Asian Conflicts Reports by muhammad nasrullah

Asian Conflicts Reports  Ethnic Conflict Intensifies in Burma  Bangkok Bombs  Religious Radicalism Grows in Indonesia Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan as a Global Threat  Political Instability, Crime and Radicalization in the Maldives

Issue 14 | November-December, 2010

Ethnic Conflict Intensifies in Burma Nelson Rand

In November, Myawaddy, a key trading town on the Burma-Thai border, was over-run by antigovernment insurgents

Ceasefire agreements with a number of armed ethnic militias are on the verge of breakdown in protest against junta attempt to create a centralized Boarder Guard Force

Over 25,000 refugees have crossed the Burma-Thai border in response to increased ethnic conflict

On 7 November 2010, as Burma held its first general elections in twenty years, ethnic Karen rebels stormed the Eastern town of Myawaddy. The troops, from a renegade faction of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), took over several key positions in the town including the police station, the post office and a Military Intelligence office, forcing government troops to flee the town. It was the first time in six decades of civil conflict in Burma that Myawaddy – a key trading town on the Burma-Thai border – was over-run by antigovernment insurgents. The siege was significant for three main reasons: it marked the first time that the DKBA, a pro-junta militia set up in late 1994, turned against government forces, it solidified a factional split in the militia group that has been a key ally of the junta in fighting antigovernment Karen rebels of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and it was the first operation of what could be the beginning of a new phase of ethnic conflict in post-election Burma. Since 1989, some 17 armed ethnic groups in Burma – one of the world‟s most ethnically diverse countries – have signed ceasefire agreements with the military government. But now, many of these ceasefires are on the verge of collapse, while several have already been broken. The catalyst is an ambitious proposal by Burma‟s military rulers to transform the country‟s ethnic ceasefire groups into a single Border Guard Force (BGF) under central military command to comply with the 2008 military-drafted Constitution that states, “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services.” Incorporating Burma‟s ethnic ceasefire groups into BGF units would entail disarming them, re-supplying them with government issued weapons and making their troops subordinate to regional Myanmar military commanders – a prospect that few of the ethnic groups want. “The BGF is an indirect order [by the regime] for the ethnic groups to surrender their weapons,” said Zin Linn, a Burma analyst who lives in exile in Thailand. “But without guns, the groups cannot defend their rights and their people so they will hold on to their guns until they gain autonomy and self determination,” he said, adding that armed conflict will almost certainly break out in the near future. To date, only a handful of groups have agreed to join the BGF, with the two main ones being the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the National Democratic ArmyKachin. In August 2009, the refusal to join the BGF by one of the smallest ethnic factions in the country – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army operating in the Kokang region of northern Shan State – resulted in a military offensive launched by government troops that sent more than 30,000 refugees over the border to China. The DKBA‟s leadership decision to join the BGF caused a split within the movement. Colonel Lah Pweh, commander of the DKBA‟s Fifth Brigade, rejected the groups‟ decision to join the BGF and broke away with some 1,400 troops. It was his forces that stormed Myawaddy on the day of the elections – the faction‟s first military operation since breaking away from the core DKBA group. The siege of Myawaddy led to heavy fighting the next day as government troops moved in to retake the town. The fighting sent some 20,000 refugees over the border to Thailand while a stray rocket propelled grenade landed on Thai soil, injuring several people. Clashes further south resulted in some 5,000 more refugees fleeing to Thailand. It was the biggest exodus of refugees from Burma in over a decade. Analysts and aid workers warn that this is likely just the beginning. “We are preparing for more refugees as fighting can happen at any time,” said K‟Nyaw Paw, an advocacy team leader of the Forum of Burma‟s Community-Based Organizations that works with refugees along the Thai-Burma border. “All the ethnic groups that have not agreed to join the Border Guard Force will be targeted,” she said, adding that the ethnic groups are prepared to fight back. Indeed, many of the ethnic ceasefire groups are now preparing for possible military retaliation by the government for refusing to join the BGF. Among those are the 8,000-strong Kachin Independence Army (or KIA, which has had a ceasefire with the junta since 1994) and the 30,000 strong United Wa State Army (UWSA) equipped with modern weapons including surface-to-air missiles. The UWSA is labeled a drugs cartel by the United States and funds itself mainly through the production and trafficking of heroin and methamphetamines.

