Jason magazine (1997), jaargang 22 nummer 2 by Stichting Jason

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MAGAZINE, VOLUME 22, NUMBER 2, APRIL 1997

ORGAN OF THE JASON FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN COOPERATION WITH DUTCH UNITED NATIONS STUDENT ASSOCIATION

JAS~'*N INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS

MAGAZINE

JASO:or. \II\G \ZI1'IoE

CONTENTS

EditorilJ/ Hoord dl"> M Cms. &lIlor in ehlef

d.... M den Holttog d", H \3/l Lecu~e mrs. drs M Med.eh dn. R Sandee drs C. Widder"Nnen EdilQri,JI lloord'l Addrtu

JASON Mailllllnc, l:.JutJrial ROMd c/o Pcacc Re..earch Cenlrc Unhcrsity of Nijmegen

Preface NATO Enlargement will damage European security.

PO, Bo~ 9108 6500 HK Nijmegen HIE NETI-IERLANDS

F. Bolkestein

J \50' FOl ,I) \TIO~ I .5111 Sdw:rn\tlll L. \ an Eff('nn~ mi" H Camerc J.A Pos)('lh ou, M de Jong:

Ch.amnan Vice.('hairm3n Sccmary: TrebUrcr: Intcnullonal Secreta/')':

L Dtttman

t'undrat'>Cr' Public Relallon~: General AlTai" SIB-Nederland

F.S,L Schoulen

J. De la Haye

Expanded NATO is bad for Russia and the World I. Rybkin

011"\. M Ik....em mn. I. Ren'Hlk

Genl'rullJourr/ dT"i LJ. Bal mr\. dl"'> E. Bcn..e mrs. dr.. K. HuMinx dn JA de Koolllg. M Phi] dr; lij La'>Cur AWL van der Lee d", LJ.J . PnT\l.~n drs D. Pnn ... df'i J. Tome<,e:n

mn.. dn. M. SIC drs E. nm Uum

Adl'isQ'1 CQuncil profdr E. Dd.ler. Ch.Jmnan

F de Baller profdr J.ThJ. ':In den Bc'l profdr 11 de liaan prof.<b V. B al~I3d1 d .... GJJ,M. III)en c.c. \an den Heuvel HAM Hoefnallelr, mI' J.G.N. de lloop Sl.:hcITer dB RW. Mell1Cs RD _Praaning dJ'S W K.N. Sehmclzer mB d~ L. Sprangcr. profdr A van Staden

Elections in Bosnia : The role of a supervisor

A competitive Europe: the enterprise approach

J. Major

Environmental standards in the European Union and adoption in associated members. A. Kentrié

JASON Seminar Participanl's conlribulions

Books

23 25

SIB-Nederland

Articles JASON Magazine

drs L Wecke Addrru

JASOS FoundatIOn

Laan \an

M ~rdcr.'0011

25 17 AR 's-Gra\enhage phol1C 070 J60 SM8 fax: 070 • J6J 128S JASQV Con/ac/poin',

Enk-Jan QQn,

(020 - 625 4795) (050 - 31264661 (050 - .\12 9252) (07 1 512 SIOO) (o·n 325 2 161)

Rotterdam'

Mar~

(OIO - 414 46(1)

Utrecht

Sandrn Gel'lCt

Am~terdam

Peter lbeum\l

GromngC'n

Juha Oorls Maanen-Jan b\rna

Kmta KUIpt"

Lelden MlIaslncht

Schipper

(0.'\0 251 206 1)

Ncither the JASON Foundation nor lhe E.dllonal Board or JASON M(lgawIC' cannot he hold accou nlahle for Clp11l10n\ pUI fOlVoard In CQntnbulions 10 Ihis publication Sub'\l,:nptlon~ ~III he aulomallcaJly I'I:OCl'oed. unkM. a wnllen cancclallon IS !>C'nd he fo~ lhe fif"i:t of dC'cembc!r

Lay-out Print

J M Kok DruklenJ LakC'n.C'ld RV.. ')-Gra\C'nhagC'

Photo (ron/page: European Union, Brussels

PREFACE This edition ol JASON Magazine is published on the occasion ol the JASON Seminar 1997 which will take place in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Dealing with European polities, people involved are automatically conlronted with the security dimension ol Central and Eastern European aftairs in relation to the (Western) European Union, the Organisation lor Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation . This Magazine will therelore contain articles dealing with this aspect ol European development. Although understanding each others arguments , president Clinton and president Jeltsin did not change their views alter the Helsinki Summit ol last Mareh. Therelore , according to the opinion ol the Editorial Board , it is very interesting to look into premises ol the Russian delegation with which they entered the negotiations. In this Iramework attention is also paid to the arguments ol the leader ol the Dutch Liberal Party, which lead to a parliamentary debate prior to the Helsinki meeting. Furthermore a lew Seminar participants present their vis ion on environmental and monetary European issues and Turkish sympathy lor the European Union (Edit. ).

NATO ENLARGEMENT WILL DAMAGE EUROPEAN STABILITY F Bolkestein NATO is playing an important part within the European security scene. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there is a need for security arrangements for Central and Eastern European countries. Although NATO has invited several of these states to join the Alliance, Bolkestein did wonder in an article preambulatory to the Helsinki Summit of last March, whether if this would be the right decision within present circumstances? In war: resolu/ion . In defeal: defiance. In vic/ory: magnanimi/y. In peace: goodwill. That is the legend with which Winston Churchill introduced his history ol the Second World War. The Cold War was acontest which the Soviet Union has clearly lost. What lorm should our magnanimity take? What type ol long-term relationship should Western Europe seek to establish with Russia? That other statesman , Michael Gorbachov, once said : He who s/rives /0 main/ain peace, mus/ regard /he securi/y of his adversary as if i/ were his own. Russia has been through a traumatic period . That process is by no means ended . The empire has disintegrated. The borders ol Russia are wh at they were belore the time ol Catherine the Great. The loss ol the Ukraine where Russia originated , is particularly painlul. The Red Army, which once was a great army, is in a bad condition , as became manilest during the war in Chechnya.

The economy is disrupted . The old nomenkla/ura have become the nouveau riche. The mafia is on the mareh. Not just Boris Yeltsin , the whole ol Russia is ripe lor intensive care. Russia looks today as it might have looked as had it lost the Second World War; diminished , divided , impoverished and in disarray. Many Russians leel wounded in their pride and honour. The East European sphere ol infiuence has turned against it. Russia is , in Asia , conlronted by the growing power ol China ; in the South , by Chechnyan separatists, Iranian lundamentalists and the radical Taliban. Is this the time to humiliate the Russians lurther and , by enlarging NATO up to the borders ol the old Soviet Union, to drive them into a corner? Have we learned nothing Irom the Die/a/e of Versailles? Saying th at NATO is a delensive organisation is ol little point, because th at is not wh at the Russians think. They see NATO as a military alliance aimed at Moscow. And th at is ol course precisely wh at it is. At what else? NATO is not a tennis club. Had the present situation existed in 1947 Russia crushed , Germany undivided, a prosperous and integrating Western Europe no one would have considered setting NATO aloot. That is not to say that NATO should now be abolished . It remains alter all the only eftective international military organisation, and indispensable to peacekeeping operations , Jason Magazine nO.2, april 1997

such as the one in Bosnia; out of area or out of business. It does however serve to emphasize the absurdity of enlargement. It has been centuries since the geopolitical position of Poland was so free from dispute. Not only is the Red Army powerless , the Ukraine has become a large buffer state . Also for Slovakia, Hungary and Romania . For the first time in its history, the Ukraine is independent. Enlargement of NATO would make Russia increase its pressure on the Ukraine. Now dormant pro-Russian elements would feel encouraged in their advances to Moscow. We should not give Moscow the power to veto enlargement; nor should we give Warsaw the power to veto non-enlargement. Rejecting the Poles is difficult. How much harder then to accept Polish membership and exclude the Baltic states? Because membership of those states is considered universally undesirable. Militarily they cannot be defended. Moreover they used to be part of the Soviet Union - which cannot be said of Poland which makes them an especially sensitive issue for Moscow. Enlargement of NATO will not increase but reduce the stability of Europe . Russia has postponed ratification of the disarmament treaty for strategic arms (START 11). A new treaty on

