Editor’s note Focus on the Mediterranean The set of ideas presented by French President Nicolas Sarkozy for the establishment of a ‘Mediterranean Union’ should, and must, have the follow-up it deserves — after further evaluation and elaboration — through a creative adaptation to the Mediterranean area of the successful regional cooperation model that has been developed in the wider area of the Black Sea (BSEC). In order for regional cooperation — given the example of BSEC — to be successful, systematic research into the areas in which the primarily common interests of the countries are voluntarily participating in it should be carried out. As time goes by, the common interests will form the basis for the establishment of multiple common interest societies, directly referring to and totally depending on the market and on the productive and creative forces therein. Within this framework the Greek-Italian initiative for the establishment by the Euro-Mediterranean countries of an Energy Society, on the same model as the one operating among the countries of SE Europe, could find fertile ground for development. And, anyway, the concept of regionalism is a deliberate policy exercised by the national states in the handling of their particular position and role in the area they belong to. The importance ascribed to it nowadays, but even more in the immediate future, is more a matter of choice than of geography. Of course, the establishment of an organization in the interests of Mediterranean regional cooperation cannot, and should not, operate counter to the particular aspirations and expectations of the countries in the area for admission/integration into the European Union. Besides, the European Union is something that transcends physical borders and the areas within them. In any case, such an organization of regional cooperation should capitalize on and develop any political, social, economic and cultural features particular to the area, for the mutual benefit of both the European citizens and the citizens of the countries that volunteer to participate in it, and it should become a reliable and trustworthy negotiator on the international level, able to initiate things and to take action. These days, the form of a Cultural Alliance is the main countermeasure to the various forms of nationalistic or religious fundamentalism. The fact alone that the Mediterranean is:
The birthplace of three monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), A meeting place, or even a place of conflict, for dozens of doctrines and creeds that have evolved from these religions (i.e. Sunni vs Shia Muslims within the Islamic world), and The arena par excellence where the model of the secular state clashes with the religious one makes it worthwhile — especially for Europeans — to seek the possibility of bringing together all Mediterranean countries, however different their backgrounds. In any case, the European neighborhood comprises societies that have a long history and tradition in incorporating diverse cultural and political influences. The consolidation of a new cultural cooperation in the area — that eventually may lead to the creation of a collective identity — is a difficult, yet attainable, goal. In conclusion, the establishment of an organization in the interests of Mediterranean regional cooperation, given the abovementioned characteristics, will function in favor of a faster and more effective incorporation of the countries in this area into the framework of principles and values advocated by the European Union. In other words, the success of such an organization will facilitate the case of the European prospect and of European integration in the Mediterranean area.
WRITING CONTEST Write a children’s short story / novelette in English and enter the International Olympic Truce Centre’s writing contest. It is open to all residents in the countries of S.E. Europe and the Mediterranean. Subject: The Olympic Truce First Prize: 1,500 Euro Second Prize: 1,000 Euro Third Prize: 500 Euro Submission deadline: 15th October 2007
The subject of the contest is “The Olympic Truce and the principles and ideals promoted through it” – a subject that allows the participants to give free rein to their imagination and to interpret, develop and modify it to fit their personal writing style, bearing in mind that the story is addressed to children and adolescents. Each story should not exceed 5,000 words and it will be judged according to its literary merit, the originality and creativity of its plot and its overall writing quality. The three best entries will receive prizes – 1,500 Euro the winner, 1,000 Euro the first runner-up, and 500 Euro the second runner-up. The winners will receive their prizes at a special ceremony in Athens. The five best stories will be published in an illustrated volume, with the aim to be distributed to the pupils of the Greek schools. This volume will also be presented at the Greek House in Beijing during the 2008 Olympic Games as one of the projects of the International Olympic Truce Centre.
Participants in the contest should submit one entry each and should be residents in one of the following countries: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, F.Y.R.O.M., Greece, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Palestine, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey. Entries should be written in English and should not exceed 5,000 words. Entries should be submitted in electronic format, accompanied by a printout of the story. The covering letter should include the author’s full name, age, address, telephone number and e-mail address, should contain the phrase, “The work under the title …………………. is entirely my creation in which I hold all rights and I herewith agree to transfer all these rights (including intellectual property rights) to the International Olympic Truce Centre, which is hereby entitled to reproduce the abovementioned work in any form, printed, electronic or other.” and should be signed by the author. Entries should be mailed to: PO BOX 75024 Kallithea, Athens, Greece The envelope should bear the inscription: “Short story on the Olympic Truce”. Entries should be postmarked not later than October 15, 2007.
cover story Sarkozy's Mediterranean A quarterly review on European integration SE Europe & the SE Mediterranean
The bridge. is a quarterly publication of the “Agora Ideon” forum Project Manager: BusinessOnMedia Contact: 118 Kremou Street, Kallithea, 17675 Athens, Greece tel: +30-210.953.3362 fax: +30-210.953.3096 www.bridge-mag.com e-mail: bridge@avk.gr Publisher: Stavroula Sourila Publishing and Business Development Director: Kostas Tsaoussis Executive Consultant: Alexia Konachou Project Director: Victor Dhimas Editors in Chief: Andreas Hardaloupas Dimitris Maziotis Editorial Consultants: Kostis Kapopoulos Stavros Kourtalis Editorial Team: Constantinos Angelopoulos Ali Osman Egilmez Alexandra Fiada Antonis Kamaras Maria Katechi Natassa Mastorakou Dimitris Pappas Simos Ververidis Columnist: Gazmend Kapllani Internet Edition Manager Vasilis Loukanidis Proof-reading: Deborah Ellis Artwork team: Dimitris Stergiou Dimitris Papadimitriou Vangelis Nikas International Relations Coordinator: Katerina Anastasaki Marketing and Communications Director: Christos Tsaoussis Advertising Executive Manager: Lydia Avrami Montage-Printing: Kathimerini SA ISSN 1791-2237
A confluence area to prosper 62-64 by Mohieddine Hadhri Toward a New EU Approach 65-67 by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
Ben Andoni Kossovo ‘declares war’ to Albania … in sport
A Dream or Implementable Agenda? 68-70 by Stavros Kourtalis & Andreas Hardaloupas Security: Over a decade of Euro-Mediterranean partnership 71-74 by Stephen C. Calleya The European foreign policy facing Islamists in the Mediterranean basin 75 by Tarek Bouzamondo United in diversity? The Mediterranean Wager 76-77 by Christos Stylianides
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Nikos Moraitis Greek music and the Balkans
What lies ahead? 78-79 by Yannis Valinakis Cleaning up the Med 80-82 by Harry van Versendaal Trade relations: Keeping record of history 83-85 by Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim
culture 114 - 115
Security concerns 86-87 By Roberto Aliboni The Iraq war’s impact on the wider Mideast 88-89 By Dr Walter Posch
Andreas A. Papandreou The Challenge of Change
Greece in search of a strategy in the Southeast Mediterranean 90-91 By Panayotis J.Tsakonas Mediterranean security and Greece 92-93 By Dimitris K. Xenakis
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Letters to the editor As of our next issue, we shall be publishing letters expressing readers’ opinions on articles printed in The bridge. Please include your name and address and keep in mind that letters may be edited for reasons of clarity or space. Please address letters to the Editor at: The bridge, 118 Kremou St, Kallithea, 17675, Athens, Greece. e-mail: bridge@avk.gr The bridge. quarterly review is distributed along with the International Herald Tribune (IHT) and Kathimerini English Edition newspapers in Greece, Cyprus and Albania free of charge (4 August 2007). After the initial day of publication it can be purchased at news-stands. The content of the magazine does not involve the reporting or the editorial departments of the IHT.
© The bridge.. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The bridge.. Where opinion is expressed it is that of the authors and does not necessarily coincide with the editorial views of the publisher of The bridge.. All information in this magazine is verified to the best of the authors’ and the publisher’s ability. However, The bridge. does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it.
dialogue
Letter to Tony
...about European Constitutional Treaty A sense of European demos-hood 48-49 by Dimitris N. Chryssochoou The Subversive Power of Politics and the Consequenses of the EU Constitutional Summit 50-51 by Sarah Seeger and Dr. Dominik Hierlemann
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Kostas Ifantis The Vosphorus Conundrum
After the EU constitutional Treaty, … the EU borders? 52-53 by Othon Anastassakis Constitutionalism and diversity in Europe’s emerging polity 54-56 by Kostas A. Lavdas Sterile debate: Britain’s engagement 58-59 by Ed Balls
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Participate 60 by Philippe Herzog
Gazmend Kapllani Women in Istanbul
themes Turkey impressions 112 - 113
Dimitris Pappas Silent growth in Egypt
Turkey in turbulent times 29-31 by Ahmet Evin Turkey in the EU: A win-win scenario 32-33 by Kemal Kirisci European Public Opinion on Turkey 34-38 by Alain Servantie Energy
market view 102
Dimitris Maziotis and Ali Osman Egilmez Turks Polls
The Russian-Westernenergy dilemma 97-99 by Dr.Constantinos Filis The South Stream Gas Pipeline checkmate 100-101 by Theodore G. R. Tsakiris market view 102 - 107
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and more...
contents
Letter to Tony A new initiative by foreign ministers of 10 Mediterranean EU states in the Middle East In the light of Tony Blair’s role as envoy to the Middle East, 10 Mediterranean EU states’ foreign ministers wrote an open letter to the former British prime minister where they stated their concerns and proposals regarding the resolvement of the Middle East problem. The very essence of this open letter is the consensus of ideas presented by the foreign ministers, an element that enhances and strengthens the role of the EU in the region.
Dear Tony, After ten years spent serving Britain, and while the world was already regretting your leaving front-line politics, you have just accepted a mission which is more complex, even more impossible than all those you had tackled until now. Impossible? The task, effectively, would be enough to discourage anyone. On top of the seemingly endless conflict between Israel and the Palestinians there is today a stack of hostile factors: the Hamas takeover by force in Gaza, of course, Israel’s domestic political difficulties, the United States wait-and-see policy, Europe’s lack of conviction ³ despite Javier Solana’s commendable action ³ and, above all, this terrible feeling of impotence, which seems to be taking hold of the whole international community. Yes, there does seem to be something to be discouraged about. And yet, in welcoming your decision to accept this mission, we can’t help feeling an improbable optimism. First of all, because we know your courage, your sense of the common good and your determination. But also because the scale of the crisis has led to a salutary awakening, which seems, paradoxically, to have at last made progress possible. Topping this analysis ³ we might as well admit it straightaway ³ is the recognition of a shared failure we can no longer ignore: the ‘roadmap’ has failed. The status quo which has prevailed since 2000 is leading nowhere, as we know. The overly strict conditions we have habitually imposed as prerequisites for the resumption of the peace process have only made the situation worse. The international community’s nervousness about doing anything at all has caused too much damage. This negative appraisal compels us to change our approach. Above all it allows us to broaden our outlook. It’s Europe’s duty to say this to its Israeli and Palestinian friends. Since if we agree to a change of perspective, if we dare look at the situation with fresh eyes, the present situation also offers its share of opportunities. We shall mention two. For a start, Hamas’ takeover of Gaza. From this defeat can emerge a hope. Indeed the risk of civil war in the West Bank, the threats of Palestine’s de facto partition and a return to the pre-1967 Jordanian and Egyptian scenarios may prompt an injection of momentum. On his own, because of his tenacious encouragement of peace and dialogue and courageous denouncement of terrorism, the President of the Palestinian Authority gives us grounds for optimism. Another reason for hope: the determined involvement of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Qatar alongside Egypt and Jordan. With their substantial resources, these new protagonists are capable of providing crucially important aid. These two factors, dear Tony, allow us to lay down revised objectives. Based on a new dialogue between the Quartet and the Follow-up Group of the Arab League (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Emirates), involving the two parties (Messrs Olmert and Abbas), we think it reasonable for there to be four such objectives: Offer a hope, a genuine political solution to the region’s peoples. This has to involve negotiations without prerequisites on the final status, even if it means acting in successive phases. Embracing the issues of Jerusalem, the refugees and the borders, these negotiations will make it possible to set a shared realistic objective. - I -
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Take account of Israel’s need for security. The idea of a robust international force, of the NATO or UN chapter VII type, is worth considering. It would be able fully legitimately to maintain order in the territories and enforce compliance with a necessary ceasefire. The risks are, of course, high, but this force can be viable and secure if we comply with two conditions: it must operate alongside a peace plan without taking its place and be based on an inter-Palestinian agreement. Obtain from Israel concrete and immediate measures to help Mahmoud Abbas. These must include the transfer of all the taxes owed, release of the thousands of prisoners without blood on their hands, the release too of the main Palestinian leaders to ensure the succession within Fatah, the freezing of the settlement policy and removal of wildcat outposts. None of these measures can be disputed for security reasons. Europe, the Quartet must tell Israel this firmly and as a staunch friend. It’s too late to prevaricate. Don’t push Hamas to up the stakes. This means reopening the border between Gaza and Egypt, facilitating movement between Gaza and Israel, and encouraging Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as President Mubarak has proposed, to help get the resumption of the dialogue between Hamas and Fatah. These four objectives are within our grasp. Despite the tragic circumstances, despite the wounds and hatred, the opportunity is a historic one ³ maybe the last one. We know your inventiveness and your resolve. So we are certain that you will be able to deal comprehensively with these problems. Hence the importance of convening without any further delay an international conference including all the parties to the conflict. You have, dear Tony, the extraordinary privilege of soon being able to help make a reality of what had until now been only an idea: two States, Israeli and Palestinian, living side by side in peace and security. I can tell you that, every day of your mission, you will be able to rely on our unfailing support and commitment. Signed by the ten Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Mediterranean States of the European Union, meeting on 6 July in Portoroz (Slovenia) Ivailo Kalfin, Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria Yiorgos Lillikas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus Miguel-Éngel Moratinos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of France Theodora Bakoyiannis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Massimo D’Alema, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy Michael Frendo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta Luis Amado, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal Andrei Cioroianu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania and Dimitrij Rupel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia. - II Published in Le Monde newspaper on July 10, 2007 http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/10-Mediterranean-EU-States-foreign.html
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The history of an
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On Monday, July 23, Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Evripidis Stylianidis, inaugurated in Sarajevo the GreekBosnian Friendship Building with his Bosnian counterpart. With the inauguration of the building, one of the most important public works of the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB) came to its completion. The Greek-Bosnian Friendship Building is located in the center of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s capital. Once it housed the government services of Bosnia and was bombed relentlessly during the recent war in the former Yugoslavia. The 20-story building was practically destroyed and the previous Greek government had the idea of undertaking its reconstruction. Thanks to HiPERB, the building was completed with the help of a Greek-Bosnian construction joint venture. The building will once again house the services of the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the offices of the Southeastern Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP). The reconstruction of the Governmental Building of ‘Common Institutions’ in Sarajevo was posed by the National Coordinator Office of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a total budget of 16,789,989 euros (participation of HiPERB 13,497,073 euros [80.39 percent], Bosnian participation 3,292,916 euros [19.61 percent]). After an international competition, with prequalification of five companies, of which three posed final, binding technoeconomical offers, the project’s construction was assigned to the Greek company Domotechniki SA, which executed the
emblematic building Inauguration of the Greek-Bosnian Friendship Building
work in a consortium with the Bosnian company Unioninvest DD. The final contract between Domotechniki SA and the ministerial council of Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed on August 1, 2005. At the same time the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, via the National Coordinator HiPERB, signed individual contracts with the following companies: Greece’s FOCAL as a project manager, and Bosnia’s AKSA as a supervisor. The Greek side signed a contract with technical consultants office Design and Application Engineers SA for technical help and support and to evaluate and control BosniaHerzegovina’s formal proposal and technical and financial elements of the project. ‘I am happy to inaugurate the Friendship Building of our peoples, the renovation of which was 80 percent-funded by HiPERB,’ Karamanlis said, adding that the building would be a symbol of the friendship between the two peoples in the center
of Sarajevo. The Greek premier also stressed that projects such as this confirmed Greece's ‘unfailing support’ toward BosniaHerzegovina and underlined Greece’s support for Bosnia’s and the rest of Southeastern Europe’s eventual accession to the European Union: ‘Greece supports the Euro-Atlantic prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rest of Southeastern Europe with all means — political, economic and military — as a guarantee for the development and stability of the region,’ he stressed. He also said that Athens is in favor of the immediate signature of a Stability and Association Agreement between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as soon as the latter fulfills the necessary criteria. As Stylianidis has stated, this particular project is the first major project to be fund-
ed by Greece in the region. More major projects will follow, showing that Greece is conscientious and effective with regard to its undertakings in the broader region of the Balkans. Within the framework of the Greek mission’s visit to Sarajevo, Stylianidis and his Bosnian counterpart signed an Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation and an Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation.
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Turk polls: Bringing the It has always been the dream of rightwing parties in Turkey to achieve the success and be the inheritor of Turkish Statesman and Prime Minister (1950–1960) Adnan Menderes, who founded the first legal opposition party — the Democratic Party (DP) — in 1946 after the Republican People’s Party (CHP)’s single-party period and made the DP in the 1950 elections the first party with an absolute victory over the CHP while gaining 53.3 percent of the vote. On May 2, 1954, the DP increased its support, getting 57.6 percent of the vote. Since then no Turkish party had achieved an increase of their votes after entering the elections as the ruling party until July 22, 2007, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) did just that. According to the results of the July 22 elections, three parties exceeded the 10 percent threshold. The AKP, with 46.66 percent of the votes, guaranteed its being the single ruling party with 340 seats and increased its votes 12.38 percent compared to the 2002 elections, which made the AKP the ruling party of Turkey for 4.5 years. The CHP got 20.85 percent of the votes with a 1.46 percent increase, gaining 112 seats, although it wa a big disappointment when one considers the huge numbers that had recently participated in ‘Republic Protests’1. The third party in the General Assembly became the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which doubled its votes compared to the last elections. Extremist nationalist parties got 14.29 per1. A series of peaceful mass rallies that took place in Turkey in 2007 in support of the Kemalist ideal of state secularism. The biggest was in Izmir, with the participation of 1.5 million people protesting the ruling AKP, claiming it has a ‘hidden Islamic agenda against secularism.’
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cent of the votes while ensuring 71 seats in the parliament. For the first time in Turkish political life, a significant number of independent candidates entered the parliament, securing 5.2 percent of the votes and 27 seats (the 10 percent threshold is valid only for parties, not for independent candidates). Participation in the 2007 elections reached 80 percent in spite of taking place during the summer holiday season. The number of women MPs in parliament doubled compared to the last assembly, reaching 50, of whom 31 are in the AKP. One of these women MPs is an independent candi-
By Dimitris Maziotis and Ali Osman Egilmez
date from Istanbul. She is a member of the Democratic Society Party (DTP)2 and still imprisoned, sentenced for being a member of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). She will get out of the jail though, due to the immunity of MPs, and join the parliament. After the elections, there will be some changes in the makeup of the assembly. Twenty-three of the 27 independents are former members of the DTP. They will have the chance to regroup in the parliament un2. A pro-Kurdish left-wing political party in Turkey.
AKP 46.66 %
AKP
CHP MHP others CHP 20.85 %
independent MHP 14.29 %
DP 5.41 %
periphery into the center der the party’s name. On the other hand, the coalition of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) with the CHP for the elections resulted in the entrance of 13 DSP members into parliament from the CHP lists. They are also expected to resign from the CHP and come together under the DSP umbrella. With that change, the CHP will have 99 seats in the parliament. AKP victory The AKP increased its votes in almost every city. The most important was the increase on the Aegean side of the country, which is traditionally a stronghold of the CHP, as well as Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, which used to be pro-Kurdish DTP centers. In these regions the AKP either became the leading party or leveled with the other two parties. For instance, Izmir was symbolically seen as the last stronghold to be conquered by the AKP and the last bastion to be defended by the CHP. The results showed that the AKP doubled its votes even in Izmir and became a real threat to the CHP. Those votes mainly came from the poor neighborhoods of the city. On the other hand, the CHP secured the middle- and upper-class votes as it did all around Turkey. That is why, strangely, the traditional social democrat voters (the excluded groups of the system in the international conjecture) went over to the AKP and center-right votes (simply the bourgeoisie votes) went to the CHP. This success of the AKP can roundly be seen as the result of 4.5 years of stability and economic growth in the country and the reactions to the April 27 ‘e-intervention’ of the military during the presidential
election. During the election period, the AKP successfully used this discourse. With tremendous growth that almost doubled the Turkish economy it was not difficult for the AKP to play the ‘prosperity card.’ After all, as former US President Bill Clinton said, ‘It’s the economy stupid!’ The AKP is very close to getting the achievements of the ‘periphery’ in the sense of getting a place in the ‘core’ with the election of the AKP-supported president, symbolically the cornerstone of secularism. The majority of the parliament belongs to the AKP, but after a previous court decision, the ‘magic’ number 367 is needed. With the 340 seats of the AKP and 27 seats of independents, the majority of them pro-Kurdish DTP members, that number to provide the absolute majority is now within reach. Here, it seems that the DTP is going to be a key party in some crucial periods and decisions in the near future. The first one will be the presidential elections. In this regard the DTP started to give the signals of bargaining with the expected future ruling party, the AKP. Furthermore, the AKP proved that it is not simply an Islamic party supported by growing middle-class Islamists but a central liberal party which has garnered the vote of one out of every two people in the country from different classes, ethnic origins, statues, ideologies and lifestyles. As Erdogan claimed on the night of July 22 af-
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ter his party’s election victory, they absolutely ‘became a societal center.’ In his speech, he also used very conciliatory language and stated his commitment to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s doctrines and embraced the other segments of society rather than resorting to provocative talk after such an historical victory. CHP On the other hand, the loser of the election was definitely the CHP, although it did slightly increase its votes by around 1.5 percent. Deniz Baykal added a nationalist debate to the Kemalist status quo and etatism of the CHP and transferred some prominent names from right-wing parties before the elections. Apart from Ilhan Kesici, none of them could have been selected. The nationalist discourse of the CHP (voters mainly chose to vote for the ‘real addressers’ of nationalism, the MHP rather than the CHP — this discourse of the
AKP’ s territorial distribution of votes
MHP’ s territorial distribution of votes
CHP mainly brought the votes to the MHP) united with the ‘threat’ propaganda stating the danger against the Kemalist and secular regime and acting with the military put the party in a more conservative position as being far away from social democracy’s values. The CHP and ‘elites’ proved that they are far from seeing the current social dynamics in Turkey. Several factors have contributed to rising nationalistic sentiments in Turkey and the consequent rise of the MHP. Negative developments in Europe itself have exercised an unfavorable impact on Turkish politics. The fact that Turkish membership had emerged as a major issue of contestation in France and also in countries like Austria during the European Parliament elections of June 2004 created the image in the average Turkish mindset that EU membership was not a credible objective. A typical line of thinking was that although accession negotiations had been formally opened, a sufficient number of obstacles would be created on the way to make sure that Turkish membership aspirations would be diverted to an inferior track of ‘privileged partnership.’ It is important to emphasize that rising Euroskepticism is a phenomenon that tends to affect most countries engaged in the process of accession negotiations, as was also the case for the new Central and Eastern European members of the EU which encountered such a phenomenon during their transition process to full membership. It is understood that the regime anxieties of Kemalist elites and institutions are not shared by the majority of the people. On the contrary, the AKP was seen as ‘unjustly treated’ by the regime defenders and it increased its votes, especially during the process of Abdullah Gul’s presidential candidacy.
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there is a strong need for a social democratic formation in Turkey.
CHP’ s territorial distribution of votes
Independend candidates΄ territorial distribution of votes
The two biggest ‘threats’ Turkey faces are the separatist movements (mainly the Kurdish separatist movements) and the Islamic movement, according to the Kemalist ‘core’ and elites during modern Turkish history. That is why Kurdish and Islamic identities were suppressed and excluded from the public sphere for many years and forced to stay on the ‘periphery.’ Starting with Adnan Menderes, who was more pro-Western but tolerant toward the traditional way of life and Islam, and continuing with Turgut Ozal, Recep Tayyip Erdogan can be seen as the mobilizer of the periphery toward the center. The reaction of military and other Kemalist institutions to the elections remains to be seen. In consolidated democracies, mainly two parties get the majority of the votes, one from — traditionally speaking — the center right, the other from the center left. Turkey found its center right but the other pillar is totally missing. The CHP is far away from the social democrat or center left with its status quo and elitist characteristic. Thus
What next? In this colorful parliament, people now are afraid to experience the vicious battles of Secularist-Islamist, Kurdish separatism3Turkish nationalism, respectively CHP-AKP, DTP-MHP. In this atmosphere, the agenda of the parliament is expected to proceed as follows: Within a week the official election results will be announced; The MPs will take an oath; The president of the assembly will be chosen within 10 days of the oath ceremony; The new president of the republic will be chosen within 30 days; A new government will be formed and get a vote of confidence within 45 days. Within this period the AKP will form the government and the parliament will proceed with the election of the president, which dragged the country into the ballots. The big bet for the AKP and Turkey is finding the balance between the rising nationalism, the Kurdish problem and the continuation of Turkey’s economic growth, EU aspirations and democratic reforms. One thing is certain: Turkey will continue in the coming months to hit the headlines while struggling to find its identity. 3. The DTP has two groups within itself: The radicals sometimes express ideas about federalization but a reformist group is in favor of solving the problems within the democratization of Turkey.
Dimitris Maziotis is a research fellow at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM). Ali Osman Egilmez is an MA student in Southeast European studies, University of Athens, and an intern at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM).
OTE Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2006
‘365 days to give back…’ ous development and prosperity of our communities.
In this respect, some of the most recent noteworthy actions are: In the area of the society OTE’s flagship voluntary program is the blood donation program. In place since 1976, it encourages voluntary blood donations by OTE employees to address an important medical need in Greece, while in the last few years internal communication campaigns have been running to stimulate employees’ participation. Today, the number of blood donors in OTE is around 3,000 throughout Greece. In 2006, nearly 1,592 units of blood were collected in the Attica area, of which 1,106 were donated to cooperating hospitals, and 486 were made available to cover the needs of employees and their relatives. OTE will continue the work begun in 2006 to align the parameters of its CSR performance and reporting to international standards, including the GRI G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Going forward, the company is committed to broadening and systematizing its ‘Building Ties’ CSR program, as well as following and recording the results of its various initiatives, so that it is constantly adjusted and improved. In the area of the marketplace In 2006, OTE initiated several campaigns to showcase broadband through ‘hands-on’ experience for first-time users, the most prominent being a two-year nationwide road show titled ‘OTE on the broadband.’ It consisted of a technological Mobile Information Unit used to acquaint the public, especially in regional areas,
with high-speed broadband Internet. Under the key message ‘Make your Life Easier,’ the mobile unit successfully visited 33 cities-stations from July to September 2006 and from May to June 2007 informing more than 28,000 visitors on the benefits of the Internet and giving them the opportunity to try out broadband applications. Regarding employees’ wellbeing and benefits, OTE continued the financial support of 54 Personnel Cultural Clubs throughout Greece focusing on arts, entertainment and sports activities open to all OTE Group employees. In 2006, the clubs counted a total number of 20,000 members, including employee families and pensioners.
In the area of the environment In the second semester of 2006 the company successfully recycled around 500 kilos of batteries. For this purpose, special bins had been placed in OTESHOPS and places of work. Moreover, at the end of 2006 the company launched an effort to recycle telecommunication appliances and equipment collected from various settings at 110 OTESHOPS.
OTE 2006 CSR Report is available on-line at the company’s website: www.ote.gr
PUBLI
For nearly 60 years the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE) has been operating in Greece, both in the Attica area and other regions, through a wide range of socially related initiatives. Since 2005, however, OTE has adopted a new approach regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR), which directly combines CSR with the company’s business operations. Within this framework, OTE is realizing a multidimensional program titled ‘Building Ties,’ which means developing long-term relationships based on respecting and contributing to the wellbeing of all its stakeholders. The program covers four equally important areas in which corporate social responsibility is implemented: the marketplace, our people, the environment and society. Under the motif ‘365 days to give back…,’ OTE’s 2006 Corporate Social Responsibility Report was recently released. As pointed out in the CSR Report, OTE’s priorities are the following: — Making a difference in the marketplace by using its unique capabilities in technology and infrastructure to benefit consumers and to bridge the broadband gap that holds back the Greek society and economy from further progress; — Taking care of our people by developing a spirit of partnership and mutual support, encouraging career development and the wellbeing of employees; — Minimizing our impact on the environment by becoming a greener company and helping customers use technology to reduce their environmental impact; — Partnering with society by being a social partner for Greece and the region, supporting citizens and enabling the continu-
Kosovo ‘declares war’ Kosovo is waiting to become independent, so a dilemma, like a ball, is circulating: Will the Kosovar football players continue to play with the Albanian national team? The officials of the two countries often make patriotic or confused declarations, while the players just want to play…
That day, he was surrounded by a crowd of fans and journalists. He was the star of the local media and the most requested man on the Albanian national soccer team in Belarus. The Kosovar Lorik Cana, who plays for French football club Olympique de Marseille, was giving autographs and responding to questions. ‘What will you do if Kosovo becomes independent? Will you still play for the Albanian national team?’ an Albanian journalist asked him. A moment of silence followed. Finally: ‘I have found my team,’ replied the best-paid footballer of the red and blacks. The truth was out: Even if Kosovo’s final status remains unresolved, the age and the talent of its players cannot wait indefinitely. This question has hung like a black cloud over sports in Kosovo and Albania. Journalists and others have put forward the ‘simple’ idea that if Kosovo becomes independent, it will ask its footballers who currently represent Albania to come back. Surprisingly, this question was not asked of Kosovar football players who have other citizenships. For example, Valon Behrami, a Lazio player and now a Swiss citizen, plays for the national team of Switzerland, while Shefki Kuqi and his brother Njazi play for the national team of Finland. The question,
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as it was put, seemed to imply that Albania is exploiting the Kosovars. And that the situation must be corrected once Kosovo gains its independence, and its own national football team. Even if the Kosovo status issue is still pending, rumors abound regarding an exodus of Kosovar footballers from Albania. But it seems to have been forgotten that a lot of them have had, and accepted, offers from other national teams… FIFA and its rules ‘If a player has played on a national team or has simply signed a contract with such a team, it is impossible for him to change his team for another. This is a FIFA rule,’ said Armando Duka, the president of the Albanian Football Federation. He didn’t exclude the other option: If a football player of one national team wants to change to another, then his request will be examined sepa-
By Ben Andoni
rately but this will take a long time. How long? No one knows. Perhaps by the time he gets the OK he will have given up…. At present a number of Kosovars play on the Albanian national team, such as Besnik Hasi (who plays in Begium), Lorik Cana (France), Arjan Beqaj (Greece) and Armend Dallku (Ukraine). They are key players and it is hard to imagine the Albanian national team without them. Moreover, Albanian specialists keep making references to other quality players from Kosovo. Those who are enrolled in the national team are provided with an Albanian passport, with quick procedures. So all parties are happy: the Albanians because they have talented football players and the Kosovars because they get the chance to play and to become known all over Europe. For example, Armend Dallku became a famous striker playing for Elbasan, an Alban-
on Albania… in sport ian football club. The same happened with Arjan Beqaj, who is now making a brilliant career in Greece. He was totally unknown before playing for the Albanian national team. And, lastly, Lorik Cana, who was ‘discovered’ by Albanian soccer scouts when he was playing with an amateur football club in France. The Kosovars’ case is nothing new. The break-up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia drove a lot of players who used to play for the USSR or Yugoslavia to don the national colors of the newly formed states. What makes the Kosovo case unique is probably the fact that it never had the status of a republic but only of an autonomous district. And now, under the surveillance of the UN, it is waiting to be granted the status of statehood. A short history If we look at the history of football in Kosovo we find that the Kosovo Football Federation was created in 1946, as a branch of the Yugoslav Football Federation. Only FC Pristina played normally in the First Yugoslav League. Just three or four Kosovar football clubs participated in the Second Yugoslav League. Kosovo itself had its first football league, and its top team usually went directly to the Second Yugoslav League. The Kosovo Football Federation
was banished in 1991 and reactivated after 1999. Conditions are still bad, but good news has come in the form of local businessmen seeking to become key investors in football clubs. In any case, Kosovo has a long way to go. ‘I’m sorry to say that Kosovo’s football is still far from Europe,’ declared Lorik Cana to the Kosovar media. ‘There are a lot of talented players but they need to work a lot. I hope that Kosovo gains its independence as soon as possible and then we can deal seriously with football in our country. Maybe we can have some good results in the next 10 years.’ But, by then, he will have retired... Nevertheless, if Kosovo does become independent, it will be eligible for financing from both UEFA and FIFA. But at present Albania is serving as an opportunity for them to play and as a stepping stone for them to make a career in Albania and internationally. And while officials in both countries continue to make patriotic or confused declarations, the players need to play, to make a career, not to mention a living…
The game of the poor people A lot of Kosovars and Albanians working and living as immigrants in Europe used to think that one of the most effective ways of social integration for their children was sport, especially football. ‘It’s not by chance,’ said Dritan Shakohoxha, an Albanian journalist, ‘that Western football teams in Germany, Switzerland, Finland or Sweden each have two or three players of Kosovar or Albanian origin. It’s their weapon against social isolation and one of the most effective ways of social ascent.’ In fact, the example of Zinedine Zidane is a source of inspiration for a lot of secondgeneration immigrants. Kosovars and Albanians all across the European continent are trying to imitate his success. As for those Kosovars and Albanians who didn’t emigrate, wearing the colors of the Albanian football national team is still their big dream…
Ben Andoni is a freelance journalist based in Tirana, Albania.
frontlines
The challenge of change By Andreas A. Papandreou
Amid growing concerns over climate change, the environment, energy security and diminishing petroleum reserves worldwide, the Mediterranean region is in a privileged geopolitical position to act as host to a wide variety of global points of view on solutions for the future. On April 17 this year the UN Security Council held its first hearings ever on the relationship between climate change, energy and security. THE ATHENS SUMMIT — GLOBAL CLIMATE AND ENERGY SECURITY — will be the first international forum for an exchange of views on this important new theme in a commercial setting. This ‘Challenge of Change,’ held under the auspices of the President of the Hellenic Republic His Excellency Karolos Papoulias, will be an international gathering of prominent spokespersons, senior government officials, top business leaders, academics and the scientific community. The understanding of the relationship between climate change and energy security as it affects the future of development is only now coming into view.
The Athens Summit — Global Climate and Energy Security, October 14-16, Athens Hilton. Athens Summit 2007 ‘The Challenge of Change’ website: www.athens-summit.com
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Presentations by senior representatives from the public and private sectors as well as discussions on renewable energy, carbon emissions trading, resource nationalism, the future of petroleum, clean coal and the nuclear option will be held. This event will focus on the most salient subjects in six panels: The Implications of Climate Change for Energy and Policy Strategic Developments in Energy and Climate Security Hydrocarbon Dependence in a Carbon Constrained Age Toward a New Energy and Climate Security Paradigm Alternative Energy, Conservation and Efficiencies The Two Communities Meet — Energy and Environment, in Conflict or Collaboration? A key component of the Summit is to formulate the Athens Declaration, an EUMediterranean 2020 Partnership to jointly achieve at least 20 percent energy savings and generate 20 percent of energy from renewable energy sources by the year 2020. It is intended to form a partnership between EU countries and non-EU Mediterranean countries in this respect, including, among others, Algeria, Egypt,
Libya, Morocco and Turkey, to meet this challenge. Greece is at the crossroads of the great civilizations of Europe, Africa and the Middle East and provided the first trade routes to North and South Asia in its own rise to empire. As the need for energy and its conservation has increased, so have the tensions between the producers of energy and the consumer states. This conference is designed to bring the various parties together for a detailed discussion of the current situation and prospects for the future — the primary personalities of the hydrocarbon industry together with the spokespersons of global warming and alternative energy — in a dialogue to assess this new era in human history.
Andreas A. Papandreou is professor of environmental economics, University of Athens, and vice president, Institute for Sustainable Development.
AMC
PUBLI
Focusing on the areas of health and social care, education and the protection of the environment, AMC implements various social and environmental initiatives, addressing the needs of the Albanian society and people. In 2006, AMC created a dedicated CSR team and started developing its CSR reporting. It also established cooperation with UNICEF, the Red Cross and governmental organizations. In the area of social care, AMC focused on supporting sensitive social groups. On World Hunger Day, the company launched a fundraising SMS campaign for the support of homes for the elderly throughout the country. During the Christmas period, AMC organized events and offered gifts to orphans and the children of policemen who lost their lives in the line of duty. Finally, aiming to confront illegal human trafficking, AMC supported the ‘Regional Anti-trafficking Initiative,’ gathering volunteers from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Kosovo and FYROM, and supported the MTV Exit concert aiming to inform and sensitize young people on trafficking issues.