“Fearing that [government troops] may launch another offensive similar to that in Kokang, the major ceasefire groups along the border have been building up their forces,” states a recent report by the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank. “These groups see their weapons as the last source of leverage in their long-running battle for autonomy with the military government.” “Both the Kachin and Wa are recruiting troops, training, and collecting arms and ammunition,” said Zin Linn. “They are preparing for war.” It appears Burma‟s military rulers may also be preparing for war. In September, the military bought 50 Russian MI-24 attack helicopters and are currently in the process of training pilots. The helicopters, which are armored and equipped with cannons, rockets and anti-tank missiles and can carry up to seven troops, are a first in the history of Burma‟s military. The government has also recently been massing troops in areas close to ceasefire group-controlled territory. According to Zin Linn, government troops have also been blocking key transport routes to cut supplies from reaching these groups. “This is preparation for an offensive,” he said, adding that such an offensive would likely begin after the Cabinet is formed from the November 7 poll – which was won by the main proxy party of the military, the Union Solidarity and Development Party. The Cabinet is expected to be formed by early February 2010. The elections have been dismissed by much of the international community as a sham. Ashley South, a Burma analyst and author, believes the possibility of the military launching offensives against groups such as the KIA and the UWSA will depend on national politics in the coming months. “If Than Shwe [the regime‟s top leader] and other senior leaders feel they are not controlling the national political process, then they could provoke some groups as a distraction,” he said. “They thrive on chaos, they are masters of conflict.” However, if the generals feel they are in control of the national political process, then they may hold off on any military action against these groups, according to South. “It is not inevitable that these ceasefires will break down.” There have been more subtle signs as well that the government is moving on these ceasefire groups. In October, state media began referring to the KIA as “insurgents” – the first time this label has been used on the group since a ceasefire was signed in 1994. The government refused the group‟s political arm, the Karen Independence Organization (KIO), to field candidates in the November 7 election, and also cancelled voting in most of the zones occupied by ethnic militias. More telling was the recent grounding of Yangon Airlines, one of two wholly privately owned airlines in the country. In late November, the government refused to renew its operating license. The reason is because the owner, Aik Hauk, is the son-in-law of Pao Yu Chan, head of the UWSA. The other wholly privately owned airline in the country, Air Bagan, is owned by business tycoon Tay Za, who is close to the regime‟s leader, Senior General Than Shwe. In preparation of possible military retaliation by the government for refusing to join the BGF plan, six of the ethnic groups formed an alliance in early November. The alliance comprises three ceasefire groups: the KIA, New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army North (SSA-N); and three non-ceasefire groups: the KNLA, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF). The main aim of this alliance is not to attack government forces but to assist each member if attacked by government forces. If other groups join the alliance, their total numbers could be as high as 100,000. They would be up against a 450,000-strong Burma Army. However, observers point out one main advantage of the ethnic forces – they are hardened guerrillas who know their territory. “They could easily fight the Burma Army because they rely on their area, they are natives, and they know the terrain better than the Burma Army,” said Soe Aung, the Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs of a Burmese exile group in Thailand. Asked whether fighting will break out between government forces and these groups, he replied: “If the military regime continues to press these groups with the ultimatum to join the BGF, then civil war will break out inevitably.”

Bangkok Bombs Matt Wheeler

17 bombs have exploded in greater Bangkok post the redshirt crackdown, killing six people and wounding 15

Thailand’s political conflict remains at an impasse, with tensions simmering and no viable political consensus in sight

In October police in Chiang Mai detained 11 men allegedly planning attacks after undergoing six weeks of training in neighboring Cambodia

Some 71 bombs have exploded in the greater Bangkok area this year through mid-October, 17 of them since Army troops evicted anti-government red-shirt protesters from central Bangkok on 19 May. These post-crackdown bombings have killed six people and wounded 15. An explosion on 5 October in an apartment building in Nonthaburi, on the capital‟s outskirts, accounted for four of these fatalities, including a red shirt activist alleged to be the bomb maker. More than 40 other improvised explosive devices and grenades have been discovered and disarmed in Bangkok and surrounding provinces this year, and there have been further attacks and bomb hoaxes upcountry. Many of these bombings are a product of Thailand‟s political conflict, which remains at an impasse. The existing political order has proved dysfunctional, but a new societywide consensus on how power should be organized has yet to emerge. Red shirts of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) are opposed to the Democrat Party-led coalition government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. The red shirts claim to stand for democracy, which they argue has been repeatedly subverted, first by the 2006 coup d’etat that ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and later by judicial intervention and elite manipulation of the parliamentary process. On the other side of the political divide stand elements of the military, bureaucracy, and palace that claim to act in the interests of the nation and the monarchy. These conservative proponents of the status quo maintain that majoritarian politics are susceptible to the machinations of self-serving politicians, and are committed to preventing at all costs a return of “Thaksinism.” The Thaksin-aligned opposition Peua Thai Party has pledged to bring Thaksin back from exile if they win power in a general election due by the end of next year. Under these circumstances a new consensus on political order is remote. The violence associated with suppression of anti-government protests in April and May raised fresh speculation that Thailand is ripe for civil war. A string of bombings and grenade attacks during the two-month UDD protest appeared to confirm government claims that red-shirt extremists had taken up arms against the state. The red shirts, who called for dissolution of parliament and a general election, built barricades around their encampment in central Bangkok and defied government orders to leave. The military operation to disperse the protesters began with the assassination of a renegade Army general-turned-red-shirt leader on 13 May and settled into days of lopsided clashes between Army troops and rag-tag red-shirt supporters. A small number of men with small arms offered minimal resistance as the Army moved on the main protest site on 19 May, ending the protest and sparking looting and arson across Bangkok. The violence claimed 91 lives between 10 April and 19 May, including 11 soldiers and police, and injured some 2,000. In spite of this toll, which according to official statistics represents the deadliest political turmoil in modern Thai history, the violence failed to resolve the conflict. Following the crackdown, top UDD leaders were arrested and charged with terrorism. Others went underground as the military-dominated Center for Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) imposed a state of emergency in provinces across the red-shirt strongholds of North and Northeastern Thailand. Opposition publications, radio stations and TV channels have been closed, and hundreds of anti-government activists have been temporarily detained under provisions of the emergency decree that has been in effect in Bangkok and surrounding provinces since April. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abihist Vejjajiva established reform commissions, stacked with establishment figures, to provide recommendations on national reconciliation in three years‟ time. The combination of suppression, censorship, suspension of rights, and pro forma reconciliation efforts appears to have created a reservoir of red-shirt resentment that has fueled a violent backlash. While it is too soon to determine if this discontent will be channeled into protracted resistance, the recent bombings suggest a pattern of conflict just short of guerrilla war. Bombings are a staple in the repertoire of Thai contentious politics. In March 2001, a Thai Airways plane exploded at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok, 30 minutes before it was due to transport Prime Minister Thaksin on a domestic flight. A flight attendant was killed. Six bombs exploded around Bangkok on New Year‟s Eve, 2006, killing three. On 7 October 2008, a bomb in a car exploded near Government House, then besieged by the anti-Thaksin People‟s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The bomb killed the apparent driver, a leader of the PAD guards.

