Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Bus Systems

Page 179

Appendix A | 161

TABLE A.16  Lessons

learned from the business collaboration agreements in Singapore

BEST PRACTICES

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

• The reform incorporated valuable existing assets from incumbent operators (depots and fleet). [planning risk] [incumbent risk] [operational risk] • The reform included transition mechanisms, remunerating incumbents for their fleet while it was replaced by new vehicles owned by the authority. [planning risk] [incumbent risk] [operational risk] • Given the shortage of land, making the incumbent depots available to bidders removed a huge barrier to entry. [planning risk] [incumbent risk] [operational risk] • The model allowed for flexibility in changing the level of service and adapting to changing demand. [operational risk] • The model allowed for flexibility in incorporating new electronic buses. [technology risk] • The reform increased the number of buses and improved the level of service. [planning risk] [design risk] [operational risk] • The short-term duration of the operation contract allows for more competition for the market. [planning risk] [operational risk] [technology risk] • The automatic fee adjustment mechanism reduces the perceived risk by the operator. [planning risk]

• Operators receive a fixed payment and are compensated by operational costs, which produces no incentives to reduce costs or limit supply. [planning risk] [operation risk] • The Land Transit Authority (LTA) requires a large capacity to monitor operational costs and compliance with service standards, and the demand level is consistent with fare collection. [planning risk] [operation risk] [institutional risk] [evasion and cash management risk] • There is no clarity on how overhaul maintenance will be done or on the capacity of the LTA to undertake it. [planning risk] [operation risk] [institutional risk]

Source: World Bank.

by the government. LTA retains all fare revenue that the operators collect. LTA determines the level of services to operate the routes, and the number of vehicles allocated to a given route. LTA acquires the fleet and owns the buses, leasing them to the operators. Operators are responsible for routine maintenance of the buses and on-board equipment as part of their contracts. They are also responsible for maintaining the bus depots assigned to them. Operators also provide user information as well as customer service (lost and found, grievance redressal). Operating contract terms range from 2 to 10 years. To provide the right incentives for operators, which are entitled to fixed payments, the remuneration includes performance payments of up to 10 percent. If the operator does not meet standards, up to 10 percent of its fee will be deducted. Performance indicators are linked to reliability and waiting times, the punctuality of first and last dispatches, and the maintenance of buses, depots, and equipment. The model has led to improved service quality. It has allowed the LTA to adapt the fleet to changes in demand, making urban bus services responsive to changes in ridership and commuter needs. It has increased competition in the industry and raised service levels for commuters. Table A.16 presents the lessons learned from Singapore’s business collaboration agreements.

NOTES 1. This improvement surpassed the municipality’s goal of a 25 percent reduction. 2. For the 10-year exchange rate, see https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from​ =USD&to=PEN&view=10Y. 3. US$1 = Mex$18.99. 4. Bono de chatarrización, a grant that allowed operators to cover the down payment for the new fleet. 5. Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le Rhône et l’Agglomération Lyonnaise. 6. T Sh 364,602,325,731 converted to US dollars (US$1 = T Sh 2,179.98).


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A.16 Lessons learned from the business collaboration agreements in Singapore

10min
pages 179-186

partnership

5min
pages 188-190

A.13 Lessons learned for urban mobility in Port-au-Prince, Haiti A.14 Lessons learned from the TransOeste bus rapid transit project in

2min
page 175

C.4 Essential elements of an operation concession contract

2min
pages 192-195

A.15 Lessons learned from the business collaboration agreements in Medellín, Colombia

2min
page 178

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

5min
pages 176-177

A.11 Lessons learned from the Metrobús-Q System in Quito, Ecuador A.12 Lessons learned from the Avanza Zaragoza concession in Zaragoza,

2min
page 173

Spain

3min
page 174

A.8 Lessons learned from the SYTRAL integrated public transportation system in Lyon, France

2min
page 170

A.9 Lessons learned from the DART Phase I bus rapid transit project in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

3min
page 171

Cali, Colombia

2min
page 169

Acapulco, Mexico A.7 Lessons learned from the Metrocali bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 168

Monterrey, Mexico A.6 Lessons learned from the Acabús bus rapid transit project in

5min
pages 166-167

Mexico City, Mexico A.5 Lessons learned from the Ecovía bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 165

Bogotá, Colombia A.4 Lessons learned from the Metrobús bus rapid transit project in

5min
pages 163-164

A.2 Lessons learned from the Transantiago bus rapid transit project in Santiago, Chile A.3 Lessons learned from the TransMilenio bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 162

in Lima, Peru

5min
pages 160-161

11.2 Situations affecting economic equilibrium A.1 Lessons learned from the Metropolitano bus rapid transit project

2min
page 156

Economic and financial elements

2min
page 155

Institutional and regulatory elements

7min
pages 152-154

11.1 Remuneration arrangements and incentives

4min
pages 150-151

Technical elements

1min
page 149

Setting up subsidies

4min
pages 145-146

Funding sources

9min
pages 141-144

Private financing instruments

12min
pages 135-139

10.1 Summary of the World Bank Group’s instruments

2min
page 140

Structuring a project’s capital

4min
pages 131-132

Model 4: Private finance and operation of electric buses

2min
page 125

Model 1: Bundled private finance and operation of buses

1min
page 115

bundled or unbundled

2min
page 122

Topical bibliography

5min
pages 108-114

Macroeconomic risks

1min
page 101

Topical bibliography

4min
pages 96-100

7.13 International lessons for achieving quality and level of service

2min
page 89

7.8 International lessons for managing fare evasion and cash risk

2min
page 85

7.7 International lesson for managing affordability risk

2min
page 84

7.1 International lessons for acquiring land

2min
page 80

Planning

1min
page 79

6.5 International lessons for defining technology components

2min
page 77

6.2 International lesson for dealing with incumbent operators

2min
page 71

5.1 Categories and types of direct risk, organized by project stage

2min
page 63

5.2 Definition of direct project risks

2min
page 64

Dealing with incumbent operators

1min
page 69

Identifying project risks

2min
page 62

Overview and guiding principles

1min
page 61

Institutional and regulatory elements

2min
page 56

Fiscal capacity

2min
page 55

Implement punctual infrastructure-related interventions

2min
page 47

Technical elements

2min
page 54

Support private sector initiatives to promote user-friendly technologies

2min
page 46

References

4min
pages 50-53

References

3min
pages 43-45

and Tendering

2min
page 41

2.2 Examples of the objectives and restrictions of key stakeholders

2min
page 42

References

2min
pages 39-40

public or private

2min
page 31

1.2 A public-private partnership: Three reasons why

2min
page 36

Notes

2min
page 38

What is a public-private partnership in urban bus systems?

4min
pages 29-30

Notes

2min
page 24

References

0
pages 25-26

Further discussion

2min
page 37

Key Messages

5min
pages 22-23
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