Jason magazine 2018, Issue 1

MAGAZINE

Natural resources and THE environment International peace- and security questions * volume 43 * issue 1 * 2018

JASON MAGAZINE

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JASON Magazine is the periodical of the JASON Institute Chief Editors Charley Steur Caitlin Morrin Rik van Dijk Daniël Stuke

Senior Editors Charley Steur Caitlin Morrin Rik van Dijk Ilias halbgewachs Daniël Stuke Wouter Witteveen

Editors Steven van der plas Caspar Stap Emanuel Skoog Ruben Tavenier Eva Troost Floris van Wieren Special thanks to lammert van Raan

Design Ervee design & drukwerk (Ruud van der Vegt)

Co-ordination Geschreven en Gedrukt Communicatie (hans van der lee) Printing Drukkerij noordhoek, Aalsmeer

Executive Board Chairman – Cherissa Appelman Secretary – Margot Karis Treasurer – Floris Duvekot External relations – Charlotte Renckens pR & acquisition – Eline hietbrink Editorial office – Charley Steur/Caitlin Morrin Events coordinator – Bhaskar Dercon General Board Dr. laurens van Apeldoorn Drs. Bas Bijlsma Dr. Francoise Companjen Col. Marco hekkens, RnlMC (ret.)

Ms. Goos hofstee Drs. Simon Minks Drs. pim van der putten Ms. Marjolein de Ridder MA Mr. hans Rouw MA Drs. Tim Sweijs Col. niels Woudstra, Rnln

Advisory Board Chairman – Dr. W.F. van Eekelen prof. dr. E. Bakker lt. Gen. Jan Broeks, RnlA Col. Marco hekkens, RnlMC (ret.)

Cmdre M. hijmans, Rnln prof. dr. J. lindley-French R.D. praaning Ms. l.F.M. Sprangers MA A. Baron van lynden Ms. Ida van Veldhuizen Contact us Schouwburgstraat 2 2511 VA Den haag T +31 (0)71 527 79 72 E info@stichtingjason.nl I www.stichtingjason.nl

neither the JASon Institute nor the JASon Magazine editorial office is responsible for the views expressed in the contributions to this magazine.

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Contents 04 08 11 15 18

Businessmen, Angry Locals and Hired Guns: Trouble in the Niger-Delta Casper Stap

Interview over klimaatvluchtelingen en politiek

Klimaatvluchtelingen en Nederland: Een gesprek met Tweede Kamerlid Lammert van Raan (PvdD) Rik van Dijk

China’s expanding multifaceted engagement with Africa

China’s non-economic interests in Africa Emanuel Skoog

The role of gold in financial and economic security Floris van Wieren Book review

Freedom within Bounds

Reviewing “The Revenge of Geography” by Robert D. Kaplan

Daniel Stuke

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21 24 28 32 35 38

JASON MAGAZINE

EDIToRIAl Dear reader,

Maritime resource conflicts

The people’s war at sea

The role of natural resources in the South China Sea disputes

Steven van der Plas

‘EU-Russian energy relations: conflict due to interdependence?’

Ruben Tavenier

Water Wars

The struggle for the gift of the Nile

Wouter Witteveen

The plundering of resources by external actors in Congo Caitlin Morrin

De onzichtbare helden van de ReparatieGeneratie

Eva Troost, Jonge Klimaatbeweging

China in the Arctic: An Opportunity for Arctic Governance Charley Steur

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More than we have seen before in recent times do we see the reasons for conflict being stripped bare to their absolute bones. no longer are questions of power, influence and political gain central prizes in the struggle between parties. Resources are the true trophy in a world where they become scarcer and scarcer.

With the earth burgeoning under the massive growth of population and the effects of development of this ever expanding Global Village, we see conflict rising about oil and water in Africa. We see a race to control the rich South-and north pole. We see a massive increase of people desperate to survive and being forced to leave their homes as they can no longer sustain their families due to the rising temperatures.

Senior military officials, from the United Kingdom, the netherlands and the United States, are warning that the effects of climate change could be the largest security threat of the coming decades.

In this edition JASon will give our readers an insight in the wars on resources that are being fought and which are to come.

Also it is our pleasure to announce a changing of the guard and introduce our new chief editors, Charley Steur and Caitlin Morrin. They will take the reign of our beloved Magazine and steer it to new heights.

Daniel Stuke, Rik van Dijk, Charley Steur and Caitlin Morrin Chief editors JASON Magazine

JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

03

Businessmen, and hire Trouble in th

JASON MAGAZINE

A quick search online will show you that Nigeria is an amazingly beautiful country, with waterfalls the size of sky scrapers, plains as far as the eyes can reach and dense, green forests. However, do not expect to see the same beauty in the Niger delta. You will see pictures of muddy, oily swamps and angry protesters. They could have been taken right from a geography textbook under the heading of oil pollution in a globalized world.

CASpER STAp

T

he case of the fight of the local people with oil corporations – of whom most notably Shell – and their government is more complex. e weakness of the federal government and its security apparatus has led the oil corporations, in collaboration with the government, to establish a semi-private security sector. e government sees its powers expand

Nigeria’s oil for sale It is in 1937 that the Anglo-Dutch Royal Shell started its activities in Nigeria. Its activities have centered around oil and gas production, development, and delivery1. e Shell subsidiary that operates the onshore and shallow water installations, including those in the Niger delta, is the Shell Petroleum Development Company of

and the oil companies see their operations being more secure. But what about the locals? A closer look at the Nigerian state, Shell, and the privatization of security in a broken country.

Nigeria Limited (SPDC). It provided the country’s first commercial oil exports in 19582. Although this company, as well as other Shell companies within and outside of Nigeria, is fully owned by Shell, it operates as a joint venture. e

The government in nigeria is very dependent on the steady flow of oil revenues.

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SPDC LV, with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company holds 55% of stock and Shell 30%. is means that traditionally, although Shell is in control of the company, the big majority of the profits go to Nigeria. is is the result of the wave of nationalization efforts of the industry in the 1970s. It is the same with other oil companies that are active in Nigeria, like Mobil and Chevron, who all operate the ventures but have a minority share2.

Nigeria has been a very volatile precarious country over the past sixty years. Nigeria has around 250 to 400 different ethnic groups and several religions to make it even more complex. is has led to patronage systems throughout society. Since Nigeria’s independence from British colonial rule in 1960, the Nigerian state has struggled greatly. For example, between 1960 and 1998, the Nigerian people have lived under ten different governments, of which seven were military, and whose life span often did not exceed two or three years2. e role of oil in this patronage system has contributed to the instability. Nigeria consists of states that are to a certain extent politically autonomous and whose geographical boundaries do not match ethnical lines.

Oil revenues are distributed among states, which makes it possible for the most powerful ethnic group in a state to allocate those revenues unevenly and in favor of their own group. Nigeria’s instability has nonetheless not discouraged oil companies to invest in the country. Whereas political instability often leads businesses to avoid a region, this does not hold up for the oil industry in Nigeria. is paradox stems from the fact that the political instability in

JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

iAngry locals d Guns: e niger-Delta

JASON MAGAZINE

Nigeria has had limited effect on the operations of oil companies, as subsequent governments continued to favor working with the oil companies.

With the central government in Nigeria being weak and historically prone to be overturned, it has been very dependent on the steady flow of revenues coming from the oil installations. e elites in Nigeria have been mostly interested in short-term benefits and survival. is makes them unfit to exploit the oil fields

themselves, as technical expertise and long-term investments are critical for success. is dynamic has created a “hegemonic alliance” between governments and the oil companies3. e governments can expect a steady income of cash as long as they give the oil companies room to work. As the government does not act in favor of the whole population but rather in favor of the elites and their clans, a

very problematic situation has emerged, where it is hard to hold neither the government nor the oil companies accountable for problems resulting from their activities. However, the common narrative of the international oil companies “dictating” their will to the Nigerian state is arguably too one-sided: the nationalization efforts of the 1970s, among others, have shown that the Nigerian state can effectively shape the situation of who benefits most.

t Villagers are bunkering oil from a Shell facility.

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JASON MAGAZINE the kidnapping of oil corporation operatives, the attacking of oil installations, large protests, etc.6 An example of this is the heavily armed militant “Niger Delta Avengers” group, who have in November 2017 announced to resume attacking oil installations in the Niger delta. eir goal is to move the government to attribute the locals more control of the oil production, a concern to which the government has been slow to respond7.

s Senior members of the “Spy police” are seen sitting at an alumni event.

To illustrate: for every barrel of oil that is sold for e.g. $30, revenue agreements as well as additional taxes lead to the oil company only making about $5 on that barrel3. oil & violeNce at many locals in especially the Niger delta do not profit from the oil industry is one problem. Besides that, the Nigerian oil industry also takes a very heavy toll on the nature. As of 2011, an expected 500 million gallons of oil have spilled into the delta. In comparison: that is more than twice as much as what spilled into the sea at the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster4. It would, however, be too easy only to attribute those spills to Shell and other major oil corporations. e size of the spills and the ecological effects have been heavily contested by both the locals and the oil corporations as the latter argue that a large part of the loss is the result of illegal puncturing and tapping of the oil lines by villagers, locally known as “bunkering”3. e unrest among the people is only worsened by their feelings of perceived injustice. is is most problematic with the Ogoni people. ey are the biggest minority in the Niger delta and have been in conflict with Shell for decades, with tensions rising highest in the 1990s3. at the impoverished locals in the Niger delta do not share in the profits is the main reason for the bunkering. is has developed into an amazingly big business and includes organized crime networks, international traders and a large part of the local 60

population. Oil can be stolen in several ways, of which the most important way is simply making a small puncture in the pipeline and syphoning the oil off.

Other strategies include tapping from a demolished wellhead or forging oil documents and tapping excess oil (the

Violence is often a way to give voice to feelings of anger and injustice.

latter is essentially mostly corruption and is also the hardest to detect)5. e oil business also manifests itself into security issues that are not economical/criminal but political.

Violence is also often a way for the local communities in the Niger delta to give to voice their anger and feelings of injustice. Security threats include the vandalizing of technical infrastructures,

a semi-Privatized security outfit It is clear that Shell wants to act to ensure the security of its business endeavors in the Niger delta. erefore, it pumps $383 million into security efforts, forty percent of Shell’s global security spending8. Like other oil companies in Nigeria, Shell has also established its own security forces.

Governmental security forces, like the police and the army, have a very bad reputation in Nigeria. Not only have they historically served as an instrument of oppression, they are also known for violently taking down protests and other forms of barbarism like executions and torture. Corruption and a general lack of professionalism only further worsen their status. For example, an oil executive remembers a police unit announcing their arrival in a village by simply firing their guns8. Hardly the sort of hospitality one wants to expect from a security guard.

In the past Shell worked closely together with the Nigerian governments for the provision of security, which has led to significant reputational damage. It now chooses a more community-friendly approach. is includes scholarships, investments in the local economy, and community liaison officers (CLOs), who serve as mediators between the community and Shell in case of an emerging low-intensity conflict. is does not mean that “hard” security is not Shell’s concern anymore. Nigeria has seen the emergence of a very interesting shared provision of security,

Shell and Nigerian corruption

Shell is currently being accused of corruption in nigeria. It is argued that Shell paid $1,1 billion in bribes in 2011. The money was meant for a settlement on an oil drilling license disagreement between Shell and nigeria. Essentially all of the money has gradually disappeared in the system, into personal accounts of among others the former minister of oil, Dan Etete. It is suspected that Shell knew about this corruption beforehand and willingly paid the settlement, knowing where it would end up. A verdict is expected on December 20, 2017.

JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

JASON MAGAZINE Summary

nigeria is one of the world’s biggest oil producers, with big firms like Chevron, Mobil and Shell having been very active in the country for more than half a century. That said, the oil revenues have never been fairly distributed among the whole population, rather it ended up in the bank accounts of the elites and the oil companies. This, combined with massive ecological damage due to oil spills has led to major security threats coming mostly from deprived and violent local communities.

Shell and consorts and the nigerian state have responded to it by establishing a unique semi-private provision of security in the niger delta. A provision of security that, unfortunately, only worsens the tensions in the country.

especially in the oil-rich areas. It is by law prohibited for private security firms to bear arms. is has led to a practice of cooperation with the Nigerian police, whereby members of the paramilitary police are practically permanently seconded to private security units. ese forces get a supplementary wage and are under the lead of their private security officer, but are also still under formal command of their police commander, which can lead to a grey area of responsibility and authority9.