More typical of Bangkok bombings are small devices that draw attention and damage property without causing casualties. Such attacks serve as signals to rivals or to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability that presumably furthers a political interest. Police rarely apprehend the perpetrators of such attacks. Police have classified a number of recent incidents as related to personal disputes, but other attacks reveal clear political motivations. On 22 June, a bomb transported in a fruit vendor‟s cart targeted the headquarters of the Bhum Jai Thai Party, a coalition party led by former Thaksin ally Newin Chidchob whose defection paved the way for a Democrat-led government in December 2008. With uncharacteristic efficiency, police arrested six people in connection with this attack within days. Assailants fired 40mm grenades at state-run Channel 11 TV station on three occasions, in March, April, and August. On 25 July, the day of a Bangkok district by-election, a grenade exploded at a bus stop at Rajaprasong, site of the main April-May UDD protest. That attack killed one person and injured 10, marking the first fatality in the wave of post-crackdown bombings. In separate incidents, two grenades exploded near a business owned by a Newin ally, one severely injuring a bystander. Whose interests are served by the recent bombings is a matter of dispute. Some government opponents insist that the bombings play into an exaggerated government narrative of violent red-shirt extremism, a convenient pretext for continued imposition of a state of emergency in Bangkok and surrounding areas. Peua Thai Party members have blamed government agent provacateurs for the bombings. Red-shirt leader and Peua Thai MP Jatuporn Promphan claimed in September that the government could use the bombings as an excuse to delay a general election. Government officials, meanwhile, blamed “ill-intentioned people” for most of the recent incidents. Abhisit attributed the attacks to those who, “do not want to see reconciliation in the country.” Suthep Thuagsuban, then Deputy Prime Minister, stated in early September that, “The country is going forward along a reconciliatory path but these maniacs are venting their personal anger toward the country and spoiling the good atmosphere.” The deadly Nonthaburi explosion yielded evidence tying the blast to a network of red-shirt sympathizers. The presumed bomb maker, Samai Wongsuwan, was a UDD member who had been injured in clashes with the Army in April. Samai reportedly told his wife four months before he died that he was leaving “to fight for democracy.” The Department of Special Investigations (DSI) has linked the blast with four bombs discovered at different locations on 8 September. Prior to the 5 October blast, officials had made little progress identifying or thwarting the bombers, and government announcements regularly struck an alarmist note. Deputy PM Suthep warned in August of a car-bomb threat to Bangkok, and a CRES spokesman claimed that major bridges across the Chao Phraya River could be targeted. Government officials insisted that the bombings demonstrated the need for the emergency decree, even as the decree proved ineffective in preventing further bombings. Officials also publicized reports of assassins entering Thailand from “a neighboring country” with plans to kill PM Abhisit and other senior officials. On 2 October, police in the northern province of Chiang Mai detained 11 men at a resort. The DSI maintains that the men were planning attacks, though police found no weapons or other evidence of paramilitary activity at the scene. The detainees reportedly confessed to undergoing six weeks of weapons training in Cambodia. A senior DSI officer claimed that the men were “brainwashed” during their training to hate the monarchy. The implication that Red-Shirt activism threatens the monarchy has raised the stakes and emotional charge of the political conflict. The CRES has maintained since April that the UDD is at the center of a conspiracy to topple the monarchy. In this context, a reported 9 September bomb threat on against Siriraj Hospital, where King Bhumipol Adulaydej has resided since September 2009, is ominous. On taking command of the Army at the beginning of October, royalist hardliner General Prayuth Chan-ocha declared that his obligation is to defend national sovereignty and the monarchy. Gen Prayuth later affirmed the need to “eradicate evil people from society” and claimed that those who do not revere the monarchy are not real Thais, language that echoes inflammatory anti-communist rhetoric of the 1970s. An election is due prior to the end of the parliamentary term in December 2011. With neither side yet prepared to compromise, an election is not likely to resolve the impasse. The red shirts have begun to regain their footing, drawing 10,000 to a 19 September protest, and smaller crowds to regular weekly rallies. In mid-October, General Prayuth deployed soldiers to every district in Bangkok and surrounding provinces to act as “eyes and ears” and to engage in civic action. The stage is set for further confrontation.

