AFP May Issue by American Foreign Policy Magazine

american foreign policy May 2009

Volume VIII, Issue 6

Obamaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Test An Embarrassing Response to North Korea

Also Inside: A Faculty Feature from Former Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer

From the Publisher

Staff

s AFP publishes its final issue of the current academic year, the staff is continually humbled by the support we receive from our readers and so many others on campus. As our publication continues to develop we owe our success to two areas of our staff in particular. First, our magazine would obviously cease to function without the work of our writers, who submit high-quality articles for every single issue (often in overwhelming numbers). But, this increase in quantity has come alongside an even more important component to AFP’s longevity: quality. The staff writers never cease to amaze the editors of this publication with their insightful, analytical, and discerning articles, and for that we owe them a great deal of gratitude. Also, the layout and design team of AFP deserves the same appreciation. The aesthetic quality of AFP is unrivaled by any other Princeton publication, and without our exceptional layout team, that would not be possible. Just compare this month’s AFP to an issue from a few years ago and you’ll see the difference that our layout team makes. Also, for this particular issue, a great deal of thanks goes to Professor Daniel C. Kurtzer, whose contribution marks yet another stepping-stone in AFP’s development. To have a former United States Ambassador to both Israel and Egypt write an article for our magazine is an incredible honor and an indication of the growing relationship between AFP and the academic community. We welcome future opportunities for professorial contributions, and hope to integrate faculty discussion and review into the content of the magazine. As the year comes to a close, AFP must once again thank the generous financial contributions from the Woodrow Wilson School, the James Madison Program, and the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies. We look forward to strengthening our relationships with these organizations over the coming months and years. Lastly, as AFP suspends publication for summer months, I encourage all those interested in the topic of American foreign policy to visit AFP’s recentlylaunched blog (blogs.princeton.edu/afp). Although it is still a work in progress, we hope to post articles during the summer months, and welcome all those interested to apply to write for the blog. It will be a great opportunity for young writers to express their opinions in a less formal and structured manner than a typical article. With that, I hope you all enjoy this issue, and appreciate the dedication and perseverance necessary for its publication.

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Dan May ’11 Publisher

Steve Lindsay ’12 Managing Editors Vishal Chanani ’11 Katherine Gaudyn ’11 Eric Stern ’11 Ben Cogan ’12 Editors Carlos Hanco ’09 Emily Norris ’09 Jessica Sheehan ’09 Zvi Smith ’09 Ahson Azmat ’10 Jon Bradshaw ’10 Heejin Cho ’10 Matthew Drecun ’10 Jon Extein ’10 Jonathan Giuffrida ’10 Lucas Issacharoff ’10 Catalina Valencia ’10

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American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.princeton.edu/~afp

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Brendan Carroll Ellen Choi Jamie LaMontagne Addie Lerner Tara Lewis Elias Sánchez-Eppler Eric Stern Kit Thayer Oliver Bloom Yun Chung Charlie Metzger Peter Wang

Anne-Marie Slaughter: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Nolan McCarty: Acting Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Katherine Newman: Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Bernard A. Haykel: Director, Institute for Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East

American Foreign Policy

American Foreign Policy May 2009 Volume VIII, Issue 6

CONTENTS Cover Story

Obama’s Test

Swine Flu in Style

Brian Lipshutz ’12 An Embarrassing Response to North Korea

Middle East

Iran, Israel and the U.S. Daniel C. Kurtzer 6 Exploring a Diplomatic Solution

Give and Take John Cappel ’11 How to Secure Russian Cooperation on Iran

AFP Quiz

Dan May ’11

Vishal Chanani ’11

Global Update

Budget Surgery

Walk Softly

Africa

Marginalizing Mugabe Yoni Friedman ’10 12 Zimbabwe’s Unity Government Needs Western Aid

In Context

Tara Lewis ’11

Strategy Shift Jim Hao ’12 How Obama Will Tackle the AfPak Region

Changing Course Lucas Briger ’12 A New Direction for America’s Armed Forces

Obama Abroad Natalie Kim ’12 How He Fared at the G-20 Summit

U.S. Foreign Policy Carry a Large Missile

Lang Live Zardari!

Photo Credits: Eduardo Verdugo, U.S. Air Force, Jin-man Lee, K.M. Chaudary / AP

May 2009

Cover Design: Yanran Chen ’12

Cover Story

Charles Dharapak / AP

President Barack Obama answers a question from a reporter about North Korea at an April summit in Prague.

Obama’s Test An Embarrassing Response to North Korea

“M

ark my words. It will not be six months before the world tests Barack Obama.” Vice President Joe Biden may well be a modern prophet. It was not even three months until Kim Jong-Il decided to test a ballistic missile over the objections of Japan and the United States, not to mention UN Security Council Resolution 1718. The Obama administration’s response left the world uncertain of America’s resolve in handling a bona fide international crisis just when the United States most needs to appear credible in dealing with North Korea and other rogues states. This past March, North Korea indicated that it would soon test what it

Brian Lipshutz ’12 called a peaceful space rocket sometime in the first week of April. According to the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il, this space test would not violate international law. Of course, as any early American or Soviet spacefarer will attest to, a rocket is simply a type of missile with a person (or satellite) on top. Therefore, Japan announced it would consider shooting down the North Korean missile if it entered Japanese airspace. The U.S. followed this up by deploying two destroyers to the area and stating that a North Korean missile launch would lead to “consequences.” Undeterred by U.S. and international warnings, North Korea launched a ballistic missile from a facility in northeast Korea on April 5th.

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Just as Obama’s pre-test warnings produced no meaningful results, the UN-based approach centered on international cooperation, so lauded by candidate Obama, proved just as ineffective after the launch. A week later, the U.S. secured a non-binding condemnation, eventually followed by tighter sanctions. Predictably, Kim responded by withdrawing from the Six Party Talks on its nuclear program (again), expelling weapons inspectors (again), and resuming enrichment (again). According to some, now is the time for concerted diplomacy and international legal action. On the first count, however, it appears that Kim Jong-Il has outplayed U.S. diplomats. Of course, true, multilateral diplomacy will lag behind Kim’s unilateral action, but for an entire week, the U.S. and its allies had no real response. The UN’s eventual, but slow response should remind U.S. policymakers that when the stakes are high enough and the rest of the world drags its feet, the sole global

