The mystery of values ludwig grunberg (1)

TFIEMYSTERYOF VALUES in Axiology Studies

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VIBS Volume95

RobertGinsberg Executive Editor Associate Editors StevenV. Hicks G, JohnM. Abbarno Mary-RoseBarnl RichardT. Hull GerholdK. Becker JosephC. Kunkel KennethA. Bryson VincentL.Luizzi H. G. Callaway Alan Milchman RemB. Rlwards GeorgeDavidMiller Rob Fisher PeterA. Redpath William C. Gay Alan Rosenberg DaneR. Gordon ArleenSalles J. EveretGreen JohnR. Shook HetaAleksandraGylling Alan Soble Mafti Hayry JohnR. Welch

The paper on which this book is printed meetsthe requirementsof "ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation- Paper for documents Requirements for permanence".

ISBN: 90-420-0670-6 @EditionsRodopi8.V., Amsterdam- Atlanta,GA 2000 Printedin TheNetherlands

Contents Editorial Foreword Preface Introduction by the Editors

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PART ONE A DISCOVERY: THE REALM OF VALUES ChapterOne. From the Mystery of Values to Axiotogy J ^J 1. BeyondAppearances 2. Axiology's Long Journeytoward Itself 10 3. The Searchfor Identity t3 ChapterTwo. Is a Scientific Reconstructionof the Axiological Possible? 23 1. The Challengesof Science 23 2. Values versusMeasurement 32 3. The Value Judgment 42 a

PART TWO A CONNECTION: VALUE AND CULTURE Chapter Three. Value in Culture and Culture as Value 1. Value, Creativity, Culture 2. Knowledge and value: The Problem of Axiological Rationality 3. Culture and Civilization; An IrreconcilableOpposition?

ChapterFour. Positivist Reductionismand the Mirage of Non-PhilosophicalCulture 1. Definition by Reduction:The standardParadigmof Reductionism 2. Transfigurations,Mutations, Alternatives 3. A PhilosophicalMetamorphosis:From Logical Empiricism to Constructive Empiricism Chapter Five. Reductionism to Literature and the Temptation of a Post-PhilosophicalCulture 1. Difficulties of the Theory of Post-PhilosophicalCulture 2. Post-Philosophyor Postmodernism?

3. "Philosophy as Style and Literature as Philosophy" PART THREE A PROJECT: THE AXIOCENTRIC ONTOLOGY ChapterSix. The Phenomenologyof Value and the Value of Phenomenology ChapterSeven.Coordinatesof an Axiocentric ontology of the Human

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CONTENTS

PARTFOUR A HOPE:UNIVERSALISM Editorial Note ChapterEight. Happiness:The Loftiest Value of Humankind ChapterNine. The Orphic Myth and the Human Condition

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Notes Bibliography About the Author Index

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Editorial Foreword The study of value theory has become a distinct advance of philosophical activity in the twentieth century. In responseto the questions of "What is value?", philosophersdivided camps in a variety of ways. While R. B. Perry proposedthat valuation consistin the severalpredicationascriptionsto objects as "good," "true," and "beautiful," others were more specific with predicated valuations,claiming that the valuationsdivide areassuch as moral, legal, and political. C. I. Lewis made important distinctions of the kind of values that are in the valuation, for example, whether they are extrinsic (instrumental) contributory, inherent, or intrinsic. Much of the focus presumed a subjectobject or inherent-instrumentalitydichotomy which receivedcriticism by John Dewey, whose approach viewed value as a dynamic relation: a whole experience.That the nature of value as a whole or organic is not exclusionary becamethe underpinning of later axiologists, such as Risieri Frondizi, Robert S. Hartman, and Ludwig Griinberg.

Griinberg's philosophical writings on value continue the explorationsof his predecessorsto discover the meaning of value - or as he aptly titles this work, The Mystery of Values.In his early works, he notes that "values are the reconstruction of what we experience as fundamentally human; that is, we value as human and are human in that we are valued in a certain way."

Griinberg extends the meaningful dialogue on value theory in his unique formulation of the "axiocentric view of the human condition."

In his ground-breaking work, Axiology and the Human Condition, Gri.inberg, in characteristic humility, attributes his motivation to another Romanian philosopher,Camil Petrescu.Petrescu'swords becamea motto for Grtinberg's life's work: "I regard the problem of value bearing such great importance, that, without it being clarified, philosophy itself looks like an adventurous failure." During my interview in 1994 with Griinberg, he commented that Petrescu's works set him in the direction to explore the reconstruction ontology of the human condition, "supported by the presuppositionthat values stand for fundamentaltraits meant to define man's specifically human way of existing as a being that creates and gets selfcreated by culture, while surpassing the natural condition to the human condition."

Typical of his own way of living, Grtinberg believed that any form of dichotomy of values presentsa partial meaning. Instead, he moves toward unification and the universalism of humanity in valuation. He was an active member of the "Bucharest Axiology Circle," whose efforts were moving toward a reconstructionof axiology as axiocentric ontology of the human in a universal project for the third millennium. Ludwig Griinberg's life was a

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EDITORIAL FOREWORD

testimony to value, and it received its regenerationin his faith in humanity.

This hope will live on in the works he contributedto the clarification of being

human.

G. John M. Abbarno AssociateEditor Value Inquiry Book Series

Preface I first met Ludwig Grtinberg in 1983 in Montreal at the World Congressof Philosophy. He was perfectly at home in the Francophone culture. We participatedin the program organizedby John Somerville and Ronald Santoni for International Philosophers for the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide (IPPNO). Everyone at these sessionsspoke on behalf of peace and thereby recognizedone anotheras peace-lovers.

After the Congress, Griinberg initiated regular conespondence with me from Bucharest.His letters, graceful and gracious, though at times guarded, were another opportunity for him to engagein philosophical activities outside the closed world of Romania. For almost his entire professional life, he remained a solitary thinker in a remote and restricted outpost of the mind, while participating as an active member of the cosmopolitan community of scholars.

"We live in a strangeworld," he wrote one New Year's eve, "but we are not strangers." He was to repeat this observation - and this commitment years afterward. Another time he wrote, "We try, together (in spite of distance,space,and time) to make life better." And again, "Let's hope in the 'world of values'!" Another time, "Let us hope in the power of philosophy."

Yet again: "Where there is a will there is a way. And a hope too."

After being preventedby Romanianrestrictionsfrom going to Nairobi to give his invited paper on philosophy of values at the Extraordinary World Congressof Philosophy, he wrote, on 1 August 1991, of future opportunities, "Let's hope again.As Bacon told us, hope is always a good breakfast,but it is a bad supper."

Grtinberg took keen interest in international activities involving philosophy of values, especially the Journal of Value Inquiry and the American Society for Value Inquiry (ASVI). From his distant yet far-seeing perspective, he had striking insights about the role, the value, and the developmentof such activities. On 3 May 1984, he sent an extensiveletter to me with this historic proposal: I dare, finally, to suggestyou - as Vice-Presidentof the ASVI (where I am an old member) ... develop the co-[operation] between American and European researchersin axiology. As you know, our ASVI is the unique society for value inquiry in all over the world; the ASVI has to do the first step for the building of a possible and desirableInternational Society for Value Inquiry (ISVI)1.

PREFACE The word I have edited as "co-operation" is "co-worker," a term Grtinberg frequently used, perhaps becausealternatives, such as "collaboration" and "comradeship,"had unfortunateconnotations.

Grtinberg followed his initial proposal with a plan for its implementation (27 September 1984). He envisioned the establishment of ISVI as a "philosophical dream come true."

I was able to sendthis reply on 28 January1985: I am pleasedto report that at its businessmeeting,29 December 1984, the American Society for Value Inquiry approved the four-point project for internationahzation that you have proposed. Several committees are at work on the tasks. 1988 is the goal for full realization You will be receiving an invitation to join the committee planning the International Philosophical Association for Value Inquiry and its first International Congressat Brighton, England, 16-23 August 1988. The chair of this committee is Sander H. Lee of Howard University; Washington. A committee is being establishedto invite scholarsthroughoutthe world to join the American Society for Value Inquiry as Corresponding Members. You will receive the first invitation. Thus, the ideas are launched,and we hdve set sail. The voyage will be worthy.

At the first International Congress on Value Inquiry, held in Brighton and Arundel, England, in 1988, Grtinberg was elected Vice President in recognition of his international standing and in appreciation for his help in creatingthe ISVI. This was only the secondtime that we met.

Later that year, on 11 November, he wrote, in an exuberant hand, in greenink on yellow paper: I can't believe it! Our idea to build an International Society for Value Inquiry crossedboundaries,grew over the years until it [has] given the fruits it could give. We Ere now THE philosophical organization in the world dealing with values.I am sure our Society will becomelonger and stronger,... In our epoch, for all the humanisttrends in philosophy, there is no area more important than the field of values.

He spoke of the philosophical eventsin England as providing "our generation of axiologists .. . arcndezvouswith destiny."

I replied,5 December1988: ISVI exists! Your idea of 27 September1984 crosseda continent and an ocean and stimulatedthe minds of others. ISVI itself is the proof that a valuable idea grows to make itself realized.

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In his suggestionsfor developing the tie between the American Society and the International Society, Gri.inberg also alluded to further cooperation between the American Society and the Journal which shared its name.

Nothing could be more natural than that this Society and this Journal unite, especially as both were engagedin international activities. JamesB. Wilbur, the founder and editor of the Journal, and also a founder and past presidentof the Society, favored the connection.

I wrote Grtinberg,20 January1987: I have pleasant news to report about our professionalconcern: values.

The American Society for Value Inquiry officially approved affiliation with the Journal of Value Inquiry at the annual business meeting in December in Boston. Furthermore,the USVI] will be created. ... These are your ideas. I was honored to speak on behalf of them, and our colleagues have carried them to realization. In this way, you have contributed immeasurably to the international advancement of philosophicunderstanding.

Bravo!

Griinberg'sinternationalconnectionswere the lifeline for his intellectual work.Of conditionsin his homecountry,he wouldrarelywrite.He did say(3 1991): January In Romania, after thesedays which will leave a mark in our history, we could realizethat, in the end, freedom prevails always, although the cost is very high.

When the Value Inquiry Book Series was established in 1992, Griinberg wrote, 13 December 1992, that VIBS is "the most important event in our realm of researches which has happened for the last decade." Though "overwhelmed with my work, ... and with the gap between my hopes in a world of values and what has happenedhic et nunc," Grtinberg was in the midst of writing a book-length work in English on values with the alternative working titles, Axiology and Universalism,and The World of Values.

On2 May 1993he wrote a short letter in order to let you know that I am still alive and our valueinquiry is going on to be ranked as the third value in my own hierarchy (after life and freedom).... And let's hope in our vocationto plea[d] and to work - with professionalmeans- for a better world! (Am I crazy?)

Other proposedtitles for his book, which he handedto me on a large sheetof paper in Moscow at the World Congressof Philosophy,August 1993, were

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PREFACE Homo Aestimans Axiology and the Mystery of Values Axio Iogy between P henomenology and Univ ersalis m Axiolo gy, Phenomenology, and Universalism Axiology and Universalism and Human Condition and the World Of Values

This searchfor the right title tells a story of Grtinberg's searchfor his place among current philosophical movements. As he treated me to bottle after bottle of mineral water at the Congresscaf6, we went over the list. The VIBS stylesheets had used The Mystery of Values as a hypothetical book title for formatting instructions; Griinberg gently asked permission to use this for a real book. Hence, The Mystery of Values:Studiesin Axiology.

Once the title was settled, Griinberg reached into his leather briefcase and took out the book in typewritten pages. I was pleased to receive this contribution to the human spirit as we sat in the former training academy for Communist Party workers, now a school for administration.

Later he wrote (27 September1993) of the Russianhospitality: in spite of my nightmare in the so-called "hostel" (without a chair, a carpet, curtain or water, but with mosquitoes.. .), I found [the Moscow Congressl to be productive. I could realize better what has happenedin contemporaryphilosophy during the last 5 years (since our Congressin Brighton,1988).

In the cafd I reiterated an offer to consider translating his Romanian essays into English for another book. But he waved this notion away. He explained that what he wrote in Romanian was generallypart of his job. What he wrote in English or French was part of his life.

We reviewed the scenein the field of value inquiry, reflecting on what "the Grtinberg-Ginsberg team" had tried to accomplish. He tiked to refer to the ISVI as our common child. We spoke for the first time, at this, our last meeting, of our Jewishness.I realized that I could have led his life, while he could have led mine. I told him how my parents had frequentedthe French Roumanian Restaurantin New York, and how I rememberedthe refrain of a Jewish song heard here, Mamaliga, Mamaliga, a little Romanian wine !

"Griinberg and Ginsberg as Jews are lost in the world," I wrotehim. "What can we do about that? Help the world. So we aresharers in thework."

Grtinberg revised and finished this book while busily engaged in the early days of Romanian intellectual independence.But at the height of his

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intellectual powers, he was struck down by grave illness. He wrote, 29 November 1994: I've lost my sleepfor a while. (It is a very interestingexperiencefor me, but only as a philosopher,not at all as a human being!)

I wrote back, 16 December 1994, Your mind is young and strong; so should your body be. I am only a doctor of philosophy, so I cannot prescribetreatmentfor you, other than rest and a little Romanian wine. Work will always await you. Don't worry about that.

The last letter Ludwig Griinberg wrote me he was unable to send. It was forwarded by his widow Cornelia Grtinberg and his daughterLaura Grtinberg.

With failing hand, and many beginnings,the short letter concludes: Your advicesconcerningthe treatment- rest and a little Romanian wine - are belated.I made a lot of mistakes.But I go on to hope.

L. Cornelia Grtinberg and Laura Gri.inberg have completed the preiparation for press of The Mystery of Ltfe with loving care. It is a remarkable book of original reflection on what humanity means. Griinberg's life's work is the appreciation of human axiocenfficity. That is, we human beings are the universe of value. Values are not simply something we possessor exercise.

We are value-beings. Grtinberg probes this mystery of human life with engagingstyle, refreshingscholarship,and illuminating insight.

This is a work of hope contributed to all the co-workers of the world: humanitv.

RobertGinsberg ExecutiveEditor ValueInquiryBook Series

Introduction by the Editors A book, once printed, departsfrom its author. The ideas in it acquire a life of their own. They come into contact with other ideas and harmonize with them or challengethem. The book, on its separateprogress,becomesa successor a failure. It may take up its well-deservedplace on the library shelvesor it may get lost in a Pandemoniumof ideas.And what does the author do meanwhile?

From the outside,the author can defend his/her ideas with new argumentation, may suffer for them, or may rejoice due to them. Ultimately, the author can write a new book resuming the ideas and strengtheningthem with a new rationale and new evidence.The author can correct or even changethe details and fundamentals of his/trer theoretical creation, with the hope for a better receptionby the reader.

Ludwig Grtinberg has had no such chance. He left this world for the world of the just. His ideas, good or less good, have been left alone. We cannot foreseetheir fate. We would like though to forewarn the reader on the dramatic history of the preparationof this volume.

An older project, the book was left unfinished.Ludwig Grtinberg would think of it as a synthesisof the stage his reflections on values had reached, which is the reasonwhy the volume resumessome of his previous writings.

Ludwig Gri.inbergloved his project and he believed in it. Several days before his tragic decision, speaking with Professor Adrian Miroiu of the University of Bucharest,Ludwig Grtinberg expressedhis apprehensionas to the publication of his book. In subsidiary, vague terms, he was asking his younger friend for help. And at a later date, ProfessorMiroiu fully contributed to the publication of this volume.

The effort of those proposing the current structureof the book has been guided by the author's last wish and heartache.We have done our best to be true to the intention and spirit in which Ludwig Grtinberg conceived his volume. We have had our momentsof great despair and helplessness.Should we have lacked the force of persuasion and encouragement of Robert Ginsberg, Executive Editor of Value Inquiry Book Series, we might surely have abandoned the task. Professor Ginsberg and Professor G. John M. Abbarno, Associate Editor of Value Inquiry Book Series, have restored our motivation to finish the task already begun. We feel we lack the proper number of words to thank them both for their support and for their mutual esteemtoward Ludwig Grtinberg.

Now, in the end, we are fully aware that this book is far from what it could have been. Our hope though is that the love with which we have completedit will not be an act of treasontoward the author.

Further on, we would like to provide some clarification as imposed by the probity of our action.

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INTRODUCTIONBY THE EDITORS

First, we have preferred to fully observe and maintain the structure of the manuscript, despite the fact that, here and there, particularly in the last section, the choice fails to honor the content. The reasonof our choice is the fact that the structure of the manuscript ultimately expressesthe author's global concept, his intent of theoretical reconstruction.This option has also been favored by ProfessorIlie Pdrvu of the University of Bucharest.There has always been a great communion of ideas between Ludwig Gri.inberg and Professor Pdrvu. Their talks used to be conducted in complete spiritual harmony. Perusing the manuscript, Professor PArvu has inferred the global intent of the volume and the place of each part as projected in the developmentof the philosophicaldiscourse.

Following an analytical exercise, by means of which the concept of value is identified and characterizedfrom various perspectives,in Part One, A Discovery: The Realm of Values, the concept is reinstated in its normal articulation in the sphere of culture, in Part Two, A Connection: Value and Culture. Based on this, a project to theoretically reconstructthe ontology of the human condition is built, in Part Three, A Project: The Axiocentric Ontology. Finally, the whole discoursewas to gain value in the context of an innovative manner of philosophizing, Universalism, in Part Four, A Hope: Universalism.

With respect to the last part, Ludwig Gri,inberg failed to prepare coherentmaterial. He was to do it. We did not dare produce it from existing writings, such as his communications to various scientific meetings, at the First Congressof Universalism, in Warsaw in 1993, or his articles published in Dialogue and Humanism : The Universalist Quarterly.We did not dare do it for a multitude of reasons, the major one being our feeling of being inadequateas far as the theme was concerned.And the fact that, in Romania, this trend of thought has failed to grow roots cannot be ignored either.

Romania's opennessto the universal is still in the stage of rediscovery, of defining its own identity. Undoubtedly, we are marked by this phenomenon.

Ludwig Griinberg had the enthusiasmneededto surpasssuch intellectual and psychologicalrestraintsand the optimism neededto dream about the future.

Thus, we have kept the title of the section to record the global vision of the author. We wanted his metaphysicalintentions to stay unaltered.The title also subsumes, thanks to the editors' kind permission, some essays representativeof Ludwig Gri,inberg'smanner of thinking. According to the author's wish, the volume closes with his essay, The Orphic Myth and the Human Condition.

Second, most of the writings in the volume were edited by the author while alive. Sometimesthe editing was done directly in English. It is the case of subchaptersThe Judgment of Value, Value in Culture and Culture as Value, and of a major part of the chapteron Reductionismand the Temptation of a Post-PhilosophicalCulture.

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At other times, the author wrote in Romanian, which made translation into English necessary.This is the time to thank Mrs. Dana Sorea,lecturer at the Faculty of Foreign Languages,the University of Bucharest.

We need to further advise the reader that some parts have already been published, in summary or in a different structure, in the Journal of Value Inquiry, or in Analecta Husserliana edited by Anna-TeresaTymieniecka.

The volume also includes some texts, selectedaccording to the plan in the manuscript, from the author's writing, Axiologia si condilia umand [Axiology and the Human condition], published by Editura politicd, Bucuregti, 1972, and from another publication the author co-ordinated, Ontologia um.anului[Ontology of the Human], Editura Academiei, Bucuregti, 1989.

All the above clarifications are intended to justify any incoherenceor repetitions that might have been prevented by our direct intervention in the text. We avoided any such intervention, with a view to remain faithful to the type of rational discourseand style characteristicof Ludwig Griinberg.

Third, the subchapterentitled PositivistReductionismand the Mirage of Non-Philosophical Culture has a distinct situation since we have inserted it without its having been included in the manuscript. The subchapter was published posthumously,in an extendedform, rn Revista de cercetdri sociale [Review of Social Research],no. 4, Bucharest,L994.ProfessorMircea Flonta, one of Ludwig Grtinberg's closest spiritual friends called our attention to the need to retain the dignity of philosophical discourse in the volume by our accuracy and fidelity to the manuscript.We hope to not have sinned much.

We consideredthat the study analyzingpositivist reductionism would add to the subchapterReductionismby Literature in support of the forceful idea of the volume. It refers to the concept of unity of culture focused on the generic conceptof value.

In Ludwig Grtinberg's professionaltrajectory, implicitly in the history of this book, a distinct note is struck by his sentimentof fulfillment he would feel every time he would come into contact with the philosophers gathered round the Journal of Value Inquiry and the International Society for Value Inquiry. We shall refrain from mentioning names,for fear that, from distant Bucharest, we might be wrong by omission. However, we would like to underline that each contact with his colleaguesin the West was a breath of fresh air to him. He would make unimaginable efforts for these periodic meetings to take place. A Westerner might find it hard to understand the actual circumstancesin which generationsof intellectuals,today aged 60 to 65, have lived and modeled themselves.Neither have we, those living in EasternEurope, as yet, the distanceneededto proceedto a lucid analysis,free of anxietyand passion.

An incomplete education,constrainedby ideology. Explicit or implicit interdictions, generalor individual. The intellectual tension charged with fear

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and burning aspirationto culture and freedom.These might be some We are certainthat decipheringsuchhumanexperiences coordinates. might representuseful learning. It might prompt the younger generationsto adopt a more resolute attitude in defending human dignity and the values of democracy. But this is not what we should be talking about here. This is an opportunity to stress the importance Ludwig Grtinberg assigned to his contactswith the Western philosophical world. The theme of the book became the focus of his preoccupationsin a period in which, in our neck of the woods, to approach this type of topic seemed,in the happiest of the cases, pure extravagance. A sort of opening in the 1970s was firmly marked by a tendency toward spiritual autarchy. Escape from the Soviet dominance was taking place at the cost of ideological convulsions with nationalist inflections.

The Romanian philosophical discoursewas blocked at the crossroadsof the contemporary rationalist trends, of Marxist extraction, and the Romanian inter-war trends.The Romaniantrends would bring along all the limitations of the philosophical culture at the beginning of the twentieth century. The "fall of the Berlin wall," with everything that it might have entailed, would not occupy, as yet, the practical horizon of the Romanians.The gate toward the West was opening, timidly, yet undeniably. It is at this point that the author wrote his first studiesin axiology. The road from here to the presentbook was long and arduous. We hope for the book to satisfy the exigency of contemporaryaxiological thinking.

Ludwig Grtinberg put much passion in his research. Much of his researchbore fruit and saw the light of the printing press. Much was shared with his students, in whose human potential the professor believed with tenacity. Many of his ideaswould be clarified in his talks with Arie Grtinberg, his brother, a Professorat the Faculty of Journalism,University of Bucharest.

This book standsfor the final homage paid to Ludwig Grtinberg by all thosehe used to meet with on the spiritual level.

We would like to expressour specialthanks to: Professor Robert Ginsberg for his theoretical assistance,patience, and time consumed,for his friendly encouragement; Ms. Maria-Ana Dumitrescu, with the UNESCO Office in Bucharest, CEPES, for the competenceand love with which she has prepared this book for printing, for her translation work, word-processing,indexing, and final typesetting; ProfessorAdrian Miroiu, for his permanent,though discreet,competent advice.

Cornelia Grtinberg Laura Grtinberg

Part One A Discovery:The Realmof Values

ChapterOne From the Mystery of Valuesto Axiology 1. Beyond Appearances While following the dispute betweenAlexius von Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels,r or reading Ralph Barton Perry's book on the general theory of values,2or the 1,500page-longtreatiseon axiology by Louis Lavelle,3you feel that, before having startedthe reading, you could have given a better answer to the question, What is valuel And you are tempted to agree with Andrd Gide: any time a philosopher answersa question, what the question has been about is no longer clear. Philosophy may look like the useless intricate accountof simple mattersthat are within the graspof common sense.

Everybody seemsto know the nourishing value of food, the moral value of behavior, the theoretical value of some scientific discovery, or the artistic value of a painting that makes us evaluate, estimate, and covet it. Thus, in everyday life, value might designatewhatever we crave for, seek for, love, and hold high. Beyond the whims of personal bias, craving, and needs, we might even try to draw up a list of values.We may open a dictionary and look up various modifiers that make up antonymous pairs, good-evil, beautyugliness,honesty-dishonesty,honor-dishonor,leaving out those toward which we are indifferent and exclusively preserving those that trigger off a preferentialchoice, such as, Would you rather have A than A'?

Theoretically, a complete list of values could be achieved.The world of qualities to which we have assignedthe name of values looks like a world which draws our attention, attracts support, arouses desire, urges us into action, as an invisible waiting-room where all setting changesin the visible world are wrought. Since we value these invisible qualities together with the things or personsendowed with them, a painting, a house, a work of art, or a human being are said to have value.

Furthermore, turn modifiers into nouns, and say they are values. Thus values do not appear as mere subjective imaginings, but as real aspects of existence,as featuresof the objects that our mind might discover there where they have been lying as before. The concept of value is used whenever an actual active interrelationshipexists betweennecessities,attitudes,and desires on the one hand, and objects on the other hand.

Yet, far from solving the matter, this conclusion only discloses more questionsto further unexpecteddifficulties.

A first difficulty: the infinite number of values. Height is not a value in itself, but the height of a hill may establish its value as a military obstacle, and, function of concurrent factors, the height of a Gothic cathedral is a

FROM THE MYSTERYOF VALUESTO AXIOLOGY determinative of its aestheticvalue. Typically, the distinction between small and big is axiologically neutral, but if you would rather have a big car than a small one, your choiceis value-biased.

Actually, the list of values can never end, since values are invented all the time, starting with fashion or dance, and ending with science and art, where a mind of genius is characterizedby the fact that it imposes a new value. Not all values are equally relevant, neither do they bear the same significance. Ideal-values are separate from goods-values: ideal-values anticipate action on an imaginative plane; goods-values are embodied in cultural works and assignthings, beyond their perceivableappearance,a new dimension, value, owing to which things acquire the ability to satisfy human needs,goals, desires,and turn into cultural goods.We distinguish betweenthe value of things and personalvalues. Charity and graciousnessare values that only human beings are endowed with; when assignedthesevalues, things are anthropomorphized and appear as fetishes of human features. Likewise, edibility could only be the value of a thing. As Claude Ldvi-Straussremarked, cannibalismrateshuman beings as things.

In this polyphony of values, basic values are also to be distinguished from derived values. Values are never equally significant when establishing the goals of human behavior. The heterogeneousrange of values seems to arrangeitself around a few values,which we could call basic values.What are these?Could they be reducedto the classicalthreesome,truth-good-beauty,as most axiological works indicate? In one sense,truth seemsnot to fall under the category of proper values, since it more-or-less rejects hierarchy. For instance,we cannot say that the Pythagoreantheorem is more correct than the Thalesian theorem, or that the theory of relativity is less true than quantum physics. But, going beyond appearances,truth itself is discoveredto occur up to variable extents, not only in the modern epistemologicalview, but also in the strictly axiological view. This happens if we grant prevalence to the pragmatic dimension of statements,to their theoretical relevance, gradually hierarchized,so as to satisfy certain human needs.

Once we agree on this point, the very distinction between basic and derived values appearsrelative, and we are entitled to wonder how we could sift the basic values accounting for the imperceptible subtlety of human behavior without ranking love among the highest. Love is both the source of life and the everlasting fountain of art. Love is, as Plato points out, within each human being, the confirmation as to the improbability of secludedlife. It is the discovery that best defines the human condition, a discovery that outshinesthat of fire, and, as Percy B. Shelley put it so beautifully, the only thing that, when shared, can grow. Any doctrine of values should be able, within the range of values,to delimit value from non-value,basic values from derived values,accordingto pertinentcriteria. It should equally accountfor an individual's choice of a specific value, under specific circumstances.

BeyondAppearances Ultimately, this meansto searchfor a basis on which the selectionof values, their correlation, and ranking should be legitimized.

Difficulties equally arise out of the fact that, for us to grasp its specificity, value needsto be, simultaneously,isolated and not to be isolated.

On the one hand, moral or aestheticvaluesare translatedinto theoreticalterms in order to become intelligible. On the other hand, they prove to own a specificity which is ireducible to other values.The most astuteexplanationof a sonata or a painting in theoretical terms communicatesaestheticvalue but within the limits of its translatability into conceptual language.Theoretical thinking, which provides a quintessentialimage of things and acts by means of concepts,fails however to reveal the singularity, the uniquenessof values.

It fails to encompassthose features by virtue of which, while relating the nature of the object to the needsof the subject, according to specific criteria, we become value-assigners.Each value seems to lose its peculiarity if extrinsicplly approached. Likewise, if we elude the interconnection.and solidarit! of values, we can betray the originality of each value. If science appropriates the other values, moral, aesthetic, religious, it turns human beings into mere mechanisms.Art for art's sake,heroism for heroism's sake, by virtue of their narcissism,lack the solidarity of other cultural values.Hence a whole range of paradoxesand antinomiesthat becomethe touchstoneof any theory of values.

The overwhelming number of viewpoints and valuation criteria reveal difficulties that often seem insurmountable.The same event may have not only different, but obviously divergent reverberations on individuals or communities sharing different lifestyles and other cultural patterns.Immanuel Kant, for instance,is permanentlyjudged by different insights, ftom different human perspectives,function of the local ring of an epoch. Albert Einstein was right in replying to those who used to challenge his interpretation that everyonehas a Kant of his or her own. Forensicpractices,which fit naturally in any modern civilization, inspire any totalitarian society with abhorrence.

Such findings suggest counterbalancingand prudence in the assessmentof customs and lifestyles different from ours and that we are tempted to credit with either absolute virtues or absolute defects. On the other hand, our certainty diminishes as to our own customs,which we mistakenly invest with absolute value, either becausewe understandthem partially, or becausewe estimate them by means of a thinking inadvertently subservient to the generating cultural system. We aim at some absolute, ultimate valueappraisal,although no two estimatesare entirely identical. The question arises naturally: are some things, works, deeds valuable becausewe assign value to them, or do we assignvalue to them becausethey are valuable?

Further difficulties are encountered while attempting to answer this question. Seemingly, value designateswhatever is wanted. Seemingly, to crave for A more ardently than for B is to assignA greatervalue than B. A

FROM THE MYSTERY OF VALUES TO AXTOLOGY closer analysis, however, reveals that value does not designatethat which is desired,but that which is desirable.Even if, in principle, value is acceptedas the object of desire, then it does not follow that whatever one person or another desiresis endowed with value only becauseit is desired.There are a lot of things that we may desire, a luxurious car, a voyage to the Caribbean, etc., not only becausethey satisfy human needs,the need for communication, for work or rest, for spiritual fulfillment and ethical achievement,but also becauseto possessthem grants us prestige in the eyes of the others.We may watch stupid action-movies,with relaxing effects, while admitting that other films have a grater aesthetic and ethical value. We may not feel enraptured by Mozart's music, while being aware of its value. We may indulge in listening to a one-night hit without ranking it topmost in our hierarchy of values. This happensbecausenobody, when expressinga valuejudgment, claims to simply translate a personal desire or preference.The value judgment is relatively independentof the judgment expressingpreference.Value envisagesvirtual choices that may be distinct from achieved preferential options. What value refers to is not a matter of what happensto be, but a matter of what ought to be. Value enablespassagefrom the desired to the desirable,from indicative assertion to imperative and practical meanings to conscienceand behavior, norms of action. Value is always expressedby means of imperative feelings and judgments that designatenot what it is, but that what an individual or a group considers, under given circumstances,it should be worth desiring, prizing, seeking for, conquering.

Thus, values cannot be restricted to the preferences of individual conscience. If anything X or Y prizes were value-bearing, we might completely credit the spontaneousacknowledgementof value accompaniedby a feeling of evidence, without resorting to any criteria, or float about in a relativistic blur, allowing personal whims to acquire the rank of norm and general standard. If the relationship a person establishesbetween personal needs,desires,and aspirationsand a specific object meant to satisfy them fails to be acknowledgedby other people,too, then we cannot be sure that what we are dealing with is value. Value is trans-individual.It involves appreciationat the level of the collective conscienceof a given human community. Far from translating this or that individual preference, values prove to be realities imposed by relating objects to ideals built according to society-specific criteria. Judgmentsof the type, I prefer tennis to football, or, This flower is worth one dollar, are descriptive judgments: the first because it states an individual preference, the second because it expressesa value judgment.

Alternatively, judgments such as Kim Basinger is beautiful, Gold is more precious than iron, X is good-hearted, are value judgments because they reveal, implicitly or explicitly, our relating to a world that we might conventionally call the realm of values. Whether we agree or not with the phrase,we still cannot deny that valuesmake up a different kind of reality and

BeyondAppearances that is why our valuation of some objects dependson the value-ideal and not on the existenceor non-existenceof the value-assigner.Freedom and justice are conferredvalue even there where they are not enthroned.That is also why, despite the fact that many of our individual choices are made freely, the criteria of our choices comply with the society we live in, although we often let ourselves be cheated into thinking of them as emissions of our own conscience.As Max Schelerwould say, society operatesas a sluice gate.

Next, values are lived through. They are generatedby and act within living experience. The mental representationof an object, no matter how appropriate, is a necessarybut insufficient condition for crediting it with value. Many things are known without being estimatedbeautiful or ugly, good or bad, useful or useless;they appear to us indifferent, therefore they lack value. Objects appearas beautiful, good, or useful not only becausewe come to representor know them, but becausewe are the ones who endow them with an aesthetic,ethical, utilitarian value becausethey echo human needs and desires, becausewe become value-sensitivein their presence,becausethey impress us, they interest us, they appeal to our sensitivity, Therefore, values cannot be exhaustedby an exclusively logical analysis. Because language often concealsthe purpose of value choices.An egocentricthinks, I must do so-and-so becauseit is for my own good, what do I care about the others?, but tells people around, I do so-and-so becauseit is for everybody's good, becauseit is the right thing to do. Also, becausewe cannot offer a rational explanationto everything.Why are we in love with a particular woman? Why are we delighted by Chopin's nocturnein D flat major, opus 27?

Living, wanting, pursuing, cherishing values would suggestintuition as the only way to locate them while probing into living experience.

Nevertheless,any value implies the transcendent.In other words, it is not to be identified with its contingent occurrences;it appearsto the human mind as a never-ending, poignant demand that needs fulfilling. It is not a mere projection of our desireupon things, it seemsto entice us from beyond, it stirs our heart and our will, it demandsour painstaking efforts, it offers us a goal and incentive for action. Despite the free choice they imply, values look like they are imposed upon us by a more or less clearly delineated social constraint.Even while enthusiasticallyperforming a moral deed, we feel as if we were outside ourselves,as if we were mastering ourselves,as if we rose above our ordinary strength, which entails combining the desirable with the compulsory to a hardly traceable extent. An impressive number of human actions are generatedby what everyday languagecalls thirst for truth, need for love, aspiration to social justice and equality.In this light, value appears as the only way to transcendhuman servitude in the face of its imminent demise,as the only way to transcendnatureitself.

Further difficulties arise becauseeach instanceof human behavior has a purpose that becomesthe key-value in choosing the means and that holds up

FROM THE MYSTERYOF VALUESTO AXTOLOGY to ridicule common causal relationships, because the future, through the assumedpurpose that has evolved into a guideline for action, influences the present. ,In Suflete tari lBrave Soulsl, written by Camil Petrescu,a Romanian playwright, the main hero, Andrei, vows to himself to kiss loana's hand by midnight or commit suicide.The ensuingeventsacquire an axiological profile only in connection with this proposedgoal. The event imagined for midnight influencesthe appreciationof the real eventsoccurring in the precedinghours.

Such situations, absurd, yet possible, create an antithesisbetween admitting the finality of human behavior in axiological analysis and a causal, deterministicapproachto values.

The series of difficulties does not end here. Values imply unequal ranking, namely, hierarchy.As Lavelle remarked,the conceptof value applies whenever we deal with a breach in the indifference or equality among things, whenever one thing needsto be classified before or above another, whenever one thing is deemed superior to another and is worth preferring to another.

Values are thus comparable, but comparing them is onerous. Should we choose good rather than truth? Should we prefer good to truth, or the other way round? The answer we may receive is that this is not a matter of disjunction, either/or, but of conjunction, and/and.Yet, more often than not, life asks for an option. And then the question arises:How can we be sure one value is superior to another?

Let us take a few examples.As a matter of principle, everybody agreps that for the sake of an ideal, a moral value, it is worth putting up yith deprivation, even with physical pain, a vital value. We neverthelessview as gruesomea suicidal terrorist's fanatic act. Similarly, a person who is subject to vital suffering in order to reach an insignificant truth seemspedantic and ludicrous, while Don Quixote inspiresus with heartfelt exultation.

Difficulties continue. If the human world is to be defined primarily as a world of meanings,human values could not be consideredanything else but meanings, significance. As meaning, values coordinate human behavior, values justify it by severe censure,and by the ensuing interiorization. Thus they acquire a very complex significance resulted from merging individual actions. To question the value of a kind of behavior, legal deed, or scientific discovery, means first of all to think about their significance. In semiotic terms, it means to separatethe signifier from the signified, and the only logical way that allows us to define them is their complementary presupposition. To interpret human values as significance, we should therefore be able to delimit the signifier from the signif,red,beyond their syncretism that can no longer explain polytheism, that is, the presenceof a multitude of purposeswhich, although divergent at times, are reachableby the same means. Or, to do it, values should be simultaneously regarded as included both in the realm of human communication, for only in the

BeyondAppearances communicativeevent, in the act of speech,doesthe signifier join the signified, and in the realm of human action. Any human action is meaninglessunless purpose-oriented.From this point of view, value is the requirementfor action of the human subject pertaining to a social framework. Included both in the realm of action and in that of communication,while simultaneouslydenoting substantiality and precariousness,values seem to abide by the common epistemologicalstatusof the unknown or lessknown phenomena.

I shall stop listing difficulties. Faced with such obstacles,the frequent attempts to use persuasioninstead of reason as a key to unlock the treasure chest of values are not surprising. Note also that value was sometimes regarded as expressing attainment of pleasure (Jeremy Bentham), of desire (Ehrenfels),of interest (Perry), pure rational will (Royce); as apprehensionof tertiary qualities (Santayana),as a life-intensifying factor (Nietzsche), as an emotional a priori (Scheler), or as the synoptic experience of individual indivisibility (Bowne). We may conclude that the concept of value itself is insufficiently defined. Let us rememberthat, before Kant, philosopherswould not doubt that they might be able to know good and other values. What they did doubt was the authenticity of empirical knowledge. During the last decade of the seventeenthcentury, John Locke doubted that there should be natural science, despite the peerless work of Newton, without doubting for one moment our ability to make up a corpus of moral knowledge as definite as mathematics is. With Kant, the fact-value dichotomy is introduced into philosophy in the eighteenthcentury, even if the concept of value is not used in its modern sense. The knowledge of value comes to be regarded as essentially different from the knowledge of facts, since values are assigned featuresthat fundamentallydistinguishthem from facts.

Distinguishing values in this way and placing them apart from, but not necessarilyhigher than other items in our life, generatesall the difficulties that have been mentioned so far and encouragesus to find an answer to all the questionsthat the knowledge of valuesraises.

As soon as we are persuadedto deal with values, with value judgments, the simplest and still toughest question, "What are values?", needs new rephrasing. Any value judgment includes a significance. But what does it signify? Is there somethingit refers to? What would that be? Does it envisage a kingdom of values or phenomena displaying peculiar qualities called values?

Values may not refer to anything outside ourselves. They may only vaguely express states of mind, thus subordinating the world to subjective desires and preferences.Such questionsare all the harder to answer because value judgments have appearedto researchers,struck by the complexity of the issue, as liable to multiple interpretations.Values have thus acquired the epistemological status usually attributed to the "philosophers' stone": some thinkers claim that values exist, therefore valuesrefer to somethingobjective;

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FROM THE MYSTERY OF VALUES TO AXIOLOGY

othersclaimthatvaluesdo not exist;andstill othersdo not denythe existence of valuesbut regardthemasthe mereproductionof feelingandmoods.

Having realized that we have not managed to know values to a satisfying extent, some thinkers have rushed into theorizing that nothing is knowable about them. Displeased,sometimesentitled to displeasure,by false solutions,they have consideredthe problem itself as false.

However, values have not ceased to act as such, and, paradoxically, those who deny them use valuejudgments.

2. Axiology's Long Journey toward ltself The key to solving the countlessdifficulties raised by the comprehensionof values is to define the concept of generic value. The concept combines in one denomination whatever is expressed by a multitude of notions, good, beautiful, useful, right, in other fields, and exclusively designates the essentialsof various kinds of values, ethical, political, aesthetic,theoretical, utilitarian, etc.

The concept, which nowadays plays a vital part in philosophical thinking, has seepedinto modern philosophy slowly and painfully, since it had not been used as such before the end ofthe eighteenthcentury.

Starting with the ancients,philosopherswould label the aspectsof the problematic of values as good, all-reigning good, and perfection. Not even Kant's work contains an analysis of the concept of value despite its preeminently being a philosophy of value. Kant's three basic works could be entitled "on Truth," The critique of Pure Reason, "on Goodness," The critique of Practical Reason, and "on Beauty," The critique of Judgment.

Paradoxically,Kant dealswith the philosophicalaspectsof value, but does not explicitly use the conceptof value in its axiological sense.

Five years before the publication of The Critique of Pure Reason,Adam Smith credits the concept of value in a purely economical paper. In a psychological account, utilitarian values are regarded in terms of their relationshipwith the human needsand desiresthey can satisfy.

The economical meaning has long permeatedthe concept of value. That is why English uses a distinct term, "worth," in parallel to the generic term, "value." The use suggests that behind their stable, empirically provable features,things might possesssome dynamic quality, weighable on invisible scalesin order to have their degreeof importancein the satisfactionof human needsestablishedand measurableby the effort neededto acquirethem.

It was only with the work of Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who in 1856 spoke for the first time about a relatively autonomousrealm of values, Reich der werte, and, later otr, with the works of Ritschie and of the Austrian economists, Menger, Friederich von Wieser, von Bohm Bawerk, that the concept of value started to be used in its strictly philosophical meaning,

Axiology's Long Journey toward ltself

1l

suggestively emphasized by Lotze's favorite maxim: whenever two hypotheses are equally possible, one of which agrees with our moral requirements,while the other disagreeswith them, the first one will always be favored.

The concept of value was masterfully promoted in a learned readership

by Nietzsche, willing to re-establishthe Aristotelian equation of values, to pillory decadent values, and to perform a transmutation of all values, Unwertung aller Werte.

The conceptreachedthe peak of its philosophical triumph by the end of the last century and the beginning of the present century, in Germany, by means of Neo-Kantianism, in Austria, with the epoch-making works of Ehrenfels,Kreibig, and Meinong, in the United States,mainly owing to W. M. Urban, and then in France.In the 1970s,it turned into a concept-obsession.

I do not intend to make a comprehensivehistory of the issue.But I must note that, as a distinct branch of philosophy, axiology is the outcome of generic values that make up its object of investigation and that have been dissociatedfrom specific valuesthat are investigatedby specializedsciences.

There was a time when papers collected as a result of the modern distinctions made by specialized research on values, ethical, aesthetic, political, legal, economic, etc., raised problems shared by many forms of research: the origin and structure of values; value change, interaction, and justification of values; value hierarchization and attainment. These interference problems focus on problems that fall under the scope of philosophy: the relationships between material culture and spiritual culture, between knowledge and appraisal,between the objective and the subjective, between the relative and the absolute, between the descriptive and the normative, between creation and reflectiort. By virtue of the inner logical character of the investigation, a movement toward knowledge has arisen, complementary to the mwement toward differentiation, a counter-trend aiming at the intermarriage of isolated research carried out from the viewpoint of just one type of values. That approach had the widest philosophical generality, and it intended to reveal the general laws of the systemof values,regardedas an open system,shapedalong severaldiachronic changes.

Once articulated, a general theory of values demands a philosophical name. Following a seriesof tentative denominations,timology, axionomy, the denomination of axiology proved viable. The term, "axiology," was consecratedduring the first decadeof the twentieth century, independently,by Paul Lapie, Logique de Ia volontd (1902), Eduard von Hartmann, Grundriss der Axiologie (1908), and Wilbur Marshall Urban, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws (1909). Originating in the Greek words axios, to estimate,to appreciate, and logos, science,axiology has grown roots in the modern society as the term that best designatesthe general theory of values. The term, "axiology," is

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thantimology,sincein Greek,axia meansvaluein the senseof moreadequate dignity, while time meansvalue in the senseof price. There are lots of beneficial human creations that have a price, but only those objects, deeds, and kinds of behavior that have dignity pertain to axia or to value; in other words, they have an axiological characteristic.Some things have a time value, and as such they can be exchanged,bought, or sold, without being axiological values: drugs, pornographicpictures,etc. Things or deedsthat are values have an axiological character, in the sense of axia, despite their having a time value, say, a painting, the value of which increaseswith time, or their lacking a time value, as is the caseof moral deeds,appreciatedand ranked according to their dignity and validity but that cannot be exchanged,sold, or bought.

