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Norwegians’ Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy: Symbolic Politics and Group Threat Justin Allen Berg, Rebecca Folkman Gleditsch Department of Sociology, University of North Dakota 225 Centennial Drive Stop 7136, Grand Forks, ND 58202-7136 justin.berg@email.und.edu; Rebecca.gleditsch@my.und.edu Abstract This study examines the extent to which symbolic politics and group threat theories explain Norwegian citizens’ opinions regarding the impact of immigration on their country and on the policy of voting rights for the foreignborn. With data from the 2012 European Social Survey, the results indicate that economic threat and especially cultural threat drive Norwegian citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants while symbolic politics play a comparatively larger role in the formation of their policy attitudes. Individuals in Norway likely consider the potential costs and benefits of immigration when forming their attitudes toward the foreign-born, yet, when it comes to deciding on immigration policies, they are more likely to resort to their latent political values by taking cues from traditional political parties and ideologies. One implication is that if extreme right-wing parties and political elites achieve more media coverage, restrictionist immigration policies may be expected to be supported by a larger contingent of the population, regardless of the actual costs and benefits of immigration into Norway. Keywords Immigration Attitudes; Symbolic Politics; Group Threat
Introduction Within the last 20 years the number of people migrating to new countries has increased substantially, with the European nations being one of the most popular destinations (UN News Centre 2013). Unsurprisingly, native-born citizens express a wide range of opinions regarding a variety of immigration issues. As Fussell (2014) discusses in her review article, there are many explanations for the variation in immigration attitudes, with some research showing that individual characteristics matter, such as educational attainment and racial prejudice (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Pettigrew 1998), and other research showing that the interpersonal environment has an effect, such as the level and type
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of contact between members of the majority and minority groups (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009). In particular, recent research on immigration attitudes in European nations has highlighted the importance of political values (e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Party affiliation and left-right political ideologies play a significant role in shaping Europeans’ immigration attitudes (e.g., Bohman 2011; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006), independent of their cognitive calculations of the costs and benefits of immigration. However, across nations, group threat appears to be a primary driver of immigration attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; McLaren 2003; Quillian 1995). It is particularly powerful in explaining the immigration attitudes among native-born residents in geographic areas that have experienced a comparatively quick influx of foreign-born residents during a time when there is a national conversation occurring about the costs and benefits of immigration (Hopkins 2010). Such dynamics are currently playing out in Norway. Since the year 2000 the number of immigrants arriving in Norway has doubled, making its foreign-born population grow to 12 percent of the overall population (Statistics Norway 2014). The national discussion about immigration and immigration rights has been growing as well (e.g., see Erlanger 2014). Analyzing Norwegians’ immigration attitudes, especially regarding policy issues, is valuable for several reasons. Understanding the dynamics that influence the formation of immigration attitudes of native-born citizens in different countries allows scholars to identify fundamental and common factors. Such knowledge may help international organizations better work with national leaders to be able to successfully integrate foreign-born individuals into new communities. Norway also has a homogenous population, with only between 5 to 7 percent of its residents being ethnic minorities (CIA 2014; Statistics
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Norway 2014). The factors that influence the development of immigration attitudes in Norway may parallel attitudes in other relatively homogeneous societies. Lastly, Norwegians are a comparatively understudied group of people in terms of understanding their immigration attitudes (cf. Ceobanu and Escandell 2010), even though they have much influence on international affairs, particularly in Scandinavia and Europe. In this study, therefore, we use the 2012 European Social Survey to analyze Norwegians’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. Specifically, we focus on the comparative explanations of a symbolic politics perspective versus a group threat perspective. In this way, we are able to assess whether Norwegians