Cover Story superpower should consider finding allies alone and proceeding without waiting for the UN. As for U.S. calls for the use of international law, this episode appears to be a perfect test case. The UN Security Council passed S/RES 1718 in 2006, which explicitly demanded that North Korea “suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its preexisting commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.” Why, then, did the Security Council oppose a meaningful response, while taking an entire week to respond at all? International law, when used as the frontline response to aggression and instability, must be swiftly and meaningfully enforced. Failure to do so only invites future violations of international norms. In this case, we are reminded that the U.S. cannot solely rely on a strictly legal approach when it comes to matters of security. The Obama approach has its merits, but, as most international relations theorists will argue, rogue states and others will begin to disregard the UN unless it has credibility. North Korea has certainly done this. If the U.S. and UN seriously seek to curb North Korean proliferation, they must step up their diplomatic efforts in response to Kim Jong-Il’s latest intransigence. They also need to back up their diplomatic talk with serious proposals for action. From here on, if Obama is serious about stopping North Korea’s nuclear program from expanding, he needs to put everything on the table. The administration’s chosen course of action requires the cooperation of Russia and China; securing that cooperation will require some concessions on the part of the U.S. in other areas, not mere window dressing. That does not mean that Obama is out of cards. For one, he can keep encouraging China to take an active role in the Six Party Talks. China could help get North Korea to return to the table, as well as help make the talks more productive. Recently, China has taken an increasingly important role in those discussions on North Korean

nuclear weapons, and the U.S. could greatly gain by further integrating China into the international system as a responsible actor. It will require giving China more influence, but that’s likely a small price to pay to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The U.S. should also continue to impose crippling sanctions on North Korea’s leadership. Defiance must be met with resolve. A combination of punishing North Korea at the Security Council, rewarding it for verified

essary, North Korea’s record of sponsoring terror in Japan also justifies returning it to the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terror. Finally, the U.S. should allocate its naval assets in East Asia to leave it prepared for an effective strike against another illegal North Korean launch. The North Korean regime has tossed aside the UN, and if the UN remains unwilling to act more vigorously, then the U.S. and other regional powers committed to stopping nuclear proliferation must apply strong sanctions outside of the UN framework. Delay and silence only help Kim Jong-Il. Un f o r t u n a t e l y, North Korea often gets forgotten amid the attention given to Iran. But North Korea, unlike Iran, has already begun amassing a nuclear arsenal. Tests like the one on April 5th allow North Korea to refine its delivery mechanisms and pose a greater threat to the United States and to the world. The risk of proliferation remains high, with regimes as far away as in Syria suspected of learning nuclear secrets from North Korea. Missile technology could prove helpful to other states, possibly even Iran. The U.S. has allowed North Korea to remain a threat at a critical time when other hostile states are surging towards the nuclear club. Looking only to the North Korean issue, Obama and the U.S. have failed to signal convincingly that Kim Jong-Il will not be allowed to blackmail the world. In the broader context, the U.S. and the UN’s current inaction in opposing this rogue East Asian state sends dangerous signals to Iran and others. Afp

The Obama administration’s response left the world uncertain of America’s resolve in handling a bona fide international crisis. good behavior, and calling on it to behave responsibly will likely be the best bet given Obama’s preferences. On the other hand, he should not follow George W. Bush and Bill Clinton in giving concessions without verifying compliance. The U.S. also has one further option. Given its overwhelming weight in international diplomacy and military arenas, the United States can afford to oppose North Korean aggression without UN acquiescence. This does not necessarily need to be unilateral action, however. Other states truly fear North Korean nuclear weapons, and if the U.S. stepped forward to lay out a clear course of diplomatic action, many states would follow. Unused influence does not do the U.S. or its allies much good. Perhaps a clearly committed U.S. would even encourage the UN to come along. The U.S. should begin by reversing the concessions granted by former President Bush. President Obama should cut off the flow of luxury goods to the top North Korean leadership. The U.S. and its allies should also refreeze the $25 million in Banco Delta Asia in Macau that were unfrozen by President Bush. North Korea has been a haven for money laundering and counterfeiting, which funds its nuclear program (among other bad behaviors). Similarly, the U.S. should punish Kim’s renewed obstinacy by halting the shipment of heavy fuel oil. If nec-

May 2009

Brian may be reached at lipshutz@princeton.edu

Middle East

Iran, Israel and the U.S. Exploring a Diplomatic Solution Daniel C. Kurtzer

Excerpted from a speech delivered on April 6, 2009 at the Woodrow Wilson School

he multiple challenges to regional and international stability posed by Iranian policy represent some of the most immediate, dangerous threats on the global agenda. Iran seeks regional respect and influence, and expects to exercise power in its neighborhood. To achieve these purposes, often described as its quest for regional hegemony, Iran has pursued an ambitious and aggressive course of action during much of the period of the Islamic Republic. Iran has been a significant state supporter of terrorism and foreign terrorist groups. Iran has been accused by the former head of Argentina’s intelligence service of direct responsibility for the 1992 terrorist attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 29 and the 1994 terrorist attack against a Jewish community center that killed 85. Iran also funds and supplies weapons and training to Hezbollah, operating in Lebanon, and probably also to Hamas, operating in Gaza. In 2002, Iran was directly implicated in the foiled attempt to smuggle vast quantities of advanced arms to Hamas aboard the ship Karine A. Iran has also been a major opponent of the Arab-Israel peace process, nowhere more evident than in the convening in Tehran—on the same day that the 1991 Madrid peace conference opened —of an anti-peace conference. And Iran has been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council for clandestine nuclear activities that point to an Iranian quest to develop nuclear weapons. Although Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) and has also signed but not ratified the Additional Protocol of the Treaty that allows for more intrusive inspections, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council have decided that Iran has violated its NPT obligations. In this charged atmosphere—indeed, Iran’s president has repeatedly promised an end of Israel’s so-called Zionist regime and has denied the Holocaust—some have argued that only threats, sanctions and possibly the use of force can change Iran’s behavior. This was the approach followed by the Bush administration. However, we also need to assess whether ambitious, multifaceted, and resolute diplomacy—as equally determined as the use of force option—can offer a chance to change the very fabric of U.S.-IranianIsraeli relations. In thinking about American diplo-

our allies and friends, especially when they have reason to feel vulnerable. Why are these issues important? The United States understands and respects Iran’s importance and role in the region. We have a deep appreciation of Iranian history and the contributions Iran has made to civilization. Iran surely qualifies as a pivotal state in any definition of international politics. The United States also respects the fact that Iran has vital national interests in its region and, like any other state, seeks to promote and advance those interests for the betterment of Iran and its people. For several millennia, Iran has asserted a prominent role in the politics of the region. At the same time, the United States also has vital national interests in this region and, as a global power, seeks to advance our goals for the betterment of our country and our people. Currently, U.S. forces are engaged in two ground wars in the region, and the U.S. has made substantial investments—in people and materiel—in achieving the objectives for which we are fighting. We understand as well that the deployment of American forces in this area—in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in the Gulf—has profound strategic consequences for Iran. Some of those consequences are perceived as negative and threatening Iran, but some have been quite positive and have served Iranian national security interests quite directly. The search for diplomatic solutions does not operate in a historical vacuum. For Americans, the memory of the 1979 takeover of our embassy in Tehran and the ordeal of American hostages being held for 444 days is still fresh in our minds. For Iranians, the memory of American interference in Iranian affairs and the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in 1953 remains a painful episode in the minds of Iranians. The search for diplomatic solutions also cannot take place in an atmosphere of disrespect. Some people talk about the use of “carrots and sticks” as though talking about farm animals. This kind of talk must stop. We need to speak with a differ-

