HUG Magazine 2018 EN - Issue 4. (№12)

2018

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HUNGARIA N G EOPOLITICS

Redefining the 21st-century geopolitical role of the East-Central European region: Let us “place� Hungary together on the political and economic world map again!

We, Hungarians have always known more about the world than the world about us. Now, we can play a decisive role in world politics again, or in geopolitical terms, occupy a strategic geographical place in the world.

HUNGARIAN GEOPOLITICS

HUG 2018 4

2018/IV.

ISSN 2498-647X

The geopolitical situation of Central Europe The relation between the New Silk Road and the V4 Hungary’s country brand in China Budapest–Warsaw axis Digital Silk Road New Amber Road The Eurasian Economic Union Geopolitical public opinion poll

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FOREWORD

Dear Reader, Readers are holding issue No. 12 of HUG Magazine in their hands. We launched our Hungarian Geopolitics magazine three years ago. At the end of year 2018, we summed up the annual results of our foundation, Pallas Athene Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation and Research Institute. We are proud of more than 175 field-specific articles published on our homepage, www.geopolitika.hu; some of the more significant research papers were also published here, in HUG. Our professional essays are read by more than a hundred thousand people from 195 countries of the world, which means 357 thousand page views, which means that the number of our visitors tripled within a year, and more than half of our readers were foreigners.

We launched our PAIGEO podcast, with professional discussions on the geopolitical challenges of the new geoeconomic world order, and more than thirty podcasts, also available on Spotify now, were published last year. In 2018, we organised three Geodebates professional discussion series on the future of East-Central Europe, Central Asia, maritime and land transport, and the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Last year we held two international conferences, with a focus on the challenges of the New World Order and One Belt, One Road. We are taking part in the largest PhD programme of East-Central Europe, organised by the University of Pécs, and we are also proud of having George Friedman, one of the most significant geopolitical thinkers, as a visiting professor in the autumn term, arranged by the GEO Institute of the Corvinus University of Budapest.

the geopolitical challenges posed by the new Amber Road, the challenges of the Eurasian Economic Union, the regional competitiveness of Central and Eastern Europe or the significance of the Chinese and Hungarian touristic brand, from a new perspective. The study of the geopolitical situation of East-Central Europe in the context of geopolitical theories, or the geopolitical viewpoints for the economic strategy of Hungary and the V4, or the significance of the New Silk Road to the V4 in the global economic space, or even the significance of the new Digital Silk Road.

On the other hand, we managed to realise one of our long-cherished professional dreams by launching our public opinion poll at the end of November, 2017, the results of which were obtained in the autumn of 2018.

We wanted to present comprehensively the foreign policy and geopolitical knowledge of the population in today’s Hungary; which foreign policy issues had a prominent role in the public mind, where they collected information from, how well they knew the leaders of the most influential countries of the world, or what they thought about major global systems of alliances.

No such comprehensive poll, covering various regions, examining the geopolitical knowledge of the Hungarian population had been conducted so far, thus we believe that with an adequate professional background and regular publications, we can provide an interesting and exciting snapshot of geopolitical knowledge and thoughts.

Last year, new architectural gems of Budapest opened: the House of Wisdom, located in Szentháromság Square in the heart of Buda Castle, and Ybl Creative House Buda on the Danube bank, which hosted our exhibition, Hungarians on the Silk Road at the end of last year, in cooperation with the Chinese Dunhuang Research Academy and the Oriental Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In 2018, we continued to support valuable initiatives, including the publication of collections of geopolitical essays, researches, educational training sessions.

Yours faithfully,

Our present issue is a special one: on the one hand, it focusses on our region, Central and Eastern Europe, and we have selected the lectures of conferences and professional essays by young PhD researchers which have been published in the conference proceedings of the professional events and conferences that we supported. These are topics that are novel, and approach given geopolitical and geoeconomic issues, such as

Norbert Csizmadia Pallas Athene Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation Chairman of the Board of Trustees HUG’s Editor-in-Chief

Enjoy reading.

table of contents

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The geopolitical situation of Central Europe

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Geopolitical viewpoints for the economic strategy of Hungary and the V4

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The importance of the New Silk Road to the V4 in the global economic space

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Building Hungary’s country image in the people’s Republic of China

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Establishing the Budapest– Warsaw axis

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The geoeconomic significance of the “New Amber Road”

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An introduction to the Digital Silk Road

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The Eurasian Economic Union

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Comparison of the economic features of the Visegrรกd countries at regional level

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Geopolitical public opinion poll 2018

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Book recommendations

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THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

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THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

Exploring the geopolitical situation of Central Europe in the context of geopolitical theories Author: GrĂŠta Czene

It is difficult to define the notion of the Central European region, because its historical, ethnic, cultural and geographical borders are not identical with each other. In certain periods of the development of the European spatial structure, Central Europe played the role of a buffer zone, and continuously was the scene of rivalries between European major powers. When exploring the historical development of the European continental space, it is revealed that there were periods when the forces maintaining the borders of the Central European region were destroyed, and the region integrated into geopolitical units, usually in a divided form. There is no agreement on the boundaries of Central Europe; there are as many viewpoints along which the notion of Central Europe is defined as there are authors.

DEFINING CENTRAL EUROPE In the 19th century, Karl Ritter saw the essential feature of this region in its distance from the seas, and identified Central Europe with the German-Sarmatian-Russian plain land between the Rhine and the Volga rivers.

He was followed by Albrecht Penck, Alfred Hettner, who already defined Central Europe as a territory under German influence, and this view was also adopted by French geography. From the middle of the 19th century, the political and cultural definition of Central Europe was coined; the notion of Mitteleuropa was created to provide an economic hinterland for Germany in the works of politicians, thinkers (e.g. (pl. Friedrich List) from the 1830s, but significant works on the topic were also published in the years before the First World. The concept of Mitteleuropa relates to a Germany-centred economic macro-space reaching out to the southeast, crossing the boundaries of the space designed by the pan-German movement. The political significance of the region grew after World War I, as the revolutionary

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transformation of Russia deprived France of its eastern ally that could serve as counterweight to Germany on its east side. In Europe divided in the Cold War era, the concept of Central Europe became meaningless, as the Iron Curtain was actually drawn along the centre line of our region, and our region was transferred into the category of Eastern Europe. It was the eighties when this spatial concept appeared in the public discourse again, especially as a result of distancing from the East cognitively, and after the regime changes this also manifested in the political cooperations of the community, demonstrated by the Central Europe Initiative (CEI), the free trade association (CEFTA) and the foundation of the VisegrĂĄd Group.

In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of Hungarian surveys and studies on Central Europe, which obviously suggests that focus of professional interest has shifted onto this cluster of countries.

Several theories have been formulated to define Central Europe as a macro-region, and meticulous work has

been done to reveal the previous territorial features of this cluster of countries. The studies also indicate that there are significant differences in marking the macro-region. One group of researches focusses on the countries of the Visegrád Cooperation (V4), formed in 1991 (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia); several others also include Austria in the image of Central Europe. Other analyses also add the eastern provinces of Germany to the macro-region, Bavaria maybe, Slovenia, related to the West-Balkan, and Romania, thus they talk about a broader Central Europe.

Tibor Baráth argues that geographical and political-historical boundaries were rarely identical in Central Europe, and the region has never been characterized by a permanence of borders. Central Europe, as a historical-political geographical space can be called a natural region shaped by various geographical, ethnographic, political and cultural factors, which can be described very vaguely in geographical terms. An essential element is that its external boundaries are not sharp, the region usually gravitates toward Germany, and its territory is dominated by the traditions of the Christian-German cultural area. In her study, Csilla Dömők means the area between the Rhine and the Vistula, stretching between the Western Alps and the ranges of theCarpathian Mountain, between the Baltic

“There is no agreement on the boundaries of Central Europe; there are as many viewpoints along which the notion of Central Europe is defined as there are authors.”

Sea and the Adriatic Sea in relation to Central Europe in an extensive approach. Nonetheless, she classifies Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary as central areas in a strict sense.

Péter Miletics and Viktor Pál mean – on the basis of political geographical viewpoints – the following countries by Central Europe: Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lichtenstein and Switzerland. In their opinion, Romania is too attached to the Balkan, and considering the dividing and space-maintaining forces of geographical features, the Carpathians cut the Romanian state into two, increasing the insecurities of a regional division of

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Central Europe

space. Ferenc Mező believes that Central Europe as a phrase cannot be defined on the basis of simple natural geographical criteria, because it exists so much in the realms of identities and sentiments that other dimensions must be called upon, such as economy, cultural geography, history, politics, social structure, etc.

Mező argues that the region has always existed in the crossfire of current policies, as the theories formulated about it have always served the ambitions of a particular power.

For my part, my starting point for the definition of Central Europe is not limited to geographical location and civilisational traditions exclusively, but I define the region on the basis of interactions between geographical and political structures, which means a broader Central Europe. The notion of Central Europe, disappeared from the political vocabulary between 1945 and 1989, has been reborn by today, and the Central European identity has resurrected from its state of suspended animation, and the states of the region identify themselves with it. The US Department of State has stopped using the name Eastern Europe in its office functions with regard to the fact that the name, which artificially divided Europe into two, no longer has legitimacy, and the name with which the

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states of the regions denotate themselves should be used. Due to changes taking place after 1989, the dissolution of the bipolar world order and the eastern expansion of Euro-Atlantic structures, my definition of Central Europe includes Austria, the eastern provinces of Germany, Hungary, Ukraine’s Lower Carpathian region, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thus it is clear that there are as many definitions of Central Europe as there are authors, although they all agree in one thing: it is hardly possible to give an accurate definition, an unambiguous and undebatable geographical classification.

CENTRAL EUROPE IN GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES The whole of Central Europe has never been permanently covered by any imperial territory, it has always been characterized by internal territorial division.

Practically, the region has never been organised into a completely uniform unit, has never constituted an independent and long-lived geopolitical field of forces, has never realised the organic integration of an empire, a cultural area. Each historical moment when a pow-

THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

er attempted to unify the region, triggered a bilateral pressure of rim states, the aim of which was to conserve the multipolarity of the region.

From a geopolitical perspective, a buffer zone of small states is a significant part of the region, the possession of which is considered to be a key to being a major power by one of the most significant Anglo-Saxon thinkers, Halford Mackinder. Let us think of his famous theory, ‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world’.

Thus, according to Mackinder, the Heartland was unprotected from the west only, on its Eastern European frontier, therefore Eastern Europe is of key importance for Mackinder. If the ruler of the Pivot Area enters into alliance with Germany, such alliance evolves that is invincible by Britain, thereby control over the Rimland is gained, and who rules the Rimland rules the Heartland and who controls the Heartland can expand its influence over the whole world. However, if the British Empire gets hold of a crucial part of Eastern Europe, neither Russia nor Germany represents a threat to it and its global power status is ensured.

Mackinder regarded Eastern Europe, which he called ‘strategical addition’, as a part of the Heartland. Eastern Europe, filling the power vacuum and divided into

small states, obtained major significance from the viewpoint of rivalry between continental and sea powers, that is the changes in international affairs. Mackinder argues that ‘West Europe, both insular and peninsular, must necessarily be opposed to whatever Power attempts to organize the resources of East Europe and the Heartland.’

According to another significant thinker, Samuel P. Huntinton, the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world are shaped by culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilizational identities. The clash of political ideologies within civilizations has been replaced by a clash of religions and cultures between civilizations. By civilisation, Huntington means the highest level of cultural grouping, the broadest level of a cultural identity, and he differentiates between eight civilizations on this basis: Chinese, Buddhist, Japonic, Hindu, Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Western Christian, Latin-American, African, and their boundaries do not always correspond with state borders. Several states are cleft between two civilizations, or are seeking to affiliate with another civilization; Huntington puts them into a separate category of ‘lone countries’, including Turkey, Haiti, former British colonies in the Caribbean, and Ethiopia. Israel could be considered a unique state, but it is extremely close to Western civilisation.

Central and Eastern Europe

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Visualisation of the Heartland theory, highlighting the significance of Central Europe

Huntington’s civilizations

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THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The eastern frontier of western civilisation

According to Huntington, the structure of conflicts has changed, conflicts have evolved along fault lines, which have become characteristic of mainly Muslim and Western countries. Huntington thinks that Europe is in a particularly difficult situation, because the longest dividing lines can be found within this continent, and they are considered to be the most dangerous by Huntington.

Hungary is situated on the boundary of the Western and the Orthodox civilisation, on the east border of Europe, which, according to Huntington, lies on the line which divides Western Christians from Muslim and Orthodox peoples. The historical antecedents of this line should be sought in the time zone between the dissolution of the Roman Empire in the 4th century, and the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire in the 10th century. There has been a borderline here for at least 500 years: it starts in the north, runs across the area that separates present-day Finland from Russia and Russia from the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), passes through the western territories of Belarus, Ukraine, separates Greek Catholic western parts from Orthodox eastern ones, runs across those parts of Ro-

mania where Transylvania with its Catholic Hungarian population is situated, goes all the way down to former Yugoslavia intersecting it at the point where Slovenia and Croatia border on the other republics. Naturally, on the Balkan this line corresponds to the historical borderline between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and the world of the Islam and the Orthodoxy begins. This is how Huntington defines Europe’s cultural borderline.

Michael Howard argues that areas that once formed a part of Western Christendom, i.e. the eastern territories of the Hapsburg Empire, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia, Poland and Germany, belong to Central Europe (or Mitteleuropa). Howard reserves the term ‘Eastern Europe’ for those regions that developed under the aegis of the Orthodox Church: the Black Sea communities of Bulgaria and Romania which emerged from Ottoman domination in the 19th century.

The geopolitical importance of the region is not disputed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, either. Going back to Mackinderian traditions, Brzezinski thinks that Europe is the

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France’s and Germany’s spheres of geopolitical interest

bridgehead of the vast Eurasian landmass, and preserving this, as well as extending US influence directly affects US security. Brzezinski’s map, however, clearly displays that the Central and Eastern European region is situated at the intersection point of France’s and Germany’s spheres of geopolitical interests.

France has historical traditions about claiming the leading role of Europe, and this special vocation, generated by a deeply felt sense of historical destiny, has important political implications. The sphere of geopolitical interests, depicted on the map, includes the Iberian Peninsula, the northern shore of the western Mediterranean, and Germany up to East-Central Europe. As Brzezinski argues, that is not only the minimum radius of French security; it is also an essential zone of French political interest.

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Germany, however, knows the real limits of French power, as France’s economy is much weaker than Germany’s, and its military power is unable to protect Europe independently. In order to construct Europe, Germany has been willing to propitiate French pride, but in order to keep Europe truly secure, it has been insisting on a central role in European security for the United States.

Brzezinski argues that Germany obviously plays a leading role in Central Europe, and by acting as the main sponsor of a larger and more united Europe when the European Union was enlarged, it has gained particularly strong influence in Central Europe.

In their book entitled The Unquiet Frontier, Jakub J. Grigiel and Aaron Weiss Mitchell argue that over time, possessing or neutralizing Central European territories was a necessary condition for Russia’s great power sta-

THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

Frontier allies of the United States in the world

tus, and on the peak of its power, when it directly controlled them, Russia was more than a simple power: it was a Eurasian superpower that had adequate resources to shape its external environment and project its power through its territorial gateways. This way Russia was the only power that threatened the USA, but without these territories Russia is just one of the large Asian countries. As the Central European allies of the United States have been inserted in front of Russia’s western frontiers, its geopolitical growth is confined between boundaries, and therefore Russia can be called a large but essentially quarantined country.

SUMMARY In the period that has elapsed since the dissolution of the bipolar world order, our region has undergone a great transformation: we have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and we have become a Member State of the European Union. With these steps, we have become entrenched in the pillars of the Trans-Atlantic world order, but we try to remain members representing sovereign national statehood.

This task is not an easy one as on the borderline between the West and the East, in the magnetic field of the great powers’ spheres of influence it is hard to re-

tain this kind of sovereignty. As Krisztina Szőcs writes about Central Europe, Central Europe is not closed, cannot be closed in terms of its openness toward West and East, not only historically or geographically but also intellectually and culturally. Due to its central position, Central Europe is the scene for political, economic and cultural movements between East and West. Due to its central position, it also functions as a dividing line, a borderline; a border that separates the East from the West and vice versa, the West from the East The ideas of the above-mentioned authors reflect that the history of Central Europe is not only about a century-old struggle between nations and empires, and we shall not forget that both world wars were triggered in Central Europe. Then emphasis was placed on the centre, and subsequently peripheries decided about its fate. Lines of power radiate from the centre towards the edges, and then from the edges towards the centre, and a sense of a perpetually moving, incessantly changing and transforming intellectual world evolves.

Thus, whatever happens in this middle region, it never remains a regional problem – this is the lesson we can learn from the thousand-year long history of Hungary and the Central European region.

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GEOPOLITICAL VIEWPOINTS FOR THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF HUNGARY AND THE V4

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GEOPOLITICAL VIEWPOINTS FOR THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF HUNGARY AND THE V4 Author: Anita Faust, Viktória Németh

Humanity has arrived at a triple milestone marking the end of an era in its history. Geopolitical rivalry for world domination has become intense, implying a change in the monopolar world order that evolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and even a redefinition of globalisation. A technoogical revolution is taking place, in which increasing automation and artificial intelligence may bring about fundamental economic and social changes. Furthermore, environmental degradation and climate change may also trigger global shifts. Since our region is a buffer zone in several respects, it is particularly exposed to the effects of systemic changes. The concurrence of these phenomena justifies the consideration of geopolitical viewpoints when developing the economic strategy of our region. In our paper, we analyse the basic and general geopolitical features of the Central European region, and within that, the V4 countries in particular, and the expected outcomes of the change of era in this context. Finally, we formulate some geopolitics-based viewpoints for an economic policy that increases the strengths of the region.

GEOPOLITICS AND ECONOMY Geopolitics as a formal discipline of science and the great power praxis based on it have a past of broadly one hundred years, during which a lot of definitions have been provided. As contemporary author Colin Flint has put it, geopolitics is the struggle between the actors of the international space for dominance over geographic entities, focussing on asserting their interests and reaching their goals through power.

From the very beginning, power, the basis for geopolitical capacity to act, and its components have been studied by geopolitical professionals. Most frequently

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listed components include geographical location, natural resources, economic output and potential, military power, and social resources, also related to demographic features, political ideology, cultural influence, education and awareness. The role and significance of specific factors depends on the current international context. The geopolitical situation of a state is in close and complex interaction with its place taken in the world economy as a system. The operation and change of the economy may weaken or strengthen the geopolitical strengths of the particular state, depending on its location in Wallerstein’s centre-periphery model, which we will later examine in more detail.

According to its dimensions, power can be relational, in which a given geopolitical actor can force a policy in line with its interests, or structural if it can establish rules and norms. Great powers, and the United States in particular, have structural power. States in a regional power role have merely relational power. The ability to exercise power depends on the possession of key positions. Simai says that in structural power ‘military power to influence factors determining security, the monopolistic or dominant ownership of scientific or innovation capacities, predominance in major sectors of production and services and their international trade, and key positions in the financial system’ are fundamental. Relational power of Central European countries is limited, they have no structural power, therefore their economic and political capacities are hindered.

Economy greatly determines the geopolitical situation of a given state, but in itself, it does not provide strength. Each factor of geopolitical strength must exist and cared for to ensure the conditions for the operation of the economy. This cannot be interpreted only in the case of states, but also in the case of regions, systems of alliances, and as such, the V4 countries.

Just like the notion of geopolitics, that of economy cannot be separated from interests, therefore it can

be examined in the case of any strategy who are the ones who benefit from them. Therefore, in itself, an economic strategy cannot be right or wrong. In our paper, we endeavoured to examine the geopolitical viewpoints of an economic strategy supporting the ability of the V4 countries as states with an international capacity to act in the international space to assert their interests.

THE BASIC GEOPOLITICAL FEATURES OF THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGION The region in the world-systems: a dependent semi-periphery ‘The emerging ECE capitalism does not fit well with the established varieties since fitting in would entail an exclusion of the central characteristic of the region, its external dependency. (…) ECE signifies the emergence of a third basic variety – a dependent market economy’, Andreas Nölke and Arjan Vliegenthar said in their paper on the typologies of capitalism. Based on their complex analysis of data, they concluded that DMEs, which is typical in East-Central Europe; ‘have comparative advantage in the assembly and production of relatively complex and durable consumer goods.’ This competitive advantage can be unfolded by the co-existence of such complementarities as cheap local la-

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bour, the transfer of technological innovations within transnational enterprises, and the provision of capital via direct foreign investments.

Figure 1: Combined export and import to GDP ratio in the V4 countries and compared to the EU average

This idea is not far from the experiences of the countries in the region, and at the same time, it can be aligned with Immanuel Wallerstein’s much debated and at least as much cited world-systems theory, gaining ground in contemporary geopolitics, which categorises our region as a semi-periphery.

In his theory, Wallerstein examines the relations between production processes. According to the theory, the regions of the world can be categorised as centres, semi-peripheries or peripheries, based on their most typical production features. In this division, the production of core-like products with high profitability and a quasi-monopolistic position is dominant.

Here wages are high, therefore there is adequate purchasing power for the products. When core-like products lose from their monopolistic positions due to the appearance of competitors, to maintain profitability, production is often relocated into countries which are still competitive, but have lower wage-levels, that is, are semi-peripheral. When these products are exposed to completely open competition, their production is relocated by the owner into countries that are categorised as peripheries, have low wage-levels and are uncompetitive.

‘Quasi-monopolies depend on the patronage of strong states, they are largely located – juridically, physically and in terms of ownership – within such states’, says Wallerstein. In this system, semi-peripheries are ‘states of medium strength [which] spend enormous energy on – at least – retain their position in the middle, but in their aspirations and hopes, naturally, there is the opportunity of advancing in the hierarchy of the world-system.’ Semi-peripheral states mainly compete with each other for foreign direct investments, and with that, for technology transfer and the creation of jobs. While competition is taking place among all countries of the world with similar features, the toolkit ranging from ‘considerable state interference’ (see p. 63.) to protectionist policies, preferred by semi-peripheries, is not or very limitedly available for Central European states, due to their memberships in international organisations.

As Géza Salamin has pointed out, convergence (advancing into a centre status), which had been expected from the EU accession, failed to take place, and

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these countries have proven to be permanently vulnerable due to their dependence. In addition to a dependent market economy in Nölke and Vliegenthar’s theory, and the perseverance of a semi-periphery status in Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, Salamin also documents that the convergence of underdeveloped regions within the countries of the region also failed to take place. Thomas Piketty’s work calls attention from a different perspective to the fact that the convergence of countries – of a peripheral or semi-peripheral status – depending on foreign direct investments (FDI) is unlikely, as FDI increases their dependence and the divestment of the produced value added. Lack of capital also excludes the improvement of the positions of these countries.

Examining the economic openness of the V4, we can conclude that since the regime change and the accession to the EU, all four countries have considerably opened up outwards (Figure 1): exports and imports have increased, there is a large-scale inflow of FDI, and the economic weight of foreign enterprises have also increased. The extent of opening up is the slightest in the case of Poland, then the Czech Republic and Slovakia follow, and it is the highest in Hungary. Poland’s relative isolation can be explained by the size of its domestic market; the export and import to GDP ratio, however, exceeds the EU average.

Hungary is even more exposed to foreign countries than the Czech Republic or Slovakia, which almost equal with it. Foreign companies greatly contribute to the economic performance of the V4 countries (Table 1). Their share in added value exceeds the EU average (24.5%) by more than 10 per cent, also

GEOPOLITICAL VIEWPOINTS FOR THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF HUNGARY AND THE V4

Table 1: Share of foreign owned companies in 2015 Czechia Poland Hungary Slovakia

GVA (% )(Gross Value Added) 41.8% 35.5% 52.5% 45.8%

Export (%) 50.8% 43.0% 80.9% 74.8%

Jobs (%) 26.8% 28.8% 26.0% 26.0%

Source: Eurostat

Table 2: Inward FDI stocks in % of GDP Czechia Poland Hungary Slovakia

2013 62 177 43 57

2014 64 174 43 54

2015 61 161 40 54

2016 63 199 42 51

Source: Eurostat

in Poland (35.5%), while in Hungary their value added is over 50 per cent. The export contribution of foreign owned companies is even more significant, and the trends that it reflects are similar to the above-mentioned data. In the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, exports of domestic companies reach or exceed a half of total exports. Meanwhile in Slovakia and Hungary this ratio is one-fourth and one-fifth of total exports respectively. In the case of employment, the share of foreign companies is considerably lower, they provide about a quarter of jobs.

In this case, Poland is the exception, where this rate is almost 30 per cent. The above data demonstrate that the Polish economy is less exposed to external market processes, and, domestic companies can also export alongside foreign ones, and relatively less foreign employers provide jobs but in greater numbers.

The trends reflected by the analysis of foreign direct investments (FDI) are similar to the above-mentioned ones. The rate of inward FDI is much higher than the region’s countries’ ability to allocate capital. Foreign direct investment arrives in Hungary at the highest rate, considerably exceeding the other three countries (Table 2). In addition, there is a proportionally greater inflow to GDP ratio in Czechia and Slovakia. in this respect, Poland is less exposed to the movements of foreign direct investments, while in Hungary very hectic movements can be observed. Although semi-peripheral states – in the case of recognised common interests – may enter into alliance with each other, they are continuously competing for investments from centre states. This competition is consciously enhanced by potential investors: they seek to create an advantageous situation for them-

selves by forcing semi-peripheral states into a competition situation, hindering their joint actions.

The concurrence of the lack of capital, typical of the Central European region, and the semi-peripheral role played in the production order of the world, may pose an extraordinary challenge to the V4 countries during the industrial revolution that has already started.

At what pace will production and service companies located in the region migrate to automation? Can capital-poor companies of the region which are not necessarily able to migrate to automation, compete with companies which lower their production costs by using high-tech? If local capital-poor enterprises can survive for a while, how much chance a more extreme difference in profitability will leave for them to keep pace? What processes will the loss of jobs caused by the massive bankruptcies of local enterprises trigger in societies? The weight of these questions is illustrated by the fact that according to prior calculations, the expected loss of jobs in our region exceeds the OECD average. But even the OECD average itself may mean losing 45 per cent of jobs (Figure 2).

This may result not only a merely temporary period of crisis, but also such a loss of position that is unrecoverable in the foreseeable future. The resulting loss of social stability, expected emigration, and the decrease in the tax incomes of the states may – without an economic policy protecting local enterprises and jobs – gravely weaken the countries of our region.

BUFFER ZONE? BRIDGEHEAD? Since a 1919 monography by Halford J. Mackinder, one of the first and most influential figures of geopolitics, the East-Central European region has

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Figure 2: Extent of job losses expected from automation

mostly appeared in reference literature as a key step leading to Russia and through it, dominance over the world. The 20th century saw several theories in the focus of which there was the strategic role of our region, and in the course of history it was one great power or the other that took control over it and used it to strengthen its global position. In the last several hundred years, there was rarely a caesura.

The last time such situation evolved when Russia and the Warsaw Treaty collapsed, which was captured by Zbigniew Brzezinski in one of his articles from 1994 saying that East-Central Europe had become a geopolitical no-man's land.

The geopolitical vacuum could not last for long. Colin Flint argues that ’one specific form of invasion is the construction of buffer zones. The term buffer zone implies a limited and defensive form of invasion; a form of territorial control that is not intended to lead to annexation, but will tackle a security threat.’

The expansion of NATO over the Central European region, and the installation of NATO facilities undoubtedly match this definition. From time to time, there are still professional debates around buffer zones, in which the fluctuation of tension between great powers and the undulation of shaping positions can be detected. Ágnes Bernek says, ‘Due to a widening “gap” between the Euro-Atlantic force field and Russia, the East-Central European region is increasingly becoming a buffer zone. However, the Eurasian Union, established in 2015, could make our country a “bridge state” between the East and the West’.

The notion of a buffer zone can be interpreted outside military terms, as power – as we could see – has many components and instruments. The experiences

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of our region show that in addition to the definition

by Flint, gaining ground economically also plays a significant role. The great power rivalry for the energy supply of the region has a prominent role in that.

Today, the energy supply of the Central and Eastern European region is still dominated by Russia. Beyond geographical rationality, this is also a geopolitical legacy. Russia wants to keep and develop this role with an aim going beyond our region: to build and strengthen relationships with Europe’s more westward countries. Today, the United States is making continuous efforts – especially since it became the leading hydrocarbon producer of the world – to attract Europe and our region to its own sphere of interest, creating a newer geopolitical reality. Thereby Russia would be cut off from Europe: it could not build any strategic relationships in this direction, and would also get into an economic disadvantage. In terms of energy supply as a geopolitical instrument, our region is a buffer zone for the USA, and a bridge for Russia. We can also conclude that economically, the buffer zone status means that rival great powers have a concurrent interest in the region. This may play an important role in the economic-strategic calculations of our region’s countries.

In addition to a rivalry between energy suppliers, the sanctions policy and the trade war unfolding within the framework of the opposition between the West and Russia may also have a marked effect on our region, due to its dependent semi-peripheral and buffer zone status. In terms of common risks and threats, this also raise the necessity of mitigating risks and finding a way out with the help of regional, V4 cooperation.

Our buffer zone is affected not only by the great power-opposition between the West and Russia, but also the one between the west and China. The Chinese New Silk Road initiative offers several favourable opportunities, such as building a gap-filler transport infrastructure integrating the region. It is backed by enormous economic might, but its dependence on our region seems less today than for example Russia’s in relation to the European gas supply. While we are a bridge for China, we fulfil a buffer zone role in this respect for the West, which regards Chinese interests as rival. Its interest is to displace China and to hinder the building of this part of the New Silk Road.

The supposition that participation in the New Silk Road may entail sanction-like retaliatory measures

GEOPOLITICAL VIEWPOINTS FOR THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF HUNGARY AND THE V4

against Russian gas pipe builders and their partners or other forms of interference to dissuade them from participation should not be dismissed.

For these factors, the representation of our region’s interests requires increased caution. If the countries of the region want to be effective, they have to do more than hope and strive for fulfilling the wanted bridge role. They should be able to interpret how major powers view the region and consider its implications in each situation.

CIVILISATIONAL RIMLAND

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES DERIVING FROM THE CHANGE OF ERA AND AN OPPORTUNITY Regarding its general features, our region is a semi-periphery striving upward, located in a buffer zone, with a desired bridge role limited by external factors. Due to its dependencies, modest relational power and complete lack of structural power, external factors may condemn it even to a periphery status. In the light of the foregoing, the following factors, which can also be regarded as a boundary between eras, represent actual challenges and opportunities, inducing a response on the level of economic strategies.

The third geopolitical feature of our region, which can be regarded as constant, is that it is situated along a civilisational rimland. As a buffer zone, this region often suffered from threats to its identity and civilisation throughout history. Therefore, it is not surprising that it absolutely insists on retaining its own civilisation and its own identity. After joint EU accession efforts, this common desire has made the Visegrad Cooperation an active collaboration providing mutual support to each other for the second time. The identity crisis of European countries lying west to our region, which are ready to receive mass immigration, seems to be prolonged at best, and even can lead to dramatic consequences. Therefore, the significance of the V4 cooperation may further increase in relation to migration.

The population’s familiarity with and acceptance of the V4 cooperation have been examined by several public opinion polls in its member countries. These can be briefly summarised that familiarity with and recognition of the V4 are well above 50 per cent in each country, and there is openness to expand the content of the cooperation.

Geopolitical value is added to this cooperation by the fact that this is a relatively compact region in terms of geographical and geopolitical features, within which the balance of power is more or less manageable, its cooperation has been and still is real and effective in the case of articulate common interests. They are rivals in involving working capital and transnational corporate employers, and there are some historical sensitivities, which make this group of countries divisible. Nevertheless, the geopolitical challenges which the region must meet prove to be manageable within the framework of regional cooperation in many cases. The existing, working V4 cooperation provides an excellent framework and foundation for this.

The mounting opposition of great powers for the control over key positions, that is, structural power, results in two, far-reaching challenges having economic relevance, and these pose a threat today.

The energy supply of our energy-dependent region is subject to extensive struggle between the current suppliers of liquefied gas, the USA and Russia, and our reliance means great geopolitical vulnerability.

This can be decreased by a balanced supply system, set up and maintained firmly against any pressure and deriving from several spheres of interests, and the reduction of our energy-dependence.

Sanctions policies, currency wars and trade wars block market opportunities, pushing the EU, our major trading partner, into a further aggravating crisis, and the business plans of investments crucial to our region might require reconsideration. The Chinese cooperation, which is in many respects very beneficial and points the way to the future is also subject to a trade war and pressurising. This will place the export-dependent countries of our region – with the exception of Poland, which is stronger because of its internal market – under unpredictable circumstances. While participation in the world economy is important and valuable, it is reasonable to break this dangerous level of dependency.

The second circle of challenges derives from the technological revolution begun for maintaining continuous accumulation. In addition of the downsizing of companies migrating to automation to a large extent, the possible termination of local enterprises poor in the capital required for a technological shift may cause the losses of social resources and economic potential.

The looming economic crisis, social destabilisation, expected emigration may push our region, which is currently in a semi-peripheral status, into a peripheral

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status for a long term. The third question the weight of which is similar to the previous ones is environmental degradation, which is also related to the order of continuous accumulation, and which is now a priority theme of geopolitical thinking worldwide. For Central Europe, the natural environment – arable land, water resources, biodiversity, climate – is the main natural resource of the region (as opposed to countries in which minerals represent their main natural resources). These resources are becoming increasingly valuable due to the global ecological crisis. This issue means more than carbon dioxide exhaustion, which receives much attention: all environmental subsystems have been damaged. Due to the complexity of the ecosystem and long lead times, the introduction of major landscaping and farming forms promptly rehabilitating the natural environment is required – to rethink the relationship between society and environment, economy and environment. Obviously, administrative boundaries are not relevant to ecology. If the region migrates to an operation that rehabilitates the environment, with determination, there might be a chance to stop and reverse the processes jeopardising our living conditions.

Finally, as a theoretical option for Central Europe, we must consider the successful V4 cooperation, which has been lately activated by the security crisis triggered

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by migration. While retaining security in itself may add value to the region, the working cooperation is such capital in a geopolitical sense that can bring benefits along further common interests of the four countries.

GEOPOLITICAL VIEWPOINTS FOR THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE V4 COUNTRIES There are many experts who doubt that national interest can be determined or that it even exists; nonetheless, practice justifies its existence. Gábor Egedy (2017) argues that national interest has always been a key question to foreign policy-makers, therefore also social sciences should reckon with it. In our experiment of ideas, our starting point was that it is an expectable aim of an economic strategy to strengthen Hungary’s and the V4’s geopolitical potential, and not to weaken it. With regard to the features of our region and in relation to the change of era taking place now, we may have our chance for it if the following viewpoints prevail.

• The effects of the geopolitics of centre powers applied to the region can be responded also in terms of an economic strategy through the V4 cooperation. Actively influencing the processes dominated by great powers and transnational companies – each representing overpowering –, in line with local social

GEOPOLITICAL VIEWPOINTS FOR THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF HUNGARY AND THE V4

interests, is possible in a regional, V4 cooperation, which has already proven to be feasible.

•T he new tasks that both the new industrial revolution, presented by automation and artificial intelligence, and environmental degradation ensue – that is, the protection of natural and social resources and maintaining stability as much as possible – may be fulfilled if the state assumes an active role and there is regional cooperation.

•T here is a chance to retain the region’s own capacity to act and stability if employment and local enterprises persist in the region.

•T he V4 countries can reduce their economic dependency and vulnerability by becoming an inte-

substantial problems, as Wallerstein (2010) pointed out, the players fulfilling leading roles in the system respond vigorously to previously tolerated critical reactions. In such case, any behaviour or narrative aiming at easing dependency on the system may entail an attack, that is, may become a risk factor. In this increasingly unstable global situation it is reasonable to consider which danger is bigger: maintaining the paradigm undergoing a structural crisis or making an alternative regional attempt in order for continuity, even despite the attacks by stakeholders in the status quo.

grated, complexity-oriented economic force field, which is built on direct and ethical relationships between local enterprises.

• I n this economic force field, the V4 countries can jointly, with the involvement of the state, establish a trading framework, which promotes local economic operators and encourages the retention and creation of jobs, and such innovations and forms of landscaping and farming that restore the natural environment.

• I nfrastructure investments serving the integration of the region should be implemented as priorities, irrespectively of the participation of great powers (New Silk Road).

•E nergy-dependency and the resulting geopolitical vulnerability should be mitigated by, in addition to balanced diversification, developments allowing for a reduction in the energy import.

Geopolitical position and economic strategy interact closely. If an economy increases social and natural resources representing its ability to assert its geopolitical interests, the state, providing a framework of the society, becomes more capable of taking action in the international space, and can protect the economy, as centre countries do. A condition for developing an economy that strengthens the geopolitical position is a realistic assessment of the situation embedded in current international relations. Regarding its present geopolitical situation, the Central and Eastern European region is a buffer zone and an economic semi-periphery, which can also be described as a dependent market economy, at once. Due to the region’s position of strength and geographical features, the major strategic challenges of Central European countries can be resolved on a regional level.

The V4’s response to the migration crisis has created a foundation for these four countries of the region to seek common solutions in other issues as well.

Coordinating geopolitical and economic viewpoints, creating a V4 economic force field providing living space for direct relationships between local enterprises within the region may offer solutions to the most pressing challenges. It offers a theoretical opportunity to take such economically strategic steps which enhance the environmental and social resources of the region amidst a triple change of era, protect its stability and mitigate the shocks of the expected transition. This may alleviate successful adaptation to the evolving new situation. If the fact and the nature of the global structural crisis is successfully recognised together, there may be the possibility to ensure social and environmental continuity with an adequate economic strategy. It could make the region shift from its present semi-peripheral situation toward a central position.

The most important success criterion is an agreement between the V4 countries. Any opportunity to extend the cooperation in this direction opens up if the four countries assess their situation and the nature of the change of era similarly. Subject to this, a common stance can be taken, which aims at easing the tensions of major powers’ oppositions, and does not encourage any escalation. The success of joint response to challenges greatly depends on narratives presenting the value of the cooperation, the challenges and the regional interests, and on the conscious management of the manifestations of interests running counter to it. Finally, geopolitical advantages can be gained from this attempt of a joint response if the economic cooperation attempt is embedded socially and culturally.

When the global system undergoes a structural crisis, that is, it repeatedly proves to be unable to resolve

CONCLUSION

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW SILK ROAD TO THE V4 IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SPACE 27

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW SILK ROAD TO THE V4 IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SPACE

Author: Marcell Horváth

China’s President Xi Jinping launched his mega-project, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) as an international economic recovery programme in 2013. The major aim of the New Silk Road is to develop ever closer economic, political and cultural ties between BRI countries through the development of maritime and overland infrastructure relationships, and to implement Eurasian interconnectivity under China’s leadership.

Hungary and all V4 countries have been building increasingly intensive relationships with China since the 2000s, which has been further fostered by the fact that the V4 lie on the New Silk Road between Europe and Asia. The V4 states are one of the destinations of the central overland route and a part of the southern railway line, to which also the Maritime Silk Road is connected. For the region covered by the V4 and more broadly, the 16+1 cooperation, BRI represents several opportunities and challenges in economic growth and the diversification of geopolitical relationships. In the future, the V4, as major participants in the 16+1 cooperation, can position themselves as a bridge linking the EU with China with an adequate common strategy.

IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW SILK ROAD China’s President Xi Jinping first proposed on an international level the implementation of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB), a new method of cooperation, during his visit to Kazakhstan in September, 2013. Then, in his speech delivered in the Parliament of Indonesia on 3rd October, he went one step further and proposed the establishment of the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR).

The word ‘belt’ refers to the relationship between China and Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, that is Eurasia, while the word ‘road’ means that Chi-

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na reaches Europe and Africa from its cities both on land and sea routes. BRI connects more than 73 countries, that is, more than a half of the world’s population through a new Eurasian landbridge. The economies of member countries together account for almost 30 per cent of the world’s GDP (Huang, Y. 2016). China’s fundamental aim with this mega-project is to strengthen its influence both in the world economy and world politics, and deepen regional cooperation in Eurasia. The strategy highlights China’s need for taking on a greater global role and also offers an opportunity to export Chinese overcapacities.

Since its launch, China has invested $87 billion into various infrastructure investments. For China, howev-

er, the New Silk Road is not merely a strategy aiming at regional development, but also a global one.

So far, more than 100 countries and international organisations have joined the BRI, within the framework of which six economic corridors have been implemented and forty Memoranda of Understanding have been signed.

The scheme includes the development of railways, motorways, oil and gas pipelines, electric and internet networks, as well as maritime and other infrastructural links, which promote the creation of Eurasia’s complex connectivity. The Chinese concept seeks to coordinate the BRI with the national development strategies of the different countries for a common objective.

The countries taking part in the BRI project cooperate in five key areas: 1. coordinating various policies; 2. improving infrastructure connectivity; 3. ensuring unimpeded trade; 4. financial integration; 5. promoting people-to-people relationships.

The financial cooperation can be primarily realised in the form of loans, thus the programme means longterm investments for China. The financial infrastructure serving the BRI is continuously being moulded. In order to promote the development and infrastructur-

al upgrading of the countries lying along the New Silk Road encompassing Eurasia, China has initiated the establishment of several investment funds to finance projects directed into the region. Moreover, financing is also facilitated by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), announced by President Xi in his speech to the Indonesian parliament, and the New Development Bank (NDB), the new development bank of the BRICS established in 2015.

Chinese companies and state-owned banks play an important role in the financial implementation of the BRI; in addition to the Export-Import Bank of China, the China Development Bank and the largest commercial banks provide funding to new projects.

The economic and financial integration of the New Silk Road is also facilitated by the internationalisation of the Chinese currency, the use of RMB in international transactions, through various funding options and investments. Overall, with its mega-project, the BRI, China’s aim is to create such complex connectivity in Eurasia which creates win-win situations in terms of trade, finance, economy and geopolitics. The effects of the New Silk Road on participating countries can be summarised as follows: 1. It incentivises the market; 2. It boosts efficiency; 3. It encourages knowledge; 4. It enhances cooperation. (Csizmadia, N. 2016)

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE V4 REGION TO CHINA The VisegrĂĄd Cooperation was established on 15th February, recalling the historical memory of the summit of the Hungarian, Czech and Polish kings in 1335 and reviving the historical cooperation. Since its establishment, the V4 group has become a recognised brand and the most influential alliance of the region.

