The Bridge Magazine - Issue 7 by Vassilios Loukanidis

Editor’s note

Nowadays, due to political and economic activities at international and European level, South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region are witnessing cosmogonic changes. States of this region are invited to move ahead by adopting a new concept of security development and stability and to meet the changing world's global demands. On November 18, 2007 Greece and Turkey inaugurated the new natural gas pipeline, which connects the gas fields of the Caspian Sea region to Europe, bypassing Russia and the Middle East. The significance of this move is not limited to the obvious economic developments in the area. It bears connotations as to the role of those two countries in South-Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the framework in which their relations are set for the future. Something is changing in our region and this issue's focus on Turkey seeks to provide answers to some of the questions that have recently emerged. The role of the state seems to have become alienated from traditional politics and is moving towards a more global approach, which brings economic cooperation prosperity and into the limelight. The notion of overcoming bilateral problems through convergence in the framework of regional cooperation, with an immediate result of strengthening ties and the creation of communities of interest, is at the forefront The states themselves can no longer deal with global problems, such as climate change, on their own; globalization has revealed potential markets, such as the Balkans and wider Europe; thus, the most institutional structure in our neighborhood, the European Union, is ‘opting out’ of the region' s common future.

This issue of The bridge tries to put these contemporary subjects into the appropriate context in order to provoke further debate for our region' s prospects. Globalization has rendered the world a place very far away and created some distance between individuals and their governance. However, in a democratic society, it is important to BRIDGE the gap and actively participate in the discussions concerning matters of public – nowadays, global – interest. At the same time, globalization can bring us closer and underlines once again that the future is what we make of it. The problems will not be solved at once, but the transformation of international politics into global politics may pave the way for a future community of people who respect diversities and eventually for the emergence of a new ‘post-modern’ cosmopolitan identity.

dialogue Climate change in the forefront A quarterly review on European integration SE Europe & the SE Mediterranean

A Security Question 32-33 by James Angelus

The bridge. is a quarterly publication of the “Agora Ideon” forum

Implications for Energy Security 34-36 by Alexander Wöstmann

Project Manager: BusinessOnMedia

Carbon Trading Outlook: any additional measures? 38-41 by Dr Anthony White

Contact: 118 Kremou Street, Kallithea, 17675 Athens, Greece tel: +30-210.953.3362 fax: +30-210.953.3096 www.bridge-mag.com e-mail: bridge@avk.gr

The Human Security aspect 44-46 by Hercules Moskoff

Publisher: Stavroula Sourila

(Yet another) Balkan Conflict: Development vs Environment 47-49 by Dr Christos Makropoulos

Publishing and Business Development Director: Kostas Tsaoussis

Homeless by nature 50-52 by Harry van Versendaal

Executive Consultant: Alexia Konachou

themes

Project Director: Victor Dhimas Editors in Chief: Dimitris Maziotis Andreas Hardaloupas Editorial Consultants: Kostis Kapopoulos Stavros Kourtalis Editorial Team: Eleni Fotiou Constantinos Angelopoulos Ali Osman Egilmez Alexandra Fiada Antonis Kamaras Maria Katechi Natassa Mastorakou Dimitris Pappas Simos Ververidis

Ben Andoni ALBANIANS & SERBS Farewell to the Eagle

frontlines 22-23

Inva Mula The Scala di Milano and the Balkans of the Future

The market the competition and the regulators 102-103 by Panagis Vourloumis culture 110 - 111

activities 104

market view

Kostas Ifantis The Lisbon Treaty: Opting out of our common future?

105-107

and more...

Columnist: Gazmend Kapllani

frontlines 12

Internet Edition Manager Vasilis Loukanidis Proof-reading: Elizabeth Gardiner Artwork team: Dimitris Stergiou Dimitris Papadimitriou Vangelis Nikas Advertising Executive Manager: Thanos Triantafyllou Montage-Printing: Kathimerini SA ISSN 1791-2237

‘Olympic Truce’ writing contest The writing contest on “The Olympic Truce and the principles and ideals promoted through it” was succesfully completed. The winners will be announced on our next issue. For more information please consult our website.

The bridge. quarterly review is distributed along with the International Herald Tribune (IHT) and Kathimerini English Edition newspapers in Greece, Cyprus and Albania free of charge (4 August 2007). After the initial day of publication it can be purchased at news-stands. The content of the magazine does not involve the reporting or the editorial departments of the IHT.

© The bridge.. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The bridge.. Where opinion is expressed it is that of the authors and does not necessarily coincide with the editorial views of the publisher of The bridge.. All information in this magazine is verified to the best of the authors’ and the publisher’s ability. However, The bridge. does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it.

cover story

Letter to José

Turkey unveiled Conservatism Globalism vs Defensive Nationalism 54-55 by Ziya Önis A silent revolution: the European integration process 59-61 by Ayhan Kaya

frontlines 10

Turkish Conservatives’ EU choice: Tactic or Strategy? 62-64 by Hakan Yilmaz

Egemen Bagis Perspectives on Turkey’s EU bid

From Domestic Crisis to Regional Challenge 65 by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis Turkey at a crossroads 66-67 by E. Fuat Keyman Accessing Justice 72-73 by Dr. Irene Banias

frontlines 14-16

A Turbulent Process: Society on the move 74-75 by Dilek Kurban

Gazmend Kapllani A Balkan Prayer

Turkey and its Northern Iraq crisis 76-77 by Ibrahim Al-Marashi Becoming an energy hub 78-79 by Gareth M. Winrow impressions 108 - 109

Dora Bakoyannis The Future in Our Hands

Performance and prospects of the Turkish economy 81 by Inan Demir Turkey’s FDI and Privatization Prospects 82-83 by Huseyin Kelezoglu

TUSIAD and democracy: The maturity of Turkish Capital 86-87 by David Neylan

Simon Reddy 40 Cities delivering for the future

dialogue 42

Rapprochement vs Nationalism 90-91 by By Umut Ozkirimli and Harry Tzimitras Out of the box: Turkish media going global 92-93 by Esra Arsan The Voice of Diasporic Turkish Artists 94-95 by Yesim Burul Seven

frontlines 24-25

contents

Europe in Brief

y Agora: bringimnge ncitvic societ

EU's progress

8 an d Fri da y, Th ur sd ay , No ve mb er entatives from across November 9 saw 400 repres ent. They were there Europe at the European Parliam aimed at more direct as part of the Agora platform a say in how the EU democracy and giving people ions and trade unions works. Associations, organisat workshops and debates were all present for a series of ion. The need for a ‘huon the future course of the Un ting Europe's values of man vision’ in policy and projec the international stage democracy and tolerance on were all stressed.

The European Commission today released its annual batch of progress reports on EU candidate countries and membership hopefuls. The reports deliver a warning to speed up the implementation of reforms affecting key political rights. Turkey has been told it must show real political change. Croatia remains on course for membership as long as reforms progress and everything is done to apprehend the fugitive war crimes suspect Ante Gotovina. Macedonia gets a thumbs up for EU candidate status. And the other western Balkan countries still have a long road ahead of them. In its regular progress report on November 6, the Commission expressed its disappointment over the slowdown of reform in Turkey, and called on the country to step up its efforts on the road to EU accession. Noting only ‘limited progress’ made towards reform so far, the report said that ‘significant further efforts are needed’ to guarantee freedom of expression, limit the military's influence on politics, as well as ensure minority rights. On a more positive note, the Commission praised the mastering of a major political crisis this year from which Turkey emerged ‘with reinforced democratic institutions’. However, Rehn underlined that now the time has come for Turkey to regenerate the reform process, saying that at least two chapters, on consumer and health protection, as well as trans-European networks, could be opened in the coming weeks. The Commission said that ‘further progress’ is also needed on the fight against corruption, the judicial system, trade union rights, children's and women's rights, cultural rights and civilian oversight of the military.

reports 2007

into Parlia

Brussels urges Belgrade

in the heat of Kosovo talks Brussels has done its best to ‘encourage’ Belgrade while talks about the status of Kosovo are entering in the final stage saying that the efforts of Serbian officials for seizing Ratko Mladic are a precondition for signing an agreement on stabilization and association - the first significant agreement between Serbia and the EU, ‘After the noted progress by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal in Hague Carla del Ponte I decided that the agreement would be signed in Brussels for stabilization and association between Serbia and the EU that will be the first step forward to the EU joining’, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn announced the ‘good news’.

ion of CO2 e EU plans inclus on tr ad in g sc he m st or ag e in ca rb

gases prevented from Industrial greenhouse h the use of so-called entering the atmosphere throug S) technology are to carbon capture and storage (CC er the EU emissions be credited as not emitted und mission plans to be trading scheme, according to Com put forward next year.

Ukraine 'moving towards'

EU membership

That was the message from Edilberto Segura, one of the country's top economists, at a meeting in Brussels. Speaking on Thursday, the former World Bank official said, ‘EU membership will come - it is only a matter of time.’ Despite the ongoing political gridlock, he said the

Orange Revolution of 2004 had led to ‘more transparency and accountability’ than his country had ever known. ‘But the risk of Ukraine going backwards is almost nil. Ninety per cent of its population want free market reform and closer relations with the EU, policies which are supported by all three major political parties.’

AMC

PUBLI

Operating in Albania since 1996 and as a COSMOTE Group company since 2000, AMC is the leading mobile operator in the domestic market. With a customer base of over 1.13 million at the end of September 2007 and a market share of approximately 52%, AMC continues its strong performance at all levels, increasing its revenues, enhancing its customers, upgrading its offerings. During the first nine months of 2007, COSMOTEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Albanian subsidiary recorded revenues of over 130 million euros, up by 18.2% on a yearly basis, resulting from a 26% increase in its subscriber base and a 23% increase in traffic, driven mainly by contract customers. AMCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s EBITDA grew by 24.5% in the nine months period on a 62.7% margin. AMC constantly enhances its network capacity, currently offering over 98.7% population coverage and enriches its services portfolio with new competitive mobile solutions addressing the real market needs.

Letter to José Reinforcing the Lisbon Strategy through external economic measures On September 10th 2007 in Meseberg, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, and Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, wrote a joint letter to José Socrates, President of the European Union Council, regarding the Lisbon Strategy of the European Union.

Dear José, The European Union has made considerable progress towards increasing its competitiveness. During the last few years, companies and employees have successfully adapted to the demands of a globalized economy. Structural reforms in the European Union and in the member states have underpinned this process, which is bringing prosperity and jobs to people. In a globalized world we can bolster the positive effects of these adjustments by reinforcing our domestic efforts through external economic measures. We remain convinced that open markets will guarantee Europe’s prosperity and development. We are therefore still working towards reaching a balanced and comprehensive agreement in the Doha Round. However, we have observed that non-tariff trade and investment barriers, as well as unfair practices in the global economy, including politically influenced exchange rates, have reached alarming proportions. We want to do more to tackle these problems, and to keep access to raw materials and energy as open as possible, to vigorously protect intellectual property rights, to reinforce trade policy instruments against unfair trade practices and to prevent State financial incentives from distorting competition. Open markets can only develop their full potential if transparent rules facilitate fair competition in a spirit of reciprocity. That will require a united front, especially when it comes to devising strategies to convince third states to dismantle barriers which place European companies at a disadvantage. Alternatively, Europe should negotiate waivers similar to those granted to our big trading partners in order to foster SME growth. Particular attention should be paid to those spheres in which sovereign wealth funds distort competition. Europe has to take this up with its partners. The EU’s economic success will continue to depend on the competitiveness of our economies. Recent developments have brought home to us that the stability of these increasingly globalized financial markets is vital for our economies and cannot by any means be taken for granted. Financial market transparency and appropriate regulation and supervision are of the essence if damaging excesses are to be averted. We need to foster this transparency and accountability for all players, including rating agencies, both at European and global level. We should also call for a code of conduct for the hedge fund sector. The heads of State and government of the European Union and the President of the European Commission should therefore work together to tackle all these issues. We could lay the necessary groundwork for making decisions by the 2008 spring summit through discussions at the next informal meeting of heads of State and government in October. - II -

Downloaded from: French Embassy in the United Kingdom, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/spip.php?page=sommaire&id_rubrique=2

GLOBUL

PUBLI

Operating in a strongly competitive market, GLOBUL today is the second biggest mobile operator and the leader in new customer acquisition in the market. As of September 2007 the company has 3.7 million customers, recording a yearly increase of almost 27% and constantly increasing the share of its post paid subscribers. Focusing on the expansion of its network coverage and distribution network, the widest in Bulgaria, and effectively addressing all market segments with its advanced products and services GLOBUL steadily enhances its subscribers growth momentum and financial performance. GLOBUL revenues increased by 21% to 301.2 million Euro in the nine month 2007 period, driven by its 90% increased postpaid traffic. The company’s net income grew by almost 49% on a yearly basis, while its EBITDA stood at 117.9 million Euro, up by 28.2% y-o-y. Enjoying a store visibility of 32% in Bulgaria, GERMANOS has significantly contributed in GLOBUL’s postpaid market share gain, as demonstrated by the fact that in Q3-07 versus Q3-06 the retailer’s participation in GLOBUL’s net postpaid adds has increased by 67%.

The Lisbon Treaty: Opting out of our common future? By Kostas Ifantis

The Euro-philes have at least one reason to be optimistic again. The integration project of the EU is on track taking into account the recent developments in Lisbon that put an end to the ‘institutional impasse’ which has troubled the EU leaders for the last two years. Two failed referenda on the draft EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands have plunged the Union into a major crisis since 2005. At the June 2007 European Summit, EU leaders agreed on a detailed mandate to finalise the text of a new Treaty to reform the EU's institutions, thus ending the two-year stalemate following the rejection of the Constitution by France and the Netherlands. The recent agreement reached by European leaders on October 18-19 in Lisbon enables a solution to the recent crisis. Although the Reform Treaty is less ambitious in terms of content and form, and it is just a modification of the existing treaties, it offers a step forward to the common future of the EU member states. As far as the content of the Lisbon Treaty is concerned, almost all the institutional reforms that the draft Constitution provided for, were included unaltered in the Reform Treaty: Double majority rule for Council decisions was adopted (55% of member states and 65% of the EU' s population is needed for EU legislations to pass with qualified majority). However, due to the fierce Polish opposition, the new voting system will be applied partially in the transitional period between 2014 and 2017, and entirely only after 2017, when additional provisions will be adopted to ease the blocking of some decisions. Qualified majority voting was extended to 40 policy areas, particularly to those related to asylum, immigration, police co-

operation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. A permanent Council presidency was set up, to chair EU Summits for a renewable term of 2.5 years instead of six-monthly rotation. The post of a ‘double-hatted’, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was introduced, replacing the current EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, and the external relations commissioner. Due to reservations on the British side, the label EU Foreign Minister was dropped. The number of Commissioners will be reduced from 27 to 15 by 2014. A single legal personality for the EU was introduced. National parliaments were reinforced with the right to raise objections against the draft EU legislations, and an exit clause was included making it possible for members to pull out of the EU. The changes in the Reform Treaty are: A more rigorous definition of the respective competence of the Union and the member states: Customs Union, trade, competition and monetary policy are still exclusive competences of the Union; social, energy, internal market, research policies are still competences shared with the states. A more specific status of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with, notably, the creation of the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the inclusion of the CFSP' s intergovernmental structure in the Treaty. The involvement and control of national parliaments with an extension of the deadlines from six to eight weeks for the examination of texts; along with this the

enhancement of control over the principle of subsidiarity (national parliaments will be able to request that the Commission review a proposal, if they believe that there is encroachment with their areas of competence). Maintenance of police and judicial cooperation with regard to criminal matters, with the exception of some opting-out clauses for the British. Facilitation of enhanced cooperation treaties in areas where unanimity rule still applies, for the states that wish to proceed faster than others – this might be applied in areas such as taxation and foreign policy. Moreover, it is important to note that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not an integral part of the treaties, but it is ensured that it constitutes an obligatory legal value and it has a well-defined range of application (with the exceptions of the British and the Polish). One very important topic was included for the first time, that of global warming. The policy to fight global warming was linked to the energy policy of the Union and was included in the European treaties. To sum up and to take account of the content of the Reform Treaty, it is commonly recognized that the institutional proposals of the Constitutional Treaty practically found their place in the Lisbon Treaty. The fact is though, that the order of prioritization differs and it remains to be seen in the future whether the Euro-philes have really a reason to be optimistic. Kostas Ifantis is associate professor of international relations at the University of Athens and Vice - President of the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM) www.ekem.gr

COSMOTE ROMANIA

PUBLI

COSMOTE Romania is gradually becoming the mobile operator of choice for Romanians. The company, almost two years after it started its commercial operation, continues to show impressive growth rates, quarter by quarter. At the end of October COSMOTE Romania’s customer base exceeded 3 million, having added one million new customers in a six month period while for 3 consecutive quarters the company lead the Romanian market in net new adds. COSMOTE Romania managed to increase its revenues by almost 300% in the first 9 months of 2007, compared to the same period last year. In this course of growth and expansion, COSMOTE Romania relies upon its strong distribution network – currently consisting of 785 stores – and also upon its rapidly expanding telecommunications network: having reached over 97% population coverage and network quality on a par with competition, COSMOTE Romania is heavily investing to expand its capacity, given the strong subscriber numbers. The company’s network is expected to exceed competition coverage by year end. GERMANOS’s contribution has been pivotal to COSMOTE’s growth in Romania: Compared to Q3 2006, in Q3 2007, net post paid customers through GERMANOS in Romania have increased by 573%.

Perspectives on Turkey’s EU bid How do you explain the huge electoral success of AK PARTI in the 2007 elections? Do you think that this success gave further legitimization to the AK PARTI government to accelerate the reform process?

Egemen Bagis was elected to the Turkish Parliament in November 2002 as a member of the Justice and Development Party, also known as the AK Party. Besides representing Istanbul in the parliament, he serves as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister. As a top advisor, Mr Bagis (www.ege menbagis.com) has been playing a key role in AK Parti’s dedicated reform drive In Turkey towards robust democracy, the protection and expansion of individual freedoms, a liberal market economy, the rule of law, and Turkey’s global integration. Bagis has also been instrumental in keeping statesmen, international fora, and the media informed of developments in Turkey. As a patron of the arts, he is among the founders of two museums: the Istanbul Modern and the Santral Museum of Art & Industry. Also, he is an honorary member of the Siirt Solidarity Foundation.

AK Parti has increased its votes by more than 12% in the 2007 parliamentary elections, which is not a common thing in Turkey. Over the past 52 years, a governing party has never been able to increase its votes. AK Parti is the center party of Turkish political life, the different backgrounds of the new MPs and the amount of votes we gained are the signs of this. I think this is the most important outcome of the elections. The results are like the regeneration of our cells. It is like a turning point. Now it is time to make all the reforms and fulfill the requirements of democratization and economic development as Turkish people want us to do. We will do our best to increase our people’s standards of living because we believe that Turkish people deserve the same living standards as those of the European Union citizens. Course of implementation of the EU requirements Since 2002, Prime Minister Erdogan has shown great commitment in fulfilling some of the political criteria. However, there are some criteria not fulfilled yet. Do you think that some criteria cannot be implemented because of the rise

Egemen Bagis interviewed by Dimitris Maziotis and Eleni Fotiou

of nationalism and its exploitation by the Opposition and the security establishment? For example, do you think that an amendment to the A.301 of the New Penal Code will lead to political cost? The rise of nationalism exists not only in Turkey, but also in all the countries in course of accession in the EU. A. 301 is a recent law, which was passed after having been negotiated with the Commission and their representative in Ankara. The problem was that some judges and prosecutors made an exhaustive interpretation of the law. In the beginning, Erdogan and the government devoted some time to the judges and prosecutors to understand the real intention of the lawmakers. With one exception – that of H. Dink, who was unfortunately assassinated – we have seen that in practice, all the charges against, for example E. Safak and O. Pamuk, were dropped. It became evident that there are some issues that have to be dealt with. Erdogan convened one meeting with all the leaders of NGOs that are in a position to express their views on A. 301 and he asked them to come up with an alternative text. Until the present moment, they cannot agree: for some, it is too soft, for some too hard. Before revising the article, the government should establish a consensus among the people.

During the reform process, we have witnessed differences of opinion inside the AKP. Some of its leaders, such as Cemil Cicek, expressed different views as to the implementation of criteria, on which Prime Minister Erdogan has expressed his disagreement. Is there an anti-EU block inside the party? No, there are different approaches as far as the EU issues. Is there a full agreement among all the members of a party in all the issues? All the MPs do not have to agree on all the issues and that is normal in democracies. There must be different voices as well.

The AKP focuses on the protection of minorities, as mentioned in the European Commission’s Progress Reports. Why? It is very important to understand the roots of the Turkish nation, looking back to the Ottoman Empire. The respect towards minorities derives from the concept of loving all God’s creatures. However, we must also expect our European partners to respect the rights of their minorities. Bulgaria was pushing the members of the Turkish minority to change their names. Today, the Turkish people have established a party, which takes part in the coalition government. Their attachment is not to Turkey, but to Bulgaria, because the more prosperous Bulgaria is, the more prosperity they enjoy. Unfortunately,

this is not the case in Greece. There is no association that can use the name Turk or Turkish in its name. Greece has not been so tolerant. We have so many churches in Turkey enjoying their freedom – the Halki issue should be resolved –, but in Greece the Turks do not have the right to choose their religious leader. Public opinion condemns the government for giving in. Erdogan was the first Prime Minister to go to Western Thrace and to Thessaloniki to visit Ataturk’s house. The message he gave to the minority – Muslim for Greece, but we know it is a Turkish minority- was that its members ‘are citizens of Greece and their attachment should be to Greece; they have to look towards West, towards Greece, Athens and not towards Ankara’. Greece has to open their way, exactly as we should open the way to the Rums of Istanbul. When I look at Bartholomew, I do not see him as a representative of the Greek community, but as a constituent. I feel responsible for him. He brings an important richness to the diverse culture of Turkey.

The EU Commission lays special emphasis on civil-military relations. Why did the AKP focus on this issue? Appointing a civil Secretary General, Y. Alpogan, dissolving the State Security Courts, and removing the military member of the Higher Education Board (YOK) were some parts of the Europeanization and westerniza-

tion of Turkey. In a democratic society, the military protects the country against the outside forces and does not serve as an obstacle to fundamental freedoms. Nowadays, the National Security Council is only an advisory body in foreign policy formation. It meets every 3 months and it issues statements for guidance to the government. It is the elected government, which sets the policies and it is the parliament, which approves them. Of course, a Prime Minister consults every expert before taking a decision, and among the experts, there is the military as well. The parliament has more of a saying compared to the past. Nothing is perfect, but there will be more reform packages that will improve the situation, and the military supports them as well. However, we have to see that the EU is playing along with us in those issues. We have to adapt to the European values, but Europe has also to adapt to Turkey. Image of EU in Turkey According to the EU, there is a delay in implementation of the requirements after 2005. What are the causes of this delay? After the elections of 2002, when AKP first came to power, there was a very determined course of reforms. Erdogan and Gul traveled to all the European capitals and Brussels in order to establish the launching of negotiations. Since October 3, 2005, current Foreign Minister Mr. Babacan has been the chief negotiator

interview

and he has been visiting a European capital for one week of every month and then passing through Brussels. Within the last year, 1600 people from Ankara and Istanbul have traveled conducting talks in an official governmental capacity. Within one year, we have completed pre-screening in 36 chapters. We opened the chapter of science and technology and we closed it. We are ready to open and close 7 other chapters. So, I do not think there is a slowing down. There are issues, such as the opening of the ports to the 10 new member-states that can be seen as a slowing down, but this is a problem not deriving from the EU commitment but from the Customs Union commitment. Turkey is the only country that became a member of the Customs Union, before becoming a member of the EU. Turkey has contributed to the Customs Union since 1996, and now Turkey, in a way, appears to be being punished. When Turkey signed the commitment to open its ports, it received some promises on behalf of the Union, like the lifting of the unfair isolation of Turkish-Cypriots. Since that promise has not been not kept, Turkey is slightly hesitant in applying its commitment. We have signed the commitment and it is waiting for parliamentary approval. However, the statements of certain EU leaders, such as Berlusconi, Shroeder, Blair and many others show that there is no intention of keeping that promise. As soon as this promise is kept, we will fulfill our commitment. The slowing down is not on the part of Turkey, but on the part of the EU.

Do you believe that the EU treats Turkey in a discriminatory way? It is a common knowledge that the military is a deep-rooted tradition in Turkish politics. Are the political requirements – such as those related to the civic-military relations – realistic in the Turkish case? The word discriminatory might be too strong, but at times, double standards are applied in EU’ s treatment for Turkey. There is no doubt that Turkey can adapt to the criteria. The Turkish people deserve to live better. They have to enjoy the same level of democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, as that which exists in the other European countries. Our roots, traced back to the Ottoman Empire confirm that Turkey is an open society. In 1492, when Jews were expelled from Spain, only the Ottoman Empire opened its doors. The same happened in WWII when Turkey opened its doors. As a matter of fact, many founders of our universities were Jewish professors who left Germany because of the Holocaust. As to the feasibility of the political requirements, the EU claims that Turkey must

restore civil-military relations. Traditionally, the military has a lot of power, because the founders of the Turkish Republic were military people. It is part of their responsibility to protect the Turkish Republic. But one of the most important messages of Ataturk and the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic was that Turkey should match the level of contemporary civilizations. Today’s contemporary civilization is composed in accordance with the values that exist in the acquis communautaire and the EU standards. That is why, in general, the military supports Turkey’s Europeanization.

Are the reactions on the part of the military, like those of Buyukanit, directed against the AKP and Erdogan, or against the EU demand for diminishing the power of the military? The goal is not to diminish anybody’s power. The goal is to enlarge the power of people and to bring democracy. As politicians, we have to bear in mind that the military is part of the people and that it loves Turkey as much as we love Turkey. The military people know that there is only one elected government, which loves Turkey as much as they love Turkey. Sometimes, attitudes differ on how to make Turkey better, but this of course is the result of a process, in which different voices are heard and, in the end, whatever is best for Turkey comes out.

Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the cooperation of UNEP MAP

PUBLI

Climate change & human security

Human Security Network Chairmanship of Greece May 2007-2008

Scientific Fact Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of our time, with widespread implications in the development context. Even if greenhouse gas emissions were stopped today, some level of climate change is inevitable. Our collective efforts to curb future emissions of greenhouse gases will start influencing the climate change after their hoped success.

Main Hypothesis Climate change can have severe effects on human security in both developed and developing countries. With respect to the latter, climate change might most gravely affect vulnerable groups of people, belonging to populations living already on the edge between poverty and extreme poverty or between hunger and famine.

One Main Priority To address the human security impact of climate change with special focus on vulnerable groups of people such as women, children and persons fleeing their homes in seriously affected regions of the developing world.

Three main objectives A) The compilation and subsequent presentation, in a concise manner, in cooperation with the Greek think tank ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy) of the existing studies on the impact of climate change on human security of vulnerable groups in regions that are to be primarily affected. B) The elaboration of three policy papers, one for each vulnerable group. These studies will be prepared in collaboration with prominent Greek (ELIAMEP) and International Research Centers. In particular, the policy paper on climate change impact on children will be implemented in collaboration with UNICEF, while the one on women will be prepared in collaboration with leading international NGO WEDO (Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Environment and Development Organization) and the one on persons fleeing their homes due to climate change in collaboration with the United Nations University. C) An overall policy paper on development cooperation and the impact of climate change on human security. This study will be elaborated in co-operation with the well known International Institute for Environment and Development with project manager the leading climate change expert Dr. Saleemul Huq.

Why Climate Change from its Human Security Aspect? Most policy analysts often focus on how to mitigate risk. Human security issues related to climate change have largely been framed in terms of conflict or cooperation rather than in terms of ‘whose security is at stake, and why?’ There is a considerable need for more research on the ways climate change might undermine human security because the level of understanding people’s vulnerability is still sufficiently uncertain as far as the designing of effective response strategies is concerned. The interplay between security and climate change is rather complex on all levels: global, national, local. It requires an understanding of the affected groups’ capacities to adapt to change, the limits of those capacities and the potential of violent outcomes should these capacities fail.

Why Women? Climate change will severely impact the lives of poor women who form the majority in the developing world and are the ones already suffering from access to basic goods and rights. Scarcity of food: In many poor countries it is often the case that women are forced to eat less and it is therefore anticipated that in cases of scarcity of resources or natural disasters caused by climate change it will be again women to be malnourished, something extremelydangerous, especially during pregnancy. Natural Disasters: Women are most vulnerable since they have to save both themselves and their children. In the aftermath of natural disasters or conflicts due to climate change: Women are exposed to increased risks, be it in refugee camps, or in their resettlement areas or even in countries where they seek asylum. Women and girls are especially vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking and other forms of gender-based violence.

Why Children? Children are physically more vulnerable than adults, to malnutrition disease and hardships, that can sometimes affect them throughout their adult life. The lives of up to tens of millions of children will be endangered by floods, drought and climate change related diseases over the next decades (malaria etc). Millions of children will be killed, forced to flee their homes and put at risk from hunger, disease and physical or sexual abuse. Children in developing countries, where there are few adequate warning systems or strategies to lower risk, will also be most affected by ‘slow-moving’ disasters including temperature extremes, desertification and extreme weather events.

Why Persons fleeing their homes? Impacts will be more significant in sectors of the population with high resource-dependency and in the environmentally and socially marginalized areas. Climate change may have a negative impact on the State’s ability to create opportunities and provide important freedoms for people, as well as its capacity to adapt and respond to climate change itself. Migration may be one response of people, although climate alone is unlikely to be the sole, or even the most important ‘push’ factor in migration decisions. Yet largescale movements of people may increase the risk of conflicts in host communities.

Why Developing and Least developed countries?

PUBLI

Developing and least developed countries are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because of their concentration in the tropics, their heavy dependence on agriculture and their limited capacity to deal with natural disasters. Climate change appears as a new challenge and a factor exacerbating existing problems such as pre-existing conflict, poverty and unequal access to resources, weak institutions, food insecurity and spreading of diseases. Least developed countries, despite having the least contribution to the greenhouse effect, will bear the immediate and heaviest burden.

Greece’s position with respect to climate change and development policy The floods in Europe earlier this year as well as the summer forest fires that raged across southern Europe and Greece in particular, demonstrated that the speed and the scale of climate change are such that can affect all regions and countries. One can easily imagine what will happen when more vulnerable countries are going to be hit by such phenomena, or other more slow moving disasters that will take place due to climate change in the next decades.

Adapting EU development policy to climate change Climate change is an undeniable reality. Whatever is done today on the front of mitigation, will not prevent most of its impacts in decades to come. This is why Greece sees climate change as an important dimension for development assistance and cooperation policy, particularly for the least developed countries. Greece also considers necessary that the commonly accepted definition of a country’s “fragile situation” should be widened and enriched with a clear reference to environmental insecurity. For all the above, there should be a serious turn in European development assistance in addressing climate change’s impact on vulnerable regions. Development assistance should be revisited accordingly especially with respect to the least developed countries. This turn should be based on an integrated approach on the issue of development, security and human security.

A European mechanism to address natural disasters Forest fires in southern Europe demonstrated also the need for closer, institutionalized and strengthened European policy for confronting natural disasters. Wildfires and floods have made it evident that climate change can put all countries’ infrastructures to an unprecedented test. Greece supports and is at the forefront for the establishment of a European mechanism able to respond to similar challenges in the near future.

Raising awareness, Elaborating Policies Athens, November 27th 2007 the Greek Chair will present the HSN priorities and work plan activities for the general public. A poster and children paintings’ exhibition on climate change, in cooperation with UNEP/MAP, will take place in parallel to this event. December 2007 & early 2008 Three international events aiming at raising awareness and facilitating the preparation of the relevant policy papers: -New York, December 2007, 12th, during the GA Special Session on Children December 11th & 12th) Event focusing on climate change and human security as far as children are concerned, in cooperation with UNICEF. -Geneva, February 2008 Event focusing on climate change and human security as far as persons fleeing their homes are concerned, in cooperation with IOM -Vienna, early spring 2008 Event focusing on climate change and human security as far as women are concerned. Athens, March 2008 Senior Official Meeting: for presenting progress reports on the scientific compilation and draft policy papers, reviewing progress, coordinating efforts and seeking possible synergies. Greece, May 2008 Annual Ministerial Meeting, organized as a Policy Forum, and back to back a major International Conference on human security and climate change, during which the final conference policy papers will be presented.