Shell also makes use of the Supernumerary police, commonly known as the “Spy police”. ese are unarmed Nigerian police officers that are used for manned guarding of private locations. ey wear a uniform that is

Biography Casper Stap holds a BSc in political Science from the University of Amsterdam and is finishing his master Crisis & Security Management at leiden University. his interests include warfare, (counter-) terrorism, intelligence agencies and cybersecurity.

distinguish the Spy police units from governmental police units.

Shell, in turn, also empowers the governmental forces. Not only do Shell and other oil companies frequently supply the government with materials like boats, equipment and vehicles, through their training of the police forces that are seconded to their own units, they also increase the capabilities of the Nigerian police forces.10 Private security firms are thus ‘providing technology, expertise, and expatriate personnel that substantially influence the practices of public security forces, as well as providing capabilities that would otherwise be absent’, according to Abrahamsen9. e partnership between Shell and other oil companies and the Nigerian state in the provision of security has benefits for the both of them. Shell controls armed security forces and has access to military and police forces for help. e Nigerian state “outsources” its provision of security and in addition sees the risk for foreign investment of oil companies lessen. Although this can provide them with political legitimacy with groups in society that notice progress, this is certainly not the case for the deprived minorities. aN awkward PartNershiP And so it happens that in a country rich of oil only the powerful few profit. After a closer look at the different actors, it becomes clear how different parties make deals and barrels of oil are shipped

around the world every day, while the people actually living on top of the oil live in poverty. e issue has generated media attention, most notably as a result of efforts from NGOs like Amnesty International, but a radical shift in course seems far away. at leaves the locals with little to defend themselves as long as neither Shell nor – more importantly – the government Nigeria will be held accountable. Or, as Nigerian minority ruler King Emere says: “Shell is Nigeria and Nigeria is Shell.”11. A bleak but unfortunately not untrue observation.

t An oil barrel of Shell is seen in Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

nigeria has seen the emergence of a very interesting shared provision of security.

almost similar to that of normal Nigerian police officers – which serves to intimidate locals – and are trained by Shell, which makes them considerably more professional than their governmental counterparts10. Just like with the use of paramilitary police officers in the private security units of Shell, it is often very hard for locals to JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

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Klimaatvluchtelingen en nederland

JASON MAGAZINE

Interview over klimaatvluchtelingen en politiek

Een gesprek met Tweede Kamerlid Lammert van Raan (PvdD) Het aantal mensen die hun huis gedwongen moeten verlaten door de gevolgen van klimaatveranderingen zal in de komende jaren drastisch toenemen. In 2008 schatte de VN dit aantal op acht miljoen mensen en volgens sommige schattingen zal dit in 2050 vertienvoudigd zijn.

Hoewel de toekomst moeilijk te voorspellen is, kunnen we er zeker van zijn dat we de term klimaatvluchteling de komende jaren steeds vaker zullen horen. In de Nederlandse politiek begint hier ook steeds meer aandacht voor te ontstaan.

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De manier waarop wij in nederland leven veroorzaakt voor het grootste deel de problemen JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

JASON MAGAZINE JASON Magazine sprak met Lammert van Raan, Tweede Kamerlid voor de Partij voor de Dieren, over klimaatvluchtelingen. Zijn partij is één van de voorlopers in het creëren van bewustzijn over de gevolgen van klimaatverandering in Nederland en lijkt steeds meer mensen aan haar kant te vinden.

RIK VAn DIJK

Beste meneer Van Raan, ten eerste gefeliciteerd met het succes van uw partij (de Partij voor de Dieren) en met uw bijna eenjarig Kamerlidmaatschap. Merkt u dat er op een andere manier tegen uw onderwerpen wordt aangekeken?

(Lachend) Enorm, enorm. Maar je ziet het wel. We zijn als partij meer dan verdubbeld. We zijn in dit versplinterde politieke landschap gewoon een middelgrote partij. En we beginnen wel te merken dat er anders naar ons en onze thema’s gekeken wordt.

Jullie zijn misschien wel de enige partij die de klimaatverandering als oorzaak noemen voor de migratiestromen. Verandert dit nu?

Je ziet dat er gesproken wordt over grondoorzaken. Dat is nieuw. Vroeger werd dat niet genoemd. Al moet ik zeggen dat het niet onze uitvinding is.

De VN schreef er in 1997 al over. Maar omdat onze visie planeet breed is en het verband legt tussen wat wij hier doen en de effecten dat ons gedrag ergens anders heeft, zagen we de gevolgen al wel vroeg aankomen. Dat is vanaf het begin één van de punten geweest. Bijvoorbeeld in een debat met Marianne [ieme] werd premier Rutte erg verrast door haar link tussen vluchtelingen en klimaatverandering. Die link had hij nog nooit gelegd.

De oud-commandant der Strijdkrachten, Bert Middendorp, noemde klimaatverandering als een van de grootste dreigingen voor de veiligheid? Wordt er in de politiek meer naar deze visie geluisterd?

We zien het wel vaker bij termen die wij inbrengen dat ze eerst niet altijd serieus wordt genomen. Het begrip Circulaire economie moesten we in 2009 spellen voor mensen, maar nu hoef je dat niet meer uit te leggen. Bij de link tussen klimaatverandering en vluchtelingenstromen moeten we soms nog wel wat dingen uitleggen maar zo langzamerhand zie je dat het verband steeds vaker worden gelegd. Al zijn er nog steeds

clubs die klimaatverandering niet als probleem accepteren. Maar premier Rutte sprak laatst over het wegnemen van de grondoorzaken, en klimaatverandering is daar een van.

We hebben gezien dat het debat rond vluchtelingen enorm polariseert. Ziet u dat er meer bewustzijn komt bij mensen over vluchtelingen en specifiek klimaatvluchtelingen?

Ja, maar het verandert de slechte kant op. En dat heeft ook redenen. Saskia Sassen, professor sociologie aan de Columbia Universiteit, heeft een boek geschreven over het precariaat. Dat gaat over een klasse die geen vastigheid heeft en wiens zekerheden steeds meer worden afgebroken. En naarmate burgers onzekerder worden over hun eigen bestaan, zijn ze minder bereid voor anderen te doen en neemt het draagvlak om vluchtelingen op te nemen af.

Iedereen moet het doen. laat duizend bloemen bloeien zou ik zeggen. Maar dat betekent wel dat iedereen zijn rol moet pakken.

Uit onderzoek blijkt dat het aantal vluchtelingen de komende jaren enorm gaat toenemen, waaronder klimaatvluchtelingen. Echter in het Vluchtelingenverdrag van de VN is geen definitie van Klimaatvluchteling opgenomen, waardoor zij geen bescherming hebben. Hoe kijkt u daar tegenaan?

Je ziet, zoals vaker, dat wetgeving achterloopt op de situatie en daardoor misstanden gebeuren. Daar zie je ook de tragiek van het verhaal. Want zodra je als wetgever het begrip klimaatvluchteling een wettelijke status geeft, moet je daar ook iets mee doen. Er zijn genoeg krachten die daar niet aan willen beginnen. Want hoe meer je recht doet aan de situatie, hoe meer wettelijke verplichtingen er komen en er zijn landen die daar absoluut niet bij gebaat zijn.

Drs. lammert van Raan (1962) is sinds 23 maart 2017 lid van de Tweede Kamerfractie van de partij voor de Dieren. hij was werkzaam op het gebied van Internet en ICT en hij was docent economie en management en organisatiekunde. Van Raan was verder duo-raadslid in Amsterdam, bestuurslid van het waterschap Amstel, Gooi en Vecht en lid van de provinciale Staten van noord-holland.

Wat zou op internationaal vlak of ook nationaal een organisatie die het draagvlak voor (klimaat)vluchtelingen zou kunnen vergroten?

Dat kan niet één organisatie zijn.

Iedereen moet het doen. Laat duizend bloemen bloeien, zou ik zeggen. Maar dat betekent wel dat iedereen zijn rol moet pakken. Onze rol hierin is bewustzijn, door invloed uit te oefenen op het debat door het te benoemen en te blijven benoemen.

Als we kijken naar de EU, heeft het vluchtelingenprobleem tot conflicten geleid binnen de Unie. Maar zou de EU niet bij uitstek het vehikel hiervoor zijn?

Europese samenwerking tussen landen is daar absoluut nodig. Het is natuurlijk heel raar dat Griekenland, een van de armste landen van Europa, het grootste aantal vluchtelingen moest opnemen. En dat de Oost-Europese landen gewoon een muur bouwen.

En ook Nederland heeft niet genoeg gedaan voor de vluchtelingen.

Maar wij zijn niet voor meer bindende Europese regelgeving die wordt opgelegd door Brussel, want daar is gewoon een te groot democratisch tekort op dit moment. Dat landen samen moeten werken prima, maar nog verdere bindende Europese integratie moeten we niet doen, zolang dat grote democratische tekort bestaat.

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JASON MAGAZINE

Interview over klimaatvluchtelingen en politiek

We zouden kunnen denken aan een uitbreiding van Frontex of een uitbreiding van Europese veiligheidsmaatregelen. Hoe kijkt u daartegenaan?

Ik kijk daarop vooraf niet heel gunstig tegenaan. De Europese instituten hebben een heel laag democratisch gehalte, dus bij uitbreiding raak je een andere problematiek. Wij zijn niet voor een Europese politie. Om dat probleem te voorkomen moet je het probleem van de vluchtelingen ook niet bij één organisatie neerleggen. Er moet een maatschappelijke bewustwording komen dat onze manier van leven in het Westen, elders erg gevaarlijke gevolgen heeft, die we nu hier gaan merken. Die bewustwording is cruciaal.

Bij een hypothetisch scenario dat er op dit moment een enorm aantal klimaatvluchtelingen, laten we zeggen drie miljoen mensen, naar Europa komen, wat zou er direct moeten veranderen?

We moeten kijken naar de situatie buiten Europa en onze rol in het veroorzaken van die grondoorzaken.

Vluchten is het laatste wat mensen doen en dan alsnog zijn alleen de sterksten in staat om te vluchten. Zulke migratie is enorm ontwrichtend. Neem het bekende voorbeeld van de vissers bij Somalië. In de wateren rond Somalië is in vier, vijf jaar alles leeggevist. Lokale vissers hadden dus geen inkomen meer.

Wat gaan die mensen doen? Die worden piraat en de allersterksten vluchten. We moeten het bewustzijn creëren dat we voor een deel ook zelf verantwoordelijk zijn voor dit soort misstanden.

Biografie Rik van Dijk is cohoofdredacteur van JASon Magazine. hij heeft een interesse in alles wat met veiligheid te maken heeft. Momenteel richt hij zich op de ontwikkelingen in het veld van cyber veiligheid.

Daarnaast is hij een liefhebber van ZuidAmerika.

Terugkerend op het hypothetische scenario, Europa kan niet in één keer drie miljoen mensen opnemen. Het zou een humanitaire ramp worden. De enige hoop die wij hebben is ervoor zorgen dat ze niet vertrekken. Ik hoop niet dat wij nog gaan meemaken dat er een muur rond Europa komt en er wordt geschoten op die mensen.

In Nederland zijn we inmiddels wel bewuster bezig met het aanpakken van klimaatverandering, maar in veel andere landen is dit nog niet het geval.

Dat klopt, maar als we kijken naar de uitstoot van landen, zijn het niet de andere landen die de veroorzakers van deze problematiek zijn. De mensen die op de vlucht slaan vanwege het veranderende klimaat zijn niet de veroorzakers. 75% van het klimaatprobleem komt van 10% van de wereldbevolking, namelijk jij en ik. Wij moeten zorgen dat de gehele voetafdruk van Nederland kleiner wordt. Die van ons is veel en veel groter dan die van landen in Afrika. Wij moeten niet de Derde Wereld verantwoordelijk houden voor de klimaatproblemen, zij zijn het slachtoffer van onze manier van leven.

We hebben een vertekend beeld maar die landen komen niet bij ons in de buurt als het gaat om klimaatvervuiling.

We mogen hopen dat ontwikkelingslanden stappen in hun energieontwikkeling overslaan. We zien dat gelukkig gebeuren bij telecommunicatie.

Veel Afrikaanse landen gaan direct over op een mobiel netwerk. Dus we moeten hopen dat die landen niet in de fossiele

t Jongeman in Ethiopië na een zware droogte.

energieval trappen maar gelijk overgaan op windmolens en zonne-energie en ook op plantaardige eiwitten.

