Nongqai Vol 12 No 3 by Hennie Heymans, Nongqai Publications

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Publisher | Uitgewer Nongqai is compiled by S.A. Police Brigadier (Ret) Hennie Heymans (HBH) together with associate editor, Frans Bedford-Visser, former Warrant Officer in the S.A. Railways Police., and recently retired Police Scotland officer.

Nongqai word saamgestel deur S.A. Polisie Brigadier (Afg) Hennie Heymans (HBH) saam met mederedakteur, Frans Bedford-Visser, voormalige adjudant-offisier in die S.A. Spoorwegpolisie, en onlangs afgetrede lid van die Skotse Polisie.

Hennie lives in Pretoria, RSA. He is passionate about our police, military and national security history and holds a MA Degree in National Strategic Studies.

Hennie woon in Pretoria, RSA. Hy is passievol oor ons polisie-, militêre en nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedenis en het 'n MA-graad in Nasionale Strategiese Studies.

Frans resides in Scotland, UK, and has a keen interest in preserving the history of our former security forces, especially the Railways Police. He holds a Diploma in Police Services, Leadership and Management.

Frans woon in Skotland, VK, en het 'n ywerige belangstelling in die behoud van die geskiedenis van ons voormalige veiligheidsmagte, veral die Spoorwegpolisie. Hy besit ‘n Diploma in Polisiedienste, Leierskap en Bestuur.

Any opinions expressed by either Hennie or Frans are entirely their own.

Enige menings uitgespreek deur óf Hennie of Frans is heeltemal hul eie

Aim | Doel Our goal is to collect and record our national security history for publication in Nongqai for future generations.

Ons doel is om die nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedenis in Nongqai aan te teken en so vir die nageslagte bewaar.

Policy | Beleid

We publish the articles and stories as received; we only correct spelling mistakes. It's important to publish the stories in the form and context as they are received. Police and defence personnel have their own language and subculture. We are not a scientific or literary journal. We only work with historical building blocks.

Ons publiseer die artikels en stories soos ontvang; ons korrigeer net spelfoute. Dit is belangrik om die stories in die vorm en konteks te publiseer soos dit ontvang word. Die polisie en verdedigingspersoneel het hul eie taal en subkultuur. Ons is nie 'n wetenskaplike of literêre joernaal nie. Ons werk net met historiese boustene.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

NONGQAI

CONTENTS

NEW THIS MONTH | NUUT HIERDIE MAAND: NONGQAI FORUM - Our contributors share their unique insights into matters of national importance. Braai gaan ons braai!

ADMINISTRASIE | ADMINISTRATION

A soldier in the nutria browns of the SADF “braais” his meat over open coals on the blade of a shovel.

3: Inhoudsopgawe | Contents VOORWOORD | FOREWORD 6: HOE GAAN ONS NAGESLAGTE ONS EENDAG ONTHOU? Hennie Heymans VOORBLAD STORIE | COVER STORY 8: Mr A. Van Wyk ELEKTRONIESE BEDIENING | E-SERVICE 18: Pastoor Koot Swanepoel NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE | NASIONALE INTELLIGENSIE 19: NI: MR CLASIE CLASSEN: Preface to Chapter second input 22: 1975: DIE EERSTE MINISTER EN AMPTENARE WAARONDER LEDE VAN BSV 23: MNR PC SWANEPOEL (SAP, KOD, SAP (RI), BSV, DNV &, NI)

Contributors to NONGQAI

24: THE GENESIS AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY TO THE SA SECURITY DISCOURSE AND EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY: Dr Anthony Turton

Get to know contributors to Nongqai whose insightful articles will delight you!

Dr Anthony Turton

Capt Andre van Ellinckhuyzen

Dr Willem Steenkamp

An enviromemtal specialist, author and Professor. Holds Professorships at the University of the Free State; and in the UESCO Chair in Groundwater Management at the University of Western Cape.

André van Ellinckhuyzen is a 53 year-old Captain in the South African Police with 36 years of service. He is also a Researcher and Writer of local History.

A retired attorney and entrepreneur, as well as former National Intelligence Service analyst, ambassador and head of the South African diplomatic academy. He has degrees in Law and a doctorate in Political Science and is also a published author / novelist.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

NONGQAI

CONTENTS

SAP GESKIEDENIS | SAP HISTORY

86: SAP PORT NOLLOTH: Kol Louis Langenhoven

30: DR LEON WESSELS VERTEL 32: TROU TOT DIE DOOD TOE: Genl. Johan van der Merwe

87: C1965: DURBAN-RADIOBEHEER: “KODE 14”— FLORIDAWEG, SAP STAMFORD HILL: Richard van Wyk

34: 1972-2022: POLISIËRING

VROULIKE

88: 1969 PERSONEEL: SAP LOUIS BOTHALUGHAWE: HBH

37: DIE SAP BALLISTIEKDESKUNDIGES BRING HUL KANT NA ‘N OLIFANTSLAGTING: Kol Wynand Schoeman

89: 1968: S A POLICE BORDER DUTY FOXTROT COMPANY: Dennis Delport

JAAR

VAN

42: SAP RANK STRUCTURE: 1961-1994 43: SAPS RANK STRUCTURE: 1994 on 44: DOUBLE TRAGEDY AT GOBENI 1920: Capt. Andre van Ellinckhuyzen 50: WHERE IT ALL BEGAN!: Die Wachthuis 51: NONGQAI TRUST 52: SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTABULARY

91: THE 1970 RADIO FREEDOM BROADCAST FROM BOTSWANA: Dennis Delport 91: RESCUE OF A STRANDED SA POLICE BOAT ON THE ZAMBEZI RIVER AT MANA POOLS: Dennis Delport 94: GROEN TWAK: Dr Coert Mommsen 96: SUIDWES-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE | SOUTH WEST AFRICAN POLICE: Tinus le Roux

53: LT GEN LORD BADEN POWELL: Nongqai

98: UIT MY KOEVOET SAKBOEKIE: WHAMME EN VLAMME!!!: Chrisjan du Preez

54: STORIES VAN SAP KING’S REST: Hennie Heymans

100: AS 'N FOTO KON PRAAT: Corrie Prinsloo

57: SOME HISTORY OF THE BLUFF AND A MAP: Paul du Preez 59: THE NATAL MOUNTED POLICE: FBV

102: DIS WIE JY KEN BY KOEVOET: Chrisjan du Preez SA SPOORWEGPOLISIE | RAILWAYS POLICE

60: MAJOR OLIVER DIMMICK, SA MOUNTED RIFLES: FBV

103: SA SPOORWEGPOLISIE: SAKE, VERHALE EN STAALTJIES: MEJUFFROU WÊRELD: Brig R Beyl

64: NATAL POLICE TROOPERS LAID TO REST AT NONDWENI: Captain Andre van Ellinckhuyzen

105: REMINISCENCES POLICEMAN: Keith Blake

65: 1922 RED REVOLT ON THE RAND: Constable H.J.B Feideler

107: DIE SPEURDER: Johan de Jager

72: AGTERGRONDARTIKEL: Brig. TJ “Rooi Rus” Swanepoel: Rika van Graan

DURBAN BOROUGH POLICE | DURBAN CITY POLICE

76: GESKIEDENIS, FEITE, FIKSIE, LEGENDES, MITES ...: HBH / BRIG TJ “ROOI RUS” SWANEPOEL: Dr Willem Steenkamp

RAILWAYS

108: ‘n LEWENSREIS: Brig Hannes Slabbert 115: THE ORIGINAL DURBAN CITY POLICE BADGE: Darryn Newcombe SA KRYGSGESKIEDENIS |MILITARY HISTORY

79: LUIT-GENL. CF ZIETSMAN, SOO, SOE: Me Rene Jooste

116: HUMOUR DURING THE ANGLO BOER WAR: Elria Wessels

85: AGTERGRONDVERSLAE: ROLSPELERS IN DIE NASIONALE VEILIGHEIDSGESKIEDENIS: HBH / MY OUPA GENL “LANG-HENDRIK” VAN DEN BERGH: Sonika

118: ANGLO BOER WAR: PRETORIA STATION & BURGERS IS SLAAGS: Tinus le Roux 119: HE PASSED AWAY ON CHRISTMAS DAY, 1913: Capt Andre van Ellinckhuyzen

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

NONGQAI

CONTENTS

123: 1917: DIE ISLE OF WIGHT EN SS MENDI: AP Stemmet

BURIED ACROSS THE WORLD: Capt (SAN-Ret) C Ross

124: THE KAISER’S SOLDIER AND HIS BOERNOOI: Maj. Jean-Pierre Scherman 126: WWII LUFTWAFFE CAMERA: Dennis Delport

186: REMEMBERING THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY FRIGATE, SAS PRESIDENT KRUGER: Wolfgang Witschas

127: MEDIESE NOODVOERTUIE SIVIEL EN MILITÊR: Nico Moolman en Paul Els

187: THREE SHIPS MEMORIAL—LEST WE FORGET: Andrew Bergman

128: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE, 1 RECONNAISSANCE COMMANDO: Manuel R Ferreira

NONGQAI HELDESAAL | HALL OF FAME

SA INLIGTING | INTELLIGENCE

188: Maj-Gen GHP Murphy: The Father of Electronic Warfare in the RSA

136: REPUBLICAN INTELLIGENCE: Wikipedia

WILDSBEWARING|WILDLIFE CONSERVATION

140: SYDNEY MUFAMADI’S AFFIDAVIT TO THE ZONDO COMMISSION

192: IT'S WORLD PANGOLIN DAY: Chengeta Wildlife

151: GIVE US NAMES OF GOVT SPIES IN RIGHT2KNOW - R2K: Busi Mtabane

NONGQAI FORUM

151: DIE BURO VIR STAATSVEILIGHEID: Wikipedia

194: HOE VERSTAAN MENS DIE POLEMIEK RONDOM DIE STAATSVEILIGHEID-AGENTSKAP?: Dr Willem Steenkamp

WETSTOEPASSING | APPLICATION OF THE LAW 155: DA CONDEMNS SAPS INACTION OUTSIDE BLOEMFONTEIN COURTS: Dr Roy Jankielsohn 156: POLICE FINALLY ADMIT CRIME IS OUT OF CONTROL: Pieter Groenewald

193: NUUT! NEW! NONGQAI FORUM

197: TWEE GROOT “WHAT IF’s…” VAN DIE SWA / ANGOLA GRENSOORLOG: Dr Willem Steenkamp SPORT

DEFENCE INTERNATIONAL

217: SAP PERDERSPORT: Nico Moolman

162: CHINA'S DRIVE FOR MILITARY SUPREMACY: Ian Birrell and Glen Owen

217: RUGBY—PIET UYS VAN POLISIE (1966).

166: THE GHOSTS OF OUR FALKLANDS FOES WHO FOUND PEACE...AT LAST: Neil Darbyshire

218: Briewe •

Genl Dirk Schoeman

RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR

•

Ferdie Burger

173: A CHANCE ENCOUNTER: Russell Haydon Fulton

•

Post by a Police Officer that just retired

175: THE RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR (1966-1979): By John Frame

•

Johan v Wyngaard

NAWOORD | AFTERWORD

BUITELANDSE INLIGTING | FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 178: THE AMAZING STORY OF THE UNLIKELY BRITISH JEWISH SPY: Danny Buckland LAASTE POS | LAST POST

LETTERS | BRIEWE

220: Nawoord: Frans Bedford-Visser INDEMNITY & COPYRIGHT | VRYWARING KOPIEREG

221: Hennie Heymans

183: SA COMMONWEALTH WAR CAUSALITIES

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

HOE GAAN ONS NAGESLAGTE ONS EENDAG ONTHOU? Hennie Heymans "The British police, efficient, polite, good-humoured to all who approach them, have replaced the Royal Navy as the symbol of British decency in the eyes of a world which no longer knows or tolerates imperialism. They are the strong dyke built against the waters of crime which are ever ready to engulf and destroy society. Every nation owes more than it can pay to that figure of the British scene - the British Bobby."

Die vraag hierbo gestel, “hoe gaan ons nageslagte ons eendag onthou?” kom uit iets wat genl JC Smuts by geleentheid geskryf het. Dit is belangrik dat ons vir ons nageslag ‘n skriftelike rekord nalaat van ons doen en late. Die oorgrote meerderheid van lesers was almal op een of ander manier verbonde aan ons voormalige nasionale veiligheids-instellings of -magte

Ons almal dateer tans van die 1950’s af toe die offisiere en

ander toesighouers vreeslik “kwaai” was. In ons dae kon die kommissaris of direkteur-generaal van enige staats-departement rustig slaap. Elke distrik in die polisie het ‘n distrikskommandant gehad wat as rekenpligtige vir die distrik opgetree het. Ons werk is elke dag, elke week, elke maand, elke kwartaal nagesien en dan was daar ook gereelde inspeksies deur die ouditeurgeneraal se kantoor.

Dit laat my dink aan perdevoer en die SAP se Staande Orders NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Voorrade). Toe ek my opleiding in die SAP-kollege gekry het, het daar een dag ‘n trok vol perdevoer arriveer en ons is as “goedkoop arbeid” aangewend. Ons moes die bale aflaai, elke baal weeg en met ‘n genommerde kaartjie voorsien waarop die gewig van die baal aangeteken was. Die bale is in ‘n voorraad register aangeteken en die totale aantal bale en die totale gewig is aangeteken. Daagliks is die register bygehou soos die perde daagliks gevreet (Continued on page 7)

(Continued from page 6)

het. Die punt van die storie is, die BO van die SAP-kollege was rekenpligtig en die perdevoer is op rekord en inspekteurs kon sien dat die voer in belang van die staat regmatig aangewend was. So is brandstof by stasies ontvang en deeglike rekord en kontrole is gehou van uitreikings aan polisievoertuie – een maal het die SAW by die stasie opgedaag sonder brandstof en die stasiebevelvoerder het die uitreiking van brandstof gemagtig en die SAP-kwartiermeester verwittig. Ons het ‘n verskriklike goeie grondwet en almal is “gelyk” wat die wet betref maar in die praktyk is daar ‘n ANC kaderontplooiingskomitee wat kaders in die staatsdiens ontplooi. Blankes en ander rasse wat gekwalifiseer is en offisierseksamens en selfs oor universiteitsgrade beskik word oor die hoof gesien. Deurwinterde speurders moet aan die spits van ondersoeke staan en insgelyks moet takbevelvoerders deurwinterde ondersoekers

wees wat die reg ken! Ek het vriende wat al amper dertig jaar as kapteins dien. Meriete word totaal oor die hoof gesien. Ons kragvoorsiening is in ‘n gemors, die spoorweë gaan mank onder plunder en diefstal terwyl spoorweginfrastruktuur gesteel en verkoop word. Hierbo kan u die hooflyn na Bloemfontein beskou. Die foto is die week deur ‘n vriend J Wepener afgeneem. Voorstedelike treine loop nie meer tussen Johannesburg en Pretoria nie. Ons kan gelukkig gebottelde water koop. Die poskantoor “werk” nie “lekker” nie – ons gebruik bv Postnet vir ‘n flinke pos– en koerierdiens. Ons het orals sigbare privaat sekuriteit. Ek kyk nie na SABCTV nie en luister nie meer na RSG nie; ons kyk na die beste programme op YouTube en luister na gemeenskapsradiostasies wat suiwer Afrikaans besig. Almal gebruik privaat selfone. Gelukkig het ons privaat hospitale en mediese fondse. Oral is alternatiewe strukture beskikbaar omdat die

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

regering gefaal het. Die prentjie hierbo is tekenend van ons skrikwekkende situasie. Wie is vandag ‘n simbool van ordentlikheid in Suid-Afrika? Wie dien vandag in ‘n pos omdat hy of sy oor die meriete en ervaring beskik? As nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedkundige vind ek dat een van die grootste probleme op staatkundige terrein is, die feit dat die destydse Nasionale Party (NP) die Regering van Nasionale -eenheid (RNE) verlaat het. Daarna het die proses van agteruitgang vinnig begin ... Maar gelukkig het ons destyds ‘n oorgangsregering gehad en is ons nie vandag “The People’s Republic of Azania” nie. Verder word u welkom geheet by ‘n besondere interessante elektroniese tydskrif. Ons bedank al ons korrespondente vir hul geskiedkundige foto’s en artikels. Nogmaals baie dankie! U sal eendag vir u nageslag kan toon wat u alles “gedoen” het om u kant te bring!

MR A. VAN WYK Director General, Bureau for State Security (BfSS)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Foto's van mnr Alec van Wyk—Brig Johan Fourie

Die gedeelte oor “Wallekraal” wat volg deur en met vergunning van mnr Gert Engelbrecht, hy skryf onder die naam “Gert Sarisam”, met dank ook aan mnr AP Stemmet. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Gedagte om te oordink…. Pastoor Koot Swanepoel Gedagte om te oordink…. Ons almal glo aan die Bybel, maar ons doen nie wat die Bybel sê nie. Ons is deesdae so selfgesentreerd. Dit gaan net oor die “Me, myself and I”, die “eie ek”. Alles moet net oor ons gaan en ons fokus is net op onsself. Terwyl die Bybel duidelik sê; “Dra mekaar se laste, loop met mekaar die ekstra myl en bid vir mekaar.” Baie kinders van die HERE kry swaar in hierdie omstandighede wat ons wêreld getref het. Baie het dors en honger. Selfs JESUS was op ‘n stadium dors gewees. Joh 4:7” Daar kom ‘n vrou uit Samaría om water te skep. Jesus sê vir haar: Gee vir My water om te drink—” Joh 4:9 En die Samaritaanse vrou sê vir Hom: Hoe is dit dat U wat ‘n Jood is, van my vra om te drink terwyl ek ‘n Samaritaanse vrou is? Want die Jode hou geen gemeenskap met die Samaritane nie. By JESUS gaan dit nie om Ras of Geslag nie. Hy sê in Mat 25:45 ”Voorwaar Ek sê vir julle, vir sover julle dit nie gedoen het aan een van hierdie geringstes nie, het julle dit aan My ook nie gedoen nie.” Onthou as jou hand toe is kan jy niks daarin ontvang nie. As jou hand oop is om te gee (saai) is hy oop om te ontvang. Gal 6:7 “Moenie dwaal nie; want net wat die mens saai, dit sal hy ook maai.”

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Mnr Clasie Classen: Voorwoord tot Mr Clasie Classen: Preface to NIS’s NI se tweede hoofstuk inset second chapter input In die vorige uitgawe van Nongqai is daar reeds in die Inleiding en Voorwoord van die NI se inset verwys na dr. Niël Barnard se boek Geheime Revolusie: Memoires van ‘n Spioenbaas. Om u belangstelling te prikkel, het ons besluit om twee van die korter hoofstukke uit die boek in hierdie uitgawe te plaas, nl. Hoofstuk 7 en in die volgende uitgawe hoofstuk 9. Lekker lees!

CHAPTER 7 UNMASKED! It is March 1989. Mike Kennedy, deputy head of NIS's counterespionage unit, and I find ourselves in the hallowed halls of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in London. It is eleven o' clock in the morning, but we have certainly not come to drink tea. In fact, our announcement to Christopher Curwen, head of the SIS, caused him to swallow a gasp. But, as behoves a good spy, he shows little of this and quickly regains his composure: 'Can I pour you gentlemen a whisky ... a single malt, perhaps?' The reason behind his attempt to defuse the crackling tension was simple: Curwen had just been informed that we had caught his spies spying on South Africa's nuclear weapons capacity. This is the kind of news the head of one of the most respected intelligence services in the world does not want to hear on an empty stomach. There were a few brief attempts

In the previous issue of Nongqai, the Introduction and Foreword of the NIS's input already referred to Dr. Niël Barnard's book Secret Revolution: Memoirs of a Spy Boss. To pique your interest, we have decided to place two of the shorter chapters from the book in this issue, viz. Chapter 7 and in the next edition Chapter 9. Enjoy reading!

at denial, including from the SIS's official representative in South Africa, Mike Thicket, who also attended the meeting. I was very respectful, but asked that we not waste one another's time with cat-and-mouse games. I offered to show them photographs and play them tape recordings of talks and video recordings of secret meetings to support our claims. What rubbed even more salt into their wounds was a letter from the South African head of state' for the attention of the British premier, Margaret Thatcher, in which he objected in the strongest possible way to this undermining by our former 'conquerors. Ironically enough, in those years Thatcher was one of a very small number of Western leaders who supported South Africa; she did so openly, but not without criticism. That evening Mike and I drank a small glass of whisky and toasted - without compliments to Her Royal Highness - this signal achievement of NIS, which afforded me the greatest personal satisfaction. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Months later Curwen wanted to know from me: 'How did you do it? You caught some of our best operators. We have retraced our steps but haven't been able to find our mistake. I responded with a counterquestion: 'Thanks for the compliment, but what were your best spies doing in South Africa? I would have thought they would be in Moscow. Or in one of the Eastern Bloc countries. What threat do we pose to you?' I didn't really receive an answer. Nor did they on how we had gone about catching the British spies. Curwen, who was later awarded a knighthood, gave me an immensely satisfying piece of news when he told me how the Iron Lady had hauled them over the coals about their South African blunder. More than a year later, Mike and I went to Washington on a similar mission to confront the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about their spies, some of (Continued on page 20)

(Continued from page 19)

whom had been arrested together with the British spies. A letter of protest for the attention of President George W Bush was also handed over. South Africa was also a target of the espionage services of Germany, France, the old Eastern Bloc countries and Russia, in the form of the KGB and GRU, respectively the civil and military intelligence services. Many of these efforts had been successfully terminated or 'turned around: The Russian 'agents' were mainly South African diplomats or officials from various state departments such as foreign affairs, trade and industry, tourism, mineral and energy affairs, and agriculture, and were stationed in South African embassies and missions overseas and locally. They were approached and, in many cases, recruited and handled by officially declared intelligence officials as well as those who were operating incognito. All of these countries were in search of inside information about political, military and economic matters - in that order. Those who had been banned from the country - that is, political exiles who were members of the liberation movements - became soughtafter targets, especially as South Africa moved towards a new political order and it was to be expected that some of these exiles would become important roleplayers in the new dispensation. Naturally we had no control over this but we were, for the most part, well informed about what was happening in this arena. When the SIS and the CIA were

confronted, they were given just enough information to show that we had an irrefutable case against them. Usually, in such cases we did not provide the names of the South Africans who had been approached or recruited by them, but only the name of the handler or sometimes - if it suited us - the other way around. The purpose of this was to keep them guessing about what we knew and didn't NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

know. If they could not establish the full extent of our information, they were forced to abandon all their operations. In this way operations we had no knowledge of also had to be scrapped. Later some of the supporting agents who had helped the British were handed over to their embassies and quietly sent back to London. The undeclared intel(Continued on page 21)

(Continued from page 20)

ligence officers' who were involved in the operations were recalled to London before South Africa could declare them undesirable persons. The same applied to the Americans, except that with them more people and a greater number of cases were involved. Generally speaking the Americans were less focused in collecting information than the British. This was presumably because they had more manpower and virtually unlimited funds. The Americans also recalled their spies who had been involved in these incidents. The CIA and SIS naturally thought that their organizations had been penetrated by NIS and we watched closely how they searched for our 'moles' in their ranks. The primary purpose of counter-espionage is precisely to penetrate the opposing intelligence service and, to a certain degree, to 'take control' of some of its operations. Over the years the KGB approached various South African officials and businessmen overseas - and also in the neighbouring states of Angola, Mozambique and Botswana. We were reasonably successful in nosing them out and would then launch a number of interesting 'doubleagent operations' against them. This involved persuading some of their agents (mostly in exchange for not being unmasked) to spy for South Africa as well, so that we could gain access to the information they had about the KGB. This also placed us in a position to feed them false information.

Some of these operations were carried out successfully for eight or more years. One such an unmasking that I can now disclose for the first time is that of the Polish spy Colonel Jan Wierzba. He was apparently (and indeed!) a qualified engineer, but what he did not tell his neighbours was that he was also a member of the Polish intelligence service who was sent here to spy on South Africa's nuclear weapons capacity. For about fifteen years he worked at power stations and engineering enterprises in South Africa. He was a thoroughly likeable fellow, exceptionally reliable, voted for the National Party and made the correct anticommunist noises. As an employee and engineer he built up a good reputation and eventually succeeded in being appointed to a post at Armscor. He began to collect information actively with the help of a South African supporting agent and on various occasions made contact with his Polish handlers who visited the country as Polish airline staff. Later he met his handlers in Europe, as well as members of the KGB in Austria.

Wierzba's case shows how extremely patient a spy has to be before he can start his real work. We were equally patient. When you are dealing with a good spy it takes on average eight years from the time he begins to operate until he or she is arrested. When we were reasonably certain that Wierzba was spying on South Africa's nuclear secrets, we followed his movements intensively for about four years. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

As is the case with any other covert spy, he had to meet his handler(s) physically at least once a year, or provide them with irrefutable proof that he was still alive (a so-called sign of life) and that the information they were receiving was indeed coming from him. This was to ensure that he had not been captured in the meantime or that 'his' messages were not perhaps coming from NIS instead. This was quite possible!

We soon had enough proof to take action against him, but we had a long-term objective: we wanted to determine precisely how he was operating, but at the same time we had to limit the possible damage he might cause. We therefore began to 'manage' or manipulate the information he was passing on to his handlers obviously without him knowing. For this reason we strung him along, observing his every move. Eventually we had about a roomful of documents and proof of his activities: from which petrol he filled up with to where he had his hair cut. He ate breakfast almost every day in the same restaurant and, more often than not, we sat at a nearby table - without him ever suspecting we were there. Every scrap of information might be important to complete the puzzle. The other aim was to establish precisely how his mind operated, because we could use this to train our spies. We knew from the outset that we were never going to charge and prosecute Wierzba. While doing so would score us a few points in the eyes of the public, he was (Continued on page 22)

(Continued from page 21)

worth far more to us than that. His mode of operation, together with the knowledge as to how he approached things, later enabled us to arrest numerous other spies.

After he was taken into custody in the mid-1980s he was thoroughly debriefed.' There was no real point in conducting an interrogation because we already knew everything about him. Naturally he wanted to know only one thing, 'How on earth did you catch me out?'

We gave him no answer. He was eventually sent back to Poland and handed over to their intelligence service.'

1975: DIE EERSTE MINISTER EN AMPTENARE WAARONDER LEDE VAN BSV

1975: Die eerste minister en amptenare waaronder lede van BSV Voor (vlnr): Mev Muller, dr Hilgard Muller destyds minister van buitelandse sake, adv BJ Vorster, mev T Vorster en dr Barend Fourie, DG-buitelandse sake. Staande (vlnr): Onbekend, Tattie van Rooyen (SAP), genl MCW Geldenhuys (BSV), mnr Johan Mostert (BSV), Rupert Annalich (SAP), onbekend, onbekend, onbekend, genl HJ van den Bergh (BSV), mnr Vorster, onbekend en onbekend. Foto: Heymans-versameling.

Mnr Johan Mostert laat soos volg weet oor die foto wat in die Februarie-uitgawe verskyn het: Oor die mense op die foto: heel links staan Johnny Van Rensburg van Buitelandse Sake, na Rupert Annelich die volgende: Johan Weilbach, mnr Vorster se PS, Jurgens Young, BSV, Vorster se skoondogter, die generaal, mnr Vorster, die Premier se seun, Waldo Prigge, BSV, dr Brink, mnr Vorster se persoonlike arts. Groete, Johan NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

MNR PC SWANEPOEL (SAP, KOD, SAP (RI), BSV, DNV &, NI) HBH

Louis Lubbe (voor regs) en Hennie Heymans bring besoek (2009-02-09) aan "Pietertjie" of beter gestel Oom Pieter Swanepoel een van die stigterslede van RI en "BOSS". Pieter Swanepoel het al verskeie boeke, artikels en verhale gepubliseer. "Pietertjie" is sy skuilnaam toe hy verteenwoordiger van Servamus in SWA was. Hy is 'n lopende ensiklopedie van feite. Hy was 'n troep maat van generaals Johan Coetzee en Manie van Zyl (Springbok stoeier). Oom Pieter was ADG by NI toe hy afgetree het. Hy is ‘n “ou” Durban-polisieman!

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

The Genesis and Contribution of the Department of National Security to the South African Security Discourse and Evolution of Democracy Dr. Anthony Turton (Veteran of the National Intelligence Service and subsequent founding member of the South African Secret Service) This is the second article in a four-part series that has been distilled from a more detailed text, written by the author and available from Amazon Kindle. [Available from Amazon.com: Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton eBook: Turton, Anthony: Kindle Store ] The original text published in 2010 has been expanded as research has deepened. The final article in this series will deal with the relevance of the fundamental issue raised by the creation of the Department of National Security (DONS), as it is highly relevant today as we grapple with the dilemma of a national versus state security paradigm.

Figure 1: Analytical Matrix showing the evolution of civilian intelligence services in South Africa over time. This article focusses on the genesis of the Department of National Security (DONS) under the leadership of Mr Alec van Wyk.

Details of the logic used to create this analytical framework will not be repeated here, and the reader is referred to the previous article for clarification. Stated simply, the matrix presented here provides a useful analytical tool to understand the evolution of the civilian intelligence services over time. It consists of a four-quadrant matrix defined by the binary answers to two of the fundamental questions relevant to security. These questions are: what is the referent object of security (either the state or the nation); and how is security being provided (either by enforcement or engagement). This

is based on the logic presented in Turton (2010) as applied from (Buzan, 1991; Buzan, 1994; Buzan et al., 1998) as the leading security theoretician of those times. With respect to these two axes, the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) had been mandated to focus only on the state as referent object, and the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act had made this law. The State Security Council (SSC) was also mandated as the central authority within the architecture of security in South Africa. However, this state security paradigm had revealed a deep-seated dilemma. The word dilemma is the correct one, because in essence it involves a difficult choice between two mutually exclusive alternatives, each with undesirable consequences that need to be carefully managed. In this regard, the object of critical thought is to convert that dilemma into a series of problems, which can then be solved. A problem is soluble, but a dilemma is not. The start of the DONS story is rooted in the demise of its predecessor, BOSS. To understand this genesis, we need to recap briefly on those times. For more detail, the reader is referred to the previous article in this series. BOSS was purely about securing the state, in a period of great uncertainty associated with the withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa. This state security paradigm was rooted in the fact that when South Africa became independent in 1961, it had been denied a civilian service by the British, fearful that such an organ would be captured (to use a contemporary South African term) by Afrikaner nationalist interest. It must be remembered that opposition to South African support for Britain during the Second World War had been fuelled by an ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism, rooted in the British concentration camps of the Anglo Boer War (Fawcett, 1901; Hobhouse, 1901; Raath, 1999; van Reenen, 2000; van Rensburg, 1980), that sought to stand

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Vervolg op bladsy 25)

(Vervolg van bladsy 24)

proud as an African nation, sovereign and equal (Davenport & Saunders, 2000; Geldenhuys, 1984; Giliomee, 2003; Harrison, 1983; Meredith, 2007; van Jaarsveld, 1975). This was not fundamentally different to African Nationalism (Walshe, 1987), but was thought of at the time as being a specific species within the overall genus of selfdetermination, and therefore legitimate as a concept. The Info Scandal was the product of a deliberate strategy for engagement, using the power of persuasion and influence, rather than the force of might. It must be remembered that the fallout of the Sharpeville Massacre was palpable, so power as force was not the preferred option. The reader is referred to the previous article for a deeper analysis of the French words of pouvoir for power as persuasion and negotiation, and puissance for power as might or force. The Info Scandal was clearly about the former (power as pouvoir), but it was conducted in such a way that the issue of taxpayer’s money being diverted to meet narrow party-political objectives lay at the heart of the matter. In short, if the state is the referent object, as defined by the state security paradigm, and encoded into law, but the state is also contested by a significant portion of the electorate, then the use of taxes from a broad base of society cannot be morally and legally justified when used in the pursuit of narrowly defined partypolitical objectives. In other words, within the state security paradigm, the referent object is

the state, but where there is no clear distinction between party and state, all actions of this nature will be contested in some form. It is about the legitimacy of the securitization process seen through the lens of who pays and who benefits. Seen in a different light, state security limits the range of options open to the government, simply because the Service typically evolves into a form of secret police, as an enforcement extension of the ruling party, to be used against enemies (real or imagined) of the ruling elite. This serves to delegitimise the Service, and therefore limit what it can provide by way of security to its principal clients. This is an extremely important issue, as relevant today as it was back in the late 1970s when the Info Scandal was playing out in the courts and media. This is central to the creation of DONS, because the name implies that the lesson had been learned. The limitations posed by the narrow definition of the referent object as being the state, were overcome by expanding the focus of the Service to embrace the nation. In one stroke of a pen, the rudimentary concept of national security was born in South Africa. This was a significant step on the overall journey to democracy just sixteen years later, as that concept matured over time. This is a major contribution to the security discourse in South Africa, which ultimately became an important step on the road to democracy, even if by default. To understand the significance of this moment, we need to travel back in time. The Info Scandal was raging within government, NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

to the extent that it was like an uncontained fire in the roof of a large public building. Prime Minister BJ Vorster had authorised the creation of a Department of Information headed by Eschel Rhoodie, working closely with BOSS as part of the engagement strategy. This included the purchase of the Citizen newspaper in South Africa, and the Washington Star in the USA, to create a platform for the dissemination of information favourable to the government (Rees & Day, 1989). In 1973 Vorster authorised the transfer of a large sum of money from the military budget, to fund what was in effect a propaganda program, and this is where things went wrong. The Erasmus Commission of Inquiry found that Vorster had full knowledge of this whole transaction, and he was forced to resign in disgrace. Dr Eschel Rhoodie fled the country, and as a fugitive, fought back by publishing a book of his side of the story (Rhoodie, 1983). The Parliament Select Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) sanctioned the parties involved, and in 1978 the Auditor General published a formal report listing illegal transactions that included money laundering and evasion of the Exchange Control regulations put in place to avoid capital flight after the Sharpeville Massacre. The Info Scandal was fiercely contested, and PW Botha, the hawkish Minister of Defence, emerged as the National Party leader after ousting both BJ Vorster, and his likely successor Dr Connie Mulder who was implicated as the Minister responsible. On assuming office, PW Botha established the Erasmus (Vervolg op bladsy 26)

(Vervolg van bladsy 25)

Commission in 1978, which found that Vorster “knew everything”, thereby eliminating both him and Mulder as potential political opponents in perpetuity. [See The Information Scandal | South African History Online (sahistory.org.za) ] While the Info Scandal was raging, several major events were playing out in the southern African region. Let us briefly examine these, as they provide context to the international milieu in which DONS was expected to operate. In 1975 the coup in Portugal saw the rapid withdrawal of all colonial power combat forces from both Angola and Mozambique. In both these countries, a festering war of liberation left no clear victor. More importantly, there was no time for any liberation movement to prepare for the transfer of power, so Mozambique rapidly succumbed to lawlessness. This opened a second front in the Rhodesian Bush War, making it unwinnable from that moment onwards. In Angola, three different ethnically based liberation movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) to the north, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the centre, and National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) in the south, turned on each other in a final struggle for supreme power. The MPLA and FNLA reached an agreement with Portugal over the transfer of power, but UNITA was excluded and the American Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) decided to support the FNLA in opposition to the Soviet backed MPLA. The Alvor Agreement created temporary stability in Angola, but factionalism in the MPLA split the movement when Daniel Chipenda was ousted, taking 2,000 soldiers with him. He linked up with the FNLA, which then became numerically the dominant force. This factor is highly relevant to subsequent decision-making in South Africa. This triggered a desire within the FNLA to capture Luanda, and a message was sent to BOSS via the London embassy on 28 February 1975, requesting artillery support [General Jannie Geldenhuys was opposed to this operation, but he was overridden by Foreign Minister Pik Botha, who allegedly said, “war is too important to be left to the Generals”. See https://m.youtube.com/ watch?v=qumJhmgkcrU] to cover their advance through a wetland at Caxito (Nortje, 2003). The CIA supported this, and Vorster, eager to be seen as a responsible African leader, faced a dilemma with his Détente initiative. If he committed to this request, then his bona fides would be shown as a reliable leader responding to a legitimate call for help by another African leader, but if it failed, then the backlash was likely to be high. Responding to a request made by the MPLA in Congo-Brazzaville in March 1975, the Cuban government decided to send instructors. These rapidly churn out 2,000 soldiers per month by June. This fed into the Cold War dynamic now firmly rooted in Southern Africa. At this very moment in time, Saigon was under extreme pressure and the American government was considerNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

ing a military withdrawal from Vietnam. When the Cubans arrived in support of the MPLA, the Americans were highly concerned, so they reached out to BOSS and requested support for the FNLA. In Zambia the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) established its first military base and the armed struggle for Namibia became a reality (Nortje, 2003). The armed wing of SWAPO, the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) launched simultaneous attacks on five SADF bases in one day (Volker, 2010). In April 1975, President Kenneth Kaunda met with President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Washington, where he raised concerns about the growing Soviet presence in Angola. This came back via diplomatic channels as pressure on Vorster to give the support that both the FNLA and a contingent of Portuguese businessmen had already requested in private. This became a top-secret naval rescue operation known as Superduck [See documentary entitled Bush War Episode 7. South African Border War. https:// m.youtube.com/watch? v=qumJhmgkcrU] on the night of 27 November 1975, at the fishing harbour of Ambrizete, after the CIA abandoned the South African Defence Force (SADF) in northern Angola at Caxito, and they had to be clandestinely extracted under cover of darkness. The Nakuru Peace Pact was unable to restore order in Angola. In June PLAN engaged in a ma(Vervolg op bladsy 27)

(Vervolg van bladsy 26)

jor battle at Omakutu in Angola, and a month later the Portuguese Army withdrew from the Ruacana Hydropower Project at Calueque. Closer to home the Lesotho Government actively opposed Vorster’s Détente initiative, lobbying African countries to isolate South Africa in response to the mooted regional economic bloc. The whole region became unstable, as the Cold War becomes a hot reality (Turner, 1998). It is against this background that the Victoria Falls meeting between Vorster and Kaunda on 26 August 1975 took place, even as UNITA allied itself with FNLA and officially declared war against the MPLA. Vorster saw Kaunda as an African leader with legitimacy, capable of becoming a partner in regional cooperation to restore stability, but also to limit the growing influence of the Cubans and Russians. The Angolan Civil War was now a reality and Operation Savannah was launched. The SADF took control of the Ruacana Hydropower Project at Calueque, responding to a call by engineers that they were not allowed to move and were potentially hostages. In November 1975 Operation Carlotta was launched by Fidel Castro (Gleijeses, 1997), and the Cuban force level eventually exceeds 300,000 troops over the duration of the war. There were clearly a lot of moving parts to the South African security situation at that time, but the Info Scandal had so overwhelmed and delegitimized BOSS (Geldenhuys, 1984), that it was simply unable to deal with

these matters in an effective way. For this reason, DONS was officially created on 1 September 1978, as BJ Vorster fought his last rear-guard action in the Info Scandal. BJ Vorster was replaced when PW Botha became Prime Minister on 28 September 1978. Botha thus inherited DONS as a fait accompli. This meant that Alec van Wyk was the DG, then known as the Secretary, during two significant transitions. First from BOSS to DONS, and then again to National Intelligence Service (NIS), both while fighting a series of political and legal battles rooted in the fallout from the Info Scandal. He took over the leadership on 1 July 1978 under the premiership of BJ Vorster, and relinquished it on 31 May 1980 under the premiership of PW Botha, arguably the most turbulent times in the Services history. He later wrote of those times as being highly disrupted by what he described as “Sturm und Drang” (NIS, 1994). He remained at the helm until Dr Niel Barnard took over on 1 June 1980 after NIS had already been formed on 1 April 1979. DONS was a transitional arrangement, unable to meet the complex intelligence demands of the era, for two reasons. Firstly, it was so embroiled in the fallout from the Info Scandal that it almost ceased to be a functioning organ of state. Public trust had been lost, and with that legitimacy. Ironically, this lesson was not fully learned, so this was to be repeated in the future as will be shown in the third and fourth articles in this series. Secondly, the complexity of the security landscape was such that the NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

state security paradigm in which it operated, was simply inadequate. These were strategically relevant issues, with no clear answers. America had been militarily beaten in Vietnam and was now deeply reluctant to become embroiled in another Cold War adventure against communism. America was further paralysed by the Nixon Watergate fallout, without clear foreign policy direction. Cuba was emboldened, and sensing the weakness in America, was keen to settle the old score created by the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961. To further motivate Cuba, it saw a chance to become an equal with Russia, still smarting after the unilateral resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis by Nikita Khrushchev in 1962, without any consultation with Fidel Castro. Both these events had riled Cuba, and now, with a weakened America, this was their chance to get even with both the USA and Russia (Gleijeses, 1997). Into this mix we had the wars in Angola and Mozambique, the Rhodesian Bush War no longer winnable, the new armed struggle in Namibia, and a militant Lesotho willing to give succour to fighters from both Mkontho we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA). Two other notable events occurred. Arthur McGiven, an analyst in BOSS, defected with several raw information reports in his possession. These reports contained unevaluated information, so their intelligence value was relatively low. The security breach was therefore minor, and he faded into the back(Vervolg op bladsy 28)

(Vervolg van bladsy 27)

ground relatively quickly, but his defection was symptomatic that all was not well. The Gordon Winter affair was somewhat different, however. A British subject with a criminal record, Winter was recruited to manage the BOSS link into the Citizen newspaper. He was active throughout the Info Scandal era, particularly during the transition from BOSS. He defected in May 1979, at the very end of the life of DONS, and wrote a highly publicised book entitled Inside B.O.S.S.: South Africa’s Secret Police: An Ex Spy’s Dramatic and Shocking Exposé (Winter, 1981). The title of the book was sensationalist, but it fed into the media hysteria of the day. This book publicly brought into focus, the limitations of the state security model, by drilling down into the dilemma arising from the use of taxpayer’s money to advance party political interests. It also started the debate about the legitimacy of an ethnically defined minority government, thereby raising the spectre of constitutional reform that was later taken further by Dr Niël Barnard (Turton, 2010). On the positive side, DONS was able to capitalise on the BOSS liaison with foreign Services, and this was expanded upon in counter espionage operations that were later destined to yield good results. But the most important contribution it made was to focus the internal debate about the limitations of having the state as the referent object within the overarching security architecture. This will be dealt with in the next article of the series.

In summary then, by the time that van Wyk was given control of BOSS on 1 July 1978, the die had already been cast. He was therefore handed a poisoned chalice. No matter what DONS did, it was unable to escape the legacy of the Info Scandal (Geldenhuys, 1984). The baggage was simply too much to carry in comfort, at the very time when major intelligence needs were being generated by the turbulent strategic dynamics of the southern African region at that time.

DONS investigative mindset was simply unable to engage with the complex intelligence demands that were overwhelming the Service at the time. This matter became one that Dr Niël Barnard took to heart, as he deliberately spread the recruitment net well beyond the South African Police (SAP) as a source for future professionals. This will be dealt with in the next article of the series.

The contribution by Alec van Wyk was his steady hand on the tiller as the ship traversed stormy seas. He gave that ship clear guidance, calming the nerves of the career professionals at a time when morale was low, and defections were becoming a growing risk. This was an important task, under the most demanding of circumstances, which he executed with dignity and professionalism. The transition to DONS was a clear indication of the limitations of a state security paradigm, which is arguably one of his greatest contributions. Another significant factor was the limitation posed by recruiting members from the police force. While these were always highly competent people, the simple reality is that a police mindset is based on an investigation of people that have broken a specific law. At best this is a tactical focus, but the demands for the career professional were rapidly widening into a more complex strategic level of focus. Tactical level operations differ fundamentally from strategic level operations, and that is a simple matter of fact. The

Buzan, B. 1991. People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

References:

Buzan, B. 1994. National Security in the Post-Cold War Third World. Paper presented at the Conference on National Security in Developing Countries, 26 January 1994, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, South Africa. Buzan, B., Waever, O. & de Wilde, J. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Davenport, T.R.H. & Saunders, C. 2000. South Africa: A Modern History. Houndsmills and New York: Macmillan Press and St Martin’s Press. Fawcett, M.H. 1901. The Concentration Camps in South Africa. London: Westminster Gazette. Geldenhuys, D. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making. Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa. (Vervolg op bladsy 29)

(Vervolg van bladsy 28)

Giliomee, H. 2003. The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Cape Town: Tafelberg. Gleijeses, P. 1997. Havana’s Policy in Africa, 1959 – 76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars: Washington DC; Pp 5-18. Available online at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/ sites/default/files/media/ documents/publication/ CWIHP_Bulletin_8-9.pdf Harrison, D. 1983. The White Tribe of Africa (Perspectives on Southern Africa). Berkley: University of California Press. Hobhouse, E. 1901. Report of a visit to the camps of women and children in the Cape and Orange River Colonies. London: Friars Printing Association Ltd. Meredith, M. 2007. Diamonds, Gold and War: The Making of South Africa. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. NIS. 1994. National Intelligence Service: 1969 - 1994. Special

Commemorative Book given to all serving officers of the National Intelligence Service. Pretoria: National Intelligence Service. Nortje, P. 2003. 32 Battalion. Cape Town: Struik Publishers. Raath, A.W.G. 1999. The British Concentration Camps of the Anglo Boer War 1899-1902: Reports on the Camps. Bloemfontein: The War Museum. Rees, M. & Day, C. 1989. Muldergate: The Story of the Info Scandal. Macmillan: Johannesburg. Rhoodie, E. 1983. The Real Information Scandal. Atlanta, Georgia: Orbis. Turner, J.W. 1998. Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers. Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http:// www.shakinghandswithbilly.com https://www.amazon.com/ Shaking-Hands-Billy-PrivateMemoirs-ebook/dp/ B07Q6ZFQMW

Van Jaarsveld, F.A. 1975. From Van Riebeeck to Vorster 16521974: An introduction to the History of the Republic of South Africa. Johannesburg: Perskor Publishers. Van Reenen, R. 2000. Emily Hobhouse: Boer War Letters. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau. Van Rensburg, T. 1980. Camp Diary of Henrietta E.C. Armstrong: Experiences of a Boer Nurse in the Irene Concentration Camp 6 April – 11 October 1901. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Volker, W. 2010. Signal Units of the South African Corps of Signals and Related Signal Services. Pretoria: Veritas Books. Walshe, P. 1987. The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa. Cape Town: Ad Donker (Pty) Ltd. Winter, Gordon. 1981. Inside B.O.S.S.: South Africa’s Secret Police: An Ex Spy’s Dramatic and Shocking Exposé. London: Penguin Books.

Left: Dr Anthony Turton giving his graduation talk

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Vervolg van verlede maand) Swart oorheersing of rooi oorheersing was ondenkbaar. Die onafhanklikheid van die Belgiese Kongo op 30 Junie 1960 met die destyds gepaard gaande foto’s en nuusberigte oor die bloedige burgeroorlog en voortvlugtende blankes het nie gehelp om bykans twintig jaar later senuagtige gemoedere in die wit gemeenskap van SuidAfrika te kalmeer nie. Die volkslied is soos altyd met oortuiging gesing: “Ons sal lewe, ons sal sterwe, ons vir jou, SuidAfrika.” Ek het nog altyd vermoed dat Suid-Afrikaners ’n groter hunkering het om vir die land te sterwe as om vir die land te lewe. Op skool is ons wysgemaak ons moet leer dat dit klap, want swart kinders doen dieselfde en dit sal katastrofies wees as “hulle” die wit mense akademies sou verbysteek. Daar is gesê dat, as dit sou gebeur, daar “geen rede sou wees om verder oor hulle te heers nie”. Dié oortuiging is nie onderlê deur enige diepsinnige staatkundige begrip nie, maar is bloot as evangelie verkondig. Dit het vir my ook sin gemaak, en ek het nie daaroor slaap verloor nie. Ek

het my skoolwerk gedoen sodat ek kan perdry en toe ek nie kon perdry nie het ek my huiswerk gedoen sodat ek so vinnig moontlik kon klaarmaak met skool. Ek het my ná matriek in Januarie 1964 vir diens by die SuidAfrikaanse Polisiekollege aangemeld. Enkele dae na ons aankoms by die kollege is dié wat by die berede afdeling wou aansluit, genooi om hulle by die stalle aan te meld. Ons het in ’n lang ry in enkel gelid gestaan en wag om ondervra te word en aan ’n toetsrit deel te neem. ’n Klomp spekvet perde het gestaan en wag. Sersant Harold Tulleken en majoor Louis Snyman was verantwoordelik vir die keuring. Tulleken het so langs die ry afgestap en almal wat te swaar of te lank was, weggewys. Hy was op soek na manne met geskikte “perdelywe”. Mense wat nie die perde sou dood-sit of te lank sou wees vir die gemiddelde ryperd nie. Die offisiere het netjiese groot perde gery terwyl die manskappe se perde van gemiddelde grootte was. Al die ruiters moes in die patroon pas. Toe sersant Tulleken by my kom, gee hy my een kyk en jaag my weg – te NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

lank na sy smaak. Hy het my nie gemeet of eers gevra hoe lank ek is nie. Ek wou nog protesteer en terugpraat, toe hy my in streng militêre taal toespreek. Teleurgesteld het ek lui-lui weggedraf. My kop het oortyd gewerk. Hoe nou gemaak? Ek het immers spesiaal by die Polisiekollege aangesluit om deel van die berede afdeling te word. Ek het op ’n wonderwerk gehoop. Toe draf ek met so ’n wye boog weg en kom terug na die lang ry wagtende aspirant“bosluise” – soos die ruiters genoem is. Ek het aan die onderste punt – wat nog nie deur Tulleken bekyk is nie – gaan staan en solank ’n toespraak begin voorberei vir ingeval hy my weer weens my lengte sou wegwys. Sweet het my afgetap terwyl hy nader kom. Intussen is die eerste groep wat die voorlopige keuring geslaag het, gevra om perd te ry sodat Snyman hulle kon deurkyk. Die situasie het egter begin handuit ruk. Die perde het van pure uitgelatenheid gebokspring. Hulle het die ganse Desember sonder oefening op stal gestaan en dit was die eerste keer in ’n lang tyd dat hulle uitgekom het. (Vervolg op bladsy 31)

(Continued from page 30)

Die chaos het Snyman geïrriteer en met ’n bulderende stem skreeu hy toe: “Is hier ’n Wessels?” Ek het kiertsregop op aandag gespring en uitgeroep: “Majoor!” My reputasie en avonture saam met Paul Bothma het my blykbaar vooruitgeloop. Snyman het ongeduldig geantwoord: “Vat daardie voorste perd en lei die groep. Stap, draf en dan galop julle.” Ek het nie op my laat wag nie, maar in die hardloop onthou ek tog om nog ’n keer “Majoor!” oor my skouer te skree. Ek kry koers na die pragtige perd wat heel voor staan. Ek sorg dat ek nie naby Tulleken kom nie, want ek wil hom nie kans gee om dit wat hier gebeur, te fnuik nie. Met gemak is ek op die perd se rug en neem die voortou. Alles verloop goed. Die ander perde volg en daar is orde. Toe die groep klaar is met die toetsrit beveel Snyman almal om af te klim en vra die volgende groep om nader te staan. Toe ek ook wil afklim, bulder hy: “Wessels, moenie afklim nie. Bly daar en ry voor totdat ons klaar is.” Daarmee was die knoop deurgehak en Tulleken het geen kans gekry om sy vetoreg oor my lang lyf uit te oefen nie. Dit was die begin van ’n avontuur wat grootliks bygedra het om my lewe te vorm. As lid van die berede afdeling was ek troepleier en beste berede student. Die berede vertoongroep het die land deurkruis en ons het allerlei avonture beleef. Ek het ou vriende weer ontmoet en talle nuwes gemaak. Ek het elke oomblik geniet, maar van die begin af het ek ook geweet dat ek nie vir altyd in die polisie sou wees nie. In daardie stadium het ek egter nog nie genoeg gehad van perdry nie, en deur die polisie moes daardie behoefte eens en vir altyd bevredig word.

Dalk sou ek anders gevoel het as ek nie op skool gedwing is om op te hou perdry nie. Ek het wel ’n begeerte gehad om universiteit toe te gaan en verder te studeer, maar drie jaar lank moes ek eers my lus vir perdry uitwoed. Terwyl ons een donker oggend in 1966 as lede van die Polisie se berede eenheid met die perde inry Kaapstad toe vir die parlementsopening – ons moes in die pragtige laan agter die parlementsgebou wees voordat die stad begin lewe kry – vertel ek vir Tinus Cilliers, wat langs my gery het, van my droom om oorsee te gaan ryloop voordat ek verder studeer. Enkele maande later het my droom werklikheid geword toe ek ses maande lank in die buiteland gaan ryloop het. Tinus het dié avontuur ’n maand lank saam met my beleef. My pa was aanvanklik skepties oor die oorsese reis. Tog het hy later saam met my opgewonde geraak en my gewaarsku dat ek my polities moes staal, want die buitelanders was erg krities oor Suid-Afrika, Suid-Afrikaners, en die dinge wat hier gebeur. Hy stel toe voor dat hy vir my ’n afspraak maak by doktor Connie Mulder, lid van die volksraad (LV) vir Randfontein, om bietjie politiek met my te praat en my touwys te maak. Hiervan wou ek egter niks weet nie: Ek is nie ’n politikus nie en ek gaan ook nie oorsee politiek praat nie, want dit is nie my besigheid nie. Ek gaan bloot vir die avontuur oorsee. Ek wil nuwe plekke ontdek en sien hoe mense in die vreemde leef. Ek wil ’n slimmer en wyser mens terugkom maar vir politieke praatjies is ek nie lus nie. In die jeugherberge en elders waar ek met mense gesprekke aangeknoop het, het ek egter my rieme styfgeloop. Die mense wou politiek praat en weet wat jy NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

as Suid-Afrikaner dink. Ek is met vrae gepeper: “Wat dink jy van Verwoerd?” “Hoe gaan apartheid werk?” “Waarom probeer julle om apartheid op Bybelse grond te regverdig?” Ek het blitsvinnig my eie antwoorde ontwikkel om apartheid te probeer verduidelik en my dan so gou moontlik uit die politieke gesprekke probeer loswikkel. Van my antwoorde het ingesluit: “Apartheid is ’n geografiese skeiding en ’n natuurlike manier om voorsiening te maak vir die verskillende volke se eiesoortigheid en hulle uit mekaar se hare te hou.” “Verwoerd is ’n slim man, en hoewel ek niks weet van die politiek nie, vertrou ek hom heeltemal.” Dié oppervlakkige praatjies het die meeste mense hoflikheidshalwe aanvaar, en ondanks die baie vrae wat in die lug bly hang het, het ons dan rustig verder gekuier uit respek vir my as vreemdeling. Maar nie omdat ek hulle oortuig het nie. Ek het in die vreemde begin om koerante en tydskrifte te lees. Daar was gereeld die een of ander skinderstorie oor SuidAfrika en die apartheidsbeleid. Dit het gou vir my duidelik geword dat daar iets groots verkeerd was met die politieke bestel in Suid-Afrika. My gespreksgenote het my egter maklik laat wegkom. Van die groot vrae waarmee die mense in die buiteland geworstel het, was onder meer waarom net dertien persent van die grond in Suid-Afrika aan swart mense gegee word en waarom wittes so brutaal aan mag vasklou. As voorbeelde is Sharpeville en die verbod op die ANC voorgehou.

In die aanhaling uit Bell en Ntsebeza se boek word gesê die hoof van die Spoorwegpolisie op Johannesburg-stasie het ŉ direkte telefoonverbinding met brig. Van den Bergh gehad het. Elke lid van die veiligheidstak wat skakeling met brig. Van den Bergh gehad het, weet dit is louter snert. Hoe enigiemand dit sou kon regkry om sake te laat verloop soos geïnsinueer, sal net Bell en Ntsebeza weet. Geen bewyse is ooit gevind om hul beweringe te staaf nie. Die vraag ontstaan waarom hulle sulke kru, irrasionele en ongestaafde beweringe die wêreld instuur. Is dit haat en wrewel jeens die veiligheidstak? Is dit die rede waarom Ntsebeza en sy geesgenote steeds probeer om lede van die veiligheidstak verdag te maak en te vervolg? Daar is ook beweer dat die CIA brig. Van den Bergh ingelig het dat John Harris die bom geplant het. Brig. Van den Bergh het egter tydens die ondervraging van Hugh Lewin nog geen benul gehad dat Harris die bom geplant het nie, soos vroeër beskryf is. Lte. Viktor en Van der Merwe was by ŉ wye reeks ondersoeke betrokke. In 1964 het hulle inligting ontvang dat Alfred Nzo (nou oorlede), ŉ aktiewe lid van die ANC, besig was met ondergrondse bedrywighede. Hulle het Nzo gaan haal en

tydens ondervraging het hy belangrike inligting verskaf en sy volle samewerking belowe. Lte. Viktor en Van der Merwe was oortuig daarvan dat Nzo nog inligting weerhou en het besluit om hom aan te hou. Kapt. Swanie Swanepoel (later brigadier), wat homself die Rooi Rus genoem en mettertyd dié bynaam gekry het, het ná ŉ vertroulike gesprek met Nzo besluit om hom huis toe te laat gaan. Hy het die ander twee verseker dat Nzo hom die volgende dag vir verdere ondervraging sou aanmeld en dan baie belangrike inligting sou verskaf. Lte. Viktor en Van der Merwe het dit glad nie geglo nie, maar kapt. Swanepoel was die senior lid en Nzo is toegelaat om huis toe te gaan. Hy het nie geld vir vervoer gehad nie en lt. Viktor het hom R10 geleen. Die volgende dag was daar geen teken van Nzo nie. Ondersoek by sy huis het aan die lig gebring dat hy na Botswana gevlug het. Lt. Viktor was sy R10 en baie belangrike inligting kwyt. Nzo het in 1969 sekretaris-generaal van die ANC geword. Lt. Viktor het al gewonder of die ANC nie dalk die R10 sal terugbetaal nie. AANHOUDING sonder verhoor is ’n ernstige aantasting van die regte van ’n mens, daarom het die bepalings van Art. 17 van die Algemene Regswysigingswet van 1963 wat voorsiening NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

gemaak het vir 90-daeaanhouding sonder verhoor, heftige beswaar uitgelok. Al het dit die beginsels van regsoewereiniteit aangetas, was dit juis daarop gemik om die soewereiniteit van die staat te handhaaf, dade van terreur aan bande te lê en die Regering teen gewelddadige oorname te beskerm. Die vyande van die Regering het egter vernuftig daarin geslaan om die media plaaslik en internasionaal in te span om druk op die Regering uit te oefen om die bepalings van die wetboek te skrap. Dat die veiligheidstak deur die toepassing van hierdie bepalings groot welslae behaal het, is gewis en seker. Altesame 10 955 persone is kragtens die 90-dae-bepalings aangehou vanaf Mei 1963, toe dit in werking gestel is, tot einde 1964. Altesame 44 mense is ter dood veroordeel, 12 tot lewenslange gevangenisstraf gevonnis en 994 gesamentlik tot 5 713 jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis weens misdrywe teen die veiligheid van die staat. Die bedrywighede van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie is ernstig geknou en adv. Jack Unterhalter, wat allerweë as ŉ vyand van die vorige Regering beskou is, het dit ruiterlik erken tydens ŉ toespraak op 13 November l964 in Pretoria: (Vervolg op bladsy 33)

(Continued from page 32)

Then too we must not underestimate the 90 days detention. It was introduced just over a year ago. Unlike the Gestapo in the war years, who used violence, the police are using psychology. It is a tremendous strain to be locked up alone. The police don’t send people to listen into any meetings that are held to plot subversion. The weakness of the subversive organisations are right there amongst those present planning subversion. A person has only to be detained under the 90 days detention and sooner or later he is prepared to talk. It is the most powerful weapon the police have of fighting subversion. Then again I must give all due to the police. Dit is waarskynlik een van die weinig gevalle waar ŉ advokaat met die status van adv. Unterhalter erkenning aan die Polisie gee. In ŉ dokument wat die SAKP begin 1966 onder die opskrif “A time for re-assessment” versprei het, word die tydperk 1963 tot 1965 as “the years of our greatest defeats” bestempel. Met vermelding van die foute wat begaan is, sê die SAKP onder meer: … what were the mistakes that were made? Bad security and secondly a failure to realise the strength of the 90 days weapon … We must rebuild our organisation as swiftly as possible, with proper and rigid security – • We must expose and isolate traitors so that they can no longer injure the liberation movement; • We must give every aid to rebuild the congress; • We must campaign for the early release of political prisoners so that they can play an essential part in solving the problem.

Plaaslike en internasionale druk

het die Regering verplig om die bepalings op 11 Januarie 1965 van die wetboek te verwyder.

EK is aan die einde van 1964 tot luitenant bevorder en na die veiligheidstak oorgeplaas, waar ek persoonlik met brig. Van den Bergh kennis gemaak het. Hy het selfvertroue uitgestraal, was dinamies en ŉ uitmuntende spreker. Die welslae wat die veiligheidstak behaal het, was in ŉ groot mate aan sy leierskap en gesonde oordeelsvermoë te danke. Dat hy die grondslag gelê het waarop die veiligheidstak gebou het om die aanslag van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie telkens te stuit, is gewis en seker. Daar is egter ŉ opvatting dat brig. Van den Bergh man-alleen verantwoordelik was vir verskeie suksesse van die veiligheidstak. Tydens ons opleiding as lede van die veiligheidstak het hy ons toegespreek en onder meer genoem dat die “mannetjie op sy skouer” vir hom gesê het om John Harris te laat haal ná die bom op Johannesburg-stasie. Brig. Van den Bergh het meer as een keer na die mannetjie op sy skouer verwys, ’n sinspeling dat sy intuïtiewe insig die saak opgelos het. In sekere boeke word ook gemeld dat Harris tydens die deurdringende ondervraging van brig. Van den Bergh geknak en erken het dat hy die stasiebom geplant het. Dit is beslis nie waar nie. Die veiligheidstak het altyd as span saamgewerk – die welslae wat in ŉ bepaalde geval behaal is, was selde indien ooit die prestasie van ŉ enkele persoon. Daar bestaan egter geen twyfel dat brig. Van den Bergh nou by al die ondersoeke betrokke was nie en dat sy raad en leiding ŉ groot bydrae gelewer tot die welslae van die veiligheidstak.

opvolger van genl. J.M. Keevy, Polisiekommissaris, wat in September 1968 met pensioen sou aftree. Volgens genl. Van den Bergh se eie weergawe is hy egter op 23 April 1968 deur mnr. Vorster gevra om ’n intelligensie-organisasie op die been te bring. Daar is ’n opvatting in polisiegeledere dat die meeste generaals hulle teen genl. Van den Bergh se aanstelling as Kommissaris verset het, hoewel daar geen skriftelike bewyse hiervoor is nie. Hy is bo verskeie ander generaals bevorder en in daardie jare was dit ongehoord. Die indruk bestaan gevolglik dat mnr. Vorster, in ’n poging om die situasie te beredder, die stigting van ’n intelligensie-organisasie waar genl. Van den Bergh as sy persoonlike veiligheidsadviseur sou optree, bedink het, waarskynlik in oorlegpleging met genl. Van den Bergh. Die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid (BVS), algemeen bekend as Boss, het op 1 Mei 1969 tot stand gekom met genl. Van den Bergh aan die hoof daarvan. Die Republikeinse Intelligensiediens (RI) is ontbind en die meeste lede is na die BVS oorgeplaas. Op 1 September 1978 is die naam van die BVS verander na die Departement van Nasionale Veiligheid en op 1 April 1979 het dit die Nasionale Intelligensiediens (NID) geword.

