orgaPakistan: progressivism, Islamism, sec- nization based in Afghanistan and tarianism, ethnic-nationalism, and con- formed by Bhutto’s son Murtaza Bhutto. stitutionalism. Most student unions ini- Al-Zulfikar took responsibility for tertially exercised peaceful dissent, but rorist attacks against Zia’s regime in the became violent when constrained by the 1980s. By the end of his regime, the ban on student unions, fear of arrest and torgovernment—or worse—made illegal.

Advocating a welfare state in the early ture, political apathy, and academic and 1950s, progressives inspired by Marxism occupational obligations took the steam and socialism formed the student wing of out of student activism. Disruption of the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP): the democratic process, judicial incomthe National Students Federation (NSF). petence, and martial law created a danmost agree unequivocally that the present system of autocratic governance has failed. Equally dubious of political parties, most secular student activists believe that an independent judiciary and media are prerequisites for a sustainable remedy to Pakistan’s addiction to military rule in the wake of civilian failure. However, religious student activists are split. Some believe in bringing change through the flawed but acceptable process of parliamentary democracy. Skeptical of elections, others blame the Islamic parties for reneging on campaign promises they made in 2002 and failing to bring about socio-economic prosperity in Pakistan’s northeast provinces. For those, the only remedy is the imposition of Taliban-style sharia law through militancy. This article examines lessons from the history of youth-driven political dissent and distinctions among Pakistani student unions, and offers an overview of current efforts and future prospects for promoting civic education among young Pakistanis. The dangers of violent opposition must guide effective policymaking in Islamabad and Washington.

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MULLICK

gerous environment ripe for violent political dissent.

However, the progressives were not the only ones shaping political dissent.

Islamist student activists, self-proclaimed interpreters and aspiring enforcers of Islamic law, first arrived on the national scene in 1977, when they questioned the validity of Bhutto’s second term election results. Bhutto’s western lifestyle, socialist policies, and disregard for Islamist ideas vexed the Islami-Jamiat-Taleba (IJT), the flagship Islamist student union. After get-

Dynamics of Dissent

ditionalists in universities and those that joined militant organizations to get rid of a secular dictator perceived to be in bed with the United States in 2007.

Ethnic-nationalists, fighting for autonomy and equal citizenship from Islamabad, formed student unions in the provinces such as the All Pakistan Muttahida Students Organization (APMSO) in Sind; the Baloch Students Organization (BSO) in Baluchistan; and the Pashtun Student Organization (PSO) in the North-West Frontier Province. From

Disruption of the democratic process,

judicial incompetence, and martial law created a dangerous environment ripe for violent political dissent. ting rid of Bhutto, General Zia-ul-Haq, cognizant of the Islamists’ desires, helped fund and expand IJT. However, IJT split in two when Zia banned student unions.

Ali Khan, a progressive student activist from the 1980s, remembers IJT’s policies of social control, noting that “they had ‘Thunder Squads’ in various universities in the 1980s that became ‘Allah Tigers’ in the 1990s…to enforce the writ of Allah in educational institutions.”4 Islamist groups also acted as incubators for sectarian and populist student unions, such as the Shia Imamia Student Organization (ISO), the Sunni Anjumane-Taleba-e-Islam (ATI), and the Muslim Students Federation (MSF) of the Pakistan Muslim League. Combining forces with IJT, Sunni sectarian organizations became more militant in the 1990s, mostly against Shias, progressives, and nationalists. Islamist populists competed against a more militant IJT for state patronage and became split between tra-

the 1960s to the present, all three unions remained protean, vacillating between peaceful campaigns for equal citizenship and provincial rights from a Punjabidominated federal government to actively supporting militant secessionist groups, such as the Baluchistan Liberation Front. These groups eventually united with progressives to protest President Musharraf in 2007.

Constitutionalists fight for civil liberties and judicial autonomy. After more than twenty years of small-scale sporadic stints of student activism, young Pakistanis came under the spotlight in 2007 when the current regime locked horns with the Supreme Court and media corporations. Although most student activists today do not adhere to a single ideology, most are fighting for constitutional liberalism—democracy under the rule of law. However, constitutionalists, being closest to the progressives in ideology, are not dependent on political parSummer/Fall 2008 [ 7 ]

TOWARDS A CIVIC CULTURE

ments, renditions, and suspicious sales of state assets, Chaudhry was physically removed from the premises of the Supreme Court building. Watching the Chief Justice being pushed and kicked by the police on live television, students joined hands with journalists and hit the streets. A few months later, the remaining Supreme Court ruled to reinstate the deposed Chief Justice. The victory was short-lived, however. On 3 November 2007, Musharraf imposed a state of Student Activism Reborn. During emergency, this time firing the entire most of President Musharraf’s regime, Supreme Court and several judges of the student activism was limited to a handful lower courts, placing curbs on an of public universities. There was little to increasingly recalcitrant and sensational complain about; relying on the liberal media, and curtailing civil liberties like vote, the president gave young Pakistanis freedom of speech and assembly.

In defiance of the student union ban, what they had always wanted: freedom of expression. In the 1980s, General Zia- students organized campus rallies, wrote ul-Haq had curtailed civil liberties and blogs, published newspapers, and conencouraged an orthodox interpretation tacted national and international news of Islam that spread to all spheres of life. agencies for maximum media coverage.

Musharraf ended such mingling of Ashar Hussain, at the Lahore University religion in politics by promoting a liberal of Management Sciences (LUMS), says, agenda of free market and free speech, at "We can't just sit idle and do nothing least at the beginning of his regime. More when Pakistan is suffering. This country than fifty new private television channels is our future."5 Unlike in the past, a mixsuch as GEO, ARY, and DAWN News ture of internal pressure from political broke the monopoly of state television parties, external political pressure from and news. This was also politically pru- human rights watchdog agencies such as dent; waiting almost two years before call- Amnesty International, and the peaceful ing for parliamentary elections in 2002, nature of student protests with its Musharraf hoped the newly freed media panoply of communications techniques would act as a pressure valve for the peo- helped stop the regime from forceful ple’s frustrations. In addition, after the suppression. rollercoaster economy and politics of the 1990s, young people found hope in the The Old vs. the New. Today, two promise of stability under the military. main ideologies dominate student March 2007 changed everything. Sev- activism and, subsequently, political disen years into Musharraf’s regime, activist sent in Pakistan. The constitutionalists Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikar Ali are fighting for the rule of law and freeChaudhry paid the price for challenging dom of speech through a democratic and, the executive. Disliked by Musharraf for so far, peaceful modus operandi. The his opposition to extra-judicial detain- Islamists are split disproportionately ties or state patronage and do not have a coherent platform. When President Musharraf unconstitutionally removed the Chief Justice in early 2007, he opened the floodgates of political dissent, leading to the birth of a potent, ambitious, and burgeoning civil society movement. Lawyers, students, and media activists hit the streets to show their disregard for unfettered executive power, representing the rebirth of student activism.

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MULLICK

between a small number that still believe in parliamentary democracy and a large number increasingly inclined toward abetting, or worse, joining militant organizations loosely connected to the Pakistani Taliban. Their remedy for Pakistan’s ills is simple: complete implementation of Taliban-style sharia law. Unlike the past waves of student activism, today’s student activists are more technologically savvy and fighting for an overhaul of the system—a system corrupted by secularist ideas and laws according to the Islamists, and vulnerable to civilian failures and military takeovers according to the constitutionalists. A polity that is answerable to the rule of law is necessary to prevent the Islamists and constitutionalists from taking the path of violent dissent.

Technologically attuned student activists have created effective venues for protest online: blogs such as chapatimystery.com, notagainneveragain.com, and werenotafraid.com; websites, online bulletins/ newspapers, I-reporters, and videos on YouTube; and specialized video sites such as vidpak.com.6 Hamid Khan, a former student activist who led protests against

Dynamics of Dissent

year-old junior at Harvard University who took a semester off in 2007 to promote democracy, started a blog and published a newsletter Emergency Telegraph, advising students on peaceful and effective protesting. The newsletter describes what to wear to a protest and how to fight tear gases—by keeping a wet towel at all times.8 While the student activist movement is largely incoherent, students from private and public universities are sharing ideas.

Hyder Mufti, a de facto student leader on the campus of Punjab University in Lahore, believes that effective protesting comes from better coordination between student activists and members of youth wings of political parties, formerly known as student wings.9 While the constitutionalists are on center stage and have access to the most resources, the Islamists seem to be stuck between democratic remedies and shariarelated revolution. While it is clear that this cohort is most vulnerable to virulent dissent, there is limited information on how many have already signed up with militant organizations such as Tehrik-e-

A polity that is answerable to the rule of law is necessary to prevent the Islamists and constitutionalists from taking the path of violent dissent.

Zia in the 1980s, says that “today, the students pressure an autocratic regime by posting videos on YouTube and…placing pressure through the international media."7 The constitutionalists are also attracting a cohort of youth traditionally indifferent to political dissent: the children of the rich. Samad Khurram, a twenty-one-

Taliban. Investigating the extent of youth support for Islamist politics, especially of the kind that rejects parliamentary democracy altogether, is a challenge for the years ahead.

Promoting Civic Education: A Role for the United States. By promoting civic values through various

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TOWARDS A CIVIC CULTURE

educational programs in Pakistan, United States, and non-governmental involvement is a precondition for an environment of peaceful political dissent. Furthermore, in order to sustain such nonviolent dissent, the government must promote constitutional liberalism.

According to a recent survey by the Center for Civil Education (CCE), young Pakistanis (18-30 years old) make up 25 percent (40 million) of the total population of 160 million. Approximately 1,130 randomly selected participants from fourteen major cities and the four provinces of Pakistan participated in the survey. Men (75 percent) and residents of Punjab (35 percent) and the capital Islamabad (17 percent) were disproportionately represented and students from rural areas were not part of the sample set.

The questionnaire had three major themes: attitude toward politics, political behavior, and political knowledge. The majority of the participants (82 percent) admitted to not taking an active part in politics. However, 84 percent believe that increased youth participation, within a democratic environment, could result in “positive political change.”10 According to Pakistan’s last census, the literacy rate was 62 percent for males and 37 percent for females.11 Although the connection between high literacy rates and peaceful political dissent is a tenuous one, youth that can read and write are a better fit for civic education.

Before the Pakistani government can work with partners such as the United States to promote civic values, student unions must be restored and work under individual university regulations. Second, the government should encourage political parties to increase the voting rights of their youth-wing members.

Finally, introducing leadership and civic [ 1 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

education courses on campuses are prerequisites for peaceful political dissent.

For example, CCE offers a leadership development course funded by the National Democratic Institute that focuses on political literacy and works closely with youth wings of political parties. However, such courses are very new and only time will tell their true impact.

Apparently, the Pakistani government is making inroads in promoting civic education. The ministries of Education and Religious Affairs worked with the Commission on Higher Education in 2006 to compile a white paper focusing on a national curriculum and teacher training program to promote pluralism and patriotism within a framework of Islamic values for both public and private schools. The mission statement declares that it is “the aim of the state of Pakistan to provide equal and ample opportunity to all its citizens…preparing him/her for life, livelihood, and nation-building.”12 Nevertheless, Shafqat Husain doubts the government’s sincerity: “Here the question arises whether democracy can be promoted and sustained without the participation of youth in its political activity.”13 Islamabad should implement its youth policy in full spirit.

Pakistan spends 2 percent of its national income on education; thus, the national curriculum does not place enough emphasis on political literacy. To be fair to the Ministry of Education, teaching political science is not an easy job in Pakistan. According to Syed Mansoor Hussain, a veteran progressive student activist, teaching about the constitution or the role of political parties is nearly impossible because both can be radically changed at the “the whim of a ruler.”14 International and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sup-

MULLICK

port civic education in Pakistan and should be further encouraged by government cooperation and funding. The Washington DC-based International Centre for Religion & Diplomacy has funded an extensive three and a half year program to train madrassa teachers. The Centre for Education and Consciousness (CEC) in Lahore provides similar training throughout the country for public and private schools, including post-high school madrassas. Civic education juxtaposed with clear constitutional changes— that the Islamists perceive as conducive to effective peaceful political dissent—will present a viable alternative to violent protests. Islamists are most vulnerable to recruitment by militant organizations, and NGOs, and the government should work closely with these young men and women to promote civic values and peaceful student activism.

The U.S. government is also indirectly affecting student activism. Pakistan has one of the largest Fulbright Scholarship programs in the world. Jointly supervised by the American Embassy and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the program encourages young Pakistanis to study in the United States, especially women and students from low-income households.15 This exchange is essential but ineffective if it is one-way; U.S. citizens should come to Pakistan too. After completing their graduate studies, Pakistanis are required to return to their country. Back-andforth cultural exchange programs promote the diffusion of political traditions between the countries and encourage creative ways of learning civic values. The Pakistani government should introduce an equally robust international scholarship program on the same scale.

Dynamics of Dissent

Creativity is also important to providing civic education. Samad Qadeer, a Pakistani-American activist who has worked on the Hill, asked, “Does Pakistan have an ‘Islamabad Semester’ like the ‘Washington Semester’?”16 There are no formal legislative internships. However, the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), a small non-profit organization, has initiated an innovative pilot youth parliament. It held its inaugural session in January 2007 and has since grown into a sixty-member body mirroring the Pakistani parliament. Male and female students between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine are meticulously selected based on “commitment to politics and democracy” and prior activist experience. Efforts are underway to encourage women and residents of rural areas to become members as well. The program objectives include debate training, committee formation and selection, and enforcing the rules of the youth parliament.17 In an environment that promotes higher literacy rates and civic education, peaceful student unions will not fall for violent political dissent. However, this is not possible without the help of the Pakistani government, which must change its policy direction and respect the rule of law in order to encourage just that in the Pakistani youth. The two victors of this year’s elections, PPP and PML(N), have promised to lift the ban on student unions, increase education spending to 4 percent, restore judicial autonomy, and safeguard freedom of speech. It is imperative to direct youth discontent toward active, democratic, and peaceful student activism through public programs and non-governmental organizations.

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NOTES

1 Youth is defined in this article as males and females between the ages of 18-30.

2 Nadeem F. Paracha, “Student Politics in Pakistan: A Profile,” Chowk, Internet, http://www.chowk.com/articles/13686 (date accessed: 4 March 2008).

3 Salman Tarik Kureshi, “Déjà vu,” Daily Times Lahore edition, 24 November 2007.

4 Ali Khan, interview by Haider A. H. Mullick, 10 February 2008.

5 Emily Wax, “For Pakistani Students, a Reawakening: ‘We Can’t Just Sit Idle,’” the Washington Post, 12 November 2007.

6 Abbas Rashid, “A Crystallizing Movement,” Daily Times Islamabad edition, 17 November 2007.

7 Wax, “For Pakistani Students, a Reawakening.”

8 Samad Khurram, The Emergency Telegraph: Fighting for Restoration of Human rights and Civil Liberties in Pakistan, vol. 1, ed. 1, Internet, http://www.esnips.com/nsdoc/ 3cc65247-4cf0-4305-abff-d97c7c26a314 (date accessed: November 2007).

9 Hyder Mufti, interview by Haider A. H. Mullick, 14 February 2008.

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10 Centre for Civic Education, Political Participation of Youth in Pakistan, (Islamabad: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2007).

11 Shafqat Husain, “The ABC of Politics,” DAWN Lahore edition, 17 February 2007.

12 Haider Mullick and Jonathan Ruhe, “Are Madrassas Producing Pakistanis?” Daily Times Islamabad edition, 2 October 2007.

13 Husain, “The ABC of Politics.”

14 Syed Mansoor Husain, “Students and Politics,” Daily Times Islamabad edition, 8 January 2005.

15 The United States Educational Foundation in Pakistan, Internet, http://www.usefpakistan.org/.

16 Saman Qadeer, interview by Haider A. H. Mullick, 26 February 2008.

17 Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), Youth Parliament Pakistan, Internet, http://www.pildat.org/YouthParliament/aboutyp.asp.

Dynamics of Dissent

Who are the People?

Why Ethnic Politics Matters Tristan James Mabry In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the idea of mass mobilization in order to redirect government is axiomatic. If the environment is degraded, then the solution is to educate and organize concerned citizens. The same can be said of gender inequality, racial prejudice, or, in the form of labor movements, class disparity. Yet of all the challenges a society may launch at its state, the most serious are not those that challenge a particular policy or seek redress of a single social issue, but those that challenge the legitimacy of the state itself. This begs the question: what makes a state legitimate or illegitimate? The short answer is whether or not the state represents the will of the people. But the long answer demands an answer to another question: who are the people? In the global arena, it is implicit that different peoples are different nations, and that different nations have different states. If there is disagreement over the composition of a particular nation, there is by extension disagreement over the composition of the state. If the raison d’etre of the state itself is contentious, this can upset the stability of said state, and, by extension, may threaten the equilibrium of international relations.

Ethnic politics matter because ethnicity is what makes a nation, and a nation is what makes a state. In the three sections

Tristan James Mabry is a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and is writing a book on the intersection of ethnicity and Islam in regional conflicts based on field research in Iraq, China, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Mabry has previously produced for CNN and reported for the Wall Street Journal.

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nations trapped, such as the Uighurs in China or Chechens in Russia. Yet most nation-states are stable and most minorities are uninterested, unwilling, or unable to challenge the legitimacy of their country. Their state may be benign and liberal, welcoming integration and political representation, or malign but formidable, controlling dissent and suppressing alternate identities. In either case, ethnic heterogeneity is in no way a sufficient condition for communal conflict.

Crises emerge when a subordinate group has the motive, means, and opportunity to strike against the dominant nationality and their institutions, viz. the government of their nation-state.

A group may claim its own right to selfdetermination by repairing the state’s First Define the People, then institutions, often by ratifying a rewritten Define the State. While settler states constitution, or by redefining the state such as Canada, Australia, and the Unit- itself to represent a different nation, as in ed States make a best effort to define cit- the case of Blacks in South Africa. If neiizenship according to patriotism and ther remedy is possible than the group allegiance to a civic ideal—and thus an may simply remove itself from the state by explicitly non-ethnic identity—most of redrawing its borders. Yet to explain, the world remains comprised of self- anticipate, or manage any one of these described nation-states like Italy or Viet- crises, it is essential to understand who is nam. Each justifies its existence accord- who: who is dominant or subordinate? ing to the doctrine of national self- Who lives where, speaks what, worships determination: a state for every nation whom? What, for any aggrieved or agitatand a nation for every state. Of course, ed group, defines membership or exclunational homogeneity is make-believe. sion? The immediate and obvious answer Few countries may even pretend to claim is ethnicity: Kurds challenge Turks, that every citizen is the same as everyone Basques challenge Castilian Spaniards, else. Aside from voluntary immigrant Tibetans challenge Han Chinese, and so communities, such as Turks in Germany, on.

What is alarming, however, is how there are also groups who find themselves in a situation crafted by the caprice of often the ethnic component of politics is history, including indigenous peoples ignored or eclipsed, even among interlike the Sami in Norway and Sweden or national affairs experts. It is often the Ainu in Japan; nations divided such ignored because the people and places in as the Hungarians in Romania or Malay question are unfamiliar or unknown: in the deep south of Thailand; and how many academics or analysts really that follow, this essay outlines the underlying principles of the nation-state, identifies the shortcomings of contemporary political science in addressing the question of ethnic politics, and considers contemporary cases of ethnic mobilization in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In regard to what academics and policymakers concerned with international order can do, the essay concludes that U.S. citizens need to spend more time overseas to understand the subjective perspectives of the politically dispossessed or to at least listen carefully when area experts and diplomats report the problems of a particular people.

However, even the best advice is worthless if ignored, as when a foreign policy is predetermined by domestic politics.

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had any idea what was happening to Albanians in Macedonia before the collapse of Yugoslavia, or know now what the problem is between Madurese and Dayaks in Borneo? Yet even when antagonists are not unfamiliar to informed observers, the importance of ethnic identity is often eclipsed by a big, bad idea.

Academic Indifference about Ethnicity. In contemporary American

political science, it is fashionable to suggest that “ethnic conflict” is a layman’s term, applied only by amateurs who fail to appreciate the real importance of economic and political institutions. Academics and analysts who sideline ethnic politics do so to no good end. Even as ethnic violence slashes across Kenya, indigenous mobilizations destabilize Bolivia, multi-national tensions strain Malaysia, and bi-national politics threaten the very existence of Belgium, players in the arena of international affairs remain too often unprepared, or troublingly ill-advised, to respond intelligently.

Dynamics of Dissent

species—area specialists trained in the languages and political scenarios of diverse peoples in the Baltics, the Balkans, the Caucasus, or the five Central Asian “Stans.” This was a positive development and applied to research on many regions. The bi-polar politics of the Cold War was apparently replaced by a collision of cultures or “civilizations,” and so new questions were asked—and answered—about the sources of, and solutions to, deep social divides. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda, for example, demonstrated it was a good idea to know who lived where within different countries— whether Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian or Albanian in the former, or Hutu or Tutsi in the latter.

Nonetheless, ethnic politics as a subject lost favor at the start of this century.

In 2000, Ted Gurr argued that ethnic conflict was waning because more groups were willing to try negotiation instead of bloodshed. But a more serious downsizing followed research suggesting that “ethnic conflict” was a kind of bogeyman, a term used by journalists to scare readers

What makes a state legitimate or

illegitimate? The short answer is whether or not the state represents the will of the people. But the long answer demands an answer to another question: Who are the people?

Like a meteor smashing into the Earth, the sudden and surprising collapse of the USSR was a mass extinction event for a certain species of academic called “Sovietologist.” Just as mammals supplanted reptiles, this afforded a growth opportunity for a range of new

and by academics or policy experts who just did not know any better.

Consider an Op-Ed in the Washington Post by a pair of political scientists: Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig. Their explanation of group violence in Kenya, which erupted following a contested December Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 5 ]

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2007 presidential election between candidates from different ethnic groups, begins with the proviso that the cause of Kenya’s crisis is “not ethnic.” While they allow that the conflict “does indeed run along ethnic lines, ethnic diversity is not to blame for the disaster,” and that the “key culprit” is a weak system of governance. In other words, it is not a question of clashing ethnic identities, but a question of faulty institutions. Thus, the best plan to repair the politics of Kenya is to rebuild and reinforce the legislature.

In the long term, this is fair enough; the institutions are weak. Yet it is safe to suggest that this is of little comfort to members of the various communities— Kikuyus, Kalenjin, Luos, Kisii, and others—who flee for their lives. According to Jendayi Frazer, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Kenya is wracked by nothing less than ethnic cleansing. Kenyan writer and filmmaker Simiyu Barasa laments that Nairobi has been “Balkanized, with whole neighborhoods turned into exclusive reserves of certain tribes.” Because membership in a particular tribe can mean “the difference between not being dead or being seriously dead,” there is no point in waiting for stronger institutions. One short-term solution, writes Barasa, is to strengthen your tribal bona fides with “crash courses” in the tongue of the tribe that is stamped on your ID card—even if it is a dialect that you may not know well, especially if you moved away from home to study or work in a polyglot city such as Nairobi or Mombassa where Kikuyu (the mother tongue of the dominant minority) or either of the official languages (English and Swahili) are the norm.

Fish and Kroenig accept that the effect of institutional weakness in Kenya is, in fact, the exacerbation of ethnic divisions, [ 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

yet insist such divisions are not to blame.

The clear implication is that the characteristics and perceptions of distinct ethnic groups are not all that important. In this now prominent view, Kenya’s diversity is no more or less important than the diversity of many other heterogeneous states because “political scientists have found that there is no statistical correlation between ethnic diversity and civil war.” This claim is valid, and Stanford University’s James Fearon and David Laitin are the political scientists most often credited with demonstrating this point. They are the co-authors of “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” a statistical analysis of 127 conflicts between 1945 and 1999 that challenges the conventional wisdom of “journalists, policymakers, and academics, which holds ‘plural’ societies to be especially conflictprone due to ethnic or religious tensions and antagonisms.” Instead, civil violence is statistically linked to conditions that favor insurgency, a military mobilization that enables small numbers of fighters to challenge the inevitably larger forces of an entire state. In other words, civil violence erupts where conditions are favorable for guerrilla warfare, such as a weak state, a large population, and notably “rough terrain.” Laitin distilled these points in a later work by ascribing predictive power to “country-level factors that have little to do with ethnicity or nationalism.”

When considering civil war, their analysis makes a lot of sense, especially in regard to topography. It is far easier to sustain a revolt when you can safely retreat into dense jungles or forbidding mountains. But it is the iconoclastic claim that ethno-national politics are relatively unimportant that seized the attention of the discipline. The influence

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of the Fearon and Laitin findings cannot be emphasized enough. Their coauthored work is the single most downloaded article from the website of the discipline’s highest-ranked journal, the American Political Science Review.

The troubling legacy of “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” however, is its tendency to support straw man arguments that sweep ethnicity in general to the sidelines. It is sensible that insurgencies do not erupt in small, flat countries with strong governments, but this is an observation that applies to questions about civil wars. Does this also mean that a small, flat country with a strong government is immune to ethno-national crises of legitimacy?

The Abundance of Ethnic Politics. Recent events in Belgium, of all

places, do not bear this out. Home to NATO and the EU, Belgium, if nothing else, is a small, flat, country with a strong government. It is also bi-national: the French-speaking Walloons and the Dutch-speaking Flemish united as Catholics to secede from the Protestant Netherlands in 1830 and have shared power in one form or another ever since.

Yet the country is beset with chronic communal tension, a “bad marriage writ large” between a pair of ethnolinguistic communities “that cannot stand each other.” According to Filip Dewinter, the leader of the separatist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Bloc), Belgium is a container for “different nations, an artificial state created as a buffer between big powers, and we have nothing in common except a king, chocolate and beer… it’s ‘bye-bye, Belgium’ time.”

Nobody is suggesting fighting is about to erupt in Antwerp or Bruges, but any analysis of Belgian politics that addresses

Dynamics of Dissent

institutional schematics at the expense of ethnic patterns is a waste of time. There may never be a Flemish firefight with a band of rogue Walloons, but in what political universe could this topic be considered unimportant, uninteresting, or unworthy of our professional attention?

What is important, interesting, and a worthy avenue of research is how and why antagonists in Belgium may come to believe that their government is no longer legitimate, that the state no longer represents the will of “the people.” Even if shots are not fired, “legitimacy cannot be inferred from a peaceful situation,” and legitimacy depends on how people define themselves.

This process is now evident and accelerating in Bolivia. In 2006, that country elected its first indigenous president. Evo Morales, an ethnic Aymara Indian, campaigned on a promise, since then delivered, to rewrite the constitution and explicitly include the majority Indians (los indios). The Minister of Education and Culture, Felix Patzi, directed all government employees to learn Aymara or another of the major indigenous languages, Quechua or Guaraní. All of this deeply troubled the formerly dominant minority comprised of the whites (las blancas, descended from Europeans) and the mestizos. The four regions where they are clearly the majority have unilaterally declared autonomy. It is the opinion of Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García Linera that there are now “two different” Bolivias and that the country is “really split.”

Even in multi-national states with carefully crafted institutions, socioeconomic inequalities can destabilize the country if inequality overlaps a specific ethnicity. In Malaysia, for example, ethnic Malay, Chinese, and Indians officialSummer/Fall 2008 [ 1 7 ]

WHO ARE THE PEOPLE?

ly share government power, but that has not engendered relative economic power or social status. Malaysia’s Indian population accounts for just 10 percent of the country; it is now quite clear this group has “lost out in the long battle of all three ethnic groups over power, privilege, and religion.” In November 2007, more than twenty thousand Indians staged an anti-government protest that was dispersed with water cannons and teargas.

Ethnic Chinese account for about one quarter of the population and are economically more secure, but chafe at affirmative action programs that admit more Malays to university and grant more government contracts to Malay-owned companies at the expense of Chinese applicants.

Belgium, Bolivia, and Malaysia appear to have little in common, but they all can be categorized as democracies, and it is easy to claim that a democratic government is legitimate. But a necessary condition for a democracy is a demos: there is little point holding elections if there is disagreement over who gets to vote.

Nationalism may not be liberal—it is hard

insurgency? No, it does not. This is a separate question. But it does mean that such minorities may find it difficult to accept the legitimacy of some other nation’s state.

Violence is more likely, however, if a dominant minority loses control of a subordinate majority, just as the Sunni Arab minority in Iraq has lost control of the majority Shia. A most horrific case of this dynamic was the slaughter of a oncedominant Tutsi minority by the Hutu majority in Rwanda. But if any lessons were learned following that tragedy, they are already forgotten in Kenya. The Kikuyu are the largest ethnic group in the country, but account only for 22 percent of Kenya’s 37 million people. Yet they are the long-time economic and social elite, and are often resented by the majority who see the Kikuyu “disproportionately represented in the civil service, the professional classes, and the business community.” After refusing to relinquish control of the government, the Kikuyu are challenged en masse by groups that are comparatively disadvantaged, both socio-economically and

If we accept the principle of popular

sovereignty as a necessary condition for legitimate government, then the sole source of political legitimacy is “the people.” to protect everybody’s liberty when the whole state hinges on a claim to represent a nation—but it is politically expedient: the electorate is the nation. Does this necessarily mean that minorities—and there are always minorities—who are either unwilling or unwelcome to assimilate or integrate into the official nation will necessarily take arms and launch an [ 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

politically.

This pattern is not unknown to political science. In 2003, Barbara Huff demonstrated statistically that states with a dominant minority, even when controlling for other variables, were 2.6 times more likely to experience genocidal violence or politically-motivated mass murder. Why this finding was eclipsed by

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Fearon and Laitin’s claim that ethnic diversity does not correlate with civil war, however, is odd. The lead essay in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs by historian Jerry Muller offers one explanation, namely parochialism: “Projecting their own experience onto the rest of the world, Americans generally belittle the role of ethnic nationalism in politics.”

To this I would add that such a confirmation of the American Weltanschauung makes it easier to ignore the inconvenient facts of intractable ethnic inequalities in the United States. Muller’s unflinching assessment also helps explain why so few American authors participate in scholarship on nationalism.

Again, this is not to say that ethnic mobilization is necessarily bloody. It is not. Czechoslovakia, for example, split along ethnolinguistic lines into the Czech and Slovak republics, but this ethnic diversity was not a sufficient condition for group violence. It was, however, a sufficient condition for destabilizing ethnonational politics: one state died, but two were born, and ethnic nationalism bore witness to both.

What Is to Be Done? Despite rising economic globalization and regional integration, membership in intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, the EU, ASEAN, the WTO, or even the Organization of the Islamic Conference, is allocated to states alone. If we accept the principle of popular sovereignty as a necessary condition for legitimate government, then the sole source of political legitimacy is “the people.” By extension, in the international arena, “the people” are consolidated as separate nations, and it is the right to national self-determination that justifies the existence of a state, i.e. a nation-state. Hence, dissenting

Dynamics of Dissent

definitions of “the people” present a very real danger. But if we are increasingly deaf to ethnic voices inside states we are limited to essentially ex post facto interpretations of why this group challenged that state. What is to be done?

It would not be a bad idea to consider the opinion of Robert Bates on this question. A chaired professor in the Department of Government at Harvard, Bates is widely recognized as one of the most influential political scientists of his generation. After four decades of scholarship, he is particularly critical of research crafted in the comfortable enclosures of academe. It is easy and therefore common to opine at length about people and places of interest without ever having met those people or seen those places. Hence, those opinions are often far removed—figuratively and literally—from the people and places in question. Moreover, the academic or policymaker may never know whether their conclusions are accurate or imaginary.

How can this be amended? For academics, the polite but oblique answer is to research other countries by actually visiting them, or to at least take seriously the findings of researchers, from whatever discipline, who collect primary sources abroad, including quantitative survey data or qualitative interviews with political actors. In either case, the relevance of overseas research is made plain by Bates: “the cure for bullshit is fieldwork.”

For policymakers, the best first step is to weigh far more heavily the opinions of diplomats and intelligence agents working abroad, rather than to blithely accept the advice of domestic agencies or nominal experts who may treat countries like so many pieces on a board game. The obvious sources for this kind of information are the Department of State and the Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 9 ]

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CIA, though this raises the thorny question of political selectivity: it is easier to accept opinions that support an existing policy than it is to accept inconvenient facts. This was the lesson illustrated by the so-called Downing Street Memo of 2002; following a visit to Washington, Sir Richard Dearlove, then head of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, reported that the decision to invade Iraq was made a priori since “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” In short, and for good or for ill, it is easy for a domestic agenda to predetermine foreign policy.

Nonetheless, it is fortunate that the State Department is working to enhance the U.S. government’s understanding of regional conditions—and the highly subjective perspectives of distinct groups—by hiring more than a thousand new diplomats. At the very top of their recruit-

ment lists are candidates with overseas experience, language skills, and area expertise. I would expect that these candidates could recognize conditions where institutional characteristics alone cannot explain why things are falling apart. This is especially critical in countries like Iraq or Serbia that suddenly find that some of their citizens, such as Kurds or Albanians, no longer identify with their state, but rather with their own people. Determining how a people defines itself—in other words, figuring out who is who—is a difficult and uneven exercise, but it is essential to understanding the most destabilizing form of dissent: ethnic nationalism.

The author would like to thank Brendan O’Leary, Jerry Muller, Gregory Stanton, and an anonymous reviewer for their very helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this essay.

NOTES

1 In Indonesia, hundreds have died and thousands have been displaced since the 1990s by communal violence in the West Kalimantan region of Borneo; the feud is between the indigenous Dayaks and the immigrant Madurese who relocated as part of Suharto’s development-through-resettlement policy called transmigrasi (transmigration).

2 The qualifier “American” is necessary because ethno-nationalism is considered critical elsewhere.

The most influential general theories of nationalism were developed at the London School of Economics

by Ernest Gellner, Elie Kedourie, and Anthony Smith. Superior work exploring normative concerns is often Canadian (e.g. Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and Margaret Moore). In the United States, Benedict Anderson is a central figure, but he was raised overseas and his work is often considered social anthropology rather than political science.

3 The ranks of former Sovietologists include the current Secretary of State. See, for example, Condoleezza Rice, “The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union,” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987): 55-81.

4 The five countries are: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

5 Ted Robert Gurr, “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (2000): 52-64.

6 M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, “Kenya’s

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Real Problem (It’s Not Ethnic)” the Washington Post, 9 January 2008, A(15).

7 Jeffrey Gettleman “Kenya Kikuyus, Long Dominant, Are Routed From Rivals’ Land,” the New York Times, 7 January 2008, p. 1.

8 “U.S. Envoy Sees ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in Kenya, the International Herald Tribune, 31 January, p. 8. Gurr.

9 Simiyu Barasa, “Kenya’s War of Words,” the New York Times, 12 February 2008, p. 21.

10 Fish and Kroenig.

11 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90, 75.

12 Fearon and Laitin.

13 David D. Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 14.

14 According to the American Political Science Association, the American Political Science Review’s publisher, Cambridge University Press, reports that “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” has been downloaded 6,990 times since its publication in 2003—more than any other article published in the one-hundred year history of the journal. “Top 50 Articles from the American Political Science Review,” Internet, www.apsanet.org/content_30489.cfm.

15 Elaine Sciolino, “Calls for a Split Grow Louder in Belgium,” the International Herald Tribune, 21 September 2007, p. 1.

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16 Sciolino, “Calls.”

17 Walker Connor, “Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy,” in Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism, ed. D. Conversi (New York: Routledge, 2002), 38.

18 Julie McCarthy, “Bolivian Leader’s Successes Expose Divisions” National Public Radio: Morning Edition, 5 February 2008.

19 Thomas Fuller, “Indian Discontent Fuels Malaysia’s Rising Tensions,” the New York Times, 10 February 2008.

20 In the twentieth century, this scenario also unraveled in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). Following independence from British rule in 1948, the previously dominant Tamil minority was democratically ousted in the 1950s by a newly independent Sinhalese majority. Civil war followed in the 1970s and continues to this day.

21 Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya’s Great Rift,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008), Internet, http://www.for-

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eignaffairs.org/20080109faupdate87176/joel-dbarkan/kenya-s-great-rift.html.

22 Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 57-73, 66. Weirdly, Harff’s argument appeared in the same issue of the American Political Science Review as the Fearon and Laitin article that dismissed a link between a state’s ethnic composition and civil war.

23 Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 18-35.

24 Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, Passion, craft, and method in comparative politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 511.

25 Don Van Natta Jr., “Bush Was Set on Path to War, British Memo Says,” the New York Times, 27 March 2006.

26 Reuters, “U.S. Hopes to Add More Than 1,000 Diplomats,” 4 February 2008.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 2 1 ]

Dynamics of Dissent

The Dialectic of Resistance and Restriction Dissident Citizenship and the Global Media Jules Boykoff The relationship between mass media and dissident social movements is complex and ever-changing. Despite the recent rise of “new media� like web logs, YouTube, and the Internet more generally, the traditional media still exert a great deal of power.1 This article considers the ways the mass media use this power to suppress dissent and whether this suppression is intentional or an inadvertent byproduct of the norms of professional journalism. While scholars researching the suppression of dissent tend to focus on how the state squelches dissent, the mass media also play an important role in hampering social movements around the globe. This article offers a typology of mass media-related suppression, from more direct forms, like outright censorship, to indirect methods such as mass media deprecation—the negative portrayal of dissidents and their movements for social change. Several international examples bolster this typology, illuminating how these methods of suppression play out in the real world.

Jules Boykoff is assistant professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Pacific University.

Dissent and the Media. Dissent is contentious, adversarial, non-conformist political thought and activity that challenges the status quo and transgresses norms of public interaction and deliberation.2 As such, it is the collective mechanism

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THE DIALECTIC OF RESISTANCE AND RESTRICTION

for initiating social change. Dissident citizens and social movements publicly contest prevailing structures of power or the underlying logic of public policy, simultaneously positing views that consistently fail to breach the dominant political discourse. They engage in an array of oppositional tactics both inside and outside the institutional pathways of political power. As Cass Sunstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago notes, dissent is a “rejection of the views that most people hold.”3 But dissent also entails action, pressing beyond mere disagreement. Dissident citizens who take action to change their socio-political environment both disagree with and actively oppose official, dominant, or hegemonic doctrines. By explicitly demonstrating their political difference with received ideas, dissidents attempt to widen the path of freedom and enhance the vibrancy of civil society.

To meet these ambitious goals, media coverage—preferably in a favorable light— is a crucial precondition.4 Media play a central role in the development and demobilization of social movements.

Social movement scholar Doug McAdam argues that media coverage is a key “strategic hurdle” that must be overcome if dissidents want to stimulate social change.5 As political geographer Clive Barnett notes, “Access to media coverage is in principle a crucial means of bringing pressure to bear on powerful actors, obliging them to act in accord with publicly accepted norms rather than from narrow private interests.”6 Sometimes dissident citizens successfully make use of the mass media to disseminate and amplify their messages. For example, a study of the women’s movement in the United States from the 1950s through the 1990s found that media cov[ 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

erage that adopted the lens of equal political rights for all had a positive influence on the public’s attitudes towards gender.7 Additionally, abortion rights movements in Germany and the United States have succeeded at getting the media to spread their ideas. Sociologist Myra Max Ferree suggests that “strategically chosen American and German feminist discourses have successfully entered the mainstream of media discourse in each country.”8 In both studies, the media portrayed the social movements in ways that resonated with public opinion, aiding activists’ socio-political agendas. Similarly, the anti-apartheid movement used a combination of creativity and common sense to secure a global media platform for its ideas, thereby increasing the visibility of the struggle. According to sociologist Håkan Thörn, “After decades of difficulty reaching out to a wider audience through the established media, there was no doubt that the anti-apartheid movement had, through its informational and media activism, a considerable impact on the ways that apartheid/anti-apartheid was represented by the established global media.”9 While some dissident movements voice satisfaction with the amount and tenor of mass media coverage, dissidents are more often less than content with the media’s reporting of their efforts.

Activists often object to the media’s tendency to focus on their outward appearance and novel tactics rather than their ideas, critiques, and alternative sociopolitical programs. In a comment typical of dissident disgruntlement with media coverage, author Naomi Klein asserts that the Global Justice Movement was “hammered in the press as tree-wearing, lamb-costumed, drum-beating bubble

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brains” rather than portrayed as principled dissidents resisting economic practices that they considered unfair.10 Such dissatisfaction emerges from a dialectic of escalation—an ongoing, backand-forth spiral between dissidents and journalists—whereby in order to be dubbed newsworthy by the traditional media and to punch through the din of “new media,” dissidents must generate protests that are novel and dramatic.

After all, as the saying goes, “If it’s not new, it’s not news.” This journalistic demand leads to attention-grabbing dissent that may be rejected for being glitzy, goofy, or downright zany by the political officials and the general public it is trying

Dynamics of Dissent

the mass media’s suppression of dissent.

This typology delimits four forms of media-based suppression that put dissident citizens and social movements on the defense: censorship; bi-level demonization; mass media deprecation; and mass media underestimation, false balance, or disregard. Recent historical data from episodes of contention around the globe clarify how this suppression plays out on the ground.

Method 1: Censorship. Censorship is the most direct way that the state and media combine forces to stifle dissent.

There are qualitatively distinct types of censorship, from full-fledged, govern-

Censorship is the most direct way that the

state and media combine forces to stifle dissent. to reach. Thus dissident citizens often sacrifice substantive media coverage of their goals and principles on the altar of an ever-dwindling mass media attention span.11 Media systems vary across the global media terrain. Yet, the professional norms and values that guide journalism, in combination with the conservative tendencies within media outlets as corporate entities, lead media coverage to detract and dismiss—rather than buoy or boost—dissent.

Although mass media are vital to dissident citizens, political scientists Dominique Wisler and Marco Giugni argue that the relationship between the media and dissent has been “largely overlooked” in social movement research.12 This article makes use of mass media output and scholarly research to counter this trend, offering an empirical typology for

ment-imposed media blackouts to the state’s strong-arming of media workers to modify or omit information. Sometimes the state colludes with journalists who proliferate dissident-disparaging articles generated by the government.

