AfricaBriefing - July - August 2023 Edition

A single currency for Africa: opportunities and challenges ahead

THE concept of a single currency for Africa has been a subject of discussion for many years, with advocates highlighting potential benefits such as promoting trade, investment, and economic integration on the continent. However, implementing such a currency poses significant challenges and necessitates careful planning and coordination among African nations. By adopting a single currency, the continent could eliminate exchange rate fluctuations and transaction costs, facilitating seamless cross-border trade between African countries. This could lead to increased economic integration within the continent and create new market opportunities for businesses.

Publisher

Jon Offei-Ansah

Editor Desmond Davies

Contributing Editors

Stephen Williams

Prof. Toyin Falola

Tikum Mbah Azonga

Contributors

Justice Lee Adoboe

Chief Chuks Iloegbunam

Joseph Kayira

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

Additionally, a unified currency could create a larger and more stable market, making Africa more attractive to foreign investors. A stable monetary framework would instil confidence in investors, encouraging long-term projects and investments.

Africa bucks global economic trend

Jon Offei-Ansah Publisher

Furthermore, a single currency would enable African nations to collectively manage inflation and maintain price stability. A strong and stable currency would inspire confidence among consumers, businesses, and investors, ultimately fostering economic growth and development.

Desmond Davies Editor

Oladipo Okubanjo

Corinne Soar

Kennedy Olilo Gorata Chepete

Designer

In 2018, six of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world were in Africa, according to the World Bank, with Ghana leading the pack. With GDP growth for the continent projected to accelerate to four per cent in 2019 and 4.1 per cent in 2020, Africa’s economic growth story continues apace. Meanwhile, the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Index reveals that five of the 10 most-improved countries are in Africa, and one-third of all reforms recorded globally were in sub-Saharan Africa. What makes the story more impressive and heartening is that the growth – projected to be broad-based – is being achieved in a challenging global environment, bucking the trend.

Deputy Editor

Angela Cobbinah

Contributing Editor

From a policy perspective, a single currency could facilitate better coordination of monetary policies among African countries. Central banks could work together to address economic challenges and respond effectively to regional and global financial crises.

Stephen Williams

Orji Director, Special Projects

Michael

Contributors

Simon Blemadzie

Country Representatives

South Africa

Edward Walter Byerley

Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights

However, alongside these potential benefits, significant challenges must be acknowledged. The vast diversity in economic structures and levels of development across African countries is one major hurdle. Disparities in inflation rates, fiscal policies, and economic stability could make it challenging to establish a uniform monetary policy that benefits all members equally.

Justice Lee Adoboe

In the Cover Story of this edition, Dr. Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), analyses the factors underpinning this performance. Two factors, in my opinion, stand out in Dr. Hippolyte’s analysis: trade between Africa and China and the intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development.

Much has been said and written about China’s ever-deepening economic foray into Africa, especially by Western analysts and commentators who have been sounding alarm bells about re-colonisation of Africa, this time by the Chinese. But empirical evidence paints a different picture.

Chuks Iloegbunam

Joseph Kayira

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

Oladipo Okubanjo

Corinne Soar

A single currency would also require fiscal coordination and harmonisation of policies among African nations. Failure to achieve proper fiscal discipline and alignment could lead to difficulties in managing budgets and public finances, potentially causing economic imbalances.

Despite the decelerating global growth environment, trade between Africa and China increased by 14.5 per cent in the first three quarters of 2018, surpassing the growth rate of world trade (11.6 per cent), reflecting the deepening economic dependency between the two major trading partners.

Gloria

Ansah Designer

Country Representatives

South Africa

47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096

Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887

Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Nana Asiama Bekoe Kingdom Concept Co.

Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Moreover, member countries would relinquish some of their monetary autonomy when joining a monetary union. This would limit their control over interest rates and exchange rate adjustments, potentially affecting their ability to respond to specific economic challenges independently.

Empirical evidence shows that China’s domestic investment has become highly linked with economic expansion in Africa. A one percentage point increase in China’s domestic investment growth is associated with an average of 0.6 percentage point increase in overall African exports. And, the expected economic development and trade impact of expanding Chinese investment on resource-rich African countries, especially oil-exporting countries, is even more important.

Edward Walter Byerley

Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights

47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096

Nigeria

Nnenna Ogbu

The resilience of African economies can also be attributed to growing intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development. A combination of the two factors is accelerating the process of structural transformation in a continent where industrial output and services account for a growing share of GDP. African corporations and industrialists which are expanding their industrial footprint across Africa and globally are leading the diversification from agriculture into higher value goods in manufacturing and service sectors. These industrial champions are carrying out transcontinental operations, with investment holdings around the globe, with a strong presence in Europe and Pacific Asia, together account for more than 75 per cent of their combined activities outside Africa.

A survey of 30 leading emerging African corporations with global footprints and combined revenue of more than $118 billion shows that they are active in several industries, including manufacturing (e.g., Dangote Industries), basic materials, telecommunications (e.g., Econet, Safaricom), finance (e.g., Ecobank) and oil and gas. In addition to mitigating risks highly correlated with African economies, these emerging African global corporations are accelerating the diversification of sources of growth and reducing the exposure of countries to adverse commodity terms of trade.

This makes me very bullish about Africa!

The successful implementation of a single currency requires strong political will and decisive leadership from African governments. It demands a shared commitment to common goals, long-term planning, and the willingness to compromise on certain national policies for the greater good of the region. In conclusion, the idea of a single currency for Africa represents an ambitious vision for greater economic integration and development. While the potential benefits are compelling, it is essential to recognise the significant challenges and complexities involved. African nations need to address their economic disparities, promote fiscal coordination, and ensure political commitment and cooperation to pave the way for a successful and sustainable single currency regime. A wellthought-out plan, careful coordination, and a commitment to overcome obstacles are essential for a unified currency to become a reality on the African continent.

Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887 Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Nana Asiama Bekoe

Kingdom Concept Co.

#4 Babatunde Oduse crescent Isheri Olowora - Isheri Berger, Lagos

Tel: +234 803 670 4879 getnnenna.ogbu@gmail.com

Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Nigeria

Taiwo Adedoyin

Kenya

Patrick Mwangi

Aquarius Media Ltd, PO Box 10668-11000

MV Noble, Press House, 3rd Floor

27 Acme Road, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos

Tel: +234 806 291 7100 taiadedoyin52@gmail.com

Kenya

Naima Farah

Room 22, 2nd Floor West Wing

Royal Square, Ngong Road, Nairobi

Tel: +254 729 381 561 naimafarah_m@yahoo.com

Africa Briefing Ltd

2 Redruth Close, London N22 8RN

United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0) 208 888 6693

Nairobi, Kenya

Tel: 0720 391 546/0773 35 41

Email: mwangi@aquariusmedia.co.ke

©Africa Briefing Ltd

2 Redruth Close, London N22 8RN

United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0) 208 888 6693

publisher@africabriefing.org

LEADER COMMENT COVER STORY

Protecting Africa’s natural wealth Charity begins at home

Advancing economic integration: the case for a single currency

Amid renewed calls for a single currency to boost intra-regional trade, Jon Offei-Ansah looks at the prospects and challenges of establishing a pan-African economic and monetary union that has been envisaged to be in place by 2028 under the Abuja Treaty of 1991

What is the model trade deal for Africa?

Reduced non-tariff barriers, lower intra-African tariffs, improved trade facilitation, and integrated markets can create a large, prosperous, peaceful, and more dynamic environment for trade and investment opportunities for Africa’s partners as well as for Africa’s own enterprises, argues David Luke, who adds that a more developed and integrated Africa is not merely philanthropy, but in everyone’s best interest

ANALYSIS

The challenge of democratic leadership in Nigeria

Looking back on two decades of democratisation in Nigeria, only civic movements mobilised in the context of larger patriotic interests can overwhelm the forces that wish to return the country to the days of totalitarian rule, argues Kayode Fayemi, a former two-term Governor of Ekiti State in south west Nigeria

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Mauritania: small but mighty

Returning fresh from delivering capacity building workshops on the ground in Mauritania, Azzedine Zikara, Director, Financial Institutions (Mauritania and Sudan) at British Arab Commercial Bank (BACB) explains why Mauritania could offer new opportunities to investors in coming years

AFRICA ABROAD REVIEWS

African soft power

Contrary to the argument that the African brain drain is a loss to the continent, Nigerians in the US and South Africans in Australia, for example, highlight how members of the African diaspora are becoming foreign policy actors for both their home and host countries, writes Christopher Isike

Cobalt Red: a regressive, deeply flawed account of Congo’s mining industry

Billed as an exposé, Cobalt Red simply rehashes old stereotypes and colonial perceptions of the DRC, write Sarah Katz-Lavigne and Espérant Mwishamali Lukobo

Shanghai Grand International Logistics Co., Ltd.

Established in 2002, Shanghai Grand International Co., Ltd. offers a variety of shipping and transportation options via air, sea and ground. Our company is based in Shanghai, China, with branches across the nation. Ranging from customs declaration, warehouse storage, containers and consolidated cargo shipping we have a large array of options to meet your needs.

In addition to being approved and designated by the Ministry of Transportation of China as a First Class cargo service provider, we have also established excellent business relations with major shipping companies including Maersk, CMA, ONE, SM line, and

C.E.O President.

EMC over the past 15 years. In addition we have also built long term business relations with major airline cargo departments. In order to expand our global operation, we are looking for international partnerships to work together in this industry. Should you ever import any goods from Peoples Republic of China please ask your exporter and shipper to contact us. We will provide our best service to you.

Room 814, 578 Tian Bao Lu, Shanghai, Peoples Republic of China

E-Mail: felix@grand-log.net

phone: 86-13501786280

Mr, Felix Ji

Protecting Africa’s natural wealth

IN the midst of ongoing conflicts in parts of Africa, the countries involved are regularly losing their natural resources to foreign bodies. The people seldom benefit from such wealth, as is quite clearly the case in a country such as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

There are some 120 militias and armed groups actively roaming around in the eastern part of the country. These so-called rebels are busy exploiting the DRC’s natural resources for themselves and foreign interests.

The underlying problem is the role of external groups in moving the natural resources out of the country and on to the international market. The DRC government has not been able to stop this, given that the country has been mired in conflict for decades.

The exploitation of Africa’s natural wealth by foreign groups is nothing new. In the 1960s and 1970s, when mercenary activities were rife on the continent, the soldiers of fortune from Western Europe helped themselves to gold and diamonds.

Now, the new group on the scene is Russia’s Wagner Group, which first appeared in the Central African Republic. It has extended its reach to Mali, where French forces were kicked out by the military regime to accommodate the Russian private military group.

The Wagner Group has been accused of funding its operations in part by exploiting natural resources in countries like the CAR and Mali. Indeed, the Group has fine-tuned its exploitation of revenue streams from Africa through companies that are involved in gold mining in the CAR.

The gold sector is critical to the economies and communities of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. which produces about 25 per cent of the world’s gold each year. These gold-producing countries would naturally want to ensure that the sector is rid of predatory and malign actors.

African countries do not seem to have the power to stop the illicit operations in their gold mining sector. The problem is that the companies operating in this area, such as the ones run by the Wagner Group, sell their ill-gotten gold abroad, where

African countries have less clout to halt the illegal trade.

The US, though, which has a robust sanctions regime in place, has been taking action to disrupt the business of these illicit gold companies. Recently, Washington sanctioned two companies in the CAR that are affiliated with the Wagner Group and its founder and leader, Yevgeniy Prigozhin.