Some things have a price, but no value, while friendship, generosity, and solidarity have value, in the senseof axia, but no price, in the senseof time.

The term, "axiology," better defines the ambiguity of value in whatever value is specific, becauseit encompassesboth the objective and the subjective in a complex interrelationship,and it generateshierarchiesas to the things that are regarded as worth appreciating,mainly related to prevailingly spiritual needs and desires.As such, axiology fails to cover all the statementsabout values and valuation. It does not infringe upon the sovereignty of economic, aesthetic,and judicial sciences,while analyzingthe economic, aesthetic,and forensic values. Its object is clear-cut:it is the study of generic value and the generallaws governing the systemof values.

Probing into the crucial events of human experience,knowledge, and action, axiology highlights the bridge between the social-historical process during which values are constitutedand their assimilation into the sphereof individual reasons.In order to have their precise targets established,human beings sift through various values,relate purpose-valuesto means-values,and comparevalues accordingto specific criteria.

The valuation criteria area major problem, if we are to find an answerto the question concerning life's meaning or to guide us through the maze of contemporary art trends. Solving such problems requires making full use of all scientific breakthroughsregarding types of values, while axiology, which helps us identify generic values and elaborate a unitary theory of values, reveals the complex relationship between object and subject and succeedsin avoiding one-sidednessand intangibility. It is this object-subjectrelationship that endows things, processes,actions, and human creation with value and provides a new, fruitful basisfor the exploration of human subjectivity.

That axiology has become a distinct branch of philosophy and that the realm of values has acquired a clear-cut position in the ensemble of our existencemust stand among the most significant discoveriesin the history of philosophical thinking. The word, "discovery," is not to be taken as a metaphor.Once axiology emerged,a new realm of reality, previously ignored or at best restrictedto other domains.was discovered.

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The discovery is twofold. First a new concept is discovered.This is a crucial moment for any type of knowledge. Without the introduction of the concept of inertia, classicalmechanicswould have never existed; without the concept of four-dimensional space-timecontinuum, relativity physics would not have occurred; without the concept of reverse connection, cybernetics would not have surfaced;without the conceptsof role and status, basic gains in social psychology would have sounded nonsensical.We witness the discoveryof the conceptof genericvalue.From this new point of view, value appears as irreducible to the observable or to the mere reflection of the observable,and axiology, the generaltheory of values,becomesirreducible to ontology or gnoseology.

Second, a new realm of philosophical thought is revealed.It cannot be completely integrated into physical existence,nor can it be included among the ideal objects or psycho-spiritualphenomena:the realm of values.

3. The Search for Identity Values are not independent of the facts they result from, owing to the experience that human beings acquire in their complex relationships with natural and social objects.The experienceof value is relatedto reflection, and, at leasttheoretically,it can be verified.

Values are not independentof human thoughts, desires,and yearnings.

As long as values were regardedby ancient or modern philosophersas things or as ideal objects, or as projections of affective and desire-oriented experience,they could still be dealt with in terms pertaining to other domains of reality. A failure occurred in pursuing the general coordinatesby virtue of which all specific values occur as instaritiationsof the manner, specific and irreducible, in which humankind relatesto reality.

From now on, all attempts to reduce the realm of values to other domains of reality, things, essences,states of mind, become anachronistic.

Values are not things, since they cannot be mistaken for their material carriers, although they cannot exist without their material frame, messenger, bearer, carrier. Beauty does not exist by itself; it is always a feature of a physical object, be it a piece of marble, the sunrise, or the human body.

However, value survives even after having been dissociatedfrom its physical frame. Death deprivesgreat historic personalitiesor our nearestand dearestof their existencebut fails to deprive them of their value, which seemsto depend not so much on their physical frame, but on the life and feeling of the survivors who grant the deceasedsubjectiveimmortality and value.

The treatmentof values as things relies on identifying values with their material frame. But reducing them to ideal objects, such as essencesof the Platonic type, relies, as with Nicolai Hartmann, on emphasizingthat they are sensoriallyperceivable,which is a peculiarity of value. Thus, quality has been

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identified with ideality, which characterizesspiritual values.Values cannot be listed into what Edmund Husserl calls the class of ideal objects, essences, relationships,concepts,mathematicalentities. Let us only compare beauty, a value, to the idea of beauty, an "ideal object." We discover that the valuebeauty, without denying the interferenceof reason, is directly perceived by meansof the sensorialand affective experience.The metaphorsof a poem are meant to be expressive and are perceived emotionally, while they lack informative and representationalintention. However, the idea of beauty falls within the field of aesthetics,exclusively due to rational dissociation, by means of concepts and propositions that bear significance at the level of reason, of discursive knowledge. Values cannot be reduced to psychological statesof mind. Pleasure,mentioned by Bentham, concern, regardedby Peny as the foundation of value, or desire, extolled by Ehrenfels, who fathered the formula, a value is higher when its desirability is greater, are only psychological conditions for values to exist. Value cannot be restricted to its object, to its conceptualtransfer,or its psychologicalconditions, becauseit is not a thing, an ideal object, or somepoint of incidenceof personalexperience.

The conclusion is obvious: the realm of values begins wherever human indifference ceases,whenever the world is no longer a stage performanceto the human eye. This realm is present whenever differences and preferences occur, whenever selectionsoperatea vertical hierarchy on the various forms of reality not according to their genetic, causal, structural relationships,but accordingto the extent they can satisfy human needsand desiderata.

The human being is not only part of the natural world and endowed with cognitive abilities definable through complex statesof mind, but is also able to develop attitudestoward reality, to assignhierarchiesto things and human creation according to the interest they may stimulate during one stage of the valuing being's "social practice." Without being left outsidethe jurisdiction of determinism, value ceasesto be a realm of things or information about their relationshipsand attributes.Value becomesa realm of feeling and preference, of evaluation and human determination. This realm could not endure, as physical reality does, outside the active instantiation of desire, at the level of direct experienceand judgment, at the level of its translation into intelligible terms. The discovery of a distinct statusfor the realm of value is crucial: first, it is a basic, intrinsic coordinateof human action; second,it is the stimulating atmosphereof our whole life. We live, work, and dream in an axiological envronment.

While attemptingto provide a definition for such a peculiar realm as that of values,at least two questionsarise: (1) Is there any contradiction between the statement that value is irreducible and the attempt to define it? Becausea definition of value turns it into an abstractobject by meansof theoreticalreflection.

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Any definition is bound to be both abstractand an absffact,a translation into the conceptual, which implies constructive action on the part of the gnoseological subject. But sciences do not discard definitions that are regarded as useful tools required to embark upon the painful journey of human knowledge.

Defining value means supplying a more or less adroit but necessary synthetic expression,able to guide our spirit to acquire an intuition of value and to make a preferential choice. For instance,we may consider value to be an abstractterm the significance of which is liable to be judged in the same manner as the commonly used phrase,X is good, is, if we reformulate the phrase as, We should develop a favorable attitude about X. In this case, the definition will focus around the essentiallynorm-settingidea of requirement, simultaneouslyenvisagingattitude and object. Such a definition is only partly satisfactory,becausedefining value as a property of objects, suggestingthat you favor A insteadof B becausethe value of A is higher than that of B, or as a valuation principle, you prefer A to B becauseA is closer to value than B, is a one-trackprocedure.

However, any of these definitions brings along a legitimate viewpoint that helps delineatethe object of knowledge and representsa strategic phase in approachingknowledge. Thus, comprehensionof values and the theoretical masteringof them are enabled.

(2) Since value is something pristine and essential, does it escape definition? This questionneedsfurther elucidation.

Value does emerge as something pristine and essential, but only in relation to the variations and changesundergoneby preferential options, and only becauseintroducing value as a notion supposesa hypothetical invariant of choice, virtually desirable,as comparedto actual choices.

Value is irreducible to other areas of reality, things, ideal objects, psycho-spiritual phenomena,but this does not mean that these other areas could be reducedto value or that value could stand for somethingpristine and essentialin relation to the objective existence.

The startingpoint in our endeavortoward a definition of value is that the notion of value designates characteristics acquired by things that exist objectively in order to satisfy human needs.

At first sight, valueslook like a singulartype of qualities. Since there are no qualities as such, only objects endowed with qualities, values do not exist by themselves; they always occur as characteristicsof objects or beings.

Beauty is characteristic of a flower or painting; goodness of heart is characteristicof a person; utility is characteristicof a tool. In other words, values always need a bearer, a carcier,what Scheler calls Werttrriger, of which they are inherent. If we carefully investigate a flower, a painting, a human behavioral act, or a tool, we find that the feature we have ventured to call value is completely different from those features that usually make up the

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identity of an object. The length, weight, imperviousness,or hardnessof an object are present irrespective of human conscience,while value can exist only through the link between the objective structure and human consciousness,beyond our feelings, evaluation, and judgment. An object cannot exist as an object without displaying any feature, but it can exist without bearing any value. Beauty, utility, or style are not conditions for things to exist as things. If an object comes to be deprived of its qualities, it may ceaseto exist as an object, while a couple of hammer strokesis enoughto put an end to the utility of a device or to the beauty of a statue. Quality is inalienable to the very existenceof objects, while value is inalienable solely for the existence of those objects that meet cultural human needs and which we call goods. A piece of marble is but a thing, exhibiting qualitative parameters.Whenever the carver'Shand, "leaving the unnecessaryaside," aS Michelangelo would put it, grants beauty to it and turns the piece of marble into a cultural asset, we find that, though the statue still preserves all the characteristicsof common marble, somethinghas happenedand has turned the thing into an asset,enabling it to meet specifically human concerns, wants, and needs.This somethingis value.

Thus, values can no longer be consideredan exclusive type of qualities that some objects display,'sincethey do not intrinsically belong to objects,but they are assigned to the object by the subject. They have to undergo a treatmentdifferent from that of qualities becausethey do not belong to a class of objects,but to a set of goods.They becomea kind of quality peculiar to the subject which operates an axiological connection between objects and the subject's needs, desires, cravings, and aims. Their defining characteristicis not their substantialitybut their interrelationship.

Values are essentially relational in nature. Through the subject-object relationship, they become inherent qualities pertaining to an object endowed with value. Subsequently they detach themselves from their conception processand appearin our life experienceunder a distorted form, linguistically enhanced by the nominalization of the value-describing adjective, as an intrinsic characteristicof the object, which is "value." This is tantamount to the alarm clock urging us to wake up at dawn. But the clock does not really urge us to wake up; it simply rings. Our understandingits ring as a wake-up signal dependson our intention. We cannot say an alarm clock has waking-up qualities, nor can we say that, intrinsically, a painting has "aestheticqualities" or that, intrinsically, a behavioral act has "moral qualities," since values do not envisagethe real structureor substantialityof objects.

Since values cannot exist outside an objective carrier and a subjective signifying act, they belong to that class of objects Husserl calls "nonindependent." They are devoid of substantiality. This feature, so hard to perceive,is a distinctive mark of values.

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Different natural things, together with different human acts do not rank the same with all human beings. Their difference in rank relates to their human significance, to the degree they satisfy needs or cravings that are socially delimited and historically conditioned. Unequal ranking is encounteredin any life experience,since attraction, preferences,and desires all display hierarchies,and it finds its rational expressionin the concept of value.

The difference in ranking is not produced by the relationship among objects. It is engendered by the relationships between objects and the appraising subject, and it does not rely on the intrinsic characteristicsof the object, but on the significancethesecharacteristicspresentto the subject who is more or less attracted by them, according to their utilitarian, moral, political, aestheticneeds.

Value implies polarity, a potential "yes" and a potential "no," a potential approval and disapproval,and hierarchy, the vertical ordering of objects from the inferior to the superior, in accordanceto their significance to the subject.

Whenever an object is grantedvalue, the granting is performed by comparing and distinguishing it from something else bearing a different value. In other words, by implicitly expressingpolarity, somethingis judged as positive when compared with something estimated as negative, and with respect to hierarchy, something is estimated as superior when compared to something estimatedas inferior. If value is regardedas a relationship between an object that is worth valuing and a subject that is able to evaluate it, and not as an intrinsic quality, then polarity and hierarchy must be understood as the primary relational determinantsof value. Polarity leads to revealing the poles of value, while hierarchy reveals the degreesof value. These characteristics further point to the peculiar statusof the "realm of values" as opposedto the "realm of things," henceto the irreducibility of values.

The polarity of value evinces an axiological breakup from the contemplative indifference that levels all objects pertaining to the physical world and regardsall actionsexertedupon theseobjects as equivalent.We can be indifferent to objects belonging to the physical world as long as we do not invest that world with human significance,as long as they are not important to us, and as long as we are not their value assigners.Once value is assignedto an object, indifference is impossible. Axiological temperature never reads zero. Any moral requirementis either attractiveor repulsive to us. There is no axiologically neutral work of art. No looker-on might ever feel wholly indifferent while listening to a symphony, contemplating a painting, or watching a stage performance. Our evaluating response must be either positive or negative. It will indicate approval or disapproval, acceptanceor rejection. Since our valuation swings between two poles, discarding the ugly by approving the beautiful, and acceptinggood while rejecting evil, all values make up polar pairs, clear-cut dichotomies: good and evil, beauty and

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FROMTHEMYSTERYOF VALUESTOAXIOLOGY

ugliness,justice and injustice,truth and untruth.Polarity is exclusivelya characteristicof the realm of values.While things are what they are by themselves, and denying something does not mean asserting its opposite, values are what they are due to the significancehuman beings assignto them.

Values encasepolarity in their structure,so that denying a value that lies at one pole, good or beauty,implicitly meanspromoting the value that lies at the oppositepole, evil or ugliness.

Values are either positive or negative, and human valuation, attitudinal response, occurs as attraction or rejection, as approval or disapproval, as desirability or undesirability.A negativevalue is not tantamountto non-value or lack of value, since ugliness, evil, injustice, and disloyalty are as valueefficient in our axiological experienceas beauty, goodness,justice, pleasure, and loyalty are. Nevertheless,the subject regards them as negative to the extent to which they seem to disfavor, instead of favor, the subject's needs and aspirations.Negative values stand for hindrancesin the achievementof the positive values which are their opposites. Instances might arise where negative values could enable accessto positive values, as far as pain, error, despair, anxiety are expressionsof poignant awareness,wheneverthey might anticipate,in a veiled manner,positive values and an attempt to dominate and convert them.

Since valueshave their reverseat the other axiological pole, or, in other words, since values are symmetrically distributed to the negative pole and to the positive pole, we are faced then with an alternative. Any valuation act implies favoring one pole or the other. Preferring one value to another is not only an alternative polar choice, but a choice made within a hierarchy.

Hierarchy is the other basic characteristicof the realm of values. If polarity means a reversal of direction inalienable to the grouping of values in polar pairs, hierarchy expressesdirectional continuity. Values have not only poles, but also degrees.From disagreeableto agreeable,from beautiful to ugly, from good to evil, from fair to unfair, there is a multitude of degrees.This complies with how the needs, the aspirations,and the goals of a human community, dwing a precise historical period, are attained, with precise social valuation criteria, and implicitly with hierarchy-settingcriteria.

The hierarchy of values is vertical, unlike the hierarchy of knowledge, which, at least at its boundaries, split from its axiological component, is horizontal. The order of values deals with subordinationand superordination relationships;the order of knowledge deals with coordination. The hierarchy of values is ascending, from the inferior to the superior. Louis Lavelle accounts for the degrees of value, and, implicitly, for the vertical scale of values, by the threefold relationship that value achieves: with time, with desire, and with effort, since it derives from the specifically human way of establishingthe connection of the self with the world.o A hierarchic ordering of values occurs in any human community, under given social-historical

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conditions. The rank on the scalerevealsthe degreeof significance the values in questionacquire within that community.

The hierarchic ordering of values is different from the classification of values, since classification does not necessarily imply an organized significance.Chemical elementsmay be classifiedinto metals and metalloids, people into overweight and underweight, tall or short, single or married, but theseclassificationsdo not point to a group as bearing more significancethan the other. Values are ordered hierarchically, according with their significance in a human community, according to specific social criteria, generatedby the practical-spiritual needsof that community. The template of the hierarchy of values is not perennial. It constantly leaves room for new experience to be acquired while bearing the imprint of a precise historical stageand of precise cultural patterns within a given human community. Despite its being revisable, fluctuating, in places incoherent, value endlessly provides landmarks for a person's behavior toward nature, the people around, and the judgments enabling a rational ordering of estimationsin terms of value.

The two opposite poles of values, one of which we favor, the other we refuse, point to a moment of discontinuity in the progressive, continuous hierarchy of values.By meansof a breachat the zero degreeof value, equal to indifference, the two opposite poles insert a directional switch, a qualitative separation of positive values from negative values. Values intertwine and interpenetratedue to their gradability, since one value may be the means to achieve another value chosenas purpose,and due to their polarity. A positive value need not be defendedagainstsome other value, as Nietzschedoes when defending the aestheticagainstmoral values, but againstthe negative value it is linked to, within the same sphere,truth againstnon-truth, good againstevil, beauty againstugly.

When analyzing the primary interdeterminations pertaining to the realm of values, polarity and hierarchy, we eventually come to the conclusion that value is not an intrinsic characteristicof some objects, be they material or ideal, nor an intrinsic characteristicof the subject, but a specific way to trace the preferential and desiderativelink betweensubject and object, according to social and personal criteria. By virtue of the bond between objects and socially generatedneeds, cravings, and ideals, objects are invested with a hierarchic rank and a positive or negative significance. Thus, value is that relationship between subject and object, which, by means of polarity and hierarchy, expressesa person's or a community's judgment of characteristics or facts, natural, social, psychological,potentially capableof meeting socially and historically conditioned needs,desires,aspirations,etc. Value is the social relationship expressing a judgment of objects or facts by virtue of the agreement, historically determined by the social-cultural background and ideals,betweenthe characteristicsof those objects and facts and the needsof a given human community.

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FROM THE MYSTERYOF VALUES TO AXTOLOGY

The dimensions of value come now into view in a wide vista. Value displays an instrumental dimension, since it represents an item in an assimilatedsymbolic systemserving as tool and standardfor potential choices between alternatives, for any preferential trend toward an optimal participation in the creation of cultural goods. Value displays an affective dimension resulting from an intended active involvement of feelings, desires, and choice that we develop toward objects,which, due to their characteristics, can satisfy the variegated range of human needs: vital, utilitarian, moral, aesthetic,political. Since value implies drawing out a hierarchy of human behavior starting from needs, but related to an ideal, it has a goal-oriented dimension expressedin the clash between goals and the self-censorshipof conscience,the uttermostpatheticexpressionof which is remorse.Thus, value involves principles in terms of which human beings set a relative degree to each value, choose their goals, coordinate them in axiological systems, and legitimize the meanssuitableto achievingthem.

This dimension is linked to three others: (l) the projective dimension, since values provide reasons and projects for action, deeply rooted in the human existential status during a given historical period; (2) the prospective dimension, since value is not grantedto a desiredor favored object, but to an object regardedas worth being desiredand favored and which complies with a human ideal establishedby the potential prospectingof the future; and (3) the norm-setting dimension, since once established,value becomes a means of guiding for what cybernetics might call "inputs" and "outputs" of human behavior in given "situations." Human desirescan never be wholly fulfilled.

Once a goal is reached, new action requirements arise, stirred by the "inventiveness" of values. Consequently,value is also endowed with an epigenetic dimension. The selective dimension of value is equally obvious, since values expressthe hierarchy of objects or acts in human experience,a hierarchy that is generatedby the relationshipsbetweendesiresand needs,but that is brought forward and made objective by the social impact.

I do not claim my enumeration to have exhaustedthe dimensions of value. I only wanted to emphasize the many-sidednessand the multiple functionality of value. Whenever in the history of axiology only one dimension has been made absolute or minimal, serious errors have been committed.

Only by weighing the plurality of dimensionsand functions of value can we understandwhy value is not a quality in the common perception of the term. It does not belong to a classof objects,but to a classof cultural assets.It implies that objects should be related neither to their immanent structure,nor to the causes that once generated them, but to historically and sociallyconditioned human needs, desires, and yearnings. Value appears as a relationship.We cannot perceive it with our life experience.We cannot grasp and retrieve it in the absenceof an object characterizedby value and which

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we call valuable, or in the absenceof the subject capable of evaluating that object and expressinga choice for it in the historical and socio-cultural frame in which the active intenelationship takes place. This is no better place for Goethe's words, If you are willing to enjoy your own value, then confer value onto the world.

ChapterTwo Is a ScientiticReconstructionof the Axiological Possible?

1. The Challenges of Science In the traditional philosophical accounts on values, the gap between the axiological and the scientific approaches wound up in undesired consequences.

Theoristsof value, making much of the lack of scientific rigor, were easily satisfied with a speculative approach of their field of investigation, while scientistscould hardly breathethe thin air of axiological speculation.

The attempt to createan axiomatic of value, such as that by John Laird,t gave rise to substantialobjections.While studying values,is there any way we could admit axioms of addition, commutation, and association?How can beauty be added to vice? How can equivalencebe drawn between acquiring material wealth, increasingknowledge, and hardly improving charity? Would admitting that values could be dealt with in symbolic language,and adopting the axiom of distributivity, (a + b)c - (a-c) + (b.c), entail degrading values, belittling them into what Lossky called "disgusting shadows?"

Despite hardshipsand failures, the last decadewitnessedthe deep-rooted belief that axiology had better acquire a downstream rather than stand as counter-currentto science.Values are not parts of the perceptibleworld, since they representmeaningsthat are not acquired through direct experience.This does not mean that they are impenetrableto scientific investigation. Neither are numberspart of the perceptibleworld, but nobody claims that the meaning of a formula like (a - I) can be read by probing into life-experience.Science fails to exhaustthe study of values.It fails to provide a reasonableexplanation for my being in love with a woman or my taking delight in a sonataby Bach.

Although irreducible to the cognitive, becausethe determinism that governs them transcendsthe field of the subject's rational decisions,values originate in human action and are conveyed by languagesloaded with cultural input, despitethe fact that they do not belong to the sensitive-intuitiverealm.

Today, the journey of axiology toward scientific methodology is almost completed, without risking the loss of its philosophical status.However, the concept of value must be re-evaluated by re-thinking value in terms of scientific results.

A set of rigorously demonstrable and quasi-unanimously acceptable propositions may be gathered,even if extracting and interpreting them would

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unavoidably bring about theoretical deviations. For the time being, the following ten propositionscan be validatedby science: (1) Valuesdo not have a natural,but a socialexistence.

(2) Values are not qualities, but social relationshipsbetweenthe subject and the valuation object.

(3) The primary relational determinants of value are polarity and hierarchy.

(4) Values do not exist outside the subject's valuation, although they stem from objective data independentof the estimating subject and observe some social and historical criteria.

(5) Values are meaning, not signs. To discover value is to discover a human meaning; to create value is to create a human meaning. This way, a new dimension and a new ontological depth are assignedto things turning them into cultural assets.

(6) The relationship among rules, values, and signs is a counterpart of the relationship among structure, function, and meaning in terms of human behavior.

(7) Values are cognizable, since meaning occurs in and by intelligible structures.Knowing values has a sui-generischaractersince it connotesboth explanationand comprehension.

(8) The experienceof value involves feeling, volition, and desire, and also acquaintancewith the object of value, a noetic feature.

(9) Value is action, not evidence;it belongs to the realm of actions as a prospectiveand purposeful requirement,verifiable by its empirically provable consequences.

(10) If consideredcoordinatesof human actions, and when their finality is distinguishedfrom their efficiency, qualitative values, by virtue of items 1 to 9 above,flay become,within some limits, quantifiable.

It is now possibleto outline an open deductivesystemin axiology and to draw out a generaltheory of values basedon a genuine methodologicalbasis.

Since any clearly formulated axiological theory cannot fail being functional, the functional component of the theory of values can be implicitly expressed by resorting to the clearest definition of terms that enables them to be identified by experience and to the measurement procedures set forth accordingto the specificity of qualitative values.

One of the most captivating attempts in this sense opens up the way toward the reinterpretationof axiological problems according to the rigorous theory of information. The starting point is that the experience of value involves not just feelings, desires,volition, but also noesis, which may be regarded as the informational side of value. The analogy between information storage: informational operations and mental functions memory; combining information: imagination; generation of information:

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encoding; collection of information: decoding is generally accepted nowadays.Since information refers to the extent to which a sequenceof signs is original, computing it inevitably raises the question of value. The same piece of information may be essential to A but superfluous to B. NonEuclidean geometry or Leibnizian philosophy are of interest to a restricted number of people, while a report on a football match is of a much wider interest.

The very act of computing information presupposesan answer to the question, for function of whom do we compute information? A and B may read it differently. An absolute information measuring-unit needs be computed, presupposingthe abstractcase of an infinite value displayed by a sequenceof symbols or signs for an infinitely knowing and infinitely curious being.

This revealsthe multiple analogiesbetweenthe encoding,informational system, and the system of values, as an ordered function of preference.Both systems bring meaning to an individual's world. Their structuresuncover a network within which some items are selected,while others are neglectedor rejected. With both systems, the neglected classes or items usually stay undefined.When I explain why I like a painting or why I appreciatean artist, it is not important why I dislike other paintings or why I do not acknowledge the value of other artists. When seeking for information, as well as when urged into the pursuit or attainment of values, human beings also try to achievecongruencebetweenideasand events.

The relationship between information and value is even closer, since they both express negative entropy; the progress of an efficient structural order is the oppositeof entropy. That is why sentencescan be translatedfrom a system of values into a system of codes. According to the theory of communication,any messagehas two aspects:(1) a statementconcerningthe state of the event at the previous moment; (2) an order that becomes the stimulus, the cause of coming events. Semantic research has proved that words not only purport information but also engenderour future actions with consequencesthat can be motivationally provable. When I convey to X what opinion Y has about X's temper,I convey information about a past event, but I also trigger X's future responsesto Y. Translating a system of codes into a system of values is translatingthe report-messagein terms of order-message.

In this way, the theory of information does not replace a computation method by a value judgment, but suppliesvalue judgments with the objective basis of a computing method. This happenswithin limits, since value should not be reducedto its informational side.

Scientific substantiationis thus provided for an outstandingaxiological problem: the translatability and the ineducibility of values. Since values have an informational side, they are mutually translatable:aestheticor moral values can be translatedinto terms pertainingto theoreticalvalues,truth or falsehood.

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A SCIENTTFICRECONSTRUCTION OF THEAXIOLOGICAL

Since values involve information, they display ineducible aspects that are mistranslated into other structures. Far from implying their purity, the ineducible character of values reveals their interaction. The message that values always carry is never restricted to a single value, and, despite the sender'sintention to assignit just one value, the receiver, by means of proper reading, can decode in the messageother values embeddedin the respective structure. A value always presupposes and embeds other values. pure goodness,pure beauty, and pure justice are mere illusions, though sometimes necessary.I get involved in the act by means of which I perform my good deed, I do my duty. Theoretically, my action relies on a moral or theoretical principle; politically, I statemy allegianceto a social group, and I might even have to sacrifice my health or life in order to solve a problem of human existence.There is no pure science,just as there is no pure art. Without an explicitly alleged pu{pose, means claim to have the status of aims. Value choicesdo not perish irrespectiveof their rank in a hierarchy. A scientist is in pursuit of truth, but while decoding such truths, we come across plenty of "impurities": moral, political, and ideological. Likewise, there is no pure human beauty, since beauty is always an expressionthat implies the presence of moral and intellectual qualities which masterfully mould the biological matter into new, striking plasticity. Even when axiological clashesoccur, we cannot and should not side with one value against another.We never defend truth from goodnessor goodnessfrom beauty. What we fight against is the opposite of that value within its specific area: truth against lie, goodness against evil, beauty against ugliness. One value cannot exclude another; it presupposesit. Each value can substantiatethe othersin the semanticworld in which we live. This is how the ineducibility of values implies translatability, and translatability implies comparability, which, in its turn, implies measurement.

From a different point of view, the re-valuation of value may resort to the theory of decision-making.Individual consciousnesstranslatesvalues into preferential acts. If we study preferential choices in their simplest instantiations, attraction or rejection, we may envisage them as choices between two different objects, as the accomplishment of either of two alternativeactions,or as the triggering of either of two possibleevents.In this respect, instead of X prefers a to b, we may say Object a is superior to object b, in terms of its utility to person X. Whatever our formulation, a preference is merely revealed,not explained.

If we want to account for the choice of a value beyond a proven preference, we come across serious hindrances when trying to apply the theory of choice. This happensbecausechoices may be inconsistent,options may vary with each successivechoice the subject makes among a, b, and c, and becausechoices may not display transitivity. A is prefened to b and b is preferred to c do not entail a is preferred to c. Choices vary according to the

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nature of the object to be preferred, according to the socio-cultural background, to the varying offers (if a is preferred to b when a and b are the only ones to be offered, we cannot ascertainwhether the samepreferencewill occur within a set including objects c and d as well), and to the subject's state of mind at the moment of choice (reversalof preferencemay happen,such as picking your food when you are replete after having been hungry). An object being desirable, its exerting preferential impact upon us, is not one of its intrinsic properties.Instead,it is a relationship between the subject's state of mind and the properties of the object. Consequently,to explain preferential options in rigorously scientific terms we should leave behind the inventory of preferential options and renouncethe illusion of building up a system which could rank preferencesaccordingto the intrinsic propertiesof objects.

Severalsolutions have arisen in order to surmount thesedifficulties and to account for the puzzling variety of preferential choices. Some of the solutions are tautological, as motivation prompts choice, others, although leading to reliable explanations,fail to support refutable statementsand fail to acquire theoreticalstatus.This is the caseof the psychoanalyticinterpretation.

These difficulties can be overcomeby introducing the notion of value in the psychologicalanalysisof preferentialrelationships.Thus, value becomesa hypothetical invariant, a function of the sum of transformations of actual choices. In other words, in addition to the actual choices of real objects that occur in our experienceat a given moment, we make potential choicesrelated to kinds of objects that are invariable in time. In addition to the real subject that makes a real choice and to whom the present motivation is relevant, we supposea hypothetical subject whose potential choices are made according to a code. In a virtual system, we come to estimatethe concept of value, over segmentsof the cognitive chain, as a rigorous scientific conceptjoining two meaningsof the term: (1) a property acquired by objects as to the evaluating subjectX: X prefersa to b becausethe value of a is superiorto the value of b, as far as the satisfactionof pre-establishedneedsis concerned;(2) a valuation principle: X prefersa to b becausea suits the value better than does b.

The introduction of this hypothetical invariant in either instance, as a human property of objects or as a valuation principle, accounts for the preferential acts varying with time, which exceedsthe restricted axiological areas and penetratesthe vast realm of sociology. There is no one-to-one dependenceof preferenceto value, all the more so becausevalues may be at stake at the same time. A combined impact of historical, socio-cultural, and sociological factors is exerted upon preferences. The notion of value, presentedas an invariant of transformationsof preferential choices, can be investigatedas any other object of scienceand explained in terms of the way values function as principles that rule human actions. Such an approachurges us to grasp the meaning of each peculiar act, in compliance with the human

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needs and aspirationsit voices, with the structure within which it has been generated,and with the precisegoals it pursues:its finality.

What I have called re-valuation of value might enable axiology to rely on the theory of purpose as well. Human behavior is purposeful, it always aims at achieving one thing or another, and it alters according to its partial consequences,success,or failure. But human behavior is not to be accounted for only causally, since one moment is relevant not for the previous moment, but for the future ones. Purposefulnessappearsas the process by means of which balanceis gradually achievedbetweenprevious information and future requirements. It simultaneously involves the orientation that any structure striving toward increasing equilibrium requires, by a trial-and-error process.

Purposefulnessappearsthus as the instantiation of the various aspectswhich come to strike a balanceowing to the action-interactiongame. Purposefulness does not leave out causality; it includes and surpassescausality, since every human action is purposeful and oriented. Values do not acquire the coercive powers of causality that rules out option; all that they acquire is the compulsory norm-setting character of requirements, the nature of which allows us to observeor infringe upon them.

If value implies purposefulness, and measuring values supposes understandingpurposefulnessin causal terms, then whenever it makes sense to measure qualitative values, we have to perform reduction. On methodological grounds, values involving fundamentalpurposesare reduced to efficiency values.

If we consider Jean Piaget's idea that value can be seen as a conscious understandingof the functional utility, we can distinguish between primary utilities, related to the quality of values produced and preserved, and secondaryutilities, related to quantitativefunctioning. Thus, values involving fundamental purposes,oriented toward satisfying primary utilities, are to be distinguished from efficiency values oriented toward satisfying secondary utilities. Values involving fundamental purposes weigh the purpose-way relationshipand are preeminentlyqualitative, while efficiency values envisage the costs or gains in the inner energeticeconomy of the individual or interindividual actions,becausethey are quantifiable.

When dealing with qualitative values, due to their being coordinatesof human actions, we may shift our focus from finality to efficiency. This is how such values become quantifiable. Whenever a mathematicianis interestedin and satisfied with changing opinions with a musician, their dialogue does not sound like an economic exchange.Even if they agreeto trade math classesfor music classes, they strike up an economic relation, which becomes quantifiable, although there are no material assets,only spiritual values that are traded.

Thus, translated into terms of efficiency, value becomes a secondary weight of objects that is not gravity-bound but generatedby the attraction of

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the axiological sensitivenessof the desiring mind. Since the idea of weight associates with that of balance, the value of an object results from its equivalence to the value of another, as if human beings were weighing everything on some invisible scale and thereby estimating the secondary weight, the relative meaning of things and beings versus the sacrifices they acceptto do.

Quantitative comparisonsbecome possible becausewe act as if things and beings possessed,in addition to their perceptible properties, a dynamic quality measurableby the effort we are willing to make to acquirethat quality.

Quantification is possible whenever stressis laid upon the efficiency and the purposefulnessof value.

We may say that axiology faces a dynamic alternative.It aims at using a rigorous method to measurethe human ability of making value options, and at gathering enough pertinent meanings and explanations to obtain maximal accuracy.It has to choose between refusing measurementand performing it by painfully renouncingpurposefulnessin favor of efficiency.

The dilemma forces the researchersinvolved in the theory of values to question theoretical and epistemologicalissuesand to critically examine their own methods. They should render obvious any over-reduction, and they should prevent any potential distorting effects. Redefining the concept in terms susceptibleof operational analysisremains the sine qua non condition usedto apply modern researchmethodsand strategies.

As specific products of the object-subject interaction, values do not make up a realm of things or of information regarding the properties or relationships between things. Values constitute a realm of feelings and preference, of human intentions and valuation, that could not subsist, as physical reality can, outside the active instantiation of desire, within direct experience, and of appreciativejudgments, when translated into intelligible language.

The realm of values is not separatedfrom the world of action. If we see action as inclusive of a whole range of kinds of behavior and activities aimed at satisfying social human needsand ruled by the purposethey strive to reach, then values representthe basics of human action. The concept of action is employed to designateall the determined,goal-oriented,and finalized human activities becoming socially useful by contentsand manner of being.

This concept should be distinguished from the Parsonian notion of action that points to social behavior as a range of responsesto a given social situation. Values have their source not in the conditions of action, but in action itself. Social-human action is simultaneously value-generating and value-oriented.Since it unfolds within precisehistorical circumstancesand is value-oriented, action is wrapped up into social backgrounds and fields of decision even when it makesuse of symbolic expression.

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Axiologically,a personis endowedwith valuenot by havingsomething but by beingsomebody, andbeingsomebody is definedby doingsomething.

Carrying out activities diminishes the existential uncertainty related to the entire human experience, since, through activity, human beings embrace values which usually representthe anti-entropicfactors for action.

Raymond Polin reveals the essentiallink between action and value that are mutually measurableand understandable.In relation to the human being, value and action constitute a dialectic system that outweighs personal space.2 That is why they should be studiedjointly when related to social structures.

From this point of view, the interconnection action-value is manyfolded. Values are products of social-humanaction. The productive activity, labor, creates economic values. The aesthetic value of masterpiecesis a product of cultural-artistic activity. Political values are the product of the political activity of social groups and communities and of political parties.As a purposeful modifier of the agent-environmentrelationship,action appearsas value-creating, while value appears as a reason-purposeoriented toward intention and effort and as a way to objectivize human activities embodied in cultural assets,in what lasts after biological death,in the perpetuum of human activity. Values are also a universal environment that mediates human relationships meant to caffy out actions. Sociology no longer regards interactivebehavior acts as dialoguesbetweentwo or severalconsciousnesses.

It estimates them as social relationships by means of which the subject establishesan active link with the environment, sociosphereand zoosphere included.

In the same way, such links create an object for a subject and a subject for an object. Axiological sensitivity is stimulated not only by creating new objects of consumption of conspicuousaxiological status,cultural assets,but also by creating new needs, chiefly cultural, and new, specifically human, ways to relate to the world. Value is both an urge to action and a latent model for action. It is generatedby action and generatesaction in its turn within human axiological responses,direct stimuli, and needs.Value manifestsitself through indirect stimuli, relatedto an ideal representationof the action goal as a possible way to satisfy the need. The object is reflected with respect to the socially conditioned human needs.This fact triggers off the ideal craving that makes up the axiological stimuli for action and determines the motivation, direction, and purposefulnessof action.

In human activity, values function as ideal tools meant to choose goals, and as well-defined, often institutionalized, social products, latently comprised in motivations. Values become meaningful by manifest behavior, by the sequenceof states of mind that the human being experienceswhile interacting with the environment. Value inevitably representsthe factor that stimulates and optimizes human action. Value lends a human touch to the satisfactionof human needs,and, owing to cultural creation, it generatesnew

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human and social needs. Value-creating human activities unfold under the guidance of valued needs. Within the praxiological interlinking of agentobject-goal-achievement-consequence,an interference occurs between nomological and psycho-sociological motivations and value-based motivation. Nicolai Hartmann used to say that moral Daltonism or "axiological cecity" short-circuit action, since the entire human activity relies on observingfunctional parametersthat logically are conditionedformally and deontically-axiologically. Value is present during each stage of action: the agent embraces values, prefers one valued object to another, establishesa goal, picks up and employs the meansto accomplishthat goal, and weighs the consequencesby resortingto a scaleof values.

To conclude, I would call value that specific determination of an assimilated symbolic system which, under given historical circumstances, offers the criteria or the standards for selecting among alternatives and for openly and intrinsically directing preferential behavior. In this way, during one stage in its cognitive journey, axiology may become what Charles W. Morris named a scienceof preferentialbehavior.3Axiological inquiry pursues not the manifest but the latent side of human behavior.

By identifying value in latent behavior, we can see that any attempt to quantify the axiological realm should adopt from the start a definition of value which could open up the way for the functional analysis of the meaning implied in the manifestpreferentialresponses.

In this sense,Robert S. Hartman's attempt to reconstruct axiologya is worth considering for the following reasons:(1) The attempt starts from the fundamental axiom: value is meaning. (2) It achieves more rigorous reformulation of the theory of valuesby employing methodsof axiomatization and formalization, the efficiency of which has been proven by modern science,and it thus has becomethe enticing gatewayto formal axiology. (3) It achievesmeasurementof values while operating with qualitative mathematics or human mathematics,as Claude L6vi-Strauss called them. (4) It aims at measuring generic value, that is the very object of axiology, and it always avoids being overlappedby specific values.

The value measurement-systemdesigned by Hartman endeavors to surmount traditional difficulties, including those arising from the attempt to formulate purposefulnessin terms of efficiency, by formalizing axiology.

Logically and mathematically,Hartman's systemis nearly faultless.However, unless we take methodological precautions, the granting of sovereignty to mathematicalproceduresrisks turning everything into an exquisite yet barren game. The test Hartman suggestedis a tempting hypothesis to have the axiological approachat leastpartly controlled by science.

Among the many possible objections that call for methodological caution, I shall mention:

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(1)

The envisaged method relies on a bilateral relationship establishedbetweenobject and its intensity. The measurementof values assumes the thorough knowledge of the predicates expressingthe defining properties of an object. In some fields, such as ethics or aesthetics, sir), the characterization of a behavior or of the beauty of a painting, such operations are impossibleand the test proves useless.

(2)

If value is reduced to cognitive value and if the differences in individual valuejudgments are reducedto insufficient knowledge of the expositionalpropertiesof the valued object, then the test is a mere IQ test, This becomeseven more conspicuouswhen we consider the distinction between the disagreementin belief and the disagreementin attitude. Let us take an example. If A and B are listening to one of Beethoven's sonatas for piano, and A thinks it is Sonata No. 8 Pathdtique, while B thinks it is Moonlight Sonata,so that they have a disagreementin belief, the appeal to facts will solve the disagreement.But, if A declares,1 like Beethoven,and B declares,I don't like Beethoven, so that they have a disagreementin attitude,then the appealto facts will in no way help.

(3)

If we take into account the dichotomy of intrinsic and extrinsic values, we may defend the claim that being sincere, honest, or open-heartedranks higher than doing something.Here we have a purely theoretical level, and the complex context of axiological experienceis underestimated.For the sake of sincerity, sublime deeds have been achieved but atrocious crimes have also been committed. For me, Richard the Third's My kingdomfor a horse! is not a preposterouscry, as R. S. Hartman maintains. It is the triumph of survival, a vital value, over kinghood, a symbolic value. Under some circumstances,people justifiably assign a higher value to lunch than to a piece composed by a musical genius, for the simple reason that when hungry, they cannot experienceaestheticsatisfaction.

2. Values versus Measurement

The scientific point of view brought into the axiological discourseenablesthe measurementof values. But such an encountermay look paradoxical at first sight. There are three main objections against applying measurementto the axiological.

ValuesversusMeasurement

a n

JJ

First, we should keep in mind that values are preeminently qualitative; they disclose polarity, good-evil, beauty-ugliness,and involve valuation of objects in respectto human needs,desires,and intentions, all of which reject quantitative evaluation. As coordinates of human actions and preferential behavior, values are primarily manifest in verbal communicationby means of symbolic items that reflect the judgment, tenets, and attitudes of a human community and that the observercan judge as decodablenatural phenomena.

The analysis of such symbolic items can be achieved owing to subtle strategiesthat attempt an objective, systematic,and quantitativedescription of the latent value-contentof preferentialbehavior that becomesmanifest during a particular act of communication, against a precise socio-cultural background, and in relation to a specific referential framework. Although a rigorous, verifiable approachcould penetrateonly the boundariesof axiology, it can provide a commendableexplanatory addendum to less verifiable and lessrigorous knowledge,meant to cover basically non-quantifiableissues.

Second, the objection was raised that quantification and measurement encompassonly the outer aspectsof such a complex phenomenonas value is.

In this case, the three levels of quantitative analysis, the illustrative, the technical, and the methodological, are being mistaken for one another. I am now solely interestedin the methodologicallevel. This is the only level which refers to the constructionof the abstractobject of investigationin such a way that conceptscould be translatedinto indices and can undergo operations in order that dimensions, feature spaces,functional variations, and correlation can be detected. The specificity of values does not exclude their measurability, their quantitative comparison.Measurementdoes not infringe upon the principle of value irreducibility. It operatesupon an abstractobject, the valuating subject,in the sameway in which other social sciencesdeal with such notions as inhabitant, demography, producer, or economics, without envisagingspecific individuals. Measurementdoes not despisethe qualitative.

On the contrary, we might say that it quantitatively graspsthe qualitative. The differencesamong values,truth, goodness,beauty,justice, pleasure,or among the valuating subjects are temporarily suppressed during the cognitive journey, not for the irreducible to change into reducible, but for the incomparableto changeinto comparable.

Third, objections are raised as to a supposedspecific of the social, and especially of the axiological by virtue of which measurementin the field of values would be an illegitimate extrapolationof the methodology successfully applied in natural sciences.Far from being a upholder of quantification or test mania, I cannot help concluding that we should not necessarily renounce measurement itself, but we should refrain from granting measurement absolutesovereigntyand we should embark upon elaboratinga theory suitable for the domain under investigation.The cognitive and functional meaning of any measurementdepends on the quality of conceptualizationand on how

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A SCIENTIFTCRECONSTRUCTION OF THEAXIOLOGICAL

accuratelythis conceptualizationis translatedinto variablesfor the analysisof the investigated object. With physics, measurement implies enumerating remarks and data analysesand the mathematicalprocessingof thesenumbers.

But this measuringdevice is not fruitful in social sciences.In this domain, any phenomenon comprises human subjectivity, be it in its objective instantiations.Further difficulties arise from the historical characterof social phenomena,from reconstructing the whole out of fragments of reality and behind the moral boundariesof social experiment.A quiz and a scalemeant to record, rank, and compare attitudes, valuations, opinions, and preferential behavior, generate deeper and subtler problems than a device designed to measurethe trajectory of a bunch of electrons.Measurementdoes not prove impossible; it only proves more complex. Such thoughts make me conclude that the generaltheory of values is striving to becomearticulatedwithin those theoretical systems which secure inflection with the object and disclose the meaning of valuesat the level of the objects.

