Revista Oriente Ocidente SUPLEMENTO N.10 - IIM. MACAU

Nuno Rogeiro

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Número 10 Janeiro/Abril de 2003 Number 10 • January/April 2003

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Nuno Rogeiro

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“JE SUIS PARTOUT” - THE GLOBAL VIOLENCE NETWORK PRESENT NIT (NEW INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM) PANORAMA: SOME NOTES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH (*) (*)

(*) Abridged, sectorial and unclassified version of report presented to the Meeting of the European Union Foreign Ministers Special Representatives on Terrorism and Extreme Fundamentalism, Brussels 2003.

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Nuno Rogeiro Foi monitor de Ciência Politica na Faculdade de Direito de Lisboa, Assistente e Assistente com Regência de Direito Constitucional e Ciência Politica, Ciência Politica II e Direito Constitucional Comparado, nos Departamentos de Direito das Universidades Internacional e Lusíada.

Foi conferencista convidado de dezenas de instituições nacionais e estrangeiras (Angola, Moçambique, África do Sul, Alemanha, Chipre, Coreia do Sul, Israel, Itália, Reino Unido), civis e militares, nas áreas da Ciência Politica, Estudos Estratégicos e Relações Internacionais.

Foi Assistente com Regência e Professor Auxiliar Convidado, nas cadeiras de Ciência Politica e Direito Constitucional, História de Ideias Politicas e Geopolitica e Geoestratégica, no Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa e Porto, e professor do primeiro curso português de Ciência Politica, promovido pelo IEP.

Recebeu os prémios de Melhor Comentador Televisivo do Ano de 1997 (Prémio da Critica, Prémio do Público, Grande Prémio), da revista “TV Guia”, e “Sete de Ouro” de melhor co-autor de programa radiofónico, com “Desmancha Prazeres” (1993).

É Professor Auxiliar Convidado do Departamento de Ciência Politica e Relações Internacionais da Universidade Lusíada, regendo a cadeira de Politica Portuguesa Contemporânea.

Foi consultor juridico das empresas Rigor e Via Norte, e da Associação Portuguesa dos Direitos do Homem, bem como membro do Comité Português da UNESCO. Foi editor internacional do jornal “O Século”, director-adjunto do semanário “O Diabo” e da revista “Futuro Presente”, e colunista dos jornais e revistas “O Dia”, “A Rua”, “Sábado”, “O Liberal” e “K”. É colunista e comentador nos jornais “O Independente” e “Jornal de Noticias”.

Foi comentador político da TSF e Rádio Renascença. Foi co-autor do programa “Desmancha-Prazeres”, com Vasco Pulido Valente. É hoje comentador do Grupo Rádio Comercial/Rádio Nostalgia.

Foi comentador político do Canal 1 da RTP, entre 1989 e 1996. Colaborou depois com a SIC e a TVI. É, desde Janeiro de 1999, comentador residente do TV2 Jornal.

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É co-fundador e co-director do Instituto Euro-Atlântico.

Publicou, em autoria e co-autoria, os seguintes livros: “Legislação de Direito Constitucional” “Portugal em Mudança. Ensaios sobre o XI Governo Constitucional” “O Que é a Política” “O Sistema Constitucional dos EUA” “O Sistema Constitucional Alemão” “Jünger: A Importância de se chamar Ernst” Prefácio a “O Trabalhador”, de Ernst Jünger

Nuno Rogeiro

Then Jesus asked him, “What is your name?”.

“My name is legion”, he replied, “for we are many”.

Mark 5: 1-20

I. COPING WITH THE NEW INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

SCOPE The original version of the present paper addressed, in summarised form, the framework of New International Terrorism , and a factual overview of the phenomenon (2002-2003 time horizon), specially relating to its links with extreme fundamentalism. The Al Qaeda network and its persistent global impact deserved detailed treatment, and it was in fact the main nucleus following the present observations. This deeper analysis was suppressed here, both because it contained embargoed and classified information, and because of space limitations.

Contents of this revised version should then be understood as mere contributions for sustained future research. It should also be stressed that the addenda, referring to the Iraqi crisis and its impact in the critical subject, was not included in the previous larger format study.