We also need to assess whether ambitious, multifaceted, and resolute diplomacy [...] can offer a chance to change the very fabric of U.S.-Iranian-Israeli relations.

matic options, we need to be mindful of the quite different calculations that Israel has when dealing with Iran. The United States is a global superpower, living at a great distance from Iran. Israel, a regional power, lives within range of Iran’s advanced intermediate-range missiles. Israel’s small size and concentrated population and industrial base make it an inviting target for the kind of awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons in the hands of an unpredictable regime. For these reasons, it will be imperative for the U.S. to consult closely with Israel at every step of the way. We owe this to

American Foreign Policy

Middle East

Hasan Sarbakhshian / AP

ent vocabulary. There must be mutual respect between governments and between peoples. There must be no talk at all of “carrots and sticks.” And there must be focused attention to interests and policies that can be worked on and advanced, rather than accidents of history or “windows of opportunity” over which we have no control. Leaders can create their own opportunities. A comprehensive diplomatic agenda should include the following elements. First, Iran and the U.S. can agree to respect the independence and territorial integrity of each other and of our respective friends. The United States needs to make a clear and unequivocal commitment that it will not seek to overthrow Iran’s democratically-elected government, change the Iranian regime or change Iran’s borders. Iran needs to make the same commitment with respect to Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel, as well as all other states in the region. Second, Iran and the United States must foreswear support for or involvement in activities such as terrorism or covert action. Iran must make clear to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas that it will no longer provide material or

political support to them if they engage in terrorism. Third, to the extent that Iran and the international community can reach understandings on the range of issues that divide them, the United States and the international community need to be ready to revisit the sanctions currently in place directed against Iran. Fourth, all sides must change their vocabulary by avoiding words that threaten or intimidate. And all must respect historical narratives: in particular, Iran must cease its pernicious denial of the Holocaust. Fifth, the U.S. and Iran can work together to assure stability in Iraq and promote stability in Afghanistan. Both have enduring interests that can be accommodated and respected. Sixth, particular attention needs to be paid to relations between Iran and Israel, the two regional powers whose policies and actions so heavily influence decisions of peace and war in the region. Both countries need to stop threatening the survival of the other, and both need to stop calling into question the legitimacy of each other’s regime or way of life. Seventh, Iran must respect its obli-

May 2009

Iranian students burn the U.S and Israeli flags in front of the former U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 2008.

gations under the NPT. Creative ways can be devised for enrichment mechanisms that meet NPT and IAEA standards. But there can be no tolerance for continuation of activities that violate the NPT. Iran should start by ratifying the Additional Protocol of the NPT. Time is working against both sides. Options are narrowing, and positions are hardening. There is still time for a reasoned and reasonable diplomatic solution that will deny the extremists on all sides the chance to bring ruin to us all. Afp

Daniel C. Kurtzer is the S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor in Middle East Policy Studies of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He may be reached at dkurtzer@princeton.edu

Middle East

Give and Take How to Secure Russian Cooperation on Iran

nternational concern that Iran is developing nuclear weapons has been growing for years, but Russia has continued to aid Iran’s aid civilian nuclear program while frequently opposing international sanctions against Iran. Russia, which has agreed reluctantly to some sanctions, clearly does not consider tougher measures to be in its own selfinterest, and strained Russian-American relations have damaged the prospects for improved cooperation on the issue. Conflicts between the United States and Russia on issues such as NATO expansion and missile defense in Europe seem to provide opportunities for America to trade diplomatic concessions for Russian cooperation. However, it is unlikely that American

John Cappel ’11 retreats on either of these issues would be sufficient to change Russian behavior toward Iran; the United States should provide Russia with additional incentives. Russia has consistently opposed eastward expansion of NATO into former Soviet satellite states and currently holds a powerful position to prevent further expansion into Georgia and Ukraine. Last summer’s war between Georgia and Russia and current plans for Russian military bases in Georgia’s separatist regions would make Georgian entrance into NATO an extremely risky and unlikely proposition. Ukrainian admission to NATO is not as perilous, but recent feuds between Russia and Ukraine over gas deliveries have demonstrated that Russia is willing to use gas

as a weapon; these same tactics could be used to make Ukraine think twice about joining NATO. NATO expansion poses little real economic or military threat to Russia, but American involvement through NATO on Russia’s border implies that the international community no longer views Russia as a major player. Efforts to secure Russian cooperation by ending or suspending NATO expansion would most likely fail, as there is little reason to believe that NATO expansion into these nations is otherwise inevitable. An additional problem with using NATO expansion as a bargaining tool is that any formal agreement to freeze membership in return for sanctions would need to be secret and unofficial. Open acknowledgement of such a trade would be humiliating to the United States, insulting to potential NATO member states, and diplomatically impossible. A tacit understanding between the Russian and American governments would also be problematic because either party could defect from the agreement at any time. American cancellation of its proposed missile defense shield in Eastern Europe in

Hasan Sarbakhshian / AP

A sign reading “Atomic Power Plant” pointing towards a power plant in Busheher, Iran, which was built with help from the Russians.

American Foreign Policy

Middle East return for sanctions against Iran would be just as unlikely to succeed. Russia has assumed an aggressive stance against missile defense initiatives, threatening to modify missiles to evade the shield and to station short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. Resolving the missile defense conflict will end these threats, but Russia seems intent on resolving this issue on its own terms possibly by relocating the missile defense sites. An end to the missile defense plans would prevent a diplomatic defeat for Russia, but it would not constitute much of a diplomatic victory. The Obama administration’s publicly expressed willingness to reevaluate the missile defense plan could

powerful incentive for Russia to agree to additional sanctions against Iran. American diplomatic recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would represent a diplomatic coup for Russia, might also be sufficient to secure cooperation on Iran. These separatist regions of Georgia have so far been recognized only by Russia and Nicaragua. Such an action would be politically and diplomatically difficult for the United States, but it would demonstrate that the United States respects Russian power. Moreover, there do not seem to be many viable options for reversing the de facto separation of these regions from Georgia,