Such direct forms of media manipulation pave the way for self-censorship on the part of journalists and media managers.

The state exerts great control over communication channels in many countries. In China, Won Ho Chang notes, “Journalism, or the dominant part of it, is an organ of the [Communist] Party, and its political orientation and fundamental policies largely or totally depend on those of the Party.”13 The inherent tension between the Communist Party’s ideological rhetoric and the forces of globalization has loosened the state’s grip Summer/Fall 2008 [ 2 5 ]

THE DIALECTIC OF RESISTANCE AND RESTRICTION

on the media, but the Chinese government still wields immense influence over what becomes—or does not become— news. As more and more media outlets become financially independent from the government, they experience greater freedom. Yet as recent imbroglios over Internet censorship demonstrate, the media are far from autonomous, and citizens are still not free to speak their minds. Jack Linchuan Qiu notes that the government uses “the Great Firewall” and a “hierarchic structure of regulation” to exclude “politically unreliable” or “ideologically undesirable” Internet users, imposing a “virtual censorship” that prevents the integration of China’s domestic cyberspace with foreign cyberspace.14 The Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD) is responsible for enforcing virtual and traditional censorship in China. Journalists who refuse to follow its dictates are often demoted, dismissed, or charged with libel. They are occasionally imprisoned, as in 2004, when a journalist posted on the Internet the CPD’s directive on how journalists should cover the fifteenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square uprising. For his online crime, the journalist was sentenced to a ten-year prison term. China is perennially the country that jails the most journalists.15 China is not alone when it comes to censorship. According to Jabbar Audah al-Obaidi, “censorship and the notion of governmental information sovereignty have become…an entrenched phenomenon in the Middle East.”16 Despite the recent development of independent news outlets like al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV, there is still a great deal of direct media manipulation in the Middle East. For instance, in June 2001, the [ 2 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

government of Yemen used defamation charges to shut down the weekly newspaper al-Shura. According to Hanny Megally of Human Rights Watch, “Charges of defamation are being used on a regular basis to silence journalists and close down newspapers” in Yemen. Additionally, the Yemeni government imposed a flogging sentence on journalist Abd al-Jabbar Saad. He was condemned to eighty lashes for allegedly defaming a leader of alIslah, the most prominent Islamist party in Yemen.17 Other countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iran, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates use sophisticated filtering software to prevent the dissemination of political and social information deemed offensive or impertinently provocative. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the government focused its attention on political web sites critical of the ruling monarchy, as well online sources for pornography and gambling.18

Method 2: Bi-level Demonization. Bi-level demonization is a two-

step process involving the state and the media that has deleterious effects on the practice of dissent. In step one, the state establishes an external enemy by portraying the individual or group as dislikable and dangerous. In the second step, the state links a domestic dissident or group to the external demon via religion, ideology, ethnicity, race, or nationality. In both steps the media play the crucial role in proliferating the state’s agenda.19 The connections—whether real or imagined— flow through the media, stigmatizing dissidents. This puts them on the defensive and encourages them to turn to self-justification and damage control, leaving less tactical space for dissidents to pursue their socio-political goals.

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In the post-9/11 era, bi-level demonization has become a widespread method of suppression by linking dissidents with varying motivations to the demon of “terrorism” in general or more directly to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. For instance, the Bush administration and its allies have labeled radical environmentalists who have committed politically motivated arson “ecoterrorists.” One day after 9/11, Representative Don Young (R-AK), pointed an accusatory finger at activists by stating on the House floor, “I’m not sure they’re that dedicated, eco-terrorists—which are really based in Seattle—but there’s a strong possibility that could be one of the groups” responsible for the terrorist acts.

The Associated Press disseminated this wildly incorrect assessment to news outlets across the country.20 The “domestic terrorism” label, as delineated in Section 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act, has been affixed to groups like the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front.21 After the FBI’s “Operation Backfire” led to the indictment of numerous environmental activists, FBI Director Robert Mueller articulated the logic of bi-level demonization, “Terrorism is terrorism—no matter the motive...Today’s indictment marks significant progress in our efforts to combat animal rights extremism and eco-terrorism.”22 The media’s habit of turning to authority figures as news sources paves a path—if an inadvertent one—for bi-level demonization. For example, when covering Mueller’s press conference, the New York Times published a number of terrorism-invoking charges from government officials and uncritically used the term “eco-terrorist.”23 President Bush’s “War on Terror” has spurred bi-level demonization in other

Dynamics of Dissent

parts of the world—numerous governments squelch their political adversaries and enemies by transforming them into “terrorists.” The media play a key role, transmitting the state’s vilifying assertions at face value. For example, while the Russian press often assumed an oppositional stance when Boris Yeltsin intensified the crisis with Chechnya, it largely went along with Vladimir Putin’s effort to reframe the ongoing conflict as another front in the “War on Terror.”24 In a Moscow News article, President Putin went so far as to compare Chechen separatists to Osama bin Laden.25 Similarly after 9/11, the Chinese government has concertedly linked separatists in Xinjiang province to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Borrowing from the “War on Terrorism” rhetoric, Chinese officials claimed Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda had supplied the Xinjiang separatists with money, weaponry, and training in order to help them “launch a ‘holy war’ aimed at setting up a theocratic ‘Islamic state’ in Xinjiang.”26 By linking the ethnic Uighurs—who wish to separate from China and form their own country, East Turkistan—to international terrorism, the Chinese government is tacitly justifying severe suppression.

According to Dilixiadi Rasheed of the East Turkistan Information Center, this alleged linkage is a complete fabrication: “The reason why they’re making it is because they want to crack down on anyone exercising freedom of speech to demand autonomy, by linking them to terrorist crimes.”27 Regardless of whether Rasheed is correct, he offers a working definition of the dynamic that undergirds bi-level demonization. All too often, global media workers uncritically diffuse the state’s denigrating portrayals of dissent.

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Method 3: Mass Media DeprecaActivists around the world have expetion. Historian Melvin Small notes, rienced mass media deprecation. In the

“The media tend to support those who operate within the system and denigrate oppositional activities of ordinary citizens.”28 This denigration is sometimes conducted in collusion with state authorities. But media suppression goes beyond cooperation with the state, since negative portrayals of dissident citizens are an outgrowth of norms and values entrenched within the media system.

Mass media deprecation is the denigrating or negative framing of dissidents and their movements. Portrayals of dissidents as marginal characters wandering the ideological and tactical fringes hinder social movements that aim to gain new recruits and get their ideas to the undecided or ambivalent public. The proclivities of modern-day news production—like novelty, dramatization, personalization, and use of authorities as sources—allow for the depiction of dissidents as zany, extremist, or out of the mainstream.29 Social movements are seen by the general public through the lens of mass media framing. According to media scholar Robert Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”30 By selecting certain aspects of dissent and rendering them salient, the media play a key role in political power machinations. By focusing on the superficial, personalized, dramatic, and novel aspects of social movement adherents rather than on the socio-political ideas and opinions these dissidents support, the mass media are making a decision that can often undermine dissent. [ 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

fall of 2007, Burma experienced waves of pro-democracy, anti-government street protests. The military junta responded with force, and numerous protesters— including Buddhist monks—were rounded up, detained, or killed. Building on a long history of authoritarianism and repression, the state-controlled media pinned the blame on ostensibly external agitators and spoke derogatorily of the protesters. While the state asserted the need to use force because the protesters were violent, the compliant media dubbed dissidents and international critics “liars attempting to destroy the nation.”31 Such mass media deprecation extends beyond the Global South. In her analysis of the British daily press’s coverage of the Global Justice Movement’s 2001 May Day protests, Karin Wahl-Jorgensen discovered that media spoke of the protests “in terms of their damaging effects on law and order and on the economy, and by making a spectacle out of the protesters’ incompetence.”32 This assessment reverberates with Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples’s research on media coverage of the Global Justice Movement: “Such media labels are the first step to dismissing the protesters as Luddites, Nativists, simpletons, or unruly college kids who are simply against things and do not understand the realities of the world.”33 Deprecatory media framing has real-world outcomes since it makes it more difficult for social movements to gain new recruits, maintain solidarity among participants, and mobilize popular support.

Method 4: Mass Media Underestimation, False Balance, or Disregard. In addition to these forms

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of mass media suppression, dissident social movements may also be hobbled through crowd underestimation, false balance, and disregard. Dissident citizens and state officials routinely present vastly different estimates of protest size, with the state underestimating crowd totals and activists overestimating. This forces journalists to be arbiters between differing estimates. During the Vietnam War, Small notes “most of the time the media accepted police or government crowd estimates as the ‘official’ estimates, and usually used those figures in their headlines or first paragraphs.”34 Todd Gitlin agrees with this assessment of anti-war resistance media coverage in the United States, arguing that “disparagement by numbers,” or what he calls “undercounting,” was a core framing device.35 While balance is a traditional pillar of journalism, it can be misleading when applied uncritically. When the media engage in false balance they give opposing sides equal time, column inches, or weight, even when the abstract notion of balance does not align with on-theground reality. For instance, media outlets misrepresent dissent by falsely bal-

Dynamics of Dissent

False balance can also arise by giving an equal number of articles or column inches to demonstrators and counterdemonstrators. Covering the 100,000person anti-Iraq War protest in Washington, D.C. in fall 2005, the Oregonian ran a single story with one photograph.

The newspaper reported on the counterdemonstration—which drew a mere 400 people—with a slightly longer story and larger photo.36 Such coverage gives the impression that these protest groups are of equal number and credibility.37 Even though protest events cohere to the media’s story-selection logic, the media disregards numerous episodes of contention. When the mass media ignore social movements, they exert a subtle form of suppression that affects the ability of dissidents to disseminate their ideas to the general public. In his research on German newspaper coverage of protest events in Freiburg, Peter Hocke came across an “astonishing finding”—national newspapers reported on an “extremely low” number of dissident actions that occurred in the city, a mere 4.6 percent of the total number of significant protests. Hocke calls this an “enormous

While balance is a traditional pillar of

journalism, it can be misleading when applied uncritically. ancing dissidents with counter-demonstrators, even when the former far outnumber the latter. Gitlin dubs this practice “polarization”—the tendency to highlight reactionary counter-demonstrators and portray them in balance with anti-war protesters—and argues it was a common feature of U.S. media coverage of Vietnam War protesters’ parlance.

selection bias” that muffles dissent.38

Rethinking Accountability and Balance. The media, the state, and

dissident citizens are enmeshed in a dialectic of restriction and resistance, whereby the state and media tend to restrict dissent and activists either resist or adapt to the imposed constraints. This Summer/Fall 2008 [ 2 9 ]

THE DIALECTIC OF RESISTANCE AND RESTRICTION

paper offers an empirical typology that classifies the ways in which the media suppress dissent. Sometimes the media engage in direct methods of suppression like censorship, but—especially in nominal democracies—the media suppress dissent in a more subtle fashion, ratcheting the brackets of acceptable political discourse and bounding what is acceptable political activity. This typology’s goal is to afford researchers greater analytical focus as they study the relationship between the mass media and dissident citizens.

Thomas Jefferson commented that “information is the currency of democracy.” With that in mind, there are many paths journalists can take to improve the quality of information available to the public, thereby strengthening democracy. First, while there are instances when reporting on events might jeopardize global or national security, journalists need to be more critical and courageous when government officials flash the national security trump card. Resisting self-censorship is not easy—especially when working on a controversial issue under the pressure-cooker of geopolitical conditions—but autonomy is the backbone of the journalist-as-watchdog ideal. Journalists should also demand

proof when domestic protesters are linked to international enemies. It is not always easy, but media workers need to slice through the rhetoric to find the facts, holding governments and dissident citizens accountable to their stated definitions along the way.

Additionally, journalists could do a better job of digging beneath the surface to explain why people are protesting; they should not fall prey to flashy style over wonky substance. Journalists should also embrace the responsibility of making their own crowd estimates, since the approximations of state officials and protesters are often off the mark. This is easier with some forms of protest—like marches that follow a planned route as opposed to spontaneous demonstrations—but it is worth pursuing.

Finally, a deep, honest look at the norm of balanced reporting is long overdue. In 1996, the Society of Professional Journalists removed the term “objectivity” from its ethics code. The professional norms of journalism are an ever-evolving project. It is time for journalists to consider additional changes to their performance codes as they attempt to widen the dialogue in America’s over two hundred year experiment with democracy.

NOTES

1 For an overview of “new media” and their sociocultural and politico-economic importance, see Terry Flew, New Media: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

2 Jules Boykoff, “Dissent,” in Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice, eds. Gary L. Anderson and Kathryn G. Herr (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 466-469.

3 Cass Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 7.

4 Jules Boykoff, The Suppression of Dissent: How the State and Mass Media Squelch U.S. American Social Movements (New York: Routledge, 2006), 61.

5 Doug McAdam, “The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement,” in Comparative Per-

[ 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

spectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 339.

6 Clive Barnett, “Media Transformation and New Practices of Citizenship: The Example of Environmental Activism in Post-apartheid Durban,” Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 51 (2003): 4.

7 Nayda Terkildsen and Frauke Schnell, “How Media Frames Move Public Opinion: An Analysis of the Women’s Movement,” Political Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 893.

8 Myra Max Ferree, “Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United States and Germany,” The American Journal.

9 Håkan Thörn, “Social Movements, the Media

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and the Emergence of a Global Public Sphere: From Anti-Apartheid to Global Justice,” Current Sociology 55 (November 2007): 907.

10 Naomi Klein, “The Vision Thing: Were the DC and Seattle Protests Unfocused, or Are Critics Missing the Point?” in From ACT UP to the WTO: Urban Protest and Community Building in the Era of Globalization, eds.

Benjamin Shepard and Ronald Hayduk (New York: Verso, 2002), 265.

11 Jules Boykoff, “Framing Dissent: Mass Media Coverage of the Global Justice Movement,” New Political Science 28 (June 2006): 204.

12 Dominique Wisler and Marco Giugni, “Under the Spotlight: The Impact of Media Attention on Protest Policing” Mobilization: An International Journal 4 (1999): 172.

13 Won Ho Chang, Mass Media in China: The History and the Future (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 56-57.

14 Jack Linchuan Qiu, “Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate Between the Cyberspaces,” International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 4 (Winter 1999/2000): 23.

15 Carin Zissis, “Media Censorship in China,” Council on Foreign Relations, Internet, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11515/ (date accessed: 25 September 2006). The author also notes, “Only state agencies can own media in China, but there is some creeping privatization as outlets subcontract administrative operations to the private sector.”

16 Jabbar Audah al-Obaidi, Media Censorship in the Middle East (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), 5.

17 Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Closure of Newspaper, Journalist Flogging,” Human Rights News, Internet, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/06/20/ yemen144.htm (date accessed: 20 June 2001).

18 Doreen Carvajal, “Censoring of Internet Spreading, Study Says,” International Herald Tribune, 18 May 2007, p. 1.

19 Boykoff, The Suppression of Dissent, 211-224.

20 “State’s Delegation Favors Retaliation,” Associated Press, 12 September 2001.

21 U.S. Congress, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing the Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Public Law 107-56, Section 802.

22 Robert S. Mueller, “Prepared Remarks of Robert S. Mueller, III—Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation—Operation Backfire Press Conference” (executive speech, RFK Main Justice Building, Washington, D.C.), Internet, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller012006.htm (date accessed: 20 January 2006).

23 Michael Janofsky, “11 Indicted in 17 Cases of Sabotage in West,” the New York Times, 21 January

Dynamics of Dissent

2006, A(9).

24 For Russian media’s reaction to Yeltsin, see Ivan Zassoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 58-64. For Putin’s reframing, see Robert Cottrell and Michael Peel, “A Stealth Fighter,” Financial Times, 6 October 2001, p. 13.

25 “Putin Says No More Dialogue with Chechen Terrorists,” Moscow Times, 8 September 2004.

26 Philip P. Pan, “China Links bin Laden to Separatists: Report Details Attacks in Mostly Muslim Region,” Washington Post, 22 January 2002, A(8).

27 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “Beijing Says Chinese Muslims Were Trained as Terrorists With Money from bin Laden,” the New York Times, 22 January 2002, A(11).

28 Melvin Small, Covering Dissent: The Media and the Vietnam War Movement (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 113.

29 W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 45-50.

30 Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43 (1993): 52.

31 For the longer view on Burmese repression, see Jalal Alamgir, “Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma,” Pacific Affairs 70 (Autumn 1997): 333-350. For articles on the recent uprising in Burma, see Jonathan Watts, “Buddhist Monk Rally Steps Up Pressure on Burma’s Junta,” Guardian, 20 September 2007, p. 25 and “Burma Blames Outsiders for Strife,” The Nation (Thailand), 5 October 2007.

32 Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, “Speaking Out Against the Incitement to Silence: The British Press and the 2001 May Day Protests,” in Representing Resistance: Media, Civil Disobedience, and the Global Justice Movement, eds., Andy Opel and Donnalyn Pompper (London: Praeger, 2003), 144.

33 Kevin Michael DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples, “From Public Sphere to Public Screen: Democracy, Activism, and the ‘Violence’ of Seattle,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 19 (2002): 147.

34 Small, Covering Dissent, 162.

35 Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 28.

36 Michael Arrieta-Walden, “Placement of Stories Sparks Charges of Bias,” Oregonian, 2 October 2005, D(1).

37 Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, 27.

38 Peter Hocke, “Determining the Selection Bias in Local and National Newspaper Reports on Protest Events,” in Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest, eds. Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 150, 159.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 3 1 ]

Dynamics of Dissent

The Politics of Change

Why Global Democracy Needs Dissent Roland Bleiker Dissidents are celebrated as heroes when they struggle against oppressive political regimes.1 In democracies, however, dissent is all too often seen as a dangerous force that undermines stability, order, and the rule of law.

Vilified as they are, dissidents nevertheless play an important role in democratic practice. This paper explores what may well be one of the key challenges of our day: extending democratic ideals to the global realm. Doing so is essential because processes of globalization increasingly undermine the traditional realm of democratic participation: the national state.

Citizens’ daily lives are influenced by political, financial, and cultural forces that transgress state boundaries. For example, the effects of greenhouse gas emissions are global, even though most of them are caused by a relatively small number of developed countries. Any solution to the ensuing problems of climate change, from droughts to rising sea levels, can only be found through a concerted and coordinated global effort.

People in all parts of the world should thus have a say in how the related issues are addressed, but many global institutions, international organizations, and multinational companies are neither transparent nor accountable to a democratic public.

Extending democracy to the global level is, of course, a dif-

Roland Bleiker is professor of International Politics at the University of Queensland. His pubilcations include Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics; Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation; and, as co-editor, Security and the War on Terror. He is currently finishing Aesthetics and World Politics and examining the emotional dimensions of security threats through a range of aesthetic sources, including literature and visual art.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 3 3 ]

THE POLITICS OF CHANGE

ficult task. Some very limited efforts are already in place. The UN, for instance, offers a forum in which states can debate issues of global concern. Some urge the UN to add an elected and globally representative assembly to its existing structure, but such suggestions are a long way from being realized in practice.2 Even if they are adopted, a far more difficult underlying problem remains: Global democratic institutions must be embedded in a global regulatory framework with the power to implement decisions if they are to play the same role as their statebased counterparts. Such a scenario is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

If democracy is to have meaning and significance at the global level, then a more fundamental rethinking of the very notion of democracy is required. This essay recommends how one might productively approach some aspects of the challenges at stake.

I first suggest, somewhat counterintuitively, that dissident movements can make a positive contribution to the search for global democracy. This is precisely because dissent disturbs existing political orders and the privileges they mask. I sustain this position through a brief engagement with the anti-globalization movement, focusing solely on the protest element of the movement. Anarchical, disruptive, and at times violent, the protest element is certainly the most contentious aspect of the movement. It also illustrates, however, how dissent can challenge institutionalized relations of power and, by doing so, generate public debate and perhaps even enforce a certain level of accountability otherwise impossible in a global realm that lacks viable democratic institutions. Arguing so is not to deny the importance of democratic institutions but to stress that [ 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

without periodic political challenges, existing forms of governance tend to establish, uphold, and mask practices of domination and exclusion.

The second point I wish to make is a conceptual reinforcement of the first: democracy must be viewed not only as a set of institutions, but also as an evolving attitude. Many theorists suggest that our conceptualization of democracy should go beyond institutional models and into a procedural realm.3 William Connolly, for instance, fosters a democratic ethos based not on fundamental principles but on the need to disturb these principles.

Connolly is afraid that any institutional order that remains unchallenged poses a serious obstacle to a truly transnational democratic disposition. He thus advocates a “democratic politics of disturbance” and, far-fetched as it may seem, promotes respect for “multiple constituencies honoring different moral sources.” 4

Globalization and the Changing Nature of Dissent. Dissent is, at first

sight, an unlikely ally in the search for global democracy. More specifically, the anti-globalization movement seems to highlight the problems of globalization rather than the search for democratic solutions.

For one, the movement is disorganized, chaotic, and seemingly unable to come up with any coherent and positive strategy. Among the diverse and often polarized groups of the movement we find feminists, environmentalists, steelworkers, anarchists, farmers, and students. Their goals are far too diverse to produce a common agenda, and violent elements of the movement, even if they are in the minority, often derail a protest event that was meant to be peaceful.

BLEIKER

Skepticism is thus warranted about the extent to which such a chaotic dissident movement can make a positive contribution to global democracy. But is this skepticism really justified? A closer look reveals a surprisingly different picture.

The movement’s first major event that attracted global media coverage was the so-called “Battle for Seattle,” which resulted in four days of massive street demonstrations against a Decem-

Dynamics of Dissent

organizations. The influential voice of journalist Vandana Shiva, who argues that the WTO is enforcing an “anti-people, anti-nature decision to enable corporations to steal the world’s harvests through secretive, undemocratic structures and processes,” is representative of many anti-globalization protesters.6 Many scholars and commentators dismiss such a pessimistic understanding of globalization. Instead, we often hear of the

A crisis of legitimacy stems from the

weak democratic accountability of the state and multilateral institutions.

ber 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle, Washington.

Many commentators consider this event, which brought together some 40,000 demonstrators of different backgrounds and political persuasions, a watershed event in the public awakening to a global consciousness. They speak of an event that symbolized the world’s discontent with the spread of globalization and with policies that seemingly promoted free trade and corporate greed over the interests of average people and the environment.5 Numerous other protest events followed in the years to come, including demonstrations against meetings of the World Economic Forum, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.

The substantive claims of the antiglobalization movement are highly controversial. Its main targets are key liberal economic institutions of the world economy: the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. Protesters strongly lament the lack of democratic accountability within these

benign story of Western democracy and free market principles bringing progress and economic growth to previously undeveloped parts of the world.7 The reality lies somewhere in between these extremes, but the message that the anti-globalization movement seeks to convey is perhaps less important than the manner in which it has managed to capture public attention. Since many people around the globe see street protests as the only opportunity to express their opinions, a crisis of legitimacy stems from the weak democratic accountability of the state and multilateral institutions. The anti-globalization movement demonstrates what Joan Bondurant identified as liberal thought’s primary flaw: “the failure to provide techniques of action for those critical occasions when the machinery of democratic government no longer functions to resolve large-scale, overt conflict.”8 But the situation is not nearly as gloomy as anti-globalization movements claim it to be. The very fact that we are Summer/Fall 2008 [ 3 5 ]

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When viewed from a traditional, institutional democratic perspective, protest actions do not seem to add a meaningful dimension to democratic deliberations.

The situation looks more complex, however, if we push our understanding of democracy beyond an institutionalized framework of procedures, such as holding elections. Anti-globalization protests may then be understood as part of broader, transnational democratic processes.

In an oppressive political environment, longed-for change will often come not from internal and institutionalized reforms, but from an externally induced politics of disturbance. William Connolly suggests that sometimes “it takes a militant, experimental, and persistent political movement to open up a line of flight from culturally induced suffering.”10 Certainly, democratic participation cannot be fully institutionalized. This is particularly the case in a global context that lacks democratic accountability and intuitions that might anchor and regulate popular participation in decision-making procedures. Regardless of the degree to which any political system has developed democratic procedures, it will necessarily include a structure of exclusion.

Public scrutiny ensures the legitimacy of even the most democratically advanced Global Democracy as a Politics society. This constant revisionist tendenof Disturbance. So far I have suggest- cy promotes adequate and fair political ed that globalization empowers average foundations.

The anti-globalization movement citizens as much as it disempowers them.

Effective protest actions may be able to affirms this revisionist tendency because induce political change at the global lev- it makes globalization a constant topic of el. Dissenting protests may even become discussion. Protest actions formed a new method of accruing power. Are around issues like environmental protecdissenting protests a new kind of democ- tion and indigenous rights ensure that ratic participation, then, and do they these issues remain under scrutiny. Antimake a meaningful contribution to the globalization protests challenge what theory and practice of global democracy? Manfred Steger calls globalism: “a polit-

aware of this movement and of its various grievances demonstrates that globalization has provided populations with a new method of participating in political debates. There are at least two reasons for this transformation of dissent.

First, recent technological innovations have provided dissidents with tools to organize and coordinate their actions.

Many of the protesters that went to Seattle, for example, were united through e-mail correspondences and a variety of websites that organized resistance strategies, thus making the movement far less disorganized and aimless than it initially seemed.

Mobile phones helped coordinate onthe-ground actions, which resulted in alliances between highly unlikely protest segments. In Seattle, again, the labor and environmental movements joined with anarchists and church groups to present a common front.9 Second, global media networks have fundamentally transformed the nature and methodology of dissent. Media can deliver images of protest that reach a global audience. The Battle for Seattle will be remembered as a global media spectacle—a rallying call for anti-globalization political movements worldwide.

As such, dissidents utilized another way to attack the global economic order.

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Dynamics of Dissent

Although it may be too early to realistically imagine how democracy could work beyond the realm of the state, a contemplation of this scenario demands consideration of dissent as a positive force of globalization.

What, then, are the practical implications of the conceptual arguments I have presented here? Democratic constituencies must make decision. They need to formulate particular positions and clearly distinguish right from wrong. Often, it is not possible to do so by consensus.

Excluding certain views is desirable, even necessary—this is why dissent is inevitable in a democracy. But to keep the decisionmaking process as fair and transparent as possible, these dissident voices must be heard and taken into account in the deliberation process. Established statebased democracies have well worked out procedures to do so, but such procedures do not yet exist at the global level where power relations are far more prevalent than democratic principles. Multinational companies and international organizations are not run according to traditional principles of democratic accountability. The UN is the only truly global institution where most states have a say, but its decision-making procedures revolve around the veto powers of the Security Council, which is dominated by few powerful nations.

Given the absence of a global institution that could facilitate and implement Towards Global Democratic democratic ideals, dissent becomes an Accountability. Important as it is, even more crucial tool in the global socipolitics of dissent and disturbance are ety. Dissent is often the only way for disnot enough to establish a new, global enfranchised people to contribute to form of democracy. Yet, how would we global affairs, and thus key actors in justly define norms and prioritize poli- international politics must be more cies when a society lacks a consensus of attuned to integrating outside dissident political opinion as well as a forum for voices into their deliberations. Take the mediating potential conflicts of interest? issue of climate change: The most pow-

ical ideology that endows the concept of globalization with market-oriented norms, values, and meanings.”11 Steger argues that the neo-liberal approach to globalization rose to such prominence in the 1990s that its fundamental values were beyond contention. Free trade and market expansion were considered politically benign; they were corollaries to globalization’s economic growth. So imperative were neoliberal norms that alternative development models were considered illegitimate, irrational, or even illusory and thus dismissed as protectionist, socialist, or utopian.12 The preponderance of anti-globalization dissenting movements and world media coverage of their activities questions the belief that free market economics produce seamless global development.

As society debates neo-liberalist ideology and considers other perspectives on globalization, belief in an alternative model is becoming more and more popular. Consider the charter of the World Social Forum, the loose institutional element of the global justice movement, which describes a set of values and goals that promote to a pacifist path of development.13 Although many people disagree with this agenda, the salient observation is that the anti-globalization movement has forced advocates of neoliberalism to actively justify the ideology’s political foundations.

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erful international actors, such as the United States, the EU, and China, will inevitably shape the types of policies that are being established and implemented in response to the challenges ahead. But the ensuing framework can only be democratically legitimate if the voices of disenfranchised people—often those

vides protection.”15 Most commentators would agree that order is desirable, if not essential because order is a necessary precondition for democracy, the rule of law, the provision of human rights, and human civilization itself.

But the politics of order and the politics of disturbance are more intricate

Order is a necessary precondition for

democracy, the rule of law, the provision of human rights, and human civilization itself. most affected by climate change—are heard in global deliberations. When this is not the case, dissatisfaction grows until it is so widespread that popular resentment erupts in the form of mass protest, revolutionary upheaval, or a terrorist attack. A functioning democratic system, one that listens to and debates grievances and heeds dissident voices, is far more likely to generate political outcomes capable of avoiding such disruptive and often violent scenarios.

Appreciating the nexus between dissent and democracy requires rethinking the underlying relationship between order and change.14 Most politicians, diplomats, and philosophers have emphasized the importance of order over the forces that promote change. Existing orders tend to be accepted as good and desirable because they reflect the values and institutions that have emerged slowly over time. Alain Joxe, a fierce critic of current international regimes, asserts, “The most formidable enemy one must face in politics is disorder.” For Joxe, order “is always necessary because it pro-

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than they might seem. Many injustices, from domestic abuse to torture and genocide, occur not from a lack of order but under an unjust order. The concentration camps of Nazi Germany did not result from the absence of order, but from the meticulous infatuation with an order—which envisioned a racially “pure” state and was determined to pursue its racial agenda with all requisite action.

Dissent can occasionally be required to challenge oppressive orders and to promote a more just global society. Doing so is an ongoing process and of particular importance in the current age of globalization, which witnesses sudden and unforeseen events that challenge and transform norms, identities, and values.

Addressing the ensuing challenges demands a politics of order and a dissident democratic element capable of critically evaluating the value of competing orders. Institutionalizing this scrutinizing process is unrealistic. This is why a healthy dose of dissent is a beneficial— even essential—component in the search for global democracy.

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Dynamics of Dissent

NOTES

1 Thanks to Mark Chou and Emma Hutchison for comments on a draft. This essay is an attempt to condense, but also further explore work I have previously presented on this topic, most recently in “Visualising Post-National Democracy,” in The New Pluralism: William Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition, eds. Mort Schoolman and David Campbell, 121-142. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.

2 Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward global parliament,” Foreign Affairs 80 (2001): 212-220; David Held, Democracy and Global Order (Oxford: Polity, 1995), 273; Robert E. Goodin, “Global Democracy: In the Beginning” (The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, March 23, 2008).

3 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988).

4 William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 149, 154; Why I am not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 51, 155; Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 195-196.

5 Margaret Levi and David Olson, “The Battles for Seattle,” Politics and Society 28.3 (September 2000): 325.

6 Vandana Shiva, “This Round to the Citizens,” The Guardian, August 12,1999.

7 Most prominently expressed by Thomas Friedman in The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000) and The World is Flat: A Brief

History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).

8 Joan V. Bondurant, Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), x.

9 See, for instance, Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, and Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7; Mark Rupert, “In the Belly of the Beast: Resisting Globalisation and War in a Neo-Imperial Moment,” in Critical Theories, World Politics and the Anti-Globalisation Movement, eds. Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguashca, 46-47 (London: Routledge, 2005; Ronald J. Deibert, “International Plug ‘n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet and Global Public Policy,” International Studies Perspectives 1.3 (2000): 255-272; Michael Hardt, “Today’s Bandung?“ New Left Review, 14 (March/April 2002):117.

10 Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist, 51.

11 Manfred B. Steger, Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism (Lanhan: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), ix.

12 Steger, Globalism, 8-9.

13 World Social Forum, “World Social Forum Charter of Principles,” http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2 (date accessed March 2008).

14 See William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 121-126.

15 Alain Joxe, Empire of Disorder, trans. Ames Hodges (New York: Semiotext(e), 2002).

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Dynamics of Dissent

Courage, Creativity, and Capacity in Iran:

Mobilizing for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Shaazka Beyerle Civic Power and Citizen Dissent. In the policy world,

the discourse of change is still based on the old “statist” model consisting of state actors or elites, top-down power, and externally prescribed “solutions” or interventions. Even the debate about hard versus soft power is about the actions of those at the top. People as an active force are not usually factored into the equation. Citizen dissent, expressed in nonviolent campaigns and movements, encompasses a different model of change— one that is bottom-up, inside-out, and homegrown.

The organized expression of citizen dissent harnesses a different form of power: civic power. It is expressed through the strategic use of strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, mass actions, non-cooperation, and over two hundred other nonviolent tactics designed to influence the power establishment and disrupt the oppressor’s sources of control and support.

Mohandas Gandhi said, “Even the most powerful cannot rule without the cooperation of the ruled:” Nonviolent movements succeed not necessarily when there are masses on the streets, but when citizens withdraw their cooperation from the status quo, refuse to obey, and thus undermine the sustainability of the existing system.1 Iran is home to one of the most innovative and tenacious examples of citizen dissent today. In Iran, women are effec-

Shaazka Beyerle is a senior advisor at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict and a researcher and educator on civic power and action.

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COURAGE, CREATIVITY, AND CAPACITY IN IRAN

another. They built new ties with student organizations, in part due to the strong presence of female students on university campuses. Those who received permission from their fathers or husbands attended major international conferences.5 Despite these improvements, Iranian Women in Iran: Contemporary women endure severe legal, political, Contradictions. There are few places social, and economic discrimination that in the world where the position of the Khatami government was unable or women is more paradoxical than in Iran. unwilling to tackle. The Iranian legal sysIranian women won the vote in 1963, tem is governed by Islamic sharia law, and well before Switzerland (1971) and Islamic feminists challenge many of its Portugal (1976). Their life expectancy is interpretations. Under the Shiite Jaafari 72 years, not among the highest, but doctrine governing Iran, women’s inherhigher than such democracies as the itance is half of men’s. In a court of law, Bahamas (69 years), India (71 years), and a woman’s testimony and value in “blood South Africa (41 years).2 The literacy rate money”—a form of reparations to a vicfor Iranian women is 70 percent (2002 tim’s family—is half that of a man. estimate), which beats that of high-tech Women are legally obligated to obey their tively channeling their grievances into a strategic nonviolent campaign to end imposed gender subordination and fight for legal rights. Beyond its own vision of gender equality, the Iranian women’s movement is expanding the frontiers of civic action on multiple fronts.

The credibility of citizen dissent hinges on maintaining a nonviolent character. powerhouse India (48 percent).3 Moreover, female university enrollment reached 66 percent in 2003, in comparison to 58 percent (2004) for their American counterparts.4 During the initial years of the “reformist” era, defined by the presidency of Mohammed Khatami from 1997–2005, the status of women modestly improved. Based on a platform of moderation and social change, President Khatami appointed women to government positions, including the office of vice president. Women’s rights advocates established civil society organizations, launched two prominent magazines, and used the Internet and blogs to publish, debate, and communicate with one

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husband’s commands and must receive male permission to travel outside the country or obtain a passport. Polygamy is legal under sharia law; men are permitted to have up to four “permanent” wives and unlimited “temporary” wives. In the case of divorce, which can only be initiated by the husband, men are automatically given custody of boys over the age of two and girls over the age of seven.6 In addition, Iranian women face statesanctioned and domestic violence.

Adultery is punishable with death by stoning. According to Amnesty International, women suffer disproportionately from this brutal sentence.7 As of February 2008, nine women and two men await this fate. Offenders of

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Dynamics of Dissent

broadcasting to literature, arts, and the Internet. Independent media outlets have been shut down, civil society organizations harassed or closed. A recent Human Rights Watch report concludes that “the Iranian government is relying on its broadly worded ‘security laws’ to suppress virtually any public expression of dissent.”11 Expressions of citizen dissent are met with threats, accusations of collaboration with foreign governments, and detention. Student leaders, trade unionists, human rights defenders, and intellectuals are frequently sent to the infamous Section 209 of Tehran’s Evin prison, a known site of abusive interroNew Century, New Movement, gations and torture.

Women have fared worse under New Threats. Over the past seven years, the Iranian women’s movement President Ahmadinejad. A 2007 report has displayed tenacity and innovation states that 16,635 women were detained under growing conditions of state hostil- for “immodest” dressing, while 121 ity to any form of citizen dissent. The women’s rights defenders—including a stirrings of rejuvenation began around male parliamentarian—were arrested. A 2001 and were initially fueled by disap- new university quota program has been pointment with the Khatami govern- instituted to reduce the number of ment. Even among reformist women, female students. Legislation was introexpectations for progress were dashed. duced in parliament to change family Some prominent figures from religious laws that would push back the few legal circles stepped forward to advocate for rights that women have.12 women’s rights, most notably Zahra Eshraghi, the granddaughter of Ayatollah Unity: The Movement’s ParticRuhollah Khomenei, the Islamic revolu- ipants and its Goals. Based on peotion’s leader, and Faezeh Rafsanjani, the ple power lessons over the past century, daughter of former President Akbar including the Indian independence Rafsanjani.8 movement, the U.S. civil rights moveThe 2005 presidential election ment, solidarity for free trade unions in marked a turning point for Iranian civil Poland, and the civic anti-apartheid society. Under President Mahmoud campaigns in South Africa, nonviolent Ahmadinejad, a climate of fear and scholar Peter Ackerman has distilled intimidation has taken over, which some three general elements for success that are calling a “Second Cultural provide a framework through which to Revolution.”9 The regime is rolling back view the Iranian women’s movement.13 the modest social liberties established The first element is unity: unity around during the reform period.10 Censorship goals and around the people and groups is all-pervasive, from the media and wanting change. “honor” killings also benefit from reduced punishments for crimes of murder.

In the political realm, women cannot run for president, become the Supreme Leader, or serve as a member of the powerful Assembly of Experts, which appoints the Supreme Leader. In the social sphere, women are not allowed to sing in public, ride bicycles, or attend civic events. Women’s rights activists assert that gender discrimination is a crushing force preventing women from succeeding in the professional world as well.

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and the effective use of resources. The catalyst for heightened coordination among women activists in Iran came in 2003, when Shirin Ebadi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. A lawyer, Ebadi founded the Children’s Rights Support Association and was awarded the Peace Prize for her efforts to bring democracy and women’s and children’s rights to the forefront of Iranian political discourse.

Upon hearing the news of her award, thousands of people spontaneously thronged the airport to welcome Ebadi home from a short trip abroad. A number of female activists who found themselves celebrating together decided to subsequently join forces and launched a new, informal forum for women to meet, plan, and act.15 However, their efforts and those of Islamic women’s rights advocates moved largely on separate, parallel planes. The secular-religious divide proved too great to quickly overcome; from a strategic perspective, it was a missed opportunity. Nonetheless, their collective activities had a mutually reinforcing effect in raising awareness and stimulating public discussion.

Planning also includes the selection, execution, and sequencing of a range of nonviolent actions designed to disrupt the system of oppression, communicate campaign messages, and win support for the cause. By the final years of the reformist era, the women’s movement launched a surge of nonviolent actions that reflected a new capacity for tactical diversity and innovation. Women organized demonstrations, sit-ins, flash protests, and acts of non-cooperation Planning: Organization, Tac- and civil disobedience. Azam Taleghani, tical Sequencing, and Inno- the daughter of Ayatollah Mohammad vation. The second element of success Taleghani, challenged the edict against identified by Ackerman is planning, women running for the presidency by which involves organization, leadership, submitting an application for candidacy.

A common challenge for civic movements is the interpretation of abstract objectives, such as human rights, democracy, or social justice, into tangible issues that are relevant to the everyday concerns of ordinary people in the movement’s respective society. Building on an overall vision of gender equality, Iranian feminists have identified two core issues around which to rally: outlawing stoning and achieving legal equality. Both are significant because they focus on real concerns of women, such as child custody, divorce, polygamy, and inheritance.

These concerns are universal, thereby cutting across social divisions of religious versus secular, Persian versus nonPersian, educated versus uneducated, and urban versus rural.

While women lead the movement, they also made a strategic choice to engage men in dialogue and as participants, understanding that there can be no systemic transformation unless a significant number of males embrace their demands for change and their vision for society.

They developed targeted communication initiatives directed to potential allies within the system to garner their support for women’s demands.14 There was one key constituency, however, that they did not initially fully engage: the movement did not target ordinary citizens. This constituted a strategic shortcoming because civic power is derived from sheer numbers of participants. Though Iranian women’s rights activists did attract some people to their cause, they did not build grassroots momentum.

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A daring group of young women identified a potent expression of sharia law that virtually every Iranian could understand: the exclusion of women from live soccer matches in a country where the sport is a national passion. On 8 June 2006, during the World Cup Iran-Bahrain qualifying match held in Tehran and broadcast live nationally and internationally, they executed what nonviolent strategists call a “dilemma action.” Storming the barricades, they overtook a section of the stadium that was in view of television cameras. With some holding signs demanding justice and equality, they energetically watched the second half of the game.16 This tactic is designed to put the opponent in a lose-lose position and the movement in a win-win position. In this case, virtually every Iranian could identify with the women’s motivations—a deep love of soccer and the desire for the right to support their national team. The authorities had two choices. They could forcefully drag the women out of the stadium, which would not only interrupt a major game but would be witnessed by millions inside the country and around the world, creating a negative image of the government and instilling sympathy for the women. Or, they could do nothing, thereby acceding victory to the women who showed they could defy a strict prohibition. They chose the latter.

President Ahmadinejad subsequently rescinded the ban, but was then blocked by the Guardian Council, the powerful non-elected body that approves all legislation and vets electoral candidates.

Though the final outcome was a stalemate, the women’s actions were still a success: a group of determined women pressured the fundamentalist president to change his position on an entrenched policy.