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PHENOMENON CHARACTERISATION The New International Terrorism (NIT) phenomenon is different from modern and pre-modern forms of politically motivated violence (or violence done under political pretext), although, as manifestation of a long standing active technique, shares elements of the so called terrorism “historical branch”. Briefly, this paper characterises NIT based on available security, intelligence and police reports, legal observations and judicial processes and suits, observations and reports from media people and independent analysts, and, last but not the least, empirical - theoretical research from major academic institutions and think tanks.

Some of the characterising elements of NIT, common to all mentioned sources, could be listed as follows:

*Trans-national or internationalised nature.

This is not a mere domestic, local, regional or national phenomenon, multiplied by X state occurrences, but a true international - and international networking - question, directly threatening international security, international law , international society, international economic life and the international state system.

Empirical studies and specialised reports show a new association and complicity between until now isolated or parochial radical groups, federation type links between terrorist units until now immersed in cellular action and organisation, and operational choice of a vast inter-regional, international and even global target lists, with an increased option for multiple simultaneous initiatives or strikes.

The “federation-catalyst” aspect of Al Qaeda will be dealt after, but is a consummated example of this trend.

*Loss of territorial bases and sympathetic states, and “disembodiment” of the national physical dimension of the threat.

The end of the Cold War and of “indirect strategies” also translated into a majoritarian abstention , from state actors, of any form of official or officious support for terrorist groups, although at least ambiguous sanctuary for guerrilla movements that sometimes choose a terror strategy continues in several places.

This loss of sympathising, supporting or tolerating nations, leads terrorist entities into a new path of clandestine existence, including in liberal or democratic developed states, or makes terror more and more attracted by failed, anomic, disorganised, uncapable, impotent or quasi-states, together with regions under disputed control, or just recovering from destruction, calamity or war.

This reinforces the idea of “invisibility” and “ubiquity”, and also makes actions less predictable, both geographically and from the tactical-operational aim point of view. (1A)

*New generation atypical recruiting.

This is also controversial, but several reports suggest that terror groups are evaluating, selecting, recruiting and training new generations of inner core operatives, militants and support personnel, who have religious concerns in the background or as a remote motive, and are specially united around “negative solidarity”, i.e., a general sense of frustration towards their communities, rebellion against perceived global injustices, “romantic” rejection ORIENTEOCIDENTE 6

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of the so called “West”, active disgust towards traditional demo-liberal states and institutions, revolt against modernity and perceived moral decadence, but also typical “anti imperialist” feelings, selecting the winner of the Cold war, na its allies, as the main threat and the prime enemy of our age.

*Use of increasingly potent means of destruction, and of “mass examples”.

The aptly coined “Catastrophic terrorism” represents a fundamental quantitative, but specially qualitative change. This includes both new technical capabilities - in hardware and software, in equipment or simply in human skills (1) - and a careful selection of inanimate, vehicle and human targets, including the threat to use WMD’s, or quasi-WMD’s (for example, high explosive materials combined with multiple boosting mechanisms and “expanders”).

The trend also links with the worrisome development of less discrimination, and consequent recourse to “mass examples”, where not anymore hand picked individuals serve as targets, but the victims are crowds, large groups and even - at least in planning - entire cities. The cases of New York, Bali and Mombassa also show that such strategy translates into less incidents but more casualties.

It could also be argued that WMD’s also reflect the global nature - quasi apocalyptic - of the struggle, as the MAD doctrine was a perfect symbol of the bipolar Cold War world. An author to be recalled here is controversial political and legal philosopher, Carl Schmitt, who once spoke of “ideal” hostility, as opposed to “real” or material one. The later translates a mere struggle for goods or earthly benefits, while the former deals with ideas, concepts, identities, doctrines, religion. The consequences for warfare are tremendous: while a war of “real hostility” is by nature limited, and can end when the benefit is reached, the “ideal hostility” war will have as outcome the conversion (identity disappearance) or physical disappearance of the enemy (as in the old Latin principle mors tua vita mea). Weapons of mass destruction perfectly translate this “endism” struggle. (1B) *Perfect adaptation to the technical age Al Qaeda is maybe the best example of terrorist groups assimilating new technologies, from micro-explosives to cybernetics, from encryption to advanced communications.

Although in the past (including the distant past) terror cells had its own technical wizards and loony inventors, signs are that a new breed of violent fundamentalists can associate extreme religious and political views and a comprehensive knowledge of important technical and scientific fields, either through basic and advanced formal education, self enhancement and self teaching, or good use of available information.