The United States must be willing to give Russia something valuable in return for sanctions against Iran. also lead Russia to believe that America will back down on the issue without receiving something in return; Russia is unlikely to pay a price to end these plans if it could potentially get the same result for free. It is difficult to believe that Russian diplomats would trade a minor victory for concessions to the American position on Iran. If the United States cannot trade favors with Russia to achieve cooperation, the most effective option might be to provide additional incentives for Russia to assume a tougher stance towards Iran’s nuclear program, particularly its enrichment of nuclear fuel. If additional sanctions were imposed on Iran, Russia would lose a significant source of trade income. According to International Monetary Fund statistics, in 2007, Russia had a $2.7 billion trade surplus with Iran, with almost $3 billion worth of exports and only $300 million worth of imports from Iran. In the same year, Russian exports to the United States were worth $8.3 billion, and imports from the U.S. were worth $9.5 billion. The United States and other interested nations, such as Britain, France, and Germany, could at least partially offset this loss by eliminating or reducing barriers to Russian exports or advocating for Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. In fact, American support for Russian entry to the WTO could be a

and acknowledging them as independent could be described as accepting the inevitable. Such a concession would be difficult, but the United States must be willing to give Russia something valuable in return for sanctions against Iran. Ultimately, concessions on NATO and the missile defense shield might help to change Russian behavior, but they are not sufficient to secure further sanctions or other cooperation against Iran’s increasingly dangerous nuclear program. The United States must be willing to weigh its various foreign policy objectives; if stopping Iran’s nuclear program is a top priority, other goals must be sacrificed. Minor concessions and diplomatic courtesies may make Russia more receptive to American proposals, but only major incentives are likely to change Russia’s position and produce an effective agreement on sanctions against Iran. Afp

John may be reached at jcappel@princeton.edu

AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Dan May ’11 1. Which country experienced a military mutiny in early May? a) Nepal b) Georgia c) India d) Moldova e) Canada 2. Which country faces a constitutional crisis after its president illegally reappointed Commodore Frank Bainimarama as interim prime minister? a) Micronesia b) Sri Lanka c) Guinea Bissau d) Fiji e) Canada 3. Which major world leader recently blamed the media for causing his wife, Lario, to file for divorce? a) Silvio Berlusconi b) Taro Aso c) Wen Jiabao d) Nicolas Sarkozy e) Stephen Harper 4. Which country’s court recently upheld a ban on people combining already hyphenated last names, preventing Fried Rosemarie Thanlheim-Kunz-Hallstein from taking this as her married name? a) Germany b) Cambodia c) Switzerland d) Austria e) Canada 5. Which country will face 0.3%-0.5% slower GDP growth this year as a result of swine flu? a) United States b) China c) Mexico d) France e) Canada

Answers on page 17

May 2009

global up

The global financial crisis continues, with many indicators in the UNITED STATES taking significant hits. The unemployment rate reaches 8.5%, and gross domestic product contracts 6.1% in the first quarter. Despite this, major banks, including Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan begin to post profits.

In the UNITED STATES, Iowa and Vermont become the third and fourth states, respectively, to legalize same-sex marriage. Iowaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s legalization occurs through the courts, whereas Vermontâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s legalization occurs through the legislature.

For the first time, pirates from SOMALIA capture an American vessel, the Maersk Alabama, at sea. Captain Richard Phillips is taken hostage and ultimately rescued by Navy SEALs in a mission resulting in the death of three pirates.

In MEXICO, the first global cases of H1N1 influenza A, or swine flu, are discovered, and over 150 are killed in the first days. The World Health Organization raises alert to level 5, warning of an impending pandemic, as the disease spreads internationally.

Incumbent President Rafael Correa of ECUADOR seeks his first term under the new constitution. Representing the Alianza Patria Altiva I Soberana, he appears to have been soundly reelected based on preliminary election figures.

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Jacob Zuma is elected President and the African National Congress comfortably retains its status as the ruling party in SOUTH AFRICA. Zuma, formerly deputy president, has faced a long history of legal trouble ranging from rape to corruption and fraud charges, none of which has stuck.

bal update Collected by Vishal Chanani â&#x20AC;&#x2122;11

Leaders of the G-20 meet in London, ENGLAND, to discuss the global financial crisis. The summit takes place amidst a backdrop of significant protests, with protestors numbering over 35,000. Financial commitments of over $1.1 trillion are made by various nations at the conference.

In PAKISTAN, President Asif Ali Zardari signs an agreement formally establishing Sharia law in the Malakand region, containing the Swat Valley, in exchange for a ceasefire from the powerful extremist insurgency there, led by Maulana Fazlullah.

General elections, which take place in five rounds, begin in INDIA. All 543 seats in the Lok Sabha are up for grabs, which normally sits for five-year periods. It is estimated that over 700 million people will be eligible to vote in these elections.

May 2009

NORTH KOREA launches rockets despite international warnings against its doing so. Leaders in Pyongyang claim the intent is to eventually launch a satellite, but most observers believe that the desired capability is missile launch.

The political crisis in THAILAND continues, with significant protests leading to the cancellation of a scheduled international summit. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva declares a state of emergency, and over 120 people are injured in the related unrest.

Africa

Marginalizing Mugabe Zimbabwe’s Unity Government Needs Western Aid

Yoni Friedman ’10

hree months after ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M—the main political parties in Zimbabwe— formed a unity government along the lines of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), there is now reason for optimism that conditions in Zimbabwe may be improving. Civil servants are finally receiving retention payments in foreign currencies, 2008’s historic inflation—which peaked at 231 million percent—is under control, schools are reopening, and basic goods are once again available in stores. Still, the bad news outweighs the good. Nearly 100,000 people have been infected with cholera since the water system failed in January, state infrastructure is in disrepair, and President Mugabe retains ultimate authority over governmental affairs with strong support from the security and intelligence agencies. Despite some setbacks, the unity government and its Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, have survived. Tsvangirai of MDC-T is gaining support in Zimbabwe

for his stated focus on the resumption of public services and his perceived ability to restore Zimbabwe’s good standing on the international scene. In order to successfully rebuild Zimbabwe and establish a stable democratic government, Tsvangirai needs the support of Western countries, particularly the U.S. and the U.K. By providing aid, not only would Western countries help alleviate the current humanitarian crisis, they would also assist Tsvangirai in raising his stature in Zimbabwe. This would put considerable pressure on Mugabe to step down before scheduled elections in 2011, ensuring an MDC-T victory. Continued inaction from the West will undo whatever gains Zimbabwe and Tsvangirai have achieved and allow opponents of the unity government to subvert the strength of the GPA The successes and failures of the unity government will be attributed to Tsvangirai, whether they are the results of his actions or not. He recognized this fact in a recent interview with the International Crisis

