Islamic state as a pseudo state in the Middle East

Islamic State as a Pseudo-State in the Middle East By Dan Ejlertsen, 2nd Semester, MA in Middle East Studies, Center for Contemporary Middle east Studies, University of Southern Denmark

Udgivet af Tendens - de historiestuderendes blad pĂĽ Aalborg Universitet 2017

Islamic State as a Pseudo-State in the Middle East By Dan Ejlertsen, 2nd Semester, MA in Middle East Studies, Center for Contemporary Middle east Studies, University of Southern Denmark

she argues, that there has become a mismatch between the actual development of some organizations and the conceptual framework used to analyze these. In this context she uses Hezbollah, Hamas and IS to challenge the concepts of insurgent, terrorist organizations and NSAGs, to state that these groups blur the lines between a

Islamic State – from small group to contested concept The common perception of Islamic State (IS)1 in Syria and Iraq in 2014 is that of a brutal terrorist organization or insurgent-group, but there are many labels to put on IS. Yet some general terms can be applied; non-state actor or non-state armed group (NSAG) (Berti, 2016: 2). The NSAG-concept is introduced by Benedetta Berti2, who defines it as “[…] armed organizations operating outside the control of the state and willing and able to use force to achieve their objectives" (Berti, 2016: 1). This, she presents in her text “What’s in a name? Re-conceptualizing non-state armed groups in the Middle East” (2016), which will be my point of departure in this paper.

state actor and non-state actor. Through her analysis she characterizes these groups as multi-layered identities that must be perceived as sui generis groups, i.e. noncomparable. Regarding IS, she set up a thesis, that it must be perceived as a “hybrid organization” due to its providing of security and safety. This she substantiates by stating that not only do non-state actors act as military powers, but they also fill a gap that the governments fail to fill: Safety and security (Berti, 2016: 2). This safety and security is important to differentiate between. The security is understood as the military protection of the population, whereas safety is understood as the group’s supply of social services, education, health care, infra-structure, etc. (Alexander and Alexander, 2015: xx). Of course, it should be questioned

Her article deals with the concept of non-state armed groups (NSAG) in which,

1 I use the abbreviation ‘IS’ through the paper due

to the most recent naming of the organization. 2 Dr. Benedetta Berti is a foreign policy and security researcher, analyst, consultant, author and

whether the population actually saw IS as security- and safety provider or as lecturer. Her work focuses on armed groups and internal wars, analyzing the impact of insecurity on civilians. Currently working as Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, US.

occupier. It should also be questioned whether they gained strength by following this strategy. This thesis will, in this article, vary in adequacy depending on the composition IS has had since its first appearance in 1999 until its curtailment today. The common factor, however, is that IS as non-state actor has been a part of creating instability in the Middle East and even in the international community. The Middle East is in this case understood as the “[…] geographic area that extends from

Map of the Islamic State controlled territory in

Iran in the east to Turkey, Iraq, the Arabian

June 2014.

peninsula, the Levant (Lebanon and Syria), and North Africa, including the Maghreb, in the west” (Kamrava, 2013: 1). Although IS has spread throughout the Middle East and to other groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)-region this paper only focuses on the area of IS’ proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria.3 Neither will this article focus on the impact of the rise and curtailment of IS in the international community or the perception of IS in relation to that. With that said, a brief historical overview of the rise and curtailment of IS is in the forthcoming paragraph provided to give an insight into the organization.

3 The Economist's map shows where ISIS is pre-

sent in, controlling, or contesting territory—a broad depiction of what the 'caliphate' might be. Source: Syria Needs Analysis Project; The Economist

History and structure of Islamic State The Islamic State has its origins in 1999 in the Jordanian militant group Jamaat al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (JTWJ), where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was the leader (Alexander and Alexander, 2015: 3). Al-Zarqawi had been a prisoner in Jordan and had traveled to Afghanistan after his release in 1999. Here he met the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. Al-Zarqawi quickly developed a network in al-Qaeda, which he used to get help establishing the JTWJ in Afghanistan. This lead to an establishment of a well-functioning organization in Afghanistan. It is here important to emphasize that JTWJ and al-Qaeda were http://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/original-size/images/print-edition/20140614_MAM914.png, consulted 19.12.2017.