This also relates to a peculiar trait of groups like the Bin Laden netwok, that chooses as heaven states that have important Muslim communities, but also good technological infrastructures, from electronic banking and modern airports to reliable communications, ready inland transportation, sprawling urban centres and business ventures, etc. *More links with common criminals.

Although this is still a controversial issue, and not all analysts see a definite trend here, multiple signs show increased association between groups with political motivation or political excuse, and organised crime entities, with technical division of work and tasks, EASTWEST 7

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areas of influence, revenue sharing and specialised skills (communications, intelligence, corrupting power on bureaucracies, handling of weapons and explosives, scouting, financial support, decoying , etc.) (1C)

*Sophistication of self help structures.

Several reports point out to the increased complexity and sophistication of support structures for terrorist groups. “Political-military” terror entities create numerous front companies, private networks of financing, draw from charities and other institutions (in Islamic connected radicalism, this is made easier by the translation of the Muslim obligation for “zakat” into the constitution of multiple support foundations) (2), or profit from their own organised micro-structures of profitable crime, from drug to arms trafficking, from illegal gem trade to prostitution, from business “protection fees” to counterfeiting and general smuggling.

Most of the financing networks have still to be uncovered, but the global scope of the one supporting Al Qaeda has been amply documented. Rooting out financing structures , and uncovering connections between “bona fide” businessmen and contributors and hardcore terrorist financiers, clerks and managers, has been a common concern of security and intelligence organisations (3).

*”Fanatical pragmaticism” Groups like “Al Qaeda” dwell around what some call, in an adequate synthesis, “pragmatic fanaticism” (3A), in the sense they ally appeals to the Holy, the Sacred, the mystical, the religious orthodox, the moral and ethical fundaments of confessional doctrine (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, other), and practical rules of engagement, target selection, strategic planning, damage control, liaison with other less spiritual prone organisations, following a pattern already described in the international, federation and crime related links. (3B)

PROBLEM DELIMITATION AND METHODOLOGICAL REJECTION OF CORRELATE PHENOMENA NIT is a real problem for the community of states in general , and for EU members in particular. Although the US was the main target in 2001, subsequent security measures dismantled scores of similar plots in several major European countries, ranging from bomb preparations to chemical and bacteriological manipulation, and worrisome surveillance and threats to public services, monuments, lines of communication, airports and ports, and the critical infrastructure in general.

NIT is not a domestic problem, but a proven serious threat to international security, free transit of people and goods, peaceful coexistence, economic normalcy, social and cultural exchange and, in last analysis, to the very survival of individuals, groups and entire nations.

NIT should then be distinguished from “merely native-domestic” terrorism, independently of how nefarious, immoral, censurable and horrific this one appears to us. In fact, domestic terror is - by conviction, lack of means or “raison d’être” - contained within the borders of a state or a region, while NIT uses the principles of violence proliferation and violence export (or “example-warning”) as essential bases of its strategy and “nature”.

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A caveat should be introduced: “mere” domestic terrorism can also grow as an international threat. This can happen if its actors go beyond a given violence plateau, and decide the use of new qualitative kinds of arms, like WMD’s. This escalation can, at least in latent form, present a serious problem to non-national existence, starting with perceived demographic consequences, movement to the exterior of internal displaced persons, possible contamination of the environment and shared resources, etc.

NIT, though, is specially worrisome, as obviously it cannot be fought and neutralised, or even minimised, by one state alone (not even the remaining “hyperpower”), or by a small or limited group of nations, but can only effective engaged (even so without clearcut short term miraculous results, which brings us to the question of expectations and public office calculations) through the firm, systematic, adequate, full fledged, multi-layered action of a large community of public entities. These include both states, trans-state and infra-state actors, i.e., governments and NGO’s, international organisations and “public opinion”, among others.

RESPONSES TO NIT: TWO HANDS, ONE SPEED, DIFFERENT SCOPE AND CONSEQUENCES, SINGLE DIRECTION POLICIES.

It seems well advised to consider a “two hands” policy towards NIT. This is evident after the consideration that this one nurtures itself in deep grievances and values, subsisting in societies, cultural circles, doctrines, ethnic and religious groups, age segments, regional actors, etc., and at the same time poses immediate vast and serious security problems to states, groups , individuals and property.

What we call “right hand” policies, of a securitarian and institutional nature, are essentially destined to prevent, dissuade and repress the terror phenomenon, in its core immediate impact, and also act on its visible and foreseeable consequences.