Growing Religious Radicalism in Indonesia Sunny Tanuwidjaja Indonesia has received a chorus of deservedly earned praise for its recent success in rooting out terrorism. Multiple arrests in the aftermath of the Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriot bombings in July 2009 have led to hundreds of terrorists being arrested and some killed. As a result, several plots have been foiled. However, this success has not been followed by progress in curbing radicalism, which continues to make Indonesia a potential breeding ground for terrorism in the future. Recent events have shown that radicalism is gaining ground, and will continue to do so if the Indonesian government and society continue to turn a blind eye away from it. On October 1 2010, Ahmadiyah‟s mosque in Cisalada, Bogor, which is less than 50 kilometers away from Indonesia‟s capital city, was attacked by an angry mob. The mob claimed that a fellow Muslim was stabbed by an Ahmadiyah members. Ahmadiyah is an Islamic sect which believes that there is a subsequent prophet after Muhammad, and in Indonesia this groups has been under constant intimidation by Muslim groups for some time. What is surprising in the aftermath of the attack is that Indonesia Religious Affair Minister, Suryadharma Ali, stated that Ahmadiyah has to be disbanded immediately in order to avoid future conflict. The Home Affair Minister, Gamawan Fauzi, blamed Ahmadiyah for failure to comply with previous agreements which in actuality violate religious freedom in a fundamental way. The Jakarta Post, the leading English newspaper in Indonesia, has reported that the Police had been informed about the potential attack, and yet for no known reason they arrived late on the scene.

Religious radicalization is gaining ground in many areas of Indonesian society, including local government, police and the judiciary

Muslim minority groups have been disbanded, attacked, had their mosques closed down, and been forcefully relocated to distant islands

The judiciary is using broad and undefined laws to prosecute religious minority groups and promote intolerant religious homogeneity

In Pekanbaru, one of Ahmadiyah‟s mosques was closed down after pressure from several Muslim groups in the area. However, the local government claimed that the action was taken to prevent violence and for the good of Ahmadiyah‟s followers. In West Nusa Tenggara, one of the Ahmadiyah strongholds, the local government is planning to relocate Ahmadiyah‟s followers to an island about 60 kilometers from the main island. Similarly, the local government argues that it is for the sake and safety of the Ahmadiyah followers to prevent other attacks which have occurred many times in the past. While in Manis Lor, Kuningan, some 500 protesters from hard-line Islamic groups attacked the village because the Ahmadiyah followers in the village reopened eight Ahmadiyah Mosques previously sealed by the local government. These events show a clear trend of increased societal violence aimed at these religious minorities, as well as state sanctioned marginalization and cultural The Buddha Statue,Tanjung Balai, Sumatera homogenization. Other religious groups have also experienced constant intimidation. A church in Bekasi, the suburban area of the capital city, experienced constant intimidation to relocate and stop their Sunday services by a group claiming to represent the local Muslim community. The most recent example was in September when one of its members was stabbed and a priest beaten up. In Bogor, another church is constantly under siege by perpetual intimidation directed from an umbrella group consisting of several Muslim organizations. The mayor of the city later revoked the permit for the church to avoid security problems. The most recent event illustrating the problem of religious freedom in Indonesia is the demand to remove a Buddha statue in Tanjung Balai, North Sumatera (See Illustration). A Muslim group demanded that the statue be removed because it does not reflect the beliefs and wishes of Muslim majority in Tanjung Balai and argued that if not removed soon it will create religious disharmony and conflict.