At the same time, the US issued a new advisory focused on the gold sector across sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting risks related to the gold trade, including conflict and terror financing, money laundering activities, sanctions evasion, human rights and labour rights abuses, and environmental degradation. It calls on American businesses to undertake responsible investment in all aspects

sub-Saharan Africa.

The international community has been making important progress toward addressing these concerns by helping industry participants identify, evaluate, and reduce risks, particularly downstream in key trading and refining centres for gold from sub-Saharan Africa such as the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland.

Of course, the advisory is not intended to replace existing due diligence guidelines, processes, or underlying reports, but rather to provide a streamlined resource that amplifies and encourages more transparent public reporting by companies implementing them, as the Americans point out.

However, malign actors continue to exploit vulnerabilities in the gold supply chain across sub-Saharan Africa, in some

Malign actors continue to exploit vulnerabilities in the gold supply chain across subSaharan Africa

of the sector: mining, trading, refining, manufacturing, and retail of end products.

But there are still many risks that are directly and indirectly connected to the gold sector in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, without adequate due diligence, an industry participant may inadvertently contribute to conflict and terror financing, money laundering, corruption and sanctions evasion.

The US points out that while these concerns have been well known and extensively documented for many years in certain regions, such as eastern DRC, there are newer risks in places like Sudan, CAR, and Mali involving the Wagner Group.

In trying to protect these natural resources from falling into the wrong hands, the continent’s leaders must be aligned with the US government in its commitment to addressing the relationship between gold and the illicit revenue streams that contribute to and fund conflicts, corruption, and other concerns in

cases with relative ease. Local armed groups in several conflict-affected regions have used the gold trade to finance their activities for decades, and armed entities hostile to American interests are also increasing their presence in sub-Saharan Africa’s gold trade.

These groups include jihadists, some with links to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, as well as the Wagner Group. Gold’s role as a store of value and currency, in addition to being a material used in other supply chains, further exacerbates these challenges. The American government has warned that those in the industry should be prepared for increased US government attention to the relationship between gold and these groups’ revenue streams and should be prepared for the possibility that US sanctions could be used to disrupt these groups’ operations.

African gold-producing countries should welcome this American initiative and back it fully.

COMMENT

Charity begins at home

DON’T you just love African leaders. While Sudan was burning, and other parts of the continent needed important issues to be resolved, the presidents of Comoros, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia, plus the Prime Minister of Egypt and top officials from Congo and Zambia upped and left for Ukraine and Russia in an attempt to end the bitter armed conflict between the two countries.

What was the essence of such a trip? The war in Ukraine is NATO’s problem, not Africa’s. It is being fought over Ukraine’s attempt to become a member of NATO, the Western military alliance that Russia does not want to be next door.

If African leaders were on top of things, they should have realised that it was the same NATO that is responsible for the ongoing disruption in Libya and the subsequent spread of Islamic terrorists in vast swathes of the Sahel, which is currently under siege. NATO sent in war planes in 2011 and unleashed bombs on the country; and eventually Colonel Gaddafi was ousted and killed by his opponents.

But even before this happened, former South African President, Nelson Mandela, organised African leaders to send a delegation to mediate in Libya. However, the then Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, told the African Union that he would not guarantee the safety of the mediators because NATO was going ahead with its bombing raids.

Incredible. African leaders were attempting to end a conflict in an African country, and they were being told that they should just forget it because a non-African military force was going to go in with all guns blazing.

As usual when it comes to Africa, no provisions were made by NATO to deal with the fallout of its ill-fated air strikes.

Thus, Gaddafi’s huge weapons arsenal that fell into the wrong hands are now responsible for the mayhem in the Sahel.

As the saying goes, charity begins at home. Therefore, it is high time that African leaders focus on resolving the continent’s problems themselves. After all, it is politicians and political parties that have been responsible for the chaos on the continent.

Now there are moves to make a difference when it comes to reducing political conflict. On July 13 the African Inter-Party Dialogue Network (AIPDN) was launched in Nairobi with the aim of “promoting the national agenda through debate and consensus building and contributing to reducing the oftenunhealthy rivalry and tension associated with competitive multi-party electoral systems in Africa”.

Under the leadership of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the AIPDN will facilitate

Desmond Davies

In Kenya, almost one year after President William Ruto came to power he has not been able to really get going because of constant political unrest stirred up by Raila Odinga, who lost the presidential election. He has been arguing that he won, and as such he is making Kenya ungovernable through demonstrations that are impeding economic development.

In Sierra Leone, at the time of writing, the 54 members of the opposition All People’s Congress who were elected to Parliament in the June 24 election are refusing to take their seats. They say they are boycotting the House because, they argue, President Julius Maada Bio did not defeat their candidate, Samura Kamara, in the presidential election.

So, we have more political stalemates. In this regard, the need for the AIPDN cannot be overemphasised. Dr Aleu Garang, Director IGAD/MSU, noted at the launch of the AIPDN: “As we embark on this remarkable journey, let us embrace the power of inter-party dialogue to shape the future of our continent.”

conversations among political parties, policy-makers, and stakeholders to foster societal harmony beyond the realm of electoral politics. The network recognises the crucial role of inter-party dialogue mechanisms in sustaining peace and stability, policy formulation, public administration, parliamentary processes, conflict resolution, peace mediation and promoting good governance.

This is crucial now. One of the presidents who went to Ukraine and Russia was Macky Sall of Senegal. How ironic that while he was trying to seek peace in foreign lands, the Senegalese police were shooting and killing demonstrators who opposed Sall’s attempt to stay in power for a third term, contrary to the Constitution, no matter how hard he tried to argue his case. He has backed down now.

The body itself acknowledges that despite the critical role of inter-party dialogues, not much information or knowledge exists across the continent for learning and experience sharing, particularly beyond the traditional area of elections.

