The reactionary formation of the MAS and ACDEGAM

THE REACTIONARY FORMATION OF THE MAS AND ACDEGAM

The early 1980s saw an immense interwoven web of support for another paramilitary force that emerged in Colombia. At the end of 1981 and through the early months of 1982, members of Medellín’s thriving drug cartel, the military, Texas Petroleum, numerous political representatives, and several cattle ranchers from the Puerto Boyacá region came together and “created an armed organization to defend their interests and deter guerrilla attacks and extortions” (Richani, 2002a: 38). Labor researcher and unionist Francisco Cellular Ramírez (2005: 68) cited paramilitary chief Black Vladimir’s account of the historic meetings in the department of Boyacá, where “representatives of the Texas Petroleum Company in addition to ranchers, mafiosos and small industrialists” collaborated to cover expenses needed to train paramilitary forces using “U.S., Israeli and English mercenaries.” The Medellín cartel helped fund the paramilitary’s formation, alongside army officers, large cattle ranchers, and numerous landowners from the Magdalena Medio region, which included Pablo Escobar, Jorge Luis Ochoa, and González Rodríguez Gacha (Livingstone, 2003: 133; see also Caballero, 2006; Kline, 1999: 68). Strategically, military personnel worked to convince dominant class sectors (and US-based MNCs) to create this “independent” paramilitary organization in regions of interest so as to target the sociopolitical networks of the guerrillas (Dudley, 2004: 42). By 1982 the force was coordinated, and aptly named Death to Kidnappers (Muerte de Sequestradores, MAS). After the MAS’s inception, the same partners created an organization to exist alongside yet appear separate from the paramilitaries. This association would facilitate the collection of funds and subsequently forward capital to the newly constructed death squads, while using far-right populism to bait peasants to support their endeavours.17 Shortly after the formation of the MAS, the Association of Peasants and Ranchers of the Middle Magdalena (Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio, ACDEGAM) was constructed (Kline, 1999: 68).

In 1984 a new organization, the Association of Peasants and Ranchers of the Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM), was created to give the paramilitary and self-defense groups legal cover .… It took responsibility for the political and military defense of the region and gave socioeconomic assistance to the peasants who supported it. The campaign against “subversion” reached new heights when ACDEGAM started to eliminate trade unionists (from, for example, the Nare cement works), peasant organizers and even dissidents from the Liberal Party. [President] Belisario Betancur himself visited the region in 1985 (at the invitation of Luis Alfredo Rubio Rojas, Pablo Guarín and the president of ACDEGAM) and highly praised the people of the Magdalena Medio, particularly General Yanine Díez, for restoring peace. (Pearce, 1990a: 247)

In the early and mid-1980s, the ACDEGAM worked hard to legitimize reaction to the threat of communism via insurgents. With its far-right rhetoric

compounded by nominal acts of charity, the association gave unspoken and spoken legitimacy to the newly armed paramilitary groups. “Puerto Boyacá had become a kind of independent paramilitary republic,” with the ACDEGAM organizing schools and health clinics, providing light road building and repair, and even constructing a communication center (Pearce, 1990a: 247). But this infrastructure was not set up for altruistic reasons: it was a paramilitary project to facilitate the narcotics industry, create training centers for new MAS recruits, build hospitals to tend to wounded mercenaries, and construct schools to disseminate anti-communist propaganda to the young and old alike. The illusion of populism was revealed as the paramilitary began to target anyone who opposed the centralized landholders of the area (that is, narcotraffickers) or the MAS’s counter-insurgency objectives, while simultaneously rewarding those aligned with what increasingly resembled a fascist movement. Simons (2004: 56) noted that the MAS and the ACDEGAM were more than willing to reward or offer assistance to peasants who were accommodating or sympathetic to their activities. Within this context, a growing sentiment of anti-communism pervaded areas of the Magdalena Medio alongside anti-worker policies and opposition to organized labor. The ACDEGAM openly threatened “any attempt to protect worker and peasant rights,” while the MAS followed up the rear with death threats, covert attacks, and assassination of suspected insurgent supporters (Simons, 2004: 56). Apparent benefits once given to peasants were largely cancelled as the MAS and the ACDEGAM consolidated activities in the pursuit of benefit for the rural elite and narcobourgeoisie. It was soon realized that the facilities and infrastructure paid for by the ACDEGAM(/MAS) were, in actuality, mediums to expand dominant class wealth and power.

The association set up more than thirty schools in different parts of the Middle Magdalena Valley. These schools created what ACDEGAM called a “patriotic and anti-Communist” educational environment. The association also established health clinics and cooperatives where local farmers could get technical and financial assistance. ACDEGAM built roads and bridges. Financing for these projects came from all types of businesses, including Texas Petroleum Company, a Texaco subsidiary. Yet behind the non-profit façade, ACDEGAM was the autodefensas’ center of operations. Recruiting, weapons storage, communications, propaganda, and medical services were all run from ACDEGAM headquarters. The association had a printing press that put out anti-guerrilla pamphlets, and it had a clothing store that furnished uniforms for paramilitary soldiers. It had “Medical Brigades,” who spent most of their time curing injured paramilitary soldiers. (Dudley, 2004: 68)

Within this context the ACDEGAM was able to present an image of, first, providing security to large landowners and cattle ranchers in the face of the growing FARC-EP threat; and second, delivering benefits to peasants if they supported the association’s expansion. The ACDEGAM’s dual stratagem of