1980s

many Latin American nations experienced during the “lost decade” (the 1980s) and early 1990s by stimulating other sectors of the Colombian economy through capital reinvestment (Schulte-Bockholt, 2006: 97, 99, 100). Table 6.1 illustrates some of the areas in which the narcobourgeoisie laundered surplus profits during this period. When asked about the AUC’s more recent investments and moneylaundering practices, one respondent from Cundinamarca told me the:

paras control an intricate gambling program in the city [Bogotá] and have invested in the highest sectors of Colombian business and the financial industry; however, there are many other service investments that the paramilitary have involved themselves in over the past several years. Probably the most upsetting is the paras’ control over child prostitution throughout central and Northern Bogotá [Northern Bogotá is the wealthiest part of the capital, populated by the middle-upper and upper strata of Colombia’s dominant class]. You can go anywhere at any time of day and see the rise of child prostitution, especially young boys, throughout the capital; all of which is controlled or indirectly related to the paras.

Although this refers to the AUC’s involvement in the contemporary urban sphere, the paramilitary has not forgotten how the countryside is one of the most important mediums of political-economic and cultural power. By the early 1980s, the narcobourgeoisie “found in land the perfect way to deposit their cash into something of value, and, at the same time, achieve the social status that had eluded most of them” (Dudley, 2004: 147; see also Richani, 2000: 41). It a short time they managed to acquire millions of hectares of the most fertile lands (Rochlin, 2003: 107; Richani, 2002a: 34).

By the mid-1980s, the Middle Magdalena Valley had become a drug traffickers’ haven. All over the region, drug traffickers were buying up land in startling quantities. To the south of Puerto Boyacá, Pablo Escobar’s strongmen and business partner in the Medellín cartel, José Gonzalo “El Mejicano” Rodríguez Gacha, owned large swaths of property .… A smattering of smaller traffickers were picking up other plots with or without

Table 6.1 Narcobourgeoisie/paramilitary leadership investment portfolio, 1980s

Area of “legitimate” investment Percentage of narco-profits allocated Land consolidation (urban and eural) 45 Cattle ranching and production 20 Financial commerce and investment 15 Private and commercial construction 10 Service industry 10

Sources: Adapted from Richani (2000: 41); Arango-Jaramillo (1988: 126) Lee III (1988: 92). This covers “legitimate” investments and not ventures in narcotics, gambling, and child prostitution.

the permission of locals. Just north of Puerto Boyacá, in a dusty cattle village called Puerto Triunfo, Escobar himself established a fifteen-thousand-acre ranchhouse, the Hacienda Napoles .… The narco-landgrab in the Middle Magdalena Valley was originally a way to launder money and gain the social status that had eluded many of the ones who, like Escobar, came from poor families. Drug traffickers bought cattle and carved out huge spaces for their opulent mansions. It was a trend that would continue throughout the 1980s and eventually change the face of the Colombian conflict forever. The drug traffickers were purchasing their way into the landed gentry. (Dudley, 2004: 72–3)

The narcobourgeoisie’s primary activities of land acquisition and concentration were a means to cleanse surplus narcodollars, while bringing the traffickers and elite ever closer through direct contact (see Schulte-Bockholt, 2006: 107; Richani, 2005b: 91; Lee III, 1988: 92). During the mid-1980s “narcotraffickers invested their illicit wealth through the purchase of 4 to 6 million hectares of land” (Rochlin, 2003: 107; see also Richani, 2002a: 34). In a decade, the traffickers came to own over 21 percent of all arable land in Colombia (Schulte-Bockholt, 2006: 107; Carrigan, 1995: 9). By 2000, it was said that “the total amount of land acquired by the drug traffickers is difficult to assess ... estimates range from 7.5 to 11 million acres – some 10% of Colombia’s most fertile lands” (Richani, 2000: 41).32 Some estimates related to earlier periods showed that lands had been violently usurped from roughly 3 million rural-based Colombians (see Bond, 2006: 1), equaling upwards of 7 million hectares (Haugaard, 2006: 2). By the turn of the century, “about 48 percent of the country’s most fertile lands” had been concentrated in the hands of the new narcobourgeoisie (Richani, 2007: 411; see also 2005b: 91).33 Recent figures have supported these findings, suggesting that the narcobourgeoisie and the AUC held title to well over half of all the country’s arable land (Neira, 2006: 15n.15).34 However, as the traffickers became the new rural elite, the FARC-EP ideologically saw them as the enemy.

As Escobar and his allies amassed billions of dollars during the 1980s, they invested in millions of acres of prime cattle-grazing lands, becoming a major part of Colombia’s agrarian elite in a short time. The FARC attempted to extract taxes from the new landlords using techniques it had successfully used with the existing landed elite; threatening retribution if those elites refused to pay, or kidnapping for ransom. Instead of paying the FARC, however, the new landlords, led by Rodríguez Gacha, created powerful paramilitary forces that attacked the FARC and its civilian allies. (Peceny and Durnan, 2006: 103)

The narcobourgeoisie were no longer mere merchants and unlawful traffickers of emeralds, marijuana, and cocaine, but were now directly disenfranchising the peasantry and therefore became a target of the guerrillas. As a result of the FARC-EP’s threat of attack, retention, and/or class-based taxation, the cartels