AFP Winter 2013

american foreign policy Winter 2013

Volume XII, Issue III

From the Editor-in-Chief

Staff Editor-in-Chief Joe Margolies ‘15

Dear Readers, With the turning of the new year, nations around the world have elected new leaders, reacted to new policies, and laid new foundations. As 2012 came to a close, the world watched Israel’s government with mounting curiosity. Continued tensions over actions taken in Palestinian territories and Palestine’s upgrade to UN observer status in November piqued an enormous amount of interest in the Israeli elections in 2013. In the wake of these elections, as Israel and the world become increasingly critical of President Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party, its leadership is reevaluating its strategy for remaining viable in future elections. In our cover article, Robert DeNunzio discusses the internal strategy of the Israeli political right leading up to the election, contending that Netanyahu’s struggle to hold on to waning power will benefit Palestine and Iran.

In India, power has also changed hands with the swearing in of 22 new cabinet ministers, but according to Suchi Mandavilli, the change will have little effect on India’s as yet stagnant progress towards modernization. In Egypt, politicians made progress of their own, ratifying the country’s first constitution since Hosni Mubarak was forced out of office two years ago.

Robert Joyce discusses the various factions vying for influence on Egypt’s future, discussing how far Islamism will permeate the foundations of the developing nation.

In Spain, austerity measures continue to spark protests. Neelay Patil argues that the global economy depends on Spain’s ability to better adapt its austerity program to its growing debt.

According to Neelay, Spain should seek help from the IMF and prioritize the infrastructure that is currently facing cuts over long-term financial commitments like social security.

The results of elections in East Asia recalled the political leadership of the past. South Korean voters elected right-wring leader Park Geun-hye in the closest presidential race in history. Park is the daughter of Park Chung-hee, a former South Korean dictator whose regime seems not to have hurt his daughter’s chances at the presidency. Seongcheol Kim contends that Park’s election demonstrates the forgetfulness of an electorate that has been exposed to constant revelations of scandal within Park’s political party or her father’s administration.

In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party returned to power after three years in the minority. Jamal Maddox explores how Japan’s new leadership raises very significant questions about Japan’s relationship with the united states. With growing friction between Japan and China, countries with which the United States has important but distinct relationships, the new government will have great influence on the stability of the region and the image of the U.S. in East Asia. Finally, George Maliha turns our attention to a way to improve both our image abroad as well as global stability. He points to our supporting allied counterterrorism measures in Mali as a potential model for future efforts without resorting to costly military deployment.

Publisher Joanne Im ‘15 Managing Editors Rachel Webb ‘14 Sunny Jeon ‘14 Joanne Im ‘15 Rahul Subramanian ‘15 Editors Matt Arons Kristie Liao Jonathan Lin Andres Perez-Benzo Christiana Renfro Daniel Toker Emily VanderLinden

Audrye Wong

David Zhao ‘15 Production Manager

Kim Hopewell Amy Gopinathan Sam Watters

No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible.

This publication strives to use all Creative Commons licensed images. Please contact AFP if you feel any rights have been infringed.

All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 3611 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com

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‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘15 ‘15 ‘15

‘13 Mia Rifai ‘14 Kathryn Moore ‘15 Patricio Elizondo

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Copy Editors Christina Henricks ‘13 Ben Kotopka ‘13 Editors-in-Chief Emeriti

Taman Narayan ‘13 Adam Safadi ‘14

Sincerely, Joe Margolies Editor-in-Chief

American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.

Valarie Hansen Suchi Mandavilli Amy Gopinathan Jared Isenstein Simon Segert Zach Ogle Monica Chon David Zhao

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I look forward to the coming year at American Foreign Policy. Please continue to follow U.S. on our website www.afpprinceton.com to read current articles, look through past issues, and check out our blog.

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Business Staff

Kimberly Hopewell ‘13

Zara Mannan ‘13

AFP Advisory Board

Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Cecilia Rouse: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School

American Foreign Policy

AFP Cover Story

A merican F oreign P olicy Winter 2013 Volume XII, Issue III

ta b l e o f co n t e n ts

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Israel’s New Right Consequences of the New Conservative Coalition Robert DeNunzio ‘16

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An Unproductive Change India’s Reshuffled Cabinet Suchi Mandavilli ‘14

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AFP Quiz

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A Continuing Battle Constitutional Progress in Egypt Robert Joyce ‘13

Joe Margolies ‘15

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Global Update

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Protesting Austerity Respondig to Spanish Budget Woes Neelay Patil ‘14

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Rachel Webb ‘14 and Sunny Jeon ‘14

The Triumph of Forgetfulness A Look at the South Korean Elections Seongcheol Kim ‘14 A Return to Power Impact of Japan’s Elections on U.S. Relations Jamal Maddox ‘16

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In Context

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Fulfilling Shared Objectives Mali as a Model for Cooperative Counterterrorism George Maliha ‘13

Adam Safadi ‘14

Photo Credits: Thierry Ehrmann via flickr.com, commons.wikimedia.org

Winter 2013

Cover Image by Joe Margolies ‘15

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Middle East

Israel’s New Right Consequences of the New Conservative Coalition

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sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have miscalculated when he aligned his Likud party to the Yisrael Beiteinu faction led by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Netanyahu shocked the political world in October by announcing that the two parties would run under one ballot in the 2013 elections. The right-of-center Likud party currently holds more parliament seats than any other faction and seems an unlikely bedmate for the right-wing extremist Beitenu group led by Avigdor Lieberman. Cynics believe Netanyahu created the alliance to stabilize his control of the government, fearing a return to politics by Ehud Olmert, the former prime minister, and perhaps the only individual capable of challenging the current regime.

Netanyahu himself explained the union by saying, “We face tremendous challenges and this is the time to join forces for the State of Israel’s sake”, but opponents of the coalition believe the decision to ally with Lieberman raises doubts about Netanyahu’s desire for peace in the Middle East.

Indeed, Lieberman is one of the most outspoken critics of the Palestinian Authority, and has gone so far as to describe President Mahmoud Abbas as, “an obstacle to peace”. The coalition announcement may particularly alarm Americans after Netanyahu’s November announcement that he is ready to launch nuclear assaults against Iran if they fail to satisfactorily halt their nuclear program. In the same announcement Netanyahu stated that Israel was prepared to act unilaterally because the United States failed to establish a clear “red line” regarding the Iranian nuclear threat. Tensions between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu remained high as elections approached, and Netanyahu’s shift towards the more militant Yisrael Beiteinu group indicates the Prime Minister will not abandon his aggressive stance against Iran.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s decision to align with Lieberman seemed to have backfired after Israeli authorities indicted the Foreign Minister in December. While

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Robert DeNunzio ‘16 the political embarrassment of his ally’s fall from grace has certainly hurt Netanyahu’s position, it appears that the PM will be able to win reelection because no credible opponent exists. The consequences for the Middle East remain unclear, but after winning reelection, it is likely that Netanyahu will continue to pursue aggressive policies in the Middle East, both against Iran and Palestine.