Greek shipping: Nationalizing the global A new wave of money is crashing on the shores of Greek economic life, originating from hedge funds and private equity investors. Fears are being raised that the leadership of the country’s corporate flagships will be turned over to anonymous and uncontrollable entities. Interestingly enough though, if we look at the funding of two of Greece’s highest-profile direct equity investors, Global Finance and Marfin investment group, which have recently raised 350 million and 5.2 billion euros respectively, we will find among their key sources of capital that element which is as old as Greek entrepreneurship itself, namely Greek shipping. This is yet another demonstration of a key feature of globalization: the fact that globalization is shaped, within national territories, by repatriated capital and know-how. In this way, globalization is nationalized, which is to say that it becomes embedded within the national community where it takes place. Essentially, as economies open up they have a natural advantage in attracting accumulated know-how and capital from their expatriate elements, which, due to the restrictions of the past, had historically sought their fortunes outside the national territory. Protection (as much as liberalization) always reinforces itself in what we
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By Antonis Kamaras
might call virtuous or vicious cycles, depending on our ideological preferences. Protection, by compelling some of the most dynamic elements of a society and an economy to leave their country, further entrenches its own mentality and practices, within its particular national territory. Conversely, liberalization by attracting these same dynamic elements that protection had previously expelled, accelerates its velocity and dramatically extends its reach. Thus the liberalization of the 1990s initially facilitated the repatriation of Greek shipping, as privatizations in Greek telecoms and banking massively improved the operational infrastructure available to Greek shipowners. Furthermore, liberalization made available a wide range of assets to Greek shipping, thus making Greece (and the wider region of the Balkans which has also been undergoing liberalization) an important component of shipping’s enduring strategy of risk diver-
sification. Last, but surely not least, from the point of view of repatriated Greek shipowners, liberalization created a culture of acceptance, as opposed to rejection, of great wealth and legitimated its participation and visibility in Greece’s public life. We can compare Greek shipping to the Indian IT magnates that established themselves in the same period. In India, too, economic liberalization encouraged the so-called non-resident Indians, most prominently Indian technologists excelling in places such as California’s Silicon Valley, to invest in their motherland. They in turn created the global outsourcing wave, which materialized in cities like Bangalore, the functional equivalent of Greek shipping’s Piraeus, which now worldrenowned companies such as Infosys represent. Liberalization, implemented and legitimated by Indian political forces, meant that the egalitarian priorities of Gandhi-Nehru vintage, encapsulated in the expression of a ‘Hindu rate of growth’ (i.e. of an economy which will not lose its
GLOBUL
PUBLI
GLOBUL contributes to social progress, focusing its efforts on the areas of health and social care, sports and education. The company is among the founders of the Corporate Donors’ Club, established with the mission to develop and convey corporate social responsibility values and practices in Bulgaria. In 2006, GLOBUL was named ‘Top Corporate Donor’ during the annual Bulgarian Donors’ Forum. GLOBUL has developed the ‘Listen to Children’s Dreams’ program for underprivileged children, aiming to develop their communication skills through art. Over 200 children from three institutions have participated in the program. Also, the company implements the ‘GLOBUL Start’ program addressed to pupils throughout the country, aiming to help young people discover their athletic skills. In 2006, more than 1,200 children from 204 different schools across Bulgaria participated in the program, which has the motto ‘Champions start from school.’
anti-capitalist restrictions for the sake of accelerated material development) lost its unquestioned dominance. As in Greece, a culture of entrepreneurial achievement, and the material distinction that goes with it, was consecrated by politics thus making the country friendlier to the US-trained, hyper-competitive, non-resident Indians. Importantly, such repatriated elements — Greek shipowners, Indian IT entrepreneurs — benefit home-grown liberalization as much as they benefit from it. By successfully relinking with their countries of origin they come to define the latter’s role in the global setting and to conceptualize anew their countries’ position in altered global hierarchies. Shipping has become a pillar of the Greek government’s projection of an ‘extrovert’ Greece, meaning a country successfully and confidently interacting with globality. Likewise India’s IT corporations have irretrievably undermined perceptions of India’s identity as a champion of the downtrodden, underdeveloped and globally disadvantaged Third World. By enabling such redefinitions these repatriated elements assist in the nationalization of the politics of adjustment to global processes. Opening up to global capital flows, growing domestic competi-
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tion and so on becomes more acceptable and the politics and policies that facilitate such changes gain in durability, to the extent that they come in a package that includes the projection of national economic prowess onto the international domain. This is the role that the Greek-owned commercial fleet plays, symbolically by its global pre-eminence and materially by repatriating billions of dollars to the Greek national economy every year, providing income to tens of thousands of high-salary employees in Greece, and channeling part of its tremendous excess liquidity to Greek entrepreneurship in Southeastern Europe. As we delve deeper into this nationalization of the global in Greece, by Greek shipping, the following key questions need to be addressed, from a public policy and analytical perspective: 1. What are the key features of the shipping cluster of Piraeus and Attica today? How does it compare and compete with other shipping clusters, such as London, Hamburg or Rotterdam? What is the set of public policies that could sustain and extend this cluster’s success well into the future (whether these relate to infrastruc-
ture, lifting remaining restrictions in shipping-related professions or upgrading merchant marine education)? 2. What are the synergies between shipping and other sectors of the Greek economy, and how can they evolve? What could be the set of policies that would enlarge the space of opportunity, either in Greece or in the region, for shipping’s interaction with the Greek economy? 3. How are the interests of Greek shipping advanced internationally by the Greek state? Has shipping been sufficiently integrated by Greek policymakers in the projection of Greece’s particular identity and role in the international system? 4. How does shipping interact with Greek society? What could be the set of measures in the status of charitable activities and in the institutional environment that structures education, health and the arts in Greece that would encourage and enable Greek shipowners to make a substantial contribution to the Greek common good?
Antonis Kamaras worked in Istanbul in the financial sector from 2003 to 2006. He is currently pursuing a PhD degree at the London School of Economics on the impact of Greece’s and Turkey’s corporate elites on the foreign policies of the two countries. Communication: A.Kamaras@lse.ac.uk
COSMOTE ROMANIA
PUBLI
Inspired by COSMOTE Group values and principles, the company acknowledges its share of responsibility and presents a tangible contribution to society and the environment. Despite its brief presence in the market, the company implements a series of actions in the context of a wider corporate social responsibility program, responding to the country’s real needs and embracing all stakeholders. COSMOTE Romania supports the initiatives of the ‘Green Line for the Protection of Children,’ a non-profit association offering assistance to abused and underprivileged children. Also it contributed to the fundraising campaign for the treatment of HIV-positive children, organized by the non-profit organization PHILOPTOCHOS, under the auspices of the Embassy of the Hellenic Republic. In the area of education COSMOTE Romania supported the educational programs for children initiated by the Save the Children non-profit organization, with the collaboration of UNICEF. Moreover, the company participated in the national painting contest themed ‘My address is Europe’ for children up to 15 years old. The competition was organized with the aim of broadening children’s perception regarding the new geopolitical position of Romania within Europe. Finally, in the area of the environment, the company partnered with the Balkan Environmental Association (BENA) in organizing the annual conference ‘The Quality of Life and Environment: A Must for European Integration,’ presenting some of the latest research findings regarding environmental and energy pollution.
Greece and the Human Security Network
An era of leadership and initiative Since its creation, the United Nations has struggled to evolve into the institution it once was deemed fit to be, or an intermediary among sovereign nation-states. In fact, the international organization has often been accused of having an indecisive nature and a framework that lacks the legitimacy needed to intervene, implement strategies and resolve issues of human security. Whether this alludes to protection from mistreatment and abuse of individuals or the inherent need to have a common set of standards by which the world as a
By Antonios V. Nicolaidis
whole remains accountable, the UN has failed to do either, since its inability to detach itself from the sovereign nature/national interests of member states, at the expense and welfare of each individual and human being, predispose it to failure. As such, a cultivation of supplemental efforts to facilitate in this process of preserving the basic needs and dignity of each individual person requires an in-depth series of legislative acts (in the realm of international law), and consequently an effort/ mechanism to uphold the laws either by separate institutions (i.e. NGOs and/or, most importantly, by the governments of the respected member states), thereby ensuring the security and welfare of all individuals alike. One such mechanism that struggles to preserve the efforts of the United Nations is the Human Security Network (HSN). Founded in 1999, the HSN is ‘an informal ministerial initiative,’1 used to facilitate, 1. http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/ en-US/08062007_SB1314.htm
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implement, promote, support and uphold UN initiatives on human security strategies in Foreign Policy.’2 In fact, the HSN is a flexible and inclusive network of NGOs, governments and academics which came together in the hope of promoting humanitarian law. The founding countries of the organization were Norway, Canada, Switzerland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Greece, Jordan, Mali, South Africa (which has observer status), Chile, Costa Rica and Thailand. Efforts of the HSN have included various initiatives. Specifically, the HSN has organized an array of forums/workshops in dealing with the alleviation of international disparities. The Human Security Network has also published its various findings, after having conducted extensive research. One such example of the HSN’s publications is the ‘quarterly news bul2. http://www.hpcr.org/projects/hsn.php
letin, which documented news from member countries as well as new literature and resources on human security.’3 In fact, the HSN has its own network of practitioner-scholars upon which the HSN relies for accurate information and insight on problem-solving approaches to international instability. Additional efforts of the network include creating and maintaining an electronic research database, in the hope of providing the UN with relevant sources, intelligence and materials to ensure the dignity and security of all in this time of turbulent stability. The presidency of the HSN rotates every year. This year’s leadership becomes particularly important as the Greek delegation takes office. In fact, the Greek presidency boasts to be one of the most encouraging, as their experience, knowhow, and understanding of international institutions and frameworks aim to enhance the HSN’s effort. Specifically, Greece recently completed its tenure as president of the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council, the decision-making branch of the United Nations, has given Greece the necessary experience to guide the decision-making policies of the HSN’s supplemental initiative. Additionally, Greece’s success in organizing the most recent Summer Olympic Games has shown its ability to organize and host an event of international magnitude. Meanwhile, the event, although an international target for terrorist attempts, 3. http://www.hpcr.org/projects/hsn.php
managed to preserve the physical integrity of all participants, which in this case were both nation-states and individuals. By doing so, Greece displayed its ability of implementation of human security, on the most primitive of levels, or the protection of humans on domestic soil. Furthermore, Greece’s membership in the European Union and Council of Europe, as well as its founding role in the original United Nations, ensures an agenda that is in accordance with the principles of democratization and rule of law. As such, Greece has a set of initiatives and frameworks that comply with the efforts of the HSN, and the UN accordingly. Hence, it should be noted that Greece has played a vital role in decision-making and implementation efforts of the HSN, not to mention helped coordinate and fund the various forums and workshops. Indeed, this new presidency couldn’t come at a better time as new initiatives make for fresh starts. Don’t get me wrong; I’m not saying that Greece’s presidency is the ‘magic bullet’ that will cure everything and make the UN take more initiative, be more highly regarded and enhance its legitimacy. In fact, I doubt very much that Greece (or any other country in the world for that matter) can
do this. I am merely suggesting that this presidency brings a time of new hope and aspiration, like any new beginning. I mean, we have to start somewhere. Why not now? Greece has the potential, the ability, and the knowledge to indirectly assist the UN in its duties. And though it is a daunting task, someone must attempt it. Otherwise, I am compelled to dread the future of our world that is to come.
Antonios V. Nicolaidis is a research fellow at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM).
frontlines
The present meets the past By Maria Katechi
It was during the last Portuguese presidency in 2000 that the Lisbon Strategy was adopted. European Union leaders defined the framework upon which each and every member state should work toward meeting the objective of the EU becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.’ Seven years on, Portugal has again taken the helm of the EU and for the following six months will be in charge of taking forward the work carried out so far by the Union. Before getting down to business under the new presidency, EU leaders should take some time out to work on the main lesson learnt from the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda: The process has not delivered the expected results due to a lack of commitment to the reform agenda on the part of member states. The time for such contemplation could not be better, since the EU’s heads of state are facing new challenges and only by assuming a more dynamic role and firmer commitment will they be able to deal with the current EU
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agenda. Before going any further on this issue, let’s examine what is currently at stake on the EU level by examining the Portuguese agenda.1 The current priorities The main priority for the Portuguese presidency is that of picking up the treaty reform process. There is a clear mandate from last month’s European Council to launch an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which will finalize the text of a new so-called Reform Treaty and break the Constitution deadlock. The IGC in July will work upon the draft text which needs to be agreed upon by the EU leaders in October when they meet at an informal council in Lisbon. The plan is for the finalized treaty to be ratified before the European Parliament elections in June 2009. Another priority is to give new impetus to the economic, social and environmental
1. http://www.ue2007.pt/UE/vEN/ & http://europa. eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm
reforms. According to Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates, his country’s presidency will actively contribute to a new cycle of the Lisbon Agenda, which will be approved in spring 2008. The aim is to further enable EU member states to respond to the challenges they face and achieve the goal set for the European Union to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010, while maintaining the balance between the three dimensions of the agenda: economic, social and environmental. Reinforcing Europe’s role in the world is another area that is of great importance and has a central role in the Portuguese agenda. The emphasis will be placed on Brazil, especially after the first ever EU-Brazil Summit, held on July 4, 2007 in Lisbon, which raised hopes of deeper cooperation between the EU and the South American Mercosur free trade
zone. Emphasis will also be given to Africa in view of the second EU-Africa summit that will be held in Lisbon in December. Last but not least, justice and home affairs is another area on which emphasis is placed, and the new presidency aims at strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice. Among other things, Portugal has stated its intention to open the way for the abolition of border controls between Schengen area member states, before the end of its presidency. Lessons learnt Having looked briefly at the current EU priorities, it is clear that challenges as well as opportunities lie ahead for the members of the Union. Only by turning their own past experience, insight and knowledge into action will EU leaders be able to grasp the opportunities and deal with the chal-
lenges. The Portuguese presidency is a good occasion for evaluating past performances and pondering over the lessons that can be learnt from the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy. More precisely, although the principles enshrined in the Lisbon Agenda were wholeheartedly supported by the heads of member states, when it comes to assessing the progress made toward the Lisbon goals the results are disappointing. This does not mean that there are no exceptions — member states who do extremely well in certain aspects — or that the process is doomed. Besides, it has only been a couple of years since the relaunched Lisbon Strategy was adopted. However, a ‘disappointing delivery’ indicates a lack of political will coupled with political inability to communicate to society the necessity of the reforms. Do they have a personal interest in the
Lisbon Agenda? Consider the battle over the Constitution, where everyone tried to add their own personal touch to the text, or French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who recently asked ‘for an intelligent and dynamic application of the Stability Pact.’ Whatever the outcome of these thorny issues — i.e. whether the Reform Treaty is ratified or not, or whether or not to grant greater flexibility to France — the fact is that EU leaders should strengthen their commitment and focus on pursuing radical reforms now that the time is ripe and the European economic cycle is on their side2. It is high time that they created the right socio-economic-political net that will protect European societies, local economies and the environment from the forces of political, economic and environmental globalization. 2. ‘Can Europe’s recovery last?’ The Economist, July 12, 2007.
Maria Katechi is a political scientist, MSc in Politics of the World Economy, LSE.
frontlines
The Bosphorus conundrum By Kostas Ifantis
International and energy security specialist Theodore Tsakiris has written one of the most meticulously researched and authoritative reports regarding the geopolitics of oil in the greater Caspian region — The Bosphorus Conundrum: Alternative Pipeline Bypasses for the Turkish Straits to 2015 (Global Market Briefings [GMB Publishing Ltd], June, 2007). Despite the fact that the sea’s hydrocarbon reserves had been severely overestimated in the mid-1990s, the region’s potential nevertheless constitutes the most important non-OPEC production region in the world after Russia. The Caspian Sea may not have the exploitable reserves of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq or even Kuwait, but it can help to make up for the unavoidable and drastic demise of the North Sea’s production. This is particularly important for oil imports to Europe, where, according to Tsakiris’s analysis, more than 80 percent of
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the region’s exports are expected to flow by 2015. In spite of China’s insatiable rising demand over the next 25 years, and partly because of Washington’s continued opposition to a Caspian export route via Iran, Europe will continue to receive the bulk of the region’s exportable output — Caspian as well as Russian oil. Tsakiris points out that the volume of those exports can serve only three major pipelines of 1-1.5 million barrels per day (MB/D), all of which should be operational circa 2015. Of those three, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan line, or BTC, was the first to be constructed. Its full operationalization since June 2006 has provided the major geopolitical impetus in Moscow’s decision to throw its weight behind the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline (BAP). In my opinion, one of the study’s major contributions lies in the realization that — in the longer term — what is even more important than Russia’s decision to underwrite the BAP is the emergence of Kazakhstan as the dominant exporter of Caspian crude.
Apart from the doubling of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s capacity, Kazakhstan is set to dominate oil exports from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan given the sheer size — 9-11 billion barrels — of the Kashagan field. Kashagan, which was discovered in 2000, is expected to start production by late 2007 or early 2008 and is not likely to reach its peak before the late 2010s. The servicing of Kashagan’s output will demand by the mid-2010s a third Main Export Pipeline (MEP) after the BTC and — in all probability — the BAP. After establishing the number and the size of potentially exportable volumes, Tsakiris delves into a detailed risk assessment study of the major contestants for the second and third MEPs. This part of the paper reads like a history of how the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline came about, but it is actually much more than that. The political and economic advantages of the BAP remain relevant for the selection of the third, Kazakhstan-dominated MEP, especially if the BAP consortium participants decide to double the pipeline’s original export capacity to 1.5 MB/D. Already Kazakhstan’s state oil and gas company, Kazmunaigas, is negotiating its participation in the Russian-Greek-Bulgarian scheme. All in all, Tsakiris has managed to produce a balanced, erudite and perspicacious analysis that will remain politically as well as academically relevant for the better part of a decade, at the very least.
Kostas Ifantis is an associate professor of international relations at the University of Athens and president of the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM). EKEM website: www.ekem.gr
Turkey in turbulent times As Turkey approaches parliamentary elections, arguably one of the most significant contests of the past six decades, an atmosphere of calm is prevailing across the country, despite strongly worded accusations from the campaign trail. There is little trace of the tensions that arose in the wake of the failed presidential election at the beginning of last May. Because the parliament was unable to elect a president then, on account of a two-thirds majority requirement in the first two rounds of balloting, the government had little alternative but to bring the general elections forward. The insistence of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on pushing its candidate for president and, failing that, passing a constitutional amendment in the hope of getting the president directly elected by popular vote at the same time as the parliamentary elections, confirmed the suspicions of those who thought the AKP had an Islamist agenda and, hence, was striving to gain political control of all institutions of the state by having a partisan president elected. Meanwhile, the appearance, after the first round of balloting, on the Turkish General Staff website of a communication supporting the secular constitution of the republic (dubbed popularly as an ‘e-ultimatum’),
By Ahmet Evin
once again raised the question of the military’s continued influence on politics. Hugely popular rallies spearheaded by civic — particularly women’s — groups, in support of the secular constitution, but also critical of military interference, took foreign observers of Turkish politics by surprise. Was Turkish democracy under threat both from Islamists and the military? Were the institutions of the state and the party system compatible with democratic criteria as espoused by the Copenhagen criteria? Under the circumstances, would there be any serious deviation from Turkey’s progress toward EU membership? First, an explanation of the ‘constitutional crisis.’ Imperfect as it is, the 1982 constitution attempted to (a) include provisions for checks and balances in the form of separation of powers between the presidency (representing the state) and the political sphere (representing the popular will) and (b) encourage consolidation of the party system by establishing a high threshold of at least 10 percent electoral support for political parties to win eligibility for parliamentary representation. The separation of powers provision, introduced first in the 1961 constitution that also called for a bicameral legislature and established a constitutional court separate from the Council of State, was conceived to prevent majoritarian control of all branches of government. The constitution
nevertheless assigned the election of the president, for a single seven-year term, to the parliament, but by setting a two-thirds majority requirement for the first two rounds of balloting it aimed to force a consensus among a broad spectrum of representatives. A single political party controlling nearly two-thirds of the parliamentary seats was not foreseen by the makers of the 1982 constitution. The constitution, however, also failed to reverse the prevailing tendency toward fragmentation; that is, the proliferation of political parties regardless of whether they had a chance of achieving parliamentary representation or not. In the 1987 elections, seven, and the 1991 elections, six, parties competed, but fragmentation increased throughout the 1990s, with 12 parties running in 1995 and a record 20 in the 1999 elections. Although the number of contesting parties had diminished to 13 by the 2002 elections, six of the parties garnered less than 3 percent of the votes. Correspondingly, the ratio of representation also continued to drop, with the parliament representing 85.5 percent of the votes after the 1995 elections, 81.7 percent after 1999, and merely 54.8 percent after the 2002 elections. Because only two
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of the 13 contesting parties made it over the threshold, the AKP was assigned 66.4 percent of the seats, having attracted 34.4 percent of the votes cast. In the current elections no less than 17 parties are still running, although there is little chance of more than three making it over the threshold. There is, however, a record number of independent candidates running at present; the number of independents elected will mirror the growing sophistication of the voter. Over the past decade Turkey’s political landscape has undergone a major transformation, with the meteoric rise of the AKP in the wake of the rapid decline of several parties that had previously held center stage. Mismanagement took a toll on the two main ‘centrist’ parties, the Motherland Party (ANAP) and True Path Party (DYP), the former leaders of both of which served as presidents of the republic. Former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP), which steadily increased its
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electoral support in the 1990s because of its leader’s popularity, is not likely to make a comeback after his death. The fate of Turkey’s political parties depends very much on the electoral appeal of the leaders who run them despotically, on a tight leash; ironically there is no provision in the political parties law to encourage or enforce democratic governance of parties which are expected to be key agents for democratic means of government. The AKP is likely to remain as the leading party in the next parliament, with the etatist Republican People’s Party (CHP) and ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) also represented. Instead of a customary left-to-right range, Turkey’s political spectrum will then comprise irreconcilable shades of conservatism: that of an Islamist-traditionalist bent with an emphasis on economic liberalism and global markets; that of a protectionist mold but staunchly secular and socially progressive; and that of a nationalist-isolationist kind which would not balk at appealing to religious/traditionalist values. As the first business of the new parliament will be to elect a president, tensions may rise once
more if an impartial candidate, acceptable to an overwhelming majority in the parliament, were not nominated by the leading party, likely to be the AKP. With fewer seats than at present, the AKP would be well advised to seek consensus among political actors as well as the military if it wishes to avoid a renewed constitutional crisis. The AKP’s insistence, moreover, on a candidate who is perceived to have Islamist leanings will deepen suspicions among broader segments of the population that it may have a hidden agenda at odds with the values of the republic and detract from its broad-based support, particularly among the business elite. The AKP’s success over the past five years significantly depended on the support of the business community, which was satisfied to see the government’s progress toward EU membership, its continuation of the reforms program launched in the wake of the 2001 crisis, and its ability, therefore, to attract record levels of foreign investment. It is this remarkable resilience of the economy that accounts for the relaxed mood of the country during
the current election campaign. The markets ignored the crisis last spring: The lira has remained strong (even at an overvalued rate); the stock exchange has maintained its momentum to reach record levels; and the presence of foreign (particularly EU) banks in Turkey has had a significant effect on reinforcing confidence in the economy and bolstering the vigor of the financial markets. While high levels of liquidity in international markets have certainly helped, Turkey’s annual growth rate has held at around 7 percent. Turkey’s performance in the globalized economic arena (even better than some significant EU member states) would seem to reinforce its EU membership goal. Regardless of their populist electioneering rhetoric, even the adversaries of the AKP are not likely to reverse the country’s European vocation that, in fact, was adopted nearly three centuries ago. There is strong public support from a broad spectrum of society for EU membership; it remains over 50 percent, despite an insulting barrage of discriminatory rhetoric from various European capitals. Continued anti-Turkish rhetoric, however, is likely to reduce enthusiasm for EU membership over time, reinforce isolationist tendencies and nationalist currents, diminish Turkey’s willingness to cooperate with the EU on a variety of programs, such as ESDP and energy security, and thus weaken the EU’s effectiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea regions. Perceived support of the PKK by some member
states, despite protestations to the contrary, may lead to a crisis of confidence between the Union and its negotiating partner as nearly is the case between Ankara and Washington over the US inability (perceived as unwillingness) to control Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activities in northern Iraq. Nor will it be likely, in the future, to have any difference of opinion between the military, security agencies, and the political leadership as well as all parties regarding Turkey’s security and defense priorities. As for Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue remains a formidable challenge to both Ankara and Athens. While Ankara considers the continued isolation of the north both unfair and contrary to the EU’s commitments before Nicosia’s accession to the Union, Athens is unable to play a mediating role, given its domestic political constraints. The lack of a resolution of the Cyprus issue also detracts from
the resolution of a host of bilateral issues relating to the Aegean. Yet the process of rapprochement, reinforced by increasingly strong economic ties between the two countries, seems to have taken root. Greece’s policy since 1999 to support Turkey’s EU membership offers further optimism for cooperation in the future. A clearer perspective for Turkey’s membership would provide the neighborhood with a strong and effective partner.
Ahmet O. Evin teaches at Sabanci University, where he served as the founding dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and directs EU programs at the Istanbul Policy Center. Recently an Onassis senior fellow at ELIAMEP, he has authored or edited seven volumes on Turkish politics, history and culture, and is currently working on Metaphors of Europe. Istanbul Policy Center website: www.ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/eng/
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Turkey in the EU: A win-win scenario It is often alleged that Turkey is simply ‘too big, too poor and culturally too different’ to become a member of the European Union. But it is debatable whether such a perspective on Turkish membership is beneficial to the EU — let alone to Turkey. In fact, Turkey being ‘too big, too poor and too different’ can actually be an advantage for all concerned if the possibility of Turkish membership can be reframed in a more positive and constructive manner. Being ‘big and poor,’ Turkey does indeed look problematic to much of public opinion in Western Europe. Yet precisely because it is big and poor, it has huge potential for dynamism and growth. The size of the Turkish economy in 1995, when the customs union with the EU was signed, stood at US$66.5 billion. In 2005 it had soared to US$362 billion. Most of that growth has actually taken place since EU membership prospects became more serious. The IMF has reported that the Turkish economy has become the 19th largest economy in the world, having now surpassed Sweden and Switzerland. On current trends, the Turkish economy will reach US$447 billion in 2007, overtaking that of Belgium. It is doubtful whether the customs union on its own would have been able to generate that kind of growth. Turkey as an engine Such performance has a number of implications. It means that if Turkey remains steady on its membership track, such per-
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By Kemal Kirisci
formance can be sustained. This in turn means more imports from Turkey’s traditional foreign trade partners in Western Europe. Turkish foreign trade from 1995 to 2005 grew from US$57 billion to almost US$l90 billion. Sustaining this performance would mean more employment not only for Turks but also for Europeans and for people in Turkey’s neighborhood. More jobs in Turkey would also mean less pressure to emigrate to Western Europe. In the future, the performance of the Turkish economy will have significant implications in terms of Turkey’s neighborhood too. That impact is a function of its size: In 2005 the Turkish economy was bigger than the Bulgarian, Romanian, Moldovan, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Azeri, Iraqi and Syrian economies put together. What’s more, Turkish business is influencing Turkish foreign policy in a constructive way. The Turkish economy, Turkish business and civil society are becoming tools of ‘soft power’ in helping to edge the region from a Hobbesian world toward a Kantian one. Turkish civil society is engaged in peace-building efforts between Palestinians and Israelis. The Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB) is actively
working on the Industry for Peace project, encouraging dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli business representatives. Turkey as a bridge Is Turkey really that different culturally? It depends on how one defines ‘culture.’ If it is a polite way of saying it has a different religion than the current EU membership, then, maybe yes, it is different. However, it would be difficult to say that Christian Europe has a homogenous culture. Yet this difference ought not to be seen as a liability, but as a strength: Slowly but surely, Turkey is saying to the Muslim communities in Europe and the rest of the world that ‘yes, democracy, secularism and Islam can coexist.’ That is why the Portuguese foreign minister commented that the decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey was a victory for Europe and a bitter defeat for Osama Bin Laden. That reasoning would seem to be confirmed by opinion research showing that, since 1999, Turks have become more ‘religious’ yet at the same time more strongly attached to democratic values and to secularism and abhor the use of violence in the name of religion. Turkey’s cultural difference is widely seen as an asset in developing a serious dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. The influential AlAhram daily in Cairo argued in October 2005 that the decision to open accession
negotiations with Turkey meant that those who wanted to see the EU simply as a Christian club had lost. Turkey’s readiness to act as a cultural bridge was highlighted by its prime minister’s efforts to help defuse the Danish ‘cartoon crisis’ in January 2006, and by the adroit manner in which the visit of Pope Benedict XVI in November 2006 was managed by the Turkish government, in coordination with the Vatican. The integration of Muslim immigrants remains a challenge in Europe. Might they see themselves differently if Europe stops seeing Turkey as the ‘other’ and shows that it is capable of integrating into its ranks a country that is culturally different (a Muslim country) but which meets both the Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria? Ceasing to see Turks as the ‘other’ of Europe might also encourage prominent figures such as former EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein to reconsider the notion that admitting Turkey to the European Union would mean that the defeat of the Ottomans at the gates of Vienna in 1683 had all been in vain. Yet if one attributes the war between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans simply to religion, then how does one explain that Poland as a state disappeared from the surface of the European map not at the
hands of the Muslim Ottomans but of the Catholic Habsburgs, Orthodox Romanovs and Protestant Hohenzollerns? This was not about religion, but good old Hobbesian power polities. Treating Turkey as a partner in European integration could also help address problems and fears to do with Europe’s own future. Specifically — and paradoxically — Turkey could become a useful catalyst for resolving Europe’s identity crisis. The remark of former Dutch Minister of Justice and Christian Democrat politician Ernest Ballin, at a conference in Antwerp in September 2004, is very telling: ‘The problem is not Turkey’s entry into the EU — crossing a supposed border between Europe and Asia or between Christianity and Islam — but rather lack of identification with shared ideals among the people inside the EU. This problem is
within Europe’s borders: If you don’t know who you are, nor what you stand for, the rejection of the newcomer reflects your own state of mind. A rejection of Turkey’s application for membership will not cure the EU’s problems.’ The European integration project has been massively successful in overcoming the fears and divisions in Europe that led to so much destruction. A European Union that is loyal to this legacy ought to be able to overcome the resistance to Turkish membership and, once again, to reap the benefits of inclusiveness.
Professor Kemal Kirisci is director of the European Studies Center at Bogazici University, Turkey. European Studies Center website: www.ces.boun.edu.tr
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European public opinion on Turkey OPINION POLLS: EUROBAROMETER AND OTHER STUDIES In one of the first surveys carried out by the European Commission in 1976 in the nine member states of what was then the European Community, after the first enlargement, in response to the question ‘Are there other countries that you would like to see entering the European Community soon? If so, which?’, 50 percent of those questioned mentioned without hesitation Switzerland, 44 percent Spain, 39 percent Austria, but only 24 percent Greece and 10 percent Turkey; the latter was hardly mentioned by German, Italian and Belgian opinion leaders. The analyst of the survey’s results drew the conclusion that ‘the geographical and cultural distance probably determines the subjective distance in the case of Turkey.’1 A survey launched in March-May 2002 showed that even if after 25 years the Western public knows a little more about Turkey thanks to tourism, travel and information, this country still received the lowest support among all EU candidates: Forty-seven percent of those questioned in the existing 15 member states were against Turkish accession and only 31 percent in favor, while Romania got 43 percent against, 34 percent in favor, and Hungary 48 percent in favor, and only 31 percent against. In a more recent Eurobarometer survey (April 2006), the majority of Euro1. Note by Mr Rabier, Adviser of the Commission, ‘Les souhaits des Européens quant à l’entrée d’autres pays dans la Communauté (Novembre 1976),’ February 2 1977.
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peans interviewed (52 percent) saw the accession of Turkey as mainly in the interest of the country itself. Twenty percent saw a mutual interest to both the EU and Turkey for its entry in the European Union.2 While 56 percent of Europeans were in favor of Croatia’s accession, between 4748 percent approved of the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), only 38-39 percent favored Albania’s accession and 41 percent were opposed, 39 percent favored Turkey’s accession; 48 percent opposed it, even if it complied with all the conditions set by the EU. Some commentators linked the rejection of the constitution in the French and Dutch referenda to the attitude of public opinion vis-a-vis Turkey; in fact, polls carried out just after the referenda showed that the question of Turkey’s accession impacted only 5-6 percent of the votes, although a qualitative study carried out by OPTEM in all member states, at the initiative of the European Commission in spring 2006, showed some confusion in public opinion between the constitution and Turkey’s accession, as a majority of people 2. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/reportsp 255enlargement20060612_en.pdf. The most recent Eurobarometer, published in June 2007, does not include a specific question on Turkey, but shows very low support for further enlargement in countries like Belgium (44 pct), France (32 pct), Germany (34 pct), Ireland, Luxembourg (25 pct), Austria (28 pct), Finland (39 pct), UK ( 41 pct), while all other member states are relatively in favor (see ec.europa.eu /public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.htm).
By Alain Servantie
thought that the accession was envisaged in the near future and not in the medium or long term. THE SPECTRUM BY COUNTRY According to the various polls and the abovementioned qualitative study, the member states can be grouped in the following clusters (although large variations can be observed in specific countries according to polls or years). Support is to a certain extent equal to indifference vis-a-vis a process considered external to the Union. According to the 2006 Eurobarometer, in the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland and Romania more than 50 percent of people were in favor of seeing Turkey in the Union; in Bulgaria, Portugal, the UK and Ireland, a relative majority also viewed Turkish accession in a favorable light. Some countries present specific features. While the 2006 Eurobarometer poll showed Finnish public opinion opposed to Turkey’s accession, other polls showed a fair support. A poll carried out in fall 2005 showed public opinion to be 75 percent for Turkish accession, and only 16 percent against.3 A poll of the Hungarian Median institute in January 2005 showed a significant difference in support for different candidate countries: While Croatia’s membership was supported by more than twothirds of the respondents, Romania’s was supported only by 58 percent. Even Turkey’s membership was more attractive 3. Daily Aamulehti. (AFP 11/10/2005)
Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be... to the accession of Turkey to the European Union? EU 25 0%
20%
40%
60%
39% Turkey 48%
In favor
Opposed
for Hungarians than Romania’s membership: Sixty-two percent supported it. In Poland, political leaders have repeatedly voiced support for Turkey’s accession, which they consider a necessary step for Ukraine’s ultimate accession to the Union. In Slovenia, while the political class supports Turkey’s accession, a poll published in the daily Dnevnik at the end of 2004 showed that 41.1 percent were in favor of Turkish accession, 40.5 percent against; the rest were without an opinion on the matter. In Sweden, minority groups like Kurds and Assyrians seem to regard EU adhesion more and more as a guarantee for respect of human rights and reforms in Turkey and favor a positive attitude of the authorities. In the UK, Turkey had the highest name recognition as a candidate country. In a 2002 poll, knowledge of Turkey’s application to join came second, behind that of Poland. By 2003 awareness had increased and 23 percent of interviewees named Turkey, compared with 49 percent who could not name any of the potential candidates for EU membership. In some countries public opinion is divided. In Denmark, recent polls have indicated increased opposition to Turkey’s accession.
In Italy and Spain political leaders have clearly expressed themselves in favor of Turkey’s accession. An opinion poll carried out by Eurispes (Institute for Political, Economic and Social Studies) indicates that only 34 percent of Italians are in favor of Turkey’s accession. Twenty-eight percent are against and 37 percent have no opinion. In the same survey Italians were more in favor of Russia membership (42.5 percent in favor and only 20.3 percent against). A poll carried out on February 10, 2005, in Spain showed only 35 percent of Spaniards favorable toward Turkish accession against 51 percent in May 2004, and 23 percent undecided.4 In some countries where the Roman Catholic Church plays a major role, such as Lithuania and Malta, public opinion is fairly divided. Malta, due to its past history at the time of the Order of St John, claims to have ‘saved’ Christianity from the Islamic ‘threat’ (the Ottoman Empire); 35 percent of people are undecided. 4. See Istituto di Studi Politici Economici e Sociali http://www.eurispes.it/ On Spain, see also Centro de Investigación Sociológica.
High opposition to Turkey’s accession exists in some of the countries with the highest percentage of Turkish immigrants (with the exception of the Netherlands and Sweden), which may reflect the lack of integration of migrants, and/or the xenophobic attitude of the local populations: In Belgium, the 2006 Eurobarometer survey showed strong opposition, although politicians mainly expressed their support for accession. Some Flemish liberal and nationalist politicians voiced a desire for a referendum on Turkey’s accession. Since 1999, in Greece, both the main political parties — New Democracy and PASOK — have supported Turkish accession as a means of instigating reforms in the country and solving old conflicts, but public opinion still remains reluctant to Turkish accession. Greek Cypriots perceive Turkey as the occupier of almost two-fifths of their island country. A poll carried out in March 2006 showed that 48 percent of Greek Cypriots prefer to live separately from their northern neighbors. People aged 18-24 years are the most opposed to coexistence (63 percent), while two-thirds of people over 55 years are in favor.5 In France, polls point to growing opposition: 49 percent against 40 percent in favor in May 2000 (IPSOS); 61 percent 5. Nicosia, 5/04/2006 (AFP); Cyprus Mail.
