JASON Magazine Volume 44-Issue 1: Strategy

MAGAZINE International peace and security questions • volume 44 • issue 1 • 2019

STRATEGY Terrorism and the Strategic Use of Cultural Heritage

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China’s Network Security Strategy in The West

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Influencing the Balkans: a Russian Perspective

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Colophon

JASON Magazine is the periodical of the JASON Institute Chief Editors Willemijn Bertels Sander Mulder

Senior Editors Willemijn Bertels Caitlin Morrin Sander Mulder Charley Steur Daniël Stuke

Editors Rik van Dijk Steven van der plas Emanuel Skoog Ruben Tavenier

Design Ervee Design & Drukwerk (Ruud van der Vegt)

Contents 04 07

Coordination Geschreven en Gedrukt Communicatie (hans van der lee)

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Executive Board Chair - Ms. Milou van Vliet Secretary - Ms. Julia Blanken Treasurer - Mr. Timon osinga External Relations - Mr. nick Ramakers public Relations - Ms. nina van Eer Editorial office - Ms. Willemijn Bertels & Mr. Sander Mulder Activities Coordinator - Mr. Bhaskar Dercon

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Printing Drukkerij noordhoek, Aalsmeer

General Board Mr.drs. Willemijn Aerdts Drs. Simon Minks Col. Marco hekkens, RnlMC (ret.)

Col. niels Woudstra, Rnln Drs. pim van der putten Drs. Marjolein de Ridder, MBA Dr. laurens van Apeldoorn Drs. Bas Bijlsma Drs. hans Rouw Drs. Goos hofstee Drs. Reinier Bergema

Strategic Culture and Change: The Case of Russia and Europe Ruben Tavenier History under Destruction: The Strategic Use of Cultural Heritage on a Global Stage Sander Mulder Understanding China’s Network Security Strategy in the West Rik van Dijk

neither the JASon Institute nor the JASon Magazine editorial office is responsible for the views expressed in the contributions to this magazine.

ISSn 0165-8336

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Influencing the Balkans: Russia’s Perspective Steven van der Plas

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Advisory Board Chair - Dr. W.F. van Eekelen Col. Marco hekkens, RnlMC (ret.)

Mr. R.D. praaning Drs. l.F.M. Sprangers, MA Com. M. hijmans, Rnln (ret.) lt. Gen. Jan Broeks, RnlA prof. Dr. E. Bakker prof. Dr. J. lindley-French Ms. I. van Veldhuizen Mr. A. Baron van lynden Drs. Angelien Eijsink Mr. R. Siccama hiemstra Contact us Schouwburgstraat 2 2511 VA Den haag The netherlands T +31 (0)71 527 79 72 E info@stichtingjason.nl I www.stichtingjason.nl

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EDIToRIAl Discussion

The Strategic Success of Terrorism Willemijn Bertels Website pick

The World is Not Enough: President Trump’s Quest for a ‘Space Force’ Emanuel Skoog Six International Political Trends to Look Out for in 2019 Sander Mulder

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Dear reader, In our conflict-ridden and interconnected world, the strategic logic behind the actions of state and non-state actors may not always be clear, or even present. While violence, provocation and other forms of influence may at first seem reckless or irrational, these choices can very well be part of a broader, thought-out plan for achieving long-term goals. In this new issue of JASon Magazine, the JASon Institute explores the strategies of various actors in the realm of security and conflict.

Strategies vary between actors and can both show continuity and change over time.

The different strategies that actors employ under similar circumstances originate from their historical, cultural, geographical and political background. Countering the dominant rationality narrative, a state’s specific strategic culture may offer better insights into the strategies it employs.

Traditionally, the focus of strategic behavior analysis has been on state actors, taking on a military perspective. In addition to the traditional great powers – Russia, China and the United States – the strategies of nonstate, terrorist actors are considered as well.

Moreover, the changing nature of modern warfare unmistakably affects the domains in which actors execute their strategies. This issue of JASon Magazine will take you on a journey through strategy, from strategic culture, political and economic influencing campaigns, cyber security strategies, cultural heritage destruction, space as a new realm for warfare to the strategic effectiveness of terrorism.

Willemijn Bertels and Sander Mulder Chief editors JASON Magazine

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Strategic Culture and Change: The Case of Russia and Europe

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The notion of rationality in strategic decision making has often been overemphasized, which cleared the way for strategic culture scholars to come up with an alternative to the Americancentric rationality-based model for the analysis of strategic behavior. Rather than one rational framework that shapes the strategic behavior of all states in a similar way, strategic culture entails that states make different strategic decisions in similar situations, because they are influenced by their specific historical, cultural, geographical and political background.

By Ruben Tavenier

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uch like the homo economicus, an economic concept that describes the completely rational behavior of a consumer, there is the concept of the homo strategicus. In the same fashion as its economic counterpart, this concept is based on the assumption that states will always make rational choices, choosing the strategy that will lead to the best possible outcome. Consequently, in any given situation, all states will presumably make the same strategic choice. However, whether resulting from a lack of sufficient information to make a rational choice, or perhaps a lack of rationality itself, not all states display the same strategic behavior, nor do they always make rational choices.

What may seem irrational strategic behavior to one state may make perfect sense 40

sense of the word, but rather to highlight the ability of strategic culture, once it is established, to persist through structural changes.1 More specifically, it refers to a set of attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential political actors, based on a state’s historical, cultural, geographical and political background, that shape the way it responds to its environment with respect to matters of war and peace. is provides states with a framework in which external threats are assessed.2 Strategic culture scholars argued that this predisposition or strategic preference is rooted in the early, formative period of a state, highlighting the continuity of strategic culture.3 By considering a nation’s specific characteristics, it becomes possible to bypass (American) ethnocentrism in strategic analyses.2 erefore, not all strategic decisions follow the same rational logic, but are intrinsically variable, depending on a state’s strategic culture.