not affiliated (Alexander and Alexander,

al-Assad (Hashim, 2014: 77). In 2010 al-

2015: 3). As a reaction to increased insta-

Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed in an

bility in Iraq caused by the U.S. invasion of

airstrike, so this decision was taken by the

Iraq in 2003 and the close network with

new leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In col-

al-Qaeda, al-Zarqawi decided to move the

laboration with AQI he decided to estab-

organization to Iraq and becoming part of

lish a group named Jabhal al-Nusra to

al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 (Hashim,

fight in Syria. This branch was inspired by

2014: 69ff.). This collaboration worked

al-Baghdadi and quickly grew big (Alexan-

generally well in the first couple of years,

der and Alexander, 2015: 6). In Iraq the

and al-Zarqawi was proclaimed emir

ISI began a “Breaking Walls”-campaign in

(leader) of AQI. Due to different opinions

2012 where they intensified their fighting

in the leadership, these lead to a split be-

for territory and especially using the reli-

tween JTWJ and the al-Qaeda in 2006 (Lis-

gious sectarianism Iraqi Shi’ite Premier

ter, 2014: 8). The al-Qaeda defined the en-

Minister Nouri al-Maliki had created since

emy to be the “West” and particularly the

2008 to gain strength (Lister, 2014: 11f.).

U.S., while al-Zarqawi defined it the Iraqi

Since al-Maliki’s inauguration in 2008 he

forces and non-Sunni Muslims in general.

had been alienating all non-Shi’a Muslims

Another reason for the split was also the

in Iraq. A strategy he increased during the

brutal methods JTWJ used, which al-

Arab Uprising. This is said to have had a

Qaeda could not vouch for (Alexander and

great appeal for the ISI to utilize in gaining

Alexander, 2015: 5). In 2006 al-Zarqawi

support among non-Shi’a Muslims to

was killed in an airstrike and the new

overturn al-Maliki’s government (Cam-

leader became Abu Ayyub al-Masri who

mett et al., 2015: 376).

instantly pronounced the establishment of Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). The commando

While the Breaking Walls campaign

of ISI was given to Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi

had great success, al-Baghdadi in 2013

(Lister, 2014: 8). ISI grew in strength, but

claimed a merge of ISI and al-Nusra into

as a reaction to the turmoil in Syria

Islamic State in Iraq an al-Sham4 (ISIS),

caused by the “Arab Uprising” in 2010-

but al-Nusra rejected it (Alexander and Al-

2011, ISI decided to operate in Syria

exander, 2015: 1f.). By doing this al-Bagh-

fighting the Syrian Alawite leader Bashar

dadi created strife within al-Qaeda. This

4 Al-Sham is a geographical designation compris-

and Jordan, or more commonly known as the “Levant” (Alexander and Alexander, 2015: 1)

ing modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine

led to a permanent split between al-Qaeda

municipality government, health care, in-

and ISIS in June 2013. In this leadership

frastructure and taxes, etc. (Lister, 2014:

dispute ISIS succeeded in getting a better

18-28). Common for IS’ capture of land is

relationship with other al-Qaeda

that it immediately after the takeover, has

branches, which made the stand against

set up local governments in charge of re-

al-Qaeda stronger. In this perspective ISIS

building the area and providing funds and

had grown strong and influential in Iraq

support from the central government – as

and Syria but also in other parts of the

long as they pledge allegiance to the or-

Middle East. On June 29th, 2014, ISIS pro-

ganization (Alexander and Alexander,

claimed the Islamic State creating a Cali-

2015: 8). By providing these modern

phate the size of Belgium throughout Iraq

state-like services it has provided a social

and Syria with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as

security that the government in both Iraq

caliph (Lister, 2014: 14). It did not take

and especially Syria hasn’t provided due

long before the international community

to the internal turmoil and political strate-

started perceiving IS as a threat. There-

gies (Beck et al., 2016: 4). Also, by provid-

fore, they started executing airstrikes on

ing military protection of the local popula-

IS territory in the name of “war on terror”

tion it seems that IS is more than just a

as a united Coalition (Alexander and Alex-

terror- or insurgent group and can be cat-

ander, 2015: 7). Even through this did

egorized as an influential non-state armed

unite IS, al-Qaida, al-Nusra and other or-

group. IS as non-state actor thus must be

ganizations to fight the western coalition,

put into perspective to state building and

it meant a beginning curtailment of IS late

conceptualization discussions in the past

in 2014 (Rosiny, 2015: 102).

decades to properly understand how IS

came into existence. In doing so it is nec-

Islamic State – is it a state?

essary to focus on politics, history, secu-

A common thing of the different de-

rity, religion, geography and culture in the

velopments of Islamic State is their organ-

region. Worth having in mind is that the

izational structure. Especially in the ISI,

modern Middle East largely has been a

ISIS and IS phases, the organization had

construct of international politics (Jung,

elements seen in many modern states.

