O
pening the discussion, Marina Costa Lobo, mentioned that we are living in interesting times, as the Chinese would put it, as we are witnessing the erosion of liberal democracy and multilateralism. We can look at the erosion of liberal democracy by considering how democratic backsliding occurs across the globe. This has been measured, for instance, by Freedom House, that published a report stating that in the last 15 years there have been consecutive declines in freedom worldwide, affecting countries like the US, Brazil or Austria. There was some debate in political science about whether this was a widespread phenomenon or not. However, we are reaching the point where it is inescapable: we are witnessing an erosion in liberal democracy and a rise of populism that accompanies this democratic backsliding. Parallel to this, we are also experiencing the erosion of the international world order, forged after World War II, and again after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While there is no single culprit for this, there are several factors that can be considered in regards to it: one is China's increasingly assertive role in the world; another is Russia's attempt to become pro-
gressively influential and to imbalance or destabilise European democracies; and finally, the third one is America's role under President Donald Trump in reneging agreements on climate change, trade, or issues like Iran, which has also contributed to the trend of the erosion of multilateralism. Given this background and taking into account the possible effects of the global pandemic on these trends, the panel started by addressing some of the causal factors that could explain the rising populism, the erosion of liberal democracy and the importance of domestic versus international factors to a certain democratic backsliding. In the West, the new order put in place after World War II, according to Sheri Berman, had two components; regional components, namely the European integration; and domestic components, meaning, the formation of social-democratic policies and compromises at the level of particular countries' political economies. At the time, all of these things were seen very explicitly by political actors, both in the US and in Europe, as part of a multi-pronged strategy designed to make democracy work in Western Europe after World War II. These political actors were very conscious of the war years' tragedy, the rise of fascism, national socialism, authoritarianism and, therefore, of how delicate and fragile democracy was. Consequently, the decline of that order has to be seen as inextricably intertwined with the problems democracy faces in Europe and the West today.
A ACELERAÇÃO DAS MUDANÇAS GLOBAIS THE ACCELERATION OF GLOBAL CHANGE
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