Strategic culture scholars tend to overemphasize continuity, resulting in overly deterministic views to another. A much-needed answer to the fallacies of homo strategicus is presented by the concept of strategic culture. is concept provides an explanation for the question why states choose different, sometimes seemingly irrational strategies in the same situation. stRategic cultuRe e concept of strategic culture was coined by Jack Snyder, who referred to it as a distinct strategic pattern based on a nation’s specific characteristics.1 e term ‘culture’ was not used in the traditional

Russian stRategic cultuRe An historical account of Russian foreign policy shows that the political elite’s threat perceptions of Europe, and general ideas about security issues, have been largely constant over the past three centuries.4 Both Western and Russian scholars have focused on the persistent factors in Russia’s strategic interests. Within this narrative of continuity, several key aspects can be identified. e most prominent continuous elements are expansionism and imperialism, accompanied by Russia’s

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JASON MAGAZINE identification as a great power.5 Likewise, it is argued that the key aspects of Russia’s world view continue to revolve around ambitious expansionism and great power politics.6 At the core of these seemingly continuous elements lay several ‘permanently operating factors’ that shape Russia’s strategic culture.7 Firstly, Russia is not surrounded by strong natural frontiers, but by permeable ones.8 erefore, it has been relatively easy for neighboring states to invade Russia, whilst conversely, it has been difficult for Russia to defend its territory. is has greatly nourished feelings of insecurity, which has led Russia’s leadership to become infatuated with its security. To counter the permanent feelings of insecurity and to enhance its feelings of security, Russia has sought to expand outwards, often with imperialist tendencies.8 Political elites in the Russian Empire have often used historical examples of foreign attacks to justify expansionism, and the behavior of Soviet leaders show great similarities with this.7 Expansionism and imperialism are often portrayed as a natural and rightful strategic reaction to the permanently perceived threats by Russia along its periphery.4 Secondly, the expansionist and imperialist characteristics of Russia that result from the permanent feelings of insecurity have nourished Russia’s feelings of entitlement to a position as great power in the international system.5 It is argued that over time, Russia increasingly identified as a great power and behaved as such to acquire an acknowledged status as great power.9 Statements by post-Soviet Russian leaders, most notably Medvedev and Putin, have clearly addressed Russia’s in-

herent great power status, and the desire to be treated accordingly by the international system.10 continuity and change However, both theoretically and in the case of Russia, strategic culture scholars tend to overemphasize continuity, resulting in overly deterministic views on a state’s strategic preferences. is is the main point of critique aimed at strategic culture. Historical examples of strategic preferences are carefully selected to match

Russia’s strategic culture. Whereas Russia is thought of as being inherently assertive and expansionist in relation to Europe, it might actually be the case that Russia’s strategic culture is more susceptible to change and less static than is often assumed.

Analysts have often treated Russia’s strategic culture as static because of the permanence of the underlying explaining factors. However, a brief historical overview of Russia’s strategic culture shows

It might actually be the case that Russia’s strategic culture is more susceptible to change and less static than is often assumed

contemporary strategic assumptions, which is later labeled as a strategic culture.11 Critics argue that there is no single strategic culture that consistently helps to determine strategic output over the course of hundreds of years, withstanding all sorts of structural changes. Whether it is gradual change, or more abrupt shortterm change, it is argued that strategic culture is able to evolve over time. Take for example the case of German strategic culture. Germany broke with its rather pacifist post-1945 strategic culture, which was focused on refraining from military action, by participating in the intervention in Kosovo.12 erefore, analyses that tend to overly rely on continuities and flatten history out in order to establish a narrative, do not provide an accurate picture of

that there is considerable variability, and that the assumed permanent factors, such as expansionism and imperialism, are not always present, or at least not to the same degree. In cases of a structural change in the political system, Russia’s strategic culture changed accordingly. Examples of this are the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet-Union, and less recently, the Russian Revolution or the ascension of Peter the Great and the establishment of the Russian Empire.13 Breaking with a mainly defensive, traditional and orthodox Muscovite strategic culture, Peter the Great has actively advocated for Western values, cooperation with Western Europe and the establishment of a Russian empire. Likewise, the Russian Revolution caused a break with the strategic culture that was focused on pragmatic cooperation with Europe and the preservation of

t Bolsheviks in Moscow during the Russian Revolution.

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not all strategic decision making follows the same rational logic, but is intrinsically variable, depending on a state’s strategic culture the empire, which changed into a strategic culture focused on socialist values and peaceful coexistence with Europe characterized by low levels of trust and cooperation.13 Depending on the structural change in the political system, Russia has portrayed varying levels of cooperation with Europe, as well as varying levels of expansionism and assertiveness. Hence, contrary to popular belief, Russia’s strategic culture in relation to Europe is not fixed. Militaristic expansionism, imperialism, distrust towards Europe and the pursuit of a great power status are not permanently interwoven with Russia’s strategic culture. conclusion Strategic culture does indeed provide a solution for the one-sided, overly rationa-

lity-dependent, ‘American’ way of strategic analysis. By looking at the way a state’s historical, cultural, geographical and political background shapes its strategic preferences, and the way it responds to its environment with respect to matters of war and peace, it becomes clear why states behave in a certain manner that may seem irrational to other states. In the case of Russia, its strategic culture is strongly influenced by the absence of natural borders, and the consequences that has brought forward. However, this does not mean that its strategic culture, like any strategic culture, will always be the same.

Structural changes in, for example, the political system can bring about similar changes in the strategic culture. Overly deterministic views on Russia’s behavior may lead to misconceptions and a misun der-standing of its behavior.

Biography Ruben Tavenier is an MA student in International Relations, specializing in global conflict in the modern era. his main interests lie in geopolitics, security studies and natural resources. he combines economic and geopolitical factors to analyze contemporary issues in international politics.

t Overly deterministic views on Russia’s behavior may lead to misconceptions and a misunderstanding of its behavior.

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history under Destruction

JASON MAGAZINE

The Strategic Use of Cultural Heritage on a Global Stage The destruction of cultural heritage in conflict areas has been a recurring theme throughout history. In modern conflicts, which are characterized by more complex, asymmetrical warfare, our ideas of these destructions have been challenged. Terrorist groups nowadays do not only intend to destroy these symbols of identity, but place these destructions within their ‘global propaganda’ strategy of shock and awe.

By Sander Mulder

‘Symbols give us our identity, our self-image, our way of explaining ourselves to ourselves and to others. Symbols in turn determine the kinds of stories we tell and the stories we tell determine the kind of history we make and remake.’

– Mary Robinson, Inauguration speech as president of Ireland, December 3rd, 1990

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ultural heritage is an important element of identity formation.

Since architectural constructions – for instance libraries, churches, mosques and cemeteries – can stand the test of time, they physically embody memories of former generations.