are influenced more by their political value orientation or by their calculations of group competition for finite resources with immigrants when forming their attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. Theory Given the importance of political values in determining Europeans’ immigration attitudes (Bohman 2011; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006), we argue that a symbolic politics perspective offers important explanations of Norwegians’ viewpoints toward immigrants and immigration policies. The primary argument of symbolic politics theory is that individuals hold latent political values, which are formed early in life through socialization processes, and this orientation emerges at particular times in adulthood because of certain political symbols (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Sears 1997; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979). The political symbols elicit an emotional response in native-born citizens toward immigrants and immigration policy rather than a cognitive calculation of the social situation (Kaufman 2006). One of the most noticeable political symbols is political elites who use anti-immigrant rhetoric (Fussell 2014). It may be expected, therefore, that Norwegians who favor a conservative political ideology and follow the words of political elites closely will be more likely to consider immigrants a burden on society and be unsupportive of pro-immigrant public policies, regardless of any potentially positive benefits from immigration. In contrast to the values-based perspective of symbolic politics, group threat theory explains anti-immigrant
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attitudes by focusing on group competition. It has three primary components: 1) a majority group believes that it owns certain economic, political, cultural, or social resources (Blalock 1967); 2) it believes that the minority group is qualitatively different from itself (Blumer 1958); and 3) it believes that the minority group has designs on taking those finite resources (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005). In response, the members of the majority group feel threatened and hold unfavorable opinions toward the minority group and any pro-minority policies (Hopkins 2010). This process may occur at multiple levels (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Majority group members may worry about their own resources, leading to the self-interest form of threat (Fussell 2014), or they may worry about resources for their group (Burns and Gimpel 2000). The threat may be real, adhering to a realistic group conflict perspective (Bobo 1983), or only perceptual (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005). Many researchers have studied individual level perceptions, such as the belief that immigrants take desirable jobs or affect religious traditions (e.g., Berg 2010; McLaren 2003). Two standard forms of perceived threat are economic threat and cultural threat (Pichler 2010; Schneider 2007). Consequently, it is expected that Norwegians who express greater amounts of economic and cultural threats from immigrants will be more likely to hold negative viewpoints of immigrants and be unsupportive of pro-immigrant public policy. Prior research also highlights other factors that influence the development of immigration attitudes, including many individual-level and contextual-level characteristics (e.g., see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Fussell 2014). For example, socioeconomic status, educational attainment, gender, age, employment status, region, and interpersonal contact with immigrants all affect the likelihood that a person will form a positive or a negative attitude toward immigrant groups and pro-immigrant policies (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Pichler 2010; Quillian 1995; Roeder 2011). In this study, we incorporate such characteristics in the analysis in order to isolate the potential effects of symbolic politics and group threat. Data and Measures We use data from the 2012 European Social Survey (ESS Data Archive 2012), which is the most recent year released at this point. The European Social Survey began in 2002 and it is conducted every two years in countries across Europe. The 2012 survey included a
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nationally representative sample of Norwegian adults aged 15 and older. Through a random probability design, respondents were chosen and interviewed face-to-face. After constraining the data to Norwegian citizens and dropping missing data on the dependent variables, the sample size is 1469. Dependent Variables In this study, we use two dependent variables to measure Norwegians’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. The first question asks, ‚Is Norway made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?‛ The answers ranged from 0 to 10, with 0 representing ‚Worse Place to Live‛ and 10 representing ‚Better Place to Live.‛ The second question asks, ‚How important do you think it is for democracy in general that immigrants only get the right to vote in national elections once they become citizens?