President Obama’s nomination of former Republican Senator Chuck Hagel for Defense Secretary may further complicate relations between the two leaders. The Republican Jewish Coalition has criticized Hagel for being anti-Israel due to some of his voting decisions in the Senate, including his opposition of sanctions against Iran and his relatively soft approach to terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah. Obama’s deputy national security advisor stated that, “The president has a record of unprecedented security cooperation with Israel and that’s going to continue no matter who the defense secretary is,” to try and assuage growing concerns that Obama and Netanyahu may have different visions for the future of the Middle East. If the Senate Armed Services Committee approves Hagel’s nomination at the end of January, it may signify a shift in U.S policy towards Israel. With Hagel’s support, Obama may be in a position to put more pressure on President Netanyahu in a variety of areas, including forcing the Israeli Prime Minister to engage in direct negotiations with Hamas.

Regardless of foreign policy implications for Israel, the coalition has reshaped the political environment of the country.

Both Shelly Yacimovich, chairwoman of the Labour party, and Shaul Mofaz, chairman of the Kadima party, advocated for a coalition of Israel’s centrist parties to balance the new unified conservative bloc. Organization proved difficult for the centrist parties, as the January elections approached the LikudBeitenu faction seemed guaranteed victory.

When Israeli prosecutors indicted Lieberman in December, however, Netanyahu’s

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brilliant political manoeuver became the single most significant threat to his reelection, a threat which news articles have begun referring to as “Netanyahu’s new Headache”.

Authorities indicted Lieberman for promoting a diplomat who gave him inside information regarding a Belarusian investigation into his business affairs. The indictment resulted from twelve years of investigations into charges of bribery and money laundering, but the Israeli attorney general said he was unable to find enough evidence to pursue Lieberman for more stringent crimes and had to settle for charges of fraud and breach of trust. Lieberman waived his parliamentary immunity in an attempt to resolve the charges before the January elections, but the testimony against him appears to be strong enough that Israeli law officials are not seeking a plea deal. Charges of moral turpitude may be added over the course of the trial. If convicted, Lieberman will be unable to seek public office for seven years.

While Lieberman’s indictment has improved Netanyahu’s prospects in future elections. Because no centrist or left-wing opponent exists to challenge Netanyahu, Lieberman’s exclusion from politics for such a long period guarantees that Netanyahu will face weak opposition in the foreseeable future. While the Likud take a softer approach to Iran and Hamas than do Yisrael Beitenu, the current policies of the party suggest that without U.S. pressure, Israel will not favor negotiations with either group.

If Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu had not formed a coalition, Netanyahu might have used the indictment to strengthen his position by appropriating troubled members of Lieberman’s party. As things stand, however, he has been forced to defend his running mate and Netanyahu commented, “I believe in Israel’s legal system and respect it. The right that it grants any Israeli citizen to defend himself also extends to Mr. Lieberman, and I hope for him that he’ll be able to prove that he’s also innocent.” When a cabinet official resigns his post, the prime minister obtains the powers of the office and Netanyahu shows no signs of appointing a new Foreign Minister prior to the 2013 elections. This means that Netanyahu has absolute control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the body responsible for implementing Israeli foreign policy. In other words, when Lieberman left office, Netanyahu’s power nearly doubled.

The Prime Minister is currently struggling to recover from the political fallout of

Middle East

A poster for Israeli conservative party Likud advertising President Netanyahu as “strong against Hamas.” Image courtesy of Hadar Naim via flickr

Lieberman’s resignation. The Likud party won 31 seats in the January 22 elections, down from a total of 42 seats in the current parliament. Still, 31 seats are significantly more than the second place party, Yesh Atid, which won 19 seats. Even if Netanyahu can stymie political criticism and achieve reelection, he may face aggressive reactions from Palestine.

Since Palestine’s United Nations status was upgraded from “non-member state” to “entity” in November of this year, the Palestinian Authority gained leverage against Israel because the PA may now petition to join the International Criminal Court (ICC). With Netanyahu’s position currently weakened, the Palestine Authority has a unique opportunity to pursue admission to the court and gain credibility in its pursuit of a new Palestinian state.

If Palestine were to join the court, they would gain the power to file complaints against Israel for war crimes. It’s important to note that the ICC would only have jurisdiction in cases following Palestinian admission, so cases occurring before that date would not be investigated. Further, the ICC has jurisdiction only in cases which occurred on its member’s sovereign territory,

which is difficult to define in Palestine’s case. Still, Israel wishes to avoid Palestinian admission to the ICC. However, after Prime Minister Netanyahu announced his desire to build new settlements in East Jerusalem and on the West Bank on land which Palestine covets as part of a future Palestinian State, Palestine has threatened to join the court in retaliation if Netanyahu is reelected and pursues this plan. Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki commented, “As long as the Israelis are not committing atrocities, are not building settlements, are not violating international law, then we don’t see any reason to go anywhere” but continued, “If the Israelis continue with such policy - aggression, settlements, assassinations, attacks, confiscations, building walls - violating international law, then we have no other remedy but really to knock those to other places.” The United States threatened to remove aid to the Palestinian Authority if they pursue ICC membership, and if Netanyahu is reelected, as his political coalition seems to guarantee, it may create a snowball effect by which the Palestinian Authority will pursue ICC membership and the United States will be forced to honor their threat.

Overall, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s

Winter 2013

weakened position benefits Palestine and Iran, two groups with which Netanyahu has been unceasingly hostile. Iran’s benefit is minimal due to the abundance of foreign pressure against the country, but Palestine has an opportunity to improve its position against Israel politically by joining the ICC. Domestically, the left-wing and centrist groups in Israel gained a chance to oppose right-wing domination of Israeli politics, but disorganization and a lack of cooperation precluded serious political change. For his part, President Obama has also gained leverage due to Lieberman’s fall, and the President’s influence will play a pivotal role in Israeli foreign policy for the next several years. The likelihood of continued violence between Israel and Palestine depends largely on President Obama’s ability to advocate for negotiation strategies that Netanyahu will accept and peace advocates can only hope that the President is able to prevent further conflict from breaking out. Afp

Robert may be reached at rad3@princeton.edu

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Asia

Indian Parliament building in Delhi, India. Photo courtesy of Shahnoor Habib Munmun via Wikimedia Commons

An Unproductive Change India’s Reshuffled Cabinet

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n October 28, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh swore in 22 ministers to the Indian cabinet. This third and biggest shuffle of ministers since Singh’s re-election in 2009 involved seven new ministers and 15 new junior ministers.

The move has been perceived as an attempt to motivate change in and create a new face for a paralyzed government.

The pressing question is whether or not this upheaval will actually produce the desired effect.

The United Progressive Alliance, which was formed after the 2004 general election in which no single party managed to win an absolute majority, is chaired by Indian National Congress party president Sonia Gandhi. Prime Minister Singh and his ministers are all chosen from UPA. Singh is also a member of the Congress party.

Singh had been under some pressure to shuffle the cabinet. The party, and Singh himself, has been under much scrutiny of late; Congress’ reputation has been tainted with a slue of charges against it, including those of corruption, nepotism, and responsibility for

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Suchi Mandavilli ‘14

India’s slowing economic growth.

In August, the Comptroller and Audit General of India released a report accusing the Indian government of missing out on close to $34 billion in potential royalties by allocating coal blocks cheaply as opposed to auctioning them off. According to the CAG audit report, the “allocation lacked transparency and objectivity.”