Dynamics of Dissent

Nonviolent Struggle, Repression, and Resolve. The third ele-

ment of success is to adopt nonviolent discipline. The credibility of citizen dissent hinges on maintaining a nonviolent character. Only nonviolent methods can enlist the active participation of ordinary people, thereby building longevity into the struggle. Nonviolent discipline denies oppressors the excuse to crack down, so that if and when they do, they lose legitimacy. Finally, nonviolent discipline is essential to spur defections from the other side, since it is not possible to co-opt those you threaten to harm. The Iranian women’s movement is consistently nonviolent, which lends it muchneeded credibility.

By the end of 2005, as it became clear that the women’s movement was gaining strength, regime repression soon followed. After Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency, women’s rights activists tested the waters with three demonstrations.

Organizers faced court summons and pre-arrests. Protestors were beaten, and many were arrested. Following a particularly brutal episode on 12 June 2006, leaders in the movement decided to halt all street actions.

This violent trajectory is common to many nonviolent struggles; though a group may be nonviolent, its opponent may not respond in kind. Nonviolent struggle defines the method of choice of the oppressed, not the behavior of the adversary. A violent response or crackdown does not indicate that nonviolent action has failed, but rather that the movement is perceived as a challenge or threat.

Violent repression, however, can also have the unintended effect of catalyzing a reassessment on the part of the move-

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ment, potentially driving it onto a new strategic and tactical path. Such was the case with the Iranian women’s movement, which is emerging from adversity with resolve and renewal.

Skills vs. Conditions: The One Million Signatures Campaign.

When civic space—the arena for public expression—has been curtailed and conventional forms of citizen dissent are met with harsh measures, what options are left for civic movements? In the battle of skills versus conditions, lessons can be learned from Iranian women’s rights activists.

After the Ahmadinejad crackdown, women activists first engaged in reappraisal by critically examining their own movement. They determined that one of its biggest weaknesses was the public perception that it was composed of elites based in Tehran. A strategist wrote, “We started to think about how to take our message to the grassroots, and to broaden our demand for reform of discriminatory laws, beyond the tight circle of elite communities, such as intellectuals, university students, professors, and women’s rights activists.”17 Such widespread popularity is necessary for a dissent movement to grow and ultimately succeed.

Second, education had previously played a secondary role to activism. After the crackdown, leaders realized that not only is education itself a nonviolent tactic; it is necessary to generate civic mobilization. Third, they identified a central challenge facing most civic movements: how to tap and transform general discontent into effective action.18 Fourth, they developed a decentralized leadership structure and support committees in order to build movement resilience.

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Finally, with so few overt nonviolent actions possible, strategists recognized that they must develop alternative, lowrisk ways for ordinary citizens to be involved.

From this collective strategizing emerged a sophisticated new plan of action: the One Million Signatures Campaign. Launched in August 2006, the direct goal is to “collect one million signatures in support of a petition addressed to the Iranian parliament asking for the revision and reform of current laws which discriminate against women.”19 The strategic objective is to “elevate the demand for change to an encompassing public demand,” thereby creating a mass groundswell of civic pressure.20 By refusing to retreat, the campaign immediately achieved a small but significant victory over the regime.

Learning from past oversights, campaigners are taking great care to build solidarity with minorities, human rights groups, trade unions, teachers, students, and the disadvantaged. Targeted outreach and dialogue are also underway with religious scholars. The Signatures Campaign has developed an innovative array of lowrisk tactics employed to educate, communicate, and engage. These include internal capacity-building through training in urban and rural areas around the country, research and documentation, legal assistance, and general support for harassed members or women in prison, widespread dissemination of layperson educational materials on the oppression of women and its day-to-day consequences, blogging, a comprehensive informational website, street plays, and face-to-face interactions.

The latter tactic is an altogether different approach from street protests. Direct contact between campaign members and

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ordinary citizens has been designed to promote awareness, set in motion a communication and feedback loop with the citizenry, and aid recruitment. Trained advocates speak directly with people wherever it is safe and possible, from buses, hair salons, and clinics to cafes, door-to-door home visits, and public celebrations. Their educational discussions do not break any laws, nor is it illegal to sign a petition. Finally, the campaign has adopted distinctive symbols, slogans, and songs that add a compelling new dimension to the campaign’s messaging and communication strategy.

The Iranian government may have shut down civic space, but it is impossible to eliminate the public space—the site of everyday social and economic interactions. The Signatures Campaign is cleverly claiming the public space as its own arena of action. This innovative approach offers a vital lesson for civic

Dynamics of Dissent

efforts, and independent in order to have credibility, build alliances, and enlist mass participation. The international community should take its cues from those within the movement and offer support as it is needed. The Signatures Campaign, for example, asks for non-political solidarity; attention from human rights and women’s rights organizations; and publicity and advocacy regarding arrests and repression. It does not wish to receive support from government groups or quasi-government groups that “are closely linked with or are traditionally viewed as hostile to the Iranian government.”22 Now into its second year, how has the Signatures Campaign fared? First and foremost, it survives and is growing—a feat in itself. Over 100,000 people have signed the petition, and nearly 1,000 individuals have been trained in face-to-

Under conditions of repression,

citizen dissent can create space to operate in the public domain. movements around the world: it is not necessary to have civic space in order to organize. Under conditions of repression, citizen dissent and imaginative, low-risk civic actions can create space to operate in the public domain.

Finally, the Signatures Campaign has adopted a successful policy of transparency and autonomy.“Strictly confined to constructive social and legal changes,” the Campaign’s website states that it “avoids ideology from within and without.”21 The women leaders understand that nonviolent movements need to be homegrown, connected to grass-roots

face education and canvassing. The campaign is officially active in over fifteen provinces. Shirin Ebadi, the Peace Prize winner, recently said in a local workshop, “I should let you know that the demands of the campaign have penetrated deeply the various layers of society.”23

Prospects. Not surprisingly, Iranian

authorities are using multiple methods to clamp down on the women, a perverse indicator that the campaign is having an impact.

Public meeting spaces are denied to them while private meetings in homes are broken up and homeowners are called in for interro-

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gations. Their multi-language website— www.wechange.info—has been blocked and filtered over ten times. Local media have been warned against covering the movement’s activities.

As of February 2008, over forty-three members have been arrested. Vague charges, such as “acting against national security through propaganda against the Order,” have been issued; this only serves to further discredit the authorities and undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the people.24 Women have transformed this to their advantage, often using the time spent in detention to educate prisoners about the campaign and to subsequently advocate on their behalf upon release. Other constraints are imposed: Parvin Ardalan, among the campaign founders, was recently denied a visa to Stockholm to receive the Olaf Palme Award for Human Rights.25 She missed the ceremony, but the regime’s manhandling backfired; her conspicuous absence generated even more international attention.

The Iranian women’s movement will continue to face challenges involving anticipating and muting regime repression, building resilience, maintaining strategic planning and tactical innovation, developing ties across the religious divide of secular versus Islamist, and increasing the participation of ordinary people. Last but not least, they must sustain hope. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, “We must accept finite disappointment, but never lose infinite hope.”26 The movement constitutes a compelling example of how civic power can be harnessed against systemic forms of oppression, and highlights the role of skills and experiences in overcoming adverse political and social conditions.

While their struggle is far from over, the Iranian women’s movement is following in the footsteps of previous twentieth century citizen dissent movements and already offers a rich source of strategic and tactical lessons for the modern dissenter.

NOTES

1 Ackerman, Peter and Jack Duvall. A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict.

2 “The World Factbook–Iran,” Central Intelligence Agency, Internet, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ir.html#People (date accessed: 24 February 2008).

3 “The World Factbook – Iran.”

4 Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); American Council on Education, Center for Policy Analysis, “Fact Sheet on Higher Education,” Internet, http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GEN ERAL/ACE_US/FS_09.pdf (date accessed: 26 February 2008).

5 Fariba Davoudi Mohajer, presentation, 28 February 2008.

6 “The Effects of Laws on Women’s Lives,” trans., Rahma Tohidi, Internet, http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article41 (date accessed: 28 August 2006).

7 Amnesty International, “Iran: Death by Stoning,

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A Grotesque and Unacceptable Penalty,” Internet, http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/iran-death-stoning-grotesque-and-unacceptablepenalty-20080115 (date accessed: 15 January 2008).

8 Nazila Fathi, “Hundreds of Women Protest Sex Discrimination in Iran,” the New York Times, 12 June 2005.

9 Danny Postel, Reading Legitimation Crisis in Tehran: Iran and the Future of Liberalism. (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2006), 4.

10 Ibid., 6.

11 Human Rights Watch, “Iran: End Widespread Crackdown on Civil Society,” Internet, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/01/08/iran17692. htm (date accessed: 7 January 2008).

12 Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace, “Support Iranian Women: Join the ‘One Million Signatures’ Campaign,” Internet, http://www.learningpartnership.org/advocacy/alerts/iranmillionsigns0207 (date accessed: 20 September 2007); Maryam Hossienkhah, “The One Million Signatures Campaign: Moving beyond Elite Demands,” Internet, http://www.wechange.info/eng-

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lish/spip.php?article197 (date accessed: 2 January 2008).

13 “Support Iranian Women.”

14 Peter Ackerman, interview by Shaazka Beyerle, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

15 Mohajer.

16 “Iran Nobel Winner Gets Hero’s Welcome.”

BBC World News, Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle_east/3192024.stm, (date accessed: 14 October 2003); “Dr. Rostami Povey on Women Human Rights Defenders in Iran,” Negotiate Peace, Internet, http://www.negotiate-peace.org/content/ view/27/34/ (date accessed: 1 March 2006).

17 Nazila Fathi, “Hundreds of Women Protest Sex Discrimination in Iran,” New York Times, 12 June 2005.

18 Hossienkhah, “The One Million Signatures Campaign.”

19 Ibid.

20 Sussan Tahmasebi, “Answers to Your Most Frequently Asked Questions About the Campaign,” Internet, www.wechange.info/english/spip.php?article226 (date accessed: 24 February 2008).

Dynamics of Dissent

21 Hossienkhah, “The One Million Signatures Campaign.”

22 Ali Akbar Mahdi, “A Campaign for Equality and Democratic Culture,” Internet, www.wechange.info/ english/spip.php?article130 (date accessed: 6 August 2007).

23 Tahmasebi, “Answers.”

24 Maryam Malek, “Ebadi: The Demands of the Campaign Have Penetrated Society,” Internet, www.wechange.info/english/spip.php?article 218 (date accessed: 16 February 2008).

25 Maryam Hosseinkhah, “Detentions and Summons Against Campaigners for Gender Equality,” Internet, www.wechange.info/english/spip.php?article 225 (date accessed: 24 February 2008).

26 “Parvin Ardalan, Banned from Travel While on Way to Receive Olaf Palme Award,” One Million Signatures Campaign, Internet, http://www.wechange. info/english/spip.php?article229 (date accessed: 3 March 2008).

27 Brainy Quote, Internet, http://www.brainy quote.com/quotes/quotes/m/martinluth297522.html.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 4 9 ]

Dynamics of Dissent

Globalization, Dissent, and Orthodoxy Burma/Myanmar and the Saffron Revolution David Steinberg The tsunami of globalization that has swept around the world is an often-melded mixture of goods, services, technologies, ideas, and aspirations. Its socio-cultural and political effects, however, are often less predictable than its technological and economic impacts. These potential impacts have often been mixed when dealing with popular dissent, and the case of Burma/Myanmar is no exception.1 The 2007 Buddhist monks’ demonstrations in Myanmar have been called the Saffron Revolution, analogously named with the Orange, Rose, and Green Revolutions elsewhere, although the color of the monk’s robes had changed from yellow to rust a generation ago.

Contemporary dissent in Burma/Myanmar must first be contextualized within the country’s legacy of orthodoxy amongst government and opposition alike. The dissent expressed in the Saffron Revolution is a product of economic degradation, the frustrations of youth and young monks, and the impact of global media on the movement. Recent events illustrate the importance of the previously unrealized effects of international attention—increased in today’s globalized world—on internal dissent and orthodoxy.

David Steinberg is the director of the Asian Studies Program at Georgetown University.

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Dissent and Orthodoxy in Myan- may not criticize the new, proposed conmar. Burma/Myanmar has been under stitution, even though it is subject to a

military rule since 1962. The 1988 junta that currently rules the country, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), is arguably the most insular of the world’s ruling groups. Its senior officials have only traveled abroad on state functions, for medical treatment, or on China and ASEAN-related trips on which they are isolated from outside influences. They are internally shielded in a Potemkin-like atmosphere in which unpleasant facts are erased or altered, diverse opinions are withheld, and disquieting questions are never asked. Their education has been controlled, manipulated, and parochial. The

public referendum in May 2008.

Orthodoxy among the opposition is evident as well. Some members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the opposition force, were expelled from the group because they questioned party decisions. In one dissident rebellion, some were executed as government “spies.” Even among expatriate Burmese living in democratic societies, to veer from the established line and question the wisdom of leading opposition figures is considered anathema. Criticism of Nobel Laureate opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi or her opinions is virtually heretical. In this environment, even

The dissent expressed in the Saffron Revolution is a product of economic degradation, the frustrations of youth and religion, and the impact of global media on the movement. government continues to build infrastructure, which it claims with a degree of accuracy the outside world does not appreciate, but which the government considers visible evidence of its efficacy.

In this society, orthodoxy—conforming to prevailing doctrines and practices—is mandatory. Vigorous elements of hierarchy are transmitted through the language and social customs, and reinforced by a dominant military command system.

Power is personalized, resulting in weak institutions. The government controls all imported books and journals, and the media, when not under direct government aegis, is rigorously censored. Under current (March 2008) junta edicts, one [ 5 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

among the opposition, analysis thus gives way to conformity. There is less dialogue in Washington on Burma/Myanmar issues than on other foreign policy questions: in part because of this orthodoxy, in part because it is less an internationally critical issue, and in part because there is no effective political constituency taking an alternative view on what has been called a “rogue,” “pariah,” or “thuggish” regime.

Popular historical dissent is still vibrant in political rhetoric and in memorial celebrations, was first focused on the anti-colonial struggle led by monks and students. It is distinct from pre-colonial attempts by various pre-

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tenders to capture the throne. Two famous monks died in British jails, and violent political and religious demonstrations against the British and Indians were sometimes led by monks. Students protested against the British because of stringent University of Rangoon regulations, and youth led the nationalist movement in the 1930s. The model is still significant today, not only because of historical precedents, but also because of the intense frustration of youth—young monks and students—who see little hope for their futures in a military-dominated system of limited social mobility except through the military and militaryapproved channels.

Dissent against the military as part of the administration—as opposed to the military itself—has been evident since the coup of 1962. Sporadic student-led demonstrations resulted in many deaths during the socialist period of 1962-1988.

The failed peoples’ revolution of 1988 was sparked by a student incident, but quickly engulfed the population as a whole. The 1962 military bombing of the Rangoon University Student Union, the fabled heart of the nationalist movement, as a result of student protests is evidence of the perceived importance of students as purveyors of dissent.

Dissent has been stifled in Burma/Myanmar through fear caused by ubiquitous surveillance, arrests, and long and arbitrary prison sentences. Inappropriate and “subversive” web sites are controlled; Internet access is limited. Yet the waxing tide of dissent in the fall of 2007 that caught the world’s attention is a watershed moment from which there is likely no return to stabilized control.

This is evident from the nature and knowledge of the transformational Saffron Revolution.

Dynamics of Dissent

The Saffron Revolution: The Social Context. On 15 August 2007,

the government made an announcement—massive increases in gas and oil prices—that the poor were unable to reconcile. As a result, there were extensive increases in bus fares for the poor, who had been shunted to the outskirts of many cities and who could not afford the new rates. Had the junta been aware of international events, it would have known that such increases have led to massive demonstrations in many countries. Myanmar was no exception. The interpenetration of globalization with the religion of a predominantly Buddhist state was amply demonstrated by the social grievances that set off the Saffron Revolution, though its causes were far more profound and intricate.

The people of Myanmar are mired in an economic crisis which is compounded by persistent inflation and which is occurring despite the regime’s increasing foreign exchange holdings. About half the population is at or below the poverty line; drop-out rates in primary school may reach 50 percent; some thirty percent of children are malnourished; malaria and tuberculosis are rampant; HIV/AIDS are prevalent; per capita state expenditures on healthcare are minimal; and food insecurity is common. According to the UN, Myanmar is one of the world’s least developed countries.2 Burma/Myanmar is profoundly Buddhist; some 85 percent of the population espouses the faith. This national Buddhism is central to the identity of most Burmans and a number of minority groups as well. One of the tenets of a Buddhist society is that the government must provide the conditions under which the people can practice their religion and Summer/Fall 2008 [ 5 3 ]

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thus improve their karmas. This includes the concern of the Sangha, or Buddhist monkhood, for the well-being of the people. The Buddhist administrative hierarchy, religious educational institutes and universities, and the numbers and types of Buddhist sects are rigidly controlled by the military. However, younger monks in many monasteries have considerable latitude in their actions. Although the Burmese consider symbolic entry into the Sangha for a certain amount of time to be a rite of passage for every young Buddhist boy, entry and exit from the Sangha is extremely easy and socially acceptable. Whatever the shortcomings of an individual monk, the Sangha is treated with great respect, far in excess of clergy in Western nations. The village monastery is the center of communal and religious life. Monastic education is still important in that society, and because of it, by the early nineteenth century Burma was considered the most literate society between Suez and Japan.

After years of failed attempts to do so, the military finally was able to register the monks and control the Sangha in 1980.

With the unannounced and overnight rise in bus fares—since rescinded because of the riots—monks in central Burma demonstrated in support of the poor.

The demonstrators were motivated by the decline in the people’s living standards, which have invariably led to reductions in laypersons’ food donations to Buddhist monasteries. There are documented cases of children being brought to the monks to be fed, since their own families were unable to provide nourishment.

Monks were also roughed up by the local military, which then refused to apologize, infuriating the Sangha.

The monks began to demonstrate in Yangon and were joined by students and [ 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

young people and students who formed a protective cordon on both sides of the long lines of robed monks, indicative of the extreme reverence shown to the Sangha. Prior to the demonstrations becoming overtly political in tone, the military showed unprecedented tolerance, even allowing some monks to march past Aung San Suu Kyi’s house, in which she was secluded under house arrest. The religious protests, however, expanded into cries for democracy and eventually became blatantly political in favor of the opposition party of Aung San Suu Kyi. Because of the perceived intensity of socio-economic and political futility, politicization of any demonstrations in Myanmar is feared by the authorities, who normally take immediate steps to prevent them and close schools and universities at any overt sign of discontent.

The fact that they initially allowed the monks to demonstrate reflects the sensitivity to Buddhism in Burmese society.

Eventually, however, military repression set in. Demonstrations were forcibly stopped with considerable violence; monasteries were raided at night, away from camera lenses; and midnight arrests of onlookers who seemed to have supported or encouraged the demonstrators caused fear to spread through the local population. Thousands were arrested and most were later freed, but the number of deaths remains unknown. The government claimed about a dozen died; the UN suggested several dozen; and one foreign embassy estimated about one hundred deaths. The repressed calm returned to Yangon, but fear permeated the atmosphere.

In the Public Eye: Globalization and the Junta. The Saffron Revolu-

tion might then seem to be relatively

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insignificant in terms of its duration and magnitude, certainly in comparison to the massive, nation-wide peoples’ revolution of 1988 that had failed. Domestically and internationally, however, its effects were profound. “To be Burmese is to be Buddhist,” goes the adage: the incidents of military beating and the humiliation of Buddhist monks in their robes have major consequences both for the military itself and for the population as a whole.3 This significance is increased because those images from the streets of Rangoon were available to the Burmese for the first time as a result of globalization. Satellite dishes are now plentiful in urban areas.4 The external world responded with outrage as films of the demonstrations and their brutal repression were shown on BBC, CNN International, and local stations all over the world. Already vilified for its human rights repression against dissenters both in and out of the formal opposition political structure, including its house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, and its military actions against minority rebellions, the Burmese government blamed the international community for causing its country’s violence.

These demonstrations, the military responded, were promoted by the evil forces of globalization: the imperialists, their minions, and expatriate dissidents had incited the people and purposefully employed “bogus” monks. Although the world responded with indignation, and the United States introduced yet another round of likely ineffective sanctions outlined by President Bush in his September 2007 address to the UN General Assembly, the international community’s reaction was programmatically weak.

The junta itself may have been shocked that the scenes of horror that

Dynamics of Dissent

inflamed the rest of the world were also available to Burmese citizens through their satellite dishes. This was unique in Burmese history: for the first time, the Burmese could see for themselves the effects of military brutality. Their concerns were no longer based on hearsay, rumor, and innuendo. Many individuals also had cell phone and video cameras, which captured the beatings in gory detail.

The junta had long insisted that it was immune to the dire effects of globalization. True, it needed to export gas, rice, and teak, and wanted assistance from China and India, but the influences from these countries could be controlled and were peripheral to continuing military political power. As much as Burma’s actions might embarrass ASEAN, member states could do little to influence the Burmese government. As many of their leaders have said in justification of noninterference, Burma was isolated for a generation under the previous regime, and thus could be so again and still survive. It has a surplus of rice and major natural resources, only some of which has been tapped.

But if foreign concerns would be ineffective under “regime change,” globalization and new technology have surpassed the military’s internal capacity for manipulation of public knowledge and opinion. In spite of attempted repression, dissent can no longer be kept in the penumbra, The most significant results of the Saffron Revolution are likely to be its internal repercussions, both among the overwhelmingly Buddhist population and, perhaps more importantly for political change, within the Buddhist military.

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in its newspaper, Metta, to demonstrate its acts of obeisance to the monks; donating to a monastery; or otherwise performing some good Buddhist act. Every day monks’ sermons are broadcast on state television. Buddhist slogans proliferate, and the military has claimed it acts with Buddhist Metta, or loving kindness, and thus must be obeyed. All this junta effort—a mixture of both sincere belief and propaganda—was destroyed in a few days of violence against the monks. Political legitimacy for the military through the Buddhist channel has been lost.

The state has not contributed to the well-being of its people, and it has violated the most cardinal of its social norms through its actions. The future is unclear. Will elements of the military turn on some of their leaders? Will the retirement of aging leaders bring change and reform under younger military officers? Will the legal but weakened opposition play any role in the near political future? Will the populace, frustrated and angry over the sacrilege and despairing of the future, take the situation into its own hands even though they remember the terror of 1988? What is the future for youth, who has no social mobility except through channels controlled by the military?

The Way Forward. For several years, the military has promised a “roadmap” to a multi-party “discipline-flourishing democracy.” The roadmap lacked international credibility, however, because it did not include a timetable. The junta claimed that there would be a new constitution, but consideration by a militarycontrolled group has technically been ongoing since 1992, and a referendum on that constitution—followed by new elections for a new government—is still [ 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

needed. Under the proposed constitution, the military would assert its primacy, control the appointment of the head of state, have the active-duty officers comprise 25 percent of the national and local legislatures, possess the ability to declare a state of emergency or impose martial law, and keep all military affairs, appointments, and budgets under military control.

The surprise announcement in February 2008 that a referendum would be held on the constitution in May 2008, followed by new elections in 2010, may have been prompted by the tumult over the Saffron Revolution. In other words, the timing of the referendum, as well as the referendum itself, may be the lifeline to save the military’s drowning leadership, as these planned events provide a safety net for the present and future military authorities. Perpetual military control through civilianized rule is also planned, for amending the constitution would require three-quarters-plus-one approval. Although the military would command all branches of government, even the legislature, some say that a constitution of almost any sort is better than the alternative—continuing rule by decree, meaning martial law. Whatever public opinion may be, the mass mobilization and explicitly military-controlled Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), composed of roughly one-third of the total population, will work with other state-controlled mass organizations to ensure passage of the constitutional referendum.

In effect, however, the timing of the referendum will undercut some foreign criticism. ASEAN, China, and India will admit that there has been some progress and ask the regime to continue to reform, while the United States will deny

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progress. Japan will likely continue to assist through debt relief and humanitarian aid.

Whatever the degree of government control over the elections, dissent against the military is unlikely to be tolerated.

The Saffron Revolution was ignited by the junta’s lack of understanding of globalized experience as it imprudently eliminated energy subsidies. At the same time, the military vilified the demonstrations as part of a globally—read “Western”—sponsored conspiracy. Yet the visceral, direct, and explosive reaction in Burma to suppression was partly a result of the new satellite television technology brought to Myanmar by globalization itself. Myanmar has entered a new era, one more dangerous for the military, but one that its oppressive government and corresponding dissent movement have brought forth themselves. Internal and

Dynamics of Dissent

The “Washington Consensus” that has inextricably linked market economies and democracy was one such example in which there was little dissent in multinational and national institutional settings and among the power elite. Indeed, the United States foreign policy position that democracy was the only form of governance that was acceptable is in itself a form of orthodoxy that is inherently inimical to the democratic norms of diversity of views and pluralism of power.

As much as the United States, the EU, ASEAN, and other states may deplore the tragedy of Burma/Myanmar—and it is a tragedy—their ability to affect badly needed reforms is extremely limited, short of a military adventurism that is as unthinkable as it is unwise. Sanctions and demands for change, both regime and otherwise, have been shown to be ineffective. More of the same, no matter how

Myanmar has entered a new era, one

more dangerous for the military but one which its oppressive government and corresponding dissent movement have brought on themselves. external dissent will grow and attempted suppression will follow, but the junta and any future government are unlikely to withstand the effects of globalization that have already found roots in Burmese society. Although national change seems most probable through the military’s internal transformation, some egregious and outrageous miscalculation by a lower official trying to please the high command could spark a new peoples’ revolution—saffron or multicolored.

The very concept of globalization has, ironically, produced its own orthodoxy.

morally satisfying to those who advocate such actions, will accomplish little except to increase nationalism and the identification of internal democratic elements with foreign powers, thus undercutting their effectiveness and internal legitimacy in periods of developing nationalistic fervor. The Saffron Revolution, more than anything foreigners can do, is more likely to affect change in that society because of the abhorrence of the repression among the people of Burma/Myanmar and many members of the military themselves.

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NOTES

1 In 1989, the military changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar, an old, written form. The Burmese opposition never accepted that change, made by a government it claims is illegitimate, and still use Burma, as does the United States. This the military regards as insulting. The UN and most other states use Myanmar. The use of either has become a surrogate indicator of political persuasions.

Here, both are used, together and singularly, without political intent–Myanmar since the coup of 1988, and Burma for the earlier period.

2 Burma was declared a least developed nation by the UN in December 1987. Various UNICEF reports delineate the state of poverty. According to the UNDP (2007/8) Burma/Myanmar received only $2.90 per

[ 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

capita economic assistance in 2005, compared to $49.90 to Laos and $38.20 to Cambodia.

3 Significantly, the junta and virtually all of the colonel and higher ranks of the tatmadaw military are “Burman” Buddhists. Significant glass ceilings exist for both Christians and Muslims, and for the minorities as well. This was not true under the civilian administration. “Burman” refers to the majority ethnic group (two-thirds of the population); the military now call them “Bamas.”

4 There are said to be some 60,000 registered dishes and perhaps another 30,000 unregistered.

From this writer’s high hotel room on one of Yangon’s main streets, he stopped counting after he saw eighty satellite television dishes on other buildings.

Politics&Diplomacy The AKP Catalyst

Progressive Islamists and Ambitious Kurds Michael M. Gunter The Turkish military led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the modern Republic of Turkey as a secular republic in 1923.1 Although Ataturk formally ruled Turkey as a civilian president, his ultimate power was clearly based on his military background. Indeed, the Turkish military has always thought of itself as the ultimate guardian of the Turkish state and, as a result, has intervened to remove civilian governments four times (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997), a role that has come to contradict modern democratic ideals.2 Over the years, the Kemalists, the secular descendants of Ataturk, and their military allies have successfully maintained that a secular Turkey was the only road to progress, reform, and modernization, which today is seen by many Turks as membership in the European Union (EU).3 The Islamists, on the other hand, have always been painted as reactionary drags on the vision of a modern progressive Turkey. Nevertheless, it has not been easy to dismiss lightly the nation’s Islamic heritage.4 Since the beginnings of multi-party democracy in the elections of 1950, Turkey’s Islamic roots have proven important and even decisive in the evolution of Turkish politics. The ruling Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes in the 1950s and the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel in the 1960s and 1970s both depended on latent Islamic support. Moreover, the vari-

Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University and teaches during the summer at the International University in Vienna, Austria.

He is the author of six critically praised scholarly books on the Kurdish question, the most recent being The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey.

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THE AKP CATALYST

ous Islamic parties headed by Necmettin Erbakan beginning in the 1960s, all eventually banned by the secular establishment, boldly espoused an Islamic agenda.

In 1996, Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (RP) or Welfare Party briefly even came to power until it was forced to resign by the military’s post-modern coup in June 1997.5 Both the Refah Party and its Fazilet (Virtue) successor were then banned by Turkey’s Constitutional Court. However, from the roots of this Islamic debacle, Recep Tayyip Erdoðan founded a new moder ate successor AKP (Adalet ve Kalkýnma Partisi or Justice and Development Party) in August 2001, which swept to victory in November 2002 as Turkey’s first majority government since the 1980s.6 After a brief interlude, Erdoðan became prime minister in 2003. The stage was set for a seemingly contradictory switching of roles: progressive Islamists versus reactionary secularists. This article will analyze the dramatic constitutional crisis that occurred between the AKP, and the Turkish military and its Kemalist (secular) allies in 2007 and what this entails for the future.

Rejecting previous Islamic hostilities toward the West, Erdoðan ’s AKP instead committed itself to pursuing Turkish membership in the EU immediately upon coming to power in 2002.

This, of course, entailed liberal political and economic reforms that challenged the privileged position of the Kemalist secularists and military. During the fledgling years of AKP’s rule, Turkey’s “EU-phoria” prevented the military from confronting it. Once inevitable EU skepticism had set in, however, the military felt strong enough to reassert itself before it had been politically reduced beyond reply. This inherent struggle

[ 6 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

came to a head in April 2007 when the AKP nominated Abdullah Gül to be the new president of Turkey. Since the AKP possessed the necessary majority in the parliament to elect him, Gül’s victory seemed a foregone conclusion. The secular opposition, however, seized upon this moment to block what it saw as the loss of one of its last bastions of power.

On 13 April, General Yaþar Büyükanýt, the Turkish military’s chief of staff, called a rare press conference in which he declared that he hoped that the next president would not simply pay lip service to Turkey’s secular constitution but genuinely respect it.7 Then just before midnight on 27 April, the military posted on its web site an e-memorandum warning against the threat posed by some groups aiming to destroy Turkey’s secular system under the cover of religion.8 Outgoing secularist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer already had claimed that “since the foundation of the Republic, Turkey’s political regime has never been under this much threat” and that “both domestic and foreign forces seek Turkey to become a conservative Islam model.”9 At the same time, massive public protests against the AKP numbering over a million each had already begun in Turkey’s major cities of Ankara on 14 April, Istanbul on 29 April, and Izmir on 13 May. Smaller but still impressive ones of over 100,000 each also occurred in Canakkale, Denizli, Marmaris, and Manisa. Pro-secular associations, crowded with retired military officers and brandishing slogans against the AKP, EU, and globalization, helped to assemble these protests. Organizations such as the Türkiye Emekli Subaylar Derneði (TESUD) or Society of Retired Officers headed by retired Major-General Riza Kucukoglu, as well as the Atatürkcü Düþünce Derneði

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(ADD) or Society for Kemalist Thought headed by retired General Þener Eruygur, the former commander of the Gendarmerie, for example, played an important role in galvanizing the massive popular demonstrations against the AKP in April and May of 2007. Secular women’s groups were also prominent in the demonstrations. The secularist opposition then managed to block Gül’s election by simply boycotting the parliamentary election and thus denying that body the necessary two-thirds quorum, a questionable tactic whose constitutionality, however, was quickly upheld by the secularist-controlled Constitutional Court.10 Erdoðan was thus for ced to call early parliamentary elections to try to break the deadlock. In another web site message, the military urged a “reflex action en masse against these terrorist acts.”11 Thus, while history has repeatedly shown military incursions into Turkish politics, the AKP represents an entirely

Politics & Diplomacy

the state in the economy.”12 Increasingly, the AKP has assumed a position as a center-right party, rather than an Islamic one. Some have seen an analogy between the AKP and Europe’s post-World War II progressive-conservative Christian Democratic parties as well as Western catchall parties. Erdoðan r epeatedly has stressed that the AKP is committed to democracy and Turkey’s secular identity.13 In power, he has established a can-do reputation of clean government, instituting democratic reforms necessary to achieve eventual EU membership. He has successfully endeavored to market Turkey abroad, attract foreign capital, pursue privatization and a liberal market economy, provide necessary services, and initiate a host of political reforms to harmonize Turkish and EU law. Under Erdoðan, T urkey has enjoyed an average of 7.5 percent in annual growth, $20 billion in direct foreign investment, an annual export volume of almost $100

Whether or not Erdoðan has a secret

Islamic agenda is something that only the future will be able to judge definitively. new sort of Islamic movement in Turkey, one exhibiting uniquely modern traits.

According to M. Hakan Yavuz, the nature of Turkish Islamic politics was already beginning to reflect modern imperatives: “The Islamism of the 1980s differed from the Islamic movements of the 1960s and 1970s in its social basis, nature, and impact…For example, the RP-led Islamic movement shifted from being an anti-global, market-oriented, small merchant and farmer’s party to one that demands full integration into the global market and sees a reduced role for

billion, an inflation rate below 10 percent, and a record 50,000 plus point high on the Istanbul Stock Exchange.14 Such stunning economic achievements can be expected to benefit the masses in terms of higher employment opportunities, greater tax revenues, more social spending, and improved educational opportunities, among others. In August 2005, he went so far as to admit that Turkey had a “Kurdish problem” and needed more democracy to solve it.15 Even his opponents agree that Turkey’s economy has done very well under

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 6 1 ]

THE AKP CATALYST

Erdoðan. Whether or not Er doðan has a secret Islamic agenda is something that only the future will be able to judge definitively. Given the secular democratic reforms AKP has instituted, however, it would be very difficult for it to change to an Islamic agenda.

Following the AKP’s unprecedented victory in the parliamentary elections held on 22 July 2007, the new parliament finally elected Gül as president by a simple majority in the third round of voting on 28 August 2007. He had failed to be elected to the office in the first two rounds because an unattainable twothirds majority had been required. Gül thus became Turkey’s first president with an Islamist background. After warning against “centers of evil” trying to undermine the secular state, the Chief of the Turkish general staff General Yasar Buyukanit declined to attend Gül’s lowkey swearing in ceremony.16 Gül’s wife also was absent because she wears a hijab, or headscarf, seen by many secularists as a symbol of political Islam. Since this head garment is banned from state institutions, it will be interesting to see how Hayrunnisa Gül will be able to wear it in the presidential palace. Even more interesting, of course, will be whether Erdogan and Gül will be able to continue their close relationship now that the latter has been elevated to the position of chief of state. It should be noted, however, that although the president has the power to veto laws, appoint the prime minister as well as many other key figures, and dissolve parliament, the prime minister remains by far the most important political figure in Turkey.

The Secularists. Turkey’s phenomenal economic success since the early 1990s has created a new socially conserv-

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ative Anatolian middle class of urban migrants with strong Islamic roots who have become entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and politicians. Industry too, represented by the Türk Sanayici ve Ýþadamlarý Derneði (TÜSÝAD) or the Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen—which is dominated by massive holding companies such as Koc, Sabancý, and Eczacýbasý—is part of this new mix. This new middle class is represented by the AKP and challenges the long-existing privileges of the older Kemalist middle class that largely consisted of civil servants and bureaucrats.

Politically, this older Kemalist middle class has been represented by the party Atatürk himself founded back in 1923, the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP).

Since the beginning of two-party politics in Turkey in 1950, the CHP has been largely on the defensive, and despite occasional revivals, slowly losing more and more support. Today Deniz Baykal, who has come to see his party’s future closely tied to that of the military rather than its supposed social democratic ideology, heads the CHP.17 During the AKP’s sweep to power in the election of November 2002, the CHP was the only other party that managed to pass the 10 percent threshold and enter parliament, but with less than 20 percent of the overall vote. Although this was actually an improvement over its previous showing that had dropped it out of the parliament in the 1999 election, the CHP proved to be largely an ineffective opposition to the AKP, at least until it managed to block the election of an AKP president in April 2007.

In its 2007 election manifesto, the CHP questioned Turkey’s EU negotiations because it knew that it would be

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impossible to maintain a Kemalist state if Turkey joined the EU.18 Almost desperately, Baykal now declared that “Erdoðan speaks with the language of terrorists and supports the view of Barzani [the Iraqi Kurdish leader].”19 These references were an attempt to paint the AKP as weak on the national security issue because it was unwilling to authorize a large-scale military intervention against the PKK in northern Iraq.

As an unabashed nationalist party, the Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP) or Nationalist Movement Party also sees the national security issue as its own special domain.

Presently, Devlet Bahçeli, a former economics professor, leads it. Frustrated by Turkey’s EU candidacy, which it sees as a conspiracy against the very independence of the state, the MHP also sees the Kurdish issue as one of terrorism and economic marginalization, rather than a struggle for legitimate democratic rights.

The CHP and the MHP have established a tacit xenophobic, anti-globalization alliance that accuses the AKP of submitting to the United States and EU as well as having a secret Islamic agenda. Clearly, the AKP has benefited from the incompetence and corruption of the secular political parties. The disastrous earthquake in 1999 and the Susurluk scandal in 1996 provide telling examples.

Thus, by understanding the Turkish political dynamic and providing muchappreciated economic handouts, the AKP has become very successful. Almost by default, it is the only mainline party that plausibly has something positive to offer towards dealing intelligently with Turkey’s economic and Kurdish problems. The AKP’s massive electoral victory in the parliamentary elections of July 2007 represented a resounding vote of confidence in its policies. On the other

Politics & Diplomacy

hand, AKP’s victory was a powerful rejection of the military and secularists that had created the constitutional crisis in the first place.

Turkish Invasion of Northern Iraq? Following Prime Minister

Erdogan’s visit to the United States and meeting with U.S. President George Bush in November 2007, President Gül journeyed to Washington early in January 2008 for wide-ranging talks with Bush.

As a result of these talks, the United States seemed to be willing to give Turkey more cooperation in its continuing struggle against the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). For their part, however, the AKP leaders appeared to be signaling the U.S. president that Turkey still lacked any comprehensive political plan to deal with the Kurdish problem despite U.S. urgings. Both Turkish leaders did appear to get along with their host and thus begin the process of renewing their states’ traditional friendly relations and alliance. Bush’s meetings with Erodogan and then Gül also gave the two Turkish leaders further legitimacy that would probably help them stand up successfully to any further criticisms from the Turkish military.20 During the final months of 2007, significant speculation arose about a possible Turkish intervention into northern Iraq to root out the supposedly terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that continues periodically to strike Turkey from safe houses in the mountains of northern Iraq, which is now thought to be governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This is indeed a terrible problem for the KRG, all the more because Turkey’s secret goal in all this may be to annihilate the KRG itself as well as prevent if from annexing oil-

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rich Kirkuk to the south.21 A successful Turkish military intervention against the PKK into northern Iraq could theoretically accomplish all three of these goals.

The Turkish argument for intervention becomes all the stronger when one realizes that the United States is already overstretched trying to contain the Iraqi insurgency to the south and is in no position to send its troops on a wild goose chase into the mountains of northern Iraq after the PKK. Even more, how can one expect the Iraqi Kurds to join Turkey in a fight against their ethnic kin, which of course they did in 1992 at the behest of Turkey and much to their subsequent regret? Indeed, a war between the KRG and PKK might lead to the destruction of the KRG—possibly Turkey’s ultimate ambition in this entire affair. Thus, it is only in Turkey’s interest to strike the PKK in northern Iraq.

Nevertheless, Turkey would be likely to accomplish little by intervening in northern Iraq (the KRG). The rugged terrain and undefined mountainous border between Turkey and the KRG would create huge obstacles for any mili-

membership chances very badly. Based on all these factors, it would seem that only small border incursions, cross-border shelling, and air attacks such as those that have been occurring since November 2007 would be considered, barring, of course, new military developments.22

AKP-Turkish Military Interactions. The legal and political condi-

tion of the Turkish Kurds is changing dramatically. Long gone are the days when they were being dismissed as mere “Mountain Turks” and the very term “Kurd” suffering pejorative treatment.

What has given rise to this new dawn awakening? Despite the PKK being labeled as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, and the EU, reports from a recent trip to Diyarbakir, the unofficial capital of Turkish Kurdistan, found few Kurds wanting to criticize the rebel PKK and its imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan.23 Rather, there is pride that the PKK was a formidable force that came close to successfully challenging the Turkish state. In more recent years, the belief is that since the PKK has repeated-

There is pride that the PKK was a

formidable force that came close to successfully challenging the Turkish state. tary operation. Furthermore, intervention would largely reverse Turkey’s historic and popular decision of March 2003 not to intervene in northern Iraq in support of the United States. Such an incursion would in turn destroy the mutually profitable economic relations the two are currently enjoying. Finally, Turkey’s intervention might hurt its EU

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ly shown a willingness to engage peacefully in the political process, the onus is now on the Turkish state to respond positively. Some have argued that the PKK attacks against Turkish targets in the fall of 2007 were provoked by earlier Turkish offensive strikes seeking clashes with the PKK that then could be used as an excuse to invade northern Iraq and eliminate

GUNTER

the KRG as well as to gain leverage over the AKP Government.24 Others have maintained that some of the reputed PKK attacks actually were Turkish “falseflag operations” masquerading as the PKK. The Beytussebap assault that killed thirteen people early in October 2007 is one supposed example.25 Even Metin Heper, a renowned Turkish scholar, arguing for the beneficent intentions of the Turkish state towards Kurds admitted: “The military ...tended to resort to harsh measures…In some instances those measures bordered on and, at times, turned out to be outright human rights violations.”26 In his recent sociological analysis of Turkey’s village resettlement program for the southeast, Joost Jongerden pointed out how “initially, the Turkish Armed Forces had played into PKK hands by taking defensive and static positions.”27 In time, however, the army “was forced into rethinking its whole approach to the war.