A more fundamental problem directly influencing the occurrences of the violation of religious freedom illustrated above is the Indonesian legal system. While its Constitution guarantees the basic rights of the citizens to freely perform their religious duties, the laws under the Constitution often deviate from that commitment. The two most known examples are the AntiPornography Law, and the Blasphemy Law. The Anti-Pornography Law does not concretely define what constitutes pornography, and thus can be interpreted openly and has the potential to be utilized by conservative groups as the legal bases to intimidate others. Similarly, the Blasphemy Law fails to explain what constitutes religious blasphemy, and can be used to prosecute groups such as Ahmadiyah that deny that Muhammad is the last Prophet in Islam. At the more fundamental level, both laws are state attempts to homogenize the society. At the moment there are several other laws that have strong religious flavor: the “Zakat” bill which will regulate the collection of Muslim‟s donation as their religious duties, the “Halal” bill which will regulate the decision and labeling of food as “Halal”, and the bill on religious harmony which will regulate how to promote religious harmony in society (rather than religious freedom). At the local level, the laws are no less problematic. Many of the local laws have strong relations with Syariah Law. At the moment, of around 450 districts in Indonesia, at least 74 have one or more local regulation related to the Syariah Law. In Padang, West Sumatera, there is a local regulation on Koran Reading Skills for Elementary Students which requires all graduates to have certificate on their Koran reading skills as a requisite to enter secondary junior level. In 2003, Gorontalo Province passed a regulation on the prevention of immorality which stated that “every man and woman who is not married to one another is banned from being together in places or times that are inappropriate to the religious and decency norms and the customary law”. The struggle against radicalism is also happening internally within the two largest Muslim mass organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) which claims to have around 40 million members; and Muhammadiyah, claiming 30 million members. While the two have been known for their moderate stand on religion in the past, recent events show that radicalism is a creeping force within the two organizations. For example, Slamet Effendy Yusuf, one of the influential figures within the NU said that the best solution for the Ahmadiyah case is for the Ahmadiyah to be categorized as nonIslamic. If the group continues to claim itself as being Islamic, then the NU will not be able to prevent the Religious Affair Ministry from banning the group. Meanwhile many of Muhammadiyah‟s leaders supported the Blasphemy Law, which is problematic from the perspective of religious freedom. These facts tell us that the struggle against radicalism in Indonesia is a long and uphill battle because the radicalism has already spread significantly within Indonesian society. All parties who are concerned with religious freedom in Indonesia have a role to play in preventing the further creep of radicalization. First, Indonesians have to realize and admit that there is a problem brewing within their society. This requires an active process of socialization and a campaign to educate the public about the situation. Second, the government has a central role in curbing radicalism in its diverse forms. In particular, it should enforce the law in order to prevent violence and intimidation, and foster the principle of religious freedom as stated within the Indonesian Constitution. Civil society groups have to actively seek judicial reviews on laws that are in contradiction with the Constitution. Civil society also has to make the idea of pluralism and freedom understandable and appealing to the larger public. Last, the international community should stop praising Indonesia‟s success in democratization because such action, if not paralleled with criticism, will provide an international legitimacy for the Indonesian government to continue its half-hearted commitment in curbing radicalism.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan as a Global Threat Khuram Iqbal

A rift between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban has resulted in closer links between the TTP and al-Qaeda

The TTP has broadcast explicit intentions to wage an international Jihad inline with al-Qaeda’s global strategy

A number of the TTP’s official video statements were filmed by the alQaeda’s media wing, al-Sahab

