Jason magazine (1982), jaargang 07 nummer 6 1

December 1982, number 6 I March 1983, number 1

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Bicentennial

Report of a Jason-exchange with an American Committee

~Jason Secretarist and FAitorial Office: Alexanderstraat 2 2514 R The Hague The Netherlands Telephone: 070- 60 56 58 Postal cheque account: 3561025 Bank account: 45.68.55.548 (Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, in Scheveningen)

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E.xecutive Committee Chairman Deputy chainnan Secretary Chief editor Memhers

Piet-Heyn Goedhart Dick Zandee Willy Hellendoom Even Jan Raven (Dep) Eveline Muusers Maarten Derks Martien de Groene

General Board A. Bouter P.R.C. Lameijer drs. A.F. van Leeuwen drs. M .T. van der Meuten drs. L. Schaapho k mr. W .H.A.M. van den Muijsenbcrgh R.D. Praaning Prawira Adiningrat drs. M . Roemers M. Vcrweij drs. G. W.F. Vigeveno R. Geunsen

Advisory Council dr. W.F. van Eeketen H.J .M. Ahen H. GabriĂŤls d r. A.M.C.Th. van Heel-Kasteel C.C. van den Heuvel dr. L.G.M. Jaquet R.C. Spinosa Cauela drs. E.J. van Vloten

FAitorial Staff of JASON-magazine Chief Editor Memhers

Even Jan Raven (Dep) H ans Fon uin Geen van Loon Maurits Dolmans Pieter de Baan Gen Timmennan G uido Vigeveno

Introduetion Last year, in 1982, a Bicentennial of Dutch-American relations was celebratecl. The Netherlands was the second country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with the United Nations, and these have never been interrupted. For the occasion, Jason thought it should not only celebrate history, but try to contribute its resources to future good relations as weU. The idea was conceived to organize an exchange between Dutch and American policymakers, accompanied by some merobers of the Jason boards and editors, in order to increase the knowledge and understanding of each other's countries and polities. A counterpart american group, a committee on Future DutchAmerican Relations, under chairmanship of Dr. Stanly R. Sloan, was set up too. Both organisations arranged a programme, which you will fmd in this issue. Of both pogrammes a list of participants can be found. ln this issue of Jason Magazine the programme in the Netherlands will be emphasized. The American delegation has got a wide view of Dutch society by visiting representatives of the different dornestic interest groups, both at the political and industrial level. For this we have tried to oompose this issue of a surnmary of the programme in the Netherlands, whereby this variety has been elaborated as good as possible.

The participation of 18 American policy-makers on qualitative high level, specialized in North European polities, has been an important factor in the intensive discussions on the exhange of arguments and facts in relation to the European-American relationship.

The Dutch and American delegates which are more or less on a professional bases activ in the field of foreign policy concluded that they were much more informed about 'their political and economie world'.

On the frrst pages you will find the lecture of Mr. A.J. Sligting who is working for the ministery of defence. The subject of his presentation is the Dutch contribution to NATO. The director of New Projectsof Fokker, Ir. J .

Comelis, held a reading about the Dutch infrastructure for aircraft research of which you can find a summary. Prof. Dr. A. van Staden, political scientist, goes in his presentation in the matter of the American-European relations. The two-way streel, which way to go? "is the headline of the reading of drs. Ch. Sanders, who works for the ministry of foreign affairs. Next you will find a report of the presentation by Dr. Ir. A .E. Pannenborg, vice president of Philips Company. The last two readings of this issue are those of Mr. K.G . de Vries, merober in the second chamber for the PvdA and Prof.

Dr. Jhr. F.A.M. AJting von Geusau, director of the John F. Kennedy Institute, about the European dimension in the West-West relations. As already been told. a delegation composed by Jason was invited by the American committee fo r a visit to the Uniled States. Dick Zandee, vice president of Jason has made a short report of the American programme, which will be the last artiele of this issue of Jason Magazine.

This magazine is printed in english. AJthough this is normaUy not the case, we have in view of the fact that this issue will be send to the Uniled States too, decided to edite this magazine as such.

New adress Jason From March the first, Jason has removed to the following adress: Alexanderstraat 2, 25 14 JL The Hague. Tel.

070 - 60 56 58 THE T AKING OVER of articles from Jason Magazine is only aUowed, aftera written consent of the editorial staff and by mentioning the name of the author, the subject of the issue in which the article is published and the adress of the Jason Foundation .

Dutch contribution to NATO The Netherlands is a small country with a surface area of only some 18,00 square miles. With 14 million people, it is the most densely popwated country in the world, with nearly 800 people per square mile. This compares to fewer than 100 people per square mile in the United States.

The reality of such popwation density creates all sorts of problems for the Netherlands, including those related to defense. Just think of the army having to train on so little available space. Think of the noise of military aircraft operating from nine different bases.

Such situations place a burden on the popwation that cannot be expressed in figures, but makes our endeavours to keep our defense posture - viewed as an accepted necessity -very difficwt.

The low countries at the Rhine delta are facing specific problems requiring considerable amounts of money. Twentyseven percent of the country housing 600Jo of the popwation is below sea level. Land reclamation, an activity of the people of this area ever since 1200, is still going on to meet the natura! 'threat from the west'. ln other words, to keep the water out, we spent this year some 1.5 billion dollars. That is as such as we invest in new defense equipment. And this is just to keep this essential link in NATO's line of communications, the Netherlands ' floating'.

Netherlands is not only a crowded country, it is also a very complicated society. Some 40 different churches, 80 daily ncwspapers with their own editorial staff, over 30 non-commercial broad-

casting organizations all compete for a place on onJy four national radio stations and two nationwide TV networks. lt is also a difficwt country to govem, There are more than 50 politica! parties in this country. Some 20 participated in recent parliamentary elections resulting in 11 parties sharing 150 seats in the second Chamber.

Due to the enormous diversity most decisionmaking depends on compromise and it is with our traditional coalitioncabinets and their programs the sarne.

In spite of that diversity there has been a continuous support for NATOmembership of about 700Jo of the population with fluctuations in reaeLions of extemal events. During the Vietnamcrisis it was 640Jo, whereas at the end of theseventies it was 750Jo. After the first year of the Reagan administration the support decreased largely because of its policy in Central America, 640Jo. The tigure is improving again at this moment.

The discussion on the defense posture generally focuses on three main points: First.

The approach of an a!J~ver security-policy on both sides of the Atlantic.

Second. The burden sharing issue: Is Europe doing enough for its defense?

Third. The nuclear issue, the peace movements, the so-ca!Jed pacifism or neutralism in Europe and more in particwar the misteading - and I am happy to say: outdated - term " Hollanditis' which the invertor Walter Laqeur told me he wiJl no longer use.

Lecture by Mr. A.J. Slichting, Director Departmant of Public Relations of the Ministry of Defence

The jirst point - the matter of security -

is a matter of foreign policy. In this regard the 1980 report 'NATO After Afganistan', prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Research Service of the US Congress had this to say.

"Europeans are well aware of, and concemed at, the implication of several aspectsof current Soviet"policies. However, after years of close proximity to the Soviet Union they have leamed to live with, and adjust to, the realities of Soviet military power. Vulnerability is a condition with which Europeans are familiar. Their policies toward the Soviet Union have evolved not from a feeling of weakness but from a sober assessment of the requirements for permanent stability and security in Europe. This assessment has produced the dual principles of defense and detente on which NATO policy toward the East in now based. "ln termsof defense. European govemments tend to believe that their current efforts are sufficient for the objectives of NATO's strategy of deterrence. Within NATO, weaknesses are recognized to exist, and these are being continuously addressed, but the answers to NATO's military probieros are being sought throught the more effective use of existing resources rather than higher expenditures. Europeans tend to place a

'growing concern about the destruclive potentia/ of nuc/ear arms'

higher premium on political and economie influence than on the role of militairy power. The detente part of NATO's policy is pursued through an erophasis on arms control and by cooperation with the East across a broad range of areas . If detente appears to be reeeiving excessive emphasis by European leaders, and if European leaders appear to be assening and increasingly independent role, it is not out of fear caused through the decline of American power (as many American critics attempt to argue). Rather, it is because of the recent inconsistencies in American foreign policy and particularly the emphasis that the Uniteel States has been placing on defense to the apparent neglect of detente.

"Thus, dUferences in perception over the nature and scale of the treat and the policies and means needeel to counter it, are as important as economie circumstances in explaining the clivergence in views on defence spending" .

Such a statement could well have been written today. But it must be stressed how happy we are that, after all, the Geneva talks on arms control did start with full support of the European allies for the American negotiating position.

There is a lot discussion at this very moment on the state of the alliance and the tension between the US and Europe.

When testifying for the Dutch partiament's standing colllJTtittees on Foreign Affairs and Defense in March 1981 Dr. Stanley Sloan said it had become a habit in the past 25 years to say that USEuropean relations are in state of crises.

The alliance always survives, however, because its memhers share the great values of our societies and realize that there is no ereelibie alternative for the security of the Western world. F1exibility

has always been one of the strong points of the alliance.

Th ere is no reason to clisagree with Dr. Sloan.

De second main issue: burden-sharing.

According to a resent Harris and Gallup poll publisheel in the Herald Tribune, a majority in Europe believes Europe is doing enough for its defense, but almost 7011Jo of the Americans sat that de US is doing too much and Europe too little for the colleelive defense.

In the 1980 "Nato after Afghanistan" report which I mentioned before, it is said, the general picture of the European contribution is mixed. It is probably best surnmarized as being substantially better than most Americans believe, but still not as good as many military and defense officials would like" .

The reports on the Allied contributions to the common defense, which secretary Wemberger presenteel to Congress in 1981 and in March of last year clearly illustrate the fumness of the European contribution. It troubles us in Europe a great deal that we apparantly have not yet succeeded in to a considerable extent, even though the evidence on this is clear . The two Weinberger reports, which we appreciate very much for both the credit and the criticism, were submitted to Congress in accordance with an arnendment on the 1981 Defense Authorization Act, authored by senator Cart Levin, dernocrat from Michigan.

When I met senator Levin in Washington last year I thought he would be encouraged by the first report, presenting a clear and honest picture of the European effort. But he said, " No, it is a sad record of failure, because you do not meet the agreed 3% increase of defense spending". And that was all. There is obviously much work to be done

by Europeans to persuade Americans

economie assistance to the third world: con/ribution to security

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that the defense effort of its NATO allies must be looked upon in its entirety rather than merely looking at elireet cost input figures.

When we talk about the defense of our free world and the sacrifices we are making for that purpose we should bear in mind that the obvious cliscrepancy bet-ween the US and allied shares of the burden has much to do with the fact that the US is a nuclear suj,erpower with global responsibilities and interests and an ability to influence world events.

It is not unfair or surprising that this entails a proportionately greater expencliture for defense than is possible for the smaller, less influential European countries. It should be remembered that NATO is actually a regional defense organisation and the European contribution is focussed on the defense of that area and not on a worldwide deptoyment of military power.

To return to secretary of defense Weinbergers report of this year, some of the highlights are: The US is spending over 5.5% of its Gross Dornestic Product for defense. lts allies are spending an average of 3.5% (The Netherlands tigure is near to that). But this is not sufficient to delermine each partoer's contribution; a number of measures must be considered in order to get a balanced picture of contribution efforts.

- For the funds available European allies armed forces have about three miUion men and woman on active duty, the US about two million are included the number rises to six miltion in Europe and three miUion for the US. lncluding civilian defense manpower the total is just under eight miUion for Europe and just over four miUion for the US. - The US allies in NATO account for 55% of the overall ground combat weapon capability, around 50% of the tactical airforce combat aircraft and around 35% of the total tonnahe of naval ships.

The European allies contribute some 90% of the cuurently available ground forces, 75% of Nato's tanks and 75% of the air forces.

Picking up from the Wemberger report agian: "even with early deptoyment of US reinforcements for Europe, the European allies would continue to provide the bulk of NATO ground and air forces in the ftrst months of a conflict".

Another signifigant point is that most European nations abtain their military manpower through conscription. Costs for all-voluntary forces, like in the US, would be much higher for the same manpower we have now. In the Netherlands it would cost some 125 miUion guilders per year more, which would increase our spending by one full percent for nota single soldier more. Conscrip-

tion is guite a burden fora nation, and one that is apparently overlooked by the US and public.

Some other areas where the European allies contributions are particularly relevant should be mentioned here. Europeans fund about two thirds of the alliance's commonly used infrastructure facilities, such as airfields, pipelines, communication systems. Futhermore, in providing the land and the facilities reguired for the whole alliance forwardsdefense posture the European alliance make hidden contributions by foregoing the civilian uses to which these resources would otherwise be put.

In addition, there are considerable defense related costs, such as real estate provided for stationed forces, stocking for equipment for reinforcements from overseas and other HNS expenditures that are not counted in the NATO definition. It should also be taken into consideration that there are numerous civilian assets (trucks, ships, planes, etc.) that are planned for military use in time of ware and that cannot be counted as defense expenditures but make a direct contobution to our military capabilities.

