6. International Responses to the Lukashenko Regime

Despite Lukashenko’s best efforts at crushing dissent, the myriad creative underground

tactics put in place by protestors, and the endurance of their resistance in the year and a half

since the 2020 election evince the will of the Belarusian people to stand up to Lukashenko’s

authoritarianism. These new forms of protest—unavailable in previous waves of unrest—may

mark hope for more durable and widespread dissidence in the future.

The Lukashenko regime’s increasing brutality and repression in the aftermath of the 2020

election has been met with political condemnation from the United States and the European

Union (EU). The Council of the European Union concluded that it “deeply regrets” the

Belarusian authorities’ lack of respect for its people’s “fundamental freedoms and human

rights.”69 Current U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken made the U.S.’s position against the

Lukashenko regime clear, highlighting the ongoing humanitarian plight and reminding the world

that “nearly all independent media outlets are shuttered, and Belarusian authorities are

attempting to silence NGOs and civil society using fabricated ‘extremism’ charges.”70

On December 2, 2021, the U.S., Canada, the EU and the United Kingdom released a joint

statement outlining coordinated sanctions that targeted 183 individuals and 26 entities, including

Belarusian sovereign debt in primary and secondary markets. The statement called for the regime

to release the political prisoners and implement the recommendations of the Organization for

69 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Belarus, 11661/20, Brussels: European Council, 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf. 70 Antony J. Blinken, “Accountability for the Lukashenko Regime’s ContinuedActs of Repression and Disregard for International Norms, ” U.S. Department of State, December 2, 2021, https://www.state.gov/accountability-for-the-lukashenka-regimes-continued-acts-of-repression-and-disregard-for-int ernational-norms/.

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).71 Following the forced Ryanair 4798 landing, the

EU imposed a ban on Belarusian carriers flying over EU airspace and using EU airports. Further,

the EU has also allocated close to 65 million euro in assistance to the Belarusian people, directed

to civil society, youth, independent media, cultural actors, and small and medium-sized

enterprises (SMEs).72 While these measures speak to strong EU/U.S. coordination in the face of

a repressive authoritarian regime, both the EU and the U.S. responses have been complicated by

their respective internal tensions and shaped by their complex relationships with Belarus’s close

ally Russia.

The U.S. response to Lukashenko has at times seemed inconsistent, owing to changes in

administration and foreign policy priorities. Just days after the 2020 Belarusian election, then

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Prague to address the Czech parliament on issues of

freedom in Europe. Pompeo underscored the threat of authoritarianism in countries like China

but failed to mention Belarus, reflecting larger shortcomings of the Trump administration in

prioritizing and recognizing the severity of the political situation in Belarus. Transitioning to the

current administration, Biden faces the challenge of de-escalating conflict with Russia while also

protecting and promoting U.S. influence on the world stage.

Meanwhile, brewing internal hostility has called into question the EU’s legitimacy on

questions of foreign policy and democracy. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s increasing

control over the country’s public funds, institutions, media, and elections is particularly

problematic, to the point that the country is no longer classified as a democracy by NGO

71 “Joint Statement on December 2 Sanctions in Response to the Situation in Belarus, ” U.S. Department of State, last modified December 2, 2021. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-december-2-sanctions-in-response-to-the-situation-in-belarus/; “Restrictive MeasuresAgainst Belarus, ” European Council/Council of the European Union, last modified December 2, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-belarus/. 72 “Belarus and the EU, ” Delegation of the European Union to Belarus, last modified December 2, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/15975/belarus-and-eu _ en.

