From the Editor Dear AFP Readers, The last few weeks have seen some incredibly interesting developments in foreign policy, ranging from the frightening to the saddening to the strange. For one, the April 6th riots in Kyrgyzstan that deposed President Kurmanbek Bakiyev led to scores of fatalities in the country and called the future of a key American air base in Kyrgyzstan into question. The crash of Polish President Lech Kaczyński’s plane near Katyn, Russia, which killed dozens of top leaders in the Polish government, came on the heals of a potential new thaw between those two countries. Finally, the volcanic ash spewed from Mount Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland led to the weeklong cancellation of almost all flights flying in or through Europe, including flights to Warsaw for President Kaczyński’s funeral. Although analysis of any these exciting international events could fill this magazine alone, a good portion of this month’s writers decided to focus on the elephant—or dragon—in the proverbial room: China. All three articles on China in this month’s AFP argue that the United States (or U.S. companies) should take a more nuanced, less confrontational stance with the Chinese government. For example, David Chen argues, in this month’s cover story, that prodding China to revaluate its currency, the Yuan, would not only run counter to U.S. economic interests, but also that it would backfire, forcing China to stand firm at risk of appearing weak in the eyes of the international community. Lauren Zumbach, writing about the recent Google China spat, similarly argues that it is not in Google’s best interest to confront the Chinese government, but instead to work within its flawed, though established, censorship framework. Hyun Sun Suh, analyzing the perceived risk of a Chinese housing bubble, concludes that the Chinese government has the “boom under wraps,” and that the U.S. would be best not to intervene in this delicate area. In light of the arguably activist mainstream media clamoring for confrontation, I believe these articles offer a levelheaded approach to U.S.-China policy. This month’s issue of AFP is the last of the academic year. I would like to thank all of our graduating seniors for their dedicated involvement with AFP and wish them the best of luck wherever they are headed next year and beyond. I’d like to do the same with our devoted senior readership. To our entire readership, we hope that you have enjoyed AFP during the past year and that you look out for us in the fall.
Editor-in-Chief Benjamin Cogan ‘12 Publisher Brian Lipshutz ‘12 Managing Editors Tara Lewis ‘11 Matthew Arons ‘13 Taman Narayan ‘13 Jake Nebel ‘13 Editors Jon Bradshaw ‘10 Heejin Cho ‘10 Matthew Drecun ‘10 ‘10 Jon Extein Jonathan Giuffrida ‘10 Lucas Issacharoff ‘10 Catalina Valencia ‘10 ‘11 Aaron Abelson Brendan Carroll ‘11 ‘11 Vishal Chanani Katherine Gaudyn ‘11 Rachel Jackson ‘11 Addie Lerner ‘11 Elias Sánchez-Eppler ‘11 ‘11 Zayn Siddique
Eric Stern Kit Thayer Oliver Bloom Yun Chung Sweta Haldar Jim Hao Natalie Kim Charlie Metzger Jay Parikh Peter Wang Don Butterworth Jonathan Lin Emily VanderLinden Audrye Wong
Yanran Chen ‘12, Production Manager Jonathan Giuffrida ‘10 Kelly Lack ‘10 Ellen Choi ‘11 Emily VanderLinden ‘13
Business Staff
All the best, Benjamin Cogan Editor-in-Chief
No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.princeton.edu/~afp
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Emma Cunningham ‘11
American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.
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Staff
Samuel Roeca ‘12
Editors-in-Chief Emeritus Dan May ‘11 Rush Doshi ‘11 AFP Advisory Board
Christina Paxson: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Katherine Newman: Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs
American Foreign Policy
AFP Cover Story
A merican Foreign Policy
May 2010, Volume IX, Issue VI
ta b l e o f co n t e n ts
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Confronting the Dragon How to Handle the Chinese Currency Problem David Chen ‘13
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Chinese Housing Bubble Are We Waiting for the Next Big Burst? Hyun Sun Suh ‘12
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AFP Quiz
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The Path to Peace The Palestinian Nonviolence Movement Emma Cunningham ‘11
Benjamin Cogan ‘12
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Global Update
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Don’t Be Evil Chinese Relations with Google Lauren Zumbach ‘13
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In Context
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Bloody Shirts Reforming Thailand’s Broken Political System Audrye Wong ‘13
Taman Narayan ‘13
Tara Lewis ‘11
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Reuniting the Island Reconciling Sri Lanka with Its Tamil Minority Ben Foulon ‘13
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The New START A Short-Term Solution John Cappel ‘11
Photo Credits: Creative Commons images from Flickr and Wikimedia Commons
May 2010
Cover Image by Yanran Chen
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Cover Story
Photo from flickr.