It transformed its strategy to one…which comprised…the application of the principles of a (fluid, dynamic) ‘war of movement,’ and…a strategy of environment contraction and deprivation.”

Effectively barred from entry into the Turkish parliament by the 10 percent threshold, as noted above, the legal Kurdish party called the Democratic Society Party (DTP) still managed to gain seats in the recent national elections of 22 July 2007 by having twenty of its candidates elected as independents. Thus, for the first time since the Democracy Party (DEP) was expelled from the Turkish Parliament in March 1994, an avowed Kurdish party has entered the national legislature.

More importantly perhaps, the AKP— with its roots in Islamic politics—garnered even more votes from Turkey’s

Politics & Diplomacy

ethnic Kurds by stressing its economic reforms and conservative values. The DTP seemingly erred by focusing more on political and ideological demands, but ignoring more immediately important bread and butter socio-economic issues. On the other hand, the AKP, as noted above, has come to represent a convergence of moderate, popular Islam with liberal economics, secularism, and moderate nationalism, portraying a modern democratic Turkey that is comfortable with its Islamic heritage and is seriously working to become fit to join the EU.28 The result is a complete reversal in Turkish politics. As previously noted, in an attempt to preserve their privileged position, the secularist Kemalists as well as the military have adopted a reactionary anti-Western position and are now skeptical about Turkey’s EU candidacy. On the other hand, the AKP, despite its Islamic roots, has become progressive supporters of the EU and the West, in part admittedly to protect itself from any state crackdown as had occurred against previous Islamic parties.

In addition, one might even argue that both the Turkish military and the PKK have a vested interest in keeping their struggle going or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant politically. On the other hand, the AKP has come to represent the best hope for ending the struggle with a political solution that integrates the Kurds into Turkey’s political system.

Thus, during the fall of 2007, the PKK (or at least elements of it) were seeking to provoke a Turkish military strike against it in northern Iraq, and the Turkish military was pushing to accommodate the PKK and thus embarrass or even sabotage the AKP’s hopes to begin solving the Kurdish problem.29

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Turkey for successfully handling its constitutional crisis over the election of a new president and for reforms bringing its laws on goods and services closer to EU standards. However, the report also chided Turkey for limited progress on political reforms in 2007 and found that significant further efforts were needed on freedom of expression, civil control of the military, and the rights of nonMuslim religious communities, in particular.

In a pointed reference to the notorious Article 301 of the Turkish penal code that makes it an offense to insult “Turkishness,” the report declared that “the Turkish legal system does not fully guarantee freedom of expression in line with European standards.”33 Indeed, the number of prosecutions of journalists, intellectuals, and human rights activists almost doubled in 2006 and had increased again in 2007. Along with the assassination of the well-known TurkishArmenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007, this has helped create a climate of self-censorship.

In reference to the Kurdish issue, the EU progress report noted that Turkey had made “no progress in the area of cultural rights.”34 In the Sur municipality, for example, “the Council of State dismissed the mayor from office and dissolved the Municipal council for providing multilingual municipal services.”35 Moreover, “the overall socio-economic situation in the south-east remains difficult. No steps have been taken to develop a comprehensive strategy to achieve economic and social development in the region and to create the conditions EU Progress Report. In November required for the Kurdish population to 2007, the EU Commission issued an enjoy full rights and freedoms.”36 As for important new progress report on torture, “cases still occur, especially Turkey’s EU candidacy.32 It praised before detention starts... Turkey needs to

The AKP has been reluctant to respond with any large-scale military incursion into northern Iraq for reasons covered above. The Turkish military, on the other hand, favors such an intervention in part as a means to question the AKP’s national security credentials for opposing it. So far, however, the two have learned to compromise and co-exist on this issue, probably because both realize that Turkey’s over-all interest would best be served by a more nuanced response to the PKK. On 23 November 2007, a new problem arose when Turkey’s Constitutional Court agreed to examine a request from state prosecutors to ban the DTP and expel it from parliament because of its calls for Kurdish autonomy and its suspected links to the PKK. The Turkish military favored the proposal. Such a move, however, would throw the Kurdish question in Turkey back to the banning of DEP (an earlier Kurdish party) more than thirteen years earlier and threaten much of the recent progress and current hope. Protests immediately ensued in Diyarbakir, and the police detained dozens.30 Prime Minister Erdogan opposed the ban, but renewed his call for the DTP to denounce PKK terrorism: “Our unilateral desire will not be enough to keep them inside democracy. They should see the two cannot go hand in hand and prefer democracy over terrorism.”31 The Turkish leader also issued a strong appeal for expanding Kurdish rights by declaring, “Let’s look together for ways of winning over the people instead of alienating them.”

[ 6 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

GUNTER

investigate more thoroughly allegations that there have been human rights violations by the members of the security forces.”37 On the other hand, the report added that the PKK was on the EU terrorist list while also mentioning that “several hundred terrorist attacks have been recorded since the beginning of the year causing multiple casualties.”38 The progress report further noted that “the armed forces continued to exercise significant political influence. . . . The General Staff directly interfered with the April 2007 presidential election by publishing a memorandum on its website expressing concern at the alleged weakening of secularism in the country.”39 Thus, “no progress has been made in ensuring full civilian supervisory functions over the military and parliamentary oversight of defense expenditure. On the contrary, the tendency for the military to make public comments on issues going beyond its remit, including on the reform agenda, has increased.”40 Furthermore, “no progress has been made towards abolishing the system of village guards.”41 Indeed, the government was contemplating further recruitment of these pro-state militia of ethnic Kurds criticized by many as an instrument of state repression.

The EU progress report also criticized Turkey for not opening its ports to vessels from (Greek) Cyprus as part of a nor-

Politics & Diplomacy

malization of relations with that EU member. In addition, there was insufficient progress in fighting corruption, judicial reform, and the rights of trade unions, women, and children. “With respect to internally displaced persons...the number of IDPs in Turkey is substantially higher than previous estimates, and stands between 950,000 and 1,200,000.”42 It was clear that EU membership for Turkey was still a distant hope.

Conclusion. This article has analyzed the Turkish constitutional crisis of 2007 that occurred between the AKP (with its roots in Islamic politics) and the Turkish military with its Kemalist (secularist) allies over the election of the AKP leader Abdullah Gül as president. The very fate of Turkish democracy seemed to hang in the balance, but in the end the AKP scored a resounding parliamentary electoral victory in July 2007. This triumph gave the AKP the votes and moral authority to elect Gül president at the end of August 2007. Despite the Cassandra-like warnings of imminent doom for the AKP and Turkish democracy, the Turkish military and its Kemalist (secularist) allies begrudgingly accepted the results. Although the two sides now appear to co-exist, it is clear that their competition for the heart and mind of Turkey will still continue.

NOTES

1 Andrew Mango, Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (Woodstock & New York: Overlook Press, 1999); Lord Kinross, Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey (New York: William Morrow, 1965).

2 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); Eric Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 2nd ed.

(London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).

3 William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Mehmet Ali Birand, The General’s Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980 (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1987); 12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ankara: Ongun Kardesler Printing House, 1982).

4 Jacob M. Landau, ed., Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

5 Serif Mardin, Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006); Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular

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Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).

6 Michael M. Gunter, “The Silent Coup: The Secularist-Islamist Struggle in Turkey,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 21 (1998): 1-12.

7 M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006); Omer Taspinar, “The Old Turks Revolt,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 114-30.

8 “Strong Warning to Erdogan by Secular Establishment,” Briefing, 16 April 2007: 2.

9 “E-Muhtira,” Internet, http://www.tsk.mil.tr.

10 “Sezer’s Farewell Speech: The Republican Regime has Never Been under This Much Threat,” Briefing, 16 April 2007:3.

11 Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkish Court Blocks Islamist Candidate,” International Herald Tribune, 2 May 2007.

12 “The Text of the General Staff Press Release,” Briefing, 11 June 2007: 14.

13 M. H. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 213.

14 “Das Sakulare Gesicht der Turkei Bewahren,” Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 18 May 2007.

15 Ihsan Dagi, “The Roots of the AKP’s Strength,” Today’s Zaman, 12 July 2007.

16 “The Sun Also Rises in the South East,” Briefing, 15 August 2005:1-2.

17 Cited in “Abdullah Gül’s Presidential Ambitions Have Long Alarmed Turkey’s Secular Establishment,” BBC News, 28 August 2007.

18 Ihsan Dagi, “To Democratize Turkey, First Democratize the CHP,” Today’s Zaman, 9 July 2007.

19 Ihsan Dagi, “The CHP and MHP: A Joint Nationalist Foreign Policy Front,” Today’s Zaman, 28 June 2007.

20 Cited in “Election Campaigns Take a Start,” Briefing, 18 June 2007: 4; Ihsan Dagi, “The CHP and the Military: What Are They Up To?” Today’s Zaman, 14 June 2007.

21 “Press Background Briefing on the President’s Meeting with President Gül of Turkey,” Internet, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01, (date accessed: 8 January 2008); “President Gül Heralds Brand New Era in Relations with the United States,” Today’s Zaman, 9 January 2008; Cengiz Candar, “Anything New on ‘Kurdish Issue’ on Western Front?” Turkish Daily News, 11 January 2008. F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 86 (July/August 2007): 103-14.

22 Asa Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey’s Kurdish Policy (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007).

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23“Turkish Planes bomb Northern Iraq,” Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk, (date accessed: 16 December 2007).

24 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York and London: New York University Press, 2007); Ali Kemal Ozcan, Turkey’s Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

25 Andrew Mcgregor, “Tactical and Strategic Factors in Turkey’s Offensive Against the PKK,” Terrorism Focus 4 (2007); Deborah Haynes, “We Will Fight to the Death, Kurdish Rebel Leader Vows from His Hideout,” Times of London, 18 October 2007.

26 “HPG [PKK] Statement on Beytussebap Massacre,” Internet, http://rastibini.blogspot.com/, (date accessed: 2 October 2007).

27 Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 140.

28 Joost Jongerden, The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 286.

29 Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Paradox: Progressive Islamists versus Reactionary Secularists,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16 (2007): 289-301; M. Hakan and Nihat Ali Ozcan, “Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages,” Middle East Policy 14 (2007): 118-135.

30 Ihsan Dagi, “Is Kemalism Compatible with Democracy?” Today’s Zaman, 4 October 2007; Ihsan Dagi, “The Future of Kemalism and the Istanbul Biennial,” Today’s Zaman, 1 October 2007; Ihsan Dagi, “Is the PKK Trying to Provoke a Cross-Border Operation?” Today’s Zaman, 22 October 2007.

31 “Police Clash with Protesters over Status of Kurdish Party,” Internet, www.nytimes.com, (date accessed: 26 November 2007).

32 “Turkish PM Opposes DTP Closure at Party Meeting,” New Anatolian, 26 November 2007.

33 Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2007 Progress Report (Brussels, 6 November 2007).

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39.Ibid.

40.Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42.Ibid.

Politics &Diplomacy

What Can Iraq’s Neighbors Contribute?

Daniel Serwer Among the many debatable issues in Iraq today is the question of its immediate neighbors: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. Are they causing instability in Iraq?

Can and should they be restrained? What positive contributions could they make? How can the United States deal with them in a way that encourages such positive contributions and discourages destabilizing moves?

We begin by examining the interests of each neighbor vis-àvis Iraq in the context of their relations with the United States.

We then look at the official diplomatic moves that have been undertaken and analyze the potential for positive contributions. The overall conclusion is that the official talks are unlikely to reach the substantial potential that exists, because of limited commitment on the part of the United States, Iraq, and its neighbors. This situation can be remedied, but only with U.S. willingness to clarify its future role in Iraq.1

Daniel Serwer is vice president of the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations and the Centers of Innovation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). He coordinates USIP’s efforts in societies emerging from conflict, especially Afghanistan, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq, and Sudan. He served as the executive director of the Iraq Study Group and led its Political Development Expert Working Group.

The Neighbors in Principle Want a Stable Iraq, but Their Behavior is Tearing It Apart. Three of

Iraq’s Arab neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan— share a common conviction that Iraq is, and should remain, not only united but also part of the Arab world, which for

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WHAT CAN IRAQ’S NEIGHBORS CONTRIBUTE?

them is a Sunni world. They dread a Shia-dominated Iraq. Saudi Arabia has snubbed Prime Minister Maliki for this reason and has dragged its feet on debt forgiveness and diplomatic relations.

Jordan has shaky relations with Baghdad and has made no secret of its interest in seeing an autocratic government there, preferably one with a Sunni or secular bent. Kuwait mainly emphasizes economic relations with Iraq and fears that Baghdad will fall increasingly within Tehran’s sphere of influence.2 While fearing the Shia-dominated Iraq that necessarily results from an American intervention that favored a democratic political regime in Baghdad, friendship with the United States prevents Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan from doing all they could to undermine the Maliki government and encourages them to pay at least lip service to support-

could well prove threatening to Iraq’s future unity if they decide to engage in military confrontation with Shia militias or Iraqi army units, which are predominantly Shia and Kurdish.

Syria is different. Its hostile relations with the United States, interest in preventing an American success in Iraq, and its traditional role as a haven for Arab political exiles have made it a more transparent supporter of insurgency. Syria would not want Iraq to come apart completely, but it serves Damascus purpose to see the United States tied down there and also in need of Syrian assistance to stem the flow of financing, arms and, personnel to the Sunni insurgency. Damascus has made it clear that its price for fullfledged cooperation on Iraq is reopening of serious talks on return of the Golan Heights by Israel. While there are recent signs of increased vigilance at Syria’s bor-

Stabilizing a country requires positive

cooperation from the neighbors, which are bound to have strong interests and substantial means to pursue them. ing it. Rumors abound that the Saudis turn a blind eye to financing of Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and there are unofficial Saudi, Jordanian, and Kuwaiti connections for many of the suicide bombers in Iraq. But at the same time Saudi money and connections seem to be playing a role in the various Sunni “Awakenings,” armed Sunni groups that are taking on Al-Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar and other governorates. These armed Sunni groups, while operating under the aegis of the U.S.-led Coalition as “concerned citizens” or “sons of Iraq” and nominally linked to the government in Baghdad, [ 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ders with Iraq, it remains to be seen whether this represents a fundamental change in Damascus’ posture.3 Iraq’s non-Arab neighbors—Turkey and Iran—have as much interest in a united Iraq as do the Arab neighbors.

Turkey does not want to see an independent Kurdistan, even one that is both Muslim and secularist like Turkey itself, because it fears independence would inspire redoubled Kurdish guerilla efforts inside Turkey. Iran sees a Shiadominated government in Baghdad as a major expansion of its sphere of influence and a step towards the regional

SERWER

Politics & Diplomacy

itive cooperation from the neighbors, which are bound to have strong interests and substantial means to pursue them.

Even a relatively weak neighbor like Syria can exploit its geographical proximity to make stability difficult to achieve. Iran and Saudi Arabia bring vastly greater resources to bear in a country whose borders are largely unguarded, much of whose current leadership spent years in Tehran, and whose rebellious Sunni minority receives ample assistance from Saudi sources.

Positive cooperation from the neighbors is not impossible to envisage, as all of them nominally seek a united Iraq, as does the United States (even if many Arabs are inclined to suspect that this is not true). The problem is that they distrust each other and the United States enough to support proxies who seek by force of arms to ensure protection or dominance for a particular sect. And the United States in turn distrusts Iran and Syria enough to try simply to shut them Positive Engagement by the out of Iraq, without the substantial Neighbors Could Make a Differ- means required to accomplish that ence. If the neighbors could be brought objective. Iran, in particular, has such a around to more positive engagement, strong foothold in southern Iraq and in would it make a difference? There is the dominant Shia political parties that it considerable debate on this issue in is hard to see how capture of a few medWashington. Some argue that the contri- dling Revolutionary Guards will stem its bution of the neighbors to instability in interference with efforts to stabilize Iraq.

What could the neighbors accomplish Iraq is marginal and that most of the problems—sectarian violence, Ba’athist if they wanted to be helpful? A great deal resistance, and Shia militias—are indige- is the answer. The Saudis, Jordanians, nous.5 Others argue that Iran and Syria and Syrians could cut off the pipelines of in particular have created the problems suicide bombers, financing, and arms in Iraq and need to be pushed back by the that flow all too easily into Iraq.6 LikeUnited States. Some mumble quietly that wise, Iran could back off its support for Saudi Arabia is as bad as Iran. the Shia militias and increase support to This is not a fruitful debate. It does the central government, in deed as it not matter whether the neighbors are does generally in word. Turkey, instead causing the problems or aggravating of using military force that arouses Kurthem. Stabilizing a country requires pos- dish nationalism, could seek a negotiated hegemony it wants. An independent Kurdistan would unsettle Iran’s own large Kurdish minority and possibly encourage other minority claims as well (only about 50 percent of Iran’s population is Persian).4 Yet Turkey and Iran, like the Arab neighbors, may do things that ultimately could undermine Iraq’s stability and unity. Turkey’s recent incursions into northern Kurdistan and bombings of PKK safe havens have provoked a strong Kurdish nationalist reaction. Iran’s infiltration of southern Iraq, where it exercises influence through militias like the Badr brigade and the Mahdi Army, offends Sunni (as well as many Shia) Iraqis and makes it difficult for Iraq to arrive at a stable political compact. Iran’s proxy military presence in southern Iraq also threatens U.S. forces there, whose eventual withdrawal from Iraq will be a long and arduous effort over exposed routes running through the south.

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WHAT CAN IRAQ’S NEIGHBORS CONTRIBUTE?

solution to the problems of the PKK and Kirkuk, the northern oil province that the Kurds claim as part of Kurdistan against resistance from Iraq’s Turkoman minority and from Ankara. Whether the neighbors are at the origin of Iraq’s instability, or merely aggravating it, such moves would make an enormous difference.

Official Talks so far Have Limited Results. Iraq’s neighbors have been

meeting on and off since January 2003, when Istanbul convened a meeting to consider ways of avoiding the U.S.-Iraq war.7 Iraq did not participate until February 2004 in Kuwait. The United States kept its distance, with the exception of a large meeting in Brussels in June 2005.8 After several years of ignoring Iraq’s neighbors even as it loudly blamed Tehran and Damascus for making trouble inside Iraq, Washington in the past year has turned towards more engagement. The United States and Iraq have engaged the neighbors, including Iran and Syria, in a series of discussions involving ambassadors and foreign ministers that began in March 2007 in Baghdad. The most recent meeting convened in Istanbul in November 2007, and the next one will take place in Kuwait in April 2008. This process foresees a series of working groups on energy, refugees, and security, including a Damascus meeting on refugees hosted by Syria in August 2007 that has led to limited cooperation with Washington.9 The United States and Iran have held a series of meetings in Baghdad under Iraqi auspices between their respective ambassadors, which were focused in particular on the security situation in Iraq.10 At the same time, the UN-organized International Compact with Iraq, released at the [ 7 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

May 2007 expanded neighbors meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh, provides a framework for marshalling regional and international economic assistance and debt relief.11 Something, but not a lot, has come of these efforts. There are signs of more cooperation from Damascus on controlling its border with Iraq. Riyadh has formally established diplomatic relations with Baghdad and agreed in principle to follow the Paris Club lead in forgiving Iraq’s debt, though the exact figure for the amount is yet to be confirmed. The United States has released a number of Iranians captured inside Iraq, and Shia militia attacks on U.S. forces and on Sunnis have declined with the declaration of a recent ceasefire by Mahdi Army leader Moqtada al-Sadr, extended in February 2008 for another six months.12 There is a potentially much richer agenda for Iraq and its neighbors than has been treated so far in official talks. At a Track 1.5 meeting sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace in March in Istanbul, officials and non-officials from Iraq and its neighbors outlined both common objectives and areas of potential cooperation in order to achieve them: in addition to security, energy, and refugees, these included stopping incitement, strengthening governance, promoting national reconciliation, and planning for eventual U.S. withdrawal.13 In addition, the United States could improve the likelihood of positive outcomes from official talks by expanding their scope and including other regional issues.

The Missing Ingredient: A Time Horizon for U.S. Withdrawal.

While the neighbors can certainly be faulted for failing to do what they can to stabilize Iraq, the critical missing ingre-

SERWER

dient is something Washington has to provide: a commitment to a time horizon for withdrawal of its military forces from Iraq. None of the neighbors wants immediate withdrawal—even the Iranians in their less flamboyant moments have been clear about wanting a plan that could extend over years. The same is true of the Iraqis: even Sunni rejectionists and Shia firebrand Moqtada al Sadr have recognized that immediate withdrawal

Politics & Diplomacy

essary to avoid the fragmentation of Iraq, which would not be in their interest. It would not be wise from this perspective to yank U.S. troops out quickly, but giving all the neighbors and the Iraqi factions a time horizon of several years would give them the time and incentive to put things in order, reaching mutual accommodations that keep Iraq whole.

Something like a time horizon is already emerging from the domestic U.S.

What could the neighbors accomplish if they

wanted to be helpful? A great deal is the answer. would cause frightening instability and likely fragmentation.14 What Iraqis and their neighbors want is what a good portion of America is also seeking: a clear declaration of intent to withdraw over a reasonable time period.

The argument against establishing a time horizon for withdrawal is often framed in the following terms: setting a date would enable the “bad guys” to simply stand down until that date, returning in force once the Americans are gone.

This is of course possible, but the United States might be quite happy if they would stand down. Another argument often put forward is that our main enemy in Iraq is Al-Qaeda, which regards Iraq as the central front in its war with the United States. But it has never been wise to fight battles where your enemy prefers to fight.

The argument in favor of a time horizon for withdrawal is basically this: the neighbors and the Iraqis are avoiding coming to terms with what is needed to stabilize Iraq because the United States is there to carry the burden.15 Only when they see clearly that the United States is planning to leave will they do what is nec-

political calendar. While President Bush has made it clear that U.S. troops will remain in Iraq at the end of his term, he has already decided to end the surge of troop strength and return to more or less the pre-surge level by July. In February 2008, General David Petraeus suggested pausing U.S. troop withdrawals in July to reevaluate the situation, after which he would make recommendations for further troop reductions.16 In fact, the General’s options are constrained. The drawdown from the current level was dictated by lack of troops to replace those deployed during the surge.

In order to maintain the surge level, the President would have had to call up more National Guard and Army and Marine Corps Reserves, something that is politically difficult. While the level of 130,000 may be sustainable without further call ups, pressures for continuing drawdown will be strong: the force is worn down, equipment is lacking, and it has become all too clear that U.S. forces may be needed elsewhere. The world notices when Gulliver is tied down: Other adversaries, but especially Iran, know that Summer/Fall 2008 [ 7 3 ]

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commitments in Iraq severely constrain the American ability to use ground forces elsewhere. Pentagon officials will be among the strongest voices in favor of continuing drawdown.17 The rate of drawdown is also constrained. It is difficult to move more than one Brigade Combat Team (BCT) per month out of Iraq with all its equipment, whose replacement would be prohibitively expensive. The result is that it is highly unlikely that the United States will have more than 130,000 troops still in Iraq by the time the new president is inaugurated in January 2009, and just as unlikely that the number will be less than 100,000.18 At that point, the pressures for further withdrawal are more likely to increase than decrease, as a result of the U.S. elections. An Iraqi or an Iranian reading the American press and talking with officials in Washington could easily come to the conclusion that it is likely the United States will continue to drawdown at least one BCT per month throughout 2009.

This would require a major shift in military objectives, as there would by the end of 2009 not be sufficient U.S. troops to play the kind of counter-insurgency, counter-sectarian role that they are playing at present.

The Administration has an opportunity to take advantage of the success of the “surge” in reducing violence in Baghdad and Anbar by making this implicit time horizon explicit. It would have to make it clear that it expects the Iraqis to take on all major combat responsibilities by the end of 2009, or as soon thereafter as possible. It would also need to make it clear that it will continue to draw down with the intent of removing all U.S. troops from Iraq unless Baghdad asks

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them to stay. This would give both the Iraqis and their neighbors a time horizon of more or less three years for removal of the bulk of U.S. forces, with complete removal possible within five years.

With a Time Horizon, the Iraqis and Their Neighbors Will Take on More Responsibility. With a

timeline for U.S. withdrawal, the Iraqis and their neighbors will face for the first time a situation in which they cannot get what they want by standing by and doing little or nothing, confident that the United States will be there ready to prevent the worst sort of fragmentation.

Left to their own devices, each group within Iraq and each neighbor might react to U.S. withdrawal with unilateral actions that would make things worse: Shia militias might decide to take all of Baghdad to prevent a Sunni resurgence, Turkey might decide to instigate a largescale invasion against the PKK in Kurdistan, Iran might seek through proxies to contest U.S. forces as they seek to withdraw.

It is critical to prevent this sort of rush to disaster by concerting efforts. First and foremost, the United States and Iraq need to coordinate the smooth handover of combat responsibilities, governorate by governorate. While the Iraqi Army seems ready for this in a number of places, the real question is whether the police can be relied upon to enforce a minimum of law and order without resorting to sectarian violence. There is little evidence that this is yet the case, mainly because the Interior Ministry is broken, and some think beyond repair.

It will be much easier to solve the internal political equation if diplomatic efforts with the neighbors have succeeded

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in convincing them that their interests will be best served by restraining their surrogates within Iraq and doing what they can to weaken Al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as Ba’athist diehards and Shia extremists. There are clear signs of effective anti-Al-Qaeda fighting by the various Sunni “awakenings.” But to prevent these armed Sunni elements from turning next on the Iraqi Army or police will require a good deal of restraint, imposed in part from Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the relative quiescence of Shia militias, even as the Coalition forces attack their most extreme elements, will require Iran to signal its concurrence.

Iraq Still Needs a Stronger Political Compact. It is difficult to

picture an effort at coordinated restraint by the neighbors being successful without a stronger political compact within Iraq.

The congenital defect of the current Iraqi constitution is its failure to provide for sufficient Sunni engagement in the political process. The Constitutional Review Committee has had some success in coming up with proposals to accommodate Sunni and other concerns, but the Kurds have blocked its proposals over Kirkuk. What the Kurds want is a date for the referendum that will determine whether Kirkuk will be part of Kurdistan. In order to hold such a referendum, difficult decisions will have to be made about who will be allowed to vote and how the polling will be conducted. A UN-

Politics & Diplomacy

brokered agreement in December 2007 postponed the Kirkuk referendum until mid-2008, and there are many in Arabs in Iraq who would like to see it postponed further, something that would please Turkey, but not the Kurds.

The main axis of conflict today in Iraq is between Sunni and Shia Arabs. There are signs of increasing Sunni/Shia political collaboration, but these fall significantly short of offering an alternative majority in Parliament, where the frayed Shia/Kurdish alliance is still the government’s mainstay. The Parliament’s recent passage of three important pieces of legislation—an amnesty act expected to lead to the release of substantial numbers of mainly Sunni prisoners, the 2008 budget that gives Kurdistan the percentage of revenue it sought, and a law that defines provincial powers—is a positive sign. But the provincial powers law was later vetoed by the presidency, and major issues remain to be settled that will strain the Iraqi political space and make it difficult for Iraqis to negotiate with their neighbors in a unified way.

Ultimately, what Sunni and Shia in Iraq have to agree on is the nature of the Iraqi state: how centralized or decentralized, how secular or religious, how democratic or autocratic, how aligned internationally? Once they have agreed on these issues and established a state that is accepted more widely, relations with the neighbors—and with the United States—will be easier to manage.

NOTES

1. For further information on the U.S. Institute of Peace’s “Iraq and Its Neighbors Project,” see U.S. Institute of Peace, “Iraq and Its Neighbors,” Internet, http://www.U.S.ip.org/iraq/neighbors.html.

2. For further discussion on relations between Iraq and Kuwait, see Jon B. Alterman, Iraq and the Gulf States: The Balance of Fear. Special Report, no. 189 (Wash-

ington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2007), 4. For Iraq and Jordan, see Scott Lasensky, Jordan and Iraq: between Cooperation and Crisis. Special Report, no. 178 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, December 2006). For Iraq and Saudi Arabia, see Joseph McMillan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry. Special Report, no. 157 (Washington, D.C.:

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WHAT CAN IRAQ’S NEIGHBORS CONTRIBUTE?

U.S. Institute of Peace, January 2006).

3. For a further discussion on relations between Syria and Iraq, see Moshe Ma’oz, Washington and Damascus.: Between Confrontation and Cooperation. Special Report, no. 146 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2005), 2-5; Daniel Serwer, “Iraq: Time for a Change,” United States Institute of Peace Briefing, September 2007, Internet, http://www.U.S.ip.org/pubs/U.S.ipeace_briefings/2007/0909_iraq_change.html; Mona Yacoubian, “Syria’s Relations with Iraq,” United States Institute of Peace Briefing, April 2007, Internet, http://www.U.S.ip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr146.html.

4. For a further discussion on relations between Turkey and Iraq, see Henri J. Barkey, Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity. Special Report, no. 141 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, July 2005), 1-20. For Iran and Iraq, see Geoffrey Kemp, Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor. Special Report, no. 156 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, November 2005), 1-18.

5. David Pollack, “Conclusion: Are Iraq’s Arab Neighbors the Answer?” in With Neighbors Like These: Iraq and the Arab States on Its Borders, ed. David Pollack. Policy Focus., no. 70 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2007), 41-44.

6. Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 165-184.

7. Middle East Progress, “Iraq & Its Neighbors: Previous. Regional Conferences,” Internet, http://middleeastprogress.org/2007/11/iraq-itsneighbors-previous.-regional-conferences/.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. “U.S.-Iran talks on Iraq postponed: American embassy,” Agence France-Presse, 14 February, 2008,

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Internet, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080214/ pl_afp/iraqiranU.S.diplomacy.

11. Government of the Republic of Iraq and the UN, “International Compact with Iraq,” Internet, http://www.iraqcompact.org/Document/ INTERNATIONAL_COMPACT_WITH_IRAQ_FINAL__English_final_2_.pdf.

12. Robin Wright, “United States Says it will Release Nine of Twenty Iranians Captured in Iraq,” the Washington Post, 7 November 2007, Internet, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/11/06/AR2007110600853 .html.

13. U.S. Institute of Peace, “Marmara Declaration: Iraq and Its Neighbors Dialogue” (Istanbul, 23 March 2007), Internet, http://www.U.S.ip.org/iraq /marmara_declaration.pdf.

14. Alissa J. Rubin, “For Iraqis, General’s Report Offers Bitter Truth,” the New York Times, 12 September 2007, Internet, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 09/12/world/middleeast/12reax.html.

15. The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, December 2006).

16. Sean D. Naylor, “Petraeus. Backs Slower Drawdown from Iraq,” ArmyTimes.com, 19 February 2008, Internet, http://www.armytimes.com/news/ 2008/02/army_petraeus._080218w/.

17. Peter Baker and others, “Among Top Officials, ‘Surge’ Has Sparked Dissent in Fighting,” the Washington Post, 9 September 2007, Internet, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801846_pf.html.

18. For elaboration, see Daniel Serwer, “Iraq: Time for a Change,” U.S Institute of Peace Briefing, September 2007, Internet, http://www.U.S.ip.org/ pubs/U.S.ipeace_briefings/2007/0909_iraq_change. html.

Culture&Society Mothers, Bombers, Beauty Queens Chechen Women’s Roles in the Russo-Chechen Conflict Francine Banner The Chechen Republic is a region of marked dichotomies.

For centuries, the Chechen people have fought brutally for independence from the Russian State, with hundreds of thousands of citizens having died in the process. Yet, Chechens gained much in the Soviet system of affirmative action, which granted opportunities to ethnic minorities based on population size.1 Today, the government advertises the post-war resurgence of the region by sponsoring cultural events and reopening the international airport. At the same time, Chechens cleave to a deep sense of history, much of which is constituted by recounting instances of resistance to Russian rule. The deportation of nearly the entire population in the 1940s continues to loom large in collective memory and is mobilized in different ways by rebel forces and pro-Russian leaders in order to entrench a sense of national identity.2 Leaders encourage citizens to keep alive “traditional” clanbased practices such as the “kidnapping” of brides for marriage and polygamy, highlighting the deeply patriarchal nature of Chechen culture. Other customary practices are promoted under sharia law, which has increasingly taken hold in the region.3 Women now are barred from universities and state offices unless they adopt hijab.4 Although Chechen women, like

Francine Banner is an attorney and Ph.D. candidate in the School of Justice & Social Inquiry at Arizona State University.

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most in the Soviet system, have worked outside the home and attended universities since the Bolshevik Revolution, birthrates in Chechnya have consistently remained the highest of any Soviet Republic, affecting both women’s health and their ability to participate in the paid labor force. This perceived oppression of Chechen women is bolstered by a myriad of human rights violations reports from non-governmental organizations.

Yet, during recent Russo-Chechen Wars, women took on roles that were anything but traditional. From 2000 to 2004, 43 percent of Chechen suicide bombers were female.5 Some scholars argue that female engagement in suicide bombing is further evidence of the exploitation of Chechen women, contending that women have chosen to immolate themselves as a result of religious zealotry, brainwashing, or mental deficiency.6 Others argue that women’s undertaking of suicide missions may not be a sign of oppression but an expression of political engagement stemming from a desire for independence and preservation of territory.7 Prior to the early 1990s, the Chechen Republic was anything but a hotbed of Islamism. Though the majority of Chechens engaged in the home-based practice of Sufi Islam, scholars have reported increasing evidence of Islamist practices taking hold in the Republic.8 At the same time as women are very visibly being “put in their place” via public mandates, they are being granted new opportunities for economic advancement. International modeling has been introduced as a potentially lucrative career path for young women. The Chechen government staged its own pageant, Beauty of Chechnya in 2006, and in 2007, playing host to contestants

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from the Mrs. World Pageant.

This article interrogates just three of the changing and contradictory public roles that Chechen women have assumed during and immediately after two recent Russo-Chechen Wars: the mother, the suicide bomber, and the beauty queen.

These roles demonstrate some of the ways women’s bodies are frequently front and center in debates over religion, tradition, and women’s rights in the developing world. Ultimately, these roles have more in common than one might think. Each of these public personae has resulted in placing women at the forefront of competing narratives regarding issues such as territorial independence, adherence to tradition, and the effects of globalization in Chechen society, while at the same time revealing little about the actual experiences of Chechen women today.

Chechen Women as “Fire Keepers”: Motherhood as AntiRussian Resistance. Chechens have

long prided themselves on having one of the highest birthrates of any Russian Republic even during times of extreme stress. In 1944, Josef Stalin ordered that nearly the entire Chechen population be deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. For more than ten years afterward, the Republic was re-populated with Russian citizens. In most populations at times of excessive hardship, such as deportation, the birthrate falls. In the case of the Chechen deportation, however, the birthrate remained high. Although an estimated 70,000 Chechens died in the first year of exile alone, the population that returned to the homeland in the 1950s and 60s was as vibrant in number as the population that had been deported.9 In the aftermath of the RussoChechen Wars, Chechen birthrates are

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again soaring, with the Republic boasting one of the highest in Russia.10 Extraordinarily high birthrates have been described as oppressive to women not only because the combination of repeated pregnancies and poor access to medical care endanger women’s health, but also because the emphasis on women’s roles as mothers may prevent women from entering other spheres of society.11 In Chechnya, the combination of state-sponsored promotion of high birthrates, a resurgence of bride-kidnapping, and the institution of polygamous practices may be indicators of strict re-impositions of gender hierarchies.

On the other hand, many scholars view

Culture&Society

many children born in Chechnya today suffer birth defects due to environmental hazards and lack of medical care, discussion of these issues is eclipsed in order to emphasize the number of children born and, therefore, the Republic’s demographic vibrancy (and perhaps legitimacy).16 These facts, combined with the imposition of stricter standards governing women’s “appropriate” behavior, make it tempting to view the engagement of women’s bodies in strategic reproduction as exploitative. However, it may be overly simplistic to attribute high rates of reproduction during deportation solely to victimization of women. While moth-

In Chechnya, women’s bodies are viewed as

the site of both the generation and preservation of culture.

Chechens’ perpetual fecundity as an example of a way that women actively engaged in resisting Soviet authority.12 High Chechen birthrates during and after deportation have been called an expression of communal solidarity, a way for the population to recover from losses and ultimately outnumber their Russian counterparts.13 Others characterize rising Muslim birthrates as a calculated threat to Western secularism.14 With birthrates in Russia as a whole dramatically declining, competition among Republics to sustain high birthrates—and thus secure access to scarce resources-continues to this today.

The Chechen government trumpets new maternity hospitals and post-natal care programs for mothers and infants as signs of health and vitality, even to the point of stretching the truth to emphasize the Republic’s fecundity.15 Although

erhood is viewed in the West as a matter of women’s personal choice, in the context of ongoing struggles between Chechnya and Russia, women’s perceptions of the role and function of motherhood may not be the same. Westerners often assume there to be an essential dichotomy between men and aggressive behavior and women and peacemaking.

However, from the time of ancient Greece, the role of the mother has been the most visible example of women’s mobilization of their bodies in war.17 The important civic function served by the mother of warriors is exemplified in Palestine today, where “[t]he climax of the process of nationalizing motherhood in the first intifada was the bestowal of the exalted status of ‘Mother of a shahid’ upon the Palestinian woman, as militant organizations encouraged women to ‘sacrifice’ their sons in the struggle against

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Israel.”18 In the Chechen case, childbirth may not only be a personal experience but also may fulfill women’s civic responsibility to engage in “self-defense in the face of possible liquidation.”19 In Chechnya, women long have been revered as “fire keepers,” members of the population who literally and figuratively preserve cultural heritage and national identity. Historically, one of the first tasks of a newly-married woman when she moved into her husband’s household was to maintain a fire lit by her motherin-law.20 The quality of a wife could be judged by the vitality of her fire. Today, Chechens continue to hold “fire keepers” in high esteem. The reverence with which Chechen speak of wives and mothers highlights that, in Chechnya, women’s bodies are viewed as the site of both the generation and preservation of culture. As will be discussed herein, this status of women of child-bearing years as responsible for upholding national traditions makes women easy targets in debates over modesty and sexual freedom and religion and secularism in the Republic. It also makes it all the more surprising that nearly fifty women of child-bearing age have engaged in political violence as suicide bombers.

Chechen Women as Perpetrators: Violence and the Cult of the “Black Widows.” The UN and

Human Rights Watch have documented at least 5,000 disappearances and innumerable other human rights violations in the period during and after recent Russo-Chechen Wars. Rape is a prevalent feature in post-modern conflict, although the actual numbers of persons who experienced this trauma in Chechnya is nearly impossible to ascertain due to the shame and stigma sur-

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rounding the crime. As the majority of the refugee population, women also faced unique challenges. Because men were charged exorbitant sums for or were prohibited from crossing borders into Azerbaijan, Ingushetia, and Georgia, women frequently became sole caregivers in the harsh and unsanitary conditions of camps for displaced persons.21 In the post-war environment, challenges faced

by Chechen women are exacerbated due to a dearth of social and medical services, as well as Russian restrictions on the operations of non-governmental organizations.

Despite the numerous ways in which Chechen women been victimized over the course of the past fifteen years, the most prevalent portrayal of Chechen women in Western media is as terrorism’s most deadly perpetrators. Since 2000, Chechen militant involvement has been identified in approximately thirty terrorist acts in the Russian Federation, leading Vladimir Putin to refer to the Republic as the “epicenter of the global war on terror.”22 Events of political violence launched by Chechen rebel forces are widely covered in the media due to the dramatic location of the attacks—one took place in an elementary school, one at a rock concert, and another in a theatre. They have also garnered worldwide attention because more than 40 percent of suicide attacks featured groups of women as perpetrators.23 Eighteen Chechen women participated as captors during the 2002 hostage situation in the Dubrovka Theater staged

by Chechen militants. Women were also the primary perpetrators of political violence during a two-week period in the summer of 2004, which was labeled the “summer of terror” by the Russian media. During this time, Chechen

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women executed a bombing on a Moscow subway, the explosion of two Russian airliners, and assisted during the hostagetaking at Beslan Primary School. Women who participated in these events often wore black robes and full face veils and frequently espoused Islamist rhetoric.

The women’s spectral presence, coupled with the knowledge that so many men had died in Russo-Chechen conflicts, garnered them the nickname “black widows.”

The combination of long-entrenched beliefs regarding Chechens as warlike and militants participating in so many terrorist activities in the Russian Federation from 2000-2004 has led to the association of Chechnya with political violence.

The fact that women participated in so many suicide missions made it even easier to portray Chechen people as hostile, strange, and aberrant. After Chechen women participated in repeated events of political violence in summer 2004, articles appeared in the Western press describing Chechen women’s participation in suicide bombing as an epidemic.

A particularly chilling article observed that there were “brigades of women swarm[ing] Russia spreading death and destruction.”24 Another noted that female rebels were “So warped by hate, they [would] kill anyone to take revenge against Russia.”25 In the end, Chechen women were considered the “most ruthless in the world,” a “striking cult of vengeance” that set a new standard for would-be “heroines of jihad.”26,27 Although the 2002 incident at the Dubrovka Theater and 2004 Beslan hostage-taking received massive amounts of coverage in the Western media, these events rarely made mention of the names, occupations, or level of religiosity of individual women who participated. The “black

Culture&Society

widows” of Chechnya most often were described in the collective—a “swarm,” a “brigade.”