Allies with weaker economies receive substantial help from other European NATO countries, for instanee through delivery of equipment free of charge or for special prices.

This is another "invisible" contribution as far as budgets are concerned.

Many European countries and that definitely includes Holland, regard economie assistance to developing countries as a contobution to security and stability.

Several countries not only meet but surpass the UN-goal of devoting 0,711Jo of the GDP to foreign economie assistance. The Netherlands is on top of the list with 0,9%. The US rankslow with 0,27% Of all NATO-countries, only Italy remains under the US percentage of contribution. By weighing these sorts of indices of burden sharing, Secretary Wemberger says that the non-US NATO-allies in aggregate appear to be showdering roughly their fair snare of the total defense effort. But, on the other hand, he rightly points out the delay in the implementation of the LTOP and the shortfalls in meeting Nato force goals. due to the fact that many allies do not achieve the three percent goal. It should be considered however, that all through the seventies the US real defense spending declined on average more than one percent per year, while the spending of the European allies increased by more than two percent in real terms per year. Ever since the three percent goal was formulated the Europeans tagether reached an average of 2.2 to 2.6 %, which Wemberger calls , a reasonably weU done.

The Netherlands defense spending has been I ,5% over the past few years. For 1982 it is I ,8% and the 1983 budget is based on a 2 percent growed.

The new govemment - sitting, only since November - is basing its budget on a program which says that two percent growth per year will be realizes during the perlos it will be in office. An that should be four years under normal conditions.

Secretary Wemberger states in his report that the current rough balance in burden sharing could change if the US continues to increase its defense efforts at a more rapid rate than that of the allies.

He states that all must do more if our common security is not to be eroded.

B4t he adds; "lt is equally clear, however, that the present economie situation makes it difficult for some countries to act with as much dispatch as they would like and that the politica! imperalive to deal with pressing social problems further lirnits the extent to which a number of allies will respond".

Since everything in the Netherlands is a compromise, a fmn determination of the new gaverment to realize two percent growth per year is - under present economie conditions -not bad at all. Defense is the only part of the state-budget which got this special favorable treatment in the new govemment program .

And after all, let us not focus too much on just a yardstick for the input. It is the output that counts, and that is a good one in this country.

Finally, some remarks on my third main point, the nuclear issue.

There is no measurable increase in padfistic or neutralistic ideas in this country. Parties which advocate those sorts of notions remain as small as they have been for many years. What is happening as it is in other European countries, is a growing and genuine concern about the destructive potential of nu-路 clear weapons and the frightening perspective of a nucleur war. After all, we do live on historie battlegrounds. In the previously cited Harris pal!, 49% the Dutch indicate nuclear armament as the most frightening issue of today as compared to only 18% in the US. A problem is that the more information people get on nuclear arms, on the threat and the means to counter it, the more concern rises. lt will require a great effort and a weU-balanced policy on the part of the govemment and the political parties to prevent emotions from taxing the place of common sense.

But we should also realize that the feelings of concern about nuclear weapons are real and that it would nu unwise to simply blame peace movements as a whole for them. Some elementsof the peace movements may adhere to pacifism and may be far too lenien towards the Soviet Union. But by and large we are dealing with people who are simply

afraid, whoare concerned about the tieree military competition and the resulting nuclear buildup. Their greatest concern is the fear that the arsenals will be used one day, that a limited nuclear war in Europe might become possible, tuming their countries into ruins. The question is not whether the European people want to defend their values and society, but rather how and at what price.

The present Dutch contribution to NATO's nuclear arsenal is: Army : One unit of Lance rockets One unit of 8-inch howitsers One unit trained for dealing withADM's Airforce: Two dual capable F104 (Starjighter) squadron, which wil/ be replaced by F-16 aircraft.

One group of Nike-Hercules air defense rackets, stationed in the GFR. Navy: LRMP aircraft. Used to be Lockheed-Neptune; repfacement by 13 Lockheed-Orions is underway.

As to future developments, the situation is as foUows. A Defense White Paper will be presented to parli~ent in September 1983, containing a ten-year defense plan, including the gaverment's view on the Netherlands nuclear posture for that period. Key points are: continuation of Dutch contobution on the one hand and on the other hand less emphasis on nuclear weapons for our defense, particularly in the battle-field arsenal . A majority in parliament have already expressed that wish and it is a major point for us in the High Level Group (HLG) of Nato. The HLG is considering a shift in nuclear weaponry which will be neccessary when INFweapons will be deployed in Europe.

The program of the new Dutch government says that present nuclear tasks will be continued as long as there are no final decisions on future Dutch contributions, to be laid down in next year's white paper.

That means that for the time being newly arrived LRMP Lockheed-Orions wiU take over the nuclear capability from obsolete and already abandoned Lockheed Neptunes in the next few months and that the F-16 aircraft will take over the role of outgoing dualeapabie Fl04 Starlighters in the course of next year.

Definite decisions on the nuclear tasks in the longer run will be taken within the framework of an ultimate decision on the deptoyment of the famous 48 cruise missiles on Dutch territory as part 3

of the 1979 doubletrack decision of NATO. The program of the new government takes the position thoe the double-track decision is an established fact. The central goal is successful negotiations in Geneva. Pending decision on deptoyment of INF, the Netherlands will take all necessary preparatory measures in

order to keep the possibility for actual deptoyment open.

In other words, the decision for a fmal "yes" remains open, but there is no preelietion to be made whether it will be yes or no in the end. By NATO, deptoyment is scheduled fot 1986. The main concern for the near future is to ereale a elimate for a rational discussion

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on the basis of facts, on the actual political and military situation and on Geneva. The biggest party (socialists, not in office) says " never" to missite deployment. Present coalition (CDA-VVD) says, there is nothing to negotiate when you say 'no' beforehand. " That sounds very logica!".

The current state of AmericanEuropean relations: how troubled is our atlantic partnership?

At the outset I must emphasize that it is very precarious, and perhaps slightly misteading to speak of Europe in general tenns. Western Europe does not constitute a political unity. In 19th century Europe the Austrian chanceUor, Count von Metternich, argued that Germany was merely a geographic notion.

Certainly, present-day Western Europe is more than a geographic concept - it is at least a strong economie entity. But, unlike the United States, Europe is not able to speak with one political voice and that obviously makes a lot of difference. One should, therefore, always be aware of divergences between for instance the Netherlands and France, or Gennany and Britain - divergences which are somelimes as great as between the U.S. and some European countries. lt has become a commonplace to say that the history of the Atlantic Alliance is a history of crisis. The Suez crisis of 1956 meant a crisis of NATO too, and so did the October War of 1973 - not to speak of the Skybolt Crisis, the French withdrawal from the military organization of NATO, and other examples. The very word " crisis" has been laboring

under inflation. In the recent past, many hooks were written in variation of a common theme: "NATO in disarray".

And still the Alliance survived, which is looking at the historical record of military coalitions - an amazing phenomenon.

Nevertheless, there is no reason for assuming that NATO is a sort of unsinkable Titanic. I agree with Stanley Hoffman that it is necessary to distinguish between - as he has put it - the routine difficulties engendered by Western Europe's dependenee on the United States for its security, as weU as by the economie interdependence of the allies on the one hand, and major breakdowns or misunderstandings which reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities on the other. The question arises in which category do the most recent and current controversies over nuclear weapons and arms control, the use of economie sanctions against the Soviet bloc and of how to deal with the Soviet Union in general belong? I firrnly believe they belong in the second.

In other words: I contend that those controversies do pose a real danger to

Lecture of Prof. Dr. A. van Staden, Po litica!

Scientist of the Leiden University.

the survival of NATO and I don't feel that current troubles and problems are just aberrations - the product of ill-fated mutual misperceptions, idiosyncrasies of individual political leaders, or things like that. Let me elaborate this point further before suggesting what could be do ne to secure a lasting cooperation in the future a condition desired so much by the clear majority of ordinary citizens on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Western Alliance is in serious trouble, since there is no basic agreement about the precise nature of the Soviet threat, and, consequently, about the desirable response. Two different philosophies are perceptible.

The prevailing view in the Reagan administration stresses the radicaUy different nature of the Soviet system, either because of its imperial essence, or, more commonly, because of its revolutionary one. The Soviet Union is being perceived as an inextricable mix of power and no conciliation possib/e . ..

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ideology on the march, driven to paranoia because its whole rationale is the assurnption of external hostility, and to expansion because its survival depends on the elirnination of its enernies (within as well as abroad). This outlook leads to the condusion that the &>Yiet system is a system with which no significant mutual gains or lasting cooperation, let alone convergence or conciliation, are possible. The West is said to be engaged in a zero-surn conflict, codernned to endure inescapable confrontation with that system and to practice a policy of perpetual containment.

Now tuming to Europe, I repeat a lot of nuances exist. I venture to say, however, that most European govemments and opinion-leaders as well tend to see &>Viet foreign policy as essentially opportunistic, rejecting any idea of masterplanning or grand-designing. Ideology is regarded as a method of dornestic legitimation rather than as a compass for world action. Many European leaders do not see every &wiet action either within or outside the satellite sphere as a chess move in a wider struggle for world domination. They put greater emphasis on the similarity between Soviet behavior and the ot:1er greater powers, on past experiences as the causes of paranoia and expansion.

Representatives of the political left have come especially to speak without hestitalion of characteristics comrnon to superpowers as through their similarities go much further than parallel nuclear might and their differences add up to little more than ideological dazzlepainting. They see pitiful Soviet leaders suffering from an encirclement syndrome. But also on the other side of the European political spectrum there is not much sympathy for a policy of containment tout court, that is to say without a concomitant search for agreements as a means to induce Moscow to behave in a more reponible way.

These different conceptions of Soviet behavior explain divergent assessments and appraisals of East-West dĂŠtente in general and economie policy toward the Soviet Union in particwar. A majority of West European leaders accept the argurnents for dĂŠtente as developed by of all people - Henry Kissinger under the Nixon adrninistration. In the early seventies, Kissinger aired the view that the Russian bear could be tamed within a web of interdependence. For this reason, the Soviet Union and its EastEuropean clients should be brought as closely as closely as possible into the international trading and fmancial system .

Like Kissinger at the time, many Europeans now assurne that this gives Moscow positive incentives to go on cooperating with the West, increases Russian and East European dependenee on the West, promotes political dialogue (eve6

rybody seems to be in favor of dialogue in Europe), and - as some point out reduces internat pressures in the Soviet Union that might otherwise become explosive and uncontrollable, putting West as well as East at risk. As you will understand I'm referring here to the important debate on how to manage the decline of the Soviet empire.

The United States, under Ronald Reagan, rejects (at least has rejected) this European case for dĂŠtente as far as economie relations with the East are concerned. The American President seems to believe that the West should make the Soviet Union pay the costs of its own policies. lf it rnismanages its economy, spends an inordinate and menacing part of its budget and technological resources on weaponry, invades Afghanistan, insists on the repression of independent social movements in Poland and other East European countries then let it take the consequences.

Let Russian living standards stagnate or fall. After all it is not the hlstorical mission of the West to bail out a sick Soviet economy and to revitalize a wicked social system. The West must - to borrow the words from the President's principal ideological advocate, Richard Pipes of Harvard - compel "the Soviet Union to bear the consequences of its own priorities." It is maintained that Soviet-Western relations have been most constructive when Western policy was based on a straight-forward defense of Western interests. The Soviet leaders offer no favors to the West, neither do they expect these from it.

In actdition to those differences of approach to the Soviet Union, a major souree of today's trouble in the Alliance is the differences of security interests between Europe and America, which have become manifest over recent years.

Unfortunately, NATO does not and can never embody 100 i>ercent strategie interdependence, because the Atlantic area is not a geographic entity.

It has been said and rightly so: "We are here and you are there" - and nobody is able to alter this misfortune of nature. Consequently, risk-sharing is a bone of contention between both sides of the Atlantic. It is in the objective interest of the Europeans to stress the retaliation or punishment element in deterrence, it is an American interest to emphasize the defense or denial aspect of it. In American eyes, a war in Europe is a lirnited war; from the European point of view, such a war (even when fought by convenrionat means only) is a total one.

Vived memories of two world wars as well as geographic proxirnity to the Soviet empire make Europeans far more concerned than Americans about the consequences of a new war. Still, contrary to prevailing conventional wisdoms and hunches, the citizens of Western Europe are generally more alarmed than

Americans about the mounting power of the Soviet Union.

According to a recent cross-national survey, sponsored by that splendid product of American jounalism, the international Herald Tribune, only 23 percent of American respondents regarded the threat of war as the greatest concern for themselves and their country, to compared 42 percent in France, Italy and Spain, 32 percent in the Netherlands and a surprisingly low 25 percent in West Germany. And only 27 percent of the same American respondents held the Soviet military buildup most responsible for international tensions, to 57 percent of the Norwegians, 55 percent of the West Germans, 38 percent of the Dutch, 37 percent of the Italians, and 33 percent of the British.