Brig. Van den Bergh het snelle opgang gemaak en is in 1968 tot die rang van luitenantgeneraal bevorder. Hy is deur die toenmalige Eerste Minister, mnr. John Vorster, aangewys as NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

1972~2022: SAP vier 50 jaar van vroulike polisiëring | SAP celebrates 50 years of female policing

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

1972 Vrouepolisie

1972 Female Police

Die vrouepolisie het gedurende 1972 in albei die SAP en SASP tot stand gekom.

1972 saw the establishment of female police in both the SAP and SARP.

Me Sarie van Niekerk en Nongqai is besig om inligting in te win. Ons is op soek na foto’s en staaltjies oor die vrouepolisie van alle vorige magte.

Ms Sarie van Niekerk and Nongqai are gathering information and seek photos and anecdotes about our female police from all previous Forces.

Sarie se selfoon no. is +27 (0)83 5160660

Hennie Heymans

Frans Bedford Visser (SA Railways Police)

Sarie’s cell phone: +27 (0)83 5160660

Frans Bedford-Visser (SA Spoorwegpolisie)

Above left: 1981: Brig. Duveen Botha with Const. (Lieut. Gen. Ret) Sharon Japhta, SAP. Above right: SAP Evening dress NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

This was an historic event in SAPS. The first women, Brigadier. Denise Brand, at that time a Lieutenant, and Lieutenant-General Sharon Jephta, at that time a Sergeant.

(Coloured and White, 1989 due to apartheid) of the year. I can't believe we were part of such system. This was the time that women were not allowed in operations and detectives.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Will still tell you how I have managed to break that barrier. In that year I became the first female Enquiry Branch Commander at Grassy Park police station. Lt-Gen S Japhta

DIE SAP BALLISTIEKDESKUNDIGES BRING HUL KANT NA ‘N OLIFANTSLAGTING Kol. Wynand Schoeman Brigadier Hennie Heymans, Hiermee `n paar artikels wat ek geskryf het oor my dae as Stasiebevelvoerder op Katima Mulilo in die Oos-Caprivi (Desember 1978 tot Desember 1981). Ek het destyds die rang van luitenant beklee. Ek was latere jare aan Veiligheidstakhoofkantoor asook Misdaadintelligensie en die Nasionale Speurdiens verbonde en kan u goed onthou. Ek hoop u vind die artikels in orde en kan van dit gebruik

Dit is net so na negeuur die Maandagoggend in September 1979 dat ek die boodskap kry dat ‘n Weermagpatrollie in die Caprivi op ses olifantkarkasse afgekom het. Die inligting het daarop gedui dat die olifante geskiet en die ivoortande uitgeslag is. Dit was logies dat die olifante onwettig gejag en die olifanttande deur ‘n smokkelaar of smokkelaars verwyder is. Die koelbloedige doodskiet en onwettige jag van olifante in die Caprivi was ‘n reuse probleem.

maak vir publisering in die Nongqai. Van die vertellings wys dat daar ook `n bietjie “humor” in die bos was, al was dit die operasionele gebied. Ek het nog `n paar gedagtes rondom Katima Mulilo wat ek op skryf wil stel en sal dit mettertyd aanstuur vir u oorweging. Ek het die S.A. Polisie einde Julie 1998 as Kolonel verlaat.

Plaas my asseblief op u Nongqai poslys. My broer Dirk het die Nongqai onder my aandag gebring. Wynand Schoeman

Adjudant-Offisier Johann Bacher, (‘n briljante en gesoute ondersoekbeampte wat die Caprivi bos ken) en ‘n kollega vertrek na die toneel wat naby die Caprivi - Angola kaplyn en nie te ver van Katima Mulilo geleë is nie. Sowat 8 kilometer van die skiettoneel is ook ‘n Weermagbasis. Dit is ‘n sensitiewe gebied binne die sogenaamde rooilyn-area wat nie sondermeer vir die gewone lid van die publiek toeganklik was nie. Burgerlike bevolking in die gebied is ook baie dun gesaai. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Wat Adjudant-Offisier Bacher daar aantref, is nie ‘n mooi toneel nie. Ses olifante lê dood in ‘n kleinerige sirkel en die olifanttande is uitgeslag en verwyder. Dit is duidelik dat die persoon of persone wat die skietwerk gedoen het, waarskynlik tot tussen die olifante in beweeg het (wat ons laat kopkrap het aangesien dit nie maklik gebeur dat jy tussen ‘n olifanttrop kon inbeweeg nie omdat die tropleier dit eenvoudig nie sou toelaat nie). Wie (Vervolg op bladsy 38)

(Vervolg vanaf bladsy 37)

dit ookal was moes die olifante vinnig afgemaai het om te voorkom dat die olifante hom of hulle eenvoudig doodtrap en vermorsel. Adjudant-Offisier Bacher maak ook sowat 25; 7,62mm patroondoppies bymekaar wat binne ‘n radius van 4 meter van mekaar gelê het. Die patroondoppies was die eerste aanduiding van die soort wapen wat afgevuur is en sou saam met herwonne koeëlpunte ‘n deurslaggewende rol speel om die verdagte wapen en skieter(s) op te spoor. Dit was duidelik dat die verdagte wapen na aanleiding van die patroondoppies se kaliber minstens een of meer R1 gewere moes wees. Dit was die eerste belangrike leidraad. Ek besoek die toneel en voel naar oor wat ek daar aantref. Die olifante lê in ‘n sirkel met ‘n deursnee van nie meer as 5 tot 6 meter nie wat definitief daar op dui dat die skieter(s) tot binne die binnekring van die olifante moes inbeweeg het. Die oortreder(s) kon beslis ‘n wapen hanteer want sover ons kon vasstel was al die olifante met suiwer kopskote neergevel. Hierdie aanduiding sou ons help om van die koeëlpunte te herwin. Die olifanttande is uitgeslag en nie met ‘n sirkel- of treksaag afgesaag of afgekap nie, wat weer wys dat die oortreder(s) genoeg tyd gehad het om al die tande uit te slag, en nie bang was om op heterdaad deur ‘n Weermagpatrollie betrap te word nie. Waarskynlik was hul dan ook vertroud met die beweging van patrollies in die area. Uit ondervinding het ek en Johann Bacher besef dat ons ‘n uiterste poging moes aanwend om soveel as moontlik van die afgevuurde projektiele (koeëlpunte) te herwin. Saam met die afgevuurde patroondoppies kon dit later, as die ondersoek tot op daardie

punt sou vorder, met ‘n verdagte wapen of wapens vergelyk en positief verbind word. Wat dan weer moontlik met ‘n spesifieke verdagte vasgeknoop kon word. Die olifantkarkasse was na skatting nie ouer as 5 tot 7 ure nie, wat meebring dat die slagting in die vroeë oggendure moes plaasgevind het. Die feit dat die slagting so vinnig ontdek is, sou later definitief daartoe bydra om die saak suksesvol op te los. Olifantvleis is vir die plaaslike bevolking, die Capriviane, ’n gesogte lekkerny en hul begin in die omgewing saamdrom om te kyk of hul nie die vleis as ‘n bonus kon kry nie. Johann Bacher reël toe met die plaaslike hoofman dat sy stamgenote die olifante kon afslag, maar dat hul die koeëlpunte in die proses moes soek. Teen ons verwagting in word ses van die koeëlpunte so uit die karkasse gehaal. Dit was ook noodsaaklik dat die koeëlpunte so gou as moontlik herwin moes word, omdat die liggaamsuur die koeëlpunte kon beskadig deur die groewe op die koeëlpunte weg te vreet en dit sodoende dus waardeloos vir ballistiese vergelyking kon maak. Ons het bereken dat ons slegs sowat 2 tot 3 ure tyd gehad het om die koeëlpunte uit die karkasse te verwyder voordat dit daarna waarskynlik onbruikbaar en selfs waardeloos sou wees. Ons het dus bitter min tyd gehad en dit was ‘n verligting toe die koeëlpunte wat wel gevind is, onbeskadig en met duidelike groewe opgespoor is. Binne 3 ure nadat die Capriviane begin het om die olifante af te slag, was vel-, vleis- en- been alles weggedra en het net ‘n bloederige massa agter gebly. Die Afrika-bos olifant is die grootste landdier wat daar is, met die bulle wat ‘n skouerhoogte van 3,2 meter tot 3,9 meter kon bereik, met ‘n gewig van 4 000 tot 6 000 kilogram. Die olifantkoeie is NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

effens kleiner met ‘n skouerhoogte van 2,2 meter en ‘n gewig wat wissel van tussen 3 000 tot 4 000 kilogram. Beide die olifantbulle en koeie se lewensduur is sowat 60 tot 70 jaar. Tropgroottes wissel gewoonlik so tussen 20 tot 30 olifante. Daar is egter ook kleiner troppe in die Caprivi van gemiddeld sowat 12 olifante. Die feit dat ses olifante afgemaai is kon daar op neerkom dat 50% van die betrokke trop uitgeskiet is, wat uiters traumaties vir die oorblywende olifante sou wees en hul ‘n uiters gevaarlike trop sou maak. Dit kon egter ook ‘n kleiner troppie van slegs ses olifante gewees het wat dan sou meebring dat die hele trop uitgeskiet is. Gewoonlik het ons gevind dat slegs een of twee olifante op ‘n slag uitgeskiet word. Die feit dat ses op een slag uitgeskiet is, was kommerwekkend en niemand het aan die ernstige graad van die oortreding getwyfel nie. Ons was desperaat om die oortreder (s) aan te keer. Onwettige jag van olifante in die Caprivi was ‘n groot probleem en dit het nie juis gehelp dat die geldende wetgewing daaroor uit toeka se tyd dateer en ver verouderd was nie. Daarby het die groot afstande in die Caprivi en ‘n polisiewyk van meer as 21 000 vierkante kilometer en gebrek aan ‘n behoorlike kommunikasienetwerk in dié gebied ondersoeke erg belemmer. Dit was nie altyd maklik om, veral in die reënseisoen, vinnig en betyds op ‘n misdaadtoneel aan te kom nie. Inligting kom soms te laat by ons uit om reg aan die ondersoek te laat geskied. In die reënseisoen word veral die oostelike laagliggende gedeeltes van die Oos Caprivi wat eintlik maar ‘n vloedvlakte is, oorstroom en word sekere areas totaal onbegaanbaar met selfs ‘n 4x4 voertuig. ‘n Groot bydraende faktor tot dié oorstromings is die Zambezirivier wat gewoonlik (Vervolg op bladsy 39)

(Vervolg vanaf bladsy 38)

rondom Maart tot April in vloed is, afkom en die massa water uit die noordweste van Zambië en Angola die rivier se walle oorstroom en dan tot 40 - 60 kilometer die Caprivi- binneland binne stoot. In so geval vra ons dan die Lugmag om ‘n helikopter met ‘n loods tot ons beskikking te stel wat dan die enigste manier is om sekere statte te bereik. Inwoners in hierdie gebiede kan dan selfs maande van die buite wêreld afgesny wees en hoe hul dan oorleef is soms ‘n raaisel. Minstens een van die karkasse op die toneel was dié van ‘n massiewe olifant en ek het besef dat dit die tropleier of patriarg van die groep moes wees. Van die oorblywende trop, indien enige was daar geen teken nie, wat daarop neerkom dat hul vreesbevange moes gevlug het. Die gedagte dat die hele trop uitgeskiet is, was iets waaraan ek nie eers wou dink nie. Terug op die stasie bespreek ek en Johann Bacher die saak en ontleed die feite en bewysstukke wat ons tot ons beskikking het. Die afgevuurde projektiele en patroondoppies wat ons kon herwin was ‘n baie groot pluspunt en kon deurslaggewend in die ondersoek wees. Dit was dan ook so alhoewel ons dit nog nie op daardie stadium kon sê nie. Die feit dat die doppies duidelik geïdentifiseer is as van 7,62 kaliber en dus dat ‘n R1 wapen of wapens in die slagting gebruik is, was ook rigtinggewend. Ons het onmiddellik besef dat die verdagte(s) ‘n S.A. Weermaglid of lede of selfs ‘n lid van die S.A. Polisie kon wees omdat slegs diegene oor ‘n R1 kon beskik. Tensy dit natuurlik ‘n gesteelde wapen was of ‘n verlore R1 wat iewers deur ‘n troepie agtergelaat is en so in die hande van kriminele geval het. Dit sou dan ook ons vertrekpunt met die verdere ondersoek wees. Die

probleem was egter dat daar op daardie stadium tussen 8 000 tot 10 000 Weermaglede in die Caprivi ontplooi was en dat dit nie prakties en logisties moontlik of haalbaar was om so ‘n magdom wapens in te trek en na die Ballistiekafdeling van die Forensiese Laboratorium in Pretoria te stuur nie. Ek gaan spreek die S.A. WeermagSektor 70 se Bevelvoerder en kry sy toestemming om elke moontlike Weermagwapen wat in die slagting gebruik kon word, in samewerking met die Militêre Polisie vir ballistiese toetsing in te trek. Met die toestemming van die Sektorbevelvoerder dat die Weermagwapens getoets kon word, het die vraag ontstaan hoe - en- waar die wapens as sulks getoets kon word. Ek stel ‘n volledige verslag op en rig dit aan die Distrikskommandant en die Forensiese Laboratorium in Pretoria en verneem of die Ballistiese toetse in die Caprivi gedoen kon word. Die Forensiese Laboratorium besef die dringendheid van die saak en besluit om Sersante Basil Young en sy kollega van die Ballistiese Afdeling, Wollie Wolmarans na die Caprivi te stuur om ons met die ondersoek by te staan. So beweeg ons na ‘n fase waar die ballistiese toetse met die “hulp” van ‘n openbare swembad uitgevoer sou word en was dit vir my ‘n nuwe en unieke ervaring.

‘n Paar dae later land Sersante Basil Young en Wollie Wolmarans met ‘n Flossie op die Mpacha Lughawe in die Caprivi. Saam met hulle bring hulle twee ballistiese vergelykingsmikroskope en ander toerusting wat hul nodig het. Beide ken hul werk, skep vertroue en is entoesiasties om die moontlike verdagte wapen of wapens tussen soveel duisende ander wapens uit te haal. Dié taak was egter nie sonder eiesoortige uitdagings nie wat nogal kreatiewe denke van die NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Ballistiese deskundiges geverg het om dit te oorbrug. Een van die uitdagings wat eers hanteer moes word, was dat ‘n geskikte watertenk gevind moes word waarin die verdagte wapens afgevuur kon word. Die S.A. Polisie op Katima Mulilo het nie oor so ‘n tenk beskik nie en ons het ook nie geweet waar ons een wat geskik sou wees sou kon vind nie. In die RSA sou dit seker nie ‘n probleem wees nie maar in die Caprivi met sy afgesonderdheid, ver weg van alles, was dit nogal ‘n probleem. Van afgesonderdheid gepraat, ter illustrasie was die naaste ander S.A. Polisiestasie 400 kilometer weg, anderkant die Wes Caprivi by Bagani geleë met die Distrikskommandant se kantore 600 kilometer vanaf Katima Mulilo. Een van die manne onthou toe van die openbare swembad op die dorp en na ‘n vinnige inspeksie is daar besluit dat dit die oplossing sou wees. Verder moes die toetspatrone se kruitlading met naastenby 75% tot sowat 25% verlaag word. Dit was ‘n taak wat die Ballistiekdeskundiges met die nodige toerusting gedoen het. Elke patroon wat gebruik sou word moes een vir een oopgemaak word en die kruit sorgvuldig en uiters versigtig verwyder word. Ek het intussen toestemming by die Plaaslike Administrasie verkry om die swembad vir dié doel te gebruik en natuurlik is die swembad vir die duur van die oefening vir die publiek gesluit. Daar is verder met die Militêre Polisie ooreengekom dat hulle die wapens by die Polisiestasie sou besorg. Hulle sou ook lyste van al dié wapens en aan wie dit uitgereik is (sover dit nodig sou wees), aan die S.A. Polisie besorg. Daar is besluit om die Militêre basis wat die naaste aan die misdaadtoneel was, as vertrekpunt vir die oefening, wat nou soos ‘n Militêre operasie (Vervolg op bladsy 40)

Bo: AO Johan Bacher en konst. Edwin Chaka (Vervolg vanaf bladsy 39)

beplan is, te gebruik. Uiteraard kon daar nie duisende wapens op een slag aan die ballistiese kundiges oorhandig word nie en is daar op ‘n werkswyse besluit dat ‘n maksimum van 50 wapens op ‘n slag oorhandig sou word. Die samewerking met die Militêre Polisie was uitstekend en dié reëling het goed gewerk. Ek het vas geglo dat die ballistiese toetse die wapen

waarna opsoek was, sou uitwys. Natuurlik was daar altyd die moontlikheid dat dit ‘n voormalige weermaglid kon wees wat met sy wapen weggeloop het en as sulks nie maklik opgespoor sou kon word nie. Die ballistiese toetse by die swembad was iets nuut vir die dorp en het baie vinnig die aandag van die inwoners getrek. Die proses het as volg verloop: NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Een van die ballistiekdeskundiges sou ‘n skoot met die wapen wat met die toetsprojektiel (met verminderde lading), gelaai was, op ‘n sekere deel, ’n afgesperde ruimte van die swembad afvuur, nadat die besonderhede van die betrokke wapen aangeteken is. Een van die plaaslike polisiebeamptes, (en sover ek kon onthou was dit onder andere konstabel Pollie Theron), sou na elke skoot in die (Continued on page 41)

(Vervolg vanaf bladsy 40)

swembad spring om die afgevuurde projektiel uit te haal. Dit is dan afgedroog en elkeen afsonderlik in ‘n koevert, met die wapennommer daarop, verseël. Terug by die Polisiestasie sou die ballistiekdeskundiges dan hul vergelykingsmikroskope nader trek, die bewysstukkoeëlpunt wat op die misdaadtoneel herwin is, aan die eenkant ingeskuif, met die swembad-toetskoeëlpunt aan die anderkant, om die groewe op die twee koeëlpunte, te vergelyk. Dieselfde proses moes met elke toetspatroon herhaal word. Dit was nogal ‘n tydsame proses maar moes sekuur uitgevoer word om nie die integriteit van die oefening te skaad nie. Op dié stadium, het die ballistiekdeskundiges deur vergelyking reeds vasgestel dat al die doppies en koeëlpunte wat op die misdaadtoneel herwin is, deur dieselfde wapen afgevuur is. Ons was dus op soek na een verdagte wapen en sy gebruiker.

Die inwoners van die dorp kon maar net hul koppe skud as hulle verneem het dat ons waarskynlik duisende wapens so in die swembad sou afvuur. Dit was natuurlik ‘n stadige proses wat nie binne ‘n dag voltooi sou word nie. Nadat sowat 1,780 wapens getoets is, het Sersante Young en Wolmarans die gesoekte wapen geïdentifiseer. Dit was ‘n heuglike dag en ons almal het ‘n sug van verligting gesnak. Selfs ek het deur die vergelykingsmikroskoop gekyk en gesien dat die groewe op die bewystukprojektiel en dié op die toetsprojektiel identies was. Dit was nie nodig om van die ander basisse se wapens te toets nie. Die doppies wat op die misdaadtoneel opgetel is se groewe het ook met die doppie van die verdagte wapen ooreengestem. Die verdagte was ’n Boesmanspoorsnyer van die nabygeleë basis en is gevolglik gearresteer en vir onwettige jag aangekla.

Die probleem was egter dat die geldende “wetgewing” wat onwettige jag in die Caprivi aangespreek het, ‘n Ordonnansie van 1897 was, wat dus bykans al 80 jaar oud was en nog van ponde, sjielings en pennies as boete melding gemaak het. Dit was een van ons groot frustrasies want sonder streng wetgewing het ons gesukkel om onwettige jag in die Caprivi aan bande te lê. Die landdros het egter sy diskresie gebruik en ‘n meer gepaste vonnis opgelê. Die sukses van hierdie saak het verseker ‘n demper op onwettige jag voorvalle in die Caprivi geplaas en het die gemeenskap nogal aan die praat gehad. Ek sal altyd dankbaar bly oor die bekwame wyse waarop Sersante Basil Young en Wollie Wolmarans die aangeleentheid hanteer het. Sonder hulle betrokkenheid sou ons nie die saak suksesvol deur die hof kon voer nie.

Die geweerloop se merke is uniek aan elke geweer, en kan gebruik word om die wapen te identifiseer wat daardie spesifieke koeël afgeskiet het.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

RANK STRUCTURE South African Police 1961-1994

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

SOUTH AFRICAN MOUNTED RIFLES DOUBLE TRAGEDY AT GOBENI 1920 Captain Andre van Ellinckhuyzen (SAPS Vryheid) It was the year 1920. In the Chinese culture it was “The year of the Monkey”. The League of Nations had just been formed under the leadership of American President Woodrow Wilson, and South Africa received a mandate from the League to administer the former German colony South West Africa. Not too far away in the past lay the end of the Boer War in 1902, with its devastations still clearly visible in the ruins of many a farmstead such as that of General Botha on the farm Goudhoek in the district of Vryheid. The Union of South Africa established in 1910 had not yet reached its teenager status. The South African Police was now only seven years old, and the South African Air Force was officially in its “year one”. The Great War had barely ended two years ago and South Africa’s big statesman of that time, General Louis Botha died late 1919 from a heart attack, preceded by a bout of the Spanish Influenza. Field Marshall Jan Christian Smuts was now the new Prime Minister, and Olive Schreiner who is fondly remembered by many for her novel “The Story of an African Farm”, died in Wynberg, Cape Town at the age of sixty-five years. Gysbert (Gijsbert) Johannes Roos was born in Dordrecht in the Eastern Cape in the year 1884 as one of the five children of his namesake Gijsbert Johannes Roos, and of Sophia Cecilia van Heerden. Sophia and

Gysbert snr were married in Burgersdorp, and their children were named Gysbert Johannes, Jan Hendrik, Magdalena Johanna Susanna Grobler, Izaak Johannes, and there also was a fifth unnamed sibling who died at infancy.

Sophia was born in Dordrecht in 1866, and she died in April 1900 at Vrededorp in Johannesburg. Gysbert Johannes snr then married Anna Margaretha Johanna Kampfer Momberg in October 1902, but he never had any children of his own with her. Gysbert Roos senior passed away in 1954. In November of 1912, Gysbert Johannes Roos jnr married Louisa Christina Catharina Ehlers Van Zijl in Pretoria. Louisa was one of the eleven children of George Archibald Ehlers and of Magdalena Jacoba Johanna du Toit Ehlers, and she grew up on the farm Wagenpadspruit near Rustenburg. At the time of their marriage Gysbert lived in Marikana where he served with the South African Mounted Rifles, and his bride Louisa was resident in Rustenburg. Before meeting and marrying Gysbert, Louisa was married in 1906 to Daniël Frederik Christoffel van Zijl, a farmer from Rustenburg. Daniël and Louisa had two children named Jacobus Albertus, born in 1908, and Susannah Cegruja (Zacharia), born in 1909. Daniël van Zijl died in 1910. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Only one child, a boy, was born out of the wedlock of Gysbert and Louisa, and he inherited his father and grandfathers names. Baby, Gysbert Johannes Roos was born in January 1914 in Rustenburg, and sadly he died when he was only eight months old in October 1914 as a result of Pneumonia. The thirty-six-year-old Corporal Roos of the South African Mounted Rifles was stationed at the Police outpost at Gobeni in a rural area situated between the mining towns of Hlobane, Coronation and Louwsburg. The outpost was strategically situated as it was right on the main transport route that ran through Vryheid, Hlobane, and Coronation from Newcastle and Dundee, towards Louwsburg and onward to Magudu, then into Swaziland and the northern territories of Zululand. Just to the North of the post lay the ruins of the farmstead on what was General Louis Botha’s farm Goudhoek, and not far from there was Waterval, the farm on which General Botha’s brother-in -law, Boer General Cheere Emmett farmed. Here stood the Gobeni Waterfalls which could be seen and heard from afar especially in summer when its catchment area received enough rainfall. Neighbouring the police post was a small Post Office, and the Gobeni Hotel, which catered for the weary traveller, was (Continued on page 45)

(Continued from page 44)

not too far away. The living quarters for the married couple was a modest sandstone building in which they had to share some space with the young Constable Lundt, but it was sufficient for the needs of the Roos couple and their two young kids at the time. What the policemen, their families, the Post Master and other locals could not source from locally, they would place an order for from Vryheid, Coronation or Louwsburg, all being a full day’s ride on horseback, in a Cape Cart or an uneasy ride on a transport wagon. The twenty-two year old bachelor, Francois Eybers Lundt was born in Noorder Paarl in the Western Cape on the 10th of August 1898 (another source suggests that he was born at Aberdeen). Francois was the son of a “Toll House Keeper”, Lucas Marthinus or “Luke” Lundt, and of Anna Susanna Elizabeth Eybers. The Lundt’s were natives of the Cape, but moved to the farm “Leonie” near Senekal in the Free State some years prior 1920. Lucas and Anna got divorced in later years, but after their deaths in 1951 and 1952 respectively, they were re-united in one grave on the farm Leonie. Francois was one of the five children, and his siblings were: Marthinus Frederik Lundt of the farm “Charity” near Koppies, Ivy Evelina Christina Lundt Schutte a housewife from Kroonstad, then Ebenhaezer Lundt and Lucas Marthinus Lundt who both died very young. Barring those few days in a calendar month when reports and general maintenance took prece-

dence, the daily duties of a law officer such as Corporal Roos, Constable Lundt, and the African “Nongqayi” (Policemen) who were stationed in an outpost such as the one at Gobeni, mostly entailed the patrolling of farms and rural areas on horseback and on foot, securing the transport route, and investigating the odd number of stock theft cases, general thefts, and common assaults reported by local farmers and other natives.

Francois Eybers Lundt joined the South African Police in July 1919 at Roberts Heights near Pretoria and after the completion of his basic training he was at first posted to Dundee for a short while and then to the outpost at Gobeni. The young constable had much respect for the war veteran Corporal Roos who had joined the South African Mounted Rifles in Pretoria before the outbreak of the Great War, and served in the Union Defence Force, under General Louis Botha, during the German South West Africa Campaign. Early on Friday, 31 December 1920, Corporal Roos and Constable Lundt saddled up their police horses and spent their morning with an easy patrol to the farm Waterval, and beyond. Unknown to anyone on that morning, the Angel of Death would visit before the sun would set. Usually when they were out on a patrol the Corporal would do almost all of the talking, mostly about work, and the Constable would listen attentively as the wise words of his senior would stand him in good stead in work and in life. However, on that day their conversation was otherwise. Perhaps it was their NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

thoughts about 1921 that was only hours away that prompted them both to speak openly about their families and their dreams for the future. It was a sweltering hot summer’s day, so on their return journey to the police post they stopped and dismounted at one of the deep pools downstream from the Gobeni Falls. There they unsaddled their horses, stripped themselves down into only their underwear, hiding their neatly folded uniforms, helmets, BSA .303 rifles, and Webley revolvers under nearby brush out from the sight of prying eyes. Holding onto their horses’ bridles Roos and Lundt waded into the water and then when it was deep enough, they swam the horses into the deep pool to cool them down.............. ...........The news of the tragedy at the pool came to the police post at Gobeni by means of a sweating, out of breath, tearful eyed messenger of the local Induna. The Gobeni Post Master hastily sent a telegram to the Police Head Quarters in Vryheid: ….Urgent. Stop. “Double Tragedy at Gobeni. Stop”…….. It was already after two in the afternoon of the first day of 1921, when a tired and dusty Sergeant John Alfred Bruce, in the company of a Vryheid “Pastor”, rode in on horseback at the Gobeni Outpost. After a sombre meeting with Mrs Roos and her two children, the customary greetings between old colleagues, a strong cup of black coffee, and a bowl of lukewarm water with which to wash off the dust and sweat of the road, the two men were escorted to the outbuilding nearby the horses’ (Continued on page 46)

(Continued from page 45)

stable, where a barefoot, spear carrying “Nongqayi” stood, dressed in black uniform and helmet. Selfishly guarding the entrance. Inside the lantern lit room lay the linen covered bodies of the two police men. Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, Friday, January 7, 1921: “TWO POLICEMEN DROWNED. DOUBLE TRAGEDY IN VRYHEID DISTRICT. Ladysmith (Natal), Thursday. - A double fatality is reported from the Vryheid district, two members of the S.A. Police being the victims. Last Friday Corporal Roos and Constable Lundt were swimming their horses in a pool at Waterfall on the farm of the late General Botha, when Roos was swept from his horse into deep water, and Lundt, in endeavouring to rescue him, was drowned. Reuter.”

Before dawn on the second day of 1921, the remains of the two policemen left Gobeni, in a respectful silence, under police guard, carried on a horse drawn cart to Vryheid. Louisa Roos and her two toddlers following the procession in a Cape Cart borrowed from the local Hotel owner. Late afternoon on the third day of 1921, Corporal Gysbert Johannes Roos and Constable Francois Eybers Lundt where laid to rest next to each other in the Vryheid Cemetery, honoured with a semi-military funeral. A year later Lundt’s family erected a grave stone, with the inscription: “GROTER LIEFDE HET NIEMAND AS DIT NIE. DAT IEMAND SY LEWE VIR SY VRIENDE GEE. Joh. 15:13.” For reasons unknown the grave of Corporal Roos was never marked with a stone. After Gysbert’s death, Louisa married Vryheid butcher and

farmer Adam Johannes Ries of the farm Eensgevonden, in 1922. Adam, who was at first married to Martha Maria Strydom of Dundee, passed away in 1952 in the Florence Nightingale Nursing Home in Johannesburg. Louisa moved on to Wakkerstroom where she spent the remainder of her life, and passed away in 1964. An elder of the Mazibuko family who now occupy what can only be described as a sad reminder of what once was the Police Outpost, house, and out buildings that once proudly stood there, tells a story of the ghost of a white man in uniform that roams the house, and of regular reports of a policeman mounted on a grey horse seen by the local community in the vicinity of the old police outpost.

Above: A portion of what is left of the original Police Station at Gobeni NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Top: A front view of the Married Quarters

Bottom: The original Married Quarters NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Top: Out buildings. Note the original sand stone blocks

Bottom: Portion of what remains of the original police station at Gobeni Overleaf Top: Remains of what may have been an out building or horses stable NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Bottom: The Graves of Cpl Roos and Cst Lundt in the Vryheid Cemetery. Roos' grave on the left is unmarked NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Above: The deep pool below the Gobeni Water Fall

WHERE IT ALL BEGAN! The Old Town House on Greenmarket Square c1909 Wachthuis where policing in South Africa started.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

An old photograph of

NONGQAI TRUST DOELEINDES VAN DIE TRUST

PURPOSE OF THE TRUST

Die doel van die Trust is om ten behoewe van enige persoon (of hul families) wat sorg, berading en ondersteuning nodig het ten opsigte van post-traumatiese stres; sielkundige ondersteuning; sorg en behandeling, of fisiese besering wat hy of sy opgedoen het as gevolg van sodanige persoon se betrokkenheid by misdaadvoorkoming, misdaadbekamping of blootstelling aan misdaadbestryding of verwante optrede, of voormalige lede van die SuidAfrikaanse Polisiemag.

The purpose of the Trust is to act on behalf of any person (or their families) who need care, counselling and support due to post-traumatic stress; psychological support; care and treatment, or physical injury that he or she has suffered as a result of their involvement in crime prevention, combating crime or exposure to the combating of crime or related actions, or former members of the South African Police force.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

LT GEN LORD BADEN POWELL: Founder of the SA Constabulary and the Boy Scout Movement

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

STORIES VAN SAP KING’S REST, DISTRIK 75, DURBAN-SUID. (NMP, NP, SABS, SAP, SAW (VLOOT POLISIE) & SAPS) Hennie Heymans

SAP King’s Rest-dae O, Mammie wat het Mammie gedoen!!?? Dis in 1968 en ek werk middagskof van 13:45 tot 22:00. Ek is sersant en is die wyksersant en patrolliewabestuurder te SAP King’s Rest. Ek geniet my werk verskriklik en jaag rond om klagtes by te woon. Destyds het dit so gewerk: Radiobeheer stuur jou na verskillende klagtes en om tyd te bespaar het elke misdryf ‘n kode. So was “kode 14” ‘n botsing; ‘n “kode 20” was rusverstoring terwyl ‘n dronk persoon ‘n “kode 28” was. Ons het natuurlik behalwe jou flits ook ‘n klomp dossiere, ongeluksvorms, dagvaardigingsboekie (UDJ 534) en geel SAP 4-vorms byderhand gehad. So kry ek ‘n klagte van diefstal. Ek arriveer by die redelike groot winkel en die bestuurder kla van ‘n saak van diefstal. In die hoek staan ‘n Ouma – redelike ineen getrek, so asof sy haar vir die polisie klein wil maak. Die

bestuurder kla dat die Ouma ‘n tolletjie gare gesteel het. Ek vra dadelik wat dit kos en bied aan om uit my sak daarvoor te betaal. Die winkelbestuurder is adamant. Hy wil die arme Ouma vervolg. Ek noem aan hom dat dit ‘n baie geringe sakie is en die howe en regstelsel is oorlaai. Hy hou voet by stuk en eis dat ons die verdagte aankla. Daardie dag het ek besonder sleg gevoel omdat ek empatie met die bejaarde gehad het. Ek arresteer die verdagte en ons gaan na die patrolliewa. Ek vra die bemanning om uit te klim en laat die verdagte voor by ons in die middel sit. Ons kom by die polisiestasie en registreer die saak, handig die bewysstuk in, en hou die ou dame aan. Intussen skakel ek haar dogter wat ouer is as ek, om na die polisiestasie te kom. Die gereg moet sy gang gaan. Na ‘n rukkie hou die dogter by die polisiestasie stil en betree die aanklagtekantoor. Sy bars in trane uit toe sy haar verwese moedertjie sien en skree-huil: “O

Mammie wat het Mammie gedoen, o wat het Mammie gedoen?” Ons staan almal verleë. Natuurlik kan ek verstaan dat enige ou mens kan vergeet om vir ‘n artikel te betaal. Dis lekker om polisieman te wees, maar sulke insidente ruk jou tot in jou siel omdat enige polisieman maar empatie het met mense. Ons het die ou Tante in die sorg van haar dogter vrygelaat en vir hof gewaarsku. Dis die laaste wat ek van die saak gehoor het MAAR ek het nooit vergeet nie! Diefstal van Weenseworsies No 30320P sersant “Wessie” van der Westhuizen het ‘n klagte van diefstal by die plaaslike slaghuis bygewoon. Hy het my van die saak vertel. Die slagter kla dat ‘n goeie kliënt elke Saterdag ‘n klomp vleis kom koop en dan steel hy ‘n pakkie Weenseworsies. ‘Sant Wessie was ‘n “ou man” met baie ervaring. Hy raai toe die slagter aan om eerder elke Saterdag, as hy vermoed die (Vervolg op bladsy 55)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Vervolg vanaf bladsy 54)

verbruiker het Weenseworsies gesteel, dan voeg hy maar net die bedrag by – so is almal te vrede: Die slagter kry sy geld vir die worsies en die verbruiker is gelukkig hy dink hy het ‘n pakkie Weenseworsies verniet gekry. Ja, Boerewysheid kan werk. Wanneer dronkbestuur nie dronkbestuur is nie

ook

Een dag werk ek weer middag aflossing. So by 20:00 ontvang ek berig van ‘n “kode 14” – ‘n botsing. Ek arriveer op die toneel. Ek spreek beide bestuurders. In daardie dae moes ons elke botsing bywoon en daarna behalwe vir die invul van vorm SAP 352 (S 68) moes ons ook ‘n plan en sleutel tot plan opstel. Ek kry die voertuie se besonderhede (lisensie skyfie nommer en derde party nommer) en neem die afmetings. Redelike gevaarlike werk om in die nag in ‘n donkerblou uniform in en langs die pad afmetings te neem. Die stasiebevelvoerder

kom by die toneel aan en vra of alles onder beheer is? Ek meld aan hom dat die bestuurder van die tweede voertuig, wat die botsinkie veroorsaak het, al hoe dronker word. Die SB gelas my om die man na die distrikgeneesheer (DG) te neem. Ons ry nou van die Bluff (naby die hawe) na Durban-Sentraal. Ons moet die DG ontbied. Ons wag. Beskuldigde word al hoe dronker! Die DG daag op en terwyl hy besig is om sy vorms in te vul word ons deur die dronk bestuurder “aangeval”. Hy het skielik opgespring en die brandblusser gegryp en ons met skuim bespuit. Die DG bevind dat die bestuurder inderdaad dronk is. Ek kla die man aan vir dronkbestuur. Later moet ek in die hof getuig. Ek het in talle dronkbestuursake getuig – selfs al was die DG nie beskikbaar nie, het ek steeds veroordelings gekry. Ek lewer getuienis en die landdros vra my toe wat ek van

die saak dink. Ek vertel die landdros dat in my opinie die man nugter was toe hy die ligte botsinkie veroorsaak het. Iemand het voor hom stilgehou en dit was net die buffers wat beskadig was. Ek vertel toe: Hoe later, hoe kwater. Die beskuldigde word vry gespreek op dronkbestuur. Na die tyd, buite die hof kom die beskuldigde na my en bedank my vir my eerlikheid. Hy vertel my dat hy ‘n huursoldaat in die Kongo was en dat hy werk by die SAS&H gekry het as hyskraanbestuurder op die kaai. Die betrokke aand verwittig sy kollega hom dat hy wel moet kom werk, maar dat daar by sy hyskraan geen skip sal wees nie. Hy beplan toe om ‘n bottel drank uit te drink, hawe toe te ry, op te klim na sy kajuit en die nag daar lekker te slaap! Iets waarvoor hy natuurlik betaal sal word! Min het hy geweet dat hy drie – vier minute voor hy sy bestemming sou bereik ook met die gereg sou bots!

West’s Hotel: Kings Rest Precinct Richard Van Wyk on 9 Feb. 2021 om 12:59. Harbour Hideaway Durban. Historical landmark build 1899. Seaman of the world meet hereall foreign currencies were accepted. The Trust Hotel (Photo John Hone)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

When stationed at SAP King's Rest and the hotel and the Admiralty Lands (the Bluff proper) formed part of our beat. To attend complaints at the Wests Hotel we had to travel overland to Point, take the ferry and attend to the complaint. There were no roads only railway lines to Wests. Sometimes the Water Police gave us a lift from Island View. One night the Water Police dropped us off - after initial investigation we made an arrest for theft. So, there we were standing at the wharf, an African Constable, myself and the suspect, an Indian gentleman and some fishing

rods that he allegedly had stolen.

Our Police Van was at Island View. So, after a while a shunting steam engine passes us and comes back, the stoker shouted: "Haai Hennie!" We were at school together and he left school during standard 7 to join the SAR. So, I asked for a lift to Island View. All three of us got onto the footplate of the locomotive with the fishing rods. I asked the driver if he could "spin" the engine and he gave me an exhibition with his Class H locomotive, we got off at near Island View and returned to normal mode of transport.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

I once attended to a murder of a prostitute and there was an argument between the detectives of the Railways Police and the SA Police about exactly “where the murder took place.” If the corpse was east of a large water pipe it was the SAP who had to attend and if it was west of the pipe the Railways Police had to attend. After a few calls it was decided the SAR Police would investigate because she was west of the line. I had exciting days in the Police and I even got paid for it!!!

SOME HISTORY OF THE BLUFF AND A MAP Paul du Preez

Morning Oom Hennie Stumbled upon this Old Image of the Bluff. No idea when taken but must have been in the 50's I assume if one looks at how under developed the mangrove area is. All of that was already part of the harbour by the time I was born in 1971. Regards

Note by HBH:- Paul also sent to historical articles on the Bluff. The red dot indicates SAP King’s Rest

Paul du Preez.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

skool vir hul kinders ontwerp. Die Zanzibari’s van Bluff- van die Nasionale regering. In 1873 is 23 volwassenes en Oor die jare heen het baie van weg Hier is ‘n verkorte weergawe van die inligting gedateer 1962 wat Paul vir ons gestuur het oor die Zanzibari-nedersetting op die Bluff te Durban. “Hoog op die Bluff wat op Durban se hawe uitkyk, woon 500 Zanzibari-Arabiere wie se afsonderlike identiteit verlore sal gaan as gevolg van die 'afsonderlike ontwikkelings'-beleid

ongeveer sestig kinders deur die Britse vloot uit Arabiese slawedae gered en na Durban gebring. 'n Moslemse liefdadigheidsorganisasie het hulle te hulp gekom en 25 hektaar grond op die destyds feitlik geïsoleerde Bluff gegee. Daar kon hulle, met die min middele wat hulle gehad het, 'n aangename gemeenskap in 'n moskee en 'n godsdiens-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

hulle Engels leer praat, maar Swahili is nog steeds hul huistaal en Arabies is die taal van hul godsdiens. Hulle het nogal 'n vreedsame en insulêre lewe gelei 'wat min aandag getrek het”. • Destyds toe ek op King’s Rest was het ek nooit probleme met hulle ervaar nie. Hulle het IDkaarte ipv bewysboeke gedra.

THE NATAL MOUNTED POLICE later the NATAL POLICE finally the 2nd and 3rd Regiments of the SA MOUNTED RIFLES Raised by Major John George Dartnell in 1874, the N.M.P. was never given the same opportunities as the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, later Cape Mounted Riflemen, and the unit always had difficulty in trying to obtain proper arms and equipment. Nonetheless, it always attracted a 'very good class of recruit', and in 1877, when Shepstone

annexed the Transvaal, a 25 -strong N.M.P. contingent acted as his sole escort. Moreover, of those men who served in the Zulu War of 1879, over 30 of them lost their lives at Isandhlwana. 256 Medals were awarded to the Natal Mounted Police, 167 of them with the '1879' clasp.

South Africa 1877-79, 1 clasp, 1879 (Tr. R. Richardson. Natal Md. Police.) NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Major-General Sir J.G. Dartnell, K.C.B. By Unknown c1890 59

Major Oliver Dimmick, 2nd Regiment, SA MOUNTED RIFLES (Formerly the Natal Mounted Police) - 1916, Battle of the Somme DIMMICK, OLIVER Rank: Major Date of Death: 22/09/1916 Regiment/Service: South African Mounted Rifles 2nd. Grave Reference: Cemetery DURBAN (ORDNANCE ROAD) MILITARY CEMETERY Apparently he is buried in a steel coffin at Old Fort after his body was exhumed and brought to Durban from Windhoek. Additional Information: Husband of Mrs Dimmick of Pietmaritzburg, South

Africa. A picture of his grave can be seen at this link http://www.eggsa.org/cgi-bin/ library/searchGraves.pl Particulars of Services in respect of which the name of Inspector Oliver Dimmick, Natal Police, was brought to the notice of the Commandant of Militia. During the night attack on the Natal Police at the Impanza River on the night of the 4th April, 1906, Inspector Oliver Dimmick, Natal Police, displayed great gallantry in rescuing, Trumpeter

Milton of the same Corps from falling into the enemy's hands. Trumpeter Milton was wounded and surrounded by the enemy, but was eventually conveyed to a place of safety by means of Inspector Dimmick's action in proceeding to his rescue and keeping the enemy at bay. H. T. BRU-DE-WOLD, Colonel, Commandant of Militia.

Below left: Major Oliver Dimmick, and Above: Inspector Oliver Dimmick, bottom row centre. :

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Art Supplement To ‘The Nongqai.’’]

[June, 1911

NATAL POLICE CORONATION CONTINGENT AND HOME BISLEY TEAM, IN THE S.A.P. UNIFORM. Top Row:- Sergt. Court, Tprs. Van Wyk, Brooke-Smith, Marais, De Beer, Sergt. Rogers, Sergt. Lawson, Tpr. Els. Bottom Row:-(Standing) Sergt. Sturgeon, Tpr. Woods, (Sitting): Tprs. King, Davis, Col. Clarke (C.C.), Inspr. Dimmick, Tpr. Schultz, Tpr. Moore, (Standing): Sergt. H. R. Wilson, and Sergt. Stephens. Tpr. D. Tew was unfortunately absent when this photo was taken.

1911—First SAP uniform, although SAP only came into being formally from 1913.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Above: Inspector Oliver Dimmick, bottom row centre. Below: Major Oliver Dimmick, circa 1916, front row second from right

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

ABOVE: NATAL POLICE FIELD FORCE, TUGELA HEIGHTS, JANUARY, 1900 Standing (L-R): Sergts. Sturgeon, Gray, Perkins, Andrews. Sitting (L -R): Sergt. Walsh, Sup-Insp. Abrahams, Sub-Insp. Maxwell, Sergts. Stevens, Lane BELOW: GROUP OF OFFICERS OF THE NATAL POLICE WHO TOOK PART IN THE PARADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S VISIT. (THE NONGQAI ART SUPPLEMENT MARCH 1911) Standing (L-R): Sub-Inspectors Hamilton, West, Borgnis and Caminada. Sitting: Sub -Inspector Clifton, Inspector Bousfield, Inspec tor and Adjudant Dimmick, Inspector Maxwell, and Sub-Inspector Esmonde-White.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

NATAL POLICE TROOPERS LAID TO REST AT NONDWENI Captain Andre van Ellinckhuyzen

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

1922 RED REVOLT ON THE RAND Reminiscences of Constable H.J.B Feideler

My main recollection of the WanReminiscences of the we would be absent. 1922 strike: Constable Most of us thought about a derers Grounds was an unpleasH.J.B Feideler week, or at the upmost fourteen ant incident, culminating in a Time has dimmed some of the incidents, while many of the names of comrades who participated, have disappeared into the limbo of the forgotten. There are, however, certain events concerned with the fateful months of the 1922 strike, that stand out clearly in my memory, as though they occurred only yesterday. I can also still recall the names of Captain Leishman, Constables Wayland, Groenewald and Bill Abrahams. The word ‘strike’, when applied to the upheaval of 1922, is really a misnomer, for it was more like a civil war, with brother fighting brother and father lifting his hand against his own son. For me and some of those mentioned above, it started off by being detailed for special duty at Witbank. As the train picked us up along the line, from Messina to Pretoria, we were a gay and rowdy crowd and there was a lot of speculation about how long

days; few, however, bargained for an absence of nearly three months and, few indeed, anticipated the hardships and hazards we were to endure, or the distastefulness of the job we would be called upon to perform. Our arrival at Witbank was almost the occasion of a public holiday; the town people turning out in masses to meet us at the railway station. Fear, uneasiness and a cessation of business engendered by the strike and which had prevailed before, was to a measure dispelled after our arrival and the town people feted and made much of us. But these halcyon days were short-lived and, less than a week later, saw us installed in tents on the Wanderers Grounds in Johannesburg. We were a large body of men – I believe about on thousand – each fully equipped with horse, saddle, rifle and ammunition. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

near mutiny, when the men, nerves frayed by the ubiquitous fly and the incessant rain – the former brought about by the insanitary conditions and the close proximity of the horses to the tents – rose in a body, to protest against the badly cooked and inadequate food. The unfortunate Orderly Officer of the day, upon calling for complaints, was met by a fusillade of bully-beef tins and loaves of puffy bakers’ bread. Some even flung their mugs, filled with a dishwater-coloured fluid that passed for coffee, at him. It was only, by the exercise of extreme agility, that the poor man made his escape, to return shortly afterwards, accompanied by a coterie of highly placed officers. An indaba was held, at which angry recriminations were freely bandied and a lot of promises made. Promises, which the men thought would not be fulfilled, as they sullenly retired to their tents. (Continued on page 66)

(Continued from page 65)

Imagine our surprise, however, when a few hours’ later, heavy Leyland lorries, laden to capacity with assorted provisions, started rolling into camp. One vehicle in particular, evoked a lot of interest; for on it was a pre-fabricated wood-and-iron building, which workmen started to erect, immediately after it had been offloaded. Our enthusiasm knew no bounds when, after aforesaid building had been completed, a second truck arrived, groaning under its load of beer cases, to stock this temporary bar; for such it proved to be. That evening, the contented murmur of a thousand voices, rose to a mighty hum, as the men lay around on the grass, drinking beer from bottles.

This event signalled the breakup of the camp; the men, there-

after, being dispersed over the vast complex of the Witwatersrand area. My contingent was sent to Boksburg and it is only of this theatre of operations, I intend writing thereafter. I naturally heard a lot about the happenings at Brixtonridge and elsewhere, but my recollections of these are too sketchy and incomplete to enable me to form a coherent picture. At Boksburg we were encamped on a football field at the back of the police station and a seemingly endless round of day and night mounted patrols began. At first the strikers were friendly and polite, but as incidents increased, the tension mounted up and I can remember occasions when we were reviled and cursed by men and women alike. Especially the women seemed to find delight in heaping on us all the obscenities they

could lay their tongues to. If we suffered indignities, it was nothing to what the men of the Police Reserve had to endure. These men, recruited locally, were looked upon as renegades by the strikers, and for them was reserved the most bitter opprobrium. The women spat at them and the most favourite insult hurled at them by the strikers, was: “You dirty five bob bastards”. Notwithstanding this antipathy, the camp was the favourite rendezvous for the young girls of the town and, on most days, a half dozen or more, could be seen hanging around its environs. The interminable patrols continued and as incidents increased, our nights became more disturbed. We hardly ever completely undressed, for when an (Continued on page 67)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued from page 66)

alarm was sounded, we were given exactly five minutes, from the time the whistle blew, to dress, find your horse on the picket line, saddle up and be on parade, fully equipped, ready to move off. We were six men to a bell tent and each man slept with his rifle and kit hugged close to his body. There just wasn’t the time to grope about in the dark for missing articles. Eventually the strikers began to openly hold drill parades and make other militarily prepara-

tions. This culminated in a severe clash with the Police, when they attempted to release by force, several of their leaders who had been arrested some days previously for seditious acts and who where then locked up in the Cinderella Prison. The turmoil and confusion of the evening still stands out clearly in my mind. Our officer – I believe it was Captain Leishman – called on them to disperse and when they disobeyed, gave the order for the first troop to charge (I was in the third troop). Vividly I recollect, the slithering NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

of the horse’s iron-shod hooves, on the hard surface of the road, as they were spurred away from a standing start; the crash as the horses struck the massed strikers; the yells; the screams of agony and above all the dull thud of the batons, punctuated by an occasional shot. Then suddenly, it was our turn to go, but by now the main body of strikers had parted and reformed on either side of the street, in the dark shadows cast by the trees. They had also armed them(Continued on page 68)

(Continued from page 67)

selves with jagged pieces of granite, from a nearby prison quarry and as we swept in between them, we were greeted by a deadly hail of stones that caused havoc in our ranks. My position was on one of the extreme flanks and as we rode in, I recollect seeing a man

emerge from out of the shadows, who was carrying an outsize hunk of rock in his back flung hand. I was obviously his target as he edged forward, but fortunately for me, in his eagerness to get within effective range, he inadvertently stepped off the edge of the pavement, at the moment of throwing, thus spoiling his aim. The stone

passed harmlessly over my horse’s neck and the next moment, standing up in my stirrups, I brought my baton down with a satisfying thwack on his head. Out of the corner of my eye, I saw him pitch forward, down between the galloping horse’s legs. Some minutes later, all was over, with the striker’s on the run, leaving two or three of their

Demonstrating miners fill the streets of Fordsburg The Cape Times, March 11 1922 NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 69)

(Continued from page 68)

numbers dead.

As far as I can remember no policemen were killed during that clash, although quite a few were wounded. Captain Leishman who somehow had been cornered in a cul-de-sac, by a number of striker’s during the melee, was so severely beaten up, that he was forced to spend some

sustained the injuries.

dence as we moved forward.

This event was followed, shortly afterwards, by the dreadful carnage, inflicted on the Transvaal Scottish, as they were detraining at Dunswart. From accounts, the striker’s heavily armed – having evidently received prior intelligence of the movement of troops – were lying in ambush in an adjacent plantation, when the

As a precautionary measure, we had scouting parties riding ahead. There was a flurry of shots and one party came galloping back, to report having been fired upon. One member of the party said: “Man, a bullet came so close, it jerked my helmet”. Actually, how close that bullet had been, he only realized

Sandbagged defences at Johannesburg Town Hall The Cape Times, March 11 1922

weeks in hospital. Taking stock of my personal injuries, in my tent later that same night, I found I was a mass of bruises from the hips upward. Examining a jagged tear in my helmet, I realized that but for the protection afforded by that useful piece of headgear; I would probably have been brained.

Strange to relate I could not recollect just when and how I had

Transvaal Scottish alighted from the train. Holding their fire until all had assembled on the platform, they opened up with devastating effect, practically wiping out the whole contingent. This apparently brought matters to a head, for on a Sunday morning shortly afterwards, my contingent formed part of a massive convergence of forces on Benoni. Police, Defence, Artillery and Citizen Forces, were in eviNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

when someone pointed out a neat hole, with a corresponding one at the back, just above the badge on his helmet. We, thereafter, proceeded cautiously and eventually drew up in array behind the Benoni Sanitary Compound, where a consultation between the respective commanding officers took place. (Continued on page 70)

(Continued from page 69)

Then once again we were on the march, my contingent moving back along the railway line for a short distance, before cutting the wires and crossing it. Our task was to encircle the Dunswart race course and the iron-foundry from the east, before proceeding on Benoni. Well on the fringe of the racetrack we dismounted, leaving the third man in each four as horse holder. Proceeding across the bare racetrack in extended order, we came under heavy fire from the direction of the foundry and plantation, on the opposite side of the track. Several men were killed that day crossing the racetrack; among others a certain Warrant Officer Milne of the Police and an unknown Lieutenant of the military forces. Being a callow inexperienced youth at the time, I might have suffered the same fate, had it not been for the wise council of my half-section Bill Abrahams, a veteran of the 1914 – 1918 war. It was he who instructed me how to chose my objectives carefully, before getting up and running; to make use of every bit of cover and of every fold in the ground; to get up as if ejected from a catapult and to fall again as if shot; to put up the heaviest possible barrage of rifle fire before getting up and to run in a zigzag manner. Half-way across the racetrack, the heavy boom of big guns to our rear, heralded the coming into action of the artillery and soon the plantation and iron

foundry were infernos of bursting shells.

necessarily in an opening in the plantation, facing Benoni.

This quickly put paid to the strikers, who hurriedly withdrew into Benoni. Soon thereafter, we occupied their positions, finding quite a lot of abandoned equipment; among other things, homemade hand grenades made of syrup tins, filled with scraps of iron and sticks of dynamite, complete with detonator and a short length of fuse to explode same.

Suddenly he toppled with a bullet wound in the thigh, while from Benoni – a good nine hundred to a thousand yards away – came the flat ‘khu-ka’ report of a Mauser rifle.

The strikers had a neat network of trenches in the plantation, the layout of which, as well as the manner in which they conducted their operations, bore that semblance of military orderliness, usually associated with a regular disciplined force. This will be better understood if it is mentioned that many of them were soldiers of the 1914 – 1918 war, while probably quite a few were officers of fairly high rank. They, of course, had no heavy guns, but what they lacked in artillery, they made up for in the accuracy of their shooting. I remember one of our horse holders, who stood leaning against an iron fencing standard, getting his back-side and other parts of his anatomy peppered with fragments from a shattered bullet, fired from an innocuous looking patch of mealies, about eight hundred yards distant on his left flank. Fortunately for him, the bullet struck the standard. Another instance where a man’s bravado proved his undoing, was that of the Transvaal Scottish soldier, who despite the warnings of his comrades, persisted in exposing himself unNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

That same day a government forces reconnaissance aeroplane was also shot down by rifle fire. After cleaning up the Dunswart area, we moved into Benoni. Many streets had been barricaded and the fighting shifted from barricade to barricade, with a lot of sharpshooting taking place from the tops of tall buildings. As we moved forward, buildings on our flanks were systematically searched and all males found taken into custody. It was alleged that many of the males changed into women’s clothes and thus attired carried on the fight. I personally, did not find any men so dressed. It was while assisting in the searching of houses, that I had a narrow shave. Knocking on the front door of a dwelling and receiving no answer, I walked around the side where a rainwater tank was situated. Passing the tank, I unexpectedly found a window behind it and glancing in, saw a man training a rifle on me. I jumped back so violently that my rifle knocked my helmet off. A shot exploded and a bullet ricochets away from the surface of the path, a few feet in front of me. Simultaneously I heard footsteps inside the house, racing towards the back and I also wended my way towards the back entrance with all expe(Continued on page 71)

(Continued from page 70)

dieny, arriving just in time to see a man dash from the door and go flying down the garden path, towards the backyard wall. Without taking proper aim and more as a reflex action, I pointed my rifle in his direction and pulled the trigger, just as he leaped from the wall. He fell back, screaming like a stuck pig, while I, having no time to waste – and rather callously, I am afraid – ran on to the next house. However, a few minutes later, I met an ambulance unit, whom I directed back to the wounded man. Later in the day I learnt that he had been only lightly wounded in the buttocks, which part of his anatomy, no doubt, had been uppermost as he tried to negotiate the backyard wall. Towards afternoon the firing died down and somehow or other I gravitated towards the mortuary. Here I found a number of reluctant temporary morticians placing scores of bodies into coffins. I strolled about and saw row upon row of bodies laid out. I did not count the bodies, but have a vague idea I was told that there were over forty. One body in particular, still stands clearly etched in my memory. It was that of a male, with a wound in the abdomen, covered by a layer of bloodied froth. The business centre of Benoni was a shamble. Plate glass windows of business premises had been smashed and goods looted. Some of the merchandise was still lying about the streets and guards were mounted to

prevent further looting. A detachment of us moved on to Brakpan that same afternoon. It became dark before we got there and later a searchlight, mounted in a mine headgear, caught us in its beam and we came under sporadic fire, with the bullets coming uncomfortably close. We later discovered, to our intense indignation, that it was our own people who had fired at us, under the mistaken impression that we were strikers. We dossed down at one of the mines that night and the next morning we wandered through Brakpan. We found that it had suffered just as much as Benoni from looting. There was plate glass scattered over the pavements and streets and most of the merchandise had been removed. A notice in a window, crudely printed on a piece of cardboard, caught my attention and made me smile. It read: “Will the person who took the ice-cream machine, come back for the remaining parts, for I am sure the machine as it is, can be of no use to him”. A day or two later found us back at Boksburg again – this time encamped at the Cason Staff Quarters. Martial law was still in force and liquor of any kind was unobtainable – that is, to all excepting the select few who had the good fortune to occupy our tent. For, although I have not mentioned it before, my pal Bill Abrahams, among his other accomplishments, was also an expert NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

scrounger. Many were nocturnal raids on the quartermaster’s dumps, with our nosebags slung across his shoulders. Great was his diplomacy, when it came to cultivating good relations with the regimental cooks. Consequently, our horses were the sleekest and we were the best fed men in camp. As for liquor, every bottle of whiskey we consumed, a full one would mysteriously appear. When questioned as to the source of his supplies, Abrahams would become evasive and vaguely hint about his ex-S.A.C friend, who was supposed to be managing a club, somewhere in the vicinity. Even some of our officers surreptitiously visited our tent for a drop of the stuff that cheers. It was round about this time that the Bondelswart campaign was first mentioned and volunteers were called for. I rushed off to register my name, only to be told that I was too young and inexperienced and that only men with previous war experience were being selected. I was bitterly disappointed, but there was nothing to be done about it and so a few days later, I found myself on a train, with my kitbag, rifle and blankets, returning to my station.

I was not much older than I had been when I had left some three months previously, but I had gained considerably in experience during that period.

Die Afrikaner - 14 Augustus 1998 AGTERGRONDARTIKEL: Brig. TJ “Rooi Rus” Swanepoel Deur Rika van Graan Bron van dokument: Paul Els het die artikel vir my gestuur en die artikel is na bewering deur ‘n persoon geskryf en op die sosiale media versprei. Ek het navorsing gedoen en vasgestel dat Rika van Graan die artikel geskryf het en ek die artikel op die volgende webwerf gekry: 19601013NewAgeDrDadooRest rained.pdf - Ahmed Timol https://www.ahmedtimol.co.za› articles Ek dink die artikel is relevant vir ons polisiegeskiedenis want dit belig ‘n “anderkant” van ons geskiedenis en bevestig ‘n “ander tydsgewrig”. Geskiedenis moet egter in konteks gesien word want dit is vir “politieke doeleindes” geskryf. Die brigadier was HNP-kandidaat. Lt.genl. Andre Beukes ooggetuie en was by die Israeligyselaarsdrama betrokke en ons het reeds sy weergawe en die van genl.maj. JAP Burger oor die bepaalde gebeure in Nongqai geplaas. In verlede maand se spesiale uitgawe het dr Steenkamp ook na brig. Swanepoel verwys en ons het vir hom om kommentaar gevra wat ons elders sal plaas.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Brigadier Theuns Swanepoel ("Rooi Rus") Hy was met oorgawe 'n polisieman en het met oorgawe in die SAP en sy land gedien. Met onuitputlike energie en deursettingsvermoë het hy altyd voorgeloop wanneer 'n operasie uitgevoer moes word. Die bynaam "ROOI RUS" het hy gekry toe hy as hoofondervraer van die Veiligheidspolisie menige Kommunis in die vroeë sestigerjare laat knak het. Brig Swanepoel is op 29 Februarie in 1928 op Stanger in Natal gebore en het later in Leeugamka opgegroei toe sy ouers daarheen verhuis het. Op 19 jarige ouderdom sluit hy op 5 Junie 1947 by die Polisie aan. Hy trou op 12 Mei 1951 met sy vrou Sera Johanna. Hulle twee dogters Petro en Erika is uit die huwelik gebore. Die Rooi Rus word hoofondervraer van die Spesiale Afdeling in die Veiligheidspolisie toe die Suid-Afrikaanse regering vroeg in die 1960's oorlog verklaar teen Kommunisme. In sy hoedanigheid as hoofondervraer het hy ook die teiken geword van die arrogante linkse persgroepe in die land en is hy sodoende soms beskuldig van dinge wat gebeur het maar dan was hy elders besig. So was hy dan ook daarvan beskuldig dat hy Ahmed Timol op John Vorsterplein by 'n venster op die tiende verdieping sou uitgegooi het. Maar die teendeel is dat hy in daardie stadium in die hospitaal was. Vele Kommuniste het deur sy hande gegaan en vele het so verkrummel tydens ondervraging sodat die regering in daardie dae Kommunisme in Suid-Afrika in bedwang kon hou. Met vernuf en onverskrokkenheid het hy onder luit. genl. Tiny Venter sy taak verrig. Dis in die tyd dat die Rivonia-arrestasies ook uitgevoer is waartydens Nelson Mandela en sy meelopers

nagelang gearresteer is. Die volgende eerste vir die Rooi Rus was toe hy die eerste polisiebasis in Ovamboland in die noorde van Suidwes Afrika in 1967 gaan begin het. Die doel was om die instroming van terroriste hier hok te slaan. Sy eerste basis was Katima Mulilo (wat beteken vuur doodgemaak) in die Caprivistrook noord van Botswana. Hiervandaan het die Rooi Rus menige geslaagde aanvalle oorkant die Zambezierivier geloods en in die proses terroristekampe uitgewis wat binne dae die grens na Suidwes sou oorsteek. Hy het soms manalleen oorgrense verkenningstogte uitgevoer en na behoorlike observasie sy teenaanvalle geloods. Die Rooi Rus het net met mense wat hy as vriende beskou het die Slag van Singalumwe bespreek waartydens hy en vyf uitgesoekte manne in die nag vanuit 'n helikopter in die mees gevaarlikste omstandighede 'n hele terroriste basis uitgewis het. Hy het altyd met die hoogste agting vertel hoe Aap Möller behendig die helikopter laag bokant die boomtoppe gevlieg het sodat hy en sy manne met R4-gewere die lugaanval kon loods. Een van die manskappe was Schalk Visser, later 'n brigadier in die Veiligheidspolisie. Terwyl die Rooi Rus die noordelike basis beheer het, het Zambiese terroriste hom voëlvry verklaar en 'n losprys van 500 000 Amerikaanse dollar op sy kop gehad. Die Rooi Rus het in sy stryd teen die insypelende terroriste geen rus vir sy siel gehad nie en met 'n minimum slaap kon hy weke en maande sy mense en sy land dien.