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against 39 percent in favor of accession in November 2002. In December 2006, 76 percent of young people in France opposed accession; only 23 percent were in favor.6 All parties in France require the recognition of the Armenian genocide by Turkey. Similarly in Germany recent polls have indicated a strong opposition to Turkish membership — between 54 percent and 73.4 percent. Proponents of Turkish membership are equally represented in western and eastern Germany, but in the west the opponents are stronger. Women are more critical than men. A positive stance on Turkish membership is linked to the level of income and education of those surveyed. This may be because those higher up the social scale feel themselves less threatened by potential waves of Turkish workers; it may also be due to a stronger sense of political correctness. Young people also tend toward a more negative stance than older respondents. Austria is the country with the highest degree of public resistance against the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, which reaches 60-70 percent according to opinion polls, and only 8-10 percent in favor (a drop from 27 percent in 2002). The opposition slightly increases with age: 75 percent are opposed among under-25-year-olds; the figure is above 80 percent for those older than 40 years. Students are generally more favorable (25 percent).7 According to a survey, 74.3 percent of people polled stated that they 6. http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/poll/8341.asp. See also IFOP/Valeurs actuelles ‘Les Francais et l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union européenne à la veille du debut des negociations,’ 26/09/2005. 7. AT Eurobarometer National Report, Aug 2005.
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Sweden
Finland
Legend More than 50% opposed Relative majority against
Estonia
Favorable relative majority More than 50% favorable
Latvia
Denmark Ireland
Lithuania Netherlands United Kingdom
Poland Germany Belgium Luxembourg Czech Republic Slovakia Austria Hungary France Romania Italy Bulgaria
Portugal
Spain Greece
Malta
don't really consider Turkey a European country. Even if Turkey met all the criteria for its EU accession and migrant workers did not move to other EU countries, 40 percent would still oppose the country's EU membership. After the FPO gathered 258,277 signatures in March 2006 in favor of a referendum on Turkish accession, the coalition government formed in January 2007 agreed to organize a referendum at the end of the negotiation. Similar trends can be observed in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, as well as in South Tyrol and other former Habsburg domains.
Cyprus
POLITICAL SPECTRUM Across the political spectrum, in and outside the European Parliament, generally extreme-right and nationalist parties are strongly opposed to Turkish accession, the European People’s Party (EPP) is divided, and Liberals, Greens, Socialists and the European United Left (GUE) are in general favorable, with some exceptions. Heated debates take place on Turkey nearly every year in the plenary sessions of the European Parliament. Most speakers underline that Turkey has not made enough steps toward democratization, while others say that anyway this country is too different from the rest of Europe to envisage its accession to the Union. On December 15, 2004, 407 MEPs voted in favor of the opening of negotiations with Turkey, 262
against, and 29 abstained.8 Polls on attitudes toward enlargement and political positions show that leftist voters are more favorable toward Turkish accession than conservative ones, also shown in a poll carried out after an intervention of President Jacques Chirac in favor of Turkish accession in December 2004, provided this country adopts European values — 55 to 59 percent of socialist-communist constituents approved his stance, while the electors of his own party (UMP) were divided: 49 percent against, 48 percent in favor. In Austria, 85 percent of the voters of rightist parties are anti, but only 74 percent of leftist voters. Among the extreme right, strong opponents are the Attak party in Bulgaria; the Lega Nord of Umberto Bossi in Italy, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, ‘sovereignists’ like Philippe de Villiers and the Front National in France, the League of Polish Families, and a civic movement called Future of Europe present in Austria, Hungary and the Czech Republic, mainly on the grounds that Turkey is a Muslim country. The Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) in the European Parliament is divided: In September 2006, 131 of its members vot8. See debates on April 1, 2004 (Oostlander report), on December 14, 2004; again on September 28, 2005 and September 2006 (Eurlings reports); and debate on ‘integration capacity’ on December 13, 2006 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu).
ed in favor of accession, 91 for a privileged partnership. Since an EPP summit in ValDuchesse in 1997 considered that Turkey does not share ‘European values’ as it has no Christian roots, part of the EPP, led by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), opposes Turkish accession. The French Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) has rallied this position, arguing that Turkey is neither a European country nor democratic, while the British, Greeks, Italians (Fuerza Italia), Spaniards (Partido Popular), Finns and Swedes emphasize the strategic influence of this country and its economic potential. The membership perspective is seen as providing impetus for Turkey to continue to ameliorate the country’s human rights situation. It may be interesting to observe whether the recent positive statements in favor of Turkey issued by the Vatican will bring some change in the attitudes of Christian Democrat parties. The Liberals, the Greens, the Socialists and the Communists (GUE) in general feel that the reforms made by the Turkish government need to be encouraged and that it would be unfair to add new conditions to the country’s accession. However, they believe that the country still has a lot of work to do when it comes to human rights, in particular for minorities and women, to favoring reconciliation, reducing the role of the military, and improving the rule of law. The Union for French Democracy (UDF) and German Lib-
erals tend to be more reserved if not opposed. Greens are generally favorable except the Austrian MEP and some Germans. Socialists have taken a pro-Turkish stance, as they oppose the concept of a clash of civilizations and consider that reforms can be implemented in Turkey and promote secularism in the whole area. Some reserved stances have appeared however among German socialists, after Gerhard Schroder’s departure, as well in the Dutch Labor Party (PVDA) or the French Socialist Party (PS), requiring an institutional reform before any further enlargement.9 The Greek Communist Party (KKE) however opposes Turkish accession as it opposes the European Union as a whole. FEARS AND PHOBIAS The OPTEM qualitative study, as well as other research, allows us to identify the main arguments raised against Turkish accession: The most complete lists are given by the extreme-rightist parties (Front National). Geographical argument: Turkey is not in Europe, the Bosporus is the frontier of Europe. If Turkey is accepted, other countries further east or south could ask 9. See Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez & Jose I. Toerreblanca, ‘European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession. Making Sense of Arguments For and Against,’ European Policy Institutes Network, May 2007. See: Mrs Grossetete, Frieda Brepoels (PPE-B), Lamassoure, Vever, Bourlange, Morillon, J. Elles, Ebner, Toubon in the EP; Website of Richard Maillie, UMP deputy; Le Monde 20-21/3/2005; Sarkozy ‘La Turquie est en Asie mineure, pas en Europe,’ Le Monde, 1112/02/2007 ; Simone Veil, Figaro 12/5/2005; Lequiller, UMP deputy, Le Monde 20-21/3/2005; Giscard d’Estaing Le Figaro, 12/5/2005; Vedrine , Le Monde, 9/11/2002; Badinter, Le Monde, 22/10/2007. Melenchon French socialist senator, Le Monde 28/5/2005.
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for membership; where are the limits of Europe? However, the Commission in its 2006 regular report did not define any frontier to Europe. The 1994 debate on Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia’s accession to the Council of Europe in the Parliamentary Assembly of this organization had concluded that there is no legal definition of the frontiers of Europe. Geopolitical argument: The neighboring region is too unstable. First of all, if the EU accepts Turkey as a member state, its frontiers will extend to countries such as Iraq and Iran, which have been a focus of instability and conflict in the region. The argument that Turkey is a US instrument in the area is less used since the Turkish abstention in the last Iraq war. In Greece, the main concerns are the threat to national security, airspace violations, and territorial claims over the Aegean Sea. The occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkish troops since 1974 is raised by many as an obstacle to Turkish accession. Cultural differences: Seventy-three percent of Austrians think that cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too significant to allow for Turkish accession, an argument only shared by 54 percent of the EU-25 on average. There is some racist reference to the absence of a connection between Turkish and IndoEuropean languages, but the main references to culture subconsciously relate to the Islamic character of Turkey, ‘whose creeds diverge totally from European civilization;’ secularism is considered a mere facade, and Islamic fundamentalism con-
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sidered rampant. Historical differences: Necessary recognition of the Armenian genocide, pushed by Armenian NGOs campaigning in favor of national laws condemning the negationism (France, Belgium, Slovakia). Political differences: The military has too strong an influence, but may be necessary to protect secularism. Lack of rights for religious and ethnic minorities, and in particular Kurds, violence and discrimination against women and torture (the film Midnight Express is often quoted), lack of social rights and social protection; drug trafficking is also considered a problem. Institutional issues: Turkey’s accession would change the nature of Europe by giving too much weight to this country in the decision process, due to its size. The accession of Turkey will be too costly for the EU, and the citizens of the current Union will have to pay, among other things, for Turkey’s agricultural reforms and regional development once the country becomes a member state. Migrant influx into the Union: The fear that too many Turks would come and work in the Union is cited in Germany — where a strong presence of Turkish communities which haven’t integrated is felt as a threat to German identity — as well as in Italy and Estonia (OPTEM). The qualitative study concludes that there is a general lack of knowledge regarding Turkey’s role in European history
and the contribution of Turkish communities to today’s economy. People who have traveled to Turkey or are in touch with Turkish communities, particularly in France or Germany, take a more favorable stance vis-a-vis Turkey. Attitudes change also according to socioeconomic level and education. In a poll compiled in 1954, 51 percent of the French still considered that ‘the German people fundamentally like to wage wars,’ and barely 29 percent thought that a German-French alliance could work. In January 2007, the Finnish MEP Alexander Stubb, a rapporteur on integration capacity, concluded, ‘When a politician says that the public is not ready, it means that politicians have not done their proper job to explain the benefits of Turkish accession to the public.’
Alain Servantie is an adviser at DG Enlargement, European Commission. He is a graduate in law, political sciences and sociology from the University of Bordeaux and has been working with the European Commission since 1971 in various services (delegation in Turkey, relations with Mediterranean countries, European political cooperation, information society, and ultimately enlargement). He has been a visiting lecturer at the College of Europe in Bruges and at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston. Servantie is the author of several books and articles on history and sociology of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. This article does not necessarily represent the views of the institution to which the author pertains.
Role and goals of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
International development cooperation constitutes one of the three main pillars of Greek foreign policy. Hellenic AID, the International Development Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the national coordinator of Greece’s development cooperation and aid policy, which encourages, coordinates, finances, implements and supervises all programs in developing countries carried out by the public sector, the ministries, non-governmental organizations and other agencies. Greece implements humanitarian projects in 46 countries, raising the flag of humanity, fostering friendly relations among peoples and contributing to the reinforcement of philhellenism. It is Greece’s firm belief that friendship and appreciation facilitate cooperation among governments, enhancing our prestige on the international scene and promoting our objectives. Relative to the size of its economy, Greece allocates significant resources for development cooperation, contributing in the fight against poverty and illiteracy, natural disaster response and alleviating the pain of victims of armed conflicts around the world. Greece has reached 46 countries through its humanitarian assistance and development cooperation projects. Since December 1999, Greece has joined the donor country list of the international community and is a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The development assistance we provide is registered and monitored in a unified, coherent and systematic way and it is based on the framework of principles and priorities shared by the international community: the ‘Millennium Development Goals.’
The Greek Policy for Development Cooperation and Assistance
In 2000 at the Millennium Summit, UN countries, Greece among them, decided to take dynamic action to combat the abovementioned problems that constitute a fundamental international threat. The common goals set out during the said conference are known as ‘Millennium Development Goals.’ By setting these goals, the international community aims at reducing by 50 percent the level of poverty in the world by 2015. The international community, and the developed countries in particular, decided to act together with the civil society to combat all major global issues in a dramatic and comprehensive way. Greece participates actively in this new global alliance. More specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, through its International Development Cooperation Department (Hellenic AID) and in the framework of the ministry’s development cooperation and assistance policy, takes initiatives and undertakes relevant actions. Greece’s assistance to developing countries is granted in three ways:
ñBilaterally (toward governments); ñMultilaterally (through international organizations or international programs), and ñThrough Civil Society (programs implemented by Greek NGOs or other Greek development assistance institutions). These actions refer mainly to emergency humanitarian food aid and development cooperation programs directed to developing countries, aiming at reducing poverty and promoting economic and social growth.
Greece responds to humanitarian crises Greece sees itself as an active and responsible member of the international community, a member wishing to play a positive and constructive role in international affairs. Greece responds to all crises, providing emergency assistance and immediate relief to people in need. Once a crisis is identified, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in particular the International Development Cooperation Department (Hellenic AID) activates the rapid response procedures and mobilizes resources at its disposal. These resources include provision of firstaid kits, food and water, and medical, clothing and sheltering supplies. Hellenic AID is also able to dispatch a variety of specialized personnel to afflicted areas. They include search-and-rescue teams, medical and administrative personnel, transportation specialists, aid distribution personnel, shelter setting up and management teams. The Greek development assistance focuses: 単 In the Western Balkans and the Caucasus region it contributes to the economic reconstruction by taking up actions with intense development orientation, such as infrastructure projects, construction of schools and health facilities, institution building in the area of the rule of law, democratization, and the functioning of market economy etc. 単 In Sub-Saharan Africa, food aid is regularly dispatched, infrastructures are set up to ensure access to safe drinking water, and activities and projects are carried out in the field of health and education. 単 In North Africa and several Middle Eastern
countries the projects mainly aim at encouraging economic growth and at pointing out elements of our cultural heritage that we share. 単 Finally, in emergency situations (countries stricken by the tsunami, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Sudan, Congo, Pakistan etc), humanitarian aid is immediately dispatched, followed by rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.
The case of Lebanon
Greece was the first country to respond to the 2006 Lebanon crisis by dispatching humanitarian aid, as well as the first country to evacuate citizens fleeing the war zone. With Greece’s immediate response to the tsunami-affected areas in Southeast Asia in 2005, the country proved its capacity and reliability in providing humanitarian assistance. — Hellenic AID responded immediately to the Lebanese government’s request for humanitarian aid. Hellenic AID, with the cooperation of the Hellenic Navy and Air Force, dispatched numerous shipments of humanitarian
assistance (such as medicine, food, baby food, tents, blankets etc) of more than 97 tons. The value of Greek humanitarian and developmental aid — which included contributions to international organizations — exceeds 7.5 million euros. — In addition, Greece in cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus channeled EU and international humanitarian assistance from Larnaca to Beirut. Hellenic Navy ships took up that task, transporting another 76 tons of Cypriot and international aid to the people of Lebanon. In addition, Hellenic Navy vessels assisted in the evacuation of EU
citizens and third-country nationals from Beirut. — Greece also contributed through international organizations and programs. More specifically: a) Greece offered 120,000 euros to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in order to facilitate the evacuation of thirdcountry nationals. b) Greece offered 140,000 euros to the World Food Program (WFP) for food aid to the region. c) Last, but not least, Hellenic AID responded to the UNHCR’s request to cover the transportation costs from Piraeus to Cyprus and from there to Beirut aboard a UN ship, for the following assistance: 10 Swedish tracks, one trailer vehicle, 10,000 blankets, 300 tents and 20 generators. Moreover, it is worth mentioning Greece’s response to Marjeyoun municipality’s special request for assistance. Greece in cooperation with Medecins du Monde dispatched food and medical supplies to the municipality of Marjeyoun, located in southern Lebanon, which is also home to a sizeable Greek Orthodox community.
Development of the local civil society, sustainable development, social and economic cohesion as well as repatriation of minorities programs in Kosovo, the reconstruction of the area of Roma Mahala in Mitrovica and support to refugee camps in Northern Kosovo. Funds were granted for combating violence against women (ASPASIA program), cooperation between Greece and Serbia in environmental matters, humanitarian aid to flood victims in Vojvodina, participation in WHO programs, restoration of the Nebojsa tower, the setting up of a museum and a cultural center, blood dialysis equipment supplies to the Kraljevo Hospital and the establishment of technical proficiency centers in modern applied technologies. * before the referendum held on May 21, 2006
Construction and renovation of school buildings including the completion of the Arsakeio College building in Tirana and Homer in Korce, road and traffic signs, combating trafficking in women and children, restoration of the THOMAS FILIPPAIOS irrigation canal, management of the River Suhe water resources, diffusion of new technologies in cardiology diagnosis, educational programs for judges, cooperation in waste management on the Aoos River, environmental research of the Prespes park, renovation of an indoor gym, development of sound transmission and data networks at the University of Gjirokaster, the Pantelis Sotiris Pedagogical School, establishment of cultural centers, educational seminars on veterinary issues, implementation of a vocational training system in border towns, collection and destruction of small arms, munitions and chemical weapons, establishment of cultural centers, specialization programs for medical and paramedical professionals of the Public Health Directorate of Gjirokaster, study and installation of internet environment for the collaboration between the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and the University of Tirana.
Development of prompt breast cancer diagnosis methods, implementation of the programs ‘New Leaders,’ ‘Michail Psellos’ (postgraduate studies in European public law and European integration) as well as the ‘Cultural Development Arch’ program against poverty in Izmir. In addition, ambulances were donated to the hospitals of Valoukli and Imvros island, the restoration of historical monuments on Imvros and Tenedos islands, and the Business Development Center, for drafting and operating a modern vocational training system as well as for developing ‘Tourism and the Environment in the Eastern Aegean.’
Infrastructure works, foundation of a women’s education center, medical and pharmaceutical supplies, reconstruction works regarding the Kabul Museum.
Prompt detection methods of breast cancer, construction and equipment of a nursery school building in the Farafra oasis, provision of equipment to a medical center, the PYRAMIDA program on intercultural relations, institutions and mass media, the FAROS program on the construction of a museum at the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, various programs concerning the improvement of the public health system and healthcare administration, leather, footwear, timber and furniture production and trade, monitoring of environmental aspects and sustainable development indicators as well as training of middle- and high-ranking employees in the tourism sector.
PUBLI
At the June European Summit, the German EU presidency clinched a political agreement for a detailed mandate to launch an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which will finalize the text of a new Treaty to reform the EU's institutions. The details of the Reform Treaty still need to be agreed upon by EU leaders, with the incoming Portuguese presidency hoping to sign a new 'Lisbon Treaty' in October. The Brussels agreement on the Reform Treaty salvaged the main institutional reforms of the Constitution rejected in 2005 and added other clauses which reveal a decline in enthusiasm for Europe. In this issue of The bridge, and in the light of these recent developments, the question of democratization of the Union, citizenship and constitutionalism, as well as the perennial topic of Europe’s frontiers, will be addressed.
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A sense of European What kind of Europe do we want (or need)? Underlying this topical question is how to transform the present-day European Union into a political community of free and equal citizens, bringing about a democratic equilibrium between unity and diversity. And that against the background of a profound political crisis following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch publics two years ago — a crisis which was not resolved at the recent European Council in Brussels, although a consensus was reached with regard to the setting up of a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to produce a Reform Treaty by the end of the year. Although the addition of ‘reform’ to the title of any EU-related analysis makes the work appear more respectable, any attempt at sketching out a comprehensive reform package should strive toward a new vision of politics based on a new ‘civic contract’ between states and peoples. This conception of Europe as an extended public space captures the dialectic between
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By Dimitris N. Chryssochoou
the viability of separate public spheres and the making of a mixed sovereignty regime. But such a vision was lacking from the directions given to the new IGC, in that they fell short of citizens’ expectations for a more democratic process of union. In short, without a European Constitution, and given the inchoateness of a European demos, there is an urgent need for a restructuring of EU strategies for democratization based on a new concept for Europe. Today, the EU is taken to denote a composite polity that combines unity and multiplicity. It is possible to capture its complexity through the lens of new conceptual schemes, which may lead to dynamic understandings of governance that disperses power within European society and encourages all segments in it to engage in an open public discourse about the future vocation of Europe as a politybuilding exercise. The point here is that public debate can become the medium through which a polity constitutes itself from the lower level upward. This leads to a transcendence of both hierarchical and territorial forms of power distribution, where different sources of legitimacy contribute to the making of a post-national order. A new concept for Europe should
entail a balanced mix of social and political forces that share in the sovereignty of the larger polity. Within the latter, political authority should not be symmetrically vested in an overarching regional center, but rather should be distributed through clusters of partial policy autonomy among different governance levels and forms of social and political contention that combine territorial with substantive public issues. Recent changes in the workings of the EU following the Treaty of Nice have not affected its character as an essentially statecentric project, preserving a balance between sovereignty and integration by means of producing a system of political co-determination, or what could otherwise be described as a synarchy of states and demoi; namely, a densely institutionalized system of collective shared-rule that produces a more flexible interpretation of the classical sovereignty principle and, with it, of the capacity of distinct yet collectively organized units to share in the emerging sovereignty of the larger polity. Today, the EU still remains a treaty-constituted political body, not the unilateral act of a single and undifferentiated demos; it does not derive its political authority from its citizens directly; it has not resulted in a complete institutional fusion among different levels of governance; its constituent units, in the form of distinct culturally defined and politically organized entities, are free to dissociate themselves from the union; its
demos-hood constitutional identity relies heavily upon domestic legal orders, although the EU already projects a profound locking together of democratic polities regarding the joint exercise of fundamental political powers. All the above is key to understanding the changing conventions of state sovereignty, which may now be interpreted as the right to be involved in the joint exercise of competences with other states, rather than as ultimate responsibility. A new blueprint for reform should guarantee a sense of process (and purpose) toward a democratic polity. In that regard, EU citizenship carries an undisputed political weight, whose democratic potential is threefold: It sets up a multilevel system of rights giving access and voice to EU citizens; it induces integrative sentiments by motivating civic participation; and it strengthens the bonds of belonging to an active polity by facilitating the process of positive EU awareness-formation at the grassroots. The question is whether EU citizenship entails a rearrangement of existing rights, or whether it amounts to a shared sense of demoshood. A plausible answer is that, to the extent that the distribution of EU civic entitlements passes through the capacity of citizens to determine the functions of the larger polity, a pluralist notion of citizenship can form the basis of a multilevel democratic order. Measures to build on a
common European civicness are: the detachment of EU citizenship from the nationality requirement; the extension of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in national elections for citizens residing in a member state other than their own; the institutionalization of the citizens’ right to information on all EU issues; the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the formal treaty framework; the introduction of the citizens’ right to hold public office within the EU; the enrichment of the citizens’ rights to social welfare and working conditions; and the recognition of political rights to legally resident third-country nationals. In conclusion, the aim is for the EU political system to allocate authoritatively, not just derivatively, rights and values within European political society. Such an outcome would not resemble the creation of a ‘community of fate,’ but should rather strive toward a new democratic design, whose civic value exists independent of national public spheres, but whose ‘politics’ extends to both European and national civic arenas. This would also signal a shift in the basis of legitimation from a functionalist-driven process of union to a political community based on more active and inclusionary civic virtues. As recent reforms failed to produce a common democratic vision, a sense of European demos-hood is needed to face the new challenges.
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou is associate professor of international organization at the University of Crete. He has held visiting posts at the universities of Cambridge, LSE, Columbia, Athens and Panteion and, for the next academic year, at the Hellenic Center for European Studies as a senior research fellow. He is the author of Theorizing European Integration (Sage, 2001) and Democracy in the European Union (Tauris, 1998). Communication: chryssochoou@pol.soc.uoc.gr
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The subversive power of politics By Sarah Seeger and Dr Dominik Hierlemann
The task which the German government sought to complete at the end of its EU Council presidency was not an easy one. More than two years after the French ‘non’ and the Dutch ‘nee,’ its stated aim at the EU’s June summit was to make a sustainable contribution to the constitutionalization of Europe. Therefore, the German government proposed a mandate for an intergovernmental conference, where a new set of reforms for the EU is to be finalized by the end of the year. The strategy is clear: The Constitutional Treaty will be the starting point of the negotiations, and most of its provisions will probably be adopted. The constitution as such will be replaced by an amending treaty in the tradition of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. The net results of the constitutional process will be seen in various institutional changes, and, over and above this, in the rationale of European politics. Success with minor blemishes There is no point in quarreling about who actually won the constitutional debate. The compromise which was reached is clearly an improvement compared to the Treaty of Nice. The principal innovations include the extension of the co-decision procedure, the introduction of the double majority, the downsizing of the Commission, the election of the president of the European Council, the legally binding character of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the strengthening of
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the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the clear division of competences, and the introduction of the European Citizens’ Initiative. Furthermore, the provisions relating to migration, energy policy and climate change do justice to the changing global challenges. Compared with the Constitutional Treaty, many of the heavily discussed amendments adopted at the June summit turn out to be rather cosmetic than fundamental. Even the deferred introduction of the double majority, which will not fully enter into force until 2017, might turn out to have a much lower impact than was communicated. This will provide some comfort to the ‘friends of the Constitution,’ who were forced to swallow a bitter pill in order to secure the assent of the opponents of the reform. The greatest sacrifice is that the idea of creating a constitutionalized European democracy had to be relinquished. With regard to transparency, legitimacy and the capacity to facilitate identity, the draft of the new treaty lags far behind the Constitutional Treaty. Obstacles to reform It is now up to the Portuguese EU presidency to implement the mandate of the June summit. However, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the new treaty will in fact be
adopted. Shortly after the June summit, the Polish government announced that it would accept the compromise. But even if it is possible to reach an agreement by the end of the year, the new EU primary law will then have to surmount the obstacle of the ratification process in all of the member states. In most cases the decision will be made by parliament; a referendum is compulsory only in Ireland. However, in the UK, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic there have already been calls for referendums. In view of the plethora of voices critical of the EU, it cannot be ruled out that the electorate may (once again) say ‘no.’ Furthermore, the lack of a Plan B may well lead to a situation where the failure of the current attempt to reform the EU primary law will arrest the European integration process for a long time to come. However, although it is impossible to predict the outcome of the current treaty reform, it is nonetheless possible to identify three main lessons from the constitutional process and the Brussels summit. Irreconcilable views of the Union’s ‘finalitee’ It becomes clear that the question of the Union’s ‘finalitee’ has returned with a vengeance to the debate about future European integration. A political order needs a framework from which it can derive its legitimacy, and within which the citizenry can perceive parts of its identity. Yet whereas former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt has
spoken out in favor of a ‘United States of Europe,’ others have cast doubt on the EU as a political project. In the wake of the Polish demands the British in particular have been whittling away at the fundamental pillars of European integration. The decision to opt out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and justice and home affairs demonstrates that the United Kingdom has shifted further away from joint policymaking. These controversies reveal the existence of profound conceptual differences. An agreement on the Union’s future shape is well needed. More politicization However, in the light of declining popular support for the EU, a second lesson needs to be taken to heart. Debates about what Europe will look like in the future should no longer be conducted in tightly guarded conference rooms. They ought to take place in public, and they should involve controversy. It is imperative to change the culture of European politics. A move in this direction was seen at the Brussels summit, where the frequently deceptive and feigned unanimity of the past was replaced by a frank exchange of views in the full glare of the media. However, hitherto there have been only a few channels capable of bringing together elitist debates and public opinion. Whereas it is true
that Europe is already at the heart of the political discourse, the debates are not fed back to the EU’s institutions. Thus it is possible for populists to jump into the gap and instrumentalize for their own purposes the citizens’ demand to discuss European politics. EU intermediary structures need to be developed and politicized in order to establish a genuine dialogue between the political decision-making center and the citizenry. Thereby it will be possible to integrate disagreement as a normal part of European politics which does not call into question the very existence of the European Union. An important step in this direction will have been taken if the reformed treaty really enters into force in 2009. The European Parliament will have been strengthened, and the introduction of a European citizens’ right to petition will encourage participation and involvement. In addition to this, EU policymaking will have been personalized. In future the president of the European Commission, with his strengthened role, the high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, and the president of the European Council will give the Union some memorable faces. This will make the EU more visible, and facilitate clear profiles. Citizens will be able to decide in favor of a political alternative at the ballot box.
Changing architecture The European Union — and this seems to be the third lesson to be learnt from the constitutional process — no longer fits into its current architecture. Different interests lead to changing coalitions, and this imparts a new character to the European Union. Although the very idea may seem inconvenient, the future of integration may well be based on dissent and not on consensus. However, this should be construed as enrichment of European integration, and not as a nightmare. Various groups of countries can make progress in specific policy areas and attempt to discover where there is further potential for cooperation. In future it will be necessary to think of Europe in a different way. Overlapping areas of integration will need a different institutional structure. Even if this idea might not attract major approval, the EU will have to take into account these developments by embarking on another set of reforms — possibly as a ‘Constitution II.’ Only after it has made substantial changes to its institutional design will the European Union be able to cope with the plenitude of global challenges.
Sarah Seeger is research fellow at the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) and Dr Dominik Hierlemann is project manager at the Bertelsmann Foundation. CAP website: www.cap-lmu.de
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After the Constitutional The failure of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands was connected, among other things, with the eastern enlargement of the EU, in what was often referred to as ‘enlargement fatigue.’ The post-referenda period brought about a climate of uncertainty, which made it harder for the EU to engage with the Western Balkans and, especially, Turkey. During the last two years, the EU was sending double messages to the Western Balkan countries, with a more cooperative European Commission on the one hand and a more reluctant Council of Ministers on the other. In the case of Turkey, the messages were even more negative, with France, Germany, Austria and Cyprus more unwilling to engage in accession talks, coupled with the freezing of chapters over Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airspace to the Republic of Cyprus. From the perspective of the candidate and potential candidate countries, the EU was refusing to commit and the constitutional impasse appeared to be one of the main obstacles in their roadmap to EU accession; with the exception of Croatia, engaged in uninterrupted accession talks and whose membership could be marginally accommodated by the Nice Treaty arrangements, all the other countries were up against a totally un-
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By Othon Anastasakis
inviting EU institutional environment. This attitude was best exemplified by the frequent references to the need for an ‘absorption’ or ‘integration capacity’ of the EU to accommodate new member states. Following prolonged talks, EU leaders agreed at the June 2007 summit to revive parts of the failed EU Constitutional Treaty by introducing a permanent presidency to replace the previous six-month rotating system, a new high representative to merge the CFSP high representative and the commissioner for external relations, a new double-majority voting system for the Council of Ministers, a smaller Commission and more powers to the national parliaments and the European Parliament in EU-law making. The new deal streamlines the EU’s institutional structure and aims at a more functional, wider European Union. Angela Merkel, the motivating force behind the European Council agreement on the new treaty, stated after the
end of the summit that the new arrangement allows for the future enlargements to take place. However, before the end of the summit Nicolas Sarkozy hastened to remind that the accession of Turkey cannot be taken for granted and renewed France’s call for a major debate on the borders of the European Union, to which the Portuguese presidency reacted strongly, by stating categorically that the focus should be on the organization of the intergovernmental conference which will decide on the text of the new treaty. While the prospective new treaty may facilitate future EU enlargements, the question is whether and how many more enlargements will be acceptable to the current EU member states. In line for potential accession are currently the Western Balkan states and Turkey; Croatia is closer to accession, maybe by 2010; Turkey is currently negotiating accession chapters;
Treaty, the borders? the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is a candidate country and the rest of the Western Balkan states potential candidates on a stabilization and association course with the EU. At some point in the future, the EU would have to consider some countries from the postSoviet space, its neighborhood to the east, notably Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia, who will no doubt express the will to become members. There are three categories of countries, which will pose different sets of problems for the EU, and the final decision will be based on different considerations. First, the Western Balkan enlargement of six (or maybe seven, if Kosovo becomes independent) small or mini states will certainly rest on more technical considerations and their accession will depend upon their compliance of the relevant criteria and conditions. All these states, except Croatia, are far from ready for accession
and the EU will be very cautious not to repeat the recent experience of the accession of the not-so-well-prepared Bulgaria and Romania. Having said that, there is an implicit consensus that their future lies with the European Union and that they are clearly within the borders of the EU. Second, Turkey, a very large future member state, will be a more politico-cultural and less technical decision, and European governments and publics are expected to be involved in the final outcome. The issue of Turkey’s accession in particular will become more and more pressing and divisive within the EU and Turkey during the next decade or so. While there is a minimum consensus among all EU countries on the need to encourage the reform and Europeanization of Turkey, the carrot of full membership is contested by some influential member states on cultural grounds. The accession of the third post-Soviet group of countries, a longer-term prospect, will probably be a strategic decision depending largely on the state of the Russian-EU relationship.
The completion of the new treaty will unavoidably open the debate on the borders of Europe, toward Turkey and the post-Soviet space. The recent constitutional impasse offered the pretext to avoid this difficult question and allowed most of the member states to avoid any commitments. With the Constitution out of the way, some argue that it would be the right thing to make a decision sooner rather than later and define the final borders of the EU. Others argue that there is no point in closing the door to potential future member states, given that the EU will probably become in the future a looser entity that will allow multiple speeds and variable geometries. In the meantime, the soft power and pull of EU membership will continue to be an appealing as well as a divisive issue.
Othon Anastasakis is director of Southeast European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) and fellow at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. Communication: Othon.anastasakis@sant.ox.ac.uk
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Constitutionalism diversity
With the German EU Council presidency coming to an end, the issues associated with Europe’s constitutional debate have reached a critical turning point. The challenge of constitutionalism is to harness the potential of Europe’s republican traditions, utilizing that potential for the emerging Euro-Polity. At the same time, diversity in today’s Europe goes beyond national differences to embrace a variety of cultural and spatial dimensions. As stated in the Berlin Declaration of 2007, the EU is enriched by ‘a lively variety of languages, cultures and regions.’ How are we to combine a robust (republican) grounding for constitutionalism and a celebratory affirmation of differences (including those emanating from multicultural coexistence)? The challenge for empirically grounded political theory is to go beyond what is evident in Europe’s experimentations with democracy, to embrace latent but crucial potentialities. As I have argued elsewhere, in introducing the concept of ‘civic polyculturalism’ I aim to contribute to current debates on European unity in diversity from a new perspective. Indeed, while it is evidently the case that Europe at 50 has been a successful experiment in regional integration, it is
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much less evident that it has been a successful experiment also in new forms of democratic governance. I suggest that, in today’s EU, one way of approaching the question of democracy (and of its possible futures) is by looking at the political system of the European Union as a liberal republican construction in the making. Unlike earlier forms of republican thought that focused on a basically homogenous political community, non-domination republicanism can accommodate and even embrace new forms of diversity (including a certain version of multiculturalism) and group rights. Approaches that associate the value of multiculturalism with its ability to provide for meaningful choices rather than uncritical commitment to inherited group values enable a view that may combine the recognition of the pluralism of cultural possibilities for access to meaningful choice and a framework based on a minimal set of shared political values that is nonetheless crucial, to the extent that it is concerned with arrangements which help citizens increase control over aspects of their own lives. Within this framework, a multi-
By Kostas A. Lavdas
tude of commitments may enhance opportunities for meaningful choices, leading to the condition of ‘civic polyculturalism,’ in which multiple allegiances coexist, without denying the basic adherence to certain minimal shared political values. This conception of a European res publica recognizes the value of diversity for the enrichment of the possibilities for self-government. From this view, a European civic space emerges as an answer to Europe’s current concerns about the centrifugal and socially exclusionary reflexes of embedded heterogeneity. Like ‘an old book of the Middle Ages’ ‘He resembled an old book of the Middle Ages, full of errors, of absurd traditions, of obscenities; he was extraordinarily composite.’ This description, by Marcel Proust (Temps perdu), of one of his more ambiguous and complicated characters (Charles Morel), would nicely fit today’s EU. Yet today’s EU is a complex creature that touches upon an increasingly relevant set of political phenomena. Many thanks to Dimitris Chryssochoou, Iseult Honohan, Jeremy Jennings and Philip Pettit for our conversations.
It may be that, more than any other formation beyond the nation state, the EU has been able to assume properties that increasingly make us think of it as a ‘state’ — in the sense that it has become a complex set of institutions affecting our lives. On the other hand, the EU appears to be a sui generis formation. Our point of departure in examining the EU of today is that the issues it has to confront are increasingly issues of the state, while its formation and outlook appear historically unique. In her speech to the European Parliament on June 27, 2007, the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that the agreement reached in Brussels enables us to retain the substance of the Constitutional Treaty. The Reform Treaty can enter into force in time for the European elections in 2009. According to Merkel, with the Reform Treaty we are taking account of citizens’ fears of an alleged ‘European superstate,’ i.e. of surrendering too
much of the nation states’ identities. That is why EU leaders decided to refrain from laying down state-like symbols and designations in the Reform Treaty. At the same time, however, the Reform Treaty contains advances for the European Union’s capacity to act, going in some areas even further than in the Constitutional Treaty (e.g. on climate protection, energy solidarity, on the conditions for enhanced cooperation, particularly on justice and home affairs, or on introducing a European citizens’ initiative — as envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty). Last but not least, the German presidency succeeded in brokering an agreement regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which will be legally binding. The United Kingdom, with its own legal tradition, has decided to follow a different path on this. In this way we reach a turning point where we need a more explicit account of the
normative dimensions of our approach. Linking normative theory and analytical studies makes a lot of sense, provided we are in a position to harness the normative vision to facilitate the search for real-world potentialities. As its aim is to tackle real-world potentialities, the normative dimension has little to do with utopian musings. In recent years, new republican understandings have sought not only to revive, but also to nurture a paradigm of social and political organization for the EU, founded upon republican notions. In its basic conception, a res publica aims at three primary objectives: justice through the rule of law; the common good through a mixed and balanced constitution; and liberty through active citizenship encouraged by institutions which guarantee undominated choice. Eagle-eyed in authority, classical (Roman and Renaissance) republicanism distilled the wisdom of a well-ordered but stern polity in which citizen participation was an end in it-
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self, as was citizen commitment to the collectivity. Not so with modern neo-republicanism. As I have argued elsewhere, neo-republican approaches need to distance themselves from two important features of classical republicanism: (a) the ‘strong’ approach to the constitutive role of civic virtues in the good polity, and (b) republican hostility toward ‘factions.’ Ultimately, the challenge for contemporary republicans such as Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit is to develop a pluralist, rather than a populist republicanism, in which tolerance would be guaranteed in diverse, multicultural societies. The role of civic education is critical. As Iseult Honohan has suggested, we need a republican education for citizenship which will encompass much more than classical civic virtues: Citizens need to become aware of multiply reiterated interdependencies and to develop civic self-restraint. Republican unity in polycultural diversity Unlike earlier forms of republican thought, which focused on a basically homogenous political community, republicanism as non-domination can accommodate and even embrace multiculturalism and group rights. Especially the reading which associ-
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ates the value of multiculturalism with its ability to enhance possibilities for meaningful choices, rather than uncritical commitment to inherited group values, enables a view which aims to combine the recognition of the pluralism of cultural possibilities for access to meaningful choice and a framework based on a minimal set of shared political values which is nonetheless crucial, in that it may help us avoid the traps of naive relativism, while focusing on arrangements and institutions that help citizens increase control over aspects of their own lives. Within this framework, a multitude of commitments may develop emotional engagement and enhance opportunities for meaningful choices. This entails the fundamentally pluralist condition of ‘civic polyculturalism,’ in which multiple allegiances coexist, without in any way denying the basic adherence to certain minimal political values. Needless to say, Europe’s political order has not yet been able to realize this potential. The political system of the EU seeks to discover development patterns amid internal (European) heterogeneity and external (international) liberalism. It is indeed the case that heterogeneity is a part of the
EU’s distinctive nature as a mixed commonwealth. Yet this could become a condition for uniting the member publics and their public spheres into a polycultural and polycentric res publica in which issues of shared concern become the target of EUrelated policies. By pointing at a mixed commonwealth, republican theory makes the point that the EU rests on a primarily political constitution. This would have to embrace a condition of ‘civic polyculturalism,’ in which multiple allegiances coexist, without in any way denying the basic adherence to a core of shared minimal political values. In her June 27 speech to the European Parliament Chancellor Merkel reminded us of an African saying: ‘If you want to move forward fast, go alone — if you want to go far, go together.’ Provided, we might add, we all share a minimal core of civic values.