A Green Light for Europe’s Blue Card At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe finds itself facing a double challenge: Demographic developments which mean that, according to projections, by 2050 two workers will have to pay for the livelihood of one retired person (compared with four workers today). An increasingly competitive global economy in which economic growth will depend on productivity growth after 2020. As a result, a growing number of suitable-skilled workers will be needed. At this point the European Commission has unveiled on 23 October 2007, a Blue Card (from the color of the European Union flag) for skilled immigrants, based on the US Green Card. The plan would allow highlyqualified migrants and their families to live, work and travel within the European Union. According to Franco Frattini, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Freedom, Security and Justice and inspirer of the project, ‘Europe must become a magnet for the highly-skilled, so that they prefer

to work in Europe, rather than in USA, Canada and Australia.’ The Blue Card would offer a two-year renewable work permit throughout the European Union, but would not provide permanent residency. After this period the same person will have the capability to work in another member country of the EU, something which is too difficult nowadays. The proposed scheme has some restrictions: in order to acquire this ‘passport’, candidates must have a recognized qualification, three years professional experience and a job offer that could not be filled by an EU citizen. On the other hand, after five years of working and living in the EU, immigrants automatically obtain permission for permanent residency. This proposal promotes ethical recruitment standards, in order to avoid ‘brain draining’ from the African continent, that would result in the loss of a large number of skilled-workers, causing economic haemorrhage. The Commission has calculated that the EU needs an extra twenty million immi-

By Thanos Triantafyllou

grants, both high-skilled and low-skilled, over the next twenty years, and is very short of expertise in engineering and computer technology. According to the European Commission statistics, 55% of qualified immigrants choose the USA and not the EU to live and work. At the same time, 85% of the immigrants who live in the 27 members states do not have a bachelor’s degree. In any case, the member state holds the right to decide how many and what kind of experts are needed. This is not an 'open doors' policy, but an ambitious and balanced policy on immigration and integration. It is necessary to master the immigration and integration of migrants from a social cohesion point of view, against those – as Commission President José Manuel Barroso said – who employ illegal migrants. It is important to underline that the UK, Ireland and Denmark could opt out, but the rest of the EU members will have to take part. The EU has to face these challenges, creating conditions of social security and economic growth, making Europe more attractive and more welcoming to migrants with sought-after skills. Thanos Triantafyllou is political scientist.

frontlines

ALBANIANS & SERBS:

Farewell to the Eagle By Ben Andoni

The Albanians and the Serbs of Kossovo are dedicated to their wedding customs. In the case of the Albanians, at the end of the wedding celebrations, the friends of the groom take away the bride wrapped in the Albanian national flag, with the black eagle in the middle. The flag that the Serbs wrap the bride in also has an eagle in the middle – only the Serbian eagle is white... The eagle 'unites' Albanians and Serbs. It is their common symbol. Until recently, it was the official symbol of the Albanians in Kossovo. And it seems that the eagle will long remain the common element uniting Serbs and Albanians– albeit only in weddings and local celebrations. Because the eagle will have to 'fly off' the new Kossovo flag. The Committee for the Symbols of Kossovo has undertaken the designing of a new symbol. According to the UN directives, the new symbol of Kossovo has to be 'neutral, original and singular' and to 'represent all national groups living in Kossovo'. So painters and designers, young and old, Serbs and Albanians, are feverishly working on the project and are submitting their finished ideas in the hope that they will be deemed appropriate to become the new symbols of Kossovo. Zake Prevulkaj is one of the

painters who have sent their drawings to the Committee. She believes that in the not so distant future, things will change and will calm down. The coming generations will not be fraught with nationalistic complexes. Whatever the future may hold, however, the question is whether the new 'national symbol' will be acceptable to the two largest communities that make up Kossovo, the Albanians and the Serbs. The chasm that yawns between the two is immense and no one knows how they will react to a new national symbol. To this end, Hajredin Kuci, head of the Committee for the Symbols of Kossovo, has a 'compromise'. He suggests that each community should be allowed to keep its own national symbols, having only the neutral state symbol in common. 'No one has ever abandoned one's own national symbol, and never will,' he pointed out. Furthermore, one should also emphasize that in Kossovo symbols come before the estab-

lishment of a sovereign state - an originality that perhaps has no counterpart elsewhere in the world…

The Committee for the Symbols of Kossovo The debate about the new symbols created quite a stir in Kossovo. Several Albanian politicians declared that it will be hard to distance themselves from symbols they identify with. Yet the directives are more than clear: if the Kossovars wish to see an independent Kossovo, then in the flag of the new state there is no place for either the black eagle or the black and red colors, which refer to the Albanian flag. It is for this reason that the Unity Team, which comprises representatives of the Albanian political parties of Kossovo, has formed the Committee for the Symbols, the members of which have undertaken to draw up the rules for the competition for designing the new symbols. Up until now, some 1,736 proposals have been submitted to the Committee, which, in collabora-

tion with the parliamentary leaders of the political parties, will select the best suggestions. Yet, this would not be the end of the story, since the new symbols will have to be approved by a two thirds majority at the Kossovar Parliament. Apart from the new symbol, the composition of a national anthem for Kossovo is also pending â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the competition for which has not been proclaimed as yetâ&#x20AC;Ś

Waiting for the flag Painter Zake Prevulkaj described how she worked on the new symbol for Kossovo. 'I tried to comply with the terms laid down by the Unity Team,' she said. 'The flag and the national emblem should not resemble the flags of either Albania or Serbia. I did a lot of research, trying to determine what could really be called Kossovar. From the beginning I avoided any religious references and any established national symbolism. Finally, I selected as the most appropriate the Dardanian figurine, which was also in use before the war as a representative symbol of Kossovar culture. It is a very old symbol, some 4,500-5,000 years old, from a time when people did not live apart. It was found in the Dardania region,

at Pristina. Besides, I believe that it is a very distinctive symbol, attractive, quite new for the people. It seems a bit like the symbols one sees in science fiction movies. In my opinion though, this symbol is the more appropriate for the Kossovo of today.' It seems though that the citizens of Kossovo are not paying much attention to the debate about the new symbols. Tired of the hardships of everyday life, fed up with the repeated changes that the international handling of the case demands of them, they are relegating symbols to a back burner. What they most ask for is a solution regarding the kind of regime that will finally be established in the region. 'From then on, I believe that, although it will not be easy to wean the Kossovars from symbols they have been identified with, they will accept the new ones, because they know they have to. The people have been tired and torn by the political and financial problems they have been suffering for so long. Psychological war is much harder than the real war we had eight years ago. The new symbols would be accepted on the premise that they will be heralding a better quality of life and the

establishment of a final regime,' said Zake Prevulkaj. Valon Syla is yet another of the painters participating in the competition. He suggests the idea of the tricolor flag: black, white, red. France, Belgium, Holland and other countries, he explained, have plenty of symbols and emblems they could have used on their national flags. Yet these countries chose the tricolored scheme as a communication symbol, initially in order to simplify their national symbols and then in order to avoid any references to the times before achieving statehood. Meanwhile, no one knows for certain when the matter of what will be the final regime of Kossovo will be solved. Until such a date, people can go on honoring their customs in their wedding celebrations, flying the flag with the black or the white eagle, depending on the occasion and their identity. At least until the competition for the new symbols has been concludedâ&#x20AC;Ś

Ben Andoni is a freelance journalist based in Tirana.

frontlines

40 CITIES The C40 climate leadership group is a coalition of international cities committed to tackling climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The group was first convened by London Mayor Ken Livingstone, who realised that 75 per cent of emissions came from cities. In August 2006, as Chair of the C40, Ken Livingstone signed an agreement with former US President Bill Clinton, which saw the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) become the implementing partner for the group. The aim of the C40 is to enable cities to take rapid action where national governments have failed. The focus of the group is, therefore, on practical measures utilizing the considerable collective powers and budgets of cities that together represent a quarter of a billion people. Tellingly, its first big announcement in May this year was of a $5bn building retrofit programme. This scheme addresses the fact that much of our building stock is poorly insulated and uses old energy-inefficient technology to heat and cool them. The programme, launched by former President Bill Clinton, along with the Mayors of London and New York, brought together five multinational corporations, five global banks providing

By Simon Reddy

backing of $5 billion, and 15 city partners to retrofit buildings and reduce carbon emissions around the world. This programme has the potential to reduce global carbon emissions by as much as 10 per cent and is the first of many initiatives that the C40 will announce in partnership with the Clinton Climate Initiative. The five biggest energy services companies in the world, Honeywell, Johnson Controls Inc, Siemens, Trane and Schneider Electric, are signed up to conduct energy audits, perform building retrofits, and guarantee the energy savings of the retrofit projects. ABN AMRO, Citi, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, and UBS have committed to arranging $1bn each to finance cities and private building owners to undertake these retrofits at no net cost, doubling the global market for energy retrofit in buildings. These banks will work alongside energy efficiency finance specialist Hannon Armstrong and the Clinton Climate Initiative to

develop effective mechanisms to deploy this capital globally. Cities and building owners will pay back the loans plus interest with the energy savings generated by the reduced energy costs thanks to the building retrofits. An initial group of fifteen cities have offered their municipal buildings for the first round of energy retrofits. They include: Bangkok, Berlin, Chicago, Houston, Johannesburg, Karachi, London, Melbourne, Mexico City, New York, Rome, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Tokyo, and Toronto. Some of these cities have also agreed to speed up permitting times and offer incentives to private building owners. London is expected to lead the way on retrofits, and has just announced a tender shortlist. Paris has announced its intention to retrofit 660 schools in the Paris area. Future programmes are planned around key emissions areas such as transport, waste and water. While the membership of the C40 is limited to cities with a population over three million, the programmes devel-

DELIVERING FOR THE FUTURE oped by the C40 and the Clinton Climate Initiative will be available to any city in the world once they are up and running. The C40 also offers an opportunity to share best practice and policy between cities. Last May, the C40 held its second summit in New York. Thirty two Mayors attended with representatives from over 50 cities as well as senior executives from the worlds largest companies and financial institutions. Many delegations declared it the most productive conference they had ever attended. The range of discussion topics included: transport – congestion charging, bus rapid transport, car free days, hybrid and hydrogen bus engines; waste – recycling and energy from waste such as bio-digestion; water – wastage and energy used in delivery of water; energy – use of renewables, decentralised energy and Combined Heat and Power systems;

building – retrofitting of existing buildings and low and zero emission homes for the future. On almost every topic covered, the world's leading city in that field was on hand to enable other cities to learn from its experiences. Summit attendees agreed to hold future workshops the first of which will be on transport and congestion, and will be held in London on December 3-5, 2007. Further workshops are planned for 2008 on airport emissions and port city emissions. The C40 started small, with 18 cities attending a meeting in London at Ken Livingstone's invitation in 2005. But the C40 now constitutes a global partnership that can rapidly accelerate greenhouse gas emission reductions, even if negotiations between national governments continue to stall. It is early days, but there is a real willingness and commitment to drive this initiative forward.

The latest C40 city is Athens, which is joining the following: Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beijing, Berlin, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Caracas, Chicago, Delhi NCT, Dhaka, Hanoi, Houston, Istanbul, Jakarta, Johannesburg, Karachi, Lagos, Lima, London, Los Angeles, Madrid, Melbourne, Mexico City, Moscow, Mumbai, New York, Paris, Philadelphia, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Shanghai, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, and Warsaw.

Simon Reddy manages the C40 Secretariat, which is based in London. C40 website: www.c40cities.org.

frontlines

Can the fires that devastated Greece and other Mediterranean countries this summer be perceived as terrorist acts? Can we attribute the characteristics of a terrorist attack to the mainly economic motives of arsonists? The Italian Vice-President of Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission, Franco Frattini opens a brand new chapter in the discussions about the confrontation of emergencies, by characterizing the recent fires that broke out in several Mediterranean countries as a result of a new form of 'territorial terrorism'. The importance of this particular stance rests on the fact that for the first time a high level official of the European Commission recognizes that there is a new issue to be dealt with in the context of European Civil Protection. Commissioner Frattini's opinion

Debate on Franco Frattini: Territorial Terrorism

shows that on the European agenda, there already exists the notion of a need to tackle with future challenges stemming from new forms of terrorism that may wish to harm governments or the social and economic structures of a state - directly, or indirectly. According to the position of the Commissioner, as it is presented in his website (http://ec.europa.eu/ commission_barroso/frattini/webroot/welcome/default_en.htm), 'The recent fires are a sign of a new form of threat against our ecological heritage and close the circle with a singular link: between the obscure and greedy building profiteers and those who are trying to put a region, an economy on its knees by changing the landscape in an irreversible manner. The flames are now at the door of inhabited centres and it's these same people that are going to die. It is a completely new form of territorial terrorism: it should therefore be fought and eliminated with

new arms and by new juridical means. We are not, in fact, confronted by a limited and opportunistic form of delinquency, or the product of somebody who has no feelings or public ethics. The fire is not the result of a guilty distraction'. It is interesting how the fires are being perceived as a European problem, given the fact that the fires affect the EU Mediterranean states as a whole and they do not constitute a mere domestic issue. 'And it is not only Italy that is prey to the local mafia. France, Spain and now Greece all know this new disaster, this territorial terrorism which is threatening the whole of Southern Europe.' The position of Franco Frattini reveals three important issues, which will set the basis for future discussions on the confrontation of emergencies. Firstly, in the effort to decode the motives behind the selection of his words, we can come up with the conclusion that â&#x20AC;&#x201C; at least at the rhetoric level â&#x20AC;&#x201C; he is trying to pres-

ent a different and more critical aspect of the problem. He has obviously realized that in order to systematize the discussion about the fires and other natural disasters at a European level, we have to put the phenomena in a different framework. We must make it clear in the consciousness of all European citizens that those disasters constitute real threats. We must consider the reaction of civilized society towards a phenomenon whose effects influence the economic, political, environmental and cultural domain of its action. The success of those directly responsible rests on the fact that citizens must adjust the norms of their daily activities to new terms of threat and new types of phenomena. Secondly, the selection of the term 'terrorism', will eventually lead the European discussions to a different level of abstraction and to a different approach to the means of combatting it. The confrontation of emergencies, which today forms part of the bilateral or multilateral

cooperation among the Civil Protection Services of the EU states that share the same characteristics (for example, the FIRE-FOUR Initiative on behalf of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal), will transform to an issue of Security, as soon as it is perceived as a threat. This shifting of policy will place the issue at the center of discussions at a European level. A new concept has therefore been introduced into the European agenda, whose deeper implications should be explored. This consists of a widening of the term of threat and the appearance of new types of motives and causes of a phenomenon that is manifested at the local level. Last but not least, throughout the approach of Franco Frattini, we can lead ourselves to the conclusion that it is high time we tackled the critical issue of rendering the coordination system of the EU member states more effective, especially with a view to confronting newly emerged threats and to adopting

new legislation accordingly. In this way, the framework will be set for the total reformation of the content and the operational competences of the European Civil Protection Mechanism and, eventually, a European Corps to encounter natural disasters, including forest fires, will be established. The Greek initiative, undertaken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms. Dora Bakoyannis for the creation of a cohesive mechanism of European Civil Protection, is under way in this same context. 'We have to act and know how to react and we have to show efficient coordination. We need new instruments capable of speeding up the initiatives of member states and promoting new forms of common actions. We have to show a new kind of conscience.'

European Climate policy: Ambitious targets need ambitious actions In order to reduce the dramatic consequences of climate change, the EU is committed to preventing the global temperature from rising more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, as recommended by the world climate scientific community. This will require a cut by developed countries of their 1990 greenhouse gases emissions levels of 30% by 2020 and of 60-80% by 2050. Therefore, the EU is committed to a unilateral CO2 reduction target of 20% until 2020, 30% in the framework of an international agreement if other industrialized countries join this effort. Achieving these targets will require active changes in technology, lifestyle and fuel mixes within five to ten years. To achieve this, policy measures must be introduced on a European level within five years. This is tomorrow in policy terms and therefore action must start today. But implementing actual measures to reduce CO2 reductions has proven much more difficult than agreeing on ambitious reduction targets. Climate protection efforts are often perceived as a threat to growth and employment in Europe. But the contrary is true. To be able to compete also in the future, Europeans have to learn to use energy more efficiently and to save energy. Every promising climate strategy has to prioritize energy saving, energy efficiency and renewables in energy use and production. This is the only way to be able to provide the consumers and the industry with affordable energy. Only with these priorities will we be capable of mitigating the economic and ecological consequences of climate

change. In some EU member states ‘green growth’ is already happening today. Those countries that have created new markets for new technologies by providing a reliable framework; as an example, Germany are now at the forefront of the development of green technologies. The renewable energy act based on the feed-in tariff has helped solar, wind and biogas technologies to become established on the market and, at the same time, it helped the environment and Germany as a technology location. In 2006, 214,000 people were working in the renewables industry. The forecast for 2007 looks even better – 250.000 jobs in this area are predicted. There is no other sector in Germany that is growing as fast and continuously. Since climate protection and the security of energy supply are priorities in many countries of the world today, markets for wind turbines, solar cells, biogas installations, but also efficiency technologies, will keep on growing. Our political aim has to be to ensure that the industry of Europe leads the way into the new age of sustainable technologies instead of missing out on these opportunities. A European regulation for the car industry is currently in the pipeline. In this case, two major goals can be reached similtaneously: climate protection and the development of cars that will keep mobility affordable by reducing fuel consumption rates. By limiting CO2 emissions from cars we create opportunities for car producers and their employees. Not only Toyota, but also VW, Peugeot and Fi-

By Rebecca Harms

at can produce efficient and climate friendly cars with style. The developers and engineers of the European car industry are already in a position to produce cars that are much more efficient than the range of cars on offer suggests. Climate friendly and fuel saving cars have to and will dominate the world market soon. Binding CO2 emission targets for 2012 and a commitment to 2020 targets will further innovation which is much needed in the car sector. Until now the car industry has had its priorities wrong. Every efficiency gain has been used for the production of even more powerful engines instead of producing smaller and more efficient cars. The implementation of the new targets will change this habit. To be successful on the automotive market of the future the CO2 targets have to be welcomed not blocked. A limit value of 120 g CO2/km for 2012 and 80 g/km for 2020 will place Europe at the forefront of the world’s production regions in terms of energy efficient technology and will guarantee jobs in the EU. The resistance, especially by producers of large luxurious cars, against the EU proposals is neither in the best interests of the environment nor of the employees in the car sector. Ambitious climate protection efforts will release the innovation brakes and ensure employment in this sector. Rebecca Harms is a member of the European Parliament, Vice-Chairwoman of the Temporary Committee on Climate Change of the EP and Vice-Chairwoman of the Group of the Greens www.rebecca-harms.de

Climate change refers to changes in measures of climate and more specifically to variations in meteorological phenomena over long time scales. Such changes include significant statistical fluctuations in the average state of climate or its variability, lasting for extended periods of time. Climate change is caused by natural processes, but also by human intervention affecting the climate, such as acts changing atmosphere consistency. The problem of combating climate change has multiple dimensions. It extends to local, national, regional and international levels. Both directly and indirectly, it touches upon the issues of environment, energy security, alternative energy resources. It therefore has legal, political, economic and social implications. In a first step towards addressing this important contemporary issue, The bridge attempts to cast some light upon particular dimensions of this problem by drawing upon the expertise of scientists, academics and politicians.

dialogue

A Security Question There are few more sensitive issues on the global stage than energy and climate change. When these two terms are linked in a security context, the implications are vastly more significant. But what does this actually mean in terms of climate or energy security, and particularly to the Black Sea or Mediterranean regions? Energy security has become a primary concern of industry and governments worldwide, competing at the top of the list with terrorism, nuclear proliferation and sustainable development. No single issue has captured the public imagination nor mobilized the international community more. And for all the right reasons. As the demand for oil and gas rises along with the prices, there is a scramble for resources and alternative fuel that is unprecedented since the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s. New players such as China and India are competing for exploration and licensing agreements against the established majors, while Russia uses its new found power to exert pressure on its neighbors. Brazil and Malaysia and a host of other developing nations are weighing in as Europe, Japan and the US address their dependence on hydro-

By James Angelus

carbons from unstable parts of the world. The Black Sea region is one of the pivot points in the so-called Great Game whereby the great powers are competing for access to this prolific hydrocarbon province as they did in the 1800s, when Great Britain and the Russian and Ottoman empires wrestled for influence. With the current volatile mix of the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with complications in Iran and neighboring Iraq, the US and Europe have been making extensive efforts to insure supplies without transiting the Russian Federation – and losing the battle in most cases. Russia in the meantime refuses to ratify the Energy Charter that would open up its pipeline system to third parties, and is moving steadily toward new projects to feed the growing appetite of Northeast Asia. Enter the relatively new, but rapidly growing concern, for climate change. The fact that the planet is in peril, once a debatable subject between the energy and environmental communities, is sobering the minds of policy makers from Brussels to Beijing. This looming crisis is much larger than US or European or Chinese or Russian control of pipelines or who will get the rights to oil and gas resources in the Caspian basin. Now the issues are – what will we do as a civilization to meet this incredible chal-

lenge? How is energy connected to climate change? And is it energy security now or climate security . . . or both? Energy is the driving force behind our developing civilization, and the majority of carbon emissions that are assumed to be responsible for climate change as a result of human activity derive directly from our production and use of energy. The energy industry is slow to realize this, and even slower to admit it, but this realization is becoming the norm. Rather than oppose the evidence of climate change, the energy industry is acknowledging this reality and is beginning to position itself as the solution. Unfortunately, the political world is awash with ‘energy independence’ notions that appeal to their electorates concerned more with nationalistic sentiment than the common good of the planet or common sense about the interdependence of energy markets and world trade. How do they explain the remarkable growth of the Japanese and German economies in the last half of the 20th century when they were mostly dependent on foreign oil and gas? Or

explain the exploding economies of China and India today, which are likewise dependent on outside resources? The truth is that worldwide demand for energy will rise by 50% in the next 20 years and there is little tangible evidence that this demand can be met with existing resources and technologies. Even with the doubling of nuclear energy by 2030 as the IAEA projects, the demand for energy will far outstrip supply in all forms that are currently on line. The only solution is to continue what is happening today: education of the public, media focus on the problem, unilateral actions of local and national governments and a multilateral framework agreement for the post-Kyoto era. Energy companies, both private and public, must take the leading role in resolving this most urgent crisis. An international conference will be convened in Athens on May 5-7, 2008 to address these issues. Entitled The Athens Summit â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Global Climate and Energy Security, several hundred senior government officials and corporate leaders will assemble to discuss the common ground of the energy and environmental communities. President Karolas Papoulias will open this historic conference, joined by Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and the EU Commissioner of Environment, Stavros Dimas. The ministers of energy from 44 countries of the EuroMediterranean region are invited to sign a draft of the Athens Declaration, an EU-

Mediterranean Partnership to jointly achieve at least 20% energy savings and generate 20% of all energy from renewable sources by the year 2020. This event may evolve into an ongoing dialogue of the nations of the EuroMediterranean region between the energy and environmental communities. An internationally celebrated energy analyst, Joe Stanislaw, former president of the Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) and a senior advisor to Deloitte & Touche, will chair this discussion in an effort to bridge the divide. While it is too early in this great debate to conclude where the world is headed and what we need to do precisely to solve these problems, it is clear that our security is at stake. A new paradigm of international cooperation is required, and our resolve to work together has to be reinforced with great determination.

James Frederick Angelus is a publisher and energy security analyst with USI Capital Corporation in Washington who has worked extensively in the former Soviet bloc based in Romania and Poland, now residing in Athens. He is the Conference Director of the Athens Summit â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Global Climate and Energy Security. www.athens-summit.com

Dialogue

Implications for Let us start with an irrefutable fact: the climate is changing. Severe drought and excessive heat in Southern Europe; drought in the normally wet UK; excessive rainfall in Eastern and Middle Europe; a suddenly ice-free North-West passage in the Arctic; early-summer temperatures in mid-winter and autumn-like weather in early summer; no snow anymore in many regions known for skiing or their prolonged and deep winters; excessive rainfall in Africa are just a few of many examples. Ask an old farmer in the region where you live and you will get the stories how it was then and how it is now. But what does it all say? How much of it is caused by humans and how much is ‘natural’? And can we do anything for or against it? In considering a vast and complex subject like this it is always good to start with the bigger picture first. So what is the bigger picture? Let us consider planet Earth, our one and only home-planet. As we are reading this, it is rotating with a speed of 1000+km per hour (depending on where you live), without us noticing anything, apart from a ‘moving’ sun. At the same time, the planet is part of the solar system and whizzing through space around our sun at a speed of 107,000 km per hour, resulting in the seasons.

In relation to the Athens Summit The Challenge of Change the author was asked to write a comment on the main topics of the conference: Climate Change and Energy Security. This article is an attempt to present a long-term view on these vast subjects in brief.

Our solar system is moving through our home-galaxy, the Milky Way, at a speed of 220 km per second (almost 800,000 km per hour). This picture can be extended, but what it is meant to indicate is that whilst time is moving, our planet is moving and all the time entering space where it has not been before. And as the planet is moving, the external circumstances are changing, so we just cannot expect that this has no influence on the global climate. It does, even if we cannot exactly know or describe how or how much. For example, it could be read recently that the changes in the ‘red spot’ on Jupiter are due to ‘global climate change’ – on Jupiter that is. Looking at the more local picture, we know that our planet is a closed unit: very little escapes from it. When we then consider that humanity has burnt away 1,5 trillion (!) barrels of oil, trillions of tons of coal as well as several trillions of cubic meters of gas, we

By Alexander Wöstmann

know that all the residues of this burning – the heat, the CO2, the NOx, the soot and ashes and all the other chemicals – have been released into the atmosphere. Add to this the trillions of cubic meters of gas that are flared or vented (methane is a much more powerful ‘greenhouse-gas’ than CO2) and the ‘exploitation’ (basically destruction) of the woods and forests that could have absorbed some of the emissions, and the picture is becoming abundantly clear. Can we expect that this behaviour has no consequences? Currently humanity is ‘using’ 85 million barrels, 13.5 billion litres, of oil, over 30 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 10 million metric tons of coal, per DAY, of which most is burnt away. Can we expect this to have no effect on the global climate? Even if we cannot exactly describe how, how much or how fast? What we do know is that the climate is changing and that humankind bears a

Energy Security large part of the responsibility for the pollution caused by the development of the last 150 years, since the start of the industrial revolution. This then leads to the question of whether we can do anything at all, seeing the scale of things. The answer is: Yes of course, and individual responsibility is the place to start, wherever and whoever you are or whatever your position and means of influencing the process is. Humanity, especially in the wasteful ‘developed’ economies, does urgently need to reduce its energy – and resource – usage, by whatever means possible. This can start with putting out lights, computers, heating, airconditioners when not in use or needed, then move on to buying locally produced food or reducing unnecessary public lighting and advertisement, to increasing

efficiency-requirements for (home) appliances, industrial processes, cars, buildings, transport and human settlements, to the minimizing of destruction of forests and nature in general to the prevention of war, either direct or via political or other means. In the search for ideas about what can be done to reduce emissions and waste of energy, lots of new and exciting, but mostly expensive projects have already been presented, be it for hydrogen, biofuels, ethanol or CO2 capturing. Unfortunately, it has rather quickly become self-evident that the investments in these projects in most cases have resulted in more emissions, environmental degradation, excessive water-usage or food-shortage. A recent Climate Change report showed that the level of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere in mid-2005 had reached about 455 parts per mm of carbon dioxide equivalent – a level that was not expected for another 10 years. So it is becoming urgent for us to get our act together and do something that is real. This then leads to the second part of this article, covering the subject of Energy Security.

What is meant by Energy Security? It is used in many forms, but most often refers to the case of a country wanting to be sure it has or may acquire the energy it needs for its economy and its people (security of supply). Added to this is often that this energy security can be increased if the energy comes from a variety of sources and/or countries. This leads to many political and especially geo-political scenarios, as we can currently see in Europe. Another way of interpreting energy security is the ‘security of demand’, as a term that is increasingly used by the oil and gas producer countries. To cater for the demand in the future, which is said to be increasing substantially, vast projects need to be set up, engendered and managed, such as on- and offshore exploration, pipelines, refineries, petrochemical installations and the like, all requiring investments in the billions, and all too often tens of billions of euros. And whilst the official statistics and projections are seeing a large increase in the demand for oil and gas, the signals that are being sent to the producer countries often carry a different message. Alterna-

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tive energy sources, bio-fuels and rhetorics are speaking of reducing our ‘addiction to oil’. The argument of the producer countries is therefore whether, in the face of possibly reduced demand, there is actually a need to invest all these billions to produce oil that may not be wanted anymore when it would come on the market. A third way of looking at Energy Security is of a different nature, and looks at the issue of whether there actually is and will be the oil and gas we need. This can be divided into two points: one around the question of whether there will be enough oil and gas ‘in the ground’ (reserves), and the other as to whether the oil and gas will actually be available for consumption (supply). Understandably, there is a lot of controversy about both points, as well as statistics, projections, politics and wishful thinking. What more and more often appears to be the case is that, whilst there may still be a lot of oil in the planet, the easily available oil has mostly gone and the big fields that have been found in the past are in most cases near depletion. This means that the search is now far more difficult, expensive and in most cases also energy- and resource-intensive. Very deep-water exploration and oil from tarsands, require vast amounts of energy, steel, water and gas, often reducing the net-gain of energy to a minimum and, in the case of tarsands, to a hefty environmental price. Adding to this comes the fact that many countries that used to be net-exporters, are now netimporters, and the substantial reserves are

concentrated more and more in only a small group of countries, with known and unknown political and other consequences. About the total amount of oil available there is much lack of clarity, as figures and statistic have been notoriously subject to politics and manipulation all over the world. However, a recent report by a German research group with a lot of credibility put the total amount at substantially less than has been told to the world-community till now. Next to the ‘oil-in-place’/reserves, there is the issue of production levels and availability to the market. Whilst there may still be lots of oil in the ground, can we actually produce it and bring it to the place it is needed? This is the issue around Peak Oil and depletion that has been stirring the market and the attention of people for the past few years. Whilst there may be oil in the ground, which first needs to be found (!), it takes 5, 8, 10 or more years to bring it to the market, because drilling needs to take place, platforms need to be built, pipelines to be laid, refineries be built etc., costing even more money and meeting even more difficulties because, as has been said, the easy reserves have already been found and are in many cases almost empty. The global picture now seems to indicate a situation in which there are a lot of major projects in building-stage or in projectionsstage whilst at the same time many fields and regions are becoming depleted. Peak Oil, which is the moment when the depletion catches up with new oil becoming available, seems not far away. The official sources say

that this may happen in somewhere between 5 to 20 years. The above-mentioned research group suggests that we are already currently at this point. This means that we are looking at a future in which the demand for oil may be higher than the supply, a situation that will be completely new for the human race. Always there has been an abundance in resources, so adaptation to this new situation (of supplyshortage) may not be simple and easy, as so much hangs on the availability, and cheapness, of oil. What therefore the effects will be on economies when oil will not be abundantly available anymore – with prices reaching what will appear astronomic proportions – is completely unclear. Additionally, it will provide for all kinds of issues like: who gets what and how much, in a situation of shortage? Let it be clear that, notwithstanding the media-hype and – manipulations, the average European uses 25-28 barrels of oil per person per year, the average North-American about 35 barrels (not counting energy-usage for wars) and the average Chinese or Indian about 2-5 barrels per person per year. It should therefore be obvious where the saving potential is. In conclusion, suffice it to say that humanity will be faced with numerous and hitherto unknown challenges in the coming years and decades and that we can be sure that climate change will happen, whilst we can also be sure that energy security is something that will be in short supply.

Alexander Wöstmann is the founder and chief editor of Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections Website: www.gasandoil.com

Carbon Trading Outlook: any additional measures? By Dr Anthony White

The European Union’s Spring Council put the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS) at center stage in its armory of measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the community. The Member States also signed up to a unilateral commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 by 20% from the 1990 levels. It would seem, therefore, that the future for emissions trading looks rosy. However, all those involved in carbon markets would accept that the first two years of substantial trading, i.e. since the start of the EUETS in 2005, have been ‘interesting’, to say the least. The market exhibited all the characteristics expected of a commodity, such as high volatility and the ability to surprise the unwary. A question facing many active in this market is whether this behavior is likely to continue after January 2008 and part of the answer will depend on politicians’ view on whether ‘trading’ is delivering the low carbon economy anticipated by the policy makers. The story so far Since the EUETS commenced in January, 2005, the price of allowances have varied between 6 euros and 33/tCO2e, yet the ma-

jor consequences of the scheme have been: higher electricity prices, windfall profits for utilities, little change in the operating behavior of plant covered by the scheme, no discernable change in investment behavior in Europe; but large scale investment in emissions reducing projects in the developing world, particularly in China. Some would argue that the scheme has not worked, as there has been little action within Europe. However, such an attitude would ignore the large scale investment the scheme has prompted in China, India and Brazil. Nevertheless, there is little chance of the European nations meeting their more ambitious emission reduction targets, such as the UK’s to reduce emissions to 60% of the 1990 levels by 2050, unless the carbon prices are suf-

ficient to force a change in behavior. Why has Europe been unmoved? The reason for this behavior may be derived from Figure 1 below. This shows the price of the first phase allowances (delivery in 2007) against that for Phase 2 (delivery in 2008). The chart also shows CCC’s estimate of the ‘cost’ of reducing CO2 emissions . This is calculated as the implied price of an allowance (or ‘switching cost’) that would encourage a utility to reduce output from coal stations and increase that from gas stations having roughly half the associated CO2 emissions per unit of output. The chart shows how movements in the EUA prices in the period up to April 2006 closely followed the calculated switching cost, based on coal prices at Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp (ARA) and gas at the UK’s National Balancing Point.