In sy tyd was kapt Blackie Swart van Alberton een van die eerste NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

drie lotgevalle tydens 'n terroriste aanval in Ovamboland. So het die bevel ook van Pretoria gekom in 1973 dat brig Swanepoel en vyf uitgesoekte manne die TANZAM-spoorlyn tussen Lusaka en Luanda moet gaan opblaas. Weereens het die Rooi Rus sy vertroue in die vernuf en getrouheid van Aap Moller geplaas. Voor dagbreek het Aap hulle met sy laagvliegende helikopter teen die hange van die berge waar die Drietooninwoners woon, neergelaat. Hy het vertel: Ons het ooreengekom dat Aap ons sou kom “lig” as daar probleme sou opduik of as ons klaar was met die sending. Dit was so teen elfuur dat ons agterkom dat die terroriste weet van ons teenwoordigheid en besig was om ons te omsingel. Ons het geroep na Aap en geroep, maar al wat “inkom” was hy. Die brigadier vertel dat ons het geweet dat as Aap ons nie “lig” nie sal ons die nag vermoor word. Toe hulle byna moedopgegee het dat redding sou kom, hoor hulle met skemer die helikopter. Dit was toe Aap. Maar toe die Rooi Rus by hom wou weet waarom hy nie op bystand was nie beduie Aap dat hy moet stilbly. In die skemer toe hulle in veilige gebied vlieg merk die Rooi Rus vir die eerste keer op wie saam met hulle in die helikopter is. Toe word dit vir hom duidelik waarom Aap Moller hulle nie op tyd kon lig nie. In die helikopter was die destydse minister van verdediging, mnr PW Botha en gevolg. Hulle het die magte gaan besoek en moes toe op 'n besigtigingstoer oor die VictoriaWatervalle vlieg.

Dis waar die Rooi Rus se bloed (Vervolg op bladsy 74)

(Vervolg vanaf bladsy 73)

begin kook het en na 'n woordewisseling met die minister toe die helikopter op die aanloopbaan by Katima Mulilo land hy hom met 'n skop onder die agterstewe uithelp. Dit was die einde van die Rooi Rus in die noorde van Suidwes en deur middel van opdrag van Mnr Botha moes hy teruggetrek word waar hy in 1973 hoof van die Johannesburgse Blitspatrollie word.

skutters stelling in.

Rus met 'n bottel in die gesig.

Maar brig Swanepoel, onverskrokke soos hy bekend was staan oop en bloot onder in die straat by sy patrolliemotor en met 'n luidspreker kommunikeer hy met die beserkers. Minister van Polisie en die Kommissaris vlieg van die Kaap af na Johannesburg maar alles is onder beheer. Die Rooi Rus is op sy pos en ondersteun sy manne. Teen dagbreek is die

'n Oorlog bars los soos die jongmanne op die tierende skare losbrand en die skuldige wat die bottel gegooi het lyk soos 'n sifdraad na hy deur outomatiese masjiengewere platgevee is.

Hy was terug op die plek waar hy jare gelede as jong polisieman die bomplanter by Langlaagte spoorwegstasie gearresteer het. Maar nou as bevelvoerder het hy "my seuns" soos hy hulle genoem het begeester om net die beste te gee vir die SA Polisie en hul medemens.

Die Rooi Rus het sy regteroog in die aanval verloor maar daaroor het die liberale pers nie 'n woord gerep nie. Later in die jaar word hy na Hillbrow verplaas as distrikskommandant. Weer sit hy in 'n "warm" stoel want die Johannesburgse voorstad met sy kosmopolitiese bevolking is die mees digbevolkte in die wêreld. Hier is hy weereens vir menige van sy kollegas 'n voorbeeld. Op 'n Oujaarsaand toe meeste met partytjies doenig is, is hy saam met sy manne in Hillbrow om die veiligheid van die inwoners en motoriste te bewerkstellig. Presies om middernag roep hy hulle almal op die polisieradio en wens hulle 'n geseënde en voorspoedige Nuwejaar toe! Vanaf Hillbrow word hy Streekinspekteur van Polisie aan die Witwatersrand met die rang van brigadier. Die Rooi Rus tree in 1983 af op 55 omdat hy weet hy nooit 'n generaal sal word weens daardie veelbesproke "skop" wat hy op die destydse staatspresident se sitvlak geland het.

Kriminele en veral gewapende rowers en motordiewe het hul rieme styfgeloop want die Rooi Rus was altyd beskikbaar en het sy manne gewys hoe om dinge te doen. Talle kere moes hy polisiemanne se huislike probleme oplos en kon hy dit doen want hy het 'n onbevlekte lewe geleef en altyd die voorbeeld gestel. Hy was nooit met vakansie nie. Hy was altyd beskikbaar met raad en daad. In die tyd is hy ook bestuurder van die polisie se judospan wat 'n hele paar Springbokke opgelewer het. Sy skoonseun en dogter Erika is deel van die span.

beleg verby en die twee broers is inhegtenis geneem.

Op 25 April 1975 word die Rooi Rus se vernuf weereens beproef met die beleg van die Israelse Ambassade in Foxstraat, Johannesburg. David Protter en sy broer hou verskeie mense gyselaar en die Rooi Rus ontplooi sy manne op die grond en in en op aangrensende geboue neem polisie skerp-

Junie 1976 met die Sowetoonluste moet die Rooi Rus weer die leisels opneem nadat hoër offisiere aan die slaap gevang is. In die hitte van die stryd moet hy en sy manne wat van rusdae opgeroep is 'n massa tierende dreigende jeugdiges stuit. Die atmosfeer is gelaai en toe gooi een van die swartes die Rooi NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Vir sy vyande was hy 'n gedugte teenstander, van sy kollegas was afgunstig oor sy vermoë om met sy "seuns" en mense te werk. Vir sy ondergeskiktes was sy lewe die ideaal wat hulle wou nastreef. Vir sy vriende en gesin was hy 'n man uit een stuk, 'n man met 'n hart van goud. Vir sy vrou het hy gereeld 'n bos vars blomme vir (Vervolg op bladsy 75)

haar sitkamer gekoop en as hy nie self kon gaan nie het hy iemand gestuur om dit te doen. Brig Theuns Swanepoel, beter bekend as die Rooi Rus by vriend en vyand is een van die kleurvolste polisiemanne in die geskiedenis van die gewese Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie. Brig Swanepoel wat op 7 Julie oorlede is was 71 jaar oud. 'n Vader van twee dogters en vele seuns soos hy die jong polisiemanne genoem het. So het hy dit ook weer gedoen die Vrydag, 'n paar dae voor sy dood op 7 Julie. Die Rooi Rus was in hart en siel 'n stoere Afrikaner -- al het die KP hom gekaap om in Westdene vir hulle

'n setel te beveg teen Pik Botha weet ek hy was 'n ondersteuner van die Herstigte Nasionale Party. Hy het afgetree op 'n plaas by Roodeplaatdam waar hy gewoon en bietjie geboer het tot drie jaar gelede waarna hy weens sy siektetoestand in 'n aftree-oord wes van Johannesburg gaan woon het. Brig Swanepoel sal onthou word as 'n baanbreker op vele gebiede in die SA Polisie. Hy sal ook onthou word vir die voorbeeld wat hy gestel het om hart en siel te werk in wat jy glo. Met sy gesin of buitestanders het hy nooit sy werk bespreek nie en so het hy hulle baie spanning en bekommernis ge-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

spaar. Soos van sy eertydse ondergeskiktes met sy dood opgemerk het: "Daar was net een Theuns Swanepoel, net een Rooi Rus, sy kaliber van offisier is dun gesaai en ons glo nie daar is meer sulkes in die mag nie." Nou na sy dood het 'n kennisgewing dat hy gedagvaar gaan word om voor die Waarheids en Versoeningskommissie te verskyn by sy tuisadres aangekom. “Geskryf deur Engeland” (sic)

Cobus

GESKIEDENIS, FEITE, FIKSIE, LEGENDES, MITES ... HBH Nongqai, as tydskrif is gemik op begrip van die strominge wat ons geskiedenis help vorm het, daarom plaas ons hierdie 1998artikel verbatim, nie om enige praktyke vermeld daarin of die taalgebruik te kondoneer nie (ons gaan bv. beslis nie saam met beskrywings van jeugdiges wat met masjiengewere geskiet is dat hulle soos "sifdraad" gelyk het nie). Die artikel word verbatim geplaas, slegs vir historiese akkuraatheid, sodat die leser 'n eie gevoel kan vorm van die destydse tydsgees ("mind-set") wat sekeres se optrede beheers

het. Aan die anderkant is dit belangrik om kennis te neem van die politiek van die dag. Die artikel is destyds geskryf om sy kandidatuur te ondersteun. Die optredes vermeld moet ook nie gesien word as verteenwoordigend van die gehele SAP of SAP-VT se beleid oor bv. ondervraging nie - sien asb. verlede maand se Spesiale Uitgawe oor genl. Frans Steenkamp en sy daarby aangehegte rondskrywe met instruksies oor hoe ondervraging korrek gedoen moet word, as

illustrasie daarvan dat dit nie histories korrek is ons die hele Polisiemag oor een kam te skeer nie. Kommentaar deur HBH : Indien die bewering, dat hy die minister onder die sitvlak geskop het, juis is, kan ons opponente vra: “As hy die minister so behandel, hoe sou hy sy opponent behandel?” Aan die anderkant, gedurende 1970 tydens ’n veiligheidskursus het hy ’n staande ovasie ontvang na sy lesing. Hy is vir sy stryd teen terroriste met die gesogte SOO vereer. Ja tye verander

BRIG TJ “ROOI RUS” SWANEPOEL Dr Willem Steenkamp Beste Hennie By nabetragting, is daar beweringe in “Die Afrikaner” se artikel wat net sodanig feitlik foutief is dat mens dit nie in ‘n publikasie soos Nongqai sonder korreksie behoort te laat verskyn nie. Die twee belangrikste insidente waarby Brig. Theuns Swanepoel betrokke was (itv publisiteit en internasionale reperkussies) was sy hantering van die 16 Junie betoging in Soweto en die Protter-insident by die Israeli konsulaat. Hiermee ‘n kort

kommentaar, vir jou oorweging: Ongeag van wat sy kwaliteite as vader en empatiese leier van sy “seuns” mog gewees het, sal brig. Theuns “Rooi Rus” Swanepoel se rol in die nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedenis van Suid-Afrika altyd by uitstek tipeer word deur sy hantering van twee hoë profiel-insidente – die besetting van die Israeli konsulaat in Johannesburg op 28 April 1975 en die 16 Junie 1976 betoging deur skoolkinders in Soweto. Veral Soweto het blywende reperkussies gelaat, wat die latere verloop van ons geskiedenis ingrypend beïnvloed NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

het. Die konsulaat-insident (wat feitelik foutief in die aangehaalde artikel uitgebeeld word) is tiperend van ‘n bepaalde “kragdadige” benadering tot die oplossing van probleme, wat ook in die hantering van die aanvanklike jeug-protes in Soweto duidelik uitgekom het. Die aangehaalde artikel uit “Die Afrikaner” tipeer die insident by die konsulaat in Johannesburg feitelik verkeerd. Wat gebeur het is dat een van die konsulaat se eie veiligheidspersoneel, die geestelik-versteurde 24-jarige David Protter, die konsulaat (Continued on page 77)

(Continued from page 76)

beset en van die ander personeel gyselaar geneem het. Die onvergenoegde Protter het sy baas, die hoof van veiligheid Nurit Raviv Dudai, doodgeskiet en om aandag op sy klagtes te vestig het hy wild en wakker begin skiet, oor sy gyselaars se koppe heen, tot die effek dat op ‘n stadium gemeen is ses Japanese terroriste het die gebou oorgeneem. Volgens die amptelike Israeli verslag het Protter egter self niemand anders in die konsulaat gewond of gedood nie. Soos die aangehaalde artikel hierbo aandui, was brig. Swanepoel se strategie om polisieskerpskutters op omliggende geboue te ontplooi. Die polisie het hulle teen-vuur o.a. op die gebou se 5e vloer gerig en volgens die “Jewish Report” se verslag oor die 40-jarige herdenkingsdiens vir die slagoffers: “The police had also placed explosives around the building and at one stage were contemplating blowing up the entire building”. Die resultaat van die hele kabaal was twee dood in die konsulaat, twee op straat, en 32 gewond. Die situasie was dus allermins “onder beheer”, en is Genl. Lang Hendrik van den Bergh as Nasionale Veiligheidsadviseur

inderhaas vanaf Pretoria na die toneel gestuur, waar hy en Israeli ambassadeur Yitzhak Unna uiteindelik Protter se vreedsame oorgawe kon onderhandel, 17 uur na die drama begin het. Om hierdie insident met eer op Brig. Swanepoel se kerfstok te wil byvoeg, is ongelukkig net nie waar nie. Veel eerder is dit bewys van hoe “kragdadigheid” ‘n reeds plofbare situasie laat uitrafel het, totdat meer beredeneerde bevel oorgeneem het. Daar is al genoeg geskryf oor die Soweto-opstand se aanvang, om nie nou te veel verder daaroor te wil derms uitryg nie. Net soos brig. Swanepoel die nasionale veiligheidsbelang onomkeerbaar geskaad het met die gebruik van skerp ammunisie teen kinders, het die nasionale veiligheidstelsel ook vir hom as bevelvoerder in die steek gelaat – eerstens deurdat daar nie werkende traangas in Soweto ter hand was vir gebruik in die onlusbeheer nie, en tweedens omdat daar nie tydig na almal in bevelsposisies wat kon saak maak, instruksies uitgegaan het oor wat om in daardie bepaalde tydsgewrig te wagte te wees nie. Kommunikasie was gewis ‘n swakheid binne die intelligensie-stelsel,

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

met slegs maar rapportering na bo, na die kabinet. Die oorhoofse nasionale veiligheidskonteks van die moment was dat eerste minister Vorster in daardie dae op die punt gestaan het om na Duitsland te vertrek vir uiters belangrike samesprekings met die VSA se dr. Henry Kissinger en die Duitse kanselier. Die doel was om adv. Vorster se détente-inisiatief te probeer aan die gang hou na die vorige jaar se propagandaneerlaag in Angola met die faal van Operasie Savannah (die militêre inval daar deur die SA Weermag). Met die voordeel van terug-sig, is dit nou duidelik dat bevelvoerders soos Swanepoel gewaarsku moes gewees het dat die vyand sou probeer om hierdie krities-belangrike samesprekings te verongeluk, deur provokasies te loods wat vir propaganda-doeleindes in die media uitgebuit kon word. Almal moes op die hoede geplaas gewees het om sulke provokasies nie te laat slaag nie, deur met die grootste omsigtigheid op te tree. Kennelik is brig. Swanepoel nie so voorgelig nie en het die provokasie totaal geslaag toe daar met skerp ammunisie op die kinders geskiet is en dramatiese foto’s van ‘n sterwende Hector Peterson die wêreld ingestuur kon word.

Brig TJ Swanepoel Kommentaar deur HBH ‘n Straat-polisieman moet “tough” wees veral op die Witwatersrand. Brig. Swanepoel was een van die pioniers tov grensoorlogvoering en buitelandse koverte aksie. Hy was op 26 Augustus 1966 by die slag van Ongulambashe betrokke Dit is juis en korrek dat hy ‘n “eenmanoorlog” op die grens gevoer het. Dit het tot sy verplasing na Radiobeheer gelei, juis omdat hy genl. Dillon (SAP Oprukeenheid) en sy manne op die grens totaal omseil en “alles” self gedoen het. Die generaal was kwaad omdat hulle (SAP Uniform) op die grens omseil was. Brig. Swanepoel het nie sy inligting met genl. Dillon gedeel nie. Die dokumente is in die argief beskikbaar. Bo: Konst. C.A. Maree (links) en sers. T.J. Swanepoel, Miskien moet die artikel as ‘n propaganda artikel vir die HNP beskou word, hy was ‘n albei van Radiohoofkwartier, Johannesburg, word weens kandidaat. hul knap optrede in die jongste Afdelingsorder vermeld.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

LUITENANT-GENERAAL CF ZIETSMAN, SOO, SOE Me Rene Jooste

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Oupa Ziets As ek aan my Pa dink, is daar een groot waarheid wat hy baie graag met my gedeel het: “Die son gaan weer skyn more”. Pa was ‘n baie positiewe mens, Die glas was altyd halfvol en nie halfleeg nie. Sy werk het ons dikwels laat rondtrek, soms net ‘n jaar of twee op ‘n nuwe plek. Dit was nie maklik, veral vir my Ma nie. As ek terugkyk dink ek die ondervinding om elke keer nuwe maats te maak was ‘n lewensles. Pa het saans as hy tuis was die skottelgoed gewas na aandete en ons moes afdroog en wegpak. Dan het hy gehoor hoe ons dag verloop het. Sondae het hy vir ons kerrie en rys gekook en graag lang ente in die Magaliesberg gaan stap. Op sulke stappe het hy met enigeen wat hy raakgeloop het ‘n geselsie aangeknoop.

Ek was baie min bewus van my Pa se werk toe ek klein was, net geweet hy was ‘n polisieman en baie dikwels nie tuis nie. In my tienerjare, het ek en hy baie gesels oor die politiek, en hy was baie bewus van my afkeer in die apartheidsisteem. Juis daarom het ons baie min oor sy werk gesels, want ek het dit liefs vermy. Hy het my egter ondersteun toe ek bv. nie op hoërskool in Pretoria my skool se petisie wou teken ter ondersteuning van die polisieoptrede teen betogende studente nie. Ek dink in sy hart was hy ‘n speurder, en die jare in die Veiligheidspolisie was nie sy gunsteling tyd nie. Ek onthou vandag nog hoe hy en ek gesels het oor kommunisme. Daardie jare was dit soos ‘n vloekwoord,

en die regering het alles wat sleg is daaraan toegeskryf. My Pa het vir my al die positiewe eienskappe van ‘n kommunistiese sisteem uitgewys, en my gemotiveer om altyd my eie opinie te vorm en nie die regering propaganda sonder ondersoek te aanvaar nie. Toe ek na matriek besluit het om nie joernalistiek te studeer nie, was hy baie verlig! My Pa en ek het ‘n liefde vir letterkunde gedeel. Hy was veral lief vir Shakespeare en kon lang stukke aanhaal uit bv. Hamlet. Hy het die hofverslag van die NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

destydse Breyten Breytenbach verhoor vir my huistoe gebring om te lees. Ek het geweet dat hy baie simpatiek gestaan het, maar oor sy werk het hy baie min met ons gepraat. Hy wou nie dat ek ‘n afskrif maak nie en ek wens nou nog dat ek dit kon gedoen het. Ingrid Jonker was nog een van sy gunsteling digters, haar Rook en Oker bundel het hy as verjaarsdag geskenk vir my gegee. Alan Paton was ook ‘n gunsteling skrywer, en hy was baie lief vir sy hartroerende verhale wat in (Vervolg op bladsy 82)

Bo: Minister Louis le Grange, destyds minister van polisie (1979-1982) en minister van wet en orde (1982-1986), gee die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie Ster vir Uitmuntende Diens (SOE, Latyns: Stella Officii Egregii) aan luit.-genl. CF Zietsman tydens ‘n medalje en voorstellingsparade by die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiekollege. Datum onbekend maar sou tussen 19791986 gewees het. Die dekorasie in 1986 afgestaan.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Vervolg vanaf bladsy 80)

Natal afgespeel het.

Sy kleinkinders was vir hom baie na aan die hart, en ons was bevoorreg om toe my vier klein was naby aan hulle te gewoon het. Pa het op Bethal op ‘n plaas groot geword, die jongste van tien kinders en dit was baie koud daar. Hulle moes kaalvoet stap na ‘n plaasskool . Hy het elke winter in Pretoria vir my kinders ‘n kombers gaan koop by Pep Stores. Sy herinneringe aan die koue het hom altyd bygebly. Dikwels het hy kom aanklop by ons net om te kyk hoe slaap die babas! My seuns en dogter het baie mooi herinneringe van visvangekskursies saam met Oupa en Ouma. Hulle moes altyd daar gaan oorslaap die aand van tevore. Daar is dan ‘n krismisbed gemaak en hulle moes douvoordag opstaan vir die uitstappie. Vandag nog het hulle die viskaste wat Oupa vir hulle gekoop het. Ons het in 2002 Amerika toe verhuis. Alhoewel dit vir almal van ons baie swaar was om te groet, het my Pa ons in alles ondersteun. Die laaste dag toe ons moes lughawe toe en alles opgepak was, het hy en Ma aangestap gekom met sy kenmerkende kortbroek, tekkies en gholfhemp met ‘n bottel

whisky en mooi glase. Sy woorde was: “Rene’tjie, ons moet julle darem ‘n goeie sendoff gee “. Sy kuiers hier by ons in Alabama was baie kosbaar vir die hele gesin. Die laaste keer

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

toe ek by Pa gekuier het voor sy dood, het hy tydens groet tyd my styf vasgedruk. Sy woorde was: “Ek weet nie of jy weer moet kom kuier nie, want die groet is elke keer vir my moeiliker”.

Lieutenant-General C.F. Zietsman, S.O.O., S.O.E. Chief Deputy Commissioner (Detective Branch) GENERAL Zietsman has a reputation for being ‘‘fierce’’. He also has a wealth of stories to recount of his early days in the Force. He started his career as a young policeman in Durban, during the fighting between the Blacks and the Indians. The Blacks went on the rampage through the Indian trading area and burnt and looted all the shops. In one incident they had attacked the shop of an Indian and stolen his safe. The Police apprehended the looters a few hundred metres down the road. Just then, another Indian came driving along and told the owner of the shop that he would take the safe and guard it, as he lived far from the Black township. Off he drove with the safe, and took the contents! He was later convicted and sentenced. At that time, the Navy was still based in Durban and was called upon to help quell the riots, which rose to an ugly peak one Friday night when enraged Blacks rushed through the Indian quarter of Durban and Cato Manor and burnt and looted houses. In the clean-up operations that followed, with the assistance of three Dakota-loads of extra policemen, 184 bodies were recovered. The mortuary could only take ten bodies. Eventually, after the room next to the mortuary was full, the bodies were laid outside for identification and autopsy. Then the overworked undertakers had to get the bodies

there was a triangle of open ground, in a mainly White area. The Indians chose this for their demonstration. Reinforcements came from Johannesburg to join the locals, squatting there in their hundreds in defiance of the law.

removed as speedily as possible. In those days, the Police in Durban had no radio cars and so six were despatched from Johannesburg, one of which served as a base station. Once the worst of the rampage was over, investigation began and went on for five months, starting every morning at three. People got up early to go to work, and the Police had to search from house to house for stolen property. In the end the stolen property was placed in the street for identification purposes. During the riots Blacks could be seen carrying off beds on their heads from shops they had set alight, or sacks of meal; anything, in fact, which was not nailed down! In 1946, there was the passive resistance movement. This was caused by the Government passing what was known as the Pegging Act, which restricted Indians from buying land in what was predominantly White areas. The Indians decided to stage a sit-in. At a corner on Umbilo Road, NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

This went on for some time until the Whites decided to attack them. The Police, working twelve hours a day, seven days a week, now had to form a cordon to protect the squatters congregating at night. This went on for months until eventually it became only a token protest with the Indians informing the station of what they were doing and handing in their names and details for the records. Then a policeman would go to the site during the evening and let them know they were to be charged for breaking the law. It all happened very peacefully. A potato boycott was staged in the mid-SOs, instigated by a preacher back in 1946. He made allegations about farmers murdering labourers and burying them in the potato fields. ‘“If you eat potatoes, you are eating something grown from your kin’’, he said. This situation was discussed by the United Nations and the African National Council movement officially banned the eating of potatoes. For months their members destroyed every potato to be found in Durban. The African National Congress used to hold meetings during (Continued on page 84)

(Continued from page 83)

holiday periods, and these were attended by members of the Security Branch. The General and other members of the Branch, including Black policemen, once went to a meeting held in December. The

to attend the meeting and, if so, should they be allowed to occupy seats reserved for ANC delegates? Mr Luthuli, who personally knew the General very well, replied: ‘‘We are in a fortunate position in Durban in that we

about. Eventually the Police sat down in ANC delegates’ seats.

don’t know who are Congress members and who are Security Branch members. If there happen to be Security Branch members in those seats, they are welcome to keep them.”’ The Police had no further problems.

When the meeting convened, one of the ANC members asked the late Albert Luthuli if it was in order for the Security Branch

General Zietsman is a rigid disciplinarian, which has earned him his reputation, but he demands high standards from himself and

ANC members continuously harassed the Police, flashing cameras in their faces, sitting on the men’s laps and pushing them

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

expects it from others. The General has devoted his life to fighting crime. He has served in various sections of the Force including Security and now is head of C.I.D. His years of experience and dedication are a source of inspiration to all who have served under him.

AGTERGRONDVERSLAE: ROLSPELERS IN DIE NASIONALE VEILIGHEIDSGESKIEDENIS HBH In ons geskiedenis is dit ook belangrik om ‘n kykie agter die skerms te kry—ons lees in die uitgawe van brig Swanepoel, ons lees oor hoe ‘n mens genl CF Zietsman was. Nongqai is

gelukkig om ook van ‘n klein dogter van genl “Lang-Hendrik” van den Bergh te hoor. Sy vertel ons ook van Oupa die mens. Dit is so belangrik dat ons die volle mens leer ken. Ons plaas haar

vertellings in twee briewe—ons weerhou haar van en waar sy woon. Ons moet egter nooi die konteks verloor nie—ons was in ‘n werklike stryd gewikkel

MY OUPA GENL “LANG-HENDRIK” VAN DEN BERGH Sonika Geagte Meneer Heymans

Geagte Meneer Heymans

Ek skryf mbt die artikel oor generaal Hendrik van den Bergh in NONGQAI. Ek sou graag wou weet waar u die inligting vandaan gekry het, net vir interessantheidsonthalwe.

Ek sal beslis foto’s soek van Oupa. Ek het met Oupa se naamgenoot gepraat kort na ek die artikel gelees het en gevra waar hy dit gekry het, want hy het dit vir my aangestuur. Toe laat hy vir my weet dat hy deel gehad het in die skryf/ inligting vergader, en hoe 'n gesukkel dit was om bloed uit die familie klip te tap! Ek vra om verskoning vir my spelling en taalfoute. Ek was net 3 jaar in 'n Afrikaanse skool, op laerskool, en probeer klou aan my taal, maar kry min geleenthede om Afrikaans te praat, nie eers gepraat van skryf nie. Ek is baie self bewus en onseker, veral as Gmail alles ROOI maak!!

My naam is Sonika (familienaam weerhou), dogter van generaal van den Bergh se oudste, oorlewende dogter.

Daar is een fout in die artikel waarvan ek weet, waarop ek u wil attent maak en dit is die ouderdom waarop my Oupa uit die skool is. Hy het die skool verlaat in Standard 6, nie 9 nie. My oupa was 'n briljante man, 'n wonderlike en liefdevolle Oupa wie se kleinkinders sy wêreld was. Hy het deur baie hartseer gegaan in sy lewe, maar hy het ook 'n lewe gelei waarvan ek glad nie geweet het nie, en eers bewus geword het van in my 40er jare. Die man, "the most feared man in South Africa", was nie dieselfde man wat vir ons ure lank 'Black Beauty' gelees het, terwyl ons om sy voete geklou het soos vlieë op 'n Wilson toffie nie. Elke mens het twee kante.... Groete uit die verte Sonika

Ek dink nie ek sal ooit weet of iets 'n V of 'n F moet wees nie! Ek woon in die VSA, nou al vir die afgelope 21 jaar. Spyt kom altyd te laat. Ek weet in sommiges se oë is ek bevoorreg, maar ek voel ek moes nooit die land verlaat het nie. Jou Vaderland bly jou Vaderland. Ek dwaal maar die afgelope 21 jaar hier tussen die Yanks soos 'n Boer tussen die Rooi nekke! Ek onthou nog my Oupa se lag, sy reuk, sy manewales! Hy het ons as kleintjies sooo beïndruk as hy sy NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

valstande uitgehaal het!! Wat weet ons nou van valstande? Ons het net gedink Oupa kan sy tande uithaal! Dis beter as enige trick!! En, die beste van als is, hy het dit op aanvraag gedoen. Toe ons op die plaas gewoon het en plaasskooltjie toe gegaan het (laerskool Witpoort) het Oupa my, my sussie en my twee nefies by die busstop kom haal met sy groot groen John Deer trekker! Dit was die bederf van die jaar. Soos apies het ons vasgeklou op die klip pad met klippe so groot soos Vollas, deur die slote so diep soos jou bad. Dit was 'n wille rit! Ek het baie spesiaal gevoel toe Oupa vir my geleer het om sy spesiale "Tier Melk" te maak. Dit was sy drankie van keuse wat bestaan het uit Johnny Walker whiskey en vars koei melk van een van sy Fries Koeie. Dit was asof ons 'n geheime 'pact' gehad het, ek en hy....maar dalk, vir al wat ek weet het hy vir almal geleer hoe om Tier Melk te maak net sodat hy nooit weet self hoef op te staan van sy bruin leerstoel na 'n harde, stowwerige dag se werk nie! Vra vir enige van sy 13 klein kinders...en almal sal vir jou kan se, seker een van Lang Hendrik se grootste gawes was sy dat hy en die koffieketel 'n siel gedeel het. As jy daai koffieketel aansit (Continued on page 86)

(Continued from page 85)

en die koppies so reg sit daar stap Oupa by die kombuis deur in! ELKE. LIEWE. KEER! Sy koffie swart met 'n sacharien pilletjie en Frisco koffie poeier wat alles so skuim as jy die kookwater ingooi. Dan gooi Oupa dit eers in sy piering en drink dit dan so. Hy het ons almal gespeen op swart Frisco koffie wat hy met 'n teelepel vir ons voer. Snaaks genoeg het hy my op die ouderdom van sewe ook geleer om koffie te maak! In daai selfde bruin leerstoel waarin Oupa met sy stowwerige werksklere sy Tier Melk en koffie gedrink het deur die jare het hy sy oë vir die laaste keer toe gemaak. Sy hart was gebroke sonder Ouma

Kotie en al was daar nog 10 jaar in hom wou hy eenvoudig nie sonder sy skat voortgaan nie.

Daar is so baie stories en herinnering wat hom 'n wonderlike mens maak, en nie een daarvan het met politiek te doen nie. Dis jammer dat mens jou sukses as mens meet volgens die maatstaf van ander. Haai, nou raak ek meegevoer. Laat ek gaan soek vir foto’s. Ek gee solank my gunsteling. Ek is die kleintjie agter Oupa se rug. Dit is in Port Edward geneem by die polisie vakansie oord op die strand.

sit heel regs. Ons het iewers pragtige wit en swart foto’s van my oupa waar hy op die plaas werk. Ek sal bietjie soek. Dankie vir die gesels en die luister na my kuiertjie in die verlede! Groete, Sonika

Die ander een is die Van den Bergh-gesin in die 50-er jare, my ma, die oudste dogter van my ouma is tweede van links en Hendrik se pa Johannes Hendrik

SAP PORT NOLLOTH Kol Louis Langenhoven

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

C1965: DURBAN-RADIOBEHEER: “KODE 14”—FLORIDAWEG, SAP STAMFORD HILL Facebook: Richard van Wyk

Robert Suberg This collision was attended by the South African Police. One a Sergeant the other probably a Constable. In those days South African Police attended Collisions or Accidents involving Vehicles. If you look carefully the Sergeant has his Pocket book out in his hand to take down the collision. The Police Area was Stamford Hill Police Station, also

known to Lambert Road to the Black Community. Looks like a Police vehicle with a Blue Bar Light with “Police – Polisie” written on parked vehicle behind the Green Car. (Photo via Richard van Wyk)

Initially we had to attend to each accident and draw a plan and do a key to the plan. If there were injuries or a crime committed e.g. reckless driving or ‘driving under influence’ we had to open a docket, in those days a RCI.

Hennie Heymans

Most difficult thing was to attend to an accident was with your cap on!

We attended to 1000’s of accidents in Durban. We compiled a SAP 352 (S68E or S68A). NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

1969 PERSONEEL: SAP LOUIS BOTHA-LUGHAWE HBH

Bo links: Konst. Jan Jordaan tans woonagtig in Ierland. Hy was ’n lewendige mannetjie—ons was saam op skool. Een aand besoek ek die stasie toe is hy op ‘n toetsvlug na Jan Smutslughawe en terug, genooi. Dit bewys maar net “die SAP was orals”. Regs bo: HBH as Stasiebevelvoerder Regs: Sers Nkosi. Ek het geen ander foto’s van die staf nie.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

1968: S A POLICE BORDER DUTY FOXTROT COMPANY Dennis Delport Sgt 44786E

Photo: Joseph A Carr In 1968 Foxtrot Company with the strength of a Battalion men assembled at the Police College for training. The SAP instructors formed part of the training course. The CO was Major Karools Mouton from East London. He was an amateur boxer in his younger years. He was fit at the age of 42 years and during an excise run to the Voortrekker Monument he would lead the Battalion.

Airforce base in a Boeing passenger plane and landed at Vic Falls airport. We were each issued with a red and black clay dog tag. At a later stage this was replaced with a metal dog tag. As a section sergeant aged 22years I made it my responsibility to see that the men in our section went home a live to their mothers. In 1968 Section Sergeants were issued with a 9mm submachine gun.

The 1968 Foxtrot Company was the last police unit that received training from the South African Defense force. The instructors were Captain Visser (Parabat) and Lieutenant Geldenhuys (SAI).

The section had two excellent constables who I appointed as permanent scouts in the section. Constable Víctor from Vereeniging was a snake catcher and Constable Roux from Namaqualand who grew up on a farm

We departed from Waterkloof

(Continued on page 90)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued from page 89)

in the water spray of the Victoria Water Falls. About 03:00 in the morning the water spray from the Vic Falls condensed to form a cloud and afterwards a heavy down pour of rain occurred. To shower we went to the local Vic falls camp site. We used to jog down to the Vic Falls Hotel for a swim. One afternoon I saw a group of colleagues who had gathered around a person wearing a light blue safari suit and white shoes. They were taking about rugby and the person turned out to be Jan Pickard from WP who bought beer for everyone.

in Namibia and spoke the Bushman language. I was 14-years old when I started shooting with a Sten gun during a police target practice. In our first week on patrol above the Vic Falls I instructed the section to spread out with less taking and repeated the instruction the second time. As the reaction was slow, I fired a burst of three rounds into the ground close to the patrolling section. It was the first and last lesson I taught the section that we were not on a picnic. If an AK47 had been fired they would have been dead. During the week W/O Oosthuizen interviewed me in respect of the shooting incident. I explained the reason to him. He remarked “Sergeant, you did the right thing”. On my arrival at the Vic Falls bridge for the first time to do guard duty I greeted a Rhodesian Railways police constable who was doing Bible study. His first words left an indelible mark on my life when he said, “What is your religion?” It was a wonderful sight during a full moon to see rainbow at night

One outstanding event was a night off to attend a Des & Dawn Lindberg music concert. It was held in a sports club. During interval there was a small distraction to see young females with short mini dresses sitting on bar stools.

when a herd of elephants encircled the section. For safety they scrambled to climb

various trees in the dark. At sunrise they established that some section members had only climbed a height of 6ft off the ground. They then hammered tent pegs into the various tree trunks for safety. Dennis Delport Sgt 44786E Comment by HBH Sgt Fivaz is identical to Andre Fivaz, brother of Gen JG Fivaz, in our young days he was stationed at Pinetown (No 76 District, Durban West).

One morning me and my driver went on a short patrol on a gravel road in the direction of Pandamatenga. The Land Rover in which we were riding had no doors. We saw a pack of Wild African dogs and reduced speed. The pack of Wild African dogs started to run alongside the vehicle. I half hung out the doorless Land Rover and had a grandstand view of experiencing the pack of dogs in motion. From all the animals I became an admirer of the Wild African dog. Our patrol and guard duties were assigned to a combined 2 sections with 2 section sergeants with 7 constables in each section. Sgt Fivaz (Durban) and his section were one night at OP19 at the Zambezi river

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

THE 1970 RADIO FREEDOM BROADCAST FROM BOTSWANA Dennis Delport Sgt 44786E One evening in 1970 during my S A Police Border duty days in the Caprivi at Bwabwata I tuned into a Radio Freedom broadcast. What I heard was how the BIGEST onslaught was being planned on the Apartheid regime. I was shocked! I remembered sitting on a stage as a youngster and listening to B.J. Vorster speech attacking the old United Party’s checkers policy. I still wonder why I never grasped the opportunity to ask B.J. Vorster what price the white South African youth must pay while he was waving his finger around during his speech. The radio announced that there was a gathering of Revolutionary leaders attending a meeting in a West African country. Those attending were Joe Slovo, Gadhafi, Arafat, Castro and members of banned political parties. The meeting made the following

announcement: “We are prepared to indoctrinate a sixyear-old child with Revolutionary ideology and are prepared to wait for 30 years.”

ical ANC cells. Later he organized underground military structures. He was targeted by the Security Forces to be assassinated.

On 23 March 1964 I joined the S A Police in Cradock my father was Warrant Officer J. Delport who enrolled the first non-white police Reservist unit in the Eastern Cape.

Matthew Goniwe, Sparrow Mkonto, Sicelo Mhlauli and Fort Calata known as the Cradock 4 were presumably killed on the night of the 27 June 1985.

Later years I followed the unfolding political events taking place in Cradock. A drunken police brutality incident involving the death of a young black male sickened me emotionally. Warning bells started to ring to say that there was something terribly wrong in Cradock. Rev Canon James Calata (Whose late father was the Secretary-General of the ANC) became the mentor of Matthew Goniwe who was a teacher at a local township high school.

I was informed by an old colleague Hendrik Momberg who was the official photographer of the Security Branch that the black student riots and protest actions that took place in the Cradock township were the biggest and longest civil unrest that later also spread to GraaffReinet. The truth is, with the youth involvement in civil unrest is that they only had to wait 24 years for the South African political change in 1994. Dennis Delport.

He was the first to organize polit-

RESCUE OF A STRANDED SA POLICE BOAT ON THE ZAMBEZI RIVER AT MANA POOLS Dennis Delport Sgt 44786E In 1971 I kept a diary of my daily experiences during my border duty in the Zambezi valley. On the 16th March 1971 the section did a 7mile patrol along the Zambezi river. We were picked up by boat and transported up stream in the Zambezi river to an island. On the island the patrol struggled for about 5 miles in the dense high reeds and grass vegetation.

After a long day and a 12-mile patrol the section arrived back at the SAP camp at 18:00. I introduced myself to the new boatsman and inquired in what town was he stationed and if he had any experience in handling a Jet wing boat with an inboard engine. I was surprised to hear he was from Molteno a small town in the NE Cape. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

I grew up in Molteno and my farther was the local SA Police station commander. Further he informed me that he had no marine boat experience. The Zambezi River is a dangerous river to navigate on by boat. I informed my section that an unexperienced person was in charge of a boat and that problems would arise. (Continued on page 92)

(Continued from page 91)

One afternoon when our section was on camp duty at Mana Pools a radio message was received to inform that an SAP boat had an engine mechanical failure and had drifted into Zambian territory. The local game warden would assist in the recovery of the boat. From Mana

Pools we set off down stream in the Zambezi river. The reality of the width of the mighty Zambezi River became a reality when you are in the middle of the river and for kilometers you just see water with no land visible.We had to stop on a sand bank in the middle of the Zambezi River near a herd of hippo to replace a broken propellor pin. The stranded SAP boat was found at an

island in the Zambezi River.

The SAP boat was towed back to Mana Pools where it was repaired. There was a second incident when the SAP boat had an engine failure with Major van Wyk on board. They had to stay on the boat all night and endure the mosquitoes. Dennis Delport. Sgt 44786E

Above: Boat in distress having drifted in Zambian territory when the propeller pin sheared NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Above and below: Boat Rescue Mission into Zambia 1971

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

GROEN TWAK Dr Coert Mommsen (Die outeur van hierdie artikel vra om verskoning vir die gebruik van die woord “mal”. Dit word gebruik om die historiese outentisiteit van die verloop van die vertelling te verhoog asook om die wetenskaplike differensiasie van die siektetoestand aan die leser oor te dra). Hoe konsekwent is die gemeenskap se waardes, het ek al vroeër dikwels gewonder. Dán is iets teen die wet, dán nie. Nouja, as daar 'n rede is waarom iets onwettig is, is daar seker 'n rede. Een van die dinge waaroor ek egter gewonder het, is die gewettigde gebruik van dagga dwarsoor die wêreld. In SuidAfrika het die beginsel met betrekking tot privaatheid, dit maklik gemaak vir die meeste mense om Dagga te gebruik. (Dan is jy ‘n skelm, dan nie(!)). My oom was ‘n speurder in Parys in die Vrystaat in die veertiger-vyftiger jare. Die Vaalrivier loop deur die dorp en was altyd ‘n gewilde vakansieoord. Baie mense vanaf die Rand het naweke hier ‘n rondawel bespreek of kom kampeer. Dit was ‘n mooi plek en ideaal vir ‘n kort of lang vakansie.

In die loop van die rivier langs die dorp is baie eilande. Party groot, ander klein. Ons het (en ek is seker my oom ook), stories gehoor van inwoners wat dagga plant op van die eilande. Party van die eilande het in die Vrystaat gebied geval en ander in Transvaal. Die grensbepaling was by geleentheid (1900’s) ‘n tameletjie (en ek glo ook vir geregsdienaars vanweë die belangrikheid van bepaalde landdrosgebiede), en pres. Kruger se hulp is ingeroep. Soos

ek verstaan het hy om die probleem op te los, voorgestel dat ‘n leë verseëlde bottel by die boloop van die rivier ingegooi word en die pad wat dit stroomaf gevolg het, aanvaar word as die grens tussen die Provinsies. My oom het baie min van sy werk gepraat maar ek weet van “skelms” wat hy aan Vrystaatkant aangekeer het. Waarvoor alles is ek nie seker nie - mens kon maar net raai. Een van my oumas by wie ons bedags gebly het en by wie my oom gereeld sy Nongqai wat hy klaar gelees het, gelos het, het altyd gesê: “As mens dagga rook, maak dit jou mal”. “Hoe kan dit moontlik wees”, het ek altyd gewonder. Dis tog iets wat jy inasem. Mens kan mos nie iets oorkom van rook wat jy inasem nie…? Baie jare later, toe ek as sielkundige in ‘n saal gewerk het waar pasiënte met dwelmprobleme behandel is, het ek gesien my ouma was reg, mens kon psigoties raak van dagga. (“Boom” ”Weed” of “Matakwane” soos soms daarna verwys is) Die gebruik van onder meer Dagga, het mense laat kontak verloor met die werklikheid en hier laat beland. Toe het ek besef dat die eintlike doel van die gereg kan wees om mense teen hulself te beskerm. Hiervan was die destydse wet teen die gebruik van Dagga, een wat mense beskerm het teen soms geweldige hartseer en verdriet, sou ek later besef: Mense moet nou self eksperimenteer en ondersoek doen na die gevolge van Daggagebruik. Gelukkig is daar die NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

internet, die wêreldwye gemeenskaplike inligtingstelsel wat kan help. Kenners is van mening dat indien jy elke dag Dagga rook, is daar bevind dat jy ‘n groter kans staan om psigoties (“mal”) te raak. Rook jy Dagga as daar by jou ‘n familiegeskiedenis is van psigose, kan jy psigoties raak. As jy op ‘n vroeë ouderdom (16) begin Dagga rook, kan jy ‘n psigose ontwikkel. Mense wat erge ervarings gehad het met die gebruik van Dagga, vertel openlik op die internet hiervan. BrightQuest Treatment Centers bespreek die newe-effekte van Daggagebruik as volg: “(A) Pre- psigotiese simptome Wanneer Dagga ‘n psigose sneller, verskyn die simptome dikwels vinnig en sonder waarskuwing. Elke persoon se ervaring is egter uniek en daar kan waarskuwingstekens wees dat die persoon psigotiese simptome begin ontwikkel. Dit word pre-psigose of vroeё psigose genoem. Van die karakteristieke eienskappe en waarskuwingstekens sluit die volgende in: •

Depressie

•

Angs

•

Onttrekking

•

Paranoia

•

Woede en geagiteerdheid

•

Ontoepaslike sterk emosionele reaksies

•

Gebrek aan responsiwiteit

•

Probleme met helder denke of konsentrasie-probleme

emosionele

(Continued on page 95)

(Continued from page 94)

•

Onsamehangende spraak of sinnelose spraak.

Iemand wat bogenoemde tekens ervaar terwyl hy/sy dagga gebruik, kan die risiko loop om ‘n ernstige psigotiese episode te beleef. Dit is belangrik om hiervan bewus te wees en mediese hulp te kry wanneer en indien dit nodig is. ‘n Psigose kan baie ontwrigtend wees en kan veroorsaak dat ‘n lyer die risiko loop om homself/haarself skade te berokken. Indien mediese hulp in ‘n vroeë stadium van ‘n psigose verkry kan word, kan dit die individu help om veilig en beskerm te voel indien die simptome sou vererger…” Soos my ouma gesê het, as jy dagga rook, kan jy “mal” word. Wat beteken “mal” nou eintlik? Voor my universiteits-studies, het ek het nooit presies geweet wat “mal” regtig beteken nie. Eers toe ons sielkunde-dosente ons gelei na die wetenskaplike begrip het ons ‘n beter geheelbeeld gekry. Ek/ons moes dus as’t ware vergeet van die woord “mal” (Dit is eintlik ook maar ‘n wrede en lelike stereotipering, het ek later gedink.) “Wees nou versigtig”, het ons sielkunde dosent, Jakkie Erasmus (toe nog “meneer” en later professor), gemaan om nie die woord sigotiese soos in mono-sigotiese en di-sigotiese tweelingskap met die woord psigotiese te verwar nie! Simptome van Dagga geïnduseerde psigose Hierdie simptome volgende insluit:

kan

die

Waandenkbeelde (Delusies). Delusies is ‘n oortuigings wat vals is. ’n Persoon wat delusioneel is, is glo vas dat sy/ haar oortuigings die waarheid is,

sonder dat enige bewyse hiervoor bestaan. Dit selfs, al is daar duidelike bewyse dat sy/ haar oortuigings verkeerd is. Tydens Dagga-geïnduseerde psigose is paranoia en agterdog algemeen. (Paranoia kan gevaarlik wees veral indien die individu hierop reageer. Die persoon kan glo dat ‘n mede skolier of kollega van plan is om hom/haar dood te maak of skade te berokken. Die individu mag haarself/homself bewapen teen ‘n vermeende “aanval”. ’n Werklike “aanval” kan by geleentheid foutiewelik geïnterpreteer word met onnodige en tragiese gevolge. Grootheidswaan is nog ‘n soort delusie wat voorkom by Daggageïnduseerde psigose. (Die individu is oortuig daarvan dat hulle tot iets anders (besonder skitterend) in staat is as wat werklik die geval is): Byvoorbeeld mag hy/sy, wanneer in beheer van ‘n vierwiel motorfiets, glo dat hy/sy ‘n ingebore en spesiale talent het om hierdie tipe voertuig te hanteer soos dit gedoen behoort te word(motorfiets in die veld, bakkie in die veld, Moto-gp tipe ry op ‘n openbare pad, Kyalami renjaer-gedrag op ‘n openbare pad) Hallusinasies. Psigose veroorsaak dikwels hallusinasies. Hallusinasies is sensasies wat ‘n persoon as werklik beleef, maar wat nie so is nie. Hallusinasies kan ouditief (gehoor) wees waartydens die individu bv. stemme hoor, (dit kan byvoorbeeld gebeur die persoon stemme hoor wat vir hom sê dat hy/sy of sy sleg of verfoeilik is, ens.) Hierdie tipe simptoom kan baie ontstellend wees want die persoon kan nie hiervan ontsnap nie. Dit kan voel NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

asof die gewaarwording alomteenwoordig is en die persoon heeltyd bybly. Visueel, wat veroorsaak dat die individu beelde of tonele sien wat nie bestaan nie. Hallusinasies kan ander sensoriese vorms aanneem, insluitend gevoel (miere of wurms onder die vel) en reuk. Dissosiasie. Dissosiasie is die gewaarwording dat die persoon nie in kontak is met die werklikheid nie. Een tipe, depersonalisasie, veroorsaak die gevoel dat die individu buite sy/haar liggaam is. Derealisasie is wanneer die persoon oortuig is dat dinge en mense in sy/haar nabyheid nie werklik is nie. Disorganisasie van gedagtes. Disorganisasie van gedagtes en chaotiese gedagteprosesse sowel as voortgesette en ontstellende gedagtes is algemene eienskappe van psigoses. Die individu vind dit moeilik om helder te dink en om op enigiets te fokus. Vir die observeerder lyk dit asof die individu nonsens praat. Spraak is verwronge en spring so rond dat dit moeilik is om te verstaan wat die persoon probeer sê. Affektiewe (Emosionele) Gedragsafwykings.

Affek, of die belewenis van emosies kan versteur word deur ‘n psigose. Dit kan tot gevolg het dat die individu reageer gedrag of ontoepaslike emosies openbaar. (Die persoon glimlag op ‘n sinistere wyse wanneer hy/sy ‘n doodstyding kry. Hierdie veranderinge kan oordrewe wees soos wanneer ‘n persoon geagiteerd raak, kwaai of geïrriteerd raak. Psigose kan daartoe aanleiding gee dat emosionaliteit afgeplat is. Die individu blyk onemosioneel te (Continued on page 96)

(Continued from page 95)

wees en in sommige gevalle, selfs katatonies “(bron) Die simptome hierbo bespreek mag vir die leser op eerste oogopslag nie erg klink nie. Wanneer ‘n mens egter bystaan wanneer ‘n gesinslid van die simptome ervaar, kan dit traumaties wees. Dit mag vir jou voel asof jy heeltemal afgesny is van die persoon, omdat hy oënskynlik daar vóór jou

onsamehangend babbel of verwilderd of selfs “besete” lyk. Dit kan vir jou voel of jy die persoon “verloor” het, of dat die persoon van jou “weg” is of “afgesny” is of stelselmatig “wegdryf”. ‘n Sterk gevoel van verlies een hartseer kan jou beetpak en wanneer jy met die persoon wil kontak maak, is daar geen reaksie nie. Die gevoel van verlies en hartseer kan lank voortduur, totdat die kind of geliefde herstel het. Hierna mag

daar altyd ŉ gevoel van voortdurende onsekerheid, afwagting of twyfel by jou wees, en dit oor iets wat die mens “net ingeasem het”... Dr. Coert Mommsen. D.Phil. (Psigologie), M.A. Kliniese Sielkunde., EEG Tegnikus.

SWAP: SUIDWES-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE | SOUTH WEST AFRICAN POLICE Tinus le Roux Onder en volgende bladsy: Tinus le Roux het vir ons foto’s gestuur van sy Oupa in die SWAP—Geen verdere besonderhede nie!

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Photograph by John Liebenberg

Deur Chrisjan du Preez Dis 27 Februarie 1986. Koevoet gevegspanne Zulu 1 Hotel en Zulu Tango volg 4x spore in die digte, soos ons dit genoem het, "etterbosse" van die Ooste van Owamboland en Angola. Die terre is omtrent 30 minute voor ons en "anti-track" (teenspoorsny). Ons het al reeds die Alou-gunships by ons gehad, maar hulle moes terug Eenhana toe om te "refuel". Ek was op daardie stadium die 2’IB van Zulu Tango en in bevel van die voorsny karre (Casspirs), wat die spore vorentoe moet probeer optel. My opleiding as ‘n spooorsnyer het nogal gehelp met die takie, want as mens die beginsel van opvolg en spoorsny verstaan is alles makliker. Die bosse is dig en kort-kort moet 'n Casspir wat kook stop sodat die drywer die

blare voor die verkoeler kan wegvat. Saam met my is my boesemvriend, Len van Z1H, Theuns van Z1H en Angus van ZT.

dig is die etterbos! Ons besluit om so 400m op ‘n slag vorentoe te gaan en te probeer om die terre vas te trap of om kontak af te dwing.

Skielik, omtrent 800m voor die opvolg tel ons 4x hardloopspore op. Ons sit net 2 spoorsnyers op die spoor om skade te beperk, sou daar ‘n Pom-Z of ander antipersoneelmyn op die spoor geplant wees. Die spoorsnyers moet kort-kort wag vir die karre om by te kom in die dik sand en digte bosse. Die Casspirs kreun en word tot hulle maksimum vermoëns gedryf! Jack (Zulu Tango se groepleier) en Pottie (Zulu 1 Hotel se groepleier) op die nommer 1 karre vang op en vat die opvolg weer oor. Ons vier voorsnykarre beur weer vorentoe, in gelid, langs mekaar. Alhoewel ons so 20m van mekaar af ry, kan mens amper nie die ander karre sien nie, so

Die onvermydelike wag. Die adrenalien pomp. Daar is net een uitkoms. Dis net ‘n kwessie van tyd!

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

My kar kook en Sakkie, my drywer, spring gou uit om blare weg te vat voor die verkoeler. Die “gunships” is weer op pad, Romeo Victor 5184XL (ruitverwysing). Skielik is daar die duidelike “WHAMPPP” van ‘n “heatstrim” (anti-tank granaat) wat in ‘n Casspir se staal invreet, so op my 10-uur. Wie se kar kan dit wees? Len was laas links van my? Toe nog ‘n “WHAMPPP” … “WHAMPPP” … “WHAMPPP”! Fokkit, het almal van hulle “heatstrims”? Geen “kontak” oor (Continued on page 99)

'n Spoorsnyer maak seker al die manskappe is uit die brandende Casspir gered. Net hierna het van die ammunisie begin ontplof. (Continued from page 98)

die radio nie, geen rooi rook nie? Net stilte, en nog "WHAMPS" en nog STILTE! Dit voel soos ‘n leeftyd terwyl Sakkie weer agter die stuur inspring! Ons jaag so vinnig moontlik na die laaste “WHAMP” toe. So 50m verder maak die etterbos skielik oop en daar is groot bome met ooptes tussen hulle. Ek sien Len se Z1H2 kar teen ‘n boom staan, met rook en vlamme wat onder die kar begin uitpeul. “Asseblief Vader, laat hulle veilig wees? Asseblief Here, hy is my beste vriend!” Skielik trek my kar ook “heatstrims”. Ek sien gelukkig dit kom van ‘n groot boom, op my 2uur, wat omgeval het, se stam af. Sakkie sien dit ook en draai

die kar soontoe en ry zig-zag om ons ‘n moeilike teiken te maak. Ek pomp ‘n paar honderd .50 Browning rondtes in en om die boomstam in, totdat die “heatstrims” stil raak. Ek pomp ook alle ander moontlike skuilplekke met sarsies "flashing fire" met my LMG en Sakkie trap elke bos wat hy kan plat. Daarna gooi ek ‘n rooi rook en skreeu “KONTAKKK” oor die FM radio. Ook “ons het Casavacs, Len se kar is uitgeskiet en brand” Terug by Len se kar, brand hy nou redelik hewig, want die dieseltank is ook raak geskiet. Almal is besig om mense uit die kar uit te dra en sleep. Die bestuurder was op slag dood, getref deur ‘n “direct hit”. Verder was almal vol skrapnel, nog twee Owambos redelik ernstig. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Len self was vol skrapnel, maar OK. Iemand het die twee .30 Brownings en nog ‘n paar wapens kon red, maar toe begin die ammunisie, granate en mortiere binne die kar ontplof. Net ‘n gedagte: “As Koevoet kon Honorus Crux’e kry?” Lang storie kort. By RV 5184XL het Koevoet ‘n manskap verloor, rus in vrede, dapper held. Ook ‘n Casspir en baie wapens en ammo. Die karre het 3x terre geskiet en die “gunships” 1x. Al vier terre het SKS’e en AKMS’e gehad, met ‘n wavrag vol “heatstrims”. Hulle was deel van die hardegat Typhoon spesmagte van PLAN. Dankie Vader dat U boesemvriend, Len, en

my ons

(Continued on page 100)

Zulu 1 Hotel se nommer 2 Casspir brand hewig. (Continued from page 99)

ander se lewens weereens gespaar het! Dankie vir die voorreg om saam met manne, met senuwees van staal en die

As 'n foto kon praat… Deur Corrie Prinsloo

moed van leeus te kon werk! Dit laat my dankbaar, klein en nederig voel. Saluut! Tot ander dag! Goedheid en guns!

Wie van julle het 'n spesiale foto uit die verlede op die Grens... wat boekdele kan spreek? Wat voor en ná die neem daarvan nog verhaaltjies van sy eie kan vertel...? Kyk bietjie na my geplaasde foto hieronder... Wat sien jy...? Die foto is deur Vroulief Riana Steyn Prinsloo geneem tydens 'n besoek aan my ouerhuis op Tsumeb. Voor ons troue. Voor eersteling Luandri Prinsloo se geboorte. Voor die 1 April 1989 NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

inval se "Nine Days of War". Voordat ek Sam Nujoma se lyfwag en Security Aide geword het. Voor Namibië se eerste demokratiese verkiesings einde 1989... Dit wil sê - toe die Bosoorlog nog ernstig in aanvang was! So het ek gelyk toe ek op een slag die ekwivalent van drie TM-57-teentenk-landmyne langs Ruacana dorp afgetrap het! Toe die Mig 23's oor Ruacana kom (Continued on page 101)

100

Foto @ Riana Steyn Prinsloo, Ruacana, 1988. Adjudant Offisier (1) CJG (Corrie) Prinsloo, Bevelvoerder van SWAPOL Ruacana Veiligheidstak en Polisie gevegspan 21 Uniform... (Continued from page 100)

draai het. Toe ons gereeld kontakte met die Polisie gevegspan afgedwing het suid én noord van die jati - én dit oorleef het! Toe ek en Swaer Bertie Steyn en ons nommer een seksie met 'n Puma uitgevlieg is berge toe met die 1 April inval, om 'n verlore Koevoet makker te gaan opspoor, én hom gekry het...? Kyk na die foto... Geen haat en verwyt oor wat ek daarbo moes doen nie! Vir tien en 'n half jaar ononderbroke...! Landmyne getrap en kontakte afgedwing. Stukkende lyke gaan optel as 'n PB bakkie 'n landmyn

afgetrap het. Die ruk in die dubbel LMG se handgrepe gevoel het in die hitte van 'n kontak - net om daarna vir die swart seksiemakkers te sê as die kontak suksesvol was : "Kalunga onéne... God is groot!"

Uniform se nommer 2 Casspir drywer! En ons het straks sy (Sam) lewe gered een dag op sy verkiesingsroete voor onafhanklikheid. Daardie storie is ook iewers in die foto se sagte lyne versteek...!

Ja, my vriend... 'n foto sê alles! Maar wat jy nie daarop in my oë sien nie, is ook hartseer. Spyt. Verdriet. Twyfel. Ewige vrae...!

Polisieman in REGTIG...?

Tog... ek het dit gemaak. Sam Nujoma onthou vandag nog vir my as "Kollie" van Ruacana. Sy persoonlike Security Aide vanaf SWA magte se kant nadat ek hom jare lank beveg het! Sy kookster op sy plaas vandag is die eggenote van my SWAPOL Veiligheidstak gevegspan 21 NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

die

oorlog...?

Kyk weer na jou ou foto's, makker! Dalk... net dalk, onthou jy ook iets spesiaals oor ons tyd daarbo...

101

DIS WIE JY KEN BY KOEVOET: Deur Chrisjan du Preez Jackie Grobler, gevegspanleier van Zulu Gholf, was onteenseglik oom Sterk Hans Dreyer se witste witbroodjie gewees. As mens 'n groot guns wou gehad het, dan vra jy vir Jackie Grobler, dan vra hy die Baas, dan kry jy dit. Hy was ook een van die min wat met oom Sterk Hans se C260 Mercedes mag gery het. Die woorde vrees, bang, ophou, opgee, genoeg, later en 'n klomp ander het nie in Jackie se gedagtegang bestaan nie. Dis nie enige ou wat die Namacunde Fapla / Swapo basis in die nag te voet met mortiere aanval nie! Ook nie enige ou wat met 'n Isuzu sagtedop bakkie die landmyn-pad tussen Oshakati en Omungwelume ry nie! Of 'n groep van 30+ Swapos met die selfde Isuzu in die nag aanvat nie! Vreesloos! Hehe ja, en ekke moes al hierdie toertjies saam met hom deurmaak. Jackie was my mentor toe ek by Koevoet aanland. Vir een of ander rede het ons dadelik "gekliek" en hy het my so half onder sy vlerk ingeneem. Dit het natuurlik voor- en nadele gehad. Voordele was dat ek van hom kon leer wat niemand anders mens kon leer nie. Van inligting insamel, 'n bronnestelsel opbou, beriggewers hanteer, ens, ens. Dit het bygedra tot ongekende suksesse wat ek as "nuwe" spanleier kon behaal. Ons het terre uitgehaal op plekke waar ander gedink het nie terre kon wees nie, en veral Typhoon het ons paaie baie

gekruis. Dit was later ‘n tipe van uitdaging gewees om die “onmoontlike” moontlik te maak. Ek dink vinnig aan ons ambush / kontak naby die Miershoop weermagbasis. Ook aan die kontakte wat ons ver Suid van Ruacana gehad het, in die pannetjiesveld net bokant Etosha Wildtuin. Daardie dag het ‘n ops-offisier my ruitverwysing bevraagteken, toe ek vra vir die Alou gunships om vir ons lugsteun te kom vlieg. Ek het ook die offisier in Afrikaans NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

vertel waarnatoe hy’ kon vlieg! Ons het altesaam agt koppe oor drie dae geskiet daar. Almal het nie van Jackie gehou nie, vir verskeie redes, maar almal het hom respekteer. Vir my was hy egter 'n "idol" gewees, ek sou my lewe vir hom gee, maar ook anders om! Dankie vir alles, Jackie, my "Brah", respek en saluut!