“Left hand policies” have, as substratum, an apparent immense, seemingly impossible task: a) The real need for studying, understanding and previewing/anticipating the several modalities and forms of terrorist activity, in the context of social sciences and associate fields of knowledge. b) Act over the causes of this phenomenon, trying to ameliorate community and intercommunity relations, wealth distribution, civil rights, legal rules, bureaucracy regulations and activity, cultural understanding, inter-faith dialogue, social integration, entity-identity protection, and many other real life problems, commonly seen as real motive, declared motive, excuse, pretext or semantic-symbolic justification for terror, or other forms of political and religious motivated extreme violence

The two policies efficacy cannot be separated from expectations and method. There is a necessity to consider and understand that each “hand” has special effects and scope, starting by the simple fact that immediate manifestations of terrorism can be repressed EASTWEST 9

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quickly, but societies cannot change in one day. At the same time, it is as wrong to think that terrorism dies with the death of a perpetrator, as it is to answer to a terrorism attack by drawing your Sociological Theory Handbook.

A single command centre has to know what both hands do, so directions and actions of each are not contradictory, redundant or ultimately useless. It is also important that both hands act at the same time and with the same speed (not postponing what can be done today, doing tomorrow what cannot be achieved correctly by now), even taking into account that, as mentioned, temporal results, consequences and scopes are different: to dismantle Al Qaeda is not the same thing as protecting Heathrow, or the Lisbon downtown, for a limited segment of time, and it doesn’t mean that NIT is finally dismembered, or that his breeding ground and causes disappeared.

Although both policies, dealt in detail, will be certainly cover in other stages and other reports of this working group, we could sum up just some examples about things still to be done, or perfected, in “right hand” matters, referring only to the continuation or perfection of decisions and strategies figured out in the vicinities of September 11. We could list: *Standardisation and unification of anti-terrorism laws and practices, without loosing from sight national peculiarities of civil rights expression, justice procedure, constitutional norms, sovereignty considerations, judicial independence and statute of other public organs. *Maintenance and support for the present high levels of co-operation between security services, polices, intelligence services and related, armed forces, national or constabulary guards and other related entities. * Data bank integration and increased intelligence exchange rationalisation, speed, relevance and comprehensiveness. *More permanent official professional security fora and seminars, and more structured centres for active lessons learned (CALL’s). *Flexibility - national and international - of prevention and response structures, with unashamed resource to task forces and “ad hoc” entities. *Maintenance and strengthening of secure and competent co-operative channels with extraEuropean experiences, specially with nations specially under threat, or with superior antiterror capabilities, like the US, Australia and Canada, but also China and Japan. *Increased attention paid to the efforts of specific anti-terrorism efforts from Arab and Islamic countries world wide, and possible creation of special links of liaison officers on permanent duty, to check real life progress in security, intelligence and also “left hand” coordination policies. This could be done through cooperative, educational or stage mechanisms, with a final aim to dissipate stereotypes and forms of non-dialogue. *Increased levels of recruiting - for the “pure analysis”security and intelligence services, but specially for polices and other related bodies, both as full time officers or collaborators and advisors -of Islamic questions specialists, linguists, scholars in religion and politics, Arabists both theoretical and practitioners, multi-cultural researchers and specialists in Islamic intelligence and security community practices and doctrine. (3C) ORIENTEOCIDENTE 10

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THE LEGAL DEFINITION PROBLEM A short note also on legal developments. Although European institutions moved towards integration of norms and practices, some already under discussion before September 11 (including the European arrest warrant, speed up of Europol and Eurojust, creation of Police Chiefs Task Force, full operation of COTER, etc.), we should insist on the benefitial capacity of EU countries to press for an international conference destined to create universal norms of criminalisation of terrorism as a whole. This relates to the continued paradox of existing multiple conventions against terrorism acts and manifestations, but absence of a basic norm defining and punishing terrorism per se.

The general idea of penalising the fruits of terror, without condemning the mother tree, perhaps made lots of sense during the Cold War, as piecemeal, step by step, realistic approach to things. During that period of global confrontation, the international community seemed to be divided over the understanding of the roots of evil, with groups of countries justifying some degrees of terror under political-ideological considerations (freedom fighting, anti-imperialist alliances, the “ultima ratio” of the dispossessed and desperate, etc.), state or bloc strategies (anti-americanism, anti-sovietism, insertion of radicals in “indirect strategies” and wars by proxy) ,or other causes of guilt reduction, guilt exclusion of excuse.