Confronting the Dragon How to Handle the Chinese Currency Problem
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espite growing criticism of China’s economic policies from both parties in Congress, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner decided not to label China a currency manipulator in early April. This decision seems to reverse President Obama’s February pledge that he would take a tougher stance on trade disagreements with China, and suggests that his administration will pursue a more diplomatic approach rather than play the blame game with its economic rival. Domestically, however, Senators Charles Schumer (D) and Lindsey Graham (R) have threatened trade sanctions, arguing that as long as China artificially keeps the yuan pegged to the dollar, making their goods artificially cheaper on the international market, American ex-
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David Chen ‘13 ports cannot compete. While expected, Senators Schumer and Graham’s aggressive response is simply a misguided reaction to frustrations over unemployment in the U.S. This response caters to popular emotions and is not rational policy. Instead, the U.S. should adopt a more conciliatory tone toward China by persuading it to voluntarily revalue its currency and by addressing the issue multilaterally at the upcoming G20 economic summit in June. Doing otherwise threatens Sino-American cooperation on other significant issues such as environmental protection and a nuclear Iran. Besides, China already has its own motivations for devaluing the yuan and would be more likely to do so without U.S. finger pointing. Recently, there seems to be increasing disagreement between the United States and
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China. President Obama’s visit to Asia last year revealed that China is unwilling to significantly budge on issues of human rights, national sovereignty, and environmental commitment. Part of this obstinacy comes from China’s distrust of America’s long-term intentions. Part, however, also comes from the aftermath of the global economic downturn. Having recovered from the economic crisis of 2008 much sooner and with more vitality than most other nations, China’s confidence on the world stage has grown significantly. The heavily controlled visit by Obama is just one example; China’s refusal to take the U.S. seriously at the Copenhagen climate summit by repeatedly snubbing Obama is another. In the past few months, confrontations involving Internet censorship with Google and arms trade with Taiwan have also revealed China’s increased assertiveness. These issues have long been points of criticism between the East and the West, but Premier Wen Jiabao’s sharp criticism of U.S. economic mismanagement last year reveals that China has become more vocal about its demands. China finally feels that the balance of power is beginning to tip in its favor and it will eagerly exploit this perceived
truth through more assertive international policies. For the United States, this new attitude makes China much harder to handle. Meeting stubbornness with its own obstinate policies will only result in a cooling of Sino-American relations, however. After President Obama’s call for a tougher stance on the undervalued yuan, China responded several days later by resolutely denying any future plans to change its policy. What the U.S. should realize is that the tough-on-China approach contributes to China’s refusal to back down in the first place. China is resisting American pressure for fear of appearing weak to the international community. The harsher than expected response from China after the U.S. announced plans to sell arms to Taiwan makes this trend increasingly clear. China’s warnings seem to be an attempt to defy American demands rather than legitimately protect its national security. Giving the perception that China is to blame for America’s trade deficit only decreases the chances of constructive dialogue. Even without U.S. pressure, there are good reasons for China to revalue the yuan on its own. Although it recovered from the global economic meltdown rather quickly, Chinese monetary policy has overshot its mark and the country now runs the risk of an inflationary cycle. Consumer price inflation was reported at a modest 2.4 percent in March, but property prices rose 11.7 percent in the same month, suggesting an asset bubble that could spell macroeconomic woes for China. Moreover, lending during the first month of 2010 rose to $203 billion, surpassing the previous three months combined and forecasting future price increases. Banks are eager to increase interest rates to encourage saving, but fear that doing so would attract capital inflows from foreign investors and exacerbate inflation. A stronger yuan would cushion the impact of capital flows by making the purchase of Chinese currency by foreign investors more expensive and thus less attractive. Zhou Xiaochuan, the chairman of the People’s Bank of China, said last month that controlling the value of the yuan is an emergency measure that will end “sooner or later.” With exports in the month of February 8 percent higher than that of two years earlier, the Chinese export market is rebounding quickly and will soon no longer need protection from an undervalued yuan. In addition, a revaluation of the yuan is a step that China has taken in the past. In late 2007 and early 2008, consumer price inflation soared to 8.7 percent, reaching a ten-year high. China al-
Cover Story
lowed the Yuan to appreciate until pegging it against the dollar several months later, Another factor that weakens the rationale for increasing pressure on China is the overstated harms of an undervalued yuan to the U.S. economy. Certainly a cheaper currency makes Chinese goods preferable to American ones, but this affects only American companies in direct competition with Chinese ones. Instead of being harmed, companies that rely upon steel and electrical machinery to create their own products actually benefit from cheaper Chinese exports in these areas. The picture on the consumer-end is similar; many low-income American families rely upon cheap retail stores that import many of their products from China. Thus, even if balancing the trade deficit creates more jobs,
“Increasing the pressure will not only make currency revaluation less likely, but also will prove counterproductive toward other American goals in Asia.” Americans might not gain more purchasing power due to the loss of cheap products. Ultimately, whether there is a net gain in economic activity and jobs will depend on the ratio of direct competitors to companies that buy materials from China. Given the diplomatic costs of applying pressure, the benefit to the U.S. economy may not be worth the risk. In the end, China will revalue the yuan on its own terms, not as a response to U.S. demands. Increasing the pressure will not only make currency revaluation less likely, but also will prove counter-productive toward other American goals in Asia. Both nations have traded accusations about engaging in protectionism, but neither has taken any dramatic measures. Alienating the Chinese with harsher rhetoric or imposing further protectionist measures may escalate tensions to the point of stifling trade, hurting both Americans and Chinese. China has already demonstrated its willingness to hinder free trade by setting a list of preferred suppliers
May 2010
to the government late last year. Outside the market, China may use its importance as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gasses to disrupt progress in the global movement for environmental protection. Perhaps most importantly, China has the ability to frustrate efforts to prevent a nuclear Iran by refusing to participate in multilateral economic sanctions of that country. That is not to say that the U.S. ought to soften its stance against China. Doing so would also be dangerous. Appeasement would achieve the same effect of emboldening the Asian power by showing American weakness. Obama’s soft stance during his trip to Asia and the administration’s decision to postpone a meeting with the Dali Lama certainly did not make China sensitive to American concerns. Instead, the U.S. needs to walk a fine line between cooperating with its rival and appearing to give in to China’s new hubris. This means that the U.S. should continue to declare its own terms, but give China a chance to accept these terms voluntarily. Any more pressure might hurt SinoAmerican relations, but any less might encourage China to flaunt American interests further. In a display of quid pro quo, President Hu Jintao attended a nuclear security summit and agreed to work with the U.S. to deter a nuclear Iran after the Washington delayed its report to Congress. This step in the right direction reveals that China is willing to meet cooperation with cooperation. Caving in to domestic pressure and raising the possibility of sanctions will only frustrate recent gains in Sino-American relations. Ultimately, each declaration against China makes cooperation with it more difficult. At times, this loss is outweighed by the benefit of standing resolute. Increasing pressure against currency manipulation, however, is not one of these times. Given the current inflationary pressure in China and the uncertain benefits of currency appreciation, the risk of inflaming Sino-American relations is simply too great. The U.S. should be willing to work toward effective policy solutions, while simultaneously refusing to capitulate to all of China’s demands. The most important question is where to draw the line. Afp
David may be reached at dcthree@princeton.edu
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Ongoing construction of new buildings in Beijing, China. Photo from flickr.
Chinese Housing Bubble Are We Waiting for the Next Big Burst?