102

Onder redaksie van Frans Bedford-Visser

S.A. Spoorwegpolisie Sake, verhale en staaltjies Brigadier Ronnie Beyl

Hie’ sta’ die Manne! Oud Spoories by ‘n byeenkoms in Addo on 19 October 2013. V.L.N.R.: Johan de Jager, Gerrie Beziuidenhout, Diedericks Stears , Ronnie Beyl, Johann Kumm, Hannes Slabbert

Mejuffrou Wêreld. Terwyl ek op Otjiwarongo en Hannes Bezuidenhout op Outjo gestasioneer was, moes ons ŉ gevorderde kursus by Esselenpark deurloop om as plofstofdeskundiges opgelei te word. Met reistyd ingesluit, was ons ongeveer twee maande van die huis af weg. Een Sondagaand besluit ek en Bez dat ons sersant Herman de Jager, ŉ oud Suidwester wat op Jan Smuts lughawe

gestasioneer was, wou gaan besoek. Ons het met die trein vanaf Kaalfontein stasie na Isando stasie naby die lughawe gereis. Om ongeveer elf uur dieselfde aand, nadat ons ŉ rukkie saam De Jager gekuier het, het ons besluit om na Esselenpark terug te keer. Ons het, tot ons ontsteltenis, ontdek dat daar nie meer ŉ trein daai tyd van die aand op Isando stasie stop nie en dat ons die trein op Kemptonpark stasie, NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

wat ŉ kilometer of twee van die lughawe was, moes haal. Ek en Bez het toe in die pad, wat voor die binnelandse vertreksaal verby gegaan het, gaan staan. Bez het die aankomende voertuie gestop en ŉ geleentheid na Kemptonpark gevra. Hy moes die praatwerk doen want ek kon nie Engels praat nie. Terwyl ons daar gestaan het, het ek ŉ pragtige blondine opgemerk wat met ŉ (Continued on page 104)

103

(Continued from page 103)

Datsun 120Y op ŉ ongemagtigde stilhouplek geparkeer gestaan het. ŉ Skare mense het rondom haar vergader en my hart het gebokspring terwyl ek Bez se aandag daarop gevestig het dat die blondine ene Annelien Kriel was en dat sy op daardie tydstip Mej. Wêreld was. Bez wou my nie glo nie. Ons het ons weg gevind tussen die omstanders deur na waar sy in haar motor gesit het en ek het myself aan haar voorgestel. Ewe beleefd het ek haar gewaarsku dat ek haar sou arresteer omdat sy op ŉ onwettig plek stilgehou het. Ek het toe haar naam en adres gevra sodat Bez kon hoor dat ek reg was; dat sy eintlik dié Annelien Kriel was. Sy het eers gehuiwer, maar toe Bez aan haar sê dat ons van Suidwes was en dat ons ŉ weddenskap aangegaan het oor wie sy was, het sy vriendelik erken dat sy van Witbank kom en dat sy wel Annelien Kriel was. Sy wou by Bez weet waarom hy so oningelig was, waarop Bez geantwoord het dat hy van Outjo kom en daar nie koerante was nie. Bez het al sy sjarme ingespan en vir Annelien oortuig dat sy ons eers in Kemptonpark moes gaan aflaai en, voordat sy nog kon besluit, was ek en Bez klaar in haar motor, maar natuurlik nie voordat daar ŉ gestoeiery was om te bepaal wie voor langs haar sou sit nie. Bez het gewen omdat hy groter en dikker as ek was. Onderweg na Kemptonpark het sy Bez meegedeel dat ŉ universiteitsvriendin van haar ook van Outjo afkomstig was. Hierop het Bez vir haar gesê dat hy, as die munisipale bul op Outjo, almal gedek het en dat daar nie so vroumens op Outjo

woonagtig was nie. Met al die nonsense wat ons kwytgeraak het, kon sy beswaarlik die motor in die pad hou soos sy gelag het. Met ons uiteindelike aankoms by die stasie het Bez aan Annelien gesê dat hy nie na Outjo kon teruggaan en nie vir manne daar kon vertel hoe ŉ Mej. Wêreld soen nie. Sy het geglimlag en gesê dat sy kon sien waarom hy die munisipale bul van Outjo was en hom ŉ soen op sy wang gegee. Bez se reaksie op die soen was: “Not a hell!” en met albei sy hande het hy haar gesig vasgevat en haar toe ŉ behoorlike soen gegee. Sy het geskaterlag vir sy manewales. Nadat ons haar gegroet het, het sy al laggend en waaiend weggery. Ek het vir Bez gevra hy moes voel hoe vinnig my hart geklop het. Die motor het al om die draai verdwyn toe ons nog in die pad gestaan het; hy wat besig was om my hartklop te voel en ons wat nie ons geluk kon glo nie. Bez het toe dadelik met die storie begin dat wanneer hy na afloop van die kursus op Outjo sou arriveer, hy sy vrou met die hand sou groet want hy was mos toe beter gewoond. Hoe dié storie so vinnig op Outjo uitgekom het, weet ons nie, maar die dag toe ons twee met die trein te Otjiwarongo arriveer, het al twee ons vrouens met die kinders op die perron gestaan en ons ingewag. Toe Bez sy pragtige vrou, Barrel, wou groet, steek sy haar hand na hom toe uit en sê: “Ek hoor jy is nou aan beter gewoond.” Ek weet nie hoe Steve, Joost en Zuma gedink het dat hulle met ŉ skelm gevryery kan wegkom nie. (Weitsche Fourie) Die invloed van televisie in Windhoek.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

In 1980, toe ons in Windhoek aangekom het, kon jy op ŉ Vrydag of Saterdagaand wanneer jy deur die woonbuurtes van Windhoek gery het ŉ braaivleisvuur in feitlik elke erf sien brand het. Dit was die kuiertyd van die Suidwester. Daar was weinig ander vermaak of aktiwiteite waarmee die inwoners hulle mee kon besig hou. Jy moes jou motor teen vyfuur die middag al voor die hek van die inry laat staan het wanneer ŉ Afrikaanse fliek in die enigste inry in die stad gedraai het. Kom jy later daar aan, moes jy maar omdraai en huis toe ry. Die inry was teen daardie tyd tot sy kapasiteit gevul. Die fliekgangers het komberse voor hulle motors gegooi en piekniek gehou terwyl hulle gewag het vir die fliek om te begin; meestal omdat dit so laat donker geword het. Vure was beskikbaar vir diegene wat wou braai. Namate Windhoek televisieuitsendings begin ontvang het, kon jy dadelik die uitwerking daarvan op die lewe van die inwoners waargeneem het. Op ŉ Vrydag of Saterdagaand het jy net by dié huise waar daar nie ŉ televisiestel was nie, ŉ braaivleisvuur sien brand. Voor die dae van televisie was daar weer op Sondag middae ŉ toeloop van mense na Windhoek stasie wanneer die trein vanaf die Republiek gearriveer het. Nie almal wat by die stasie opgedaag het, het passasiers kom afhaal nie. Net omdat daar niks anders op ŉ Sondag middag in Windhoek te doen was nie, het die inwoners na die stasie gegaan met die hoop dat hulle iemand wat vanaf die Republiek met die trein aangekom het, sal herken. (RB)

104

REMINISCENCES OF A RAILWAYS POLICEMAN by Keith Blake

Keith Blake

POLICE STORY: BLAKE TO ASSIST NIGERIAN PRISONER ESCAPE. The following story would probably have made the escape artist Houdini frown but to me it was frightening if I had fallen for the scheme, but let me let you decide. One morning I came to work at the Table Bay Community Centre as Charge Office Commander. I took over but made sure all the items handed over to me was correct before I signed the Handing Over Certificate and this included all prisoners in the cell as per the SAP14 Prisoner Register. I noticed that one of the prisoners was a huge African gentleman in full traditional Nigerian attire and next to his name was a title DR. but it was a doctor in the economic and not medical field. I signed that all was received and made me an cup of hot tea and sat down at the desk when the first phone call of the morning came in. I answered it as was taught and then the person on the other side asked me. "Hoe gaan dit ou pel?" I immediately recognised the voice of a brigadier whose name I will withhold.

He asked me about my health and this raised my alertness to red as this call was too formal, too friendly, and it was more about me and my health. The next moment the following was asked if the Doctor whose name he mentioned was still in my cells and I replied that he was. The next statement made the milk in my tea go sour and the spit in my mouth to almost dry up and put me on full alert and I quote, "Blake ou pel daai doktor is baie belangrik vir die SuidAfrikaanse ekonomie en die man moet om 10h00 ŉ belangrike vergadering bywoon en jy moet hom uitboek uit die selle en ek belowe na die vergadering sal hy terugkom". Now stupid I am not or ignorant nor a fool as I was aware that a prisoner can only be released legally by certain legal methods and just booking out is not one of them and if I do this then I may as well book my career and pension down the drain with a criminal record of aiding and abetting a prisoner to escape! Who will believe me if I told them the brigadier's version. I had to think quick very quick so I told the brigadier to just hold there was another call. I then buzzed the station commander and told him a brigadier so and so was on the phone in regard to a prisoner can he deal with it and put the two on call. Well nothing happened and the next day the doctor of crime went to court still in custody, I have my career. A few years later this same brigadier was involved in playing with marbles, the uncut kind that you measure in carats! POLICEMAN PAYBACK PROJECT: This story I am about to tell involves friends, flour, calamari and Russians and cash refunds! NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Before I confuse you more let me take the stage. Many years ago while I was still a policemen, with the motto Protect and Serve as my guideline. I received a telephone call from my late daddy who at that stage lived on a smallholding in Ottery and he asked me if I wanted to make extra cash. I jumped into my car and rushed to my beloved daddy’s home. When I arrived there my daddy showed me hundreds of bags of snowwhite flour, he had bought from a flour factory. My daddy told me he wanted R9 per 25 kg bag and that I can sell it for R12 or more. I took up the offer and took a few bags on the bookie and rushed home and my first sales from the boot and backseat was done with my neighbours for R12 a bag but cash on the spot as that entry on my daddy's bookie had to be settled. With sales going so good I realized that the NG churches were the biggest enterprises of Kerk Bazaars and so with the phone book I phoned every dominee and make my sales offer. The response was so great that being a Pinkster Protestant Kerk member I thought will all these dominees parked in front of my home, my neighbours might just think I changed denomination. Keeping my values in mind I told each dominee to collect the bags at my parents’ smallholding When all that was done I made a speedy call to my daddy telling him if the NG convoy pulls up he must tell them it is R12 a bag and no discount at all on bulk sales, but to keep my cash one side. Well I made quite a lot of money from fellow brothers of the faith. A few days after this a fish monger friend came to my home and we made a deal, that he can buy the flour as much as he wants for R9 a bag but I wanted two (Continued on page 106)

105

(Continued from page 105)

boxes of prawns. My friend bought a huge truck load and when I asked where was my prawns, he told me that lots of the flour had goggas in them. I knew he was taking me for a pap snoek but I kept quiet with my thoughts going from the narrow to the broad road on getting even. A few weeks later this fishmonger friend told me he had 22kg calamari boxes and he wanted R22 per box. I ordered quite a few boxes and make good money selling each box for R35 to restaurants in Cape Town and Sea Point, to neighbours, family a strangers. When my fish monger friend came to collect the last consignment's monies, I told him that a few customers refused to pay me and there is nothing I can do. He was not happy but I had recovered my lost income and with the money I kept for myself. I could have bought 6 boxes of prawns! A few months later he told me he had small packets of Russian sausages and yes I again made money and yes I again told him with the last consignment that a few customers refuse to pay and that money finally eased my taste for free prawns.

SPIT AT THE TABLE. The next police story can also have the title “When in Rome do what the Romans do” but there are certain things we must ignore in Rome. I remembered being phoned at home as to a mutiny case at the Table Bay Harbour Charge Office and when came on duty at 14h00 I saw about twelve Philippine seamen with all their baggage. They had been employed on a Taiwanese vessel but do due conditions decided to abandon ship and seek diplomatic help from the police. Well the ball got rolling and I summoned Mr. Lieu the fishing consul in my first story “PHYSICAL DIPLOMATIC CREDENTIALS”. He and the ships agent all wanted these seamen back and so the negotiations started with me in the middle. I already decided these seamen were going home but received all kinds of excuses that the seamen must go back to the ship. Then to my surprise I was invited to the ship in question and walked in just at the right time or at least my lunch time. At the table was Mr. Lieu, the ship agents, the captain and his senior officers and my disadvantage was they were speaking in Mandarin of which I do not

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

understand a word. While we were "negotiating" the cookie and his assistants brought in platters of food. The only thing I had in common I ate with the Chinese sticks. All went well except no grace was said until the cookie brought on a platter this huge fried red roman. The first one to stab and grab at this delicacy was the consul and I eyed that he was putting fish with bones in his mouth. He started eating and the next minute turn to his right and spat the bones like a bullet out of a revolver onto the floor, I was horrified and expected a rebuff from the other quests but not a word. The next moment they also ate from the fish and bones were being spat all over the floor or rather the deck. I was encouraged by all to taste the fish and place a big piece in my mouth and then I spat the bones like a Thomson 48 machine gun onto the deck. I quickly looked around but not a flinch or a murmur! I could not help thinking if I did this culinary act at my parents table I would ended up with swollen ears or lips and a fierce rebuke. Yes, the seamen were later taken to the airport and flown home!

106

Onder die betrokke sitplek het ek ’n plastieksak gevind wat verskeie verbode en onwettige publikasies (handleidings en tydskrifte) bevat het!

DIE SPEURDER deur Johan de Jager HOOFSTUK 27 ARRESTASIE VAN TERRORISTE ’n Passasiersbus vol passasiers onderweg vanaf Angola was tydens ’n tydelike padblokkade deursoek deur die Spesiale Taakmag. Die standaard metode was gevolg: Die bus was omsingel, lede het stelling langs/teen die bus met hul rûe ingeneem, ’n ander lid het dan op die eerste lid wat langs die bus stelling ingeneem het se bene gespring, en sy vuurwapen op die passasiers gerig om ’n moontlike aanval van binne die bus te voorkom. Ek was die betrokke dag die lid wat die springwerk verrig het. Ek het waargeneem dat een van die passasiers verdag voorgekom het, deurdat hy iets onder sy sitplek gegooi het. Ek het die persoon dopgehou en hom genader nadat almal die bus verlaat het. Ek het die persoon in boeie geslaan en van die lede aangesê om hom aan te hou terwyl ek die bus deursoek het.

Een van die taakmag lede het my gevra waarom ek die persoon gearresteer het. Ek het die tydskrifte en handleidings aan hom getoon en het hom ook daarop gewys dat die literatuur deur die “Foreign Language Press of Peking” gedruk en versprei was, en dat Peking deel van die Oosbloklande, en dus kommunisties van aard, was. Woerts, daar trek die lid weg en arresteer wragtig ’n tweede terroris wat ook soortgelyke tydskrifte in sy besit gehad het! (Party van ons het maar gesukkel met die Rooitaal!) Die lede, veral dié van Transvaal, het maar gesukkel met die Rooitaal (Engels). Die metode van kommunikasie met die passasiers was beperk tot “where come and where go?” Tydens ondervraging het dit aan die lig gekom dat beide die terroriste onderweg was na Fort Hare Universiteit, Alice in die Oos Kaap, Suid-Afrika. Alice is ongeveer sestig kilometer vanaf King William’s Town geleë. Dit was ook my tuisdorp en binne die jurisdiksie van my distrik as wykspeurder! WIL JY NOU MEER? Beide die terroriste was die volgende oggend deur die Veiligheidspolisie vir verdere ondersoek verwyder. Ons het later slegs verneem dat die twee as ‘GROOT VISSE’ geïdentifiseer was. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

HOOFSTUK 28

DIE VLOEKENDE ROOF Dit was ’n rustige Maandagoggend toe die Kaptein by die Polisiekantoor opgedaag het om ’n verrassingsinspeksie te doen. Soos die tradisie was, het die Kaptein met die aankomslag aan die roof (studentkonstabel) opdrag gegee om dadelik vir hom ‘n koppie tee te maak. Die roof was baie bang vir die groot offisier, en het gestotter en die Kaptein soos volg ingelig: “Kaptein, jammer maar daar is F@KK@L melk en F@KK@L suiker.” Die Kaptein het geweldige eksepsie geneem teen die swak taalgebruik van die roof en het onmiddellik die waarnemende Posbevelvoerder, ene Sersant Jan F@k (sy bynaam omrede hy so verskriklik die “F” woord gebruik het), geroep en opdrag gegee om die vloekende roof aan te spreek. Sersant Jan het besluit dat dit onder geen omstandighede geduld gaan word nie, en het die roof sonder verdere seremonie net daar en dan voor die offisier uitgetrap. Baie kwaad het Sersant Jan die volgende woorde geuiter: “IS JY BE@#K OM SO TE FO@#N VLOEK VOOR DIE FO#@N KAPTEIN EN MY NOU IN DIE FO@#N K^K TE DROP, JOU FO@#N ROOF!” Nodeloos om te sê dat die Kaptein baie geskok was. Die Kaptein het sy kop geskud en het Sersant Jan aangesê om die aangeleentheid maar te los.

107

HOOFSTUK 8. Die oggend van 16 Maart 1962 is een van die beste dae in my lewe. Na byna agt jaar diens is ek nou ŉ speurdersersant wat die eerste tree op die bevorderings pad gegee het. Ek trek my beste pak aan want jy gaan nie hof toe as jy nie ŉ behoorlike pak klere aan het nie. By die kantoor aangekom is dit ŉ oor en weer gelukwensery. Ek voel baie belangrik maar besef dat alhoewel ek nou n sersant is dit maar die eerste trappie waarop geklim het. Die hofsaak is suksesvol afgehandel en daar wag in interessante paar maande op my. Ek werk nou die gebied wat as Langlaagteseksie bekend staan. Daar is geweldig baie werk. Saam met die pos het ek ook ŉ byna splinternuwe Ford Zephyr kar gekry met departementele nommer R 8016. Diefstalle van veral sigarette is aan die orde van die dag en byna elke week word n groot hoeveelheid sigarette wat deur United Tobacco Company afgestuur is uit spoorweg trokke gesteel. In een geval word sommer 12 kartonne gesteel. Die speuroffisier is nie

gelukkig met toedrag van sake nie en gee opdrag dat ek alles moontlik doen om die skuldiges aan te keer. Ons vermoed dat die spoorwegpersoneel en hoogs waarskynlik rangeerders is wat weet dat daar sigarette in bepaalde trokke is. Om alles nog erger te maak gebeur dit dat mense deur treine raakgery en gedood word en ek moet daaraan ook aandag gee. Ek het egter ŉ getroue en redelik ervare swartspeurder, Joseph Moya wat saam met my werk. Hy ken die woongebiede soos Orlando en ander baie goed en dit vergemaklik my taak tot n groot mate. Die geluksgodin lag eendag vir my toe ek inligting oor die sigaret diefstalle kry. Dieselfde aand arresteer ons ŉ rangeerder wat n karton sigarette uit n trok steel en hy verklap sy swaers wat daardie week met vakansie is. Dit kom toe aan die lig dat dit hulle paar is wat vir die diefstal van duisende rande se sigarette verantwoordelik is. Dieselfde nag arresteer ons n Indiërman, Barbarosh Kahn, wat al die gesteelde sigarette gekoop het en die volgende more gaan haal ons die twee NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

swaers waar hulle luilekker langs ŉ swembad ontspan. Die man wat die sigarette gekoop het was ŉ eerste oortreder en is vir ses maande tronktoe gestuur. Die ander die het later in die streekhof voor landdros Jooste verskyn. Nadat onbetwisbare getuienis gelewer is deur onder meer die persoon wat die sigarette gekoop het het die landdros besluit die mans is onskuldig. Hoe hy tot daardie beslissing gekom het het net hy geweet maar selfs die staatsaanklaer het verbaas gelyk. Later het ek egter die waarheid agter die waarheid gehoor. As n mens lid van sekere organisasies is gebeur snaakse dinge. Ek gaan nog oor net een saak wat ek te Langlaagte ondersoek het vertel anders word die storie eentonig. Een aand word ŉ man by een van die spoorwegstasies geskiet. Hy oorleef die aanslag en die koeël word suksesvol uit sy liggaam verwyder. Weke na intensiewe ondersoek ontvang ek inligting wat daarop dui dat twee mans wat by 1218a Orlando-Oos woon vir die daad verantwoordelik is. Daardie nag gaan ek en speurder(Vervolg op bladsy 109)

108

(Vervolg van bladsy 108)

konstabels Andries Lubbe en Moya na die adres. Dit was darem in die dae toe drie lede daar kon ingaan. Vandag is dit ŉ ander storie. Ek maak storie weer korter maar het die twee mans wat aan die beskrywing voldoen het in die huis gekry. Tydens deursoeking van die een kamer kry ons ŉ rewolwer in ŉ tas bo op ŉ hangkas. Daar is later bewys dat die koeël wat uit die slagoffer se liggaam verwyder was deur die betrokke rewolwer afgevuur is. Die beskuldigdes is aan poging tot moord skuldig bevind en vir 12 jaar tronktoe gestuur. Eendag word ek deur die speuroffisier ingeroep en hy vra of ek daarin belang sal stel om oorgeplaas te word na die kantoor waar ek my eerste dag as speurder begin het. Ek het die uitnodiging dadelik aanvaar en n dag of wat later was ek in beheer van daardie kantoor. Ek dink nog steeds ek was nie baie welkom daar nie want die lede wat daar gewerk het was al manne met jare se diens en ek was maar, soos hulle gesê het ŉ blougatsersantjie. Die einste sersantjie het egter geen nonsens geduld nie – veral nie dat sy opdragte bevraagteken word nie. Ek het later hulle guns gewen en ons het ŉ formidabele span geword wat menige dief aan die pen laat ry het. ŉ Eienaardige probleem het een middag opgeduik. ŉ Verteenwoordiger van ŉ groot saak het gebel en meegedeel dat daar die oggend ŉ besending matte by sy plek afgelaai moes word. Hy het by

die besteldiens navraag gedoen en is meegedeel dat die matte volgens dokumente wel afgelewer is en dat iemand daarvoor geteken het. ŉ Speurder het dadelik die betrokke dokumente gaan nasien en vasgestel dat ŉ drywer Slabbert die aflewering moes doen. Hy het hom gou opgespoor en hy het volgehou dat hy die matte wel afgelewer het en ŉ handtekening daarvoor gekry het. Die man het egter tekens getoon dat hy lieg. Hy is na ons kantoor gebring vir ondervraging. Sy assistent is deur ŉ ander speurder ondervra en het ŉ heel ander storie vertel naamlik dat die matte by n Indiërman se huis in Vrededorp afgelaai is en dat die handtekening vervals is. Toe Slabbert hiermee gekonfronteer word het hy gebieg en die assistent se weergawe bevestig. Hy en die Indiërman, wat in Belgravia gewoon het, het mekaar goed geken. Slabbert het geld nodig gehad en ŉ uitkoms gesien deur die matte aan die Indiër te verkoop. Die Indiërman is gehaal maar hy het dood en lewe gestry dat hy die matte gekoop het. Eers vroeg die volgende oggend het hy geknak en ons gaan wys waar die matte was. Hy en Slabbert is aangekla en het borgtog gekry op voorwaarde hulle mag Johannesburg nie verlaat nie. Een aand laterig bel n vrou ( ek vermoed dit was Slabbert se vrou) en deel mee dat Slabbert in ŉ trein oppad Kaapstad toe is. Konstabel Hugh Farrell en myself het dadelik na Potchefstroom vertrek waar die trein sou stop. Ons was ŉ paar minute voor die NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

trein daar en toe die trein die stasie intrek het Slabbert by een van die vensters uitgekyk. Toe hy ons sien het hy dadelik in ŉ kompartement gaan wegkruip waar ons hom uitgehaal het. Die volgende dag het hy in die hof verskyn en is sy borgtog teruggetrek en die bedrag wat hy betaal het verbeurd verklaar. Hy en die Indiër is later lang gevangenisstraf opgelê. Intussen is kaptein Basie Rothmann bevorder na majoor en na Kimberley verplaas. Hy vra my een middag om hom huistoe te neem en op pad bekla hy sy lot oor sy goeie huis wat nou verhuur moet word. By die huis te Railstraat 7, Florida, aangekom sien ek die plek is baie netjies en wat my opval is die groot en veilige erf- net die plek waar die seuns lekker kan baljaar. Louwtjie is toe al twee en n half en Charles so 19 maande. Voor ek daar wegry het ek met die majoor ooreengekom dat ek die huis sal huur. Dit is klipgooiafstand van die stasie en in n goeie buurt. Die einde van daardie maand trek ons vir die derde keer. Ons het dierbare bure met die van Brough—Engelssprekend maar wanneer ons met hulle gesels slaan hulle oor na Afrikaans. Ons hou die tuin in goeie toestand want die huur is maar min en ons kan bekostig om ten minste die tuin netjies te hou. Al wat die eerste ruk pla is die geraas wanneer ŉ trein verby ry maar na ŉ maand of wat hoor ons dit nie eens meer nie. Ons gesinnetjie is gelukkig en dit is al wat tel. (Continued on page 110)

109

(Vervolg van bladsy 109)

Een Sondagoggend word ons aangenaam verras toe my ouers se bure, Boet en Lenie daar aankom. Daar is vir ure lank gesels en ek was eintlik hartseer toe hulle weer ry. Terloops, hulle was Louwtjie se peetouers. Die speurdersersant in Potchefsroom word verplaas na Standerton en gevolglik ontstaan ŉ vakature. Ek loop n paar dae met die gedagte om aansoek te doen vir die pos maar besluit telkens daarteen. Ons bly lekker, ons is gelukkig in die groot huis en daar is werklik geen rede waarom ons moet weggaan nie. Of so het ek gedink maar ek glo vandag die Hoër Hand het toe al ander planne vir my gehad. Planne wat dalk nie vir my rooskleurig gelyk het nie maar uiteindelik tot my voordeel sou wees. Eendag loop ek in een van die lang gange toe kaptein Piet ( Witkop) Pretorius by sy kantooor uit stap. Ek groet en hy, wat later ŉ goeie vriend geword het, vra hoe dit gaan, Ek vra sommer so terloops of die pos in Potchefstroom al gevul is en dadelik sê hy ‘ jy is net die man vir daardie pos- ek wag vir jou aansoek”. Ek wil nog protesteer maar hy stap weg. Nou ja in daardie dae het jy nie draaie geloop met n offisier nie en ek het maar my aansoek gaan tik en dit vir die hoofkonstabel gegee. Hy het nogal; gevra “wil jy ons nou verlaat?” Ek kon maar niks antwoord nie want op daardie oomblik was ek verward en myself afgevra wat ma sou sê as ons nog n keer moet trek.

n Dag of wat later is ek in kennis gestel dat ek na Potchefstroom verplaas is. Ek was darem daarvan oortuig dat ek oor die nodige kennis beskik om beheer van die speurders daar te neem en die werk te doen. Kort daarna het ons een more na Potchefstroom gery om huis te soek. ŉ Agent het ons na ŉ huis in Rivierstraat geneem. Dit was aanvaarbaar maar sou beteken dat ek elke dag met die kar werk toe sou moes ry en geld vir brandstof was nie eintlik volop nie. Ons het nietemin dokumente geteken en die huis gehuur. Sersant Barend van Graan was die posbevelvoerder en konstabels Dad van Eck en drie swart lede het die uniformafdeling uitgemaak. Speurderkonstabel Gawie van Rensburg en twee swart speurders was vir baie jare al daar en het die dorp soos die palm van hulle hand geken. Gawie het grond gehuur en n klompie beeste en hoenders aangehou. Hy was welbekend in die dorp en hy, sy vrou en drie kinders het naby die stasie gewoon. Die einde van daardie maand het ons vir die vierde keer getrek en het seker heimlik gehoop dat dit die laaste keer sou wees. Wat nie gebeur het nie. Dit was erg koud in Potchefstroom en aangesien ons naby ŉ rivier gewoon het was dit nog erger. Ek het elke dag met die kar werk toe gery maar dit was nie vir my die aangewese ding nie. Ma en die kinders het ook gou aangepas in die ‘nuwe’ huis. Gawie was lid van die spoorweë se behuisingskomitee en ek het hom gevra om met die NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

volgende vergadering ŉ poging aan te wend om vir ons n departementele huis te kry sodat ons nader aan die werk kon wees. Ons geluk het saam geloop want die more na die vergadering het hy my meegedeel dat ons ŉ huis sommer baie na aan die kantoor kon kry as dit aanvaarbaar is. Ons het na die plek gaan kyk. Dit was ŉ semihuis met twee redelik groot slaapkamers, sitkamertjie, kombuis en badkamer. Daar was ŉ baie groot erf en alhoewel daar nie ŉ motorhuis was nie was daar ŉ digte boom waaronder ons kar kon staan. Ons het dadelik die huis aanvaar en kennis gee dat ons die een waarin ons woon gaan ontruim. Ons moes egter self vir die vervoer van ons meubels betaal maar Gawie het ŉ vriend gehad wat dit vir ons gedoen het teen minimum koste. Dit was toe al die vyfde keer dat ons getrek het. Ons bure was ŉ ouerige man wat ook vir die spoorweg gewerk het en sy vrou. Dierbare mense wat ons met oop arms ontvang het en dadelik goeie bure geword het. My werksgebied het gestrek vanaf Stilfontein tot by Westonaria en al die myndorpe soos Carltonville ingesluit. By Oberholzerstasie was twee swartkonstabels gestasioneer. Ek het dadelik gesien daar is ontsaglik baie werk veral diefstalle vanuit spoorwegtrokke. Nog iets wat gereeld voorgekom het was oorwegbotsings waar voertuie nie by stoptekens stilhou nie en dan voor of teen ŉ trein beland. Dit was by die einste (Continued on page 111)

110

(Vervolg van bladsy 110)

Oberholzerstasie waar ŉ jong ma een middag voor ŉ trein beland het en noodlottig beseer was. Dit was altyd hartseer om die verminkte liggame te sien lê en te besef dit is as gevolg van nalatigheid dat die persoon dood is. Een van die snaakste voorvalle wat ek gedurende my tyd in Potchefstroom ondervind het was toe n bankbestuurder my bel en meedeel dat ŉ spoorwegman wat goed aan hom bekend is n tjek of twee geskryf het terwyl daar nie geld is om dit te dek nie. Dit was op een van die kleiner stasies waar almal vriende is en niemand ŉ ander in die moeilikheid wil sien nie. Ek het soontoe gery en met die man by sy huis gaan praat. Terwyl ek praat het ek ontdek die man het nie eintlik kennis van die werking van ŉ tjekboek nie en het alles aan sy vrou oorgelaat en net die tjek geteken. Toe ek hom verwittig dat dit ŉ ernstige oortreding is om ŉ tjek uit te reik as daar nie fondse in die bank is nie het sy vrou ewe gesê “sersant maar daar is dan nog bladsye in die tjekboek”. Dit blyk toe dat sy gedink het solank daar bladsye in die tjekboek is kan hulle maar ŉ tjek uitreik. Die aangeleentheid is gou uitsorteer toe die vroutjie geld geneem en die plekke gaan betaal het. Tussen Potchefstroom en Stilfontein is ŉ klein stasie, New Machavie en dis daar waar baanmeester Fred Pretorius en sy vrou Nellie woon. Hulle het twee opgeskote dogters, Annatjie en Petro. Ek leer oom

Fred deur die werk ken en gou is ons goeie vriende. Ons ry menige aand gou soontoe om koffie te drink of net te gesels. Daar is ook ŉ spoorwegkampong waar baie werkers woon. Toe ons eenkeer van vakansie af huistoe gaan neem ons ŉ hele basterbokkarkas saam met ons en een van daardie ribbes wat goed gesout was, het oom Fred s’n geword. Ons het ook goed bevriend geraak met Gawie van Rensburg en sy vrou Doorsie wat in die middag musiekklasse aangebied het. Vrydagaand was ons kaartspeelaande en dan het ons en hulle kinders sommer daar in die kombuis op die vloer aan die slaap geraak. Ek het Gawie baie male probeer oorreed om eksamen te skryf maar hy het nie belang gestel nie want as hy slaag moet hy verplaas. Hy was ontsettend lief vir sy diere en het elke middag na werk gery om te kyk af hulle kos en water het. Wanneer die kerkbasaar was het hy ŉ jong ossie geslag en vir die kerk gegee- hy het altyd gesê dis uit dankbaarheid vir wat hy het. Om te sê hy en Doorsie was goeie mense is nie nodig nie-hulle hande was oop vir dié wat nood gehad het.

Ons erf was netjies toegespan, ons het volop water gehad en ek het lusern geplant en ŉ klompie kuikens aangeskaf wat sommer van die lusern ook geëet het. Ek het netjiese hokke gemaak en geen probleme ondervind nie alhoewel ek maar altyd daarna bewus was dat dit dalk nie toelaatbaar is om hoenders en diere aan te hou nie.

Maar soos in so baie gevalle was daar tog n probleem – een van die hane het gedink die plek behoort aan hom en die ander haan rondgejaag. Eendag sien ek dat die haan vir Charles, wat toe sterk begin stap bestorm. Ek jaag hom weg en so waar hy storm weer en skop Charles onderstebo. Net toe die kleine Charles weer op is storm meneer mos weer en skop die kind weer onderstebo. Ek gaan die storie ook maar kortknip deur net te sê later die aand het die haan in n groot swartpot gekook. Een Sondagmiddag laat word ek uitgeroep om aandag te gee aan ŉ geval waar ŉ student by Cachetstasie uit ŉ bewegende trein gespring en op die perron geval het. Dit was nogal ŉ ernstige oortreding om ŉ trein te verlaat terwyl dit nog in beweging is. Baie mense het dit gedoen en dan onder die treinwiele beland. By die toneel aangekom vind en ŉ meisie van so 19-20 jaar oud op die perron. Sy het ooglopend nie baie seergekry nie alhoewel sy mank loop. Ek stel myself voor en kry haar naam en adres. Dit blyk toe dat sy vir die naweek na haar ouers was en toe die trein redelik stadig beweeg het sy kans gevat en uitgespring. Ek skrik my amper lam toe sy sommer daar voor al die studente wat daar saamdrom haar rompie oplig en my wys hoe haar bobeen beseer is. Nou ja ek moet die saak behoorlik ondersoek en sy moet deur ŉ dokter ondersoek word. Die distrikgeneesheer, dokter Jan Nagtegaal het haar ondersoek en bevind dat sy (Continued on page 112)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

111

(Vervolg van bladsy 111)

gelukkig vir haar geen ernstige beserings opgedoen het nie. Die dossier was na die senior aanklaer, meneer Flip Jacobs verwys en hy het besluit om geen vervolging in te stel nie. Toe ek hierdie besluit aan die meisie oordra was sy baie verlig en dankbaar. Vroeg in 1964 is bekend gemaak dat ŉ eksamen vir bevordering na sersant klas 1 in Julie afgeneem sal word. Ek het dadelik begin studeer want ek het geproe hoe bevordering smaak en het na meer gehunker. Oor die etensuur het ek, in plaas van huistoe loop, gesit en studeer. Wes –Transvaal is bekend vir erge donderweer en daar het ek dit persoonlik ondervind. Een middag het die weer gedonder en geblits terwyl ek baie ernstig sit en leer. Konstabel van Eck was ŉ stoute man en het my van agter bekruip met ŉ wieldop wat hy op die vloer laat val het. Ek weet nie wat ek alles gesê en gedoen het nie maar dit moes iets ysliks gewees het. Soveel so dat sersant van Graan uit sy kantoor gekom het om te kyk wat aangaan.

Ek het besef dat my kans skraal is om as ŉ speurdersersant klas 1 aangestel te word omdat daar nie gereeld vakatures vir daardie rang was nie maar dit het my nie afgesit nie en ek was vasbeslote om die eksamen af te lê al sou dit beteken dat ek na die uniformpersoneel moes oorplaas. Gawie en ek moes eendag ŉ rewolwerskietoefening in Kaserne bywoon. Die

baanoffisier was kaptein Gustav Coetzee en ek het my kans waargeneem en hom gevra vir twee weke verlof. Op sy vraag waarom ek verlof wil hê was ek eerlik om te sê ek wil plaas toe gaan om in stilte te studeer. Hy was gou om te antwoord dat ek maar net wil gaan jag maar nietemin gesê hy sal my aansoek goedkeur. Ek het in Junie verlof gekry, na my ouers toe gegaan en tog ŉ klomp leerwerk ingekry afgesien daarvan dat ek elke dag in die veld was. Ek het in die oggend ŉ boek saamgeneem en terwyl ek gesit en rus het gou n stuk geleer. Ma en die seuns was baie lief vir die plaas en het die kuier meer as ek geniet. Die eksamen is afgehandel maar ek was nie baie oortuig nie. Een of twee vakke was besonder moeilik en ek het getwyfel of ek slaagsyferpunte sou haal. Die gewag vir die uitslag was senutergend. Ek was destyds besig met die ondersoek van ŉ moordsaak. ŉ Soorwegwerker is een nag in sy hut by Tarentaal, ŉ sylyn naby Fochville doodgeskiet. Ons het inligting gekry maar elke slag teen n muur vasgeloop. Daar was geen ooggetuies nie en alles was op hoorsê gegrond. Een van die mense wat in die omgewing gewoon het het egter gepraat van twee mans wat die nag van die moord daar rond was. Hulle was onbekend. Toe kry ons inligting wie die twee mans is en na ŉ erge gesoek kry ons hulle ten laaste in die hande. Hulle erken dadelik dat hulle die betrokke aand by Tarentaal was maar ontken enige aandeel in die moord. Ek weet dat daar NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

tog omstandigheidsgetuienis was wat genoeg was om hulle op ŉ klagte van moord aan te hou. Destyds moes beskuldigdes eers by n voorlopige ondersoek verskyn en as die landdros dink daar is genoeg getuienis beskikbaar word hulle saak na die hooggeregshof verwys. Dit is dan ook wat in dié geval gebeur het. Toe ek die middag baie laat na ŉ erge lang dag in my kantoor kom lê daar ŉ nota van sersant van Graan wat sê dat ek die eksamen geslaag het. Lam van skok bel ek ŉ paar kollegas wat ook geskryf het en verneem dat Smit en Hannes Smith ook van die gelukkiges is. Ek stap huistoe maar is so deurmekaar dat ek byna voor ŉ trein instap. By die huis kon ek net sê ‘ ma ek is deur”. Groot dankbaarheid en vreugde maar dadelik daardie kwelvraag – waarheen gaan ek gepos word? Volgende dag bel hordes van my kollegas my en wens geluk. Een van hulle noem terloops dat speurdersersant klas 1 J.F. Burger van Port Elizabeth na adjudant-offisier bevorder is. Die benaming hoofkonstabel het verdwyn. Ek bel dadelik vir Burger wat bevestig dat hy bevorder word. Nou moet ek gou speel en ek bel die stafoffisier, luitenant Eben Jordaan in Johannesburg. Ek vertel hom van my dilemma en dat ek graag na Port Elizabeth wil gaan. Hy sê hy sal ŉ gunstige aanbeveling maak. Op Maandag 17 Augustus 1964 moet ek in Johannesburg wees en daar verneem ek die goeie nuus dat ek vanaf 16 Augustus na speurdersersant klas 1 (Continued on page 113)

112

is weer swanger en ek wil die reis so gemaklik moontlik maak.

(Vervolg van bladsy 112)

bevorder en na Port Elizabeth verplaas is. Ek kon nie gou genoeg by die huis kom om die goeie nuus aan ma oor te dra nie. Ek handel soveel moontlik werk af. My opvolger word aangewys. Hy is sersant Johan Geyer wat al lank ŉ speurdersersant is. Ons begin maar weer inpak, tref reëlings vir die vervoer van ons meubels en kry toestemming om tot einde September aan te bly. Ons is eintlik tog ŉ bietjie hartseer om vriende soos oom Fred hulle en Gawie hulle te groet. Ons het ŉ ander kar, ŉ Vauxhall Velox gekoop en maak die agterste sitplek gerieflik vir die seuns. Dis ŉ lang reis en hulle kan nie ongemaklik sit nie. Ma

Op 29 September 1964 trek die meubelwa in en die personeel laai ons aardse besittings wat maar nie veel is nie, in. Ons trek vir die sesde keer maar hierdie keer is ons gelukkig want ons gaan huistoe. Om en by 4 uur die middag trek ons daar weg en toe ons die dorp uitry was ek op die tweede trappie van die bevorderingsleer.

moeg maar druk aan om so vroeg moontlik op die plaas te kom. Ma en die seuns gaan op die plaas bly terwyl ek by tant Kang gaan bly solank ek ŉ huis soek om te huur of te koop. Ons wil ons eie plek hê waar die seuns vryelik kan beweeg sonder om aan gevaar blootgestel te word. Ons wil graag in Despatch woon omdat dit nog nie so ŉ besige dorp is nie. Slegs die tyd sal wys wat sal gebeur.

Ek het toe al begin wonder waarom ek nie vroeër begin het met die klim van die leer nie. Ons reis via Orkney en Vierfontein, ŉ pad wat ons toe al redelik goed ken. Twaalfuur die nag kan ek vir ma gelukwens want dis haar 27ste verjaardag. Dis ŉ lang pad en omdat die vorige dag ŉ besige een was raak ek ook maar

Vauxhall Velox PB (1964) Photo from Wikipedia—Creative Commons License—Photographs by Steve Glover NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

113

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

114

THE ORIGINAL DURBAN CITY POLICE BADGE/COUNCIL COAT OF ARMS WAS USED UNTIL THE LATE 1980'S. Darryn James Newcombe The original Durban City Police Badge/Council Coat of Arms was used until the late 1980's.

The shield is divided into 4 quarters. The top right and bottom left quarters have against a black background, a silver chevron and three Leopard faces in gold adapted from Sir Benjamin D’Urban’s coat of arms. The other two quarters are adapted from the arms of Sir Benjamin Pine and each is divided into two horizontal bands of blue and silver with a small upright red lion on the silver. The shield is surmounted by a knight's helmet from which a decorative scrollwork flow down in blue and silver on each side of the shield. A stylised mealie plant in natural colour tops the helmet and above that is the five - pointed star. Below the Coat of arms is the motto in Latin. Translated, has the following meaning. "Better fortune will follow a weak beginning". Lieutenant-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban, GCB KCH FRS (16 February 1777 – 25 May 1849) was a British general and colonial administra-

tor, who is best known for his frontier policy when he was the Governor in the Cape Colony. In January 1834 in South Africa D'Urban took office as governor and commander in chief of the Cape Colony. His administration was complicated by the exodus of Dutch farmers to the far north and east (known as the Great Trek) and the outbreak of the Cape Frontier Wars of (1834–1835) due to clashes between the colonists and the Bantu-speaking Xhosa peoples. He drove back the indigenous peoples and annexed the territory between the Keiskamma and Great Kei (Groot-Kei) rivers. He was in office when Britain abolished slavery, established municipal and legislative councils, occupied Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal) and named it as a new colony for the British

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Empire. To commemorate this the name of the principal port was changed in 1835 from Port Natal to Durban.

115

HUMOUR DURING THE ANGLO BOER WAR Elria Wessels Many a funny incident happened during the war. In his memoirs of the war Denys Reitz wrote about the following incident: “On my way to the gorge I found two wounded officers beside the track, one with his thumb shot away and the other with a broken arm. As I came up, I hear one of them remark,” Here comes a typical young Boer for you’ and they asked me if I understood English. I told them, “Yes” and the man with the thumb said, “Then will you tell me why you fellows are continuing the war, because you are bound to lose?” I replied, “Oh, well you see, we’re like Mr. Micawber, we are waiting for something to turn up”. They burst out laughing, and the one said,” Didn’t I tell you this is a funny country, and here’s your typical young Boer quoting Dickens. R. W Schikkerling wrote about the following incident. “A local preacher was engaged in holding a service and his flock around him was bent in prayer when a horseman in a cloud of dust came racing towards us shouting: “Opsaal! Opsaal!” The preacher, being in a standing position, and having the advantage over the congregation of looking in the direction from which the horseman came, was the first to know of the danger. With hardly a word of warning and like a champion hurdler. He leapt over his crouching flock, and had almost reached his sad-

dle before those in the praying position knew what was happening. At his horse, a youth shouted at him: “Dominee, you forgot to say Amen” If he had said that, he would not have had the good start or such an undisputed walk -over, for these days had bred some practised sprinters in his flock!” Ben Bouwer wrote about the following incident: “The Du Plessis brothers came across a herd of baboons to which they gave chase, and the baboons, already confused and frightened climbed into the trees in a foolish panic.

One enormous old male in a tree was selected by the two men and the brother called Wolf climbing into the tree kicked him down to his brother called Fox who held him until Wolf had climbed down again. Then leading their horses and each holding the hand of the baboon, he walking on his hind legs. They marched him to the camp and sent a message to President Steyn saying that a new burgher had just joined the commando and would like to be presented to him. The baboon was by this time so overcome that he apathetically allowed his had to be shaken by the President and after he was let go, sat on an ant heap watching the entire command ride past within ten yards of him!” J.F.C. Fuller in his book The last of the gentleman’s wars describes the following incident: “I captured a gentleman who insisted he was Christiaan de Wet NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

but not THE De Wet. I decided to send my prisoners to Kromdraai and at the same time I sent the flowing telegraphic message: Christiaan De Wet captured is on his way to Kromdraai. I was told that this message caused the most profound sensation not only at Kromdraai, but all down the line. When my two prisoners arrived at their destination, old Jordaan was sent to hospital and De Wet to the Quarter Guard tent, which was soon surrounded by a mob of inquisitive soldiers. One, so I was told, in spite of the guard, thrust his head into a tent to have a look at the great man. Then he withdrew it, exclaiming with utmost disdain: “That aint Christian de Wet; that be a bloody ant-bear!’ C.R Prance in his book, The occupation of Pretoria by the British Forces recalls the following incident: “General Clement, overheard talking to staff officer: ‘Brabant’s Horse? Yes, I call them ‘Catchthem-alive-ohs’. It’s just like the way we went ratting with ferrets when we were boys-put in a ferret and it presently comes out with a rat. You put Brabant’s on and they never let the Boers rest till they “bolt’ them; and they do find them, by Jove every time – and they catch them alive too, sometimes!’” A great many stories about sentries and passwords abound. (Continued on page 117)

116

(Continued from page 116)

Here is a selection of the best: Lt-Col Backhouse tells about the following incident in his book With the Buffs in South Africa. A Scottish Militia Battalion is credited with the following incident which took place at Kroonstad: An officer was challenged, but not knowing the countersign, and knowing that the sentry was a Scotsman made a shot at it and replied: “Glasgow.” “You’re wrong man”, replied the sentry, “Its Aberdeen!” Julian Ralph recalls in his book, The War’s brighter side the following incidents: A French -Canadian of the R.C.R was doing sentry-go one night at Graspan. The countersign for the night was “Halifax”. Presently there came strolling along a soldier whom the Canadian promptly challenged: “Who goes there?” “Friend.” “Advance friend’, and pace on – and say Haversack - all is well” Yorkshireman demanded a countersign from a man he knew quite well with the following words: “Halt! Who goes there? Say ‘Majuba’, there’s a

good chap and then toddle along - isn’t this all blooming nonsense?” An amusing incident occurred the other day at Glen. An officer of one of the Guard’s Battalions was found bathing in the Modder River by a sentry stationed there with the sole purpose to prevent the men from bathing in the river. The sentry knowing full well what he had was supposed to do, unceremoniously ordered the delinquent to come out of the water. The gallant captain, in all his nakedness, approached the bank and indignantly asked:” Can’t you see that I am an officer?” The removing of badges of rank from the officers led to a many amusing mistakes. On the march from Poplar Grove a certain general was returning to the camp after another hard dusty and dry day in the veld. A subaltern who was sitting under his canvas awning addressed the distinguished gentleman as follows: “Now look here if this happens again, I’m darned if I don’t report you. For the last two hours you have been away, and heaven only knows what those bloody mules have been up to!”

the subaltern had mistaken him for a mule driver!

Captain S. E. St Leger recalls ion his book War Sketches in Colour the following happening:” An amusing incident occurred when our pom-pom, commanded by Captain De Winton R.A., was under a perfect blizzard of shells at Klipriviersberg. There were half a dozen Boer guns doing their best to silence the little pompom. When the fusillade began the gunners were boiling water for their breakfast; but as the Boer shells began dropping all around the fire, they were obliged to seek cover near the gun. One of the men, who with an anxious eye had been for some time fixedly staring at the fire, suddenly remarked: “Begorra, the kettle is boiling over”, darted out and brought it safely in, and, regardless of shells and anything else set about making tea! It is rather wonderful that the British soldiers during the war kept note of all the funny things that happened to them and around them.

The general was not amused when he realised that

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

117

ANGLO BOER WAR: PRETORIA STATION & BURGERS IS SLAAGS Tinus le Roux

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

118

SOUTH AFRICAN MOUNTED RIFLES He passed away on Christmas Day, 1913 Capt. Andre van Ellinckhuyzen (SAPS Vryheid)

Sergt. Major Percy Coupe is in the centre of the middle row

1 April, in 1913 marked the beginning of a new and challenging era in law enforcement in the history of South Africa. Policing Units such as the Cape Mounted Police, the Natal Mounted Police, and others were now amalgamated and officially there were now only the two police forces operational mandated to “Serve and Protect” the people and the laws of the Union of South Africa. The South African Mounted Rifles, and the South African Police.

Percy Coupe, or “Pep” as he was fondly known in his family,

was born on the 4th of April 1878, in Douglas, the Capital of the Isle of Man. His father, Joseph Coupe who was born in Oldham, Lancashire, in Northern England was a tobacconist, and his mother was Mary Platt a native of Lincoln, Lincolnshire, in England. Joseph “immigrated” to the Isle of Man in about the year 1860, and he and Mary were married there in the Parish Church in the Parish of Kirk Braddan on Spring day 1864, and thereafter made their home in Georges Walk in Douglas. Originally Joseph earned his living as a “Grocer”, but later in life, NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

and until his death, he owned the “Coupe’s Cigar Depot”, in Victoria Street, in Douglas.

Percy had eight siblings. Four girls and four boys, named: Ernest John; Annie Mona; Douglas Henry; Samuel Hallsworth; Ethel; Harriet Susannah; Frances May; and Joseph. Francis May and Joseph died at infancy, and Douglas Henry Coupe later became the owner of the Coupe’s Cigar Depot after the death of their father. Michael Coupe, who lives in Kirkcudbright on the Solway (Continued on page 120)

119

(Continued from page 119)

Coast of Scotland, is a descendant of the Coupe family, and Michael wrote that on a clear bright day he can see the Isle of Man from where he lives across the Irish Sea. Michael’s father was named Percy, after the uncle who died in South Africa. Michael writes that his great uncle Percy Coupe was educated in Douglas until he was about fourteen years old, and in seeking adventure, he came out to South Africa at the age of eighteen years, in about the time of the

Jameson raid in 1895 or 1896, and during the Anglo Boer War, from 1898 to 1902, Percy Coupe served with Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts. The Isle of Man Times, dated 21 October 1899: “Mr Percy Coupe, the son of Mr Coupe, tobacconist in Douglas, who joined the Natal Mounted Police about the time of the Jameson raid, has been promoted to sergeant.” Mona’s Herald dated 21 March 1900 reports: “Coupe, Percy, Cape Mounted Police, on the border of Basutuland. Son of Mr NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Coupe, Victoria-street, Douglas.” Mona’s Herald dated 4 April 1900, also reports: “LETTER FROM A DOUGLAS MAN. A MEMBER OF THE NATAL MOUNTED POLICE……The following letter has been received by Mr. Joseph Coupe……The Post office authorities have notified me that no parcel of tobacco has arrived for me…..The war is still dragging on slowly……The most important revelation is the inefficiency of our artillery, which has been outclassed altogether (Continued on page 121)

120

(Continued from page 120)

er……The best and ablest officer we have in South Africa is our own darling chief-Colonel Dartnell, of the Natal Mounted Police……Your loving and devoted son. PEP” Percy Coupe served with the Cape Mounted Police, and with the Natal Mounted Police, and during that time he saw service in many parts of the Natal Colony, on the Basutuland Border and in Johannesburg. It was during the “Great Flood” of 1905 that Sergeant Coupe distinguished himself in an act of bravery during which he and a fellow policeman, Trooper Treanor, imperilled their own lives, and in doing so saved twenty four persons from possible drowning in the Inanda area near Durban when the Umhlothi River burst its banks. Isle of Man Times, dated 2 September 1905, reports: “A BRAVE MANX MAN- HE SAVES 24 LIVES, In the “Natal Gazette” appears a report on the loss of life which occurred in the Inanda Division during the storm of May 31 and June 1…I bring to the notice of the Government the part played by Sergt. Coupe and Tpr. Treanor in saving the lives of 24 Indians……Although Sergt. Coupe could not swim, he entered the water of the overflowing Umhlothi river……he discarded the rope, and went forward with Tpr. Treanor, and rescued the exhausted Indians….” In the years when he lived and served with the Mounted Police in Vryheid he also joined the St. George’s Masonic Lodge in 1911. Sergeant Major Coupe had been stationed in Vryheid as a Squadron Leader with South African Mounted Rifles, and after his

return there from Johannesburg, at the beginning of September 1913, where he had been engaged with the Natal Mounted Police in fighting a number of related mine workers protests and riots, the sickness that grabbed onto him during those many cold Highveld nights, just refused to let go of his body in spite of the best available prescription medication of that time and the tender loving care of one special lady.

Monas’s Herald, dated 29 October 1913, reports: “The friends of Sergt. Major Percy Coupe, third son of the late Joseph Coupe, and brother of Mr. Douglas Coupe, tobacconist…….will be very sorry to hear that he is seriously ill. Mr. Coupe was in charge of the Natal Mounted Police during the recent riots in Johannesburg, and while camping out during the cold nights he had the misfortune to catch a chill.” (Continued on page 122)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

121

(Continued from page 121)

Percy had a very close lady friend in Vryheid. Her name was Jeanette O’Bryen. Percy and Jeanette had been resident at the same address which was known as “Kayalami” or “Kya Lami” somewhere in Landdrost Street. The Coupe family actually believe that Percy and Jeanette had already been engaged to be married. Mid December he was admitted to the Vryheid Government Hospital, and he passed away on Christmas Day, 1913. Isle of Man Examiner, dated 10 January 1914, reports: “On Christmas Day, Sergt. Major Percy Coupe, of the Natal Mounted Police passed away as the outcome of an illness while on duty in charge of a detachment of police at Johannesburg during the strike riots of August last………..His energy and conscientious discharge of duty secured him rapid promotion…….Sergt. Major Coupe was a son of the late Mr. Joseph Coupe, tobacconist, Douglas, and brother to Mr. Douglas Coupe, tobacconist, Victoria street.”

who had actually travelled by ship to South Africa, and by train from Durban to Vryheid after his brother’s death in order to finalise his brother’s affairs. The rest of Percy’s personal belongings he had bequeathed to Jeanette O’Bryen. Jeanette stayed on in Vryheid for a while, but after about a year she moved on to Utrecht. The future of Jeanette O’Bryen after Christmas Day in 1913, remains a bit of a mystery for now.

wagon that transported his remains to the Vryheid Cemetery where he was laid to rest. Percy Coupe shares a memorial stone with his parents Joseph and Mary, as well as his brother-inlaw, Stanley Thomas Crellin, in the Rake Lane Cemetery at Wallasey in England. Lest we Forget.

Squadron Sergeant Major Percy Coupe was afforded a semimilitary funeral at the St Peter’s Anglican Parish, and his coffin was loaded onto a mule drawn

On December 29, 1913 Lieutenant Thomas Houlditch Hedges, of the 3rd Regiment South African Mounted Rifles, officially reported the death, on Christmas day 1913, of Squadron Sergeant Major Percy Coupe. Thomas Houlditch Hedges was born in England in the year 1879. He married Janet Jones of Melmoth in Pietermaritzburg in October 1927, and at the time of their marriage he served in the South African Police at Eshowe in Zululand with the rank of an Inspector. After Percy’s death his Masonic regalia was inherited by his one brother Douglas Henry Coupe NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

122

1917: DIE ISLE OF WIGHT EN SS MENDI AP Stemmet

SS Mendi, gesink op 21 Februarie 1917 met die verlies van 30 Britse en Sierra Leonean bemanning en 616 troepe, die meeste van hulle mans van die Suid-Afrikaanse Inheemse Arbeidskorps (SANLC) © Skildery deur R. Belling 1996. Oop bron gebruik.

Dankie vir die interessante artikel oor die Isle of Wight deur Sam J Basch in Rapport Be!eef van 7 Februarie 2021.

Die sterk Suid Afrikaanse verbintenis met die eiland word dikwels vergeet of is nie bekend nie. Op 21 Februarie 1917 gedurende die Eerste Wêreldoorlog het die oorlogskip SS Mendi vol Suid Afrikaanse soldate ongeveer 10 myl Suid van die Isle of Wight gesink. 646 waarvan verreweg die meeste swart was, het verdrink. Van die lyke het glo op die eiland uitgespoel. Baie van die oorledenes is net

oorkant die Solent in Southampton begrawe waar die grafte nog goed versorg word.

en sy vrou wat lekker biltong en droë wors in hul winkeltjie verkoop, was daar.

Eersdaags herdenk ons veterane in die RSA en Brittanje weer die tragiese gebeurtenis.

Daar is natuurlik nog meer Suid Afrikaners op die pragtige geskiedkundige eiland. Toe ek gedurende 2011 gedurende n besoek siek geword het, het ‘n Nigeriese en Suid Afrikaanse dokter (afkomstig uit Kroonstad, Bruin en baie Afrikaans) my oë behandel. Puik diens.

Dit is nie algemeen bekend dat heelwat Suid Afrikaners hulle op die eiland gevestig het nie. Toe ek en my vrou laas in Augustus 2018 ons kinders en kleinkinders wat daar in Ventnor in die Suide woon, besoek het, het 9 Suid Afrikaanse families wat hulle permanent daar gevestig het die aand van ons aankoms daar saam vleisgebraai. Selfs n Zimbabwiër NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Die klimaat daar maak dit baie gewild by Suid Afrikaners. 'n Mens het baie tyd nodig om al die besienswaardighede te (Continued on page 124)

123

(Continued from page 123)

besoek. Een maand is te min. Net ‘n besoek aan al die ou kerke, een is meer as n duisend jaar oud, neem dae in beslag. Ek was al twee keer daar en het nog nie almal gesien nie. Covid het verhoed dat ons in 2020 weer gaan. Dit neem tyd. Daar is selfs n plaas uit die Romeinse tyd. Dan het die eiland ook deurgeloop onder Duitse invalle in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Die eiland is nooit deur hulle ingeneem nie. Lugafweer- en

seewaartse - kanonne het die groot rolle gespeel om die eiland te verdedig. Van die indrukwekkende kanonne is nog daar.

•

Kollega “AP” het ‘n afskrif van sy brief aan Nongqai gestuur

In ‘n besoek aan Brittanje is hierdie eiland ‘n moet. Die diskriminasie tussen die afstammelinge van inwoners en voorvaders uit verre eeue, die locals, en die uit Engeland, die mainlanders, is interessant. Die locals is baie soos ons Afrtikaners. Koppig en dwars ! Beste groete, Adamus P Stemmet (AP)

THE KAISER’S SOLDIER AND HIS BOERNOOI Maj. Jean-Pierre Scherman Centre for Military Studies Military Academy (Saldanha) Faculty of Military Science Stellenbosch University My family connection with the military runs several generations strong. What is noticeable when examining our family genealogy is the frequency that male members marry female members who themselves come out of strong military backgrounds.

Case in point is Izidore Biela, who arrived in Swakopmund German South West Africa on 28 July 1894 as a soldier of Kaiser William II. During the First World War Biela serves in the German army. After being wounded in 1915 while fighting at Kabus, Keetmanshoop, Biela is awarded the Iron Cross. He is later decorated with the Kampfer Cross, an award presented for those sol(Continued on page 125)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

124

(Continued from page 124)

diers who always fight in the front echelon of a battle. One day Biela meets a young South-Wester while she is busy combing her hair in Keetmanshoop. The 22 year old Biela immediately falls for the 16 year old, but waits two years until she is 18 before they get married in Keetmanshoop on 27 October 1897. From the marriage ten

children will be born. One of them, a daughter, Aldelheid, will one day meet a dashing young man in uniform, Theodore Scherman. The two will eventually get married and many many years later, my aunt Adelheid will show me a photo and a newspaper clipping of her parents marriage day, while I sit at their house in Velddrift, their retirement home, after Uncle Theo retired as the head of the

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Commercial Branch, South African Police, with the rank of Brigadier General.

As an army officer who himself married a girl whose father served in the same regiment that he spent over 20 years working in (the School of Armour, Bloemfontein), this story has always struck me as serendipitous. I attach a copy of said photo and newspaper clipping.