However, the scale for the EUAs is roughly one third that of the switching cost, implying that actual EUA prices were too low to encourage any abatement by the utilities. The reason for this apparent paradox is probably a combination of: since installations receive free allowances for each year before the date for allowances to be surrendered to cover the previous years’ emissions, operators had no need to buy allowances until the end of 2007, when gas prices, and hence switching costs, were expected to be lower; traders ‘trade’, so stimulated activity by moving EUA prices when gas and coal prices varied, but had no ‘view’ of the ‘correct’ level; market participants anticipated the arrival of cheap allowances from CDM projects at the end of 2007, so applied a hefty ‘discount’ to the switching cost; such discounts were probably compounded by uncertainty surrounding actual emissions. Emissions data had not previously been aggregated according to the sectors and sizes of installations covered by the EUETS. In the end, emissions data for 2005 released by the Commission in April 2006 demonstrated that, rather than the market for Phase I being short by around 200 mtCO2, the number of allowances issued for 2005 exceeded actual emissions. In other words, the market was long and so the ‘correct’ level for Phase I was zero. It still took the market until Spring 2007 to price these Phase I EUAs appropriately, because many of the installations holding excess allowances were

more interested in ensuring that they held sufficient allowances to meet their own needs, rather than sell any surplus allowances to those installations that happened to be short (mainly the utility sector). In conclusion, the behavior of the EUETS during Phase I demonstrated that carbon prices are heavily influenced by: fossil fuel prices, which tend to be volatile, uncertainty over historic emissions data, non-profit-maximising behavior of some of the participants; and political uncertainty. Looking forward Nevertheless, there are reasons to be far more confident about the development of the carbon markets in 2007 than in 2005.

The main reason is that, in accepting the National Allocation Plans, the Commission was able to draw on actual emissions data for 2005 and so the market may have some confidence that the over-allocation of allowances in Phase 1 should not be repeated. Indeed, Figure 2 below shows an ‘abatement curve’ for the EU-27. The horizontal axis shows the emissions of CO2 over the Phase II period, 2008-2012, whilst the vertical axis gives the carbon price required to cause the various operators of installations across the EU to change their behavior and reduce emissions. The higher the price, the more actions will be taken and, hence, emissions should reduce. In practice, it is the utility sector that is likely to provide most of

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the emission reduction, or abatement. The vertical line in red shows the sum of the allowances to be issued under the NAPs. However, the Commission is also allowing installations to use emission reduction certificates issued under the Kyoto Protocol (CERs and ERUs) to meet up to 10% of their obligations under the EUETS; and this is indicated by the blue line. This indicates that the installations covered by the EUETS will have to undertake abatement action. This suggests that carbon prices should be determined by the ‘switching’ costs, as shown in the abatement curve. We do not expect an occurrence of the large discount to this cost, as observed during the earlier part of Phase I. However, there will be other factors, as well as movements in coal and gas prices, influencing this price: Competition from non-EUETS entities to purchase Kyoto credits. Figure 3 below shows, schematically, that there are a number of alternative ‘sinks’ for these certificates – we estimate that this could amount to some 1,300 mtCO2e, which may lead to further action being required within the EUETS. The ability to use Phase II allocations in Phase III. This is likely to smooth prices but, depending on the outlook for Phase 3 prices, could provide upward pressure on EUA prices. The inclusion of aviation into the EUETS

in 2011. Given the limited abatement options available to airline companies at such a late stage in Phase II, this is likely to represent a late boost to demand for allowances, thereby providing further upward price pressure. At the same time, we do not expect the political uncertainties surrounding carbon trading to weaken significantly. Indeed, there are a number of major policy developments scheduled to occur over the next five years which are likely to impact on price expectations:

The EU’s review of the EUETS this autumn could refine the current commitment of a 20% reduction in emissions by 2020 into a target for the EUETS itself. This could provide some price transparency for the post 2012 period which, thanks to banking, influence prices for Phase II. The EU’s proposals on clean coal could increase expectations for abatement in the post 2012 era. However, there is a case to argue that the carbon price alone should be sufficient to encourage sequestration, rather than enforce it by regulation. Nevertheless, the possibility will increase uncertainty until it is clari-

fied whether targets will be adjusted in the light of such regulation. The Bali COP/MOP in December may provide the first glimmerings for the post Kyoto period in terms of targets. This could influence CER/ERU supply. Developments of other trading regimes, notably in Australia and the different States in the USA could lead to additional demand for EUAs. Do we need additional measures? This incomplete list of policy initiatives indicates that carbon prices are likely to continue to exhibit considerable volatility. Though, by itself, this is not the end of the word, it does imply that operators of installations in the EUETS will tend to favor short term, possibly more expensive, forms of abatement over others. Indeed, after the discontinuity in the oil market in the 1970s, it did not take long for financiers to invest in oil fields. But even then financial prudence acts as a break. Oil prices have recently exceeded $70/bbl, but no field is being developed whose financial viability depends on oil remaining north of $35/bbl, let alone $50/bbl. This financial prudence will be applied to the greenhouse gas market, and is likely to be enhanced by the political nature of the carbon market. Do we need faster change? We may not have time for an evolutionary

approach. A large proportion of the present electricity generating fleet is approaching retirement. Decisions taken over the next few years will define the generating mix for the next 30 to 40 years and thereby lock in the associated emissions. Plant developers will need assurance that the penalty for emitting greenhouse gases will not fall below a particular floor for a long period before they will invest. One way of achieving this goal is to support the EUETS with a further measure. If, for example, the value of the EUAs were to fall below, say 15 euros/tCO2e, then Governments could introduce a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;dutyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; on greenhouse gas emissions. If the EUA price averaged just 12euros/tCO2e over the year, the duty would be 3euros/tCO2e. The scheme has a number of attractive features: It provides plant owners with the confidence that they will avoid a penalty over many years. After 2012, it is expected that Governments will sell allowances. If the carbon duty is introduced, the Governments could be confident that their revenues

from emissions would not dry up. It could be introduced unilaterally. UK companies could consider a range of short and long term options to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Operators in other Member States would be restricted to measures that are financially viable in the short term alone. Conclusions We expect that the carbon markets will continue to reflect considerable volatility, driven by fossil fuel prices but exacerbated by policy uncertainty. It is not a market for the unwary. Nevertheless, carbon trading is clearly working, in that there has been significant investment in low carbon schemes, but primarily in the developing world, rather than in the only large scale market, i.e. the European Emissions Trading Scheme. It is unlikely that this result was anticipated by the politicians who introduced it.

Dr Anthony White, MBE is Managing Director of Market Development and Chairman of Advisory at Climate Change Capital. www.climatechangecapital.com

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The Future in Our Hands By Dora Bakoyannis

Climate change is a reality. The world is already warmer by 0.8Æ Celsius than it was in the pre-industrial era, and this increase in temperature is speeding up constantly. This year, unfortunately, we had a foretaste of the consequences of these changes, the real extent and speed of which we cannot foresee with absolute certainty. For years, the intrinsic uncertainty of predictions has played into the hands of various sceptics, allowing the truth to be distorted. There is uncertainty because by increasing greenhouse gases and global temperature, mankind is in effect carrying out a planet-wide experiment of dimensions and speeds never seen before. But the main subject of this experiment is not – as some incorrectly believe– the planet. It is first and foremost the human race. We are the laboratory rats. Climate change is not a problem that can be addressed by any one country solely or group of countries alone. Greenhouse gases emitted by anyone on the planet affect everyone. The pollution of the rich has an impact on the poor. The pollution of the past affects future generations. The challenge before us is truly historic. If this challenge is to be met, global negotiations over the next two years will have to be successful; negotiations that will shape a new, much more demanding and binding contract for the protection of the global climate following 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol expires. These negotiations, the most difficult phase of which begins at the Climate Change Conference in Bali, are particularly complex and difficult because they must result in:

– Broader alliances in the effort to reduce emissions, including those of developing countries, through fair and proportional objectives. – Funding and incentives for faster development of green technologies. – Funding and incentives for public transport and green technologies in the developing world, because it is morally indefensible for us, while enjoying a western way of life and making, at most, ‘small ecological sacrifices’, to ask billions of people to continue living in poverty. – A new treaty that provides for adequate funding for the adaptation of developing countries – and the least developed countries in particular – to the consequences of climate change. Greece was among the countries that supported the adoption of a decisive European policy on unilateral reduction of emissions in order to facilitate the negotiations that are getting underway. At the same time, within the framework of the Human Security Network, Greece is supplementing this policy by dedicating its Chairmanship to raising public awareness on the impact of climate change on vulnerable groups of people in developing countries; particularly women, children and migrants. It is our moral and political duty to address this impact, because it is serious, immediate and massive. So our objective over the coming months is to systematically study and address the impact of climate change on hu-

man security and to encourage a turn of focus of international and European development assistance towards confronting this impact, in cooperation with our Human Security Network partners and top international agencies, foundations and non-governmental organizations. At the same time, in cooperation with and within the framework of international and regional organizations, we are drawing up a plan for the creation of Greek funds that will provide flexible financial support for climate change adaptation programmes in Africa and in Small Island countries. Likewise, our goal is to deal effectively with the perils springing from climate change, by enhancing the capacity of developing countries to adapt to climate change and by encouraging greater assistance from the developed countries to those in need. The challenge of climate change is the historic challenge of our generation. To meet this challenge, we must form a new global alliance. We must overcome our differences, weaknesses and prejudices and move ahead together, each of us accepting our own responsibilities. This article is based on a Message of Greek Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis at an event on Climate Change and Human Security in Athens, 27 November 2007

The Human Security aspect By Hercules Moskoff

Last summer, Greece witnessed the devastating reality of a climate change induced disaster. The wild fires that reduced vast areas of the Greek landscape to a nightmarish inferno shocked the world. The catastrophe is perhaps the worst thing to have hit the country since the ravages of the Second World War. The loss of life has been shocking. Whole villages have been incinerated and ancient olive groves, pine forests and livestock, with their attendant history, livelihoods and futures, are now piles of ashes. A lethal mix of a dry winter, summer heatwaves and strong winds, along with a few misanthropes, speculators, and copycats are held accountable for the recent disaster. Will our ‘tsunami’ soon be forgotten by the disaster-weary media, which will move on to the next attention-seeking subject? The answer to that question lies in the fate of the ‘inflamed’ public sentiments. For some, the cry for help was an ephemeral plea for immediate aid. For others, it signifies the threshold of a new era of environmental awareness. The truth is that, although the summer flames generated considerable political cost for those continuing to patronise us with their ‘developmental illusions of grandeur’, we still have to cover a

lot of ground to claim that environmental issues have moved their way up in the pipeline of political priorities. At the moment, however, virtually all politicians and wannabe public figures have adopted a rhetoric showing that it is ‘sexier’ than ever to raise the issue of Greece’s environmental protection deficit. The depleted chromium found in the Asopos River shows that failure to protect our natural resources from industrial waste is a clear and present danger to public health. The condescending Janusfaced smile of the officials claiming that ‘environment protection is an imperative’, that they will make ‘no concessions to punish those held accountable’ is not alleviating an increased public sentiment of helplessness and insecurity. The purpose of this article is to complement the Greek debate on Climate Change (CC) by highlighting the human security dimension. In doing so, we will furnish a brief insight to recent path-breaking developments in the international community’s endeavour to contain CC. The United Nations recent high level meetings on CC called up-

on the international community to treat CC as a cross-cutting problem demanding solutions beyond the narrow perspectives of science, technology and national security. Indeed, CC is about our collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world. Calling for a long-term global response to deal with CC, the UN SecretaryGeneral said that projected climate changes could not only have serious environmental, social and economic implications, but implications for peace and security, as well. Several alarming scenarios include limited or threatened access to energy increasing the risk of conflict, a scarcity of food and water transforming peaceful competition into violence and floods and droughts sparking massive human migrations, polarizing societies and weakening the ability of countries to resolve conflicts peacefully. Most policy-making analysts of climate change often focus on how to mitigate risk, particularly in the context of ‘national security’. Few scenarios to date have considered the usefulness of assessing the human security impact to vulnerable groups and attempts to mitigate vulnerability and avoid conflictual outcomes that are considered in a framework other than a nation-state re-

sponse to an emerging ‘threat’. Most definitions of human security are based on the concept of freedom from fear and freedom from want. This article underscores freedom to take action on one’s own behalf in response to changing environmental conditions. While catastrophic climate change will affect the globe in a disastrous way, scenarios that consider the direct impact on human security vulnerabilities might compel the serious development of a research agenda that moves beyond the nation-states as the best response mechanism to human security impact outcomes as a result of CC. Greece has undertaken a campaign in the E.U. to establish a permanent structure that will respond immediately to CC disasters. CC can have severe effects on human security in both developed and developing countries. Those that will be affected the worst will be the vulnerable groups in Least Developed Countries, such as women, children, the elderly and needy. This is especially true in vulnerable regions and groups which face multiple stresses at the same time – pre-existing conflict, poverty and unequal access to resources, weak institutions, food insecurity and spreading of diseases. The degree to which people are vulnerable to CC depends on the extent to

which they are dependent on natural resources and ecosystem services, and the extent to which the resources and services they rely on are sensitive to CC. Yet CC rarely undermines human security in isolation from a broader range of social factors. These include, among other things: poverty, the degree of support people receive from the State, their access to economic opportunities, the effectiveness of decision-making processes that govern people’s lives and the extent of social cohesion within and surrounding vulnerable groups. These factors determine people’s entitlements to economic and social capital that in turn determine their capacity to adapt to CC so that the things that they value are not adversely affected. The consequences of climate change mean that the lives of up to 175 million

children a year will be endangered by floods, drought, earthquakes and tsunamis over the next decade – a potential increase of 40% on the previous decade. A new report by Save the Children UK looks for the first time at how climate change will specifically affect children, who will be hardest hit by increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters. Already in any emergency, half of all those affected are children. Over the next decade, up to 175 million children every year will be affected by climate-related natural disasters compared to 125 million a year between 1995 and 2005. Millions more children will be killed, forced to flee their homes and put at risk from hunger, disease and physical or sexual abuse. Children in developing countries, where there are few adequate warning systems or strategies to lower risk, will also be most affected by 'slow-moving' disasters, including temperature extremes, desertification, and a rise in sea level brought by CC. Smallscale disasters, which are typically overlooked by the international community will also intensify, most affecting vulnerable communities living rurally, on flood plains or on steep slopes at risk of erosion. Children are already bearing the brunt of climate change and there will be millions more children caught up in climate-related

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natural disasters every year that will urgently need our assistance. The ideological challenges for policy makers dealing with CC threaten to revive ideological disputes, with ominous consequences for human security. The slogan Hot Planet, Cold Wars refers to fact that the attempts to control CC will create conflicts of interest and provoke conflicts of principle. To moderate CC, human beings will almost certainly have to reduce carbon emissions dramatically. This will almost certainly force them to curtail their use of modern machinery and impose hardship on innumerable people. Since programs for reducing CC give individuals onerous new duties, they force us to rethink liberal concepts of individual freedom. Furthermore, if such programs are to work, people must apply them internationally. As the effects of climate change grow more severe, the states that are willing to re-think liberalism will grow increasingly frustrated with those that are not. Therefore, diplomats, political thinkers and environmental policymakers would be well-advised to take into account the ideological problems of addressing climate change. Greece is the current Chair of the Human Security Network, a cross-regional group of thirteen like-minded countries. Since its inception almost ten years ago, the HSN has provided a platform of communication and path-breaking synergy between policy makers, diplomats, and civic society. The HSN has promoted the UN system of

values and highlighted our vision for a humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from fear, free from want. Responding to the clear and present challenge of CC, the Greek HSN chairmanhip is focusing its efforts on examining how best to address the impacts of CC that have the potential to undermine the human security of vulnerable groups, such as women, children and people fleeing their homes due to climate change. The Greek chairmanship approaches CC as an issue that has implications for human security. Human security issues have largely been framed in terms of conflict or cooperation, rather than in terms of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Whose security is at stake, and why?â&#x20AC;&#x2122; We wish to emphasize that CC is an issue that cuts across national boundaries and needs to be addressed at different scales and units of analysis. We emphasize CC is an issue of equity that selectively undermines the human security of some vulnerable regions and groups. This is essential to addressing the underlying factors that drive processes, influence outcomes, and condition responses to climate change.

Dr Hercules Moskoff is an expert-councellor at the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Hellenic Aid

(Yet another) Balkan Conflict: Development vs Environment By Dr Christos Makropoulos

Environment: An irrelevant luxury? Environmental issues within the context of large scale socio-political and economic change currently underway in the Balkans surely catch no eyes. The drive for change and development – including, but not restricted to, industrial redevelopment – is paramount for all former Yugoslavia, let alone new EU member states, such as Bulgaria and Romania. But are the two issues in conflict and indeed should they be? To answer these political questions one needs to answer two technical questions first: is the issue of environmental degradation (currently observed in the Balkans) one related to normal economic activities or can it be attributed to mitigating circumstances beyond anybody’s control (i.e. the recent wars)? And secondly, how irreversible human impact has been on the environment over the years: is there anything that can be done now or has the opportunity been lost long ago particularly in the communist era? The Danube: An environmental challenge for a millennium. The first question can be answered through the example of the River Danube and the effects from the Kossovo conflict. A study conducted as early as 2000 under the auspices of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) in Vien-

na, investigating environmental impacts of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, on bio-indicators in the Danube, suggested that the bulk of the pollution found on a 1000 km stretch of the river between Former Yugoslavia and Hungary could be primarily attributable to long-term industrial discharges rather than war consequences. Although the results of the study should be taken with a pinch of salt due to their obvious political context, is seems that the Danube tributaries (well outside the conflict zones) contain heavy metals in their sediment at least in the same order of magnitude as the Lower Danube (that was affected by the war). An interesting phenomenon identified, in both that and subsequent studies, is one of apparent pollution load reduction along the Danube, towards the Black Sea. This is attributed to sedimentation and bioaccumulation, particularly in critical points of the river system, such as the Iron Gate Reservoir: the longterm exposure of the river system to pollution produced a system ‘memory’ mechanism, responsible for increasing the resident pollution in the river and resulting in an ‘inertia’ effect that will persist for hundreds of years - if unchecked.

The Black Sea: An example of unintentional rehabilitation Given the predominance of regular polluting activities, rather than war, as the main pressures on environmental pollution in the Balkans, we can turn to the second question: that of irreversibility. The Black Sea will serve here as an illustrative example. The Black Sea is the world's most isolated sea, fed primarily by Danube. This makes pollution ‘control’ through simple dilution highly problematic. At the time of the collapse of Eastern Europe and particularly in the late 1980s, the Black Sea was black in more than name. Significant parts of the Sea were suffering from eutrophication, resulting in anaerobic conditions and algal blooms. The collapse of economic activity in parts of the Black Sea extended catchment, resulted in a sharp decline in pollution inflow to the lake – primarily in terms of nutrients: closures of large livestock farms and nutrient-discharging industries (e.g. fertilizer industry) due to recession, largely contributed to this unintended environmental blessing. The reaction of the ecosystem was positive indeed. By early 2000, the Black Sea had environmental conditions similar to its state in the

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1960s – the ecosystem was bouncing back. It took one decade of (unintentionally) allowing the system to breath for the natural resilience to take over. Today, its situation is steadily declining once more, not least because overfishing is upsetting the Sea’s natural trophic cascades. So what now? The economic recession however is (fortunately) coming to an end and economic redevelopment is the cornerstone of Balkan economic efforts and EUs regional aspirations. Already there are signs of increased nutrient emissions in the Black Sea and the ICPDR is beginning to worry. Economic Redevelopment is happening fast, fuelled by EU and international support through inter alia the European Agency for Reconstruction and the European Investment Bank. It could be put forward that although it is economic activity that is the primary polluter and although small changes in practices do have impressive results in environmental terms the developmental imperative takes precedence over any environmental management afterthought. This, however, hardly makes sense: in environmental economicspeak prevention is much more cost-effective than rehabilitation. The unique circumstances given by the necessary, and painful, re-invention of the production and market system in the Balkans imply an unprecedented opportunity for ‘getting things right’ in the first place – this time round. This could decrease the environmental bill for year to come, but is by no means a simple task: Let us examine some of the key issues related to realising this opportunity.

Environmental Policy and Agents thereof The successful implementation of environmental measures presupposes the existence of environmental policies, which themselves presuppose both a strong political will able to pass environmental laws (driven by Departments of Environment with due consideration to long-term sustainable development goals) and an independent Environment Agency which is empowered to enforce that legislation. The policy framework is to a large extent provided by EU Directives, given the recent Member State status of some of the Balkan countries and the accession status or intentions of the rest. It would be wrong to assume however that this allows for a seamless transposition to national law. Departments of Environment need to pay considerable attention in customising the Directives to local circumstances before the costs of implementing irrelevant measures become ammunition for discrediting many of the best environmental intentions. Furthermore it is at the national level that perceived conflicts between environment and development can be resolved for the benefit of both. Recent work in Bosnia-Herzegovina proved that environmental actions, such as wetland protection, can coexist if not enhance local and regional development objectives, through eco-tourism, organic farming and other low impact high revenue activities for which the global market is growing. These initiatives however can achieve little if they are not firmly embedded in a long-term strategic development plan – and evidence of such thinking is scarce. The same goes for international initiatives if not embedded in national policy: the sense of ‘fatigue’ in the implementation of Danube’s Environmental Programme through ICPDR further attests to this fact.

Environmental Black Spots Black spots, i.e. areas of significant environmental degradation are numerous and spread across the Balkans, from mercury pollution still linked to the former mines in Idria (in Slovenia), to Bakar bay (in Croatia), to the Gacko thermal power plant (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), to the copper mines and metallurgical industry of Bor and the hazardous chemical leaks in Pancevo (in Serbia), the thermal power plants in Kosovo and the ferro-nickel mines and smelting industry in FYROM, these areas are not decreasing – they are actually on the increase. The efforts of the European Agency for Reconstruction to fund rehabilitation projects to address these issues should not be underestimated, yet the observed industrial growth (5-10% per year in some cases) poses long-term threats, particularly in view of deficiencies in industrial waste processing. Disperse and Diffused Pollution However, beyond fairly localised (but severe) black spots, the environment in the Balkans is being further degraded due to significant gaps in both point and diffuse pollution control. Wastewater treatment plants are either non-existent or not fully operational in an alarming number of cases – with the notable exception of Slovenia and to some extent Croatia. Pollution from agriculture is significant and the use of fertilisers and pesticides is neither well regulated nor monitored. Managing agricultural pollution is a key aspects in achieving EU Directive objectives (such as the 2000/60, Water Framework Directive) as older Member States are currently discovering. Yet this particular target carries political implications in the agriculturally-based economies of many Balkan countries challenging govern-

ment will. The situation is further complicated by the inertia of the physical systems (e.g. Danube), due to decades of abuse: Environmental management practices employed today will not result in immediate changes either for the river systems or the receptors, as observed, pollution levels will also be affected by background concentrations already present in the system. Sediment transport and release mechanisms therefore, in the short-term, will govern pollution levels despite any regulating actions. Furthermore, the rate of pollution transfer through the various parts of the environmental system (catchment, river, reservoirs, costal zone), will be largely dependent on hydrological processes in the catchment and hydraulic processes in the river system (floods, changes in currents, sediment re-suspension etc). This implies that extreme pollution events will not always be correlated with pollution generating incidents (e.g. accidental spillages). This fact increases the unpredictability of the system and demands a change in the paradigm of water quality management, pollution prevention and control. Management and Governance Considerable attention has been given, as a precondition to EU funding support, to changing the (up to recently public) management of Water and Sanitation Companies in the Balkans. This is an effort to address a perceived (and sometimes very real) inefficiency with which these companies were run in the past and press for solutions such as private-public partnerships (PPP), privatisation and management subcontracting – usually to European companies and consortia. This is not dissimilar to the ap-

proach the West adopted to address water and sanitation problems, and associated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in Africa1 – an approach which is currently being reappraised. Early experiences of such processes, including for example some of the PPPs operating major wastewater treatment plants, have however produced mixed results and reluctance to enter into new PPPs is growing: Privatisation and subcontracting to foreign companies, without the proper overview based on sound in-house expertise is more complex and less rewarding than initially thought. Capacity Building This last point brings us perhaps to the single most pressing environmental issue (and this time a direct effect of the war and economic recession): that of the lack of qualified young environmental professionals. The brain drain that started with the economic collapse and in some cases the war has not really stopped and the quick gains of the post-war/reconstruction era, offer much more lucrative alternatives to young professionals than underpaid and overworked careers in environmental engineering. This is an area where international collaborations between Higher Education Institutions, supported by the European Union and championed by member states in the Balkan Neighborhood such as Greece, can make a real difference and progress a considerable way towards long-term transboundary collaboration in, inter alia, Environmental Management in the Region. 1. MDGs on water and sanitation are still not fully met in the Balkans.

A (tentative) conclusion The basis for a healthy environment in the Balkans needs to be laid down now – at the foundations of the Region’s reconstruction. It is by no means a hopeless enterprise, nor contradictory to a sustainable mode of development that is willing to learn from mistakes made in Western Europe and the US rather than being bend to repeat them. Although it may sound trivial it is developing (and utilising) local capacity that can do the trick and not some external deus ex machina. Europe, in the role of the proverbial theatrical deity, is most welcome to help, but has to focus her attention on things that really need fixing and be open to ideas from people on the ground. It would not have escaped the attention of the reader that the environmental situation in the Balkans is not that dissimilar from the situation in other parts of Europe – notably South and South Eastern Europe – including member states and non-member states alike. Although this is clearly a whole different subject, provided that this article is printed in ‘double spacing’, the reader is invited to read between the lines...

Dr. Christos Makropoulos is a Lecturer in the Centre for Water Systems of the University of Exeter, UK and an Associate Editor of the Urban Water Journal. He has worked in teaching, training, research and consultancy in the Balkan Environment Sector for the past 10 years in collaboration with NTUA (Athens) and the Universities of Belgrade, Bucharest and Ljubljana. c.makropoulos@exeter.ac.uk

Dialogue

Homeless

by nature

People on the move as environment deteriorates The number of people forced to leave their homes as a result of environmental disasters is expected to soar dramatically over the coming years as the effects of climate change take their toll on the planet, experts warn, calling for international recognition of this new breed of refugee. According to the latest forecasts, one billion people – approximately one in seven on the planet today – may have to seek refuge as the repercussions of climate change aggravate an already acute migration crisis. ‘On current trends, a further 1 billion people will be forced from their homes between now and 2050,’ said a Christian Aid report published earlier this year, warning that the combined effect of climate change, conflicts, natural disasters and development projects could spiral the migration crisis ‘out of control’. It is estimated that around 155 million people are displaced today. The charity group warns that some 645 million may have to migrate in the coming decades because of development projects such as dams, factories and mines. Climate changerelated problems such as hunger, water shortages, desertification and flooding could push the number up by a further 250 million. More may have to flee because of unpredictable, non-human induced disasters such as earthquakes. According to the Red Cross, more people are currently displaced by environmental

By Harry van Versendaal

disaster than war. A UN report published in October said that nations still fail to grasp the magnitude of global environmental threats. The fourth Global Environment Outlook (GEO4) released by the UN Environment Program (UNEP) slammed the response of governments to climate change as ‘woefully inadequate’. The exact number of environmental refugees is hard to establish. One of the main reasons for this is that environmental ‘push factors’ are often hard to disentangle from economic ones. ‘You can't separate environmental degradation (and related migration) and absolute poverty. Environmental degradation makes people poor, for instance, because their water dries up, their soil blows away, their animals die and, without water and soil, they can no longer grow enough crops. Without enough vegetation covering the land, floods and other disasters are more likely,’ Rachel Baird of Christian Aid told The bridge. The consequences however are more clear-cut. ‘It is clear that when people lose their ability to meet their basic human rights, such as the ability to access food and water security, to make a livelihood, to live in places free of pollution, they do what any-

one in such a situation with no alternative does – they move,’ Stephanie Long of Friends of the Earth Australia said. Wet feet Environment groups stress that the consequences of pollution primarily affect those who are contributing less to the phenomenon: the poor, resource-scarce populations of the south. Mass migration, scientists warn, will be mostly evident in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, India and Latin America. Global warming, the main indirect human-induced cause of displacement, is expected to affect millions in places such as Egypt, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. According to GEO-4, should the Greenland ice sheet melt, sea levels will rise by seven meters. The UNEP report pointed out that the West Antarctic ice cap could collapse by the end of this century. Tuvalu, a small South Pacific island, has already reached an agreement with New Zealand to relocate its 11,600 inhabitants if rising sea levels swallow the land. Chinese authorities estimate that some 30 million people are already being displaced by the impacts of climate change, while others set the figure at 72 million. According to Friends of the Earth, a one-meter rise in sea levels would flood Shanhghai and 96 percent of the surrounding province. A similar rise would affect 67 percent of the population in the Netherlands. ‘The mega cities of London, Shanghai, Hamburg, Bangkok, Jakarta, Bombay, Manila, Buenos Aires and Venice are all built on low-lying coastal areas. The city of

Manhattan in New York is in fact an island. It too is also under threat from sea-level rise,’ Long said. The elevation of sea levels is hardly a concern for Greece – at least for the moment. Nevertheless, the devastating wildfires that hit the country this summer have spawned a wave of environmental refugees as thousands of economic migrants left the rural areas for the urban centres in search of jobs. More than 48,000 foreigners worked in Ilia, Messinia, Arcadia and Laconia and most of them have been exempt from government benefits for fire victims as well as relief aid from voluntary organizations. According to data provided by WWF Greece and the Aristotle University in Thes-

saloniki, the fires in the Peloponnese, south of Athens, destroyed over 170,000 hectares overall, including agricultural land mostly covered by olive groves. The natural habitat will take at least two decades to recover. No UN recognition International law has so far failed to take environmental refugees into account. This means that victims are usually spared the assistance and protection offered to people fleeing violence or persecution. ‘The political decision not to recognize environmental refugees is a barrier to identifying why people are forced to move and

Dialogue

the soon-to-be-submerged mini-state.

how to create culturally appropriate resettlement opportunities,’ Long said. For Baird, recognition partly hits on the objections of western states wary of the swelling numbers of outsiders in their midst. ‘One important reason why the UN refuses to recognize the category of environmental refugee is that many of its member states oppose changes that would lead to more refugees being able to legally enter their countries,’ Baird said. But reluctance is not all self-interest. Recognizing environmental refugees could stretch the definition to absurd lengths and render it meaningless. For one thing, it would stretch the already scarce resources. ‘Expanding the refugee definition might reduce protection for existing refugees, as resources for looking after them are limited,’ Baird said. Officials of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) admit that the

agency is under-funded and already strained by the demands of conventionally recognized refugees. Kaiti Kehayioglou of the UNHCR office in Greece notes that the organization has already participated in two ad hoc environmental disaster relief campaigns, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake a year later. ‘But expanding the UNHCR mandate to encompass environmentally displaced people would require more funds,’ Kehayioglou said. Until then, UN officials claim, the problem should be addressed on a state level. But failure to hammer out an international campaign has met with strong criticism from those who believe that global problems require action on a global level. Ask the people of Tuvalu. ‘If there is no state left, how can the state protect its citizens?’ Andrew Simms of the London-based New Economics Foundation think tank has said of

Polluter pays The good news is everyone agrees on the solution: more money for the needy. The bad news is that few are willing to line their pockets. After all, one of the main reasons for the poor shape of the UN’s finances is the failure of the wealthy, industrialized states – which are also the world’s biggest polluters – to pay their contributions to the organization. ‘Rich countries should do vastly more to help poor countries cope with the effects of climate change,’ Baird said, adding that Christian Aid has called for the creation of a $1 billion a year fund for this purpose. ‘This is compensation for the damage we have done, and not aid,’ she stressed. At the same time, environmentalists are calling on rich countries to make deep cuts in their emissions of greenhouse gases – Christian Aid wants the UK government to legislate for cuts of 80 percent. In addition, they demand that polluting states be legally bound to take in environmental refugees spawned by their insensitive policies. ‘As the countries that have produced the vast majority of greenhouse gases over the past 150 years, we have an unequivocal obligation to provide a humanitarian response to adapt and accept environmental refugees,’ Long said of the western, industrialized nations. For Friends of the Earth, ‘taking a supportive approach to asylum seekers is not merely an act of basic solidarity. It is based on the understanding of the environmental dimensions of the refugee issue.’

Harry van Versendaal is journalist based in Athens

cover story

Compiled by Dimitris Maziotis and Eleni Fotiou

The recent national and presidential elections in Turkey last July and August respectively revealed the internal negotiations, which Turkey is undergoing, mainly due to its choice to follow the European path and in its efforts to keep up the pace in the economically developed globalized world. Having committed to reforms in order to comply with European standards, the re-elected government of AKP reaffirmed its commitment to implement the political criteria and requirements of the European Union. Turkish economy is booming and the business world shows great openness to the global economy and trade. However, Turkish society seems to be divided ranging from secularists to islamists, from nationalists to democrats, from Euro-philes to Euro-sceptics, while the country reveals its great competence in speeding the pace of development. In light of that course of events, the cover story of this issue of The bridge seeks to reveal all the aspects of Turkish political, economic and social life in order to combine the pieces that eventually compose the real image of the country. In this respect, a number of politicians, diplomats, academics, members of the business world and artists were asked to reflect upon these issues.