Today, though, the “New World Order” is supposed to be based on a sole criteria of humanity, protection of civilians, neutrals, prisoners, NGO representatives and other non-combatants, ban on cruel and excessive warfare means, strengthening of international law and peaceful resolution of conflicts, leading all nations to a legal and moral obligation of writing down their proclamations of opposition to terrorism “in toto”.

The missing general convention should also follow the wisdom of UN resolutions immediately following September 11 (4). We should return more times to its contents, as what is denounced and fought there are not only terrorist moments, but terrorism itself, and all direct or indirect complicity, help or abetting actions, by individuals, groups, organisations or nations, together with inaction or abstention from anti-terror measures.

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ADDENDA: THE IRAQI CONFLICT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE NIT QUESTION

A “Post-Iraqi Factor” in NIT? This paper was written while the US-British and Australian forces consolidate their gains inside Baghdad and Basra, and when the Iraq Baathist regime seems to start to crumble like a castle of cards.

Many analysts believe that a new generation of terrorists will be born out of frustration for Iraq’s defeat, and out of the idea that the US shall be confronted everywhere, as a dangerous hyper-power.

This point of view thought to be partially confirmed by the fact that Baghdad has been defended, since January 2003, by important groups of international Islamic volunteers, and because foreign nationals from Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, the Maghreb and other countries and regions have manned Saddam Hussein Fedayeen para-military forces. There were also foreign volunteers caught in Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, and in a large training ground at Salman Pak, South of Baghdad (5).

Other observers stress the use, although not in large scale, of “martyr squadrons”, taking the resistance to the US forces, by means of suicide bombings (including of women) and ambushes and sabotage by irregular groups.

In Pakistan, groups close to Al Qaeda also stressed their will to “punish” the US “aggressor”, and president Saddam Hussein insisted, in several statements since the beginning of the military campaign (March-April 2003), on the need for a “Holy War” that should reunite all courageous, conscious and good willing Islamic citizens. Muslim theologians and doctrinaires have been largely mute to this proclamations, a bit like in 1991. Some say this is due to the fact that the Baghdad Baath Party Regime is essentially a secular one, although changes occurred in speech and substance, since “Desert Storm” (6).

It is also possible that some elements would lessen even more Saddam’s appeal. These could include: *Discriminatory, military directed attacks by the coalition, and relatively few comparative “collateral victims”. *Rapid return of Iraq to self government, and low profile of any foreign occupiers. *Legitimacy of the new dispensation through arrangements with the main regional Muslim or Arab countries, including Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran. *Quick restoration of Iraqi economy, and rapid creation of better social conditions for the less favoured among the Shi’ite majority , North and South. *Support for the new dispensation by the main Iraqi religious leaders. *Implementation of the US-UK sponsored Middle East” Road map”, including the solemn proclamation of a date for Palestinian statehood. *Discovery of WMD caches, and so final Litmus Test proving the justification of the whole US-UK-Australian operation.

Several countries worry, though, about the possibility of growing international support for violence against the US and its allies, specially based on non-religious motives, and more in anti-imperialist, “traditional” coalitions, gathering classic anti-Americanism, third world recycled ideologies, and post-left and post-right “right to difference” militants, together with Arab radicals increasingly impatient at apparent Muslim official inability to deal with ORIENTEOCIDENTE 12

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Washington DC and its Middle East plans.

Monitoring of several chat rooms and e-forums also allow security services and other analysts to verify increased traffic of messages translating the growth of new post-Iraq militant varieties.

Iraq and Al Qaeda: Suspected links, innuendo, coincidences and smoking guns

1. What are the exact relations between Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Iraqi regime? Bin Laden’s network being supposedly “fundamentalist” and the Baghdad Baath Party dispensation “secular”, there seems to be a gap in objectives and basic references between the two biggest names in the present international crisis. It is known that Bin Laden was never a supporter of Saddam Hussein, and AQ may have presented the Saudi intelligence with a special plan to liberate Kuweit and get rid of the “impious” and “opportunistic” Iraqi dictator.

But it is also known that one of the most persistent intelligence stories is that AQ was given a set of Yemenite blank diplomatic passports, by a special Bagdad officer, Farouq al Hijazi, in 1992 (see also under). There are also reports that two alleged officers from Iraq External Intelligence, Abu Zuhair and Rafid Fatah, have links to AQ, working as paramilitary techniques advisors.

