Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Bus Systems

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148 | Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Bus Systems

included two metro lines. Ecovía led to the development of a 30-kilometer BRT route, 39 stops, 2 terminals, 2 intermodal stations, and a fleet of 80 vehicles, each with a capacity for 80 passengers. The project had five main aims: • • • • •

Modernize the city’s transportation system Decrease travel time by 50 percent Reduce emissions by 5 percent Create a model that can be replicated in other parts of the state Carry 160,000 passengers per day.

The federal and state governments financed 68.5 percent of Ecovía’s infrastructure, which included stations, terminals, and roads. A private consortium financed, constructed, and operated the system’s stations. The same consortium financed and procured fare collection systems. One bundled operator financed and operated the rolling stock on a 20-year concession. BANOBRAS, Mexico’s national development bank, provided the credit to acquire the rolling stock. A third private partner supplied natural gas for the buses, and a fourth partner commercialized it through service stations. Unlike other bus projects in the region, a private partner was responsible for revenue management through a trust fund (escrow account).

TABLE A.5  Lessons

learned from the Ecovía bus rapid transit project in Monterrey, Mexico

BEST PRACTICES

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

• The competitive procurement of infrastructure gave certainty to bidders and reduced political influence on the choice of partner. [operation risk] [planning risk] • Independent companies validated technical studies to confirm demand, route, and size of fleet. [design risk] [design risk] • The government incorporated incumbents in the planning and operations of new systems and benefited from including them as partners in the project via a specialpurpose vehicle. [operation risk] [planning risk] • Putting up the concession as collateral to banks is an effective measure for derisking the operators’ debt and reducing the cost of capital. [financing risk] • Payment systems were placed in easily accessible sites, including OXXO (the best-known convenience store in the country) as well as all stations and points in the feeder routes. [financing risk] [operation risk] • An integrated tariff allowed passengers to use the metro, buses, and feeder systems. [financing risk-fare evasion] [operation risk-demand] • The government established a fund capitalized by revenues acquired during the grace period for repaying loans for the acquisition of new buses. [operation risk] • Financing of the fleet was negotiated using low-demand estimates, diminishing the possibility of a default on the payments. [operation risk] • Smart traffic lights gave priority to buses in exclusive lanes to reduce travel times. [operation risk] • Tariffs are reviewed monthly. [operation risk] • Buses use natural gas, and fuel provision was included in the contract. [operation risk] • The project established a contingency fund with Mex$12 million. [operation risk]

• Sound analysis of the fiscal burden and costs to the government could have prevented cost overruns and the transfer of financing to a private partner midway through construction. [design risk] [construction risk] [financing risk] • The demand projections developed by the government were not accurate and could have been improved by the use of qualified and independent parties. [design risk] [operation risk] • The project did not adequately integrate the feeder system, which restricted demand. [planning risk] [operation risk] • The provision of infrastructure was greatly delayed and could have been improved through better planning, analysis, and contract design. [planning risk] [construction risk] • Buses operated for a year without monitoring systems, which was a government responsibility, and the lack of monitoring affected private partner revenue collection. [planning risk] [design risk] [operations risk] • Operators could not acquire parts to repair and maintain buses, which could have been prevented with an improved contract design that would have required the party responsible for maintenance to have an inventory of replacement parts or face penalties for maintenance delays. [maintenance risk] [operation risk] • The government did not maintain infrastructure. [maintenance risk] [operation risk] • The contract did not include changes in legal provisions to allow for adjustments of payment mechanisms following regulatory or legal changes. [political and social risk] • The system might consider ways to integrate tariffs better between the metro and buses to reduce the number of people who pay for only one service. [financing risk] [operation risk]

Source: World Bank.


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A.16 Lessons learned from the business collaboration agreements in Singapore

10min
pages 179-186

partnership

5min
pages 188-190

A.13 Lessons learned for urban mobility in Port-au-Prince, Haiti A.14 Lessons learned from the TransOeste bus rapid transit project in

2min
page 175

C.4 Essential elements of an operation concession contract

2min
pages 192-195

A.15 Lessons learned from the business collaboration agreements in Medellín, Colombia

2min
page 178

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

5min
pages 176-177

A.11 Lessons learned from the Metrobús-Q System in Quito, Ecuador A.12 Lessons learned from the Avanza Zaragoza concession in Zaragoza,

2min
page 173

Spain

3min
page 174

A.8 Lessons learned from the SYTRAL integrated public transportation system in Lyon, France

2min
page 170

A.9 Lessons learned from the DART Phase I bus rapid transit project in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

3min
page 171

Cali, Colombia

2min
page 169

Acapulco, Mexico A.7 Lessons learned from the Metrocali bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 168

Monterrey, Mexico A.6 Lessons learned from the Acabús bus rapid transit project in

5min
pages 166-167

Mexico City, Mexico A.5 Lessons learned from the Ecovía bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 165

Bogotá, Colombia A.4 Lessons learned from the Metrobús bus rapid transit project in

5min
pages 163-164

A.2 Lessons learned from the Transantiago bus rapid transit project in Santiago, Chile A.3 Lessons learned from the TransMilenio bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 162

in Lima, Peru

5min
pages 160-161

11.2 Situations affecting economic equilibrium A.1 Lessons learned from the Metropolitano bus rapid transit project

2min
page 156

Economic and financial elements

2min
page 155

Institutional and regulatory elements

7min
pages 152-154

11.1 Remuneration arrangements and incentives

4min
pages 150-151

Technical elements

1min
page 149

Setting up subsidies

4min
pages 145-146

Funding sources

9min
pages 141-144

Private financing instruments

12min
pages 135-139

10.1 Summary of the World Bank Group’s instruments

2min
page 140

Structuring a project’s capital

4min
pages 131-132

Model 4: Private finance and operation of electric buses

2min
page 125

Model 1: Bundled private finance and operation of buses

1min
page 115

bundled or unbundled

2min
page 122

Topical bibliography

5min
pages 108-114

Macroeconomic risks

1min
page 101

Topical bibliography

4min
pages 96-100

7.13 International lessons for achieving quality and level of service

2min
page 89

7.8 International lessons for managing fare evasion and cash risk

2min
page 85

7.7 International lesson for managing affordability risk

2min
page 84

7.1 International lessons for acquiring land

2min
page 80

Planning

1min
page 79

6.5 International lessons for defining technology components

2min
page 77

6.2 International lesson for dealing with incumbent operators

2min
page 71

5.1 Categories and types of direct risk, organized by project stage

2min
page 63

5.2 Definition of direct project risks

2min
page 64

Dealing with incumbent operators

1min
page 69

Identifying project risks

2min
page 62

Overview and guiding principles

1min
page 61

Institutional and regulatory elements

2min
page 56

Fiscal capacity

2min
page 55

Implement punctual infrastructure-related interventions

2min
page 47

Technical elements

2min
page 54

Support private sector initiatives to promote user-friendly technologies

2min
page 46

References

4min
pages 50-53

References

3min
pages 43-45

and Tendering

2min
page 41

2.2 Examples of the objectives and restrictions of key stakeholders

2min
page 42

References

2min
pages 39-40

public or private

2min
page 31

1.2 A public-private partnership: Three reasons why

2min
page 36

Notes

2min
page 38

What is a public-private partnership in urban bus systems?

4min
pages 29-30

Notes

2min
page 24

References

0
pages 25-26

Further discussion

2min
page 37

Key Messages

5min
pages 22-23
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