Conservatism Globalism vs ‘Conceptual distinctions such as left-right divide and center-periphery have some value in understanding the nature of Turkish politics. However, such distinctions can be confusing at the same time given the difficulties of making sharp distinctions between the right and the left and the center and the periphery especially if one tries to adopt these terms from their everyday usage in European politics. A differentiation along the lines of ‘globalists’ and ‘defensive nationalists’ arguably provides a more precise and meaningful distinction in understanding the recent realignments in Turkish politics, particularly in the post-Helsinki era. The term globalists would refer to those segments of the state and society which essentially have a positive view of globalization and see it as a phenomenon which provides opportunities for material improvement and advancement of society in general. Globalists tend to be integrationist and reformist at the same time. Those who hold a positive view of globalization also see European integration and Turkey’s membership of the EU as parallel and positive processes. Europeanization, in this context, becomes a mechanism, a framework or an intermediate route for a country like Turkey to cope effectively with and benefit from the process of globalization. They also tend to be reformist in the sense that they see economic and political reforms as necessary condi-

By Ziya Önis

tions to be able to capitalize on the benefits of Europeanization and globalization. In contrast, groups whom we categorize as defensive or inward-oriented nationalists have by and large a negative view of globalization. Their politics is based on fear in the sense that they see globalization as a process that will lead to the erosion of national sovereignty which in turn will generate partition and an inability to preserve the existing borders. Their conception of globalization is a negative process whose risks and associated inequalities far outweigh its potential benefits. Defensive nationalists also perceive globalization and Europeanization as parallel and complementary phenomena, but they tend to regard these processes in a rather negative fashion as working against the unity and the secular character of the Turkish state. The globalists’ camp would include at the elite level secular liberals both within the state and the society at large, moderate Islamists, and Kurdish reformers. This bloc has become increasingly powerful in the post-Helsinki era enjoying considerable public support on the basis of the expected material benefits of effective exposure to globalization and eventual membership of the EU. The defensive nationalist or the anti-reform coalition, on the other hand, includes ultra-nationalists, hard-core Kemalists, radical Islamists as well as major labor

unions. One can easily fall into the trap of putting all these groups into the same basket and exaggerate the degree of their antireformism or Euro-skepticism. For example, Kemalist hard-liners, who are extremely sensitive on issues like secularism and national sovereignty are at the same in favor of Westernization and find themselves in awkward situation of supporting Turkey’s EU membership in principle, since opposition to EU would signify an anti-Western stance which would be inconsistent with the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. When it comes to reforms, however, they tend to find themselves in a rather uncomfortable position. This is clearly the kind of the dilemma that the Turkish military establishment finds itself at the moment. It would be misleading to argue that the military is firmly in the anti-EU camp. It would also be incorrect to suggest that the military has a negative view of economic globalization given that, as a powerful economic actor in its own right, it actively engages and benefits from the process of globalization. At the same time, there is no doubt that the military leadership is highly uncomfortable with many of the key political reforms sponsored by the EU and would probably maintain a

An old caricature shows Turkey as a combination of Belgium and Afghanistan. This is not as accurate as it used to be, but still symbolizes many of Turkey`s disparities and diversity. Murat Gulkan, Managing Director, Global Markets – Deutsche Bank, Turkey

Defensive Nationalism privileged role for itself in Turkish politics. Hence, even a conceptualization along the lines of globalist /pro-reform coalition versus defensive nationalist/anti-reform coalition contains certain shortcomings. The globalist versus nationalists division cuts across party lines. Indeed, it is possible to find elements of both camps within the same political party. It would be interesting to consider in this context the coalition government of 1999-2002, which played an important role in initiating widespread political reforms in Turkey including the abolition of the death penalty. The major partner of the coalition government, the Democratic Left Party (the DSP) led by Bülent Ecevit, would be considered much closer to the nationalist bloc. At the same time, the party contained a large number of individual MPs including influential figures such as the Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Kemal Dervi – and the Foreign Secretary Ismail Cem whom one would clearly identify with the globalist camp. The second major component of the coalition government, the Nationalist Action Party (the MHP) would clearly be classified as a key element of the defensive nationalist bloc, whereas the third and minor party in the coalition, the Motherland Party (the ANAP) led by Mesut Yilmaz, was firmly in the globalist/pro-reform coalition.

In fact, the leadership of Yilmaz was critical in pushing the coalition government to pass a large-scale reform package through the Parliament in August 2002. The AKP, which established its electoral dominance in 2002, clearly capitalizing on the negative impact of the major economic crisis of 2001 on the established political parties, constitutes the strongest and most vigorous element of the globalist/pro-reform coalition within the Turkish political party spectrum. In contrast to the divisions which existed within the DSP, for example, the AKP presented a broadly united front in its defense of the EU-related reforms as well as IMF disciplines. The period 2002-2004 constituted the golden years of the AKP government. This again demonstrates that there is no neat correspondence between left/right distinction and reformism versus anti-reformism. The AKP is a conservative, right-of-center party with explicit Islamist roots. At the same, however, the commitment of party leadership to reform has been much more pronounced than any of its predecessors or existing competitors. Between 2002 and 2004, in the presence of a double external anchor (IMF and the EU), the economy has recovered swiftly from a major crisis. The democratization reforms continued with an accelerating momentum. The AKP government also differed from its

predecessors in terms of some of its foreign policy initiatives. For example, for the first time a Turkish government in the recent era was willing to contemplate an internationally acceptable solution to the Cyprus dispute along the lines of the proposed UN plan. The very pace of the reform process in Turkey resulted in the historical decision on the part of the EU to initiate accession negotiations in December 2004, probably a much earlier date than initially anticipated in the Helsinki Summit. The July 2007 elections represent a clear victory for the conservative globalist camp. In spite of a strong nationalistic backlash during the years 2005-2007, the AKP has managed to claim 47 percent of the total vote indicating the depth of its societal support. It remains to be seen, however, whether the party will be able to press single-mindedly for the continuation of democratization reforms and for EU membership. Taking into account the sources of resistance, both within the state and the society at large, and in the face of escalating conflict with the PKK in the south east, considerable obstacles remain on the path to democratic consolidation and eventual EU membership.

Ziya Önis is professor at the Department of International Relations, Koç University, Istanbul. zonis@ku.edu.tr

cover story

Facilitating Volkan Vural interviewed by Dimitris Maziotis and Eleni Fotiou

As the first Head of Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s EU General Secretariat, and given the fact that you were one of the pioneers when accession process started, are you satisfied with the progress in Turkey-EU relations since 1999?

Ambassador Volkan Vural served as Chief Advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister and as Head of the Permanent Representation of Turkey to the United Nations. He was the first Secretary General for EU Affairs and after his retirement, he is Counsellor to the Chairman of Dogan Holding.

I am certainly happy with the fact that we are on the right track. However, on the other hand, I am a little disappointed that progress has been so slow. The opening of negotiations has not led to any significant acceleration of the process. There are obstacles, which prevent the negotiations taking place, but also there are psychological obstacles, which basically stem from some European countries, that still question Turkish membership, although the decision has already been made. This is not helpful for very coherent progress in Turkish-EU relations. The image of Turkey in EU member states Do you think that some leaders of some EU member states have a discriminatory approach towards Turkey? Is there an inherent double standard? I would not describe it as double standards or discrimination. I would describe it as a sort of hesitation, and a re-opening of old books every day. The decision of the Turkish candidacy was made

in 1999, the negotiations started in 2005 and the decision for the opening of negotiations was made one year earlier. Everything is going according to a certain schedule and framework. To challenge the basic framework at this point and open it for discussion is not helpful. Some of the reasons for that approach are domestic politics. On the other hand, there are firm commitments on the part of the states. Therefore, I do not view this questioning as a very healthy exercise. It is not helping Turkey; it is not helping the European public. Instead, we should focus on the real issues, that is to say, the real difficulties in the negotiations, which we have yet to address.

Which are? Agriculture: a huge subject. Turkey definitely needs major transformation, but we cannot do this alone. We need help in this particular area. So, we have to focus on the real issues, which will bring Turkey closer to the EU. Thereby, the resolution of these issues will not only precede our accession, but will also precipitate the adoption of Turkey by the EU. We have some statements by N. Sarkozy, in which France raises some issues in the opening of new chapters. Do you think this will become a big problem? I hope that President Sarkozy, in time, will come to a point of recognizing that Turkish entry into the EU is not only for Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interest, but also in the in-

EU Entry terest of France. I think he is capable of understanding this process, but he will probably need time to adjust the electoral campaign speeches to the reality of life.

Do you think that, in accordance with President Sarkozy’s statements, calling for a ‘Mediterranean Union’ will work in the future? Do you think that this union will give a voice of expression to Turkey? The whole idea of Mediterranean cooperation is a very old concept. There is nothing new about it. We know the reasons why the Mediterranean region has not prospered, as it wished. Especially the southern part. We know the reasons why the Arab countries, northern African countries and Israel face a new era of cooperation in the Mediterranean. The problems of the Middle East prevent such developments. We are of course, as Turkey, a Mediterranean country and no one is going to admit us or reject from the Mediterranean. We are already there. So, it is not up to Mr. Sarkozy to determine Turkey’s place. Turkey’s place has been set by geography and by history, not by anyone else. We do not concede his idea for Turkey being part of the Mediterranean but not part of the EU. This is unacceptable. For us, so-called membership in a Mediterranean role does not prevent membership in the EU., just as membership in the EU does not prevent our role in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, a Turkey, which is a member of the EU could contribute, more than anything else to the development of cooperation in the Mediterranean region. Why? Because the southern

Mediterranean is basically dominated by countries of Islamic faith. And there, they will see another country, which is predominantly Muslim, as a member of the EU, with a successful democracy and human rights’ record; then they will find certain guidance from this role. They will have Turkey as a model. Therefore, I believe if President Sarkozy wants to develop the Mediterranean region, his first objective should be to facilitate Turkey’s entry into the EU. Otherwise he will send the wrong message to the Mediterranean. They will feel that Turkey has been discriminated against because of religion. Turkey’s view of EU You were a member of the Convention for the Future of Europe. How do you see the institutional reforms now in the EU, given the fact that the European Constitution is coming to a stalemate and furthermore, if we assume that Turkey will enter the EU, is it going to support a more political or a more economic Union? Basically, from the very beginning we were interested in a political EU. Of course, economy is the essence, but without a political European Union, I do not think we can achieve anything. So, unlike the UK, we are in favor of a political union. As to the constitutional reforms, I think there is a need for the legislative transformation, but the present draft constitution was not explained well

to the public. It was too long, too detailed. So, I think the new exercise to redraft or change the constitution, making it more acceptable to the public, is understandable and we are in favor of it.

How do you see these efforts on the part of the Catholic Church, or other churches to put Christianity as one of the values of the EU? We do not deny the role of Christianity in the process and the formation of the EU. But of course, there were other religions. Judaism has played a role, just as Islam today plays a role. I think it would be wrong to attribute the whole thing to Christianity. It should be more neutral and more collective. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Christianity, as a historic reference, will not upset us. Reform process If we go a little bit back to the issue of the reforms in Turkey, the EU Commission’s Progress Reports refer to some drawbacks since 2005, including Article 301 of the New Penal Code, the minorities’ issue and the civilian-military relations. Which of those do you think should be a priority for Turkey’ s reforms, taking into account that the new draft for the Turkish Constitution is in the way of its formation?

interview

If I were advising the present government, which I am not at the moment, I would advise them to change, amend or completely take out A. 301, because it has established a very bad precedent regarding the freedom of expression in Turkey and it has caused a lot unnecessary problems, not because of the text, but because of its interpretation. So, my first priority would be to change A. 301. But the draft constitution will address many issues, and I believe it will remove all criticism by the EU. But this will take some time. It will take at least a year for us to agree on a new constitution. So, as a matter of urgency, certain things which were highlighted in the Progress Report must be changed.

Do you think that the victory of the AKP in July elections and the new President of the Turkish Republic will somehow affect EU-Turkey relations? Will this affect the image of secular Turkey abroad? No, I think the present government has from the very start committed itself to EU membership. They have been very sincere on that and during their last term they pushed for many reforms. The present government again committed itself to the EU process and it is preparing a new constitution with freedom in mind. Therefore, I think their activities are recognized by the EU as something positive for Turkish EU membership. In that respect, I do not have any problems. The problem is how to bring other sectors of society into this process, because the government sometimes expresses itself against the EU. The opposition parties must also make their contribution to the EU process and that is what, as a civilized

society, we are trying to encourage. Foreign policy issues Concerning the recent crisis in the South-eastern borders of Turkey, do you think this will have a long-term effect in EU-Turkey relations? I do not think so. I mean the government objected to NATO involvement that could threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq or that could in any way hurt the neighbor. It has specified the objective as fighting against the terrorist organization, which is recognized as such by the EU. Therefore, it is limited in objective and we hope they will not be able to use this possibility, because this is our last resort to prevent terrorists infiltrating into Turkey. I do not think this will basically hurt Turkish-EU relations. But of course, depending on the scale of the activities and operations, it may create some problems.

Regarding Greek-Turkish relations, as you are a former ambassador, we have seen some cooperation in the energy field, an economic dialogue, banking sector. There is a delay in bi-

lateral talks about the issues that have been troublesome throughout those years. Do you foresee any progress in the near future? I think so. Bilateral relations with Greece are improving. A few years ago, neither in Turkey nor in Greece would anyone have imagined that a Greek bank would buy a Turkish bank. But this is normal life. I think it is a good sign, a positive element, which shows competence. As for the bilateral questions, which have been on the agenda for many years, they must be seen in the entire spectrum of problems including Cyprus. My feeling is that there is no question that we cannot solve bilaterally. I think together we have to solve the Cyprus question, because this is a poison to Turkey-EU relations, to Turkey-Greece relations, to the regional situation. We must address the Cyprus question with urgency â&#x20AC;&#x201C; we cannot leave it as it is. There is an unsolved problem, which must be addressed and Greece and Turkey must work together in the hope of resolving it.

A silent revolution: the European integration process By Ayhan Kaya

Despite political, ethnic and religious predicaments in neighboring countries, Turkey has experienced one of the steadiest periods in the history of the Republic. At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the European Heads of State and Government for the first time offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the European Union, more than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community in July 1959. The decision taken in Helsinki was in almost direct opposition to that taken at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, which was designed to crush Turkey’s hopes for EU membership. In the aftermath of the Luxembourg Summit, the public response in Turkey was immediate and harsh. Popular nationalism, minority nationalisms, Kemalism, religiosity, occidentalism and Euroscepticism all reached their peak shortly afterwards, but thanks to the Helsinki Summit, this destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last long. The EU perspective delivered to Turkey in Helsinki owed much to the letter that had been sent by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, in May 1999. The letter was crucial because in it Turkey expressed its willingness to undertake structural reforms in the political, social and economic spheres in order to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. These commitments were optimistically interpreted by

the political elite of the EU member states, and particularly by the German Greens and Social Democratic Party. The letter was sent in the immediate aftermath of the arrest of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in January 1999. As one can imagine, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan was regarded as the end of a traumatic reign of terror and violence, both for the political establishment and the nation in general. The European Union perspective offered in Helsinki has radically transformed the political establishment in Turkey, opening up new prospects for various ethnic, religious, social and political groups. Kurds, Alevis, Islamists, Circassians, Armenians and a number of religious and ethnic groups in Turkey have become true advocates of the European Union in a way that affirms the pillars of the political union as a project for peace and integration. The EU provides a great incentive and motivation for numerous groups in Turkey to reinforce their willing-

ness to coexist in harmony. What lies beneath this willingness no longer seems to be the retrospective past, full of ideological and political disagreements among various groups, but rather the prospective future, in which ethnic, religious and cultural differences are embraced in a democratic way. The EU currently appears to be the major catalyst in accelerating the process of democratisation in Turkey. ‘If, in December 2004, the European Council, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay’ state the conclusions of the European Council, summoned in Copenhagen in December 2002. However, both the political establishment and the general public in each of the European Union countries are aware of the fact that Turkey’s membership of the Union will further stimulate discussions about “European identity” and “the limits of Europe”. There have recently been heated public debates on Turkey’s EU membership in several countries, mostly disfavouring membership of a large state like Turkey with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-economic conditions below the European average (Kubicek, 2005). Some argu-

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ments put forward the socio-economic disparities between Turkey and the EU, some underline the Islamic character of Turkey, and some emphasize Turkey’s undemocratic and patrimonial political culture, whilst others even raise the clash of civilizations in order to reject Turkish membership. Nobody can deny the fact that it will be difficult for the Union to absorb Turkey in the short term. However, a more constructive discourse needs to be generated with regard to Turkey’s full membership in order to revitalize one of the fundamental tenets of the European Union, that of “a peace project’” There is no doubt that a peace project requires constructive rather than destructive criticisms. The discourse developed by the Independent Commission on Turkey is constructive, and thus deserving of admiration. The decision taken by the Union on December 17, 2004, and reconfirmed on October 3, 2005, to start accession talks with Turkey immediately, has also reinforced the Turkish public’s faith in the EU. What is even more important in Turkey is that “the peace project” discourse has become quite popular and political. One comes across articles in the newspapers and speeches on TV and radio that address the EU as a peace project that has been able to settle the deep-rooted animosity between Germany and France and, more recently, between Germany and Poland. It is believed that the EU is not only a

peace-making political union, but also one that exports peace. 1 The 1999 Helsinki Summit decision stimulated a great stream of reforms in Turkey. In fact, the country achieved more reforms in just over two years than during the whole of the previous decade. Several laws were immediately passed in the National Parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. These included the right to broadcast in one’s mother tongue; freedom of association; the limitation of military impact on the judiciary; more civilian control over the military; bringing extra-budgetary funds to which the military had access within the general budget of the Defence Ministry; removing military members from the High Audio Visual Board (RTÜK) and the Board of Higher Education (YÖK); removing military judges from the State Security Courts (DGM) and eventually the abolition of those Courts;2 the extension of civil rights to officially recognized minorities (Armenians, Jews and Greeks); reformation of the Penal Code; the abolition of the death penalty; release of political prisoners; the 1. During her recent visit to Ankara, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dora Bakoyannis, expressed her wish to see Turkey and Greece taking the same lines that France and Germany had once taken towards peace and stability.

abolition of torture by the security forces; and greater protection for the press. Furthermore, strict anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully enforced along with the International Monetary Fund directives; institutional transparency and liberalism have been endorsed; both formal nationalism and minority nationalism have been precluded; and socio-economic disparities between regions have also been dealt with. However, much remains to be done and to be implemented. The EU perspective has also provided the Turkish public with an opportunity to come to terms with its own past, a Turkish Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past). Two widely debated and polemical conferences on the ‘Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire’ and the ‘Kurdish Question’ were organized at the Istanbul Bilgi University, on September 2526, 2005 and March 11-12, 2006 respectively, a point to which we shall return later.

2. DGMs were established in 1973 and enshrined in law in 1982 in order to regulate Turkish political life. However, there have recently been some discussions about the revised Turkish Penal Code (TCK) which includes a new version of the former article 159, prohibiting ‘public degrading’ of ‘Turkishness’, the Republic, the armed forces and other institutions of state, on pain of six months’ to three years’ imprisonment. Most recently a prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for ‘insulting Turkishness’. See Article 301 of the new Türk Ceza Kanunu on: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html. Article 301 of the Penal Code still remains there intact waiting to be rephrased and changed.

61 Turkey: conflict and strain in search of identity. Angelos Syrigos, Professor Panteion University

Although the judiciary acted favourably towards the lawsuits claimed by some ultranationalist lawyers, both conferences paved the way for public discussion of two subjects that had hitherto been taboo in contemporary Turkish history. Another international conference was hosted (May 26-27, 2005) by the Istanbul Bilgi University’s Centre for Migration Research, on the theme of the emigration of Assyrians who were forced to leave Eastern Anatolia in the aftermath of the foundation of the Republic in 1920s. Assyrian-origin participants from various European countries including Sweden, Germany, France and Belgium openly expressed their excitement at seeing the radical democratic transformation that Turkey had recently gone through. Another conference, on the theme ‘Meeting in Istanbul: past and present’, was organized by the Greek-origin minority in Istanbul, to bring together intellectuals from the Anatolian-Greek diaspora and the Greeks of Istanbul (June 30 - July 2, 2006). Apart from the fact that such conferences could be organized in contemporary Turkey without encountering any major public intervention, the latter conference was even hosted by the AKP-affiliated Istanbul Metro-

politan Municipality. All of these legal and political changes bear witness to the transformation of Turkey regarding its position vis-à-vis the notion of diversity. This transformation corresponds to a discursive shift, which officially recognizes Turkey as a multicultural country. That is to say that multiculturalism is no longer just a phenomenon in Turkey: it is also an officially recognized legal and political fact. From December 17, 2004 to October 3, 2005, when EU state and national government leaders decided to start negotiations with Turkey, tensions began to rise between nationalist, patriotic, statist, pro-status-quo groups on the one hand and pro-EU groups on the other hand. A new nationalist wave embraced the country, especially among middle-class and upper middle-class groups. The electoral cycle of presidential and general elections, witnessed militarist, nationalist and Eurosceptic aspirations coupled with rising violence and terror in the country. The fight between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the other statist political parties, backed by the army, crystallized during the presidential election in May 2007. The AKP had nominated the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah

Gül, as presidential candidate, but Mr Gül did not fit the expectations of Turkey’s traditional political and military establishment and he failed to reach the required twothirds majority in the assembly sitting. This failure resulted from the fact that the presidential post has a rather symbolic importance in Turkey since it was first occupied by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. However, the establishment argued that, as someone with pro-Islamist values and a wife who wears a headscarf, Mr Gül was inappropriate for the office of president. The conflict even led to military intervention in politics on April 27, 2007, an intervention notoriously labelled ‘e-intervention’ because of the way it was announced on the web page of the Chief of Staff. However, the nationalist and militarist alliance against the AKP was unsuccessful in the general election and on July 22, 2007 the party won a landslide victory, with 47% of the votes cast. It could simply be concluded that, instead of heeding the nationalist and militarist electoral campaigns, based on a parochial, local, anti-global and anti-European discourse that aimed for ‘nationalist closure’, the Turks opted for Europeanization, globalization, stability and progress. Ayhan Kaya is Associate Professor of Politics and Director of the European Institute, Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences, Istanbul Bilgi University. ayhank@bilgi.edu.tr

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Turkish Conservatives’ EU choice:

TACTIC or In the July 2007 general elections, the AKP, which had been governing Turkey for the previous five years, increased its share of the votes by 13% over the previous elections, from 34% in November 2002 to 47% in July 2007. This was the second time in Turkish democratic history that a party had increased its percentage of the votes from one election to the other while in government. Moreover, this was the largest share of votes that a party had been able to get in a general election since the electoral victory of the center-right Justice Party in 1969. All in all, the AKP won a historic victory in July 2007. Almost all the other larger parties got most of their votes from certain regions of the country: CHP from the coastal zones of the Marmara and the Aegean regions; MHP from the inner Anatolian regions; and the DTP from the Kurdish-populated south-east Anatolian regions. Only the AKP received votes from every corner of the country, including people of Kurdish origin. The high percentage of the votes and the more or less even distribution of its electoral support across the country can be taken as the indicators that the AKP made a drastic move to occupy the center-right mainstream of the Turkish party system. However, this statement has to be qualified. The AKP did not simply occupy an empty

center-right seat; it also set out to redefine the center-right mainstream of Turkish politics along three new dimensions: Islamic conservatism in politics, neo-liberalism in economics, and pro-EU orientation in foreign relations. What we are observing can be interpreted as the birth pangs of a ‘Muslim Democracy’ in Turkey, which are not very different from the problems encountered during the formative years of Christian Democrat parties and ideologies in countries like Italy and Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, and later on in Spain (Popular Party) and Greece (New Democracy Party) in the 1970s and 1980s. The AKP deserves the credit of time, and a lot of European help, so that it can successfully complete its historic leap from an antiWestern Islamicism to a pro-Western Muslim Democracy. Why did so many people go and vote for the AKP, despite the allegations, voiced by no less than the chief of the general staff, that the party might endanger the secular character of the Turkish regime? The oft-cited reasons for that success usually revolve around the general macroeconomic improvement during the AKP government, which reflected itself, for the common people, as a drastic fall in the inflation and unemployment rates, and a slight improvement in income distribution. On the more political side of the pic-

By Hakan Yilmaz

ture, one can pinpoint three other reasons that might help us understand how the AKP could gain the favor of so many voters. One reason could be that the AKP was the only party that based its electoral campaign on a list of ‘do’s’, positive promises, and a general air of optimism, as opposed to the other parties that stressed their ‘don’t’s, gave negative promises and talked pessimistically. The electorate never had a chance to learn what the opposition parties were planning to do if they made it up to the seat of government. All they heard was what the other parties would not do or would not let other people do. A second probable reason behind the choice of the AKP could be that the AKP appeared to be the only party that talked over multiple isues, while each of the other parties stressed a single issue only: secularism by the CHP, Turkish nationalism by the MHP, Kurdish nationalism by the DTP. Still a third probable reason behind the electorate’s choice of the AKP was the AKP’s generally flexible and pragmatic stance as

Turkey is a unique and rich tapestry of peoples, proud of its past, troubled with its present, and unsure of its future. Gareth Winrow, Professor Bilgi University

Strategy? opposed to the other parties’ ideological, inflexible, and extemist discourses. In the eyes of the average voter, the hard-liner discourses of the opposition parties might have rung the alarm bells that, had they come to power, they might have drifted the country towards some sort of crisis. Admittedly, the pro-EU attitudes of the AKP elites had started as a tactical choice, as a matter of finding European protection against the suppressive policies of the Turkish secularist establishment. However, this tactical choice seems to have been evolving into a strategic one. This strategic choice also has to do with the defeat of Turkish political Islam, which has been traditionally represented in the political arena by Necmettin Erbakan and by the so-called National Doctrine parties he led, through the shock waves of the ‘post-modern’ military intervention of February 28, 1997. Hence, antiKemalist revanchism, top-down transformation of the society along Islamic lines, using democracy as no more than an instrument to be able to come to power, this quintessentially political project, has proved to be futile. Erdogan, who was a radical Islamist in the pre-February 28 period, once said that democracy was but a train and that one should get off the train at the right station. Once his party took

power, the same Erdogan started to say that he and his party rejected any project of ‘social engineering’, that is to say, using political power to change the society according to the precepts of a certain ideology, including the Islamist one. He also, started to deny vehemently that his party was Islamist or even that it was a religiously-based party. In quest for a more appropriate appellation that would better reflect the party’s new orientation away from political Islam and towards the center, the party ideologists came up with the term conservative democrat. What can be said about the ex-Islamists’ strategic choice for the EU and how different is it from the earlier tactical rapprochement towards the EU? The strategic choice seems to involve the following dimensions. The first dimension has to do with delinking from political Islam, ideologically as well as institutionally, while the second one aims at Europeanizing the Turkish public sphere for it to ac-

commodate the performances of Islamic identity, particularly by passing legislation that would allow Muslim women wearing a headscarf to have a legitimate presence in the universities and government institutions. Here the issue is the compatibility of Muslim identity and European modernity. In this respect, Kemalist-nationalist understanding of modernity is too restrictive, too exclusive for the desired integration of Islamic identity and modernity. Hence, a new, more liberal, more inclusionary version of modernity, one could say a more ‘post-modern’ definition of modernity, such as the one that is upheld by the European Union, would offer a much better ground for that integration to take place. The Kemalist understanding of modernity is, paradoxically, too modernist, too much attached to an earlier, French revolutionary, 19th century definition of modernity as to allow the manifestations and performances of Islamic identity in the public

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sphere. On the other hand, the current European understanding of modernity is, again paradoxically, much less ‘modernist’ than Turkey’s. Therefore, a Europeanized public sphere in Turkey would more easily tolerate the free display of Muslim identity. Two forces will resist this project, however. The first of these is euroskepticism and nationalist isolationism in Turkey: Nationalist isolationists will not leave the battleground without, at least, a fierce last battle. Nationalists will particularly be willing to mobilize public opinion against the government, whenever the latter attempts to touch upon such nationally sensitive issues as the Kurdish and Cyprus questions. The second force is likely to be Turkoskepticism and rejectionism of Turkey in Europe. Hence, European rejectionists of Turkey, such as the newly elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy, sticking to theses of cultural and civilizational incompatibility between Turkey and Europe, will make it harder for Turkey to get integrated into European Union, alienating many Muslim supporters of the AKP, while at the same time playing into the hands of Turkish nationalist isolationists. The success of the conservative democratic project for Europeanizing Turkey depends essentially on an external and uncontrollable factor, namely, the EU policy towards Turkey. Squeezed between Turkish Euroskepticism and European Turkoskepticism, the AKP project may very well fail. If it fails, then, Islamism, as a po-

litical ideology, will surely come back. Kurdish secessionism would most probably follow suit, as Kurds would lose their hopes of expanding their community rights in a democratic Turkey. As a result, Turkish politics would again revert to the battlefield, much the same as in the 1990s, of Islamism, Kurdish nationalism and Turkish isolationism. If Turkey’s integration with the EU makes a leap forward with the smooth progression of the accession negotiations that were opened in the fall of 2005, then the expected short-term consequence of this would be felt, at the political front, in the form of the consolidation of a more democratic and liberal atmosphere. In such an atmosphere, it would be easier for the AKP to build a wide-ranging consensus for the purpose of integrating Muslim identity into the liberalized Turkish public sphere. That would satisfy the party’s more religious constituency and provide the party leadership with enough ideological ammunition to fight against, and detach themselves from, their Islamist critics. In this manner, the AKP could cross a critical threshold on its journey towards the secular center of Turkish politics, and this would surely make a significant contribution to the stabilization and consolidation of the democratic regime in Turkey.

Hakan Yilmaz is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University, Istanbul, and the executive coordinator of Bogazici University’s Master of Arts Program in European Studies.

From Domestic Crisis to Regional Challenge By Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

The spectacular victory of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the July 22, 2007 parliamentary elections contained a set of clear political messages. Turkish people rewarded the AKP for the economic growth and political stability which its government had secured. Besides, it clearly condemned military interventions into politics. The grave political crisis which erupted after the military’s e-memorandum of April 27, 2007 and the Constitutional Court’s decision of May 1, 2007 turned out to work to the electoral benefit of the AKP. The dramatic – and highly unusual for a single-government ruling party – increase of the AKP electoral strength should be primarily be attributed to popular reaction against the military intervention. Despite the high profile which the Turkish military has enjoyed in Turkish public opinion and the often-exaggerated concern of many secular Turks about the potential Islamization of Turkish society under the AKP, this was not translated into support or even tolerance for their blunt intervention. The uneventful election of Abdullah Gül to the Presidential office on August 27, 2007 comprised the culmination of AKP hegemony in Turkish politics and a turning point in republican Turkish politics. The third message was addressed to Turkey’s traditional political parties. Those parties whose electoral strength had plummeted in the 2004 elections again performed very poorly. The CHP failed to provide a credible political alternative to the

AKP and was caught in a nationalistic, populist rhetoric which repelled many of its potential voters. The MHP recovered its position in the Parliament, capitalizing on the general rise of nationalism, though without approaching its 1999 percentage, while parties like the DYP and the ANAP got results which put their very existence into question. The public’s rejectionist stance pointed at the serious structural deficiencies of the Turkish political party system. Finally, Turkey’s Kurds sent a powerful message to the pro-Kurdish political movement in Turkey. By increasing their support for the AKP, they manifested that they shared AKP’s agenda for economic development, minority rights reform and Turkey’s EU membership and objected to political extremism. However, Turkey’s post-election political climate has become seriously aggravated under the influence of developments in the field of foreign and security policy. The deep political crisis in Iraq has allowed for the resurgence of the PKK security threat and a serious deterioration of US-Turkey relations, as the deadliest PKK attacks for more than ten years hit Turkey. Moreover, the already strained US-Turkey relations faced the possibility of an all-time low, when the Foreign

Affairs Committee of the US Congress approved on October 10 a declaration on the recognition of the Armenian genocide and it seemed probable that the Congress itself would follow suit. Although the government has wisely avoided inflammatory rhetoric and disproportionate reactions, the threat of Turkey’s gradual shift towards isolationism and rampant anti-Western nationalism cannot be precluded. It is imperative that the United States act promptly to eliminate the PKK security threat emanating from Iraq. The European Union, whose role in triggering the reform since 1999 is hard to overstate, should also continue to offer a balanced set of reform incentives and a credible membership perspective. Turkey needs to maintain a moderate stance against the PKK provocation and accelerate reform in a broad range of issues – including minority rights – in view of its EU accession negotiations. The European Union should express its support for Turkey’s struggle against the PKK, clearly signal that the decision for Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership is final and that Turkey’s accession negotiations will be conducted on a fair basis. Western support is critical for controlling and resolving the current crisis.

Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis is Lecturer at the Department of Turkish and Modern Asian Studies, University of Athens and Research Fellow at ELIAMEP

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Turkey at a

crossroads By E. Fuat Keyman

-There is a consensus within the debates on terrorism that the aim of terrorist acts is very much larger than the direct physical destruction they cause. The audacious 9/11 act of terrorism illustrates this point very clearly. The 9/11 terror and the neoconservative response to it, which has come to be known as ‘the global war on terror’, have created not only a ‘clash of fundamentalisms’ in world politics, but also more importantly, the emergence of ‘the new dark age of dogma’ replacing the place of reason and critical thinking in public and political discourse. Today, we are living in a world in which we are witnessing more human misery, more terrorist dangers and more corruption of politics and political reason in the way in which world affairs are conducted. Terror in Turkey Today Turkey is appalled by the recent PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) terrorism, which has recently caused 50 lives. The last PKK attack on October 22, 2007, which left 12 soldiers dead, 16 wounded and 8 missing has created shock, grief, anger and a wave of rage society. The general feeling in Turkey concerning the recent inhuman and audacious PKK terrorism is that Turkish patience has been exhausted and the possibility of the cross-border military operation in Northern Iraq is increasing daily. Given that Turkey, in terms of both its

government and its society, has every right to express its anger towards the PKK terrorism and its criticism to the US-government, the Iraqi state and the regional government in the Northern Iraq, it is nevertheless crucial to recall the fundamental lesson we learnt from the 9/11 attack that the aim of terrorist acts is ‘very much larger than the direct physical destruction’ they cause. The aim of the PKK terror is threefold: a. to push the Turkish government to initiate a cross-border military operation into the Northern Iraq, and thus to increase the possibility of a clash between Turkey, Iraq and the US in that region, which has the potential to give rise the perception of the Turkish military presence in the region not as an actor acting in self-defense, but as an invading security force; b. to bring the Southeastern Anatolia back to its highly securitized, military-led governance in the late 1990s, and thus to demonstrate in that region that a demo-

cratic and political solution to the Kurdish problem is impossible and not desired by the state, and C. to create a Turkish-Kurdish identitybased clash in society, thus to demonstrate that the coexistence and unity within diversity is impossible in Turkey. Change in Turkey It is therefore imperative that in responding terrorism, we should express our anger, but act with reason and critical thinking, so that we do not fall into the traps of terrorism. If necessary, Turkey should initiate military operation in self defense, but this should not be the only way, or only policy that it puts into practice in its fight on terrorism. Turkey’s fight against the PKK terrorism should make sure: (a) that the democratic and economic reform process will continue in the region, and (b) that the present societal anger and rage would not in any way lead to the process and feeling of societal polarization in which our Kurdish citizens are regarded as ‘the Other’. In other words, Turkey should apply what I call the human-focused three-dimensional approach, in which, (a) while expressing and implanting its “zero-tolerance” to terrorism, it should act on the basis of (b) the principle of rule of law and democratic

Turkey is a dynamic, fast-developing country that has some problems mostly stemming from the restructuring it has been experiencing on the political and economical front. Baturalp Candemir, Chief Economist, Macroeconomic Research, EFG Istanbul Securities

norms, and increase the pace of (c) its democratic and economic reform process in the region to gain especially the support of its Kurdish citizens for its legitimate fight against PKK terrorism. It seems to me that today, the possibility of success through the human-focused three dimensional approach is likely for two reasons. First, we are living in a country undergoing a number of changes in its modernization, democratization, globalization and Europeanization; a change which is translating itself in the widening, deepening and speeding-up of the middle class and its centrists values. The survey, released on October 25, 2007, conducted by Scientific Research Projects for Open Society Institute and the Bosporus University, has revealed that Turkish people support secularism, act against military-coups, consider themselves devout yet modern, and support Turkey’s European Union accession process. Since the 1980s, and even more so since the 1990s, we have been witnessing a changing Turkey where the urban middle class values locating themselves at the center are creating a great potential to further Turkey’s journey in democratic consolidation, economic welfare and European integration. Today’s Turkey has the capacity to achieve social cohesion, and ‘stability and unity in diversity’ in its society. This achievement makes it more possible for Turkey to fight against terrorism without falling into its traps, mainly in

terms of the creation of a ‘fear society’ in which, rather than coexistence and multiculturalism, every identity selects its shelter for its security and protection. Constitution in Turkey The second reason for the possibility of success lies in the fact that, in a time when Turkey is preoccupied with the question of terrorism, it is also undergoing the process of preparing a new and civilian constitution, which will replace its existing authoritarian and post-1980 military coup constitution. The new constitution provides both chance and a suitable and feasible platform to create stability and solidarity in increasing cultural diversity and corresponding demands of recognition. The changing nature of Turkish modernity and democracy, and the impacts of globalization and Europeanization, cannot be handled by the post-military coup 1982 constitution, and require a need for a new, civilian constitution paving the way to the construction of the good, just and effective governance of the country. As noted above, the widening

and deepening of the middle class and its values, as one of the significant sites of change, constitutes the normative basis of the new constitution. In this sense, Turkey should not stop the process of, and the debate on the new constitution in the name of the fight against terrorism. Instead, Turkey should see the constitution-preparation process and debate as integral to the possibility of its success in its fight against terrorism without facing the problems of societal polarization and social fragmentation. Without any doubt, Turkey is at a crossroads in terms of its decision about terrorism, a decision which has the potential to determine the near-future of Turkey, its domestic stability, and its international perception. Not dogma but reason, not fear but courage, not one-dimensionality but multi-dimensionality, and not only state security but human security should frame this crucial decision.

E. Fuat Keyman is a professor at the Department of International Relations, Koç University, Istanbul. fkeyman@ku.edu.tr

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Exposing the Achilles heel of Europeanization By Eleni Fotiou

Since 2001, the Turkish parliament has passed loads of amendments to the Turkish Constitution. Those legislative reforms are sometimes claimed to be only changes in legal texts, without any actual impact in the political practice. It is true that some of the reform packages may not have been implemented yet, but they have had an unexpected impact on the society, which is in the way of transformation towards more active citizenship and participation in the decisionmaking processes. The amendments de jure granted the civilian authorities the power to control the security sector1, but de facto, the political system is dependent on the military establishment2. This must not be judged in light of the customary European perspective. For, the military in Turkey enjoys public support, because it has been the ‘modernizer’ since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 1. See amendment of A. 118 of the Constitution as to the synthesis of the National Security Council and its “advisory role”, L.2945 as to the civilian Secretary General of the NSC (Yigit Alpogan), abolition of State Security Courts and of the military representatives to the Supreme Education Board/YÖK and the High Audiovisual Board/RTÜK. 2. The Armed Forces have extensive powers and they are not subordinate to civilian control of the Ministry of Defence, the Red Paper (National Security Policy Document) is in the jurisdiction of the National Security Council, but most of all, in practice, neither the government (despite some mere statements), nor the parliament exert any kind of control over the Armed Forces and the military budget.

Some of the amendments, especially those related to the judicial system, the functioning of the public administration, the measures against corruption, respect for human rights and gender equality managed to pass. However, they need time to be implemented, because they require full absorption of the democratic values. The amendments that failed to pass fell in the trap of domestic constituencies and the atmosphere preceding the national elections of July 2002. There is no consensus on Article 301 of the new Penal Code, for example, among the members of the Turkish society and an attempt to amend it may bear political cost. The rest of the amendments required, such as the restitution of minority rights, trade union rights and expansion of freedom of association, need an overall rethinking of politics and identity issues and the reconstruction of the state-individual relations. Leaving the legal and bureaucratic structures aside, the democratization process, more than concrete changes, brought an overall transformation of Turkish society. The reforms revealed the existence of an intellectual elite, specifically located in the big cities, that has been stimulated and that raised its voice against the traditional

role of the military in politics. The voices of these elites can be heard more compared to the past and are no more object of censorship. Minority consciousness has been fostered and public discourse with regards to the restitution of the minority cultural rights of Christians, Alevis and Kurds are not taboo issues anymore. Human rights’ consciousness has been triggered too. The new intellectual elite started to be represented in universities (inter alia Bilgi), think-tanks (inter alia TESEV) and newspapers (inter alia Radikal) and a new group of young academics forms new discourses about Turkish politics, comprising elements that used to be ‘alien’ to the Turkish reality in the past, such as the demand for a civic identity. The intellectual elite have created some grounds for discussion about democracy, freedom of expression and participatory citizenship. Conferences, seminars and public discussions (about the Ottoman Armenians, the Kurds and the Rums of Istanbul) have strengthened the participation of society in politics, which traditionally has never been a participant one, as ‘democratic reforms’ or ‘Western orientation’ has always been a choice of the elite. The society has become familiarized with the EU goal, because the economic benefits started to be evident in everyday lives, so that the public has started

Turkey is a rapidly-changing country with the potential to contribute to peace and stability in its region as well as in our globalizing world, and in that sense it is a pivotal state, a regional power, whose ability to combine Islam with modernity and democracy makes it a model country, or a significant historical experience to learn from. Of course, all of this depends on the ability, capacity and will of Turkey to deepen and consolidate its democracy. Fuat Keyman, Professor, Koc University

to voice its support clearly to the EU as a foreign policy objective3. The victory of the AK PARTI in the 2002 elections interrupted the marginalization of the traditional religious classes. Their participation in politics and in wealth since the foundation of the Turkish Republic was trivial, but the new government did not only proceed to a legitimization of the newly-emerged bourgeoisie, but also became a party of mass support deviating from the traditional ‘cadre party system’ of Turkey. The European choice and the economic policy of the AK PARTI government increased the support by the economic elites and their organizations, such as TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) and the stabilization of Turkish economy attracted foreign investments, which contributed to economic growth and development. The democratization process precipitated the transformation of the political parties. The EU requirements posing the question of ‘Who are the modernizers?’ created the impression that AK PARTI can follow the pace of modern civilizations more than the secular military. On the one hand, the Islamicrooted4 government moved towards a moderate approach to politics, alienating itself from the traditional Islamic discourse of Erbakan, in order to gain the reputation of the 3. Today, that support is at its lowest due to the nationalistic backlash. 4. It should be noted that western media defines the AK PARTI as a moderate Islamic party; they identify themselves as conservative democrats.

party that lead Turkey to the EU. On the other hand, MHP in practice moved towards the Center, by not opposing in principle the EU path and by countersigning the amendment for the abolition of the death penalty, as a result of its participation in the government from 1999 to 2002. The democratization process had some side effects in the way nationalism is expressed in the public sentiment. The statenationalism transformed and began to oppose the democratization process, which brings polyphony and equality before the law and the state, hence threatens the nationalistic, unitary, secular structure of the Turkish state. Due to the reforms and the need for compliance to the political criteria and prerequisites, the Sevres syndrome has received a new lease of life. The ‘bad Europeans who want to divide Turkey’ perception became persistent in the minds of the anti-EU bloc, especially when it comes to the cases of expanding human and minority rights. The quests of Islamic fundamentalism, due to the power of AK PARTI and Kurdish separatism, due to the precondition of granting cultural and minority rights became popular and, in the minds of some sectors of Turkish society, further legitimized the importance of the secular, military establishment. By introducing an inclusive concept of democracy, the intellectual elite

disrupted the secular establishment and further boosted the nationalistic sentiment. Among others, A. 301 of the Turkish new Penal Code, the vetoed Law on Foundations and the permission of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, put the discussion in the framework of ‘Turkishness’. Furthermore, the foreign investments in Turkey sowed the seeds of the nationalistic perception that ‘Europeans are invading the Turkish land and buying Turkish property’. However, the nationalistic aura is in a vicious circle with the rhetoric used by leaders of some EU member states due to their domestic constituencies, as well as with the hesitancy of the EU to proclaim its commitment to accept Turkey as a full member in the future – if Turkey complies with the EU political criteria and its prerequisites. This air of distrust against the EU, which pervades Turkish public opinion, is further boosted by the recent developments in the southeastern borders of Turkey with Iraq and it remains to be seen in the future whether the democratization process will fall victim to the internal balances of the Turkish bureaucracy or it will be further encouraged by the democratic forces of Turkey.

Eleni Fotiou is research fellow at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM).

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When society How do you see the democratization process as it has been from 1999 until today? Are you satisfied with the implementation and the progress made? Whether the reforms brought any change in Turkey depended very much on the conjuncture of the world situation, the psychology of the Turkish public and the conflicts and contradictions of the different communities. And a reflection of these contradictions and conflicts would be seen in the civilian and military relationships. It is a very complex issue. Although there are actors who want to make the reforms, you do not see a straight line of reforms and a deliberate action on the part of the government and the parliament. There are zig-zags, steps forward and then steps back, because reforms will really change the balance of the state in Turkey, because the state is too much militaristic. There is military supervision over civilians, exactly the opposite of the European situation. This means power, advantages in economy and social status on the part of the bureaucracy. It is a very complex issue and if we want to be realistic, it is going as expected. If we compare it with the anticipations of the Turkish public and mine, of course, it is not going in the right pace.

What articles will the new draft Constitution, which is to be submitted to the Turkish parliament, amend, according to the require-

pushes for

ments of the European Commission? Do you believe that AK PARTI after its victory will push the democratization process further? I am not sure you can call it an amendment, because they want to change the whole thing. As it is discussed, it becomes more and more of an amendment. Because there is resistance, and all those articles concerning YOK, A. 301 of the New Penal Code and the National Security Council are the points of resistance. These are the main articles to be changed, but in the end, maybe we will reach a point where those will not change but all the rest will. We do not know. This government, despite its 47% of the vote, is not strong. They are weak because legitimacy in Turkey comes from two bases. One leg is across the political/democratic legitimacy and is counted by vote, but the other is an ideological legitimacy. And since these people come from an Islamic background, visĂ -vis Kemalism, they are not as legitimate as a secular political party. So, they need the approval of the military, judiciary and bureaucratic sectors. They do not want to take risks, and they know that even without doing anything, they may win the next elections as well because the electorate of AKP does not have high expectations regarding AKP. They know this is a very difficult process for them, everyone knows they are not experienced and everyone realizes this is a big change for Turkey. It is not just amending some articles. This will be such a change, after which it will be very difficult to turn the course back again. Everyone has a bit of double talk. Everyone is trying to stay firm

Etyen Mahcupyan interviewed by Dimitris Maziotis and Eleni Fotiou

and not take unnecessary risks and to see whatever he can do depending on the conjuncture, and mainly on the relation between Turkey and the EU. If there is no support from the EU in the upcoming 3-4 years, I do not think this government can really reform rather a small pack of amendments. They will choose to remain at one point and they will try it again 3 or 4 years later. I do not think they will push it so much. Results of the reform process As to the reforms already made, are you satisfied by their implementation? Changing the legality of things is very easy compared to real changes in the social sphere. When it comes to society or to bureaucracy, we are talking about a specific mindset. That mindset is connected to a certain actor that is called bureaucracy in Turkey, meaning the military, the judiciary and the YOK. They act in accordance with their own codes and in accord to the ideology that they share: you can call it Kemalism, or status quo understanding of things. But, in the end, they are the ones using those articles or clauses.

Democratization We have a very big problem in terms of implementation. It is obvious that the real problem does not lie in the legality of things. We cannot deal with this problem only by changing the articles. We have to go into the balance of bureaucracy.

Maybe the democratization has not been implemented as it should have been, but do you think that some things have really changed in Turkish society? We have seen taboo issues begin to collapse (i.e. the Armenian genocide allegations, the Kurdish issue, the minorities and the civilian-military relations). We have seen a deliberation of speech since 2002. Conferences in Bilgi, Meeting of the Rums of Istanbul… The democratization process is affected by the society. Until now, we have been speaking about the bureaucracy, but the society is changing for the better. The problem is that society does not know how to politicize its ideas and demands. Maybe this stems from the Ottoman legacy. The Turkish public knows how to complain, how to differentiate between right and wrong, but they do not know politics. They do not know how to enter the public sphere and influence the political actors. When you look at the society, you become optimistic, because it is really changing toward the right direction. Then you look at the gap between the state and the society, which is enlarging and you become pessimistic. For, without the state authorities acting on the behalf of society’s de-

mands, we will not be going anywhere. This clash will be more open and it will not stay as rhetoric. It will become tangible in terms of the Kurdish issue, for example, or the Armenian issue. And when that happens – which is kind of enforced even today – the rise of nationalistic attitudes may stop the democratization process and all the changes in the society. The society will be more hesitant to voice its demands, feelings and ideas.

There are areas of society that are more progressive, but we also have witnessed a rise in MHP’s votes and CHP’s adopting more nationalistic rhetoric. Do you worry there will be a serious division within Turkish society, in a way that no common ground will be found in the end? I do not think so. These elections were held at a very peculiar time. The seculars do not know the Muslim community. It is such a communitarian country – again the Ottoman legacy, that you can live your whole life, in fact, not knowing anyone from the other community. Your friends, family can be from the small community of seculars, or on the other side, a small community of Muslims. The seculars were not ready to be governed by a Muslim political party. It was beyond their imagination. Kemalism says

that modernity will come and everybody will become secular. As a result, they have a psychology of defeat. That is why CHP can still receive so many votes. There is significant change, but the transformation has not reached that point, which will be adequate to alter the psychology as well. If CHP continues with the same strategy, I do not think they will be able to get another 20% in the next elections, of course, assuming that everything will go smoothly. If there is a rise in nationalistic sentiment or a clash between the USA and Turkey with Turkey going into Iraq, then we will experience a totally different Turkey, thereby creating a totally different psychology. Politics in Turkey are really based on the psychology of peoples, communities… In these elections we did not see any real political argumentation vis-à-vis each other. Everything was about threats, fears, risks. It is very easy to manipulate the Turkish public because it is based on the psychology of politics. We are not sure what point it will reach. Although the votes of MHP and CHP do not signify a real risk, they make us realize that at any time, with the manipulation of the Turkish public, they can receive the same votes again, and we can move away from real politics once more and fall into the trap of the psychology of fears.

Etyen Mahcupyan, Director of Turkish Eco-

nomic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Democratization Program.

interview

Accessing Justice By Dr. Irene Banias

The year 2002 was the beginning of far reaching legislative and constitutional changes in Turkey necessitating continuing efforts to implement them. Reforms in human rights and civil liberties, enhanced civilian control of the military and greater effectiveness in the administration of justice, were the areas identified as critical factors for a viable, democratic and peaceful Turkey. The implementation of such broad and far-reaching changes represented a major challenge for all institutions involved, but progress was being made and changes were taking place at a different pace. Access to Justice In response to the significant reforms taking place in Turkey we began our program, Access to Justice in March 2005. The program focused on the need to strengthen the implementation of human rights standards in all aspects of the judicial process, making justice more accessible to the people of Turkey. The program was structured as a process of continuing professional development for judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police, representatives of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior and representatives of civic society.

The immediate goals of the project were: to refresh and renew the participantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; knowledge and commitment to making human rights principles a core part of their professions, to create a forum for open communication among them to increase their awareness of the interconnection and interdependence of their functions within the judicial system, and as a consequence, to strengthen future communication and cooperation among judges, prosecutors, lawyers and police for an accessible and effective administration of justice. The primary challenge at the opening was to initiate the process of building relationships among our skeptical and at times antagonistic participant groups. We began with experienced professionals from the United Kingdom (UK) who shared the challenges and successes of the UK in implementing the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The

discussion concentrated on the critical ongoing adjustments at all levels of the administration of justice in the UK, the necessity for communication and cooperation among all its sectors, the initiation of rigorous professional training and the cooperative and constructive relationships that have developed between the components of the system of justice and particularly between law enforcement and civic society. The questions and comments from the audience, the ideas shared, the comparisons between the UK and the Turkish experience in implementing the ECHR, including the commonalities and divergences between the two systems created the proper atmosphere for continuing discussion. In the following month fourteen participants embarked on a study visit to the UK, to meet and observe their counterparts, to visit courts, ministries, police stations, crime laboratories and NGOss and have the opportunity to see first hand how justice is administered in the UK. The results of the visit, based on a debriefing session after their return, were very positive. They found the experience enriching, offering them insights

After a long period of crisis and tension, we are back on track particularly since the economy is booming as we look optimistically toward a brighter future. Volkan Vural, Former Ambassador, Advisor to the Chairman of Dogan Holding

and greater clarity as to their own professional role in the system of justice. They were able to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the UK system but also of the Turkish system of justice. They shared their ideas and recommended changes with the potential to enhancing the effectiveness of justice in Turkey. We subsequently took our program to various regions of Turkey including Erzurum, Antalya, Ankara and Izmir. Members of the core group assumed the role of leading the regional seminars, presenting, engaging and discussing with their colleagues challenging aspects of the implementation of human rights provisions. The substantive areas of focus were: the implementation of the right to life with emphasis on the use of lethal force, the prohibition of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty, right to fair trial and the rights of the accused, the right to private and family life, and the right to freedom of expression. The seminar leaders engaged in a dynamic process of discussing, questioning, challenging and exchanging views and insights on various legal issues, using scenarios and mock trials to highlight difficult areas of implementation and analyzed cases from the European Court of Human Rights, particularly the significance of the Courtâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rulings for Turkey and its implementation of the ECHR. But, just as importantly, we were simultaneously attempting to narrow the profes-

sional gap across the participant groups, by promoting open dialogue, sharing the unique challenges each profession experiences in implementing human rights and ultimately the critical importance of coordinating professional functions for an effective, accessible and fair justice system. Some of the highlights of the program Our participants were slow to open up at first and they were hesitant to speak. And yet at times we were surprised by efforts to bridge gaps and to establish relationships, such as when the anti-terrorist unit of the Istanbul Police Department invited representatives of civil society for a tour of their facilities. There was unanticipated openness and willingness to work toward change in some sectors: The Main Police Headquarters in Ankara opened up their offices, laboratories and made their scientists and staff available for questions, a full day tour and inspection of their facilities, in particular to Human Rights Defenders members of bar associations and civic society, among others. In their assessments and evaluations participants revealed their surprise that they had actually worked so closely with groups

they had never considered as their colleagues, such as police and NGOs, prosecutors and defense lawyers. Naturally, our efforts were challenged and thwarted by obstacles coming from those who resist and fear change, by the lack of a culture of institutional cooperation and dialogue among the groups who are responsible for access to justice in Turkey. Each participant group came with its own preconceived notions about the others, but in the process that began to change and communication started to flow across the aisles of our conference halls. Conclusion At the beginning of every seminar, I invited our participants to bring with them their energy, their vision, but especially their courage and commitment to the rule of law, so that together we would arrive at the most effective ways of making justice more accessible to all people. I believe that this challenging and intense series of human rights seminars began the process of opening the minds and hearts of many of the participants and challenged them professionally and personally to making human rights principles central to their professional duties as judges, prosecutors, lawyers and police. Dr. Irene Banias is assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bogazici University in Istanbul. She was legal advisor of the project Access to Justice undertaken by Bogazici University in partnership with European Dialogue, a United Kingdom NGO. banias@boun.edu.tr

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A Turbulent Process: By Dilek Kurban

Turkey’s process of accession to the European Union (EU), which formally started in 1999 with its declaration as an official candidate for membership, brought about an unprecedented legal and political reform movement. While modest in absolute terms, the reforms undertaken in the areas of human rights, rule of law and minority rights were radical in comparison to the state of affairs in the country before the initiation of the EU process. The reform process, which gained speed with the election to government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve KalkÈnma Partisi – AKP) in 2002, came to a halt in 2006 after having slowed down considerably from the second half of 2004 onwards due to the increasing opposition of new governments in major EU countries to Turkey’s eventual membership, the AKP’s declining commitment to the reform process in the interest of attracting nationalist votes in the 2007 parliamentary elections, and the resistance of

the civil, military and judicial bureaucratic establishment to the enactment and implementation of progressive laws. With the escalation of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces, the political and legal deadlock during the first round of presidential elections, the escalation of tensions between the government on the one hand and the armed forces, the main opposition party and the bureaucratic establishment on the other, 2007 has been the year of political turmoil and regime crisis in Turkey. As a result, the EU reforms dropped further down in the agenda of the government. And yet, the AKP was reelected to government by gaining nearly fifty percent of the votes in July 2007 elections. This was read by many as a stance for democracy and against military intervention and authoritarianism on the part of Turkish society. However, the post-election performance of the government has put its stated commitment to the process

of democratization and human rights reforms into question. Under increasing pressure from the military, the opposition and the media to respond to the reemerging acts of terror by the PKK through a cross-border operation into Iraq, the AKP government has resorted to a militarist rhetoric and hawkish policy vis-à-vis not only the PKK but also the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP), which claims the representation of the Kurds in the political system. Currently, both Turkey and the AKP government stand at a crossroad between reverting back to authoritarian rule and continuing with the democratization process. The difficult yet inevitable choices the government will have to make on critical issues such as the resolution of the Kurdish question – whether by democratic means through politics or by coercive measures through militarism – and the assertion of civilian control over the mili-

Turkey today is a country that finds itself at the crossroads on the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation. Ziya Onis, Professor, Koc University

Society on the move

tary will also determine the path that Turkey will take in the near future. In short, the past few years witnessed an initial unprecedented democratization process, and subsequent political turmoil and the regime crisis, which brought the reforms to halt. The current stalemate is ultimately the latest incident in an old struggle over political power in Turkey; a fight between the elected civilian government and the appointed bureaucrats of the civilian and military establishment. Is it possible to conclude then, that not much has changed in Turkey after all? Not quite. As never before in its history, the latest reform process triggered considerable social change in Turkey. The democratization

process generated a much more vocal, demanding and questioning society and an increasing awareness of principles of human rights, rule of law and democracy. It would be far-fetched to argue that this awareness is fully informed, that the culture of democracy is embedded and the values of a democratic society are internalized. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of human rights is gradually spreading across society, there is a burgeoning of civic society organizations, particularly in the field of human rights, the level of association and participation on the part of ethnic and religious minorities has increased considerably as is evidenced by the new associations founded by minorities. There is an increasing recourse to novel strategies in human rights advocacy – the hitherto silent non-Muslim and various ethnic minorities have not only started to speak up, organize and associate, but also to litigate against the state in both national and international courts…

The change is slow, painful, unpredictable, but irreversible. The EU process, coupled with the process of globalization, has been instrumental in encouraging individuals to speak up and in creating real and visual public spaces, which enable the expression and sharing of opinions. As never before, the concept of ‘citizenship’ is being contested, debated and redefined by the very citizens themselves. Individuals are no longer satisfied with the liberal definition of democracy, one that is defined in procedural terms. They demand the institution of a substantive democracy, one where they can have their voices heard and identities recognized. No matter what path politics will take in the near future, it seems to be impossible to reverse the path that the society has started to take in Turkey. Dilek Kurban is Program Officer at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)

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Turkey and its Northern Iraq At the time of writing this article, it remains questionable whether the unilateral cease-fire declared by the Turkish Worker’s Party (PKK) will stave off a Turkish military response. Regardless of the decision made in Ankara, the deep seated roots of this current conflict should be analyzed rather than attributing Turkey’s response to the string of PKK terrorist attacks that took place in October 2007. From Turkey’s perspective, the current tensions can be attributed to four years of inaction from the Kurdish parties and the US forces in Iraq to deal decisively with the PKK. Turkey operates in an environment where the future of Iraq’s territorial integrity still remains in question. Ankara’s pre-Iraq war fears of an emboldened semi-autonomous Kurdish region destabilizing the Southeast of Turkey have proven true. As Kurds in the north of Iraq enjoy greater autonomy in the ensuing post-war chaos, they felt secure enough to ignore the request from the Turkish government to deal with the PKK. Furthermore, the relations between the US and Turkey are still in flux after the latter’s refusal to permit American forces to deploy from its soil during the combat phase of the war. There exists a perception among the Turkish public that the US is turning a ‘blind eye’, if not directly supporting the PKK. The rationale behind this argument can be traced back to a similar crisis in 1998, when Turkey mobilized troops to the Syrian border. The threat of military action was enough to compel Damascus to expel

By Ibrahim Al-Marashi

Abdullah Ocalan. Turkey has mobilized troops on the Iraqi border, but the Kurdish leaders in Iraq have done nothing to expel the PKK. Skeptics in the Turkish public ask, ‘What is different now as opposed to 1998? In 1998, Syria did not have the US to back it against Turkey. The Kurdish leaders do have the US behind it now.’ Across the border, Kurdish views also vary with some news channels and papers supporting the PKK, while others call for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. For example, an editorial in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s paper, Kurdistani Nuwe (which means ‘New Kurdistan’) wrote: ‘In fact, they will not target the PKK, but rather use the PKK presence in the Kandil Mountains as a pretext. Do they intend to stay in certain strategic locations in the Badinan area?’ a reference to the far north of Iraq. Other sentiments in the Kurdish media suggest that the Turkish incursion is a pretext to exert influence over the oil rich city of Kirkuk, ensuring it does not fall under the federal jurisdiction of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The president of the KRG Barzani said in a reference to a possible attack: ‘This is an Iraqi issue. Any aggression will make this an issue for all of the people of Iraq.

This will be aggression against Iraq’s sovereignty. It will not be a Kurdish-Turkish issue only’, invoking a notion that all of Iraq would be harmed. Ironically, he also suggests that an attack against the PKK, who are not even Iraqis, would be construed as an attack against the whole of Iraq. Even Muqtada al-Sadr, the young cleric known for rallying the Shia on numerous occasions, had declared that his forces would resist a Turkish incursion. However not all Iraqis would condemn a Turkish response, particularly the Iraqi Turkmen. Most media have referred to a Turkish military strike against the PKK as an ‘intervention’, ‘incursion’ or an ‘invasion’. During a debate on the issue of Kirkuk, Asif Turkoman of the Iraqi Turkoman Front questions how Turkey’s possible strike against the PKK in Iraq is labeled as an ‘intervention’. He said, ‘Why should we call it a Turkish intervention while there are 26 states inside Iraq, be it from Denmark or other small states that we have never heard of? There is also the US army that crossed wide continents and invaded Iraq. Isn’t that intervention?’

'Turks are a group of people gathered on the deck of a ship. But, interestingly enough, the Turks are running towards West while the ship is moving to East.' Quoting from Sakalli Celal, Turkish journalist in Ataturk's time. Ayhan Aktar, Professor Bilgi University

C r isi s In terms of future scenarios, four possible outcomes emerge, with the first being the most positive for Turkey and the region with the last ushering in even more instability to Iraq and the Middle East. The first scenario would suggest that from a political economic perspective, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) would disarm the PKK. The economy in the north of Iraq is booming, and part of that economic boom is related to investments from Turkey, thus closely integrating both economies. If the priority for the Kurdish authorities remains the economic development of the north of Iraq, they would not want to risk an armed conflict with Turkey, in exchange for panKurdish solidarity with the PKK. In other words, the President of the KRG, Masud Barzani would realize that he has more to lose from giving sanctuary to the PKK . The second scenario envisions tensions increasing only in terms of rhetoric and ideology. The Kurdish authorities constructed an enemy in Saddamâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Iraq in the past to unify their Kurdish constituents. In the north of Iraq, Turkey, along with Iran and Syria, are seen as the obstacles preventing Kurdish independence in the north

of Iraq. Furthermore, Abdullah Ocalan is considered a hero among some Kurds in Iraq. The Iraqi Kurdish authorities may continue to cultivate this inimical image of Turkey on a popular level, as a means to deflect attention away from their own shortcomings, but the tension would not necessarily evolve into an armed conflict. The third scenario involves a short surgical military operation against the PKK. Prior to such an attack, the PKK is most likely to have dispersed its factions into Iran or other parts of north of Iraq, making it harder for a military strike to score a decisive blow. Nevertheless, a Turkish military operation may be enough to appease Turkish public opinion. The fourth scenario would entail a long term troop deployment in order to eradicate the PKK camps in Iraq and prevent the group from reconstituting itself in the north. If this scenario were to occur, the armed forces attached to the Kurdish parties would most likely attack Turkish forces as the Kurdish leaders declared they would do. In this

case, Turkish armed forces could overrun Kurdish urban centers in the plains of the north of Iraq. The Kurdish forces could operate withdraw from the mountains and launch a guerilla war, as they have been doing for the last eighty years. In this scenario, a long drawn-out conflict would emerge. The question remains as to why the Kurdish Regional Government has failed to forcefully disarm the PKK in order to avert a crisis with Turkey. While the Kurds in Iraq have stated that they are reluctant to attack their fellow Kurds in the PKK, such pan-Kurdish solidarity seems to be mere posturing. After all, Barzaniâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Kurdish Democratic Party did engage in heavy fighting with the PKK in the north of Iraq during the late nineties, in exchange for support from Turkey. The answer to the Iraqi Kurdish intransigence may lie in Ankara. The official Turkish policy has been to reject calls by Iraqi Kurds for direct talks to defuse the tensions, insisting that Ankara will only deal with the Iraqi Government in Baghdad. Perhaps the current crisis is a means of the Kurdish Regional Government to compel Turkey to recognize its authority in the north of Iraq. Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi is adjunct faculty member of the Department of History at Bogazici University in Istanbul, where he lectures on modern history of Iraq and Iran.

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Becoming an energy hub By Gareth M. Winrow

Turkish officials and representatives of the European Commission have repeatedly stressed how Turkey is destined to become a key energy transit state in the near future. Increasingly concerned about issues of energy security, Brussels is seeking for EU member states to become less dependent especially on imports of natural gas from Russia. Ankara is keen to promote Turkey’s credentials as a vital conduit for the transportation of hydrocarbons from the Caspian region, the Gulf and the Middle East to Europe, thereby hoping to facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EU. Oil: A mixed picture Undoubtedly, the commencement of operations in May 2006 of the 50 million ton (mt) capacity Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export crude pipeline to transport oil from Azerbaijan’s oil fields to the Turkish Mediterranean coast was a major political and economic success for Turkey. The pipeline should reach full capacity in 20089. However, to maximise its profitability in the longer term significant amounts of Kazakh crude will need to be delivered to Baku. This crude could be carried in small tankers across the Caspian, but this is far from certain with Moscow’s stranglehold over much of the Kazakh oil sector, and given the skyrocketing costs and delays over planned oil production at Kazakhstan’s giant Kashagan field.