With terrorist groups expanding their outreach and incorporating local, regional and international allies, the global threat of terrorism appears far from over. Although the international campaign led by the U.S has significantly damaged the physical infrastructure of various interlinked terrorist groups operating in different parts of world, final victory seems unattainable without addressing the root causes of violent radicalization. Ultimately, al-Qaeda‟s message of global Jihad is engulfing more individuals (as evident from the rise of homegrown terror in the West) and groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and most importantly Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP, which can be best described as an outcome of unintended spill-over effects of the international intervention in Afghanistan, has undergone radical transformation since its inception in December 2007. An entity that was formed to safeguard and strengthen the Afghan Taliban‟s movement against the foreign forces has been gradually enhancing its global profile through its aggressive propaganda against the West in general and the U.S in particular. The group‟s transformation into a global entity offers an interesting case study. In order to assess and comprehend the global scale of threat posed by the TTP, it is essential to analyze the post-9/11 shifts in the links between al-Qaeda, and the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. The TTP is often confusingly described as a Pakistani branch of Afghan Taliban that shares similar objectives. However, this is not the case, as the TTP and Afghan Taliban are two totally different entities with very different goals. The Pakistani Taliban, currently led by Hakeemullah Mehsud, has been joined by individuals of various Afghan Jihadi militias including the Haqqani Network. But due to different goals and objectives, the leadership of the Afghan Taliban has never endorsed the TTP‟s formation and activities. Since its inception, the TTP leadership has always pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar, who is also recognized as the spiritual leader of Taliban on both sides of Pak-Afghan border. This move was orchestrated by late Baitullah Mehsud, the founder of group, and was probably intended to capitalize on the significant support and sympathies available to the Afghan Taliban from a large segment of Pakistani population. The TTP also claimed that Mullah Omar has personally appointed Baitullah Mehsud as the Head of Pakistani Taliban. However, it is pertinent to mention that despite all the rhetoric and propaganda by the TTP, the Afghan Taliban never approved Baitullah Mehsud and his outfit. Pervasive confusion over the links between the two groups forced the Afghan Taliban to publically disown the TTP. In January 2008, the official spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid set the record straight and stated: Ours is an Afghan movement and we as a matter of policy do not support militant activity in Pakistan […] Baitullah is a Pakistani and we as the Afghan Taliban have nothing to do with his appointment or his expulsion. We did not appoint him and we have not expelled him. The timing of the statement was crucial. The Afghan Taliban publically denounced the TTP when the later unleashed a wave of terror across Pakistan in which thousands of Pakistani security forces, government officials and civilians were being killed indiscriminately. The Pakhtuns inhabiting in the FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have become the prime victims of the atrocities committed by the TTP. Hence there is a great fear among the Afghan Taliban of loosing popular support from the Pakistani Pakhtuns due to the anti-Pakistan activities of the TTP. Therefore, it was necessary for the Afghan Taliban to distance itself from the TTP in order to secure their support base in the Pakhtun dominated areas of Pakistan. Another factor defining the rifts between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban is the former‟s policy vis-à-vis the non-TTP Taliban of the FATA. These factions are more focused on Afghanistan and do not necessarily support the TTP‟s terrorist activities in Pakistan. On the other hand, the TTP has always tried to persuade and coerce these groups to join hands to enforce Sharia in Pakistan and such failed efforts have caused violent clashes between the TTP and various factions of Afghanistan-focused tribal militias of the FATA. For instance, in July 2008, the TTP killed two veteran Jihadis in Mohmand agency who maintained close links with Afghan Taliban movement.

The tribal areas of Pakistan are considered to be an important base for the Afghan Taliban to wage guerrilla warfare against foreign forces in Afghanistan. The loss of key commanders in these areas would have displeased the Afghan Taliban, and would have led them to publically disown the TTP. As a result, today al-Qaeda exerts more influence on the Pakistani Taliban than the Afghan Taliban. In fact, the TTP has crossed the red line by vociferously endorsing al-Qaeda‟s agenda of global Jihad and collaborating closely with the global terrorist outfit in various acts of international terrorism. The group has not only intended to operate globally, but it has also demonstrated the required capabilities to carry out attacks beyond the territorial borders of Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud, the deceased founder of the TTP, strongly endorsed al Qaeda‟s ideology of the global Jihad including threats against the White House, New York and London. In his first-ever television interview aired on 28 January 2008 Baitullah told Al Jazeera television network: Our main aim is to finish Britain, the US and to crush the pride of the nonMuslims. We pray to God to give us the ability to destroy the White House, New York and London. And we have trust in God. Very soon, we will be witnessing Jihad‟s miracles. Apart from the TTP‟s explicit intentions to wage an international Jihad in-line with al-Qaeda‟s global strategy, content analysis of the video interviews and official statements issued by the group‟s leadership also reveals startling insights into group‟s global agenda. In order to access the scale of threat from a totally different angle, ten official video statements and interviews of the TTP‟s leadership released and issued during 2007 to 2009 were randomly selected for content analysis. The videos and interviews were collected through enhanced field and online research, and were closely scrutinized to identify the specific characteristics of TTP‟s communication, which ultimately define its global ambitions. An examination of the TTP‟s official communication using the techniques of content analysis reveals that increased attention to the West and global conflicts has replaced talk of supporting the Afghan Taliban‟s cause, which was one of the group‟s main concerns in the early phase of its formation. Compared to the Afghan Taliban, the texts from Pakistani Taliban are more emotional, angry and concerned with other groups and governments – all similar features that define al-Qaeda's texts. Keywords such as apostates ( a term to define Pakistani soldiers and anyone supporting the government actions against Pakistani Taliban), Iraq, Palestine, India, global, international, glory of Islam and Crusades occur frequently in spoken and written communication of the TTP. Under Hakeemullah Mehsud, the group has also vowed to replace existing imperial system with a Caliphate that will be extended throughout the world. The Pakistani army is repeatedly described as an American puppet. Interestingly, a number of the TTP‟s official video statements were filmed by the al-Qaeda‟s media wing known as al-Sahab, which comes as another indication of the close ideological and operational collaboration between the two groups. The international war against terrorism has radically transformed the global threat environment, fractured alliances, and gave birth to world‟s deadliest terrorist groups. Whereas the Afghan Taliban appears to have realized the risks associated with linking their group to global Jihad movement, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has rose to embrace al-Qaeda and its global agenda. The TTP, as al Qaeda‟s front organization, does not only intend to take its fight to the West, it is also gradually acquiring capabilities to fulfill its global designs. The history of the TTP‟s involvement in the acts of international terrorism is detrimental in comprehending the global threat posed by the outfit. The newly emerged alliances and the post-9/11 shifts in the links between various Jihadi outfits active in the region demand an immediate review of regional counter-terrorism strategies. Since the core objective of war on terror was to eliminate al-Qaeda and its support structure, more resources and efforts need to be spent on securing the FATA where al-Qaeda is hiding, regrouping and reorganizing in collaboration with and under the protection of the TTP. Given the complicity of problem in the FATA, this can only be best handled and managed by the Pakistani government itself. An outside force without sufficient knowledge of the people, culture, militant groups and the terrain, would only add to the deterioration of the situation. Any direct Western involvement on operational level would most probably be highly counterproductive. There is a need for enhanced regional and global collaboration to counter the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is no longer just a Pakistani challenge but an emerging global threat.