Kostas A. Lavdas is the Constantine Karamanlis professor of Hellenic and Southeastern European studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts, USA, and a member of the administrative board of the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM).
Sterile debate: Britain’s For the past 50 years Britain’s engagement with Europe has been constrained by a sterile debate between two opposing schools of thought. On one hand, some pro-Europeans have traditionally advocated closer union as the sole solution to what they saw as Britain’s declining influence and wealth, policy paralysis and apparent ungovernability. For this view, British attempts to argue for reform in Europe, to oppose savings tax harmonization or to stay out of the eurozone have often been seen as betrayals of the European idea. On the other, anti-Europeans have argued that the very definition of Britishness lies in rejecting anything put forward by the EU. Forged in opposition to the idea that a European federation was the only and inevitable next step for Britain, this view reflected similar assumptions about British weakness. So for successive British prime ministers the negotiating challenge in the runup to a European Council has been either to agree — and be accused of selling out the national interest in the view of the anti-Europeans — or to say ‘no,’ often in isolation, and sell out the European ideal. To me this old ideological debate about Britain in Europe seems increasingly
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By Ed Balls
out of place and time. While in 1997 Britain was bottom of the G7, including its European counterparts, for national income per head, today Britain is second only to the USA. That Britain is in inevitable decline and needs Europe as its salvation now looks absurd. At the same time, the nature of the European project has changed and continues to change. The new member states have already begun to shift the center of European debate, bringing a liberal approach which emphasizes openness and the importance of cooperation between sovereign countries. The old assumption that economic cooperation would inevitably lead to political integration, from single market to single currency, tax harmonization and a European state seems removed from the reality of modern Europe today. Many of our European partners join us in pressing for
more intergovernmental cooperation and reform of Europe’s budget and institutions rather than further centralization and European state-building. I believe we can break out of this outdated and sterile debate, as I argue in my pamphlet for the Center for European Reform, but only if we develop a more confident vision of Europe, and a more hardheaded view of the UK’s place in it, based squarely on advancing our national interest and the EU public interest together. Britain needs Europe — for securing rising employment and sustained growth while confronting climate change, protectionism and terrorism. This requires effective cooperation with our partners in the EU and reform of its institutions. To meet these challenges Europe must change. We need a new economic focus on job creation and single-market reform, a radical reform of the EU budget and an end to backward-looking attempts at European state-building. Here in Britain, I want to make the case for a hardheaded pro-Europeanism. Pro-European, because we recognize that we are stronger by cooperating with our partners. Hardheaded because we
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have the confidence to put our national interest first, to say ‘no’ sometimes and to argue our case where we believe Europe risks taking the wrong course. On financial services, on competition policy, on the environment, on the Common Agricultural Policy and the EU budget, our challenge is to create an outwardfacing, flexible Europe. Our approach should be to engage to advance the British and European public interest where we can — while standing firm where our national interests would be damaged. And in the debate on European institutional reform, it is essential that we also take a hardheaded approach. We must not return to the old ideological assumption that being pro-European means moving inevitably toward European political integration, regardless of the opposition of national populations. Public support for Europe has ebbed in recent years, with slow economic growth, high unemployment, budget problems and the rejection of the 2004 constitutional treaty making Europe seem stagnant and out of touch. A European state is not
the answer. We do not need a constitutional treaty that fundamentally changes the relationship between member states and the EU. And so in the discussion of institutional reforms in the weeks ahead we should always start with this test — will reform help us make better decisions that address the task of delivering opportunity, fairness and prosperity to all our citizens? Defending our wider national interest means being at the table and winning the arguments. We will not succeed by following the path proposed by Conservative
leader David Cameron and withdrawing to the extreme and anti-European fringe. The only way to get the best deal for Britain is by working together with our partners in the EU and not being afraid to stand up for Britain’s interests. We can only do so if we reframe the British debate. Most people of our generation reject the old false choice between Britain and Europe. Instead, in 2007 the sensible mainstream view is pro-British and proEuropean.
Ed Balls (MP) was the economic secretary to the UK Treasury; he is now secretary of state for children, schools and familes. His pamphlet Britain and Europe — A City Minister’s Perspective was published by the Center for European Reform on May 17, 2007. Ed Balls’ webite: www.edballs.com
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‘ France is back in Europe,’ declared Nicolas Sarkozy on the night of his election. His actions alongside German Chancellor Angela Merkel made it possible for a positive agreement to be reached at the Brussels Summit. It wasn’t easy but for him, as for us, the hardest part is still to come. The agreement abandons the name and the symbols of the Constitution, but it retains the main innovations of the 2004 project: the consolidation of the institutions, the legal personality of the Union, respect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the extension of the qualified majority vote. It is real progress for the Union. It remains framed and limited by the will of the nation states for reinforced control (in particular by the transfer to 2014 of the application of the double majority vote rule). The Reform Treaty will establish a framework, but the will for promoting common policies is not sufficiently established. There is the imperative need for a second stage in order to give the European construction meaning in the real world. The proposition of the organization Confrontations Europe for a New Single European Act is empowered even more now that the page of the institutional reform can finally be turned. With this perspective, the consolidation of the economic Union is a priority. Sarkozy has often expressed his criticism about it and ‘his pressure makes the European debates inevitable. The dilatory tactic will not be possible anymore,’ writes Ferdinando Riccardi, editor of Bulletin Quotidien Europe. That creates an opportunity, provided that France retains these positions. However, this is not going to be simple: Across the political spectrum, France
Participate now By Philippe Herzog
has cultivated a defensive stance and a protectionist tendency regarding the open market and globalization. A will for major change has been expressed by way of internal reforms of structures and behaviors in favor of work, initiative and innovation. Their success is necessary in order for France to once more gain credit in Europe. At the same time, France must establish its place in the large common European market; if it invests positively, it will have the legitimacy to propose new ways of achieving this. Certain options of Sarkozy must be thorough in this sense: to moralize and control the financial capitalism, to define the Community preference. We want a market accompanied by European public goods and by truly common policies in sectors like energy, education, innovation and employment. The ambivalence of the Reform Treaty doesn’t translate into opposition between good and bad students of the Union, but
into the great disorder of its peoples regarding the direction of Community engagement. We are asking the new leaders of the country to examine our proposition for a New Single Act: France, then, would really be back in Europe with great prospects. This option could be at the center of public European debate. Returning to Europe is a challenge for all in France, one that cannot be achieved without reform of the structures and working methods of the state. The centralization of our European policy has been proven to be deeply inefficient. Like us, the Council of State has underlined the French administration‘s lack of strategy, anticipation and influence capacity in the Community area. In order to restore them, the state must request the participation of companies, trade unions and civil society in general. We are available.
Philippe Herzog is the president of the think tank Confrontations Europe. Confrontations Europe website: www.confrontations.org
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cover story In a campaign speech in the French port city of Toulon in February, Nicolas Sarkozy floated the idea of a Mediterranean Union as a separate organization from the European Union. ‘The Mediterranean is a key to our influence in the world,’ said the man who would soon be elected president. It could be argued that Sarkozy was testing the waters for closer cooperation between Southern European and North African states. In his view, a permanent council should govern the Med Union. Its focus would be on organized crime and terrorism, sustainable development, illegal immigration and energy security. The cover story in this issue of The bridge seeks to address the potential of cooperation in the Mediterranean, the energy aspect, security in the region, and trade and economic relations between the countries of the basin. In this respect a number of politicians, academics and young scholars were asked to reflect on these issues.
A confluence area to prosper We cannot think the world but as a unified village, where multiple and interdependent nations live together. Each nation is concerned with its own prosperity, however, liable toward the other ones as to general interest of humanity. Kheireddine Al Tounsi, Tunisian Prime Minister (1822-1890)
There is no doubt that the Mediterranean region has not taken advantage of the globalization drive in the world economy as has been the case for other regions of the world (China, India and Southeast Asia in particular, but also parts of Latin America). It is well known that the northern states of the Mediterranean (Spain, Portugal, Greece) have taken advantage of their integration in the European Union and benefited from the accompanying large financial resources. However, this is not yet the case for the other areas. It is true that through the Barcelona Process and the MEDA program the European Union has contributed large amounts of humanitarian aid to conflict zones and increased loans and grants for infrastructure or economic reform. But these transfers do not match the amount of flows disbursed to concretize the single market and reduce regional asymmetries between the richer and more industrialized
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By Mohieddine Hadhri
parts of Western Europe and poorer and less dynamic regions. As a result, many Mediterranean economies might not be ready yet to take advantage of free trade and globalization and some countries are exposed to more unemployment and social pain as their economies are being opened up. Economic and social imbalances The Mediterranean region began to take action to enter into a sustainable development process in the mid-1970s, particularly with the Mediterranean Action Plan, the Barcelona Convention and the prospective analysis. This region is a fragile eco-region that has become aware of the pollution threats that originate from different factors such as agriculture, mass tourism, the intensity of road and maritime traffic, and increased urbanization. Several interstate agreements were signed to deal with the various sources of sea pollution. The creation of the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (MCSD) in 1996 was another important step toward developing a full strategy for
sustainable development in the region. The establishment of the Barcelona Process in 1995 and the initiative of the European Union to create a Mediterranean free trade zone between its various shores have served as an additional incentive to develop such a strategy, in spite of all constraints and challenges. In this context, the Mediterranean region suffers from various social, economic and environmental imbalances. These imbalances have a negative impact on the environment and the preservation of the Mediterranean patrimony. In addition, several conflicts and situations of violence continue to affect the lives of millions of Mediterraneans. The Mediterranean region today is characterized by a sharp asymmetry between its two parts, the European Union countries and the other Mediterranean countries: The distribution of the population around the Mediterranean and its structure have changed greatly. From about one-third of the total Mediterranean population in 1950, the countries of the east and south are expected to reach two-thirds in 2025. Moreover, the population in the European
The Mediterranean is a key to our influence in the world. It’s also a key for Islam that is torn between modernity and fundamentalism... A Mediterranean Union would work closely with the European Union and might eventually form joint institutions with the 27-nation bloc. But it would be a separate organization. Excerpt from Nicolas Sarkozy’s campaign speech in the port city of Toulon in February 2007.
countries is getting older whereas the majority is below 20 years in the rest of the region. In the north, standards of living have increased to almost reach the level of the more developed part of Europe. At the same time, mass tourism, heavy maritime transport activities, and pollution of the main rivers that end in the sea are putting heavy ecological pressure on this part of the region and mainly on coastal areas. The conditions of the enlargement of the European Union to Mediterranean countries in the framework of a single market illustrated this duality between, on the one hand, economic and social coherence and, on the other, the diffusion of new ecological problems related to the adoption in member states of patterns of consumption, production, distribution and transport that are not sustainable. In the south, the standard of living has a tendency to stagnate at a low level (between $2,000 and $4,000 of GDP
per capita compared to more than $20,000 per capita in the north). Economic activities are highly dependent on low-level traditional services; manufacturing activities are neither developed nor competitive; and population growth, although on the decline, is still very high. Mass tourism and the high dependency of the transportation system on cars and trucks create additional pressure on natural resources and ecological balances. In addition to the income gap, another indicator of the deep asymmetry affecting the Mediterranean region is the distribution of exports. Eighty-five percent of exports and 80 percent of imports are due to three northern countries (France, Italy and Spain). In addition, the region suffers from structural trade deficits affecting all countries with the exception of Italy and France, as well as Libya and Algeria,
which are energy-exporting countries. These asymmetries will not be reduced unless a great effort is made to bring about drastic changes in growth patterns in the north and the south as well as the east. Even with an optimistic projection of a decline in the population growth from an average of 2 percent to 1.24 percent in the Maghreb and 1.39 percent in the Mashriq countries, and with an average annual economic growth of 4.2 percent for the developing countries of the region, the differences in GDP per capita will continue to present a huge gap. Common ecological problems The asymmetry in itself does not prevent the fact that common ecological problems do exist and have to be dealt with. The resident population of the Mediterranean countries has jumped from 246 million in 1960 to 427 million in the year 2000. Urbanization, overcrowding in coastal regions, evolution of consumption patterns, intensive agriculture, mass tourism and
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unrestricted coastal area development combine to assault the natural environment — marine, terrestrial and water resources. These factors interact to cause pollution loads that endanger people’s quality of life. They constitute a major Mediterranean problem and potential threat. An important quantity of untreated wastewater and many toxic substances are discharged into the semi-enclosed Mediterranean Sea. Transport and industries cause atmospheric pollution that damages human health, nature and archaeological sites. The delicate Mediterranean ecosystem is disturbed in a variety of ways, from the contamination of fish by industrial effluent to the destruction of the habitats of endangered species by tourism. The development of coasts and coastal plains for the purpose of urban, tourism and industrial expansion has led to an imbalance and a gradual concentration of the population, infrastructure and economic activities along the coast, to the detriment of the interior. The governance issue: An equitable development aiming at sustainable prosperity Dealing with all these problems requires a much larger degree of governance at the local, national and regional levels. The concept of governance is not yet adequately grasped in the region as in most parts of the world.
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Governance is a positive, descriptive, analytical concept, not a normative one. It should not be understood as a normative pretension to impose a political or administrative model on less developed countries. It is neither government nor governing, it is a much larger concept embracing networks or interrelationships between strategic actors — governmental, nongovernmental, economic, social, cultural and religious. Institutions and capacities implied by the concept of governance go beyond democracy. In fact, governance is an approach to development. It refers to the institutional arrangements and capacities required to produce sustainable development. Implementation of governance principles will have to be an essential part of the strategy for sustainable development. It will represent a new arena to try to cope with the main challenges facing the Mediterranean, i.e. better and more efficient management of water, energy and land resources, as well as a more adequate transport system and urban management.
Bibliographic references Mohieddine Hadhri, Spetses international seminar, Greece, ‘Environnement et Developpement durable: Un nouveau vecteur de cooperation Nord-Sud en Mediterranee.’ In Sustainable Development and Adjustment in the Mediterranean Following the EU Enlargement (Franco Agnelli Edition, Milan, 2006).
The preservation of the archaeological treasures and the variety of cultures in the Mediterranean area is an additional dimension to be taken into consideration. In this respect, consumption and production patterns as well as mass tourism and the concentration of the population in coastal areas constitute many negative factors that have to be dealt with in defining the strategy for sustainable development. In short, the South and the North Mediterranean, more than ever before, are confluent in terms of identity, culture and economy. Together, we can build a prosperous confluence area in the Mediterranean, and ensure peace and welfare for future generations.
Mohieddine Hadhri is professor of international relations at the University of Tunis. He is a member of different international and professional associations such as COPEAM 1994 (Rome); a founding member of SIHMED (Societe Internationale des Historiens de la Mediterranee, 1997, Rome); FEMISE (Forum Euro-Mediterraneen des Instituts economiques), 1997, Marseille; a member of the International Orientation Team of the Alliance for a Responsible, United and Plural World — Geneve, 1998; Economic Research Forum ERF (Cairo) 1999; the Mediterranean Dialogue Conference of the International European Movement, 2004 (Brussels; GDN (Global Development Network) New Delhi, 2004); the International Scientific Committee for the UNESCO 2006 (Paris); and a member of the Athenes Club — Global Governance Group, Montreal, Canada, 2006. He is the author of some 50 publications and articles related to a wide range of topics and international issues including peace and Mediterranean security, North/South dialogue, global and regional integration, and sustainable development. Communication: hadri.cetima@gnet.tn
Toward a new EU approach By Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
The Mediterranean region has always been in the spotlight for some reason or another. The most striking reason is an almost daily reference in the press to developments in the Middle East; in the meantime President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya occasionally finds himself at center stage for his peculiar remarks on the state of the world, while Egypt is still seen as a regional power whose authority is being challenged in a variety of ways. Like other regions, the Mediterranean was also severely tested by the consequences of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, in terms of their impact on the Arab world and through their association with militant Islam and in relation to the rise of neoconservative interventionism aspiring to remake the Greater Middle East which led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Closer to home, the sum total of the aforementioned trends and developments has also had an impact on how the states of Europe, especially through the cumulative expression of their interests — the European Union, attempted to deal with many of the issues at hand. These range from supporting the further political, social and economic development of the countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean to stemming illegal migration and dealing with the integration of Arab, subSaharan and Muslim populations into European societies. The EU and its member
states strengthened the Union’s Third Pillar — Justice, Liberty and Security — while the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched to cover relations with the Union’s neighbors to the south and the east. Finally, within the framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership, which celebrated its 10th anniversary with a summit in November 2005, the pillar on cooperation in the area of intercultural dialogue acquired a well-deserved importance. The need for an enhanced policy dialogue across the Mediterranean has increased especially since the perceived radicalization of Islam became a matter of major concern in today’s globalized world, as the post-9/11 attacks on Casablanca, Madrid, London and elsewhere would attest. The intent of this article is not to dwell in particular on the various zones of insecurity around the Mediterranean, the most relevant being the developing civil war between Palestinian factions, but to assess in practical terms the implications of Mediterranean developments for the European Union and its member states. In its Security Strategy of December 2003, the European Union identified the key threats as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the persist-
ence of regional conflicts, state failure and the lack of rule of law, and transnational organized crime. Over time the list has grown to include energy security, combating pandemics, stemming the flow of illegal immigrants, dealing with natural and man-made disasters and cyber crime with its malware (malicious software) dimension. In response to these threats the Union focused on security in its neighborhood by promoting ‘a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom [it] can enjoy close and cooperative relations.’ As a result, the ENP was conceived to cover both the eastern and the southern dimensions of the EU’s regional policies, often leading to confusion, divided loyalties and mixed-up priorities among EU member states. On the one hand, the recently concluded German presidency heavily invested in promoting an ‘Ostpolitik’ and the formulation of an ENP+ to offer additional incentives to the countries aspiring to join the Union at a time when no imminent new rounds of accession negotiations are on the horizon, to enhance relations with Russia
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and to devise a new platform for relations with the Central Asian states. On the other hand, the current Portuguese presidency is understandably giving priority to the preparation of the EU-Africa Summit in December and focusing on the Mediterranean and EU relations with Brazil as an emerging regional power. Together with French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s idea for the creation of a ‘Mediterranean Union’ and the recently adopted EU ‘Global Approach to Migration,’ this sets the stage for increased EU attention to Mediterranean affairs. The EU interest in the Mediterranean, or at least in some parts of it, is of consequence at a time when there is a lively debate over how to approach relations with the Union’s Mediterranean partners in a cooperative manner. Much has been written about the failure of the Barcelona Process to tie the Southern Mediterranean states to a serious development agenda and about the probable need to focus on sub-regionalism (roughly one made up of Maghreb states and the other of Mashriq states) as a possible remedy for tackling the region’s priorities. The failure of most
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Arab states to promote free trade among themselves (south-south integration) and the likelihood of being unable to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by the target date of 2010, in spite of an average real GDP growth of 4.8 percent in 2006, suggest the need for a different approach. In this context, converting the European Investment Bank’s Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) into a Mediterranean Investment Bank separate from the European Investment Bank might be an idea worth reconsidering. Also, a concerted approach to the transfer of financial services know-how to Arab countries in order to liberalize trade in financial services may make a lot of sense. The EU Global Approach to Migration, which links migration to the development agenda, as well as to internal aspects such
as legal migration, integration, protection of refugees, border control, readmission and the fight against illegal migration and human trafficking, is based on a genuine partnership with third countries as an integral part of the Union’s external policies. It addresses many of the concerns of the EU Mediterranean member states (France, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus and Slovenia) which met at a foreign ministerial level in Lagonissi, near Athens, for the first time in October 2006, upon the initiative of the Greek Foreign Ministry, to discuss common concerns in the Mediterranean, especially the issues of illegal immigration and further enhancement of cooperation in controlling the EU’s external sea borders. These concerns, together with the prospects of establishing a European Coast Guard Service and enhanced cooperation between port authorities, suggest a conver-
THE PRESIDENT — (…) I want to reach out to all of the people of the Mediterranean to tell them that everything will unfold in the Mediterranean. That we must overcome all the hatred and leave in its place the great dream of peace and the great dream of civilization. I want to tell them that the time has come to build at its center a Mediterranean Union, that will like Europe and Africa… What was done for Europe 60 years ago, we will do today for a Mediterranean Union. (…) Nicolas Sarkozy’s acceptance speech, Paris, May 6, 2007.
gence of views among the aforementioned EU-8 on how to tackle the Mediterranean issues. This in turn also evokes the much-discussed Mediterranean Union proposal of the French president, announced first in Sarkozy’s election night victory speech of May 6, 2007, which links the development of the South Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa to a cohesive mutually agreed migration policy. Taken together, the Sarkozy proposal and the common approach by the EU-8 indicate that the Mediterranean is bound to remain at the top of the EU agenda for some time. It should be noted that the current Portuguese presidency of the EU will be followed by Slovenia and France in 2008. Also of relevance is that the EU-8 form a substantive voting bloc with enough votes to block qualified majority decisions within the EU’s current voting procedures and will probably continue to remain in that position once new provisions are negotiated, ratified and implemented. Another noteworthy development is that the EU-8 member states will as of next year all be part of the Eurogroup with the accession of Malta and Cyprus thereby enhancing their position within the EU substantially. Should the trend toward a two-tier EU, with a noyau dur centered on the Eurogroup, take shape as the Union’s decision-making mechanism at 27 falters,
the EU-8 with their Mediterranean focus could play an even larger role in shaping the Union’s external policies. Though this tendency could in fact complicate the bifurcation of the EU’s external focus to the east and the south, it should nevertheless lead to a new approach toward the Mediterranean which would seek to remedy the failures of the Barcelona Process and address the security concerns of the EU’s Mediterranean borders. The impact will also be felt in a greater political role for the EU in the Middle East peace process. It stands to reason that continued failure to find a solution to the Palestinian civil strife, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Sunni-Shia proxy war in Lebanon would make any targeted policies aimed at enhancing development and curbing illegal migration almost irrelevant. In other words, the EU-8 can only become all the more active in the promotion of a greater EU role in the region. After all, it should be noted that the efforts of the EU-8 and the focus of the Mediterranean Union proposal are relevant independently of Turkey’s EU prospects. Turkey’s eventual accession into the EU would in fact help the implementation of a concerted approach toward the Mediterranean. However, should accession stall, a
common approach by the EU’s Mediterranean member states is imperative to deal with the implications of such a prospect. In other words, the key threats to the EU’s and the Mediterranean region’s security will remain and will need to be tackled irrespective of Turkish membership of the Union. Therefore, linking the Mediterranean Union proposal to a possible alternative to full membership for Turkey is largely irrelevant and beside the point if one were to account for the positive synergies a Mediterranean Union could create. In conclusion, the protracted instability emanating from the EU’s southern borders has mobilized its Mediterranean member states to converge on the need to refocus on the south. The potential of a future Mediterranean policy based on a genuine partnership among all of the region’s stakeholders exists. It remains to be seen what its future shape and content will be.
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou is assistant professor of international relations at the Department of Mediterranean Studies of the University of the Aegean, Rhodes, and director general of the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens. ICBSS website: http://icbss.org
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A dream... The past two months of heated debate among European Union member states have cultivated a European agenda that heeds the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms, operations, and the functions of the regional order (in general). From the issue of the EU Constitution (having resurfaced as of late), in part due to the German presidency, to the ongoing negotiations regarding the Turkish bid for EU accession, the European Union continuously seeks to broaden its horizons, with new initiatives, policies and cohesion efforts in hopes of enhancing harmonization among member states. Yet at a time so crucial to the ‘deepening’ processes of the EU, one politician has stood out, as his adamant stance calls for the creation of a new, loosely based union among coastal Mediterranean states (or the creation of a ‘Mediterranean Union,’ MU). In fact, this effort, as put forth in the political agenda of Nicolas Sarkozy (the recently elected president of France), has yet to sway all the potential candidates/member states and independent observers, in part due to the undefined nature of the proposal, as skeptics recall prior efforts/lackluster attempts to enhance regional cooperation be-
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tween Europe and its bordering regions. Sarkozy’s proposal aims to create a union that is to be economic in nature, though efforts have been put in place to expand cooperation ‘to the fields of energy, security, counterterrorism, and immigration on a trade agreement, and create a Mediterranean Investment Bank modeled on the European model, thus facilitating the development of local economies on the eastern and southern edge of the region.’1 His proposal outlines and underscores the importance of the regional interdependence, specifically with regard to mutual economic prosperity among the participants, and in return for access to the oil reserves of North Africa, France plans to share their expertise on nuclear energy, to help with the conservation and overall management of the scarily declining energy resources of the region. In this proposal, member states are to encompass the coastal rim, or countries ringing the Mediterranean, namely Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. ‘Sarkozy has
By Stavros Kourtalis & Andreas Hardaloupas
said that he wants the countries of the Mediterranean to form a council and hold regular summit meetings under a rotating presidency and envisions it as being a bridge between Europe and Muslim world.’2 When asked to elaborate on the newfound interest, feasibility of implementation, and tangible role of the key players in the realm of regional cooperation, the French president emphasized the importance of engagement and collaboration among bordering regions, and proposed to build upon the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). His attempt to provide clarification was at best unclear, as Sarkozy’s plan called for the motions ‘to reshape the architecture of the Barcelona Process and that of the ENP by separating the southern and eastern branches of the ENP.’3 The Barcelona initiative was an effort set forth in 1995, aimed at strengthening regional collaboration between the European Union and the Middle East by providing a forum for the EU to engage, discuss and ideally resolve issues plaguing the Middle East and
1. www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=5656114 2. http://216.239.59.104/search?q+cache:S9XDFa GNqAQJ:nykrindc.blogspot.com/2007 3. www.euractive.com/en/enlargement/sarkozyunclear-proposal-mediterranean-union
THE PRESIDENT — (…) On the Mediterranean Union, I have to say that Mr Prodi had already proposed to my predecessor a joint demarche and you know how keen I am on this Mediterranean Union project: We have to build in the Mediterranean what was built 60 years ago in Europe and the idea of a meeting of the seven Euro-Mediterranean countries — without shutting out the others, which is important, informing them and leaving the door open — is a potent idea. The prime minister and I will decide whether it’s held in Italy or in France, but what’s important is for the seven Euro-Mediterranean countries to work together to promote this initiative. Of course, it will have to be broadened to include the countries of the southern Mediterranean. But you can understand how important it is for the seven Euro-Mediterranean countries to have a common position. (…) Statements made by Nicolas Sarkozy, president of the French Republic, during his joint press briefing with Romano Prodi, Italian prime minister, following their meeting (excerpts), Paris, May 28, 2007.
or an implementable North Africa. The main objectives of this partnership were the creation and ‘definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue (Political and Security Chapter), the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free trade area (Economic and Financial Chapter), and finally the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Social, Cultural and Human Chapter).’4 Yet the Barcelona Process was perhaps the greatest example to date of the EU’s inability to engage and collaborate with the bordering regions of the Middle East (ME) and North Africa (NA) (MENA). The Barcelona Process failed within the broader scope of regional cooperation. In fact, the inability of the partnership to take the initiative and become involved in the Middle East peace process exploited numerous flaws and various structural weaknesses of the EU’s institutional framework. And though many argue the hands-off approach may have been (at least in part) due to the American presence within the Middle East, historic ties to the region make for an excellent incentive to deepen the collaborative efforts of engagement between the EU and MENA. Additional criticism comes in light of the timing behind the proposal. The ‘Turkish problem’ is clearly in Sarkozy’s sights,5 writes Katrin Bennhold. In all fairness, this assess4. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/ 5. Katrin Bennhold, ‘Sarkozy’s Proposal for Mediterranean Bloc Makes Waves,’ May 10, 2007 www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=5656114
agenda? ment maintains accuracy, particularly since Sarkozy recently finished his campaign platform that vowed to deny Turkish access to the elitist club of the European Union, at all costs, ‘maintaining that the large Muslim country is part of Asia Minor, and not Europe.’6 Needless to say, this proposal instigated a public outcry of dismay by the Islamic populace of Turkey. Specifically, most Turks feel that they are victims of religious discrimination, and that Sarkozy is the figurehead of the systemic conspiracy to end the mere prospect for EU candidacy. Asked to comment on the situation, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan replied, ‘Every country that started membership negotiations with the EU has completed them, and if Turkey becomes the only exception it would send a very bad message to the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims.’7 Nonetheless, the attributes of the Sarkozy initiative far outweigh its drawbacks. Specifically, the exclusive ‘Club Med’ of 18 members has the potential to function as ‘a supplementary forum of political dialogue.’8 Additionally, the new plan envisions an extensive partnership with greater inclu6, 7. Katrin Bennhold, ‘Sarkozy’s Proposal for Mediterranean Bloc Makes Waves,’ May 10, 2007 www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=5656114 8. Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, CEPS Commentary, ‘A little clarification, please, on the “Union of the Mediterranean”’
sion at the core. Thus, by being more inclusive, you enhance regional cooperation. In fact, regional proximity and common boarders make for engagement which in turn may cultivate collaboration. However, for there to be collaboration, the channels of communication must be open to one and all (aka inclusive engagement). For example, Israel has often viewed the EU’s stance as pro-Arab, and has opposed the direct involvement of the EU in any round of its recent negotiations and discussions. Why? Israel feels threatened. And yet, regarding Sarkozy’s proposal, it should be noted that a senior Israeli diplomat, who declined to be identified, said, ‘My feeling is that there is every reason to believe that Israel would be interested in this because it gives us another opportunity to have a dialogue with countries that we sometimes have difficulties holding a dialogue with.’ Oddly enough, most countries, with the exception of Turkey (depicting apprehension regarding the timing of the issue) support the proposal. What is ironic is that certain experts have predicted that the path of Turkey to the EU goes through this backdoor proposal. That is to say Turkey can use the Mediterranean Union to show a sign of good faith and emphasize the importance of its participatory role. ‘In my view, Turkey should actually work with France on this to show that it is ready to be the bridge be-
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tween Europe and the Middle East and North Africa,’9 writes Bennhold. Another country that is following the Sarkozy proposal closely is Turkey’s neighbor Greece, since the country stands to gain much from such a union. In particular, Greece is carefully examining the policies of immigration. Sarkozy’s plan calls for an effort to regulate visas and the free travel of individuals. If this occurs alongside a steady dose of economic development, then illegal immigration will cease to be a problem, as individuals will be able to sustain themselves vis-a-vis the domestic economy of their country, thereby not needing to migrate. Accordingly, Greece is an asset to the Sarkozy proposal as well, due to the fact that, geographically, Greece has been labeled the crossroads between East and West. This is important in two respects: firstly because of its geographical significance as the most eastern country of the European Union (along with Cyprus), which means easier access, fewer trade barriers etc, regarding the sector of commerce. Secondly, Greece invests heavily in neighboring regions. One example is the country’s economic investment in the Balkan peninsula, specifically in the Former 9. http://216.239.59.104/search?q+cache:S9XDFa GNqAQJ:nykrindc.blogspot.com/2007
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Romania and Bulgaria. But we are not just talking about financial incentives; rather, Greece maintains the ability to vouch for humanitarian aid in times of crises, as depicted by Athens’s initiative during the latest Israeli-Lebanese conflict. In the case of events ranging from natural disasters, such as the massive earthquake in Turkey in 1999, to the ongoing stalemate of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Greece being closest to the region will facilitate the path of transition for the Middle East into the European Union because common boarders make for an impetus to invest in regional cooperation. Thus, the closer the integration within the region, the less likely the probability of having rising tensions, hostilities, and even violent ethno-political clashes, among member states. In this regard, the newfound interest on Sarkozy’s part couldn’t be more timely, as violence continues to plague the Middle East. One such incentive that makes the proposal enticing/mutually beneficial to both Europe and MENA is a common framework for cooperation. In particular, Sarkozy has proposed collaboration on specific areas of concentration. These areas are to be monitored by independent institutions. That is to say that, in fact, a separate entity has the ability to deal with more specific issues, as members can voice direct concerns of the involved parties, rather than outside ob-
servers sitting on the sideline and giving recommendations on issues that are not of dire importance to them. Now the question remains whether Sarkozy’s intent is to build on the effort and the initiatives of Barcelona and the ENP. Or is the plan to create something from scratch that is able to take greater initiatives and work beside the EU to bridge the gap among the regions? Whatever the case, the prospect sounds promising. Sure, there are some points that need clarification, but the truth of the matter is that the region (of the Middle East) is one that borders Europe, and its conflict-ridden territories have the potential of spilling over into Europe, albeit in differing forms (i.e. instead of war, attacks will come through terrorism). If Europe doesn’t do something now, it will pay the price later. Hence invest now, and reap the benefits of regional cooperation later; otherwise, the problems of the Middle East and Africa might just become yours at a future point in time.
Stavros Kourtalis and Andreas Hardaloupas are political scientists.