More problematic is the projected 5070 mt crude pipeline connecting Samsun on the Turkish Black Sea coast with Ceyhan. Here, work began in April 2007, but the Turkish authorities have yet to conclude agreements to ensure that the pipeline will be filled. Expectations had been raised in encounters between Prime Minister Erdogan and President Putin that Russia would help to fill Samsun-Ceyhan. Instead, Moscow is now backing the planned Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline linking Bulgaria and Greece and is pressuring the Kazakhs to commit large volumes of oil to this project rather than to Samsun-Ceyhan. The failure to secure a throughput guarantee for Samsun-Ceyhan would be a major embarrassment for Ankara. Gas: Success with the Turkey-GreeceItaly Interconnector? In July 2007 officials from Turkey, Greece and Italy signed an intergovernmental agreement to complete by 2012 a gas pipeline connection between the three states which could deliver up to 11.5 billion cubic metres annually (bcm/y). The intention is to fill this line with natural gas produced from the Azerbaijani Caspian offshore gas field at Shah Deniz. A pipeline from Baku to Erzurum has been constructed and the

Turkish-Greek section is about to be commissioned. This pipeline would at least partially reduce the over-dependence of Turkey and Greece on Russian natural gas, and would provide a useful alternative supply to the Italian market. Fierce lobbying from the Bush administration ensured that the Interconnector should be filled with Azerbaijani and not Russian natural gas. However, Moscow continues to question whether Azerbaijan will produce enough gas in the foreseeable future for the Interconnector and also to help fill the much larger Nabucco project. Gas: Will Nabucco be realised? The construction of the 25-35 bcm/y Nabucco gas pipeline running from Turkey to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, would certainly enhance Turkey’s stature as a strategically important energy transit state and could alleviate Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas supplies. Strongly backed by the European Commission, the project has nevertheless encountered delays and commentators question if it will ever be realised. Turkish officials have complicated matters in their reluctance to allow Gaz de France to become the much-needed sixth partner in the

Turkey is a country that is trying to find the right balance between West and East. Huseyin Kelezoglu, Director, Strategic Planning and Corporate Development, EFG Istanbul Securities

project. This is due to Ankara’s vehement opposition to the views of the French National Assembly on the issue of the socalled Armenian Genocide. The main problem involves filling the pipeline. Ankara has concluded provisional agreements with Iran in July 2007 which include the construction of a pipeline to carry 30 bcm/y of gas from the South Pars gas field in Iran and from Turkmenistan to Turkey to hook up with Nabucco. However, the Bush administration is strongly opposed to these agreements and has signaled that sanctions may be imposed if Ankara finalises these deals with Tehran. Turkey could then be forced to raise virtually single-handedly the $3.5 billion required to develop the Iranian gas fields — an exceedingly tall task. The Turkmens have remained quiet over these proposed arrangements. There is speculation that Moscow, exploiting the infrastructure already in place between Russia and Turkey, would provide gas to help fill Nabucco. This would mean, though, that Europe would continue to remain dependent on gas deliveries from Gazprom. Plans for Turkey to become a

transit state for the delivery to Nabucco of natural gas from Egypt and Iraq will most probably have little impact given the small volumes of Egyptian gas and the ongoing security problems in Iraq. Moscow concluded preliminary agreements in spring 2007 which would entail the upgrading of the Central Asia-Centre pipeline network to enable much larger volumes of Turkmen as well as Uzbek and Kazakh natural gas to be delivered to Russia. The US administration would prefer Turkmen and Kazakh gas to be delivered to Europe via Turkey by means of a possible Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, but this is highly unlikely because of disagreements between the littoral states over the status and division of the Caspian Sea. Meanwhile, Moscow has been promoting alternative pipeline projects such as South Stream which could make Nabucco redundant. Backed by Gazprom and its Italian partner ENI, South Stream would link Rus-

sia with Italy through a pipeline network by-passing Turkey and running through southeastern Europe. To conclude… There has been much hype over Turkey’s future role as an energy transit state. Expectations have been raised before throughput guarantees for certain projects have been secured. There are almost inevitably delays in the realisation of pipeline schemes as technical and feasibility studies are prepared and funds need to be raised, while in the meantime political circumstances may alter and other projects may be proposed. Ironically, dependent itself on Russian gas supplies and thus vulnerable to leverage from Moscow, Turkey may yet become a corridor for the transportation of more hydrocarbons from Russia to Europe. Gareth Winrow is Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences, Istanbul Bilgi University. gwinrow@bilgi.edu.tr

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Great expectations? Economy in the forefront It is 12 years since the first day I arrived in Turkey. Working for a large US company, my brief was to explore the feasibility of setting up a private equity fund. I have been travelling to Turkey almost every month since then. Never since my first visit have I seen my Turkish friends so apprehensive and anxious. 12 years ago the Turkey I discovered was, as one might expect, grand and charming and, for a Greek like me, curiously familiar. At the same time however, Turkey was disoriented and insecure, trying to find its balance between its rigid Kemalist tradition and the shocking reforms Turgut Ozal implemented a few years before. Businessmen talked about the potential of the Turkish economy: about the large young population and its strategic location; about a country brimming with opportunity. These discussions, of course, were largely theoretical as crisis after crisis made people cynical and economic players were oriented towards the very short term; business leaders envisaged great business plans and long term projects, but their real time frame was months not years. International capital was incessantly sniffing around, but touching nothing. The issues of democracy, minority rights and the relation with Islam were often negotiated among the political and the intellectual elite, but nobody believed any change was imminent or even feasible. Out of fear of change, everybody was hiding behind the latest suspect versions of Kemalism.

By Vassilis T. Karatzas

Today the nervousness and anxiety of my Turkish friends fully contradicts my personal experience. To my eyes, things in Turkey have never looked better. The Turkish economy has never been healthier. Long term foreign capital is flowing in and, during the last few years, insolvent local conglomerates have turned into cash-rich companies ready to tackle great opportunities along with the largest international companies. All the state-owned sacred cows (telecom, refineries, steel industry, etc) have been privatized. This is a colossal change for the economy, but an even larger one for the political economy. The embrace between large companies and the state has been broken. Apart from the spectacular economic successes, what you hear today in Istanbul is nervousness and worries about the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issues and above all the sanctity of the secular state. But in reality, all these problems are the outcome of the successes of the last five years. What does the latest PKK violence demonstrate? It is the fact that they are left out of the new system in Turkey that make them resort to destabilizing violence. With DTP representing the Kurds of Turkey in the parliament and a new confident state in Iraq promoting its own interest rather than the irredentist aspirations, the PKK has to increase its terrorist activities once again. The Armenian issue continues to plague relations between Turkey and many of its western allies. Sooner or later, Turkey will have to engage in a pragmatic dialogue regarding the fate of the Armenians of the Ottoman empire and its past. It is because

Turkey is becoming more integrated with the EU and the west that this issue is becoming salient. And, finally, talks over the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;culture warsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, with the headscarf being the major bone of contention, are something that one encounters on a daily basis. But here again it is progress that has brought this problem. More democracy and its counterpart social and economic mobility have created this problem. While women with headscarves worked on the fields or the factory floors, the issue remained peripheral. Today, however, with most of these women walking in the lobbies of five-star hotels in Istanbul, the issue is central as competing social classes are fighting their battles using their respective symbols. So it was more democracy and progress that brought these issues forward; these problems are nothing more than the hallmarks of the success of Turkey. It is in this context that we should comprehend Turkey. The European Union should look to Turkey under this prism. It is very easy for Europeans to reject Turkey for many of its drawbacks, especially the democratic deficit. One should however contextualize. Just as one would not reject an adolescent as long as he was still willing to learn and change, so Europe should not rebuff Turkey.

Vassilis T. Karatzas is Managing Director of the Global New Europe Fund and the GFM Levant Fund.

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[Performance]and prospects of Turkish economy Following 2006, which was characterized by high market volatility, 2007 has been a year of recovery for Turkish financial markets. Although political uncertainty and twin elections, as well as global credit worries, led to occasional volatility through the year; compared to end-2006, TRY is now stronger by 10.9% against the currency basket (0.5 euro + 0.5 dollar) and 16.7% against USD. Likewise, in the bond market, benchmark yield is lower by some 450 basis points1. Macroeconomic variables paint a mixed picture. After overshooting the target in 2006, inflation continued edging down through 2007. However disinflation momentum was slowed down by exogenous factors such as food/energy prices and administered price hikes. Central Bank communicates that monetary policy is still supportive of disinflation, implying that monetary policy is still tight. This message underpins our expectation that monetary easing will continue going forward. Economic growth has slowed in 2007 as tight monetary policy, currency shock in 2006 and political uncertainties restrained domestic demand. Yet, contribution of net exports to growth increased visibly, which enabled 4Q rolling GDP growth to remain at 5.1% as of June 2007. In the remainder of the year, we expect contribution of net exports to diminish; nonetheless, moderate recovery in domestic demand should be sufficient to keep annual growth slightly above 5%. Slower domestic demand growth and lagged effects of TRY depreciation (particularly against euro) led to a modest improvement 1. These figures are based on market data as of endNovember.

in external balance. For the first time in the post-crisis period we expect ratio of current account deficit to GDP to decline over previous year. Note that this would still imply a widening in the deficit in absolute terms. The brighter side is improved financing; on a 12month rolling basis net FDI flows stand at roughly USD20 billion, covering 58% of the deficit. Nonetheless, despite improved financing outlook, sheer size of the current account deficit renders Turkey vulnerable to shifts in investor sentiment and presents a convenient excuse to sell TRY denominated assets at times of risk aversion. Fiscal policy seems to have been the biggest casualty of the election process. On the revenue side, tax receipts were weaker than programmed due both to slower growth and tax cuts. On the other hand, non-interest expenditures grew briskly in the pre-election period. Although tighter spending discipline is in place since August; this will not be enough to make up for the slippage earlier in the year and IMF-defined primary surplus is expected to end 2007 at 4.1% of GNP, significantly below the 6.5% target. However, the fact that government committed itself to expenditure freezing measures and recent spending discipline bodes well for the attainability of next yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s target which is reduced to 5.5%. As regards outlook for 2008, the biggest unknown is the course of global markets. Our macroeconomic forecasts are based on the assumption that global economy will slow but avoid slipping into a recession, which would provide a supportive backdrop for emerging markets. Against such a global backdrop, we expect inflation to decline grad-

By Inan Demir

ually to 5.7%, which is only slightly below the ceiling of the uncertainty band. Note that this is more cautious than Central Bankâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s own forecasts which foresee headline inflation within 2.5% - 5.7% interval by-end 2008. We expect Central Bank to continue easing in the coming months, before pausing (possibly in 2Q 2008) in order to assess the implications of a more neutral policy stance. Beyond that our baseline scenario sees Central Bank finding the opportunity to reintroduce rate cuts in second half of 2008, bringing the policy rate to 14% by the end of next year. Obviously, this call depends a lot on a benign global backdrop, supportive supply side and commitment to fiscal discipline; and the Bank might adopt a more cautious stance if these prerequisites are not there. We expect GDP growth to accelerate to 6.1% on the back of easing monetary policy and stronger consumer/business sentiment. This, and higher energy prices will lead to further widening in current account deficit towards 8% of GDP. Barring a major global shock we expect FDI trends to remain favourable next year thanks partly to loaded privatization agenda. This is a clear positive that alleviates financing concerns; however, it goes without saying that such a high deficit leaves Turkey exposed to strength of risk appetite on investorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; part. Inan Demir is Head of Economic Research, Finansbank

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Turkey’s FDI and Privatization After long years of minor FDI (Foreign Direct Investments), Turkey has recently become a magnet for foreign investments. Net FDI inflows have surged to 3.7% of the GNP within 2005-20071, from a mere 0.6% within 1984-2004. Interestingly, the year 2005 also marked a watershed for large scale privatizations. Turkey’s privatization deals have soared to an average of US$7.3 billion on an annual basis within 200520072, up from an annual average of US$473 million within 1985-2004. Which factors have set the stage for such a radical transformation? To thoroughly comprehend this, we need to provide some background information. The key factors to deter FDI inflows to Turkey in the years preceding 2005 were mainly political and macroeconomic instabilities; lack of a reform impetus; as well as inconveniences associated with the business environment. The markedly unstable economic environment brought about excessive real interest rates (25% in real terms in between 1990-2001), high inflation, as well as a deteriorating budget and debt position. These, coupled with the lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights, a lethargic judicial system, corruption and red tape, created an unfavourable business en1. Includes EFG Istanbul’s 2007 expectation of US $17bn net FDI to Turkey (2007 Jan-Aug realization is US$13.9bn, according to the Turkish Central Bank). 2. Includes EFG Istanbul’s expectation of a total of US$5.6bn privatization receipts for 2007 (privatization receipts of US$4.2 already realized heretofore in 2007).

By Huseyin Kelezoglu

vironment and dimmed Turkey’s prospects as an investment destination. The structural reforms Turkey had launched including the social security reform in 1999, as well as the banking sector re-capitalization in 2001, among several others backed by the IMF and the World Bank, helped allay investor concerns to a limited extent. However, the turnaround in Turkey’s prospects came only after two important developments. Firstly, political stability was attained when the reformist AK Party came to power with a strong parliamentary majority following the 2002 general elections. Senior AK Party authorities demonstrated a strong commitment to pursue the economic and social reforms

83 United Cultures of Turkey. Katerina Moutsatsou, Actress

that were vital for Turkey, starting from the onset of their term. Secondly, another critical development was the EU Council granting Turkey a date for the start of EU membership negotiations in December 2004, thanks to the AK Party’s commitment to EU reforms, which served as a credible international anchor for investors. The fact that FDI and privatizations gained momentum in October 2005 when Turkey’s EU membership negotiations kicked off, should not be considered a mere coincidence, in our view. While buoyant global liquidity conditions during these years might justify the inflows to EMs on the overall, they fall short of ex-

plaining Turkey’s recent popularity, as Turkey had received a very minor share of the previous wave of FDI flows to emerging markets ahead of the year 2000. Apart from the longer-term EU anchor, Turkey’s highly attractive population demographics3, regional significance as a bridge between the East and the West, and its strategic location at the energy crossroads, have been pivotal in its attraction as an FDI destination. In an attempt to increase Turkey’s allure for international investors, the AK Party amended the Foreign Capital Law in 2003, providing explicit guarantees against expropriation and nationalization, specifically allowing the repatriation of income, reducing restrictions on foreign ownership of land and significantly reducing the bureaucratic procedures to obtain a licence. According to the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business 2008’, Turkey

ranks 57th, 8 ranks above its 2007 level and 34 ranks above its 2006 level. Moreover, in 2006, the AK Party decided to slash the corporate tax rate from 33% to 20%, so as to improve the business environment. These reforms, among others, helped the country solidify its disinflation process, along with a significant decline in interest rates, improving budget balances and debt position. The experiences of former EU membership aspirants in Central and Eastern Europe suggest that Turkey is well-poised to sustain its FDI flows in the long run, provided that it remains committed to EU reforms. An analysis of these countries indicates that an FDI level corresponding to 5% of the GNP is sustainable for longer pe-

riods. It is worth noting, though, that Turkey’s EU membership trajectory is liable to be strewn with difficulties, with the negotiation process likely to be a protracted one. A case in point has been the EU Council’s suspension of the negotiations in 8 out of 35 chapters in December 2006, due to Turkey’s refusal to open her ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes. It is worth noting, however, that the AK Party administration considers Turkey’s commitment to reforms and resolve to improve its investment environment to be more crucial than an eventual EU membership, a view that is commonly shared by international investors. We believe Turkey’s FDI prospects are rather robust, especially when compared with the past, as major reforms have already been completed; disinflation is well entrenched and budget balances are quite healthy. However, sudden shifts in investor sentiment due to global risks or risk factors specific to Turkey could lead to temporary aberrations in FDI inflows. Among factors to increase Turkey’s vulnerability to such shifts in investor sentiment are its Current Account deficit, which reached 8.6% of the GNP in 2006; geopolitical risks, such as instability in neighboring countries like Iran and Iraq; and increasing Kurdish terrorism that threatens stability, especially in the south-eastern part of the country.

Huseyin Kelezoglu is Director, Strategic Planning and Corporate Development, EFG Istanbul Securities.

3. Total population: c70mn (c25% in between 0-15 years); Population Growth: 1.25%

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Securities Update in Turkey A few years ago, the Turkish Capital Markets Board (the CMB), the independent governmental authority regulating and monitoring the capital market activities in Turkey, prepared a bill amending the existing Law on Capital Markets No. 24991 (the Capital Markets Law), (the Draft Law)2 to revamp the current one, with a view to bringing it into line with the relevant European Union legislation. The Capital Markets Law is the main piece of legislation governing capital markets in Turkey. Nevertheless, the Draft Law has not yet been submitted to the Prime Minister for its enactment and it seems that some additional time is needed, also taking into account the elections in July 2007, and amendment plans of the Turkish Commercial Code, which is closely related to the content of the Draft Law. Most of the board members of the CMB and heads of several departments have been replaced early this year as the term of previous officers has expired. This year will also serve to observe the potential and performance of these new officers. Despite the constant position of the Draft Law, the CMB has made few amendments in its secondary legislation to reflect the needs of several market players in addition to its monitoring of the market. Below are highlights from the major new regulatory acts of the CMB. 1. Published in the Official Gazette No: 17416 on July 30, 1981. 2. (See http://www.spk.gov.tr/HaberDuyuru/haberduyuru.htm?tur=diger).

By Hergüner Bilgen Özeke, Attorneys at law

Intermediary Institutions (Brokerage Companies) Several amendments were made to the Communiqué regarding the Principles on Intermediary Activities and Intermediary Institutions.3 The most recent amendment was made with respect to record-keeping and registration systems of intermediary institutions. The Communiqué Amending the Communiqué on Principles Regarding Record-Keeping and Documentation in Intermediary Activities (Serial V, No.93)4 introduces more detailed provisions in connecting with the recording of orders obtained by means of electronic transmission, including orders obtained via internet or by fax. The said amending Communiqué requires intermediary companies to retain documentation and records, including internet and fax records, related to customer orders five years from the issuance date, while verbal customer orders are required to be kept for two years, starting from the end of the year in which the verbal customer order is obtained. According to the said amending Communiqué, certain provisions which require intermediary institutions to adopt recording 3. The Communiqué Regarding the Principles on Intermediary Activities and Intermediary Institutions (Serial V, No: 46), published in the Official Gazette No: 24163 on October 7, 2000; the Communiqué on Amending the Communiqué Regarding the Principles on Intermediary Activities and Intermediary Institutions (Serial V, No: 86), published in the Official Gazette No: 26097 on March 3, 2006. 4. The Communiqué Amending the Communiqué on Principles Regarding Record Keeping and Documentation in Intermediary Activities Serial V, No.93 published in the Official Gazette No. 26566 on June 28, 2007.

systems in accordance with such Communiqué are to enter into force within one month following enactment of the said amending Communiqué. Also, the said amending Communiqué allows intermediary institutions to obtain orders before or during correspondence by means of phone, fax, ATM records, electronic means or other similar ways without a customer’s signature. Pursuant to the general provisions, such orders are considered to be ‘verbal orders’. The said amending Communiqué requires intermediary institutions to keep a neat inventory of all voice records regarding customers’ orders by phone, the instructions regarding orders by fax and all orders by fax, with the date and time of receipt by the intermediary institutions; of the IP numbered records regarding the ordering customer and of all necessary electronic log records with the origin to determine the source of an order received by means other than the above-mentioned avenues. Another recent amendment is made with respect to internal audit systems of the Intermediary Institutions.5 Accordingly, Intermediary Institutions which (i) are publicly held, or (ii) have ten or more branch offices, or (iii) have a license to trade foreign derivatives are required to have an independent audit report with respect to the functioning of their internal audit systems and procedures. This report should be submitted to the CMB within the first twelve weeks of each year. Despite the fact that the applicable legislation requests the intermediary institutions

Turkey is a bridge of civilizations and a democratic, secular, economically powerful country headed towards the west, aiming to become a full-fledged member of the European Union. Egemen Bagis, AK Parti MP/ Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister

to issue and execute separate framework agreements for each of the licenses they have obtained from the CMB, in the weekly Bulletin of the CMB published in the week of June 2529, 2007 with No. 2007/26, the CMB resolved that intermediary institutions will merge relevant framework agreements under one single framework agreement. Framework agreements required to be merged into one single agreement by intermediary institutions are as follows: framework agreement for intermediation in the sale and purchase of capital market instruments, framework agreement for portfolio management, framework agreement for investment consultancy, framework agreement for purchase (repo) and re-purchase (reverse repo) transactions; framework agreement for intermediation in the sale and purchase of derivatives; framework agreements for margin trading, short sell-offs and lend-outs, and borrowing securities. A framework agreement for intermediation in public offerings is not listed among the agreements to be merged into one single agreement. These framework agreements will be prepared in a form where the customers may exclusively sign relevant sections in connection with the services they request from the relevant intermediary company. Mutual Funds Guaranteed funds and protected funds are introduced to the Turkish market by an amendment to the Communiqué regarding Principles on Mutual Funds.6 According to the amending Communiqué, the definition of guarantor is listed in the definitions section of the Communiqué as ‘non-resident banks and insurance companies which guarantee payment of the investment amounts subscribed by the guaranteed fund in accordance with 5. The Communiqué Amending the Communiqué on Principles Regarding Internal Audit System to be Implemented on Intermediary Institutions (Serial V, No. 89) published in the Official Gazette No. 26470 on March 22, 2007.

the principles foreseen under their internal regulations and not covered by the Mutual Fund through a guarantee agreement, and bears the qualifications foreseen under this Communiqué provided that the provisions of the Banking Law 5411 regarding the banks and insurance companies are reserved.’ In this manner, the formation of the guaranteed funds and protected funds will be pioneered in the Turkish derivative instruments. Guaranteed funds are the repayment of a particular part of, and all of the initial investment or a particular earning which exceeds the initial investment of the investor, in specific term or terms, in accordance with the internal regulations. These are undertaken based on an appropriate investment strategy and the guarantee agreement entered into by and between the Founder and the Guarantor. Protected funds are the repayment of a particular part of, and all of the initial investment or a particular earning which exceeds the initial investment of the investor, in specific term or terms, in accordance with the internal regulations, and based on an appropriate investment strategy in accordance with the best effort principle. According to the amending Communiqué, these funds will be subject to the provisions of Communiqué VII No. 10 with respect to the investment restrictions. On the other hand, taking into consideration that these funds have different features compared to the other funds, in the event there is no equivalent fund trading in the stock exchange with respect to the terms of the other agreements, it is permitted to become a party of reverse repo and derivative agreements outside the stock exchange, provided that specific terms will be met. Under the amending Communiqué, where the guarantor is an entity resident in 6. The Communiqué Regarding the Principles on Mutual Funds (Serial VII, No: 10), published in the Official Gazette No: 22852 on December 19, 1996; the Communiqué on Amending the Communiqué Regarding the Principles on Mutual Funds (Serial VII, No: 33), published in the Official Gazette No: 26532 on May 25, 2007.

Turkey, such entity must have sufficient financial strength. If, on the other hand, the guarantor is resident abroad, it must have obtained the required rating for investments to be made by such guarantor, and the rating agency must be among the international rating agencies recognized by the Board for conducting rating activities in Turkey. With respect to public disclosure, the amending Communiqué provides that prospective standards of guaranteed and protected funds will be determined and announced by the CMB. Nevertheless, other than the principles determined by the prospectus, further undertakings or commitments are not allowed in relation to the announcement, advertisement and other marketing activities of the guaranteed and protected funds with respect to protected income. Derivative Transactions The CMB has published a Communiqué on the Incorporation and Operation Principles of Derivative Transactions Intermediary Companies. The Communiqué sets forth principles with respect to (i) scope of activity, (ii) incorporation terms and procedures, (iii) usage of trade name, (iv) limitation of participation in other companies, (v) obligation to enter into a framework agreement with clients, (vi) internal and external audits, book keeping and disclosure principles of the derivative transactions intermediary companies. Hergüner Bilgen Özeke is one of Turkey's largest law firms. Located in Istanbul, it represents and provides legal services to foreign, Turkish and multinational companies, financial institutions, government agencies and multilateral institutions www.herguner.av.tr

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TUSIAD and democracy: The maturity of Turkish Capital It comes as a great surprise to many that one of the leading voices in the Turkish democratization drive is the largest association for businessmen and industrialists in Turkey – TÜSIAD. This is surprising because for decades TÜSIAD was known as the ‘organization that topples governments’ as a result of its role in the fall of the Ecevit government in the late 70’s and it’s alleged involvement in the military coup of 1980. The fact that following the coup, Prime Minister Özal and a number of his ministers were drawn from the ranks of TÜSIAD, reinforced the public image that TÜSIAD was a sinister body bent on controlling the political system by any means necessary. Although the organization remained on the sidelines during the 1997 ‘post-modern coup’, which forced the Islamist Erbakan and his Refah Party (Welfare Party – the forerunner of the present AKP) out of politics, many have accused TÜSIAD members of supporting this ‘soft-coup’ outside of the organization’s confines. It is therefore even more surprising to many that the organization, which represents the interests of some of the largest and most ‘Europeanized’ businessmen, supports the AKP government – a party with Islamic roots. TÜSIAD’s democratization campaign, which reached an apex with the watershed 1997 Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey report, as sincere and influential as it is, is far

By David Neylan

from being purely philanthropic however. Despite the pleasant side-affects of human rights and individual freedoms, at the heart of the TÜSIAD democratization campaign is the desire to lock the often unpredictable and corrupt Turkish government into the political reforms of the EU and the economic reforms of the IMF. Notwithstanding the mutual suspicions and periodic ‘battles’ between TÜSIAD and AKP leadership, the AKP government with its parliamentary majority, commitment to the EU accession process, and its proven economic track record has emerged as the safest bet for TÜSIAD. Rows over the AKP presidential appointment and constitutional drafts are unlikely to undo this dependent relation. TÜSIAD’s foot-dragging over AKP presidential nominee Gül and the organization’s subsequent acceptance of Gul ‘in the name of stability’, likely foreshadows the path that the organization will follow with regard to the AKP’s draft constitution. The reasons for this are simple: whereas in the past many TÜSIAD members were dependent on one government or another for discretionary rent allocations, today the largest business conglomerates are dependent on the AKP in order to ensure that EU accession stays on track and stability prevails in the economic and political realms. In spite of deep-seated TÜSIAD fears concerning AKP stances on such issues as the headscarf ban and the Imam Hatip schools, the nationalistic political platforms,

(complete with their anti-globalization rhetoric) which have come to characterize the former mainstream parties such as the CHP, have made the AKP the choice of TÜSIAD by default. Consistent with the legacy of maintaining a non-partisan stance however, TÜSIAD strives to demonstrate that it is the AKP reform process that it lends support to and not to the party per se. TÜSIAD’s democratization campaign needs to be understood in the context of the larger phenomena associated with the ‘maturity’ of domestic capital and the forces of globalization. Similar to the Latin American experiences which witnessed business supporting the overthrow of unstable populist democratic governments, business learned that ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ outcomes were often no less easy to control. In Turkey, after experiencing decades of arbitrary, corrupt government powers, and suffering at the hands of one populist coalition government after another which they were dependent on for protection and rents, by the 1990’s TÜSIAD members had become much less dependent on the government for their wellbeing. Access to international capital and the lifting of trade restriction to the large European Common Market took away two of the government’s most powerful tools that they had previously relied on to keep business in a somewhat dependent relationship. Today, many Turkish firms dominate

Turkey has one foot in Europe and the other in Asia. Ibrahim, Taxi driver on the way from Asia to Europe while crossing the Bosphorous Bridge.

European markets. Koc Group’s Becko, for instance, is now the best-selling appliance producer in Europe and the stream of recent banking and industrial mergers and aquisitions, have only served to reinforce the mature capitalists of Turkey to long for greater integration with Europe. As Can Paker, a TÜSIAD member and director of TESEV revealed in one recent interview: ‘Ensuring that the hundreds of billions of dollars in trade with the EU continues to flow is the driving motivation of TÜSIAD. Anything that deters this process will be resisted.’ In order to ensure this, TÜSIAD has extended its reach beyond the Turkish boarders. TÜSIAD now operates representative offices in a number of capitals (the most recent addition being Beijing), and its Brussels office now serves as an important intermediary between the EU and Turkey on matters related to accession. Recently, in a bid to overcome the suspicion which the EU harbours towards TÜSIAD as a result of the latter’s tiny constituency, TÜSIAD has embarked on a campaign to incorporate many of the Anatolian

SIAD’s into its constituency thereby making it more representative of Turkish business as a whole. TÜSIAD has thus inserted itself as an active and important actor in the Turkish accession process serving as a sort of ‘watch-dog’ for Turkish reform – which ultimately boils down to political reforms in line with a more democratic society. Whether the form of democracy that TÜSIAD advocates constitutes democracy in the Western liberal sense of the term is subject to debate however: TÜSIAD publications such as a report entitled The Optimal State, lay out the framework for the state TÜSIAD invisions: a small government committed to carrying out IMF and EU related reforms, ensuring the enforcement of law and order, and severely curtailing the governments ability to respond from societal demands. A number of unelected bodies assume much control in dictating acceptable fiscal policy. In addition to political economic stability, the above arrangements have been noted by some as having additional benefits for

TÜSIAD members: austerity measures prevent a new class of more politically and socially conservative businessmen from raising and challenging TÜSIAD’s hegemony. By taking away the government’s ability to provide the same incentives to smaller Anatolian capitalists that TÜSIAD members were themselves able to benefit from in the past, the largest businesses have gone a long way in securing their political and economic hegemony. This has interesting implications for the traditional Islamic-Secularist split in Turkey. Although business organizations such as MÜSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association – commonly referred to as the ‘Muslim Businessmen’s Association’) were very supportive of the AKP in the run-up to the elections and provided much of the financial base for both the AKP and the party’s predecessors, this support from members in less competitive sectors has begun to wane as the AKP has been championing TÜSIAD’s ‘liberal state’ doctrines and restricting preferential credit allocation. Some formerly supportive Anatolian business groupings have even become outspoken opponents of the AKP. Should a downturn in the economy arise, MÜSIAD support preferences may change to a party less committed to ‘reform’. Much can be learned from the case of TÜSIAD by foreign policy makers looking to promote democracy abroad. Free markets, in combination with the right sticks and carrots, have clearly contributed to the ‘organization that topples governments’ transformation into one of the strongest democratic forces in Turkey. David Neylan is Director of Istanbul Corporate Editing and Translation Services www.istanbulediting.com

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Developing business ties Undoubtedly, in the beginning of the 21st century, bilateral relations have a special value. The significance of peaceful relations and close cooperation among neighboring countries have started to be more beneficial through global market competitiveness. The strong sense of regional cooperation, thanks to the ease of transportation, brings more opportunities to the countries involved rather than leaving them as separate players in the global market. The conjecture of today does not entertain the 19th century ideology of protecting autocratic closed political and economic systems, which were hostile to good neighboring relations and promoted the attitude of ‘being enough on its own’. In that context, the development of business ties between Greece and Turkey is a positive sign of moving closer to the EU mentality. The role of businessmen The role of businessmen is of vital importance in overcoming bilateral tensions and prejudices between states and societies. The language and strategies of business circles are different than those of politicians and bureaucrats, which is why they can easily communicate when it comes to delicate issues because of their liberal views. Businessmen look at the foreign policy of Turkey and Greece from the perspective of profitable cooperation rather than social and political taboos and they go beyond populist political discourses. In the example of Turkish-Greek relations, businessmen from both countries saluted the earthquake diplomacy and current political rapprochement as well-advised and intentional.

‘Trade is fundamental to building a bridge between our two countries.’ says Ekrem Demirtas, the President of the Izmir Chamber of Commerce. As one of the most active chambers in Greek-Turkish economic relations, Izmir Chamber of Commerce, in cooperation with the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, was the initiator of the Turkish Aegean Coasts and Greek Aegean Islands Economic Summit, which initiated highly influential meetings and common projects. This initiative led to the establishment of Business Aegean Bank, a joint venture of Turkish and Greek businessmen in 2005. Islands and Western Turkey The arm of the Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, lies in between two old and historic peninsulas of the region, the Anatolian and Balkan peninsulas that have been the birthplace of many civilizations. Trade was the catalyst for the development of the civilizations in the region. An abundance of gulfs and islands made the sea one of the most important natural harbors and marine trading routes throughout history. The resurgence of trade relations is once again on the agenda after a long break. In 2006, the National Bank of Greece invest-

By Ali Osman Egilmez

ment in the Turkish banking sector was the 3rd biggest foreign capital flow in Turkey. The 200 million dollar trade capacity of 1994 has reached almost 3 billion dollar today. From the joint agreement of constructing natural gas pipelines through the famous Turkish kebab houses in Athens, there are visible signs of social and economic recovery. Turkey’s Aegean costs and East Aegean Greek Islands are the most prominent examples of such a recovery. Following the cold relations between these neighboring countries, there is now an encouraging trend as exchange and trade between the two sides are steadily increasing. This is evident in the increasing market trend towards Greek investments in Turkey as well as the number of Greek tourists visiting Turkey daily, both of which are reciprocal on the part of Turkey. Especially during the summer, Greeks and Turks visit the opposite shores as another result of political rapprochement and the commercial boom. Greeks in particular

surge into the Turkish ports on local ship tours just for a coffee, now that they have the chance to enter Turkey only with their identity cards. For instance, in one year more than 300 thousand passengers crossed over from the Greek island of Kos to Bodrum, the Turkish holiday resort on the coast opposite. The main reasons for the flow of daily tourists from Greek islands to Turkey’s west coasts are low prices and geographical proximity. On the other hand, the infrequent passenger ferry services between these islands and Piraeus, the port of Athens, can be seen as another reason. For instance, in the summer period, there are only two daily passenger ship connections from Mytilene, Greece to Piraeus, whereas there are four daily ships to Ayvalik in Turkey; from Samos to Piraeus there are two daily, but to Kusadasi there are five. In the case of Kastelorizo Island, there is no passenger service between the island and the capital, Athens. The residents of the island go the Turkish coast Kas in their personal boats to do the daily shopping.