It notes: “Inter-party dialogue cuts across elections, policy formulation and public administration, parliament, conflict and peace mediation, and is an effective tool for promoting good governance. Political parties are often instrumental in mobilising people, especially the youth for violence during elections.

“They are often consigned to their traditional role of participating in elections and downplaying their role as a mechanism for sustaining post-electoral societal harmony through inter-party dialogues. Indeed, the winner takes all politics and authoritarianism dominate.”

Let’s hope that the AIPDN will make the much-needed headway. AB

The war in Ukraine is NATO’s problem, not Africa’s ‘ ’

Advancing economic integration: the case for a single currency

of 1991

NOW that William Ruto is President of Kenya, he is using his position to challenge the system whereby African countries are forced to use foreign currency when trading with each other. During the 22nd Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Heads of State and Government Summit in Lusaka, Zambia

in June Ruto called for the introduction of a single currency across the entire African continent aimed at strengthening trade and regional integration.

“If we are selling from Kenya to Djibouti, we have to look for US dollars. How is the dollar part of the trade between Djibouti and Kenya? Today we are saying the African Export-Import Bank

[Afreximbank] has given us a mechanism where traders in our continent can trade in their goods and services and the bank will settle payments in local currency. That is why Kenya champions the Pan African Payments and Settlement Systems that are done by our own institution the Afreximbank.”

Ruto added: “Why is it necessary for

Amid renewed calls for a single currency to boost intra-regional trade, Jon OffeiAnsah looks at the prospects and challenges of establishing a pan-African economic and monetary union that has been envisaged to be in place by 2028 under the Abuja Treaty

William Ruto: “We are not against the US dollar; we just want to trade much more freely”

us to buy things from Djibouti and pay in dollars? There’s no reason. We are not against the US dollar; we just want to trade much more freely. Let us pay with the dollar [for] what we are buying from the US. Let us pay with our currency [for] what we are buying from Djibouti.”

While Ruto’s call for a single African currency may be altruistic, others offer more pragmatic views on currency policy. Some economic analysts see the need for an alternative to the US dollar due to the increasing weaponisation of the currency.

According to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) executive director for Russia, Aleksei Mozhin, the West’s decision to lock out certain countries from the global payments system is forcing many nations to look for a substitute currency. Speaking to the Russian news outlet, Sputnik, in June, he highlighted how the US and its allies have used economic and financial sanctions to penalise Russia

for its war in Ukraine.

In March 2022, the West imposed foreign sanctions that froze about $300 billion worth of Russian reserves. The sanctions also cut off Russian banks from SWIFT, a cross-border payment system dominated by the dollar and the euro.

Mozhin believes that the use of sanctions as a stick to punish Russia is leading to a more divided global economy. As he explains to Sputnik: “The blatant use by the West as a weapon of international trade, finance, as well as the dollar and the euro itself, makes the fragmentation of the world economy not only inevitable, but also irreversible.”

He sees the weaponisation of the dollar as the main reason why there is a push by a number of nations to bypass the American currency when settling international trade dals. “The Americans themselves have created a situation where the search for alternatives to the dollar has inevitably started. And now we see how it’s happening…We see that Iranians, Brazilians, and Saudis are already switching to trade in yuan not only with China, but also with third-party countries.”

Indeed, in May, reports surfaced that China had inked deals with dozens of countries to settle $582.3 billion worth of global trades in yuan in an effort to

Area Agreement (AfCFTA) paves the way for a single currency, the majority of participants acknowledge its potential positive impact on economic development, improved price transparency and reduced inflation. An African single currency has always been on the cards. The Abuja Treaty of 1991 called for, among other things, an African Monetary Union (AMU) that aims to have a single currency in place under the aegis of the African Central Bank by 2028.

A single currency would eliminate exchange rate volatility, facilitate cross-border trade and foster economic cooperation, leading to increased investment, job creation, and economic growth across the continent. A common currency would also reduce transaction costs, eliminate exchange rate risks and reduce financial risks, making trade and investment easier within Africa.

The reduced barriers to crossborder trade and investment are likely to encourage more small and mediumsized companies, previously limited to domestic markets, to enter neighbouring markets, fostering increased competition and resource allocation within Africa. It would also create a larger market for African businesses, creating and enhancing competitiveness on the global stage.

Africa's abundance of natural resources

How is the dollar part of the trade between Djibouti and Kenya?

circumvent the dollar. And in early June, Andrey Kostin, the chief executive of Russia’s second-largest bank, said that the yuan could end up dethroning the dollar as China appears to be on the path of removing its strict currency restrictions.

Altruism, fragmentation of the global economy and the weaponisation of the US dollar aside, advocates for a single currency in Africa argue that it would promote greater economic integration among African nations and enhance the already ongoing process of transforming the continent’s segmented national markets into an integrated Africa-wide market.

As the African Continental Free Trade

has driven historic growth, but dependence on a few key commodities has resulted in market uncertainty surrounding many of the continent's currencies. Africa remains an important producer of oil and natural gas, accounting for a significant portion of global production – and a single African currency could address the region's monetary challenges with respect to oil, gas and minerals, including currency conversion difficulties, which could positively impact revenues.

The importance of a single currency is emphasised by the African Union’s consideration for the entire continent, as it aligns with the objectives of the AfCFTA, and the eventual realisation of the AMU.

A unified currency would enable the implementation of a coordinated monetary policy across Africa, allowing for more effective management of inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates, which could contribute to macroeconomic stability, price stability, and fiscal discipline, fostering investor confidence and economic stability in the region. However, implementing a mechanism for gradual single currency integration requires energy, patience, and strong political leadership, despite potential doubts and setbacks.

One of the primary challenges to adopting a single currency in Africa is the significant economic diversity among African countries. Disparities in economic development, inflation rates, fiscal policies, and levels of economic integration make it difficult to establish a common monetary policy that suits the needs of all nations. Harmonising diverse economies could lead to economic imbalances and potential conflicts among member countries.