‛ It also ranged from 0 to 10, with 0 representing ‚Not at All Important for Democracy in General‛ and 10 representing ‚Extremely Important for Democracy in General.‛ The first dependent variable, therefore, measures a proimmigrant response, while the second dependent variable measures an anti-immigrant response, since immigrants would only be allowed to vote in national elections only after they become official citizens. Independent Variables To represent a symbolic politics perspective, we use five questions: 1) ‚Which party did you vote for in that (previous) election?‛ We recoded this variable into liberal = -1 (Rodt, Sosialistisk vensterparti, Det Norske Arbeiderparti, Venstre and Senterpartiet), conservative = 1 (Kristelig Folkeparti, Hoyre and Fremskrittpartiet), and don’t know/refused = 0; 2) ‚In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?‛; 3) Please tell me on a score of 0 – 10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Politicians; 4) Please tell me on a score of 0 – 10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Political Parties; and 5) ‚Please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general...Opposition parties are free to criticize the government,‛ where 0 represents ‚Not at all important for democracy in general‛ and 10 represents ‚Extremely important for democracy in
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general.‛ The first two variables that measure political party and ideology are standard measures of symbolic politics theory. Scholars, however, typically include additional measures. For example, Calavita (1996) focused on voting on a specific U.S. state proposition to represent symbolic discontent for illegal immigration. Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) used measures on support for requiring youth to learn Spanish and immigrants to learn English, considering the variables to be symbols of latent ideologies. Sides and Citrin (2007) included a variable for frequency of political discussions to represent a link between knowledge of political elites’ messages and ideology. Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) used an indicator of intolerance with respect to race and busing issues, tapping into emotions. Similarly, Kaufman (2006) argues that the main point of the symbolic politics perspective is the emotional response that political symbols elicit, such as fear. Following prior scholars in extending the potential measures of a symbolic politics perspective and building on the emotional response aspect of the theory, we include measures of trust in politicians and political parties, two important political symbols, and ones that represent the notion that people who trust more in politicians and political parties will be more likely to rely on their political predispositions than rational, self-interested calculations when forming their immigration attitudes. We also include a measure of political beliefs about allowing opposition parties to criticize the government, tapping into latent predispositions about power. Many studies find variations of this aspect of power relations in Europeans’ attitudes toward immigrants to be significant (e.g., Bohman 2011; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2007; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007). We use five questions to measure economic threat and cultural threat. The following two questions measure economic threat: 1) ‚Would you say it is generally bad or good for Norway’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?‛, where the range is reverse coded so that 0 = ‚Good for the economy‛ and 10 = ‚Bad for the economy‛, and 2) ‚To what extent do you think Norway should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here? Would you allow many to come and live here, allow some, allow a few or allow none?‛ Three questions measure cultural threat: 3) ‚Would you say that
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Norway’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?‛, where the range is reverse coded so that 0 = ‚Cultural life enriched‛ and 10 = ‚Cultural life undermined.‛; 4) ‚To what extent do you think Norway should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most Norwegians to come and live here? Would you allow many to come and live here, allow some, allow a few or allow none?‛; and 5) ‚How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most Norwegians? Would you allow many to come and live here, allow some, allow a few or allow none?‛ Control Variables Following prior research (e.g., see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Fussell 2014), we include a number of important control variables that also predict immigration attitudes: 1) ‚Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in Norway?‛ (yes = 1 and no = 0); 2) ‚Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?‛ (yes = 0 and no = 1); 3) ‚On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in Norway?‛ (coded in a range where 0 = ‚Extremely dissatisfied‛ and 10 = ‚Extremely satisfied‛); 4) Sex (male = 0 and female = 1); 5) ‚What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?