All methods of investigation, including measurementprocedures and techniques, cannot be elaborated outside the theory. Indeed, theoretical hypothesesmust be turned into investigation tools. Speaking about a method to measurevalues implicitly means speaking about axiology as a theoretical discipline. Each axiological conception advancesa theoretical model. This theoreticalmodel has an explanatory function which includes a latent pattern of organizing the componentmoments with a view to investigatingits object, in other words, a method. The unity between theory and method in the measurementof values is evidencedby'the requirement of functionalism. In order to be adequateand accepted,any theory must be formulated to comprise the modalities to investigate, measure, and verify in practice its own conclusions. Under the headway of investigation, a theory needs to be convertible into the methodsspecific to the sciencein question.

In a wider sense,the measurementof valuesappearsas the projection of a system of value-bearingreal objects onto a purely formal abstractsystem of items equipped with some properties, and of operations that apply to these items; that is, in a mathematicalsystem Rudolf Carnap would call calculus.

Successivecalculi correspondto successivemeasurementstages,and calculi imply an increasingnumber of ever more complex properties and operations.

The purpose of this transposition of a system of real objects into a mathematicalsystem is to substitutethe operationsin the abstractsystem for operationswhich are performable in a concretesystem.For the operationsin the abstract system to make senseto the physical, real-world system, which also includes value relationships,the axioms that underlie the abstractsystem must satisfy the conditions peculiar to the physical system.

Measurement relies on a major operation: choosing a level for measurement,an abstractsystem,where all data are orderedby nominal scale, ordered metric scale, interval scale, ratio scale, etc. As Clyde H. Coombs

ValuesversusM easurement

35

remarks, the axiomatic basis of the selectedmeasurementlevel makes up a theory on the behavior in question.s Axioms determine the relationships that are to be recorded in the database and the properties pertaining to these relationships. Axiological concepts turning into measurable functional operators enhance operationai efficiency with regard to adequatelyoutlining the object of investigation, to choosing a suitable measurement level, and to suitably interpreting the collected data. We need to resort to a method that can employ the stratified mix of all quantitative analysistechniquesin the intricate realm of values, in an attemptto have them inclosed in a theoreticalpattern.

A unifying structural approach,with but a few alterations,supplies the means to use Robert S. Hartman's techniques of measuring the noetic dimension of value.6Once we have discoveredthat the relationship between rules, values, and signs translatesthe relationshipbetweenstructure,function, and meaning into terms of human behavior, a new avenue to measuring qualitative values opens up. If we consider rules as systems of obligations, values as systemsof exchanges,and signs as conventionalsymbols serving to expressrules and values, as does Piaget, then the realm of values becomesa vast field for comparativeresearch.T If, on the other hand, the starting point is another dimension of value, say, desirability or attraction, and the operational definition pertaining to it, say, a hypothetical invariant providing the code to choose between desirable action alternatives,then the measurementof values follows a newly-traced trend that should not be underestimated.The researcherwill study inferential constructions instead of directly variable phenomena. The researcher will replace manifest choices, which are not values but expressionsof value, by desirableoptions that impact upon meansand ends, influence alternativesfor action, and heavily bear upon preferential responses.Persons and groups always have to make a choice between alternative desiderata.Preferences differ with distinct contexts, but they always follow and reiterate a model assigned to values that stands for the code supplying ranking and hierarchization criteria for the intensity of desires, in case of diverse desiderata.Each socialized human being lies at the crossroadsof several social force-fields that draw that being toward varying desiderata. If desideratum means whatever a person wishes for at a given moment, a material object, social relationship, a piece of information, or any object of desire, then valuation can take over W. R. Catton Jr.'s definition: an action expressing the intensity of an individual's desire as to various desiderata, namely, that person's determination to achieve the desideratumin question.

The in actu choice, projected onto an n-sized axiological space, helps us measurethe valueshaving generatedmore or less intensedesiresand compare the relationships between desiderataand values. The proceduresdevised by Catton have managed to prove that, if starting from this operational

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A SCIENTIFIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AXIOLOGICAL

framework,we introducethe conceptsof valueperspectiveand axiological space,thenwe couldtalk aboutthelimitedmeasurability of humanvalues.8 If I abide by Catton's operationaldefinition of valuation, I can formulate the following thesis:The impact of valuesupon human choicesamong several desideratais conditionedby the socially acquiredknowledge of characteristics that values have. When these characteristicsare fully known, this influence becomesan invariant, while the differencesbetweenthe preferentialbehavior of the valuating subjects,involving the subject's adherenceto the value to a higher or lesser extent, will depend on several variables. The perspectiveof value might be one of thesevariables.If, for instance,two Romanians,A and B, are in Rome and feel hungry, the food they would normally prefer when in Bucharest, s4), mititei or sarmale, the traditional Romanian dishes, will not present immediate value to them. In their new perspective,this desideratum wanes, while the effort they might undertaketo achieve it, as compared to a similar, encounterabledesideratum,is equally bound to dwindle. The apparent value of an object varies not only with the intensity of desire, but also with spatial proximity. The framework for this value-perspectiveis provided by a space endowed with different properties than the physical ones, and I shall call it, axiological space.A subject perceivesa goal as less valuable when the social distance separatingthe subject from the goal increases.In present-day political activity, a remoter goal is translated into emergency targets, and perspectivetrends are traced with increasedhuman effort. As to scienceor art, waste of talent is often generatedby the subject's inability to translate a generous desire, say, to be in the service of humankind or to create masterpieces,into tangible targets, the perspective trends of which should generate axiological attraction and activate abilities. Owing to the counterbalancingmechanismsinherent to social determinism, any action or value, as Robert T. Merton demonstrates,is always controlled by closer targets, or, to use the words of Talcott Parsons,by tangible targets. As with gravity, the attractionexertedby a target-objectdependsupon the distance,in axiological space, between the valuating subject and the object liable to valuation.

Valuation involves severalvariables as functions. Choosing only a few such variables niurows down any approach. A generalized operational analysisis neededto turn a one-sidedview into a holistic view, to assessvalue as a whole, by means.of a wide range of methods and complementary techniques.I consider the actual value a subject promotes as being a function of three variables:(l) the socially acquiredvalues,(2) the thorough knowledge of the various desiderata,and (3) the distancebetween values and desiderata within the n-sized axiological space. A valuating human being lies at the crossroads of several force fields and is thus attracted toward multiple desiderata.In each case,the attraction is a function of the proximity from the desideratato the valuating subject within an n-sized axiological space.Each

Values versusM easurem.ent

37

person defines the kinds of desideratathat are activated within the respective fields of forces according to assimilated cultural patterns and to social interaction. The many-sided axiological space which hosts the relationship between the desideratumand its values should be regardedas a sociocultural product. In this context, I attempt to correct Catton's magnetic model of values that renders absolute the treatment of values as forces. Within operational analysis, value may be a sui generis force, but it can be such a force only in a sociologicaland psycho-sociologicalsense,and not in the physical sense. This idea paves the way for the investigation of the mathematicalstructureof the axiological space.

From this point of view, we could considerthat the axiological space,as a socio-culturalproduct, containssubsetsin different culturesand subcultures.

If preferencesfor some desideratavary with the distancebetween subject and desideratawithin the axiological space,the size of the axiological spacewill vary with eachpersonor group.

The graph below presentsthe one-sidednessof the desiderata,located within a two-sided axiological space,with X1 and X2 as dimensions,and A, B, ..., H, the desideratafound in a coordinating system with the value assignerat the origin.

Assuming that a person in one group is enculturated to perceive the object-desideratain terms of the one-sidedspaceX1, while a personin another group comes to see it in the X2-spaceterms, the first person will display the

38

A SCIENTIFIC RECONSTRT.]CTIONOF THE AXIOLOGICAL

preferential order D', A', H', F', C', G', E', B', while the second person will favor a different order, H"rG", F", E", D", C", A",8", althoughthe values are the same for both groups and their variations can be a measured function of the referential dimensions of the axiological space. Though limited, a gateway is thus opened to measurepreferences,explain the functionality of values,and passfrom manifest behaviorto potential values.

The separateuse of a peculiar technique of value measurementwould not engendertricky methodological issues.Serious hardships,however, may arise in our analysis if we use an overwhelming variety of methods and proceduresin order to collect, analyze,and measureobservationaldata. Not even Hartman's and Catton's approachesare comparable. They fail to be comparable because their logical syllabus is different. To make them comparable,to help them communicatewithin a wider theoreticalpattern, we should keep in mind that they both operatewith reductions.My suggestionis that the measurementof values might become a pseudo-problemfor whoever deniesreduction.

An axiological analysis that overlooks the emotional, intentional, and desiderativemeaning and pays heed only to the descriptive meaning of the uneven ranking of things, expressed in human hierarchies, is bound to underestimateor disregard the specific cognitive core of axiology. Statistics, mathematical models, or axiomatic schemesshould not deprive axiology of the need for observation and experience.All they can do is outline efficient and rigorous devices for analysis and comparison over some stages of the cognitive journey. Each measurement strategy has its limits, since it complicates the concept of value. With each of them, the strategy considers only one dimension, functionally defined, in a many-sidedsystem.The limits are obvious even in the fortunate casesof contextual analysis,when variables are set for individuals and their environment and the scientific proceduresare enriched by a sociological perspective. Measurement is performed at the expenseof reducing value to its instrumental,noetic, perspectival,epigenetic, selective, or desiderativedimension. Each kind of measurementis justified, since it converts raw phenomena,the result of the investigation of symbolic matter in the natural environmentof social life or in simulatedconditions, into data liable to quantitative treatment that can be integrated into a notional system and lead to conclusions that apply beyond the boundaries of their generatron.

Notwithstanding, any type of measurementis one-sided. If we rely exclusively on just one kind of measurement,this might deal a deadly blow to research,all the moreso that measurementis meaninglessat a macro-social level. Relying on just one type of measurementwould entail leaving out the complex structure of society as a whole and focus just on elementary responsesand exchangesbetween individuals or small groups, where the connection among valuation, the structure and dynamics of culture, and the

ValuesversusM easurement

39

psychological mechanismsmight or might not be revealed.Value needsto be approachedin layers by multiple methods. The axiomatic of classesand of relationshipsand attitudinal scaleselaboratedby social psychology are useful to acquire an accurateexpressionfor the mechanicsof hierarchy-building and qualitative value-exchange.

All methods of measurementrely upon the hypothesis that manifest behavior is a function of a latent, genotypical attitude of the subject, and of conditions that the subject encountersin a given situation and when faced with stimuli. Whether we accept or not the presenceof an axiological space, two levels of descriptioncould be accepted: A. a phenotypic, P, level of behavior as observed, the manifest behavior; B. a genotypic, G, level of latent behavior, supposedlycomprising a pre-establishedcomplex of possibilities and underlying manifest behavior.

As long as a number of subjectspassa test and we classify their answers,we provide a description of the manifest behavior,the P level, and obtain either a pattern of classifiable answers,successes,and failure, or a numeric score of congruent versus deviant answers. This is only a starting point for the investigator whose endeavor is to draw genotypic conclusions on valuation abilities and strategiesand to extract genotypically infened observationsby correlating answersand measurements. social psychology widely uses scaling procedures to achieve measurementsof attitude (Thurstone, Rickert, Guttman, Lazarsfeld, etc.).

Passing on from the phenotypic level, which is intelligible by interpreting each answer given during a test, to the genotypic level relies on the combined answers a person supplies to several questions. This transition aims at measuringvaluation abilities or the intensity of value options, in relation to an ideal or to a parameter.

Once attitudeshave undergonemeasurement,investigation should probe into the subtle blend of intentions,desires,and volitions, that characterizesthe realm of values in relation to the informational moment. The rating scales used to measurethe intensity of the attitude, namely, differences of degree, and not differences of species,allow us to infer from the phenotypic to the genotypic.

The theoreticalbaseunderlying such inferencesmight be a unanimously accepteddefinition of information included in phenotypic observationand in the relationship betweenthe (P) and (G) levels. In order to grasp the subject's valuation ability and standpoint, we must employ stimuli that trigger off a manifest behavior with axiological relevance, such as answering questions, collective statesof mind, moods, and stimulus situations.

We will find two types of information in the phenotypic manifest behavior and, hence, two different procedures to acquire them. The first

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A SCIENTIFTC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AXIOLOGICAL

procedureis to run a teston the subjectto establishtwo groups,successand failure,accordingto the natureof the itemsandthe numberof itemsrequiring lesserabilities than those with which the subject is endowed,and then to draw genotypicalconclusions.The secondprocedureis to let the subjectpick up the item closest to his or her hierarchy ideals and discard all the other items, whether they lie above or below the chosenone. In this way, we establishtwo more groups, the acceptedand the unaccepteditems, and we draw another kind of genotypicalconclusion.

The measurement of value will pursue two complementary goals, corresponding to the two types of information that are to be reached by suitable methods and procedures.During the process,we will understandby "appraisal," the theoretical act of ranking an already-existingvalue, and by "valuation," the pragmatic act of assigning value to an object that lacked it previously since the object can satisfy human needs,desires,aspirations.

Now, distinguishing between relative behavior, the collected data of which are based on the relationshipsbetween two or more stimuli, say, the subject's preference for either of two politicians or two friends, and independent behavior, where the subject's judgments refer to only one stimulus, with the subject simply stating a like or a dislike for a politician or friend, we can also displdy them in a four-squaretable. The table provides a unitary schemeof all the methods of data-collectingand analysisinvolved in value measurement.

Borrowed from Coombs.the table reads: Independent behavior '1.r..

Relative behavior

II A

Task A

I

IIB

TaskB

ilI

ry

From an axiological point of view, to introduce data into one of the four squaresmeans to adopt one or anothermethod of data-collection,elucidating the type of information to be extractedfrom the data in question,and to use a precise method of analysis: a set of proceduresfor the data that fit into each square.By meansof measurement,this should help the investigatorpass from phenotypic information to genotypical conclusionsand from a gnoseological

ValuesversusM easurement

41

diagnosis to an etiological one. I should note that in squareII, subgroup IIA includes monotonous stimuli and the subject fails a test, as with arithmetic tests, while subgroup B includes non-monotonous stimuli and the subject agrees or disagreesto a statement of opinion, while choosing those items which are closestto an ideal.

My intention here is not to go deeper into technical details, since specialized writing provide an impressive number of such details. The considerationsabove allow me to draw a few conclusions which I regard as crucial for the future of axiology.

The measurement of value is not a pseudo-problem. The problem remains genuine,despitethe pseudo-solutionsso often provided to it.

First, we should know exactly what we intend to measure.It is not a matter of listing or numbering persons who have come to voice preferential opinions; it is a matter of strictly measuringthe ability to value or the attitude as to value, of assessingthe statusa value holds within a community, and of ranking a value within individual behavior. Given our presentknowledge, to judge measurement as more than an accessory meant to facilitate the understandingof values would sound utopian. This accessoryneverthelessis valuable. Provided we do not make measurementabsolute,we will find out that we cannot do without it. We have striven toward getting axiology ready to undergo such schemes of analysis, to assimilate the measurement procedureswithin its specific language,and to shapethem within its specific thought, instead of merely witnessing the strict application of those schemes.

Our endeavorhas resultedin what I dare call re-valuation of value. This is the way for rigorous scientific procedures to enter the realm of axiology, by tradition speculative. The much-discussedineffable character of value is consequently an axiological echo of the impossibility of fully formalizing scientific research. Dealing with axiological issues in terms of scientific methods and proceduresmeans to self-inflict restraints and constraints,but only to make axiology more fruitful and knowledgeable.Far from diminishing curiosity and astonishment with the unknown, this approach enhances bewilderment and shifts it from the realm of emotions to that of rational knowledge.

Second, we should know how to proceed to measurements.The flaw with most measuring methods and proceduresconsists not so much of their technical drawback as of their claim to be all-encompassing.Most methods need refreshing. They need a fresh network of relationships to assign new consistency to each method and to the methodological ensemble as a wellstructured whole of methods, procedures, and techniques. Since the measurementof values is a componentof operationalresearch,we should put aside individual, isolated devices in favor of a flexible, interdisciplinary, axiology-biasedanalysis.

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The use of scientific data as a foundation of cognitive procedures pertaining to axiology is a process in itself. Science is not a saturated, completed abstractsystem,but a huge building-site where an edifice is being erected, ceaselesslyprogressing, forever perfectible. No general theory o? values can be founded by juxtaposing demonstrationsand points of view taken from several sciences.Scientific explanationsneed to go beyond the boundaries of science into the invigorating realm of philosophy. Scientific data and arguments need interconnecting by means of a cumulative, yet unitary, languageand a sufficiently comprehensivetheoretical model, which should first translate the scientific approachesand then articulate them into a unifying synthesis. Any such translation could be only partial, since an exhaustivetranslation is unattainablefor a given state of knowledge and as a matter of principle.

The strategy of investigating values in an intuitive, skilled way is obsolete. Not all quiz-makers and option-processors help axiology to progress.Axiological researchis incompatible with the intellectual candor of a Labiche character, who thought that science meant counting the widows who used to cross Pont-Neuf in Paris. Axiology cannot be reduced to measurement.Yet, axiology is not possible if measurementand computation are discarded. The ontological substantiationof value, as a feature of the human existential modality, provides the premisesfor the use of conceptsthat are technical enoughto detecttheoreticalerrors and to solve the practical. The philosophical status of axiology will not be diminished if axiology adopts scientific methods.Far from being affecied as a theoretical disciptine, it will acquire the practical benefits of applied disciplines and will better contribute to assessing,guiding, and foreseeingsocial contemporaryaction. Probing into the sphereof action will enable us to adjust to the increasingrate of historical evolution and to the continual, often amazing, growth of the number of situationsin which a decision needsto be made.

3. The Value Judgment Value judgment is a philosophical problem. As Arnold Berleant remarked,eit is one of the most recurrentproblems in modern value theory. Before dealing with it in a library or during a lecture, we come acrossit during our solitary daydreaming,in our encounterswith people, in the street,in the forum. People love or hate, they experiencedelight or agony, they go in for struggle or yietd to resignation, they live and die while searchinga rationale for their valuebaseddissociationand hierarchization.We might even say that their pursuit of valuejudgments is never-ending. within the polyphony of human judgments, the value judgment representsthat kind of judgment that lends objectivity and universality to acts otherwisepurely individual and subjectiveand that are latently engenderedby

The Val.ueJudgment

43

spontaneousaffective and desiderative psychological reactions. The value judgment is the logical axis of axiological preferences.Wondering whether the value judgment is true or false is tantamount to wondering whether this judgment has cognitive value. Dealing with such a problem belongs ro axiocentric human ontology, and its purposeis to interpret the meaning of the value judgment by considering the path from the logical to the axiological perspective.

At a first glance, debatesabout the rational basis of value judgments, their origins and relevancealso, should take place in the fietd of logic. This approachmay be acceptedor refuted. The answeris yes in relation to the form of the logical meansof thinking; it is no in relation to the basic manifestation of the human spirit. With the first alternative, we have strict logicmathematical formalization. with the second, we deal with the human motives of valuation, namely, with its ontological meaning. Here are passionatephilosophical inquiries about the kind of ontology. To Plato, it was an ideal rational order, transcendentto human beings. Kant conceived the foundation to be a priori structures in the depths of the human spirit. To Husserl, the ontological foundation meant the intentional structures of pure consciousness,with experienceas a starting point for an autonomous game through which the value judgment offers a conceptual formulation and justifies, within an irreducible Geftilslogik, the values presentin experiencing options.ro Though it may seema paradox,any judgment implies a value as it refers to a choice: we are bound to choosebetweendifferent possibleassertions.The mere fact that about any judgment, S is P, we may make the meta-judgment,S is P is false/true,shows that any judgment incorporatesvalue. since it implies discrimination and choosing between various possible statements and a statement relative to a standard. Even if we know that a judgment that subordinates the particular to the general does not create value, but discriminates value according to a precise criterion, we cannot deny that the act by which the judgment makes its statementis a valuation act. The reverse cannot be refuted either: valuesimply judgments.

I am not speakingabout an "inborn common senseof value" (Ren6 Le Senne), but about a critical spirit capable of a value judgment, rationally grounded. It is true that we cannot reason in the absence of a valuation judgment, and, as Stephen E. Toulmin pointed out, that thought cannot get hold of value without reason. Yet the nature of the correlation reason/value becomes dramatically important when we reach the axiological stage in a processthat involves a hierarchy ofpreferences.

The presenceof a preferenceis a necessary,but insufficient, condition that shows we are on the right track in our inquiry into the value judgment.

From preference to judgment, we pass from sentiment to reflection, from individual subjective projects to objective foundations,from the spontaneous

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to the conscientiousact, to critical analysis. The value judgment stands for that type of judgment which gives an objective and a universal form to an act of a subjective and individual character, gradually obtained as a result of psychological, emotional, and preferential spontaneous reactions. Value judgment is the logical axis of axiological preferences.

A value judgment is not a simple statement about a preference.

Judgmentssuch as,I like Mozart's music,I don't like Twin Peaks,I preferfair women to dark women, are not valuejudgments. They statea preference,as a mere fact, or they are sentenceswith an emotional content alone. On the other hand, the value judgment is a judgment in which value is the predicate of the judgment, A is good, or, X is better than Y, that joins the act of evaluation and valuation, that is, the act of stating a value and the axiological act of assigning value to an object. Generally speaking,the value judgment is a judgment the subject of which is always the valuatedobject, that always comparesvalues.

If we accept an it-is-good interpretation,we can rcahze that the it-isgood statementrests upon the unstatedcomparisonbetweenwhat is good and what is not good. Moreover, we are unlikely not to even consider questions whether there are other equally good objects or behavioral alternatives.A is good, used in the senseof a value judgment, is always an elliptical expression for any number of more complex predicates,such as good-in-such-and-such-a respect,good for one of its kind. The axis of this processis the comparisonof values.ll This is not a comparison between two objects. Let us discuss the next example. Those who consider the judgment, A is better than B, a simple comparison betweenA and B, are inclined to think so. But this is a complex value judgment that implies from the very beginning that the two entities are good. Namely, they start from the simple value judgment, A is good, and, B is good, and move on to comparison,concluding that, A is better than B, or B ls less good than A. But, if in the simple value judgment of the A is good type, the valuation is the corollary of placing the fact against an ideal, of a comparison between object A and the tendency of the subject, the complex value judgment A is better than B presupposes,in its turn, either the judgment B is good, making a comparison between B and the ideal, followed by the judgment A is better than B, comparing A to B, or the judgment A is good, comparingA to an ideal, followed by the judgment B is not as good as A.ln these examples, the value judgment implies a comparison resulting from relating both objects,A and B, to a common tendency,or wish.

As they are always comparative,value judgments are also valuations of objects, setting up a vertical hierarchical order in relation to a determined criterion that guides the assertion or rejection of the value hierarchy.

Sentencessuch as, This picture is more beautiful, or This behavior is worthier, imply the idea that they ought to be prefened to others. This ought to is a primitive term in relation to value, and it cannot be translatedas a fact, but it

The Value Judgment

45

may be tested in action, as it tends to become a practical axiological experience.It may either refer to achievedvalues or to ideal values, as in the case of moral, aesthetic,and religious ideals. Perhaps Socrateshad grasped just this aspect when he said that there was no difference between knowing the good and doing good. Thus, the value judgment is not rendered by the subject's passing emotional mood. It has an informational content, closely linked with the emotional state of mind, as it expressesa socially determined attitude on the part of the subject. This attitude may be tested within the axiological experience.The valuejudgment informs us about the nature of the axiological relation between the subject and the object. Our approval or disapproval is no longer a formal characteristicsof the value judgment, as negationand assertionare in the judgment of inference.The conceptsof good and bad, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, do not come into play in such judgments, X is good. X is uglier. Z is best, or in negativejudgments, a role different from is/is not or copula. They substitute for the copula, and such conceptsbelong to the attributesof judgment, that is, to its material.

The value implied in the predicateof the value judgment is not an entity to be displayed. It is a meaning to be recognized.This leads the way to a sui generis intensional and extensional analysis, one based on the nonreductionist understanding of the relations between descriptive and value judgments.

Some authors think that the value judgment, P(a), is true when (a) belongs to the denotatum of the valuation predicate,P, and becauseof this, the difference refers to the manner of establishing the extension of the predicate, P. And they feel it has an exclusively pragmatic character. I disagree.I will demonstratethat, when dealing with a value judgment, we will not find the object included within the sphereof the valuation predicate.

We can speakof an

strictly extensionally,by rejecting Thus, the value judgment cannot t:tHf; its relational character. It is a well-known fact that when saying P(a), we relate object (a) to value P, and therefore assign value P to (a) Despite this, we cannot but accept that, though in the judgment, A is good, the predicate good does not refer to a natural quality of things that could be empirically found out, but the non-naturalquality expressedby the predicateof the value judgment may be testedin a specialway. Our experienceas a whole, either in the practical or the phenomenologicaldimension,keeps us from assertingthat the position of the democratcannot be anymorerationally explained than that

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A SCIENTTFTCRECONSTRUCTION OF THE AXIOLOGICAL

of the fascist,that human solidarity is not any more rationally explainablethan masscrime.

Let me explain the idea above by using a semanticanalysisof the value judgment on the intensional plane. The traditional method of the extensional approach,a < P, becomesirrelevant for the judgment of a relation, as it is in the case of the value judgment. Through human action, as a third member, a relation is establishedbetweentwo different entities, the object and the value.

As the value judgment concludes that the object a has a value p for individuals, as members of a community, of a given culture of an historical period, and finally, as human beings, a semantic analysisreveals that in this case, as in the case of descriptivejudgments, we project it against a field of facts as well. But in this case, it does not representan empirical datum. It standsfor a given socio-cultural,historically determinedprinciple, because,as JamesColeman said, there is no absoluteobservationpoint, outside any social systems from which a value judgment can be made.r2So, the differences betweendescriptiveand evaluativejudgments are here to stay.

Therefore, I am not saying that value judgments may be reduced to descriptivejudgments, nor am I saying that they can be inferred from them.

By accepting the irreducibility of value judgments, I consider, nonetheless, that those who draw from these premises the conclusion, value judgments have no factual content, have committed the sophism of justifying to conclusions. My conclusion is that value judgments involve descriptive conditions; they both involve them and transcendthem.

From my point of view, which is that the value judgment is irreducible to the descriptivejudgment, value judgments, although factually unverifiable, can be compared to already accepted value judgments, and in this way coherent systems of value judgments can be established.Even if we do not appeal to facts, value judgments are not mere emotional outbursts,since they can be assigned not only attitudinal meaning but also logical value which determinestheir congruity or incongruity with other value judgments, already acceptedin a given cultural pattern.

A descriptive utterance and the sentenceexpressingit differ in syntax and logical form from the axiological value-formulating utterance. The difference is visible in the predicatestructure.

As demonstratedby David Hume, no sentenceof the type, this ought to be the case, can be deducedfrom a sentenceof the type, this is the case.The reasonwhy is that the value residesin the predicate.

Moreover, it cannot be deduced because,in the last analysis, the distinction between factual and value judgments is not a simple logical distinction.The first has a prevailing epistemologicalstatus;the second,by including value in the predicate,that is, a human existentialdetermination,has an ontological status. Thus, we have the dianoetic pivot of consciousness, marked, on one hand, by an appeal to investigative experience,and, on the

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other hand, the axiological sensitiveness, appealing to a committed experience. The value judgment offers a foundation for human action in which interestappearsexclusively as finality, and not as efficiency.

If we analyze the active relation of the axiological subject to the objective situation and we take heed of the indispensablerational quotient, we cannot deny that axiological sensitivity plays a major part. Assigning value is an act performed by the subject not as an all-knowing spirit, but as a complex human being endowed with axiological sensibility.What I have in mind is not a Cartesian cogito but an axiological cogito. All primary tendencies that undergo co-ordination and hierarchization make up, through their inner connections,the foundation of axiological sensitiveness,which can engender proto-valuation.Thesetendenciesare intentional and becomemeaningful only to the envisaged outer object they vaguely, still poignantly, yearn for, thus arousing pleasure or pain, satisfaction or dismay. Axiological research has revealedthe position of past experienceas the starting point of tendenciesand that of the obstaclesthese tendenciescome across while attempting to get satisfied. Several contextual factors make tendencies contribute to the complex processduring which finality turns from a blind craving into a target consciously accepted,the strain of the pursued effort turns into volition, and the tendency to satisfy that volition associatedwith the craved-for objects, turns into desire. The subject assignsvalue to the intentional object of desire that is first experienced as attraction. The alternative, or rhythmical, successiveachievement of values is closely related to the structure of the psychological human universe,to the proteic, molding axiological sensitivity.

Value is consequentlyinvolved in the act of assimilating primary experience into structures pertaining to the tendencies delineated by axiological sensitiveness.The next step is the separationof value from the assimilating act and the focus of axiological sensitivenesson the goal it strives to attain. In this way, attraction becomes detached from the structures in the subject's conscienceand becomes a value in itself. It is assignedto the object as a quality pertaining to that object and making that object desirable, as if the object itself has had a ne varielzr status.

The agreementbetween needs, necessities,and aspirations,on the one hand, and objects, creative works, and behavior, on the other hand, is perceived as a feeling of value, which stays blurred and puzzLing,unless undergirded, substantiated,supported, enriched, and justified by a value judgment.

Value judgments cannot be discussedwithout admitting that they are based on experience and develop within human experience, that they get shape by applying judgment to the values present in our experience.

Experience is not to be taken in its limited meaning, as a precise responseto observablestimuli. Values make up anotherrealm of reality, with a different statusfrom that of the sensoriallyperceptiblethings. Things are designatedby

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perceptions;values are designatedby feelings. As any perceptive experience comprises,or exhibits, aspectsof things, so feeling designatesa value asserted or assessedwithin axiological experience.There is no value that fails to stir our affectivity, that fails to stimulate attraction and desire. A value fails to be known unless it is experiencedfrom within, as much as a thing fails to be known unless it is first glimpsed from the outside. The act of judging, in which rational abilities play the prevalent part, analyzes, substantiates,and justifies the implicit presenceof value in axiological experience,in the area of feelings, desires,and volition. Since it involves our conscienceas a whole, not just its dianoetic axis, the axiological experienceincludes the entire range of human activities, governed by the physical, social, historical, and cultural conditions in which the individual lives.

Axiological experienceimplies not only activity, but also an object of activity. Guided by cultural needsexpressingwhat opposesthe social to the biologic, activity is selective,intentional, conclusive, hierarchical,projective, and prospective.Its object is value, identified through intentional conscience.

The value of judgment offers a conceptual formulation; it classifies and anchors present values in axiological experience. Axiological experience, consideredas an experiencepervaded by temporality, respondsto reality by acts specific of axiologichl sensitiveness.Such an experienceis determined simultaneouslyby the psychologicaland cultural conditioning of the valuating subject and by the object. It is an estimating description, including information. So it also includes some knowledge about the object, even if transfigured by emotional accretion or need inflections. Sometimes, the transfiguring could be distorted at the level of one individual experience.For instance,some faults could be attributed to an unpleasantperson,even if that person does not have them. By examining though the crucial facts of the axiological experience, we discover the connection between the social and historical processin which valueshave been createdand their incorporation in the sphere of individual motivations. This does not imply that value judgments lack a factual content, but that this content is limited and transfigured. Its presence could still be verified by confronting value judgments with the values actually present in the living axiological experlence.

By further introducing the conceptof situation into our analysis,we may reap the fruits of the analysis made by Hartmann on the importance of situation in the human ethos.We start from the finding that tension is present in axiological experienceas an expressionof the contradiction between the pursuit of value and the circumstancesmaking possible its attainment.Human action has no value in itself, but only in relation to another.Value exists only in a situation. As a function of the situation,justice may becomecruelty, love, or weakness.In all such confusing cases,we do not usually deny value but catch its inactuality in the given situation. In other words, axiological

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sensibility has the intuition of a discrepancy between value and the given situation, declining to actualizeother values except for those that could really function as adequate values in a given situation. The situation seen as a context of circumstances, objective and subjective, becomes one of the constitutive moments of our axiological experience. Situations have both generaldeterminantsand somethingindividual that only exists once. A person who, having been in a situation, has failed to perceive its virtual richness of ethical attainment,has lost the possibility to actualize a value and will regret the irreparable. Our axiological experience is woven from a multitude of situationsin which major axiological conflicts are engraved.In any situation, a human being has the occasionto discover valuesthat he or she can attain or through which she or he can self-realize.Each situation is an occasionto test human forces or weaknesses;it is a stimulation or tension, an occasion for ethical self-realizationor abdication.The signs of a value judgment reside in understandingthe concretesituation. In a historically constitutedcommunity, an individual is determinedto consider as moral a certain behavior, and not another one. The axiological experienceof humankind is not oriented by the timeless transcendentalprinciples of good or beauty, but by criteria able to always solve concrete problems posed by concrete events in concrete situations. Values exist and have a meaning in a given situation alone, in a given social context. In point, perennial values are explained by the generality,recurrence,and stability of some situationaldata. Quite frequently, the situation offering support to a value judgment may change.Its horizontal axis is the pluralism of social positions and roles, of the types of human communication,and of cultural patterns.Its vertical axis is temporality. There are contexts when we judge a certain behavior as intrinsically good or a picture is intrinsically beautiful, but this is just a way of distinguishing a categoryof goals from other categoriesthat we want to rule out.

The value judgment conceives and organizes values that appear in axiological experienceas a responseto typical situations.The processis based on social criteria of desirability and has its consequencesin the world in which humankind circumscribesits existence.The aspiration of the value of judgment toward universality, by passing on from existence to need, and toward objectivity, by relating to extra-individual criteria, is based on the dialectics of the social and individual. The disagreementbetween someone saying,X is yellow, and someoneelse saying,X is not yellow, is solved by confronting the descriptivejudgment with facts. The axiological disagreement between someonesaying, X is good, and someoneelse saying, X is not good, is solvable by confronting the value judgment with its consequenceon the axiological experiencein a given situation.

The predicate of the value judgment no longer appearsas a manifest entity, but as arecognizablemeaning,since it relies on the consequenceof the value judgment being involved in actions that are participative and verifiable

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at the same time, and not on psychological motivation. Value judgments are not equivalent. They can rank hierarchically because they are involved in

humanexperience, in theenvironment-changing humanaction.

Taking into accountthe above considerations,I feel reticent toward Max Weber's desideratumof axiological neutrality of the cognitive approach.13I admit that the cognitive approachincreasesin objectivity while unloading its distorting axiological connotations,its deceiving ideological prejudices, and its narcissistic survey of the subject's emotional responsesprojected on the investigated object. I agree with Weber in his request that axiological presuppositionsnot be convertedinto explanatoryhypotheses.I agreewith the requirement for the researcherto formulate verifiable statements,to acquaint others with the valuationsdemandedby investigation,atrd to reach an optimal degree of objectivity. I cannot believe that excluding the value judgment might provide an outer condition for scientific objectivity, as causal explanations provide the inner condition for objectivity. Counting out the value judgment from the cognitive investigationcarried out by social sciences is neither possible nor necessaryin order to enhancethe degreeof objectivity in research. It is not possible, since, on the one hand, by establishing an axiological ratio, Wertbeziehung,as Rickert calls it, the researcherinvolves a value judgment in the selectivecriteria that allow the delineation of a specific field of social research.On the other hand, the truth-value sentencesare not value-free, Wertfreiheit. Neither is the exclusion necessary, since value judgments do not boost objectivity in research,becausethey have an objective content and objective consequencesentdiled by action, and they do not turn causal reasoning into conditional reasoning. The much-discussedevaluative must rn the value judgment is generatedby concretehistorical circumstances, and if we consider the referential system, the context, we can establish the objective source of the informational content of the judgment. This information can be proven by the value judgments being compatible with scientific truths and can be verified by their practical consequences.

Overrated causality as a way to neutralizethe subjectivity of value judgments is useless, since making a valuejudgment implies a causalrelationshipto a standard.

In phenomenologicalterms, axiological sensibility is intentional, aiming at objects that correspondto its interests.But, if our own structurescan be intentionally directed toward objects, this means that, in reality, something allows for or favors the assignmentof values. Without being based on the objective data of the real, values could no longer play the key role of optimizing human action.

I have thus adopted a view that is the antithesis of the empiricistpositivist position: valuejudgments are not cognitive.

A new beginning was promised to axiology by the type of conceptual analysispracticed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations and by ordinary-languagephilosophy, as practiced by Ryle, John Austin, and

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Strawson. Reductive analysis was abandoned. Wittgenstein asked in his lectureshow value judgments could really be meaningless,when they played such an important role in everydaylife and had such a tremendousrole to play in ordinary language.la Value judgments zre not inferior to descriptive judgments, but are of a different nature.The task of researchis to find out the differencesbetweenaxiological and assertorialsentences.

Thus, we can surpassthe alternative intuitivism/emotivism. If George Edward Moore's intuitivism considered value judgments as having the cognitive content characteristicof descriptivejudgments, the only difference being that the predicateof the judgment representsa non-naturalquality, and if Charles L. Stevenson's emotivism felt them to be completely void of cognitive content, both explanations are the same: they share the same prejudice that value sentences might be assimilated to the category of assertorialsentences,or that they could not.

The person who is delighted with a work of art is an axiological subject, not a gnoseological subject. The emotional states, the echo of which, for emotivism, is proof of their non-cognitive character, belong to human experience.The sentencesabout this experiencehave thus an informational content. They can be confronted with a sui generis experience.They can be controlled, provided we distinguish between values as modalities characteristic of relational human experience and value judgments as statementsabout these modalities. The value judgment offers a conceptual formulation, classifies, and justifies the values present in axiological experience.

Their verification, also extremely complex, appears theoretically feasible.For instance,the statementthat it is right to sterilize the incurable is false in Kantian ethics, the way that the statementthat it is better to take revenge than to forgive is false in Christian ethics. A value judgment is falsified either when we reject the whole value-systemwithin which the given judgment is interpreted, or when it is impossible to find within the given value-systema principle to justify the judgment, sometimes even when the facts presupposedin the value judgment are wrong. Thus, value judgments meet the postulate of controvertibility, that is, for any given value judgment we can indicate conditions under which it may be proved false. Interpretedon the basis of the given value-language,a judgment contains the cognitive information that the person, object, or act mentioned meets or does not meet valuation criteria. The criteria have to be demonstratedin a specific languagegame, otherwise the statementwould be incomprehensible.The information about meeting or not meeting rationally acceptablecriteria of valuation can facilitate the recognition of the evaluatedobject. Likewise, the circumstances in which anyone who understandsthe given value-languagecan, on the basis of an implicit description of specific facts, formulate his or her appropriate

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valuation, indicates the presenceof cognitive content connectedwith emotionalcontentin valuejudgments.

In this way, the value judgment no longer appears as a whimsical projection of some feelings or desires, but it involves a special kind of rationality and a knowledge of its object. Its object is nothing other than value that confers supreme dignity on the human being and continuously devises fruitful issuesfor a philosophy that aspiresto meet Seneca'sancient endeavor of being a recte vivendi ration.

PartTwo A Connection:Value and Culture

ChapterThree

Valuein CultureandCultureasValue 1. Value, Creativity, Culture Two centuries have passed since, in a book that was a trailbreaker for the modern concept of culture, Johann Gottfried Herder complained about nothing being vaguer than the term, "culture." He insistedon the idea that the term, "culture," might involve a philosophical predicament to the extent to which it comprisesthe whole range of customs,morals and manners,ways of thinking and acting, characteristicof a given society, and to which it manages to enable that society to bring its significant contribution to the notion of "humanitas."

Far from losing ground, interrogatory issues related to culture have acquired new dimensionsin modern times. The query is about what we have done to ourselves, about our responsibility. It is concerned with what we should be, and with what we could do for our life to have a meaning and for humanity to have a future. These are questionsthat human sciences,such as sociology, ethnology, or psychology may try to answer by providing the clues of a possible solution, but the questionsare commonly ascribedto philosophy, given their scope,comprehensiveness, and perspective.r The starting point of the discussion is that the old prerogatives of the philosophy of culture have become questionable under the impact of the successesof cultural sciences.Cultural anthropology and culture theory have a set of rigorous concepts, such as element, complex) area,type of culture, acculturation,cultural pattern,function of culture, and others,that overshadow reiterated philosophical distinctions between culture and civilization, immersed in a disconcerting semantic indetermination. However, a concept pertaining to the philosophy of culture resistsany attempt made by sciencesat capturing it in operational definitions, at reducing it to laws, structures, or logic-mathematical symbolism. This is the axiological concept of value.

Starting from this concept, philosophy can render, in an integrated perspective,what is specific to culture. This is what I will try to prove in the following pages.

A philosophy of culture that tries to ignore the gains of sciencesabout culture would be inconceivabletoday. Philosophy offers a propaedeuticand completes the scientific approach; it is not a substitute for this approach.

When it rises to that conceptus cosmicus Immanuel Kant talks about, philosophy can remain behind or beyond the scientific data, creating phenomenologicalcircles.

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The circles are dialectically ananged and lead to meanings through a relevant, significant integration of knowledge with the existential, spiritual, and axiological order.2 A different referential framework and a different notional content to direct the search for answers to the two complementary procedures are implied in the very question,What is culture?

Often this question appears a scientific problem, and the suggested answer may be expressedaccordingto Edward Tyler's definition of 1871.3 We are told that by culture we could designatewhat human intelligence and feeling have accomplished through the ages: values, symbols, myths, language, religion, arts, sciences,technology, laws, philosophy, social and political structures.

If we were to stop here, we would run the risk of dealing with culture as though it were a juxtaposition of unrelated factors that cannot be made to agree with one another, by our ignoring the conditions in which they are possible or the way they are involved in, united, on an axiological horizon.

However, as Ernst Cassirer noticed, a philosophy of value begins by presuming that the cultural universe is not a mere accretion of components and by stating the conviction that the multiple and seemingly incongruous rays can be concentrateddnd brought to a common focus.a In this perspective,only by taking into accountthe values in culture, that is, culture as a realm of values, can all types of non-philosophicaldefinitions of culture be critically examined, integrated, and dialectically excelled. The types are systematized by Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn as descriptive,historical, normative,psychological,structural,and genetic.s At close-rangeanalysis, the six types of non-philosophical definitions used in social sciencesare operationalin an accurateepistemologicalcontext, and the determinantsof the cultural phenomenonare correctly grasped.But when the definitions try to substitute for the philosophical approach, they make the mistake of becoming unilateral and oscillate between extremes.

They either expand the cultural spheremore than may be admitted, as in the case of historical definitions that, comprising everything that is a product of social, non-biological heredity, come to identify the cultural with the social, or they artificially confine the cultural spher to its symbolical, prescriptive expressions,as in the case of norm-setting definitions. They either shift the accent to the subjective moment of culture, by psychological definitions, or they pave the way toward understanding the objective moment within structuraldefinitions. Or the social sciencesappealto enumerative,descriptive definitions, frequent in ethnology, and include in culture all that is not containedin other speciesand might describea specifically human condition: language,myths, arts, science,moral codes.Even when values are included in an enumeration, their role is only that of components, sometimes even of primus inter pares, and not that of ontological foundation, of cultural unity

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and intercommunicationof a diversity of cultures. Or else the social sicences come to use genetic definitions, viewing the culture spheremostly as an ideal of socio-humanperfectibility.

To pass beyond these alternatives,a tertium datur may be offered only by going from a non-philosophical to a philosophical definition of culture, within the framework of an ontology of the human that appeals to the methodologicalvirtues of the conceptof value.

If the diversity of cultures is a source of polyphonic harmony and not a potential source of conflict, if the historical development of cultures engenderscommon cultural assetsfor humanity and a common responsibility for their preservation or continuation, this proves that any cultural creation contains something ineducible: value, as a specifically human way of responding to the world through projections, attitudes, preferences,ideals.

Value is, in the human realm, part of the order of existence itself, being involved in all tension-adaptation-transformationissues pertaining to the harmony, always to be created and re-created,between ethos and situation, between the real human being and the real world in which the human being acts and therefore exists, through the organizationof culture, as a constitutive and irreversibly constituted dimension of the human-way-of-being.

Ultimately, cultural creation appears as the work process by which we introduce an object into the realm of values,thereby giving a new fulcrum to a human need and aspiration. And the products that are thus created are considered cultural assetsonly if they acquire the power to satisfy human needs:theoretical, moral, aesthetic,etc. A shapelesspiece of marble has the same natural properties as the one from which Michelangelo eliminated what was superfluousin order to make it respondto the human need for beauty. It is not a cultural asset unless axiologically structured, unless it obtains a human significance felt through past experience, through the hierarchical range of attractions, preferences,wants, purposeful valuation acts, and is expressedin rationalizing form by the conceptof value.

Approached in the axiological perspective,culture as realm of values a dialectical, integrative meaning, growing aware of the rediscover can condition of its possibilities, of its distinctive ontological status, and of its humanistic vocation. At the same time, the viable elements included in the non-philosophical types of definitions are also present, yet the pseudoalternativesmentionedabove are avoided.