Critics argue that adopting a single currency would result in African countries relinquishing their control over monetary policy to a central authority. This could limit countries' ability to respond to domestic economic challenges and tailor monetary policies to their specific needs. The loss of flexibility in managing fiscal and monetary policy could hinder countries' ability to address economic downturns or imbalances.

Establishing a single currency requires strong regional institutions, including central banks, regulatory bodies, and mechanisms for fiscal coordination. Africa's institutional capacity varies across countries and building the necessary infrastructure and institutions could be a complex and time-consuming process. Implementing a single currency prematurely without robust institutions could lead to inefficiencies, governance issues, and potential economic crises.

Most importantly, implementing a

single currency requires strong political will and consensus among African nations. There may be concerns over giving up national sovereignty, as a shared currency would involve coordinating economic policies and decisions with other member states. Political challenges, divergent national interests, and concerns over decision-making authority could hinder progress towards a single currency.

The debate over a single currency for Africa involves weighing the potential benefits of enhanced regional integration, increased trade, and economic stability against the challenges of economic diversity, loss of monetary autonomy, institutional capacity, and political complexities. It is crucial to carefully consider the readiness of African economies, establish strong regional institutions, and ensure broad consensus among member countries before embarking on such a significant undertaking.

The weaponization of the dollar is the main reason why there is a push by a number of nations to bypass the American currency

Revolutionising cross-border payments to boost intra-Africa trade

The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) takes centre stage, enabling seamless financial integration and unprecedented opportunities for African economies, writes

IN a groundbreaking move to reshape Africa's financial landscape, the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) has emerged as a centralised Financial Market Infrastructure that facilitates secure and efficient cross-border transactions across African borders. Working in collaboration with Africa's central banks, PAPSS provides a robust payment and settlement service connecting commercial banks and licensed payment service providers across the region as “Participants.” Since its announcement at the Twelfth Extraordinary Summit of the African Union in 2019, PAPSS has been hailed as a key instrument for implementing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), paving the way for enhanced intra-African trade and financial integration.

Afreximbank, in partnership with the African Union (AU), played a pivotal role in developing PAPSS, which aims to minimise risk and streamline crossborder transactions, significantly reducing the dependency on hard currencies. This revolutionary Financial Market Infrastructure is set to boost Africa's economic growth and underpin the implementation of the AfCFTA, serving as a continent-wide platform for processing, clearing, and settling intra-African trade and commerce payments through a multilateral net settlement system.

With its operational roll-out announced by African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and AfCFTA Secretariat, PAPSS is set to be a game-changer for the African continent. By saving over US$5 billion in payment transaction costs annually, the platform will foster financial inclusion and facilitate seamless cross-border payments in local currencies, bolstering intra-African trade and reinforcing economic development.

Professor Benedict Oramah, President of Afreximbank and Chairman of the PAPSS Management Board, expressed

his pride in realising the long-envisioned dream of implementing PAPSS. "With the implementation of PAPSS, Africa can expect to begin to reap the fruits of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. Afreximbank is proud to have contributed to the realization of this multi-decade dream," he said.

He emphasised that PAPSS collaborates with existing regional and national payment systems, complementing them to better integrate African economies for the collective benefit.

Wamkele Mene, Secretary-General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, lauded the establishment of PAPSS as a pivotal development in facilitating affordable and efficient cross-border trade transactions, a crucial aspect of AfCFTA's implementation. With greater capacity for conducting cross-border transactions, Africa can now unlock numerous opportunities for enhanced intra-African trade. He said: "The introduction of PAPSS provides Africa with greater capacity to conduct cross-border transactions and expand the scale of both active and latent opportunities for enhanced intra-African trade."

PAPSS CEO, Mike Ogbalu III, envisions PAPSS as a fundamental rail connecting African markets, enabling seamless trade for individuals, businesses, and governments across the continent. "PAPSS will provide fresh impetus for businesses to scale more easily across Africa, essentially eliminating the borders that have balkanised us and robbed us of our economic prosperity for so long," he

added.

Following the successful pilot phase in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), PAPSS is now advancing discussions with other national and regional institutions to expand its continent-wide connectivity. Afreximbank, as the main Settlement Agent, provides settlement guarantees on the payment system and overdraft facilities to all settlement agents, further accelerating expansion and ensuring settlement finality.

To further support the clearing and settlement in WAMZ countries, Afreximbank has already approved $500 million, with an additional $3 billion estimated to bolster the continent-wide implementation of PAPSS.

In a remarkable step forward, PAPSS has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with five African multinational commercial banking groups: Access Bank Group, Ecobank Group, KCB Group, Standard Bank Group, and UBA Group. This collaboration seeks to revolutionise cross-border transactions across Africa, leveraging the extensive networks of subsidiaries and representative offices across major economic centres.

By integrating PAPSS into their existing systems, these commercial banks aim to enhance efficiency, transparency, and reliability in intra-African settlement, driving financial inclusion and continental economic development.

The joint efforts of PAPSS, Afreximbank, African central banks, and participating commercial banking groups are setting the stage for a more integrated and efficient African banking landscape. With PAPSS poised to unleash its potential continent-wide, Africa stands on the cusp of a new era of financial prosperity and boundless cross-border opportunities. Customers of the partnering banks will soon experience the benefits of PAPSS, as the service becomes available in their countries towards year-end.

Jon Offei-Ansah

What is the model trade deal for Africa?

AS the past decades have shown, a new trade deal is needed. Africa could do with a trade deal that incentivises and rewards trade diversification, expansion of productive capacities, interconnection of supply chains, and sustainable growth.

