Jason magazine (1993), jaargang 18 nummer 6

Contents Editorial Board Chief Editor: Tom Kupenls

End Editors: Marc Klumper

Jaap Rodenburg Erik Jan Keijzer

1

Jaap Roclenburg

South Lebanon, the War Continues EmmaMuller

Emma Muller

Barhara Rijks Jason Magazine is a blmonthly publicatloo of the Jason Foundation

4

Paradoxes of Armed Protection jean-Christophe Ru[in

Executlve Board Chainnan: Martijn Boelen Vice-Chairman & Int. Secre[ary: Jolm Kootstra Treasurer: Bartje Kruiten

Secretary: Diane de Vries Fundraiser: Alexander Aaidering

in Peace 10 War Marc Klumper

PR-Coördinalor: Guillaine de B1écollI1 General Affairs: Matthijs de Wolf

General Board Jhr Mr A,G .F.M. Alting von Geusau nrs F.G.H. van den Broek Mr F.C.M. Caris, MBA

Drs F.G. Cleton Mr Drs A.H. Gierveld Mr F.A.M. van den Heuvel DrsJ.A. de Koning, M. Phi!.

Empire Dying 14 An Tom Kuperus Perspective is Needed 17 Another Lász ló Marácz & Erik-Jan Keyzer

nrs H.J.C. Laseur Mr R.H. van der Meer

nrs F.J.J. Princcn nrs EJ. Weterings

Advlsory Councll Prof. Or W. Dekker, voorziner F. de Bakker Prof. Or J.ThJ. van den Berg

Prof. Or H. de Haan Prof. nrs V. HaJberSl<ldl Drs G.JJ.M. Hayen

the Security Council 21 Restructuring BarbclI-a Rijks Greenhouse policy 25 International Ma/hijs Ransijn &jaap Rodenburg

c.c. van den Heuvel H.A.M. Hoefnagels

Mr j.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer

Drs R.\V. Meines R.n. PrJ.aning Drs W.K.N. Schmelzer Prof. Or j.G. Siccama Prof. Or A. van Swden

Jason Contactpoints leiden: Diane de Vries 071 - 125100 Amsterdam: Peter Theunisz 020 - 6254795 Rotterdam: Stephanie de Blécourt 010 - 414 1584 Utrecht: Sandra Genet 030 - 512061 Groningen Frederik Smits van Oyen 050 - 128509 Maastricht: Erik-Jan Goris 043 - 252161 Nijmegen: Esther Peeters 080 - 558549

Juon Foundation Laan """ Meenlcrvoort 96 2517 AR TIIE HAGUE Phone070-3605658 Fax 070 - 363 32 85

nte Juon Foundation cannot he held accountabIe for opioJons put forward in contrlbutions to this publicatIon.

Subscrlptions wW he automatically renewed. un· Iess VOD sent 115 a written cancelation before the IInot of december_ Lay-out: John Ysebaert Print: Haagse Drukkerij

ISSN 0165-8336

Copyright

Rcproelucrion of co ntributio ns 10 Ihis period ical is o nl y pcrmittcd wilh permission of th c aUlhor anel the eelitorial board of.1ason Foundatio n when accompanied hy a sou ree note along Ihe following lines. between br~ckets thc data o f Ihe comriburion being rcproeluceel:

"This contriblltion of [name anc! tille 311lhorl, was publi shecl in jason Magazine. volume [volume no.], number [issue no.1, {Illonth , year], which had as a theme [titie], Jason Maga zine is a billlon thly publication of the jason Foundation 1'0 1 IrHernal Affairs, The Hague.

South Lebanon, the -war • contlnues EmmaMulier

'The HIZBULLAH were in almost all terrorist activities in Europe, Africa and Asia on bebalf of Iran. Uri Lubrani, tbe leader of tbe peace delegation for Lebanon, as weil as tbe Government Coordinator on Lebanon, takes in tbis interview a look at Israel's position in soutbern Lebanon, it's relations witb UNIFIL and tbe SLA. 11

T

he rea.':ions for the establishment of a Peacekeeping Force in soulhern Lebanon go bac k ro lhe seventies, when (wO impol1anl developments look pla ce in the Middle

East. In thc firsi place. Jordan expelled its PLO frccdom fi ghters ( ["tahs) from the country, who had managccl 10 exel1 their innuence to an unacceprable extenL The seco nd significa nt event, was lhe o lltbreak o f a civil war in Lebanon, w hic h turned the CQUllt!)' into a bloocly theatre of warring Muslim anel Christian militia 's.

Thc expell ed fatahs fromJorclanlook advanlage of th e chaos in Lebanon anel reestablis hccl lheir base in the soulhern p~1I1 o f thc devastated co ul1uy. Frol1l lh is no-man's land, they supportecl lhe Muslim mililia's anel continueel (heir slruggle againsl ISïdel. The miels inLO Israel increaseel graelually, answcred by Israeli countcmuac ks. I n March 1978. an as-

S3ult . carried OU I by the PLO. killed a number of Israeli civil ians. Art er Ihis incident , Prime minister Begin decicled to invaele Lebanon in order 10 expcl th c PLO from Lebano n.

The in vas ion, known as 'Operat io n Litanï. ' took pJace on (he fOlll1centh of Mareh. Immediately <lfler the auack, the SeclIriry Council enclorsee! res()llItion 425, which callee! upon Isr:lel to ccase ilS milit~lIy act ion anc! 10 withdraw its forces from Lc banese terrilOryl. Thc rcso luflllther tion askcd for the eswblishment o f a Peacekeeping force in Lcbanon, As arcslI lt, lhc Secllriry COllnci ! established Ihe 'UnÎted Narions Interim Force In Lebanon' (UNIFIL) with th e mandale 10: 1) confirm thc wi thclrawal of Isïde li forces;

2) reslOre the internat ional peace and secu rity ; 3) resto re thc effective au thority of the Lebanese govcrnment in southern Lebanon.

",üh these local elemcnts. A clcar eX3 1llpl e o f th c!'>c loca l militi:l!'> in !'>oulhern Lc:hanun. is Ihe SOllth Lch:tnese Arm )' (SLA). Thc SLA contmls :t part of sout!H.: rn Lehanon. gramed h y Isr~l c l during iL'i wilhdrawal in 1978.

Fin ~d! y. ~t third proh!elll, Î!'> Ihc I:tcking consent of a significant !Xtl1 y {Q thl' conniet, namdy I sr~lel , who refu~l·.'lo lO accept t JN IFIL's maneIai e. IlowL'vcr. il mu sl

Thanks from south Lebanon

Despite Ihis dear d efinemc nl of its objeclives. the Force has not been ahle 10 fulfi ! its mandale umit loday. In the IÎrsl pla ce, UNI FIL had to deal with mi litary as weil as politica I clifficulties , wh ich hael a direct hearing on lhe o rgani zalion o f th e Force du ring ilS deploymenl. In the seconcl place. the influence of loca ! mi!itias in lhe area, who b y no means are wil ling 10 co-opemle with UNIFI L, co nfirm the wea kness of the Force 10 dca!

he nOlc(1. th~11 Israel's recent effo l1s to improve il s rc lations wilh UNI Fl L are hearel hy Ihc l Jnited Nalio ns :lI1d Illight h ring a c hange in Ihe p resent rdalionship.

From Ihe start il was cle.t r Israd no r Ihe SLA wen.: w ill ing 10 co-opl:ralc wilh l1NI-

FIL. Thercfore. it scems wOl1hwhile 10 examin e Ihe re1ationship hetwcl'n l !N IFIL and Israc l ~I S weil a ~ the SLA . since they cxcrc ise a significa nt influence on

jtiSOIl Magaz ille no. 6, december

1993

1

the failure of UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate after ] 5 years of deployment.

Q The political structure in sOUlherl1 Le-

banon cot/sists of Shiite re/igiolls alld political leaders who import doctrines of religiolls activism. Ibis develvpment musl have seriOIiS secl/rity im plicCltlons for fsrael. Whal meClsures bas Israel taken against tbis development?

U.L.: 'Weil look , we arc qu ic t seasoned to an ongoing compilation of different threats from sourhern Lehanon. beginning from the '70's, the Patestinians took over the sourh and began ra deptoy their various terrorist groups there in order to move to nonhern Israel. Nowaelays, the most predominant terrorist activity is by the Hizbullah , whieh is a force composed of religiously fundamental ist orientated Shi 'i. Most of them are not from the south, but from th<.: Northern 8ekaa va l-

ley. They receivc their training, their arms, their inspiration, their guidan ce anel very frequently, their direct orders, from Teheran (Iran). Not from Beirut and not from Damascus. They have politica I objectives w hich they are declaring open ly. Their major objective is to frustrare anel interfere with the peace process. Iran and therefore Hi zbullah , do whatever they can 10 frusrrate it anel they also come with very extremist Shiile dialectics of having ra cOlllinue the ir hOSlilc activities in Israel until it wil! be \vipeel out of the map. We are quit used ra that, I mean, we know where it comes from , that 's the way they express their politica I objcctives. '

U.L.: 'Look , if they were jüst wiking .. At least in Israel it is a free countty. you can talk, say whareve r you want. I don't suppose in Lebanon these days you Glll. because it is nor a free cou ntry. They use their ideology in order to recruit support.

The Hi zbullah now moves in anel (des to do the great mischief along the security zone and so we have to retaliate.'

the ex tension of the Irani oriema ted terrorist movement, not only in Lebanon hur all over the work!. The Hi zbullah mcmbers where in almost all te rrorist activities in Europe, Afriea and in Asia, doing their \Vork on behalf of Iran. Syria has no money to pay, to finance. or ta arm l-li zbullah. It has hardl y enough 10 do its own arming and therefare Iran is doing it. Sa, yes , if Syria wanted ra stop it, 1 think it co uld. But to say that Syria is sen ding t hem down , no.'

Q n)e Syrian presellce in sOli/bern Leba-

Q Regardin.g Ismel's relmionship wilh

is an important COllcern Jor Israel as we//, since they also seem to support terrorist groups similar 10 Ibe llizbuflah. Wbat Ineasures has Israel taken againsllhe Syrian moves?

tbe Ull iled Nations peacekeepingforce UNIFIL, is there official liaison between Ihe fSl'ael Defense force (JDr-j and the SOl/th Lebanese Anny (SLA) on tbe one hand and the United Na/ions on Ihe othel:"?

Q Sa, Ihere is

particular polic,)' to deal with tbese terrorist groups?

110

1/011

U. L : '\Vell , th ere is very scanl Syri:.ln prescnce in southern Lebanon. There are Syrians in areas which arc defined as south leb~lI1on. Syrians are very careful not to be too near la the boreler in sourhern Lebanon.

They are véry careful.They have same intelligence officers coming elown quiet c10se ly to th e crust of the security zone, but very much at artns Jenglh. They don 'r come to near. I-Iowever, this is on th e local level , for in fact Syria is controlling Lebanon. 1t has bet ween 35.000 and 40.000 lroops anel a ve ty hefty intelligence componenr in Leba non. They con trol Beimt and oth<.:r centres of major populations.

Furrhermore, they con trol the major cetllres of economie anel political light, in fact they 'call the shots in Lebanon '. Now, the nexl question which would lend itself to th is situation would bei can Syria srop hostilities presently emanating from Lebanon? The answer is Yes. If it wanteel , it could stop it, but it doesn't want ta stop it for its o\.vn political reasons. Fo r Syria , hara ssment o f Israel from borck: rs whieh are not Syria n borders is we\come , because they can n o t he directly responsible while somebody elsl' is eloing their work and of course is buffering anel exposing itself without Syrians being in any way involved.'

Q How strong is Syria s politica/ injluen-

ce in Beinll?

U.L.: 'At this poin t in time , absol ute. '

Q You men/ioned before tbat f-fizbul/ah

is sl.lpporled by Iran, however according ta Cl UN aJJicia/ at the Uniled Na tions /-Ieadquarters in southern Lehanon. it is aClUal/y Syria wbo is sending Hizbl.lllab la alwck the seCl/rityzone .. u.L.: '1 think, t hat th is is a simp list ic way of looking at it , because Hizbullah is an 1ïdni creation anel Hi zbullah has been

2 Jaso1l Magazi1le no. 6, december 1993

U.L.: 'We prefer of course that lia ison at all level shOlJld be done as in normal course of business. The lOF has a unit \Vhieh liaises \Vith all the Un ited Nations farces , both in thc Lcbanese thea tre and in other tilemres. However, with reference to lhc Lebanese lhealre, we ha ve liaison officers. Israel prefers that liaison be done on local level. l\ot always is it possible, and when I say not always, not Wilh all banalions of UNIFI L is it possible to Iiaise, because the mandale of UNI FIL formally prohibits it from having contact with a militia which is not recognized by the central Lebanese governmem, in th is case SLA. Therefore, if they wan t to be strictl y w ithin th e confines of their mandate the UN banal ions are not to Iiaise.

But Iife is stronge r 1 think than restrictions of that sart, so the differcnt battalions find their way in Iiaising. At times ir is not salisfactory nor sufficiem, ar times irs very frail , but we have always been encouraging liaison. \Y./e believe that Iife is stron ger than anything else and if liaison of that sort saves hUllun Jives, it is somelhing which Israel would suppo rt, as simplc as thaI.'

Q St/ppose the Illalldate oj the jarce

would he extended witb regard 10 se((defense, enabling UNIFil. so/diers 10 use weapolls tl llecessclly. \17ould Israel/hen Clcknowledge UNIFIL as Cl relevanl SeCH111y buffer againsl terrorisl aclivities in sOlllbern Lehamm?

U. L. : 'Weil you see, our problem is really that UN1FIL has no teeth. Ir can only stop terrorist acti vity thaI comes 1.0 UNIFIL checkpoints. \Y./hat happens is. that if they sec a group of terrorists moving they cm teil them: "Look you are not nice boys. we will return the arms to you whcn yO ll go back 10 where you come from, sayi ng Tyre or Sidon (Tyre and Sidon are PLO strongholds in southern lebanon). But lhey can no t punish , lhey G II1 not contral , they GI11 not judge ... they can not elo anything. J mean , they can not pUL any boely

on trial fo r pcrpctîJting an act o f terror o r an act o f violence, That kind of mandate is reall y IOlall y insufficient. However, I do ubt VC I) ' muc h if Ihe donor countries wou ld agree fo r their pcrsonnel to have a mo re tight mandate, beca use this would expose th eir people to confrontatio ns wilh terrorists and m y God, if I were thc mentor o f these troo ps, I would not think that any Norwegian , any French or any Dwch would wam 10 confronl the I l izbullah , So, wc have a catch th ere.'

Q AccordillR a /JeplII)' Commander of Ihe liJF Liaiso n UHil Ihere are COllcreIe plalls 10 in/prove I/Je relaliol1shlp bet ween Ismel Cllld UNIFIL. Whal is Ihe reason fo r Ihis illi/iative?

U,L.: ' 11 is an ongoing lask. The friction which sometimes occurs wirh lOF/ SLA anel UNIFIL units is "Iways a sou ree of great COIKern 10 liS, hecallse we feclthat we have a very contrad icto ry kind of situalion there, O n the o ne hand most of th e UNI FIL soldiers, most of th em , ccrtainl y no t all, originate from very friendl y

fOllh . At some times there \Vere misunderstandings, but now we have lh is initiati ve going and I am all fo r it. '

Q 111 19 78, Ihe Leba nese govenuuelll re1I01lllced its cllllh on'~), over the SOlllh Lebclllese Army (SLA) al/d slaled Ihal Ihe SLA would nOl negotiale with the U'lited Naliolls ally more. Did Israel couti17l(e to recoguize Ibe SLA as a leg itimale member in soulbern Leban011 aftel' iJ 's autborily WClS depn'ved?

U. L. : '\Xfcll , I think the differentiation is a very nice one, anel I lhink that my elefin ilion o r it is vc ry simpie. The SLA is a 10cal force whieh is comm3nd ed by somE'one who i .. incJined 10 co-operare with Isra el. I ie is a Lebanese Genera l who helieves that he is se rv ing his country \'v hile co mmanding his Lebanese force. \Ve on our part. consider lhe existence o f the SLA as a component in our d eployment with rega rd to lhe secllri ly o f th e border area sOlnh of the internationa l border anel north of lhe internationa l border, Thc rc forc, we support the SLA, we finan ce it anc! we give lhe necessary back ing to make it a viabie force, SA 10 go inlO n icest wher her Isra e! d oes Ihis or Ihal is irrelevant . The pallicularity of the SLA is thar il is composed of mem bc l'S who come from Ihe villages within lhe sec urit y zone.

They are not mercenaril y in the sensc that the)' come from somewhere in Beirut o r Gaza. All o f them ha ve their families, their home, lheir he!ongings and their rea l es!:1te in the securiry zone and therefore thc SLA is a local militia .'

Q 77Je relCllio l1sbifJ 00lween the Lebanese governmenl Clnd t/Je SLA is CIS sNcb Ibal Ihere is no close co-opera/ion ..

te infrastructure needs some tention. countr'ies 10 us. So here we are \Vi th a situation whieh leads to friction . Somctimes this fri ctio n is a resull of misundersra nding anti thc less mislinderstandings occur, th e less frictio n there is.

I think , in man y cases you find Ihat if you explain Ihe point o f view of each party 10 Ihe olber anel teil them \Vhal is permissabie, \Vhat is possihle and what is nol possihle, b y way of liai sing anel by ex pecling the olher part y 10 co-operate and so fonh . Thc less friclion Ihere will occur. \Xfe arc uy ing la teach o ur soldiers ho\v to relatc to UNIFIL unit s. Someti mes it helps. sOllletime.s it doesn·t. Vou see il is pan of thc joh o f the liaison unit whieh we havc in th e lOF, to tcach our soldiers the nalure o f the UNIFIL units, the eOllntries th ey eome from , their particularities, their c u s t o m ~, their manelate anel sa

ne-

U. I.. : There is no rc latio nship al all tween lhc Lebanese government and th e SLA. There is ani)' a positio n and the position is very nt 'gative.'

Q D oes the South ü !btlllese A rm)' cOHsisl sole(y 0/ Chrislia ns?

U, L.: 'No, not at all , over 5()Oh are Shiï. and there are also Oruze anel Sllnnïs, In th e beginning therc were fewer Shi 'ites and more Christians. Now there are predominantl y Shi 'i . They represent I thin k , a true ren ection of the tlc mographic structure in the area.'

Q CCiU you g ive tlll)' concrete examples

0/ wbal

Israel bas done 10 slrengtben

Ihe SLA ' U.L.: ') wou ld say, Israel has done whate-

SLA the kind of IrJining ;lI1d the kind of equipment which would nl ~lk e il ~Ib l e la do its joh. Th::11 mea ns rraining , that means appropriate arrns. It mea ns logistieal back-up, paying sa laries, you name it..

Q \fIbat plans does IsrClel ba/V! (dtb Ibe SLA atlbe prese1Il momeNt?