The Jack of a complete indentity of security interests across ilie Atlantic did not pose a serious problem as long as the United States enjoyed an overwhelmingly strategie superiority over the Soviet Union. The option of a reprisal by centralized American systems was believed to be sufficiently credible in deterring a possible Soviet attack on Western Europe.

However, as the Soviets were coming more and more to strategie parity with the U.S. and as the American homeland was getting increasingly vulnerable to Soviet nuclear strikes, this option lost much of its credibility. Over ilie past two years a curious paradox has emerged. Attempts by the Reagan adrninistration at regaining a strategie edge and giving substance to a counter-force posture - efforts not exclusively but also intended to rescue the concept of extended deterrence and to strengthen the much-discussed militairy coupling between Europe and America did not lessen the problems but, to the contrary, multiplied them.

Many Europeans carne to believe that the U.S. has embarked on a collision course with the Soviet Union. They called ilie Ame.rican comrnitrnent to arms control most se.riously into question and, stimulated by ill-timed and impmdent statements by American officials on lirnited nuclear war, they feit frightened by the nightrnare of a new war to be fought in Europe for the third time in succession, while the homelands of both superpowers would escape unscathed. In this connection, the TNF issue is a real tragedy. What was meant to allay fears of abandonment on the part of the European allies, actually brought about instead suspicions of entrapment.

Thus far I have dealt with conceptual differences as regards the Soviet Union and conflicts of security interest as main causes of intra-Atlantic controversies.

Of course, several additional factors have to be taken into account. The most important one seems to me the diver-

gence between the global scope of American attention, interests and commitments on the hand and the generally much more restricted and parochial domain of European concerns.

To put it most simply: the difference between the outlook of a global power and of regional powers. Thus, Alnerica's pre-occupation with the conflict in Vietnam for the decade between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s and such more recent concerns as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have brought to the surface the absence of political concord in the Alliance, especially with regard to developments outside its geographic province and. concomitantly, the difficulties for the Uniteel States in eliciting political support in such cases.

The many manifestations of hostility between the Uniteel States and the Soviet Union outside the Atlantic area have repeatedly raised tensions. These in turn have increased the threat faced by the Alliance, including its European members, which may perceive no integral link between such events far removed not only from their geographic domain but also from their goals and values in international relations, like the promotion of human rights and the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor countries.

Now I'U address the question of what could be done to repair the transAtJantic darnage. Many observers practicians as weU as theorists - have recently pleaded for the framing and adoption of a common strategy spelling out NATO's policy toward the Soviet Union. More specifically, such a strategy, it is argued, should define: (I) Which Soviet actions are justified by legitimate considerations of national security and which are not. (2) Which economie transactions are in the West's interest and which are not. (3) The purpose and requirements of arms controL I sympathize with pleas for a joint American-European plan for aclion, but at the same time I must point out that its realization is bound to be greatly complicated by the uneven distribution of the fruits of dĂŠtente.

What I really mean is that Europe gainee! far more in tangible benefits, some of utmost importance, than did the Uniteel Stales from the period of dĂŠtente. The value of the West European countries' trade with the Soviet bloc is a dozen times that of U.S. trade with Eastern Europe. West European banks, especially in West Gennany, have heavy loans outstanding there. This is not to say that West European govemments have actually become hostages to dĂŠtente, but it is necessary for comprehension to stress their understandable reluctance of putting their economie stakes at risk

4111111111 IN COI\SUU:NOO Lll(l

troub/ed partnership?

in times of mass unemployment.

Trade with the East means jobs, and that is what the gas pipeline tights was all about. So, one must conclude that Europe and America are not easily going to agree on policy towards the Soviet Union.

What's more, a common strategy, necessary as it is, is certainly not a magie fonnula or likely to work as a cure-all for NATO's diseases. It seems to be also essentialto transfonn the Western Alliance into a real (that is to say, equal) partnership and to give the European countries a bigger say in solving common policy problems. NATO can no Jonger be treated as a prescriplive right automatically vested in the most powerful member, as a proprietary fiefdom of the U.S. And the European countries, self-concious and independent in their political thinking and dealings as they have grown after postwar economie recovery and prosperity, cannot be expected to accept a greater share in the common defense burden without being given more political and military responsibilities. Indeed, a process of controUed devolution of U.S. responsihilities to a West European entity - let's say an European Defense Community (1954 revisited!) - with independent defense functions, but at the same time tightly linked to U.S. military planning, might be a major requirement for making the Alliance work again and to

bring about a consensus arnong the status and peoples NATO is designed to proleet.

I arn happy to note that this view is not only held by many Europeans, but by a lot of Americans as well. To be sure, there are many inconveniences, disadvantages and obstacles to eneauraging the establishment of an European pillar in the Alliance. But they seem minor compared with the prospect of averting the virtual disintegration of it.

* 7

Dutch infrastructure for aircraft research and development I. Comelis began with the statement that the Netherlands do not have an important home market, and that the military market in general is not very important for Fokker. The European market may be large, but Fokker found more possibilities outside Europe. KLM has a network mainly consisting of long lines, while Fokker is specialised in short-range aircraft. OnJy NLM, an intemal Dutch airline that is a subsidiary of KLM, uses Fokker airplanes in the Netherlands.

Military orders constitute onJy some 20% of Fokker's turn-over, and Fokker would not take a lead in a NATO-wide military airforce, since experience is too specialised. Although, the co-production of F-16 is going very well, production of that aircraft is greatly facilitated by the flxed length of the program as well as the number of planes for which the sale is guaranteed. lf Fokker would lose military sales, survival would be difflcult but not impossible: salaries would have to be decreased by 511Jo in order to be competetive again.

8

Taking these faets into consideration, one can wonder how Fokker is able to remaio in existence. It takes flve years and an enorrnous amount of expertise and capital to develop and market an aircraft, and onJy afterabout 15 years more will a project yield proflt.

The reason for Fokker's existence in the special Dutch infrastructure for aircraft development and research. After World War 11 it was decided that for designing, producing and marketing of aircraft a special relationship with the govemrnent id needed. An interdepartmental Committee was set up in whlch the Ministers of Economie Affairs, Transport and Pubtic Works, Foreign Affairs, Finance and of Defense participated. ln 1964 a foundation was flnally established in whlch both govemrnent and industry are represented. This foundation fmances new projects with govemrnent money.

Repayment of loans by Fokker out of these funds are put in a revolving fund.

With this capital F-27 was developed; such support dirninishes the great risks

Summary of the presentalion of Jr. J . Comelis, Director of New Projecls of Fokker.

that exist when fmancing aircraft reseach and development. lf new ideas come up, Fokker has to present these to the foundation, that decides whether to make funds available or not. Research is supported by the Netherlands 'Airospace Laboratory (NLR) of Delft University, that is also represented in the Foundation.

No duplication of Aviation Organisations, whether it be companies, laboratorles or others, is allowed in order not to fragment knowledge, expertise and work, and resulting in an ineffective Ajrcraft Industries in the Netherlands.

The two-way street, which way to go?

At the NATO-summit of 1977 President Carter cornrnitted the US to "a better balance on the two-way street of transatJantic military trade and improved cooperation in development, production and procurement of alliance defense equipment."

Americans and Europeans agree upon the need to avoid duplication of precious R & D (Research and Development), to improve interoperability and cross-servicing of weapon systems and components, and to reduce the unitcosts of equipment by archieving economiesof scale with Jonger production tines.

Broad agreement on these objectives does, however, not mean agreement about the best way to proceed. ln the US-view an important precondition is that the European industrial base shall be organized according to the same principles as the US industry. That is to say that competetiveness should be the sole determinant, and that as long as the price and quality of a European product cannot stand me the comparison with an American product, this European product can never be a candidate for the two-way street. But even if the condition of competetiveness is met, the US, for politica! and strategie reasons, will never accept a European single souree production for US requirements, and will always insist on an indigenous production line.

Because of the fact that trade in military equipment between Europe and the United States is very unbalanced, in fact Europe subsidizes the American Defense lndustry.

Although estimates vary according to the definitions used, the frequently quoted ratio in the seventies for the equipment balnee was ten to one, that is that European allies bought ten times as much military equipment in the US than vice versa. The table below shows a more precise picture which gives for " total Europe" (not including the economically Jesser developed allies) a ratio of 6.3 to I, which is explained for the better part by the relatively favorable British ratio of 2.3 - 1.

European ideas on the Two-way streel do not deny the necessity of a strong, rational and competetive European defence industry. lndeed, the organizing of the European defence market has been the central purpose of the decision of Eurogroup

The Balance of Defense Trade The table shows U.S. defense trade (in millions with its major allies during the live years from 1976-80. For most, U.S. sales vastly outweighed U.S. purchases. The dispanty might have been even wider had the United States not waived some barriers to foreign sales.

US US sales purchases Ratio Belgium Denmark France West-Germany ltaly Netherlands Norway Britain Total Europe Canada

$481.7 257 .7 166.2 1.540. 1 586.8 669.6 345.5 1.120.3 $5,167.9 976.7

$37 .4 49.9 15.7 70,8 45 .5 46.5 74.4 482.2 $822.3 943

13-1 5.2-1 11 -1 22-1 13-1 14-1 4.6- 1 2.3-1 6.3-1 1-1

SOURCE: NATO

ministers in November 1975 for the establishment of an independent European Programme Group, including France. This alone, however, would not raise the European production to a level sufficiently high to achieve the required economiesof scale.

In order to reach this level, the US as a basic premise should buy more of its equipment in Europe. Europeans argue that in certain fields European products (e.g. tanks) are very competive, but that the US forces adapt their evaluation criteria to favour US development. ln any case Americans tend to see a future growth of US purchases in Europe as a result of more rational European defence industry, while Europeans see these purchases is an important condition that has to be met in order to reach comparable levels of production.

Until now the more Atlantic-oriented European allies have resisted efforts to establish a "European preferance" in view of the Jack of progress on the twoway street. This would of course be another way of improving European production levels, but this tendency would also be a very dangerous one, because it would split up the alliance in two independent "production-blocs" with all its military opertational consequences.

Organizing their defence market is of course no easy task for the Europeans,

Lecture of Drs. Chr. Sanders, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

because this would this mean a rather strong involvement in privately owned industries, apart from the question of the extent to whkh western governments are capable of significantly influancing industrial development in their countries.

Americans tend to narrow their focus on armaments cooperation for the sake of RSl (Rationalization, Standardiza tion, Interoperability). They promote these ideas in relative isolation from broader potitical and economie currents now prevailing in European capitals.

They often do not realize that their audiences are typically drawn from European defence ministries, which Jack power and influence within their own govemments and must frequently submil to pressure from trade and finance ministries. These ministries focus their priorities not on meeting the Soviet threat but on enhancing employment. technology and exports. These are rockribbed bottom-line national interests, and no amount of rhetoric will alter them .

This phenomenon is of course only worsened by the deepening differences in economie issues路 between Europe and the US. Besides the fact that the US, notwithstanding a liberal economie tradition, expects its own market to an extent that it would fmd hard to accept from the European side.

As an implementation of President Carter's cornrnitment of 1977, Dr. Perry, then the US-armaments director, presented in 1978 his famous triadproposals, which since can be consictered as the yardstick of progress in the transatlantic armaments dialogue.

The jirst leg of this triad is the condusion of bi-lateral Memoranda of understanding, between the US and individual European nations. European industries would be enabled to compete on an equal footing with US industry in acquiring US defence orders. This implied a waiver of the rather prohibitive Buy American act for the European partners.

The MOUs have been concluded with the European allies but the over-all effects on the balance of defence trade are generally not considered to be of 9

major signifacaoce. Under the pressure of worsening economie conditions Congress is gradually adopting other legislative measures which tend undermine the orginial equal position that the MOUs granted to European industries. Examples of these are the recurring Buy Americao amendments added to the defense authorization bill, that take many farms.

An important amendment sponsored by A. Kazen requires notification of the Congress if the US would become dependent on a sole souree foreign supplier for a major article.

Another example is an amendment by Elwood Hillis that allows US fmns to compete with (European) host nation companies for vehicle contracts, in order to prevent the purchase of light trucks in Britain, Italy and Germany, for US farces stationed in these countries.

As to the purchase of ships, there is a longstanding Congressional prohibition against the procurement of foreign ship hulls. Repeatedly bans are put on the purchase of speciality metals outside the US in the interest of the dornestic steel industry. Although European Govemments realize that these protectionist Iegal steps do not reflect t;1e US govemment attitude towards armaments colla-

10

boration, the negative impact of these actions on specific areas of possible cooperation but also on the general atmosphere of the trans-atlantic dialogue remains an unresolved issue. lndeed the US administration tries hard to convinee the Congress not to initiate this restrictive kind of legislation. But the downwarcts economie trend does not work in favour of these efforts. So generally speaking there has been a longstanding succession of on-again-offagain probibitions. Other impediments from the US side cao be mentioned such as the inflexible application or decades old "mils specs" regulations that specify the size, weight and preformanee of weapons-systems; difficulties in waiving of intellectual property provisions; difficulties in getting access to classified information etc.