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Security: Over a decade of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is certainly the most important regional process that currently exists in the Mediterranean as it brings together all of the European Union member states and 10 Mediterranean countries, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Turkey. At the first Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial conference that took place in Barcelona in November 1995 the original 27 Euro-Mediterranean countries established three principal areas of cooperation: A political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability; An economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; and A partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The Barcelona Declaration stresses the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and is founded upon a basic understanding that future Euro-Mediterranean relations should be based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the
By Dr Stephen C. Calleya
privileged nature of the links forged by neighborhood and history. Given the more indifferent patterns of regional relations that have dominated Mediterranean relations than those that existed in November 1995, it is no small feat that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has continued to evolve. As the Barcelona Process proceeds through its second decade of evolution, the participating EuroMediterranean countries are continuously taking stock of the progress or lack of achievements registered in each of the different cooperative sectors they are seeking to advance. The groundwork for the eventual introduction of a Charter for Peace and Stability, preparations for the smooth functioning of a Euro-Med free trade area and the establishment of an interactive Euro-Mediterranean Foundation that brings civil society together at regular intervals should be the priority areas that policymakers focus on. Implementation of the EU Commission’s ‘Work Program for 2006-2010,’ published at the 10th anniversary Euro-Med summit held in Barcelona in November 2005, identifies those areas of cooperation where implementation of confidence-building measures
can proceed in the short term. If European Union efforts to foster interMediterranean political and economic cooperation are to succeed they must be complemented by initiatives that Mediterranean states themselves initiate as part of a process that aims to create a transnational network upon which cross-border types of economic and financial interaction can take place. To date, the Mediterranean has not succeeded in creating an environment where people, products, ideas and services are allowed to flow freely. At the moment there are too many bottlenecks in the system and this will prohibit the region from competing and prospering in the global village of tomorrow. Through its Neighborhood Policy the EU is seeking to secure its borders by promoting a ring of well-governed countries to the east and south of Europe. The overriding goal of this policy is to ensure that successive waves of EU enlargement do not create new dividing lines in Europe. The EU is already seeking to project prosperity and resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a strategic priority for Europe. Stability in the Middle East depends
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on such an outcome. Measures must also be introduced to bolster the Barcelona Process by dedicating more resources and commitment to the EMP objectives of enhancing economic, security and cultural cooperation with the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean the progressive establishment of Euro-Mediterranean free trade in the coming 10 years will have farreaching consequences for Mediterranean societies and economies. Euro-Mediterranean policymakers must articulate more clearly the positive goals and the time frame it will take to implement such goals. Emphasizing that the Barcelona Process is a long-term initiative will also help eliminate the high expectations that have dominated the EMP since 1995. By 2015 the EMP will vastly enhance the volume of trade within that gigantic trade area. One may expect that by 2015 the participating 40-odd countries will do 5060 percent of all their trade within the zone. In the next decade the EMP will also have a positive impact on the amount of foreign direct investment in the Mediterranean countries. Assured market access and an improved overall political and economic environment will facilitate the task of attracting European, American and Asian investors to this region of the world. The Euro-Mediterranean partners should focus their attention during the next five years on ensuring that the EMP has enough of a direct positive impact on
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the Euro-Mediterranean citizens it is supposed to be addressing. Raising awareness of the EMP can be achieved by directing more future Euro-Mediterranean programs to the civil societal level, especially educational programs as already identified by the European Commission in its current work program. In many ways the Barcelona Process is a farsighted and novel initiative. Some scholars believe that the EMP is so ahead of its time that it is unrealistic to achieve the objectives stipulated in the Barcelona Declaration. A major problem with the EMP is that it takes little account of the need for prior resolution of existing disputes in the Mediterranean area that include the ArabIsraeli, Cyprus and Western Sahara conflicts. It is highly unlikely that protagonists in each of these disputes can enter into cooperative security arrangements without first resolving their antagonisms. Only the creation of a cooperative Mediterranean region in which the perceptual and prosperity gap is addressed, reduced and gradually eliminated will ensure that the Mediterranean does not become a zone of indifference and an eventual economic wasteland. Integrating the Mediterranean into the 21st century international system through mechanisms such
as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the EU Neighborhood Policy and a sustainable Middle East peace process is the immediate challenge that the international community must confront. Otherwise transnational sources of instability emanating from the Mediterranean will continue to manifest themselves at a regional and international level. Enhancing Euro-Mediterranean relations Since becoming independent, Malta’s strategic relevance in the central Mediterranean has led the island country to pursue a comprehensive and proactive foreign policy agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The importance that Malta attaches to Euro-Mediterranean security, stability and prosperity is highlighted by the prominent role that it has been playing in international organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commonwealth and the European Union. Malta’s foreign policy priority of promoting a more enhanced structured dialogue between the European Union and the League of Arab States and its member states is essential if closer Euro-Mediterranean re-
(…) THE PRESIDENT — (…) This is a matter which also concerns Foreign Minister Moratinos. We have — I think one can say Mr Zapatero — the same analysis. We have to do in the Mediterranean what the Europeans had the wisdom to do, 60 years ago, for Europe. So we have decided to propose, with our Italian friends, a meeting of the eight European countries — eight because there’s Slovenia which will soon have the European Union presidency — to see how we can propose a common initiative to the southern Mediterranean countries. Spain and France will work hand in hand, of course, with Italy and, of course, with our other partners. (…) Visit to Spain — Preliminary statement made by Nicolas Sarkozy, president of the French Republic, at his joint press briefing with Jose Luis Zapatero, prime minister of Spain, following their meeting (excerpts), Madrid, May 31, 2007.
lations as envisaged in the Euro-Med Partnership and Euro-Neighborhood Policy are to be realized. A better-structured EU/Arab political dialogue must focus on building confidence and trust and ensure that the media make use of their advanced technology to transmit such positive messages instead of the regular flow of negative political messages. Malta believes that the time has come to focus more Euro-Mediterranean political energy on delivering practical cooperation in areas where such measures are urgently required. This includes cooperative measures in the field of management of migration control, environment control and also economic development. Such forms of cooperation are essential if the Euro-Med Partnership is to be perceived as relevant to the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean area. Such modalities of cooperation would of course adopt all of the existing mechanisms of partnership (association agreements, action plans, trade provisions and financial cooperation) that already exist through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighborhood Policy. The main goal of this initiative would be to create a more positive atmosphere between Europe and the Arab world in all sectors, including politics, education, culture and business. The success of this initiative will lie in the informality of regular interaction be-
tween the two shores of the Mediterranean. When it comes to immediate practical forms of cooperation, Arab states should be encouraged to play a direct role in the management of illegal migration across the Mediterranean. One modality of cooperation that could be considered is that of cooperating more closely with FRONTEX or the EU Council of Interior Ministers against appropriate financial support from the EU. Preparatory discussions ahead of the ministerial summit scheduled to take place during the Portuguese presidency later this year that will focus on legal and illegal migration and migration and development should concentrate on identifying practical measures that can be introduced in the short term to start addressing this phenomenon in a more concerted manner. Similar modalities of cooperation can be launched when it comes to surveillance of pollution, monitoring fishing activities and carrying out search-and-rescue missions in the Mediterranean. The success of coordinating EuroMediterranean relations will be determined by the extent to which interaction between these two adjacent regions of the Mediterranean contributes to an improvement in the standard of living of all peoples. A more integrated engagement should focus on immediately enhancing Euro-Arab R&D in the field of innovation, especially when it comes to renewable and alternative energy.
Global warming, global climate and global environment protection have become a key issue for worldwide political and industrial actions. Europe — under the German presidency — is taking appropriate actions through leadership in relevant key technologies. New innovation policies for Europe (e.g. FP7) and for Germany (HighTech initiative, launched late 2006) are already being implemented. EuroMedITI (the Euro-Mediterranean Initiative for Technology and Innovation) is an initiative that was launched by Malta in early 2007 and is already opening up partnerships between research, business and governmental sectors supporting innovation policies. Water and environment technologies, sustainable energy technologies, marine technologies, and information and communication technologies are the main areas of cooperation being focused on and will be discussed at a workshop scheduled to take place next month in Malta. EuroMedITI aims to develop and empower an outstanding technology and innovation platform in the Mediterranean markets for business-driven services in training, applied research and development, testing and prototyping, incubation and dissemination in the region. This will appeal directly to industries searching for a location to execute applied research and development under
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favorable conditions, and a hub to access the emerging Mediterranean market of approximately 400 million people. An enhanced Euro-Mediterranean dialogue needs to focus much more seriously on climate policy. So far not enough attention has been dedicated to this issue in the Mediterranean. The time has come to start addressing this issue in a more comprehensive manner so that a Euro-Mediterranean strategy can be adopted and implemented as soon as possible. Strengthening such practical policy dialogue mechanisms will add momentum to the Euro-Med Partnership Five-Year Work Program that is currently being implemented and which seeks to integrate our Mediterranean partners closer into the fabric of European society. The Five-Year Euro-Med Work Program (2006-2010) also calls for the ‘launching of a substantial scholarships scheme for university students from Euro-Mediterranean Partner countries and increase mobility grants for higher education staff.’ The educational field is a sector where much more needs to be done. The European Commission, together with its member states, needs to trigger both public and private stakeholders to work hand in hand with a long-term perspective to attract a larger number of Arab students to their shores. This will of course require an updating of procedures for visas, making them more user-friendly for such a category of professionals. Future Euro-Med programs need to
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ensure that people-to-people interaction is at the forefront, especially young people. It is essential that a much larger number of students from the Arab world are given the opportunity to study at EU universities. The Bologna Process must be made functional to them. The same goes for joint EU-Arab research projects. The EU must introduce a package of programs that seeks to tap into the wealth of intelligence in the Euro-Med region via scholarships, seminars and other initiatives. The Euro-Med Education Ministerial meeting which took place in Cairo in June this year served as a catalyst in this regard. When it comes to diplomatic training Malta has already established itself as a regional center of excellence in the Mediterranean through its educational and training institution, the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), where over 400 graduates have been trained in the last 17 years. Since 1996, MEDAC, together with the European Commission and the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has also been responsible for coordinating the Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminars, or, as they have become more commonly known, the Malta Seminars, which are an official confidence-
building mechanism of the Barcelona Process where more than 600 diplomats have had the opportunity to interact. The time has come to emulate such success in other areas such as that of justice and home affairs so that a future generation of professionals from other sectors also have the chance to share a similar experience. In such an exercise one needs to guard against abstract grand designs. The focus needs to be on delivering practical modalities of cooperation. Such an enhanced dialogue will also provide more dynamism and substance to the EMP, ENP, and also sub-regional groupings such as the Med Forum and the 5 + 5. In such an exercise of network building one must also remember the very important role that Mediterranean municipalities can play. If we can manage to establish a truly interactive network between them, this will go a long way toward fostering a closer understanding of one another. The longer-term objective of an enhanced political dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean world should be to foster a more conducive political environment within which a political dialogue that aims toward a convergence of civilizations is achieved.
Dr Stephen C. Calleya is director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, and author of Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations (Routledge, 2005).
EU foreign policy facing Islamists in the Mediterranean The European Union’s common security and foreign policy has confronted numerous international crises during the last couple of decades. Geopolitical upheaval following the fall of the Berlin Wall made Europe a dominant power on the international scene, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Europe during this period was the only actor capable of counterbalancing the diplomatic hegemony of the United States. Co-development and Euro-Mediterranean dialogue were and still are bases for common policies in an increasingly politically unstable environment. At the same time, countries of the South Mediterranean are facing an increase in violent acts against political regimes by opposition forces, especially Islamists. To confirm its diplomatic force in this area, Europe had to unify its foreign policy in order to put forward a common vision for these countries. However, the diplomatic strength of the European Union is not very strong vis-a-vis the omnipotence of foreign national politics facing a phenomenon which menaces the stability of Union nation-states. European Union member states have maintained strong links with their former colonies, and the presence on their territories of strong minorities coming from theses countries allowed Union states to act in a coordinated way while favoring statecentered approaches in some cases. The traditional colonial powers (the UK, France, Belgium, Spain) are not the only countries in the European Union faced with an increase of the Islamist phenomenon on their border lines; other countries are too. The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and even Germany have the same
problems because they are now home to large Muslim communities. Electoral victories by Islamists in North Africa and the Middle East during the 1990s and 2000s surprised European states, which are used to working directly with nationalist secular governments (the power-taking by Hamas after legislative elections in 2006 put European countries in a difficult situation). The emergence of new actors on the scene reduced European countries’ room for maneuver. These European countries continued to support the existing political powers while at the same time advocating a larger democratization of the Mediterranean basin’s political systems. Thus there was a sort of conflict between official speech and real politics. National interest defense and global community became a priority of PESC toward these countries even if that meant that the liberalhumanitarian ideal of the community would be given up. In some cases countries’ interests overtook common interests. The case of France with the Algerian crisis is very significant. The presence of a great minority of people coming from Algeria to French territory (more than 700,000) urged France to encourage the development of a Euro-Mediterranean Union while developing important efforts to let the power issued from the 1992 crisis have control in the security situation. This has recently been synonymous with the pacification of the southern border lines as well as stability in some French areas. The situation is completely different in Egypt, where the United States and Europe, to a lesser degree, urged those in power to be less strict with the opposition in
By Tarek Bouzamondo
general and the Muslim Brothers in particular in order to reaffirm the principles of human rights and democracy. European policy regarding southern countries is different according to situations and geopolitical contexts. It is more open in some situations and stricter in some other cases. The Palestinian case following legislative elections is a great example showing the unity of the European positions. In fact, Europe, while claiming political systems’ liberalization of the area, has difficulty accepting a government legally elected in the occupied territories due to the Islamist risk present in the post-September 11 era. The dualism of European foreign policy speech weakens its position vis-a-vis the other big nations in this area. The uniformity of American or Russian speech, in contrast, makes it more credible even if sometimes it favors political powers in place in this area less. The European Union, in order to optimize the Euro-Mediterranean Union’s chances of success, has to build a strong common foreign policy in a global approach toward international questions more than individual states’ approaches. Tarek Bouzamondo is a research fellow at the Center of Analysis, Comparative Politics, Geostrategics and International Relations, Bordeaux, France.
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United in diversity? The Mediterranean wager By Christos Stylianides
The countries geographically positioned on the southern edge of Europe — Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Italy and Spain — find themselves at a critical juncture regarding the role they are being called upon to play. They stand at the outpost of Europe, within the Mediterranean region and between the West and the East. The question is whether this chance geographic proximity with the rest of the Mediterranean region means that they have common interests and goals that they need to work toward and whether they can positively influence the Mediterranean area bordering Europe. Although a positive answer may seem at first glance an easy one, this is not the case. In recent times we have witnessed the intensification of the so-called ‘clash of civilizations.’ After the horrific incidents of 9/11, which signified a turning point in people’s perception of ‘the enemy,’ a worldwide war on terrorism was declared. Extremist groups announced their own ‘jihad’ against the West. Whether we like it
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or not, events and developments like the war in Iraq and the continued turmoil in the Middle East have had the effect of heating the wider Mediterranean region up to boiling point. European countries like Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Italy and Spain have to assume the responsibility to encourage the coming together of civilizations and to promote the idea that the European slogan ‘United in diversity’ can work successfully outside the European borders as well. The Barcelona Declaration back in 1995 identified the need for a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue, the creation of a zone of shared prosperity through economic and financial
partnerships and the rapprochement between citizens through social, cultural and human partnerships. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership has been active in a lukewarm fashion for more than a decade now and in combination with the European Neighborhood Policy they have made attempts at leaving the European stamp on the Mediterranean region. Two years ago, in the ‘Year of the Mediterranean,’ the Commission issued a five-year work program in which, among other things, it called for the preparation between the Euro-Mediterranean partners of ‘a Code of Conduct on measures to fight terrorism, including its financing aspects as proposed by Arab partners, with the objective to reach an agreement before the end of 2007.’ The recent 11th Euro-
(…) THE MINISTER — (…) It is the will of all the countries of the Mediterranean that there should be closer cooperation; cooperation that will allow for the handling of problems that all of the countries of the Mediterranean have in common. I mentioned the issue of migration, energy cooperation, which was a Greek proposal that we submitted with our Algerian and Italian colleagues. There are specific forms of cooperation that must be promoted, but closer cooperation as proposed by the French president was generally met very positively by all the countries of the southern Mediterranean, and of course by us. We are just starting out. More work will have to be done. All of the countries will submit their own ideas, our own proposals, and I assume that it is one of the basic objectives, particularly now when the next three Presidencies of the European Union – over the next 18 months – will belong to Mediterranean countries, that is, first Portugal, then Slovenia and France itself. (…) Press conference of Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis following the proceedings of the Mediterranean Forum, Rethymnon, Crete, June 1-2, 2007.
Mediterranean Conference which took place in Brussels on June 18 and 19, 2007, focused on economic cooperation, tourism, environmental issues and sustainable development. There is no doubt that the above issues are important to enhance the bond between Euro-Med partners; however, the area concerned is ravaged by political instability and security threats. It is of paramount importance that the attention of the EU is focused more on those aspects that will help the area exit the current wave of instability before it becomes a permanent one. The European Union had to focus on its own internal political problems in the past few years, dealing mainly with enlargement, the failure of the European Constitution and the standstill as far as further European integration is concerned. These factors have prevented Europe from playing a decisive role within the Mediterranean, or any other external region for that matter. Now, it is high time that European leaders realized that the problems existing in our immediate backyard will
eventually have an effect on our own household. It is especially in the interest of the European countries positioned within the Mediterranean region to take the initiative. All of them are facing great challenges with extremely high numbers of illegal immigrants in their territories, most of whom are claiming asylum on political grounds. A common and coherent immigration policy is of paramount importance. The stability and security of the region is at stake. Coordinated efforts need to be initiated in order to ensure that Europe remains unaffected and secure. The only way to achieve that is by promoting peace and stability within the region. Countries such as Greece and Cyprus, which have cultivated traditionally good relations with both Israel and the Arab nations, need to
step up to the challenge. In the recent Lebanon crisis, Cyprus played an important role by receiving thousands of civilians, offering them a safe haven from the war. It would of course have been better if the countries in the region had managed to proactively intervene via diplomatic means to end the conflict sooner. The countries of the Mediterranean basin have common interests, they need to cooperate, they need to fight against terrorism together, and they need to promote peace, stability and security in order to ensure the prosperity of the Mediterranean region. Multicultural communities can coexist in peace. This is the message to be spread throughout the rest of the world. It is a challenging but necessary task which calls for coordinated and united efforts.
Christos Stylianides (DISY) is a member of Cyprus Parliament, Democratic Rally Party. Cypriot parliament website: www.parliament.cy
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What lies ahead? The adoption of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 marked a turning point in relations between the EU and its neighbors on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. In 2007, the creation of an area of shared prosperity continues to be a central objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Being in the same geographic region, the Mediterranean countries face numerous common challenges. In addition to the issues of the past, new issues have now emerged, a fact that obviously renders the need for collaboration among the states of the region more imperative than ever. Combating international terrorism, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the promotion of democracy and equal opportunities for development, the protection of the natural environment, the management of illegal migration, the securing of energy supplies — all these constitute the major expressions of the new globalized reality. Their management calls for political extroversion and cooperation among the states at a bilateral and multilateral level, especially in the context of regional cooperation. In this new setting of challenges, as well as opportunities, of the 21st century, the establishment of institutionalized channels of dialogue and cooperation is the only means to guarantee a
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By Yannis Valinakis
common prosperous future for the countries of the region. In other words, we ought to face jointly, rather than separately, the opportunities as well as the insecurities of this new environment. Today, the EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries in the trade of both goods and services. This is a mutually beneficial partnership. More than 50 percent of the region’s trade is with the EU, and for some countries the Union represents the destination of more than 70 percent of their exports. Mediterranean partners are progressively opening their markets, thus allowing for an increase in EU exports. Europe is the largest direct foreign investor and the EU is the region’s largest provider of financial assistance and funding, with nearly 3 billion euros per year in loans and grants. For Greece, the region of the Mediterranean is not simply our direct geographic environment but a region of immediate priority. It is a common space of activity and development of friendly relations and multifaceted collaborations. And this is exactly what a comprehensive strategy such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) serves. It is very important that for the first time at the EU level we have a comprehensive strategy and policy frame-
work toward the bordering states of the Union. The ENP was promoted simultaneously with the enlargement of the Union in May 2004, in order to avoid the creation of new bisector lines with the neighboring countries and with the aim of promoting economic growth, political stability and better governance in the Union’s immediate environment. It clearly reflects the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, political dialogue, cooperation and the use of economic tools to tackle the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, deprivation, human rights abuses, corruption and bad governance. Building on the achievements of the Barcelona Process, and based on the principle of co-ownership and differentiation, the ENP should reinforce existing forms of cooperation within the Euro-Med framework with the objective of offering partners a stake in the EU internal market and the possibility to participate in EU programs and policies on the basis of the fulfillment of jointly agreed priorities, reflecting shared values and joint policy objectives. It will enhance the Barcelona Process and bring it forward, also in its regional dimension, provided that care is taken to en-
sure that all partners are advancing toward compatible overall objectives. Greece has demonstrated a special interest in the further development of the ENP and supported the latter’s geographic cohesion as well as the maintenance of balance between its ‘Eastern’ and ‘Southern’ legs. During the European Council of December 2006 our country vigorously supported the EU Commission’s proposal to reinforce the ENP and to adopt a new financing mechanism (the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, active since January 2007), which would allocate more resources than the older programs TACIS and MEDA and promote new forms of cooperation. The March 2007 General Affairs Council opened new prospects with its decision on the participation of the partners of the ENP in Community programs and institutions. In the framework of the renewed ENP I would like to highlight the new dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which, in a few months, will complete 12 years of life. At the Barcelona Conference of 2005 we placed the bases of the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on the following axes:
a. Political cooperation, aiming at the transformation of the Mediterranean basin into a space of peace and stability with particular reference to human rights, good-neighborly relations etc. b. Economic cooperation, aiming at the establishment of a free trade zone by the year 2010, with emphasis on rural and industrial products. c. Social and cultural cooperation, aiming at communication at a civil society level. This collaboration includes, among others, issues concerning the environment, health, transport, work, tourism, immigration etc. Apart from the fact that, henceforth, these three sectors of cooperation will be included in an integrated policy framework (ENP), it should be noted that they are not and cannot be autonomous. On the contrary, these three sectors are inextricably linked, as prosperity cannot be ensured without peace and stability, and the latter cannot be generated without the rapprochement of societies and cultures. Our collaboration with our partners in the Mediterranean constitutes a priority for the EU for a number of issues, most prominent of which is that of illegal immigration. In the frame of the overall approach of the EU toward immigration, and with particular em-
phasis on the Mediterranean and Africa, as was adopted in the conclusions of the European Councils of December 2005 and 2006, we stressed the need for the reinforcement and the intensification of cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. Indeed, there is a need for intensified cooperation that addresses the root causes as well as negative effects of illegal migration, including transit migration. This cooperation should involve all aspects of illegal migration, such as the negotiation and/or implementation of readmission agreements, the fight against human-trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal migration, border management and migration-related capacity building. Full commitment to the realization of all the goals in the Barcelona Declaration, namely turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, strengthening democracy and respect for human rights, securing a balanced economic and social development, adopting measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, will lead to the creation of a structure of cooperation and partnership-building measures. Professor Yannis Valinakis is deputy minister for foreign affairs of the Hellenic Republic. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: www.mfa.gr
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Cleaning up the Med
EU pushes campaign to phase out Mediterranean pollution by 2020 By Harry van Versendaal
Recent news from Marrakech must have warmed the hearts of environmentalists around the Mediterranean. Environment officials and experts from the European Union and its southeastern neighbors met in the Moroccan capital to push ahead with the bloc’s ambitious Horizon 2020 project. The EU’s much-hyped cleanup blueprint adopted by Euro-Med leaders in Barcelona in 2005 and further elaborated in the follow-up Cairo summit last year, aims to thwart the hot spots of pollution in the fragile Mediterranean basin by 2020. There is no time to waste. The Mediterranean marine ecosystem is deteriorating fast and experts warn that the damage could be irreversible. ‘The assumption that damage is always reversible is often a false one,’ Andrew Murphy of the Horizon 2020 initiative said in an interview with The bridge. ‘In climate change, for example, we seek to limit the global temperature increase to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, not because there won’t be changes — there will — but because beyond two
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degrees the changes may well be irreversible. Many of the Mediterranean problems may well turn out to be irreversible if we let them go too far,’ he added. Soaring population numbers — more than 400 million people live around the Mediterranean while some 175 million tourists visit the region each year — and economic development have put unprecedented pressure on this enclosed sea. On current projections, 50 percent of the Mediterranean coastline will be built up by 2025. Industrial emissions, municipal waste and urban waste water are said to be responsible for up to 80 percent of pollution in the Mediterranean. According to the Mediterranean Action Plan of the UN’s En-
vironment Program (UNEP/MAP), millions of tons of pollutants are discharged into the basin every year as a result of industrial activities near the coasts. The main culprits, according to the UN report released last year, are oil refineries, the metal industry, industrial farming, fertilizer manufacturing, the chemical and paper industries and sewage treatment. The good news is that the response has been far from laconic. Umpteen agencies busy themselves monitoring and campaigning for the environment and piles of agreements have been signed to protect the basin. The bad news is that results so far leave a lot to be desired. ‘While the environmental challenges are well known and solutions exist, the effectiveness of international action to date has been hampered by lack of finance, the low political priority given to environmental protection in many countries, limited public awareness and weak institutional
(…) THE MINISTER — (…) Another important dimension is the neighborhood policy, particularly with our Mediterranean partners. We have to see how we can set up a genuine Mediterranean Union, building on the already existing Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, giving it a higher political profile. Paradoxically, in the globalized world all the major regions are visible: America, Europe, Asia and Africa — even though Africa is failing to keep up and being neglected, there is an international will not to leave Africa by the wayside, expressed inter alia in the G8 meetings. But there’s one region people never speak about despite it being a source of conflicts and destabilization and one where there’s very little cooperation: the Mediterranean. It’s important for the Mediterranean to have a far higher political profile in the globalized world, and this is why we’re keen to promote the Mediterranean Union project. (…) Interview given by Jean-Pierre Jouyet, French minister of state responsible for European Affairs, to France Culture (excerpts), Paris, June 30, 2007.
cooperation. This is why it is more important than ever to target our resources and coordinate between the various donor organizations,’ Murphy said. Prompted by allegations of costly duplication and overlaps, the EU has made an effort to pull together the main cleanup campaigns in the region. In a bid to appease early concerns among UN officials wary of Brussels flexing its muscle in MAP territory, EU officials are not tired of stressing MAP’s role as a key partner in the new project. To prove their point, they have included MSSD, the UN agency’s sustainability-oriented strategy for the Mediterranean environment, into Horizon 2020. MAP officials sound convinced. ‘The work that we have done previously is coming to good use,’ said Paul Mifsud, MAP coordinator in Athens. In fact, MAP is eager to do more. It recently announced a concurrent plan to curb transboundary pollution in the basin. Some analysts fear that the plethora of campaigns defeat the purpose but UN officials are confident that MAP’s GEF project by no means undermines Horizon 2020.
‘The advantage is that we are involved in both initiatives so we make sure that this does not happen. It is in our interest that there is no duplication,’ Mifsud stressed. EU soft power The EU’s occasional meetings with its southeastern neighbors, dubbed in Brussels’s notoriously technocratic lingo the Barcelona Process, were launched in 1995 in a bid to exercise the bloc’s much-vaunted soft power beyond the land mass of EUhopefuls. The idea was to shake up the volatile and largely undemocratic Muslim states of North Africa and the Middle East by exporting the continent’s political and economic norms. The program also came with an overambitious objective to set up a free trade area by 2010. True to form, the EU has failed to make any major economic or political breakthrough but the not-so-loaded environment issue has occasionally brought perennial foes to the same table. The pro-
gram currently links all EU members with 10 partners around the Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and, finally, Turkey — the only country in the EU’s waiting room. The Euro-Med Program runs parallel to the EU’s Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Launched three years ago, the ENP is also a carrot-driven program encompassing the nations of the Mediterranean as well as the southern Caucasus and Eastern Europe. It offers financial and technical assistance as well as gradual access to the single market in return for EU-minded reforms. More than 12 billion euros will go to these countries by 2013, 32 percent up in real terms over the first budget phase. The bulk of the money for Horizon 2020 will come from the ENP. The EU must coax rather than lecture. And without the promise of membership, it’s hard to make the whole thing take off. If environmental sensitivity has failed to
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prod national governments into taking measures, the sobering cost of inaction may perhaps do the trick. The World Bank has warned that the economic fallout of coastal zone pollution in the Mediterranean Sea ranges between 2 and 8 percent of the countries’ gross domestic product. ‘We need to move away from the mindset in some quarters that ignores the costs of environmental damage and only sees protection from that damage as an expensive luxury that can wait until a country is wealthy enough to pay for it. In reality, environmental damage is a deadweight slowing the economic development of partner countries,’ Murphy said. The World Bank predicts that investments to curb the cost of pollution by 35 percent in Egypt would yield economic returns of more than 20 percent over the next 20 years. To be sure, footing the bill for depollution projects requires deep pockets. ‘For the four countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, we estimated that in the period 2007-2020 total investments in sanitation and treatment required to cut in half production from municipal waste water are in the range of US$700 million to $1 billion pear year,’ Inger Andersen of the World Bank told the
Cairo meeting. The amount is more than twice the average budget that these countries have spent on similar projects over the previous decade. Footing the bill The EU is eyeing international financial institutions for those precious wads of cash to fund its activities. The European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World Bank are lining their pockets, bringing their project portfolios under Horizon 2020. For its part, the European Commission has tried to lure the national governments, often skeptical of such pay-now-benefit-later plans, by softening the loans. The Marrakech summit made it known that the EIB and MED POL, a MAP component grappling with land-based pollution, have joined hands to identify bankable projects in target countries. Experts have already been sent to inspect the top hot spots in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria but environmentalists are troubled over the banks’ reluctance to finance projects under the 25-million-euro threshold. A meeting in Athens in October will discuss
ways to enhance involvement of private investors in the program. Overall, NGOs such as WWF and Friends of the Earth have welcomed Horizon 2020 but stress that more needs to be done. Detractors point out that key challenges such as acute urbanization and desertification, a pressing problem in countries like Algeria and Tunisia, have disappeared from the EU’s radar screen. ‘It’s a welcome initiative but still in the making. We do have our reservations. Our main concerns have been addressed but whether this translates into eventual allocated funds remains to be seen,’ said Anastasia Roniotes of the Athens-based Mediterranean Information Office (MIOECSDE). There are worse combinations than skepticism and hope.
Harry van Versendaal is a journalist based in Athens.
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Trade relations: Keeping a record of history The interest of the European Union in the South Mediterranean countries (SMCs) dates back to the time of its inception.1 Its contractual relations with the SMCs started in 1961 and 1963 by the signing of the accords of Athens and Ankara respectively, which mainly addressed the formation of customs unions with both Greece and Turkey. Up to 1975, the European Community (EC) continued signing up a series of customs union (CU), free trade area (FTA) and preferential trade agreements with other SMCs. No harmonization was achieved between the contents of such agreements, and they were rather confined to trade matters. Since 1975 the EC has always tried to harmonize the heterogeneity of its prevailing agreements with the Mediterranean countries by adopting a global policy toward them. This included the accession of three Mediterranean countries, including Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1973 an FTA agreement was signed with Turkey, followed in 1975 by one with Israel. A set of association agreements was signed in 1976 with Maghreb countries including Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and in 1977 with Mashriq countries including Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. This last set of 1. Based on Ahmed F. Ghoneim, and Hanaa Kheir-ElDin (2006), ‘Trade Relations Between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean Countries: Prospects for Export Based on the Enlargement of the European Union, the New Neighborhood Policy and the Barcelona Process’ in Sustainable Development and Adjustment in the Mediterranean Countries Following the EU Enlargement (Franco Praussello, editor), Franco Angeli - Milan, 2006.
By Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim
association agreements was characterized by certain features where they were of unlimited duration, providing trade concessions for exports of the aforementioned Maghreb and Mashriq countries in the EC market with duty-free access for most of the industrial products and preferences for agricultural products, and reciprocal treatment of EC exports in the SMCs was not required. Moreover, there was financial assistance provided by the EC to SMCs through financial protocols which accompanied the association agreements. The EC SMCs association agreements reflected in many cases historical ties such as those stemming from French links with Morocco and Algeria or a desire to bind the SMCs into the region of EC influence, while simultaneously managing its trade and controlling the pressure of heavy immigration into the EC. The agreements also helped to diffuse criticism over market access, especially for the agricultural imports in which EC concessions were made. However, the agreements remained heterogeneous and did not fulfill their main intended objectives where they fell short of controlling illegal migration moves, did not
help in improving the economic performance of SMCs and did not achieve the expected development of exports from SMCs into the EC. Aid provided through financial protocols remained ineffective. Moreover, pressures from certain EU countries to increase aid allocated for Central and Eastern European countries created a counter-type of pressure from Spain, Italy and France to increase aid allocated for SMCs. This resulted in a new policy adopted by the EU in the 1990s. Adoption of the New Mediterranean Policy heralded an era where aid was stepped up, a new aid device was put into force (MEDA), and concessions for agricultural SMCs’ exports increased. Barcelona and the association agreements Following the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference (November 27-28), the EU decided to enter with the SMCs into a new type of relationship where association agreements were signed. The main two features of such association agreements
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included the addition of new aspects (political, social security, human and cultural) to the trade and financial aspects, and having a mutual type of relationship in the trade relations replacing the one-way concessional agreements that used to prevail. In general the quantitative assessments of the impact of the association agreements on the welfare gains of SMCs were highly modest. The expected results are manifested by the modest increase in the SMCs exports’ share to the EU out of total exports whose agreements entered into force. It is premature to estimate the relative impact of the association agreements on the direction and magnitude of trade from the SMCs. We do not expect a surge in EU exports’ percentage to total exports as a result of the association agreements because the percentage is already high in the case of Morocco and Tunisia. We might expect an increase in the case of Egypt and Lebanon as their exports are more geographically diversified than Tunisia’s and Morocco’s and hence the EU might offer better market access and increase the trade relations after full implementation of the agreement. We do not expect the same to happen with Jordan, which has a biased geographical trade orientation with the US and has signed an FTA agreement with the US and hence it is likely that the options of opening up new markets for its products are equal in the two largest worldwide markets. The same is likely to happen, though to a lesser extent, in the
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rules and standards is not likely to result in enhanced trade relations. case of Morocco, which signed an FTA agreement with the US. The less likely possibility of diverting trade from the EU to the US is a result of the strong historical bonds tying Morocco to the EU, geographical proximity and language spillovers (French-speaking) and hence it is unlikely that the Moroccan FTA agreement with the US (which carries political motivations) might significantly divert trade away from the EU to the US. The association agreements were criticized for being shallow, where they were confined to ‘border measures’ and did not deal with ‘behind the border aspects’ associated with deep integration. The deep integration aspects are considered an important element of the success of regional trade agreements. The reason is that tariffs in general do not play the role they used to play in acting as a protection measure. The role of aspects of deep integration as standards is rather more important. Hence, a regional trade agreement that does not deal with aspects of deep integration as harmonization of trade and investment
The EU enlargement process The enlargement process of the EU from 15 to 27 members is not likely to affect the trade patterns between EU and SMCs in the short run due to several factors, including the relatively small size of the newly acceding countries and the lack of similarity among SMCs’ exports and those of the newly acceding countries. However, the prospects of trade relations in the long run are likely to change if we take the financial variable into account (whether in terms of financial aid or FDI). Financial resources directed to the newly acceding countries by and large exceed those directed to SMCs. As a result the institutional setup and different aspects of competitive advantage are likely to be further enhanced in newly acceding countries when compared to SMCs. Hence, despite the fact that the enlargement process in the short run might not be negatively affecting the SMCs, the prospects for the future differ and tilt toward diverting trade as a consequence of diversion of financial flows away from SMCs to the newly acceding countries.
The proposal of France for the establishment of a Mediterranean Union has the positive element that it brings the two sides of the Mediterranean closer together, so that we may all work more intensively at a series of new sectors in order to further this collaboration. Many are regarding France’s proposal as a substitute for the process of Turkey’s accession negotiations. For us there is no other view beyond our firm resolve that the process of Turkey’s accession negotiations is measured against the resolutions of the European Union, that is to say, through a series of priorities and criteria that Turkey has to comply with. Complete compliance means also complete admission. Contribution by Greece’s Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Valinakis to the Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the eight Mediterranean member states of the EU, held in Athens, July 6, 2007.
European Neighborhood Policy In 2003 the EU announced that it would adopt a new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to be implemented in 2007. The ENP is to replace all regional policies of the EU toward its neighbors with the ultimate aim of securing its enlargement process. The main idea based on the European Commission announcements is to surround the EU with a ring of friends which, based on their own pace and desire when getting closer to EU rules and regulations, are likely to be given a stake in the EU internal market. The ENP is not likely to bring much to the SMCs. The reason is that it does not add much to the Barcelona Process and has no strong enforcing mechanism that can push forward the deep integration aspects. Nobody, including the European Commission, is able to figure out what is meant by ‘stake’ in the market. Moreover, and as stated by the communication of the European Commission (2004), ‘in the south, the ENP will also encourage the participants to reap the full benefits of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), to promote infrastructure interconnections and
networks, in particular energy, and to develop new forms of cooperation with their neighbors. The ENP will contribute to develop further regional integration, building on the achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, notably in the area of trade. It will reinforce efforts to meet the objectives of the European security strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.’ All such issues have been previously mentioned in Barcelona Process; besides they are vague targets that include anything and everything. Some experts view that the ENP is rather a method to deepen the existing association agreements. Given the criticisms against the association agreements of their shallowness, the ENP offers the SMCs an opportunity to deepen their relationship with the EU based on an a la carte approach. However, we believe that the association agreements contained the necessary provisions for such deep integration but were rather postponed to the future or worded vaguely. The ENP has an advantage of making such issues precise based on the action plans agreed upon jointly between the EU and the neighborhood
countries. Nevertheless, what remains to be decided is the implementation method or answering the ‘how’ question. We believe that the EU enlargement process has established a necessary reservoir of experience to enable it to handle each case following its own specific nature. Reviewing the EU documents shows that the vague wording of cooperation and harmonization in the field of customs and technical regulations still prevail. There has been emphasis on progressivity, however what worries us is that the ENP is just repeating the same provisions of the association agreements without any value added. To sum up, it seems that the EU is still discovering the optimal way to deal with the SMCs. The ‘trial and error’ approach adopted so far by the EU in its relations with the SMCs is still ongoing. What is needed is a more precise type of relationship that includes clear incentives and acts as catalyst for economic and political reforms in SMCs.
Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim is associate professor of economics in the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University. Communication: aghoneim@gmx.de
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Security concerns With violent conflicts going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Mediterranean area may look relatively peaceful. Yet while North Africa has somehow stabilized with respect to the 1990s — when it suffered strongly from religious radicalism and terrorism — things have worsened and conflict is spreading in the Levant, namely in Palestine and Lebanon, with obvious repercussions in the neighborhood, including in Egypt. Furthermore, Turkey could be affected by Iraq’s trends toward disintegration. The internecine conflicts unleashed by the US-led intervention in Iraq have set in motion two developments that put in danger not only the Gulf but also the Middle East as a whole and the Mediterranean in particular. One such development is the emergence in Iraq of an Arab state led by a Shia majority — no doubt an historical development on the Middle Eastern stage. The other development is the consolidation of a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. The instability emanating from these two factors may be more or less intense, depending on whether Iraq splits, whether a rump Iraq of sorts prevails or whether the country remains as a weak confederation. In any case, these two developments will not fail to generate negative consequences
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By Roberto Aliboni
and, in fact, they are already doing so. In the eyes of the conservative and authoritarian Sunni Arab regimes, the emergence of a Shia government majority in Iraq links up with Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. King Abdullah of Jordan has talked of a Shia ‘crescent’ expanding throughout the Middle East. Beyond historical and sectarian controversies, this development is perceived by the regimes as an emerging opposition between revolutionary Shias and conservative Sunnis. In fact, the revolutionary Shias are taking up the banners that used to mobilize the Arab masses — the struggle against Israel and the one against the new Western crusaders. This contributes to discrediting the regimes domestically and strengthening their (mostly religious) opposition and to fostering instability in the area. This is all highly destabilizing for them.