Freedom House. Poland, with similar infringements under the Law and Justice Party, has been

downgraded to a “semi-consolidated democracy.”73 Anti-democratic tendencies within the EU’s

own borders have left the body unprepared to deal with them outside, and this lack of

consistency has impeded its response to the situation in Belarus. For example, EU sanctions fail

to target one of the country’s main exports, potash with 60% potassium content.74 Despite early

U.S. sanctions, potash manufactured by state-owned company Belaruskali was still transported

into the EU by Lithuania’s state-owned Lithuanian Railways until February 2022.75 This serves

as a prime example of stakeholder lobbying—in this case, the EU’s agricultural

lobby—influencing member states and blocking passage of an effective, unified response.76

Concurrently, the EU suffers a migrant crisis fabricated by Lukashenko on the border of

Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.77 While migrants from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan

typically attempt to enter the EU from its southern border, Lukashenko offered a quicker route,

assuring migrants that Belarus would “not try to catch [them], beat [them], and hold [them]

behind barbed wire.”78 Lukashenko’s actions have allowed him to both exploit and highlight the

EU’s incoherence on the issue of migration. On paper, the EU maintains that asylum is a

“fundamental right” per the 1951 Geneva Convention, yet Poland has greeted migrants at its

73 “Democracy Status, ” Freedom House, last modified 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=nit&year=2021. 74 Polina Devitt andAndrius Sytas, “Most Belarus Potash Exports NotAffected by EU Sanctions, ” Reuters, June 25, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/most-belarus-potash-exports-not-affected-by-eu-sanctions-analysts-2021-0625/. 75 “Lithuania Terminates Railway Contract to Transport Belarus-Produced Potash, ” Radio Free Europe, January 12, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-lithuania-railways-potash-contract/31651043.html. 76 Giselle Bosse, “Authoritarian Consolidation in Belarus: What Role for the EU?, ” European View 20, no. 2 (2021): 201–210. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/17816858211061839. 77 Alice Tidey, “Police Uncover 455 Social MediaAccounts Encouraging Belarus-to-EU Migration, ” euronews, December 20, 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/20/police-uncover-455-social-media-accounts-encouraging-belarus-to-eu-migra tion. 78 “Belarus’Lukashenko Says Migrants Have ‘Right’to Go West, ” Deutsche Welle, November 26, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-lukashenko-says-migrants-have-right-to-go-west/a-59954017.

border with water cannons and tear gas.79 Furthermore, the EU has a long history of border

externalization that has accomplished an objective prohibited by its own law while shifting the

logistical burden to Middle Eastern countries. Lukashenko’s artificial migrant crisis has already

succeeded in exacerbating existing splinters within the EU. Frustrated with the lack of EU

support, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki made a statement citing “Polish solidarity

with other free-world countries long before the European Union and NATO were born,” thus

wielding his country’s individual agency—and authoritarian tendencies—as an alternative to EU

membership.80

The EU’s vulnerability to Lukashenko’s machinations is also notable in the contentious

issue of energy supply. 41 percent of EU natural gas is already imported from Russia, and while

the proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline would provide a low-cost source of natural gas, it would

also increase the EU’s energy dependence on Russia.81 Lukashenko controls another natural gas

pipeline to Europe, Yamal-Europe pipeline, and has already used it as leverage by threatening to

turn it off. From this perspective, the potential ramifications of a Russian-Belarusian cooperation

against the EU on energy supply are worrisome.82 Wielding ultimate control over an EU that is

struggling to work in concert to reach the goals of its 2030 Climate Target Plan, Russia and

Belarus together have the power to send the EU into an energy crisis, destabilizing the economy

and increasing the potential for “environmental authoritarianism” within the EU itself.

79 “Common EuropeanAsylum System, ” Migration and HomeAffairs, European Commission, last modified 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system _ en. 80 “#WeDefendEurope, ” Chancellery of the Prime Minister, YouTube, November 21, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ST4HOPEWdb0. 81 “From Where Do We Import Energy?” Eurostat, last modified 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/index.html?lang=en. 82 David Meyer, “As Belarus Threatens European Gas Supplies, Here’s How a Migrant Crisis is Turning into a Russia-EU Face-Off, ” Fortune, November 11, 2021, https://fortune.com/2021/11/11/belarus-europe-gas-lukashenko-putin-merkel-migrant-poland-lithuania-latvia-eu/.