The empirical evidence suggests

that for these goals to be met, two complementary measures are required: firstly, a sequencing of trade policy that prioritises intra-African trade (which is already more diversified than Africa’s external trade), and, secondly, liberalised trade between African countries with harmonised trade rules, as offered by the African Continental Free Trade Area

(AfCFTA) initiative. In that regard partner countries should ensure first of all, like doctors, that they “first do no harm”.

But that is not always the current practice. The evidence suggests that implementing reciprocal agreements with the European Union (like the Economic Partnership Agreements) and other

Reduced non-tariff barriers, lower intra-African tariffs, improved trade facilitation, and integrated markets can create a large, prosperous, peaceful, and more dynamic environment for trade and investment opportunities for Africa’s partners as well as for Africa’s own enterprises, argues David Luke, who adds that a more developed and integrated Africa is not merely philanthropy, but in everyone’s best interest

Egypt and Tunisia are already members of COMESA

developed countries ahead of Africa’s AfCFTA would result in losses in trade – or trade diversion – between African countries.

The problem is that such agreements force African countries to undertake divergent regulatory and trade reforms rather than first consolidating better regionally. In contrast, if the AfCFTA was fully implemented before such reciprocal agreements, such negative impacts would be mitigated.

Trade gains for both African countries and the EU (or other countries) would be preserved while intra-African trade would expand significantly, benefitting trade in industrial goods. African integration is in the interest of its trading partners. This points to the need for strategic sequencing to prioritise implementation of the AfCFTA.

The main elements of the ideal trade deal for Africa at this stage can be sketched

along the following lines: for a transitional period benchmarked against milestones in AfCFTA implementation and the gains emerging from it, a good development case can be made for Africa’s trading partners to offer to all African countries unilateral market access that is duty-free and quotafree with a cumulative rules of origin regime.

Granting concessions to Africa to allow non-reciprocal access to partner markets for goods and services for a fixed transitional period is a strongly pro-development measure and poses little commercial competitive risk to developed countries. With external market access secured for Africa’s exports, it incentivises African countries to seek trade

years from 2025 is understood to be the timeframe that is, as of early 2023, being considered for a renewal of this trade concession. Yet another clue comes from Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) modelling, which projects that after full implementation of the AfCFTA gains for Africa would essentially be concentrated in intra-African trade, which could see an increase of up to 33.8 per cent by 2045 as compared to a baseline without the AfCFTA. The ECA projection and the year 2045 may be considered to be a judicious timeframe for the transition period.

On the second question of inclusion of North African countries, the August 2022 US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa announced by the Biden Administration

opportunities with each other and mitigates the risks of trade diversion.

By ensuring such a deliberate sequencing for the AfCFTA, this will help Africa to build productive capacities and achieve its potential for strong and diversified growth in intra-African trade with inclusive and transformational consequences.

The ideal trade deal for Africa raises three immediate questions: what might constitute a sufficient transition period; how to justify the inclusion of North African countries; and possible obstacles to a World Trade Organisation (WTO) waiver allowing special treatment for Africa as a whole. Concerning the transition period, the first clue is the AU’s Agenda 2063, which envisages significant transformation of African economies by that year. The EU’s Post-Cotonou Agreement (PCA) provides another clue.

The EU’s current bilateral trade deal with sub-Sahara countries is for a period of 20 years from 2021. This suggests that in the minds of the negotiators, it may take up to two decades for significant changes in Africa’s trade to emerge which at that point would warrant a review of the PCA.

As regards the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 10

calls for the US to “address the artificial bureaucratic division between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa”. The EU has also, for example in Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2018 State of the Union address, raised the prospect of a “continent-tocontinent free trade agreement as an economic partnership between equals”. This acknowledges that the value chains developing across the continent are outstripping artificial divisions and that trade integration for the continent as a whole will provide a more dynamic market for both imports and exports.

Egypt and Tunisia are already members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Mauritania is in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while Morocco has sought ECOWAS membership.

Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia have ratified the AfCFTA Agreement (while Libya has signed but not yet ratified). The economic models that forecast a transformative impact of the AfCFTA are predicated on continent-wide implementation, not a sub-Saharan rump.

On the third question of multilateral legitimisation through a WTO waiver, the precedent established by the US’s AGOA –which obtained a World Trade Organisation (WTO) waiver – suggests that this is not

‘ ’

insurmountable. Africa’s small share of global trade flows, at 2.3 per cent, poses little competitive threat to the commercial interests of the world’s most advanced economies.

And as a member-driven organisation, with African countries accounting for a quarter of its membership, consensus on a special deal for Africa may not prove too difficult to achieve. The international trading system can accommodate a special trade deal for Africa with negligible systemic effect.

The ideal trade deal for Africa is one within a broader trade-support framework. Trade preferences alone are an important but insufficient part of the solution.

The experience of trade under AGOA, the EU’s various regimes, and China’s Duty-Free, Quota-Free (DFQF) regime shows that more is needed. African businesses struggle with non-tariff barriers, such as product standards, sanitary and

phyto-sanitary measures, and technical

norms.

African businesspeople sometimes face challenges in obtaining visas, making

Africa’s trade partners can help by buttressing their trade preferences for Africa with a set of complementary measures. The first would be deliberate

it difficult for them to meet business partners and strike deals – especially where smaller businesses are concerned. The policy environment in African countries themselves is often not supportive either. Many African countries suffer unstable macroeconomics and deficits in trade infrastructure, trade facilitation efforts, and institutional quality.

efforts to boost investment in African countries and improve the type of investment, diversifying away from disproportionate concentration on resource extraction to encourage agriculture and industry.

Secondly, initiatives are needed to assist African businesses to overcome non-

African businesspeople sometimes face challenges in obtaining visas, making it difficult for them to meet business partners and strike deals Image by javi_indy on Freepik

In geo-economics and geo-politics, individual African countries lack the influence to achieve meaningful outcomes that impact their development prospects

tariff barriers. China has shown the value of deliberate, value-chain-specific “green lanes” to fast-track agricultural exports, for instance.