Photo: NATO Photo, Brussels 2

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

ballistic missiles (ABM) has been put on hold. The disarmament treaty for conventional arms (CSE) was concluded in the light of the previously prevailing European balance of military power. Enlargement of NATO would disturb that balance, causing the Russians to seek to amend the CSE. Russia will , at the very least, feel compelled to reinforce its armed forces, using resources desperately needed for its economic development. Loans extended by the West are not consistent with enlargement. We need Moscow's cooperation in Bosnia , to curb the export of fissionable material, in Iran and to combat international terrorism . Such cooperation will not be stimulated by enlargement. Wh at kind of problems would NATO take on board? An artificial separation of Hungary and Romania on admission to NATO wil! stir up extremist elements in both countries. Those were the cautionary words of the Romanian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs , Theodor Melescanu (NRC Handelsblad, 23 October 1996). Should Romania then join? Does Western Europe really want to become involved in a dispute belween Romania and the Ukraine over Moldova? Would Romanian membership truly increase the security of Western Europe? Turkey has warned th at it will block entry of East European countries to NATO until such time as the European Union has assented to Turkey's membership. This is the last thing the EU should do. The population of Turkey is too numerous and poor, the culture , and in particular the religion, are too dissimilar to our own and the Turkish communities in Germany and The Netherlands would act as magnets in stimulating migration. All unnecessary problems! As if we didn't have enough . As the Indian prove rb puts it: When in a burning forest, do not shout to attract the attention of the tiger. Who actually wants this enlargement, apart from the East European governments? In the first place America . On 23 October 1996, President Clinton spoke in Detroit, where many of the ethnic voters live. That was during his election campaign . He spoke in favour of admission of Poland , Hungary and the Czech Republic. To make the connection obvious, he visited , after the meeting , the Polish Village CafĂŠ. Wh at is the attitude of ordinary people in Eastern Europe to these issues? Poland will be compelled to double its military budget for the coming five years in order to adapt to NATO standards, as Polish President Kwasniewski told his military staff. That will cost billions of dollars, money beller spent elsewhere . Opinion polls indicate that enthusiasm for NATO

membership is on Ihe decline in Ihe Czeeh Republie and Hungary. Many people Ihere regard neulral Auslria as a better example. Thai should also be Finland for Ihe Ballie slales. Finland is nol a NATO member bul enjoys prosperily and independenee and rales good relalions wilh Moseow as ils firsl priorily. The surge of favour for expansion is ebbing. German Chaneellor Helmul Kohl warned in Ihe Wehrkundetagung of February 1996 againsl a 100 rapid enlargement: Ihe West must be aware of the position of Russia. Anyone dismissing this matter /ightly, has gone severely astray (Telegraaf, 5 February 1996). Presidenl Jacques Chirae would prefer Ihal Russia's wis hes are mei before any enlargemenl of NATO is undertaken. The same proeess works in Ameriea . Certainly, heavyweighls sueh as Henry Kissinger and Ihe new Seerelary of Slaie for Foreign Affairs

Madeleine Albrighl are in favour of enlargement. Bul Sam Nunn , Ihe highly respeeled former ehairman of Ihe Senale Defenee Committee , has never eoneealed his misgivings . Joseph Biden , now Ihe leading Democralof Ihe Senale Foreign Affairs Committee , also has reservalions . NATO expansion needs 10 be ralified by a two-Ihirds majorily of Ihe Amereian Senale. If NATO were 10 resolve 10 enlargemenl bul Ihis would nol be ralified by Ihe Senale, il would eonslilule a major ealaslrophe. Is Ihere an allernalive 10 enlargemenl? Certainly. In Ihe firsl plaee, Ihe Partnership for Peace. Thai is no bogus effort. II offers Easl European partners Ihe opportunily of participaling in NATO aelivilies wilhoul being members . Seeondly, membership of Ihe European Union. Thai will provide Ihe Easl European slales Ihe framework neeessary for slabilily. Accession 10 Ihe EU is slill five 10 len years away bul Ihe Russian army will in all probabilily remain weak for al leasl Ihal long. Should Russia revert 10 ils old expansionisl habils, Ihere will slill be lime 10 eonsider NATO's response. In May 1990 George Kennan said: It is unwise for one great power to utilize the temporary weakness or embarrassment of another great power to force concessions which under normal circumstances would not be forthcoming . Summing up: a eosl-benefil analysis of NATO expansion is highly unfavourable. II serves no slralegie purpose and dislurbs Ihe relalion wilh Russia for no good reason . II will raise precisely Ihe dangers whieh il wishes 10 allay. Don'l do it.

Mr drs F. Bolkestein is chairman of the Liberal Party (VVD) in the Second Chamber of the Nethertands Par/iament. This contribution is a translation of an artiele he wrote for De Volkskrant of 8 February 1997. F. Bolkestein, VVD

Jason Magazine no.2, april 1997

ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA The role of a supervisor J. Oe la Haye On the 14th of September 1996, the people of Bosnia were able to play an active part in the democratisation process of their country. One of t he Supervisors of the OSCE at the elections, mr. De la Haye, writes in th is article about his experiences in Novi Grad , Sarajevo. The Organisalian far Securily and Caaperalian in Europe (OSCE) is still implementing its largest mission ever: to aid the implementation ol the peace accord on Bosnia-Herzegovina . The Organisation plays a key rale in the postconflict settlement and efforts to rebuild civil society. The Daytan Peace Agreemenl included an Agreement on Elections as an integral and vital part ol the overall solution . Some describe the elections as the key element on the civilian side, however, a serious democratisation process also deals with economic reconstruction, restaurative jurisdiction, freedom ol press . .. The preamble of the Agreement (Annex 3) expresses the objectives neatly: In order la promale free, fair, and democralic eleclions and la lay Ihe foundalion far represenlalive gavernmenl and ensure Ihe progressive achievemenl of demacralic goals Ihroughoul Basnia and Herzegovina ... Also the role ol the OSCE in the elections was defined in the Peace Accord. In lact, the organisation was burdened with heavy and unprecedented responsibilities. It was up to the OSCE to certify whether elections could be effective under current social conditions and to provide assistance to the parties in creating these conditions ; it was up to the OSCE to adopt and put in place the elections program as stipulated in the Peace Accord; and it was the OSCE's duty to supervise the preparation and the conduct ol the elections. Part of the OSCE's mandate was to establish the provisional election commission , which was charged with the tasks of supervising all aspects ol the electoral process, to determine voter registration , to ensure compliance with all the electoral rules and regulations, and to accredit observers. The reason why the OSCE was charged with these responsibilities seems to lie in !wo lacts. 4

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

First, the CSCE meeting on the human dimension , held in Copenhagen in 1990, has approved unanimously the commitments of all CSCE countries with regard to elections, la ensure Ihal Ihe wi/l of Ihe peaple serves as Ihe basis of Ihe aulharily of governmenl commitments th at were incorporated in the Dayton provisions'. Second , the OSCE could still operate as a neutral actor in the conflict, which could not be the case for the European Union , nor lor the lailing United Nations. Thirdly, the OCSE missed some conflict prevention actions at the beginning ol the conflict, and could now gain more credibility il it could successlully organise the elections . Within a period of six to nine months, the elections were supposed to be held'. So it was not a coincidence th at the elections were held on the 14th September 1996, nine months after the implementation ol the Peace Accord . On top ol that came the American elections (5th November 1996), this was the only thing already known at December 1995 (not whether the situation would be good enough on the ground to have elections) . The American elections strongly determined the agenda .

The OSCE Supervisor The OSCE mobilised some 920 short-term observers to monitor the elections. They were deployed in teams of two across the Federation and Republika Srpska to cover the 4.400 poling stations. There were, in addition , some 1.200 long-term supervisors stationed in BosniaHerzegovina . They we re also deployed in teams ol !wo, usually in such operations the teams were of mixed nationalities, this was , however, more the exception then the rule. The official reason was for organisational reasons, however, security played an important role as weil. Nearby every national group of supervisors , there was a military IFOR contingent ol the same nationality. The Belgian supervisors were located at Sarajevo and Vitez, and in Visoko was the BELUGA - IFOR division (Belgium , Luxembourg , Greece and Austria), not a coincidence . Other Belgians were send to Mostar where a WEU police force was operational , and only a couple ol Belgians were

in Prijedor. Each team had a driver and interpreter at its disposal, and was responsible lor approximately eight poling stations. The difference between the observers and the supervisors is double, the mandate and the duration ol the presence on the field. The supervising mandate goes lurther than the mandate ol the observer, the lalter can only observe, in the sense ol watching and inquiring. Whereas the supervisor was entitled to advice as weil. The presence ol the supervisor is longer, three weeks instead ol one week lor the observer. The impression one gets after one week ol the political situation on the field is very basic, only after three weeks one is able to get a clearer view. Three weeks is a start or the absolute minimum to understand what is happening in a specilic country. Another difference was that both had separate chiels, Ambassador Frowick headed the supervisors, whereas mr. Ed. van Thijn was the responsible lor the observers. Both had to decide - autonomously - whether the election were valid or not. The responsibilities ol the supervisor were numerous, we can distinguish ten. 1. Inspect polling station sites Prior to election day the supervisors had to visit all polling stations sites in their area ol responsibility to become lamiliar with their locations and conditions, and il possible conlirm the availability ol electoral supplies and polling staff. The presidents ol the polling stations were asked whether they knew the procedures and whether they had lound enough staff members to help him during the election day. 2. Gonfirm arrangement for delivery of eleclion material to polling stations The day belare the elections the local authorities delivered the election material at the polling stations. It was up to the supervisors to confirm with the Local Election Gommission (LEG) th at adequate arrangements had been made lor delivery ol election materials to the polling stations. Il arrangements seem problematic the supervisor had to consult with the LEG and OSGE Election Officer to ensure that election materials were distributed in a timely manner. Once delivered, the material came under the responsibility ol the chairman ol the polling station . 3. Gonfirm security arrangements for polling stations In the days belare election day supervisors had to confirm with local officials arrangements lor security at the polling stations, including the involvement il any ol local police. They had also to consult with International Police Task Force (IPTF) and military Implementation Force (IFOR) units th at will be operating in their area