Christian Lutz/ AP

Morgan Tsvangirai at an EU debate on developement in 2008

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Group, saying, “We are aware that anything positive that comes from this government will be credited to us, and equally the negatives, so we have no choice but to get this inclusive government to deliver.” The success of Tsvangirai as prime minister and the marginalization of President Mugabe depend on the ability of the unity government to provide for Zimbabweans. Nevertheless, he faces major obstacles in delivering on his promises to pay civil servants in foreign currency, to stabilize the economy, to provide health care, and to maintain a functional school system after an estimated 80,000 teachers have fled the country. One major obstacle to the success of the unity government is the desire of the leadership in ZANU-PF and in the military to see it fail. They, too, are considering their positions in a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe and recognize that if the unity government remains functional, Tsvangirai will receive overwhelming support in the 2011 elections. Military leaders fear that Tsvangirai could prosecute them for crimes against humanity, which have been numerous since the Matabeleland Massacre in 1985. Because Mugabe has intentionally refrained form establishing a line of succession within ZANU-PF to prevent internal opposition, party leaders recognize that the party would fracture in the wake of Mugabe’s death or retirement. ZANUPF would splinter into three or more parties, none with the strength to defeat Tsvangirai in fair elections. Their mutual goal, for now, is to ensure the failure of the unity government in order to re-entrench Mugabe and secure their own political futures. While the military is simply seeking protection from prosecution and demobilization, ZANU-PF leaders are trying to acquire Mugabe’s blessing as his potential successors. Interestingly, one major faction of ZANU-PF—led by Vice-President Joice Mujuru—has hinted its willingness to work with and even support Tsvangirai once Mugabe is out of power. Its support could be a meaningful asset to the unity government in the coming months. The second challenge facing the MDCT is the lack of the financial and technical resources necessary to rebuild Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s Short Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) estimates that Zimbabwe needs $8.5 billion for economic recovery and has requested an emergency $2 billion to keep the government functioning and guarantee funds for water, electricity

Africa and grain. This is clearly an area in which Western aid can have a significant impact. The stability Western aid would provide would undoubtedly give Tsvangirai much needed leverage in dealing with the military and with opposition ZANU-PF leaders. In resuming aid to Zimbabwe, Western countries need to direct their funds to Tsvangirai’s economic recovery and humanitarian relief programs. Repairing sanitation systems, restoring the power grid, supplementing salaries of teachers and medical professionals, providing drugs and medical equipment, and delivering farming equipment are examples of the types of programs Western countries should support. A potential sticking point might be the use of foreign aid to pay military salaries, but if Western countries come through with these other programs, Tsvangirai should have enough financial resources to support the military. Recent interviews with low ranking military officers reveal a

newfound admiration for Tsvangirai since he issued $100 in foreign currency to each of them, though they are asking for $500 per month. Most importantly, Zimbabwe needs to set up accountability mechanisms to ensure that Western aid is not siphoned off by Mugabe and his allies for use as kickbacks to supporters and military leaders. Tendai Biti, the secretary general of MDC-T and the current finance minister, has been working to set up such mechanisms over the past few months in preparation for the anticipated resumption of aid from the West. Targeted sanctions against Mugabe and his entourage should remain in place and used as bargaining chips in negotiating the resignation or retirement of Mugabe and his supporters, in military and intelligence organizations, who would likely demand amnesty before resigning. With the winter season beginning, Western countries need to increase aid to

Zimbabwe to resolve the humanitarian crisis that has caused thousands of preventable deaths. Assisting Tsvangirai in his relief and development programs would have the secondary benefit of buttressing his standing against challenges from military and intelligence leaders in Mugabe’s patronage. Although Western countries are hesitant to trust the unity government with their funds, Tsvangirai is right in declaring, “Don’t make us pay for working with Mugabe.” The West’s “wait and see” approach has had a disastrous effect on Zimbabwe thus far. As one Harare diplomat told the ICG, “The costs and risks of doing something are definitely less important than the costs and risks of doing nothing.”Afp Yoni may be reached at yfriedma@princeton.edu

In Context

Compiled by Tara Lewis ’11 “The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations.” President Barack Obama, in a video message to Tehran encouraging Tehran to change its foreign policy “A perfect storm of ignorance and enthusiasm.” A former CIA official describing the U.S.’s use of harsh interrogation methods “There is no cloud above my head—there is not even a mist.” South African presidential candidate Jacob Zuma in response to the dropping of corruption charges against him “This is not just the flogging of the girl; it is an indication of what is in store for us.” The head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Asma Jahangir, responding to Taliban’s beating of a young girl for “immoral behavior” in Pakistan’s Swat valley

“There is no safer place than your own home to avoid being infected with the flu virus.” Mexican President Felipe Calderon following the World Health Organization’s warning of an approaching swine flu pandemic “They should see it like a weekend of camping.” Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi while visiting a tent village housing thousands of Italians homeless following the earthquake “I am going to ask him to walk on the channel, and he’ll do it.” French President Nicolas Sarkozy scoffing at the French media’s high praise of President Obama during the G-20 summit

May 2009

Brennan Linsley / AP

U.S. Foreign Policy

Strategy Shift How Obama Will Tackle the AfPak Region

high-ranking World War II general was once asked by a European ally how reliable U.S. military technology was. The general thought for a moment, and then responded; “U.S. bombs are very, very accurate; they always hit the ground.” While the general was right at the time, the United States’ ability to fight its wars is diminishing as old strategies fail to pay off against modern, insurgent enemies in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (“AfPak”) border region. It is with good reason that Barack Obama once called this border “the world’s most dangerous place.” Quelling this insurgency on both sides of the border should be a top priority for the new administration. Since NATO invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and overthrew the Taliban, the region has suffered from a tenacious insurgency and declining NATO participation in the ground war effort. At the same time, al-Qaeda’s leadership has fled to the ill-governed mountains of northwestern Pakistan and has been carrying out attacks on both nations as well as on coalition troops. Unfortunately, weak and uncooperative governments on both sides of the border have frustrated NATO efforts to police the region and root out this insurgency. With hopes of a victory against al-Qaeda fading, President Obama spoke last month at a conference in the Hague about the U.S.’s new, comprehensive plan in Afghanistan to increase troops, expand Afghanistan’s army, strengthen its government, get Pakistan to cooperate, and draw Iran into the effort— effective immediately. Coming on the heels of NATO’s 60th anniversary, many nations present were encouraged by the U.S.’s promise of renewed commitment. At first glance, Obama’s plan is not radically different from that of his predecessor, George W. Bush. Conceptually, however, the new plan reframes the war effort from building a democratic state in Afghanistan to resolutely destroying al-Qaeda, with the caveat

