Central and Eastern European Geopolitical Study

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL STUDY Central and Eastern European Countries in the Multipolar World of the 21st Century

Dr. Ágnes Bernek PhD

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL STUDY Central and Eastern European Countries in the Multipolar World of the 21st Century

MARCH 2018

Central And Eastern European Geopolitical Study V-Report Central and Eastern European Countries in the Multipolar World of the 21st Century

Prepared by: dr. Ágnes Bernek Geopolitical Analyst Director, Geopolitics Research Centre, King Sigismund University Expert, Hungarian National Trading House

Edited by: Norbert Csizmadia The opinion expressed in the polemical essay is that of the author and does not reflect the official position of Pallas Athene Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL STUDY Central and Eastern European Countries in the Multipolar World of the 21st Century Transition from Being the 21st Century’s Buffer Zone between the West and the East to the “Bridge Region” of Eurasia in the 21st Century

DISCUSSION PAPER Written by: Dr. Ágnes Bernek PhD Published by: Pallas Athéne Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation H-1013 Budapest, Döbrentei st. 2.

Date of issue March 2018

Page-setting: Gyula Nagy Printed by: Copy & Consulting Kft.

Contact: Please send your questions, remarks and suggestions about the study and discussion document to riport@paigeobudapest.hu.

Pallas Athéné Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation March 2018

foreword

Preface to the Discussion Paper This Central and Eastern European geopolitical study aims to present what role and opportunity the Central and Eastern European countries situated in the central and eastern parts of Europe have in the multipolar world of the 21st century.

In the 20th century the region was often called the buffer zone between the West and the East; however, the role of the East has changed in the new world order, similarly to Asia and Europe. From the earlier buffer zone, the Central and eastern European countries have become as a bridgehead.

This study deals with the geographical location and role of the region and presents the evolving geopolitical multipolar world of the 21st century. It provides an orthodox geopolitical analysis of Eurasia, the World Island, outlining the Neo-Eurasian geopolitical trend. It provides a detailed analysis of the Chinese One Belt, One Road Initiative from the perspective of the new Eurasian paradigm. The study seeks the answer to the question how our region looks like in the geopolitical chessboard of the 21st century. It presents the Trans-European Transport Networks of the European Union and the corridor of the five core networks passing across them. The author also touches upon their economic spatial organizing effects, with special attention to the Chinese “gates” of the region. Finally, she suggests a new geopolitical attitude.

In November 2017 the Research Institute of Pallas Athéne Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation founded its Belt and Road Center with the aim of establishing a close professional network among the research institutes, think tanks and universities of the region, building a bridge between the East and the West. Therefore, it is essential that we introduce the study to be published now to the research instituted and decision-makers of the region on a broad scale. The latest issue of Hungary’s leading geopolitical magazine, the HUG =Hungarian Geopolitics), which is published by us, includes this study, too, among other Central and Eastern European geopolitical studies and specialized articles.

Dr. Ágnes Bernek’s geopolitical study is a discussion document. We would like to send the ideas expressed in this discussion document to professional organizations, universities, research institutes and professionals in the spirit of common thinking and planning, and we would like to ask them to send their suggestions and studies to is so that we can plan and create the vision of the region and Central and Eastern Europe together.

Budapest, March 2018

Norbert Csizmadia President of Pallas Athéne Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation Editor-in-Chief of the HUG (Hungarian Geopolitics) magazine 5

KELET-KÖZÉP-EURÓPAI GEOPOLITIKAI tanulmány

Table of Contents

11. Central

and Eastern Europe – From the “captivity” of the buffer zone role between the West and the East to the bridge-region of the multipolar world of the 21st century – research objectives ................................................................................18

12. The evolving multipolar world of the 21st century – uncertain prospects..............................22 13. Eurasia – the orthodox geopolitical interpretation of the “World Island”............................25 14. Russia and the geopolitical school of Neo-Eurasianism.........................................................36

“In the world of geopolitics, the order established and proclaimed as universal by the Western countries stands at a turning point. Its nostrums are understood globally, but there is no consensus about their application; indeed, concepts such as democracy, human rights, and international law are given such divergent interpretations that warring parties regularly invoke them against each other as battle cries.”

Henry Kissinger: World Order. 2015, p. 372.1

15. China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative and the new Eurasian paradigm..............................44 16. The Central and Eastern European countries on the grand geopolitical chessboard of 21st-century......................................................................................................48 17. Central and Eastern Europe or Eastern and Central Europe – problems associated with denomination, geographical demarcation and classification of the countries in the region...........................................................................................................................50 18. Central and Eastern European countries within and outside the Euro-Atlantic force field...................................................................................................60 19. The EU’s five TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Networks) Core Network Corridors passing through the Central and Eastern European Region and their spatial organizational impact, with special emphasis on the Chinese “gates” of the region................................................................................. 82 10. Central and Eastern Europe – the bridge region of the Eurasian supercontinent of the 21st century – towards a new geopolitical attitude......................................................105

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Central and Eastern European countries in the multipolar world of the 21st century From the buffer zone of the 20th century between the West and the East to the Eurasian Summary When it comes to defining the geopolitical role of the Central and Eastern European region, the main question is usually whether it belongs to the West or to the East. The West and East distinction is still the basis of our thinking about the international geopolitical space, although the closing of the Cold War Period in the 1990s has made the international distinction based on this logic pointless. Still, is it possible at the beginning of the 21st century that the Central and Eastern European countries change their traditional geopolitical attitude, especially their entrenched stereotypic approach about “looking up to the West and looking down on the East”?

By 2018 it has become a fact that the unipolar world built on the world political and world economic hegemon role of the USA and the Atlantic force field is taken over by a new multipolar world. The USA is not “first among equals” in the world any longer, and in a geopolitical context it can be stated that the spatial diffusion of the power has started. But what is this multipolar world going to be like? Since the control system of the currently emerging multipolar world is only taking shape now, today’s completely uncertain world can mainly be traced back to system-level geopolitical risks. With China becoming the second largest national economy in the world, political and economic models and economic approaches other than the Anglo-Saxon world economic control system are also gaining importance. A nonAnglo-Saxon world is on the way (though, for now, in co-existence with the AngloSaxon world). Therefore, the dominance of the “West” in the traditional sense can be challenged.

The “grand geopolitical chessboard” of the 21st century undergoes a fundamental change, and – together with the crisis of the European Union and the European countries that started in 2008 – the central region of the world is shifting towards

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the force field of the Pacific Ocean. Today we can investigate the grand strategies of the 21st century solely in the light of the endeavors of three world political powers, namely the USA, Russia and China. The globe is turning, and every forecast seems to suggest that the 21st century will see the downfall of Europe. And in addition to that, the Eurocentric worldview will slowly but surely change. In cartographical terms, the point of orientation is changing, and the world will no longer be interpreted only from Brussels or Washington, but from Beijing and Moscow, too, so we should work out a new geopolitical view of space.

Nevertheless, we are witnessing the renaissance of the orthodox (traditional) geopolitical attitude. The most frequently cited author of present-day geopolitics is undoubtedly British geographer Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947). The two most important terms of geopolitics, namely, “Heartland” and “World Island” are connected to Mackinder’s works.

“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world."

(H. Mackinder, 1919. p 186) In recent geopolitical studies this quotation is often used in the sense that whoever rules the “Heartland” commands the world. In the 21st century the “Heartland” is placed in the Middle Asian Region, although in the wake of the Ukrainian events more and more people highlight that Western Europe still keeps its central role in world policy. In the 21st century the “Heartland” can be interpreted as the “clashing pole” of the geopolitical space.

In his political analysis of Europe and Asia, Mackinder tried to find out what connection might there be between the geographical and historical processes, and major events. Mackinder is the father of the political concept of Eurasia, which not only suggests that Europe and Asia constitute one single continent geologically, but it also points out that the peoples and states of Europe and Asia form the center of the world power. In the quotation above, the term “World Island” refers to Eurasia, the largest contiguous continent of the Earth.

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However, the term Eurasia is one of the most hotly debated words today. In the western part of Europe even the sheer existence of the term is denied, and it is usually equated with Russia or even the rebirth of the Soviet Union. In Hungary, in the stereotypic way of thinking typical of the Cold War Era, Europe is equated with the West and Eurasia is identified with the East. Even the well-established political wording according to which we should choose between Europe and Eurasia is basically wrong both in geographical and geopolitical terms.

Europe is not a separate continent either geologically or geographically. Even Alexander Humboldt defined Europe as the enormous western peninsula of Asia. The reason why we think that Europe is an individual continent is rather rooted in its history, culture and perception. H. Mackinder described the political structure of the world as the American continent and the World Island. Although everything changes, the basic geopolitical question remains the same: will Halford Mackinder’s World Island ever take shape as an actual territorial unit, and will we be able to investigate the world political relations as the World Island and the American continent? Will the USA’s Cold War Policy of Containment continue in the future, and if so, how will it prevent Europe and Asia from establishing strong economic and political relations? Will a new Eurasian supercontinent emerge through the enhancing economic cooperation between Russia and China? What new multipolar world will it create and what position will our region and country have in the currently evolving Eurasian supercontinent?

In the 2000s - after V. Putin became President and Russia’s economic and political consolidation and rising started - the term Eurasia was solely associated with Russian geopolitical ambitions. In this way this word was given a PostSoviet interpretation, and the Eurasian geopolitical strategies of Western Russia suggested the risk of the Soviet Union’s rebirth. It was not by chance that this concept met utter rejection in the countries of the Euro-Atlantic force field, and that the establishment of a new ally, force field between Europe and Asia was entirely rejected.

Since 2013 the introduction and launch of the Chinese “New Silk Road”, or officially the “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure and economic development program gave the term Eurasia a new, primarily economic context and went beyond the PostSoviet imperial interpretation. For the first time in history, there is a realistic economic chance for Europe and Asia to form one single economic force field, for the western part of Europe would be actually connected with the eastern part of Asia.

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This also means that while earlier the term Eurasia was only accepted geologically around the world (except for Russia), by today Eurasia has received a new political and economic interpretation.

But what geopolitical role will the Central and Eastern European region have in this new emerging Eurasian continent? In European terms, this region is the periphery of the EU, the eastern half of the European continent. But will this region be given a new geopolitical role, will it become the bridge region between Europe and Asia, between the western part of Europe and the eastern part of Asia? Will the Central and Eastern European region be able to break free from the “captivity” between the West and the East?

In order to become the bridge region of the currently emerging Eurasian continent, the Central and Eastern European countries have to transform into an individual economic force field. However, it is only possible if the countries of the region do cooperate with each other economically, and, instead of the intensified westerneastern division, a new Central and Eastern European economic force field comes into existence based on the north-south infrastructure corridors. The necessity of establishing this Central and Eastern European North-South economic (and political) force field was actually mentioned in the settlement plan of Polish Marshal Józef Pilsudski after World War I. Marshall Pilsudski created the term Intermarium, which referred to the idea that the countries of the region from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea would cooperate more closely in order to maintain their independence.

The three key driving forces of this new, currently emerging Central and Eastern European economic force field are the following: 1. The original purpose of the Visegrad cooperation signed in 1991 was to realize the Euro-Atlantic integration as soon as possible. Since then V4 has become a recognized political “trademark”. The Polish V4 Presidency of 2016/2017 was the first period when the Visegrad cooperation had already set serious foreign political purposes: to enhance the economic and political cooperation of the V4 countries with other states in the Central and Eastern European countries, the countries of the Western Balkan and the states of the EU Eastern Partnership Program. The current Hungarian Presidency Program preserves the foreign political ambitions of the Polish Presidency, and one of the high-priority purposes of the Hungarian Presidency Subprogram entitled “Regional Visegrad” is to establish stronger relations between the V4 and the Western Balkan. But one of the

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big questions in the near future is whether the Visegrad cooperation will be extended further. According to the forecast of this study, the V4 formation should be transformed into a V7 formation: Croatia, Slovenia and Austria should also be included in this cooperation, and thus a new Central European cooperation framework should be created for the 21st century.

2. I n order to establish the new North-South relationship network of the Central and Eastern European Region, the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) was formed with the aim of building new economic relationships within our region, between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Seas. The Three Seas Initiative was initiated by Croatia and Poland. The first summit was held in Dubrovnik, Croatia in the summer of 2016, while the second summit was organized in Warsaw, Poland in July 2017. Its northern “gate” is the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) Terminal commissioned in Swinoujscie in Northern Poland in 2016, while the northern “gate” is the Adriatic Sea LNG Terminal to be completed on Krk Island, Croatia in 2019.

3. T he “16+1 Cooperation” to be established between China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries was announced by former President of the People’s Republic of China, Wen Jiabao during his official visit to Hungary in 2011. The aim is that China establishes a new platform with the Central and Eastern European countries. Officially, this “16+1 Cooperation” transregional platform was formed at the Warsaw Summit in 2012, and since then a Prime Ministerial Summit has been arranged every year between the 16 Central and Eastern European countries and China. In November 2017 the Summit of the 16+1 cooperation was held in Budapest.

However, beyond these three initiatives and forms of cooperation, this emerging Central and Eastern European economic force field is also reflected by the fact that the missing transport sections of the EU’s five Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) related to the European Union region are being built. The most important question is how these TEN-T transport corridors will be able to connect to the main routes of the Chinese New Silk Road economic zone. The two European gates of the mainland route along the Chinese New Silk Road economic zone are Terespol, Poland / Brest, Belorussia and Záhony, Hungary. On the other hand, the European gate of the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road is definitely the Port of Piraeus, Greece.

Nevertheless, we cannot doubt that for the emergence of a new Central and Eastern European economic force field, all agents of the political, economic and business life should work out a new geopolitical attitude. In a few decades, what answer will we give to the question where the Central and Eastern European Region is: on the eastern part of Europe or in the middle of Eurasia?

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1. C entral and Easter Europe – From being “trapped” between East and West to becoming the “bridge region” in the 21st century’s multi-polar world – aims of the study and hypotheses When it comes to defining the geopolitical role of the Central and Eastern European region the main question, usually arising, is whether it belongs to the West or the East? What is more important, the fact that it is the eastern frontier zone of the Atlantic field or more so that it is the westernmost bridgehead of the Eurasian field currently in the making?

Though, it should be noted that these are no longer the right questions to ask in the 21st century. These questions belong rather to the traditional North–South and West–East division that was prevalent during the second half of the 20th century.

In the 1980s, with the former German Chancellor, Willy Brandt playing a leading role in its conception, the so called Brandt Report was published which depicted a North–South divide with regard to the existing global political and economic discrepancies. The so called Brandt Line divided the globe into developed northern and developing southern countries along the 30° north latitude. However, during the Cold War the developed northern world was subdivided into the western capitalist world and the socialist eastern bloc (The Soviet Union and the socialist Eastern European countries) opposing it.

The West–East division still forms the basis of our present-day thinking about the geopolitical field, despite the fact that as a result of the regime changes that started from the 1990s the world has become unipolar, and the international division constructed upon Cold War logic has become obsolete. What is more, due to the emerging markets of the previously underdeveloped southern states even the North–South classification has become irrelevant. So much so, that the developing country denomination is no longer used in the global political and economic discourse of the 21st century. It is also imperative to point out that the underlying idea behind the traditional geopolitical interpretation of geographical directions is that the European continent’s central position in the world is self-evident for us.

Thus on the world maps we use Europe is always in central position. Consequently, it becomes clear that the North–South and even more so the West–East geopolitical approach is rooted in the fact that we investigate the 21st century’s geopolitical field exclusively from the perspective of Europe.

The “grand geopolitical chessboard” of the 21st century, however, has transformed profoundly, and due to the 2008 crisis of the European Union and other European

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countries the world’s centre of gravity has shifted to the Pacific field of power. The “grand strategies” of the 21st century are, by now, investigated solely in the light of the geopolitical interests of three political world powers, namely the USA, Russia and China. The globe is turning and every forecast seems to suggest that the 21st century will see the downfall of Europe. And in addition to that, slowly but surely, the Eurocentric world view is going to change, thus bringing about a shift in the interpretation of the traditional North–South and West–East division of the international order. That is, in cartographic terms, the zero point will change and the world will no longer be interpreted only through Brussels and Washington but through Beijing and Moscow, as well. Therefore, we must work out a new geopolitical view of space.

The China-centered, Chinese-language world map

But in the case of the Central and Eastern European region shaking off the Cold War “shackles” of being caught between West–East is a daunting task. In the wake of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, due to the standoff between the USA and Russia East-Central Europe has once again gradually become a buffer zone, like so many times throughout history. On the flipside, the multi-polar world currently in the making provides new geopolitical opportunities too. Instead of the “age-old” West–East-based geopolitical thinking we need to adopt a new approach. This will allow for a profoundly new interpretation of the relative geopolitical situation of Central and Eastern Europe in the near future.

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The Eurasian continent

On the other hand, despite all its inherent risks the evolving multi-polar world provides new geopolitical opportunities too. In my view, the global economic and political role of East-Central Europe and the members of the Visegrad Group in particular could be that of a mediary between the major economic and political power fields in the 21st century. From an economic perspective this could bring about the dominance of transport services and intermediary activities in the field of business and finance in the region. Ideally, Hungary could become a hub for logistics for both western (primarily from North-America and Western Europe) and eastern (predominantly from Russia and China) transnational companies.

In my opinion, in order for Hungary to become successful on the long term it should strive towards becoming a strategically important geographical spot, or in geopolitical terms a “bridge state” in the multi-polar world of the 21th century. The evolving Eurasian supercontinent provides an opportunity for that. As a result of the intensified cooperation between Russia and China a new Eurasian field of power is on the rise but the main question is what Asian-European political and economic relations will be like and whether the European continent will constitute a part of Eurasia or not?

Can a country as small as ours have its own foreign trade and foreign policy strategy?

In the current period of “deglobalisation” and ever-strengthening macro-regions cementing the Visegrad Cooperation and establishing an East-Central European economic field of power underpinned by a new North-South infrastructural corridor could serve as a suitable basis for adopting a considerably more independent foreign policy strategy.

The basic concept of the study – the so-called new Eurasia paradigm. Its most important elements are the following: Ø In the 2000s – from the beginning of V. Putin’s tenure as president and the economic and political consolidation and rise of Russia – the concept of Eura-

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sia was solely associated with Russia’s geopolitical endeavours. Consequently, a post-soviet interpretation was attributed to it, and the Western world ultimately saw the dangerous prospect of the Soviet Union’s rebirth in Russia’s Eurasian geopolitical strategy. It was not by chance that the concept met utter rejection in the countries of the Euro-Atlantic field of power, and that they entirely dismissed the possibility of creating a new European–Asian alliance and field of power with the Russians at its forefront. Ø In 2013, with the introduction and implementation of the “New Silk Road” infrastructural and economic development programme, however, the concept of Eurasia was assigned a new, primarily economic interpretation, and definitively surpassed its post-soviet imperial meaning. This is because for the first time in history there is a realistic economic chance for Europe and Asia to become a single economic field of power, for the eastern end of Europe and the western half of Asia are, in effect, merged. Ø This also means that while earlier the concept of Eurasia was accepted geologically around the world (with the exception of Russia), by now the concept has acquired a new political and economic interpretation. This will have a profound effect on the general view of the world. Instead of the permanent West– East contrast we will have to take new regional levels into consideration. Ø But what will the regional organisation of the 21st century Eurasia look like? Instead of the traditional centre-periphery relation what will the new relationship of interdependence between Eurasian regions be like? Can the buffer-zones of the past actually be transformed into “bridge regions”? Does Central–Eurasia exist? In what ways is it different from the traditional concept of Central Asia? Ø What will be the role of the Central and Eastern European region on this new evolving Eurasian continent? From a European perspective it is the peripehy of the EU, the eastern half of the European continent. But will this region assume a new geopolitical role and will it become a “bridge region” between Europe and Asia? Will it be able to free itself from being caught between West and East?