Culture is no longer limited to the symbolical, spiritual area,as was the case with norm-setting definitions, nor is it expanded so as to identify the cultural and the social, the way historical definitions proceed, because it envisagesthe axiosphere,that which pertainsto the realm of values. Value is begotten only by those products of human action that have the faculty of satisfying human needs and of awakening purposeful preferential acts. This way, values acquire a cumulative character, expressed in non-hereditary

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behavior,learnedand transmittedthroughthe relay of generations, intact or invigorated,amplified,yet occasionally diminished,altered. culture is no longer reduced to the subjective moment, as in psychological definitions, because,as Louis Lavelle remarks, in axiology, explaining values through a subject's pleasureor need is a superstition.6We can feel or think of value only as long as it establishesa sui generis social rapport between something worth being appreciatedand someonecapable of appreciatingit, of creating a hierarchy of objects, works, behaviors, etc., by judging how important they are for the human being, for the being I would call homo aestimans. As such, culture implies a relationship between the subjective and the objective moment, anticipatedas an ideal in the pursuit of values and materialized in assets,in obtained values. This relationship is structured and evolves into the sphere of action, of valuation criteria, made possibleby socio-historicalexperience.

The last remark allows us go beyond the alternativeinto which the other two types of non-philosophicaldefinitions, enumerativeand genetic, fall. The alternative may be expressedas follows: Does culture store the results of human action, or does it mould the human condition, maintaining the awarenessof a life that, since it cannot last indefinitely, should not be lived in any way? Yet, a human being createsthe realm of values,the axiosphere,and also a second nature, an artificial one, culture, through which new needs and new conditions for action are pursued.The pursuit takes place not at the level of the quasi-automatic,biologically-motivatedbehavior, but at the level of the value-orientedbehavior, recognizing truih, goodness,beauty, etc. Devised in analogy to cultura agrorum, the phrasecultura animi indicates,from Cicero's time to the contemporaryphilosophical literature, what human beings plant in the ground of natural abilities, in other words, the way human beings benefit from education,learning, using intellectual and moral powers to reach beyond the natural state, assimilating the values belonging to their time and creating new ones.That is why, to humankind, values are not somethingadditional, an accessory, a luxury. They are determinants defining the human being's specific way of existing as a being that creates and self-creates through culture, transcendingthe natural stateby the human condition. Culture, as the realm of values, as axiosphere,is not a by-product in relation to an aspiration projected somewhere,in the natural abyss.

Thus, in the axiological perspective, culture appears as incompatible with any form of reductionism. Value is the ontological foundation of constitutive culture; it is the ineducible factor of human creativity. By way of its axiological propensity,culture is not only a continuation and amplification of nature by mankind. Beyond a certain limit, culture is a sourcepursuing its own purposes,the biological causeof which cannot be found. Understood in the perspective of the axiocentric ontology of the human, culture is an

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autonomousrealm of values with its opening toward the dilemmas of human condition.

In spite of the variety of problems, we can easily understand,for every contemporary trend, that the human condition differentiates itself in the infinity of the world and within the unity of everything that is alive, as adetermined-way-of-being-and-becoming. Human existence appears as irreducible to other modes of existence,allowing for the configuration of a new human ontology, where the existence, for us, therefore the human, replacesexistencein itself, and the processof the becoming of being replaces existenceas a given fact. Thus, when scienceitself defines its objectivity by referenceto the human point of view and adopts the anthropic principle, the traditional discourse has to be substituted for by an ontological discourse, liable to stressthe edification of the human as a self-realizationof the human, and to surpassthe alternativetranscendent,or transcendental,by highlighting the immanent dimension of the human way of relating to others and to the world, due to the valuation endowmentof a homo aestimans.

By way of the axiological approach, contemporary culture can rediscover the global, all-human problems of the contemporary world.

"Global problems," Robert Ginsberg said, "invite global perspectives...

Philosophy will have greater human value when it crossesworld cultures as we fully become global thinkers."T According to metaphilosophy, starting from such an understandingof the connectionbetween value and culture, it is difficult to deny that the global problems of our epoch, like life, freedom, democracy, welfare, justice, peace, have granted first-rank significance to universalism in order to defend and promote the all-human values, altered in technocraticsocietiesand re-discoveredin 1989 even in those countries which ignored them, forced by their totalitarian'regimes. Across the beneficial differences and pluralism of values, the universalistic way of thinking is always trying to find a unified conceptionof contemporaryculture on a global scale. Its motto could be, "Nothing that pertains to the universal realm of value is alien to any culture."

In other words, universalism is a new metaphilosophical way of approaching culture. Across the beneficial pluralism of values, the universalistic way of thinking is always trying to find a unified concept of value as an all-human modality of human self-educationand a pre-condition of world culture.

Let us remember Goethe's heritage, becausehe has brought along a promising shift of vision concerningthe bond of universality in art, relevant to our discussion about Polishness, Europeanism, and Universalism. Like Montesquieu, Goethe recognizedthe constraintson the mind that arose from its being rooted in a particular community. But unlike Montesquieu, who wondered, How is it possible to be a Persian?,Goethe showed that a Persian could have wonderedin the sameway, How is it possible to be a German or a

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European?To Goethe,Germany,Europeanism,or Asianism were the issue of a specific cultural tradition, a fact to which, henceforth,no one could be blind.

There are realities that should be recognizedbut not worshipped.In Goethe's terms, our Polishness,Romanianness,or Frenchnessare our different ways of seeing,judging, and estimating things rooted in our common Europeanism.

We should be proud of our cultural heritage,a dependencethat ennoblesus, as cultural beings, and enableus open the horizon to universality. A precursor of universalism, Goethe could appeal to art to transcendthe dependence,not to reinforce it.

On 31 January 1827, in his conversationwith Eckermann,Goethe, then at the height of his fame and in the evening of his life, was talking about a Chinese novel he was reading that had struck him as quite remarkable.While he had expected the book to be strange and picturesque,he had found in it affinities with his own Hermann and Dorothea and with the novels of the English writer, Samuel Richardson.He was surprisednot by the exoticism of the book, but by the lack of it. This patriarch of Europeanism,through the feeling of familiarity arousedin him by a Chinese novel and through a bond stretching across beneficial differences, became aware of the genius of the mind that can overstep cultural and historical boundaries. Dazzled by this rcahzation, Goethe immediately drew a conclusion from it. Since literature was capable of transcendingdifferences of space,time, race, language,and culture, without any hesitation,this opportunity becamefor him an ideal. It is the same universal ideal we meet with in John Locke's Two Treatises on Government.sThe country and the European epoch he was born in were not fortuitous but fundamental elements of his life and work. Yet through his Englishness and Europeanism he has become the theoretical architect of democracy as it exists in the Western world today and as it will exist in the European countries that have ignored it, forced to do so by their totalitarian regimes. A careful study of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States and of the new Constitutions adopted in Romania and in other countries in Eastern Europe, reveals an abundanceof phrasessuch as AII men are created equal, The main values are life, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness, and so on. From the forerunner of modern democracy,we have learnt that if a nation valuesanything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom. The irony is that if a nation values comfort or money more, it may loosethem, too.

Approached in this perspective,culture can rediscover its axiological meaning and its humanistic vocation. Since human beings affirm themselves as cultural beings who createboth the world and the self through values, and since the condition or possibility of the human being derivesfrom assigning value, the ontology of the human condition becomesaxiocentric. It conforms to Edmund Husserl's advice to understandthat all values are part of the one and sameaxiosphere,culture, where unity does not mean uniformity. It is only

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in freedom, tolerance,complementarity,and pluralism that human beings can advance from the diversity of national and individual values toward the community of value.

In Phenomenologyand the Crisis of Philosophy, Husserl pointed out that to restore the lost genuine links with life-world and to live as a human being is to live in an axiological framework wherein we all live together in a community and have the community as a horizon.eWe can find here an unconditional universal imperative,not to allow anything to happenthat is not in accordancewith the growing solidarity of world community, associated with the intersubjectiveresponsibility for the fulfillment of human vocation as a value-assigningbeing, homo aestimans,and to reach for the supremegoals of the universalistic approach of culture, that may be summed up by Paul Eluard's symbolic phrase:Passerde l'horizon d'un seul d I'horizon de tous.

I consider that Janusz Kuczynski's words, For universalism does not neglect anything of value,to may also be interpreted as an assertion conceptually intelligible in the framework of what I called an axiocentric ontology of the human condition. In the axiological relation between local values and all-human values, a Copernicanrevolution appears,analogousto Kant's Copernican revolution in approachingthe cognitive relation between subject and object. In both cases,we note a fertile shift of direction.

In the cognitive relation, the subject,with a priori forms of intuition and categories,has become the sum of our knowledge. The axiological relation makes a shift of direction from the traditional phenomenologicaldescentinto the diversity of cultures to the axiological ascent toward the unity of humankind, emphasizingthe irreducible human condition, the common realm of values, and the all-human values by which the human being becomes a creator.

The human, creative, value-laden activity is the vehicle without which the human being would not be able to endow existence with a specifically human meaningfulness.Because I conceive of human beings as able to surpasstheir creation but never surpassingtheir condition as creator, I am in search for the specific of the human way of being in the process by which human beings createand createthemselvesthrough cultural values,exceeding the natural statethrough their human condition. The processof the passingon from nature to culture, from iterative adaptation to value creativity, takes place through what we may call a coupure ontologique, to paraphraseGaston Bachelard.The essenceof the ontological mutation consistsin the following: while other beings integratein the given circumstancesof existenceaccording to their prevailing inborn needs,the human being, as a value-assigningbeing, as homo aestimans,establishes,by creativity, a fundamental specificity of a new way of relating to the environment. Thus, the issue of cultural creativity appearsas the focal point of interest in philosophy. By reflecting upon the creative process,on the one hand, and on the creative product, on the other

62

VALIIE IN CULTURE AND CULTURE AS VALUE

hand, philosophy can understandthe fundamentalspecificity of human beings.

If we approachthe issue in axiological terms, the creative processappearsas the sui generis work processby which we actually introduce an object into the realm of values, thereby giving a new fulcrum to one of the human needsand aspirations, to value. And the creative product is always a concrete and relatively durable reality structured by purposeful acts of valuation and endowed with value. The core of creativity remains value in both cases.

We owe to Karl Marx the emphasislaid on creativity as a distinctive mark of the human being as a generic being. Creativity represents the assertionof the human ability to dominate natural existence,not by simply adjusting to it but by progressively adjusting it to the self, by creatively assimilating it, and to dominate social existence. Potentially, the realm of creativity coexistswith the generalareaof human activity.

Becauseits distinctive mark is that of identifying and socially assessing creation in value, the way creativity is defined as production of something new, original, socially valuable, and resulting from the processof creation, I maintain that creativity is present in actu in any human attempt materialized in work. That is the reason why, as Anna-TeresaTymieniecka pointed out, creative action is the prototype of action, and value becomesthe irreducible factor of human cultural creativity.tt Everywhere and every time we try to investigateculture and cultural creativity, value is inescapable.This is not to be taken as a claim for the objective existence or categorical force of any values in particular, but rather as a claim that the processesof estimating, ascribing, modifying, affirming, and even denying value, in short, the processesof valuation,can neverbe avoided.12 Creativity, Pete A. Y. Gunter says,has many meanings,but all of them include the production of novelty, of something new, not something just apparently new but really, ultimately new.r3 which means, all of these meaningsinclude value creation and creation value. This accounts,inter alia, for linking up the axiological viewpoint with other approachesof creativity in order to understandthe human being as a being surpassingits creation but never surpassingits condition as creator. But, as you can realize, my purpose was only to submit the axiological point of view for our discussionconcerning the philosophical understandingof creativity.

Perhapsno one else has expressedthis point, which I use to designatean axiocentric ontology of the human condition, more emphatically than John Feketehas. So, I will gratefully paraphrasehis words: No aspectof human life is unrelated to values, valuation, and validation. Value orientation and value relations saturate our experiences of life practices from the smallest establishedmicrostructure of organizations and institutions. The history of cultures and social formations is unintelligible except in relation to a history of value orientation, value-ideals,goods values, value responses,and value judgments, and their cultural objectivations,interplay, and transformations.ra

Value, Creativih,, Culture

63

The axiological interpretationsuggestedin the present chapter is, therefore,inescapable.

This is not meantto replace,in the investigationand understanding of culture,an old scientificreductionismwith a new, valuation, one.

What I havc actually plcadedfor is what Ilya Prigogineand Isabelle Stcngerscall a ncw alliancebetweenscienceand philosophy.That agreeswith understandingvalue as a fundamentalconcept of the philosophy of culture and with the antireductionist spirit that the metamorphosis of scienceitself impliestoday.We are not, therefore,talkingof a reductionof cultureto value, but of understanding the multiple determinations of culturein an integrating, axiological perspective. This docs not overlook anthropological, psychological, sociologicalaspects.

It doesnot excludethe cognitivemoment from the cultural sphcre,containingthe cumulativeproductsof knowledge, subordinatingit to that eternalsenseof culture:that of' assuring,within the complexrcalm of values,thc preeminence of moral-spiritualvalucsby which wc rise, even when we stray or err, to higher stepsof humanity.Thus. after a long detour throughthe complexphilosophicalproblemsto value, we come acrossE. Herriot'ssuggestive maxim: La culturec'est ce qui restequandon a tout oublii.

And if culture is what remains once we have lbrgotten acquired knowledge,thcn lhe way its resultsinf-luence the mannero1'buildingour own realm of values,startingfiom variegatedpossibilitiesof choiccsopenedby lif-ecircuntstances, becomeshighly significant.

2. Knowledge and Value: The Problem of Axiological Rationality I start from a commonplaceyet question-posing finding: we can clearly see the beneficialinfluenceon humanknowledgeof the revolutionin scienceand technology,but we celnbarelypcrcciveits repercussions, their hows,and their whcretos,on human valuc-loadedresponsesto thc world. As Alexandre Koyre pointed out, the influences of the new scicntific paradigm on knowledgeand valuesare uneven.Althoughmodernsciencehas removedthe barriersseparatingheavenand earth,the macrocosmand the microcosm,and organicand inorganicmatter,the unitaryand unifying image of the universc and doesnot tell us anythingaboutthe world in which we live, love, and die, while it placesus in a world where,thoughthereis room fbr everything,there is n o ro o m f br hum anit y.rs .fhis situation.much more complexthan the diagnosismade by Koyr6 would suggest,raises the question: what is the importanceof the new relationships between knowledge and values fbr the philosophical understanding of the specificcharacterof axiologicalrationality?

I will try to answerthis question.Bccausephilosophershave long been in the habit of preceding every theoreticalapproach by an analytical

examinationof the questionitself and by an outlineof the conceptualcontext, I must say that I am taking into consideration a relationbetweenclassesof distinct values.In other words, I will introducea conventionaldistinction bctwcenthe field of knowledge,which includesspecificvalues,and the field publishedby Alois of the other values,calledethicalin Husserl'smanuscripts Roth. At the sametime, I will deliberatelyuse a conjunction,knowledgeand values,insteadol'a disjunction,knowledgeor values,becauscin the caseo1disjunctionwe would be faced with a false alternative:to hcad for the myth of technocraticrationalism,claiming knowledge against values, or for thc narcissisticimmersion in personal experience,claiming values against knowledge.

With the questionset in these terms, logical analysis,syntacticand semantic,helpsus seethat the problemof the knowledge/values relationship would be meaninglessif there were no convergencebetweenthe two terms and if they were not distinct.I only continuea significanttrend in Romanian philosophicalthinking when statingthat the problemis meaningfulprecisely because:( I ) values,in the humanrealm,belongto the orderof existenceitself and cannotbe reducedto a cognitiverelation,to the productionof knowledge; (2) scicntific rationality is not the only, or the paradigmatic,type of rationality, which is polymorphous and comprises all intentional acts, includingthosewith a prevailinglyaxiologicalload;(3) in practice,the human being keeps the attributesof homo cogitons and those ol homo aestimans interrelated.

We can therelbre say that the present revolution in science and technology has not provided the possibility of a oontradictionbetween knowledge and values deriving from the determinationsof the human ontologicalstatus,nor has it transformedthis possibilityinto reality for thc first time. It has causedthe contradictionto developinto an acute conflict, becauseit substitutesthe new myth of axiological death of the physical universe for the old pessimistic myth of thermal death of the physical universe.Intoxicatedwith operationalityand accuracy,scientificknowledge may transfbrm logical rigor or technologicalefficiency into an end in itself, may invert ends and means, and may reduce the human being to an exhaustibleobjcct throughthe frozen rigidity of abstractformulas and codes.

Paradoxically,thc mctamorphoscs of contemporaryscience,while enhancing the divorce between knowledge and values, creates,for the first time in history, both the necessityto bridge the gap, becausethe self-reflectiveness of knowledgeconstantlyoalls for value optionsand thesesupposea cognitive support,and the possibilityof overcomingit by making useof the impact of scienceon the understandingof the specific natureof axiological rationality.

By adopting, tacitly or explicitly, new philosophical presuppositions, contemporary science provides the prospectsof a new alliance between humanity and nature.The allianceregardsobjectivity of knowledgeas a value

Knowledge uncl Value: T'heProlslem of Axiolo,qic'al llationolih

6.5

that involvesa humanref'ercnce and becomespart of oulturewithout assuming the right to deny the pcrtinenceof other viewpoints,includingthe axiological point of view, and dispensingwith the fascinationof rationality,irrespective o l ' i l . sc l o s c n e st so u s . ' n Dwelling on the last-mentioned consideration, we seethat our time has broughttogetherthe two terms o1'theknowledge/values relation.Today, when scientific knowledgehas proved, through its technologicalapplications,to have good or nef-arious consequences in terms of value,scientificrationality can no longerbe the authorityentitledto judge good and evil unconditionally.

The traditionaljudge of valuesshould be the one to be judged in the first place.That is why, as Hilary Putnamnoted, we are compelledto reversethe terms and to ask not, How rationalgoodnessis?, but, Why is it good to be rational'/ The instrumentalistanswer is unsatisfactorybecauseit values rationalityexclusivelyin terms of efficiencyof the meansused for an end, whilc it deniesthc cognitivestatusof valuejudgmentsand doesnot rationally legitimatethe ends,the ultimatevalues.Logioalempiricismis a sophisticated expressionof the same instrumentalisttcndency, even though it values rationality not lbr practical-utilitariansuccess,but Ior the theoreticalsuccess of prediction and rctrodiction, of the means used to verify or Ialsify propositions.In this restrictiveview, Putnam points out that the question, What good is rationality'?, finds no longera valid epistemological explanation, and the soleanswerto the questionis that rationalityis good for the discovery o l ' mca n s / end c onnec t io nIs7.

The critical responseto this view on instrumentalrationality,irrelevant in both variantsmcntionedabovc,led to the conceptionof intrinsiccognitive rationality,which shiffs the emphasisfiom the means/endconnectionto the purposeol-thc cognitivcproccss.The answerto the qucstion,Why is it good to be rational'/,has become,becausetruth may thus be discoveredby an inhcrcntmethod.Unfbrtunatcly,as long as it was belicvedthatjust the fbrmal part of the inhcrent scicntific method was the necessaryand sufficient condition to guaranteethe in actu rationality of all knowledge, a risky method-fetishismdeveloped. When Nelson Goodman distinguishedthe implicationsof Bayes's theorem regardingthe limits of formalrzattonin inductivelogic, the dependence of the formal part ol' scientificmethodson prior informaldecisions,it becameclearthat,underthe impactof present-day scientificmetamorphoses, the hope for a formal method,capableof being isolatcdfrom actual humanjudgmentsabout the contentof science,that is, about the nature of the world, and from human values, seems to have evaporated.ls Becausethe rationalityof value judgmentshas been contestedon the grounds of now unacceptablesuppositions,the falsc idcntification of rationalitywith scientificrationality,and of scientificrationalitywith the use of a fbrmal mcthod, prescntscientificknowledgeitself has restorcdvalue

.judgmentsto their cognitivestatus.We reachthe conclusionthat rationality, in a broad sense,including also what we have called practicalreasonsince Kant, involves criterizrof relevanceand of rational acceptability,which no krnger opposc knowledge to value, but are specificaily applied to both, becausethc study o1'thepracticalrationalityof moral endsmay also be nonarbitrary.If rationalityis an ability that enablesthe possessorto determine what.questionsare relevantto ask and what answershe or sheis guaranteedto acccpt,thenits valuelies on its sleeve.r" If we try now to distinguishother implicationsof the atbrementioncd conceptionof the knowledge/values relationship,we see that, in point of we oughtto identifya rationalityot valuejudgments. axiooentricontolo-qy, l'he intuitivism/emotivismalternativemay bc resolved dialectically becauseit is based on the unsatisfactorypresuppositionthat descriptive judgmcntsalonehavecognitivccontents.To acceptthe cognitivecontentsof value .judgments,George Edward Moore's intuitivism reducesthem to a judgments,while to denythat cognitivecontent,Charles speciesof descriptive L. Stevenson's emotivismappliesto valuejudgmentsthe criteriaof cognitive significanceput forward by logical empiricism,and, bccausereduction is impossiblc,declaresthem meaningless, althoughthey are highly relevantin everyday life and in building scientific theories.And yet logical criteria cannotbe appliedto valuc judgments,not becausethey lack raticlnality,but becausethey possessanothertype of rationality.Moreover,as John Rawls noted, the criteria that identify thesejudgments are not arbitrary. They are actuallysimilar to thosc that singleout consideredjudgmentsof any kind.2O The discourseof ethicsno longer appearsto be inferior to the theoreticalone.

It is a practicaldiscourseoperatingwith valuejudgmentsthat arc irreducible to descriptivejudgmentsand the rationalityof which shouldbc examinedby proceedingfrom its specificnature,sanctioned by the highestauthority:social przrctice.

Another inf'erenceis that distinguishingin the sphereof knowledge between instrumcntalrationality, which concernsonly the relevanccand rational acceptabilityof the means used to achieve an end, and intrinsic rationality, which endorsesthe relevanceand acceptabilityof the end itself, in the realm of values,where technologicalrationality has a correspondent and what I term axiologicalrationalitymay be delincated.

Technologicalrationality poses only the problem of optimizing the resourcesand means used in an action with a view to achicving an end.

However, becauseoptimizing the efficiency of the instrumentis different to the end fbr which it is uscd,optimizedmeansmay efficientlycontributeto the implcmentationof vague, inadequate,or downright irrational ends, such as nuclearwar, massexterminationcamps,or settingLa Mettrie's vegetableman as an educationalexample.

Know'!edgeancl Value: the Problemrl'Axiological Rutioncrlin,

6l

The axiological rationality of an action involves non-arbitrariness, humanrelevancc,rationalacceptability, and,hence,the valueof the end itselt'.

Whereasrules,like thosesuggestedby Mario Bungc's technocthics, may bc formulatedfor technologicalrationalitybecausethe sufflcient condition of correspondencc ol' the meanswith a given end becomesalso the necessary condition,no strictrulcsmay be formulatedfor axiologicalrationalitybecause the end is open to innovating value creativity that cannot be put into algorithms.Thus, the necessarycondition, non-arbitrariness of the end, becomesalsothe sufficientcondition.

Technologicalrationalityignoresthe quality of the end. An action is regardcdas non-arbitraryi{'the meansare optimized.Axiological rationality does take into accountthe quality of the mcans.An action is considered rationally aoceptableon the strcngthof the fact that the value of the end prcvails,though thc higher principleof finality docs not suspendthe quasicausalrelationshipbetweenthc quality of the meansusedand the deliberate achievementof the goal. Wc cannotobtaina lofiy moral or political purpose by usingrationallyunacceptable means.That is why it is not recotnmended tct use any means whatsoeverfor the achicvementol' an end, even though that end were superior in itsell',as the Jesuitssuggestedin their adage,The end justifiesthe means.The end does not justify the means,becausewe cannot implement a humanistic program by anti-humanisticmeans. The end incriminatesthe means,becausewhen tcchnologythreatcnsthe human,it is the human,which must be saved,not technology.From the axiologicalpoint of view, an action,or a set of actions,like thosel"r'iggcred by the present-day rcvolution in scienccand technology,meets the criteria of relevanccand rationalacceptabilitycxclusivelywhen and where it maintains,by the very naturcof the meansused,thc supremcvaluethat grantsit purposefulness and humansignificancc.

In a lectureclnthe crisiso1'humanexistenceunderthe conditionscrcated by techno-scientillcprogressthal was beginning to elude moral control, Husserlsaw the major sourceof'the dawning crisis in a crippled cognitive rationality,boggeddown in naturalismand objectivism,and that had lost its links with the world ol-hf'c,thus, its axiologicaldirnension.Husser'lbelieved that the breachbetweenknowledgeand valueswas not a somberdestiny.an unavoidablcf-ate,and hc advocatcda possibleovercomingof the crisis by the s p i ri t o f philos ophy ,by h e ro i c re a s o n .2Hr i s v i e w a s si gnsphi l osophythe leadingrole in the complex,ever-openprocessof crcationof value and ol self-oonstructionof human condition, in the cstablishrnentof criteria of rclevanceand acccptabilitycapable of avoiding the risk of substituting instrumentalrationality by axiological rationality,the risk of an abcrrant inversionof endsand means.

Can philosophy mcet the prcsent-dayhuman need of axiological rationality?Can it associatcthe valuc of knowledgeand the knowledgcol-

values?Can it aim at keepingthe meansof humanactionunderthe controlof moral ends,while carrying on rts searchfor an agreementbetweenknowledge and values?The possibleanswcrsto the questionsadvancedhere are lel't to thejudgmcntof the reader.

3. Culture and Civilization: An Irreconcilable Opposition?

The relationship between culture and civilization ranks lbremost. in contcmporary philosophical debates generated by the olash betwcen technological progrcssand spiritual-valuc deadlock.I oftenwondercdwhether moral,artistic,philosophical, religious,and evenscientificvalueswere altered or disregardedin a century hauntedby the alleged boons ol hypertechnical conspicuous consumption.A more strikinglormulationmay soundas follows, Are culture and civiliz.ationat irreconcilableodds/ I cannotembarkupon sucha philosophicaldebatewithout f irst clearing out thc spccificterminology.

We rnay find distinctconnotationsof the tcrm, "culture," in Romance and Germanic languages.Thus, in French, the philosophicalconcept of culture is translated by civilization. Thc French translation of Jakob Burckhardt's Die Kultur der Renaissancereads "La oivilisation de la Renaissancc,"and it influenced the English translation as well, "The The Spanishtranslation,"La cultura del Civilization of the Rcnaissance."

Renascimento,"and the Romaniantranslation,"Cultura Renaqterii,"have both faithfully preserved the initial German meaning. Ambiguity increases whenever an author invests the concept of culture with new shadesof meaning.To Cassirer,culture is a systemof symbols,while Claude L6viStraussseescultureas an ethno-eraphical entiretywith significanthistoriclagbehinds.RalphLinton cnvisionscultureas a configurationof culturalpattcrns.

Marshall Mcluhan uses it to designatecommunicationalphenomena.The tcrrm,"oivilization,"is alsoproncto variousintcrpretations.

Leaving aside the ethnographicinterpretationof thc concept o1' civilization, that dcsignatcsthc particularitiesol- a well-dcfined human communityand makespossible{br us to talk aboutthe Aztec or the Etruscan civilization,and the historicalinterpretation, which envisagesa stagein thc historyof humankind,distinctIi'om savagehood and barbaritydue to literacy, township,arndan increasinglycomplexsocial lifc, the philosophyof culture assignsa new meaning to the concept of civilization. This concept will dcsignatcthc rcalm of thosevalueswhich pertainto the realm of satisfiable materialneeds.It includesthe utilitarianitcms in the sphercof civilization: t e ch n i q ues and t c c hnolo g i c sd,w e l l i n g ,fo o d , c l o th e sp, u bl i cbui l di ngs,means o1'communication,economic and administrativcactivities,social-political, military, and legal organization,and the artificial cnvironmcntthat securc cverydayconvcnicnce.While investigatingthe relationshipbetwccnculture

Cultureand Civiliz.atiort:An lrreconcilableOppo,sition'/

69

and civilization, philosophicalthinking renouncesthe sensu lato of the conoept,cultureseenas the ensembleof materialand spiritualvalues,in f-avor of its sensu stricto that designatesonly those values that satisfy spiritual nceds:the discovcryof thc unknown,the pursuitof an ideal,the searchlbr the self, the pursuit of the self into other selves,the thirst for the absolute, contemplationof beauty,the fice exertionof crcativity.The sphereof culture comprisesonly spiritual values that live through customs and traditions, religious creedsand belief's,scientificand philosophicalworks, literatureand music,architecture,painting,sculpture,fine arts.

The conceptualization suggestedby Nietzschebasedon the clear-cut distinctionbetweencivilization,as the totality of materialvalues,and culture, as Lheaggregatespiritualvalues,substantiates the irreconcilableopposition between culturc and civilizatron.In 1918, Oswald Spenglerdevelopeda synthesisof the oppositionin his book The Declineof the WesternWorld.He metintainedthat the priority assigned to strictly utilitarian, technical, economicalvaluedevaluates the spiritual.This entailsa moral crisis,a lack of laith in democraticand humanitarianideals,a minimalizationof the rolc of philosophyand art. Civilizationmarksthe twilight of cultures,foreshadowing their degeneration and decline. To Spengler, culture means the accomplishment of thc spirit,while civilizationmeansthe unavoidableend o1' any culture.Spenglerand Arnold Toynbeeadvancedthe idea of the cultural lag that increases with the progressof civilization.Philosophicaloutlooksthat extol societiesgovernedby technological rationalityand consumption-biased, utilitarianmentalities,and that regardthe progressof cultureas achievableby narrowingdown the spiritualhorizon,havebroughtcountcr-arguments.

In his writings,HerbertMarcusedevelopedan amplecriticalanalysisof such theories.With Marcuse,the dangerof "one-dimensionalman" in the conditionsof administered happiness may be eliminatedby act"ivating the new sensibilityof the erotic-aesthetic or moral type. In other words,the authorof One-DimensionalMan resortsto the procedureof restructuringthe hierarchy of values.The proccssis to take placc in agreementwith the realitiesof-the contemporarycivilization and the cultural aspirationsol- thc human beings living in the twenty-firstcentury.22 During the last deoadeof our century,more and more analystshave rallicd aroundthis point of view. For example,from a diff-erentperspective, Alvin Toffler speaksabout the authority of' moral values.23Mircea Eliade declaresthat the twenty-firstcenturywill be religiousor will not be at all.

Both outlooks,that in which culture is privilcgedfbr spiritualreasons. and that in which culture is underestimated on technologicalgrounds,share the idea that civilization might bc seen as an entity opposedto culture.

Nevertheless, delimiting materialvalues fiom spiritual valuesis significant only in some ideationalcontexts,when we attemptto prove that material valuesare means-values and that spiritual valuesalone are entitled to rank as

purpose-values and resistto being renderedabsolutc.If we discussmodern means of mass communication,including printing, the media, television, movies,CDs, we cannot deny their involving spiritual valuesbeyond their matcrialessence,sincethcy are instantiations of crcativeintclligcnceanclclf scientific knowledge. They impact upon the cultural message,lacilitate worldwidecommunicat"ion. as ntuchas moral or aestheticvaluesirnpactupon the levcl o1'civilization.The distinctionbetwcenmaterial(civilization)and spiritual(culture)generates a clashonly in discascdsocietiesthat suffcr frclm the undcrdevelopment fallacy,from the noxiouseffectsof technocratism, or liom endemicintoleranceof spiritualvalues.If we consistentlyregardculture Iiom a philosophical-axiological perspective, as an ensembleof all material and spiritualvalucscreatedalongthc courseof history,we regardthe concept of civilization,as seenby contempclrary approaches, as somcthingthat, far liom lying outside culture and opposing it, is culture-assigning.It is neverthelessrestrictcdto partial culture, deflned by material valucs aimed at practical-utilitariantargets. We nced not destroy civilization to acquire culture.We shouldstrive to enrich civilizationand admit that wheneverthe valuesof civilizationhaveaugtnented within a framework,we shouldwonder whether highlighting those values alone is enough and whether that civilizationnccd not be cnrichcdby the pursuitof humanculturalpurposes.

Civilization need not be ignored in order to save culture. On the contrary,it should be expandedand enriched.Humankindneedsan integral culture,whereautonomous forms shoulddevelopin naturalinterconnection.

We are not dealing here with the nostalgiaof the lost paradiscin Magdalenianor Paleolithiccultures,whcn the genuinelink betweenculture and civilizzttionwas imposedby the lack of autonomyof culturalforms,all ol' which were rootcd in myth and magic. Thc modernprocesswherebyvalues gct diversified and acquire autonomy is undeniable,despite all thc illlunctioningaccompanying it. In all technocraticmodenrsocicties,a tendcncy may appearto overratctechnicaland material-valuesand to overrankthem as purpose-values.Totalitarian re,eimeswitness the decay of Iundamental spiritual valucs in the name of unreasonablestate reasons. Between worshippingLechnicalprogressand dooming it, there is a wide range of attitudesand opinions,of appreciation and interpretations.

The modcrn differentiationof values is an essentialcondition lbr culturalprogrcss.For valuesto becomeembodiedin culturalassets,a set of' citmplextechnicalprocedures is needcd.Producingculturalassetsrequiresthe meansto faultlesslyadaptto the pursuedgoal.

Thc abovc paragraph rcveals the fundamental contribution r)l' contemporaryphilosophyto the understanding ol' thc relationshipbetween cultureand civilization:we risk a clashwhen the differencebetweenpurposevalues,inherentto spiritualculturc,and means-values, pertainingto material civilization.is erasedand when utilitarian,technical-economical, and political

Cultureand Civilizatiott:An lrreconcilahle Opposition?

11

valuespreposterously turn from efficientmeanstowardhumanself-realization into self-standing goals.

Civilizationand cultureare intertwinedto suchan extentthat separating them could bring abouttheir gettingmaimed,The only legitimatedistinction is that with certainvalues,strcssis laid upon the universaluseful,while with others, it shifts to the specifically human gratuitous.Reversing a longworshippedscaleof values,I may claim that what mattersabove all is the gratuitous.The uselul, in all its fbrms (political,economical,organizational action)is usefulonly to the extentto which it servesas a meansto createthe gratuitous.

In evcrydaylif'e,this issuecould be rephrascdas a question What is the nteaningoJ'beinga vvell-readperson today? The answermight be jocular: it mcans what it used to mean yesterdayand what it will mcan tomorrow.

Beyond the joke, the answer points to an option. Culture presupposes knowlcdgc and thc handling of advancedtechnology.But it necessarily irnplics the impact of the latest discoveriesof the human mind upon lil'e ideals, upon how to render creativc abilities fiuitful. Culture generatesthc poignantawarenessof hurnandignity and establishes demandingcriteria to operatevalue distinctionsand influence lifestyles.I1' culturc is what we are lcft with once wc havc fbrgotten whatcver we have learned,the significance ol'our learninglies in its impactupon the way we chooseto build a home of our own arnid thc variousoptionsprovided by life circumstances.

Without deprivrngthe useful of its rank, this scale of values would in all sincerity proclaimthc prevalcnccof the spiritualovcr the technologicalachievements that keep bedazzlinghurnankindand thus reachthc wisestsolution.What is supposcdto bc thc attitudco1'thegenerations to come as to thc issueI have dcalt with'? I can only makc a wild guess.Thc substanceand quality o1' lornorrow'sculture,its {utureplace in clur lil'e, will dcpendon this attitude.

The questionis dccisivelbr anyonewho standson thc thresholdol'philosophy whilc consideringthe rclationshipbetweenculturcand civilization.

ChapterFour PositivistReductionismandthe Mirage of NonPhilosophicalCulture 1. Definition by Reduction: The Standard Paradigm of Reductionism No other issueseemsmore centralto the philosophyof sciencethan that of rcductionism,maintainsGerhardVollmer.rBy placingthe issuein the context of justification or in that of discovery, whether by answeringit in the affirmative or in the negative,the philosophy of sciencelegitimately asks whethera law, a theory,or a I'ieldof researchcould be reducedto other laws, theories, or llelds. Whcn Logicai Positivism, though, granted absolute sovcrcignty to reduction,the term, "rcduction," becamc the magic word by which modern science assertcd its right to expansion into eminently philosophicdomains.Rcductionismthen becamean anomalywith a scientiflc cast. A new mythology o{' the epoch surfaced:in terms of culture, the supremacyof science, and the reductionof all the other types of rationality to the scientific type, which, in its turn, is identifled with the utilization of n e o p o si t iv is t cicr it c r ia.

As long as the boundariesof the logical analysis in the scientific languagcare ncltinvaded,the operationof suchcriteriacannotbe summarily rejected.Yct, it is not lesstrue that an invasionof thoseboundariesand the persisLcntapplicationo1' ncopositivisticcritcria could cnd up in the total spiritual drain of the cultural crcation.Thc type of analysisproposedby reduct.ionism,with lormal logic as thc supreme {brum clf cognitive signilicance,rcachesthe conclusionthat, since rnetaphysicalsentencesare ncithcr analytic:alnor synthetic,and are liable to cndure the prinoiple o1' crr-rpiric confirmation,they shouldbe eliminatedfiom cultureas meaningless.

According tcl the neopositivistdoctrine, not only metaphysics,but also philosophyas a whole consistsof such meaninglesssentencesand pseudoproblems.Hence,the conclusionthat philosophyis left with the act of selfannulment alone. Sinoe neopositivism itself is reluctantly a kind o{' philosophy,you might say that neopositivism cravesto be the self-destructive dcedof philosophy.

Even if suchan act cventuallyfails, the metaphysical dimensionmaims thc rcsulting philosophy,which is deprived of its interrogative-axiological role, and its self-infliotedwoundsprcventit fi'ornfulfilling its role as the selfconscicnceof culture.The place philosophyholds in culturc would be more appropriateonly as long as it could usc sentcnces rcducibleto the languageof science(Rudoll'Carnap),as long as it transl-ers its cognitiveprcrogativestc)

scienoe(Otto Neurath),or, finally,if it becomes a sciencein itself (Hans Reichenbach).

In all thesecases,the standardparadigmof the scientific reductionismperpetuates the mirage of some chimericalnon-philosophical cultures.

The advisedreadermight be surprisedby the placementof the discourse in the spiritual atmospheregeneratedby the Vienna Circle. The readermight rightly objectthat the option fails to considereitherthe typologyof reductions or thc chronologyof reductionism.Typologically,reductionsare inscribed into so vast a rangethat, even leaving asidethe distinctivereductionof the Husserlianphenomenology,eideticor transcendental, it seemsimprobablefbr us to find a standardparadigmable to merge the different possiblevariants.

And even if wc would find one, it seemsunacceptable to placeit in the third decadeof our century,since,chronologically, the mechanisticreductionismof the sevcnteenthand eighteenth centuries, with its project of rnrfihesis universalis,has precededthe logistic reductionismwe have in view. A series of remarksarc thereforerequiredfbr the sakeof accuracy.

First, I deliberatelyproposenot to discussall types ol reductionism, except for that used in approachingthe status of philosophy by scicntific reductionism.This type of action refers to the reduction of one form of culture,namely,philosophy,to anotherform of culture,namely,science.It is, therefore, an explanatory reductionism with an axiological load and an axiologicaltrend.Scienceis not seenas superiorto philosophy.It is not about a reductionismwith neutralityof value,as happenswhen explainingthe laws of thermodynamicsby means of statisticalmechanics,for example. It is ultimately a reductionism"intendedto reveal that philosophy turns {iom spcculationinto science."2This is the reasonwhy I will not consiclerthc technicalsubtleticsof the vast epistemologicalliteraturc,except for thosc aspectsthat ref-erfiom an axiological perspectiveto the intentions of the reductionismpcrfbrmcd.

Second, no prior instanceof rcductionismhas involvcd an explicit metaphilosophical program.Logical Positivismgovernedthe sccneo1-science philosophyfbr three decades.It startedwith thc publicationin 1929 of the manifesto of the vienna Circle. preparedby otto Neurath, H. Hahn, and Rudolf Carnap. It culminatedwith the publioation,in 1960, of the study dedicatedby Carnapto thc methodological statusof the theoreticalconcepts.

It had a metaphilosophical program.In the outlook of Logical Positivismon thc status of philosophy, side by side with the dogmatic acceptanceof the analytic-synthetic dichotomy that would open the only alternativein the fbrmulation of meaningful statements,the other rule is that of reductionism.

Any significantenunciationis consideredas being [he equivalentto a logical construction, achievedin termsreferringto an immediateexperience.

Now, going beyond the preliminary considerations,I think we can understand the reductionistconceptof logicalempiricismin the contextof the

7-1rc StandardParadigm of Redur:tionisnt

15

projeotof a unifiedhumanknowlcdge.This presupposes that only what bears l.heimprint of scienccobtainsthe passportto enterthe territoryof knowledge.

Philosophyappealsto u priori syntheticsentences, the truthfulness,or Ialsity of which can be determined neither by a logical-mathematical cxpression,nor by cmpirical verification or lalsification. This is why philosophywith its specilicsentences is non-existcntas a lleld ol'knowledge, adjoiningscience.The body of the scientificsentences consummates the bulk of the meaningful sentences.r In addition to reductionismin science,the reductionismof meaningfulknowledgeto scienceis alsoinvolved.

The realizationof such an aspirationeliminatesthe possibility of a philosophy imperceptiblethrough the grid of a formalized analysis of scientific language.Thc identificationof the effort to obtain a systematic, cohcrcnttype ol- knowledge,in consonancewith the target of thc unificd sciencebeingpursucdherc.

Thc building of such a rcductivesystenrassumesa differcnt approach.

The rcprcsentativcs ol- logical cmpiricismno longer ask thcmselveswhether the wor'ldis unitary,whcthcrthercis a diffbrencein kind betwcenthc physical and mentalproccsses, or il'all the eventsin the world are of thc sametype. 'fhc only thing thcy ask is if the productso1'scicnce- bearingthe mark ol' their genesisand pu't,zhngin their diversity- could nol be reducedto and rclbrrnulatedin a unitary language.Their attention is exclusively directed toward rcvealing the unity of science through logical re-construction conductedwith the help ol'a rcductiveanalysisof the rapport betweenthe terms used and the statementsassertedby scientists.Since, in science,the analysisof linguisticexpressions that is placedin the contextof the logicalstructuralapproachof the scientific-activity{rutcome,the context of the generatingprocesses beingdeliberatelyignored,is callcd the logic of science, thc issueof thc unity of scienceis herebyunderstoodas one of sciencelogic, an d n o t as an ont ologicails s u c .r Thc main chapterol'the studyin which Carnapoutlinesthis argumentis cntitled"Reducibility."Carnapshilts the emphasisliom thc ontologicalissue o1 world unity onto l.hclogical-epistemological issuc of sc:ienceunity. The issucof world unity is declaredas meaningless, while the cognitivcdimension ol'mctaphysics and in generalthatof philosophyis challenged.

It is the principleo1'reducibilityminutelyclaboratedby Carnapthat the formal study of'the logical relationshipsamong terms pertainingto various partsof the sciencelanguageis basedon. Accordingto the principle,logical syntaxresortsto criteriato demonstrate if two termsare interdefinable. if one tcrm could be reduccdto the other.When the conditionsol'usinga [crm,r, are characteriz.ed by other tenns, ,r' and z, by mcans o1'the procedurescallcd reduction,we may say that the initial term, .r, is rcducibleand that the end resultis the reductionstatcment.Thc basiclbrm of thc reductionstatcmentis dcfinition, yet it is not always possible.When dispositionalpredicates,

expressingthe property of the obiect to react in a certain function of thc situation,occur in the reductionstatement,then that statementtakes on a conditional fbrm. A hi-ehly refined logical procedure,appealing to thc mentionedconditionaldefinitionsand thc dispositionalpredicatcs,cnablcs Carnap to advancchis criteria toward the rcductionof' the terms of othcr scicnccs,such as biology and psychology,to the physical language.This languageis granteda privilegedstatussinceit includesa sub-language, that of Lhings,the thing language.It lackstheoreticaltermsbut includesobservational predicatesof objccts,such as yellow, cold, light, and soluble,that off'er a sufficient reduction basis for the heterogeneous theoreticalterms to be translatedfrom the entire field of science into a unique, homogeneous language. As it may be easily observed, the standard paradigm of reductionismidentifiesrationalitywith logic, which conf'ersupon scicncethe ability to put scnsorialdata in order and thus build the coherentedificc of' theory,undera strictobservational control.

Whilc succinctlypresentingthe reductionist-logistic orientation.I tried to ovcrlookthc projectof rcpresenting thc world as elpurc logicalconstruction made of data taken fiom the perceptivcexperience,presentcdin Der logische Aufbau der Welt ( 1928)Carnaphimself passedquickly over thc excessesof this episodeof his spiritualitinerary.