What is significant from the point of view of Mediterranean security is that the Shia-Sunni opposition, generally limited to the Gulf, is now spreading over the whole of the Middle East and is affecting in particular the Levant — Lebanon, as well as Palestine and Syria. Consequently, it is moving closer to and increasingly concerns European security. Although the Shia-Sunni divide is a new factor of instability in the Mediterranean, it affects longstanding indigenous conflicts there, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regardless of the revolutionary winds blowing from the Gulf, after the failure in 2000 of the attempt made in Camp David to solve it, the Israeli-Palestinian question has practically reverted back to square one. Public opinion in Europe may be convinced that their governments are working toward a solution via the ‘roadmap’ and the Quartet, but in actual fact the Quartet is subservient to the United States and the Bush administration decided upon its inception that that question was not a priority. Today the Quartet is irrelevant, while political developments in both Israel and Palestine have led the two countries to a dead end.
(…) Speaking during a press briefing, Sarkozy said he has held ‘long hours of discussions’ with his Algerian host on bilateral partnership cooperation, and also on the Mediterranean Union plan, which he said was aimed at making the Mediterranean region ‘a sea of peace and security,’ and hoped this project will be achieved in 2008, during a Mediterranean summit to be held that year. (…) Source: People’s Daily Online, Xinhua, China, July 10, 2007.
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has worsened independently of events in the Gulf, yet these events make the conflict even more impervious. All in all, while we continue to talk about a ‘two-state’ solution, the Palestinian, Arab and Muslim publics are increasingly returning to the idea of suppressing the Zionist state. The influence coming from the Gulf is only strengthening this trend. To be honest, the Sunni regimes are making efforts to get out of this trap. The Arab League has revived the 2002 Beirut plan which recognizes Israel if it accepts a reasonable and just solution to the Palestinian question. Its leadership is weak, though, and so is that of Israel. Moreover, the West is not supporting the initiative and seems unable and unwilling to intervene. Alongside these conflicts in the Levant, the current crisis in the Iraqi state could involve Turkey because of the Kurds. The latter are working toward an institutional and political situation in which, regardless of what happens to the Iraqi state, they will — unlike in the past — be the masters of their own destiny. This is
perceived as a serious risk for national security by Turkish actors and, sooner or later, could trigger a conflict. The emerging domestic tension between Islamists and Republicans in Turkey could facilitate a conflict with the Iraqi Kurds, if the latter were to come to be regarded as instrumental to solving or influencing the domestic tension. A conflict between Turkey and the Kurds — that is the direct involvement of Turkey in the Middle Eastern arc of crisis — would put Turkey-EU relations into serious danger and broadly affect European security. In fact, the Middle East’s conflicts would be brought much closer to Europe (ironically, not because of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU, but because of Turkey’s involvement in the regional conflicts). In conclusion, security concerns in the Mediterranean are growing. Negative in-
fluences are coming from the Gulf and these influences are reviving and reinforcing longstanding indigenous conflicts in the Levant. The responses coming from European countries and the EU are not very effective. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has failed to trigger any regional political solidarity. The new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is not even aimed at such a target. However, both the Partnership and the ENP could provide an important background, were a political strategy set in motion by the Europeans. This strategy is lacking for the moment and, in fact, the problem lies less with the weaknesses of the Partnership or the ENP than with those of national and EU foreign and security policies. Roberto Aliboni is vice president of the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) and head of the institute’s Program on the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Italian International Affairs Institute website: www.iai.it
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The Iraq war’s impact on the wider Mideast It goes without saying that the last Iraq war has already had a significant impact on the wider Middle East, however broadly defined a concept that might be. The most important consequence is, of course, the expectation that US forces will remain in Iraq for a prolonged and undetermined period of time. It is true that there is discussion on US troop withdrawal, but even the most vociferous supporters of that would argue it would be irresponsible for the US to do so too quickly, at least not before attaining a reasonably sound security situation and demonstrated standalone competence in the Iraqi military. Hence, any current expectations for ‘withdrawal’ would be rather a drawdown from over 150,000 to a remaining 30,000 to 50,000 US troops in Iraq. Such a scenario would still leave the US as the most important and efficient fighting force in the country, which would be entrenched together with vast administrative and logistics support in impenetrable compounds (‘super bases’). Such a ‘permanent’ force will reinforce the already impressive US naval presence in the Persian Gulf and fuel American resolve to remain the region’s sole security provider. Iran would thus be even more isolated than at present. Tehran’s initial joy over the US being bogged down in Iraq has given way to concern for two reasons: Firstly, Tehran cannot appreciate that the US is now firmly engaged in two of its neighboring countries (Afghanistan and Iraq); and, secondly, the question remains as to what would happen if the US did indeed leave Iraq one day. Both Tehran and Washington surely realize:
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a. That their respective strategic objectives are unlikely to materialize; b. The US will continue to dominate the Gulf region militarily; and c. The former’s Islamic regime will remain in power — even if subjected to air strikes or more serious and effective sanctions. On the other hand, Iran and the US share many objectives in Iraq, including the survival and stabilization of the Iraqi government. Thus it is imperative that the US and Iran agree to support equilibrium inside Iraq, as well as across the region. Nonetheless, we dare to predict that there would be no formal restoration of relations, but rather some kind of unwritten agreements in order to avoid escalation of existing tensions. That still leaves key and troubling regional aspects for mutual consideration: the ShiaSunni divide; regional security and democratization; and the Kurdish issue. Iran and Saudi Arabia used the ShiaSunni divide for the end of their own political and ideological struggles for leadership in the Islamic world. The years after the Islamic Revolution were marked by a perceived confrontation between ‘revolutionary’ Shiites led by Iran and ‘reactionary’ Sunnis under Saudi leadership. However, both sides — Iran and Saudi Arabia — turned their focus to play confessional cards
By Dr Walter Posch
against their respective minorities, i.e. Shiites in Saudi Arabia and Sunnis in Iran. Direct Shia-Sunni sectarian strife continued only in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following the US-led invasion of Iraq and the later electoral victory of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, the Shia-Sunni confrontation took on a new quality. Firstly, as seen from the perspective of the Arab world, Iraq then became a de facto Shiite country that has politically moved close to Iran, i.e. to the periphery of the Islamic world. Previously, it was seen as a Sunni-dominated but secular country located at the heart of the Arab world. Secondly, the fact that Iraq’s new government was elected democratically against all odds was a shock to Arab autocrats, as it possibly heralded a wider trend toward democratization in the Gulf states and beyond. With allies being elected in Iraq (2005), brothers being the most efficient political force in Lebanon, and friends having won the Palestinian elections in 2006, Tehran rightfully could be satisfied. However, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and Western shock over the victory of Hamas in Palestine allowed Saudi diplomacy to isolate Iran in the Muslim world by instigating fears of a Shiite ‘crescent.’ This political maneuver is deeply rooted in the competitive history of Saudi-Iranian
(…) THE PRESIDENT — (…) The in-depth development of our bilateral relations with each of our partners in the South and building of the Mediterranean Union are two complementary initiatives. The Mediterranean area is the one in which we enjoy the second strongest ties of solidarity, after Europe, and in fact the two widely overlap. The prosperity, stability and security of the two Mediterranean shores are interdependent. Our histories, our cultural lives, our societies are mutually permeated. Our common sea is also a major ecological challenge. Together, we can do more to develop our trade and cultural and human exchanges to prevent crises and improve the management of those already existing or which break out. (…). Visit to the Maghreb — Interview given by Nicolas Sarkozy, president of the French Republic, to the Algerian El Watan and El Khabar newspapers (excerpt), Paris, July 10, 2007.
relations, and this latest round has been won by the Saudis. However, the situation on the ground in Iraq is more dramatic and gives immediate reason for concern. The breakdown of Iraqi society has unleashed a wave of sectarian violence that, if it should one day break into open civil war, would draw Saudi Arabia and Iran into a proxy war, a crisis both sides have been keen to avoid. Even more alarming is evidence that groups related to al-Qaida or its networks have found fertile ground in Iraq where they train and retrain fighters. Tactics and techniques used first in Iraq have already found their way into Afghanistan, for instance. It is not improbable that one will find these same fighters and techniques moving toward the shores of the Indian Ocean, across Africa, including the Maghreb, Kashmir, the Caucasus and Europe. In other words, the US-led invasion of Iraq directly links to European insecurity. Terrorists are only one side of this threat, although admittedly the most serious one. Iraq’s general insecurity and the decomposition of its society have created a unique kind of war economy and social dysfunctions typical of failed states. In this case, they may very well lead toward the breakdown of the whole region. All kinds of smuggling (including narcotics, weapons and women) and other contraband activities have largely replaced ordinary economic activities. Needless to say, in such a situation, even more
refugees make their way into neighboring states (with the exception of Turkey which has sealed its borders), depriving Iraq of many of its brightest and most educated citizens and imposing added social and security related pressure on its neighbors, especially Jordan but also Syria. In case of an — unlikely — military attack on Iran, the nightmare of a totally destabilized arc reaching from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean could come true. Hence there would not only be a failed state, but a failed region. Another state though is anxious to come into being: Kurdistan, which is now much more than what was the Kurdish autonomous region within Iraq until 2003. Most observers point to the fact that such a state would not be viable. Turkey especially, but also Syria and Iran, would oppose it. This is certainly true. Turkey managed to closely cooperate with Iran and Syria against the resurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It is, however, unlikely that Turkey would invade Kurdish territories in northern Iraq because the risks are still too high and the outcome too uncertain. Besides, during the last four years, Turkey has formed reliable alliances with Syria and Iran, but its relations with the US have cooled dramatically over Iraq, and Turkey has not made any new friends where it needed them most: among Iraqi Arabs. That said, Turkey is now alone when confronting the two main Kurdish parties in Iraq, which today, unlike under the regime of Saddam Hussein, have their backs freed from any potential threat from Baghdad and therefore act with much self-confidence. The extent of this self-confidence can be seen
with the question of the oil-rich, former Turkmen city of Kirkuk, for which the Kurds have scheduled a referendum in November 2007. A sovereign Kurdistan would be certainly viable with Kirkuk even if it met with Turkish and Syrian opposition. However, a referendum would be problematic because it would clearly result in ‘losers,’ namely the Arabs and Iraq as a unified nation state, and ‘winners,’ namely the Kurds. Further insecurity would be realized as Iraqi Arabs and Turkmens would certainly resist Kurdish rule. That said, calls for Kosovo independence certainly fan Kurdish aspirations for their own state. To sum up, no end to Iraqi insurgency is in sight four years after US military intervention. Thus, the US will remain a strategic actor in the region, which makes it advisable to reach some kind of understanding with Iran while at the same time remaining the main security provider for Arab states in the Gulf. We do not see fulfillment of this latter objective dependent directly on success in Iraq. It is imperative, however, to consider the impact of Iraq risks at every level in the context of the wider Middle East, where failures will reverberate. Likewise, a coherent regional policy will reinforce the support required to foster stability in Iraq.
Dr Walter Posch is a senior research fellow with the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. EU Institute for Security Studies website: www.iss-eu.org
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Greece in search of a SE During the second half of the 20th century the Eastern Mediterranean was the stage of a chain of hot wars — between Israel and its Arab neighbors — as well as a cold war, plus several crises between Greece and Turkey. Since 1999, however, a drastic change in the logic of the conflict between the latter two has occurred and, as a result, they seem much better off today in terms of bilateral relations than they were seven years ago and/or over the course of their three-decade conflict. The new era in Greek-Turkish relations was ushered in mainly due to a visionary strategy that was inspired and implemented by the former Greek government of Costas Simitis and is being continued — albeit with particular changes and/or ‘refinements’ — under the current leadership of Costas Karamanlis. Following the demands of globalization, the need for domestic modernization and reform and, mainly, common sense, the Greek government in the mid-1990s opted for a medium- and long-term policy endeavoring to anchor Turkey in the European integration system, where European norms of behavior and certain European-style rules of the game had to be followed by Turkey. This strategy reached its climax at the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999 when the bloc acknowledged the linkage between Turkey’s EU orientation, the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict over Aegean issues, and the end of Turkey’s occu-
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By Panayotis J. Tsakonas
pation of the northern part of Cyprus. Greece thus managed to secure the issues of both Cyprus and the Aegean within the context of the European Union — where Greece enjoyed a comparative advantage vis-a-vis an aspiring member state — and ensured that both issues remained closely linked to Turkey’s European accession path. The first fruitful results of Greece’s strategy came shortly after: In December 2002, at the EU summit in Copenhagen, Cyprus was admitted to the EU, although its political problem remained unresolved with Nicosia remaining the last divided capital in Europe. Interestingly, in March 2004 the thorniest and most ambivalent issue Greece’s newly elected conservative government had to deal with was the rejection of the United Nations secretary-general’s plan by the Greek-Cypriot community in the referendum that took place on Cyprus in April 2004 regarding the reunification of the island. The half-hearted position adopted by Prime Minister Karamanlis regarding the ability of European integration to eventually restore certain provisions of the plan detrimental to the Greek-Cypriot side proved unable to convince the majority of Greek Cypriots to vote in favor of what was known as the ‘Annan Plan.’ The fact that 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected it while 64 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor negatively affected — if not delegitimized — the Greek strategy. Indeed, Turkey’s ability to secure EU membership no longer hinged on
its stance regarding the Cyprus issue, as the international community gave the Turkish government full credit for its sincere and successful efforts to neutralize and finally replace the intransigent Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in order for the Turkish-Cypriot community to support the Annan Plan for the reunification of the island. By implication, and viewed from a purely instrumental logic, Greece also lost much of the leverage it had possessed to check Turkey’s European path through its stance on the Cyprus issue. The lack of success in resolving the Cyprus problem in April 2004 could have had negative consequences for Greek-Turkish relations. Most importantly, it could have made a compromise deal between Greece and Turkey on ‘high politics’ in the Aegean before the end of 2004 an issue of high political risk for the newly elected Greek government. Indeed, faced with a Greek public educated to the uncompromising position that besides the delimitation of the continental shelf all other issues are considered as unilateral Turkish claims, it is hard to think of a Greek government willing to deal with the political cost entailed in any resolution agreement with Turkey. In the aftermath of the Cyprus referenda, Karamanlis’s government was not hesitant to decouple the Cyprus issue and GreekTurkish relations by stating that Greece would not consider resolution of the Cyprus
Mediterranean strategy issue to be a precondition for Turkey’s accession to the European Union. In other words, Greece would continue to support Turkey’s EU accession process even if Greek-Turkish differences were not resolved by the Helsinki timetable, which had set December 2004 as a deadline for the resolution of the conflict either through an agreement between the disputants or via the compulsory reference of the Greek-Turkish dispute to the International Court of Justice. The decoupling of the resolution of the Cyprus issue and that of the Greek-Turkish dispute from Turkey’s accession to the EU was further enhanced by the December 2004 EU summit conclusions in Brussels which, with Greece’s concession, had withdrawn the Helsinki deadline. It seems that by delinking progress on Turkey’s membership with the resolution of its dispute with Greece, the 2004 EU summit decreased both disputants’, especially Turkey’s, incentives to search for a — solely bilateral — compromise solution. The basic rationale for this decision on the part of Greece was that it would be to its benefit to concede to and promote a resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute at a later stage when Turkey’s Europeanization process would have produced a much more favorable situation regarding Greece’s demands and interests. At the time the management of the conflict and its eventual transformation seemed to constitute the two main goals of Greece’s strategy. For achieving the first goal
the temperature in the Aegean had to be kept at the lowest level possible, while the transformation of the longstanding conflict with Turkey was expected to come through Turkey’s Europeanization. The EU was thus expected to act both as a trigger and an anchor for Turkey’s reform. However, although an adoption of the EU’s legislation, norms, rules and requirements was put into motion after Turkey’s EU candidacy in 1999 and one may observe certain normative and internalization effects of the EU on the process, style and content of Turkey’s foreign policy toward a more rationalized and multilateral stance, no one can deny that there was a serious setback at the 2004 summit on the EU’s willingness to actively contribute to the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Turkey officially started accession negotiations with the European Union in October 2005, yet the road to membership looks long and strewn with obstacles. Obviously, the refinement of Greece’s strategy since 2004 — by decoupling progress on Turkey’s membership from the resolution of its dispute with Greece and by withdrawing the Helsinki deadline for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute — negatively affected both the credibility of the EU as an active player in the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict and its ability to be viewed as a framework with potential positive effects in the long run. Furthermore, a series of other developments could
also worsen the EU’s ability to constructively intervene and contribute to the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Indeed, in the years to come the resolution of Greek-Turkish differences is expected to become even more secondary to the EU’s priorities in its enlargement policy. Moreover, representations of Turkey as ‘non-European,’ especially after the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands, resurfaced in many EU countries, Greece included, as the European identity discourse began to emphasize the ‘non-European’ characteristics of Turkey. Such developments may move Turkey back to an ambiguous, if not threatening, institutional position in relation to the EU and thus have detrimental consequences for the resolution of its conflict with Greece. The Greek government should address all the above issues and develop a strategy that would allow for the absorption of the turbulence that a probable deterioration in relations between the European Union and Turkey would entail for Greece’s security in what promises to be a very contentious election year in Turkey. Panayotis J. Tsakonas is an assistant professor at the University of the Aegean‘s Department of Mediterranean Studies. He is the author of the Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations? Understanding Greece’s Socialization Strategy (PalgraveMacmillan, London and New York [2007, to be published]). University of the Aegean website: www.aegean.gr
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Mediterranean security and Greece Located in the eastern hub of a strategic theater at the crossroads of three continents — Europe, Asia and Africa — Greece is well anchored to the European zone of peace and stability. The country has always held a prominent role in the attainment of European peace due to its critical geopolitical position — at the natural bridge between three continents. Being at the heart of this volatile triangle comprising Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean has played a pivotal role in Greece’s history, politics and society, and continues to do so today. The Aegean passage has always been an important shipping route for the transportation of energy supplies to continental Europe. After the Mediterranean enlargements of the European Union, Greece’s strategic significance for Europe was further enhanced. Greece is also an integral part of the oft-troubled Balkan state sys-
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By Dimitris K. Xenakis
tem, sharing a common heritage and culture with Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and those approaching the Middle East (Turkey and Cyprus). Greece’s complex relationships with these three sets of neighbors in the wider EuroMediterranean space dominate current regional politics. The relationships between Greece, the Balkans, and Turkey/Cyprus and the EU typify the difficulties and challenges involved in seeking regional unity and cooperation. Greece has exhibited a firm European orientation since the early 1990s, being one of the firmest supporters of deeper EU integration in general and the federalization of the EU political system in particular. The once problematic relationship with
what was then the European Economic Community, conceptualized along the lines of an ‘uneasy interdependence,’ is long gone. Being an integral part of the eurozone, and with a generally increasing propensity for internalizing European norms, Greece is a polity that strives toward a more profound deepening of the integration process, especially in the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), perceiving them as a prelude to a truly common European defense and external action. Long-term strategic objectives of the Greek polity are, among others, to safe-
guard its territorial integrity (especially from the east), to further the process (as well as the quality) of Europeanization within its domestic governance structures, and to project its civilian values to its ofttroubled peripheries (on its northern borders, after the successive Balkan crises). With Greek politics being formulated in relation to an ever-globalizing — if not already globalized — world, the time is ripe for the country to redefine its strategic orientation in the new multicultural settings, including the Mediterranean. Greece has particular Mediterranean concerns that relate to both internal and external security. Its principled policy is guided by respect of internationally recognized borders, stability, peace, security and full respect for human and minority rights. Despite the many complex problems faced by the littoral states, Greek foreign policy aims to develop multilevel bilateral and multilateral relations with these countries based on historical and cultural ties and affinities, as well as on common economic and commercial experience. Greece has also intensified its efforts to foster links with its southern partners, by acting as a factor of stability throughout their transitional phase. Building on the EU’s Mediterranean approach, the new regional space becomes a rediscovered land of opportunity and belonging for Greek policymakers.
Greece has a clear interest in participating to its full capacity in the formation of a vibrant and viable Euro-Mediterranean space and also recognizes the notable potential for regional systemic change. This is particularly crucial now that the EU — ever more closely bound by its East European anxieties and so obliged to further the transformation of the European order post-1989 — has perhaps not been paying due attention to the new and pressing realities of Mediterranean security. The country where the idea of democracy was born some 2,500 years ago and an ensemble of historically constituted cultural properties that has managed over the course of time to reconcile homogeneity and diversity, Greece today is a promising regional actor, capable of contributing further to the cooperation structures in the Mediterranean area. At a time when many on both shores of the Mediterranean are groping for change, the strategic orientation and rationale of Greece in the region is becoming a focal point of attention. With this in mind, it is important to promote strategic cooperation aiming at a complementary framework for coordinated collective action in the Mediterranean. The stalled Charter for Peace and Stability would have been a good step, but institutionalization alone will not be sufficient to manage the
regional complexities. Without doubt, Greece is being called upon to play an important role in promoting peace and stability in the Mediterranean region, by undertaking conflictprevention initiatives as well as actively participating in the elaboration and planning of EU foreign policy. The 2003 Greek presidency of the European Union renewed interest in the initiation and institutional consolidation of a political dialogue on matters of Mediterranean security and defense. The Greek proposals for extra-transparency, trust-building and the institutionalization of political dialogue in the Mediterranean enhanced the internal cohesion of the European projects (Barcelona Process and ESDP). Today, however, the broader redefinition of Europe’s relations with the Arab world is ever more necessary, including the escalating regional power deficit. There is no doubt that the creation of a united and militarily autonomous EU should not lead to such a construct, and therefore it shouldn’t obstruct the regional transformation process and the creation of a stable and prosperous free trade region.
Dimitris K. Xenakis is a lecturer at the University of Crete. Communication: dxenakis@otenet.gr
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The Mediterranean energy community Greece and Italy, the two European Mediterranean countries who played a decisive role in the creation and the operation of the SE European Energy Community — the treaty of which was signed in October 2005 in Athens and which went onto effect on July 1, 2006 — have now put at the top of their agendas the implementation of this successful model of regional cooperation and development in the Mediterranean area. Greek Minister of Development Dimitris Sioufas had the opportunity last May, when participating in the ministerial conference of the International Energy Agency in Paris, to point out once more the need to enhance the dialogue between the Agency and the oil-producing countries of North Africa, insisting that the establishment of a new regional energy market among the Mediterranean countries (Energy Community of the Mediterranean Countries) would be the most solid and decisive step in this direction. Sioufas, as he has repeatedly declared, is cooperating with his Italian counterpart, Pier Luigi Bersani, minister of economic development — following Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi’s initiative — with the aim of promoting a common proposal for the creation of yet another Energy Community: the Energy Community of Euro-Mediterranean Countries, based on the pattern of the SE European Energy Community.
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Greece actively supports the efforts of the EU to strengthen the already existing mechanisms and the development of new operational ones in order to ensure solidarity among member states and having as a goal their safe and untrammeled energy supply. This can be achieved both by the establishment of new links with neighboring countries in the fields of electricity, natural gas and oil and by encouraging the establishment of new regional energy markets, such as the SE European Energy Community. The establishment of a new regional Euro-Mediterranean energy market would enhance the collaboration of the EU with the hydrocarbon-rich countries of North Africa, such as Algeria, Egypt and Libya, which, according to available international data, possess 7-8 percent of the world’s natural gas deposits. And anyway, most of the Mediterranean countries in the EU (Italy, Spain and Greece) are already being supplied with large quantities of natural gas by those same North African countries.
European Union Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/
Institut Europeu de la Mediterrinia program www.barcelona10.org
European Neighborhood Policy http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm
Euro-Mediterranean study commission www.euromesco.net
EC aid programming southern Mediterranean, Eastern European and Southern Caucasus countries http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/index.php
Fondazione Laboratorio Mediterraneo www.euromedi.org
Financial Cooperation / MEDA Program http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm
EuroMed Info Center http://www.euromedinfo.eu/ La Fondation mediterraneenne d’Etudes Strategiques (FMES) http://www.fmes-france.net/ Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior http://www.fride.org/home/HOME.aspx CIDOB Foundation http://www.cidob.org/ Mediterranean Scientific Observatory http://www.bcn.es/medciencies/home.htm Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal Euromediterranean Forum of Economics Institutes http://www.femise.org/ Observatory Mediterranean Politics www.medobs.net Euro-Mediterranean Observatory http://emo.pspa.uoa.gr/node.php?n=home
EC delegations Algeria http://www.deldza.cec.eu.int/fr/ue_algerie/coop_tab.htm Egypt http://www.eu-delegation.org.eg/en/eu_funded_programmes/all_programmes.htm Israel http://www.eu-del.org.il/english/content/eu_and_country/1.asp Jordan http://www.deljor.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_jordan/info_sh eets.htm Lebanon http://www.dellbn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_lebanon/project1.htm Morocco http://www.delmar.ec.europa.eu/fr/ue_maroc/cooperation.htm Palestinian Authority http://www.delwbg.cec.eu.int/ Syria http://www.delsyr.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_syria/euro_pro jects.htm Tunisia http://www.deltun.cec.eu.int/fr/article.asp?ID0=15&ID=15
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Useful Mediterranean links
EuroMed policies Institut Europeu de la Mediterrinia www.iemed.org
Useful Mediterranean links
Economy and Sustainability Arab Institute of Business Managers (IACE) http://www.iace.org.tn/fr/home.asp
Society and Cultures Mediterranean Women www.mediterraneas.org
European Economy. Occasional Papers http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasionalpapers_en.htm
Mediterranean Cultures site www.babelmed.net
Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies http://www.animaweb.org/index_en.php EuroAssociation des chambres de commerce et d'industrie de la Mediterranee http://www.ascame.com/ascamefr/mcci/index3.asp Mediterranean Business & Tourism Network http://www.1stmediterranean.com/ Economic Research Forum http://www.erf.org.eg/
Migration Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) http://www.carim.org/
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures www.euromedalex.org SALTO-YOUTH EuroMed Resource Center http://www.salto-youth.net/euromed/?SID Euro-Med Youth Platform http://www.euromedp.org/en/home.asp Musee des civilisations de l’Europe et de la Mediterranee http://www.museeeuropemediterranee.org/projetgb.html Museu de la Mediterrania http://www.museudelamediterrania.org/
Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale http://www.cespi.it/home.html
Cooperation and Dialogue European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation www.medea.be
Global Commission on International Migration http://www.gcim.org/index.htm
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network www.euromedrights.net/ Centro de Estudios de Cooperacion al Desarrollo http://www.cecod.net/inicio.htm Interculturality and Human Rights Euromed Observatory http://www.humanrights-observatory.net/ Arco Latino http://www.arcolatino.org/en
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The Russian-Western energy dilemma By Dr Constantinos Filis
Energy is without doubt among the thorniest issues in Russian-Western relations. Disparate interpretations of the term ‘energy security,’ as well as a failure to differentiate other problematic areas — such as broader geopolitical rivalry — from energy security, have resulted in a vicious cycle of standoffs and reciprocal accusations that perpetuate the climate of distrust. As a basic energy supplier and hydrocarbon transit hub, Russia is using this state of affairs to its own advantage, sometimes aggressively promoting its interests around the globe, while also controlling the game at home by keeping the largest energy companies and pipelines under state control, and thus dictating the rules of competition and increasing the Kremlin’s clout in negotiations with foreign investors. Consequently, BP, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Shell and other companies have been brought to heel, adapting to a modus vivendi with the Russian government. At the same time, Moscow comes across as wanting to diversify its exports to the benefit of Asian markets, with the possible ulterior motive of playing its basic energy ‘partners’ — that is, the EU, China and India — off against one another: Russia’s stated intention of earmarking 30 percent of
its oil exports over the next 15 years for Asian buyers, if materialized, will drastically limit its exports to the West. 1 Stoking East-West competition for greater access to Russian energy reserves, the Russian leadership essentially hopes to attract investments, but mainly on its own terms and while promoting an agenda that is ultimately linked to energy: 1. First, limiting reactions to the state monopoly in strategic sectors of the Russian economy. 2. Opening up Western markets to Russian capital (in many EU countries, there is currently clear discrimination against, for example, Gazprom). 3. Moderating Western calls for domestic reform in Russia (democratization, human rights, freedom of the press etc). 4. Engendering ‘understanding’ for Russian positions, not just on burning international issues, but also — and mainly — regarding Moscow’s vital interests in the post-Soviet space. 5. Increasing Russia’s role and say on the world stage. 1. Oxford Analytica Brief Paper, ‘Security Thinking Fuels Energy Dilemma,’ September 21, 2006.
Diverging views in the West, Russia’s ‘divide and conquer’ policy, and Tehran’s growing allure Looking at the energy issue from a consumer perspective, the West is pursuing a two-pronged approach: diversification of its energy suppliers on the one hand and gradual reduction of its dependence on hydrocarbons through the use of alternative forms of energy on the other. The emergence of oil- and natural gas-producing champions as key states in the energy community has increased Western concerns regarding state intervention in the rules regulating the international energy market. The fact that 79 percent of global oil production rests in the hands of state-controlled companies bears out these concerns.2 In terms of demand, among the West’s greatest concerns is the effect that the thirst of the growing markets of China and India will have on the global market: In addition to forcing prices up, the demand in these two populous countries virtually guarantees that the European market will have reduced access to natural gas. Whatever the case, in Western circles there are two inclinations — with a common denominator, but different points of departure. The US — which incidentally is not dependent on Russian oil or natural gas3 — wants on the one hand to limit the energy-based leverage Russia wields in its 2. Richard Lugar (US senator), September 2006. 3. Despite the fact that Russian companies are active in the US market, mainly in petroleum products (e.g. gasoline).
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wider neighborhood, and on the other to undermine Moscow’s quasi-monopoly on the transport of Caspian reserves to Western markets.4 Within this framework, it is endeavoring to create conditions (while ignoring certain objective realities)5 for the circumvention of Russia through new transport networks, while at the same time trying to ensure the economic viability of Ukraine and especially Georgia6 so that they can be pointed to as countries where the gradual strengthening of democracy7 neutralizes Russian leverage. Europe, on one level, is trying to forge a cohesive, common energy policy vis-a-vis Russia, but has so far been unsuccessful because a number of EU member states (including Germany and Italy) are very heavily dependent on Russian natural gas. In fact, the respective energy monopolies in the EU states are pursuing privileged partnerships with Gazprom — negotiating one-on-one 4. Oxford Analytica Brief Paper, ‘Security Thinking Fuels Energy Dilemma,’ September 21, 2006. 5. Among these are the overly optimistic projections for Azerbaijan’s production potential. The BakuCeyhan pipeline, with a 50-million-ton-per-year capacity, carried a mere 29 million tons of crude to Western markets in 2006. 6. Oxford Analytica Brief Paper, ‘Security Thinking Fuels Energy Dilemma,’ September 21, 2006. 7. As Washington appears to perceive it.
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agreements and closing long-term contracts in order to secure the provision of maximum quantities of natural gas to their domestic markets — thus hindering Brussels’s efforts to avert a hostage situation in which Russia will be holding the gun. From a Western point of view, if Russia wants to be seen as a credible power in the energy sector, it will have to: 1. Acknowledge its growing energy interdependence with the West (with both sides equally vulnerable); 2. Become more predictable as regards its intentions; 3. Attract foreign capital, which is vital for the modernization of its infrastructure and will facilitate the development of new resources; and 4. Purge stereotypical mindsets and strategic rivalry from the rhetoric it employs in its ongoing energy dialogue with the West, emphasizing what Russia and the West have in common, rather than their differences. Meanwhile, Russia is equally interested in shoring up its interests vis-a-vis China, given that Moscow, due to its geographical position, cannot control energy routes to the East (toward China and India). This explains the recent Russia-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan agreement, which is expected to stem the 8. The new Russia-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan agreement provides for greater Kremlin control of current Turkmenistan natural gas reserves.
increase of exports to thirsty China, thus securing greater quantities of natural gas for the European market. However, this agreement8 offers an additional comparative advantage to Moscow vis-a-vis Washington and, to an even greater extent, Brussels, given that the relatively small output of Azerbaijan9 to date — and its consequent inability to meet the ambitious energy production projections of the EU and the US — has undermined efforts to mitigate Western markets’ dependence on Russia.10 So the downside of the situation is that Europe is not in a position to force its terms on the Kremlin, with one notable exception: Increasing EU-Russian energy interdependency11 will give the EU leverage in its negotiations with Russia if the partners in Brussels can reach a consensus on a clear, cohesive stance in their dealings with Moscow. This state of affairs has left Iran as the most serious alternative for confronting Russia’s tightening grip on energy in the Caspian, mainly with regard to supplying 9. In 2006, Baku’s natural gas production came to 6.7 billion m3, dwarfed by Kazakhstan’s 26.3 billion m3, Turkmenistan’s 65 billion m3, and Russia’s 656.2 billion m3. (Source: Russian State Energy Agency, preliminary data for 2006) 10. In addition to being the largest energy producer, Russia, as a transit country, controls the export routes of landlocked Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 11. The EU is Moscow’s best-paying client.
Western markets with natural gas from this region. This will probably bring about a shift in the West’s stance in its negotiations with Tehran on the latter’s nuclear program, perhaps even accelerating efforts toward regime change, from the current, willful Ahmadinejad to a government more amenable to Western interests. If Washington pursues a velvet regime change in Tehran — rather than opting for a military operation — it will probably base its efforts on the ethnic mosaic that comprises Iran, as well as the dynamic elements of Iranian society (mainly youth), who are seeking structural reforms and thoroughgoing changes in the social and economic model as a whole, as well as in the system of governance. Greek and Turkish takes on the recent energy agreements The aforementioned trilateral gas agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, if materialized, would directly affect Ankara’s undeniably strong role as a natural gas transit hub for the region of Southeast Europe; a role that appears — right now, at least — to be less than secure, as the natural gas pipeline under construction along the Caspian coast would be in direct competition with the Baku-Erzurum and Nabucco projects, through both of which Turkey is seeking to make substantial geopolitical and financial gains. With regard to the recent South Stream agreement — a project that will link Russia and Bulgaria via the southern Black Sea seabed, splitting off toward Greece and Italy on the one hand and Central Europe on the other — in previous analyses I forecast that in the given state of affairs,12 Russia and the West would be forced to reassess their 12. We are referring to Turkey: With its domestic crises coming to a head, the political climate polarizing and leading to the adoption of extreme positions, and the political and military elite vacillating between West and East, the likelihood of destabilization remains very real. For more on Dr Filis’s predictions, see: http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/ _w_articles_world_405819_20/05/2007_227688.
game plans, seeking alternative southern transport routes for Caspian hydrocarbons — routes safer and more reliable than those involving Turkey. And this might well be put to good use by the Greek side, provided of course that Turkey’s domestic crisis does not spread to the Aegean, Thrace and/or Cyprus. But it must be borne in mind that this agreement, despite appearing to enjoy European support — as new infrastructure rather than an extension of an existing network — as well as the participation of a number of EU member states (with a Bulgaria otherwise firmly in the US camp receiving a significant boost), may well fail to serve overall European interests or take into account the contractual obligations arising from our participation in Euro-Atlantic institutions.13 On the other hand, it is encouraging that Greece — defying pressure from its Western partners, and mainly Washington — appears determined14 to 13. Might this project, rather than fitting in with the EU’s plans for diversification of supply countries (especially regarding Caspian countries), serve Moscow’s perception of ‘diversification’: finding more export routes and increasing options for transiting through states that are more predictable for Russian interests? And how can such a project be more cost effective and help reduce prices for EU consumers given that it, too, relies on Gazprom and Russian gas? These and other questions remain to be answered, given that, for instance, in January 2007 a dramatic rise in natural gas prices of 16 percent for EU consumers and 9 percent for European industries took place. (For more see Eurostat.) 14. Not because it is bucking US interests, but because its heretofore compliance and predictability, resulting in its being taken for granted by its Western partners, bore little fruit beyond a relative stability on its borders — let’s not forget the broader situation in the Balkans — vis-a-vis the promotion of its national interests. There is no doubt that Greece’s transformation into a democracy in the early post-dictatorship years was consolidated by its participation in Euro-Atlantic institutions and allowed it to avoid any misadventures in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR. On the other hand, however, Greece came to rely on its membership in the EU and NATO to the extent that Athens failed to develop certain dimensions of its foreign policy and did not exploit many opportunities that arose for fear of the consequences that might accrue from any conflict with the interests of its Western partners.
move within reasonable bounds, and open up and strengthen channels of communication with emerging powers (like Russia) that are enjoying increased negotiating leverage in certain sectors and instances: a realization that could very well give Athens greater room for maneuver, while sending the message to its Western partners that they should not take Greece for granted. On the oil front, of particular concern to Southeast Europe is the recent Russia-Kazakhstan agreement earmarking increased quantities of Astana oil for transport through Russian territory — from 20 to 40 million tons, of which about 17 million tons is to feed the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline. This may well mean an increase in annual capacity for the Greek-Bulgarian route, from 25-35 to 45-55 million tons. To conclude, the relative instability in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America,15 along with increasing Russian-Western energy interdependency, renders imperative the forging of a predictable, long-term and viable partnership based on mutually acceptable rules, ongoing political consultation and reciprocal investments. For this to be feasible, however, Moscow and the West will have to agree on a common perception of energy security. 15. Oxford Analytica Brief Paper, ‘Security Thinking Fuels Energy Dilemma,’ September 21, 2006. Dr Constantinos Filis is head of the Center for Russian and Eurasia at Panteion University’s Institute of International Relations, Athens. Center for Russian and Eurasia website: www.cere.gr
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South Stream gas pipeline checkmate? By Theodore G.R. Tsakiris
When, during her short visit to Athens back in March 2006, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared Washington’s opposition to the potential utilization of the IGI (Italy-Greece Interconnector, known as the Poseidon Project) by Gazprom, she might not have anticipated Greece’s participation in a much more ambitious Russian scheme to reach Italy via a network of pipelines spanning Southeastern Europe. The USA’s objection to increased Russian hydrocarbon — particularly gas — exports to Europe is deeply rooted in the belief that Moscow could use its renewed energy-muscle to blackmail Europe in a potential energy crisis. This apprehension can be traced at least back to the early 1980s when the Reagan administration enraged all of its NATO partners, including Britain, with its decision to unilaterally impose extraterritorial sanctions on any European companies that might participate in the construction of exactly the same pipeline network that Russia is currently trying to bypass. US sanctions were relatively quickly abrogated but the reflexive rationale behind Soviet hydrocarbon exports has evi-
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dently surpassed the end of the Cold War. To be frank, America’s uneasiness with the ever-expanding influence of Russian energy exports to Europe is not entirely unjustified, at least as far as many of Russia’s former satellites are concerned. Back in the early 1980s Washington could only evoke the specter of a Soviet ‘gas weapon.’ Today new EU and NATO member states such as Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are claiming that Russia is already punishing them for joining what in their eyes remains the most credible long-term deterrent against renewed Russian revisionism. Regardless of how parochial these fears may sound to the ears of many ‘Old Europeans,’ Russia’s recent transit crises with Ukraine (January 2006) and — to a much smaller extent Belarus (January 2007) — scared every European bureaucrat and politician east of the Elba and can still jeopardize the entirety of the EU’s hydrocarbon imports. Nevertheless, a closer analysis of what actually happened in January 2006 indicates that the real problem with EU import security does not lie in the unlikely event of a Russian gas embargo,
but in the deteriorating condition of the Russian-Ukrainian ‘special relationship.’ Ever since the emergence of the Orange Revolution in late 2004, a political movement openly supported by Washington, the state of affairs between Moscow and Kiev has teetered on the brink of a disastrous breakdown. The country is itself deeply divided along linguistic, national and religious lines between a vehemently anti-Russian west and a pro-Russian and potentially secessionist east. The immense gas pipeline network that carries more than 70 percent of all Russian gas exports and more than 90 percent of Russian exports to Europe lies in the middle of this increasingly volatile area. Regardless of who is to blame for this worrisome state of affairs, the fact of the matter remains that Russia’s willingness to diversify away from its transit dependence on Ukraine and its former Warsaw Pact ‘allies’ is much more justifiable and pragmatic than the specter of a Russian gas embargo. The recently announced (24/6/2007) 900-kilometer South Stream pipeline that could channel up to 30 billion cubic meters per year to Europe via Bulgaria and Greece is the southern equivalent of the nearly equal capacity North European Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream) linking Russia directly with its greatest European client, Germany.