2017: 221), and the conceptualization of

This includes a form of leadership, a form

IS has been widely discussed. My primary

of cabinet of ministers in charge of differ-

focus will be IS in 2014 due to the self-

ent areas, such as military, education,

proclamation of the Islamic State, and on

the period of the curtailment of IS as far as

of state formation in relation to war mak-

possible. My thesis is that IS in 2014 could

ing, but I rely on Weber’s definition of

be perceived as a pseudo-state and not

state. Max Weber has defined the most

just as hybrid organization. By pseudo-

central feature of modern statehood to be

state I mean a “geopolitical entity which

“the monopoly of the legitimate use of

has some of the trappings of an inde-

physical force within a given territory

pendently-governed country or territory,

[where] the factual monopoly of the use of

but which lacks real independence and is

physical force has to be considered legiti-

not recognized as a self-governing political

mate by both rulers and ruled.” (Jung,

entity by the international community of

2017: 225). This means that the govern-

nations” (Wiktionary, 2017). This indi-

ment in a state cannot be considered legit-

cates that IS has more indicators of a state

imate unless both those who are ruled

in the way it was administered and orga-

upon and those who rule consider the

nized than just a hybrid organization.

state and its use of force to be legitimate.

Therefore, this paper will analyze and dis-

Legitimacy, according to Weber, must

cuss whether IS can be perceived as a hy-

have its roots in the cultural and symbolic

brid organization or as a pseudo-state in

order of the society to call it a stable sys-

2014 and today. The natural question is

tem of political authority and not just in a

therefore: Can Islamic State still be per-

monopoly of coercion (Jung, 2017: 225).

ceived as a pseudo-state due to the rise

To secure that, the political institutions

and curtailment of the Islamic State fol-

need a stable set of rules that are determi-

lowing the thesis of Benedetta Berti?

nant for the ways in which rulers and

ruled normative and cognitive act in the

The theoretical frame

society, as a means of officially recognized

To be able to answer my main ques-

rules and unofficially norms (Jung, 2017:

tion, it is relevant to start with a definition

225). Therefore, Weber defined “[…] the

of a state. To do so I use Dietrich Jung’s

obedience to political institutions as resting

use of Max Weber’s definition in his chap-

on legal or rational authority” (Jung, 2017:

ter “War and State in the Middle East: Re-

226), which emphasizes that the rulers

assessing Charles Tilly in a Regional Con-

have to act in a legal and rational way to

text” (Jung, 2017). This definition is part

provide proper governance. This proper

of a discussion of Charles Tilly, Marx We-

governance is secured by the authorities

ber and Norbert Elias defining ideal types

following the formal legal procedures set-

up in the state and that these authorities

theories can be used in analyzing non-

are selected in legally organized and

state actors. His argument is that the most

standardized selection processes (Jung,

adequate International Relations theory

2017: 226). By having legitimately elected

to use is constructivism, in which he iden-

authorities there must be a trust in these

tifies IS as a supra-national or “a-national”

people to have a powerful position. Re-

organization. This is due to IS’ rejection of

garding this, Weber says that: “[…] the

internationally recognized state-defini-

power of the ruling elite depends on the ef-

tion, rejection of the split between civil

ficient exertion of political authority by its

law and religion, and its attempt to estab-

administrative and security staff.” (Jung,

lish a caliphate as state to manage the civil

2017: 225). Thereby, he emphasizes that

population using radical and violent as-

these people are crucial in transferring

sets. Valensi also states that analyzing

the state of power into concrete practices

non-state actors like IS one must use a

in everyday life (Jung, 2017: 225).

multi-oriented theoretical approach, so

Having this in mind, Berti’s article will

that the dichotomy between state actor and non-state actor is broken. In Zeray

be used as main text in critically analyzing

Yihdego’s article “The Islamic ‘State’ Chal-

IS in 2014, as well other main contribu-

lenge: Defining the Actor” (2015) her start-

tors to the question of conceptualization

ing point is that IS is a terrorist organiza-

of IS. These will in the following be pre-

tion, but by discussing how the interna-

sented to show how divers this conceptu-

tional law system fit on IS she argues that

alization discussion is. Due to a lack of

IS do not fit into the international law sys-

space far from all contributors are pre-

tem. She emphasizes that in the interna-

sented, but I find it relevant to present

tional political sphere IS has been deemed

some of the most common perceptions of

a terrorist organization.

