JASON Magazine 2017, issue 2 by Stichting Jason

MA GAZINE

POWER VACUUMS International peace- and security questions * volume 42 * issue 2 * 2017

JASON MAGAZINE

Colophon

JASON Magazine is the periodical of the JASON Institute Chief Editors Rik van Dijk Daniël Stuke

Senior Editors Dana Cohen Rik van Dijk Ilias halbgewachs Daniël Stuke Wouter Witteveen

Editors Giles longley-Cook Emanuel Skoog Floris van Wieren Special thanks to Judit neurink

Design Ervee design & drukwerk (Ruud van der Vegt)

Co-ordination Geschreven en Gedrukt Communicatie (hans van der lee) Printing Drukkerij noordhoek, Aalsmeer

Executive Board Chairman – Cherissa Appelman Secretary – Bente Scholtens Treasurer – Floris Duvekot External relations – Charlotte Renckens pR & acquisition – Eline hietbrink Editorial office – Rik van Dijk/Daniël Stuke Events coordinator – Bhaskar Dercon General Board Dr. laurens van Apeldoorn Drs. Bas Bijlsma Dr. Francoise Companjen Col. Marco hekkens, RnlMC (ret.) Ms. Goos hofstee Drs. Simon Minks Drs. pim van der putten Ms. Marjolein de Ridder MA Drs. hans Rouw Drs. Tim Sweijs Col. niels Woudstra, Rnln

Advisory Board Chairman – Dr. W.F. van Eekelen prof. dr. E. Bakker lt. Gen. J. Broeks, RnlA Col. Marco hekkens, RnlMC (ret.) Cmdre M. hijmans, Rnln prof. dr. J. lindley-French R.D. praaning Ms. l.F.M. Sprangers MA A. Baron van lynden Ms. Ida van Veldhuizen

Contents 04 08 12 16 20

Failed states

Overcoming Chaos Emanuel Skoog Dictatorship collapse

After the Strongman Daniël Stuke

losers of modernization

The Ideological Vacuum in Western Societies Wouter Witteveen

The Gaza power Vacuum after Disengagement

Gaza’s Power Vacuum

EDIToRIAl

Russia in the geopolitical landscape

The End of a Power Vacuum

Floris van Wieren Rik van Dijk Website pick

Secession from the European Union and its Risks to International Security Rik Evers

Interview

The Vacuum of Power and Politics in Northern Iraq An interview with Judit Neurink

Giles Longley

ISSn 0165-8336

JASon Magazine * Volume 42 * Issue 2 * 2017

neither the JASon Institute nor the JASon Magazine editorial office is responsible for the views expressed in the contributions to this magazine.

Dear reader,

Why Russia is reasserting itself in its former sphere of influence

Dana Cohen

JASON MAGAZINE

Central to the study of international politics and security is the concept of power. The centralized exercise of power is the cornerstone of political stability – a society cannot function in its absence. The situation in which power is absent is called a power vacuum, and when one arises it can have dire consequences.

In recent years, the world has witnessed the destabilizing effects a power vacuum can have. In Iraq, a weak central government enabled the rise of the vicious Islamic State, while the collapse of government in Somalia triggered large-scale international piracy. And what about the US’ loss of global hegemony, which is causing increased uncertainty in the international balance of power?

our leading story discusses the quintessential type of power vacuum in our time: that of the failed nation-state. The instability caused by failed states poses a significant challenge for the global security architecture of the 21st century. But how do failed nation-states come into being? The next article analyses the fragility of dictatorships that rely on the power of a single individual, and which are the progenitor of all current failed states.

As ISIS implodes in Iraq, the threat of another power vacuum looms. our interview with journalist Judit neurink discusses what comes next for the factional players, including the Kurds’ possible bid for independence. Meanwhile, a new power vacuum threatens to emerge in Gaza, where hamas is losing ground to more extreme factions. our article lays out the lessons Israel must learn from the mistakes it made in Gaza.

other types of power vacuums exist as well. Consider for instance the perceived ideological vacuum which currently plagues Western societies and drives youngsters to embrace extremist ideologies, which is discussed in a separate article. It is our hope that reading this edition of JASon Magazine will leave you better equipped to deal with the uncertainty that power vacuums arouse. Rik van Dijk and Daniël Stuke Chief editors JASON Magazine

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overcoming Chaos

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Failed states

Failed nation-states and their international implications

The intricate balance of power between the globe’s most dominant nation-states was the principal issue dominating global security discourse for decades. As a direct consequence, many global institutions and policies were designed to deal with possible violent engagements between nation-states. However, nowadays the world’s failed nation-states have given rise to a multitude of grave threats facing the 21st century security architecture and the implications are as real as they are immediate. The fragility of these failed nation-states often permits extremist groups to flourish within their borders, they have the potential to become breeding grounds for disease pandemics, environmental degradation and to create waves of instability in their regions. In today’s interconnected world, the flow-on effects have the potential to have global and incalculable ramifications.

states such as Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen proved to be ideal locations for militant groups to set up bases to train their militants for attacks far beyond the borders of these countries. ere has been an upsurge in the number of failed nation-states in recent years and many of the most recent ones are located in geostrategic locations such as Yemen with its proximity to the Gulf of Aden vital for global commerce and Syria’s vicinity to Europe, making them even more dangerous to global security6. Until recently, the majority of failed nationstates were located far from important population and economic centres. “the arc of volatility” Unfortunately, the geo-political situation in the strategic arc which stretches from the Sahel in the West to the Hindu Kush in the East has worsened during the last years. It has produced a number of new failed nation-states located in far more strategically pivotal regions of the world7. In the West, Libya has

Europe’s doorstep and its potential ﬂowon eﬀects have on internal European political debates.

descended into chaos since the downfall of Muammar Kaddaﬁ in 2011, with many competing armed groups vying for power in the current political vacuum, providing fertile ground for the emergence of Islamic State-controlled enclaves. As a result, there has been an upsurge in uncontrolled illegal

Syria’s descent into civil war has resulted in the country turning into a failed nation-state sharing a land border with Turkey (a NATO membership country),

immigration to Europe which has led to strained political relationships among European states as to how to best share the burden of the newly arrived immigrants8. Underscoring the ramiﬁcations, a failed nation-state on

accentuating its close geographical proximity to Europe. Syria being a failed nation-state has not only led to the breakdown of order within the country itself, but also largescale immigration ﬂows into its neighbouring countries

not until the attacks on the 11th of September 2001 did the world fully wake up to the potential threats originating from failed nation-states

t The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted the emphasis of failed nation-states as just regional humanitarian problems to one that could present international security threats.

EMAnUEl SKooG

Why failed nation-states matter. ation-states fail due to the fact that they are consumed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants, their governments lack or lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the speciﬁc state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes of a growing number of its inhabitants1. e failure of nation-states is not a novel concept of the 21st century global political landscape. However, in an era in which nation-states constitute the fundamental building blocks of legitimate world order, the violent disintegration and substantial weakness of various nation-states around the globe threaten the very foundation of that

system2. Furthermore, due to the growth of international terrorism and increasing interconnectivity, the consequences of failed nation-states for the global order are potentially of a much more damaging nature than ever before. e aforesaid assertions are widely shared by global development agencies, the U.S. military, the United Nations and the European Union, accentuating the global comprehension and seriousness attributed to the potential threats emanating from failed nation-states3. For reasons such as security, material and moral ones successful nation-states and multilateral organisations et cetera cannot longer ignore the failed ones. However, both the globe’s most powerful nation-states and the many multilateral institutions they manage are

facing an uphill struggle in their eﬀorts to assist failed nation-state to recover and once more become responsible actors in the international political realm. Strategists and policymakers have expressed their trepidation about failed nation-states. Since the end of the Cold War, at the onset theatres of war and chaos were seen principally as threats to the population living within them or adjacent to them4. However, not until the attacks on the 11th of September 2001 in the United States which were established to have originated in Afghanistan, did the world fully wake up to take notice of the threat to global security that such failed nation-states can pose5. For example, failed nation-

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Failed states

e general problems associated with failed nation-states can be reduced and managed more eﬀectively, dependent upon the political will and judgment of the world’s leading nation-states, aligning multilateral and national institutions to improve their approach14. ere is a growing realisation about the potential threats failed nation-states present among the globe’s leading nation-states. However, it will take continuing determination among their leaders, encouraged by a sense of working towards upholding a global order and human responsibility, to continue to keep the issue front and centre on the global agenda and to assist on better institutional alignment and collaboration15. is will not only assist

s Libya has descended into chaos since the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 with an upsurge in uncontrolled illegal immigration to Europe as a result.

and Europe, increased sectarianism in Iraq and Lebanon and assisted in the rise of IS9. IS has used its newfound territorial base in Syria’s uncontrolled spaces as a launching pad for attacks in Europe and elsewhere. At the eastern end of “the arc of volatility” lies Afghanistan which has experienced various conﬂicts during the last couple of decades and is today a failed nation-state with a central government only controlling some

parts of the country. Furthermore, due to the volatile state of the country there is increased risk of a destabilising impact on Central Asian countries. ey are worried about the emergence of IS-aﬃliated groups in Afghanistan and the risk that they might expand their base of operations into their countries10. e outlined cases exemplify the multitude of threats which have the possibility to originate from failed nation-states and make it abundantly clear that the threats

The research and educational institution The Fund for peace is annually releasing its Fragile States Index (FSI). It has based its index on twelve social, economic and political variables that quantify pressures experienced by the countries and, consequently, their susceptibility to instability17. In 2017, the FSI was topped by South Sudan, pakistan recorded the most substantial improvement of any country and Finland was ranked the globe’s least fragile country18. There has also been a number of developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States which have seen their scores deteriorate, attributed to highly contentious political campaigns during 201619. Furthermore, the FSI has raised red flags when it comes to a number of countries with a particular focus on South Africa and Senegal, where conditions could lead to increased instability20. It is imperative to remember that the FSI does not forecast chaos or conflicts. however, it does provide potential early warning of indicators which have the potential to lead to volatility21.

are not restricted to solely the failed nation-state itself and its neighbourhood.