In his laterworks,Carnapdevelopsthe nuancesof the standardmodcl of Iogical cmpiricism. At flrst, he abandonsthe idea o1'translatingphysrcalworld statementsinto statementson the immediate expericnce and of substitutingthe phenomenologistlanguagefor the physicalisticlanguage.

'Ihen, the principle ol' verifiability is replacedby that of confirmabilityand controllabilityas a criterion lbr term significance.Thc scquenceof shading continueswith the proposedprotocol sentcnccs(Neurath),to distinguisha subclassof scicntificsentences expressinginformationaboutreality obtained through perception,etnd to formulate a distinguishingcriterion between empirical scienceand metaphysicsor philosophy,which would no longer pertainingto scienceto direct involve the requiremcntto reduceall sentences Moreover.C. G. Hempelno longeracceptscorrespondence experience. rules for a term-by-termreduction,advancinginsteadto a holistic approach.The theoryis connectedto an empiricalbasisof "rules of interpretation."s Beyond thesevariantsand variations,one invariantis lcfi: the ideao1-doublclanguagc, the custom of dividing sciencc language into two parts, observational languageand theoreticallanguage.The observational languagemakesuse of termsto describenoticeablethingsand events,while the theoreticallanguage containsterms that may ref'erto the unnotioeableaspectsof phenomenaor cvcnts.(' The acceptance clf a clear distinctionbetweenthe theoreticalterms and vocabularyis accompaniedby the assumptionthat thoseof a pre-theoretical termsarc fundamental.

They ref-er,directlyor indirectly,to the pre-theoretical

'I'ha StandardParacligmof Reductionisnt

ll

perceptible phenomena,given by cxperience,possessinga prearranged significanceto any rational human being, while theoreticalterms reccivc a cognitivesignificanceby meansof a secondarygame,and correspondence or intcrprctationrules are resortedto Ibr them to be reducedto the terms in the previouscategory.

We can easilyseethat the conceptabovealreadyimpliesthe non-sense of the metaphysicalissues.Becausethey appeal to an a priori synthetic sentence,the descriptivepredicatesof which do not relate with possible observations, they hold no cognitivesignificancc.

And as we can casily see,even in its nuancedand liberalizedvariant, Logical Positivism,with its generalprogramof rationalreconstruction, which dominatcd epistcmolo-eyfbr three decadcs, remains attached to theses essentialfor thc standardparadigmof the scientificreductionism.Logical Positivismacccptsthe unitary and neutrallanguageof scicnce.It combines cmpiricist suppositionson the origin of knowledgewith a fbrmalist-logicist approachto its nature.It placesthe basis of inductivc cmpiricism on the dogmas of analysis and reductionism.By reduction, Logical Positivism identiflesrationalitywith logicism,and it identifiesknowledgcwith one of its varieties:scientillcknowledge.

Due to its metaphilosophicalprogram, the standard paradigm of scientific rcductionism has had disappointingconsequences subjectedto repeatedcriticism. Resumingthe systematrzation proposedby Ilie PArvu,Tthe fbllowing points of criticism could be detected:(l) a criticism of the cpistemologicalpremisesof the program;(2) a criticism of the ontological assumptions, suchas a clear-cutdistinctionbetweenthe observational and the theoretical;(3) a sharpdifferentiationbetweeninternaland cxternalissues,in other words, scicntific issuesconcernin! thc cxistenceof some theoretical cntitiesinsidethc linguisticframcworkand the philosophicalissuesaboutthe rcality of thc cntirc systcmof thoseentities;and (4) a global criticismof the analytical-empirical approachof the mcthodof fbrmalizedanalysisof science and o1the reductionistapproachto the statusof thc philosophicaldiscourse. fhe sequcnceol' criticism mentionedabove was not lcll without an echo. By abandoningthe standardparadigmor by lending it a series of nuances,the analytical philosophy f ollowed the path leading liom its positivist stage to its postpositivistone. In other words, the analytical philosophywas forced,throughinternaldialectics,to takeon a more and more pronouncedantipositivisticcoloring and withdraw,gradually,falteringly,yet irreversibly,fiom Reichenbach's dreamo1'justifying the philosophicalissues, approaches, and optionsexclusivclythroughsciencecriteria.

2. Transfigunations,Mutations, Alternatives The Carnapianproject for the reductivetranslation.by logical rneans,of thc theorcticalinto the observationalproved r-rnf'casible.

The corollary of the project,a strictdelimitationof the meaningfulsentenccs of scicnceliom those ol' the meaninglessones of metaphysics,could not endure analytical examination.Based on the criterion of cognitive signilicanceadvancedby neopositivism, F. Waismannis forccdto realizethat thc very thesisaccording to which metaphysicsis nonsensicalis a non-senseitself.t In his turn, Kar'i Poppercriticizesthe thesisof logical empiricism.Popperconsidersthat the statements of. rnetaphysics could be delimitedfrom thoseof sciencewithout the need to judge them as nonsensical and without expellingthem from thc continent ol' knowlcdge.The critcrion proposedto separatcscicncefrom metaphysics is farlsillability.

A systemshouldbe consideredas beingscientific only if it fbrmulatcsassertionsthat may contradictobservations.The systemis efl-ectivelytested by an attempt made to produce such contradictions.

Thcrefore,the distinctionin kind betwccnmeaningfuland meaningless turned into a gradualdclimitation.A theory is so much the more capableof being testcdas it imposesmorepreciseexigencieson reality.

Given that statcments of philosophyarc not falsifiablc,thereresultsthe prccariousness of thcir cognitive status,and not thc fault that they would verge upon pseudo-problems.

Popper resiststhe tcmptationto replacethe criterionof completeverifiability by that of completefalsiflability,since he acceptsthe theoreticalload of the observationalknowledge.As a matter of principle,Poppereliminatesthe possibilityof refutationby meansof a flnire numberof observational data.Thus. in the Popperianversionof falsification, an importantmodificationemerges,as comparedto the standardparadigm:thc theorybecomesnow more importantthanthe observational data.

The idea of a basicobservational languagethat would allegedlyprccecle theoryand, following the applicationof the reductionprocedure,offor a lastminute justification ol the theory is no longer accepted.In the dynamic approach of science as proposed by Popper, theory precedesdata. The developmentol' knowledge as a shift from oldcr problems to new ones ultirnatelydependson the suggestionand rejectionof thcoriesin a rational manner. By shifting the acccnt toward incrcasing knowledge. Popper c;onsiders that scicnccdocsnot build on a granitefoundation.Sciencecoulclbe comparedwith a construction, the pillarsof which sink into a swamp and are not supportedby firm ground.And if wc stop shovingthc pillars down, it is not bccausewc havc reachcdfirm ground.We simply stop whcn wc think the pillars are steadlastenough lor thc constructionto stand.!)Thc metaphor submitsthe idea of the relativity of basic statements, of thcir relizrnceon ir theoreticalmeaning.Yet, despitethe accentbeing shifledliom the Carnapian translationof the theoreticalinto the observational on the comparisonof the

'l' r urrs.fi,qurut i orts, M utu t i ons, A lt er nat iy,es

19

testabilityor falsifiability degreesof theory.thc reductionol the rationalityin scienceto logicism is only transf'erred in a diff-ercntarea and nuance.As a conscquence,dcspite open criticism, an unwantedaffiliation with logical empiricism is maintained,although it trusts the ability of philosophy to cooperatewith sciencewith a view to teachingus somethingaboutthe enigma o l 'th e wor ld in whic h w c a rc l i v i n g a n d a b o u tth e e n i gmaol ' our know l edge erboutthis world. Popperassignsthe theory of scicncethe role of ref-eree in philosophicaldebates.

Since rt is not possibleto reducethe statusof the theoreticalterms to that ot'observationdata,the weight is shiftednow on thc competitionamong rival research programs. The programs could bc rationally compared to unbiasedbackgroundknowledge.This way, by being theoreticallystructured, all knowledgeproductsentail that rationality is reducedto logicism. The move towardchallengingnon-problematic backgroundknowledgeenablesthe cclmparison, the commcnsuration, of the theoreticalterms used in divergent rcsearchprograms.In the analysisand asscssment of the new philosophyof scienceby Norbert R. Hanson,ThomasS. Kuhn, and StephenToulmin, the place it allowed to theoreticalterms and, in general,to the theoretical approach,we should take as a naturalreactionagainstthe standardparadigm of reductionismthat resultedfrom the empiricist tradition. If a complete rcductionof the theorcticalconceptsto the termsof an observational basisis impossiblc, if a partial rcduction is possiblc in tcrms o{' a theoretical fiameworkalonc,thenthe problemof verifyingor falsifyingthe theories,by et function of data, no longer holds thc focal point. Thc stressshifts to thc understandingof how observationaldata are structuredby theories.Three osscntial thescs of theorcticism are outlined by the deviation of the problematicwhich cnjoys an ample and systematicpresentationin Kuhn's The Structure of the ScientificRevolutiort:( l) the paradigmaticcharacterof lrumanknowledge (2) the priority of the paradigrnin the explanationof the structureor of thc dynamicsol-knowledge;(3) the incommensurability ol the empiricalbasis.r0 In this vision,the periodsof normal sciencearc markedby some paradigms, such as excmplary problem-solving, symbolic generalizations, models acceptedby the disciplinary community, and values that carninfluencethe choiceof thcory.Similarly,the periodsof revolutionary sciencepresuppose the adoptionof a new paradigm.Due tcl the fact that it is theoreticallyladen,observationacquiressignificancewithin the confinesof the paradigmalone.This meansthat the hope in the possibilityof creatinga neutrallanguageol'the sensorialdatain which theoriespertainingto different paradigmscould be comparedis eliminated.Paradigmsare incommensurablc.

The reductionof rationalitytcl logicisrnand conceptsdocs not exclude the assessmentof the dynamics of science, taking into considerationthe connectionsbetweenthe succession of hypotheses, or thc theories,the socialinstitutionalcontext,the systemsof values,or the ontologicalcomrnitmentsof

thc researchpractice.Thus, Kuhn gives up the rcductionist traditionof derivingparadigm shilisfromthelogicalstructure of thescientific knowledge alone.

If theoreticism,at least in Kuhn's version,no longer confcrs on data their independenccof' theories,thc distinctionbetwcen sensorialdata and theoriesis maintained,allowingit to rcpresentparadigmsas exernplarities for what we are given through experience.rrThe methodologicalanarchism proposedby Paul Fcyerabenddrives thc acceptanccof data-ladenness to its extreme consequence: the legitimacy of thc distinction betweendata and theories is challenged.Since data exist only when gencratedby theory, alternative theories generate different sets o1- data, and such sets are incommensurable.

Then, asks Feyerabend,how can data help in testing or eliminatingthcories'/Fcyerabendanswersthat anythinggoes.This meansthat the standardsand the criteria of rationality are inherent to theoretical frameworks.They can be evaluatedfiom within alone,without supposingthat replacingone thcory with anothermight bring us closerto the truth.Thus, we go beyond thc criticism ol' the c priori rationalityto the suprcmacyof the extra-logicalfactors in knowledge.What remains, holds Feyerabend,is acstheticjudgment,judgmentsof taste,metaphysicalassumptions,religious desires,in short, our subjectivedesires,since the developmento1' science conceptsstopsbeingrational.'tThe immanentand contextualapproachof the criteria and types of' rationality,conjugatedwith the rejection ol' logicist reductionismkeepsthcoreticismapartfrom empiricism,yet thc lirnits of thc visionof truth bringsit closer. relativist-conventionalist The subtlecriticismof the two dogmasof logicalempiricism,conducted

by Willard van Orman Quine, is rnorc radical. Going beyond the lalse and coherenceleadsto a decperlcvel of dichotomybetweencorrespondence the philosophic understandingof the status held by thcoreticalentities.

Accordingly,a shi{i of the problematicemerges.Within the new concepton overlooking rationalityproposedby Hilary Putnam,it rendersindispensablc the current alternativein philosophy bascd on scientismlogicism versus cultural relativism, and overlooking the promotion of an cpistemological realismopposedto the tendencyto dressup the older empiricismin the new empiricism.rs clothesof the so-callcdconstructive 3. A PhilosophicalMetamorphosis: From Logical Empiricism to Constructive Empiricism With a certainamountof humclrousness and lucidity, that we ourselvesmay need, Bertrand Russell pointed out that, in philosophy,the allegationof dealing in metaphysicshas bccomc an allegationsimilar to that brought a securityrisk to his country.Conf-essing againsta functionaryrepresenting that, as far as Russellwas concerned,he did not know what they meant by

A P Iilo soplticul M etuntrtrlthrt.si.;

8l

"this word mctaphysics,"Russcllfound a dcfinition for it, that seemedto be adcquateto all cascs: "a philosophicalopinion that the author does not support."rtWhen readingthc main chaptersof the much commentedbook by B. C. van Fraassen,The Innge of Sc'ienc'e.'t yuu have the impressionthat alniostthe samething c;ouldbe saidaboutthe term "cmpiricism":it designatcs son-rcthingthat thc pcrson spcaking in its name does not uphold. If by cmpiricismwe understand that kind of approacho1'theissueaboutthe sources of knowledgein oppositionto rationalismor revolutionismand in harmony with JohnLocke's crcdo,nihil est in intellectuquod non prius.fueritin sensu, then van Fraassenlails to sharcthis approach.

As a matterof fact, accordingto Locke's criterion,Galileo Galilei was an empiricistin terms of souroesof knowledgennd Cardinal Bellarmino a revelationist.According to van Fraassen'scriterion, it is Bellarmino who becomesatnempiricistand Galileoa predcccssor cll-scicntificrealism.Wc arc ad ri fti n f ull- s c aleam big u i ty .

If we abandonthe contextof discovcryand try to defineempiricismin tcrms of justil-ication,then the fundamentaldogma ol' moderncmpiricismis thc idca that any non-analyticalknowledgc is fbundcd on experience.'6 Empiricismis no longcrdel'ended eitherwithin the contextof'discovery,or in that of .justillcation,exceptfbr what I dare name the oontextof flnality. To van Fraassen,bcing an empilicist means to propose an epistemological position about the aims of scienceas opposedto that promotcd by the representatives of realism.The decisivequestionbecomesnow: Is it possible that thc lundamentalaim of the scientifictheory is to tell us the truth abouta reality fbund beyond perceptiblestates,relations,or events, yet not be uto p i a n?

As known, oncc we accept that the thcorctical-ladenness of thc observationaltcrms and the doublc-languageparadigm, bascd on the theoretical-cmpiricitl dichotomy,were abandoned, thcn analyticalphilosophy stcp p e di nt o it s pos t posi ti v i s tta g c T . h e c o h e rc n c th e c o ryof truth,w hi ch w as t h e co ro llar yof ac c c pt i n gth c d o g ma so l -L o g i c a lPo s i ti vi smand of cquati ng what was rationalwith what was logical,ccasedto bc competitivein relation to the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, fbllowing the declineof logical empiricism, the contemporarydebate over truth in sciencc has brought forward the point of view o1-scientific rcalism. Anti-rcalistic approaches, conventionalistor instrumentalist, could not have an echo comparableto realism,sincerealismproved to be the only philosophythat did not make a miracleout o1'soientificbreakthroughs.'t Van Fraassenrcgretsthat the representatives of logical empiricism have gone so lar in their attemptto convertphilosophicalissuesinto issuesabout languagethat the linguistic orientationof which, in some cases,has had disastrouseffects in the philosophy of science. He considers that the Carnapiandichotomy betweenthe theoreticaland the observationalis the

resultof an error of category,failing to distinguishamongentities,which can be observational or non-observational, and terms,concepts,which can be only theoretical.The fact hinders the correct understandingof the constructive dimensionand of thc empiricalcontentof scientifictheories.Hc admitsthat, today, logical empiricism no longer ofl'ersviable counter-arguments to the argumentsof the epistemologioalrealism and that the positivist imagc of sciencecan no longer be upheld.Yet, van Fraassen'sbook disavowslogical empiricism alonc and dcfbnds with original argumentsa metamorphoscd e mp i ri cis mc alledc ons t r u c ti veemp i ri c i s mr8 .

Undoubtedly,constructiveempiricismtries to transcendthe unilateral understandingof theories ficm a predominantly linguistic standpoint, characteristicof Logical Positivism.With logical empiricism,advancinga theory meant specifyingan exaci languageand a set of axioms to which a partial dictionary was added so as to connect thcorctical tcrrns to observational ones.On the contrary,in constructiveempiricism,advancinga theory consistsin specifying a family of structures,called modcls, and dissociatin-q some of their empirical substructures thzrtcan be rcgardedas direct representations of' obscrvationalphenomena.Van Fraasscncalls thc sLructurcs that can be describedby meansof controllablestatements aboutthe results of experiments and measuremcnts"appearances."From the new perspcctive,a theory needsto be cmpiricallyadequate.That is, [o includeat least one model, so that its appearances are isomorphicto the empirical structuresof said model. The entire constructiveempiricism consists in variations on a similar theme, meant to oft'er both a metamorphosisof empiricism and, at the same time, an alternativcto realism in contemporary philosophy.

Later I will try to bnng fbrth argumentsto demonstratcthat, althoughit advancesan originalalternativeto [he optionsof realism,this option doesnot seemviable.The spectacular metamorphosis of empiricism,from logical into constructive.fails to also involve the rejectionof'ontologicalassurnptions in L o g i ca lP os it iv is m .

Van Fraassen characterizes the rangeof realisticpositions,from Wilfrid Sellars'smetaphysicalrealism to Hilary Putnam'sinternalrealism, by two main theses:(l) Throughits theories,scicnceintcndsto tcll us a litcrally true story of what thc world is likc. (2) The acceptanceof a scientific theory assulnesthe belief that the thcory is true. Consequently,the irnperceptible entitiespostulatedby theorydo exist in reality.In oppositionto the thesesof scientificrealism,constructiveempiricismholds that: (l) scienceintendsto off-erus theorics that are empirically true; (2) the acceptanceof a scientiflc theory requiresyou only believe that it is empiricallyadequate.As can be easily seen,the main differencebetweenscientificrealismand constructive empiricismis that betweeniiteral truth and empirical adequacy,taken as aims of scienceand criteria in the acceptanceof the theory. Lel. us not forget that,

t\ P ltilosop hical M etannrpho,si.g

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ils shown, in constructivcernpiricism,a theory is cmpirically adequateif it includcs at lcast onc modcl that actual phenorncna1lt. f'hus, errpirical adcquacydoes not link the acceptancco1'a theory to the existenceo1'nonobservationalobjects or processesthat should correspondto theoretical entitiesor to thc correspondence clf our theoreticalentitieswith an ob.jective rcality.Thc critcrionof ernpiricaladequacyof the theory is obviouslyweaker than that ol' the verification or confirmation of i(s truth. Assessingthc significanceo1' this modiflcation, van Fraassenconcludesthat the ncw criterion, his cmpirical zrdcquacy,would finally allow f or tl're cl'ficicnt clirninationol metaphysicsliom scientilicdiscourse.

Wh ilc it is not m y p u rp o s cto ma k e a d e ta i l e da nal ysi sol ' sornereal l y intcrestingaspcctsof' the philosophicalposition adoptcdby van Fraassen,I wo u l d l i k e t o as k a qu e s ti o nl h a t s e e msc o n c l u s i veto me. W i thi n thi s ntctamorphosis liorn logical empiricismto constructiveempiricism,are the ontologicalassurnptions ol-crnpiricisrnabandoned, are they moditied, or afe thcy maintained/ As a rule, thc analysisol'thc problemis cornplicatedby the lact tha'Lthe adhcrents cll' empiricisrn rcluse to explain their irnplicit ontolo-eical cotnmitrnentand to subjcotit to critical analysis.Van Frarassen seemsto be the exceptionto the rule. He acceptsto speakaboutontolo-{icalcommitment.

Yet he placesit at the observational level alone,consideringthat ar:ceptinga nerv theot'yshould not crcateany other clntologicalcommitment,since the d e scri p tiv eex c c llenc ea t th e o b s e rv a ti o n alle v e l i s thc onl y gcnui ne measuremcnto1'any thcorcticaltruth. According [o van Fraassen,bcing an cmpiricistprcsupposes a triple commitment:not to bclieve in zrnythingthat goes bcyond the admittcd actual phenomena;to trcat scienccas a way of scarchingfbr truth, aimcd at actual observablcphcnomena;and to firmly leject any explanaticln of regularitiesgiven throughassumedtruths about a rcalitylying bcyondwhat is actualand perceptible.re What do we find'/ That the assumptionof the classicalempiricisrnis adopted.Accordingto it, thc debateon the issueol'truth shouldbe centered on the cognitivestaLusol'thc isolatedindividualtruth. The subjectis placed outsidethe empiricistworld; his/herrcflectionswould not be influencedby logical structuresand would deliberatelyplace himself/herselfoutside the realm of language.As a rule, many philosophersol' sciencewho reject the unilateralismof the enrpiricistpositionadoptedby Lo-eicalPositivismtry to go bcyond crnpiricismand enter one or anotherof the orbits of scientillc realism.T'he constructiveernpiricisrnupheld by van Fraassenalso aims at su rp a ssing t he unilat c ra l i s m o f th e l o g i c a l -e mpi ri ci stapproach i n epistcrnology.Yct, this way, it does nothing rnorc l"hanproceedliom onc linguisticlbrm to anotherlinguisticor structuralfbrm o1'empiricism.

Acc or ding [ o c o n s tru c ti v c en rp i ri c i s m. p h i l osophi cal probl crns p ro cl a i m edm c aninglesbs y l c l g i c a cl n rp i ri c i s rna rc c o m promi sedas genui ne

cognitivc ones. Although constructivccmpiricism acceptsthe constructive dimensionof scientificknowledgeand rejectsreductionismcharacteristic ol' the standardparadi-emclf thcorics,it maintainsthc dogma ol' rcductionism.

Thc do-ernasurvivesthrou-ehthc assumptionthat the test on the truth o1'our theoricson non-observzrtional realitiesis offcrcd by crnpiricaladcquacy.That is, the observationiilcxcellcnceis takcn scparatelyand not in the contextof -qlobalexcellence.

Whilc lhc dogm a o n re d u c ti o n i s mi s ta c i tl y a cccptcd,constl ucti vc e mp i ri cis mr c t ainst hc em p i ri c a ol p i n i o nth a t s c i e n c eh a s,i n termso1' val uc.a neutralbasisand it is detachedliom socialprocess;accordingto it, l'actsand lcl g i ca s the only c ogniti v cd e te rm i n a n ts o 1 ' s c i e n c eH. o wever,an ontol ogi cal commitmcnt o1' the issue of truth remains necessary,ablc to surpassthe simplistic undcrstandingol' correspondence,without rcsorting to the a b a n d o nm ent of a r ealisti cs p i ri t.

Rejectingthc truth as a relationof partial and rclativecorrespondcncc, co n stru ct iv cem pir ic is mc a n n o te x p l a i nw h y th c rea re t hcori cs,w hi ch, w hi l e basedclnstatements aboutunobservable cntities,still let us discovcrnew l'acts and in'egularities.It scemsto placatcthc nced lbr explanationtl-ratrcalism e mp l o ys.Neit her is t he n e e d l b r a s s c s s m e nsta ti s l l cd,si nce the empi ri c adequacyo1'arnodelautomaticallyentailsa Yesanswcrto the question:Is the theorytrue? We know that a Ies answeris valid only when the givcn answer rnightalsobe No. To answerthc epistcmological and axiologicalrequircmcnts o1'contemporaty scicncc,we needto not only go beyondthc narrow realm ol' the linguisticanalysisperformedby logical empiricism,but also beyondthe scientificmodelsscrutinizedby constructiveempiricism.Lct us move toward suchan ontologicalcommitmentof the issueo1'truththat is able to transccnd thc crude undcrstanding of thc statementcorrespondence with the existencc.

Such intent is indispcnsablewhen we considerthe bcneficial impulse that co n stru c t ivccm pir ic is mg i v e sto p h i l o s o p h i c aclo n te mpl ati on.

Thc cmergenceo[' thc constructivcempiricism on thc philosophical sccnc scemsl"ohzrvehad totally dil'l'crcntclfects than those anticipated.As Hilary Putnam rentarkcdin a dispute with van Fraassen,thc hot dcbates generatedby the metamorphosisof logical cmpiricism into constructive cmpiricism lcad [o thc conclusion that the contemporaryphilosophical projectswill be achievedwith lcss errors il' wc are liee liom any lbrrn ol' rcd u cti o nis mT. hc r c lor e ," rc v i v i n g a n d re v i ta l i z i n gth e rcal i sti cspi ri t i s thc r t th i s ti m c .rr2lt) im p o rta ntt as k f or a ph i l o s o p h c a 1 i s a concl usi onI share becausethrough it the mirage of a non-philosophical culturc vanishes.The chancc of a new alliance between scicnce and philosophy arises in the p o stmo der nisctult ur c ,ba s c do n th e c o rl m o n n e e d so 1 ' ancpi stcmol ogi cal as w cl l a s ax iologic alnat u re T . h u s .c u l tu rcrc m a i n sa s p c c i fi cal l yhumanreal m, thc diversecomponcntsof which will preservetheir axiolo-ricalspecificity. yet irreducibleto eachothcr.

They are complementary,

ChapterFive Reductionismto Literatureand the Temptationof a Post-Philosophical Culture 1. Difficulties of the Theory of Post-PhilosophicalCulture Concernedwith the attemptsol' the precursorsclf the Parnassianschool to isolateart fiom its naturalbonds with the other ways in which the hurnan being spirituallyrelatesto thc world, CharlesBaudelaireexpresseshis hopc that the unnaturalnessof a literature paying tributc to an atmosphere propagatinganti-philosophicalprejudice will remain a mere unpleasant mcrnory.ln The Pagan School,Baudelaireurgcsfor a cleaneratmospherein which literaturcneedsto invigoratciLslbrccs.Hc cnvisionsthe momentwhen wc undcrstandthc lact that any literaturcdcclining to step betweenscicncc and philosophyis a murderousand suicidalliterature.' cnvisionedby Baudelairein Signalsare that the timc ol understanding thc ncar luture has not yet arrived.The pagan schoolendangeringthe sacred unity ol- art, screncc,and philosophy has its own lollowers. With one correction.The old adage,Literature,bewctreoJ'philosoph)'!,isreplacedby thc new phrase,Literature, substitute.fbrphilosoph,t,/In other words, if the Baudelaireandispute criticizt:d those who placed literature bcyond any scientil'icor philosophical"contact,"today we witnessthe developmento1'a tentativeinfluenceto place literaturebeyondphilosophy.It is about the socallcd "theory oi post-philosophical culture" that has gaincd more precise co n to u r sdue t o t he s t ir r i n g y, e t a l s omi s l e a d i n ge,s s a y so l ' R i chardR orty.l Despitehis vibratingpraiscfor thc historyof art, GeorgW. F. Hegelhad state of the absoluteidea. In littlc trust in its future as a pre-philosophical contrastwith Hcgcl, Rortv hasgrcattrustin the futureof art as "the queen"cll' p o st-p hilos ophic calult u re .Ag a i n s t th e b a c k g ro u n do f l cgi ti macycri si s i n philosophy,Rorty restatedFriedrichSchlcgcl'shopc to listento the voice ol' poctrywhen the powcrsof philosophyslaokencd. ol'the lact The startingpoint of Rorty's rellectionsis the demonstration that philosophyhas gaineda dominantand unilying role in culture after thc rnoderndiff'erentiation ol' valuesand the withdrawalof philosophyli'ornunder the authorityof rcligion. But, by ruling itself out of the "republicof letters," and by mirnickingthe esotericlanguageof science,philosophywas -uradually which broughtit on thc vcrgc of a crisis caughtin a turmoil of rcassessments ol 'l e g i tir nac yT. he c laim so l ' p h i l o s o p h yth a t i t i s a b l eto deci pherthe ul ti matc nerturcof rcality or to f ind the primordial principlesol- culturc havc bccn virtually abandoned.

Its influenceon the idealsof lifc hasrcduccd.According

to Rorty, the rcason is that art shows an incrcasingtendencyto rcplacc rcfigion and philosophyin rnoldingand comibrtingthe agonizedconsciencc ol .th e yo ung. Nov els an d p o e msa re n o w th e p ri n c i p almeansby w hi ch a bri g h t yout h gains s c lf ' - i ma g cWe . l i v e i n a c u l t,u rei n w hi ch putti ng orl c' s m o ra lscn s it iv it yint < lword si s n o t c l e a rl yd i s ti n g u i s h efrom d cxhi bi ti ngone' s Ii t c r a r ys c n s i b i liict s . l As Har old B loon r, w h o m R o rty a l s o i n v o k e s i n support ol ' hi s arsunlents,puts it, thc tcachcrof litcraturcwill be condemncdto tcachin thc luture the prescntness of' the past, becausehistory,philosophy,and religion havc withdrawnas agentsfiom thc "Soeneol'Instruction."4 Undcr thesc circumstanccs.Rorty declaresthat it is high timc that philosophysttlppcdtrcatingliterarturc with an air ol'superioritybut took into accountthat we cnteredthe stage of post-philosophical culturc. It is time philosophyccascdto olaim anotherpurposein additionto that ol'entertaining a convglsationcarriedon by pcoplc throughthc centur^ies with the rvorld and wi th th ci r 'own pr oblc m s .' Ih c c s s e n ti ath l i n g i s n o t to l ook fbr chi mcri cal clitcria for thc trcatmento1'controvcrsies by argumcntsand founclingculturc ne varietur,but, lttllorvingthe model of litcrature,to crcatca nc\,vvocabulary and ncw lbrnrs ol' cxpressionto allow thc conversationol' humatrity to c o n ti n u e .

Thc rcally cxaspcrating thing aboutliteraryintcllectuals.ll'om thc point of vi e w ol' t hos e inc linc dto w a rds c i e n c co r p h i l o s o p h y,i s thei r i nabi l i tyto engagein such argumcntation, to agrceon what would count toward settling disputes,on thc critcria to which all sidcs should appeal. In a postphilosophicalculturc,this cxzrspcration would not bc I'clt.s In Rorty's vicw. philosophymusttakeinto accountthe historicalplocess by w h i ch it s m es s ianicd e l i ri u m i s u n d e rm i n e dc, s p e c i al l yw hen tw enti ethccnturytcxtualismaims to placc literaturcin the centerand trcat both scicncc and p h i l o s ophyas .at bc s t,Ii te ra ryg c n rc s .t' Ph i l o s o pshhyoul dconstantl gl y fcr ncrv eloquentcxpressions of the'humanreactionto the troublingspcctaclco1the univcrse,it should kcep thc spirit in a "poctic amazemcnt"propitiousto -{raspingwhatcveris new underthe sun,and it shouldoutlinean autongmous litcra ryg enr cpr oud ol' it s s ty l i s ti cv i rtu e s In . a p o s t-p h i l osopl i i cal cul ture.i t w ou l d b e cleart hatt his is a l l th a tp h i l o s o p h yc a nb e .7 At a s uper f lc ialglet n c cR. o rty ' sp l e a fo r a p o s s i b l ea nd dcsi rabl ccul ture whcre literature,particularlypoctry, should take ovcr the place previously hcl d b y philos ophym c r c l y re s u m c so n c o f th e o b s c s si ons of' R ornanti ci sm.

So rn cw o u ld c ons idc rt ha t a rt l -u l l l tl srts ro l e rn s o l ' aar s phi l osophi cthi nki ng demonstrates its ability to conccptuallyscrutinizcthe human conciition.Thc Romantics came to considcr poctry a subscquentand ultimate form o[ phi l o so p hics pc c ulat ion.

T h i s i s th e re a s o nw h y R o rty i n vokesthc supportol ' I t o ma n ti ct r adit ion.Y c t , w h i l c S c h l e g eal n d N o v a l i srn a i ntai nthatphi l osophy re so rtsto lit c r at ur ewit h t h c d c c l a rc di n tc n ti o no l ' b c c o rn i nsa l ornt ol ' uot' si s.

l )iJ'fit'ulticsol tlrc'['haoryof Po.tt-PhilosophiculOulturc

fi7

o1-thetitanic creationof the world, Rorty urgesliteratureto takc upon itself thc rnissionusuallyassumcdby philosophyin modcrnculture.Thc so-callcd theoryof post-philosophical culturcintendsto dcf'endthe claim that literature lias displaccdphilosophyas the presidingdisciplincol'contenporaryculture.

In thc pursuito1'aphilosophicalfoundationftrr the practiccsol'contcnporal'y criticistn, thc thcorist ol' thc post-philosophical culture departs fi'om tht: originalinspirationol'Romanticistn, drawingupon it only insolaras he or she attributesto it a specialsignilicancc.Rclrtycalls"Romanticism"the thesisthat rvl-rat is ntost importantfbr humanlif-eis not what propositionswc accept,bul wh a t vo cabular ywc t is e.* Romanticismthus becomcsthe attributeof a mode in which we relatc spirituallyto the rvorld,which opposesthc tolcrationo1'creativeimagination 'Ihis, to thc dcspotismof rcason. in [urn, presupposes the preservationof an agrecmentof conscienceswith rcspectto the acceptancc ol'the uscfulness ol'a vocabulary and thc rclcvancc o1' a tcxt, When Baudelaire exclaims patheticaliy,"l want red-coloredllelds and blue-colorcdtrees,""Rorty dcles not idsntily him as a rcprcsentativc of Romanticismwho views modern art and litcratureas dcsigncdto rc-builda world able to satisfythe thirsLlbr thc absoluteor philosophy.Hc identifiesBaudelaireas a precursorol' thc new prist-philosophical Romanticismwho perccivesmodern art and literatureas dcsigned to rc-build, by substitutingthemsclveslor philosophy,the li'ail linking humanbeingsto the world. brid-ees He Baudelaireis not only the poetof modernity,but alsoits aesthctician. is the first to use, in 1859, the term "modernity," with rel'erenceto the particularityol'an art airnedat settingcreativeimaginationas f'ar as possible away from the canons of absolutc bcauty by building an aesthctic conligurationable to transfigurercality and compctcwith it. But Rorty's plea lirr a post-philosophical culturc finds itsclf {ar from Baudclairc'sidca o1' r n o d crn it ywhic h giv c s up th c c l a s s i c aol u l t l o r a b s o l u t ebcautyand i nvol ves ol' autononrouslorms ol' culture. thc discontinuity and interdcpendence Idorty's cultulal rnodel in whictr literature takcs ovcr thc philosophical plerogative unnaturallyshilis the emphasisliom treating the relationship autonomy,valuc betwccnlitcraturcand philosophyin terms o1'coordination, equivalence,and interdependenc;e to an approaohin torms of subordination, heteronomy,valuehierarchy,and dcpendence.

A connotationof Baudelaire'snotion of modernity appearsonly in Ii.orty'sattemptto dircct attentiontowardthc ideaof a brcaklrom culturethat hasbeenlegitirnizedby philosophicalconsiderations and thus toward the idea ol' discontinuitywith the past. But this idea, which, lbr a long tin-re,has graspedthe signil'icance ol'innovativetrends,acquiresa shrill and aclcquatcly anachronistic tone in the currentdebateson the characteristics of.postmodertt culture:no breachr,viththe past,a non-consolatory retrieval,unity between c r r n t i n uyi ta n dd i s c o n t i n u i t y .

Rorty's attempt to forecastthe future of art is basedon the erroneous presuppositions that thc cardinalproblcmof contemporary cultureis to set up a new hierarchyof {brms. But, in a debateon postmodernculture, JcanFranEoisLyotard pointed out that thc csscntialproblem o1' contemporary cu l tu rei s t hatof legit ima c y ." ' Lyotard definesas postmodernthe statcof culturc that hasresultedfiom the rccent translbrmationswhich have affbcted the rulcs of the game in science,literaturc,and the arts.He declaresthat speculativephilosophywill havc to relinquishits legitimrzingfunctions."His analysistakesinto account solcly the speculativeclaims of ne varietur lounding. The purpose ol' philosophy in thc general cultural contcxt bccomes that o1 providing plovisional,revisablc,and partial legitimacyopposcd,on the miclo-logical lcvcl, to speculation.As Lyotard rightly claims, the downfall o1- old metaphysicsdoesnot incvitablyresultin pragmatism,and it does not lbllow fro m th i s t hatphilos oph yi ts e l l ' h a sto b e c o mea n a rt.r2 By cxtendingLyotard's interpretation,we can scc that to adequatcly graspthe future ol art and makc conceptuallyintelligiblethe new allianceof philosophy,scicnccs,and the arts, againstthe backgroundof a legitimacy crisis of speculativcrationalitywith absolutistclaims,the option betweenthe approachto this metamorfhosisin termsof moving liom a philosophicalto a post-philosophical culturc and lrom modernity to postmodernitybecomes decisivc.In the first casc,becauseof inadequate conceptualization, we reerch the conclusionthat a philosophywhich abandonsthe pride of building a categorialmatrix apt to bring all thc othcr forms of culturc in fiont of an almighty tribunal of met.aphysical reason wcluld become a discourseo1' crcative imagination.Such a discoursewould bc similar to an approach specificto literature.Here we are in Rorty's ccnterof gravityof the new postphilosophicalculture.In the secondcase,philosophyremainsitsclf and meets integrationof the humanconditioninto thc contextof the demandsol'releveint the connectcdculturaltrcnds,thc constellation of values,and the invenLoryof proccduresand attitudcswe call postmodernism.r3 Philosophyis no longer situatedon the level of an all-lcgitimizing"mctadiscoursc"above sciences and arts,but sideby sidewith them,with its own identityand equalrights.By sh i fti n g t he em phas is fi o m th e e p i s te mi c -c e n tritco the axi occntri c,rJ philosophyalso bccomcsa privilegedinstanceof postmodcrnculture,capablc of scrutinizingthc world of valuesas a wholc in which art and philosophy takeup their own places.

Lately, a tcndcncy to detect unsuspectedanalogiesbctween art and philosophy has been cncountcrcd.Jaakko Hintikka establishesa relevant analogybetweenHusserland Cubist painting.Startingfrom the distinction between noemato, tncanings. and ob.iects,things meant, Husserl saw phenomenology as the studyof noemata.Hintikka seesPicassopicking up the samcdistinctionwhentelling GertrudeSteinthat he paintedthingsthe way he

D iJJicult i es o.l't| rc'I'hertry o.fPrtst -Plti Io,top hi cu I Culrur e

ti9

knew them to bc rathcr than as thcy looked.Hintikka draws the conclusion that the way phcnomenologyis supposedto be a philosophicalstudy of noemata,thc samcway cubismis the art of noemata.i5 By virtue ol such analogies,cspeciallythosc bctwcenphilosophyand literature,a questionis ficquently askcd, Can philosopht,be reconciledr,tr rennitedwith literatLtre /"' The answersto this questiondivide opinionson the futureof philosophy culturc are in f'avor of and literature.Thc partisanso{' a post-philosophical reuniting philosophywith litcrature,with thc risk of rnistakingthe poctic virtues of imagistic languagc for the expressivevirtues of conceptual They considcrthat we would do well to see philosophyas just lan-euage. another literary genre.'t They see philosophy and literature as different cxerciseso1'the samc creativc imagination.They will thereby support l-he trying to compensate proliferationof a type of works that are unsuccessfully for the absenceof a spccificallyphilosophicalargumcntationby meanso1litcrary eff-ectsand lor thc absenceol' proper literary qualiticsby meansof p h i l o so phic al allegat ionIE s.

From thc perspectiveof an axioccnLricontology o1' the human, postmodernculturcopensthe way to reconciliation,to a ncw allianceamong rirt, scienc:c,and philosophy.Litcrature,art in ,{eneral,has ncver been and cannot be a substituteof philosophy.Today we witness a transitionfiom rnodernityto postmodernity.An art in searchlor its road toward the future increases its need f or philosophy by diff'erentiation,heteromorphism, indeterminacy,a pluralism of innovation that retricvcs tradition without consolation,by crcativcquestsfor axiologicallandmarksin their innovations.

Thc sarncchangesin the culturalparadigmhavc turnedinto a logical scandal ontology,the philosophyof culturc,and ethicsin the attemptsto rcconsl,ruct disregardof the philosophicalrclevanccof art. In this context,let me recall thc motto to a book writtenby GastonBachclard,wcll-knownfor his rcsearch as a philosophero1'scicncc:"Poetsmust be the primary study object of any philclsopheri1'hc wants to know mankind.""'With Paul Ricoeur, literature in with phcnornenology, opensthe gateto a possiblecouplingol hcrmeneutics ol'culture.Thc iin attemptto direot ontologytoward a global comprehension advocatcsol' the analytical school themselvcsno longcr consider art as philosophicallyirrelevant.Togetherwith RobertNozick, they claim thal"only by rooting thc philosophicaldiscoursein the conceptuallanguageof sciencc and in the imagisticlanguageo1'artcan philosophybecomca supportand a barring the cultural progressof humanity. hope to overcomethc clbstacles Fertile interdependencebetween philosophy and science and hetween philosophyand literaturehasbeenemphasized.

Philosophyemergestodayas rclatedto literaturethroughits axiocentric of the place ol' purpose,sincc both, in conjunction,pursucthe undcrstanding its lact in a world of valucsand not of thc nlaceof valucsin a world of {-acts,

sciencedoes.Thus, they have the missionto entertainthe self-conscicnce of human beings,o1-theirfundamcntalattributesas bcings creatingvaluesand r ca l i zi n gthc m s c lv es t hr o u g hv a l u e sT . h i s i s th c p ro l o u n dmeani ngo1' l -udw i g Wi ttg e n s t ein' cs onlbs s io n": I m a y Ii n d s c i e n ti fi cq u e s ti onsi ntercsti ng,but they never really grip mc. Only conceptualand aestheticquestionsdo [hat [o rrro lnL'.

"

Wc should not disregardthc fact that conccptualqucstionsancl the philosophicalworks dealingwith them have their own irreducibleauronomy.

In their own way, thcy resortto thcoreticalargumentsaimcd at diminishingor supprcssingambiguity, while poems and novels are works of fiction that createan acstheticuniversewith a plurality of meanings.This explainsthc puhlic reactionsto thc conceptualconstructions o1 philosophy,which resortto rcsponsivcnessto argunrents,to intellcctual options, diff-crentfrom thc complex aesthetic reactions to litcrary creations, primarily targeted at axiologicalsensitivcness.

The distinctionsare also clear with regarclto style.

Thc beautyo1'philosophicalstyle pcrtainsto abstraction,not to scnsitivity. 'l-hc styleof literarytcxtsaitrtsat crcatingimagcsof intmutablcoriginalityancl unl i mi te ds y nr bolis mand , i t ru l e s o u t th e ri g o rs o f mcthod.In phi l osophy, method is presentas an cstablishedstyle, a style of philosophywhich has Ibrsottenits origins.

Tlicsc arc, itt briel', a I'cw considerationsto the cffect that literature ca n n o ta s s um et hc plac eo 1 ' p h i l o s o p hiyn a p h i l o s o p h i cal cul ture.P hi l osophy and art will rernainpermanentlyrelatedby their roots in the intcrrogations on the humancondition.As rclatecllbrms oi-culturc.yet originaland irreducible, thcy will continueto exist in the luture in permanentsirnultaneityanclneithcr will cver bc willing to transformitself to replacethe other.

In disregardof this point o1'view, loversof culturewho claim that it is neccssaryto conl'erupon litcraturethe philosophicalattributesr.rf the age erl-read seemttt litrset that, in the realm of spiritualvalucs,any transgression againstautononryleopardizes thc wholc of culture.

2. Post-Philosophyor Postmodernism?

II'rcduclionismto sciencesumrnonsthc philosophicalrcflectionsol' scicntists in its aid, then literature,as promotedby the theory o{' post-philosophical culture,fabricatcsits predecessors by summoningthe aestheticmeditationof the poet.Les.fleursdu mal is insistentlyinvokcd.We are told that, {iom his cnthusiastnfbr Delacroix'sromanticpaintings,Baudelairccrosseclthc road that broughthim to the thrcsholdof a pragmaticunderstanding o1'ugly,evil. {-ictittn.Baudclaireis placeditmong those who havc fathcredthc charterolinoderll literatureand addressed philosophycondescendingly, fiorn a highcr perspcctivc,by virtueof their cxclusivcpassionlbr the arts.

P o st- P h ilo sop lty or P o.s[mode rn i sn L'/

9l

Screaminginjustice! Baudelairedid not acccptthc exclusivismof those who judged culture as a whole by using criteria and exigenciesof artistic cssence,and he stresscdthat thc passionfbr art is an all-dcvcluring cancer.He severelyand frequentlycriticized tlie error of the philosophicalart which rcsortsto childishhieroglyphto discoverthe truth or to del'endjustice instcad of' pursuing the intrinsic aesthetic linality characteristicof a work of imagination.Baudelaireaffirms that if the literary work is well written, nobody will f-eellrke violatrngthe laws of nature.Hc deflesanyoneto f ind cven a singlework of imaginationmeetingall the conditionsof the bcautif'ul yet being harmful.In this scnsc,Baudelaire'splea lbr thc irrcduciblcspecific of art has nothing in common with the formalisticdepreciationof mural valuesor with thc anticipationof the pragmaticabandonof truth. Hc asserts that the absenceol justicc and truth from art is tantamountto the ahsenceol' art. What Baudclairerefusesto acceptis a literatureassumingcxtrinsicgoals and giving up its prcrogativcsto teach history, cthics, and philosophy.