IS in the scholarly field besides Berti’s. In

In discussion of what IS then is, by

the text “Non-State Actors: A theoretical

looking at its organization and methods,

Limitation in a Changing Middle East”

she defines it as ‘de facto state’ due to the

(2015) by Carmit Valensi, the framework

fact that IS controls territory and lifts

of testing International Relations (IR) the-

state-like tasks. In her second point she

ories on the concept of non-state actors is

defines IS under the concept of Extremist

applied on Hezbollah and IS as case stud-

Criminal Organization (ECO) but re-

ies. Through the paper he challenges if IR

conceptualizes IS to be a Regional ECO

separation of secular and religious institu-

(RECO).

tions, etc. This is based on the fact that IS -

despite using the term ‘state’ in its name -

Challenging the conceptualization of Is-

doesn’t want to be perceived as a state. At

lamic State

least not as a state in Weber’s definition.

Islamic State is by many scholars de-

In the use of IS’ term ‘state’ lie a historical

fined as a non-state actor in the Middle

Islam-definition of state as presented by

East (Berti, 2016; Valensi, 2015; Hashim,

Valensi. He presents that “It is not used in

2014; Durac, 2015: , etc.) but as indicated

the modern sense of a nation-state with

earlier IS has many different labels.

territorial boundaries, but in an earlier

Among the different labels are “terrorist

sense that reflects the idea of the Caliphate

organization”, “insurgent group”, “energic,

and an Islamic space not delineated by de-

radical (Sunni) Islamist movement”,

fined geographical boundaries” (Valensi,

“proto-state”, “quasi-state”, “pseudo-

2015: 73), which in the basic conception

state”, “supra-national organization”, “a-

of state varies from a “western” definition

national organization”, “de facto state”,

of state.

“violent non-state actor”, “non-state

From this perspective it is also rele-

armed group”. (Berti, 2016; Valensi, 2015;

vant to question whether the use of We-

Jung, 2016; Hashim, 2014; Alexander and

ber’s definition of state is usable. It is im-

Alexander, 2015; Lister, 2014: etc.). In the

portant to remember that it is a western-

terminology by Berti IS must be perceived

developed term, which is not compatible

as a “hybrid military organization” (Berti,

with the definition of state IS has. IS as an

2016: 5). By this concept she emphasizes

anti-systemic entity strongly rejects the

that IS in its fundamental form is a NSAG

western-defined borders that was agreed

working as a violent military organization

upon in the Sykes-Picot Agreement in

which also lift the role as security pro-

1916 and the only valid term is a caliphate

vider in the caliphate - especially in the lo-

which in nature rejects borders encircling

cal governance-areas (Berti, 2016: 5). This

a geographical political controlled area

means that IS in the first place differenti-

(Alexander and Alexander, 2015: 7). In

ates from what is understood as a state in

Dietrich Jung’s reassessing of Charles

a Weberian definition. It differs in the ar-

Tilly’s theory, he also has pointed to this

eas of legitimacy in upholding authority,

problematic but pointed out that “It is not

use of force, adherence to human rights,

[its] European origin that put [its] validity

into question but the flawed idea that [it]

Berti’s perception of IS as NSAG working

ought to find correspondence in historical

as a violent military organization fit

reality.” (Jung, 2017: 241). This means

within the concept of ‘non-state actor’. De-

that the state-concept must be considered

parting from this concept-analysis it is

in a historical perspective. Since IS want-

now relevant to look at the organizational

ing to establish a caliphate based on the

aspects of Islamic State in June 2014-

Umayyad caliphate from 661-750, the his-

terms to substantiate the validity of the

torical importance in the definition of

non-state actor concept. Berti has stated

state varies in the western and Islamic

that there is a dichotomy between ‘state

conceptualization (Rosiny, 2015: 97).