ol responsibility to determine the local security situation and plans and procedures lor responding to contingencies . The primary security responsibility was in the hands ol the local police. 4. Gonfirm polling station operalion On election day, the supervisors had to observe the opening ol a selected polling station . After the commencement ol voting at 0700 hours, the supervisors had to visit all polling stations in their area ol responsibility to ensure that polling stations had cammenced and was proceeding normally. In the event th at a palling station was not aperating it was the supervisors task ta report the lact to the Local Election Gommittee and support actions necessary ta ensure the polling station commences operations as soon as possible. 5. Advise polling station chairman Ouring election day the supervisor was responsible lor supporting the operatian ol several polling stations (mostly eight). They had to answer questians and advise the Ghairman ol the polling station . They could provide guidance, inlormation, clarification ol policy and procedure , and advise polling procedures , preserving peace an'd good order, and other matters affecting the operation ol the polling station . The supervisors had ta lacilitate communication between polling stations , local election committees and OGSE election afficers and assist in ensuring th at polling stations had the necessary election materiais . 6. Respond to complaints and make inquiry into condilions affecting the electoral process The supervisor could hear observations, receive complaints and solicit inlormation concerning all aspects ol conditions at the polling station and in the vicinity thereol Irom the polling station chairman. OSGE-accredited persons (inciuding internationalobservers), local party representatives, ol citizens' groups, and private individuals . 7. Respond to situalions affecting the integrity, security, or tranquillity of the electoral process In extreme cases affecting the integrity, security or tranquillity ol the electoral process, OSGE supervisors may intervene. In the process ol conducting the vote , or request additional assistance to pratect it lrom disruption. In doing so, they had to respect the Guidance on the Role and Responsibilities of OS GE Supervisors, issued by the OSGE Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina . They had also to modify the LEG and the OSCE Election Officer in the area ol the intervention.

Jason Magazine no.2, april 1997

8. Confirm arrangements for transport of bal/ot boxes to counting center Prior to election day supervisors had to confirm th at adequate arrangements had been made lor secure transport ol ballot boxes and other election materials Irom the polling stations to the counting center. After the close ol the polls on election day, the supervisor had to accompany ballot boxes to the counting center, il possible, and ensure th at they are stored in a secure manner. 9. Bal/ot reconciliation Prior to the start ol counting , supervisors were responsible lor aballot reconciliation process at the counting center. Relugee , displaced persons, and military absentee ballots received lrom the sorting center had to be removed lrom their envelopes and mixed with ordinary ballots lrom th at municipality so that during counting it would be impossible to determine their origin . 10. Counting Supervisors had be actively involved in the counting process. II possible, one supervisor worked as a member ol each counting team . Supervisors had to support all counting operations and had to witness related lorms.

Evaluation on election day, Saturday 14 september 1996 Organisation of election day - on paper Approximately 4 .400 polling stations we re operational over the whole ol Bosnia on 14 September 1996. The army and members ol the Special Police could already vote (by absentee ballot) the day belore, so that they would be able to work on Saturday. Refugees abroad had already the opportunity to vote between 28 August 1996 and 3 September 1996. The poling stations opened their doors at 07 .00 am and closed at 19.00, without interruption. In every polling station the following persons we re allowed : the staft of the polling station , registered party observers, OSCE supervisors and accredited OSCE observers . All the voters were free to vote in any polling station within their area , except for the absentees (refugees and displaced persons), which had aspecific polling station. Immediately after the voting , the ballot boxes were taken to the counting center, where the ballots would be counted the morning after, with the help of the supervisors . Organisation of election day - in Novi Grad (Sarajevo) The discussion in the next paragraphs is only pertinent for eight polling stations in Novi rad (Sarajevo), since these were the station in 6

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

which I was a supervisor during the elections. References to other events are based on discussions with other supervisors. Almost everybody (OSCE, IFOR, IPTF and local people) expected tension would raise the closer the election day was in sight, even the election day promised to be not without problems . The main reason was the possibility lor refugees to go back to the area where they had to flee Irom (and would see their damaged house), as aresuit riots could happen . Fortunately, nothing ol the kind happened, nor before, nor after the elections, and even not when the final results were known. In Novi Grad (Sarajevo) a lot of refugees were expected since it was the area with a lot of absentee polling stations. Tension rose in the morning of the election day, when it appeared that only two local policemen were present to guarantee order and security. This could never be enough for the expected crowd for a small school in which twelve polling stations (eighl absentee ballots and four ordinary stations) were located. At a certain moment the doors of the school had to be closed in order to keep voting possible inside, the problem was to calm the waiting crowd . With two local policemen , this was not enough, so IPTF aid had been requested . With success, within a short time, two IPTF policemen arrived and with them some IFOR military support (waiting outside at a sight distance). With IPTF and the - in the mean time arrived - local police support, people could be calmed down and little by little people were able to enter the school to vote. IFOR intervention was never necessary, fortunately, and by 10.00 pm the paling station could be closed.

Results of the elections Ten days after the elections, the results were known . The result was not a surprise, the worry of some became real , the nationalistic candidales (those who started the war) had been given a democratic mandate. The final result was : Izetbegovic 731 .024 ; Krajisnik 690 .130 and ; Zubak 329 .891 . The one with the most personal votes would become head ol the three headed presidium , in this case , it was Izetbegovic. The voting behaviour indicated once again the precair situation , every ethnic group had voted for their candidale . The parties with the most extremist and separatist programs won the elections . For the Croats Zubak was the hero, the Muslims voted for Izetbegovic and the Serbs lor Kraijsnik. It was obvious thaI with the cold peace at the moment, the democratisation process in Bosnia still needs a long way. Same reasons explain the voting behaviour, the elections came to soon after the war and the

feelings of hate were still active. 35% of the political parties were created alter the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which meant they had only a couple of months to present themselves and to work on a program, build a network etc . Another reason laid in the important role of the media , which was controlled by some political parties: SOA in Bosnia; HOZ in Herzegovina; and SOS in Srpska (until the last week before the elections one could say there was freedom of media, but this was only to impress the international observers). Finally, there was a huge gap between the big and small parties when it came to party funding, also crucial in building up a promotion campaign. The elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not translate the new political structures (as foreseen in the Dayton Agreement) into a new political culture, more is needed for th a!. New was the huge number of new political parties (47) which participated , the disadvantage was, however, th at it was only the case in the big cities (such as Sarajevo). The more one lelt the big city the smaller the political choice became . Actually, not a real surprise, in a country which knew a communist regime for many years and where the inter-village connections are not that easy.

OSCE presence

The OCSE presence was significantly important, and this in several ways. First, the supporting role the OCSE played in organising the elections. The local authorities and the presidents of the poling stations knew most of the time how to organise elections, but were much more comfortabie knowing the OCSE supervisors were around in case of problems either logistically of on the procedure. Secondly, the OSCE presence gave the voters the feeling there was a supervision so th at there was liltle chance to fraud . Nevertheless, it must be said , th at the president of a polling station sometimes tried to pass on his responsibility of a decision on the supervisor. One cannot say th at the huge international media altention and the OSCE presence had negative side eftects on the voters. On the contrary, the OSCE presence had been respected and there were no abuses of media altention in the sense th at some parties organised an altack or a rio!. The OCSE presence made sure the elections we re seriously meant, by which it has not been said the elections would be approved automatically. Some voices (e .g. the International Crisis Group) had the opinion the elections could not have been declared valid since

1) there was no freedom of movement (only 15.000 voters had crossed the IEB-line to vote); 2) mistakes were made during counting; 3) the voter registration system failed ; and 4) a lot of people voted for the wrong location due to the P-2 form. It is true some things went wrong, however, one may not loose the global contex!. Indeed, by and large, one may say election day went regarding the circumstances without remarkable problems. At some places difficulties occurred (such as the temporary closing of a poling station due to the amount of people, in Novi Grad , Sarajevo) but no violent actions were signaled . The OSCE contributed to the democratisation process in Bosnia , th at is clear. However, one may not forget th at it takes more then just having elections to have a successful democratisation process . Indeed, there is also the economic reconstruction , the judicial system, the freedom of circulation , freedom of speech, respect for basic human rights, civil society, eftective institutions and so on . Elections are just one part in the process . In this process it is very important that the external international institutions, such as the OSCE, cooperate closely with the local authorities. It is recommended for the coming local elections in September this year, th at the OSCE would work closer together with the local election commiltee , in order to prevent registration mistakes . The OSCE (at least some staft members) learned a lot from this election monitoring experience, out of which actions should made possible for other parts in Middle and Eastern Europe , for instanee another mission in Albania ...