Daar liggen de kansen om deze problematiek aan te pakken. Daarbij komend zullen wij in het Westen ook naar andere waarden moeten. De fixatie op groei en het Bruto Binnenlands Product kunnen niet meer. We moeten naar een breed welvaartsbegrip waar minder aandacht is voor onze spullenbehoefte. Bij de jongere generatie zien we die fixatie gelukkig al afnemen.

Als China en de Afrikaanse landen zo gaan leven als wij doen, houden we dat misschien een dag vol. Als voorbeeld, de totale kopervoorraad in de wereld zou binnen vierendertig maanden compleet uitgeput zijn als andere landen ons consumptiepatroon overnemen.

Zouden we kunnen stellen dat als we de veiligheid in ontwikkelingslanden willen verbeteren en een enorme stroom klimaat vluchtelingen willen voorkomen, we het in Nederland moeten doen?

Ja, vanuit welbegrepen eigenbelang, het punt voor onze veiligheid ligt inderdaad niet over de grens maar in Nederland.

De manier waarop wij in Nederland leven veroorzaakt voor het grootste deel de problemen. Jouw stelling somt dat mooi op.

Dank u voor uw tijd.

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JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

JASON MAGAZINE

China’s noneconomic interests in Africa

China’s expanding multifaceted engagement with Africa

s Forum on China-Africa cooperation.

Prior to China’s implementation of the marketoriented “reform and opening” of its economy in 1978 its interaction with Africa was primarily ideological and geopolitical. Predominantly in an effort to export Maoism, oppose U.S. and Soviet influence, and expand the influence and reputation of China1. However, the meteoric economic growth and expanding middle class of China during the last couple of decades have fuelled an incomparable need for resources and as part of this effort China has turned to Africa.

It is an engagement that has faced criticism from civil society in the West and Africa pertaining to its controversial business practices, failure to champion good governance and human rights.

Although, a number of African governments seem to be content with China’s policies2. At the same time, China’s multidimensional relationship with Africa has tested its policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of African governments3.

EMAnUEl SKooG

C

ontrary to conventional held perceptions that China is solely interested in Africa’s natural resources, China’s national interest includes at least four dimensions: political, ideological, security and economic4. Since the inception of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, political interests have been the lodestar and a continuing theme in its relationship with Africa. It saw natural common ground with Africa because of their mutual historical experiences: Africa and China were both victims of “colonization by the capitalists and imperialists”.

Presently, China relies heavily on diplomatic support and cooperation from the 54 African countries, which account for more than one-quarter of U.N. member states. China, needs their votes on issues that are integral for it in the global arena and at multilateral forums5.

Another of China’s essential political objectives when dealing with Africa is to terminate Taiwan’s diplomatic foothold on the continent and that African countries embrace the One China policy stipulating that Beijing and not Taipei is the sole lawful representative of China.

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JASON MAGAZINE

China’s expanding multifaceted engagement with Africa

During the Cold War and prior to China’s reform and opening up the ideological dimension of its engagement with Africa was framed as a struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

that combines political authoritarianism and economic capitalism in order to demonstrate that economic development and political stability can override the need for a sound

However, this approach has been disbanded and China has instead developed broad relationships with all African countries that subscribe to the One China policy6. In addition, China uses its own development model “the Beijing Consensus or the China Model”

democratic system7. China’s interest from an ideological vantage point in Africa did not disappear as the country shifted its stated priorities towards economic development. Instead, it has taken on a different and more subtle role that lends support to Beijing’s legitimacy

China’s interaction with Africa is more multifaceted than is often widely acknowledged.

through the dissemination and popularization of its development model8.

Due to the large geographical distance, Africa does hardly pose any direct physical threats to China’s immediate domestic security or the security of its periphery. However, its emerging security interests are driven by, and subservient to its more overarching goals of safeguarding economic development and expanding political influence9. As its economic footprint and personnel presence are increasing quickly, the physical security of Chinese investments, assets and nationals have become an increasing priority and so far, they have outpaced Beijing’s capability to secure them in Africa10. e failure to provide

t One belt, one road.

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JASON MAGAZINE In order to keep its insatiable economy moving forward China has worked frantically in order to secure enough resources ranging from oil, gas and minerals on a global scale. In Africa, Chinese mining investments have seen a 25-fold increase in just 10 years22. China has assumed a robust position in African mining sectors and imports more African minerals and metals than the U.S.23 Chinese firms have exhibited a greater tolerance for risks and adaptability to navigate political and economic upheavals than their Western counterparts. This is due in large parts to the fact that the country’s mining firms enjoy the strong backing of the Chinese state and are therefore able to adopt a longer strategic view in their business interactions25. however, as the Chinese economy has stalled recently and commodity prices have decreased, China has moved to drastically reduce some of its imports, leading to closed Chinese mines in Zambia (copper) and South Africa (iron ore)26.

adequate protection jeopardizes China’s economic benefits from Africa, which it needs to fuel its domestic growth and challenges the government’s prestige (even legitimacy) at home11.

examiNiNg siNo-africaN ecoNomic ties Economic ties between China and Africa have deepened significantly as its economy averaged a growth rate of 10 percent per annum during the last decades until 201012. e aforementioned ties have elevated Africa from minimal to moderate economic importance for China and have made China a key player in a number of African economies.

In its pursuit to secure the necessary resources needed in order to keep its economy expanding, China engages in a form of commercial diplomacy that

addition, China has been accused of its close relationship with “rogue states” such as Sudan and Angola in its quest to secure natural resources (oil in this case), countries known for their human rights abuses, political censorship and prevalent corruption.

As a result, China’s global reputation has suffered criticism, leading the nation to commence adopting a more diplomatic approach. Nevertheless, it is engaged in a delicate balancing act between securing the natural resources needed from the sources at its disposal and not attracting unwanted criticism for its trade practices. However, it is imperative to bear in mind that for the ruling Chinese Communist Party enough resources to propel economic growth means social stability at home and the continuing rule of the Party which is its overriding political objective.

Some analysts and experts say China’s activities in Africa – from building infrastructure projects to providing medical support – are goodwill for later investment opportunities or in an effort to accumulate global support for contentious political related issues16.

Africa has almost been used as a testing ground for expanding China’s global ambitions.

most other countries cannot contest with. is includes massive trade, assistance, and investment deals in their engagement with resource-rich countries, and retaining an almost unparalleled capability to offer low-cost financing and cheap labour for infrastructure projects13.

Experts from AidData a research and innovation lab located at the College of William & Mary, identified a connection between Chinese assistance and the alignment of recipient countries concerning Beijing’s UN voting and its One China principle17.

China imports the majority of its natural resources from regions other than Africa, particularly the Middle East, Australia, and Latin America. However, the monetary value of African imports understates their actual importance to China’s economic security and African resources constitute an essential element of supply diversification, lessening the risk of interrupted supply by dispersing to multiple sources14.

Oil constitutes the largest African export to China, followed by iron ore, cotton, diamonds, timber and copper. Beijing’s growing stake in African oil projects coupled with a heavy state footprint have caused anxiety in the West over the potential for resource conflicts15. In JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

Summary

China’s rapidly expanding presence in Africa during the past decade has gradually become a contested topic for global debate. Whilst the country’s adopted economic approach towards Africa partly meets the African countries’ need for funding and infrastructure projects, the model has faced a lot of criticism. In particular, China’s natural resourcebacked loans raise questions regarding the continents future and its capacity for long-term sustainable development.

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JASON MAGAZINE

China’s expanding multifaceted engagement with Africa

It is imperative to put China’s immense economic endeavours in Africa in perspective. In reality, Africa accounts for only a tiny percentage of China’s overall foreign economic activities and politically the continent is of small importance and plays a largely supporting role in China’s overarching foreign policy agenda18.

However, it has become evident that Beijing is gradually moving away from this position19. is ongoing change is notably visible in Sudan, a key oil exporter to China, where conflict there and subsequently in South Sudan led to changes in its policies20. Furthermore, China has also expanded its commitment to U.N. and African

NoN-iNterfereNce iN domestic affairs aNd security Beijing’s non-interference policy and respect for sovereignty allow assistance with few to no strings attached, providing repressive governments throughout the continent with much needed financing. e policy of noninterference has been tested, due to altering geopolitics on the continent whilst the Chinese central government continued to advocate for the merits of non-interference.

Union peace missions and established its primary overseas military outpost in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. In March 2017, more than 2500 Chinese police and military personnel were dispatched to six UN peacekeeping missions ranging from Darfur, Mali and the South Sudan. Increased Chinese presence on the African continent has seen its peacekeepers killed in Mali and South Sudan, the kidnapping of Chinese workers in Cameroon, which has contributed to an expanding Chinese presence and involvement. is a clear

Biography Emanuel Skoog works with assisting Swedish companies in their business internationalization development in the Benelux.

Furthermore, he has worked and studied in Australia, Spain, Sweden, the Benelux and the United Kingdom.

Whilst China’s economic footprint in Africa is rising, it represents only a fraction of China’s combined economic activity around the globe.

transformation from China’s previous criticism of U.N. peacekeeping deployments as violating sovereignty to at present participating in them21. coNclusioN It is arguable that Africa has become a more important issue for Beijing during the past decade; however, overall Africa’s strategic importance remains low.

Furthermore, there exists a lack of comprehensive, long-term strategic vision, which complicates the engagements between Beijing’s political agenda and its economic goals in Africa, and between short-term commercial gains and long-term national interests.

s

e Sino-African relationship can be characterized as being comparatively smooth and free of major troubles due in part to a mutual sense of historical victimization on behalf of Western colonial powers and a mutual identity as developing countries. Given Beijing’s priority of fuelling its domestic economic growth with African resources and market potential it is likely that the Sino-African relationship will continue to be largely transactional and reciprocal in its nature moving forward.

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African Union conference centre and complex.

The role of gold in financial and economic security

JASON MAGAZINE

The role of gold has always played an important role in the economy and its security. Gold was first used as money around 3000 BC, a position it has kept until 1914 or even later. It was seen as a medium of exchange, having intrinsic value. As this became unpractical, governments across the world started issuing money, which if intended could be exchanged for that amount in gold. This idea that you can exchange gold for a currency gave a sense of security, the money people held, could always be exchanged. This system collapsed in 1973, when the Bretton – Woods system broke down, and since then we have moved to fiat money, money with no intrinsic value. In other words, no gold to back up the amount of currencies. However, are we even moving past the system of fiat money, as currencies are being manipulated and cryptocurrencies are emerging? What will the role of money be in the future, and will we see a return of gold?

FloRIS C. VAn WIEREn

T

o understand why we use fiat money now, we need to understand what we were using during the Bretton woods system and why it failed. While World War II was nearing its end, representatives from different countries met in the town Bretton – Woods, to establish post war international economic cooperation. ey believed this was needed to prevent another “Great Depression” which had inevitability led to World War II. e countries that joined, agreed to keep their exchanges rate pegged to the US dollar, which could be exchanged by Central Banks for 35 dollars per ounce of gold. is implied that all currencies that were fixed to the US dollar had a fixed value in terms of gold. is created international economic stability, and made the US dollar the most important currency in the world. Money had gained intrinsic value, as technically if you owned 35 dollars, you could exchange this for 1 ounce of gold (IMF). e system collapsed as the United States started accumulating more debt, due to international conflicts such as the Vietnam war. is worsened the overvaluation of the US dollar, and the order ultimately broke down when

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JASON MAGAZINE

The Gaza Power Vacuum after Disengagement

President Nixon, announced that the dollar would no longer be convertible into gold. is meant the end of the Bretton – Woods system, and global currencies were no longer pegged to the US dollar, making them float.

Since the start of the Bretton – Woods system the US dollar has been the main currency, it currently accounts for 65% of the glal foreign reserves and accounts for 30% of global trade flows excluding the United States. is shows how important and influential the US dollar is. Its main current competitors being the Euro, the Yen and the Chinese Renminbi. So why is this relevant, and why does this lead to more security? For one instance the Federal Reserve, the central banking system of the US, has a monopoly on the supply of the US dollar, this implies that it has a certain influence over countries which hold large deposits of the US dollar. If the

s Gold Reserves Bank of England.

becomes scarcer. is means that actions from the Federal Reserve, will have profound implications across the world.