U. L. : "I think th c phi10sophl' of our prese nt depl oymc nt is in place as o fJanuary 1985. whieh means that Ihere will be a sccurit y zone which is clefinecl. Within the securily zone th ere will be an SLA which is a loca l fo rce, composecl of personnel com ing from the villages In th e secu rit y zone who are going to he trained anel paid by Israel. This force will be ;\utomatica lly SlIppOllCd h)' the lOF. Whenevcr this force wou ld feel that it c m no l co pe with a military si tu;\t io n, then the IDF comes in and gives th c m suppo rt . l'\ow I don't think Ihis is going 10 change for the mo ment. \Xfe arc prcpared 10 discu:o.s a change on condition that we do it wilhin lhc frame\\"ork o f negoti ation for thc peacc trcat y which was then laid down ( 1985).

The ;uî.lngcIllcnt hy the two cou nlries fo r securit y was th en to he exercised on hoth sides of the border in a way whi ch would give Israd the kind o f sa tisLlClio n it ne<:us in o rder to Icavc Lehancse tc rritO!)' all logether and leave the exercising of aUlho rity in Lehancsc hands. ULII Ih is is what the pcace negot iatio ns are for and Iht:rc is progrcss, unfollunately with Lebanon it is a ve!)' slow ,md arguahlc t<1sk, hut then: wc are ..

Q In /984. Ibe Commander (ij Ibe Soulb Lehtwese A rmy. Major Iladdad U'as offered ti b/Rb posi/ioJl iJ{ tbe Lebal1ese Army. \fIbal bafJfJelled 10 Ibis p1'Oposal?

U. L.: 'Yes, 'w ell it was in o rd er to lure him back inlO the Lehanese Arm )', whieh I don 't think would occur with thc present Commander of lhe SLA, General La had. Lahad hJS a rank of:t General in Ihe Lebanesc Army. he was ca ndidale to bccome the Chief o f Sl aff o f the LelxlI1ese Army, but W~IS passed by, b}' somehod y else and I don't Ihink anybody would offer him ~lI1 ylh ing <l1 Ihis poi nt of time, heG lll SC the Syrians \vill no t permit Ihis to happen. '

Q Besides tbe s(,cllri~F as/)(!C!, ;s Israet:.,sUfJfJO I1 la tbe SLA parI q/ ti moral commilme11l as u1ell?'

U. L.: "J think we ha ve a moral co mmitment la people who ha ve been working with us for a Il1utual ohjt.::ctive . \Xfe h:we a moral COl11ll1ilment 10 make surt' that their welfare is taken carc of, thaI Iheir dail y need s arc tak en care of, th at the securiry is laken care of and Ihat their fuw re will be assurcd . This will be, I'm surc part o f wha t h~l S to he discussed in thc p

ve r il believes il should do to give the

Jaso" Magaz i"e no. 6, december 1993

3

Paradoxes of Artned Protection jean-Christophe Rufin, MÊdecins Sans Frontière

The number of cases in which relief efforts have been accompanied by armed protection has multiplied in the past three years. Does this mean - as certain politicians have been quick to claim - that conflicts are now beyond the means of conventional - and private - aid organizations? Are we now witnessing an era of'armed charity'? Or is this nothing more than a pretext used by the major powers to advance their own cause yet again through subterfuge, the real aim being to engage in a new 'policy ofmandates' as a prelude to recolonizing the South?

I

nterrret:Hions along these lines are , in aClUal [act, fragment<'lly anel fairly wide of thc mark. Ir is usdul , in

orde r to unclerstand Ih is sensitive issue

more clearly. 10 look a l thc point of view of Ihe NGOs and 10 re-ex<lminc lhe

problems anel paradoxes inherent in the provision of volunteers.

4

protection

for

their

A llew cOl!flict ellviro1l11lelll For over twenty yea rs, by tra velling to repUledly dangerous far-off places 10

help civilians or COmhJ[3nts, the NCOs have provicled confirma tion of all 3uclaciolls principle - that they are prepared 10 go where oIhers rear to tread. Consciously or not, they have lent support (Q the iclea that Ihey not only take risks , but the greatest o f risks at thar. 13y rejecting any elependence on 'the Swte', by crossing borders illegally, Ihey ended up convineing Ihemselves that they wcre Ihe explorers of no-go areas beyonel the reach of rhe legitimate authorities. It did not take much 10 deeluce from th is that no one was in charge of su eh areas and thar Ihe NCOs were th emselves responsihle, hy dint of Ihcir own effoIts, for their own security, somelhing Ihe meelia were all too ready to prodaim, quite o ften aidcd anel abetted by ourselves. Il was lhe done lh ing 101rumpet forth that the we~lIy heroes, back from Afghanistan or Angola, had braveel unspeakahlc dangers, someth ing 111l: y qllire moelestly confirmeel, leading olhers to condude that the NCOs were eapable of raking on any kind of d:mger, anywhere. But now it is time 10 drop the pretence. No, lhe relief areas of thc -1980s \vere not as dangcrous as many bel ieveel, anel during that perioeI prorection was accorded defaclo hy lhe guerrilla movemenIs, for the following three hasic reasons.

1 Those guerrilla grollps \vere few in number in any given conmcr. The aid \vorker:;' ' partner~ ' helongeel lO wellstructureel anel strong polit ical and military organizations o ften controlli ng vast anel homogeneous areas (Angola, Eritrea, EI Salvador).

2 Against the backelrop of the Col el \Var each of the belligerents owed allegiance, more or less opcnly, to o ne ideologica l bloc or the other. Respect for human rights and humanitarian principles was one way of achieving the international

Jasoll Magazille no. 6, december 1993

respectability by which such movemen ts laid great store.

3 These guerrilla fighters had well-organized logistics, lIsually depcnding on a kind of et:onomic lImbilical corel': a safe area along a front ier eonsist ing of refugee camps controllcel by one from and recciving supplies from the interna tional cOl1lmllnity, These 'sa netuaries' providcd thc fronts .wilh.well-orelered war economies and offercd refuge to civilians on Ihe orh er siele of the bord er. A large proportion of the humanitarian relief operations took place in th ese ealllps, lh at is to say outside the combat zones anel in regions which all pal1ics - the host countrics, the guerrilla fronts anel the majo r powers (via Ihe United Nations) - strove 10 proleet.

All th is has ch angeel rapielly over the past few years.

1 Many guerrilla movel1lents are now depriveel of the ir olltsic\e support ( provided in l1lany cases hy the USSR) anel are clisintegrating rapiclly. \Xlherc there were onee onc or two interlocutors, there arc now dozens, with sllch fragmentalion leacling to th e establishment of sllla ll anel uncontrollable armed bands,

2 Pow~r stru ggles al world level are nowäebys unlikely to be fought v ia Ihe provision of su pport for cli s t ~lI1t guerrilla movemenls far aW<'ly in thc Soulh . These conmets arc increasingly bccoming local - or regional - aff:tirs. Hcspecl ror human rights anc! humanit~lrian principlcs is na langer 'in '. Some of the movemc:. : nts (Shining P3th , PKK, Khmer Houge) ha ve even taken a conscious decision to flout such rights anc! principles in order to sha ke a lT the values 'of the Non h'. As tor thc ~lfIll ec! bands anc! minor factions , they are out to establi sh a rc:..:putation for themselvcs by threatening aid workc:..:rs r~lIh<':" r than p rotecling Ihem.

3 The main elevdopment has bee n the rapid change in the war economies. The 'sanctuarics' have d isa ppeared (owing 10 the repatria tion o f refugees , as in Cambod ia, or a change of attitude in thc hosl counu)', as in Ethiopia). \"'a rs are moving o ut of Ihe harder arcas and spreading into th e centers to Ihe effect that the clisl inclion between Ihe rcar ba se, libera· led areas and cO llllx lI zo nes ha s disappearcel. Civi lian.., Gclll now bt.: found wandering aimlessly in war-tom regions.

Southern Sudan , Afghanistan and Angola are co untries where this developlllcnt has takt.:n holcl recently.

This unavoidably worsens the situations in wh ich aid workers o perate. Forced, in orde r 10 gel through to rhe civi lians, to enl er the ve l)' heartland of the banle zones and 10 move in from the siddines, they no langer enjoy the proteclion of the armed movements, w h ich ~Irc themse\ves finding it difTicult 10 p reserve their own unily. Wh~1l is more, th ese move· menlS na longer have an y re3r bases ~t1 ong thc harders, anel arc forccdlO look fo r sllpplies w ithin the cou nt ry ilScl f, lIsually by pn.:ying on the population.

Therefore, Ihey no langer usurp humanilarian aid in thc way they used to (by divel1ing it at source) but if need be they will now tem it from thc vel)' mOluhs of

ils intended redpients by plundering COIlVOyS, pillagi ng an el eXlor~ tion by gangs in the pay o f warlorcls.

COntr.:lI)' ra the idea cu ltivmed all lOO often , the nature o f thc conflicts has nol cha ngcd from being pulitically allel ideologica ll y based in

th e 1970sand 1980s 10 bcing purely econom ie now, What has happened is thai th ere has been ;In abrupt break down of the war economies. whie h up lill now have been centrali zed ancl located in safe areas to the great profit of the guerrilla Illovemems, whose interest by in protecting tbe pcoplc run~ ning [hose are~ls .

In this ncw context Ihe qucstien of pr<.r lect ion is becom ing centrdl for NGOs. 11 is al this point that the tenacious m yth concerni ng their total independenee falls down , hecause - unable by thei r vel)' nature 10 ca n)' arms Ihemselves ~ Ihe NGOs musl of necessily turn , in order to ensure Iheir own proteclien, 1O forces to w hich they arc then beholclen. This is nOl a ncw issue ~l1ld 11l~l1ly of the amhiguilies wÏl ncssed in thc Co ld \"'ar era already constituted 'p~lrael oxes of prolection'.

Nevenheless, things were simpier anel th e compromi ses less visible then , If the NGOs \vere sometimes <lccused of indirectly funding the war, il was clearly no l of their volit ion. Nowadays, the links hetween aid and arms arc Illore violent and more hlatant whelher il is direct plundering o f conveys, wages pa kl to ~l1"Il1 ed gU~l rd s o r the enforced co hahil:ltio n of relief workers w ilh intern::l1ional cxpeditional)' farces.

Protectio"from wUbi" In orde r to ensurc th eir p roteclion in this ncw conflicl contex t, the NGOs have two basic oplions. The fjrst is th c internal o ptio n, which consists in tl)'ing to find, without an y interfcrcnce from oUlsi cl c, an internal pralector within tht.: conflict zone ilself. This was the meth O<.I usecl Ihroughout the Cold \"'ar peri<.xl, and il must be added thai suc h slabie armngement s still exist in same pla ces. A lot of conllicts are still hOl1logeneOlls in nalure; it is possible to approach thc lwO or Ihree warring siclcs ancl main ta in a neutral profile. Serious, vic iou s anel ana rchic conllicts should nOl be regardecl <I:') the genera I rul e fo r thc moment. It is slill possible, for exa mple in the mountains

o f l3urnl ~l, in Bougainville. Tajikislan, M:lurit~lI1i:1. Sri Lank ~1 :lIld N:lgol'!lnK:lr:lhakh , 10 call)' out an evcn -ham.led hu· manilarÎ<ln aid oper~l1i on spread o\'er a small nlllllher of w~ l rring faclions which cont inue to givc sal i ~faclol)' proleet ion.

Thi s leaves us w ith the small Ilumher of Iragic cases where this halance has hroken down . In Somalia. Liberia :lIlci Afgh~lI1bt~lI1 it is ohviou:-, that Ihc :-,Iructure of the con flicl ha s ch:lI1gcd, na langer involvi ng a stahle ce ntral governmenl at o dds with rebel groups hUl rather pilling brother ag=lin:')t broth er anel neighbour againsl neighboul". And Ihis is \\' here ~l id worker.., face their fin..t IXlradox. Ir. in o rder la p rolect Ihclllsel\'cs. Iht.:y plan: themselves undc r thc sphl're o f inlluence o f ~l ce rtain !"act ion - assllllling Ihey Gcll1 find one sutlicienll y st rong to gU~I­ rantee Ihei r security - this make~ Ihem the encmy of all Ihe ot her.." ancl what was inlendeel 10 bc {heir salv~lIion i:-, in reality Iheir uncloing. It is <llmost impos ~ sible 10 ~l vo id Ihis trap bccallse the mere fact of:In opera ti on being in a p~1I1icu\ar geographica l arl."~I, in a panicul:tr zone held hy a particubr f ront. is enough 10 give th e impression of SUppOt1 for a eertain politica l group.

It is ag:linst this hackdrop thaI Ihe prolr lem of armed gll:lrds h:1 S to h(.' vie\\'ed.

Tht.' NGOs do nol have t he mealb 10 sel up fully-fleclged arm ics 10 p roteet Iheir wOT·ke rs. The guard s they had in Somalia were only the embod illlent of thc armed protcclion o f o nc of the 1~lCtions . The dcterrenl effecl of ..,uch guard..., stt"mmecl less from the fael th:H they wcrt.: arrned than from Ihe faet that they belonged 10 a powerfu l clan. The n:ltural aUlhority flowi ng from this. wh ic h Ihe \\'eapuns merel y symholiz<.:d. mcant the guards clid nOl have 10 use their :mns.

This ~lrt1l ecl proleet ion i:-. IhL' \' i:-.ihlL· Ill~l ­ nifcslation of the plundering of llum:lIli-

J(ISOI1 Jl.l11g11zi"e no. 6. decel11lx'f

1993

5

list o f vio lent appro~lches tor dealing w ith guerrilla forces . Depo t1ation. strateg ie hal1l lets, counter-te rm I' against civilians - such methocls arc ba sed on nothing more th an an eternal fantasy o f the estahlished powers-that -be, th:1t of draining away the water sa that the cOl1lba tants - w ho supposed ly move among the p eople like fish in w ater - will perish. ft is clea r that th is is not compatib le w ilh humanitarian p rinciples, and that two ai ms ea nnot be aehievcd in one fa rm o f aClio n: thai of hel ping pop ulatio ns and that o f ending thc wa r. It has 10 he accepted tha t th ere is a celtain contrad iet ion between the two.

tarian aid b y the factio ns. Thc insidio us tapp ing o f su pplics which used (0 go on in thc rcfugee camps has been replaced by wha t is tantam oum tu tribule rendered more o pen ly: paymcnL o f guards o r 'donation' o f same of th e ai d as recompcnse for the dominant r'Ktio n providing protccl ion . The Olhers, Ihc less powerful, are reclu ced 10 maraueling o n the fringes by scavenging on the COtwoys anel attack ing those weaker than themse lves.

Thi s interna l protect ion is undoubteell y effective. In Somalia, prior lO international imervention , rel ief efforts were sti ll possible and at relatively low human cast. The situation on ly tLlrns nasry when aid workers - sudden ly horrifi eel anel sickened by the eliversion of supplies they w itness - refu se 10 -pay up' any more, i.e., no lo nger accept diversion of a cerwin - nego tiated - ~I m o unt o f relicf supplies. In such cases Ihe p rOlecti ve power is pl aeeel in jeoparely beca use it cominues 10 be the target of atlacks from the others bUl is na longel' making any -p rofi l'. The war economy is deslabilized.

6

One should no t look. in ~ u c h internal. eonfused anel fragmenled connicts, al the sca le o f slIpply diversio n in absolute terms. Rather one should look ::11 the seaIc it assumes - or assu mc d - in the 'setpieee' wars in volv in g a ·sa nclwuy'. The lIndo llhl<: d conclu sion would be th at Ihere is basically no difference. lnrervening in such squalid conOicts means if the aim is 10 get lO the victims - accepting that an inevitable amount of the aid has to be handed over to the combatants. This is an olel paradox, Qne which is nowa cla ys more visible and whic h, unquestio nably, leaves hUl1lanitarian relief efforts o pen to the charge of being partly respons ible fo r p erpetuming suc h wa rs.

But w hat is it we want? 1'0 save ci vilians at all costs, or to d ry up the eonniCIS b y closi ng o ff the combatants' supplies anel thu s nrst and foremosl conclenming all Ihe unarmed victil1lS to further su ffering?

Those ca lling for zero diversio n of supplies, w ho are read y - fo r thc sa k e of drying up the conflict - te leave the eivilian popu lation w ithou t any help beca use the factions feed off the aid supplies, are o nl y aeld ing ano ther variant to the long

Jasol/ Magaz ine no. 6, decembe r 1993

Thc second contex l that wc have to consider is that in whieh o Ulo.;ide fo rces - intelvening or interpos ing - undertake to p rovicle protective cover for relief efforts.

Here, aga in , we mu st distingui sh between Iwo types. First, in some cOllntries - u suall y troublespms lefl over from the Cold \'Var - we have p eacek eeping o perat ions based o n agreement between the parties eoncerned. This is the case, fo r cxa mple, in Cambodia follow ing the Paris Agreements, in EI Salvaelor o r Mozam biqu e. These opcf<lIions give the UN farces an overall polili ca lmandate w hieh is u su~t1l y dear: disann the ractions, organi zc th e repatriatiol1 o f refugees, gel the adm inistration ope ral ing again allel ove rsee the ho lding of free elections.

Thc associated humani tarian aspect poses few problems as it is separate fro m Ihe politica l mandale, BUI th ere is a need for wa ri ncss of future u ncettainties in such COntexls becausc these o perati ons ca n go w ro ng, as in Angola . If civil wa r flan:s up again it is importani that the relid o rgani zatio ns arc no t overtl y associared w ith one side o r th e o lher and that they can co ntinue to enjoy relative ne utralit y. In such operations there mu st be ccrtain limits with regard to humanitarian anc! po litica l coordination. Cooperati on between rel ief ::Igcnc ics mu st be lechnica ll y effective, bUI il is not desirabie fo r collusion to arise between the humanitari an anel thc polit ica l p laye rs.

Apart from th is one reserva tÎon , such peacekeeping o perati ons e<luse few problems for aid workers.

Du t th e situ atio n is tot al1 y different for the sccond rype o f interventions: those in which - wÎthou t Ihe agreement of the parties concerned - th e international community takes it upon itself to proteet no t lhe po pulatio ns, but those who provide them w ith aid , that is 10 say, [hose mak ing relief effo n s possible. In Somalia , lhe argument uscd to juslify the UN Secrelary-General 's ca ll fo r the use o f fo rce was the sca le on w hich supplies were being diverted from their proper

purpose and the alleged blockage of opcra tio ns. These arguments appear sWlIlge now after one yea r o f internat ional presence in thar country: the mo ney

spen t o n lhe allied intervention exceeds hy far lhal lost through the waslage ancl diversion of aid supplies occurring prior to the international farces' arrival. If the goa l rea ll y wa:.. to save money, then lhe opc誰dtion has faileel. As for the main argument - thar rdid opera ti ons were being blocked - it has to be aelmitted that thi s applieel mainly to those of lhe Uniteel N~Hi ons. From spring ta autumn 1992, whcn lhe famine was at its height, the NGOs and thc In lern~ltional Commitlee of the Reel Cross saveel lho usands of lives. ancllhe armcel intervent ion - whic h ca me very b te in the clay - was credited with a su<..:cess c3 uscd in actual fact by lhe fami ne itself, whic h - like a forest fire - bUI11t..'d itsel f out owing to Jack of fu e!.