However, history has shown that the intentional, often symbolic destruction of cultural property is a continuous act of warfare. e Reich Kristallnacht in November 1938, the destruction of the Old Bridge of Mostar during the Balkan War in 1993 as well as the 9/11 attacks in New York can all be seen as case studies of this phenomenon.

e importance of cultural heritage manifests itself in international bodies, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), who commits itself to the task ‘[of ] encouraging the identification, protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding value to humanity.’

what are the precise motivations behind these destructions? new waRs, and the impoRtance of (sub)identities Most conflicts during the twentieth century were characterized by a clear overview of warring parties, nation-states that all had their (in)direct enemies and alliances. is changed at the end of the twentieth century; conflicts between states moved to conflicts within states, classified by Mary Kaldor as ‘new (civil) wars’.1 More often, national insurgency groups challenged the political leadership of their own state. In these conflicts, identity was of crucial importance. Because the individual actors did not always necessarily seek a political or economic goal – and therefore were just as much empowered by ideological, ethnic or religious divisions – identity created a cornerstone of political mobilisation. is mobilisation required a clear framing of the enemy, that eventually justified violence as the only logical solution. is is the point where cultural heritage gets important. In these new wars, where identity is the catalyst, violence does not limit itself to physical confrontations. e

The destruction of cultural property serves both a contemporary goal, the intimidation of the enemy, as well as a ‘destruction of memory’.

Political discussions that deal with the topic of cultural heritage destruction often specifically focus on the legal dimension of punishment and preservation. However, one other problem is less researched:

destruction of symbolism attacks the feeling of continuity, national cohesion and democratic governance. As Auwera states in her article: ‘Meaning is given through identity and is produced and exchanged

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s A sunset view of a row of medieval columns in Palmyra, Syria, 2013.

by social interaction. is process results in the contemporary character of heritage, since heritage is created, formed, and managed through the questions of the present.’2 e destruction of cultural property serves both a contemporary goal, the intimidation of the enemy, as well as a ‘destruction of memory’ that puts a burden on future generations, who are limited in their ability to connect and construct their cultural group identity.

For example, during the Yugoslavian war in the 1990’s, the Bosnian and Croatian forces both fought heavily over the city of

was reconstructed with funds of UNESCO, Serge Brammertz, the head prosecutor of the International Court for the Trial of Yugoslavia (ICTY) said that ‘as this reconstruction shows, extremists cannot erase from history our common heritage of diversity, co-existence, and religious pluralism.’ Identity, memory and conflict coincided at the bridge. is was also the reason why specific cases were filed against the perpetrators of this destructions, since ‘crimes against cultural monuments and institutions are war crimes, and often part of broader ethnic cleansing campaigns […] to protect our

Videos that show the destruction of cultural heritage serve the same purpose as videos displaying human violence.

Mostar in the south. In 1993, this led to the purposeful destruction of the Stari Most, an old bridge that was the main connection between the two parts of the city centre, by the Croatian military groups. Since both parts had a Bosnian or Croatian population, this bridge was a symbol of the intertwinement of the two cultures, who until the war had live together in peace. In 2015, when the bridge 80

common heritage, the perpetrators must be held accountable’. teRRoRism, global pRopaganda and ‘global destRuction’ Terrorists put the destruction of cultural heritage within their international strategy. Religious fundamentalist violence, by groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS, con-

nects identity to the global level by the kinship linkages of their fighters and new technologies such as social media. Violence takes place on a regional level, but transcends it by spreading fear to a larger, not physically connected crowd. e framing strategy of terrorist groups helps to create a big group of allies and adversaries that is not restricted by national borders. e destruction of cultural heritage becomes multivocal: the same message communicates different information to different audiences.3 A video of a beheading can attract allies as well as repulse and humiliate enemies. Videos that show the destruction of cultural heritage serve the same purpose as videos displaying human violence. In many short, mostly grainy recordings, the leaders of these terrorist organisations justify their attacks by linking it to a purification of the Islamic identity as well as challenging the notion of global culture. e purification already links to a larger, cross-national goal. Heritage is therefore a useful target, since it as well touches upon internationally shared feelings of ancestry. Within the globalized world, this has led to the intentional display of destruction as a part of what Smith calls ‘global propaganda’. She elaborates on this statement by saying that ‘World Heritage sites become particularly vulnerable

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JASON MAGAZINE as meaning is constructed at a larger scale through modern media channels.’4 Social media in this way supports the multivocal view of propaganda and framing: the destruction of a local museum can be seen

Islamic nature. is destruction was a precursor for the violent, essentialist politics that would terrorise the region in the years after. Surprisingly, Western journalist were invited to report live on the destruction

Terrorists can always use the imagery of cultural heritage destruction because they can anticipate the reaction and manipulate that resulting anger.

as a purification and an act of war, just depending on the viewpoint. At the same time, global propaganda refers as well to the goals of terrorists to enrage the international community by showing them their incapability of acting against it.

For example, cultural heritage in the MENA-region is a useful target, since these temples, churches, statues, etc. display internationally shared feelings of ancestry. ese multivocal processes were shown in 2001, when the Taliban blew up two 30 meter high Buddhist statues in the Bamiyan valley between Afghanistan and Pakistan. e internationally acclaimed pieces of architecture were, according to the Taliban, destroyed due to their non-

by leaders of the Taliban.5 Again, this shows that the global impact of destructions is an important element of the framing campaign. By targeting statues that have an international character, the framing resonance exceeds the borders of national identity it was subjected to until then. conclusion: a call foR a moRe complex view e biggest effect of framing within the global discourse is the fast distribution, repetitions and generalisation of narratives.

Terrorism, with its own global propaganda of shock, awe and fear, paradoxically reiterated the belief that all acts of violence in the MENA-region are related

to the Islamic ideology. e global resonance has resulted in global Orientalism, the idea coined by Edward Said that ‘shows that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.’6 By seeing the Islam and related violence as one inflexible entity, we are having our image of the complex nature of contemporary conflict obscured.

In that way, analysing the destruction of cultural heritage as global propaganda is a very effective tool as well. Terrorists can always use the imagery of cultural heritage destruction because they can anticipate the reaction and manipulate that resulting anger. It almost works like a reinforcing cycle: the destructions lead to shock; the shock leads to anger against the terrorists, which showcases itself in essentialist claims of the Islam; this angers Muslims who as an answer join terrorist organisations that later on use that same destruction technique again. It is important to break that cycle, and recognise that although the global propaganda of cultural heritage destruction works, it needs to be challenged as a counteraction to both manipulation and hurried political respon ses.

t A statue in the Bamiyan region, Afghanistan, before and after the demolition by the Taliban in 2001.

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Biography Sander Mulder is editor in chief of JASon Magazine. he completed his BA in history at Utrecht University and currently pursues a MSc in Conflict Resolution and Governance at the University of Amsterdam. his main interests lie in the interplay of international relations and conflict studies, with a particular focus on culture, postcolonialism and social movements.

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Understanding China’s network Security Strategy in the West

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Google announced it through a blog post on 12 January 2010: Hackers, known as the Elderwood Group, had tried to steal the source of the company’s search engine. Thirty large American companies had been targeted by sophisticated attacks, thought to be executed by the same group. Operation Aurora, as the series of attacks was dubbed, was connected to a hacker organization in service of the Chinese government, which was after important intellectual property of these large American corporations.

