7. Recommendations for the Way Forward

Ultimately, the EU’s idealism isn’t enough to hide its internal instability, rendering it

vulnerable to future manipulation by Lukashenko. And even with a completely unified response,

economic sanctions and political statements only go so far with such an aggressive, repressive

dictator. Belarus encapsulates a larger conflict between authoritarianism and democracy, and

increased Belarus-Russia cooperation could complicate the geopolitical situation in a region vital

to U.S. and EU interests and democracy and the rule of law more broadly.

Alexander Lukashenko’s violent and ongoing attempts at suppressing the media and

opposition movement in Belarus are well documented. And his February 2022 referendum on a

new constitution threatens to further reinforce his hold on power. 83 The EU and the U.S. have

openly expressed their disagreement with Lukashenko’s presidential illegitimacy and

re-emphasized their commitment to the democratic rule of law. The complex nature of events in

Belarus, which have threatened the balance of power in the wider European continent, have

presented both the Belarusian opposition and international stakeholders in support of democracy

with multiple challenges: promoting the growth of democracy in Belarus; strengthening the

Belarusian opposition; weakening Lukashenko’s grip on power; and managing the Russian

reaction to unfolding developments in Belarus. It is likely that a combination of coordinated

efforts from various global actors will be needed in order to identify and analyze issues, trends,

drivers, as well as possible options and opportunities for the way forward in Belarus.

83“Lukashenka Says Belarus Plans Constitutional Referendum By February 2022, ” Radio Free Europe, September 28, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka--belarus-constitution-/31482744.html.

In addition to maintaining and increasing sanctions aimed at Lukashenko and his allies, a

variety of informed stakeholders, such as federal agencies and nonprofit policy institutes, have

made policy recommendations with the understanding that a voluntary or forceful withdrawal of

Alexander Lukashenko is highly unlikely in the near future. In this vein, the European

Leadership Network has recommended that Western policymakers invest in “institutional

networks, contextual understanding and strategic planning” to respond appropriately to

developments in and around Belarus, as well as “take additional steps to address the risks of

military confrontation in the region.”84 The Atlantic Council has made several recommendations

for President Biden’s administration, including the provision of secure assistance and protection

to Belarusian opposition leaders, journalists, and political prisoners, and the management of

Russia’s influence in Belarus, specifically with a focus on preventing a “Kremlin crackdown.”85

The Index on Censorship’s Monitoring and Advocating for Media Freedom project recommends

that Belarus amend the law on mass media so that journalists can “appeal rejected accreditation

requests,”86 as well as train journalists in United Nations (UN) human rights procedures,

including the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council,87 and the UN Special

Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus.88

Despite the recommendations listed, which represent only a fraction of recommendations

put forward, there has been a general lack of action by the EU and U.S. in this regard.

84 Ben Challis, Belarus Beyond 2020: Implications For Russia And The West (London: European Leadership Network, 2020), https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ Belarus-policy-brief-1.pdf. 85Anders Åslund, et al, Biden And Belarus: A Strategy For The New Administration, (Washington, DC:Atlantic Council, 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Biden-Belarus-IB-v3.pdf. 86 “Legislative amendments further restrict media in Belarus, says OSCE media freedom representative, ” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 18 June, 2018, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/384786. 87 “Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, ” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx. 88 “Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, ” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CountriesMandates/BY/Pages/SRBelarus.aspx.

Additionally, sanctions and policies that have already been utilized have failed to significantly

improve the state of affairs in Belarus. It is important to note though that even in the absence of

imminent regime change progress is still very much achievable. The role that media and online

freedom play in upholding the values of democracy cannot be stressed enough in this regard.

Free and independent journalism counters misinformation and disinformation.89 Furthermore,

when media freedom is limited, the ability of citizens to share and receive information and hold

their government accountable begins to erode.90 It is therefore important that the

recommendations proposed above be coupled with efforts to:

● Enforce existing laws to protect media freedom and, where laws do not exist, provide

appropriate combinations of incentives and penalties in favor of media freedom;

● Inform journalists of their rights and provide adequate options and channels for the

protection of those rights;

● Support and advise media channels and civil society organizations on the ground in their

efforts to disseminate accurate and/or nonpartisan information;

● Support international media channels in monitoring human rights threats, limitations, and

violations in Belarus, with a focus on human rights and the preservation of human life;

● Deepen efforts to regulate social media while safeguarding freedom of speech and

avoiding censorship;91

● Promote alternate forms of media where traditional media is limited.

89 “Free press ‘a cornerstone’of democratic societies, UN says, ” UN News, 3 May 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1091132. 90 “Media Freedom, ” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/issues/media-freedom. 91 “Social media and democracy: we need laws, not platform guidelines, ” European Parliament, October 2, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20210204STO97129/social-media-and-democracy-we-ne ed-laws-not-platform-guidelines.

Belarus is not an isolated case. Authoritarian threats to media freedom and other markers

of democracy are on the rise in Europe and other parts of the world. In order to make

well-informed predictions and recommendations for the way forward, it is therefore important to

draw upon lessons from the past, as policy recommendations aimed at strengthening journalism

and free speech in Belarus have wider implications for the future of democracy in Eastern

Europe, as well as Europe more broadly. If authoritarianism and illiberalism continue to flourish

in and around the borders of Belarus, this will undoubtedly threaten the ability of the West to

defend and promote democracy in other parts of the globe. Undermining Lukashenko’s hold on

power while avoiding events that may threaten Moscow’s security interests will require a

deepening of the current measures being led by the EU and U.S., as well as a commitment to

increased coordination between them. It is hoped that these efforts, if sustained in the long run,

will assist the Belarusian opposition and other willing actors in fulfilling their human rights

obligations and strengthening foundations for democracy and media freedom. Otherwise,

continued failure to effectively transform the situation in Belarus could potentially catalyze a

major shift in global power and help usher in a new world order that is more tolerant of

authoritarian and illiberal leadership.