Literaturewill rcrnain literature.Didactic, philosophizingpretensesrisk to debaseliteratureand hijack it from its purpose.Is art useJ'ul? asksBaudelaire.

And he answers,Yes.WhyTBecauseit is urt.)t Thc ansr,ver cannotvouch lor a post-philosophicalculture governed by a literatureable to substitutefor p h i l o so phy .

AlongsideRcn6Huyghe,thosetrying to pclccivc the profoundmeaning of Baudclaire'saestheticand philosophicrneditationscan easily realizethat they expresshis aspirationto new literaryand philosophicalbondsand outline a theoryscatteredall over his writings on art. The theory is the philosophical awareness of what his art was trying to achievo.22 Thc novelty of Baudelaire'sAesthetic Curiosities23resides in his considering the concretc manifcstations of litcraturc and arts as mere landmarkson the way meditation pursuesits path toward philosophical dcbatcs.Baudelaircl-clt thc need to clarify his acstheticc:onsciencc.

For a while, his thirsL for philosophic introspectionbrought him closc to the dcceptivctemptations of a system.He cclnt'esses to his scveralattemptsto lock himselfup insidea syste.m fiom wherehe would have f'eltliec to preach.But hc linds the systernto be a kind of curse,driving him to perpctualdenial.You 'Ihe must constantlytry to invent anothersystem. needfor philosophizingled him throughsuccessive philosophicalapostasies beyondthe presentcanonso1' the systemin perpetualdelay with respectto the universalhumanbeing and lbr ever running after the multiform beautyof life. Reachingto embracea philosophy ablc to nurture the conncctionbetr.veen the rational discourse directed toward knowing the truth and impeccablesincerity, Baudelaire linally admitsthat his philosophicalconscience has found its respite.What he reproachesin "philosophism" is not its philosophicalstructure,but its unyieldingschematics, not its integratingontologicalvision,but the obsession of building closcd systems,the idcas of which are rcmotc from thc motlcy

variety of human cxpcrience.It is not the rationalityof the method,but thc type ol' reductionistrationalitythat disparagesthe virtues of sensibilityand affectivity.

If B audelair c ' phi s l o s o p h i c aels s a y se x p re s sa n d cl ari l y the conccptsof his acstheticcreed, wc must not forgct that, lbr thosc who insist on the deliberateimpersonalityof his poems,this creed is not a prclcction of his enrpiricalself. Thc fact that today Les.fleursdu mal is consideredone ol'the sourcesof'thc contcmporarypoctic movcmentshouldbe corrclatedto another fact. Baudelairestartedto depersonalize modernpoetry.Baudelaire's1 is no longer the cmpirical 1 of traditionalRomanticism,which points to a hreak fro m Edgar A . P oe' s " i n to x i c a ti o no l ' th e h e a rt." In thi s context, w c understandBaudelaire'stributeto imaginationscenas thc queenof facultics and involvcd in all functionso1-theart in ordcr to creatc,both in agreement with and in oppositionto the naturaluniverse,a univcrsctraverscdby thc supernaturalartiflciality of values.Thus, art respondsto thc eternalhuman needto build and rebuildthat consensus betweenworld orderand thc orderof valuesthat offerslif-eits ontologicalcontour.

Rot ' t y ' sdis c our s a c g a i n sat l i te ra tu re a x i o l o g i c a l l ygui dedby phi l osophy culminateswith a plea fbr post-philosophical literature,a literatureconccrned with the conversational cfficienoyand communicationof thc text beyondany aspirationtoward truth. Thc Baudelaireandiscourscagainsta literaturethat leavesthe areasol' spiritualityin the name of the photographicfidelity to a positivisticallyconceivednature,culminatesin alarm. Baudelaireconsiders that by continuingtcl evolve as a copy of nature,art will cancelitself.For an artist, imagination is the queen of truth and the possible is one of the provincesof truth.2rBaudelairemakesusc of the conceptof'supernaturalism in art in order not to reject truth, but to cndow truth with a content, in consonancewith thc availabilityof modernart to use nature's"dictionaryof lorms" to go beyond naturc,in thc world of human values,where natureis "absorbed"and transliguredby the axiologicalscnsibilityand ludgmentof the crcator.

Rorty's attemptto discoverthe characteristics of our cra's culturepays tributeto both his pragmattcparti-pris and the constitutiveconfusionsol'the conccptof post-philosophical culture.Rorty wantst.osign the deathcertificatc of a p h i l os ophy - im buecdu l tu re .B u t th a t w h i c h h c c o n si ders deadstaysal i ve through the very phrase, "post-philosophicalculture," which rcnders philosophyas a ref-erence term in the outline ol' currenttcndencies.A falsc issucis thus bcing dcbated:which cultural fleld, sciencc,art, may take over the former prerogativesof philosophy'/The whole discourseis bascdon thc tacit and erroneousassumptionaccordingto which the cardinal issuc of contemporaryculture is that of- re-hierarchization o{' its fornrs. Or, with contemporaryoulture,the essentialissueis that of its bcing legitimized.

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3. "Philosophy as Style and Literature as Philosophy" Thc debates in reccnt years over the relation between literature and philosophyhave brought lbrward the option for either a new type ol their alliancewithin culture,or for transitiontoward a type o1-culture meant to transformphilosophyinto a literary genre.The first option is pursued,with typical ditlbrencesand nuances,by the theoreticians of postmodernism.

The secondoption is pursuedby the partisansof the so-callcd"post-philosophical culture."

The diverging connotationsof the option are revealcd by a debate initiatcd a l'ew ycars ago by The Monisf. Thc topic was Philosophl,as Style und Literature as Philosophl'.The authorsof thc articlesare quasi-unanimous in admitting that duc to an unjustificd inferiority complex in the facc ol' science,the philosophyof Logical Positivismmimed its jargon, and, in some casesan aberrantstyle was reachcd.From lhc texts of Plato and Aristotlc, Michel de Montaignc and David Humc, Jean-JacquesRousscau and ImmanuelKant, John Dcwey and Martin Hcidegger,a privategamc has been who spcnd their erudition in specialized developedby sorneprof-essionals rcvicw to establishif the sentence, Thereore gra\t thingsand thereore cows, is bcttcrexpressed by the formula: (3 x ).E,x w .(3 x.Ex ) y o r by (l x ).Bx .(3 x ).C x Donald Henze observes that this is a cornputerizedstyle reflecting a hypotheticalcomputerized conceptionaboutthc world: form without contcnt, price without valuc, sight without vision.tt To avoid abdicationfiom the the maligningeffectsof logicist function of philosophyand to counterattack of thc traditionalsituation, scicntism,the authorsproposea re-cstablishment when valuablephilosophicalwritings were also good literatureor, at lcast, they would have some virtues of literary and stylistic nature. Could philosophybe reconciledor reunitedwith literature'/asksHenze.

The answersto this questionseparatethe participantsin the debate.The partisansof post-philosophical culturefavor the "reunion"of philosophywith litcrature.As Bouveresse observed,they run the risk of confusingthe poetical virtues of imagistic languagewith the expressivcvirtues of conceptual language . They might alsoconsiderthatphilosophyand literatureare diffcrent cxercisesof the same creativeimagination.Thus, they would support the prolil-erationof some kind of works that try, unsuccessfullythough, to compensatefor the lack of argumentscharacteristicof philosophyby literary cftbcts, and for the absenceof the qualiticscharacteristicof literature,by philosophicalpretense.26

Thosc probing into the fbrceful lines of postmodernculturecan fbresceat pclssiblc and desirable reconciliation,what Prigoginc called the "new alliancc," betweenliteraturcand philosophy.That is, thc cstnblishmentof somcconnectionsbetwcenliteratureand philosophy.

Literatureor literary criticism havc never substitutedfor philosophy.

Our cra ampliliesart's needlbr philosophy.It does it throughdiff'erentiation, openness,heteromorphism,indcterminance,pluralism ol' innovation in recclveringtradition,and a crcativescarchfbr axiologicallandmarks.But thc samechangesin the culturalparadigmturn into genuinelogical scandaithc attemptsto relruildthe ontologyof the human,epistemologv,the philosophy of cultureor ethics,in disregardol'thc philosophicalrclevanceof art.

For cxamplc, with Ricoeur, literature opens up the way toward a possibleconnectionof hermeneuticswith phenomenologyin an attemptto direct ontologytowarda desirablcglobal cornprehcnsion of culture.Evcn thc representatives crf thc "analyticalschool" ceaseto considerart irrelevantin terms of philosophy.Togetherwith Hilary Putnamand RobertNozick, they claim that only throughthe twolbld rooting of thc philosophicaldiscourscin fhe conceptuallanguageof scienceand in the imagisticlanguageof art could philosophybecomea hopein ovcrcomingthe obstacleshamperingthc cultural progressr-rl'humankind.

This way, thc interdependence betwcenphilosophy and science,or betweenphilosophyand liter:rturc,dccpens.But thesclitcrary and philosophicalconncctionscannotbc explained.as Rorty bclieves,through the common pra-smaticconscience,abandoningtruth in the nante of thc "innovatingvocabularies," and the textualistconscience, the ability to respond to text ratherthatt to the world.rtThey could be cxplaincdby thc acceptance o1'a plurality o1'typesof rationality.It is about an irreducibilityo1'the truth characteristic of the philosophicaldiscourseor ol' thc literarycreationLo the synthetic-analytic altcrnativeeffectivefor the criteriologyof truth in scientilic theor-v.This discourscis achicvedby understandingthe connectionto the wclrld,beyondtcxts,by meanso1'thehumanref'erential alone.

Today philosophy appcars to be related to liferaturc through its axiocentricdimension.In conjunction,they try to discovcrthe placc of facts in a world of values,and not the placeof valuesin a world of lar:ts,as science does.Their missionis to takecareof the humanbeing'sself'-conscience, in its basioattributcas a creativebcing who self-develops throughcultural values.

This is consistenl. with the profound meaningof Wittgenstein'sconf'ession that though scientific problcms may interest him, hc is f-ascinatedby philosophicaland aesthetic problemsonly.28 The regainedfocus on the humanproblemand the explicit assumption of the axio-centric perspectivcon the side of the great contemporary philosophicorientationshave allowed for the new connectionsof philosophy with literatureand havepromptedus fiequentlyto resumeHume's questionas to whctheror nof philosophyhas a lot to losc if it lails to rcintegrateinto the

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rcpublic of the letters.We should not forget that philosophy,in Hume's vision,retainsits functionas backboneof culture.

Today, the complex issues of the postmodern culture demand philosophicalre-constructionand a counterattackagainst reductionismto science through the revigoration of the literary and philosophical links.

Philosophicalde-construction and promotionof reductionismto literatureby turning philosophyinto a "literary genre" are out o1'the question.But both attemptsto reductionism,to scienceand to literature,althoughdiametrically opposed, spring from a consciencewhich ignores the autonomy and the irreducibility of the interdependent domainsof culture.

Contemporaryliterary and philosophicalconnectionscould be deepened and amplifiedonly when the irreplaceable specificof the distinctways of the spiritualrclationwith the world is takeninto consideration.

First of all, philosophy and litcraturediffbr in thc produot o[ thcir creativity.The productshold e.itheran explanatoryintentionalityable to reveal the generalhuman significanceof somc knowledgeabout the universc.or an expressiveintentionalityable to conveysuggestively a pcrsonalprojectionof the world.

The meansthe artist and the philosophermake use of are also specific and irreducible.The artist.works exclusively with means pertaining to intuition and sensitivity.The philosopheroperateswith conceptsand visions crf utmost abstraction.Literature and philosophy depart from science,ars demonstrandi,sincethey are variantsof ars inveniendl.Partly, this explains why their productsarc meantto be receivedin their original form, why their messagecannot he extractedor paraphrasedwithout being alteredor ruined.

Philosophicalworks resortto their own mannerof theoreticalargumentation Ineantto diminish or suppressambiguity.Poems and novels are works of Iiction buildingan aestheticuniversewith a pluralityof meanings.

Hence,the public reactionto the conceptualconstructions of philosophy appcalingmainly to our responsiveness to arguments,[o our aptitudesfor intellec{.ual option, are diff-erentfiom that ol' literary creation engaginga complex aesthetic reaction and addressedmainly to our axiological sensitivity,but not to the dianeticaxis of conscience.

In fictionalworks, ideas becclmecharacters.In philosophicalworks, the charactersare ideas.Even with respei;tto style, relevantin literatureand in philosophy,where all works enduring the wear of time combine organicallywhat and how, we must rememberthat the beautyof the philosophicalstyle is of an abstractnature and not of sensibility.The style of literarytexts,meantto createimageswith inimitable originality and unlimited symbolism,excludesthe stringencyof method.In philosophy,method is presentas a sedimentstyle, as a style of philosophizing,the origins of which havebeen{brgotten.

Theseare someof the considerations by virtue of which literaturecannol substitutefor philosophyin a supposed"post-philosophical culture,"the way

a philosophygonebeyondthe messianicfever of the uniquetruth claimedby pre-criticism metaphysicsdoes not ask literature to sacrifice its way of existence.Philosophyand literaturewill always be connectednot through their content, but through their roots in the interrogation of the human conditionand throughtheir drive to completeness.

Disregardingthis point of view, thosewho maintain,in the namcof love of culture, that it is necessaryto confcr upon literature the attributes of philosophyin thc era to come, seemto forget that, in the realm of spiritual values,any trespassing of autonomyendangerscultureas a whole. To avoid this risk, the disjunction.poetsversusphilosophers, frequentlypresentin the debateson the metamorphoses of contemporaryculture,shouldbe replacedby a coniunction.

PartThree A Project:The AxiocentricOntology

ChapterSix The Phenomenologyof Valueand the Valueof Phenomenology In May 1935,in Vienna,EdmundHusserldeliveredhis lectureonThe Crlsis oJ'European Huntan Existenceand Philosoplq,.Later, hc also delivered a seriesof lecturesin Prague,bascd on which he developedThe Crisis nf EurrtpeanSciencesand Trctnscendental published after his Phenomenolog.t,, death.It is with theseoccasionsthat Husserlestablishedthat the main source of the crisis resided in a truncatedrationalismcaught up in naturalismand objectivism and that had lost its original links with the world of life.

Consequently,rationalismhad lost its axiologicaldimension,its ability to adecquately direct humanity'spracticaland value-assigning reactionstoward the world. The documentsjust mentioned, advocating a "heroism of rationalism"'to surpassthe crisis, reveal the climax of Husserl'sconstant concernwith outlininga setof humanisticmoral principlesableto attainunity between individual autonomy and collective responsibility,among homo cogitans,homo aestimans,andhontoagens.

I proposea reinterpretationof the meaningof Husserl'scthics from the perspectiveof the path that led him to the foundation of philosophy as a thcory of thc practical,value-assigning, and knowing rationalism.It is a difficult but necessaryattempt.Following that path, Husserl reachedat the axiological rooting of morality in the life-world, Lebenswelt.Lebenswelt appears as an expression of a possible synthesis ol the theoretical and practical,cthical, attitudemeantto serve,in a different way, humanity, while humanity,in the first place,naturally,is living its lif'e.rThe tenet,explicitly phrased in The Clisrs, offers the key to understandingthe author's entire spiritual development,characterizedby a permanentconcern with practical rationalism. The pursuit of rational bases for ethical choice takes phenomenologicalanalysis below the gnoseologicallevel, as low as the primary "layer" of thc humanbeing'spracticaland value-assigning response to the world. This view is consonantwith Husserl'slundamentalcredo:before deciding to contemplatethe world, I cxist in this world. This primary condition implics "a practical-axiological relationship."Therefore,looking trut on the world, [iberschauen,meansnot contemplatingit, but preservingit with its valuationand practicalresponses that it constantlylbrcesmc to give ( . in meinem Wertsetz,ungen und HandLungengestalteteund immer neu gestaLtete Welt).3 In a letter addressedto Georg Misch on 1 June 1930, Husserl remonstrateagainstthe indiff-erencefor his concern with understandingthe

synthetic,both practicaland theoretical,natureof rationalism.His conccrn oulminatedin his rooting morality in the lif'e-world.The role of practical rationalismand the axiologicaldimensionof the Husscrlianphenomenology havebecomemore evidentonly arfterAlois Roth publishedHusscrl'sresearch in ethics and after the publication of a series of revealing studies and monographson the philosopher'slate manuscripts.Today, we know that Husserl'sprcoccupations with cthicswere committedto manuscriptunderthe title Kritisches aLts Ethik-Vorlesungen(Sommersenlester,1902) But his preoccupations datc back to 1891,that is, a decadebeforethe publicationof Logische Untersuchungen.In thc notes appendedto the carly manuscript, Husserlapproached the issueof valuewith a view to graspingthe role played by sensitivityand emotionsin delining the specificso1'ethicaljudgments.

Even though initially Husserl made only some remarkson lhc parallclism hetweentheorcticaland practicalrationalism,he refusedto substitutelogical rcductionismfor psychologicalreductionism.He pointedout that, despitethe cssentialanalogybetwccnlogic and axiology(practicc).creatinga purc cthics does not in the leastmean duplicatinglogic, but ratherbringing to light the lundamentaldiff-erencebetween the two realms.r Husserl's aim was to establish thc autonomy of thc ethical. This implies both grasping dissimilarities between logical and axiological, and pointing out thc relationships betweenvalueand valuation,with thc stresson thc noeticaspect of the intentionality of practiczrlrationalism. Aiming at revealing thc synthetic,both theoreticaland practical, characterof rationalismand at placing thc issuc o1-the irreduciblespecific of value in the right context, Husserlalsodcvelopedthc ideaof interdependence of ethicsand valuetheory on social and historicalfactors.As Dallas Laskeyconvincinglyargued,with Husserl,the limited contextof ethicsmust bc seenasjust a part of the broadcr axiologicalconcernsof a developingsociety.s The axiologicaldimensionof Husserl'sethics can be also graspedby understandinghow he approachedthe specificsol' axiologicalrationalism.

The originalbackgroundhelpsus perceivehis evolutiontowardunderstanding the humanbeingas a substratum of a teleologicalrationalism,implicitely,as a valuingbeing.It alsorendersevidentthe connotations of the "intentionalityof concept within Ihe ego-cogito-cogitotum consciousncss" structurc.Thus, a promisingprospeotopensup to reinterpretHusserl'sconcepton thc human condition.It is fiom this pcrspectivethat thc path havingled Husserl,through reductions,applicd to the very ernpiricalego, to the transcendental ego, and ultimately to thc caprtal idea of Lebenswelt,acquiresrelevance.The idea connectsknowledgeo1'valuation to action.

As early as 1929, whcn he cxplained the transition from passivc Husserl pointed out that, by means <lf syntheses to active syntheses,t' phenomenology, we must,eachof us separatelyand all together,look for the

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ultimatepossibilitiesand necessities basedon which we shouldtake a stand towardreality:judgment,valuation,action.T The triplet, knowledge,valuation,action,revealshow Husserlroots all responsibilitiesof human lif-e in the life-world. Thus, by means of an axiologicalapproach,Husserlcndowsethicswith the potentialto surpassthe traditionalapproaches,empiricist-naturalistic or rationalistic-fbrmalist.

The theoreticalitineraryprclcceds fiom "purc ethics"to a phenomenological ethios conceived as a logic of sensibility, Gef[ihlslogik.Eventually, we reach the "community ethics," giving hope in a possible synthesis between Weltverstcindnisand Selbstverstcindnis, awarenessof the world and selfawareness.

The Husserlianitineraryin reconstructing ethicshad first to overcome the obstacleof a pseudo-alternative facing traditionalethics: naturalismor Ibrmalism?They proposedthe elaborationof scientificethics startingfiom cmpirical observationand gcneralizationol- found uniformities into moral sensibility regardedas "natural ovents" (David Hume). Or the a priori establishment of the universalityof moral principlcsand norms was achieved by virtue of their fbrm that rationalismestablishes as a pre-conditionof any moral experience(ImmanuelKant). Hume assignedto sensibilitythe role of motivating moral behavior and making ethical assessments.

The role of rationalism was depreciated.It was reducedto its cognitive function o1 apprehending the statcof f'actsand the rclationsbetweenideas.Kant assigned raticrnalism thc ability to establisha priori the necessarycharacterof' moral principlesand norms.The purely formal determinationol'ethical imperatives doesnot take into accountscnsibility,the senseof value,and all that pertains to their content.The projectof "pure ethics,"proposedby Husserl,took shapc as a re su ltof a t wof old c ri ti c a la n a l y s i s ' o fH u m e ' s a n d K ant' s concepti ons madefiom the vicwpointof transcendental phenomcnology.

Such an analysis allows us ( l) to transcendthe naturalisticcxplanationby understanding moral sensibilityas an "intentionalact" aimedat valuesas "intentionalobjects"and that no longer opposesrationalism.Moral scnsibilityis includedin the widc range of intentionalacts of rationalismand is legitimizedby how Husserl undcrsLands evidence. This allows lor its dissooiationinto correct and incorrect.It allows us (2) to rcjec;tthc idcntilicationol a priori wrth the formal, to recognizethe emotionala priori as a f'catureof the senseof value, and to baseethicson a "materiala-prior-rLyof sensitivity."It considersmoral valuesas beingindependent of empiricalcxperience, seenfiom a naturalpoint o1'view. In this case,empirical expcrienceis no longer dependenton the intentionalorder of experienceseenfrom a transcendental point of view. The traditionalalternativemight be re-wordedas lollows: either a naturalistic Iegitimizationof ethicsbasedon empiricalcxperience,or a lbrmalista priori foundation of ethics placed beyond any experience.As a result of his theoretical innovations, Husserl dialectically overcame the traditional

alternativeby means of'a tertium datur: researchinto the a priori intentional structuresof experience.When this is applied to ethics and axiology, we understandthat Husserl was concernedwith making clear the transcendental conditionsthat makesuchethicaland axiologicalmeaningspossible.s The phenomenological method in which Husserl conceivedhis "pure ethics" let him grasp some analogiesbetween the ethical ancl the logical.

Thcse are renderedevi<Jent by transgressing psychologism.The procedureis meant to safeguardthe objectivity of both logical idealitiesand the moral valuesaimed at by intcntionalactsof scnsibility,actsthat are conditioneda prirtri and abide by "essentiallaws," Wesengesetz,e.

However,the major stress shified,normally,to dissimilarity.With Husserl,rationalismmay includeboth poles: intellectand sensibility,Geftihlslogik.However,sensibilitycannotbc reducedto subjectivity;it also implies the senseof value. Therefbre,the rationalisrnof morality becomesaxio-logical,and it is demonstrated by the distinctionbctweena "spontaneous sympathy"and a "rationalsympathy"that approvesof somcthingas bcing just and disapprovesof somethingclse as being unjust.We should make clear, though,that only "rational sympathy" acquiresthe attributesof moral phenomenon,since it is grafted onto the axiological fccling of justice. The critical analysisof Ralph Cudworth's conception,and of the eighteenth-century school of Cambridgein general, enabled Husserl to discovcr lundamental diflbrences bctween practical rationalism and theoretical rationalism, urteilende VernunJi beyoncl the parallelismbetweenthe compulsorynatureof moral principlesand of logical, or mathematical,principles. Practical rationalism is a rationalism that originates in motivations provided by sensibility and will. Thcoretical rationalismis basedon logical motivation.Practicalrationalismis fbcuscclon intentionalactsof the axiologicalsensibility.Theoreticalrationalismis basecl on the intentionalacts of the dianoeticpivot of consciousness.

Practical rationalismoperatesmainly with axiologicalsentences; theoreticalrationalism with assertorial sentences.

As I have pointed out elsewhere,t'phenomenologicallyspeaking, axiologicalsensibilityis intentional,aiming at objectsthat satisfyits demands.

Sometimes value appears fetishized as objectivization of' axiological sensibility,becauseit is actively dirccted toward intentionalobjects ancl hierarchizesthem pref-ercntially.

In this situation,fhe tncqualityin the value orderof thingsbecomesa purely subjectivecreation,an emotionalprojcction.

Ethical behaviorf-avorsvaluationwhen desiderative-volitional structurescan bc intentionallydireotcdtoward things and the corresponclence betweenthe subjectiveand the objectivecan be establishcd.

Thus, it is the ethicalvalues that come to enhancehumanaction.Emotionalstatesbelongto the rangeof intentional human cxperience,and, as such, sentencesbuitt about this experiencecan be legitimized by evidence and can be confronted with experience.

This way, the claim of emotionalism,accordingto which the echo

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of emotional states in value judgments would prove their non-cognitive character,is refutcd. Ethical value judgments o{fer a conceptualexprcssion andjustify the valuespresentin axiologicalexperience.

Thus, in ethics we can transcend not only the older alternative, naturalism/ formalism, but also the new alternative,intuitivism / emotivism.

GeorgeEdward Moore's intuitivism attributedl-clethicaljudgmentsthe same cognitive contentcharacteristicof descriptivejudgments,the only difference being that the predicateof ethicaljudgmentsrepresentsa non-naturalquality.

CharlesL. Stevenson'semotivismperceivedthem as being devoid of any cognitive content.In both cases,the explanationis alike. The two views share the samebias: value sentences could be "rationalistic"only if they could be reduced to assertorialsentences.From the perspectiveof Husserlianethics, one may argue,though,that the intuitivism / emotivismalternativeis basedon a false premise that ignores the specificity of estimative and normative sentenccs characteristic of moral life. By virtue of their logical and clntological status, their rationalism is not reduced to the rationalisrn of assertorialsentences.

It is the criteria of their intentionalevidencethat can be applied to value judgments,and not logicist criteria. Though specific, since they envisage other intentional acts, such criteria show similarities to any other type of judgmentstakcn into consideration.Thus, the ethical discourse no longer appearsinferior to the theoreticaldiscourse.It becomesa practical, axiological, discourse.It operateswith value judgments that cannot be reducedto descriptive.judgments.

The rationalismof valuejudgmentsis to be examinedby proccedingfiom their specific nature,certifled by the supreme cclurtof legitimization:the "lif-eworld."

Husserl approachesthe problems of ethics in a broad axiological context.Intentionalvaluationactsspring from the practiceof the world of lifb (lebensweltlischePraxis) which is value-assigning(wertsetzend)in itself and by itself. Husserl suggestsanotherpossiblereply to the cardinal questionof axiology: Do objectshave value becausethe subjectconfersvalue onto them, or does the subjcct value them becauseobjects have value of themselvcs?

Louis Lavclle pointedout that this is a questionto which most philosophical trendshave given antinomic,unsatisfactory, answers.The answersoscillate betweenthe primacy ol valuation,the subjectiviststand,and the primacy of value,the objectiviststand,On the one hand,the Austrianaxiologicalschool maintainedthat the sourceof value is subjectivepleasure(Alexius Meinong), or desire (ChristianE,hrenfels).On the other hand, Neo-Kantianismand the ethics of valuestreat valuesas eternalobjective validities,placing them in a transcendentalrealm of ideal meanings (Rickert), or in the transcendental realm of crbjectsof a priori emotionalintuitions(Max Scheler).This leadsto a theoreticalquandarythat Lavelle can discernwhen saying,"It is a superstition to reducevalueto objects.r0 to reducethe objectto valuation... a desecration But not even Lavelle was able to find a way out of the quandary,becausehe

failedto adopta relational approach.

I believethatHusserl'scthicsproject suggests,although not consequentially, one way of surpassingthe subjectivism/ objectivismalternative.

Husserl's critical reactionagainstsubjectivism,especiallyagainst il-s hedonisticvariant,is cxplicit. He declaresthat any behaviorthat choosesto seek pleasure in the absenceof any other general purpose, is not only immoral, but becomesmorally negative;it is moral evil, becauseit denies gcneralgood,justice,love, generosity, and othervalues.However,by arguing that "sensibilityis subjective,value is objective,"and by making clear that first a valuationobject must exist, and then it may get axiologicalpredicates, too, Husserl also rejects the view that renders values autonomous and separatesthem from intentionalvaluationacts,in which sensibilityinterl'eres.

He is convincedthat if we attemptedto extinguishany sensibilityin a human being,all ethicalconcepts- ways and means,good and evil, virtue and duty would become meaningless.rr Tacitly, both subjectivismand objectivism accept an assumption:values are qualities, not object/subjectrelationships.

They also accepta way of putting the questionin antitheticalterms: values can either be reduced to valuations,or they can exist independentlyof the valuing subject. Husserl rejects such assumptions.Consistent with his phenomenologicalstyle of philosophtzing,he treal.svalue as an objective correlate of the desiderativeintentional act, pref.erential,Gemiitsakt. Hc derives the relevant consequenceof the intcrdependenoebetween the intentionalactsof the ethicalsubjectand their objectivecorrelate.Given this interrelationbetweenthe noetic and the noematicaspectof the intentionality of valuation acts, we can say that value is a specialrelationship.It is a relationshipbetweenan axiologicalobject and an axiologicalsubject.The axiological object, given its qualities, can satisly needs, yearnings,and desires.The axiologicalsubject,throughits intentionalacts,can experiencc attraction,offer estimates.arrangeobjects accordingto the degreein which they deserveto be wantedand valued.From this perspective,the antinomy of subjectand object of which Lavelle was speakingis surpassed by changing the manner in which the question is put, by enscribingit into a fertile phenomenological circle. There can be no value without valuation,just as there can be no valuation without value. The genetic primacy of valuation presupposes the structuralprimacy of value.

The itinerarythat Husserlfollowed led him, in his last writings, liom "pure ethics," through the outlines of a phenomenologicalethics, as GefiilsLogik,toward a community ethics. The community ethics seeks to restorethe lost genuinelinks with the "life-world" by consideringthat "to live as a personis to live in a socialframeworkwhereinI and we live togetherin a communityand havethe communityas a horizon."Rootedin thc "life-world," the most profound productive lif'e, morality can achieve its virtuality in the "Social World" alone. We need to set up a Personenverband,a society of

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personswith sharedvaluation,a social framework,as Husserl put it. The socialframeworkshouldprovidehistoricallyand sociallyapprovedcriteria.It is within this framework, during an ever-openprocessof self-improvement, that we can distinguishgood from evil, and justicefrom injustice,in order to securehumanity's self-determination within the community in association with thc intcr-subjcctivc rcsponsibility for the realization of the human being'svocationas a valuingbeing,homo aestimans.Thus, the realizationof Husserl's ethics supreme aim might be summed up by Paul Eluard's suggestivephrase:Passerde l'horiz,ond'un seulit l'horizonde tous.

In point, I would like to ask a question:What would be the most fruitful continuationof Husserl'sethics'JDespiteits importance,the ethicsof values proposedby Schelerignores the fact that values appearin and through the valuationproccss.According to Scheler'sethics,moral values are a priori the autonomousthings,independentof the valuationprocess.Consequently, valuatingfunctionof thc moral senseis ignorcd Following thc debatesaroundthe Schelerianstandpoint,the moral sense was proposedas standingagainstmoral values,and the idea was expressed that moral valuationrefers to elementinteractionin life-world dynamics and in the social-worldframework.r2 Thus, we can object againsta value-basedethics by asking, Could humanbcingsknow good and not do good'/Likewise,a symmetricalquestion ethics.How could could be askedaboutthe alternativeto thc valuation-based peopledo good and not know good?

In my opinion, the concept o1- mutual involvement of value and valuation outlined by Husserl presupposesan ethics co-ordinatedby the axiocentric ontology of the human. This ethics, pleading for a mutual foundationof moral valuesand moral sense.is ableto assurewhat JohnRawls calls "a reflectivecquilibrium."''tIn other words, it follows the theoretical voyagc toward an ethicswhich shouldreplacea disjunction,moral senseor moral values,with a conjunction,moral senscand moral valucs.Along this itinerary, the "phcnomelogyof the creative context" promoted by A.-T. Tymieniecka{lnds its place.

As early as 1938,CarnilPetrcscu,one ol'the most competentRomanian that phenomenology clf Husscrl'swork, reachedthc c;onclusion commentators means a divorce lrom traditional metaphysics,while offering some "openings"toward the foundationclf a new ontologyof the humancondition by a shifi of emphasisfrom the transccndentto the transcedental,fiom the "given f-act"to "mcaning," fiom contemplationto the practicaland valuation rcsponses to the world by the humanbeing.rr

ChapterSeven Coordinatesof an AxiocentricOntologyof the Human The re-valuationof value and the outline of an axiological theory of human significancehave promptedmy attemptto reinterpretthe ontologicalproblem from an axiologicalperspective.Implicitly, I also intend to developa regional ontology of the human within a given theoreticalreference-system and by meansol' specificconccptualdevices.

The project of developinga particularontology of the human,basedon the idea that valuesare determinants of the humanbeing'sontologicalstatus, raisesfiom the very beginningat least two questions:( I ) How justified is a rcgionalizationof the ontologicalissue'Jand (2) Why does value hold a privileged statusin thc projcct of developinga particularontology of thc human'J ln answering the first question, I would remind the reader that any philosophyinvolvesan ontologythe object of which is what Aristotle called "existenceas existence."At the currentlevel of the philosophicaldiscourse,to admit an undifferentiatedtreatmentof the ontosis unsatisfactory. ln the conccptof contemporaryphilosophies,the ontos is intendedto be approachedin its diversity of structures,in the complexity of the determined levels and mannersof operation.Thus, a regionalizationof the ontological problem is required,as more ontic regionscan be discovered.

The ontic region of the human is inscribedin the infinity of the world with a determinedmannerof being. If comparedto nature'sontic region, fbr instance,it has its own gepesis.It also has anotherstructure,involving a constellationof determinedinteractionsbetweenthe human being and the world, betweenthe individual and the community.The ontic region of the human has a psycho-socialessenceand a functionalityconf-erred upon it by the human action that alters existence,praxis. The project (the investigation into the future), the conscious finality (liberty), the standardactivity (the dialectictriptych of knowledge-valuation-action) representonly a few of its determinantsas regional ontology.

While admitringthe legitimacyof a particularontology,we could pass on to thc sccondqucstion:Why does value hold a privilegedstatusin the project of dcvclopingthis ontology'?The questionis quite appropriatesince thc idea often dominatesthat philosophycould constitutean ontology only through its oognitivcdimcnsion,and not throughits axiologicaldimension.

This meanscreatingan artificialhiatusbetweena scientificontology,reduced to synthetical-totalizing knowledge,and anthropocentricethics,reducedto the

coordinationof projects,goals,hierarchiesof values,and ideals.I invalidate sucha point for the simplereasonthat philosophyitself is born out of the need to meditateover the humancondition,to explorethc humanbcing,as a whole, in interactionwith the environment.So thc human being should not bc considereda functionof the way we considerphilosophy,but the other way round: philosophyis to be considereda function of the way we think about human beings. Or, the human being is both the object and the subject, the human being is both expressionand creator of human nature. As a real creature, the human being is object-oriented, cntering dcterminatc relationshipswith the natural environment, which is aimed at as a manifestationof his or her essence.The human being is the subject transforming the object, creating himself or herself, and not the object ontologicallythoughtof. The concreteand total humanbeingis wholly human only in the midst of the developingsociety,in history.This doesnot meanthat the hurnan being is stripped of essence,but that the manifestedessenceis acti o n .

The human being is a permanentlyopen being, never completely created,but permanentlyorcatinghimself or herself through projects and attitudesthat lend freshmeaningsto humanexistence.

That is why he or sheis in permanenttensiontclwardsomething.And this tensiontoward the exterior, born out of the need to satisly practical needs,is actually the tension to discoverthe infinite within the limited. It gives birth to an essentialforce, characteristicof human beings, that energeticallydrives them toward thcir objectives.The essentialforce is value.Value is a specificallyhuman way, project-conceiving,attitudinal, preferential,to respond to the world. It is presentin the passionfor the new, for the unmet-with,in the dissatisfaction with what has been achieved,and in the aspirationto achieve morc, in the dialecticsof need-tension-grief-passion-project-fuffillment-joy-new needs-new existentialproblemsof tension/adjustment.

If human beingswere not valuing beings,then they would alwaysbe satisfledwith what they are, they would be no longer active,passionate, creatorsof projectsand ideals,they would losc their ability to act, the defining attributesof their way of existingtogether,and their aspirations.

This is why a regionalontologyof the humancould not be built in the absenceof the combined participationof the cognitive and axiological dimensionsof philosophy.Generalizations on the human ontos arc to be supportedby scientificdata abouthumanbeingsand by the data suppliedby human action and lived-throughexperience.The human being lives and achicves values through the cffective interaction between the concrcte situationand the ethos.

The humanbeing occupiesa completelyindividualand irreduciblearea of the world, found in a plane of the interactionsbetweenthe subjectiveand the objective.The human being holds an ontologicalstatusjustifiable by an

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axiocentricperspective,not by a geocentricor zoocentricperspective.The axiocentricphilosophyis able to reveal what is indeed irreduciblein the humanbehavior,the distinctivecoordinates ol the humanway of being.

When the ontologicalproblemis posedin post-Kantianterms,thoseof the possibility o.f'conditions,the key questionbecomes:How is the human possibLej2 The answer,startingfrom the considerationthat the human being is not a given fact, but an institutionassumedin and through the practical processof his or her self-creation, of the creationol values,may be summed up in a synthetic fbrmulatron:the human heing is value-possible.Ontology acquires new attributes, becoming not only anthropocentric, but also axiocentric.

The shift from centering ontology on essentialist speculative suppositionsto centeringit on the world of values initiates the dialogue betweendiversephilosophicalorientationswith similar preoccupations.

I refer to phenomenology,through its occurrencein Heideggerianontology and Ricoeureanhermeneutics,or throughmutationscausedby the phenomenology of the creativecontextproposedby Anna-TeresaTymieniecka.r I also think of analytioalphilosophy.By focussingthe ontology of the human on the world of values,Hilary Putnam'srecent preoccupations of approachingthe criteria of rationality from an axiological perspective,or Nozick's attemptto rescuethe axiologicalissueof life's meaning'become momentsof dialogueand a metaphysicalconstruction.

In my supportingan axiocentricaxiology of the human, I continuethe remarkabletraditionsof Romanianphilosophy,amongthe exponentsof which are LucianBlagaand Dumitru D. Rogca.

In his vast Triktgia valorilor lThe Trilogy of Valuesl, Blaga basedhis distinctionbetweenparadisiacal knowledgeandLuciferian knowledgeon the dissociationof the immedictte horizon,o1'theexistencefor conservationfrom the horizon of nyslery,,of creativc existencc,preeminentlyaxiological. The movc to the horizon of values, the shift from nature to culture involves, accordingto Blaga, an ontological mutation, sincevalue is not an aocessory, but a defining involvementof a way of existence,specificallyhuman.Blaga (1895-1961)was a Romanianphilosopher,poet, and dramatist.Outsidethe national borders,he is known for his dramaticalproduction,as most of his plays have been staged by famous European theatres.The amplitude and architectureof his philosophicalsystemis comparableto that of Hegel's,and its literaryexpressionto the works of Nietzscheor H. Bergson.However,due to the languageit has been written in, Romanian,Blaga's philosophical system has failed to accedeto the world circle of philosophicalideas. After 1989,the systematic translationof his work hasbeenstartedin France.l In his turn, Rogcaargued that wc could searchamong values for the element supporting the human action of perpetual creation and self-cxccllence, since they represent determinants of the human being's

ontological status. A Romanian philosopher,Roqca (1895-1981),was a promoter of rationalism.He conceivesof philosophy as being a moral and estheticattitudetoward a world foundedon the myth of "total knowledge."A scholarin the world of Hegel,much appreciated in Germanyand France,his presencein the Europeanphilosophyis acknowledgeddue to his book cntitled Existenla tr agicd [Tragic Existence].

Directly or symbolically, value expressesthe synthetic project of a humanbeing, or of a community,a humanbeing's way to gcl toward,to eksis/, to refer to himself or herself in his or her polymorphic rapport with others.The entire humanaction,the entire humanexistenceis traversedby an axiologicalprinciple. Value is the axis of actions and its nerve. It is the possiblcexpressionof a satisf'actory adjustmento1'ethosand situation,of the real humanbeing and the real world in which thc humanbeing actsand thus cxists.Conditionedby an earlierbiochemicaltransfiguration, by combinations of chromosomes and hereditaryhabits,by individualpsychismand collective psychology,by mentalstructuresand languages, the humanbeing establishes himself or hcrsclf as thc single being capableto adaptto reality and to adapt reality to his or her needs. The attributes of existence rcach back to antecedents, to the socialand naturalenvironment,but they alsoreachforward to reality, as they become objective through action and values.The human being's action is creationand self-creationand developsin an axiological climate. Ontologically, value preceded cultural assets, norms, even knowledge. The human being cultivates science becausescience grants humanity the valuc of efficiency. An action is truly human clue to its axiologicalload. The human being cannot be treatedexclusivelyas homo ftiber or homo cogitans.The human being knows, acts, and lends a new significanceto objectsof knowledgeand thoscof action,in her or his quality of value-generatingbcing, as homo e,stimans.In the human realm, values pertain to the very order of existenceand are inherentto human actionsthat. are their basis and to which they are aimed. Values constitutc shaping principlesand changingfactors of physical and moral existence.And, we wonder, how could they fulfill this admirablefunction unlessrooted in thc very substanceof life? We cannotchangethe face of the world with chimcras and spiritualphantasms.Or, valuesare involved in all existentialissuesof tension-adjustmentof the ever-reconstituted, re-createdoonsensusbetween subiect and object. Producersand productsof human action, phantasmsand structured by practice, values represent a unity between the possible, expressingour freedom,the freedom of the project within which knowledge takesplace,and necessity, the motor of our action.This is why valuesare the determinants of the specificallyhumanway of being.Without contrastingthc natural to the human, without taking the human outside the legislation of determinism, values make possible the discovery of the qualitative characteristic of the humanbeing'sexistcntialmodality.The human being is

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simultaneously consideredto be (1) the determinedproductof some natural processes,that is, a creaturc self-developingthrough his or her practical rapport with the naturalenvironment;(2) a member of the society he or she inl"egratesinto by means of a complex system of social relations and communication,and (3) a valuing being endowed with self-conscience, availabilityfbr deliberation, and responsibilityfor his or her actions.

This is why, axiocentric ontology off'ers the ref'erencerequired to developan ontologicalview of the universeas a whole. By transcending the false alternativeor the generalontologiesthat start from a natural existence lacking in human reference, or ontologies of the human existence of a spiritualist-autonomist extractionthat disregardthe human being's relation with nature and society, the axiocentricontology unblocks the way toward general ontology. Axiocentric ontology does not claim to substitutefor the general ontology or to be a particularizingapplication of a metaphysicsof Existenceor of the Bcing to the ontic field of the human.

Such a philosophical approach opens up the perspective of understandingthat, ultimately,culture is more than a mere depositof material and spiritual achievements.Culture appearsas a polymorphic and dynamic reality, in which and through which the individual gives shapeto his or her aspirationsand changesthe environment,while changinghimself or herself.

The diversity of cultures is a source of polyphonic harmony and not a potential reservoir of conflict. The history of cultures generatesa common patrimonyof humankindand a commonresponsibilityfor its preservationand continuation.Such conclusionsprove that only cultural creationpresupposes the irreducible: value, as a specificallyhuman way of attitudinal,preferential reactionto the world. That is why value appearsto be involved in all problems linked to tension-adjustment-change of the ever-to-be-re-created agreement betweenethosand situation,betweenthe real humanbeing and the real world in which the humanbeingacts.

Understoodas a universeof values,as axio-spherc,culturg can maintain its conscienceof its conditionsof possibility, as Kant would say, and of its humanisticvocation,of its ontologicalstatus.From the perspectiveof an axiocentricontology of the human,the real in culture is no longer constricted in the symbolic-spiritualareaand no longer expandedsuch that the cultural is identified with the social, since the cultural envisagesthe axiosphere,value.

Not all productsof human action becomeacts of culture; only those which, given their potential to satisfy human needs and awaken desire-oriented deliberate actions, acquire value. This is how they capture a cumulative character,expressedin non-hereditarybehavior.but learnedand handeddown fiom one generationto another,alike or regenerated, expandedor sometimes even reduced, altered, due to some significant codes bearing cultural information.This is why, to the human beings,value is not an annex, an accessory,a piece of luxury, but a determinantdefining their specific way of

existing as beings who, at the same time, create and develop themsclves through culture, exceedingtheir natural condition by means of the human co n d i ti on.

Consideringthat thc dcvelopmentof a regionalontologyof the humanis appropriateand that value is the irreduciblebolt of the human condition, thc developmentof a distinctivetype of a regional ontology of the human is justified,and I darecall it axiocentric.