actor’ and ‘non-state actor’ in discussing

where to place IS (Berti, 2016: 5). Berti is To the analysis of the adequacy of the

of the conviction that IS and other non-

‘non-state actor’-concept belongs also the

state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah

aspect of which kind of non-state actor IS

blurs the line between state actor and

is. According to Valensi, who has identi-

non-state actor (Berti, 2016: 5). Berti

fied four different types, IS belong to the

states that

“violent non-state actor” (VNSA)-type in

“[…] none of these NSAGs can be de-

contrast to multinational corporations

fined as applying a purely predatory and

(MNC), non-governmental organizations

coercive model of governance. Even

(NGO) and inter-governmental organiza-

ISIL[IS], with its strong recourse on bru-

tions (IGO) (Valensi, 2015: 62). This indi-

tality and its heavy extortion tactics with

cate that IS not only varies from the state

respect to the areas it controls, has done

but also varies from other non-state ac-

more than just acquire resources to fi-

tors in the international arena. Valensi

nance its armed struggle. The governance

point out that the VNSA-concept is con-

project has also been aimed at building a

tested within academia, but consists of

new political order and shaping a new

“[…] terrorist organizations, criminal or-

type of citizens. In order words, govern-

ganizations, quasi-military organizations,

ance has aimed at establishing a new so-

militias, freedom fighters, pirates and gue-

cial contract, ascertaining legitimacy and

rillas” (Valensi, 2015: 62). These labels

authority and creating a new political or-

correspond quite well to the above-men-

der: representing thus a state-making en-

tioned labels that IS has. Following this

deavor.” (Berti, 2016: 5) Thereby she rec-

type-construction it becomes clear that

ognizes that IS has taken significantly

initiatives in state-making and tries to get

collecting taxes, and VII) has established a

the organization like a state, but she disa-

religious education system (Lister, 2014:

grees that IS is closer to a state-actor on

18-28). Supporting these identifications

the dichotomy-line.

Ahmed S. Hashim recognizes that IS as or-

This might be true, but I think that

ganization has been working as a ‘proto-

placing IS - on the line of this dichotomy –

state’ in Syria by providing a “[…] holistic

must be closer to a state actor than non-

system of governance that includes reli-

state actor, namely as a pseudo-state. This

gious, educational, judicial, security, hu-

is due to the fact that IS in many scholars’

manitarian and infrastructure projects….”

analyses of the organization has inte-

(Hashim, 2014: 77). According to Stephan

grated many state-like formal institutions,

Rosiny IS in the takeover of areas in Iraq

informal institutions, norms, ideological

and Syria has functioned as a modern, bu-

reference points, history, religion and nat-

reaucratic state. He identifies that they

urally cultural reference points. These are presented in the following. Bringing the state-concept from We-

“[…] operates ministries and various executive organs; imposes taxes and customs duties; distributes food; controls

ber in play with the ‘hybrid’-concept from

prices; passes draconian court verdicts;

Berti many state institutions and security

maintains information offices and a secret

providing mechanisms can be identified.

service; and establishes a capital, Raqqa,

According to Charles Lister seven ele-

complete with a flag that resembles the

ments that IS has succeeded in providing

Prophet’s, a hymn, and even coins.” (Ros-

must therefore be recognized as a step to-

iny, 2015: 100).

wards a pseudo-state in Iraq and Syria. Lister points out that IS, I) has accumu-