Summary over the last decades, the realisation of the multitude of potential threats originating from failed nation-states has become more apparent in the global political and security discourse. Due to growing global interconnectivity, possible international flow-on effects and implications from failed nation-states have risen with hard-to-calculate longterm consequences for the current global order.

Biography Emanuel Skoog works with assisting Swedish companies in their business internationalization development in the Benelux. Furthermore, he has worked and studied in Australia, Spain, Sweden, the Benelux and the United Kingdom.

the globe’s leading nation-states to curtail and manage the threats from failed nation-states. It will also help improve the quality of life for failed nation-states and neighbouring countries’ populations. at is the most sustainable long-term path of upholding and expanding global security for everyone16. conclusion e words articulated by the English cleric and poet John Donne that “No man is an Island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main” ring true in the context of failed nation-states and the possible multifaceted threats which can originate from them with wide-ranging global repercussions due to increasing interconnectedness. Gone are the days when threats emanating from a failed nation-state were almost exclusively limited to the failed nation itself and its immediate neighbourhood. e globe is truly moving in the direction of “one Continent” and away from being made up of many diﬀerent “Islands” – therefore the solutions to managing and rebuilding failed nation-states will have to be global in their nature. e ﬁrst step in the right direction is to realize many of the global organisations and polices designed to curtail violence

between the most predominant nationstates are not adequately tailored towards preventing nation-states from failing and assisting them to become responsible stakeholders of a “one Continent” again.

t Syria’s descent into civil war has resulted in the country turning into a failed nation-state.

hoW to assist failed nation-states Failed nation-states can recover and are more likely to recover if the assistance they receive from the global community is focused at ending the cycle of violence, the breakdown of economic activities and unﬁt government. However, at present the global community is poorly organized to address the problems at the intersection of the aforementioned problems11. In addition, failed nation-states do not conform to the way in which the global community is presently organized: they do not respect the traditional boundary between security and development12. Which sometimes makes it hard to discern if the solutions to a failed nation-state should be more security- or development-related. Until the global community can address more directly the underlying reasons why nation-states fail and cannot recover and rebuild, it is likely the problem will persist and even get worse13.

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After the Strongman

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Dictatorship collapse

This article sets out to examine some of the dangers inherent in political systems that rely heavily on the leadership of a single all-powerful individual. These dangers will be discussed using a recent example where the downfall of a strongman was indeed followed by a political power vacuum and prolonged chaos and violence: the toppling of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. DAnIEl STUKE

O s

f all autocratic forms of political organization, the personalist dictatorship where power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual – is probably the one that fascinates us most. Dictators tend to be colourful and eccentric characters, and the extreme degree of control they exert over their

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Mohammed Siad Barre, former dictator of Somalia. After his removal, Somalia would become the archetypical failed state.

subordinates often means they can single-handedly determine the path of an entire nation. e strength of the man does not translate into strength for the state, however – quite the opposite. e concentration of political power in the hands of a single individual has farreaching consequences for a state’s future. What happens when the individual disappears? When political order can be equated to the leadership of one man, can political order outlast his demise? What comes after the strongman? cracking the façade e typical strongman not only accumulates power, but – feeling insecure in his power – actively dismantles political institutions and civil society, eroding the foundation of the state and thus severely weakening it1. is ensures the political system’s utter dependence on the strongman. is might be beneficial for the dictator in question, but for the state this means that it has nothing else to fall back on. When no one is able to seize the reins of power after the removal of the strongman, a power vacuum arises. Political order within the borders of the state collapses entirely, leading to civil war and what is called a failed state. is was, for instance, the case in Somalia, where rebel factions succumbed to infighting after the removal of the dictator Siad Barre in 1991. e country still has not recovered from this disintegration. e danger of a power vacuum emerging after a strongman’s removal became painfully clear in 2011, after Libyan dictator Gaddafi was ousted and killed, thus ending the Libyan Revolution. Political order could not be successfully re-established, as the country found itself in the grip of escalating conflict between rival groups. Since then, Libya has fallen prey to incessant fighting, Islamic insurgencies and sectarian violence. e country’s disintegration was dramatic and its reverberations are still being felt throughout the region. e explanation for the country’s rapid and spectacular descent into chaos must be sought in its political system. Libya under Muammar Gaddafi was a personalist dictatorship pur sang. What follows is an account of the way in which he designed the country’s entire political structure to utterly depend on

s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

himself as the essential linchpin, demonstrating the inevitability of the structure’s collapse after his removal.

Council (RCC), would go on to become the unoﬃcial government of the country. A young colonel named

stranglehold In 1969, a group of young army oﬃcers successfully staged a coup to seize control of the Libyan government. e leadership of the group, a directorate known as the Revolutionary Command

Muammar Gaddafi was the chairman of the RCC, which in effect made him the unofficial head of state.

libya’s unity could be justifiably equated with Gaddafi’s personal rule

But Gaddaﬁ was dreaming of greater things. e objective was to organize the

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Dictatorship collapse

country’s political structure according to the ideal of direct democracy, whereby the country would be governed by people’s committees at the grassroots level. While local and regional administration was carried out at the grassroots level, legislative and executive authority would be ﬁrmly in the hands

systematically eroded and undermined, until Libya’s unity could be justiﬁably equated with Gaddaﬁ’s personal rule from behind the scenes.

of the General People’s Congress, a national representative body. is new system of government was christened the Jamahiriya system, and in theory, it would render the RCC obsolete.

its long-felt discontent with Gaddaﬁ’s autocratic rule. Gaddaﬁ responded to calls for his abdication by stating that he was a symbolic leader only, not holding any real power.3 e people were not having it and popular discontent fueled

fall into ruin In 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring, the population of Libya began to stir in

When no one is able to seize the reins of power after the removal of the strongman, a power vacuum arises

an uprising, leading to civil war between Gaddafi loyalists and a broad coalition of rebels, who unified under a provisional government called the National Transitional Council (NTC). With the aid of NATO, the NTC quickly established military control over Libya and was recognized by the UN as the sole legitimate government of Libya, thus formally replacing the Gaddafi government. In 2012, power was transferred to a democratically elected parliament: the General National Congress, which attempted to stabilize the country amid rising sectarian violence. is would prove an impossible task. After two years, the GNC suffered a schism, leading to the emergence of two rival parliaments and governments, each with its own army, police and security structure. Each government was

supported by a different collection of domestic militias and a different cast of foreign actors, even as they engaged each other on the battlefield. To complicate matters further, the southwest of the country was by now firmly under the Summary The article points out the dangers of political systems that rely heavily on the power of individual leaders. The typical strongman not only accumulates power, but actively dismantles political institutions and civil society, eroding the foundation of the state. In the case of libya, the foundation of the state was eroded and undermined by Muammar Gaddafi in order to support his autocratic rule, leading to the inevitable emergence of a power vacuum after his removal.

control of Tuareg rebel forces, and militant jihadist groups were exploiting the chaos in the country and claiming territory left and right. e disintegration of Libya was complete. It is important to note that the disintegration of Libya is partly due to factors other than Gaddafi’s personalist rule. e country had always been a loose collection of tribes, not unified by an overarching sense of nationality. e sudden vanishing of autocratic rule exposed divisions in Libyan society that had never been smoothed. is does not negate the bigger point of this article, however: had Gaddafi fostered an active civil society instead of eroding it, and had he refrained from exploiting tribal rivalries, the country would never have disintegrated to the extent that it has. Yet, precisely these measures were necessary to maintain his personalist rule.

Biography Daniel Stuke is editor-in-chief of JASon Magazine and has a Bachelor’s degree in political Science. he specializes in issues relating to international relations and security, but likes to write about any topic as long as it provides food for thought.