Its initial aim of enabling its member countries to join the Euro-Atlantic integrations as soon as possible changed in the meantime, and as their weight in terms of economy and foreign policy grew, their foreign policy goals also levelled up. Thus, the V4 has set the common goal of becoming the leading and decisive economic and political cluster of the CEE region. To this end, they have developed economic and political cooperation in the region with Western Balkan states and the countries participating in the EU’s eastern partnership, and then they have continued building relationships on a global level.

In the future, the aim of the V4 might be to go further with their geopolitical objectives and fulfil the role of a bridge mediating between the west and the east. Therefore, they might have an important role in relations with China, and may appear as an interme-

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diary between China and the EU, and may become the main European destination of the New Silk Road, China’s mega-project.

The relationship between China and the V4 countries was taken to a new level by the 16+1 Cooperation in 2012. China initiated this new platform at a meeting held in Budapest in 2011, and the 16+1 cooperation mechanism, established during the China-CEE summit, first organized in Warsaw in 2012, has become a comprehensive inter-regional forum. The cornerstones of the cooperation include infrastructural developments, financial cooperation, science, education, culture and people-to-people relationships.

Within the framework of the cooperation taking place with the participation of 16 Central and Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), comprehensive and sector-specific platforms and communications forums have been set up.

In this new cooperation framework between China and the region, the role of the V4 countries may be considered to be the most important. Nevertheless,

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW SILK ROAD TO THE V4 IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SPACE

China’s leadership pursues a flexible and pragmatic policy also with the V4 countries. They not only envisage the rapid development of the region; they also hope that the V4 countries will fulfil an increasingly significant role in the CEE region. Notwithstanding that all 16 CEE countries are members of the BRI, the V4 is of crucial importance to the cooperation.

Poland is the only founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) from the region, and Hungary was the first European country that signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the BRI scheme. In recent years, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been taking an increasingly active part in the cooperation. The Chinese government also ap-

ships with Asian countries and China in particular.

Since then, the frequency of high-profile visits has increased, and today Hungary is China’s number two trading partner in the CEE region after Poland.

preciates the V4’s influence in the CEE region in the following fields: •T he V4 countries play a significant role in promoting the 16+1 Cooperation; •T he V4 have an important role in the CEE region both economically and politically; •T he four countries are perceived by China as a kind of entrance to the single European market due to their locations.

Lama again. We cannot talk about any substantial Czech-Chinese relations of the time; China did not send Chechia invitations to any major regional summits. The election of Miloš Zeman as Czech president in 2013 constituted an important turning point, which accelerated the relations between the two countries.

Below, the complex present-day system of relationships between particular V4 countries and China is outlined, with a primary focus on investments. Three of the V4 countries, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, pursuing a similar strategy, compete and try to seem to be a bridge between China and the EU.

RELATIONSHIPS AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE V4 AND CHINA The initial relationships between the V4 countries and China can be well characterized through Hungary’s example. A couple of days after the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China on 1st October, 1949, Hungary was among the first countries to officially recognise China, and the two countries established diplomatic relations, and several agreements were signed.

The cooperation continued in economic, political, cultural, educational and scientific terms. As the climax of the relation then, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai paid a visit to Budapest in 1957, and in the same year, János Kádár also paid an official visit to Beijing. However, the good initial relationship was followed by a split between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and that of China in 1962, and the Sino-Soviet conflict also adversely affected the Sino-Hungarian relations and relations with other Communist countries.

The relations between the two countries, just like in other V4 countries, started to become more intensive in the 2000s. Then, after the ‘Eastern Opening’ policy, announced by the Orbán government in 2011, relations received even greater impetus. The objective of the new policy was to strengthen relation-

Chechia is a bit off-pattern: after a hopeful start in the 1990s, the country’s diplomatic relations with China were at a low point up to 2012; the Dalai Lama provides the context for this period. In the early 1990s, Czech President Václav Havel received the Dalai Lama officially, in 1995 he welcomed Taiwan’s Prime Minister, Lien Chan for an official visit, and advocated Taiwan’s accession to the UN; then, in 2009, Prime Minister Jan Fischer received the Dalai

HUNGARY Hungary was the first European country that joined the New Silk Road. Most FDI flows into Hungary within the CEE region. According to 2015 data, of the countries participating in the 16+1 cooperation, Hungary received 30 per cent of all Chinese investments. Furthermore, Hungary is the location of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line, China’s fist railway construction project implemented within the territory of the EU, which increases the country’s importance to China.

Hungary is an attractive target country for FDI, primarily due to its qualified and relatively cheap workforce. The country is characterized by high economic growth, modern infrastructure, and a good telecommunications network. The GDP growth rate is 15.6 per cent (in 2013), inflation is 3.1 per cent.

Furthermore, significant financial cooperation started between China and Hungary in 2013. The Bank of China opened its first regional RMB clearing centre in Central and Eastern Europe in Budapest in October, 2015, and on 9th September, the Central Bank

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Figure 1: Investments projects of Chinese enterprises in the CEE region (2003-July, 2018) Country Poland Hungary Romania Czechia Bulgaria Serbia Slovakia Lithuania Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Slovenia Estonia Macedonia Latvia Total

Number of investments projects announced 68 49 43 34 21 18 15 10 4 2 2 2 1 1 270

of Hungary was the first bank on the continent and, after the Bank of England, the second bank in Europe that signed an agreement to set up a foreign currency swap line with a nominal value of 10 billion yuans in order to promote trade and investment relations between the two countries. In April, 2016, Hungary issued three-year maturity, RMB-denominated bonds of a value of 1 billion RMB (136.8 million EUR). On 12th December, 2016, direct RMB/HUF trading started on the Chinese onshore (domestic) foreign exchange market in the CFETS system (China Foreign Exchange Trade System). All these measures promote the development of bilateral financial and economic relationships. Of the V4 countries, our country has the greatest Chinese FDI stock in spite of the fact that we do not take a prominent place in competitiveness lists. Huawei Technologies was the first significant Chinese transnational company that moved to Hungary, and opened its subsidiary in Budapest in 2005. Since then, several large companies have moved to our country, primarily from the chemical industry (BorsodChem), telecommunications (Huawei, Lenovo), automotive industry (BYD), pharmaceutical industry and the banking sector, but logistics and electronics industry are also popular sectors for Chinese investors of FDI. The BRI’s first Hungarian project, the Budapest–Belgrade railway line is aimed at infrastructural development. The 350-km-long line, stretching to the Kelebia border section in Hungary, might cost 550 billion HUF, 85 per cent of which is financed through

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Investment volume (USD million) 2,526 1,661 2,249 897 2,630 1,044 492 130 339 667 77 42 400 5 13,159

a loan from the Chinese policy bank (for a term of 20 years, with an annual interest rate of 2.5 per cent). It is again the Export-Import Bank of China which finances the he modernization of the Serbian section; the Serbian government took out a loan of 266 million EUR in May, 2017, with which work has already started on the Serbian side.

In 2017, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) set up its China–Central and Eastern Europe Institute, with its seat in Budapest, the objective of which is to promote and facilitate scientific cooperation between the 16+1 countries through seminars, joint research projects and conferences.

POLAND Poland is the only country in the EU where economic growth has been continuous since 1991. The country’s GDP grew by eight times in the period from 1991 (80 billion USD) to 2016 (468 billion USD). In addition to its outstanding economic output, Poland

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW SILK ROAD TO THE V4 IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SPACE

excels the other CEE countries also in its size. More than 30 per cent of the population of the entire CEE region lives in Poland, and this 38-million market offers excellent opportunities to Chinese investors. Poland is currently characterised by a strong domestic market and low levels of private debt. The GDP growth rate is 21.3 per cent (2013-2017), inflation is 2.5 per cent.

On the Asian continent, China is Poland’s largest trading partner, thus the further expansion of bilateral relationships brings mutual benefits to both parties. Since 15th June, 2016 Poland ¬– as the only country from the CEE region – has been a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which perfectly fits in this economic strategy. Poland’s AIIB membership, in addition to attracting capital into the country, could also increase its political and business role in the Asian region.

Financial integration between Poland and China is also significant. In August, 2016, Panda bonds of a value of 3 billion yuans (452 million USD) were issued on China’s interbank market, yielding 3.4 per cent on average. In June, 2012, the Bank of China and in November, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) established their branch offices in Warsaw. HSBC Bank opened a China Desk in Poland in January, 2018, to encourage trade and investments within the BRI framework.

The Biała Podlaska Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is being integrated into the New Silk Road initiative. With its total surface area of 94.06 hectares, it is situated in Eastern Poland, near the Belarussian border, along the New Silk Road, and near the Małaszewicze-Brest border crossing, which lies on one of the most popular railway lines between Europe and China.

The Łódź Special Economic Zone, which is an area of 1,339 hectares, is similarly important. The region offers favourable opportunities to investors, the level of state aid may reach even 55 per cent, and foreign investors are also incentivized by tax allowances. The area has a developed transport network, thus investments are also facilitated by motorways and railway connections (especially the railway between Łódź and Chengdu). Thanks to the Łódź-Chengdu railway line, opened in 2013, now the region can boast of the most dynamically developing network of relationships with China.

Poland has played a particularly active role in the 16+1 initiative since the platform was established.

In 2014, at the summit held in Belgrade, the decision was made to set up the China-CEEC Business Council and the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism, an information-sharing centre, in Warsaw. Furthermore, several institutions have been established and measures have been made that aim at strengthening its relationships with China. These include, for example, the ‘Go China’ programme and the Center for Polish-Chinese Economic Cooperation. The economic agenda of the government is also in line with the OBOR initiative.

Regarding bilateral relationships between the two countries, it should be mentioned that the Polish Investment & Trade Agency opened a trade office in Shanghai, the main tasks of which include arranging B2B meetings, information sharing, selecting business partners and providing investment advice.

China views Poland as the informal leader of the 16+1 initiative, as this country has the highest GDP of the participating countries, and its domestic political system is stable. And Poland is seeking to reinforce this. In February, 2017, when the ‘Riga Guidelines’ were adopted, the China-CEEC Secretariat for Maritime Issues was set up in Warsaw.

Poland also seeks to create a positive image about itself in China through culture and education. They attended the 2010 Shanghai Expo, where they presented eleven programmes related to Polish culture in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Hangzhou. In the middle of 2014, a Polish Institute was opened at Poland’s Embassy to China, with the aim of promoting Polish culture, and various Polish events are held on a monthly basis. Confucius Institutes are an excellent way of promoting Chinese culture; there are four such institutes in Poland: in Krakow, Wrocław, Opole and Poznań.

CZECHIA Czechia is one of the richest, stablest and most developed countries in the CEE region. Unlike Poland, it has very developed infrastructure. Just like Poland’s and Hungary’s, Czechia’s economic growth is strongly affected by FDI and export. The growth rate of GDP is 21.1 per cent (2013-2017), inflation is two per cent.

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ceiving orders for some 317,000 vehicles. Since 2017 a total of 2 million cars were delivered to Chinese customers. Home Credit, an insurance company owned by the Czech financial group PPF (První Privatizační Fond – First Privatisation Fund), entered the Chinese market in 2007. Despite initial difficulties, currently PPF is one of the most important actors when it comes to fostering relationships with China.

Czechia has one of the most extensive railway network in entire Europe. Four of Europe’s nine most important transport corridors run across the country. In addition to favourable railway links, Czechia boasts of one of the largest airports in the CEE region, with direct flights to several Chinese cities, and a cargo route was also opened between Hong Kong and Prague in May, 2017.

According to the data of the Czech Statistical Office, Czechia’s export to China increased by one-fifth in 2017, and export to Germany increased by 7.3 per cent. Czech export to China increased twice as fast in 2017 as import did, the Chinese export to Czechia amounted to 472 billion CZK while the value of the Czech export to the Asian country was 56 billion CZK, therefore Czechia’s trade deficit with China is significant, it amounted to almost 8.4 billion EUR in 2017, according to Eurostat’s data. Despite positive changes in trade, Chinese investments in Czechia have not been significant, either. Chinese FDI started to grow after 2013, reached 259 million EUR in 2015, but Chinese FDI represented only 0.23 per cent of FDIs in the Czech market in 2015. The largest Chinese investor in Poland is the investment group CEFC (China Energy Company Limited). The Shanghai-based company chose Poland for its European seat, and set up an office in Prague. The presence of Czech companies in China has started to increase, with the automotive industry being the most illustrative example. Škoda, owned by German Volkswagen, entered the Chinese market in 2006, and set a new record in 2016 by re-

In order to boost trade relations, CzechTrade agency, established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, has opened several offices in China, in Guangzhou, Beijing, Chengdu and Shanghai. The task of the offices is to facilitate trade between the parties in healthcare, food, services, equipment for civil aviation and environmental technologies. In the development of Sino-Czech people-to-people relationships, Jan Kohout, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and an advisor to president Zeman, had an important role. Kohout founded an institute named New Silk Road Institute Prague in September, 2015, in response to the ongoing and accelerating geopolitical and economic changes in the world, and with the aim of strengthening Sino-European relations. NSRIP is an independent think tank, which holds symposiums and prepares publications for both experts and the public. Its objective is to contribute to mutually beneficial cooperation between Asian and European countries, and facilitate it by searching for new methods of communications and economic cooperation within the New Silk Road concept.

The Czech and the Chinese Ministries of Education signed an agreement for cooperation in the period between 2016 and 2019 to enhance educational relationships, by increasing the number of university scholarships, promoting cooperation between universities, and joint research and innovation projects.

SLOVAKIA Compared to Slovakia, the other V4 countries are much more active in maintaining and developing relationships with China. The Slovak party started to

Figure 2: Export between V4 and China in 2017

Poland Czechia Hungary Slovakia

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Trade relationships between V4 countries and China in 2017

16,322 2,062 10,537 2,138 5,612 1,579 3,078 1,213

in million EUR -14,260 -8,400 -4,033 -1,865

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW SILK ROAD TO THE V4 IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SPACE

build relationships actively in 2017, when the Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with China 2017-2020 programme was announced.

Among the V4 countries, Slovakia has its own competitive advantage. First and foremost, it is the only V4 country where the euro is used. Furthermore, Slovakia has been one of the regional frontrunners when it comes to economic reforms, attracting high amounts of FDI and generally experiencing rapid economic growth. In terms of its trade with China, Slovakia has the lowest trade deficit in the region, mainly thanks to its automotive industry exports.

Slovakia’s GDP has been increasing continuously since 2014, growth reached 4.6 per cent and inflation stood at 2.4 per cent in 2017.

When it comes to scientific and educational relationships, Comenius University, Bratislava should be mentioned, which is one of the official partner institutions of the 16+1 Think Tanks Network. The Department of East Asian Studies forms a part of the Faculty of Arts, which is the only department with oriental studies programmes in Slovakia. The Slovak Academy of Sciences is also a member of the 16+1 Think Tank network; its Institute of Oriental Studies focusses on Asia and as such, China.

To sum it up, the V4 countries have a prominent role in the 16+1 cooperation platform. This is contributable to, on the one hand, their EU membership and their geostrategic locations, which is partly central in terms of the region, and partly frontier in terms of the EU. The prominent role within the 16+1 is contributable to, on the other hand, their bilateral economic relationships with China. Trade with the V4 countries accounts for 70 per cent of the total trade volume between China and the 16 CEE countries. Approximately 70 per cent of total Chinese FDI is directed to the V4 countries, thus the V4 group is the most important area of the 16+1 cooperation in trade and investments. With regard to the fact that in addition to trade and investments, geographical location, or more precisely, the resulting access to the EU market, plays a key role in international relations with China; the V4 countries’ role in China’s system of foreign relations with the CEE countries has the greatest weight.

However, as long as V4 countries are competing with each other while seeking to establish as favourable cooperation with China as possible for

themselves individually, the V4-led CEE region cannot be globally competitive for China. Out of pragmatic considerations, China seeks cooperation with larger regions. That is why the 16+1 cooperation of diverse CEE countries, which is easier to grasp on a Chinese scale, has been established; the disadvantage of this loose cluster derives exactly from this wide-reaching diversity. Therefore, an interest of all parties may lie in establishing cooperation within the region at least on V4 level, ensuring economic and infrastructural links, which may become an integral part of the BRI. A “win-win-win” situation could be created, which can be beneficial for the V4 countries individually, the V4 group, and China.

SUMMARY In the 21st century, centres of economic power, rivalling for global economic power, seek to build as complex and global connectivity as possible and extend it over the world. One of the “players” of this competition for interconnectivity is the BRI, designed by China. The New Silk Road aims at achieving infrastructural, commercial, financial and people-to-people integration between its member states, and thereby creating a Eurasian region. In this BRI project, great value can be attached to the role of the V4 countries, due to their geostrategic location. The role of the V4 could be a linking activity, which may include providing transport routes and railway lines as well logistics, and on the other hand, an intermediary activity between the west and the east, with financial and business services. In order for the V4 countries to become a geopolitically decisive bridge region, integration between them must be enhanced, which would also enable them to lead the future of the CEE region into a competitive direction.

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BUILDING HUNGARY’S COUNTRY IMAGE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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BUILDING HUNGARY’S COUNTRY IMAGE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Author: Levente Horváth

Today, China is the world’s largest region generating tourism. The data of the China National Tourism Administration show that in 2016 more than 122 million Chinese tourists travelled all over the world, as a result of which China has been the largest source market of tourism for four years. Chinese domestic and outbound tourism is developing continuously and dynamically, affecting global tourism. The countries of the world, including European nations, devise various marketing strategies to make their own cities destinations of choice for as many Chinese travellers as possible.

Western European states have become popular destinations for Chinese outbound tourism, but the number of visitors in East-Central Europe has been increasing, too.

In our region, there is intense competition for attracting Chinese tourists, who has the highest purchasing power. Although the number of Chinese travellers arriving in Hungary has been showing a growing tendency in recent years, Hungary lags behind if we compare it to Czechia’s data. In my essay, I explore in terms of different branches of tourism how Chinese target groups can be approached, and on the basis of the analysis I will outline a proposal on a market strategy for Hungary to enter the Chinese market, drawing on my ten-year-long stay in China.

HUNGARY ON THE CHINESE TOURISM MARKET The data of the China National Tourism Administration show that in 2016 more than 122 million Chinese tourists travelled abroad, as a result of which China has been the largest source market of tourism for four years. According to an annual statistical publication issued by the China National Tourism Administration in 2017, 5.13 million Chinese tourists visited Europe in 2016, and the first quarter of 2017 saw a 30 per cent increase. Their popular destination is Western Europe, but in 2016 the number of travels to East-Central Europe also produced an increase of 229 per cent compared to the previous year.

Hungary experiences a 30 per cent increase in the number of Chinese tourists on an annual basis. In 2016, a total of 170,000 Chinese tourists arrived in our coun-

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try, which is not an outstanding number compared to the data of nearby countries: the Czech Republic, for example, welcomed 350,000 tourist in the same year.

Hungary’s country image building on the Chinese market is lagging behind the V4 and nearby countries, an average Chinese person still sees Hungary as an “unknown” country, and hearing the name of our country they cannot associate it with an attractive tourist destination.

Hungary started to really focus on the Chinese market in the last twelve months; however, the needs of this new target group and the ways of reaching them have not been explored or examined yet. In China, movie tourism, health tourism, sports tourism and culinary tourism have been emerging branches of tourism recently, through which the Hungarian country image could be built easily, and world’s highest spending tour-

ists could become available more effectively. A strong country brand and a positive country image could help Hungary a lot to enter the Chinese tourism market.

Marketing research on Hungary, as a touristic product Due to the size of the Chinese market, Hungary should be specifically positioned and rebranded considering local features, using the model of international marketing management (analysis, planning, implementation and control).

I reviewed Hungary’s situation on the Chinese market with marketing research methods: – raising the problem: the state of and reasons for Hungary’s backlog in the region on the Chinese outbound tourism market, – developing a research plan: obtaining secondary data and information from the China National Tourism Administration and Chinese tourism internet portals, – analysing information from the viewpoint of the marketing strategy, – presenting results, proposal for a new marketing strategy.

CHINESE OUTBOUND TOURISM IN EUROPE In recent years, the People’s Republic of China has become a key player of world politics and the world economy, and an ever more important factor in world

tourism, and topped various tourism rankings of the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO): in 2012 – overtaking Germany and the USA – China took first place in the list of top spenders on international tourism; since 2013, China is the world’s largest source market, but China is also near the top as a tourist destination.

China’s tourism After the policy of ‘Reform and Opening’ was announced in 1978, the People’s Republic of China has undergone rapid economic development, and demonstrated growth above 6 per cent continuously in the past forty years, as a result of which today China is the second strongest economy in the world after the United States. According to the statistical data of the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA) (Table 1), dramatic changes have taken place also in the past ten years. The CNTA issued its 2016 report on tourism on 8th November, 2017, which reveals – beyond Table 1 – that Chinese tourism is still growing rapidly, with domestic tourism being the most considerable part; the increase of the extent of outbound travelling was not so intensive compared to previous years.

In 2016, the total revenues in the Chinese tourism sector reached 4.69 billion RMB (721 billion USD), which represents an increase of 13.6 per cent compared to the previous year. With an amount of 8.19 billion RMB (1,268 billion USD), tourism accounts for 11 per cent of annual GDP. One of ten employees, almost 80 million

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Table 1 – China’s inbound and outbound tourism data in 2006 and 2016 CNTA data No. of domestic tourists Revenues from domestic tourism (RMB) No. of inbound tourists Revenues from inbound tourism (USD) No. of outbound tourists Cost of outbound tourism (USD)

Year 2006 1.39 billion 623 billion 124 million 33 billion 35 million 32.5 billion

people, work in tourism directly or indirectly. In September, 2017, China established a global tourism organisation, the World Tourism Alliance (WTA), as a kind of rival to the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC).

Europe, as one of the major Chinese tourist destinations By now, Europe has become the third most popular tourist destinations of the Chinese after South-East Asia and East Asia, which is mainly contributable to the following three changes: – Direct flights to European countries are launched in an increasing number of Chinese cities, cutting the flying/travelling time.

– Several countries have set up visa centres in several cities of China, thus it is not necessary any longer to travel several hundreds of kilometres to an embassy or a consulate general.

– Relaxation of the visa policy: the European Schengen visa has become more easily available for Chinese citizens, and they can be required even for years.

CNTA prepared a study jointly with two leading Chinese tourism companies on the touristic data of the first half of 2017, focussing on the habits of Chinese tourists visiting Europe: in 2016, 5.13 million Chinese tourists travelled to Europe, which represents a 7.3 per cent increase compared to 2015 data. Regarding the data of the first half-year, the CNTA and Chinese travel agencies are positive and forecast the arrival of 5.5-6 million Chinese tourists in Europe in 2017. Europe-bound Chinese tend to travel in guided groups (85%) and only 15 per cent of them organize their travels individually.

Figure 1 well illustrates their destinations of choice: the popular destination of Chinese tourists is Western Europe, and France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and England attract the most travellers. The East-Central European region also sees more and more Chinese

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Year 2016 4.4 billion 3,940 billion 138 million 120 billion 122 million 109.8 billion

Growth 316% 632% 111% 363% 348% 337%

Figure 1 – Distribution of Chinese tourists in European countries in 2016

Figure 2 – Age of Europe-bound Chinese tourists

tourists, as Chinese visitors do not usually travel twice to a country they have already seen, but they are always interested in new countries.

According to an analysis by Ctrip, China’s second largest online travel agency, the majority of Europe-bound Chinese tourists are people between the age of 40 and 60 (see Figure 2) with a stable financial and family background. But 20-40-year-olds also deserve attention, as this age group is a generation after the ‘Reform and Opening’ policy; they are more open to the world, and have grown up in a dynamically developing and increasingly rich China.

According to the data of a report, The 40th China Statistical Report on Internet Development, published by the China Internet Network Information Center (CN-

BUILDING HUNGARY’S COUNTRY IMAGE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

NIC) in June, 2017, by age distribution, 20-40- yearold internet users account for 52.7 per cent of 751 million active internet users. Thanks to the development of the internet, more informed customers have appeared on the tourism market, a shift in tourism has started to taken place, which requires adaptation.

A REVIEW OF HUNGARIAN-CHINESE TOURISTIC RELATIONS Hungary and China have been fostering close ties since 1949; Hungary was one of the first countries that recognised the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, and entered into diplomatic relationships with the country. Although the relationship between Hungary and China “froze” after the regime change, since the 2000s the two countries have been drawing closer together again. Since the announcement of the ‘Eastern Opening’ policy in 2010, Hungary and China have been in a continuous and close relationship.

Tourism policy relations between Hungary and China Since 1949, the Hungarian-Chinese touristic relations can be divided into five sections: – Between 1949-1990, mostly political delegations travelled between the two countries, ordinary Chinese citizens could not travel freely abroad.

– Between 1990-2000, several Chinese citizens settled down in Hungary, especially in the early 1990s, as Chinese travellers could enter Hungary without a visa between 1990 and 1992.

– Between 2000-2004, Hungary was the first country in Central and Eastern Europe that was given the Approved Destination Status, that is travel was allowed; meanwhile, Hungary was admitted to the EU. – Between 2004-2010, although Hungary became a Member State of the EU and then the Schengen Area, the world economic crisis left a profound imprint also on Hungarian and Chinese tourism.

– After 2010, against the backdrop of Eastern Opening, political relations have become closer. On 22nd May, 2014, the China-Central and Eastern European Countries’ Tourism Coordination Centre was established in Budapest. In March, 2016, the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA) opened its first headquarter office in the CEE region in Budapest, which will work as a regional centre at once.

Furthermore, in November, 2017, simultaneously with the China-CEE Prime Ministers’ Summit, within the framework of the Hungarian-Chinese bilateral

meeting, the Hungarian Tourism Agency signed a partnership agreement with Chinese Ctrip tourism company on stimulating Hungarian tourism.

Chinese inbound tourists to Hungary The foregoing illustrates that Hungarian-Chinese touristic relations are very strong in terms of policy, but Chinese travel agencies and Chinese tourists have not yet followed political developments: in 2016, 170,835 tourists visited Hungary, which represents a 35.7 per cent increase compared to the previous year.

In recent years, a 30 per cent increase has been continuous, but this is contributable to the fact that we started from not very high basis data, compared to nearby countries: 750,000 Chinese people travelled to Austria in 2016, and they planned to reach 1 million Chinese tourists in 2017 – Austria was planning an increase of 20-31 per cent. In 2016, Czechia also saw more than 300,000 Chinese travellers. Overall, we can characterize Hungary’s tourism life cycle model as one being in the “exploration” stage from a Chinese perspective.

PROPOSAL FOR A HUNGARIAN COUNTRY IMAGE STRATEGY ON THE CHINESE MARKET Apart from cultural differences, several factors are worth examining; after exploring them and basing the country image on them, Hungary could achieve more efficient strategic development results in tourism in the CEE region.

An overview of Chinese tourists’ habits, recommendations On 20th January, 2017, the China Tourism Academy (CTA), directly affiliated with CNTA, and the Ctrip company jointly published their study paper Tribute to Chinese Tourist – 2016 China Outbound Tourists Large Data, which reveals the factors that Chinese tourists regard as important during their trips broad (Figure 3).

Transport, travelling to target area 33.7 per cent of Chinese tourists regard the convenience of transport as important. Western European countries try to meet this need by expanding their airlines, but Hungary’s neighbouring countries also try to do all that they can about it: e.g. there is direct flight from Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu to the Czech Republic. Hungary, in cooperation with AirChina, launched the Beijing–Budapest direct flight, but the plane stops

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BUILDING HUNGARY’S COUNTRY IMAGE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Figure 3 – Preferences of Chinese outbound tourism in 2016

in Minsk, therefore Chinese travel agencies do not consider it to be a direct flight. In the future, the Hungarian government would need to agree with Chinese airlines on direct flights taking off in other Chinese cities.

Sights, places of interest, attractions: Hungary’s sights are not well-known in China, and distinguished touristic products offered by our regions are almost unknown to Chinese tourists. The reason is that there are very few programmes sharing information about the country. Furthermore, it should be noted that Hungary has delegated one tourism attaché to the Embassy in Beijing in China, being the size of Europe, while the Czech Tourism Agency has a representative office both in Beijing and Shanghai independently from Czechia’s foreign missions.

Shopping: During their trips to Europe, Chinese tourists like buying international brands to avoid Chinese consumption tax and customs duties – in China, in addition to 17 per cent VAT, 10-25 per cent customs duty and 3050 per cent consumption tax are added to products, therefore foreign luxury products may cost the double of the European prices, consequently, the designer shops of downtown shopping streets are very popular. In addition, it is important to mention that elite shops in Western European countries employ Chinese-speaking shop assistants to provide an even better service to Chinese tourists. Remarkably, drawing on also my own personal experience, there are also Chinese signs – in addition to English, French, Spanish, Japanese and other languages – to please Chinese tourists in Western European countries in the streets, at hotels and airports. In Hungary, Chinese signs are not wide-spread; the shops in Váci street have imported this kind of marketing, too, with Western European brands and products, but in general, very few Chinese signs can be seen at Budapest’s sights and attractions.

Exit and entry: Certain countries attract Chinese tourists with preferential visa policies, as it is very important for Chinese people how quickly and for how many years they can obtain a visa; it is even a matter of prestige of some sort whether someone has a long-term visa for a country. A ten-year visa can be obtained for the USA, a UK visa can be applied for online, and Western European countries advertise the swiftness of issuing visas. Hungary is subject to the regulation of Schengen countries, thus theoretically visas are issued with the same procedure as in other Schengen countries, but France, Germany and Italy, with larger consulate teams, can consider visa applications more rapidly.

Country image strategy plan on the Chinese market Countries’ image is changing and can be changed continuously, it may evolve either spontaneously or in a directed way (Papadopoulus – Heslop 2002).

Having examined the Chinese tourism market, the habits of Chinese travellers and current touristic trends, I am making the following recommendations to successfully build Hungary’s country image in a directed way and manage destinations adequately on the Chinese market: Step 1: Online platforms – increasing “touch points” As I have mentioned above, in China half of the 751 million internet-using society belong to the age group of 20-40 years, who are potential inbound tourists to Hungary. Thanks to the diffusion of smart phones and the Internet, everybody learns about the actual events of the world on Chinese blogging and social media platforms through mobile internet. The Czech and Polish Tourist Agencies, taking advantage of the internet, have created their official websites on WeChat, Weibo, etc., but Hungarian tourism is not promoted on these platforms.

Step 2: Customizing domestic touristic services to the needs of Chinese tourists Chinese signs must be placed at the sites of tourist attractions, Chinese-speaking or Chinese shop assistants must be employed following the Western European example, kettles should be provided in hotels – the first thing Chinese guests do after checking in a hotel is boiling water for tea. These little bits may be of key importance to Chinese tourists. This kind of destination marketing works excellently in relation to the town of Hévíz.

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Step 3: Opening tourism representative offices In Chinese business culture, personal relationships are essential. More tourism professionals with China-related competencies must be delegated to foreign missions for negotiations and collaborations with tourist agencies, firms and companies.

Step 4: Building Hungarian-Chinese collaborations in tourism In 2014, the China-CEE Regional Coordination Centre for Tourism opened in Budapest, but during the transformation of the Hungarian National Tourist Office into the Hungarian Tourism Agency the organisation of the tourism centre stopped. The support and organized establishment of the centre and similar touristic collaborations, institutions and organisations, and their coordination are recommended.

Step 5: Commencing negotiations on the popular subtypes of Chinese tourism Movie tourism – indirect country promotion: Movie tourism has started to grow in the past 3 years in China, an increasing number of reality shows are made abroad with famous Chinese actors, which evidently boosts tourism. Travel agencies compile film-based packages, which also facilitates country promotion.

In 2016, a Chinese touristic reality show was shot in Hungary, with famous actors who have tens of millions of followers on their social media sites. Based on the data of online video sharing platforms, each episode on Hungary has been watched by 50-50 million viewers!

Wedding tourism Several young Chinese couples go abroad before their wedding to take the wedding photos of their dreams.

Specific companies have been founded on the Chinese market which organize travel and the photo-shooting as well, providing a complete range of services. The Czech Republic has also been focusing on this area of tourism, and has achieved considerable results.

Educational tourism 10 million students take the GCSE exams in China every year, and there is fierce competition between students for being admitted to universities, and parents do all they can to help their children achieve better results. More and more schools organise trips abroad for student groups to see what they have learnt about, and parents accompany their children on their trips abroad.

Music tourism Hungary, together with Austria, is the country of music, which could be adequately exploited on the Chinese tourism market. Several parents are willing to send their children to a music camp-like trip to Europe, so that they could learn from the “the great ones”.

Sports tourism Just like music tourism, several student groups pursuing various sports arrive in Europe. In the summer, several Chinese football teams participated in local tournaments to develop the skills of Chinese football players. But this is true for all other sports, too. With adequate marketing, schools engaged in aquatics could be invited to Hungary, the great power of water sports.

Step 6: Analysing the habits of Chinese tourists, responding quickly to novelties In a digitalized world the habits of tourists change rapidly; with continuous monitoring and analysis, and subsequent quick responses very positive results could be achieved: Hungary’s Consulate General in Shanghai, responding quickly to the boom in Chinese movie tourism, is conducting negotiations with TV companies to select Hungary for the site of their next programmes.

SUMMARY China as the world’s largest source market is taking an increasingly important role also in European tourism.

European countries develop their domestic touristic services with massive investments to receive Chinese guests adequately by developing their touristic products to make the world’s highest spending tourists stay as many nights as possible. In addition, they continuously monitor the peculiarities of the Chinese tourism market to be able to build the marketing of their country and their range of touristic products in accordance with the trends of Chinese tourism and the habits of Chinese tourists. Compared to Western European statistics, few Chinese tourists arrive in Hungary, but these figures lag well behind even the Czech Republic’s.

With the recommendations made on the basis of the review of Chinese people’s travel patterns, I think great results could be achieved with little investment on the Chinese market.

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ESTABLISHING THE BUDAPESTWARSAW AXIS

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ESTABLISHING THE BUDAPEST-WARSAW AXIS

by developing the infrastructure in the Southern Slovakian region Author: Ádám Bohár

The presidency of the V4 is held by a different member state year by year; in 2017, Hungary took it on from Poland. These two countries are not adjacent; Slovakia is a wedge between them. In order to develop the economic relationship between Poland and Hungary, the country between them must be addressed. The basic assumption of my essay is that the Southern Slovakian region may seriously benefit from establishing a new Polish-Hungarian infrastructural axis. I will analyse the current economic situation in Slovakia, the differences that exist there and afflict the country and affect the future economic development of the region. I will specifically cover the situation of the southern regions. The road network of the region is the second important element that affects the development of the region’s economy, and is absolutely relevant to infrastructure links. I will highlight a possibility that could found the economic development of the region. Finally, I will examine a recently launched project, the main aim of which is to make contacts, but it is also capable of shedding light on the problems outlined above.

NEW PRESIDENCY, NEW PROGRAMME Hungary took on the V4 rotating presidency from Poland on 19th June, 2018; one of the main goals that Hungary set then is building economic cooperation and improving diplomatic relations. The plan of establishing a new Budapest-Warsaw axis already arose then. But the implementation of the plan requires a plethora of steps and projects. Beata Szydlo, Poland’s Prime Minister of the time emphasised that one of her main objectives was the fast and safe development of the V4 group. Furthermore, she also added that the V4 was such a group of countries that ‘above all, address the issues important for its citizens.’ Hungary has taken on the presidency of the group comprising countries from Poland, and will fulfil this role within the V4 group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) from July, 2017 until June, 2018.

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ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION ON COUNTRY LEVEL I will analyse Slovakia’s regions based on the surveys conducted by INEKO to provide an understanding of the current situation. Regions prone to poverty include the Banská Bystrica region, but the Košice region should not be neglected, either. The poverty index has been well above the Slovakian average in each region for more than ten years. It is well demonstrated by the fact that Slovakia takes 21st place among OECD’s 32 member countries in terms of unemployment and employment. There is a difference on regional level in the aspects of transport, employment, remuneration, and parallelly, poverty; however, compared to surrounding countries, income is higher but it performs worse in terms of employment and unemployment Figure 1 well illustrates that southern and eastern districts are lagging behind the other districts the most.

Figure 1: Registered unemployment rate broken down by districts in March, 2017. The darker colour marks a higher rate.

Figure 2: Changes in the number of registered unemployed people in the regions between 2011 and 2016.

Figure 3: Changes in the unemployment rate of the eight least developed districts in Slovakia in the last four years.

Unemployment is the highest (above 20 per cent) in the Rimavská Sobota, the Revúca and the Rožňava districts, and slightly under 20 per cent in the Kežmarok district. Interestingly, the lowest unemployment rate is below 3 per cent (Piešťany, Trnava and Hlohovec), and it does not reach 4 per cent in the remaining ten districts, either. Figure 2 shows that unemployment increased dramatically at the outbreak of the crisis, then it started to decrease, but the difference in unemployment between regions has not decreased.

The Trnava region has caught up with the Bratislava region, regarded as the most developed, unemployment has dropped below 5 per cent in the Trnava region. It has also decreased in the Nitra region and is current-

Figure 4: Distribution of vacant jobs broken down by regions in 2015.

Figure 5: Number of job seekers broken down by regions in 2015.

ly between 5 and 10 per cent. In the Banská Bystrica and the Košice regions, the number of the unemployed is below 15 per cent. Figure 3 well illustrates that from 2016 by March 2017, unemployment had decreased in the Rimavská Sobota district; for the present, the level of unemployment is still stagnating in the Rožňava district. It is important to note, as these districts can be found in Southern Slovakia.

After unemployment, let us examine the situation of the regions in relation to new jobs. The Bratislava region is the first with 51 per cent, second is the Banská Bystrica and the Trnava region with 8 per cent. Comparing Figure 2, 4 and 5, the problem is clear: jobs exist and are created in regions with low unemployment rates, but few jobs are created in regions struggling with a high rate of unemployment. Consequently, employees have to travel to be able to work, thus road and railway networks are extremely important to them.

Figure 5 details the distribution of job seekers broken down by regions. This figure well illustrates that most jobseekers are in the Prešov, Košice and Banská Bystrica regions. The number of such people is around 6-8

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Figure 6: Change sin the average wage in euros broken down by regions in the period between 2000-2016.

Figure 7: Extent of emigration broken down by regions in the period between 2005-2015.

situation seems to be similar in the period between 2010-2015.

Of the recommendations of the INEKO Institute, which has carried out the surveys mentioned above, I want to highlight the ones that focus on the development of the transport system and the creation of more favourable conditions for entrepreneurs.

Summing up the findings of this chapter we can conclude that there are enormous regional differences in the labour market between eastern and western regions, in terms of remuneration, the size of workforce and vacant jobs.

ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

Figure 8: Using EU funds on Slovakia with a view to the Hungarian minority (2007-2013)

per cent in the Bratislava, Trnava and Trenčín regions.

In terms of remuneration, the Bratislava region takes first place. Wages are the lowest in the Nitra, Prešov and Banská Bystrica regions. Regarding wages, there has been some development in the Trnava and Žilina regions since 2000. The analysis of Figure 6 reveals that the difference between the Bratislava district and the other regions further increase the difference between regions in terms of average wages, as in the past 16 years, the average wage has increased to 1,200 EUR in the Bratislava region but in other regions this amount is only 700-800 EUR or less.

Figure 7 shows the tendencies of emigration in particular regions in the last 10 years. It can be concluded that the number of emigrants is high in each region, but the Košice and Banská Bystrica regions stand out, and the

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IN SOUTHERN DISTRICTS I will present the situation of southern districts below. Ákos Csonka wrote that the Ipoly Valley and the Börzsöny region are areas placed on the sidetracks in terms of their infrastructure. Infrastructure, gas and water networks are scant in this region. Officially, there is only one bridge over the river, which divides the two regions along 50 kilometres, thus the two regions, similar physical geographically and coherent socially, are separated. The author mentions only one honey factory in Ipeľský Sokolec, but, as the description shows, the “struggling” agriculture cannot keep young generations in the region, and investors avoid it because of the deficiencies of the infrastructure. The author calls the steps taken to improve tourism in the Börzsöny and their effect on boosting the region exemplary.

In the 1990s, the southern districts were considered developed, but in 25 years their situation has changed.

As it can be seen, developed regions can be found starting off from Bratislava towards Northwest, to the High Tatras, and the areas situated east of Žitný ostrov have become more underdeveloped economically. This can be contributable to the fact that the state does not manage the development of these regions, they are in a disadvantageous position when economic policies are developed. Within the European Union, it is typical of Slovakia that development aids tend to be concentrated in small areas, and specific regions, such as the Southern Slovakian ones, where the number of ethnic Hungarians is high, are forced to take a back seat.

The above statements are justified by a survey conducted by the Entrepreneurs Association of Slovakia according to which southern regions are the most underdeveloped on country level, especially from east of Komárno to Medzibodrožie. It is important to note, how-

Establishing The budapest–warsaw axis

ever, that parallelly, the eastern region in Hungary is a lagging region. It is important to add to the above conclusions that the number of state investments is low in this region. It is important to highlight that the development of the infrastructure, and in this case, that of the road network would be extremely important for the development of the region, as main junctions fall outside the region, therefore transport is more difficult, major investors also avoid the region, and those who want to invest locally cannot forward their products onto larger markets.

Figure 9: Road conditions in the period between 2000 and 2016. Orange expresses the share of unfit roads and red expresses the share of dangerous ones. (The country average is 7.4 per cent.)

CURRENT SITUATION OF THE ROAD NETWORK IN SLOVAKIA The development of infrastructure, and in our case, of the road network may be a breakout opportunity, but concepts are rather one-sided, and it is important to note that they do not take place within the framework of the V4 cooperation. The road network of all four countries used to run east to west in the last 20-25 years, as generally western countries wanted to forward their goods onto the eastern market and transport their semi-finished products from east to west as soon as possible, and all investments were implemented taking these viewpoints into account. Thus, this west-east axis has been established, while northsouth connections have not or hardly developed.

Crossing borders is an illustrative example: there are border crossing points at every 5 kilometres between France and Germany, but in the case of Slovenia and Hungary the distance between border crossing points is between 20 and 60 kilometres, and even between Poland and the Czech Republic, or the Czech Republic and Slovakia the average is 25 km. On road, the average speed between Budapest and Vienna is 93 km/h, between Warsaw and Berlin it is 103 km/h, but on the Warsaw-Budapest axis it is 64 km/h and between Prague and Vienna it is 52 km/h, thus the V4 countries cannot benefit from the competitiveness deriving from the speed of delivery. Furthermore, trade between the V4 countries is not optimally developed, either. That is why it was necessary to select 61 possible new border crossing points, as it is underpinned by economic interests.

The Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) includes a core network, that is, the major routes, and additional networks. The north-south routes belong to the category of additional networks. The development of the core network receives 80-85 per cent EU funding, but the development of the additional network

Figure 10: Motorways and express roads in Slovakia today.

