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The Center and the West: Austria, France, and Germany
Given strong bilateral ties between Luxembourg and the United States, it comes as no surprise
that the two nations share in a high level of financial activity.88 Importantly, Luxembourg is also a
vocal advocate for European integration.89 When the Trump administration came to power in the United States, Luxembourg, along with a host of EU members, felt that the U.S. was no longer
dependable as an ally.
Luxembourg’s commitment to openness and economic diversification, due to its growing dependence on the financial sector in recent decades, played a sizable role in shaping its reaction to the 2020 U.S. election. Journalists and government officials made it clear that Luxembourg would be better served by a Biden administration, citing hopes for improved transatlantic trade.90
However, hope for new economic opportunities in partnership with the U.S. is tempered by
lingering fears about the Obama administration’s proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). There is concern among the Luxembourgish population that a free trade agreement similar in nature to the TTIP would give foreign investors too much power.91
The implications of a Biden administration for Luxembourg as a financial center is concentrated on the possibility of a U.S. financial transaction tax (FTT). President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris have already been vocal about their intentions to raise corporate
taxes.92 Despite these fears and the sense that they may find more reliable allies in the European Union, Luxembourg will continue friendly diplomatic relations with the United States, even
while they explore and pursue transatlantic economic opportunities with lucidity and caution.
AUSTRIA Under President Donald Trump, Austria found little out of the ordinary in terms of
diplomatic relations. Both countries share memberships in several international organizations and recently engaged in a bilateral strategic dialogue focusing on home affairs, cybersecurity,
and they also share an interest in the fight against terrorism.93 President Trump and Austria’s
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz found common ground on policies regarding immigration and seemed
to maintain cordial relations with one another.
Kurz’s warmth towards Trump was not shared by the Austrian public who expressed
overwhelming support for Biden.94 However, Kurz and other mainstream politicians were quick
to offer their congratulations and hope for continued cooperation upon Biden being finally declared the winner.95 The right-wing Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) did not relay similar messages, demonstrating a stark contrast to their enthusiasm for Trump’s election in 2016.96
Unlike in France and Germany, Austria’s far-right has been kept at bay. Despite
speculation that the FPÖ would experience some sort of bump in the 2016 Austrian presidential election due to its proximity to Trump’s election, an independent candidate and former leader of
the Green Party prevailed.97 Trump’s policies seem to have had fewer ripple effects in Austria’s
domestic affairs, but optimism surrounding Biden’s win is tempered by anxieties about the relationship the Chancellor maintained with his predecessor.
Some predict that the ideological similarities between Chancellor Kurz and President
Trump, as well as Kurz’s support for Trump’s peace plan in the Middle East, may make it
difficult for Kurz to restart relations with Biden.98 It is unlikely, though, that Biden will slight Austria as he begins the process of mending ties across the continent. Furthermore, Austria’s
optimism and eagerness to work with the new president on climate change and security should
come as a welcome respite for the Biden administration.
FRANCE U.S.-French relations are longstanding and generally positive, and it appears they will
continue in this manner. President Trump and President Emmanuel Macron of France forged a
working relationship despite widespread distaste for Trump amongst the French people.99 It could
be argued that Trump’s abdication from the Paris Climate Accords and criticism of NATO has
allowed Macron to follow in his wake, questioning the purpose and benefits of these multilateral institutions and agreements for France.100
The rise of Trump proved helpful for another French politician, Marine Le Pen. The
leader of the Rassamblement National (formerly known as the Front National) saw Trump’s victory in 2016, along with the Brexit referendum, as the potential beginnings of an international rebuke of globalist political “elites.”101 The Rassamblement and their anti-globalist platform
naturally favored a second Trump term over the perceived “third Obama term” of a Biden presidency. However, a wider distaste for Trump led most French politicians, Macron included,
to view Biden’s victory as good news.102
President Biden will pose new challenges for Macron who finds himself on unsteady political footing. France’s president faces bipartisan criticism for both his handling of the
pandemic and ongoing tensions surrounding the country’s Muslim population.103 Macron hopes
to steer France and lead Europe towards a future of “strategic autonomy” with limited American influence, and has cautioned against returning to the traditional, asymmetrical U.S.-European power dynamic.104 Moreover, Biden’s emphasis on identity politics, as evidenced by his racially and gender, but not ideologically, diverse cabinet picks, does not align with the legacy of
secularism and the idea of a neutral or universal citizen in France.105
The 2020 French municipal elections exposed the fragility of Macron’s party, leaving
him vulnerable to challengers across the political spectrum. While Macron has been proclaiming the need for increased European and French independence, it is uncertain how far he is willing
or able to achieve these means. The absence of Trump’s anti-establishment force in the U.S.
may prevent Macron from fully committing to these goals. For the time being, the Biden administration should face little opposition from Paris, as the two sides cooperate with an eye
towards achieving their shared international goals: combating terrorism, enacting policies to
prevent the climate crisis, and renewing transatlantic trade. However, there may be an impasse
when it comes to revitalizing NATO.
GERMANY Like France, the 2020 U.S. election represents a somewhat critical juncture for
Germany’s international leadership capacities. Trump tattered the historically positive
relationship between the two countries, principally through his disparagement of NATO and
his withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany, which was seen by Germans as a symbolic
abandonment.106 Though the relationship remains intact, the recent tensions have led to both
countries reconsidering their stances toward one another.
The German public’s preference for President Biden is largely interpreted as backlash against Trump, and Biden will have an uphill climb as he attempts to repair America’s reputation abroad. For instance, 82% of American youth see the relationship with Germany as “good” while only 40% of German youth say the same of America.107 German politicians and media
outlets celebrated Biden’s win, but there is little consensus as to what relations with a Biden administration will look like, and there is a patent desire for more autonomy from the U.S. in
certain policy areas.
Indeed, Germany has already maneuvered itself away from American economic interests.
A diplomatic investment deal between the EU and China, the EU-China Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment, has just reached full agreement, a result of a seven year-long push by
Germany to better control automobile companies located in China.108 The Biden administration petitioned the European Union to hold on the agreement, citing that the agreement does not
do enough to open the Chinese market or reduce human rights violations.109 While the EUChina agreement would advance global cooperation between two of the world’s three largest
economies, and further strengthen China’s international standing in a global market only
beginning to recover from the disastrous effects of the coronavirus pandemic, it represents a new
rift in transatlantic relations as Biden takes office. Before Germans look too far into the future, however, they anticipate the lingering influence of Trump’s tenure on their own political discourse. The Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD), Germany’s leading far-right party, is supported by around 13% of the population, roughly the same percentage of the German population that supported Trump in the election.110 The AfD
may follow Trump’s example and claim election fraud in the upcoming German federal elections