This transit diversification constitutes a cardinal interest for Europe’s security of supply and does not necessarily increase the share of Russia’s control over European gas markets. It merely makes that critical supply more geopolitically secure. The idea that Moscow is somehow trying to pre-empt the construction of ‘antagonistic’ gas pipelines such as IGI and Nabucco does not survive closer scrutiny. Russia is not forcing anyone to accept its gas for very capital-intensive infrastructure projects. The European Commission, Italy, Greece and all European countries involved in IGI and/or Nabucco can exclude Russian gas from utilizing the EC-funded pipeline networks. However, this does not mean that Moscow cannot come to terms with those same countries so as to construct an exclusively Russian network spanning the Baltic Sea as well as Southeastern Europe. More to the point, no one can exclude Russian gas flowing via privately owned networks such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) promoted by Swiss-based company EGL that would reach Italy via Albania and Greece. EGL is following an ‘open-access’
strategy that focuses on the volumes of exported gas, not its nationality. Another important clarification is that the goal of Europe’s import diversification away from Gazprom is not served by the construction of alternative pipeline routes but by the monetization of available exports volumes from non-Russian producers. The critical problem for Europe is that there is no major alternative gas producer that could challenge Gazprom’s dominant position, other than Iran, at least not in the medium term. Turkmenistan, the only major Caspian producer, as well as Kazakhstan have recently committed (May 15) the near entirety of their exportable volumes to the construction of an inter-Caspian pipeline connecting both countries to Russia. Uzbekistan, another major reserves holder in Central Asia, has been isolated from the EU after the Beslan massacre of May 2005 and lies well within Russia’s sphere of influence. In this regard, US policy can prove decisive in altering its stance vis-a-vis Iran,
the only world-class reserves holder and progressive producer that could seriously undermine Russia’s dominance. The prospective abrogation of US-imposed sanctions can surely accelerate the pace of Iranian output, thereby creating the necessary surplus, which could then be exported to Europe either via pipeline or by liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. In conclusion, we need to underline the fact that the South Stream and other three alternative pipelines (IGI, TAP and Nabucco) are in the long term complementary. The former — and to a certain extent TAP — diversifies Russian export options away from increasingly volatile transit routes. The latter — especially IGI and Nabucco — keep the option open for an increased diversification of EU gas imports from potentially crucial mediumterm sources such as Iran and Iraq. Theodore G.R. Tsakiris is an international and energy security specialist.
themes
Compiled by Dimitris Pappas
Silent growth in Egypt A wind of change has been blowing in Egypt recently. The government of Ahmed Nazif has one serious and difficult goal: to implement a number of radical economic reformations, through which living standards will be raised and the country will remain one of the main economic powers in Africa and the Middle East. Egypt, a country of 75 million people, has the second-largest economy in the Arab world after Saudi Arabia. Gross domestic product grew at a rate of about 5 percent a year in 2005 and 2006. For the next two years GDP is expected to accelerate to 7 percent, mainly thanks to the increase in the investment demand. Foreign investment Under a program launched in July 2004, the Nazif government has been implementing a policy to facilitate private sector-led sustainable growth through the reorganization of governmental bodies and the utilization of a new generation of businesspeople and economists. Dr Mahmoud Mohieldin is the minister of investment responsible mainly for the privatization and restructuring of public enterprises. Wooing foreign investments is part of the new economic policy, especially after years of stagnation. According to official statistics, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Egypt will receive a record net — more than $10 billion in 2006. It could be called an economic miracle, if one considers that in 2002 and 2003 foreign companies invested only $0.7 billion. Over the next fiscal year
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(2007-2008) the investments are expected to be continued, as the government will ensure a friendly environment for businesses and the privatization of state-owned companies will be continued. Banking sector A large number of these investments are associated with the banking sector. Egyptian banking has long been dominated by four public sector giants which held half the assets of the country and more than 57 percent of its deposits. In October 2006 the Italian Gruppo Sanpaolo IMI acquired 80 percent of the Bank of Alexandria, the smallest of the four, for $1.6 billion in the country’s largest privatization deal, just one example of Egypt’s new determination to reform. Recently it was announced that 80 percent of the country’s third-largest public sector bank, Banque du Caire, will be sold to a strategic investor. This decision surprised many experts, because in September 2005 Nazif had announced that Banque du Caire would merge with Banque Misr, the secondlargest bank. According to financial analysts this was changed when it was decided that there would be too many redundancies. Nazif believes that the privatization of Banque du Caire will raise more than $1.6 billion in a public auction that would be open to foreign bidders with no restrictions. The decision to sell off the banks is part of the government’s strategy to consolidate the banking sector by reducing the number of banks from 60 to 26. Piraeus Bank was the first foreign bank to buy an Egyptian bank, the Egyptian Commercial Bank in June 2005.
Competitiveness Even if the economic growth of Egypt is following an upward trajectory and is expected to peak in the fiscal year 2007-2008, the competitiveness of the Egyptian economy has dropped 11 places in the world ranking (from 52nd in 2005 to 63rd in 2006). The decline in competitiveness appears to contradict the fact that Egypt was able to attract $10 billion in foreign investment. Ahmed Galal, director of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, gave two reasons for this paradox: Firstly, Egypt made deals related to specific sectors such as banking, gas and tourism and, secondly, the flow of foreign capital has not gone toward diverse activities across all economic sectors, which would have been evidence of a significant improvement in competitiveness. The executive director of the Egyptian National Competitiveness Council, Samir Radwan, attributes the decline in the competitiveness of the Egyptian economy to three primary reasons: the budget deficit, public debt and inflation. ‘The public debt remains large because the government is facing a very hard social choice. Public debt is mainly due to expenditure on subsidies reaching almost 100 billion Egyptian lira, salaries of the civil service of about 5.7 million people, and infrastructure. It is very difficult for the government to reduce spending on these items,’ stressed Radwan. Inflation is still high despite the fact that it fell to 10.5 percent last May from 11.7 in April. Nazif said that the government’s target for inflation was 8 percent by July or August.
market view Worldwide distinction for Cosmote Cosmote ranks among the top performers in the global information technology industry for 2007, according to the BusinessWeek Info Tech 100 list. Cosmote, for yet another year the only Greek company to be included in the list, has leapt to 26th place, from 80th in 2006, ascending an impressive 54 places. The company ranks sixth in the world in terms of return on equity, after Grupo Iusacell, Windstream, Amazon.com, British Telecom and Accenture. In terms of shareholder return Cosmote ranks 50th, while in revenue growth the company holds 35th place. The list, compiled annually by BusinessWeek, ranks the most important IT companies based on assessment of key criteria, including return on equity, shareholder return, revenue growth and total revenues. According to the magazine, ‘if there’s one theme that unites the companies on the 2007 Information Technology 100, BusinessWeek’s ranking of the top tech performers, it’s reinvention.’ BusinessWeek characterizes Cosmote’s growth as significantly strong and notes the impressive 54-place rise as a result of the group’s dynamic expansion in the emerging Southeast European markets, with operations currently in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
Postbank awarded Bank of the Year Bank of the Year for 2006 in Bulgaria was Postbank. In the traditional annual contest organized by the financial newspaper Pari Daily, the president of the country, Georgi Parvanov, presented the awards to the winners. Along with the most prestigious prize, Postbank was also honored in the category ‘Dynamic and Development.’ The award was accepted by Antonis Hassiotis, chief executive officer of Postbank and DZI Bank, Assen Yagodin, executive director of Postbank and DZI Bank, and Petya Dimitrova, chief financial officer of Postbank and DZI Bank, procurator of Postbank and executive director of DZI Bank. ‘The fact that Postbank was named Bank of the Year is of great importance to all of us. I accept this award with great appreciation on behalf of all our customers, shareholders and employees that made all this happen. I hope that in the future our financial institution will keep up with your expectations and I promise that we will continue putting great efforts into being a good bank and a good corporate citizen,’ Hassiotis said at the award ceremony. This is the second ‘Bank of the Year’ prize for the financial institution since Postbank was awarded with the trophy in 1993. Earlier this year Postbank won two awards at the international banking exhibition ‘Banks Investments Money.’ In February the financial institution got two prizes — one in the category ‘Combined Financial Products’ for hedge instruments and the special prize for ‘Debut for the Factoring Services’ offered by the bank. Postbank is wholly owned by EFG Eurobank. In the same contest, the Bulgarian-American Credit Bank was distinguished as the most efficient. In the category ‘The Bank of the Client,’ the winner was First Investment Bank, which was chosen via online voting. The criteria for selecting the nominees in the prestigious contest are traditionally based on the dynamic and efficient development of the banks as financial intermediaries. This was the 10th time that the newspaper has selected the Bank of the Year in an effort to encourage the financial institutions to work toward the progress of Bulgaria’s economy. Sources: www.postbank.bg www.pari.bg
Banking forum on Hydra Greece will host the next meeting of the Banking Unions of Balkan nations. The 8th Inter-Balkan Forum of Banking Unions, which has been recognized as an institution for the banking system in SE Europe, will take place on September 15 and 16, 2007, on the isle of Hydra. The acting chairman of the forum will be the general secretary of the Hellenic Bank Association, Christos Gortsos. The Inter-Balkan Forum of Banking Unions was founded in 2004 with the initiative of the Hellenic Bank Association and convenes at a level of general secretaries of the Banking Union members. The aim of the forum is the institutional exchange of information, the reciprocal
support and collaboration in finance-related matters as well as education on banking subjects. The last meeting took place under the presidency of the Hellenic Bank Association in Sofia. In that forum, the participating bank unions, apart from the Greek and the Bulgarian organizing association, were from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey and Slovenia. Montenegro will host the forum of 2008, while the Greek presidency has been renewed for another three years after the unanimous decision of the member countries of the forum.
Real estate boom in Montenegro Real estate prices on Montenegro’s coast are rising by up to 50 percent per annum. The price of new modern buildings in the popular towns of Herceg Novi, Ulcinj, Bar and Tivat is now between 2,500 and 5,000 euros per square meter while in holiday destinations such as Budva, Sveti Stefan and Petrovac prices are ever higher, according to Colliers International Serbia. The increase in both prices and demand shows no sign of slowing down. According to the latest Colliers report, the property boom in Montenegro has grown by 400 percent — reinforced mainly by investors from the UK and Russia. This constant trend in property investment comes on the heels of a report by the World Travel and Tourism Council which said Montenegro is expected to become the fastest-growing travel and tourism economy in the world. At the same time the price of land is al-
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so increasing constantly, and it now ranges between 200 and 450 euros per square meter, depending on the area. The most expensive areas are in Sveti Stefan, Budva and Petrovac-Lucice. This increase in real estate prices is not surprising if one considers the economic development of the country. Montenegro’s GDP growth in 2006 was 4.5 percent, while inflation was low at 2.8 percent and foreign direct investment (FDI) increased by 31 percent in 2006 to over 500 million euros. According to experts, FDI is expected to increase to 850 million euros this year — and to continue to rise progressively in the next years. With a population of 620,000, Mon-
tenegro is third in Europe in investment per capita, after Estonia and the Czech Republic. The biggest investments in the country stem from the financial sector. New investment funds, well-known banks and brokerages have entered the Montenegrin market. According to the Montenegro Investment Promotion Agency, tourism is a close second in bringing in investments, with the construction of new, or reconstruction of existing, hotels. As Montenegro’s economy is mainly based on tourism, an increased number of foreign visitors — around 450,000 — are expected to spend vacations on the Montenegrin coast this year, 30 percent more than last year. All the major investments in the new country are also expected to draw a type of more personal financing. By improving the infrastructure of the area, with money being plowed into roads, airports and railways, many individuals are now contemplating the country’s real estate prospects. Sources: www.neurope.eu www.property-real-estate.net
market view Hydro power plants in Albania Several foreign companies have expressed an interest in the construction of 15 hydroelectric plants in Albania, as part of the attempt to cover the increasing demands for electricity, either domestic or regional. In Albania the existing hydro power plants provide an inadequate supply for the population. The total energy production in the country (98 percent) is created through its hydro resources. The sector is currently being privatized and the government is determined to solve the energy problems by offering concessions for construction and operation of small and medium-sized hydro power plants on all of its major rivers. The investors (foreign and domestic) interested in taking part in the project will take advantage of the new legislation. The fact that there have been no new developments over the last 20 years has contributed to the shortages the country experiences today. The annual water flow of the rivers combined is 40 billion cubic meters and with the use of this quantity the annual energy production will reach 16 to 18 TWh. Until now energy production has stood at between 3.8 and 5 TWh, which means that only one-third of the total hydro potential is exploited. The three major hydro power plants, one of which is Albania’s largest, are located on the River Drin, with average water flow of 320 cubic meters per second. The first is in
Fierza, with installed capacity of 500 MW, the second and biggest is located in Koman (600 MW), and the third hydro power plant at Vau i Dejes (250 MW). According to governmental studies, the Drin has the capacity for two additional large hydro power plants. The River Vjosa has large growth potential as it is largely unexploited. The annual energy potential of the second-largest river in Albania is 2 TWh. Even if there are currently no plants on the Vjosa, experts believe that eight can be constructed. The Devoll and Mat rivers offer many possibilities. Especially on the Devoll, there is the potential for the development of 10 plants between Lozhan and Than. On the Mat there are already two hydro power plants, in Ulez and Shkopet, with a potential for a third in Milot. The first three plants will be built on the River Devoll by EVN AG, an Austrian regional utility. The three plants will generate more than 400 MW of electricity for Albania. Sources close to the deal said if EVN’s tender is successful the investment volume will be around 1 billion euros. Sources: www.ebrd.com www.forbes.com
High sales of ice cream products The high temperatures that have plagued Romania this summer have boosted the sales of ice cream, creating what is probably an unbreakable record. Ice-cream producers are targeting turnover increases as high as 40 percent this year. The very high temperatures have not only allowed producers to step up production to the maximum, but also to launch new brands and products. According to Nestle Ice Cream, retail sales, currently estimated at 80 million euros, could exceed 100 million euros by the end of the year. With a level of consumption of 1.77 liters of ice cream per capita, compared with 4.8 liters per capita in Greece and 3 liters in the Balkan states, the Romanian market is seen as having a significant growth potential. The Romanian ice-cream market could increase by over 12-14 percent in terms of volume this year compared with 2006, according to estimates made by Dimitris Zogopoulos, marketing manager of Nestle Romania. The Romanian ice-cream market is presently divided between Nestle Ice Cream and Napolact (a company in the Friesland Foods Group) and other smaller domestic companies that hold similar market shares, of 10 to 15 percent .These companies are Betty Ice, Alpin, Top Gel and Kubo Ice (Amicii). Unilever is another company that has a relatively low presence on the market, with brands such as Magnum, Carte d’Or and Cornetto, which are imported by a domestic distributor and sold in major chain stores. It is expected that Unilever will become more aggressive in this market over the coming period, which would therefore bring an addi-
tional rival into the premium segment, which is currently dominated by Nestle Ice Cream. A year after the Nestle Swiss group took over Delta Ice Cream, Nestle Ice Cream Romania is already considering building a new plant and improving distribution services by taking over a smaller rival. Domestic companies, as well as Nestle, have so far bet on the medium- and low-price segments, but Zogopoulos sees a high growth potential for the premium segment in the medium term. New launches and rising consumption levels have generated the need for additional production capacities. The high distribution costs explain the fact that domestically manufactured products now account for over 90 percent of the market. The impulse-buy segment accounts for around 80 percent of sales in Romania, which makes distribution even more difficult due to the high number of outlets that need to be covered. Furthermore, the summer season in Romania started with a boom in the consumption of mineral water, juices and sunscreen products. Most of them hit the shelves in the first week of April although sales reached considerable levels in June and July. ‘The seasonality pattern has changed from previous years, and as the summer period practically begins in May, sun products start selling in May and reach a peak between June 15 and August 31,’ said Roxana Minculescu, procurement manager with the Help Net drugstore network, one of the main players in the field. Sources: www.nestle.com www.euromonitor.com
A new deal with Zastava Zastava automaker and General Motors signed a contract for the production of Opel Astra vehicles in Serbia. The cars would be assembled in Zastava’s complex in Kragujevac, central Serbia. Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Delic said that according to the contract the assembly of Opel Astra Classic cars would begin in the third quarter of 2008.
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‘According to the deal, 10,000 vehicles will be assembled by 2012,’ Delic added. ‘The deal with General Motors will enable Zastava to work with modern technology, raising its chances of fully benefiting in the coming privatization process,’ a government source said to the media. The state-owned Zastava plant, which last year produced 15,000 cars, well under its annual capacity of 60,000, also has a deal to assemble Punto cars for Italy’s Fiat. It mar-
kets them in Serbia and neighboring Balkan countries under the Zastava 10 brand. It also has permission to start selling the cars on the Russian market. In order to start with the production of the Zastava 10 model, the Kragujevac factory needed a 14-million-euro investment. The Zastava 10 is the domestic version of Fiat’s Punto model. Sources: www.theautochannel.com
market view Ford invasion in the Balkans
The discovery of a gas field Hungary’s top oil and gas company MOL and its 25 percentowned Croatian affiliate INA recently announced that they have discovered a new natural gas field in the exploration area of Zalata (Hungary) and Podravska Slatina (Croatia). ‘This is the first result of the agreement signed in September 2006 by the two parties for jointly drilling exploratory wells in Zalata and Podravska Slatina, aiming at the exploitation of the hydrocarbon potential of the Drava Basin,’ MOL said. ‘The success of the Zalata-1 well is the first major result of the MOL-INA strategic partnership in hydrocarbon exploration and production.’ Drilling of the first well, Zalata-1, was completed in December 2006, reaching a depth of 3,515 meters. The exact quantity of hydrocarbon reserves recently discovered will be defined after the completion of the reservoir analysis. The successful well is located in an under-explored area, which MOL claims adds further value to the discovery, as it may open new prospects for exploration in the region. During the tests, production from the lowest layer was 62,000 cubic meters per day, with some condensate. The middle section, after well stimulation, is now producing 337,000 cubic meters per day, which MOL stresses is ‘a considerable volume in Hungary.’ Sources: www.mol.hu/en www.rigzonc.com
US carmaker Ford Motors is ready to build one of the biggest car plants in Europe, in Craiova, Romania, by upgrading a plant that once belonged to the South Korean group Daewoo. The decision was made in order to cover the high demand from the European market, according to the CEO of Ford Europe, John Fleming. Recently Fleming met Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu and revealed the plan of the company. Ford committed to build 300,000 vehicles and 300,000 engines per year at the plant in Craiova from 2011. The US group plans to invest 675 million euros to upgrade the factory, which in 2006 under its former owners made 24,000 cars and 116,000 engines. He added that the number of employees in the factory will be doubled to between 7,000 and 9,000. The Romanian government is selling a 72.4 percent stake in the company and Ford is the sole bidder for the plant. The price it had offered to pay for the shares is still unknown. The two other groups that had expressed an interest in the plant, General Motors and JC Russian Machines, declined to make formal offers. In August 2006, Romania paid US$60 million for a 51 percent holding in the facility that had belonged to Daewoo, which declared bankruptcy in 1999. It should be mentioned that in 1994 the South Korean company had paid US$156 million for a majority stake in the plant, and had invested another US$850 million to upgrade it. The planned investment by Ford follows a trend in the car industry of shifting production to Eastern Europe, where production costs are low. Renault of France, which owns the Romanian carmaker Dacia, is using Romania as a base to build a successful low-cost car for emerging markets. To the north, Slovakia has emerged as the Eastern European center of the automobile sector, with Volkswagen, Peugeot and Kia among the major manufacturers investing in new factories. Sources: www.ford.ro www.romanialibera.ro
Expectations from regional cooperation On June 18 and 19, 2007, the Hellenic Exchanges Group organized the Fourth International Capital Markets Conference in Thessaloniki. At this year’s conference there were participants from exchanges, depositories, capital markets authorities and brokerage houses from Bulgaria, Slovenia, Romania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia, Jordan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Montenegro. In the first three conferences, issues discussed had been more or less concerned with the development of all the capital markets in the broader region and the effort to identify the willingness for potential cooperation. During this year’s conference, the main focus was to establish a thorough view on the advantages of regional cooperation, define plausible means of cooperation, listen to the views of HELEX clients and regulators and identify ways to increase market and regional appeal. This year’s program included a distinguished set of speakers who elaborated on capital market consolidation in the European landscape; case study sessions that were focused on regional cooperation and combined the views from international investors, brokers, custodians and regulators; brief presentations from participating exchanges, presenting the status of the local capital markets and the prospects for cooperation; presentation of the successful common platform that has been established between the Athens and Cyprus stock exchanges and fi-
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nally, the presentation of DAC. The conference opened with the welcome speech of Iakovos Georganas, chairman of Hellenic Exchanges SA. In his speech Georganas emphasized that great prospects of economic development for our region lie ahead. However, stock exchanges in the region should focus on consolidation and cooperations in order to be able to meet the challenges that do and will exist in the future and also to be able to offer services of upgraded quality and wider variety to investors. An introduction speech by Spyros Capralos, chairman of the Athens Exchange and CEO of HELEX, followed. In his speech Capralos noted that the aim of this year’s conference is to show that the Greek capital market can play the role of a pool for attracting international liquidity and part of this liquidity can be then driven to neighboring regional capital markets, based on the successful example of the cooperation between the Athens Exchange and the Cyprus Stock Exchange. In this opening session the keynote Sspeech was delivered by Jukka Ruuska, president of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE), which focused on capital markets’ consolidation and the European experience on this issue. In his speech he noted that globalization is now evident
in capital markets, since more and more investors are including international investments in their portfolios. Competition is growing and stock exchanges should be ready to offer their clients an access cost that will diminish on a continuous basis. He concluded his speech emphasizing that the only way for reducing market access cost is regional cooperation. As far as the program of the conference, several sessions were presented covering major aspects of potential cooperation between stock exchanges. Specifically, at the first two panels, ‘Perspectives of the Market, Views of the Directors on Regional Cooperation,’ the speakers were representatives from the MSE (FYROM), Bucharest Stock Exchange (Romania), Georgian Stock Exchange (Georgia), Amman Stock Exchange (Jordan), Banja Luka Stock Exchange (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Bulgarian Stock Exchange (Bulgaria), Tirana Stock Exchange (Albania), Ljubljana Stock Exchange (Slovenia) and Montenegro Stock Exchange (Montenegro). Each presentation included details regarding key financial indices such as population, GDP, tax regime (especially taxes on trading), dividends, capital gains, a brief presentation of the exchange, ownership, international investors, market statistics and finally each exchange’s views on consolidation. The subject of the third panel was: ‘Development of Common Indices and Products in Regional Markets as a Tool for Cooperation.’ The speakers were Imogen Dillon Hatcher, managing director of EMEA FTSE, Rosa Anna Grimaldi, regional director
of STOXX Ltd, and Isabelle Bourcier, ETF Global coordinator of Lyxor. In the evening of the first day a gala dinner was held where the minister of Macedonia & Thrace, Giorgos Kalantzis, was invited to speak on behalf of the Greek government. At the beginning of the second day it was the turn of the panel with the subject: “The Future of European Markets: The clients’ View.’ The speakers were Menelaos Demetriou, Securities country manager, Citi Global Transaction Services, Robert Barnes, managing director, Equities UBS Investment Bank, and Udayan Goyal, director, head of European Financial Technology Advisory Deutsche Bank. The next panel focused on the presentation of the common trading platform that has been set up between the Athens Exchange and the Cyprus Stock Exchange. The title of the session was ‘The HELEX Alliance: An Open Invitation to All Regional Exchanges’ and the speakers were Socrates Lazaridis, general director, Post Trading Operations of Hellenic Exchanges SA, Nicos Tripatsas, chief officer, Cyprus Stock Exchange, and Kostas Karanassios, director, Project Management Division, Hellenic Exchanges SA, while the moderator was Gikas Manalis, general director, Financial Markets, Hellenic Exchanges SA. The third panel of the day was dedicated to the regulators’ view on regional cooperation which carried the title ‘Changes in
the Operation of the Capital Markets from the Implementation of the European Directives.’ The moderator of the panel was Alexis Pilavios, chairman, Hellenic Capital Market Commission, while the speakers were Djordge Jovanovic, member of the Serbian Securities Commission, Spyros Kokkinos, member of the Cyprus Securities Commission, and Apostol Apostolov, chairman of the Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission. The next panel was aiming at covering the views of market professionals regarding the issues of regional cooperation and, more specifically, their expectations on this potential. The title was ‘Expectations from the Regional Cooperation: The Local Brokers’ View’ and the moderator was Gikas Manalis, general director, Financial Markets, Hellenic Exchanges SA, and the speakers were Alexandros Devletoglou, managing director of Piraeus Securities SA, Yiannis Katsouridis, chairman and CEO of National Securities SA, Abis Levis, general manager of EFG Eurobank Securities SA, and Paris Vassiliadis, managing director of Alpha Finance SA. In addition, for the first time this year, participants had the opportunity to attend a seminar featuring an interactive computer simulation session designed to provide participants with hands-on experience in making tactical trading decisions, and implementing them in different market environ-
ments. The simulation exercises are an invaluable tool for deepening understanding of how the structure of trading influences actual trading behavior. Participants enter orders into a computer-driven market that generates order flow, responding directly to participants’ orders. Participants see their results in real time, and analyze them with the instructors after play. Continuous orderdriven and quote-driven markets are simulated, along with call auctions and hybrid combinations. For this purpose, Hellenic Exchanges had agreed with Robert Schwartz, professor of finance and University Distinguished Professor in the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York, to deliver the seminar. The conference was closed by Spyros Capralos, chairman of the Athens Exchange and CEO of HELEX, who noted that the focus of all the exchanges nowadays must be on fulfilling the needs of our clients, with an increased range of quality products and services at a cheaper price — as compared to what they can obtain today. HELEX believes that in order for the regional capital markets to be able compete effectively in the global environment they must work toward establishing a large regional emerging market in Southeastern Europe that is highly visible to the international investment community, thereby attracting liquidity.
economy & market
impressions By Gazmend Kapllani
The leading mobile operator in Albania
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Women in Istanbul Sunday evening in Istanbul. I am passing the time until the hour of the appointment I have to go to. In the lobby of the Germir Palace, the hotel where I am staying (a very charming establishment on Taksim Square), the TV is on: It is the evening news. At some point Salman Rushdie appears on the screen in archive shots. An irate crowd follows. These are not archive shots. They are angry demonstrations, because Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II has knighted Rushdie. ‘Death to Rushdie,’ ‘Death to the infidels’ read the banners. I leave the hotel lobby and go outside. My appointment is on Istiklal Street, close to Taksim Square. ‘The whole of Istanbul promenades along this street,’ Seljuk, a Turk researcher, tells me. The voice of Charles Aznavour, singing L’homme d’Istanbul, emanates from a record store. It is the soundtrack of That Man in Istanbul. A movie with lots of action, many secret agents, plenty of bullets flying around and guns galore. At that moment three Turkish policemen are walking down Istiklal. On of them is carrying a machine gun in his right hand. Such is his insouciance, one would think he was carrying a water pistol. Suddenly they stop. They start examining a solitary, parked motorcycle. ‘Routine checks,’ explains Seljuk. ‘They are apprehensive of terrorist bombings.’ In That Man in Istanbul one also sees a lot of bikinis. Tonight on Istiklal one also sees a lot of Islamic scarves. They are walking past or in company with modern, ‘provocative’ outfits. I turn right into a side street. A woman, wearing the Islamic scarf, is sitting on the sidewalk singing doleful songs to the accompaniment of her guitar. In front of her, the guitar case is lying open to collect ‘rewards’ from the passers-by. The case is resting on a copy of the newspaper Vatan (Fatherland). This is the picture of a different Islam, I am thinking, the kind of Islam that bears no relation with those who
brandish the banners reading ‘Death to the infidels’… *** The itinerant guitar player is almost the same age as Neslihan Akbulut’s mother. Neslihan is the young lady with whom I have an appointment in Taksim Square, over which looms the Monument of Turkish Independence. She is a Muslim, one of those who project their Islamic identity through the wearing of the Islamic scarf. She is 25 years old. Neslihan’s parents immigrated to Istanbul in the 1950s, from the Black Sea coast. At that time the Istanbul suburb where they took up residence was thickly forested. Her mother was never educated beyond fifth grade of grammar school. She never worked outside the house. ‘Though our parents were uneducated, they set great store on our education,’ says Neslihan. She was born in 1982, two years after the military coup. At that time the greatest enemy of the military was Communism. The army Chief of Staff used to appear on TV reciting verses from the Koran. The Koran versus the Communist Manifesto. The years went by and democracy made a so-called comeback, as always, with the approval of the military. In 1993 Neslihan finished grammar school. At the time the religious schools were all the rage. She decided to enroll in one of them. Her curriculum was heavy: She was attending both high school and the imam-hatip. It was then that she first donned the Islamic scarf. ‘My parents didn’t like it at all,’ she says. ‘My grandfather, especially, was greatly upset. They wanted me to lead a normal life and to hold a good job in the future.’ They had sensed right. In 1997 the military staged another coup. This time, the enemy of Kemalism was no longer the Communist Manifesto but the Koran. In 1998 Neslihan was expelled from high school, because of her Islamic scarf. ‘At the age of 16, along with other girls, I started knocking on doors, asking for help. I was shocked: None of them dared speak up.’ Neslihan however managed, with great difficulty, to graduate. After that, she started looking for a job. Everywhere she went she was turned down.
‘The Islamic scarf is a matter of faith, therefore a personal matter. My brother’s wife does not wear the scarf, yet we are very good friends,’ says Neslihan.