By Rik van Dijk

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he Chinese government has been accused of a myriad of cyberattacks around the globe, not only against the United States. Does this point towards a growing aggression of China in the cyber domain? In this article I will describe why full cyber warfare between the West and China is unlikely, yet a bilateral agreement on a clear set of rules in cyberspace is just as unlikely. Furthermore, I will try to explain how the Chinese domestic situation regarding digitalization influences its international position on cyber security and what this means for negotiations between China and the West. a tRoubled Relation into cybeR space Operation Aurora was not the first cyber incident between the United States and China. e United States frequently ac10

cuses China of conducting cyber espionage operations to steal intellectual property from US firms. e Chinese in turn bemoan US hegemony in the global software market and accuse the West of trying to undermine the legitimacy of its government by allowing dissidents to manifest themselves on the internet. e United States and China have opened multiple forms of dialogue to discuss norms and behavior in cyberspace, most notably in 2013, when the two states initiated a formal bilateral dialogue on cyberspace, and 2015, when President Obama and Chairman Xi Jinping signed an agreement to move forward on the issue. However, negotiations are stuck whilst the two powers accuse each other of ongoing cyber espionage and at the same time have different expectations of the preferred outcome of the negotiations.

Both powers have a very divergent view of what the internet should entail. Where the Americans view the internet as a global phenomenon, uncontrolled by a state, which promotes freedom of speech and ideas, the Chinese center their views around the concept of cyber sovereignty, which dictates that states have the right to decide the information streams to their citizens.1 A noticeable difference to keep in mind is the term cybersecurity itself. In the West, the term cybersecurity is used to describe the protection and defense of a wide array of electronic and communications information, China uses the term ‘network security’ (wangluo anquan) to refer more specifically to the protection of digital information networks. e term ‘information security’ (xinxi anquan) refers to a broader swath of information and communications systems. linked However, while both the United States and China may pursue opposite outcomes for the internet, they are inextricably linked in cyberspace. e two economies are economically deeply intertwined, especially when it comes to technological hardware. For instance, when we look at the market for computer chips, a 400 billion dollar industry, five of the ten largest companies are from the United States.

However, 95% of the minerals used to make these chips come from China. We see a similar pattern when we look at smartphones and laptops where many American products are manufactured in China and Chinese products are in very high demand in the United States.

Jon Lindsay, Assistant Professor at To-

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JASON MAGAZINE ronto University and author of multiple books on cyber warfare, states that ‘cyberwar’, like regular war, is highly unlikely between the United States and China, but that “economically driven proliferation of information technology enables numerous instances of friction to emerge below the threshold of violence.”2 Moreover, the digital intertwinement is rapidly increasing, not decreasing. e Chinese government’s policy of informatization, which revolves around digitalizing large swaths of the population, carries the inherent consequence that Chinese citizens come into contact with Western economic forces online. However, as more and more Chinese citizens are connected to the internet, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a growing interest in controlling the online information sources of the population.3 rough the socalled ‘Great Firewall of China’, the Chinese government forces internet service providers to block politically sensitive information. However, government censorship only reaches that far and civil society groups are frequently able to

circumvent government censorship, reach their audiences, and set up political action, frequently using technologies produced in or even supplied from Western states.

maintaining internal political and economic stability).

inteRnational vs domestic Many in the West consider China’s activity as specifically targeted against U.S. interests and assets. In reality, Chinese aims are more diffuse, comprehensive and based on domestic concerns. is means

Whereas the Western notion of cybersecurity emphasizes technical threats, China places greater weight on ideological threats. In 2012, the State Council published a new policy opinion that connected continuation of economic success of Chinese citizens with the need to safeguard national security information and dynamically monitor the internet.

that China would more likely adhere to international norms and standards of behavior when they allow for sufficient flexibility of interpretation to serve these domestic interests (such as supporting the legitimacy of the Communist Party and

China’s foreign policy behavior, including its cyber activity, is primarily driven by the domestic political imperative to protect the longevity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Ensuring domestic stability, territorial integrity, modernization, and

While both the United States and China may pursue opposite outcomes for the internet, they are inextricably linked in cyberspace.

t Flowers left outside Google China’s headquarters after its announcement it might leave the country due to Operation Aurora in 2010.

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s President Barack Obama talks with President Xi Jinping of China about cyber security at the Annenberg Retreat in California.

June 7, 2013.

economic growth, while simultaneously preparing for the possibility of militarized cyber conflict in the future, are all objectives that directly or indirectly support the continuation of CCP rule.4 china’s cybeR stRategy e authors of a Rand Institute study on U.S. Chinese relations in cyberspace were intrigued by the lack of concrete demands from the Chinese side. Where US diplomats have it clear, among other things,

sary or available, involves industrial economic cyber espionage of U.S. and other foreign targets. In line with the concept of cyber sovereignty, the CCP initiates computer network operations to signal dissatisfaction with foreign powers over developments outside of China (e.g. on maritime territorial disputes and foreign allegations of Chinese hacking activity) that negatively affect China’s reputation.

And most importantly, protecting the governing power of the Chinese Commu-

however, government censorship only reaches that far and civil society groups are frequently able to circumvent government censorship.

that they want to set stricter norms to stop cyber espionage, the Chinese have not made such requests. Nor have Chinese policy makers formulated for substantial offerings from the U.S. with regard to these negotiations. e CCP seems mostly intent on reformulating the idea that the issue of cyberspace is a domestic issue first.5 Beijing’s thinking about cybersecurity and its cybersecurity strategy consists of three main drivers: economic, political, and military. Important manifestations of those drivers are maintaining its economic growth and stability, which, when neces12

the United States and its cyber security strategy paints a different picture. While China uses cyber espionage for economic gain when it sees an opportunity, the priorities of the CCP in cyber space are aimed inwards. China centers its cyber security strategies around the idea of national sovereignty and information control of its citizens. With a quickly digitizing population, the CCP is afraid that an uncontrolled internet will strengthen dissent groups, fuel unrest and eventually be a threat to its power. For the CCP the domestic control over cyberspace is much more important than a successful international treaty with the United States. 

nist Party through information control, propaganda, and targeting of domestic sources of potential unrest. Again, the last driver is based on the concept of sovereignty.6 pRioRities in cybeRspace In the recent decade, the Chinese state has developed notoriety through using its offensive cyber capabilities to steal valuable intellectual property, target dissidents and cause disruption. ese actions have led to the idea that China is prone to conflict in international cyberspace. However, its position in the ongoing negotiations with JASon Magazine • Volume 44 • Issue 1 • 2019

Biography Rik van Dijk works as a cyber security expert at CGI Consulting. he has a great interest in artificial intelligence, cyber security, terrorism and international relations as a whole.