The Congress party’s principal opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party has accused Singh of mismanaging the party. According to a BJP Statement, Singh “is morally, politically and personally responsible for this wrongful loss.”

The Indian National Congress has not even been faring well with its UPA allies. The Trinamool Congress Party (separate from the Indian National Congress) withdrew support from the UPA in September due mainly to anger at the decision to open India’s retail sector to global supermarket chains. While the withdrawal was not enough to threaten general UPA support, it did not help the Congress party’s situation.

The coal scandal and TMC’s withdrawal are just two examples of many

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allegations held against Congress and its members. As the last change of ministers before the 2014 national election, the shuffle was hoped to improve the party’s electoral prospects. There is, however, much controversy over whether the change is a productive one or not.

On one end, some believe that the shuffle has brought the new faces necessary to get things done in a government that has thus far shown to be incapable of accomplishing much. Singh advertised the change as one that would bring needed youth to the cabinet. Despite these assertions, the move has done no such thing. The average age of the seven new ministers is just over 62. The average age of all cabinet ministers was only lowered by a few months to just over 64.

Certainly some of the new ministers are younger than their predecessors, but the age difference is not significant.

At the other extreme there is the belief that these shuffles are preventing badly needed development. According to Neelam Deo, director of the Mumbai-based research institution Gateway House, the “changes appear arbitrary, and don’t have any apparent logic for the efficient functioning of the ministries.”

Consider the fact that five of the new additions are from the state of Andhra Pradesh. Many have commented that this seems to be a purely political

move, as Congress attempts to cement its power in the state. There has been some criticism for these appointments, for Congress has now placed people in important ministerial positions on the basis of regional affiliation as opposed to merit.

These new appointments have also done nothing for Congress’ reputation as being mired in corruption. Former law minister Salman Khurshid became India’s new foreign affairs minister in the shuffle. Khurshid is the first Muslim foreign minister in 16 years, and the third in India’s history. He is hoped to be a more effective force in ongoing talks with Pakistan than his predecessor S.M. Krishna was. His reputation, however, is not without blemish. His family has been accused of diverting funds from a charity for disabled persons.

Also, Shashi Tharoor, now minister of state for human resource development, is not a new face. A former minister of state, he resigned in 2010 in light of a corruption scandal.

UPA certainly intended shuffling the cabinet ministers to signify a modernization in Indian government and an omen of change for the future. Given the decisions made in the shuffle, however, the future they are predicting does not seem to be the best one possible. While new faces can certainly be helpful in instigating change, if these new members do not have the proper capabilities to handle their ministerial positions, then the change is for naught.

The Indian government is certainly in dire need of a boost. During its monsoon session, which ran from August to

Asia

September, the Indian parliament accomplished little. “The UPA Government has been accused of delays, indecisiveness, [and] lack of leadership in economic decision making leading to policy paralysis,” BJP said in a statement. If the shuffle was expected to lead the government out of its paralysis, the results have yet to be seen.

The parliament’s winter session ran from November 22 to late December without much to show. According to PRS Legislative Research, during the winter session Lok Sabha (the lower house) worked for 53% of its schedule hours, and Rajya Sabha (the upper house) for 58%. Important bills and questions that ought to have been addressed during this session were left at the wayside due to the parliament’s time management issues. This Lok Sabha has passed an average of 40 bills a year since its 2009 election. This is in contrast to the previous Lok Sabha’s 72 bills a year.

While some look upon this shuffle hopefully, anticipating a more productive government leading up to the 2014 election, current prospects are dim. The shuffle was a good opportunity for Congress to choose better, more qualified faces to replace ministers that hadn’t been as effective as they should have been. Instead, by pandering to politics, Congress seems to have missed this chance, which could lead to yet another unproductive year. Afp Suchi may be reached at smandavi@princeton.edu

AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Joe Margolies ‘15 1. How many U.S. senators voted not to appoint Senator John Kerry to the position of Secretary of State?

A. Five B. Thirty-two C. Twelve D. Three 2. In January, what nation became the first ever to miss its own UN Human Rights Council review?

A. Russia B. Israel C. North Korea D. Venezuela 3. What 2013 candidate for the Australian senate, best known for his other ventures, received the endorsement that “He will be awesome” from his mother?

A. Queenie McKenzie B. Hugh Jackman C. Julian Assange D. Lleyton Hewitt 4. Which South American Nation plans to decriminalize ecstasy in an attempt to curb drug use and trafficking?

A. Colombia B. Nicaragua C. Venezuela D. Bolivia 5. Citing the struggle against global Jihad, what nation recently deported a group of radical muslim clergy?

A. Spain B. England C. France D. Canada

Sources: BBC News, Daily Mail, The Local, The Age Indian PM Singh presenting at the India Leadership Forum. Photo courtesy of Mark Kobayashi-Hillary via Wikimedia Commons

Winter 2013

Answers on page 15

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Middle East

A Continuing Battle Constitutional Progress in Egypt Robert Joyce ‘13

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n December 26th President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt signed the country’s first postMubarak constitution into law.

The charter was approved by a 63.8% margin over two days of voting. The constitution marks a milestone in Egypt’s stuttering transition following the January 25th, 2011 Revolution. Decried by some Western observers as overly Islamist, the constitution falls far short of Taliban or Iranian-esque expectations. While likely to holdup its drafting and passage represents a serious misstep that has shaken Morsi’s credibility and emptied his political capital.

In the weeks preceding the vote, the opposition was undecided whether to boycott or vote against the measure. They decided, late, to vote against it. Despite winning the majority of the vote, the large protests and low turnout suggest Morsi does not have a consensus. His bizarre, dictator-like behavior during the process has left alienated some supporters.

For the United States, the content of the constitution means little. No single element has raised concern. The process, however, ought to concern U.S. policy makers who question Egypt’s stability and Morsi’s ability to deliver domestically on his foreign agreements. Given almost total control over what could have been a relatively simple process, Morsi’s otherwise organized Muslim Brotherhood proved unpredictable and incompetent under pressure. The less than stellar performance, however, also should calm those caught up with convincing the rest of U.S. that Egypt is headed right into the hands of extremists, because, if Morsi’s steering, they’ll never get there.

The charter, and more importantly the process that created it, has been an undeniable debacle. Since the Revolution, news outlets around the world have been saturated with stories of protest, violence and votes in Egypt. The coverage has often blurred the story. The public shouting match in Egypt, often staged in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, has

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pitted overlapping societal elements debating the role of religion, socioeconomic class, civil rights, economic and foreign policy. Conflicts have been popular, with civilians protesting and counter-protesting each other, popular vs. government, and government on government. The constitution itself has at some times been at the forefront of these debates, while at others has sunk into the background. The process started weeks after former President Hosni Mubarak stepped down. On March 19th, 2011 a set of amendments to the existing constitution, drafted in 1971 under then President Sadat (Mubarak’s predecessor and fellow National Democratic Party member), was passed by a large majority.

The changes answered some basic opposition demands of the Mubarak era.

Most importantly, the president was limited to two four-year terms. Parliamentary and presidential elections were set to precede the writing of a new constitution.