If a couple decades from now in the future we were asked where the Central and Eastern European regions is, what will be our answer? At the eastern end of Europe or in the centre of Eurasia instead?

The main objective of the study is to contribute to laying the conceptual, current political, diplomatic and economic diplomatic foundation of the Central and Eastern European regions role as a “bridge-zone”.

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2. The evolving multi-polar world of the 21st century – a precarious vision of the future „In the current global economy only two things are certain. First, it is uncertain. Second, the USA is the leading economic and political power of our time.” Excerpt from an interview conducted in 1998. Interviewee: André Kostolany (1906-1999), stock market expert.2 If we asked André Kostolany today in 2017, he would probably give the following answer: „In the current global economy only one thing is certain. It is uncertain.”3 By 2017 it has become evident that in place of the unipolar world, built on the global political and economic hegemony of the USA and the Atlantic field of power, there is a new multi-polar world on the rise. In the USA’s global role of “first among equals” has now come to end and geopolitically it can be stated that spatial diffusion of power has begun. As a result the liberal economic model and the American model of democracy are both losing of significance. Though Barack Obama claimed on numerous occasions that “democracy is our brand”, it is apparent that the American model of democracy does not fare well outside the Anglo-Saxon world. Furthermore, it is also obvious that nowadays the USA’s global engagement is ahead of changes. Though, these days it is hard to decipher the geopolitical strategies applied in the foreign policy of U.S. president Donald Trump, the American approach is going through a fundamental change. The question is whether Trump and the political and economic elite close to him can actually drive the systemic change of the world and Western society within?

What will the multi-polar world be like? Since this evolving multi-polar world is still lacking a regulatory framework, the extremely volatile nature of our world can primarily be traced back to the so-called systemic geopolitical threats. It is indisputable that the post-World War II. framework of the world economy and world politics is in dire need of a change in the 21st century. The actual power of “developed countries” in the traditional sense is declining and big emerging markets have become decisive factors in the world economy. With China becoming the second biggest national economy of the world, political and economic models and economic approaches other than the Anglo-Saxon set of rules of world economy are also gaining ground. The so-called non-Anglo-Saxon world is already taking shape (though, for now, in co-existence with the Anglo-Saxon world). Thus, the dominance of the traditional “Western” world is highly questionable.

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A new era of “deglobalisation” has been emerging recently in which regions and regional markets are obtaining more and more significance beside the world’s global market. These regional markets are still managing and shaping their sphere of interests only on a continental or regional level and not on a global scale. For great powers and big emerging markets geostrategic thinking and the construction of macro-regional fields of power has become more important than in the past. The so-called “imperial thinking” has re-emerged as the central element of the major powers’ geopolitical endeavours. What is the spatial organisation “Pax Americana”, that is, the “American Empire” like in the 21st century? With regard to Hungary, the most crucial issue is the nature of the future role envisaged for the East–Central European region within “Pax Russica”, namely in the “Russian Empire” currently evolving on the geographical level of the Eurasian continent. Moreover, if the 21st century world economy’s centre of gravity shifts to the Pacific field of power then it will restructure the major fields of power overarching the continents and most of all the relationships between them.

Changes in US Outward FDI as per direction in 2015 - Based on figures of FDI outward stock

Source: Map prepared by the author and Cartographia Kft. based on the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) data stock

Though the world is going through fundamental changes, the several-decades-long opposition of the Cold War that ended in the 1990s still lives on in our political thinking and in the conceptual framework used for the study of international relations. Up until now, we have not been able to part with associations of Cold War. Consequently, according to general view, Russia is the arch enemy of the Anglo-Saxon world. The

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beginning of a new era reminiscent of the Cold War seems to be lingering above us due to the 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia. In this era the opposition of the West (Euro-Atlantic field of power) and the East (Russia) is becoming starker, the Western world is imposing a plethora of new sanctions against Russia and NATO is increasing and intensifying its military presence in the East-Central European region which has once again became a buffer-zone. Nonetheless, Russian national consciousness and the declaration of Russian independence and geopolitical strategy is much stronger than it was a few years ago. American experts on foreign policy repeatedly state that “Russia as an enemy is more important to us than as a friend”. It is indisputable that the “Russian card” is one of the pivotal elements of American media communication. And underpinning all these ideas is the age-old Cold War principle of “containment” elaborated by George Kennan in 1947. The cornerstone of Truman’s National Security Act of 19474 was to prevent by any means possible (possibly without starting a war) the further expansion of the Soviet power sphere. There seem to be no change in this regard; the USA’s attitude towards Russia and every Eurasian economic/political organisation is till the same.

However, establishing the new geopolitical role of the Central and Eastern European region and that of Hungary is an extremely challenging task, since this transitional period – an era of transition from a unipolar to a multi-polar world characterised by the competition and power display of major powers – is very dangerous in terms of national security. The political and economic institutions of the Anglo– Saxon world are no longer fit to properly uphold world order and global economicpolitical stability. The emerging markets (especially the BRICS countries) are not nearly strong enough, and most importantly, they do not form a strong enough alliance either economically or politically to be able to lay the foundations of a new world order. At the same time the contest between major powers also triggers the weakening or even the elimination of power control over the various spheres of interest. It is an obvious fact that in countries where American influence has declined the expansion of the Russian and/or Chinese sphere of interest has started.

Nonetheless, security risks are dramatically increasing due to the evolving power vacuums, and countries or regions uncommitted to either of the power-based spheres of interest as of yet. An example of that are the chaotic Iraqi situation and the unresolved Syrian conflict that followed the withdrawal of American troops and which led to the declaration of the Islamic State on the border of the two countries in 2013. The huge influx of refugees arriving into Europe from early 2015 was also mainly the result of the unresolved Afghan, Iraqi and Syrian conflict and the rise of international terrorism primarily associated with ISIS.5

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3. Eurasia – the orthodox interpretation of the World-Island “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.”

(H. Mackinder, 1919. p. 186.)6 It is apparent that the evolving multi-polar world of the 21st century is in need of new a geopolitical approach and new geopolitical concepts. In spite of that, we are witnessing a renaissance of the orthodox (traditional) geopolitical approach.

Indisputably, the most often cited writer of present-day geopolitics is the British geographer Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947). The most important terms of geopolitics, namely “Heartland” and World-Island are products of Mackinder’s work as is indicated by the above quotation.

In recent geopolitical studies the quotation is regularly used in the sense that whoever rules the “Heartland” commands the world. In the 21st century the “Heartland” is placed in the Central Asian region, though in the wake of the Ukrainian events more and more people call attention to the fact that Eastern Europe remains a key player in world politics. In the 21st century the “Heartland” can be defined as the “clashing point” of the geopolitical field.

Mackinder’s most famous study is “The Geographical Pivot of History”. He presented it at the meeting of the Royal Geographical Society on 25th January 1904.7 In his political analysis of Europe and Asia Mackinder tried to find out what kind of connection might there be between geographical and historical processes and major events. Mackinder coined the political concept of Eurasia which does not only suggest that Europe and Asia constitute a single unit geologically, but more importantly, that the nations and states of Europe and Asia form the centre of world power. In the quotation above the term “World-Island” refers exactly to Eurasia, the largest continuous continent of the planet.

The concept of Eurasia is one of the most disputed nowadays. In the western half of Europe even the sheer existence of the concept is denied and it is usually equated with Russia or the rebirth of the Soviet Union. In Hungary, in the stereotypical way of thinking characteristic of the Cold War era, Europe is equated the West and Eurasia is identified with the East. The well-established political motto, always re-emerging

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during V. Putin’s visits to Hungary, that we have to make a choice between Europe and Eurasia, is fundamentally flawed both geographically and geopolitically.

The reason for that is that Europe in its own right is not a separate continent either geologically or geographically. Even Alexander Humboldt defined Europe as the enormous western peninsula of Asia. The reason why we consider Europe to be a separate continent is rooted to a greater extent in its history, culture and its perception. Eurasia is the largest continent of the planet. Its overall territory is 55 million square metres which amounts to 37% of the world’s land surface. The entire are of the American continent is “only” 43 million square meters which makes up 28% of land areas.8 This comparison is of great significance because H. Mackinder described the world’s political structure as a unit consisting of the American continent and the World-Island.

The Pivot Area and the Inner and Outer Crescent – Mackinder 190411

the World-Island, so in other words, in the 21st century China, considered to be a land-based power, and its allies could subdue the western sea powers.

Mackinder finishes his study, “The Geographical Pivot of History” on the following note: “...it may be well expressly to point out that the substitution of some of some new control of the inland area for that of Russia would not tend to reduce the geographical significance of the pivot position. Were the Chinese, for instance, organized by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region.”12 This quotation also refers to the fact that the geopolitical stake involved in China’s 21st century “One Belt–One Road” infrastructural development plan is enormous because if it becomes reality then for the first time in history the three oceans will be successfully connected. This will render it viable to access the seas from Eurasia, that is, from the World-Island, so in other words, in the 21st century China, considered to be a land-based power, and its allies could subdue the western sea powers.

The boundary between Europe and Asia: the Ural Mountains

Mackinder finishes his study, “The Geographical Pivot of History” on the following note: “...it may be well expressly to point out that the substitution of some of some new control of the inland area for that of Russia would not tend to reduce the geographical significance of the pivot position. Were the Chinese, for instance, organized by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region.”12 This quotation also refers to the fact that the geopolitical stake involved in China’s 21st century “One Belt–One Road” infrastructural development plan is enormous because if it becomes reality then for the first time in history the three oceans will be successfully connected. This will render it viable to access the seas from Eurasia, that is, from

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The Urals are considered to be the eastern border of Europe, however, in physical geographical terms the mountain range is not a natural but an artificially designated continental border. This is also supported by the fact that the Eastern-European Plain located on the western side of the Urals and West Siberian Plain on its eastern side are similar in every respect geographically. The Urals flatten to a hilly region in the south the majority of which belongs to the Steppe region. This area stretching from the Urals to the Caspian Sea – more specifically the Mugodzhar

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Hills and its eastern part, the Turgay-Gate – has always been of great significance with regard to transport routes. The region’s geopolitical importance is described

by Halford Mackinder in his study as follows: „Through the Steppe on the other hand there came from the unknown recesses of Asia, by the gateway between the Ural mountains and the Caspian Sea, in all the centuries from the sixth to the The Steppes of the world

sixteenth, a remarkable succession of Turanian nomadic peoples — Huns, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Khazars, Patzinaks, Cumans, Mongols, Kalmuks. Under Attila the Huns established themselves in the midst of the Pusstas, in the uttermost Danubian outlier of the steppes.”13 In other words, this geographical gateway is the key to the continuity of the Eurasian Steppe (reaching from the Great Plain in the Carpathian Basin through Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia to the historical Chinese region Manchuria). This great Steppe of the ancient world served as the foundation for the major trade route of medieval times, the Silk Road (for its northern stretch to be more precise), through which the nomad shepherds and caravans connected the eastern and western halves of the Eurasian continent.

Central Asia or Central Eurasia – the prominent stage of the “grand geopolitical game” Central Asia - The prominent stage of the "grand geopolitical game"

Source: www.britannica.com/place/the-steppe

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The Central Asian region is the central part of Eurasia; an endorheic region isolated from seas by drainage divides, characterised by dry climate, the surface area of which is 4 million square kilometres. The region includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Owing to the former ancient Silk Road the region was one of the major routes of contemporary world trade. The area, formerly denoted as Turkestan in the 18th and 19th centuries, was later brought

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under Russian control and with the birth of the Soviet Union its countries became soviet member states. These states gained their independence only after the fall of the Soviet Union, in 1991.

Besides the delineation used in physical geography and the country-based demarcation, in the Hungarian literature the area is often denoted as Inner Asia, which designates a more extensive, predominantly culturally and historically defined region. This is an endorheic region of roughly 8 million km2 encompassing temperate steppes and temperate deserts. Culturally and economically speaking, its most distinctive feature is the presence of cattle herder nomadic tribes who lived encircled by sedentary agricultural communities. This dichotomy – nomadic herding and the agricultural lifestyle of desert oases (especially cotton production intended for export) – is still the main traditional economic feature of the region’s countries.

The economic development of the five Central Asian countries is highly dependent on the production of crude oil, natural gas and mineral resources. With the exception of Turkmenistan the countries are member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (free-trade area) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (forum for political cooperation). Furthermore, Kazakhstan is one of the founding members of the Eurasian Economic Union, brought into existence in 2015. Kyrgyzstan, another country in the region, also joined the union.

The “heartland of heartlands”, that is, the very core of the 21st century’s Eurasian supercontinent, is without doubt Kazakhstan. As Nursultan Nazarbayev, KazakhThe concept of the Hungarian Pavilion: The Tree of Life - Astana Expo 2017 (The Future Energy)

Source: https://www.astanaexpo2017.hu/hu/#news

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stan’s president put it, it is the “Heart of Eurasia”. The new capitol (from 1997) of the country, Astana (which means capitol in Kazakh) is aspiring to become the business/financial centre of the region. This is also exemplified by the fact that this year’s summer Astana hosted the EXPO 2017, the theme of which was future energy and renewable energy sources.

Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country in the world and largest landlocked on the planet. Its geopolitical situation is excellent. In the north it shares borders with Russia (longest land border in the world with 7644 km), in the west it is bordered by the Caspian Sea (which is actually a lake, since it is an endorheic basin), its eastern neighbour is China, while in the south it borders Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Border crossing at Khorgos Horgos/Khorgos located at the China-Kazakhstan border is the remotest geographical location from open sea in the Eurasian continent. In Halfrod Mackinder’s interpretation sea powers always subdue land-based powers, however, this “most landbased” location in the world Source: shutterstock.com might emerge as the “geopolitical winner” in the 21st century. This is because the biggest commercial road freight terminal of Western China is being constructed (and already partly in operation), within the framework of the Kazakhstan-China cross-border cooperation, between Khorgos and Horgos, on the Kazakh and Chinese sides of the border respectively. This terminal connects Western China with Central Asia and Europe, thus playing a major role in the commerce of Central Asia. This project is globally perceived to be the largest urban, and commercial and logistics hub construction project in the new Silk Road Economic Belt.

Kazakhstan is currently the 48th biggest national economy in the world (based on its total GNI – nearly 200 million USD). The record-scale boom of the Kazakh economy started in 2000 primarily thanks to the enormous increase in crude-oil production and export. The Karachaganak oil field located in the north-western part of the country is considered to be the largest in the world. In 2001, a pipeline, crossing the Caspian Sea, was opened in the second most promising oil field of the country, in Tengiz, thus considerably increasing export capacity. According to estimates, Kazakhstan possesses the 12th largest crude-oil and the 15th largest natural gas reserve in the world. Currently, the country is the 10th largest crude-oil and the

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19th largest natural gas exporter on the planet. Crude-oil and natural gas products account for 60% of its entire export, and its biggest sales market is China. Its import comes primarily from Russia. Besides hydrocarbons the country has considerable uranium (estimates suggest that the world’s biggest uranium mine is in Kazakhstan), copper and zinc reserves. Precious metals make up 20% of its export. Thanks to the above, high-value working capital investments are pouring into the country (predominantly from China, Russia and the USA). The overall value of investments in 2015 amounted to nearly 120 million USD. January 31, 2017 President Nazarbayev announced the third stage of Kazakhstan’s modernisation, the five main pillars of which are the following: technological modernisation of the economy, technological development of traditional industries, further development of the country’s mining industry, complete restructuring of the agricultural sector and making it the leading sector of economy, joining the new Eurasian logistics infrastructure and the construction of its vital elements within the country. Taking all the above into account it can be stated the main objective of the country is to become one of the top 30 national economies in the world by 2050!

Astana – The capital city of Kazakhstan

Source: shutterstock.com

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East of the Mugodzhar Hills, enclosed by the Urals and the Caspian Sea, and the Caspian Lowland lies the Turan Depression. Its original geographical name was West Turkestan, after the Turkish speaking peoples that had lived here. From 1924 it was called Soviet Central Asia and then after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 it was named the Turan Depression. This region is part of the West Asian lowland characterised by ergs, clay deserts and huge salty lakes in its endorheic territories. The name Turan is of Persian origin, formerly used to denote the home of the peoples who lived north and east of ancient Persia.14 This is of outstanding significance, for The Hungarian Turan Society (also called The Hungarian Asiatic Society), in essence, can actually be considered as the historical antecedent of Hungary’s current Eastern Opening policy. The interpretation of the denomination Turan was always a subject of dispute while the Turan Society existed.15 Geographers used the term “Turan” in a purely geographic sense and were fierce opponents of imbuing the idea of Turanism with a scientifically utterly unsubstantiated linguistic, cultural or political interpretation. Pál Teleki wrote the following in the 1918 January-February issue of the society’s journal, Turán: “ Turan is a geographical concept to me, a type concept, the concept of the Central Asian Steppe with its agony under the vicissitudes of the fluctuating climate and its grapple with the desert...”16 Despite the endeavours of the most prominent figures in geography, Turanism eventually acquired a political charge, and its ideology became especially forceful in the wake of the 1920 Trianon peace dictate and promoted the “search for allies in the East after the treason of the West”.

During the First World War with considerable government support – from May, 1916 – The Hungarian Turan Society was transformed into the Hungarian Centre for Eastern Culture with the purpose of establishing a stronger relationship with peoples of the Turanian language family (with Turkey and Bulgaria in particular). The former Eastern Trade Academy which operated as an independent entity between 1899 and 1920 is of great importance with regard to Hungary’s current foreign trade strategy, the Eastern Opening. Students of the institution were specifically trained for promoting trade with countries in the Balkans and Anatolia. Trade conducted in these regions was supported by contemporary state policy by establishing trade offices in the prominent economic hubs. These offices also served as consulates in the respective states. Since the students of the Academy were granted considerable scholarhips, and could expect to build a serious career in foreign affairs/trade after graduating the Academy, which admitted 25 people annually, was heavily oversubscribed. The most outstanding scholars of the era taught at the Academy, including, for example, Gyula Germanus who

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was the professor for Turkish and Arabic languages. Unfortunately the Eastern Trade Academy has sunk into oblivion by now, only a handful of documents dealing with its operation are accessible.17 In American geopolitics exerting political control over the Eurasian field of power has always been a pivotal element of exercising power globally. In the 20th century, for example, in the work of Brzezinski the political concept of Eurasia crops up as the “Eurasian chessboard” and it sums up the geostrategic objectives of the US as regards Eurasia.18 Brzezinski states the following in his book, “The Grand Chessboard”: “Hence, the issue of how a globally engaged America copes with the complex Eurasian power relationships – and particularly whether it prevents the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power – remains central to America’s capacity to exercise global primacy.”19 In this book Brzezinski sees the following prospect as the one posing the greatest threat to America’s position of global supremacy: “Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an „antihegemonic” coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.”20 In Brzezinski’s 2012 interpretation the two main pillars of the USA’s grand new geopolitical strategy is the “greater West” and the “new East”. The “greater West” refers to the USA’s primary objective of strengthening the West and along these lines recruiting Russia and Turkey as the USA’s allies. Though this interpretation from 2012 has already become irrelevant with regard to Russia. Brzezinski’s term, the “new East” encompasses China, East and Southeast Asia, and in his view these are the regions with which the U.S. should form a new comprehensive and balanced network of relationships.21 The “grand geopolitical chessboard” of the 21st century is going through fundamental changes, and owing to the evolving multi-polar world there are new “pieces” appearing on the board who will bring new rules to the game. Even though everything is in motion, the fundamental question remains the same: Will Halford Mackinder’s World Island ever take shape as an actual geographic territorial unit and will we be able to investigate global political relations in terms of the WorldIsland—American continent dichotomy in the near future ? Will the USA’s policy of containment continue, and if so, how will it actually thwart the creation of a strong economic and political relationship between Europe and Asia? Will a new Eurasian supercontinent be created through the ever-intensifying economic cooperation between Russia and China? What is the new multi-polar world going to be like and what will be the role of Hungary and the Central Eastern European region in the currently evolving Eurasian supercontinent?