Despite this, Rosiny point out that, the

lated considerable territorial military con-

caliphate in which the IS is functioning

trol, II) operates as a highly controlled and

transgress the nation-state authority and

bureaucratic organization based on a cabi-

capacity (Rosiny, 2015: 100). Also point-

net with ministers of military, civil, politi-

ing in the direction of state Yonah Alexan-

cal and financial duties and al-Baghdadi as

der & Dean Alexander identifies that IS

calif, III) using municipal administrations

has conducted governance by providing

and aid-based services, IV) has instituted

administrative and service-oriented sup-

the Sharia-law as law-system, V) has es-

port, tax-collection, court administering

tablished a capital in Raqqa, VI) is

and schools. Internally it has a

hierarchical organization with al-Bagh-

accomplishing their goals. In the perspec-

dadi as caliph, two deputies, twelve gover-

tive of Weber’s state-definition the au-

nors in Syria and Iraq, a Shura council, fi-

thority and legitimacy must come from a

nance-, military-, and security councils

legal and rational government operating

and a widely distributed de-centralization

within a strictly and “trustworthy” system

of autonomy (Alexander and Alexander,

that not only relies on violence as force. IS

2015: xx). The fact that IS has succeeded

do not compel to this, as stated by Ed-

in creating an organization composed of

wards, and thereby cannot gain legitimacy

all these aspects makes it clear that it

in the international community. According

must be perceived more like a state than a

to Andrew Phillips IS’ claim to caliphal au-

NSAG. Based on these institutions and as-

thority is challenging the fundamental

pects, IS has succeeded in establishing and

principles of the global order, “[…] in

maintaining the first part of the pseudo-

which political authority is institutional-

state definition in 2014.The second part of

ised [sic.] […]” and not in a system of reli-

the definition constitute another reason to

gious authority (Phillips, 2014: 496). It is

conceptualize IS as a pseudo-state. This is

worth bringing back in the point that IS

founded in the aspects of international

does not want international recognition

recognition as state and its brutal working

because of its anti-systemic character

methods. According to Holli Edwards IS’

(Berti, 2016: 2). In this relation the aspect

working methods and the fact that it im-

of local recognition and endorsement of

plemented strict Sharia-law, it was not

IS’ takeover of their area is up for ques-

compatible with the international law sys-

tioning. In trying to answer that question

tem in which much of the recognition of

the comprehensive turmoil first in Iraq

state lie (Edwards, 2017). As a way to get

and then in Syria has to be considered a

indorsement in the areas of which it oper-

big factor (Beck et al., 2016: 1-2). Here it

ates, IS has “[…] spread fear through bar-

is relevant to emphasize the conflict be-

baric acts of violence” (Edwards, 2017),

tween Sunni and Shia Muslims because IS’

says Edwards. By using these words, she

use of the Sunni-uprising against the Shia-

distances herself from IS’s methods, but it

regime in Iraq to gain support from many

also tells that the common perception in

Sunni-Iraqis (Alexander and Alexander,

the western world and international law

2015: xxi).

is that IS is an organization that do not

hesitate to use brutal methods in

Also, many scholars emphasize that

2014. It will be discussed in four perspec-

the international community can not rec-

tives – historical development, organiza-

ognize IS as a state because of IS’ brutal

tional structures, legitimacy and concep-

use of violence (Alexander and Alexander,

tualization. First, it must be proclaimed

2015; Edwards, 2017; Rosiny, 2015; Berti,

that answering this question is not possi-

2016; Valensi, 2015; Lister, 2014). It is es-

ble in the timeframe stretching to this ex-

pecially due to the ways IS sustain the

act date, but I will try to provide an an-

above-mentioned point one and four by

swer as far up in time as possible. In terms

Lister. These brutal methods used to

of historical development from 2014 IS as

maintain the caliphate are primarily be-

pseudo-state it can be said that the cur-

headings, amputations, crucifixions, mass

tailment already stared short after the

executions, stoning, raping, burying and

pronouncement of the Caliphate on June

burning people alive, in order to control

29th, 2014. IS had success in conquering

its territory (Alexander and Alexander,

Deiz al-Zor province in Syria in July, the

2015: xviii). These methods have also

Mosul Dam, oil-fields and many cities in

made Andrew Phillips perceive IS as “[…]

Iraq in August and in September IS surged

the world’s most dangerous […] jihadist

across the northern Iraq towards Erbil

terrorist entity.” (Phillips, 2014: 496).

and into the Sinjar Mountains (Alexander

These methods make the legitimacy frag-

and Alexander, 2015: 13). It also gained

ile, if not non-existing, why it does live up

control of some cities in the Aleppo prov-

to the lack of independence and recogni-

ince and the Tabqa air base, but most

tion as self-governing political entity by

prominently the Kobani region in Syria.

the international community required in

(Alexander and Alexander, 2015: 14).

the second half of the pseudo-state defini-

During this period, local forces got help

tion.

from a U.S.-led anti-IS-coalition in retak-

ing some cities in Iraq and Syria. As stated

Islamic State - a pseudo-state or non-

by Rosiny the curtailment of IS started in

state actor today?

late 2014, and in December 2014 Alexan-

Now we turn to the question of

der & Alexander states that Kurdish Pesh-

whether IS still can be perceived as

merga5 forces retook much of the Sinjar

pseudo-state due to its curtailment since

Mountains. This became the starting point

5 Peshmerga is a Kurdish army fighting for the ter-

ritory of Kurdistan in the northern Iraq.