Civil liberties and human rights issues were ignored, left for the constituent assembly– a move proved unwise considering the rise in military trials and arrests of protestors and journalists. The vote, also, marked the end of Egypt’s revolutionary unity. Secular liberals condemned the move, calling it rushed and thereby giving an advantage to the better organized Muslim Brotherhood to sweep the Parliament, Presidency and control of the constitution process. Their concern proved prophetic.

The first constituent assembly, tasked with writing the constitution, reflected the majority won by Islam-inspired parties in the November 2011-January 2012 parliamentary elections. Out of 100 members, 66 were from Islamist backgrounds, with only five Coptic Christians and six women.

After significant secular opposition, this assembly was dissolved in favor of a new formula in June. Women’s representation, however, dropped to four, all from Muslim religious parties. Secular liberals eventually dropped out of the process altogether,

American Foreign Policy

claiming that their concerns were not being addressed.

In November, the constitution was pushed back to the forefront of Tahrir’s concerns. On November 22nd, President Morsi issued a decree excluding his future actions from judiciary oversight. The declaration removed Egypt’s chief prosecutor, a Morsi opponent and Mubarak holdover in addition to promising new charges against former regime officials for violence committed during the Revolution. In light of the praise he gained from his diplomatic involvement reaching a ceasefire in Gaza, Morsi felt his hand strengthened enough for such a bold move. He underestimated his opposition. The judiciary branch as a whole declared the decree illegal. In a rare act of unity, the secular opposition worked together to protest with major political leaders demanding Morsi’s resignation.

Morsi was forced to back down from the decree in the favor of popular outrage, but in that time the constituent assemble had hurriedly approved the draft charter.

Morsi’s retreat signified a win for the masses and for democratic precedent in Egypt.

Given that the constitution was approved anyway, the win was moot. The resulting constitution is not, as some commentators have claimed, an “Islamist” dream: the codification of Shariah law; but rather a hastily produced often disappointing document.

From the onset, the controversial constituent assembly opted to start with the existing 1971 as a base, as opposed to starting fresh. This decision was made, as experts have suggested, out of the fear from the controlling religious parties that the assembly could be dissolved any time by the judiciary or public outcry. Few changes were actually made to the 1971 version, notable differences were pointed out by Al Jazeera.

Perhaps the most fought over was Article 2, which was in the end left unchanged.

The article reads: “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language.

Principles of Islamic law [shari’a] are the principal source of legislation.” Secular opposition leaders sought to keep this article intact. Traditionally, the Egyptian judiciary has interpreted the term “principal source” very broadly, leaving this section toothless.

Islam, nevertheless, leaves a strong mark on the constitution. “Insulting prophets and messengers” is explicitly outlawed, notable given the September 11th riots in Cairo ostensibly over a film insulting the Prophet Mohammed. Al Azhar, the leading

Middle East

Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square to protest the new constitution. Photo courtesy of Lilian Wagdy via Wikimedia Commons

Sunni Islam university and religious authority in Egypt founded in 970 CE, is specifically mentioned as “independent.” Further, that “scholars of Al Azhar should be consulted in all matters related to Sharia.”

Under Mubarak, the head of Al Azhar was handpicked by the regime and issued politically based rulings. Secularists now worry that Al Azhar’s influence will grow politically, leading to more religious legislation and interpretation. It is unclear, however, that Egypt’s political class, even the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafis, is willing to yield any real authority to the unelected scholars.

Treatment of minority faiths is also cause for concern. One article spells out state protection for followers of the “heavenly religions,” meaning Christianity, Islam and Judaism. While the Abrahamic religions dominate Egyptian life, this article could legalize discrimination against other religions, especially, as Al Jazeera notes, Bahais.

Two other areas, women’s rights and indefinite detention, also drew the ire of activists. Article 10 states that the Egyptian state shall ensure “reconciliation between the duties of a woman toward her family and her work,” and then in the following article: “protect ethics, morality and public order.” Neither are significant departures

from the 1971 text, but they are let downs for women’s rights activists who saw the Revolution as an opportunity for a progressive leap out of patriarchy.

As for detention, habeas corpus is preserved except in “flagrant” cases–a definition no one in the human rights community is comfortable with the Egyptian government or military deciding.

Opponents to the constitution also cite the referendum process itself as undermine the document’s legitimacy. They point to the low turnout, only 33% of voters according to AP, as evidence that no national consensus exists. Princeton’s own Sarah Mousa condemned the process as chaotic and issued her own verdict on the President writing, “the Morsi government, in its failure to run orderly elections, is not in control.”

Lack of judicial oversight in many locations led to substantiated complaints of fraud. While likely credible, these complaints will be ignored. The vote is over, and despite the grumblings of a large cross section of Egyptian society, the constitution itself doesn’t instigate the same furious response as the flawed process of passing it.

The document as a whole will likely stick.

Nevertheless, we can expect multiple judicial challenges on the measures deemed controversial. The courts will fight for pow-

Winter 2013

er over their domain, curtailing articles they deem out of line. The larger question is where does the end of this process leave Morsi?

Looking ahead, Morsi will likely focus on small, noncontroversial measures aimed at stability domestically. A significant portion of the votes in favor of the constitution can be read as votes for stability rather than the document itself. People want the protests to end, trash to be picked up, tourism to return, businesses opening and the economy moving again. After two years exactly, Egypt is weary. Morsi likely understands this and will aim to avoid contentious domestic issues for the time being.

Abroad, expect involvement in issues like Palestinian unification, talks between Fatah and Hamas, as that is one of few foreign policies that will gain him support from both the secularists and religious parties.

Morsi has urged Egyptians to move on from the constitutional fiasco and instead turn to “the epic battle for construction and production.” In Egypt, the battle continues.

Afp Robert may be reached at rjoyce@princeton.edu

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A: Even as NORTH KOREA

threatens “strong physical countermeasures” against South Korea in response to increased UN sanctions, the U.S. envoy to North Korea commits to judging the country by its “actions, not its words.”

B:

RUSSIA does not renew a 20-year-old weapons pact to dismantle nuclear weapons. Observers believe this move is partially motivated by broader desire to pull out of America-led initiatives.

G: The General Assembly’s vote to H: President Hugo Chavez is upgrade the status of Palestinians at the UN leads ISRAEL to increase settlement construction. The project would partially divide the southern and northern West Bank, blocking a contiguous Palestinian state.

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inaugurated to his fourth term in VENEZUELA. Despite a health crisis that prevented his attending the ceremony, Mr. Chavez continues to control power through dictations to his vice-president.

American Foreign Policy

C: Demonstrators in EGYPT have

ignored President Morsi’s 9 p.m. curfew, gathering in the thousands in Cairo and Alexandria. Morsi has described recent protests as “against the revolution.”

I: President Mukherjee of INDIA

calls for the country to “reset its moral compass” after the rape and death of 23 year old Badri Nath Singh. The incident led to a government report urging reforms in the treatment of women.

D: CHINA and the PHILIP-

E: President Yahya Jammeh of THE F: In Buraida, SAUDI ARABIA, GAMBIA has implemented a four day work week to give the large Muslim population more time to pray, socialize, and tend to farms.

women protest the detention of family members by the government.