Many academics have unquestioningly adopted the term “black widows” to describe female militant actors, regardless of whether women rebels engaged in particular acts of political violence were religiously observant, wore black, or were, in fact, grieving over men lost in the war.28 One rumor—now widely discredited—abounded that the women were brainwashed by an Arabic female handler called Black Fatima, a middle-aged woman with a “hooked nose and dark hair.”29 The most common belief about Chechen women engaged in political violence is that they are part of a “cult of vengeance,” seeking bloodthirsty revenge for the deaths of male relatives during the wars.30 Activists in developing nations observe that the function of nicknames bestowed on women militants, such as the “armed virgins” and “birds of paradise” of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Palestinian “Army of Roses,” or the Chechen “Black Widows” is to characterize women’s engagement in armed struggle as exceptional and to de-politicize the actions of such women.31 The majority of scholars studying suicide bombing today describe suicide bombing as structured, purposeful action intended to influence political processes.32 However, the much scholarship regarding women and terrorism is premised on the assumption that women engage in such activities because they are brainwashed, drugged, or more easily led than their male counterparts.33 This status of women bombers as “dead enders” in highly patriarchal societies allegedly makes women easy prey for terrorist organizations and/or may cause them to “snap” and seek to avenge

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the deaths of male relatives.34 The effect of such descriptions is to render the actions of Chechen women suicide bombers outside the realm of political violence and within the realm of personal psychological disturbance. An image persists of women who engage in militant operations as “double deviants,” persons who, in stepping outside traditionally ascribed gender roles, violate both criminal laws and laws of nature.35 Ultimately, these representations of women function to stigmatize Chechnya in the public imagination and to foreclose discussion of the countless human rights abuses that have occurred and continue to occur in the Chechen Republic.

Although scholars generally discuss suicide bombing as collective violence in terms of male actors, the case of Chechen

giously observant, and others were not.37 Like male suicide bombers today, Chechen women bombers were better educated than the surrounding population. More than 65 percent of Chechen suicide bombers finished high school, and more than 34 percent were in college or had completed college.38 These statistics comport with recent data that suicide terrorists frequently emerge not from the lowest rungs of conflict-torn societies but from the middle classes, perhaps because it is “educated, middle class” persons who may suffer the most frustration with societal circumstances as they recognize that “potential opportunities are less attractive than…prior expectations.”39 Most conflicts today are not waged between states but between states and

The government deemed the visit of the

world’s most beautiful women as demonstrating that the Republic had finally reached a “muchneeded lasting peace. female suicide bombers may too fit into this paradigm. Chechen women’s engagement in motherhood as part of a resistance strategy demonstrates that female bodies have long been politically engaged in protest to oppression by the Russian state. Analysis of attacks by Chechen female suicide bombers as acts of collective political violence is supported by the fact that Chechen female militants are among the few women to have participated in coordinated suicide attacks. It is also bolstered by the fact that the women engaging in Chechen suicide attacks have come from many walks of life. The youngest were teenagers, the oldest in her fifties.36 Some were reli-

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non-state actors. Similarly, traditionally demarcated gender roles in conflict— men as perpetrators and women as victims—are blurred in post-modern war.

“Civilians,” including women, not only suffer “collateral damage” but are also “legitimate” military targets.40 In the Chechen Republic, women have been systematically identified as enemies of the state, and the torture of women has become a form of military aggression integral to Russian military practices.41 The American Committee for Peace in Chechnya describes cleansing operations as “underappreciated as a motive for suicide bombing,” noting that suicide terrorism was absent from the Russian

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Federation after the start of the Second Russo-Chechen War, a conflict that was marked by the razing of the capital city, annihilation of nearly all Chechen cultural resources, forced disappearances, and widespread rapes.42 The link between state aggressions and suicide bombing is bolstered by the fact that today’s suicide bombers are usually not members of state military forces but volunteers from areas where states have not successfully been able to distinguish among civilians and soldiers. Chechen women and men have suffered similar oppression from both Russian military and rebel forces, and it is possible that they have elected to engage in suicide attacks out of a similar sense of attachment to a territory that is rapidly slipping from their grasp.

Conflict may provide a “terrain for renegotiating oppressive…gender hierarchies.”43 Women in the military have the opportunity to gain skills unavailable to civilian women, “which provide them with the possibility of interrogating conventional gender prescriptions.”44 Speckhard and Akhmedova found that nearly half of women bombers had actively assisted in rebel movements prior to engaging in suicide missions, receiving specialized training not only as nurses but also in driving, shooting, and tactical operations.45 To this end, the RussoChechen Wars may be argued to have facilitated “cross-gendering,” opening up different avenues for women’s engagement in public life.46 Because men began to be targeted by Russian soldiers for searches during the First RussoChechen War, women became actively involved in selling arms in Chechen marketplaces.47 Women also assisted in barricading cities and provided assistance in rebel operations as nurses and caregivers and in providing safe-houses.48

Culture&Society

During the Second Russo-Chechen War, traditional roles of Chechen women as guardians of collective morality, may have led Chechen women to play a different role—that of suicide bombers. In the aftermath, however, the roles that women played in militant struggles over the past fifteen years are rarely recognized.

Rather, in keeping with traditional associations of war and masculinity and women and peacemaking, the government is focusing on promoting a postwar baby boom and sponsoring events such as beauty contests. Their aim is to de-link Chechnya in the public imagination from images of terrorism and to instead promote an image of the Republic as peaceful, modern, and beautiful. Whether they are portrayed as militants or as beauty contestants, women’s bodies remain at the forefront of debates over tradition and modernization, independence and oppression, and Islam and secularism in the Republic.

Swimsuit Optional, Kalashnikov Necessary: The Beauty of Chechnya. In May 2006, fifteen-year-

old Zamira Jabrailova was crowned the first ever “Miss Chechen Beauty.”49 In her acceptance speech, the winner thanked both her mother and deceased former President Akhmat Kadyrov for stopping the war that had plagued the majority of her life.50 For her prize, she won a Toyota, which she was too young to drive.51 While women in the pageant were unveiled, in a nod to propriety there was no swimsuit competition, the panel of judges were all female, and rehearsals were attended by Muslim clerics.

Indicative of the conflict in the Republic between adherence to tradition and desire for modernization, Zamira was selected as the winner in part due to her

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knowledge of Chechen culture and graceful folk dancing, and in part based on votes gathered from around the world via the Internet. Although the pageant offered women—young, pretty, unmarried women—opportunities for advancement including trips abroad and cold hard cash, the contest also provided a way in which the government could emphasize the importance of female modesty and domestic pursuits. The finalists sang, presented baked goods, performed national dances, and showed off their knowledge of traditions and culture of the Chechen people.52 The official press release by the government identified the pageant as a way for the Republic to disassociate itself from both war and radical Islam: “We want Chechnya to stop being associated with bearded men carrying guns.”53 The press release also implied that the contest signaled the modernization of Chechnya by demonstrating the government’s commitment to women’s rights: “It’s no secret that women in the Republic are being driven into the background. Now a beautiful girl will become the symbol of our country and we’ll show that we are no worse than other states.”54 Building on the success of Miss Chechnya, in March 2007 the Republic played host to contestants in the Mrs. World pageant, an international beauty competition for married women being held in another part of Russia. The government deemed the visit of the world’s most beautiful women as demonstrating that the Republic had finally reached a “muchneeded lasting peace.”55 Despite the Chechen government’s enthusiastic promotion of recent beauty contests as demonstrations of the region’s peaceful and cosmopolitan state, a cursory examination of these events

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shows that, like many of Chechnya’s renovated buildings, the events are decorative facades that mask continuing, and very real oppression. The clash of traditional adats and modernization in the Republic became evident when one of the most memorable stories to come out of the Mrs. World pageant was not the crowning of the winner but the marriage proposal extended from President Kadyrov to Mrs. Kenya. Kadyrov reportedly sought to “redeem” his bride in accordance with Chechen custom, offering her “horses, a white goat, and a couple of hens.”56 These pageants also took place in the context of very real dangers that remained unacknowledged in the midst of the contest. When the Mrs. World contestants were transported to Chechnya, they were driven into the Republic in unmarked cars, with armed soldiers positioned along the road to protect them from rebel attacks.57 In a war-torn region like the Chechen Republic, a beauty pageant may be seem like a breath of fresh air and a positive herald of reconstruction. Such pageants also may be seen as providing new and potentially lucrative opportunities for women, particularly via migration.

Unveiled women parading on the pageant stage, however, masks the fact that the advent of sharia law and the ascendancy of President Kadyrov in Chechnya have come at a significant price for Chechen women. The aftermath of the two wars has brought about not only a resurgence of “traditional” values but also the imposition of Islamic law strictly limiting women’s rights in many different arenas. President Kadyrov has publicized plans to propose a bill in the Chechen parliament to legalize polygamy in the Republic.58 The government has also demanded that women wear head-

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scarves or be banned from jobs and university classes.59 There is even a current ban against women wearing “low-cut” wedding dresses.60 Russian Federation officials are quick to attribute this return to (or newfound embracing of) religion to Islamist influences from outside the region. Others observe, however, that mobilizing the rhetoric of fundamentalist Islam has historically been a key means of promoting a Chechen identity in opposition to the Russian State.61 Regardless of the motivations, these mandates—some seemingly minor and some significant—carry very real consequences for the women of Chechnya. Abuses against women in Chechnya are not uncommon. A recently-released report from the International Rescue Committee found that genderbased violence was a fact of life in Chechnya; 95 percent of female focus group participants had heard about or witnessed an incident of violence against women.62 In a survey of approximately 200 women from Chechnya and neighboring Republics, 80 percent stated that they felt it was appropriate for a man to hit his wife if she had an affair with another man, over 60 percent felt it was proper for a man to hit a women if she “behaves inappropriately.”63 Women have suffered public beatings by secret police after allegations of adultery.64 Chechnyafree.ru, a website allegedly supported by the Chechen government, cautions ominously, “[A] woman of loose morals is the biggest disgrace of her family. A few women of loose morals have been lynched in the Republic.”65 The recent emphasis on beauty pageants in post-war Chechnya highlights another way in which women are at once “guardians of national morality and the largest threat to this moral founda-

Culture&Society

tion simply because of their gender.”66 Granting Chechen women the opportunity to succeed based on traditionally “feminine” characteristics such as beauty or diplomacy may seem harmless, but the focus on women’s attractiveness may function to obscure the very real effects experiences of longstanding conflict have had on the women in the Republic. The UN Economic and Social Council recently reported that the restructuring of the Russian Federation to a market economy has led to an “upsurge in patriarchal attitudes towards gender relations,” increased barriers to women’s political participation and employment, and an upsurge in violence against women.67 The situations of women in the Caucasus further are impacted by continued violence as a result of military operations. Focusing primarily on women who have strived to maintain traditionally “domestic” or private pursuits, rather than those who have stepped out of traditionally-ascribed gender roles during times of war, may also reinforce patriarchal standards in peace time.

Conclusion. History is written on the

body.68 Factors such as historical, social, and cultural exigencies produce bodies of a determinate type. In the Chechen Republic, women’s bodies have been front and center in struggles to raise birthrates in order to secure ethnic advancement and promote a sense of peace and national unity in periods after time of strife. They have been the focus of discussions over modesty, adherence to tradition, and religious observance, as women took the stage as contestants in beauty pageants. And they have been at the forefront in debates over Chechen terrorism, with the “black widows” of Chechnya being recognized in the West as

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heroines of jihad.

While it may be tempting to focus on specific, iconic female bodies during times of struggle, highlighting certain types of women may foreclose important discussions of the everyday challenges and realities faced by all women. “[T]o date, no liberation or revolutionary war, no matter how progressive its ideology regarding emancipation of women…has empowered women and men to maintain an emancipating atmosphere for women

after the military struggle… [is] over.”69 In the aftermath, women who have served in militant operations face a lack of acknowledgement of their contributions, and there is a scarcity of options for addressing concerns such as rape that are faced by women in war. Critically examining the roles that women assume during times of conflict may be one way in which we can begin to identify more effective ways to challenge gender hierarchies in the aftermath.

NOTES

1 Igor Rotar, “Under the Green Banner: Islamic Radicals in Russia and the Former Soviet Union,” Religion, State & Society, 30:2 (2002): 89-153, 97-98.

2 Brian Glyn Williams, “Commemorating ‘The Deportation’ in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorialization and Collective Memory in the 19941996 and 1999-2000 Russo-Chechen Wars,” History & Memory, 12:1 (2002): 101-134, 102; Anna Politkovskaya, A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 16.

3 Nora Boustany, “Chechen Warns of Islamic Extremism; Appeal of Militant Ideology Is Spreading in North Caucasus, Rights Activist Says,” the Washington Post, 6 February 2008, A12.

4 Radio Free Europe, “Kadyrov Uses ‘Folk Islam’ For Political Gain,” 6 December 2007.

5 Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows: The Chechen female Terrorists,” in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? (Yoram Schweitzer, ed.)

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 84 (2006): 6380. Hereinafter Speckhard & Akhmedova 2006 a.

6 Yoram Schweitzer, ed., Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memo.

No. 84 (August); Rosemarie Skaine, Female Suicide Bombers. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006), Clara Beyler, “Messengers of Death, Female Suicide Bombers,” (February 12, 2003),. m edcfl.eid tar/ie=scl?4iart7/1ol.irgt.i (date accessed: 15 February 2008).

7 Islah Jad, “Between Religion and Secularism: Islamist Women of Hamas,” in On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh N (New York: CUNY Press, 2005): 172-202.

8 Nora Boustany, “Chechen Warns of Islamic Extremism; Appeal of Militant Ideology Is Spreading in North Caucasus, Rights Activist Says,” the Washington Post, 6 February 2008, A12.

9 Williams, “Commemorating the Deportation,” 112.

10 Jamestown Foundation, Chechnya Weekly, 6: 16, 8 April 2005, Internet, http://www.jamestown. org/publications_details.php?volume_id=409&issue_i

[ 8 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

d=3315&article_id=2369677 (date accessed: 15 February 2008).

11 Monica Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 49: 2 (2005): 161.

12 Amjad Jaimoukha, The Chechens: A Handbook, (London: Routledge, 2005); Williams, “Commemorating the Deportation,” 2000.

13 Anatoly Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 189; Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, “Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case,” World Politics 36: 4 (July 1984): 555-580.

14 Michael Akerib, “Where Have All the Children Gone? Can Russia Reverse its Demographic Crisis?,” Johnson’s Russia List, 6 September 2007.15 In 2008, Chechnya’s Committee on Government Statistics announced that the Republic’s population as of January 1 stood at 1,205,000, approximately 22,000 more than on the same day in 2007. See Paul Goble, “Window on Eurasia: Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics about Chechnya,” 12 February 2008, Internet, http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/02/win dow-on-eurasia-lies-damn-lies-and.html (date accessed: 15 February 2008).

16 Khassan Baiev and Nicholas Daniloff, “Russia’s Public Health Catastrophe in Chechnya,” speech delivered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 12 June 2006.

17 The most prominent example of this is idealized in the Spartan mother of Plutarch’s Moralia. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

18 Yessir Arafat is reported to have said, “The Palestinian woman who bears yet another Palestinian every ten months…is a biological time bomb threatening to blow up Israel from within.” See YuvalDavis, 36.

19 Jaimoukha, The Chechens, 130.

20 Jaimhouka, The Chechens, 129.

21 Thomas Faustini, “Desperate Decline: The

BANNER

Situation of Chechen Refugees in Azerbaijan,” Publication of The Harriman Institute, 30 September, 2004; Jamestown Foundation, “Refugees in Georgia Don’t Want to Go Home,” Chechnya Weekly, Vol. 3, Iss. 6, 20 February, 2002.

22 John Kampfner, “A President Craves Understanding,” New Statesman 13 September, 2004.

23 See Speckhard & Akhmedova 2006a.

24 Australian Sunday Times, “New Era of Evil Blows Away Sanctity of Childhood,” 7 September 2004: 14.

25 Matthew Owens, “So Warped By Hate, They Will Kill Anyone to Take Revenge Against Russia,” Daily Mail (London), 4 September 2004: 8.

26 Mark McGivern, “Slaughter in the School: Terror of the Black Widows,” Daily Record (Scotland), 4 September 4, 2004: 8.

27 Christopher Dickey, “Women of Al Qaeda, Newsweek, 12 December 2005, Internet, http:// www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10315095/site/newsweek/ (date accessed 1 May 2007).

28 Speckhard & Akhmedova; Skaine 2006; Schweitzer 2006; but see Jessica West, “Feminist IR and the Case of the ‘Black Widows’: Reproducing Gendered Divisions, Innovations: A Journal of Politics, 5 (2004/5): 1-16 29 Skaine 2006, 47; but see Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006a. This rumor widely has been discredited.

30 Speckhard & Akhmedova 2006a; Schweitzer 2006; Skaine 2006. See also Murphy, Kim, “Chechen Women are Increasingly Recruited to Become Suicide Bombers,” in What Motivates Suicide Bombers?, ed. Laurie Friedman, (San Diego: Greenhaven, 2005): 77.

31 Adele Balasingham, A. 2001. The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance, (Mitcham, England: Fairmax, 2001); January 2005.

32 “In contrast to being ostracized, poverty stricken, or misfits, “most suicide attackers are psychologically normal, have better than average economic prospects for their futures, and are deeply integrated into social networks and attached to their national communities.” Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 2005), 22; see also Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2005); CharlesTilly, “Terror as Strategy and Relational Process,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 46 (2005): 11-32.

33 When discussing women, scholars most frequently argue that the desire to commit acts of terrorism is a result of emotional problems, brainwashing or stress stemming from personal factors such as infertility, lack of educational opportunity or divorce. See, e.g., Skaine 2006; Schweitzer 2006; Beyler 2003; Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (New York: Rodale, 2003).

34 Jad 2005, 191.

35 Yvonne Jewkes, Media and Crime (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 111-112.

36 Pape 2005; Spekhard and Akhmedova 2006.

37 Steven Lee Myers, “From Dismal Chechnya,

Culture&Society

Women Turn to Bombs,” the New York Times, 10 September 2004: A1.

38 Spekhard and Akhmedova 2006, 66.

39 Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 (Summer 2004): 67-90, 78; Pape 2005.

40 Mariam Cooke, Women and the War Story (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 106.

41 G.W. Lapidus, “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya,” International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 5-49, 26.

42Reuter, 2 43 Rita Manchanda, “Ambivalent gains in South Asian conflicts,” in The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation, eds. Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen (London: Zed Books, 2001): 99-121, 120.

44 Balasingham 2003, 6, 270. See also A. Gunawardena, A.“Female Black Tigers: A Different Breed of Cat,” in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, ed. Yoram Schweitzer, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, No. 84 (August 2006): 81-90, 84.

45 Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism , Vol. 29, Iss. 5 (2006), 165: 33, 47.

46 Cooke, 103.

47 Anne Nivat, Chienne de Guerre (New York, PublicAffairs, 2001): 48 Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), 64. Carlotta Gall and Thomas De Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York, New York University Press, 1998), 263.

49 Kazbek Tsurayev and Leila Baisultanova, “Storm Over Miss Chechnya Contest,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 342, 2 June 2006, Internet, http://www.mail-archive.com/ caucasus_reporting_service_english@iwpr.gn.apc.org/ msg00002.html (date accessed: 15 February 2008).

50 See Tsurayev and Baisultanova.

51 Critical Beauty Journal, May 2006 edition, Internet, http://www.criticalbeauty.com/Journal_May_2006.html (date accessed: 31 March 2007).

52 See Tsurayev and Baisultanova.

53 See Tsurayev and Baisultanova.

54 See Tsurayev and Baisultanova.

55 Stephen Corby and Leah Creighton, “Mrs. America crowned Mrs. World,” the Daily Telegraph, 9 March 2007, Internet, http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21351871-401,00.html (date accessed: 15 February 2008).

56 See Corby and Creighton.

57 Chechnya Weekly, 8:9, 1 March 2007.

58 Tom Parfitt, “Chechen Leader Backs Polygamy, the Guardian, 14 January 2006, Internet, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/14/chec hnya.tomparfitt (date accessed: 15 February 2008).

59 Radio Free Europe, “Kadyrov Uses ‘Folk Islam’ For Political Gain,” 6 December 2007.

60 See Radio Free Europe.

61 Edward W. Walker “Islam in Chechnya,” speech

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delivered at University California, Berkley: BerkleyStanford Conference (13 March, 1998).

62International Rescue Committee, Gender-Based Violence Technical Assessment, September 2006, 48.

63 IRC Gender-Based Violence, 39.

64 Valentinas Mite, “Chechnya: Cell-Phone Videos Reveal Abuses,” Radio Free Europe, 6 September 2006, Internet, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2006/09/ba53439c-db63-423d-a08e736db03e6998.html (date accessed: 30 March 2007).

65 IRC Gender-Based Violence, 39.

66 Sarah Banet-Weiser, The Most Beautiful Girl in the World: Beauty Pageants and National Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999): 9.

67 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Integration of the Human Rights of Women and a

[ 8 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women,” Sess.

62, Item 12 (26 January 2006): 21.

68 Emma Pérez, The Decolonial Imaginary: Writing Chicanas Into History (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1999); Arthur Kleinman, “’Everything that Really Matters’: Social Suffering, Subjectivity, and the remaking of Human Experience in a Disordering World,” The Harvard Theological Review, 90: 3 (1997): 315-335; Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies. Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Indiana University Press, Bloomington; and Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1994); Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Unmaking and Making of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

69 Sondra Hale, “‘Liberated, But Not Free’: Women in Post-War Eritrea,” in . S. Meintjes, A. Pillay, and M. Turshen, eds. (New York: Zed Press, 2002): 122-141, 123.

Conflict&Security Airpower

The Flip Side of COIN Daniel Baltrusaitis Despite the success of the U.S. military in conventional warfare, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated the challenges of pursuing a counter-insurgent strategy against “asymmetric threats” such as improvised explosive devices or suicide bombers. The “asymmetric” strategy often adopted by insurgents allows a relatively weak force to incapacitate a stronger one by exploiting the stronger force’s vulnerabilities rather than meeting it head-on in conventional combat. Our current wars have focused national attention on the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to cope with this “asymmetric” environment, yet the influence of airpower has been conspicuously missing from the debate. Even the core military doctrine for counterinsurgency, or COIN, fails to acknowledge the benefits that airpower can play against these asymmetric threats. The Army and Marine Corps recently released Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5), an impressive and influential 282-page document that skillfully addresses many difficult COIN issues. This doctrine is viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq, and will likely become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine that will guide all the armed services.1 Regrettably, this impressive doc-

Daniel Baltrusaitis is a U.S. Air Force colonel and has held numerous command and staff positions in the Air Force as a B-1B and U-2 pilot. He is currently a PhD candidate in international relations in Georgetown Univeristy’s Departmeny of Government.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ument fails to inform the COIN strategist, and policymakers, on the influence of highly integrated joint COIN strategy.

Rather, it treats the influence of airpower as an adjunct capability confined to a short, five-page annex of “supplemental information.” By failing to integrate the full potential of today’s airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on only the ground dimension, FM 3-24 falls short of offering U.S. decisionmakers a pragmatic, joint solution for the challenge of COIN.2 The current doctrine fails to integrate all aspects of military power that may be implemented for the most effective counterinsurgency campaign. By failing to integrate airpower (or seapower) into this cornerstone doctrine document, U.S. and coalition forces risk planning operations in a disjointed fashion where planners do not understand the strengths and weaknesses of service capabilities. This paper examines the influence of airpower on COIN strategy and articulates the benefits of an integrated joint COIN doctrine to combat effectively the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Airpower Misunderstood.

People, even military commanders and political leaders, often misunderstand the influence of airpower in a military campaign because of the claims that it is an indiscriminate weapon that induces unwarranted collateral damage, thereby damaging the campaign for hearts and minds. William Arkin, who writes an online national security column for the Washington Post, suggests that by accepting unsubstantiated collateral damage claims, U.S. military leaders actually undermine U.S. coalition strategy by leaving unclear the role of airstrikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents. By not stressing [ 9 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

that these airstrikes are attacking combatants–while at the same time safeguard civilians in that process–allows insurgents to gain an advantage in the propaganda war.3 Arkin exposes the central paradox in the understanding of the use of airpower; it is an essential COIN tool, but it is often unfairly accused of being a blunt, highly destructive, instrument that undermines the COIN strategy. Civilian casualties from U.S. and NATO airstrikes in Afghanistan were one of the main storylines of last year, but these stories of civilian casualties do not tell the whole story. The use of airpower in Afghanistan has been highly effective, allowing a NATO presence across the breadth and depth of the country, denying sanctuary to insurgents while ensuring a sustained NATO offensive.

Arkin equates U.S. acceptance of collateral damage claims as equivalent to answering the following question: “When did you stop beating your wife?”4 He argues that instead of accepting unsubstantiated collateral damage claims, senior leaders should highlight the fact that airpower’s effectiveness is so frustrating to the enemy that the insurgent’s only recourse is to portray it as particularly damaging to civilians. Arkin’s point is that U.S. commanders do not have to hold the assumption that airpower is more damaging than other elements of force and that insurgent fighters still retain a responsibility when using civilians as shields. As part of a proper information strategy, this point needs to be emphasized by U.S. commanders in the media. The attitude that airpower causes undue damage is emphasized in FM 3-24 when it states, “an air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation (HN) government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory.”5

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While it is certainly true that air attacks can–and do–cause civilian casualties, FM 3-24 overlooks the fact that other forms of lethal force cause damage that is even more significant. In a study on the invasion of Iraq, Human Rights Watch noted that in most cases, “Aerial bombardment resulted in minimal adverse effects to the civilian population.”6 In the same report, the organization observed that Army uses of force caused significant civilian casualties. This is not to suggest that the Army was negligent in its use of force, but reflects the reality that close contact operations are just as dangerous for the civilian population–and as damaging to the hearts and mind campaign–as airstrikes.

By voicing concerns on the use of airpower, and not expressing the same concerns for other elements of military firepower, FM 3-24 inappropriately focuses on weapon systems rather than effects.

Major General Dunlap of the U.S. Air Force contends that the manual’s reliance upon a “boots on the ground” approach actually increases the risk of incurring the exact type of civilian casualties most likely to create the adverse operational impact normally attributed to airpower. The Haditha incident—

Conflict&Security

damage; however, the manual ascribes the greatest risk to the wrong source.

According to Dunlap, “if avoiding the most damaging kind of ‘collateral damage’ is as important as FM 3-24 claims, then reducing the size of and reliance on the ground component is the way to do it, not by limiting airpower [emphasis in original].”7 It is not surprising after reading FM 3-24 that ground commanders fail to appreciate airpower’s essential contributions to the COIN effort. The lack of sound operating concepts for integrating airpower into COIN doctrine has concrete consequences for the overall COIN effort. One battalion commander admitted that, in his first few months in Iraq, he “rarely put air into my plan— this was because we did not understand how it could assist us in a counter insurgency fight.”8 RAND analyst Benjamin Lambeth, in his analysis of the use of airpower in the initial Afghanistan effort, notes that the lack of understanding of airpower advantages is endemic in the Army.

According to Lambeth, leading Central Command leaders were “insufficiently appreciative” of what the Air Force could do, leading to excessive collateral damage constraints, unnecessary bombing, and

The Haditha incident——where numerous

cilivians were wantonly killed by ground forces that had just come under insurgent attack—— highlights the risks when young soldiers are in close contact with a hostile population. where numerous civilians were wantonly killed by ground forces that had just come under insurgent attack—highlights the risks when young soldiers are in close contact with a hostile population. FM 324 is rightly concerned about collateral

distorted targeting.9 Strategically, the misunderstanding of the use of air assets let fleeing targets escape while increasing the danger to coalition ground forces.

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Afghanistan provide a telling example.

Seymour Hersh, in Chain of Command, illustrates that Army leaders mistakenly thought that they could do the operation on their own and took little consideration of how airpower could provide assistance.10 As a result, the air component was introduced to the planning process very late and was not permitted to conduct major preparatory strikes, nor was it afforded sufficient time to move air assets to support the large-scale operation.

Even though air assets can be moved rapidly, the Air Force was not aware of the scope of the operation and therefore ran out of aircraft during the operation.

Integrated planning from the onset would have ensured that sufficient air resources were tasked and available to support the operation. The consequence was an operation where key Taliban escaped, and numerous ground forces were killed or injured, due to lack of air support.

south of Baghdad illustrate how small concentrations of coalition forces could interdict al-Qaeda forces.12 Air strikes were used as a means to deliver precise firepower, limiting the exposure of both friendly troops and the local population.

Airpower not only allows a smaller footprint in the host nation, but the range and flexibility of air assets allow them to support commanders in multiple theaters with the same assets, reducing the number of U.S. military required in theater. Aircrafts such as B-1s and U-2s stationed in the Persian Gulf region routinely support operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, providing commanders strike and reconnaissance capability with fewer forces, while the Air Force unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) platforms such as the Predator and the Reaper support the theater with the bulk of the manpower stateside. Air Force UAV pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence “fly” their weapon system from Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada Airpower Advantages. The main desert using intercontinental data links. advantage of using airpower in a military Effective use of airpower assets permits a operation is that its speed and flexibility smaller footprint in the host nation while allows fewer troops to physically be on providing a large security capability.

The second advantage of airpower in a hostile ground, providing a smaller intrusive footprint and allowing a larger COIN operation is that it gives the U.S. area to be controlled by a given ground strategic “staying power” by reducing the force. This aspect of airpower has two potential for U.S. military casualties, advantages for a COIN strategy. First, it which erodes support for the COIN minimizes the presence of foreign troops domestically. Rory Stewart, in a recent with the host nation population. Air- New York Times op-ed, argues bluntly that borne surveillance, combined with rapid the U.S. COIN strategy exceeds national strike capability, makes it difficult for will–“American and European voters will insurgent forces to move in large num- not send the hundreds of thousands of bers or to mass on a target without detec- troops the COIN textbooks recommend, tion. This allows friendly forces to patrol and have no wish to support decades of in small numbers or be stationed in iso- fighting.”13 The current national debate lated villages without risk of being over- reflects the public’s cost benefit analysis whelmed by a large insurgent force.11 The regarding the COIN in Iraq. The large recent strikes against al-Qaeda havens deployment of ground troops is limited [ 9 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

BALTRUSAITIS

by concerns for the health of the Army and the political consequences for a long-term deployment. Unlike a large deployment of ground forces, airpower has considerable staying power because of

Conflict&Security

activity in that area. These missions are highly effective, and if planned in advance, provide a preventive non-lethal deterrent capability.14 Air assets are also used to provide infrastructure protec-

With the current generation of targeting

pods and small explosive munitions, aircraft can, and often do, target these insurgents in the act, protecting critical infrastructure. its relatively low cost, its low visibility to the public, and because it limits enemy opportunities to inflict U.S. casualties.

The enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraq illustrates the staying power of airpower. U.S. and coalition airmen successfully enforced the UN-mandated no-fly zones over Iraq for more than 11 years without losing a single aircraft. This is not to argue that airpower can “go it alone”–ground forces would still be an essential element of any strategy–but rather proffers a strategy whose costs are more in line with the sacrifice Americans are willing to make.

Airpower is More than Airstrikes. Although airpower often makes

the headlines when it strikes insurgent strongholds in Iraq or Afghanistan, it routinely supports coalition ground troops in nonlethal ways. Nonlethal innovations–such as showing force, providing airlift, facilitating medical evacuation, and providing surveillance capabilities–often prove more useful and effective than airstrikes, particularly in the context of a COIN operation.

One nonlethal innovation is the “show of force” in which strike aircraft fly at a low altitude over potentially hostile areas in order to discourage adversary

tion. Rather than patrolling the skies in benign orbits, waiting for a ground support requests, fighter aircraft routinely fly over critical infrastructure such as pipelines and power lines providing a deterrent protection to infrastructure that is critical to reconstruction. With the current generation of targeting pods and small explosive munitions, aircraft can, and often do, target these insurgents in the act, protecting critical infrastructure.

Air Force mobility capabilities also give commanders an advantage over insurgents by moving necessary forces rapidly over great distances. Airlift provides a significant advantage to COIN forces, enabling commanders to rapidly deploy, reposition, sustain, and redeploy ground forces. While ground forces can execute these basic missions alone, airlift bypasses weaknesses that insurgents have traditionally exploited. For instance, responding to the threat of roadside bombings and ambushes of U.S. ground convoys in Iraq, the Air Force, in November 2004, sharply expanded its airlift of equipment and supplies to bases inside Iraq in order to reduce the amount of military cargo hauled over land routes. This effort kept more than 400 trucks and about 1,050 drivers with Summer/Fall 2008 [ 9 3 ]

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military escorts off the most dangerous roads in Iraq. Innovations in airdrop technology allow airlifters to resupply ground units without putting the aircraft or ground units at risk. Ground units in remote areas of Afghanistan are being resupplied through Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) airdrop missions.

JPADS combines a low-cost guided parachute system with GPS integration, allowing very accurate high altitude airdrops, keeping the aircraft out of harm’s way while accurately supplying isolated units. Resupplying troops by air in remote locations takes vehicles off dangerous roads, thereby avoiding the threat of accidents, improvised explosive devices, and insurgent ambushes.

A key element in ensuring that U.S. losses are minimized is the robust aeromedical evacuation system.

Aeromedical evacuation allows for the rapid transport of injured personnel and civilians, not only shrinking the critical time between injury and focused medical care, but also reducing the footprint of medical facilities within the host nation.

During the Vietnam War, the average time for the injured to be transported from the battlefield to the United States was forty-five days. Today all services use medevac helicopters to move injured patients to forward-based trauma centers, while the Air Force typically moves these patients from Iraq and Afghanistan to major medical centers in Europe and the United States in three days or less. In addition to the obvious benefits that medical evacuation provides to U.S. military personnel, it provides further advantages in a COIN operation. Medical evacuation of host nation military or civilians can also build good will among the population and create a positive message. Saving the life of someone’s child or [ 9 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

spouse is “one of the biggest rounds we can fire,” says Lt. Gen. Gary North, the top Air Force commander for the Middle East and Southwest Asia. “That’s a story they’ll tell forever.”15 Finally, manned and unmanned surveillance systems, such as the U-2, Predator, Global Hawk, and space assets, give U.S. coalition counterinsurgent forces unprecedented capabilities in surveillance and target acquisition. Overhead surveillance fills critical gaps in knowledge, especially when the counterinsurgent force has not gained the acceptance and trust of the local population. Aerial surveillance platforms with long loiter times can place an entire region under constant surveillance visually and electronically. Air surveillance has been particularly useful along isolated border areas where insurgents are tracked, and engaged with airstrikes, when entering Afghanistan.

“We find and track the insurgents with our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and then target them with precise effect,” according to Maj. Gen. William L. Holland, U.S. Central Command Air Forces deputy commander.16 Enhanced awareness from airborne surveillance of enemy operating areas, when combined with other sources of intelligence, increases the number of opportunities for COIN forces to take the initiative. For instance, in Iraq, overhead platforms are used to track insurgents planting IEDs back to their bomb-making network, allowing the whole network to be dismantled.17 Just as in traditional warfare, an integrated strategy affecting key nodes of the bomb-making network usually reaps greater benefits than attacking the bomb-planters themselves.

Conclusion. The particular advantages

of airpower–its speed, range, persis-

BALTRUSAITIS

tence, flexibility, and lethality–make it an integral element of modern COIN operations. Unfortunately, FM 3-24, the current COIN doctrine, presents a ground-focused perspective that limits strategic options compared to a truly joint strategy. The Air Force must take some of the blame for this lack of air strategy in the current document. Writing in 1998, one airpower scholar observed that, “to a large extent, the Air Force has ignored insurgency as much as possible, preferring to think of it as little more than a small version of conventional war.”18 This lack of interest was reflected in the slow introduction of COIN doctrine. The U.S. Air Force just recently released its primary doctrine document AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, incorporating airpower issues directly related to fighting a COIN. The Air Force needs to dedicate additional energy to showcasing its recent doctrinal developments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and multi-service forums where irregular warfare and COIN concepts are being debated in order to ensure that Air Force perspectives are voiced.

This essay is not a call for an “air only” strategy, but rather a call for the full potential of airpower to be integrated into a more inclusive joint and interde-

Conflict&Security

pendent COIN doctrine. FM 3-24 is an outstanding work of scholarship and military theory, forming the bedrock of military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The immediate concern, however, is whether the designation of FM 3-24 as the “Book for Iraq” will cement FM 3-24 as U.S. joint COIN doctrine. The airpower contributions reviewed here provide a short list of capabilities that should be integrated into a comprehensive strategy for the counterinsurgencies rather than ad hoc supplemental additions. The need for truly joint COIN doctrine is not about whether airpower is acknowledged; rather it is about bringing the best of the whole armed forces–and the unique capabilities of all the services–to bear on our current armed conflicts.

The author would like to thank Elizabeth Grimm, Tricia Bacon-Gonzales, Sarah Cross, Hamutal Bernstein, John Sawyer, Colonel Keith Hrebenak, and an anonymous reviewer for their edits on draft versions of this article. Additionally, he would also like to thank Major General Charles Dunlap, USAF, whose impassioned arguments for developing a “truly joint” attitude towards counterinsurgency greatly influenced his thoughts on the subject.

NOTES

1 Michael R. Gordon, Military Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency (the New York Times, 2006, Internet, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/05/washington/05doctrine.html?pagewanted=print (date accessed: 2 February 2008).

2 FM 3-24’s preface does not describe it as doctrine aimed merely at ground operations but as doctrine for “military operations” in “counterinsurgency environments.” See United States. Dept. of the Army. and United States. Marine Corps., The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army FM 3-24 : MCWP 3-33.5, University of Chicago Press ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), vii.

3 William M. Arkin, In Defense of Air Power (the Washington Post Online, 2007, Internet, http://-

blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/12/afg hanistan_commander_bombs_li.html (date accessed: 1 February 2008).

4 William M. Arkin, In Afghanistan, It's About Air Power, Too, the Washington Post Online, 2007, Internet, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/12/in_afghanistan_its_about_air_p.html (date accessed: 1 February 2008).

5 United States. Dept. of the Army. and United States. Marine Corps., The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army FM 3-24 : MCWP 333.5, E-1.

6 "Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq," (New York; London: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 20.

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7 Charles J. Dunlap, Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing True Joint Doctrine (Air University Press, 2008).

8 Howard D. Belote, "Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War," Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 3 (2006): 56.

9 See especially Chapter 8, Lambeth outlines persistent problems integrating air operations into a coherent strategy. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2005).

10 Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, 1st Harper Perennial ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 137.

11 Alan Vick, Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006), 113.

12 Deborah Haynes, U.S. Airstrike Targets al-Qaeda Havens in Iraq, 2008, Internet, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ iraq/article3166641.ece (date accessed: 29 January 2008).

13 Rory Stewart, "Where Less is More," the New York Times, 23 July 2007.

14 Marc Santora, "U.S. and Iraqis Hit Insurgents

[ 9 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

in All-Day Fight," the New York Times, 10 January 2007. “Show of force� missions comprise a large number of the daily total of coercive missions flown, far outnumbering bombing missions. See 21 January Airpower Summary: F-16s Provide Show of Force, 2008, Internet, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123083132 (date accessed: 1 February 2008); Airpower Summary for 28 January 2008, Internet, http://www.centaf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123084058 (date accessed: 1 February 2008).

15 See Michael M. Phillips, "In Afghanistan, Mercy Missions Are a Part of War; Medevac Helicopters Offer Villagers Services Taliban And al Qaeda Can't Match," the Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2007.

16 Air Assets Support Afghanistan Strike, 2007, Internet, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123037535 (date accessed: 4 February 2008) 17 Marcus Weisgerber, Air Force ISR 'Backtracking' Helps 'Round Up' IED Makers, 2006, Internet, http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2006/November/11302006/ 11302006-17.htm (date accessed: 31 January 2008).

18 Dennis M. Drew, "U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion," Journal of Military History October (1998): 809.

Conflict&Security

The Tigers Abroad

How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka Dr. Peter Chalk Now in its 29th year of existence and 18th year of concerted combat, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has earned a reputation as one of the most sophisticated and deadly terrorist insurgencies in the world. The organization has demonstrated a proven ability to operate along the entire ambit of the conflict spectrum—from selective assassination and indiscriminate acts of terrorism to large-scale, battalionsized assaults—and retains effective control over significant tracts of territory in northern Sri Lanka where it runs a mini Tamil state complete with its own police, judiciary, tax, health, and educational infrastructure.

To be sure, adroit employment of guerrilla tactics, the dedication of its own fighters, and Colombo’s military incompetence have all been important factors in accounting for the LTTE’s battlefield success. However, just as significant is the international support structure that the Tigers have developed to tap and harness the Tamil Diaspora, which in the words of one senior Sri Lankan official, constitutes the critical lifeline for Tiger cadres on the ground.1 This paper provides an overview of the essential features of the LTTE international support structure. Its purpose is to demonstrate just how effective external Diaspora assistance can

Dr. Peter Chalk is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, California), and also serves as an adjunct professor at the Postgraduate Naval School in Monterey, California.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 9 7 ]

THE TIGERS ABROAD

be when integrated into one all-encompassing network. It needs to be noted, however, that the LTTE example is atypical and should not be seen as indicative of insurgent movements in general.

Indeed, with the possible exception of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and possibly the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), no other group has come close to establishing the type of highly organized support structure that the LTTE has been able to call on.

referred to as “little Jaffna’s”—developed as self-administered Tamil zones complete with their own media, cinema, service, and business outlets.2 Today, the Tamil Diaspora is thought to number between 600,000 and 800,000. The bulk of this expatriate population is divided between North America, Western Europe, and the AsiaPacific, with most migrants concentrated in the following seven countries: Canada (320,000), the United Kingdom (300,000), India (150,000), France The Tamil Diaspora. Much of the (100,000), Germany (60,000), AusTamil Diaspora stems from a wave of Sri tralia (53,000), and Switzerland Lankan emigration that was first trig- (40,000). The middle and professional gered by bloody ethnic riots in 1983. classes tended to move to richer Western Essentially instigated under the auspices states such as Canada and the UK, which of the army in revenge for an LTTE were also known to operate liberal asylum landmine blast and ambush that killed laws, while those from poorer backthirteen Sinhala soldiers in the country’s grounds mostly migrated to refugee Northern Province, anti-Tamil distur- camps in the southern Indian state of bances became particularly serious in Tamil Nadu.3

With the exception of the Kurdish

Workers Party (PKK), and possibly the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), no other group has come close to establishing the type of highly organized support structure that the LTTE has been able to call on.