125

WWII LUFTWAFFE CAMERA Dennis Delport When I saw this WWII Luftwaffe 35mm camera in a Cape Town Chemist’s photography section it attracted my attention. The camera had a Leica lens then you know it is a top of the range camera. The following day I returned to take photos of this unique old camera. Sometimes I still wonder what sort of photos were taken by this camera during WWII. Right: Luftwaffe Camera WWII Front view Below: Top and rear view of the same camera.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

126

MEDIESE NOODVOERTUIE SIVIEL EN MILITÊR Nico Moolman en Paul Els

Bo: 1940: Pretoria Munisipaliteit: Ambulans Onder: Herstelkamp, Roberts Heights, Pretoria

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

127

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE, 1 RECONNAISSANCE COMMANDO Manuel R Ferreira Gone but not Forgotten. “A hero is someone who steps up when everyone else backs down”. (Anonymous) What started off as a pet project in 2015 with a handful of members has now become one of the better if not best page regards military matters on Facebook at present and there are some exceptionally good ones. The page now has over three thousand members who actively contribute towards keeping the memory of Forgotten Portuguese soldiers alive, many themselves having been frontline combatants or had family members serve in some of the most elite units that Portugal had fielded in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. The page has also become a go to site for researchers to gleam information for books, articles, and family histories. Manuel Ferreira has created a page where stories come to light that perhaps would not have and this story is a case in point. This story began on 11/1/21 when Manuel posted the follow-

Corporal Benedito Gouveia, 5 Recce Operator (RENAMO camp, Mozambique).

ing message. Dear friends, it is with sadness that I inform you all that Corporal Benedito Gouveia, former 1 Recce Operator answered the Sunset call last Thursday, 7 January 2021. Benedito Gouveia was a member of Daniel Roxo militias in Niassa. In 1975, before Mozambique's independence, Benedito with two fellow militias, his brother Caetano Gouveia and Cipriano Luís fled

Mozambique with their Commander Daniel Roxo and joined the South African Defence Force, 1 Recce. Benedito done his Special Forces selection in 1977 and became an Operator. Cpl Gouveia was extensively involved in Operation Force (Mozambique/RENAMO). He subsequently joined a TopSecret unit under the direct command of the Minister of Defence of South Africa and served until (Continued on page 129)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

128

(Continued from page 128)

the unit was disbanded in 1993. Rest in Peace Benedito! You served Portugal and your adopted new country well! Descansa em Paz Soldado de Portugal e da África do Sul. Having written the book “Phantom of the forest” about the life and times of Daniel Roxo, I was sad to hear of Benedito’s passing, but also excited that perhaps we could source new information from the last surviving member of the trio, Mr. Caetano Gouveia about Daniel and his actions in Mozambique from a first-hand source. On 14 and 15/1/2021 Manuel personally contacted Caetano to speak to him and hopefully get first-hand accounts of how he as well as his brother and Cipriano had entered SA and their relationship with Daniel Roxo he al-

Above: Corporal Caetano Gouveia (5 Recce Special Forces Operator) standing on the right. Below left: Jorge Jardim.

so wanted to discuss their selection into the Recce’s. Manel messaged me to say there was good and bad news. The bad news was that the three men had not been part of Daniels Militia in Mozambique but merely met him in the Caprivi. While this new information was a little disappointing the good news however was that Caetano gave some insight as to how he, his brother and Cipriano had become valued members of the SA Special forces. Both Manuel and I agreed that the conversations warranted writing down to ensure that his as well as Benedito’s and Cipriano’s contribution to the defence of Southern Africa are recorded for future generations. Their story begins in Mozambique, both Cpl Caetano (Continued on page 130)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

129

(Continued from page 129)

Gouveia and Cpl Benedito Gouveia having been born in Sena, a small village in the Beira region. Theirs as well as L Cpl Cipriano Luis is interwoven with Jorge Jardim as well as Orlando Barros de Sousa Cristina both major role players in the history of Mozambique. Jorge Jardim who died in Libreville Gabon 1/12/1982 was a man with many jobs and different faces having played a key role in the politics as well as finances of Mozambique. Between 1948 and 1952 he served as under Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry in the government of António de Oliveira Salazar and had the ear of his successor Marcello José das Neves Alves Caetano. Jardim was a personal friend of Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, and of President Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, who appointed Jardim as Malawi’s Honorary Consul in Beira, Mozambique. Many considered him the chief of his special forces even though he had never been in the military, this is probably due to his close involvement with the GE’s (Grupos Especiais) and GEP’s (Grupos Especiais Para - quedistas) in fact many saw those two units as his private armies this may have come about due to the fact that the GE’s formed in 1969 were not an Army formation although they came under military control after command was unified in 1970. Jardim was known as the “Strong man” of Mozambique and a close friend of Antonio Gomes Lopes, Chief of PIDE in Beira. Just prior to the Carnation revolution of 25 April 74 that resulted in the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa he had

Jorge Jardim and President Banda of Malawi.

advanced plans to declare UDI in Mozambique just as his friend Ian Smith had done in 1965. The Lisbon coup as well as being “dropped” by John Vorster and SA caught him of guard that was something else that Jardim and Smith would have in common with SA pulling the rug from under Rhodesia’s feet some 6 years later. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Orlando Cristina had also lived a remarkably interesting life in Mozambique, Malawi, Rhodesia as well as South Africa leading to his assassination in Pretoria on Sunday night 17 April 1983 after returning from Durban with another Portuguese Military intelligence officer. Orlando was assassinated on an old agricul(Continued on page 131)

130

(Continued from page 130)

tural property North of Pretoria where the movements broadcaster operated at the time of his death Orlando held the position of Secretary General of RENAMO. Suspicion for his killing initially fell on Boaventura Bomba, brother of former Mozambican Air Force pilot Adriano Bomba who at the time of Orlando’s death was at a Renamo base in Mozambique. At the TRC hearing on 20 No-

vember a Sgt Charles Lotz gave evidence that Boaventura Bomba and four other individuals were interrogated at a military camp in near to where Orlando was killed and during those interrogations Boaventura confessed to his involvement in Orlando’s death. On 23 November Brigadier Van Niekerk made a statement at the TRC that the five were taken to Namibia, underwent a military trial and were then executed on board a helicopter and dropped into the sea

off the Namibian coast. Orlando’s CV and his contribution to the fight against Communism in Southern Africa is impressive. He completed National Service and left the Army the first time in 1954. He then returned to service with Military intelligence in 1957 working with Costa Matos the Chief of Intelligence in LM who formed three hunter/intelligence gathering teams each under the control of a white Lieutenant, Orlando being one of them. Officers and men wore civilian clothing and operated in the Cabo Delgado as well as the Niassa Province They posed as hunters and were expected to hunt, make money and self-fund their activities. Orlando could speak most of the Northern Mozambican dialects and was well respected by the blacks living in those areas. By 1960 Orlando Cristina was a 2nd Lieutenant and was tasked to give a "Recruit" course to new troops at the Boane Military Training Centre. In 1962 Orlando began working with the Portuguese military intelligence where he most likely worked under the Auspices of Major Costa Matos. In 1963 he “deserted” to Frelimo and while many people have written (myself included) or stated this was under the auspices of P.I.D.E. Thanks to his son José who advised this is not correct, Orlando never worked for P.I.D.E In fact, on his return to Mozambique in 1964 he was arrested by P.I.D.E who were not aware that he was on an undercover mission and had in fact not joined Frelimo. The officer in Military intelligence that was aware of Orlando’s mission was no longer in Mozambique, having been recalled to Lisbon.

Orlando Cristina. (Continued on page 132)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

131

(Continued from page 131)

Jorge Jardim visited Orlando in jail and offered to get him released on the condition he would work with Jardim. Orlando was put on the Lusalite’s pay roll as head of security for SONAREP in Dondo. Jardim set up a select militia group of between 35-70 men essentially to secure the Lusaslite factory in Dondo. A few of the men Orlando used until late 1974 in covert activities in Manica, Zambezia and Malawi to collect intelligence on Frelimo as well as other operations as they came up. In 1965 Orlando also assisted Jardim with the creation of the “Young Pioneers”, a militia force of Malawian president Hastings Banda. After the coups in Lisbon and LM in 1974 Orlando settled in Rhodesia becoming a CIO agent and helps with the formation of RENAMO. In 1980 he relocates to SA. Orlando would become one of the main pillars of RENAMO, working for the SA military intelligence with many of the opinion it was his employers that had him assassinated. Caetano, Benedito and Cipriano were part of a small team commanded by Orlando Cristina to operate in the North of Mozambique their mission was to gather intelligence and either capture FRELIMO in the field or bring back FRELIMO cadres captured by the Portuguese security services before they were killed as the Portuguese forces in the field rarely brought back prisoners. Those cadres captured had two uses, one was to glean any vital information that could assist the security forces in gaining the upper hand against FELIMO and the other was to “turn” those captured to work/fight for the Portuguese. In Caetano’s own words “the Army

did not process them properly; they did not know what to do with them”. Soon after the Portuguese leftwing revolution Jardim fearing the worst ensured that Caetano, Benedito and Cipriano were taken to Malawi and two weeks later they moved to Rhodesia, While Orlando was to be recruited by the Rhodesians the other three men were taken to South Arica by Jardim himself. Eventually the three joined the SADF and were sent to the Caprivi, most probably Fort Doppies to undergo intense training under the watchful eye of a former Portuguese Special Forces operator. The three had been told that they were being trained by the SADF to be able to go back to Mozambique and work with NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

RENAMO who had been founded in 1975 by the Rhodesians as part of an anti-communist backlash against Mozambique’s ruling FRELIMO party who were actively assisting Mugabe’s ZANLA to infiltrate Rhodesia to commit attacks on both civilian and military targets

It was while in the Caprivi that Caetano, Benedito and Cipriano encountered two absolute legends in the Special Forces community, Daniel Francisco Roxo and Amilcar Queiroz. Caetano remembers meeting Daniel and Queiroz while training alongside them in the Caprivi (This would have been around 1975). Caetano said to Manuel “Daniel Roxo the man from Vila Cabral, that they had heard so (Continued on page 133)

132

(Continued from page 132)

much about while still in Mozambique”. Daniel had successfully fought Frelimo in The Niassa province of Mozambique with his own Militia for several years and decided to carry on his fight against Communism joining the SADF in 1974 having left Mozambique after the failed LM coup. Daniel as well as several other Portuguese were used to train FNLA troops that would eventually become the formidable 32 Battalion. Daniel was the first nonSouth African to win the Honoris Crux for action at “bridge 14” during operation Savannah sadly he was to die on 23 August 1976 a mere 23 months later leaving Mozambique. In a short space of time Daniel was to cement his status as a Legend to the South Africans who had read about him but not seen him in action. (Daniels life story can be read in full in Phantom of the Forest) Queiroz was in Portuguese commandos up to 75, he made his way to Namibia, together with few of his mates, they were sent to the Caprivi where they constructed Doppies with Colonel Jan Breytenbach. He did special forces ops, then 3 years later he successfully completed the selection course, to be able to get the pay rise as a special forces soldier. Queiroz started his Special forces career in 1 Recce moving over to 4 Recce when they were formed in July 1978 specialising in Amphibious operations. Like Daniel Roxo, Queiroz also won a Honoris Crux on Ops Argon when he safely took rest of team out to the submarine after Wynand du Toit got shot in Cabinda. He was also in some major battles, like Eheke, were

all 6 guys on his left flank got killed. While sadly no biography has to date been written about Queiroz he is mentioned in numerous well written books on the Recces and South Africa’s fight against the forces pitted against her. Jo Viana was kind enough to shed light onto what Caetano, Benedito and Ciprano were doing prior to attending and then successfully completing Recce selection course in 1977. Jo’s first contact with the three men was in February 1977 when their training started and while Jo was their instructor from Special Forces, he was joined by Selous Scout as well as a turned SWAPO political commissioner who had fled his former organization. Other than the normal weapons and tactics training they were to be immersed in the customs and routines of how SWAPO operated and their camp routine. The training was wide-ranging, even including how huts were placed, what was eaten in a SWAPO camp to learning their songs and history. The training was given in preparation of infiltrating SWAPO and gathering valuable intelligence that would assist the SADF in combating their mission to spread Communism into South West Africa.

Caetano, Benedito and Cipriano were not the only men in the camp being trained, as recruits had also been drawn from 21 and 32 Battalion as well as refugees from Angola and Mozambique. An interesting piece of information is that none of the black recruits spoke Portuguese and with Benedito being able to speak passable English he became the translator, while not the best of passing on information it was the best way of communication. For 5 weeks NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

José Monteiro, 1 Recce the men were trained tirelessly as if they were in fact SWAPO recruits. Making the task a little more difficult was that none of the black recruits had military training. A base camp was built on the curve of a horseshoe about 100ms from the river full of Crocodiles. The camp was visited nightly by wild animals. Jo Viana made mention at the beginning the recruits where mainly ex-FNLA and UNITA supporters Benedito friends having been born in Mozambique and that they were caught between the various factions in 5 Recce. Benedito and the others (Continued on page 134)

133

(Continued from page 133)

after training were to move to Ondangua where the main 5 Recce would later be established from there, they were sent to 1 Recce in Durban and then for selection at Duku Duku (Natal) and after that to 5 Recce in Phalaborwa. 5 Special Force had come about in 1976 there was a decision to split up 1 Recce into three sub - units that would include a group specialising in the use of black soldiers trained in guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla warfare branch was formed mid December 1976 and a group of white Recces under the command of Major Joe Verster left for a course in Rhodesia that gave them insight into working with black members. This was the beginning of 5 Reconnaissance Commando. 5 Recce’s specialities were overland operations, especially long-range infiltration, intelligence gathering and airborne operations. After being established in Durban, 5 Recce then moved to DukuDuku, east of Mtubatuba in Kwazulu Natal (where many a selection course was held) and in 1980 they moved to Phalaborwa in the east of the norther Limpopo province. While presently we have no information regards specific operations that the three men took part in, it’s safe to say that they would have been deployed for operations in Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the fight against the ANC and in support of RENAMO. Operations were however fraught with danger for 5 Recce members as this statistic shows. Of the 61 Recces and one person attached to the Recces that died on active duty between 1974 and 1989, 34 of those were 5

RR members, that is 57% of the total number. The next time that Jo Viana saw Benedito was in Rhodesia in June of 1977 where they conducted some straightforward operations that gave the command element an idea as to Benedito’s and other’s capabilities as well as suitability to the operations of the future. Benedito and those that had undergone basic training some 42 men began a threeweek selection course between 17 April and 6 May of those 42 that started 22 passed. Those men who had passed selection and had families were housed at DukuDuku at an old airfield. G Fernando (HGC) and Neves Matais (HC PMM) were part of that selection course. After 2 months in Rhodesia Benedito returned to Ondangwa. The next time that Jo would see Benedito was in February 1978 when Jo was part of a team that instructed 2 groups of Jonas Savimbi’s personal bodyguard. Members of that team included Andre Deidricks, Neves Matais, Dan Lamprecht and José Monteiro. Benedito was part of Dan and José’s group. When that assignment was successfully completed Benedito returned to DukuDuku and continued with training for two months that included instruction on explosives, mines, and antiaircraft. Benedito and eight of his fellow 5 Recce members were to be sent to Rhodesia to reinforce an operation in which Jo had been injured. Around 1982, Major General Fritz Loots then G O C of Special Forces paid 5 Recce a visit and when he saw Caetano he informed him his previous boss Jorge Jardim had died in France. Caetano was devastated at the news. This information NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

was not 100% correct as Jorge Jardim died in Liberville, Gabon in 1982. At the time of his death, he had been working for Interbanque in Gabon. Jardim died while having lunch with a good friend Dr Carlos Graça. At the time there was questions whether he had died of natural causes or if he had in fact been assassinated. No post-mortem was ever carried out, but it is believed that he died from a heart attack. Caetano told Manuel that he had been devastated to hear that Jardim had died and that he believed that Jardim had in fact died from “Desgosto” which literally translated means “from a broken heart”. Manuel commented “What came across strongly from Caetano was his loyalty and devotion for Jorge Jardim and his patriotism to Portugal. He speaks very highly of his former boss Jardim”. Benedito was smart, fit and fearless all you could want in a Special Forces Operator but just like Achilles he too had an Achilles heel with Benedito having a fear of heights, due to this fear he was not Parabat trained and would have been a drawback for a 5 Recce Operator and together with fact he did not fully integrate into the unit was possibly the reason he was transferred to another Special Forces unit that was so shrouded in secrecy that for many years is existence was not known. I feel privileged to be putting to paper a little of these three men’s contributions to the defence of Southern Africa so that they do not become Forgotten Heroes. What makes their story even more amazing is that just like Daniel Roxo none of the three prior to moving to SA had any formal military training, none of them had been in the Portu(Continued on page 135)

134

(Continued from page 134)

guese military having only spent several years with Orlando in the field, yet not only did they became highly respected Special Forces Operators serving South Africa with honour, Benedito was also to be recruited to a top secret unit that was under the direct command of the South African Minister of Defence and served with distinction until it was disbanded in 1993, he would then be reintegrated into the SADF, 1 Recce as SSO LOG, SSO Logistics While their stories are not complete by any means and timelines may not be correct, this

narrative is the beginning of Benedito’s as well as Caetano and Cipriano’s stories. Hopefully, comrades who served with them will come forward and add information and hopefully photographs to their stories. Caetano is not a youngster and aged 84 is also not in the best of health but thankfully we have managed to get some information from him. Sadly, L Cpl Cipriano Luis passed away in 1993 and recently Cpl Benedito Gouveia also answered the sunset call. Manuel Ferreira and I would be remiss if we did not thank former Special Forces operators •

Caetano Gouveia 5 Recce

•

Neves Matais 1 & 5 Recce

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

• Jo Viana Portuguese Commando & 1 Recce As well as our brothers Mr. Paul Els, Mr. Luiz Correia as well as corrections from José Cristina for ensuring the story of Benedito as well as his brother and Cipriano was not only written but they are also given the honour and respect they deserve. Thank you, Dankie, Muito Obrigado. Manuel Ferreira (former Military Intelligence) and Stephen Dunkley (Author & Military historian).

135

REPUBLICAN INTELLIGENCE (SA POLICE) Wikipedia Republican Intelligence From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia

tablished in the early 1960s after South Africa became a republic and ties with British intelligence had become weaker due to the system of Apartheid. Republican Intelligence was later replaced by the South African Bureau for State Security (BOSS) in 1969. Background Prior to South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth and the creation of the Republic of South Africa in May 1961, there was no effective intelligence service in

trated by nationalist Afrikaners, the Ossewabrandwag and Nazi sympathisers. Colonel Pierre de Villiers, Commissioner of South African Police and the countries liaison with MI5, approached MI5 in 1938 in an attempt to set up a security organisation based on the latter. They refused believing they were solely responsible for monitoring security in the Union and when intelligence gathering was reorganised in 1940, with internal security remaining the prerogative of the SAP now under Colonel Baston and not military intel-

Gen Van den Bergh

Republican Intelligence (RI) is defunct South African intelligence organisation that was es-

Maj Gen IP de Villiers

Mike Geldenhuys, Head of RI

the country. Prior to 1961, intelligence, if and when required, had been provided by British intelligence, after 1961 any remaining links between them ended. The British authorities squashed any chance of an early national intelligence service, based on MI5, being created in 1938 as they feared that it would be infilNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Brig Baston

ligence, MI5 input with the SAP declined regarding the SAP as being corrupt and inefficient and some in elements, antiBritish. Basic intelligence was provided by the Detective Branch of police and a fledgling intelligence unit in the Union De(Continued on page 137)

136

(Continued from page 136)

fence Force (UDF). During the Second World War, the UDF formed the Department of Military Intelligence whose focus was on the white nationalists and Nazi sympathizers while an Intelligence Records Bureau was formed to collect, record and disseminate information fed to it by South African government organisations and British and colonial intelligence services. In September 1940, the Defence Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of Denys Reitz, reported their concerns about the confusion, overlapping of information and delays when it came to the collection and distribution of intelligence. He suggested the creation of an organisation to centralise the collection, analysis and distribution of intelligence. Headed by Colonel Lenton weekly meeting were held and attended by representatives for censorship, intelligence, SAP, railway police, treasury, immigration and customs. By 1948, the National Party of nationalist Afrikaners had won the election and by the early 1950s, the first apartheid laws were introduced in South Africa. MI5, seeing the new governments anti-communist credentials, initially thought of establishing a new intelligence service in South Africa styled on its own structure as it had done with ASIO in Australia, but had second thoughts fearing it would be used to suppress and oppress opposition in the country. What was recommended instead was the formation of a Special Branch within the South African Police later to be called the Security Branch. This branch would be responsible for internal security and the gathering of intelligence freed from criminal inves-

tigation. The beginning of the sixties in South Africa was a turbulent time beginning with the Sharpeville Massacre which led to the anti-apartheid organisations of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) being banned and with that their departure from passive resistance and declaring the beginnings of the 'armed struggle'. A year later in 1961, the ANC formed their armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and begun their sabotage campaign in December the same year while left-wing white radicals such as the African Resistance Movement begun bombing. These events saw the need for a more effective intelligence service than could be provided by the Security Branch of the South African Police. Formation In 1960, Hendrik van den Bergh was appointed as the Head of the Security Branch. By 1963, he would form the Republican Intelligence a secretive offshoot of the Security Branch. It would become bogged down in internal security matters and could not become an effective external intelligence gathering and analysis organisation. RI was initially based in Johannesburg before eventually moving to the Wachthuis, police headquarters in Pretoria. Reporting to Van den Bergh, overall command of RI lay with Brigadier Tiny Venter while the day-to-day running of RI was conducted by Mike Geldenhuys. Most recruits for the new organisation had their origins in South African Police's Security Branch, with the recruits resigning from their previous positions and re-employed in frontorganisations in the main South NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

African cities. Apart from offices based in South Africa, RI had stations based in overseas South African embassies such as Washington, London, Paris a nd Vienna. Demise of RI During the middle of 1968, the South African cabinet approved the implementation of a centralised security service and on 28 August of the same year, General Hendrik van den Bergh was instructed to start planning the new organisation. It aimed at gathering intelligence on internal and external threats and provide national security intelligence. On the 1 October 1968, LieutenantGeneral Hendrik van den Bergh, Deputy Police Commissioner and Head of the Security Branch, was promoted to General and then appointed as Security Advisor to Prime Minister John Vorster. Attached to the Prime Minister office, he would be in command all security and intelligence chiefs in the country including the military, and reported only to Vorster. He would set about forming the Bureau for State Security and merging some of RI's personnel into the new organisation drawing others from military intelligence and the security branch of the police. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Republican_Intelligence dated 1 December 2020.]

DA calls for disbandment of SSA 26 January 2021 The Democratic Alliance (DA) calls for the total disbandment of the entire State Security Agency (SSA) and for the establishment of an independent, efficient and transparent state security agency. (Continued on page 138)

137

(Continued from page 137)

Just when we thought nothing could shock us further, the revelations at the Zondo Commission of Inquiry have done just that. We knew it was bad, and indeed the openly available High-Level Review Panel Report revealed in broad strokes how the SSA had been refocused with only one aim: Protect Jacob Zuma. We also knew from this report

the SSA in its current format. Those nameless, faceless officials who were put in place, are still there, and may well still be looting at levels never before seen in South Africa. The High-Level

Dr Sydney Mufamadi

Report was released in March 2019 and after the fanfare, and a flurry of media interest, nothing. No arrests followed. Here we are two years later, and still no arrests and not a cent recovered. How many more years Dianne Kohler Barnard, MP must the South African public wait for acthat millions had gone missing. countability? The looted money However, to have these facts could have paid for vaccines for expanded upon in such techni- every single one of us. Instead it colour detail – to hear how this was swindled, and as far as anycountry has lost hundreds upon one knows, millions are still hundreds of millions to Zuma streaming out to people who and his cohorts, has been the have no right to it, and who cerfinal straw. tainly have no interest in protectThere is no possibility of saving ing us from either domestic or NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

international threats. The High-Level Report gave a detailed account of how to rearrange the deck chairs. However, not a cent has been recovered, not a single arrest made, and not a single soul jailed. Indeed, it has been business as usual, year after year, with the odd bout of musical chairs played by various new Ministers. Urgent investigations need to be launched into the various allegations of Dr Sydney Mufamadi, including: The alleged recruitment of members of the judiciary to secure Zuma favourable outcomes in cases against him, dubbed Project Justice; The infiltration and manipulation of the media through Iqbal Survey’s African News Agency which is claimed to have received R20 million for services rendered for 8 months; The R1.5 million per month (Continued on page 139)

138

(Continued from page 138)

spent on toxicologists to test Zuma’s bedding but only found expired cool drinks; The false allegations against the heads of the Hawks and IPID; Project Commitment which allegedly saw an estimated R80 million allegedly funneled to Zuma from the SSA for about two years; Project Tin Roof reportedly cost around R5 million to provide housing for Zuma’s wife excommunicated wife, MaNtuli, and their children, with a further R800 000 spent on the project monthly; and Project Wave sought to protect Zuma’s reputation locally and internationally.

Those that initiated, drove and participated in these various abominable projects should be investigated and pursued to the full extent of the law. They must no longer remain nameless and faceless, but their iniquities should face the full light of day. The DA has put through rafts of questions asking about the implementation of the High-Level Review Panel Report recommendations – with zero response. What vague assurances are given, are done so in the lockdown of the JSCI committee meetings. We are not satisfied that this report has been taken seriously by the latest powers that be, and that the undermining – or the looting – has been stopped in its tracks.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

The only possible way to ensure this is carbuncle is finally lanced, is to shut down the entire SSA, and start again, from scratch. South Africa’s Crime Intelligence is in chaos – and this must be music to the ears of enemies of our State. The SSA must be disbanded and replaced by an independent entity. Issued by Dianne Kohler Barnard, DA Shadow Minister of State Security, 26 January 2021 Photo Ms Dianne Kohler Barnard: https://af.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Photo Dr Mufamadi: SAPS

139

SYDNEY MUFAMADI’S AFFIDAVIT TO THE ZONDO COMMISSION Sydney Mufamadi | 26 January 2021

HLP chairperson says SSA had a project to recruit sources in judiciary, influence cases Text of Fholisani Sydney Mufamadi’s affidavit to the Judicial Commission of Enquiry into the Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector, including Other Organs of State 1.1. I am an adult male residing in Gauteng. I am currently employed by the University of Johannesburg as Director of the Centre for Public Policy and African Studies. 1.2. I confirm that the averments contained in this affidavit fall within my personal knowledge except where the converse is expressly stated or where the converse appears from the context in which the statement of facts is made, and they are to the best of my knowledge and belief both true and correct. 1.3. Since my teens, I have been in public life in a variety of capacities ranging from student, trade unionist and political activist. I have also had the privilege of involvement in statecraft as one of the framers of our country's interim and final constitutions. I have been a Minister in government for almost fifteen years. I consider myself a public intellectual. My lived experience and academic training give me the credentials necessary to be of assistance to the Commission's quest to understand whether some of the things which happened in the State Security Agency ("SSA" or "Agency") do throw some light onto "allegations of state capture, corruption and fraud in the public sector, including organs of state". 1.4. The key finding of the Panel was that there has been a serious politicisation and factionalisation of the intelligence community over the past decade or more, based on factions in the

ruling party, resulting in an almost complete disregard for the Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts. Our civilian intelligence community was turned into a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals. In addition, the Panel identified a doctrinal shift towards a narrow state security orientation in the intelligence community from 2009 in contradiction to the doctrines outlined in the Constitution, White Paper on Intelligence and other prescripts. The Panel expressed concern that the cumulative effect of the above led to the deliberate re-purposing of the SSA. 1.5. The findings raise the question as to whether this capture and repurposing of the SSA was designed to and did facilitate and protect the project of state capture. 2. Background 2.1. The High-Level Review Panel on the SSA ("the Panel") was established by President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa in June 2018, began its work in July 2018 and was given six months to submit its report. The key objective for the establishment of the Panel was to enable the reconstruction of a professional national intelligence capability for South Africa that will respect and uphold the Constitution and the relevant legislative prescripts. 2.2. I was asked to chair the Panel. The Panel included nine other members with a wide range of senior level experience and expertise in law, security studies, civil society, academia, the intelligence and security community and other arms of government. The contents of this affidavit have been largely drawn from the Panel's report.

2.3. The Panel had the benefit of presentations and submissions from SSA units, from other sectors of the intelligence community, from past and current individual members of the community and from other relevant arms of government. Its resources included an extensive number of documents including policies, legislation, regulations and directives, previous review reports and discussion documents, and investigation reports. The records of the Panel's inquiry are retained under the control of the SSA. 2.4. It was important for the Panel to understand the nature of the operations conducted by the Chief Directorate Special Operations ("SO") and other units of the SSA, how these operations were executed, and how funds in relation thereto were spent and accounted for. Accordingly, the Panel interviewed, among others, Mr Thulani Dlomo, who was the General Manager: Special Operations and later Deputy Director-General: Counter Intelligence. 2.5. The Panel also engaged with several bodies and persons whose responsibility it was to conduct oversight of the SSA. These included members of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence ("JSCI"), the Inspector-General of Intelligence ("IGI") and the Auditor-General of South Africa ("AG"). 2.6. Although our Terms of Reference were limited to the SSA, we invited submissions from the Intelligence Division of the South African Police Service ("SAPS") and the Intelligence Division of the South African National Defence Force ("SANDF"). Because of the similar environment in which these intelligence divisions work, we recommended that a similar investigation (Continued on page 141)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

140

(Continued from page 140)

should be conducted into their activities. 3. The Panel's Terms of Reference 3.1. The Panel's Terms of Reference provided 12 focus areas for the Panel's work: 1.5. The findings raise the question as to whether this capture and repurposing of the SSA was designed to and did facilitate and protect the project of state capture.

2. Background 2.1. The High-Level Review Panel on the SSA ("the Panel") was established by President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa in June 2018, began its work in July 2018 and was given six months to submit its report. The key objective for the establishment of the Panel was to enable the reconstruction of a professional national intelligence capability for South Africa that will respect and uphold the Constitution and the relevant legislative prescripts. 2.2. 1 was asked to chair the Panel. The Panel included nine other members with a wide range of senior level experience and expertise in law, security studies, civil society, academia, the intelligence and security community and other arms of government. The contents of this affidavit have been largely drawn from the Panel's report. 2.3. The Panel had the benefit of presentations and submissions from SSA units, from other sectors of the intelligence community, from past and current individual members of the community and from other relevant arms of government. Its resources included an extensive number of documents including policies, legislation, regulations and directives, previous review reports and discussion documents, and investigation reports. The records of the Panel's inquiry are

retained under the control of the SSA. 3.1.1 The high-level policies and strategies, legislation, regulations and directives governing, or impacting on, the mandate, structure, operations and efficacy of the SSA. 3.1.2 The impact on the work of the civilian intelligence agencies of the amalgamation of the previous services into one agency and the appropriateness of this change.

3.1.3 The appropriateness of the current structure of the agency to its core mandates and to effective command, control and accountability. 3.1.4 The mandate and capacity of the SSA and to examine the compatibility of its structure in relation to this mandate. 3.1.5 The effectiveness of controls to ensure accountability.

3.1.6 The institutional culture, morale, systems and capacity to deliver on the mandate. 3.1.7 The involvement of members of the national Executive in intelligence operations and measures to prevent this. 3.1.8 The policy framework (including legislation) that governs operational activities conducted by members of the national Executive. 3.1.9 The development of guidelines that will enable members to report a manifestly illegal order as envisaged in section 199(6) of the Constitution. 3.1.10 The effectiveness of Training and Development Programmes in capacitating members of the Agency. 3.1.11 The effectiveness of intelligence and counter-intelligence coordination within the Agency NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

and between the agency and other South African intelligence entities and the capacity and role of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee ("NICOC") in this regard. 3.1.12 The effectiveness and appropriateness of the existing oversight mechanisms in ensuring accountability and transparency. 3.2. The Review Panel concluded its work and submitted its report to President Ramaphosa in December 2018. 4. The Philosophy and Principles underpinning Intelligence Organisations. 4.1. In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 democratic breakthrough, government assiduously spread commitment to reconstruction, development and reconciliation as the underlying philosophy of governance and the practice of statecraft in South Africa. To that end, government adopted a White Paper on Intelligence which: 4.1.1. Defines modern intelligence and juxtaposes the purpose of intelligence in a democratic and constitutional dispensation against the purpose of intelligence during the Cold War period. 4.1.2. Underlines several principles that underpin intelligence organisation. Among these is the principle of political neutrality. This principle asserts that a national intelligence organisation is a national asset, and shall therefore be politically non-partisan. 4.1.3. From the above, it follows that no intelligence or security service or organisation shall be allowed to carry out any operations that are intended to undermine, promote or influence any South African political party or organisation at the expense of another by means of any acts, (Continued on page 142)

141

(Continued from page 141)

including active measures or covert action or by means of disinformation. In this regard, there is a clear resonance between the White Paper on Intelligence and the Constitution of the Republic. The Constitution reflects the resolve of its drafters that our intelligence and security services should never return to the wanton disrespect for political and human rights that preceded the democratic dispensation. Coming as they did from a past of conflict and warfare, our intelligence officials had to be consciously reeled into a new intelligence dispensation — the new dispensation being a novel instrument as one that is united in its diversity. 5. Proclamation 5.1. On 11 September 2009, President Jacob Zuma issued a proclamation in terms of which he established the State Security Agency — an amalgam of the National Intelligence Agency ("NIA"), which dealt with domestic affairs, and the South African Secret Service ("SASS"), which dealt with foreign affairs. 5.2. The designation of the civilian intelligence organisation (as amalgamated) as a "State Security Agency" echoed the pre1994 mindset of the warfare state. Given where the new South Africa came from, this reversion to the state security, as opposed to the human security mindset, was not only a retrogressive position. It was reflective of an allergy to accountability in that it was done without reference to Parliament and the attendant public consultation required by the Constitution. 5.3. The effect of this was that the two distinct branches of the SSA, the NIA (domeitic) and the SASS (foreign) were centralised under authority of a single Director-General ("DG"). This centralisation made external executive

control of the Agency easier than it would have been in relation to a decentralised organisation. The evidence before the Panel was that this also had the effect of weakening the foreign branch of the SSA. 6. Some Findings 6.1. The Panel examined an extensive archive of evidence. The report confirmed the abuse of the intelligence structures dating back to 2005. These included allegations relating to the Principal Agent Network ("PAN") programme and more recent allegations concerning the Special Operations ("SO") unit. 6.2. The Panel was given information in regard to: 6.2.1 Incidents that speak to the weaponisation of intelligence services for partisan and/or factional purposes. 6.2.2. Incidents which show the attempts to secure the connivance of the SSA in opening up the state to rent-seekers. 6.2.3. Abuse and the bypassing of proper financial and procurement controls. 7. The Weaponisation of Intelligence for Partisan and Factional Purposes 7.1. From accounts provided to the Panel, the SO unit of the SSA was rekindled in about 2011. Its re-emergence was stimulated by the incendiary politics of partisanship and factionalism which had become endemic in the country as well as in the African National Congress ("ANC"). 7.2. The notion of a SO unit in intelligence, military and police services is not at all unusual. Normally it entails units that work under deeper cover than other units of a service and that work on particularly sensitive operations against especially serious targets or issues, usually at a national level. Members of such NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

units are supposed to be specially trained and highly competent. In the case of the NIA and SSA, such a unit would be based at head office and work on national projects of particular seriousness that cannot be assigned to a provincial or other structure. 7.3. The Panel probed deeply and widely into the issue of SO. Towards the end of its deliberations, it received a briefing from the Inspector-General of Intelligence (IGO, Dr Setlhomamaru Dintwe, on an investigation his office was conducting into SO. For the purposes of this exercise, I highlight key elements of what was presented to the Panel on SO, particularly in relation to the naked politicisation of intelligence in recent years. 7.4. The key player in the politicisation of SO and the SSA in general, according to information before the Panel, was Mr Thulani Dlomo. Mr Dlomo later became South Africa's ambassador to Japan. According to reports, he was "deployed" to SSA by then President Zuma via then Minister of State Security, Siyabonga Cwele, in 2012 to head up the SO Chief Directorate. This was in spite of allegations that he left the employ of the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Department of Social Development under a cloud of corruption allegations.

7.5. According to Mr Dlomo, his brief CV is that he was a member of ANC underground structures in KZN since 1985; left the country in 1988 and returned in 1992. He then worked with the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security in KZN. After 1994 or thereabouts he was integrated into the SAPS VIP Protection Unit and served as a protector for me when I served as Minister of Safety and Security. Mr Dlomo claimed to have worked for the Presidential Pro(Continued on page 143)

142

(Continued from page 142)

tection Unit ("PPU") of SAPS during President Thabo Mbeki's time. He left government in 2002 and worked for a security company in KZN which was assisting the eThekwini Municipality on cashin-transit heist investigations. He left that company in 2006 and joined the KZN Department of Social Development as Security Manager. As mentioned, he joined SSA in 2012 as General Manager SO and was promoted in 2014 to DDG Counter Intelligence. According to former Minister of State Security, Bongani Bongo, President Zuma eventually complained that Mr Dlomo had "created too many structures" and that he had to take him out of SSA. Mr Dlomo was appointed Ambassador to Japan in 2017. He has now been recalled from his ambassadorship in Japan. 7.6. The Panel put it on record that Mr Dlomo was the most recalcitrant and evasive "witness" it encountered in all its interviews. Mr Dlomo invoked the "need to know principle" to withhold information from the Panel — particularly with regard to his interaction with the Executive. 7.7. It was clear to the Panel that the SSA's SO unit, especially under Mr Dlomo's watch, was a law unto itself and directly served the political interests of the Executive. (This is what I mean by the "weaponisation" of intelligence for partisan political purposes.) The SO also undertook intelligence operations which were clearly unconstitutional and illegal. Information made available to the Panel indicated that among these operations were the following. 7.8. Project Construcao: This involved the training of undercover agents in VIP protection elsewhere on the continent and

assigning some of these to provide protection to the then President of South Africa, as well as to others who were not entitled to such protection, such as the former Chairperson of the Board of South African Airways, Ms Dudu Myeni; the former National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Mr Shaun Abrahams; the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) President, Mr Colin Maine; and the former Acting Head of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI or the "Hawks"), Gen Yolisa Matakata. VIP protection is a mandate of the SAPS. The Panel was aware of initiatives some years ago to attempt to make this a NIA responsibility. This did not happen. Apparently, this project had an annual budget of around R24 million. 7.9. Project Commitment This involved providing then President Zuma with R2.5 million per month in the 2015/16 financial year, increased to R4.5 million per month in the 2016/17 financial year. Apparently, this money was provided via then Minister Mahlobo. Although acknowledgments of receipt of these funds were received from Minister Mahlobo, there is apparently no proof of the funds being received by President Zuma. 7.10. Project Justice: This project involved recruiting and handling sources in the judiciary in order to influence the outcome of cases against President Zuma. Information provided to the Panel indicated that amounts of between R1.2 million and R4.5 million were routinely taken from SSA and provided to Minister Mahlobo whom, it is said, was responsible for handling these sources. 7.10.1. The-Panel was told that this project was motivated by a perceived need to counter the influence of judges hostile to President Zuma. Allegations made were to the effect that NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

judges were bribed to achieve this purpose. This should, however, be treated with extreme caution as one would not want to be party to the destruction of public confidence in the judiciary if there is no actual evidence that the operation was carried out to conclusion. 7.10.2. The Panel believed it was possible that this project did not exist and was instead used as a ruse to obtain State resources. However, even if this were so, funds should not have been allocated to a project of this nature which on all accounts constituted a serious breach of the constitutionally guaranteed separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. 7 .11. Operation Lock: This involved providing a safe house and protection to Mr Eugene de Kock when he was released from prison, apparently on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Correctional Services. The Panel was aware that, prior to Mr De Kock's release on parole, he had been assisting the NPA's Missing Persons Task Team to locate the bodies of murdered cadres of MK. According to the Task Team, the SSA blocked access to Mr De Kock for some time. 7.12. Project Wave: This involved infiltrating and influencing the media at home and abroad in order, apparently, to counter bad publicity for the country, the then President and the SSA. The project was launched in the 2015/16 financial year with a budget of R24 million. One of the largest amounts issued for this project was one of R20 million given to a media agency, Apricot, apparently for "services rendered" for eight months. 7.13. Project Accurate/ Khusela: This was a project to recruit toxicologists to test the (Continued on page 144)

143

(Continued from page 143)

food and bedding of then President Zuma. This project had an initial allocation of R500 000 per month which increased to R1 .5 million per month in the 2015/16 financial year. Again, the Panel did not understand this to be the responsibility of the SSA. 7.14. Project Tin Roof: This involved an investigation into the alleged attempted poisoning of President Zuma by his wife, MaNtuli, but it also involved acquiring a safe house for MaNtuli and seemingly maintaining her, given the quantum of the project budget of R5.2 million, with a monthly withdrawal of R800 000. 7.15. The SSA and Civil Society: The Panel also heard testimony and was provided with legal papers about a union called the Workers Association Union which was established with the support of the SO unit of the SSA. The purpose served by the formation of this union was ostensibly to neutralise the instability in the platinum belt and counter the growing influence of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union ("AMCU"). The Panel also heard testimony from the IGI, Dr Dintwe, about the SSA having put under surveillance unions that had broken ranks with the Congress of South African Trade Unions ("Cosatu") and were critical of President Zuma. 7.16. Project Academia: This was designed to intervene in the #FeesMustFall protests and influence the direction of the student movement. The main agent in this project, Murray was sent on training to a foreign country. According to Mr Dlomo, the purpose of Project Academia was to support "young bright minds" to be patriotic and to be strategically deployed to institute counter measures and ensure stability and peace in our universities.

7.17. These are just some of the SO projects that the Panel was made aware of. In addition, the Panel was given access to a document which was purportedly a report to the then SSA DG, Mr Arthur Fraser, in February 2017 in which the author "boasts" of his SO unit's performance in the 2016/17 year. These "achievements" include:

that SO had largely become a parallel intelligence structure serving a faction of the ruling party and, in particular, the personal political interests of the sitting president of the party and country. This was in direct breach of the Constitution, the White Paper, the relevant legislation and plain good government intelligence functioning.

7.17.1. During the 2016 ANC January 8 statement in Rustenburg, the unit "initiated 3 countering operations to impede the distribution of CR17 regalia, impede transportation system of dissident groups from [Gauteng Province]".

8. Attempts to Secure the Connivance of SSA in Wrongdoing. 8.1. In its interviews with the SSA leadership, Messrs Jeff Maqetuka (former SSA DirectorGeneral) Gibson Njenje (former Director Domestic Branch), and Moe Shaik (former Director Foreign Branch), the Panel heard that the three had submitted a report to the then Minister of State Security, Dr Siyabonga Cwele about the emerging influence of the Gupta family over government officials and then President Zuma as a threat to national security. Mr Njenje gave an example where the former President instructed former Minister of Minerals and Energy, Ms Susan Shabangu, to meet with Mr Ajay Gupta at the President's home. At the Minister Shabangu's request, Mr Njenje accompanied her and described Mr Gupta as being rude and "demanding certain things in mining".

7.17.2. During the February 2016 State of the Nation Address the unit was "able to infiltrate and penetrate the leadership structure of the ZMF [Zuma Must Fall] movement. The initial ZMF indicated that more than 5 000 people would embark on Parliament, but with efficient and effective countering actions, and the dissemination of 'disinformation' to supporters of ZMF, only approximately 50 ZMF supporters attended the march". 7.17.3. During the ANC's manifesto launch in Port Elizabeth in 2016, the unit "initiated a media campaign to provide positive media feedback through the placement of youths of various ethnic groups in photographic vision [sic] of media personnel, thereby promoting social cohesion". 7.17.4. The report "boasts" of various other similar operations, including that "Active monitoring of the South Africa First, Right to Know, SAVESA, CASAC and Green Peace was done due to the penetration ability of the group". 7.18. It was clear from the above information and other information available to the Panel NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

8.2. According to Ambassador Maqetuka, when he was at the SSA, and in response to growing concerns about the influence of the Gupta family, domestic operations under Mr Njenje undertook an investigation into the Guptas. According to Minster Cwele, he was unhappy with how the investigation was conducted. As a result of this investigation, the former President was advised to reconsider his relationship with the family because it may damage his reputation. According to the three, this report was suppressed and in (Continued on page 145)

144

(Continued from page 144)

part led to the departure of the three of them from the SSA. 8.3. One of the things that surprised the Panel was that the revised Oath of Allegiance that SSA members are expected to take requires members to swear allegiance to the Constitution, the laws of the country and the President. It also requires them to "recognise the authority of the Minister of State Security". 9. The Abuse and Bypassing of Financial and Procurement Controls 9.1. A key concern for the Panel was the failure to implement financial controls in the SSA. In particular, this applies to the failures in the adherence to operational directives and especially those which apply to special operations. 9.2. A key element of this is the fact that most of the operational financial transactions of the Agency are done by means of cash. This is to hide the fact that the origins of the payments are the SSA. This would, among others, apply to the payment of sources, purchases of certain fixed and moveable assets, running costs of cover entities etc. This fact is a major vulnerability in the system of financial controls given that, often, proof of the legitimate disbursement of such cash payments has to avoid revealing the identity of the recipient or that, indeed, the intended recipient actually received the funds. 9.3. This system of cash disbursements is handled through what are called Temporary Advances (TA). How the system is supposed to work is that a member applies for the TA on the basis of an approved submission. That member is then required to account for the expenditure of that TA and return any unused amount. There is supposed to be a rule that a member may not

receive a second TA until he or she has reconciled the previous one. 9.4 Notwithstanding these control measures, it became clear to the Panel that a practice has developed in which members are able to acquire subsequent TAs, even when the previous ones have not been settled. In the operational environment, some of these advances sometimes run into millions of Rands. This has led to a situation in which certain members have accumulated several advances that they have not accounted for. However, the Panel was informed that where steps are taken to recoup the funds through deductions made against salaries, the amounts can be too large to be realistically settled over time. Furthermore, the Panel was made aware of a number of members so affected who have left the Agency before they were able to settle the balance and are thus owing large sums of money, which they are unlikely to ever be able to pay back. 9.5. In addition, the TA system does not guarantee that the cash leaving the Agency is indeed paid as intended to the ultimate recipient. The Panel was made aware of cases where money was taken to pay sources and the sources paid an amount less than was requested, the remainder being pocketed by the handler. Of concern to the Panel was that the consequence management in many of these matters has been completely absent or inadequate. The Panel was informed by one SSA officer of a case where it was discovered that a member was underpaying. a source and pocketing the balance himself. When this was reported to the relevant General Manager, he simply imposed a sanction that the officer should repay the money through salary deductions. There was no consequence for the criminal act of NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

theft of state funds. The Panel noted that there is a fine line between such losses incurred being administrative or criminal. 9.6. The Panel received a submission from several members working in the Finance department. They alleged that Dwayne (Management Accounting) restructured the budget process leading to the collapse of the budget structure for domestic intelligence. The DG at the time was Ambassador Santo Kudjoe. Dwayne removed all divisional heads and concentrated authority in his hands. This concentration stripped further powers from the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and effectively made Dwayne the budget controller for all of the SSA, including the provinces. This concentration of power reduced transparency and enabled the movements of funds to areas of the SSA favoured by the SSA leadership, such as Ambassador Kudjoe and Mr Dlomo. 9.7. The Panel received briefings on the theft of over R17 million from a safe inside the SSA complex in December 2015. In spite of video footage of the perpetrators and the outcome of internal investigations, there appears to have been no consequence management for this incident. Of particular concern is the report the Panel received that the Head of the DPCI ("Hawks") at the time, General Berning Ntlemeza, failed to take the investigation of the burglary to its logical conclusion. 9.8. The Panel was made aware that, although the SSA has strict procedures and controls for the procurement of assets, these assets are often reported as missing and cannot be easily found on the assets register. Examples of such assets include high value cars and SUVs, specialised surveillance equipment, properties and houses used for cover and even the profits de(Continued on page 146)

145

(Continued from page 145)

rived from entities created as front companies. This problem is particularly the case within the covert operations environment. In some cases, the asset ends up in the technically legal possession of a member or source under whose name it was acquired and there are problems determining rightful ownership or repossessing the asset. 9.9. One of the key challenges of the SSA lies in its planning processes and the budgeting process arising out of them. The Panel was provided with documentation and heard evidence from numerous members about strategic and operational planning deficiencies within the SSA. Over the past decade or so the Agency has been riven by a series of senior management changes and each time such changes occur, the strategic and operational plans that had been developed were either adjusted or replaced by a new set of plans. This has had a deeply damaging impact on the SSA's ability to plan and see through those plans to fruition. A consequence has also been that budget planning within the SSA has suffered and has become nothing more than an annual allocation with a small percentage increase. The Auditor General ("AG") has regularly raised the concern that there seems not to have been a serious attempt in the SSA to define strategic programmes or identify clear, measurable targets and indicators. Neither have the plans been underpinned by a rational allocation of budgetary resources. 9.10. One of the key control weaknesses as far as financial management in the SSA is concerned lies in the fact of a perceived (perhaps falsely) impermeable border between the "covert" SSA and the "open" SSA.

9.11. From evidence heard by the Panel, it seems even the CFO of the SSA is restricted in terms of information he or she can obtain from the covert structures and, in many cases, is not taken into confidence. In fact, the Panel heard of incidents where serious tensions and conflict arose between the CFO and operational management when the CFO tried to impose basic financial and budgetary management controls on them. It surprised the Panel that a CFO of an intelligence agency should have any restriction on the information she or he is entitled to and the controls she or he can effectively impose. It seems that even the IGI has more entitlement to access than the CFO. 9.12. Related to this is the issue of the AG's inability to effectively audit all of the SSA's financial, procurement and performance activities. The AG was interviewed by the Panel to provide it with a perspective on the audit process involving the SSA. The AG conducts an annual audit of the SSA in terms of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 as is the case with all national departments. 9.13. The AG noted, however, that every year he is forced to automatically provide a qualified audit of the SSA. 9.13.1. Firstly, this is because he is not provided with access to information to allow him to verify the finances and assets of the SSA. 9.13.2. Secondly, he is not able to determine the extent to which performance targets have been met. 9.14. This situation pertains notwithstanding attempts by the AG and the SSA to develop mechanisms to enable a thorough audit process to be conducted.

9.15. The AG's report on the SSA for the 2017/18 financial year provides a useful example of why the AG is forced to qualify his audit: 9.15.1. He noted the high-risk environment within which the Agency functions, and yet the manner in which expenditure and assets were recorded did not sufficiently mitigate the risks. 9.15.2. He noted the extensive use of TAs for operations which were required to be certified for surety. However, during the audit, management was unable to provide documentation to verify operational expenditure of R125.6 million or that the money was used for the intended purpose. 9.15.3. The AG was unable to confirm redundant assets in excess of R9 billion as there was insufficient audit evidence and the assets could "not be located by the Agency”

9.15.4 He was unable to confirm the reported irregular expenditure of R31.3 million as stated in the financial statements. 9.16. In addition, the AG has regularly made findings on the internal control environment. In his report on the 2017/18 financial year, he noted for example: 9.16.1. Lack of consequence management and not holding staff accountable for poor quality of financial and performance reporting. 9.16.2. Inadequate internal review processes by management leading to material misstatements as required in section 40 (1)(a) and (b) of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA). 9.16.3. Non-compliance with supply chain processes going unnoticed.

9.16.4. Absence of approved (Continued on page 147)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

146

(Continued from page 146)

standard operating procedures to guide collection collation verification, storing and reporting of actual performance information. 9.16.5. Numerous senior acting positions have created instability, which resulted in delays in the audit of performance management. 9.16.6. Lack of monitoring and implementation plans by the Accounting Officer and senior management to address key control deficiencies. 9.17 The AG's report also complained about the incomplete assessment of the useful life of assets which have recurred year after year as a result of information being withheld. While this is assumed to be because the SSA is reluctant to disclose this information because of the covert nature of the assets, it could also be because the Agency is intent on hiding indications of serious management weaknesses. 9.18. The Panel recognised that the AG, as a result of limited access to information, could only provide a qualified audit and could not publish his annual report. This is a matter of great concern. 9.19. The SSA is defined as a national department established in terms of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 and the PFMA. 9.20. The SSA does not have a separate budget vote for its annual allocation of funds. Instead its allocation is included as a line item in Budget Vote 7 (National Treasury), Programme 10. This arrangement is made possible by the Secret Services Account established in terms of section 1A of the Secret Services Act 56 of 1978. It means that the only information made available for public scrutiny is the overall allo-

cation for the financial year, but none of the details such as programmes or their respective allocations. The SSA was allocated R4.3 billion for the 2017/18 financial year. 9.21. Several consequences flow from this secrecy arrangement: 9.21.1. Firstly, unlike other national departments, the SSA does not participate in the annual Medium-Term Expenditure Committee (MTEC) budgetmaking process, where anticipated expenditure over a rolling, three-year cycle is estimated and considered for allocation. 9.21.2. Secondly, while SSA provides National Treasury with confidential monthly financial statements, these do not include operational expenditure, which therefore cannot be monitored over the course of the year for spending trends or adjustments. 9.21.3. Thirdly, the virement rules which require approvals for the movement of funds between programmes within a department's allocation do not apply in terms of the Secret Services Account. Therefore, the SSA is able to shift funds around between its various component parts without the disclosures required in other legislation. 9.22. Once the annual allocation has been approved by Parliament, the Secret Services Account requires only that the SSA submits a letter to the Minister of Finance for the release of funds at the beginning of each financial year. 9.23. In terms of section 2A of the Secret Services Act, the SSA may keep any unused funds at the end of the financial year instead of disclosing and returning these to the fiscus as all other departments must do. This means that unused funds from a previous year can be utilised the following year off-budget. If NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

funds are under-utilised over time, a sizeable "pot" may develop, (and has developed), which can be used without any disclosure. 10. The Principal Agency Network (PAN) Programme 10.1. The Panel was presented with the results of several investigations into the so-called PAN programme which the Agency (NIA at the time) had implemented over several years until 2011, when it was suspended. 10.2. The implementation of a Principal Agent Network ("PAN") is accepted practice in intelligence agencies. In essence, it is a method of "force multiplication" in which principal agents are recruited outside the Agency who in turn are trained and capacitated to recruit and handle sources and agents in or close to targets of legitimate interest to the Agency. This is primarily a human intelligence (HUMINT) collection initiative. However, it appeared to the Panel that PAN evolved into a methodology designed to avoid or bypass the procedural requirements for recruitment of staff, disbursement of funds and procurement. As an example, the Panel became aware that one person was recruited into the PAN to provide analysis support. The analysis function does and should reside in the Agency itself and be conducted by full-time employees of the Agency and should be the capacity that receives intelligence from PAN agents. An analyst is not a principal agent. There were plenty of other examples of breaches of the principal agent network concept. Indeed, apart from this, the PAN Project has gained notoriety for alleged wide-ranging illegality which has led to several investigations as well as seeped into the media in recent times.

10.3.

Several

investigations (Continued on page 148)

147

(Continued from page 147)

have been conducted into this project by internal Agency investigators, as well as two investigations which were conducted by the former IGI, Ms Faith Radebe. The Panel heard the views of several persons involved in the investigations, as well as those of the current 1GI. 10.4. The Panel noted that the nature of the accusations and the evidence collected during the various investigations painted a disturbing picture. Allegations of malfeasance, procedural transgressions and criminal behaviour were placed before the Panel. These included, for example, the procurement of assets without adherence to formal procedures, the signing of fraudulent contracts and payments to persons without valid contracts having been signed, the employment of family members and close associates outside of formal processes, the abuse of assets, and missing funds and assets. 10.5. In his interactions with the Panel, Mr Fraser confirmed the appointment of his son as an employee of a warehouse that was a front company for the SSA. He also confirmed initiating the employment of the wife of the Manager of the Cover Support Unit ("CSU"), Philani. 10.6. It appeared to the Panel there had been instances of serious criminal behaviour which had taken place under the guise of conducting covert work and that this. behaviour may have involved theft, forgery and uttering, fraud, corruption, and even bordered on organised crime and transgressions of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 ("POCA"). 10.7. The Panel was concerned whether the reporting requirements were followed by the responsible individuals in management when the allegations were

discovered. This includes reporting of fruitless and wasteful expenditure to the National Treasury in terms of the PFMA and to SAPS under section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 ("PRECCA"). 10.8. Of particular concern for the Panel was that, apart from suspending the PAN programme in 2011, it appears that no formal action or consequence management has taken place by the Executive or the Agency management. The absence of consequence management has become a theme running throughout the Agency over several years. 10.9. The Panel received reports that members of the Agency's internal investigations team into the PAN project had been subjected to various forms of intimidation and some had their offices broken into. 10.10. The PAN programme has had other consequences which seem not to have been addressed with the seriousness warranted. One such consequence is the large number of claims made against the Agency and the Minister of State Security by former PAN members involving allegations of breaches of contract by the Agency. These have amounted to hundreds of millions of Rands.

11. Conclusion 11.1. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that the information provided herein is based on what the High-Level Review Panel into the SSA gathered in the course of its work. 11.2. The key finding of the Panel was that there has been a serious politicisation and factionalisation of the intelligence community over the past decade or more, based on factions in the ruling party, resulting in an almost complete disregard for the NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts. Our civilian intelligence community was turned into a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals. In addition, the Panel identified a doctrinal shift towards a narrow state security orientation in the intelligence community from 2009 in contradiction to the doctrines outlined in the Constitution, White Paper on Intelligence and other prescripts. The Panel expressed concern that the cumulative effect of the above led to the deliberate re-purposing of the SSA. 11.3. The Panel made several general recommendations arising out of its findings. First, it recommended that the President appoint a Task Team to unpack the more detailed recommendations of the Panel into a concrete plan of action. The Task Team should be required to initiate, undertake and coordinate the recommended reviews and oversee the implementation of their outcomes. 11.4. The Panel further recommended that the President instruct the appropriate law enforcement bodies, oversight institutions and internal disciplinary bodies to investigate all manifest breaches of the law, regulations and other prescripts in the SSA as highlighted by the report with a view to instituting, where appropriate, criminal and/ or disciplinary proceedings. 11.5. The Panel also made many detailed recommendations throughout its report. The most relevant recommendations in relation to the findings discussed above concern the role of the executive, the application of financial controls and the strengthening of oversight. 11.6 I believe that the information provided in the report, as well as the report’s findings and (Continued on page 149)

148

(Continued from page 148)

recommendations, will assist the Commission in its investigation. Signed by Sydney Mufamadi in Pretoria on the 30th November 2020 *** Extract from the report of the High-Level Review Panel Report on the State Security Agency, December 2018: 9.3.5 Special Operations According to information provided to the Panel, a SO unit was first set up in the then NIA in or around 1997, was subsequently shut down (date not known) and re-opened again in or around 2002/03 and, apparently, carried over into the SSA. The notion of a SO unit in intelligence, military and police services is not at all unusual. Normally it entails units who work under deeper cover than other units of a service and who work on particularly sensitive operations against particularly serious targets or issues, and usually at a national level. Members of such units are supposed to be highly trained and particularly competent. In the case of NIA and SSA, such a unit would be based at head office and work on national projects of particular seriousness that cannot be assigned to a provincial or other structure. The Panel probed relatively deeply and widely into the issue of SO. Towards the end of its deliberations, it received a briefing from the OIGI on an investigation it is currently conducting into SO that it hopes to conclude by the end of the current financial year. The Panel will make recommendations regarding this below. For the purposes of this chapter of our report, we highlight key elements cf what was presented to the Panel on SO. particularly in relation to the naked politicisation of intelligence in recent years. The key player in the politicisa-

tion of SO and the SSA in general, according to information before the Panel, was Thulani Dlomo. Dlomo is currently South Africa's ambassador to Japan. According to reports, he was 'deployed' to SSA by then President Zuma via then Minister Cwele in 2012 to head up the SO chief directorate. This in spite of allegations that he left the employ of the KZN Department of Social Development under a cloud of corruption allegations.30 According to Dlomo, his brief CV is that he was a member of ANC underground structures in KZN since 1985, left the country in 1988 and returned in 1992. He then worked with the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security in KZN. After 1994 or thereabouts he was integrated into the SAPS VIP Protection Unit and served as a protector for the Chair of the Panel, Sydney Mufamadi when he served as Minister of Safety and Security. He claimed to have worked for the Presidential Protection Unit during Mbeki's time. He left government in 2002 and worked for a security company in KZN which was assisting the eThekwini Municipality on cashin-transit heists. He left that company in 2006 and joined the KZN Department of Social Development as Security Manager. As mentioned, he joined SSA in 2012 as General Manager SO and was promoted in 2014 to DDG Counter Intelligence. According to former Minister Bongo, Zuma eventually complained that Dlomo had 'created too many structures' and that he had to take him out of SSA. Dlomo was appointed Ambassador to Japan in 2017. The Panel needs to put on record that Dlomo was the most recalcitrant and evasive 'witness' it had encountered in all its interviews. Dlomo invoked the 'need to know principle' to withhold inNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

formation — particularly with regard to his interaction with the Executive — from the Panel. The Panel makes recommendations on this matter later. It is clear to the Panel that the SSA's SO unit, especially under Dlomo's watch, was a law unto itself and directly served the political interests of the Executive. It also undertook intelligence operations which were clearly unconstitutional and illegal. Information made available to the Panel indicated that these operations included, inter alia: - Project Construcao: This involved the training of undercover agents in VIP protection in and elsewhere and assigning some of these to provide protection to the then President, as well as to others who were not entitled to such protection, such as Dudu Myeni, former Chairperson of the South African Airways (SAA) Board; former National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Shaun Abrahams; ANC Youth League (ANCYL) President Cohn Maine and former Acting Head of the Department of Priority Crimes Investigations (DPCI- the Hawks), Gen Yolisa Matakata. VIP protection is a mandate of the SAPS and, although the Panel is aware of initiatives some years ago to try to make this a then NIA responsibility, this did not happen. Apparently, this project had an annual budget of around R24 million. - Project Commitment: This involved providing then President Zuma with R2 million per month in the 2015/16 financial year, increased to R4,5 million per month in the 2016/17 financial year. Apparently, this money was provided via then Minister Malilobo. Although acknowledgments of receipt of these funds were received from Minister Mahiobo, there is apparently no proof of the funds being received by the president.

- Project Justice: This protect (Continued on page 150)

149

(Continued from page 149)

involved recruiting and handling sources in the judiciary in order to influence the outcome of cases against then President Zuma. Information provided to the Panel indicated that amounts of between R1,2 million and R4,5 million were routinely taken from SSA and provided to Minister Mahlobo whom, it is said, was responsible for handling these sources.

volved an investigation into the alleged attempted poisoning of President Zuma by his wife, MaNtuli, but it also involved acquiring a safe house for MaNtuli and seemingly maintaining her, given the quantum of the project budget of R5,2 million, with a monthly withdrawal of R800,000.

- Operation Lock: This involved providing a safe house and protection to Eugene de Kock when he was released from prison, apparently on the basis of a MoU with the Department of Correctional Services. The Panel is aware that, prior to De Kock's release on parole, he had been assisting the NPA's Missing Persons Task Team to locate the bodies of murdered cadres of MK. According to the Task Team, the SSA blocked access to De Kock for some time.

- The SSA and Civil Society: The Panel also heard testimony and was provided with legal papers about a union that was established with the support of the SO Unit of the SSA (the Workers' Association Union) ostensibly to neutralise the instability in the platinum belt. The union was meant to counter the growing influence of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). The Panel also heard testimony from the IGI about the SSA having put under surveillance unions that had broken with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and were critical of then President Zuma.

- Project Wave: This involved infiltrating and influencing the media at home and abroad in order, apparently, to counter bad publicity for the country, the then president and the SSA. The project was launched in the 2015/16 financial year with a budget of R24 million. One of the largest amounts issued for this project was one of R20 million given to the media agency, Africa News Agency (ANA), apparently for 'services rendered' for eight months.

- Project Academia: This was designed to intervene in the #FeesMustFall protests and influence the direction of the student movement. The main agent in this project, [redacted], was sent on training to [redacted]. According to Thalami Dlomo, the purpose of Project Academia was to support 'young bright minds' to be patriotic and to be strategically deployed to institute counter measures and ensure stability and peace in our universities.

Project Accurate/Khusela: This was a project to recruit toxicologists to test the food and bedding of then President Zuma. This project had an initial allocation of 8500,000 per month which increased to R1,5 million per month in the 2015/16 financial year. Again, the Panel does not understand this to be the responsibility of the SSA.