Although this might seem enlightened on paper, it is important to note that the newly structured Libyan government also incorporated what was called a “revolutionary sector”. e revolutionary sector was headed by Gaddafi and the other members of the RCC and its main task was to supervise the Jamahiriya system. So-called revolutionary committees were set up with the aim of carefully monitoring and managing the people’s committees and to stamp out political opposition. Critics were assassinated or incarcerated. is way, Gaddafi steadily increased his stranglehold over Libya’s political structure. Although purportedly independent and vibrant, Libyan civil society was in fact thoroughly infiltrated by Gaddafi’s informants (it is estimated that at one point, between 10 and 20 percent of Libyans were informants for Gaddafi’s revolutionary committees2). Actual political participation became impossible, due to the threat of elimination by the regime. Another significant way in which Gaddafi maintained his position of power was by following the principle of “divide and rule”. He carefully balanced the constellation of forces inside the country against each other (most significantly the various tribes which coexist within Libya’s artificial borders), by fostering mutual distrust between them. In these ways, the already wobbly foundation of the Libyan state was

Fighters for the NTC have conquered the town of Bani Walid in 2011.

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The Ideological Vacuum in Western Societies

JASON MAGAZINE

Losers of modernization

The failure of capitalism to deal with losers of modernization

WoUTER WITTEVEEn

ome say ‘we’ have won. When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union lost its ideological and arms race for world supremacy the West won. e United States of America has dictated the ideological framework of our society unchallenged ever since. No matter the eﬀort of present-day Russia and no matter the enormous improvements of China’s economy, the US is the top dog in the world. Europe has proﬁted from this

Japan could be called a loser of modernization based on the Second World War. e modern atom bomb won from the old-fashioned kamikaze pilot. One could state that modern capitalism defeated the old-fashioned communist system which was not open to change. It went broke at both the ideological and economic level. However, it is more common to deﬁne losers of modernization within the frame of socio-economic and social-cultural

The Western capitalist world has no answer to rising grievances

structure on many levels, being a loyal ally. Capitalism and liberalism are the directive. Delightful. Due to this system, we live in a rich country. No one dies of starvation here. But this begs the question, why on earth are so many Dutch citizens angry? Why the political unrest, the rise of the extreme right and the large number of foreign ﬁghters? Could it be due to an ideological vacuum? Does the modern, capitalist society not know how to respond to rising grievances within Western countries? losers of modernization One could take the term ‘loser of modernization’ literally. In doing so, 12

aspects. Not only between countries and diﬀerent parts of the world, but within countries as well. Globalization and capitalism, intertwined as they are, have completely shifted relations in the world, including local relations. e ‘losers of modernization’-thesis states that the deep socio-economic and social-cultural transformations in the last couple of decades have caused huge divides and feelings of deprivation between and within societies. e Western world has transitioned from industrialized to post-industrialized societies. Whoever was unable to deal with this transformation now falls short in terms of welfare and employment.

e ones proﬁting from this new reality are the (already) rich and higher educated in the service industry and ICT sectors. Bluntly put, these people can be categorized as supporters of neoliberal political parties. Both the people and the parties are happy with the current status quo. Opposite to this group are the ones who lost their job or even entire industry to outsourcing and who were not able to adjust properly. Often, these are the relatively lower educated, feeling pressure from (economic) migrants and refugees who sometimes are (in the Dutch case this mostly accounts for Syrians) higher educated than themselves. is is the breeding ground for extreme-wing voting. Often this thesis is called elitist. e higher educated are proclaiming themselves to be winners, while the lower educated are labeled losers. In light of recent events, such as the election of Trump, the Brexit referendum and the rise of populism in Europe, the losers of modernization thesis is frequently used. ‘ey’ who are not able to adapt to modern times are demanding that power return to their hands. Going back to the good-old, safe and above all well-known traditional norms and values of the indigenous population becomes priority number one. America ﬁrst, close the borders,

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renegotiate with the EU and if that doesn’t work, leave it. Isolationism above global cooperation if cooperation equals an inﬂux of other traditions and cultures. ‘We’ however get the complexities of the world and support global cooperation, including an even more expanded Europe. ideological vacuum e Western capitalist world has no answer to these rising grievances. ere have always been losers in capitalist societies. But the growing gap between the winners and losers provides the capitalist ideology with the biggest threat since the opposed communist alternative. ere no longer is a clear alternative. ere is only an ideological vacuum on how to deal with and an ideological emptiness to choose from for the losers of modernization.

could become a millionaire. As opposed to the ‘evil’ communist ideology. e advantage of such a bipolar system is that one is almost forced to take sides and connect with an idea. At the very least, the bipolar system provided a framework in which answers could be

During the Cold War, people felt connected to their systems, their ideologies. ey were proud of their systems. e capitalist ideology stood for an open and free society. Everyone had equal chances (in theory). e postman

found. It gave either an opportunity to express grievances from the other ideological perspective, or provided a reaction from within the own ideology to counter and prevent a negative standpoint towards it. In doing so, the

s American wartime propaganda. Capitalist ideology stood for an open and free society.

When economic deprivation is mixed with cultural deprivation, mobilization occurs

bipolar system accommodated an everpresent alternative for the losers. e current individualized western world has lost this alternative. ere is the overwhelming presence of neoliberalism and capitalism. Systems which are by now spread throughout the entire world, being present even in China and Russia. Despite trying to implement a certain form of collective capitalism, even China is now moving towards the infrastructure based on the American individualized version. Capitalism therefore is currently not matched by any other big ideology. But not everyone thrives in such a system. ere are, as stated, inevitably people losing. And their numbers are growing. ese people do not feel a bond with capitalism, or at the very least the

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Losers of modernization Summary Even though capitalism has defeated communism, the lack of a competitive ideology has ironically become the biggest threat to its survival. The losers of modernization, who are unable to deal with the new status quo, cannot deal with the emptiness of just being losers. They turn extreme in order to search for a sense of significance. hence the rise in right-wing extremism and foreign fighters.

and a bright future perceive capitalism as a failure. It does not provide the chances it promises. Due to lack of an alternative, they are prone to Islamic extremism, currently one of the biggest nominees of becoming a competitor of

the Western neoliberal capitalist ideology. from victory to curse Winning the bipolar Cold War has thus brought the West a bright future. ‘We’ won, our system is implanted everywhere. But lack of competition has made the ideology and school of thought behind it hollow. e current status is that capitalism and neoliberalism are prone to challenge. A rising group of losers are looking for a way to ﬁll their ideological vacuum, more and more reaching out to extremism as an answer. We need a new alternative ideology, or a re-interpretation of the values of neoliberalism and capitalism that reaches out to the losers. Otherwise we can expect extreme ideas to increasingly set foot in Western societies.

Biography Wouter Witteveen is a graduated MSc in Conflict Studies. he is currently enrolled in the Master program of Sociology at Radboud University. he specializes in radicalization processes and the recent Balkan history.

t Muslims protest against Western ideological tenets. Extremist Islam is one of the biggest nominees of becoming a competitor of Western ideology.

s Right-wing nationalist protesters from Germany fear a loss of identity due to immigration.

current completion of the capitalist societies. Due to lack of a common, widely accepted alternative ideology which provides a sense of belonging and answers the quest for signiﬁcance, these people go extreme. rise of the extreme Strangely enough, the ﬁrst signs of a growing number of losers of modernization cannot be found in the rise of leftist extremism, but in a rise of right-wing extremism – although sometimes these right-wing extremists pursue leftist economic ideals. It seems that, in the current Western societies,

economic deprivation alone is not enough for people to get mobilized anymore. When economic deprivation is

deprived, all of a sudden a cultural tradition such as Black Pete is challenged, the losers get angry. Only

mixed with cultural deprivation, resulting in social-cultural grievances, mobilization occurs. And this is the playing ﬁeld for the extreme right. Only when, besides being economically

when Sharia courts are set up, the losers get angry. is is perceived as a red line which cannot be crossed. Although economically beaten down, the cultural threat pushes people to conﬂict. Fear of identity loss due to immigration and no ideological worldview to choose from pushes people over the edge.