Colombo and Jaffna where an estimated 400 were killed in wholesale communal massacres. A major hardening of the Sri Lankan internal ethnic divide quickly ensued, with large numbers of Tamils living in predominantly Sinhalese areas forced to flee overseas. The overall tempo of emigration gathered pace in line with the escalating civil war throughout the 1980s and 1990s, resulting in sizeable Tamil enclaves in several Western states. Many of these hubs—sometimes [ 9 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

In countries where large numbers of Tamils have settled, the LTTE has moved to set up front organizations to help manage, control, and integrate the support of the respective expatriate community. Notable groups established for this purpose have included the British Tamil Organization (UTO) in the UK, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the French Federation of Tamil Associations (FFTA), and the Australasian Federation of Tamil Associa-

CHALK

tions (AFTA).4 In addition, various World Tamil Movements (WTM) were created, which according to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), work through a “mother” WTM office located in Toronto. Combined, these entities are thought to provide the principal “lens” through which the LTTE central leadership levers and monitors the Tamil Diaspora—a function that is reputedly performed as part of the Tiger Organization of Secret Intelligence Service’s (TOSIS, also known as the Aiyanna Group) clandestine global management responsibilities.5

The LTTE Global Diaspora Support Network. The LTTE global

Diaspora support network can be subdivided into two main functional areas— publicity and propaganda and finance generation (a third type of overseas support, arms procurement, is not covered in this paper as it does not directly involve the Tamil Diaspora).6 Although each component nominally operates independently of the other, their activities invariably overlap and are frequently integrated to coordinated under the auspices of the group’s International Secretariat.

Publicity and Propaganda. LTTE

publicity and propaganda is coordinated through the Eelam Political Administration, which has the responsibility for managing the LTTE’s external “diplomatic” representation as well as the group’s mediation efforts with the Sri Lankan government and third-party peace envoys.7 Prior to his death by cancer in December 2006, Anton Balasingham served as the chief architect of Tiger external propaganda activities.8 His main goal was to galvanize international sup-

Conflict&Security

port for the Tiger cause, while simultaneously discrediting Colombo, by disseminating a consistent three-fold message: · Tamils are the innocent victims of Sinhalese discrimination and government-instigated military repression. · The LTTE represents the only vehicle capable of defending and promoting the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamil community. · There can be no peace in Sri Lanka until the country’s Tamils are granted their own independent state under the governance of the LTTE.9 Balasingham headed a quasi-diplomatic structure that consists of sympathetic pressure groups, media units, charities, and benevolent non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although as of 1998 the Tigers were represented in fifty-four countries as far flung as Burma and Botswana, the concentration of their political activity takes place in Western countries that have large Tamil expatriate communities, including, most notably, Canada, the UK, France, Australia, and Switzerland. As noted above, in each of these states, political support for the LTTE has been effectively harnessed through overarching front organizations that integrate, and thereby inflate, the individual efforts of specific lobbying and charitable bodies.10 LTTE propaganda targets both the Tamil Diaspora and the host government. Initially, most lobbying took the form of crude propaganda disseminated via local libraries, mass mail outs, and community television and radio broadcasts.11 However, at a relatively early stage the LTTE came to realize that its efforts would be substantially augmented through the placement of carefully selected in-country information specialSummer/Fall 2008 [ 9 9 ]

THE TIGERS ABROAD

ists. These “counselors,” who have mostly operated out of the front organizations noted above, have proven to be especially instrumental in arranging for cultural and social gatherings that have been specifically calibrated to maximize mobilization among committed LTTE adherents as well as sway potentially sympathetic backers.12 To bolster their potential impact, these events are often timed to take place in the aftermath of major battlefield successes or coordinated with venerated dates in the Tiger calendar such as Martyr’s day, which is celebrated every year on 27 November—the birthday of the group’s supreme commander, Velupillai Prabhakaran.13 During the last decade, the Tigers have also come to appreciate the importance of additional mediums through which to extend the range and scope of their publicity efforts. Like many other legitimate and illegitimate non-state entities, electronic platforms such as the World Wide Web, news groups (Usernet), and email have been especially favored and are now employed on a routine basis both to galvanize international support and to discredit the policies and counterinsurgency actions of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF). Most commentators agree that the LTTE’s electronic war has been far more effective than any counter-campaign so far mounted by the Sri Lankan government, allowing the group to continually embarrass Colombo and gain political and financial capital at its expense.14 As insurgency analyst Sisira Pinnawala observes: “The major distinction between the pro-Tamil struggle websites and those belonging to the other camp is operational sophistication.

Pro-Tamil websites cater to a wider audience, [extending] a full service [that provides for the] cultural and social needs of [ 1 0 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the Tamil community…There has also been [a vigorous] attempt…to introduce multimedia, including real-time video…The government approach to the Internet is totally the opposite of the above. It is characterized by old Soviet style propaganda…None of the government-operated websites have attempted to attract audiences from among the Sri Lankans overseas by addressing their needs…like the pro-LTTE camp. There is, in other words, no full service approach.”15 The effectiveness of the LTTE propaganda campaign can be measured by the high degree of legitimacy the group has been accorded among many Western states—the main focus of Tiger international publicity activities. Certainly for most of the 1990s, the LTTE was portrayed as a genuine national liberation movement engaged in bone fide struggle for independence against an oppressive Sinhalese dominated state. This, despite its involvement in numerous terrorist atrocities during the decade, including the assassinations of Rajiv Ghandi in 1991 (former Indian head of state) and Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993 (the former Sri Lankan President) as well as the devastating suicide bombing of Colombo’s Central Bank in 1996—an attack that left 100 people dead and over 1,400 injured.16 More significantly, it is only comparatively recently that those states most closely associated with the Tamil Diaspora have moved to take a harder line against the LTTE. The UK government banned the group in 2001, with similar measures enacted in Canada and the European Union (EU, which has pertinence for both Germany and France) not until 2006.17 At the time of this writing the Tigers had yet to be officially proscribed in Australia.18

CHALK

Conflict&Security

Tamil social service, development, and Fundraising. Alongside propaganda, rehabilitation programs in Sri Lanka. In the LTTE runs a sophisticated interna- these cases, it is generally very difficult to tional revenue-generating operation that prove that funds raised for humanitarian draws from three main sources: direct purposes are being diverted to propagate Diaspora contributions; funds siphoned terrorism or other forms of illegality off from contributions given to NGOs, elsewhere.21 This was particularly true charities and benevolent donor groups; prior to 9/11, when many countries did and investments made in legitimate, not physically require organizations to Tamil-run businesses. The exact amount register with governing authorities before or percentage breakdown that is pro- engaging in fundraising activities.22 cured from each of these financial well- According to G. H. Peiris, Professor springs is not known. Combined, how- Emeritus at the University of Peradeniya ever, they are thought to provide an near Kandy, co-opted non-profits, annual income base of between $200 NGOs, and charities afford an estimated and $300 million. Taking into account $2 million a month to the LTTE war estimated fixed operational costs of $8 chest.23 million within LTTE-administered Beyond direct Diaspora contributions regions of Sri Lanka, this would leave the and siphoned funds, the LTTE has group with a healthy profit margin of at derived funding from investments in least $192 million a year.19 legitimate overseas Tamil business and A significant amount of money used to commercial holdings. In many cases, these support the LTTE insurgency is raised enterprises run on a system of “ownership from the international Tamil Diaspora. by proxy,” where the Tigers cover initial The Tigers focus most of their efforts in capital start-up costs and then split the this regard on Canada and Europe—both subsequent profits with the company’s of which host sizeable, well-off middle ostensible owner. The LTTE has estabclass expatriate communities. While lished a number of businesses that operate some of this money is coerced, the bulk is in this manner, including ventures that given voluntarily, frequently in line with deal in the gold and jewelry trade, wholea standard baseline “tax” that is levied and sale commodity freight and distribution, paid as a minimum obligation to the and the provision of local Tamil computTamil cause. In Canada, the sum runs to er, telephone, and bus services. Due to a between US$240 and US$646 a year per lack of reliable data, it is not possible to household depending on the needs of provide a definitive figure for the amount the group at any one time. In the UK, of money the Tigers generate from these annual family donations average in the sources. However, according to Gunaratrange of $600, while in France they na, the revenue earned from Canada—the reportedly run as high as $2,728.20 main locus for this form of financial proFunds are not always directly procured curement—can be roughly estimated at from the Diaspora community. Often, $6.5 million for the period October 1998 the LTTE will siphon off expatriate con- to October 1999.24 tributions that are given to non-profit Finally, the LTTE is widely suspected NGOs, donor bodies, and charities that of raising money by exploiting the plight have been ostensibly created to finance of Tamils wishing to emigrate to the West, Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 0 1 ]

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which is now thought to constitute an increasingly central component of Tiger financial procurement. According to intelligence officials in Ottawa, the group plays a pivotal role in the trafficking of illegal migrants and refugees to Canada, charging between $18,000 and $32,000 per “transaction.”25 Given the inherently esoteric character of the human export trade, it is difficult to determine the overall scope of this particular revenue-source. However, in June 2000 Sri Lanka’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) claimed to have uncovered one major Tiger operation involving some 600 people who had been illegally shipped to the European

place, “illegals” quickly go underground, generally taking menial jobs that have been pre-arranged by established LTTE country representatives. This ensures that the new arrivals remain semi-permanently indentured to the LTTE, which in many cases, has translated into acting as local Tiger henchmen and/or debt collectors.28

Conclusion. The LTTE insurgency and its Diaspora are intimately tied to one another. So long as the group is able to lever expatriate Tamils for propaganda and fund-raising purposes, its ethnoseparatist campaign can be maintained.

These communities have not only pro-

The LTTE is widely suspected of raising

money by exploiting the plight of Tamils wishing to emigrate to the West, which is now thought to constitute an increasingly central component of Tiger financial procurement.

Union (EU) on forged visas.26 The net profits from such an endeavor—even after taking overhead costs into account— would have been in the millions.

Typically, migrants and refugees are trafficked to North America and Europe via Thailand and Burma, which are used either as identification forgery hubs— high quality but cheap passports can be made to order in Bangkok—or proximate staging points for onward trips.27 As with human smuggling rings in general, direct passages are avoided whenever possible in favor of staggered journeys or routes that travel through/via neighboring and transit countries characterized by less intrusive immigration checks, including the Balkans in Europe and Mexico/land border crossings in the Americas. Once in [ 1 0 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

vided two ingredients that are essential to any insurgency—international political recognition and money—they have also formed the basis of a highly effective international support structure upon which to anchor the group’s actual onground war effort in Sri Lanka.

Unfortunately, the international community has proven to be particularly amenable to Tiger global operations. In the West, this has largely been a product of tolerance borne of the common Tamil ethnic identity that underscores the LTTE both domestically and in its Diaspora—something that has made it increasingly difficult for governments and law enforcement agencies to differentiate between ordinary Tamils and pro-LTTE activists.

CHALK

Just as important is the prevalent belief among many Western politicians that it is the ethnic or the minority vote, which makes the difference in an election. As such, they tend to be sympathetic to the political aspirations and the grievances of the minorities and ethnic groups living in their constituencies. Because the Tigers have been able to run effective propaganda campaigns which have successfully mobilized significant sectors of the overseas Tamil Diaspora in their favor, politicians have become increasingly reluctant to support tougher actions against the LTTE for fear that this will impinge on their local electoral support base.

Sri Lanka has long pressed Tamil-rich Western countries to take more concerted steps to identify and root out proLTTE Diaspora activities, arguing that if they do nothing they tacitly accede to the group’s political and military agenda by allowing its members to organize and fundraise internationally. While these diplomatic exhortations have, at times,

Conflict&Security

been viewed as interfering and pressuring, a number of states and political entities have now officially designated the Tigers as a terrorist movement, including, as noted, the UK, Canada, and the EU. These proscriptions certainly carry significant symbolic weight and will also have practical import, not least because they make providing material support to the LTTE a criminal offence. However, to truly impact on expatriate support for the Eelam insurgency, host governments must necessarily accompany legal responses with a more active program of community policing and assimilation. If LTTE control over immigrant populations can be curtailed, involuntary and coerced pledges of assistance are likely to decrease. Equally, if Tamil Diasporas are allowed to assimilate fully into their adopted countries, it is reasonable to assume that they will have a weaker cognitive tie to the idea of a separate “homeland” and, as such, will gradually disassociate themselves from the objectives of the Tiger insurgents fighting there.

NOTES

1 Sri Lankan official, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, April 2005.

2 Peter Chalk, “The LTTE Insurgency in Sri Lanka,” in Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia, Eds. Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff, (London: Sage, 2003), 130; John Solomon and BC Tan, “Feeding the Tiger—How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (date accessed: 1 September 2007).

3 “Sri Lankan Diaspora,” Internet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lanka_Tamil_dias(date pora#References_and_further_reading, accessed: 12 December 2007); John Solomon and BC Tan, “Feeding the Tiger—How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (date accessed: 1 September 2007). ; Matthew Rosenberg, “Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger Rebels Run a Global Fund-Raising and WeaponsSmuggling Network,” The Associated Press, 5 November 2007.

4 Sri Lankan officials, interview by author, Ottawa, Canada and Canberra, Australia, November-

December, 2000. See also Dushy Ranetunge, “British Charities Fund Tamil Tiger Terrorists,” information paper published by the Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights (SPUR),(Melbourne: September 2000).

5 John Solomon and BC Tan, “Feeding the Tiger – How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (date accessed: 1 September 2007).

6 Responsibility for LTTE arms procurement falls to the Office of Overseas Purchases. Heading this division is Tharmalingham Shunmugam, alias Kumaran Pathmanathan and colloquially known simply as “KP” (the source of the office’s nickname, the KP Department). He is the second most wanted man in Sri Lanka (after Villupilai Prabhakaran—the supreme Commander of the LTTE) and he is currently the subject of an international Interpol arrest warrant (Red Notice). Pathmanathan runs a highly proficient arms network that has been linked to weapons deals in Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia and which is thought to own at least ten ocean-going vessels known informally within the group as the “Sea Pigeons.”

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THE TIGERS ABROAD

These vessels are charged with transporting procured weapons to Sri Lanka and are typically registered under flags of convenience (FoC) with bureaus in Panama, Liberia, Honduras, Cyprus, Malta or Burmuda). Author interviews, Sri Lankan officials, Bangkok, December 2000. See also Dan Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); John Solomon and BC Tan, “Feeding the Tiger–How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (1 September 2007); Rosenberg, “Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger Rebels Run a Global Fundraising and Weapons-Smuggling Network”; and “The Tiger Shipping Empire,” The Island (Sri Lanka), 26 March 2000.

7 Thamil Chevlam headed the Eelam Political Administration until his death in November 2007 (he was killed in an airstrike by the Sri Lankan military); at the time of writing no successor had been announced by the Tiger leadership.

8 As with Thamil Chevlam, at the time of writing the LTTE leadership had yet to announce a successor to Balasingham.

9 Anthony Davis, “Tiger International,” AsiaWeek, 26 November 1996.

10 In addition to front groups, the LTTE has effectively exploited the liberal democratic ethos that underscores many Western states to establish offices that are openly representative of the Tiger cause.

Foremost amongst these is Eelam House in London, the LTTE’s principal headquarters outside Sri Lanka.

Although nominally headed by A C Shanthan, the LTTE Chief in the UK, it serves as the LTTE’s principal base of operations for coordinating overseas political activity; it is also the location out of which all official Tiger statements, memoranda and proclamations emanate. For an overview of many of the coordinating functions carried out by Eelam House, and its links with other pro-LTTE groups see “LTTE Establishes Global TV Sweep with Merger,” The Island (Sri Lanka), 20/09/2000.

11 Rohan Gunaratna, “LTTE Organization and Operations in Canada,” unpublished document supplied to author, November 2000.

12 Key LTTE political counselors include: T. Jeyakumar (Australia), Manuel Mariyadas (Canada), Nadarajah Illango (France), Rudrakumaraan (United States), A.C. Shanthan (United Kingdom), and Anton Ponrajah (Switzerland).

13 Sri Lankan officials, interview by author, Canberra, Australia, December 2000. See also Dan Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,2001).

14 Sri Lankan officials and commentators, interviews by author, Ottawa, Canada and Bangkok, Thailand, November-December 2000.

15 Sisira Pinnawala, “Lankan Ethnic Conflict on the Internet,” Daily News (Sri Lanka), 25 June 1998.

16 The 1996 suicide bombing of the Central Bank remains the worst act of terrorism to have ever been

[ 1 0 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

carried out in Sri Lanka. The attack was the main catalyst for Washington’s decision to designate the LTTE a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FCO) in 1997.

17 This action was taken after the LTTE’s involvement in the 2005 assassination of Lakshman Kadrigamar, the Sri Lankan foreign minister.

18 John Solomon and BC Tan, “Feeding the Tiger–How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (date accessed: 1 September 2007).

19 John Solomon and BC Tan, “Feeding the Tiger – How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (1 September 2007); Rosenberg, “Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger Rebels Run a Global Fund-Raising and Weapons-Smuggling Network.” The Island (Sri Lanka), 26 March 2000.

There have also been periodic allegations that the LTTE has raised money by trafficking Afghan heroin through India and Sri Lanka to the west. However, definitive proof linking the group to drugs running has yet to emerge.

20 Gunaratna, ““LTTE Organization and Operations in Canada”; “Behind the Tamil Tigers” SBS Dateline (Australia), 4 October 2000; Solomon and Tan, “Feeding the Tiger–How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (date accessed: 1 September 2007).

21 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,2001) 51.

22 Following al-Qaeda’s attacks in the United States on 9/11, many governments quickly moved to introduce legislation designed to constrain proscribed groups from engaging in concerted financial activities on their soil.

23 John Solomon and BC Tan, “Feeding the Tiger – How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (date accessed: 1 September 2007).

24 Gunaratna, ““LTTE Organization and Operations in Canada” “Behind the Tamil Tigers” SBS Dateline (Australia), 4 October 2000; Stewart Bell “Money Trail: Financing War from Canada,” the National Post (Canada), 3 June 2000.

25 Sri Lankan intelligence officials, interviews by author, Ottawa, Canada, November 2000.

26 “Human Smuggling Racket Busted,” the Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka), June 26, 2000; “CID Bust Another Multi Billion Rupee Human Smuggling LTTE Operation,” the Daily News (Sri Lanka), 17 May 2000.

27 See, for instance, Chris Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka. Civil War and Reconciliation Robert Rotberg ed., (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999), 33; Anthony Davis, “Tracking Tigers in Phuket,” Asiaweek (16 June 2000); John Nicol, “Passports for Sail,” McLeans (3 April 2000) 2-8; and Charu Lata Joshi, “The Body Trade,” The Far Eastern Economic Review (26 October 2000) 100-102.

28 Sri Lankan officials, interviews by author Bangkok, Thailand, December 2000.

Law&Ethics Citizenship in The Making Gustavo Gordillo de Anda The Play: The Problem When the Results Are the Problem. In early June 2006, Felipe Calderón, the conser-

vative candidate, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the leftist candidate, faced each other in the second presidential debate. At that time, most of the opinion polls gave a small advantage to López Obrador in what was called a “technical tie.” Concurrently, the other three presidential candidates simply faded from the public view. Roberto Madrazo, the candidate of the once-invincible Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), was headed for a major defeat. Roberto Campa, the candidate of a small party created by the powerful National Union of Teachers, was a generally unpopular candidate.

Patricia Mercado, the attractive and charismatic candidate for Alternativa Socialdemocrata, was popular mainly with a small fringe of young, mostly female, middle class, and well-educated voters.

Calderón, a young member of the family that founded the conservative, center-right National Action Party (PAN) in 1939, had made a political career as a party official and parliamentarian. López Obrador, a former PRI member and protégé of a former governor of his state of Tabasco, split from the PRI like many of the prominent leftist leaders such as

Gustavo Gordillo de Anda is a visiting scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at the University of Indiana in Bloomington.

His main areas of research are democratic transitions in Latin America, institutional change, norms and social movements and regional, and rural development.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 0 5 ]

CITIZENSHIP IN THE MAKING

Cuauhtemoc Cardenas had done in 1988. López Obrador had until then only held local positions in the official party, but he won national notoriety as a result of his two highway marches from Tabasco to Mexico City. Supported by Cardenas, he won the internal elections and became president of the nationalist, center-left Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo in the late 1990s. López Obrador used that position to catapult himself to head the government of Mexico City.

The elections were, in fact, about choosing between a rightist and a leftist coalition. López Obrador’s leftist coalition obtained 35.3 percent of the total votes whereas Calderón’s rightist coalition narrowly won the presidential elections with 35.9 percent of the vote, a margin of 233,831 votes. However, each coalition represented only around 20 percent of Mexico’s 71.3 million registered voters. In addition, both in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies, no party held a majority. In order to secure sufficient votes to modify the constitution, at least two of the three major parties—PAN, PRD, or PRI—needed to develop a coalition. Thus, a divided government was the result of this election.

The PRI’s 18 percent of the vote represented the worst result in its history.

For example, even in 2000 when it lost the presidency for the first time in party history, it still ended up in second place with more than 35 percent of the total vote.1 Notwithstanding its poor performance in the elections, the PRI was able to play the role of the main dealmaker.

This unexpected result was a crucial development during the post-electoral conflict that ensued following the elections on 2 July 2006.

On that night, Luis Carlos Ugalde,

[ 1 0 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

president of the Federal Electoral Institute, said in a nationally-televised message that the race was too close to call.

The “rapid count”—a random sample of around 7 percent of the total precincts— presented a very small difference between the two leading candidates. That same night and during the following day, López Obrador and his main spokespeople argued that the election was a fullfledged fraud. Their argument was based on the alleged disappearance of more than three million votes. In fact, those votes were set aside as a result of an agreement among all parties, including López Obrador’s PRD, to separate ballots that could have had technical irregularities.

However, Ugalde omitted this information in his first appearance. Then, the day after the elections, Ugalde gave confusing reasons regarding why those ballots were set aside. Thus, he gave ammunition to the allegations of electoral manipulation. In the midst of demonstrations and a bitter political atmosphere, the allegations ranged from the use of algorithms to alter the tallies (it was called “a new type of cybernetic fraud”) to the old-fashioned massive forms of election-rigging.

On 5 August, the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF) ruled on the PRD’s filings alleging irregularities and requesting recounts. The unanimous vote of the seven magistrates conceded a partial recount of 11,839 ballot boxes (9.3 percent of the total) in 155 districts. The tribunal based its decision on the fact that, despite demanding that all votes be recounted, the PRD presented legal claims to less than 34 percent of the polling stations. The results of the partial recount amounted to 237,736 votes annulled out of around four million votes recounted. The recounts

GORDILLO DE ANDA

revealed no widespread pattern of electoral fraud that was deliberate and determinant in the outcome, and thus there were no grounds to invoke the “generic cause of annulment” as demanded by López Obrador. This decision recalled previous rulings of the TEPJF in two gubernatorial races.2 As the ultimate arbitrator of the elections, the TEPJF proclaimed Calderón president on 5 September with a victory margin of 0.55 percent. Nevertheless, in this same ruling, the TEPJF conceded important irregularities during the electoral campaign. These namely included incumbent President Vicente Fox’s

Law&Ethics

Obrador launched an important popular movement including mass protests, marches, civil disobedience, and encampments along one of the main arteries in Mexico City—Paseo de la Reforma.

López Obrador and his coalition were torn between two choices: either argue the elections were rigged against him and, thus, the authorities should recognize his triumph by recounting all votes; or claim the elections were manipulated in a way that the results were completely unclear, and, thus, the elections should be annulled.

These paths created a series of legal and constitutional problems. First, the

The greatest threat is the...inability to

grasp the exceptional moment in which democratic consolidation and economic modernization appear to coincide in the minds and hearts of many of its citizens. elections for president were simultaneous to and used the same booths and lists of voters as the elections for deputies and senators. As a result, it was a difficult argument to make that while the presidential elections were fraudulent, the other national elections were not.

Although this peculiar claim was not made, the ambiguity within the Obrador coalition was due to the fact that the PRD had won its largest parliamentarian group ever—it was the second largest group in the Chamber of Deputies and third in the Senate.

The constitutionally-mandated legal The Actors: Restoration as a Non-Electoral Outcome. As the path in the case of the annulment of a TEPJF entered the crucial deliberation presidential election made the issue even on the legality of the elections in late more complicated. According to Articles August and early September, López 84 and 85 of the Constitution, if the interventions through the publicizing of the government’s social programs, the distribution of private sector-sponsored ads to supposedly promote voting (they were heavily skewed in favor of PAN), and the negative campaign between PAN and PRD. Nevertheless, the TEPJF concluded that those irregularities did not affect the constitutional principles of certainty, legality, independence, impartiality, and objectivity. As a result, the elections were declared valid and not subject to any legal contestation.

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presidency is vacated for any reason, the joint National Congress—Chamber of Deputies plus the Senate—should elect an interim president by at least a two-thirds vote. Ten days later, the same Congress should schedule national elections to be held fourteen to eighteen months later.

Then, the nationally-elected president would hold office for the remainder of the six-year constitutional period. In order for this process to happen, the TEPJF would have had to annul the elections.

Confusion abounded and paralyzed government and political parties as the specter of a conservative restoration made its way through hearsay and rumors. The conservative stranglehold on power was partially broken when an opposition leader won the presidential elections in 2000—the first time this had happened since the PRI gained power in 1928. Due to the contested results of the elections and the incomplete democratic transition, a restoration of the previous authoritarian regime might occur as a result of an improbable but not impossible alliance between the PRI and PRD. Hearsay had it that there were intense negotiations among the PRD, PRI, and other minor parties to guarantee the two-thirds of the Congress required to elect the interim president. Some rumors even held that the consensus candidate for the interim presidency would be the prestigious dean of the National University, Dr. Juan de la Fuente.

Supposedly, there were discussions that debated whether Calderón and López Obrador would again compete in the new elections.

Of course, these rumors cannot be confirmed. However, the general atmosphere among players across party lines was a strong penchant toward restora-

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tion. The primary reason for this inclination was the PRI and PRD’s shared heritage. Many PRI leaders and electoral operatives had fled to the PRD as a result of the structural reforms promoted during Carlos Salinas’s presidency in the late 1980s and early 1990s. What makes restoration possible is a combination of administrative centralization and restricted democracy in the context of a political crisis in which both elites and a considerable number of citizens might prefer stability rather than consolidating democracy.3 Since the TEPJF did not annul the elections, López Obrador and his supporters then resorted to Article 39 of the Constitution in order to justify their claim of a “legitimate” government.

Article 39 states that “the national sovereignty resides essentially and originally in the people. All public power originates in the people and is instituted for their benefit. The people at all times have the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government.”4 Using this justification, López Obrador and his supporters held their Democratic National Convention in mid-September, which led to the formation of López Obrador’s “shadow government” in November.

However, this legal claim was very weak since the Constitution establishes that the way of exercising popular sovereignty is through elections and is based on the electoral institutions. As stated in the Constitution, the TEPJF is the final authority on the legality of elections. The Constitution further establishes that the TEPJF’s rulings are final and cannot be contested in any other court.

In addition to the constitutional issue, López Obrador may have been overly confident on planning mass mobilization and backroom negotiation all along.

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The PRD’s legal claims in the aftermath of the elections that concerned only 34 percent of the polling stations and the López Obrador campaign’s incredible blunder of leaving more than 20 percent of the polling stations unmonitored by PRD representatives suggest as much.

These massive mobilizations and backroom negotiations were constantly employed by the PRI and PAN in the 1990s, but they also benefited López Obrador in his various bids in his home state of Tabasco.5 It could be concluded that the leadership in López Obrador’s campaign was overconfident in its success to the very last moment. Only when the trend was unequivocally against him— probably in the first hours of 3 July— was an alternative design to contest the elections put in place.6 The impact of the 2006 elections has been paradoxical. The PAN won the presidency and became the largest parliamentarian group in Congress, but that power did not give way to a coalition clearly able to break the Mexican political stalemate. As a result, they have been unable to pursue many of the muchneeded economic and political reforms.

The PRD obtained the highest levels of support in the history of the Mexican leftist movement and strong representation in Congress, but it has not convinced the leadership under López Obrador that they are now part of the government and should as such be concerned with governance and performance.

The PRI, despite its spectacular defeat in the elections, is the party with the strongest local networks.7 By never losing its penchant for power, the PRI has been able to play a strategic role in governance at the national level due to PAN and PRD’s unwillingness to negotiate direct-

Law&Ethics

ly. It is this non-cooperative interplay that was aggravated after the conflict following the 2006 elections but has been present since the 1997 mid-term elections. It is a dangerous outcome in the context of a long period of economic stagnation and social fragmentation.8 This atmosphere is further aggravated by the still-fresh memories of rigged elections, and perhaps more importantly, the informal arrangements during the Salinas administration—the concertacesiones.9

The Rules: Weak Agreements Based on Distrust. The recurrent

political crises that had accompanied the one-party political regime since 1968 were recognized as systemic failures during the Salinas presidency and addressed through two approaches.10 First, Salinas’s administration instituted economic reforms—privatizations, deregulations, and trade reforms—that could evolve into a new governing coalition based on urban middle classes and the trade-oriented segment of the business community. This coalition would replace the traditional bureaucratic nomenklatura that had governed Mexico for sixty years.

Secondly, he sought to internally restructure his dominant party, the PRI, and launch political reforms that would open elections to competition and a multi-party system. The reform of the PRI was aimed at reducing the influence and political clout of unions and peasants’ associations in favor of local and regional electoral machines.

However, the Salinas regime was tainted by allegations that he had won the presidency in a rigged election. In these same elections and for the first time in decades, a leftist coalition, the National Democratic Front—led by former PRI

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leaders and socialist militants—finished second in votes, electing a sizeable number of deputies and senators. This front was the origin of the PRD that would be constituted two years later. The traditional opposition party, PAN, also had a strong performance in big cities albeit behind the leftist coalition in the presidential contest.11 Nevertheless, the PAN ended up playing a pivotal role because the PRI did not have the majority necessary to change the constitution.

However, the resurgence of the PRI’s electoral strength in the intermediate elections in 1991 prevented a continuation of the internal transformation of the PRI. Political assassinations as well as the Zapatistas’ upheaval in 1994 further sidelined the overall reformist strategy.

As a consequence of those events and as a result of the mismanagement of the macroeconomic policy, a major eco-

Constitution had been reshaped in the 1940s and 1950s under the influence of a one-party regime. However, political commitments to reforming these delicate electoral rules and the constitutional framework were weak.13 The important issue for all opposition parties and civil society organizations was to guarantee the absence of any fraudulent conduct by the PRI and the government because having competitive elections was paramount for any future political change. In other words, in order to oppose the PRI regime, there would first have to be the possibility of defeating the PRI in clean elections. This would then create opportunities for new institutional arrangements and changes in the constitution.

The intermediate elections for deputies in 1997 tested the new electoral rules. At that time, the PRD won the first

The general atmosphere among players

across party lines was a strong penchant toward restoration. nomic crisis erupted at the beginning of Ernesto Zedillo’s presidency in 1994.

The Zedillo regime was tainted with economic and political crises and had very few incentives for the different political actors to cooperate.12 The only common interest among the players in government and the opposition parties was the need to assure competitive and clean elections.

The 1996 electoral reform created excessive and costly checks and balances because reform was influenced by a strong mutual distrust among all actors.

Discussions were held regarding the need to change the electoral rules as well as the overall constitutional framework. The

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general elections held in Mexico City since the 1920s and became an important parliamentary group.14 These elections inaugurated a new era of “divided governments,” and since then, the party in the presidency has not had a majority in the Congress.15 Although one could have expected more incentives for cooperation, in fact, what resulted was political entrenchment. Both opposition parties adopted non-cooperative strategies since they sensed that the seventy-yearold PRI regime was coming to an end, and a presidential election was scheduled for 2000. However, in many state and local elections held between 1997 and

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1999, the PRI slowly recuperated from its 1997 defeat. The PRI also changed the rules for electing its presidential candidate by establishing a primary-based election system that allowed four candidates to run for the nomination. These events generated the impression that the PRI could retain the presidency.

Due to a large, although internally weak, center-right coalition, the 2000 elections resulted in the first overall defeat of the PRI. More importantly, a considerable amount of political power in the national legislature, state governorships and legislatures, and municipal governments was distributed among the three major parties. Because of stability in the political distribution of power, a new political system emerged from the 2000 elections.

However, following the 2000 elections, two major political developments caused distrust to resurface among the actors and created incentives to resort to non-institutional behaviors. In 2003, the PAN and the PRI joined forces to name the new leaders of the Federal Electoral Institute over the objections of the PRD. This was in contrast to the previous elections of the “counselors,” who included a number of distinguished academics and non-partisan activists. The counselors had the trust of all parties and had earned a strong reputation for impartiality and efficiency. In 2004, as the presidential elections approached and the popularity of López Obrador, then mayor of Mexico City, grew stronger, Fox made a mistake by promoting the impeachment of the mayor on the grounds of an allegation of disobeying a federal judge’s order regarding construction standards in a residential area. This seemingly-shrewd political move backfired, and as of 2005, López Obrador’s

Law&Ethics

triumph seemed certain.16 In fact, the Fox administration was confronted with a stark choice: either establish a coalition with the PRI or develop an alliance with the PRD. A coalition with the PRI would have been closer in terms of economic and social policies, but would have prevented the administration from digging into incidents of past corruption and misdoings of the one-party regime. Developing an alliance with the PRD would have allowed the Fox administration to push for major political reforms, but it also would have required the reversal of some marketoriented economic policies. Fox took neither course—sometimes constructing bridges with the PRI in what appeared to be a governing pact, and sometimes proceeding to investigate past corruption and thus flirting with the possibility of a PAN-PRD alliance. Pursuing an unspecific political strategy not only weakened Fox’s presidency enormously, but more importantly, it blocked any real effort to develop rules and institutions that would express the new political plurality emerging in the post-PRI era.

The consequences of Fox’s actions are clear. Failing to develop stable governing coalitions has encouraged regional or corporate elites—from local bosses and drug dealers to union leaders and corporate businesses—to entrench themselves into the territories or economic segments that they control. The result has been a negative impact on civic participation. This, in turn, weakens governance and further deepens social fragmentation. Until now, this has been the pattern of behavior, managing a slow but persistent decadence.

Future Implications. There is a complex combination of mistrust toward

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other political actors, short-term strategies, weak political institutions, and strong incentives to resort to informal arrangements and street mobilizations.

This has hampered the development or consolidation of institutions that could channel the various impulses from society that have resulted from the downfall of the PRI’s political monopoly. In fact, the lack of incentives for cooperation and the lukewarm acceptance of democratic rules among all major political actors continue to erode citizens’ confidence in the ability of the government to address their needs.

The past three presidential elections have demonstrated three main weaknesses in the electoral rules: the regulation of public contributions, the length of campaigns and internal party primaries, and the role of mass media. It was generally assumed that campaigns were too lengthy—six months for presidential and gubernatorial elections and three

months for legislative elections—and the cost of campaigns was excessively expensive in a country with extended poverty and inequalities. Campaigns became expensive due to access to mass media, especially radio and television, and costs were further aggravated by the fact that two private media networks control more than 90 percent of the media market.

Nevertheless, the successful negotiations regarding the constitutional change in the electoral rules in the last months of 2007 seem to have opened a window of opportunity that might modify the current political paralysis by establishing new rules for political competition. Against a backdrop of inequalities, discretional use of power, corruption, and crony networks, the greatest threat is the Mexican leadership’s inability to grasp the exceptional moment in which democratic consolidation and economic modernization appear to coincide in the minds and hearts of many of its citizens.

NOTES

1 It is instructive to recall that in November 1999, 33 percent of voters preferred Fox, 53 percent— Labastida and 10 percent—Cárdenas. The actual results of the 2 July 2000 election were Fox—42.5 percent; Labastida—36.1 percent; and Cárdenas—16.6 (Lawson).

2 The generic cause of annulment included in the Electoral Code was different in regard to other causes of annulment in that it did not require a specific numbers of contested boots or tallies for annulment of the elections. A much more general, and thus subjective appreciation of the tribunal was that the overall conditions of the elections were skewed and strongly impaired the constitutional principles of certainty, legality, independence, impartiality, and objectivity.

The elusive way in which this generic cause of annulment was used in two gubernatorial elections created a strong opportunity for López Obrador and his coalition to resort to it. Recognizing its difficulties to enforce it and the conflicts it creates, this provision has been omitted from the recent electoral reform in 2007.

3 A comprehensive study funded by UN Development Program (2004) on citizens and elites’ attitudes and opinions related to democracy in eighteen Latin American countries revealed that 56 per-

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cent consider economic development to be more important than democracy, 55 percent would support an authoritarian regime if it solved economic problems efficiently, 43 percent believe that the President should be above the law, and 40 percent think that democracy can blossom without political parties. In Mexico the numbers are slightly higher. More than two-thirds of Latin American citizens consider themselves governed by a small number of powerful groups.

4 Constitución General de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Derechos Reservados, (C)1995-2003 IIJUNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM. 5 For example, this is what the political analyst Todd Eisenstadt implies: “The PRD never expected electoral justice, but López Obrador, taking a cue from the PAN, explained: ‘Whatever we do, it will be construed as acting outside the law, so we must proceed through strict legal channels in addition to extralegal channels to avoid these criticisms. We must follow this legal course, even as we mobilize citizens, knowing that it [the law] does not work’” (2004, 112).

6 In the last weeks of June as chief campaign manager strategist to Patricia Mercado, the female candidate for the youngest party to participate in the presidential campaign, Alternativa Sociademócrata, I

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attended two meetings with top leaders of the “For the Good of All” coalition that supported López Obrador. The purpose of the meetings requested by Ms. Mercado was to confirm that she would not decline her candidacy for López Obrador under any circumstances, even if the opinion surveys continued to reduce the margin between Calderón and López Obrador. Both times our interlocutors seemed comfortable with the alleged five points difference that their surveys gave López Obrador.

7 In fact, the PRI holds the governorships in 17 of the 32 states where 55 percent of the citizens live.

8 Between 1959 and 1982, the GDP had a 6.52 percent annual average growth and the per capita GDP had a 3.2 percent growth rate, whereas from 1983 to 2006 the GDP had a 2.45 percent annual average growth rate and the per capita growth rate hovered around 0.8 percent.

9 Concertacesiones, referred to as the segunda vuelta or “second time around” by the PRD, operated at the margins of—and in lieu of—formal institutions designed to resolve electoral disputes (see Eisenstadt 2006, 237 for table with examples of some major concertacesiones). The demand for informal post-electoral bargaining tables was driven by the poor reputations of formal electoral and judicial institutions….as well as

by PRI and PAN leaders’ recognition that informal institutions offered them flexibility to tailor electoral outcomes to the parties’ mutual needs (Eisenstadt, 2007: 39).

10 The one-party system was established in 1929 as a compromise between the different military factions to end the civil war that erupted in 1913. Its consoli-

Law&Ethics

dation was a result of major social reforms during the Lazaro Cardenas presidency (1934-1940). Until 1968 this one-party system maintained relative stability by having elections every three years for mayors, deputies, and senators and every six years for president and governors. This lasted until 1997 when the oneparty regime came to end as the PRI lost its majority in the Chamber of deputies. In 2000 it also lost the presidency in the first competitive election in decades.

In the 2006 presidential elections a multi-party system emerged with the PRI still strong in many states but scoring third in the presidential elections.

11 PAN has been in the opposition since its inception in 1939.

12 In a dramatic change of the informal political rules that left the families of the former Presidents above the law, the government imprisoned Salinas’s powerful brother on allegations of fraud and murder.

13 The present constitution was originally drafted as a result of the civil war in 1917.

14 Since the late 1920s and until 1997 the Mexico City’s head of the government was appointed by the President of Mexico.

15 Various Mexican scholars have highlighted this crucial characteristic of the new political scene (for example, see Merino, 2003; Casar, 2007).

16 The impeachment was promoted by the presidency, approved in a joint session of the National Congress with the votes of PRI and PAN, and then repealed by the National Attorney when President Fox realized that pursuing the impeachment was giving more popularity for the almost certain bid of López Obrador for the presidency in the 2006 elections.

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Science&Technology Golden Shields and Panopticons Beijing’s Evolving Internet Control Policies James Mulvenon As the Beijing Summer Olympics approaches, China’s planned security measures, including its Internet control regime, are receiving greater scrutiny. Critical reports by Human Rights Watch and insightful media analyses, such as James Fallows’ article in the March issue of The Atlantic Monthly, have compelled outside observers to once again examine the meteoric rise of the Internet in China and its technological, economic, social, and possibly political consequences.1,2 Indeed, by any measure, the growth of the Internet in China has been remarkable. Conservative estimates place the number of users at more than 100 million and it is widely expected that China will eventually have more Internet users than the United States. Yet the Chinese Internet is also fascinating in its contradictions. The authorities in Beijing clearly see the Internet as an engine of economic progress, but fear its subversive power. Although China’s Internet users have enthusiastically embraced the Web and the blogosphere, only a brave few dare to defy the political status quo. Some elements in the American political class, allied with human rights and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), see the rise of the Internet in China as one of the best hopes for political reform and even regime change in Beijing. On the other hand, the

James Mulvenon is vice-president of the Defense Group Inc’s Intelligence Division and the director of its Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis.

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plicates the state’s internal security goals.

Faced with these contradictory forces of openness and control, Beijing seeks to strike a balance between the IT, needs of economic modernization, and maintaining internal stability. In doing so, China’s Internet Censorship authorities actively promote the growth Regime. From public statements, of the Internet while placing significant policies, and actions, it is clear that Chi- restrictions on online content and the na’s regime is anxious about the conse- political use of information technology.