Jim Hao ’12 that the U.S. does not plan on permanent occupation. Also, with Pakistan growing as an international concern, Obama’s plan treats Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater, aiming to draw troops and resources to both. While the plan is no doubt superior to the original American strategy, it still requires a level of U.S. and international commitment that the Bush plan lacked. This is because the new strategy includes a substantial increase in troops and resources, establishes more cooperation and accountability with the Afghan and Pakistani governments, and requires international commitment significantly beyond present efforts. First, and foremost, the plan focuses on winning the ground war. The new AfPak strategy consequently involves a substantial increase in troops to Afghanistan. Currently, there are 38,000 American troops there, the vast majority situated in the south near the Pakistani border. The U.S. has already begun to send 17,000 more combat soldiers with another 4,000 to train Afghan troops. It also plans to expand Afghanistan’s army from 80,000 to 134,000 troops by the year 2011. The word “surge” today evokes memories of the successful 2007 campaign to stop the war in Iraq from deteriorating further. Similarly, Afghanistan can benefit from a large increase in troops to help stop terrorism at its source: the AfPak border. On the other side of the border is Pakistan, where the U.S. once carried out air strikes on terrorist strongholds until such strikes were banned by Pakistan’s government due to concerns over sovereignty issues. Since July 2007, 1,700 Pakistani civilians have been killed in terror attacks in the north. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan is notoriously difficult to control, as police are disadvantaged in a region where al-Qaeda has established both a strong economic infrastructure in the illegal opium trade and strong political support from opium farmers. Pakistan has indicated that it prefers to

American Foreign Policy

take care of the issue by itself, a sentiment Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi echoed in a speech at Princeton last fall. To maintain Pakistan’s cooperation, the U.S. has shifted its focus to providing aid to Pakistani forces. The U.S. has pledged $1.5 billion in aid for each of the next five years and nearly $3 billion in counterinsurgency military aid, a huge amount that should both improve relations with Pakistan and positively affect the ground effort on the Pakistani side of the border. But without the ability to bring coalition troops into Pakistan, the “single theater” conception of the border region may not translate into a radically different strategy whereby the U.S. crosses into Pakistan at will to chase down terrorists. Still, the new pledge of troops and money to the AfPak region should go a long way toward securing the border. The additional resources should improve military outcomes in the region in much the way the troop “surge” in Iraq offered regional security to Iraq. That said, the U.S. still cannot be sure that the aid money will be spent effectively, given the multitude of other problems facing Pakistan’s government. Aside from committing more troops and money, the U.S. and NATO cannot reasonably hope for greater stability as long as the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan remain uncooperative and weak. In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai has resolutely failed to address the rampant corruption in his government. Worse yet, his officials have actually aided the Taliban in a number of instances. In her visit to Afghanistan last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid down a series of benchmarks for progress, making it clear to Karzai that progress needs to be made in his own government with respect to corruption and training of local forces. These are important steps that need to be monitored in order to ensure Afghanistan’s cooperation and accountability. The U.S. faces a trust issue in Pakistan as well. Pakistan and Afghanistan are trying to avoid being seen by their populations as acting under pressure from the U.S. Unfortunately, a negative side effect of this is that both countries do only enough to satisfy the U.S., which is far below the level necessary to eradicate al-Qaeda. There may be nothing the U.S. can do about this. The Obama administration can, however, balance this forceful message with a more supportive one, since Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari is overwhelmed with more problems than just the border in the

U.S. Foreign Policy

M. Sajjad / AP

A Pakistani soldier guards suspected Taliban fighters. north. Pakistan is “fighting a battle for its own survival,” Zardari asserted in a recent statement. Indeed, a report from the Atlantic Council, an American thinktank, warned that time is “running out” for Pakistan. Whatever plans the U.S. has for helping Pakistan’s government must be given priority; if we do not act expediently, there may no longer be a Pakistani government left to help. By being more cooperative with Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s governments, the U.S. and NATO can hopefully obtain more support and accountability from them. Moreover, by refocusing the fight on al-Qaeda instead of on nation building, the U.S. will send a clear message to the governments to improve now—a message that the U.S. will not necessarily be around to pick them up if

they fail. Finally, the new U.S. strategy includes a vigorous effort to improve international support. Over the last few years, the NATO coalition has been faltering under poor U.S. leadership and a growing death toll. Germany and Spain, for instance, have withdrawn their forces from combat duty, leaving the U.S. to pick up the slack. As a result, the war in Afghanistan has lost much of its multilateral legitimacy. But NATO-brand multilateralism has its limits. No coalition of European countries can solve the problem of anti-Western sentiment. Thus, the most intriguing part of Obama’s new strategy is to bring Iran, a prominent Muslim country, into the fold. On her European tour, Clinton also made a stop

May 2009

in Iran to invite Irani President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the table to discuss AfPak policy. Encouragingly, Ahmadinejad has already begun attending trilateral terrorism summits with leaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan, since a destabilized Afghanistan on its eastern border would pose a serious threat of terrorism spilling over into Iran. Drawing in Europe and Iran could do wonders for NATO’s worldwide perception in AfPak and make for a truly “Global” War on Terror, but the actual feasibility of cooperation remains to be seen. Although Ahmadinejad has warmed to Obama, he is still hesitant to appear too cooperative with the West. Moreover, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has the final say on any action to commit aid to the effort. But perceptions are not actions and outlooks are still grim. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Richard Holbrooke, special envoy to the region, disturbingly conceded in an interview last month that the U.S. was not winning the war in Afghanistan. Still, though, key parts of Obama’s new strategy offer hope of a brighter future and change of direction. Through a substantial increase in troops and resources, newfound cooperation and accountability with the new governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and meaningful expansion of international support, the new strategy has a strong chance of succeeding where its predecessor failed. In sum, the new administration’s fundamentally different approach toward AfPak, focused on destroying al-Qaeda instead of nation-building and treating AfPak as a single combat theater, serve to point the Global War on Terror in the right direction. The accuracy of American bombs is a doubleedged sword: they always hit the ground, but when not used strategically, they can do more harm than good. Afp

Jim may be reached at jhao@princeton.edu

U.S. Foreign Policy

Changing Course A New Direction for America’s Armed Forces

Lucas Briger ’12

n April 6th, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the Obama administration’s new defense budget proposal for fiscal year 2010, marking a significant departure from military policy under the Bush administration. If passed, Mr. Gates’ changes in military spending undoubtedly point to a comprehensive shift in American military strategy. This budget reallocates billions of dollars from the high-tech buildup of the last eight years to a more cost-effective strategy designed to better equip and expand today’s armed forces for counterinsurgency campaigns like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In light of the economic strains posed by the financial crisis and the Taliban’s resurgence in