Mr. J. De la Haye is staff-member at the Political Science Deparlment at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium and was OSCE Supervisor during the elections in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Notes

, Unto Vesa , Bosnian Elections : OSCE's Contribution to Peace , in OSCE Review, Vol.4, No.3/96, pag.2-3 . , The Oayton Peace Accords , General Framework Annex 3, Articles 11 paragr.4, and

VI.

Jason Magazine no.2, april 1997

Treaty of Rome (1957) (Photo: European Union, Brussels)

Treaty of Maastricht (1992) (Photo: European Union, Brussels)

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION express or slow-train?

Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)? (Photo: European Union, Brussels) 8

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

EXPANDED NATO IS BAD FOR RUSSlA AND THE WORLD

I. Rybkin NATO is on the threshold of en larging the All iance w ith the Czech Repub li c, Hungary and Po land (and Romania?). However, not everyone is very pleased with this modification in the European securi ty system . In this artiele, the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council gives the Russian opinion on th is matter, which was the main issue of pres ident Jeltsin at his meeting w ith his American collegue Clinton a few weeks ago. In Helsinki, arrangements are made, though feelings are hard to change! Despite all the assurances from the western NATO partners, expanding the alliance easlward - and moving its military infrastructure to the borders with Russia - poses a rnajor longterm threat to Russia's security and interests. It would be unpardonable not to take that threat seriously. Russia is against any expansion of the North Atfantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which does not take into account our security interests. There is a consensus on this issue among all the sensible political forces in this country.

Cooperation to ensure European security By expanding NATO to include Eastern European nations, the Alliance would create preconditions for undermining the established system of arms control, practically the only foundation on which the present European and global system of security and stability rest. Democratie Russia has no wish to engage in military-technological competition with the West or participate in a new arms race. Indeed, no one in the West or East wants the world to return to the enmity and hostility of the Cold War. All of Europe is striving for guaranteed collective security. If, however, NATO leaders stubbornly continue with their plans for expansion Russia, may find itself against its will, in political isolation. This could significantly increase the risk of serious political changes inside this country. These changes, in turn, could provoke a profound military and political crisis; the consequences of which would be very diffcult to predict.

NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe makes the possibility of nuclear weapons being deployed in the immediate proximity of the Russian border quite faal. Granted this is very unlikely at the moment, but this threat may force Russia, on her own, or along with other countries, to take additional measures to safeguard her security. It is too early to say what these measures might beo Russia has not yet finished elaborating its national security concept. Nevertheless it is clear th at, for now and the near future, the main mechanism to prevent both nuclear and conventional large-scale war will be nuclear deterrence and an adequate conventional capability. Russia's preferenee and proposals remain the same: to gradually turn NATO into a predominantly political organisation and to create a comprehensive system of European security on the basis of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which unites far more countries than NATO. We must find a way of perfecting the OSCE and creating on its basis a Europe without lines of division. There is a need for a substantive and comprehensive treaty belween Russia and NATO, which would impose certain obligations on both sides. Russia remains open for the closest possible co-operation in ensuring European security, including participation in peace-keeping forces under the aegis of international organisations . Russia has no intention of attacking or threatening anyone with nuclear weapons .

Strategie arms limitat ion process We have never contemplated and will never allow any preemptive nuclear strike but, like any other country, Russia has the right to defend itself and will do so in the event of direct aggression using all of its capabilities . This is only natural and legitimate and any enemy should realise that if it attacks us , we have no choice but to retaliate in a manner proportional to the situation. There is nothing new or sensational about this position : it is the basis of the well-know strategy Jason Magazine no.2, april 1997

Kremlin Buildings, Moscow (copyright: NOVaSTI, Press Agency) of deterrence. One of the main principles of deterrence is keeping the aggressor uncertain about the possible variants of retaliation . This principle is fundamental to the national security concepts of many Western countries. The only thing certain is that retaliation will be inevitable.

Russia wants the strategie arms limitation process to continue and I believe th at if the international situation is favourable , it will be further possible further to reduce the number of nuclear warheads . The US administration thinks the same . The START-II Treaty, which still remains to be ratified by the lower house of the Russian parliament, will not be ratified if NATO carries out its expansion plans without regard for Russia's legitimate interests. But I think it is still possible to overcome our current differences

Jason Magazine na. 2, april 1997

and break the deadlock. Confrontation between Russia and NATO is ruinous and wasteful for both NATO and Russia and dangerous for Europe and the rest of the warld. For the sake of ourselves and future generations we must preserve all progress we have made in strengthening security and trust and build on it together.

Mr. I. Rybkin is Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council.

â&#x20AC;˘ The Editarial Baard wauld like ta thank IPS and mr. A. Paskakaeshin af RIA NOVOSTI far their kind caaperatian.

A COMPETITIVE EUROPE: THE ENTERPRISE APPROACH

J. Major One of the most important issues European leaders are dealing with in relation to the European integ ration process is the Social Chapter. The British government is questioning the consequences of the Chapter. The British Prime Minister, mr. Major advocates the enterprise approach : to keep bu sinesses competitive and encourage j ob creation'. In Europe, Ihe greatest threat used to be war. Twice this century war has torn our Continent to pieces. It is fifty-two years to the day that the Big Three met at Yalta and set the course for Europe's post-war history. Today, the notion of war between the countries of Western Europe is unthinkable. And the credit, in no small part, goes to the European Union (EU). Peace is the prize th at the project of Europe has won . We must build on th at. That is why I believe in the enlargement of the membership of the Union rather than more integration of existing members - is the proper priority. Today Europe faces a historic challenge - how to keep our companies competitive and our people in work in the face of intense global competition. Prosperity - th at aim which every politician shares - depends on winning in that world . But Europe is not winning. 18.5 Million people are unemployed - the size of Denmark,

Finland and Sweden put together. We are not creating enough new jobs. Over the last twenty years America has created 36 million new jobs, of which 31 million were in the private sector. In that time, the EU as a whole only created 5 million new jobs, of which 1 million were in the private sector. Europe cannot brush th at comparison aside . We have to ask why the private sector has not created extra jobs in Europe whilst it has elsewhere. We have to find the answer and act on it. I believe the answer lies in the policies Europe has followed . We are at a turning point. The choice ei th er to press ahead with policies th at are causing unemployment, or change direction. Crudely, the choice is between two dramatically different economie philosophies the enterprise approach, and the approach most people knowas the European Social Model. It is a debate in which the British Government is often portrayed as being out of step with her European partners. Up to a point, that is true . We are about of step with the European Social Model. We believe it prevents job creation and creates unemployment. We believe that is politically wrong and economically wrong . But no-one should misrepresent our commitment to an enterprise approach to suggest we are against Europe . We are not. We are for Europe . Our history is entwined with europe . Our trade depends on Europe. Our arguments are not about Britain against Europe. Our arguments are about achieving success for the whole of Europe. First, when we oppose a policy it is because we believe it is amistake - it is not a public relations gesture. I do not just mean amistake for Britain , I mean amistake for Britain and Europe as a whoie . And second , our partners are wrong to believe we will come on board in the end . If we dislike the policy - we will not. Because Britain has too much to lose.

Britai n's success

Photo: European Union. Brussels

Britain has been able to create more jobs in the last four years than aal the other major Jason Magazine nO.2, april 1997

countries ot Europe put together. It is not just British companies th at are creating the jobs though they certainly are. We are now also drawing in billions ot pounds worth ot investment trom around the world , one third ot all inward investment into the European Union. And our near neighbours are investing in Britain too . In recent years Britain has been the number one destination tor overseas investment by German business. Some 1,600 German companies now have a base in the United Kingdom .

The European Social Model While we have put our taith in enterprise and the individual , others have tollowed the European Social Model. Britain apart, across the EU state's share ot national income rose trom an average ot 45 percent ot national income in the late 1970s to 49 percent today. Many countries are now making Herculean efforts to bring it under control. They are right to do so. But they have a long way to go and though problems to overcome, not least the mounting bills tor state pensions next century. But public spending con trol is now one area where most European governments can agree on the direction tor the tutu re . The same cannot be said tor labour market regulation . There is a sharp divide between Britain's enterprise approach and aUempts elsewhere in Europe to cocoon jobs by legislation . Protecting jobs by legislations sounds good. But it is a traud , a talse security. It is a case ot bureaucracy detending the status quo as the quo inexorably loses its status. Yes , you can pass legislation to make it harder tor a company to reduce its worktorce . But it reducing the worktorce is what is needed to survive, all you have done is to jeopardise the jobs ot the entire worktorce. It is weil meant but shortsighted policy. The harder it is tor companies to adapt to change, the slower they will be to match the competition they tace . The slower they react, the worse they do. Over-regulation damages growing industries too - the ones on which our security really depends. By making it more expensive to take on additional workers , it locks out the unemployed and adds to long term employment. It may sound responsible and carring . But the European Social Model is in tact tundamentally tlawed . It deprives today's companies ot the chance to compete, and drives away tomorrow's investment and new jobs. Overregulation does not work. And as a result, nor do millions ot Europeans . The figures say it all. 12

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

For every 100 pounds paid in wages, in Germany non-wage costs add an extra 31 pounds, 41 pounds in France and 44 pounds in Italy. In Britain , it is only 15 pounds .

