150 | Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Bus Systems
TABLE A.6 Lessons
learned from the Acabús bus rapid transit project in Acapulco, Mexico
BEST PRACTICES
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
• Acabús conducted operational trials months before operations started. These trials allowed Acabús to ensure the adequate functioning of the system. [operation risk] • The competitive procurement gave more certainty to private parties and helped the government to select the most qualified firms to do the work. [operation risk] [political and social risk] • The government incorporated incumbents in the planning and operations of new systems and benefited from including them as partners in the project in a specialpurpose vehicle. [operation risk] • Acabús offers integrated tariffs between feeder routes and trunk routes, which makes the service more accessible. [operation risk] [financing risk] • Acabús’s operational program is designed by the operator and approved by the public authority, which has improved efficiency. [operation risk] • The contract includes penalties as performance-based incentives if the operator does not meet the contractually mandated service standards. [design risk] [operation risk] • Putting up the concession as collateral to banks is an effective measure for derisking the operators’ debt and reducing the cost of capital. [financing risk]
• The project would have benefited from specialized personnel to manage the system. [operation risk] • Fare collection systems failed in several stations, resulting in fare evasion and lost revenues equivalent to US$1.6 million. [operation risk] • Fare collection systems were not available in all stations or along all feeder routes. [operation risk] • The city did not effectively maintain the exclusivity of the bus lanes, which were frequently used by private vehicles or people walking. [operation risk] • The government would have benefited from the inclusion of positive performance-based payments in contracts. [construction risk] [operation risk] • Incumbent service providers that were not included in the project protested at the beginning of project operations. [planning risk] [political and social risk] • Only one firm responded to the request for proposals for the fare collection systems. Rather than rescope or retender the project, the government chose the only firm that applied. [operation risk] • It is not advisable to start operations without having all components of a project ready to start operating. In this case, station equipment, control systems, and maintenance depots were not ready by the start of operations. [operation risk]
Source: World Bank.
METROCALI (CALI, COLOMBIA) The Metrocali BRT system with exclusive lanes was developed using the “bundled private finance and operation of buses” PPP structure (Guerrero and Scholl 2015). The project sought to upgrade the infrastructure and fleet in Cali’s existing public transportation system. However, it failed to improve public transportation.
Before Metrocali, Cali suffered from congestion, traffic accidents, and pollution. Cali’s public transportation system was unregulated and oversupplied. Its aging fleet of more than 5,000 vehicles transported an average of 1.37 passengers per kilometer. Observing the success of TransMilenio, the national government and the municipal government of Cali sought to develop a BRT system to address the city’s mobility and public transportation issues, dismissing the original plan of developing a light rail system. Metrocali led to the development of 3 primary trunk lines of 49 kilometers, 180 articulated buses, 9 terminals, and 78 stations. The project had four principal aims: • Improve service frequency and reliability • Reduce travel times, accidents, and pollution • Connect the low- and middle-income areas of Cali with the areas that concentrate job-generating and social activities • Carry 960,000 passengers per day. The national government and the municipality financed and built Metrocali’s infrastructure—which includes roads, terminals, and stations—initially amounting to US$300 million (in 2005 US dollars). Four bundled operators financed, procured, operated, and maintained the fleet. They also financed and built parking and maintenance depots. Another operator financed, procured, and operated the fare collection systems.