Although there is no considerable investment by Turkey in Eastern Greek Islands, increasing small scale businesses are gradually raising their profile. Turkey sells many products to the Greek islands, from food, furniture to textiles and electricity. There is noticeable competition among small towns of Western Turkey such as Ayvalik, Akcay, Dikili, Edremit, and Burhaniye in order to attract Greek tourists visiting on daily tours. In Ayvalik for instance, most of the shopkeepers speak Greek and accept payments in euros. The new target is to attract tourists visiting the Greek islands to the Western coast of Turkey. Therefore, cooperation between Turkey and Greece as far as tourism is concerned is starting to be regarded as essential. Obstacles facing trade Although, a very important agreement to overcome the commercial problems, Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income came into force on January 2005, persistent lack of political will remains an obstacle in the way of enthusiastic entrepreneurs. In the case of trade relations between the Greek islands and Turkey, the legal obstacles are more dramatic. Greek islands could work very well as transit points for goods coming from Turkey, but present legislation forces trucks transporting goods to go via land customs points, Edirne, Turkey

and Alexandroupoli, Greece. The second biggest port of Turkey, the Port of Izmir is located just 8 mile away from the Greek island of Chios, but the goods going to that island from Izmir have to travel via Piraeus with higher costs. Optimistic declarations have been made by both sides. The Turkish Minister of the State Kursad Tuzmen, for instance, expects trade between the two countries to reach 5 billion dollars by 2010. But there is still a delay in taking the appropriate measures to abolish trade barriers. Regional cooperation is not being given sufficient attention in practice by either side. Cooperation will be successful if both sides dare to take the right measures to overcome the legacy of the past and to defy the ambiguity of the future, which includes the risk of tensions and instabilities. The greatest burden is on the shoulders of businessmen. In the light of this, the Aegean Sea can become a trade ‘lake’ which will lead to a reconciliation of differences.

Ali Osman Egilmez, MA, is an intern at the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM)

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Rapprochement Rapprochement or détente? In the quest for an explanatory label of TurkishGreek relations since the late 1990s, analysts seem to have been eager to emphasize or downplay respectively the developments and events, indeed even the changing policy choices that are discernible in the Turkish-Greek bilateral relations. It can be argued that since 1999 Greek-Turkish relations seem to have entered a new and largely unprecedented phase, allowing for the characterization of the state of affairs between the two countries as rapprochement. Indeed, an argument could be made as to the existence of an acquis of rapprochement. Since the unfortunate events of 1999, Greek-Turkish relations have entered a phase that had as a point of departure, but not as a cause, what has been called ‘earthquake diplomacy’. This policy has, above all, been characterized by a profound political will for solving bilateral disputes, overcoming historic rivalries, bypassing the reservoir of negative images and stereotypes, and overcoming the perceptions. The seeds of rapprochement seem to have been planted in the period following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the system that provided the countries with more clear-cut foreign policy choices and paths. Therefore, rapprochement, a political and

vs Nationalism

strategic choice that was generalized and acquired a wider public basis and acceptance, was based on realistic – and therefore sustainable – criteria. Today we experience the qualitative and quantitative upgrading of the bilateral relations and an overtaking of the zero-sum mentality that have prevailed for years. In tackling past entanglements, the fundamental question seems to be this: With respect to any of the traditional bilateral disputes, say in the Aegean, would a possible change in any of them add or subtract anything from the security of either state? It is submitted that most of these bilateral disputes were prompted and fuelled – indeed made sense – within the Cold War framework or, as the case might for instance be, within a frenzied quest for perceived energy sources and would hold much less water today as substantive conflicts beyond a confrontation of pride. Rapprochement further grew roots as a result of public acceptance – indeed by acquiring a social basis. In particular, what makes the new state of affairs a case of rapprochement and not mere détente is a series of elements that seem to be present for the first time in decades and it is these that offer hope for its future prospects. At the same time, new international challenges that transcend borders, such as terrorism and environmental issues, require common handling and wider cooperation at direct regional level as well as within the framework of multilateral agreements and organizations. Among

By Umut Ozkirimli and Harry Tzimitras

other things, these trans-boundary issues contribute to the new understanding that Turkish-Greek relations do not have to be a no-win game. Further, precisely because of these new international challenges, states and actors that in the past either might have actively supported bilateral disputes or at least not facilitated their resolution, now actively press for rapprochement. Moreover, in the same connection, two factors that facilitated this process were the new phase that the Cyprus issue entered and the constructive role played by the European Union and the United States. Rapprochement came about in the late 1990s as the outcome of a political will to transcend the past. Since then, it seems to have reached a plateau marked by the exhaustion of initiatives for the improvement of relations at the low politics and track-II diplomacy levels. It would seem that a new initiative indicating the political will to take it to the next level is needed. The recent past has clearly sketched the reality of co-dependence in various functional areas. This fact, coupled with the partial surrendering

91 Turkey: The cutting edge of everything, including contemporary art. Orhan Taner, Director of Contemporary Istanbul

of sovereignty within the EU context signifies the need to shift the reality and the understanding of foreign policy along the lines of functionality rather than territoriality. It is hoped that this will ultimately lead to a reevaluation of traditionally perceived principles of national interest, its definition and the ways to achieve it. The internalization of this objective will further introduce alternative political languages and will allow building the future by re-evaluating the past, individual and common. It is usually argued that nationalism in both countries still plays a significant role in poisoning bilateral relations by cultivating a spirit of confrontation and furthering the perceptions of glorious pasts, historical enmity theories and irreconcilable differences. Presently, a question frequently asked is whether the current ‘rise’ of nationalism in Turkey poses a threat to the recent rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. The short answer to this question is ‘no’, for

two reasons. First, there is no objective way of measuring whether nationalism is higher today than, say, eight years ago, when the massive earthquakes of 1999 and the widespread feelings of common sympathy that ensued have prompted some to speak about ‘earthquake diplomacy’. In any case, nationalism is not a conjectural force which waxes and wanes in particular historical moments. It is a deeper state of mind, continually reproduced by the state and through popular culture. It may thus become more visible or aggressive depending on certain conjectural factors, but it never disappears. What this tells us is that nationalism has always been high in Turkey, and this did not prevent earlier phases of rapprochement to happen, be it in 1988, when Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Ozal met in Davos, or in 1999, right after the two countries came on the brink of war over an uninhabited rocky islet in the Aegean. The second reason is closely related to the first. Those factors which render nationalism more visible and aggressive in Turkey are not related to Greek-Turkish relations.

The ‘others’ of official Turkish nationalism today are the European Union, the Kurds, the US and the internal ‘collaborators’ of these forces, i.e. ‘liberal intellectuals’. A recent public opinion survey on Nationalism in Turkey confirms this. According to the findings of this survey, 50.3% of the respondents believe that the European Union wants to divide Turkey. And when asked ‘which country/political entity’ poses the greatest threat to Turkey, a clear majority of the respondents, 35.6%, said the United States and 25.8% said a potential Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Greece was third, with only 9.5%of the respondents perceiving as a threat to Turkey. Thus, even if we admit that nationalism is on the rise in Turkey today, it is certainly not concerned with or worried about Greece. Umut Ozkirimli and Harry Tzimitras are Associate Professor of Politics and Assistant Professor of International Law respectively, at Istanbul Bilgi University, where they are also the Directors of the University’s European Institute, Division of Turkish-Greek Studies.

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Out of the box: Turkish media ‘A Turkish media outlet owned by a Greek entrepreneur: wow!’. This statement was on the headlines of one of Turkey’s English language newspapers, Turkish Daily News last month. Barcin Yinanc, columnist of the paper, was talking about the unexpected interest of foreign media outlets in Turkish media firms, especially their interest in buying one of the country’s major media group, ATV-Sabah. While writing about the same issue, another prominent journalist of Referans Daily, Eyup Can confronted us with these questions: ‘Whoever I speak to in business circles, it is always the same question that arises: What is going to happen with the Sabah-ATV sale? The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) had announced the terms of bidding, which took place on November 7. We know that five international companies have applied to join the process. But some questions on both the process and the aftermath remain: The fact that Antenna, a Greek media company, is among the bidders has surprised everyone. Or, what will be the strategy of Rupert Murdoch, who is the boss of News Corp., after the TGRT (Turned into Fox TV) experience? What are ProseibenSat.1, RTL and the Czech company Central Europe Media Enterprise going to do? But, as a foreigners are limited to a 25 percent stake in any given company in the Turkish media sector, the biggest

going global

question is who will their local partners be?’ Turkey, as a country in the heart of Eastern Europe, and as a developing candidate of the EU, has long been an attractive market for the foreign investors. Seemingly, the Turkish media market is also one of the most important sectors having great potential for growth. First, US media companies have shown their interest in the market, and some of them are already directly or indirectly operating in Turkey. It is an expectation that the numbers of the foreign companies and their investment will increase in the near future. After the 1980s, media ownership structure in Turkey changed radically. Traditional ownership structure was replaced by one of new ownership. Among them, Aydin Dogan (Head of Dogan Media Group), who is the most powerful media baron in today’s Turkey, controls a big portion of the media sector in the country. Until April 2001, two media giants – The Sabah Group and the Dogan Group – dominated 80% of the whole sector. Today, as a very lively sector, the Turkish media landscape is being shaped within this

By Esra Arsan

framework: there are 6 State controlled, 24 nationwide private, 16 regional private and 224 local private TV channels. In the meantime, 34 nationwide distributed daily newspapers, 900 local newspapers, 250 advertisement supported magazines and 700plus other magazines are running. When we take a brief look at the media companies’ sources of money, according to the 2006 figures, there are 14,000 advertisers with 17,000 brands in Turkey. Also, 1,000 active advertisement agencies, and 100 full service advertisement agencies, 23 of which have global partners, are in operation and 12 media-planning and media-buying agencies exist in the country. According to Nuri Colakoglu, Chairman of TV Broadcasters Association, and Vice President of Dogan Media Group, total advertisement expenditure for 2007 is expected to reach about 4.3 billion YTL (new Turkish Lira). Consequently, it comes as no surprise that global media and entertainment companies see a lot of value in Turkey. Long before this recent deal of ATV-Sabah, global capital had a relatively enough history in the country. Groups like Burda, Rizzoli, and Hearst have come to Turkey as partners of major magazine groups such as 1 Numara Yayincilik and the Dogan Group years ago.

Despite the fact that none of the terrestrial broadcasters have legal licenses, global players have started investing in Turkey during the last decade. Time Warner was in Turkey as partner of CNN Turk from the beginning. NBC had licensed CNBC to Dogus Group for the creation of CNBC-e, News Corp. of the USA last year bought the controlling shares of TGRT TV and relaunched it as Fox TV. Can West of Canada has bought three important radio stations from the privatization authority, and finally, Axel Springer of Germany has bought 25% of DTV (Dogan TV) which controls Kanal D, Star TV and CNN Turk. But, who will be the winner of the latest deal of ATV-Sabah bid, and most importantly who will be their local partners in Turkey? Bidders should have filed their initial applications by October 15, and then should have submitted their offers by November 6. According to Eyüp Can of Referans Daily, TMSF has made such a calculation: ‘The amount that is to be accounted in return for Dinç Bilgin’s (previous owner) debts is around $900 million. The amount to be paid to Turgay Ciner (latest owner) in return for expenses he incurred as Merkez Holding stands at $159 million. And cleaning-up ATV-Sabah’s current debt requires approximately $300 million.’ Head of TMSF, Ahmet Ertürk says that the Greek Antenna Group seems to be a serious bidder. It is said that national bidders

like Hüsnü Özyegin, Ethem Sancak-Hasan Dogan and Ahmet Calik are going to be among bidders. Hüsnü Özyegin’s son Murat Özyegin set up a media company last month, so that it is taken as a preparation to be a local partner of a global investor. According to Turkish laws, local partner companies have to hold at least $225 million capital in stock. Hüsnü Özyegin is one of the most liquid investor in the country. Turkey’s most powerful media group, Dogan Media Company had announced long before that it was not interested in buying ATV-Sabah. One of the latest declarations has come from Murdoch’s News Corp. is that they are still going to be one of the bidders, and their local partner will be Istirak Radio-TV Company. Istirak Radio-TV was founded in September 2007, and its shareholders are Ece Güner of Güner Law Firm from Turkey (%74), News Netherlands BV owned by Rupert Murdoch (%23), Jeffery Edward Parker from USA (%1), Laura Ann Oleary from USA (%1) and Ömer Er of Güner Law Firm from Turkey (%1). Today, media development is still on its

way in Turkey. Technology is changing. Main TV broadcasters are going to come under the same company to complete the digital transformation. A new company with the name of Anten AS is being incorporated to build and operate digital terrestrial transmitters. Anten AS aims to build transmitters in the 13 largest cities with an investment of 30 million Euros within the next year to carry 30 digital channels that will reach nearly 50% of Turkey’s population. By the end of 2010, Anten AS plans to reach all the towns with a population over 10,000. Hopefully, these transformations and media developments will bring Turkey a better understanding of pluralism and democracy in terms of freedom of speech as well as freedom of expression.

Esra Arsan is Assistant Professor at Istanbul Bilgi University, Faculty of Communication, and a freelance media critic in Turkey.

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The Voice of Diasporic Turkish Artists By Yesim Burul Seven

At the Oscars this year, in the best foreign film category, Germany will be represented by the latest film of much-acclaimed Turkish-German director Fatih Akin, entitled Auf der Anderen Seite (The Edge of Heaven). The film, which premiered at the 60th International Cannes Film Festival and received the best screenplay award there, has been receiving raving critiques ever since. It is not the first time that Akin is making Germans and Turks proud, simultaneously. In 2004, with Gegen die Wand (Head On), Akin brought the Golden Bear award from the 54 International Berlin Film Festival back home to Germany for the first time in 18 years. Meanwhile in Turkey, it was celebrated as the second Berlinale victory of Turkey after the 1964 award for Susuz Yaz (Dry Summer) by Metin Erksan. Above all the fuss made by the media of both countries, Akin has been enjoying the benefits of his hybrid cultural identity and its mark on his creative abilities. He repeatedly left unanswered the questions regarding his ethnic and national loyalties. On the contrary, he stressed that he himself and his works were above that archaic dichotomy imposed by the notions of nation and nationality. Fatih Akin is one of the leading figures in the diasporic arts and culture scene created by second and third generation Turks in

Europe. Within this scene, Germany plays a major role as the home to the largest Turkish population outside of Turkey. Alongside the established first generation artists such as the author Emine Sevgi Ozdamar and the filmmaker Tevfik Baser, who have become household names in the world of German arts and culture, a new generation of talented artists are putting their marks in the European cultural sphere. What has driven these young people to create such extraordinary, challenging and inspiring visions was their in-between positionings between Germany and Turkey, Turkey and Europe, Europe and USA, local and global, national and transnational… While these preformulated dichotomies can multiply in number, the dynamic, unstable and mobile positionings of these artists with regards to those dichotomies create all the difference. Instead of being bound to singular subject positions confined by the limits of national imagination, these artists surf along the borders, cross the boundaries, back and forth; sometimes they occupy multiple subject positions and sometimes they sit in-between in a third space. This is termed ‘The third chair’ by Aziza A, the Turkish-German singer and songwriter from Berlin. That is the answer she delivers when she is asked whether she feels Turkish or German. She says: ‘I refuse to sit on either chair and instead I put a third chair in between and sit there.’

The discourse of victimization employed to analyse the situation of second generation Turks in Europe was also based on the notion of ‘in-betweenness’. But that understanding of the concept was very pessimistic and referred to the condition of being stuck and immobile between two opposing and conflicting cultures, that is between Turkey and Europe. However the success of these young artists refutes such an understanding of cultures as exclusively different and irreconcilable. Instead they exhibit very clearly how cultures have always been very dynamic and evolved and transformed through dynamic processes of conversation, incorporation and bricolage. Today you can find second and third generation Turkish artists in Europe in all fields of culture ranging from cinema, theatre and performing arts to literature, music and fine arts. In cinema, Fatih Akin’s immense success has unfortunately overshadowed many talented, award-winning filmmakers such as Thomas Arslan, Ayse Polat, Yuksel Yavuz and Buket Alakus, all from Germany. Their films are deeply different than the bleak films made by first generation filmmakers who had only the misfortunes of migration to focus on. Besides, the European film funding bodies were more interested in such stories back in the early 1980s. Since the early 1990s, the new generation has been able to come forth and tell

Turkey is a country which is learning and which is afraid of what it learns. Etyen Mahcupyan, Director of TESEV’s Democratization Program

their own stories and create their own personal visions on the big screen. Meanwhile in Italy, around the same period, a new filmmaker emerged with Turkish origin. Ferzan Ozpetek, who moved to Italy in 1977 as a 19-year old young man to study cinema, has made Rome his home and went on to make films more Italian than the films made by some Italian directors. In his first three films, Hamam (The Turkish Bath), Harem Suare and Le Fate Ignoranti (The Ignorant Fairies), border crossings both physically and metaphorically have a major role. Travels to and from Turkey, to its present and its past, play their part in his filmography. In his later films, he is more immersed into the Italian lives and it is almost impossible to figure out where he is originally from. Both Akin’s and Ozpetek’s films are commercially distributed and screened in Turkey. As they make some of their films or shoot some parts of their films in Turkey, they are literally a part of Turkish film industry, but their connection lies much deeper in terms of influence. Not only are they influenced by different periods of Turkish cinema ranging from the old commercial Yesilcam period to more political films by Yilmaz Guney, they also have an influence on the contemporary filmmaking in Turkey. While Akin’s film is the German nominee for best foreign film at the Oscars, he is also the producer of Takva, the Turkish nominee for the same award. In literature, Turkish-German authors, such as Zafer Senocak and Feridun Zaimoglu, have received the most presti-

gious German literature awards. Literary critics claim that some of the most interesting and refreshing works of contemporary German literature are coming from what they used to call Auslanderliteratur. It may still take a couple more generations to get rid of that label that connotes foreignness and being an outsider. Ethnomusicologist Martin Greve has made an extensive study of the musical scene of migrants with origins in Turkey. The Turkish translation of this study accompanied with a compiled music CD is of 572 pages. Even the sheer size of this book is expressive of the extent of the Turkish musical scene in Germany. Yet in terms of mainstream popularity, Hip Hop artists and groups such as Kartel have been the leading figures just like their French counterparts. But more recently a new musical phenomenon has arrived in Germany with the young Turkish star Muhabbet. Combining popular Turkish music genre Arabesk with R&B and funky rhythms, Muhabbet sings in German with the most heartbreaking lyrics, an es-

sential quality of hardcore Arabesk music. With his debut album R’nBesk, released in 2006 in Germany, he is not only appealing to young fans of Turkish origin, but is also capturing the hearts of young German girls with his good looks, romantic lyrics and sentimental performance. Moreover, with his first album, he is also supporting the UNICEF campaign in Turkey designed to promote the education of young girls. These snapshots from the Turkish diaspora in Europe provide only a very fragmented picture of the whole scene. Nevertheless, they display a performative answer to the old question, the validity of which has since expired: ‘Is Turkey a part of Europe?’ This question stands obsolete today due to the obvious answer: ‘It already is.’ Yesim Burul Seven iis Lecturer of Media and Communications at Istanbul Bilgi University and Istanbul Bilim University. She teaches cultural studies, film studies and mass communication theories. She is a founding member of NECS, the European Network for Cinema and Media Studies. yburul@bilgi.edu.tr

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Colorful and Serious: Black Humor of Turkey’s Youth By Ceren Kenar & Neslihan Akbulut

Their names have become widely known in the mainstream media since their participation in President Abdullah Gul’s reception in the Presidency of the Republic where they wore their casual Converse type shoes rather than formal black ones. They are the first generation of Turks since the country threw its doors open to liberalization and to the market economy. They are the generation of the ’80s and ’90s. They have been the first to enjoy the color screens of private TVs in Turkey. They are the children who are mainly criticized as being apolitical by the older generations. Sometimes they are even called generation X. Contrary to all prejudices against them, they show great interest in politics and the issues of their countries and world. In contrast to their fathers and mothers in the 1970s, they do not choose violence to express their ideas. They make more colorful politics rather than sticking to its demagogic discourse and boring ‘blackness’. Genc Siviller (Young Civilians) are some of these children. In their activities, protest meetings and press conferences, they apply their sarcastic and humorous method of criticism to the ‘hot’ and ‘taboo’ topics of Turkey.

‘Turkish Group Wields Wit as Tool for Political Change,’ says Sabrina Tavernise in her article published in New York Times and adds, ‘The group is one of several starting to openly question the hierarchy in Turkey, which, as the Young Civilians see it, goes something like this: The secular state elite and the military, which have steered the state since its beginning, are on the top. Elected officials deposed every decade or so by military coups are on the bottom. The Young Civilians want that to change. Wit is their principal weapon.’ Founded in 2006 with a manifest on the Kurdish issue against the rising nationalism in Turkey, Young Civilians became one of the most popular youth organizations in Turkey. Young Civilians owe this popularity not only to their humorous and effective language as Sabrina Tavernise mentions, but also to their strong stance and aspiration for democracy in Turkey. Young Civilians, with a wide diversity of members who come from different backgrounds, ideologies, religions, and ethnic origins, reflect the hetero-

geneity and vividness of Anatolia. The name of the activist organization, Young Civilians is a political opposition in itself, just like our symbol, that is a sneaker. In the manifest of Young Civilians, in which we introduce ourselves, it has been stressed that the Young Civilians are an aggregation of the ordinary people in Turkey. It has been stated that ‘we were born in this country’s hospitals and educated in its schools. We are the equal owners of this country not more or less than anyone.’ We do not wear any uniforms; have no connection with violence at all. The symbol also refers to being civilian that we defined as roughly being ‘no one’s woman’ who does not wear the uniform of any institution, and who is able to be intellectually and bodily flexible and free without being bound to any single ideology or identity with strong connections. Being non-uniformed gives us the freedom to follow our conscience, because it is essential for us to bring our consciences into play in politics… In a country like Turkey, where people are only sensitive to their own problems and show democratic reactions only when they benefit from democracy, we assert that an ethical political position can only be provided if we emancipate our hearts and minds. We argue that any political discourse that

can go beyond the partial interest of its followers, is more valuable and ethical. We are inspired by different ideologies and views, but what summarizes our political stance is not a single ideology but the values and notions of humanity. We believe in democracy that is not a tyranny of majority but comprises notions of humanity such as equality, freedom, and tolerance. We stand for the public debates and dialogue and we are aware that Turkish contemporary politics is marked with barriers preventing this dialogue. We are aware that the Turkish state historically has defined some ‘others’ among its citizens and deliberately averted the development of amity between the ‘others’ and ‘non-others’ in Turkey. Thus, we strive for a just society, civil politics and strong democracy. We are widely known in Turkey for our demonstrations in which you can see Kurds, Armenians, and Turks together or religious and non-religious people hand in hand. Being inspired from the Argentinian notion of vita activa, as an existential need we constantly seek new ways and new discourses in which we can reflect our political opposition towards the establishment in Turkey. Publishing manifestos, organizing demonstrations, conducting seminars, ar-

ranging workshops are some methods that have been used for conveying our message. In countries like Turkey, which are faced with chronic problems, there is no word left unvoiced regarding these problems, so we have to construct a new, creative and popular language in order to deliver and distinguish our message. Young Civilians’ utopia of Turkey in particular, and the world in general, can be symbolized in the lines of Tagore: – Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high – Where knowledge is free – Where the world has not been broken up into fragments – By narrow domestic walls – Where words come out from the depth of truth – Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection – Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way – Into the dreary desert sand of dead habit – Where the mind is led forward by thee – Into ever-widening thought and action – Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake.

Ceren Kenar & Neslihan Akbulut are members of the Young Civilians NGO in Istanbul

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Microsoft role

Southeastern Europe is an exciting region to be in, states Goran Radman, Microsoftâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Chairman in SE Europe pointing out that technologies will have to be seen as a platform for opportunities. He also stresses the need for close international cooperation to make computer and digital protection from attacks more effective. Regarding electronic security, he cites the concept of Trustworthy Computing, as the foundation for an industry-wide effort to create trusted computing experiences.

What is Microsoft's profile in SE Europe? Our business in South East Europe is overseen from the regional headquarters for Central and Eastern Europe, one of the six areas through which Microsoft Corporation runs its global business operations. We deliver products and services across South East Europe through a large network of local distribution, reseller and ISV partners. On top of that, we have our own subsidiaries in all SEE countries, except Albania where one is scheduled to open in the first half of 2008. The primary role of a subsidiary is to look after the market and channel development, customer care issues and the overall quality of local services, while partners focus on supplying customers with licenses, services, solutions and support needed in the daily use of technology. This primarily means enabling users with technology they demand for use in business, public services, education and at home. Customer and partnerwise, this also means transferring our knowledge and expertise to a great number of local IT companies, thus enabling them to use our latest technologies, utilize Microsoftâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s business expertise and achieve global competitiveness. In the public sector,

Goran Radman interviewed by Dimitris Pappas

this means partnering with local, national, and regional governments in helping them achieve public service efficiency and national objectives, ranging from e-government and e-democracy to digital communities. In the education sector this means engaging with schools and universities in providing better integration of technology into the curriculum to proliferate better e-skills among educators and students. Finally, it also means partnering with civic society organizations to improve, for example, lifelong learning for disadvantaged youth and adults through our community programs.

How easy was the business penetration of Microsoft in SE Europe? What is your evaluation of the market development in the area? The first Microsoft subsidiary in SE Europe opened in Slovenia in 1994 and since then the companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s penetration had different dynamics, depending on local needs as well as business and political circumstances. But wherever we started doing business, we were among the first international technology companies in the market and we needed to work first on the very basic principles of the market, such as the respect and protection of intellectual property. It was very natural for us to partner in this endeavor not

in SE Europe only with local technology companies but also with national governments and other global partners and organizations in order to find the best ways possible to support the adoption of IT technology as the best enabler of economic and social growth of their nations and competitiveness of the local economies. I believe technologies will have to be seen as a platform for opportunities. This process is already starting to gain ground globally, but the region of SE Europe is still lagging behind. Nonetheless, SEE is a very vibrant and exciting place today – the region is generating dynamic IT growth, more dynamic than the rest of CEE and Western Europe, and will continue to do so in the years to come. Actually, in some countries like Romania, we are witnessing the biggest IT growth in the world, even bigger than that of the Asian Pacific region. These facts indicate that SEE is indeed an exciting region to be in. However, according to the World Economic Forum’s Networked Readiness report, which measures the integration of technology in business, the technology infrastructure available, government policy for fostering innovation, and promoting the usage of the latest technology, SEE countries as a group still come low in the list. The highest ranking SEE country is Slovenia. Therefore, continuous government and business investment is needed to support an ongoing and dynamic

growth. What Microsoft is doing, as an employer and as an IT business enabler in the region, is to try to make technology available in a way that is relevant, accessible and affordable to more people. For example, the region has some of the biggest mobile penetrations in the world, so we look at Windows Mobile as an opportunity for delivery. In Croatia we are piloting a subscription based model where consumers can get a PC and genuine Microsoft software via a telecom partner. Another pilot, the Family Education PC in Romania, is a partnership with local software developers, education partners and retailers to create a software package on a low cost device, specifically designed to support the whole family from a child’s educational needs as well as helping parents with tools to improve their IT skills. We also observe instances of intra-regional competition, such as outsourcing from Hungary and the Czech Republic to Romania and Bulgaria. And EU membership has helped some countries build on not just opportunities in IT, but business competitiveness in general. An example of this is EU funding for innovation – Microsoft’s EU Grants Advisor (EUGA) program, which helps small businesses to take advantage of available EU funding. Through EUGA we’ve managed to get up to 128m USD for the business ecosystem since 2006 and see plenty of opportunity there for smaller businesses in the future.

Microsoft operates in a region, where the rising markets and companies are not yet experienced enough to deal with technological developments efficiently on the internet and at the same time take precautions against the relevant threats. In what way does Microsoft tackle this issue? Regional business today shows a significant level of maturity and overall awareness of technology opportunities and threats. It is really a much different world than it was two decades ago. I truly believe businesses across the region have recognized the potential and opportunities that technologies today provide. But they are also much more aware of the threats that rise daily. We are also aware that threats are not of a local nature. In a world where everything is connected and Internet penetration among business and home users is growing fast and steadily, threats are much wider and go beyond regions. Microsoft is addressing these issues through a number of new products which customers will be able to use wherever they are. We also provide information resources, such as technical documentation, webcasts, seminars and white papers, making them available to people all over the world.

interview

What are your proposals regarding electronic security? Trust and security are critical priorities for Microsoft. We are aware of the changing nature of security and the work in the connected world and we are working hard to advance trust in computing and to help pave the way for future connected experiences based on secure and easy access anyplace. We call this initiative and concept Trustworthy Computing and believe it provides the foundation for an industry-wide effort to create trusted computing experiences. Announced five years ago, Trustworthy Computing is a core principle that places security, reliability, and privacy at the center of all of our software development efforts. One example of the impact of Trustworthy Computing is the Secure Development Lifecycle, a rigorous software development process that makes security a critical focus for every line of code that we write. Trustworthy Computing is an important reason why e.g. Windows Vista is the most secure operating system that Microsoft has ever delivered. Developed from the ground up using the Secure Development Lifecycle process, Windows Vista includes new security features that help computer users protect sensitive information and give IT administratorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; new ways to protect corporate networks and preserve data integrity and confidentiality. Windows Vista also offers new controls that enable parents to manage exactly what their children can do on the computer. These controls allow parents to restrict computer use to specific times and determine which games their children

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can play, which programs they can use, and which websites they can visit. But before trust can become a reality, systems, processes, programs, and applications must work together reliably and securely. That is one important reason why Microsoft is committed to interoperability: before digital identities and information protected by policy-based security can move unfettered between platforms and devices, systems must be able to interoperate. Today we are working closely with governments, organizations, and partners to create and implement industry-wide standards that will enable systems and applications to work together so that connectivity can be seamless and pervasive, and people can access digital information more securely no matter where they are or what device they have at hand.

Do you believe that initiatives like the proposed Balkan Network of Computer Emergency Response Teams will be able to introduce vital activities which, among other functions, reinforce the protection of companies as well as the protection of products? Every initiative that supports and protects users from malicious and criminal attacks, including national and regional CERT net-

works, is highly welcomed and should be embraced. We see a change in the nature of threat and whereas publicity once motivated many digital attacks, criminal financial gain is behind most security threats today. So, in addition to viruses and worms, we deal more and more with spyware that logs keystrokes; rootkits that are used to hijack computers; and social engineering threats where criminals try to trick people into divulging the personal data needed to exploit digital information. Closer international cooperation is needed to prevent and make computer and digital protection in general more effective than before.

Do you feel confident that in the near future electronic transactions and communications will be safe or will hackers always be one step ahead? Creating electronic systems and processes that are always secure, so that people and organizations have a high degree of confidence that the technology they use will protect their identity, their privacy, and their information, is an imperative that transcends any one company. Success will require hard work and extensive cooperation between companies, governments, and organizations from around the world. Achieving the levels of trust needed to make connected experiences based on anywhere access possible will require an industry-wide effort to change the way we approach digital identities, build networks, and protect information.

The proliferation of identities and identity systems is a significant problem and a difficult challenge. We all struggle to remember an ever-growing number of user names and passwords as we move between systems at work and home. Because it is unlikely that a single digital identity system or technology will be universally adopted, a different approach is required - an approach based on creating a system of systems that provides the interoperability needed to link all identity solutions and technologies. This ‘identity metasystem’ will be able to take advantage of the strengths of existing and future identity technologies while enabling the creation of a consistent and straightforward user interface. Solutions built on top of this metasystem will enable digital identities to be managed and protected effectively and easily. To resolve the tension between providing access and maintaining security, new technologies for managing the way people and information move between corporate networks and the Internet are essential. In the face of a rapidly evolving threat landscape, the firewall - the fundamental tool for managing network security today - is no longer adequate. A better approach is security that is based on policy. With policy-based security, the rules that govern access to networks, resources, and information can be enforced seamlessly across platforms and devices. It is impossible to overstate the importance of providing the right levels of privacy and information protection so that users can trust that their information is secure. To achieve this, we must be able to protect information not only

when it is in transit, as we do today through encryption, but also on the server, desktop, mobile device, and wherever else it may reside. Policy will also play an important role in the evolution of protection. By applying policy when information is created, we can enable information to flow freely and safely across systems and networks while maintaining appropriate control over how it is used, and by whom.