Social Chapter When one looks at those figures, it is easy to see why Britain will not sign the Social Chapter. This is not some arcane dispute about a trivial statement ot good intentions. The point is that, it we signed it, the Social Chapter would be the mechanism to implement the European Social Model in all its aspects . It is not just what is in the Social Chapter today that matters. It is wh at will go in it. The tact th at we have retused to sign it has acted as a brake on its development. But remove th at brake , and new legislation will pile up tast. There is plenty in the pipeline already or under discussion: shifting the burden ot proot onto employers in sex discrimination cases ; extending tuil-time rights and conditions to part-time and temporary workers; compulsory arrangements tor intorming and consuiting employees at national level; turther restrictions on the dismissalot workers ; and new European rules on sick pay. All that and more proposals to regulate working time . That is why I will never sign it. Because one signature on the Social Chapterwould mean 0.5 million signatures on the dole. All Britain would gain trom the Social Chapter is a less competitive economy and more umemployment. First stop Social Chapter, next stop social security. I have no doubt th at it we sign the Social Chapter it would become a Trojan horse unloading on Britain the problems th at brought us to a low point in the 1970s. The Social Chapter has the appetite to become one ot the most tar-reaching provisions in the Treaty covering everything trom working conditions to union rights. And it is no good pretending th at once you had signed up you could have second thoughts . Once you sign up, you cannot opt out again . In the key areas there is no veto . Britain would be powerless to stop our businesses being burdened with all kinds ot unnecessary regulations. I want the whole ot Europe to wake up to the crying need tor an enterprise approach so that Europe can get back to work and we can all prosper. This argument will be crucial at the Intergovernmental Conference at Amsterdam. People will aUack me tor not signing the Social Chapter, and will question my motives: how can I disagree with the objectives ot the Social Chapter - the promotion of employment and improved living and working conditions? Of course I share those aims: in Britain , we are actually achieving both. But ill-considered

burdens on business act against those objectives - not lor them. To achieve those aims , we have to keep our businesses competitive. And we have to encourage enterprise and job creation and not to penalise it. How is job creation helped by centralised , legally binding agreements between employers and trade unions? Some people try to shrug oft the impact ol new regulations by saying th at large companies can aftord the extra cost. That is surely the wrong point. An extra 20 percent or more on employment costs is not small change lor any business. That money could better be used lor Iresh investment.

Myths

Critici sm is generously laced with some contemporay myths. So let me address these myths that stand in the way ol an enterprise th at could Europe put its citizens back to work . The lirst myth is that without the new Social Chapter provisions workers would be open to exploitation. This is nonsense. Let me illustrate that by relerenee to Britain's experience. Britain has comprehensive laws against racial or sexual discrimination . against uniair dismissal , and guaranteeing the right to tra de union membership. Our health and salety legislation has resulted in one ol the best salety work records in Europe. But the State should step in only where it is needed . Over-prescriptive legislation impedes a Iree labour market and adds to costs and not jobs. Proper negotiation between employer and employee is the best guarantee ol workers' opportunities and rights. We are now in the 1990s, not the 1840s. Companies nowadays send young people on training courses not up chimneys. II The second myth is that social legislation is necessary to proteet workers Irom job insecurity. This is a simplistic and unrealistic view. In any modern developing economy there are always going to be some people changing jobs as the result ol competition and technological innovation. That is just a lact ol lile. But wh at is important is th at those who lose their jobs have a good chance ol finding one again soon. The best way to guarantee that is to have adynamie economy where job creation is encouraged . Making it more expensive lor employers to take on new staft hinders, not helps, that process . All social legislation will do is to make it more likely that those who become unemployed stay unemployed. That is in no one's interests.

111 The third myth is th at social legislation will help increase permanent employment rather than temporary jobs. Here too the evidence is clear cut. Britain has the lowest level ol workers on temporary contra cts ol any major European country - 7 per cent in Britain as against over 10 per cent in Germany and France , and over 30 per cent in Spain. And people get out ol temporary jobs and into permanent ones quicker in Britain too: 25 per cent em ployees on temporary contracts in Britain were in permanent work a year later, against just 14.5 per cent in Germany and only 9 per cent in Spain . The truth is that it is the social model , not the enterprise model , that encourages temporary contracts . Employers use temporary work to avoid the red tape that comes with permanent jobs. In one European country, il you give an employee a permanent contract, you connot dismiss him without first applying to the employment service . In two others you would need permission lrom the works council. In yet another, large lirms have to produce a social plan and may lace lengthy appeals th at can ultimately prevent restructuring . And in some other European countries dismissing an employee is virtually impossible. As aresuit, there is a bias against lull-time employees, more are on temporary contracts and more are without jobs entirely. That is one illustration ol the way in which the social model is wellmeaning but soft-headed .

IV Then there is the lourth myth : that without the Social Chapter we will only create low wage jobs and increase inequalities in society. I will let the lacts speak lor themselves. Britain has created over 900,000 new jobs in the last lour years . Ol these, 24 per cent have been in prolessional occupations and 21 per cent are managerial. Almost a quarter ol a million new jobs have been created lor managers, administrators and prolessionals within the financial services sector. So the truth is the British economy is producing good jobs: skilied jobs and weil paid jobs. But because we welcome lull-time jobs does not mean we should scorn part-time jobs. Some opt lor part-time work because they want more leisure and can aftord to reduce their hours. Many women or young people preier a part-time job so that they look after their children or study more . Once people find , albeit part-time work in some cases, our experience suggests that they are likely to see their earnings rise more quickly in a less regulated market. A recent OECD survey showed that in Britain over hall ol those in the botlom fifth ol the Jason Magazine nO.2, april 1997

earnings distribution had risen out of it within five years - a higher proportion than in any of the other countries surveyed . This underlines why a minimum wage would prove counterproductive. If it was above market levels it would price many first time jobs and parttime employees out of the labour force. It removes the bottom rung of the ladder. Where's the social justice in th at? V Finally there is myth number five- the allembracing myth - that a country without the Social Chapter is a sweat-shop economy. That sort of overblown language is simply a substitute for real argument and fact. Yea, it does cost less overall to employ someone in Britain than in many other countries . But that is because of lower Government-omposed costs, lower personal taxes, and because prices are lower here. It does not mean lower take-home pay. The sweat-shop economy myth is now 50 widespread th at few people realise that a production workers take home pay is higher in Britain - in terms of wh at it will actually buy

- than in any other major European economy bar Germany. And of course , you are more likely to have a job in the first place in Britain.

The message tor Europe So my message is clear. I am not seeking special arrangements to allow Britain to benefit at the expense of the rest of Europe. Our British interest is for Europe as a who Ie to succeed . We have nothing to gain if our largest export markets hobble themselves . My message is that Britain hopes Europe will succeed. But I believe it will only prosper in the long term if the enterprise model becomes the accepted way forward . Our arguments are serious. They are based on facts . They deserve careful evaluation . I believe Britain can help shape a Europe in which business can prosper. We are willing to play th at role . It is in our interests to do 50 - and Europe's interest as weil. But we cannot win these battles alone . We need business across Europe to speak up as weil before it is too late. Every day lost makes the battle harder. The British Government has made up its mind . Our enterprise economy is not negotiable. To me , the choice for Europe is simpie. We can either stand up and be counted or lie back and be counted out. And that is no choice at all.

Mr. J. Major is Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

Photo: European Union, Brussels

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

Last February Prime Minister Major addressed the European Poliey Forum in Brussels, of whieh th is is a resumĂŠ. The Editorial Board wishes to thank the stalf of the British Embassy at The Hague for their kind cooperation.

ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ADOPTION IN ASSOCIATED MEMBERS A. KentriĂŠ As stated by mr. Middelkoop, member of The Netherlands Parliament (JASON Magazine 1996/5), the solution to environmental problems is of great importance within the European Union. In this contribution, one ofthe participants of the JASON Seminar analyses the environmental standards in the European Union. In the last few years it has become clear th at civilisalion has reached agiobal phase . This is obvious in all dimensions: social , economie, cultural , political and ecological. Human activity has global impact on the environment. Large possibilities of development drive the global system to accelerated changes. Stability is no longer a value. But all these changes also mean a threat to the future of humanity'. One of the most important ideas in the weslern culture is development which is often used as synonym for economie growth'. Economie growth is responsible for many ecological problems for example climate change, acid rain, deforestation and so on . All these ecological pro bi ems have caused the need for a new definilion of development. The international community has five main characteristics: universality, globality, heterogenity, high structurality and suicidality. The last one defines the possibility of the end of civilisation . There are many reasons which could cause this : possibility of nuclear conflict, use of non-renewable resources and pollution of the environment'. All these reasons caused the development of a concept of sus/ainab/e developmen/ in the eighties. This concept admits the need for development but it also marks that environment cannot handle unlimited development in all the cases. Great importanee is placed on the needs of future generations'. There are no specific provisions made for the relationship between trade and the environment in the Uruguay Round Final Ac/, as many argued there should be. The Uruguay Round does, however, specifically state th at measures designed to proteet the environment are permissible'.