The second part of the Perry-traid consists of "dual production arrangements." To avoid duplicative efforts and to promate standardization the US and Europe under this arrangement cao enable each other to lieensed production of systems that are already in the stage of production on their side of the Atlantic. Dual production is formally pursued between the US and the IEPG {lndependent European Program

Group), but of course also outside this context on a programmatic case-by<ase basis. An important condition for effective dual production is that the gains in the form of increased RSI, employment and transfer of know-how will outweigh the losses in form of the additional casts of the second production line. Until now IEPG selected four candidates out of a list of potential projects: AlM 9L Sidewinder, Stinger, M-483 artillery arnmunition, and Maverick air to surface missile.

A oomparabie - though much shorter list of potential European dualproduction caodidates has been communicated to the US authorities. No forma! reaelions have yet been received: however the tripartite (France, Belgium, Netherlands) Mine Counter Measure vessel seems to be an item in which the US may be interested because it entails a lot of technology that the US must otherwise develop from the beginning.

Outside the IEPG framework, several examples of succesfull European production lieenses of US developments cao be cited (F-16, M-109, YPR 765).

For European nations these possibilities are interesting from the view of technology-transfer. They do not, however, alleviate the unfavourable trade balance between Europe and the US.

Relevant for this balance are the USlicensed productions of European development. Important (and almast the only) examples like Roland, RR Speypropulsion and JP 233 airfield attack system illustrate the problems that may endanger the whole licensing enterprise.

These problems center mostly around the cutting of funds by the Congress as a result of the " not invented here" syndrome, a chauvinism that holds that US defence technology can generally imprave upon foreign system. lf not barred by the Congress, the result of the many "improvements" or modifications in the US of European technology is a much more expensive and aften scarcely inoperable system.

The third, and potentially most promising part of the Perry-traid is the family of weapons appoach, in which agreements between the US and Europe are concluded regarding a certain degree of specialization in the development of a category (family) of weapon-systems.

The parties should also agree to adopt each other's development in return. This approach clearly concerns future developments. The families that have so far been identified and agreed upon are an Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile I AM RAAM) whereby European contractors are expected to participate as part of a European consortium.

From the European side, under British pilit-nationship an ASRAAM (short range) development has been initiated under the sarne conditions.

At this moment, however, it is doubtful whether the US industry will respect the di vision of Iabour, it seems probable that they wiU develop a US-originated ASRAAM as well, which wiU be a competitor of the European development.

The second farnily concerns Anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW).

The US wiU concentrale on a medium range man-portable system, and a European combination led by France will develop a system for the Jonger range. At this moment it seems much too early to evaluate the success of the families of weaponsapproach. The idea is stimulating, and provided that the countries from going "their own way" the approach could become a useful instrument to imprave the cost effectiveness of the Allied R&D efforts.

In surnmary, the general picture after six or seven years of activity to establish a genuine two-way streel (usually taking the 1975 Culver-Nunn initialive as a starting-point) the condusion must be that only very lirnited progress has been possible, due to factors of stuctural complexity of the market, hard care economie interests, military hobbyism and political considerations. By-far the

greatest part of the NATO~ollaborative programs is of US-origin, while European developments are introducat only in a very few cases at the other side of the Atlantic. These very few cases have either met with a disproportionate measure of difficulties or have simply failed.

A strong concentratien on one specific ally, the UK, is another predominant characterists of the picture.

Mounting pressures in the US to restriet the transfer of sophisticated technology, the growing tendency towards protectionism , but also the fact that the present US administration apparently prefers to leave trans-atJantic collaboration as much as possible to what they describe as " industrial tearnjng up", all point in the direction of rather gloomy prospects fo r the two-way street. The preferenee fo r industrial initiatives generates a eertaio fear in Europe that the US wiU try to escape govemmental responsibility for the state of affairs in the trans atlantic dialogue.

For the time being the two-way street seems to offer hardly any prospect -at least for the short and medium term fo r a real enhancement of NATO's RSI. Nothwithstanding an incidental success, substantive solutions for impraving the conventional defense posture of the west have to be sougth elsewhere for the next ten years at least.

*

11

Philips and the world-wide competition The cooperation agreements and joint ventures which Philips enters into are frequently in the news. In recent months Dr. W. Dekker has emphasised the need for cooperation to ensure the continued ex.istence of a European electranies industry .

Dwing the visit of the American delegation of policy staff to Eindhoven, Phllips Vice-President Dr. A.E. Pannenborg outlined the special structure of thls multinational in order to provide some insight into the background factors involved in the condusion of cooperation agreements.

Philipscan best bedescribed as a highly ctiversified, research and labourintensive, producing both fmished products and components and having a very small home market.

1t is cliversified by products and by sales areas ans as a result has multiple targets.

New products require now a days expensive research, which can onJy be paid for if large quantities are sold. This means in effect producing for the entire world market. Similarly, the lowering of the cost-price per unit required because of considerations of competition can onJy be achieved with large series for the world market. The ever-increasing pace of technological developments and the rapid succession of new rnadeis reinforees the need to introduce large quantities of products as quickly as possible in order to be able to compete.

For components, these higher research casts and the dependenee of the casts price on series size are even more relevant than with the fmished products.

This means that the concentraled production of components is even more desirable than for fmished products.

Fmished products can be divided into professional produels and consurner products. A feature of professional products in that they are aften made to the specific requirements of customers, whlch in many cases are gaverrunent bodies.

Philips is active in a large number of markets, sells products in 160 countries and has national sales organisations in 62 countries. The three leacling regions of the world market for electranies products (Europe, the US and Japan) are extremely diversified. Both America and Japan have large home markets with the advantage of having some uniformity in ctistribution systems and the very great advantage over Europe of having a single language for the entire market area.

12

ln the EEC, on the other hand, we have an entirely clifferent situation. When the European Common Market was formed in 1958, Philips began to adapt its structure toa new situation. Up to this point, the Philips operating pattem had been based on local integration, good knowledge of the local markets and circurnstances, cantacts with the goverrunent bodies, and in many cases national product eentres (NPCs), etc.

In order to benefit from the advantage of European inlegration such as market expansion, economies of scale, free trade, etc, Philips changed its structure for example, by setting up international product eentres (lPCs), a development which in fact became more and more necessary in order to be able to survive with large-scale production in a market which was increasingly characterised by wortd-wide competitive conditions.

Unfortunately, halfway through its evolution, the European Economie Community has gatten stuck between nationalistic and community goals. The resulting stagnation in .European inLegration has serious consequences for a company like Philips. Large products sectors have remained outside the Common Market, inclucling those which are tried

Report of rhe presenration of Dr. Ir. A.E. Pannenborg, vice presidem of Philips Company.

to gaverrunent contracts, such a defense and telecommunications, and others which are tied to goverrunents via technical and safety standards, etc. Thus, in adclition to professional products, there are many consurner electranies products which require some degree of infrastructure standardisation, such as television, citizens' band raclio, cellular radio and other telecommunications radio systems.

The European problem now is that national preferences for technical standards must be drawn tagether into one European standard. Obviously these drawbacks apply to a lesser extent in America and Japan .

On top of this, the economie recession is creating a growing breecling ground for protectionist tendendes among the member states of the EEC. The result is a European market that is becorning more and more fragmented.

In such an environment, Philips finds itself increasingly and inescapably confronted with a dilemma between interna! efficiency and extemal flex.ibility.

FREE TRADE

RESTRICTED

TRADE

HIGH WORLDWIDE INTEGA A TION

REL. MARKET SHARE

ADMINISTRA TIVE COORDINA TION

NATIONAL RESPONSIVENESS LOW

Philips. operating under world-wide competitive conditions, is particularly aware of the area of tension between the economie imperalive and the political imperative. Dr. Pannenborg illustrated by means of a diagram the way in which Philips as a company (with its diversity of products) must be oriented towards "world-wide integration" on the one hand and " national responsiveness" on the other.

A company which can orient itself totally towards world-wide inlegration using world products enjoys the tremendous advantages of econornies of scale in the fieldsof both research, production and marketing, and also benefits from the administrative and managerial coherence.

A company with "national" products, which has to take national responsiveness into account, has to have a good na没onal set-up with local branches, and must behave as it were like a national company. A multinational like Philips, with both these images, has the advantage of internal efficiency, due to the spreading of financial risks, corporale reseach, and a good diffusion of knowhow, and the advantage of external flexibility, owing to a good national structure. But it also has the disadvantages of cumbersome coordination, duplication and less internal efficiency, panly because the economies of scale cannot always be used to advantage with the sarne ease.

Depending on the product/ market combinations which are involved, this dilemma between intemal efficiency and external flexibility applies to a greater or lesser extent to a transnational such as Philips, which has both "world" products and "national" products and operales both inside and outside the EEC. Philips is aiming at standardisation, with the advantage of the economies of scale, but on the other hand it wilt not always be able to ignore national traditions and govemment preferences.

A flexible organisational structure is therefore an absolute must if the dilemmas outlined are to be tack.led.

During the discussion which foliowed Dr. Pannenbarg's talk, a number of other matters were brought up. Because of the fragmented European market and the absence of a genuine European industrial policy, the European electronics industry is trying to reduce the tremendous R.&D. costs and to achieve standardisation by means of cooperation agreements. Cooperation in the field of fundamental research between Siemens and Philips, the joint production of glass libre cables by Philips, Siemens and others, and the joint development and production of cellular radio equipment by Philips and the French firm of CIT-Alcatel are a few examples of such cooperation. European cooperation is based on technologies which are availa-

view at the Phi/ips research Iabaratory

bie in Europe and have yet to be developed . The European electronics industry is cenainly not inferior to the Japanese, but the Europeans still lack econornies of scale.

Possible cooperation in the field of consuroer electronk between lborosonBrandt (Fr.), Grundig and Philips may st em the tide of Japanese competition.

Given the dominant position of the Japanese in the consumer electronics market (the Americans have been swept away; only a few Europeans are still holdingtheir ground) it is necessary for standardisation agreements to be made with them too, as was done for the Digital Audio Disc (a Philips invention) and the eight mm video. These are world standards.

For professional products the situation is different again. As can beseen from the above, at the moment there is little if any European cooperation and no real European market. The impressive cooperation between Philips and AT & Tin the field of the development, production and sale of digital telephone exchanges has its logica! explanation in the huge development costs, the know-how of both AT & T and Philips and the powerful sales and distribution network of Philips.

The American market's growing importance for Philips due to its rapid technological developments and high sales potential can be seen, for example, in th.:! cooperation between Philips and RCA Motorota (development and production of chips), lntel , Control Data

and the takeover of Westinghouse Oamps), Signetics, Magnavox, Micom, Superscope, etc. The strong position held by Philips in America in the field of razors, televisions, picture tubes, lighting produels and rnicroelectronics all make Philips less dependent on Europe.

Conceming the eroptoyment situation, Dr. Pannenborg noted that the electronics sector is now in the same phase of development as agriculture was at one time. The increase in Iabour productivity, panty as aresult of automation, is such that the volume increase in production is far greater than the increase in sales. Cenainly in the present stagnating situation there is no room on the market to sell the extra production. The increase in productivity is above IOOJo and the volume increase is only a few percent.

An increase in unemployment is therefore inevitable, with important exacerbating factors in the limited mobility of the European worker and the probieros involved in retraining older workers .

* 13

Attitudes of the Netherlands and the European dimeosion The Dutch economy and its political position in this continent or in the world are always tied up within the European context. A few figures supports this concept. Over half of the Dutch economy depends on coordination of the European economy, because over half of out products are exported. The greater part of HoUand's exports are to the European market, be it the partners of the European Community itself, or to the other European countries that have free-trade agreements with the Community, like Switz毛rland, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Fmland. Therefore discussing the Dutch economy makes no sense if you do not discuss at the same time the state and polides of the economies of the surrounding countries.

Politically you fmd very much the same thing. There can't be an independent Dutch attitude.

Tiny as they are, and Europe being tiny in itself, we are all more or less conderrmed to do eertaio things tagether.

What is this "European dimension"?

Europe is only historically and culturally a continent, not geographically. lt is more a peninsula of a great continent.

That's what makes our position so extremely vulnerable. The Netherlands are no more than one of the deltas in that peninsula. You can't dissociate that part from the rest. lf you want to have anything nearly effective in the world, as a position, an attitude, a policy, you have to share with others. And that's the origin of the European Community.

Therefore today there is a clearly recogicable European attitude.

I'U come back to that later.

Fifty years ago nobody would have spoken of an European attitude; there was no thing like it. There were attitudes of individual countries which, down to the smallest, had their empires spreading all over the world, and they had an attitude and policy of them selves.

But since 1945 we have been dwarfed by history, and that pusbed us to do things tagether, or least to try and do so. When this movement started in the early fifties I left the Dutch foreign ministry because I found that another approach to international affairs was more constructive than just EDESC in a tiny little country in a part of Western Europe.

So I linked up with the building of the Community in Europe and I spent practically the rest of my professional life there, and until today I try to foUow things as we U as I can.