Ethnic youngsters seeking significance perceive capitalism as a failure

one of the most interesting examples of a loser of modernization is that of Morten Storm. This Danish citizen converted to Islam and quickly rose to be a die-hard Jihadist, who trained in Yemen, joined Al-Qaeda and became well-known among top members of the global Jihadist movement. It gave him a sense of importance and belonging which he was unable to get in a society based on consumerism and disloyalty. however, ‘going extreme’ wasn’t all he had hoped it to be, and once more he started to doubt his own beliefs. he abandoned his faith and started working for the pET, MI5 and the CIA. The irony of him working for the main protectors of capitalist societies was not lost on him, and after a couple of years he broke all bonds. he is now no longer being protected by the secret services, and is on many death lists of Jihadists. About his amazing life he wrote a book called Agent Storm: my life inside Al-Qaeda. It also appeared in Dutch; Al-Qaida undercover.

e same goes for European foreign fighters of Arab descent. ey grew up in a capitalist world, Europe, which promised equal chances of making it. For their grandparents, their parents and now them. But instead of a huge increase of social mobilization amongst migrants it has more or less stagnated. We face the huge problem of intergenerational deprivation, on several levels. Youngsters seeking significance (how can I make a difference?), status

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Gaza’s power Vacuum

JASON MAGAZINE

The Gaza Power Vacuum after Disengagement

self-governance e sudden withdrawal of all Israeli presence was especially troublesome since the Gaza Strip has never been truly sovereign. Since the 16th century, Gaza was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. e British were in charge from 1918 until Egypt took over in 1948. During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel took hold of the territory. After the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1994, Israel agreed to let the Palestinian Authority (PA) selfgovern the area. However, Jewish settlements and military structures stayed in place under Israeli control. e rest of the territory came to be under partial control of the PA, limited in its sovereignty by restrictions imposed upon by Israel.

Twelve years after Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the impoverished area is ruled by the terrorist organization Hamas. Meanwhile, even more extreme groups gain prominence and Gaza’s future looks dire. Was the 2005 disengagement predestined to fail or could this fate have been avoided?

Following Yasser Arafat’s death in 2004, the relatively moderate Fatah party was left without a leader. Arafat’s successor Mahmoud Abbas could not fill his predecessors’ shoes, lacking charisma. Fatah slowly gained a reputation for being corrupted and dishonest. Hamas was seen by many as being better organized and more competent and true to the resistance movement,7 ultimately leading to Hamas’ success in the 2006 elections. Fighting between Fatah and Hamas affiliates ensued, until Hamas finally took over fully in 2007.

DAnA CohEn

ntil 2005, the Gaza Strip was under full Israeli control, drawing heavy criticism from the international community. Since Israel’s withdrawal from the area, however, the day-to-day situation has not improved much. Hamas, which initially ﬁlled the power vacuum left by Israel’s withdrawal, has proven unable to exercise full authority over the region. Smaller, more extreme fundamentalist groups such as Islamic Jihad are a noticeable presence, attacking music and video shops accused of colluding with the West, pharmacies supposedly selling Viagra, and American and UN schools. Gazans are subjected to live under strict, fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, while rockets frequently ﬁnd their way into Israeli territory. Unemployment in Gaza soars, while the economy falters badly.1

Many Israelis thus view the Disengagement as a mistake. Some politicians use it as an anecdotal argument against closing down settlements or withdrawing troops from Palestinian lands in the West Bank. ey claim that withdrawing Israeli forces from the West Bank would create a second Gaza. is argument assumes only one possible outcome, ignoring the obvious fact that fatal mistakes were made during the Gaza Disengagement.

JASon Magazine * Volume 42 * Issue 2 * 2017

Former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.

referring to the 2002 peace plan. enPalestinian leader Hanan Ashrawi likewise stated: “You cannot occupy a people for 37 years and then decide, well I will evacuate one part, Gaza, regardless of the havoc and the destruction that I have wreaked there without any negotiation as to what will happen.”4 In 2014, Jerusalem Bureau Chief Matt Rees said: “a lot of the people on the left

In some ways, the Hamas takeover was terrible for Israel, with over 1,500 rockets and bombs being ﬁred from Gaza towards Israeli towns in the ﬁrst year alone. Hamas, however, is far from the most extreme faction in Gaza and fairly rational by comparison. Smaller groups, such as Islamic Jihad, are much more radical and extreme both towards Israelis and towards the Gazan population itself. According to Yuval Diskin, director of Shin Bet (the Israeli internal security agency), several factions in Gaza are directly connected to

believe they shouldn’t be supporting a plan which is unilateral, which doesn’t incorporate an agreement with the Palestinians.”5 Weary of the possible power vacuum ensuing after a unilateral withdrawal, the Egyptian government planned ahead to provide adequate training to Palestinian security forces and to send 200 Egyptian trained military intelligence agents into Gaza.6

terrorist groups involved in global jihad8. ese groups are gaining prominence due to Gazans’ continued disappointment with Hamas’ governing failures. While Hamas has reached out to the more moderate Fatah in recent years, leading to several attempts at a coalition agreement, some Gazan citizens have started drifting in the opposite direction.

s Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas.

Any such future move could, and should, avoid the mistakes made in 2005, likely leading to very different results. unilateralism Although the Disengagement plan was generally viewed favourably, there were also many skeptics. Criticism mainly focused on the unilateral nature of the move and the lack of coordination with the Palestinians. e plan was also executed relatively suddenly, first being proposed by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003, adopted by the government in 2004, approved by the Knesset in February of 2005 and implemented in August of that year in just a few weeks’ time. Sharon’s persistence to putting the plan into practice unilaterally was even seen in some circles as “a pressure tactic to give Israel leverage in peace efforts.”2 Late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat proclaimed that the withdrawal “should be through talks between the two parties and the framework of the road map,”3

“hamas has proven unable to exercise full authority over the region”

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JASON MAGAZINE

The Gaza Power Vacuum after Disengagement Summary When Israel left the Gaza Strip in 2005, it left behind a power vacuum initially filled by hamas. Disappointed with hamas’ failures, however, extremism is on the rise and a power vacuum is opening up. To prevent a similar situation in the West Bank, if and when a two-state solution is put in place, Israel should take heed and learn from the mistakes made in Gaza.

s A British aid convoy entering the Gaza Strip through the Rafah border crossing from Egypt.

occupation? Ever since the Disengagement, opinions diﬀer on whether Gaza is still occupied by Israel. One of Sharon’s stated goals of disengagement was to bring an end to the occupation, and with that an end to the responsibilities Israel held as the occupying power. “e law of occupation belongs historically to the law of land warfare which requires, at its core, a land-based security presence.”9 Some opposing voices, including Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross, argue the occupation is ongoing because Israel still controls the ﬂow of goods and people to and from the Strip. Israel controls the Gazan seaports and airspace as well as the shared land border; Egypt controls the Egyptian land border.

of factors, such as lootings by locals, corruption in the PA, export restrictions put in place by Israel, and a lack of water to irrigate the lands, made the farming eﬀort lag far behind. Limited by the Oslo Accords on the amount of energy they are allowed to generate, Gaza also remains dependent on Israel for electricity and fuel. hindsight In short, three main problems persisted with the implementation of the 2005

Disengagement. First and foremost, the plan was not consulted with Palestinian leaders. If the operation was coordinated with the PA, Gaza could have been better prepared. Possibly, agreements would have been made to withdraw the troops in phased stages rather than all at once or Palestinian police oﬃcers could have been provided with basic training in Israel. A mutual agreement could perhaps also have avoided or lessened the huge spike in unemployment directly caused by the Disengagement.

t A protest against the evacuation of the Jewish settlement Kfar Darom in the Gaza Strip.

e consequences of unilateralist actions were exacerbated by the fact that Gaza has never truly self-governed and therefore lacked the basic structures to do so. is problem might also have been overcome by coordination between Palestinian and Israeli leaders. e latter could have provided Gaza the necessary resources and knowledge, while the former could have helped Israel to secure the land border. A third diﬃculty stems from the restrictions on Gaza, complicating its struggles. Under no circumstances should the movement of products such as food be hindered from entering the territory and materials for construction could at least be let through under supervision. A free ﬂow of goods and people through Gaza is only possible, however, under cooperation between the two sides.

ird, unnecessary road blocks and police stops should be reduced, permitting Palestinians their freedom of movement within their own territories at the very least. Israeli work permits for Palestinians will boost the West Bank’s economy and be of advantage to Israel’s security in the long run. Israel can also work together with the PA to strengthen the latter’s standing and receive cooperation on security aﬀairs in return. Regardless of, or maybe even because of, the fact that a two-state solution seems to be further away than ever, it is of utmost importance to continue to contemplate what moves should and should not be made if and when the moment ﬁnally arrives.

t A watchtower at the Rafah border crossing with Egypt.

“Several factions in Gaza are directly connected to terrorist groups involved in global jihad”

conclusion Although the peace process and the twostate solution are at an impasse right now, the Gaza Disengagement should not be used as anecdotal evidence against this compromise. Rather, we should learn from the mistakes made in the past and refrain from making them again. First, any agreement on permanently dividing the land should be made bilaterally. Second, Israel should work with the PA to make sure it has suﬃcient means at its disposal to succeed in its eﬀorts to self-govern and also provide it with enough freedom to do so. Instead of an active military

Gaza remains under Israeli military control and is not allowed its own armed forces. e hindrance of controlling their own seaport, among other things, adds to stagnate the economy. International aid and trade are disrupted, as is employment. Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip provided hundreds of local Palestinians with employment, mostly in the settlers’ greenhouses. Some of these structures were destroyed by settlers when they were forced to leave, others were bought by James Wolfensohn and given to Gazans to boost their economy. A mix 18

For instance, preparations could have been made to protect the settlers’ greenhouses, thus saving many Palestinians’ jobs. Also, cooperation could have helped Gaza prepare for the eventuality in which the 120,000 Gazans who worked in Israel before the Disengagement suddenly lost their jobs due to the heavier restrictions put in place by Israel directly following the withdrawal. Possibly, close cooperation could even have taken away the necessity for these heavy restrictions.