Figure 11: Expected system of motorways and express roads in 2020.

receives only 30 per cent. The TEN-T network must be re-designed, specific routes must be connected. After 2020, the Cohesion Fund is expected to cease to exist, therefore planning must be done in such a way that V4 countries should be connected, even by establishing a V4 Fund and co-funding. In relation to the development of transport, INEKO’s survey also highlights that level of road network development in the Southern Slovakian region, examined previously, and the region lying east of Žitný ostrov in particular, does not reach that

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of other regions. It is also a fact that there is a very high rate of Hungarian-speaking population in this region, and this trend is not likely to change in the next three years. INEKO’s analysis reveals that 40 per cent of roads in the region are in an unusable and/or dangerous condition. The construction of motorways and express roads is not taking place on the promised schedule, nor the development of railways reaches the required extent, that is, state funds are not used as efficiently as possible. Analysts claim that the maintenance of primary roads is a priority as most traffic flows on them.

In southern regions, the section connecting Bratislava with Dunajská Streda, and the section connecting with Michalovce will be developed only; no road developments are planned in other regions. The fact that there is no or little funding for motorway and express road developments planned earlier should be highlighted from the analyses. In the following tables, the green colour marks investments that have state funding, and red marks the ones lacking state funding. This table reveals that apart from certain sections of D1 and D3, there is appropriate funding for D4R7 around Bratislava.

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Neither the R2 express road, the Zvolen-Košice section of which would mitigate infrastructural disadvantages in the Southern Slovakian region, nor the R3’s section between Zvolen and Šahy had funding when the table was prepared. It is important to highlight that there are no resources for R7’s Nové Zámky-Lučenec section, either. In the South Slovakian region, developments are planned – in addition to the previously mentioned ones – only around Rožňava and Košice.

Road constructions alone are not enough, since Slovakia is struggling with major regional differences. They started at the time of the regime change, and have continuously become profound. Unemployment is low only in and around Bratislava, along the Váh River and in Liptov; this rate is considerably higher in all other regions. There are several analyses concluding that the construction of motorways can reduce unemployment but they are insufficient alone, and the expected positive impact is not necessarily achieved.

According to analyses, if an express road and/or motorway is accessible within 30 minutes, unemployment is reduced by 0.9-1.6 per cent. Fundamentally, it is contributable to the fact that investors invest in areas with

Establishing The budapest–warsaw axis

adequately developed infrastructures, as in this case transport and storage costs significantly decrease.

However, this is true for a specific distance only, as it is illustrated by the Jaguar Land Rover case; Bratislava’s leadership could not convince investors to move their investments more eastward, because the transport of parts, which originate from Germany and the United Kingdom, incurs significant costs.

would be connected into main road no. 131, Komárom’s southern bypass on the Hungarian side. It is important to note, that there is a weight limit of 22 tons on the Elisabeth Bridge, linking the two cities, Komárom and Komárno, and the nearest possibility to cross the Danube is at Vámosszabadi upriver, or over the Megyeri Bridge downriver, thus this development would extremely ease transport.

The qualifications of the workforce in a given region, and population density are further factors. The construction of a motorway section could affect areas with low population density positively, because it may set off urbanization, population density increases,

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

which is an attractive fact for investors. Furthermore, it is qualifications that can attract investors into a region, and it takes more than building primary roads.

There is a correlation between the existence of motorways and the decrease in the unemployment rate, but this is mainly true for districts with high unemployment rates.

The construction of the bridge in Komárno, expected to be inaugurated in the autumn of 2019, may help to link the two countries and the two geographically similar regions. 2x1 car lane, a cycling road and a pedestrian sidewalk are planned for this 600-m-long bridge. It

As a summary of our essay, we can conclude that there are huge differences between the western and eastern regions in Slovakia, in terms of remuneration, workforce and labour shortages. The eastern regions are likely to further decline in the future. It is important to highlight that Hungary’s northern areas adjacent to the South Slovakian areas are also lagging regions. It would be also very important to develop the road network to a maximum extent. The bridge being built now over the Danube at Komárom/Komárno would make transport between the two countries considerably easier in the future, and is expected to contribute to the development of the Southern Slovakian region, and the Budapest-Warsaw transport/economic axis. But the development of local, regional enterprises is also a priority for the development of the Southern Slovakian region.

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THE GEOECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “NEW AMBER ROAD”

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THE GEOECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “NEW AMBER ROAD” Author: Ádám Sashalmi

The objective of this study paper is to explore the possible geoeconomic consequences of the establishment of the new rail freight corridor called the “New Amber Road”, and its effect on the economic and trade relations of participating countries.

During the short period of time that has elapsed since the launch of the initiative, specialized literature has produced relatively few relevant publications on the topic. The article by co-authors, András Inotai and Ottó Juhász (Inotai, A. – Juhász, O. 2017), however, must be highlighted. Publications examining the competitiveness of the port of Koper and other ports, first of all, the calculations of Wiktor Żuchowski (Żuchowski, W. 2014), and the article written jointly by Cedomir Dundovic and Svjetlana Hess (Dundovic, C. – Hess, S. 2005), have also helped in writing this research paper. The data of the European Commission, the World Bank and specific port authorities have served as a basis for statistical analyses. Communications, information disclosed officially by specific national governments, the Visegrad Cooperation and the institutions of the European Union have served as sources. In addition, works by historians and geographers have also been used.

In addition to relevant reference literature examination, the paper considers official sources of law, strategies, communications and news items published in the media. In addition to lexical research, the paper greatly relies on the analysis of statistical data on rail freight transport, port traffic and inter-state trade. The results of data analyses are visualised by diagrams and cartograms.

THE ANCIENT AMBER ROAD The new rail freight corridor has been named after one of the most important ancient European trade routes, the Amber Road, therefore it is worth dwelling on it briefly. The Amber Road is assumed to have existed even earlier, but it was flourishing in Roman times. The route linked the Adriatic Sea with the “Eastern Sea”, which is called the Baltic Sea nowadays, and according to certain theories, there was also another branch towards the Black Sea. It was named after amber, the most important product it

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transported. This product counted as a very important, versatile commodity, which was used not only as jewelry, but medicine as well. Amber was worked in Aqulieia and finished articles were exported from here. Apart from amber, however, many other commodities were carried on the route; the trade of furs and leather goods also counted as significant.

The route of the Amber Road within the Roman Empire is relatively well-known. It passed through Italia, Pannonia and Noricum provinces within the empire, then crossing the limes in the territory of the so-called “Barbaricum”, it went on across the zone outside the administration of the Roman Empire. It is assumed to have continued through the Little Carpathians and along major rivers, such as the Danube, the Morava and the Oder, beyond the borders of the empire. From time to time, the latter ones were used for river transport, but it greatly depended on weather conditions. Several posts are known in the territory of present-day Hungary, such

Zalaszentiván, and then branches off toward Sopron and Csorna. From Csorna, it continues to Rajka, and another branch to Budapest via Komárom, from where it goes as far as Kelebia, the Hungarian-Serbian border. From Rajka and Komárom, it runs towards the north, crossing the Hungarian-Slovakian border. It traverses Bratislava, Leopoldov and Žilina.

Then it continues in Poland, where it passes through Katowice and Krakow, and proceeds into two directions, one of them ending in Warsaw, and the other ending as far as Terespol, the Polish-Belarusian border, via Luków. Apparently, it will connect important industrial, economic and transportation hubs.

as former Savaria near Szombathely, or Scarbantia, once situated in the location of present-day Sopron.

THE NEW AMBER ROAD The new initiative relates to the ancient Amber road to the extent that it follows approximately the same route. The New Amber Road, however, is a rail freight corridor, and it will be built and operated in accordance with the conditions of the present. The establishment of the freight corridor has been initiated jointly by four countries, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. The four EU Member States put forward the initiative to the European Commission in March, 2016. The Commission approved the establishment of the corridor in its Implementing Decision No. 2017/177 on 31st January, 2017, which was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 2nd February, 2017. Pursuant to the Decision, the new freight corridor must be established until the end of 2018.

The New Amber Road will start from the port of Koper, run across Slovenia, including its capital, Ljubljana. Then it reaches Hungary, where traverses

A parallel plan of the Polish government, the “Via Carpathia” should also be mentioned here. This initiative is about the establishment of a road transport corridor also in a north-south direction, starting from Klapiea, Lithuania, running across the eastern parts of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, and finally reaching Romania. In Romania, it splits into two, one branch goes to the Black Sea, to Konstanta, the other enters Bulgaria and Greece, as far as the port of Thessaloniki at the Aegean Sea. The transport corridor is scheduled for completion in 2025 (Sejm.gov.pl: Highway from Rzeszów to Budapest – Via Carpathia under construction, 2017). With the establishment of the Via Carpathia, such a trade-transport infrastructure could be established geographically that would be similar to the Black Sea branch of the ancient Amber Road.

HOW THE INITIATIVES FIT IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE EU AND THE V4 The initiative is supported by the fact that it fits in the concepts of the European Union and the Visegrád Cooperation, and even strengthens them. The establishment of a north-south trade and transport corridor in the region matches the objectives of both the EU and the V4.

Within the European Union, the first international, market-oriented rail freight corridors were designated by Regulation (Eu) No 913/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Regulation (Eu) No 913/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 2010). The regulation specifies nine freight corridors, several of them run through the four countries. The “Rheine-Danube” runs through Slovakia, the “Eastern” through Slovakia and Hunga-

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ry, the “North Sea-Baltic” through Poland, and the “Mediterranean” corridor through Slovenia and Hungary. In addition, a north-south corridor, the “Adriatic-Baltic” corridor, already exists; it runs through Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland, but not Hungary. The New Amber Road would be connected at several points with the Adriatic-Baltic corridor.

Annex 2 to Regulation (Eu) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council modified and expanded the corridors, also providing an opportunity to establish new corridors. Furthermore, the EMPIRIC (Enhancing Multimodal Platforms, Inland Waterways and Railways Services Integration in Central Europe) programme in the 2007-2013 programming period should be noted, which was devised to link the ports of the Northern Adriatic region with Central European markets, primarily using rail freight transport (Żuchowski, W. 2014).

of the 16+1 regional cooperation with China, which strengthens synergies between the parties.

One of the objectives set by the Visegrád Declaration, which established the Visegrád Cooperation, was the establishment of a north-south transport corridor (Visegrád Declaration 1991). The programme of the Polish presidency between 20162017 included the New Új Amber Road as a concept to be realised (Programme of the Polish Presidency, 2016-2017). The Eastern Partnership is also important to the European Union, and due to its geographical location, the Visegrád Cooperation. The New Amber Road may contribute to encouraging economic cooperation within the partnership. From this perspective, it is particularly important that the Polish-Belarusian border is the northern terminus of the planned freight corridor, as Belarus participates in the Eastern Partnership.

From the perspective of the new rail freight corridor to be planned, underlying power interests are not the only things that count, but also the specific features of the initiating countries do. From the European Commission Rail Market Monitoring 2016 database, I relied on two statistical data to justify the benefits of the project for Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia: railway density and EU rail funding in the Member States in the period 2014-2020. On the basis of the length of lines per 10,000 km2, the figures of all

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NEW AMBER ROAD AND THE NEW SILK ROAD The name New Amber Road is symbolic not only because the ancient trade route used to stretch along roughly the same line, but the Silk Road, running across Eurasia in a west-east direction linking the Roman Empire with China, was in operation simultaneously with the ancient Amber Road, which is another connection point. With this, the four countries initiating the project wish to indicate that the new rail freight corridor is a response to the New Silk Road concept, and is intended to be connected with it. The branch of the New Amber Road reaching

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towards the Hungarian-Serbian border plays an important role here, since it would join a branch of the New Silk Road, running from Piraeus to Budapest via Belgrade, which would make the transportation of Chinese goods to the north possible. (Inotai, A. – Juhász, O. 2017). The idea of the New Amber Road was received positively in China, too; China’s President Xi Jingping expressed it when he met Poland’s Prime Minister Beata Szydło at the Belt and Road Forum in May, 2017 (Premier.gov.pl: Prime Minister Beata Szydło at the international Belt and Road Forum 2017).

China’s intentions are not worsening the EU’s positions, as China is interested in a strong EU. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia are also members

SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE INITIATING COUNTRIES

four countries are above the EU beverage (Figure 1).

Hungary takes first place in the four countries, and fifth place in the EU, with its railway line of 848 km per 10,000 km2. Then comes Slovakia with 740 km, Poland with 605 km, and Slovenia with 596 km. On the basis of the density of the rail network, the situation of the fur countries can be considered favourable.

Again, by the total allocated EU rail funding, the figures of the four countries are above the EU average. Poland’s figure is the highest within the entire EU, it is 521,000 EUR/km. Slovakia’s figure is 364,000, Slovenia’s is 262,000, and Hungary’s is 259,000 EUR/km (Figure 2). It is visible that railway developments are supported by considerable EU finding in these four countries in this programming period. This, again, can be considered a favourable situation. However, the condition of the rail infrastructure and the level that can be reached with the available funds are also important factors from the perspective of the Amber Road.

THE GEOECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “NEW AMBER ROAD”

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Figure 1.: Density of railway network, 2014 (km / 10,000 km2) 1400

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THE GEOECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “NEW AMBER ROAD”

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PORT OF KOPER The port of Koper is important to the initiating countries because it enables them to reach and trade on the high seas. This is particularly significant for the two landlocked countries, Hungary and Slovakia.

Geographically, the Adriatic Sea is within the shortest reach both form Slovakia and Hungary. Consequently, Hungary itself develops the port of Koper.

The Slovenian port, however, is important not only for the three smaller countries but also for Poland, which has its own ports. Wiktor Żuchowski’s article points out that it is more beneficial to embark goods arriving from Asia in Koper, and transport them further by rail to Poland’s central and southern parts, including Warsaw, skipping German or Polish ports.

We can find out more about the competitiveness of the port of Koper if we compare the data of cargo traffic records kept by the port authorities of major ports in the Northern Adriatic region (Trieste, Ravenna, Venice, Koper, Rijeka). Based on the changes in cargo traffic, Koper is only number four of the five ports, its traffic exceeded 20 million tons only in 2015. Trieste’s figure is outstanding, the traffic of Venice and Ravenna is roughly similar, and the vol-

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ume of goods disembarked in Rijeka annually does not reach 10 million tons (Figure 3). This suggests that – apart from Rijeka – the other ports are more competitive than Koper. However, if we take the changes of cargo traffic into account, we can say that Koper’s traffic increased to the largest extent, by 67 per cent between 2009 and 2016. Ravenna’s cargo traffic increased by 39 per cent, Trieste’s by 33 per cent, and Venice’s by less than 1 per cent compared to 2009. Rijeka’s traffic increased approximately by 9 per cent between 2009 and 2015.

Based on changes on the previous year, only Trieste and Koper could increase their cargo traffic every year (Figure 4).

Additionally, we can mention that Ravenna and Venice play a less significant role in Eastern European freight transport, thus Koper must primarily compete with Trieste and Rijeka. The difference between Trieste, and Koper and Rijeka is that while the two latter ones mainly focus on transit cargo traffic, it forms a much smaller part in the case of Trieste; we can say, it is a port with a different profile. In this regard, Rijeka is the real rival of Koper, which is more successful based on several indices. Thus, we can conclude that Koper counts as a competitive port.

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Figure 4: Changes in traffic of ports on previous year

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POSSIBLE CHANGES A positive consequence of the realisation of the New Amber Road may be an increase in trade between the four initiating countries. According to the data of the World Bank (World Bank Trade Statistics 2015), the extent of trade between each other is currently low; by contrast, the value of trade with Germany measured in USD is much higher. According to current data, Hungary’s export to Slovakia accounts for 5 per cent of total exports, while its export to Germany accounts for 27 per cent of total exports. Hungary’s import from Poland accounts for 5.5 per cent of total imports, and its import from Germany accounts for 26 per cent of total imports.

Proportions are similar in the case of the other three countries, too. The rate of export to import between each other is a one-digit number, while with Germany the share of export and import in total trade is between 15 and 30 per cent.

The establishment of the new freight transport corridor may enhance the value of certain transporta-

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tion hubs through which the New Amber Road runs.

It is particularly important for those that other corridors traverse, such as Koper, Ljubljana, Budapest, Bratislava, Žilina, Katowice, Warsaw or Terespol (Figure 5).

ITALY’S INVOLVEMENT? The initiative does not exclude the subsequent extension of the New Amber Road (GYSEV: The ancient Amber Road can be resurrected by rail, 2016).

Obviously, the idea that the corridor should also reach the Apennine Peninsula as the ancient Amber Road did, occurs. With the involvement of Italian ports, trade passing through Eastern Europe may further increase. Italy itself has significant economic weight within Europe, and has been an important trading partner for participating countries. Thus, Italy’s involvement would further promote the diversification of the trade relations of Central European countries. On the other side, Italy may also be interested in being reached by the New Amber Road.

Figure 5: Hubs on the New Amber Road

CONCLUSION If established, the Amber Road may bring about changes that will improve the competitiveness of the Central European region. It may represent development and breakout opportunities for the initiating countries. However, there are several questions unanswered about the New Amber Road. It is unknown whether it will be able to mitigate the economic dependency of participating countries.

Can increasing trade with China, Italy or each other counterbalance Germany, and will Germany have a response to it? Can it enhance the Central European political cooperation, can the political weight of the region increase? Can it contribute to the growth of the region’s economic output? Can there be any negative consequences? Can a new dependency, this time from China, develop? Will Chinese goods force domestic products out of the market? We will have answers to these questions after the initiative is realised.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

Author: György Bartha, Marcell Horváth

The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (or the Belt and Road initiative, BRI), evolved from the synthesis of the “New Silk Road Economic Zone” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, is not only about the revival of former trade routes. BRI also involves the development of railways, motorways, oil and gas pipelines, electric grids, internet networks as well as maritime and other infrastructure links.

The concept of the Digital Silk Road had appeared before the BRI, originally launched in 2013. The possibility of establishing an online Silk Road was first raised by DHgate, an online retail firm in September, 2011. Subsequently, the importance of information connectivity, the concept of building a Digital Silk Road was more and more emphasized in the development plans of the leadership in Beijing.

In the past decade, the Chinese digital sector has undergone enormous development; in 2017, the digital economy accounted for 32.2 per cent of the Asian country’s GDP, which represents an average growth of 1.59 per cent (year/year). The size of the digital economy amounted to 26.7 trillion RMB (4.2 trillion USD) in 2017, which means a 17.2 per cent growth on the previous year.

China’s state- and privately owned companies all take part actively in developing the Digital Silk Road through their infrastructure and network building activities. The three largest state-owned telecommunications companies, China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom established international companies in Hong Kong, as a platform for their internationalization. In addition to state-owned companies, the large companies of the private sector also take an active role in building digital infrastructure. In 2006, ZTE was commissioned to build the optic cable network in Afghanistan and Huawei received a contract from the government of Tajikistan.

The Digital Silk Road is not being built only on the earth’s surface or under water. The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), China’s independently

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constructed and operated satellite system, serves the development of the BRI, with an eye to the needs of the country's national and economic and social development. In addition to navigation, the satellite system is also applied in such fields as transport, fishery, agriculture, forestry and public safety.

Developed telecommunications and information connectivity offers outstanding opportunities for Chinese online retail firms in the countries related to the BRI. China is currently the world’s largest e-commerce market, where 40 per cent of transactions take place. The two most significant companies engaged in Chinese e-commerce are the Alibaba Group, taking a leading role in both the B2B and the B2C segments, and JD, the second largest company in the B2C segment. Both corporate giants are very interested in expansion in BRI-related countries.

Currently, intercontinental digital connectivity is implemented with submarine optic cables, which carry 98 per cent of telecommunications and data traffic.

By the end of 2017, four international cable landing stations – Qingdao, Shanghai Nanhui, Shanghai Chongming and Shantou – had been established in

China’s territory. The country has built ten submarine cables landing in mainland China. Still, there is still a considerable gap in submarine cable communication. In developed countries, such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom or Singapore, the number of cables is several times that of China.

Facing the slowing growth of its economy, industrial overcapacities and an ageing society, China is starting to shift the focus onto the digital economy as much as possible. Consequently, operators of the Chinese digital economy are fundamentally interested in supporting and building the Digital Silk Road.

Companies that have started from the-commerce sector and expanded their scope of activities with fintech services are the greatest winners of the Digital Silk Road. The Digital Silk Road holds several potential opportunities to such large companies as Alibaba, JD or Tencent. Government measures also contribute to the success of e-commerce platforms; by now, international e-commerce pilot zones have been announced in 35 Chinese cities, where companies can increase their market portfolios under favourable market conditions, benefiting from preferential tax policies. However, the initiative does not hold benefits for companies only. In developing countries related to the BRI, Chinese fintech companies are potentially capable of promoting financial integration. Additionally, Chinese fintech com-

panies can contribute to the promotion of trade between the BRI countries by facilitating supply chain financing.

The most frequently voiced criticism of the Digital Silk Road is related to the optic cable system built by Chinese companies. Some analysts are afraid that China’s leadership will insert so-called “backdoor mechanisms” in the system, increasing Beijing’s intelligence and propaganda operations in BRI partner countries.

The BRI, initiated by China, is the new engine of globalisation. The emergence of the digital economy provides new drives for economic development. China supports the building of the Digital Silk Road politically and economically. Such digital infrastructure developments could be implemented within its framework that may promote the development of the digitally least developed BRI countries and the levelling-up of the digital economies of technologically more developed countries, and, at the same time, it creates the digital interconnectivity of BRI partner countries, through which information, the most important resource of the 21st century, could flow freely and effectively.

1. THE SILK ROAD Throughout history, people – as part of their natural behaviour – moved and migrated from place to place, exchanging products, technologies and ide-

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as with others. Communication routes and paths of trade gradually linked up to form what are known today as the Silk Roads. These routes did not have a particular name for centuries. The term Silk Road was coined by German geologist Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, who first used the term “Die Seidenstrasse” (silk road) in 1877.

The method of producing silk was kept a secret for some 3,000 years. The Chinese monopoly on silk production, however, did not mean that the product was restricted to the Chinese Empire. The special fabric was extensively traded and was used as an important diplomatic gift. By the period of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), silk had become one of China’s major exports. Over time, the trade routes changed, reflecting geopolitical changes.

Researchers have found clothes from the period of the Han dynasty in Egypt, Mongolia and several other countries.

In addition to overland routes, maritime trade routes also formed an integral part of the global trade network. Primarily, spices were transported on maritime routes; this is where the “spice route” name of the routes comes from. The history of maritime routes can be traced back thousands of years.

These routes linked the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley Civilisation. The ancient Silk Road was more than merely a trade route, one of its major legacies is its role in bringing cultures and peoples in contact with each other and facilitating cultural exchanges between them.

2. THE SILK ROAD INITIATIVE Based on the legacy of the ancient Silk Road, China’s head of state, Xi Jinping first suggested the establishment of a new type of cooperation on the international scene, the overland Silk Road Economic Belt, in his speech delivered at the Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan, on 7th September, 2013, and then in his address to the Indonesian parliament on 3rd October, he expressed his intention to strengthen the relationships with ASEAN countries and put forward his proposal to establish the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). After that, in November, 2014, President Xi announced the allocation of 40 billion USD for the establishment of the Silk Road Fund.

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The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (or the Belt and Road initiative, BRI), evolved from the synthesis of the “New Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, is a systemic project, the joint development of which is carried out with consultation, so that the interest of all partner countries could be asserted. Furthermore, integrating the development plans of related countries within the BRI framework forms an important part of the BRI. A communication issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission emphasizes that the BRI is in accordance with the five principles of the United Nations (UN), that is, the principle of mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful co-existence.

The plan is not only about the revival of former trade routes. The BRI also involves the development of railways, motorways, oil and gas pipelines, electric grids, internet networks as well as maritime and other infrastructure links through Central, West and South Asia to Africa. In addition to trade and economic cooperation, technological exchanges also play an important role. Within the frameworks of the initiative, financial cooperation can be primarily realised through loans, thus the programme represents long-term investments for China.

3. BACKGROUND OF THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD INITIATIVE 3.1. Political background The call for establishing digital interconnectivity was published in the BRI White Paper (Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road), issued in March 2015. The publication mentions the establishment of an Information Silk Road by constructing cross-border optic cables and other communication trunk lines.

According to the joint statement of the EU-China summit issued on 29th June, 2015, the parties acknowledged the importance of the digital economy and the cooperation within the ICT sector.

The Chinese State Council released a document entitled Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the 'Internet Plus' Action Plan on 4th July, 2015, the aim of which is rapid and quality development through connecting the internet and the real economy.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

Internet Plus (IP) seeks to integrate the internet and other achievements of information technology (such as mobile internet, cloud computing, big data and the Internet of Things) with traditional industries, fuelling economic growth. The plan focusses on 11 points: 1 1. entrepreneurship and innovation 1 2. collaborative manufacturing 1 3. modern agriculture 1 4. smart energy 1 5. inclusive finance 1 6. public services 1 7. efficient logistics 1 8. e-commerce 1 9. convenient transportation 10. green ecology 11. artificial intelligence In addition, the Guiding Opinions includes supportive measures in five categories: • Policy Environment: eliminate unreasonable mechanisms and policies, ease Internet-integrated product and service market access, and promote entrepreneurship and innovation • New-Generation Information Infrastructure Development: accelerate research and development of new hardware engineering, such as chips and high-end servers, as well as applications of cloud computing, big data • Public Resources Sharing: enhance public services and start pilot programs for public access to government data, encourage online access to national innovation platforms by small and medium enterprises • Business Operation Support: increase government procurement of cloud services, innovate credit products and services, pilot equity crowdfunding • Safety Regulations: improve risk assessment, safeguard network and information security, and protect fair competition In 2015, China overtook the USA and became the world’s largest e-commerce market. In addition, there are more than 720 million internet users in the people’s republic, still, internet penetration is only 52.2 per cent, which lags well behind the typical level of developed countries (in the United Kingdom, for example, this is 92.6 per cent.)

Recognising the enormous potential of the rapidly developing e-sector, the government devised the

Internet Plus Program to connect online and offline trade channels, and to address the need for modernisation.

In July, 2015, Lu Wei, director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, mentioned the construction of the Digital Silk Road at the China-EU digital cooperation roundtable held in Brussels. Lu explained that they would seek cooperation between China and the EU in cyberspace. The leaders of several Chinese companies in the ICT sector attended the meeting, representing such companies as China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, ZTE, Huawei and Xiaomi.

At the 15th Forum on Internet Media held in Zhanjiang in July, 2015, Ren Xianliang, Vice Minister of the Cyberspace Administration of China, encouraged companies in his speech to engage in the efforts promoting interconnectivity, represented by the BRI, by investing in network infrastructure and building the Digital Silk Road.

The 13th Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social Development (2016-2020), adopted in March, 2016, also refers to the construction of the Digital Silk Road. In December of the same year, the State Council issued the 13th Five-Year Plan on China's National Informatization, which also emphasizes the construction of the Digital Silk Road, in addition to the establishment of smart cities and the elimination of online poverty.

It is clear from the plans that China’s government contributes increasing significance and economic value to the digital economy and to cooperation.

They pay particular attention to the construction and upgrading of the terrestrial and submarine cable infrastructure, and the establishment of the Information Silk Road linking China with the Arab countries, and the China-ASEAN information harbour.

The China-ASEAN information harbour was officially launched in the city of Nanjing, Guangxi province, in 2015. After the base was constructed, 34 projects were selected of a value of 3.28 billion USD. The aim of the initiative is to share economic, scientific and educational information services with ASEAN countries. Since the base was set up, the China-ASEAN Information Harbour Forum has

69

been held three times; its third event was hosted by the city of Nanning, Guangxi province, in September, 2018.

The joint statement released after the round table meeting of leaders at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in May, calls attention to cooperation on innovation in the fields of e-commerce, the digital economy and smart cities.

In his speech delivered at the Forum held on 14th May, Chinese President Xi Jinping called attention to the necessity to pursue innovation-driven development, and intensify cooperation in frontier areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and quantum computing, and advance the development of big data and cloud computing.

Subsequently, at the 4th World Internet Conference, taking place on 3rd December, 2017, the Chinese president encouraged the countries again to engage in the development of the internet and the digital economy, and then the representatives of China, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the other attending countries signed the “Belt and Road” Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative.

The initiative includes expanding broadband access, improving quality, promoting a digital transformation, encouraging e-commerce cooperation and supporting internet-based entrepreneurship. The document also mentions encouraging investment in the ICT sector, and promoting inter-city cooperation of the digital economy. The objective of signatory parties is the establishment of a peaceful, secure and open cyberspace, the document reads.

70

China’s plans to become a scientific and technological superpower are also related to the foregoing.

China’s President Xi Jinping came up with the plan at the 19th Party Congress held in October, 2017.

To this end, China works hard on the development of artificial intelligence (AI).

The New Generation AI Development Plan, released by the State Council in July, 2017, clearly states that China treats the development of AI as a high priority. The plan provides specific reference values for the AI core industry and AI-related industries. The target set for the AI core industry is to reach a total output of one trillion RMB (150.8 billion USD) by 2030. The above-described steps well reflect China’s plans to fulfil a leading role in AI technology.

3.2. Economic background Notably, the concept of the Digital Silk Road had appeared before the BRI, originally launched in 2013. The possibility of establishing an online Silk Road was first raised by DHgate, an online retail firm in September, 2011. Subsequently, Alibaba and other online companies started to work on the establishment of a Digital Silk Road.

The particular attention paid to the digital economy and the ICT sector can be explained by the boom of China’s digital sector. In the past decade, the Chinese digital sector has undergone enormous development; in 2017, the digital economy accounted for 32.2 per cent of the Asian country’s GDP, which represents an average growth of 1.59 per cent (year/ year). The size of the digital economy amounted to 26.7 trillion RMB (4.2 trillion USD) in 2017, which means a 17.2 per cent growth on the previous year.

At the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum held in the summer of 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping talked about the establishment of a “BRI spatial information corridor”, the main components of which are communication, navigation, and remote-sensing satellites.

The new corridor would serve the partner countries and the implementation of information interconnectivity between them.

3.2.1. Increasing foreign direct investment China's outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) has exhibited significant growth in the past decade.

In 2016, with a growth of 44.1 per cent (year/year), the value of annual OFDI reached 170 billion USD, which had decreased by 19.3 per cent by 2017 due to the introduction of stricter regulations, but China’s OFDI stock was 1.8 trillion USD that year, ranking second in the world. The six leading sectors include software and information technology services as well.

The total of the agreements, calls and efforts detailed above forms the initiative known as the Digital Silk Road today.

On the basis of the China Going Global Investment Index, Singapore was the primary target of total Chinese OFDI in 2017, overtaking the USA; Hong Kong

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

Figure 1 Chinese OFDI stock (billion USD)

180

170

160

145,7

140 123,1

120

107,8

100

87,8

80

68,8 55,9

60 40

158

74,7

56,5

26,5

20 0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

takes 3rd and Malaysia takes 4th place. In terms of the ICT sector, the first three countries are Japan, the USA and India. Pakistan takes 9th place on this list; it is a flagship country under the BRI, and one of the largest telecoms markets in South Asia, where there is a high growth in market demand for broadband internet, internet services and mobile phones.

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 works. To do this, China has enhanced its engagement with a number of international standards bodies, such as the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO), or the International Telecommunication Union.

OFDI directed to the ICT sector has undergone significant growth. The 2016 data of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce reveal that 109 outbound deals were recorded in information transmission, software and information technology services. The value of total investments reaches 26.4 billion USD. The primary target countries of OFDI in ICT are the USA, the EU and ASEAN countries.

China’s state- and privately owned companies all take part actively in developing the Digital Silk Road through their infrastructure and network building activities. In addition to the previously mentioned BRI White Paper, the Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting International Cooperation in Production Capacities and Manufacturing, in accordance with the foregoing, encourages telecom companies to increase their market shares and competitiveness on international markets.

3.2.2. Telecommunications In addition to the fact that China’s industry policy greatly supports investments into foreign ICT sectors, the Asian country wants to take an active part in developing international standards, increasing the competitive advantage of Chinese companies in foreign markets. The adoption of Chinese domestic standards abroad will better position Chinese ICT companies, particularly in developing countries with low levels of technology, as well as in areas of emerging technology, such as 5G for mobile net-

The three largest state-owned telecom companies are: • China Mobile (market capitalization in October, 2018: 206 billion USD), • China Telecom (market capitalization in October, 2018: 40.7 billion USD) és a • China Unicom (market capitalization in October, 2018: 35.2 billion USD).

These companies have set up international companies in Hong Kong, as a platform for their internationalization:

71

•C hina Mobile International Limited (established in 2010.)

In July, 2015, the company launched the initiative called “Hand-in-Hand Program”, designed to cooperate with international operators, and provide more reliable and faster services for the BRI. Its partner companies include VimpelCom, A1 and Telenor.

• China Telecom Global Limited (established in 2012.)

The company primarily focusses on Eurasia, the Greater Mekong Subregion and Africa within the framework of the BRI. China Telecom’s subsidiary, China Comservice has developed the Construction of a Trans Africa Information Superhighway between Africa and China scheme, with an investment of 15 billion USD. The planned length of fibre optic cables is 150,000 km, covering 48 African countries.

• China Unicom Global Limited (established in 2015.)

The company is expanding the network layout in countries along the BRI, laying fibre optic cables to connect Central Asia, South-East Asia and South America. In June, led by China Unicom, China ASEAN Information Harbor Co., Ltd was founded, to in-

72

tegrate information resources across the regions and establish the Internet Plus industrial ecosystem.

Privately owned corporate giants, such as Huawei and ZTE, also take part in promoting the Digital Silk Road. Approximately half of the revenues of China’s two largest companies engaged in telecommunications and network equipment services derived from overseas deals.

Several large-scale projects are underway. In 2006, ZTE was commissioned to build the optic cable network in Afghanistan and Huawei received a contract from the government of Tajikistan. China and Russia jointly build the cable connection between Europe and Asia. Further projects include the Europe-Russia-Mongolia-China (ERMC) network and the Trans-Eurasian Information Superhighway (TASIM).

TASIM is a regional initiative aimed at the creation of a transnational fibre-optic backbone connecting Western Europe (Frankfurt) and East Asia (Hong Kong, Shanghai). The route runs across China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey as far as Germany. Participating operators on TASIM are MTCHT,

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

and AzInTelecom LLC (Azerbaijan), China Telcom China), Kaztranscom (Kazakhstan), Rostelecom (Russia) and Türktelekom (Turkey).

Orbit (IGSO) satellites and four Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites were launched between 2004 and 2012.

ZTE is planning to take part in the BRI project in network development and e-commerce. Furthermore, the company participates in the implementation of the Smart City 2.0 strategy, under which it started developing smart cities in more than 140 cities of 40 countries. Within the framework of Smart City 2.0, the digital infrastructure of cities is open to everyone and allows them to see, hear, feel and smell what is happening in the city real-time, with the help of cameras, air quality sensors and micro-

The goal of BDS-3, the third development period started in 2009, is to provide basic services for the partner countries of the BRI and neighbouring regions by 2018, and to have a total of 35 satellites launched by 2020 in the third development period.

BDS-3 13 and 14 are China’s 37th and 38th satellites,

phones. The investments of Smart City 2.0 focus on platforms promoting data access, data sharing, re-utilisation and interoperability.

3.2.3. Spatial information systems The Space Silk Road initiative was presented by the International Alliance of Satellite Application Service (ASAS), an organisation formed by companies, institutions and scientists in the space industry, in 2014.

In May, 2015, the China International Satellite Service Business Matching Event was organised, the theme of which was China’s International Satellite System: the New Space Silk Road. The primary aim of the event was to define the role of satellites within the BRI framework. At the conference, executive vice-president of the ASAS said, China had several satellites in orbit, including communications, navigation and meteorological satellites. The Space Silk Road will use dozens of these satellites to meet the needs of the BRI. The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), China’s independently constructed and operated satellite system, serves the development of the BRI, with an eye to the needs of the country's national and economic and social development. Based on the BDS White Paper, published in 2016, the development strategy of BDS can be divided into three major periods.

The first one is BDS-1, which was started in 1994, with the launch of two geostationary (GEO) satellites. After that, a third GEO satellite was launched in 2003. During the second step, BDS-2, five GEO satellites, five Inclined Geosynchronous Satellite

which were launched on 19th September, 2018. The satellites are in medium earth orbits. In addition to navigation, the satellite system is widely used in transport, fishery, agriculture, forestry and public safety.

3.2.4. E-commerce The developed telecommunications and information interconnectivity creates outstanding opportunities for Chinese e-commerce companies in the BRI partner countries. Currently, China is the world’s largest e-commerce market, where some 40 per cent of transactions take place.

In the 2000s, the rapid development of the e-commerce sector can be seen. On the basis of statistical data, the total value of e-commerce transactions (without Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) exceeded 29 trillion RMB (4.2 trillion USD), which represents a 11.7 per cent growth of the e-commerce sector. Although the pace of growth is slowing down compared to the outstanding 55 per cent figure of 2015, the 2017 data show that the digital economy accounted for 32 per cent of the GDP and the extent of annual growth significantly exceeded the average GDP growth of 6.9 per cent. Analysts expect the expansion to continue; by 2035 the size of the digital economy may reach 16 trillion USD. Additionally, an increasing percentage of B2C e-commerce services will contribute to the GDP growth of the country.

The so-called cross-border e-commerce forms an important part of e-commerce, which refers to transactions, payments or logistics realised in other countries with the help of e-commerce. China’s cross-border e-commerce is gradually increasing.

According to a report released by the China E-Commerce Association, the business turnover of China’s cross-border e-commerce may reach the value of

73

Figure 2: Total value of e-commerce transactions (China)

600

500

400

300

200

FI

SE

IE

UK

BE

FR

NL

DE

IT

AT

ES

EU

EE

BG

DK

RO

SI

HU

LU

CZ

HR

LT

SK

PT

LV

PL

0

EL

100

Figure 3: Total value of cross-border e-commerce transactions (China)

10

45.0% 38.8%

Transaction value (trillion RMB)

8 7

35.0%

33.3%

8.8 8.2

6.6

29.0%

30.0%

28.0%

25.0%

4.8

25.0%

5

22.3%

15.0%

2.7

3 1.2

1.6

2

10.0% 7.3% 5.0%

1 0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Volume of cross-border e-commerce

74

20.0%

3.75

4

40.0% 35.0%

6

2

38.7%

2015

2016

2017

2018 (Expected)

Growth pace (year/year)

Growth pace (%)

9

0.0%

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

8.8 trillion RMB (1.2 trillion USD) in 2018. China’s e-commerce export is considerably greater than the import of the country. Cross-border e-commerce is most active in Guangdong province in South China, Beijing, Zhejiang and Shandong provinces in East China, and Henan province in Central China.

The two most significant companies of Chinese e-commerce are the Alibaba Group (market capitalization in October, 2018: 378.8 billion USD), taking a leading role both in the B2B and the B2C segments, and JD (market capitalization in 2018: 35.3 billion USD), the second largest company of the B2C segment. The two corporate giants are very interested in expansion in the BRI partner countries.

JD buys products from, among others, the USA, Europe, Australia, and sell them within China. In addition, products from BRI countries, like rice from Thailand, or electronics from Israel, have an increasing role. By 2016, the company had had 250 large warehouses within the territory of China, including such important cities of the BRI as Shanghai, Xi’an or Chengdu. Furthermore, it is planning to build further warehouses in the BRI partner countries.

At the 13th National People’s Congress in March, 2018, Prime Minister Li Keqiang said that in the last five years, the Chinese standard of living had

been increasing continuously, personal incomes had grown by 7.4 per cent on average, which exceeded the average economic growth of the country. He Lifeng, the Director of the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) added that on the basis of statistical data, approximately 400 million of China’s population of 1.4 billion belonged to the middle class, and this number was continuously growing. A growing middle class creates a better environment for the growth of the domestic market, and leads to a sharp increase in consumption, offering several opportunities to retailers, primarily online retailers. The volume of Chinese e-commerce demonstrates continuous growth (Figure 3).

In addition to a growing purchasing power, government measures also contribute to the success of e-commerce platforms; by today, international e-commerce pilot zones had been launched in 35 Chinese cities, where companies can increase their market portfolios under favourable market conditions, enjoying preferential tax policies.

The State Council approved the establishment of the first international e-commerce pilot zone in Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang province in East China. The objective of the pilot zone is to set standards, and supervise e-commerce transactions, payments, logistics, custom clearance, and tax rebates.

75

Figure 4: Largest B2C e-commerce companies (China)

Figure 5: Largest B2B e-commerce companies (China)

On 12th January, 2016, the State Council made the decision to establish further 12 international e-commerce pilot zones. The zones have been established in Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Hefei, Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Dalian, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenzhen and Suzhou. The pilot zone established in

76

Hangzhou a year earlier was the model for new developments, which were complemented with local features. In 2018, China designated further 22 cities as international e-commerce comprehensive pilot zones, with the objective of facilitating economic opening and foreign trade. The zones have benefits

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

in two directions; help foreign companies expanding in China in penetrating the market and encourage the cross-border sales of Chinese SMEs, and their trading without intermediaries.

In 2016, Jack Ma, Ali Baba’s executive chairman, who resigned in September, 2018, said that the BRI partner countries were the most important area for his company. When a world trade platform was launched in Malaysia, Jack Ma said that ‘the first globalization was the Silk Road... today in the Internet [age], I think we should transfer the Silk Road to an e-road. The e-road is to connect every country.

The e-road is to give inclusive opportunity for every-

vate and co-create solutions. The DFTZ consists of three main components that combine both physical and virtual zones. The physical zone comprises of the eFulfillment Hub and Satellite Services Hub, while the virtual zone consists of the eServices Platform. The DFTZ will provide SMEs, marketplaces and monobrands a holistic e-commerce trading experience.

In 2018, Alibaba established a joint venture with Mail.ru, a Russian internet company, MegaFon, a Russian telecommunications company and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), investing 2 billion USD and acquiring 48 per cent ownership in the

body.’

joint venture.

Alibaba takes an active part in developing the Digital Silk Road. In April, 2016, the company acquired 51 per cent of Lazada, and currently, with another acquisition of 1 billion USD in the summer of 2017, it has 83 per cent stake in the company and has invested additional 2 billion USD in the Southeast Asian company.

The fact the RDIF, a sovereign fund close to the Russian government is involved in the deal suggests that it enjoys the support of Russia’s leadership. The primary aim of the agreement is to further increase the existing business interests of AliExpress Russia.