‛ ranging from 1 = no education to 14 = Ph.D. level; 6) ‚Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Paid work (yes = 1 and no = 0); 7) Age in years; 8) Household income (a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = 216,000NOK to 973,001NOK and above). Results As Table 1 indicates, Norwegian citizens are split in their ideas about whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live, given that the average score is 5.6 on a scale that ranges from 0 (worse) to 10 (better). The median score (not shown) is 5, indicating that half of the respondents believe that immigrants make the country worse and half the respondents believe that immigrants make the country better. However, Norwegian citizens’ policy opinions are much more in agreement. The vast majority believe that it is important for a democracy in general that ‚immigrants only get the right to vote in national elections once they become citizens.‛ In terms of the variables that measure symbolic politics, Norwegian citizens appear to be quite split once again. They are slightly liberal in their political
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party affiliation yet slightly right-oriented in their political ideology. They are also split in terms of their trust of politicians and political parties, scoring a 5 on average on a 0 to 10 scale. They are more in agreement in their assessment that opposition political parties should be free to criticize the government in democracies, with an average score of 8.5 on a 0 to 10 scale. Additionally, Norwegian citizens lean slightly toward believing that immigrants are good for the economy and also enrich the culture, scoring a 4 on the scales that range from 0 to 10 (good for the economy to bad for the economy and enrich the culture to undermine the culture). They are also willing to ‚allow some‛ immigrants into the country who are poor and of the same race as the majority as well as ‚allow some‛ who are a different race from the majority. TABLE 1 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES OF INTEREST
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Worse or Better Place 5.59 1.97 Vote Only in National Elections Once 8.01 2.36 Citizen Minority Grp Member .04 --Satisfied with Economy 7.96 1.67 Female .47 --Education 7.28 3.28 Paid Work .66 --Age 46.41 18.30 Income 5.37 2.67 Not Discriminated Against .95 --Effect on Economy 4.10 2.02 Poor Immigrants 2.22 .75 Effect on Culture 4.00 2.26 Immigrants of Same Race 1.97 .68 Immigrants of Different Race 2.14 .74 Party -.09 .87 Left-Right Ideology 5.68 2.11 Trust Politicians 5.08 1.91 Trust Political Parties 5.13 1.84 Opposition Parties Can Criticize 8.47 1.77 Government Notes: European Social Survey, 2012. N=1469 Norwegian Citizens.
Table 2 presents the multivariate models that predict Norwegian citizens’ beliefs that immigrants make Norway a better place to live. In the second model, which includes the control variables and symbolic politics variables, all of the symbolic politics variables are statistically significant. However, in the fourth and full model, only two of them are statistically significant and one is in the opposite direction of expectations. Individuals who have greater trust in political parties are more likely to believe that immigrants make Norway a better country. But the coefficient is small. For each unit increase on the scale, which ranges from 0 to 10, individuals are predicted to
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move up the scale that measures beliefs that immigrants make Norway a better place to live by only .088 units. Individuals who favor conservative political parties, however, are less likely to believe that immigrants make Norway a better place. The variables that represent a Left-Right ideology, trust in politicians, and support for the idea that opposition parties should be able to criticize the government, lose significance in the full model when the group threat variables are included. These outcomes suggest that economic and cultural concerns may underlay some of Norwegians’ Left-Right ideology and trust in politicians and certain parties. TABLE 2 OLS REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING NORWEGIAN CITIZENS’ BELIEFS THAT IMMIGRANTS MAKE THE COUNTRY A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE
Variable Intercept
4 β 8.395 (.378) Min. Grp Mem. .163 .017 (.179) Sat. w/ Econ. .020 .017 (.023) Female -.038 -.009 (.073) Education -.014 -.023 (.012) Paid Work -.014 -.003 (.086) Age -.002 -.018 (.002) Income .025 .034 (.002) Not Discrim. .149 .017 (.162) Effect on Econ. -.20*** -.209 (.023) Poor Imm. -.226** -.086 (.080) Effect on Cult. -.36*** -.414 (.021) Imm. Race -.080 -.028 (.080) Imm. Diff. Race -.260** -.097 (.098) Party -.238*** -.119* -.053 (.065) (.050) Left-Right Ideo. -.097*** -.001 -.001 (.027) (.021) Trust Pols. .138** .007 .006 (.045) (.034) Trust Parties .121** .088* .082 (.046) (.035) Opp. Parties .121*** -.002 -.002 (.028) (.022) F Statistic 17*** 28*** 122*** 91*** Adjusted R2 .08 .19 .52 .53 Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). European Social Survey, 2012. N=1469 Norwegian Citizens.