2. But by August 21, 2002, it was perplexing and disturbing to hear about AQ related alleged experiences with riccin and other deadly substances, in Kurdistan, Northeast of Iraq, precisely in an area where Saddam’s forces cannot exert control. The region lives under a sort of international protectorate and semi-independent status, but political life includes many disparate groups, from pro-Western to anti-US, from extreme religious to laicist, from nationalist to socialist, etc. These parties include the KDP, the KWP, the PUK, the SPK, the SAIRI, and pother groups that mainly resulted from splinters from the original and traditional ones.

The riccin experimeny is said to have been conducted by a supposed bin Laden associate group in Kurdistan, Ansar al Islam (a front of Salafist and extreme Sunni groups, the most important being JAI/Jund al Islam), based in Halajba, where once occurred one of the worst chemical weapons attack directed by the Iraqi military.

“Jund al Islam” (Soldiers of Islam) survived as a bloodthirsty gang, between Iran and Iraq, and managed to get, under “Ansar”, a new life and “respectability”. Iraq says it is funded

by Iran, benefitting from hardware from old pro-Teheran SAIRI front, while Iran says it is a “Saddam Hussein drone”, bent on destroying the mainstream Kurdish movement, through division, terrorism and selective assassination. On the other hand, it is known that the first incarnation of JAI was very much connected to one of AQ’s top lieutenants, Abu Zubaydah.

JAI leader, Abu Wa’el, became number 2 of Ansar, under Mullah Krekar (Najn Din Faraj Ahmad), who was after expelled to Europe. Wael (not to be confused with a senior officer of EASTWEST 13

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Palestinian Intelligence in Jericho, who has the same name and is also known as “Akram”), whose real name is Sadoun Abdul Latif, is differently described as a seasoned anti-Saddam fighter, or , in a majority opinion, as an ex-major in Saddam’s General Intelligence Service, an ex-lawyer who was responsible for sensitive “black operations”, first in Europe and after in Kurdistan. Abu Wael, according to this thesis, answers to a Iraqi Mukhabarat senior officer in Kirkuk, Col. Abu Agab, and has as sole mission the destruction of the Kurdish anti-Saddam consensus, under the disguise of promotion of a Taliban-like micro-state in the region. Other people said to be go-betweens in the AQ-Saddam-JAI-Ansar game are Abu Darda, Abu Yasser, and Abu Abdullah Shafai.

3. But there is still deep division about the importance and credibility of much reports about the Ansar-UBL-Baghdad connection. Some developments could be expected, after alleged security operations from mainstream Kurdistan militia, and from the interrogation of Ansar militants, mostly detained in a special centre under Col. Wastya. Other reports, picked by the “Washington Post” but considered doubtful, talk about Ansar smuggling VX gas components from official Iraqi factories (December 2002).

By end of March 2003, though, all bases of Ansar were destroyed by joint air and US special Forces ground attacks, specially close to As Sulamainyah, as part of “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. Scores of prisoners were still being questioned, and materials about CW were found in at least one camp.

4. Other element, advanced by the US as main “smoking gun” against Saddam, is the Zarqawi case.

In August 2002, intelligence sources detected a vist to Iraq of AQ senior officers Abu Musab Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadeel al Khalaylah), a Jordanian, and Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi.natural iraquiano. This one is usually associated with Ramzi Yussef, and may have been in a much debated “planning general meeting” of AQ, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, January 2000. And Yussef himself is seen by some as a deep agent from Iraq, with the mission of taking Saddam Hussein’s revenge for the destruction of his forces in Kuwait to the nations that intervened in “Desert Storm”.

As for Zarqawi, he is also consideered a new AQ manager for extreme operations in Jordan and Turkey, but there are no exact signs that he lives under protection of the Iraqi regime.

The US tried several times, through French, German and Egyptian intelligence, to obtain his capture from Bagdhad security, but Iraqi intelligence say the man was not found, and that no one entered the country “legally” under that name.

5. AQ - Iraq relations were also deeply alleged in the judicial suit promoted by the 9/11 victim’s families (Kathleen Ashton e.a.), being tried by the NYC South District Court. (7), against UBL’s organisation, but also against the Sudan and Iraqi States, among other defendants (that also include Muslim charities and Saudi entities). The Iraqis accused of special collusion with AQ are Saddam Hussein, son Qusay Hussein, and main directors of the special intelligence and security cell referred in the accusatory document as “Unit 999”, “Fedayn” or “M8”.