Most of B2C e-commerce between China and Russia takes place on this platform. The contracting partners set up the joint venture, which retains the name AliExpress Russia, by combining their financial, strategic and management theory capitals as well as their resources and experiences. According to the published details of the agreement: • Alibaba Group will contribute to the joint venture with its AliExpress business in Russia and Tmall; • Alibaba Group will further invest into the joint venture;

In 2017, the first Digital Free Trade Zone (DFTZ) was launched by Alibaba and the Malaysian government, with the aim to double the nation’s e-commerce growth by 2020. The DFTZ will provide physical and virtual zones to facilitate SMEs to capitalise on cross-border e-commerce activities. It will act as a microcosm to support internet companies to trade goods, provide services, inno-

Figure 6: The submarine cable system of the world

77

Table 1: IDI index and share of households with internet access in major BRI countries Country

ICT Development Index 2017

Hong Kong Slovenia Hungary Kazakhstan Brunei Malaysia China Indonesia Cambodia India Laos Bangladesh Afghanistan Kyrgyzstan Slovakia

6 33 48 52 53 63 80 111 128 134 139 147 159 109 46

Households with internet access, 2016 (%) 87.3 75.5 79.3 76.8 75 78.8 53.2 25.4 25.6 29.5 21.9 18.2 10.6 34.5 80.5

Country

ICT Development Index 2017

United Arab Emirates Czech Republic Poland Uzbekistan Russia Azerbaijan Myanmar Thailand Singapore Sri Lanka Vietnam The Philippines Pakistan Bhutan Mongolia

40 43 49 95 45 155 135 78 18 11 108 101 148 121 91

Households with internet access , 2016 (%) 90.6 76.5 73.3 46.8 76.4 78.2 25.1 47.5 81 32.1 46.5 55.5 15.5 41.8 22.3

Table 2: China’s cross-border terrestrial cable connections Number

Direction

Cross-border terrestrial cable

Border crossing

Operator

China-Russia

Fuyuan, Manzhouli, Heihe, Suifenhe

China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile

2

China-Mongolia

Erenhot

China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile

3

China-Vietnam

Pingxiang, Dongxing

China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile

China-Myanmar

Ruili

China Telecom, China Unicom

5

Cjina-Laos

Mengla

China Telecom, China Unicom

6

China-Kazakhstan

Khorgas, Alashankou

China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile

China-Kyrgyzstan

Artux

China Telecom, China Unicom

8

China-Tajikistan

Tashikuergantajike

China Telecom

9

China-Pakistan

Tashikuergantajike

China Telecom

China-India

Yadong

China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile

China-Nepal

Zhangmu

China Telecom, China Unicom

China-North Korea (DPKR)

Dandong

China Unicom

1 Russia and Mongolia

4

7

10

ASEAN

Central Asia

Southeast Asia

11 12

Northeast Asia

•R DIF will have a 13 per cent share in the joint venture, while MegaFon will sell its 10 per cent share of Mail.Ru Group to Alibaba Group for a 24 per cent share in AliExpress Russia; • Mail.Ru Group will transfer to the joint venture its e-commerce business Pandao, cash and distribution in the format of integration with Mail.Ru Group products, for a 15 per cent share in AliExpress Russia;

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• AliExpress Russia and Mail.Ru Group will cooperate in, among other terms, exchange of traffic and product initiatives.

After all transactions are finalized, AliExpress Russia will be owned by Alibaba Group with 48 per cent, MegaFon with 24 per cent, the Mail.Ru Group with 15 per cent and RDIF with 13 per cent of shares. The

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

Table 3: China’s system of submarine cable networks with landing stations Szám

Submarine cable

Landing station

Operator

TPE

Qingdao and Shanhai Chongming

China Telecom, China Unicom,

NPC

Shanhai Chongming and Shanghai Nanhui

China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom

EAC

Qingdao

China Unicom

APG

Shanhai Chongming, Shanghai Nanhui and Hongkong

China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom

APCN2

Shanhai Chongming and Shanghai Nanhui

China Telecom, China Unicom

C2C

Shanghai Nanhui

China Unicom

7

SJC

Shangtou and Hongkong

China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom

8

PLAF

Shanghai Nanhui

China Telecom, China Unicom

SWM3

Shanhai Chongming and Shantou

China Telecom, China Unicom

AAE-1

HK

China Unicom

1 2

Direction USA

3 4 5

Southeast Asia

6

9

Europe

10

Table 4: The Chinese telecommunications cable infrastructure in an international comparison Country

China

USA

Japan

United Kingdom

Singapore

Number of submarine cables

10

80

23

53

24

Total international bandwidth, 2017 (Gb/s) International bandwidth/person (Mb/s)

43,445

201,527

38,799

151,066

46,544

0.031

0.618

0.306

2.289

8.297

effects of the partnership go beyond e-commerce.

Access to Mail.ru’s users will give the joint venture the opportunity to meet the needs of consumers by creating a consolidated platform for social media, communication, online games and purchases.

4. INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD Efforts promoting cross-border digital relationships in relation to the BRI also have economic and strategic significance. Several BRI countries can be rated as undeveloped based on the ICT Development Index (IDI) in 2017.

The IDI index is a composite index that combines eleven indicators into one benchmark measure to monitor and compare developments in information and communication technology (ICT) between countries and over time. It was developed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2008. It has been published annually since 2009.

As Table 1 shows, several BRI partner countries are at the bottom of the list comprising a total of 176 coun-

tries. The lack of telecommunications infrastructure and outdated technology are the greatest barriers to the provision of high-quality mobile and internet services. In countries, such as Mongolia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar or Indonesia, only a quarter of households, or less have internet access. The situation is even less developed in Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, where the share of households with internet access does not reach 20 per cent. The situation is far more favourable in the V4 countries, where the rate of internet access is around 75 per cent.

Currently, intercontinental digital connectivity is implemented with submarine optic cables, which carry 98 per cent of telecommunications and data traffic. In addition to the fact that the locations of these cables are concentrated geographically, data traffic is controlled by the USA, which may raise data security concerns to China.

This was one of the reasons why China’s leadership launched such a large-scale project as a 820-km long fibre optic cable link under the aegis of the

79

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The newly built cable link was inaugurated in July, 2018, the total cost of investment amounted to 44 million USD, 85 per cent of which was provided by China’s Exim Bank as a loan. The contractor of the project was Huawei. The project’s aim is to create a direct link between Pakistan, Central Asia and East Asia.

The new fibre optic cables are expected to be fully functioning by the end of 2018, and currently they provide the shortest way for Chinese telecommunications companies. With setting up new connections, such choke points as the Straits of Malacca between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra can be bypassed, and China can ensure the cybersecurity

Shanghai. This would be the first underwater connection between Asia and Latin America, and would greatly contribute to the promotion of interconnectivity, commerce and investments, and would also facilitate scientific and cultural exchanges between the two countries.

of the country’s communications network more effectively.

Finland, Norway, Japan and Russia. If laid down, the cable could provide the fastest ever data link between China and Europe by 2020.

China has 14 neighboring countries in total, and consequently, it has unique geopolitical advantage in constructing a terrestrial and undersea cable system. With the help of cross-border terrestrial cables China has developed such a cable network that not only creates links with neighbouring countries but also reaches Europe. China currently has 17 international terrestrial cable landing stations, and with the exception of Bhutan and Afghanistan, has developed cable links with all neighbouring countries, the bandwidth of which can even reach a configuration capacity of 70 Tb/s (2017). As a result of its cooperation with Russia, information channels have been established between China, Russia and Europe; China, Mongolia, Russia and Europe; and China, Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe.

China’s first submarine cable was constructed in 1993, creating an information link between China and Japan; by now, submarine fibre optic cables have become the most important means of linking China with the rest of the world. By the end of 2017, four other landing points – Qingdao, Shanghai Nanhui, Shanghai Chongming és Shantou – will be established. The Asian country has developed a submarine cable with 10 terrestrial landing points, which serve the data traffic of the country with a bandwidth of 43.4 Tb/s.

China’s further large-scale plans include the construction of a submarine fibre optic cable link between the Asian country and Chile. The cable would begin in the city of Valparaiso, passing New Zealand, Australia and French Polynesia to end up in China's

80

The warming of the Arctic may offer the opportunity to build a 10,000-km-long telecommunications cable link between China and Finland. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and stateowned China Telecom are taking part in negotiations on the construction of the over 10,000-kmlong cable. The participants of the project include

Further projects include an optic fibre cable link between Beijing and Myanmar, Nepal and Kyrgyzstan, constructed by China Mobile; furthermore, Huawei signed a contract in 2017 on creating the cable link between Pakistan and Kenya via Djibouti.

Despite existing cables, there is still a considerable gap in submarine cable communication in China.

In developed countries, such as the United States, Japan the United Kingdom or Singapore, the number of cables is several times that of China. Table 4 shows the development level of China’s telecommunications cable infrastructure in an international context.

5. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD Facing the slowing growth of its economy, industrial overcapacities and an ageing society, China is starting to shift the focus onto the digital economy as much as possible. Consequently, operators of the Chinese digital economy are fundamentally interested in supporting and building the Digital Silk Road. With the measures and initiatives presented in chapter 3.1, it not only wants to promote the technological development and the digitalization of the economy, but also wants to support Chinese companies in advancing on untapped markets in telecommunications, e-commerce and information technology. Among others, it is greatly needed because with the development and maturity of the Chinese digital economy, competition is naturally

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD

getting increasingly intense and there is a drop in the increase of local demand. Consequently, operators of the Chinese digital economy are fundamentally interested in supporting and building the Digital Silk Road.

BRI projects are financed directly through financial institutions backed by Chinese leadership in Beijing, consequently projects are outsourced to various Chinese companies on several occasions.

Chinese internet companies regard the Digital Silk Road initiative as a form of state subsidy. An example for this is the loan provided in 2015 by the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which was paid to Bharti, India’s largest telecommunications company to finance domestic infrastructure developments. Subsequently, Bharti Airtel outsourced a part of its network equipment manufacturing to Huawei and ZTE, two large Chinese network equipment manufacturers, supporting the foreign market activities of the two large companies.

5.1. E-commerce Some of the greatest winners of the Digital Silk Road initiative, which forms an integral part of the BRI, are the e-commerce companies of the Asian country. Due to infrastructural deficiencies, e-commerce is relatively underdeveloped in several BRI partner countries. With the construction of the Digital Silk Road, infrastructure is developing rapidly, and companies, such as Alibaba or JD, which will be able to launch their business activities in the given region from the most advantageous market situation, are preparing for exploiting this. JD’s management has admitted that cooperation with BRI partner countries has greatly contributed to the expansion of the product range available on their e-commerce platform. In addition to the expansion of the product range, the BRI also facilitates and accelerates the transportation of products. By using the China-Europe railway link, JD could cut shipping time of automobile accessories between China and Germany in half.

Alibaba taps the opportunities offered by the BRI with AliExpress, its global retail platform. the company is continuously seeking to develop logistics and payment services, and have formed several partnerships in Russia, Kazakhstan, Singapore, Malaysia, Spain and several countries in Southeast

Asia. Integrating small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in the global trading system forms a part of the strategy of the Alibaba Group. Alibaba and the BRI together are able to greatly promote the integration of small enterprises in to the global trade network.

5.2. Fintech In BRI partner countries, Chinese fintech companies are potentially capable of enhancing financial integration. Chinese fintech giants have been able to get market shares in an environment dominated by state-owned banks, where it is difficult for SMEs and private individuals to take out a loan. These market conditions are practically the same in the BRI partner countries. Some companies have already started to expand along the Maritime Silk Road. Mobile payment systems and easier access to smallamount loans promote consumption and have a positive effect also on the SME sector.

Although most fintech investments are made in the USA, China is the largest consumer market of fintech services. Since its launch in 2005, fintech lending has undergone obvious development, specifically in China and the USA. Annual growth was 252 per cent in the period between 2013 and 2016, while the global average was 199 per cent.

The largest fintech company is Ant Financial, which was valued at 60 billion USD at its IPO in 2016, and is planning to raise further capital, reaching a total company value of 80-100 billion USD. Several Chinese fintech companies have been established on the foundations of e-commerce and entertainment companies, including the above-mentioned Ant Financial, which belongs to Alibaba Group, an e-commerce giant, and JD Finance, belonging to JD, another major operator in the Chinese e-commerce sector. The third major operator of the Chinese fintech sector is WeChat Pay, owned by Tencent, a media enterprise. Just like the e-commerce sector, China’s domestic fintech market is also becoming increasingly saturated, encouraging service providers to expand towards foreign countries, and the BRI offers excellent opportunities.

In the Asian region, the services of Alipay have been available in, among others, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, and also in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and the Philippines since

81

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2018. The service can be used in 19 countries within Europe, including the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, as well as Hungary since 2018.

The company is expanding in the Middle East region as well, and is available in Israel and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, Alipay has also reached the markets of the USA, and Africa.

As a response to Alipay’s expansion in Europe started in 2015, WeChat Pay also started to expand in Europe in 2017, with an agreement concluded with German Wirecard. Since then, the company has been available also in the United Kingdom, France and Italy. Naturally, the Tencent-owned company also expands its markets in the Southeast Asian region, in countries such as Thailand and Malaysia.

Additionally, Chinese fintech companies can contribute to the facilitation of trade between the BRI countries by supporting supply chain finance.

There are experiments in China and in India to apply the blockchain technology. Dianrong, a Chinese online market lender and Taiwan-based Foxconn have jointly launched an enterprise named Chained Finance, with the aim of providing supply chain finance for Chinese SMEs. 6. CRITICISM OF THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD The most frequently voiced criticism of the Digital Silk Road is related to the optical cable network constructed by Chinese companies. There are several methods to obtain data from optical cables, but the two simplest ones are decrypting and physical access to cables. If someone has physical access, obtaining information is rather simple. On top of that, fibres in the cables can be manipulated during the construction of the optical cable network, and

the resulting micro bends of fibres allow for tapping data and forwarding them externally.

Some analysts fear that China’s leadership will insert so-called “backdoor mechanisms” in the system, increasing Beijing’s intelligence and propaganda operations in BRI partner countries. If cables, which transfer massive amounts of personal, government and financial data, are controlled by telecommunications firms, regulatory grey areas emerge when it comes to enforcing security. The cables can serve as means for Chinese intelligence to get access to confidential or classified information.

7. SUMMARY The BRI, initiated by China, is the new engine of globalisation. The initiative creates connectivity between countries on land, sea and digitally. The digital implications of the initiative are touched too briefly in reference literature; the latest part of the BRI, however, has increasing significance. The emergence of the digital economy provides new drives for economic development. By now, e-commerce and fintech companies, founded in China and often featured in the international press, have developed into global large companies serving millions of customers, and have significantly contributed to GDP growth. Less visible companies engaged in developing digital infrastructure are also working on largescale projects.

China supports the construction of the Digital Silk Road both politically and economically. Such infrastructure developments may be implemented within its framework which will promote the development of digitally least developed BRI countries, and the levelling-up of the digital economy of technologically more developed countries.

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PERSPECTIVES OF

84

THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION 85

THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

as a regional integration; trends in the foreign trade turnover between Hungary and the member states between 2011-2016 Author: Andrea Szegedi

The fundamental aim of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which launched its official operations on 1 st January, 2015, is to become the first, functioning integration of the post-Soviet region. According to its supporters, the EAEU can become a negotiating partner of the European Union and other international organisations, while its critics claim that it is a tool of Russian dominance in the region by preventing the development of relations between member states and third countries.

Experts claim that under current circumstances, the EAEU can become more successful if: 1. Russia takes the divergent interests and intentions of member states and potential members also into account; 2. it primarily works as an economic integration, contributing to the economic development and modernization of the region; 3. it places considerable emphasis on the modernization of public administration and the fight against corruption in member states; 4. it enhances its social support and its appeal to potential joiners (especially in the Central Asian region) by achieving real advancement in the issue of labour migration (and in the field of employees’ rights in particular) and exerting a favourable effect on economic growth; 5. it improves the efficiency of its institutional system, manages to achieve the elimination of protectionist trade defence measures of member states against each other and the execution of decisions applicable to member states.

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Economic coordination between member states and a common market can evolve only in a long term. The coordination of the financial sector, a common energy policy and common natural gas and oil trade are included in long-term plans. Processes taking place in the EAEU should be monitored, since they do not affect only the direct region but go far beyond: among others, they affect our foreign economy expansion efforts formulated in the Eastern Opening. Measures adopted by the EAEU may have significant, market-making consequences, which might concern specific Hungarian interests. Because of the foregoing, it is Hungary’s interest that, if adequate conditions exist, a kind of cooperation between the EU and the EAEU should start and evolve.

PREDECESSORS OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE INTEGRATION After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet member states were rather reserved about the question of regional integration (in Baltic states,

this idea was absolutely rejected), but within a relatively short period of time, partly out of security considerations, some attempts appeared to create some form of cooperation (BORKÓ T. 2010). During his first official visit to Russia, Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, proposed to found the Eurasian Union on 29th March, 1994. Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus formed a Customs Union (CU) in 1995, which can be regarded as the foundation of the integration process taking place in the post-Soviet Eurasian region now. The presidents of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan signed the Treaty on the Customs Union and Single Economic Space on 26th February, 1999.

On 10th October, 2000, the member states established the Eurasian Economic Community in Astana to accelerate the operations of the Customs Union.

On 19th September, 2003, the presidents of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed the Treaty on Establishment of the Single Economic Space in Yalta, and agreed to draft the legal framework ensuring free movement of goods, services, capital and labour within the EAEU. The Customs Union was launched in 2010. As opposed to earlier agreements, it achieved economically detectable results. The treaties establishing the three predecessor organisations (the Single Economic Space, the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community) laid down the foundations of the Eurasian Economic Union.

The document on establishing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was signed by Russia, the Republic of Belarus, and the Republic of Kazakhstan on 29th May, 2014. Armenia joined the integration

in October, 2014. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) started its official operation on 1st January, 2015. Using the operating model of the European Union, the EAEU also seeks to create a single market within the integration. To this end, it has set the following objectives: • free trade of goods and services between member states; • application of common external customs tariffs; • harmonisation of regulations on quality requirements of goods; • to ensure the free movement of labour.

INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM The centre of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) can be found in Moscow. The EAEU has a considerable supra-national decision-making organisation, with the following structure: The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, formed by the presidents of member states.

The Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, formed by the heads of government of member states.

The Eurasian Economic Commission, a permanent supranational regulatory body of the EAEU, which adopts its resolutions on the basis of collective decisions. Its core tasks are fostering the conditions to support the operation and development of the Union, and drafting proposals in the field of economic integration within the Union. The Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission, comprised by the Vice Prime Ministers of member states, is the supreme body of the Commission, with a 10-mem-

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ber Board (2 members per country) as its governing body, each member of which is responsible for specific areas.

The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: completes legal tasks related to the activities of the Union, which partly concern member states and partly the Union’s international agreements concluded with external members. Its place of seat is in Minsk. (www.eaeunion.org).

The above described structure works well in areas where there is substantial agreement between the member states, and decisions are of a bureaucratic or technical nature. In debated issues, however, Russia’s geopolitical power position dominates, in spite of the democratic structure. Another serious problem is that Court of the Eurasian Economic Union has never exercised its right to oblige any member states breeching any regulations applicable to the EAEU to comply with the regulation concerned.

(INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP).

The EAEU is one of the world’s leading producers of energy and minerals. In this role, it has to prepare for the possible scenario of radical changes taking place in this field (the use of renewables). Its geographical location, and its transport infrastructure provides an opportunity to take the role of a transport and logistics hub on the East-West trade corridor (between China and the EU). (www.eaeunion.org).

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE EAEU

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

In the case of the EAEU, comparable quantitative elements are relative, but the indices published in the official communications of the EAEU indicate priorities, in addition to comparisons.

The success and feasibility of the EAEU as an economic integration will in the long term depend on how intensively the citizens and enterprises of the member states will feel its positive impact on the economy, trade relations and the flow of labour.

The EAEU does not expect such cardinal structural changes and reforms from its member states as the EU does. In certain areas, integration has taken place, but Russia’s dominance can be felt in the measures taken so far. Adopted regulations aim much more at maintaining the status quo than at modernization. The member states of the EAEU have adopted a common customs tariff regime, which have mostly taken import customs used in Russia on board in the common regime. These tariffs were relatively high in the case of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Armenia, where levies on imports used to be lower, and have resulted in higher prices on several products. Mainly foodstuffs imported from China have been affected, and it has also had an adverse effect on wholesale and re-export trade transactions. The situation has been somewhat eased by the fact that Russian goods have become cheaper as a result of the weaker rouble. Russia and Kazakhstan’s WTO membership further complicates the situation. In line with commitments Russia made on joining the WTO, external tariffs are expected to

Territorial and population indices: The EAEU covers 13.62 percent of the Earth’s land areas (20.286 million km2), but encompasses only 2.55 per cent of the population (182.1 million people).

Internal resources: 2.6 per cent of the Earth’s economically active population (92.9 million people) live within the territory of the EAEU. Data from the period between 2011 and 2014 have been published to compare natural resources and production (http://eec.eaeunion. org). They suggest that globally the EAEU takes 2nd place in the extraction of natural gas (18.4 per cent of total natural gas extraction), sixth place in coal mining (5.8 per cent of total coal mining) and fourth place in the generation of electric power (5.1 per cent of total electric power).

In metallurgical production, 4.5 per cent of cast iron and 4.5 per cent of steel come from the region, taking 3rd place in the production of cast iron and 5th

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place in steel production. In the examined period, it accounted for 3.7 per cent of global industrial production, taking 6th place. Globally. it takes 2nd place in the production of mineral fertilisers, accounting for 10.8 per cent of production. In agricultural production, in takes 3rd place in the production of potato (1 per cent) and wheat (nine per cent), and 4th place in the production of meat (3.5 per cent).

The length of the road network within the territory of the EAEU is 1,605,900 km (2.5 per cent) and the railway network is 107,000 km long, which is 7.8 per cent of the length of the entire rail network.

THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

fall; Kazakstan has ended up with applying two sets of tariffs, one for goods destined for other EAEU states and another for those destined exclusively for its home market.

Within the EAEU, GOST (ГОСТ: государственный стандарт) quality standards, developed in the Soviet regime, are applicable. Interstate coordination tasks are completed by the Euro-Asian Council For Standardization, Metrology And Certification, which is also recognised by ISO as a regional organization for standardization, based on a resolution adopted in 1996 (http://www.easc.org.by). One of the major issues within the EAEU is the harmonisation of the requirements of plant and animal health regulations applicable to foodstuffs. Russia has used them – particularly veterinary requirements – several times as a trade defence instrument in political disputes. Others also use such instruments: in 2015, Kazakhstan sought to block cheap imports

of Russian dairy products. Kyrgyzstan has struggled to meet EEC standards, because it lacks the necessary infrastructure, while the transition period and reliefs that have been granted to catch-up and to adopt and introduce the regulatory system of the EAEU will expire at the end of 2017. (As for agricultural product, Kyrgyzstan can transport its meat and dairy products only through its competitor, Kazakhstan into the member states of the EAEU.) According to analysts, the mitigation of problems related to labour migration is one of the successes of the EAEU’s activities. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia are the member states mainly concerned by this topic. It is a fact that the legal employment of EAEU citizens has become easier, they have to meet less administrative requirements. The EEC has set up a department which monitors migration flows, and is responsible for migrants’ rights in member states.

89

Nonetheless, people’s freedom of movement within the EAEU is not completely unimpeded. EAEU citizens have reported frequent delays at internal borders. At times, international tourism and the free movement of citizens of third countries are also restricted.

COOPERATION OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES In its official statements, the EAEU is continuously emphasizing the importance of cooperation with countries outside the EAEU, which is underpinned by ongoing negotiations on trade agreements with almost 40 countries. A free trade agreement was concluded with Vietnam in 2015. At the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, held on 26th December, 2016, the presidents of member states agreed that the short-term plans of the EAEU include the conclusion of free trade agreements with Iran, Egypt, India and Singapore. Talks on the establishment of free trade zones are ongoing with Serbia and Israel. Negotiations on the opportunities of trade and economic cooperation have also begun with China. The key relationships for the EAEU are with the EU and with China The establishment of the EAEU divided EU Member States. Jean-Claude Juncker responded to the establishment of the EAEU with a letter to President

90

Putin in November, 2015 that held out the possibility of cooperation with the EAEU under certain conditions. Poland and Lithuania, however, strongly objected any cooperation with the EAEU (INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP). At the moment, partly for political (Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine – sanctions), and partly for economic (the difficulty of harmonising EAEU and EU standards) reasons, there is little chance of any progress in the EU-EAEU relations.

With the exception of Russia, member states of the EAEU are seeking to forge deeper economic relations with the EU, meeting with Russia’s opposition.

In September, 2013, Armenia suspended negotiations on signing the DCFTA, in spite of the fact that the EU is one of Yerevan’s most important foreign trading partners (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ countries-and-regions/index_en.htm).

While its relationship with the EU is controversial, the EAEU can see serious potential in its cooperation with China, particularly in the so-called Silk Road project crossing Central Asia and linking China with Europe. The initiative, the cost of which is planned to amount to at least 40 billion USD, would considerably cut travel and shipping times between the EU and China, and the countries along the Silk Road may take the role of important transport and

THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

trade hubs. The fact that China has an increasingly serious role in the trade and economy of member states cannot be disregarded, either. The common market policy of the EAEU does not necessarily promote the interests of specific member states (import tariffs), but provides Russia with an instrument to control China’s expansion in the Central Asian region.

On 1st January, 2016, Russia suspended its recognition of a CIS Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine; announced an embargo on Ukrainian food imports; and imposed obstacles on Ukrainian goods transiting to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As opposed to Russia, other member states maintain their trade and economic relations with Ukraine.

ECONOMIC INDICES OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION IN 2016 In terms of trade and economy, indices have been negative within the integration so far (in 2015, mutual trade within the EAEU decreased by 26 per cent, while trade with non-EAEU countries plummeted by 34 per cent), but the operation and the results of the EAEU cannot be considered independently from the negative economic processes taking place in the EAEU region (which are dominated and multiplied by the weakening of the Russian economy). In the short term, the harmonisation of legal standards pertaining to trade and customs tariffs and the settlement of legal issues of migration related to employment within the EAEU could have a positive impact on the operation of the EAEU. Intra-Union Trade Value was still negative in 2016, but the reduction decelerated to 6.7 per cent. It should be noted that the volume of trade in physical terms increased by 0.4 per cent, and Armenia’s and Kyrgyzstan’s exports to EAEU member states increased significantly (by 20 per cent in Armenia and by 4.4 per cent in Kyrgyzstan).

In 2016, all indices of foreign trade turnover with third countries (export, import, turnover, foreign trade balance) decreased compared to the previous year. The EAEU’s foreign trade turnover with third countries decreased by 12 per cent, to 509.8 billion USD in 2016. Export accounted for 60.5 per cent of foreign trade turnover (308.4 billion USD), import accounted for 39.5 per cent (201.3 billion USD); reduction was much larger in export than in import.

Foreign trade balance deteriorated by 36.4 per cent

compared to 2015, but was still positive. The volume of mutual trade between EAEU member states reached 42.5 billion USD in 2016. The value of intra-Union trade has been decreasing since 2013, in 2016 it amounted to -6.7 per cent compared to the index in 2015, but reduction is decelerating as the overall reduction of mutual trade in value terms amounted to -25.5 per cent in 2015 vs. 2014. (EURASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK).

Trade reduction causes include both external and internal factors. Decisive external factors include: 1. Reduction in oil prices – Energy resources account for the bulk of trade activities conducted by EAEU member states (with 22.8 per cent of the total mutual trade value and 58.9 per cent of the value of exports to third countries). Mutual trade value indicators directly correlate with movements in global oil prices. The share of energy resources shrank more than the extent of the average reduction in exports both in mutual and external EAEU trade.

2.

Deceleration of global trade and economic growth – The global economy grew by 3.1 per cent in 2016, the lowest growth rate since the 2008–2009 recession. Global trade increased by merely 1.2 per cent, which is the lowest growth rat in the last 30 years. This had an adverse effect on the demand, and consequently, the price of exchange commodities and oil.

3. Sanctions against Russia – The preservation of the sanctions imposed on Russia and extended also in 2016, continue to constrain the growth of intra-EAEU trade turnover, but also has a salubrious effect on mutual trade in certain products (e.g. agricultural products.)

The devaluation of national currencies has been a decisive factor. The weakening of national currencies against the US dollar also made an important contribution to the overall reduction in mutual trade turnover.

Major foreign trading partners of the EAEU Examining groups of countries, the EAEU realised 46.5 per cent of its foreign trade turnover with third countries with the European Union in 2016.

Foreign trade turnover with APEC countries is also significant, which accounts for 31.5 per cent of total trade turnover. Trade with non-EAEU CIS countries accounted for 5 per cent of total turnover in

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Table 1: Intra-Union and Foreign Trade of EAEU Member States (2015–2016) Indicator 2015 2016 2016 vs. 2015 Change (billion USD) (billion USD) Intra-Union Trade 45.6 42.5 -6.7% Value EAEU Foreign Trade 579.4 509.8 -12% Turnover Exports from the EAEU 373.8 308.4 -17.5% Imports into the EAEU 205.5 201.3 -2% Table 2: TOP 5 EAEU Trading Partners in 2016 Rank

Country

Foreign Trade Turnover in 2016 (billion USD)

1st

China

78.6

-0.4%

15.4%

+1.8%

Germany

45.1

-11.7%

8.8%

0.0%

2

nd

Share

Change vs.

2015

3

Netherlands

37.0

-26.9%

7.3%

-1.5%

4th

Italy

28.9

-29.3%

5.7%

-1.4%

5th

USA

23.1

-2.4%

4.5%

-0.4%

All countries

509.8

-12.0%

100%

0.0%

rd

2016. Compared to the previous year, the share of EU countries in EAEU foreign trade turnover has decreased by 2.3%, while the share of APEC countries has increased by 1.8 per cent.

While in 2015 trade with the EU was the highest both in exports and imports, in 2016 APEC countries have taken first place (42.3 per cent of total imports) in EAEU imports, pushing EU countries down to second; 40.8 per cent of total imports came from the EU. In terms of export destinations, the EU kept its leading position (50.3 per cent of total exports); 24.4 per cent of total exports was directed to APEC countries (24.4%).

At country level, the largest EAEU trading partners are China, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the United States. The chief EAEU export destination was the Netherlands (33.5 billion USD, 10.9% of total exports), followed by China (32.9 billion USD, 10.7 per cent of total exports), Germany (22.6 billion USD, 7.3 per cent of total exports), Italy (19.5 billion USD, 6.3 per cent of total exports) and Turkey (14.7 billion USD, 4.8 per cent of total exports).

The chief import partner of the EAEU was China in 2016 (45.7 billion USD, 22.7 per cent of total imports), followed by Germany (22.5 billion USD, 11.2 per cent of total imports), the United States (12.9 billion USD, 6.4 per cent of total imports), France

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Change vs.

2015

(9.5 billion USD, 4.7 per cent of total imports) and Italy (9.4 billion USD, 4.7 per cent of total imports) (EURASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK).

HUNGARY’S FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER WITH THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION EAEU member states play an important role in Hungary’s Eastern Opening policy, which was announced by the Hungarian government in 2011. The objective of the foreign policy strategy is to facilitate Hungarian companies in acquiring export markets in the east. In this process, the market acquisition of the Hungarian SME sector is a priority.

When evaluating results, however, the fact that economic processes taking place in the region examined since 2014 have an adverse effect on the foreign trade metrics of these countries must be considered. The significant drop in oil prices and the dependency on the Russian and the Chinese economy have led to the devaluation of the countries’ currencies. As a result, specific countries apply trade defence instruments to protect their domestic markets or to maintain the balance of their current accounts. The aim of the EAEU as a regional economic integration is in part to mitigate external negative economic effects, but it affects the presence of Hungarian trade adversely, as the member

THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

Figure 1: Hungary’s foreign trade turnover with EAEU member states (million USD)

the year 2011 as the baseline, then foreign trade turnover between Hungary and EAEU member states decreased by 65 per cent between 2011 and 2016.

The decrease affected both imports and exports, although at a different extent. The value of the import from EAEU member states to Hungary decreased by 69 per cent, while the value of exports from Hungary to EAEU member states decreased by 53 per cent between 2011 and 2016, resulting in an improvement of our trade balance in the period examined. It is an encouraging sign that according to the data in the first eight months of 2017, the year-on year-data of foreign trade turnover show a growth of 38 per cent. The value of import to Hungary increased by

Figure 2: Hungary’s export és import turnover with EAEU member states (million USD)

45.5 per cent, while the value of export from Hungary to EAEU member states increased by 26 per cent.

If we examine the distribution of foreign trade turnover with EAEU member states by countries, Russia’s dominant role is obvious.

10000 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000

Import (million USD)

3000

Export (million USD)

2000 1000

Ja

nA 20 ug 1 Ja 6 nA 20 ug 17

0

Figure 3: Distribution of our foreign trade turnover with EAEU member states (million USD) 14000 12000 10000

Kyrgyzstan

8000

Kazakhstan

6000

Armenia Belarus

4000

Russia

2000 0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

states prefer developing trade relations between each other, and facilitate the free flow of goods, services and labour between member states.

Between 2014 and 2016, foreign trade turnover between Hungary and EAEU member states decreased significantly. If we regard the foreign trade data of

In 2016, most of foreign trade turnover with EAEU member states (92 per cent) was conducted with Russia, followed by Kazakhstan with a share of 4 per cent and Belarus with a share of 3.5per cent. The remaining 0.5 per cent is “shared” by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Our three most important products imported from the EAEU are crude petroleum and crude oil obtained from bituminous minerals (55 per cent of our total import from the EAEU, 83 per cent of our total import of crude oil and oil obtained from bituminous minerals); petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons (25 per cent of our total import from the EAEU, 48 per cent of our total import of petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons) and synthetic rubber and factice (4 per cent of our total import from the EAEU, 40 per cent of our total synthetic rubber and factice import). Our three most important products exported to EAEU member states are medicaments in measured doses (23 per cent of our total export to the EAEU, 13 per cent of total export of medicaments in measured doses); medicated preparations (5 per cent of our total export to the EAEU, 16 per cent of total medicated preparations export) and automobiles (4 per cent of our total export to the EAEU, 0.6 per cent of our total automobiles export) (as calculated by the author on the basis of the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office).

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COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES AT A REGIONAL LEVEL

Author: Zsolt Gál

The importance and relevance of the research topic lie in the fact that the countries of the Visegrád Four, expected to be further expanded in the future by some Western Balkan countries that are already EU Member States or are expected to join the EU in the near future, are the most dynamically developing group of countries within the entire EU-28. Furthermore, the group of the Visegrád Four countries may also be expanded with the EU Member States of the Baltic region. This possible expansion process may also lead to an enhanced role of the Visegrád Four countries within the EU in the future.

The economic upturn and the expanding economic role of the Visegrád Four countries within the EU have required an in-depth, detailed economic analysis of this group of countries, primarily in terms of population, employment, production – that of products with greater added value – and family earnings. It is important to assess what the components and foundations of the economic upturn in the Visegrád Four countries are, and how long term this economic upturn is expected to be. Notwithstanding the economic upturn, this group of countries has had to cope with several difficulties, such as the small share of population with tertiary educational attainment in some regions, the greater economic weight of the mining-quarrying sector decreasing the share of products with higher added value, decreasing family incomes, significantly increasing unemployment, a shrinking population and the growing number of ag-

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ricultural workers or farmers in different regions. The main solution to these economic difficulties may be offered by more effective cooperation between regions, a more efficient use of financial resources available, the encouragement of foreign direct investments, an increase in the number of higher education graduates and a more flexible adjustment of higher education to labour market requirements.

INTRODUCTION My research focused on comparing the regions of the Visegrád Four countries by their economic variables and characteristic features. The four countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – are listed with their particular regions, and also their Eurostat identification numbers are indicated. In the case

Canarias

Guadeloupe Martinique

Guyane

Mayotte Réunion

Açores

the NUTS-2 statistical classification method applied in the EU. In the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the names of smaller areas within regions used in classifications are indicated in brackets, which can also be traced in the statistical records of Eurostat.

Madeira

The importance and relevance of the research topic lie in the fact that the countries of the Visegrád Four, expected to be further expanded in the future by some Western Balkan countries that are already EU Member States or are expected to join the EU in the near future, are the most dynamically developing group of countries within the entire EU-28. Furthermore, the group of the Visegrád Four countries may also be expanded with

REGIOgis

Map 1.8 Total expenditure on R&D, 2014 % of regional GDP < 0.5

3–4

0.5 – 1

>= 4

1–2

no data

2–3

EU-28 = 2.04 BE, DE, EL, FR, AT, SE = 2013 The Europe 2020 R&D target is 3%.

Source: Eurostat

0

500 km

© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries

Canarias

Guadeloupe Martinique

Guyane

Mayotte Réunion

Açores

Madeira

the EU Member States of the Baltic region. This possible expansion process may also lead to an enhanced role of the Visegrád Four countries within the EU in the future. The economic upturn and the expanding economic role of the Visegrád Four countries within the EU have required an in-depth, detailed economic analysis of this group of countries, primarily in terms of population, employment, production – that of products with greater added value – and family earnings. It is important to assess what the components and foundations of the economic upturn in the Visegrád Four countries are, and how long term this economic upturn is expected to be.

Some experts have concluded that, in relation to investment activities targeted to increase the number of jobs, a well-functioning banking system and bank controlling should audit the controlling activities related to banks, to develop and ensure that they adequately plan their tasks, i.e. managing market risks, structuring income opportunities and increasing the potential of the bank in particular (Kalmár et al, 2015). Economic growth substantially depends on the activities of private companies, regulated and affected by tax policies. Usually, the reduction of taxes or direct taxes may encourage the private sector to increase their investments and further economic activities.

REGIOgis

Map 1.11 Population aged 25–64 with tertiary education, 2016 % of total population aged 25–64 < 15

30 – 35

15 – 20

35 – 40

20 – 25

> 40

25 – 30

no data

EU-28 = 30.7 ISCED levels 5 and 6 Source: Eurostat

0

500 km

© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries

of Poland, voivodeships of main regions are analysed in my research, as the size of voivodeships corresponds both to the regions of the Visegrád Four countries, and

According to Mina’s (2015) expert opinion, political guarantees are required to decrease the level of political risk and to conclude bilateral treaties, which ensure capital flow for the sake of increasing investments. Other experts have laid down the importance of reducing inflation to harmonise economic growth in different countries. Different forms of taxes, as revenues of the government budget, have a significant impact on budget balance, which might be continuously

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negative and as such, might accumulate the entire government debt of EU Member States year by year.

Considering the issue and difficulties of taxes, it is a positive government budget balance that is needed the most. In order to render economic life stable and the economic growth more dynamic, it is important to increase the investment activities of enterprises, encourage foreign direct investment, and increase purchasing power to expand the domestic market, which require the reduction of government debt and government budget deficit by avoiding an increase in taxes (Lentner et al, 2017). In regional economic developments, it is appropriate to focus on environmental investments, which make aids disbursed by the World Bank more easily available. In technological development, it is important to eliminate an unfavourable financial background, which requires an increased role of financial institutions, in addition to the reduction of government debt and government budget deficit (Zsarnóczai et al, 2016).

MATERIAL AND METHODOLOGY

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In terms of regional demographical statistical data, it is important to analyse the differences in population (Polulation1) and education (Education2) by regions. In my researches, the changes in the population, labour and educational level of regions have an important role, which have considerable effects on employment to create corporate competitiveness.

This is another reason why it is important to evaluate these two economic variables in the regional analysis of the selected countries, i.e. the countries of the Visegrád Four.

The level of economic development in the given regions is well characterised by the size of expenditure on research and development, and the educational level of the workforce, therefore it is important to in-

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Map 2 Change in GDP per head index, 2008–2015 Index point difference < -20

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In the economic analysis of the Visegrád Four countries, I primarily use the code names used in the EU statistical data records of NUTS-2 statistical units, regions, and, in Poland, voivodeships. In the regional economic analysis of specific regions, I considered major economic features, which have an important role in the economic development of all regions. Generally, economic variables are based on data from the period between 2010 and 2015; if not, it is indicated separately. Data disclosed from June to December, 2017 by Eurostat have been used for my scientific analyses.

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crease financial resources spent on these areas. The regions’ GDP growth and the production of higher added value products affect employment, the income level of families, their purchasing power, and essentially, the subsistence of the population in the given region.

Therefore, these economic variables may improve a region’s ability to retain its population, while their declining tendency may deteriorate it. That is why it is important to evaluate the situation of these economic variables at a regional level in my research. The economic development of particular regions is well characterized by the changes in the regional gross added value calculated at the basis price (RGVA4), and the changes in family earnings (FamEarn6) also belong to these economic and financial regional comparative analyses.

In my analysis, I dwell upon the situation of regional employment, particularly in mining (Mining11), as this sector exerts an important impact on the general employment situation. Industrial production takes place in the geographical environment, which provides the minerals, energy carriers and raw materials needed for production. The amount and significance of natural resources change over time. Nowadays, companies that want to remain successful in the market competition should consider geographical

COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES AT A REGIONAL LEVEL

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Map 2.6 Change in employment rate (20-64), 2008–2016 Percentage point change < -5

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factors that represent the supply of raw materials, renewable energy resources and locations that are essential for trade.

During my researches I used a statistical method named Special Program for Social Sciences (SPSS), which was developed in more detail by Csalner (2015) and Huzsvai-Vincze (2012). This statistical analysis method ensures a comprehensive overview of a high number of regions of several countries, as well as their analysis and comparison on scientific grounds. In analytical methods, I highlight the socio-economic similarities and differences of specific regions.

(Śląskie), Katowice, the Subcarpathian Voivodeship (Podkarpackie), Rzeszów, Greater Poland (Wielkopolskie), Poznań, West Pomerania (Zachodniopomorskie), Szczecin, and PL16 Pomerania (Pomorskie), Gdańsk.

Factor analysis based on economic variables: Population, Qualification, Mining, Competitiveness

RESEARCH RESULTS The economic analytical comparison based on the above-listed economic variables provides an adequate scientific basis for ranking and grouping the regions of the Visegrád Four countries based on their economic and social development. Currently, the most dynamically developing region of the EU is the Visegrád Four countries, while its population and territorial coverage are significant within the EU. This also makes the analysis of the regional development of the four countries and the comparison of their regions important, especially in terms of analysing employment, education, scientific-technical development, the earnings of the population, technology and knowledge-intensive relations, placing special emphasis on the role of sectors producing raw materials, such as mining and quarrying.

In raw material producing sectors the issue of employment may be important because they are fundamentally related to the countryside, and an increase in the employment rate in this sector raises the question how the population can persist in rural areas. Naturally, the development of agricultural production also implies a decrease in the employment rate, that is why it is important to develop other sectors to retain the population in rural areas, and to design adequate employment policies to maintain their purchasing power.

