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many Latin American nations experienced during the “lost decade” (the 1980s) and early 1990s by stimulating other sectors of the Colombian economy through capital reinvestment (Schulte-Bockholt, 2006: 97, 99, 100). Table 6.1 illustrates some of the areas in which the narcobourgeoisie laundered surplus profits during this period. When asked about the AUC’s more recent investments and moneylaundering practices, one respondent from Cundinamarca told me the: paras control an intricate gambling program in the city [Bogotá] and have invested in the highest sectors of Colombian business and the financial industry; however, there are many other service investments that the paramilitary have involved themselves in over the past several years. Probably the most upsetting is the paras’ control over child prostitution throughout central and Northern Bogotá [Northern Bogotá is the wealthiest part of the capital, populated by the middle-upper and upper strata of Colombia’s dominant class]. You can go anywhere at any time of day and see the rise of child prostitution, especially young boys, throughout the capital; all of which is controlled or indirectly related to the paras. Although this refers to the AUC’s involvement in the contemporary urban sphere, the paramilitary has not forgotten how the countryside is one of the most important mediums of political-economic and cultural power. By the early 1980s, the narcobourgeoisie “found in land the perfect way to deposit their cash into something of value, and, at the same time, achieve the social status that had eluded most of them” (Dudley, 2004: 147; see also Richani, 2000: 41). It a short time they managed to acquire millions of hectares of the most fertile lands (Rochlin, 2003: 107; Richani, 2002a: 34). By the mid-1980s, the Middle Magdalena Valley had become a drug traffickers’ haven. All over the region, drug traffickers were buying up land in startling quantities. To the south of Puerto Boyacá, Pablo Escobar’s strongmen and business partner in the Medellín cartel, José Gonzalo “El Mejicano” Rodríguez Gacha, owned large swaths of property .… A smattering of smaller traffickers were picking up other plots with or without Table 6.1 Narcobourgeoisie/paramilitary leadership investment portfolio, 1980s Area of “legitimate” investment Land consolidation (urban and eural) Cattle ranching and production Financial commerce and investment Private and commercial construction Service industry
Percentage of narco-profits allocated 45 20 15 10 10
Sources: Adapted from Richani (2000: 41); Arango-Jaramillo (1988: 126) Lee III (1988: 92). This covers “legitimate” investments and not ventures in narcotics, gambling, and child prostitution.