I-Iere, ~Igain, wc have anolhcr of the paradoxes inherent in protection: the need to provide protection was used to justify an act ion whose rea l roots la y elsewhere. Protectio n of relief workers is a pretext pushed forwarel hy gavernments anel international hodies la disguise their real politieal ail11S. \'Vhat were these in Ihe case of Somalia? Thc cra ving for med ia attenlion of a US presidcnt anxious to leave hy the fronl door anel have his name embla zoned in h istory? probably.

Strategic regiomli illlercsts in a counlly co nsidereel cleeisive lor fina li zing the protective ring around theJe ru sa lem -Riyadh axis? Not ve ly likely. No eloubt anc of th e main reasans was the desire o f the UN Secretary-Gencral to avoid elisclosure of his organization 's bureaucratie failings, m:1c1e politiGlily visih le by the enforced resignalion of Mohammed Sah noun. the on ly person in a position to breathe fresh life inlO lhe sea rch for politica I Solulions wh ilc respecting the integrity anel complex nature of Somalia .

These failings tl id nOl take lo ng to manifest themsdves technically lhrough lhe

collapsc of the sccond IOO-day plan , mainly owing to lhe UN bigwigs bent o n ddeneling their own pelty inlereSlS and fundamcntally incapahle of cooperating with ane another. "Jlle UN proclaimed that protection was impossible and called for oU lsidc military help. evidellll y with lhe aim of ejeeling' itsclf oul of the crisis 50 as nOl to expose open ly its own politica I and tech nieal ShOfl comings.

It GI 11I10t be denied that difficuhies existeel prior l a lhe milil<.l ly intervention anel that p roleclio n was posing a problem.

But consieleri ng how much more acute the problem has since become, and look ing at Ihc cost of lhe ope ration, anc ca nnot help but think that thc protect ion o f aiel workers is an aim largely lIsurpeei for the purposes of inlervcntion elietateel by q u ile different intentions. Loo king at the situation in farmer Yugos lavia, the pardelox !Jeeomes glaringl y dear. Nowhere else has the goal o f pratecting relicf workers been more clearly exploiteel in order to mask othe r designs, first and foremost that of nOL really protecting th e people themsdves. l3y choos ing to ensure the seeurity o f food convoys, the govefJlmelllS anel the UN have been abl e to create thc impression of a magnificent show of force while at the same time making veI)' su re tha t their traops did not accomplish w hat should ha ve been lheir essentia l missio n, i.e., ta firmly sland up 10 Dlher farces, the very o nes responsible fo r the aggression.

This firsl paradox resieling in o Ulsiele protection provided by expcditionary farces seems to be congenital. The fa lse mom l stance ofgovefJlmcllls, which is

claimed to be a Iate-twenrieth-cenru ry phenomenon, is a pour m:lsk fo r an agcold tenelency among politicians - that of hieling (heir intercsts under thc cover of moralizing declaration:-,. I holcl this to be much nearer thc truth th an th e theory menlioneel earlier, ",hieh is often given greater crede nce but secms unfounded to me, anel which cla ims that protection of aid workt..'rs is a pretext for a new wave of eo lonia lism on the part of a numbe r of countries. Just as the I3ritish or the Freneh useel th e murder of miss ionaries as a prctext rol' pacifying anel eonquering their future colonies, thc arl1lies rushing la the ::lid o f relief workers are saki to bL: out to dominate eountries whieh would ot herwise escape their el1lb race. This argulllL:11I ignores Ihe hislorical co nlext. i\'ow;\ebys we are na langer in a phase of expansion , anel territoI)' is na langer thc decisivc criterion o f power. The altr::lCtion of the Somh has dil1linished, the 'h istoric' lands are shrinking anel the grea l powers are alxlIldoning their L:ntrenched positions. The ail1l is not to conquL: r o lhers rdvaged by anarchy :md war. No, proteetion of aid worke rs is more gener.l ll y a way o f doing more or lL:sS nothing, soothing the elllotiollS of :-.In agitated publi c opinion anel d isgui sing the ~Ibanelo nm en t o f ce rlain causes, rat her than the mantle for a new hegclllony.

But in o rder to assess such intervent ion measures it is not enough to eX:1mine thei r underlying reasans. \X' e also have to look al what th cy IC:ld 10. Aid worke rs might be ~Ibl e to li ve w ith the bct of their being protected for Ihe wrong reasons if only th~lt protection was adequa-

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Jasoll Mag a z ine no. 6, deccmber 1993

7

Politico-militay logic vs. humanitarian 10gic. This is nor the case. Quite thc contraly, as armeel intervention complicates thc siruation anel aftel' ~111 initi~1I rebtive!y calm phase it heightens rather than clecreases thc elanger. Thi s process lus been observeel in the three major militaIY opcrations launcheel with humanitarian aims in the pa st two years: in Kurelistan, the fonnerYugoslavia anel Somalia. There are IwO possible si tuations.

In the nrst orthese, rhe 'humanitarian' armies are themselves belligerent':), i.e" directly involved in the con flict. Thi s was the ca~e in Kurdistan. I-I::i rassing rhem anel the civilians associmed with them is merely a logica I COJllinuation of the war. \X1hen - as seems almost ccrtain ly the case - the Iraqis arrange to have allacks carricel ou t against United Na tions agencies in the Kurelish zone, it is merely an extension of their desire [0 lhwalt the Americans and to liberale their territo-

lroops are immediately forced 10 confront the lrue na ture o f the con tli ct and to become afTecled by it. As soon as they arrive in the country, peJu:keeping troops make the hitter cliscovery l hat even if they lhemselves have no views on the conflict, the belligerents have their concepl ion of what 10 hope or fear from lhe internationa l troops. In Somalia, thc firsl Unitl'eI Nations peacekeeping forces we re regarded w ith consielerable suspicion by the dominant group (that of

'y.

Clausewitz's theories are not easily dism issed and these 'neutra]' expeelitionary

8

As th eir 'humanitarian' lrappings are rejected outright, the UN forces are caught in a defensive pattern where tbc absence o f a comprchensive politica I goal means they respond in an ael hoc fas hion anel they rapidly come to exchange their humanitaria n gll ise fo r onc that is purely and simply military. Originall y there to defend humanilarian aid worke rs, the allied farces soon adort the goal of clefenel ing themselves.

This trend is particu larly clear in Somalia where lhere is an o fficiatly identjfjed encmy incarn ation of Evil. Gelling riel of General Aidid seemed, in the summer of

Given that the Gulf \Var allies have moved into Ihe humanitaria n fielel , their Iraqi opponenrs quite natuw lIy do the same anel do nol hesitate to target volunteers working the re, as was Ihe case with the mureler of a mcmber o f the French agency, Handicap Internalional, in the spring of 1993.

The second possibiliry is Ihat the m ililary/ humanitarian forces are not a pri ori involved in the conflict In Yugoslavia and in Som<llia, lhe United Nations peacekeeping forces are a rdleclion of an international communiry, \vhich is otherwise all too absent from the 10Cli politica I scene. This sums up the complete ambiguity of this ty p e of operation: act ion for action's s~l kt':', often pU1'cl y for ils meelia impact, designecl to soothe puhlic opinion by 'doing something'. I3ut thc decision 10 move into thc humanitarian field is lhe result of a crue! lack of a political perspective. Protecting humanitarian aid-workers becomes an aim in itself, replacing the age-old need for soldiers to have a political purpose when going to war. This ncw paraelox of protection GlIl be summeel up as follO\vs: humanitarian aid permits intelvention by armeel fo rces yet gives them no precise political program.

pleasant discovery that th ey are viewed as very far removed from anything huma nitarian. Ever since the beginn ing of thl' conflict. the Serbs have scen them as a hindrance to the ir future conquests, the Croa ts have accuseel lhem of 'freezing' the terri toria I gains made b y thei r enemies, while the Muslims have been vocal in lheir c1isappo inlment at seeing the farces given only a humanitarian mandate.

1993,

lO

have become ,he

new war aim. Focusing in the beginning entirely on the hllma nitarian aspect - to the point of neglecting such essentia l steps as el isarming ancl neutralizing the va riolIs factions - the interna ti onal force has embraced an em irely military option - so much sa that il has nOl hesitateel to fjre missiles at NGO buildings where it felt th is was necessary. Is Ihis a UlLJrn? Far from ie T he Iwo

71â&#x20AC;˘ General Aidid) which saw iLself ready 10 seize sole po\ver. The interim presielent Ali Mahdi , by contrast, forcefully clemandeel intern ationa l intervention. lf General Aidid even tllally elid we\come the American traops , Ihis was only on the mach iavell ian principle of making a virtue out of necessity. T hus, even before commencing th ei r o penl1ions on Somali soi l, the international forces werc faced by a co mplex network of benevolencc and hostility.

In fa rmer Yugoslavia , wh ile idealisl ic young UN soldiers cot1linue ( 0 see themselves as rescuers as Ihey arrive from I3ritain anel France, those w ho arrived before them have already made the un-

JasollMagazi"e no. 6, decembe r 1993

phases are Iinked by the absence of a politica I pla n for Somal ia. What shou ld be done with this count lY anel why was there inrervention? Failing an unclerlying mOlive, the operation is elragged along in the wa ke of partial, shortterm objcctives - tlrst humanitarian anel then mili tary - elictated by a remorseless logic.

The trend seen in Somalia is al50 to be fou nel, although in a different guise, in the former Yugos lavia. \Vhereas in the former the politica I choke was to finel an enemy at all costs where none was apparem, in Bosnia il was the reverse - never to single ou t an enemy although th ere was no difficu lry in cloing so. DeliberateIy ecumenieal, the overriding goal of the intervention was not to be a true intervention. Determinedly rema ining a h u-

manitarian mÎssion was nOl lhe renecti on of a pristine purity maintained against all odels but rather o f a cy nica l po litica I clecision taken al the OUlset - to let the Serhs win. This assiduo llsly cu lti vated impo tence is now sclf-reinforcing. If one prefers not 10 name the aggressor, circumstances always coneur 10 make th is the right dcc isio n. Thc passivity o f the UN forces, signifying an acceptance of the cru shing o f thc Rosnians, finall y led them (0 provoke Ihe pea cekeeping troops in thc hopes that they wo uld rea ct - o r rath cr act. Attaekccl b y those they had th e t~l s k of dcfcncl ing, the UN forces were forccd 10 the disl ressing conclusion that all sicles w ere to blame and thaI impotencc was justificd.

Still funher down the scalc of political c1ariry come opera tions like (hal in farmer Yugoslavia , whcre the major powers have no very d em war aim, but whe re, if Qne looks ca refull y, murky politica I reasons for Ihis passive anirude ca n be founel - lhe iclea that events should be allowed to tak e their course in Ihe Balkans so that a sta bie o rder can be imposed b y force.

Thc paradoxes of prOleetion, wrapped one inside th e other like Russian dolls, have transfo rmecl th e Yugoslav contlict into a series of alxlications justified firs! b y the desire to proteet thc civi lian popubtion, th en hy that o f proteeting the prmeclors until finally the IXlr~ld ox peaks with governments justi fy ing their inael ion by th eir fear of; compro mising Ihe sa fety o f the contingents they ha ve committed. W hen thc victim is saerificeel rather than endangering the appointed prot ector, one 11(Is 10 concede thar the humanitarian/ po litical alliance is full of surpriscs.

All interesling po inr about this scal e is that it shows that humanitarian activity is nOl necessa ril y incompatibie w ilh political or po litico- military act ion b y states. \Xlhen the aims of th is c1ear, it is easy for the aid organi zat io ns, while remaining fully independent , 10 adopl a Sla nce in re lation tO il. 10 cOOperJle or o ppose it, associate themselves wÎ1h it or keep Iheir d istance. The real danger for humanitarian worke rs lies in blurred politica l objectives, in o peratio ns wit hou I a real aim, in w hich protectio n of aid wo rkers - who never asked for it - becomes a subsrirule fo r thinki ng d earl y abou t what is 10 be achieved hy anned inlervcnl ion. All parties in such a confused situatio n have a lot to lose. Firs( o f all, thc po liticians and soldiers, since o n ce l he humanitarian phase is over- anel often quickly overlhey find themselvcs in the worst possibie predica menl, in Sa rajevo, Moga dishu o r elsewhere: how is fo rce 10 be used. when there is no pol itical o bjective in sight? But the aid organ izations, 100, have every reason 10 fear Ihis unsolicited protecti on, whieh draws them illlo Ihe iIl-d irecled activit ies of 'peace keep ing· annies.

A scale ofpoUtical clarity As wc ha ve seen, the association of mil ita ry and humanitarian activities takes various fo rms. In essence, Ihese ca n be dassified 3ccording to wha t one might ca ll a sC~ll e of politica I c13 rity. At the top o f tht! sca le come peace keeping operdtio ns ari sing from internati onal agreements, as in EI Salva dor, Angola or Cambodi;:1. In such cases, the political aim is clear: to disarm the factions and prepa re lhe country for free elections. As already noteel , the humanitarian aspects give ri sc to few problcms - provided over-close <Jnd thus dangerous coorel inat ion belween humanitarian and polit ica l actors is avoieled.

Next come o penuio ns in wh ich the internatio nal forces are pursuing war aims which are deal" in their own eyes but whieh ca nnot be opcnl y stated or which , fo r o ne reason o r anolher, they wish 10 disguise under a doak of concern . A case in point is Kurdistan . Here, the emergence of a humanitarian dimension reOects a elegree of po litical uncertainry for ex ample, when the Coalition decic!ed in March 199 1, to SlOp t!"ying to overIhrow Sadclam J-I ussein and to givc thc Kurds humaniwri:lI1 aid o nly. In such circumstances, il is more cssen tial than ever for aid o pennio ns tQ remain independem anc! neu tral , <lncl rh e NCOs must be careful to es<.:hcw all eollahoralion lct alone integra ti o n.

Hight at the bott om come opera ti ons su eh as in Somalia , w herc th ere is absolutely no political rationale and the intercommunily hides behind national various masks (humanitarian yeslerday, military toclay) to avoid the question: whal are we do ing in Somalia?

Th e worst aspect is Ihat w hen the humanitaria n sk ie breaks down in th is military/ human itarian associatio n, ir is not only the 'official' humanitarian action, that of the armies and internationa l agencies, that suffers. In such theaters, all scope fo r humanilarian act ion is lost.

Henri Dunanr's original concept of a neutral sphere from which the combalants are exc1uded is shanered by such o perat io ns. Thc humanit:uian sp here is invaded on all sides. The international armies are th e first culprits, with their hotchpotch o f poli tica l anel humanitarian <:I ims. The ir encmics on the ground reply in ki nd: th e Iraqis di rectly attaek aid workers, w hom (hey equale w ith l he All ies; l he Somalis harass not only the UN forces bu t also the aid agencies; in YlIgoslavia red crosses have long been a sniper's target.

Never have sO man y memhers of aid organizatio ns paid wilh their lives for Iheir commitment as in the last Ihree yeus. in these theaters where the military has intervened . This l o~s of life gives the lie to those sel f-salisficd cuhivalOrs of puhli c opinion who slllugly repeal thaI the more aid w o rk ers Ihc re are, lhc merrier. and thaI Ihere is room for all - the militaIy, nat ion al govcrnments and the interna tional politica I instilutions - in this great anc! ho peful enterprise. I-Iumanitarian aCLio n, in such dirncult and dangerous conclilions \vhieh are so far removed from roaelside firsL aid in our own counlries, presupposes illlpaniality and polit ical indcpe nclcnce, and these are qualities w hich armies ancl governmems, by their very n ~lIure, ca n never possess.

COllclllSioll The new en vironment in which con niCls arise confronts NCOs with new problems, bul they arc nol insurmountable.

At first il seellled , g ive n the complex ity of the si tu alio ns in Somalia or Yugoslavia , that the NGOs had hael th eir da y and the need for prot ect io n would mcan tha t arm ies wou ld come to dOlll inate the humanitnia n scene. \X1(: mUSI (h ink again.

The mi litari zation in volved in ha ving operations protected h y external forces is a dealhtrap anel w ill destroy all hllmanirarian activity hy allowi ng it 10 heeome submergcd in a politieo-military contex t in which it GlIlnOt survive.

On Ihe con trary. Ihe nex ihiliry and d ear thinking o f the NGOs has enahled them . in Somalia for example, to maimain a presence th rougho ut Ihc crisis, al ti 100v cost in human tenns , and to make SUfe that essential aid was avaiiJble. There was certain ly considerable misappropriation, but no more than usecl to occllr in the old fro nti er gucrrilla havens, anel th e cost was eenainl y less than the enor1110 US cx penditllrc on 'protectio n' h y thc American expedit io nary fo rce in Som~l ­ lia. If lhe major powers wish to inlervene in wa r zones, Ihat is for them to decieIe, but we shOllid not give them Ihe excuse that (h ey are protccting aid wo rkers. It is difficllh enough today for aid workers 10 prolect themselves, without their being the ohject of the Ihcoretical ly benevolent and pra ctieall y detrimental solicillide of po liticians at a loss for a po licy .• n JÎS al1ic!e was publlsbed in /b e reeel1lÖ ' pril1/ed hook: Life, Deal.h Aid; Tbe Médecius saus Fro"lières rejJorl 011 Worltl Crisis 1,,'ervelllÏoll . I.'.cliled h)' FranÇois Jea n, NOlflled!w ISBN 0-4]5-10550-1 . n , is 1>001.1 o.D'ers al1 i11leresling rca!islie alld rejir:sbing lI;eU I of /b e UN's (i n )c{(.:IiOlls, in/ernatiollal polities cwd aid. Reiul ;1.

jasoll Magaz ille

,,,,d

no. 6. december 1993

9

Piece in War Marc Klumper

The Cold War has become an historical statement. The end ofthe ''War'' did not show up on one particular day or year. Several (political) events, occuring some succeeding years, made the Cold War loose its impact.

This process started at the time Michael Gorbatsjov gained the ultimate political leadership in the Soviet Union in the year 1985. Erom that time on the politica I and economie relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were intensified. A numberof top-conferences, heldfrom 1985 until 1989, succeeded in gaining mutual respect and lowering political tension developed.

10

Jasoll Magazille no. 6, d ecember

T

hC Ca ld \'(far de mandecl a greal P,111 of financial input. On borh sides the econom y sufferecl from

the priorities given la the battle between

two poiitiGIl and economie systems. IL

was in lhei r own inte rest that the battle \Vould end. Thc negOlialions. therefore, became a success. O n almOSl every issue. Iike l1uclcar power, human rights

anc! tradc.: , we il -structureel agreements we re signed.