On the basis of factor analysis, Figure 1 well illustrates the quarters in which the specific regions of the Visegrád Four countries can be found in the coordinate system by their economic variables. 10 regions belong to the first, top right quarter of the coordinate system: the Bratislava region (Bratislavský kraj), the Prešov region (Prešovský kraj), the Košice region (Košický kraj), the Masovian Voivodeship (Mazowieckie), Warsaw, Lesser Poland (Małopolskie), Krakow, the Silesian Voivodeship

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Source: proprietary calculations based on the SPSS statistical analytical system

The three major economic variables of Component-1, namely Population1, Education2 and Mining11 can be found on the horizontal “X” principal line, and are in linear correlation with the two economic variables of Component-2 on the vertical “Y” principal line, namely RGVA4 and FamEarn6. A linear correlation means that if the economic variables of Component-1 (“X”) are increasing, or slightly decreasing, the economic variables of Component-2 (“Y”) are also increasing or slightly decreasing. It is also true the other way round; if the economic variables of Component-1 (“X”) are decreasing, or slightly increasing, the economic variables of Component-2 (“Y”) are also decreasing or slightly increasing.

Between 2012 and 2016, the growth rate of the population was the highest in the Bratislava region with 4.4 per cent, the number of people aged 25–64 with tertiary education increased by 39 per cent, while the number of people employed in mining grew by 200 per cent during this period. The population growth rate significantly affected the increase in the number of people with tertiary education, but, as a peculiarity of the region, the number of people employed in mining increased significantly, reaching the highest figure in the Visegrád Four countries. In this region, development

COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES AT A REGIONAL LEVEL

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Map 4 Total population change in NUTS 3 regions, 2005–2015 Total change (%) < -10

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has unfolded, which can be characterized by a high growth rate of tertiary graduates and an outstanding growth rate of employees in mining, the growth rate of family earnings, which was the highest in the Visegrád Four countries with 17.2 per cent between 2010 and 2014, and the growth rate of the gross added value, which was 12.4 per cent between 2011 and 2015, was significantly affected. The high growth rate both in the number of tertiary graduates and employees in mining was a significant lever for the growth of family earnings.

Substantially, the Bratislava region achieved significant economic results compared to the regions of the entire Visegrád Four. This region was followed by the Prešov region with a population growth of 0.6 per cent, an increase of 43.1 per cent in the number of tertiary graduates – exceeded by only the Prague region – and an increase of 24.2 per cent in the number of employees in mining during the same period. This latter figure is far less than that of the Bratislava region, but a strong growth rate compared to the entire Visegrád Four. Such high growth rate of the number of tertiary graduates in the Prešov region significantly affected the growth rate of the gross added value, which was 14.3 per cent between 2011 and 2015, and the growth rate of family earnings (“Y” principal line), which was 13.6 per cent between 2010 and 2014, which counts as significant in the Visegrád Four countries.

It can be concluded that a significant growth in the share of tertiary graduates affects the growth of employment on higher levels and with higher educational attainment, which may result in a higher level of aggregation in companies. A growing employment rate and a higher level of education of the workforce contribute to the increase in family earnings. The best examples are given by the Bratislava, the Prešov and the Košice regions between 2011 and 2015.

These three regions are followed by the Masovian Voivodship (Warsaw) with a population growth rate of 1 per cent and an increase of 38.4 per cent in the number of tertiary graduates, while the number of employees in mining decreased significantly, by 6.4 per cent during this period. Although the population growth rate is more modest than that of the region, the high growth rate of tertiary graduates is still significant, almost reaches the rate of the region, in this respect there is no substantial difference between the two.

The decrease of the employment level was significant in the mining and quarrying sector. Nevertheless, the

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COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES AT A REGIONAL LEVEL

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strong growth in the number of tertiary graduates in the region had a significant impact on the growth rate of the gross added value, which was 16.3 per cent between 2011 and 2015. With this result, this region was the third largest in the Visegrád Four region after the Greater Poland Voivodeship (Poznań) and the Lesser Poland Voivodeship (Krakow). In addition, the growth rate of family earnings (FamEarn6) was also significant (“Y” principal line), 25.7 per cent, which was the second highest in the Visegrád Four countries after the Bratislava region.

The Bratislava region exhibited a high population growth rate with 4.4 per cent between 2012 and 2016; it is the highest within all regions of the Visegrád Four countries; only the Central Bohemian Region (Středočeský kraj) around Prague was the one that almost reached this level with 4 per cent, followed by the Prague region and the HU01 Central Hungary (Budapest) with 2 per cent each.

The population growth rate of other regions reaches 1 per cent at best, and the number of their population decreased by 2 per cent in most of them. Basically, only capitals or their direct regions could increase the number of the population. The regions in this top right quarter of the coordinate system achieved impressive results in the growth rates of gross added value and family earnings (FamEarn6) due to such high increases in the number of tertiary graduates between 2011 and 2015.

There is a total of 12 regions in the second, top left quarter of the coordinate system: the Łódź Voivodeship (Łódzkie), Łódź, the Lublin Voivodeship (Lubelskie), Lublin, the Lubusz Voivodeship (Lubuskie), Gorzów, Greater Poland, Zielona Gór, the Lower Silesian Voivodeship (Dolnośląskie), Wrocław, the Opole Voivodeship (Opolskie), Opole, the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship, (Kujawsko-Pomorskie), Bydgoszcz-Toruń, Central Transdanubia, Western Transdanubia, Northern Hungary, HU07 Southern Great Plain, the Žilina region (Žilinský kraj), and the Banská Bystrica region (Banskobystrický kraj).

The regions belonging to the second, top left quarter of the coordinate system are characterized by decreasing variables belonging to the “X” principal line, i.e. Population1, Education2, Mining11, while the other two economic variables, RGVA4, FamEarn6 are usually characterized by growth.

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The population growth rate of the PL01 Łódź Voivodeship (Łódź) decreased by 2 per cent between 2012 and 2016; compared to all regions of the Visegrád Four countries, decrease was greater only in the Northern Hungary, the South Transdanubia and the Southern Great Plain regions.

The population grew by 2 per cent in the Central Hungary region, the number of tertiary graduates increased significantly, by 35.5 per cent, which is the sixth best figure in the countries of the Visegrád Four, while the number of people employed in mining decreased by 11 per cent during this period. The growth rate of the number of tertiary graduates was high in spite of the very modest, 4.1 per cent growth rate of the region’s gross added value (RGVA4) between 2011 and 2015, but the growth rate of family earnings (“Y” principal line), reaching only 8.9 per cent, can be regarded as medium in the context of the Visegrád Four countries.

In Prague, the population grew by 2 per cent, the number of tertiary graduates grew by 43.3 per cent, while the number of people employed in mining grew by 30 per cent during this period. The growth rate of tertiary graduates was the highest in all Visegrád Four counties, while the gross added value of the region decreased by 0.5 per cent between 2011 and 2015, and family earnings (“Y” principal line) also decreased significantly, by 6 per cent.

It can be concluded that basically the Czech data indicate a declining economic situation of regions relying on mining, which is reflected by the low increase or stagnation, or in certain cases the decrease of gross added value and family earnings in these regions. However, it is reality that mining basically counts as a traditional industry in mountain areas.

The bottom left quarter of the coordinate system includes a total of nine regions: the Holy Cross Voivodeship (Świętokrzyskie), Kielce, the Podlaskie Voivodeship, Białystok, Southern Transdanubia, Northern Great Plain, the Trnava region, the Nitra region, Southwest (Jihozápad) and Nortwest (Severozápad). Again, the changes in the regional gross added value, which is increasing in most regions but usually to a lesser extent than in the majority of regions belonging to the other quarters of the coordinate system, are crucial in the development of the regions belonging to this quarter. The growth rate ranges from 1.9 per cent to 10.5 per cent, but in the case of the CZ04 region the gross added value decreased by 1.6 per cent.

A Visegrádi országok gazdasági jellemzőinek összehasonlítása regionális szinten

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GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018

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GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 1. General awareness of foreign policy

Our geopolitical public opinion poll is being published in early 2019, but the idea of a geopolitical public opinion poll began to form in our minds as early as in 2017. Our concept was to present comprehensively the population’s knowledge of foreign policy and geopolitics in present-day Hungary: which foreign policy issues play a prominent role in the public mind, from where people gather information, how familiar they are with the leaders of the most influential countries of the world, or how they perceive major global systems of alliances. As a small, land-locked country, we could see that the Hungarian population is rather inward looking: they are less interested in foreign policy issues and events as they do not seem to feel that we could affect them, and they tend to turn towards events on the domestic political and public scene. This presupposition has been justified also by the results of the public opinion poll.

Beyond doubt, foreign political public opinion polls examining the European ties of the Hungarian population, their information on international partners or relationships with certain nations, had been taken in Hungary earlier as well. However, no such comprehensive poll, covering various regions, examining the geopolitical knowledge – and, at the same time, opinion – of the Hungarian population has been conducted so far; thus, we believe that with an adequate professional background and regular publications, we can provide an interesting and exciting snapshot of geopolitical knowledge and thoughts in 21st-century Hungary.

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1.

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general awareness of foreign policy The first group of questions (questions 1-11) assesses the awareness and knowledge of foreign policy of the Hungarian adult population, including the ways of seeking information and familiarity with specific media. Furthermore, it also assesses sympathy towards various countries, familiarity with the leaders of given countries and the view on the effects of their policies that can also be felt in our country, and also how these leaders as persons are perceived.

In addition, the questions also aimed at assessing how influential the respondents had felt significant regional or global political events taken place in recent years (such as Brexit, terrorist attacks in Western Europe or Donald Trump’s election as president) on their own lives. On this basis, a general picture emerges about the attitude of the Hungarian population towards events happening outside Hungary.

The answers produced the following main results: • as Hungary is a small country, interest in foreign policy is relatively moderate, two-thirds of respondents consider themselves not or just slightly informed of the subject matter, and discussing foreign policy topics between each other is not typical, either • of various media, the Hungarian population prefers television as a source of obtaining information; in younger age groups, however, gathering information

on the Internet is more dominant. However, all this is confined to Hungarian-language sources, familiarity with foreign media (print media, news channels) is extremely low: on average, 50-70 per cent of the population do not know these at all • Respondents think that the foreign policy mindset of the nation is primarily influenced by the media and secondarily by politicians • In general, the effects of global political events are felt by the population to a lesser extent (they are not at all or rather not felt by almost half of them), but when enquiring about specific events, figures are higher • Poland is considered to be the friendliest of surrounding countries by respondents, while Romania and Ukraine are considered to be the least friendly • in general, the leaders of specific global powers (the United States, Russia, Germany) are known by half of the population, but it drops dramatically about Asia (familiarity with the heads of government of India and China is merely around 5%). The leaders of nearby global powers (Germany and Russia) are considered to be the most influential; furthermore, sympathy somewhat correlates with familiarity (the less known a leader is, the less likeable they are considered).

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1. How informed do you consider yourself of foreign policy issues?

The first question of the questionnaire was about how informed the population considered themselves of foreign policy issues. This question influences all the answers given to the other questions in this section, as other questions about the knowledge of foreign affairs will follow. First, these cover the source of gathering information (familiarity with media focussing on foreign affairs); second, the view on external events; third, they assess familiarity with and the influence of leaders of countries that are important from a global perspective, as well as how their activities are perceived.

Our pre-assumption was that attention focussing on foreign affairs, events outside Hungary would be relatively law in our country. Although theoretically we are informed immediately of events taken place at any point of the world with the help of live television broadcasts and especially of the Internet, and, in fact, these broadcasts can also affect the events themselves (it already has a more or less scientific definition, the socalled CNN effect1), broadcasts on foreign affairs have been given less and less emphasis for years. The questionnaire does not provide an answer for the causal link between these two things, that is, whether the interest of the population in world political events decreases because less attention is paid to these events in news reports, or the events of foreign policy receive less attention because the level of interest in them is low. The answers reveal, however, how informed the population considers itself of the topic.

On a scale of five, less informed ones account for almost two-thirds of the population (more than a third of them [36.5%] are not at all informed, and nearly 30 per cent of them [27.7%] are rather not informed), some 64.2%. Respondents giving a neutral answer account for a further quarter, and the percentage of those who consider themselves informed in these matters is merely 10.2%.

On the whole, only one-tenth of the population is open-minded, interested in and seeking information about foreign policy issues in Hungary. When consid-

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ering distribution by gender, men have a slightly higher percentage and women have a slightly lower one, which is not a surprising result being aware of the fact that external events are often about conflicts, wars, balance of power, politiciansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; meetings, which are basically masculine topics (as world politics is dominated by men to a significant extent).

As for age groups, 18-49-year-olds have a lower â&#x20AC;&#x153;level of knowledgeâ&#x20AC;? compared to the full sample, and only the knowledge of 50-59-year-olds and 60+ year-olds is higher compared to the full sample. According to this, it is not only young adults but also middle-aged ones who are rather disinterested in foreign affairs. Relevant previous surveys showed that young ones demonstrated general indifference and negative attitudes towards2 politics, which can explain their low level of interest in the topic. However, it is a somewhat surprising result that the large group of middle-aged people consider themselves rather uninformed.

Relatively significant differences can be detected in foreign policy awareness according to educational attainment and type of the place of residence. A much higher proportion of people with higher educational attainment considered themselves informed or very informed of foreign policy topics than people with primary of secondary educational attainment; accordingly, the proportion of not at all informed or rather not informed people is much lower in this group. (In connection with that it must be noted that the group of people with higher educational attainment is quantitively much smaller than that of the respondents with primary of secondary educational attainment; less than 20 per cent of respondents belong to this group.)

Similarly remarkable differences arise between Budapest and all the other settlements: people living in Budapest feel themselves much more informed, and villagers consider their knowledge of foreign affairs the least relevant.

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2. What is your primary source when seeking information about foreign affairs ?

The second question sought an answer to the question as to how the population gathered information about foreign affairs, what their most important source of information was. Of the four possible categories (television, print media, online media, family&friends), television was marked by far by most respondents: this medium is the primary source of information about foreign affairs for almost 60 per cent of respondents, followed by online media and then family&friends. Seeking information in print media was given a marginal value.

The most recent similar survey on media consumption patterns was conducted in Hungary in May, 20173. It examined general media consumption habits within the adult population, and the results revealed that half of the adult population (exactly 50 per cent sought information on television, one-third (36%) on Internet; print media and radio received only 4 per cent each. The comparison of results is further nuanced by the fact that our survey also included personal relationships as â&#x20AC;&#x153;news sourcesâ&#x20AC;? (but did not include the radio); taking that into account, proportions can be regarded as roughly equal.

Although the survey we compiled naturally represents a situation relevant at one single point in time, it is worth calling attention to trends in relation to media consumption: several surveys analysing media have found4,5 that recently the propor-

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tion of consumption of television content has been increasingly losing ground to the consumption of digital (online) content, and interest in print media demonstrates a decrease even in terms of absolute numbers (this medium suffered a heavy blow during the economic crisis in 2008, and has not yet recovered).

The patterns of seeking information about foreign affairs correlate with general media consumption habits also in other respects. In this regard, it is true, for instance, that according to the distribution by age, online media consumption is the highest in the group of young adults (a little bit more than 50 per cent of them seeks information primarily digitally), and there is a linear relationship between a growing preference of television and higher age (less than one-third of 18-29-year-olds, while more than 80 per cent of 60+ year-olds marked television as the primary source).

A significant difference was detected at these two most important media also according to educational attainment (seeking information on television is the highest among people with primary educational attainment, and the lowest among people with higher educational attainment; and the opposite is true for online media). By types of settlements, the lowest rate of respondents in Budapest seek information on television and the highest rate of them via the Internet, while in villages the rate of television is particularly high, and that of the Internet is rather low.

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3. How often do you discuss major external events?

It is worth comparing the results of the third question also to the answers given to the first two questions.

This can be related to how informed of foreign policy issues the respondents consider themselves and also to the way of seeking information, as we assume a close relationship between discussing events and how informed of foreign policy issues people considers themselves.

Regarding the results of the full sample, the proportion of those who do not discuss external events at all, or do so only rarely is larger than those whose answer to the first question was that they were not at all or just slightly informed of foreign policy issues. By contrast, those who talk about foreign affairs frequently or very frequently are fewer than those who consider themselves informed or very informed of the subject. The proportions, however, – in line with previous expectations – are rather close to each other.

If we assume that there is a relationship between the way of content consumption and the intensity of discussion about the topic, in terms of age groups we should get the result that younger age groups discuss foreign policy more frequently than older ones, as the internet media consumption of younger ones was much higher than that of old ones (no such pattern can be detected among those who seek information through personal relationships – family&friends –; older ones are less likely to gather information through personal relationships, but the difference is not nearly as big as in case of the Internet). However, if we examine the proportion of respondents answering ‘frequently’ and ‘very frequently’ to the third question by age groups in a combined way, no relationship is detectable. Although it is 50-59-year-olds

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who discuss foreign affairs the least frequently, they are followed by the youngest age group, 18-29-yearolds. (It is worth mentioning that no one of either the 18-29-year-olds or the 30-39-year-olds answered that they discussed these topics very frequently!)

Then the 40-49-year-olds follow; their proportion is almost exactly the same. 60+ year-olds represent the highest proportion, which absolutely contradicts our preliminary hypothesis. It can therefore be concluded that seeking information either online or through personal relationships do not influence substantially the frequency of discussing foreign policy issues (either in person or via the Internet).

In terms of educational attainment, the results correlate with the answers given to the first question: the more educated a person is, the more frequently they discuss foreign policy issues (as they are also more informed of these issues). More than three-quarters of respondents with primary educational attainment (77.2 %) has no or just little discussion on these issues in their environment, while in the case of respondents with secondary educational attainment this rate is over two-thirds (67.9 %), and it is almost 60 per cent (59.4%) among respondents with higher educational attainment. Similarly, although at a lower rate, the proportion of respondents with primary up to higher educational attainment who often discuss foreign policy issues in their environment is growing.

Again, no such relationship could be detected by settlement size; the proportions of those who discuss and those who do not discuss foreign policy issues are similar roughly in all kinds of settlements. The proportion of those who frequently discuss them is slightly higher in the capital, but villages, for instance, overtake towns in this respect.

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GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 1. General awareness of foreign policy

4. Which of these influence the foreign policy mindset of the nation the most? (media, politicians, social networks, blogs, other) The fourth question was a complex one: the respondents had to assess on a scale of one to five how much influence the media, politicians, social networks, blogs and other institutions/organisations/groups/platforms have on the foreign policy mindset.

The respondents’ opinion was that of the four categories (the majority of respondents could not or did not want to answer the ‘other’ question, or they answered that they did not influence the foreign policy mindset at all (score 1 on the scale), thus this question produced very little substantial result, its explanatory power is small and will accordingly not be considered below), the most influence was exerted by the media and politicians, followed by social networks, while blogs exerted the least influence. But even the ability to influence of the media and politicians was given just a lower score (in both cases the most frequent answer was ‘it does not influence at all’), so the question arises: if these do not exert influence, then what or who the respondents think influences the foreign policy mindset (and behaviour) of our nation? Such examination would require further research, thus now we need to resort to existing results.

In the case of the media, the proportion of respondents who thought the media did not at all influence or did rather not influence the foreign political mindset was the same as the proportion of those who thought the media influenced it (38.5%) or influenced it very much (37.5%) We will see that this imaginary gap continues to widen in the case of the other categories. The influential role of the media is felt the least significant by the youngest age group (16-29-year-olds), less than 30% of them think the media is influential or very influential, while at least 35 per cent of respondents in all the other age groups think so (however, the proportion of those who could not/did not want to answer was the highest in the youngest age group; this proportion was about 5 per cent in all other age groups). The influence of the media is felt the most powerful by respondents with higher educational attainment, while the least powerful by respondents with primary educational attainment.

Politicians were regarded as the second most influential group by respondents; a total of 37.1 per cent of them thought that they either influenced the public mind or influenced it very much (although 48 per cent of them thought they did not influence or did not at all influence it). By age, a weak link is detectable between the opinions, that is, the older the age groups we are moving towards are, the more respondents think that politicians significantly influence our opinion on foreign policy issues.

In the case of social networks, the aggregated proportion of those giving the two highest scores was 20.3%, while the proportion of those giving the two lowest scores was 51.6 per cent. Interestingly, those who rated the influence of social networks as high are equally present among 18-29-year-olds, 30-39-year-olds and 40-49-year-olds; a spectacular decrease takes place only in the age groups above 50 years. Consequently, there is no great difference between young adults and middle-aged people regarding the use of social networks and the assessment of their influence (at least not on foreign policy issues). Furthermore, it is also interesting that the opinion on social networks in Hungary was not really affected by current international criticism, according to which social networks have a much more powerful effect on the mechanisms of politics than we thought earlier, and social media is an increasingly important platform for propagating political ideas, providing open space for several negative developments (disinformation, spreading fake news, etc.).6,7 Only 13.2 per cent of respondents regard the influential power of blogs as significant, and 57.5 per cent of them regard it as completely insignificant. There are slight differences in this respect by age (the age group of 18-39-year-olds attributes greater influential power to blogs than the older ones do) and by educational attainment (people with higher educational attainment gave higher scores to blogs than those with primary educational attainment).

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5. How familiar are you with the following media?

Again, the next question was a complex one: respondents had to assess on a scale of one to five how familiar they are with the following media (1 = not at all, 3 = very much): The Economist, BBC, CNN, Russia Today, Al Jazeera, Vice News, Financial Times, The New York Times, Washington Post, Le Monde, CCTV, and whether there are other international media on global politics from which they seek information.

When selecting the media, we aimed at featuring the most popular ones and the ones that are leaders even in just one particular region (e.g. Al Jazeera, CCTV) but have global significance. The list includes long established weekly and daily newspapers, magazines (The Economist, Washington Post, etc.), television channels with global presence (BBC, CNN, etc.), but relatively new players as well (Vice News started its operation in 2013, Russia Today (RT) was launched in 2005), and, of course, today each has also some kind of an online platform or availability.

On the whole, we can say that international media products are less known among the Hungarian population: there was none of the listed items which received the answer â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;not familiar at allâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; from less than 40 per cent of respondents, and in most cases, the proportion of respondents not being familiar tended to be around 50-70 per cent. Furthermore, there were very few media in the case of which the proportion of respondents being familiar or very familiar with them was above 10 per cent.

No remarkable differences can be detected between familiarity with print media and that of television channels: fundamentally, in terms of television broadcasters, the ones being present for a longer time are more known, but the same does not apply to press products, as they include both relatively known and less known ones.

For the evaluation of results, we put the different media into categories, and hereinafter we will refer to these three categories so established: 1 L ong established printed press, including The Economist, the Financial Times, The New York Times, the Washington Post and French Le Monde. All products

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also have online availability, thus some of their content (with or without subscription) is available on the Internet, too. On the one hand, based on their long history, we could assume that these papers are relatively more known, but regarding the fact how rapidly the share of printed press itself decreases in content consumption, very high scores cannot be expected.

Compared to the other categories, however, there are some papers achieving relatively high scores: some 14 per cent (13.8%) of the population is familiar with or very familiar with The New York Times, and almost 11 per cent (10.9%) are familiar with the Washington Post. The Financial Times is less known, only 9.3 per cent said they were familiar or very familiar with it, 6 per cent of them were familiar with Le Monde, and quite surprisingly, The Economist takes last place in this category, hardly 4 per cent of respondents (3.9%) were familiar with it (it is barely more known in Hungary than CCTV, China Central Television or Vice News, a news channel established in 2013).

2 Global news channels: two elements, BBC and CNN, were put in this category (in addition, the former one is rather an odd-one-out, because the British Broadcasting Corporation is involved in many other things beyond news broadcasts, but it was put in this category as its news reporting principles represent an international standard). As they are long established broadcasters, which are available in Hungary for a relatively long time, it is not surprising that these two channels received the highest scores of all media: almost a quarter of respondents were familiar with CNN (18.9 per cent was familiar or very familiar with it), and 17.6 per cent of them were familiar with BBC. Furthermore, these two channels were the ones with which the smallest proportion of respondents, roughly 40 per cent of them, were not familiar, while the number of those who were not familiar at all with the given media was 50-70 per cent in all the other cases.

3 Regional/new media: Quatar-based news channel Al Jazeera, Russian Russia Today, Chinese CCTV, and the news channel Vice News, launched most recently in 2013, were put in the third category. The media of this category on average reached even lower scores than the others, and the least known elements are also included here. The relatively most known member of

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 1. General awareness of foreign policy

this category is Al Jazeera (5 per cent are rather familiar or very familiar with it), followed by Vice News with 3.6 per cent, CCTV is known to some extent by 3.2 per cent, and Russia Today is known by 3 per cent (the latter one could have been misleading, as it had

changed its name to RT, thus it could become more difficult for the Hungarian audience to identify it). In the case of all four channels, the proportion of respondents who had never heard of them was above 70 per cent.

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6. How much do you think changes in world politics affect your everyday life?

Answers given to this question can be evaluated the best when compared to the answers of the eighth question where the survey enquired about specific events. However, comparing the results to being informed of external events (question 1) also seems quite appropriate. We presumed that those who did not considered themselves informed perceived an effect on their everyday life to a lesser extent, while those who were more informed, possibly felt external events exerting a greater effect on their lives. The question itself, however, is not exact, and consequently it is rather subjective how respondents interpret the extent to which given events affect their lives.

Answers given to this question produced rather identical proportions: the proportions of respondents who think external events do not at all affect their everyday life, those who think external events rather do not affect their everyday life , those who think external events both do and do not affect their everyday life and those who think external events rather affect their everyday life were all about twenty per cent (21.6%, 23.4%, 24% and 21.1% respectively). Only the proportion of respondents perceiving a significant effect differs substantially, there are only 5.3 per cent of them (4.6 per cent could not or did not want to answer the question). Opinions on this matter are distributed roughly evenly, but there are only very few people who experience a very big effect on their everyday life through world political events. All this can be related to the fact that both the media and daily politics primarily deal with domestic policy issues, therefore we tend to forget about the dependence Hungary

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has on the actors of world politics due to its size and situation (as it has always been the case all through its history).

The answers given to the eighth question included three specific events the results of which in the same category (highest score) were outstanding: a much higher proportion of the adult population feels that a great effect was exerted on their lives by Western European terrorist attacks (13.1%), the migration crisis (17.5%) and the world crisis in 2008 (26.9%). They are two, three and five times more than the answers given to the sixth question in the same category (the answers could be rated on a scale of one to five in both cases). In the case of terrorist attacks and the migration crisis, the communication of the domestic policy may play a role in high scores as it is hard to imagine that the life of the Hungarian population is actually affected by these events to such an extent; the world economic crisis, however, might mean real involvement as it could have far-reaching consequences, and it is a much longer running process.

Looking at the distribution by age groups, we can see that younger age groups (18-39-year-olds) feel the effects of events on their everyday lives to a lesser extent, and the majority of older people (40+ years) feel a great influence, but also the majority of them think that the events have no or just little effect on their lives (obviously, the proportion of those giving the middle score is lower).

In this question, no patterns can be detected among answers either by educational attainment or by types of settlements.

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7. On a scale of 1 to 5 please rate the different countries as to the relationship you think they have with Hungary.

(Germany, United Kingdom, Francie, Italy, USA, China, India, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Austria, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Czech Republic)

The survey also included a question about what people think the tones of Hungary’s foreign relations are, from very hostile to very friendly. The question related to a total of 16 countries, which essentially could be divided into three groups: 1 Surrounding countries, such as Austria, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Czech Republic; 2 Major economies in Europe: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy; 3 Regionally or globally prominent geopolitical actors: USA, China, India, Japan, Russia, Turkey.

The answers given by most respondents were ‘both hostile and not hostile’ (3), and ‘rather friendly’ (4); with the exception of two countries, the modus8 of answers always fell into the ‘rather friendly’ category. The two exceptions are Romania and Ukraine, where the ‘both hostile and not hostile’ option was chosen by the most respondents, thus these two countries are viewed the most negatively by the population.

In the opinion of the adult population, Hungary has the friendliest relationship with Poland of all the countries included in the survey; their relationship is outstanding, as it is considered very friendly by one-fifth of respondents, and rather friendly by 45 per cent. The underlying reason for this result is the image of a thousand-year old friendship, which is still vivid among the population and has been also commemorated by an official holiday established by a resolution adopted by the Hungarian Parliament

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and the Polish Sejm in 2007: 23rd March is the day of Hungarian-Polish Friendship.

The middle of the pack – from which Poland, receiving the highest score, and the two tail-enders (Ukraine és Romania) are well separated – is rather populous. If we combine the ‘rather friendly’ and ‘very friendly’ answers given to the specific countries, the differences between them are marginal, but they can be grouped along natural breaking points. Keeping this in view, the middle of the pack is like this: Austria (51.6%), Czech Republic (51.4%), Japan (48.9%), Italy (47.9%), United Kingdom (47.7%), Russia (47.7%), Germany (46.8%) and China (46.6%) lagged a bit behind Poland, but still received high scores (the proportion of respondents who thought these countries were rather friendly or very friendly was above 45 per cent). Thus, in this score category all three groups of countries were represented: surrounding countries – in this case, (direct or indirect) Western neighbours –, major economies in Europe – Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom–, and more distant, but economically and politically important geopolitical actors such as China, Japan and Russia.

The last but one place of Germany – which is Hungary’s number one economic partner, and the relationship with it is of strategic importance –within the bloc reflects a relatively unfavourable view, which can be evaluated as the result of a declining tendency. Beyond earlier historical relationships, the base of the current German-Hungarian political relationship is constituted by the opening of borders in 1989, which enabled the citizens of the DRG staying in Hungary

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 1. General awareness of foreign policy

to flee to the West. In addition to a friendly political relationship, economic relationships have been also enhanced since the regime change: according to the Central Statistical Office of Hungary, today, Hungary conducts a quarter of its external trade with Germany. Despite this, the underlying reasons for this more neutral, slightly positive perception may be the differences of opinion, disagreements between the two countries, which are related to the events taking place in the Hungarian domestic policy in recent years.

Within the bloc, China’s last place can be explained by the fact that it is a new, and increasingly emphatic actor of Hungary's foreign political and economic relations. In the light of economic opportunities offered by the country, this is supposedly a positive tendency: as a previously “unknown” actor enters the stage, it is viewed relatively favourably, and it is expected to increase in the future. Time will prove it right or wrong.

There are three “lagging” countries in the middle of the pack, about which 40 per cent of respondents said that they were rather friendly or very friendly– that is, they can be regarded as “viewed neutrally”.

These countries, in descending order, are Slovakia (40.5%), the United States (40.4%) and France (39.3%). Regarding groups of countries, this category is not homogeneous, either, as it contains a global geopolitical actor, a neighbouring country and a major European national economy as well.

The most negatively viewed part of the middle of the range (regarded by roughly 35% of respond-

ents as a friendly or very friendly country) consists of two countries: India (36.2%) and Turkey (34.8%).

This is the first more homogeneous group, as both of its members are regional powers.

India’s place is attributable to the lack of familiarity with and information about it, as respondents gave the answer ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ at the highest rate – 27.5 per cent of respondents – in the case of this country. In the case of Turkey, this can play only a partial role–the rate of the ‘I cannot/do not want to answer’ option (21.6%) just slightly differs from Japan’s (20.7%), which is viewed much more positively. External events presenting the country to the public in a more negative light – the attempted coup d'état in Turkey and subsequent clean-up or tensing EU–Turkey relations due to the migration crisis –may be major influential factors.

The other homogeneous group consists of the tailenders, who are viewed far less positively than the other members, that is, respondents think Hungary’s relations with them are the least friendly: Ukraine and Romania, our two Eastern neighbours. The proportion of those who think they are hostile or very hostile is above 20% in the case of both countries; this rate is below or about 15 per cent in the case of any other countries (the third country considered ‘most hostile’ is Slovakia: 15.3 per cent of respondents think it is rather hostile or very hostile). The background to this may be the memory of the Treaty of Trianon signed in 1920, the majority-minority conflicts flaring up ever since and measures negatively affecting the diaspora living abroad.

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8. How do you assess various world events, what impact did they have on your life?

(Arab Spring, global crisis in 2008, Russia-Ukraine conflict, terrorist attacks in Western Europe, Trump’s election as president, migration crisis, Brexit) In the eighth question, respondents had to answer as to what influence they thought various (a total of seven) external events had on their lives (1 = it had no impact 5 = it had a big impact).

felt the impact of the crisis significant or very significant), while moving away from them in age (either into the direction of younger ones or older ones) proportions decrease.

First, we evaluate the results on the basis of the median (the “middle” value) of answers given. The highest median value was given to the global crisis in 2008 (4), thus it had the biggest impact on the lives of respondents. Migration crisis, terrorist attacks in Western Europe, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Brexit received a median value of three (it both had an impact and had no impact). Trump’s election as president and the Arab Spring were given a median value of only two; these two events were felt the least decisive by respondents.

Interestingly, these results are not in line with the survey results conducted by the Central Statistical Office about the effects of the global economic crisis on the labour market, which also reveals the age groups of people who lost their jobs due to the crisis. On this basis, among people who had lost their jobs by 2009, the proportion of the age group of 40-49-year-olds was “only” 22.4 per cent, while the age groups of 30-39 and the 18-29-year-olds accounted for higher proportions, 28.7 per cent and 28.3 per cent respectively.

We can detect a certain link to geographical distance: the closer an event was (which might result in a direct concern), the higher median value was usually given. In relation to the last two events, cognitive distance, that is the image that people create in their minds about how far the location of these events are, is much better reflected than geographical one. Hungarian people consider the United States, as part of the Western culture, closer than the Middle East or North Africa.

The answers refer to the labour market prospects peculiar to age. For the youngest age group, (further) participation in higher education might mean a temporary solution in an unfavourable economic environment. People in the age group of 30-39-yearolds still count as relatively young employees, but they have considerable work experience to easily re-join the labour market after any period of unemployment generated by the crisis. For the 60+ age group, proximity to retirement could raise hopes, even in an unfavourable situation. These may be the reasons why the lives of these three age groups, the answers suggest, were less influenced by the global economic crisis than those of 40-49-year-olds, for whom both participation in the educational system and retirement are already/still distant.

People think that the global crisis in 2008 was the most decisive: it rather had an impact on the lives of more than a quarter of them (27%), and it had a big impact on almost an equal proportion of them (26.9%). Both genders agreed upon this: men responded to the two options above at a higher rate, but there is only a slight difference compared to women’s answers.

There are more significant differences, however, if we examine respondents by age. The global economic crisis had the biggest impact on the age group of 40-49-year-olds (more than 60 per cent of them

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In the respondents’ opinion, of the events listed, the migrant crisis had the second biggest impact on their lives (more than 40% answered that the migrant crisis rather had an impact or had a big impact on their lives). Today, the refugee issue is a central topic in the media and its opinion-forming power is also considerable. There was a difference between respond-

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 1. General awareness of foreign policy

ents regarding educational attainment: people with primary educational attainment were the least influenced (it had no impact at all or just a slight impact on one-third of them), it had a medium impact of those whose highest educational attainment is secondary (it had no impact at all or just a slight impact on 26% of them, and it rather had an impact or a big impact on 45% of them), and respondents with higher educational attainment were influenced the most (more than half of them – 51.1 per cent– answered that this process rather had had an impact or a big impact on their lives).

The reason for this may lie in the people’s awareness of foreign policy issues, which is directly proportional to educational attainment: 6.4 per cent of respondents with primary educational attainment considered themselves informed, or very informed of the subject, in the case of respondents with secondary educational attainment, this rate was 11 per cent,

and of respondents with higher educational attainment, it was 19.7 per cent.

The impact of all the other events was felt to a greater extent by roughly 20 per cent of respondents (the combined proportion of answers ‘it rather had an impact’ and ‘it had a big impact’), which reflects their indirect impact on Hungary. In this respect, the lowest values were given to the Arab Spring, hardly 15% felt the impact of this event, and the proportion of those who could not / did not want to answer was also outstandingly high: more than one-fifth of respondents marked this answer.

Regarding the distribution of respondents, we can conclude that the proportion of those who perceived the impact of specific events on their lives as more significant parallelly increases with the level of educational attainment, which is likely to be related to their general awareness of foreign affairs mentioned earlier.

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9. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate how well you know the following persons.

(Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Robert Fico*, Xi Jinping, Recep Erdoğan, Theresa May, Narendra Modi) A question closely related to the characteristics of foreign relations was how well respondents knew the listed – a total of 9 – heads of state and government. Their figure may fundamentally influence the opinion about the country that they lead, therefore also its relations to Hungary. The political leaders included here are partly overlapping with the countries listed in question 7: there is a leader of a neighbouring country (Robert Fico), the leaders of major European economies (Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Marcon, Theresa May), and heads of such states that are regionally/globally major geopolitical powers (Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Recep Erdoğan, Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi).

Two leaders of two European countries are in the middle range: Robert Fico (the prime minister of Slovakia, with 28.2 per cent) and Theresa May (the prime minister of the United Kingdom, with 22.8 per cent). In their case, geographical distance (vicinity) is definitely an important explanatory power, which is further strengthened by a regional economic position in the case of the United Kingdom.

On the basis of the results obtained, heads of state and government can be divided into three groups. In a descending order, the most known ones – based on the aggregated proportion of respondents giving ‘known’ and ‘very well known’ – include: Vladimir Putin (53.9%), Angela Merkel (53.9%) and Donald Trump (44.2%).

Fundamentally, their result can be attributable to two things. One of these is how known the country that they lead is. In this case, there are two major global geopolitical actors (USA, Russia), and an economy which is significant from a European perspective, i.e. Germany.

Thus all three states are often on the news, and there is a strong possibility that their heads of state are also known among respondents.

The least known heads of state and government can be divided into two subgroups. The first group includes Emmanuel Macron (the aggregated proportion of respondents knowing him or knowing him very well is 15.3 per cent) and Recep Erdoğan (13.5%). Macron’s place can be explained by his relatively recent appointment, as he has been fulfilling the presidential position of France since May, 2017, that is, he is a relatively new actor in the political news. In Erdoğan’s case, the low level of familiarity can be explained by the foreign political weight of the country led by him, as viewed from a Hungarian perspective, and not by his the term of office. Turkey is a major power but not a global one and is outside the EU; thus it is regularly but not frequently in the news.

Another important factor is the length of the term of office of specific persons, which is parallel to their ranking according to how well known they are. Vladimir Putin was head of state from 2000 to 2008, he was Russia’s prime minister during the cycle commencing in 2008, and he has been the president of the country again since 2012. Angela Merkel has been Chancellor of Germany since 2005, being the second best known head of state in the Hungarian public opinion. Donald Trump ranks “only” number 3, which might be explained by the length of his term, as the businessman had held

The second subgroup of tail-enders include the leaders of two Asian countries, China and India: Xi Jinping (5.4%) and Narendra Modi (4.9%). Although they lead important countries of the world economy, they do not have such influence (which, in the present situation, is an equivalent of familiarity) as, for example, the United States does, and are not so much in the forefront of the Hungarian foreign policy as European states are. In China’s case, familiarity is expected to increase in the future, due to the One Belt, One Road initiative, through which its relations to Hungary will strengthen.

* Slovakia’s Prime Minister at the time of the survey

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no political office before his inauguration in 2017. But, as he is the President of the Unites States, it is fair to assume that he is known enough to be in the forefront.

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 1. General awareness of foreign policy

10. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the extent of the effect you think these persons exert on Hungary.

(Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Robert Fico*, Xi Jinping, Recep Erdoğan, Theresa May, Narendra Modi) The question following the familiarity with the heads of state and government was the extent of the effect these persons exert on our country, again, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = he/she exerts no effect at all, 5 =he/she exerts a powerful effect. There was only one change to the ranking connected to question 9 (On a scale of 1 to 5, how well do you know the following persons?): British prime minister Theresa May moved up to fourth place, while Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico fell to fifth place. Thus, the familiarity with a given head of state/government strongly correlates with the extent of their effect exerted on Hungary.

For the sake of simplicity, the results are analysed on the basis of the aggregated proportion of respondents giving positive answers (rather exerts an effect, exerts a powerful effect). On the basis of answers, Russian head of state Vladimir Putin (66.6%) and Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel (63%) stand out in this group. In Vladimir Putin’s case, there were no considerable differences between respondents by gender, age, educational attainment or type of settlement. That is, the two most influential heads of state are Hungary’s neighbours geographically: they are major European actors from an economic and political point of view.

In a descending order, the mid-range is composed of Trump (46.1%), Fico (31.6%), Theresa May (30.2%) and Macron (27.7%), who, although do not exert such an effect of Hungary as the head of state of the Eastern European major power or one of the most robust economies of the European Union does, have considerable influence (but it is worth mentioning that with

the exception of Trump, in the case of the other three leaders about a quarter of respondents marked the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option, that is, the share of uncertain respondents is relatively high).

The geographical context is more diversified here: in addition to European heads of state and government, the USA as a geopolitical major power is also represented in the group, which is able to exert a considerable effect on our country despite its geographical distance.

The population thinks that the least influential leaders include Recep Erdoğan (20.9%), the prime minister of Turkey, Xi Jinping (20.9%), president of the People’s Republic of China and Narendra Modi (12.1%), the prime minister of India. Seeing the results of the question related to familiarity, this ranking is not surprising, as the extent of the influence of less known figures is also less certain for the public. (This is also reflected by the proportion of respondents selecting the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option at question 10, which was 23 per cent in Erdoğan’s case, 30.5 per cent in Xi’s and 32.9% in Modi’s.)

Another factor lying in the background of the result may be the fact that the United States, having a globally dominant geopolitical position, was able to bridge vast geographical distances – that is, respondents thought it could exert a considerable effect on Hungary apart from its neighbours, from overseas –, in the case of Asian countries, however, we cannot speak about such a geopolitical weight; here geographical distance limits the scope for exerting influence.

* Slovakia’s Prime Minister at the time of the survey

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PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS WHO KNOW THE INDIVIDUAL LEADERS* *

by combing the responses “Very well-known” and “Rather known”

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GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 1. General awareness of foreign policy

11. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate how likeable you find the following persons.

(Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Robert Fico*, Xi Jinping, Recep Erdoğan, Theresa May, Narendra Modi) Another interesting question to examine related to the leaders of countries is personal sympathy, that is, how likeable respondents consider the previously examined 9 leaders – Trump, Putin, Merkel, Macron, Fico, Xi, Erdogan, May and Modi. The results of this question are definitely worth comparison with the answers related to the familiarity with heads of state and government (question 9) and the tone of Hungary’s foreign relations (question 7).