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1 2.902 (.351) .313 (.248) .217*** (.030) .167 (.100) .106*** (.016) .013 (.118) -.003 (.003) .042* (.020) .016 (.224)
2 2.200 (.408) .283 (.234) .115*** (.030) .081 (.095) .075*** (.016) .059 (.112) -.003 (.003) .045* (.019) -.094 (.211)
3 8.870 (.311) .205 (.180) .040 (.023) -.013 (.073) -.015 (.012) -.036 (.086) -.002 (.002) .023 (.015) .226 (.163) -.215*** (.023) -.265** (.080) -.376*** (.021) -.076 (.080) -.265** (.098)
With respect to the group threat variables, both economic threat and cultural threat variables are statistically significant in model 3, which does not include the symbolic politics variables, as well as in the full model. All of them are also in the expected direction. The findings from the full model indicate that individuals who consider immigrants to have a negative effect on the economy and culture and who do not want poor immigrants or immigrants of a different race from the majority of Norwegians to enter the country are much less likely to believe that immigrants make Norway a better country. Overall, the effects are somewhat small. For example, for each unit increase on the culture scale, which ranges from 0 to 10, individuals are predicted to move down the 0 to 10 scale that measures whether Norwegians believe immigrants make the country better by .36 units. Put differently, someone who scores a 10 on the culture scale would be predicted to be 3.6 units away on the better place to live scale than someone who scores a 1 on the culture scale. Additionally, in models (not shown) where the economic threat and cultural threat variables are analyzed separately with the other variables, the statistically significant coefficients remain statistically significant, indicating that both forms of threat add to the explanation of Norwegians’ immigration attitudes. Even though the effects of these coefficients are somewhat small, they are relatively much larger than the symbolic politics variables—two to three times as large. Additionally, the standardized coefficients show that the variables that measure beliefs about immigrants hurting the economy and culture are the most powerful (-.209 and -.414, respectively, compared to the political party variable, which has a standardized coefficient of -.053). Overall, therefore, the variable about immigrants undermining Norwegian culture is more than twice as powerful as any other variable in the model, including the control variables. This indicates that, with respect to determining whether immigrants make Norway a better place to live, Norwegian citizens are particularly concerned about the cultural impact that the foreignborn may have on the country. These results also show that the group threat perspective is much more explanatory in terms of explaining Norwegians’ attitudes toward immigrants than the symbolic politics variables. The explained variation also supports the outcomes of the coefficients. When comparing the adjusted coefficients of determination from models 2 and 3 with that of the full model, the symbolic politics
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perspective adds only 1 percent to the explained variation beyond that of the control variables and the group threat variables (53% – 52% = 1%), while the group threat perspective adds 34 percent to the explained variation beyond that of the control variables and symbolic politics variables (53% - 19% = 34%). TABLE 3 OLS REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING NORWEGIAN CITIZENS’ BELIEFS THAT IMMIGRANTS ‚ONLY GET THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS ONCE THEY BECOME CITIZENS‛
Variable Intercept
1 7.214 (.432) .261 (.304) .023 (.037) -.075 (.122) -.103*** (.020) .299* (.145) .018*** (.003) .000 (.025) .350 (.275)
2 5.614 (.521) .372 (.298) .056 (.038) .077 (.121) -.096*** (.020) .262 (.142) .015*** (.003) -.022 (.024) .407 (.270)
3 4.841 (.517) .287 (.298) .086* (.038) -.001 (.121) -.060** (.021) .307* (.142) .016*** (.003) .004 (.024) .318 (.270) .063 (.038) .335* (.133) .076* (.034) .068 (.133) .094 (.162)
4 β 3.370 (.622) Min. Grp .400 .035 (.295) Sat. w/ Econ. .086* .061 (.038) Female .109 .023 (.121) Education -.069*** .096 (.020) Paid Work .278* .056 (.141) Age .013*** .104 (.003) Income -.017 .020 (.024) Not Discrim. .367 .035 (.269) Effct on Eco. .075* .064 (.037) Poor Imm. .242 .077 (.132) Effct on Cult. .050 .048 (.034) Same Race .160 .046 (.131) Dif. Race .026 .008 (.161) Party .107 .078 .029 (.083) (.083) Left-Right .193*** .159*** .143 (.034) (.034) Trust Pols. -.029 .016 .013 (.057) (.057) Trust Parties -.065 -.053 .041 (.058) (.058) Opp. Parties .100** .141*** .106 (.036) (.036) F Statistic 6.71*** 10.88*** 9.63*** 10.50*** Adjusted R2 .03 .08 .07 .10 Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). European Social Survey, 2012. N=1469 Norwegian Citizens.