The third area is alignment of development assistance with trade. In programmes such as the EU’s Global Gateway, China’s Belt and Road, the US’s Prosper Africa and Power Africa, the UK’s British International Investment and British Support for Infrastructure Projects, and the multi-partner Trade Mark

Africa, Africa’s partners have recognised the need for investments to help reduce supply-side constraints in fields including infrastructure, energy, transport, education, health, research, and digitalisation.

Yet Africa’s deficits in these areas persist and more support is needed. Africa’s development partners should craft new trade deals to use trade as a key for sustainable development, the alleviation of extreme poverty, and closer integration of Africa into the world economy.

With strategic sequencing to offer unilateral preferential access for African exporters now, and deeper reciprocal trade deals only when African economies are better integrated and ready, the world can create the right trade environment for Africa. Buttressed with complementary support measures, Africa’s development partners can help unlock trade as an important tool for African sustainable development

The ball is not only in Africa’s

African businesses struggle with non-tariff barriers

partner countries’ court. African countries themselves do better by taking a deliberate, strategic approach to trade. For example, those with a dedicated AGOA utilisation strategy, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, and Mauritius, performed much better.

Yet most do not approach their trading relationships with sufficient strategic foresight, coordination, or clarification of practical objectives. No African country, for instance, has a China strategy despite the country being such an important export destination, nor is there much evidence of coordination among African countries in their approach to China.

There is more coherence in the Chinese approach towards African countries than there is within the African Union on China. And, as laid out above, Africa’s trade has been splintered by incoherent arrangements between regional groups (or in some instances individual countries) and third countries.

The onus is on African countries themselves to pursue strategic coordination in engaging with external partners. AU resolutions frequently call upon its member states “to engage external partners as one … speaking with one voice”. Yet the AU Commission has no mandate to act on behalf of member states in trade negotiations (or indeed in climate talks), although it is well established that Africa is disadvantaged in both areas. Only ad hoc arrangements are put in place to coordinate negotiations.

present in Beijing, but its concentrated power structures perhaps offer openings for coordinated African diplomatic activity.

In Geneva, the AU office lacks the capacity to provide technical services, such as drafting proposals and preparing responses, to the WTO African Group. To enhance the role of the AU in Geneva, it is essential it is given observer status at the WTO, which it is currently denied. To help ensure that African countries engage proactively on current and future questions that arise at the WTO, work strategically with partners, and maintain trade policy coherence, the AU should set up a dedicated think tank on WTO and trade issues to provide its member states with policy options that support African interests.

One of the emerging issues that will impact how Africa trades concerns initiatives to decarbonise national economies and the role that border adjustment measures can play in reducing the risk of carbon leakage. Another is emerging rules to govern global digital trade and e-commerce.

It is essential that – already at this early stage – African countries are able to shape new global rules on trade and

No African country has a China strategy despite the country being such an important export destination

Although the AU maintains diplomatic representation in key capitals such as Washington, Brussels, and Beijing, African diplomatic missions struggle to engage strategically and coherently, and so underperform. Washington and Brussels offer multiple entry points for engagement, through the diverse agencies of the US executive branch and the Congressional caucus and committee system, and the EU Council, Commission, and Parliament respectively. Such pluralism may not be

climate and digitalisation. Without effective coordination, African countries are vulnerable to being outmanoeuvred in trade negotiations and in their engagement with partners.

In geo-economics and geo-politics, individual African countries lack the influence to achieve meaningful outcomes that impact their development prospects. They should work together. The AU Commission must be given a mandate, direction, and resources to secure outcomes that meet African aspirations.

David Luke is Professor of Practice and Strategic Director at the London School of Economics Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa, where he oversees the Africa Trade Programme. The article is an abridged version from How Africa Trade, of which he is the editor. The book is published by LSE Press and is freely available to read and download via Open Access publishing distribution. The link to download the book is here: https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.hat

WTO delivers breakthrough deals

IN the early hours of June 17, after several sleepless nights, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the World Trade Organisation’s Director-General, stood up and, her voice rising to a crescendo, told exhausted delegates words few had envisaged would be uttered at the end of the organisation’s 12th Ministerial conference (MC12): “You stepped up and delivered in every area we have been working on.”

She then listed a package of agreements now known as the Geneva Package — covering, among others, a waiver of intellectual property protections to boost countermeasures against Covid-19, a longillusory agreement on fisheries subsidies, and a decision addressing food insecurity. These achievements demonstrated, OkonjoIweala said, that the WTO “is, in fact, capable of responding to the emergencies of our time”.

She hailed a world in which WTO members “can come together, across geopolitical fault lines, to address problems of the global commons, and to reinforce and reinvigorate this institution.” WTO agreements are reached through consensus and are binding on members.

Multilateralism, under attack on multiple fronts, had been given a lifesaving shot in the arm.

The triumphant outcome at MC12 was anything but anticipated. In fact, on June 13, a day before the conference opened, Nick Dearden, a columnist for the UK’s Guardian newspaper, wrote that delegates arriving for that conference would find the organisation in an “existential crisis”.

Amid a pandemic, Dearden bemoaned, WTO members were still cavilling about temporarily waiving property rights of pharmaceutical companies to allow developing countries to produce Covid-19 vaccines; and many of them were still confused about a “common approach” to the growing global food crisis. It was time, he wrote, to “bury” the organisation.

Pessimism about the WTO is nearly

always a safe gamble. Only this time pessimism lost.

First, there was an agreement about the definition of fish. It was no mean feat. For the past 21 years since fisheries negotiations were launched at Doha, this was one of the fraught issues. Fish, the agreement now states, “means all species of living marine resources, whether processed or not”. The old canard that it includes “aquatic plants” had been quietly jettisoned, almost without notice.