The relatively small proportion of respondents giving absolutely positive answers reveals that no head of state or government can expect immense popularity among the Hungarian public. In the context of other possible answers, it can be attributed to various reasons in the case of specific leaders: in some cases, due to a higher proportion of negative answers (not likeable at all, rather not likeable), while in other cases due to the lack of familiarity.

likeable, and the proportion of non-sympathisers was hardly higher. In the case of all other politicians, the proportion of non-sympathisers was always much higher than that of sympathisers; in many cases, differences were double or even five-fold. For example, it does not matter that Russian head of state Vladimir Putin is found likeable by almost as many respondents as Theresa May is (Putin by 19.8 per cent, Theresa May by 22.2 per cent) if the proportion of Putin’s non-sympathisers is 40.7 per cent (in May’s case it was only 23.6 per cent).

French President Emmanuel Macron is found unlikeable by roughly twice as many people as he is found likeable by (the rate is 29.5 per cent vs. 15.3 per cent), being more or less in the middle of the pack – the proportion of his sympathisers is not particularly high, but that of his non-sympathisers is not particularly high, either.

Defining sympathy is not an easy task, as considering average values just “level out” positive and negative opinions, and therefore, it is less suitable for illustrating extremes. However, the total proportion of sympathisers and non-sympathisers does not provide a full picture, either; therefore, their further analysis was based on their comparison. Thus, we evaluated sympathy as a proportion of respondents who find a given politician very likeable or rather likeable, and very unlikeable and rather unlikeable.

By contrast, the proportion of sympathisers is roughly the same in the case of US President Donald Trump, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel (15.9 and 17.7 per cent respectively), but the proportion of non-sympathisers is considerably higher: in Trump’s case, it is almost a half of respondents (48.3%), which was the highest proportion regarding all politicians, while in Merkel’s case it was 46 per cent, which is the second highest figure. Thus, they are the politicians who were found not likeable by the highest proportion of respondents.

On this basis, according to the Hungarian public opinion, Theresa May is the most popular political leader, who succeeded David Cameron – also a Conservative – as UK prime minister after he had resigned following the Brexit memorandum: in total, more than one-quarter of respondents found her very likeable or rather

The proportion of non-sympathisers is rather high in Slovakia’s prime minister, Robert Fico’s case, too (still in office at the time of the survey), some 43.3 per cent (the third highest rate), and the proportion of his sympathisers is also relatively low, hardly more than ten per cent (10.1 per cent).

* Slovakia’s Prime Minister at the time of the survey

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A separate group of the list comprise Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, Recep Erdoğan, Turkey’s head of government, and Xi Jinping, Secretary General of the People’s Republic of China; in their case, the proportion of those who could not or did not want to answer was considerably high, around 30-40 per cent. In their case, the comparison between the proportions of sympathisers and non-sympathisers is particularly interesting, as neither proportion in itself reveals too much

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(just because of the high proportion of respondents who did not answer). From this viewpoint, Recep Erdoğan has the poorest ratings: more than five times more respondents find him not likeable than likeable (there is a 37.1 per cent – 7.1 per cent gap). Xi Jinping was found not likeable by slightly four times more respondents, and Narendra Modi by slightly twice as many respondents (and he was the most likeable of the three politicians in total, 9.3 per cent of respondents were his sympathisers).

LIKEABILITY – AVERAGE VALUES (full sample)

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2.

perception of the hungarian foreign policy In addition to general foreign policy awareness, the second group of questions (questions 12-17) specifically assessed the knowledge of the Hungarian foreign policy guidelines and the Hungarian population’s attitude towards these guidelines, where the centres of gravity are, what is considered as the most important field by the population, and what relation it has, in a given case, with actual policy guidelines. The answers may also provide some additional information to developing a foreign policy strategy in the future.

The questions cover the relationships between Hungary and various foreign organisations (European Union, the Visegrad Four, NATO, etc.), and how their importance is perceived. We also focussed on how our policy on the diaspora is perceived, and what effect the Hungarian population thinks Hungary can exert on specific events and processes taking place in the world.

The following main results were obtained from the answers given: – The people marked the opportunity generating the most evident results, i.e. revitalising economic and trade relations, as the most important goal of Hungary’s foreign policy. At the same question,

cross-border relations with Hungarian minorities take only the last but one place in the order of importance.

– Brussels is considered to be our most important diplomatic relation, overtaking Washington and Berlin.

– Now it is logical that the European Union was ranked number one of the international integrations, way ahead of the NATO or the Visegrad Group.

– There are almost four times more people who feel the role of NATO important in Hungary’s defence policy than those who do not feel it important.

However, only a quarter of the population would send soldiers onto missions abroad, and almost two-thirds of them would not.

– As regards events/processes directly concerning our country (migration crisis, neighbourhood policy), respondents think that the influence of Hungary’s foreign policy on events is significant; but they think so to a much lesser extent about the operations of major integrations (EU, the Visegrad Four).

And when it comes to elusive projects, such as the New Silk Road initiative, they regard the presence of Hungarian influence as even less realistic.

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12. Please place foreign policy goals in order of importance as to the priority you think they should have in Hungary’s foreign policy.

The first question of the second block of questions seeks to identify what is considered to be the most important foreign policy goal for Hungary by the adult population. The respondents had to put five pre-defined possible answers in order. The five possible answers are: – economy and trade: economic situation, productivity, welfare indicators are a central thematic group in domestic policy discourse, and because of the influence of external factors they must be given great emphasis in foreign policy as well. The question remains whether this is evaluated similarly by the population.

– defence policy: protecting the external borders of the country is a traditional field of our foreign policy. In this regard, Hungary is in a special situation: as it is a member of the Schengen Area, permanent border control has been abolished for its neighbours belonging to the Schengen Area (Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia), but it has been strengthened for other countries (and a relaxation of border checks is applied for Croatia and Romania, which are also EU Member States, but are not members of the Schengen Area). It is a question what importance is attached to the defence policy by the population.

– cross-border relations with Hungarian minorities: on the one hand, the situation of Hungarians living outside Hungary is a recurring issue of the domestic policy (referendum in 2004, facilitation of dual citizenship in 2010, etc.), and, on the other hand, it is also an important focus area of foreign policy aspirations.

This issue divides the Hungarian population, which is likely to influence how its importance is perceived.

– enhancing Hungary’s international prestige: enhancing the international recognition of our country must be a key political factor, because, among others, it

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affects foreign economy and trade. However, what is decisive on the level of politics might not be perceived similarly by the people; we assume that this conceptual question is less visible to ordinary citizens.

– Influence on the events of the world through international diplomacy: Hungary is small country, with rather limited resources, also having a peripheral position within the European Union, and we have almost always belonged to the attraction zone of a major power throughout history. Accordingly, having a say in the events of the world also seems a consideration of secondary importance.

The answers formed the following ranking (the average value of answers next to it; the lower the value is, the better place the given element has taken):

Foreign policy goals

average value

Economy and trade

2.30

Defence policy

2.75

Enhancing Hungary’s international 2.97 prestige Cross-border relations with 3.36 Hungarian minorities Influence on the events of the world through international 3.62 diplomacy Respondents think that our most important foreign policy goal is developing economic and trade relations: more than one-third of them (36%) put it in first place, and 28.5 per cent in second. In the order of importance, defence policy is next: more than 45 per cent of them ranked it number one or two. This is not a surprising result; although no border threats are posed to our country, border protection is a traditionally important task,

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 2. Perception of the Hungarian foreign policy

and also due to the situation generated by the refugee crisis this topic has been given more emphasis recently.

On the whole, two-thirds of respondents putting the element ‘enhancing Hungary’s international prestige’ in second, third or fourth place in a roughly equal proportion (20%), resulting in its third place on an aggregate basis. The fact that this category is so important relatively may be contributable to Hungary’s international reputation being more negative in many cases recently, and improving it would be an important task.

Maintaining cross-border relations with Hungarian minorities is not given particular priority by respondents, which might be explained by the complex view on this topic, already discussed above (and by the fact that the case of Hungarians living abroad has often got into the crossfire of domestic political battles).

The need for having a say in the world’s events is placed last; since it had been assumed to be a less emphatic area, the result meets expectations.

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13. Please put the foreign diplomatic missions into order of importance as to how important you think these missions are for Hungarian diplomacy.

(Brussels, Washington, Berlin, Moscow, Beijing) The next question basically measures the strength of our relationships with global major powers, i.e. four countries – the United States, Russia, China and Germany –, as well as our relationship with the European Union. In this respect there is a strong link between the answers given to the seventh question and this question, but the way the questions are posed is different, because respondents could give equal scores to countries at the former question, but here they had no choice but to put them in order.

Three groups can be clearly distinguished based on the scores.

Washington, Berlin and Moscow take place in the second group. Their results differ only in hundredths, thus these three cities can be handled in the same way (they might as well “share second place”). All three of them are equally important for Hungary but for different reasons: Washington is the capital of the USA, a global power that can be still regarded as the only hegemon in the world, with which we should align, and from a military perspective, our NATO membership is an important link. Berlin takes a prominent place due to traditionally strong German-Hungarian relations (despite the fact that this relationship has deteriorated a bit lately), and as our most important economic partner. Moscow still takes a relatively important position in Hungary’s diplomatic relations (and in the public mind), presumably due to the recent Eastern Opening policy.

The first “group” consists of Brussels, the “capital” of the European Union alone, which has been the target of political communication attacks for a long time, still, the population considers it to be our most important foreign diplomatic mission. In

Beijing ranks last, significantly lagging behind (almost 45% of respondents ranked the importance of our representation in China last, and more than two-thirds of them put it into the last two places). It is not a surprising result for several reasons:

The ‘order of diplomatic importance’ is as follows (the average score is put next to the names of cities, where a low score means high priority):

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this regard, the result is surprising; but it is not surprising at all if we regard the fact that the regulations and – to an even greater extent – the funds of the European Union affect everyone in some form, irrespective of place of residence, age, gender or even educational attainment, thus it is logical that the centre of the European Union is perceived as the most important place, where Hungary must be represented.

Diplomatic mission

average score

Brussels

2.22

Washington

2.93

Berlin

2.94

Moscow

2.99

Beijing

3.92

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 2. Perception of the Hungarian foreign policy

China is a distant country geographically, culturally and historically as well, and has never played a significant role in Hungaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s foreign relations. However, it may change in the future, and it might be

interesting to compare the present figure to the figures of coming years, which may demonstrate how efficiently (or inefficiently) Sino-Hungarian relations will be built.

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14. Please put the following alliances in order of importance as to the priority you think they should have in Hungary’s foreign policy.

(European Union, Visegrad Group., NATO, Eurasian Economic Union) With the next question we wanted to find out how the Hungarian population evaluates our participation is specific transnational cooperations, and our involvement in these.

European Union: Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, and participation in the integration has largely determined social, economic and political processes in Hungary ever since. The opinion about the European Union is constantly changing, this topic is extremely complex (our survey dedicated a separate block of questions to examining the EU, which can be found in the next chapter); in the future, it will be worth following up how it changes over time. Since 2008, the operation of the Union has been determined by the spill-over of the global economic crisis, the Euro crisis, the prolonged crisis of southern Member States, the intensification of separatist aspirations within the states, and Brexit; furthermore, Hungary has to agree upon several disputed issues with Brussels. Nonetheless, it is very likely that on the basis of the answers, the European Union will take first place, just like Brussel was in the previous question.

NATO: Hungary has been a NATO member together with the Czech Republic and Poland since 1999. At present, the most important (and the nearest) NATO mission is operated in Kosovo9, and our soldiers are also present in Iraq within the framework of NATO activities10. Our participation in the military alliance pervades the everyday lives of people to a lesser extent, but it is likely that their opinion about the importance of the NATO membership will be relatively emphatic as defence and security issues have come to the fore recently.

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Visegrad Group: the Visegrad Group (Visegrad Cooperation, the Visegrad Four, V4) is a regional organisation of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, the aim of which is to collectively represent the economic, diplomatic and political interests of participating countries, and to align their political and other activities. The cooperation was renewed in 1991, and its declared goals include efforts to align the foreign and defence policies of its member states. The V4 countries are bound together by a shared Eastern-Central European identity and historical experiences, but the interests of specific countries differ in several aspects, therefore it is rather difficult to pursue a meaningful cooperation, and this might affect the opinion formed about the importance of the cooperation.

In the case of the Eurasian Economic Union, some supplementary information was also attached to the survey: ‘An integrational community launched under Russia’s leadership in 2015, including former Soviet member countries (Current members are: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan).’ Thus, this integration is not related to Hungary in any form, furthermore, it is a relatively new initiative, therefore it is likely to be less known for these reasons alone. Its significance is also minor, because although Hungary announced the Eastern Opening policy, our economic activity towards these countries is still rather low. It can be a question for further examination as to whether the perception of the importance of the Eurasian Economic Union will improve over time or not.

The answers received are summarised in the table below (the lower the average score is, the higher the importance of a particular organisation is):

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 2. Perception of the Hungarian foreign policy

Name

average score

European Union

1.90

NATO

2.46

Visegrad Group

2.55

Eurasian Economic Union

3.09

The ranking completely matched previous expectations. Most of the respondents, almost half of them (47.5%) put the European Union, as the most important organisation for Hungary, in first place. The breakdown of answers by age group indicates a trend: the older the age groups were, the less people put the EU in first place (with the exception of the last age group of 60+ yearolds, where this rate is higher again), the EU is regarded as the most important organisation at the highest rate by 18-29-year-olds (52.7%), thus the younger the age group is, the more important the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role is considered.

The same pattern emerges by educational attainment as well: the higher the educational attainment is, the higher the rate at which the EU is ranked number one is (55.2 per cent of respondents with higher educational attainment, while only 42.5 per cent of people with primary educational attainment belong here).

The perception of NATO and the Visegrad Group generated very close results. Although NATO ranked number two, the Visegrad Group was put in first place by more people (NATO was put there by 21.6 per cent and the Visegrad Group was put there by 22 per cent).

The two organisations are very close to each other in terms of aggregated scores, thus it is hard to tell which of them is more important. However, no other patterns can be detected among respondents in any other cases (by gender, age, educational attainment or place of residence).

Finally, the Eurasian Economic Union ranked last (more than 70 per cent of respondents put this integration in third or fourth place), which completely meets previous expectations, in full knowledge of the above explanatory factors. The integration has achieved a slightly more favourable result among 30-39-year-olds (2.97) in terms of age, among respondents with higher educational attainment (2.93) in terms of educational attainment, and among respondents living in Budapest in terms of place of residence (2.90), but the reasons why would require further research.

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15. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the role of NATO in Hungary’s defence policy.

Examining the previous question in more detail, now we enquired about how the role of NATO is perceived. As an EU Member State, our defence policy is greatly shaped by the fact that we participate in the collective foreign and security policy of the European Union11, as a UN member, we take part in various UN missions, furthermore, our participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also affects how our defence policy is developed. In addition to our NATO membership, these organisations play the greatest role on an international level, but the question does not focus on what role the NATO has compared to these, but on the effect it in itself has on Hungary’s defence policy.

In the previous question about the importance of NATO, the results had a large dispersion: NATO was put into all four places in the ranking by more than a quarter of respondents, only second place was more significant, with 32.5 per cent.

There are no remarkable differences between answers received here, either, but we can conclude that in the people’s opinion, the NATO rather fulfils

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an important role in the defence policy of our country. The ‘not important at all’ and the ‘rather not important’ categories included only 14.4 per cent of answers (3.2 per cent and 11.2 per cent respectively), the middle score was selected by a quarter of respondents (20.1%), while the ‘important’ and ‘very important’ categories were selected by more than half of respondents (39 per cent and 16.8 per cent respectively). Overall, we can conclude that the majority thinks that NATO plays an important role in the defence policy of our country.

There is a general male-female difference in this question: a much larger proportion of men feel the role of NATO more important than women (and the proportion of those who gave no reply is half of the women’s). In other regards, however, there are no considerable differences between answers, either by age groups (40-49-year-olds consider the role of NATO slightly more important, but apart from that, there is no significant difference), or educational attainment or types of settlements (here villages contributed higher importance to NATO, but there was no considerable difference between answers).

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 2. Perception of the Hungarian foreign policy

16. Do you agree that Hungary should send soldiers onto foreign missions?

A higher number of Hungarian soldiers took part in two foreign missions in 2017: in Kosovo and in Iraq. In both cases, these were led by NATO. The total headcount of these two sub-units was five hundred.12 Apart from these, Hungary takes a more significant part in UN and EU missions. In 2016, under the auspices of the UN, an average of 77 Hungarian soldiers guarded the status quo in the buffer zone intersecting Cyprus, four people were posted in the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, seven observers took part in the Western Saharan mission, and additional four people helped the operations in the Central African Republic. Within the framework of EU missions, we were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an average of 163 people in 2016, and, with a smaller number of people (less than 10), in Mali, Somalia and Georgia.13 In line with Hungary’s current Nation-

of Hungary’s participation in foreign missions and our interests in participation. Still, the majority of the Hungarian population opposes our participation in military missions.

al Military Strategy, we station a maximum number of one thousand troops in international operations.14

However, no pattern emerges among answers broken down by educational attainment or age groups.

Participation in foreign peacekeeping and peacebuilding services is required to ensure security in Hungary. For example, rectifying the Middle East situation is Hungary’s fundamental interest in order to decrease the number of refugees arriving to Europe from the region.15

On the basis of the types of settlements, foreign missions are by far the least supported in Budapest, only 18 per cent answered yes, and almost a quarter of respondents (24.4%) did not answer the question, so the proportion of respondents not giving a reply was roughly the double of the proportion with any other breakdowns. The other types of settlements, however, produced scores around the average.

Question 17 was a simple yes-or-no question. The objective introduction above outlines the importance

About a quarter of respondents (25.6%) agree with sending soldiers abroad, but almost two-thirds of them (61.1%) do not. The remaining 13.4 per cent of respondents did not answer this question. As it is a military-related question, just like in the case of question 15, a relatively more significant male-female difference can be detected in the answers: some 30 per cent (29.9%) of men agree with foreign missions, while only slightly more than 20 per cent (21.9%) of women do.

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17. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the effect and influence exerted by Hungary’s foreign policy on the following events.

(Migration crisis, EU integration, V4 policy, Chinese New Silk Road project)

In the next question, we listed five events, processes of world politics and global policy guidelines, and respondents were requested to form an opinion about them, and determine what influence was exerted by Hungary’s foreign policy on them (on a scale of one to five, from none to great influence).

- Migration crisis: the migrant crisis and related response measures are most probably the international event that has recently aroused one of the biggest storms in domestic policy. Hungary’s influence on the process, however, is perceived ambivalently: on the one hand, we can obviously exert less influence on root causes (crisis situation of the Middle East region, challenges posed to instable states, climate change, etc.), but we implement important measures in connection with the actual exposure of our country (building a fence, sovereign decision-making, expressing our opinion in the EU, etc.).

- EU integration: recently, the revision of the operation of the European Union, the reconsideration of its basic principles, the topic of the future of the integration and the related scenarios have arisen over and over again. Thus, this question seeks to find out what role the population thinks Hungary has in shaping and influencing the operation of the EU. - V4 policy: The Visegrad Four is a much looser integration than, for instance, the European Union, but, as it includes only four countries, Hungary may have a greater say in shaping common guidelines. The question now is whether the population sees it the same way.

- Chinese New Silk Road project: China’s large-scale infrastructure-economic-trade project encompassing entire Eurasia may also affect our country to a large extent. However, first, this is a completely new concept (it was announced in 2013 by the Chinese pres-

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ident), second, there are still a lot of question marks behind it, third, China is at a significant distance from Hungary and no economic-cultural relations have been formed traditionally between the two countries, thus the assessment of Hungary’s impact on the project is likely to be given a low score.

- Neighbourhood policy: policies related to neighbouring countries, also due to the involvement of our country, are likely to receive high scores. This is a complex question, and the assessment of Hungary’s influential power is also questionable; nevertheless, we assume that neighbourhood policy will be given a high score On the basis of responses, the five events can be put into three groups: 1 Respondents think that we exert the greatest influence on how the migrant crisis develops (based on the proportions of ‘rather exerts influence’ and ‘exerts great influence’ options selected). This probably applies to issues directly concerning Hungary. More than half of respondents (56.2%) thought that Hungary rather exerted influence or exerted great influence on events. The results also reflect the effects of the political communication campaign and the increased media attention directed to the subject.

2 Similarly, respondents considered the influence of Hungarian politics on the neighbourhood policy as significant, here 53.5 per cent of them attributed considerable influence to it. However, while a quarter of them (25.2%) thought that Hungary’s foreign policy exerted great influence on the migration crisis, in the case of the neighbourhood policy less than one-fifth of them (18.2%) thought the same, the answers lean towards middle scores. In further two cases (V4 and EU), results displayed extremely small differences; on the whole, it can be concluded that the Hungarian

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 2. Perception of the Hungarian foreign policy

population perceives that Hungary has the same level of ability to exert influence both on the V4 policy and shaping the EU integration. As regards these two questions, the greatest uncertainty was about the V4 policy: almost one-fifth of respondents (19.5%) did not want to or could not answer this question (the share of respondents giving no reply was above 10% at other questions as well, but it was the highest in connection with the V4 of the elements discussed so far). No remarkable differences can be detected, the middle score and the ‘rather exerts an influence’ answer were selected by most people, but in both cases only 15-16 per cent of respondents think that we exert great influence on any of the processes.

3 Finally, our influence on the New Silk Road project is assessed differently from the rest. Of the five elements, the proportion of uncertain respondents was the largest here, almost one-third of them (31.1%) gave no reply. A quarter of respondents (25.6%) think that we exert no or just minor influence on the course of events in connection with the New Silk Road. A further one-fifth of them (20.9%) takes a neutral stance about this question, and slightly more than a further one-fifth of them (22.5%) think that we exert some influence on events. Obviously, the most question marks arise in connection with this question, but also the most exciting changes are likely to be seen when examining this question in the long term.

I.

II.

III.

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3.

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perception of the european union in hungary After the collapse of the Socialist regime, Hungary (as well as other Central and Eastern European countries) articulated its demand for joining the Western European integration as soon as possible, because the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union until 1993, had guaranteed the reunion of the Europe divided by the iron curtain for four decades, and, as an economic centre of the world, offered excellent opportunities to Hungary’s economy and trade.

Accession – eventually to the European Union – took place in 2004, and in the period elapsed since then, the Union has become a major player in Hungary’s life from economic, social, political and other points of view. For a while, the EU has been experiencing its most severe crisis of its history, hence its operation has been subject to several criticisms, therefore it is especially exciting to examine how the Hungarian public sees the role, the present and the future of the organisation. The following conclusions can be drawn from the answers given to the questions related to this: • The public opinion on the operation of the EU is rather divided (even though there is a high number of neutral answers): according to more than a quarter of respondents, the integration is functioning well, while according to almost a third of them, it is working poorly.

• Brussels, which is regarded as the “capital” of the EU, has all the other functions included in the sur-

vey (economic, cultural, technological/innovation) in addition to the political one, based on the public’s perception. Probably, this is not to be contributed primarily to the diversity of the city, but rather to the fact that the city is identified with the Union due to its “capital city” role.

• The majority of the Hungarian public is pessimistic about the future of the EU, they think the supranational organisation will have been dissolved in twenty years’ time.

• Nevertheless, almost 30% of respondents think that changes to the EU will have no impact on Hungary in 20 years, and practically the same number of people answered that the impact would be positive.

• Public opinion considers financial assistance to be the greatest advantage of Hungary’s EU membership. This indicates that it is obvious for many people that EU funds play an important role in the economy of our country.

• The idea of a joint European army is supported by twice as many respondents as the foreign service of Hungarian soldiers is. The reason behind this difference is the fact that the participation of Hungarian soldiers does not arise explicitly in the case of a joint army.

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18. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the operation of the European Union.

In recent years – especially since the global economic crisis of 2008 – many criticisms have been made about the functioning of the European Union from several sides. The causes could be found in – among others – Germany’s excessive ability to assert its interests, the operational problems of the Eurozone, the economic crisis or the management of the refugee crisis. In addition, for Eurosceptic, nationalist voices, increasingly promoting national interests, the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union has also served as a confirmation. Although Hungary had high hopes for accessing the Community after the regime change, by today sceptic voices have become stronger here as well, not only on behalf of citizens but also the government: confrontation has become significant in its relationship with the EU in recent years.

In this light, we thought it was worth examining what the Hungarian public was thinking about that, therefore with Question 18 we intended to find out how satisfied the Hungarian public is with the Union, how effectively they think the European community works. Scores ranging from 1 to 5 could be given, with 1 meaning very ineffectively, and 5 meaning very effectively.

A significant proportion of respondents could not really assess the operation of the EU, as more than one-third of respondents (35.2%) gave the ‘it works both effectively and ineffectively’ answer (the middle score). If we look at the proportion of the other responses, the scales tilt towards the very slightly negative direction from the neutral one: more than a quarter of respondents (26.6%) gave a score of 2 to the operation of the Union (rather ineffectively) on a scale of 1 to 5, while 21,1% rated it as 4 (rather effectively). Considerably more respondents (5.6%) gave 1 point than 5 (1.9%).

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If we examine respondents from different viewpoints, we can see no considerable differences between opinions. As regards gender, for instance, there is only a difference of some per cents between answers given by women and men in the specific categories (on the whole, less women think that the EU works ineffectively, but also less women think that it works very effectively, and the proportion of female respondents not giving a reply was higher); on the basis of educational attainment there was a great similarity between the results of respondents with secondary educational attainment and those of higher educational attainment – slightly differently, respondents with primary educational attainment perceive the operation of the EU more positively.

In terms of age, we can talk about differences of only a couple of percentage points in the case of shares of specific scores. The greatest difference of opinion evolved around the “Works very effectively” (3 points) option: it was selected at the highest rate (39.7 per cent and 39.8 per cent) by the 30-39 and 50-59 age groups. With the exception of the age group of 18-29-years-olds, the shares of the others were 35 per cent or higher.

The question itself did not specify which segment of the Union’s extensive activity it was about, thus the generalisation is suitable for assessing the overall impression formed about the EU. The results indicate that the public opinion on the operation of the EU is rather neutral; despite the negative political communication campaign against the EU running in the media for years, radical opinions are not widespread.

Thus, such a conclusion can also be drawn that the idea of leaving the European Union as a potential solution to the existing problems about the organisation does not occur to the Hungarian public opinion, as the proportion of benefits roughly equals with that of difficulties.

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 3. Perception of the European Union in Hungary

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19–22 Which city do you think is the political, economic, cultural, technological/innovation centre of the EU? Questions 19 to 22 assessed which cities were considered to have the most political/economic/cultural/technological/innovation functions in the Union.

It was an open-ended question, that is, there were no possible answers given, but respondents had to give their own answers. In the case of all four questions, answers included the capital cities of EU Member States. In addition, new elements were also added at various functions, for example Strasbourg at the question about the political centre – the European Parliament and the European Council have centres here, and the European Court of Human Rights can also be found here.

A great majority of respondents (73.9%) answered that Brussels is the political centre of the Union, which is not a coincidence, as the “capital city” of the EU is home to the seat of several institutions of the community, including the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Committee and The European Parliament. These institutions employ tens of thousands of people: the European Committee alone employs more than twenty thousand people in the Belgian capital.16 Therefore it is not a coincidence that the name of the city is often used as a synonym of the EU in the media.

The ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option had the second largest proportion of answers to the question (10.8%). The proportion of this option was the smallest at this question of the four ones related to cities, which reflects that this was the question that people could answer with most certainty. Berlin ranks number 3, with 7.2 per cent. Its prominent place – despite its small share – is attributable to Germany’s active role in the life of the EU – let us just think about its role taken in managing the Greek crisis. The other cities did not receive considerable numbers of votes, their shares remain usually below 1 per cent.

When examining respondents from different aspects we found that the proportion of respondents

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selecting Brussels increases parallel to the level of educational attainment: Brussels was named as the political centre of the Union by 70.2 per cent of respondents with primary educational attainment, 77 per cent of respondents with secondary educational attainment and 79 per cent of respondents with higher educational attainment.

It is interesting to note that the share of respondents who could not/did not want to answer is expected to be inversely proportional to educational attainment, but results do not confirm this: this option was selected by a smaller proportion of respondents with secondary educational attainment (5.6%) than those with higher educational attainment (7.5%).

But the share of both groups is smaller than that of respondents with primary educational attainment (15.2%).

After Brussels’ political role, the situation was not so clear about the economic centre. Although the Belgian capital received the most votes at this question, too, “only” 44.6 per cent of respondents regard it as the economic centre of the Union, which is 30 percentage points less than the proportion of votes received at the question focussing on the political centre.

Parallelly, the rate of respondents who could not/ did not want to answer almost doubled (to 20.7 per cent). That is, according to the public opinion, Brussels’ economic function is not as obvious as the political one, but it still stands out from the rest.

Berlin, again, ranks number three, but with a higher rate of votes (16.1%), compared to the previous question. This is probably attributable to the fact that it is the capital of Germany, which can be regarded as the economic powerhouse of the EU. The rest of the cities received only a negligible number of votes–their shares of votes remain below 2 per

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 3. Perception of the European Union in Hungary

Which city do you think is the political centre of the EU?

Which city do you think is the [...] centre of the EU?

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cent, with the exception of Amsterdam (4.2%). It is an interesting fact that London, the world’s leading financial services centre17 receives a share of only 1.8 per cent of the answers. This is probably a consequence of Brexit, because of which the public opinion does not regard the British capital as a valid EU city – despite the fact that the exit process has not taken place yet.

The answers to the question what the cultural centre of the Union is outline a more diverse picture. Although Brussels still ranks number one – being the “capital” of the Union, it also holds the title of the cultural centre according to the public –, but its advantage over the other cities decreased: “only” less than one-third of respondents (29.4%) chose the Belgian capital. Furthermore, uncertainty also grew among respondents, as a total of 27.2 per cent selected the ‘I cannot/do not want to answer’ option, making it the answer receiving the second largest number of votes.

Based on the proportion of votes, Paris takes third place, lagging behind the first two finishers by an order of magnitude: the French capital received 9.4 per cent of votes. The picture of the middle of the pack seems more balanced: Paris is followed by Vienna (7.8%), then Berlin (6.8%).

That is, Brussels still dominates the pack in respect of this question as well, but other cities with significant cultural heritage also appear – although lagging behind by an order of magnitude –, and the degree of uncertainty is still high (27.2%). This suggests that the Hungarian public opinion identifies the European Union with Brussels, practically in all aspects. A much smaller proportion of respondents dissociated from the Belgian capital and named Paris, the home of the Louvre and the Sorbonne, or the Austrian capital, earning world fame as the “capital of music”, just to mention a few of countless examples.

The last question about European cities wanted to find out which city is considered to be the technological/innovation centre of the Union. This function was surrounded by the greatest uncertainty, as more than one-third of respondents (34.5%) could not/did not

150

want to answer. The uncertainty can be attributed to the inquired function itself. Previously, questions were about easily identifiable roles – political centre: number of EU institutions; economic centre: it can be expressed by the GDP-generating capacity; cultural centre: number of museums, theatres, architectural monuments, etc.– , but it is harder to capture what the appropriate measure of innovation and technology is. Is it the number of patents, universities, research institutes, high-tech companies?

The great uncertainty also reflects the fact that Europe lags behind on the global scene in terms of technology and innovation: the EU spends less than 2 per cent of its GDP on R&D activities, while Japan spends 3.3 per cent and the United States 2.8 cent.18 This situation is addressed by the EU2020 strategy, which prescribes a minimum 3 per cent share of the GDP to be invested in R&D.19 On the basis of the distribution of answers, Brussels takes only second place (29.3%) – behind the ‘I cannot/do not want to answer’ option – but its result still stands out from the rest. It is followed by Berlin, ranking number 3, with a share of less than half of Brussels’ (11.5%).

Again, the middle of the pack lags considerably behind: cities receiving values around 3 per cent can be classified here, including, in descending order: Amsterdam (3.4%), Budapest (3.2%), Vienna (3.1%) and London (3.0%). The values of other cities mostly remain below 1 per cent.

As regards all the questions about European cities, it can be concluded that Brussels, which is considered as the “capital” of the EU, has all the functions included in the survey (economic, cultural, technological/innovation) in addition to the political one.

Probably, this is not to be contributed primarily to the diversity of the city, but rather to the fact that the city is identified with the Union due to its “capital city” role. Only a small proportion of respondents could dissociate from this, which is reflected by the high proportion of respondents who could not/did not want to answer, and the almost negligible share of other cities.

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 3. Perception of the European Union in Hungary

Which city do you think is the [...] centre of the EU?

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23. How do you imagine the European Union in 20 years?

Today, when the global world order is transforming and the European Union is losing its relative global weight at spectacular speed, the community has to face such challenges as Brexit or the masses of people flooding Europe in the hope of a better life, not to mention internal political tensions over the operation of the EU. Thus, it is an exciting question as to what future people envisage for the integration. (The EU itself is concerned about the expected future of the EU, therefore the Committee assigned 25 chief analysts to investigate the issue, who outlined three scenarios: “Nobody cares”, “EU under threat” and the “An EU Renaissance”.20) The closed question contained five possible answers: • Unchanged; • United States of Europe; • A loose federation; • A highly centralised state;

aging the survival of the EU also implies an unchanged situation, that is, no solutions will be found to problems that would bring about a significant change. Certain challenges tensing the EU internally have been present for decades, such as the issue of the depth of political integration or the boundaries of expansion.21 The Loose federation scenario took third place, with 23 per cent of votes. That is, there is a very small difference – only of 1.6 percentage points – between number two and number three. This answer assumes a step back in terms of political integration, compared to the current situation, which would probably entail a reduction in the roles and functions of institutions.

When examining respondents broken down by different categories, no regularity can be detected here, either, but we should note that the greatest difference of opinion occurs between age groups. There is a difference of more than 10 per cent between the percentage rates of the age groups of 40-49 and 50-59-year-olds: in favour of the former ones, 19.3 per cent and 29.7 cent.

• The EU ceases to exist.

Almost one-third of answers (30.5%) was given to the last option, that is, the majority of the Hungarian public is pessimistic about the future of the EU, they think the supranational organisation will have been dissolved in twenty years’ time. Looking at recent political events, this proportion is not surprising, as both Brexit and the independence memorandum in Catalonia in autumn, 2017 seriously harmed the image of a united EU. The breakdown by age reveals that the proportion of the youngest age group (18-29-year-olds) voting for this scenario was the smallest (22.3%), and the proportion of such 50-59-year-olds was the largest (35.6%).

The answer assuming an unchanged situation in 20 years took second place, as a quarter of respondents (24.6%) selected this option. Thus the answer envis-

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13.8 per cent of answers were given to the vision of the United States of Europe, which took fourth place. The expression itself is associated with Winston Churchill’s name, who delivered a speech in Zurich in 1946, in which he formulated his conclusions drawn from the horrors of World War II, declaring that in order to avoid new conflicts, a supranational organisation of the size of a continent should be created.22 Today, the name most often refers to an integration with a close federation of member states (much closer than the current one), modelled on the United States of America, in which a part of the national autonomy and independence of Member States would vanish. That is, this vision for the future envisages the deepening of political integration.

‘A highly centralised state’ option, which would practically mean the abolishment of the sovereignty of nation states and their merger on a European level, attracted the fewest answers (8.1%).

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24. What effect would the change that you indicated have on Hungary?

Although the answers given to the question above cannot been completely compared with the previous one (thus we do not know if someone envisages a closer integration, it is evaluated as a positive or negative change, and vice versa, if looser cooperation is projected, it is not clear whether it is implemented in Hungary with a negative or a positive sign), but we get the answer about the direction that the operation of the EU is taking and what outcomes are expected for Hungary. The question intends to find out what effects the processes going on in the EU in 20 years, whatever they may be, will have on Hungary.

Most respondents chose the ‘it would have no effect’ and the ‘it would have a positive effect’ options, in almost equal proportions: no effect received 29.3 per cent, and the positive effect received 28.9 per cent. In view of the fact that the European Union has been struggling with various grave problems (Greek debt crisis, Brexit, migrant crisis, ideological differences between Eastern and Western Member States) for 10 years, since the global crisis of 2008, and has not yet found solutions, the first place taken by the ‘no effect’ answer is in line with that conclusion of the survey that the foreign policy awareness of the Hungarian population is low (it is also indicated by the relatively high proportion of respondents selecting the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option [14.6%]). Otherwise, it is hard to imagine that there is such a high number of people who think that the problems of the EU will not affect Hungary, and whatever turn the future of Europe takes, it will have no effect on our country.

Those who gave positive answers – supposing that they also see the EU being in crisis – must think that the continuation of current processes, albeit detrimental to the EU, would be beneficial to our country. There must be some of them who hope for the dissolution of the EU, or the evolvement of a looser integration entailing enhanced sovereignty of Member States. In addition, of course, there might

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be respondents who think that even if the operation of the EU remains unchanged – also including the fact that Hungary will continue to receive high levels of financial assistance and pay much less than that into the EU budget –, it will have a positive effect on our country.

A certain share of respondents obviously agrees with the official Hungarian position on the institutional future of the EU, which disapproves the concept of a two-speed Europe, but (quoting Viktor Orbán) ‘through strengthened cooperation [Hungary is] not opposed to the idea of some countries making more progress than others on some issues’.23 Nonetheless, it cannot be easily identified which answer(s) were influenced by the official position.

20.4 per cent of respondents selected the ‘It would have a negative effect’ answer. Obviously, some of them think that the above-mentioned problems of the EU signal that the EU is going into a wrong direction, and some of them believe, agreeing with the often expressed position of the Hungarian government, that the Union takes away too many functions from Member States, harming their sovereignty.

The very negative option was selected by 5.4 per cent of respondents, and the very positive one was selected by 1.4 per cent of them. The examination of educational attainment reveals that a much greater share of respondents with higher educational attainment is optimistic: 38.5 per cent of them think that the future of the EU will have a positive effect on Hungary, which is a much higher proportion than the proportion of 27.9 per cent of respondents with primary educational attainment or the proportion of 25 per cent of respondents with secondary educational attainment. Much smaller proportions of respondents with higher educational attainment chose the very negative and the very positive options than others did: in the case of the former category, the difference was approximately 4 percentage points compared to

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the average of the other two groups, and regarding the latter category, the proportion of respondents with higher educational attainment was some 8 percentage points lower than the proportion of 20 per cent of respondents with primary educational

attainment and the 26 per cent proportion of respondents with secondary educational attainment.

Respondents with higher educational attainment also have the highest share in the very positive category, with 2.5 per cent.

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25. What do you think the most important benefit of the European Union is for Hungary?

The question focussed on which of the five aspects related to the EU membership and listed below (defence, economy, common currency, global assertion of interests and financial support) is the most important for Hungary. The category of financial assistance was chosen by far by the most respondents (45.2%), which can be explained by the fact that it has been often in the news for years that Hungary has been granted various European Union aids. In addition, various projects have been carried out with the help of Union aids in several settlements, therefore aids have been generally embedded in the public mind to some extent. When analysing the distribution by age groups, respondents can be divided into two groups: one of the groups is consisted of 18-39-year-olds and 60+ year-olds, as the proportion of respondents choosing the above-mentioned category is almost the same among them, between 39 and 43 per cent. The other group contains 40-59-yearolds, among whom this proportion is considerably larger: it is about between 51 and 54 per cent. The reason for this remarkable difference is not clear, and understanding it would require further examinations.

There were significant differences regarding financial aids by types of settlements: while only slightly more than 30 per cent of residents of the capital city consider financial assistance the most important benefit of the European Union, 45 per cent of the residents of towns, and more than 50 per cent of the residents of county seats and villages think so. This can be probably explained by the fact that in Budapest, it is less visible if an infrastructural, touristic or other project is carried out from EU funds, while in other places, especially in county seats and villages these developments are much more â&#x20AC;&#x153;in sightâ&#x20AC;?.

Economy was the second most frequent answer to the question, which, with its proportion of 27.3 per cent, is considerably lagging behind the aspect taking first place, but the difference between it and the category marked as the third most important benefit is also significant: almost 17 percentage points. Interestingly, the above-mentioned remarkable difference by age groups can be detected here as well, but with opposite pro-

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portions: while 18-39-year-olds and 60+ year-olds are represented in a proportion of about 27-32 per cent, this proportion is only about 22-23 per cent among 40-59-year-olds. The survey does not reveal the reason for this difference, either.

However, we should mention the distribution of answers broken down by types of settlements: 30-31 per cent of the residents of Budapest and towns regard economy as the most important, but this proportion is only about 24-25 per cent among the residents of county seats and villages. This might be explained by the fact that more jobs are directly related to the Member States of the European Union in Budapest and other towns, while the rate of such workplaces is lower in other parts of the country, and the relationship between the EU and the Hungarian economy is less obvious.

The other three categories that could be given as an answer to the question (in order of importance set by respondents: defence, global assertion of interests and common currency) finished significantly lagging behind the categories discussed above, but there were only minimal differences between them (all three categories fell between about 8 and 10.5 per cent). As regards defence, the Union has no joint army, so it could not protect Hungary; this might explain the low proportion of respondents selecting this category (10.4%). The majority of the Hungarian population, due to their lack of foreign policy awareness, probably cannot associate any tangible content with the meaning of global assertion of interests, and the last place of the common currency must be explained by the fact that the currency of Hungary is the forint, consequently the common currency does not play a role in the everyday experiences of the population.

It should be highlighted that as regards the question asked, the only category in which there was a significant difference by gender was defence: while 7.2 per cent of men regarded this viewpoint as the most important, this proportion almost doubled and was 13.1 per cent among women. The conclusion that this is dictated by womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s greater need for security is possibly

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not without basis, irrespectively of the fact that the EU has no army (as there is common security and defence policy). The breakdown of respondents by age does not outline any patterns from which conclusions could be drawn about the last three categories.

As for educational attainment, the rate of respondents with secondary educational attainment selecting the common currency was double of the rate of respond-

ents with primary or higher educational attainment. In connection with the importance of defence, the answers point to the conclusion that the higher the educational attainment of a person is, the less important benefit they think this aspect is. This can be perhaps explained by the fact that people with higher educational attainment possibly have greater awareness of the fact that the European Union does not provide military protection for Hungary.

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26. Which 3 of the listed countries do you think should have a place in the European Union?

(Ukraine, Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Albania, Switzerland, Macedonia, Russia) Question 26 was related to the expansion of the Union, in which respondents could choose which of the following countries they wanted to welcome in the EU as a member: Ukraine, Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Albania, Switzerland, Macedonia and Russia. The data were evaluated according to how many per cent of respondents put a given country in any of the first three places. The three countries that would be welcomed the most in the EU by respondents are, in descending order, Switzerland, Serbia and Russia.