14

In this job I had the great privillige during a considerable period of time to work on European-American relationships, especially when I was in charge of foreign relations as Director General in the European Commision. One of the most important parts of my job was to conduct almast daily forma! and informa! consutations with our American friends and to try to make our relationship a constructive one and a good one.

I wiU come back later to the keyquestion in this respect. Is the existence of an European Community and of European polides condudve to a better relationship with the United States, or is it perhaps a complication and an obstacle? lf it is conducive, we must do anything to promate it; if we found it not to be so, we should be very careful, because, and probably l'm not the frrst one to say that, the state of our relationship at that moment is, alas, not an easy one.

l'm all the more glad to see that a more distinguished group of people has come over in the framework of the Bicentermial-celebrations, and I know that this is an exhange of a visit that some of my younger friends have paid to Washington earlier this year. I only would like to express the wish that we do not only need a Bicentermial to organize these things and that it would be done on a much more regular basis than every 200 years. Anyway l'm glad that this 路has been set up, because I think it extremely important. May I just add that these days the newspapers carried the item that George Schultz wiU be here at next December 11th. lf I add that it wiU be the frrst time in six years that an American secretary has come to the Netherlands, you may perhaps measure, how far away people in this little corner of Europe feel themselves from the events in the world and in Washington, and from policy declarations made.

Did we have an occasion to put our ideas in the processor not? Sametimes the feeling is rather that we have not. I think that's as much our own fault as of others, but the feeling is there, and it's an important one among the negative elements of the present situation. I can't say how important it is to have secretary Schultz coming to the Netherlands, even if in such a visit nothing fundamental wiU be raised or settled; the gesture of the visit itself is of an extreme importance in this centrifugal world.

Presentation of Mr. K.G. de Vries, member of the Second Chamber for the Labour pany (PvdA)

Back to the European dirnension. I re-

call to what an enormous extent the Dutch economy is involved in the European economy, which again fmd its pattem because there is a European Community. lf you would be able to listen to the debates in Dutch parliament today with the new gaveroment making its policy declarations, you would hardly fmd a single reference to this outside element. Mostly dornestic policy is discussed: monetary policy, the overspending welfare-state, etc. Few people wiU say that it is at least as important to look what happens next door in Germany. lf the Oerman gaveroment should decide to foUow a deflation policy and to cut down a great deal on expenses, that would be much more important than any single decision the Dutch govemement can take about Dutch economy. That's the degree of involvement.

In the meaotime that had become true for all partners in the European Community, including the UK, which as you know joined much later, in 1973, so that nearly half of its foreign trade is taking place within the EC. They came in as the center of an indeed small empire than it was before, but now they are nearing the magie 500Jo, which is the average of trade within the Community of all ten members. lf I may continue with just a few figures, I look at the other half of the external economie relations of EC countries and fmd that the US is the frrst trading partner of his group.

However, if we count by region rather than by nation, for instance, the Middle East is a larger trading partner. The importance, if you count by groups of countries, is that about forty percent of the export of the EC countries are to the developing countries, including the oil countries. The US gets one sixth, Japan 2% (against 5% income) - a small figure. To this pattem you can see that our involvement in the world economy is enormous and stretches all over the world. lt is sametirnes said that we have only regional interests, but that is denied by the tigure of 40% export to the developing countries, and there still is an increase going on, besides oil, in ma-

--j

~~-路~ 40o/o export of the deve/oping countries

nufactures.

Next to these figures the size of the trade with the Soviet Uruon and the other Eastern European countries is very small. lt is only 7f1/o, and it has not, like the relative part of the developing countries, been growing during the last 10 or 12 years. Of this 7f1/o exactly half is for the Soviet Union. The rest for its satellites in Eastern Europe, and the nature of the trade is very similar to that of the developing countries: raw materials, oil, wood, processed agricultural materials.

Considering we are direct neighbours the percentage of trade is of low level, compared to countries like Austria, Sweden, Norway etc. That's the position of EC-trade in the world and the Netherlands are part of that.

What has the European Community achieved until today and what has it not achieved? You know that they set out to make an economie Community. One could say very roughly that we are more

or less halfway. We do not have a real economie community. We have a Common Market, which has come under great pressure these days because of the economie depression, protectiorust pressures from all govemrnents everywhere, and enorrnously alarrning unemployment figures that are rising all the time.

We have this Common Market, but it is not perfect; there are loop-holes in it. ln principle it should provide for the free movements of people, goods, services and (investment-)capital. The free movement of goods is pretry well secured, I would say, as is the free movement of people and their right to go and work in another EC-country. The free movement as investment capita! is much less perfect, though it is a basis with which one could work. What is really incomplete is the movement of services. For instance, the insurance-transactions in many countries come under severe

restrictions, and there is a strong resistance to do away with the last barrieres in the Market.

Sirrularly we don't have a common transport policy, which we should have in the Common Market. The service sector is simply not ready. 1t has proved awfully difficult to make further progress, even more so in a depression.

So there is a Common Market, imperfect, but it is there. There is not only an incomplete monetary system, since not all our member states have joined in the European Monetary System, which is in itself is far from a monetary uruon. lt's a system of discipline and of macroeconomie behaviour, with more or less stabilised, but not immutable, exchange rates that have been changed several times. But it is a system and it keeps the fluctuations between the values of the currencies of our membercountries, thank God, within reasonable limits. lf we had as disorderly a monetary situation, as we have in the world between the major currencies, I can teil that the Common Market would many years ago have gone down the drain. At such pressure it would explode, or one major partner would not live up to the rules anymore.

So thank God we have at least this incomplete monetary coorporation . We can only hope that it will be reinforced.

To live in a depression like this with a lot of these halfway constructions is of course a perilous affair.

At the time, perhaps prematurely, it was planned in Europe to extend this economie inlegration into the field of politics and that of defense. You're all too young to reeall it but you may have read about it. There was a plan, even a treaty for a European Defense Commuruty, but in my view it was launched at such an early date that was asking a lot of the people, only five, six years after World War 11, to have a common army with a Dutch peleton under a Gerrnan sergeant. lt didn't pass in France, and if this plan had been launched later and in a better psychological context, it might have succeeded and I think it would have done us alot of good.

That is the picture for the moment.

There is very much talk to try once again to move into the field of common defense. There is a lot of talk of moving further into the field of political coorporation. That's a very sensible thing td do and it has made considerable progress; it is not a machine for integrated policies in the sense that they are defmed and everybody is bond by them, it is a machine for coordination.

But, we all living in this little corner of the world find that the reactions of the Western European countries to world events have become similar. That's logical, because we're all in the same fix and corner. Our biggest partners, the Uruted Kingdom and France, of course 15

have eertaio reminiscences of greater times in history and sametimes behave more on that wave length, but fundamentally we're aU in the same situation, and attitudes to certain events like those that occur in the MiddJe East are very similar. Therefore politica! coorporation has been able to be achieved quite a lot on a number of issues.

We have also been able to achieve in this way things with the United States.

A case in point was, and is perhaps again, the Camman Market. The conference on security and coorporation in Europe, the big exercise that started in the seventies with the Soviet Union and the Eastem European countries to define rules of behaviour, and ended with the Helsinki~eclaration is another example. If you consider the extremely difficult substance which was discussed there, and the extremely delicate situation in which for several partners this conference had to be conducted, if you consider how the close coorporation with the United Stales the European Community came, through politica! coorporation between the EC members, to what I think a very satisfactory condusion at Helsinki (people in Eastem Europe are still embarassed by the effects), I think that it proved that when people concentrale on what is really essential and try to find a camman denominator for attitudes, it is possible to do sa within the European group and between the US and Europe. It requires an enormous amount of effort, camprehension and knowledge of the situation inside Europe and inside the United States.

I come to the condusion of my talk. Is the existence of an European dimension, for example fora country like the Netherlands, conducive to better channels of communication with the US, or is it an obstacle?

My countrymen these days perhaps have second thoughts. There was a period that we in HoUand and in the greater part of Europe had a certain natura! enthusiasm for everything that was European. At a certain mo ment, as in any human undertaking, things aren't as easy as you would like them to be, other people being bloody difficult and so on.

At this moment there is no doubt a eertam disenchantment with the European dimensions of our policies. I wouldn't dare to think about what would happen to my country and to its inhabitants individuaiJy, if this construction would break apart, nat being able to benefit from what nowadays simply is taken for granted to live in European space, with the various benefits mentioned in the beginning, as if it were one. Apart from that, the mood is suddenly much less enthusiastic than it used to be. Sometimes Dutchmen may feel that it's difficult to still have a visible inpact in 16

the European Community when it negatiales with the United States or Japan, and ask, "where do we recognize our own input?" But if we make a little list of things that in the past times have been difficult questions between the US and Europe - and you aU know the list the steel trade, the gas pipeline, the East-West trade and in particwar the terms for statebacked credits for trade with Eastem Europe - I think that it's quite evident that none of these could have come to a reasanabie condusion to both sides if we hadn't worked through the channel of the combined European input. It's absalutely unthinkable that the Netherlands itself could have worked out any formulal for the steel mar-

ke beutiful new institutions. It's there to have a moderating and constructive influence in the conduct of the extemal relations of the whole group of countries.

If I may spend a last word on the EastWest trade and the credit terms: I've had the good fortune myself to initiate the policies which led to the very ftrst efforts in OECD in Paris and to come to terros about minimum interest rates and minimum conditions for export credits of a different, in particular, Eastem part of the world. I can only be extremely grateful that today, building layer on layer, we've achieved sarnething that amounts to an operational consensus about what we should do in the field of credit terms for trade with Eastem Europe. I think this is a considerable achlevement.

Ten years ago that field was a complete jungle in which everybody did what he liked and was nat being very helpful to eachother.

These few examples indicate that, if handled with care and skill, and with some consistcy in the policies, the European elimension can be a useful, and more than aften an indispensible dimension for conducting the dialogue across the Atlantic (including Canada as an important partner in this kind of discussion). Therefore I think it is good, when you hear sa much of the Netherlands and their position, that you alsa heard about the Netherlands as part of the bigger whole, which to a large extent conditions the weU-being of my beloved country.

gaspipeline: common Europeon input necessary in discussions

ket, that the French and British could have done that by themselves. It could only trough done a camman European input the discussion, and I think that this last week has shown us that the same was true for the disputs about the Soviet gas pipeline.

Why could that only be done on a European level and not by individiual nations? I think the best illustration is the declaration that you have seen in the press, since this roadblock was cleared, for instanee by Paris. They said, "we're not party to this agreement, there is no agreement." But , nevertheless, under the cover of what has been discussed, the problem has been settled, alsa with Paris.

If you would conduct these discussions with each individual European country, things like that would glare up left and right. There would nat be a moderathing influence of the general interest of the whole, and that is the only thing the Community is for- it's nat there to ma-

*

The European dimeosion in the West-West relations To start off the discussion I should like to give a broad view of how I see the present situation in Dutch-American relations and in European-American relations in genera!, which many people fee! are in a critical state. They can be split up into the following headings: jirstly, the deterioration in relations between Western Europe and America; secondly, a comparable situation in West European countries' relations with each other; thirdly, what I should like to call the deterioration within these countries themselves in the relationship between governments and population. These are the three dimensions of the present AtJantic crisis. Then I intend to say something about the deeper causes of the situation. Finally, I shall conclude by stressing that the crucial problem of this threefold crisis lies in our security in an increasingly turbulent and unsettled world.

The most important aspects, ftrst of all, of these troubled Atlantic relations is the erosion of mutual trust. In contrast to the Warsaw Pact, the cornerstone upon which the Atlantic Alliance was set up was the feeling of, or the attempt to secure trust between the member countries. This mutual trust has undergone a long-lasting and serious form of erosion. I shall mention the most im-

portant elements. Firstly, detente with the Soviet Union in the early sixties developed from a elimate in which there was scope for an impravement in relations to one of increasing disparity in approaches to the Soviet Union by the various allies. Secondly, as a result of changes in the political and military balance between East and West the American proteetion of Europe (extended deterrence) was no Jonger, as in the fifties regarded as adequate. A third element is that, rightly or wrongly, European confidence in the United States was shaken in the sixties and seventies; the war in Vietnam was particularly responsible for causing great constemation in the inteUeetual elimate in Europe. There is (still) more talk about the who comparable superpowers both representing a threat to peace and security, rather than of the " American ally" and the "Soviet enemy" , with completely different political objectives and intema! structures. We can see a twofold development in the way of thinking o f European inteUectuals: while on the one hand confidence in the United States as an ally has had to make way for the idea of America as a troublesome superpower, on the other the image of the Soviet Union has changed from that of a totalitarian threat to that of a super-

Lecture of Prof. Dr. Jhr. F.A.M. Alting YOn Geusau, Director of the John F. Kennedy lnstitute.

power that adopts a position with care and which to a certain extent is satisfied with the situation in Europe.

Fourthly, there is the often underestimated crisis in the continuning process of European integration, which began in the sixties. This inLegration was bom, as you probably know, out of the following ideal: politica! and moral recovery after the Second World War, cooperation with regard to the proteetion of human rights in Europe and the pursuil of a federal association of West European states. At the moment, in spite of the enlargement of the European Community and greater cooperation in both the monetary sphere and foreign policy, this development is in a deep political crisis.