Accusation document (AD) paragraph 18 explains that Iraq’s support for “enemy” AQ was due to a need to avenge the crushing defeat at Kuweit. Paragraph 22 details that such support was under the guise of training, intelligence exchange , supply of passports and other documentation, logistics support, etc., including the loan of a military camp where terrorists would train plane hijacking, with a static Boeing 707 airframe. Paragraph 39 says ORIENTEOCIDENTE 14

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that Al Zawahiri met senior Iraqi officers, in 1992, according to a confession obtained from an AQ fighter, captured in Afghan soil.. Articles 43, 59 and 68 detail the stay in Iraq of Abdul Rahman Yasin, Muhamad Abu Islam and Abdullah Kassim, all AQ operatives, and their contacts with special intelligence director, Qusay Hussein, with whom they visited the de Salman Pak complex, between April 25 and May 1998. Paragraph 67 mentions a new trip to Baghdad of Al Zawahiri, to meet Vice-President Taha Ramadan, and the visit of alleged chemical bases at al Fallujah and al-Nasiriyah.

Paragraph 79 states that Saddam Hussein sent special agent Faruq al Hijazi to Kandahar, January 1999, to plan direct operations of AQ. Article 81 mentions the delivery of the Yemeni passports (see before) , p. 86 details the trip of Haqi Ismail, Iraqi intelligence officer, to an AQ training camp in Afghanistan, January 1999. Paragraph. 94 recalls that in October 14, 2000, Baghdad gave asylum to the hijackers of a Saudi Boeing 777. Paragraph 103 and following ones are specially conspirational in reasoning. They state that one Mulhahal, Iraqi media featured columnist, wrote an article, 21 July 2001, that anticipated 9/11 (even mentioning a supposed UBL curse against Frank Sinatra, interpreted as an omen for New York), and that it could not have been exempted from State censorship or permit.

Paragraph 117 mentions the trip to Germany and Afghanistan of alleged Iraqi intelligence agents Abu Agab e Abu Wa’el (see before), July 2001. Paragraph 118 says that Mohammed Atta met a senior officer from M8, general Habib al Mamouri (see before, “Czech Republic”), several times. Al Maouri was based in Iraq’s embassy in Rome, and would cover most Europe. Paragraph 130 says that Taliban and AQ forces, under Baghdad sponsorship and material support, took the Kurdish towns of Tawala and Byarah, so they could install there operational bases.

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NOTES

(1A) Cf. Robert Rotberg. Ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, New York 2002 (1) The powerful destructive effects of explosive “dual use” emulsions like ANFO (a version of it was the basic detonator in Okhlaoma), makes human skills more critical than the availability of hardware.

(1B)The seminal and controversial “Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism” study, sponsored by the Pentagon’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Special operations and LowIntensity Conflict (Washington DC 1994), stresses that WMD’s are not only the possibility but the near probability for next waves of terror attacks and tactics. Hence the reference to “Super Terrorism”. One should wonder if the hijacked jets of Sept.11 were not the first mass destruction vehicles.

“Terror 2000” was supervised by Peter Probst, who contracted Forecasting International to do the evaluation. The research was done by people like Oleg Kalugin, Brian Jenkins, Paul Wilkinson, Amir Ayalon, Marvin Cetron, etc.

On catastrophic terrorism, the prospect for use of WMD, etc., seee Ken Booth, Tim Dunne, eds., Worlds in Collision. Terror and the Future of Global Order, NY 2002.

Nadine Gurr, Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2nd revised edition, St. Martin’s Press 2002; S. Drell, A . Sofaer, G. Wilson, The New Terror: facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, Stanford 2001; G. Schweitzer, C. Dorsch, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters and Weapons of Mass Destruction, NY 1998; J. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Harvard Univ. Press 2002.

(1C)On Terror-Criminal links, see, for example, R. Taylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld economy, Ithaca 2002.

(2) The base for Islamic charities is the Zakat commandment, the legal alms, a sort of social tax that translates distributive justice. This is expressed in the recommendation of Caliph Ali, who ruled from 656 to 661 AD: “God made it mandatory for the rich to provide the poor with his necessities”. Before that, the Koran contained, specially in its Chapter II (v.g. verses 195, 254, 267), several allusions to the necessity to fulfil the Divine Will, by channelling wealth to the support of the weakest.