The European Union (EU) has the most significant infiuence on this area in Europe. The EU has already five Environmen/al Ac/ion Programmes which deal mainly with crossborders problems . The key-principle is sustainability. There has been a change in the relationships between EU and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) after the fall of communism. Many of CEEC have Trade and Coopera/ion Agreemen/s and also, a stage higher, European Agreements for the preparation of CEEC for the membership of the EU . The possible membership creates the need to adjust to EU legislation. The European Union has offered potential members among CEEC programme of the economie help, Poland Hungary Aid for Recons/ruc/ion of Economies (PHARE), for support of economie and social reforms. PHARE also includes environmental projects. The CEEC are facing a difficult task of adjustment to EU standards since EU standards have advanced so much in last two decades. The European Union alone has twohunderd Legal Acts in this field . Accomplishment of th is task can be only gradual with financial help from EU institutions. The CEEC must not forget the concept of sustainable development which is the only appropriate for the environmental harmiess strategy of development.

Environmental standards in European Union The European Union has approximately two hundred Legal Acts in the field of protection of the environment. The Single European Ac/ of 1987 already included respect to the environment. The Trea/y on /he European Union (1992) clearly indicated that the completion will be an important means to reaeh , inter alia , a sustainable and non-infiatory growth respecting the environment. EU environmental policy shall aim at a high level of protection and it shall be based on the precautionary principle'. Jason Magazine nO.2, april 1997

Fifth Environmenlal Aclion Programme' The Fifth Environmental Action Programme (5th EAP) has marked an important change of direction for the EU environmental policy. lts key principles are : to integrate environmental considerations into the various target economie sectors, to achieve policy objectives, to broaden the range of instruments and to establish shared responsibility. New concept of sustainable development was evolved . Some of the pressures on the environment have shown a decreasing trend over the past years (mainly due to the pre-5th EAP policies) . However, the following issues require further attention at the European level : climate change and acidification, waste management, (urban) air quality, groundwater quality, habitat destruction and fragmentation. If EU wants to solve these problems , an accelerated environmental policy is needed. This is a major challenge to the European Union in the coming years, since most societal trends show th at further pressures on the environment are likely to occur.

Transfer of Ihe environmenlal slandards 10 Ihe associaled members of CEEC Environmental considerations are from the very beginning part of the process of the commercial

and economie integration of the Associated CE EC. This is clearly expressed in the European Agreements'. Process will be longlasting and will require dialogue among states . The environment in the CEEC presents some stark contrast, extensive wild areas together with some of the worst pollution in the world . In terms of environmental improvement the CEEC have much to gain from weil targeted and weil managed aid programmes bul they also have a great deal to lose from short-term measures , designed to promote economie growth without regard for the environmental consequences . Few projects, programmes and policies are environmentally neutral. II is inevitable thai PHARE will have environmental impacts, some positive and same negative'.

PHARE" The PHARE program me is a European Union initiative which aims to help the CEEC . PHARE does this by providing granl finance to support its partner countries through the process of economie transformation . The main priorities for PHARE funding are common to all countries, although everyone is at a different stage of transformation. The key areas inciude reslructuring of state enterprises, including agriculture , private sector development, reform of institutions, legislature

Photo: European Union, Brussels

Jason Magazine

no. 2, april 1997

and public administration, relorm ol social services, employment, education and health , development ol energy, transport and telecommunications inlrastructure, and environment and nuclear salety. For countries which have signed Europe Agreements, PHARE lunding is also locused on meeting the conditions required lor eventual membership in the EU . PHARE lunds commitled to environment and nuclear salety Irom 1990 to 1994 represent 9% share, th at is 401,4 million ECU . 125,5 million ECU we re intended lor multy-country programmes . The rest ol financial aid was placed in the lollowing countries: - Poland : 87 million ECU 62 ,5 million ECU - Hungary: - Bulgaria : 54 ,1 million ECU - Czechoslovakia : 35 million ECU - GDR: 20 million ECU million ECU - Latvia : 5,5 - Romania : 5 million ECU - Albania: e,e million ECU - Estonia : 2,5 million ECU - Lithuania : 1 million ECU Countries that did not receive financial aid lor environmental protection are ex-Yugoslavia, Slovene and Czech and Slovak Republic after the secession .

THE EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME"

PHARE

Environmental aid was an early CEEC priority and the PHARE Environmental Programme was introduced in 1990. In lact PHARE has provided 75% ol grant lunding to the environmental sector in the CEEC . In addition PHARE lunds support programmes in other sectors which have an impact on the environment such as agriculture, transport, energy and industrial restructuring . There is however intensive critici sm ol the PHARE programme. The end product ol many PHARE-Iunded projects was a corpus ol studies rather than an action; lunding was used to pay western consultants while existing CEEC expertise was not used ; there appeared to be a litlle improvement in the environmental situation as a consequence ol the aid, it was difficult to get inlormation on PHARE-Iunded projects. The lunds allocated to the environmental sector, although large, represent only 9% ol the total PHARE budget. The environmental impact ol the remaining 91 % is likely to be more significant. There is a big problem ol the

ol inlormation on the inaccessibility implementation ol PHARE-Iunded activities . The PHARE programme should consider SEAP in its help to the CEEC . Environmental questions must be integrated in the sector ol economic restructuring.

A. Kentrié, of the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, is participant of the JASON Seminar 1997.

Notes

, Gallopin, G.C., Gutman, P., Maletta, H., Global Impoverishment,Sustainable Development and the Environment: A Conceptual Approach . International Science Jaurnal XLI(3) (1989), pag .375. 2 Gowdy, J.M., Progress and Environmental Sustainability. Environmental Ethics 16(1) (1994), pag.41 . 3 Buar, Bojko, Mecharodna okoljevarsfvene prizadevanja. Vesela znanost 0 okolju; zbornik predavanj 1993/94 (1995), Ljubljana : KUD France Pre eren, pag.170. • Buar, Bojko, Mecharodna okoljevarsfvene prizadevanja . Vesela znanost 0 okolju; zbornik predavanj 1993/94 (1995), Ljubljana : KUD France Pre eren, pag.174. • European Commission, The European Union and World Trade , Luxembourg (1995a), pag.19. • Commission of the European Communities, White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Counties of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of Union (1995). Brussels, pag.214. 7 European Environmental Agency, Environment in the European Union 1995; Report for the Review of the Fifth Environmental Action Programma, Brussels (1995), pag .1-3. • Commission of the European Communities, White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Counties of Central and Eastem Europe far Integration into the Internal Market of Union (1995). Brussels, pag.215. • Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, Report on the Environmental Aspects of the PHARE Programme in the Visegrad Countries, Brussels (1993), pag .9-10. " European Commission, Phare Funding 1990 to 1994, Brussels (1995b), pag 1-66. " Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Con su mer Protection, Report on the Environmental Aspects of the PHARE Programme in the Visegrad Countries, Brussels (1993), pag .8-16

Jason Magazine nO.2, april 1997

JASON SEMINAR 1997 Participant's contributions The fol/owing two contributions were send in by participants of the JASON Seminar 1997.

TURKEY AS A PARTNER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

c. Atag端r Turkey has for long adopted the goal of being within Europe and with Europe together. Above all , Turkey wants to be within the European Union in order to accelerate her modernisation and doing such catch up with the level of the developed countries. The stabie EC market, which Turkey knows very weil as it has fostered mutual trading relations for a long time , has a special importanee for Turkey. Turkey is not a poor and crowded country that wants to join the European Union. Turkey has adynamie and developing economy th at will provide significant economie opportunities to the European Community. It is one of the few European countries in Europe th at have achieved and maintained a high level of economie growth since 1960 (an average annual rate of 5.3 % in the period of 1960-88 and 9.2 % in 1990) until present. Furthermore , Turkey has a high technical capacity so that it can absorb and adjust to new technologies successfully. Therefore, it is possible to build up new industries using new and advanced techniques on the existing industries. Some advantages which Turkey has over the other European countries , like a combination of a low cost and a technically qualified labour force, provide a common opportunity of setting up the industries in Turkey which are no longer preferred in Europe. With many such opportunities, Turkey is also a good and important market for the EC . Turkey has a market of 60 million consumers whose purchasing power, though not high at present, has been increasing fast. Turkey is situated on both sides of the Bosporus and forms a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, Central Asia and the Islam ie world . Since Turkey is an Islamic country, her possible membership in the EU will bring about positive impacts on the latter's relations with other Islamic countries . Turkey, with it special dynamism, seems to be the only country th at can provide the dynamics the European Community needs for its further development. The Customs Union with EC , is of massive importanee for Turkey. It is the way of joining the European Union. It does not only have this economie focus like free trade area for goods or a common tariff for third countries. But the 1/95 decision has also brought an obligation to make differences on judicial and legal structure. This is really very important for Turkey to continue her progress and to catch up with the level of developed countries such as the European Union members. The Customs Union is not only a trade decision, it is a decision making reformation in all the areas in social life from issues such as democratisation and human rights to environment and education . Turkey, with its high youth potential and economie and commercial advantages , has to fulfil all the required duties that has obligated from customs Union to take part as a membership in European Union.

c. Atag端r, /stanbu/ University, Turkey

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

FORWARD IN EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION A. Abazi The elements ol European Union do not have a place in the Treaty ol Rome but its creators loresaw it as a luture step toward integration. European integration seemed like a lew storied building supported by the economie pilar. In lact politica I goals always appear through the economie ones. Even lorty years lrom the loundation we can consider the European Monetary Union as an economie approach to loster political ends.