This crisis underlies the second main point that I should like to deal with: the erosion of mutual trust in the relations between the West European countries.

As you know, the unification and the economie recovery of Western Europe have reached an impasse, and I should like to take a closer look at some of the factors involved .

Atlantic alliance: not so strong as it shou/d have been

17

Until the end of the 1950s the process of European integration and Atlantic relations were parallel developments. ln the sixties, mainly as a result of the Gaulle's policies, we experienced an increasing nurnber of collisions. Many people fee! that the reason why European inlegration is at a standstill is precisely that greater degree of cooperation; further development is no Jonger based on the ideals I mentioned earlier.

Naturally enough, this has consequences for its effects on the peoples of Europe.

Alongside this hold-up in inlegration European leaders are tending, in their search for a politica! identity in world polities, to want to stand out more and more at surnmit conferences and in the field of European cooperation. ln the absence of intemal cohesion this tendency has developed to a stage where they are launching themselves against and distinguishing themselves from the United States, as can be seen from the European peace initiatives in the Middle East.

My third main point is the clearly discernabie intemal crisis of confidence in each of our countries. This may have something to do with the era of detente, with the growing instability of the world in genera!; it certainly has something to do with the uncontrollable devdopment of the arms race and the inability to reduce or to control weapons and troops in Europe. The biggest problem, however, is the degree of trust between govemments and people who elect them in the countries of Western Europe.

The polarisation of pubtic and politica! opinion extends over a growing nurnber of extremely important intemal and extema! affairs. There is also, just as in the United States, a sharp decline in the consensus among the major democratie politica! parties about the general lines to follow in the fields of foreign policy and defence. Fmally, there are signs of increasing disharmony about those democratie and cultural values that are considered worth defending and preserving. This is the basic problem for both Atlantic relations and for failing European inlegration.

18

This brings me to the deeper causes that have been found for this threefold erosion of Atlantic relations: the unresolved post-war di vision of Europe into East and West is, in principle, a far more European than American problem and is clearly a burden for the West Gennans and for their relations with the United States. The United States, like many other countries, see the elivision of Gennany in a completely different light from the West Gennans themselves. The inability to resolve this elivision of Europe means that in Europe, much more than in America, there is a tendency to accept a totalitarian state as a neighbour: the Jonger such a state exists, the less inclined peolple are to make pubtic denouncements. This of course has a far-reaching effect on the thought processes of many Europeans; I have already referred to the change in the image of the Soviet Union.

1)

2) The second World War brought West European control of world affairs to an end. ln Western Europe this had two consequences: the erstwhile major powers had the greatest of difficulty accepting the decline in their politica! power toa regional European level, while the smaller countries experienced just the opposite. At the end of the 1940s the Netherlands, for example, were forced to surrender their neutrality and by aligning themselves with the United StaLes were more secure than ever before; but at the same time this alliance required a more intensive involvement in decision-making which have been avoided as a neutral power.

3) Much more so than in America there is a revival in Europe of a deeprooted fear of a new war on the continent, which is fed not only by the memory of the Second World War, but also by the uncontrolled stockpiling of arms, by increasing tension between East and West and above all by the inability, stemming from the faiture of integration in the field of defence, to exert genuine influence on the world politica!

scene and on a possible war situation in Europe.

4) The problem of detennining the European position in West-West relations is not to be found in the absence of influence, but in reduced extemal security. Primarily, the cause of this can be found in what I consider to be the ever-growing Soviet threat, seen in the light of the effects of economie depression and of the military growth and the well-organised non-militairy warfare of the Soviet Union, whose airn is the demoralisation of Western Europe and the seperation of Western Europe from the United States. What's more, the friction between the United States and Western Europe represents a threat for the Jatter, which cannot defend itself without help from the USA. 5) Finally, European security is threatened from within. There is a growing feeling of insecurity as a result of social uncertainty, unemployment, economie decline, increasing violence and a growing politica! impotence on the part of govemments in their own countries.

There is also increasing confusion about what the alliance actually stands for, about what the values laid down in the frrst introductory articles mean today.

The result is a fragrnentation of policy within and among the West European states. It is significant of the present situation that most attention is devoted to specific problems, such as the modernisation of nuclear weapons and the gas pipeline, while there is hardly any discussion of what I see as the most important problem for the years of crisis to come. We should not be concemed so much with how to counter every expansion of Soviet Union weaponry with an expansion of weaponry on our side but, more importantly in my opinion, with how we can generate sufficient politica! and moral cohesion in the West European countries to put us in a position to safeguard peace and security in the face of the undoubtedly destruCLive power of the Soviet Union.

Impressions from Washington A JASON delegation made a visit to Washington D.C. in conneetion with the bicentennial celebrations form 25 September to 3 October 1982. The program was organised by the Conunittee on Future Dutch-American Relations 18 of whose members visited the Ne-' therlands in November (see alswhere in this edition) The American Conunittee was set up specially with exchange in mind and consisted of staff members of the Congress and the Senate. policy advisers to the State Department and the Pentagon and representatives from the academie world and the press. The Otairman of the Committee was Stanley R. Sloan who is an expert in the field of American/European relations in the Congressional Research Service.

The aim of the visit to Washington was to gain some insight into the current security and foreign polides of the United States administration . The program took the delegation to the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Senate Foreign Relations Conunittee, the Brookings Institution, the Washington Post and the Camegje Endowment. The highlights of the visit are summarised below.

Eugene Rostow Eugene Rostow, who has recentely been disrnissed from the post of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) by President Reagan, brought the delegation up-to-date with what is happening in the arms control negotiations in Geneva and the aims with which the United States entered inEugene Rostow

to these negotiations. He drew attention to the links between the negotiations on strategie nuclear weapons (START Strategie Arms Reduction Talks) and the intermediate range weapons (INFlntermediate range Nuclear Forces).

Systems with an intercontinental range cannot be separated from individual categories for the medium range. Soviet roc.kets which are capable of hitting Chicago can also be used against London. For this reason, it is not possible to talk about a balance in medium range arms (known as the Eurostrategie balance) in isolation from the intercontinental systems. Rostow believes that the INF and START negotiations should be joined together. In the current situation the INF discussions can only be success~ ful after START has been concluded sucessfully. Rostow referred to the importance of the NATO doubletrack decision of 1979 for the INF negotiations.

The Soviet Union was only prepared to negotiate after this decision had been taken. It is therefore of great importance that the member states of NATO impiement the decision in un.ison and the arms control expert also said that the Dutch position was crucial in this context.

Rostow emphasised in his address that arms control is an essential component of the security policy of the Reagan administration. The United Stales is trying to re-establish the credibility of deterrence via negotiations which the Washington adrninistration believes might be forfeited by the modernisation of the strategie and medium range arsenal (SS20) uf the Soviet Union . Rostow said that we must prevent the Soviet Union from developing a pre-emptive strike capability. In that case, the Soviet Union would be in a position to demand concessions from the West by threatening to use nuclear weapons. On another occasion, Rostow explained this as follows: "President Reagan's approach to INF and START calls on the Soviet Union to join us in recognizing that the question of hegemony is the greatest possible threat to peace, and the United ~tates _- parity, that is, in deterrent capaCity - ts the most feasible foundation for a joint program to establish world political stability bases on the rule of law". I

Senate Foreign Relations Committee On Capitol Hili the delegation spoke to Hans Binnendijk and Casimir Yost (staff members) and the senators Otarles ~C Mathias and Otarles H . Percy, Otamnan of the Senate Foreign Relations Conunittee. Various subjects were raised during tht路 discussion. In general

Report of a visit by the JASON delegation in the American capita!.

terms, this Conunittee has quite a balanced view of the stance of Western European countries on security matters.

This can be seen, for instance, in a study about the Atlantic alliance published by the Conunittee in early 1982.2 Refer~nce was made to the possibility of reduCJng the number of American troops stationed in Europe during the discussion with the Senators. The proposal, presented by Senator Stevenson envisages unilateral reeall of 23 <XX> soidiers. The aim of this measure 'would be !O pressur茂_se European treaty partners mto applymg more sanctions relating to Soviet policy in Poland and Aghanisatan. It would also force the Europeans to increase their defence expenditure. Finally, a role would be played by military considerations. The recalled troops c:<>uld be used to meet American obligattons elsewhere in the world. 3 The Europeans have protested against this proposal since it would weaken the conventional defence posture, cause further det~rioration in American/European relauons and would have a negative effect on the MBFR negotiations in Vienna (about withdrawal of troops in central Europe). Mathias and Percy said that they were against the reduction plan and expresses their belief that the Stevenson proposal would not gain a majority vote. 4

Heirnut Sonnefeldt This former colleague of Kissinger drew attention to hirnself in "1976 with the Sonnenfeldt doctrine which was named aftc:r hirn. Sonnenfeldt appealed to the Uruted States to encourage "organic" relations between the East European satellite countries and the Soviet Union because the artificial relations in the communist block based on arms "nonorganic" rather than on friendship posed a greater threat to world peace than the East-West conflict.5 Sonnenfeldt ~ow wor.ks for the Brookings lnstitutton, an mdependent institution which carries out studies in the field of econornics, govemment policy and foreign policy.

Sonnenfeldt spoke about East-West relations and developments within the communist block . Despite events in Poland, he was optirnistic about the evolution if a more pluralistic Eastem Europe. The trend towards more freedom of movement for the satellite states is inevitable since the Soviet empire is not via19

bie and the various nations do not accept dominanee by the Kremlin. Sonnenfeldt based hls ideas on developments in Rumania und Hungary but admitted that the prospects for greater liberalisation are worse than they were a decade ago.

The attitude of the Reagan administration to the communist block was characterised by Sonnenfeldt as the "though way" . Th is approach does not encourage positive prospects. The attitude of the reagan administration will only change when the international political elimate improves. ln this context, Sonnenfeldt remarked that the United States is capable of modifying its policies more quickly than Western Europe.

The détente policy has had far reaching effects in many areas in Europe. The countries in Western Europe, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, have established a different relationship with the communist block as a result of détente. A generation has grown up with détente and it would be more difficult for these countries to move away from these ideas than for the United States to do so.

Richard Perte Richard Perte, Assistant of Defense for International Security Policy, played an important role in defining the American stance in the arms control negotiations in Geneva and Vienna. It will therefore be no surprise that he depends the zerooption and American proposals for reductions in strategie arms with enthusiasm and rejects the idea of a nuclear freeze. Perte, like Rostow, pointed to the importance of a positive decision in the Netherlands about the placing in rniddle range weapons. A negative decision would not only cause disappointment in NATO but would also corrode the credibility of the treaty organisation since it would prove NATO was not in unison when it came to dirticuit decisions. The Federal Republic and Belgiurn would probably have futher discussions about the placing of medium range weapons on their territory and Perte

Richard Perte

even expressed the opinion that the negotiations in Geneva would be unsuccesful if one of the NATO countries decides not to place weapons. He also added that the Netherlands would lose its influence within NATO if it refused to place weapons.

Seminar about West-West relations The program closed with a seminar about current problems in the relations between the United States and Western Europe. Robert Osgood, Dimitri Sirnes and Sirnon Serfaty, employees in the Johns Hopkins School for Actvaneed Studies, expressed their opinions about West-West problems.

The lecture demonstrated that one of the speakers expected the Atlantic alliance to coltapse since common interests are currently too extensive. However, it was stated that the current crisis in the alliance is more serious than any other in the past.

Osgood gave three reasons for this: a) the current crisis is marked by the involvement of all member states; b) the ideas of the United States and those of Western European countries (especially the Federal Republic) about the attitude and threat of the Soviet Union have beoome too disparate; c) the process of détente has come to an impasse and opinions about what should happen now vary greatly.

Osgood drew attention to three subjects on which American and Western European ideas differ most. First strategy: how can the security of Western Europe best be guaranteed? Rumblings from Washington about a limited nuclear war in Europe have affected peolple greatly and raised the question as to how fmn the link is between Western European and American security. Second is the problem of détente. Opinions about détente on both sides of the ocean vary greatly on this point. Osgood was of the opinion that this problem will solve itself when the international elimate has improved. Third are the different ideas of the United States and Western Europe about world polities. The Americans approach developments outside the authority of NATO as the global interests of a super power. This means that they see almost every conflict in the EastWest context. Europeans see peripheral events less through the eyes of a super power and ascribe more importance to local or regional circumstances.

Sirnes emphasised that the continuation of problems between the United States and Western Europe will benefit the Russians. The Kremlin does not have any illusions about the alliance collapsing but it will not miss any opportunity to promore discord between the United States and Western Europe. The Russians are above all realists according to

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20

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Europe in the interests of the Atlantic treaty. It seems as if this traditional East coast approach is gained influence.

A number of hot issues like the Siberian pipeline have in the meantime been pusbed into the background by a revision of the American standpoint. Although there is still suftkient potential material for conflict, these developments which improve transatlantic relations should be welcomed wholeheartedly.