An axiologicalreconstructionof the philosophicdiscourserendersit more suitable to propose solutionsto the dramatic problems of the human condition.

The legitimacy of the theoretical and methodological framework through the drawing of such a particular ontology of the human could be as follows: synthesized First, human existence appears to us as bearing an irreducible particularity and a privileged ontic status. A nco-ontology exceeding the traditionalspirit is thus constituted.Existencefor its own sake is replacedby existencefor our sake,with a human referential.Existenceas a given fact gives way to existenceas a processof production and rcproductionof processis replacedby a discourseable to reveal existence.The gnoseological The transcendental human institution as the human being's self-achievement. alternativeis surpasseddue to the immanentcharactcrol or the transcendental rapportwith the world. humanactivityconsistingin valuation-practical Second, the ontology of the human pertains to the flow of modern philosophicalthinking openedby the Kantian criticism. The new theoretical framework is propitious to the harmonious articulation of various or methodologicalproceduresin vicw ol' suppositions,conceptualizations, reconstructingontology, in consonancewith the modern scientific spirit, Since the human being is a being hostileto reductionismand essentialism. creating values and developing himself or herself by values, and the conditions of possibility of the human result from value-type teleological institutions,the ontology of the human acquires individual accents and b e co me sax ioc ent r ic .

Third, conceivedas such, thc ontology of the human is fundamental ontology. The ontology of the human becomes fundamental not in the Heideggerianmeaning,as a ruining area of the generalontology,but as a theoreticalareafor the renovationof ontology from the perspectiveof praxis.

The generaldeterminationsof the world have no objective significanceand cannot be known otherwisebut through and for the human being. To refuse the ontology of the human this status means to develop a totalitarianizing vision of the world: a world historicallyand socially bearingthe seal of a registerof the human values,but whencethe creatorof thesevalueswould be exiled and wherethe samecreatorwould neverfeel at home.

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Fourth, the axioccntric ontology of the human does not start lrom apodicticalpostulateswhich might throw it in thc situationto fall back in the prc-criticalontologies.Thc axioc;entricontology o1'the human starts fiom prcmisestestedin rigorousthcoretioalcontexts,deliberately epistemological adoptingwhat Willard van Orman Quine calls thc principle oJ'ontologicctl relativity. Its disooursedoes not. propose a "picture of the world," a but replacesthe descriptivetheoryof systematics of the ne varieturcategories, the traditionalontologiesby a critical metatheory.Such a metatheorybecomes suitableto supportthe self-reflexivityof the philosophicalconscienceagainst the "will of the system," and with a view to pursuing the program of ontological reconstructionby problem-raisingand theme-posingwithin determinedknowledgecontextscontrolledby the legitimacyinstanceof the practice.As a matterof [act, as Max Born usedto say, with socio-historical the scientistand the philosopheralike, the belief that you hold a uniquetruth is thc deepestrootedevil in the world.

In my proposinga reconstructionproject of the ontologyof the human,I hope that it could be fostered,corrected,deepened.The merit will be greater ol thosc who know to go further, on unknown paths, into what we do not know yet. As Ludwig Wittgensteinuscdto joke, in philosophy,the winner of the raceis the one who runs slowest,the one who reachesthe aim the last.

Part Four A Hope:Universalism

EditorialNote This part of the book was left unfinished.

In our introduction,we have advancedthe legitimacyof maintainingthe title of this Part when preparingthis volume for the printing press.To the argumentsof a theoreticalnature,we must add our sorrow that the author's intentionscould not be fulfllled by himself,duringhis lif-etime.

Wt: consideredunproductivethe mere reproductionof some fragments lrom the studieson philosophicaluniversalismpublishedby Griinberg.This reviews.And it would havebccnrcdundantfor thosewho readthe specialized so long as the editorslacked would have been theoreticallyinconsequential thc author'sbeaconin termsof organizingthe ideas.

Gri.inbergscnseda changedneed for philosophy of humankind in the third millennium.This is what he wrote in his essay"$anseleuniversalismului filosofic" [Chancesof PhilosophicalUniversalism],publishedin 1995, in Bucharest: What is universalismafter all'l A new approachof the world and of the humancondition,of placesand things,of creationsand institutions,of startingfrom the assumptionthat businessand meansof communication, the issuesol contemporaryhistory and culture needto be addressedat a perspectiveacceptedby all stylesof global level. A meta-philosophical (analytical, synthetic, dialcctical, phenomenological) philosophizing finding of a common languageneededby the lacilitate the able to "dialogue of humanisms."A new hermeneuticsgoverned by the "principle of multi-levcl identification," offering an intellectual f oundation to dialogue, constructive critioism, tolerance, and, as EmmanuelLevinas might put it, to the "permanentopennesstoward the other one." A vision of the human condition that starts from the acceptanceof existence and from the understandingof the use of generally-human values:lil-e,truth, good, love, liberty, dignity,justice. and happiness.And, as a corollary, an ambitious attempt to create,by common ctfort and on a planetary level, a post-modern,postwisdom,in conformitywith the needs and post-totalitarian technocratic, and hopesof mankindat the beginningof the third millenium' ol'PartFour.

Two of the author'sessaysmakeup the substance "Happiness:the LoftiestValue of Humankind"is a possiblecomponcnt part of the writings found in the manuscriptfile, yet its place in the economy of the book has not been firmly establishedby the author.It is however, an application to humanity's burning aspiration, in theory and practice: happiness.

In the manuscriptfile, the essay "The orphic Myth ancl the Human Condition" was subtitledby the author himself, "Insteadof Ending." It has thusbeennaturalfor us to concludethe volumewith it.

Cornelia Griinberg Laura Griinberg

ChapterEight Happiness:The LoftiestValueof Humankind Tracing back the historicalevolution of the conceptof happiness,we reahze that the contemporaryphilosophershave criticized the older theoriesrather than developed new theories. Today's philosopherswcluld rather not talk about happiness.When they do, they do it more to indicate its radical impossibility. While an abundant literaturc is dedicated to agony, hopelessness, and anxiety,happinessis merelymarginallycommentedon and in subduedterms.As a rulc, happiness itself,as a term,is avoided.Seenas too committalor out of style,thc term, "happiness,"is substitutedfor by words likc "pleasurc"or 'Joy," clftenwith a shift of'stresson pain and sorrow.

The temptation to rcturn to thc ancient thinkers therefore oocurs.

Happinesswas among their favored themes.llow to attain the supremegood or inner balancethrough wisdom? How to accomplishyourself as a human being by reachingat an agreementbetwecnvirtue and happiness'?

How to find happiness,by rezisonor by virtue'JWhere to seek for happiness,inside or outsideyour soul'/Thesearc oniy a f'ewthoughts.

It is obviousnow that the older Enlightenmentillusion of the univocal rclatioti among knowledge - progrcss happinesshas vanished. The spectacularprogrcssof knowledge,the most sophisticated technologies,ancl thc ampleconsumersatisfaction do not renderpeoplebetter,wiser,or happier.

Thc developmentreachedat in someregionsof the world is like thc two-faced 'Ihe just one ol-thetwo Janus. triumphof civilizationand well-beingrepresent faces. Meanwhile, the other face prompted Albert Camus to designatethe twentiethcentury,the Century of Fear. Extensiveconsumption,luxury, and the rnollifying drug of sexualityarc sourcesof both ephemeralpleasureand constantanxiety. f'raditionally,happinessis seenas the ideal rapportbetweenneedsand satisfiednecessities.

To qucry this vision is to give thc idea of happinessits final blow. Pcople may forsakethe idea of happinessentirely or embraceits hedonistic,minor, variant.Thc cmphasisshifis from lif-eand its senseas a whole to fleeting moments.From the ideal to minor delights.From self-attainmentand self-realizationto comfort and greaterprospectsof immediate pleasure. Happiness becomes a holiday project good as interludc cntertainment, entailinga provisionaland marginallif'e in which adulthood rnimicschildhood,or in which the aclultcan llnd the compensatory dclightsof the cclnsumer.

No wonderthat undersuchcircumstances the crisisof the ideal ol happincssalso surf'acesin thosesocietieshaving dcmonstratedtheir ability to honorthe promisesof demclcracy and the hopesof increasingwell-being.

Hence,it is commonfor philosophers to be reticentabouta philosophy of happiness.In some cases,those approachingthe subject resort to a scientific solution. Which, in the end, boils down to recommendinga procedure to aggregateand maximize pleasure, or to proposing several techniques on how to succeedin life. Eitherway, the dominantmood in which the problem is tackledremainspessimistic.

Disenchanted,philosophers leave the concept of happiness outside philosophicaltheory or deny happinessthe attributeof value in terms of the ideal of life. The question arises naturally: should we eliminate the word "happiness"from our language,even though millions of human beings keep on running after it? We can find the answer in the spiritual geographyof contemporaryphilosophies.We can discover here severalways in which to approachthe theme, approachesthat are sometimesmerely outlined, and at o t h e rt i m c si m p l i c i t .

A first group of conceptionsconsidersthat the issue of happiness, althoughimportantin termsof a person'soptionsin life, could not be posedin theoreticalterms and cannot be the object of philosophicalknowledge.It is the philosophyof the contestedhappiness.Given the perspective,the problem, What is happiness?, would seem nonsensical. Classified by a subtle structuralist such as Michel Foucault, it appears among the problems conceivedin moral, value, terms.The result is that it is not worth being a theoreticalproblem.

From the positionsof analyticalphilosophy,CharlesL. Stevensonranks happiness with the problems appealing to floating notions that have an exclusivelyemotionalcontent.When was Goetheright, wondersStevenson, when rn 1824,Goethetold Eckermannthat in the seventy-fiveyearsof his lifc he had not known more than four weeksof completehappiness,or later on, in 1830,when Goethewrote toZelter, "I am huppy and I wish I could live my life the sameway again"?

The questionthough can be answered.Both statementscould be true when consideringWittgenstein'sadvice,"Do nol look for relevance,search for application."In eachplay upon words,a different meaningis associatedto happiness,thereforeanotherconcept.In the first context,happinessindicates those momentsin which we experienceprofound, intensejoy, psychological meaning, while the letter to Zelter makes use of the Hegelian meaning: happinessis the satisfactiongiven by a life seenas a whole. As we can see, Foucault promoteslogical purism, reducing the philosophicaltheory to a science theory of the logical-mathematicaltype, in which the conceptsof humanbeing,value,freedom,and happinesswould remain unsupported.

Some thinkers oonsider that the restorationof philosophy should be obtainedat the terrible price of renouncingits timelessmission of being the theory of the most generalcriteria of the human choice,the axiological guide of humankind.To devise a philosophyof happinessmeansto embracethe

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human cause. This option ol philosophy does not threatento lose the objectivity accessibleto it, the sameway medicinedoesnot repudiateitself as knowledgeby placingitself in the serviceof the ailing.Thosechallengingthe possibilityof placingthe problemof happinesson a theoreticallevel, by virtue of the idea that their sciencedeniesthem any commitment of value, decline responsibility.Deolensionof responsibilitydoes not concernthc mcans thcy command,but the objectivesthey set forth lbr themselves,and thus the very senseof their activity is invalidated.But even while refusing the idea, such philosopherstake happinessas a relative term of referenceby consideringit the highest reason of human lif'e that, in the absence of a conceptual resignation,or the longing for the can unleashhopelessness, correspondent, lost paradise . In the end, this refusaljustified by a specificidea aboutscience is alsothe resultof a philosophy.

In contemporary philosophy, we can encounter a second type of conception.With it, the problem of happinesscan and must be posed; yet it has no solution, since the human being has been sentencedto fieedom. The structuralistpreconceptionof the hiatus between knowledge and values is substitutedfor by a new preconception:freedomand happinesswould be two irreconcilablevalues.We deal here with what I like to call the philosophyof the compromisedhappiness.The most signiflcant exponentof this trend of thoughtis existentialism.

Existentialismgrantsa privilegedpositionto the problemof happiness.

Albert Camus's essay,The Myth of Sisyphus,startswith the assertionthat to appreciatewhetheror not life is worth living meansto answerthe basic topic of philosophy.Then, after havingtaking the mythicalSisyphusas the symbol of the human condition, Camus concludes with the much-commented sentence,"We should imagine a happy Sisyphus." We deal with an individualisticphilosophy, primarily in its maior, Heiddegerianversion, maybethe most ambitiousevcr. Human existencebuilds itself as a projectin its progresstoward the essence.Transcendingthe humanconditionby making a choiceseemsto be the sourceof any sense,thereforeof any foundation.And the freedom to make a choice one variant of action appearsto be the implied and ultimatefoundationof the progressfrom existencetoward humanessence.

Paradoxically, this moraleof unlimitedindividualismrefusesto presentitself but that as moral.We are not told that humanbeingsmust exceedthemselves, human reality is a project perpetuallyand unjustifiablytranscendingexistence towardessence. freedomceasesto be a processualachievement Thus, in existentialism, to any human of culture and becomesan initial gift, a structureconsubstantial bcing hurled into the still world of things and into the anonymousworld of human creatures,forever having to make a choice. Yet, while making their choice, human beingscan find relief nowhere:not in the objectivereality, as the absenceof determinism renders the human being helpless,not in the

choice made by other people,sinceeach human being has a personalfbrmula in creatingher or his own essence, not in a transccndental factor."If there is no God, then everythingis permitted,"says Jean-PaulSartre,resumingthe words of the well-known Dostoevskiancharacter.What countsis to makc a choice,to be you, to take responsibility.It is equivalentwhetheryou choosc Ibr your role model a giant of human knowledge,say Einstcin,a symbol of mystical ecstasy,say Saint Vincent de Paul, or the f-arnousCasanova,to whom any conqueredwomanis a new stagein his philosophicalstudyof life.

EmbracingCaligula'scredo,"I believethat all actionsare equivalent," points to existentialismas a philosophydissociatingstrictly between thc individualand the social.Taking as a startingpoint the isolateclindividualand her or his iife expericnccindependentof the economic and socio-cultural structures,cxistentialismcan no longer find any objectivecriteriafor hurnan choiceand ends up by deploringthc imperfectionof a world ruled by moral chaos. In such a world, the human being would be a Sisyphus,fbrever engagedin actionsdesignedto expressillusoryfieedom,foreverfrustratedby the consequcnceso1' his or her actions, expericncingthe tragic cJivorcc betweenproject and result,and ultimatelyhaving to acceptthe world as is, sonseless, devoidof value.In sucha world, happiness is compromised.

From the moment when freedom, internal, subjective,located on the level of pure choice, is consideredto be the fragile principle of values, happinessceasesto be the goal of humanexistence,the ideal,the meaningof our presencein the world. Happinessis compromisedas soon as you accept this freedom-spell, in the absenceof supportelementsand criteria,luring you away into quicksand,on a path where the contrast betwcen happinessand unhappiness is canceledby the absurdityof humanexistence.

In our time, a third type of conceptionabout happinessexists, that exceedsboth structuralism,by stating that the problem of happincssdoes arise,and existentialism, by maintainingthat the problem of happinessdoes havesolutions.I particularlyrefer to Neo-Thomismand the Amcrican l,arianf of pcrsonalism,which proposes,in diversc styles, what we could lcrm a philosophyof the happy unhappiness, since it recomrnends mystical ecstasy as the uniquehappinessinsteadof real happiness.

Both the neo-ThomistJacquesMaritain and the personalistw. E. Hocking respond to thc question, what is happiness?,with the answer proposedby ThomasAquinas:a perfectsatisf-action. absolute,independcntof temporality,permanent.This kind of happinesscannot be aspired to or reachedby thosewho focus their attentionon the hurnanworld alone,a world breedingtemptationsand suffering,impcrf'ectsatisfactions,irrelevant,subjcct to temporality,ephenreral.

Only thosewho havc not lost their faith in God can hopefor it. The unhappiness of the modernhumanbeing would be explained exclusivelyby the lossof faith. The conclusionis the sameboth with Maritain and Hocking;only the argumentation differs.Maritaincalls the new situation,

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thc tragedyo1'anthropocentrichumanism,characterizedby the certitudc that advancemcntol knowledge and revolutions maintain the conviction of humankindthat, if no God exists,then no human being exists.Thus, the Hocking calls the same human being is hurled into hopelessunhappiness. condition the dilemma of modernity, considering that our era, by people'sfaith in their reasonand action,would confrontthem strcngthening with a dilemma. The dilemma would be to either assume the risk of knowledge,or refuseit and thus surrenderto a deeperand deepersolipsism.

Given the alternative,irrespectiveof one's option, happinessis impossible without belicvingin God. Yet, the questionarises:Is happinessin the real world an illusion? The questionwas appropriatelyphrasedby SigmundFreud,who openedthe fourth type of conccptionof happiness,dcveloped,in various patternsand with notable alterations,by thc' philosophersof thc Frankfurt School. The ol' this conseptiondiffer fiom the structuralistsby asscrting re.prescntatives that the problem ol happinessis already posed and it has a theoretical relevance.They differ fiom the existentialistsby consideringthat it does have solutions, and they delimit themselvesfrom the representativesof the religious philosophiesby searchingfor the possible solutions in the real world. Yet, such a conception,althoughof an indisputableinterest,recovers happinessas a fundamentalhuman aspirationonly to losc it again either by placingit outsidethe culturalvalues(Freud),or by identifyingthe strugglefbr happinesswith the fight fbr a new sensibility and sensoriality(Herbert Marcusc).It is as if we were dealingwith a philosophyof happinessregained and lost.

What tlctpeople want/ lUhatdo they aspire /ol', asksFreud. His answer is unambiguous.Pcoplc want to bc and stay happy. Yet, why arc they not happv'l Bccauseo1'the imminent decay of the body and the prescienceof death, becauseof thc ambiguity of any all'ectiverelationshipbetween two pcrsons that leaves bchind a deposit of hostile, inimical feelings. But especiallyby virtue of the oppositionbetweenthe cultural norms ensuringthe creation o1' the works of civilization and the foundation of lasting human relationsaccordingto the principleol reality and the aspirationto happiness. that presupposcthe satisfactionof the natural impulse basedon the principle of pleasure."That rvhich we call happiness,"writes Freud, "results fiom the ol- sorne needsthat havc attaineda vory high tension," yet it satisf'action remainsan "episodicphenomenon,"since thc condition of the progressof civilization is "to ccnsurethe satisfactionol thesetendencies."Thus, with Frcud, ncurosis corxcs to express the degree of abdication reclaimcd by societyin the nameo{'the culturalideal.In the very end, Freudcomesto say that happinessis no culture value: Glilck ist kein Kultur-Gur. As it proceeds, culture dictates sacrifices that could hardly ever allow people to capture happiness.Hence, only the liberation of humankind from the repressive

characterof culturemay signify a return to the chancesof happiness.Sensitive to the risks of the technocraticcivilization,yet somberand ambiguous,by pcdaling on tht; clashbetweentwo bcatings,Eros and Thanatos,Freud sannot seea way out.

Marcusetried to find a way out. He considersthat,criticallyreevaluatcd, Freud's theory suppliesthe argumentsneededto query the thesisaccordingto which civilization reclaims a more and more intense repression.And implicitly, to recover an impossiblehappiness,Marcuse finds that in thc advancedindustrialsociety,efficiencyhasbecomean aim in itself so much so that the principle of reality, characteristicof any culture, operatesin its degrading variant, that is, the principle of efficiency. Or, according to Marcusc,this principleopposesthe lllflllment of the aspirationto happiness.

The technocratic society obstructs the way to happiness through the manipulationof contrived consumerneeds of the "unidimcnsionalhuman being." Recoveredand placedat the junction point of the harmonybetween the soul's faculties and the social and cultural environment,the ideal of happinessproposedby Marcusc is Utopian. His solutions,reinstatemcntol' sensibilityin its rights, the appearance of a human type whose biological impulsesare altered,and abolition of work as a condition fbr happincss, continueto bear the mark of the original Freudianpreconceptions:happiness is not a culture value. Whereversuch a preconception exists,people shrink from usingthe word "happiness," yet do not stoppursuingit.

But happinessbecomesa syntheticculturalvalue if, by it, wc meanthe satisfactionobtainedby the course of our existenceseen as a whole. To understand happinessas a culturalvalueis to elevatea problemof life, clad in a massof individualforms, to the conditionof principlc.As a consequence, we reach a standpointliable to organizethe motlcy variety of personal experiencesand render it intelligibly rational.This principle of happiness cannotbe that of stoicalpassiveness, that of the existentialist"non-freedom," or that of "pleasure,"in its ancienthedonisticor modernFreudianhypostasis.

It is not easyto flnd, but it is worth lookingfor.

What is happiness?remainsan open qucstion.To obtain an acceptable definitionof happiness somcdifficultiesmustbe transcended.

The first difficulty: the term, happinessis ambiguous.Its meaning, developedin the courseof historyand lunctionof the socialcontext,initially connotedsuccess, and lal.er,the screneconditionof wisdom,while in modern times it would mainly refer to pleasure,and, of late,to the satisfactionwrth a generalcourseof life. The very sameperson,in diff'erentlife circumstances, meansby happinessa momentaryfeelingof powerfulemotion,or a feclingof oalm and lasting contentmentwith thc senseof her or his cxistencc.The personmay evenagreewith Seneca,"If you think you arc happyit will suffice "I would bc to be happy,"but also with onc of the Shakespearean characters, less happy if I thoughtI was." The ambiguityis total. This way we could at

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most succeedand explain what one human being meansby happinessln a given situation.

To go beyondthis difflculty, I will settlefor one notion of happinessthat I considertheoreticallymore rclevant and practically more important for the effort a human being makes to advance to superior stages of humanity.

Namely, I settle for a definition that placeshappinessin the sphereof ideal values,within an exigencyof action, grantingit thc privilege of bcing the sourcein the processof humanperfectionand fulfillment.

The second difficulty: the pair ol correlative terms, happinessis asymmetrical.

It is distinctfrom other pairs,such as pleasureunhappiness is more dependenton adverseconditions tormentor joy-sorrow.Unhappiness Happinessis particularlyrelatedto human valuationsand zrndcontingencies. acticlns.The term, "unhappiness,"does not contain the power that should render it the opposite of happiness.As a matter of fact, thc term, "unhappiness,"is a mclderndevising.The ancientshad no negativeterm correlatedt<>beatitudoor felicitas, becausethey would look upon happiness as the ideal of perfection and not as a state o{' things. We are never in the position to declarc that those who can dismiss unhappincssmay become happy.On the contrary,only thosc who pursuethe attainmentof happinessas That is why a negativedefinitionof a valuecan also experienceunhappiness. happinesscould offer only the premises,while the positivedefinition should pursuc a different path of posting happinessin the polymorphic register of humanvalues.

The third difficulty: an acceptabledefinition can refer to the ideal of alone,beingonly indirectlyand approximatelyappliedto actualizcd happiness For humanlife to be qualifiedas happy,it shouldexclusivelybear happiness. thc auraof good and fulfillment.But in the courseof a lifetime,it is difficult for a finely-shadedcombinationof achievementand failure and of good and bad not to cocxist.At the sametime, as a result of a processof idealization bcing,the ideal vision of the huppy life is of any valuc-oriented characteristic good at which a humanbeing'smoralewill the aspects only built. It includes aim, while rcfining itsclf. Oncesuchan idcal imageis built, we are inclinedto invest it alone with the name of happiness,as Cicero did, when sayingthat thosewho can enjoy the good alonewithout any mixture of evil can be happy.

Graspedas the supremegood and the complete,permanentsatisfaction,in the happinessis a notion designatingan ideal sum total of hf'e's manif'estations, situationto which we constantlyaspire and that commandsconstantselfperf'ection.Such a happiness,the only one that could be defined,is the one that we are in pursuitof, yet not the one that we can find. One is the ideal, pcrf-ecthappiness;thc othcr one is the tangible happiness,imperl'ect,yet genuine,especiallydue to the alternationof the moods and to the strainfor the ideal of happiness,which is, in fact, the authentichuman happiness.Or the difficulty we are faced with is the very same problem: we develop and

experiencereal happiness,permanentlyperf'ectible,but only thc idcal happincsscan be dcflned.Since happinessinvolvcsa satisl'action of its own kind, having such attributesas permanence, attainment,and completion,it is difficult to estimatethe minimum requiredfor real happiness,but it is no1 difficult to foreseethat maximum supposedof ideal happinessthat could be included in a definition. Thus, we will know what real happinessis, yer indirectly,becauseof thoseattributesof ideal happinessthat it approximates and actualizcsby the humanactioninscribedon the axiologicalhorizon.

The fourth difficulty: happinesspresupposes the completeindivisibility between objective and subjectivetime. Happinessis neithcr the automatic result of externalphenomena,nor is it an automatiocrcationby thc subject.

Happinessis the productol'a person'sactivity.the end resultof the processol assigningvalue to the materialsuppliedby the naturalenvironmentand thc social-culturalsetting.Bringing to harmonya humanbeing'ssoul, the social cnvirontnent,and the needs,establishinga balancebetweenthc subject ancl the object may also bring along happiness.

This is why it does not sufiice to dcfine happinesseither by its lavoring objectiveconditions,or by a statcol' subjectivesatisfaction, in orderto achievean optirnalrclationin a fraction,the numerator of which would be representedby satisfied clesires,ancJthe denominatorol' which would rel-erto desiresas a whole. To claim that happinessis a stateof satisfaction is to havein view a psychologicalindicator only, yet, as long as we cannotdetenninewhich desiresneed bc satisflerJ, which meansand ways arc worth promoting, we have not steppedonto the axiological ficld, and, as such, wc are still far liom our goal. Happiness involvesa satisfactionjustified by valueswith a lif-eto bc built ancl worth living, a lil'e able to achicve a sorl. of ontologicalharmony betwecn thc subjectivityof desiresand the objectivityof the valuationactions.

The difficultiesdiscussedimmediatelyaboveurge us to placeourselvcs in a predilectlyaxiologicalperspective and definehappinessas a value,in the conceptualframework of a possible ontology of the axio-oentralhuman condition.The proximal genre for the notion of happinessseemsto be thc notionof genericvalue.

Vafue rspar excellence relational,beinginherentto the humanactionof creatingvalue and bcing value-oriented.

It concernsnot the statcof facts,but the stateof right, advancingfrom indicativc finctingsto idcal significance, shapingconscienceand bchavioralike.Value exprcsses not what wc are, bu[ what we are not, what we are in searchfbr, what we want to be and think that we shouldbe. Valuesanswerthe dernandsof socialpracticcby a multi-shadcd dialecticsof interiorizaLron and objectivization, thus bccomingrequirementin action.Action requirements arc involvedin any opticlnsof the accord,lorever to be reconstituted,recreated,between a particular human being and the particular world in which he or she participatesto build his or her own destiny. The entire human activity, which is creationand self-crcation,is

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driven by the pursuitand achievement. of values.A world without valuesstops being a human civilization,looking rather like a society of Hymenoptera.

Human beings would return to anirnality or change into a bio-mechanical aggregate.Directly or symbolically,values exprosspeople's projects,the constellationof their preferencesprof'essedand aimed at, the hierarchy of their preferences, their way of making a choice and being chosen.It is only through the values assumedand prornotedthat a person's synthetic project calledhappiness acquiresshape.

Thus conceived, happinessappears to us as value. Expressing a synthetic project, happinesspresupposesand integratesother values. Their contents determine its ethical height, and their amplitude determines its magnitude.Pure happincss,separatedfrom other values- good, beauty,truth, justice,freedom,work, duty, love, honor - would drown in silenceor cancel itself in a pathological narcissisrn.As a synthetic cultural value of each person,happinesscannotbe a pure value {br the very reasonthat it is intrinsic and, as such, the other values lend it contcntsand support.All other values could be pursued,lunction of the context,for themselves, too, but aiso as a meansto achieveanothervalue,as instrumentalvalues.And if questionssuch as, Useful to what?, Knowledgefor what?, or Well-beingfor what?, make sense.the question,Why be happy?,is nonsensicalexactly becausehappiness can never be an instrumentalvalue, only an intrinsic value. It representsthe ultimategoal.

Situatedin the f-ascinating realm of values,happinessis not, despite frequent languageambiguities,egotisticalwhim, instinctiveimpulse, lucky accident,or mcdiocreluxury. Happinessis a humanbeing'sessentialnlfnner of relating,socially,culturally,pref'erentially, to the world. People'saspiration to happiness is involvcd in their specific manner of existence and dcvelopment,nS, homo aestimans.If people were not estimatinghuman beings,thenthey would alwaysbe satisticdwith what they arc.Human beings would no longer bc active,creative;alongsidethe loss of their craving fbr perf-ection,their ability to give senseto lif'e, their competenccto fight and achievethc ideal of happinesswould be alsolost.Happinesspresupposes that human beings are able to control the hard moments of decision-making between ahernativesol' action, conliont dangers and temptations,surpass failure and sorrow to fulfill their life through struggle, unfolding all their creative powers. Indeed, what else is happiness if not the long-lasting satisfactionwith a li{'e endowedwith a meaning?A life that a person gladly relivesand that survivcsthe individualby virtue of the valuescreated?What is happinessif not a pcrsonalvalueassimilatingand organizingthe aggregate of cultural valuesin a syntheticproject, and thus contributingto the designof a life open to new stagesof humanity'?Could it not be, then, the lasting and stimulatingsatisfaction,which accompaniesthe strugglefor happiness,of the kind fclt by the creatorof a work of art?

If placedamongother humanvalues,we can associate to happinessthe special joy of creation. Such satisfactiondoes not eliminate sad or disappointing moments, periods of physical or moral suffering. Such satisfactiongrantsimmunity againsthigh stressand a predominantlypositive affectivity. This type of completesatisfaction,as it goes beyond the intense, yet transient,superficialdelight of the senses,entailing all spiritual faculties, sensitivity, affectivity, reason, will-power, is long-lasting because it is achievednot with the help of, but throughoutan entire life. It is maintained not by suffocating needs, but by satisfying them and concomitantly heighteningthe level of valueexigency,by virtue of the paradoxsayingthat if devoid of fresher longings for perfection, we would be unhappy in our happiness.In its acceptanceof a highly passionateemotional experience, happinessinvolvestransientcontentment.Happinessas satisfactionwith the whole of a lifetime wherethe order of the personalvaluesharmonizeswith the world is durableand could be constantlypresent.

Although it offers prospectsfor the future and assurancetor the past,the pursuit of ideal happinessunlblds in actionsin the presenttimc. A human being's life is like an unfinishedwork as long as hc or she comprehends, estimates,acts,hopes,creates.

Seen in this light. happiness presupposesself-fulfillment, selfrealization.Its paths,so diversefrom one personto another,from one instance to another,proceedthroughthc continuousdevelopmentand workings of all human faculties. Thus, the idea of happinesscomes to involve the full ernploymentof all human faculties,of the entire human potential.In this way the major cultural needs are first and foremost cultivated, since they are reflectedin the aspirationto excellenceand fulfillment. Truth, good, beauty, justice, dignity are values revealed as summation goods, not as consummation goods. Circumstancesexist though when the existenceof an individual favors specific faculties,being centeredarounda unique focussing value, and thus the fulflllment of sharedlove is f-elt as symbolizing the attainmentof the syntheticproject. Even in such border cases,happiness cannotbe selfish,as it presupposes bridgeslinking consciences, adjustmentto the developmentof the other human beingsas a condition of developingyour own personality.

Maybe now the reasonwhy human beings pursue happinessbecomes clearer.The reasonwhy they searchfor happinessby developingvaluesand granting meaning is happinessitself. The creation of values, assigning meaning,the use of f'aculties,attainmentof aims and desiresare all attributes that persuadeus refuseto considerhappiness a condition,somethingfinite.

Irrespectiveof how subtle and profound philosophicalattemptsmay be in defining happinessexclusivelyas a predicamentand in systematizinga number of its constant characteristics,they all seem to suffer from the drawback I have already mentioned: they ignore the fact that the main

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attributeof happinessis its being foreverpursued,yet neverwholly attained.

As I argued above, the notion of happinessexpressesactivity, a dynamic infinitely open on the axiologicalvista.From this processof self-realization, perspective,happinessis no longer a terminal we arrive at, after having fbllowed, by no trial and error, an itinerarypreviouslyestablished,to exclaim, "This is wherc we stopl" or Instant,halt! This is not a feeling of oomfortable self-satisfaction,in which all your desireswould be completelysatisfied,the the stoic concept.Happinessis hedonisticconcept,or completelysuppressed, active life, guided by values, directed toward self-realization and self'improvement.

Aristotle defineshappinessas the life of that human being who aspires to what is the best, the most beautiful, and, at the same time, the most pleasurable.

We are thus offered the way to overcome the artificial alternative: "pleasurewithout virtue," Cyrenaichedonism,or "virtue without pleasure," To decidein favor of one or the otherpossibleanswersto the Stoicascetioism. alternativeis to ignore that happinessrules out conflicting human faculties This is possibleso far as we understand their reconciliation. and presupposes happiness as an activity of self-realization and self-completion. In the employment of human laculties, pleasure acquires an axiological rank, with life's creativemeaning.Moral virtue becominga long-lastingsatisfaction imposed by outernorms,but alsoas an inner craving is felt not only as a duty for sell'-completion. happinessopensup the vista for surpassing This way of understanding the disjunction,desireor reason,with the help of a conjunction.Immanuel Kant usedto think that due to our affectivcand sensorialfaculties,we long for while as rationalbeingsand moral "agcnts,"we settlefor duty. The happiness, that by pursuinghappinesswe may hope proposedvision helpsus understand to attain what Hegel saw as a merger of desire and duty, betweensentiment and reason.Our desiresacquire a reasoningof their own, and reason is involvedin the intentionof desire.Thus, happinessis not externalto morals, exceptwith thosewho persistin their error of taking it fbr hedonisticpleasure Happiness is understood as the moral yearning for sell'-perfectionand lulfillment of a humanbeing'sdestinyby meansof culturalvalue-generating cndeavor.And cultural creationmeansnot only the productionof exceptional work, but also the conscientiousconduct in doing your duty, so that each individualcontributesto the moral ascentof humankind. joy and sorrow, hope and nostalgia, Satisfactionand dissatisfaction, memory and project, all receive a failure, and success reflection, effort and new meaning and a higher axiological status due to the comprehensive This happensas a resultof attaininggoalsthat processof self-improvement. can always find sourcesof dynamism,of the long-lastingsatisfactionbrought

aboutby the activityaimedat thesymbiosis of individualself-perfection and thegoodofthosearoundyou.

In a vision consonantwith the Aristoteliangraspof happiness,human beings are conceived of as constantly open-minded creatures, nevcr completelycreated,but always creatingthemselvesby the generationof such projectsthat lend human existencepristine meanings.The nccessityto satisfy their practicai needs makes human beings actively relate to historical conditionsin order to selectvaluesand make decisionsas to their actions, striving for harmony between the hierarchy of values and the order of the world. The major content of happinessis the painstaking engagementof human faculties, self-realization and self-perfection in the struggle to transform reality and give human lif'c a meaning. Surrender to external constraints, blind necessity, chance, alienating social conditions, thc magnetismof thc situation,or to inner servitude,instinctualautomatism. ignorance,stereotypicaladjustment,preconceptions, the tyranny of emotion, would be tantamountto relinquishingthe aspirationto happiness.

Thc vision of happinessfor which I arguedoesnot invadethe belief.sof greatwriters and philosophersin the existenceof some "factors" of happiness bearing a degreeof generalization,with the inevitablepersonalnote. On tfie contrary, it deepenssuch beliefs and shifts their weight to what is really cssential.For cxample, Leo Tolstoy considersthat attainmento1 human happiness presupposes suchconditionsas unmarredbondsbetweenthe human beingand nature,pleasantand unconstrained work, family, candidand sincere Iiiendship, health. Bertrand Russell resorts to a different type of systematizationwhen sayingthat thereare four importantingredients:the first is, probably,health;the second,the matcrialmeansnecessaryto protcctyou againstnecds;the third, the relationshipwith other persons(friendship,love, the parent-children relationship, etc.);and the fburth,accomplishment o1'your work. Both the writer's and the philosopher'sperspectives, though, include the samedominantelement:work is a vital prcrequisite of humanlif-e.It is the way toward happiness,as Tolstoy maintains.Russell rnaintainsthat thc greatesthappinessderives fiom cxcellencein rvork, from successin spite gf difficulty and that he or shewho doesnot struggle,cannotreachit.

By placing happinessin a privileged relationshipwith the activrty directedat the generalpurposeof giving meaningto lif'e, the shift ol' weight from the conditionsof happiness,necessary,yet insufficient,onto its efficient reasonbecomesclearer.A patternof happiness,perfect f-orall times and all humanbeingsis inconceivable.

Happinessis a humancreationdependentboth on the socictyin which humanbeingslive, and on thcir abilities,talents,and personalaspirations,genuineand irreversiblc.Undoubtedly.to be able to realizethemselvesas human beings,to enjoy thc meaningconferredto their lives, people need biological conditions, good health, environmental conditions,intelleotualconditions,such as a distinct levcl of knowledse.

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relationships, friendship,love, af-fection, suchas family warmth.interpersonal and the rnaterialconditionsdescribedby EugdneIonescoas scmi-prospcritl, or scmi-poverty.In the absenceof thesecclnditions, the courseto happinessis strcnuousand, sotneLimes, in the allsence,Ibr example,o1'thc biological or ail-fcctive ones,almostin-rpossible.

Their absencedoes thwart happincss"yet, althoughimportant,their presencedoesnot automaticallvsecureit. Happincss is abovc these oonditions.You can be vi-{orouslyhcalthy, you may have advanceclknowledge, you can be well-to-do, you can have friends t<r you, yet the lack o1 meaningin your life wili be felt as a more or understand lcssacutepercepl.ion of unhappint:ss.

If you Th i s is not a r es t r i c ti v cs ta te me n t, s i m p l i l y i n go r standardi zi ng. pursuc liappincss,thcn nothing that is human can bc alicn to you, whcther r n cd i ta ti onin s olit udc . c o n te mp l a ti o np, a s s i o n ,d re a mi ng,l ei sure, pl ay, convcrsation,rerncmblance,hope. or conliontationand conflict, crring and Iilrgiving,solvingproblems,and surmountingobstaclcs.So much thc lcssare bridgcsof humarnwarmth,comfortingand stirnulatingenergy.Thc sonataol' happincsscannotbc composedwith just one musicalnote.Yet it.is playcd on .iustonc scale.The compositionsarc alwaysoriginal.Each personcrcatcshis or hcr own work of life, using specific abilities and talents, in distinct tcchniques,of his or her own tonality.When edifying a life of meaningand value,eachdetail,eachchoice,and eachmome.ntcommandscrcation.

Photornetryuscs a notion meerntto designate[he ratio betweenlight radiatedand light receivedby a surface,called "albedo."Each planet in our solar systemhas its own albedowhioh can alwaysbc lcssor at most equalto onc, sincc no solar system unit can radiate nlorc light than it receives.

Metaphorically,we may considcrthatthe albcCoof the "hurnanbeingplanet," as il' challcngingthc laws of' nature,is greaterthan the unit. Inheriting so much throughtheir genetic,soi;ial,and culturalcndowmcnt,humanbeingsare vtrluc-gcnerating being,able'toadd sornething ncw to thcir inheritancc,ableto givc sornethingmorethanthey haveinherited.

To conclude:the optimizedratio of satisfieddcsircsto existingdesircs can lcad to thc atl.ainment of thc aspirationto happinessonly then and there where it cxprcssesa maxirnizcd ratio of the crcated values to the inherited values.Perhapsthis is what Albert Einsteinmeantwhen he said that a human being'svaluercsidesin what he or shecan give, and not in u'hathe or shecan obtain.

ChapterNine The Orphic Myth and the Human Condition In our time, preeminentlyrationalisticand demystifying,the tendencyhas paradoxicallysurfacedto recur to myths every time people wish to better understandthemselvesand the world in which they live. Perhapsthe tendency could be explainedby the fact that myths succeedin symbolicallycombining motivation, experiences,and attitudes with basic meanings toward an understanding of the humanplight.

Given their form, myths could abridge the ever-presentspan between what people want to do and what they succeedin doing and understanding.

Myths reflect the reliance and trust of an archaic society on valucs in their perpetualoperationon a humanontic level. The comprehensionof this belief, free of subsequent ideological subterfuges, enables the individuals to rediscoverthemselvesand their private and primary problems in a myth.

Thus,myth-conveyed messages can acquireundyingcontemporaneity.

By recurringLomyths, the contemporaryauthorbenefitsfrom irrefutable advantages.

Its languageis suppler,richer in nuances,since,basically,the myth is an extensive metaphor. By endowing the imaginary with values characteristicof an instrumentof knowledge,the myth makesgood use ol the capabilities of reason, while also protecting reason against its own imperialisticdemands.And through hermeneutics,as Mircea Eliade used to say, you can decodethe fresh meaningsof the encodedpracticalwisdom that mythscontain.

The Orphic myth, more than any other myth, holds the virtue of encompassing in its registera world of values.The myth invokesthe ideathat value is the necessarylink bctweenneedsand desires,betweenideal and reality, betweennatureand culture. The fbrmidable task of Orpheusaims to rcbuild the bridges between the pursuit of pragmatic efticiency and the impassioned living of thejoys of lif'e.

The Orphic myth conveysmeaningsother than thoseof the Narcissan myth to which it is often compared.For cxample,in his Eros and CiviliTation, Herberl Marcuse maintainsthat both Orpheusand Narcissussymbolize the same anti-Prometheanideal. In his opinion, both legends demonstratethe revolt againsta civilizationbasedon labor and efficiency,or, in other words, they expressthe Great Denial. This can be true with respectto Narcissus.He is an anti-Promethean, since,contentto endlesslyadorehis imagein the water mirror, he spurnsthe valuesof labor and efficiency.The Narcissanmyth, seen

by Marcuseas a symbol of the pluridimensionalhuman being,expressesan anthropometricideal, symmetricalto the Sisypheanmyth. Prometheus,who revolted againstZeus and gave humankindthe gift of fire at the price of his

own perpetualagony,remainsthe heroo1'acultureof labor.Prometheus is the symbolof a pyramidalaxiologicalhierarchytoppedby the practical-utilitarian values.Both Narcissusand Sisyphussymbolizeaxiologicalhierarchiesby lefusingto bestowvalue to labor.Narcissusrejectstoil, withdrawinginto the dimensionsof inward Iiving. Sisyphusacceptsit as an agony.Both Narcissus' introvertedbehavior and thc standardizedbehavior of Sisyphussymbohze a human universedevcliclof an axis of values.In either case,the altormaLhis lailure.Failureof cvasion.in the caseclf Narcissus.Failureof aut.omatism, in the cascof Sisyphus.The failurc of solitudeand of denial of values,in both 'fhis cases. is the reasonwhy neitherNarcissus,nor Sisyphus,but Promethcus hascome to standfor the symbolof Westernculturalprogress.

The case o1'Orpheusis completelydifferent.Orpheusis not an antiPromethean.Like Prometheus,he cultivates labor in its major variant: authenticcreation.With Orpheus,labor and efficiencyare sources of joy and elementsin the fulfillmentof the humanbeing'screativeskills.This way, the Promethean idealis dialecticallyintcgratedand excelled.

Orpheus'work is both sat"isfaction and fun. His languageis singing.His life is beautyand the ability to communicatc.To the legendarypoet,to live is to comrnunicate.FIis ultimate satisf'actionis the satisf'actionhe brings to his hurnanfcllows. Creatiortis his mannerof life. Lovc is his style of living. His arspiration is to achicvethe unity betweenthe human bcing and nature,not through authority,violence,repression,but through the fiee dominationof creativeactivity over the social,natural,and subjectivefclrces.Thc Orphic creationtamcs thc elementsof naturc,humanizesthc Universe,propagates beauty.Orpheuscoversthe entire registerol'life values,keepingin balance satisfactionand pain, exultationand dismay, tcnsictnand conversion.His arc genuinely human and acquire a srrong axiological [::*:.5:t"tt Orpheus'destinyevokesan axiologicalexperiencein fostcringeachand every value.Inf-eriorvaluesaid in the achievcmentof superiorvalues,wliich, in turn, dispel their meaning over the whole rangc of values. Thc placc assigned,within the range,to lovc, to Eros, is an implicit protestagainslan order basedon the cult of efficiency for efficiency's sake.The world (or which Prometheus standssignifiesthe denialof any suohorder.Orphcusgoes farther attd, after having denicd the existing ordcr, discovcrsa ncw reality with its own axiological order. In this new reality, lerboracquiresmoral values.The human being opposesignoranceand misery,cruclty and death.

Aestheticsensibilityturns into a power opposingover-repression by instinct-.

In this world lacking ontologicalharmony, happincssis nonscnsical.Thc moral values are on top of the list. Aesthetic valucs second them. The hierarchicalorder of valuesharmoniouslyintegratcsall values.thc affective. strictly individual ones included,and thus thc aestheticpatternbccomesthc coordinatingparadigm of all values.This does not lead to a paradisiacal

l-he Orphir: Myth und the HumctnConditiort

r35

vision, free of contradictions,tcnsions, and suffering. On the contrary, Orpheusexperiencesthe rnajor drama of choice. Orpheusmakes his choice and payshis tribute.Orpheusregretsand suffers.He regretsthe consequences, yet not his defianceof gods in the nameof the lofiy idealsof liberty and love.