Both citizens and rights groups have protested the poor treatment of prisoners.

J: SOUTH SUDAN fails to reach a

K: The former GUATEMALAN

L: The United States steps up its in-

PINES’ dispute over sovereignty in the South China Sea is being taken to an international tribunal. The U.S. remains neutral on the issue.

deal on security arrangements and oil exports with SUDAN with the demilitarized 14-mile border zone remaining contested.

dictator, Rios Montt, is ordered to stand trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity by a Guatemalan judge.

Winter 2013

volvement in the French intervention in MALI. The U.S. military is now conducting aerial refueling missions in addition to providing intelligence and airlift support.

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Europe

Protesting Austerity Responding to Spanish Budget Woes

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n December 19th, Spanish scientists protested against cuts in federal research by releasing balloons into the sky, an act that symbolized how the cuts could result in a Spanish brain drain.

Since 2009, Spain’s budget for scientific research has dropped by 39%, down to 2005 levels. This has prompted scientists to join the widespread “15-M” protests, an ongoing grassroots movement in which public health workers, transportation workers, miners, and even police officers, are involved.

The Spanish government has announced that it will attempt to slash more than $50 billion from its annual budget through spending cuts, which would lower its expenditure down to the limit set by the European Union.

The recent cuts are a response to an economic crisis that began with the 2008 global financial collapse. Since then, crashes in the Spanish property market, a massive trade deficit, and decreasing competitiveness in global markets have exacerbated Spain’s economic woes.

The failure of a major economy like Spain’s would have worldwide reverberations, harming the economies of Europe and the United States. Spain should redesign its austerity program to accommodate growing debt and social unrest by limiting expenditure on long-term commitments like social security instead of cutting costs in educational and infrastructure programs.

Furthermore, Spain should appeal to international bodies, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for support to ensure the successful refinancing of its national debt if an economic collapse seems imminent.

The current recession has continued for five straight quarters, and inflation remains high. Furthermore, the national sales tax rose to 21% over the summer, and the unemployment rate is nearing 25%, lowering domestic con-

12

Neelay Patil ‘14 sumer demand. In October, the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded Spain’s credit rating two levels to BBB-. These economic troubles have become entangled with the ongoing housing crisis; hundreds of Spaniards are evicted daily from their homes due to longstanding debt and a complex system of blacklisting.

“Spain should redesign its austerity program to accomodate growing debt and social unrest by limiting expenditur eon long-term commitments like social security instead of cutting costs in educational and infrastructue programs.”

If Spain’s economy experienced the type of total collapse that some analysts fear threatens Greece, the repercussions would spread to other members of the Eurozone as well as the United States.

As the fourth largest in the bloc, Spain’s economy plays a major role in the continent, comprising approximately 11% of the Eurozone’s total GDP. To put that into perspective, the countries that have previously received rescue packages from the European Union (EU) and the IMF, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, make up less than 6% combined.

Given that the United States has economic ties to Europe, an economic collapse in Spain would have dire effects on the United States. President Obama explained the connection in simple terms after a European debt conference in 2011, saying, “if Europe is weak, if

American Foreign Policy

Europe is not growing, as our largest trading partner, that’s going to have an impact on our businesses and our ability to create jobs here.” American banks, companies, and individuals have major investments in Europe that would be affected by an economic breakdown.

Prime Minister Rajoy, the leader of the conservative People’s Party in Spain, won the premiership in 2011 running on a reformist platform based on decreasing the size of government, lowering taxes, and empowering small business. Although his policy of austerity certainly lowers government spending, citizens have not enjoyed the benefits of increased discretionary income and economic empowerment.

In his austerity proposal last July, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy detailed a set of spending cuts, saying the reductions are “not pleasant, but they are necessary.” His plan to cut 150 billion euros by the end of 2014 includes public sector pay freezes, unemployment benefit reductions, energy production taxes, the elimination of property tax breaks, and even a new tax on lottery winnings. In September, Spain made a pledge to the Eurozone to lower its deficit to 4.5% of its GDP in 2013.

Despite the administration’s stated commitment to protect the social welfare programs that benefit the most people, in 2012 there were over 1900 civilian protests in Madrid alone. Recently, some demonstrations have taken an ugly turn, causing mass arrests and injuries and spurring police to use batons and rubber bullets. Protesters claim Parliament does not represent them fairly and that it is tied to corporate interests.

Regional authorities have also responded to the actions taken by the Spanish government. Five of Spain’s seventeen semiautonomous regions have withdrawn money from a federal emergency fund organized by the Rajoy administration. The powerful region of Catalonia, led by regional President Artur Mar, has made a forceful bid for independence in an attempt to escape Spain’s economic woes. The Rajoy administration has maintained that any attempt to secede from Spain is unconstitutional and has threatened to use legal means to prevent such a move.

Growing discontent in the region, how-

Europe

Spanish citizens protesting the 2013 budget proposal. Photo courtesy of Popicinio via flickr.

ever, spurred Spanish King Juan Carlos to appeal for national unity in the face of crisis in his annual Christmas Eve address.

Due to the magnitude of the challenges that Spain faces, Eurozone ministers approved a rescue package in June to provide funding to the country’s banking system. A second, larger bailout from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF may also be forthcoming, though the Rajoy administration claims that Spain will not need it. By refusing money from international institutions, the Spanish government can maintain more autonomy, but risks falling deeper into the recession.

Other members of the European Union that would be affected by economic policy changes are also involved in the discussion of Spain and the Eurozone. Most notably, Germany has been an advocate of price stability and a strict policy of austerity, especially in negotiations involving Greece.

Clearly, the Spanish government faces a complicated set of issues as it searches for ways to maintain an acceptable budget. Though Rajoy’s hands seem to be tied by a number of political and economic restrictions placed on Spain’s policies, certain initial steps can be taken to promote a more effective austerity policy. An overall goal should be to avoid missteps that could lead to

long-term inefficiency in the future, especially in the areas of education and infrastructure. The cuts to education and scientific research that were recently proposed, for example, could hamper Spain’s chances to encourage innovation in the future. Plans to privatize Spanish ports, airports, and railways could leave the future of Spanish infrastructure in precarious conditions. The Rajoy administration should exercise extreme caution when implementing spending cuts in these areas, for they are likely to drive growth in the future.

It seems obvious that during this period of austerity, Spain should be wary of making long-term spending commitments. Nevertheless, the Rajoy administration plans to increase pension payments by 1% in the 2013 budget. Though the gesture fulfills one of Rajoy’s many campaign promises, several economists have suggested that the spending increase in pension payments is not sustainable. This small increase in disposable income will probably increase consumer spending only slightly, whereas spending on infrastructure and education would likely boost the job market and spark more economic growth. In the future, the Spanish government should avoid making spending increases in areas of long-term commitments, such as social security.

Winter 2013

Finally, if Spain believes that it needs a bailout, it should be ready to approach negotiations with the ECB and the IMF with an open mind. In the extreme case of an economic collapse, the Rajoy administration should accept a rescue package rather than risk the economic wellbeing of Spain, Europe, and countries across the globe.