Fmally, on behalf of the Management Comrnittee of JASON, I should like to thank all those who made this visit possibie and especially the members of the delegation for their positive contributions during our stay in the American capita!.

Dick Zandee.

Notes 1. The Future of Soviet-American Relations: Where are We Going in the Nuclear Arms Talks?

Address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council by Eugene Rostow on September JO 1982.

2. Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance: Origins and lmplications. A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Senate Document No; 97-31. Washington, April 1982.

3. lbid, page 73.

4. This proved to be a correct evaluation. In December 1982 the Senate and Congress decided that the size of American Forces in Europe should be maintained at the current level for the time being .

5. See JASON Magazine, April/ May 1976, number 3, for an explanation of the Sonnenfeldt doctrine.

some of the porticipants

Simes. They will not involve themselves in actventures without knowing for certain in advance that it is to their advantage.

Conclusions The visit to washingion gave the delegation more insight into the attitude of the current American administration. The election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States was more than just a changing of the guard . With him, the power centre has shi fted from the East coast to the West coast and this means that the priority of Western Europe in the American security policy has been

reduced. From a Californian point of view, Europeis only one of the many regions in the world where the United States has important interests. Europeans should fall in line with the American attitude since the Untited States can make a correct evaluation of decisions to be taken in their capacity of super power with a global look. Outside the adrninistration, e.g. in the Senate Foreign Relations Comrnittee, different opinions can be heard. They have greater understanding of the Western European attitude and believe that the United States should take more account of the specific requirements of Western

* 21

IJst of the JASON -<lelegation for the visit to Washington D.e. and New Vork, Septem ber 25 - October 5, 1982

Suumne Dekker Fonner Member of the European Parliament and fonner Member of thc Second Olamber of the Dutch Rarliament for Democra ts '66 (0'66).

Maarten Derks Member of tbe Executive Board of JASON: student of Law at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam .

Jan Bron Dik Adjunct-Secretary of lhc European Movement in tbc Netherlan ds.

Maurirs Dolmans Member of tbe Executive Board of JASON : Editor-in...Qlier of JASON-Magazine; Student of International Lawal Leyden-University.

Cor de Feyler Associate Professor in Corporal e Stategy and Industrial Policy at the Graduale School of Management at Delft.

Piel-Heyn Goedhart President of JASON ; student of Law at the Erasmus University in Rotterda m and student of International Relations at Leyden-University.

Martien de Groene Treasure r of JASON; student of law at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam .

Willy Hellendoorn Secrewy of JASON; Civil $ervant.

Theo van den Hooger Research Fellow at the Polemological lnstitute, University of Groninge n.

Aat de Jonge Fonner Member of the Second O1amber of the Dutch Parliame nt for the O1ristian-Democratic Pany (CDA) .

PauJ lAmeijer Member of the Executive Board of JASON; student of Law at Leyden University.

Eveline Muusers Member of the Executive Board of lASON; specialized in Public Relations.

Progra m for JASO N Delegation in Washington September 25 - Octob er 3, 1982

10.00 a.m.

Disussion wilh Eugene Ros/Ow, Director, Arms Con/rol and Disarmamenl Agency ACDA Conferen ce Room - Room 5934. Contact: Bob Hansen (for Stan Rivel~) , Strategie Program s Bureau ACDA, Room 4494 Tel: 632-7438

This program would not have been possible without ...

11 .30 a.m.

Mee/ing with Robert Blackwill, Depu/y Assistani Secretary of Slate for European AfJairs - EUR Conference Room - Room 6226. Contact: Lencowski (see above) Buffet lunch al State Departmenl Van Buren Room (8th Ooor) Contact: Lencowski (set above) Discussion with Ambassa dor Eugene Douglass, Ambassador-at-Large fo r Refugee Affairs. Topic: Global Politica/Issues.

EUR Conference Room - Room 6226

the financial support of United States Infonnat ion Agency Gennan Marshall Fund IXiA International lnc.

Ihe cooperalion op Dupont Plaza Hotel Le Manouch e Restauran t Internatio mJ Limousine Service the participation of U.S. Depanme nt of State U.S. Depanme nt of Defense U.S. Arms Control and Disarmam ent Agency U.5. Congress U.S. Naval Academy National Security Council Staff Embassy of the Netherlands Republican National Committ ee The Washington Post The Los Angeles Times WETA Televisio n Washington World Affairs Council Camegie Endowm ent Atlantie Council of the United States Amencan Enterprice lnstitute Brookings Institution lnstitute for International Economics John Hopkins University - SAIS Satml.,. September 15 (Accomp anied by Speek) Arrive Washington .

Delegation housed. at Dupont Plaze Hotel, Dupont Cirde, Tel: 483-6CXX> Metro stop: Dupont Cirde Sunday, September 26 (Accomp anied by Chit-

wood)

1.30 p.m .

Individual Sightseeing (no transportation provided)

1.30 p.m .

Bus departs Dupont Plaza for 1150 l5th St. N.W.

2.00 p.m.

Visit 10 Foreign Desk, The Washington Post 1150 15th Street N.W. Washington , D.e. (enter L. St. Employees entrance)

3.15 p.m.

Bus departs Washinto n Post for van Waning residence, 3112 Brooklawn Terrace, Chevy Chase, Md.

4.00 p.m.

Reception al invÎta/ion of Comman der and M~. Jan W. van Waning ans Ms. Marijke A. van Drunen Ultel

Kees Nederlof Civil $ervant at the Ministry o f Fortign Affairs, Directorate Atlantic Co~peration and Security Problems.

Siebren Singelsma Military $ervanl at the Ministry of Defense, Bureau Political-Strategical Affairs.

Ton Veen Member of the First O1amber of the Dutch Parüament ror the Liberal pany (VVD).

Wim Winz Journalist for the General Press Agency and for

the Leidsch Dagblad.

Dick Zandee Vice-President of JASON; student of Contemp orary History at Leyden University.

Hein Roethof Fonner member of the Second Chember of the Outch Parliame nt for the Labour Party (PvdA).

22

Monday, September 27 (Lencowski) 8.00 a.m. Bus departs 3112 Brooklaw n Terrace for Dupont Plaza 8.30 a.m. Bus departs Dupont Plaza for State Departme nt (Diplomatie entrance) 9.00 a.m. Welrome and briefings at State Depar/ment EUR Conference Room Room 6226. Contact: J. Lencowski, Special Advisor, Office of the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Room 7240 Tel: 6324313

00.30 p.m.

1.30 p.m.

2.30 p.m.

Bus departs State Departme nt for Dupont Plaza

5.J{).

Welroming dinner al Le Manouch e Reslaurant 1724 Connecti eut Ave N.W.

7.30 p .m.

Tuesday. September 18 8.30 a.m. Metro (subway) from Dupont Cirde to Capitol South. Accompanied by Winningh am

Capitol Hili/ House of Representatives (see details attached). Contact: James Galbraith , Staf( Director , Joint Ecomie Committ ee, G-133 Dirksen Senate Office Building Tel: 224-5171. Acoompanied by Gal· braith .

12.00 noon Lunch at Capitol Hili Club (Republican National Committ ee; IXiA Inl.). Speaker: The Honorable J .

William MiddendorJ, U.S. Ambassador to the Organiza tion of Amencan States, farmer U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands. Contact: Sam Winningh am Tel : 289-1375 .

Accompanied by Yost and Binnendijk.

9.00 a.m.

2.30 p.m.

3.005.00 p.m.

5.15 p .m.

6.008.00 p .m .

8.15 p.m .

Walk 10 U.S. Capitol, S-117 Meeting with Senale Foreign Relations Committ ee Members and Staff. Contact: Cas Yost or Hans Binnendijk. Senate Foreign Relations Committ ec Tel : 224-4651 Bus departs U.S. Capitol for WETA Studio 3620 South 27th St., Arlington, Va.

Observe MacNiel-Lehrer TV broodcast live WETA Studio, 3620 South 27th St., Arlington , Virginia. Contact : Pat Ellis Tel: 998-2812

Bus departs WET A Studio for Dupont Plaza

Wednesd ay, September 29 9.30 a .m . Bus deparu Dupont Plaza for 1875 Eye St. N .W .

10.00 VlSit to Los Angeles Times Washington Bureau. lnternatio nal Square 1875 Eye Street, N .W. Suite 1100 Contact: Mariene Manno (ror Jack Nelson) 293-4650. Accompanied by Sloan.

I UlO a.m.

Walk to 1616 H St.

11.15 a.m. - Atlantic Council working lunch on 2.00 p.m. energy issues.

1616 HSt. N .W., first floor conference room . Contact : Lee Brady, Atlantic Council Tel: 347-9353. Accompanied by Niehuss, Henderson, Winningham 2.15 p .m .

Bus depans 1616 H. St . for 1150 17th St.

2.30 p.m . - Seminar at American Enterprise 4.30 p.m. lnstitute (with Richard Scammon and others to discuss U .S. political process) 1150 17th St. N.W. 12th floor Contact: Randa Murphy Tel: 8625946. Accompanied by Sloan, Henderson, Riveles.

4.45 p.m.

Bus departs 1150 17th St. for Dupont Plaza

5.30 p.m.

Bus departs Dupont Plaza for 4200 Linnean Ave. N .W.

6.00 p.m.

Reception at the ln vitation of the Ambassy of the Netherlands

10.00 a.m.

Old Executive Office Building 17th Street entrance. Contact: Rosemary Niehuss Tel. 857~50. Accompanied by Niehuss and Sloan 11.15 a.m.

1.1 5 p.m.

Bus departs Embassy of the Netherlands for Dupont Plaza

Thursday, September 30 8.45 a.m.

Walk from Dupont Plaza to Carnegie Endowment

dowment) Presentations: 'Robert Osgood- The Alliance Viewed from Washington Sirnon Serfaty - The Alliance Viewed from Europe Dimitri Sirnes - The Alliance Viewed from Moscow Moderator: Stan Sloan Contact: Barry Lowekron Uniled Stafes Informa/ion Agency Tel. 724-9317 5.00 p.m .- Reception with seminar porticipants 7.00 p.m . and press representatives at Carnegie Endowment

Saterday, October 2

and Winningham .

10.30 a.m.

Walk to Brookings lnstitution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.

11.30 a.m .- Discussion with Helmrit Sonnen00.30 p.m. feldt, The Brookings lnstitution Accompanied by Lowenkron 2.30 p.m .

Bus departs Dupont Plaza for Pentagon

3.00 p.m.

Discussion with Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Contact : Dov Zakheim The Pentagon Room 3D 777 Tel: 697~209.

Accompanied by Sloan

4.30 p.m .

Bus depans Pentagon for 1135 16th St . N.W.

5.30 p.m .- International issues Group, World 7.00 p.m . A/fairs Counci/, Norman Boiley,

Senior Director, National Sectlrity Planning, The White House.

Topic: H igh Interest Rates, lnflation, and Sovereign . Risk: Impact on the International Monetary System .

University Club, 1135 16th St. N.W. Contact: Julie Chitwood. Tel: 293- 105 1.

Friday, October I 9.30 a.m.

Bus departs Dupont Plaza for Old Executive Office Building

4.30 p.m.

7.00 p.m .

Sunday, 3 October

Reception at the residence of Dr W.F. van Eekelen, Under-Secretary for European Affairs and Chainnan of the JASON Advisory Council.

Nieuwe Parklaan 64, The Hague, Phone: 070- 54 32 91 Departure from Hotel des lndes at 6.45 p.m .

Mo nday, November IS 9.45 a .m.

Lecture by Drs. H. Daalder, Associate Professor at the University of Leiden. "The Differences in the Parliamentary systems in the United States and the Netherlands".

First Chamber Building, phone 64 48 00.

10. 15 a .m .

Lecture by Drs. H. van den Bergh, Representative of the Iabour Party, (PvdA) Foreign Affairs Specialist.

The vision of the Labour pany concerning foreign policy in panicular the Atlantic Cooperation.

11.15 a.m .

Lecture by Mr. J.P. van Ierse/, Representative of the Christian Demoeratic Party (CDA). Foreign Affairs Specialist. The vision of his party concerning foreign policy, in panicular on the Atlantic Cooperation.

12.00 noon

Luncheon in the Second ChamberRestaurant with party representatives.

Bus depans Dupont Plaza for Annapolis

11.30 a.m.- Visit to Annapolis, Nova/ Academy 4.30 p.m. (box lunch) Contact: Peggy Speek, American Security Bank, Tel: 624 - 4982 4.30 p.m. Bus departs Annapolis for Dupont Plaza

Discussion Koningin Emmasalon , Hotel des Indes.

Contact: Nancy Ambrose, ABC News, Tel : 887-7245, or regarding Camegje facilities, Karen Robens Tel: 797-6450

Senior Fellows John Williamson and Gary Htifbauer on international economie relations, trade and sanctions issues. Accompanied by Small

Lecture by Prof Drs. H. ter Heide, Professor at the University of Delft.

"The Dutch Society".

Introduetion on the social-<:eonornic structure.