Influencing the Balkans: Russia’s perspective

JASON MAGAZINE

A coup on election day in Montenegro, pro-Russian sentiments during Serbia’s presidential elections and deals between Kosovo and Serbia. All these events in the Balkans in the last two years have one thing in common: They have either been influenced or directly facilitated by Moscow. The fact that Russia operates in the Balkans is no secret, but why is this region such a priority to Putin’s government? Which Balkan states does Russia specifically focus on, and does it have a grand strategy for the Balkan region, or are these incidents just separate events?

By Steven van der plas

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n August of 2018, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić unveiled a joint proposition to settle a historic border dispute with Kosovo by means of a territory swap.1 As part of this deal, Serbia and Kosovo would adjust their borders to ethnic lines between Serbs and Albanians, which would mean that Serbia has to give up the Preševo Valley in the east to Kosovo in exchange for the Serbian integration of northern Kosovo.1 e proposal has been heavily criticised for potentially setting a precedent of adjusting sovereign borders along ethnic cleavages in the Balkans, which would erode the precarious stability in the region. Interesting is the alleged influence of Russia, which has used the Kosovo issue to further its relations with Serbia, in establishing this proposed deal.2 is instance has only been the latest efforts of Russia to alter the course of events in the Balkans since its return to power politics in the early 2000s, with the Russia-backed coup attempt during the 2016 elections in Montenegro being the most visible.2 e question arises how these events fit into Russia’s plans for the Balkans and in what ways a Russian strategy to influence the Balkans can be identified.

post-cold waR developments in the balkans e emergence of a post-Cold War Russian strategy towards the Balkans can be traced back to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and subsequent NATO enlargement in eastern Europe and the Balkans.3

During the Cold War, the eastern European and Balkan regions were located solely in the Soviet sphere of influence. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was unable to exercise the power it once had in the region, which allowed NATO to intervene during the crises in Bosnia and

t Russian president Vladimir Putin and Serb president Aleksandar Vučić on the Moscow Victory Parade in 2018.

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JASON MAGAZINE Herzegovina in 1995 and most notably, Kosovo in 1999.3 e intervention, which solidified Kosovo as an independent state instead of a Serbian province, was legitimized by the NATO member states by referring to the right of self-determination of the people of Kosovo.2 NATO saw the Kosovo intervention as unlawful but legitimate.3 Russia was less supportive of this course of action, as it was taken without a mandate from the UN Security Council, where the country holds a crucial veto.

In the years following the Kosovo incident, Russia saw many of the states in its Eastern-European traditional sphere of influence become NATO members. is led to further military isolation and the hardening of Russian policy towards further NATO enlargement along its border.4 e extent to which Russia was prepared to defend its immediate interests was revealed when the potential NATO accession of Georgia in 2008 provoked a

Russian military reaction. Similarly, the takeover of the Ukrainian Crimea peninsula in 2014 can be viewed as a reaction to a potential danger to Russia’s interests along its borders. e trend of NATO enlargement was accompanied by the EU’s eastward expansion, which brought the Balkans into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).5

stance, the ENP aims to promote security, stability and prosperity in states neighbouring the EU to effectively secure the EU member states themselves.5 is is done by promoting norms and socialization processes in the neighbouring states while emphasizing good foreign relations.

Stability is also reinforced by promoting good governance and economic development.5 A special initiative of the ENP in

Competing with the EU for influence in the Balkans proved to be another challenge to Russia, asserting itself in its former dominance in the region. e EU and Russia have very different conceptions and plans for the Balkan area. For in-

the western Balkans is currently underway, with Montenegro, Albania, Serbia and Macedonia being considered for EU membership.6 On the other hand, Russia believes that it needs a sphere of influence to promote its

Russia believes that it needs a sphere of influence to promote its national interests and security

t Mural in Mitrovica, Kosovo. The text says “Kosovo is Serbia! Crimea is Russia!”

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JASon Magazine • Volume 44 • Issue 1 • 2019

JASON MAGAZINE  The European Neighbourhood

national interests and security, in addition to maintaining special relations with other powers. Ingrained in this foreign policy strategy is the notion that small states are objects of interest for large powers to exploit. Without these international ties, Russia cannot function in a multipolar world, where many great powers operate in their own spheres of influence.4 is agenda does not always align with the EU’s interests, which is reinforced by the EU and Russia’s different conceptions and methods of diplomacy.5 In the current international context, it makes sense for Russia to assert itself in the region by influencing Balkan states to adopt a more pro-Russian agenda. cuRRent Russian stRategy in the balkans Following the expansion of NATO and the EU to eastern and central Europe and the Baltics, Russia has been attempting to win back influence in the Balkan to assert itself. It does so, mainly through a combination of soft power, hard power and new tactics.2 e ultimate goal is to turn Balkan states back to the Russian sphere of influence or to separate them from EU states and institutions.4 Existing tensions in the region are instrumental for Russia to assert itself.7 For example, Russia harnesses the Kosovo issue to strengthen its relations with Serbia, by aligning itself with Serbia in the dispute.4 is way, Russia has presented itself as one of Serbia’s closest allies. Additionally, it has given Russian oil and gas companies access to Serbian markets.8 However, Serbia has effectively managed to create leverage with both competing great powers, by seeking EU membership and friendship with Russia simultaneously. Despite Serbia’s

Policy, a potential rival for Russian ambitions in the Balkans.

projects to modernize the country. e Kremlin can also use its position in the oil and gas market to wield considerable influence, but the more favoured method is to use its other economic ties to facilitate dependence4.

Politically, Moscow utilizes and creates pro-Russian elements in Balkan regions to influence the media discourse.4 e Serbian elections of 2016 have been the most notable showcase of Russian propaganda, as it used the Kosovo issue to mobilize large nationalist groups.2 is way, Serbia serves as a direct conduit for Russian interests in order to destabilize the Balkans.7 Kosovo experienced such attempts during its 2017 elections, where its Serbian minority was targeted by pro-Russian propaganda in Serbia.8 Again, the intention here was to weaken existing political structures and to make decision-making more difficult in Kosovo.2 e Kremlin

important, but its geographic vicinity to Russia makes it an area of strategic interest. Additionally, the Balkan region carries a lot of political significance, as Russia can use diplomatic and historical relations to increase dependence and to promote its own interests and security. Essential to understanding Russia’s strategy here is its post-Cold War history in the Balkans and the ongoing competition with the EU and the US. In this context, Russia uses existing rivalries and divisions in the Balkans to simultaneously frustrate the development of competing great powers while furthering its own interests.

