2. Post-Soviet Belarusian Politics: The Rise of Lukashenko

higher than the USSR-wide average.11 Organic desire from citizens in the BSSR to form a

sovereign Belarusian state simply was not a major force driving Belarusian independence unlike

most of the other USSR constituents.

Belarus did eventually gain sovereignty, but it was not the direct result of a cohesive

anti-USSR sentiment from Belarusians. Interestingly, the Belarusian Communists were the ones

who proposed official Belarusian independence. On July 27, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of

Belarus enacted a Declaration of Belarusian State Sovereignty. One year later, the leaders of

Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics met with the new leader of Belarus, Stanislav

Shushkevich, to promulgate the Belavezha Accords, signed in December 1991. These accords

officially declared the dissolution of the USSR. While Belarus’s signing of these accords may

seem like a proactive move for Belarusian independence, in reality, the state was following the

decision made by the much more politically powerful entities of Russia and Ukraine.12 The fall

of the Soviet Union in Belarus came not as a shout but as a whisper, and leaders in the new

country of Belarus failed to effect any meaningful changes to transition the country from its

Soviet past. The lack of a distinct, non-Soviet national Belarusian identity as well as political

polarization and government inaction after the Union’s fall left a vacuum of power at the dawn of

independence.

Alexander Lukashenko has dominated Belarusian politics since he rose through the ranks

of the Belarusian government, an ascent made possible by the power vacuum following the fall

11 Wilson,

“Politics Either Side of Independence, ” 150. 12 Savchenko, “Borderland Forever, ” 156, 158.

of the USSR. The future president had a poor upbringing in a rural part of the BSSR and was

involved with the Communist party throughout his early life. While he strongly supported the

maintenance of the Russia-Belarus relationship after the collapse of the USSR, he had few other

political ideas. An opportunist, Lukashenko floated to whichever party would host his ambitions

for leadership, first as a liberal and later with the Communists for Democracy. 13

Lukashenko lost his first bid for office when he ran for the Congress of the USSR, but he

succeeded in establishing a reputation for his unwillingness to yield to party politics and

propaganda directed against him. In 1990, Lukashenko capitalized on this reputation in a second

campaign, this time for the Deputy to the Supreme Council of Belarus, the legislative body of the

still-Soviet BSSR. He gained office for the first time with this victory and later joined the

influential anti-corruption commission in the new Belarusian government in 1993. In a country

rife with corruption, citizens came to see Lukashenko as “a fighter for social justice as well as a

practical man who could really improve the collapsing economy.”14 In the early 1990s, the

post-Soviet, independent Belarus was facing an economic crisis and decline in living standards

under the liberal democratic rule of its first parliamentary chairman, Stanislav Shushkevich.15

Disillusioned with self-governance, many Belarusians desired a return to the old, “familiar

pseudo-prosperity” and stability of membership in the Soviet Union.16 This support for economic

and political integration with Russia proved to be key in Lukashenko’s popularity in the first

presidential election in 1994. During this first—and, to date, only—“absolutely democratic

election in Belarus,”17 Lukashenko played on the class divide, angling himself as a humble voice

13 Wilson,

“Politics Either Side of Independence, ” 148. 14 Savchenko, “Borderland Forever, ” 179. 15 David R. Marples, The Lukashenka Phenomenon: Elections, Propaganda, and the Foundations of Political Authority in Belarus (Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures and Societies, 2007), 14. 16 Andrew Savchenko, “Borderland Forever, ” 181. 17 “Populist in Belarus Sweeps to a Presidential Victory, ” The New York Times, July 11, 1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/11/world/populist-in-belarus-sweeps-to-a-presidential-victory.html.

for the common people and promising to redistribute the “spoils” of the elite, who had little in

common with the lower class in terms of language, ideology, and even religion.18 The landslide

victory for Lukashenko symbolized a triumph of the masses over the aristocracy.

Once elected, Lukashenko wasted no time consolidating his power through various

referendums. In 1995, the official result of his first referendum signaled overwhelming support

for strengthening ties to Russia through symbolic gestures, such as giving the Russian language

equal status, and through closer economic alliance. These results demonstrated a lack of

domestic nationalist sentiment in Belarus. These symbols, like the flag and coat of arms,

addressed the nostalgia for soviet membership and a Belarusian view of the country as more of a

Russian constituency than an independent nation. By far the most wide-reaching consolidation of

power, the 1995 referendum gave the President the right to dissolve parliament, setting

Lukashenko up to fill the parliament with loyalists.

The 1996 referendum further amended the constitution to create a “super-presidential

system,”19 which granted Lukashenko powers to appoint and dismiss government officials. He

was also given the power of presidential decrees, to be taken as law without requiring approval

from parliament, and a term extension through 2001. This was the turning point when he truly

became autocratic: he presented a façade of “pseudo-democratic institutions,” like the

ceremonial elections each term, while effectively using repressive tactics to maintain control.20

What may have been an accidental rise to power of a person in the right place and right time

became a deliberate plan for the development of authoritarianism in 1996. Lukashenko was

re-elected for a second term in 2001 with 75.6% of the votes through a “fundamental flaw[ed …]

18 Oleg Manaev, Natalie Manayeva, and Dzmitry Yuran,

“More State than Nations: Lukashenko’s Belarus, ” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2011): 93–113, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24388184. 19 GrigoryAstapenya, “1996 Referendum: The Constitution of the Dictatorship, ” interview by Yuri Drakakhrust, Prague Accent, November 26, 2017, https://www.svaboda.org/a/28877709.html. 20 Erica Frantz, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, s.v. “Autocracy, ” Oxford: Oxford Research, 2016.

electoral process” that included blocking the opposition, early voting measures which skewed the

ballot counting, and censorship of the media.21 Over time, the Lukashenko who had once fought

back against the propaganda of the reigning party began to become a master of propaganda

himself, controlling all official media and cenorsing those who pursued true investigative

journalism. When his government released the election results, they were widely speculated to be

fabricated to oversell his approval, especially as his rule became less popular term by term.

By the time Lukashenko eliminated term limits in a 2004 referendum, the opposition to

Lukashenko’s regime was aware of the need to present a united front and selected non-partisan

Alexander Milinkevich as the opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential race. After

Lukashenko’s victory, rioting in a “Jeans Revolution” broke out, and Milinkevich and another

candidate were jailed for “hooliganism.”22 The 2010 and 2015 elections followed a similar

pattern: an unfair election, riots, and Lukashenko’s open, physical repression of opposition.

Media coverage of the suspicious disappearances of Lukashenko’s opponents was silenced. Aleh

Byabenin, a journalist involved in the investigations, was found hanged. The events of the past

three decades have given rise to a political infrastructure that severely punishes those who speak

out against Lukashenko, creating a vertical power structure wherein Lukashenko essentially

controls the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.23

21 “Limited Election Observation Mission: Presidential Election, 9 September 2001, ” OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, accessed December 23, 2021, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/belarus/111402. 22 Ilya Barabanov, “Only hooligans do not like Lukashenka, ” Gazeta.ru, March 29, 2006, https://www.gazeta.ru/2006/03/29/oa _ 193969.shtml. 23 Andrei Sannikov, “TheAccidental Dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko, ” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2005): 75–88, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999249.