Biography Dana Cohen is a graduate of the University of Utrecht, where she studied Gender Studies during her BA and Conflict Studies and human Rights during her MA.

presence, it should assume the role of an inspector, overlooking the PA’s doing and helping where necessary. A strong PA government is, after all, in Israel’s best interest as well.

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The Vacuum of power and politics in northern Iraq

JASON MAGAZINE

Interview

An Interview with Journalist Judit Neurink

Judit Neurink has been working in Iraqi Kurdistan for many years as a journalist and advisor. She has written extensively on the political situation of the Kurds and on the crisis facing Iraqi minorities in the civil war. She was kind enough to speak to JASON magazine about the situation in Iraq as the ISIS state is imploding. We also discussed what comes next for various factional players, including the Kurds’ possible bid for independence. GIlES lonGlEY

o begin with the Fall of Mosul itself, how could this happen, given the intelligence and resources the Iraqi government had? Before August 2014, there were already groups connected with al Qaeda, that were active within radical Islam and acted as mobsters at the same time. ey extorted money, kidnapped people and forced shopkeepers to pay for security. ISIS already had boots on the ground. So when Mosul fell, it was not a big surprise. e intelligence services all knew this was going to happen. ey already had a date and how they were going to enter the city. Also, in Mosul ISIS had very easy access. If you speak to people now in Mosul they will tell you that this is what they are afraid of in the future, because those links have not gone. ose people who were the base of ISIS, are now among refugees or have returned to East Mosul. Was the rejection of the Iraqi state by the Sunni population anticipated? ISIS was feeding on the fact that the Sunnis were very unhappy with their treatment by Baghdad. ey felt that after Saddam went, they were in a vacuum, unable to inﬂuence the government. Nouri Al-Maliki (Iraq’s Shiite ex-prime minister) was getting rid 20

of their leaders, persecuting them and many had to leave the country. ISIS knew this and was feeding on it. A lot of Sunnis thought that ISIS’ victory would be what they call the Tribal Revolution. ey thought the tribes were getting together, making a fist, and fighting for a better position. So for the first weeks you saw an interesting mix of groups working together. Radical Islamists as well as Baathists and Sufi militants.

then they could stay. However later they were kicked out, because they sought to form a movement that tried to get rid of the Islamist forces, whom many people in the region had decided that they did not want.

But after a few weeks ISIS took over, as they had planned from the beginning. And ISIS itself remained a combination of Al Qaeda and former Baathists, especially members of Saddam’s secret service and Special Forces. So there was a lot of information there about what kind of Baathists were there and what roles they were playing. So ISIS wanted to get rid of the people looking to make a Sunni region in Iraq, and they were picked up and murdered. ISIS originally let former police and military believe that if they recanted

is is a very diﬃcult process, as for the Shiites just about anyone who is Sunni is considered ISIS. ere have been some private projects to get people to realize that they are all Iraqis and that being Shia/Sunni should not play a role. It is possible but will take lots of hard work and I don’t see it happening. e Kurds tried to convince Baghdad to decide on a policy for what to do once ISIS is defeated. Now they are almost defeated and there is still no policy. e other day there was a conference of Sunni politicians in Baghdad where a

number of them were not able to go because they would be picked up and prosecuted once they got there, so from Erbil they decided to form a new political platform. With reports of a huge exodus from Mosul, is there a danger this is becoming a repeat of the 2006 cleansing which strengthened sectarian groups? What most of us expect and what is happening, is that ISIS will go back to where Al-Qaeda went in 2010, to the Iraqi-Syrian border, to hide and wait, to try to come back. What will help them is that parts of the

Shiites and Iraqi army are picking up any men coming out of the old centre of Mosul, where there is still ﬁghting going on, and executing them without trial. ere are videos going around of supposed ISIS members being tortured, shot and dumped in the Tigris river. is sectarian violence will only inspire more sectarian violence. Lots of people in Mosul are saying ‘thank God ISIS is gone, we are all one with fellow Iraqis again’ but if these things keep happening this will change. People in Mosul are complaining about army looting and the Shiites not being as friendly as expected. And what is very important is that the Iraqi government has decided to put

families of ISIS ﬁghters into camps. ese camps already existed. I have visited one outside Tikrit. And what is happening there is that a new generation of frustrated young people is being made, because these camps are a terrible place to be. ey are worse than other prisoner camps, there is no communication with the outside world. ere is no freedom, no schools for teenage children, people are getting very bored there and are treated as members of ISIS even if they didn’t want their family members to join the group. is type of behavior is feeding a new frustration and might help ISIS ﬁnd ground and come back in the future.

t Judit Neurink has been working in Iraqi Kurdistan for many years as a journalist and advisor.

e Sunni tribes were once described as the ‘centre of gravity’ for the antiISIS alliance. Now that ISIS is withering, will Sunnis still be treated as partners?

The intelligence services already had a date and how ISIS were going to enter Mosul

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JASON MAGAZINE

Interview

With the creation of a vacuum in common culture and history, are we looking at de facto partition of the country and will this require international forces protection? What started the partition was the Kurdish independence referendum. People are warning that this could start other groups demanding independence as well. e Yazidis see no safe way to

ese disagreements make the Christians very insecure about their future.

return home without an international force making sure there is no ﬁght between the main Kurdish party and the Turkish Kurd PKK over Sinjar. e Christians I speak to say they are not going back, some go back to send their children to school and clean up, leaving the other part of their family in Erbil’s Christian area, as they do not feel safe enough to go back to Christian towns. e call for independent Christian areas is sometimes linked to the Kurdish independence movement or seeking their own Christian independent area.

and I do not see an international UN army coming in to provide safety. So the other option is the forming of militias, which is already happening. is makes things even more complicated. Who will make sure these militias will not fight each other? e main danger is if the Kurds start fighting the Shiites, and this is already happening in some places. So there are a number of possible battles that could start when the battle against ISIS is finished. But even that battle is not over yet. ere is still Tal Afar, the Turkman area,

We have the various groups, some of whom are Shia and some are Sunni; the Sunni stayed and the Shia ﬂed. It is not clear what will happen to them now. e only reason why they might return is if the situation becomes really safe,

ISIS will go to where Al-Qaeda went in 2010, to the Iraqi-Syrian border, to hide and wait

a very important place, to retake, and other important strongholds. It will continue until at least the end of the year. And if there is no political decisionmaking and planning in the meantime this will be very dangerous, as the new battles are already in the making. Kurdish independence, could it happen? And is such a result workable and possible? is is the worst possible time for it. Barzani, the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, probably thought it would bring together the warring Kurdish groups. You have the struggle between Barzani’s KDP and the change movement and the PUK. is battle is preventing any chance for independence to be successful. Many say that if they are lucky 17% will come to vote. Kurds cannot vote ‘no’ if they want independence but oppose Barzani’s model. So they don’t vote. Also, the parliament should be working again if there is to be a referendum. Instead Barzani just brought it himself, and there is no parliament deciding on it. is is all part of the Barzani faction’s plan, leaving out the other factions. I don’t see how something so divisive will solve anything.

t The banner of terrorist group ISIS waved atop buildings in Mosul until July 2017.

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Is there an alternative in Kurdish politics to the corrupt and ideologically limited leadership of Barzani and the opposition? No. e corruption is a huge problem and has gotten worse with the recession and the ISIS war, as civil servants try to make up for their lost salaries. Politicians here will not compromise, which is the only way they can govern together. e last coalition between the opposition and ruling party failed, as they did not put aside their individual interests. Now with the upcoming elections, changes in voting may make coalitions more possible. But the glue that holds such coalitions together has always been the Islamic parties, and they are stuck in the same mindset. So it’s a very diﬃcult

no one is really looking for a solution

situation that the Kurds have gotten themselves into. How can people in the West support the Kurds in real terms? e big thing to solve will be the

disputed territories, which includes areas of Northern Iraq that they seized but do not belong to them. ey also need to learn good governance, how a parliament, a government and justice should function and the relationship between the three. I tried for five years with the Independent media centre in Kurdistan to train journalists and politicians and police, to make them understand how to work together and be transparent and have dialogue but it’s a difficult task. Kurdistan’s parliament has not functioned for two years. How can that be democratic? It is very depressing as there is no solution, and no one is really looking for one. e only solutions are ones that are away from the traditional way of thinking: new coalitions, new possibilities, and I don’t see any of this happening at the moment. I don’t see a solution as it is, and I only hope some people in Iraq make new movements to bring things back to a more civil level than these politicians who are talking heads filling their pockets. Perhaps in Mosul, where they are very aware of the failures of the government and of ISIS this can happen, but it needs organization. It is not happening yet but I hope it will.