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hile the global economy suffers, China’s housing juggernaut shows no signs of slowing. After the briefest of blips, residential transactions are back at a record level, up 80 percent this year alone. Prices, already having risen every year for more than a decade, are exploding in tandem, and speculators are shopping properties with the expectation that the market will continue to flourish. Many observers, including those in the government, have voiced concerns that the boom could indicate a growing bubble that, if it were to burst, would seriously damage China’s economy. Especially after the recent collapse of the U.S. housing market,
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Hyun Sun Suh ‘12 which contributed to the worldwide economic recession, international concerns about China’s housing market are not groundless. However, the significant differences between the Chinese and American situations should relieve American apprehension of a Chinese housing bubble. A growing economy, continued urbanization, and a different banking system mean a housing bubble followed by a burst is less likely to occur in China. Furthermore, the Chinese government is already taking steps to prevent the collapse of its housing market. One report that led to fear of a Chinese housing bubble showed that housing price hikes have outpaced increases in income. According to this
American Foreign Policy
report, the cost of one square meter is equal to an average resident’s salary of seven months. But this report is not entirely accurate; in reality, the report underestimates people’s actual incomes, which are grossly underreported in China. China’s tax report system explains why. While U.S. citizens report their income individually to the Internal Revenue Service, Chinese companies report and pay income taxes for individual employees. As a result, Chinese companies illegally report lower salaries in order to decrease the amount of taxes they must pay. Because of this trend, the difference between the rise in housing prices and income is not nearly as significant as reported. The Chinese financial market is also fundamentally different from the U.S. market. To qualify for a residential loan in China, consumers are required to put down a large down payment: 30 percent for the buyers’ first home and 50 percent for additional properties. Therefore, Chinese buyers don’t exhibit the reckless behavior that was rampant, even encouraged, in the United
States prior to the collapse of the financial system. Furthermore, the Chinese banking system does not suffer from extreme securitization of mortgages by financial institutions. Original lenders generally hold mortgages in China. Considering it was also excessive leverage, not high prices, that caused the real estate meltdown in the U.S., there is still room for optimism on this front. Another difference between the current situation in China and the conditions leading to the U.S. bubble is demand. Urbanization in China is growing, suggesting that even if speculative buying slows, demand for housing will remain high. According to the State Council, as many as 400 million people will move to cities by 2035. The Chinese government has expressed its intent to ensure these migrants access to affordable housing. Thus, a collapse is not likely in a housing market experiencing steady demand and matching supply. Nevertheless, given that traditional savings accounts yield less than 1 percent interest annually and playing the stock market is perceived as high-risk gambling in China, real estate remains very enticing for speculators and investors, signaling the need to be vigilant about a possible housing bubble. With a clear understanding of this behavior, the Chinese government has demonstrated a willingness to intervene early to prevent a collapse. Last November, Beijing introduced a new real estate sales tax aimed at cooling the property market fever. Designed to discourage the “flipping” of houses by speculators, this nationwide tax policy instituted a sales tax of 5.5 percent to anyone selling a second apartment within five years of its purchase. Further policies are on the way. The State Council issued a statement on April 15th laying out specific measures to further curb exorbitant housing prices. The details included raising mortgage rates and down payment requirements, and allowing banks to refuse credit to buyers who the banks believe to be speculating. Although the Chinese government was right to take preliminary steps to control housing prices, immediately after it outlined its intervention plan, worries over the measures dampened the stock market. The announcement
Asia
led to a drop in Hong Kong’s property index, and the Hang Seng Property Index dropped to a three-week low. Critics worry that the tightening of credit would not only cool down the overheated market, but could cause it to freeze. These fears are unfounded for now; the HSNP soon bounced back, albeit to a lower level, and credit remained available, exactly what the government wanted. Drastic policies, however, could create a damaging credit crunch. Beyond these changes, China has even more tools in reserve to prevent the boom from becoming a bubble. The introduction of property tax and the revaluation of its currency could help make China’s housing market sustainable. In the absence of property taxes, the costs of holding empty homes is very low, which provides a great incentive to speculators in buying real estate for investment purposes. Beijing’s hesitation to levy the property tax largely stems from local governments’ reliance on property sales as their major source of revenue. It makes little sense to the government officials to reduce their income by keeping down the property prices in normal times. If things get out of hand, however, a property tax could keep them in control. Also, in order to keep its currency artificially devalued, China’s central bank has to spend billions of dollars buying U.S. Treasury bills, which significantly hinders its ability to use monetary policy to quell rising prices. Revaluation would put strains on China’s export industries, by raising the prices of Chinese goods, but would more than compensate by stabilizing the overall economy. Given the grave dangers posed by a collapsed housing market, the signs of China’s growing bubble certainly call for vigilance and international attention. However, the evidence suggests that panic is not yet in order; China’s unique housing dynamics and its government’s quick policy responses are happily keeping the boom under wraps. Afp Hyun may be reached at hsuh@princeton.edu
AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Benjamin Cogan ‘12 1. The New START Treaty recently signed by President Obama limits the U.S. and Russia to how many operationally deployed weapons? a. 655 b. 1550 c. 2300 d. 4545 2. What is the name of the Polish President who was recently killed when his airplane crashed near Katyn? a. Lech Kaczyński b. Jarosław Kaczyński c. Donald Tusk d. Bronisław Maria Komorowski 3. Recent Israeli reports claim that Hezbollah received a shipment of Scud missiles from which country in the region? a. Iran b. Jordan c. Yemen d. Syria 4. What was China’s annual rate of growth in the first quarter of 2010? a. 4.1 percent b. 7.8 percent c. 11.9 percent d. 13.9 percent 5. The New York Times recently released a memo from which US Cabinet Secretary questioning whether the US has an effective policy to deal with the Iranian nuclear program? a. Hillary Clinton b. Ben Rhodes c. Janet Napolitano d. Robert Gates
Answers on page 13
May 2010
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Middle East
The Path to Peace The Palestinian Nonviolence Movement
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ollowers of international news can attest to the fact that media coverage of the West Bank tends to focus on conflict and violence. Sporadic acts of terrorism, suicide bombings, and rockets fired at civilians have created the perception in the international community that the Palestinians favor violence as a method of protest, and that the Israelis respond in kind. Because violence has been prevalent in the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, media attention on the armed resistance has remained largely unswerving. Recently, a different kind of resistance movement, a nonviolent resistance
Emma Cunningham ‘11 movement, has come to the forefront of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian resistance movement has included nonviolence in the past, but only minimally so; peaceful resistance has never before played a significant part in the resistant movement. Yet given the failure to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank through diplomacy and armed struggle, the Palestinians need a new way forward. The coordination of the government, civilian population, and business community to create a popular, nonviolent resistance offers a chance to both reopen peace talks and build a more cohesive and unified Palestinian state.
The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research reported in March that the percentage Palestinians in the West Bank who support armed resistance as a viable method to end Israeli occupation has decreased to 47 percent. The Center believes that Palestinians in the West Bank find themselves caught between failed diplomacy and failed armed struggle, which may open the door to nonviolent resistance as the only viable form of protest left. Palestinian political analysts also claim that violent uprisings against Israeli occupation are much less likely now that Palestinians have established regularly functioning security forces and government ministries in the West Bank. Whether or not the Israelis and the international community can afford to believe this theory is still a question, but nonetheless it seems that if there were a time for nonviolent resistance to catch fire, that time would be now. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad have come out strongly in support of peaceful, nonviolent resistance, and increasing economic progress
Palestinian children participate in a protest in the West Bank. Photo from flickr.