If the Federal Reserve decreases the money supply to increase interest rates, this will have a global effect on Central Banks across the world, as the US dollar becomes scarcer.

Federal Reserve decreases the money supply to increase interest rates, this will have a global effect on Central Banks across the world, as the US dollar

However, why are foreign reserves so important to countries, what is the added benefit of having foreign reserves? ere are different reasons to have

foreign reserves. If the Central Bank wants to increase the exchange rate, it might sell or buy its currency, which will cause an appreciation or deprecation of the currency. Although one of the most important reasons to have foreign reserves is that currencies can be subject to speculative attacks. In short this means that when investors see that a Central Bank holds little foreign exchange, they will start to sell the currencies, promoting the Central Bank to defend the currency, which will lead to the Central Bank actively purchasing local currency. is will cause the currency to increase in value, as less is in circulation. When the Central Bank runs out of foreign reserves money, the currency will depreciate in value. is

t The Federal Reserve building in Washington DC, where all the important decisions are made.

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JASON MAGAZINE creates uncertainty in the market and can have some serious consequences for the security of the currency. ese changes mark the importance of having a large foreign reserve, as this will allow one to prevent speculative attacks and allow one to manipulate the exchange rate. is form of influence makes the United States the biggest player on global currency, a position it is keen to hold.

However, recently its position has been challenged, key events occurred that have changed the global environment of global currencies. e first is that the Chinese Renminbi, the country’s official

When the Central Bank runs out of foreign reserves money, the currency will depreciate in value.

currency, joined the elite IMF basket of reserves currencies, known as Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Hereby acknowledging the global importance of the Chinese Renminbi. e second is the economic crisis of 2007, this financial crisis has had a profound impact on global currencies, with Central Banks across the world adopting unconventional measures to increase economic growth. is has caused many people to fear that a race to the bottom will occur. e first signs of this occurred in 2015, when the Chinese government announced it would devalue the Renminbi, the first time in 20 years. is has led to the accusation of US officials that the Chinese government is trying to weaken its currency to increase its exports, and undermine US exports. However, such accusations are not only made against China, US President Donald Trump has accused Germany and Japan of keeping their currencies artificially weak to increase their exports. ese developments show the importance of stable currencies and security to countries across the globe. e Trump administration has continued to accuse other nations of keeping their currency weak, prompting analysts to fear a currency war, which could lead to economic decline across

Biography Floris van Wieren is a bachelor student in International Studies at leiden University and is currently doing a minor Macroeconomics: International and monetary economics. he is fascinated by the ongoing geopolitical situation and the financial market.

Summary

Since the end of the Bretton – Woods system international currencies have been floating, depended on the market. The consequences of the financial crisis have caused countries to devalue their currencies, to gain an upper hand in trade.

This might lead to a currency war between countries, the gold standard might prevent this from happening, but it is too late to implement the gold standard again.

the world. e increasing threat of currency wars, has caused people to increasingly look at alternatives to market based currencies, or more broadly defined floating currencies.

One of the possibilities is that cryptocurrencies will replace conventional money, as no government or official department will have influence over it. However, making such assumptions is quite pre-mature. e largest cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, to date has 17 million in circulation, which is quite little compared to the US dollar.

Moreover, as many people still use the dollar as a unit of value it’s importance will not decline anytime soon there are also people stating that we should return to the gold standard.

Return to the gold standard may seem a good alternative, there are certainly benefits. A country would be depended on its gold reserves, creating a fixed money supply. is would discourage government budget deficits and will reward productive nations. Nevertheless, there are also clear disadvantages to this alternative. As there is a limited amount of gold in the world, the gold supply would not be able to keep pace with the money supply. Furthermore, countries would become obsessed with keeping gold, which would not benefit the global

s Bitcoins have seen an enormous rise in value in the past few months.

have a point when acknowledging that other countries are devaluing their currency. e prospect of a currency war, will not benefit anyone, and will harm the world economic growth significantly. Furthermore, the damage done by a currency war, will significantly

The Chinese government announced it would devalue the Renminbi, the first time in 20 years.

economy.

While it might seem ideal to return to the gold standard, the truth is that this is no longer possible. e system of floating exchange rates has proven to be manageable, if countries do not try to undermine each other. While he may be stating it bluntly the US President does

harm relations between countries and will impact consumers around the world. erefore, it is vital that the current system works, with supply and demand ensuring stable floating currencies. A return to the gold standard, as nostalgic as it may sound, is out of the question.

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Freedom within Bounds

JASON MAGAZINE Book review

Reviewing “The Revenge of Geography” by Robert D. Kaplan

When looking at the big picture of human history, it is not the actions of individual people or even the cultures of civilizations that determine its course. Rather, it is the shape of the world’s natural geography.

To ignore the imperatives that geography imposes on our actions is ultimately a futile endeavor, doomed to failure. When considering the grand theatre of international politics, we ought to make the geography of the world our starting point.

That is the argument which Robert D. Kaplan puts forward in his book “The Revenge of Geography.” The book is at times vague and selfcontradictory, and in spite of its author’s enormous efforts to the contrary, frequently fails to avoid the trap of determinism. All the same, Kaplan’s reflections on the geographical circumstances of the world’s major powers and how these might influence them in the future offer some compelling insights, making the book worth the read.

DAnIEl STUKE

A

t the outset, Kaplan notes that the development of modern technologies has caused us to neglect the prominent role which geography still plays in the daily reality of international politics.

Technologies such as instant communication, air travel and longrange missiles make the world seem a lot smaller, and this has led policymakers to no longer consider a region’s natural geography a relevant factor. Sure, mountain ranges might have been formidable natural barriers in the past, but what should we care about them now that our aircraft can transport us 18

across them in a matter of hours, or now that our missiles can easily reach any target on the other side? the returN of geograPhy is type of thinking, Kaplan states, is a fatal mistake. He points to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an example of what happens when policymakers fail to properly take into account the geography of a certain area. Emboldened by the success of military operations in the Gulf War and Kosovo in the 1990s, US policymakers had begun to trust in their country’s military superiority, making them confident that an invasion

of Iraq would be successful. But the operations in the Gulf War and Kosovo were limited air force operations, and could by no means be compared with a full-scale invasion and occupation with ground forces. Kaplan points to two main geographical factors that ultimately made the invasion of Iraq an impossible endeavor: the vast distances of empty desert which the troop convoys had to cross, and the difficulty of fighting insurgents in urban terrain. Suddenly, air power proved to be insufficient.

Kaplan is of the opinion that in order to avoid another fiasco from occurring in

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JASON MAGAZINE the future, we must rediscover our respect for the geography of the landscape, so we can better anticipate the constraints it will impose on future actions. Perhaps a military strategy may be altered to account for the geographical reality – or perhaps a certain operation must be considered unfeasible altogether. falliNg iNto the traP e author then turns to a number of thinkers from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the hope that their theories can offer us some insights into the dynamics and limits imposed on us by the shape of the natural geography. While this in itself is a commendable endeavor, the discussion of the selected thinkers’ ideas is regrettably lacking, as it is riddled with apparent contradictions and bold statements that require explanation – but receive none. In addition, Kaplan fails to adequately criticize certain obviously pseudoscientific theories. As such, this is clearly the weakest part of the book.

Consider for instance the treatment of the theories of Hodgson, a historian who explained the emergence of Islam and “Islamicate culture” using the geography of the Arabian Peninsula as a starting point. His reasoning is as follows. Because the Arabian Peninsula has little agricultural land, trade towns naturally gained a dominant position, which made merchants the most powerful social class. As such, this was a world of “trade contracts”, in which moral norms such as honesty and reliability were of paramount importance. is favored the emergence of a religion in which ethics were more important than rituals – the latter being a staple of agricultural religions. While the explanation sounds somewhat plausible, it is spurious and hardly scientific, and one could conceive of any number of other, equally plausible explanations for the nature of the Islamic Faith. Kaplan however, treats the idea as valid.

Furthermore, the author does not quite succeed in his professed goal to avoid falling into the trap of geographical determinism. His ambition is to create a nuanced view, in which human beings initiate change, and geography merely imposes limits on what is and is not possible. He calls this moderate determinism. Yet again, certain profoundly deterministic ideas are not subjected to proper criticism. McNeill, another historian discussed by Kaplan,

s Cover of “The Revenge of Geography”.

states that the Indo-European peoples developed a peaceful mentality because the “monsoon-cycle encourages meditation and religious knowledge.” e notion that a peaceful mentality is purely the result of specific climatological factors seems to me to be profoundly deterministic (not to mention that the relation between the two is not at all selfevident in this case). Once again, the idea is not subjected to proper critique.

Other examples abound. heartlaNd aNd rimlaNd e thinkers that feature most prominently in the book are Mackinder

and Spykman, the theories of whom form the main starting point for the discussions of specific regions later in the book. Once again, explanation of the theories is marred by vagueness and contradictions, but here I will limit myself to a brief summary.

Simply put, Mackinder views the entirety of Eurasia as a closed system, which he refers to as the “World Island.” e World Island consists of the continental Heartland and surrounding coastal regions. e coastal regions with its maritime states are where the demographic and political powerhouses

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JASON MAGAZINE Book review

are located, but the sparsely populated Heartland with its easily traversable steppes is more crucial. is is because the Heartland provides easy access to the maritime powerhouses of Europe, India and China. In Mackinder’s words: “Who controls the Heartland controls the World Island; who controls the World Island controls the world.”

Spykman’s theory is very similar, but he places the emphasis elsewhere. It is not the control of the Heartland that matters, but of the so-called Rimland. is is the strip of land that surrounds the Heartland and which connects it to the coastal regions with its maritime powerhouses, and the coastal regions to each other. is is formed by a chain of mountain ranges, stretching from the Romanian Carpathians through the plateaus of Anatolia, Iran and Afghanistan, all the way to the Mongolian plateau. the world islaNd Whereas Kaplan’s discussion of the various theories leaves a lot to be desired, his attempt to apply them to contemporary contexts is more elegant and yields some interesting insights.

From the point of view of the Heartland theory, the most important country in Eurasia is obviously Russia. A succession of foreign invasions throughout its history (made possible by the country’s lack of natural borders) has driven the Russians to seek control over the entirety of the Heartland in a bid to gain

While “The Revenge of Geography” by Robert D. Kaplan is at times vague and self-contradictory, the merit of Kaplan’s work lies in the fact that it aims to redeem a way of thinking that incorporates geography as an important factor in human history and international politics.

security. Control over the Heartland was eventually established in the 20th century by the Soviet Union, but it could not translate this into control over the World Island. is was because the Rimland was largely under the influence of its rival; the United States. e US’ politics of containment were an effort to keep the Russians confined to the Heartland, whereas the Russians desired to extend their control over the Rimland.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia lost control over significant parts of the Heartland, which it is currently struggling to regain. In this struggle it finds itself in a tug-of-war with China and (to a lesser extent) India and Iran over control of the Central Asian states,1 which – according to Kaplan – form the very essence of the Heartland. If any one of these powers manages to gain supremacy in this region, their influence over the World Island will increase significantly.

t Map of Mackinder’s Heartland and Spykman’s Rimland.

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Biography Daniel Stuke has a Bachelor’s degree in political Science and specializes in issues relating to international relations and security, but likes to write about any topic as long as it provides food for thought.

Summary

Similarly, China is currently seeking to gain control over neighboring parts of the Rimland, such as the Mongolian Plateau, whereas India and Iran seek to dominate Pakistan and Afghanistan.

By now it must be evident that it is not the aim of the book to put forward any one single coherent argument. Rather, the book is a jumble of ideas and notions that relate to the important role of geography in the reality of international politics. If any conclusion may be drawn from his work, it is that the geography of the so-called World Island is what will determine the dynamics of international relations in the century to come. But that is not what matters most. e merit of Kaplan’s work, and the main reason why you should read the book, is quite simply the fact that it aims to redeem a way of thinking that incorporates geography as an important factor, one that informs and constrains human action. People believe they are free to bend history to their will. ey might be, to some extent, but this freedom is significantly bounded by the everpresent constraints of geography.

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The people’s war at sea

JASON MAGAZINE

Maritime resource conflicts

The role of natural resources in the South China Sea disputes

The South China Sea has been marked by state conflicts over islands and resources in the last decades and future incidents are likely to occur.

But what exactly is the importance of these islands, who are the main actors in these disputes and how do these resources explain current and possible future disputes?