What does EMU represent?

The two most important components ol EMU : the Union ol Exchange rates and the integration ol the capital market which in practice do not reflect a great distinction. As an economie approach , EMU brings with its advantages also disadvantages. Going through the specific elements ol Monetary Union we can get a clear view on them . An agreement on the common stock currency permits a good management and gives way to the transactions without changing national currencies between the member countries. Some sources could be saved and these countries would be liberated lrom the deficit. The permanent fixed exchange rate promotes trade and alree move ment ol capital and labour toward high productivity and real wages. The presence ol a central authority can be positive . It harmonises the monetary and fiscal policy, finances the regional deviations Irom the balance ol payments, specifies the situation and compensates the negative effects ol the monetary integration. EMU as a whole is a good beginning and also lorms a basis lor other policies ol the European Union. EMU is offered to member countries limiting the instruments ol the national financial policy depending on the central authority. Comparing the positive and negative effects we can distinguish their dependenee on the characteristics ol the area where EMU is applied . In EMU , countries can not make use ol a national exchange rate as an financial instrument. Only with high flexibility and similar reactions they could conlront the shocks which could bring otherwise different effects lor each one giving another view to the structure ol EMU. Flexibility could be provided by the common market. The mobility ol the lactors ol productions can substitute the flexibility ol the exchange rate in adjusting the possible shocks. These shocks would have smaller effects il the production structures ol the economies are diversified and wages and prices are flexible . To reduce these negative effects the integration ol fiscal policy is also necessary. Then symmetrical impact could be gained il the member states offer similar production structures, similar inflation rates, and a high degree ol economie openness. To prelorm EMU there should be a political desire supported by marginally small exchange rate fluctuations .

Convergence criteria

One can see below the necessary criteria lor the sta bie existence ol this Union as represented in a way in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. There are lour monetary and fiscal criteria presented in the Treaty ol Maastricht ol 7 February 1992. It may be noted that a country can only join the EMU when it lulfils all ol them.

Jason Magazine nO.2, april 1997

... ( \

.,(

Photo: European Union, Brussels

1. A high degree of price stability, which means an inflation rate that does not exceed more than 1/2 percent points of, at most, the three best performing member states in terms of price stability.

2. Do not have an excessive budget deficit to Gross Oomestic Product at market price; and 60 percent for the ratio of government debt to Gross Oomestic Product at market prices. 3. Have relatively stabie exchange rates, which means th at must respect the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the ERM of EMS without severe tensions for at least the last !wo years before that examination . The margin was widened from ca. 2.25 percent to ca . 15 percent on August 1993. 4. Convergence of interest rates meaning that a member state has to have an average nominallong term interest role th at does not exceed by more than !wo percent points that of, at most, the three best performing member states in terms of price stability. In fact these criteria would be an obstacle for the membership of the most countries of the European Union in European Monetary Union.

Should we be optimistic tor 1 January 1999? There has been exchange rate stability since spring 1995. This makes the future look optimistic for the process of monetary integration considering it as a success of common policy reflecting the convergence criteria. We can join the future gradually so the idea of a Euro-zone forwards very weil to EMU . This stage would clarify the real problems , the relations with non-members and would give the possibility to reflect the real criteria of the Monetary Union on the convergence criteria. Considering the benefits with our eyes, this would facilitate the political decision for membership. The political decision joining the economic criteria would be astrong cornerstone to the Monetary Union.

A. Abazi, Tirana, Albania (3 February 1997)

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

BOOKS HMS BRILLIANT In a ship's company Chr. Terril BBC Books, London (1995) price: ( 14.99 ISBN 0 536 371 84 6 224 pages, hardcover From the end of September till the end of October 1994 Her Majesty's Ship Brilliant was deployed in the Adriatic Sea near Bosnia and Montenegro in the NATOIWEU-mission Shape Guard to support sanctions of the United Nations against the former Republic of Yugoslavia. HMS Brilliant, amongst other ships, had to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering the restricted areas ..... and to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary to enforce the resolutions (UN Security Council resolution 820, paragraphs 28/29, 1993). In the form of a diary Terrill tells the events on HMS Brilliant du ring the above mentioned enforcement operation from the time she left in Bari (Italy) to her entrance in the Naval base in Plymouth. These diary notes were used as basic material for a BBC TV serial and the book HMS Brilliant which show the lifes of 250 people serving aboard of this Royal Navy frigate. The Brilliant, a Broadsword Classtype 22 frigate, with Exocet surface-to-surface missile and Sea Wolf closerange air defence missile system, is the tenth Brilliant since the seventeenth century. In 1982 it sailed into war against Argentine which had invaded the Falklands in the South Atlantic. By reading this eye-witness account one becomes sharer of a conversation between the Brilliant and one of her NATO partner-ships, the USS Deyo, informing about an action of armed Croatian police boats. HMS Brilliant also observes an intensive training exercise by the Yugoslav air force: They come out to sea towards the edge of their territorial waters which is something we have to wateh. We have to track them and if they come towards us we go through the warning procedure. If they kept coming we would deal with them. In HMS Brilliant, which is marbied with Royal Navy slang (Jackspeak) , the author reports on the beginning of the ship's share in Operation Sharp Guard, Yugoslav air activity, helicopter training on board, measures taken against violaters of the embargo, huil checking by divers, patroll ing, entertainment by naval crew and their run ashore (social visit with

shipmates). The author informs about naval discipline , toasts (on monday to our ships at sea and on saturday to wifes and sweethearts), ship's history, naval jobs and abbreviation . HMS Brilliant is a documentary book which offers the reader the possibility to be a witness of events which follow after decissions made by (international) politica I institutions, what happens if the political elite decides to take part in a military operation overseas and wh at the consequences are for the men and women involved. Although it is not a scolarly book, HMS Brilliant - the coverage, the book (as weil as the TV series) - is a splendid document and gives readers necessary insight information to complete the picture of the practical execution of a military operation decided upon after a theoritcal and political debate.

BORDERS , NATIONS AND STATES Frontiers of national sovereig nty in the new Europe L. O'Dowd , T.M. Wilson Avebury, Aldershot (1996) ISBN 1 85972 158 3 price : ( 32 .50 237 pages , hardcover After the end of the First and Second World War, Europe is for the third time undergoing a major re-arrangement of its borders . Within the European Union one can currently speak of a contradictory situation: on one hand EU member states remain to control their borders, on the other hand borders our going to be more penetrabie than before . This is above all the case in accordance with environmental policy which is becoming more internationalised than ever before. Baker mentions an expansion of the nation-states as weil as that of local and regional authorities . Through several case studies the contributors demonstrates that although there is a difference in points of view on the consequences of further European integration as weil of fragmentation . One of the characteristics of borders is the inclusionary as weil as the exclusionary dimension of the conception . The process of European integration and the will of some states to retain their sovereignty forms in this context a dilemma which of great significance for contemporary European policy. The editors Jason Magazine no.2, april 1997

argue that an appreciation of the ways in which frontiers are zones of contest over sovereignty. According to one of the authors it is of great importanee to put less accent on the old conceptions of national sovereignty. One has to keep in mind the process of emerging informal borders behind current official borders of the European Union. In this context the move of informal EU borders towards Poland's eatern borders and the Hungarian-Romanian border is mentioned. By presenting the cases of ethnic-regionalism in Northern Italy; cross-border co-operation in the Basque country; physical fortification of the British-Irish border; socio-spatial development in Slovenia; pressures for pluralism and regional autonomy in Upper Silesia; the ethnographic aspects of the Spanish southern border in the light of the wider process of European integration the contributors argue the fact of different factors (formal as weil as informal) influencing the settlement of frontiers . Wilson advocates greater involvement of the European Union in frontier regions of the EU periphere . He argues this is of great importanee for the process of politica I and economie integration which among other processes depends on the development of a social cultural system. In the final analysis the book presents the antropologist dimensions of the European integration. Wilson argues th at borderlands are seen as a melting pot of various national identities and cultures.