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4. Russia and the geopolitical school of Neo-Eurasianism “In the past 20 years, our partners have been trying to convince Russia of their good intentions, their readiness to jointly develop strategic cooperation. However, at the same time they kept expanding NATO, extending the area under their military and political control ever closer to our borders. And when we rightfully asked: “Don’t you find it possible and necessary to discuss

this with us?” they said: “No, this is none of your business. Those who continue insisting on their exclusivity strongly dislike Russia’s independent policy. The events in Ukraine prove this. They also prove that a model of relations full of double standards does not work with Russia.”

Excerpt from V. Putin’s address at the conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives on July 1, 2014.22

The physical geography and borders of Russia

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Since 2000 Eurasia has been a central element of Russia’s new geopolitics, for Neoeurasianism, that is, the creation of a new bipolar world order – i.e. Eurasianism vs Atlantism – , is of utmost importance in their efforts to obtain world supremacy. This Russian Eurasian geopolitical field is so decisive that V. Putin too made allusions to it in his speech at the presidential inauguration ceremony, May 7, 2012: “...our determination in developing our vast expanses from the Baltic to the Pacific, and on our ability to become a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of Eurasia.”23 The mastermind and the “leading figure” of Russia’s new geopolitics is Aleksandr Dugin, who in 2002 created his own party, the Eurasian Movement. Thus, Mackinder’s political term has become the ultimate “keyword” of Russia’s current geopolitical direction. Since Eurasianism has a long history in Russia, Dugin labelled the current Russian geopolitical direction as Neoeurasianism.

Neoeurasianism is in stark contrast with Atlantism and the ultimate aim of Russian geopolitical endeavours is the creation of the multi-polar world! Dugin outlined the theory of Russia’s new geopolitics in his book titled the “Foundations of Geopolitics”.24 On the basis his work the most important features and objectives of Russian geopolitics are the following:

tion concerning the creation of a new Eurasian field of power is whether Russia is going to be able to find allies in the future, and the most essential part of that question: what is the Russian-Chinese relation’s course of development going to be like? In this respect, arguably the most significant event was the meeting between the Russian and Chinese president in Moscow, May, 2015. On May 8, 2015 (a day before the Victory Day military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WW II.), Russia and China officially signed the deal on the Eurasian Economic Union and the New Silk Road Economic Belt cooperation.27 This is much more than a simply economic agreement because the deal outlines a common major investment and infrastructural development plans.

What is the world like from Moscow? The Eurasia map attached demonstrates what major regions Eurasia can be divided into in accordance with Russian interests and geopolitical goals.

The main geopolitical regions of the Eurasian supercontinent from the perspective of Russian geopolitical strategies

Ø Instead of a unipolar system of world politics, controlled from the Atlantic field of power, the creation of a bipolar system of world politics is needed, and Eurasia must be re-established as a dominant centre of world politics; Ø The champion of Eurasianism (or Neoeurasianism to be more specific) is Russia whose primary goal is the conclusion of Pan-Eurasian agreements with the leading powers of Asia (Japan, China, India) and the Asian member states of CIS; Ø Russia is not “merely” a state or a regional power but a world power the primary aim of which is the creation of a Russian Empire; Ø Establishing new types of economic relations with the states of the European continent (primarily with Germany and countries of East-Central Europe) is central to the creation of Russia’s economic sphere of interest.25 To date, the movement of Eurasianism has received a strong institutional basis in Russia. In January 1, 2015 Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia joined forces and established the Eurasian Economic Union. Kyrgyzstan became the fifth member of Eurasian integration in August, 2015.26 Geopolitically the main ques-

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Source: Markings by the author on a Russian-language world map Source of the Russian-language world map: http://www.mapsland.com/world/large-detailed-political-map-of-the-world-in-russian

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The central area or in Macikinder’s terms the “Heartland” of the map is Russia, China, Central Asia and Mongolia. This central area is surrounded by four belts or geopolitically speaking “rimlands”.

Great Eurasian Partnership

These rimlands are the following: Ø The zone consisting of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; Ø Europe – from Western Europe to the Russian border; Ø Southeast Asia, South and East Asia – from the western border of Mianmar to Japan; Ø The Middle East – North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Iraq.

Therefore, China, Middle Asia and Mongolia are central to Russia’s geopolitical endeavours and to the new Russian Eurasian space in the 21st century. The question is what kind of allies Russia can find in the four “rimlands” and in what direction it can expand its economic and political influence.

The most important platform for the cooperation of Russia and China is the Shanghai Cooperation Organiztaion, founded in 2001. The founding members of the organisation also include the “Heartland-countries” of Central Asia, that is, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2017 the political significance of SCO increased considerably, it expanded further as two other states, India and Pakistan, joined its ranks and became full members of the organisation.

This is why Russian political analysts often call it the “G8”. The great questions for the near future are the following: when will Iran join the SCO and when will Turkey, currently a partner country of the organisation, become a full member? It is beyond dispute that the SCO can be regarded as the most important organisation of the evolving Eurasian supercontinent.28 The map shows the member states of the two main organisations of economic integration in the evolving Eurasian supercontinent – the Eurasian Economic Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – , and those of the aforementioned Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It can be observed that only a handful of Asian countries have not joined either of the three organisations so far: Turkmenistan (which in the past had a contentious relationship with Russia due to the conflict around the gas pipeline construction, however, the parties have already started settling their differences); Nepal and Bhutan, North Korea,

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Belarus is an observer and not a full member of SCO Source: https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2017/08/15/new-eurasian-age-chinas-obor-eurasian-economic-union-shanghaico-operation-organisation-complimentary-white-paper-download/

South Korea and Japan (which can be regarded as an American ally in the region).

The idea of the Great Eurasian Partnership was conceived by V. Putin at the International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, July, 2016. The map exemplifies which already operating major organisations would serve as a basis for the planned new Eurasian cooperation. According to the Russian plans the Greater Eurasian Partnership could get under way in 2018 in the form of a multi-level integrational model; it is envisaged to come into being as a new type of international network.

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Siberia

Europe Kirov

Moscow Hamburg Rotterdam / Antwerpen

Perm

Yekaterinburg Omsk

Novosibirsk

Lille / Brussels Paris

Cologne Salzburg Münich Salzburg

Nuremb.

Northern Corridor

Krasnoyarsk Tayshet

Warsaw

Ulaanbaater Aktogay / Alataw Pass

Chop Budapest

Heihe

Irkutsk

Astana

Pardubice

Vienna

Skovorodino Chita

Minsk

Berlin

Kiev

London

Yakulsk

Manzhouli

Harbin

Central Corridor

Ürümqi

Samarkand

Istanbul

Tashkent Lop Nor

Khujand (Kokand)

Ankara

Antiochia

Rome

Damaskus Cairo

Teheran

Taxila

Balkh (Bactra)

Xian

China

Mashhad

Bagdhad

Shenyang / Fushun

Lanzhou

Holan (Kholan)

Yerevan Tabriz

Venice

Wuwei

Niya

Changchun

Bejing / Tianjin

Jlayuguan

Sofia

Vladivostok

Erenhot

Turpan

Belgrade Skopje

Tianshu / Guyvan

Lianyungang

Zhengzhou

Xuzhou Nanjing

Shanghai

Wuhan

Basra

East China Sea

Changsha / Zhuzhou

Mediterranean sea

Sevelskaya Gawan

Suifenhe

Saksaulkaya Alterau (New Sarai)

Khabarovsk

South Corridor Karachi

Arab Peninsula

Tamluk

Hanoi

Barygaza

Shenzhen / Hong Kong

Masulipatam

The sixth improvement was to announce and build the Silk Road, i.e. the One Belt, One Road initiative

South China Sea

Bengal Bay

Singarpore

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5. China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative and the new Eurasian paradigm

The main routes of China’s “One Belt – One Road” development programme as of March, 201731

But what does the world look like from Beijing? China’s ancient name is Chung kou which means “Middle Empire”. This, without doubt, refers to the fact that China has always considered itself to be centre of the world, and it still does today. In 2016 the USA produced 24% of the world’s total GNI, while China came in second with 15%. In the same year, among the world’s 500 biggest companies there were 132 American and already 109 Chinese corporations. As a side note it should be pointed out that in 2016 Russia was the 11th biggest national economy in the world (despite all the Western sanctions and low oil prices) but it produced only 2% of the world’s total GNI, and there were altogether four Russian companies in the world’s top 500.29 It follows clearly from all the above that the creation and shaping of the new Eurasian supercontinent is mainly contingent upon China’s endeavours. It can also be stated that Russia will never engage in a rivalry with China, it is in its interest to form an alliance with China, as strong as possible.

The most important factor in the creation of a 21st century Eurasian Supercontinent is, without question, China’s ambitious plan of constructing the New Silk Road Economic Belt – One Belt One Road. In 2013, in Astana, Kazakhstan (the “Heartland of Eurasia) Xi Jinpind announced the trade and infrastructural development programme that would connect Eastern and Central Asia with Europe, thus making the Eurasia of the 21st century become reality.30 The three main routes of the New Silk Road Economic Belt on the land: 1. The route connecting China with Europe going through Central Asia and Russia; 2. The route connecting China with the Middle East going across Central Asia; 3. The route connecting China with South-east Asia (and the countries of the Indian Ocean).

The two main sea routes of the New Silk Road Economic Belt: 1. The route connecting China with Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean; 2. The route connecting China with the southern region of the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea;

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It can be stated geopolitically that the routes will allow the creation of a new Eurasian field of power in the 21st century. Moreover, the route will create unique, unprecedented opportunities for infrastructural development in the countries it crosses. Thus, Mackinder’s concept of the World-Island could actually become reality in the broadest sense, that is, the economic power field of the three continents (Europe, Asia, Africa) might be brought into life. This will raise the possibility of the USA losing ground in the World-Island and having its power gradually limited only to the American continent.

There are six main areas of development connected to the 5 routes listed above.

These rimlands are the following: 1. The so-called “New Eurasian Land Bridge” development area. The basis of this is the railway connecting Lianyungang in Jiangsu province beside the Yellow Sea and Alashankou, in Xinjiang province, Central China. This city is located in the vicinity of the Dzungarian Gate, the most important KazakhstanChina border crossing which was already one of the main mountain passes used by nomad tribes during the Migration period. The westernmost point of the development area is the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. As part of the “One Belt” programme China has taken under the construction of direct

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The six major development zones of China’s “One Belt – One Road” development programme32

5. The “China – Pakistan” development zone. Its main objective is to connect the Central Chinese Xinjang province with Gwadar port city in Pakistan through railways and highways.

6. The “Bangladesh – China – Myanmar” development zone. In May, 2013 China signed a mutual development deal with India, and subsequent to that in December, 2013 the deal was extended to include Bangladesh and Myanmar.33

rail freight lines between Chongquing and Duisburg, Wuhan and the Czech Melnik and Pardubice, Chengdu and the Polish Lódz, and between Zhengzou and Hamburg.

2. The “China – Mongolia – Russia” development zone. The three states, located in the zone, signed the agreement in order to strengthen their trilateral cooperation in the near future at the conference of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Dusanbe. According their plans they will renovate Russian railways in the area, and in addition to that, build the so-called “new Mongolian Steppe route” within the framework of their cooperation.

The financial resources necessary for this enormous Asian infrastructural development (a development of such volume, comprising the whole continent is unique and unprecedented in the era of post-World War II world economy) are provided predominantly by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was proposed

by China and was declared open for business in January, 2016. Currently it has 77 members; Hungary joined AIIB June 26, 2017. According to official reports of the bank, the number of members will reach 85 by the end of the year, that is, almost a half of the world’s nearly 200 nation-states will have joined this new infrastructure bank come end of 2018.34 From a geopolitical standpoint it is important to stress that the USA in not a member (the USA promotes the primacy of the World Bank in the field of international developments) and nor is Japan which sees the AIIB proposed by the Chinese as a rival of its self-established Asian Development Bank.

The Port of Piraeus as the European gate for the 21st-century New Maritime Silk Road

3. The “China – Central Asia – Western Asia” development zone. It will connect China with Turkey through the five Central Asian countries and Iran. Accordingly, China signed a cooperation agreement with the five Central Asian countries which dictates that these countries harmonize their strategies of national development with objectives of the New Silk Road development programme.

4. The “China –Indochina” development zone. China concluded a new cooperation agreement with five countries of the Indochinese Peninsula. This agreement and the “Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation” programme form an interconnected unit. Within the framework of these programmes the construction of several railway lines and highways was set forth.

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6. Central and Eastern European Countries on the “grand geopolitical chessboard” of the 21st century The state of Central and Eastern European countries on the “grand geopolitical chessboard” of the 21st century can be elucidated based on the following power matrix. I took Brzezinski’s 2012 interpretation, namely the “greater West” and the “new East” paradigm as a basis, as does the power matrix, however, I replaced the expression “new East” with the concept of “Eurasian supercontinent”. The reason for this change is the fact that it is much more relevant for the Central and EastCentral European region.

The present and future geopolitical situation of Central Eastern Europe is highly dependent on the prospective relationship of the Greater West and the Eurasian supercontinent. If the global political environment, which is currently constructed upon the American principle of containment and consequently on the Russophobia of the Atlantic field of power, remains unaltered then there will be very few opportunities for East-Central Europe and inherently Hungary to free themselves from being trapped between West and East.

– What will the political future of the European Union be like? Or does the conflict of the EU’s nation-states foreshadow the creation of the so-called “Russo-German” Europe?

– Will there be another “Eastern enlargement” in the EU? When can we expect the states of the Western Balkans (especially Serbia which is of paramount importance geopolitically) to join the EU? – How will Russia’s role change in the future and what will the Eurasian Economic Union-European Union relationship be like?

– What role will the East-Central European region play in the geo-economic strategy of China? Will the New Silk Road Economic Belt lead to the creation of the new Eurasian supercontinent, economically speaking?

Central and Eastern Europe from above

Geopolitical power matrix in respect of the Central and Eastern European region35

Based on the matrix the most important geopolitical questions of the near future with regard to Central and East-Central Europe are the following: – Will the foreign policy strategy of the Trump administration change with respect to the East-Central European region and what kind of policy will NATO adopt with regard to the region?

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7. Central and Eastern Europe or East-Central Europe – the issues of denomination and geographical restriction and the problematics associated with the classification of the countries in the region The Central and Eastern European or in other words the East-Central European region has no clear-cut geographical borders; therefore, it is disputable whether such a region can be distinguished geographically within the European continent at all. On the other hand, the countries in the region are all characterised by three main physical geographic features, namely, their landlocked position, geographical conditions favourable for agricultural activities and the lack of energy carriers.

However, even the denomination of the region raises some issues. In the news about world politics the region is usually called Central Eastern Europe which, following the logic of the Hungarian language, denotes the middle of Eastern Europe, so in physical geographical terms it is defined as the centre of the East European Plain. Consequently, the name is incorrect because we consider the region to be the eastern half of Central Europe, that is, East-Central Europe. The question of whether we can consider the Baltic region or the Balkan Peninsula as parts of Central Europe is another issue.

Based on the definition used in physical geography, Central Europe, a European macro-region, stretches from the Rhine to the edge of the East European Plain in a west-east direction, while from north to south it extends from the North Sea to the roots of the South European peninsulas. The border of Central and Eastern Europe is the imaginary axis that can be drawn from the Bay of Gdansk to the ranges of the Eastern Carpathians. East of this line lies the East European Plain with its area of about 4.5 million km2 which is roughly half of the entire continent. Though, the fact remains that Central and Eastern Europe has no actual natural borders.

The macro-regions of Central Europe include the Central European Hilly Region (the German, Polish and Baltic Plain and the German, Czech and Polish mid-mountains) the Alps, the Carpathians and the Carpathian Basin. The Carpathian Basin covering about 330 thousand km2s is a very unique geographical region indeed, for it is the most homogeneous and most clearly definable landlocked macro-region in Europe. The Balkan Peninsula, already regarded as a part of Southern Europe, borders Central Europe at a 1200 km long stretch in the north, therefore it is diffi-

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cult to differentiate from the Central European macro-region. But the Balkans is of paramount strategic significance, for it serves as bridge to Anatolia from which it is separated only by two narrow straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. These two narrow straits have always possessed great importance throughout history, since the way out from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean leads through them.36 Despite the denomination and the geographical demarcation – or maybe exactly because of these – the area of Central and Eastern Europe is regarded as a historical region. The unique historical development of the countries in the region has already started in the 15-16th century when – owing to their geographical location – they were left out of the great geographical discoveries. The global trade’s centre of gravity shifted to the countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean and the countries located in the heart of the continent gradually became peripheral/semi-peripheral to world trade. In these countries the industrial revolution started only in the 19th century, much later than in the western half of the continent. The basis for the capital accumulation, necessary for industrialisation, was agricultural goods production which took advantage of the favourable physical geography of the region on the one hand, and the food export to western countries of the continent on the other. As a result of World War I. the borders of national states were fundamentally changed in the region. Austria-Hungary ceased to exist and several independent nation-states were formed in its place. The Second World War laid waste to the countries of the region. Subsequent to WW II. the region was set for a “unique” course of development. The victory of the Soviet Union also meant the expansion of its political sphere of interest to several countries over the globe. Due to the politically-based division of Europe after Wold War II. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Romania were all forced to create a socio-economic system between 1945 and 1949 in which the Soviet Union’s model of socialism had to be taken over mandatorily.

The most important present-day economic and social problems of Central and Eastern European countries originate from the change of regimes that started in 1989-90. The most crucial issue of this era is the accession to the European Union which can be interpreted as the manifestation of belonging to a reunified European continent after the fall of what was considered to be the symbol of Cold War, the Iron Curtain. Based on their geographical location, history, events of the 1990s and their belonging to the Atlantic field of power the 20 countries of the region can be classified in the following manner:

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL STUDY

But is the traditional classification applied in the table above still valid today? Is belonging to the Euro-Atlantic field of power still the most important criteria of classification? What kind of sub-regions can the countries be grouped into based on their geography, history and geopolitical situation? And the most important question is what future role the 20 Central and Eastern European countries will play in the evolving multi-polar world of the 21st century?

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe – 2017 Population

GNI

GNI/capita

NATO

The EU and the Eurozone (€)

million – 2017

billion USD – 2016

billion – 2016

year of accession

year of accession

Visegrad Group Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia

10.7 38.5 9.9 5.4

186 481 123 91

17570 12680 12570 16810

1999 1999 1999 2004

2004 2004 2004 2004 – € 2009

Baltic states Estonia

1.3

23

17750

2004

Latvia

1.9

29

14630

2004

Lithuania

2.8

42

14770

2004

2004 – € 2011 2004 – € 2014 2004 – € 2015

12 53 187

4250 7470 9470

2009 2004 2004

2007 2007

17

4880

50 10 7 4 37 45

12110 4980 3850 6970 5280 21660

2009

2013

Former Soviet states of the European continent Belorussia 9.6 53 Moldova 3.5 8 Ukraine 44.0 99

5600 2120 2310

Southern European states Albania 3.0 Bulgaria 7.1 Romania 21.5 States of the former Yugoslavia Bosnia and 3.9 Herzegovina Croatia 4.3 Macedonia 2.1 Kosovo 1.9 Montenegro 0.6 Serbia 7.1 Slovenia 2.0

A table created by the author based on data acquired from World Bank World Development Indicators

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2017 2004

GDP per capita (PPP) of the EU NUTS2 regions in 2015 as a percentage of the average regional economic development for the EU-28 Source: Eurostat Regional Yearbook, 2017

2004 – € 2007

The classification of the 20 countries in the table as Central and Eastern European is somewhat similar to the so-called “16+1” cooperation between China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries. In 2011 during his official visit in Hungary Wen Jiabao, former president of the People’s Republic of China, announced plans for creating a new platform for establishing more intense economic relations with Central and Eastern European countries and with the region itself as a whole.

