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DECEMBER 30, 2021 | The Jewish Home The Jewish Home | OCTOBER 29, 2015
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Political Crossfire
Biden’s Foreign Policy: The Tough Guy vs. the Pussycat By David Ignatius
“I
t’s been quite a year,” allowed Secretary of State Antony Blinken as he began a final 2021 speech on Tuesday – and his face, etched with the fatigue and stress of the past 11 months, told the story. Blinken went on to offer the kind of upbeat valedictory you’d expect at year’s end from Foggy Bottom. But at a time when the United States is being tested as rarely before, it’s important to separate the genuine achievements of the Biden administration from some stunning reversals – and to offer a theory of the case about the ups and downs of our foreign policy. President Joe Biden’s team has gotten one thing right, in spades – its effort to restore America’s global alliances and partnerships after four years of malign neglect under Donald Trump. The United States’ greatest strength abroad is this web of interdependence that Trump had foolishly disdained (or, worse, tried to monetize). Biden began a repair job on day one, and it has mostly been successful – with the notable exception of consultation about Afghanistan. Our strengthened partnerships buffer some of the crises that are festering abroad. NATO is acting like a real alliance again. This past week’s meeting of its military council framed clear, decisive plans for how NATO would respond to a Russian invasion of Ukraine – by moving troops forward toward Russia, not retreating under pressure. The United States is stronger in Asia, too, because of an alliance upgrade. The Quad – linking the United States with Australia, India and Japan in politics, technology and someday, perhaps, military planning – is the best check against Chinese
dominance of Asia. And in terms of hard power, the AUKUS alliance with Australia and Britain to build nuclear submarines and share other military technology might be the most important strategic move in decades. The AUKUS rollout offended France, which wasn’t informed that it would be losing its submarine-building franchise Down Under. But Blinken and others did some hasty and mostly successful repair work. Recent French cooperation in the Ukraine crisis reminds us that they’re a good ally. They get it. Biden’s biggest blunder was the management of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Biden owns that one personally. He was absolutely determined to end America’s longest war, and he’s a stubborn and sometimes irascible man. He got what he wanted, but at a significant cost to the image and credibility of the United States. The military and CIA took care of their own on the way out, but the State Department didn’t adequately manage the im-
plosion of the government in Kabul and the foreseeable need to evacuate tens of thousands of Americans and Afghans. Afghanistan was damaging in reputational terms. After Biden’s boasts in June that “America is back,” Kabul showed instead a picture of pell-mell retreat. Adversaries are now testing American resolve – and the sturdiness of those alliances Biden and Blinken have been trying to repair. Russian President Vladimir Putin is pushing for a new Yalta division of Europe by threatening an invasion of Ukraine. Biden’s response has been a sensible combination of seeking to deter an invasion and preparing for the possibility that Putin will roll across the border anyway. That planning includes a bold warning that the United States will support an anti-Russian insurgency if Putin does invade. The Biden team was eager for better relations with Russia, a relationship with more stability and predictability. In that spirit, Blinken has said he’ll talk with Moscow about
anything. But he drew a useful line Tuesday in rejecting Putin’s demand to create a new division for spheres of influence in Europe, a concept that he rightly told reporters “should be relegated to the dustbin of history.” Putin, alas, isn’t the only leader testing Biden’s resolve. Iran is sprinting toward nuclear-weapons capability; China is racing to build a huge nuclear arsenal as well as delivery systems the United States might not be able to track. Talk about destabilization. It’s a wonder that North Korea’s Kim Jong Un hasn’t joined the poke-America festival. My take is that Biden in his first year has proved to be remarkably coldblooded and pragmatic in his foreign policy. For all the backslapping and Irish charm, he is quite unsentimental. Trump talked about pulling out of Kabul; Biden did it. Trump talked about opening a new round of diplomacy with Moscow; Biden did it. The problem is that Biden’s realpolitik engine is mounted atop an administration that stops at every congressional red light – especially those flashed by progressive Democrats. And it’s fueled by a democratic system that is demonstrably failing to produce consensus, which frightens allies and encourages adversaries. Being a realist in foreign policy sometimes means being unpopular and facing criticism for not putting enough stress on values. That Kissingerian space – valuing order and predictability over bromides about democracy – is where you sense Biden wants to be. But there’s a disconnect between the private tough guy and the public pussycat we sometimes see in Biden’s foreign policy. (c) 2021, Washington Post Writers Group