Recently the E.U. imposed a heavy fine of 600 mln. euros on Microsoft for abusing its monopoly position. What are your views on this and how much will it affect your activity in the long run? Firstly, we appreciate the court’s judgment. It’s clearly very important to us as a company that we comply with our obligations under European law. We are in the process of studying this decision carefully, and if there are additional steps that we need to take in order to comply with it, we will take them. I would note that a lot has changed since this case started in 1998. The world has changed, the industry has changed, and our company has changed. We sought to underscore that over a year ago when we published what we described as our Windows Principles, principles

intended to ensure that future versions of Windows, starting with Windows Vista, would comport not only with the principles of US law but with the principles that are applicable here in Europe as well. We’ve sought to be open and transparent, and we’ve sought to strengthen our ties with the rest of our industry. Indeed, it’s notable that just last week we announced a new agreement with Sun Microsystems, and the week before that we announced a new agreement with Novell, two of the companies that started out on the other side of this case almost nine years ago. A lot has changed, but I will say that one thing has remained constant, and will continue to do so, and that is Microsoft’s commitment to Europe and the region of SEE. When this case started, we published Windows in 24 European languages; today that number is 41, many of which are languages spoken in SEE, and it will continue to grow. When we started this case, we had 3,900 employees in Europe; today we have 13,000, and that number will continue to grow. When this case started, we were spending $3 million a year on research and development in Europe; today we are spending almost half a billion, and that figure will continue to grow. Today we work with over 200,000 business partners, who employ almost 3 million people on the European continent, and that number too will continue to grow. So, we look forward to continuing to move technology forward to create more jobs in Europe and the region of SEE.

interview

The market the competition In telecoms, the often sybilic dictates of Brussels are interpreted differently by member country regulators. Starting at one end from a laissez faire attitude we go to the other extreme of Napoleonic ambitions to radically reform the industry. Some regulators believe they own the incumbents. In between we have variations and dogmas all claiming to be the right interpretations of Brussels, much as all Christian sects claim to be the true interpreters of the Gospels. It would be amusing, if it was not deadly serious for the industry, to follow the argument of whether there should be one all powerful European super Regulator or not. A fight between EU statism and local statism in the name of the interests of competition and the consumer. In reality, a clash of ambitions and agendas. Regulation can be a serious threat for the industry, and I do not mean only for the incumbents. It is both at EU and national levels â&#x20AC;&#x201C; in most cases â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a constitutional anomaly. Regulating Authorities are bodies vested with the power to legislate, interpret the law, apply the law, be the judge and the executioner. They are financed by the taxpayer and are accountable to no-one. At a time when democracy and accountability are considered the foundations of our system, we have legitimized bodies, not only in telecoms, which in many cases can act with impunity above the law.

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Regulation is about interests and the regulator redistributes money, not his own. It is essential for a Regulators credibility not only to be but also to appear impartial. Regulation is here to stay. What must be done is to try to eliminate its weaknesses and to start by making it accountable and legally liable for its actions and mistakes. Not an easy task, but I am glad to read that in the country that is hosting this conference there is a lively debate on the subject. A similar debate is, I understand, taking place in the corridors of power in Brussels. Things take time to change there and in the meantime here are some practical suggestions and comments on how the situation could be improved, for the industry as a whole and for the competitiveness of Europe. Regulators should give up police and schoolteacher-like attitudes where these exist and sit down with the incumbents and where applicable with the responsible Ministries to decide on a long term policy of telecom development. In each separate country and then at a European level. I suggest that large companies listed in stock exchanges follow much more transparent procedures than most regulators and treating them with consideration and listening to their views would be more productive. In many cases today this does not happen. Incumbents are regarded with suspicion and considered guilty in advance. Indeed Regulation in Europe has imposed its own negative way of looking at the industry, even on some incumbents. Incumbents possess enormous knowhow and are powerful development engines

By Panagis Vourloumis

in an economy. In an industry which requires very deep pockets and must take big risks because of technological change it is to everyone's interest for the incumbent to be treated not as the whale which will be fed to the sharks. The countries that have understood this have the best results and the healthiest industries. Very large investments need careful planning, heavy financing and take a long time to be implemented and bear fruit. The business risks are considerable. If Regulatory risk is added the investment may not be worth it. Regulatory certainty, a stable horizon, is absolutely necessary for investment. Uncertainty is poison for planning. We now have to contend with the scarecrow of functional or structural or whatever separation. It is a reasonably sounding theoretical proposal to make eggs out of an omelet. It does not tell us how of course. As Brussels does not seem so enthusiastic about it any more they are passing the buck to the local boys. Be nice or I will chop you up. How conducive is this to a productive dialogue? Even if the idea could have merit in some cases, the way of serving it kills it. Not all countries are the same. In some, fixed lines cover almost 100% in other like Romania less than 25%. In some, like Britain,

and the regulators regulation has been in place for decades, in others it is new. Some markets such as Germany, Italy, France, Britain are huge, other are small or even tiny like Cyprus and Malta. In most countries the industry developed before the regulator came in. Often it developed in an anarchic or individualistic way. In some countries like Greece and Germany the incumbent is still suffering from legally imposed rigidities which raise their cost of operation. Rigidities which do not exist for their competitors. One thing, however applies everywhere. The economics of the business require a certain critical mass if an enterprise is to survive. By critical mass I mean a certain number of paying customers to cover the overhead and all other costs. Regulation that encourages fragmentation and the survival of the unfitest is bad for the industry and bad for the economy. Technology in telecoms is moving very fast. Much faster than regulation. Regulators often chase yesterday's realities and a case to the point is convergence. The combination of fixed and mobile features in the same products is here to stay and will continue to spread. This is urgently creating the need to redefine markets and the meaning of what is a dominant position. In some instances, regulation, rather than promoting technological progress, inhibits it by refusing to recognize that risk must be rewarded and investment must have a return or it will not happen. I suggest that, both at the local and European level, Regulation should study deeper the trends of the industry. Regulators and Governments have to make choices. Devel-

opment and consumer interests may sometimes seem contradictory but only in the short run. Investment should not be sacrificed to the populist slogan of ever cheaper services. Often Regulators impose prices on incumbents arbitrarily following nontransparent methods. Such methods distort the market, inhibit investment and damage the industry on a national and European scale. Anyone who lives in a European country knows that there is fierce competition in telecoms. It is probably the only sector where prices are continuously coming down, the consumer has infinite choices, services are improving. Is this because of Regulation? Maybe they should receive some of the credit though mostly Regulation is taking a free ride on the wave. I believe that the main factors responsible for the advancement of the industry have been the liberation of the market, the breaking up of legal monopoly power and technology. It was a matter of time for competition to happen, for the incumbents to lose market share and for the market itself to grow. Not a zero sum game. Where regulators try to force unreasonable speed on the process they do more harm than good. Be as it may, with some contribution by Regulation, Europe has now a vibrant, competitive and creative industry and market in

Telecoms. Countries which were lagging behind are catching up and the industry is at the head of progress. Regulators should be happy but they are not. Instead they feel nervous. The job they were set up to do is done or almost so. Congratulations and go home? But bureaucracies are survivors. We, the industry, know that European telecom regulation will never stop inventing reasons for its continuing existence. Let's hope that at least it becomes more accountable. Regulation should be regulated.

The present article is based on a speech of OTE's Chairman & CEO, Panagis Vourloumis, in ANRCTI Conference held in Bucharest on November 13, 2007.

themes

The Bosphorus Conference

EU and its neigbours

In Istanbul, on September 15-16, 2006, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), the Center for European Reform and the British Council co-organized the 3rd Bosphorus Conference on EU-Turkey Relations. The aim of the conference was to evaluate the progress made on the part of Turkey towards the implementation of the political criteria set by the EU. The conference in its conclusions refers to the progress made during the previous year and to the political obstacles raised throughout this process. The vicious circle of the EU concerns about Turkey’s slowing reforms and Turkey’s anger due to the perception that double standards are applied in its candidacy has created an air of distrust. Leaders of certain EU member states, who offer Turkey a privileged partnership, but not full membership, further cultivated that impression. The problems regarding the implementation of the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, the upcoming elections and the EU reluctance to guarantee full membership to Turkey further raised the political heat and as it is presented in the conference’s conclusions: If current tendencies towards mutual recrimination and incomprehension continue, the accession process may soon stall or even fail. Finally, as it was stressed in the conclusions, the issue of Cyprus and the lack of support to Turkey’s accession by the European public opinion, due to ignorance, prejudices and national stereotypes, lead the European support to a stalemate. The conference proposed some ideas on how to sustain momentum. On Turkey’s side, the final prize – accession – should remain the objective; on the EU’ s side, consistency is needed; while for both sides, the conference agreed that it is important to highlight the advantages of the European process in order to cultivate a positive climate in EU-Turkish relations.

The European Council of Foreign Relations organised its launch conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 19 November, where the challenges the EU faces with regard to its Russia policy, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe were discussed. Speakers included Gergana Grancharova (Bulgarian Minister of EU Affairs), Georgi Pirinski (Speaker of the Bulgarian National Assembly), Martti Ahtisaari (former President of Finland), Mark Leonard (Executive Director of ECFR), Svetoslav Bojilov (Head of the Communitas Foundation), Ivan Vejvoda (Executive Director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy), and author Tim Judah. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev addressed participants during the reception that followed. The conference evolved around three panels. The first explored Europe’s relationship with Russia. Taking as a starting point the fact that Russia exploits Europe’s internal divisions on all issues in bilateral relations, the panel investigated the prospects of a common European strategy towards Russia. The future of Western Balkans was the subject of the second panel. Stuck between the need of EU membership in order to emerge from the state of underdevelopment and their current inability to negotiate full membership, combined with the ongoing threat posed by the Kosovo issue, the panel discussed what Europe’s positive contribution to the region could be. Finally, the third panel focused on the topic of EU’s Eastern enlargement and discussed the ability of the EU to pursue a dynamic strategy of integrating its Eastern neighbors to the common European values and practices.

The key conclusions of the 3rd Bosphorus conference can be found at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/conclusions_bosphorous_conf_2006.pdf

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More information on the conference can be found at http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/sofia_launch/

activities

market view

Compiled by Dimitris Pappas

600 million euro Bosnia power plant France's Alstom has been chosen as the best bidder for the construction of a power plant in northern Bosnia estimated to cost over 600 million euros. Alstom was ranked the best of nine companies seeking to build the 200 megawatt thermo-electric plant at Stanari, near the town of Doboj. Last year, UK-based Energy Financing Team (EFT) won approval from a regional government to build the plant at Stanari, where it owns lignite mines. The new plant would burn lignite from the Stanari mines. ‘The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which assisted EFT in publishing the tender, has approved the choice of Alstom and pledged to take part in financing the project,’ said Nenad Savic, the EFT Director of Communication. Savic added that the total value of the project would exceed 600 million euros. ‘We expect the EBRD to cover about 25 per cent of financing for the project and we shall cover the same percentage from own resources and through loans by producers of equipment,’ Savic stated. Finally he mentioned that the remaining part will be financed by commercial banks and partner companies.

Vojvodjanska merger The period of merger between Vojvodjanska Banka ad – Novi Sad with the National Bank of Greece started in October. In Serbia, NBG was among the first foreign banks to enter the local banking market in 2002 by opening the first branch in Belgrade. Since then the Bank, with the help of stability and growth in Serbia, has developed a network of 35 branches, which is now transformed into a fully owned subsidiary bank under the name National Bank of Greece AD-Beograd. NBG finalized the acquisition of a 99.4% stake of the share capital of Vojvodjanska Banka ad – NoviSad, in December 2006. The acquisition of Vojvodjanska by NBG, via a privatization process in which 11 European banks originally expressed interest, is considered the largest and most significant sale process of a state-controlled bank in Serbia to date. Vojvodjanska has a nationwide branch network of 169 banking units, a leading issuer of payment cards – Visa and Diners Cards, and a significant market share in the country’s

domestic and international payments. Following the acquisition of Vojvodjanska Banka, the Group is placed 5th in terms of total assets and 2nd in terms of branch network (total of 204 units), confirming the potential of further growth in the Serbian Banking Sector. According to Group’s 3-year Business Plan, in 2009, the SE Europe region will contribute 13% to the Group income. The Serbian contribution ratio to the region’s income is expected to amount to 20% of this. Takis Arapoglou, Chairman and CEO of NBG, said that in order to accommodate both banks’ operations and reputation for continuity, ‘we intend to keep its name, with its headquarters in Novi Sad.’ NBG, as he stated, will invest 40 million euros in order to support the bank’s modernization and competitiveness.The total cost of the acquisition of the 481,718 shares of Vojvodjanska Bank estimated at 385 million euros.

Mall construction fever in Sofia Greek construction company Terna S.A. was chosen to build the Hermes Park Sofia which belongs to Carrefour Bulgaria AD and European Trade Center OOD. The Project will be constructed on a plot of approximately 54,000 m2 and will consist of a multifunctional shopping and entertainment centre with an office complex, three levels of underground car parking spaces and open air parking spaces for visitors of a total built area of approximately 241,000 m2. The shopping area consists of a hypermarket (Carrefour) and other shops in a typical Mall structure and will be placed on the ground floor and the first two floors. The third floor includes multiplex cinemas, restaurants and fast food restaurants. The office complex consists of five buildings of various sizes. The largest

office building is close to a main Avenue of Sofia and its architectural features will distinguish the whole complex. The cost for the construction is 123 million euro and it is expected to be completed by the end of 2009. Carrefour will invest more than 80 million euros. Generally, mall construction fever has seized the biggest investors in Bulgaria. _ore than ten large-scale trade centres will tower above Bulgaria's big towns in the next three years. In Sofia, the number of projects totals thirteen. Apart from Carrefour, the Austrian-German consortium ECE is another influential player in the construction upsurge. Shopping City West, another Austrian investor, and Bulgaria's Silvana Forest plan to jointly erect a mall called Eurogate, situated in the western part of Sofia. The project is estimated at 250 million euros.

Sofia malls over the period: 2007-2010 Already finished: 1. City Centre Sofia (next to the National Palace of Culture - NDK) 2. Mall of Sofia (West Sofia) 3. SkyCity Shopping Centre (Slatina residential district) Planned for 2008: 4. Olympian Mall and Tower 5. Commercial Centre Planned for 2009: 6. Carrefour 7. Sofia Acropolis 8. Bulgaria Mall 9. World Office Centre Planned for 2010: 10. Trade Centre Central Train Station Other planned malls: 11. Tsarigradsko Shosse 12. Mall next to Business Park Sofia 13. Sitnyakovo

Soravia eyes the opportunities Austrian Soravia Gruppe plans to invest around 300 million euros in property, outdoor advertising, soft drinks and fruit juice industries in Bulgaria over the next three years. Martin Ohneberg, Chief Operating Officer for investments at Soravia, said that at the moment the company is looking to buy land plots suitable for the development of logistics and office parks. The company is also on the lookout for real estate opportunities in Serbia and Romania. Other potential acquisition targets for Soravia are beverage, fruit juice and mineral water bottling companies in SE Europe. Talks are already underway with sever-

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al such companies. Soravia has already notched up one acquisition in the sector with the purchase of Devin, a water bottling company that has a 30 per cent market share in Bulgaria. Ohneberg stated that up to 30 million euros have been earmarked for a new Devin bottling line. The Austrian company is also eyeing Bulgaria's outdoor advertising sector. To this end, it has registered a wholly-owned subsidiary here under the name Megaboard. Vienna-based group company Megaboard CEE already has operative subsidiaries in Russia, Poland, Croatia and Slovakia.

market view A new Serbian Silicon Valley A tiny Serbian town, Indjija located halfway between Belgrade and Novi Sad, will host the biggest techno park in Europe. About USD 600 million will be invested by the Indian estate developer Embassy Group, a property developer based in Bangalore, India's Silicon Valley, in order to build the IT park with roughly 250,000 square meters for business activities and 25,0000 employees. In the first project phase, USD 60 million will be invested and 2,500 people will be employed. IBM and Hewlett Packard have already shown significant interest towards this initiative, and according to Mr. Mladjan Dinkic, Serbian Minister of Economy the expected exports will reach USD 2 billion per year. ‘It is a very important project for us, because Serbian students who finish electro-technological faculty and technical sciences leave the country … to work in big international software companies. It is our duty to per-

suade these young people, who are so intelligent and diligent, to stay and work in Serbia,’ said Dinkic. Embassy Group is one of the world's leading companies in building and development of IT and business parks. The companies' clients in the IT sector include IBM, Microsoft, HP, ANZ Information Technology, and Goldman Sachs. Goran Jesic, the 33-year-old mayor of Indlija, is confident the project for the technology park will also boost the national economy, improve its war-tarnished image and help persuade young Serbians that they have a future in their own country.

That it has been agreed between two places with similar names – India and Indjija – is no coincidence, for that was one of the reasons the country's ambassador, Ajay Swarup, paid a visit to the town soon after moving to Belgrade late last year. Ties have since grown between the tiny municipality of 53,000 inhabitants and the South Asian giant. In spite of its modest size, Indjija has the most impressive economic record in Serbia, which only managed to attract a total of 300-400 million euros in Foreign Direct Investment last year. Indjija alone has pulled in around 300 million euros worth of greenfield investments that have created at least 2,000 jobs during the past three years. The municipality of Indjija will donate the land on which the IT park will be built, and the state will finance the building of the infrastructure with funds from the national investment plan for 2008.

Bancpost pension sector Bancpost, member of the Eurobank EFG Group, have established a subsidiary with the name Bancpost Fond De Pensii which focuses exclusively on the private management of employees’ pension contributions in Romania. Romania is one of the first European Union member states to implement a management system of part of the employees’ pension contributions in accordance with the second Pillar. Within that framework, it assigned the management of employees’ contributions to properly authorized private enterprises in an effort to maximize the

return on their funds. Utilizing the above new institutional framework, Bancpost Fond De Pensii is aimed at ensuring high return rates, while at the same time catering for the individual needs of each client, thus maximizing the synergies and the international know-how of the Eurobank EFG Group in the provision of financial services. In its effort, the company has utilized the know-how of the Group’s subsidiary in Greece, EFG Eurolife Insurance. Bancpost has a network of 246 branches and employs 3900 specialized executives.

impressions

A Balkan Prayer This summer I visited Baarle again. That small town, on the Belgian-Dutch border, which belongs simultaneously to both countries. Last time I was here, it was raining cats and dogs. Now the sun is shining. The border, however, has remained the same – totally unchanged: A kind of strips made of tiny white crosses that seem to have been put down in order to decorate sidewalks and streets. On the right and on the left of these decorative strips the letters NL (Holland) and B (Belgium) are printed. The history of this quite odd town claims that in the Middle Ages the area was parceled out between a Duke and a Baron. Much of the Duke’s land was surrounded by the Baron’s lands and vice versa. When the time came for the states-nations to define the border between Belgium and Holland the experts threw in the towel. Since the Dutch and the Belgians do not cut each other’s throat on the matter of borders, Baarle remained as a singular ‘monument’. Divided between Belgium and

Holland, with some eight thousand permanent residents (six thousand Dutch, two thousand Belgians), the town has a duplicate of everything: two town halls (the Belgian BaarleHertog, the Dutch Baarle-Nassau), two churches, two police forces, two fire brigades. The streets, however, the beer-parlors, the shops are common to both. Because Baarle belongs, above all, to its citizens and to this unbelievable game with the borders, which have been traced out in such a way as to resemble a baby’s scribble on a piece of white paper… *** I decided to go on the same round I went last year. I went into the Zeeman supermarket. I bought a notebook in Belgium and I paid for it at the counter that is in … Holland. I asked the cashier to tell me which country the mini-market belongs to. To Belgium, she answers, because that is where the main entrance is. Which country a building belongs to depends on where its main entrance lies. Now, with the advent of the EU and the euro, the edge has been somewhat taken off things. In previous years though, there were countless irregularities. Let me tell you one: There

By Gazmend Kapllani

The leading mobile operator in Albania

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Map of Baarle-Hertog/Nassau. The Dutch parts are white, the Belgian pink. The tiny crosses show the borderlines. If you can figure out what is where, do tell me!

were (and maybe there still are) cases in which the owner of a house, finding it more convenient to pay his taxes in Belgium, would take the central entrance of his residence that opened into Holland and move it a few meters further – into Belgium. Or vice versa… *** I walk down Oosteinde Street. I go into the Forbidden Fruit: a well-known beerparlor in this small town. The mural on the outside wall shows Adam offering a glass of red beer to Eve. I sit at a table and I notice the white line, which has been painted down its middle to show that the borders go through the beerparlor. The serving-girl comes over. I order black beer, sitting in Belgium. She notes down my order and gives me a smile from the Holland side… *** I leave the Forbidden Fruit and I go to one of the most renowned beer-parlors in the region, the Het Brouwershuis. It serves seven hundred different kinds of beer. I meet the owner, Johan Spopen. As ever, he is friendly, smiling and charming. His beer-parlor is also a museum. Here one can find the entire history of beer in Europe. Beer-bottles dating from the 18th century and incredible, one-of-akind beer glasses. One can also find the entire history of smuggling that was once rampant in the region. Excisemen in period costumes ‘surround’ the main hall of the beer-parlor. Further on, signboards full of bullet-holes are displayed next to various implements once used by smugglers. What did the smugglers carry? Sugar, rice, salt. And especially alcohol. Because once, in these parts, poverty flourished with a vengeance… *** I say goodbye to Johan, who looks quite a lot like Orson Welles, and go over to Loveren Street. I find the house I have been looking for. Here the borderline goes through the middle of the entrance door. I check the name on the bell-push: M.S. On the upper left-hand of the door I notice a small Belgian flag: therefore the

house belongs to Belgium. How is this possible, though, since the borderline divides the house exactly through the middle? And I am told the following story, which I don’t know whether it is true or just another urban legend. Because the couple owning the house wanted their children to be Belgians and since here women usually give birth at home – the obstetrician and the midwife come to your house – the couple, on the day the birth was expected, moved the bed from the bedroom that lies in Holland to the living-room that lies in Belgium… *** Baarle is one of the oddest places I have ever seen. I, at least, know of no other place where you can cook your dinner in the kitchen, which lies in one country, and eat it in your living room, which lies in a different country… There are other villages, too, on the Dutch-Belgian border, in which ‘borders’ seem to be a game. None of those however can compare with Baarle. And what impresses me most, like the Balkanian that I am, is the fact that, despite all this confusion about the borders, the people here do not suffer in the least from confusion or identity crisis. Indeed, they make a joke of it. How have these people managed to do it? To laugh at borders, to make fun of them, to turn them into a game, into a farce, into a tourist attraction? This is why, whenever I have the chance, I love visiting Baarle in order to undergo a border detox. It is the only place on Earth where I cease to suffer from border syndrome. And now I have been thinking: perhaps it is here that Serbs and Kossovars should come to negotiate their differences. Why on Earth are they taken to cities full of historical statuary and past and present splendours? They should be brought here, to this humble village, on the chance that they may finally come to an agreement. Or perhaps – this is another thought – summer schools for students from the Balkans should be organized and established here. It never hurts to see the world in a different way. It never hurts to see a place where borders are

The strip with the tiny white crosses – the borderline – divides this house in Baarle exactly through the middle. It is one of the houses in which the living room lies in one country and the bedroom in another.

not the death of people. It never hurts to smile instead of weep on seeing a borderline. Who knows, with the advent of the European Union, future generations in the Balkans may perhaps import from here some clever idea for the tourist development of their borders… For just a moment, passing before my eyes I saw the divided cities of the Balkans: Nicosia, Mostar, Mitrovitsa… Thinking all this, I sat on the border dividing the house in Loveren Street. I sat as in prayer and I prayed: ‘Dear God, please make the borders in the Balkans look like these. Even after a hundred, two hundred, three hundred years. Amen!’… My heartfelt thanks to Willem von Gool and to Johan Spopen for their wonderful hospitality. Info: http://english.baarledigitaal.org/ http://www.brouwershuys.be/

The Scala di Milano and the Balkans of the Future Inva Mula is today one of the best-known sopranos in the world. To the wider public of pop culture, she is known for the film The Fifth Element (1997, directed by Luc Besson), in which she sings Donizetti’s Lucia di Lammermoor. In this exclusive interview with The bridge, the world-famous soprano, who was born in Tirana in 1963, talks about her childhood, her departure from Albania into the wider world, her career and her efforts, how classical music is perceived today, national borders, Albania and the Balkans of the future… (www.inva-mula.com) Where were you born and raised? I was born in Tirana. I had a happy childhood, the best that any child could wish to have… When was your first contact with the opera? Who were you childhood heroes? Music was an integral part of my daily life during my childhood. The heroines my mother played on stage – she was also an opera singer – soon became my role models and so, without realizing it, they became part of my playacting with my dolls. I mean that my relation with music was so ingrained that I cannot say whether music chose me or I chose music.

Let us talk about the 1990s. Why did you decide to leave Albania? The ’90s were a very difficult time for Albania with changes coming one after the other as the hope for a better future started dawning. I was also drawn into that kind of psychosis that prevailed at the time: to seek a hopeful future anywhere on Earth, as long as it was outside Albania. However, I was unable to sever the close ties I had with my family so abruptly. On the other hand, it was just then that I had started working as a soloist at the Opera and Ballet Theatre in Tirana and this wonderful experience played a decisive role in the development of my later career. It was then that I was granted a scholarship, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and so I set out for the city of my dreams – Paris.

Inva Mula interviewed by Adrian Thano

Who were your first contacts abroad and how did you manage to enter the world of opera? My first contacts were minimal and quite difficult. Unfortunately, the teacher relegated me to the position of student, never understanding my resolve to get where I wanted to be. Despite my strenuous efforts, she never gave me the slightest chance to sing, even at a small theatre, just to be heard by someone. Faced with such a dead end, I chose the arduous task of participating in various international music contests. After winning the Grand Prize in Barcelona in 1992, I entered in 1993 the first Placido Domingo Operalia competition. I won the first prize. But above all else, I won a wonderful chance to team up with the great Domingo, who also guided my steps in the course I was to follow.

If someone asked you today, what the most significant turning points in your career have been, what would you answer? My career – just like anyone else’s – has been composed of various stages that followed one another. I would, however, choose my debut at the Verona arena in 1997, in Rigoletto, which was repeated a year later at the Scala di Milano. I would also choose my collaboration with a Grande Maestro, Ricardo Muti, as well as large productions in L.A., Chicago, Washington, New York, etc. What are your plans for the future? It is difficult to make forecasts and even more so for an artist who has become so attached to the stage, but knows that there will come a moment when she will have to step down. I would like, sometime in the future, to do something entirely different from what I am doing now – something related to art, something exciting through which I will discover myself all over again. What do you think of the lyrical theatre today? It is a fact that the opera today still retains the interest of a wide public. It proves that, contrary to those who claim that the time of the opera is past, the opera is flourishing. This means that modern and classical music have discovered a common formula for co-existence, and that the latter, despite having to adjust to the demands of modern audiences, remains timeless. What does the phrase ‘I am Albanian’ mean to you? To be Albanian… It is a bit difficult to me to answer this question… But apart from the pride, which is typical of any person born and bred in a small nation, the other side of the coin shows the enormous effort a person must make in order to survive and to overcome the inherent complexes of an individual from a small country that has lots of problems…

How do you regard other Balkan countries in general? When I happen to work with colleagues from the other Balkan countries, it becomes quite obvious to me that, our common cooking and diet apart, we also share many other things… How do audiences receive you today? Audiences are not the same everywhere. Sometimes the response is great, the audience shows great warmth towards me, and sometimes, I would say, it shows even coldness. It depends on geographical location and other factors. In Albania? There I find the best audience I could wish for…

Do you still carry an Albanian passport? Certainly. I have dual citizenship.

What does it mean to go through customs on an Albanian passport? Although for a long time now I have not been obliged to use my Albanian passport, I confess that I still feel anxious about crossing any borders. And to think that all this ‘confusion’ is caused to one by a piece of paper that has nothing to do with the skills or character of its owner. I do hope that one day the Albanians will get over that persecution complex they feel when faced with a border post. How do you imagine the future of Albania and of the Balkans will be? I dream of a wonderful Albania – just as it has always deserved to be. I know, however, that unfortunately, this day will take a long time to come. I imagine the Balkans living in peace, within a United Europe, whose members, one day, will also include Albania… Adrian Thano is a journalist and editor-inchief of the largest Albanian newspaper Shekulli www.shekulli.com.al

culture

The EU impact on SE Europe This monograph examines the politics and economics in Southeast Europe. Political instability and military clashes in the Balkans during the 1990s resulted in many countries joining the European Union, or obtaining the status of candidate countries. Many others are hoping to do so soon, while moving toward greater socioeconomic stability. The co-authors of this book, both experts in the politics and economics of the region, argue that the Balkan Peninsula is a critical region in the struggle for international stability today. This book takes the reader on a historical journey

through the region. The authors examine the process of European Union enlargement, with a particular focus on the integration of the Balkans. They also look closely at economic growth in the region, and pursue ideas for more effective policies against corruption and organized crime. The causes that have conditioned policy response and prospective policy options are also clearly illustrated. The book paints a definitive picture of a Peninsula that needs to move toward a clear and lasting membership of the European Union.

Bruno S. Sergi, Qerim Qerimi, The Political Economy of Southeast Europe from 1990 to the Present, 160 pages, Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd., forthcoming 2008, ISBN: 0826428673

The Changing face of Turkey Turkey is a country in a state of flux, swept along by an extraordinary process of change. In the last few years, a series of far-reaching political and economic reforms has swept away much of the old order which ruled the country for so long. Some people call it a second Turkish revolution. But resistance to reform remains strong. Pressure for change has

come from ordinary people fed up with the old ways; it's also been motivated by the dominant issue of Turkish political life â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the long pursuit of membership of the European Union. And yet Turkey remains a mystery to many outsiders; a complex country hard to understand. It's secular and Muslim, Western and Eastern, democratic and authoritarian, all at

the same time. This book examines the potential and the problems of the new Turkey, and the expectations of the people who live there, drawing on first hand interviews and observations gathered over several years.

Chris Morris, The New Turkey: The Quiet revolution on the Edge of Europe, 258 pages, Granta Books, 2006, ISBN:1862078653

Understanding Islam

Islamic peoples account for one fifth of the world's population and yet there is widespread misunderstanding in the West of what Islam really is. Francis Robinson and his team set out to address this, revealing the complex and sometimes contrary nature of Muslim culture. As well as taking on the issues uppermost in everyone's minds, such as the role of religious and political fundamentalism, they demonstrate the importance of commerce;

literacy and learning; Islamic art; the effects of immigration, exodus and conquest; and the roots of current crises in the Middle East, Bosnia, and the Gulf. Throughout, emphasis is placed on the interaction between Islam and the West, from the first Latin translations of the Quran to the fatwa on Salman Rushdie. This elegant book deliberately sets out to dismantle the Western impression of Islam as a monolithic world and replace it with a balanced view, from current issues of fundamentalism to its dynamic culture and art.

Francis Robinson (ed), Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World, 352 pages, Cambridge University Press, new ed, ISBN: 0521669936

112 113

book reviews Balkans in Transition With an expertise in political geography and post-conflict transition, Dr. Brad K. Blitz edits one of the most thoroughly researched analyses to date, on the postcommunist breakup of Yugoslavia, in the book War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict, and Cooperation. He meticulously explores the reasoning behind the dissolution of ‘Great Yugoslavia’, as well as the aftermath of repercussions that subsequently gave way to the effort of democratic transition, through a collection of extensive assessments by various scholars of the field. Topics explored range from the rise of nationalist sentiment, to the institution of national homogeneity. The contributing authors explore these, as well as other various reasons behind, the demise, inabilities, inadequacies and failures to sustain stability in Yugoslavia. Factors assessed range from the inefficient leadership of politicians, to key macro-economic policies that attributed to an overwhelming inflation, added to the already conformed pressures of key western influenced institutions (i.e. the IMF) which inevitably set Yugoslavia up for an economic downfall. Historical attributes are key to the analysis presented in the writings, as many of the chapters base their assessment not just on pure statistical relevance, but on historical facts as well. In many cases, the historical relevance sets the stage for assessment, as the factual evidence gives impetus to the overall assessment. In fact, the book is so well written that it ap-

peals both to scholars and other experts in the field of International Relations and to those do not have such an extensive background in post-communist Balkan studies. The historical references breathe life into the analysis, as they substantiate and legitimize the conclusive writings of the experts. Such is the case with the extensive reference to the Milosevic policies, behaviors, and his ‘personality of leadership’ during the ’90s. Srdja Popovic explores the dynamics and implications of the Milosevic era, through an evaluation of actions while William A. Stuebner and Fraser Cameron, examine the subsequent involvement of third parties in response to the Milosevic malignancy, i.e. international actors (US and EU), and implementing agencies (or the International Criminal Tribunal). References are made to other external factors, such as the role of regional or neighboring pressures through independent channels, (in particular the use of NATO as a forum) to resolve debates amongst conflicting neighbors of the Balkan Peninsula, as is the case with Greece (authored by Thanos Veremis) and Turkey (in Ali Karasmanoglu’s writings). This analysis establishes the importance of the issue, not just on a domestic, but rather a regional level as two valuable members of the Euro-Atlantic club bumped heads over the approach towards resolving the issues at hand. From ethno-political strife to partition, the book comments on the stalemates, stating four transformations responsible for the

Brad Blitz, War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation, 302 pages, Cambridge University Press, 2006, ISBN: 0521677734

transition of the Balkans, with these being: 1. the transformation of state structure, or the demise of Yugoslavia and the creation of new states, 2. the importance of nationalist ideologies and their short-lived era, 3. the role of external actors, 4. democratization and integration into the European structures. The book concludes with a review that evaluates issues, unresolved problems plaguing the troubled region. It gives hope for a brighter more peaceful region, should the challenges of a peaceable transition be met. This is to say, the reconstruction of states requires stability within the Balkans. Only once stability is achieved, can the peninsula begin to co-exist and work toward a more cohesive, solidified voice that in turn will enable a transition to a safer environment, a brighter future and ultimately pave the path to European accession. All things considered, Dr. Blitz has compiled and edited an objective and insightful analysis that is as easily read as it is understood. The effort depicts a diligent work ethic that is historically relevant. The significance of this work and its contribution to the field of International Relations is undeniable, as it will benefit future generations for both policy-making and academic sectors, in the years to come.

7 Nile Bridge Egypt by javika