Many

peopJe

arguc

Ihal

Gorbatsjov

\vouldn'( ha ve had a n ather choice ; as a leader of an economica ll y braken nation

he woulcl have made co ncessions with his bac k agai nsr thc wa ll. The US appeared to he the winning team. President Bush c mphasizecl this (politica!) Sllccess in his "state of thc union" of 1992: !!Th e UniteJ Statcs of America have won th e Cold \'<Ia r!", he proudly proclaimed. Sa. the \'<Iest judged the end of the battle in terms of w innin g anel loosi ng. This way o f evaluating Ihe final stage o f lhe "\Var!! is 100 simpie. There is not eno ugh focusing on \Vhal could have happened also.

Thc c hanges wcrc namcly for lhc grealcr part lhe rcsuh o f a morc nex ible attitude o f Michael GorlXltsjov. He cleared the way 10 mo re democracy within lhe communist system . Apart from lhe intrinsic power of the US, the mOfal change w ithin th e Soviet polities ha s also been o f great va lue to the peace process o f the Colcl War. This articl e \V ill describe lhe developments dlll'ing the Co ld War in a chronologica l way, accompanied by histo rica l facts. The goal of the articl e is to offer the reader info nnation about the reasons w h y lhe two supe r powe rs played lheir role in Ihis \'<Iar. Furthermore I try 10 help the reade r la gel same understanding for the way the US and Soviets behaved during th is period of time. Th e slatcment "Cold \Vart! (crea led by Herbert Swope, US) o nl y was used in the \Vest. In thc East th e battle was considered as "flghling imperi alism".

Germally's rok After the Second \'<Ia rle! War the contliet belwccn the Easl anel the West mainly focusseel on th e fUlme of cenlral anel eastern Europe. From th is sL1 rting point

1993

Gennan y pla yeel th e key- ro le in rebuilding the internatio nal re lations.

Just b efare the surrender of Germany the Allied Powers (US, France, Great-Britain anel the USSR) agreed that they would occlipy anel divide lhe country inLo fOllf parts Qalta, Feb. 1945).

The \'<Iestern Allies rea li zed thar Germany, in cverybocly's interest, had to be su pported in rebuilding its nat ion. A weil developed Germany woulel stabelize the relations in Lh c reg ion, th e Western Atlies said . The three occupied parts b y the Western Allies became therefore economi ca ll y ancl po litiGl1l y integ ratecI. In 1949, th is resulteel in th e c realion of a ncw natio n ca lleel W'est-Genna ny ( BRD).

Th e Soviet Uni o n elicln 't want to be left behind anc! created the GOR (Ge rman Democratie Republic) as a communist counte rpan. Th c Russ ians we re fllriolls about Ihc way lhc \Vestern Allies took ho ld of the polcnt ial ri chest part of Germany.

During the fiflies Lhe Soviets gave up hope ro separa te West-Germany from the \'(!estcrn Allies. They recognized the I3I~O as a souve reign country. In 1955, \'<Iest-Gennany became a NATO memb er. The Soviets stro ngly opposed this politica l development anel startecl a worlel wide ca mpaign for the recognition o f the thc G OH. East- fJeriin became the capital of lhe GD I~ . Thc western pan of the farmer capita I o f Germany still was occupiecl by the \'<Iestern Allies as agreed after the su rrender of Hitlcr-Ge rmany.

Berlin became o nc o f the first examples of grmving tensian between East and \Vest. The city was silualed in Ihe centre o fthe GDH, so the Allies hael to transport food, medicins, etc by train , trucks o r by air 10 Lhe weste rn inhabil ants of Ihe fo rIller cap ital. It was in 1948 that the Soviets h loc ked the sllppl y- lines to \'<Iest-Bc rlin to protest aga ima the "imperia listiel! jX>litics of the Western Allies.

On May 12th 1949 th is blockaele ended , followcd by a twclvc ye::n period oftime w ithout excessive p o litical events.

In 1961 thc communists began to build a wa ll betwcl:n th e eastern and western part of thc city. This ncw "borderline" had to p revenl people from escaping to the liberal weste rn part o f the city. "The

\Vall" hecame a s~ld ~y mho l of lhe Colel \Var hetwee l1 commu nisl1l ,md capitaIbm. Towa rds Ihe end of rhe sixties rhe role of Germany ch:lI1ged a little. \X/illy Br.md. political h:ader o f the I3RD at that time , sl<l l1 ecl w ilh his o\\'n "Ost-Polit ik". Brand wanted a c10ser re1alionship with the GD R and otht:r parts o f t:aslern Europe in order to hre:'lk the sla tu s quo. Several meetings wen: org:1l1ised .Incl a lot of agrecmeJ1(~ we re signt:d, culminating in the recogni\ion of the GDH iJy Wesr-Germany in 1972.

J)uring thc CVSE-Conference of 19731975 l he US anel thc USSH also wanted to ex press thl! dcsire 1O break the status quo. I lowc.:vcr, a definite sett lement of the position of Germany was not thc result . This CVSE-agreement , called the " Helsinki -treaty", was from a juristi c po int o f view a cli ma x in hreaking the t en~ ion betwecn the 1wo parties. From a political point of view however, this gesture wasn't real al all. This ca n in the first plan: be explained by the MiddleEast wa r ( 1973) herween Israel and Egypt/ Syria . Funhermorl:, o n the sa me conlinl:nl. in Angola, a war deve10ped ht.'\wt:t:n the western () ri e nt ~Hed governmc nt anel a commun ist guerilla movement suppo rl ed h y sold icrs from Cuba ( 197:;). T hc stro ngest incl"l'ase of political tens io n in Ihal pcri(xl of time .."as obviowily ca uscd b y the wa r in Vietnam . After thL' LJS-forces relurned to their country in 197'::; the fighting continued in

a diplomatie way. The invasion of Soviet-Iroops in Afghanistan in 1979 made Ihe follow-up CVSEﾂｷConference fail o n every issue.

The turning point in Ihe co nlinuing story of the Cold \Var had to Ix: th e resllh of a new spirit coming up from MoscO\v. \Xlhen Miehac1 Gorbalsjov in 1985 beeame the new political leader of the USS I~ il seemed that Ihis wish eamc truc. The INF-trea ty in 1987 conce rning witheIrawa l of nuclear missiles in Europe became thc first rl:al measure th::11 crea ted a strong base to g:1in more coope r~lIi o n anel agreements. Some pcop lc st ill see Ih is treaty as :1 turning poi nt in world polities. The strong b~l se for more coor era tion gOI its l:x:sl result o n November 9th 1989. "The \Vall" went down in Berl in!

The "Helsinki-trcaty" gO! its follow-up meeting and the role of Gcrman y was finall y scttlcd. Negotia tio ns alllong th e two Germ~lIl nations and the fou!" Allies resulted in the unificm ion of Germany on Octoher 3rd 1990. The conflict about power in Europe had been settled b y Ihe n ~n i ons who stancd it.

In spile of al1t he joy it is an illusion that lhe two rivals will never be in co nflict aga in. It wil l depend on the ever c1u nging (polit ical) circLl1l1sta nces if the seltlement will last fo r a long pcriod o f time.

Ba/allce ofpower The Cold War can :llso he seen as a conflict between IwO ieleologies. Manyt poli-

tical leaders or the US always thought that their political and economie system \"\'3 S ~ Llrerior 10 the otller s)'~ lell1s in the worlc!. Thc kno\\'kdge that Eurore could prolecl and incn:a:-.e Ihe ﾃ始fluence of their "'ystem in ot her pans of the world made the l 'S deci<.le 10 minimize or deslroy the influel1ce o f com lllunism in Ihat pal1 o f the \\'orld . From thb point of view thl' l IS cOI1:-.trllcted SOTlll' politica l \"ays 10 reach that go~tI .

In the nrst place thc Trum ~lI1 -doct rine was developcd. Every country in the worl d Ih ~H feit :1 thre:H of occuring co mmuni sm inside or o utsidc their borders could cou nl o n the ( military) support from the US. Thc Korean and Vietnam war are Ihe best cX~lll1pl es ca used b y Ihis doctrine.

Second ly, a Europcan Rl'covely Program was st~ lrt ed (J\larsh:tli -plan). This plan cons isled of econo mie aid for Europe in the il1lcrest uf the L:nitcd S I ~lIes. hut very Illuch necded 10 rL'build Ihc Europca n n ~Hi o n s and to m ~lke it SI rong cnough to proteet it ~eJ r again~t com munist Ihreal .

Tb e third political way w as to start the !!containment"-po litics. 1I h:td th e same goal as thc Truman -doclrine. Th c main differenCt.' was \h ~ t\ within this politica l strategy prc"e ntioll o f spreading commllni sm Iud thl' highL'st priorit y. In this strategy the fOllnd~I1ion of NATO is the best L:x amph:. To tighlcIl Europe in a military \\'ay to Ihe US. the SO\'iets would't even Iry to Mart a war with. almost ce rtain . heav)' lo!-.sL':-'. This (l\1u tual) deler-

jasoll MClgaz ille IlO. 6. d ecL'mb er 1 99.~

11

renee became a main instrument in co n{roling thc Cold \'({ar.

lead to a military cun fli ct , hut the Soviels finall y draw IXlck their missiles. There \vas a kind of IllLHual respect towa rds

O n the othe r hand it is nOl dea r i f Stalin really had the focus to spread communism all over Europe.

More anel more hislorical scientisLS have an opi nion Ihat doubts the ielea that Sta lin h ad thaI purpose. The Second World War hael ca usecl a grea! damage to Hussia.

Stalin on his own had enough trouble to cont rol the lead ership of his own country. Th e way he co ntroled powe r brought a lo t of tension in his own parliament :md among a 101 of ci tizens. O ne thing is for su re; lhc Hussians were al that time nOl able to start a big cam paign against beller structured ancl more SlabJe western countries. The Illission fo l' comlll llnisll1 was mainly concentraled o n countries where Hlissia already had its inflllencc.

Thc fifties broughl na big cha nge in mutual rebtions. It was a period of time with relati vcly few conflicting events. Thc buileling ::tnd st ructuring o f bOlh hlocks continueel slowly. NATO got Germany as a mem her aftel' Turk ey anel Greecc had joi ncd Ihe club two years before. 13esides thi:; miliwl)' inlegral ion, lhe US also suppol1ed lhe economic intcgralion of Europe. In 1957. this support resulted in lhe fo undation of Ihc EEC. An important consequencc was thar \VestGemlany cou ld contriblue to thc economic growth o f western Europe in a direct way.

On the east siele a similar developmem occured. Thc USS H wantcd to n13intain econo m ic. political and milital)' innuence in ilS "sa tc.:llite-states". Those states had 10 become to wll y depenclem o n thc USSH. In 1949. thcreforc. the COMECON was foundl:d as thl: l:conomic counterpart of thc EEC. Six ycar:; later the Soviet Union took thc initiati ve to crea te a milital)' in tegrated :-,tructure in eastern Europe. This resulted in the crea tion of the \'({arsaw-Pact and was cons idered as the military opponent of NATO. Rec<1use o f all these dcvelopmcnts a weil balanced situ ati on was created. The passive altitude of th e western countries during the SovÎet military Illcasures taken in HlInga1)' (956) an el thc CSSR (1968) ca n from th aI point of view he dcclared.

In that time the USSR ca me in the possess ion of a nucle~lr bomb, so the delerrence had an impacl on the reactio n of Ihe \'({est. Thc same kind of rea ct ion was showed by the Soviet Un ion when the US orde reel Ihem to withd ra w nuclear missiles from Cuba.

This event, called the Cuba-crisis, almost

12

US during this cris is caused a conflict \vith thc USSR. Soviel leader Breznjev threatened thc US w ith a military interve nt ion in the Middle-Easl. The Americans wa ntccl 10 prevent thal more Sovict-in fl uencc \vould be fOlllld in lhe "holtesl SpotH on eal1 h and warned MoscO\v in a vel)' aggressive way .

Secondl y, at th e same time de oil producing couIll ries (organised in OPEC), mainly Arab countries, slopped supplying weSlern coun tries 10 protest aga in:;l lheir attitu de towarels Egypt/ Syria :m d the support they gave to th e US. This oilcrisis dicln't last for a long time hut the polilical consequences were ralher important.

Firsl. cluring th is crisis Europe showed th e wodel Ihat its own inlerest prevaled inslCacl of follow ing Ihc same course as thc US.

each olher concerni ng thc inIluence they bol h had in some of rt.'g ions of thc worlel .

Thc rcblions in Ihe world were uctcl'Inined by the eleveloped balance of power bctwcc n I he US and Ihe USSR.

Detellte?

Aftel' thc Cuba -crisis, wha t G IIl bl.' seen as a Illutual acknowledgement of one's "OW11" rcgio n!'i, a cal m ;md mo re relaxed perioeI of time fo llowed. The super powers gave more :.tttcntion 10 common interests. In thc nrSl place the USSR anel the US wanlcd ta prevcnl the spread of nuclear arms among other countries.

They wanted to mainlain control. This goa l resultecl in 1968 in the "Non-proli feralion"-treaty. Sccond ly, ncgoliarions were started for thc limitation of st rategic missiles. These Strategie ArnlS Limitation Talks (S ALT ) resu hed in an agreement, SALT-I. in the year 1972. Ncw limitations conce rning thc Illlmbe r of missiles anel clevelopment of missile-dcfendingsystems wen: mentioncd .

From 1973 the tensio n incrcased. In lhe nrst place Ihis W<lS mainly c<l llseel by thc war in the MieldJc-East (October 1973).

Egypt, slipponeel by the USSR, attacked Israel 10 liberale th c Sin •.IÎ-desel1 from jewish occupat ion. Thc diplomacy of the

J asoll MagtlZil/e no. 6, december 1993

Second. bOlh super powers got problems wilh their allies and in habitant s. Thc Soviel Uni on suffered from elecrea:;ing inclustrial produ ct ion, had argkultural condilions and a growing p o litica l cri sis caused by non-competen t communist Icaelership. Furthermore, the co mmuni st !t fri ends" of the Soviet LJnio n slowly followed their own course. Good exampl es can he found in the diplomatie break· down wit h Yugoslavia anel China .

The US had lhe same kind of problems.

Fra nce, u nder th e leaele rship of Oe GaulIe. cxpressed its douhts ahout the intentions the Amcricans would have w ith Europ e. NATO. lhcrdore, 10sI France as a mcmber. Bcsicles Ihe Eliropean trollble , Ihl: US suffered from t he Vietnam-war. Not o nl y hy heavy los:;es bUI also because of :;trong p rotest from AmeriG\J1 citize ns thc LJS-adminislration had 10 acl under a 10 1 of pressure.

Beca use of th ese prohlcIllS European political leaders askcd th emselvcs; what are the priorities of thc Un ited States?

The Reagan Aelminislr;:nion (198 1- 1989) becaIlle aW<l re of cook'd relarionship w ith Europc. To gain morc trust from Europe thc US therefore o ffcred proleclion by Pershing-mi ssi les. FUl1her. NATO experienced betIer leadership hy the US and opc rated from that time in a more unifying way. Thc Illutual trust Glme back again. During the firsl years of the Reagan Administration the tension between th e \Vesl anel thc fasl increased becau!'ie of the sl rongcr rc latio ns bet\vecn the NATO and EEC mem h ers. Bul we all know thc result of Ihe Gorhatsjovdoctrine. From 1985 th e USSR slowly collapsed. Anc! fina ll y the USSH didn'l exist anymore.

A 1/ew world order?

Aftc.:: r lhc coll apse o f the Sovh..:1 Uni o n the

ck:vd oped anc! 3ccepted w a rle! o rder disa ppe ~ln:d . The problc m is lhat up 1I11til no w nu ne\V weil structureel o rder ha s b een develo ped by Ihc w o rldcomtnun ity. O nc (hing is fo r sure; the biro larity has vanished . Thc present situatio n can he d escribe d as o nc o f "multilevel inter-

de pe nde nce". Thc \v ays In comrol COI1niets, llsed by lhe two confl icling parties ove r th e last four decades, ha ve 10sI their va luc. Nc w melhod 'i ha ve no t been gen e r~l1ly acce pt cd yel. Thc UN is still looking ror ilS ultimale conflict-contral inslrurnenl. Another impo r1am issue is th c present v::d ue o f a ll th<.; anns-reducl ion ag rcemems. signed over the last tw ent y-fi ve yca rs. It lo oks that lhe US anti the counlries o f the fo rmc r Soviel Union we re aWJre of the problem ju st befo rc it cou le! e!evelo p in a e!ramatie wa y. But thc p o liticians have lO rea li ze that the selling o f Jrms Ca nllo t he COJ1(ro-

lcd fo r 100%.

Thc po:,it io n o f Germ any and j apan in wurle! po lities has heen a maller o f di scuss ion since Ihc enel o f the Cole! \Var. Econo mi eally the (WO eOllntries can be seen as on e of the strongest in lhe wo rlel.

That posilio n ha s heen accepted b y o t her slrong countries in Ihc w o rlel. A d bcuss io n occurs w hen we talk about an aCli ve German and j apanese role in w o rd po lities. Th e e! esirc to become a perman ent mc mber o f the UN Securily Council makes a lal o f countries shi ve r.

On the olher hanel il is still very d oubtful wh eth er Gcrman y anel j ~lpa n wa nt to p lay a ke y role in w o rld po lit ies. During lhe Gulfwa r ( 199 1) bo th countries did

nol parlicipal e in an acti ve military o r po litica I w ay, but supportedlhe US o nl y in a financül l w ay.

The futme w orld o rder wil l d cvelop in an uncertain wa y. An impo rtant role in Ihal develo pmenl will be given la the Ulliled Natio ns. This o rgani sa tio n 113 5 beeolllc mo re effecti ve in d eeisio n making since the end o f thc Cold War. The Secmil y Council has nOl experienced :lny veto inlerpose since thc end o f thaI battl e. Decisions concerning secu riry matters are taken rapidl y :m d unan iIllousl y. The UN , as a long term instrument fo r w n rld peacekeeping. can onl y ex ist in its future rol when its o rganisational stmcture ( deve lo ped in 1 9~1 5) will c hange. The airfo il for Ui'\ measures has 10 become Iarger. COUl1lri es like German y, j apan and India should play a more d irect ro!e in UN deci sio n making.

Ho we vcr, th e disc uss ion aboul Ihis matter still has to stalt on the high est politica ! level. There is 100 111uch d o ubl to stal1 this d eb31e beGIUSC o ne is afraid to undermin e the present existing vulnerabi e w o dd balancc of po wer.

In Ihc nc w w orlel o rder the US wi ll play key role during thc neXI decade. There arc some pol itical scientislS who ha ve an opposile o pin ion (they are Gilled "declinisIs"). Paul Kenned y fo rmulates in his book "The rise and fall o f the Great Powers" ( 1987) a statemenl saying that a super po w er shoulel nol try to express its pu wer more than its econo mie w elfare allows. These declinists think tha I within th e America n polities th e d ght proportio n bet w een ambiti on and eco nomi e possibilities do es nOl exist at the prescnt time.