Afghanistan and Pakistan, Gates’ attempt to refocus America’s military expenditures away from unlikely wars to winning contemporary conflicts should be applauded. Unfortunately, many individuals in the national security community will see the current budget as a step backwards. Such concerns mainly revolve around the sharp slowdown in the development of advanced military technology. Critics will argue that America’s enemies had to resort to terrorist tactics and insurgency because of the unquestionable dominance of U.S. conventional forces on the ground, in the sea, and in the air. Furthermore, they assert that by allowing any possible weakening of military capacity, the U.S. erodes the foundation of its prevailing military hege-

mony, increasing the likelihood of possible Chinese or Russian aggression. Assuredly there is some credence to this “peace through strength” approach, a notion whose origins trace back to ancient times. It was only in March that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev declared a “comprehensive rearmament” of Russian military forces. As President Medvedev went on to say, the “most important task is to re-equip the [Russian] Armed Forces with [the] newest weapons systems,” a process that should see 70% of its military modernized by 2020. To many, this is a worrisome development, given Russia’s continued and escalating interference in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Russia displayed its bellicosity last year when it invaded neighboring Georgia and shut off gas to Ukraine during the winter. China’s modernization is also problematic. In 2007, Gates publicly voiced concern over “the uncertainty [of] China’s military modernization and the need for greater transparency to allay international concerns.” Gates’ claim seems all the more relevant in light of China’s unprecedented demonstration of maritime power in exer-

Marco Garcia / AP

America’s $361 million F-22s have spent more time partying in Hawaii than flying combat missions in Iraq.

American Foreign Policy

U.S. Foreign Policy cises held just a few weeks ago to celebrate the navy’s 60th anniversary. Given the potential for conflict with Taiwan, overwhelming military dominance may be needed for America to retain a credible deterrent against possible Chinese aggression. However, the United States’ military superiority is so great that it can continue to pursue a policy of “peace through strength” while still tailoring its fighting forces to neutralize the kinds of threats present in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simply stated, the United States military is the best and will continue to be the best for quite some time despite smaller investments in high-tech weapons. The projected 2010 U.S. defense budget will still be nearly five times the combined reported numbers for China and Russia. The United States military retains a strong competitive edge in a variety of fields. American air superiority, central to controlling the battlefield, is guaranteed. The U.S. possess the world’s only fifth generation fighter (the F-22), this fighter cannot be matched by even the most advanced Chinese (the Shenyang J-XX) and Russian (the Sukhoi PAK FA and HAL FGFA) fighters currently under development. Moreover, no discussion of air dominance is complete without the inclusion of the aircraft carrier, the floating air fortress that takes with it just under five acres of legal American territory wherever it travels. Today the United States alone possesses more aircraft carriers than the rest of the world combined, and a significant portion of the world’s remaining carriers are in the hands of American allies. America’s carriers are also qualitatively superior to those of rival states, carrying more aircraft and employing advanced radar technology. Aside from the United States’ formidable deterrent power, there are political and economic factors at play, which make war with Russia or China extremely unlikely. Both Russia and China have expressed a willingness to participate and be responsible nations on the international stage, and the Obama administration has started to engage them in win-win diplomacy. Although President Medvedev vowed to revitalize and modernize the Russian military, his initial conception of the new Russian military was that of a force “operating alongside Western forces.”

Although China’s military buildup is worrisome, President Hu Jintao continues to stress that “both now and in the future, no matter to what extent we develop, China will never seek hegemony.” Even if this is merely rhetoric, the truth remains that relations with China and Russia are not likely to spiral to Cold War lows. In today’s increasingly globalized and interdependent world, it is illogical, if not suicidal, for great powers to engage in war. Post-World War II institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization make the current system, as Princeton’s John Ikenberry puts it, “easy to join and hard to overturn.” The thrust of Mr. Gates’ budget re-

end strength by a combined 92,000 persons for a total fighting force of 547,000. These extra soldiers would be a much-needed addition to a force that has been stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, Gates plans to add 2,800 more special forces personnel, a critical asset in today’s counterinsurgency conflicts. Ultimately, Gates is investing where the taxpayers’ money is deserved: not into the hands of coddled defense contractors, but towards the recruitment, training, and combat readiness of American soldiers. Gates explains the reasoning behind the administration’s budget request with the following: “It is important to remember that every defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk—or, in effect, to ‘run up the score’ in a capability where the United States is already dominant—is a dollar not available to […] win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable.” It is by no means certain that Gates’s budget request will pass Congress without compromises. Lawmakers have filed protest over programs proposed for cuts or termination that are important to their states or districts. Regardless, Gates and the current administration should be commended for their vision of an American military fit to fight and win contemporary conflicts, while remaining prepared for any future hostilities. Afp

In today’s increasingly globalized and interdependent world, it is illogical, if not suicidal, for great powers to engage in war. quest revolves around success in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is in this regard that it shines. Whereas the F-22 was introduced into the U.S. Air Force in December of 2005, it has not yet flown a single mission in Iraq. In stark contrast, the MQ-1 Predator drone, 30 of which can be purchased for every F-22, flew 242 raids, engaged 132 troops in protection maneuvers, launched 59 Hellfire missiles, all while flying 2,073 missions for more than 33,833 hours of flying time in just one year. While Gates has already taken heavy criticism for cutting parts of the Future Combat System, he merely scrapped useless or anachronistic programs (including one which called for the production of more lightly armored Humvees, the same vehicles that were doing nothing to protect American soldiers from highly lethal IEDs). Simultaneously, Gates vowed to accelerate the development of simple sensors and robots that could scout ahead for potential enemy hideouts and relay information back to coalition soldiers. In short, Gates will continue to fund the truly necessary new weapons systems, while cutting wasteful projects. As an alternative to technology spending, Gates plans to invest more money in training, equipping, and recruiting personnel. Even before this budget, Gates had proposed to increase Army and Marines

May 2009

Lucas may be reached at lbriger@princeton.edu

Answers to quiz on page 9:

1) B 2) D 3) A

4) A 5) C

U.S. Foreign Policy

Obama Abroad How He Fared at the G-20 Summit

Natalie Kim ’12

resident Barack Obama made his debut as an international diplomat with the April 2nd G-20 summit in London. Although he made three trips abroad during his time as an Illinois Senator and on the campaign trail last year, he has been criticized as relatively inexperienced in foreign policy matters. Aides have expressed hope that Obama would renew faltering public belief in international institutions and their ability to forge and follow through on economic, environmental, and political commitments. Despite Obama’s popularity abroad during his campaign and his position as a symbol of renewed multilateralism before the economic crisis, many G-20 leaders have become less suportive. Many remain apprehensive about American commitments to “listen as well as lead.” Despite these concerns, expectations were high, and the summit became a testing ground for Obama to showcase his abilities as a unifier, diplomat and leader, as well as a chance for him to deliver on some of the promises and messages of hope conveyed during his campaign. Unfortunately, Obama’s significant involvement in the summit belied the lack of real advances made towards economic recovery. In press conferences before his departure to London, Obama outlined his administration’s main goals for the G-20 summit. The first goal was to enact new regulatory reforms and reenergize the economy, with European states adopting a U.S.-style economic stimulus plan that would include substantial government spending. Another major issue on the table was free trade. G-20 members reaffirmed their commitment to decrease protectionist measures that could further damage the shrinking international trade system. Finally, an implicit but nevertheless important goal was to counter the nascent anti-Americanism forming as a result of the

widespread (and not completely inaccurate) perception that the U.S. was to blame for the financial crisis. These goals set important benchmarks for evaluating his performance. On the issue of the financial crisis, Obama stressed the importance of combined international efforts in outlining his plan for broad commitment to economic stimulus. Such commitment signaled a move away from the unilateralism of the Bush administration to a more global approach. At the summit, Obama declared that the U.S., as part of an “integrated global economy,”

confidence on the financial markets.” Finally, the prospect of global stimulus raised fears about inflation. Although no coherent consensus on fiscal stimulus could be reached at the conference, Obama did manage to secure an unprecedented $1.1 trillion for the International Monetary Fund and other global institutions, such as the World Bank, to boost trade and mitigate the damage to the world’s most fragile economies. The response was also mixed on trade issues. Obama dispatched Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to press world leaders to scale back protectionism in order to help developing markets that would be hit hard by the contracting U.S. and European economies. He argued such provisions are necessary for the U.S., since the stability of the global financial system translates to more jobs and security for Americans. However, in the short term this may mean fewer jobs for Americans, who already face soaring unemployment rates. Despite Obama’s rhetoric on the “integrated global economy,” his discussion was limited to government retention of unemployed workers and the ideal of free trade. Two hundred fifty billion dollars worth of trade credits were pledged to kick-start faltering exports in Africa, but experts worry this is a Band-Aid policy that ignores much larger problems, such as heavy U.S. and European agricultural subsidies that keep local industries afloat at the expense of Africa’s. As a consequence, the G-20 summit made little progress on trade liberalization. One achievement of particular note, however, is Obama’s significant role in mediating heated arguments on the issue of tax havens between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao. Indeed, the extent of new regulations in the financial sector more broadly was a major subject of contention, forcing Obama to fight both international conflicts as well as criticism back home that overregulation is choking business and investors. Nevertheless, Obama managed to push through an agreement on regulations, saying that “unprecedented steps” were necessary to prevent another financial crisis of such proportions. The new agreement would entail increased controls on hedge funds and derivatives trading, as well as new, stricter rules about executive compensation and bonuses. The new system of financial oversight takes some les-

With signature grace, Obama deflected criticism from some countries that American irresponsibility caused the financial crisis.

needed to be mindful of economic conditions overseas. However, the response to the U.S.’s own stimulus package has been mixed at best, with increasing criticism of its excessive deficit spending on social programs and public works. It is unclear whether European allies and other key economic players bought into Obama’s economic approach. Hence, Germany and many other countries vehemently opposed Obama’s calls for Europeans to enact U.S.-style stimulus packages. First, Germany and other central European governments have already enacted substantial stimulus plans in their own economies. Second, EU limits on the budget deficits make spending much more unsavory to European policymakers than to Americans. Third, because of Europe’s integrated fiscal system and the different economic needs of individual countries, Europeans are wary of any sweeping new rules on monetary regulation that might benefit some countries more than others. Fourth, as German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück asserted, “it makes no sense” to pass stimulus packages when European governments “haven’t restored the

American Foreign Policy

U.S. Foreign Policy

Charles Dharapak / AP

sons from the economic crisis—that full and transparent disclosure is required for banks regarding toxic assets—but it leaves much to be desired in other respects. For instance, the Financial Security Board, established to give early warnings for future economic crises, is largely a figurehead organization. Despite these shortcomings, some experts praised Obama’s performance at the summit. Stephen P. Schrage, an international business expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, claims that “he handled himself very well.” With signature grace, Obama deflected criticism from some countries that American financial irresponsibility caused the financial crisis. He proved himself able to bridge differences when he made direct appeals to Presidents Sarkozy and Hu to push through an agreement. Indeed, supporters hope the G-20 will set the tone for more foreign policy successes at upcoming international events. On the other hand, some critics claim that both the summit and Obama’s performance were devoid of any substantial achievement, despite their many promises. The goals outlined in the G-20 communiqué included “the largest fiscal and monetary stimulus and the most comprehensive sup-

port program for the financial sector in modern times,” and the achievement of fiscal expansion “that will by the end of the next year, amount to $5 trillion, raise output by 4%, and accelerate the transition to a green economy.” Many experts, such as Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, claim that such expansive promises are “a great show […] but short on substance. The recovery will be anemic, tentative, and very fragile at best.” Skeptics are doubtful about what real, longterm results the one-day meeting will produce. Unfortunately, Obama’s political capital overseas is nowhere near what he would need for all his ambitions to be realized, and international cooperation remains fragile. Such criticism merits attention precisely because the economic crisis has grown to such historic proportions; drastic measures are necessary to revive the economy. Yet at the same time, there are doubts about which measures, if any, could improve the economic situation. Although reforms agreed to at the summit show promise, many of the suggested strategies to block future crises seem like gestures at best and steps backward at worst. For instance, it is hard to see how short-term trade credits will help realize Obama’s ideal of an “integrated global economy,” or whether

May 2009

investors will actually listen to the FSB at the expense of short-term profits. Indeed, simply hammering the capital interests so crucial to sustaining economic growth might actually slow down recovery once it has begun. Clearly these solutions will not be sufficient to achieve the goals that had been set before the conference. While Obama undoubtedly played a central role in his first international summit, earning high marks for character and diplomacy, he will have to do more to fulfill the expectations cultivated during his historic campaign in order to ensure that his presidency is not based on mere rhetoric but instead on results. After three months in office, Obama needs to move beyond criticizing the Bush administration and take charge of the burden which has now become his, before the prolonged economic downturn begins to eat away at his approval ratings and to discourage the people who voted him into office. His performance at the G-20 suggests that he is getting there, but still has work to do. Afp Natalie may be reached at nekim@princeton.edu

See You Next Year!

Stephan Rousseau/ AP

Until Then... The AFP blog features back issues and up-to-date coverage of foreign affairs: blogs.princeton.edu/afp