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL STUDY

The imports of Central and Eastern European countries from China and Hong Kong as a percentage of GDP for the countries, 2016

Countries of the "16+1 Cooperation"

Source: Own map prepared by the author and Cartographia Kft. based on the data stock of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the World Bank World Development Indicators

Based on the Chinese definition of the East-Central European region the countries belonging to this group are the ones “trapped” between the Western European and Russian spheres of interest. Thus, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are excluded from the 20 examined countries based on the Chinese definition of 16 Central and Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the Chinese efforts for promoting peace and avoiding conflicts did not allow the inclusion of Kosovo either.

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Source: http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/chinas_investment_in_influence_the_future_of_161_cooperation7204

The “16+1” transregional platform was officially brought into life in 2012 at the Warsaw summit and since then a Prime Ministerial summit has been organised annually by the 16 CEE countries and China. The main goal of China is to strengthen its economic relationship with the countries involved and to further expand the cooperation to the fields of science, technology, education and culture. China’s ultimate goal, however, is to improve its cooperation with the countries in the region to help implement its ambitious “One Belt – One Road” programme for the 21st century the aim of which is establishing a new Eurasian field of power. It is imperative to point out that for China it would also entail strengthening relationships with the entire region and not with the individual countries. Nevertheless, it is still unclear to what extent the Chinese “16+1” formation will contribute to the creation of a new Central and Eastern European field of power in the 21st century.37

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In November, 2013 at the Bucharest summit the countries agreed on elaborating a medium-term programme for the “16+1 cooperation”. In December, 2014 at the Belgrade summit the members decided to adopt the directives of the “EU-China 2020 strategic agenda for cooperation” and EU-law as the basis of the “16+1” cooperation. This was the date when the agreement on renovating the BudapestBelgrade railway line, the first large-scale infrastructural project of the “16+1 cooperation”, was signed. Furthermore, the parties agreed on the creation of sectoral coordination centres: the China-CEEC Tourism Promotion Agency in Budapest and the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agency in Warsaw and Beijing. At the Suzhou summit in November, 2015 the institutional framework of the “16+1 cooperation” was solidified definitively. In order to strengthen their economic cooperation the parties agreed to improve the railway link – taking the transportation of goods between Lodz and Chengdu as an example – between the two regions. The customs clearance facilitation cooperation mechanism between Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary came into force in order to promote the seamless transportation of goods from the port of Piraeus to the EU (China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line). The parties showed support for the plan ensuring the cooperation between Adriatic, Baltic and Black Sea ports and their accompanying industrial parks, and the connection of these ports with economic corridors (Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation). The most important achievement of the Riga summit that took place in November, 2016 was the foundation of the China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund. The parties agreed that they would harmonize their infrastructural developments with the routes of the Trans-European Transport Network. The China-CEEC Secretariat on Logistics Cooperation was established in Riga and it has its own virtual platform too(www.ceec-china-logistics.org). The parties support the second large-scale infrastructural project of the mechanism which is the modernisation of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line.38 Leaders of China and the 16 Central and Eastern European countries at the Summit of the "16+1 Cooperation" in 2016

Source: shutterstock.com

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Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the 16+1 Summit

This November the summit of the “16+1 cooperation” took place in Budapest.

At the final press conference (November 27, 2017) Viktor Orbán evaluated the summit as follows: „We confirmed the recognition that a new world order is taking shape around us – both politically and economically. In this new world order the role of Asia and China has increased significantly, and will continue to increase in the future. Asia and China have also become a determining factor in terms of finance and technology. Central Europe welcomes this development. In our view, the strengthening of the Chinese economy also offers great opportunities to the countries of Central Europe. Unfolding before us are the signs of a success story: the success story of cooperation between the countries of Central Europe and China. There is enormous growth potential in the Central European region. You can see this potential if you study the Central European region’s economic growth figures. In this cooperation system, eleven of us are Member States of the European Union, while five of us are not yet members. In terms of the future, the key question is whether we can involve the Central European countries in the European Union and the other five countries aspiring to become members in overarching long-term economic projects, investments and developments which will lead to the rise of the entire region. In order for this region to be able to grow, we need external resources in terms of technology and financing. Existing European resources are no longer sufficient on their own. We therefore welcome the fact that, as part of the new economic world order, China wishes to be present in the growth and development of this region.. We have reviewed the most important projects in which this cooperation manifests itself. From among these, I should men-

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tion the modernisation and development of the Belgrade–Budapest railway line.

This is a flagship project with future strategic significance for freight traffic along the Silk Road within the One Belt One Road Initiative. Today we had the opportunity to hear about projects and development plans which will create “win-win” situations: situations in which every participating party will be a winner. What we have achieved today is beneficial for China, beneficial for the European Union, and also beneficial for the countries of Central Europe.”39 Concerning the classification of the 20 countries included in the table, it is apparent that there is only one group not based on geographical location or shared history.

This is the Visegrad Group which was established to promote political cooperation after the regime changes in the 1990s. In Visegrad, February 15, 1991 – following the example of the meeting between the Polish, Czech and Hungarian rulers back in 1335 in Visegrad – Václav Havel, the president of Czechoslovakia, József Antall, Hungarian prime minister and Lech Wałęsa, president of Poland signed the Visegrad Declaration. By signing the declaration the leaders of the three countries (now there are four member states due to the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia) stated that they would closely cooperate on their way towards European integration. Since then the V4 has become a recognised political “trademark” or in marketing terms a “brand” and in the international literature and diplomacy these countries are now called the Visegrad Four. The V4 countries have already achieved their goals set in the 1990s and joined the EU in 2004, moreover the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became member states of NATO in 1999 while Slovakia joined the military organisation in 2004.

One of the biggest achievements of the Visegrad Group is that in 2000 the International Visegrad Fund was established in Bratislava. The main objective of the Fund is to promote the cooperation of V4 countries in the field of education, science and culture. What is more, nowadays the Fund supports programmes intended to strengthen the relationship of V4 countries with the neighbouring states. The main goals of V4 countries coming into the 2000s were the preservation of Central European countries’ identities and the assertion of their common interests.40 The migrant crisis peaking in 2015 only strengthened the capacity of V4 countries to assert their interests both within and outside the EU. But of course, this is connected to the EU’s political crisis (will the EU ever become a strong political union or will national sovereignty still serve as its foundation in the near future; what kind of solutions can European integration offer for the migrant crisis and how great is the opposition of the individual nation-states in this regard). Nowadays the opposition of the V4 countries within the EU is most apparent in the issues of the

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mandatory migrant resettlement quoCountries of the Visegrad (V4) Cooperation tas and the interpretational differences between the EU and Central European countries concerning the model of democracy. Though in this regard there is a discrepancy between the Polish and Hungarian interpretation and the Czech and Slovakian standpoint.

The period of the 2016/2017 Polish V4 presidency was the first time during which the Visegrad Group set very serious political goals: intensifying the economic and political cooperation of V4 member states with other countries of the Central European region and with countries of the Western Balkans and those involved in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme (primarily Belorussia, Moldova and Ukraine).41 The current Hungarian presidency programme carries on the foreign political endeavours of the Polish presidency. The prime goal of the Hungarian presidency sub-programme, called “Regional Visegrad”, is also the strengthening of relationships between the countries of the V4 and Western Balkans. Furthermore, it aims to increase the role of the V4 in elaborating and substantiating the EU’s policy on further expansion through the strengthening relationship with the countries of the Eastern Partnership.42

But the great question for the years to come is whether the V4 will expand or not?

Will other countries be involved from the region? From a geopolitical standpoint the expansion of the Visegrad Group is indeed by all means justified because in order for the Central and Eastern European countries, currently divided by great powers, to form a new and strong region both politically and economically, they will have to acquire significantly more dominance and strength. The 2017 Czech and Austrian general elections do fall in line with these efforts. According to my prognosis for the future the V4 group ought to be transformed into a V7 partnership. Croatia, Slovenia and Austria should be added to the cooperation, and consequently, a new framework of 21st century Central European cooperation should be established.

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL STUDY

8. Central and Eastern European countries inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic field in the 21st century

Exports of the Central and Eastern European countries to the USA as a percentage of GDP for the countries, 2016

In the 2008 January/February issue of Foreign Affairs Ronald D. Asmus, director of the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Centre, published a study titled “Europe’s Eastern Promise: Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement”.43 The author is an expert on the topic since from 1997 until 2000 he worked as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and his field of expertise was primarily NATO and Transatlantic affairs. He played an invaluable role Hungary’s accession to NATO in 1999.44 In this study the author examines the two major geopolitical areas of the EastCentral and Southeast European region: on the one hand the North-South axis, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and on the hand the south-eastern axis of countries extending from the Balkan Peninsula to the Black Sea where Asia and Europe meets. Countries of the North-South axis joined the military organisation either in the first (in 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) or second (in 2002 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) wave of post-Cold War NATO enlargement, then they joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, thus becoming full members of the Transatlantic field of power both politically and economically.

But what sort of enlargement policy should NATO adopt with regard to the southeast-southwest axis of countries stretching from the Balkans to the Black Sea? In the view of Ronald D. Asmus a profoundly new policy should be adopted since the Transatlantic enlargement policy of the early 2000s is in need of fundamental reforms.

Ronald D. Asmus finishes his 2008 study by presenting two scenarios. According to the first, the new U.S. administration taking office in January, 2009 will rebuild its relations with the countries of the region, moreover NATO and the EU will continue their respective enlargements. As a result by 2012 and 2014 – so almost 10 years after the biggest enlargement of the EU and NATO’s second round of expansion – the USA and the EU can redraw the geopolitical map of Europe and Eurasia.

The second scenario foretells a state of stagnation, in which the leading countries of the Atlantic field of power (primarily the U.S.) display passivity towards the region.

Furthermore, neither the EU nor the U.S. – based on the forecast – will confront Russia and thus certain countries in the region will be left to their fate to preserve a “good” relationship with Russia. If by 2012, all that happens is – as reads the study – that Croatia (and expectedly Albania) joins NATO and only Croatia becomes an

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Source: Own map prepared by the author and Cartographia Kft. based on the data stock of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the World Bank World Development Indicators

EU member state then it will lead to a geopolitical standoff and “...the next generation will have to pay a huge price for this passivity”.45 Now, in 2016, it can be clearly stated that unfortunately the second scenario, outlined by Ronald D. Asmus, became a reality. Between 2008 and 2012 all that happened was that by April, 2009 Croatia and Albania had been admitted to NATO and in July, 2013 Croatia became an EU member state. What is more, by now the the situation, labelled by Asmus as a “geopolitcal standoff ”, has only worsened because the Euro-Atlantic field of power and Russia are in open conflict.

In 2008, as described in his article, Ronald Asmus expected the new presidential administration, taking office in 2009, to elaborate and implement a new strategy for NATO’s and the EU’s eastern enlargement by recognizing that the world of the 21st century will change the role of the Euro-Atlantic field of power and pose challenges to it. Unfortunately, neither NATO nor did the EU understand that in an uncertain global political and economic order the rules were also constantly changing.

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL STUDY

The foreign policy of the first Obama administration (2009-2012) had always been harshly criticised by the European states. Mainly because of the fact that the U.S. did not devote nearly as much attention to Europe as it would have deserved. In November, 2009 despite the invitation of the German Chancellor, the president of the U.S. did not attend the commemoration on the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall which meant that the “U.S. president does not understand Europe” – as many headlines read at that time. In the view of leading European politicians – during Obama’s first term – Atlantic relations suffered a relative devaluation from the part of the U.S. and thus the European continent was gradually losing significance in the geopolitical strategy of the USA. For the U.S. Europe became all the more important geopolitically after the Russian annexation of Crimea. This is clearly shown by the fact that Barack Obama’s first official visit to the EU took place in Brussels, March 26, 2014 (for the first time during his 6-year tenure as president at the time). The visit regalvanized the Euro-Atlantic alliance which was in a bad condition due to the 2013 wiretapping scandal.46 During the visit both of the parties expressed their intention to restart the negotiations about the creation of the Transatlantic Free Trade Zone.

The Central and Eastern European countries were even more disappointed about the foreign policy of the first Obama administration than the leading European nations. In June, 2009 – not long after Barack Obama’s visit to Moscow – several, formerly high-ranking East-Central European politicians wrote an open letter to the U.S president, asking him not to forget about the strategic interests of the Central and Eastern European region during his negotiations with the Russians. In the view of the authors of this letter the greatest threat was that Russian influence was increasing again in the region which would “lead to the de facto neutralisation of the region”, as the letter read.

During Obama’s second presidential term, however, the global and primarily the European geopolitical situation changed fundamentally due to the Ukrainian crisis that started late 2013 (still on-going and ever more intensifying) and the March, 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russians thereafter. The Central and Eastern European countries have become a buffer-zone in the 21st century’s “grand geopolitical game” between the West (NATO and EU) and the East (Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union). Central and Eastern European countries, that have already become NATO and/or EU member states, have acquired an increasingly more important role as the eastern frontier of the West. In the case of those coun-

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tries that have not yet joined the Euro-Atlantic field of power the main questions are whether they will ever become members of the EU or NATO or they will enter the Russian sphere of interest, and to what extent will they swing back and forth between the two major spheres of interest.

In July, 2014 Barack Obama visited Warsaw (before the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the British and American troops landing in Normandy) and, in essence, announced the new Eastern European strategy of NATO. In the same spirit (as it had been promised by Barack Obama) NATO’s summit took place in July, 2016 also in Warsaw. Here, the reinforcement of NATO’s eastern frontier was accepted institutionally too. Consequently, NATO will send four battlements (a multinational group of 4000 soldiers) to Poland and three Baltic states to operate on a rotational basis as spearhead forces. By now, that is 2017, the four battlements have already been deployed, currently there are a 1000 soldiers stationing in each of the four countries. The expression “rotational presence” is of significance because by using it NATO indicates that it did not violate the 1997 agreement with Russia which stipulates that there shall not be any permanently stationing NATO military forces in the new NATO member states. Hungary (similarly to other NATO countries) is to create a leadership centre, that is, a command structure ensuring that it is ready in case it has to mobilise NATO forces. Furthermore, at this summit a definitive decision was made on admitting Montenegro to NATO and as a result on the 5th of July, 2017 the country became the 28th member state of the organisation.47 However, the opinions of experts on security policy vary as regards the acceptance of Montenegro to NATO. On the one hand, there was no referendum held in Montenegro on the issue of joining NATO; unofficial surveys suggested that nearly half of the country’s population was against becoming a NATO member state. On the other hand – according to international analysts – the accession was poorly timed because NATO should seek cooperation with Russia. Without it there is no chance for international collaboration in the fight against ISIS and in resolving the Syrian crisis. However, looking at the map it is apparent that the accession of Montenegro to NATO was of top priority because now all the countries having an Adriatic coastline have become NATO member states and as a result Russia will not be able to get an access to the Adriatic Sea. The deployment of NATO military forces, operating with a rotational presence, to the Baltic States and Poland and the accession of Montenegro to NATO are perceived by Russia as a national security threat as expressed in an official statement.

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Montenegro48 From among the 20 Central and Eastern European countries examined, only the area of Kosovo is smaller that of Montenegro (13.8 k km2). Its entire population is 643 000.

As regards its ethnic structure, the population is fairly homogeneous; more than 40% is Montenegrin while 30% is Serbian. The country owes its geopolitical importance to its Adriatic coastline which is 293 kilometres long. Apparently, its advantageous geographical location was one of the main reasons for its accession to NATO in 2017. The country has been conducting negotiations with the EU about its accession for years, and out of the former Yugoslav states Montenegro is the most likely to join the EU in the near future.

The Serbian name Crna Gora (spelled Montenegro in Latin) is mentioned for first time in documents originating from 1296 and its meaning is black mountain. From the 18th century onwards the majority of Montenegro’s current lands were in the possession of the Serbian state. Later the majority of the area was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. In 1878 at the Berlin Congress Montenegro was recognised as an independent state. In 1910 the monarchy was declared, however, in 1916 the monarch lost its power.

In 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed and Montenegro also became a part of that state. In 1941 it came under Italian occupation. After World War II. the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established and Montenegro became a member state too. In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia break away from Yugoslavia, then the next year Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit, then finally Macedonia too.

Thereafter, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed by the Republic of Serbia (and its two nominally autonomous regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo) and the Republic of Montenegro. In 2003 the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was established which was based on the loose union of the two countries. In 2006, 55% of the Montenegrin population voted for the secession from Serbia.

By then, Montenegro’s economy had been independently functioning since the establishment of the State Union in 2003. At that time it already had its own national bank, and adopted the euro as its national currency instead of the dinar. Its great aluminium plant which is based on hydroelectric power stations and nearby bauxite mines has already been privatized. Its leading economic sector in the present and more so in the near future, is tourism. The value of foreign working capital investments coming into the country has been constantly growing since 2003 (aluminium industry, financial sector, tourism), the value of the entire foreign working capital stock of the country amounted to 4.7 billion USD in 2016. Foreign investments also receive various government subsidies, the business-friendly environment of the country is considered to be very advantageous. In the wake of the global economic crisis, the GDP of the country suffered a setback of 6% in 2009, and its economy is characterised by moderate growth (2%) as of now. The 12% unemployment rate and the regional discrepancies pose a severe problem for the country. Its most important foreign trade partner is Serbia (export 25%, import 22%). Between Hungary and Montenegro trade is very limited, in 2016 it was only nearly 40 million USD worth.

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At the 2016 NATO summit the NATO-Ukraine Commission has reassured the parties that the alliance supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and called on Russia to revoke its decision on the annexation of Crimea and to refrain from taking aggressive steps against Ukraine. However, Ukraine did not receive a NATO-candidate status because Angela Merkel confirmed that she did not support the accession of Ukraine to NATO, and her statement was supported by the other member states too. It is beyond dispute that Russia would perceive it as an “open declaration of war”, a security threat if NATO were to expand its borders to its immediate vicinity.

There are two significant questions to be answered with regard to Russia and Ukraine: (1) Why is Crimea of primary importance to Russia; (2) Does the territorial integrity of Ukraine referred to in every political statement of the West and NATO really exist?

1. Why is Crimea of primary importance to Russia?

As it has been pointed out before, Russia might become the leading land-based power of the Eurasian field of power but establishing itself as a “Sea Power” is rather questionable both in terms of physical geography and geopolitics. Even though Russia has a coastline of 37653 kilometres (its borders on land are 22407 km long), most of it is along cold seas, it borders the Arctic Sea to the north and the Pacific Ocean to the east. The ports on the northern and eastern coastline are frozen most of the year with only one exception – the port of Murmansk never freezes thanks to the Gulf Stream. In his “Foundations of Geopolitics” Alekszandr Dugin describes Russia’s situation as being stiflingly encircled by land borders in the south which makes it impossible to reach the warm seas.

In accordance with its geographical conditions, one third of Russia’s entire sea power is made up of its Northern Fleet the base of which is located in Severomorsk nearby Murmansk.