STEVEn VAn DER plAS

s Map of the South China Sea, with China’s nine dash line and exclusive economic zones of other states visible.

iNtroductioN n the 31st of March, 2016, Malaysia summoned its ambassador of China to protest Chinese incursion into Malaysian’s exclusive economic zone1. A week before, around 100 Chinese fishing boats, guarded by China’s coast guard, were seen near the Luconia Shoals, a part of the disputed Spratly Islands2. is move was remarkable, as the Luconia Shoals are located more than a 1000 miles from the Chinese mainland1. is incident has

O

only been a tiny part of the web of disputes and conflicts of multiple states that riddle the South China sea. ese disputes have been portrayed as a question of sovereignty, but the region itself is also rich in natural resources.

What resources are there to be found in the disputed territories and do they help to explain the current and future disputes? territorial disPutes e conflicts in the South China Sea are about claims to economic zones and

several clusters of islands. e main focus is on the claims regarding the three main clusters of islands: the Paracel islands, the Spratly islands, Scarborough Shoal and the area between these reefs and small island groups. China has been most aggressive in pressing its claims within the South China Sea. China claims all territory within the so called nine-dash line through naval presence3. is allows China to claim sovereignty, object to oil and gas exploration and to claim fishing rights within almost the entire South China Sea3. is has led to

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Maritime resource conflicts

the occupation of many of these islands within China’s nine-dash line. China’s claim on the Paracel islands is disputed

by Vietnam, which also claims ownership of the Spratly islands, together with Taiwan4. Parts of the Spratly islands also lie in the exclusive economic zone of Brunei and Malaysia.

Indonesia has no official claim on the islands, but disputes China’s nine-dash line within its own exclusive economic zone. is has led to dangerous situations between Indonesian fishers and Chinese coast guards vessels. Lastly, Scarborough Shoal is claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines, with China and Taiwan both citing historic claims4.

Escalation on the shoal between the navies of China and the Philippines almost occurred in 2012, when a direct standoff over who controlled the shoal took place5. In the end, the situation was resolved peacefully. China continues to have a strong presence in the Scarborough Shoal despite a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 in favour of the Philippines5.

China remains de facto in control of Scarborough shoal, as the Philippines are unwilling to risk a conflict with China.

s Indonesian war against illegal fishing.

Spratly Islands and surrounding territory, is estimated to contain at least 750 million barrels of oil4. An estimate by the US Geological Survey from 1994 suggests that the entire South China Sea accounts for even more oil, with resources containing billions of barrels of oil being present4. Natural gas is also present in the South China sea, with reports that at least 70 trillion cubic feet of gas is yet to be discovered4.

oil aNd gas resources e South China Sea is an extremely large area of extreme economic importance, dotted with island groups

It is easy to frame the economic importance of the South China Sea as solely based on oil and gas resources. It is

and archipelago’s. e region is strategically important, as vital trade routes between East and South Asia and the Middle East and Europe connected by the Malaccan strait run go through the South China Sea. e area between and around these islands is abundant in natural resources. ere are potentially huge amounts of oil to be found under the South China Sea. e South China Sea Platform, an area that consists of the

true that the states that have made disputing claims on territories within the South China Sea have need of these resources, as their economic growth and expansion demands it. Chinese nationalized oil companies have drilled extensively in the South China Sea, accounting for nearly a third of Chinese oil production4. Vietnam’s oil expansion has been limited by Chinese presence in its territorial claims. Keen to defend its

China claims all territory within the so called nine-dash line through naval presence.

The perfect example of the possible consequences of territorial disputes within the South China Sea is the standoff between China and the philippines regarding the Scarborough shoal. Tensions between China and the philippines peaked on April 8, 2012, when vessels from both states engaged in a tense standoff after the philippine navy tried to arrest Chinese fishers and were subsequently blocked by Chinese observation vessels. The standoff led to the deterioration of diplomatic ties, cyber-attacks, the suspension of tourism, a Chinese ban on philippine fruit and protests by the philippines against Chinese naval presence. Both countries periodically imposed a fishing ban on the shoal, stating environmental concerns.

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interest, China has made attempts to incentivise and coerce Vietnam into abandoning oil and gas exploration within the Spratly islands and the rest of Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, making offers to give Vietnam oil fields and going as far as threatening with force if Vietnam continues its exploration activities6. However, the view that oil and gas resources are the main driver of conflict in the South China Sea is problematic. Firstly, most of the discovered oil and gas resources in the South China Sea are in uncontested areas near the mainland4. Deeper waters and disputed areas have only been partly explored. An important reason for this is that oil and gas is relatively difficult and expensive to extract in deep waters in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the contested Paracel islands and Scarborough shoal are devoid of oil or gas reserves4. e Spratly islands are significant for oil and gas resources, which are located in the contested Reed bank. Nonetheless, focus on oil and gas resources alone provides an insufficient view of the resources that makes the region so important. maritime resources as driver for coNflict e South China Sea is home to a vast amount of fishing opportunities. An estimated 12 percent of global fish catch comes from the South China Sea, signifying its importance as a source of fish7. More than 3 million jobs are in the fishery sector of the South China Sea9. e fishing resources in the South China Sea are not only important for the amount of income that they can potentially produce, they are also vital for the food security of littoral states. is is shown in the amount of resources that claimant states are willing to put in protecting their fishing fleets. e

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JASON MAGAZINE Chinese and Taiwanese fishing sectors receive heavy state subsidies and are protected by coast guard vessels as they encroach on the exclusive economic zones of other states8. e conflict

The view that oil and gas resources are the primary resource in the South China Sea is problematic.

between China and the Philippines regarding Scarborough shoal asserted Chinese presence in the area and its fishing resources. e problem with current fishing practises in the South China Sea is that it puts enormous stress on the maritime environment. Fishing stocks are being depleted at an unsustainable level, with some studies predicting a 50% decline in fishing stocks in 20457. Because Summary

There are multiple conflicts between many states currently ongoing in the South China Sea. oil and gas resources in the sea only partly describe the economic importance of the region. Maritime and fishing resources are also critical in explaining why the South China Sea is such a conflicted area and why there is potential for more conflicts and disputes in the future.

Biography Steven van der plas has a bachelor in International Relations and organisations and is currently doing the master Crisis and Security Management at leiden university. he is interested in public-private partnerships and cyber-security. In his free time, he enjoys cycling and reading a good book.

fishing is so important for jobs, income and food security in the littoral states, it is not possible to simply seek alternative food sources. is drives states with competing claims further to fish in disputed territories. Fishermen from the Philippines continue their practises in the Scarborough shoal, even though they are left at the mercy of the Chinese coast guard10. Other states try to protect their fishing grounds by attacking foreign fishing vessels on sight. is led to incidents between Indonesian and Chinese patrol vessels in 20167. It is unlikely that multilateral solutions will prevent the depletion of the South China Sea as a fishing resource, because of the nature of the disputed territories and the competing claims and needs of the littoral states. e depletion of the South China Sea will drive fishing fleets further into disputed territories and the exclusive economic zones of rival states.

Already, Vietnamese vessels have been signalled in Australian waters in search for more fish. is is a worrying trend,

It is unlikely that multilateral solutions will prevent the depletion of the South China Sea.

as this will definitely increase the potential for conflict between the littoral states. coNclusioN e value of the natural resources in the South China sea help understanding

why the South China Sea is a contested area. While deep water oil and gas resources are important in explaining the Chinese expansion in the region and some of the incidents, it is ultimately only partially responsible for the conflicts and incidents during the last years. Maritime and fishing resources not only play a critical role in explaining the territorial disputes, but also reveal why so many incidents between vessels from rival states happen. e depletion and scarcity of fishing resources will potentially drive new conflicts in the future, as fishing fleets continue to encroach on the exclusive economic zones of neighbouring states.

t Chinese island building in the South China Sea.

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‘EU-Russian en conflic to interdep

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This article analyzes and explains the relation of interdependence between Europe and Russia regarding natural gas. Implications of this relation are highlighted, and policy options for both parties are provided.

Whereas oil is often thought of as the most political natural resource, the relationship between Russia and Europe is mostly characterized by the politicization of the trade in natural gas. To meet its energy demand, Europe is for a large part dependent on the import of Russian natural gas.

On the other hand, the Russian economy is quite undiversified, and is therefore dependent on the revenues that it gets from the energy exports to Europe. This interdependence can quickly be weaponized and be used to pursue political goals. In this article, the implications of this interdependence are highlighted, and the policy options that both parties can implement to limit the negative implications of the interdependence will be provided.

RUBEn TAVEnIER

historical coNtext o understand the interdependence that exists today, and the complexities that go along with it, the characteristics of trade in natural gas, and the historical context of the trade between Europe and Russia need to be examined. e reason why natural gas differs from oil, and why gas can easily be politicized, lies within the way that it is transported. Because oil is found in a fluid state, and can be transported as such, no elaborate and fixed infrastructure needs to be built.

However, natural gas cannot be

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transported easily like oil, and needs to flow through pipelines. Building a pipeline, which is a costly investment, is the physical sign of interdependence between two parties. It literally and figuratively cements the interdependence of two states. e network of pipelines in Russia and Europe was established during the era of the Soviet Union, meaning that the pipelines running through the Baltics were all under central command. When the Soviet Union fell apart, the pipelines suddenly fell under the governance of different countries, and new terms needed to be agreed upon. In this situation, the

contracts and agreements came after the building of the pipelines, instead of the other way around. traNsit risk Both parties of this interdependent relation can politicize the matter, and use the trade in natural gas for political ends. Yet Russia has proven to be more assertive when it comes to using natural gas in a coercive way. One of the problems that arose because of the fall of the Soviet Union is one of transit states.

As mentioned before, natural gas used to flow directly from the Soviet Union to Europe, without much problem.

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ergy relations: t due endence?’

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However, before natural gas reaches its destination, it now needs to travel through several transit states, of which many used to be part of the Soviet Union. Russia does not always have good relations with these states, and when a conflict rises, the Russian government can cut off the flow of gas to coerce these states to comply with Russia. It has done so to Ukraine, a major transit state, in the winter of 2008/2009, and in 2014. is significantly harms European energy security, and gives Russia leverage.

PriciNg Power Because of the permanence and high costs of a pipeline, natural gas contracts tend to be long term, which gives the supplier the possibility to fragment the

Because of the permanence and high costs of a pipeline, natural gas contracts tend to be long term, which gives the supplier the possibility to fragment the market.

market. In this case, Russia can agree on different terms and prices with different buyers in Europe, resulting in an increased market power for Russia.

Russia can also exert influence through price-differentiating strategies. Russia prices gas differently for different buyers.

In general, the countries that are neighboring Russia usually pay a higher

price than West-European countries1. e Russian pricing power is a political tool that is employed regularly by Russia to coerce European countries2. When relations between Russia and a gasconsuming country deter, prices tend to go up to harm the gas-consuming country’s economy, until the consuming country makes concessions towards

t Gas pipelines.

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s Large tanks for LNG or liquid natural gas, in the Rotterdam harbour.

Russia. is illustrates the problem of a fragmented market. Because Russia can make separate deals, and agree on different price points with different countries, it can target individual countries to alter the price as a way of coercion.

is too dependent on one energy supplier, and Russia is too dependent on the revenues that it gets from gas trade. In both cases, diversification is the answer.

reversiNg the flow However, Russia is not the only one who can exert influence by politicizing the trade in natural gas. In reaction to a Russian gas cut-off, or limitation of supply, European countries developed reverse flow capacities. Whereas gas used to only flow from East to West, another

failed diversificatioN e reason for the European failed diversification is that some states, like Germany, have no interest in diversifying, as they would rather maintain the status quo and keep the dependence on Russia. Germany, through the proposed pipeline Nordstream 2, could function as gas hub for other European countries, which would be economically beneficial for

tool of Russia to fragment the market, European states developed reverse capacity flows to also facilitate gas flows from West to East. In case of a Russian gas cut-off, Baltic states who no longer receive Russian gas, can now import energy from Western states. is significantly counters Russian energy power.

Both Russia and Europe face the same problem of failed diversification. Europe

Germany3. Consequently, Nordstream 2 would fortify Russia’s dominant position in the European energy market. Russia maintains its position of power because no consensus can be reached on whether, and how to diversify. Rather than putting all its eggs in one basket, Europe needs to look for additional suppliers, such as the import of natural gas from Central Asia, or the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from the

Instead of having 28 different interests and policies on how to diversify, the establishment of the EEU could lead to the formulation of a single, effective diversification policy.