Although the United States will certainly be affected by the developments in Spain, its role in European politics remains limited. Nevertheless, American policymakers can urge Spain to implement a more efficient set of austerity policies that focus on maintaining educational and infrastructure programs.

In addition, the United States can encourage negotiations between Spain and international organizations in order to facilitate an appropriate bailout package if it becomes necessary.

Spain’s path forward is difficult; the country confronts massive debt, ongoing protests, and calls for regional secession. Only by designing policies that spur long-term growth and by gaining international support can Spain begin to regain national stability. Afp

Neelay may be reached at npatil@princeton.edu

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Asia

The Triumph of Forgetfulness A Look at the South Korean Elections

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n December 2012, Park Geun-hye of the right-wing Saenuri party was elected to the South Korean presidency with the most robust mandate of any president in the democratic era, garnering over 51% of the vote compared to the 48% for Moon Jae-in of the Democratic United Party (DUP). The election, dubbed the closest head-to-head race in the country’s electoral history, was notable particularly for the extent of intra-camp consolidation of candidacies. Ahn Cheol-soo, an independent candidate who had emerged as a serious challenger to Moon as frontrunner of the center-left opposition, as well as Lee Jung-hee and Sim Sang-jeong, the candidates-designate of two smaller center-left parties, all agreed to withdraw in favor of Moon, paving the way for a truly two-horse race between the Saenuri and DUP candidates. Park’s victory, then, had the added legitimacy that it came against a “unity candidate” backed by the full force of the center-left; as South Korea’s eccentric electoral system does not provide for a two-way runoff to decide which candidate receives a majority, the opposing camps had essentially chosen to create a de facto runoff situation in an attempt to concentrate the vote to their respective candidates. It is this process that has produced the closest two-way race in South Korean electoral history (with the possible exception of 2002, when a similar exercise in intra-camp consolidation took place) and the only president in the democratic era to be elected by a majority of the popular vote.

In an ironic twist, this president-elect is the very candidate who has come to be known – rightly or wrongly – as a “dictator’s daughter” in the international media.

Indeed, it is tempting to interpret the Park – Moon race as a clash of contrasting pasts, especially given the conspicuous absence of major policy differences in the candidates’ platforms. While Park famously grew up as the daughter of the dictator Park Chunghee, Moon was a student protester against the latter’s regime whose formative years in politics came as chief of staff to the reformminded President Roh Moo-hyun. Yet

14

Seongcheol Kim ‘14

while Park has maintained a largely unexamined, if not outright contradictory, attitude toward the legacy of her father’s dictatorship – as is evident from her less than satisfactory responses when challenged on her positions – she has succeeded in winning election in no small part on her promise to transcend the country’s polarized past by making appointments across the partisan and regional divides. This strategy of indirect outward conciliation vis-à-vis her past was part of Park’s cleverly orchestrated electoral strategy to rescue her party from collapse, whereby she also presented herself as an independent-minded figure in an otherwise corrupt, scandalridden ruling party. It is, then, not only by tabling the coming to terms with her own past, but also by diverting from questions of ruling-party accountability, that Park has shamelessly exploited the forgetfulness

“Having thus singlehandedly engineered the Saenuri victory in the April parliamentary election and practically saved her party from collapse, Park was able to secure the presidential candidacy following an at times bitterly contested internal primary.” of voters and warrants questions as to her democratic credentials.

As presidential candidates, both Park and Moon were faced with, to paraphrase Nietzsche, the advantages and disadvantages of history for electoral-political life.

Park, who grew up under her father’s dictatorship and served as de facto First Lady

American Foreign Policy

after losing her mother to a North Korean assassin, has faced criticism for a perceived lack of critical distance to her father’s legacy ever since entering politics in the 1990s. Indeed, she had long taken the position that the 1961 coup that brought her father to power was a “revolution to save the country” – an astonishing affront to the legacy of the broad-based democratic revolution of April 1960 that had brought down the dictatorship of Syngman Rhee only to be ousted by Park Chung-hee’s military coup a year later. In the Saenuri primary campaign ahead of the 2012 presidential election, as her stance toward her father’s dictatorship came under scrutiny from her party rivals, Park responded indecisively, refusing to take a stance as to whether the May 16 event was a “coup” or a “revolution;” earlier she had even hinted at a possible change in her previous position. What is characteristic about Park’s attitude toward her past, then, is not only her lack of critical distance to it, but also the subordination of any kind of direct coming to terms to the interests of power politics.

During the presidential campaign, Park repeatedly stressed her desire to “cut ties with [the country’s] history of conflict by bringing reconciliation and bridging the party divide,” pledging to make political appointments across the regional and partisan divides; in other words, she sought exit from questions about her past with the classic power-political assurance that her decisions as president will speak for themselves. In contrast, Moon can be said to have positively instrumentalized his past and even relied on it; the DUP candidate had first built up his political credentials as chief of staff and personal aide to President Roh Moo-hyun and subsequently consolidated his public profile with his work as organizer of Roh’s funeral – in the aftermath of the ex-president’s tragic suicide – and then as Chairman of the Roh Moo-hyun Foundation. Thus, Moon’s image was inextricably bound to that of ex-President Roh and even depended on it for positive substance, in the absence of substantial policy differences amid an evident “race to the middle.” The paradox might be that Moon’s past appears prima facie to have backfired on him even in spite of Roh’s association with a reform-minded, populardemocratic ethos; for Roh’s presidency was also polarizing in ways that may still have been fresh for much of the electorate. In contrast, Park, even with her problem-

atic attitude toward her father’s coup, submerged issues of the past altogether behind a façade of reconciliation – and her reference to the country’s “history of conflict” was surely a reference to not only her father’s presidency, but also to Roh’s and all others remembered at least in part for the partisan wrangling that has become such a mainstay of South Korean politics.

Park’s strategy of presenting herself as relatively value-neutral with respect to the past was part of a wider electoral agenda that emphasized cosmetic rebranding to compensate for the inherent weaknesses of the ruling Saenuri party. In December 2011, Park inherited the chairpersonship of a party in crisis ahead of the April 2012 parliamentary election; the Grand National Party (GNP), as it had been called since 1997, had taken a hammering in the 2010 local elections and was reeling under the unpopularity of President Lee Myung-bak’s administration. Park, who had consolidated her image as a maverick figure in the party after challenging Lee for the party’s presidential candidacy in 2007, proceeded to run an energetic election campaign that succeeded in bypassing questions of the Lee administration’s record and visited over 100 constituencies to ensure that it was she, and not the oft-ridiculed Lee, whom the voters saw as the face of the campaign. Park even changed the party’s name and color, taking advantage of South Korea’s political culture of frequent party rebranding with each new legislative term.

Having thus single-handedly engineered the Saenuri victory in the April parliamentary election and practically saved her party from collapse, Park was able to secure the presidential candidacy following an at times bitterly contested internal primary.