Biography Judit neurink is an author and freelance journalist based since 2008 in Iraqi Kurdistan. She has written six books on the region and its ongoing political and demographic struggles. She writes regularly for Dutch and English language media outlets and is the founder of the Independent Media Centre Kurdistan, an institution for training local journalists.

t The Iraqi army moving into Mosul after defeating ISIS in July 2017. The city had been in the hands of ISIS since 2014.

JASon Magazine * Volume 42 * Issue 2 * 2017

Why Russia is reasserting itself in its former sphere of influence

JASON MAGAZINE

Russia in the geopolitical landscape

The collapse of the Soviet Union some 25 years ago came as a great shock to many experts. Many people cherished hope that the power vacuum created by the collapse would bring a new wave of democratization. While creating hope for democracy, it also created the opportunity for the United States to become the only superpower in the world, allowing it to wield its influence in different conflicts, to promote the rise of democracy. This combination led to the third wave of democratization. Latin America, Asia and Europe were seeing a rise of democratic states. Now, 25 years later, the power vacuum in the former Soviet Union has been filled by Russia, the influence of the United States is decreasing, the world is moving away from a unipolar to a multipolar world. What happened? FloRIS VAn WIEREn

ince the end of the Second World War and the defeat of Nazi Germany, the world had been divided in two spheres of influence. e Western and Communist blocs were fighting proxy wars to gain the upper hand in a competition between two superpowers. e Soviet Union controlled a large amount of countries they had liberated from the Nazis during the Second World War. ese states were seen as buffer states to protect the Soviet Union from another invasion. Paradoxically, the states that were meant to protect the interests of the Soviet Union ultimately led to its downfall. When eventually the power of the Soviet 24

Union started to diminish, the wall that had divided much of Germany collapsed. is symbolic event created a chain reaction throughout the many Eastern European satellite states. is loss of power demonstrated to the world that the Soviet Union was not as powerful anymore. e election of Russian President Boris Yeltsin resulted in more conﬂict in the Soviet Union, speeding up the process of disintegration. Yeltsin’s personal battle for control with Communist leader Gorbachev created turmoil in the country. In reaction to this, communist hard-liners attempted a coup against Gorbachev and tried to re-impose the strict rule of the Soviet Union. Tanks and soldiers were running through the

streets of Moscow, Gorbachev was being detained in the Crimea and a state of emergency was declared. is deﬁning moment ushered in the end of the Soviet Union, with a surprise turn where many civilians started to protest against the army and its tanks. e elected president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, called for resistance. Nobody involved in the coup was prepared to issue an order to attack. When three boys were hit by a tank and killed, the leaders of the coup attempt decided to abandon their pursuit and Gorbachev was reinstated as leader.1 e coup attempt also marked the end of a global conﬂict that had dominated the second half of the twentieth century.

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s Boris Yeltsin celebrating his victory after the Coup of 1991.

However, it also brought hope in the West and in Russia itself that the country would become democratic. Now, 25 years later, Russia is seen by some experts as not really a democratic state, with Vladimir Putin in power directly and indirectly since 2001. While being a democracy, the country is experiencing restrictions and

opposition leaders are being killed only a few hundred meters from the Kremlin. e secret police are rounding up potential protestors against the government. e country has regained its influence in the region, with wars in Georgia and Ukraine, and has retained its influence in geopolitics with conflicts in Syria.2

from bipolar to unipolar When the Soviet Union collapsed there was a huge power vacuum in the region as well as globally. e United States was willing and able to influence global affairs by itself. is unopposed ‘rule’ was marked by different conflicts, the Iraq War, the war in former Yugoslavia and the war in Libya. ese were cases

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JASON MAGAZINE

Russia in the geopolitical landscape Summary Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region has experienced a power vacuum, with different countries regaining independence and being drawn to other players. In the past decade, Russia has slowly grown in power and is fighting the new world order.

ousted and replaced by a pro-European candidate, the country feared an increase in NATO members. Ukraine has the largest land border with Russia in Europe. Should this country move closer to the European Union and NATO, it would mean more NATO troops on the border of Russia. e location of the Russian navy at the port of Sebastopol in the Crimea, further explains its annexation. is all shows a country desperately trying to regain its inﬂuence in the region.5 e democratization of the former satellite states also entailed expansion of the European Union with these states. Starting with German reuniﬁcation, in 2004 the European Union added 10 countries and its eastward expansion was complete.

s USA F-16 flying over Kuwait, in operation Desert Storm.

where a major conflict involving the United States was not influenced by the Soviet Union. Because of its unopposed rule, and the economic crisis in Russia, the United States and its allies were able to expand their influence in the former sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. One of the prime examples of this is the expansion of NATO. When we compare the current border of NATO and Russia with the border of NATO and the Soviet Union, we can see that the border has moved eastwards, including many of the former satellite states of the Soviet Union. is has angered Russia in many ways, with Russian President Medvedev criticizing the west in 2009, for breaking the promise that NATO would not move eastwards.3 e West claims it has never signed anything backing this claim, however some analysts agree with Russia’s claim. is behavior and this claim have resulted in Russia starting to influence the Soviet Union’s former sphere of influence. Since the election of President Putin in 2001, the country has benefitted from rising prices in oil and gas. is has increased government revenue and allowed Russia to recover from their economic crisis after the 26

collapse. One of the ﬁrst moments the world was introduced to the new Russia under President Putin was the conﬂict in Georgia. Where Russia annexed small

crisis, NATO continued to expand its members, until it bordered Russia. When Russia ﬁnally recovered it was unable to undo what had happened, and

parts of the country in an attempt to stop closer relations with NATO and the European Union. is development showcases who ﬁlled the power vacuum militarily in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Russia was weak and dealing with its domestic

could only prevent further states to become a member of NATO.

Russia annexed small parts of Ukraine in an attempt to stop closer relations with nATo and the European Union

Interestingly enough, Russia has managed to regain a foothold in geopolitics in a relative short time. Since the incursion in the Ukraine and the Arab Spring, Russia has been fighting on multiple fronts. however, the West’s biggest concern is what it will do with the Russian minorities in the Baltic countries. The potential for another Ukraine exists.

is period of expansion has conﬁrmed the power of the West. e former

Biography Floris van Wieren is a bachelor student in International Studies at leiden University. he is currently in his third year and is fascinated by the present geopolitical situation.

Soviet sphere of influence has now become an integral part of the European Union. United in their ambition to use a single currency and their use of European rules, this is a prime example of how the European Union has replaced Russia and the Soviet Union as a main power in the region. However, the Union has experienced many obstacles in recent years, the economic crisis of 2008 and the Brexit are examples of this. e growing bureaucracy of the European Union has made it ineffective. e growing threat of Russia since the conflict in Ukraine has caught much of the European Union off guard. With many states realizing they need to expand their military spending to counter the Russian threat. As mentioned before, Russia’s supposed aspiration to belong to the Western world and become a democracy has disappeared. Under President Putin the country has tried to regain influence. EU and/or NATO countries with large Russian minorities are being influenced to create Russian nationalistic feelings as seen in Eastern Ukraine.6 e surprise collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequential weakness of Russia, created much opportunity for the West. Which they have seized,

expanding their military capabilities and influence in the region. With Eastern Ukraine, the continent has experienced the first conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some analysts believe there is a new cold war. is seems unlikely, as Russia does not seem to have the same resources as the Soviet Union. But this does not diminish the threat Russia poses. In their mission to reinvent themselves in the global world order, they threaten the very peace we have enjoyed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

t Parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory, on the Red Square in Moscow.

the re-rise of russia is could explain Russia’s current foreign policy in the region. Having been sidelined and confronted by continued expansion of NATO the country is ‘fighting back’. As mentioned before, the first sign of this was Georgia in 2008. However, many people will look at the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea.4 It also explains its intervention in Syria, trying to hold on to its influence and prevent another Libya. We could to some extent understand Russia’s reasoning behind this policy. Seeing the pro-Russia president in Ukraine being

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The End of a power Vacuum

JASON MAGAZINE

Colombia and the Victory of the State

For decades Colombia has struggled with non-state actors within its borders who exploited the weakness of the federal state and the inhospitable terrains to carve out their own empires and pursue ideological and criminal goals. However, with the peace treaty between the FARC and the Colombian state the power vacuum seems to have come to an end. Is the state of Colombia strong enough to overcome the decades-long conflict within its borders and fill the power void? RIK VAn DIJK

ccording to the Fund for Peace’s 2017 Fragile States Index, which measures the vulnerability of states by 12 indicators, Colombia is steadily climbing up the charts. is is mostly due to the peace agreement the government reached with the FARC on the 29th of August 2017 and improving

its own governance. Moreover, its tourism sector is ﬂourishing and its bloody history of being the breeding ground for drug cartels and criminal empires seems to be scaling oﬀ. But is Colombia ready to shake its image as a failed state? e history of the power vacuum is a long and complicated one. It is

interesting to look at the span of the conflict to highlight the scope of the power vacuum the state of Colombia struggled with. Colombia’s armed conflict is the longest running conflict in recent global history, spanning from the mid-60s until now. It has left 220,000 people dead and has displaced more than 6 million people. Rural defense groups were founded during the first years of the civil war, the explosion of a decade-long conflict between conservative and liberal parties, in the late 1940s. ese groups formed to protect peasants against the violence of the conservative government, who