Bus departs State Department for Dupont Plaza Hotel

2.30 p.m.- Seminar on Issues in Dutch5.00 p.m. American Relations (Carnegie En-

9.00 a .m .- lnstitute for International Econo11.00 a.m . mie - briefing and discussion with

11.15 a.m.

4.00 p.m.

Bus depans Old Executive Office Building for State Department

11.30a.m.- Roundtab/e working lunch with OI.OO p .m . START, INF, MBFR negotiators and experts - ACDA Conference Room - Room 5934. Contact: Stan Riveles (see 9127 above)

4200 Linnean Ave. N .W. Contact : Marijke A . van Drunen Littel. Tel: 244-5300 8.00 p .m .

National Sectlrity Counci/ Briefing on U.S. -West Europeon Relations, Dennis 8/air, Member, NSC Staf!

Second Chamber Buildings, phone: 61 49 11 1.30 p.m .

Lecture by Prof Dr. Ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Representative of the Liberal party (VVD) Foreign Affairs Specialist. The vision of his party concernins foreign policy in particular on the Atlantic Cooperation.

2.30 p .m .

Depart Washington

Lecture by Prof Mr. B. V.A. Rรถling, Former Director of the Polemological lnstitute. "Critical notes corncerning the Arms-race" .

Program for the conunittee on

3.45 p.m.

future Dutch-American relations.

PROGRAM IN THE HAGUE, November 14 November 21 , 1982. Organized by the Association of Young Dutch for Atlantic Cooperation (JASION).

The Delegation is housed at : Hotel des lndes, Lange Voorhout 54-56, The Hague, Phone 070- 46 95 53.

Sunday, November 14 3.30 p.m. Lecture by Prof Dr. U Rosenthal, Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

"Polities and Policy in the Netherlands" Pillirazation, Polarization and Restauration .

Briefing at the Ministry of Defence.

Leerure by Gommander R. den Boeft, Director Defence Staff, and

by Mr. AJ. Sligting, Director Depanment of Public Relations of the Ministry of Defence. "The Dutch Defence Policy and the Dutch Contribution to NATO' .

5.30 p.m.

Reception with Director of the Defence-staf, Director of the Depanment of lnformation, Director General Policy and the Sous-<:hefs of the Navy Army and Airforce.

6.30 p.m.

Dinner at Societeit "De Witte", Plein, The Hague.

Tuesday, November 16 9.30 a.m.

Lecture by Drs. A.S. Spoor, Editor in Chief of one of the most important Dutch newspapers, N.R.C. Handelsblad . "The attitude of the Dutch Press towards the United Stales and the lnfluence of the Press

23

on Dutch Foreign Policy".

12.00 noon

Anna Povlova Salon, Hotel des Indes.

Working lunch with drs. E.P. Wellenstein, fonner Directa r-General

-2.00 p.m.

of Extemal Relation (European Comrnunities), on ' The European Community in the 1980's: Problems and Perspectives'.

10.30 a.m.

Meeting with Ambassador William J. Dyess (uncertain).

12.00 noon

Luncheon with Drs. R.J. van Schaik, Director-General of lntemational " Dutch Development Policy".

2. 15 p.m.

Bus departs from Plein 23, The Hague, to Fo kker B.V., Dutch Aviation lndustry

3.00 p.m .

Visitto Fokker 8 . V., Dutch Aviation Industry. Leerure by Ir. J. Corne/is, Director New Projects. " The Dutch lnfra-st.ructure for Aircraft Research and Development".

Anna Powlonaplein 3, The Hague.

4.00 p.m .

Schiphol, Amsterdam, phone 020 544 9111.

5.00 p .m .

Reception with the Board of Directors and dinner affered by Fokker B.V.

Meeting at the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), t he most important organization of the Dutch peace movement, with Mient-Jan Faber (secretary), Wim Bartels (lntemational secretary), Laurens Hogenbrink (Member of t he Council) and Ben ter Veer (President).

Briefmg by drs. J.C. Siccama, of the 'Netherlands' Institute for Studies on Peace and Security' on 'Deterrence and the Balance of Vulnerability'.

Hotel Des lndes, Anna PavlovasaIon .

6.00 p.m .

8.30 a.m.

Bus departs from Hotel des Indes to Rotterdam .

reception at Nieuwspoort Press Centre, with representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, joumalists and representatives of the JASON-foundation.

9. 15 a.m.

Visit to Rotterdam Harbour by boat. Leerure by mr. Snijders, De-

Friday, November 19

Wednesday, November 17

partment of Extemal relatio ns of Rotterdam Harbour on board the boat. "The fun ctioning of the Worlds Largest Harbour".

9.30 a.m .

"East-West / West-West Relations", Jhr R.H . Loudon, "European P olitical Cooperation", Mr. B.J . van Eenennaarn, " Netherlands Defense Policy".

After the lecture a discussion wil! be held.

Galvaniestraat, Ponton Merwehaven , Rotterdam, phone OIO 89 69 11 11.00 a .m .

Bus departs for Shell B.V.

11 .30a.m.

Visit to the Shell Company. Leerure

by Drs. F. Ouwerhand, Director Section European Gas Affairs.

"The European and Dutch Energy Supply".

SheU Gebouw, Hofplein, Rotterdam.

12.00 noon

Luncheon affered by Shell Company.

2.00 p.m .

Bus departs from Shell Company to Philips, Eindhoven.

3.没0 p.m .

Visit to the Philips Company.

12.45 p.m.

2.004.30 p.m.

Sonday,

~ovember

21

Departure of t he American Delegation (rooms must be Ie ft before 1.00 p.m .)

Committee Future DutchAmerican Relations Delegation to Holland November 13-21, 1982 Nancy Ambrose ABC News, Washington Bureau

Ju/ie Chitwood Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Washington; Treasurer, Committee on Future Dutch-American Relations

Elisabeth Downes Vice-president, Washington Center for Learning Alternatives C. Grayson Fowler

Legislative Assistant to Senator Zorinsky

Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr. Professor of Business and Public Administratie Howard University.

Wil/iam 8. lnglee Director, Republican Task Force on Foreign Policy.

Joseph T. Joekel

Hoge Nieuwstraat 32-34, The Hague.

Director, Canadian Studies Program, St. Lawrence University

Luncheon with Dr. W.F. van Eeke/en, Under-Secretary for European

Marsha M. Me. Graw

Affairs and Chainnan of the JASON Advisory Council

Leerure by Prof Dr. Jhr. F.A .M. Alting von Geusau, Director John F. Kennedy Institute, and Mr. K.G. de Vries, Member o f Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense. "The European Dimeosion in the West-West Relatio ns".

Lecture by Dr. Ir. A.E. Pannenborg, Vice-president of the Philips

9.00 p.m.

Lectures by: Mr . J.J. de Visser,

Conc/uding Dinner with members of the JASON-Advisory Council the General Board, the Executive Board and members of the Dutch Delegation.

House of Lords, Hofstraat 4, The Hague, phone 64 47 71

Elout zaal, in the Nieuwspoort Press Centre, Binnenhof, The Hague.

Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. Grote Zaal, Plein 23, The Hague.

2.00 p.m .

8.00 p.m.

First Chamber Building, the Hague.

Former Associate Director, U.S. Arms Control Association C urrently Covest Lecturer, NATO Defense College, Rome, ltaly

Marcie Ries Strategie Nuclear Policy, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Department of State.

Stanley A. Riveles Stategic programs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmaml!nt Agency.

Stanley R. Sloan Specialist in U.S. Alliance Relations, Congressional Research Service; Chairman Committee on Future Dutch-American Relations.

Company. " Philips and World Wide Competition".

Saterday, November 20

9.00 a.m .

Visit to the Delta- Works in Zeeland.

Kenneth R. Smal/

Reception at t he Residence o f Mr. and Mrs. Goedhart. Kievietlaan 6, Eindhoven, phone 040 - 435 205.

10.45 a.m.

Explanation of the Eastem Scheldt Project in general by Ir. M. Nijboer

11 .00 a.m.

Visit to contructien-site

Development Officer, Center for Strategie and International Studies; Vice Chairman, Committee on Fut ure Dutch-American Relations (Moving to Unesco, Paris)

Thursday, November 18

12. 15 p.m.

Ferry to Zijpe

Peggy L. Speek

8.30 a.m.

Bus departs from Hotel des Indes.

12.30 p.m.

International Economist, American Security Bank

9. 15 a.m.

Guiding Tour around the Academie-gebouw, the oldest part of Leyden.

Visit to Zierikzee, small fishennanstown

1.00 p.m.

Departure to Haarnstede, luncheon at Hotel Haamstede

Benelux desk Officer, International Security Policy, Department of Defense.

Leerure by Prof Dr. A. van Staden, Political Scientist at Leyden

2.15 p.m.

Arrival Burghsluis, explanation barrier construction

Robert H. Trice Legislative Assistani to Senator Bumpers

University. "The Current State of American-European Relations: How Troubled is our Atlantic Partnership?"

3.00 p.m .

Visit to construction-island Neeltje Jans

R. Samuel Winningham

5.00 p.m.

Depart to the Hague, Hotel des Indes.

Rosemary Niehuss

10.00 a .m .

Gravensteen, Leiden.

11 .30 a.m.

24

Departure to The Hague

Harion Strauss

President, Winnigham International Assistani to Dr. Henry Kissingcr

INDEX JASON MAGAZINE 1982 West-West relation: Partners in dilemma

What happens in Latin-America?

Dr. A . I.Ammers America, Europc and the Frust at ion of history.

Prof Dr. F.A.M. Alting Will coopcration endure? The future of Europcanvon Geusau American relations.

Mr. drs. C. D . de Jong Can economie problems undermine NATO.

Drs. P. Nelissen Dr. L . Schellekens

R . ter Beek J.D. Blauw Mr. J .S .L. Gualtherie van Weezei H .A . Schaper William J. Dyess Mr. L.J. Brinkhorst

To a more independent Europeon policy

U.S.-Europe: disappointment and vigilance Living under the same roof but not eating from the same rack .

Is there a crisis?

An interview with the U.S. ambassador in the Netherlands. lmpressions from Moscow.

Inside the Kremlin, foreign policy of the Soviet Union Drs. A .P.

Goud~ver

Foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the Brenjnev-

Era Dr. R. Th . Jurrgens

Drs. B. de Jong A . Haig V. Katin

Drs. D. Zandee

Dornestic aspccts of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

A sodalistic alliance o f a higher plan?

Relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europc.

The American view on Poland .

Lecture of the secretary of state for foreign affairs The Russian view on Poland Report of the Jason conference for scholars on uni· lateral disarmament

Regional troubles and Western interests Mr. K.E. VosskîJhler

Prof Mr.B. de Gaay Fortman R. Groot Dr. L.C. Biegel

Drs. D . Zandee

Threats to Western interests outside the territory of NATO countries Vital interests: to live and survive The Netherlands and militairy action outside the territory of NATO countries.

Self-inter Interview with an expert on the Middle East Jason delegation visits Bay-serninar: "Eastern Europc, the impact on East-West rela· tions" . Condusion of the Dutch govemment at the U.N. report on nuclear arms.

Special issue Introduetion What is Jason ?

Drs. L. W«:kel Dr. H. Waltman The Netherlands as a guide Mr. J.L. Heldring Mr. M . van der Stoel Prof Dr. Jhr. F.A .M .

Alting von Geusau Dr. James E. Dougherty

A guide belongs to a group The role o f the Netherlands in international politics Will coopcration endure?

A letter from a Transatlantic Friend

An obstinate revolution From slavery to multinationals, historical back· groud of the underdevelopment in l.atin America.

E .J . Hertogs American-Europcan rivalry in the Caribbean Dr. A.E. van Niekerk Netherlands and l.atin America; facts and ideas Mr. W. V. Cohen Stuan Cuba in l.atin America I El Salvador; a case-study Drs. B. Kreemers U.N. and disarmament; impressions of a disappoin· ting meeting.

Dealing in international politics Dr. L . Doom J. van Rens

Cheese-selling diplomats?

Some aspects o f development aid and foreign poli· cy: The trade union 's point of view.

Drs. B.P.J.G. Kerslens Dutch governmental policy on the export of arms E.J. Raven Economical sanctions: an illusory policy?

M . Dolmans Siberian gas: backgroud of an explosive situation.

Mr. W. V. Cohen Stuan Cuba in l.atin America 11

Bicentennial: A report of an Jason exchange with an American delegation.

L«tures by: Mr. A .J. Sligting Dutch contobution to NATO Prof. Dr. A . van Staden The current state of American-Europcan relations: Drs. G. de Vries Drs. Chr. Sanders Mr. K.G. de Vries

How troubled is our atlantic partnership?

The Netherlands and NATO: continuity or change The two-way street, which way to go?

Attitudes of the Netherlands and the Europcan dimension.

The Europcan dimension in the West-West relations.

Prof. Dr. Jhr. F.A.M. Alting von Geusau Reports of presentations: Ir. J . Comelis Dutch infrastructure for aircraft research and development.

Dr. Ir. A .E. Pannenborg Philips and the world-wide competition.

Report:

Drs. D. Zandee

lmpressions from Washington .