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Middle East, which does not need to be transported by pipeline. a euroPeaN aNswer To reach consensus on how to diversify in Europe, EU member states need to move towards a European Energy Union (EEU). rough the EEU, more integration and cooperation needs to take place regarding energy policy. Its top priority is to safeguard energy security, and ensure that that the rising European demand for energy is met, for not only EU member states but also other states in Europe, because certain non-EU member-states are vital in the supply chain of energy to EU members.

Additionally, a fully integrated energy market combined with an integrated energy network in the EU needs to be established, to facilitate more trade in energy within Europe4. Instead of having 28 different interests and policies on how to diversify, the establishment of the EEU could lead to the formulation of a single, effective diversification policy. If member-states transfer the decision making regarding energy to the EEU, effective diversification could be achieved, which will lead to a decreased market share for Russia. us, Russia will have a smaller energy market share in Europe. Additionally, the establishment of the EEU could also counter Russian pricing policy. If the European energy market is unified by the EEU, then Russia must treat the energy market as a whole, and can no longer agree on different price points for

JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

JASON MAGAZINE Summary

Because of the way that natural gas needs to be transported, trade in natural gas can easily be politicized and used for political goals.

An example of this is the relation of interdependence between Russia and Europe.

The implications of this interdependence can be countered if both parties adopt diversification strategies.

different countries. is will counter the Russian energy power. In addition to being unified, if the European energy market is liberalized, Russia will lose more of its pricing power. When the market is liberalized, more competition can take place and eventually, the price will be determined more by demand and supply, and less by Russian political objectives. russiaN alterNatives On the other hand, Russia would also benefit from adopting a diversification strategy. e diversification strategy of Russia should be twofold: it needs to diversify its economy, and it needs to look for other energy markets to decrease its dependency on Europe. e first option of diversifying its economy might be more structural and harder to achieve. Russia could however significantly limit its dependency on Europe by looking for new energy markets in Asia, and in particular China.

China’s growth will result in a higher energy demand, and this could be used

by Russia to diversify its export markets.

Russia has already signed a 30-year deal

with China to supply natural gas, worth 400 billion dollars5. is shift towards Asia significantly limits the leverage that Europe has, and provides Russia with a more stable income. However, it should also be noted that a Russian shift to Asia does not counter the underlying problem of the Russian economy being too dependent on revenues from energy exports, it just counters its dependency on Europe. coNclusioN Russia and Europe are significantly dependent on each other, and instead of creating stability, this relationship is exploited and used for political goals.

Both Russia and Europe face the same problem of failed diversification.

Biography Ruben Tavenier is a 3rd year bachelor student of International Relations and organizations at leiden University. his main interests lie with geopolitics, security studies and natural resources. he combines economic and geopolitical factors to analyze contemporary issues in international politics.

e best policy option for Russia as well as for Europe is to diversify. Europe needs to diversify its energy supply, by looking at the possibilities of importing LNG, or natural gas from Central Asia for example. is can best be achieved by moving towards a European Energy Union. To ensure more economic stability, Russia needs to look towards Asia for new export markets. China is the best option, because its rapid growing economy demands a great deal of energy. e interdependency did not promote peace and cooperation, but rather it facilitated coercion and uncertainty.

t Refinery factory, petrochemical plant.

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Water Wars

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The struggle for the gift of the Nile

When we talk about resources in a security perspective, images of valuable minerals, gas and oil come into the mind. Water is a resource taken more for granted, especially in Western Europe. However, fresh water, more so than the three mentioned above, is critical to human life.

Due to climate change and a growing world population, the access to water is becoming an issue of national security. In Northern Africa, Ethiopia is building a hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile River that will provide an enormous boost of renewable energy to the country and other African states. However, neighboring countries, most notably Egypt, fear the dam for the control it will give Ethiopia over the critical (Blue) Nile water. In the region, the control of the Nile water is the prize in a heated political struggle that can have horrendous consequences.

WoUTER WITTEVEEn

Nile as source of coNflict he construction of the dam is the source of heated debate and conflict between the African states that are so dependent on it, especially between the region’s strongest power Egypt and Ethiopia. e Ethiopian government announced the constructions of the hydroelectric dam, named boastfully the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2011.

T

e dam, which at the moment of writing is near completion, is supposed to double Ethiopia’s energy production.

Currently Ethiopia is one the least developed states in the world, with only 27% having access to the electricity grid1. e energy from the dam would support Ethiopia’s growing economy and greatly increase its importance in the region. e dam will return Ethiopia as a major player in Africa. However, it also means that a large portion of the Blue Nile can and will be subtracted from reaching Egypt, the strongest player in North Africa.

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e Economist wrote in 2016 that the dam is a boon to Ethiopia but a bane for Egypt. If we look at satellite pictures of Egypt, it becomes clear how heavily Egypt depends on the Nile water. 95% of Egypt’s population lives directly around the Nile1 and the only farmlands are found here. Without a steady flow of Nile water the Egyptians will be

the Nile which concerns Egypt. It is also the decreasing amount of available cubic meters of water supply per capita. In 1947, the average was 2.500 cubic meters per person. In 2013, this was reduced to only 660 meters. e reason for this is a fixed supply of water and a vastly growing population. e Nile water simply can not transport a larger

completely shut off from drinking- and irrigation water. Egypt could be ruined in days.

amount of fresh water through Egypt.

Egypt is currently already below the UN’s water poverty threshold3, and the UN estimates that by 2025 Egypt will be a state of “absolute water crises”4. And this estimate does not even contain any loss of water due to Ethiopians Grand Renaissance Dam. When this dam is up and running, Egypt is in acute trouble.

Due to climate change and a growing world population, the access to water is becoming an issue of national security2.

water scarcity iN egyPt; without the dam already a Problem It is not only the extremely high percentage of people that live directly at

JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

JASON MAGAZINE e problem for Egypt is that the Nile does not originate in Egypt itself. e Nile partly originates in Rwanda and Ethiopia and flows through no less than ten countries in total (Sudan, SouthSudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC and Egypt). Problems along this route can be instantly disastrous for Egypt, which as stated relies almost entirely on the fresh water from the Blue Nile. As much as Egypt would like to, it cannot fully prohibit these countries from using the water in building their own countries and using it for hydroelectricity.

Ethiopia is the first state to challenge Egypt openly on this principle. Ethiopia simply started building the Dam in 2011, when Egypt was in the middle of the turmoil of the Arab Spring. When peace returned in Egypt, a large part of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was already done. shifts iN balaNce of Power No matter the details, the bravura of Ethiopia gives a great insight in the shift

of power in North Africa. Ethiopia had the plans to build this dam for decades, but never dared to actually cross the Egyptians, who were economically and militarily far superior. Egypt had always

during the talks. Recently countries such as Ethiopia have dared to step up to Egypt. Ethiopia has a vastly growing economy and military and saw an opening at the outbreak of the Arabic

stated it has a fundamental right to a huge amount of the Nile water, as is agreed in the Nile Treaty of 19595.

However, all Nile treaties were formed during, or under heavy influence of, colonial times and were de facto reached between the UK, Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan6. Other Nile-countries, such as Ethiopia, were never present

Spring that caused chaos in Egypt. en-president Mohamed Morsi, briefly president of Egypt, stated “the water security of Egypt was not to be threatened in any way”, menacingly adding that “every single drop of water that disappears will be replaced by blood”. Responsibility over Nile water moved from the Ministry of Irrigation

Egypt was in the middle of the turmoil of the Arab Spring. When peace returned in Egypt, a large part of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was already done.

t Satellite photo of Egypt.

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s Tissisat Fall in the Blue Nile.

to the National Security Authority.

Wikileaks reported that Egypt had serious plans to blow up the Dam in 2012. Funding for the dam from the World Bank, the European Investment bank and China was withdrawn due to Egyptian pressure. But Ethiopia simply ignored all of that and kept building the dam, forcing civil servants to buy stocks and starting lotteries to raise money itself. In this game of chicken, Ethiopia did not change its course.

With the dam nearing completion, Egypt, under current president Al-Sisi, has found a more conciliatory tone.

Contributing to this are studies that show that destroying the dam would have disastrous effects on Egypt’s own water supply due to the pollution and stoppage of the rubble.

New Nile treaties as solutioN? Currently the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is as good as complete. Sudan has followed the

subtract a lot of the water from the Blue Nile reaching Egypt. What this will mean is unclear. It has yet to be determined how much water will be subtracted and withhold from Egypt,

developments with great interest and it is thought the Sudanese government is working on a plan for their own dam. is would again

what Egypt considers viable options to deal with a water shortage and how willing Ethiopia will be to let water out of the dam in years of little rain to support Egypt.

Water has the potential to become the sole most important resource in the struggle for power in the region and Egypt is the first to witness its might.

In the 5th century B.C., the Greek historian herodutus famously wrote.

“Egypt is the gift of the nile.” The river is the reason civilization could developed in the warm region of north Africa. The source of the Blue nile is in Ethiopia and it runs through Sudan before joining the White nile at Khartoum and flowing through Egypt. The nile’s seasonal flooding is a central theme in African history. The river flow follows regular patterns, increasing between May 17 and July 6, peaking in September, and then receding until the next year.

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Blowing up the dam, as was Egypt’s plan in 2012, will not only spark war but will in this stage destroy the Blue Nile for years, therefore hurting Ethiopia but destroying Egypt itself. What is clear is that, since peace was reinstated, Egypt still is by far the biggest military and economic player in the region. Egypt has

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JASON MAGAZINE SUMMARY

The growing scarcity of water in north Africa is bringing about a new play for power to the region. In 2011, Ethiopia started building an enormous dam near the source of the Blue nile River, which would greatly increase their energy supply but also give them control over the critical water flow towards the region’s military power, Egypt. The water of the nile is becoming the prize in a brewing conflict.

yet to respond, and they have the means to do so militarily.

New Nile treaties may sound as the most viable option for peace and the guarantee of water for all. But both Egypt and Ethiopia are playing another game of chicken here. Since starting with the Dam 14 rounds of talks about new Nile treaties have been set up between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt (all Blue Nile countries). e last round, just as all other rounds, resulted in nothing and it was decided to stop with the talks.

In 2015 an agreement was reached

between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt to start an impact study, carried out by two French firms, but even before this study was set up it was abandoned again7. water as the Prize In the coming years it will become clear who comes out on top concerning the struggle for fresh water in the Nile region, and through that in the redistribution of power in North Africa.

Water has the potential to become the sole most important resource in the struggle for power in the region and Egypt is the first to witness its might.

Much of the regions security issues, including the possibility of war depend on the strategy Egypt will take in handling the Grand Renaissance Dam topic with Ethiopia. For now it is a strategy of talking and restoring faith in each other as reliable partners, but the political damage the dam has done is huge. In International relations, carrots and sticks are the means and water is the prize. It is no longer a humanitarian good, it’s become a matter of national security.

Biography Wouter Witteveen is a graduated MSc in Conflict Studies. he is currently enrolled in the Master program of Sociology at Radboud University. he specializes in radicalization processes and the recent Balkan history.

t Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

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The plundering external act

JASON MAGAZINE

This article sets out to highlight the role of external actors, countries and international firms, in plundering the resource wealth of the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC). The Central African country has long suffered from oppression, corrupt rule and violent conflict, and has seen its resources plundered by a variety of external actors. These resources have often funded armed groups, prolonging the conflicts that broke out in the 1990s and 2000s and left millions of Congolese dead.

CAITlIn MoRRIn

C

ongo is one of the most resource rich countries in the world possessing about 24 trillion dollars worth of valuable minerals, such as coltan, copper, gold, diamonds and uranium1. is dazzling amount is close to the combined GDP of Europe and the United States, thus making it potentially the richest countries in the world2. It is however one of the poorest countries on the planet,3 having suffered severely from several violent conflicts since the 1990’s. Neighbouring states, armed groups and transnational firms have taken advantage of the DRC’s political and military disarray to illegally expropriate the state’s natural wealth4. resource aPProPriatioN duriNg coloNial times e largescale exploitation of resources in Congo, linked to outside powers is not a recent development. In the 19th century King Leopold II of Belgium carved out an empire in the African country, plundering it’s natural wealth in the process. e Congolese were often forced to accept extremely low prices for the ivory in their possession, or violently forced to harvest rubber. e rubber was then shipped to the West, where it was used to produce increasingly popular bicycles and cars. e appropriation of 32

resources for Western consumption didn’t end in the 19th century, copper, and uranium derived from Congolese mines were used for allied shells in the First World War and nuclear bombs in the Second World War. e Congolese population however were denied many rights, and so when the country became independent in 1960, years of colonial rule had left it underdeveloped and illprepared for nationhood5.

an “anti-communist” buffer against revolutionary movements in Africa6.