She wanted to go to university. But the ban on the Islamic scarf applied there, too. ‘Then I heard that at Bilgi University the ban was not observed. I sat the entrance exams, passed and was enrolled at Bigli University in 2000. My life changed.’ Yet only until 2002, when a journalist published a front-page photo in one of the newspapers with the caption ‘There are Islamic scarves at Bigli University.’ The next day, at the university’s main entrance, men from the security police were finecombing the female students. Some of the girls abandoned their studies forever and went home. Others left to continue their studies abroad. Neslihan could not afford the latter. Neither did she wish to abandon her studies. From that day on her life became an ordeal. After keeping away from the university for a few weeks, she went back. She had decided, this time, to wear a hat instead of the Islamic scarf. ‘They wouldn’t let me in either… But my friends were very helpful. They were not religious; they were just against the irrationality of the military rule. Many times they would envelop me in their midst, so that the guards would not see me. I became, in a way, an invisible person. I
never went out into the yard or to the coffee shop with my friends. For three years I was hiding in corners, in the rest rooms, behind the library’s columns. I felt humiliated, but I had given myself a goal: to graduate from the university without abandoning the scarf. It is hard to believe, but in 2005 I finally managed to get my degree.’ Night is falling. Enveloped in the hubbub of the crowds and the glare of the floodlights, I turn my eyes once more upon the Monument of Independence. Behind its shoulders, in the summer evening sky, the sickle moon is hanging. I ask Neslihan, ‘What do you think of the hundreds of thousands of women who demonstrated a few days ago against the Islamic scarf here in Istanbul?’ ‘On that day,’ she responds, ‘I happened to be in the vicinity and I came across a group of women who were going to the demonstration. One of them looked angrily at me and shouted, “Kill the uncivilized!” I was supposed to be the uncivilized… Because I believe in God and I wear my scarf, they forbid me from having an education and working… I am uncivilized because I defend my rights, because I defend the rights of the Kurds, of the Armenians, of the Greeks, of the Jews, of the gays and the lesbians… ‘There are many who claim that the Islamic scarf poses a threat to the secular state. ‘The Islamic scarf is a matter of faith, therefore a personal matter. My brother’s wife, just like the lady who called me uncivilized, does not wear the scarf, yet we are very good friends… The scarf does not pose a threat to the secular state, but to the state’s elite, which is trying at all costs to hold onto its privileges.’ *** Neslihan tells me that it is time for her to leave. I escort her as far as the bus stop. I give her my hand, to say goodbye, and she does not refuse to take it, though Islamic law forbids handshakes between men and women. Fifty yards further on is the entrance to the subway. I take the escalator down. On the platform, as well as inside the train, I am once more watching the people around me. Young
girls, some wearing and others not wearing the scarf. An extreme Kemalist would say to me: ‘You wander too often around the city center, sir. Why don’t you visit the poorer neighborhoods and have a look at the women there? The sight will remind you of Iran or Saudi Arabia.’ I leave the train. As I am walking toward the exit, I come across a young girl playing the cello. I stop, I listen to her play-
Watching the girl playing the cello, I recalled the words of Fatma Nesibe, a Turkish feminist, spoken a hundred years ago: ‘Pay attention to every corner of the world, we are at the eve of a revolution. Be assured, this revolution is not going to be bloody and savage like a man’s revolution.’
ing, I watch her, and in my mind the image of the guitar player wearing the Islamic scarf comes back. I walk out of the station. I stand next to the robot, waiting for the little green man to appear, so that I may cross the street. While waiting, I observe the countdown displayed over the robot: 16, 15, 14, 13, 12… It is like an allegory of Turkey today. For the countdown here has already begun. Is it a countdown for the continuation of military rule or for the establishment of democracy? Hard to predict. The little green man flashes. I cross the street…
Greek music and the Balkans The fad that has acquired substance
While Dionysis Savvopoulos may have composed and sang years ago ‘This is the Balkans; this is not a joke,’ he was however referring rather to the geopolitical position of Greece during the 70s than to its music. It is a fact that Greece forms part of the Balkan Peninsula, but as far as music is concerned, it took the country a long time to realize it. Already in the 60s, when the modern Greek song was starting to take shape, Greek music production was reaching as far away as Afghanistan, Iran, Turkmenistan and even India for inspiration, yet it would not cross the Balkan borders. The reasons were definitely political: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania were all ‘on the other side of the world.’ The Iron Curtain stood between them and Greece. So the musical affiliations were ignored and the common musical roads were hidden under layers of political veils. When you are led to believe that someone is a threat to you, you certainly do not wish to have anything in common with him. And even when it is obvious that you do, then you prefer to look down your nose at it. This is exactly what happened with the brass bands of wind instruments that were playing in Florina, Goumenissa and other cities in Macedonia, whose roots go back to the military bands of the early 20th century. The mere sound of the brass, however, was making two powerful sections of the Greek public shudder: on the one hand the
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By Nikos Moraitis
politicians and the government, who believed they could hear the Red Army marching through Greece, and, on the other, the bourgeoisie, who deemed those instruments ‘Gypsy’ and would not accept them as part of the Greek musical tradition. Yet, blood is thicker than water. Very timidly at first, in 1985, the Greek group Heimerini Kolimvites (Winter Swimmers) began to incorporate Balkan musical aspects in their songs and used the Florina Brass Band in their recordings. This move was a sign of things to come. When the walls collapsed, the neighbors came together. That was at the very end of the difficult 80s. Those on the other side of the border, the former ‘opponents,’ started heralding a different tomorrow. The ‘dangerous neighbor’ became an ‘ally.’ The Berlin Wall came tumbling down, the Balkan walls followed suit and the local music airs started communicating with one another. And just as one was thinking that this musical intercommunication
would proceed at a slow, steady pace, a veritable volcano erupted. And the volcano had a name: Goran Bregovic. The Bregovic era The frenetic, stormy music from the soundtrack of Emir Kusturica’s movie Time of the Gypsies overwhelmed Greece. Two women, singer Alkistis Protopsalti and lyricist Lina Nikolakopoulou, got into their car, drove across the border and knocked on the door of Goran Bregovic. There, in between endless cups of coffee, countless cigarettes and Gypsy feasts, they decided to translate the songs from Time of the Gypsies into Greek. This is how the record I Have Accepted (Both Life and Death) came into being. The summer of 1991 found the whole of Greece dancing to the rhythms of Petrol Station, I Got Pardoned and I Wish Joy Was a Plot of Land. The record had record sales, the Balkans became fashionable, and so did the once-despised brass instruments. As usual, success triggered adverse reactions. The Serbs, Slav-Macedonians, Bulgarians and Romanians on the one hand were claiming (often rightly) that Bregovic had copied all their traditional melodies and was presenting them as
his own; the Greeks of the north, on the other, were greatly upset: ‘We have been using brass wind instruments to make music for ages — we don’t need Bregovic to teach us how to play them!’ they were saying, and, in all fairness, they too were in the right. Now the Florina Brass Band became the apple of discord among recording companies and singers. They all wanted to have it in their new recordings, for one or more songs. In the 90s the whole scene of the modern Greek song was ‘Balkanized.’ Recordings featuring the ‘Balkan sound’ became the order of the day. Suddenly Greece discovered its ethnic identity and, along with the brass wind instruments, anything of Balkan origin became the height of fashion: from Albanian folk songs to the sublime women’s choirs from Bulgaria. Both eminent and less distinguished Balkan composers sought in Greece to duplicate Bregovic’s success. A typical example was Kiki Lesendric, who produced an entire record called On the Road of the Brass Wind Instruments, with vocals provided by Manolis Mitsias, but the record did not find favor. Goran Bregovic, on his part, produced a second ‘Greek’ record, this time with George Dalaras singing (Thessaloniki-Yannena with Two Canvas Shoes, 1997). The record was a success, but it also revealed an important development: 1997 was not another 1991. The years had passed. The
‘foreigner’ Bregovic had become more ‘Greek.’ He attempted the composition of ‘Hasapiko’ music, and used only Greek musical instruments in his orchestrations. The ‘import of melodies’ had developed into a musical dialogue. On the Greek side, Christos Nikolopoulos further enhanced this dialogue by producing an entire instrumental record featuring the Florina Brass Band (Cyclamens of Olympus), on which he interwove the ‘Balkan’ wind instruments with the bouzouki. This kind of musical exchange has been kept alive up to now thanks to two charismatic composers, Panayiotis Kalantzopoulos and Evanthia Reboutsika, who in their songs and instrumentals employ not only the Balkan instruments but also that impromptu, amateur ‘ecstatic abandonment’ that Balkan music usually induces. The Balkan West These cases apart, Greece, as of the year 2000, does not seem to have entered into a new era as far as its relationship with the music of the Balkans is concerned — it has rather gone back to the previous one. Today Greek music increasingly looks toward the West. The appeal that traditional melodies had in the 90s has now shifted to ‘pop’ music. The rest of the Balkans though are also looking West. Europe is their political goal; therefore, it also becomes their musical one. Where once traditional bands
flourished, now rock and pop groups made up of very young people are cropping up. Ten years ago, people would come to blows over whether the melodies played by the brass wind instruments were Greek, Serbian or Slav-Macedonian. Now, no one seems to care enough to pay any attention to brass winds. The fad faded out. With it, however, the opportunists were phased out, too. Now the Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian and other Balkan composers who meet at the ethnic festivals or at the recording studios meet because they really want to, and not because such meetings generate greater sales of records or tickets. Nikos Moraitis was born in Athens in 1973. He attended the University of Athens Law School and took postgraduate courses at the Department of Communications and Mass Media of the University of Athens. He works as a journalist at Elle magazine, as a radio producer for Melodia FM, and as editor in chief for Lefteris Papadopoulos’s TV show Meetings that is broadcast by Greek National TV & Radio (ERT). He has contributed to the newspapers To Vima and To Thema, and the magazines Time Out, Diphono and Metro, among others. He also writes lyrics. His songs have been sung by well-known Greek singers such as George Dalaras, Haris Alexiou, Vicky Mosholiou, Dimitris Mitropanos, Dimitra Galani, Alkistis Protopsalti, Eleftheria Arvanitakis, Michalis Hatziyannis and others.
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Musical exchanges in the Aegean This summer in this part of the Mediterranean, two countries are exchanging their most talented performers. In Turkey and Greece, the neighboring countries’ concert halls and amphitheaters are echoing with local and universal sounds. During these months many performances will be held, while the famous and talented Omar Faruk Tekbilek has already opened the season in Athens with an extraordinary concert. The famous Turkish accordion virtuoso Muammer Ketencoglu, with a range of music varying between Balkan and Aegean, accompanied by his group Zeybek, and Aynur, the fascinating Kurdish voice that many became familiar with from the documentary of Turkish-German director Fatih Akin, The Sounds of Istanbul, will follow. Throughout the year, Turkey also wept to the soundtrack of the highly awarded Turkish film My Father and My Son, composed by Greek musician Evanthia Reboutsika. The new style in Turkish folk music which includes a mix between traditional Turkish instruments and electronic elements brought the wellknown Baba Zula to Greece. Meanwhile, the exchange continued with world-renowned Greek director Theo Angelopoulos’s film score’s composer Eleni Karaindrou in Ankara. It must be noted that the mutual exchanges of culture between Turkey and Greece have been gradually increasing over the years, extending the function of the ‘clef’ as a key for the ‘cloaked collective conscious.’ The expansion of this phenomenon was commented on by many scholars as the social result of the political rapprochement. It
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seems that people and cultures were thirsty for this infusion during all those years of separation. A closer look, into the perception and definition of the audiences and performers, must be taken. International music with local taste The concerts and performances mentioned here have a common characteristic: their high quality. Their success lies in their ability to use contemporary and universal methods in music. One of these artists, Tekbilek, defines his work as ‘music rooted in tradition that has been influenced by contemporary sounds.’ He describes his approach as ‘cosmic.’ He uses his creativity within the essence of ‘mysticism, folklore, romance and imagination.’ For instance, Fuat Saka, a Turkish Black Sea singer, might not have won fans in Athens if he had just retained the pure local sound. If he had, he would probably have only gained the attention of a few people with Pontic roots and missed a younger generation eager to hear something authentic but also contemporary. Fans of this music are also a specific kind of audience, similar to each other in both countries. That specific type of audience sprang into existence within the Balkans as an effect of globalization. As a consequence, many listeners in the region, influenced by international sounds, started to demand other music forms but similar to their music as well. The best doors to knock on were those of their neighbors. This specific audience group does not comprise listeners of ‘popular’ music, who
consume easily without digesting its essence, message or absence of dreaming. It is a group of conscious consumers with a hunger for good-quality art. They share more global thoughts while having a taste for traditional values compared to simpler listeners. The intellectual level of this audience, together with their unprejudiced standing, may open the gates for the much delayed cultural fusion between the masses — that’s if we take into account that intellectuals are usually considered pioneers in societies.
‘Ode to the Olive Tree’ A study focusing on the role of the olive tree in all aspects of Greek life, taking a particularly folklore, historical and archaeological approach to the subject. General Secretariat for the Olympic Utilization, Hellenic Folklore Research Center of the Academy of Athens 1st Release: June 2004 & 2nd: July 2006.
PUBLI
Various authors, bilingual publication (GR-EN),
The mystery and the authenticity of Anatolian music have found an audience in Greece. It should not be seen as an orientalism on the part of Greek intellectuals. They are not looking for a new Anatolian-Turkish bohemian-style sound, but something deeper. An answer can be found via social psychology. The same is valid for the Turkish audience, which prefers the soft, familiar and entertaining melody of the bouzouki and lyre. Recalling the forgotten past with music Balkan people show their emotions, express them more readily and portray them more deeply than their more rational Western peers. This anarchic emotional background changes the music of this geographical area, leading it away from the given doctrines of nation-states and nationalist discourses. It opens the gates to the subliminal realities and to the hidden mystical past. Listening to a song or an instrument enriched with soul by a virtuoso is like developing wings and looking at the world from above the borders, then returning to the normal flow of life. We’re now left in the arms of the wise common past with this music, hard to forget, like an uncompleted delicious flavor… The common experience of life, which we obscured in the past, thrown into the dark labyrinths of our collective subconscious, hidden between the dusty pages of history, or made colorless and pale in the sinister corridors of politics, was recalled from the subconscious. The failed lives which are left half-ended, like unfinished sentences with three dots (…), are remembered again with these sounds. We started to realize our commonalities and remembered that
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we used to live together… An Athenian, for instance, may remember the taste of a partly heard song from a record on the gramophone, a remembrance of the foggy Bosporus, from a melody that he now hears in the Odeon of Athens from a Turkish neyzen1. They who owned the record could have been his grandparents… but he can deeply feel and recognize the song, even he had never heard it before, simply from the stories his grandfather whispered to him like the winds of Pringipos2 or from the tasty meals his grandmother cooked with a sigh, ‘Ah, Konstantinoupoli!’ This is not their first encounter with this sound. In the books they read, on the wall of a mosque or church, in an ancient ruin by the roadside, in the smoke of a narghile, in a dance, on a plate of meze, in a street name and in their lullabies, they have already heard this sound. This sound was the sound of our Turkish or Greek neighbors who left a home country behind them a long time ago. We were forced to forget them and their sounds, but we could not… This linking of memories is the result of 1. Player of the reed flute (often used to play in Mevlevi Dervishes’ music). 2. One of the Princes’ Islands in Istanbul.
fantastic unknown cosmic paths in our small brain cells. Like a butterfly effect in our minds, these notes grab us and carry us to the gates of an old relative’s house whom we haven’t talked to for a long time, bringing us childhood memories and pleasure. It’s just like that. A melody, a taste, a dance from the other side of the border… We left our lands, we left our neighbors, and we left our lives on the other side of the sea without even being able to say goodbye to them. This is the story of being left halffinished. The common sentiment felt by both sides. The attention is raised by the need to hear the ‘other’ side’s similar melodies. To feel the art of the ‘other’ gives us a chance to see ourselves as well. There are more similarities which can bring us closer than differences. Music can help us close our ears to all the aggressive propaganda and open them to the heartbeat of the Aegean as music has the power to become a channel between us, transcending the prejudices and misunderstandings, helping us embrace the future.
Ali Osman Egilmez is a master’s student in Southeast European studies, University of Athens. He completed his BA studies in media and communication systems and double majored in sociology, Istanbul Bilgi University. He is currently an intern at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM).
A Medea from Albania Seven years ago, 19-year-old Mikel Kalemi, a sophomore in the Drama Department of the Academy of Arts in Tirana, attempted to clandestinely cross the Greek-Albanian border after several days’ hike through the mountain passes. During his subsequent 24-hour detention, the Greek soldiers and border police who apprehended him laughed when he kept insisting that the sole purpose of his illegal entry into the country was to attend performances of classical drama. He was deported. However, after resting for three days in his homeland, he managed — via Corfu and after many trials and tribulations — to reach Athens, the city of his dreams. That reckless trip, which was filled with performances of classical drama (The Clouds, The Trojan Women, Oresteia and others), indelibly marked his subsequent development. This year, Kalemi, now 26, has returned legally to Greece, as a theater director with the group Atelier 31, in order to present Euripides’ Medea in Albanian to the Greek public — with performances in Athens, Grevena, Thessaloniki (during the First Theater Festival of
By Ghiota Myrtsiotes
SE Europe ‘Aspects of Classical Drama’) and Kavala. Medea is the second classical tragedy Kalemi has staged in his country — the first being Antigone, with which he introduced Greek classical drama to the Albanian public. ‘Because of the dictatorship, there really isn’t a theatrical tradition in Albania. The ban did not allow us to build a real circuit in Albania,’ said Kalemi. ‘The two tragedies made an overwhelming impact on audiences. Of course, they were aware of both ancient stories, but the themes they deal with are more relevant for Albanian society today than at any time before,’ continued the stage director, speaking flawless Greek. At the beginning of July he was honored in Albania as Best Theater Director of the Year for his staging of Medea. His interpretation of the play combines the classical elements of ancient Greek tragedy with modern theatrical patterns. The story, which does not pertain to any particular place or time, develops on
a revolving circular platform. ‘On this circular labyrinth I let Medea (Emma Andrea) and Jason (Vassian Lami) suffer for their deeds,’ said Kalemi. ‘On the one hand, he is the man who drove things to this point and, on the other, she is the victim who leaves her mark through violence. Betrayal, contempt and desertion bring exasperation and revenge. The only path toward tempering pain is revenge, yet this path rolls downward so steeply that revenge drags down along with it all that surrounds it.’ The portrayal of revenge is the director’s main objective — revenge being a behavioral pattern that seems very close to modern Albania. ‘This myth touches my country as never before,’ he said. ‘In the years of isolation, for some 45 years, our society was extremely closely knit. Divorce and abandoned children were unheard of. Today, Albanian society has changed and incidents of revenge in the name of love, of horrible crimes passionels are not unusual.’ Kalemi’s Medea, which is based on an earlier translation by Sotir Papachristo but has been revised by the director himself, does away with the deus ex machina, with Aegeas, and with the various gods who ‘are not conducive to the message imparted on the human level,’ but he retains the chorus, the poetry and the melody of the verse. ‘The play does not depart much from the original Greek tragedy. The performance comes close to the Greek renderings of it and I believe the Greek public will respond to it. Bread, stone, music and songs are common symbolic elements,’ maintains the director. A polyphonic group sings Albanian folk songs during the performance. ‘The dirges, excerpts of which are going to be sung — and which are quite similar to those of Epirus — constitute a strong element of our tradition, which even today is kept alive throughout Albania. This is why we had no problems during rehearsals. The actors knew beforehand how to lament the pain or how to sing for joy.’
Performances will also be given in Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo and other Balkan countries up to the end of September.
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The rebirth of Eastern European film By Panayiotis Panagopoulos
Now the opening up of the Eastern European countries to the West also has a cinematographic aspect. The eastern side of Europe is embracing the Western way of life more and more – while, however, still retaining cultural elements and mentalities that let one glimpse the distinct differences – and the film directors of these countries are entering the international world of cinema once again. The recent victory of the Romanian Cristian Mungiu at the Cannes Film Festival with the outstanding 4 Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days was the result of a trend that became quite apparent during the two weeks of the festival. This trend has been incorporated in the greater framework of an Eastern European cinematographic renaissance, since these countries are also providing loca-
tions for film shoots for important Hollywood productions. The film scene in Eastern Europe has two distinct sides. On the one, movies that retain the sensibility and humanistic elements of the older cinematographic tradition of the Russian, Czech and Polish film schools are being created, while on the other, examples subscribing to ideas that would have been considered unacceptable in the past – such as the blockbuster – are being made, and these countries are also helping Hollywood to produce more pictures, more cheaply, and under excellent production conditions. Mungiu’s film fits into the first category. The Romanian film director, working with just three main actors and a minimum in the way of sets, has created a sensational and powerful movie. He based it, however, on a profoundly exciting story, and this was enough. As Mungiu himself said, after receiving his prize: “We are go-
ing back to the simple story. Previously, the narrative was given in a tortuous, complicated way. Movie-goers simply want the story.” In his film, the director who carried away the Golden Palm touches upon the subject of abortion and has created so realistic and intense a film that at times it could be mistaken for a documentary. He notes: “The script begins with a personal experience, which usually one does not want to share with others. Yet various people, as soon as they heard the story, would come out with a similar experience they wanted to share. All of a sudden, everybody had something to say on the subject. I was astonished by the fact that such stories were common enough, yet so well hidden. Talking to people, I became acquainted with really horrifying experiences. But I did not use them in my movie. I recounted the story I already knew very well, but these other stories helped me understand how widely disseminated this phenomenon was.” The film takes place a little while before the fall of the Ceausescu regime, dur-
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ing which abortions were forbidden, with heavy penalties. According to the film’s director, “in 1966 a law was enacted forbidding abortion and the repercussions were immediate. By the early 70s the birthrate had risen considerably. The average number of pupils in a schoolroom rose from 28 to 36. When I was at school, we were seven Cristians in the class, since there were not enough names to go around. Women started to resort to illegal abortions. By the end of the Communist regime 500,000 women had died as a result of these, while when abortion was legalized once more, a million such operations took place within a single year.” This year the “In Competition” program of the Cannes Film Festival was filled with Easter European entries. Side by side with directors such as Emir Kusturica and his Promise Me This and Alexandre Sokurov with Alexandra, who have a solid relationship with international film festivals, more “alternative” directors, such as the Hungarian Bela Tarr and his The Man From London, the Russian Andrei Zviaguintsev with Banishment, as well as the Austrian Ulrich Seidi with Import-Export, who attempts to comment upon the economic immigration from Eastern to Western Europe, made their appearance. These cinematographic examples are not all equally successful; they do however indicate that a certain movement is beginning to take shape on the other side of
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Europe and that the “high and mighty” of the film industry are noticing it and seem rather interested, as they are interested in the attempts to develop a more popularoriented cinema. The Russian Timur Bekmambetov is the most typical case. His Night Watch was the biggest box-office hit in Russian history. His sequel, Day Watch, runs along the same lines – an adventure/action film filled with special effects – while the third part will be financed by Fox, with American money. In the meantime, Bekmambetov has already signed up to direct Angelina Jolie in Wanted, a film based upon a comic series of the same name! Yet Eastern Europe does not just produce blockbusters – it also hosts shoots. The Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia have already achieved what Greece has been trying for years to achieve: to attract American producers to make their films there. The Czech Republic has large studios manned by huge and specialized personnel – and box-office hits ranging from Hannibal Rising to Casino Royale have been filmed there. Romania was the location for the filming of Cold Mountain, of Borat, as well as for Francis Ford Coppola’s new film. The Hostel series of horror movies were filmed in Slovenia, while in Bulgaria Rambo IV, starring Sylvester Stallone, was made – a movie that will be released next season. The reason for this phenomenon is simple. The countries of Eastern Europe are still very cheap, while they also boast an
endless supply of very efficient technicians and of a lot of quite virgin locations. At the same time, however, they continue to produce talented and creative thinking people, who perhaps now will have the opportunity to be discovered by a much larger audience.
International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) Over the past six months the growing interest in the wider Black Sea area by policymakers, research institutions and other actors throughout Europe and the world has translated into a heightened demand for the ICBSS’s expertise both in its capacity as an independent think tank and as a related body of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). As a result the center’s workload has increased significantly in all aspects, including research and advocacy activities as well as a series of related projects, publications and events. Key ICBSS news: Policy-shaping in the frame of the BSEC The ICBSS’s continued work as coordinator of the ad hoc Group of Experts on BSEC-EU Interaction has lead to significant results: a Working Paper drafted by the ICBSS with input from the BSEC member states was adopted on January 17 as an official BSEC policy document ‘BSEC-EU Interaction: The BSEC Approach,’ which in turn was a regional input for the EU Commission communication on a ‘Black Sea Synergy’ [COM(2007)160]. The EU Commission also became an official observer of the BSEC on June 24, 2007. The ICBSS continued its active involvement in the BSEC reform process. Recent output includes a Food-for-Thought Paper concerning a proposed ‘Fast-Track’ model. Research The ICBSS together with 20 partners has submitted a large-scale proposal regarding policy cooperation in Science and Technology under the EU’s Seventh Framework Program for Research and Development and is preparing further project proposals. The ICBSS co-hosted a conference on ‘Security Concerns in the Wider Mediterranean and Black Sea Regions’ (Rhodes, June 1516) as part of its focus on regional cooperation. The ICBSS successfully closed a research project on Good Gover-
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nance and Institutional Renewal presenting a substantial study on the reform of the bodies responsible for institutional renewal in the BSEC member states (May). A study on ‘Energy Cooperation among the BSEC Member States’ has been completed and is in the process of editing and publication. Selected activities In the framework of its Outreach Program and in cooperation with the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), the ICBSS held a round-table debate with Peter Semneby, EU special representative for the South Caucasus, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union, on ‘Developments in the Caucasus,’ Athens, July 5, 2007. The ICBSS and the International Policy Research Institute of the Turkish Economic Policy Research Foundation co-organized a high-level round-table debate on the prospects and potentials in the wider Black Sea (Istanbul, June 24). Keynote speakers were Suleyman Demirel, ninth president of the Republic of Turkey, and Nino Burdjanadze, chairwoman of the parliament of Georgia and the PABSEC. A conference on Black Sea cooperation from the viewpoint of the Danube region was held in cooperation with the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (Vienna, June 1-2). The Black Sea Research Network is expanding and has welcomed two new member institutes: the International Policy Research Institute of the Turkish Economic Policy Research Foundation (Ankara) and the Black Sea — Caucasus Research Center (Istanbul). A workshop on visa facilitation between the EU and the BSEC member states was held on Kos, Greece, on May 18-19. As part of its Outreach Program the ICBSS organized an open discussion with Greek journalists (Athens, February 14).
Romanian Academic Society (SAR)
Selected Publications The two latest books of the ICBSS are a collection of key BSEC documents and an edited volume on the past 15 years of regional cooperation with ‘Views by Foreign Ministers and Heads of BSEC Institutions.’ Work on the second ICBSS Xenophon Paper is coming to a close with publication planned for July. At the same time a Greek version of the series is about to be launched. ICBSS Policy Brief #4 looks at ‘Science and Technology in the BSEC Region: Proposals for Enhanced Cooperation’ by George Bonas and Dimitrios Filippidis (July 2007). In June 2007, the ICBSS collaborated with ELIAMEP to produce a special issue of the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies published by Taylor & Francis Group (Routledge, London), this time focused on energy security. The ICBSS contributed vital expertise to the conceptualization of the The bridge, Q2/2007 Issue 5, April 2007 with the cover story ‘The Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Searching for the Golden Fleece.’ Three issues of the Black Sea Monitor were published in March, June and July. Building on its achievements, the ICBSS aims to further improve and expand its activities throughout the second half of 2007. For more information, see www.icbss.org.
Established as a think tank in 1996, the Romanian Academic Society (SAR) aims to further the ideas of freedom, democracy and good governance in Eastern Europe. Starting with Romania, SAR seeks to raise the public awareness level of policy issues, contribute through research and advocacy to informed policy formulation and assist administrative reform through performance assessment. SAR seeks to: Contribute to good governance and development through its policy research; Contribute to the European integration of Romania, Western Balkan countries and Moldova through transfer of best practices and advocacy; Enhance the contribution of independent policy institutes to the process of policy formulation through advocacy and public debate; and Contribute to the (re)building of the fields of applied social sciences and public policy in Romania and Southeastern Europe after 50 years of communism. SAR recently published a policy brief under the title ‘How to Avoid the Mezzogiorno Syndrome’ by Sorin Ionita. The sudden inflow of EU funds can be a great burden for Romania’s regions, the author argues. As a new EU member, Romania as a whole still has a chance to avoid becoming one of ‘Europe’s Sicilies,’ trapped in a developmental dead end. Nevertheless, inside Romania there are already areas threatened by the immobility-cum-dependency syndrome so familiar to those who visited Southern Europe. The Romanian Academic Society will conduct an exercise of analysis and reflection on the perspectives of education and research in Romania involving several prominent personalities alongside SAR’s board of directors and experts. This exercise will take place during the next two years, aiming to create a 10-year plan which can be a part of/or a source of inspiration for the national strategy needed to accomplish the Lisbon Agenda objectives. Romanian Academic Society website: www.sar.org.ro
activities
Hellenic Center for European Studies The Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM) is an independent research center established in 1988 under the institutional supervision of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its main objective is research on European matters, issues that are linked to the participation and achievements of Greece in the European Union, as well as general issues that affect Greek foreign policy. EKEM offers scientific support to the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive and cohesive Hellenic policy toward issues related to the EU. EKEM aims to contribute to the promotion of public awareness on European issues by organizing various initiatives (seminaries, conferences, public discussions etc) throughout the country. EKEM is currently implementing in Greece the European Commission’s Plan D program for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Administration and Decentralization, and the Secretariat General of Communication / Secretariat General of Information, with the cooperation of the Representation of the European Commission in Greece and the European Parliament. In this framework, EKEM organizes public debates during which it is directly involved with the local authorities and civil society, stimulating productive discussions related to EU issues. These events take place in various regions of Greece.
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In this context the following events were held: — ‘Greek Mountainous and Disadvantaged Regions and the Future of Europe,’ Trikala, February 16, 2007 — ‘European Social Model and Employment. Toward a Coherent Society,’ Tripolis, March 1, 2007 — ‘European Governance and Information Society,’ Lamia, March 15, 2007 — ‘The Mediterranean Sea and Europe — – Problems and Challenges,’ Iraklion, April 20, 2007 — ‘Eliminating Discriminations: Europe of Equal Opportunities,’ Lesvos, May 18, 2007 — ‘Regional Inequalities and Economic Development,’ Ioannina, June 5, 2007 — ‘Cultural Identity and the Future of Europe,’ Naxos, July 11, 2007 On April 18, 2007, EKEM in cooperation with the ‘European Union Club of Athens’ organized a symposium on ‘Kosovo and its Transition to Final Status’ with the participation of the special representative of the United Nations secretary-general in Kosovo and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Ambassador Dr Joachim Ruecker. The Educational, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency of the European Commission granted EKEM a program ti-
tled ‘Federalizing the EU: Why Do it?’ In this regard, EKEM organized a three-day international conference in Athens (May 18-20, 2007). The papers of this conference are available on EKEM’s website (www.ekem.gr). EKEM has participated in the French Confrontations Europe think tank’s program ‘Tour d’Europe’ organized in nine different European cities, aiming at promoting the debate and dialogue for the future of the EU, after the rejection of the European Constitution. EKEM organized the last ‘etape’ of the ‘Tour d’Europe’ in Athens (June 29-30, 2007), under the theme ‘Participation and Democracy.’ Regarding its publications, EKEM has recently published the following ‘EKEM Papers’: ‘Europe and the Challenge of Jihadist Islamism in Post-bipolar Politics: The Jihadization of Islam, its Threat to Europe’s Security, and the Need for a Democratic Response to Totalitarian Islamism,’ by Bassam Tibi; ‘Strengthening the Continued Relevance of the Concept of “Civilian Power Europe”: The Need to Revisit its Forgotten Democratic Scrutiny Dimension,’ by Stelios Stavridis; ‘Democracy Assistance and the Democratization of Recipients,’ by Sarantis Kalyvitis and Irene Vlachaki; “Integration Theory Then and Now: Making Sense of it All?’ by Kostas A. Lavdas and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou.
Federalizing Europe: Why do it? The conference that took place in Athens on May 18-20, 2007, titled ‘Federalizing Europe: Why Do It?’ and held under the auspices of the Hellenic Center for European Studies with the support of the European Commission (Jean Monnet Action) and in cooperation with the University of Athens and the Greek NGO European Expression, was a success story for two reasons: First, it set in motion a series of thought-provoking debates on whether or not federalism is still capable of providing new insights into the process of developing a more profound understanding of the European Union today. Second, it allowed for a number of interesting comparisons between the EU political system and contemporary federal models, placing the current debate about the future of Europe in a comparative perspective, useful to both academics and policymakers. Little doubt exists that federalism, as a political theory of integration, is more relevant to the study of the EU polity-formation than is often confessed. And that is due to: its concern about the dynamics of power-sharing in compound political settings; its emphasis on inbuilt democratic arrangements linking different levels of governance; its flexible interpretation of the classical sovereignty principle; its focus on constitutional issues including the protection and respect of individual and collective liberties; its emphasis on legislative representation within a bicameral structure combined with the allocation of competencies among different policy domains; and its concern on how to organize, in a mutually reinforcing way, the concurrent demands for ‘unity in diversity.’ Leading international scholars considered in the context of the conference the extent to which federalism can offer a way out of the present institutional impasse of the EU, either by reviving the interest of the academic and policy community on new forms of power-sharing within densely institutionalized frameworks of political co-determination, or by revealing different forms and means of mutual governance among distinct culturally defined and politically organized demoi, as is the case in today’s EU. The participants reached a consensus that federalism does not emanate either from a single corpus of theory or from a grand constitutional design that can be transplanted from one federation to another without losing its internal or systemic relevance and cohesion. Rather, there exist different but equally federal sets of principles and structures composing a federal polity, which need to be seen in a wider symbiotic perspective: a creative coexistence of distinct but constitutive units. This, however, does not mean that federalism is the most appropriate or desirable form that integration can take in the foreseeable future, given the lack of organic unity among its member demoi or the divergence of opinions and visions that characterize its dominant political elites. Still, federalism remains a useful term in the vocabulary of integration studies, as it facilitates the development of understandings on the composite nature of the European polity and its relationship with its citizens. For more information on the ‘Federalizing the EU: Why Do It?’ conference, please visit the site www.ekem.gr.
Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), Turkey The Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) is an independent think tank in Istanbul, Turkey, that conducts studies and realizes policy-oriented projects in the areas of economy and international relations. Our objectives are: To provide information and knowledge to support and facilitate the accession negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, and at the same time to generate opportunities for active participation of the business sector, civil society and academia in the accession process, and To help achieve a better and more accurate understanding of Turkey by the European public and opinion leaders. While on the one hand EDAM focuses specifically on TurkeyEU relations, on the other, it aims to explore and analyze these relations within a multidimensional and global context and generate policy suggestions which can be influential on the decision-making processes both within Turkey and EU member states. EDAM conducts policy-oriented research both in-house and through partnerships. For 2006 and 2007, EDAM’s research program mainly focuses on four broad themes: Accession Negotiations for Turkey, European Public Opinion and Turkey, Immigration and Integration, and Globalization and Turkey. Within the scope of its program regarding European public opinion, EDAM conducted research on the public opinion in France. The study under the title ‘Franco-Turkish relations in Turmoil’ was carried out by Dorothee Schmid, an IFRI-affiliated researcher. The research methodology is based on a large number of face-to-face interviews with the key opinion shapers in France on the question of Turkey. The study aims to shed light on the rhetoric and to uncover the arguments of the actors who pronounced themselves against the Turkish candidacy for EU membership. Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies website: www.edam.org.tr
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The Halki International Seminars The Halki International Seminars (HIS) are the pride and joy of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), forming the core of its training activities for young leaders. They have been held annually since 1990 on the small island of Halki in the Aegean Sea (off the island of Rhodes). In 1983 Halki was proclaimed by UNESCO ‘The Island of Peace and Friendship of International Youth.’ The primary purpose of the HIS is to promote the exchange of ideas and experiences leading to greater understanding and forging links among young leaders interested in international affairs, while offering training packages on the processes of European integration and the building of civil societies. The HIS bring together an exceptional group of policymakers, diplomats, journalists, researchers, academics and young scholars from Europe, the former Soviet space, the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, the US, as well as representatives from international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Seminars enjoy a first-rate reputation, and are among the best attended for young leaders from the aforementioned regions. The HIS contribute not only to a highquality and high-level scientific exchange but also to a greater understanding of current political, security and economic de-
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velopments in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea in an effort to explore emerging opportunities for peaceful cooperation. The so-called ‘Halki spirit’ is an effort to address misperceptions and negative stereotypes, promote empathy and to better understand the other side’s interests, concerns and fears. The Seminars aim to orient participants to the importance of safeguarding and promoting pluralist and parliamentary democracy and the development of political pluralism, especially in the post-communist societies of the former Soviet space, and the Mediterranean. The promotion of cross-border and regional cooperation through the creation of various networks ranging from networks of institutes of international relations of countries of Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, to networks between governmental and non-governmental organizations is also stressed. The Seminars also attempt to promote a better understanding between various regions of the world that might see their interests as not necessarily compatible. The result of this interchange between participants from various regions is indeed very interesting, as it provides Western observers with new insights into the whole process of enlargement and regional integration. The past 18 years of the HIS have resulted in a vast network of over 1,000 Halki alumni from 60 different countries as well as governmental and non-govern-
mental organizations. The unique experience and the dynamic environment of the Halki International Seminars allow the participants to closely interact with their counterparts outside the conference room. Such interaction is of invaluable importance to the creation of strong ties and future working relationships among participants. Each Seminar includes a written evaluation, which is used to improve the next year’s program. As the Halki International Seminars embark on their 18th consecutive year, the Seminar’s Steering Committee maintains its commitment to creating a mix of high-caliber participants with a broad range of nationalities, institutions and expertise. This, we hope, will ensure once more that the Halki International Seminars remain a unique, challenging and stimulating experience for both senior and junior participants. Session 07.1 on ‘Redefining Security in SEE and the Middle East: Searching for New Ways to Address Regional Security Problems’ which will take place on September 12-17, 2007, in Halki, is designed to provide a forum for informal and susbstantive discussions among approximately 60 young political and economic decision-makers, researchers, diplomats, academics, journalists and other professionals interested in international affairs, on the role of transatlantic institutions in helping local stakeholders address security challenges in Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Good governance, climate change and hu-
man security, migration trends and challenges will be among the core focal points. Discussions will also concentrate on two functional issues that cut across geographic regions: energy security and security sector reform. The seminar format will be highly interactive and will include breakout working groups and round-table discussions. Among the speakers who have already confirmed their participation are: Dr Ivan Vejvoda, executive director, Balkan Trust for Democracy, Belgrade; Dr Sergei Konoplyov, director, Harvard Black Sea Security Program, US-Russia Security Program, Boston; Dr Alexandros Yannis, Council of the European Union, Brussels; Mr John Roberts, energy security specialist, Platts Energy Group, United Kingdom; Dr Geoffrey Kemp, director, Regional Strategic Center, The Nixon Center, Washington; Ambassador Mohamed Shaker, president of the Board, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo; Dr Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the US, Washington DC; Mr Muin Khoury, director of the Research Deptartment at the Royal Court, Amman; Dr Willem van Eekelen, senator, the Netherlands Senate; Former Secretary-General of the WEU, The Hague, Professor Ayhan Kaya, Istanbul Bilgi University; Dr Bruno Tertrais, senior research fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Paris; Mr Daniel Vernet, director, International Relations Department, Le Monde, Paris; and Dr Stephen Flanagan, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS in Washington DC. ELIAMEP website: www.eliamep.gr
Center for liberal strategies, Bulgaria The Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia is pursuing with the support of the Sixth Framework Program of the European Commission a research project under the title ‘The Challenge of Socioeconomic Cohesion in the Enlarged European Union.’ This project is structurally based on the comparative analysis of the role of social capital and civil society in achieving the goals of development policy through stimulating social partnerships and improving levels of administrative capacity, is based on research conducted in non-Cohesion (Germany and Italy), old Cohesion (Greece and Spain), CEE (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) and candidate states (as were Bulgaria and Romania) of the EU. The project focuses on identifying the patterns of interaction between the levels of social capital and the capacity of civil society to choose effective and efficient development policy strategies and implementation processes to achieve the goal of sustainable development. Hence, the principal goal of the project is threefold: first, to identify the existing differences in the structure of civil society between the old and new member states, by evaluating the level of social capital present in different territorial contexts; second, to assess how these differences in the strength of social capital and civil society may be related to the levels of effectiveness and efficiency of development policies in these countries; and third, to identify ways in which the Europeanization of public policy (in our case, cohesion policy) may be used to strengthen the level of social capital and civil society at large, thus indirectly affecting/improving the levels of effectiveness and efficiency of development policy. The Center for Liberal Strategies and Foreign Policy Magazine — Bulgaria organized a meeting of young Bulgarian researchers in the field of social sciences. The meeting took place on July 25-26, 2006, in Sofia, Bulgaria. The major goal of the meeting was to provide a forum to the young Bulgarians who work abroad to present their activities and make or renew valuable contacts with colleagues from similar fields. Another goal was to create a database of potential authors for the Bulgarian edition of Foreign Policy Magazine. By being published in the magazine, they will be able to present their ideas and analyses to the Bulgarian audience. Center for Liberal Strategies website: www.cls-sofia.org
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6 The Mostar Bridge Bosnia — Hercegovina by doorsas