The implementation of this strategy quences of the country’s information technology modernization, particularly includes both low-tech and high-tech the increasingly complex global informa- countermeasures. The low-tech countion security environment. The govern- termeasures, which are non-technologiment fears that liberal organizations, cal and primarily organizational and regforeign or domestic, will use information ulatory in nature, draw upon the state’s technology to inspire the population to Leninist roots and tried-and-true bureaucratic methods of censorship, undermine the regime.

As a result of rapid Internet growth in while the high-tech countermeasures China, the leadership of the Chinese embrace modern information technoloCommunist Party faces a series of chal- gy as an additional tool of state dominalenges that are testing its ability to balance tion. The mixture of the two has proven the competing imperatives of modern- a potent combination in deterring most ization and control. On one side, the anti-regime behavior and neutralizing regime believes that information tech- much of what remains.

Since the arrival of the Internet in nology is a key engine of economic develhighly influential business community seeks to avoid market destabilization and loss of consumer trust by de-politicizing China’s ongoing information revolution.

High-tech countermeasures embrace

modern information technology as an additional tool of state domination. opment, and that future economic growth in China will depend in large measure on the extent to which the country is integrated into the World Wide Web. At the same time, however, China is still an authoritarian state run by a Leninist party, whose continued rule relies on the suppression of anti-regime activities. The installation of an advanced telecommunications infrastructure to facilitate economic reform greatly com[ 1 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

China, low-tech countermeasures have been an important component of the regime’s strategy for countering what it regards as subversive use of the Internet and related communications technologies. The Chinese authorities have issued a series of broad regulations that forbid online activities seen as detrimental to the Communist Party’s interests.

Bureaucratic regulations are among the most effective lines of defense in China’s

MULVENON

Internet security strategy. For example, laws that make Internet service providers responsible for the activities of their subscribers are shaping the market environment and the incentives of key participants in ways conducive to the state’s interest. In other words, the government is forcing ISPs (Internet service providers) to protect themselves from government reprisal by deploying their own, often overly conservative, censors.

To complement these regulations, the authorities have also elicited further pledges of cooperation from key industry players, which include both domestic (e.g., Sina.com) and international (e.g., Yahoo!) service providers.

Another important part of the lowtech counter-strategy is using draconian measures to make examples of dissidents.

In addition to selectively broadcasting the details of some of these arrests, the regime occasionally misrepresents the monitoring capabilities of its “Internet police” in the official media because ISP censors often perform the task on their behalf. The desired result is the creation of a climate of fear in which the vast majority of Internet users are either deterred from or simply disinterested in undertaking any punishable online activities.

While the regime was initially dependent on this sort of “low-tech Leninism,” it has recently supplemented this strategy with an array of high-tech countermeasures. These high-tech countermeasures have become more sophisticated and effective over the past several years, reflecting a substantial investment by the Chinese authorities in enhanced blocking, filtering, and monitoring capabilities. At the center of the regime’s high-tech strategy has been the construction of an elaborate system of Inter-

Science&Technology

net controls, dubbed “the Great Firewall” by its critics. Although it remains far from impenetrable, “the Great Firewall” is becoming more and more effective as it incorporates cutting-edge technologies. Technical analysis of “the Great Firewall” indicates extensive deployment of sophisticated equipment capable of blocking access to prohibited sites and proxy servers as well as filtering the content of accessed sites and email, though uncoordinated internetworking construction in China appears to be a growing source of disruptions and failed service for China’s Internet users.3 In particular, technical analysis reveals the widespread use of transparent proxies to perform inline content filtering, proxy server hunting, and POP3 email filtering, as well as rampant hijacking of domain name service (DNS) queries, including capturing the requests to foreign servers on the wire and spoofing responses.4,5,6,7,8

Recent Case Studies of Chinese Internet Censorship and Active Measures. Chinese attempts to censor

the Internet as early as the late 1990s are well-documented by both domestic and international observers.

Censoring “Tudou,” China’s Version of “YouTube.” While China, in

order to prevent its citizens from viewing unsavory footage of its crackdown in Tibet, blocked access to U.S.-based YouTube.com in March 2008, authorities in Beijing were taking a number of measures to strengthen the state’s control of domestic video-sharing sites. In January 2008, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued new regulations restricting ChiSummer/Fall 2008 [ 1 1 7 ]

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na’s new video-sharing websites, such as tudou.com, youku.com, 56.com, and ouou.com.9 The new rules, which were to go into effect on 31 January, were very comprehensive in their restriction of video content. They also mandated that video-sharing sites were to be stateowned or have majority-stake state investment. All online audio and video service providers are now required to apply for an “Online Audio-Visual Broadcasting License,” which requires that a provider be largely state-owned and in possession of a comprehensive censoring system, legal program resources, legal funding sources, and “standardized technology,” which is required to enable surveillance. All content broadcast online must be available for at least sixty days, with the following forbidden: that which “damages China’s unity and sovereignty; harms ethnic solidarity; promotes superstition; portrays violence, is pornography, gambling, or terrorism; violates privacy; damages China’s culture or traditions; or violates the existing laws of China.”10 The development of these regulations

able content; the second is to regulate P2P video sharing, which often relates to porn; and the third relates to sites such as Chinese YouTube clones Tudou, Youku.com, and 56.com. These government-imposed measures intend to promote the uniformity of censorship standards as well as the enforcement of penalties for illicit video content.

Unfortunately, these rules are so new that it is difficult to predict how they will actually be implemented, but past experience suggests that the initial rules will be periodically revised in order to accommodate technological innovation and changes in user behavior, which continues to be the key successful element of the Chinese government’s overall Internet control strategy.

The Good News and Bad News.

Chinese Internet censorship has significant implications for its domestic development, bilateral relations with the United States, and integration into the global economy. Beijing’s control over the Internet has prevented the Chinese people from enjoying its full benefits,

By creating a form of “cyber apartheid,” the Chinese Communist Party has protected its monopoly on power at the expense of individual freedom. follows a familiar pattern of new technology arising and the government issuing a custom-tailored set of regulations designed to shape it according with its goals. Rebecca MacKinnon offers three reasons as to why the Chinese government is behaving in this way. The first is to regulate streaming, sometimes live, video sites that are often full of question[ 1 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

especially the ability to freely communicate and cooperate with an increasingly global community of users. By creating a form of “cyber apartheid,” the Chinese Communist Party has protected its monopoly on power at the expense of individual freedom. Furthermore, its efforts to filter content and hijack DNS (domain name system) requests under-

MULVENON

mine the true benefits of the World Wide Web. Since the regime believes that information technology is a key engine of economic development, growth in China will depend in large measure on the extent to which the country is integrated into the global information infrastructure. Overzealous application of DNS hijacking and content filtering could spill over into nonpolitical transactions as well, perhaps threatening to undermine the Chinese government’s strategy of exploiting the Internet as a key driver of economic growth.12 Despite the success of Internet censorship in China thus far, the outlook is not completely bleak. A 2003 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) report on the social impact of the Internet in China found that Chinese web surfers expect the Internet to enhance their freedom of speech and increase opportunities for political participation.13 According to the report, “the Internet is changing the Chinese political landscape. It provides people a platform to express their opinions and a window to the outside world.”14 As a professional Chinese middle class emerges, it will seek to leverage its growing economic clout in the political arena, or at least to provide inputs into state economic policies. With the media under state supervision, the Internet is an attractive forum for organizing and articulating these preferences, and could thus serve to increase participation in the Chinese political system. In this way, the Internet in China could facilitate political change in the same way that audiotapes of Khomenei’s speeches spread a revolutionary message of political Islam that helped overthrow the Shah in 1979.15 The Internet not only has the potential to be a catalyst for political change but can also increase plurality by

Science&Technology

creating a more knowledgeable and assertive populous.

Beijing has been relatively successful in protecting “the Great Firewall” from attacks. The current lack of credible challenges to the regime despite the introduction of massive amounts of modern telecommunications infrastructure does not necessarily mean that it will continue to be immune to the consequences of an increased flow of information. While Beijing has done a remarkable job thus far of finding effective counter-strategies to what it perceives as potential negative effects of the information revolution, the scale of China’s information technology modernization would suggest that the future will favor the regime’s opponents. According to political scientist, Nina Hachigian,“control over information will slowly shift from the state to networked citizens.”16 At least a few Chinese scholars agree with the thrust of this assessment. In the words of a Chinese researcher,“[in the long term] it will be impossible to control this technology completely, even with an army of trained digital agents.”17 The government will not lose the upper hand soon as it continues to cooperate with the commercial Internet sector through a complex web of regulations and fiscal relationships. China’s current economic environment, which emphasizes commercialization over the politicization of the Internet, is conducive to the government’s censorship goals. As one Internet executive put it, for Chinese and foreign companies, “the point is to make profits, not political statements.”18 Thus, the Internet, despite the rhetoric of its most enthusiastic supporters, will probably not bring a rapid “revolutionary” political change to China, but will instead be a key pillar of China’s slower, Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 1 9 ]

GOLDEN SHIELDS AND PANOPTICONS

evolutionary path to increased pluralism and possibly even nascent democratization. The exports of information communications technology to China are facilitating this transformation of the Chinese system, even though some of the

technologies can be used in the shortterm to constrain the inevitable. We must therefore accept the fact that we cannot predict the course of the revolution but simply be comforted that the revolution is already underway.

NOTES

1 “Human Rights Abuses Shadow Countdown to 2008 Beijing Games,” Internet, <http://china.hrw.org/agenda_for_reform> (date accessed: February 2008).

2 James Fallows, “The Connection Has Been Reset,” Atlantic Monthly (March 2008) 3 “Internetworking” is “the art and science of connecting individual local-area networks (LANs) to create wide-area networks (WANs), and connecting WANs to form even larger WANs. Internetworking can be extremely complex because it generally involves connecting networks that use different protocols.

Internetworking is accomplished with routers, bridges, and gateways.” Internet, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/i/internetworking.html.

4 A “proxy server” is a “server that sits between a client application, such as a Web browser, and a real server. It intercepts all requests to the real server to see if it can fulfill the requests itself. If not, it forwards the request to the real server,” Internet, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/proxy_server.ht ml.

5 “Proxy server hunting” refers to applications that identify and then block access to proxy servers (see endnote 4).

6 “POP3” refers to the latest version of “Post Office Protocol, a protocol used to retrieve e-mail from a mail server. Most e-mail applications (sometimes called an e-mail client) use the POP protocol, although some can use the newer IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol)” Internet, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/POP2.html.

7 DNS” is an abbreviation of “Domain Name System (or Service or Server), an Internet service that translates domain names into IP addresses. Because domain names are alphabetic, they’re easier to remember. The Internet, however, is really based on IP addresses. Every time you use a domain name, therefore, a DNS service must translate the name into

[ 1 2 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the corresponding IP address. For example, the domain name www.example.com might translate to 198.105.232.4,” Internet, http:// www. webopedia. com/TERM/D/DNS.html.

8 “Spoofing” is “forging an e-mail header to make it appear as if it came from somewhere or someone other than the actual source,” Internet, http://webopedia.com/TERM/E/e_mail_spoofing.html.

9 “Marbridge Consulting”, Internet, http://www.marbridgeconsulting.com/marbridgedaily/2007-12-29/article/7063/ sarft_mii_co_ issue_ online_video_regulation (date accessed: February 2008).

10 ibid.

12 “DNS hijacking” is the interception and “spoofing” of a genuine DNS server in order to redirect the website request to a different, incorrect IP address.

13 Guo Liang, 2003, pp. 55-57. About 72 percent of Internet users surveyed agreed that the Internet would provide the people of China with greater opportunities to express their political views, approximately 61 percent stated that it would make it easier to criticize government policies, some 79 percent indicated it would improve the people’s understanding of political issues, and 72 percent said they believed the Internet would allow government officials to enhance their understanding of the public’s views.

14 ibid, p. 55.

15 For a more detailed discussion of the early use of information technology to achieve political change in Iran, see Jerrold Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization, (Praeger, 1982).

16 Nina Hachigian, “China’s Cyber-Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2, Mar/Apr 2001, pp. 118133.

17 Interview with Chinese researcher, January 2001.

18 Interview, U.S. businessperson, 2001.

A Look Back

Realizing Rights Interview with Mary Robinson In his thoughtful work entitled The Warrior’s Honor, human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff wrote about the “seductiveness of moral disgust” in a world confronted with so many conflicts and so much human suffering, suggesting that people are tempted to be indifferent when confronted with yet another humanitarian calamity. How does one overcome this “seductiveness” and galvanize citizen activism?

GJIA:

ROBINSON: It is an important question. With television images we are now very used to seeing suicide bombers in Baghdad. It takes at least a dozen people to be killed in Baghdad to make the news these days, and it is so easy to break away from the images and go get a cup of coffee.

We have to be aware that there is a dulling of the consciousness. We have to find strong advocacy leading to meaningful connections among people. My own experience is that if you talk about egregious human rights violations in too large terms, people do switch off because there is nothing that they can personally do. The experience of the tsunami in Asia was a good one. It was partly because it was around the Christmas period and families were together, but it was also because people felt they could do something. The figures of the number of

Mary Robinson served as the first female president of Ireland from 1990 to 1997 and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from 1997 to 2002.

She has been honorary president of Oxfam International since 2002, is Chair of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and is a founding member and Chair of the Council of Women World Leaders.

She is also one of the European members of the controversial Trilateral Commission. Robinson’s newest project is Realizing Rights: the Ethical Globalization Initiative, which promotes equitable trade and development, more humane migration policies, and better responses to HIV/AIDS in Africa.

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families in this country and in Europe including Ireland who actually donated, gave their time, and sent things is astounding. There is a lesson there. We need to make it realistic in order for people to do something and engage specifically.

In a way, this is what we are doing in the context of The Elders campaign. We start people off by directing them to the website “www.everyhumanhasrights.org” to look at the Universal Declaration, read it and see that this is the value system of our world, sign up to it, and then live by it.

GJIA: Your approach to the enforcement

of international human rights has always emphasized the role of national governments. How does one reconcile global standards with the nation-state?

Moreover, how does one contend with the age-old argument for sovereignty when dealing with these supranational laws?

I have always been conscious that the international human rights system consists of normative standards that governments have agreed upon. And in fact they have agreed unanimously. Then there is a second process, which is that they ratify laws. The governments that are not implementing these laws are not implementing what they legally promised to do. They should be held to the standard they voluntarily accepted. And when they start coming up with cultural arguments you look at them and you say, “Well, I’m sorry, you signed up for this voluntarily.”

However, that said, I believe that cultural arguments strengthen the embedding of a real culture of human rights based on the spirituality and the cultural

ROBINSON:

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values of a country. When I was in Afghanistan in 2002 after the Taliban had been defeated and Hamid Karzai was the chairman of the transitional government, we celebrated the International Women’s Day with about eighty or ninety extraordinarily fine Afghan women who worked for many weeks to draw up a charter for women’s rights. They included former judges, former members of Parliament, teachers, and housewives that had been very active in children’s education under the radar—very remarkable women. But we began every meeting with a prayer, and they did not want to discuss some issues that might have been on an agenda of an American or a modern Irish women’s meeting; the issues didn’t interest them. But they had very strong issues that they wanted to put forward—that to me is truly what human rights are. There is no sense of cultural relativism there. It is just really important because events like that will make a big change.

Most of the human rights groups working for women’s rights or children’s rights encounter poverty and they have priorities within the human rights agenda. It is usually the governments that try to say, “We have our strong tradition of genital cutting and we tried to do something about it but it is very deeply part of the culture in our society.” No, it is not!

It is a harmful, traditional practice. It’s not cultural in that sense because it’s harmful. We have some very good voices— strong Pakistani women and human rights advocates from Sri Lanka—who have been reporters of the UN as Muslim women. They are effective at distinguishing between what is cultural and helps human rights and what is a harmful, traditional practice, which is usually patriarchal.

ROBINSON

Turning to migration, there are about 192 million people living outside their place of birth, approximately 3 percent of the world’s population. Though migration is hardly a recent phenomenon, what is the source of this exceptionally high labor mobility in the twentyfirst century? As Commissioner of the Global Commission on International

GJIA:

A Look Back

What are the main issues that you will tackle in your role on The Elders, an alliance of senior leaders dedicated to solving global issues?

GJIA:

ROBINSON: The group is on a learning curve. We have had several meetings and we have communicated quite a bit by email, phone, etc. What we are aware of is

The only way that we can make sustainable change is through structured change, change through institutions.

Migration, what were your findings concerning the key policy issues in that field?

that we are not “doers” in the programmatic or political sense. We are Elders, and therefore we have to stand back a litROBINSON: I think that the elements that tle bit and maybe watch something get to we call globalization usually mean eco- a point where we can then push things in nomic globalization. They mean free the right direction. Or things can get so trade: free movement of goods and ser- bad, such as in Darfur, that we have to go vices and free flowing of capital. All of there and deliver warnings. For instance, those generate push-and-pull factors in Kenya, someone has to go there and that make it more desirable, more of an transform the situation.

However, there are big debates going incentive for people to move. Income disparity has become shockingly wide, on that we might try to be a part of, such much wider than it has ever been. For the as macro-debates on climate change and first time people can see in a window to global health. But the last thing that we the world through television how the would say, especially at this stage, is that other half lives. In my experience, when I we are going to solve all our problems. went to the poorest villages and the deep- We are not. We are going to be something est slumps, there might not be a televi- that is very difficult to discern and somesion in every house but there is a televi- times even hard to measure: a moral sion in the street or around the corner. voice. A moral voice that hopefully will So most people in the world can see the allow even the most marginalized to be other parts of the world, and the major- listened to. And it is about trying to do in ity of the world is very poor. So the pull the global context what Nelson Mandela factors are enormous. The push factors stands for in the world. He stands for are also enormous because of the con- coming out of prison without bitterness stant insecurity and what hunger can do and forgiving his jailors, bringing the to your family. The bulk of the world’s majority of the population to a forgiveyoung people reside in developing coun- ness of those who have kept down that tries, and yet that is not where the jobs majority through the apartheid system and learning to create a government are.

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together. It is very remarkable.

Let’s talk about the people in the developed world. Political leaders in the West are in particular concerned by their electorate. For example, in the United States you see a lot of concern about the U.S. border. What do you think are the political and social benefits of increased international migration and how do you think leaders in the West can better communicate these benefits to their electorate?

GJIA:

ROBINSON: I think it is important to take

pieces of the issue and show the global interconnections within it. I gave an example when I was talking about the immigration of health workers. This country needs 800,000 nurses and 200,000 doctors between now and 2020 to maintain the current level of the health services—which some people will say is not exactly inclusive. America, in fact, attracts nurses to come here on special visas, which is undermining the health services in many developing countries. People do not recognize that. They do not recognize that it is a cheap development gain for the United States at the expense of the poorest countries. If that conversation could be opened up, I think people would have a fairer sense of what this issue is, and begin to see connectivity.

Another piece that is going to become very critical in the United States is that the country is dependent on migrant workers for much of its agriculture and all of its packaging. Moreover, Americans are enforcing the rules more rigorously for undocumented workers, and you are going to see economic costs pretty quickly in the U.S. economy because of this. That is going to be an argument. People will

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hear that argument because people care about jobs, particularly in the current stage in which we appear to be: in a recession, or on the fringes of a recession, and we do not know how deep that recession is going to be. The part where I want to see some leadership is with language. If you start calling a human being by double negatives, such as “illegal alien,” that matters.

It is horrible for the individual and the individual’s children. It reinforces prejudices and bias, and it is not necessary. You need leadership for that.

GJIA: As a consequence of its successful pursuit of FDI, Ireland has become a prototype for developing countries that seek a winning “recipe” for their own development. What lessons, if any, does the Irish case offer to those countries that are pursuing FDI?

You are right to a considerable extent because I hear it from other countries. Ireland is looked to as a model, and countries say they want to know more about how the Irish economy managed to develop so rapidly.

There is a double lesson. One is that it gives hope that small countries can develop, especially if they put emphasis on education, which is human capital. We were also lucky to get a low rate of corporation tax. We would not have gotten this low rate if it were recognized that we could become as capable as we have become.

But the lesson also is the dependency of the Irish economy on this FDI at the moment. Ireland, probably out of the European countries, is most dependent on the United States continuing to do reasonably well. So, another lesson is that as you benefit from the FDI and build up your local entrepreneurial activities, ROBINSON:

ROBINSON

software, and scientific innovations, your economy becomes less dependent and has a stronger indigenous research base, and scientifically, this helps the development of the economy. And indeed it is not going to be easy in the years ahead. I speak for Ireland and for other small countries in the periphery of large leading blocs.

GJIA: What will be the Bush administra-

tion’s legacy in human rights?

I was UN High Commissioner for a year after the terrorist attacks in this country. I remember coming to New York City, going to Ground Zero and meeting some of volunteers and the brave families of the victims. I knew that this event was going to have a terrible impact on human rights, but I can honestly say that I did not think it was going to be so bad. But the dipping of standards is quite shocking.

The fact that there was recent legislation depriving people of habeus corpus is one example. I am a graduate of Harvard Law School, and if someone had told me when I graduated in 1968, “Oh, by the way, in this country sometime in the near future, habeas corpus will be removed,” I would have said, “Rubbish! This country has much stronger standards than that!”—but it doesn’t.

I have learned of the vulnerability of a country when it is shocked. I have begun to understand the extent of the shock and trauma of 9/11, especially now that I am living in New York. The United States had been invincible up until then, when it came to attacks of that kind. These attacks were traumatic, even humiliating in some sense, especially the attack on the Pentagon—so deep within members of Congress was the sense that “we are ROBINSON:

A Look Back

somehow going to just fight back, whatever it takes.”

But as for the dipping of standards that came in after 9/11, it is absolutely vital that the United States regains its standards. Without these standards, we cannot have a secure world. You can not argue for democracy and security without standards. The divide has opened up.

The moderates in countries in the Muslim world have been affected the most from what has happened to the United States, because they are trying to have the same standards in their own country.

I can give you an example. I was involved recently in a women leaders’ summit in New York on security. With seventy-five women leaders we addressed security in regards to acts of terrorism and the criticism of the broad sweep “War on Terrorism.” The group included Muslim, European, and South Asian women. Explaining why your government is not living up to economic and climate change commitments is a difficult task. Our group of women leaders decided to draft a call-to-action to address these issues.

In the first paragraph of the first draft there was a reference to democracy.

Women from South Asia and other parts of the Muslim world asked us to take out the word “democracy.” When we protested, they responded that even though the term was mutually understood, if we have a call to action that mentions “democracy,” it is seen in a different way. So we used different words to refer to accountable, responsible, transparent government. These women addressed the deep and troublesome idea that because of the war in Iraq, their participation in a conference in New York with a call to action about democracy would cause problems

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back home.

What reassures me is the extent to which professional law organizations such as the American Bar Association and the International Bar Association have realized that the erosion of standards is a very serious issue. It is valuable that we are marking the sixtieth anniver-

formulating the various policies. I supported them, I advocated about them, I spoke about them, but I was not working on these policies. What I was trying to do was a little more on the symbolic side, which is also important. By reaching out to those of Irish heritage around the world, I was signaling that modern

You cannot argue for democracy and security

without standards.

sary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During those sixty years, the powerful countries of the world had a tradition of democracy and human rights. In the next thirty years we are going to see the emergence of countries, particularly China, but also Vietnam, India, and Brazil, that do not necessarily and innately have a strong sense of a rule of law, democracy, and human rights. If we do not strive to embed these values over the next twenty years, we may not have a world that is going to operate by those standards in the same way as during my lifetime.

GJIA: As Ireland began to grow econom-

ically, its trend of net emigration was reversed, and as of 2007, it is estimated that 10 percent of Irish residents were foreign born. Could you provide us with some of the key lessons from your time as President of Ireland during the return of many Irish citizens as well as non-Irish immigrants? What are some of the challenges Ireland faces as the consequence of this increased participation in a globalizing world?

ROBINSON: First of all, I was a non-exec-

utive president so I was not central to

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Ireland was interested in them. As a result, those of Irish heritage felt more linked to modern Ireland. The Irish who were doing well in this country, in a corporate sense, would not make sentimental decisions, but they became more inclined to look again at Ireland than they would have been.

The Irish also began realizing that Ireland was a good place to educate their children and that they could have a good life in Ireland. Because Ireland became so appealing, Irish people migrated back.

The country also experienced immigration from Eastern Europe and from countries in Africa with which we had a long tradition, including Nigeria and Rwanda.

The migration has been a challenge, but we have a very good civil society in Ireland. A very diverse society mediates what is going on, which is important because of the threat of racism. We realize that we are just as vulnerable and prone to racist responses and that people may react with fear when they do not understand those from other countries.

I recall an interesting meeting with a young woman from Romania who was telling her story of the hidden life she had to lead in Ireland. She had been

ROBINSON

forced to lead this life because she had done something very minor—she had overstayed her visit before she renewed her visa. And although she has gotten herself out of it, she has become a champion voice of undocumented migrants in Ireland.

I have tried relating her story to Irish audiences by saying “think of Maureen in Washington D.C. She is an undocumented Irish migrant who is forced to live an underground life, and she is telling her story.” We are concerned about and try to help the undocumented Irish in the United States, yet we have our own undocumented problems at home that we do not deal with. I am not arguing that you should open up your borders and have no control—because you have to have control—but it is how you deal with people who just fall between the cracks because of either their own stupidity or because they cheated a little bit on the system, for example, they brought their family in when they should not have.

A recent Irish study showed that 95 percent of those that were undocumented in the study came into Ireland documented. They overstayed or bent the rules of their visa by changing employers or coming to study and then working.

These are not major crimes; it just depends on how you deal with them. Do people have to fall into a black hole because of this?

A Look Back

international institutions to step in whether it is in Europe with a robust security force or the UN with no force all together. Is the personalization of these tragedies, then, the essential ingredient to combating indifference? Is it being able to show someone up as an exemplar of the crisis or the conflict? And is there a possibility you can go too far in that direction as well? Can you get away from the sheer magnitude of the crime by focusing on individual components of an individual society?

I see what you are getting at.

Personalizing stories is important to get that empathy and to understand that it is not just a big, massive problem of human rights out there. But the only way that we make sustainable change is through structured change, change through institutions. That is why I am so interested in the current debate on aid effectiveness and the review of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness later this year.

But what do we mean by country ownership? Generally up until now we have thought of the government of a developing country as taking more responsibility for aid programs. But at a meeting I attended in London, I learned that civil society groups from developing African and South Asian countries said they saw country ownership as meaning democratic country ownership. It means civil society and parliament and the other GJIA: One theme that we’ve raised is the structures being involved as well.

In our work in Realizing Rights we criticality of personal life in these struggles—having someone you can point to want to see more commitment by donor and say “understand their plight, they governments to the crosscutting issues of have fallen through the cracks.” While gender equality, human rights, and envianswering the question about moral ronmental sustainability. We want the indifference, you mentioned the fact that change to be transparent and we want there is often just a sense of a huge civil society groups to be trained to do calamity of refugees and a failure of the budget examinations for gender equality.

ROBINSON:

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REALIZING RIGHTS

We need to deal with trade issues and the lack of coherence between aid and trade policies. In most of the high income countries, including Ireland, we are very good on providing aid, but we are not so good at seeing changes in agricultural subsidies.

Telling good, empowering stories is fine. But it is not going to change the sys-

[ 1 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tem. You have to give attention to detail, understanding, and empathy to then talk about real structural changes that need to take place. was interviewed by Steven Hamilton & Mithuna Sivaraman on 14 March 2008.

MARY ROBINSON

Books

East Asian Optimism Review by Peter Boettke DAVID C. KANG. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia.

New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 296 pp. $24.95.

Historically, economic science has argued that growth and development are correlated with peace and social cooperation.

Adam Smith posited that economic development follows from peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.

And Frederic Bastiat, a popular interpreter of Smith's vision of free trade, is known to have stated that when goods and services do not cross borders, soldiers certainly will. George Washington translated this market-based worldview into a matter of practical foreign policyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that a country should pursue economic relations with all nations, but political alliances with none.

Many disciplines within the social and political sciences do not agree with this argument that is so fundamental to economics and political economy. In these fields it is assumed instead that growth and development are correlated with increased tensions among nations. In this more realist outlook, peace and prosperity do not follow from one another.

The economic rise of a nation enables it to become a more viable military threat, requiring a response from neighboring

Peter J. Boettke is the deputy director of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, and a professor in the economics department at George Mason University.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 2 1 ]

EAST ASIAN OPTIMISM

countries in order to maintain balance in the region. Geopolitical considerations trump the logic of market processes in the minds of most of these analysts. In fact, many scholars claim that market processes in any one country—and, more importantly, between nations—are ultimately shaped by geopolitical alliances and agreements. According to this view, it is historical tension and present conflict—rather than the pattern of specialization and exchange—that result from free trade.

David Kang’s China Rising addresses the

decades.

Despite Kang’s aim of analyzing China within the context of international realism, his book does not address the reasons behind China’s recent economic success in terms of specific policies or fundamental shifts in economic institutions. Stanford's Barry Weingast, for example, has emphasized the shift in fiscal policy in Russia that has produced what he terms “market-preserving federalism” in China. Weingast emphasizes a point that most observers miss: that the fundamental changes to China's politi-

The major tale of the post-communist era

of political economy is the comparative analysis of Russia and China.” puzzling role of China in East Asia, which has emerged in literature on international relations. Since 1979, China has emerged as the economic and political power of East Asia. However, instead of causing conflicts, this development has ushered in a new era of cooperation and harmony among the countries of the region. Only Taiwan fears Chinese military force, while the other East Asian countries seem more-or-less optimistic about China’s rise. Kang begins his book with a quote from Chan Heng Chee, Singapore’s ambassador to the United States, referring to the peace and stability that existed during the fifteenth century. According to Chee, “It was China’s economic power and cultural superiority that drew these countries into its orbit and was the magnet for their cultivation of relations.”I It is this same stability that is a source of optimism in Southeast Asia today. Realist theory, however, would have predicted a different outcome from China’s development over the past few [ 1 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

cal-economic structure since 1985 and the incentives that change has provided for economic actors have allowed for wealth creation through arbitrage and innovation, rather than wealth destruction through special interest politics and rent-seeking behavior. From a comparative institutional perspective, it is fascinating that while the communist political system in China has formally remained unchanged, its changing economic structures and practices have enacted a fundamental shift in effective power and governance. China’s decentralization of economic opportunity has not only served to create pockets of domestic freedom, it has also stimulated foreign economic relations with Chinese nationals throughout East Asia through the channels of foreign direct investment. China Rising does not provide an explanation for China's economic performance over the last two decades. Instead of including a discussion of institutions, incentives, and investment, it limits its discussion to

BOETTKE

the implications that growth and development have for international relations.

Instead, Kang’s work focuses primarily on the macroeconomic performance that over the past three decades has produced China's current economic dominance in the region. This dominance, combined with the geographic and demographic enormity of the country, as well as its stockpile of nuclear weapons, makes it a formidable nation-state. Given such an influence, traditional realist theory would predict that a balancing of forces between the nations in that region would be soon to follow.II Kang challenges this interpretation and instead explains how ideas and public policy can produce stability. The evidence, he argues, reveals that the countries of East Asia are not engaged in military balancing acts, but are instead involved in efforts to encourage economic interrelationship and international cooperation. U.S. policy plays an important role in Kang’s story as well. As long as the United States avoids a policy of realist power-balancing motivated by fear of China’s growing economic and military capabilities, and instead pursues a set of policies that entails a receding U.S. military presence in East Asia along with increasing economic relations and political alliances, the future of East Asia can be one of peace and prosperity.

Kang’s story is an optimistic one.

There is hope, as he puts it, that if all parties manage their relationships appropriately the future will be more peaceful, more prosperous, and more stable than at any time in the past.3 “So far so good,” as far as contributing to our basic knowledge of the region. However, from an economic standpoint, Kang fails to confront the problem of “incentive compatibility”: how do we make sure that

Books

the incentives are aligned so that the future that Kang hopes for becomes a reality? It is that question which Kang fails to adequately address.

Ultimately, it is not just a matter of whether or not the United States and China would benefit from conflict. It is, instead, a matter of whether interest groups within the countries in question will be able to derail efforts of democratic governments to curb those groups' machinations, and whether the policies that have generated domestic growth, attracted foreign direct investment, and encouraged free trade among the nations of the region are self-sustaining. On these issues, Kang remains silent. Perhaps that is for another book—a book that could ultimately determine the direction of research and public policy in the twenty-first century in economics, comparative politics, and international relations. Some further discussion on economic transitions will help elucidate this contention.

The major tale of the post-communist era of political economy is the comparative analysis of Russia and China. Many observers erroneously look at Russia’s economic and political problems and blame the swift transition attempted to the capitalist system, while they attribute China’s growing prosperity, political stability, and relatively peaceful relations with neighbors to the slower pace of their reforms. In short, these two significant case studies supposedly demonstrate the failure of shock therapy and the success of gradualism.

But this interpretation is based on several false premises. First, the advocates of shock therapy never argued that the “shock” itself was the cure to the ailing economy. The “shock” of economic liberalization puts the economy on a path to recovery. The distortions of the socialist Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 2 3 ]

EAST ASIAN OPTIMISM

experiment with economic planning were evident throughout the social system. Capital and labor were misallocated, and failures of coordination in both the producer and consumer markets were endemic to the socialist economic system. Transition policy required the reallocation of capital and labor as well as the opening of the economic system to competition from foreigners and new domestic entrepreneurs that could satisfy productive inefficiencies and consumer frustrations through alternative supply networks for goods and services. One could say that the socialist system was one in which individuals woke up at the wrong time, to go to work at the wrong place, to do the wrong job. To break out of the cycle of misallocation and coordination failures, the economic system must be introduced to market signals and the discipline of profit and loss.

This is a daunting task, especially when conducted in the context of democratic government. The logic of democratic government is to create public policies that concentrate benefits in the short run on well-informed and well-organized interest groups, and to disperse the costs on the unorganized and ill-informed mass of citizens. In contrast, the logic of reformsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;if they work to reallocate capital and labor in a more economically rational direction, and alleviate consumer frustration by providing lower cost and higher quality goods and servicesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is to concentrate costs on existing well-organized interest groups, such as state enterprise managers, labor leaders, and party bosses, and disperse the benefits widely to the citizenry.

Another way to think about it is that socialist economies are characterized by shortages of goods and services, as official government prices were set below mar[ 1 2 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ket-clearing levels. To fix shortage economies, price reforms must be introduced to allow the market to rise to market-clearing levels. Thus, the first consequence of reforms is higher prices than those officially posted under socialism.

Moreover, socialist economies suffered from misallocations of labor such that, officially, unemployment did not exist.

Market reforms have to reallocate labor and discipline inefficient enterprises into bankruptcy. Thus, the second consequence of reforms is explicit unemployment.

Finally, the socialist experiment drew much of its justification from the egalitarian distribution of income that it promised. But to eliminate the economic inefficiencies and to spur entrepreneurial innovation, market reforms rely on the lure of pure profit and differential returns on investment for making prudent and sometimes lucky decisions on what products to produce and distribute to consumers. Thus, the third consequence of reforms is income inequality, as some entrepreneurs will achieve wild success in the market while others will learn the hard lesson of market competition. So what we are left with is a situation where market reforms give us, at least explicitly, higher prices, greater unemployment, and income inequality.

However, such a political platform does not form electoral success.

Of course, it is important to stress that the reality of socialism was that the official government-set prices were not the prices at which people purchased goods and services, and the black market price that consumers faced in trying to acquire daily products was higher than these market clearing prices in an above ground and legitimate market. Furthermore, while officially, unemployment did not

BOETTKE

exist, labor was misallocated. "We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us" was a standard Soviet-era refrain. So the introduction of market discipline actually induces individuals to pursue their comparative advantage and to find gainful employment in work options that provide both personal and financial rewards.

What is true of prices and employment is also true for income inequality.

Inequality under socialism was real—those with political privileges shopped in special stores and had access to goods, services, travel, and general living conditions that were unheard of among the mass of citizens. Nevertheless, the disconnect between the rhetoric and reality under socialism could be exploited during the transition period to raise doubts about the welfare consequences of market reform to a democratic citizenry. And so it was throughout East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. As the realities of the adjustment process from the distortions of socialist planning

Books

pean Union and the demand for harmony of policy throughout Europe ensured that the East and Central European states would not pursue their comparative advantage and compete with the “old” Europe, but would instead linger as second-class economies within Europe. The “new” European states did not shape the fate of the economic and political landscape, but were instead captured by the social democratic policies of the “old” Europe. Unfortunately, for most of the former communist countries this means that the distortions caused by socialist planning will just give way to the distortions and inefficiencies caused by social democratic welfare state policies that cannot be sustained by the economies of the former communist countries.

In Russia, while the rhetoric of reform seemed to suggest a quick break with the past, the break was not so decisive. State interference with the market plagued Russia throughout the 1990s—how else to explain the rise of black markets in a

One could say that the socialist system was

one in which individuals woke up at the wrong time, to go to work at the wrong place, to do the wrong job. in the 1990s became apparent, populist politicians and socialist demagogues preyed on insecurities and uncertainties to stall reforms, and to backtrack from the path of reforms.

When we look at the history of postcommunism from this perspective we start to realize that shock therapy ran into problems not because of its speed, but because of its lack of voltage. It didn’t shock the system enough off the socialist path. In fact, the social democratic Euro-

world of supposed economic liberalization? The predatory power of the state was not curbed by the reforms in Russia.

Russian reforms, in other words, were more or less rhetorical, while the reality was a powerful central state that had its fingers deep in the economic system.

Socialism was defined by corruption and abuse of power, and during the transition in Russia we saw continued corruption and centralized power. Crony socialism was replaced with crony capitalism. While Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 2 5 ]

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the rhetoric of reforms supposedly introduced market discipline, the reality was that centralized power was not checked institutionally to the extent required for reforms to have the desired consequences of de-statization of the economic system. Political intervention in the Russian economy translated into militarization, and geopolitics still influences the allocation of scarce resources and continues to govern international relations more so than comparative advantage and opportunities for mutual gains from trade.

China, on the other hand, pursued a more radical set of economic reforms.

Certainly not immune to its own versions of corruption and power, Chinese reforms unleashed market forces to a far greater extent than the reforms in East and Central Europe. Effective governmental power was decentralized in China to a far greater extent than in Russia.

The narrative that I have started to construct flips the conventional story on its head. The real shock therapy in terms of market reform took place in China, while the real gradualist approach to political and economic reform took place in Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and the consequences are the lingering problems in Russia and the great optimism surrounding China.

This narrative also makes us rethink international relations in a way that emphasizes trade over geopolitics.

Kangâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s book challenges the realist literature in international relations by arguing that Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prosperity has not generated a chain of military reactions on

the part of smaller and less prosperous countries seeking to prevent a hegemonic China in Asia. This is an important point to make. We should not fear the economic prosperity of our neighbors.

However, Kang does not really explain the mechanisms by which peace and prosperity go hand in hand internationally. Russ Sobel and Peter Leeson, in contrast, demonstrate empirically that countries that pursue policies of economic freedom and long term economic growth have a contagion effect on their neighbors. There is, in short, both a demonstration effect as the policies of economic freedom spread, as well as a further impact as international commercial entanglements minimize conflicts and reinforce the incentives for pursuing opportunities for mutual gains from trade across borders.

Optimism results from expanding opportunities for mutually beneficial trade, while pessimism follows from the persistence of the predatory state's economic meddlesomeness. We have reason to be optimistic about China to the extent that we can demonstrate that its economy is grounded in trade and not in governmental predation. Kang does not drill deep enough at the institutional level to investigate that distinction. But despite that shortcoming, China Rising ultimately does a very effective job in demonstrating the macroeconomic growth and documenting the optimistic attitude that define China and its East Asian neighbors as we move forward into the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Kang, David C. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 3.

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2. Kang, China Rising, 53.

3. Kang, China Rising, 203.

Books

Old Paradigms, Challenging Realities, New Interpretations Review by José A. Montero PARAG KHANNA. The Second World. Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. New York: Random House, 2008. 496 pp. $29.00.

The world is still seeking a new paradigm that can put together the apparently disorganized pieces comprising the global scene. In the Cold War era, political theorists responded in a variety of ways to the reality that confronted them. The first years of the Cold War served to assist Hans J. Morgenthau in developing the theory of Realism.1 The growing complexity of international agendas drove Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye to define the concept of Complex Interdependence in the 1970s.2 Meanwhile, détente offered new opportunities for “middle” powers, whose position became the main topic of scholars such as Carsten Holbraad.3 When the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union ended in the early 1990s with the apparent victory of the former, all those schemes apparently lost their appeal. Francis Fukuyama predicted the inescapable triumph of liberal-capitalism. He depicted a future where virtually all the nations of the globe would share a common system of values, making the appear-

José Antonio Montero is a visiting researcher in the Prince of Asturias Chair and the BMW Center for German and European Studies of Georgetown University.

He holds a PhD in History from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in Spain and is currently engaged in a research project focused on the cultural policy of the U.S. towards Brazil and Mexico in the Cold War.

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ance of serious threats to peace and stability extremely unlikely.4 These illusions waned almost immediately, as the focus of the analysts shifted from Moscow to the various other developments that had been maturing unnoticed under the umbrella of the contest between Russia and America: global terrorism, the unending instability in the Middle East, the emergence of China as an economic competitor, to name a few. Samuel Huntington interpreted many of these perils as evidence of a new international order in which civilizations had replaced the old military alliances as sources of future conflicts.5 It is between Huntington’s gloomy pessimism and Fukuyama’s innocent optimism that Parag Khanna tries to place his examination of current international problems, using certain elements of the classic theories mentioned above. In his view, geopolitics continues to play an essential role in international relations, but its elements have under-

the position of the United States as the only superpower has been contested by the two rivals whose economic energy may equal that of America: China and the European Union. These three giants compete in a race to expand their respective spheres of influence through the use of different strategies. America is still building a foreign agenda based on short-term interests, which often betray its stated principles of democracy, economic liberalism, and so on, and arouse strong suspicions even among its closest allies. The members of the European Union have agreed to offer the advantages of their integrated markets and financial aid to those countries that submit to certain economic and political standards. Meanwhile, China remains eager to incorporate more and more nations into its so-called “Co-prosperity Sphere” without waiting for political reforms in return—in the process, however, these nations may transform into sub-sovereign clients.