:1

Thc ncw US administr.Hio n (C linton) seems to rca li ze this po tc nlial problem .

The US go vernmenl willm ~linl y focus on internal eco no mi c prob lems and devclopmcnt du ring the co ming four years.

Ilopc ftdl y fo r th e US their president re ~l ­ li zed this problem o n timc.

Besides the opinio n o f the declinists most olher po litical scientists arc aware o f lhe fact that lhere arc mo re aspecls eletermining thc ( futme) role o r 3 G rea l Power. Aspects like nalio nal ielentit y, selfconfielence, strength of the political system and the w eak leading Glpa cities o f o t her co untries in th e w o rlel have a great impact o n po litical anel econo mic influence o f a super po w er. \Vh en w c look at these aspecIs and 1î.II1S!aIC ,hem int o thc present situatio n in w o rlel po li ties it is cl ear that the US finds it self in a comfOJ1ablc situatio n . Thc form c r So viet Un ion losl its strength tOlall y, China is mainy con cerncd abo ut maintaining Ihe communist syslem in its o wn counuy anel thc Islamic w a rlel is di vided and lherefo re lInable 10 o rgani zc itself in a w eil stfllcilired w ay. The Eli rop ca n COIllIllUnit y, .J a p~1I1 and grow in g South E ~I S I Asia slill ha ve 10 prove themselves in a ( illlernatio nal) po lil ical wa y. Econo mi cal1 y these oppo m:nts are w eil ~lCce p l ed anel can be seen as the Illain world trade pal1ners.

The end o f the Cold \Var made everybod y cheer. I lo w ever new p robl ems and u neenainties have occurcd . Po litical and m i lil ~lIy c vcnts have becoll1 c mo re unpredict::lble . Thc next decad e will bring us a, still unpredictable . worlc! o rder.

Hope full y a long term o rd er..

JAS~N Facing the challenge of the future today

President Applicatians are in vitee! far the abave chair. The appaintee wallicl be expectecl la asslIme cllIty as ea rly as passible. Applicants shall id passess appropriate qllalificatian ane! experience.

Applicatian by e.V. shallicl be sent ta:

StichtingJason Laan van Meerdervoort 96 2517 AR DEN HAAG Equal appartllnity elllplayer ]asoll Mtlgllz ille no.

6) december J 993

13

An Empi

Fo to's were taken in Abd inJune, .Iuly, Au gusi

Dying and Nagorno- Karabakh )3, b y To m Kllpe rll s

i

Another Perspective is Needed László Marácz and Erik-Jan Keijzer

Democracy is fragile and depends 011 the degreeof institutiollaliz ation of the state organs, the role of law, the development of civil society and the mark et economy. Establishing this is for the post communist countries a tall order since all this must be created simultaneously. The circumstances faced by the new democracies in Centra I and Eastern Europe are not in fa vour of a smooth and painless transition process. The tensions in the fortner Soviet Union and its influence on East and Central Europe (ECE), a dif.ficult economic transition in a hard economic period, and regional tensions arising to the political surface are some ofthe aspects ofthe present day circumstances influencing the democratic

developments. The consequences ofthe deep abyss the ECE countries are going through are th at the results of the transition process so far lack behindthe expectations. lt's time to make an up-date of the results ofthe transformation process in the ECE countries, especially ofthe Hungarian situation, and to take a closer look at possible new perspectives.

S

ince the fall of COlllll1l1l1islll in Ilungary fore ign poliey has been ba scd o n th rce doclI'ines in order ra help realize Il ungary's intcgration in Europe: (I) ::1 quick accession 10 rhe European COl11l11uniry (EC); (2) a quick accession 10 the NATO: anel (3) a system

of bila l!.;:ral trealies w ith the neighbo uring counlries that ha ve large 11111llbcrs of Hungarian l1linoritics w ith in

their borders.

In lhc cuphoria that swepl over EUfope in Ihe rcvolutionary yL"H of 1989 these doctrines of foreign policies seclllcd 10 he rea l istic. FUt1hermo rc, Ihe euphori:l was not only ruling Hungary anel olher farmer Ea stern Europcan com munist sta les hul il dClcrmineel Ihc: attitude o f Weslern inldlectuals and poliey makers as weIl. Thc commo n opinion was Ihal a quick exlcnsion of Ihc.: European grem ia \vas jusl a maller of a few years. I Ic.:nce.

I l1Ingary's prime minisIer József Anl:!11

decbred al Ihe heginning of his Ic.:fm in 1990 Ihallhe II1Ingalün ~l ccL'ssi()n 10 Ihc EC could be achieveel heforc 199). Ilo\\'ever. il was dear fromlhe beginning Ihal no receipls wc re aV~l ibhlL' for Ihe transilion of a IOlalilarian pulitiGd :-.y . . lem wilh a gllickd econoJ11y into :1 democralie. open . . ystcm wilh a frec m:lrkL'l-economy. So thc ",holc Eastcrn Eliropc~1n enterprise, ahhollgh Ihere was no other alternative. was and rem:lins ~I 1l1:lIter of speculalion with an o pen end.

Apart from Ihis bet it lus also turncd out Ihal in ncarly all fOflller commu nist states the forlller nomenclatun: reJllai ncd in kcypositions inflllcncing aspects of politica!. pllhlic :md econom ie Iife. The rc h:ls heen no Ildearing storm". Inslead forme r dissidents. like thc Czech p resident Vacla v Ha ve l or the I lungarian aUlhor Gyürgy Kondd !13ve hecn praised for their toleranee to\\'ards Ihe former nlling elite. FlIrther. it h~ls often heen argued that a clearing Slo rm wOltld ha ve heen impossihle hecallsc aht.:rnativc knowledg<.: to govern th <.:se countries is sim pi )' beking. \\fhatevc r th e l11or~1 1 implicHions of this negiecl of persecution . . may he. in any case callsi ng cmbi ttL'rment :tmong the poplibtion, it is hecoming clc:lr th::11 <mei this h ~l s bL'en largely lIndcrestimalcd in the Wcst- a long IX' ri (xl of cOl11l11l1nism h:1S affeCled the minds more dceply Ih:ln was expectce\. 1I secms th~1I the combi nation of thc formcr anel the ncw elites arc not eqllippecl. hdng more int<.:resled in power games, 10 take the mL':lsurcs thaI are necess31)' 10 elevelop aClive. creal ive ~ltld imaginalive political soill ti on:, fo r the enonnous t:'lsks that :lwait a sol ut ion.

Thi s gcts painfully clelr if we cons idc r Ilung:l ly's foreign pol ie)'. O ne GlIlnot avoi d the obscrva l ion thaI Ihe conce pt s art.: toD unrealist ic, narrow :lIld inflexibIe. inelccd al most dogmalic, The doctrine.;; o f I lungarian fort.:ign policy ~I .s dbClISSèd above seelllL'd realistic in 1989 hut :-.incL' 19B9 th e politica! sÎlu:ll ion

Jasoll Magaz ille no. 6. decem he r 199.'

17

has radically changed in Europe. Lel us discuss the thrcc doctrines of Hungarian fo reign po lilics one-by-one.

A quick access ion to lhc EC is illusionary, a[tho ugh it w ill prolx lhl y remain the long-term goal both fo r the Western and Centïdl European co untries. There are [WO types of objecti o ns lO this .

Ilo\\'e\'er. it has become c1L'ar th ai it ha s gra ve efft.:cb upon Ihc socia l struetun.: of society Ihal has been disbalan ced hy the nc\\' phcnomenon of lInemploymcnl. Of course a halanced social structure of soc iet y is a nccessary co ndition lor maintai n ing internal politica! stability. Th e price of the shoc k the rapy h a~ alread y to he p roven high. La rge numbe rs o f unem-

Thc CirsI type of arguments againsl a quick accession are rel aled to thc interna! rroblems of the EC ilsdf. The collapse o f Ihe EMU system in the summer of 1993 has !aid bare thai Ihe EC is stron-

gly

divided

abolIl

the possib ilit y to reali zc a European CUfrency , the ECU. André Szász, directo r of Ihc Du tch Nationa! Bank. has recenl-

The second group o f arguments that do no t favou r .1 quick accessicn is the b et that there are too man y unccrtainties in the political and social-<..:conomic situ:!tio n in Central Europe itsclf. Several mer deis to transform the guidcd eeonom y into a free market econom y ha ve been introduccd. Poland has applied the ":;hock-therapy" to recove r econom y.

18

Flinhermore il ·s important rea li ze th:1I if for instance the Czech Republic moves c10ser to the West , the Ukraine mu st be moved wcstward toD. A SlabJe Ukraine is th e ultimate gua rantee fo r a st~lhJ c East and Centra! Eliropc. The Ukrai ne call11ot he ignored. 11'5 huge and as Ihc U k r.:linian Assistant Sec relary of Foreign AlTairs Mr Ta rasyuk said : "like it or nat, it's there" . Yeltsins' ;Iltempt s to di vide Poland from the Ukraine arc nOl const ru ctivc . Ukraine shou!d begin to parricipal c in CE l anel maybc in Visegrad.

10

Iy st.. ,cd Ihal Ihe EC is fa r from read y 10 introd uce a commo n currency. As a consequence, the estabof a lishment monetary union within lhe EC is o Ulside ou r scope. The accession of Cenu'a l European counrries having wcak cconomies and lack ing hard currency would increase th e Illonetary cri ses within the EC. I-Ience, this sho uld Ix: rejected as lo ng as the intern al Illonetary crises has nOl been ove rCOIllC. Anolher argument aga insl a quick accession is the fact that the produ cls made by th e Centr.11 European countries. slIch as agricultural prodUCIS, matches the produ cts of so-called poor EC-members, like the Southern European countries Greece, Spain .lIld Portugal. As long as the Central European econo mies are not successfu ll y transformed manufacturing products that fill gaps in \Veslern market or <I rc ca pable to compele with produets manufaclUred w ithin the EC an accession of the Central Europe~lIl countries wou ld on ly conrribute to lhe "seas of wine" and to the !1 moun min s o f milk anel butl er", ~lIld so o n. This means that th e ~lCccs:;ion of lhe Centrdl European countries in the present fa rm w ill have to face st rong objections, espec ially by the "poor" EC-members.

poliC)'·makers like NATO's sec retai)' genera l F\lan frcd \Vörncr anti the German minisIer of defense Volker Ri.."dle have argued for a qllick access ion . From German point of view this is llndcrst;lndab!e, otherwise German y will borde r a weak and in stabic Cemral Europc suffering social llnresl , strcams of refugc<..:s, and so on . For German y's secllril y and stahilit y it would be important to integrate lhe Centra I Eliropean "cordon sa nitaire" int o the Western alliance. Po litica l cooperatio n, given its geopo lilics, is an Qverriding imper.:ni ve fo r German y. lhe nalio nal interests of w hich are interwoven with those o f its neighbours. W ilhout cooperal ion, ilS politica! aclio n is constrainetl , because it is vu!nerable in the center of Europc.

til '

sr

ploycd and home-Jess pcople and the fonncr ('O!1UnUniSlS reblx.'lIed :l~ soc Î3lists being back into power. Shock-therapy has turned o ut to be a poli tical h(}()ll1erang!

Il ungary has chos<..:n fo r ~lIlo t her model, actu;dl y a COnlinuatiun of the po licy already iniliated b y the fa rmer com m u nist regimes. thai is a slep-by-step libera li zation o f th e ccono m y. Even this more careful po licy has alread y made socbl -ccono mi c viet ims. 10% of the employees ha s lost their jobs. Another facto r increasing insta b ilit y h ~l s been the complete, unconditiona l sel l-out of :;t;He faclO ries and companies to fore ign in veslO r:,. It has probably nOl been rcalized that forcign in vestors are in p rinciple in leresled in profit and nOl in the social censeqllences of their :Iet ing. lt is not tlifficult to pretliet tha I in a coulllry in \-vhieh nearl y all compani<.:s owncel by fo reign investors disinterested in sodal prohlcms will caliSC tension among Ihe loca l popula tio n hit by crises. Even the oli lcome of a step -h y-step :Ipproach is uncc l1ain.

H unga ry"s w ish of a quick accession to th e NATO faces th e same sO l'I of diffic lliti es. Inl<.:rnal prohl ems within thc NATO anti inslahilities in the CentraJ Ellropea n region itsel f. Interna ll y NATO is divitl<.:d over the consequences of Ihc integration of the CentraJ Eurupe;1I1 counl ries into the organi zat ion. German politicians anel

Jas o1l Mag Clz ille no. 6, december 1993

France and Great-Britain are against a quic k :.Iccession of Central Europe because acce:;sion would SlippOI1 thc nalio na list-exlremisrs farces in Ru ss ia in case th e sphcre o f innuence o f NATO is shiftcd eastward . The outcome o f this Western dilemma is lInclear. But il is highly unlikely that lhe comin g N ATO slimmit in Janllary o f n<..:xt year wi ll solve lhi ~ dilemma . Mlich wi ll dqx:nd o n the devclopments in Russ ia .

Fer thc ECE countries thi s po licy of awa it ing what the cl evc!opments in M oscow w ill bring means {ma l d ependenee on a unpreclictahle sitllatio n . Thc worst case scenario \vill hring 1110S1 o r the ECE countrics back inlo Moscows' sphere of influence possibJ y comrolled by nalion3li st-extremist. To p rcvc nt Ihis from happening the ECE cOllntries sho uld search fo r <In alt ernati ve sccllriry system making them more independent of a NATO decision an d the situ ati on in Moscow.

It's obvio us lhal the building o f an all Euro pca n security <.I nd coopcrat ion struCfure !ags behind negative regiona l trends

like nalionalisl11 anel ot her extremes developing out of economie and social problems.

In Ihis perspective lhe fUlllre role of NATO w ill ha vt: 10 he more political anel aimed at crc.Hing anc! maintaining sta biliry. The sccuriry concc.::pt must he enla rgeel anel w ill ha ve IQ include economies anc! provisions for non-military cat astrophes. Some scepticism is necessaly since no miraclcs can be expecled . InSlitutions alol1c cannOl fulfil the tri ck .

Fo rms follows fun ction but at the sa me time form crcates constr:1int to develop appropri ate funct ioning.

The deterio rating o f the political , economie and military gllarantees tor the regional security is a conscquence o f the strict observa nce of the principle!'i, rul es and resolutio ns ad opted by the internacommunity tional anel in pal1i cu lar hy the UN and the C5CE. Grea ter understanding and assislance from Ihese o rganizal ions and the leading cOllJ1lries in them is needed so rhal Lhc necessary strength coulel be gathercel on its way to democracy anel a markei econo my.

Triomon (930) and Paris in (1947) in exchange for autonomy anel local self-govemmenr of Ihc Hungaria n minorities.

The treaties with Slovenia anc! Ukraine have been concluded more or less, although wi th respect to the Ukra ine it rcmains to be secn wh ether lhe cuhural 3111Onomy o f lhc Hungarian minority in Sub-Carphatia wi ll be realized if (he

Especially HlIngary'!'i cont•.lCLS wit h th e Netherl ands are develo ping dynamieall y.

Thc contacts belween these cOllntries have been confinncd at the highest level of policy- making. Both ministers o f fore ign affa irs Ilan!'i van den Broek and his Hunga ri an co lleaglle Géza je!'izenszky have made clear in thei r jo int statement of Novemher 1992 in Budapesl that the Netherl ands wiJl assist I lungary with its intcgration in the European communiti es. The Dlitch-HlInga rians conWcts do not only affect the highesl strata o f society bUI ha ve reached all strata , as thc foll owing examples illustrate.

A number o f DUlch ancl I-Iu ngaria n lIniversi lies have sl<lrted up exchanges programs with scientists and students. In the spring of 1993 a large delegatio n of Hungarian NGOs. incl uding trade unions, o rganizat ion for gypsies. hUll1an rights, CIc. vis iled the province of Drente (lhc Netherlands) in o rder 10 es t ~lbli s h contacts with their Dut ch countcrpal1S. Thi s project was sponsored hy the provincial governmcllI of Drente. Thc Eurorean movement in Ihe Net herlancls has assisled its Ilungarian counterpan to make J-1 l1nga ri an ci ti ze ns more fam iliar w ith the concept of Europe~1Il integratio n. Trdd itionally Ihe Dutch and Hlingarian ca lvinist churches have had intensive anel floll rishing conlact'l. These contacts w hieh were even operati vc during co mmunism have been reacli vated.

The DUl ch ca lvin ist churches have hel· ped to fOlllld Ihe ca lvi nist universiry o f Blielapest. These ecclesiastic cont ~lCts are not onl y limited 10 Ihe I lunga ri ans of Hungary hut al so to the Hlinga rian minorities, especiall y LO thc I lungarians from Transsylva nia. Contacts exisl between Dut ch and Hungarian politica l parties. The I-Iungarian Christian Democratic Pcopl e's Part y ( KD NP) is rdated 10 lhe Dlitch CDA; and Ihe Un ion o r Young Democrats (FIDESZ) is relaled to Ihc DUlch conserva tive liberal party VVD. Of course the DUl ch parties ca n transmit their experiences and knowlcdge of how to make polities in a democratie society.

Crossing the East-West chasm

In th e regio n itself national ancl ethn ic connicts being a chlllger for the security of Europc. Th is has been recogni zed by the French prime minister Balladur who proposes a Europcan Conference to seHIe these displlIcS. Alt ho llgh m ino riti es in HunWIl)' have been granted cu ltllral 3 Utonoll1y Hungarian ll1ino riti es su ffer a poli cy of repression in the ncighbouring cou nlries, especiall y in Rumania , 510vakia and Serbia. In case Central European count ries would becoll1e members of NATO the \Veslern alliance wi ll acru ally be involved in potential conflicLS probahly losing ite; slabilizing role in Europe.

Teither NATO, nor Europe ca n take this ris k. Hence, a quick accession of Cent f"d l European cOllntries 10 NATO is far from bcing realistie. Ell rope's zone of slabiliry and prosperily mu st he expanded, but lhe West is not going to import th e east's internal con niCIS inlo ilS own zo ne.

HungalY's third doctrin e o f foreign policy is to conclude bilmeral treaties with neighbouring cOllntrics. Th e I-Iungarian concept is 10 provide guarantces fo r the status quo. that is, the fixing o f Ihe bo rders delcnnined by lhe Peace Treaties o f

country falls hack into a centn.i li zed nationalisl poli cy. The negotiations with Serbia. Slovak ia and HUll1ania have been unsuceessflll so far. The atJ110sphere is one of J11utual distrust anc! fea r. Hence, ît is undear wha l the ou tcome of these negotialio ns wi ll be. FUl1h ermore, alt· hough the Hungarian position favours slabilily and the develo pment of democratizat ion in thc regio n Hungary has no! receivcd any seri ous diplomati c support from the West. Ilence, the changes for a qu ick solutio n o f the Hungarian minority problems i!'i ral her unlikely. It is safe to conclude that th ese problein s will effect internal rela l ions in the area and that th ey w ill hinder the process o f European integration of the area .