The base of the Russian Pacific Fleet is in the biggest and southernmost city of the Russian Far East, Vladivostok, however, the port of Vladivostok and the nearby Nahodka are usually frozen from October to March.

Russia’s gateway to the Baltic Sea is warranted by the Baltic Fleet which is based in the port of Baltyisk within Kaliningrad Oblast. The geostrategic importance of the Baltic Sea is constantly increasing for Russia, primarily because of the gradually in-

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tensifying Russian-German relations. The most important element of this process was the inauguration of Gazprom’s Nord Stream pipeline in 2011 which delivers natural gas directly to Germany under the Baltic Sea by bypassing Ukraine.

Sevastopol, the Crimean Peninsula, 20 April, 2017

Russia’s Caspian Fleet is relatively small; its base is in Astrakhan, the biggest city of the Volga Delta. However, because the Caspian Sea is a sea only by name (it is the largest lake in the world with no gateway to the sea), the purpose of the Russian fleet stationing in the region is not to establish Russia as a “Sea Power” but to maintain the balance of power among the countries of the Caspian region. Apparently, in this case special attention is devoted to Russia’s biggest national security risk, Chechnya.

The Black Sea Fleet is somewhat smaller in size than the Baltic Fleet but its base in Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula is the key element of Russia’s sea power, and thus Russian geopolitics. The warm deep-water port of Sevastopol, located in a protected bay, provides Russia a gateway to the warm seas. In 2010, the Ukrainian parliament decided (amidst exploding smoke grenades and fighting) to extend the

The Crimean Peninsula

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Russian navy lease of Sevastopol until 2042. This port is of primary geographical importance to Russia because without the port Russia cannot get access to the Mediterranean Sea. The reason for the annexation of Crimea was evidently the Russians’ fear mainly of losing the port of Sevastopol due to Ukraine’s rapprochement to the EU and NATO. Moreover, this fear of Russia does have a historical background. 160 years ago, during the Crimean War the Russian Empire was defeated by the joined forces of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France, thus preventing the expansion of Russian influence to the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the two straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Currently Russia’s engagement in global affairs (for example shipments to Syria) always starts from the port of Sevastopol. The possible accession of Ukraine to NATO would undoubtedly result in NATO’s supremacy in the region because Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are already NATO member states. It is no coincidence that one of the primary goals of Russian geopolitics is to strengthen Russian-Turkish relations. Gazprom’s Blue Stream pipeline, delivering natural gas to Ankara through the Black Sea, serves as a foundation for that endeavour. The question for the future is whether Georgia, who also has a Black Sea coastline, will ever join the Euro-Atlantic region. A committee has been established devoted to promoting the cooperation between NATO and Georgia but the country’s accession to the military organisation is not yet on the agenda. In the summer of 2014 the EU and Georgia signed the Association Agreement.

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2. Does the territorial integrity of Ukraine exist? – The geopolitical analysis of Ukraine Even the very name of the country –u-krajina – means “frontier”. Throughout its history Ukraine has always been a buffer-state and it still is, currently between the Euro-Atlantic field of power and Russia (and between the Eurasian Economic Union that is being organised by Russia). The importance of Ukraine can partly be explained by the “power of size”, the Republic of Ukraine is the second biggest country of the European continent behind Russia. With 44 million inhabitants Ukraine is one of the most populous countries of Europe.

In the 9th century the Kievan Rus’ was created in this territory and it became one of Europe’s leading powers in the 10th and 11th century, then by the 12th century it dissolved. After the Mongolian-Tatar hordes laid waste to the so-called Old Russian State, it was merged into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The sovereignty of the state was preserved, with varying success, only by the Cossacks whose duty was to secure the borders. From the 18th century Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Ukraine declared its independence but by the spring of 1920 the Red Army had already taken control of the country. The Socialist Republic of Ukraine was established which became one of the founding members of the Soviet Union in 1922. It’s current borders were drawn up in 1945 with Polish, Czechoslovakian (formerly Hungarian) and Romanian lands, then later on with the acquirement of Crimea in 1954. In 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union Ukraine declared its independence. However, in all likelihood, the 26 years that have passed since then were not enough to form an independent, sovereign, economically strong state.

Actual political reforms started only in the 2000s. During the 2004 elections Viktor Yanukovych (who was supported by Russia too) and Viktor Yushchenko, supporting a policy of Western opening, faced off against each other. Based on the official results Yanukovych came out victorious, however, opposition supporters started protesting (“Orange Revolution“). Eventually, Yushchenko became president. The 2007 general elections were once again won by the parties that led the “Orange Revolution” and Yulia Tymoshenko formed a government. In 2010, Yanukovych won the Ukranian presidential elections. In 2011, Tymoshenko was arrested and was sentenced for seven years of prison for abuse of power. In November, 2013 Viktor Yanukovych rejected signing the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Subsequent to that,

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Map of Ukraine and territories occupied by breakaway military units

people started protesting in Kiev (“Majdan” – i.e. the revolution of dignity) as a result of which Yanukovych was toppled in February, 2014, and then an armed conflict broke out in Eastern Ukraine, inhabited mostly by Russians, with the purpose of breaking away from Ukraine. The peak of the Ukrainian political crisis was the point when in March, 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, and later in that month on the 18th of March the Russian Parliament declared Crimea to be a part of Russia. After the presidential elections in May, 2014, Petro Poroshenko, the incumbent president, took office on July 7th. In the summer of 2014 the EU signed the Association Agreement with Ukraine and as a result of the shift in foreign policy the country started to gradually loosen its political ties with Russia but it is rather questionable whether it can break away from Russia economically (and if so, what price it has to pay). It is apparent that Ukraine has never been independent either politically or economically. Russia always perceived Ukraine as its prominent peripheral area. The most important element in creating Ukrainian sovereignty has always been the decrease of Russian influence on the country. Henry Kissinger was the only person in the Western world to realize this: “The Western world has to understand that Ukraine is not a foreign country to Russia. Russian history started with the Kievan Rus’......Ukraine is part and parcel of Russian history.”

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Demonstration in Kiev's Independence Square on 1 December, 2013

In connection with the Ukrainian crisis, the “restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity” is regularly referred to in the Western world. March 27, 2014, voting by majority, the UN General Assembly accepted a resolution in which the UN confirmed the sovereignty, political independence, integrity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally accepted borders.

Though, the international press emphasized only the majority of the ‘yes’ votes, the result of the vote already reflects the evolution of a multi-polar world and the presence of countries opposing the Atlantic field of power. Out of the 193 UN member states only 168 voted (for example Iran and Serbia). 100 countries were in favour of the resolution, 11 countries were against it (including Armenia, Belorussia, Bolivia, Sudan, Syria) and 58 countries abstained from voting (the BRICS countries with the exception of Russia – China, India, Brazil and the Republic of South Africa – , furthermore, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan).

The phrasing used by the UN and the Western world with regard to the political independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine is entirely valid in international law.

However, in a geographical, historical, geopolitical context the statement is not valid, for Ukraine never had territorial integrity and the current borders were drawn up in 1945 and in 1954 with the acquirement of the Crimean Peninsula to the country.

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Ukraine is divided geographically too; the demarcation for the west-east territorial divide is the line connecting the towns of Harkov and Uman. This line also serves as a geographical divide because this is the border where the temperate forest region and the temperate steppe region meet. The majority of people living in the forest region, that is, in Western and Central-Western Ukraine are of Ukrainian nationality and consider themselves to be Central European. These two major regions have very scarce mineral resources, therefore, they were left out of the process of industrialisation in the past. The agricultural centre of the country is Central-Western Ukraine which belonged to the sphere of interest of the Kievan Rus’ in the Middle Ages. Chernobyl is located north of Kiev. The 1986 explosion of the nuclear plant is still considered to be the worst nuclear catastrophe in history. Eastern Ukraine which belongs to the steppe region was the “bastion” of heavy industry in the Soviet era. The iron and steel and the heavy industry was based on the black coal of the Donets Basin and the iron ore of Krivoy Rog. Since during the era of Soviet industrialisation Russians worked here in great numbers the Russian-speaking population is still in majority in the bigger cities of the region. They think that ,without doubt, Eastern Ukraine belongs to Russia. The three industrial centres of the region: Harkov, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. The Russian-speaking population is in majority in Southern Ukraine too. The centre of the region is Odessa, one the biggest ports on the Black Sea coastline. The Crimean Peninsula, which is also part of the region, was annexed to Russia by Catherine the Great at the end of the 18th century and the Russian settlers arriving to the region gradually forced out the indigenous Tatar population. In 1954, the Crimean Peninsula was given to Ukraine by Khrushchev.

In his article published in March, 2014 Henry Kissinger elucidated that Ukraine cannot chose between West and East, it cannot join either side, it has to serve as a “bridge nation” between the two fields of power. But what are the chances of Ukraine becoming a “bridge state” instead of a buffer-state? In the current economic situation of the country it is impossible. As of now, Ukraine is one of the most underdeveloped national economies in Europe, its GNI value in 2016 was only 2310 USD and it was second to last among the 20 examined Central and Eastern European countries, outperforming only Moldova. Ukraine’s GDP dropped by 7% in 2014, nearly by 10% in 2015 and by 2,5% in the year of 2016.

The most important industry of its economy is agriculture, due to the excellent climatic and soil conditions. There were periods during the Soviet era when Ukraine gave ¼ of the entire Soviet agricultural production, and owing to its natural con-

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ditions it could still be one of Europe’s leading food producers, however the establishment of private farms is still an ongoing process. Before the 2014 shift in foreign policy Russia was the sole outlet of Ukrainian food products, currently, however, Ukrainian food export is minimal. One of the fundamental flaws of the economy is that 80-90% of its energy demand is covered by import (three thirds of the country’s oil and gas demand and 100% of nuclear fuel is imported). Given its geopolitical situation, Ukraine is a transit country. Currently, most of Russia’s oil and gas pipelines go to Europe through Ukraine. These include the Friendship oil pipeline, The Brotherhood gas pipeline and the gas pipelines of Gazprom.

Though Ukraine’s role as a transit state will probably decrease in the future, since in 2011 Gazprom has inaugurated its Nord Stream pipeline which delivers natural gas to Germany directly under the Baltic Sea by bypassing Ukraine. Moreover Gazprom has already started constructing another pipeline which runs parallel to Nord Stream, and if completed, Russia will most likely stop the delivery of gas running through Ukraine, as a result of which Ukraine might lose its role as a transit country – and its income related to its role – in the near future.

The value of the foreign working capital stock amounted to 62 billion USD by 2015, and the most important working capital investor is no longer Russia but Germany. Its merchandise export is mainly made up of metal, machine and chemical industry products. It imports electricity, energy carriers and mechanical and chemical products in greater volume. According to the data of IMF, Ukraine’s main foreign trade partner was Russia in 2016, though its share has been gradually decreasing, currently Russia’s share of Ukraine’s merchandise export and import hovers around 10%.

The most crucial question, however, is whether the West – through the credits of the USA, EU and IMF – will be able to help Ukraine’s economy to recover? It is most unlikely in a country that is almost completely divided socially, politically and territorially too.

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The exports of the Central and Eastern European countries to Germany as a percentage of GDP for the countries, 2016

Source: Own map prepared by the author and Cartographia Kft based on the data stock of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the World Bank World Development Indicators

Besides the role of NATO in the region, the further enlargement of the EU is of biggest concern to Central and Eastern Europe. Will there be another enlargement at all?

Between 2004 and 2013 out of the 20 Central and Eastern European countries 11 were admitted to the EU and thus received a full membership. Nonetheless, it seems that since the 2013 accession of Croatia the EU has not considered putting a further enlargement on its agenda. Naturally, this is connected to the modification of the EU’s vertical integration, namely, to the likelihood of the EU becoming a strong political or in other words a federal political union. Member states of the EU admitted before and after 2004 responded fundamentally differently to the migrant crisis that started in 2015 which indicates that there is an ever decreasing chance for the EU to achieve a higher level of integration after having established the monetary union.

However, the migrant crisis affected exactly those former Yugoslavian states in the Western Balkans the most – through the Western Balkan migration route – that have already started negotiating about joining the EU or are currently

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waiting for the EU to release a statement on when they can start accession negotiations.

Montenegro has been negotiating with the EU about its accession since June, 2012 (as it has been pointed out before, it became a NATO member in 2017), and accordingly, Montenegro might become the next state to join the organisation. Serbia has been conducting accession talks with the EU since January, 2014, however, currently there is no telling when it might join the organisation, even though it is beyond dispute that the key for stabilising the Western Balkans would be the soonest possible Euro-Atlantic integration of Serbia.

Serbia is the largest state of the former Yugoslavia in the Western Balkans, both in terms of territory (77 thousand km2) and population (7.1 million). Ethnically it is fairly homogeneous, 83% of the population is Serbian and of Serbian orthodox religion, while the Hungarian minority makes up 4% of the population according to estimates.

It owes its geopolitical importance to its geographical situation and its role as a transit country, since all the routes going through the Western Balkans also cross Serbia. It has 8 neighbours and its land borders are 2322 kilometres long. It is the “key state” to the political settlement and economic development of the Western Balkans. It is the most important transit country with regard to international migration which has been constantly growing since 2015, and especially regarding the route leading through the Western Balkans.

The Serbian statehood, which had been developed under the Byzantine rule and cultural influence, was replaced by Turkish rule and as a result the country could start the restoration of its independence only from the beginning of the 19th century. At the end of World War I. the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established.

The state was born with the leadership of Serbia out of Montenegro, those areas of the dissolved Austria-Hungary that were inhabited by South Slavs and out of Macedonia which was taken from Bulgaria. In 1929 it was renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In 1941, Germany and its allies occupied the country and divided it up among themselves. A partisan war was started against the occupiers which was also characterised by features of civil war. With Soviet support the partisan army lead by Tito won the war, and in 1945 the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was formed (it was made up of six South Slavic states and two autonomous provinces not inhabited by Slavs). The socialist Yugoslavia fell apart in a bloody civil war between 1991 and 1995. The new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was declared in 1992. In 2001, national forces arrested the president of Yugoslavia (Slobodan Milošević) after which he was summoned to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for his crimes against humanity. The formal state union of “Serbia and Montenegro” was declared in 2003. In March, 2006 Milošević died in The Hague before his trial would have been concluded.

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In June, 2006 Montenegro officially declared its independence. In October, 2006 the Serbian Parliament accepted the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia. In 2012, Serbia officially became a candidate for EU membership and currently it is conducting negotiations, however, one of the main requirements of accession is to settle its affairs with Kosovo. There is virtually no hope for the resolution of this situation because Serbia does not recognize the independence of Kosovo which was declared in 2009.

The 1991-1995 civil war left the entire Serbian economy in ruins and NATO’s bombings in 1999 only worsened the situation. The economic sanction of the UN completely isolated Serbia from the global market. Though privatisation has already started in Serbia the share of the state sector is still significant (energy sector, telecommunications, gas service, aviation). From 2003 onwards, the volume of foreign investment coming into the country has increased substantially; by 2015 the value of foreign investment amounted to 30 billion USD. Even the biggest Hungarian corporations (e.g. OTP) have started investing heavily in the country. In the wake of the global economic crisis, the GDP of the country dropped by 3.5% in 2009, and it is recovering very slowly, up until 2016 the growth was close to only 3%. Structural reforms are needed to boost further development in the country. A crucial problem is that one fourth of the population is unemployed. Nonetheless, its favourable geographic location, relatively well-trained work force, and the free-trade agreements provide a good opportunity for economic growth. Various analyses show that the Serbian economy has a huge potential for improvement, currently, however, Serbia’s total GNI value (37 billion USD) is only one third of the Hungarian value and Serbian GNI/capita is only 5280 USD too. Its main foreign trade partners are Italy and Germany.

The two candidates for EU membership are Albania (since June, 2014) and Macedonia (since December, 2005).

Albania became a NATO member state in 2009, mainly because of its rather advantageous geopolitical situation, given its coastline. It has a coastline of 362 km which extends along the Adriatic and overlooks the Strait of Otranto. This is the strait connecting the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. Though the country could serve as a gateway to the Balkan Peninsula, it has very few ports with adequate infrastructural conditions. Albania is one of the poorest countries in Europe. In 2016 the value of GNI/capita was only 4250 USD. The country is characterised by mass emigration primarily to Greece and Italy where approximately 400 thousand workers of Albanian nationality are registered whose high-value foreign exchange transfers accounts for a considerable proportion of the national income. The main hurdle of economic growth is the complete lack of infrastructure, tough, in the past several years the development of communications technology has already started.

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With its area of 26 thousand square kilometres Macedonia is one of the most important transit countries of the Western Balkans. It is the hotspot of the Western Balkan route, starting from Greece, which is the main land-based route for international migration that is currently at its peak. Its population is only 2.1 million.

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in 1991, the country declared its independence, however, Greece did not recognize it as a sovereign state, it protested against the use of the name national symbols. The relationship of the two countries somewhat improved by 1995 but the country adopted the official name “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. As a result of UN negotiations, in 2004, its official name was changed to Republic of Macedonia. By the mid-1990s the economy of Macedonia had slumped into recession and it has been showing signs of slow growth only since 2010. Officially, unemployment rate is at 29% but due to the significant volume of grey economy (20-45% of GDP) this figure may well be overestimated.

Germany is by far its most important foreign trade partner, therefore, it belongs to the German economic sphere of interest.

The two potential countries for EU membership candidacy are Bosnia–Herzegovina (it submitted its accession request in February, 2016) and Kosovo.

The area of Bosnia–Herzegovina is 51 thousand square kilometres. In essence, it is a landlocked country with a coastline of the length of only 20 km. It is the most ethnically mixed country of the Western Balkans. Its population is around 4 million, 48% of which are Bosnians, 37% are Serbs and 14% are Croats. Accordingly, 40% of the population is Muslim, 30% is of orthodox religion, while 15% is Roman Catholic.

Bosnia–Herzegovina declared its sovereignty in October, 1991 and it became an independent state March 3, 1992. The Serbian minority boycotted the results of the referendum for independence. As a country of central location and of heterogeneous ethnicity within the former Yugoslavia, it suffered the most during the 1990-95 civil war, and it was a scene for cruel “ethnic cleansings”. The Serbs of the country provided armed support for the cause of making Bosnia–Herzegovina a part of the “Great Serbian Empire”. The 1995 Dayton Agreement divided the multi-ethnic state into two “sub-states”: the Federation of Bosnia–Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. A further sub-division of the country is the Brcko District which is under international supervision. From 1995 onwards international peace-keeping forces stationed in the country, then in 2004 these troops were replaced by EUFOR, and since 2007 police has taken over duties of peace-keeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Kosovo is the smallest country of the Central and Eastern European region, its population is 1.9 million 92% of which is Albanian. Thus, Muslims are in absolute majority in the country. In the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, declared in 1945, Kosovo was part of Serbia, then in 1963 the Autonomous Province of Kosovo was formed. The 1974 federal constitution reaffirmed the autonomy of the territory, however, it was still a part of Serbia. Yugoslavia fell apart in the bloody civil war between 1991 and 1995.

The new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was declared in 1992 (it was constructed out of Serbia – and two nominally autonomous regions of the country, namely Vojvodina and Kosovo – and Montenegro). The war, described as a series of bloody ethnic purges, was ended by the intervention of NATO forces in Kosovo in 1999. In 1999, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of the UN, Kosovo was temporarily placed under UN administration and NATO-led peace-keeping forces were sent to the territory. In 2007, the UNSC suggested “supervised independence” for the province, however, it was vetoed by Russia, a permanent member of the SC. Despite Russian opposition the USA, Great Britain and France backed the independence of Kosovo and as a result the Albanian leaders of Kosovo accepted the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008. Even though a number of countries recognized the independence of Kosovo afterwards, Serbia issued an official protest to the UN Security Council. The Security Council remained divided in the issue, out of the five permanent members possessing a veto right the USA, Great Britain and France recognized the independence of Kosovo, while Russia and China deemed the declaration of independence illegitimate.

