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backed paramilitarism to respond to the hostilities and sustain revenues. In response the AUC targeted the insurgency’s support base, increased private property holdings, and prevented equitable land reforms (Richani, 2005b: 91; 2000: 41). A cyclical relation began where coercive displacement was followed by a legitimate land acquisition. First, the AUC strategically deployed violence in FARC-EP territory. This was to intimidate sympathizers in the hopes of decentralizing resistance. Second, Colombian law at the time made allowances for particular lands – abandoned, failing to be used productively, or without legal title – to be acquired by interested parties. If peasants were physically removed – via massacre, displacement, or flight – then capitalists could gain ownership. Since land titles are disputed in the areas where the conflict is concentrated, the expulsion of poor peasants and the colonos meant a transfer of the claim over the land. The expelled peasants had no legal right to return to the land before the introduction of the Law 387 in 1997. In this manner, property could change hands, and violence became a profitable vehicle as a means to this end. Against the institutional loopholes regarding property rights, massacres became an effective tool in the process of concentration of land. (Richani, 2002a: 119–20) In short, “the right-wing offensive began to look like good business, the exodus of peasants enabled others to appropriate their lands” (Pearce, 1990a: 247–8). However, how did the narcobourgeoisie materially consolidate politicaleconomic power and by what means was this achieved? The next section looks in detail at the AUC’s actual transgressions, illustrating how fascist practice has ensured the stability of the existing sociopolitical construct. COLOMBIAN FASCISM IN ACTION After interviewing Carlos Castaño, the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy concluded that the leader of the AUC was an unquestionable fascist and “a psychopath confronting mafiosi” (Lévy, 2004: 71, 89). Although Lévy accurately depicted Castaño as the AUC’s sadistic mastermind, attributing fascism to one charismatic authority fails to explain the larger context of the far right in Colombia. Attempting to remove any restrictions to political and economic growth, fascism has long needed the ability to facilitate violations against those that pose a potential deterrent to such interests. The AUC has done this not by targeting the FARC-EP specifically but brutalizing non-combatants. It would be impossible to outline all that it has done, but here are some samples to illustrate the objective realities of contemporary Colombian fascism. A recognized tactic of the far right has been to impose a model of morality through the practice of “cleansing” society. Taussig (2004a) devoted an entire text to this subject by documenting the paramilitary’s activities over a two-week period in May 2001. Within Taussig’s work the AUC was repeatedly