However, there are limits to Russian influence in the region, as it mainly relies on Serbia to fulfil its interests. Outside of Serbia, Russia is limited to indirect methods to influence Balkan affairs. Despite their indirect nature, Russian tactics have proven to be highly effective in mobilizing ethnic groups and instigating new tensions, which has already visibly affected recent events in the region. It is likely that the Balkan region will further develop into a geopolitical battlefield, considering its significance and the portrayed strategies of the competing great powers. Future regional developments should therefore be closely monitored, as there is certainly more to Balkan politics than meets the eye. 

outside of Serbia, Russia is limited to indirect methods to influence Balkan affairs

strong cultural, economic and military relations with Russia, it continues to appeal to the EU by seeking membership, which signifies the limits of Russian influence.4 As Russia’s only ally in the Balkans, Serbia is the perfect example of the combination of political and economic measures Russia uses to assert itself in the Balkan region.

Economically, Russian companies are still very important for the economies of Balkan states, which is intensified by economic and political actors that collaborate with Russia. For example, Russian companies have substantial stakes in Serbian markets and contribute to infrastructure

also uses other elements of so-called hybrid warfare to far-reaching extents, to protect its Balkan interests. is is illustrated in the attempted coup in Montenegro by Russian-backed parties, which was carried out to prevent the country from NATO accession.2 conclusion e Russian strategy in the Balkans is one that is driven by its geopolitical ambitions in a multipolar world. Russia’s aim is not to completely restore its dominion over the Balkans, but to compete with western interests in the region. In this sense, the Balkan region is not really economically JASon Magazine • Volume 44 • Issue 1 • 2019

Biography Steven van der plas has an MSc in Crisis and Security Management and is currently pursuing a MSc in public Administration at leiden University, where he also finished his BSc in International Relations and organizations. In his free time, he likes cycling, running and reading.

15

The Strategic Success of Terrorism

JASON MAGAZINE Discussion

In today’s world, one may open any newspaper and find an item related to terrorism, be it on the front page or in the short foreign news section.

Around the globe, terrorists have been successful in terrorizing people and their governments.

Much attention is paid to counterterrorism strategies and their effectiveness, while little attention is paid to the success of terrorism itself as a means to reach strategic goals. Is terrorism actually effective? And if so, what conditions determine its success?

By Willemijn Bertels

T

errorism is generally regarded as strategic, rational behavior; a violent tactic, employed to achieve long-term, political end goals. Since the use of terror is costly, it would be logical to assume that organizations would only continue to employ it, if the benefits outweigh those costs.

Worldwide, the prevalence of terrorism in the past few years has been extraordinarily high in comparison with historical trends1 and gains much public and political attention. Despite its ubiquity however, one may wonder if terrorism actually is an effective tool to reach strategic goals. Does terrorism work? the stRategic goals of teRRoRism When terrorism is defined as ‘the use or threat of violence by a non-state actor against non-combatants, to inspire fear or alarm in an audience beyond the immediate target for political ends,’ it is easy to assume that terrorism is effective. Indeed, terror is successful in terrorizing societies, 16

creating fear and provoking overreactions from governments. Terrorists may succeed in killing civilians, gaining sympathy for their cause and increasing their financial capacities.

Tactical and organizational successes, such as executing an attack as planned or attracting new members through propaganda, are helpful to the survival and

Before moving on to answering this question, the content of the strategic goals terrorists aim for must first be considered.

Strategic goals differ between terrorist organizations and are rarely stable or consistent. Furthermore, some terrorists have limited, practical goals, whereas others issue more maximalist demands, which may be neither tangible nor negotiable.2 For example, terrorists may aim for decolonization (like the FLN in Algeria), revolution (like the Red Army Faction in Germany) or regime change (like the Shining Path in Peru). Others seek territorial change (like the ETA in Spain), (foreign) policy change (like Al Qaeda in the Middle East) or social control (like the anti-abortion group Army of God in the United States). Moreover, some terrorist groups emerge in reaction to the presence of other terrorist groups, with the sole aim to maintain the status quo. For example, the strategic purpose of the Ulster Defence Force in Northern Ireland was to prevent the IRA from influencing British regional policies.3 Undoubtedly, strategic goals are related to ideologies. Ethnonationalist, separatist groups have strategic goals that usually differ significantly from those held by sectarian, political or religious fundamenta-

It would be logical to assume that organizations would only continue to employ terrorism, if the benefits outweigh the costs

strengthening of the terrorist organization. However, these types of goals must be distinguished from strategic, longterm, political goals. Do organizations that employ terrorism achieve the strategic ends that inspired them to use violence in the first place?

list groups. Moreover, different terrorist groups that are categorized within the same ideology, may pursue different end goals. Compare for example Al Qaeda and the Islamic State: although they are both jihadist fundamentalist groups, the former aims at replacing corrupt ‘apostate’

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s ETA members announce a permanent ceasefire in 2011.

regimes in the Middle East with ‘true’ islamic governments by targeting the ‘far enemy’, whilst the latter aims to create a caliphate by expanding its territory into the muslim world and beyond, meanwhile ‘purifying’ its population by targeting the ‘near enemy’.4 the efficiency debate So, do terrorist organizations actually succeed in achieving their various strategic goals? For decades, terrorism scholars have attempted to answer this question. Publi-

serve to illustrate the difficulty of defining success and failure. In Algeria, the French decided to ‘grant’ independence even after militarily defeating the FLN. By raising the financial and psychological costs, the terrorist organization helped persuade the French imperialists to leave, thereby achieving strategic success. In Spain, the ETA did not achieve its final goal of establishing an independent Basque state.

However, throughout its 43-year violent campaign, the Basque region did receive significant grants of autonomy from the

Depending on the perspective, the strategy of ETA may be labeled both as a failure and a partial success

cations titled Why terrorism works5 and Why terrorism does not work6 illustrate the division in the field. However, the apparent disagreement between scholars seems to be largely based on the use of different definitions and methods for measuring terrorists’ success. When taking these differing standards in consideration, no real debate actually exists.2 For example, no consensus exists on how to define ‘success’ in this context. Do the ultimate aims of an organization have to be realized for it to be called a success? Or do smaller policy concessions – such as the granting of financial ransom or the release of prisoners – count as well? Evidently, the effects of terrorism on strategic goals are more nuanced than plain ‘victory’ or ‘defeat’. Moreover, as put forward

by Krause,2 the attainment of tactical or organizational goals may eventually lead up to the realization of strategic goals, which means these different types of goals cannot be considered to be seperate, independent aims.