After the end of the Cold War outside support for his regime quickly waned and he was ultimately ousted in 1996 during the First Congolese War, war when the AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire), a coalition consisting of the Ugandan and Rwandan armies, invaded Zaire7. e AFDL claimed

iNdePeNdeNce aNd war In 1965 Mobuto Sese Seko, taking advantage of the chaotic situation and power vacuum that came about after independence, seized power and became president. He renamed the country as Zaire and looted the country’s natural wealth, enriching himself and close allies. His corrupt and often violent regime was supported for decades by Western governments as he was seen as

Mobutu’s Congo was giving refuge to many of those responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda8. AFDL leader Kabila officially replaced Seko in 1997, changing the name from Zaire back to Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 1998 Uganda and Rwanda turned on Kabila and invaded the country, hereby starting the Second Congolese War. e war became known as ‘Africa’s first world war’, as many

Congo is one of the most resource rich countries in the world possessing about 24 trillion dollars worth of valuable minerals, such as coltan, copper, gold, diamonds and uranium.

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of resources by ors in Congo

JASON MAGAZINE

African countries were involved.

Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia supported Kabila, whereas Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi wanted him gone9.

PluNderiNg of outside forces duriNg the coNgolese wars In 1996, before Seko’s regime was officially toppled, and the AFDL was still in control of only a small portion of the country, international corporations, many of them mining companies, already negotiated with the rebel group to restructure deals established under the rule of Seko. Hereby not only funding and empowering the AFDL, but also breaking Zairian rules that asserted that permits for prospecting exploration and prospecting were to be required through the country’s mining ministry10. e looting of resources continued throughout the Second Congolese War, which lasted from 1998 until 2003 and saw the armies of a variety of African countries intervene. Rwandan and Ugandan forces particularly have been accused of stealing resources and subsequently channelling the illicit trade through appointed rebel leaders after their invasion of the DRC11. A 2001 UN report alleges that Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo to secure their borders, but that later the plunder of resources became one of the prime reasons for them to stay12.

Ugandan soldiers for example occupied gold-rich lands in the north, extracting almost a ton of gold from it13. In 2005 the International Court of Justice instructed Uganda to pay reparations to Congo for its five year occupation of Congo’s eastern regions. e court found, among other things, that Ugandan forces, used child soldiers, s

Miner carrying a bag filled with copper ore.

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JASON MAGAZINE inflamed ethnic tensions, and stole natural resources14.

It wasn’t just Rwandan and Ugandan armies as well as Zimbabwean government officials that were implicated in the plunder of resources.

International firms have also been accused of being involved. In 2002 the UN published an influential report, stating that 85 multinationals based in the Europe, the United States and South-Africa had been facilitating the plunder of DRC’s natural resources.

According to the report these companies ignored OECS guidelines on ethics in dealing with criminal networks which have looted natural resources from the country15. Noting also how international companies, from a wide range of countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, UK, Malaysia and Russia, were active in the coltan commodity chain that facilitated armed groups in their endeavours to gain financially from illegally mind coltan. eir representatives allegedly often didn’t buy the mineral directly, but instead bought it from Congolese or Rwandan firms that transported it from Congo to Rwanda16.

Even after the war thus had officially ended, external actors and rebel groups were still, though it be often indirectly, involved with conflict minerals. Now, fifteen years after the official ceasefire public scrutiny and new legislation seems to have had some effect on the power of warlords and armed groups.

e Second Congolese war officially ended in 2003 and the Rwandan and Ugandan armies, as well as all other foreign armies, left not much later.

Transnational corporations subsequently began pursuing state licenses from the interim-government, among other

siNce the wars: legislatioN In 2014 it was reported by the Enough Project, that Congolese warlords had lost control over most of the country’s mines and conflict minerals. Conducive, some say, was a 2010 US law, known as the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act21. is piece of legislation requires companies to publicly disclose the use of conflict minerals, some of which are

things, for gold extraction in northern Congo. However as armed groups, often local proxies of above mentioned countries, were still in de facto control of certain areas instead of the government, some international companies established links with them in order to get access to mineral-rich areas. In 2005 Human Rights Watch published a report, linking Anglogold Ashanti, one of the largest goldmining companies in the world, to warlords active in the mining areas of north-eastern Congo. e company avoided gold exploration activities during the war but after the war, Human Rights Watch alleges, it

used for consumer electrics, retrieved from the DRC or its neighbouring countries. Although businesses could still use conflict minerals, the Act gives activists the option to ‘name and shame’ these companies22. Since the implementation of the Dodd-Frank armed groups have seen conflict mineral revenues plummet23. In 2017 the EU followed suit when the European Parliament voted in favour of conflict mineral legislation. e legislation requires importers of tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold to check if the materials are not derived from conflict and high-risk areas and are not used to

The looting of resources continued throughout the Second Congolese War, which lasted from 1998 until 2003 and saw the armies of a variety of African countries intervene.

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Biography Caitlin Morrin is co-editor-in-chief at JASon Magazine and is currently doing a Master in International politics at leiden University.

She is very much interested in the economics of conflicts.

established relations with the Ugandanbacked rebel group FNI, which still controlled parts of north-eastern Congo, in order to start with its gold extraction.

Anglogold was allowed to start operations in the area, and in return, the group were given logistical and financial support17. e company responded to the report by withdrawing from the area, and denied supporting rebel groups18.

Moreover a Swiss gold refining company, Metalor technologies, was linked to conflict minerals. e company too bought its gold in Uganda, after it was brought there though a chain of armed groups, middlemen, and Ugandan traders19. e company later said it had been unware that the gold was of illegal origin20.

fund armed conflicts24. Critics however say that legislation such as the FrankDodd act not just negatively affects armed groups but also the local population, who might lose their livelihood as companies scale back or stop sourcing ore25. Whether such legislation is thus a viable solution to deal with trade in conflict minerals remains contested. coNclusioN Congo has a long history of resource plunder by neighbouring countries, armed groups, dictators and, directly or indirectly, international corporations. ough resources are generally not regarded as the main cause of the country’s wars and conflicts, they allegedly have added to their intensity and duration. e number of warlords plundering resources seems to have declined over the past few years and new legislation and public scrutiny have made international companies more wary of getting involved with conflict minerals in the DRC. ere are however still many armed groups active, particularly in eastern Congo, plundering resources and using violence to fund their activities. Some experts therefore argue that in order to genuinely tackle the instability and violence caused by these armed groups, more attention should be given as to why they these groups emerge in the first place. is requires addressing underlying grievances such as local conflicts over land and traditional and administrative powers. Moreover it requires the international community and NGO’s to tackle the violence and instability in the DRC through a bottom-up approach; for example by supporting grassroots projects26.

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De onzichtbare helden van de ReparatieGeneratie

JASON MAGAZINE

Op dit moment leven er 7,4 miljard mensen op de wereld. Allemaal ondervinden we de gevolgen van klimaatverandering, ongeacht afkomst, inkomen of politieke voorkeur. Deze gevolgen zullen we de komende jaren vele malen erger zien worden. Wij zijn dan ook de eerste generatie die de effecten van klimaatverandering écht voelt en tegelijkertijd ook de laatste generatie die er iets aan kan doen. Het is daarom tijd dat er een groep mensen opstaat en zegt: “Tot hier en niet verder!”. Goed nieuws: er is al zo’n groep mensen, die invloed kan uitoefenen op hun eigen duurzame toekomst. Hij bestaat wereldwijd uit 1.2 miljard mensen, waarvan maar liefst 2.5 miljoen in Nederland. Het zijn jongeren, ofwel: de onzichtbare helden van de ReparatieGeneratie.

EVA TRooST, JonGE KlIMAATBEWEGInG

klimaatveraNderiNg, hoe zat het ook alweer?

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andaag de dag is klimaatverandering zo vaak het onderwerp van de dag, dat we bijna zouden vergeten hoe het ook alweer zat. Daarom een kleine recap: In de lucht om ons heen zitten

broeikasgassen, zoals koolstofdioxide (CO2), methaan (CH4), distikstofmonoxide (N2O) en waterdamp (H2O). Dit zorgt voor het ‘Broeikaseffect’ dat onze aarde leefbaar maakt. De afgelopen eeuwen is de hoeveelheid broeikasgassen in de atmosfeer explosief toegenomen. De grootste veroorzaker van het versterkte broeikaseffect is de stijging van CO2-uitstoot, gevolgd door

de stijging van methaangas. Deze stijging wordt onder andere veroorzaakt door het verbranden van fossiele brandstoffen, ontbossing, veeteelt, meststoffen met stikstof en gefluoreerde gassen. Het gevolg hiervan is dat de gemiddelde temperatuur op aarde flink omhoog is gegaan: oceanen worden warmer en verzuren en het wordt droger op plekken waar het al droog was, zoals

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JASON MAGAZINE doel is om de belangen van jongeren te behartigen bij overheid, politiek en de maatschappij. We werken samen met meer dan 60 diverse jongerenorganisaties: van politieke jongerenorganisaties zoals DWARS en de JD tot jongerenorganisaties zoals de Moslim Studenten Associatie (MSA) en FNV Jong. Alleen samen is onze stem sterk genoeg om het klimaat- en duurzaamheidsbeleid te beïnvloeden. De noodzaak voor klimaatactie is namelijk niet links of rechts, progressief of conservatief, maar het overstijgt alles.

s Het overhandigingsmoment van de Jonge Klimaatagenda aan Marcel Beukeboom, tijdens de Jonge Klimaattop 2017.

in Oost-Afrika. Zuid-Azië kampt met heftige overstromingen en in Amerika worden orkanen alsmaar heviger (denk maar aan Hurricane Irma en Hurricane Harvey).

Ook in Nederland zijn de effecten van klimaatverandering zichtbaar. Zo zijn tijdens de ‘Westerstorm’ in januari 2018, voor het eerst de vijf grote stormvloedkeringen gesloten. Ongeacht dat dit geen grote natuurramp was, zoals de eerdergenoemden, is het nog nooit eerder voorgekomen dat alle stormvloedkeringen gesloten werden. Klimaatverandering heeft dus desastreuze consequenties, waar wij als mensheid, zelf verantwoordelijk voor zijn. de reParatiegeNeratie Het is duidelijk dat het tijd is om onze verantwoordelijkheid te nemen. Tijdens de Klimaatconferentie van de VN in Parijs 2015 (COP21), hebben 200 landen besloten dat de uitstoot van broeikasgassen moet worden teruggebracht en dat de opwarming van de aarde beperkt moet worden tot maximaal 2ºC. Om deze doelen te halen 36

heeft Nederland in 2016 de Energieagenda opgesteld. Een goed begin, maar nog lang niet ambitieus genoeg! Wakker geschud door de woorden van Obama, “We are the first generation to feel the effect of climate change and the last generation who can do something about it”, besloten we dat het tijd werd dat wij, jongeren, onze stem laten horen. Het gaat om onze toekomst, dus het is noodzakelijk dat we ons verenigen. En daarmee bijdragen

oNzichtbare heldeN Als reactie op de Energieagenda, heeft de Jonge Klimaatbeweging in oktober 2017 de Jonge Klimaatagenda gepresenteerd tijdens de Jonge Klimaattop. Hier werden we onder andere geïnspireerd door Klimaat-correspondent Jelmer Mommers. Tijdens zijn speech benadrukte hij dat niet grote organisaties, overheden of activisten de beslissende factor zijn in acties tegen klimaatverandering. Het zijn juist de gewone mensen: de onzichtbare helden.

Hij omschreef deze onzichtbare helden als mensen die je niet snel zal herkennen om hun groene daden of klimaatzorgen, het zijn de onopvallende mensen die je op straat tegenkomt: “Denk aan de man die al bijna geen vlees meer eet, de wandelaar die elke dag een stuk plastic uit een tuin vist en de directeur die zijn Mercedes wegdeed en voortaan de trein nam. Maar ook het gezin dat alleen nog in eigen land op vakantie gaat en de kok die nog enkel kookt met groenten van het seizoen”, aldus Mommers. Deze onzichtbare helden zien wij ook bij de jongerenorganisaties die bij de Jonge Klimaatbeweging aangesloten zijn.