Political Instability, Crime and Radicalization in the Maldives Abdulla Phairoosch

A power struggle is taking place between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, resulting in growing political and civil unrest

Convicts are being courted for political advantage by both major political parties, with general amnesties and lax prison regulations as a result

Urban gang-crime, drug trafficking and Islamic radicalization all appear to be on the rise within Maldives society

The Maldives is currently beset by a series of worsening security challenges, including political insecurity, increased domestic and transnational crime and a newly emerging religious extremism. Yet, no concerted strategy is being implemented to address these issues. As an infant democracy, a power struggle is taking place in the Maldives between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, resulting in growing political and civil unrest. The People‟s Majlis (the legislature) has passed motions undermining the powers of the executive; the executive has harassed the People‟s Majlis, challenged the laws, exerted undue influence on the judicial system and acted irresponsibly to disrepute the judiciary. The entire cabinet, except the President and the Vice President, resigned en masse on 29 June 2010, citing lack of cooperation from the People‟s Majlis and corruption within it. They also alleged that the opposition-led parliament was hijacking their powers and continuously hindering them from performing their constitutional duties. Soon after, police arrested two parliamentarians: Abdulla Yameen, leader of the People‟s Alliance (PA), and Gasim Ibrahim, leader of the Jumhooree Party, accusing them of treason and bribery. A week later, the Deputy Speaker, Ahmed Nazim (from the PA) was arrested on charges of corruption. On 11 July 2010 the Supreme Court invalidated the legitimacy of the arrests of Yameen and Ibrahim, and they were released from custody. The Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) then took Yameen into „protective custody‟ against his freewill. He was released on 23 July 2010, hours after US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Blake, told journalists that Yameen should either be charged or released. Later, in the verdict of a civil suit filed by Yameen, the Civil Court ruled the „protective custody‟ given to Yameen as illegal and unconstitutional. In the middle of this political turbulence, the nation is beset by protests and rallies organized by the ruling and opposition coalition parties. The political situation does not show any signs of improvement, instead it is deteriorating. The all-party talks which began on 25 July 2010, with the aim of breaking the political deadlock, ended on 2 September 2010 without reaching a productive outcome, and with the ruling-coalition and opposition-coalition blaming the other for the failure. In a late September 2010 the Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party (DRP) decided to boycott the state-owned media and declined to further negotiate with the government. Tensions are increasing not only between the government and opposition, but also within the ruling-coalition. In April 2010, the Vice President of the Republic, Dr Mohamed Waheed Hussain Manik, who is also the leader of Gaumee Iththihaad party, openly criticized President Nasheed and the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) for lack of political discourse between MDP and its coalition. As a result, the Minister of Trade and Economic Development, Mohamed Rasheed, who belong to Gaumee Iththihaad was dismissed from his post on 9 May 2010. The situation is expected to worsen, and civil violence could flare. Already it is clear that national development is being adversely affected. This was clearly evident when some nations issued travel warnings for their nationals travelling to the Maldives soon after the political clashes in July 2010. Almost complete economic dependence on tourism makes the Maldives‟ economy highly vulnerable to such announcements. To make matters worse convicts are being courted for political advantage by both major political parties. In order to gain political support and win the Presidential Election in 2003, President Gayyoom gave general amnesty to 72% of the prison population. Another 69 criminals were awarded presidential pardon just a day before ratifying the new Constitution which outlined the boundary on clemencies and pardons for convicts. Immediately after the change of government in 2008, the new administration also introduced many noxious changes to the prison system, such as permitting mobile phones into cells, prohibiting any forceful action against inmates who break the rules, and the unlawful transfer of inmates to house arrest. This empowerment of the inmates caused havoc and destruction in Maafushi Jail (the central prison) when the inmates twice torched the building in 2009. On the second instance, a temporary detention facility had to be established at the MNDF base in Gan Island until the Maafushi Jail could be rebuilt.