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in the West Bank gives the Palestinians significant bargaining chips. Visits by Mahatma Gandhi’s grandson and Martin Luther King III, the son of the famous civil rights leader, to speak on the importance of nonviolent struggle are among the most visible manifestations of the nonviolent resistance movement. Other important signs of this movement include peaceful protests against Israeli policies, such as weekly demonstrations in the West Bank cities of Bil’in and Ni’lin. Prime Minister Fayyad has entered West Bank areas that are off limits to his authority in order to plant trees, symbolically declaring the land a part of the future Palestinian state. Furthermore, The government has teamed up with business leaders to finance the Karama National Empowerment Fund, which pays for campaigns of billboards, ads, and public events to end the purchase of goods produced by Israeli settlers and to end settler industries’ employment of Palestinians. The Palestinian Economy Minister Hassan Abu-Libdeh has even announced that the purchase of settler goods will likely soon be banned by law, which would cost Israeli settlements $200 million per year and send a powerful non-token message of resistance. The level of organization and coordination needed to form a cohesive nonviolent resistance movement is encouraging to proponents of peace who feel that Palestinians need to unify for peace, but the Israeli response so far has been less than promising. The Israeli military claims that the new nonviolent movement is actually violent, since it often involves throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, burning Israeli-produced goods, and attempting to destroy separation barriers. This perception leads Israeli forces to respond to nonviolent protesters the same way as they do violent protesters—with arrests, stun grenades, rubber bullets, and tear gas. Human rights groups such as the International Solidarity Movement and Amnesty International allege that Israeli forces are responsible for detainments without trial, beatings, and even deaths of protestors, including both Palestinians and internationals. If the Israeli military continues to respond in this way, it will perpetuate the widely held Palestinian belief that violence is the only available form of protest in this long-lasting conflict, undermin-
Middle East
ing the nonviolent resistance movement. How can Israel expect Palestinians to stop armed resistance if Israel responds to nonviolent protests with violence? Israel needs to recognize that there is little chance it will be able to suppress opposition to occupation of the West Bank. The key is not for Israel to attempt to subdue all Palestinian opposition, but rather to promote the kind of opposition that can be dealt with peacefully and diplomatically. The nonviolent resistance movement fits this requirement, and Israel should treat this group accordingly. It is easy, however, to fall into the trap
“The key is not for Israel to attempt to subdue all Palestinian opposition, but rather to promote the kind of opposition that can be dealt with peacefully and diplomatically. ” of concluding that Israel is the only obstacle to peaceful interaction between the two sides. Given the history of violence in this conflict, it is unreasonable to expect the Israeli military to give Palestinian protestors in the West Bank significant leeway, regardless of how nonviolent their demonstrations appear to be or are. Violence and distrust are too deeply ingrained in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, and Israel has learned in the past that the even initially peaceful protests can quickly escalate to all-out warfare. The Israeli military fears that unless it keeps protests under control, the protests may escalate into a full-scale uprising. There is also the potential for armed resistance groups to take advantage of the gatherings and turn peaceful crowds into violent ones. The memories of Palestinian acts of terrorism and violence against Israelis are too vivid to ignore this possibility. So we seem to be caught in situation in which nonviolent resistance is a
May 2010
catch-22: Palestinian resistance through diplomacy and armed struggle has proved ineffective, and nonviolent resistance is an increasingly popular alternative, but because of the historical distrust between Israelis and Palestinians, the Israeli military sees no option other than reacting to the nonviolent resistance the same way it has been reacting to violent resistance for years. But is this continuation of the present stalemate truly unavoidable? No. The nonviolent resistance movement has the potential to change how the international community views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to improve the prospects for negotiations between the two sides. The key to creating an atmosphere that is conducive to the reopening of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks is a mutual recognition of the possible gains from cooperation and peace. Israel needs security in the West Bank; nonviolent resistance could help Israel achieve it without the need for heavy-handed military measures. The West Bank needs economic development and political freedom; a unified nonviolence movement could mean fewer checkpoints and greater access to Israeli markets. The movement toward peace talks must come from both sides, and the current state of mutual distrust dictates that such movement must be simultaneous. The challenge for Palestinians will be to resist the atmosphere of frustration and violence in order to maintain the nonviolent resistance movement for as long as it will take to see results. And Israel must find a way to protect its national security without itself sparking violence. Afp Emma may be reached at ecunning@princeton.edu
AFP Quiz Answers Multiple Choice Monthly 1. B 2. A 3. D 4. C 5. D
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A:
B: Deposed President Kurman-
G:The
H: European leaders, in conjunc- I: A UN report pins the blame
Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats’ surge in popularity injects real drama into the parliamentary elections of GREAT BRITAIN, with the possibility of the first hung parliament in over 35 years looking increasingly likely.
United States warily watches as VENEZUELA announces a new trade deal with China that would allow the increasingly assertive and energy-hungry Asian power to stake its claim to Venezuelan oil resources in return for providing infrastructural assistance.
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bek Bakiyev of KYRGYZSTAN resigns after bloody street protests forced him out of power in a replay of the Tulip Revolution. The new government promises to transform the country into a multiparty parliamentary democracy.
tion with the International Monetary Fund, finally reach an agreement to bail out GREECE to the tune of $50 billion in order to avoid a default that may have crippled the euro.
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C: Tragedy ensues in POLAND
as President Lech Kaczyński and other top government and military figures die in a plane crash in Russia en route to a commemoration of a Stalin-era massacre.
for former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on the army and intelligence services of PAKISTAN, which it says failed to take adequate security measures and openly interfered with investigations after the assassination.
D:
Pope Benedict XVI, in VATICAN CITY, finally speaks out on the growing Catholic Church child-abuse scandal, attempting to stem controversy that has linked the former cardinal directly to the scandal.
E: SRI LANKA’s ruling party, the F: Planes begin to fly over Europe United People’s Freedom Alliance, wins nearly two-thirds of the vote in parliamentary elections, even as the nation comes under increasing criticism for human rights abuses in the northeast Tamil region of the country.
once more after the eruption of ICELAND’s Mt. Eyjafjallajökull grounded most air traffic for a week. Airlines, stung by $1.7 billion in lost revenue, criticize what they see as excessive cautiousness by European regulators.
J: UKRAINE announces that it will K: Two terrorists blow up a sub- L: President Joseph Kabila of the voluntarily give up all of its fissile material, boosting a major global nuclear summit held in Washington, D.C. that some observers say was otherwise uneventful.
way in Moscow, RUSSIA, just feet from the Federal Security Services headquarters, reigniting dormant fears of Chechnyan rebels and throwing the capital city into panic.