JoNge klimaatageNda Hoe ziet onze maatschappij er in 2050 uit? Wat is de impact van klimaatverandering op onze manier van wonen of op het voedsel dat we eten? Hoe

“We are the first generation to feel the effect of climate change and the last generation who can do something about it”.

aan het zoeken en vinden van oplossingen voor de grote klimaat-vraagstukken van deze tijd. Wij zijn een ReparatieGeneratie die kan herstellen wat er de afgelopen jaren kapot is gemaakt.

Om deze reden is op 1 november 2016 de Jonge Klimaatbeweging opgezet. Ons

moeten kinderen en jongvolwassenen onderwezen worden in klimaatverandering? Hoe gaan we ons verplaatsen naar onze banen of werken wij vanuit een groene omgeving thuis?

Deze vragen stonden centraal bij het opstellen van de Jonge Klimaatagenda.

JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

JASON MAGAZINE In de Jonge Klimaatagenda hebben we een duurzame, ambitieuze toekomstvisie gecreëerd. Een visie die niet schetst hoe we verwachten dat 2050 eruit gaat zien, maar hoe we hopen dat 2050 eruit gaat zien. Het opstellen van deze Jonge Klimaatagenda is tot stand gekomen door 30 diverse jongerenorganisaties, die hun eigen inbreng en expertise konden

van mening dat iedereen, jong of oud, hiertoe is staat is.

meegeven. Geen oude, grijze en stoffige politici dus! De Jonge Klimaatagenda is opgesteld aan de hand van vijf thema’s:

Emma Clemens, Jongerenvertegenwoordigers Duurzaamheid naar de VN, hebben de Jonge Klimaatagenda ondertekend. Tijdens de COP23 in Bonn hebben Martijn en Emma, namens alle Nederlandse jongeren, de agenda overhandigd aan Eric Wiebes, de eerste Minister van Economische Zaken en Klimaat in Nederland.

Biografie Eva Troost (1992) is werkzaam als trainee bij de universiteit van Wageningen. In haar vrije tijd praat, denkt en schrijft ze graag mee over een duurzame toekomst. net als de meeste ‘gewone’ mensen is ze te herkennen aan haar onzichtbare cape.

Tijdens de Jonge Klimaattop hebben we de Jonge Klimaatagenda overhandigd aan onder andere Marcel Beukeboom, de Nederlandse Klimaatgezant, en Ruud Koornstra, eerste Energie Commissaris van Nederland. Ook Martijn Visser en

De stem van deze onzichtbare helden hebben we gezamenlijk verwoord en uitgebeeld in de Jonge Klimaatagenda.

1. Wonen 2. Werken 3. Mobiliteit 4. Onderwijs 5. Voeding Deze thema’s zijn zorgvuldig uitgekozen en gebaseerd op een gemiddelde dag van jongeren. De Jonge Klimaatagenda geeft niet alleen jongeren zelf DIY’s (do-ityourself) om hun eigen CO2 voetafdruk te verkleinen, maar geeft ook handvatten aan de overheid, de maatschappij en ondernemingen om hun duurzame toekomst te verbeteren. ‘Vergroenen’ is per slot van rekening niet meer alleen een spaarlamp indraaien, maar bewust bezig zijn met het repareren van jouw leefstijl. De Jonge Klimaatbeweging is

Het opstellen van de Jonge Klimaatagenda en de vele enthousiaste reacties op de Jonge Klimaatbeweging, hebben ons laten zien dat jongeren hun verantwoordelijkheid accepteren om gezamenlijk aan een betere toekomst te bouwen. De consequenties van klimaatverandering zijn enorm groot en daardoor kan het lastig zijn om te bepalen waar je moet beginnen. De Jonge Klimaatagenda toont dat je moet beginnen bij jezelf. Wij zien onze toekomst vol verwachting en positief

enthousiasme tegemoet. Jij en talloze andere Nederlandse jongeren kunnen, als leger onzichtbare helden van de ReparatieGeneratie, onze toekomst ‘veilig’ stellen. “Not all heroes wear capes!”

t Jonge Klimaattop 2017, Arminius Rotterdam.

Op de hoogte blijven van de Jonge Klimaat Beweging? Volg ons op Facebook, Instagram en Twitter of ga naar jongeklimaatbeweging.nl Stichting JASON ondersteund de doelen van de Jonge Klimaat Beweging en heeft de Jonge Klimaatagenda ondertekend.

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JASON MAGAZINE

China in the A An opportuni Arctic Govern

The Arctic region is undergoing unprecedented environmental and developmental changes. Arctic temperatures rise at a rate almost twice as high as the global average, glaciers are melting, and the amount of multi-year ice has decreased. Moreover, the Arctic potentially contains 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas1. The abundance of these valuable resources and the opportunity to exploit them has created a gold rush-like scramble in the high north, with fierce competition to determine which countries have the right to access the riches of the Arctic. Furthermore, disputes on undefined continental shelf boundaries and new northern shipping routes have made the Arctic an area of major geostrategic importance.

ChARlEy STEUR

G

iven their littoral position to the Arctic, issues such as undefended continental shelf boundaries, security implications, and resource exploitations are becoming a significant factor on the domestic and foreign policy agendas of the Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States). Right now, the most far-reaching legal document to resolve these disputes is the U.N. Convention on Law of Sea, or UNCLOS2. All of the Arctic states are exploiting its rules to assert their claims. Initially, the Law of the Sea was designed to govern issues like 38

fishing rights and the granting of an exclusive economic zone 200 miles of a state’s coast. However, due to climate change, the territory of the sea in the Arctic is changing rapidly. erefore, areas are overlapping and undefined and making UNCLOS an imperfect guide to resolve the territorial disputes. e lack of security infrastructures, weak regulation and uncoordinated bilateral and multilateral surveillance could pose a threat to the regional stability in the region. e five Arctic littoral states are all members of the Arctic Council, which was established in 1996. e mandate of

the Arctic council is to facilitate regional cooperation in addressing sustainable development and environmental protection in the North3. e Arctic council is now increasing in international prominence due to the growing geo-strategic importance of the Arctic region. e opening of the Arctic creates new opportunities in the exploration of resources and the accessibility of potential maritime transportation routes. e opening possibilities however, have not gone by unnoticed by other potential stakeholders such as international organizations and Non-Arctic states.

Notably, Asian states like China are

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rctic: ty for ance

The Arctic potentially contains 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas.

showing increased interest in Arctic affairs such as the management of natural resources, northern shipping and scientific research4. chiNa aNd the arctic Even though Arctic issues are not top priority on the Chinese foreign policy agenda, China has in recent years diversified its interest and increased its diplomatic and economic activities in the region. It also clearly expressed a desire to be involved in the development of Arctic affairs and to be acknowledged

and included as an ‘Arctic stakeholder’.

China’s growing presence in the Arctic has raised a lot of questions, as it remains unclear whether China’s activities are guided by any specific strategy.

Even though China does not have an official Artic strategy its current President Xi Jinping suggested that: “China should make efforts to explore the poles in order to take advantage of their resources”5. e Chinese government, however, explains its

growing interest and presence in the Arctic mainly by the necessity of conducting research on the environmental changes that are present in the region6. In October 2015, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, further described China as a ‘near Arctic state’ and referred to China’s long history of Arctic interests stretching as far back as China’s signing of the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty in 19257. China has played an active role in Arctic affairs even before its admission as a Permanent

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JASON MAGAZINE Observer to the Arctic Council. Now that China enjoys Permanent Observer status, it will most likely play an influential role in Arctic governance.

In general, China is one of the countries that is affected most by climate change8.

China is heavily dependent on its

Biography Charley Steur is co-editor in chief of JASon magazine.

She is currently doing two masters in international relations and in journalism & new media at leiden University. She is very much interested in conflict resolution, diplomacy and human rights.

conflicting with China’s progressive trends in Arctic governance. China has invested deeply in the strengthening of bilateral relations and participation on an idea of Arctic governance on basis of legal orders11. us far, China has played a positive role in Arctic affairs and governance through its Permanent

China has invested deeply in the strengthening of bilateral relations and participation on an idea of Arctic governance on basis of legal orders.

agricultural sector, but the climatic and environmental changes in the Artic are expected to have significant effects on China’s domestic climate and environment, which has direct implications for China’s industry, agriculture, and people’s livelihood. erefore, environmental developments in the Arctic region in fact concerns China’s economic and social development and security directly. Some argue that China’s activities in the Arctic region are a threat to regional security9. is observation is often connected with China’s political and economic power.

Additionally, the territorial disputes in the Southern Chinese Sea are often compared to China’s activities in the Arctic and regularly described as hostile10. chiNa’s iNclusiveNess as a gateway to arctic goverNaNce However, such a perspective is

Observer status and through bilateral dialogues and exchanges with both Arctic states and the indigenous peoples.

In order to gain more influence, China is willing to invest in bilateral and multilateral cooperation and in vital Arctic projects that are crucial to effective Arctic governance. China will likely continue to hold dialogues with Arctic states to strengthen mutual understanding and trust, and create deeper relations through institutions in order to pursue its interests, which consequently facilitates effective Arctic governance.

As shown by the case of China, the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of other potential stakeholders is likely to affect the institutional performance of the Arctic governance framework. Besides China, several actors like Brazil, South Africa, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, the EU, and various international organizations and NGO’s

are seeking a more inclusive role and have the potential to facilitate effective Arctic governance. Asian states in particular, that already enjoy Permanent Observer status, could contribute to the Council’s activities. Like China, this could lead to knowledge building, spur regulatory advances, and lead to capacity- enhancement. Inclusion of these actors could provide external expertise, which might contribute to efficient responses to environmental challenges and result in collective action by the international community.

t Melting of Arctic ice.

40

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Rory Carroll (2002, 22nd october). Multinationals in scramble for Congo’s wealth. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/22/congo.rorycarroll.

Sustainable Security (2016, november 28). The politics of coltan: An interview with Michael nest. Retrieved from https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/11/28/the-politics-of-coltan-an-interview-with-michael-nest/.

See: note 9. news24 (2005, 6 January). Anglogold admits DRC rebel bribes. Retrieved from https://www.news24.com/Africa/news/AnGold-admits-DRC-rebel-bribes-20050601-2.

Relief web through human Rights Watch (2005, 2 June). The curse of gold – Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/curse-gold-democratic-republic-congo.

Elizabeth Davies (2005, June 1). Curse of gold has fuelled slaughter and rape in Congo. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/curse-of-gold-has-fuelled-slaughter-and-rape-in-congo-492783.html.

David Smith (2014, 11 June). Congo mines no longer in grip of warlords and militias, says report. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/congo-mines-no-longer-grip-warlords-militias-report-enough-project. laura Angela Bagnetto (2017, 7 March). Future of DR Congo mining could be on rocky ground if US Dodd Frank 1502 rolled back. RFI. Retrieved from.

Janvier Bakihanaye (2017, 23 February). A Congolese view on why we need the US minerals law. The Hill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/320868-a-congolese-view-on-why-we-need-the-us-conflict-minerals. laura Value Chain (2017, 21 March). new EU conflict mineral legislation: another step towards industry-wide change.

Fairphone. Retrieved from https://www.fairphone.com/nl/2017/03/21/new-eu-conflict-mineral-legislation/.

Mvemba Dizolele (2011). Conflict minerals in the Congo: lets be frank about Dodd-Frank. Huffington post. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mvemba-dizolele/conflict-minerals-congo-dodd-frank_b_933078.html.

Severine Autesserre (2012, June 22). The only Way to help Congo. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/the-only-way-to-help-congo.html.

China in the Arctic: An Opportunity for Arctic Governance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

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Jiang, y. 2014. “China’s role in the arctic affairs in the context of global governance”. Strategic Analysis 38(6): 913-916. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21589908-putting-down-roots-antarctica-they-may-be- some-time. http://en.siis.org.cn/En/Research/1707. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.

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Kraska, J. 2013. Arctic security in an age of climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. press.; Jakobson, l. 2010. “China prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic.” SIPRI. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349.

Gayazova, o. 2013. “China’s Rights in the Marine Arctic.” International Journal of Marina and Coastal Law 28(1): 61-95.

JASon Magazine * Volume 43 * Issue 1 * 2018

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