These are just some of the SO projects that the Panel was made aware of. In addition, the Panel was given access to a document which was purportedly a report to then SSA DG, Fraser, in February 2017 in which the author 'boasts' of his SO unit's performance in the 2016/17 year. These 'achievements' include: During the 2016 ANC January 8 statement in Rustenburg, the

- Project Tin Roof: This in-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

unit 'initiated 3 countering operations to impede the distribution of CR17 regalia, impede transportation system of dissident groups from GP...' During the February 2016 State of the Nation Address the unit was 'able to infiltrate and penetrate the leadership structure of the ZMF3I movement. The initial ZMF indicated that more than 5 000 people would embark on parliament, but with efficient and effective countering actions, and the dissemination of "disinformation" to supporters of ZMF, only approximately 50 ZMF supporters attended the march.' During the ANC's manifesto launch in Port Elizabeth in 2016, the unit 'initiated a media campaign to provide positive media feedback through the placement of youths of various ethnic groups in photographic vision [sic] of media personnel, thereby promoting social cohesion.' [Our emphasis] The report 'boasts' of various other similar operations, including that 'Active monitoring of the South Africa First, Right to Know, SAVESA, CASAC and Green Peace was done due to the penetration ability of the group.' It is clear from the above information and other information available to the Panel that SO had largely become a parallel intelligence structure serving a faction of the ruling party and, in particular, the personal political interests of the sitting president of the party and country. This is in direct breach of the Constitution, the White Paper, the relevant legislation and plain good government intelligence functioning. ENDS https://www.politicsweb.co.za/ documents/sydney-mufamadisaffidavit-to-the-zondocommission 150

Give us names of govt spies in Right2Know - R2K Busi Mtabane | 02 February 2021 Organisation says its basic right to privacy has been violated and demands redress from president Statement: Ramaphosa must provide us with the names of government spies in Right2Know 2 February 2021 On Tuesday, 02 February 2021, the Right2Know Campaign wrote a letter to President Cyril Ramaphosa at the backdrop of the revelations and testimony given by the Chairperson of the HighLevel Panel Review, Dr Sidney Mufamadi at the State Capture Commission of Inquiry in the previous week. Mufamadi confirmed that the State had spied on the Right2Know and went further to disclose that we were infiltrated by State Security agents. Our basic right to privacy has been violated. We have written to President Ramaphosa demanding redress. We want Ramophosa to provide us with the name of the agents (who are most likely still amongst us) and to assure us that State Security no longer has us under surveillance. We demand the democratic right to organize and hold the government accountable. Ramaphosa has a constitutional responsibility to ensure this right. Our letter also raises broader concerns that, nearly two years later, not a single person has been held accountable for the creation of a parallel structure

within the State Security Agency as well as the rampant looting and malfeasance that happened in the hollowing out of the institution for political reasons. We demand that all those implicated in the corruption of the agency be held to account without any fear or favour. Ramaphosa must ensure: That the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence provides reasons for their inability to hold the agency to account and how they can commit to doing better in their oversight role. The SSA provides all organisations with the name of the agents that were sent to infiltrate them. This includes ourselves, CASAC and Greenpeace as well as Student Movements and Workers Movements. Instruct the appropriate law enforcement bodies, oversight institutions and disciplinary bodies to investigate all manifest breaches of law, regulations and other prescripts within the State Security Agency with the view of instituting criminal and disciplinary prosecutions for all those implicated. Take action against former Director-General Arthur Fraser, former Ministers: Mr Siyabonga Cwele, Mr David Mahlobo, Mr Bongani Bongo, head of the rogue Special Operations Unit, Mr Thulani Dlomo as well as the

former President Jacob Zuma, we call for them to be charged with defeating the hands of justice. We view their conduct as nearly treasonous. We also believe that they have gone on for too long without being disciplined. Ensure that all the recommendations of the High-Level Panel Review are fully implemented to avoid such from happening in the future. We demand that those who gave the orders, those who carried out the infiltration be named and held to account. From the highest echelons within the agency to the very spies that were placed within our movements to spy on us. We reiterate that for the agency to reform and regain the lost public confidence in the institution, the President has to ensure that all the recommendations by the High-Level Panel review are implemented as well as instituting an investigation through the different law enforcement agencies available to ensure all those implicated are brought to book. Issued by BusiMtabane, Right2Know Communicator, 2 February 2021 https://www.politicsweb.co.za/ politics/give-us-names-of-govtspies-in-right2know

Die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid in Wikipedia, die vrye ensiklopedie Verwysings Die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid was ’n SuidAfrikaanse staatsdepartement wat in 1969 ingestel is ten opsigte van aangeleenthede wat op die veiligheid van die staat

betrekking gehad het. Dit is in 1980 vervang deur die Nasionale Intelligensiediens (NI). Lt.genl. Hendrik van den Bergh het in Augustus 1968 NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

toestemming by John Vorster en P.W. Botha verkry vir stigting van ’n oorhoofse intelligensieliggaam. (Continued on page 152)

151

(Continued from page 151)

Die Buro is met die funksies belas om (1) alle aangeleenthede wat die veiligheid van die staat raak te ondersoek, die inligting wat ingewin is te korreleer en te evalueer en om die regering, belanghebbende staatsdepartemente en ander instansies, waar nodig daaromtrent in te lig en te adviseer; en (2) sodanige ander funksies en verantwoordelikhede as wat van tyd tot tyd bepaal mag word, uit te oefen. Die Staatspresident het dit goedgekeur dat die administrasie van die buro aan die Eerste Minister opgedra word. Die departementele hoof daarvan was die veiligheidsraadgewer van die Eerste Minister, te wete Hendrik van den Bergh. Die organisasie is in Mei 1969 bekendgestel, en was gou by die media as B.O.S.S. bekend. Kommer oor die organisasie se wye mandaat en volmag is gou uitgespreek, aangesien dit ’n gesentraliseerde liggaam was wat intelligensie-insameling vir beide die polisie en weermag sou behartig. Die Buro het onder meer berug geword vir die betrokkenheid by die Inligtingsdebakel, toe SuidAfrikaanse regeringsfondse aangewend is vir die stigting van 'n Engelstalige pro-Nasionale Party koerant, The Citizen. Hierdie debakel was die hoofrede vir die Buro se vervanging in 1980. Webmeester, Gelofteland (201102-18). "Boss-spioen moes liewer saamgewerk het..." Politieke sluipmoorde in Suid-Afrika. Gelofteland. Eksterne skakels This Day in History - The South African Bureau Of State Security (BOSS) established

Crimes and Mysteries of South Africa - The Information Scandal Sien ook Burgerlike Samewerkingsburo Staatsveiligheidsraad https://af.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Buro_vir_Staatsveiligheid Bureau for State Security Bureau of State Security From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia The South African Bureau for State Security (given the acronym BOSS by journalists, Afrikaans: Buro vir Staatsveiligheid) was established in 1969 and ultimately replaced by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in 1980. The Bureau's job was to monitor national security. It was headed by Hendrik van den Bergh. A scandal was the main reason for its replacement by NIS in 1980. The Bureau was involved in the Information Scandal or Muldergate Scandal, in which South African Government funds were used to establish a proNational Party English language newspaper, The Citizen. Background In the 1930s, the Union of South Africa had formed an intelligence organization modelled after MI5 and MI6 as a special branch of the South African Police. After the country's 1960 republic referendum and its expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations, the organization was renamed Republican Intelligence. During the middle of 1968, the South African cabinet approved the implementation of a centralised security service and on 28 August of the same year, General Hendrik van den Bergh was instructed to start planning the new organisation. On the 1 October 1968, Lieutenant-General Hendrik van den Bergh, Deputy Police Commissioner and Head of the Security Branch, was proNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

moted to General and then appointed as Security Advisor to Prime Minister John Vorster. Attached to the Prime Minister office, he would be in command of all security and intelligence chiefs in the country including the military, and reported only to Vorster. By March 1969, the skeleton of a new security service began to emerge with the release of the expenditures for 1969-70 when R5,320,500 was allocated to the secret services, a 188 percent increase over the previous year with R4,063,000 allocated to the Prime Minister's office and Van den Bergh. Military Intelligence's (MI) budget was reduced from R830,000 the previous year to a R39,000 at which would lead to continuous struggle for power between MI and BOSS throughout the seventies. On 13 May 1969, Minister of the Interior S.L. Muller introduced the framework of the new service in the Public Service Amendment Bill which he said was responsible for coordination and would draw personnel from other security and intelligence organisations. It outlined the control of the Bureau for State Security would rest with Prime Minister and that the civil service Public Service Commission would have no control over it powers, functions and duties. A Government Notice No. 808 on 16 May 1969 announced the Bureau for State Security's formation and came into being retrospectively on the 1 May as a department under the Prime Minister. BOSS' function was stated as investigating matters of state security, collect and evaluate any information received and distribute the analysis when necessary throughout the government and secondly but more ambiguously, perform other functions and responsibilities when required. (Continued on page 153)

152

(Continued from page 152)

The 19 May 1969 saw the introduction of the Security Services Special Account Bill and that would pass into law on 16 June 1969, and saw the use of money allocated to BOSS as confidential and not subjected to an audit by the Auditor-General as with other government departments. The General Law Amendment Bill was introduced on 4 June 1969 and passed into law on 30 June, with two clauses of interest to BOSS. One, the amendment of Officials Secrets Act to include BOSS and secondly, preventing the Prime Minister, Van den Bergh or cabinet ministers from giving evidence or producing documents in court that might prejudice State Security. This caused outrage throughout the South African legal community as it could no longer protect citizens rights from the Executive. On 5 September 1969, Prime Minister John Vorster formed a commission led by Justice H.J. Potgieter to establish the guidelines and mission for intelligence gathering by the Military Intelligence (later DMI) and the Bureau for State Security. The Commission to Inquire into Certain Intelligence Aspects of State Security, known better as the Potgieter Commission would investigate the clashes between the two organisations over who had primary responsibility for intelligence gathering in South Africa. As the BOSS head Hendrik van den Bergh was a close ally of the Prime Minister, it was seen by Military Intelligence as a foregone conclusion that BOSS would achieve favour. The Potgieter Commission reported back on the 2 February 1972 and the results were subsequently used to enact the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act 64 of 1972 on 24 May 1972. The Act formalised the functions and the

brief of BOSS while another part of this act would also establish the formation of the State Security Council under the control of the cabinet and established it as the government's national centre for operational security. BOSS was actively involved in South Africa's foreign policy. It worked closely with intelligence services of other whiteminority governments including PIDE of Estado Novo Portugal and its colonial empire as well as the British South Africa Police of Rhodesia to coordinate counterinsurgency oper ations between the three countries. It and the South African Defence Force managed Operation Plathond, an operation to train insurgents in an attempt to destabilize Zambia, before President Kenneth Kaunda accused South Africa of destabilization operations. The organization also arranged for political assassinations. Former agents testifying before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have confirmed the existence of a secret death squad called the Z-Squad managed by Dirk Coetzee. [Not True — Dirk Coetzee was at Vlakplaas and not in the ZSquad— HBH] The agents have claimed that the Z-Squad killed dissidents through letter bombs and snipers. BOSS also attempted to kill Bafana Duna, the African National Congress representative to Swaziland, but he survived with a lost arm. Directors-General DONS • •

BOSS/

Hendrik van den Bergh (1969–1978) Alec van Wyk (1978–1979)

Organisational structure The organisational structure of BOSS is said to have been composed of the following departments: • Subversion NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

• •

• • •

Counter-Espionage Political and Economic Espionage Military Intelligence Administration National Evaluation, Research and Special Studies

End of the Bureau In the wake of the Information scandal (known as Muldergate) in which the Bureau for State Security (“BOSS”) had become mired, the head of the “BOSS”, Hendrik van den Berg, resigned in June 1978 and was replaced by Alec van Wyk. Beginning with the covert Operation Savannah in 1975, it helped organize operations against the MPLA during the Angolan Civil War with the assistance of the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. This action, which escalated into a fullscale undeclared war and had received neither approval nor discussion from the Cabinet, prompted further outrage at the organization. The Bureau for State Security was then renamed the Department of National Security (DONS) on 1 September 1978. By 2 October 1978, Prime Minister John Vorster had resigned and on 9 October, the Defence Minister P.W. Botha was appointed as the new Prime Minister of South Africa. On 20 November 1978, the Bureau for State Security was brought under tighter control as a cabinet portfolio called National Security managed by Prime Minister who also held the Minister of Defence portfolio. With the rise of P.W. Botha to prime minister, the SADF's power increased in cabinet, along with that the Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI), who would strive to dominate security issues in the new government and decide its policy and implementation.

In October 1978, Deputy De(Continued on page 154)

153

(Continued from page 153)

fence and Intelligence Minister Kobie Coetzee was appointed by Prime Minister P.W. Botha to lead a commission of inquiry into intelligence gathering in South Africa and in particular who would be the lead agency. It was believed that it was predetermined that the DMI would be the lead intelligence agency. P.W. Botha had decided to split the intelligence gathering ability of South Africa amongst four agencies, the DMI, “BOSS”/ DONS, Security Branch and Foreign Affairs, hoping to reduce the political dominance by one over the others, but the rivalry would continue. At the same time, the Erasmus Commission of Inquiry was investigating the Information scandal. Believing that the outcome of both inquiries was already predetermined, BOSS officials began to shred any document that could be used against them. P.W. Botha was looking for an alternative to the policing function of “BOSS” as well as an alternative to a military view of intelligence, one which would provide long-term strategic intelligence to the government about the southern African region and world. He viewed Foreign Affairs as too overt and tainted by the Information Scandal and therefore saw a need to organise “BOSS” into a new agency based around research and analysis and removed its old covert operational function and transferred that to the Security Branch of the police. The new Prime Minister P.W. Botha appointed Niël Barnard in November 1979 to form a new intelligence service. Barnard

would take over the South African Department of National Security (DONS) after the retirement of the existing head Alec van Wyk. The now newly named National Intelligence Service was announced on the 6 February 1980. Barnard had to restructure the NIS to a role based on analysis and evaluation, which meant that the old organisations offensive operational and policing role had to change resulting in many of the old BOSS/ DONS personnel leaving. See also • Apartheid • B. J. Vorster • State Security Council • Special Branch#South Africa References Leander (2017-0623). "Bureau of State Security (BOSS)". South African History Online. Retrieved 2019-02-11. O'Brien, Kevin A. (2011). The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 19482005. Abingdon, Oxford: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-20384061-0. Hepple, Alex (October 1969). "South Africa's Bureau for State Security". Royal Institute of International Affairs. 25 (10): 436– 439. JSTOR 40394202 – via JSTOR (subscription required) "Prime Minister John Vorster appoints a Commission of Inquiry under Justice H.J. Potgieter, of The Appellate Division of the Sup". South African History Online (SAHO). Retrieved 29 Decem-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

ber 2014. "An abridged version of the security report by Justice H.J. Potgieter's Commission of Inquiry on State Security is submitted to". South African History Online (SAHO). Retrieved 29 December 2014. Sanders, James (2006). Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service. John Murray. ISBN 978-0-71956675-2. Swanepoel, Petrus Cornelius (2007). Really Inside BOSS: A Tale of South Africa's Late Intelligence Service (and Something about the CIA). Piet Swanepoel. pp. 76– . ISBN 978-0-620-382724. "1978". The O'Malley Archives. Retrieved 21 November 2014. "1980". The O'Malley Archives. Retrieved 21 November 2014. Further reading Spaarwater, Maritz (2012). A Spook’s Progress: From Making War to Making Peace. Penguin Random House South Africa. ISBN 978-1-77022-438-4. External links This Day in History - The South African Bureau Of State Security (BOSS) established Crimes and Mysteries of South Africa - The Information Scandal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Bureau_of_State_Security (— both wikipedia articles were off loaded on 11 Feb 2021)

154

DA condemns SAPS inaction outside Bloemfontein courts by Dr Roy Jankielsohn MPL, Leader of the Opposition in the Free State. 19 February 2021

ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule’s throng of supporters outside the Bloemfontein Magistrate’s Court on 19 Feb 2021. Picture: Timothy Bernard / African News Agency (ANA)

The Democratic Alliance (DA) notes with contempt the inaction of the South African Police Services (SAPS) outside the Bloemfontein courts today. As the face of government throughout the Covid-19 lockdown, SAPS are implementing two sets of rules with the implementation of regulations. ANC supporters of the factional warlord Ace Magashule arrogantly defy government lockdown regulations with impunity in the Free State province, while other citizens are subjected to bullying and abuse.

used water cannons outside South African Social Services (SASSA) offices in Bellville during a visit there by Minister Lindiwe Zulu. Vulnerable and frail people, some of whom were on crutches, were dispersed by SAPS water cannons for allegedly not applying social distancing in the long queues. Normal citizens were intimidated by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the SAPS who patrolled beaches with automatic firearms to enforce lockdown regulations.

In January this year, the SAPS

Today, in front of the courts in

Bloemfontein large numbers of ANC supporters of the Magashule faction blatantly defy lockdown regulations relating to the ban on all political meetings, social distancing and the wearing of masks in public. This is done in front of the SAPS who appear unwilling or afraid to take action against them. It is clear for the whole country to see that government Covid-19 regulations only apply to people who do not wear ANC branded clothing or uMkhonto we Sizwe camouflage uniforms. (Continued on page 156)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

155

(Continued from page 155)

This is another example of the selective implementation of the law by a factionalised hypocritical ANC-led government that is afraid of its own ANC factions who are outside of government. The ANC-led government are keen to abuse the weak and vulnerable, while cowering in face of puerile delinquents who blatantly and visibly defy the law.

The DA will question the Free State MEC for Police, Roads and Transport, Mr Sam Mashinini, in the Free State Legislature on whether he has raised the blatant defiance of the law in the Free State with the SAPS and Minister Bheki Cele. The DA condemns the ANC for turning our Bloemfontein streets into factional war zones. The unwillingness of the SAPS to im-

plement lockdown regulations against ANC supporters is a further example of how South Africa has degenerated into a weak state under the current government. Issued  by  Roy Jankielsohn,  Leader of the Opposition in the Free State, 19 February 2021  https://www.politicsweb.co.za/

Police finally admit crime is out of control Pieter Groenewald | 21 February 2021

Image South African Police Services courtesy GovernmentZA via Flickr Creative Commons license.

FF Plus leader says country will pay dearly for SAPS' failure to combat ordinary crime during lockdown It is good that the police finally admits that crime is out of control 19 February 2021 It is encouraging that the police now admits that crime is on the

rise and that a lot of hard work is needed to combat it effectively. A significant contributing factor to the sharp rise in crime could be that during the lockdown period, the police shifted its focus to policing lockdown regulations and as a result, combating ordinary crime was neglected. The increase in serious crimes in NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

the last quarter of 2020, like murder (6,6%) and sexual offences (1,8%), is a great cause for concern. A total of 12 218 people were raped during this period – an increase of 1,5%. Regarding murder, it is insightful to note that the place where the third most murders were commit(Continued on page 157)

156

(Continued from page 156)

ted is in the vicinity of where alcohol is available. The number of farm murders, which had risen sharply with 62,5% in the previous quarter when compared to the same period in 2019, was once again very high in the months of October, November and December. According to the statistics, 19 people were murdered in 18 separate incidents that occurred during that period. The feared trio crimes also showed a significant increase

with carjacking that rose with 7,4% while there were also 77 more incidents of robberies at residential premises, an increase of 1,3%. The extraordinary spike of 66,7% in cash in transit heists and the 34,2% increase in truckjackings are both a great cause for concern seeing as it has a direct effect on the country's economic recovery.

the coming years, the country will pay dearly for the police's failure to combat ordinary crime while it focused on enforcing Covid-19 regulations, like patrolling empty beaches. Issued by Pieter Groenewald, FF Plus leader, 19 February 2021 https://www.politicsweb.co.za/

The hijacking of ordinary motor vehicles rose with 7,4%. The incidence of crime in South Africa was already very high even before the lockdown and in

Image: Open source—Free to modify, share and use.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

157

MAKE-A-WISH FOUNDATION By Tate Delloye and James Gordon Make-A-Wish Foundation creator Frank Shankwitz dies at 77 after helping a terminally ill seven-year-old to be cop for a day in 1980 gave him the idea for the organization that's now helped 500,000 children •

Frank Shankwitz who co-founded the Makea-Wish Foundation has died aged 77

•

The Arizona Highway Patrol officer helped a terminally ill seven-year-old boy realize his dream of being a motorcycle cop

•

His police department decided to make the boy’s wish come true for a few days

•

The charity estimates it has helped realize the wishes of more than 500,000 children. It has grown to 60 chapters nationwide

Frank Shankwitz, the co-founder of the Make-AWish charity and a former Arizona state trooper, has died. The Make-A-Wish organization confirmed Shankwitz died at his home in Prescott of oesophageal cancer.

By TATE DELLOYE and JAMES GORDON FOR DAILYMAIL.COM PUBLISHED: 03:45 GMT, 7 February 2021 | UPDATED: 06:16 GMT, 7 February 2021

Make-A-Wish is known for granting the wishes of children dealing with critical illnesses. 'Wishes' range from trips to day-long experiences.

Frank Shankwitz is a founder of the Make-A-Wish Foundation. The former Arizona Highway Patrol officer has died at age 77

The organization was created in 1980 after Shankwitz and five others helped a seven-yearold Phoenix boy battling leukaemia be a highway patrol officer for a day.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 159)

158

(Continued from page 158)

Shankwitz also initially served as its president and CEO. The charity estimates it has helped realize the wishes of more than 500,000 children. It has grown to 60 chapters nationwide. Frank Shankwitz was a member of the Arizona Highway Patrol's ten-man tactical unit that covered the entire state by motorcycl. He stayed in the police department for 42-years before retiring in 2014. He started Make-A-Wish in 1980

Shankwitz was a patrol officer with the Arizona Department of Public Safety from 1972 until his retirement in 1996, according to the state agency. He is pictured in 2019 Shankwitz was a patrol officer with the Arizona Department of Public Safety from 1972 until his retirement in 1996, according to the state agency.

ly ill boy who had just a week to live. His dying wish was to become a police officer and it fell to Shankwitz to help.

He remained a reserve detective but also worked for the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division's Office of Special Investigations. In all, he worked 42 years in law enforcement.

Shankwitz was on patrol one afternoon when the dispatcher radioed in and ordered him to find the nearest payphone as soon as possible - his commanders at the station had an important message for him.

The idea for Make-A-Wish started with a terminal-

Frank Shankwitz shows Chris Greicius his motor-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 160)

159

quarters in Phoenix. 'As the helicopter was approaching…I could look up and I can see this kid's face pressed against the glass, looking down a big smile on his face,' said Shankwitz, who expected the paramedics to help him out once they landed. Instead, Chris came bounding out the door with energy, 'He was laughing and giggling, running all over the place.' He couldn't contain his excitement. Shankwitz remembers looking over at Chris' mother crying, 'I couldn't understand why at first. Then it dawned on me, she has her sevenyear-old back.' Shankwitz's police sergeant sits with Chris Greicius, the seven-year-old boy diagnosed with leukemia whose dying wish was to become a motorcycle cop like his heroes in TV show CHiPS Chris' dream was to be a motorcycle officer and the station commissioned him a set of 'wings' the silver insignia that all motorcycle cops wear pinned to their uniform. Before they had a chance to present it to him, Chris took a devastating turn for the worst and fell into a coma.

(Continued from page 159)

cycle. The police department had a custom-made uniform created for Greicius; the store owner and two employees stayed up all night sewing so it to be finished in time. Chris died just a few days later Frank Shankwitz is pictured with Chris Greicius, the 7-year-old boy who inspired him to help start the Make-a-Wish FoundationChris Greicius poses in his police uniform on his motorcycle 'I called in thinking I was in trouble for something,' he recalls during a 2019 interview with DailyMail.com. Instead he was being asked for a favor by a Customs Agent named Tom Austin who had befriended a little boy named Chris Greicius with leukemia.

Shankwitz rushed to the hospital and pinned it to his tiny custom-made uniform that was hanging near his bedside - he became the first and only honorary highway patrol officer in the State of Arizona. He died a few days later.

Chris' heroes were Ponch and John from the hit television show about the California Highway Patrol, CHiPS and his only wish was to meet a real motorcycle cop.

Flying back from Chris' funeral is when Shankwitz came up with the idea for Make-A-Wish, 'I started thinking, here's a boy who had a wish and we made it happen. Why can't we do that for other children? And that's when the idea for Make-AWish was born.'

They arranged to pick Chris up from the hospital in the helicopter and flew him to the police head-

(Continued on page 161)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

160

(Continued from page 160)

The life of Frank Shankwitz was dramatized last year in the film Wish Man

Getting Make-A-Wish off the ground was not easy, but Shankwitz's work ethic helped drive the project forward as he continued to work full time at the police department while trying to balance the nonprofit in 20-hour long days. After 18 months Shankwitz made the decision to hand over the reins to more capable hands. 'I was also going into narcotics at the time, I couldn't have my face and name plastered all over the Frank Shankwitz is pictured at the premiere of his film, Wish Man, which debuted in 2019 Andrew Steele, who plays the role as Frank Shankwitz talks to the young actor playing Chris Greicius during a poignant scene in the film, Wish Man, which came out 2019 Share or comment on this article: Frank Shankwitz, who created the Make-A-Wish Foundation in honor of a terminally ill boy, dies at 77

Comment by HBH: Wish upon a Star place anymore.' Shankwitz knew he needed professional help from the non-profit world: 'You've heard the phrase, 'surround yourself with people smarter than you' right? Well that was the best decision the board made at the time.' They began hiring people that had the proper experience, background and contacts to turn Make-A -Wish into what it is today – a worldwide non-profit in 50 countries around the world that have helped to make more than 334,000 wishes come true.

Our sympathy with Frank Shankwitz’s family and his foundation. May he Rest in Peace. The old adage comes to mind: “The Police is the Public and Public is the Police”. Projects like “Make a Wish Foundation” fosters an ethos of to “Protect and Serve”. It fosters goodwill between the public and the police and keeps the police humble. We ‘protect and serve’ and this is part of serving the public. Many Years ago the South African Police and/or International Police Association (IPA-SA) was involved in a similar project called “Wish Upon a Star” where similar work was done with especially terminally ill children.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

161

CHINA'S DRIVE FOR MILITARY SUPREMACY: Ian Birrell and Glen Owen

A Dongfeng-41 intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles group formation marches to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in Beijing, October 1, 2019

•

China is spending huge sums to create super-fast hypersonic missiles

2021 | UPDATED: 09:21 GMT, 7 February 2021

•

It has created an army of drones and has an estimated 350 nuclear warheads

China is spending huge sums to create hypersonic missiles that will go so fast (up to twenty times the speed of sound) that military chiefs believe they will be invulnerable to any form of defence.

•

Universities play a central role in maximising the country's military power

By Ian Birrell and Glen Owen for The Mail On Sunday

PUBLISHED: 09:18 February

GMT,

HYPERSONICS

Indeed, some analysts fear that human capability to respond to such lethal weapons will be in-

adequate and that the only way to protect against them would be to rely on artificial intelligence and computer systems. Travelling several miles a second as they deliver surprise attacks within minutes of being launched, they have been described as a 'game-changer' for warfare. Although America, too, has such Star Wars-style weapons in development, General John E. Hy(Continued on page 163)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

162

A DF-17 missile is presented during a military parade at Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2019

(Continued from page 162)

ten, commander of US Strategic Command, told a Senate committee three years ago: 'We don't have any defence that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us.' Such missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, would deliver precision attacks on people, vehicles and buildings. To test such weapons, the Beijing government said three years ago it was building a wind tunnel that simulated conditions up to 25 times the speed of sound. And a contractor has said it has carried out a six-minute test flight for a hypersonic missile. The complexities of developing hypersonics – using sophisticated sensors, guidance systems and innovative propulsion methods – have been compared to building the atomic bomb. GRAPHENE This is a revolutionary material with enormous defence and manufacturing potential. One atom thick and the thinnest and lightest material known to man, it conducts heat, absorbs light, stretches and is 200 times stronger than steel.

It was invented by researchers in 2004 at Manchester University – with China's President Xi Jinping having made an official visit to their lab. Among its military applications are as coatings on ballistic missiles, wiring in hypersonic vehicles exposed to high temperatures, camouflage of vehicles and body armour for troops. Chinese reports suggest that the Z-10 attack helicopter – a rival to Boeing's Apache – has been equipped with graphene armour developed at the Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials. The institute has ties to three universities in Britain, where it collaborates on two centres specialising in research into the use of graphene in the aerospace industry. Chinese media have reported plans to use graphene coatings on military installations on artificial islands built in the South China Sea, an area where Beijing has controversially deployed Jinclass ballistic missile submarines armed with nuclear missiles. One of the most sinister recent trends in China has been the creation of a surveillance state that

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 164)

163

(Continued from page 163)

seeks to control 1.4 billion citizens through a constant watch over their movements, thoughts

involves universities playing a central role in maximising the country's military power.

China's constitution also stipulates that all new technologies,

controlled by the military and specialises in hypersonics, drones, supercomputers, radar and navigation systems. It has links with eight British universities, including a formal collaboration with one worldrenowned seat of learning. Eight other UK universities have ties with the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which spends 60 per cent of its research budget on defence activities.

Another important centre is the Harbin Institute of Technology. It has a joint research lab with the nation's leading ballistic missile manufacturer and has links with three British universities. DRONE SWARMS Chinese troops take part in marching drills ahead of an October 1 military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at a camp on the outskirts of Beijing, China, on September 25, 2019

The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones to hover in the sky as they locate

and words. People are tracked via a massive network of street cameras, facial recognition technologies, biometric data, official records, artificial intelligence and monitoring of online activities as mundane as things like shopping and takeaway food ordering habits. The most extreme example is in the Western province of Xinjiang, where Uighurs and other Muslim minorities are under 24/7 surveillance. Much of the network was developed by the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones to hover in the Corporation, which supports sky as they locate their target. Pictured, stock photo work at four Chinese universities with ties to seven British univer- even if developed by the private their target – while communisities. sector, must, by law, be shared cating with each other and cowith the People's Liberation Ar- ordinating their movements withCHINESE UNIVERSITIES out any human input. my. As part of President Xi's bid for This marks the next era of robotChina's global supremacy, he A key research institution is the ic warfare, with autonomous has employed a so-called National University of Defence (Continued on page 165) 'military-civil fusion' strategy that Technology, in Hunan, which is NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

164

(Continued from page 164)

weapons replacing current drones that have to be preprogrammed or are remotecontrolled. The United States and Israel are also working on such technology, while Britain, too, tested a swarm of 20 drones last month with sorties from RAF Spadeadam in Cumbria. The advanced technology uses computer algorithms – often modelled on biological studies of insects and fish – to create selfnavigating drone squadrons. In total, China is estimated to

have 350 nuclear warheads, including 204 on operational longrange missiles fired from landbased launchers. Pictured, hypersonic missile launches from Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii on March 19, 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS In total, China is estimated to have 350 nuclear warheads, including 204 on operational longrange missiles fired from landbased launchers, 48 on submarines and 20 'gravity bombs' to be dropped from aircraft.

plans to double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade as part of President Xi's drive towards global dominance. Many of these weapons are being developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a massive stateowned conglomerate that has links with at least five UK universities. Share or comment on this article:

China's drive for military supremacy: Beijing's armoury of weapons

A recent Pentagon report warned that, in its bid to catch up with Russia and the US, Beijing

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

165

The ghosts of our Falklands foes who found peace... at last: How a British officer set out to identify and bury with dignity every Argentine who fell in the 1982 war (and won a nomination for a Nobel peace prize) By NEIL DARBYSHIRE FOR THE DAILY MAIL PUBLISHED: 22:00, 26 February 2021 The radio message was conveyed in the brusque, demotic language of the British squaddie. ‘We’ve found a stiff on Mount Longdon, Sir. In the middle of a minefield. What do we do?’ It was the body of an Argentine conscript, probably killed during the final, chaotic retreat into Port Stanley as British forces closed in, supported by intense artillery fire. There had been no time for burial, or probably even for prayers as his comrades bolted for cover. Little more than a boy, he wore no dog tag and carried no obvious identification. Just an

abandoned unknown casualty of war. On the other end of the line was Geoffrey Cardozo, then a young captain in the Dragoon Guards operating from a converted school in the Falklands capital. The bitter war for control of the islands had finished a few weeks earlier and he been tasked with looking after welfare and discipline issues in the aftermath of victory. But as everyone else was at lunch that day, he decided he must respond to the call. It was the beginning of a remarkable journey of detection and discovery that would lead to NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Cardozo’s nomination 39 years later for the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize. It would take him into political as well as actual minefields, see him forge a deep partnership with a man on the other side of the conflict and bring some closure to grieving Argentine mothers whose sons had been killed in action. ‘We were all soldiers,’ Cardozo says. ‘We do the same job, laugh at the same jokes, know what it’s like to have a chum cop it next to you. English, Argentinian, there’s no difference really.’ (Continued on page 167)

166

Geoffrey Cardozo, pictured in 1982, brought closure to grieving Argentine mothers and earned a nomination for the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize in the process (Continued from page 166)

Cardozo’s own forebears were of Portuguese origin, establishing themselves in the London tea trade from the 17th century. ‘When I left for the Falklands I got the most incredible hug from my mother. The sort of long, tight hug I hadn’t really had from her since I was five or six years old. Nothing was said but I guess she knew full well there was a chance I might not come back. ‘I didn’t think a lot of it at the time but it came back to me when I saw that first body on Longdon. He had a mother, too.’ Armed with a grid reference, Cardozo

interrupted a helicopter pilot’s cigarette break and a short time later he was being lowered into the minefield by rope. The Argentine army had buried explosive devices on most of the main approaches into Stanley, often in a haphazard way. Clearing them was a Herculean task, completed only late last year. ‘I got down and prodded around for a bit with one foot, to check it was safe. And there he was. A youngster 18 or 19 years of age. I had to be careful he didn’t have any grenades ready to go off but then I saw his face. ‘The cold had preserved him so he seemed almost alive. And so NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

young. I just thought of my mother. And his.’ That was the moment Cardozo decided to take responsibility for gathering, recording, reburying and doing everything to give a name to every Argentine serviceman killed in action. His commanding officer, MajorGeneral David Thorne was immediately in favour and gave support. But it was gruelling work. ‘They just kept on coming until there was a proverbial tsunami of dead bodies being found.’ Some had simply been left in the open or were discovered in re(Continued on page 168)

167

(Continued from page 167)

cesses between crags. Others had been buried in shallow roadside graves. And there were mass graves in Stanley, mainly of soldiers killed by Vulcan bombers, naval gunfire or artillery barrages.

The idea of ‘repatriating’ the fallen also raised hackles. As far as Argentina was concerned, the dead were already on home soil. Returning them to the mainland, nationalists believed, could weaken their claim to sovereignty.

Things started to move quickly. Within two days a representative of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission flew out, inspected the site and approved it. By mid-December 1982, Cardozo was back in London (having exchanged his muddy fatigues for a shirt and suit borrowed in a hurry from the Cavalry and Guards Club in Piccadilly) selecting potential undertakers and gravediggers from a list drawn up by the MoD.

Royal Marines guard Argentine prisoners during the Falklands War in 1982

‘We knew we had to dig them up, give them a decent burial.’ But how and where? The politics on both sides were toxic. The Islanders, understandably still deeply embittered by the invasion, didn’t want a shrine to the enemy in or anywhere near their own cemeteries in Stanley.

backwater with a raw, Hebridean beauty.

So having embarked in good faith on a humanitarian mission, Cardozo found himself in the middle of a diplomatic nightmare.

The Argentine government didn’t want them back, either. Although General Galtieri and most of his junta had been deposed, there was still a sense of deep national humiliation over the defeat.

Eventually, two things broke the impasse. First, Buenos Aires gave permission for their casualties to be exhumed where necessary and buried together on the Falklands. Secondly, a farm manager named Brook Hardcastle offered some land near the settlement of Darwin as a possible site for a cemetery.

A procession of coffins being unloaded at Buenos Aires would only serve to compound it — and emphasise the terrible human cost of that failed hubristic venture.

Considering Hardcastle was under arrest throughout the conflict, it was a magnanimous gesture. Darwin was an appropriate location, the site of the first real land engagement and a tranquil NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

And so it was that on February 19, 1983, 220 Argentine servicemen were formally laid to rest with military honours on a gentle peaty slope outside Darwin. General Thorne attended, along with Cardozo and a detachment from the Royal Hampshires and Royal Engineers, who cleared and built the cemetery. Led by the Vatican’s representative on the Falklands, the ceremony was one of sombre reflection and deep respect. A volley of salute was fired over the graves by a ten-man firing party and the bugler sounded The Last Post. This was one group of soldiers honouring another — in the knowledge that but for the grace of God, their positions may have easily been reversed. The white crosses in grid formation brought to mind World War I cemeteries across France. The epitaph on 114 of those crosses was also eerily familiar — An Argentine soldier known unto God. (Continued on page 169)

168

An Argentinean relative of a victim from the war attends to the grave of a fallen loved one

(Continued from page 168)

Cardozo had suggested those words, which for him had particular resonance. His grandfather had been badly wounded on the Western Front in the same 1915 engagement as Rudyard Kipling’s son John, whose body was never found. Kipling travelled to France in a fruitless search for news of his son, and his haunting poem ‘My Boy Jack’, though not directly about him, echoed the grief and incomprehension of all parents who had given their children ‘to the wind and the tide’. More significantly, it was Kipling who came up with the inscription ‘A British soldier known unto God’, inscribed on the graves of

those killed in the 1914-18 war but whose bodies were too badly mutilated or buried too deep in the Flanders or Somme mud to be identified. They were simply, the missing. Cardozo was determined that those of his Argentine charges who could eventually be given a name, would be. ‘I was sure these boys would be claimed and exhumed in the near future, so I thought we must preserve them as best we could,’ he says. ‘Each body was laid out, wrapped in a white cotton shroud, then in three body bags inside one another and finally the coffin.’ Crucially, Cardozo kept a meticNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

ulous log of everything about where each body had been found, where it now lay and everything that was known about it. For the many who had not been wearing dog tags or other identification, any clues were pieced together from letters or other personal effects recovered through often gruesome searches of the remains. His final report is a model of painstaking and detailed scholarship. But he still felt his job was only half-done. ‘When I was leaving the islands in a Hercules [aircraft] I first thought, Geoffrey, you did your best. Seconds later I realised that with half the bodies still unidentified, I hadn’t done my job. It (Continued on page 170)

169

Argentine conscripts (Continued from page 169)

was as if I’d been hit with a hammer.’

Fast forward a quarter century. Cardozo had ended his military career a colonel, and was working for a veterans’ aid charity. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

A fluent Spanish speaker, he was asked in 2008 if he would interpret for an Argentine veter(Continued on page 171)

170

(Continued from page 170)

an researching the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on those who fought in the Falklands. It was almost divine serendipity. Julio Aro had been a 19-year-old conscript during the conflict and a few weeks earlier had visited the Darwin cemetery in a bid to ‘find the Julio I had left behind’. He was shocked to find 122 crosses there (eight more had been interred since 1983) bearing no name. He returned to Argentina and asked his mother how she would have felt if he were one of those unknown soldiers. She replied: ‘I would have searched for you until the end of my life.’ Aro determined to discover as many identities as he could. DNA testing was by now wellestablished, so if he could trace close relatives and persuade them to give DNA samples, the problem of identification could be solved. It would involve exhumation, for which all sorts of permissions were required. But it was possible. One might have thought tracing the families of missing servicemen to be a fairly straightforward business. Check the official list, locate the addresses and make contact. Not in Argentina. If an official list existed, it was certainly not being made public. The war was still a painful memory and neither the government, military, or even human rights organisations wanted to know. These men and their families were being quietly

airbrushed from memory for political convenience. There was another major problem. Aro had no grid-map of the Darwin cemetery and no information about the occupants of individual graves. So even if he could obtain a DNA sample, checking it could involve digging up dozens of bodies at random. Would that really be acceptable? Then, in perhaps the most extraordinary moment of this remarkable story, while Aro was detailing these seemingly unsurmountable difficulties, the man sitting next to him and translating his words was also the man who held most of the solutions. In the airport terminal at Heathrow, Cardozo handed Aro a copy of all his research. He would later also give him a video of the 1983 Darwin funeral ceremony, to show the dignity and honour his fallen comrades had been accorded by the British military. It was the catalyst Aro needed. He went on to set up an organisation whose English translation is ‘Forget Me Not’ and with the invaluable help of journalist and former war correspondent Gaby Cociffi, he set about tracing families with new vigour. Most were suspicious to begin with, as Gaby explains. ‘People manage pain in different ways. These mothers felt they had been forgotten and that nobody cared much about them or their sons. So they wondered why we cared after all this time. ‘Some acted as were still alive, rooms the same, talking to them,

if their sons keeping their their bicycles, even setting

places for them at Christmas dinner. Maybe they didn’t really want proof he was dead. Others felt they had cried so much and for so long, they couldn’t cry any more.’ But eventually most came around, in no small part because the 1983 video and Cardozo’s cemetery plan quashed conspiracy theories that the Darwin graveyard was a sham and that bodies had been unceremoniously dumped in mass graves. In 2016 London and Buenos Aires sanctioned the Red Cross to carry out exhumations and DNA checks. In another twist, Gaby enlisted the help of Pink Floyd’s Roger Waters, whose own father was among the missing presumed dead at Anzio in World War II. While on tour in Argentina he successfully lobbied thenpresident Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner to lend her support. Cardozo’s assiduous record keeping and foresight in treblewrapping the bodies made the job of identification infinitely easier than it would otherwise have been. ‘In 2017, when the Red Cross did finally disinter them, I was amazed to find that while the coffins had disintegrated, the bodies inside the three bags were almost intact.’ Two years later, 89 relatives of the missing walked together along the pebbled path to Darwin cemetery to finally put names on their lost sons’ graves. Some stood weeping in silent remembrance, others spoke to their sons, brought gifts, told them all the family news they’d (Continued on page 172)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

171

(Continued from page 171)

missed.

‘They arrived with such a leaden step but they left with their heads held high and perhaps with a new sense of pride,’ Cardozo says. ‘They didn’t want their children to die of course, but at least they now know how and where and that they died for their cause.’ A further ceremony took place the following year and others are being planned for after the Covid emergency. Just seven bodies are now still unidentified. Typically, Aro, Gaby

and Cardozo, though pleased their work has produced such heart-warming results, believe it will be incomplete until every cross has been given a name. The Nobel Peace Prize selection process is shrouded in secrecy, but it’s understood the final shortlist will be drawn up (by an unnamed panel) in the next month. Choices are highly political and sometimes controversial. Cardozo is naturally thrilled by his nomination, but he’s not holding his breath. He has his reward.

her son’s grave for the first time 36 years after losing him is an incredible moment. ‘On the way out of the cemetery, one mum turned towards me with tears in her eyes, and I reached out to dry them, which she let me do. ‘There is no prize — including the Nobel Prize — which is greater than that.’ Share or comment on this article: The ghosts of our Falklands foes who found peace... at last

‘To see a mother put flowers on

115 remains in the 122 graves at the Argentine military memorial cemetery have been identified, but apparently there are several combatants who were buried together and this needs to be sorted out.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

172

A Chance Encounter Russell Haydon Fulton This is the closing chapter on 'My Mujiba' that so many of you good folk took the time to comment upon and for which I am most enormously grateful. How's this for a strange turn of events: Of Lumpy Throats and Misty Eyes A few months ago, in a local Canberra supermarket, I was standing behind a black gentleman and his wife at the checkout. Whilst he was being served, I overheard him chatting to his wife and my ears suddenly pricked-up because he was speaking chiShona! I greeted him casually (testing the waters you see?), “Kwazisa Shamwari” (Greetings Friend). He turned around to look at me and I nearly collapsed in an untidy heap. This was a face so very familiar to me from over forty years ago! He looked at me and, without speaking, reached out with his hand to shake mine. Only then did he return the greeting with a broad and an engaging and knowing smile. He completed his purchase and waited for me whilst I paid for my mine and we walked outside the shop chatting animatedly. I invited him for a coffee whilst his wife took their shopping to their car and I asked him: “Unonzi ani? Ini indini Russell Fulton” (What’s your name?). He spoke perfect English and said, “My name is Elijah Mukono" (surname abbreviated for security reasons). I was wearing my RAR regimental tie and when he noticed it, his eyes widened, and he asked, “Is that an RAR tie Russell?” My initial sense of his having recognised something very special about my appearance was about to be revealed. Simply incredible too. I told him that I had once commanded 3 Platoon, A Company, 1RAR and that my “Batman’s” name was Emmanuel Mukono. He stood, immediately, and came to my side of the table and drew me up by my hand and then embraced me. “That’s my

older but late brother, Russell!” His eyes became as ‘misty’ as mine and we just stood there, holding each other! I had learned of Emmanuel’s tragic demise many years ago and he told me, “I remember you now! You came to our home a few times after giving Emmanuel a lift home. My brother loved you Russell, as only you soldiers can love one another. He spoke about you all the time whenever he was on R&R. Do you know that Emmanuel has a son, who still lives in Zimbabwe, whom he named Russell?”

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 174)

173

that a chance encounter of this sort would be possible?

(Continued from page 173)

My ‘Mujiba’ had shared that very special compliment with me in his last letter and whilst I was serving in 3RAR. No greater compliment, no greater tribute and no greater an endearment has been paid to me than that. I was incapable of controlling my emotions and wept publicly and unashamedly. “So what” I say to the shedding of tears? I was so very close to this young, wonderful, and gallant man and it makes me so very sad that he honoured me but passed-on before me. Elijah and his wife were passing through Canberra on their way to Sydney. I shared my contact details and he promised to write to me once he had settled.

As I write this my eyes are filled, once again, with tears and my heart truly aches at the memory of a fine young soldier who once fought bravely by my side. These are the finest memories I have of my time in the RAR. God is good. Zororayi Murugare Mukono. Tichazo Sangana. Salute Russell Haydon Fulton

How very special is this life we live! Who would have thought, even in one’s remotest dreams,

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

174

THE RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR (1966-1979) By John Frame March 1968 - Rhodesia The Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) were fighting a Zimbabwe Nationalist guerrilla insurgency (ZAPU), whose intention was to overthrow the Rhodesian Government, plus the SAANC as they sought to gain access to South Africa. Despite being largely unsuccessful to infiltrate beyond the Zambezi Valley regions where conditions were harsh and unforgiving, the Insurgency forces persisted in their attempts to gain access to the Rhodesian tribal trust lands where they believed food and water could be secured through coercion or collaboration of the tribal population. Regular Army patrols in the rugged Zambezi Valley were exhausting and the area too extensive to properly cover. Intel from local Rhodesian tribe folk and from the National Park game ranges fed into the overall RSF operations to hunt down the insurgents. Boot prints, Elephant and Buffalo carcasses and discarded food tins were some of the tell tale signs. In December 1967 through to March 1968, 250 ZAPU / SAANC insurgents established camps 30km apart from the Zambezi River towards Sipolilo. Operation Cauldron which lasted 6 weeks, was one such case where a National Park Ranger, noticing that the habits of wild animals had altered, suspecting poachers, spotted the distinctive patterned boot prints of communist sponsored insurgents. The RSF operation was coordinated by the Joint Operational Centre (JOC) manned by senior Army (RLI), Air Force and Special Branch officers based at Karoi. Internal Affairs and BSAP were seconded. The Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) were choppered in and soon engaged a group of 14 ZAPU and SAANC insurgents on 18th March - the 14 Insurgents were killed. From captured documents, the leader of the insurgents was identified as a person called Hadebe, plus their intended operational targets

were revealed, albeit those were now in tatters as the Insurgents had scattered and some appeared to be making their way back to Zambia. 100 insurgents had moved back to Zambia for resupply days earlier. An extended contact occurred when Hadebe and 59 insurgents pinned down RLI troops in a river gully. A chopper was called in but when it failed to dislodge the Insurgents two Vampires were scrambled to lay down rockets and cannon fire ahead of a Canberra dropping 28lb Frag Bombs. The Vampires struck home but while the phosphorous grenade to set the marker for the Canberra was laid on target, the wind blew the smoke towards the pinned down RLI troops who were nearly taken out by the Canberra Bombs that were released off target. When the RLI moved forward the insurgents had moved away. Their tracks showed they were heading south, up the escarpment and out of the Valley, towards farming areas. The Police AntiTerrorist Unit (PATU) were mobilised and the

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 176)

175

gents and losses themselves. (Continued from page 175)

JOC moved to Doma Police Station.

3 RLI soldiers were killed in separate contacts with other remnants of the initial insurgency group over the next few days - they were all under the age of 18. This caused consternation within the military as to whether 18 year olds should be on the front line. Tracking of the Hadebe group was done with 15 RLI troops on foot and in the air by a chopper. The chopper located the group and a short contact accounted for 4 insurgents. Again Hadebe escaped and over the next few days running contacts took place with this group and the RLI with chopper support accounted for a number of Insur-

Eventually Hadebe and one other insurgent managed to escape into Mozambique Tete Province only to be captured by locals and 'sold' for reward to the Portuguese police. Rhodesian Special Branch flew in by chopper to collect him back to Rhodesia for interrogation. Operation Cauldron was the most extensive joint operation conducted up to that date - 69 Insurgents were killed with 48 captured. 7 RSF soldiers were killed with several wounded. The sophistication and secrecy of this insurgency and that it had gone undetected for several months was of concern to the RSF in that the in-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 177)

176

(Continued from page 176)

telligence network had not detected it. The failures of the incursions by ZANU /SAANC reverberated at the SAANC congress held at FC camp 15 km outside Lusaka. The SAANC was then dealt a devastating blow in April 1969 with the Lusaka Manifesto stating Zambia and Tanzania withdrew support for SAANC armed struggle against South Africa.

nificance and the scale of contacts of that Operation would eventually become a regular occurrence. The Rhodesian Civil War history book is available from: The Book Depository with free global delivery In South Africa Bush War Books eBook in Kindle version The Rhodesian Civil War Facebook page

ZAPU leadership under Chikerema re-evaluated their approach after these failed incursions and that the unintended consequence of the alliance with SAANC had brought SAP into the front line in the Zambezi Valley. However the scene was being set for this conflict with communist sponsored guerrillas to escalate so that Operation Cauldron would pale into insig-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

177

Revealed: The amazing story of the unlikely British Jewish spy who loved swish apartments, expense accounts and beautiful women but fooled the Gestapo for years before he was gunned down in a Nazi death camp Danny Buckland Marcus Bloom was one of 104 agents who were killed or executed in France • He enjoyed the profile of managing Super Palace cinema in Battersea, London • The 'ebullient entrepreneur' was instrumental in saving downed Allied airmen • Story emerged thanks to historian Paul McCue and archivist Martin Sugarman By DANNY BUCKLAND FOR MAILONLINE PUBLISHED: 18:38 GMT, 2 February 2021 | UPDATED: 19:06 GMT, 2 February 2021 •

Marcus Bloom (pictured above) was a businessman before he joined the Special Operations Executive (SOE)

Marcus Bloom was an unlikely spy. A bon viveur who followed a playboy lifestyle of swish apartments, expense accounts and beautiful women, he was far from the dashing, image of a secret agent. He drove a pale blue convertible Delage classic

car, an icon of French style, was often seen at the wheel sporting a white pilot's flying helmet, and owned a Great Dane called Sphinx. In his mid-30s with a balding head, reddish moustache and a figure turned decidedly portly from

The Super Palace theatre in Battersea where a young Bloom was manager. He also managed a restaurant in Hove before being sent to Paris to run its burgeoning European operation.

the good life, he even struggled to enlist at the start of World War Two. But his intelligence and ingenuity elevated him to the elite level of British spies risking their lives to disrupt and derail the Nazi war machine in France.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 179)

178

(Continued from page 178)

For almost a year he adopted the persona of French citizen Michel Boileau living near Toulouse while dodging German patrols to operate a prized radio set that relayed vital information between his Special Operations Executive (SOE) handlers and Resistance groups. Bloom was instrumental in saving downed Allied airmen, took part in sabotage missions and supplied his French comrades with arms, money and information until he was betrayed, beaten up, tortured and then shipped to a notorious concentration camp. Witness reports tell of him being dragged bloodied through the streets of Toulouse and being system-

face, would not have appeared ideal spy material but he hated Fascism and was prepared to stand up to it,' said McCue, an author and trustee of the Secret World War 2 Learning Network. 'His bravery was astounding and it is right that his story is being told.' Bloom's family, which had Polish roots, had humble beginnings in London's East End but his father became a pioneer of mail order goods and they prospered and sent their four boys to private schools. The second eldest, he stood out for his gregarious, enterprising character and was soon working in the family business, which had diversified into textiles and running a chain of cinemas, at a time when they were packed nightly. He enjoyed the profile of managing the Super Palace cinema in

Wanborough Manor, near Guildford, an SOE training base during WW2. Bloom joined an intake that was trained at the Elizabethan manor house

Bloom in uniform. He was instrumental in saving downed Allied airmen and took part in sabotage missions.

atically beaten when transferred to a prison, in Paris. He did not crack but was one of 104 agents – 13 of them women – who were killed or executed in France. Every bit of Marcus Bloom's story is astonishing and it is only coming to full light now thanks to the research of historian Paul McCue and archivist Martin Sugarman, of the Association of Jewish Exservicemen and women (AJEX). 'He was an ebullient entrepreneur who, on the sur-

Battersea, London, and a restaurant in Hove before being sent to Paris to run its burgeoning European operation. Bloom developed an interest in polo, shooting and mixed with aristocracy at Parisian racecourses and would have remained in France but for a business downturn and the start of WW2. He returned to England determined to enlist and utilise his French knowledge and contacts but was rebuffed. Nazi forces were storming across Europe and France was about to fall when his obvious potential was recognised but he still faced suspicion when he finally made it to the SOE training courses. His lack of physical prowess was one thing but being Jewish marked him out for concern with one senior officer observing: 'Physical effort seems to come hard to this pink yid' while another described him as 'slightly Jewish in his outlook and appearance'. Bloom joined an intake that was trained at Wan-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 180)

179

(Continued from page 179)

borough Manor, an Elizabethan manor house near Guildford that was requisitioned by the SOE. Other

The chateau home of Count Jean D’Aligny, who had hidden 35 tons of French military supplies on his estate, where the Gestapo captured Bloom after his network was betrayed.

graduates were the agents Violette Szabo and Noor Inayat Khan, who were both executed at concentration camps. Bloom's intelligence, resilience and easy charm lifted him above the petty discriminations which were more a symptom of ageing officer class attitudes than operational barriers. He was spirited into France by boat, landing near Marseille with fellow Jewish agent Captain Isidore Newman, a 28-year-old teacher from Hull, and they joined separated networks only meeting again just before their grisly deaths. Codenamed BISHOP, he operated effectively, helping destroy an explosives factory and derail a supply train as well as coordinating the return of British airmen via Spain. He was based at the chateau home of Count Jean d'Aligny, who had hidden 35 tons of French military supplies on his estate, but was rounded up after being betrayed by a double agent.

The notorious Mauthausen concentration camp, which was run by members of the SS Death's Head unit, near Linz in Austria, where Bloom met his death.

Guards at Mauthausen. The Nazis were desperate to stamp out the growing Resistance movement which was causing huge impact and embarrassment.

German officers walk up the Stairs of Death. Mauthausen was built next to a granite quarry where inmates were set to work, cracking rocks then carrying them up 180 narrow steps

Handcuffed to a Spanish member of his group, the pair leapt from a window of the chateau and escaped across country, crossing a river several times to throw pursuing dogs off their scent before attempting to contact a pro-Resistance gendarmerie 12 kilometres away only to be met by the Gestapo and they were re-arrested. Retribution was swift and brutal and Bloom was seen being led through the streets of Toulouse with a blooded face. His next stop was Fresnes

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 181)

180

The pitiful scenes of hundreds of prisoners carrying heavy rocks up the 180 steps of the 'Stairs of Death' - 180 narrow, uneven steps. (Continued from page 180)

Prison, in the heart of Paris, where he was regularly ferried to the Gestapo base at Avenue Foch for beatings and torture. 'He was badly beaten but appears to have given nothing away which is a very admirable thing,'

adds McCue. 'He didn't give away any of his radio codes or security checks. 'He was very brave and held out under brutal interrogation. Bloom was an ordinary man who volunteered for a highly-dangerous role in the war,

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 182)

181

(Continued from page 181)

believing that his chances of survival were only 50:50. He had a love of France and a hatred of fascism and was prepared to stand up for his beliefs and risk his life for them.' The Nazis were desperate to stamp out the growing Resistance movement which, supported and supplied by SOE agents, was causing huge impact and embarrassment. Captured spies were tortured and then dispatched to concentration camps. Bloom's French wife Germaine was able to visit him in Paris and provide some food and comfort during what would be his final days before he was moved to high security prison in Silesia and then, in a party of 47 Allied agents, to Mauthausen concentration camp, near Linz in Austria, which claimed 300,000 victims gassed, hanged, shot, drowned in huge water cisterns, clubbed or worked to death before it was liberated. Mauthausen, which was run by members of the SS Death's Head unit, was built next to a granite quarry where inmates were set to work, cracking rocks then carrying them up 180 narrow, uneven steps, known as 'The Stairs of Death'. Bloom, and 28-year-old Newman, arrived on September 5, 1944, and were kept for two days in a garage before having numbers 1 to 47 painted on their chests – the order in which they were to be executed. They were marched down to the quarry floor and told to pick up rocks and run up the stairs where they were shot in the back and officially recorded as 'killed while trying to escape'. Bloom reportedly threw his rock at a guard and ran up the steps before being gunned down. His body was never recovered. Karen Pollock CBE, Chief Executive, Holocaust Educational Trust says: 'It is so important to share these stories. Everyone should know the names of Lt Marcus Bloom and Captain Isidore Newman, two British heroes who fought the Nazis. They were brutally tortured and murdered at the notorious Mauthausen concentration camp. 'These stories shine a light on brave efforts of individuals in the most awful of times. This year, as we mark Holocaust Memorial Day, we remember the victims persecuted by the Nazis and those who survived, but we also pay tribute to those who stood against the darkness. The Holocaust is part of British history, a part of our national consciousness, and we should all know and remember these two names.' Marcus Bloom is officially commemorated on the Brookwood Memorial near Woking, Surrey, and the Valencay memorial, a monument to SOE agents in France. He is also remembered on a

A memorial tablet to the Allied agents murdered at Mauthausen, with Bloom's name seen on the left, sixth from the top

plaque to the 47 murdered agents and on a private memorial erected by his family at Mauthausen. Share or comment on this article: British Jewish spy fooled Gestapo for years before Nazis killed him.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

182

SOUTH AFRICANS COMMONWEALTH WAR CASUALTIES BURIED ACROSS THE WORLD – PART THIRTY-SIX By Captain (SAN) Charles Ross (SA Navy Retired) South Africans took part in almost every theatre of war during both the First and Second World Wars. According to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Casualty Data Base 7 290 (includes 607 unknown) First World War casualties and 9 986 (includes 84 unknown) Second World War casualties are buried in 1 207 cemeteries while 2 959 First World War and 2 005 Second World War casualties are commemorated on 48 memorials. This does not include the 1 750 members of the South African Native Labour Corps and the 306 from the South African Book of Remembrance, whose names are in the process of being added to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission’s Casualty Data Base. With South Africans having served far and wide, it is not surprising that you would find single or small group graves in cemeteries across the world. Here are some of those cemeteries where one or a tiny group of South Africans are buried. I.

F. BURIAL GROUND - FRANCE

Flers was captured on 15 September 1916, in the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, when it was entered by the New Zealand and 41st Divisions behind tanks, the innovative new weapons that were used here for the first time. The village was lost during the German advance of March 1918 and retaken at the end of the following August by the 10th West Yorks and the 6th Dorsets of the 17th Division. The cemetery was begun by Australian medical units, posted in the neighbouring caves, in November 1916-February 1917. These original graves are in Plot I, Rows A and B. It was very greatly enlarged after the Armistice when almost 4,000 Commonwealth and French graves were brought in from the battlefields of the Somme, and later from a wider area. The following were among the burial grounds from which Commonwealth graves were taken to this cemetery:- FACTORY CORNER, FLERS, a little West of the crossing of the roads from Eaucourt-L'Abbaye to Gueudecourt and from Flers to Ligny-Thilloy. This place, which had been a German Headquarters for Artillery and Engineers and had a German Cemetery, was taken by the 1st Canterbury Infantry Regiment on the 25th September 1916, and again by the 7th East Yorks on the 27th August 1918. Fifteen soldiers from the United Kingdom and 13 from Australia were buried here in October 1916 - March 1917, and in August 1918. NORTH ROAD CEMETERY, FLERS, North-West of the village, at the crossing of the Eaucourt-L'Abbaye road with "North Road" (to Factory Corner). Here were buried, in the winter of 1916-17, 13 Australian soldiers and seven from the United Kingdom. The great majority of the graves in A.I.F. Burial Ground date from the autumn of 1916, but one is from 1914, and (Continued on page 184)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

183

there are others from the spring of 1917 and the spring and summer of 1918. There are now 3,475 Commonwealth servicemen of the First World War buried or commemorated in this cemetery. 2,263 of the burials are unidentified and there are special memorials to 23 casualties known or believed to be buried among them. Other special memorials record the names of three casualties buried in a cemetery at Flers, whose graves could not be found. The cemetery also contains 170 French and 3 German war graveshe cemetery was designed by Sir Herbert Baker. There are 27 (Three unknown and 23 known) First World War South African casualties buried in this cemetery.

BOLSENA WAR CEMETERY – ITALY On 3 September 1943 the Allies invaded the Italian mainland, the invasion coinciding with an armistice made with the Italians who then reentered the war on the Allied side. Progress through southern Italy was rapid despite stiff resistance, but the advance was checked for some months at the German winter defensive position known as the Gustav Line. The line eventually fell in May 1944 and as the Germans fell back, Rome was taken by the Allies on 3 June. The Germans made their first stand after being driven north of Rome at Bolsena and to the east of Lake Bolsena, there was a tank battle in June 1944 between the 6th South African Armoured Division and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. The site for the cemetery was chosen in November 1944, and graves were brought in from the battlefields between Bolsena and Orvieto. Almost one-third of those buried at Bolsena were South Africans. In 1947, 42 graves were brought into the cemetery (into Plot 4 Rows G and H) from the Island of Elba. The cemetery is on the actual site of the first camp occupied by General Alexander's advanced headquarters after the liberation of Rome and it was here that King George VI visited General Alexander at the end of July 1944.

Bolsena War Cemetery contains 597 Commonwealth burials of the Second World War, 40 of them unidentified. The cemetery was designed by Louis de Soissons. There are 186 (two unknown and 184 known) Second World War South African casualties buried in this cemetery.