But is Colombia ready to shake its image as a failed state?

saw the rural communities as hideouts for communists. e groups developed political programmes and increasingly took control of entire regions, imposed taxes and levies on the wealthy and administered jurisdiction.1 Plato ó plomo, an expression so famous that even in the Western world people 28

JASon Magazine * Volume 42 * Issue 2 * 2017

JASON MAGAZINE know the sinister meaning of the phrase made famous by Colombia’s infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar, who himself carries god-like status in certain circles in Colombia but also in the rest of the world. It is a sentence that is symbolic of the weakness of the Colombian state. During the 20th century non-state actors had wrestled away the state’s monopoly

rehabilitated into Colombian society. It may be the only way towards reconciliation but for many, some victims of the violence, it is an aﬀront to justice. For the Colombian government the peace treaty symbolizes its growing power and the stabilization of the Colombian state. However, it has made

of violence and created their own private militaries.

deals in order to succeed peacefully and move forward. A state must ﬁnd a balance between forgiveness and justice in such a transitional phase, and while the treaty seems a success for the

Biography Rik van Dijk is co-editor-in-chief at JASon Magazine and studies International Studies at the University of leiden. he is an avid traveller to latin America.

Reconciliation is an important part of the peace treaty but it was not popular among all of Colombia’s citizens and with good reason

For the Colombian state, the fall of one criminal cartel created its own power vacuum, spawning many smaller ones, whom fought for dominance in bloody conflicts. Paramilitary organizations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, better known as the FARC and parts of the AUC (right-wing organization of vigilantes) let go of their ideological components and became narcotics traffickers. e peace treaty with the FARC meant more for the state of Colombia than the surrender of the paramilitary group turned drug trafficker itself, although the end of protracted conflict in itself is a victory for the country. It was a milestone for a new Colombia to finally put an end to a cycle of violence that had been going on for decades. President Juan Manuel Santos, who has been awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in establishing the peace treaty, called for reconciliation as he urged FARC leader Rodrigo “Timochenko” Londono to “leave decades of violence forever in the past, to unite for all of us, for Colombia, for this dear nation, and to work together for reconciliation around shared ideals of peace.” Reconciliation is an important part of the peace treaty but it was not popular among all of Colombia’s citizens and with good reason. e treaty arranged that the demilitarized FARC would be guaranteed five seats in the Senate and the House after the 2018 elections. But more importantly, the Colombian government has granted more than 7000 FARC supporters amnesty or released them from prison to

government now, the way it handles the FARC rehabilitation is only the ﬁrst step. Success in expanding its bureaucracy to serve all its people, especially in less accessible and rural places is much more important, as it has failed those communities through the years.

e Colombian government struggles with connecting the bureaucracy of the state to the rural areas of the country. Outside of the large cities the influence of the state remains limited. As Javier Guzman, principal of the Colombian Risks Control argues, “the causes of the conflicts are rural violence, poverty, lack of state presence, lack of infrastructure, illicit economies like illegal mining and drug trafficking. With those elements remaining present, a transformation of the sources of violence is likely. Whether the new sources of violence will be politically motivated is yet to be seen. But the elements for instability remain.” conclusion For now the peace treaty of the 29th of August seems to be a symbol of the strengthening of the Colombian state, an end to the power vacuum which has terrorized the nation for decades. But for Colombia to have lasting it must address the problems in poor, rural communities which the state has failed for so long. To dissuade these communities from falling in the hands of drug cartels or rebel groups, the Colombian state must step up its bureaucracy and assist these communities in reaching their full potential and provide the services the people deserve.

To dissuade these communities from falling in the hands of drug cartels or rebel groups, the Colombian state must step up its bureaucracy and assist these communities in reaching their full potential and provide the services the people deserve. JASon Magazine * Volume 42 * Issue 2 * 2017

Secession from the European Union and its Risks to International Security

JASON MAGAZINE

Website pick

Every week on Sunday, the editors of JASON Magazine bring you an exclusive article on the JASON Institute website at www.stichtingjason.nl. Below you can read one selection from the many excellent articles that we offer exclusively online. Please be sure to check them all out. RIK EVERS

any political parties in Europe which can be characterized as right-wing populist, have seen a signiﬁcant increase in popularity and votes. is poses a danger to Europe’s international security due to these parties’ promise to pull their country out of the EU. ey claim that leaving the EU and becoming more “sovereign” will improve their security by (re)gaining control. But in fact, it will do the opposite. Unfortunately, this promise is shared by almost all of Europe’s rightwing populist parties, making it an issue we should not underestimate. A country leaving the EU can be considered dangerous to Europe’s international security, because it will damage security cooperation between European countries. interconnectedness of european countries In the last few decades, globalization has led to an increasingly interconnected world, especially in Europe. Europe’s strength is founded on its interconnectedness. e ability to travel and transport freely between countries, as well as increased sharing of information and technology, has helped 30

the European Union in many ways, including security. Agencies such as Europol and Frontex have achieved a step forward in ensuring Europe’s international security. Meanwhile, globalization and freedom of movement between European countries have also given way to a number of threats that ignore national borders1, such as international crime, the massive influx of refugees, and terrorism. is underlines the need for international cooperation even more, for countries alone are often ill-equipped to handle threats across their borders. Populist parties call for regaining sovereign control over their own borders, suggesting this is an effective way to combat international threats such as the large numbers of refugees entering Europe. Closing a country’s borders can be effective in stopping refugees from entering that country, whilst however failing to ensure international security. By closing the borders, other EU countries are put under more strain because of the larger number of refugees they have to harbor. is is problematic, because large numbers of refugees in one

place can create a number of problems. For example, the refugee camps in Greece and Italy, which are in need of international help. Due to their sheer size, crime and disease have spread within these camps2. It is likely that without help, disease will spread to the general population as well, and there is no form of border control that will be able to stop this. It is necessary that every country does its part and harbors refugees to reduce the size of refugee camps and, with that, the risks as well. is requires European cooperation. Leaving the EU in order to close your borders is an inherent danger to the refugees, the country harboring the refugees, as well as the leaving country.

resources of all of its members. Combining these things is a great tool in our ability to solve problems that cross borders, such as the vast stream of refugees, crime and terrorism. Leaving the EU will mean losing part of the expertise, intelligence and resources. is problem with security cooperation was brieﬂy noticed when it became clear that Britain could no longer be a full member of Europol, and needed to renegotiate their cooperation. Even though Britain will retain its intelligence-sharing agreement with

Europol, it is still unclear what Brexit exactly means for Britain’s collaboration with Europol and other EU security agencies3. It is however evident that cooperation will not be the same as before. conclusion e argument that leaving the EU will improve national security is simply not true. As demonstrated, leaving the EU can potentially endanger the security of other EU countries, as well as the security of the leaving country, by

negating the gains of cooperating on international security issues. e desire for sovereignty and control does not account for what will be lost when international cooperation becomes more diﬃcult. Perhaps it is worth surrendering some sovereignty in order to gain the beneﬁts of cooperation. erefore, we should strengthen the bonds between EU countries, and share in our wealth of knowledge. Instead of breaking them up into islands, hoping we can control enough of our territory to keep us safe.

t One of the stars of the EU is sadly missing.

international security policy Populist parties also carry the argument that with leaving the EU, they will regain complete control of their security policy and thus improve their security. is is based on the premise that EU policy does not benefit the country in question, or even endangers it. When it comes to national security however, there are many issues that simply cannot be resolved by any one state. For example, the vast streams of refugees among many European countries, or terrorism threats originating from other countries or on international transports. these are issues that require close cooperation between countries. e EU provides an opportunity for such cooperation. ere are also other benefits to be enjoyed by taking part in the EU. Improved cooperation can offer the shared intelligence, experience and

JASon Magazine * Volume 42 * Issue 2 * 2017

MIGRATIon To EURopE

JASON MAGAZINE

VENT E G N I M UPCO

The EU-Turkey refugee declaration and beyond Conference on the migration crisis including lectures, workshops and a simulation game

What is the JASon Institute? In 1975 the JASON Institute (Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings orgaan nederland) was founded by a group of young professionals interested in international relations and peace and security issues, looking to inform and interest a younger audience in these sorts of questions. In the beginning, JASon focused mainly on peace and security issues within transatlantic relations, especially on the role of nATo. later on JASon expanded its horizon, organizing lectures and publishing articles about a growing number of topics within the spectrum of international relations and security issues. JASon is a neutral observer and not bound to any political conviction, religion or worldview. This is to ensure objectivity and provide our audience with a broad scale of views. We seek to inform our audience through two instruments.