Two ethnonationalist terrorist groups

Spanish government. ese concessions would probably not have taken place without ETA’s violent efforts.7 Depending on the perspective, the strategy of ETA may be labeled both as a failure and a partial success.

case of non-violence in Western Sahara provides insights into the success of nonviolent resistance as an alternative to terrorism.

Unfortunately, no universal answer can be given as to when terrorism works. Muro concludes on the notion that terrorism is largely ineffective for realizing strategic goals.2 However, short-term tactical and organizational goals – such as gaining sympathy and support, or provoking an emotional overreaction from the targeted state – are commonly achieved. is may explain why groups continue using terrorism, even if it may only grant them partial success. Moreover, the continuation of terrorism depends on the perception of those employing it. As Lutz and Lutz put it: “As long as groups believe that such violence can work – even if they are wrong – they will be tempted to adopt the technique in pursuance of their goals.”7 

when does teRRoRism woRk? In the recently published book When does terrorism work?,2 Diego Muro aims to provide an answer to the question that has remains unanswered, by combining contributions from scholars that have been at the forefront of the efficiency debate. Contributions include considerations of cases where terrorism has proven to be ineffective and even counterproductive from the terrorist perspective, as well as cases where terrorist groups actually achieved their strategic goals – although these latter cases are rare. e authors take on various refreshing perspectives. For example, the effects of counterterrorism policies in Britain and France are examined in relation to jihadist violence, whilst the JASon Magazine • Volume 44 • Issue 1 • 2019

Biography Willemijn Bertels is editor in chief of JASon Magazine.

She completed a BSc in Criminology and currently pursues a MSc in Crisis and Security Management. her main interests lie in terrorism, crises and global criminology.

17

The World is not Enough: president Trump’s Quest for a ‘Space Force’

JASON MAGAZINE

Website pick

Every week on Sunday, the editors of JASON Magazine bring you an exclusive article on the JASON Institute website (www.stichtingjason.nl). Below you can read one selection from the many interesting articles that we offer exclusively online. Please be sure to check them all out.

By Emanuel Skoog

I

n mid-June this year, the U.S. President Trump announced the creation of an additional branch of the U.S. military, complimentary to the existing Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps and Navy branches. is “space force” should be “separate but equal” to the U.S. Air Force and strengthen both national security and the economy1. e proposed creation of a space force has been compared by some to the moment when the U.S. Air Force was established as a separate entity from the U.S. Army, by an act of Congress. Up until 1947, the U.S. Air Force had been a subordinate part of the U.S. Army2.

e underlying motivation for the establishment of a U.S. space force revolves around China and Russia, since both countries have technological capabilities that could be used to target satellites3. In February 2018, a U.S. intelligence threat assessment warned that in two to three years, China and Russia would have the technological capability to shoot down American satellites, potentially endangering GPS satellites, military and civilian communications satellites and the country’s spy satellites4. Anti-satellite weapons can be divided into two overall categories: those that interfere and those that destroy.

Interference weapons include for instance

With his announcement of a new military branch, president Trump waded into a policy debate as old as the Clinton administration

18

satellite jammers, which drown out communication signals, or lasers that have the potential to blind satellites. Destructive anti-satellite weapons, on the other hand, have the potential to pose an escalating threat. eir destructiveness was exemplified when China launched a groundbased missile in 2007, that destroyed a weather satellite in low Earth orbit3. However, the event also exemplified that destroying a satellite is not a great option, because it creates an uncontrollable cloud of debris, which could damage other satellites, including one’s own.

With his announcement of a new military branch, President Trump waded into a policy debate as old as the Clinton administration, on the desirability of such a space force5. e military and Congress have cautioned that the establishment of another branch of the armed forces would require an extensive and detailed process, and argue that the present period of international conflicts is not the time to weigh

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s President Trump holds up Space Policy Directive-3 at the White House on June 18, 2018.

down the armed forces with bureaucratic procedures5. Furthermore, it seems like lawmakers in Congress have adopted a rather reserved attitude towards Trump’s proposed space force. In the defense policy bill for the fiscal year 2019, there is no mentioning of the creation of the new military branch. Instead, it directs the Department of Defense to work on “developing a space warfighting policy” within

creation of a novel military branch would need congressional authorization and approval before its implementation7. If Trump receives authorization to establish his proposed space force, it will not go unnoticed. e Outer Space Treaty (established in 1967), centers on the core belief that space should be used peacefully, without Earth’s conflicts being transferred. It outlaws the placement of

the already existing military branches6.

However, President Trump is receiving some support from people who argue that the Air Force will never make space its top priority. Moreover, they plead, it makes sense to put the already existing and fragmented space forces capabilities into one coherent organization, under one chain of command4.

weapons of mass destruction in space8. In fear of falling behind in the technology race, the U.S., China and Russia are developing weapons that challenge this treaty3. In direct response to Trump’s remarks, the official reply from Russia stated that if the U.S. withdraws from the Outer Space Treaty, their nation and other states would follow “with a tough response aimed at ensuring global security”9. e Chinese reply opposed to turning

outer space into a battlefield3. As rivalry in space increases, it seems to become more likely that the agreement to maintain peace in space will fall on deaf ears. 

It is important to bear in mind that the creation of a novel military branch would need congressional authorization and approval

It is important to bear in mind that the

JASon Magazine • Volume 44 • Issue 1 • 2019

Biography Emanuel Skoog works with assisting Swedish companies in their business internationalization development in the Benelux.

Furthermore, he has worked and studied in Australia, Spain, Sweden, the Benelux and the United Kingdom.

19

Six International political Trends to look out for in 2019

JASON MAGAZINE

2018 has been a turbulent political year all over the world. The election of populist leaders, changing international power dynamics and rise of non-state terrorist actors have all challenged different levels of governance. Simultaneously, citizens used social media and the act of protest to show their dissatisfaction with the effects of climate change, migration and other global issues.

We can never predict what the new year will have in store, but based on the developments of the past year, here are six trends to look out for in 2019.

By Sander Mulder

1

tRump’s contRadicting moves on the global stage

e midterm elections resulted in a Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives. Ever since, American politics has been dominated by a domestic government shutdown over the funding of the border wall with Mexico. erefore, in the short term, the US will have a diminished presence abroad. However, the Trump administration can use its Senate majority (which has more legislative power with regards to international affairs than the House) to exploit external fights to undermine the rising Democratic popularity. Even though the army is pulling out its forces from Syria, tensions with 20

Iran, Russia and China are rising.

Trump’s unpredictable behavior poses a threat to the status quo of diplomacy, a development that can certainly lead to escalation.

