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Colombian fascism in action

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backed paramilitarism to respond to the hostilities and sustain revenues. In response the AUC targeted the insurgency’s support base, increased private property holdings, and prevented equitable land reforms (Richani, 2005b: 91; 2000: 41). A cyclical relation began where coercive displacement was followed by a legitimate land acquisition. First, the AUC strategically deployed violence in FARC-EP territory. This was to intimidate sympathizers in the hopes of decentralizing resistance. Second, Colombian law at the time made allowances for particular lands – abandoned, failing to be used productively, or without legal title – to be acquired by interested parties. If peasants were physically removed – via massacre, displacement, or flight – then capitalists could gain ownership.

Since land titles are disputed in the areas where the conflict is concentrated, the expulsion of poor peasants and the colonos meant a transfer of the claim over the land. The expelled peasants had no legal right to return to the land before the introduction of the Law 387 in 1997. In this manner, property could change hands, and violence became a profitable vehicle as a means to this end. Against the institutional loopholes regarding property rights, massacres became an effective tool in the process of concentration of land. (Richani, 2002a: 119–20)

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In short, “the right-wing offensive began to look like good business, the exodus of peasants enabled others to appropriate their lands” (Pearce, 1990a: 247–8). However, how did the narcobourgeoisie materially consolidate politicaleconomic power and by what means was this achieved? The next section looks in detail at the AUC’s actual transgressions, illustrating how fascist practice has ensured the stability of the existing sociopolitical construct.

COLOMBIAN FASCISM IN ACTION

After interviewing Carlos Castaño, the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy concluded that the leader of the AUC was an unquestionable fascist and “a psychopath confronting mafiosi” (Lévy, 2004: 71, 89). Although Lévy accurately depicted Castaño as the AUC’s sadistic mastermind, attributing fascism to one charismatic authority fails to explain the larger context of the far right in Colombia. Attempting to remove any restrictions to political and economic growth, fascism has long needed the ability to facilitate violations against those that pose a potential deterrent to such interests. The AUC has done this not by targeting the FARC-EP specifically but brutalizing non-combatants. It would be impossible to outline all that it has done, but here are some samples to illustrate the objective realities of contemporary Colombian fascism. A recognized tactic of the far right has been to impose a model of morality through the practice of “cleansing” society. Taussig (2004a) devoted an entire text to this subject by documenting the paramilitary’s activities over a two-week period in May 2001. Within Taussig’s work the AUC was repeatedly

involved in eliminating those deemed detrimental to Colombia’s social fabric. These ranged from persons who displayed an incorrect understanding and practice of a perceived conservative morality to people who did not support economic growth (Lévy, 2004: 74; Livingstone, 2003: 107; Shah, 2002).35 Suspected guerrilla sympathizers, unionists, community organizers, street-kids, homosexuals, independent prostitutes, drug addicts, beggars, small-scale street merchants, and the homeless are regularly besieged. Even:

Catholic Church workers and human rights activists, who used to be seen as unbiased mediators between the military and guerrillas, have become targets for the paramilitaries, who view them as apologists for the guerrillas. In February 1998, for example, in the southern state of Putumayo, paramilitary groups entered into a town and listed the names of priests and other activists to signal that they had been marked for death.

(Crandall, 1999: 229)

Unlike US forces that claim “collateral damage” as a consequence of war, the AUC has repeatedly violated international law and Geneva conventions by specifically coordinating attacks against civilians and the public infrastructure. Healthcare facilities and workers in predominantly FARC-EP influenced regions are embattled under the pretence of disabling social services for their community and/or the guerrillas (Brittain, 2006c; Isacson, 2006a; Coghlan, 2004: 31). Such military actions are quite different from those employed by the FARC-EP. While not always successful, the guerrillas tactically target state and corporate infrastructure, trying to keep civilian casualties to a minimum (Holmes and Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, 2006: 112–13; Molano, 2005: 191, 195; Coghlan, 2004: 107).36 A surprising issue concerning the AUC has been the lack of open denunciation of the organization’s involvement in human rights abuses against noncombatants. It seems that little quantitative analysis has been conducted in relation to the paramilitary’s extensive actions against unarmed civilians during the civil war. For example, much of the AUC’s leadership was extradited to the United States in May 2008 not on charges of assassination, disappearances, or genocide – even though they have admitted as much – but rather on the grounds of drug trafficking. While numerous groups condemn their activities, the vast majority of human rights-based organizations and NGOs seem to criticize the FARC-EP. Such enthusiasm is ironic given the fact that the insurgency commits a much lower proportion of abuses against non-combatants. Furthermore, it could be argued that when looking at this issue through a lens of class warfare that the people targeted by the FARC-EP predominantly belong to, or are associated with, Colombia’s dominant class.37 In the context of class struggle, the guerrillas perceive this section of society as legitimate targets as they are members of the elite, class enemies. In contrast, the AUC (and state forces) have done the direct opposite in targeting poor unarmed civilians. Figure 6.1 shows two specific outcomes. First, the AUC, alongside its state allies, is responsible for most human rights violations. Over 140,000 victims

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