Should the superpowers succeed in

expelling their rivals from their respective spheres, the chances of a future clash of interests among them could result in the outbreak of World War III. gone a deep transformation. When measuring the strength of a nation or group of nations, military capacities appear to be less important than “economic productivity, global market share, technological innovation, natural resource endowments and population size.”6 Increasing market integration has raised the costs of potential wars among states considerably, making them less attractive as instruments of foreign policy. Thus [ 1 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Who are the subjects of this contest among superpowers? This is where Khanna introduces the core concept of his analysis: the second world. Second world countries possess certain assets that bring them closer to the developed nations: natural resources, reliable financial systems, and modern urban areas transformed into flourishing business centers. Nevertheless, they also face serious barriers to their growth: large under-

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developed zones, wide income inequalities, massive poor populations, and corrupt systems unable or unwilling to guarantee the exercise of democratic rights.

On the whole, their situation is such that any unexpected event might turn the balance toward one side or the other, either propelling the nation on the road to the first world or adding it to the list of failed states. Success among second world powers largely depends on a combination of good leadership and the advantages of globalization. The former does not imply democratization so much as good levels of efficiency to improve the living standards of common citizens through mechanisms of wealth sharing. The latter have provided the opportunity to balance their dependencies on different superpowers, creating an equilibrium that can free the country from falling into a single sphere of influence.

The author then invites us on an impressively broad trip through five different regions: Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia, where he identifies both the second world nations and those states on the verge of the third world. Khanna tries to relate every case to the interplay among superpowers using the degree of success of secondary countries in promoting the coexistence of different groups, spreading the benefits of modernization to all strata of society, and finding stable forms of government for themselves. In Eastern Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Communist Bloc led to the creation of newly independent nations, which are still looking for the best route to modernization. Unlike Poland or the Czech Republic, other former Soviet States still suffer from severe handicaps, which have prevented

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their incorporation into the European Union. Some of them grapple with serious ethnic or religious differences within their borders; others have endured severe political turmoil only to see the establishment of governments as corrupt as their predecessors. Ukraine is almost half-split between the Catholic and pro-European West and the Orthodox and pro-Russian East. The Orange and Rose Revolutions have hardly improved the situations in Ukraine and Georgia, respectively.

Meanwhile, Turkey eclipses its westernization with occasional phases of Islamic revival. And Serbia has combined its attempts at running from the inheritance of Milosevic with the prospect of losing the very same territory which gave birth to Serbian identity: Kosovo. It is in this area that Europe has the best chance to promote its mixed recipe of economic assistance and demands for democratization.

The prospects for what Khanna calls the “stans”—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan—look far darker. In many cases they are still confronting Russia and China’s eagerness to gain access to their important strategic and natural resources. Oil and gas not only draw the attention of great powers but also constitute in many cases the basis for mafia-like, corrupt regimes that perpetuate the suffering of the people, who in turn will become likely candidates to fall under the influence of Islamic radicalism. Among this group, Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan seems to have understood better than any other the advantages of modern capitalism, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may be destined to follow the example of many poorer African nations.

Latin America has been considered a geopolitical domain of the United States since the enunciation of the Monroe Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 2 9 ]

OLD PARADIGMS, CHALLENGING REALITIES, NEW INTERPRETATIONS

Doctrine in 1823. But as the Wisconsin school of revisionist historians argued back in the 1960s, America’s preponderance throughout the Caribbean and the rest of the Western Hemisphere has been more a source of discontent and revolution than a step in the direction of a real community built upon goodwill and common interests.7 Until recently, Latin American countries had little choice but to submit to the economic and political rules emanating from Washington. Only Cuba was able to take advantage of the Cold War game to escape the influence of its northern neighbor. Today, the waves of globalization have allowed Central and South American countries to compensate for the weight of the United States through the economic influence of powerful foreign investors. China has not missed the opportunity to enter through the United States’ back door, making significant investments in countries like Brazil or Venezuela. Brazil has abandoned its traditional role as a loyal ally of the American colossus, while Venezuela is using its oil reserves to attract a handful of nearby countries into a bloc that actively opposes the designs of the United States. Nevertheless, the new prospects are not enough to hide a wide range of flaws existing in the area. Chavez’s rhetoric is a poorly calculated attempt to draw the attention away from the growing violence and poverty that is spreading across Venezuela. Only Chile has risen to become a difficult-to-copy model of success, improving the prospects for its merger into the exclusive group of first world countries.

The Arab World and the Middle East also offer examples that cover the full range of stages between a beckoning future and a hopeless outcome. There, the menace of falling within the scope of [ 1 3 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

radical Islamism can only be counterbalanced by policies designed to improve the quality of citizens’ lives. Morocco in the west and the United Arab Emirates in the east conform to Khanna’s archetypal examples of advancement. Both still live under the influence of feudal-type monarchical regimes, but Morocco has shown its interest in mixing timid political reforms with close contacts with the European Union, while the UAE has profited from their rich oil resources, which attract people and investments from all over the world. Between them we can find many countries, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, where traditional or paternalistic administrations continue fighting to find their way out of extremism and deprived populations, with Iraq as an unfortunate example of the consequences of trying to impose change in the region through the utilization of hard power tactics.

Finally, East Asia becomes the setting for the potential strengthening of China’s co-prosperity sphere. Even Australia has succumbed to Beijing’s mounting seduction, relaxing its strategic ties with the United States and working for deeper integration into a new Asian community. Nevertheless, success still does not reside in submitting to China’s leading role, but in counterbalancing it through the establishment of ties with other superpowers. However, to successfully play this game, performers must possess the status of true middle powers—only Malaysia and Singapore hold the required cards.

It is in his conclusions that Khanna’s observations acquire a controversial tone. First, British historian Arnold J. Toynbee’s theories on the rise and fall of civilizations seem to have taken hold of the author’s mind, inspiring him to pre-

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dict a long decline for the United States.

For him, America has not been able to face its internal challenges and remains condemned to both a declining march towards the second world and a diminishing influence in international affairs.

Nevertheless, the proof he offers for this claim does not seem especially convincing. We may interpret the failure of America’s invasion of Iraq as a symptom of its diminishing military capacities, but we might just as well adhere to the opinion of Niall Ferguson, and see the outcome of the Iraqi adventure as a consequence of Washington’s unwillingness to deploy its full potential against Saddam’s regime.8 Likewise, income disparity does not constitute a new phenomenon in the United States. In 1893, 9 percent of the American families possessed 71 percent of the wealth, a situation that did not prevent the country from entering the club of the great powers.9 Furthermore, these disparities are even more serious in the Chinese economy, and do not inhibit Khanna’s characterization of China as a growing superpower. Similarly, marginalization does not manifest itself exclusively in America. Instead, it has become a common concern of all developed countries experiencing high immigration rates, as the Paris riots of 2005 demonstrated. Secondly, Khanna presents the current world as a contest between America’s coalition, Europe’s consensus, and China’s consultation.

These three entities remain immersed in a “Great Game” to enforce, create, and expand their respective areas of influence, “eroding the fiction that laws and institutions alone can restrain imperial competition.”10 Should the superpowers succeed in expelling their rivals from

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their respective spheres, the chances of a future clash of interests among them could result in the outbreak of World War III. This prospect might only be avoided through “a global concert of powers” and the use of the levers of globalization to keep China, the European Union, or the United States from creating their own exclusive areas of interest. If we consider, as the author does, the possibility of a global armed conflict, then we cannot afford to diminish the weight of military force as a source of power, and must admit that America still holds an upper hand over its rivals.

Finally, Khanna’s characterizations of certain countries seem forced to fit the patterns of the book’s arguments. Let us consider for a moment the case of Morocco. The comparative advantage of Rabat with respect to its neighboring countries remains undeniable, but the reforms of King Muhammad VI have been regarded by some scholars as merely cosmetic changes designed to perpetuate the power of traditional oligarchies.11 Similarly, Turkey is not following a direct trail on its way to integration in the European Union, and some of the measures that separated the country from the other Islamic nations have been reversed by the recently elected parliament. In the same way, China’s presence as a foreign investor in Latin America has been overstated, while the role of such countries as Spain has been ignored, whose financial presence in the area is second only to that of the United States.12 Nonetheless, Parag Khanna’s book remains a smart and engaging account of current trends in international relations. While we may still be looking for a new paradigm, this work contributes to our understanding.

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OLD PARADIGMS, CHALLENGING REALITIES, NEW INTERPRETATIONS NOTES

1 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw Hill, 1993.

2 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little Brown, 1977.

3 Holbraad, Carsten. Middle Powers in International Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

4 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.

5 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

6 Khanna, Parag. The Second World. Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. New York: Random House, 2008, xv. Page numbers correspond to the advance reader’s edition, so they may not correspond with those on the final book.

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7 Williams, William A. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: W.W. Norton, 1988.

LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

8 Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: the Price of America’s Empire.

New York: Penguin Press, 2004.

9 Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage, 1955, 136.

10 Khanna, The Second World, 335.

11 Zoubir, Yahia H. and Amirah-Fernandez, Haizam. North Africa. Politics, Regions and the Limits of Transformation. London: Routledge, 2008.

12 Guillén, Mauro. The Rise of Spanish Multinationals: European Business in the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

View from the Ground

American Muslims and the Use of Cultural Diplomacy Hafsa Kanjwal One of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century will be to address the growing mutual suspicion, fear, and misunderstanding between Western and Muslim societies. Within the United States, in particular, there is an increase in Islamophobia, which seeks to dominate the discussion surrounding Islam and Muslims by linking it to the actions and views of an extremist minority. Within this tense environment, a number of organizations and initiatives have taken steps to urge greater dialogue between the West and the Muslim world on an international level. Oftentimes, this is done with the underlying understanding that there is a bifurcation between “the West” and the “Muslim” and/or “Islamic world.” As such, the primary focus is not placed on changing negative perceptions of Islam in the West, but rather, to improve the image of the West in the Muslim world. The fact that Islam exists within the West, and, for the purposes of this article, in America, is often overlooked. Nonetheless, there are an estimated three to seven million Muslims living in America and a greater number of them are second or third generation Americans.1 The American Muslim community, especially its youth, is at a unique position in history because they actively engage in the process of reconciling its Muslim as well as American identities in the

Hafsa Kanjwal is a 2008 graduate of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, majoring in Regional Studies of the Muslim World and International Development; she has served on the board of the Muslim Students’ Association at Georgetown University.

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public sphere. Young American Muslims have the capacity to decrease the negative views that some Americans may have towards Islam. This article explores the specific role that the younger generation of American Muslims plays in using cultural expression to bridge the gap between Western and Muslim societies.

There has been a growing tendency to define and articulate the “American Muslim” experience and identity, in which culture plays a great role. I believe that the American Muslim community must take on a non-traditional diplomatic role to represent Islam to the greater American community. There are two different conceptions of how this diplomatic role can be played out. One, termed “public relations diplomacy,” is a more direct, and often reactionary, engagement with society that comes out of a need to bring awareness of and dispel prejudices of Islam and Muslims. The second concept, cultural diplomacy, incorporates nuanced involvement with culture and society that does not always stem from a need to serve as an “Ambas-

While U.S. diplomacy is mainly approached from an inter-state rather than an intra-state perspective, I believe American Muslims have a unique historical opportunity to constructively situate the relationship between Islam and the West through a more micro-level diplomacy. With a better general understanding of Islam, U.S. policies can be made more sensitive, understanding, and relevant to the Muslim context, whether domestically or internationally.

Demography of American Muslims. Islam in America has a long history with multi-faceted demographics.

While the earliest Muslims came into America as African slaves, droves of Muslims emigrated from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, as immigration laws became more relaxed in the 1970s. Over a quarter of Muslims in America are African-American, as many converted through the initial influence of the Nation of Islam and later through mainstream Sunni Islam. Meanwhile, in comparison to Muslims living in Europe,

American Muslims have a unique

historical opportunity to constructively situate the relationship between Islam and the West through a more micro-level diplomacy. sador of Islam.” Cultural diplomacy, rather, uses the importance of art and its creators to serve as an intermediary between two cultures even when the individual does not necessarily practice the faith. Artists are automatically categorized and assigned as such ambassadors based on perceptions of the artists’ biases by those operating within and outside of the artists’ perspective. [ 1 3 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

immigrant Muslims in America are mainly middle-class, highly educated, and highly assimilated into American society.2 Although diversity defines the American Muslim experience and is one of its strengths, diversity has also led to divisions, especially in regard to relations between different ethnic groups. For example, there is a wide rift between the immigrant and the African-American

KANJWAL

Muslim communities.3 Many of the challenges surrounding the future of the Muslim community in America will pertain to how it addresses the heterogeneity within its backgrounds, ideologies, and experiences. The solution primarily lies in how it approaches the creation of one or several American Muslim culture(s).

Towards Cultivating an American Muslim Identity: Theoretical Contributions. Perhaps the most

relevant scholar of the cultural formation of the American Muslim community is Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, Director of the Nawawi Foundation. In a groundbreaking work entitled “Islam and the Cultural Imperative,” Dr. Abd-Allah argues that for centuries, “Islamic civilization harmonized indigenous forms of cultural expression with the universal norms of its sacred law… [In] China, Islam looked Chinese; in Mali, it looked African.”4 Thus, in America, Islam must look “American.”

He examines the history of Islam in other parts of the world and gives examples of how Islam allowed for the engagement with local customs and traditions, as long as such practices did not directly go against any Islamic teachings or principles. Broad application of the law allowed for an even broader accommodation of local norms. This syncretism allowed Islam to flourish in diverse societies as it allowed for the creation of “stable indigenous Muslim identities and [allowed] Muslims to put down deep roots and make lasting contributions wherever they went.”5 Unfortunately, as Dr. Abd-Allah states, contemporary Islamist rhetoric chooses to ignore or remains ignorant of this ancient wisdom, and views culture in a more predatory fashion, placing it as a

View from the Ground

“toxic pollutant that must necessarily be purged, since Islam and culture are mutually exclusive in their minds.”6 He links this mindset with the greater political and social ills plaguing the Muslim world and states that this view is a “byproduct of the grave cultural dislocation and dysfunction of the contemporary Muslim world….Culture—Islamic or otherwise—provides the basis of social stability but, paradoxically, can itself only flourish in stable societies and will inevitably break down in the confusion of social disruption and turmoil.”7 Dr. Abd-Allah recognizes the unique position of the American Muslim community, and cites the need for the continued cultivation of a distinct Muslim community in America that normatively would transcend its immigrant backgrounds. However, he does acknowledge that there are a few deterring factors. He states that much of this cultural production has been feckless without clear understanding of Islam as a counter-cultural identity religion.”8 As such, American Muslims engage with their surroundings within the context of public relations diplomacy, perceiving the need to assert identity within what they see as a hostile environment.

Dr. Abd-Allah summarizes his work by stating that the development of a “sound Muslim American cultural identity must be resolutely undertaken as a conscious pursuit and one of our community’s vital priorities.”9 It is interesting to note that Dr. Abd-Allah does not focus on how the creation of this culture will better improve Islam’s image in America, but rather that it will provide for a constructive unified sense of identity for the American Muslim community. There is a recognition here that solely focusing on improving Islam’s image in Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 3 5 ]

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festations when it comes to American Muslim culture. It appears that sometimes cultural expressions are geared more towards ensuring that Americans have a better impression of Islam. This approach is problematic because genuine American Muslims as “Ambas- artistic expression is being manipulated sadors of Islam.” With increasing to fit a certain agenda. Artists feel comlevels of Islamophobia pervading the pelled to be the token “Ambassadors of United States, American Muslim organi- Islam” and represent Islam or Muslims zations are constantly working to counter on a highly normative level, even when the negative image of Islam and Muslims reality is otherwise. The role of 9/11 on in the media as well as on the interna- the American Muslim psyche cannot be tional and domestic political scenes. In a underestimated; the need to emphasize sense, they are working full-time in the “moderate” Islam in public and cultural realm of public relations diplomacy, discourse has been heightened. Furtherstriving to represent “pure” Islam to the more, American Muslim organizations general American public. Although these may even shy away from cultural producorganizations differ in their goals and tion that is not necessarily focused priobjectives, they are unified in the sense marily on correcting the Muslim image. that they strive to create long-term means for American Muslims to be active in Case Studies. As Dr. Abd-Allah American civic life. However, they are mentions in “Islam and the Cultural often placed in the awkward position of Imperative,” American Muslims have having to defend Islam or Muslims when significantly contributed to a number of a problematic incident occurs nationally diverse avenues in arts and culture. Not or internationally, continually going on necessarily molded to fit the “public talk shows or radio shows to explain the relations” framework, this work has been causes of terrorism, the role of women in extremely constructive as it seeks to “tell Islam, or the conflict between Sunnis stories” and speak directly to and out of and Shi’as. They do not necessarily people’s experiences. change or shape the discourse, but rather, respond to it. While these Musa Syeed. Musa Syeed is a young responses are motivated from American American Muslim filmmaker who Muslim leadership onward, the negative recently produced an award-winning image of Muslims nonetheless remains in documentary called “A Son’s Sacrifice,” the United States. Hence, one must ask “which follows the journey of Imran, a whether such groups’ efforts are truly young American Muslim who struggles to improving the image of Islam. Perhaps take over his father's halal slaughterhouse presenting the material in a defensive in New York City.”10 In his work, Syeed and reactionary way may in fact be doing seeks to explore the immigrant experimore damage than good to perceptions ence in America, especially how it relates of Islam. to the notion of the spiritual value of a Oftentimes, this “public relations” journey. He is interested in providing a framework translates into similar mani- human dimension and connection to America is superficial and does not engage with the diverse talents and viewpoints of the American Muslim constituency. Thus, this culture should not be reactive but rather, proactive.

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View from the Ground

broader theoretical issues such as the clash between modernity and tradition or political conflict. Although he recognizes that he is one of few American Muslims in the film industry, he doesn’t wish to be “pigeon-holed” into the token American Muslim filmmaker.11 He believes this is very limiting and self-defeating.

He acknowledges that this problem exists in terms of how the American Muslim community perceives the arts and culture. The community “values representation in the media, but in a certain way—they don’t see the arts as important— there is a certain level of mistrust of those who get involved with mainstream media.

They wish to create an image of the Muslim community that is immaculate and doesn’t necessarily represent threedimensional characters.”12 This observation is highly relevant as the American Muslim community is focusing too much on “doing good PR.” The community needs to tell its specific stories, but do it in a meaningful way that is applicable to universal themes. Through his work, Syeed brings to his audience the human stories behind normally homogenized communities, and in that sense broadens perspectives and bridges divides.

With his talent, he could have done much more universally for Islam and the image of Muslims, but instead he was making Islamic music tapes for the younger generation.13 In terms of the role Islam should play in a Muslim author’s work, Moghal says that it should not be explicit. He mentions a powerful scene in The Kite Runner in which the narrator at the end of the novel is praying in a mosque in hopes that the young boy who has disappeared will return to him. Although the ritual he is performing is distinctively “Islamic,” the way the author Khalad Hosseini portrays it is very subtle and universal in terms of its intention of turning to a higher power for solace. The reaction to The Kite Runner has been very positive because the author focused on themes that have universal resonance, but posited the novel in a distinctively Afghan manner. People react to the human experience, which is what culture narrates. By successfully adding the “human universalizing” element to his art, one can serve as an indirect diplomat of Islam to the greater community through one’s writing being explicitly Islamic.

writer based in New York and is wellknown in the American Muslim cultural scene for his award-winning blog as well as his first novel, The Order of Light. Moghal acknowledges the problematic tendencies of how American Muslims view culture.

Many Muslims have alienated an audience that they could have had influence on because they have been so “inward” looking. He mentions the case of Yusuf Islam (formerly known as Cat Stevens), who went in a very specifically Islamic direction at a certain point in his career.

bi-monthly magazine that reaches out to Muslim girls growing up in North America. The magazine aims to “tell lifeaffirming stories of Muslim girls in North America, be a voice for these girls, and bring them together, and show them that they can make positive contributions to their societies as Muslims.”14 The magazine also seeks to take away perceptions of Muslims being aliens, and to counter stereotypes of the “submissive, oppressed Muslim woman.” The magazine faces challenges in terms of advertising, and

Ausma Khan. Ausma Khan is the Haroon Moghal. Haroon Moghal is a editor-in-chief of MuslimGirl Magazine, a

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Khan mentions that it is difficult to get sponsorships given that potential funders are still skeptical of whether or not the magazine can be a positive representation of American Muslims. The magazine has

food pantries, and professional development training. IMAN also has a strong arts and cultural component to their work, and Jafri himself is a DJ who works with national hip hop groups. IMAN

There is a large percentage of Americans who are

Muslim, but have been left out of the “core” because oftentimes, it appears that the “core” is too focused on issues relating to theological matters. hosts “Takin’ It to the Streets,” a day of music and service that brought together over 10,000 people in Chicago last summer. IMAN also organizes monthly community cafes that bring together artists, rappers, poets, and academics to share their work. Currently, IMAN is working to transform its arts and cultural initiative to include visual arts, theater, and film.

Jafri says that IMAN’s work is inspired by the call to social justice that is at the root of Islam. Although the members of IMAN recognize problems existing in other parts of the Muslim world, they are very adamant about being involved in the society in which they live. Tackling the problems facing the urban communities in Chicago is an example of social action that is encouraged by Islam. The arts and cultural component of their work was Asad Jafri- Inner-city Muslim created out of a need to better represent Action Network (IMAN). Asad Muslims in America, but also out of a Jafri works as the Youth Coordinator for need to create an authentic American IMAN, the Inner-city Muslim Action Muslim culture.15 By including nonNetwork based in Chicago. IMAN is a Muslims in the creation of a space for this non-profit organization that serves mar- culture to flourish, IMAN takes a proginalized communities in the Chicago gressive approach to cultural diplomacy. area. They run a grassroots direct services By “living out” their beliefs as Muslims initiative which includes health clinics, creatively and in the spirit of social jus-

also made a deliberate decision to include all girls in their pages, including those who may not necessarily wear the traditional headscarf, which has received some negative feedback.

MuslimGirl Magazine is an innovative approach to showcasing the American Muslim experience. It is an excellent model of cultural diplomacy as it seeks to “humanize” American Muslim girls, and in doing so, allows people to get an introduction to Islam and Muslims through a familiar means. By allowing itself to be an open venue to the diverse segments of Muslim girls living in North America, the magazine can play the dual role of both furthering the cultural cultivation of the American Muslim community and serving as a bridge between Muslims and non-Muslims.

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View from the Ground

the United States. They, in turn, could contribute to this identity and this inclusiveness would be valuable because the Conclusion. The case studies present- expressions of art and culture would not ed above represent a fraction of the cul- be monolithic or directly representatural material being produced by the tional from only a small segment of the American Muslim community. These demography.

Looking into the future, and especialindividuals or organizations serve as ideal representatives of Islam to the general ly in terms of what the American Muslim American public, by humanizing Islam community and additional funding sources could focus their efforts on, this and Muslims.

Involvement in the arts and culture article argues that cultural diplomacy could serve a few additional benefits to should take precedence over public relathe American Muslim community. One tions diplomacy. An indigenous Ameriprimarily associates the term, “American can Muslim culture must be cultivated Muslim community” with the small per- and supported. It should not be reaccentage of Muslims, or the “core,” in the tionary or defensive, but rather self-critcountry that visibly identifies with Islam ical, nuanced, and universal. By explorand is involved with the different Islam- ing the “humanizing” aspects of Islam, ic-based institutions in the country, be it culture can play a great role in bridging the local mosque or the National Muslim the divide between the West and the MusStudents Association. There is a large lim world. Furthermore, I believe that in percentage of Americans who are Mus- order for the American Muslim commulim, but have been left out of the “core” nity to be engaged in America civically because oftentimes, it appears that the and politically, it needs to truly be reflec“core” is too focused on issues relating to tive of its identity, goals, and aspirations. theological matters. The cultivation of an Thus, it needs to develop a sophisticated American Muslim culture that looks cultural presence before it can be coherbeyond this will be beneficial as this ent on a civic or political level. In this allows those individuals who previously way, the formation of a cultural identity disassociated themselves from the com- will allow there to be more consensus on munity to get interested in the more what the political platforms of the Amer“cultural” aspects of Muslim identity in ican Muslim community should be. tice, the members of IMAN serve as “diplomats” of Islam in America.

NOTES

1 “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” Pew Research Center. ed. 22 May 2007, Internet,http://pewresearch.org/pubs/483/muslimamericans (date accessed: 8 December 2007).

2 Ibid.

3 Sherman Jackson, Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection . (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

4 Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, “Islam and the Cultural Imperative,” Nawawi Foundation, 2004 (1) 5 Abd-Allah 2.

6 Abd-Allah 2.

7 Abd-Allah 2.

8 Abd-Allah 2.

9 Abd-Allah 2.

10 "About,” A Son’s Sacrifice, ed. 2007, Internet, http://www.sonsacrifice.com/about.html (date accessed: 8 December 2007).

11 Musa Syeed, interview by author, 5 December 2007.

12 Ibid.

13 Haroon Moghal, interview with author, 5 December 2007.

14 Ausma Khan, interview with author, 6 December 2007.

15 Asad Jafri, interview with author, 7 November 2007.

Summer/Fall 2008 [ 1 3 9 ]

View from the Ground

As Hazy as Ever, the Cross-Strait Status Quo Lin Fu China and Taiwan always seem to bring out the pettiest behavior in one another. Their recent squabble regarding the route of the Olympic torch for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing—in which Taiwan ultimately declined its place in the route—serves as a case in point. Originally the torch was to pass through Taiwan, arriving from Vietnam and continuing to Hong Kong, but Taiwanese officials argued that the proposed course implied that Taiwan was part of China and asked for it to be changed. Of course, further aggravating the issue was the fact that Chinese officials had asked that only songs and flags approved by the International Olympic Committee be used at events related to the Olympic torch in Taiwan, which meant that neither the Taiwanese anthem nor its flag could be used.

Reading this news item called to mind the way one of my professors at National Chengchi University in Taiwan started off his course on cross-Strait relations: “In Taiwan, everything is cross-Strait relations and everything relates back to crossStrait relations.” The term “cross-Strait relations” refers to the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan, with “Strait” being the Taiwan Strait, and is used because it is seen as more neutral phrasing than “relations between People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Republic of China (ROC)” or

Lin Fu is a 2006 graduate of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where she majored in International Economics.

She studied at National Chengchi University (NCCU) on a Georgetown-National Chengchi University China Studies Fellowship.

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even “China-Taiwan relations.” Perhaps my professor’s declaration overstated the weight of the subject in day-to-day activities; nevertheless, it certainly holds true that considerations of cross-Strait relations are present in almost every facet of Taiwan’s economic and political motives.

Unfortunately for Taiwan, these economic and political considerations often pull it in opposite directions. This dilemma will continue to be an issue for Taiwan because of the changed crossStrait dynamic, with China’s economic and military might giving it the upper hand, and as a result, it seems that the best option for Taiwan is to maintain the status quo of neither reunifying with China nor declaring independence.

Former Taiwanese President Denghui Lee once compared the case of Taiwan and Mainland China to that of “divided countries” like East and West Germany before reunification and North and South Korea. The relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China, however, is no longer analogous to that of the two

trast, results from clear victory in revolutionary war, with the Mainland regime dramatically overshadowing that on Taiwan as a result of a far larger economy, population base, and—measured in sheer numbers and nuclear dimensions—military capacity.

This uneven balance permeates not only Taiwan’s political atmosphere, but its economic one as well.

The “Trojan Horse Effect.” When

cross-Strait economic relations first started to thaw, Taiwan was the stronger economic entity. However, the economic upper hand currently seems to belong to China since the Mainland is not only a source of relatively cheap labor, but also possesses untapped market potential.

This change in economic strength has affected how the two sides view each other: China has became more confident because it feels that increased cross-Strait economic integration is working in its favor; Taiwan, on the other hand, is wary about the negative consequences of eco-

The status quo is, for the moment, the Taiwanese people’s choice.

Germanys and the two Koreas. As scholar Arthur Cyr observed: The realities of power politics, including relative influence in the world body, undercut the comparisons. The division of Germany and the division of Korea were directly linked to the politics of great power competitions, in military as well as political dimensions, in the turbulent closing months of World War II and the early phase of the Cold War….The Chinese situation, by con[ 1 4 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

nomic integration, including “hollowing out,” domestic unemployment, capital flight, and what Vice President Annette Lu calls the “Trojan Horse effect.” In other words, are closer economic ties an insidious method of reigning in Taiwan so that it will capitulate to the wishes of Mainland China? This “Trojan Horse effect” is not a myth, nor is using economics to influence politics as insidious as some might think, since the Beijing authorities openly state that their policy

FU

View from the Ground

Kong or Macau will only go up, making such a transit requirement inefficient.

Given that the airline industry is also on somewhat of a downward trend, this transit requirement does not seem tenable over the long term. It does, however, highlight the conflict between economic interests and security concerns that Taiwanese policymakers face.

Although, from an economic standpoint, trade and travel restrictions are certainly counterproductive, from a national security viewpoint, domestic fears and concerns about the rising influence of China make such regulations understandable.

Furthermore, as manufacturing activities increasingly move to locales with lower labor costs, Taiwan has decided to move up the value chain by becoming a regional operations center, something that is unlikely to happen without direct trade and transportation links with the Mainland. For multinational corporations doing business in Asia, the Mainland market is a much desired target. The current restrictions on cross-Strait trade and transportation would increase their cost of doing business should they locate their headquarters in Taiwan. Bottom lines and profit margins will dictate that these companies set their headquarters Three Direct Links. Unfortunately elsewhere, like Singapore or Hong for Taiwan, it seems that that greater eco- Kong. In a recent poll, about threenomic integration with the Mainland is quarters of Taiwanese who responded inevitable. The current restrictions it said that they would like to see the “three imposes on trade and travel between Tai- direct links” implemented as long as such wan and Mainland China—goods and links do not harm Taiwan’s security. The passengers traveling across the Taiwan three direct links refer to direct mail, Strait transit through Hong Kong or direct transportation, and direct trade Macau before their final destination on between the two sides without having to either side—is irrational in terms of eco- transit through a third party, as is curnomics. With fuel prices steadily rising, rently the case.

Even though Taiwan may not have a the cost associated with the additional mileage of transiting through Hong choice but to institute the three direct

is to do just that.

Since Taiwan officially loosened its restrictions on cross-Strait interaction in the 1990s, Taiwan has become, on a per capita basis, the largest investor in China.

According to the 2002 Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) statistics, cross-Strait trade was around $40 billion; Taiwanese investment in Mainland China reached $5 billion; and there are more than 3 million Taiwanese visitors to the Mainland. In fact, China and Taiwan are sometimes called an “uncommon dyad” because political rivals usually do not have such robust trade nor is there such a large amount of investment activity. The economic activity between this uncommon dyad is rather asymmetrical, however, with Taiwan, the weaker party in terms of size, population, and military might, increasingly dependent on China for export and investment opportunities.

From this point alone, one can see why some Taiwanese fear that greater crossStrait economic interaction might jeopardize Taiwan’s security, economy, and political autonomy. So far, closer economic relations have not, precisely because of Taipei’s fears, and in spite of Beijing’s hopes, brought about closer political relations.

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against the present administration, the issue of identity played a role. A Taiwanese classmate mentioned in class that many of her relatives, and presumably many Taiwanese, equated being antiChen with being anti-Taiwan. Politically, this was beneficial for Chen since few people would dare say that they do not love Taiwan, that they do not love their land and their home. Such logic, however, connotes a wider tendency toward division along sub-ethnic lines, which could have rather negative consequences for social equality and stability in Taiwan.

This sub-ethnic division, between The Taiwanese Identity. On the political front, China has made every native-born Taiwanese, transplantedeffort to isolate Taiwan on the interna- Mainlander Taiwanese, and Mainlanders, tional stage. Taiwan is recognized by only will become a critical issue, and is, in fact, twenty-three states and is a member of already one. Identity—a complex emojust a handful of international organiza- tional, mental, and experiential affinity tions. These diplomatic victories for Tai- with a particular group—is not something wan are flimsy at best because the states that can be forced. It is created and nurthat recognize Taiwan are considered tured through shared experience. This peripheral and are usually highly depen- point is particularly pertinent in analyzdent on Taiwanese foreign aid; more- ing the arguments of those who want Taiover, Taiwan has not gained admission wan to be its own nation. As Richard C. into any of the more important interna- Bush, Director of the Center for Northtional organizations and in the organiza- east Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings tions it is a part of, it is usually known as Institute once wrote, “Taiwan became a “Chinese Taipei,” and not Taiwan or part of the Chinese cultural world only ROC. An unintended but very serious gradually.” Aboriginal tribes were the consequence of the isolation of Taiwan original inhabitants of the island and it has been to boost a Taiwan-centered wasn’t until the 1400s and 1500s that the identity and a process of “de-siniciza- first ethnic Chinese—pirates, traders, and tion” in Taiwan. As a result, words like fishermen—arrived. It wasn’t until the “China,” “Chinese,” “one country, two 1700s that ethnic Chinese culture became systems” have become alienating to Tai- dominant in the area, with the settlement wanese and instead of extinguishing a of large numbers of farmers from southseparate Taiwanese identity, China has west China. Then, ceded by the Qing helped reinforce it. The issue of identi- Dynasty to the Japanese under the Treaty ty is another touchy topic within the dis- of Shimoniseki, Taiwan was a Japanese cussion on cross-Strait relations. Even colony for fifty years. During this period, during the “Depose Chen” protests in a greater sense of Taiwanese identity, “an late fall of 2006, which were actually island-wide consciousness” emerged, focused on allegations of corruption partly because Japanese colonial rule links despite its security concerns, these concerns are not to be taken lightly. As China becomes more powerful, it has also been more successful in isolating Taiwan from the international community. To develop diplomatic official ties with Taiwan means to endanger diplomatic, and perhaps more importantly economic relations, with China, something that few countries would do since the market potential represented by the billion plus population of China is too large of a lure.

[ 1 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

FU

ignored the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the population and grouped all inhabitants as “islanders.” In addition, there is the complicated history that Steven Phillips notes in “Building a Taiwanese Republic.”

Fifty years of Japanese rule laid the base for much of the conflict between the Taiwanese and the Nationalists. The Taiwanese endured the dual nature of colonialism: law and order in a brutal police state, economic development and exploitations, education and forced cultural assimilation. As important as what islanders experienced was what they missed: the key events that shaped the national consciousness of the Chinese, including the collapse of the Qing, Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary efforts, warlord depredations, the literary revolution of the May 4th Movement, the glory of the

View from the Ground

ethnic Chinese arrived? Or, by virtue of being the dominant culture on the island, are the ethnic Chinese who arrived before Japanese colonial rule the true arbiters of Taiwanese-ness? Or, did shared experience under Japanese colonial rule widen the ethnic parameters of what it means to be Taiwanese to include both groups?

According to the definition offered by World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) of what it means to be Taiwanese, “[all of those who identify] with Taiwan, [love] Taiwan, and [wish] to be part of Taiwan’s destiny, regardless of when they immigrated or were born on Taiwan, all will be equal citizens of Taiwan after independence.” The idea that identity is based on choice and not race or ethnicity is one that resonates with many. Identity based solely on race or

If identity is based on shared experiences, then does the fact that Taiwan missed the aforementioned events mean that it merits a unique identity?

Northern Expedition, the epic suffering of the Long March, and the myth of national unity during the War of Resistance.

Phillip’s observation is a rather important one for he implies that Taiwan’s collective memory does not include many of the pivotal moments that happened on the Mainland. If identity is based on shared experiences, then does the fact that Taiwan missed the aforementioned events mean that it merits a unique identity? What constitutes Taiwanese identity exactly? Does one have to trace one’s ancestral roots to the aborigines who lived in Taiwan before the first

ethnicity—you are and you will be what you were born—is very limiting because it is not something that individuals have control over. Especially in today’s globalized communities, identity is multifaceted and fluid. The freedom to choose one’s identity, including the countries or cultures that one identifies with, helps make complex decisions more personalized. While WUFI’s definition of Taiwanese identity is laudable for inclusiveness, it seems to be predicated, however, on Taiwan being an independent nation first. The implication appears to be that those who want an independent Taiwan (regardless of ethnic and sub-ethnic difSummer/Fall 2008 [ 1 4 5 ]

AS HAZY AS EVER, THE CROSS-STRAIT STATUS QUO

ferences) are Taiwanese. So, in the end, the definition is rather exclusive after all because it does not allow for divergent opinions within the cohort group and the determination of what precisely constitutes a Taiwanese identity.

Politics & Security: The Bottom Line. Complicating this situation fur-

ther is the arms race between Mainland China and Taiwan. Both sides continue to increase their military capability, although the Mainland’s push toward military modernization is directed more toward becoming an international heavyweight, which escalates military tensions.

The U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is still very strong; Taiwan is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign military training in the Pacific Command area and it also periodically buys millions worth in arms from the United States. Are U.S. arm sales making things worse? Possibly.

Chas Freeman, co-chair of the U.S.China Policy Foundation, certainly thinks so. His most salient point, however, is the following: The best short-term solution to the Taiwan question may be no solution at all: no change in the “one China, but not now” status quo, no reunification, no assertions of independent sovereignty by Taipei. Thus the United States should encourage Beijing and Taipei to discuss deferring negotiations about their longterm relationship for a specific period— say fifty years. In the interim, neither side would attempt unilaterally to alter the status quo. Neither side would threaten or use force against the other.

A survey conducted by six different organizations, including the Election Study Center of NCCU and Burke Marketing Research, Ltd., and published by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), shows that most Taiwanese favor the status [ 1 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

quo for right now. Choosing the status quo means choosing neither reunification with China nor independence. For some the status quo is nebulous and not a choice at all; for others, it represents the safest choice because it is the option that guarantees no war for the moment.

Paired with a time dimension—for example, Freeman’s suggested fifty years—the status quo might very well be the best short-term solution because in that time, the Mainland can work on soothing the nationalist elements within its military as well as offer carrots instead of sticks to Taiwan, as recommended by China scholar Michael Yahuda. At the same time, if both sides promised not to alter the status quo, Taiwan could then reap the benefits of further economic liberalization if security concerns were minimized, which would be the case since China would presumably not feel the need to flex its military muscle to keep Taiwan “in line.”

A visiting scholar at Georgetown, who was a colonel in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), once told me that the PLA was ready and willing to invade Taiwan should it declare its independence. The substance of his threat hinges on a hypothetical, if Taiwan declares its independence. Because really, who would actually want a cross-Strait war and all its attending casualties and costs? Certainly not the United States, which would most likely be pulled into such a conflict; certainly not the hair stylists I overheard in southern China at the time of the 2004 Taiwanese presidential elections, who worried, with fear and wariness palpable in their tones, about Chinese military action in response to a Taiwanese declaration of independence; and certainly not my male classmates at NCCU, the overwhelming majority of whom, in an

FU

informal poll, responded “surrender” to the question “what would you do if there were an invasion—fight or surrender?”

Granted that those questioned may have been a somewhat biased sample since male graduate students do not represent the entire population, the results of the informal poll still do mirror the reality: according to the MAC survey, the status quo is, for the moment, the Taiwanese people’s choice.

While the official and uncompromising position of the Chinese military is that it most certainly will take military

View from the Ground

action if Taiwan was to declare its independence, the general public on both sides of the Strait obviously want to avoid such a confrontation. Neither China nor Taiwan desires a military confrontation over the question of reunification versus independence because neither side would be able to emerge from this “worst case” scenario outcome unscathed. With a negotiated agreement barring a declaration of independence by Taiwan and the use of force by China, time and further economic interactions just might redefine the situation.

NOTES

1 Arthur I. Cyr, Taiwan: the Commercial State, (2003): 58-59.

2 Chien-min Chao, “National Security vs. Economic Interests Reassessing Taiwan’s Mainland Policy under Chen Shui-bian,” Journal of Contemporary China (2004): 15, 24.

3 Chien-min Chao, “National Security vs. Economic Interests: Reassessing Taiwan’s Mainland Policy under Chen Shui-bian,” Journal of Contemporary China (2004): 9.

4 T.J. Cheng, China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and Superconductivity, Chapter 5 in Nancy B. Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-TaiwanChina Crisis (New York: Columbia UP, 2005): 93.

5 Chien-min Chao, “National Security vs. Economic Interests: Reassessing Taiwan’s Mainland Policy under Chen Shui-bian,” Journal of Contemporary China (2004): 18.

6 Chien-min Chao and Chih-Chia Hsu, “China Isolates Taiwan”, in Edward Friedman, ed., China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2005): 61-62.

7 Richard C. Bush, “Getting to the Present” in Untying the Knot (Washington, DC: The Brookings Insti-

tution, 2005): 14.

8 Steven Phillips, “Building a Taiwanese Republic: The Independence Movement 1945-Present,” in Nancy B. Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia UP, 2005): 47.

9 Steven Phillips, “Building a Taiwanese Republic: The Independence Movement 1945-Present,” in Nancy B. Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia UP, 2005): 64.

10 Michael S. Chase, “US-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship,” in Nancy B. Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-TaiwanChina Crisis (New York: Columbia UP, 2005): 163.

11 Chas W. Freeman, Jr, “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining Taiwan and Beijing,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 4 (July/August 1998): 10.

12 Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), “Unification or Independence (area chart)” (see “Public Opinion Polls”) Internet, http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/ index1-e.htm.

13 Michael Yahuda, “China’s Taiwan Dilemma,” Yale Global, 18 February 2004, Internet, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3360 (date accessed: 8 March 2008).

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