May 2010
CONGO demands that the United Nations peacekeeping force stationed in the country leave even as violence spreads and observers fear a return to the deadly civil war of the 1990s.
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Don’t Be Evil Why China Should be Able to Google
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Lauren Zumbach ‘13
oogle’s presence in China has sparked controversy and debate about freedom of speech and Internet censorship since the company introduced Google.cn in 2006. The longstanding tension between Google and the Chinese government culminated in Google’s announcement in March that it would withdraw from China, a marked reversal from its original stance. Google’s decision raises questions about its motivations, what the consequences will be for Chinese users, and possible implications for the future of U.S. businesses in China. Although Google deserves credit for taking a stand on freedom of speech, complete withdrawal from China is not the best way to foster Internet freedom. Google, by withdrawing, lost the ability to influence China’s policies on Internet censorship. In the long run, leaving the market is a risky maneuver that will be costly for Google and further diminish its role in the evolution of China’s Internet policy.
Google has long been an advocate of Internet freedom; unfortunately, China’s non-democratic government forced the company to make difficult concessions before entering the Chinese market. When Google entered China in 2006, agreeing to compromise with the government by censoring search results, the company faced what many called a decision between the lesser of two evils: compromising on freedom to offer users some information, or completely denying Chinese “netizens” Google’s information services. Some argue that Google’s decisions had more to do with profit motives than with ideals. Google is indeed a profitseeking corporation, but profit motive cannot fully explain its actions. Even if Google decided to leave China because it failed to obtain a dominant market share, a small percentage of the Chinese market would still have been highly profitable for Google. Economic analysts at Piper Jaffray, a U.S.-based investment banking
A tribute to Google.cn
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Photo from Wikimedia Commons
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firm, estimate that Google China, Google. cn, would produce about 2% of Google’s total revenue, or a little more than $400 million. While that may seem like a small percentage, analysts also note that Google China was growing faster than other areas of Google’s business. The profit would likely be more significant in the long term given that only 25 percent of the China’s population currently uses the Internet. Future profits were potentially very large. Some argue that multinational corporations like Google have been able to achieve more in terms of freedom of speech by working outside of China rather than within it. For example, despite Google’s withdrawal, its former users in China can access content through Google’s Hong Kong site, though still filtered by “The Great Firewall.” In addition, Google was also able to change the protocol it uses in Gmail from HTTP to HTTPS, a more secure version used in virtually all e-commerce transactions. This more secure connection prevents the Chinese government from tapping email accounts. Web experts point out that the Chinese government cannot eliminate HTTPS traffic without halting all e-commerce, a nonviable option. Google cannot, nonetheless, completely achieve Internet freedom without working with the Chinese government. China has the ability to shut down Google services if it should so choose. It is not the case that China does not have the ability to shut down Google services if it so chose. The fact that China has yet to block access to Google speaks more to the possibility that China would like to allow Google the potential for negotiating new terms with the government in the future, From a broader perspective, because the Internet is a relatively new and constantly changing technology, there is little relevant precedent to guide Google in its actions. This is one of the first major cases where a prominent international corporation has pursued a policy agenda independent of its host country. Google and corporations like it have the potential to be powerful policy actors, but there is no guarantee that their actions will promote positive outcomes. At the same time, the situation is not entirely new. Google can learn from Microsoft’s experience doing business in China. When Microsoft visited China in
1994, amid disputes between the corporation and the government over piracy and intellectual property rights, China decided to restrict Microsoft from selling Windows in China. Microsoft, rather than abandoning that market, concluded that it could in the end benefit from Chinese citizens using pirated versions of its Windows software and operating system. Microsoft executives invested in a longterm position in China, an investment that is now paying off—China is Microsoft’s second largest market. Censorship is a more fundamental violation of the affected party’s rights than is the restriction of access to computer software, but both Google and Microsoft faced a choice between compromising on issues important to them and abandoning a major market as well as their business and employees within that market. Microsoft offers an example of accommodation to China: developing long-term personal relationships with business partners and the government, and a willingness to accept less-than-ideal conditions initially while focusing on how to create the outcome Microsoft wanted over time. Google will likely achieve Internet freedom if it creates the right incentives for freedom by finding areas of overlap with economic and productivity-enhancing online tools. The online productivity tools that Google is in the process of developing will make it easier for individuals around the world to collaborate online. Google can demonstrate that allowing citizens to access these tools is essential to conducting business with the rest of the world. Even if China’s government does not reduce censorship, China’s continued economic success requires a technologically connected population for both greater productivity and the ability to collaborate and compete globally. Google, by creating such incentives, stands a strong chance of putting the government’s interests in line with users’ interests and the company’s ideals. Google’s opportunity to engage with China’s government is rare and should not be easily disregarded for the sake of idealism. Afp
Lauren may be reached at lzumbach@princeton.edu
Asia
In Context Compiled by Tara Lewis ‘11
“They use so many pages and blogs, and terms like BlackBerry and Twitter, these conspiracy currents.” Hugo Chavez, Venezuelan president, on his opponents’ use of Internet networking sites.
“The international community should not let Obama get away with nuclear threats.” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in response to the new U.S. nuclear strategy that promises not to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for non-nuclear strikes, but makes exceptions for Iran and North Korea.
“Any Muslim in any part of the world who works with Switzerland is an apostate, is against [the Prophet] Muhammad, God and the Qur’an.” Libyan President Moammar al-Gadhafi calling for a jihad against Switzerland due to its recent ban on minarets.
“The earthquake showed no mercy, but we have love. Let us wipe our tears off and strive to meet a brighter tomorrow and let a more beautiful, wealthy and socialist Yushu stand on the vast Tibetan plateau.” Qiang Wei, the Communist Party secretary of China’s Qinghai province, speaking to a gathering mourning the 2,064 victims that died in the earthquake in China on April 14th.
“Only death can stop me.” Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan’s ousted president, asserting presidential legitimacy and calling on the world to reject his country’s transitional government.
“Once you slip in Japan, there is no one to catch your fall.” Masami Yokoyama, a resident of Japan whose application for government aid was rejected three times; Japan’s new left-leaning government revealed that Japan has secretly tracked growing poverty rates since 1998.
“Many women who do not dress modestly ... lead young men astray, corrupt their chastity and spread adultery in society, which increases earthquakes.” Hojatoleslam Kazem Sedighi, an Iranian cleric claiming that women’s clothing choices cause earthquakes.
Sources: Time.com, Reuters.uk, Daily Mail, New York Times, Google News.