Switzerland absolutely takes the lead, almost half of respondents think it should have a place in the EU. Its position is not surprising: it is the only Western European country in the question, where the quality of life is proverbially high (it is supported by the statistics of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), according to which the quality of life in Switzerland exceeds even the average of OECD countries24), and on the basis of per capita GDP, Switzerland is among the first twenty countries of the world.25 Practically, it seems evident that the country should be a Member State of the Union.

Serbia takes second place (some 36.7 per cent would welcome it among EU Member States), lagging behind Switzerland with a considerable difference of nearly ten percentage points. Serbia’s second place can be probably explained by the fact, that, apart from Ukraine, this is the only country in the list which is a neighbour to Hungary. Compared to Ukraine – which ranked number five on the list –, Serbia is “closer” to Hungary in the public mind, because, for example, more Hungarians live in Serbia (according to the 2011 census, 254 thousand28) than in Ukraine (according to 2001 data, 159 thousand27).

Russia takes third place, with a value of 33.6 per cent; the difference between Russia and Serbia is only three percentage points. Russia’s prominent place is somewhat surprising, regarding the fact that its relations with the European Union have dramatically deteriorated in recent years; in addition, the possibility of Russian mili-

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tary aggression has arisen at the north-eastern borders of the Union (which was unconceivable before). This must have been counterbalanced to some extent in the public opinion by the spectacularly closer ties pursued between Hungary and Russia over recent years.

Montenegro took fourth place with 30.1 per cent. The country submitted its application for EU membership in 2008, and has been a candidate country since 2010.

Accession negotiations commenced in 2017, and country will possibly join the integration in 2025.

Turkey’s fifth place is also surprising, and it just finished right behind Montenegro with its value of 29.9% (the difference is only two tenths percentage points, which is statistically negligible). The fact that Turkey expressed its intention to join the European integration years ago, in 1987 and accession negotiations commenced in 200528 probably contributed to this, as it apparently had left its mark on the public mind. In connection with the EU membership of Turkey, we would think that the Muslim religion of the country and its increasing distancing from the ideas and values accepted in the European Union (democracy, freedom of speech, etc.) represent a grave obstacle to its EU membership; nevertheless, possibly due to the economic might of the country, many believe that the country should have a place in the integration. In recent years, Hungary has established a friendlier relationship with Turkey, which could also contribute to the ranking of the country.

Following Turkey, two other countries finished with values over 25 per cent: Ukraine (28%) and Macedonia (25.5%). The countries following them received votes in proportions about or below 20% the most, i.e. this was the proportion of respondents who ranked them among the first three countries. In descending order, they are Moldova (20.5%), Albania (18.7%), Georgia (16.9%), and finally Belarus (14.2%). Fundamentally, countries that have already commenced the accession process in some form and important economic or geopolitical players (Switzerland, Russia) were given more votes.

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27. Please put the countries that are the most important for the operation of the European Union in order of importance.

(Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy) In this question, respondents had to rank the following five countries according to their importance for the operation of the European Union: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy. The five countries listed are the five largest economies and the most populous Member States of the Union29. The countries had to be evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being the most important and 5 being the least important. We analysed the results based on primarily mode, that is the ranking that was given the most votes, and secondarily, on the basis of polarisation of answers (comparison of first and last positions).

An overwhelming majority considers Germany to be the most important country for the operation of the Union: some 55.5 per cent of respondents put the country into first place, while all other states were ranked number one by maximum about 15 per cent of respondents.

The first place of Germany is not surprising, as it is often in the news, which clearly convey that the country is one of the key Member States in terms of economy, politics and culture. Germany generates the greatest share of the Union’s GDP (21.1%30), and the Greek financial crisis, reaching its peak couple of years ago, also clearly demonstrated Germany’s immense economic and financial weight in the EU. The country is also the most populous Member State of the Union: more than 16 per cent of the EU’s total population live here31. In the public mind, Germany's importance must be also enhanced by the fact that it has long been a prominent actor of European history – in the form of various entities –, with some links with Hungarian history. Furthermore, Germany is the most important trading partner of Hungary, which could also contribute to its first place in the ranking.32

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France was put into second place by most respondents (35.2%). The second place of the country can be attributed to the fact that it is often in EU-related news, just like Germany is. This was particularly true in 2017, at the time of the French presidential elections, and after the elections the focus shifted to the “strengthened Franco-German axis”, which has major importance for the reform of the Union. Naturally, the weight of the country prevailing in the economic and other fields is also an important point of view: it has the third largest economy of the Union (contributing to the combined GDP with 15 per cent33), and its population is the second largest within the EU (some 13 per cent of the total population34). Furthermore, its ranking must have been influenced by the fact that – just like Germany – it has long been an important actor of European history.

The opinions on other countries are mixed, and we took other factors in addition to the mode into account when determining the ranking. We put the United Kingdom in third place, because although it takes last place on the basis of mode (30.3 per cent put it here), it is ranked in front of Spain and Italy on the basis of the aggregated rates of the last two places.

In addition, the United Kingdom was ranked number one and number two in a large proportion than the previous two countries were, which also reinforces its third place.

The United Kingdom, just like the two countries discussed so far, is often in the news in relation to the European Union, although practically exclusively in the context of Brexit since summer, 2016. Supposedly, the United Kingdom would have achieved a higher place without the referendum about exiting the European Union, and would have been ranked closer to France than Italy in terms of importance, as opposed to the result of our survey. Its result suggests

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 3. Perception of the European Union in Hungary

that the public opinion does not necessarily regard it as an EU member any more, despite the fact that the exit process has not taken place yet (the country was ranked last by 30.3 per cent, a larger proportion than any other country was; only Spain is close, which was ranked last by 29 per cent). Nonetheless, as regards its economic weight and population, the United Kingdom equals with France: it accounts for 16 per cent of the EU’s GDP35, and it is the third most populous Member State (with a share of 13 per cent36).

Furthermore, its central role played in European and world history – which must have left its mark on the public mind, just like in the case of Germany and France – cannot be neglected.

1 or 2. 52.9 per cent of respondents ranked Italy last but one or last, and 22.4 per cent of them ranked it number one or number two. Spain were put into one of the last places by more respondents (62.5%) and into one of the first ones by less (16.1%), therefore Italy is designated as the fourth most important country, and Spain is the fifth one (although we evaluate them together, as their differences are marginal).

Based on mode, both Italy and France were put into fourth place by most respondents, we differentiated between them according to the combined proportions of respondents ranking them number 4 or 5 and

thermore, in the case of Spain, the share of the population within the EU is also smaller (Italy has some 12 per cent of the Union’s population, Spain has approximately 9 per cent of it38).

The permanently lower ratings of the two Mediterranean states, as opposed to the previous three countries, can be contributable to, among others, their smaller economic weight – especially that of Spain is smaller (Italy accounts for approximately 11 per cent of the EU’s GDP, Spain for 7.5 per cent37); fur-

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28. Which countries are the most important partners of the European Union?

(China, Arab countries, USA, India, Russia, Brazil, Japan, other)

In this question, several countries could be selected in the answer, but during the analysis we examined answers indicating a given category as a share of all answers given (thus the total of all answers adds up to 100). More than half of respondents (26.2%) think that the USA is the most important partner of the European Union, but China is not far behind (23.5%).

Russia takes third place (lagging considerably behind with a share of 17.4 per cent), followed by Japan (12.4%), the Arab countries (9.1%), India (5.2%), Brazil (3.8%), and finally the categories ‘other’ and ‘none of them’ (the combined proportion of these two accounts for 2.4%).

If we compare the answers to the statistics on the trading partners of the European Union, the first couple of countries relatively match: according to the latest data of 201639, the most important trading partners of the European Union include, in order, the USA, China, Switzerland, Russia, Turkey, Japan, Norway, South Korea and India. This means that – if Switzerland and Turkey, which were not included in the question, are not taken into account – the first four finishers of the survey (USA, China, Russia and Japan) are indeed the most important trading partners of the European Union.

Nonetheless, it is not very likely that the majority was aware of this, in view of the low level of foreign policy awareness of the Hungarian population. It has more to do with the fact that the United States, Russia and Japan are traditionally world leaders and have been regularly in the news for decades. As regards Japan we must add that Japan may seem less important politically from a Hungarian perspective (due to its geographical distance, and because Japan is not a major power in a political sense), while the USA and Russia are traditionally regarded as major powers; but, from the viewpoint of the survey, it must have been counterbalanced by the high quality of Japa-

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nese products and technology, well-known also in Hungary for a long time. (In connection with the USA, we must note that its traditionally close ties with Europe, in the defence of which the USA plays a prominent role through NATO, may also contribute to its first place.)

As regards China, it is widely known that the country exports huge quantities of products all over the world, including Hungary. Its economic impact on the world is significant, and it has been coupled with increasingly self-confident actions in world politics in the last 5-6 years. These two factors together result in a wide range of news on China, often encountered by ordinary people, which can explain China’s prominent place.

The Arab countries, India and Brazil, obviously, were selected in smaller proportions than other countries were, because geographically they are situated far from Hungary, and they are not so much present in the public mind as such distant countries as Japan or China are.

The distribution of answers by gender revealed a great difference in the case of two countries: China was chosen by almost 9 percentage points more men than women, while in the case of Japan, the proportion of men was 6.5 percentage points larger than that of women. Perhaps we can draw the conclusion that men are usually more interested in technology, and this is the reason why they knew in a larger proportion that these two countries of the Far East are at the global forefront in this field (Japan is in terms of quality and China in terms of quantity but, more and more often, also of quality).

No obvious patterns emerged in answers by age or educational attainment. However, if we examine answers by types of settlements, it is striking that

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 3. Perception of the European Union in Hungary

residents of Budapest chose all countries (with the exception of Russia) in smaller proportions than the residents of the other three settlement categories (but no pattern emerges if these categories are compared). The ‘other’ and the ‘none of them’ answers were selected by residents of Budapest in a couple of

percentage points larger proportions than by the residents of other types of settlements, that is, a higher proportion of the residents of Budapest think that the most important partners of the European Union are countries not included in the survey (whatever they may be).

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COUNTRIES REGARDED AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC PARTNERS OF THE EU Responses indicating a given category as a share of all responses given

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29. Do you think that a joint European army is needed?

A convincing majority, 55 per cent, of respondents answered ‘yes’ and almost 30.5 per cent answered ‘no’ to the question about the necessity of a joint European army, while the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option was selected by some 15 per cent of respondents. The majority possibly supports the establishment of a joint army because it is conventional for countries to have military force, and consequently, it may seem natural that the European Union also needs an army. In addition, uncertainty about the defence of Europe has increased in recent years, partly due to Russia’s military actions targeted on Ukraine, and partly due to US President Donald Trump’s statements. Perhaps even the Hungarian public communication about the migrant crisis of recent years can also increase the proportion of those who advocate a joint army.

It should be noted that the question of military security is not crucially important for the Hungarian public opinion. It is related to the fact that NATO, which serves the military defence of our country and of which Hungary has been a member since 1999, is generally considered to be ‘[...] an alliance that is elusive from several viewpoints, is perceived, on the one hand, as insignificant and, on the other, as exerting adverse effects […]”.40 When examining the distribution of respondents by gender, 5 percentage points less women than men think that a joint European army is required. It is rather surprising knowing that almost twice as many women considered defence more important than men at question 25. Negative answers to the idea of a joint army were given by nearly the same proportion of both genders, the proportion of ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’, however, was almost 5 percentage points larger among women than among men.

Breaking down the answers by types of settlements, Budapest stands apart as it supports the idea of a

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joint European army to a much lesser extent than other types of settlements (about 43% versus 5361%), and also opposes it to a greater extent (about 35% versus 25-31%). The proportion of respondents selecting the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ is also higher in the capital than anywhere else.

Towns seem to be the most supportive and also the most certain: with a proportion of almost 61 per cent, town-dwellers support the idea of a joint army the most, and they gave by far the fewest ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ responses, too.

It is worth comparing the answers received to this question and the ones given to question 17 (‘Do you agree that Hungary should send soldiers onto foreign missions?’), as their distribution is exactly reverse: only a quarter of respondents (25.6%) answered ‘yes’ to the latter question, while 61.1 per cent of them answered ‘no’ (13.4 per cent of respondents did not answer the question). The comparison of answers given to these two questions can be interpreted as roughly half of respondents support a joint European army, but this support shrinks to less than fifty per cent if it implies that Hungarian soldiers also should go into the services (since a joint European army can also be regarded as a foreign mission). This might be explained by the fact that a joint European army is an idea which has not yet been elaborated and exists in theory only, while the participation of Hungarian soldiers in foreign missions is a real and potentially dangerous task, therefore it is “easier” to approve of the former one than the latter.

The establishment a joint European army remains to be seen, although the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was adopted by 25 Member States of the European Union in December, 2017, and the main aim of which is to coordinate the military capacities and resources of Member States, is definitely a step forward in the EU’s defence policy.41

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4.

perception of asia; the world in 2050 The fourth, and last, block of questions is focussing on Asia and the situation of the world in 2050. This block contains a total of ten questions, which can be divided into two parts. The first six questions cover issues related exclusively to Asia, dominated by China. The last four questions ask for the respondents’ opinion on how the global distribution of power will change in coming decades, and which continents will have seen the most conflicts by 2050.

The answers produced the following main results: • although the New Silk Road initiative is such a distant notion for about two-thirds of the population that they are unable to form their opinion about it, most of those who expressed their opinion (three quarters of opinion makers) have a positive attitude towards it. From Hungary’s point of view, most respondents (34%) expect economic growth from the imitative, and East Asia to get closer to Hungary.

• The proportions of attitudes towards China are similar to those of the answers given to the question

focussing on the New Silk Road: about half of respondents did not give a reply, or gave a negative one, but two-thirds of those who took a stand had a positive attitude towards China.

• Respondents believe that today the three most important Asian economies are (in order) China, Japan and Russia, and these three were also mentioned in the largest proportions among the target countries of Eastern Opening. Two-thirds of respondents gave a neutral answer to the question as to how successful the policy of Eastern Opening was (middle score or no reply), and slightly more than half of the remaining 40 per cent evaluated this foreign policy direction positively, while slightly less than half of them evaluated it negatively.

• Respondents think that either the USA or China will be the leading economic power of the world by 2050 (the two countries received almost equal shares of votes), the United States will remain, less ambiguously, the political and cultural power, and the most military conflicts are anticipated on the Asian continent.

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30. What is your opinion on the New Silk Road based on preliminary information you have heard?

The assumption is focussing on opinions about the New Silk Road; before the question respondents had received a short description to provide them with information about the initiative. “Chinese New Silk Road project: The ‘One belt, One Road” initiative, announced in 2013 by the president of the People’s Republic of China, is a large-scale foreign policy agenda transforming Eurasia and Africa’s network of relationships by building new infrastructure links on land (New Silk Road) and sea (Maritime Silk Road), strengthening the economic, financial, cultural, scientific, etc. cooperation of the regions.’42 By 2015, 3,000 projects had been launched and Chinese investments had been made in 49 countries under the One Belt, One Road scheme, increasing the share of total investments by 18.2 per cent. Chinese investments that can be associated with the New Silk Road accounted for US$17.83 bn.43 On behalf of Hungary, the government set three specific goals in relation to One Belt, One Road.44 1 The use of highly developed Hungarian technologies in the development projects that are being realised in this part of Asia, primarily within the fields of water management, city management and IT. 2 Infrastructure development projects and to achieve that as many Asia-Europe routes as possible should reach Europe via Hungary, increasing the export opportunities for Hungarian products to Asia.

3 Finally, to ensure adequate environment to be the destination for a significant proportion of the Chinese investments being made in Europe.

One of the major projects that concerns also Hungary is the Budapest-Belgrade railway line, the main aim of which is to upgrade the railway line in order to decrease travel time, and enable the route to provide significant freight transport in addition to passenger transport.

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As the New Silk Road initiative is given priority in the Hungarian political communication, and due to sceptical opinions arising in the European Union45, we can hear about the initiative in the Hungarian media more and more often; however, the highest percentage of respondents [35%] chose the “I do not know/do not want to answer” option, which implies the lack of knowledge of the New Silk Road.

The ‘both negative and not negative’ answer received the second highest number of votes [27.2%], which also indicates the lack of familiarity, as respondents are uncertain about their views, and cannot decide whether they see the One Belt, One Road initiative rather positive or negative, therefore they chose the neutral option. On the basis of the result we can conclude that more than half of respondents [62.2%] do not have adequate information about the New Silk Road, which raises doubts about the efficiency of related communication in Hungarian media in view of the fact that it is a high-priority international initiative for Hungary.

37.8% of respondents have some relevant information about One Belt, One Road, and could take a stand on the matter, according to which 26.1% of them consider the initiative positive (rather positive [23.2%]; very positive [2.9%]). The proportion of respondents holding a negative view is 11.7 per cent, 9.7 per cent of whom consider it rather negative and 2 per cent consider it very negative.

On the whole we can say that almost two-thirds of the population do not have adequate information to form an opinion on the New Silk Road; this proportion is similar to the number of people considering themselves not so informed of foreign policy issues in the question asked at the beginning of the questionnaire. The remaining almost 40 per cent [37.8%], however, have some information, and nearly three quarters of them consider the initiative to be rather positive or very positive, and only a quarter think it is negative or rather negative. No significant differences display in terms of gender, age group or educational attainment, but as regards distribution by types of settlements, on the

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basis of the average, respondents from Budapest have the most negative attitude to this question. If the proportions of negative and positive opinions are compared, we find that twice as many people have a positive opinion [26.1%] on the initiative

than a negative one [11,7%]. This suggests that the initiative is perceived rather as an opportunity, and not as a danger by the population on the basis of the information obtained from the media or other sources.

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31. What is your attitude towards China?

The next question examined the attitudes of respondents towards China. This is closely connected to the previous question, as the concept of the New Silk Road initiative started from China. However, it is not the only point of view from which it is important to examine opinions about the country, but also because of its increasing role in world politics. In terms of nominal GDP, China has recently become the second largest economy in the world46, and a key player of global life. While US president Donald Trump, inaugurated in 2017, advocates bilateral relationships and the USA’s turn inward, in his speech delivered at the Davos World Economic Forum in 2017 Chinese president Xi Jinping championed multilateralism and globalism, and fancied China’s chances of becoming the world leader.47 When it comes to changes in global power, it is important to clarify how the Hungarian population perceive China and what their attitudes are towards China’s growth.

As opinions regarding the New Silk Road demonstrated, almost two-thirds of respondents did not have adequate information about the initiative to be able to form a positive or a negative opinion on it. As for attitudes towards China, slightly more than half of respondents (52.5%) gave a neutral or uncertain answer (16 per cent did not know it or did not want to answer, and the attitudes of 34.6 per cent are both negative and not negative, that is, the neutral option was selected). We can draw the conclusion that a larger portion of the population is informed of China than of the New Silk Road initiative, which is not surprising, as the Chinese initiative was announced in 2013, while China has a history of several thousands of years. 47.7 per cent of respondents took a stand on China on either side.

Nearly two-thirds of these 47.4 per cent have a positive attitude towards the country (they are 31.8 per cent of total respondents; 29.1% have a rather positive attitude, and 2.7% of them have a very positive one). The remaining almost one-third (15.6 per cent of total respondents) have a rather negative attitude towards the Asian country (13.4 per cent have a rather negative attitude, and 2.2 per cent

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have a very negative one). Washington-based Pew Research Center surveyed a similar question in several countries in 2017, where Hungary, with a similar percentage, can be rated into the group of countries having a negative view of China.48 There were no significant differences by gender, age group or educational attainment of respondents, but by types of settlements, a smaller difference can be detected on the basis of the proportion of votes given to negative categories: just like in the case of the previous question, respondents living in Budapest have the most negative attitude towards this question.

Ultimately, we can conclude that almost half of respondents have such information that enables them to judge China either positively or negatively. This proportion counts as a good result, in view of the fact that 64.2 per cent of respondents considered themselves less informed of foreign policy affairs in the first question. Almost 32 per cent of respondents have a rather positive attitude towards China, and approximately 16 per cent of them have a rather negative one. Based on question 7, which focussed on the relations of specific countries with Hungary, China finished in the middle of the pack, but according to question 9 and question 10, where familiarity with particular leaders and their effects on Hungary were evaluated, Xi Jinping was one of the least known and rated leader. The paramount leader of China and Chinese politics is Xi Jinping, the current president of China, elected in 2012, taking office in 2013 and re-elected at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. His relative lack of familiarity might be contributed to the fact that most often people encounter only China in the news, and therefore they are less able to identify the country with the figure of Xi Jinping.

Respondents have a positive attitude towards China, but they consider the relationship between Hungary and China to be of medium importance, and China’s power is not necessarily identified with the figure of Xi Jinping. This question will be worth examining and data will be worth comparing later as China’s growth and position in global life evolves.

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32. What effect do you think the New Silk Road initiative can potentially have on Hungary?

The next question examined the effects the New Silk Road initiative would have on Hungary according to respondents. During the analysis, answers indicating a given category were proportionated to the total answers given, thus their total adds up to 100. According to the question asked previously (What is your opinion on the New Silk Road based on preliminary information you have heard?), almost 63 per cent of respondents gave a neutral or uncertain answer, which indicated that there was no such information available that would enable respondents to take a stand on the Chinese initiative.49 The effect exerted on Hungary by One Belt, One Road, however, was viewed neutrally by only 4.3 per cent of respondents (1.6 per cent said it had no effect, and 2.7 per cent selected the ‘Other’ option). Although the great majority of respondents cannot form an opinion on the new initiative in itself, more people took a stand on its effects on Hungary.

The three effects receiving the most votes can be considered positive, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the opinion on the New Silk Road received twice as many positive answers [26.1%] than negative ones [11.7%]. The greatest majority of respondents hope that the New Silk Road will result in economic growth in Hungary [24.3%]. Drawing closer East Asia takes second place [17.9%], that is, people hope that the Chinese initiative will result in strengthened East-Asian relationships, which is reasonable, as one of the goals of the initiative is to connect Europe and Asia. The opportunity for job creation took third place [16.6%]. The risk of Asian migration comes next [12.7%], that is, although the majority of respondents expect East Asia to be drawn closer, they still perceive it as a threat, enhancing migration leaving from Asia. According to 11.1 per cent, it will improve political relations, but 6.6 per cent believe it will undermine the unity of

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the EU. Sceptical opinions often appear within the European Union, according to which the unity of the EU may be threatened if China gets closer, although mainly due to the “16+1 Cooperation”.50 Only 6.5 per cent of respondents think that the New Silk Road initiative possibly poses an ideological challenge to our country. This possible answer could have arisen as the People’s Republic of China, proclaimed on 1st October, 1949, is still led by the Chinese Communist Party. However, as opposed to the American export of democracy, China is not characterised by imposing its own ideological beliefs on other countries.

Although the proportion of ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ and ‘both negative and not negative’ answers was larger to the question ‘What is your opinion on the New Silk Road based on preliminary information you have heard?’, more respondents took a stand and chose one of the possible answers offered by the survey to this question, suggesting that the new initiative would have some kind of an effect on Hungary. The majority of respondents think that the Chinese initiative will have a rather positive effect on our country, and most of them hope for economic growth. The population is least afraid of the ideological challenge the initiative may impose on our country and there are only very few people who think that, if implemented, the New Silk Road initiative will have no effect on Hungary.

Respondents think that the Chinese initiative will have an effect on our country, but according to the content of question 16 (On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the effect and influence exerted by Hungary’s foreign policy on the following events.), they think that Hungary’s foreign policy cannot substantially influence the New Silk Road initiative. It will be worth monitoring how opinions change as One Belt, One Road is implemented.

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33. Which 3 of the countries listed below do you think are the most important in terms of economy?

(South Korea, Indonesia, China, Thailand, Japan, Singapore, India, Malaysia, Russia) With this question, the survey wanted to find out which countries of the Asian continent are the most important economies for the world economy. Respondents could choose from a total of nine countries, including: South Korea, Indonesia, China, Thailand, Japan, Singapore, India, Malaysia and Russia. Respondents had to put these countries in order of importance, putting the country they consider to be the most important in terms of economy into first place. The first three places are as follows: China finished in first place with 62 per cent (the country was put into any of the first three places by this percentage of respondents), followed by Japan with a result of 53.2 per cent, and Russia took third place lagging behind the second place by less than 1 per cent, with 52.4 per cent of votes. The rankings of the other countries, in descending order, are: India [32.3%], South Korea [29.6%], Thailand [22.3%], Indonesia [16.3%], Singapore [18.2%] and Malaysia [14%].

Comparing the rankings of countries based on GDP data in 2016, issued by the World Bank at the end of 201751, to the final results of the survey, respondents assessed the economic importance of the listed Asian countries roughly correctly; Russia is the only exception, taking a much more prominent place in the mental rankings than in reality.

China finished first place, with an advantage of almost 10 per cent, which is no wonder, as the economy, which was able to grow even after the global crisis in 2008, is currently the second largest after the United States of America.52 It took over the number two position from Japan, which fell to third place, at the beginning of the 2010s.53 Interestingly, the view of China’s economy deteriorates as the level of educational attainment of respondents increases. While respondents with primary or secondary educational attainment ranked China num-

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ber 1, 2 or 3 in equal proportions, close to those of the full sample (63.5% and 63.2% respectively), a considerably lower number of respondents with higher educational attainment did so (only 55.7%).

By types of settlements, residents of Budapest are even more sceptical (or less informed) about China’s leading position, only slightly more than half of them [51.4%] put the country in one of the first three places.

Japan’s economic significance was consistently ranked number 1, 2 or 3 by roughly half of the population, there are differences of barely 1 to 2 per cent in this respect by any breakdown (gender, age, educational attainment and types of settlements).

The results obtained from the survey differ to the greatest extent about Russia. Of the optional countries, respondents regarded Russia as the third most important economy, barely lagging behind Japan, but based on the data of the World Bank, it takes only the 12th place in the rankings of countries in terms of GDP, while India takes 7th, and South Korea takes 11th place. The answers of respondents were probably greatly influenced by Russia’s geographical vicinity and recently closer Hungary-Russia relations, e.g. Paks II, and the decreasing weight of the Russian economy was not realised by respondents. Although to a small extent, the answers outline by educational attainment that the higher educational attainment a respondent has, the larger the proportion was in which they positioned Russia (incorrectly) in any of the first three places. The greatest differences are displayed by types of settlements: while barely more than 40% of the residents of Budapest [41.2%] considered Russia as an important economy, in the case of town-dwellers this proportion is over 60 per cent [61.8%].

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 4. Perception of Asia; the world in 2050

According to the final results of the survey, India and South Korea take fourth and fifth place, with a considerably wide gap compared to the first three countries. The economic weight of the last four Asian economies was assessed roughly correctly by respondents, although they placed Thailand’s before Indonesia’s, while Indonesia is number 16 and Thailand is only number 26 in terms of the size of the GDP.

On the whole, respondents’ assessment on the economic weight taken by the listed Asian countries in the world economy were correct proportionally. There was a more significant difference about Russia, to which greater importance was attributed than the role that it actually fulfils based on GDP data.

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34. Which do you think the most important target countries are for Eastern Opening?

(Russia, China, countries of Central Asia, India, Japan, Turkey, other) Before the question, respondents received short information about Eastern Opening: ‘Eastern Opening is a foreign policy agenda of the Hungarian government, announced in 2011, the aim of which is to gradually decrease the traditionally Western economic orientation of our country, and pursue closer ties towards the East (towards Asia)’, as this question seeks to find out which countries the respondents think count as the primary targets of Eastern Opening. Thus, the initiative intends to facilitate the diversification of the Hungarian export market and encourage these countries to invest their capital directed to Europe in Hungary. The New Silk Road initiative announced two years later fits this policy very well, and has formed an important part of it since then.54 There was a total of eight possible answers to the question, and respondents could choose more than one of them, but we evaluated the number of answers indicating a given category as a share of all answers given.

We should note, however, that a Western orientation still prevails in Hungary’s foreign trade and foreign economic relations, and the successfulness – or unsuccessfulness – of Eastern Opening must be seen in this light. This might be the reason why the diplomatic mission in Beijing was considered last in terms of importance by respondents in question 13 (Please put the foreign diplomatic missions into order of importance as to how important you think these missions are for Hungarian diplomacy.) but it was considered to be the most important target country from the point of view of Eastern Opening.

According to respondents, the rankings of the first three most important countries are as follows: China [28.6%], Russia [22.2%], Japan [15.8%]. It is interesting to compare them to the outcome of the previous question, in which the questionnaire seeks to find out which three Asian countries are the most important in terms of economy, because the first three countries match, although their rankings do not completely, as Japan took second place and Russia took third place

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in that question. This implies that Japan is considered the second most important country for the world economy by respondents, but from the viewpoint of Hungary and the successfulness of Eastern Opening, the second most important country is Russia. This is interesting not only because of the similarity of results but also from the viewpoint that while the previous question focussed on Asian countries only, the present question also included Turkey, and ‘other’ and ‘none’ options. Eastern Opening is not directed towards exclusively countries of Asia in a strict sense, but also towards countries of the Middle East, but the majority of respondents regard rather Asian countries as the major target countries of this policy initiative.

Surprisingly, it was Turkey of the listed countries that received the lowest number of votes. It is surprising from the point of view that according to the OEC’s report, the volume of Hungarian export directed towards the countries listed in the question in 2016 was the second largest towards Turkey [1.9%] after China [2.2%].55 This figure was 1.6 per cent in 2011, the year of Eastern Opening, while export to Russia, receiving the second highest number of votes, was 3.5 per cent in 2011, which dropped to 1.6 per cent by 201656, although this was mainly due to the economic sanctions introduced against Russia by the European Union because of the Ukraine conflict.

On the whole we can conclude that the majority of respondents are aware of the growth and significance of the Chinese economy, therefore they regard China as the most important target country of Eastern Opening. Probably due to the lack of information and the closer Russian-Hungarian ties of recent years, it is Russia that took second place, and not Turkey, towards which, as regards the countries listed, the second highest volume of export is directed from our country, and which ranks number six only. The rankings of other countries by and large correlate with their volume of trade conducted with Hungary. This question will be worth examining also in the future, in relation to the implementation of One Belt, One Road.

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35. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate how successful Eastern Opening has been so far.

Having evaluated the target countries, respondents were asked to rate the successfulness of Eastern Opening on a scale of one to five. Although most respondents took a stand on the side of one of the countries from the list, almost 64% of them gave a neutral or uncertain answer to this question.

This is possibly the consequence of the fact that respondents had received a brief summary of the Eastern Opening itself, but they were unable to take a stand on its successfulness based on that.

They could connect the target countries of the foreign policy agenda with the eastern countries often featured in the media, but they could not draw any conclusion on the effectiveness of the policy from this information. Most of them [34.4%] thought that Eastern Opening was both successful and unsuccessful, that is, they could not take a substantive stand, and the second largest proportion of respondents [29.4%] could not or did not want to answer the question. This ratio [63.8%] almost fully matches those 64.4 per cent that considered themselves less informed of foreign policy issues. This is likely to result from the fact that the successes, agreements and results achieved within the framework of Eastern Opening are poorly or insufficiently communicated to the public via the media by the Hungarian government. Furthermore, insufficient emphasis is placed on including the agreements, meetings, etc. with specific eastern countries within the policy of Eastern Opening.

20.8 per cent of respondents had a positive view on the successfulness of the policy, and it was considered rather successful by 18.7 per cent of them and very successful by 2.1 per cent. The remaining 15.3 per cent had a negative view of Eastern Opening, and respondents consider this initiative of the Hungarian foreign policy to be a failure, because 12.8

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per cent of them think it is rather not successful and 2.5 per cent think this policy is not successful at all. The difference between the proportions of respondents holding a positive [20.8%] or a negative view [15,3%] amounts to only a couple of percentage points [5.5%], which means that people who consider themselves informed of this foreign policy segment are divided on the successfulness of Eastern Opening. Based on distribution by age groups, the successfulness of Eastern Opening is viewed more negatively by 40-49-year-olds and 50-59-year-olds (nearly 20 per cent of respondents in both age groups perceive this foreign policy guideline unsuccessful), and more positively by 60+ years olds (the proportion of negative opinions was the lowest and that of positive ones was the highest in this age group). If we examine the answers by the distribution of gender, age, educational attainment and settlement type, we can draw the conclusion that 50-59-year-old male residents of Budapest with higher educational attainment tend to think the most that the Eastern Opening policy of the Hungarian government has not proven to be successful at all. 30-39-year-old male residents who live in county seats and have secondary educational attainment regard this kind of foreign policy completely successful.

Overall, we can say that more than a half of respondents could not take a concrete stand on the question and rather chose neutral options, such as ‘both successful and unsuccessful’, and the ‘I do not know/I do not answer’. This question is seen positively by almost a half of the remaining nearly 40 per cent and negatively by the other half of them, which suggests that well-informed respondents taking a stand in this question are very divided on the successfulness of the Eastern Opening.

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36. Which country do you think will be the world’s leading economic power in 2050?

(USA, Russia, Germany, United Kingdom, France, China, Turkey, Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, other) This group of questions, consisting of four parts, intended to find out which of the listed countries would be the most important economic power in 2050. Respondents had to choose one of the eleven countries, or the ‘other’ or the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option. The final results revealed that nearly one-fifth [18.1%] of respondents chose the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option, and 0.2% gave the ‘other’ answer, which suggests that the 11 countries listed included the states that are seen as economic powers of the future by respondents. This means that four-fifths of respondents had enough information to take a stand on the side of one of the countries, but they do not seem to form a strong opinion on future shifts, and the final result of their answers rather reflect the current state of affairs.57 Of the countries listed, the first place went to the USA with 23.9 per cent, thus respondents think that the United States will remain the most important economic power by 2050, and although China took only second place, it is lagging only one-tenth percentage point [23.8%] behind the first finisher. That is, respondents think the current rankings of the world’s two largest economies are likely to remain the same also in 2050, although a significant decrease of the American advantage is expected. China’s second place may refer to both trust in the economic growth of the United States and doubts about China’s development. By contrast, most experts anticipate the period in which Chinese economy will overtake the American one, being currently number one, for the 2020s,58,59 and there are some who think Chinese GDP will be one and a half times the size of the American one by 2050.60 Third place went to Russia with 14.1 per cent, in spite of the fact that it is ranked last of the 11 countries listed in terms of economic weight on the basis of the 2016 data of the World Bank.

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However, India, for example, took seventh place, with a rather small proportion of 1 per cent. It displays some scepticism (and lack of information) about the Indian economy, because, as opposed to this result, international economic analysts are much more optimistic, some position China as the third largest economy by 2050,61 and according to an analysis by PricewaterhouseCoopers, global centres of gravity will shift so much in the coming decades that India is expected to be the second largest economy also in terms of purchase power parity.62 Citibank’s analysis predicts that India will become the largest economy of the world on purchase power parity by 2050.63 Respondents assessed the decrease in Japan’s economic power by and large in accordance with forecasts. The last three places, with the same share of votes [0.4%], went to Turkey, Brazil and South Africa, although the Middle East, Latin America and Africa are predicted to be able to increase their economic might, and traditional centres of gravity, such as the European and American continents, will gradually lose some of their significance.64 Asia is expected to be the region demonstrating the highest growth in terms of GDP and per capita GDP in the next four decades [4.7%], followed

by Sub-Saharan Africa [4.4%], then the Middle East and North Africa [3.9%], Latin America [3.3%] and Eastern Europe [3.2%].65 On the basis of results, respondents do not expect significant shifts in the world economy by 2050.

They rather hold the opinion that the United States of America will continue to be the most powerful economy, followed by China. The future of European economies is also viewed positively, they are expected to keep their current positions in the world economic rankings.

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 4. Perception of Asia; the world in 2050

37. Which country do you think will be the world’s leading political power in 2050?

(USA, Russia, Germany, United Kingdom, France, China, Turkey, Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, other) The question focusses on the relations of political power predictable for 2050 between the given countries. Respondents had to select one of twelve possible answers (ten countries, other, I do not know/ do not want to answer). One-fifth of survey respondents could not or did not want to take a stand here, either, but there was some modification compared to the previous order. The USA still firmly holds its leading position, Russia took second place and China slipped back to third place. Not only the first three places saw changes compared to the outcome of the previous question, which shows that respondents do not necessarily suppose a close link between the political and the economic roles (as one often does not imply the other in reality).

Compared to the previous question, it was interesting to see that, if countries were ranked in terms of political power, Russia [15.3%] overtook China [13.4%], and the United States received 10 per cent more votes [34.2%] and its first place became even more stable. This might suggest that while one-fifth of respondents recognised the growth of China’s economic significance, fewer of them expect China to become a political power [10%]. If compared to Germany [7.3%], China was selected by almost twice as many respondents as the most significant country of the European Union was. Respondents ranked India as an economic power only number seven in the previous question, but its political power is regarded to be enough to be only number nine. According to forecasts, however, the world economy will be dom-

inated by the three largest national economies, the trio of China, the USA and India, by 2050. All this should mean that the three economic major powers will determine how the world economy, international politics and international institutions will work.66 It is probably contributable to the fact that India as a potential economic or political power has a low presence in the Hungarian media. Most of the time, it is only mentioned in the media, in connection with a major disaster that befell the country in most of the cases, although it is referred to the largest democracy of the world, where elections take place with the most participants.67 It is interesting to note that male respondents above the age of 60 and with higher educational attainment were the only ones who voted for India’s political power in 2050 (the proportion of answers in the other groups were 0%!), achieving a total of 0.2 per cent, overtaking only Turkey in the aggregated rankings of countries.

Respondents think that the USA will possess political power in 2050 with a great advantage, and as regards the Eurasian continent, the political power is expected to shift to the East. Thus respondents cannot imagine that the USA will not be the leading political power in 2050. They think that the economic power of the USA will be threatened by China in the future, but they do not perceive the second economic major power to be capable of breaking the US hegemony by 2050; in fact, they think Russia will have become the number two political power by then.

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WHICH COUNTRY DO YOU THINK WILL BE THE WORLD’S LEADING ECONOMIC POWER IN 2050?* *

proportion of respondents placing a given country in first place

WHICH COUNTRY DO YOU THINK WILL BE THE WORLD’S LEADING POLITICAL POWER IN 2050?* *

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proportion of respondents placing a given country in first place

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38. Which country do you think will be the world’s leading cultural power in 2050?

(USA, Russia, Germany, United Kingdom, France, China, Turkey, Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, other)

After economic and political power, respondents had to answer the question as to which country will be the greatest cultural power in the world in the future. Respondents could choose from eleven countries, the ‘other’ and the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ options. Of the three questions, the question examining cultural power attracted the highest number of uncertain answers, the proportion of which was 26.5 per cent; not only the number of respondents choosing the ‘I do not know/do not want to answer’ option grew, but the percentages of the listed countries also differed to a lesser extent.

The Unites States takes the lead even in this respect with 17.9 per cent, but it does not significantly overtake France, which takes second place with 14.5 per cent of the votes and appears in the first three places as a major power for the first time. China takes third place again with 10 per cent, although its advantage is minimal over such European countries as Germany [8.8%] or the United Kingdom [8.5%].

By age, the rankings display interesting differences.

30-39-year-olds chose the ‘I do not know’ option in the smallest proportion [18.8%] If we interpret this that this age group are the most confident respondents, we must note that this group reversed the order of France taking second place based on the answers of the full sample [10.5%] and China taking third place [11.6%]; and they also put the United States into first place in a larger proportion than other age groups did [21.5%].

It is not an accident that American culture could take the lead, as the culture of the current political and economic major power has always had and still has a great impact on the whole world, regarding either fashion, films or fast food restaurant chains.

Thus, it is not surprising that the country, which fin-

ished in first place in the previous two questions as well, is expected by respondents to remain the cultural power as well as the economic and political one in the future. That means that respondents think that it is a country with significant economic and political power, and as such, it can export its culture into other countries. The result of France, taking second place, also indicates that respondents think that French culture will continue to significantly affect the cultural life of the world. Examining the case of China, a country which could rank in the top three in the previous two questions, it seems that it has succeeded in increasing the socalled ‘soft power’, constituting an important part of its recent and current foreign policy. Confucius Institutes68, operating since 2006 and engaged in teaching the Chinese language and promoting the Chinese culture worldwide, have been established for this purpose. When examining this result, it is not surprising if we compare it to the results of the United States. Respondents think that by 2150 China will be a significant economic and political major power, and consequently, its cultural significance will also grow in the world.

If we attribute significance to the change in the rankings occurring in the age group of about 30-year-olds, we can assume that China’s significance is increasing thanks to its conscious country image building strategy. Probably this is why respondents believe that it will become a significant cultural power of the world by 2050. It is interesting to note that the culture of Russia, which finished in a prominent place in the previous two questions, is not seen so important for the future as its economic or political role is. Again, the position of India is worth examining: it took eighth place in the rankings of countries, which is not surprising, regarding the similar outcomes of the previous two questions.

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39. Which continent do you think will see military conflicts the most frequently in 2050?

(North America, South America, Africa, Europe, Asia, other)

In this question, respondents had to select the continent where the potential of the outbreaks of military conflicts were considered the highest. Possible answers included North America, South America, Africa, Europe, Asia, other, I do not know/do not want to answer, from which respondents had to choose one. ‘I do not know/do not want to answer’ was the second most frequently selected option, chosen by almost a quarter of respondents [24.6%], that is, a lot of them were uncertain about this question, and they rather did not take a stand on the side of either continent.

The greatest proportion of survey respondents selected the Asian continent with 25.8 per cent, which is barely more than the ‘I do not know/I do not want to answer’ option taking second place with 24.6 per cent or the African continent taking third place with 23.5 per cent. Considering the fact that we can currently talk about several territorial conflicts between the countries of the Asian continent, the end result is not surprising. Of these, Hungarian people could learn in the media the most about the nuclear proliferation by North Korea or the island disputes on the South China Sea. If we also include the Relations of the Middle East, it becomes obvious why the majority of respondents selected this continent as the most conflict-ridden continent in the future.

The fewest respondents selected North America with 5.1 per cent, which is understandable from the viewpoint that this continent has a very favourable geographical location. The countries on this continent are their allies, it is bordered by oceans on two sides, which are of strategic importance geopolitically, and its current situation can be regarded as free from conflicts. On the basis of age groups, however, if compared to respondents of other age

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groups, a higher number of 30-39-year-olds think that this continent will see the most conflicts in the near future. The last but one place went to South America [7.3%], overtaking only the ‘other’ answer option [0.5%] with this result, which may derive from the fact that respondents have less information on the continent and its countries, or they think conflicts concerning the will have significantly diminished by 2050. If we take the present situation into account, just like in the case of other countries, suffice it to mention the situation of Brazil or Venezuela, although they are mostly conflicts concerning the internal affairs of countries. This option was selected by 18-29-year-old respondents with secondary educational attainment in the highest number. Europe finished in the mid-range with 13.2 per cent, which is interesting regarding the fact that the respondents live on this continent. Based on their responses, they believe that conflicts will possibly concern their continent in the near future.