Currently, NATO, the European Union and most of OECD’s member states do recognize the independence of Kosovo. The international situation of Kosovo, however, still remains unresolved.

Currently, Kosovo is one of the most underdeveloped countries in Europe (GNI/capita is 3850 USD) where 30% of the population lives under the poverty threshold, unemployment rate is at 35%, moreover, unemployment among 15-24 year-olds is at 58%.

People are leaving the country at a record rate, according to estimates 5-10% of the population has already left the country. In 2015, when news about Germany waiting Kosovan workers (and that people would get the advertised jobs in the order of arrival) were spreading in the media 25-30 thousand people left the country on a monthly basis. According to the latest reports, so far close to 9 thousand Kosovan citizens have requested political asylum in Germany but because Kosovo is regarded as a safe country the aforementioned requests are consequently rejected. Every international analysis shows that one of the most crucial problems of Kosovo is the general lack of economic prospects.

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The imports of the Central and Eastern European countries from Russia as a percentage of GDP for the countries, 2016

Source: Own map prepared by the author and Cartographia Kft based on the data stock of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the World Bank World Development Indicators

Out of the 20 countries that have been examined there are three former Soviet states in Europe (with the exception of Baltic EU and NATO member states) with which the EU conducts political and economic relations along the lines of the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy and more specifically the Eastern partnership programme. The aim of the Eastern Partnership is to strengthen the political ties and the future economic integration of three Eastern European (Belorussia, Moldova, Ukraine) and three South Caucasian (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia) countries to the EU. Though, the extent to which South Caucasian countries belong to Europe is disputable because geographically the Caucasian region is already considered to be a part of Asia. This problem derives from the fact that have already been addressed earlier: can we clearly identify an eastern border of Europe and what sort of line should be drawn between Europe and Asia which are, parenthetically, contiguous with each other.

Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership programme: Ø In 2014, the EU signed an Association Agreement with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as part of which free trade agreements were put into place between the EU and the three countries;

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Ø On May 11, 2017 the European Council adopted a regulation on visa liberalisation with regard to Ukraine which allows Ukrainian citizens to travel to the EU without a visa for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period. Ø In 2017 , the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Programme was signed with Armenia; Ø In 2017, the EU has started conducting negotions with Azerbaijan about the new comprehensive agreement; Ø According to the official statement of the EU, the EU will take steps to improve relations with Belorussia.49 However, if the eastern partnership of the European Union is interpreted from the perspective of geopolitics then it can be stated that the EU is already lagging behind Russia in terms of achieving its geopolitical endeavours, thus the eastern partnership programme has become “ineffective”. Mainly, because in January 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Belarus and Armenia too, became operational which means that these two countries will not join the European integration, what is more, Russian influence has already become very strong in them. Moreover, based on the extended boundaries and the growing number of member states of the Shanghai Cooperation it can be stated that the new political platform opposing the EU is already being organised. Out of all the countries in world Belarus is regarded as the most important ally of Russia, even its name means White Russia. The likelihood of Belarus falling out of the Russian political and economic sphere of interest is rather low.

The Baltic region is also of great importance to Belarus, since it would provide an opportunity for the country – the largest landlocked country in Europe – to become more independent form Russia and to significantly strengthen its ties with the neighbouring Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Belarus is the 4th biggest (207,6 thousand square kilometres) out of the 20 Central and Eastern European countries (Following Ukraine, Poland and Romania). The overall length of its land borders (3642 km) is second only to that of Ukraine. Though it has five neighbours the Russian stretch is the longest with 1312 km. The population is 9.6 million. Belarusians constitute 81% of the population, 11% is Russian, 4% is Polish and 2% is Ukrainian.

The country came under Russian influence at the end of the 18th century. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was declared in 1919. During the First but primarily the Second World War the country suffered enormous losses. Though the country has regained its independence in 1991, it still has very strong ties with Russia. In 1999, for example, the two countries concluded a deal about the creation of a political-economic

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union. In 2010, Belarus entered into a customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan.

Belarus was also one of the founding members of the Eurasian Economic Union which commenced its operations in January, 2015. Belarus is still regarded as the most important ally of Russia. Though the country is involved in the eastern partnership neighbourhood policy of the European Union, due to its commitment to Russia and its engagement in the Eurasian Economic Union its accession to the EU or NATO is highly improbable in the near future.

Its transition to market economy has officially started in 1995, however, the country has not benefited much from it so far. With state-controlled private property, state-regulated prices and the nationalisation of the greatest companies the economic management role of the state became exclusive. Although, subsequent to gaining its independence several banks were privatized, later they were taken back by the state, consequently 75% of the banking sector is still state owned. The most important element of its economy is the re-exportation of Russian oil to the global market. Since the end of 2006, Russia has started to abolish subsidizing the price of oil and natural gas transported towards Belarus. The “oil and gas dispute” between the two countries peaked in 2012 when Russia stopped oil export for a while. In 2011, the two countries signed a deal in which they agreed that Russia would cut gas prices drastically for Belarus, while in return Belarus would sell its share in the gas pipeline operator company Beltransgaz to Gazprom. In part, this was the transaction that allowed the country to recover from the severe 2011 financial crises, though it still needed external credits too. Its export is dominated by the re-exportation of oil, mechanical, chemical and textile products. The import is predominantly made up of energy carriers, industrial raw materials and mechanical and chemical products. It conducts 40-50% of its foreign trade exclusively with Russia. Up until 2015, the value of foreign working capital investment in the country amounted to 18 billion USD and roughly 60% of it is in Russian ownership.

In the recent past – when the price of Brent oil was above 100 USD per barrel – Azerbaijan did not wish to commit itself either to the Euro-Atlantic or to the Eurasian field of power Currently, it seems to be gravitating towards the Eurasian field of power – partly due to its geographical location – in its foreign policy.

As regards Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine the most important question for the EuroAtlantic powers is how they can actually protect these countries against the real or supposed Russian aggression or how they can signal politically that they take note of the countries’ worries about the Russian threat and territorial ambitions. The bridgehead of the Euro-Atlantic power in the South Caucasian region is considered to be Georgia.

Because of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 (as result of which Georgia lost its territorial control over Abkhazia, located on the Black Sea coastline, and over South

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Ossetia near the Russian border) NATO deems the Russian threat to be real, and even though the possible NATO accession of Georgia has arisen several times there is no chance for it to happen in the near future. The geopolitical examination of Ukraine has already been carried out earlier and it can be stated that the 2014 Association Agreement concluded with three countries were, in essence, triggered by the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea. With regard to Moldova, the possible Russian claim for Transnistria also has to be taken into account. Though, the likelihood of this event is very low since due to its history and geographical location it would seem to belong much rather under Romanian political authority. This scenario, however, is also very unlikely. But what is role of Moldova on the “grand geopolitical chessboard”?

Wedged between Ukraine and Romania, Moldova has a surface area of 34 thousand square kilometres and 3.5 million inhabitants. 78% of the population is Moldovan Romanian, 8% is Ukrainian, 6% is Russian and 4% is Gagauz. The Gagauz are of Turkish origin and live in the south-eastern part of Moldova; this part of the country, Gagauzia, is an autonomous region. Another autonomous region within the country is Transnistria lying east of the Dniester River. The 500 thousand inhabitants of region call it the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and consider it to be a sovereign entity, however, no country recognizes its independence.

As the eastern part of the former Principality of Moldavia (Bessarabia) its territories were under Turkish rule during the 15-18 centuries. It was liberated and taken control of by Russia in 1812. Between 1918 and June, 1940 most of its territories (with the exception of Transnistra) belonged to Romania. In August, 1940 it came under Russian authority and thus the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova was established. The country declared its independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Its independence and territorial integrity is compromised partly by the secession efforts of the Russian and Ukrainian minority living along the Dniester river and by the geopolitical goals of Romania and Russia.

Despite the fact that its agricultural and natural conditions are advantageous and it has an abundant source of mineral resources, Moldova is a low-income country. It is the poorest country in Europe; in 2016 its GNI/capita was 2120 USD altogether. During the Soviet era its economy was dominated by agriculture and the production of agricultural machines. The role of the agricultural sector is still very important (27% of workers are employed in agriculture and it accounts for 16% of the GDP), though its significance has decreased. The agricultural machine production of the country has almost completely disappeared due to the prolonged privatisation and the lack of markets. As the country lacks energy carriers it has to import them from neighbouring countries which created a situation of high-degree economic dependency. Its most important outlet is Romania while its main import trading partner is Russia.

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9. The EU’s five TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Networks) Core Network Corridors passing through the Central and Eastern European region and their organisational impact on economic space, with special regard to the Chinese „gates” of the region

TEN-T Core Network Corridors of the EU53

In accordance with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Union has created Trans-European networks (TEN) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy, and has started to develop these specific networks in order to promote the functioning of the internal market, to contribute to the establishment of economic and social cohesion and to ensure the interconnection between the EU’s central areas and the peripheral regions. The latter are landlocked regions, or regions which do not have any islands. All this means that the aim of the TEN concept is to connect the existing national and regional networks, to build up the missing sections and to remove the bottlenecks between the national networks, as a result of which networks could be created encompassing the whole European integration, or, in broader sense, the whole European continent. A further objective of the TEN programmes is to extend EU networks to Central and Eastern Europe and to the Mediterranean countries.50 The headline target of the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) is to interconnect the road transport infrastructures, to establish high-speed rail networks on the whole European continent and to standardise air transport and air traffic management systems. The EU’s 1996 and 2001 transport development plans for creating trans-European networks attached particular priority to the establishment of seaports, inland ports and intermodal terminals.51 Later, the 2013 Review of the EU integrated the TEN-T network structures with approximately thirty related priority projects and it also identified nine TEN-T Core Network Corridors. The EU set 2030 as the target date for the implementation of the projects relating to the creation of core networks.52 The following map illustrates these nine Core Network Corridors of the EU:

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Five out of the nine Core Network Corridors pass across or touch the border of the Central and Eastern European region. Three of these corridors are West-East corridors, which are the following: Ø the Rhine-Danube corridor; Ø the Mediterranean corridor and Ø the North Sea-Baltic corridor.

There are also two North-South TEN-T corridors; these are the following: Ø the Baltic-Adriatic corridor and Ø the Orient/East Med corridor.

From the perspective of the Central and Eastern European countries, usually two critical remarks are made on the TEN-T transport corridors. Firstly, they are dominated by the networks determined in the West and the aim is merely to supplement and extend these networks to Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the establishment of transport networks within the Central and Eastern European region is not regarded as a priority. Secondly, the existing funding conditions (individual

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The five TEN-T Core Network Corridors in the Central and Eastern European region54

dors could be connected to the two Chinese routes, that is, the land route (passing through Central Asia and Russia) and the maritime route (across the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean) connecting China with Europe.

However, the idea that the EU could be seen as a part of the Eurasian field of power has not been included among the EU’s official resolutions yet. Moreover, for the time being, the EU’s official leaders and opinion formers reject the concept of Eurasia itself as well. Nevertheless, considering the Central and Eastern European region to be a part of the Eurasian field of power is of paramount importance for us, as it is the only way to break free from the “captivity” of the West and the East and to become a bridge region in the 21st century.

project financeability) enable the consolidation of formerly established networks exclusively and there is little prospect that new structures will be built or established. For the Central and Eastern European region it means that since it is the eastward extension of the TEN-T West-East corridors that prevails in the EU transport directives, these TEN-T networks contribute only partially to the creation of a 21st century North-West economic field of power in Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, the current TEN-T network structure does not take into consideration the aspects of the enlarged EU’s spatial organisation. Instead, it reinforces the central role of the Western European “core region”.55 However, the enlargement of the EU is not the only reason why the 21st century transformation of the TEN-T corridors has become a key issue. It is important for China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, too. The main question is to what extent can the EU transport corridors which traditionally focus on Western Europe be transformed in such a way that they fit the transport network of the emerging Eurasian field of power; that is, in such a way that a new single Eurasian transport network is created, including the land and maritime routes of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. In this case, the task would be to find the place where the EU TEN-T corri-

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In the case of the EU, the fact that there is an increasing number of EU development programmes in which the candidate countries for EU accession are also included can be regarded as a step forward. As regards the Central and Eastern European field of power, the EU’s so-called macro-regional strategy is of outstanding importance.

The concept of macro-region has no uniform definition. It can be used to describe country groups of international importance (such as the EU, APEC and the Eurasian Economic Union), specific countries or it can also refer to regions within a specific country which belong to a particular large area. According to the EU definition, given in 2009 when the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was adopted, the concept of macro-region refers to territorial units encompassing those regions of various countries which display common cohesive features and have special mutual political, economic and cultural relations. After the adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the EU devised three further macro-regional strategies: the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (2011), the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (2014) and the EU Strategy for the Alpine Region (2016).

The macro-regional strategies involving 19 EU and 8 non-EU countries have become an integral part of the EU policy framework. The objectives of the strategies are entirely consistent with the EU’s political priorities; they reinforce the various EU policies and are built on the framework of cohesion policy. Macro-regional strategies enhance the value of the cooperation dimension within the cohesion policy.

They provide space for multi-sectoral, multi-country and multi-level governance even for non-EU Member States. They can play a significant role in the mitigation of the potential adverse effects at the EU’s external borders and in promoting the reinforcement of relations between these countries and the EU.

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Macro-regions of the European Union56

The basis of the EU macro-regional cooperation comprises a number of points. These are the following: Ø Macro-regions are large gravitational regions based on real internal relation systems; Ø The basic prerequisite for the cooperation is commitment at national and regional level; Ø It is characterised by a participatory process and multi-level governance efforts; Ø Within the framework of cooperation, specific activities are carried out, which are implemented as common projects; Ø The implementation of macro-regional strategies is carried out by creating coherence with the existing EU legislation and policies.

The EU’s fundamental principle adopted for macro-regions is based on the principle of the ‘three NOs’, according to which: Ø The strategy provides no new EU funds. There could be additional international, national, regional or private funds, although the emphasis is on the better use of existing funds; Ø The strategy requires no changes to EU legislation; Ø The strategy does not establish new structures; it is implemented by existing bodies, whose complementarity must be maximised.57 Macro-regions can also be interpreted as the joint development of areas based on geographical location and geographical features. From a geopolitical point of view, the question is the following: to what extent can macro-regional development strategies exceed the different historical developmental paths of countries and areas belonging to macro-regions and whether these strategies are able to soften or change the Cold War rhetoric, which is based on the West-East division. However, it is undisputed that the EU’s macro-regional strategy leaves room for the 21st century spatial reorganisation of the Central and Eastern European region, which will be based on economic cohesion and not on political divisions.

In the following section, we analyse those five major Core Network Corridors of the EU which pass across the Central and Eastern European region. The analysis focuses on the potential new economic spatial organisational forms this region might or will take due to the impact of the corridors.

The Rhine-Danube corridor The Rhine-Danube corridor is the most significant West-East transport corridor of continental Europe. Following the route of the Danube, it runs from Strasbourg through Southwest and Southeast Germany towards Central European cities. It connects Vi-

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The Rhine-Danube (TEN-T) Core Network Corridor58

enna, Bratislava and Budapest with Bucharest and the easternmost point of the corridor is in Constanta, at the most important Black Sea port of Romania.

The second, northern branch of the corridor links Frankfurt, Prague, Žilina and Košice and its easternmost point can be found at the Slovakia-Ukraine border.

The main issue of this transport corridor’s future development is to further develop transport routes which connect Germany with Central and Eastern European countries.

The basis of this main transport route is the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway (Europa Canal), where vessels can sail from Rotterdam, located at the North Sea, to Constanta, located at the Black Sea. This trans-European waterway is the longest inland waterway in the world, which is 3 434 km long. Together with its river stretches, the length of this waterway system is 12 000 km. The establishment of this waterway system required substantial water engineering work on the originally non-navigable sections of the Danube and the Rhine. Furthermore, between the Main and the Danube, a navigable canal has been built. This 171 km long waterway connects the Main with the Danube from the Bavarian Bamberg to Kelkheim. The canal was completed in 1992 and the plan was to construct 29 dams on the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway, out of which 14 have already been built. These dams create a 607 km section meeting the waterway parameters, thus enabling undisturbed navigation.59 The fact, that the EU adopted the Strategy for the Danube Region in 2011, which is the second macro-regional strategy of the EU, contributes significantly to the development of this transport corridor. This strategy is the macro-regional development strategy and action plan of the countries and regions of the Danube River Basin. The strategy was developed by eight EU Member States: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany (Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria), Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and six non-EU countries: Croatia (which was not yet a Member State), Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Moldova and Ukraine.

As, with the exception of Austria and Germany, the countries participating in the strategy for the Danube region are countries which acceded to the European Union through the enlargement policy of the EU (2004, 2007 – eastern enlargement;

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The territory of the EU Macro-regional Strategy for the Danube Region60

2013 – Croatia) or Western Balkan countries involved in accession negotiations or Eastern Partnership countries; this macro-regional strategy is also regarded as the symbol of the new, enlarged EU. From the aspect of economic partnerships, it can be considered to be the growth axis of Central and South-East Europe. The map above demonstrates the macro-regions of the Danube. Based on this map, we can conclude that this area can be regarded as a significant sub-region of the Central and Eastern European region. This sub-region is based on physical geographic features and goes beyond the political approach which focuses on distinguishing countries that are members of the Euro-Atlantic field of power and non-member countries.61 The Rhine-Danube Core Network Corridor and the Danube region are of paramount strategic importance for Hungary, as, due to its geographical situation, its history and its current EU-membership, half of the export of goods are carried out within the framework of this transport corridor. The reason for that is that traditionally, the Danube is the most vital physical geographic link between the West and the East of Europe. As the map below outlines, there are four destinations (countries of the Danube) which contribute to the fact that the value of Hungary’s merchandise exports exceeds 5 million USD. These priority destinations are the following: Germany (value of all merchandise exports: 28.9 billion USD, accounting for 28.1% of Hungary’s total volume of merchandise exports), Romania (value of all merchandise exports: 5.3 billion USD, accounting for 5.2% of Hungary’s total volume of merchandise exports), Slovakia (value of all merchandise exports: 5.12 billion USD, accounting for 5.02% of Hungary’s total volume of merchandise exports) and Austria (value of all merchandise exports: 5.1 billion USD, accounting for 5.0% of Hungary’s total volume of merchandise exports).

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The main destinations of Hungary’s merchandise exports in 2016 and the offices of the Hungarian National Trading House in 201762

This most important West-East transport corridor of the European continent is ahead of an outstanding technical development, since the first European ‘Hyperloop’ train line is planned to connect Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest and Košice. Hyperloop is a vacuum tube train, which is planned to reach supersonic speeds (1220 km/h). In March 2016, the CEO of the Hyperloop Transportation Technologies (HTT) signed an agreement with the Slovak Minister of Economy to build the Hyperloop transport line connecting the four cities by 2020. As the map below demonstrates, the transport time between these cities would become significantly shorter, as a Bratislava-toVienna route would take only 8 minutes and a Bratislava-to-Budapest journey only 10 minutes. This new, today still almost incomprehensible mode of transport will establish a direct link between the large cities of the region and might create new spatial organisational forms, as well as spatial connections. Obviously, there are a lot of people who are sceptical about this revolutionary new technology. However, it is beyond doubt that this Hyperloop technology would practically eliminate geographical distance.63 This is particularly important, as the Central and Eastern European economic field of power has two major growth axes: the Vienna-Bratislava economic axis and the Warsaw-Berlin growth axis (where the Polish government also plans to construct a Hyperloop railway). The latter will be discussed later.