2

noRth koRea’s nucleaR pRogRam and the stability of east asia

On 12 June 2018, president Trump and president Kim Jong-un met in Singapore, leading to a resolution declaring new peaceful relations and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Ever since then, Kim Jong-un has consolidated his grip on power and has doubled down on his nuclear and missile programs, developing

long-range missiles and threatening neighboring countries. Even though a new summit is in the planning, the provocations of North Korea may destabilize the balance of power in the region even more, reinforce the US army presence in East-Asia and demonstrate Beijing’s lack of influence regarding this matter. Additionally, the long-simmering tensions between South Korea and Japan may hinder the efforts by the US to present a united front against North Korea.

3

populist stRongmen and dRug Related violence in latin ameRica

Manuel López Obrador of Mexico and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil are the two newest presidents of Latin America, both running campaigns on corruption, crime and poverty. ese caudillos often portray themselves as strongmen, resembling the style of the old dictators that have tormented the continent for decades. e Venezuelan left-wing populist government of Maduro is stripping the country of its democratic institutions in a sharp slide towards authoritarianism, leading to large migration flows in the region. Besides, drug trafficking is increasing in countries that are dealing with internal political divisions. After a 2009 coup in Honduras, the country was run by a fragile government – lawlessness increased dramatically.

Honduras now has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the US are seeing a significant increase in the number of refugees arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued by drug related violence.

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4

escalating violence in the mena-Region

All actors in the MENA-region are connected through the many local conflicts, leading to a further escalation of the already instable region. e civil war in Syria does not seem to reach a conclusion in its near future, partly due to the proxy support of militants by Russia and the US. Even though the US pulls out their own forces, they continue to seek influence in the region. e same happens with Iran, which continues to be a particular interest for National Security Advisor John Bolton. Simultaneously, Iran and Saudi Arabia, both plagued by internal division and economic challenges, will continue their proxy disputes in Yemen, Bahrein and many more countries. In addition, non-state (terrorist) actors still claim large territories in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, resorting themselves to suicide bombings and violent attacks. In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations. Conservative religious groups and ethnicallybased organizations are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region. A combination of all these factors increases the difficulty of conflict resolution.

5

challenges to the legitimacy and efficiency of the eu

e core foundations of the EU have been challenged multiple times during the past few years, most notably with the Brexitvote that (probably) will come into force in March this year. Besides that, the rising popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe and resistance to EU policies by Eastern European countries has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe.

In May this year, elections for the European parliament can consolidate the combined forces of those right-wing national parties into one parliamentary faction.

However, Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend. is does not mean that further European cooperation and integration is becoming easier; rising demographic and economic tensions actually make it more difficult. erefore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in EU institutions, most specifically regarding their economic and security measures.

6

Russia’s inteRnational standoff with nato and the us

is year, NATO celebrates its 70th anniversary. However, since its creation in 1949, there have not been more turbulent times than this. Diplomatic spats, multiple proxy wars, the rise of non-state terrorist groups, as well as strategic political tensions between Russia and the US are among the examples. In Washington, US President Donald Trump’s administration may have few choices for dealing with the sanctions from the US Congress or the Mueller-probe that is looking into its relationship with the Kremlin. Meanwhile in Moscow, the Backdoor policy in Eastern Europe – more specifically Ukraine and Syria – is more important. Sanctions enacted on Russia by the US and the European Union will probably stay in place until the end of the year. Depending upon what investigations on Russia’s role in the 2016 US Presidential election tell the international community, Washington might even ramp up the political and fi nancial pressure on Russia.

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© Adrian Askew, 2012. Retrieved from https://www.flickr.com/photos/58182080@n04/6918664049

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Influencing the Balkans: Russia’s Perspective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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MacDowall, A. (2018, August 22nd). Could land swap between Serbia and Kosovo lead to conflict? Retrieved 2018, october 3rd from: www.theguardian.com Kallaba, p. (2017, october). Russian interference in Kosovo: how and why? Retrieved 2018, october 3rd from: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Russian_interference_in_Kosovo_finale_2_735070.pdf Marten, K. (2017, March). Reducing tensions between Russia and nATo. Council on Foreign Relations special report no.

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Galeotti, M. (2018, April 4th). Do the western Balkans face a coming Russian storm? Retrieved 2018, october 4th

picture credits: © Wikimedia Commons, 2018 © Wikimedia Commons, 2016 © European Commission, 2018

Discussion: The Strategic Success of Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

- page 16-17

national Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2018). Global Terrorism in 2017. START Background Report, University of Maryland.

Muro, D. (ed.) (2019). When does terrorism work?. Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy.

Chenoweth, E. (2006). The inadvertent effects of democracy on terrorist group emergence. BCSIA Discussion paper 200606. Kennedy School of Government, harvard University.

Byman, D. l. (2015, April 29). Comparing al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets. The Brookings Institution.

Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/ Dershowitz, A. (2002). Why terrorism works: Understanding the threat, responding to the challenge. new haven, Connecticut: Yale University press.

Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. International Security, 31, 42-78. lutz, J. M., & lutz, B. J. (2009). how successful is terrorism? Forum on public policy, 1, 1-21. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5fa3/f5d6d2ff50c200e759eba39509d179b0e33c.pdf

picture credits: © Wikimedia Commons, 2007 © Flickr Creative Commons, 2011

The World is Not Enough: President Trump’s Quest for a ‘Space Force’ - page 18-19 1

2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14

Remarks by president trump at a meeting with the national space council and signing of space policy directive-3: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-national-space-council-signingspace-policy-directive-3/ The US ‘Space Force’ and Its Implications: https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/the-us-space-force-and-its-implications/ Why a U.S. ‘Space Force’ is ‘premature’ but ‘inevitable’: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/why-a-u-s-space-forceis-premature-but-inevitable and president Trump Calls on pentagon to Create new Military Branch” A ‘Space Force’: http://time.com/5314994/donald-trump-pentagon-space-force/ A Space Force? The Idea May have Merit, Some Say: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/us/politics/trump-spaceforce-military.html See note: 3 Trump orders Establishment of Space Force as Sixth Military Branch: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/trump-space-force-sixth-military-branch.html See note: 6 Trump’s Space Force Will have to Wait: https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/trump-space-forcecongress/565967/ See note: 4 Trump space force: us to set up sixth military branch: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44527672 United national Treaties and principles on outer Space: http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/i515en.pdf See note: 3 Russia Warns of ‘Tough Response’ to new U.S. Military Space Force: https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-warns-oftough-response-to-new-us-military-space-force-61928 See note: 3

picture credit: © nASA/Bill Ingalls, 2018. Retrieved from: https://images.nasa.gov/details-nhQ201806180003.html

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