May 2010
13
A sia
Bloody Shirts Reforming Thailand’s Broken Political System
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hailand is a nation with a long history of military coups and political drama. Yet the ongoing political theatre, sparked by a 2006 coup that deposed ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra, is unprecedented. Since March, over 100,000 “red shirt” protesters—the core of Thaksin’s power base— have camped out in the streets of Bangkok, demanding that the government step down and hold new elections. The coup has taken a macabre twist with a blood-splattering stunt by protesters on the walls of current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s house. A botched crackdown by the army that left 24 dead did little to calm the storm. At the time of the coup, the military held that it was necessary to rid Thailand of Thaksin due to his gross abuses of power. What originally started as a movement to remove an individual politician, however, has since given way to a larger, more pressing national conflict between the Thai masses, known as the “red shirts”, and the Bangkok elite, or “yellow shirts”. Holding another round of elections for a new government (which has changed hands three times since the 2006 coup), will merely serve to perpetuate the conflict and discontentment on either side, as both refuse to accept the legitimacy of the other’s victory, let alone reconcile or negotiate. The urgency and acuteness of this political gridlock demands a new solution. Although it may be a controversial move, the monarchy must step in to bring all stakeholders to the negotiating table to hammer out a compromise. One reason why the present standoff has taken such a different, agitated path is Thaksin’s role as a symbol of the popular vote and the masses (not to mention his ability to mobilize their anger). When in power, Thaksin instituted many populistspending reforms that benefited the rural poor. This group constituted Thaksin’s main support base and now forms the core of the
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Audrye Wong ‘13 “red shirt” movement. While now a fugitive, Thaksin regularly grabs the political limelight, riling up his supporters through (video) calls for a “people’s revolution.” In addition, the powerful Bangkok elite—comprising the military, business and aristocratic elite as well as the urban middle-classes—has consistently been hostile to the red shirts’ popular appeal. Their use of hard-handed tactics has only heightened tensions. For example, the yellow shirts staged a massive sit-in at Bangkok International Airport, paralyzing the country for days. This demonstration, along with convenient court rulings, helped to topple the Puea Thai party (a Thaksin proxy) after it was elected into power. It was in fact the yellow shirts who first set a precedent for large-scale protests, leading the red shirts to adopt similarly disruptive tactics, as evidenced by the large-scale protests that continue to erupt in Thailand today. Hence, many describe Thailand as being polarized between the red-shirted rural poor in the northern provinces and the yellow-shirted entrenched urban elite, some who disdain the idea of a one-person-onevote democracy as a poor method of political governance. The yellow shirts claim the tacit support of the military and the Thai royalty. They also appear to have the backing of the country’s political and judicial institutions. Past court rulings have not only indicted Thaksin and seized his assets, but also removed the popularly-elected Puea Thai party from power on grounds of fraud. While still true to an extent, this analysis tends to oversimplify the current picture, especially as the protest movements have gained in momentum and scale over the past years. A significant population in Bangkok—most notably the urban lowerincome groups such as taxi drivers and street vendors—identify with the red shirts, supporting the protests even at the expense of their disrupted livelihoods (many work in the tourist and commercial sectors). The
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protests do not even spare the army—a major player—of rifts. While support for Abhisit’s government has traditionally prevailed in the higher echelons of the military, many rank-and-file soldiers belong to lower classes, and share the discontent of the masses. There have been several reports of soldiers melting into the crowds of red shirt protesters, or failing to muster more than half-hearted attempts to rein in the protests as ordered by the government. Such divided loyalty was a key reason that recent efforts to capture red shirt leaders ended in an embarrassing failure for the government, with protesters escaping in blatant view. In fact, even some military top brass are privately urging compromise. In late March, televised peace talks between Abhisit and red shirt leaders raised some hopes for a peaceful resolution, but both sides refused to budge over a timetable for elections. Abhisit proposed dissolving parliament in December 2010 (a year before he has to), but the red shirts are demanding new elections immediately. In addition, the Thai Supreme Court’s recent decision that the Abhisit government had been involved in accepting illicit campaign donations has given the red shirts a timely boost. The current political environment is a lose-lose situation for Abhisit. While a further crackdown on protests would likely be ineffective and only serve to rile the masses further, ceding outright to their demands looks weak politically. Concession would also send the wrong message to the protesters that disruption and violence is the best way to achieve their goals. Clearly, the Prime Minister will have to step down sooner rather than later. Merely working out an election timetable, however, is not sufficient. Such a piecemeal answer will merely continue the same cycle of violent political dramas and standoffs between the red and yellow shirts. The crux of the issue is that both sides must be willing to accept the election results, even if they are in favor of the other party. In order for the political system to function, no party should seek to subvert the results, whether in the form of open protests or by pulling strings behind the scenes. In this respect, the yellow shirted royalists must acknowledge the mandate and staying power of the red shirt movement. It is no longer just a motley rabble of Thaksin proxies and supporters. The red shirt protests have escalated beyond Thaksin, and they now represent a movement to give
Asia
Photo from Flickr Commons
The Red Shirt army in Bangkok, Thailand, the day before the political violence on April 10
more voice to Thailand’s masses symbolizing a hope for future change in Thailand’s institutions. Abhisit and his powerful backers need to recognize that popular attitudes see the current government as an illegitimate front for the elite. Trying to maintain their grip on power without heeding the wishes of the people, as expressed through electoral votes, will impede any forward peaceful resolution in addressing the waves of discontent. On their part, the red shirts must also have more realistic expectations. Declaring the streets of Bangkok to be their “final battleground” in an all-out war is scarcely a productive approach to achieving systematic empowerment for the people. Rather than making uncompromising demands, the red shirts must come to the negotiating table with an open mind. A victory
would entail finding common ground that addresses the concerns of all parties rather than a radical upheaval. Reconciliation, admittedly, is easier said than done, especially with the systemic mutual mistrust present between the people, elites, and the army. This is why the much-revered Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej should step in. The King should use his influence to get the various parties together and broker a compromise. Although the Thai monarchy has historically stayed out of politics, Thailand’s current crisis is unprecedented and begets action rather than silence. To maintain its position above the murky realm of politics, the monarchy certainly should not be a partisan actor and must avoid taking sides. Nevertheless, the King should capitalize on the respect and influence he commands in the nation as le-
May 2010