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The planned Hyperloop route for the 2020s connecting Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest and Košice64

The Mediterranean corridor The approximately 3000 km long Mediterranean transport corridor is the second most important West-East axis of the EU’s TEN-T networks. It connects the south-western Mediterranean region with the HungaryUkraine border. It runs from the southernmost point of Spain, the Strait of Gibraltar, along the coastlines of Spain and France, crossing the Alps it goes through the northern part of Italy and continuing through Slovenia and Croatia it enters the territory of Hungary.

The easternmost point of this Mediterranean corridor is Záhony, at the Hungary-Ukraine border. The Mediterranean corridor is significant also because it connects the western Mediterranean region with the EU’s core region. In Spain this transport corridor has not only a coastal The Mediterranean (TEN-T) Core Network Corridor65

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route, but also another one, which connects Madrid with the coastal areas. The 621 km long high-speed railway line (designed for speeds above 300 km/h) connecting Madrid and Barcelona was opened in 2008. Formerly, a Madrid-to-Barcelona route took five hours; today, however, the same route takes only two and a half hours, thanks to this high-speed railway. There is a high-speed rail line in France as well, which connects Marseille and Lyon. One of the largest investments of the Mediterranean transport corridor is the construction of a new railway line between Lyon and the Italian city, Torino. A key part of this investment is the construction of a new, 57 km long tunnel through the Alps. This new railway line, which would be a new border crossing, is expected to be ready by 2028. The modernisation of the railway networks in those areas of Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary where the Mediterranean corridor crosses the countries is only a long-term plan of the EU.66 The EU Strategy for the Alpine Region, adopted in 2016, is related to the Mediterranean corridor. However, this strategy concerns only Slovenia out of the 20 Central and Eastern European countries.

The territory of the EU Macro-regional Strategy for the Alpine Region67

The Alpine region is one of the richest regions in the world. Moreover, thanks to its unique geographical and natural features, it is one of the most economically dynamic, innovative and competitive regions of Europe. The strategy concerns about 80 million people and 48 regions in the seven countries of the Alpine macroregion. Five out of these seven countries are EU Member States (Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Slovenia) and two countries are not members of the EU (Liechtenstein and Switzerland).68 The reason why this transport core network corridor is of major importance for Hungary is that Záhony, located at the Hungary-Ukraine border, is the eastern gate of the EU and also one of the western gates of the New Silk Road Economic Belt’s New Eurasian Land Bridge development zone. Thus, Záhony can be regarded as one of the key strategic geographical locations of the new Eurasian field of power.

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Záhony is an important station of the East-West rail transports, which is the junction of the European “standard gauge” and the eastern broad gauge railway networks.

Transhipping, made necessary by the 89 mm difference in gauge between the two systems, has been going on since 1948, that is, for over 60 years. The land transhipping complex, often referred to as the eastern gateway to Hungary, has a total area of 84 km2. With its 260 km long standard gauge railway lines and its 140 km long broad gauge railway lines, it can be regarded as a large-size complex with large transhipping capacity also at European level. Its principal activity is transhipping cargo arriving from the Commonwealth of Independent States and countries beyond via Ukraine’s Csop (Záhony) and Batyevo (Eperjeske) border crossing points in cars on broad gauge (1520 mm) railway into standard (1435 mm) gauge cars.

Now, however, Záhony may be granted a new role through China’s New Silk Road economic project, as, in the near future, one of the major routes of the transport of goods between China and the European continent will pass through Záhony.

Thus, Záhony can become the logistics hub of Chinese goods. In accordance with the agreement, concluded in November 2017, to develop the Chinese-Hungarian logistics cooperation; in the near future, a certain part of the flow of goods coming from China into the EU will be transported into Hungary, and the goods will be distributed to the Central and Eastern European region from this country.

In order to attract Chinese railway container traffic to Hungary, the Ministry for National Economy of the Hungarian Government designated an area of more than 17 000 square metres, in the free enterprise zone of Záhony, as a customs free zone.

Currently, this is the only customs free zone in Hungary, which can make the region an attractive industrial location again and plays a pivotal role in making the Záhony region an international freight and logistics hub. From the aspect of import duties, taxes and import measures of the commercial policy; goods within the customs free zone are to be regarded as goods outside the customs territory of the EU. Therefore, in such zones any kind of industrial, commercial or service activity is permitted, under the conditions laid down by customs legislation. This means that businesses are allowed to carry out activities involving the storing, processing, selling or the purchase of goods. If a certain investment is carried out in a customs free zone, there are no duties or national taxes payable on goods imported from abroad; thus, the costs of economic activities planned to be carried out in an industrial area are lower. Furthermore, capital allowances can also be ensured, because the imported means of production are also exempt from duties and taxes.69

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However, the key to Záhony’s genuine future development would be to establish a direct railway link between Záhony and Horgos/Khorgos, located at the China-Kazakhstan border. Currently, this China-Kazakhstan Border Cooperation is globally regarded as the biggest largest urban, and commercial and logistics hub construction project in the new Silk Road Economic Belt. Khorgos, located on the Kazakhstan side and Horgos, located on the Chinese side of the border, constitute the largest commercial road freight terminal of Western China.This terminal connects Western China with Central Asia and Europe, thus playing a major role in the commerce of Central Asia. In Horgos, a Border Cooperation Centre is being built, which is suitable for trade negotiations, presentations of goods, carrying out sales and transportations and organising various regional or international economic and commercial conferences. The prevailing trade policy of the region is a favourable bilateral trade policy; the citizens of China, Kazakhstan and other countries can stay for 30 days in the centre without a visa, together with their commodities and cars.70 The North Sea-Baltic corridor The North Sea-Baltic (TEN-T) Core Network Corridor71

The EU’s North Sea-Baltic transport corridor runs from Helsinki, connects the ports and the most important cities of the three Baltic States, and following the traditional West-East corridor, it passes through Warsaw, Lodz, Poznan and Berlin, continuing towards the major ports of the North Sea, that is, towards Hamburg, Bremen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Thus, it connects the most important ports of the European continent with Poland and the Baltic States. The entire transport corridor consists of 5 947 km of railways, 4029 km of roads and 2186 km of inland waterways. One of the corridor’s most important projects is the construction of a new, high-speed railway, running from Tallinn (Estonia) towards the Lithuania-Poland border, continuing to the Polish city, Bialystok. The plan is to extend this railway line to Warsaw.72 Since this transport corridor ensures a link between Eastern Europe and the busiest ports of Western Europe, it is of key importance for the New Silk Road Economic

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Belt, more precisely for its development zone, called New Eurasian Land Bridge.

At the Belarus-Poland border, opposite the Belarussian city of Brest, in the Polish city of Terespol; a logistics hub, that is, basically a new city is being built with Chinese capital investment exclusively. The Polish city of Terespol is often referred to as one of the major cities of the New Silk Road already today. In the near future, it will be one of the main directions of the Chinese flows of goods. However, Terespol’s importance can be definitely connected to Brest’s transhipment complex on the opposite side.

Similarly to Záhony, Brest is also a transhipment station where the broad gauge railway, built in the Soviet era, meets the European standard gauge railway line.

From the aspect of transport geography, Brest has an excellent location, as it is located on the main railway line connecting Moscow and Minsk. Furthermore, in the Soviet era, a highway was also built between the two cities.73 As already mentioned above, the second Hyperloop railway line within the Central and Eastern European region is planned to be constructed in Poland, on the Warsaw-Lodz-Wroclaw route. It would connect the capital of Poland, Warsaw, with the manufacturing and technology centre, Wroclaw, over a of 415 km stretch. While a “traditional” journey from Warsaw to Wroclaw takes 3.5 hours, thanks to the Hyperloop railway, it will only take 40 minutes in the future. The first section of the Hyperloop route in Poland is planned to be built between Warsaw and Lodz, as Lodz is a major European logistics hub of the Chinese New Silk Road Belt. The Polish gate of the New Silk Road’s land route is the city of Terespol, opposite the Belarussian city of Brest. According to the plan, a new railway line is to be built between Terespol and Warsaw, there should be a Hyperloop railway line connecting Warsaw and Lodz, and the North Sea-Baltic TEN-T corridor runs from Lodz, through Poznan right up to Berlin. The implementation of this plan would be extremely significant, as one of the most important growth axes of the Central European region is the Warsaw-Berlin axis.

Another plan of the company Hyper Poland is to construct a Hyperloop railway line connecting Warsaw with Krakow. This line would be of particular importance for the other Visegrad countries and would significantly contribute to the establishment of a new Visegrad economic field of power.74 The company Hyperloop One plans to construct two new railway lines in Europe which are closely connected to the North Sea-Baltic TEN-T corridor, as well as the Central and Eastern European field of power. The first one would connect Helsinki with Tallinn over a length of 90 km. This journey would only take eight minutes. The second plan is to construct a 1991 km ring line in Germany on the Munich-Berlin-Hamburg-Frankfurt-Stuttgart-Munich route.

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The planned route of Hyperloop in Poland connecting Warsaw, Lodz and Wroclaw and a picture depicting what the Polish Hyperloop is planned to look like75

This transport corridor is closely connected to the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea region which was first adopted by the European Council in 2009. Thus, this region can be regarded as the “flagship” of the EU’s macro-regions. As the figure below demonstrates, the Baltic Sea macro-region The territory of the EU Macro-regional Strategy consists of 11 countries, eight EU Memfor the Baltic Sea Region ber States: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany (the States/Länder of Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, SchleswigHolstein and Lower Saxony – only the NUTS II region of the Lüneburg region), Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, and three non-EU countries: Belarus, Norway and Russia (St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Republic of Karelia, Komi Republic, Leningrad Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug, Novgorod Oblast and Pskov Oblast).

The major aim of the Macro-regional Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is to

develop the whole region around the Baltic Sea into a leading region at a global level. This strategy is based on four fundamental pillars: 1. To make the Baltic Sea Region environmentally sustainable.

2. To make the region prosperous (through the more effective coordination of research and innovation and the EU laws).

3. To make the region accessible and attractive (by improving the transport systems and energy supplies, which is a great challenge, in view of the low population density and the peripheral nature of certain parts of the Baltic Sea Region).

4. To make the region secure (through the more effective joint surveillance of shipping, public health, crisis management etc.).77 The fact that Russia and Belarus are also partner countries, increases the geopolitical importance of the Baltic Sea macro-region significantly. The Baltic region is of key importance for Russia because of the Nord Stream pipelines of Gazprom.

The Nord Stream 1 and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline of Gazprom78

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The reason why the Nord Stream pipeline of Gazprom is significant is that it brings gas under the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, without passing through Ukraine. Germany is the biggest purchaser of Gazprom’s gas and this pipeline reveals how excellent the economic relations between Russia and Germany are today, which have been improving since the 2000s. From a geopolitical point of view, it can be regarded as the new, 21st century Russian-German economic axis. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline

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was inaugurated on 8 November 2011, which transports natural gas from the city of Vyborg, located at the Finnish-Russian border, to Greifswald in Germany. The Nord Stream company is a joint venture whose majority shareholder is Gazprom, holding a 51 percent stake. When the construction of the South Stream pipeline was stopped in the first half of 2015, the Nord Stream joint venture concluded an agreement to build the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with a length of 1200 km and a planned annual transport capacity of 55 billion cubic metres. The construction is planned to be completed by 2019. The planned total annual transport capacity of the Gazprom 1 and Gazprom 2 pipelines is 110 billion cubic metres of gas. In April 2017, five big European energy companies (ENGIE, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper and Wintershall) signed an agreement with Gazprom to cover 50 percent of the costs. This is of paramount importance, as Gazprom plans to complete 80 percent of gas transportation to Europe on this route; thus, in the near future, Ukraine would lose revenues by no longer playing the role of a transit country.79 The Baltic-Adriatic corridor The EU’s Baltic-Adriatic transport corridor is of paramount importance for the Central and Eastern European region, as this North-South corridor connects Poland, which has a coast along the Baltic Sea with Slovenia and Italy, which have a coast along the Adriatic Sea. One of the transport corridor’s major long-term developmental goals is the establishment of the missing infrastructural links between Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The corridor has two starting points in Poland. The first one is Szczecin, whose seaport is in Swinoujscie (the LNG terminal, which was opened in 2016, is located there), and the second one is the busiest seaport of Poland, Gdansk (Gdynia). The transport corridor starting from Szczecin runs through Poznan and Wroclaw to Ostrava in the Czech Republic, continuing through Pferovo and Brno to Vienna. The corridor starting from Gdansk connects Warsaw, Lodz and Katowice, and passing through the Slovakian cities of Žilina and Bratislava it also reaches Vienna. From Vienna and later from Graz, one of the transport corridor’s branches runs towards Italy, where passing The Baltic-Adriatic (TEN-T) Core Network Corridor80

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through Udine it reaches Venice, where it establishes a transport link between Venice, Padua, Bologna and Ravenna. The second branch of the corridor starting from Graz runs towards Ljubljana and establishes a transport link between the Slovenian port of Koper and the Italian port of Trieste.81 However, it is important to note that this corridor only partially contributes to the establishment of a new Central and Eastern European North-South economic field of power, since it does not concern Hungary and Croatia. Instead, it strengthens the transport links between Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Italy.

The Three Seas Initiative has been launched with the aim of establishing a new North-South link in the Central and Eastern European region. This initiative has set the target of establishing new economic relations between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea. Therefore, as opposed to the TEN-T corridors of the EU, this initiative does not aim to establish a relationship (on a residual basis) between the former EU Member States and those Eastern countries which acceded to the EU in 2004. Instead, its objective is to create a new economic field of power where the aim is indeed the development of the given geographical area and the establishment of transport links with Western Europe is not a key consideration.

The Three Seas Initiative was initiated by Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic and by Andrzej Duda. The former is the President of Croatia, which has the longest coastline along the Adriatic Sea (5 835 km), and the latter is the President of Poland, which has the largest national economy out of the Central and Eastern European countries and a 440 km coastline along the Baltic Sea. The first summit took place in Dubrovnik in the summer of 2016. The 12 participating states were the following: Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria. Although Romania and Bulgaria, which have a Black Sea coastline, are members of the Three Seas Initiative, one of the most problematic issues is the establishment of stronger economic relations with the Black Sea region. The big question is whether Ukraine (with a 2 782 km Black Sea coastline) will play a role in this initiative at all. This Three Seas Initiative is very similar to the 16+1 initiative by China. As opposed to the Western Balkan countries, Austria is not part of this initiative.83

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The countries and the three basic principles of the Three Seas Initiative82

The second summit was organised in Warsaw in the July of 2017, which was attended by the President of the United States, Donald Trump, who interpreted the Three Seas Initiative as the Central and Eastern European region’s independence from Russia, more precisely from Russian natural gas deliveries. In his speech held in Warsaw he said Russia was the country posing the biggest threat to the safety of the Central and Eastern European region and he confirmed that NATO was ready to protect the region against any kind of Russian aggression. However, the motivation for Donald Trump’s visit to Warsaw was geo-economic, rather than geopolitical, as the first American LNG Carrier, the Clean Ocean, had arrived at the new LNG seaport of the Polish city of Świnoujście at the beginning of June, several weeks before the US President’s visit to Warsaw. The key question of the near future is what role LNG shipments from the US will play besides or instead of LNG shipments arriving primarily from Qatar. At the end of July, after the visit of Donald Trump, the US House of Representatives voted in favour of imposing new sanctions on Russia. These sanctions concern all the energy companies of Russia and even those European companies which participated in Russian energy investments. Obviously, it affects primarily Gazprom’s investment in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

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The third summit will take place in Bucharest in 2018. Thus, while the first two summits were organised in a country of either the Adriatic or the Baltic Sea, the third summit will be held in Romania, which has a Black Sea coastline. The Świnoujście LNG (liquefied natural gas) terminal in northern Poland was inaugurated in 2015 and put into operation in 2016. The terminal, which was began to be built in 2011 with a budget of EUR 830 million, should have been ready by the middle of 2014.

In the presence of President Andrzej Duda, the gas terminal was named after Lech Kaczynski, a former Polish President, who died in the Smolensk plane crash in 2010. Lech Kaczynski initiated the establishment of the gas terminal back in 2006.

Due to the delay of the project, there was a need for the modification of the contract regulating the delivery of Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG), which had to be transmitted through the terminal. On the basis of the modified contract, the gas which is not used in the Polish terminal can be sold by the gas transporter on other markets, too. Currently, there are two gas storage terminals with a capacity of 5 billion cubic metres, which cover approximately one third of Poland’s annual gas demand.84 The Świnoujście LNG terminal is a project supported by the EU. It is a part of a North-South gas corridor, leading to the Croatian island of Krk, where an Adriatic gas registration terminal is planned to be constructed The Polish gas pipelines running from the Baltic LNG terminal will transmit gas to Gdansk, which is also a Polish seaport, and to Lwówek, located in northern Poland. Furthermore, it will be possible to deliver gas from the Polish gas pipelines to Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Ukraine, through the existing gas interconnectors.85 The operation of the terminal is limThe planned North-South energy gas corridor ited, as the Nord Stream pipeline, inaugurated in 2011, which crosses the maritime routes leading to this terminal, makes the transport of LNG ships with a draught of more than 13.5 m difficult.

Besides the northern, Baltic terminal in Poland, another terminal is planned to be constructed in the south, in the island of Krk. It is the Adriatic LNG terminal, which is expected to be ready by 2019 and to work with an annual capacity of 6 billion cubic metres. The terminal in the island of Krk would ensure the natural gas supply of the Polish, the Czech, the Slovak and the Hungarian market as well and it is also expected that there would be gas deliveries to Ukraine, too.86 88

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Thanks to these two terminals, it would be possible for the first time to establish a new North-West energy corridor in the Central and Eastern European region, running from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea. Thus, instead of depending on Russian gas, gas import from global markets could be geographically diversified for the first time.87 The figure above demonstrates this particular NorthSouth energy corridor, focusing on the plan of establishing a Polish-Slovak gas distribution centre.

The Orient/East-Med corridor The Southeast-Northwest Orient/EastMed transport corridor establishes a transport link between the busiest seaports of Greece (and Cyprus) and Germany. More precisely, it will establish a link only in the future, as the southern and the middle parts of this TEN-T corridor still require large-scale developments. The maritime route of the corridor starts from Larnaca Port in Cyprus, continues to the island of Crete and turns into a land route at the port of Piraeus in Greece. One branch of this transport corridor connects Athens and Piraeus with important cities located in the western part of the Greek Peninsula. From here, passing through the city of Thessaloniki, it continues to the Bulgarian city of Sofia. From Sofia, one branch of the transport corridor runs towards the port of Burgas, while the main branch of this TEN-T corridor continues from the Bulgarian city of Vidin to Romania. It enters Hungary at Lökösháza, which can be found on the route between Oradea and Arad, and continues to Budapest through the Békéscsaba-Szolnok route. Then, from the direction of Bratislava and Vienna, it continues to the Czech Republic and at Děčín, on the Prague-Mělník route, it enters Germany. In Germany, one of the main routes passes through Berlin to the port of Rostock. The second main route runs to the port of Hamburg and Bremen through Leipzig and Magdeburg.

This transport corridor runs through EU Member States exclusively; therefore it makes a detour towards Bulgaria and Romania. However, the traditional Western Balkan route (as well as the migrants’ major land route) follows the geographically The Orient/East-Med (TEN-T) Core Network Corridor89

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shortest route from Greece through Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary. The newest map of the EU’s TEN-T transport corridor already includes the new planned branch of the Orient/East-Med corridor, the Thessaloniki-Skopje-Pristina-Belgrade-Budapest route.90 The rehabilitation of the Budapest-Belgrade railway is of paramount importance for the commercial relationship of China and the EU, as, thanks to the maritime route of the Chinese Silk Road, the goods shipped to the port of Piraeus, from where they should be delivered to Western Europe, can be transported through Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, which will be the fastest way. The rehabilitation of Serbian section of the Budapest-Belgrade railway began last November. After the modernisation, the journey between the two capitals will take only three hours, instead of the current eight-hour journey time. The project is financed by China.