Borders, nations and states shows that the disposition of European borders after the opening of the Iron Curtain is far from settled and wh at the meaning of the various types of borders - legal, political, cultural, economie as weil ethno-national dimensions - within and without the European Union will be ; as the designation of the external borders has become much more difficult, as for instanee ethnonational border confliets in the Balkans show. Nevertheless, the whole question of borders remains of great significanee .

JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW S.M. Schwebel Cambridge University Press , Cambridge (1994) price : ca . [ 60 .00 ISBN 0 521 462843 630 pages, hardcover

Last February the Netherlands former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Kooijmans was appointed as Judge of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). One of his col leagues is Vice President of the Court, Judge Schwebel. In different functions Schwebel developed expertise on different legal matters and wrote more than a hundred articles varying from relations between the Internatio22

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

national Court of Justice and the United Nations, fact-finding , internationallaw of human rights, international arbitration and inter-state disputes, to the functions of internatioal law. Schwebel starts with a reflection on the history of the institutionalisation of international law since the The Hague Peace Conference. In 1922 the World Court came into force in the Peace Palace in The Hague. Although it could not prevent World War 11 it was of significant value to the development of the international law system . The advisory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court was created through practise in this context he underlines the aspect of the interpretation of living law in relation to the realisation of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In his vision the ICJ is a body of high achievement and unused potential. There are states who have refused to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court; other states did not even appear in Court. Although the Court is confronted with these and other difficulties, Schwebel sees the ICJ as the pricipal judicial organ of the United Nations and therefore the only universal institution of international adjucation which will form a fundament for a more peaceful and less lawless world . In fact, there will be a more effective role to play by the International Court if the revival of the United Nations (as we have seen after the Gulf War) will be of an substantial nature. Referring to the past activities of the ICJ there is no reason to underestimate the role of the Court. In relation to the development of the international law of hu man rights, for instance, the influence of the ICJ has been very constructive . In this context he refers to several cases, as the, by internationallaw students, weil known Notfebohm case and the Corfu Channel Case. To prevent a continious process of a lack of opportunities for the court tocontribute to the solution of international legal disputes (its jurisdiction has over the years been severely limited), the author is pleading for the strengthening of the judical conduct of the Chambers for particular cases.

Justice in International Law is divided in five parts, in which the author discusses different aspects of international law: the role of the ICJ; international arbitration, the United Nations, the Secretary General and the Secretariat; international contract and expropriation and aggression under international law, esspecially the unlawful use of force . In a word , Justice in International Law is a collection of legal articles which is recommended for those interested in the evolution of international law. (MC)

SIB-NEDERLAND Wat is de sIB? De stichting SIS-Nederland (Studenten- en jongeren verenigingen voor Internationale Betrekkingen) houdt zich bezig met internationale vraagstukken. SIS-Nederland is de platformorganisatie van 8 verenigingen die samen ruim 2.000 leden hebben. De stichting coรถrdineert de activiteiten van de SIS-verenigingen, stimuleert, financiert en organiseert projecten op nationaal en internationaal niveau en onderhoudt contacten met diverse binnen- en buitenlandse organisaties. De SIS werd opgericht in 1947 en opereert onder deze naam sinds 1962. Internationaal is de SIS bekend als de Outch United Nations Student Association (DUNSA). De stichting is geassocieerd lid van vele nationale en internationale non-gouvernementele organisaties, zoals de Europese Beweging Nederland (ESN), het Nederlands Genootschap voor Internationale Zaken (NGIZ) en de Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties (NWN). Ook onderhoudt de SIS contacten met ambassades, ministeries en andere instellingen. De SIS heeft geen enkele binding met enige politieke stroming of godsdienstige overtuiging. De SIS onderschrijft wel het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties en de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens.

De verenigingen en de werkgroepen Er zijn 8 SIS-verenigingen , die gevestigd zijn in de volgende universiteitssteden: Amsterdam, Groningen, Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, Tilburg en Utrecht. Sinnen deze verenigingen bestaan diverse werkgroepen welke zich bezig houden met een specifiek aspect van internationale betrekkingen . Zo zijn er de werkgroepen : Europese Integratie, Verenigde Naties, Afrika , LatijnsAmerika, Midden-Oosten, Oost-Europa , Kunst en Cultuur, Milieu en Religie. De werkgroepen organiseren congressen , debatten, fora , lezingen, excursies en studiereizen .

Activiteiten De stichting SIS-Nederland besteedt bijzondere aandacht aan de VN , de Europese Unie en actuele internationale gebeurtenissen, zoals de SIB - Midden en Oost-Europa Campagne 96/97. Sinnenkort zal de Midden-en Oost Europa Campagne van start gaan. Op landelijk niveau zullen er weer congressen georganiseerd worden. Ook in de 8 SIS-steden zullen er in het kader van deze Campagne lezingen, fora, symposia en workshops plaatsvinden . Voor meer informatie: SIS-Nederland Secretariaat, tel. : 071 - 521 7351 .

sIB-TEIMUN TEIMUN (The European International Model United Nations) is een simulatie van de VN en is georganiseerd door stichting SIS-TEIMUN in samenwerking met stichting SIS-Nederland. TEIMUN biedt aan ongeveer 250 studenten uit 30 landen de mogelijkheid om door middel van een rollenspel , de werking van de verschillende organen van de VN te doorgronden. De deelnemers vertegenwoordigen een ander land dan hun thuisland bij de Veiligheidsraad , de Algemene Vergadering of het Internationale Gerechtshof. SIS-TEIMUN is een unieke mogelijkheid voor jongeren om in een internationale omgeving te debatteren, onderhandelen en oplossingen aan te dragen voor actuele mondiale problemen . TEIMUN wordt gehouden in juli. Informatie: secretariaat SIS-TEIMUN , tel. : 050 - 313 2333, fax: 050 - 363 2095.

Secretariaat SIS-Nederland Postbus 148 3500 AC Utrecht 070 - 362 2376

Jason Magazine no.2, april 1997

This publication has been made possible by:

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M.A.O.C. Gravin van Bylandt Stichting

Jason Magazine no. 2, april 1997

ARTICLES JASON MAGAZINE 1996/1997 1996/1

Wecke's Wereld T. Melescanu

M. Cras

M. den Hartog

A.M.J. Weissink

R. Smeets

1996/5

Helder water Romania : a bridge-country and stability factor in Central Europe Vijftig jaar VN-vredesoperaties , conferentieverslag Een nieuwe vredestaak voor de Organisatie van Afrikaanse Eenheid (OAE) Japan's inescapable road to assuming international responsibility De splitsing van FransNederlandse relatiedeeltjes

Wecke's Nederland Europese integratie versterkt Nederlandse identiteit E. van Middelkoop Klimaatverandering als internationaal milieuvraagstuk M. Rifkind Reuniting our continent: Britain's approach to NATO and EU-enlargement Nieuwe dreiging voor de C. Widdershoven NAVO

1996/2 1996/6

J. Ruys

M. Patijn

IN.F. van Eekelen G.E. Loek

J. Q. Th. Rood

Intergovernmental Conference 1996 - Youth Seminar The Intergovernmental Conference is more than just an opportunity to patch up the Treaty on European Union Security in a changing Europe The might of evolution : Europe and its identity Between supranationalism and realism: the dilemmas of Dutch European policy

Wecke's Wereld F. van Beuningen

G.O. Kremer

C. Widdershoven M.J. den Hartog

Vrede Van collectieve verdediging naar collectieve veiligheid Medical ethical dilemmas in a peacekeeping operation Onrust in de Golf The Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Bosnian crisis

1996/3-4 1997/1

Wecke's Wereld G. Zalm A.J.J. de Hoogh

M. den Hartog

M.J. Solana

IN. Christopher

Het onderzoek Financial Review The International Law Commission's distinction between international delicts and international crimes De geschiedenis als zwarte schaduw over de Chinees-Japanse betrekkingen NATO: Shaping up for the future The United States and NATO's new challenges

E.S. Th. Scheenstra Van de voorzitter Wecke's wereld Gelijk J. Ramaker Op weg naar een totaal Kernstopverdrag S.E. Wilde vuur Zonder aanziens des persoons, tussen hulpverlening en humanitair recht R. Sandee Wit-Rusland : probleemgeval in het Oosten C. Widdershoven Soedan: roepende in de woestijn?

THE JASON FOUNDATION The JASON Foundation has been lounded in 1975 to provide in a need to get balanced inlormation on international affairs. JASON is not affiliated to any politica I party or group. JASON inlorms in !wo ways. First, it publishes a bi-monthly magazine on international affairs and secondly it inlorms by organising activities like congresses , excursions, lora and youth-exchanges. Some recent subjects ol JASON Magazine were European integration , NATO and enlargement, Eastern Europe in balance?, Multinationals and The Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. Twice a year JASON Magazine is published in English . Recent international seminars organised by the JASON Foundation were European election study tour, Economie Iransformation and integration in Eastern Europe and Intergovernmental Conference 1996.

II you want to receive additional inlormation on the JASON Foundation , please write or phone to the lollowing address:

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