verage to force the different groups to the negotiating table. He should aim to work out an electoral timetable, a fair system that would take into account the interests of both the masses and the elite, and a mutual agreement to accept the results of a vote by the people. The King should take action soon, especially in light of his ailing health. The uncertainty surrounding his political succession and the unpopularity of the Crown Prince as a successor would put the monarchy in a more difficult position in the future if it attempts to rally the people, army and opposing political leaders together. Furthermore, a silent monarchy will ultimately decrease its legitimacy (already seen to be tacitly backing the elite, who even call themselves the “royalists”) and increase the fragility of both the monarchy and the country’s political system. The existing electoral system has all but broken down. It needs a higher, respected authority to mend the fissures. For all the internal turmoil, the Thai people still accord great love and respect for the throne, believing the King to have their best interests at heart, and will thus be far more likely to listen to him than any perceived partisan actor. Thailand’s harsh lèse majesté laws, which criminalize criticism and defamation of the monarchy, have greatly restricted debate about the King’s national role, and even about his possible death. But it is precisely because of the monarchy’s centrality that Thailand must reform and engage it in securing the foundations of a fair and democratic political system that represents the interests of the people. The King should look at avoiding the regular patronage of loyalists in the army and bureaucracy as well as reducing palace meddling in political appointments. Ultimately, this reform can build a stable, legitimate system that Thais trust without dependence on the King’s leadership and direction. It provides a hopeful, conducive environment for the various quarters in Thailand to thrash out their differences and come to a compromise. With a dose of royalty sense, Thais would hopefully be able to look beyond the color of their shirts and towards their country’s best long-term interests. Afp Audrye may be reached at aywong@princeton.edu
15
A sia
Reuniting the Island Reconciling Sri Lanka with Its Tamil Minority
A
lthough it never achieved the same level of international publicity as some Middle Eastern extremist groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was once one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations in the world. For 27 years, the LTTE fought a bloody civil war against the Sri Lankan government, seeking to carve out an independent state for the Tamil minority against the protests of the ethnically distinct Sinhalese majority. Then, one year ago, the unthinkable happened: the LTTE was defeated, and the civil war came to an end. By May 2009, the LTTE’s territory had been reduced to the size of Central Park, and its remaining soldiers and leaders were soon subdued. Now, for the first time in nearly 30 years, Sri Lankan forces are in undisputed control of the entire island. This newfound stability gives the current government under President Mahinda Rajapaksa a chance to turn the page on this violent chapter of Sri Lankan history and lay the foundation for a lasting peace. For the government, the task ahead will not be easy. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, mainly Tamils, need to be resettled, and much of the north needs to be rebuilt. Moreover, the Tamils are still uncertain of their place in a country controlled by a Sinhalese majority, and their concerns will need to be addressed to ensure that civil war remains in Sri Lanka’s past. While the current challenges are tough, they are certainly easier without the obstruction of the LTTE. Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan government and the international community need to act now to pre-
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Ben Foulon ‘13 vent a recurrence of violence and to establish a stable society. Unfortunately, the government has acted aggressively in the months since the LTTE’s defeat and has made little progress in resolving postwar issues. President Rajapaksa, in particular, has sought to use Sri Lanka’s victory to his personal advantage. In January 2010, Rajapaksa held the presidential election a year earlier than scheduled to capitalize on the popularity surge that came with the war’s end. Despite his easy
“Given the negative repercussions of renewed violence in Sri Lanka, it is clear that the international community has a stake in the success of Sri Lanka’s reconciliation efforts. ”
victory, the president then had his opponent, General Sarath Fonseka— who oversaw the Sri Lankan Army’s victory over the LTTE—arrested for allegedly plotting a coup. Furthermore, President Rajapaksa has continued the government’s wartime restrictions on civil liberties. With the LTTE annihilated, maintaining
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such unnecessary restrictions damages Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions and international credibility. More disturbingly, the government has made little progress in resettling the nearly 260,000 Tamil refugees displaced during the conf lict. Instead, these refugees have been left to languish in crowded, unsanitary, hastily-constructed camps built during the war that are both expensive to maintain and serve as a source of resentment for those trapped inside. The sooner the government can empty the camps, the better. Yet the government has only compounded the problem by allowing Sinhalese families who were evicted by the LTTE during the civil war to return to their former homes and reclaim their land, land on which Tamil families often now reside. Unfortunately, this policy has immense potential for abuse and runs the risk of strengthening the resentment between the two ethnic groups at a time when the country cannot afford such tension. These shortsighted policies risk sowing the seeds of another civil war, which would not only be tragic for Sri Lanka, but also problematic for the international community. With 60.8 million Tamil residents itself, India has a particularly strong interest in a stable Sri Lanka. From 1987 to 1990, India performed peacekeeping operations in the island nation. During that time, it faced stout opposition from the LTTE and lost over 1,000 soldiers, an experience India certainly does not want to repeat. Others—like the United States, China, and Europe—could see trade suffer throughout Southeast Asia if the conf lict reignites due to Sri Lanka’s strategic position along the Indian Ocean trading routes. Moreover, a renewed conf lict would breed new Tamil militant groups that would invariably jostle for power and destabilize Tamil communities. The LTTE was notorious for arms and drug smuggling and was suspected to have ties to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and al Qaeda. Indeed, such organizations adopted several tech-
Asia niques developed by the LTTE. The last thing the international community needs is another LTTE-style extremist group that would carry out illicit activities and cooperate with other terrorist organizations. Given the negative repercussions of renewed violence in Sri Lanka, it is clear that the international community has a stake in the success of Sri Lanka’s reconciliation efforts. On this basis, the United States, the European Union (EU), and the IMF should insist on funding the resettlement of the Tamil refugees and the reconstruction of northern Sri Lanka. By providing funds, the international community can also ensure that the reconstruction is done responsibly. For instance, the EU could require the government to hire Tamils from refugee camps to help with resettlement and reconstruction. Another option is to offer economic incentives or threaten eco-
nomic sanctions if Sri Lanka does not begin resettlement, reconstruction, and political rehabilitation. The EU, in particular, has an effective and easy-to-wield economic lever: the GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) Plus. The GSP Plus is a low-tariff trade arrangement the EU offers to states around the world. The EU recently revoked Sri Lanka’s GSP Plus status in response to its questionable human rights record during the final stages of the civil war. The EU could offer to resume this arrangement with Sri Lanka if it notices progress in the handling of postwar problems. Inf luencing Sri Lanka’s postwar development would be an efficient policy for the United States and the international community. Aiding the reconstruction of Sri Lanka would not significantly increase the amount of foreign aid that the global powers provide annually to various regions. Furthermore, giv-
en the rare advent of peace in Sri Lanka and the popularity of its current government, a well-designed aid plan could yield considerable progress in tack ling postwar challenges. Such efforts would be a small but significant step in eradicating violent extremism and promoting stability in the region. If these efforts are successful, Sri Lanka could become a model for solving longstanding ethnic conf licts. If these efforts fail, the civil war could easily be reignited, and Sri Lanka would follow the tragic path of so many other states mired in endless conf licts around the world. Afp
Ben may be reached at bfoulon@princeton.edu
A LTTE car with soldiers, in Killinochi, April 2004. Photo from Wikimedia Commons.