Although Ihe doclrines of HlIngarian foreign policy sho uld nOl be given up a more rea listie sho l1 -term approach is necdeel. 'l lIng;:uy's fo reign poliey sho uld be lurned into a muit i-tra ck policy that forces Hungary 10 be active o n several tracks ~liongs icle lhe "\Vestern " Irack remaining the lIltil1late goal. Probably lhe most effectivc means of integration into the European comlllllnities is not only the frequen t consultations of lhe Europe· an insl illltio ns in 13ru xe lles and St rasbourg but also Ihe exploitation and promotion o f bilateral co ntacts w ith separate East and Central European cou ntries and wit h Western European cou ntries.

In thc Cent ral European region Illorc o ptions are availahl e 10 crea te a kind of nucleus of slales. I lungary could join the associal io n of EFTA cou nlries. Probably most o f th e EFTA co untrics, like Austri a and Sweden, wi ll soon qlli! this o rga ni. zat ion unlike 5wiss that is interestcd in maintaining its special posit ion in Europe. Swiss has recently olTered I 11Ingary a pal1nership in the Er·-rA in o rder 10 fi l! up th e arising g~lp . A S\\'iss-Ilungarian

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no. 6. december 1993

19

HUl Ihe rel~Hions bdween Hunga!)'. Pocombinalian wauld h ~IVC many advantages for J-Iungary. Swiss could Iransmil 10 land and thl! Czech Republic are free of Hungary knowledge alX>lIt nanking thar tensio ns. Ilencc. these rdations could be would allow lhe Illll1garians 10 pla y Ihe activaled anel !'>Iimulaled. rly dOÎng 50, role of mo ney-lransactor in Central and Slova kia ha:-. to pal1ieipatc. o lhnwise il will be iso!atc(1. Th c Visegdel coope raEasl ern Europe. similarly 10 lhe role Swiss pbys in the \Vest. As a eonsequcnee, I-Iungary wOli lcl appeal' in the midellc of aetiviry instead of ncing al the periphe!)' of \VeSlern Europe. Anolher impo t1:1nt eonMensen die zich willen inzeILen voor de lribution Swiss eould o ffer la Stichtingjason .

HlIng ~l1y would be a model of milit,uy defense. Swiss has Op clit moment zijn wij voo ral op zoek naar: a we ll-c1aboral cd military dcredactieleden fensc syslem thar is based on a quick anel massive mobiliPR-fuctionarissen zal ion of the eivil po pulation.

This system could he copied

Gezocht

Fund-raisers

by Ilungary. Ilopefull y Ihis would not prova ke aggression by the Ilungarian neighlx)urs but would o nl y satisfy ils Icgitimatc rights concerning a elcfense syslcm.

Anothcr opl ion wou ld be 10 c1aborat c more intcnsi vcly on thc Visegráel cooperalion , including Pobnd, Ihl: Czeeh Ikpublie, Slovakia anel Il ungaly. So f:lr Viseg rád has not been succcssful for a number of reasans. Firstly, all the countrics have tried by "Allcing:inge" 10 become members of the EC. This is o f course an illusion for these countries ha vc a rclateel level of elevelopmenl anel have to fa ce the same SOt1 of political and socio-economic problems. Secondly, serious tensions exisl among the Visegrád countries , in particular nClween I-Iungary ancl SIO\·akia.

Bri ef m eI motivatie e n e.V. opsturen naar: Stichtingjas( )!1 Laan van Nleerdervoort

25 17 AR DEN "AAG lion ShOldd he extended with Sloven ia as soon as possinle bl!cause lhis count!)' ha s a eommon horder w ilh Hungaly and is free of problel1ls and in a Jaller stage wil h olher Centra I Europcan countries or regions. Thc Visegdd coope rati o n can bc stimu!al<:d hy thc West. fo r eX<ll1lple hy lhe Benelux countries. a sil1lilar union of small counlries that are positioned among grcat Europea n powers.Cenlral and East European cou ntries sho uld think t\vice hefore simpl y dismiss ing re-

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96

jasoll Magazine no. 6, december 1993

gional coopcration in favour of inlegraLing wilh thc \Vest. After all , NATO anel the EC are Western regional o rganizaIÎons, and for instanee Gennanies eooperation through them wilh its partners was cruci:ll for its poslwar rcconSlmclio n.

FUl1hermore, Ilunga!)' cou ld study clevelopments in the Far Easl. john Na isbitt and Patricia Arburdene have argucd in Iheir bestse ller Megatrends 2000 that lhe focus of economie activity will shift to the Far East in the beginning ofthc next eentu!)'.

Central anel Eastern Europe will have to ere,lIe an ahemalive poliey soon. This w ill prevcnl ECE countries from 10lal elcpendence of a poss ibie fUlure EC and NATO integ rali o n, somcthing lhey ca n hardly innuence themse lves.

A ncw perspectivc musr stimul.atc the sOdal , politi ca l anel economie development \V hat in Ihe end w ill bring integration into lhc EC and NATO closer. Almosl passively waiting for EC and NATO inlegralion prodllces nOIhing positivc fo r the region .• Dr. l.ászló MC/rácz feac!Jes /lul1gan·an

sludies al Ihe Easl-EliropeclII /llsliJliJe of tbe Ulliliersily of Amsterdam. Erik--jtm Keijzer is editor of jC/solI Magazine and is preselll~)J finisbillg bis final thesis aboltl Ibe stab ili~ y afCentral Europe.

Restructuring the Security Council Barbara Rijks

When last year the General Assembly debated the Security Council's role for the first time in a decade, industrial and developing countries were almost unanimous in saying the Council should be refashioned to represent the realities oftoday's world and not the world of 1945. Japan and Germany, the countries defeated in the World War II, are also pressing toeliminate post-war discriminatory clauses left over from the war.

This would in addition unleash demandsfor reform.

I

n Ihis 311icle I wish to disClISS the way the Security COllncil has te reform anel adjust its cOlllposition to the contemporary re lations anel ta the politica I reality. Many countries argue that the Unitecl Nations should givc serious consideration to reviewing the privileges srill held by lhe five Wo rl d \X1ar I I vieren:;, who holc! pennanent Security CO lincH sea ts anel the right of veto over ils decisions. The five permanent members of the Securi ty Council are: the Repub lic of China (now People's Republic), France, The Unitecl Kingclom of Gre~H Britain anel Nonhern

Ireland, The Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (now Russia) anel the Unitecl States of America.

The question has (0 be ra ised as 10 whelher the UN system is served by a change in ilS present conSlruction. \'(1ould the organizarion become more effective in achieving its aims if its Slructure were 10 be changed? Over the past five years one can state a conti nuous close coope rarion between the five permanent members of the Security Coullcil.

In 1990-1991 , cont inuo us direcr discussions took place befW"een the permanent Fi ve and the non-aligned mcmbers of the Security Coullcil. The five permanent members worked closely togerher, bUl they were conce rned to cmphasize that the results of their deliberations would not tie down the Council as a whoie, and 10 seek cr iticism and 3mendments.

As the coope ration between the permanent members becomes more cohesive and the Security Council as a whole becomes more active, new disc uss ions on its compos ition, its role anel positi on are emerging. As 路far as the composition is concerned, the Big Five's permanent membership with the right of veto remains the most imponant point of discussion.

Change Is Necessary The righ l of veto is one of the most delicate of issues. Hecemly, the Swedish Hepresentative al th e UN eompared ripping up the right of velO with opening Pandora's box - and finding nothing in ir. ' Nevertheless the pressure is growing 10 scrutinize the Security Council structure with the permanent members' right of velO. In 1945 lhis construct ion could be accepted. The five allied powers had won the war. T hey we re the 'Great Powers', which eOlIid not tolerate thc new organiza tion to taking decisions which woulc1 interfere with their interests.

Now, 48 years later, relations differ. Germany and Japan have beeome rhe economie great powers. DUI路ing the wa r in Iraq , they made it clear tha t they do not want 10 be the large financia l eontributors w ithout bcing involved in the deeision-ma king about the war in the Security Council.

Many options for reform have been suggested and the problem wil! eel1a inly nOl be solved readily in the near future. One (h ing is cel1ain: the Securiry Council ha s to cha nge its current eOll1positi on, Olherwise it will lose its legitimation. The past ha s proved rha t the United Natio ns withou t an effective Security Councillooses its credibi li ty and falls into deeay. The re are divergent seenarios possible to restrueture the composition of the Security Counci!.

Regiollal Represe1ltatioll The first anclll10sl radieal one, presemed by drs. Ringnalda , is th e formation of groups of countries with a sill1 ilar ethnicculru ral com positi on. Each of these groups wou lcl appoint a representat ive in the Security Couneil on the grounds of a mUlUally agreecl eirculation scheme which the groups themselves set up. Thc d istinction betwcen permanent and nonpermanent seats in the scenario disappears as does the right of veto. Instead of th is right of veto, a weight voting- procedure is imroducecl whereby criteria such as poplllation and th e amount of UN subscription would play a role. The b ig advantage of this scenario is thar all lhe member states wOllid be more or less represented in the Security Council, and ir would eonsequently gain legit imaey.

Aceording to drs. Ringna lda 2 this scenario is by far to be preferred to all other scenarios. If the member states decide to restructure the Securiry Council (whereby revision of the Charter cannot be avoideel) then it has to happen in sueh a way that the legitimacy will be revalic1ated. Ir is belter to raise a new building

Jaso" Magazi"e

no. 6. december 1993

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than LQ p atch up a briule :I nd oki one.

Are the mcmbers ca pablc o f such a scenario? It is more likely that the member slatt:S \vill decîc.le o n 0 11<.: of the foliowing scenari os, which al best will slow clown the process or lo:-.ing legilimation.

EC as Olie Body or all Elected COIlIlcil The second scenario is LhaI o f a smal! operation which wou ld, however. require a change in the Charter. 11 is suggested that the European Coml11unity as one body could assume Britain 's anc.l France's scats. The vacant scat could be vield ed to japan. Thc EC membcr states cou ld mutuall y agree o n a ci rculation

TIH:se should comprise Gcrmany and japan hccause o f lheir econo mie superpo\Vcr ~t. ltu ~. plu s one African, one Latin American and o nc other Asbn count ry. It would he up to thl.' regi on::11 groups to make th eir own choiees. If they found it Împossib le to d o 50 beGllISC of rivalrics, the places sho uld re main unnlled until agreement was reached.

Obvio usly a twenty mcmber Council w ith ten permanent Illembers woulJ be mo re unwieldy than the present pauern.

But it w Olild not be unrea sonable as the ove rall UN membership approaches two hundred. ~Ind the risk of di visiveness anc! vetocs sho llld be dim inishetl in Ihe 'Ncw

\Vork!'.

~c h e m e.

joanm: L 1l1dy criticizes this suggestion .

She says that the prop osed soilition does nOl even gel close to Ihe hem1 of the p ro bl em . "\'\Thy nol propose inslead Ihat tht: entire Security Council were 10 be elected by the General Asscmbl y - a logica l g lo b::11 extension of th e idea of democÎJtizat io n w ilhin natio ns. Few wou ld dare to suggest so boldl y lhat leading positi ons in the United States Government be filled by non -elected indi viduals; why sho uld such bl~ltant eliti slll he acceptable in internatio nal governmenla l instituti ons? M o reover, w hy nOL end the anticlemocratic veto pla ced in the hands o f a few lOp natio ns in 1 9'1 5M~

The Positioll ofJapan alld Germally

r

The Braz iliatl Plall The founh scenario is the simplest one la accompl ish, anc! d oes no t require a change in the Charrer. Accoreling to drs.

G. Ringnaida , Ihis is Ihe sce nario w il h the biggest chance o f success. In this Bra zilian-p lan, nameel after the nalionality o f irs fOllnder, Bra zil's Fo reign Minister Celso Later, German y, Japan, Argentina , Bra ziI , India anel N igeria all w ould be adl1litled [Q the Security Council. They wou ld not get (he right of velo. bUL il could be pri vately arranged that they would always keep the ir seats. Such arrangements are cuslomaly in UN bodies ancl commissions. Accoreling to RingnaIda , Ihis scenario would irrcvocabl y, in the lo ng run , lea d 10 lh e end of lh e Securily Council. Funher enlargemems COliIc! not be preventeel ; Ir India were ad miued , (hen why nor Pakistan, Egypt, ltal y eLc. This wöuld' paralyse the body. It is a course too often followeel wilhin the UN orga nizarion, lhe easieSI way o ul and it evades the.problem behind the enlarge4 ment.

Sir Anthony Parsons puts forward a recommendation that follows the same Jines. He suggesLS thm discussions shOlild be in iliated among regional groups for an agreeel expansion of the Security Counc il up [Q twent"}' membersi The aelditiona l five to be permanent members.

22

In e~lrl y 1992, there were disc lI ss ions on the reqUl:SLS from German y and .Japan fo r pe rm ~lI1ent sea ts o n Ihe Security Council. By allowing Ru ss ia 10 take ove r the Soviet Un io n 's permanent Security COllncil scat at the end o f 199 1, the three \'\Testern powe rs believed that they wou lcl have p ostponed aClio n for severa l yem s o n c!emancls b y Gcrman y, j apan and scveral large third worlel countries for permanent membership o n the Council.

In lhe past. the Uniled Sta tes ha s supportee! Ihe principle of Council member:-lhip ral" japan <I nel, !'iince the Germa n reunification in October "1 990, fo r Germany as well. I lowever, it h ~ls also quietl y discOLlr<lged both cou ntrÎes' pressing openly for permanent membership , fea ring that any attempt l a amcnd the Unitcel Nations Charter would risk unIcashing prcssurcs for more far-reac hing orga nizaliona l c hanges. The collapse o f the Soviet Union wa s a logical moment to reopc n the United Nations' founding w Charter and review the Security ài COUIlCiI'S composi tion . Ilowever, as ~ the Soviet Union disintegra ted , lhe ~ Un itc d States, w ilh Ihe SUppOI1 of Britain , France anel China, moved swiftIy. wilhollt puhlic debale o r any altcmpl 10 rca pen thc Ch a11cr, 10 ensure tlul the former Soviet sea t wen t to Russia as th e largest anel the stronges! o r lhe fa rmer Unio n·s repub lics.

The Unitecl States :md il s allies were able 10 geL Lheir way because thei r vetoes control all decisions o f th e Secllriry COllncil.

Thc move, Illan)' di pl oma ls say, sho wed that the five permanent members were detenn ined to rcsist demands fo r any fa r-rc achin g chan ges in memhership of thc Council , :H the time the COUI"lCii is starting to act like Ihe gua rdia n o f the worlel order it is su.pposecl lo beo

Jason Magaz i"e no. 6. decem be r 1993

LaM yea !", when the General Assembl y d ebatecl the Counc irs role fo r the nrst time in a decade, Germany anc! Japan, as econo m ie superpowers pa ying ::1 ris ing s hare o f UniteJ Nati o ns hills, both contended that they cleseJved a permanent Council sca t.

Nevel1heless, the present permanent members Ihen appeared con fid enl that Lhey cOldd hokl lhe line against change lIntil the micldle of the decade, largely because Germany ancl japan , lhe IWO strongcsl calldidares, had softened their demands. jap~1I1 's appetite for a pennanent sea l was appea sed somt:what by its elc<.:Lio n lU lhe Council la :">l ye.u ror a two-yea r tel111 as a rot<lting member.

130 nn softened its campaign for a permanent se~1l w hen Ihe two Gcrm any's reunited because it fea red that sllch a clem<.tnd, coming immed iatc1y arter reunification, might alarm it s nc ighbours.

Later th aI year, o n September 23rd , 1992, Germa ny for lhe first time lo ld the UN General Assembl y thaI it would like a permanent seat on lhe Securit y Council anc! promised to rev isc it s constitutio n in a way that German sold iers could take IXII1 in Unitec! Na ti ons militaty o perati ons.

200 190 16 0 170 160

150

1-W

1JO 120 110 100

90

80 70

60 50 40

30 20 10

o

1946

19 5 1

~ . .«;-! .

PErm . rre rrb . S.C.

~ I\k)n

The German statement, made by Fo rl'ign Minister Klaus Kinkel in an address to lhe Assembly, was widely viewed as a sign thai two years afler the reu nificalion Genn any was ready to take a role in \Vorlel politica l affairs commensurate with its econom ie strength. Mr. Kinkel saiel th at the !!efficiency anc! creelib ility" o f lhe Council were important if il was 10 serve as a guarclian of international peace. Gcrman officia ls say thar the pressure will fo rce the Uniled Nations 10 reconsicler lhc Council 's membcrship in lhe ncx t few yea rs ancl thaI Germany then will seek permanent mcmbc rship.

The Gl'rman Governmenr decicled thar the time was right to press more openl y for permanent membership hecause of the feeling that Britain ancl Frdnce \Vou ld never agree on an alternalive plan under which they \Vou ld merge their naUonal seats into a single permanent scat representing the European Community.

Th e Ge rl1l ~1I1 Fo reign Mi nister also sought to dca I w ith anc of the major arguments agai nst giving German y permanenl Sl'curity Council Membcrship: the Governmenl's content ion thaI a constitution~i1 ban against send ing German soldiers OLHsidl' Ihe NATO area prevents it

from taking part in peacekel'ping operations.

ned the attack for refo rm of the Sccuri ty Counci!.

Mr. Kinkel sa icl the ruling coalit ion of Christian DemocralS anel Free DemocralS was comm ilted "to make the armed forces available to the United Nations, \Vith approval of Pari ia ment, for peacekeeping and peacemaking assignmenLS.N6 German officials said Ihis pluJse was meanl to include both classi c peacekeep ing operations anc! milital)' enforcemem aclion aga inst aggressors alltho ri zed hy Ihe Sccurity COllncil.

In the meantime, France anc! G reat Dritain arc resisting persislemly to the Ameriean proposa!. France, the almosl Lr..Iditiona l ri va l o f lhe United States in international bodies, has taken the lead.

Dllring the prepardtions of the European summil o f Maaslricht in 199 1, concerning the Europcan Polit ical Union (EPU), France rejcclecl all proposals for a common representation o f lhe EC in the Seemily Council. London SUppOl1S Paris, although less fi rml y, for rear 10 loose innuence.

In facI, German armed forces ha ve played suppol1ing ro les in several United NatĂ&#x17D; ons pcacckeeping opcra ti ons recentl y in w hal Germany says is 3 calculared policy o f preparing German public opinio n for a larger role. Not all Gcrman legal experts agree lha( the conslirution bars Germany from taking part in United Nations peacekeeping operalions, bUI lhe Govcrnment wa nts Parliament to approve a constitutional 3.mcndmcnt g iving it an unambiguous righl 10 sen d forces abro~ld on UN business. However, it has been unable to assem bic Ihe necessal)' majority beeause of deep-seated objeetions b y the lef! wing of the Social Dcmocrals in the oppositio n.