Due to scarcity of space in the prisons, over 500 criminals with pending jail sentences are deliberately kept loose in the society. The freed convicts have become a threat to the society and are creating a climate of general fear and distress. The consequent loss of any fear of incarceration is causing criminals to become more brazen. The national crime rate is increasing, especially the number of violent crimes. According to a survey conducted by the Human Rights Commission of the Maldives (HRCM) in 2009, 42.7% respondents felt that the capital, Malé, was unsafe to live in, and 38.7% expressed hesitation to be on the streets of Malé during the daytime. Furthermore, 51% attributed the “release of convicts without enforcing sentences and failure of the government to take necessary actions against offenders” as the main reason for the rise in crime. There are over 25 criminal gangs operating in Malé. They are highly organized and operate within a well-coordinated system, and are frequently involved in murder, assault and violence (mostly inter-gang). Most of these gangs are also involved in the drug trade. About 80% of convicts serving sentences in jail are drug offenders. Due to lack of proper and efficient rehabilitation mechanisms, and severe punishments even for possession of small amounts, many youths have taken to crime as a career. In a nation with a population less than 400,000, police arrested 2,613 persons on drug-related offenses in 2008, of which 84.2% were under 33 years of age. The figure in 2009 was 79.5% of 5053 arrestees. Being a country with 71% of its population under 31 years of age, and a median age of 22 years, these figures depict an alarming situation. However, there exists no reliable assessment on understanding the reasons behind the prevalence of the issue. The geographic location of the Maldives – not too far from golden triangle and golden crescent – and its dispersed geographic layout makes it a potential transit point for drug trafficking, especially the transshipments of precursor chemicals or narcotics. In April 2006, a fishing vessel looking or lobsters found 1.6 tones of packaged hashish concealed in a shallow lagoon, well-laid to avoid drifting away due to the water current. Though this is the only discovery of this sort so far, the frequent movement of vessels, including luxury yachts, makes the waters of the Maldives a potential mid-stage point for traffickers. Islamic extremism and terrorism is also emerging for the first time as a security issue in the Maldives. The first act of violence committed by extremists took place on 29 September 2007, when an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was detonated in Sultan Park, a popular tourist attraction in Malé. The blast injured twelve tourists: eight Chinese, two Japanese and two Britons. It was carried-out by young radicalized Maldivians who were subsequently found to have had links with Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan. Violent defiance demonstrated by radicalized locals at Himendhoo Island in October 2007, when police arrived to verify and establish links from the Sultan Park blast, casts doubts on the social and religious harmony of the Maldives. This bloody confrontation ended with the arrest of 63 persons. Though the government has acknowledged that religious fundamentalism is the biggest threat to the security of the Maldives, the HRCM recently raised doubts on the commitment of the government to properly address the issue. There has been no attempt to identify or understand the underlying issues behind the growth of religious extremism in Maldives society. Instead, the government appears to be committed to freeing or awarding clemencies to convicts sentenced for being involved in religious violence. In August 2010, the government freed two (amongst the three) operatives of the Sultan Park blast, upon serving less than three years jail-term, into an environment where monitoring mechanisms are very weak. In order to efficiently tackle the political insecurity and criminality engulfing the Maldives, policymakers need to address these issues objectively. However, at present political ambition is superseding the greater national good. Ill-judged policies on criminal management have resulted in unprecedented level of crime, and have established a climate of fear within the society. Religious cohesion has traditionally been a hallmark of the Maldives, and Islam has been practiced in a tolerant and relaxed manner. But a failure to adopt sound policies and strategies in response to the problematic effects of globalization is resulting in an increased level of social dislocation that is tearing the social fabric of the nation. Until recently, political stability has ensured that the Maldives has progressed more quickly than any other nation in South Asia. The advent of political insecurity, however, is now arresting national growth and security.

Asian Conflicts Reports Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research Editors Dr. Julian Droogan | Macquarie University, Australia Mr. Shanaka Jayasekara | Macquarie University, Australia Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig | Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens | Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia About the Authors NELSON RAND is an independent journalist based in Bangkok, Thailand MATT WHEELER is a PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales, Australia SUNNY TANUWIDJAJA is a research fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia KHURAM IQBAL is Research Coordinator at the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan ABDULLA PHAIROOSCH is former head of the Strategic Development Department of the Maldives Police and is currently a research student at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR) includes as its members: Afghanistan: Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies | Australia: Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University | Bangladesh: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies | Bangladesh: Bangladesh Institute for Peace & Security Studies| India: Institute of Conflict Management | Indonesia: Center for the Study of Islam and Society, State Islamic University of Indonesia | Japan: Research Institute of Science and Technology | Malaysia: Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism | Pakistan: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies | Philippines: Strategic and Integrative Studies Center | Philippines: Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research | Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Nanyang University | Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka International Centre for Terrorism Research and Conflict Management | USA: Institute for Defense Analyses | For inquiries about CATR or Asian Conflicts Reports: Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens, SFRD, Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria VA, 22311, USA. E-mail: cziemke@ida.org