The data also reveal current geopolitical conditions, and the prominent place that Africa and Asia took could seem to be a logical choice to respondents also from this point of view. By age and educational attainment, 40-49-year-olds with higher educational attainment selected Asia and 60+ year-olds with secondary educational attainment selected Africa at the highest rate as the most conflict-ridden continent in the future. We can see, however, that there is a very small difference between the top three.

Some experts believe that the Asian and the African continent will see the most conflicts in the world in 2050.69 Overall, we can conclude that the majority respondents who took a stand on the side of either of the continents assessed the situation in accordance with forecasts.

GEOPOLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2018 – 4. Perception of Asia; the world in 2050

WHICH COUNTRY DO YOU THINK WILL BE THE WORLD’S LEADING CULTURAL POWER IN 2050?* *

Proportion of respondents placing a given country in first place

WHICH CONTINENT DO YOU THINK WILL SEE MILITARY CONFLICTS THE MOST FREQUENTLY IN 2050?* *

Proportion of respondents placing a given country in first place

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book recommendations

Thomas J. Wright: All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the TwentyFirst Century and the Future of American Power The two decades after the Cold War saw much closer cooperation between the major powers than previously as liberal international order gained ground. Now, power competition is back in international politics and the future of the liberal order is uncertain. Russia and China have been increasingly committed to revisionist politics, while Middle Eastern politicians face unravelling conflicts. Moreover, many Americans question the necessity of US global leadership.

Thomas J. Wright’s book endeavours to present the main characteristics of great power competition, which includes every instrument possible except for war. At the same time, he wishes to offer an alternative to shape an ideal American strategy that adapts to changing circumstances.

188

Benjamin J. Cohen: Understanding Monetary Rivalry

Malise Ruthven: Carving Up the Globe: An Atlas of Diplomacy

Monetary rivalry between major powers is extensively present in the world economy, however, political competition also significantly limits the global influence of the dollar, the euro, and the yuan, determining a given country’s geopolitical situation and potential. The author examines the relationship between major currencies and state power through their role in international financial markets.

Contrary to popular opinion, which holds that the days of the US dollar are numbered, the book concludes that the dollar is still “indispensable”, as the word could not function without it. While the euro is burdened by various government mechanisms and the yuan is struck by political and financial problems, only the US’s currency enjoys the political and economic support that will ensure its role as the world’s dominant currency for years to come.

Treaties determining border lines have, for thousands of years, influenced the development of empires and countries, the evolution of international relations, and the lives of millions of ordinary people, of course. Lines drawn on maps by diplomats have always had much significance; one just has to look back on the ancient Egyptian and Hittite accords, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, or the 2014 Minsk Protocol.

With hundreds of colour maps, the atlas takes the reader on a journey in history. It illustrates in rich detail the factors that led to the signing of treaties, the ambitions and fears that drove diplomats and politicians as well as the implications which can be identified in politics, economics, and the military alike. This work by a team of authors led by Malise Ruthven also endeavours to present, in addition to territorial agreements, several armament pacts, environmental and economic treaties.

Slavoj ŽiŽek: Living in the End Times The book starts from the premise that global capitalism is fast approaching its terminal crisis, after which its reform will become impossible. The author wishes to draw attention to four simultaneous trends which, together, substantiate the decline of the Western-type capitalist system: the worldwide ecological crisis; the biogenetic revolution; imbalances within the economic system; and social divisions at the brink of explosion.

Slovenian philosopher, critic, and university professor Slavok Žižek reveals in his book how humanity is reacting to the deepening crisis, while claiming that the end of capitalism also implies a chance for a new beginning, which can ultimately lead to the creation of a more just social, economic, and political system.

Otilia Dhand: The Idea of Central Europe: Geopolitics, Culture and Regional Identity The concept of Central Europe has gained much significance in classical geopolitics over the years, yet it is, in fact, a fragile concept, whose proper interpretation has been long overdue. The region would have been part of the German dominated political and economic union in line with the original perceptions, however, it eventually caused much trouble to leaders of major powers in both the East and the West due to a variety of factors.

Otilia Dhand, a geopolitical expert and a dedicated researcher of the Central Eastern European region, provides a critical examination of the concept of Central Europe, from its early inception to the present day.

The book, based on extensive archival research, contributes much to the development of the study of European regionalism and geopolitics, regarding it indispensable to revisit certain theories in light of original sources.

Steven D. Usdin: Bureau of Spies: The Secret Connections between Espionage and Journalism in Washington Washington's National Press Building was a popular centre of international spy networks for decades, where agents acting as journalists tried to gather key information about the functioning of the US administration. In the beginning, Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, and later the Soviet Union and the CIA have all operated offices in the press building, where the primary goal of spies, in addition to intelligence gathering, was to disinform.

As the author points out in his book, efforts to influence American elections by foreign governments are nothing new, and WikiLeaks is not the first organisation to expose huge quantities of classified information.

Using extensive research, the work offers an excellent overview of the complicated connection between journalism and intelligence, which was not short of controversies, while also further enriches the literature on the Cold War.

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LIST OF SOURCES Exploring the geopolitical situation of Central Europe in the context of geopolitical theories Alapblog: Halford Mackinder játéka a szívvel – I. Rész, https://alapblog. hu/halford-mackinder-jateka-a-szivvel-i-resz/, 2019. január 12.

Baráth Tibor: Kelet-Európa fogalma a modern történetírásban, In: Ring É.: Helyünk Európában I. Kötet, Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 390-404.

Czirják Ráhel: GeoDebates: Közép- és Kelet-Európa 21. századi szerepe Európa és Ázsia között: hídfő vagy ütközőzóna?, 2018. június 20. http:// www.geopolitika.hu/hu/2018/06/20/5-geodebates-kelet-kozep-europa-21-szazadi-szerepe-europa-es-azsia-kozott-hidfo-vagy-utkozozona/, 2019. január 5.

Dömök Csilla: Közép-Európa és a föderalizmus, Nemzet és Biztonság, 2011. április, 85.o. http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/domok_ csilla-kozep_europa_es_a_foderalizmus.pdf, 2019. január Hardi Tamás: Változó Közép-Európa kép a 21. században, Karlovitz János Tibor (szerk.), Fejlődő jogrendszer és gazdasági környezet a változó társadalomban, http://www.irisro.org/tarstud2015aprilis/21HardiTamas. pdf, 2019. január 7.

Irah Kučerová: Geopolitics of Central Europe - A Historical View, Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Historica, https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/307174672_Geopolitics_of_Central_Europe_-_A_Historical_View, 2019. január 6.

Jakub J. Grygiel -A. Weiss Mitchell: Nyugtalan határvidék, Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2017.

Mező Ferenc: Közép-Európa fogalmi változása térben és időben, Tér és Társadalom, XV. Évf. 2001. 3-4. 81.o.

Michael Howard: Lessons of the Cold War, Survivar, 36. Winter, 1994, 102-103.o.

Miletics Péter – Pál Viktor: A közép-európai tér fejlődésének kérdései, Földrajzi Értesítő, XLVII. Évf. 1998. 2. füzet, 219. http://www.mtafki.hu/ konyvtar/kiadv/FE1998/FE19982_217-233.pdf, 2018. december 27.

Rechnitzer János: Elmozdulások és törésvonalak Közép- és Kelet-Európa térszerkezetében, Tér és Társadalom, 30. évf., 4. szám, 2016, 38.o.

Samuel P. Huntington: A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása, Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1999. 259.o.

Szilágyi István: A Földrajz A Történelem Kulcsa, 150 Évvel Ezelőtt Született Sir Halford J. Mackinder, A Geopolitika Klasszikusa, Magyar Tudomány, http://www.matud.iif.hu/2011/11/10.htm, 2018. december 29.

Szőcs Krisztina: Gondolatok Közép-Európa fogalmáról, Fogalom és Kép, A kolozsvári Babes-Bolyai Tudományegyetem Filozófia Tanszékcsoportjának magyar tagozata által szervezett nemzetközi tanévkezdő konferencia előadásai, Szerkesztette: Gál László, Egyed Péter, Kolozsvári Egyetemi Kiadó, 2010. http://old.tok.elte.hu/tarstud/fogalomeskep/ kotet1/szocs.pdf, 2019. január 6.

Vogel Sándor: Az euroatlanti integráció és a román Közép-Európafelfogás, Magyar Kisebbség, 5. sz. = 5. évf. (1999.) 1., http://epa.oszk. hu/02100/02169/00011/m990108.htm, 2019. január 12.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: A Nagy Sakktábla, Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1999.

Geopolitical viewpoints for the economic strategy of Hungary and the V4 Bernek Á. (2015): A Közép- és Kelet-Európai régió a XXI. századi geopolitika nagy sakktábláján. Köz-Gazdaság. 2015/1. pp. 77-90.

Brzezinski, Z. (1994): Getting Real on Central Europe. New York Times, 1994. 06. 26. p. 17. https://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/28/opinion/ getting-real-on-central-europe.html (Elérés dátuma: 2018. 07. 22.)

Egedy G. (2017): Bevezetés a nemzetközi kapcsolatok elméletébe. HVGORAC Kiadó, Budapest.

Flint, C. (2016a): Introduction to Geopolitics. 3. kiadás. Routledge. New York, NY. Flint, C. (2016b): Intertwined Spaces of Peace and War: The Perpetual Dynamism of Geopolitical Landscapes In: Kirsch Scott – Colin Flint (szerk) 2016: Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies. Routledge, New York, NY. p. 34.

Flint, C. – Taylor, P. J. (2018) Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality. 7. kiadás. Routledge. New York, NY. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017.

Nölke, A. – Vliegenthar, A. (2009): Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe.

World Politics. 61 (4). pp. 670-702.

Piketty, T. (2013): Le capital au XXIe siecle. Éditions du Seuil. Párizs.

Salamin G. (2015): Transforming Regional Position of Central-Eastern Europe in the Economic Space of the European Union with Special Reference to Hungary. Hungarian Studies 29/1—2. pp. 73-91.

Simai M. (2012): A hatalmi viszonyok, a világgazdaság és a katonai szektor a XXI. században. Köz-Gazdaság 2012/2. pp. 33-77.

Szilágyi I. (2013): Geopolitika. Publikon. Pécs.

Wallerstein, I. (2010): Bevezetés a világrendszer-elméletbe. L’Harmattan.

Budapest.

The importance of the New Silk Road to the V4 in the global economic space Bernek, Á. 2017: A közép- és kelet-európai országok a 21. század több pólusú világában. HUG Hungarian Geopolitics. 2017/ IV. 24-75. o.

Chan, L. 2017: The Czech Republic: A Belt and Road Link in CEE. HKTDC Research. Interneten elérhető: http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.

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com/business-news/article/Research-Articles/The-Czech-RepublicA-Belt-and-Road-Link-in-CEE/rp/en/1/1X000000/1X0AAQU0.htm (utolsó elérés: 2018. 07. 05.)

Csizmadia N. 2016: Geopillanat. A 21. század megismerésének térképe.

L’Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 162-173. o.

CzechTrade in China. Interneten elérhető: http://www.czechtradeoffices. com/en/cn (elérés dátuma: 2018. 07.13.)

Devizacsere-megállapodás a kínai jegybankkal. MNB közlemény Interneten elérhető: https://www.mnb.hu/sajtoszoba/ sajtokozlemenyek/2013-evi-sajtokozlemenyek/devizacsere-megallapodas-a-kinai-jegybankkal (az elérés dátuma: 2018. 06. 10.)

Eszterhai V. 2017: The presentation of the “16 + 1 Cooperation. Interneten elérhető: http://beltandroadcenter.org/2017/11/07/the-presentationof-the-16-1-cooperation/ (az elérés dátuma 2018. 06. 12.)

HSBC opens newest China Desk in Poland to capture Belt and Road opportunites in Central, Eastern Europe. HSBC News Release 4 Jan 2018 Interneten elérhető: http://www.about.hsbc.com.cn/-/media/china/en/ news-and-media/180104-hsbc-opens-newest-china-desk-in-poland-en. pdf (elérés dátuma: 2018. 06. 20.)

Foreign Trade Offices of the Polish Trade Agency (PAIH). Interneten elérhető: https://www.paih.gov.pl/about_us/Foreign_Trade_Offices (elérés dátuma: 2018. 07. 13.)

Huang, Y. 2016: Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment. China Economic Review, 40 2016. 314-321. o.

Kugiel, P. (szerk) 2016: V4 Goes Global: Exploring Opportunities and Obstacles in the Visegrad Countries’s Cooperation with Brazil, India, China and South Africa. The Polish Institute of International Affairs. Varsó. 85. o.

Liu, Z. 2016: How the Chinese Perceive the Visegrad Group. Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 2/2016. 56-67. o.

Members and Prospective Members of the Bank. Interneten elérhető: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/ index.html (elérés dátuma: 2018. 06. 10.)

Syrovátka, J. – Tomášek, J. 2017: Overview of Economic Relations between Czech Republic and China. In Comparing the Czech-Polish Approach to China: Assessing both challenges and opportunities from a security-minded perspective. Prague Security Studies Institute – Centre for International Relations. 4-12. o.

Przychodniak, M. 2017: The 16+1 Initiative and Challenges for Cooperation between China and Eastern European Countries. The Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin No. 121 (1061), 5 December 2017. 2. o.

The Belt and Road Initiative. Changing the behaviour and perceptions of corporate China. Interneten elérhető: https://www.firmenkunden. commerzbank.de/portal/media/corporatebanking/neu-hauptportal-rebrush/insights/bri/42340_ENG_BRI_Whitepaper_brochureA4_260618_Online.pdf (az elérés dátuma 2018. 07. 22.)

Turcsanyi, R. Q. 2017: Slovakia’s Overdue China Strategy. The Diplomat.

Interneten elérhető: https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/slovakias-overdue-china-strategy/ (az elérés dátuma 2018. 06. 23.)

Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road 2015/03/28 Interneten elérhető: http:// en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html (az elérés dátuma 2018. 06. 23.).

Building Hungary’s country image in the people’s Republic of China Somfai Vera (2004): A kínai beutazó turizmus Magyarországon. BGF KKFK Elektronikus Könyvtár.

Simonyi Norbert (2006): A kínai lakosság utazási szokásai. Turizmus Bulletin X. évfolyam, 2. szám, 3-8 oldal.

Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség: Nemzeti Turizmusfejlesztési Stratégia 2030 Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség: Magyarország Turisztikai Küldőpiacai: Ázsia Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség: Turizmus Magyarországon 2016. 8. oldal Kerényi Ádám – Molnár Júlia (2016): A FinTech-jelenség hatása – Radikális változás zajlik a pénzügyi szektorban. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 16 évf. 3. szám, 40. oldal Vágási Mária (2007): Marketing – stratégia és mendzsment. Alinea kiadó Philip Kotler, Kevin Lane Keler (2006): Marketingmenedzsment. Akadémia kiadó Papp-Váry Árpád Ferenc (2006): Az országmárkázás elmélete és gyakorlata. Reklámérték, IV. évf. 34. sz. 1-11 oldal Papp-Váry Árpád Ferenc (2007): Az országmárkázás szerepe és hatásai: országimázs a kibövült Európai Unióban. Doktori disszertáció. Nyugat Magyarországi Egyetem Közgazdaságtudományi Kar Gazdasági Folyamatok Elmélete és Gyakorlata Doktori Iskola, Sopron Papp-Váry Árpád Ferenc (2006): The World Online, Egy Internetes országimázs-kutatás tapasztalatai (MOK 2006 Konferencia) Csapó János – Reményik Bulcsú (2011): Aktív turizmus. Turisztikai terméktervezés és fejlezstés Online források: Kínai Turisztikai Hivatal: www.cnta.com Kínai Turisztikai Akadémia: www.ctaweb.org Kínai Statisztikai Hivatal: www.stats.gov.cn UNWTO: www.unwto.org Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség: www.mtu.gov.hu

Establishing the Budapest-Warsaw axis MäRLE, Tamás: Közép-Európa a Budapest-Varsó tengely körül. In: Magyar Fórum, 2017., http://magyarforum.hu/cikk/3573/KoZeP-EURoPA-ABUDAPEST%E2%80%93VARSo-TENGELY-KoRuL/ (2019.02.13.)

Felvidék.ma: A V4-Benelux-csúcstalálkozót követően Magyarország átvette a V4-csoport elnöki tisztségét. In: Felvidék.ma, 2017.06.20., https://felvidek.ma/2017/06/v4-benelux-csucstalalkozot-kovetoenmagyarorszag-atvette-v4-csoport-elnoki-tisztseget/ (2019.02.13.)

KIRÁLY, Zsolt: A magyarlakta területek mint mostohagyerek – Hogyan csökkenthető a régiók közti különbség Szlovákiában. In: Körkép.sk, 2017.04.30., http://korkep.sk/cikkek/gazdasag/2017/04/30/a-magyarlakta-teruletek-mint-mostohagyerek-hogyan-csokkentheto-a-regiokkozti-kulonbseg-szlovakiaban/ (2019.02.13.)

CSONKA, Ákos: A régió, melyet magára hagyott a történelem. In: Körkép. sk, 2014.01.02., http://korkep.sk/cikkek/mindennapjaink/2014/01/02/aregio-melyet-magara-hagyott-a-tortenelem/ (2019.02.14.)

BERTA, Ágnes: Felvidék gazdasági helyzete – Hogy állunk? In: Felvidék, 2016.11.23., https://felvidek.ma/2016/11/felvidek-gazdasagi-helyzetehogy-allunk/ (2019.02.13.)

MATUS, Tibor: Az eltévedt autópályák a Visegrádi térségben In: Felvidék, 2017.01.04., https://felvidek.ma/2017/01/az-eltevedt-autopalyak-avisegradi-tersegben/ (2019.02.13.)

KIRÁLY, Zsolt: Észak-Szlovákia vs. dél és kelet. Régiófejlesztés napjainkban és a következő években. In: Körkép, 2017.05.02., http://korkep.sk/ cikkek/gazdasag/2017/05/02/eszak-szlovakia-vs-del-es-kelet-regiofejlesztes-napjainkban-es-a-kovetkezo-evekben/ (2019.02.13.)

KOMJÁTHY, Lóránt: Nem az autópályák ész nélküli építése, hanem a képzés-fejlesztés csökkenti a munkanélküliséget. Körkép, 2017.07.25. http://korkep.sk/cikkek/gazdasag/2017/07/25/nem-az-autopalyakesz-nelkuli-epitese-hanem-a-kepzes-fejlesztes-csokkenti-a-munkanelkuliseget/ (2019.02.13.)

JÁMBOR, Gyula: Építhetik a komáromi hidat. Magyar Idők, 2017.08.04. https://magyaridok.hu/gazdasag/epithetik-komaromi-hidat-2040706/ (2019.02.13.)

The geoeconomic significance of the “New Amber Road” A 2016-2017-Es Lengyel Visegrádi Elnökség Programja A Bizottság (Eu) 2017/177 Végrehajtási Határozata (2017. január 31.) a „Borostyán” árufuvarozási folyosó létrehozásáról szóló közös javaslatnak a 913/2010/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet 5. cikkének való megfeleléséről. – Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 2017/28. pp. 69-70.

Az Európai Parlament És A Tanács 913/2010/EU RENDELETE (2010. szeptember 22.) a versenyképes árufuvarozást szolgáló európai vasúti hálózatról (EGT-vonatkozású szöveg). – Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 2010/276. pp. 22-32.

Az Európai Parlament És A Tanács 1316/2013/ EU RENDELETE (2013. december 11.) az Európai Hálózatfinanszírozási Eszköz létrehozásáról, a 913/2010/EU rendelet módosításáról és a 680/2007/EK és 67/2010/ EK rendelet hatályon kívül helyezéséről (EGT-vonatkozású szöveg). – Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 2013/348. pp. 129-171.

Sejm.Gov.Pl: Highway From Rzeszów To Budapest - Via Carpathia Under Construction 2017: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/v4Komunikat.xs p?documentId=CBCE79C441AF78DAC125814D003D8B93&lang=EN 2017.08.20-i letöltés.

Błażejewski, A. 2015: The Amber Road in Poland. State of research and perspectives: http://www.journals.vu.lt/archaeologia-lituana/article/ view/5132/3389 2017.08.20-i letöltés.

Dundovic C. – Hess, S. 2005: Competitiveness of the North Adriatic port sin various cargo flows on selected transport routes. – Promet- TrafficTraffico 17. 4. pp. 205-216.

Empiric Program: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects/austria/empiric-enhancing-multimodal-platforms-inland-waterways-andrailways-services-integration-in-central-europe 2017.08.19-i letöltés European Comission Rail Market Monitoring 2016: https://ec.europa. eu/transport/modes/rail/market/market_monitoring_en 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

Gysev: Vasúton Éledhet Újjá Az Ókori Borostyánút, 2016: https://www2. gysev.hu/rolunk/sajto/hirek/vasuton-eledhet-ujja-az-okori-borostyanut 2017.08.19-i letöltés Herber A. – Martos I. – Moss L. – Tatár Cs. – Tisza L. 2005: Történelem 2 Kr. e. 500-tól Kr. u. 1000-ig. Reáltanoda Alapítvány, pp. 364.

Inotai A. – Juhász O. 2017: The New Challenges for the EU and the New Amber Road – National Think Tank 2017/1. pp. 55-62.

Pałkiewicz, J. 2017: Poland could rebuild the Amber Road: https://poland. pl/politics/opinions/poland-could-rebuild-amber-road/ 2017.08.20-i letöltés.

Pap N. 1997: Európai Korridoron. – In. PAP N. – TÓTH J. (SZERK.): Európa politikai földrajza. Jannus Pannonius Tudományegyetem. pp. 49-64.

Póczy K. 1999: A via „Postumia” meghosszabbítása a dunai átkelőhelyekig. – In. Gömöri J. (szerk.): A Borostyánkő út tájai és emlékei, Scarbantia Társaság, Sopron. pp. 49-56.

Port Of Koper, 2016: https://luka-kp.si/eng/cargo-statistics 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

Port Of Ravenna, 2016: http://www.port.ravenna.it/category/portoravenna/statistiche/ 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

PORT OF RIJEKA, 2015: http://www.portauthority.hr/en/promotion/statistics 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

Port Of Trieste, 2016: http://www.porto.trieste.it/eng/statistics/statsyear-2016 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

Port Of Venice, 2016: https://www.port.venice.it/en/the-port-in-figures. html 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

Portfolio: Tengeri Kikötőt Fejleszt Magyarország, 2017: http://www. portfolio.hu/vallalatok/tengeri_kikotot_fejleszt_magyarorszag.247119. html 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

Premier.Gov.Pl: Prime Minister Beata Szydło At The International Belt And Road Forum 2017: https://www.premier.gov.pl/mobile/en/news/ news/prime-minister-beata-szydlo-at-the-international-belt-and-roadforum.html 2017.08.19-i letöltés Rail Market Monitoring: https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/market/market_monitoring_en 2017.08.19-i letöltés Rajtár, J. 1999: A Borostyánkő út a Dunán való átkelés után – Pozsony környéki emlékek (Az előadás kivonata – In. GÖMÖRI J. (szerk.): A Borostyánkő út tájai és emlékei, Scarbantia Társaság, Sopron. pp. 128129.

Scotti, F. M. 1999: A kulturális turizmus lehetőségei Aquileiában. – In. GÖMÖRI J. (szerk.): A Borostyánkő út tájai és emlékei, Scarbantia Társaság, Sopron. p. 16-17.

Világbank Kereskedelmi Statisztika 2015: https://wits.worldbank.org/ countrystats.aspx, 2017.08.19-i letöltés.

Visegrádi Nyilatkozat, 1991 Wielowiejski, J. 1999: Az Adria és a Keleti-tenger között vezető Borostyánkő út régészeti és turisztikai szempontból (Az előadás kivonata). – In. GÖMÖRI J. (szerk.): A Borostyánkő út tájai és emlékei, Scarbantia Társaság, Sopron. pp. 137. Żuchowski, W.2014: Alternative connection between territory of Poland and Far / Middle East countriesfor containers transport – LogForum 10.2. pp. 153-161.

An introduction to the Digital Silk Road The Eurasian Economic Union as a regional integration; trends in the foreign trade turnover between Hungary and the member states between 2011-2016 Borkó T. 2010: Kaukázus és Közép-Ázsia In. BLAHÓ A. – KUTASI G. (szerk.): Erőközpontok és régiók a 21. század világgazdaságában. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest pp. 380-404 Deák A. 2017: Gazdasági divergencia és inercia a posztszovjet térben In: DEÁK A. (szerk.): A kéretlen integráció A Putyini Oroszország világgazdasági beilleszkedése 2000-2013 pp. 197-22 Eurasian Development Bank Report 43. – Eurasian Economic Integration 2017 <https://eabr.org/en/analytics/integration-research/cii-reports/ eurasian-economic-integration-2017/> (utolsó letöltés 2017. 11. 25.)

Eurasian Economic Union hivatalos oldala <www.eaeunion.org > (utolsó letöltés 2017. 11. 24.)

Központi Statisztikai Hivatal oldala <www.ksh.hu> (utolsó letöltés 2017.

11. 27.)

The Eurasian Economic Union: Power, Politics and Trade, International Crisis Group Report N 240/Europe and Central Asia 20 July 2016 https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/eurasianeconomic-union-power-politics-and-trade (utolsó letöltés 2017. 11. 24.)

Vigóczki M. 2016: Az Eurázsiai Gazdasági Unió: Szovjetunió 2.0 vagy Európai Unió 2.0 – KKI-elemzések E-2016/20. pp.3-9.

Comparison of the economic features of the Visegrad countries at regional level Csallner A E (2015): Bevezetés az SPSS statisztikai programcsomag használatába. Jegyzet. Szegedi Tudományegyetem, Juhász Gyula Pedagógusképző Kar, Szeged, p. 133 Huzsvai, L –Vincze, Sz. (2012): SPSS-Könyv. Seneca Books, ISBN 978963-08-5666-9, p. 325 Kalmár P - Zéman Z - Lukács J (2015): Bankcontrolling marketing szemléletben: Alkalmazott statisztika a kontrolling szolgálatában (Bank-controlling marketing conceptions: adapted statistics for aim of controlling). HITELINTÉZETI SZEMLE /Credit Institutional Review/ 14:(4) pp. 108-123.

Khemiri, R. - Ben Ali, M.S. (2013): Exchange rate pass-through and inflation dynamics in Tunisia: A Markov-switching approach. Economics, Issue 7, Scopus Journal Lentner Cs – Zsarnóczai J S – Zéman Z (2017): Taxation, governmental debt and budget in the European Union (in Russian). Economic Systems, Vol 10. No.1 (36), pp. 104-109.

ISSN 2309-2076, in Moscow.

Lentner Cs (2007): The Competitiveness of Hungarian University Based - Knowledge Centres in European Economic and Higher Education Area.

TRANSFORMATIONS IN BUSINESS & ECONOMICS 6:(2) pp. 87-100.

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121-132.

Mina, W. (2015): Political risk guarantees and capital flows: The role of bilateral investment treaties. Economics, Issue 9, Scopus Journal Valentini, E. (2015): Indirect taxation, public pricing and price cap regulation: A synthesis. Economics, 9. Issue, pp.1-39. Scopus Journal Zsarnóczai J S – Lentner Cs – Zéman Z (2016): Indicators of the World Bank for environmental conservation. Modern Science. No. 4. Prague, ISSN 2336-498X, pp. 37-46.

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Geopolitical public opinion poll 2018 1) How informed do you consider yourself of foreign policy issues?

1 GILBOA, Eytan (2005): The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations. In: Political Communication, 22:27–44. DOI: 10.1080/10584600590908429 2 BOGNÁR, Adrienn (2015): A fiatalok politikai attitűdjei (Political attitudes of young people). In: Kultúra és közösség, IV. folyam VI. évfolyam, 2015/III. szám, 85–99. http://www.kulturaeskozosseg. hu/ pdf/2015/3/09.pdf 2) What is your primary source when seeking information about foreign affairs?

3 Publicus Research (2017): Médiafogyasztási szokások és egyes médiumok politikai megítélése (Media use patterns and the political perception of certain media). 2017. május 21. http://www.publicus.hu/ blog/mediafogyasztasi_szokasok_es_egyes_mediumok_politikai_megitelese/ 4 PwC (2012): Szórakoztatóipari és médiapiaci Körkép 2012–2016 (Entertainment Industry and Media Outlook 2012-2016). 13. kiadás, 2012. november https://www.pwc.com/hu/hu/mediaes-szorakoztatoipar/assets/e-m-outlook-2012.1.pdf 5 Médiatudományi Intézet (2013): Magyarországi médiapiaci körkép (Media Outlook in Hungary) 2013. 1. félév. http://mtmi.hu/dokumentum/438/mkpp_13_01.pdf 4) Which of these influence the foreign policy mindset of the nation the most?

SCHWARTZ, Jason (2018): Is Facebook preparing to open up on fake news? In: Politico, 2018. 01. 07. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/07/facebook-fake-news-326996 7 MADRIGAL, Alexis C. (2017): What Facebook Did to American Democracy - And why it was so hard to see it coming. In: The Atlantic, 2017. 10.

12. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/whatfacebook-did/542502/ 7) On a scale of 1 to 5 please rate the different countries as to the relationship you think they have with Hungary.

8 modus: the most frequently occurring element of a data set (i.e. the responses given) 14) Please put the following alliances in order of importance as to the priority you think they should have in Hungary’s foreign policy.

9 A Magyar Honvédség békefenntartó missziói 2. (2017): Infojegyzet a Magyar Honvédség folyamatban lévő békefenntartó és válságkezelő szerepvállalásairól, illetve a katonai miszsziók finanszírozási mechanizmusairól (Peace-keeping missions of the Hungarian Defence Forces 2 – Information on the current peace-keeping and crisis management engagements of the Hungarian Defence Forces and on the financing mechanism of military missions). 2017/49, 2017. június 6. http://www. parlament.hu/documents/10181/1202209/Infojegyzet_2017_49_ MH_missziok_2.pdf/ab17dc18-6ce7-47e2-99b9-1b4638cf3bf0 10 GALAMBOS, Sándor (2017): Külszolgálatra indulnak (Deployed abroad). In: honvedelem.hu, 2017. augusztus 5. https://honvedelem.hu/ cikk/64723_kulszolgalatra_indulnak 15. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the role of NATO in Hungary’s defence policy.

11 Europa.eu (2018): Kül- és biztonságpolitika (Foreign and security policy). https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy_hu 17) Do you agree that Hungary should send soldiers onto foreign missions?

12 GALAMBOS (2017) 13 A Magyar Honvédség békefenntartó missziói 2. (Peace-keeping missions of the Hungarian Defence Forces 2) 14 Honvédelmi Minisztérium (Ministry of Defence) (2012): Magyarország Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiája (The national military strategy of Hungary) http://www.kormany.hu/download/a/40/00000/nemzeti_katonai_strategia.pdf 15 GALAMBOS (2017) 19-22) Which city do you think is the political, economic, cultural, technological/innovation centre of the EU? 16 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-commission-hr-key-figures_2017_en.pdf 14 http://www.zyen.com/component/content/article.html?id=240 18 https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domesticspending-on-r-d.htm 19 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/framework/europe-2020-strategy_hu 23) How do you imagine the European Union in 20 years?

20 https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/ global-europe-2050-report_en.pdf 21 Pogátsa Zoltán (2016): Magyarország politikai gazdaságtana – Az északi modell esélyei (Political economics of Hungary – Chances of the Northern model). Osiris Kiadó 22 https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/ winston_churchill_hu.pdf 24) What effect would the change that you indicated have on Hungary?

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Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda: Magyarország számára Tusk újraválasztása Európa működőképességéről szólt (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister: To Hungary, the re-election of Tusk was about the functioning of Europe), http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/ hirek/magyarorszag-szamara-tusk-ujravalasztasa-europa-mukodokepessegerol-szolt 26) Which 3 of the listed countries do you think should have a place in the European Union?

24 OECD Better Life Index: Switzerland, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/switzerland/ 25 CIA: The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html 26 Kapitány Balázs: Ethnic Hungarians in the NeighbouringCountries, http://www.demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php/demographicportrait/article/view/894/656, 233-234.

27 Kapitány Balázs: Ethnic Hungarians in the Neighbouring Countries, http://www.demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php/demographicportrait/article/view/894/656, 236.

28 European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey_en 27) Please put the countries that are the most important for the operation of the European Union in order of importance.

29 Eurostat: Share of Member States in EU GDP, http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1 30 Eurostat: Share of Member States in EU GDP, http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1 31 Eurostat Newsrelease, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8102195/3-10072017-AP-EN.pdf/a61ce1ca-1efd41df-86a2-bb-495daabdab, 1.

32 KSH: Jelentés a külkereskedelem 2016. évi teljesítményéről (Central Statistical Office: Report on foreign trade output in 2016), http://www. ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/kulker/kulker16.pdf, 21-22.

33 Eurostat: Share of Member States in EU GDP, http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1 34 Eurostat Newsrelease, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8102195/3-10072017-AP-EN.pdf/a61ce1ca-1efd41df-86a2-bb-495daabdab, 1.

35 Eurostat: Share of Member States in EU GDP, http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1 36 Eurostat Newsrelease, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8102195/3-10072017-AP-EN.pdf/a61ce1ca-1efd41df-86a2-bb-495daabdab, 1.

37 Eurostat: Share of Member States in EU GDP, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1 38 Eurostat Newsrelease, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8102195/3-10072017-AP-EN.pdf/a61ce1ca-1efd41df-86a2-bb-495daabdab, 1.

28) Which countries are the most important partners of the European Union?

39 European Commission, Directorate General for Trade: Client and Supplier Countries of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade, http://trade. ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf 29) Do you think that a joint European army is needed?

40 Szálkai Kinga: Magyarország NATO-tagságának jelentősége a 21. század elején (The significance of Hungary’s NATO membership in the early 21st century), http://www.ajtk.hu/uploaded/file/ file_1499425185_1_AJRC-Elemze%CC%81sek%202016E06%20 Sza%CC%81lkai%20Kinga.pdf, 3. o.

41 PESCO: a hatékonyabb védelmi együttműködésért az EU-ban (Pesco: EU countries sign off on plan for closer defence cooperation), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/hu/headlines/security/20171208STO89939/pesco-a-hatekonyabb-vedel-mi-egyuttmukodesert-az-eu-ban 30) What is your opinion on the New Silk Road based on preliminary information you have heard?

42 The official website of the Chinese government: http://www.gov.cn/ xinwen/2015-03/28/content_2839723.htm 43 „2015年中国对外投资同比增长14,7%” In: Xinhua, 2016. január 21. http:// www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-01/21/c_128652668.htm 44 „Az Egy övezet, egy út stratégia komoly lehetőségeket jelent Európának” (The One Belt, One Road strategy offers major opportunities to Europe). In: Magyarország Kormánya, 2017. május 14. http://www. kormany.hu/hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/hirek/az-egyovezet-egy-ut-strategia-komoly-lehetosegeket-jelent-europanak 45 Le Corre, Philippe: Europe’s mixed views on China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. In: Brookings, 2017. május 23. https://www.brookings. edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/23/europes-mixedviews-onchinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/ 31) What is your attitude towards China?

46 The World Bank Data Catalog https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/ dataset/gdp-ranking 47 ’Full Text: Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the World Economic Forum.’ In: The State Council Information Office The People’s Republic of China, 2017. április 6. http://www.china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm 48 Pew Research Center. Global Indicator Database. Opinion of China. http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/ 23

32) What effect do you think the New Silk Road initiative can potentially have on Hungary?

49 2012-ben Kína és 16 közép-kelet-európai ország kapcsolataik intézményi koordinálására létrehozta a „16 + 1 együttműködés” elnevezésű Platformot (In 2012, China and 16 Central Eastern European countries established the “16 + 1 Cooperation” Platform to institutionally coordinate their relations) 50 Le Corre, Philippe: Europe’s mixed views on China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. In: Brookings, 2017. május 23. https://www.brookings. edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/23/europes-mixed-views-onchinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/ 33) Which 3 of the countries listed below do you think are the most important in terms of economy?

51 https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf 52 Official site of the World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview 53 Barboza, David: China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy.

In: The New York Times, 2010. augusztus 15. http://www.nytimes. com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=all 34) Which do you think the most important target countries are for Eastern Opening?

54 „Az Egy övezet, egy út stratégia komoly lehetőségeket jelent Európának” (The One Belt, One Road strategy offers major opportunities to Europe). In: Magyarország Kormánya, 2017. május 14. http://www. kormany.hu/hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/hirek/az-egyovezet-egy-ut-strategia-komoly-lehetosegeket-jelent-europanak 55 The Observatory of Economic Complexity https://atlas.media.mit. edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/hun/show/all/2016/ 56 The Observatory of Economic Complexity https://atlas.media.mit. edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/hun/show/all/2016/ 36) Which country do you think will be the world’s leading economic power in 2050?

57 https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf 58 Long-term macroeconomic forecasts. Key trends to 2050. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015. 4. (Economist, 2015) 3. http://pages.eiu. com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Long-termMacroeconomicForecasts_ KeyTrends.pdf 59 The World in 2050: Will the shift in global economic power continue?

PricewaterhouseCooper, 2015. február. http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf

Long-term macroeconomic forecasts. Key trends to 2050. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015. 4. (Economist, 2015) 3. http://pages.eiu. com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Long-termMacroeconomicForecasts_ KeyTrends.pdf 61 Long-term macroeconomic forecasts. Key trends to 2050. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015. 4. (Economist, 2015) 3. http://pages.eiu. com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Long-termMacroeconomicForecasts_ KeyTrends.pdf 62 PwC 63 Lee, William: Global Economic Outlook and Growth Generators. Citibank http://www.citibank.com/transactionservices/home/sa/2011q1/ cab/docs/presentations/day2_3_Economic_outlook.pdf 64 Long-term macroeconomic forecasts. Key trends to 2050. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015. 4.

66 Eszterhai Viktor – Polyák Eszter: A világgazdaság jövője 2050-ben. In: PAGEO, 2017. február 3. http://www.geopolitika.hu/hu/2017/06/12/avilaggazdasag-jovoje-2050-ben/ 37) Which country do you think will be the world’s leading political power in 2050?

66 Long-term macroeconomic forecasts. Key trends to 2050. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015. 4. (Economist, 2015) 3. http://pages.eiu. com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Long-termMacroeconomicForecasts_ KeyTrends.pdf 67 Gáthy, Vera (2014): India választott (India went to the polls). In: Társadalomkutatás - A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Gazdaság- és Jogtudományok Osztályának Folyóirata. 32. évf. 3. sz. 2014, pp. 235– 246.

38) Which country do you think will be the world’s leading cultural power in 2050?

68 Official site of the Confucius institutions: http://english.hanban.org/ 39) Which continent do you think will see military conflicts the most frequently in 2050?

69 HEGRE, Haward – KARLSEN, Joakim – NYGARD, Haward Mokleim – STRAND, Haward – URDAL, Henrik: Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010– 2050.November 21, 2011 http://folk.uio.no/hahegre/Papers/PredictionISQ_Final.pdf 60

LIST OF PICTURES AND FIGURES Exploring the geopolitical situation of Central Europe in the context of geopolitical theories Figure 1. made by the author Figure 2. https://pangea.blog.hu/2014/06/29/a_foldrajz_a_tortenelem_kulcsa, 5 Jan. 2019.

Figure 3. Zack Cooper: The Clash of Asian Civilizations?, https://www. cato-unbound.org/2017/02/16/zack-cooper/clash-asian-civilizations, 6 Jan. 2019.

Figure 4. Zbigniew Brzezinski: A Nagy Sakktábla, Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1999. p. 88.

Figure 5. Jakub G. Grygiel – A. Weiss Mitchell: Nyugtalan határvidék, Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2017. p. 20.

Geopolitical viewpoints for the economic strategy of Hungary and the V4 Figure 1. World Bank Figure 2. OECD, in: The Economist Table 1. Eurostat Table 2. Eurostat The importance of the New Silk Road to the V4 in the global economic space Figure 1. fDi Intelligence, from the Financial Times Ltd 2018.

Figure 2. Eurostat Building Hungary’s country image in the people’s Republic of China Table 1. 2006 report by the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA) Figure 1. CNTA (2017) Figure 2. Ctrip (2017) Figure 3. China Tourism Academy – CTA Establishing the Budapest-Warsaw axis by developing the infrastructure in the Southern Slovakian region Figure 1. Labour Office Figure 2. INEKO Figure 3. INEKO Figure 4. INEKO Figure 5. INEKO Figure 6. INEKO Figure 7. INEKO

Figure 8. Őry Péter, Pro Civis PT Figure 9. INEKO Figure 10. INEKO Figure 11. INEKO The geoeconomic significance of the “New Amber Road” Figure 1. made by the author based on data from Rail Market Monitoring Figure 2. made by the author based on data from Rail Market Monitoring Figure 3. made by the author based on data from port authorities Figure 4. made by the author based on data from port authorities Figure 5. made by the author An introduction to the Digital Silk Road Figure 1. China Go Abroad (6th Issue), Xinhua Net, China Daily Figure 2. National Report on E-commerce Development in China, Asia Times Figure 3. National Report on E-commerce Development in China, EC, Enterprise Singapore Figure 4. EU SME Centre Figure 5. EU SME Centre Figure 6. TeleGeography Table 1. Measuring the Information Society Report 2017 Volume 1 Table 2. China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) Table 3. China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) Table 4. China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) The Eurasian Economic Union as a regional integration; trends in the foreign trade turnover between Hungary and the member states between 2011-2016 Table 1. Eurasian Development Bank Table 2. Eurasian Development Bank Figure 1. made by the author based on data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office Figure 2. made by the author based on data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office Figure 3. made by the author based on data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office

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credits EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Norbert Csizmadia MANAGING EDITOR Anton Bendarzsevszkij EDITORAL BOARD Anton Bendarzsevszkij László Körtvélyesi Géza Salamin Péter Szatmári György Szapáry István Szilágyi Ákos Vajas COPY EDITOR Szilvia Kalla

AUTHORS György Bartha Ádám Bohár Norbert Csizmadia Gréta Czene Ráhel Czirják Ádám Csenger Anita Faust Zsolt Gál László Gere Levente Horváth Marcell Horváth Fanni Maráczi Viktória Németh Ádám Sashalmi Andrea Szegedi Alexandra Zoltai

ART EDITOR Gyula Nagy Fülöp Kovács Zsófia Szabó PUBLISHED BY: Pallas Athéné Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation H-1014 Budapest, Úri str. 21, Hungary DATE OF PUBLICATION December 2018

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