Her presidential campaign saw a successful continuation of her electoral strategy, as Park’s personality seemed to deflect away every new scandalous revelation involving the Saenuri party or the Lee administration, from an illegal surveillance scandal that a leading Saenuri politician even compared to Watergate, to the use of fake social media accounts in the presidential campaign. Given that opinion polls consistently showed a clear majority in favor of replacing Saenuri in government, enough voters genuinely seemed to believe Park’s self-presentation as somehow distinguishable from a thoroughly corrupt and discredited ruling apparatus. By means of cosmetic reshuffles and shameless person-

Asia

The main candidates in the South Korean presidential election. Image courtesy of Julio Martiez via flickr

ality politics, Park had succeeded in diverting both the April and December election campaigns almost completely from issues of ruling-party accountability.

Just as she succeeded in downplaying the relatively distant past of Park Chunghee’s dictatorship in the name of a vaguely conciliatory politics for the future, Park was able to dissociate herself from a Saenuri administration under Lee Myung-bak that had become synonymous with patronage, corruption, and broken promises. On the one hand, Park’s ability to bypass questions of ruling-party accountability were symptomatic of problems inherent in South Korea’s political system: any presidential system is bound to make it easier for a clever electioneer to distance herself strategically from her out-of-favor ruling party – even if any such distance is, for practical purposes, imaginary – while a political culture in which changing party banners every four years is established practice made it easier for Park to cosmetically reinforce the sense of distance from the old administration.

Yet Park’s successful electoral strategy unmistakably gives rise to serious questions as to her democratic credentials: her single-handed direction of the April election campaign coincided with increasing criticism of her authoritarian style, with one rival Saenuri politician criticizing her “secretive” manner of reaching decisions behind closed doors. If Moon Jae-in did indeed suffer from his association with the “Roh

Winter 2013

Moo-hyun clique,” while Park appeared by contrast to be a stand-alone politician, a “maverick figure” in an otherwise disagreeable ruling party, this might just be indicative of a lack of democratic sensibilities for a president-elect: Kim Deog-ryong, a leading Saenuri critic of Park, bemoaned precisely the fact that no one seems to know whom she consults when reaching major decisions. The point, of course, is that she apparently does consult people, even if not in front an electorate: as Kim went on to note, from his experience of working with Park as former leader of the party’s parliamentary group, the few advisors that Park does like to surround herself with are mostly figures from the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan dictatorships. Afp Seongcheol may be reached at seongche@princeton.edu

AFP Quiz Answers Multiple Choice Monthly 1. D 2. B 3. C 4. A 5. C

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Asia

“Considering the nationalist tendencies of A Return to Power Shinzo Abe, confrontation Impact of Japan’s Elections on U.S. Relations Jamal Maddox ‘16 with China seems more n with the old, out with the new” tinuation of previous policies? How is the order of the day in Japan will these elections influence the U.S. likely. Only time will tell after parliamentary elections. relationship with China? These quesThe Liberal Democratic Party tions, among many others, lack clear how this confrontation returned to power in a landslide vic- and definitive answers. But their imtory over the left-leaning Democratic plications are extremely important in will manifest itself.”

I

Party of Japan in the Dec. 16th election. The victory marks a restoration of the LDP’s half-century control of political power, halted three years ago by the DPJ’s unprecedented political takeover. The last three years have been a transient interruption in the LDP’s almost continuous postwar political rule. The DPJ failed to deliver on several initiatives: recovery from Japan’s decade long economic stagnation and a shift from bureaucratic control, among others. Most significantly, a foreign policy less dependent on the United States partially defined the DPJ’s platform. Japan’s new prime minister, veteran politician (and former prime minister) Shinzo Abe, is a known nationalist. Moreover, his party defined the relationship with the United States, playing a pivotal role in structuring the 1960 Security Treaty, which solidified U.S. military interests in Japan. What will the return of the LDP mean for the US- Japan relationship, especially in a time of increased tensions with China and weakening Japanese influence? Will it spell a con-

shaping U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Three years ago, Yukio Hatoyama, former prime minister and leader of the DPJ, implicitly defined his views on the US- Japan bilateral relationship after his party’s victory: “Of course, the Japan-U.S. security pact will continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy. But at the same time, we must not forget our identity as a nation located in Asia. I believe that the East Asian region, which is showing increasing vitality, must be recognized as Japan’s basic sphere of being. So we must continue to build frameworks for stable economic cooperation and security across the region.” Hatoyama’s call for economic integration among other Asian nations was an attempt to shift alliances to the emerging East and Southeast Asian region. To his party, China looked better as an ally instead of a regional foe, regardless of historical tensions.

But this desire manifested itself within the US- Japan bilateral relationship. Hatoyama’s assurances about the

strength of US- Japan ties clashed with his attempts to lessen the U.S. military presence. In 2009, relations became strained after a plan to relocate a U.S. Marine Corps base was stalled, leading to a row between Washington and Tokyo. Although a compromise was reached, the bumbling eventually factored into Hatoyama’s resignation. The March 2011 triple disaster occupied the capacities of Japan’s leaders for the duration of the DPJ’s rule.

This most recent changing of the guard is significant for U.S. foreign policy. Japan’s elections coincided with heightening tensions with China over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese). With frequent Chinese incursions in waters off the coasts of the islands, Japan has realized the extent of its’ naval and geopolitical rivalry with China. Considering the nationalist tendencies of Shinzo Abe, confrontation with China seems more likely.

Only time will tell how this confrontation will manifest itself.

Tokyo finds itself stuck between its alliance with the U.S. and increas-

Election campaign material adorned with prime minister Shinzo Abe’s face. Image courtesy of Reuters

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American Foreign Policy

ing economic interdependence with China. A new political paradigm is developing in the region. Recent territorial conflicts reveal an increasingly assertive China. Glaring differences between the U.S. and China remain.

For Japan, leaning to either side might alienate the other. With an LDP government, it looks like they will lean even more towards the United States.

Yet even subtle changes in the bilateral relationship are not without consequence.

For the US, Japan could very well be the catalyst for a Cold War-like mentality in the East Asian region. The most recent deployment of U.S. troops to Australia invariably sent a confrontational message to the Chinese. By extension, any aggressive steps by the Japanese over territory will possibly be construed as further attempts by the United States to “contain” Chinese influence. To Chinese observers, the United States would be guilty by association. Shinzo Abe has expressed desires in the past to change Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution, which stipulates that Japan may never maintain a military. In the short term, such action is improbable with the prospect of Upper House elections looming.

But amending the Japanese constitution would certainly inflame tensions between Japan and China. Although a constitutional amendment is unlikely, China will scrutinize the actions of Japan’s leaders even more under the current tense geopolitical climate. Their intense scrutiny will certainly color relations with the United States.

Although the LDP’s election victory may not drastically change USJapan relations, America could find itself at greater odds with China. The U.S. cannot easily distance itself from decisions made by the Japanese government due to its unique bilateral relationship with Japan. Conversely, Japan certainly pays attention the desires of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In the current geopolitical climate, whether the LDP will leverage this influence is an extremely significant question. Afp

Asia

In Context

Compiled by Adam Safadi ‘14 “The idea that we should extract ourselves from the bulk of EU obligations is nonsensical,”

Chief Secretary to the Treasury Daniel Alexander on the debate in the United Kingdom about the possibility of exiting the European Union

“After a series of votes and statements and incidents we have decided to suspend our working relations with that body.”