The railway rehabilitation project is important from a number of aspects, since this is the first cross-border project that will be implemented within the framework of cooperation between China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries, and this is the first tripartite agreement that has already been signed and whose implementation has already been started. Furthermore, it is also unique, because China, an EU Member State and a non-EU country take part in this project together. The project is executed by the China Railways International and the China Communications Construction Company and it is planned to be completed in three years.

After the renewal, the trains will be able to run at a speed of 200 km/h on the first 20 km section and they will be able to run at a speed of 120 km/h on the rest of the section. The average speed of the trains on the whole Serbian section will be 120180 km/h. So far, the speed has barely reached 70 km/h.

In order to build a double track electrified railway line between Budapest and Belgrade, a 350 km railway section has to be renovated, out of which 166 km runs through Hungary and 184 km passes through Serbia. Besides passenger traffic, this railway line will also be suitable for freight transport. The complete rehabilitation and modernisation is planned to be finished by 2023. The call for proposals for the design-build procurement procedures concerning the section in Hungary between Soroksár and Kelebia (which is a 152 km railway line) appeared on the website of MÁV (Hungarian State Railways) on 27 November 2017, which was also the day when the 16+1 Forum of China and the 16 Central and Eastern European Countries commenced in Budapest.91

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As analysed above, the land route of the Chinese New Silk Road Economic Belt has two European gates, the Polish/Belorussian Terespol/Brest and Záhony in Hungary.

However, the European gate of the 21st century Maritime Silk Road is obviously the Greek port of Piraeus. The Chinese state-owned company, COSCO, began to operate the container port in 2008. In February 2013, the railway line of the port of Piraeus was connected to the European rail network and since then, it has been functioning smoothly. In August 2016, COSCO bought a 67 percent stake in the port of Piraeus from the state-owned company, the Piraeus Port Authority; thus COSCO has become the majority shareholder.92 The state-owned COSCO is China’s largest and the world’s fourth largest marine shipping company. This year an estimated 3.4 million containers will be unloaded at the port of Piraeus by this company. Currently, COSCO sends three trains a week from Piraeus to Hungary and through Hungary to Central Europe. Through the construction of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line, Hungary would have a realistic chance of becoming the Central European distribution centre of the Chinese products delivered by sea. In 2016, the port of Piraeus was the 8th biggest container port in Europe; however, according to the forecasts, it could become Europe’s largest container port by 2030. 93 The Port of Piraeus, Greece was the 8th largest container port of Europe in 2016

10. Central and Eastern Europe as the “bridge region” of the 21st century’s Eurasian supercontinent – towards a new geopolitical frame of mind The most optimistic scenario with regard to our region is that Central and Eastern Europe will become a “bridge region” not only between Western and Eastern Europe but between Europe and Asia too. Will the Eurasian supercontinent ever become reality? It is beyond dispute that by now the Eurasian supercontinent of the 21st century has already started taking shape, primarily because of the intensifying economic cooperation between Russia and China. However, the main question is what Asian-European political and economic relations will be like and whether the European continent is going to constitute a part of Eurasia or not?

Despite all its inherent risks, the multi-polar world currently in the making provides new geopolitical opportunities, too. In my view, the global economic and political role of East-Central Europe and the members of the Visegrad Group in particular could be that of a mediary between the major economic and political power fields in the 21st century. From an economic perspective this could bring about the dominance of transport services and intermediary activities in the field of business and finance in the region. Ideally, Hungary could become a logistics hub for both western (primarily from North-America and Western Europe) and eastern (predominantly from Russia and China) transnational companies.

In my opinion, in order for Hungary to become successful on the long term, it should strive towards becoming a strategically important geographical spot, that is, a “bridge state” in the multi-polar world of the 21th century. Can a country as small as ours have its own foreign trade and foreign policy strategy? In the current period of “deglobalisation” and ever-strengthening macro-regions, intensifying the cooperation among the countries of the Visegrad group and establishing a EasternCentral European economic field of power underpinned by a new north-south infrastructural corridor could serve as a suitable basis for Hungary, too, for adopting a considerably more independent foreign policy strategy. The necessity for the creation of this Central and Eastern European North-South economic (and political) power field has already appeared in the post-World War I. settlement plan of Józef Piłsudski, Polish marshal. Piłsudski coined the term of Intermarium which referred to a closer cooperation between the countries of the region, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea, with the aim of retaining their independence.

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The “grand geopolitical chessboard” of the 21st century is going through fundamental changes, and owing to the evolving multi-polar world there are new “pieces” appearing on the board that will bring new rules to the game. Even though everything is in motion, the fundamental question remains the same: Will Halford Mackindr’s World Island, that is, the Eurasian continent ever take shape as an actual geographic territorial unit and will we be able to investigate global political relations in terms of the World-Island–American continent dichotomy in the near future?

In my view, in order for the Central and Eastern European region to be as successful as possible in the evolving Eurasian power field, it is indispensable for the citizens of the region to change their traditional, entrenched, Cold War-like perception of the world and adopt a fundamentally new geopolitical way of thinking. One of the main elements of this is profoundly changing the way we perceive Russia. For Hungary the realistic assessment of Russia, and learning as much about it as possible would be of great importance, regardless of the actual global political situation.

Furthermore, it is also imperative that we profoundly change our “entrenched” stereotypical way of thinking about “looking up to the West and disdaining the East”.

Instead of the general and fundamentally flawed common simplifications (e.g.: the Eurasian Economic Union is the enemy of the European Union), we have to adpot a new geopolitical view. We have to accept the existence of the multi-polar world and the evolution of a new 21st century Eurasian continent, and most important of all, we have to accept that Hungary is a bridge state between the western half of Europe and the eastern half of Asia.

But can we change our way of thinking in the years to come? Can we adopt an “eastern way of thinking”?

The differences between Eastern and Western way of thinking and strategy can be interpreted in terms of the differences between the games chess and go. Chess is a typical example of a zero-sum game since the victory of one player entails the defeat of the other. Therefore, chess is about total victory, its aim is to mate the opponent: to attack the king of the opponent and to put him into an impossible situation. In other words chess is about the final, decisive battle. Put into everyday terms, it means either white or black, either the West or the East, the USA or Russia will emerge victorious. In essence, the Cold War era was reminiscent of a game of chess. It is no coincidence that in American geopolitics the scene of global politics is called a chess board – after Z. Brzezinski’s term.

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On the contrary, the game wei qui (its Japanese name is go) is about prolonged warfare. If translated word by word the name of the game means “board game of surrounding”. The principle of the game is strategy itself, the strategy of encircling.

In his book about China, Henry Kissinger describes the characteristics of Chinese strategy, different from those of Western strategy, through the book of Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”. According to Kissinger “Hence the task of a strategist is less to analyse a particular situation than to determine its relationship to the context in which it occurs. No particular constellation is ever static; any pattern is temporary and in essence evolving ...Sun Tzu uses the word “shi” for that quality, a concept with no direct Western counterpart.”94 But will we be able to use this Chinese way of thinking in the future? Do we have the ability to apply the shi approach, that is, the method of constantly adopting to the ever-changing situation, in economic and political strategy? Are we able to redefine the geopolitical position and strategy of the Central and Eastern European region in the 21st century by using the shi approach?

In my view, getting acquainted with the strategic principles and rules of wei qi (go) provides a useful basis for the creation of this novel mind-set and new set of strategies.

The four strategic principles of the game serve as the main foundation and guideline for creating long-term strategy. These are the following: 1. Principle of counterattack: As the saying goes, the best defense is good offense, and this is also valid in go. If we adopt a defensive strategy then the game will go exactly the way the opponent planned it. Therefore, it is advisable to reply to an attack with a counterattack, if missing out on defense will not harm us.

When conducting a counterattack, our move should always force an immediate response from the opponent. Therefore, always try to initiate first.

2. Principle of containment: If we can isolate the territory of the opponent from other parts of the board then we will be at an advantage. The isolated territories will not able to affect the course of the game later on. Thus, in given situations, it is worth making smaller sacrifices.

3. The principle of resilience: We should strive towards achieving our goal, however, we should always take note of the opponent’s moves. It might become necessary

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to make a change of plans at some point. This also implies, that as long as it is possible that the move of our opponent changes the game fundamentally, we should only make preparatory, tentative moves.

4. T he principle of reducing losses: Even our best plans might be thwarted by out opponents. In this case, it is crucial for us to have an opportunity to minimize casualties.95 The so-called ten golden rules of wei qi (The golden rules were compiled by Wang Jixin, a renown Chinese wei qi player who lived in the era of the Thang dynasty (618907)) provide assistance in the tactical implementation of long-term strategies.

Ten golden rules of wei qi: 1. Greediness is not victorious!

2. Be unhurried to enter opponent’s territory!

3. Take care of oneself when attacking others!

4. Discard stones to gain sente!

5. Abandon small to save big!

6. When in danger, sacrifice!

7. Make thick shape, avoid hasty moves!

8. A move must respond to the opponent’s!

9. Against strong positions, play safely!

10. Look for peace, avoid fighting in an isolated or weak situation!

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Notes 1 Henry Kissinger: Világrend. Budapest: Antall József Tudásközpont, 2015. p. 372.

2 André Kostolany: Világpolgár. MTV, video, 1998. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLkuL4PHsOE, August 10, 2017.

3 The sentence was written by the author.

4 National Security Act of 1947. Truman Doctrine.

5 5Bernek Ágnes: : „21. századi geopolitikai stratégiák. Az ortodox geopolitika újjászületése és az egyre fokozódó biztonsági kockázatok”. Nemzetbiztonsági szemle, Vol. 2. No. 3. (2014). pp.

18-46.

6 Halford J. Mackinder: Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction.

New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919. p. 186.

7 Halford J. Mackinder: „The Geographical Pivot of History”. Geographical Journal, Vol. 23.

No. 4. (1904) pp. 421-437.

8 Földrajzi Világatlasz. Budapest: Cartographia Kft., 2012.

9 Halford J. Mackinder: „A földrajz mint a történelem kulcsa.” In: Geopolitikai szöveggyûjtemény (szerk. Csizmadia Sándor, Molnár Gusztáv, Pataki Gábor Zsolt). Budapest: Stratégiai és Védelmi Kutató Hivatal, 2002. p. 25.

10 Ibid. p. 26.

11 See endnote 7.

12 Ibid. p. 27.

13 Ibid. pp. 16-17.

14 Marosi Sándor, Sárfalvi Béla (szerk.): Európa. Budapest: Gondolat, 1975.

15 Farkas Ildikó: „A turánizmus”. Magyar Tudomány, Vol. 38. (100.) No. 7. (1993). pp. 860-868.

16 Teleki Pál: A turán földrajzi fogalom. No. 1-2. (1918). p. 49.

17 Szögi László – Zsidai Vilmos: Dokumentumok a Keleti Kereskedelmi Akadémia történetébôl 1892-1919. A Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem Levéltárának kiadványai 12. Budapest: Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, 2007.

18 Zbigniew Brzezinski: A nagy sakktábla. Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1999.

19 Ibid. p.7.

20 Ibid. p. 77.

21 Zbigniew Brzezinski: Stratégiai vízió. Amerika és a globális hatalom válsága. Budapest: Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2013.

22 Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives. July 1, 2014, The Kremlin, Moscow. http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/22586 , July 19, 2014. The quotation is the translation of the author.

23 Vladimir Putin inaugurated as President of Russia. May 7, 2012. July 1, 2014, The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15224 , May 8, 2012.

24 Alekszandr Dugin: A geopolitika alapjai. In: Oroszország és Európa. Orosz geopolitikai szöveggyûjtemény. (szerk. Ljubov Siselina – Gazdag Ferenc). Budapest: Zrínyi Könyvkiadó, (2004) pp. 333-376.

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25 Ibid. pp. 333-376.

26 Eurasian Economic Union. July 1, 2014, The Kremlin, Moscow. http://www.eaeunion. org/?lang=en#info , July 12, 2017.

27 Russian-Chines Talks. May 8, 2015. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49430 , May 10, 2015.

28 Sanghai Cooperation Organization – http://eng.sectsco.org – September 15, 2017.

29 According to data acquired from World Bank World Development Indicators and Fortune Global 500.

30 The Belt and Road Initiative. The State Council The People’s Republic of China. http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad – September 3, 2017 31 Merics – Mercator Institute for Chineas Studies –

https://www.merics.org/index.php/en/china-mapping/silk-road-initiative 32 Source: See next endnote!

33 Sources of the information concerning the development zones and routes: The Belt and Road Initiative. Hong Kong Trade Development Council, HKTDC Research. http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/ The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm, 2017 augusztus 14.

34 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – AIIB. – October 10, 2017.

https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html 35 Source: Product of the author.

36 Marosi Sándor, Sárfalvi Béla (szerk.): Európa I. kötet. Gondolat, 1975.

37 Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries – www.china-ceec. org/eng/ 38 PAGEO Budapest, Eszterhai Viktor: A „16+1 együttmûködés” bemutatása. November,2017.

http://www.geopolitika.hu/hu/2017/11/01/a-16-1-egyuttmukodes-bemutatasa/ 39 http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/orban-viktor-sajtonyilatkozata-a-kina-es-kozep-kelet-europa-csucstalalkozot-koveto-sajtotajekoztaton 40 The Visegrad Group: www.visegradgroup.eu 41 The Visegrad Group 2016-2017 Polish Presidency

http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/program-of-the-polish 42 The Visegrad Group 2017-2018 Polish Presidency

http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/2017-2018-hungarian/20172018-hungarian 43 Ronald, Asmus (2008) Europe’s Eastern Promise. Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement.

Foreign Affairs. January/February 2008.

44 Ronald Asmus passed away in 2011 at the age of 53. His life’s work is still regarded by the Hungarian Government as a prime example of successful Transatlantic relations. This study is partly an homage to the outstanding professional work of Ronald Asmus.

45 See footnote No. 35, p.7.

46 In connection with the case of Edward Snowden about revealing the secret surveillance practices of the National Security Agency.

47 North Atlantic Treaty Organization: www.nato.int

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48 The geopolitical analysis of the countries examined in this chapter was put together as a result of the author’s continuous research work compiled since 2013. The sources used are the following: CIA „World Fact Book”, World Bank „World Development Indicators”, IMF „Direction of Trade Statistics” and the online publications of IMF „Coordinated Direct Investment Survey”.

49 The Council of the European Union, the eastern partnership programme:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/policies/eastern-partnership/ 50 Európai Unió, Európai Bizottság: Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) public portal:http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/index_en.htm 51 Horváth Zoltán: Kézikönyv az Európai Unióról. Budapest: HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kft, 2011.

52 European Union, European Comisssion – http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/brochures_images/20150429_final_common_progress_report_final.pdf 53 Source of the figure: website of the European Union, European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/maps_upload/SchematicA0_EUcorridor_map.pdf 54 A map made by the author and Cartographia Ltd. based on the European Commission’s website, the TENtec Interactive Map Viewer..

55 Fleischer Tamás: Transzeurópai folyosók – A meglévôk hosszabbítgatása vagy egy összeurópai hálózat kialakítása? A délkelet-európai térség és Magyarország Európa közlekedésében: Elôadások a Balkánról. 6. Balkán-tanulmányok Központ, Európa Intézet MTA Társadalomkutató Központ. Budapest, 2006. május 16.

http://www.balkancenter.hu/pdf/elemzes/fleischer.pdf 56 The map of the publication released in 2017, presenting the EU’s macro-regional strategies: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/hu/information/publications/ 57 The EU’s macro-regional strategies:

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/cooperation/macro-regional-strategies/ 58 European Union, European Commission: TENtec Interactive Map Viewer:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html 59 Connecting Europe, Rhine-Danube Corridor

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/rhine-danube_en 60 European Union, European Commission, the EU Strategy for the Danube Region: www.danube-region.eu/ 61 European Union, European Commission, the EU Strategy for the Danube Region: www.danube-region.eu/ 62 A map made by the author and Cartographia Ltd. based on the data of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and the information of the Hungarian National Trading House.

63 The source of the information is the website of the company Hyperloop Transportation Technologies:www.hyperloop.global 64 Source of the image: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3493007/Hyperloop-coming-Europe-Superfast-tube-people-continent-just-25-minutes-2020.html

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65 European Union, European Commission: TENtec Interactive Map Viewer:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html 66 Connecting Europe, Mediterranean Corridor

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/mediterranean_en 67 European Union, European Commission, the EU Strategy for the Alpine Region: www.alpineregion.eu/ 68 European Union, European Commission, the EU Strategy for the Alpine Region: www.alpineregion.eu/ 69 Záhony-Logistics and Load Handling Servicing Company – publication of 2011: http://www. zahony-port.hu/prospektus/zp_2011_hu.pdf 70 https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/01/09/horgos-the-first-new-city-of-the-newsilk-road-becomes-a-hub-for-robots/#c1b5994245e5 71 European Union, European Commission: TENtec Interactive Map Viewer:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html 72 Connecting Europe, North Sea – Baltic

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/north-sea-baltic_en 73 Forbes: A Look at 7 New Cities Rising Along The New Silk Road https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/09/20/7-new-cities-that-are-rising-alongthe-new-silk-road/#117ed0bd1300 74 Hyperloop One, Hyperloop One’s Vision for Europe Summit: https://hyperloop-one.com/hyperloop-ones-vision-europe-summit-unveiling-9-routes-spanning-continent-part-its-global-challenge 75 Website of Hyper Poland: www.hyperpoland.com 76 European Union, European Commission, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: www. balticsea-region.eu/ 77 European Union, European Commission, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: www. balticsea-region.eu/ 78 The image was retrieved from the website of Gazprom: www.gazprom.com 79 The source of the data and information is the website of Gazprom: www.gazprom.com 80 European Union, European Commission: TENtec Interactive Map Viewer:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html 81 Connecting Europe, Baltic-Adriatic Corridor

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/baltic-adriatic_en 82 Slawomir Debski’s presentation:

https://twitter.com/slawomirdebski/status/879437089162629121 83 The Polish Institute of International Affairs: www.pism.pl 84 LNG World News www.lngworldnews.com 85 Polskie LNG S.A. http://en.polskielng.pl 86 LNG Terminal Krk – LNG Croatia LLC – www.lng.hr 87 Gas Transmission Operator Gaz-System S.A. http://en.gaz-system.pl/nasze-inwestycje/integracja-z-europejski-systemem/korytarz-polnoc-poludnie/

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88 BIZNESALERT – www.biznesalert.pl http://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-eu-grant-agreement-poland-slovakia-gas-interconnection/ 89 European Union, European Commission: TENtec Interactive Map Viewer:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html 90 Connecting Europe, Orient/East-Med Corridor

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/orient-east-med_en 91 http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20171128-megkezdodott-a-budapest-belgrad-vasutvonalfelujitasanak-szerbiai-szakasza.html 92 Pireus Port Authority S.A. www.olp.gr/en/ 93 PAGEO Geopolitical Research Institute (2016): The geopolitical significance of the port of Piraeus for China: http://www.geopolitika.hu/hu/2016/07/08/a-pireuszi-kikoto-geopolitikai-jelentosege-kina-szamara/ 94 Henry Kissinger: Kínáról. Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2014. pp. 47.

95 Go wiki website – Principles and rules – http://gowiki.hu/index.php?title=Alapelvek

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