Still, one of the most common ways that Palestinians engaged with their national movement was to join the armed struggle against Israeli forces, as they perceived it to grant them greater agency, as publicized by PLO’s media outlets.35 In fact, the primacy of ‘armed struggle’ as a way to achieve the PLO’s political objectives was enshrined in Article nine of the Palestinian National Charter.36 The first indication that the PLO was successful in forming a new type of Palestinian identity, was when the Palestinians living in camps reconceptualized their identity. More specifically, they shifted from “refugees” to “militants, activists, or revolutionaries”.37 Another example of the PLO’s role in forming the modern Palestinian identity, was with their free distribution of Filastin al-Thawra to groups that had been directly disenfranchised by Israeli forces – guerrilla fighters, refugees in camps, and those living in the occupied territories.38 The newspaper was cleverly constructed to inspire Palestinian national sentiments, and further develop the Palestinian national movement: it commemorated politically significant dates, like the Nakba of 1948, and its first two pages would usually be emblazoned with colourful posters of guerrilla fighters or images of the flag of Palestine.39 Filastin al-Thawra also used diction in a way that presented Palestinians as the agents of their own liberation, rather than victims of an occupying force.40 Moreover, Filastin al-Thawra introduced phrases like “Palestinian personality” to the local lexicon because it sought to recognise Palestinians by their common national identity and suppress differences in gender and class.41 By disseminating the newspaper amongst politically vulnerable groups, PLO authorities believed they would encourage Palestinians to join the armed struggle, strengthening their politically active base. Thus, the narrative of organized, large-scale mobilization of Palestinians was very much embedded in the aesthetics of popular culture that was being produced by the PLO.42 Despite their significant role in reframing Palestinian national identity in the 1970s and 80s, the PLO’s use of mass media was limited in its ability to empower Palestinians in the diasporas to join the national movement. Diasporic Palestinians often lived outside the sphere of control wielded by the PLO which was mostly based in Lebanon – it was the centre of their activity in the 1970s.43 Moreover, the organization was more concerned with mobilizing the Palestinians in camps and occupied territories during this time.44 On the other hand, any Palestinians who responded to the PLO’s mobilization programs and joined the armed struggle as
guerrilla fighters, were automatically characterised as “terrorists” by rival political groups in attempts to discredit the Palestinian cause.45 The more recent advent of social media platforms, like online blog forums, has managed to satisfy the Palestinian diasporas’ demand to easily access information about their homeland as well as provide them with a way to engage with their national identity.46 With its ability to enable dispersed Palestinians to engage in the Palestinian national movement, social media has become the superior tool for participation versus the PLO’s mass media of the 1970s and 80s. Looking at a case study of the Palestinian diaspora in the UK, they seem to agree that Palestinian media is “irrelevant” as it is only concerned with promoting political interests which do not always align with the Palestinian national interest.47 Instead, the British-Palestinian community endorses the use of the Internet as a medium for media consumption – blogging sites allow them to engage transnationally with Palestinians from other countries in a way that newspapers and news channels cannot provide.48 Similarly, the use of virtual spaces by the diaspora residing in Malmö allows second and thirdgeneration Palestinian-Swedes to explore what it means to be Palestinian.49 Thus, the emergence of social media has transformed the way that diasporic Palestinians interact with their national identity. Additionally, Arab-American influencers and platforms are creating new ways for diasporic Palestinians to maintain links to their national community.50 Firstly, community-based cultural initiatives are enabling Palestinians in diasporas to contribute to the national cause. Take for example, Dar Collective by Palestinian-Filipino social media personality Subhi Taha.51 Nominated for “Breakout Youtuber of the Year” in the 11th Annual Shorty Awards which showcase the best of social media and digital content, Taha has built a large social media following through comedic skits.52 His content destigmatizes cultural differences, addresses misconceptions about Islam, and calls attention to topical issues across platforms like YouTube and Instagram. Along the same lines, Taha founded Dar Collective at the start of 2020. By collaborating with indigenous and diasporic artists, the initiative aims to highlight the cultural identity of one community at a time.53 The first community that Dar Collective focused on was the Palestinian community, reflecting Taha’s own heritage. Artistic pieces that are a part of the Palestine series range from clothing to posters.54 Going one step further, the initiative has a philanthropic aspect, as it ensures that a portion of the funds accrued from the sales of the 66