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor on Israel’s decision to boycott their regular review by the UN Human Rights Council

“I’m going to miss her. Wish she was sticking around. But she has logged in so many miles, I can’t begrudge her wanting to take it easy for a little bit.”

President Obama discussing Hillary Clinton’s service as Secretary of State and decision to retire

“We urge the US to responsibly treat the Diaoyu issue, watch their words and deeds, maintain regional stability and Sino-US relations, so that Chinese people can trust them.”

Chinese ministry spokesman Hong Lei discussing earlier statements by Secretary of State Clinton backing Japan’s claims of disputed islands in the East China Sea

“This new arrangement will allow Gambians to devote more time to prayers, social activities and agriculture - going back to the land and grow what we eat and eat what we grow, for a healthy and wealthy nation.”

President Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia commenting on the decision to shorten the work week

“If this information is confirmed, then we are dealing with unprovoked attacks on targets on the territory of a sovereign country, which blatantly violates the UN Charter and is unacceptable, no matter the motives to justify it.”

Russian Foreign Ministry expressing concern over alleged Israeli air strikes on Syria

Jamal may be reached at jmaddox@princeton.edu

Sources: BBC News

Winter 2013

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Africa

French troops board a U.S. cargo aircraft en route to Mali. Photo from Wikimedia Commons

Fulfilling Shared Objectives Mali as a Model for Cooperative Counterterrorism

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f the ongoing French campaign in Mali to rid the country’s north of Islamic extremists succeeds, Washington may have just forged a new counterterrorism strategy that saves the U.S. the blood and treasure we have spent over the last decade. Instead of massive, long, and expensive wars, the U.S. has begun to participate in critical support efforts, relying upon allies to prosecute the direct operations. While it is difficult to imagine this strategy as a universal one, sharing the burden for counterterrorism operations will certainly invest others in our cause and reduce the supposed sensitivities involved with direct American intervention in global theaters. In fact, Mali might emerge as the exemplar of a new paradigm in the continuing war on terror.

While assessments of the exact nature and strength of the threat differ, Al Qaeda is certainly weaker today than it was on September 12, 2001. Without

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George Maliha ‘13

a secure base of operations in Afghanistan, its top leadership decimated, under attack in Somalia and Yemen, and now retreating in Mali, the terrorist group and its decentralized affiliates are under pressure. In fact, if Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magrheb is defeated in this current struggle, one of the most well-funded (from kidnappings and smuggling operations) Al Qaeda affiliates will have lost its base of operations. This is not to say that the group and its allies can no longer mount attacks (the threat still exists), but the task now is to snuff out the group (and causes like it) wherever it attempts to make a stand.

It is a given that Al Qaeda and its affiliates thrive in countries with faltering governments or failed states. Whether in Afghanistan three decades ago, Somalia in the nineties, or Mali today, nations that cannot govern themselves or assert control outside a small geographic area are vulnerable to the terrorist group. In-

American Foreign Policy

deed, in Mali, the most recent violence did not begin as a terrorist offensive — but as an ethnic Tuareg rebellion against a central government that it believed to be ignoring its demands. In fact, it was the fourth rebellion in two decades, but this one garnered the international spotlight because several radical Islamic groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar Dine, and others, joined the fray.

As such, it is essential that going forward Washington assists in bolstering weak and friendly states that are receptive to our assistance. Although the U.S. was the largest bilateral aid donor to Mali before the war and extensively

“To reduce pressure on American defense capabilities, our allies should be encouraged and supported in undertaking legitimate counterterror operations.”

trained the Malian army, these efforts were simply not enough (unfortunately, the leader of the current coup, Captain Sanogo, reportedly received some American training). The paltry 7,000-member army was unable to keep order before the crisis and contributed to extremist gains during the disorder of the military coup.

It had been viewed as a weak link in the counterterrorism coalition of the region (the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership). While the U.S. should, to the extent possible, bolster elected civilian governments (most of Mali’s neighbors have undergone military coups in the last several years), strengthening states by training and supplying their militaries, providing humanitarian aid, organizing infrastructure projects, facilitating investment, and negotiating trade agreements are the best way to prevent failed states and ultimately more costly interventions.

To reduce pressure on American defense capabilities, our allies should be encouraged and supported in undertaking legitimate counterterror operations.

France has historic, colonial ties to Mali and felt the need to protect its interests in the region (France obtains most of its uranium for electric generation from neighboring Niger). While the U.S. delayed supporting that intervention, it appears that it ultimately supported a winning strategy. Frankly, most of our allies cannot project military force very far beyond their borders, but the provi-

Africa

“Sharing the burden for counterterrorism operations will certainly invest others in our cause and reduce the supposed sensitivities involved with direct American intervention in global theaters. In fact, Mali might emerge as the exemplar of a new paradigm in the continuing war on terror.” sion of American transport, refueling, reconnaissance, and other logistics allows allied forces to be deployed without American boots on the ground—a partnership that is well worth promoting in the future.

Indeed, regional forces should be developed and trained so that they can respond to crises in their own neighborhoods. For instance, African Union (AU) troops were not yet prepared to deal with the crisis in Mali, but arguably, those troops—coming from friendly neigh-

bors—would be much better received and cause less unease and backlash than would American or even French forces.

While the AU troops should be prepared soon, the lesson is clear: there must be available capabilities—both allied and American—in any region of the world where trouble can occur. In fact, creating partnerships by which troops are provided by several nations discourages militaries from taking unilateral action.

If forces are integrated such that they are designed to act optimally and cooperatively (with logistical support from the U.S.), unilateral use of force becomes less desirable, more difficult, and less likely.

It is essential that Washington internalizes the lessons of Mali going forward.

The American public is ever more reluctant to commit to long-term campaigns abroad—with the obligatory loss of life and expenditures. Nonetheless, it is essential to continue to counter extremism wherever it is encountered. To do so without a heavy American footprint requires utilizing regional resources and allies to ensure that extremism does not pay a dividend and cannot gain a foothold in unstable regions. Nonetheless, we cannot be under any illusions that every threat can be countered using the “Mali model”; it continues to be essential that American capabilities are kept maintained and improving. Unfortunately, some challenges will require aggressive response that only the U.S. military can and should be able to provide. But, as in the Cold War—despite the obvious differences—every threat to American interests does not need to be handled or contested by American troops.

Mali potentially represents a new chapter in the war against Islamic extremism. Hopefully, it will be a nimbler, more flexible, and cost-effective approach against the threat. By investing our allies and regional partners with some of the capabilities to fight threats within their regions, we ensure that our commitments can be limited and that our partners have the vested interest and resources to combat the threats that affect them—and us. Afp

George may be reached at gmaliha@princeton.edu Islamist troops in northern Mali. Photo courtesy of Russavia via Wikimedia Commons

Winter 2013

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American Foreign Policy magazine thanks the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University for its generous sponsorship. The Program is dedicated to examining the application of basic legal and ethical principles to contemporary problems and offers numerous opportunities for student engagement, including sponsoring conferences, seminars, lectures, and colloquia throughout the year. The Program’s Undergraduate Fellows Forum provides opportunities for Princeton undergraduates to interact with Madison Program Fellows and speakers. For more information on events and how to get involved please visit: http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/

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