JERUSALEM WAR CEMETERY – ISRAEL At the outbreak of the First World War, Palestine (now Israel) was part of the Turkish Empire and it was not entered by Allied forces until December 1916. The advance to Jerusalem took a further year, but from 1914 to December 1917, about 250 Commonwealth prisoners of war were buried in the German and Anglo-German cemeteries of the city. By 21 November 1917, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had gained a line about five kilometres west of Jerusalem, but the city was deliberately spared bombardment and direct attack. Very severe fighting followed, lasting until the evening of 8 December, when the 53rd (Welsh) Division on the south, and the 60th (London) and 74th (Yeomanry) Divisions on the west, had captured all the city's prepared defences. Turkish forces left Jerusalem throughout that night and in the morning of 9 December, the Mayor came to the Allied lines with the Turkish Governor's letter of surrender. Jerusalem was occupied that day and on 11 December, General Allenby formally entered the city, followed by representatives of France and Italy. Meanwhile, the 60th Division pushed across the road to Nablus, and the 53rd across the eastern road. From 26 to 30 December, severe fighting took place to the north and east of the city but it remained in Allied hands. JERUSALEM WAR CEMETERY was begun after the occupation of the city, with 270 burials. It was later enlarged to take graves from the battlefields and smaller cemeteries in the neighbourhood, including.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(Continued on page 185)

184

(Continued from page 184)

There are now 2,515 Commonwealth burials of the First World War in the cemetery, 100 of them unidentified. There is a small Jewish Section, near Plot "N". Within the cemetery stands the JERUSALEM MEMORIAL, commemorating 3,300 Commonwealth servicemen who died during the First World War in operations in Egypt or Palestine and who have no known grave. It was designed by Sir John Burnet, with sculpture by Gilbert Bayes. In addition, the mosaic in the Memorial Chapel was designed by Robert Anning Bell. The Memorial was unveiled by Lord Allenby and Sir James Parr on 7 May 1927. There are 51 First World War South African casualties buried in this cemetery. The casualties are mainly members of the Cape Corps who died during the Battle of Square Hill.

NEW CEMETERY - ASCENSION ISLAND Ascension Island New Cemetery contains six Commonwealth burials of the First World War, two of which cannot now be traced and are represented by special memorials. There is also one Commonwealth burial of the Second World War.

Labourer Johannes Witbooi, Cape Coloured Labour Regiment, who died on 3 August 1919 is the only South African buried in the cemetery.

ASSISI WAR CEMETERY - ITALY On 3 September 1943 the Allies invaded the Italian mainland, the invasion coinciding with an armistice made with the Italians who then reentered the war on the Allied side. Progress through southern Italy was rapid despite stiff resistance, but the advance was checked for some months at the German winter defensive position known as the Gustav Line. The line eventually fell in May 1944 and as the Germans withdrew, Rome was taken by the Allies on 3 June. Many of the burials in this cemetery date from June and July 1944, when the Germans were making their first attempts to stop the Allied advance north of Rome in this region. The site for the cemetery was selected in September 1944 and burials were brought in from the surrounding battlefields. Assisi War Cemetery contains 945 Commonwealth burials of the Second World War. There are 55 Second World War South African casualties buried in this cemetery.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

185

Remembering the South African Navy frigate, SAS President Kruger. The event of 18th February 1982: "WE SHALL NOT FORGET" Via Wolfgang Witschas The SAS President Kruger was a frigate of the South African Navy. She sank on 18 February 1982 with the loss of 16 lives after colliding with her replenishment ship, the SAS Tafelberg, in the South Atlantic. Here is the honour roll of the 16 members of the SAS President Kruger that never returned. ACT OF REMEMBRANCE “They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old, Age shall not weary them nor the years condemn. At the going down of the sun, and in the morning We will remember them.”

• • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • •

AB Benjamin, G.T. PO Booysen, J. PO Bothma, S.P. PO Brind, G.A.F. PO Bulterman, R.C. PO de Villiers, G.W. PO Koen, E. PO Lotter, H. PO Mc Master, R.A. PO Skeates, R.F. CPO Smit, H.W. PO Smith, W.R. CPO van Tonder, W.M.G. CPO Webb, D. PO Whiteley, M.B.R. PO Wium, C.J.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

186

THREE SHIPS MEMORIAL—LEST WE FORGET by Andrew Bergman

21 February 2021

the way a small gathering of Le- death' as the SS Mendi’s deck gionnaires has grown into this im- slipped beneath the frigid English Ever since 2015, the General portant annual event. Channel would not go unrememCemetery in Noordwijk, Zuidbered. Holland, Netherlands, where six Today, as it has done on 21 Febcasualties of the SS Mendi which ruary for the last several years, Observing strict compliance with sank on 21 February 1917 lie bur- the sun came out in Noordwijk, Dutch distancing regulations, I ied, has seen an annual gather- however, to protect the living from observed two minutes’ silence at ing of the Mayor and Aldermen of the scourge of COVID-19, there 11:00, also remembering the fallNoordwijk, the South African Am- could be no bands, no banners, en of the HMSAS Southern bassador, Consul, and embassy no flags, and no bugler. But the Floe (11 Feb 1941), and the SAS staff, diplomats and military atta- men who danced the 'drill of President Kruger (18 Feb 1982), that are collectively remembered chés of several countries, as well by the SA Legion UK & Euas many members of the South rope as ‘The Three Ships’, and African community in the Netherlaid a poppy wreath in an unfamillands. iarly deserted, but sun drenched The service and wreath-laying cemetery to maintain the continuiremembers not only the men of ty. the SS Mendi, but also usually The SA Embassy has informed marks a national day of rememus that the planned occasion next brance for all South African war year to mark 105 years since the casualties and is coupled to sinking will be a special one, so South African Armed Forces Day. be sure to mark February 21 in The Dutch Armed Forces send a your diary. band, a bugler, and a piper, and it’s especially heartening to see NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

187

Maj-Gen GHP Murphy: The Father of Electronic Warfare in the RSA MURPHY, GERRIT Henry Pretorius: 01575273PE (b. 29 Apr 1935 East London) SD, SM, MMM: Major General. After completing his high school training in Vereeniging, he started his training and career in1953 in the Engineers Division of the Department of Post and Telecommunications and qualify in the beginning of 1958 in Telecommunication Engineering. He was a member of the Radio Section that concentrated on international telecommunications and assisted in the development and operations of the international telecommunication service for South Africa. This included radio, sub-marine cable and research and development of satellite telecommunications. In 1965 he joined the SADF as a signals officer and in 1968 as a junior officer he was given the opportunity by DMI (Brig Fritz Loots) and D Sigs (Col Gert Boshoff) to establish an electronic warfare (EW) ability for the SA Army. During this period “Operation Brush” was deployed at Katima Mulilo in 1968 and Rundu in 1969. He was also responsible for the reconnaissance and deployment of “Operation Falcon” in Rhodesia in 1969, both operations were electronic warfare operations concentrating on enemy interception and direction finding. He was also responsible for obtaining EW equipment from Germany and build a strong relation(Continued on page 189)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

188

(Continued from page 188)

ship with the firms C Plath, Siemens and Rhoode & Schwarz. During this phase of his career, he was the EW Troop Commander at DHQ Signal Squadron. In 1969/70 he attended a Military Telecommunications Engineering course in the United Kingdom and receive his staff qualification on completion of the course. On returning to the RSA, he carried on with his duty as EW Troop Commander and EW Squadron Commander when DHQ Signal Squadron was upgraded to 2 Signal Regiment. In 1971 the EW ability was further expanded by deploying a static EW station in Pietersburg. In 1972 Project Ebbehout (Static Command and Control Telecommunications System for the SA Army/SADF) was approved and he became a member of the initial project team under Col Tony de Wit who was the project leader. In 1972/73 he and Hans Hoff of Armscor attended a Tropospheric Scatter course in the United Kingdom at Marconi Chelmsford. Tropospheric Scatter was to form the main transmission backbone of Project Ebbehout. On his return the initial design and test of the network was done and the necessary operational and technical requirements for the implementation of the telecommunication network was drawn up. From 1974-1978 he was appointed SSO Sigs Ops (Cmdt/ Col) at D Digs under Col George Meiring and Brig Leon Cascoigne-Tailor and was responsible for the telecommunication and electronic warfare operational support to the SA Army. In 1977, still a Cmdt, he attend-

ed his Joint Staff Course at the SADF College. During his term of duty at D Sigs he was closely involved in OP SAVANNAH (1975/76) and OP REINDEER (1978). From 1979-1980 he was appointed Officer Commanding, The Army Gymnasium (Col) during which period he also attended a Senior Logistical Management Course at the University of Pretoria. From 1981-1983 he was appointed D Sigs/OC Sigs Form (Brig) he was responsible for the establishment of the Signal Formation of the SA Army and also appointed as the first commanding officer. During this period, he was involved in OP PROTEA, DAISY, SUPER, MEBOS and ASKARI. 5 Signal Regiment was also activated in 1982 and Wonderboom Military Base was also taken into use in 1983. From 1984-1986 he was appointed Officer Commanding Witwatersrand Command (Brig) and elected as Chairman of the JMC of the NMS for his whole term of duty at Wit Command. During this period, he was intensely involved in handling the unrest and riots in the Witwatersrand area and the following operations were executed:

OP PALMIET, ASKEET, ADAMSVY and BLADJANG the troops deployed in OP PALMIET was 5000 SA Army members and 2500 SAP/SASP members. The teething problems of the JMC of the NMS was also sorted out during his term of command. During the centenary festival of the City of Johannesburg in 1986 the citizens of Johannesburg saw the biggest military parade in the history of the city when the complete 72 Mot Bde NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(personnel and vehicles) and the eleven other units which have been granted the freedom of the City of Johannesburg took part in a military parade on the 5th of July1986. Honoris Crux Decorations were also handed out to eight worthily recipients on the same parade. From 1987-1988 he was appointed D Inspections for the SA Army (Brig). From 1989-1991 he was appointed D Tels & EW (Brig) for the SADF. During his term of duty, he was Chairman of the SADF Tels Board, Chairman of Joint Communications Security Board (JCSB) for the RSA, Controlling Authority of the Communications Security Agency for the RSA and Chairman of the South African Telecommunications and Electrical Power Supply Authority (SATEPSA) for the RSA. In 1988 he was involved with the deployment of Project Metal II Static Command and Control Telecommunications System from Grootfontein to Ruacana in SWA. During OP AGREE in1989 Project Metal II was removed from SWA and the equipment sold to Telkom and redeployed in North-West Province. During OP AGREE he was closely involved with the redeployment of telecommunications and EW facilities from SWA to Walvisbay.

On the 1st of November 1991 he was promoted to Major-General and appointed as Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics (SADF) and the aim and functions of his last appointment in the SADF was to ensure that efficient integrated logistics support be rendered to the operational services in the SADF: to maintain the development of a technology basis for the support of the SADF’s operational needs, to ensure efficient (Continued on page 190)

189

(Continued from page 189)

He retired from the SADF on the 31st of October 1993.

new tactical telecommunications equipment for the SA Army; he was responsible for the development and operation of the static, mobile and tactical electronic warfare ability of the SA Army; he was responsible for the development and deployment of the Military Area Radio Network (MARNET) system – this was a radio alarm system for civilians on the borders of the RSA, the control station and reaction force was manned by the Commandos.

Important Projects that Maj-Gen Murphy was involved in, including assisting Armscor with the development and establishment of the local military electronic industry; assisted in the development and operation of the static command and control telecommunication system for the SA Army/SADF; assisted in the development and operation of the mobile command and control telecommunication system for the SA Army; assisted in the development and operations of the

He was also a member of the following task groups: investigation into the founding of a PEACE CORPS (1990); defining technical specs with respect to Satellite Telecommunications for the RSA (1990); survey and report on broadcasting policy, strategy, a controlling structure, future needs and other relevant aspects of broadcasting in South and Southern Africa (19901991); survey and report on the possibility of a country wide telephone number for emergencies

management for the procurement of all weapon systems in the SADF, to ensure efficient management for the availability of all weapon systems in use in the SADF, to ensure efficient management for the procurement of matériel and logistic services in the SADF and to ensure efficient management for the procurement and optimum use of the facilities in the SADF.

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

(1991). His medals and decorations included:

•

Military Merit Medal (1969)

• Southern (1977),

Cross

Medal

• Pro Patria with Cunene Clasp (1977), • Good Service (Bronze) (1980),

Medal

• Southern Cross Decoration (1982), • Good Service Medal (Silver) (1983), • Southern (1991),

Africa

Medal

(Continued on page 191)

190

(Continued from page 190)

• General (1991),

Service

Medal

• Good Service Medal (Gold) (1993) •

Unity Medal (1994).

In March 1994 till May 1994, he was appointed as a Telecommunication Coordinator for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and in the three months they deployed and remove a countrywide telecommunication system for the election in 1994. During this period the Cell Phone Network for the RSA was also put into operation and used by the IEC. In July 1994 Maj-Gen Murphy was requested and called up by the SA Army to act as mentor for the newly appointed black gen-

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

erals during phase.

their

orientation

From 1995 – 1997 he was employed by Alcatel Altech Telecoms and appointed as a Telecommunication Consultant and assisted them in the upgrading of the MARNET system which was then called the National Emergency Alarm Radio (NEAR) system. Gerrit Murphy was married to Rita (deceased 22nd February 2017) and they have two children.

191

IT’S WORLD PANGOLIN DAY Chengeta Wildlife Up to 2.7 million pangolins are poached every year – a huge number for this ancient species, an important socio-ecological symbol illustrating the complexities existing between culture and nature, society and ecosystem. There are eight extant pangolin species ranging across Africa and Asia, all of them are threatened with extinction over the course of the next two decades. The need to ensure their survival is absolutely critical and Chengeta works in partnership with organizations on the ground in Africa to help protect these fascinating creatures. One of the protected areas in which Chengeta is the most involved is the Dzanga-Sangha Protected Areas Complex in the Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked tropical country in the Congo Basin. Here, pangolin trafficking is tied to the local and regional wild meat or ‘bushmeat’ trade in the area meaning that closing down networks is quite a complex affair.

Here we work with the Sangha Pangolin Project, a truly inspiring local research initiative with a strong community empowerment approach who created a conservation campaign designed to spread awareness about the pangolins’ plight from village to village. This World Pangolin Day, we have worked with Wildlife & Conservation Photographer and Storyteller, Alice Péretié to produce an article: 'Protecting Pangolins' on these enigmatic creatures to showcase not only the work we are doing to protect them but to give pangolins and their onthe-ground support organizations the awareness needed to showcase their plight. Read the article here: https://chengetawildlife.org/ protectingpangolins/

Rescued and released black-bellied pangolin (photo by Tessa Ullmann) NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

192

NUUT! NEW! NONGQAI FORUM As mens terugkyk die geskiedenis in (of ook nasionale veiligheid-beleidskeuses van die hede betrag), wonder mens dikwels: “what if…?”. Hoe sou dinge dalk uitgedraai het indien dié of daardie generaal of staatsman ‘n ander opsie gekies het, soos bv. indien Duitsland nie gedurende die 1e Wêreldoorlog vir Lenin in Rusland ingesmokkel het nie? Or, to a present-day example – how may things evolve, should Taiwan proclaim full independence as a sovereign nation standing apart from the People’s Republic of China? Nongqai is dedicated to fostering a better understanding of national security policy, past and present. This kind of intellectual exercise can clearly contribute a lot to clarifying the options and policy considerations that dictated decision-making at crucial moments in history, or which will do so in future – in addition to being serious fun. Best of all: among our readers there are very many retired national security experts and former intelligence analysts who are eminently qualified to contribute to such analysis and interpretation. Hierdie Forum word geskep juis om sulke ope gesprek uit te lok onder u, ons gewaardeerde lesers. Ons gaan sulke spreekwoordelike “klippe in die bos” gooi – soms oor betwiste,

polemiese onderwerpe – juis om te sien watter wyshede ons versamelde grysheid daaromheen kan laat uitspring. Makie sakie of u bloot u eie ingeligte opinie as kommentaar aanbied of geboekstaafde feite met ons wil deel, en of u bydrae kort of lank is, or whether you write in English or Afrikaans – we invite you to join the scrum to push our collective understanding to new heights. But please keep the game clean – play the ball, not the man, when you differ. Ons vorige uitgawe met lt. genl. “Lang Hendrik” van den Bergh op die voorblad, sowel as laasmaand se spesiale uitgawe oor genl. maj. Frans Steenkamp, het beide melding gemaak van die intense meningsverskil wat daar binne veiligheidskringe geheers het na die val van die Fascistiese bewind in Portugal, oor hoe om die buurstate (en by uitnemendheid Angola) te benader. Ons eerste “klip in die bos” is ‘n opinie-stuk oor hoe die geskiedenis van Suider-Afrika anders kon verloop het as Operasie Savannah (1975 se konvensionele inval in Angola) nooit geloods is nie, en in stede daarvan, dieselfde koverte beïnvloedingsbeleid teenoor Angola gevolg is as wat met sukses teenoor die ander buurlande aangewend is en bv. in Mosambiek se geval op die Nkomati-akkoord uitgeloop het.

Regarding topical national security policy issues, this month’s NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

FORUM includes commentaries on what to make of the current public airing of the misdeeds committed by and within the State Security Agency under the reign of former president Jacob Zuma. Some of the luminaries involved have stressed the importance of public debate about the very important issue of how South Africa’s national intelligence capacity should be structured and focused, so please let us have your informed comments and inputs. We hope that these first FORUM articles (which we publish to elicit a debate, not because they reflect any official viewpoint held by Nongqai or its editors) will set you to thinking and move you to join the debate by sharing your insights. Onthou net om nie u kommentaar / bydraes anoniem te stuur nie – gee asseblief vir ons u naam en baie kortliks u agtergrond / betrokkenheid / kennisbasis omtrent die onderwerp (u kan ‘n skuilnaam gebruik vir publikasiedoeleindes as u só wil, solank die redaksie net weet wie u in werklikheid is). Moet asseblief nie huiwer nie om vir ons u vrae te stuur of nuwe onderwerpe vir beligting te identifiseer, as daar sulke “what ifs” is wat al lank in u kop maal en waaroor u graag sou wou hê dat ons paneel van kundiges ‘n debat oor moet afskop. Lekker lees, en lekker saam breinskrum oor die onderwerpe, tot ons almal en die nageslag se voordeel. 193

HOE VERSTAAN MENS DIE STAATSVEILIGHEID-AGENTSKAP?

POLEMIEK

RONDOM

DIE

Dr Willem Steenkamp Danksy onlangse getuienis voor die Zondo-kommissie oor staatkaping, is die StaatsveiligheidAgentskap (SVA) weer in die media-kollig. Hoe moet mens al dié gewoel verstaan? Die SVA is die agentskap wat tot stad gekom het toe oudpresident Jacob Zuma aan die begin van sy termyn, per dekreet Suid-Afrika se twee na-1994 intelligensiedienste (vir onderskeidelik binne- en buitelandse insameling) laat saamsmelt het. Toe President Cyril Ramaphosa by Zuma oorneem, was een van sy eerste stappe om in 2018 ‘n hoëvlakse paneel (HVP) daar te stel om die SVA se aktiwiteite onder die loep te neem. Hierdie paneel se verdoemende verslag is vryelik beskikbaar op die internet, daar geplaas deur die Suid-Afrikaanse regering self (om dit te lees, kliek hier: https:// www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ gcis_document/201903/highlevel-review-panel-state-security -agency.pdf ). Die voorsitter van díe paneel was oud-minister, dr. Sydney Mufamadi. Hy het nou onder eed getuig voor regter Zondo se kommissie na staatskaping. Sy eedsverklaring is ook aan die publiek beskikbaar: https:// www.politicsweb.co.za/ documents/sydney-mufamadisaffidavit-to-the-zondocommission Dit is nie die eerste keer in Suid -Afrika se geskiedenis dat geheime “spesiale operasies” van ‘n intelligensie-agentskap

voor ‘n geregtelike kommissie uitgelap word nie. Dieselfde het gebeur rondom die destydse Erasmus-kommissie wat deur oud-president PW Botha aangestel is om sy politieke opponente te ondersoek oor die boeg van die sg. Inligtingskandaal. Toe was dit genl. Lang Hendrik van den Bergh en die destydse Buro vir Staatsveiligheid wat saam met dr. Eschel Rhoodie en die Inligtingsdepartment in die openbaar die spit moes afbyt. Die hoogste politieke slagoffer egter van die slegte mediapublisiteit wat hierdie (nou bevraagtekende) geregtelike ondersoek se “blootleggings” by noodwendigheid tot gevolg gehad het, was die voormalige Eerste Minister en oud-president, Adv. John Vorster. Die eerste ding wat opval oor die huidige polemiek, is dat dit weer ‘n publieke spektakel is. Vuil wasgoed word baie sigbaar in die openbaar gewas (met verslae en getuienis vriendelikNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

gerieflik op die internet geplaas, o.a. deur die regerings self). In die internasionale konteks is dit nie gebruiklik dat hierdie tipe van ondersoek na jou intelligensieinstellings so in die openbaar gedoen word nie – regerings het tog die diskresie om sulke ondersoeke agter geslote deure te laat geskied en die verrigtinge, getuienis en dokumente te klassifiseer as geheim. Wanneer dit nie só gedoen word nie, kan mens maar aanvaar dat die doel met die publlisiteit is om politieke appeltjies te skil. Die mediapublisiteit en uitbasuin van die meer sappige nuusbrokkies gaan diegene wat moet pa staan daarvoor (tipies die vorige bewind) definitief nie in positiewe lig stel nie. Die Hoëvlakse Paneel (HVP) se verslag is nou weer deur oudminister Mufamadi voor die Zondo-kommissie gelê. Dit maak opspraakwekkende beweringe oor korrupsie, maar veel-al word die SVA onder Zuma getipeer as ‘n hoogs-verpolitiseerde wapen wat in die ANC se binnegevegte sedert 2009, teen opponente van die Zuma-faksie aangewend is – strydig met die Grondwet en die regsraamwerk waarbinne die Suid-Afrikaanse intelligensiedienste wetlik verplig is om te opereer. Die doel waarvoor Pres. Ramaphosa die HVP aangestel het, was om “die her-opbou van ‘n professionele nasionale intelligensiekapasiteit vir Suid-Afrika moontlik te maak, wat die (Continued on page 195)

194

(Continued from page 194)

Grondwet sal eer en respekteer en wetsvoorskrifte sal gehoorsaam”. In praktiese terme, egter, skyn dit my dat die oogmerk was om die greep van die Zuma-faksie op die intelligensie-instellings en in die besonder die SVA, te breek. Dis seer-sekerlik so dat die bewerings van bykans perkelose korrupsie (soos bv. dat maandeliks R4.5M uit die SVA se geheime fondse gekanaliseer is om Zuma se reeds-hoë salaris aan te vul) dringende ondersoek en optrede verg. Ook is dit kennelik só dat Suid-Afrika ‘n behoorlik-funksionerende professionele intelligensie-kapasiteit van die hoogste integriteit benodig, om besluitneming oor nasionale veiligheid-kwessies te rugsteun. Geen moderne land van enige substansie probeer tog om sonder só ‘n kapasiteit te funksioneer nie. Die liberale stemme wat nou weer opgaan (soos hulle van die dae van die BSV ook gepleit het) dat die oplossing is om die SVA bloot in sy geheel te skrap, mens maar net kan laat kopkrap... Of die HVP en die Zondokommissie ons wel na die beloofde land gaan lei, is egter ‘n ander vraag. Die huidige prosesse van ondersoek en blootlegging is net so verpolitiseer as dit waarvan die HVP die leidende figure in die Zuma-SVA met reg beskuldig het. Is hierdie openbare spektakel die beste werkswyse vir ons land om weer ‘n funksionerende, eerbare intelligensie-werktuig daar te stel wat ons besluitnemers van betroubare, tydige inligting en

vertolking (m.a.w., intelligensie) kan voorsien? Spreek die huidige openbare prosesse die werklike probleem aan, of word ons oë verblind met debat oor die “argitektuur” van die intelligensiegemeenskap as sodanig? Mens kan met ‘n voorbeeld probeer toelig: Piet en Koos koop identiese gewere. Piet gebruik syne voorbeeldig, binne die wet en met al die nodige permitte, om ongediertes op sy plaas onder beheer te hou. Koos, daarenteen, gebruik sy geweer om sluip-sluip in die donker van die nag renosters te loop skiet, om hulle horings op die smokkel-mark te verkoop. Nou kom Koos se dinge aan die lig – stel ons nou ‘n paneel of kommissie aan om die geweer te ondersoek, en met voorstelle te kom oor hoe om die geweer aan te pas sodat dit nie meer renosters kan dood nie? Is die geweer (m.a.w., die werktuig) die probleem, of is Koos die probleem? Moet dit nie eerder ‘n kriminele ondersoek wees na die misbruik van mag en staatsbates, deur politici nie? (Soos die geweer, is die SVA slegs maar ‘n werktuig – dis mense wat die kwaad gedoen het, met die wanaanwending van die werktuig se vermoëns). Daar moet ‘n onderskeid getref word tussen die kern-funksie om intelligensie betroubaar en tydig aan besluitnemers te kommunikeer sodat hulle ingeligte besluite kan neem, versus uitvoerende aksies – die sogenaamde “spesiale operasies”. Operasies wat nie ten doel het om inligting in te samel wat vir beredeneerde nasionale veiligheid-besluitneming benodig NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

word nie, maar wat partypolitieke doelwitte van die gesaghebber van die dag moet bevorder om hom polities te bevoordeel (of wat sy sak moet vul). Dis laasgenoemde waaraan die Zuma-personeelplasings binne die SVA hulle skyn skuldig te gemaak het. Dit is nie die funksie van ‘n intelligensieagentskap om die politieke gesag se werktuig vir geheime uitvoerende aksies te wees in sy party-politieke magstryd nie.

Die kern-probleem skyn vir my opgesluit te lê in die misbruik van die kleed van geheimhouding wat noodwendig inligtingsinsamelingsaksies moet beskerm, wanneer staatsveiligheid op die spel is. Hierdie geleentheid om dinge te kan doen, weg van die publieke oog, word dan ‘n betowerende verlyer van mense in gesagsposisies, wat geleentheid sien om met dinge weg te kom wat andersins nie sal mog of kan nie. Hoekom bv. die beweerde R4.5M maandelikse betalings vanaf die SVA kanaliseer, eerder as om sommer direk aan die Tesourie opdrag te gegee het om dit oor te betaal? Hoekom ook die BBPbeskerming wat aan sekere (niekwalifiserendes) in die Zumadampkring aangebied is, vanuit die SVA bedryf, en nie vanuit die SAPD wie se lynfunksie dit is nie? Opsigtelik omrede die SVA dit kon verdoesel onder die kombers van geheimhouding, terwyl die Tesourie of SAPD nie sou kon nie. Solank daar ‘n reg tot geheimhouding gebied word ter beskerming van noodsaaklike intelligensie-aktiwiteite omrede dit essensieel is vir nasionale (Continued on page 196)

195

(Continued from page 195)

•

veiligheid, sal daar versoeking wees om hierdie reg tot geheimhouding te misbruik. Die uitdaging is om geheimhouding slegs te laat funksioneer ter beskerming van bronne van inligting en insamelingsmetodes, en nie vir verdoeseling van onbehoorlikhede nie. Ongelukkig is die HVP se aanbevelings maar skraps oor hoe om die Zuma-SVA katnes (wat hulle met lus in baie detail blootlê) op te ruim en die intelligensie-agentskap weer tot eerbare, doelmatige funksionering te bring. Hulle meen daar moet verdere ondersoek en nasionale debat wees hieroor, en fokus dan op wat hulle noem “argitektuur” (soos dat die SVA weer in twee aparte dienste geskei moet word, met onderskeidelik binnelandse en buitelandse insamelingsfokus). So-iets mag wel dienlik wees, maar dis in werklikheid ‘n gefokus op die geweer se konfigurasie, eerder as op die werklike probleem, nl. die mense wat die geweer in hand geneem het om hulle politieke vyande daarmee by te kom. Die werklike probleem is tog duidelik dat politici die werktuig wat die Grondwet vir hulle daargestel het, vir eie gewin (geldelik sowel as party-polities) misbruik het. Nie hoeveel agentskappe ons in teorie behoort te hê, onder welke benaminge en onderskeie taakafbakenings nie. ‘n Nasionale debat sal wis en seker waardevol wees, dus hiermee my paar stuiwers in die armbeurs, ontleen aan my navorsing oor praktyke in die buiteland en eie waarneming:

•

Daar moet duidelike, ernstige kriminele strafmaatreëls op die wetboek geplaas word vir politici en hulle meelopers wat die intelligensieinfrastruktuur van die staat vir eie gewin misbruik, om daarmee ‘n einde te kan maak aan die impuniteit wat tans skyn te geld; Die strafprosesreg moet aangepas word om te voorsien vir die verhoor van sulke sake op ‘n wyse wat nie die nasionale belang deur ondeurdagte openbaarmaking gaan skaad nie, soos die spesiale howe met veiligheidsgeklaarde regters waarvoor die VSA se FISA-wetgewing voorsien; Motiveer rapporteerders van binne die stelsel (“whistle-blowers”) om wanpraktyke aan te meld, deur hulle anonimiteit te waarborg en hulle ‘n persentasie van die geldwaarde van misbruikte bates wat herwin word, by wet te laat toekom; Oorweeg om die finansiële bestuur van die intelligensie-agentskap(pe) nie loopbaangewys ‘n interne komponent van die agentskap self te maak nie, maar dit te laat resorteer onder die Ouditeurgeneraal, beman deur gesekondeerde, veiligheidsgeklaarde personeel van sy kantoor; Die intelligensieagentskappe moet in die hande wees van ‘n permanente korps van professionele beroeps

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

•

intelligensie-offisiere wat dit ‘n loopbaan maak en wat met paslike opleiding gevorm is in ‘n kultuur van landsdiens, integriteit en partypolitieke neutraliteit; Verban die praktyk waarkragtens dit vir politici in die uitvoerende gesag (die president by uitstek) moontlik is om sy gekose politieke apparatchicks (“party hacks”) in te valskerm in sleutelposte in binne die intelligensieagentskap, waar hulle dan aan die politikus persoonlik lojaliteit verskuldig is en die intelligensie-instrument kan misbruik in sy/haar belang (oud-president Zuma se wysiging van die eed van getrouheid vir SVA-lede, om nie net trou te sweer teenoor die land en aan die grondwet nie maar ook teenoor die staatspresident, was ‘n onding); Geheimhouding moet funksioneel beperk word tot dit wat onontkombaar nodig is vir die beskerming van bronne van inligting en insamelingsmetodes; Die aanwysing van die Inspekteur-generaal van intelligensie behoort te geskied deur ‘n parlementêre proses wat sy/haar onbevange onpartydigheid en outonome jurisdiksionele gesag so ver menslik moontlik sal verseker; Plaas die klem absoluut op die intelligensie-lynfunksie van die insameling, verifikasie, vertolking en tydige (Continued on page 197)

196

(Continued from page 196)

•

aanbieding van nasionale veiligheidsinligting essensieel vir besluitneming, wat behoorlik gekoördineer moet word tussen al die staatsorgane wat daartoe kan bydra (bv. Verdediging, Polisie, Internasionale Verhoudinge) sonder om deur sulke koördinasie ‘n komitee-styl groepspraak te bevorder ten koste van die noodsaaklike reg tot deurgee van teenstrydige menings waar en wanneer dié manifesteer; Verseker dat die uitvoerende gesag hulle strategiese rol in die intelligensie-siklus vervul, nl. om die “Sleutel Intelligensie Vrae” (m.a.w., dit wat hulle as besluitnemers nodig het om antwoorde op te kry vir doeleindes van goed-gefundeerde besluitneming), te iden-

•

tifiseer en te definieer op gereelde grondslag, ter leiding van die intelligensiegemeenskap; en Sien toe dat alle opdragte van die uitvoerende gesag aan die intelligensie-agentskap(pe), uitsluitlik op skrif oorgedra word en in ‘n sekure argief bewaar word, waar dit op gereelde grondslag deur veiligheidsgeklaarde regters van die FISA-styl intelligensie-hof hersien kan word vir grondwetlikheid.

By nalees van die HVP se verslag en Dr. Mufamadi se eedsverklaring, sien mens duidelik dat individuele politici (van die hoogste vlakke van die uitvoerende gesag tot by hulle meelopers wat in sleutelposte binne die SVA geplaas is) hier die kwaaddoeners was. Hulle het die staat se intelligensiemasjinerie (noodsaaklikerwys beklee met die reg tot geheimhouding ter wille van die

inwin van nasionale veiligheidsinligting) vir eie politieke en geldelike gewin misbruik. Hierdie politici en meelopers was van oud-president Zuma se kamp, deel van ‘n vertrouenskring wat agendas gehad het totaal los van die grondwetlik-neergelgde lynfunksie van die SVA. Dit is dus onregverdig om almal binne die SVA wat eerbaar hulle loopbaan daar gemaak het, oor dieselfde kam te skeer. Dis goed en reg dat hierdie tema nou ook bestryk word deur die Zondo-kommissie, want onteenseglik was hierdie primêr ‘n geval van staatskaping – kaping van die SVA. Sulke misbruik van die Staat se werktuie behoort nie ongestraf te bly nie, maar die straf behoort nie op die instelling te val nie – die kapers wat in gevalskerm is en veral dan hulle here en meesters moet aan die pen ry, sodat toekomstige politieke bekleders van posisies van uitvoerende gesag twee keer sal dink voor hulle enige sulke misbruike probeer waag.

TWEE GROOT “WHAT IF’s…” VAN DIE SWA / ANGOLA GRENSOORLOG en die impak daarvan op Suider-Afrika se geskiedenis Dr Willem Steenkamp Die val van die sterk antikommunistiese Caetanobewind in Portugal in 1974 het die geo-strategiese prent in Suider-Afrika oornag ingrypend verander. Voor die staatsgreep in Lissabon het Portugal sy kolonies op die vasteland van Afrika (Mosambiek, Angola, GuineeBissau) gesien as oorsese gebiede van die Portugese staat sigself. Beskou as juridies integrale dele van die Portugese nasionale

territorium, is hierdie oorsese grondgebied militêr verdedig teen die kommunistiesgesteunde nasionale bevrydings-bewegings wat in elk die Portugese bewind uitgedaag het. Daarom was dit maklik vir Wit Suid-Afrika om ‘n “voorste verdedigingstrategie” te implementeer teen sy eie kommunistiesgesteunde bevrydingsbewegings, aangesien die antikommunistiese Portugese en Rhodesiërs ‘n buffer NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

daargestel het wat insypeling vêr weg kon hou van die RSA se eie grense. Die linkse junta wat in Lissabon oorgeneem het se hoof-oogmerk was egter om so gou moontlik van hierdie konflik-gebiede (en die las wat hulle in geld en bloed meegebring het), ontslae te raak deur hulle onafhanklik te laat word. Logies moes Suid-Afrika voorsien dat die eensmalige (Continued on page 198)

197

(Continued from page 197)

bevrydingsbewegings hoogs waarskynlik in elk die mag sou oorneem. Dit sou beteken dat Suid-Afrika/Suidwes-Afrika skielik direkte nuwe buurlande gaan hê (in die vorm van Mosambiek en Angola), wat onder gesag sou staan van Moskou-bevriende regerings ideologies gebonde tot die totale bevryding van Afrika deur die loop van die geweer, bondgenote op MarxistiesLeninistiese lees van Suid-Afrika se eie bevrydingsbewegings. Dus, ‘n baie anderse nuwe werklikheid. So – wat nou gemaak? Kon ‘n voorste verdedigingstrategie steeds werk, gegewe dat Mosambiek bv. net maar 300 km van Pretoria af is? Of sou hierdie nuwe geostrategiese werklikheid noodwendig moes lei tot ‘n nuwe nasionale veiligheidstrategie? Een gemik daarop om SuidAfrika se buurlande te beweeg om nie toe te laat dat hulle grondgebied afspringplek word vir insypeling na die RSA self nie? Daar was wesentlike interne verskille binne die SuidAfrikaanse veiligheidsopset oor hoe om hierdie oogmerke te verwesenlik – sou Suid-Afrika sy optrede kon beperk tot koverte beïnvloedingsaksies (wortel en stok) of sou dit werkbaar wees om die groot stok van overte direkte militêre ingryping ook in te span? Soos gesê, was daar in SuidAfrikaanse veiligheidskringe nie eenstemmigheid hieroor nie – by uitstek nie tussen, aan die een kant, eerste minister John Vorster en sy nasionale veiligheidsadviseur, genl. “Lang

Hendrik” van den Bergh van die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid (BSV), en aan die ander kant, verdedigingsminister PW Botha en die S.A. Weermag (SAW). Die doel met hierdie analise: begrip, nie afbreking nie In hierdie, die eerste “klip in die bos” analise vir die nuwe Nongqai Forum, word gekyk na hoe en hoekom dinge in SWA/ Angola geloop het soos ons weet dit inderdaad wel het (en hoe alternatiewe beleidsbesluite die prent dalk kon impakteer het). Hier word ‘n bepaalde interpretasie gegee van hoe 1975 en die 15 jaar van grenskonflik daarna – veral die bosoorlog in SWA en suid-Angola – uiteindelik die tafel gedek het vir Suid-Afrika se eie unieke politieke skikking. Was die aksies wat geloods is van die Suid-Afrikaanse kant (hier beoordeel met die voordeel van terug-sig) altyd vir die beste? Ongelukkig nie. Beteken dit dat al die offers wat gebring is, nodeloos was? Bepaald nie. Die stryd gevoer en die offers daarin gebring, het ‘n absoluut essensiële rol gespeel in die daarstel van die uiteindelike vrede – maar miskien nie vir die redes wat aanvanklik voorsien was nie... Hierdie artikel mik nie daarna om die historiese gebeure bloot weer van voor af te tabuleer nie – dis al genoeg gedoen. Wat Nongqai (as tydskrif gerig op bevordering van begrip vir ons geskiedenis se rol in die vorming van ons hede) met artikels soos hierdie in sy nuwe Forum-rubriek wil bereik, is verhelderende debat oor hoekom dinge gebeur het soos dit wel uitgespeel het en wat die gevolge daarvan was. NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Een manier om sulke deurdagte begrip te bevorder, is deur ingelig te bespiegel oor wat dalk kon gebeur het, indien ander beleidskeuses toentertyd gemaak is. Wat hierdie artikel NIE wil doen nie (eerstens omdat dit nie histories korrek sou wees nie, en tweedens omdat dit moreel onaanvaarbaar sou wees) is om met sulke retrospektiewe “war gaming” die hoogste offers wat soveel gebring het in die loop van dit wat werklik gebeur het, nou as sinnelose vermorsing van jong lewens af te maak. Inteendeel – hierdie artikel sal wys dat daardie offers, daardie pad wat geloop is (reg of verkeerd), noodsaaklik was om Suid-Afrika by sy unieke vreedsame oordrag van politieke mag te bring. Danksy daardie offers het ons nie die “Volksrepubliek van Suid-Afrika” op ons afgedwing gekry nie, maar wel die essensie van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika as regstaat met vryemark en individuele beskermings kon behou, nou egter met sy demokrasie uitgebou oor kleurgrense heen. Wat gebeur het, het gebeur – dit kan tog nie nou intellektueel ongedaan gemaak word nie. Net so min baat dit om die beleidstwiste van destyds, nou weer oor te wil baklei. Maar die vormende effek daarvan op die hede moet egter wel behoorlik na waarde geskat word. Want anders word dit alte maklik om nou die hedendaagse SuidAfrikaanse werklikheid sleg te maak as die jammerlike gevolg van verkeerde (selfs verraderlike) politieke (Continued on page 199)

198

(Continued from page 198)

beleidsbesluite in daardie vormingsfase. En dít was die besluite wat tot vrede en ‘n demokratiese Suid-Afrika gelei het ten ene male nie. Dit sal gou genoeg blyk as mens nou self weer realisties deurwerk deur die beperkte opsies van die daardie spanningsvolle laaste dae van die grensoorlog. As mens in ag neem wat die vyand sou kon gedoen het, en wat ons dan sou moes doen, as nie op die nippertjie (aan alle kante) gekies is om eerder vrede te sluit nie. As nie besluit is om, by wyse van onderhandeling, die SWA en Angolese vraagstukke vir eens op te los, eerder as om die militêre konflik verder te bly eskaleer nie.

hierdie forum, die voordeel van u eie insigte daaromtrent te gee – hetsy u breedweg saamstem daarmee, of meen dit het geen historiese basis nie... Die geostrategiese konteks: Détente en die Koue Oorlog Om so ‘n “as en indien...” debat oor die grensoorlog af te skop, moet 'n mens rekening hou met die gebeure wat die wêreld en Afrika se geskiedenis gevorm het gedurende daardie deurslaggewende jare van die sewentigs en tagtigs van die vorige eeu. Ook moet mens bewus wees daarvan dat daar soms skerp verdeeldheid oor nasionale veiligheidsbeleid binne die destydse Suid-Afrikaanse regering geheers het.

Dit val nie te ontken nie dat, onder baie van diegene wat nou ons vreedsame oorgang in SuidAfrika self bekla of bevraagteken, die “dood” van Wit Suid-Afrika vir hulle in die pot gekom het met die “verraad” teenoor Ian Smith se Rhodesië en veral dan met die “weggee” van Suidwes. Diesulkes is na my mening besig om dieselfde fout te herhaal wat vele Duitsers in die jare tussen die twee wêreldoorloë gemaak het: “ons kon militêr die 1e Wêreldoorlog gewen het, as dit net nie vir die politieke verraaiers in Berlyn was nie...” (‘n beskouing wat natuurlik lynreg tot die 2e Wêreldoorlog en die amperse vernietiging van die Duitse staat en volk gelei het).

Die vroeë sewentigerjare is gekenmerk deur eerste minister John Vorster se "uitwaartse" beleid van détente. Waar Dr. Verwoerd in 1962 'n versoek deur sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa van Nigerië verwerp het om Suid-Afrika te besoek en ook so gedoen het t.o.v. 'n aanbod deur dr. Kenneth Kuanda van Zambië in 1964 om diplomatieke betrekkinge te vestig, het Vorster daarenteen doelgerig probeer om détente te vestig. Vorster het ook begin om die Wit kiesers te beweeg na die aanvaarding van ‘n nuwe, meer verligte en inklusiewe beleid by die huis – so het hy uitgewys dat die alternatief vir 'n vreedsame onderhandelde oplossing "too ghastly to contemplate" sou wees.

Dit is die analogie wat hierdie artikel sal ontwikkel, met die doel om u as ingeligte en betrokke leser te stimuleer om vir ons almal, by wyse van gesprek in

Vorster het in 1966 met hoofman Leabua Jonathan van Lesotho ontmoet, met sir Sereste Khama van Botswana in 1968 en met prins Makhosini Dlamini van NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

Swaziland in 1971. Die eerste amptelike (dit wil sê, openlike, nie-koverte) besoek aan 'n nieaangrensende Afrika-staat was dié van buitelandse minister Muller aan Malawi in 1968, wat gevolg is deur die sluit van formele diplomatieke betrekkinge dieselfde jaar. Suid-Afrika se relatiewe ekonomiese krag het ook as hefboom kon dien, wat Vorster in die geval van die Cahora Bassaen Calueque-hidro-elektriese projekte in onderskeidelik Mosambiek en Angola gebruik het. In 1969 het die Vorsterregering 'n fonds daargestel wat spesifiek toegewys was aan die bevordering van ekonomiese betrekkinge met ander Afrikalande. Lusaka Manifes van 1969 Dit word dikwels oor die hoof gesien hoe belangrik 'n olyftak die Lusaka-manifes van 1969 was. Daarin het die sleutel Afrika -leiers Suid-Afrika se blankes as in wese die vasteland se wit stam erken (m.a.w., nie setlaars nie), dus geregtig op volle burgerskapregte. Ook het hulle die Republiek van Suid-Afrika as 'n soewereine VN-lidstaat erken wat dus ‘n wettige onderhandelingsvennoot sou kon wees (anders as Rhodesië, Suidwes-Afrika, Mosambiek en Angola, wat ondergeskikte koloniale entiteite was). Geen wonder dat die ANC en PAC die Manifes verwerp het nie. Gedurende 1971 en 1972 is hoëvlakse gesprekke gevoer met 12 Afrikastate en 43 groepe verteenwoordigers van Afrika het Suid-Afrika besoek. In 1974 en (Continued on page 200)

199

(Continued from page 199)

1975 het adv. Vorster self ‘n aantal Afrika-toere onderneem en met leiers in Liberië en Senegal vergader, asook met president Houphouet-Boigny van die Ivoorkus, wat daarna ander Afrika-leiers aangemoedig het om met Suid-Afrika te praat. Koverte Buitelandse beleid gedryf deur die BSV en Dept. van Inligting Vorster se détentebeleidsinisiatiewe is in wese gedryf deur die BSV, die geheime diens wat hy in 1969 onder genl. Hendrik van den Bergh gestig het, met die ondersteuning van die Departement van Inligting onder dr. Eschel Rhoodie. Hulle het goed verstaan dat Suid -Afrika se uitdaging fundamenteel 'n politieke een was, dus nie primêr veiligheid nie (hoewel Vorster sy verligte beleid met 'n baie sterk standpunt oor "wet en orde" probeer balanseer het). Om 'n onderhandelde oplossing te vind, sou dus eerstens verhoudings gebou moes word wat 'n klimaat kon skep bevorderlik vir onderhandelinge – 'n poging wat noodsaaklikerwys aan die begin onder dekking onderneem moes word weens die sensitiwiteit vir al die sleutelrolspelers, veral vir die Swart Afrika-staatshoofde wat betrokke was. Vorster, Van den Bergh en Rhoodie het verstaan dat dit hand-aan-hand sou moes gaan met vordering in die aftakeling van rassisme tuis en die oplossing van die dilemmas wat deur Rhodesië se verklaring van UDI en die Suidwes-Afrika-mandaatkwessie

daargestel is. 1974 / 1975: Die VSA se Viëtnam-debakel en Portugal se "angelier-revolusie" verander alles Binne die wêreldwye konteks van die Koue Oorlog en die beweging om te de-koloniseer, was Suid-Afrika natuurlik maar 'n relatiewe klein speler wat nie eensydiglik sake tot sy eie smaak kon dryf nie. In hierdie internasionale skaakspel sou 1974 en 1975 goue jare vir Sowjet-belange wees. Op 25 April 1974 het die "angelierrevolusie" in Portugal plaasgevind en het 'n linkse militêre junta aan bewind gekom. Soos gesê, was hulle oogmerk om so vinnig as moontlik, van die hoëkoste Afrika-kolonies Guineë-Bissau, Angola en Mosambiek ontslae te raak. Toe, skaars twee jaar nadat Amerikaanse gevegsbetrokkenheid in Viëtnam in Januarie 1973 opgeskort is, het Saigon op 30 April 1975 geval en die VSA met 'n enorme vertrouenskrisis gelaat, gepaardgaande met ‘n sterk openbare afkeer aan militêre verpligtinge in die buiteland. Die Lissabon-staatsgreep en die VSA se ervaring in Viëtnam was sleutel-gebeure vir die toekoms van Wit heerskappy in SuiderAfrika. SAW vs BSV: Verskillende uitkyke op hoe om die buurstate te benader Die aanvanklike reaksie van die SAW op die staatsgreep in Lissabon, was om Mosambiek (wat geografies soos 'n dolk lê, gerig op die hartland van SuidAfrika) uit die hande van sy

dominante bevrydingsbeweging, FRELIMO, te probeer hou. Dit is nie algemeen bekend nie dat 'n koverte militêre operasie op daardie tydstip beplan is om die Mosambiekse radiostasie se hoofkantoor te beset as speerpunt van ‘n poging om 'n "vriendelike" Mosambiekse setlaar-regime daar te stel. Eerste minister Vorster het egter 'n ander visie gehad en die regering het in die openbaar gesê dat Suid-Afrika sou kon saamleef met enige Swart regering wat in Angola en in Mosambiek aan bewind mag kom. Vorster en Van den Bergh het dus die koverte operasie in Mosambiek gestop. Wat die Angolese situasie gelaat het... Met terug-sig is 'n mens gebonde om te vra: As Mosambiek (wat reg op ons voorstoep bietjie meer as 300 km van Pretoria af is) nie binnegeval moes word nie, hoekom op aarde dan gaan inmeng in Angola? (wat meer as 1 200 km van die hartland lê, boonop oorkant die Kalahari- en Namibwoestyne). As mens kyk na die oorloë van bevryding wat post-WO2 geveg is in plekke soos Algerië en Viëtnam (om maar net twee te noem), waar ryk Westerse magte die onvermydelike moes aanvaar en onttrek, wat sou mense kon laat dink het dat Suid -Afrika ‘n militêre ingryping in Angola sou kon volhou? En as Suid-Afrika deur een of ander magiese bestiering daarin sou geslaag het, soos die spreekwoordelike hond wat 'n bus jaag, om wel die bus te vang / Luanda te beset – wat (Continued on page 201)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

200

(Continued from page 200)

sou ons dan met daardie “bus” gedoen het? UNITA aan bewind plaas? Wat sou dit gekos het om so ‘n regering jaar na jaar in gesag te probeer handhaaf? (of kon ons sommer-so aanvaar het dat die opponerende magte eenvoudig sou opgegee en verdwyn het?). Aan die ander kant – wat sou die risiko / koste wees daarvan om so 'n onderneming aan te pak, en dan te misluk? Moes die waarskynlike Sowjet-reaksie op so 'n Suid-Afrikaanse ingryping om hulle MPLA-bondgenote die mag te ontsê, nie vooraf uit alle hoeke deurdink gewees het nie, gegewe hoe hoog die Kommuniste hul sterte ná Viëtnam in die lug gehad het nie? Koverte "wortel en stok" vs. overt militêre ingryping Die basiese beleidskwessie wat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering in 1975 gekonfronteer het, was of Suid-Afrika al die koverte hefbome van invloed tot sy beskikking moes gebruik, (maw, uitgeslote overte militêre ingryping in eie uniform deur die SAW), om só die nuwe regerings in die voormalige Portugese gebiede te oorreed om beleid te volg wat Suid-Afrika nie sou benadeel nie (indien nodig, hefbome wat bedekte bedrywighede van beide druk en beloning kon insluit). Die hoofdoel was om te verhoed dat hierdie lande afspringplekke word vir terroriste-insypeling in RSA-grondgebied in. Hierdie was die beleid wat genl. Van den Bergh voorgestaan het en 'n mens sou kon argumenteer dat die Nkomati -Akkoord van goeie

buurskap wat op 16 Maart 1984 met Mosambiek onderteken is en wat die ANC-MK effektief van Mosambiekse grond verban het, 'n perfekte voorbeeld was van beide die doeltreffendheid en haalbaarheid van presies so 'n koverte strategie. Die alternatief tot koverte beïnvloeding – soos voorgestaan deur verdedigingsminister PW Botha en die SAW – was vir SuidAfrika om met eie konvensionele magte toe te tree tot Angola se interne konflik, ten einde 'n gunstige militêre uitkoms op die grond af te dwing, wat ander partye dan bloot as werklikheid sou moes aanvaar. Dit is duidelik, met die voordeel van terug-sig, dat daar potensiaal was vir oorvleueling tussen hierdie twee benaderings. Daar was ook onteenseglik 'n algemene vertrekpunt wat deur albei standpunte gedeel is, naamlik dat Suid-Afrika nie net maar kon terugsit en bloot niks doen nie – gegewe die potensiaal vir Angola om 'n afspringpunt vir SWAPO teen Suidwes-Afrika te word. Daar was dus wikkelruimte vir kreatiewe interpretasie en die massering van kabinetsmagtigings (wat in werklikheid by uitset gegee is met die oog op die implementering van die koverte benadering) om op die grond inkrementeel die beleidsimplementering te transformeer in die overt militêre inmengingsbenadering in. Suid-Afrika word inkrementeel steeds dieper ingetrek in die Angolese konflik Soos met die VSA in Viëtnam NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

gebeur het (waar die lewering van opleiding en advies inkrementeel transformeer het in volskaalse openlike Amerikaanse gevegsbetrokkenheid) het Suid-Afrika ook in Angola stuksgewys ingetrek geraak in konvensionele gevegsbystand in eie uniform. Dit het begin met goedkeuring deur adv. Vorster op 14 Julie 1975 vir die geheime aankoop van US$14 miljoen se wapens vir die FNLA en UNITA. Maar toe skop 'n reeks gebeure af (wat van die SAW-kant af gedryf is) en wat 'n fait accompli op die grond gevestig het, wat dit toenemend moeilik gemaak het om 'n streep tussen koverte en overte betrokkenheid te trek. Op 9 Augustus het 'n klein patrollie van 30 SAW-troepe sowat 50km oor die grens na die terrein van die RuacanaCalueque hidro-elektriese skema verskuif om daardie gesamentlike onderneming (waarin Suid-Afrika 'n aansienlike wettige belang gehad het), te beskerm. Toe, op 22 Augustus 1975, het die SAW die geleentheid aangegryp om 'n groot oorgrens-operasie teen SWAPO van stapel te stuur. Op 4 September het adv. Vorster beperkte opleiding, advies en logistieke hulp gemagtig wat kovert verleen sou word aan die FNLA en UNITA, wat op hulle beurt dan weer teen SWAPO sou help. Al die voorgaande stappe kan steeds gerasionaliseer word onder die vaandel van 'n koverte "alle hefbome"-benadering, wat boonop daarop gemik was om bewysbare Suid-Afrikaanse ekonomiese en (Continued on page 202)

201

(Continued from page 201)

sekuriteitsbelange te beveilig.

UNITA het egter onder ernstige druk van die MPLA se FAPLAmagte gekom en dit het duidelik geword dat UNITA op sy eie nie die Angolese hoofstad Luanda voor die 11 Novemberonafhanklikheidsdatum sou kon beset nie. In alle waarskynlikheid sou UNITA ook uit van sy sleutel suidelike bastions soos Huambo gedryf word. Gevolglik is mobiele eenheid Foxbat van die SAW (aanvanklik slegs 'n opleidings- en advieseenheid) opdrag gegee om self beheer te neem van die verdediging van Huambo en het Foxbat die aanvallende FAPLA-magte op 5 Oktober 1975 daar militêr gestuit en gekeer dat hulle die dorp verower. Eskalasie en teen-eskalasie: Operasie Savannah ontmoet deur Kuba se Operasie Carlota Op 14 Oktober 1975 het die SAW in die geheim operasie Savannah geloods – die konvensionele overte militêre inval van Angola. Taakmag Zulu (later herdoop Bravo) saamgestel as 'n konvensionele bataljon van SAW-personeel en SA-opgeleide FNLA-vegters onder bevel van Kol. Jan Breytenbach het die SuidwesAfrika / Angola-grens oorgesteek. Die Suid-Afrikaners het vinnig noordwaarts gevorder en Roçadas (Xangongo) op 20 Oktober, Sá da Bandeira (Lubango) op die 24ste en Moçâmedes op 28 Oktober verower. In totaal sou hierdie gevegseenheid 3,159 km in net drie-en-dertig dae vorder.

As gevolg van die SuidAfrikaanse inval het Fidel Castro

vroeg in November (met Sowjetondersteuning) Operasie Carlota van stapel gestuur en is elite Kubaanse spesiale magte in groot getalle ingevlieg om die MPLA te versterk. Hulle het eers die noorde van Angola teen die FNLA verseker, sodat die SAW se artillerie-kontingent daar per skip ontruim moes word. Op 11 November, onafhanklikheidsdag, was die MPLA stewig in beheer van Luanda en is hulle deur Portugal erken as die nuwe regering van Angola. Ernstige botsings ten suide van die hoofstad het nou gevolg tussen FAPLA / Kubaanse troepe en Russiese adviseurs aan die een kant, en SAW / UNITA-magte aan die ander kant. Op 13 November 1975 is die SAWopmars langs die kus naby Novo Redondo gestuit. Twee bykomstige gevegseenhede, Orange en X-Ray, wat intussen ontplooi is om Zulu/Bravo en Foxbat te ondersteun, kon ook nou nie verdere vordering in die suidelike binneland maak nie. Waarskuwings deur BSV Pik Botha geïgnoreer

•

Eerstens is die vyandelike reaksie heeltemal onderskat of nie voorsien nie;

•

Tweedens, is nie die SAW se gebrek aan vermoë om te kan bly teen-eskaleer (in die geval van 'n ernstige eskalasie aan die kant van die vyand) genoegsaam in ag geneem nie;

•

Derdens, die ondersteuning waarop gereken kon word van die kant van ons veronderstelde internasionale “bondgenote” (veral die VSA) is heeltemal misreken;

•

Vierdens is nie genoegsaam vooraf afgeweeg wat die balans sou wees tussen die denkbare wins indien die operasie suksesvol sou wees, teenoor die omvang van verlies en koste, indien die operasie sou misluk nie;

•

Vyfdens, is die logistieke uitdaging wat die operasie sou kon meebring as die vyand sou eskaleer, nie vooraf behoorlik oorweeg en voor voorsien nie; en

•

Laaste maar nie die minste nie, is nie in berekening gebring nie hoe groot – in geval van mislukking – die verwoestende sielkundige impak sou wees op persepsies (beide intern en

Die SAW was blykbaar oortuig dat die VSA die overte militêre ingryping in Angola sal ondersteun, ondanks die luide waarskuwings tot die teendeel van die BSV en Buitelandse Sake (veral Pik Botha as ambassadeur in Washington het korrek voorsien dat die VSAKongres enige hulp sou verbied, soos dit toe ook met die Tunneyamendement gebeur het). Moenie 'n fout maak nie, ons jong manne op die grond het hard en goed geveg met dit wat hulle ter hand gehad het. Maar in terme van strategiese beplanning en besluitneming, NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

was Operasie Savannah 'n militêre inisiatief wat onteenseglik misluk het:

(Continued on page 203)

202

(Continued from page 202)

ekstern) oor dít wat voorheen een van Wit Suid -Afrika se grootste strategiese bates was, nl. sy beeld van onoorwinlikheid. Afrikaen Internasionale mening draai teen Suid-Afrika Soos die militêre konflik in Angola hand-oor-hand toegeneem het, het dit aanstons duidelik geword dat die SAW nie vir UNITA in Luanda aan die bewind sou kon plaas nie (veral gegewe die Sowjet/Castroreaksie om die Kubaanse gevegsmagte in getalle in te stuur, wat ons eenvoudig nie op kort kennisgewing op ons eie kon ewenaar nie). Die waarskuwings deur Pik Botha / Buitelandse Sake en die BSV dat die VSA opsy sal tree en Suid-Afrika nie sal ondersteun nie, is gou korrek bewys. Internasionale openbare mening het beslissend teen Suid-Afrika gedraai as synde die vermeende eerste aggressor, en die gefluisterde ondersteuning vanuit die geledere van konserwatiewe Swart Afrikastate vir Suid-Afrika om iets te doen om die kommunistiese ekspansie te probeer stuit (wat hulle gevrees het hulle uiteindelik ook sou teiken) het soos mis voor die son begin verdamp. Onttrekking uit Angola en die gevolg daarvan Einde Desember 1975 is 'n helikopter-landingsblad haastig by adv. Vorster se vakansiehuis by Oubos aan die Kaapse kus gebou. Op 31 Desember het ‘n vergadering van sleutel-

kabinetslede en senior adviseurs daar plaasgevind, met veral genl. Van den Bergh wat dinge na ‘n punt sou druk. Daar was in werklikheid geen ander opsie nie, en is daar besluit dat die SAW heeltemal uit Angola moet onttrek. Die datum hiervoor sou wees na die komende OAEvergadering wat vir 10 Januarie 1976 beplan was. Wat was die gevolge Operasie Savannah?

Die eerste direkte gevolg daarvan was dat die instuur van die Kubaanse ekspedisiemag internasionaal as 'n wettige en geregverdigde teeningryping erken is, wat die Kubane dus 'n gemagtigde militêre teenwoordigheid op Afrika-bodem gegee het.

•

Suid-Afrika se baie sigbare maar kennelik onsuksesvolle militêre ingryping in Angola het die OAE, (wat voorheen eweredig verdeel was tussen die 22 lande wat die MPLA ondersteun het en 22 Westers-leunende state wat Holden Roberto en Jonas Savimbi ondersteun het), beslissend laat kant kies vir die MPLA en is die Kubaanse ingryping as 'n geregverdigde reaksie op Suid-Afrikaanse aggressie gekondoneer. Suid-Afrika se overte militêre “aggressie” was deel van die regverdigingsgronde wat gebruik is vir die internasionale wapenverbod teen die Wit regering, wat só die basis gevorm het vir steeds

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

en hoogs toekomstige sanksies en

•

Daar is geen twyfel daaroor nie dat Operasie Savannah die Vorster-regering se détente-inisiatief ‘n doodhou toegedien het.

•

Die SAW se overte militêre ingryping in Angola het Suid-Afrika vir 15 duur jare vasgevang in 'n konflik ver van die huis af, wat steeds groter en groter toewysings van skaars hulpbronne aan die SAW vereis het (dit het gegroei van 1.8% van die begroting tot uiteindelik ongeveer 20%) en só begrotingsprioriteite skeeftrek het terwyl die tuisfront self aan die brand was.

•

Terwyl Suid-Afrika vroeër van relatiewe periferale belang vir die USSR was, het Ops Savannah ons 'n top-prioriteitsfokus vir internasionale kommunisme gemaak.

•

Die mees verwoestende gevolg was egter dat dit wat as Suid-Afrika se militêre nederlaag en gedwonge onttrekking uit Angola gesien is, onherroeplik die sielkundige borrel gebars het, die aura van onoorwinlikheid wat ons voorheen as skild om ons gehad het. Dit het wesentlik impakteer op die persepsies wat swart SuidAfrikaners gehad het, op dié van westerse vennote / beleggers en veral ook op

van

•

groeiende skadelike ekonomiese boikotte.