First we publish our magazine, the one you are reading right now. In each issue we strive to cover a broad number of subjects tied to the broad spectrum of international relations. Secondly, the JASon team organizes a number of activities each year, ranging from debates and lectures to conferences and field trips. You don’t have to be a member of JASon to sign up as they are open to everyone.

on Friday november 3rd, JASon Institute will organize a conference at Igluu in The hague on the topic of migration to Europe. The day will be opened by two keynote speakers presenting their take on the current developments in migration, and on the EU-Turkey deal and its takeaways.

The magazine and most of the activities are free of cost. All those interested can sign up easily either through our Facebook or our site www.stichtingjason.nl

RECEIVE JASON MAGAzINE FREE DIGITALLY! JASon magazine is free for students, young professionals and all those interested in international relations and international security. To subscribe the magazine, go to our site www.stichtingjason.nl. If you want the magazine in printed form, please contact our editorial board at redactie@stichtingjason.nl and we will contact you as soon as possible about the possibilities.

After lunch, participants can follow two of the workshops provided by representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Security and Justice, Clingendael, University of Amsterdam, leiden University and a journalist.

STAY UP TO DATE ABOUT OUR ACTIVITIES? JASon Institute announces its activities through a bimonthly newsletter (go to stichtingjason.nl/contact/). Also we post our upcoming activities on our website and on Facebook. To stay up to date about our interesting lectures and inspiring field trips, please visit our site or like our Facebook.

Finally, at the end of the day there will be a simulation game in which participants will represent states and will try to negotiate a deal with other states in order to settle the migration issue. The day will be concluded with drinks.

WORKING FOR JASON? JASon Magazine is always looking for new writers to join the board of editors. Are you a student or young professional who likes to write articles on international relations or security issues? please contact us at redactie@stichtingjason.nl (editors work on voluntary basis). Want to help organize lectures with interesting speakers or set up field trips to nATo or the European parliament? please contact us at coordinator@stichtingjason.nl.

Tickets can be ordered on our site, stichtingjason.nl and are € 7,50. places are limited! More information can be found on our Facebook or at stichtingjason.nl.

JASON MAGAZINE

JASon Magazine * Volume 42 * Issue 2 * 2017

DONATE JASon Institute is made possible by hardworking volunteers who see it as their mission to inform their audience on international peace and security issues, defense issues and engage in debate on the subject of international relations. In order to keep our activities and magazine free and openly available, we would like to ask you to please donate to our organization. our account number is nl10InGB0667315802. For more information, please contact us at (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/). (JASon has an AnBI-status which makes it easier to deduct donations from taxes). JASON INSTITUTE ONLINE Facebook: JASon Institute Twitter: @stichtingjason Website: www.stichtingjason.nl

JASON MAGAzINE ONLINE The new and previous issues of JASon Magazine can be accessed free online at www.stichtingjason.nl/magazine. like us on Facebook to receive a new articles every two weeks!

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JASON MAGAZINE Sources

Overcoming chaos

JASON MAGAZINE - page 4

Robert, I Rotberg (2003) “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, The Wilson Center, Retrieved from: tps://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Failed%20States%2C%20Collapsed%20States%2C%20Weak%20States %20Causes%20and %20Indicators.pdf 2 See: note 1 3 “Weak and Failed States: What They Are, Why They Matter and What To Do About Them” (2008), The Brookings Institution, Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/events/weak-and-failed-states-what-they-are-why-they-matter-and-what-todo-about-them/ 4 “Fixing a broken world” (2009), The Economist, Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/13035718 5 “The Dangers of the World’s new Failed States” (2015), International Strategic Analysis, Retrieved from: http://www.isa-world.com/ news/?tx_ttnews%5Bbackpid%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=63&chash=03d0ba5fd44edb20 dc57406be01796e5 6 Richard W. Rahn (2015) “The rise of the failed states”, The Washington Times, Retrieved from: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/6/richard-rahn-the-rise-of-the-failed-states/ and see note: 5 7 See: note 5 8 patrick, Wintour (2017) “Italy considers closing its ports to boats carrying migrants”, The Guardian, Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/28/italy-considers-closing-its-ports-to-ships-from-libya 9 David, Ignatius (2015) “how ISIS Spread in the Middle East”, The Atlantic, Retrieved from: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/ 10 Gabriel, Domínguez (2015) “Why Central Asia is increasingly worried about Afghanistan”, Deutsche Welle, Retrieved from: http://www.dw.com/en/why-central-asia-is-increasingly-worried-about-afghanistan/a-18826223 11 Marla C. haims, David C. Gompert, Gregory F. Treverton, Brooke K. Stearns (2008) “Breaking the Failed-State Cycle”, Rand Corporation, Retrieved from: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAnD_op204.pdf 12 See: note 11 13 See: note 11 14 See: note 11 15 See: note 11 [16 “State legitimacy, Fragile States, and U.S. national Security” (2016), Center for American Progress, Retrieved from: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/09/12/143789/state-legitimacy-fragile-states-and-u-snational-security/ 17 J.J. Messner (2017) “Fragile States Index 2017: Factionalization and Group Grievance Fuel Rise in Instability”, The Fund for Peace, Retrieved from: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/14/fsi-2017-factionalization-and-group-grievance-fuel-rise-in-instability/ 18 See: note 17 19 See: note 17 20 See: note 17 21 See: note 17 1

Why Russia is reasserting itself in its former sphere of influence - page 24 1 2 3 4 5 6

The End of a Power Vacuum

1 2 3

- page 8

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-26/new-dictators http://www.meforum.org/878/libya-and-the-us-qadhafi-unrepentant http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122216458913596.html

Gaza’s Power Vacuum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

- page 28

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/colombia-struggles-fill-power-vacuum https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/08/why-the-real-test-for-colombias-peace-beginsafter-the-demobilization-process/?utm_term=.e9b53224dda3 http://www.richardmccoll.com/power-vacuum/ https://matadornetwork.com/life/new-modified-peace-deal-farc-means-colombia/ http://www.mattersburgerkreis.at/dl/toooJMJkmoJqx4KooJK/JEp-3-2011_05_WAlSCh_TZ_Transitional-Justice-inColombia-Does-it-Contribute-to-Reconciliation.pdf

Secession from the European Union and its Risks to International Security - page 30 1 2 3

After the Strongman

G.F “Mixed Moscow memories”, The Economist, Augustus 2011 “Inside the Bear”, The Economist, october 2016 Uwe Klussmann, Matthias Schepp, Klaus Wiegrefe “Did the West Break its promise to Moscow.”, Spiegel Online, november 2009 Sophie pinkham, “how annexing Crimea allowed putin to claim he had made Russia great again”, The Guardian, March 2017 Sophie pinkham, “how annexing Crimea allowed putin to claim he had made Russia great again”, The Guardian, March 2017. paul Kirby, “Ukraine conflict: Why is east hit by conflict?”, BBC, February 2015

Group of personalities in the field of security research (2004). Research for a secure Europe. European Communities. Cutler, S. (2016). Refugee crisis and re-emergence of forgotten infections in Europe. Clinical Microbiology and Infections, 22, 8,9. Rayner, G. (2017, March 7). Europol boss: Britain will carry on sharing intelligence after Brexit. The Telegraph, retreived at 12-05-2017 from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/07/europol-boss-britain-will-carry-sharing-intelligen hYpERlInK “http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/07/europol-boss-britain-will-carry-sharing-intelligence-brexit/”cebrexit hYpERlInK “http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/07/europol-boss-britain-will-carry-sharing-intelligence-brexit/”/

- page 16

Erlanger, Steven and hassan M. Fattah. (2007) ‘Jihadist Groups Fill a palestinian power Vacuum,’ in The New York Times. hDn. (2004) ‘Arafat: Gaza pullout must lead to full withdrawal,’ in Hürriyet Daily News. Ibidem. Editorial office. (2004) ‘Controversy Surrounds plan to Evacuate Israel’s Settlements in Gaza,’ in VOANews.com. Rees, Matt interview by neil Conan. (2004) ‘Analysis: proposed plan to Remove All Israeli Settlements From The Gaza Strip, NPR.org. Thorpe, nick. (2004) ‘Egypt’s own Gaza plan,’ in BBC.com. Byman, Daniel. (2015) ‘Israel’s Gaza Withdrawal 10 Years later: More Successful than You Think,’ in WarOnTheRocks.com.’ See note 1. Scobbie, Iain. (2004) ‘An Intimate Disengagement: Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, the law of occupation and of SelfDetermination,’ in Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online.

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