Nongqai_Vol_12B

SUCCESSFUL OUTREACH TO THE KREMLIN, VIA THE KGB (extracts from books by Dr. L.D. Barnard, former head of the N.I.S.) “As early as 16 June 1981, with Gert Rothmann taking the lead, NIS used the negotiations on the Kozlof (spy) exchange to establish dialogue between us and the Russians. We wanted to go to the Big Bear in his lair and tell the Russians that we liked them, were busy sorting out our problems and didn't want outside interference. The Russians were initially as tough as nails and our talks with the KGB which took place in various European cities, often in Vienna, were an attempt to convince them of the value of a secret diplomatic channel.

The discussions took place with a KGB member I shall call Leo, who wasn't the least bit interested in trifles such as politics and diplomacy. However, at NIS we were convinced that we were on the right path and believed that if the superpowers left Africa to the Africans, we would be in a position to sort out our continent's problems far quicker.

We made slow progress. The first meeting took place in August 1984 when a delegation from NIS and the Department of Foreign Affairs' 4 met the Russians, led by their ambassador, at the Russian embassy in Vienna.' The KGB used this intelligence link to request that NIS persuade the Mozambican resistance movement Renamo to release a number of Russians they had held captive since the previous year. MI had refused to co-operate on this matter.

In the end, it took the intervention of the prime minister, who issued an order to the South African Defence Force (SADF) to persuade Renamo to set the hostages free. This only happened in part because Renamo held back two Russian geologists, Yuri Gavrilov and Viktor Istomin. We did everything we could to convince the SADF to pull the necessary strings to get these two released as well, but to no avail. After the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984 Renamo refused point blank to co-operate.

This protracted episode only came to an end in January 1988 in Vienna when the new liaison, Boris, shared the news in a rather emotional way that the Russians had irrefutable information that Gavrilov and Istomin had been dead since May 1985 after an attack on Renamo's headquarters at Gorongoza in Mozambique. Our Russian colleagues were very upset because they presumed that we had really known all along that the two were already dead. It was only after months of talks that relations improved and they finally accepted that we really had no knowledge of the deaths.

This may seem like a trifling incident in the larger context of events but in the brotherhood between spies, mutual assistance creates the crucial trust which later makes the significant, seemingly impossible meeting of minds possible. It seemed that this insight was beyond the understanding of some of our military colleagues.

At last, on 29 March 1987, Rothmann made the breakthrough towards which we had worked for so long after he demonstrated fully to the Russians the mutual advantages that could arise on a range of fronts thanks to discussion and co-operation. The Russians agreed to the establishment of a highlevel secret communication channel.

However, they were seriously worried about whether the Americans had been informed of the KGB's contact with NIS and continually asked for assurances that this was not the case. This we were able 279 Nongqai Vol 12 No 12B : SAP-SB / ANC-MK