His soul acquirespathetichumanaccents,solemnaxiologicalresonance.

His sorrowtranscends the strictlypcrsonalboundsof distresscausedby his lossof the most beloved human creatureand grows into grief for the servitudeof humanconditionperceivedin the limit-caseof havingto makea choice.

Even when experiencingterrible misfortune,Orpheusis great, because he is aware of his mischanceand yearns to surpassit. With Orpheus,the discrepancybetweenthe order of valuesand the order of things can and must be elfaced. He trics to eradicatethe repressiveforces, to build, for and together with his fellow beings, a harmoniousorder of values in which the sourccsgeneratingunhappinesswill be limited. His attitudetoward the world is that of a Faust avant la lettre. To Orpheus,happinessitself is the human dcsign of a basicagreementbetweenthe world order and the determinedorder of human values.In our times, the terms of the agreementhave changed.The agreementitself has changed.But Orpheusremainsthe perennialsymbol of the human being's effort to devise such an agreement. When in his mastcrpiece,The Old Man and the Sea,ErnestHemingway had the old man say that man is not createdto be defeated,we could hear the contemporary resonance of the Orphic lyre.

Indeed,Orpheuswas not defeated.Neither were the elementsof nature, the occult forces in Hades, decisive in the absolute loss of his beloved.

Orpheuswas perfectlyawarethat to look at Euridice was to lose her. He knew prccisely the restriction imposed by Persephone:it would be impossible to save his beloved if hc looked at her. Yet, Orpheusattemptedthe impossible.

Metaphorically,his behavior conjuresa profoundly human reaction.History rvas possible only becausethe human being challengedwhat was sacredly impossible! By every progress in social practice, by every important breakthroughin science,philosophy,or art, the kingdom of the impossibleis reduced.The human being, who has a finite existence,venturesto touch the infinite through reasonand values.An enigmaticforce urgespeople to push that frontier of the impossiblefurther and further away. Orpheus' sublimefeat testifiesto a consciencewhich, observingitself, hasrediscoveredthe objective and constrainingsignificanceof the cultural values.Orpheusevokesthis in an exemplaryway: the human being does not only reason,but also estimates values.The human life's axial principle is not the Cartesiancogito ergo sum, butvaleo ergo sum.Orpheusis the symbol of homo aestimans.

Orpheus'bchaviorpoints to the existenceof an ontologicalstatusof the humancondition.It also indicatesthat valuesstandfor the basic determinants of the ontological status.Peoplewere living in the woods and their lif-e was governedby instinctswhen the legendarypoet taughtthem not to kill and eat

inf-amousfood any more, when he urged them to be concernednot only with what they owned,but also with what they were.Orpheusis the symbol of the disputednon-humannaturalorder,govcrncdby instinctand challengedby a cultural order distinctivelyhuman,governedby valuessuch as truth, good, beauty,justice. Orpheusdoes not challengeuniversaldeterminism.But he knows that while things are what they are, and evolve in a certain direction, yet the individuals have the right to wonder where they have come fiom, where they are going to, what they are, and why they exist.with orpheus, the essentialis to be, not to have.And to the humanbeing,to be is to know, to estimate,and to act so as to give life a sense.

Narcissuswas obsessed with his physicalbeauty.Sisyphuswas obsessed with the tormentof his effort. They both linger within the limits of a universe they accept as is, devoid of sense and value. orpheus embodies the prospectivefacultiesof any humanbeing,who, in the nameof values,actsto establisha cultural order, specifically human. Even when he looks back to Euridice,his action is precededby a look forward, toward the projectedideal.

Thus,lucid conscicncecomesto be linked to the irresistibleaspirationtoward the sense-givingvalues of human lifc. orpheus enjoys a philosopher's wisdom, forever in pursuitof the absolute,in spite of his knowing that both his tools and his productliave not and cannothave absolutevalue.The system of valuespresentin Orpheus'bearingsymbolicallyoutlinesthe utopianworld of the disalienated humanbeing.

Time and again, Orpheustries to smooth the asperitiesof the road to disalienation.

A road endlesslyresumedby history,with fieshertools but with the same purpose in view. On the one hand, this is about harmonizing people's relationshipwith naturc. Orpheustries to commune with trees and animals and thus attune natural order and human order. What other significancecould we assign today to the ecologicalvalues promoted by people?Does not our fight to preservenature,fought with the weaponsof our era, bear the same meaning that Orpheus' fight, fought with mythical weapons,did? On the other hand,this is aboutthe relationshipof one human being to another.With Orpheus,a human being can be nothingelse but the aim, and this is what ImmanuelKant will expressin philosophicterms.It is therebynatural for the relationshipof human beings with their fellow beings to be that of value-carrierswith other value-carriers.

The 1 and non-l formula, where non-l is either the enemy or the inferior, is forcign to Orpheus' yearning.The 1 could challengeat most the 1, in the individual'sfight with himself or herself in the attemptto createa harmoniousaxiological climate.

The climate will not be completelyfree of contradictionand tension,danger and temptation,failure and suffering.Yet their naturewould be changed,their sphereof action would be restrictedas the vital unity betweenthe order of thingsand the orderof humanvaluesis beingbuilt.

'l'he

Orphic' Mt'tlt antl the I-lurnan ()rtndition

t37

Scen liom this perspectivc,the Orphic rnyth becomesan evocative mctaphoricalrecollcctionof thc humanbeing'svirtuesas an estimatingbeing.

In a worid in which wc must decide betweenthe fascinationof things, tcchnioal,ceremonial,and consumergoods,and the fascinationof the spiritual and moral valucs,thc Orphic rnyth staystruc. Without neglecttngthe "sensc of the aotual,"living so as to achieveour time's lolly valucsby meansof the interactionbetweenthc concrctehistoricalconditionsand ethos,thc Orphi<; voice echoesours wheneverwe wonder:What am I? What must I do'l What can I believein'l What can I hopefor?

To tell value from anti-value,to adequatelyhierarchrzethe valuesof lil'e and culture,we needa guide.Unlike in myth, we will not be guidedby Orphic music. Philosophymight becomeour guide when it resoundswith human pathosand enjoysan axiologicalperspective. that there dialogucPhaedo,I prof-ess AlongsidcPlatoand his celebrated is no loftier musicthanphilosophy.

Notes Part One ChaptcrOne l. See Alcxius von Meinong,PsychoLogish-etisclrc Untersuchungen zur (1894)anJUber Werrhalten Wert-Theorie und Wert(1895).Christianvon Ehrenf'els, Werttheorie und Ethik (1893) and Von der Wertdefinition zurtr Motivatiortgesetze ( I 896). ?. Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory o.f' VaLue (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1950).

3. Louis Lavelle, Traitd des vale,urs,2 vols. (Paris:PressesUniversitairesde F r a n c e1, 9 5 1 ,1 9 5 5 ) .

4. Lavelle, Traitd des yaleurs.

ChapterTwo l.

John Laird, Tlte lclectof Value (Carnbridge,Unitcd Kingdom: Carnbridge University Press,1929). sur Ie Jondementde 2. Raymond Polin, La crdation des valeurs: Recherc'he l'objectit,iti axiologiqrze(Paris:PressesUniversitairesde France,1945).

3. CharlesW. Morris, Varietiesof Htunan VaLues(Chicago: University of ChicagoPrcss,1956).

4. Robert S. Hartman,The Structureof Value: Foundationsofa Scientificct Axiology (Carbondale,Ill.: SouthernIllinois UniversityPress,1967). ,5. Clyde H. Coombs,"La mesuredans les sciencessociales,"Les mdthodes rle recherchedans le.sscie.nces sociale(Paris:PrcssesUniversitairesde France,1963).

6. R. S. Hartman, "Formal Axiology and Measurementof Values," The JournaLof' Value Inquit1,, I : I (1.967).

7. Jean Piaget, "Les courants de l'6pistemologie scientifique contemporaine,"Logique et c'onnaissance scientifique(Paris:Gallimard, 1967).

8. William R. Catton, Jr., "Exploring Techniquesfbr Measuring Human Value,"AmericanSociologicaL Review,No. l9 (1954).

9. Arnold Berleant, "The Experience and Judgement of Values," l'he Journalof ValueInquirv,l:l (Spring1961),p.24.

10. Edmund Husserl, "Zur Phrinomenologieder Intersubjeckivitiit,Zweiter Teil," Husserliana,Vol. 16,cd. Iso Kern (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff-,1964),p.334.

I l. Joseph Margolis, "The Use and Syntax of Value Judgments,"Value Thenry in Plilosoplry and Social Science,eds. E. Laszlo and JamcsB. Wilbur (New York: Gorclonand BreachSciencePublishers,1973),p. 120.

12. JamesColeman,FoundationsoJ'SociaLTheory (Cambridge,Mass.:The BelknapPressof l{arvardUnivcrsityPress,1990),p, 387. l3. Max Weber, The ProtestantEthic and the Spirit of Capitalisru(London: Allen zindUnwin, 1904).

14. Ludwig Wittgenstcin, Lectures and Conversntions on Acsthetics, Pstchologt,, and Religiotts Belie.l's,ed. C. Barret (Los Angeles: University o1Cafifbrnia Press,1961),p.27.

Part Two Chapter Three l.

Venant Cauchy,Conf6rencede cl6ture."Culture ct d6viancehurnainc; Philosophy and Culture," Proceedings of the XVIlth World Congress oJ' Philosopht, ( M o n t r e a lE : d i t i o n sM o n t m o r e n c y1, 9 8 6 ) p , p 411-412.

2. Immanuel KanL, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Thc Macmillan C o . , 1 9 1 9 )p, . 7 2 .

3. Edward B. Taylor, Prinitive Culture, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, l87l).

4. Ernst Cassirer,Es.saisur I'honune(Paris:Eclitionsclc Minuit, 1955),p.

248. .5. Allied L. Kroeber,Clydc Kluckhohn,"Culturc: Critical Analysis o1'thc Concept and Definitions," Dictionan' of Social Scicrtccs,cds. Julius Hould and William L. Kolb (New York: The FrcePress,196q.

6. Louis Lavcllc, Traitd des valeurs(Paris:PressesUniversitaircsde France. l 9 5 l ) .V o l . 1 . p . 2 6 .

7. Robert Ginsberg,"The Value of Philosophy:A Dialoguc," The Journal o.f VaLueInquiry,,24:1 ( 1990),p. 41.

8. John Lockc, Tv,o Treatiseson Government(Cambridge,United Kingdom: CambridgeUniversity Press,I 960).

9. Edmund Husserl,Phenomenolog,and the Crisisof PhiLosophr-.

10. JanuszKuczynski,"The First International Symposiumof Universalism," Dialecticsand Hunnnisn, No. 2 ( 1989),p. 213, I l. Anna-TeresaTymieniecka,"The CreativeSelf and the Other in Man's Seff-lnterpretation," Analecta HusserLiana (Dordrccht: D. Reidel Publishing C o m p a n y )V, o l . 6 ( 1 9 7 1 )p, . l 0 l .

12. Steve Connor, Theon, and Culnrral Value (Oxfbrd: Basil Blackwell, 1 9 9 2 )p , .8.

13. PeteA. Y. Gunter,"Creativityand Ecology" (paper),WestcrnDivision of the Societyfbr Philosophyof Creativity,1984,p. 1.

14. John Fekete,"lntroductory Notes fbr a PostmodernValue Agenda,"Lfe cfter Postmodernism: Essayson Value and Culture, ed. John Feketc (London: M a c m i l l a n ,1 9 8 8 ) p , . 1.

(Paris:Gallimard,1968),pp 4315. AlexandreKoyr6, EtudesNewtonienrzes 44.

16. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers,Lct nouvelle alliance (Paris: Galfimard, 1919),pp.64 and273. ll. Hilary Putnam, Reason, TrLtth, and History (Cambridge. United K i n g d o m :C a m b r i d g cU n i v c r s i t yP r e s s 1 , 9 8 2 ) p, p . 1 7 4a n d 1 8 7 .

1 8 . I b i d . ,p . 1 9 2 . lc). Ibid., pp. 201-202.

Notes

l4l

70. John Rawls, A Theory of' Justice (London: Oxfbrd University Press, t973).

Menschentumsund die 21. Edrnund Husserl, Die Krisis des europc)isches Philosophie(The Hague:Martinus Nrjhoff, 1962),pp. 347-348.

2?. HerbertMarcuse,One-DimensionalMan (Boston:BeaconPrcss,1912).

23. Alvin To1'fler,The Third Wave( New York: BantamBooks, 198I ).

Chapter Four l.

GerhardVollmer, "Reductronand Evolution:Argumentsand Examples, Reduction," Science:Struc:ture,Examltles,PhilosophicaLProbluns, eds. W. Balzer, D.A. Pearce,and H. J. Smith (Dordrecht:D. ReidelPublishingCo., 1984),p. 131.

2. Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientdic Philosophl, (Berkeley: Press,1951),p. 2.

Universityo1'California -1. Otto Neurath,Empiricismand Socictbgv,eds.M. Neurathand R.S. Cohen (Dordrecht:D. ReidelPublishingCo., 1973),p. 337.

4. Rudolf Carnap, "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science," F-oundations oJ'the Unitv o.fScience,eds. O. Neurath,R. Carnap,C. Morris (Chicago: Press,1971),1:1-10,p. 49.

Universityo1'Chicago 5. C. G. Hernpe|,Fundamentalsof ConceptFormation (Chicago:University o1 ChicagoPress,1952),p. 46.

6. Rudolf Carnap, The MethodologicalCharacter of TlrcoreticaLConcepts, eds. H. Feigl and M. Scriven(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress,1968),p.

38.

1. Ilie Pdrvu, T'eoria stiin{iJicd (Bucuregti: Ilditura $tiintifica 9i Irnciclopedica, 1981),pp. 28-29.

8. F. Waismann, "How I Sec Philosophy'l,"Logical Positivism,cd. A. J. Ayer (Glencoe,Ill.: Thc FreePress,1959),p. 380.

9. Karl R. Popper,The Logic ofScie.ntificDiscovery(London: Hutchinson& Ltd., 8th lmpression,1975).

Co. Publishers, 10. Thomas S. Kuhn, "Thc Structureof ScientificRevolutions,"Foundations rl'tlrc Unity ofscience: Toward an International Encyclopediaof Unified Science,eds.

O. Neurath,R. Carnap,C. Morris (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,l9l1).2: l9.

I 1. T. S. Kuhn, The EssentialTension(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, te7]).

AgainstMethod(London,1975),p.285.

12. Paul Feyerabend, 13. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and Historv (Cambridge, United Kingdom:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982),p.126.

14. BcrtrandRussell,Histoire de mes iddesphilosophiques(Paris:Gallimard, 1 9 6 1 ) p, p . 2 7 6 - 2 7 7 .

1,5. B. C. van Fraassen,The ScientificImage (Oxford: The ClarendonPress, I 980).

16. C. G. Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criteria of Meaning," Senrcnticsand the Philosopltyof ktnguctg,e,ed. Leonard Linsky (Urbana, Ill.: The Universityof Illinois Press,1952),p. 163.

11. Hilary Putnam,Meaning and the Moral Sciences(Lonclon:Routledgeand K c g a nF a u l , 1 9 7 8 ) p , . 19.

18. van Fraassen,The ScientificImage,p. 4.

I f . ibid., pp. 202-203.

20. H. Putnam,"The RealistPictureand the ldealistPicture,"Philosophl,and Culture: Proceedingsof the XVIlth Wrtrld Congresso.fPhilosopft,i,(Montreal: Editions du Beffioi, EditionsMontmorency,1986),Vol. I .

Chapter Five l.

CharlesBaudelaire,"$coala pf,gdn6."Criticii literard qi ntuzicald.Jurnale intinte.trans.into Romanian(Bucuregti:EditurapentruLiteraturaUniversald,1968),p.

44.

2. Richard Rorty, Consequences o.fPragmatism(Minneapolis:Univcrsity o1MinnesotaPress,1982).

-?. Ibid., p. 66.

4. Harold Bloom, A Mttp of Misreading (New York: Oxfbrd lJniversity Press,1975),p. 39. .5. Rorty, Consequences of Pragnntism, p. xli.

6 . I b i d . ,p . 1 4 1 .

7. Ihitl.,p. xi. tt. Ibid., p. 142.

9. Charles Baudelaire,Les parctdisartificieLs(Paris: Gallimard et Librairie G6n6ralFrangaise,1964),p.99.

10. Jean-FranEois Lyotard, In conditionpostmoderne(Paris:Les Editions de Minuit,1979)p , .19.

I 1 . I h i d . ,p p . 6 7 - 8 .

12. Jean-FranEois Lyotard, "Presentations," Philosophyin France Toda\,, ed.

Alan Montefiore (Cambridge,United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.122,125.

13. Ihab Hassan,The Dismernbermentof Orpheus: Totvardsa Postrnodent Literature,2nd ed. (London:The Universityof WisconsinPrcss,1982),p. 260.

14. Scc Ludwig Grtinberg, "From Phenomenology to an Axiocentric ontology ol the Human Condition,"AnalecrctHusserliana,2T,ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka (Dordrecht:D. ReidelPublishingCo., 1986),pp. 249-213.

15. Jaakko Hintikka, The Intentionsof Intcntionolit.vand Otlrcr New Models (Dordrccht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1975), quoted in A. Harrison, Modalities for Philosophvand the VisualArrs (Dordrecht:ReidelPublishingCo., 1985),p. 85.

16. Donald Henze,"The Style of Philosophy,"The Monist,63:4 (October, 1980),Philosophyas Styleand Literatureas Philosophy,p. 420.

11. Richard Rorty, "Essayson Heideggerand Others," PhilosophicalPapers (Cambridgo,UnitedKingdom:CambridgeUniversityPress,l99l), Vol. 2, p. 105.

18. JacqucsBouveressc,"Why I Am so Vcry Un-French ," Philosolthy irt France Today, ed. Alan Montellore (Cambridgc, United Kingdom: cambridgc U n i v e r s i t yP r c s s ,1 9 8 3 ) p , . 15.

19. GastonBachelard,L'air et les songes(Paris:Librairie JoseCorti, 1943), p.3.

Notes

i r .

| +-1

2{J. Ludwig Witt-qenstein, Cul.tureand Value,ed. G. H. von Wright (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l ,1 9 8 0 ) p , . 79, 21. Baudelaire, Criticd literard Si muzicald. Jurnale intime, trans. into Romanian,p. 140 2?. Ren6Huyghe,,Sens et destinde l'art (Paris:Flammarion,1967),Vol. 2, p.

19 8 .

23. CharlesBaudelaire,Curiozitd{iestetice,trans. into Romanian(tsucureqti: EdituraMeridiane,l9l 1), pp. 77-80.

24. Ibid., p. 110.

25. Henze,"The Style of Philosophy,"p. 420.

26. Bouvercsse,"Why I Am so Very Lin-French,"pp. l4--5.

21. Rorty, "Essayson Heideggerand Others,"p. 140.

28. Ludwig Wittgenstein,Culture and Value,ed. G. H. von Wright (Oxfbrd: Basil Blackwell,1980),p. 79.

Part Three Chapter Six l.

Edrnund Husserl, "Die Krisis dcs europziischenMenschentumsund die Philosophie," and "Die Krisis des europdischen Wissenschal'ten und die transzendentale Phdnomenologie," AnalectaHusserliana,6,pp.,134,116,341-48.

2 . I b i d . ,p . 3 2 9 .

3. EdmundHusserl,"ErstePhilosophie," Pt. 2, Husserliana,3,p. 157.

4. Alois Roth, "Edmund Husserl's ethische Untersuchungen," Phenomenologica, T (The Hague,1960),pp. xii-xiii. .5. Dallas Laskey, "Husserl as a Humanistic Moralist," Phenomenology InJormationBulletin, T (October1983),p.40.

6. E. Husserl,Formale und transz.endentale Logik (Halle, 1929),p. 5.

7" Cf, "Edmund Husserl'sethischeUntersuchungen," pp. 37-60.

8. Laskey,"Flusserlas a HumanisticMoralist,"p. 45.

9. Ludwig Griinberg, "Rationalism and the Basis of the Value Judgment," TheJournaLoJ ValueInquiry, 12:3(Spring1978),p. l3l.

10. Louis Lavclle, T'raitd des voleurs (Paris: PresssesUniversitaires de F r a n c c1, 9 5 1 )p, . 5 2 9 .

I l. Husserl, "Dic Krisis der europaischenWissenschalienund dic Phfuromcnologie," p. 329. transzendentale 12. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Moral Sense: A Discourse on the Phcnomenological Foundation of the Social World and of Ethics," Analecta Husserliana,T5,eds.A.-T. Tymicnieckaand Calvin O. Schrag(D. Reidel Co.: Boston, 1 9 8 3 )p, . 1 0 .

13. John Rawls,A Theoryof Justice(London: Oxfbrd UniversityPress,1913) p p .4 8 - 5 1 .

1,+. Camil Petrcscu,"Edrnund Husserl,"Istoriafilosofiei modenzefHistory of Modem Philosophyl.Vol.3 (I3ucureqti: SocietatcaRomAndde lrilosofie, 1938),pp.

375-42'7.

ChapterSeven "ThePraiseof Life: Metaphysics l. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, of Lif'eand of tlie HumanCondition,"Phenomenologv Information Bulletin,6(October1982),pp.

8r - 9 6 .

2. Robert Nozick, PhilosophicalExplanatiorts (Cambridge,Mass.: The Be l kn aP p r es of s Har v arUn d i v e rs i ty p p .5 7 l -6 5 0.

Pre s s1, 9 8 1 ), -1. Cf, Larousse,Dictionarde ./ilosolie.Didier Julia (Bucuregti:Ilditura UnivcrsEnciclopedic, I 996).

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About the Author Ludwig Criinberg (12 November 1933- 8 January1995) graduatedfrom the Facultyof Philosophyof the Universityof Bucharest,Romaniain 1955,with a Merit Diploma. He obtained his Doctor's Degree in 1962 and became a Doctor's Dcgreeconsultantin 1911.He was a Professorof Philosophyat the Academyof EconomicStudies,Bucharest.

A teachcr by vocation, L. Gri.inbergendeavoredto pass on to his studcnts, including doctoral students,some of his own pathos in asking questionsand searchingfor answers,some of his own respect and critical spirit with which he relatedto the greatmomentsin the history of philosophy, someof his own aspirationtoward self-realization,someof his own exactness and imaginationwith which he would conceivehis ideas.Trying to set up a philosophicalschool in axiology, he was the leaderof the Circle of Axiology in Bucharestin an adverseideologicaltime.

L. Grtinberg produced a significant number of university textbooks, lecturesin philosophy,axiology, the history of philosophy,aesthetics,and gcn cra so l c iology .

He was a memberof the InternationalInstituteof Sociologysince 1969, of the American Society for Value Inquiry since 1973,of the World Institute of Advanced PhenomenologicalResearchand Learning, since 1980, and of the InternationalSocietyfor Universalismsince 1993.

In 1912, L. Grtinberg received the "Vasile Conta" Award o1 the R<rmanianAcademy.In 1979,he was the recipientof the Certificateof Merit from the University of Cambridge,England.In 1993, he receivedthe Award ol the InternationalSocietyfor Universalism.

L. Griinberg'smain volumeswerepublishedin Romanianand English: Axiology and the HurnanCondition, 1912.

WhatIs Happiness,1978.

Opliuni /ilozofice contemporane.1980 fContemporary Philosophical Ch o i ce s l.

Ontologiaumanului,cditor, 1989[Ontologyof the Humanl.

He was the author of a number of introductionsto and co-editorof variousvolumestranslatedinto Romanian,amongwhich, CharlesBaudelaire, Curiositris esthdtiques["Curiozitali estetice" (1971)], Ren6 Huyghe, Les puissancesde l'intage ["Putereaimaginii" (1912)1,PierreFrancastel,Peinture et soci|td ["Picturaqi societatea"( I 970)1,and Michel E. de Montaigne,Essais [ "Ese u ri"( 1984) ] .

L. Gri.inbergalso published over two hundred studies in specialized journals in Romania and abroad,including Analecta Husserliana, edrtedby Anna-Teresa I'ymieniecka, The Journal o.f Value In.quiry, Dialogue and Humanism,andReviewoJ'InternationalSociology.

Some of his studies published in volumes include: "Axiological Approaches in Modern culture" and "Nietzsche and Marx in the ContemporaryAxiological Thought," Crisis and Consciousness, ed. Ralph M. Faris (Amsterdam:B. R. GriinerPublishingHouse, 1977);"The orphic Myth and the Socicty of Creation,"Explorationsin Philosophyand Societ1,, ed. Ch. Cunnen,David H. De Grood (Amsterdam:B. R. Griiner PublishingHouse, 1978);"The Futureof Art and the Theoryof Post-Philosophical Culture,"The Futureof Art (Lahti,Finland,1990).

The author left behind a multitude of manuscriptson axiology, the history of art, the history of culture,as well as a significantnumber of essays on variedrelatedthemes.

The author's major interestswere axiology and the ontology of the human.He was fascinatedby thc subtletyand wisdom of Montaigneand by the modernityof Jean-Jacques Rousseau'sconceptof the human being. He strongly believedthat, today, the issuesof value and the ontology of the human could not be pursuedwithout assimilatingKant's criticism.Often he identifiedhimself with the turmoil of existentialism.He would ponder over the virtues and limitations of pragmatic psychoanalysisand analytical ph i l o so p hy .

He would feel at home among his friends at the American Society for Value Inquiry who strive toward a reconstructionof value theoryin agreement with the coordinatesof the contemporaryphilosophical thinking and the aspirationsof humanityin the twenty-firstcentury.

He loved sports,trips in the country, and theater.As a young adult, he tried his hand as a theaterdirector of a number of plays, and later he also contributedthe textsof the theaterprogramsfor Jean-PaulSartre,Le Diable et Ie Bon Dieu fDiavolul qi Bunul Dumnezeu],TennesseeWilliams, The Glass MenageriefMenajeriade sticla] for sometheaterhousesin Bucharest.

He was a loyal friend, a devotedhusbandand father.

He lived everythingwith uncommonintensity:a footballmatch,a book, grief, or conversation.He was always impassionedby life as experiencemore than by life as performance.He experiencedthem both at utmost intensity.

Upon his death,a young doctoralstudentwrote: A restlessflame has recently found its tranquility. Much too early than we could have expected,too early for how much he still had to say and do. Professor Ludwig Gri.inbergpassed on into posterity with his characteristictenaciousanxiousness:in his philosophicaland nonphilosophicalliiends.

Index Abbarno,G. JohnM., viii, xv American Societylbr Value Inquiry ( A S V I ) ,i x , x , x i , 1 5 1 ,1 5 2 analyticalphilosophy , Jl , 8l , 109, 120,152 Aquinas,Thomas,122 A r i s t o t l e 9. 3 . 1 0 1 . 1 2 9 Arundel, England,x Austin,John,50 axiocentricontology,vii, 58, 61,62, 6 6 , 8 9 , 1 0 5 ,I 1 1 , 1 1 3 r e g i o n aol n t o l o g y ,1 0 7 ,1 0 8 ,1 1 2 a x i o l o g y i,x , x v i i i , 3 , 1 2 , 2 0 , 2 4 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 1 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 5 0 , 5180, 0 , 1 0 2 , 1 0 3 1, 0 9 ,1 5 1 , 1 5 2 axionomy,17 vii, I l2 reconstruction o1'axiology, t h e o r yo f v a l u e s3, , 5 , 1l , 1 2 , 1 3 , 24,29,34,42 timology,11,12 v a l u et h e o r yv, i i , 4 2 , 1 0 0 , 1 5 2 axiomaticof value,23 axiosphere, 57, 60, 111 axiologicalexperience,lS,32,45, 4 8 , 4 9 , 5 1 ,1 0 3 ,1 3 4 axiologicalrationality,63,64,66, 6l axiologicalsensitivity,47,95 B a c h ,2 3 Bachelard,Gaston,61, 89 Bacon,Roger,ix Baudelaire C,h a r l e s , 8 5 , 8 7 , 9 0 , 9 1 , 1 4 2 ,1 4 3 ,1 5 1 B e e t h o v e 3n 2, B e n t h a mJ,e r e m y9, , 1 4 Bergson,Henry, 109 Berleant,Arnold, 42,139 Berlin wall. xviii Blaga,Lucian, 109 Bloom, Harold,86, 142 Bouveresse, 93,142 Jacques, Bowne,9 Brighton,England,x, xii

Bucharest, ix, xvii, xviii, 36, 152 Academyof EconomicStudies, 151 BucharestAxiology Circle,vii, 151 Bunge,Mario, 67 Burckhardt,Jakob,68 Cahgula,122 Camus,Albert, ll9,l2l CardinalBellarmino,81 C a r n a pR, u d o l f ,3 4 , J 3 , 7 4 , 7 5 , J 6 , 141 C a s a n o v a1, 2 2 C a s s i r e r , E r n s t , 5 6 ,16480, C a t t o nJ r . ,W i l l i a mR . , 3 5 , 3 6 , 3 " 1 , 3 8 , 139 Cauchy,Venant,140 C h o p i n 7, C i c c r o , 5 81, 2 5 c i v i l i z a t i o 5n , 5 5 , 6 8 ,6 9 ,1 0 , 7 1 ,1 1 9 , 123,121 Coleman,James,46, 139 conceptof value,xvi, xvii, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11,11,23,27,38,551 , ,59 goods-valuc,4 12 means-value, purpose-value,72, J0 xvi Congressof Universalism, Connor,Steve,140 C o o m b sC , l y d eH . , 3 4 , 4 0 , 1 3 9 creativity,58, 61, 62, 67, 69,95 Cudworth,Ralph,102 c u l t u r ev, i i , r x , x v i , x v i i , x v i i i , 1 1 , 3 7 , 3 8 ,4 6 , 5 5 ,5 6 , 5 7 ,5 8 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 2 , 6 5 , 6 8 ,6 9 , J 0 , J 7 , J 3 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 1 0 9 , I I 1,I 17,I2I,123,133,l3l non-philosophical culture,J3,J4, 84 Delacroix,90 judgment,6, 46,51, 66, descriptive 103 Dewey,John,vii, 93 Don Quixote,8

Dumitrescu,Maria-Ana,xviii

Ehrenfels, von,3,9, I l, 14, Christian 1 0 31, 3 9 E i n s t e i nA , l b e r t ,5 , 1 2 2 , l 3 l Eliade,Mircea,69.133 Eluard,Paul,6l , 105 empiricism,80, 81, 83 classicalempiricism,83 constructive empiricism,80, 82, 8 3 ,8 4 inductiveempiricism, 77 logicalempiricism,65, 66,'74, 76, J8,J9,80,81,83,94 modernempiricism,Sl Eros, 124 ethics Christian,51 Kantian,5l E u r i d i c e .1 3 5 .1 3 6 existentialism, 121, 122,152 F a u s t ,1 3 5 Fekete,John,62,140 Feyerabend,Paul, 80, l4l Flonta.Mircea. xvii Foucault,Michel, 120 Francastel,Pierre, l5 I FrankfurtSchool,123 Freud,Sigmund,123 FrondiziR , i s i e r i ,v i i G a l i l e i ,G a l i l e o , 8 l Gide,Andr6,3 Ginsberg,Robert,xii, xiii, xv, 59, 140 gnoseology,I 3 G o e t h e 2, 1 . 5 9 . 6 0 . 1 2 0 Goodman.Nelson.65 Grtinberg,Arie. xviii Grtinberg,Cornelia,xiii, xviii, 118 Grrinberg,Laura,xiii, xviii, 118 Gninberg,Ludwig, vii, ix, x, xi, xii, xiii, xv, xvi, xvii, xvili,142,143, 1 5 1 ,1 5 2 G u n t e rP , e t eA . Y . , 6 2 , 7 4 0 Guttman,39

H a h n .H . . 7 4 Hanson,NorbertR.,79 h a p p i n e s s6,0 , 6 9 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 0 . 1 2 2 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 7 , 1 2 9 , 1 2 9 ,1 3 0 , 1 31 , 1 3 4 H a r t m a nR, o b e r S t . ,v i i , 3 1 , 3 5 , 3 8 , 139 Hartmann,Eduardvon, 1l Hartmann,Nicolai, 13,3l , 48 Hassan,Ihab,142 hedonism,129 Hcgel,Georg W. F., 85, 109, 110,129 I-leidegger, Martin, 93 Hemingway,Ernest,135 HempelC , . G.,76,141 H e n z eD , o n a l d ,9 3 . 1 4 2 Herder,JohannGottfried,55 hermeneutics, 89, 94,109, 111, 133 Herriot,8., 63 Hintikka, Jaakko,88, 142 H o c k i n gW , .8.,122 homoaestimans, 58, 59, 61, 64, 99.

1 0 5 .r 2 7 . 1 3 5 h u m a nc o n d i t i o nv, i i , x v i i , 4 , 5 6 , 5 8 , 6 2 , 6 J , 8 6 ,g g , 9 0 , 9 6 , 1 0 0 ,l 0 g , 1 1 2 ,l 1 7 , 1 1 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 6 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 5 h u m a ns i g n i f i c a n c el J, , 5 l , 6 7, 9 5 , 101 h u m a nl i e e d o m ,x i , x v i i i , 7 , 5 9 , 6 0 , 6 1, 110, 120, 121, 122, 124, 127 Hume,David, 46, 93, 94, 101 H u s s e r lE, d m u n d ,1 4 , 1 6 , 4 3 ,6 0 , 6 1 , 6 4 , 6 1 , 9 8 , 9 9 1, 0 0 ,l 0 l , 1 0 3 ,1 0 4 , 1 0 5 ,I 3 9 , 1 4 0 , 1 4 1 , 1 4 3 H u y g h eR , e n 6 , 9 11 , 4 3 ,1 5 1 i d e a l ,6 , 8 , 1 9 ,3 0 , 3 9 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 5 8 , 6 0 , 6 9 ,7 1 , 9 5 , 1 0 3 ,l 0 g , 1 1 9 , 7 2 0 , 122,133,131 53 , 6 culturalideal.123 human ideal, 20 idealobjects,13, l5 idealofhappiness,124,125,l2l ideal of perf-ection, 125 idealvalues,125 value-ideal .1 . 62

155

Inde.t InternationalCongresson Value Inquiry,x InternationalInstituteof Sociology, I 5l InternationalPhilosophersfbr the Preventionof NuclearOmnicide (IPPNO),ix InternationalSocietyfbr Universalism,151 InternationalSocietyfor Value I n q u i r y( I S V I ) ,i x , x , x i i , x v i i Ionesco,Eugdne,131 i r r e d u c i b i l i to y 1 ' v a l u e s , 51, 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 17,23,25,26,43,57,58,62,95, 1 0 0 ,1 l l , 1 1 2 Janus1 , 19 K a n t ,I m m a n u e l5, , 9 , 1 0 , 4 3 , 5 5 ,6 l , 6 6 , 9 3 , 1 0 1 I, 1 1 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 61, 4 0 , 152 Kluckhohn,Clydc, 56, 140 Koyr6, Alexandre,63, 140 K r e i b i g ,l l K r o e b e rA , lfied L.,56, 140 K u c z y n s k iJ, a n u s z6, 1 , 1 4 0 Kuhn, ThomasS., 79, 80, 141 La Mettrie, 66 Labiche.42 L a i r d , . l o h n2, 3 , 1 3 9 Lapie,Paul, 1l Laskey,Dallas,100, 143 LavelleL , o u i s , 3 , 8 , 1 8 , 5 8 , 1 0 3 ,1 3 9 , 140,143 Lazarsl-eld, 39 Le Senne,Ren6,43 L c c ,S a n d eH r ., x Levinas,Emmanuel,I 17 L 6 v i - S t r a u sCs l, a u d e , 4 , 3 l , 6 8 L e w i s ,C . I . , v i i Linton, Ralph,68 L o c k e J, o h n , 9 , 6 0 , 8 1 ,1 4 0 L o g i c a lP o s i t i v i s m7, 3 , 74 , 7 7 , 8 1, 8 2 , 8 3 ,9 3 Lotze,Rudolf Hermann,l0 88, 142 Lyotard, Jean-FranEois,

Marcuse,Herbert,69,123,724,133, l4l Margolis,Joseph,139 Maritain, Jacques,722 Marx, Karl,62 Mcluhan, Marshali,68 Meinong,Alexiusvon, 3, I I , 103, 139 Menger,l0 Merton, RobertT., 36 m e t a t h e o r yl 1 ,3 Michelangelo,16,57 M i r o i u , A d r i a n ,x v M i s c hG , eorg,99 M o n t a i g n e , M i c h e l E . d e ,19531, Montesquieu,59 M o o r e ,G e o r g eE d w a r d , 5 1 , 6 6 ,1 0 3 M o r r i s ,C h a r l e sW . , 3 1 , 1 3 9 M o s c o w ,x i Mozart,6,44 m y t h ,x v i , 5 6 , 6 4 , 7 0 , 11 0 ,1 2 1 , 1 3 3 , 136, 137 Nairobi,ix N a r c i s s u s1,3 3 ,1 3 6 N e u r a t hO , tto,J4,76,141 Newton,9 N i e t z s c h e , 91,1 ,1 9 , 6 9 ,1 0 9 Novalis, 86 Nozick,Robert,89,94,109,144 man,69 one-dimensional ontology h u m a nb e i n g ' so n t o l o g i c asl t a t u s , 46,5J,64,703,107,108,110, 111, 135 ontologyof the human,57,94, 10J, 1 0 8 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 2 ,1 5 2 ontologyof the humancondition, v i i , x v i , 6 0 ,1 0 5 O r p h e u s1, 3 3 ,1 3 4 ,1 3 5 ,1 3 6 Paris,4Z ,6 P a r s o n sT, a l c o t t 3 P A r v u I, l i e , x v i , 7 1 , 1 4 1 Perry,Ralph Barton,vii, 3, 9, 14, 139 Petrescu,Camil, vii, 8, 105, 143

phenomenology, 74, 88, 94, I 00, 105, 109 phenomenologyof value,99 philosophy Lelbnizian,25 Piaget,Jean,28, 35, 139 Picasso,88 Plato,4, 43,93, 137 p l e a s u r e9,, 1 4 ,18 , 3 3 ,4 7 , 5 8 , I 0 3 .

I 1 9 ,1 2 0 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 , 1 2 9 P o e ,E d g a r4 . , 9 2 Polin,Raymond,30, 139 P o p p e rK , arl R.,78,79,741 postmodernism, 88, 90, 93 Prigogine,Ilya, 63, 94,140 P r o m e t h e u s1,3 3 ,1 3 4 psychoanalysis, 152 Putnam,Hilary, 65, 80, 82, 84, 94, 1 0 9 .1 4 0 .l 4 l Quine,Willard van Orman,80, 1l3 R a w l s J, o h n ,6 6 , 1 0 5 ,I 4 1 , 1 4 3 r e a l i t y ,6 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 4 , 1 5 ,2 9 , 3 4 ,4 7 , 5 0 ,6 2 , 6 4 , 7 6 ,8 1 , 8 2 , 8 3 , 8 5 , 8 7 , l 0 l , I 1 0 , I I l , 1 2 1 ,1 2 3 ,r 2 4 . 1 3 0 , 133,134 reductionism, 58, 73, I 4, 76, J9, 84, 95,112 logical reductionism,I 00 logicistreductionism, 80 logisticreductionism, 74 mcchanisticreductionism.

74 positivistreductionism, xvii, 73 psychological reductionism,100 r e d u c t i o n3, 8 , 6 3 , 6 6 ,J 3 , 74 , 1 5 , 1 6 . 1 8 . 7 9 ,1 0 0 reductionismto literature,85, 95 scientiticreductionism, 63, 74, 77, 90, 95 Reichenbach, Hans,I4, 7l , 141 Richardson,Samuel,60 R i c k e r t ,3 9 , 5 0 , 1 0 3 Ricoeur,Paul,89, 94 R i t s c h i eA . . D.. l0 R o m a n i ai,x , x i , x v i , 6 0 , l 5 l R o r t y ,R i c h a r d 8 , 5 , 8 6 , 8 8 ,9 2 , 9 4 , 1 4 2

Rogca.Dumitru D.. 109 Roth,Alois, 64, 100,143 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 93. 152 Roycc,9 Russell,Bertrand,80, 130, l4l Ryle,50 SaintVincentde Paul, 122 Santayana, George,9 Santoni,Ronald,ix 122, 152 Sartre,Jean-Paul, S c h e l e rM , a x , 7 , 9 , 1 5 , 1 0 3 ,1 0 5 Schlegel,Friedrich,85, 86 scientificrealism,8l , 82, 83 Sellars,Wilfiid, 82 S e n e c a5, 2 , 1 2 4 Shelley,PercyBysshc,4 S i s y p h u s1,2 1 ,1 2 2 S m i t h ,A d a m , l 0 Socratcs,45 Somerville,John,ix Sofea,Dana,xvii Spengler,Oswald,69 Stein,Gertrude,88 Isabelle,63, 140 Stengers, S t e v e n s oC n ,h a r l e Ls . , 5 1 , 6 6 . 1 0 3 , 120 Strawson,51 structuralism, 122 Taylor,Edward8., 140 Thanatos,124 Iheorem Pythagorean,4 Thalesian,4 theory7 , 6 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 8 2 ,9 1 , 9 4 , 9 9 , l 1 l , 1 2 0 ,1 2 4 axiologicaltheory, 107 c u l t u r ct h c o r y .5 5 philosophical theory,I 20 theoryof behavior,35 theoryof choice, 26 theoryof communication, 25 26 theoryof decision-making, theory of infbrmation,24 theoryof post-philosophical c u l t u r e8 , 5 ,8 7 ,9 0

t5l

Incle.t theoryof purpose,28 theoryof relativity,4 theoryof science,19, 8l t h e o r yo f t r u t h , 8 l t . h c o r oy f v a l u c s 2 , 9,34,42 J'hurstone, L. L.,39 T'otfler,Alvin, 69, 141 T'olstoy,Leo, 130 Toulmin, StephenE.,43,19 T'oynbee,Arnold, 69 Tyler, Edward, 56 Tymieniecka,Anna-Teresa, xvli, 62, 105, 109, 140, 143,144, l5l LfNESCOOllice in Bucharest, C E P E S ,x v i i i u n i v e r s a l i s vmi i, , 5 9 . 6 0 , 6 1 l, l l university HowardUniversity,Washington,x Univcrsityof Bucharest, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, 151 Universityof Cambridge,England, l5l Llrban,Wilbur Marshall,l1 v a l u a t i o nv, i i , 5 , 7 , 1 2 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 7, 1 8 , 24,27,29,33,34,35,36,38,39, 43,44,45,41,50,51,57,58,59, 6 2 , 9 9 , 1 0 0 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 3 ,1 0 4 ,1 0 5 , 1 0 7 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 6 a p p r a i s a 5l ,, 1 1 ,4 0 r e - v a l u a t i o n , 2 6 , 2 84,1 , 1 0 7 valuationjudgrnent,43 value fact-valuedichotomy,9 -{cnericvalue, 10, 1I , 12, | 3, 3l , 126 l r i e r a r c h y , 61, 8 , 1 9 , 4 4 , 6 9 ,8 7 , 1 3 0

ideal-value, 4 instrumentalvalue,l2J intrinsicvalue,127 measuremeo n ft v a l u e s , 3 l , 3 2 , 3 4 , 3 5 ,3 8 , 4 0 , 4 1 multiplef-unctionality, Z0 plurality of dimensions,20 pluralityof functions,20 polarity,17 structureof values,I I translatabil ity, 5, 25 '/ utilitarianvalue, , 10, 68,10, 134 valueas relationship axiologicalobject, 104 axiologicalsubject,47,51, 104 v a l u ej u d g m e n t6, , 9 , 2 5 , 3 2 , 4 2 , 4 3 , 44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52, 6 2 , 6 5 , 6 6 ,1 0 3 van Fraasscn, B. C., 8l , 83, 84, l4l, 142 ViennaCircle,74 Vollmer,Gerhard,13, 141 v o n B o h m B a w e r k ,l 0 W a i s m a n nF,. , 1 8 , l 4 l W a r s a w x, v i W c b c rM , a x , 5 0 ,1 3 9 Wieser,Friedrichvo 1n 0, W i l b u r ,J a m e sB . , x i W i l l i a m s ,T e n n e s s e e1,5 2 W i t t g e n s t e i nL,u d w i g ,5 0 , 9 0 , 9 4 , 1 1 3 , 1 2 0 ,1 4 0 ,1 4 3 World Congressof Philosophy,ix, xi World Instituteof Advanced Phenomenological Researchand Learning,I 51 Z e l t e r ,l 2 O