I n december 1992, thc attirud e of the United Slales lowards refo nning lhe UN systel11 changeeI. Hili Clinto n, at the time President-elecl , talked boldly about expanding the UN's role in global crisis m ~lI1 ageme nl. The top priorities were 10 be giving tb e U i mili(31)' improving its fi nances, muscIc, strengthening ilS management anel broael ening representat io n on tbe Secu rit y Cou ncil.

At january 29th of th is year, the Clinton Aelm inistration inclicatec! that it favou reel ~II I O\v ing Germany and Japan to have permanent seats in lhe United Nations Secllrity Counci l. The eall for changes in th e Secmit y COllnciJ's co mposi ti o n drew a pained refrom Britai n's Fo reign sponse Secretary, Douglas t-J lirel, who sa icl , "If it ain 't broke, do n't fix il."7 Other sharp oppositio n to the granting o f permanent membership la Germany anel j apa n only w ill come from developing cou ntries and probably from man y ot her coul1lries as weil.

1 96 1

n

metrt> . S.C.

1966

1971

1993

~ ""'n- mem:> . S.C.

In the Ncw Vork Times of jllne JOth anel lhl' Volkskrdlll of june 16[h of lhis yea r, we could reacl tha i the chief US clelega(e to the United Natio ns, Madelaine Albright , stalcd that \'\fa shington sllppo rted Ihl' bid by japan anel Germany for a permanent sca t.

"The time has co me that th e Security Cou ncil ShOlIld rencct th e worlel of Ihe nineties, not lhe world of (94)1'. \'\fith these worels, Ihe dclegale ope-

France's amb:lssador, MerimĂŠe, assumes that Germany ;md ja pan \Vill be grantecl the righl of velo. The US have nOl made an y pronollnecments on that subject yeL. An important argumen t is that th e constiwtion of bath Gl'rm any and japan ha ve limitations o n sending troops to other countries. France argues th ai Genn any and Japan, o n Ct.: thcy ha ve joined the Couneil. will receive the politica l ::.dvantages, bUI they can not take on lhe milila ry burdcns. Morcover, France anel Grem Brilain pointed to the faCl that both Germany anel japan are not nllclear powers, wh ill' th e pn.:scnl members arc.

A fo reign poliey advisor o f l3i ll Clinton declared that in thc near fut ure japan ancl Gt.:rmany wil! e1 iscuss the adjustments o f their constitutions.

The American proposa ls arc unclerstandabie in the light o f the posl-Colcl \'\far era. However, in ~11l orga ni zation whe rc the interests o f 183 membcrs have to show to full advantage, the clebates w ill not follow th e la\Vs of logie. "Still we believe that , in lhe long IlJn , the UN wil! be belter off if lhe Secllriry Cou ncil wOlilel become a hetter retlection o f the real ities in Ihl' world '\ a \XIhil e House f lIncti o naly rema rkeel .

The Brazilian Plu/I: No Legal

Basis "The General Assembly shall elect ten m her members o f the Uniled Natio ns 10 be non-perma nent membcrs o f the Security Council, w ilh d ue regard bcing paid , in lhe fjrst instance la Ihe contrihlllion o f Members of the Un ited Nat ions to Lhe maintcnance o f internationa l peace and securily anel 10 m her purposes of the O rganization, anel to equitabl e geogra phica l distribution '\ il says in Chapter V, anicle 23, IXlr~l graph l o f Ihe Chart er o f Ihe Un ited Nations. This tex! is become topica I as Secretary-Ge nera l Bo utros Boutros-G hali has plans to enlarge lhe permanent mcmbership of the Seeurit y COlll1cil from 5 to 10 members. These extra seats are intcnded 10 go to German y, I ndia , Brazil , Nigeria ~1I1c1japan as we cOlild rcad above. This \Voli lcl be a speclacular intervention.

J(lSOII MCigaz ille no.

6. decembe r 1993

23

However, while judging, one should bear in mind the prima!)' responsibility of the Security Council: " ... the maintenance of international peace and sccuri-

ty" CC h.V,art.24(I)). The Seclirity COllncil does nOl const itute a world governmem, in whieh every region with a dominant superpower is represented. No, the firsl principle is: how and in what compo5ition ca n the Counci l effective ly preven t and/ or intervene in conflicts?

Slrollg Ecollomies One can defend the thesis that the contemporary composition is no longer in accordance with the Cha t1er. The 'Rep ub i ie of China ', spoken of in th e Charter, Article 23(1), has its seat in Taiwan. \"'Vhen lhe Communists defeated the Nationalists in 1949, the Republic of China had already been accepted as a pennanent member in the Security Counci l. It was nOl until 1972 that the Republic was replaced by the People's Republic. However, th is alteration was not ca rri ed through in the Chal1er.

Another case is the USSR. The United Soviet Socia list Republics no longer exisl.

Within t he Secl.lrity Council th is subject has scarcely been mentioned. Russ ia was readily accepted as the successor of the USSR. Yet , to date the Charter has not been rewritten. Nevertheless, th is al teration is not of minor importance. The Ukraine, for instance, was, rhrough the delegarion of the USSR, always represe nred in the Security Council. This is no lo nger the case . Russia has a seat now, nOl the represenrative of th e Common-

wealth of Independent States (C IS). The same applies to Kazakhstan which is, like the Ukraine, not arepublic to set as ide easily.

If both these changes cou ld be carried lhrough so easil y, then w hy no t ca r!)' through two mo re? What I am driving at is the position of Germany ancl Japan. It is 1993 n ow, almost half a centu ry after the Seconcl \"'Vo rlcl War. Does the sheer fact that the allied countries we re vietors in the war, constitute a legitima tion for the privileged position into th e mists of time?

The two countries that were elefeated in the war cleveloped LO new superpowe rs.

In effect: o n the interna tional level, Japan and Germany have more significa nce than China, Russia and Great Britain. japan contributes no less than 12.5 per cent to the total budget of the United Nations. That is half of the Uniled States' contribution and more than both the contributions o f Grea t Br itain and France put togel her. It is true that neither count!)' has nuclear arms at its disposa l, but

24

th e status of a superpower is not uependent sole\y on one military or economic factor. j apan ancl Germany both have strong economies. It is natural th at the ir military past makes mher cou mri es extremely cautious, bu t th e process of their continued progress is irreversible. \Xfould it then not be better to draw Tokyo anc! Bonn into the deliberations of the Security COllncil? They cOLdd contribute to the realization of lhe primary responsibility of th e Security COllnc il: maintaining international peace and security. \X!hy con::;ide r granting the m perma nent sea ts without the right of veto in the Council if it is obvious that Ihere is no economic distinction between Germany and japan and the cu rrenl permanen t members? If o ne would examine th e possible dist inction, it would prove to be negative for most of the per manent Five, which is all th e more reason to grant a permanent membership with the right of veto to the new superpowers.

Too Many COllIesIants The admission of N igeri a, Brazil ancl India to the Security Council is a whole dif· ferent story. Ir is obvious that in selecting these countries the regiona l aspect plays a lea ding role . Of course, these countrie::; are regional superpowe rs, but they are as su ch quite contestable. WOllid there nor be any other states left in Afriea - like N igeria- that could make a claim to a permanent seat? Za ire has the potent ia1 of becoming a regional superpower. And w h at about South Africa? If the dom est ic relations are stabilized an d the country receives internationa l recognit ion, the Republ ic wou lcl be more powerful than N igeria. Pakbtan th ere upon, wil l not ac· cept India beingfavoured. Argentina ancl Mexico will have trouble with asolid position o f Brazil in the Council as \vell.

This kind of dimcult discussions will he enclless if o ne takes the regional representation as starting-poin t. One sholl id primarily focus on lhe firsl respons ibilily of the Secllrity Council : peace and security. Bearing that in mind , the reg iomil aspect ca n have importance: lhe COllncil shoulc! not turn into a Western private affair. A 101 has to happen before an y plans of enlargement will be realized.

Even the more or less logiea l membership of Germany and japan is a tende r spot.

A LOllg Way to Go Sh ou ld France and Great Britain d isa ppear as permanent members? Germany prefers a permanent seat for the European Commun ity. BUl the EC is still a long

jaso1l Magazine no . 6, d ecember 1993

way from a common fore ign poliey. The British Prime Minister john Major sa id: "Never cha nge a w inning team". This argument is, however, nOl vely SI rong in connection Wilh the Security Council.

Moreover, it is characterisrie for thc fact that London feels threatcnecl.

As we could read ahove lhis plan w ill not be rea li zed in the near future. However, qua concept this plan has potential.

If one d ay the European Community w ill form a political unity with a cOl1lmon foreign poliey, the plan is executable. The member states of the EC can ro tate in the Security Cou ncil. This sol utio n w ill immediately take care of lhe \"'Vestern overrepresenrat ion in th e Council.

Not Realistic Th e first ancl the thircl scenario, respectively from drs. Ringna lcla and joanne Landy, are in my opinion too far [rom reality to ever become a possible alterna· ti ve. Althollgh there is a lOl of tnJth in both proposa ls with respect to the misrepresel1lation and especially \"'Vestern dominance in the present Security COllncil , the scena rios can no t as such be executed in the near future .

As I menrionec! above we must bear in mind that lhe primaly responsibility of the Secllrity Council is sti ll the maintenance o f internationa l peace anc! secllrity. The system and th e international comm unity is in need of a SI rong and effective Council th at represents the relative powers in the world. The UN system al ready has a body that reprcsems all nations that joined the United Nations, namely the GenerJI Assembly.

Moreover, major aherations in lhe stru c· ture of evely system lake time an el have to be realizecl gradually in o rder to smoothen the adjllstment-process. This al50 applies to the UN system .•

No/es 1.0rs. G. Rîngnalda , "Restructuring of thc Uniled Natîons", Jason Magazine nr. 6, Dec 1992 2.1bîd.

3.Joa nne L'lI1dy,"Let lhe UN Assembly Elect Securi ty Council" , the New Vork Times, Dec

24. 1992.

4.0rs. G. Ringnalda, "Hestructuring thc Un ited Nations", Jason Magazine nr. 6, Dcc 1992 '.Sir Anthony Parsons, "The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era" , rrom: International Relalions, vol XI, nr. 3, december 1992 6.Paul Lewis, "Germany Tells the UN It Wants a Permanent SC:'I on the COllncil", rrom: thc Ncw Vork Times, Sept 24, 1992 7. Palll Lewis, "U.S. COllncil Backs Seats for Bonn anel Tokyo" , from: the New Vork Times, Jan 30, 1993

International Greenhouse policy; "The proof, we fe ar , will kill us".

Mathijs Ransijn andJaap Rodenburg

For the Association of Small [stand States, the greenhouse problem and the possibly resulting rise ofthe sea level is a nightmare in which they wililiterally drown. Radical measures against the' emission ofgreenhouse gases are necessary wh en the globally accepted concept of sustainability is taken seriously. But the world of environmental policy is also a world of war and conflict. A war is raging between people who are taking the possible climate change very seriously and people who argue that measures would be premature and a waste of tax payers money.

Once a government has decided to take measures anyhow, the second greenhouse policy conflict shows: the wide gap between

\'\fe w ill now have a look at thei r argu-

sustainability and actual policy.

ments.

Motives

T

hiS article deals with these

(WO

conOicts. The questions wc \Viii ti)' 10 answer arc:

> whic h are th e motives of lhe supporters of taking measures in th eir conflict

with the su ppo rt ers of business-as-usual anel which measures s h OlJl cl be laken?

> to \Vhm extent is slistainabil ity a part of lhe international poliey in relat ia n ta the greenhouse problem?

Recently, lhere has been a great ta-do about the green house problem. The grealc r pan of lhe scîenti sts, international orga ni za tions anc! 3uthorities on all

levels are very concerned abou t the possible rise of temperature anc! sea levels anc! recognize th e necess Îty of taking ll1easures as 500n as possible. Wie could ca ll their sta nd the 'prudent' sta nd (Opschoor and Van der Ploeg, 1990, p. 80-

100).

All Illotives of the prudent are in fact sUlllllloned up wi th the concept of 'Sll Stainability', w hich has appeared in ecolo-gy and environllletal po licy since th e first Report o f Ihe Cl ub of Rome in 1972.

T he reasons for sustai nability are risk evasion, irreplaceability, irreversibility and pace ancl direction of technology. In other words: ir you want to behave sustainable , you ca nnot take any risks with lhe earth , on ly having confidence in a rast development of en vironment prolecting techno logy. Any clalllage you might do cou ld be beyond repa ir; species w ill never come back o nce they ha ve been exterlllinated. This brings us to the question if damage is to be expected and to w hich point sustainabiliry is lhreatened.

Is the Earth a Living Pumet?

Is th ere life on earth o r is the eart h a living planet? It may seem as if th is q ues-

Opposite the prudent majority we see a more and more noisy m inority taking a 'carefree' stane!: a man-made increase of the natura l green ho use effect, even if there is one, wou ld have po-siti ve co nsequences; taking measlIres is premature ancl costly; let li S wait until we ha ve the closely- reasoned scientific p roof (Böttcher,

1993), \XI'e cou ld easily speak of a confl ict, even of an unhriclgcablc gap between the 'sensible' ancl the 'silly', the 'prudent' and the 'care-free'.

jason Magazine

no. 6, december 1993

25

TetUQSlrahng de rUH'TIle In

If w<: agree that we should not p lay th at game, wc have 10 find out wha t Gaia ca n handle and set cl ea r stancla rds 10 May between her limits. Therdore we nrst will descri be the natural situation anel expectecl cha nge.

Hel broeikase.Dixl lion would not ha ve anything te do Wilh th is al1icle. This prohlem is almast philosophieal and has clividcd sciencc since the inlraduclion of the Gaia theory.

The Ga ia theo lY considers lhe cal1hs environ ment and life o n ea nh as two-inane, as one syslem. This system , Gaia , has developed in such a way that il ca n adjust. sustain o ptimum conditions for life anel even recover w hen il is broughl OUI of bahmce (Lovelock, 1980). This theory has nOl been prove n (a nel perha ps never wjJ; be) anel has strong sUI)porters as weil as SI rong o pponems. At this po inr. lhc ir mOlives are irrelevant; the va lue of lhe two stands co nce rning the theory lies in the fact lhatthey arc recogni zab le in thc prudem and [he ca refree stand.

The care- free use the conce pt of Ga ia as an excuse for siuing back anel do nothing: why worry , Gaia w ill clean up the mess anyway. An additional problem is lhe slow progression of cl imale change 10 human slandards: a century is nothing on lhe geological timclable, so things may not seem as bad as they are.

And in fa ct, c1ima te changes in the pa st have never been radical enough te wipe ou t life itself; always a ncw equilibrium developed . But in ~dl cases the number o f animal and plant species C'bio diversity') dropped anel ot her, new species arois lhe abrupt se.

An cxa mple eXlenninatian of the dinosaurs and thc subsequelll rise o f lhe mamlnals.

Life's ability of rapicl adaptatio n to ncw circumstances makes it very unlikely that Iife itself \Viii be threa tened b y climate change. In th is line of argument, climale change does nOl pose a threat 10 the sustai nability of life itself. Ho wever, when man uses this reasoning to d ismiss the' green house prohlcm as being not dangerous, he is playing for high stakes. Bccause he is risking his own life, since it is very weil possible th:H lhe human race will not fit in a new b io logical equ ilibrium, and the life of species which he is

26

(direclly) depend<:nt upo n, for instance craps (Goudriaan, 1993).

The Greellhollse Effect alld the Greellhollse Problem The green house effect has existed since Ihe CJ I1h had an 3tI11osphere. If [his protective gaseous shield would not enclose the earth, Ihe avcrage temperarure here wou ld be minu s IR C instead of the cu rrent comfo rtabie p lus 15 C. The atmospherc lets in marc hea t radiation from the sun than shc lets out rcnected S Uil radiati o n and raeliatio n emitted b y the earth. This 'radiat ion balance' is the cause of th e suitability o r the earths temperature for life.

The greenhouse problem we are d iscussing is a greenhousc effect rci nforced by man. Man is changing the radiatio n balance by inlrcxlucing ncw greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and increasing the co ncC nlratio n of natural greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases absorh heat radiation o n a large sea le. These gases are carbon dioxide C02, respons ible fo r 55% of the greenhollse problem), methane (C I-I 4, 15%), laughing-ga, (N 20, 6%) and chlo ro-fluo ro-carbons (CFCs, 24%).

There is a numher of processes in which these gases are emilled . The combustion of fossil fuel is the most importanl source o f C02 emission. Melham' and laughinggas are emitted hy agricuhure (for instance wet riee culture). Melhane is also emilleu hy natural ga~ <t nd petroleulll prcxluclio n, by gas lr.:II1spo rt and use, and hy flIminant digeslion. CFCs o riginate from industrial processes and , amo ng others, from (old) cooli ng machines like refrigerdtors anel ai r-conditio ners.

Th c CFC emissions ha ve already been strongly reduccd by Ihc Montre~Il protocol and wi ll drop to alm osl zero in 1995.

Bul because technica l failures are nOl deal t with in treat ies. DSM has legall y leached more Ih~ln 5200 tonnes of CFCs in 1992 b y accidcill (De Limburger, 1993).

The damage done by CFCs \Viii die 3\Vay o nl y slowly, elue to their tifetime of more

Jaso" Magazi"e no. 6. december 1993

than a ce ntury. Bc.:s ides, HCFCs, the replacements o f CFCs for ce rtain applications , also conlribulc lO th e greenhouse problcm (CQpius Peerehoom, 1991). For olher gases na resu lts have bcen ach icved yel.

JPCC The effects o f these changes are veI)' hard LO predicl. Thereforc the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change OPCC), wa ' fo unded in 1988 10 fill in Ihe gaps in knowl<:dge ahout the assumed greenhouse prohlcm. Thi s IPCC consists o f a couple of hunclreds of scicntisls, and (heir research results are recognized by (a hnaSI) all co untries and scientisls.

The IPCC is convinced lhat the rise of lhe concentrat ion of greenho use gases w ill lead la climat e change. The most nOlo rio us effect is a rise o f lempcrature of ] .5 up 10 4.5 C. This \V iII ca use a sea level rist: o f 30 up to 100 centimetres in the next cent ury. Besides, an acceleration of the hydro logical cyele will proba bl y occur an d l oc~1I dimates will become more extreme. The lPCC admirs that the dear scientific proof o f lhe cau sal relati on belwccn human greenhouse gas cmiss io ns anel the tcmperature flu ctuati ons ca n not be furnishcel in ten yea rs.

Since thc re is lifc on earth , there are natural fluctuati ons, and they could be responsiblc for the rise of tcmperature of 0.3 up la 0.6 Cover the last century. The cha nces that th is is lflle however, are diminishing faslcr and faster.