Such tax is usually calculated as 2.5% of the yearly current (non used) revenues of the contributor, after deductions for basic needs. Several charitable and solidarity entities channel voluntary donations from the Diaspora, or from affluent Muslim nations, using part of the proceedings in beneficial works, both educational and cultural, from health assistance to social security and unemployment support, infrastructure construction and, in several militant versions, sustained support to “martyrs” families. The best known (and more “institutional”) organisation, created in 1974, at the second summit of the Islamic Organisation Conference, is the Islamic Solidarity Fund, based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, specially dedicated to the Palestinian support strategy.

Some charities bad reputation, in western political, media and security circles, was aggravated or revealed through the legal action authored by the Sept. 11 victims families, against six Saudi based such groups. The defendants representatives and counsel gathered in Jeddah, 30 December 2002, under chairman Abdullah Al Turki, General Secretary of the Islamic World League. The meeting’s aim was to plan a public relations and media strategy, specially in perceived hostile American society, under attorney Basim Alam.

The role of charity structures in Al Qaeda work itself was recently engulfed in controversy, also in the US. Washington Senator (D) Patty Murray declared, 19 December 2002 (in Vancouver, US), that Bin Laden became popular in the Muslim world because of the worthy social activity of his organisation, in building schools and roads, and helping the needy. Murray added that the US should copy such “keys to success”. After intense and violent criticism, she argued that this doesn’t diminish the criminal burden over Bin Laden, special for his “genocidal role” in September 11.

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Nuno Rogeiro

(3) On the question of terrorism financing and preventive/repressive measures, M. Greenberg, chair, Terrorist Financing. Report of an independent Task Force sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations, NY 2002, and Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions. Economic Statecraft in na Age of Terrorism, NY 2002. See also paper’s Annex C (US ordered terrorist related frozen assets update list).

(3A) M. Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al Qaeda: An Anatomy of extremism in Middle Eastern Politics”, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, n.2, Verão 2002.

(3B)Cf. Daniel Benjamin, Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, NY 2002, John Esposito, Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford University Press 2002. In The New Jackals. Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston 1999, specially pp. 244-254), Simon Reeve addresses the difficult question of the non-Islamic, secular extreme elements of people like Yousef, the mastermind of the first WTC bombing.

(3C)Some interesting topics about counter-measures can be found in works of unequal value, from somewhat biased but well researched studies to personal meories, including scientific exercises and aptly sustained theses. Cf. Y. Alexander, ed., Combating Terrorism. Strategies of Tem Countries, Univ. of Michigan Press 2002; Robert Baer, See No Evil. The True Story of a ground soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism, New York 2002, 2nd revised edition; R. Howard, R. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, NY 2002; Matthew Levitt, Targeting Terror, NY 2002; Thomas Powers, Intelligence Wars. American Secret History from Hitler to Al Qaeda, New York 2003; Robert Satloff, ed., War on Terror. The Middle East Dimension, NY 2002.

(4) General Assembly Resolution 56-1, Security Council Resolutions 1368/2001 and 1373/2001.

There was also a reccommendation for urgent and complete application of previous Security Council decisions on terrorism, like Resolution 1269/99.

(5) One of Saddam’s Palaces in Baghdad, facing the Tigris River, for example, was defended only by an infantry squad of Syrians. One captured element, caught inside a refrigerator on April 7, after indicated that the volunteers were left to fight for the complex by Special Republican Guards that fled the city.

(6) The phrase “Allah u Akbar” was added to the Iraqi flag after 1991, apparently under suggestion of ex-Sudanese strongman and cleric, Hassan al Turabi, now in home arrest in Khartoum, after splitting from President Beshir National Congress Party (ex-NIF). Some analysts see in this “opportunistic Iislamisation” by a threatened Saddam regime the same element of last moment “sacred national union” tried by Josef Stalin, after the start of Operation Barbarossa, with Churches being reopened and a plethora of old Russian icons being revived, including the masterful antiTeutonic allegory of Eisenstein’s “Alexander Nevsky”.

(7) Details on this process can be checked at http://www.kreindler.com. Main accusation materials come from open sources, intelligence affidavits in the US Congress, testimony from officers released for this purpose, lawyers enquiries and apparent transcripts of interrogation of AQ militants in Afghanistan.

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“JE SUIS PARTOUT” THE GLOBAL VIOLENCE NETWORK

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Nuno Rogeiro

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