However, in terms of forming their immigration policy opinions, Norwegians likely rely on their political ideologies and political symbols more than rational, self-interested calculations. In Table 3, model 4 (the full model), two of the symbolic politics variables are statistically significant and in the expected directions. Individuals who favor a
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conservative political ideology and who feel more strongly that opposition parties should be free to criticize the government are more likely to express an anti-immigrant policy attitude. Specifically, they are more likely to think that immigrants should ‚only get the right to vote in national elections once they become citizens.‛ Only one group threat variable is statistically significant. Norwegian citizens who lean toward believing that immigrants are bad for the Norwegian economy are also more likely to hold an antiimmigrant policy stance. Based on the standardized coefficients, this group threat variable is only about half as strong as the symbolic politics variables (.064 versus .143 and .106). Overall, the group threat and symbolic politics variables are relatively more powerful in terms of explaining Norwegian citizens’ policy opinions than the control variables, and, of the two theoretical perspectives, symbolic politics theory offers a better understanding of Norwegian citizens’ immigration policy attitudes. Conclusion International migration is unlikely to recede anytime soon, making it important to understand the factors that shape native-born citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants. Prior research has set a strong foundation by examining individual level characteristics, intergroup dynamics, and group threat processes (e.g., see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010 and Fussell 2014 for reviews). The current study has added to this research by focusing on Norwegians’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. In terms of evaluating the impact that immigrants have on Norway, Norwegian citizens appear to be strongly influenced by group threat processes. Fears that immigrants will hamper economic progress play an important role in their viewpoints, yet their beliefs that immigrants will undermine Norwegian culture is the most consequential factor. Given Norway’s recent absortion of so many immigrants, this finding bolsters Schneider’s (2007) research, which highlights a relationship between immigrant group size and a powerful fear of cultural conflict. In the current study, economic and cultural threats are two to three times more powerful than any of the other factors in their immigration attitudes. These results support Pichler’s (2010) argument that economic and cultural factors are foundational to perceived group threat in European countries. Yet, with respect to Norwegian citizens’ immigration policy opinions, symbolic politics theory offers a better
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explanation than does group threat. Norwegian citizens’ political ideology and values that opposition parties should be able to criticize the government play a relatively important role in their policy attitudes. That is, they rely comparatively less on cognitive calculations of the costs and benefits of immigration and rely comparatively more on taking cues from the platforms of political parties and traditional political ideological differences. Bohman (2011) found a significant connection between the anti-immigrant pronouncements of political parties and Europeans’ anti-immigrant attitudes. Other research shows that anti-immigrant sentiment is stronger in places that express greater support for right-wing extreme parties (Cohrs and Stelzl 2010; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Consequently, latent political values, which are evoked by the rhetoric of political elites, may override Norwegian citizens’ rational assessments when it comes to favoring or opposing immigration policies. If national discussions about immigrants in Norway become more restrictionist, following right-wing arguments, scholars may predict that the average individual will also take on a comparatively negative attitude, all else equal. This especially may be the case in a homogeneous country like Norway, since the positive effects of intergroup contact, which other scholars have found to be powerful in combating anti-immigrant attitudes in many European countries (e.g., see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; McLaren 2003), will be limited due to the homogenous demographic composition. In Norway, because economic and cultural threats are particularly important in the assessment of whether immigrants make the country better or not, social organizations that attempt to integrate immigrants into new communities may find it helpful to publicize any positive information regarding the economic and cultural benefits of immigration. Yet, in terms of influencing Norwegian citizens’ policy opinions about immigration, community organizers may be better off framing their arguments in ways that resonate with traditionally held political party platforms and ideology. In the end, such knowledge will hopefully help all groups enjoy the resources of a stable democracy. REFERENCES
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