(Continued on page 204)

203

(Continued from page 203)

die regerings van naburige Swart-regeerde lande, wat Wit Suid-Afrika nie meer as 'n almagtige militêre krag gesien het nie. Die internasionale verloop rondom Savannah het Swart leiers en die bevolking laat besef dat Wit Suid-Afrika in werklikheid alleen staan, sonder betroubare bondgenote – terwyl hulle self op daadwerklike Sowjet-hulp sou kon reken. Vorster se beleidsposisie oor Mosambiek, nl. dat ons met enige vorm van regering daar kon saamleef, het gespreek van SuidAfrikaanse selfvertroue. Die openlike militêre ingryping in Angola het egter na desperaatheid geruik, asof Wit SuidAfrika besef het ons staan uiteindelik met die rug teen die muur. Om klaarblyklik gedwing te word om met ons sterte tussen ons bene te onttrek, het ons teenstanders uitermate bemoedig. Dit is geen toeval nie dat die ernstigste binnelandse opstand wat Suid-Afrika nog ervaar het, minder as ses maande later in Soweto uitgebreek het en soos 'n veldbrand oor die land heen versprei het. Wat sou ‘n beleid van koverte beïnvloeding en onderhandeling mbt Angola in 1975 kon opgelewer het? Nou vir die eerste SWA/Angola “what if...?” Wat kon anders verloop het, indien genl. Van den

Bergh se beleidsvoorkeur gevolg is? Indien koverte beïnvloeding en onderhandeling toegelaat is om mbt die onafhanklikwording van Angola ook uit te speel (maw, sonder dat die SAW Angola in 1975 openlik in eie gedaante konvensioneel-militêre binnegeval het)? Die doel van beide die koverte en die overte opsies was veronderstel dieselfde te gewees het, nl. die beperking van SWAPO se vermoë om Angolese grondgebied as afspringpunt vir insypeling in SWA te gebruik. Angola was egter tog nie Suid-Afrika se enigste buurland nie. Mosambiek, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho en Swaziland begrens ons eie hartland baie meer direk. Ons het nooit enige van dié lande konvensioneel militêr binnegeval nie. En tog het die ANC se MK nooit op groot skaal hulle grondgebied as oorgrensafspringpunt kon gebruik nie – danksy effektiewe koverte beïnvloeding en onderhandeling. Daarin lê dus empiriese bewys dat koverte beïnvloeding en ‘n beleid van onderhandeling ook in Angola sou kon gewerk het. Dit is in latere jare trouens onomstootlik bewys, eerstens in die vorm van die Nkomatiakkoord met Mosambiek, en toe weer op 1 April 1989 toe SWAPO – ondanks die internasionale skikking oor implementering van VNresolusie 435 – op eie houtjie besluit het om Suidwes binne te val, in die aanloop tot die VNgereëlde verkiesing; die internasionale gemeenskap (Angola, Kuba en die USSR inkluis) het SWAPO se

aggressie verdoem en die SAveiligheidsmagte is toegelaat om die insypeling binne net 9 dae volledig hok te slaan. Watter ander gevolge sou ‘n koverte beïnvloedingsbeleid gekoppel met onderhandeling kon gehad het? Sonder die komplikasie van die baie sigbare konvensionele Suid-Afrikaanse militêre inval in Angola in 1975: Sou die kommunistiese militêre inmenging aan die kant van die MPLA die sigbare aggressie gewees het en sou die konserwatiewe Afrika-lande en Westerse wêreld-mening nie so maklik oorgegaan het tot erkenning van die MPLA se magsoorname in Luanda nie; Die Kubaanse militêre teenwoordigheid op Afrikabodem sou nie so geredelik as gewettig beskou gewees het nie;

Die VSA-regering sou waarskynlik heelwat minder deur sy Kongres gekniehalter gewees het in die loods van koverte aksies teen die kommuniste in Angola, en sou die Sowjet/ Kubaanse ingryping daar veel makliker deur die Westerse moondhede en hulle konserwatiewe Afrikabondgenote teengegaan kon gewees het (in die styl van die koverte ondersteuning wat ‘n dekade later so effektief aan die Mujahiddien in Afghanistan gegee is, teen die Sowjet-inval daar); Die Vorster-regering se détente sou waarskynlik gebaat het (omdat die kommunistiese ingryping in Angola die konserwatiewe Afrika-state benoud gehad het) en sou genl. Van den Bergh se (Continued on page 205)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

204

(Continued from page 204)

beleidsvoorkeur om Rhodesië en SWA te speel as kaarte wat tyd kon wen vir die skep van ‘n onderandelingsklimaat (met Suid -Afrika gesien as essensiële ondergandelingsvennoot) tot uitvoering gebring kon word; Suid-Afrika sou, sonder die 15 jaar van voortslepende en altyd weer eskalerende militêre konflik in Angola, ontsaglik baie geld en ook bloed kon gespaar gewees het; Die wapenverbod teen Wit SuidAfrika sou nie so maklik ingestel kon gewees het nie en sou daar meer onderghandelingshefbome teen sanksies beskikbaar gewees het;

steeds gebeur het, op die manier wat dit toe wel uitgespeel het?) Soos die spreekwoord egter sê, gedane sake het geen keer nie. Mens sou maar net kon hoop dat die lesse van 1975 geleer sou word. Toe kom PW Botha egter aan bewind in Suid-Afrika, en het die konflik in Angola jaar na jaar bly eskaleer. Totdat die geskiedenis hom in 1987/88 prakties weer herhaal het... SWA/Angola 1987/88:

Geskiedenis herhaal homself met Cuito Cuanavale / Lomba / Tumpo-driehoek

Die DTA in Suidwes sou ook gebaat het as die plaaslike bevolking daar se persepsie tydens die VN-verkiesing nie was dat Suid-Afrika in wese militêr tot oorgawe gedwing is nie; en

Die SAW het in Maart 1987 bewus geword daarvan dat die MPLA se FAPLA-magte, met Russiese advies, besig was om ‘n grootskaalse offensief te beplan. Dit sou kom na die winter, teen UNITA se “hoofstad” Jamba, via Cuito Cuanavale en Mavinga in Suidoos-Angola. Agt brigades is hiervoor ge-oormerk, waarvan vier die speerpunt sou vorm. Die MPLA was begerig om met die VSA in onderhandeling te tree en die verowering van Jamba sou hulle, in hulle eie oë en dié van die Russe, in ‘n gunstige onderhandelingsposisie plaas. Die Kubane was egter geensins beïndruk met hierdie plan nie en het hulleself dus arms-gevou op die kantlyn gehou.

Belangrikste van alles – Wit Suid -Afrika sou nie sy eensmalige aura van onoorwinlikheid op die slagvelde van Angola agtergelaat het nie, wat die verloop van die binnelandse versetpolitiek waarskynlik sou getemper het en die klimaat vir onderhandeling en binnelandse alliansie-vorming sou verbeter het. (Sou Soweto in 1976 bv.

Aan die Suid-Afrikaanse kant was die SAW se oorhoofse oogmerk om SWAPO se area van oorgrens-insypeling na SWA so vêr moontlik te bly beperk tot slegs die gebied direk ten noorde van Ovamboland. Toegang via Suidoos-Angola tot Kavango en die Caprivi moes SWAPO dus ontsê word, deur daardie deel van Angola onder

Sonder die kontaminasie wat UNITA beleef het deur sy assosiasie met Wit Suid-Afrika (en veral die verloordersbeeld wat die SAW se uiteindelike onttrekking uit Angola aan UNITA as bondgenoot laat kleef het) sou UNITA in ‘n veel beter posisie by die stembus in Angola gewees het;

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

UNITA-beheer te hou. Die FAPLA-aanmars na Mavinga en Jamba sou dus gestuit moet word. Aanvanklik het UNITA gemeen hulle sal dit basies self kan vermag, en was die SAW se beplanning beperk tot koverte ondersteuning aan hulle, hoofsaaklik in die vorm van tenkjagter-eenhede bestaande uit lede van die Spesiale Magte. Die FAPLA-opmars het in alle erns begin in Augustus (sonder Kubaanse betrokkenheid) en dit het gou duidelik geword dat UNITA hierdie grootskaalse pantser-ondersteunde aanslag nie alleen die hoof sou kan bied nie. Omdat die SAW ernstige eskalasie wou vermy en sy betrokkenheid so kovert moontlik wou hou, is eers gemeen dat Mavinga maar sou kon val. Toe die sielkundige impak hiervan op UNITA egter onder die loep geneem is, is besluit dat Mavinga níe moet val nie en dat SAW-ondersteuning dus uitgebrei moet word deur gemeganiseerde eenhede na die front te stuur, wat FAPLA moes stuit aan die Lomba-rivier in die omgewing van Cuito Cuanavale – dus voor hulle naby Mavinga kom. Om die ingryping nie te opsigtelik te maak nie is die gebruik van SAW-tenks op hierdie stadium verbied. Deurgaans het die generale staf beklemtoon dat die SAbetrokkenheid beperk moet bly en nie te sigbaar moet word nie. ‘n Ander beperking wat konstant van bo benadruk is, is dat SAWongevalle tot ‘n absolute minimum gehou moes word, op die basis dat behoud van eie lewens belangriker is as die (Continued on page 206)

205

(Continued from page 205)

verwesenliking van militêre oogmerke. Die SA Lugmag sou, kragtens bevele van 3 September 1987, ook slegs in ‘n aanvalsrol ontplooi word sou FAPLA die Lomba-rivier oorsteek. Die aanvanklike SAW-doelwit was dus bloot om die FAPLAaanmars te stop en te verhoed dat Mavinga val. Dit het die amptelike posisie gebly, tot en met die bevele uitgereik op 26 Augustus. Die inkrementele insleep van die SAW (wat begin het as slegs maar koverte steun in die vorm van spesmag-lede) het toe begin eskaleer, en op 31 Augustus is die opdrag uitgebrei: nie net moes FAPLA se opmars gestuit word en die val van Mavinga verhoed word nie, maar “die situasie in Angola se 6e militêre gebied moet duidelik in die guns van Unita geswaai word”. Hiervandaan vorentoe sou die SAW-betrokkenheid net steeds maar inkrementeel verder bly eskaleer, alhoewel steeds gekniehalter deur politiesgedrewe beperkinge opgelê deur die generale staf – beperkinge wat die uitvoer van aanvalsplanne (wat in terme enkel van militêre logika die situasie beslissend in die SAW/ UNITA se guns kon geswaai het) verbied het. Hierdie kombinasie van eskalasie maar steeds ook hande vasbind, onderwyl daar in die praktyk geen manier meer was om die groeiende SAWbetrokkenheid geheim te hou nie, het tot heelwat frustrasie onder front-bevelvoerders gelei. Kol. Jan Breytenbach van 32Bataljon bv. het hierdie beluitnemingsproses getipeer as

in wese een van ‘n: “fatally flawed incremental nature”. Die gevegte aan die Lombarivier Deeglike beplanning vir die uitwis van die vier speerpuntbrigades, een vir een, is gedoen. Dit was gebaseer op die SAW se hoë-mobiliteit-doktrine vir gemeganiseerde oorlogvoering, wat die behou van die inisiatief in die kies van die slagveld, plus aanval waar die vyand op sy swakste is, beklemtoon het. Die eerste veldslag, gerig teen FAPLA se 47e Brigade, het op 3 Oktober 1987 aan die Lomba plaasgevind. ‘n Gemengde SAW -eenheid van bataljon-sterkte het met een taktiese oorwinning ‘n goed-bewapende FAPLAbrigade so totaal verslaan dat 47 Brigade ophou bestaan het as ‘n effektiewe militêre eenheid. Kortom, die knap krygsplan is met so ‘n skok-effek ten uitgevoer gebring dat die troepe van die 47e begin hardloop het (díe wat nog kon). Twee dae later is ‘n Angolese bevel onderskep waarin opdrag gegee is dat, in stede van voortgaan met die aanslag op Jamba, die gekombineerde FAPLA-magte moes terugtrek en konsolideer. Die aanvanklike oogmerk om die FAPLA-opmars na Jamba te stuit is dus vroeg in Oktober reeds verwesenlik. Eerder as om oorwinning uit te roep en terug te trek, missie afgehandel, het díe sukses egter weer gelei daartoe dat die generale staf die doelpale verskuif het, ten gunste van verdere eskalasie. Die doelwit sou nou wees om FAPLA so ‘n harde hou toe te dien dat hy nie in staat sou wees om die volgende seisoen weer ‘n NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

aanslag op Jamba te loods nie, en om die Cuito-rivier te versterk as ‘n verdedigingslyn wat UNITA in die toekoms sou kon hou. Op 9 November was dit FAPLA se 16e Brigade se beurt om deur te loop, in nog ‘n hoogs-mobiele aanval. Die vernietiging van die 16e as effektiewe militêre eenheid is verseker met ‘n opvolg-aksie op 11 November. Weer het die FAPLA-troepe wat kon, gehardloop. Die Kubane se verwagtinge oor hoe die Russies -geïnspireerde aanslag op Jamba sou verloop, is dus ruimskoots bewaarheid – maar, dit moet onthou word dat die Kubane steeds nie deel van die gevegte was nie (trouens, Fidel Castro het deurentyd, oor die twaalf jaar heen sedert Operasie Savannah, sy troepe in Angola so ver moontlik weggehou van direkte botsings met die SAW – die enigste noemenswaardige uitsondering was toe ‘n Kubaanse pantserkolon probeer ingryp het tydens die SAW se valskerm-aanslag op die SWAPO-basis by Cassinga, maar die tydige tussenkoms van ‘n stoppergroep het verhoed dat hulle betyds tot die geveg kon toetree).

Opsies na oorwinnings

die

Lomba-

Gegewe dat die aanvanklike doelwit nou dubbel en dwars bereik is, was daar drie opsies: Onttrek terug oorwinnaar; of

SWA-toe

Vat Cuito Cuanavale (FAPLA se bevelspos en sleutelrivierkruising) vanuit die Weste, wat die voorkeur was van die front-bevelvoerders; of (Continued on page 207)

206

(Continued from page 206)

Ruim FAPLA op aan die oostekant van die Cuito-rivier (hulle het steeds ‘n teenwoordigheid gehad in die sg. Tumpo-driehoek en was besig om in te grawe op die hoogliggende terrein van die Chambinga). Met die voordeel van terug-sig, is dit duidelik dat Opsie 1 die korrekte was; FAPLA was in geen posisie meer om weer aanstons ‘n aanval op Mavinga en Jamba te loods nie, en hulle posisies in die Tumpo-driehoek het geen wesentlike bedreiging ingehou nie. Met die missie volvoer, sou terugtrekking na SWA eskalasie verhoed het, wat die Kubane sou vingerwysend kon uitwys dat hulle reg bewys is. Opsies twee en drie sou noodwendig beteken dat die SAW sou moes oorgaan vanaf ‘n verdedigingspostuur (die aanvalle om FAPLA te stuit aan die Lomba was verdediging by wyse van aanval) na ‘n volwaardige aanvalspostuur. Die Kubane sou dan nie net kon bly terugsit nie. Ongetwyfeld sou ‘n aanslag op Cuito Cuanavale vanuit die weste ‘n wesentlike eskalasie beteken het, wat die ontplooiing van nog meer konvensionele magte sou vereis het. Die generaals het besef dat dit regtige oorlog sou kon beteken. Om FAPLA op te ruim aan die oostekant van die rivier, sou egter beteken dat hulle tromp-op

geloop sou moes word op ‘n slagveld van hulle keuse waar hulle daagliks beter ingegrawe was, beskerm deur mynvelde, artillerie en lug-dekking. Dit sou takties lynreg indruis teen die SAW se bewese doktrine vir mobiele oorlogvoering – maar daar was stemme op hoogste vlak wat gemeen het dat, as daar net genoeg geraas gemaak sou word, FAPLA weer sou hardloop. Wat daardie stemme nie in ag geneem het nie, is wat Kuba sou doen, in die aangesig van die MPLA-regering se vinnigverslegtende militêre situasie... Die FAPLA-neerlae aan die Lomba het Fidel Castro erg onthuts, al was dit breedweg in lyn met dit waarteen die Kubane juis gewaarsku gehad het. Castro het besef dat Kuba nie onbepaald in Angola sou kon aanbly nie (veral omdat, in Rusland, die skrif aan die muur te sien was vir die kommunistiese bewind daar, wat Kuba grootliks ekonomies aan die gang gehou het). Kuba sou egter nie kon onttrek midde-in ‘n MPLA-nederlaag nie, a.g.v. die negatiewe interne politieke reperkussies wat dit binne Kuba vir Castro sou hê. Hy sou moes na ‘n wenner lyk, voor hy kon ontknoop aan Angola. Op 14 November het die toenmalige Kubaanse bevelvoerder in Angola, genl. Ochoa, vir Havana laat weet hy weerstaan steeds Russiese druk om Kubaanse troepe in te stuur, maar dat ‘n “katastrofe

onvermydelik op hande is” as die moreel en gevegskapasiteit van FAPLA nie baie vinnig herstel word nie. Die meester-strateeg en propagandis Fidel Castro gryp persoonlik in Op 15 November het Fidel Castro ‘n nood-vergadering van sy top-adviseurs byeengeroep. Hyself het pas teruggekeer gehad van ‘n besoek aan Moskou. Dit is duidelik dat Castro wou “uit” uit Angola, maar dat hy besef het dat – om dit te kan doen – hy eers dieper sou moes inspring. Daar is vervolgens in Havana op ‘n driepunt-plan besluit: Om versigtig kovert uit te reik na die VSA en Suid-Afrika met die oog op vredesonderhandelings; Om nie toe te laat dat die SAW verdere suksesse behaal aan die Cuito-rivier nie, deur die bestaande FAPLA-posisies daar (aan die oostekant in die Tumpodriehoek en in Cuito Cuanavale self) te versterk met die instuur van Kubaanse spesiale magte en 1, 500 troepe toegerus met tenks en artillerie; en Om grootskaals te eskaleer by wyse daarvan om ‘n nuwe front te loods waar die SAW dit nie sou verwag nie, deur die elite Kubaanse 50e Divisie (wat normaalweg getaak is om die Amerikaanse basis op die eiland van Kuba by Guantánamo-baai onder die oog te hou) en Kuba se beste vegter-loodse te ontplooi na Angola se suidwestelike Kunene-provinsie teenoor Ovamboland, en só die dreigement van ‘n potensieel beslissende flank-operasie te (Continued on page 208)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

207

(Continued from page 207)

vestig. Hierdie aksie-plan was Castro se eie inisiatief (m.a.w., nie in oorleg met die Sowjet-unie nie) en spreek van sy begaafdheid as politieke en militêre strateeg. Net soos wat die SAW nie in 1975 voorsien gehad het nie dat Kuba in reaksie op Operasie Savannah sou teen-eskaleer deur met sy Operasie Carlota grootskaals tot die militêre stryd toe te tree, net so ook het die SAW kennelik nie verwag dat die inkrementele Suid-Afrikaanse eskalasie in 1987 sou lei tot nog ‘n massiewe Kubaanse teeneskalasie by wyse van die ontplooiing van ‘n elite Kubaanse divisie direk op die grens van SWA nie, toegerus vir desnoods ‘n konvensionele inval loods. Daarby was dit opperste politiekpropagandistiese vernuf aan Castro se kant om die “verdediging van Cuito Cuanavale” in die media te verhef tot iets soortgelyk aan die kommunistiese verdediging van Stalingrad. Die gevegte om die Tumpodriehoek Terwyl hierdie Kubaanse strategiese beplanning in implementering was, het die SAW sy posisie aan die Cuito versterk, o.a. met die toevoeging van nog meer Olifant-tenks. Die intelligensie-analise van die heersende situasie in die Tumpo -driehoek wat “skoongemaak” moes word, was egter nie bemoedigend nie – dit het korrek

voorsien dat die terrein nie geskik is vir hoë-mobiliteit gemeganiseerde oorlogvoering nie, dat die vyand ingegrawe is met ekstensiewe mynvelde en artillerie gekonsentreer op die hoë grond oorkant die rivier, en dat die vyand ook lugsuperioriteit sou geniet. Daarby was die vyand nie maar net weer die FAPLAs van die Lombagevegte nie – nou was daar Kubaanse beplanning en leiding, plus Kubaanse gevegsbetrokkenheid om dit ruggraat te gee. Desondanks, en ondanks die feit dat ‘n frontale aanslag teen die ingegraafde Kubaans-Angolese stellings lynreg ingedruis het teen doktrine, is drie opeenvolgende frontale aanvalle deur die SAW van stapel gestuur – klaarblyklik gebaseer op die generaals in Pretoria (wat alles van ‘n afstand mikro-bestuur het) se aanname dat: as ons genoeg geraas maak, sal hulle weer hardloop. Die aanvalle is geloods op 2 Januarie 1988, weer op 13 Januarie en laastens op 14 Februarie 1988. Al drie het klaaglik misluk (gelukkig, as gevolg van goeie opleiding en bevel op die grond, sonder oormatige lewensverlies). Die Cuito Cuanavale debat Wat ons noodwendig bring by die propaganda-stryd wat rondom hierdie onsuksesvolle aanvalle ontketen is – die “spin” oor of “Cuito Cuanavale” kranig teen die Suid-Afrikaners verdedig is, en of die dorp glad nie eens ‘n SAW-teiken was nie (en dus met as logiese gevolg, dat die SAW nie daar kon NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

verslaan gewees het nie).

Mens verstaan uiteraard die politieke beweegredes agter die twee gesigpunte. Feit is egter dat die Kubane (en diegene wat hulle standpunt huldig) onteenseglik reeds die propaganda-stryd gewen het. In die publieke oog, binne SuiderAfrika en oor die wêreld heen, het die Kubane die FAPLAneerlae aan die Lomba omgekeer en die SAW gestuit, sodat Cuito Cuanavale nie geval het nie. Eerlik gesproke, moet mens erken dat argumente tot die teendeel is in werklikheid blote woord-spel is van sofiste, wat alles wil hang aan die kapstok van ‘n naam. Dit spreek tog vanself dat, as enige propagandis ‘n kampanje wou loods, daar ‘n naam op ‘n kaart gekies moes word wat die leser minstens sou kon opkyk. En die enigste naam in daardie geografiese omgewing wat ‘n leser dalk op die gemiddelde kaart sou vind, is Cuito Cuanavale (wie sou bv. die Tumpo-driehoek kon lokaliseer?) Die dorpie staan dus in vir al die gevegte in die nabyheid van die Cuito-rivier. Anders gestel – indien iemand nou met geografiese eksaktheid sou vra aan diegene wat volhou dat Cuito Cuanavale as sulks nie ‘n teiken was nie: Het julle opdrag gehad om die Tumpo(Continued on page 209)

208

(Continued from page 208)

driehoek te verower? dan is die antwoord onteenseglik “ja”. Het julle dit toe wel aangeval? “Ja”. Hoeveel keer? “Drie keer”. En het julle dit verower of is julle afgeslaan? “Ons is elke keer afgeslaan.” So, kom ons hou op met hierdie sinnelose debat oor wat presies die naam Cuito Cuanavale versinnebeeld en erken die feite: Aan die Lomba-rivier het ons FAPLA oortuigend verslaan, maar in die Tumpo-driehoek het die verdedigers ons aanvalle afgeslaan. Propaganda wentel tog nie om die letterlike van ‘n naam nie – dit gaan oor die spin van die sielkundige impak van gebeure, en feit is dat die SAW in 1988 nie op die slagveld die opdragte van sy oppergesag kon tot uitvoering bring nie, met die gevolg dat die Suid-Afrikaanse magte genoodsaak was om ongedane sake terug te trek. Soos in 1975, is ons eie aanvanklike inkrementele eskalasie in die Cuito-omgewing deur die Kubane ontmoet met ‘n daadwerklike teen-eskalasie, en kon ons nie die vermoë monster om dit te oorkom nie. Castro se strategiese plan, om die SAW vas te maak in die ooste rondom Cuito terwyl hy ‘n tweede front in die weste open, was besig om tot vrug te kom. Die opmars na die SWA-grens van die elite Kubaanse 50e Divisie

Die mees saakmakende Kubaanse teen-eskalasie was

egter nie die versterkings wat hulle inderhaas na Cuito gestuur het nie, maar wel die opmars van die Kubaanse 50e Divisie na die grens van Ovamboland. Sou hulle by die grens stop, of Suidwes inval? As dit lg. was, dan was dit volskaalse oorlog... Die eerste kontingent van die 50e het Kuba op 24 November 1987 verlaat, in 9 skepe en 20 vragvliegtuie. Teen Maart 1988 was die divisie aan land en gereed om suidwaarts te begin beweeg. Op 6 Maart het Castro die opdrag gegee om te begin opruk. Op 11 Maart het ‘n tenkbrigade van die 50e met 40 T-62 tenks Chibemba bereik. Dit blyk dat die SAW teen die middel van April 1988 van hierdie suidwaartse ontplooiing deur die Kubane bewus geword het, o.a. danksy intelligensie gedeel deur die CIA. Die nuwe front het ongeveer 250 myl gestrek ooswes, breedweg parallel met die Ovamboland-grens, en op plekke net 12 myl van die grens. Dit het o.a. ingesluit die bou van twee nuwe vliegvelde by Xangongo en Cahama, met bunkers vir die gevorderde MIG23’s. Vanweë die nabyheid van hierdie lug-basisse aan die grens en die ontplooiing van gesofistikeerde lugafweerstelsels en radar wat die hele Suid-Angola plus die noorde van SWA gedek het, sowel as die instuur van Kuba se beste vlieëniers plus die volledige eskader gevorderde MIG-23s (wat die SA Lugmag se Mirage’s tegnies voor was, veral m.b.t. voorskiet-vermoë) sou Kuba NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

definitiewe lugsuperioriteit in die nuwe teater kon geniet. SWAPO was in hierdie area ook nou volledig geïntegreer met die Kubaanse eenhede, sodat oorgrens-operasies teen SWAPO noodwendig ook kontak met die Kubane tot gevolg gehad het. Volgens ‘n voorligting wat die Pentagon aan die SuidAfrikaners gegee het, het die Kubaanse eenhede beskik oor 800 stuks swaar pantser, 400 ligte pantser, 300 artillerie en vuurpylrigters, 250 lugverdedigingstelsels, 80 missiel-lanseerders, 60 tot 70 vastevlerk-vliegtuie en 20 tot 30 helikopters. Die Amerikaanse inskatting was dat hierdie ‘n veels te sterk mag was vir net maar ‘n politieke vertoon met die oog op onderhandelingsvoordeel – dat dit al meer begin lyk het na ‘n invalsmag wat op soek is na ‘n geveg. Die SAW was in Maart/April nie bedag op so ‘n bedreiging van ‘n konvensionele inval in NoordSWA in nie, en die enigste magte wat toe op toneel beskikbaar was om die Kubane teen te staan (as hulle toe wel sou ingeval het) was liggewapende teen-insurgensie eenhede en verouderde Elandpantserkarre. Op 18 April het die Kubane ‘n aanval geloods teen Suid-Afrikaanse troepe wat besig was met ‘n roetine oorgrens-operasie teen SWAPO. Die aggressie waarmee dit gedoen is het vir die SAW gewys hier is ‘n geheel nuwe situasie op hande, en gepaste (Continued on page 210)

209

(Continued from page 209)

versterkings is inderhaas na die nuwe teater ontplooi. ‘n Aantal kleiner “”voeler”skermutselings het tot Junie plaasgevind, soos bv. op 22 Mei naby Techipa, waar ‘n eenheid van die SAW se ervare 32bataljon ‘n lokval gestel het maar toe moes uitvind dat die Kubane wat daar ingeloop het, veels te sterk was. Die eenheid se voertuie is uitgeskiet en hulle moes terug hardloop na die SWA-grens (wat hulle gelukkig kon doen, gesien hoe fiks hulle was). Planne wat die Kubane in die SAW-voertuie gevind het, het hulle oortuig dat ‘n aanval op Techipa beplan word (dis vervolgens in werklikheid afgelas) maar die Kubane het besluit om dit voor te spring met ‘n aanval van hulle eie op o.a. die Calueque-dam (lewensbelangrike bron van water vir Ovamboland). Die Kubaanse aanval op 24 Junie het dinge in die nuwe teater vinnig laat eskaleer. Die aanval het effektiewe SAWteenstand ontlok, veral by wyse van ‘n dodelike artilleriebombardement. Castro is hierdeur in ‘n woedebui gestuur en het gelas dat ‘n grond- en lugaanslag op die Caluequedam gedoen moes word. Drie Kubanse gepantserde kolonne het vervolgens opgeruk na die dam, maar is voorgelê deur Suid -Afrikaanse gemeganiseerde eenhede (toegerus met Ratels en anti-tenk wapens). Daar is vermoed dat so ‘n aanval sou kom en die SAW-eenhede is

vooruit gestuur is om ‘n lokval voor te berei. Toe die Kubane wel daarin inry, het die SuidAfrikaners egter gou uitgevind dat hulle totaal deur die Kubane “out-gun” is. Gelukkig kon ‘n eenheid Olifant-tenks haastig ingeroep word wat die geveg tot skaakmat gebring het, met beide kante wat besluit het om te onttrek. Kort voor 3nm daardie middag het twee golwe van 7 MIG-23s die SAW-eenhede by Caluequedam vanaf lae hoogte aangeval. Die MIGS het keer op keer omgedraai om weer aan te val, en het die damwal en ‘n Buffeltroepedraer met hulle bomme getref. Dit was ‘n geheel ander tipe lugaanval as diè vanaf hoë hoogte waaraan Suid-Afrikaners voorheen in Angola gewoond was. Operasie Hilti mik hoog Daardie selfde aand het die hoof van die SA Leer na Oshakati gevlieg en opdrag gegee dat alle operasies teen die Kubane gestaak word, in die lig van die Amerikaans-gefasiliteerde vredesonderhandelinge wat op 3 en 4 Mei in London afgeskop het tussen Suid-Afrika, die Kubane en die MPLA. Die SuidAfrikaanse eenhede het uit Angola onttrek en die Kubane het teruggetrek na hulle basisse by Techipa. Dit is duidelik dat beide kante besef het dat ‘n volskaalse oorlog op hande sou wees, indien daar nie suksesvol vir vrede onderhandel sou word nie. Beide kante het wel NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

gebeurlikheidsplanne gemaak ten einde te kan eskaleer, indien nodig – Castro het gelas dat die volgende rondte (as daar een sou wees) swaar aanvalle op SAW-installasies in Ovamboland moes behels. Die SAW se onmiddellike beplanning (genaamd Operasie Hilti) was om die Kubane in SuidwesAngola aan te val op dieselfde patroon as die suksesvolle aanslae teen FAPLA aan die Lomba-rivier, net op ‘n veel groter skaal – op divisie-sterkte (die eerste keer sedert die 2e Wêreldoorlog), eerder as net die bataljon-sterkte eenhede wat op ‘n slag aan die Lomba ontplooi is. 10 Divisie, vernoem na Sektor 10, sou hiervoor gevorm word. Vir hierdie doel is ‘n gedeeltelike nasionale mobilisasie in SuidAfrika afgekondig, met die oproep van talle Burgermageenhede. Operasie Hilti is beplan as ‘n konvensionele gemeganiseerde blits-aanslag op die Kubaanse 50e Divisie in Suidwes-Angola, gefokus op hulle agter-basisse sowel as hulle logistieke lyne, insluitend ‘n interdiksie-aanval deur die SA Vloot op die hawe van Namibe en ook ‘n aanval op Lubango as belangrike logistieke steunsentrum. Operasie Handbag realistiese opsie

‘n

meer

‘n Adviesgroep saamgestel onder leiding van brigadier Eddie Webb het egter bevind dat die militêre magsbalans die vyand (m.a.w., die Kubane) bevoordeel i.t.v. wapentuig en mannekrag. Sou die SAW die Kubane op so (Continued on page 211)

210

(Continued from page 210)

‘n groot skaal in Angola aanval, sou Suid-Afrika ook weer internasionaal as aggressor gebrandmerk word. Voorts het die adviesgroep bevind dat daar net ‘n beperkte vooruitsig op sukses sou wees, met swaar verliese ‘n gegewene. Vanuit die logistieke hoek het die SAW se logistiese beplanners dit ook duidelik gemaak aan die Staatsveiligheidsraad (SVR) dat hulle eenvoudig nie in staat sou wees om so ‘n massiewe konvensionele aanval soos beplan met Hilti, diep in Angola in, op die korttermyn suksesvol te ondersteun nie, a.g.v. knelpunte ten opsigte van die beskikbaarheid van voertuie, brandstoftenkers en seintoerusting en onderdele vir enigiets van tenks tot G-5 kanonne. Die SA Lugmag se Mirage’s en Buccaneers was op hierdie stadium reeds teruggetrek na basisse in Suid-Afrika. Die Lugmag se voorlegging aan die SVR m.b.t. vliegtuie beskikbaar vir ontplooiing teen ‘n Kubaanse inval was nog meer soberend: slegs 4 Mirage F1CZ vegters en 7 Mirage F1AZ grondaanvalvliegtuie, plus dan van die verouderde platforms: 4 Mirage IIICZ vegters, 3 Buccaneers, 3 Canberra bomwerpers, en 10 Impala Mk II ligte grondaanvalvliegtuie. Hierdie reeds lae vlakke van vliegtuigbeskikbaarheid sou ook net op die loodsingsdag van die aanval beskikbaar wees, en sou na skatting met 10% per dag verminder deur gevegskade en meganiese probleme.Dus ‘n

aanvangs-totaal van 31 vastevlerk-vliegtuie van meerendeels verouderde ontwerp en doelmatigheid, teenoor 60 – 70 vastevlerkvliegtuie van resente generasie en moderne gevegskapasiteit aan die Kubaanse kant. Voorts het die Lugmag nie die kapasiteit gehad om die ekstensiewe vyandelike radardekking van die lugruim van die Noorde van SWA en SuidAngola te kon stoor nie, en het ook net 9 ontwykingspakkette vir die afskud van hitte-soekende missiele beskikbaar gehad. Die lugmag (wat a.g.v. die wapenverbod nie sy verliese uit oorsese bronne sou kon goedmaak nie) se sobere analise was dat hulle nie die vyand se lug-krag op die grond sou kon neutraliseer met voorspring-aanvalle nie, en dat eie vliegtuie daarenteen uiters kwesbaar sou wees. Hulle aanbeveling aan die SVR was dus direk op die man af: Vermy konfrontasie ten alle koste. Indien konfrontasie egter onvermybaar sou word, weet dan net dat die Lugmag se offensiewe vermoë binne ‘n kort tydsbestek geneutraliseer sal word. In die lig hiervan is Operasie Hilti op 29 Junie 1988 laat vaar en vervang met ‘n ander verdedigingsplan, genaamd Handbag. Hiervolgens sou die slagveld die noorde van SWA wees. Die SAW-magte in Ovamboland sou, in geval van ‘n grootskaalse Kubaanse konvensionele inval, langs twee roetes terugtrek: een suidwaarts NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

van Ruacana tot by die Etoshawildtuin, en die ander suidweswaarts van Ondangwa na Oshakati. Die vasskop-punt sou die hoë terrein rondom Tsumeb wees, en die Blanke bevolking daar sou vooraf ontruim word. Dit was duidelik dat hierdie nie ‘n teen-insurgensie “bos-oorlog” sou wees nie, maar ‘n volskaalse konvensionele oorlog soos wat Afrika nie sedert die 2e Wêreldoorlog gesien het nie. Die vredesonderhandelings Verteenwoordigers van SuidAfrika, Angola en Kuba het op 3 en 4 Mei 1988 die eerste keer in ‘n Londense hotel ontmoet, onder voorsitterskap van Chester Crocker van die VSA. Dit is tien dae later gevolg deur ‘n ontmoeting tussen die SuidAfrikaners en Angolese in Brazzaville. Die eerste substantiewe samesprekings het op 24 en 25 Junie in Kaïro plaasgevind. Dit het stormagtig afgeskop, maar het tog tot ‘n aanvanklike deurbraak gelei toe dit as vertrekpunt aanvaar is dat almal moet gesien word om as wenners uit die onderhandelinge te tree. Buitelandse minister Pik Botha het naamlik aan die Kubane aangebied dat SuidAfrika sou onderneem om die VN se Resolusie 435 oor Namibië ten spoedigste te implementeer (dus: vrye verkiesing gevolg deur SAonttrekking uit SWA, wat Castro as ‘n oorwinning sou kon aanbied) terwyl ‘n gekoppelde Kubaanse onderneming om dan ook uit Angola te onttrek (wat in ieder geval Castro se dryfveerbegeerte was) deur Botha as ‘n “oorwinning” aangebied sou kon (Continued on page 212)

211

(Continued from page 211)

word. Werklike vordering het gevolg op ‘n werksvergadering op amptenaar-vlak, gehou in New York op 11 en 12 Julie, waartydens die Kubane hierdie “gekoppelde” wedersydse onttrekking as onderhandelingsbasis aanvaar het. Die SAW se definitiewe onttrekking uit Angola is op 8 Augustus tydens ‘n perskonferensie deur mininsters Pik Botha en Magnus Malan, en genl. Jannie Geldenhuys aangekondig. Die finale vredesooreenkoms is in Desember 1988 in New York onderteken, met 1 April 1989 as implementeringsdatum vir VNResolusie 435 en 1 November 1989 as verkiesingsdatum. Vanaf 1 April sou daar ‘n staakvuur wees, met die SAmagte beperk tot basis en SWAPO-magte wat in Angola noord van die 16e breedtegraad moes bly. Hierdie laaste bepaling is nie deur SWAPO gerespekteer nie, wat op 1 April eensydig begin het met ‘n inval in Ovamboland ten einde sy “sterkmansbeeld” voor die verkiesing te probeer uitbou. Hierdie aggressie het vir SWAPO die argwaan van die wêreld op die hals gehaal (insluitend van Angola, Kuba en die Russe) en is die SA-magte se hande vrygemaak om die SWAPO-insypelaars hok te slaan – wat binne 9 dae gedoen is, in hoofsaak deur die SAP se Koevoet-eenheid wat met net maar ligte wapens, dog leeuemoed, die PLAN-insypelaars

aangedurf en grootliks uitgewis het. SWAPO het die verkiesing gewen, en Suid-Afrika het woordgehou en uit SWA onttrek, wat vervolgens die onafhanklike Republiek van Namibië geword het – nie ‘n MarxistiesLeninistiese “Volksrepubliek” nie, maar ‘n regstaat met beskermings kragtens ‘n onderhandelde nuwe grondwet. Kuba het ook woord gehou en militêr uit Angola onttrek. Hoe kon die militêre stryd verloop het as vrede nie gesluit is nie? Attrisie! Vir baie van diegene wat SuidAfrika se eie demokratiese oorgang teengestaan en as “verraad” gesien het, was die “weggee” van Suidwes ‘n belangrike aanloop daartoe. Maar kon Suid-Afrika werklik anders gedoen het, as om die implementering van Resolusie 435 te aanvaar? Gegewe dit wat die voorgaande jare se avonture in Angola gekos het en die militêr-strategiese magsbalans gelaai teen ons, waarmee dit ons uiteindelik gekonfronteer het? Dít was tog die harde werklikheid, teen die agtergrond waarvan uiteindelik met erns en fokus vir vrede onderhandel moes word. Ons tweede groot “what if...” is dus: wat sou gebeur het, as die verdesonderhandelinge sou afgespring het? In 1988 was daar vir Suid-Afrika ‘n geleentheidsvenster oop, deurdat Ronald Reagan en Margaret Thatcher aan bewind NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

was – dit sou nie altyd so bly nie en die geleentheid om die SWA/ Angola situasie vir eens en vir altyd vreedsaam te skik, moes eenvoudig aangegryp word, met aan die ander kant van die munt die dreigende Kubaanse postuur in die nuwe teater teenoor Ovamboland. Die punt hier is nie om enigsins te kenne te probeer gee dat Kuba die SAW in ‘n voluit-stryd die loef sou afgesteek het nie. Geensins nie. Niemand sou wil beweer dat die Kubane beter of moediger soldate sou gewees het as ons manne nie. Maar dis moontlik om meeste gevegte te wen, en dan tog die oorlog te verloor. As jou (onvervangbare) wapentuig op is, of as daar nie meer onderdele, brandstof en ammunisie beskikbaar is nie, dan gaan selfs die dapperste en kundigste soldaat noodwendig verloor. Daarom staan militêre beplanners en staatsmanne wat ‘n gewapende konflik moet bestuur, altyd voor die werklikheid dat gesonde besluitneming verg dat jy voor-af deeglik moet verreken, wat dit jou gaan kos as jou wél sou verloor – in Suid-Afrika se geval, sou verloor beteken dat ons prakties geen meer onderhandelings-hefboomkrag sou hê nie. Nie m.b.t. SWA/ Angola nie, en ook nie vir ‘n interne skikking nie. Dus, ‘n risiko wat eenvoudig nie geloop kon word nie. Dit is duidelik dat daar aansienlike kommer was oor ‘n konvensionele Kubaanse inval in (Continued on page 213)

212

(Continued from page 212)

SWA. Dit was nie ‘n irrasionele kommer nie, gegewe dat Castro doelbewus almal aan die raai gehou het oor sy werklike strategiese oogmerke en die SAW dus wel deeglik vir so ‘n moontlikheid moes beplan. Wanneer Castro se eie latere uitsprake onder die loep geneem word, is dit egter duidelik dat hy meer waarskynlik ‘n attrisiebenadering sou gevolg het indien die onderhandelinge op niks sou uitgeloop het nie (hy was baie attent op Suid-Afrika se beperkinge onder die wapenverbod en t.o.v. mannekrag). Castro se krygservaring was by uitstek as suksesvolle guerilla-leier, en guerilla-oorlogvoering is per definisie gemik op langtermynattrisie – val aan waar die vyand dit die minste verwag en op sy swakste is, en trek dadelik terug om nog ‘n dag te kan veg – eerder as om te soek na beslissende frontale konfrontasies. Gedurende die loop van die Angola-konfllik het Castro ook doelbewus probeer vermy dat sy troepe direk konvensioneel met die SAW slaags raak, en dit sou waarskynlik sy werkswyse gebly het. Ek meen die volgende sou waarskynlik gebeur het, as vrede nie wel gekies is nie (wat dink u?): Die Kubane sou die watertoevoer van Calueque na Ovambo afgesny het, waarskynlik aanvanklik by tye (om die punt te maak dat hulle kon) en dan desnoods permanent;

SWAPO sou kennelik die Kubane se beskerming geniet het, nou digby die grens, wat dit vir hulle PLAN-vegters veel makliker sou maak om Ovambo te infiltreer en baie moeiliker vir die SAW om oorgrens-operasies teen hulle te loods; Dit sou ook veel veiliger en makliker gewees het vir veral Ovambo’s om oor die grens heen uit te wyk om by PLAN aan te sluit, a.g.v. die heelwat verkorte afstand na relatiewe veiligheid, wat seer sekerlik die getal uitwykings (en dus mannekrag-toevoegings) vir SWAPO sou verhoog het; Kuba sou aan PLAN-eenhede artillerie- en lugdekking kon verleen vir aanvalle uitgevoer binne Ovamboland, wat die intensiteit van die insurgensie daar aansienlik sou verhoog het; Kuba en PLAN sou die luukse kon gehad het om, van hulle nuwe stellings net oorkant die grens, die aanvals-inisiatief te neem i.t.v. watter sagte teikens hulle wanneer wil slaan, met welke mate van swaargeskut- en lug-dekking, wat dus heelwat groter magsontplooiing van die SA-kant sou verg om dit effektief te kon teenstaan; Die SA Lugmag sou oor lang afstande moes opereer om nie sy beperkte aantal onvervangbare vliegtuie te veel blootgestel te laat op basisse naby die grens nie (die Mirage’s was bv. reeds onttrek) terwyl die Kubane kon opereer vanaf verharde vliegvelde na aan die grens, gerugsteun deur gesofistikeerde lugafweerstelsels en radar, sodat dit vir hulle moontlik sou wees om lugaanvalle te loods NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

sonder effektiewe SuidAfrikaanse lug-teenstand (soos wat in werklikheid reeds met die lugaanval op die Calueque-dam gedemonstreer is en waar ‘n Kubaanse loods ‘n oorwinningsrol oor die slagveld gedoen het om in te vryf dat die SA Lugmag nie daar was om hulle teen te staan nie); Dit sou moontlik wees om oor tyd die SA Lugmag stuksgewys in botsings in te probeer lok, wetende dat elke vliegtuig wat Suid-Afrika verloor, nie vervang kon word nie, om só deur attrisie die SA Lugmag se relevansie en kapasiteit te reduseer; Suid-Afrika moes, om genoegsame mannekrag te monster om die 50e Divisie geloofwaardig te kan teenstaan, ‘n gedeeltelike nasionale mobilisasie van die Burgermag afkondig, wat nie ekonomies of polities-sosiaal volhoubaar sou wees as Castro met die oog op attrisie bloot net die bedreiging oor tyd in stand gehou het nie (die beperkte oproep-tyd vir Burgermag-soldate sou konstante rotasie en gevolglike nasionale ontwrigting meegebring het); Kuba sou vanaf sy voorste basisse en met gebruik van PLAN as proksie, aanslae kon loods op die SAW se beperkte aantal en ook baie lang logistieke lyne van Suid-Afrika af na die noorde van SWA; Kuba sou die Suid-Afrikaanse skatkis (reeds onder geweldige druk vanweë sanksies en binnelandse onrus) onder ekstra druk kon plaas deur bloot oor tyd die bedreiging van ‘n inval in stand te hou; (Continued on page 214)

213

(Continued from page 213)

Indien vrede nie gesluit is nie sou Kuba sekerlik alles moontlik gedoen het om binnelandse onrus in beide die RSA en SWA verder aan te blaas en sou die oproep van mannekrag en middele om die Ovambolandgrens te gaan verdedig, noodwendig die binnelandse kapasiteit om die onrus te beheer nadelig geraak het; Kuba was nou ideaal geplaas om, wanneer daar debatte in internasionale forums sou wees oor SWA / die RSA se binnelandse situasie, provokasies te loods wat negatiewe media-aandag vir die SAW se noodwendige teenoptredes sou genereer en na alle waarskynlikheid die isolasieen sanksie-veldtogte sou intensifiseer;

Die ontplooiing van die 50e Divisie teenoor Ovamboland sou dit ‘n logistiese onmoontlikheid gemaak het vir die SAW om in die toekoms effektiewe steun in die ooste aan UNITA te verleen, wat SWAPO in staat sou kon stel om die Kavango en Caprivi ook grootskaals as infiltrasieteikens te aktiveer – wat op sy beurt weer die teen-insurgensie kopseer in SWA aansienlik sou laat toeneem het in omvang; PLAN en die Kubane sou bepaalde areas in Ovambo kon teiken om, onder ‘n Kubaanse militêre sambreel van oorkant die grens, as “bevryde gebiede” te ontwikkel; Indien al hierdie tipe van provokasie tot grootskaalse gevegte sou lei, sou dit die risiko verhoog dat ‘n VN-vredesmag daargestel sou word om in te

gryp, gerig teen en “geregverdig” deur die RSA se “onwettige okkupasie” van Namibië (soos enkele jare later in die Balkans gebeur het, onder Demokratiese Party-bewind in die VSA); Die Weste sou al hoe meer onder druk gekom het om konkreet kant te kies teen die “rassistiese onwettige besetters” en sou die temptasie vir militêre ingryping met lugaanvalle teen Suid-Afrikaanse infrastruktuur (soos enkele jare later wel teen Serwië uitgevoer is) al hoe sterker geword het; en, les bes As Suid-Afrika onder toenemende druk sou dreig om homself met sy kernwapens te verdedig, sou dit onmiddellik tot volskaalse internasionale sanksies en direkte inmenging gelei het.

Die kies van vrede, al was die prys die afgee van SWA, was in Suid-Afrika se beste belang Twee keer (in 1975 en weer in 1987) het Suid-Afrika hard sy kop gestamp toe toegelaat is dat die SAW deur inkrementele eskalasie in Angola in ‘n openlike, konvensionele militêre stryd daar vasgevang geraak het. Twee keer was die SAWleierskap nie genoegsame bedag op wat die vyand kon doen by wyse van massiewe teen-eskalasie nie, en twee keer is nie volledig genoeg afgeweeg wat die potensiële wins in geval van wen sou wees, teenoor die potensiële koste en verlies van verloor nie. Gelukkig is gekies om nie ‘n derde keer daardie pad te loop nie, toe Castro die uitdaging van die 50e Divisie se opmars na die

Owamboland-grens aan SuidAfrika se voete gewerp het. Nie omrede die Kubane noodwendig sou gewen het nie, maar omdat die geopolitieke, ekonomiessosiale en militêr-logistieke realiteite sodanig teen SuidAfrika gelaai was dat ons nie met sekerheid sou kon sê dat ons definitief sou wen nie (veral nie as die bedreiging een van attrisie oor tyd sou geword het, of die vyand weer nog verder sou ge-eskaleer het nie).

Daarom was dit in 1988 duidelik dat die koste van militêr verloor in SWA/Angola, sou wees dat Suid-Afrika met geen hefboomkrag by die onderhandelingstafel gelaat sou word om die afdwing van “Volksrepublieke” in Namibië en Suid-Afrika self, af te weer nie. En dit was ‘n risiko wat eenvoudig nie geneem kon word nie – veral nie met ‘n geleentheidsvenster oop van die Kubane wat wil rasioneel onderhandel, en met Reagan en Thatcher wat minstens sou luister na die Suid-Afrikaanse saak. Dit is ‘n feit soos ‘n koei dat partye wat konflik met mekaar afgeskop het deur elk te meen dat hulle ‘n kans staan om die hele koek te wen met ‘n militêre oorwinning, uiteindelik net realisties onderhandel wanneer en nadat beide deur die harde leerskool van die werklikheid geleer is dat die hele koek nié deur die loop van die geweer gewen kán word nie, en dat hulle meer gaan wen / minder gaan verloor deur om die onderhandelingstafel na ‘n billike kompromis te soek. Die grensoorlog was só ‘n leerskool (Continued on page 215)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

214

(Continued from page 214)

vir Suid-Afrika se militêre bevelvoerders, maar in wese ook vir ons teenstaanders. Die stryd het vir Suid-Afrika enorm baie gekos aan skaars middele en ook aan kosbare lewens. Maar die realiteitsbewussyn wat dit wedersyds gekweek het, het onteenseglik uiteindelik ‘n vreedsame, onderhandelde oorgang na ‘n demokratiese Namibië en ‘n demokratiese Suid-Afrika moontlik gemaak. Dit kan met reg geredeneer word dat Operasie Savannah ‘n uiters duur fout was, wat die Vorsterregering se strewe na détente en vreedsame oplossings gekelder het – tot groot koste vir SuidAfrika en die streek. Nooit sal mens met sekerheid kan weet nie, hoe anders dinge regtig sou kon verloop het as dieselfde beleid in 1975 teenoor Angola gevolg is as teenoor Mosambiek. Heel moontlik sou détente wel skikkings kon voortgebring het – maar sou Suid-Afrika se Wit kiesers gereed gewees het daarvoor? Sou leiers oor die spektrum heen, sonder die ervaring van militêr koppe te gestamp het met die Kubane in Angola, genoeg gestroop gewees het van illusies omtrent ons militêre krag, om sulke “verligte” skikkings as die beste beskikbare uitkoms te aanvaar? Die PW Botha-jare weer besoek: Ironies genoeg het dit op die ou end die oorgang gefasiliteer Ironies genoeg glo ek dat daardie jare van PW Botha wat die SAW prioritiseer het en sy "totale reaksie" op die "totale aanslag" tot die maksimum

moontlike vlak uitgebou het, in werklikheid noodsaaklik was vir die uiteindelike sukses en veral die aanvaarding van die KODESA-proses deur die Wit kieserskorps en konserwatiewe leiersfigure. Om hierdie weliswaar teenintuïtiewe interpretasie te verduidelik, moet ons kyk na wat die bereiking van Suid-Afrika se eie onderhandelde skikking die ernstigste bedreig het: realisties gesproke was die mees geloofwaardige bedreiging daarvoor die vermoë van konserwatiewe Afrikaners om dit met geweld teen te staan – iets wat genl. Constand Viljoen byvoorbeeld destyds meer as net gesuggereer het gedoen sou word. 'n Gepaste analogie is dié van Duitsland tussen die twee wêreldoorloë – te veel Duitsers het geglo dat hulle nie in die eerste Wêreldoorlog verslaan is nie, dit wil sê dat hul weermag kon gewen het, indien nie vir politieke "verraad" by die huis nie. As die PW Botha-jare nie gebeur het nie, kon jy jou laaste sent wed dat enige KODESAstyl skikking as "verraad" aangeval sou word. Dit sou gedoen gewees het op grond daarvan dat – as ons net ons militêre vermoë ten volle ontwikkel het deur die daarstel van 'n kernwapen / ballistiese missiel afskrikmiddel met behoorlike gemeganiseerde wapentuig en artillerie, in plaas daarvan dat die verligtes gejaag het agter détente aan – dan sou geen buitelandse mag gewaag het om te "neuk" met ons nie en sou ons die terme kon gedikteer het. (Soos die Kubaanse 2e front en Castro se NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

eie latere opmerkings getoon het, is hulle in werklikheid nie deur Suid-Afrika se kernwapens afgeskrik nie – hulle het bloot hulle magte in verskillende kolonne verdeel vir groter oorleefbaarheid teen díe wapens, wetend dat die gebruik van kernwapens teen hulle, Suid -Afrika onmiddelik tot totale internasionale teen-aksie sou gedoem het). Soos dit was, het die oorgrote meerderheid Wit Suid-Afrikaners geen illusies meer gehad oor die feit dat PW en sy denkgenote inderdaad die militêre opsie sover gestoot het as wat dit kon nie, in werklikheid verby waar dit denkbaar kon of moes gegaan het. Daardie militêre hand van kaarte is, onder PW, ten volle gespeel, tot die heel laaste kaart – en dit het nie gewerk nie: dit het ons geïsoleer, niks gedoen om die brande wat op die tuisfront woed te blus, of die ekonomiese druk teen te werk wat die wêreld so effektief teen ons begin uitoefen het nie en ook nie die kulturele boikotte soos dié in sport vermy nie. Laaste maar nie die minste nie, kon daardie groot militêre belegging in werklikheid nie die belangrikste militêre aanslag teengaan wat teen ons ontspring het nie, nl. Fidel Castro se tweede front, omdat ons nie enige volstrekte vertroue kon hê in ‘n vesekerde oorwinning nie. Dit is ironies dat die finale gevegte in Angola in 1988 so nou weerspieël het, dit wat in 1975 gebeur het: weer was dit 'n geval van die SAW wat eers UNITA kovert verdedigend bygestaan het, op 'n relatief beperkte skaal in wese met (Continued on page 216)

215

(Continued from page 215)

artillerie en anti-tenk, maar toe inkrementeel ingetrek geword het totdat Cuito Cuanavale die grootste konvensionele grondstryd op Afrika-bodem geword het sedert die 2e Wêreldoorlog. Weereens het die jong mans op die grond manjifiek geveg, maar strategies is Verdedigingshoofkantoor se mikrobestuur vanuit Pretoria as rampspoedig bewys. Op die ou end het Castro al die illusies weggestroop deur met ‘n grootskaalse konvensionele aanslag op ‘n nuwe wes-front te dreig; weereens het die SAW die propaganda-oorlog verloor toe Cuito Cuanavale suksesvol as 'n groot oorwinning vir die kommunistiese magte aangebied is.

Hierdie keer was dit egter die PW Botha-regering self, en nie 'n John Vorster of Hendrik van

den Bergh nie, wat moes erken dat die risiko daaraan verbonde om die bedreiging wat hierdie tweede groot Kubaanse teeneskalasie ingehou het, militêr te probeer afslaan, eenvoudig te groot was. Die PW-regering self – die SAW inkluis – moes dus die besluit neem om Suid-Afrika aan Angola en uiteindelik uit Namibië te onttrek op die basis van ‘n vreedsaamonderhandelde skikking. Dit het die bloudruk geword ook vir die skikking wat onderhandel kon word vir Suid-Afrika se eie interne konflik, wat uitgeloop het op die vreedsame oorgang van 1994 met Nelson Mandela as president van ons Nuwe SuidAfrika. Elke lewe in daardie bos geoffer, was dus ‘n kosbare, onmisbare belegging in die noodsaaklike fondasie van realisme skep aan beide kante oor die perke van die geweer. Ook het dit tyd gewen totdat die gevaar ingehou deur die Sowjet-Unie,

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

verbygegaan het en daar ‘n geleentheidsvenster was vir ‘n vreedsame skikking. Nie een lewe is nodeloos opgeoffer nie – al kan ons nou bewys dat sommige van die militêre beleidsbesluite (soos die loods van Operasie Savannah of die drie aanvalle op die Tumpodriehoek) nie van die beste was nie. Want sonder die realisme wat daardie ervarings op die slagvelde van Angola ingebrand het in ons besluitnemers se breine oor die limiete en risiko’s van die militêre opsie, sou daar nie gewillige onderhandelingsvennote vir die vind van ‘n vreedsame kompromis gewees het nie. Naskrif: As daardie droom van die reënboog-nasie ondertussen vir sekeres versuur het, is dit insigself ‘n gepaste tema vir ‘n volgende Forum-gesprek: om saam die hoekoms en waaroms van alles wat ondertussen nie na wense geloop het nie, te analiseer.

216

SAP Perdesport: Pretoria Skou 1930’s—Nico Moolman

Piet Uys van Polisie (1966). Foto opskrif in Pretoria News lees as volg: Piet Uys, ongetwyfeld S.A. se beste skrumskakel op die huidige, druk ‘n pragdrie teen Wes-Transvaal. Foto: Pretoria News NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

217

Genl Dirk Schoeman Middag Hennie Vertrou dat dit goed gaan. Die huidige publikasie van Nongqai is hoogstaande gehalte en puik! Sal tyd neem om alles te verwerk en te verorber. Het die grootste waardering vir die artikel van ons vriend oudspeuderserant John Kotzee van die Suidkus. Hy sal dit so waardeer. Het jy enigsins kontak met genl George FIvaz? Indien wel sal jy so gaaf wees om vir hom hierdie publikasie te stuur. Ek het hom vertel van beskeie bydrae oor Tugela Ferry en John; hy te kenne gegee dat hy dit graag sou wou lees. Ek het ook van hom verstaan dat jy eenmaal ‘n storie gehad het oor genl Fivaz. Indien die publikasie beskikbaar is sal ek dit graag wou lees. By voorbaat dankie. Geniet nou ‘n rustige naweek. Ons het aan jou versoek voldoen. Groete

Geagte genl Ek het die Nongqai aan genl Fivaz gestuur. Ons het ook lekker gesels en hy belowe mettertyd ‘n inset deur homself.

Versamelaar wil Koop Hi Hennie, Eerstens net sê ek geniet jou tydskrif so baie. Ek versamel polisie- en weermag uniforms. Kan jy dalk ‘n advertensie plaas vir mense wat SAP en Sharp en weermag boshoede en ook kamoefleerrange het om te verkoop om my te e-mail. Baie Dankie, hoop jy kan help. Alles wat mooi is. Ferdie Burger Ferdie@theburgers.co.za Post by a Police Officer that just retired This was a post sent by a Police Officer that just retired. It was a sad day when I decided to leave SAPS, but an honourable day to enter into the world of the common man. SAPS had become a racist organisation that looked after the masses and forgot those with weather beaten insignia that never got promoted since 1994. It's those same men and women in blue from the 80s and 90s that proudly protected SA with their lives. Come 94 and they were declared as part of the apartheid police. Back then the word corruption did not exist in our dictionary. Those that remain are the old faithful with nowhere to turn to. About time SAPS changes its promotion policies and stop promoting on the grounds of black empowerment. You are empowering criminals and this puts the entire SA citizens lives at stake. We are doomed to become lawNONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

less if this practice pursues.

Naand Hennie Een van ons manne is besig met n boek oor die destydse 1 Militêre gebied/ later Sektor 20 Rundu. Die gebied het voorheen bekend gestaan (1970-74) as 1 Sub area. Het jy dalk enige inligting oor die sub areas wat 1 subarea en die res van die Ops gebied ingedeel is. Hierdie was voor 74 toe die verantwoordelikheid van die beveiliging die taak van die SAP was. Sektor 10 Oshakati was voorheen (Tot en met Savannah) 2 sub area. Sektor 20 Rundu was 1 sub area Sektor 70 Katima was om een of ander rede 13 Sub area 1Mil Area was further subdivided into 5 sub areas. • 1 sub area (Eastern Caprivi), • 2 sub area (Kavango), • 3 sub area (Ovambo) • 4 sub area (West Caprivi) • 5 sub area Kaokoland Dankie Johan v Wyngaard (See relevant map on next page please)

218

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

219

By Frans Bedford-Visser

in order to dispense anti-viral medication because the government themselves show no sign of dealing with the problem, it is more important than ever before to remember where we have come from, and to preserve not only our history but also our heritage.

I first became involved with Nongqai in order to raise the profile of the erstwhile South African Railways Police. In 1986 this proud Force ceased to exist and its members and assets were transferred across to the South African Police in what many believe was an ill thought out move. Although the former Railways Policemen and women continued in many cases to serve in their original posts for a while under the auspices of the “Transport Section” within a few short years this emphasis was lost, and the promise that South Africa’s transport network would continue to be properly policed despite the amalgamation was soon forgotten by those at the top once the senior serving former SARP Commissioner and his deputies retired. Sadly the outcry against the amalgamation was soon proven to be justified as lawlessness gradually began to creep in where once efficient and disciplined police officers had kept order. Today the rail network in South Africa is just one of many organisations which have not just begun to crumble but which have either collapsed or are on the brink of collapse. Whole train stations are being stolen before our very eyes whilst the government stands idly by overseeing the destruction of our once proud and efficient transport systems. South African Airways, one of the longest-standing national airlines in the World is bankrupt, having been bailed out time and again with public money. The latest attempt by the government was to attempt to raid public pension funds in a

Whilst apartheid was indeed abhorrent, and nobody in their right mind can condone it, what has replaced it in the “New South Africa” is far more dangerous, far more destructive than anything which went before. vain attempt to stave off the inevitable. Not only are our transport systems a mess, but our once formidable military is but a shadow of itself. Firearms and ammunition regularly “go missing”, and whilst there are no doubt a few hardworking and deserving individuals in the military and police who do the best they can under very trying circumstances, their efforts appear to be hampered at every step by incompetence and in some cases, downright corruption. South Africa sadly, is a country in turmoil, with crime out of control, rampant farm murders and other violent crime being the order of the day rather than an occasional hazard. Yet those in power turn a blind eye, and instead of trying to serve the nation, the people, concentrate instead on meaningless name changes for towns and cities in an effort no doubt to deflect from their own incompetence, or worse.

Loadshedding and constant power cuts, the product of years of neglect by the ruling party, and years of ignoring the pleas to maintain and improve the electrical infrastructure, wrecks national industry, and is a constant thorn in the side for the average citizen. Yet in the face of all this chaos and despair, there is hope. There are signs that the people have had enough of living on empty promises, enough of having no work, and enough of the rampant and destructive race -baiting constantly being trolled out by the EFF and their lackies. There are signs, positive signs, which show that the country is slowly awakening to the destruction being wrought by those who seek only to line their own pockets. I only hope that it is not too late, and that our beautiful country can once again be great—the greatest economic powerhouse in Africa, as it once was!

Against this backdrop of chaos, where private citizens are forced to take the government to court

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

220

SLOT | END

Dear reader Please note that in this quasi-historical magazine we make use of various sources and consequently it is obvious that the document contains various diverse and personal opinions of different people and the author of the Nongqai cannot be held responsible or be liable in his personal capacity. Geagte leser Vir hierdie kwasiehistoriese tydskrif maak ons van verskeie bronne gebruik en bevat die dokument uiteraard uiteenlopende en diverse persoonlike menings van verskillende persone en die opsteller van die Nongqai kan nie in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid daarvoor verantwoordelik of aanspreeklik gehou word nie. © 2020 Brig. HB Heymans (SAP Ret.)

NONGQAI VOL 12 NO 3 MARCH 2021

221

Nongqai Vol 12 No 3

Articles inside

AS 'N FOTO KON PRAAT: Corrie Prinsloo

STORIES VAN SAP KING S REST: Hennie

THE 1970 RADIO FREEDOM BROADCAST