Sustaillability for Nature alld forMtm Now \Ve know the possible results, we must decide w hal kind of c1imate change we dare to ri sk , which o ur goals are, what we call susTainable. Sustainability is ~I gcncrally accepted principle. Ho\Vever, it is in fa cl a worel without a meaning, that must be filled in fo r cvery aspect it is rclat eel with.

Here, suslainability mcans the su rviva l of elements of ecosysrems w hieh are funcrional fo r society. The pressure society puts o n lhe environmenl 111USI 'fit in eco10gically" (Opschoor, 1990). Ta prevent o ur en vironme11l from changing sa fast that the sustainability of o ur cxislence is endangered, wc must sec to il thaI nature ca n keep up with thc changes. For thaI , we need 10 know rhe changes that ha ve occurred in th e past. These changes can he divided in to threc aspects that are the mosl relevant for ecosystems.

Tempera/ure ri.w:, Resea rch has poimed oul lhat a lemperature change o f more [han 2 C compareel with Ihe pre-i ndustrial level, can be dangcrous for vulnerable ecosyslems, coasta l areas and cora l reefs.

And it can G1 USe much stronger climatie changes on a regional sca le due 10 another position o f the major gulf streams

(Gouclrban, 1993, p. 53 1-543) (RIVM , 199 1, p. 145- 150).

Pace DJ cbcmge: Another condition is that thc pace of temperalurc change should nO{ be higher than 0. 1 C per decennium.

Olherwise dimalic borders are moving faster than ecosystems ca n follow them.

Sea level rise. The sea level rise that wil! occu r musl he lcss than 2 cm each dece nnium 10 give wetlands, coastal areas and cor<l l l'ecrs the oppo rtunilY 10 follow them.

In o ur opinio n Ihe only criteria for sustainable clim3tie change must be based on this natural val'iah ilit y. \Xfhen the nrst criteriull1. a m~lxill1um temperalure rise of 2 C, is uscd 10 eslimale the Im lximum C02-risc it is deal' lhat a C02-doubling is unacceplable, hecausc Ihat means a tempcralure risc of 2.5 10 3 c. A simple calcu lation shows that, for sustainabilit y, the maximum concentratio n rise o f C02eql1iv~lIenl gases is 70% com pan::d 10 l he pre-indu sl rial level. Thc scientinc unce rtainty for the se~1 level rise is even larger, bUL lhe expectcd sca level rise of 30 10 100 cm for lhc cOl11ing cen tury is far more than thc maximum tolerabie 20 cm.

The second criterium, the pace o f tcrnperalure changes sets th e most drastic demands. For a telllper~lIure change of less than 0. 1 de,gree C each decennium. an immediate srah ili z,Hion of green house gasses in (he :I(mosphere is necessary.

This means an emission reduction of 60"10 far C02 , CFC's a ncl N20, anel of 15

la 20% fo r C1l4 (HIVM. 1991, 1'.145-150) (Cbrcnburg, 1993,1'.7).

I1 is deal' that it will be all110st impossihle 10 meel the la st d emand. Policy, and especially the ponderous international p o licy, neecls (100 Illuch) time fol' getting results.

Seellarios The (PCC h ~IS eX3mi ned in her study a few policy scenario':, anc! their OU[COllle for the concentrarion o f C02-equi va lent gasses. They have not cxamined the emission reducl ions mentioned above as nnal and illlpossi bi e. But the first criterium, a ma x imum ri se of 700/0 , is met with in lhe most severe !PCC-scenario ( RI VM,

1991,1'. 155). This isthe Acceleraled Palicies scena ri o. Th c emission reduction thai is part o f Ih is scenario is ::1 reduction of C02 -eq ui val ent gasses with 70 to 900/0 in 2030 fo r thc incluslrialized countries.

These rec1ucti o n:-; have been adopled by lhe environment::l1 movemenl. For the developing cou nlries there are different reduct ion ral es. According 10 the equ3lity-principlc they G IIl ~[ ill fil! up <l large

part of their c mission space that is now occupied by lhe inc1ustria lised cou ntries.

Only in the next ce ntury they have to stabit isc their emissions with technological aid of the \XfeSlern world. \Xfhen the ofncial policy o f the 'el herlands (-2% eaeh ycar afler 2000) is assumed 10 be followed worldwide the redu ction rates are even sharper. Th e sa me is thc case w ith the Toronto guideline (a SOO/o reduction in 2025). But iml1lediate reductions world wide will never be acceptable for the devc lopi ng countries. Beca u se it is not in accordance with the equality principle and w ill make ~I diminishing of the prosperity gap belween the developing and devcloped countries very difncult, if not impossible.

And this diminishing is one o f th e cond itions for international cooperat ion and successfu l environmental poliey as acce pted by lhe international commu niry.

Illterl/atiol/al Poliey In th is part of this artid e we discuss and criticize a few international treaties and policics in relation 10 crit eria we have set above.

EC poliey: Not Sttstail/able The target of the EC policy conce rning the greenhousรง problcm is the stabilizalion o f C02 el11issions on the level o f 1990 in lhe yea r 2000, anel ti rceluct ion hy 25% in the year 2040. This is not sufficient 10 prevent a redoubling of the C02 concemra tio n in the next century and therefore does not exclllde radical climate changes. 11 is ve ly deal' that th e EC poliey does not come up 10 the criterium o f sustai nabilil Y. At the same time, ''suslainabl e growth ', a new, unexplained and 1110st probably impossible principle, is included in the second anicle of the EC (Maastricht) Treat y (Sevenster, 1993), And the ce ntral theme of the Fifth Environmenwl Action Programme of lhe Europe~lJ1 COl11missio n is 'o n the road to suslainability'. The 'preeautio nary principle ', which was embedded ea rlier in interna-=tional treaties , 1 !. is set down in

alliele 130R of the EC Trcaly.

This principle prevenLS a situation in whieh actors cia not lake mea sures against environmcntal problen1s beea use thc dear proof of the rel:nion with

J

hUlllan act ivit ies is not ye t available. It is a good principle, internationa ll y acce ptcd , o nl y not used in praclice. Finally, the EC treaty l11entions 'sllstainable d evelopmcm ' in relalio n to development aid.

COl/filet wi/b tbe Europeall EI/ergy CIJlIrter Apart from a non -susw inable larget , that \Vi II be difficuh cl10ugh la meel , Ihere is even question of conOicting economie

EC policy.

By the enel of this year, th c EC member states will p robably sig n thc European Energy Cha rt er. This is an iniliative of the Dutch Prim e Minister Lubbers. The cha rter contains guielelines for lhc ex pl o ita {ion of stocks of fossil fuel from Ihe former Soviet Union . The combustion of fossil fuel \vill cause a prolonged emissio n of greenhouse gases into thc at mosphere in fou r W~lyS: - the combustion o f petroleum and nalural gas itself causcs C02 emission; - intensificd exploitation in Siheria , and the rei nforced green l1 0use effect, cou ld cause th e eXlensivรง permafrost area 10 dcfrost mo rc deerly. In the process, billions of ton nes of mClhane, a l11uch stronger green house gas tl1:111 C02, will be emitled and in ve rse the green hou se effeC!: - the massive input of fossil fuel inlo the world markcl will caust." prices 10 drop.

In th at way an ince ntive for economiea l lIse is lost ; - if these stocks would nOl lX.'come availabie, the search for alternatives would be Illuch morc urgent and " wc would have 10 look hard for suslainable energy sources like wind, b iomass and sola r power, wh ich produce virtually no greenhou se gases.

The fact 1hal a c harter th~tI no n-sustainabic has been proposed by the Netherlands is a mockery of the Dw ch claim

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Jaso" Magaz ille no. 6, d ecember 1993

27

that lhe country advocates sustainanle development internmiona ll y.

Application of New EG-Principle s: a Change for the BeUer ?

So far all great souncling prin ciples have also not come to much (Sevenster, 1993). Apart from Ihe shortcoming EC greenho use target, it is absolu tely unclear how it ever will he meI. The EC deveConcrete lo ps conflicting policies. instruments Iike energy raxes are shoved back anc! forth between different authorities. The Netherlands will o nl y introduce an energy lax when the rest of Europe does lhe same, the European Council has l orpcdoed a European Commission proposa l for energy lax (Joh nson, 1993), in view of th e slow prog ression in Japan and lhe United Statcs (Van der Wiel ,

1993).

Still, the Netherl ands ho lds high hopes o f the EC environmental policy. [n fact , there certainly are reasons for moderate optimism : - the signanlre o f the EC Treaty wi ll change decision-making procedures: - the European Parliamen t could see Lo Lhe fulfi lment of thc principles (sustainability and sustainable development , preca utio nary principl e) mo rc strict ly; - and finally the European Coun could apply the principles mo re o ften (SevenSIer, 1993).

If the EC w ishes not to be 'on the road to susrainabiliry' for ever, bUL phms to reach her goal at some point , she will have to sharpen her target conce ming Ihe greenhouse problem and she will have to establish a more effective greenhouse po liey.

Unnerving UNCED For a lo ng time many ho ped that th e nations present at the Un ited ations ConEnvironment and ference on Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, wou ld concJude an important treaty concerning the atmosphere. In the autumn of 1990, the Second \Vorld Climate Conference (SWCC) had been held. Everyone had agreed thaI a world c1imate lreaty wou ld be rea dy for Rio, and many ho ped thaI lhe treaty wou ld conlain c1ear and strict reduct io ns of emissions. Although the America ns did recognize lhe precautiomuy principle at thc S\VCC for the first time, berween th e SWCC and Ri o th ei r position has not shown a lot of progressio n.

Conferences held in Noordwijk and Bergen d id not bring much news, either,

28

and in th e run to the Rio conference the cxpcct3tions o f someonc likc the Dutch M inister o f Environment Alders grew mo re and more pessimistic (de Volkskrant , 3-6- 1991). In Ihe pre-Rio negotia(Îo ns thc US did nOl agrec to reduclions o f emissio ns. Also al UNCED itself su eh reclucti ons were nor added. In the end a trea ty was concluded , but man y dismissed this United Nati ons Framework Convention o n Climate Change (U !FCCC) in a few worels ( Kakebeeke Jlllong others, verbal message).

When the targets in the UNFCCC are put the test o f sustainability, it is clear that this convention absolurely does nor come up to sustainability, beGluse not one single number is mentioned and nOl a single emission reducti o n is agreed.

O n account o f the UNFCCC wc fear th e w o rst for the efficacy the international po licy needs now more Ihan cve r, for instance in the shape of a supra-natio nal authorit y. Many ha ve been disappointed by this missed opportunit y ancl say that this convent io n is no convent ion.

10

Cold Comfort Thc veto th e us have put on em ission recluctions has greatly diminished the prest ige the US had in the (environmental) world . The onl y lighl at the end o f the tunnel is that at least sornelhing has been wrillen down which can be sharpened. In addition, the country wi th the la rgesl emission of green house gases ( th e US) has at least agreed to this conve nlio n. Experienccs in Ihe pa st show lhal a somewhal ton ed down Ireaty with a US signafure on it is preferabIe to a sharply fonnu laled trea ty w ilhou t the US o n board. Al so because a country in selfchosen internatio nal isolmion wi ll o nly slowly afriliate itself agai n, we mighr have had to give up thc US altogelher in this case. Bcsides, th e c1ectio ns w2ere coming up ancl the chanccs are {hat the con vention will be sharpened under PresicIent Clinton. In any case it has been signecl .

On the other hand , we ca nnot deny the strong pragmatic insight o f Ihe America ns. Their policy (reforeslatio n) may be realistic, wh ile th e EC, w hen askecl about results and time frame , speaks bea lItifliI words but is left empty-hancled . Like we see it happen so much w hcn Ihe protectio n o f o ur environment is at stake...

Conclusio1t It is difficult to prove th e green house effecL, bUL il has been accepted , lhanks to the IPCC, (almost) worldwide. The serio usness of the expected changes made prcca utio nary measures wide ly accepted. Therefore it is very sad lO see that internatio nal po licy makers seem to be

Jaso1t Mag a z i1te no. 6, december 1993

unable 1O use th is frightening knowledge in internatio nal po licies ancl actions.

They ha ve accepted the concept of sustainahilit y and altho ugh the concept of sustainability can be explain ed in many '\vays, il has proven itself to be useful , if it is c1early operated . IL is good to see that internati onal po liey has adopted lhis concept , but lhe way it is usecl is mostly we~lk.

The o nl y co nclusion we ca n clrJ. w is thaI po licies most of the time are fo rmulated 'on the road ro sustainability' but that policies in m her fj elds are confl icting. Especially in the globa l contex t not enough has been achieved yel. In facl we can s~l y that a rea l and suslainable approach of the complex greenhouse probl em still has to start. \Ve are wait ing for lhe first emission reductions ...•

Ma/hUs Nans'ljn and Jaap Rodenburg are sfudying ecology al Ihe Ul1iversity of Utrecht.

"Th e European Energy Charter is a mock ery to the claim by the Netherlands that they advoca te suslainable development internationa ll y" "BeC3 use technical failures are not dealt with in treaties, DSM has legally leached mo re Ihan 5200 ton nes of CFCs in 1992 byacc ident" "Wc are waiting fo r the first emission reduclions ... "

l iterature !3öHchcr, C..J.F., Science and fiction of the green house effect and ca rbo n diox ide. In:

Change, 1993/ 13Ciarenhurg, L.A. . De wereldomvattende milieuproblematiek. Lecture in the course International Environmelal Po liey, UU, 1993.

Copius PecrclX>OIll, ).w., Milieuchemie. In: Basishoek Milieukunde, Boom Meppel Amstt:rd:un, 1991.

Goud riaan. j. , Plantengroei en broeikaseffect.

In: NalUur & Techniek , Maastricht , 1993/7. j ohnson, S. P., The Earth Surnmit . The United Nations Conference on Environment and DeveJopment (UNCED), Gra ham :md Trotman/ Martinus Nijhoff. London, 1993.

Loveiock , James, Gaia een nieuwe visie o p de aarde. Kosmos Utrechlf Antwerpen. 1980.

Opschoor. I-l ans & Ploeg, Floris va n der,.

Duurzaamheid en kwaliteit: hoofddoelstellingen van milieubeleid. In: liet mi lieu, denkbeelden voor de 21e eeuw. Commissie Lange Tennijn Milieubeleid. Kerckehosch BV Zeist, 1990.

Rijk , Peer de, Energiepb n verslerkt het broeikaseffect. In: Milieudefensie 1993/ 10.

RI VM, NalÎonale Milieuverkenning 2, Sa mson IlDrrjeenk Willink BV, Alphen aI d Rijn, 199 1.

Sevcnster, Hanna G ., lIet EG -mi lieubeleid: duurzaam op weg? In: Milieu en recht.

1993/6.

Wiel , Ilan va n der, Het niel te bewijzen broeikaseffect. In: Milieudefensie, 1993/10.

"M inister Alders somher over kans op C02verd rag". de Volkskrdnt, 3-6-199 1. "jaarverslag DSM". de Limbur~er , 18- 10- 1993

Wat is Jason?

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Index ]ason Magazine 1992/1993 1992/ 6. The changing UN A. van Staclen

From peace-keeping 10 peaceenfo rccmcnt

A. P,It Jacobovits

de Szeged (lmerview)

The UN anel NATO in peaceoperations: panners or competitors

M. Geus J.G. Siccama

G. Ringnaida

J.

Shea

lJ1'\CRC SiJllulat ion '92: Sirengrhening the worl el

Theo Wams

Mu ltinational en het m il ieu

P..J. M. Köbhen

Open markten en versterking

Scherpenhuijsen Rom(int )

De Trilaterale Commissie

13arbara Rijks

Ged ragscodes voor Multinationale ondernemingen,

Restructuring o f the United Natio ns

Ton Klulllper

Cultuurverschi llen en cultuurveranderingen

P.J.A. Lidkl.'lls

1\ society in love w ilh technique

A.G.D . van Osch

Voldoet de nieuwe NA VOstrategie

o pkomende standaarden?

Nato's role in peace-keepîng

Nico Schulte Nordholt

Nederlands blinde vlek tot lndonesiL:

André Haakma t

De hedendaagse betrekking tuss<.:n Suriname en Nederland

Stefan L'1ndsberger

Hong Ko ng: van Britse kroon kol onie tOl Volkrepublikeinse "Special Admin istnH ion Region l!

D. Leurdijk en J. Brugman (Intelview)

Groot I3rittan ië en Palestina: Een vergeten geschiedenis

Hans van der Lee

De Omaanse Rena issa nce

S. van Bennekom

Interna[ionale Samenwerking in An tarctica: successen en beperkingen

1993/ 4.

Tom Kuperus

De Palestijnse staal

Lec h \X!a lesa

T<.:nels of Polish Securily Po licy

Pietef Kooijmans

H el Midden-Oosten \verkbezoe k

Malco lm Rifk ind

Pea ce- keeping or Peace-making

james Dobbi ns

The T ra nsatlantic Relat ionship

Pieter van Geldrop

In dienst van de vrede

11..1. Regeu r

IAEA

jemen \X1arner

Water

Sophie Verbllrgh

Leven in barakken

De Europese Leadership crises

1993/2. Oost·Europa in Balans?

Conflict in voormaligjoegoslavië: een hi storie van angst en nat ional isme

Marc van Wees

Hel milieu van Oost-Europa onder cl e loep genomen

Erik-jan Ke ijzer Peter A.J. Broeders

I Ioc stabiel is Ho ngarije?

Criminal activitics in Eastcrn Ellrope

Tom Kuperu s

Eens verguisd, nu met open

D e e igen cultuur, belemmering of bevordering

Frankrijk/ Afrika: macht <.:n onmacht

Lesley d' H uy

arme n ontvangen.

M. Veltman

Elly Rijnie rse

Marc KJumper

F.P.H. van Nouhuys (interview)

The va r iability of the UN as an effective pea ce- and securitys[ructure

1993/ 1. Oude koloniale banden

Mient jan Faher (Intervie\v)

1993/ 3. Multinationals

Schendingen van Mensenrechten in Bosnië- I lerzegow ina: Verkrachlingen en etni sche zuiveringen Trends in the former Soviet Union High Noon: Return 10 the cold war?

Piet Danken

Centra I Ea stern Ellrope anel [he process of Ellropean integration.

TOI11 Kuperus

Killed by Other Mea ns

H erman Kok

Als toerist in Hepllblica I-Irvatska

1993/ 5. Aandacht voor Duitsland Tom Kupenls

Ahsurd

Ch ristoph Driessen

Philips, drugs en Bea trix

E. de Roy van Zuydewyn

Gennan aflns exports

Ursula Mehrbnder & Günther Schultze

Iml11igration concept for Gerl11an y

J-I ans-Ulrich Seic!t

A new security environm ent

jacco Kroon

Oosl-Duitsland in de verkoop

jaap Rodenburg

M ilieuheleid in Duitsland

Lesley d' H uy

Veranderingen in cle VN

El11ma Muller

Lehanon & Unifil

Manijn Hop

Oostenrijk en de EG