for IS’ fast curtailment in the following

Iraq and Syria, and finally, that they have

months until late in April 2015 where it

lost centralized command (Rosiny, 2015:

lost huge amounts of conquered territory,

94). Catching the last aspect by Rosiny, the organizational structure has during this development been the most decisive. As stated by Rosiny “[…] defending a “state” that is malign to all those surrounding it is a tremendous challenge” (Rosiny, 2015: 102), which Rosiny emphasizes IS be-

as shown on the map above (Alexander and Alexander, 2015: 18)6. As a consequence, “[…] its potency in terms of military capabilities in Iraq – at very least – have waned, although the group appears to have maintained some constancy, if not strengthening, in Syria” (Alexander and Alexander, 2015: 19). This is as far up in time found regarding the curtailment of IS, which of course is problematic in the further discussing of its curtailment. The fast curtailment of IS is according to Rosiny caused by several aspects. First, IS has overreached military, politically and ideologically by proclaiming the new caliphate, second, that they have suffered several military setbacks in

6 The map shows how much land IS controlled on

January 5th, 2015 and on December 18th, 2017. This map also shows the curtailment of IS since 2015 until present day.

came in 2014. This is also the area of which IS has failed most tremendously. It has failed to adapt its organizational- and leadership structure, and especially its military, in its new role as a serious actor bordering other recognized entities (Rosiny, 2015: 102). Because of that, the organization became vulnerable to international pushbacks that – in western perspective – was a success (Hashim, 2014: 79). IS has thus failed to “[…] be the ‘sovereign power’, […] holding a monopoly over the use of force and exercising control over [the] territory and population” (Berti, 2016: 5). This has had an impact on the leadership in IS towards a terrorist organization according to Rosiny (2015: 102). It is also clear in the Source: HIS Conflict Monitor, BBC http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east27838034, consulted 29.12.2017

change from a “hit-and-run” to “run and

deviating from pure Islam (Rosiny, 2015:

hide” strategy for military operating (Ros-

103). Thereby they have not only lost le-

iny, 2015: 103). Thereby it also fails in the

gitimacy in the local populations, in the in-

perspective of the Weberian state-defini-

ternational community but also within

tion (Jung, 2017: 225-226).

Muslims as well. Putting these three as-

This curtailment of IS has also had a

pects together in the context of conceptualizing IS as organization today – or as late

huge impact of its legitimacy, which, fol-

as possible – in the perspective of Berti

lowing Beri’s point of view, is created by

and Weber, it seems that IS still can be

discursive and symbolic politics (Berti,

perceived as a non-state actor or non-

2016: 5). In this perspective it must have

state armed group but less of a pseudo-

changed from a discourse of IS as the Is-

state. Despite its shrinking territory pos-

lamic State to an aggressive and defending

session, legitimacy and structural changes

discourse. Likewise, Rosiny is of the con-

it is still an armed organization operating

viction that “[…] its shrinking wealth is lim-

outside the control of the Iraqi and Syrian

iting its attractiveness; those who have

state and is still willing and able to use

been terrorized are now united in their de-

brutal force to achieve their objectives of

sire for revenge; and the narrative of an

creating and maintaining the Islamic State

imminent victory is being undermined by a

(Berti, 2016: 1). According to Rosiny its

series of defeats.” (Rosiny, 2015: 102).

modus operandi in the future will turn

Thereby the earlier endemic legitimacy in

from authoritarian ruling and sovereignty

the Sunni-Muslim world have been dam-

to a terrorizing strategy to maintain its

aged. Also, the non-Sunni Muslims that

territory (Rosiny, 2015: 102). In terming

has not seen IS as legitimate has down-

IS a pseudo-state today it is not as easy as

graded IS’ legitimacy further. Already in

earlier. This is due to the fact that the or-

the moment of the proclamation of the ca-

ganizational structures are getting

liphate, IS-opponents rejected the legiti-

smaller, which makes it more difficult to

macy in the proclamation (Rosiny, 2015:

constitute an entity with some of the trap-

103). During the curtailment even many

pings of an independently-governed coun-

Salafis and jihadists that share the same

try or territory. Also, its rising use of ter-

religious ideology as IS has rejected it and

ror-based methods erodes the legitimacy

now perceive it as an apostate sect from

in the Weberian understanding, which fit

the earlier periods of Islam who was

to the other half of the pseudo-state defi-

quickly shrinking of the organization and

nition.

the thus loss of their geographical entity.

Conclusion I set out to answer whether Islamic

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