May 2010
17
US Foreign Policy
The New START A Short-Term Solution
O
n April 8, President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev met in Prague to sign a follow-on agreement to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expired in December 2009. Like START I, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) sets limits on strategic nuclear weapons, specifies how these weapons are to be counted, and includes provisions for verifying compliance with the terms of the treaty. By demonstrating that the United States and Russia are committed to the principle of nuclear arms control and capable of cooperating with each other on this issue, the treaty potentially sets the stage for more ambitious nuclear arms reduction measures in the future. However, the treaty itself is a cautious agreement reflecting unfortunate political realities, and does little to bring the world closer to eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons. New START limits both Russia and the United States to 700 total deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, collectively known as “delivery vehicles.” Because a single delivery vehicle can carry multiple warheads to different targets, the treaty sets a limit of 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. The treaty further limits the U.S. and Russia to no more than 800 combined deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles. While these limits will require some reductions in the number of delivery vehicles and deployed warheads both countries possess, a change in the counting of warheads will allow both countries to cut hundreds of them on paper with no actual reductions. Under START I, each deployed delivery vehicle was counted as carrying a specified number of warheads, regardless of how many warheads were actually equipped on the missile or bomber. These counting rules were based on the fear that, in the event of a crisis, warheads would be added to delivery vehicles and thereby significantly alter the
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John Cappel ‘11 nuclear balance of power. New START abandons these rules, instead only counting the number of warheads actually equipped on deployed missiles. In addition, strategic bombers each count as one warhead, regardless of how many warheads they are actually carrying. New START allows both sides to claim substantial reductions from previously reported warhead levels without decommissioning delivery vehicles or placing warheads in storage. For example, the Russian strategic bomber force, capable of launching over 800 nuclear warheads, will now count as only 75 warheads under the new rules. These new
“New START allows both sides to claim substantial reductions from previously reported warhead levels without decommissioning delivery vehicles or placing warheads in storage. ” rules reflect the evolution in the RussianAmerican relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the Cold War over, neither country appears concerned about a surprise attack involving warheads being rapidly loaded onto existing delivery vehicles. The new treaty’s more relaxed verification measures, designed to be less costly and intrusive, also reflect this improvement in Russian-American relations. The treaty forbids concealing weapons from satellite surveillance, and it allows for on-site inspections
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to check the accuracy of reported weapons counts. But unlike START I, which allowed each country to maintain a permanent monitoring mission at the other’s weapon production facility, the new treaty removes permanent on-site monitoring. When the United States stopped manufacturing new nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, Russia withdrew its suddenly useless monitoring mission, but because Russia has maintained its production of new nuclear weapons, an American mission continued to monitor Russian production facilities until START I expired. The original provision for permanent monitoring consequently came to be seen as unfair and politically toxic in Russia, leading to the removal of this provision in New START. This change and other moves towards a less costly verification regime are reasonable given improved Russian-American relations, though they have the potential to raise some concerns in the Senate during the treaty ratification process. New START effectively continues START I with minor modifications, but the issues left unaddressed in the treaty are almost as notable as its provisions. The new treaty only concerns the number of strategic nuclear weapons held by each nation, completely overlooking thousands of tactical nuclear weapons which are distinguished by their shorter ranges, smaller explosive yields, and intended use against military targets in a combat theater. Nonetheless, some of these tactical weapons are more powerful than the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Both the United States and Russia have undertaken voluntary efforts to reduce their arsenals of tactical weapons, but international agreements continue to neglect this important area. The new agreement also fails to address NATO expansion and American missile defense systems. These issues are necessarily related to decreasing the threat posed by nuclear weapons because they have led Russia to maintain a substantial nuclear arsenal. Russia successfully pressed for the treaty’s preamble to include a statement recognizing the connection between offensive and defensive systems, but there is no mention of NATO. In addition, New START does not address the alert status of nuclear weapons, which can currently be launched within minutes of detecting an incoming nuclear missile—or, as almost occurred in 1995, a U.S.-Norwegian weather rocket. Furthermore, the treaty largely deals
with only deployed warheads and delivery vehicles. Although the measure limiting each country to 800 total deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles will require the United States and Russia to dismantle significant numbers of weapons kept in storage, it does not compel them to dismantle warheads or reduce their stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile materials that could be used for new weapons. Large stockpiles of non-deployed weapons and fissile materials, unnecessary for any legitimate national security purpose, are a security risk, because they increase the likelihood that terrorists will acquire a nuclear weapon or the fissile materials needed for creating a crude, radioactive “dirty bomb.” To be fair, the negotiators appear to have done the best they could, considering the political challenges in both nations. Russia has loudly protested NATO expansion and American missile defense systems. Despite the improbability of a NATO-Russia war, much less one involving nuclear weapons, and the questionable effectiveness of current missile defense systems, such fears
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make Russia unwilling to allow large cuts. Russia’s heavy reliance on a nuclear deterrent to compensate for the degradation of its conventional forces only exacerbates this reluctance. Cold War-era strategic calculations also continue to influence thinking on the American side. A number of Republican senators insist on the need for new nuclear weapons and oppose any mention of missile defense restrictions. Meanwhile, there is broad opposition to weapons cuts to levels that might require the U.S. to eliminate one leg of its strategic triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines, and bombers). The logic behind these arguments is dubious at best. Programs extending the service life of existing nuclear weapons have proved effective in the past. Furthermore, missile defense systems, whatever their value, are under no threat from the vague provisions of New START. Finally, cutting one leg of the strategic triad would hardly undermine America’s nuclear deterrent, particularly considering the hardened state of nuclear missile silos and the relative invulnerability
of nuclear submarines on patrol. On the whole, New START is a modest, stopgap replacement for START I. While it is encouraging that the Obama administration was able to work with Russian leadership to ensure the continued presence of substantial arms-control agreements, the new treaty missed an opportunity to address a number of important issues in reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Although New START demonstrates that the United States and Russia are at least minimally capable of working together on such issues and suggests the possibility that a more extensive agreement may eventually be reached, this treaty and the political circumstances that shaped it give little cause to believe that the world will be, as President Obama hopes, free of nuclear weapons anytime soon. Afp
John may be reached at jcappel@princeton.edu
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev after signing the “New START” treaty in Prague. Photo from Wikimedia Commons.
May 2010
19
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