The agreement on fisheries also includes a curb of around $22 billion in annual government subsidies to fishers from wealthy countries who ravage African

waters. In other words, this agreement, as well as helping to protect the livelihood of millions of small-scale and artisanal fishing communities in Africa and elsewhere, will also help protect ocean health.

The WTO Director-General writes it is the first such pact in WTO history “with a primarily environmental objective at its core”. This alone would count as a major achievement.

Second, the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver decision will contribute to diversifying the vaccine manufacturing capacity of countries, and Africa stands to benefit from it. Request for the waiver had

In a time of pandemic and war-related doom and gloom, a striking moment of real multilateral triumph must be celebrated, says Lansana Gberie

Lansana Gberie: Chair of crucial TRIPS Council negotiations

been submitted by India and South Africa in October 2010, long before Okonjo-Iweala became Director-General.

That request triggered a counter proposal from the European Union. Things stalled until she initiated a highly creative process, bringing together India and South Africa (the original proponents), and the EU and the US (two key rights holders). In five months, the Quad produced an “outcome document” that formed the basis for serious negotiations.

For full disclosure, I facilitated those negotiations as Chair of the TRIPS Council beginning in early May through to the ministerial conference. However, OkonjoIweala and her Deputy, Anabel Gonzalez, helped guide those negotiations. It was the last decision that was gavelled, at 4:30 am, shortly before the conference was brought to a close.

Work on extending the waiver to cover therapeutics and diagnostics, as mandated by the MC12 Decision, has already started and has to conclude before the end of December this year. In the meantime, the decision will be celebrated in Africa, particularly in countries with the capacity to manufacture vaccines.

Resented by pharmaceutical companies for going too far and by civil society for not going far enough, the TRIPS decision would help African countries work together to build and diversify vaccine production capacity. It will provide a streamlined avenue for exporting vaccines to countries in need – directly or through international humanitarian programmes.

At the moment, four WTO members (the US, the EU, the UK and Switzerland), all in the global north, produce over 90 per cent of Covid-19 vaccines, and more than 70 per cent of Africans remain unvaccinated.

Third, in the midst of current global food shortages and record high food prices, the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity includes a decision that removes export prohibitions and restrictions on the World Food Programme humanitarian purchases, ensuring food assistance reaches the most vulnerable. Hundreds of millions of Africans suffer from hunger.

Okonjo-Iweala said the decision would help WFP “do its difficult job of feeding millions” of people facing hunger. That

she was working on many difficult issues and still overseeing other negotiations, including tackling food insecurity, underlines her depth of commitment to the developing world, especially her continent, Africa.

Success triggers greater expectations, as well as pushback. The struggle to integrate Africa firmly into the global trading system must continue.

Remember that the WTO, which sets rules that facilitate around 97 per cent of global trade, helped make the developed world significantly richer by opening up global trade for their companies. By some estimates, the organisation, and its forerunner the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has helped increase trade among members by around 171 per cent.

Africa’s share of global trade has actually declined from a high of around 4.4 per cent in 1970 to about three per cent currently. Our earnest friends and detractors never tire of reminding us of this. It is time to reverse this trend. And in Okonjo-Iweala, Africa has a champion.

The Doha round or the WTO 4th Ministerial Conference in November 2001 for the first time bracketed development as a central goal of global trade. Over two decades later, this sentiment remains merely aspirational. It must become a policy goal.

I wrote shortly after Okonjo-Iweala took over as Director-General that the growing expectation of what she might deliver for the continent needs to be tempered, in part because of the sheer difficulty of navigating decisions in an

organisation that moves at a glacial pace, and where paradigm-shifting decisions tend to be studiously avoided.

But by sheer force of will, hard work and enormous goodwill, the WTO under her leadership is delivering more than could have been expected.

Highlights of the Geneva Package

1. a package on WTO response to emergencies, comprising:

• a Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity (

• a Ministerial Decision on World Food Programme (WFP) Food Purchases Exemptions from Export Prohibitions or Restrictions

• a Ministerial Declaration on the WTO Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics

• a Ministerial Decision on the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

2. a Decision on the E-commerce Moratorium and Work Programme

3. an Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

4. a Decision on the Work Programme on Small Economies

5. a Decision on the TRIPS nonviolation and situation complaints

The WTO under Okonjo-Iweala’s leadership is delivering more than could have been expected

Dr Lansana Gberie is Chair of the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone in Switzerland. The above was first published in Africa Renewal, a UN publication.

Forlorn hope for Zimbabwean voters as yet another election looms

Our Special Correspondent looks at the dynamics of Zimbabwe's electoral landscape, examining the strengths and weaknesses of the presidential candidates, the state of the economy's influence, the role of foreign powers, and the historical context of disputed elections, shedding light on the recurring challenges that have marred the country's democratic progress

ZIMBABWE, a nation grappling with economic hardships and political challenges, is on the brink of another crucial election that could determine the country's future trajectory. The upcoming elections, set against a backdrop of a legacy of disputed electoral history, hold the potential to reshape the country’s political landscape and offer a choice between continuity and change.

Zanu-PF, the former national liberation movement that has been in power since independence from Britain in 1980, remains in power 43 years on and is seeking to extend its vice grip on the levers of State for another five years. After ousting longtime strongman, President Robert Mugabe, in a military coup in November 2017, his erstwhile deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, has struggled to steady the country’s economy since taking over, but believes a

second and final term at the helm is well deserved.

In Zimbabwe's highly anticipated elections, which are scheduled for August 23 this year, President Mnangagwa and opposition Citizen’s Coalition for Change (CCC) leader Nelson Chamisa emerge as the main contenders, offering contrasting visions for the country's future. Other bit part players include Douglas Mwonzora, who wrestled the MDC Alliance party brand associated with the late veteran opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, from Chamisa through a legal battle in the courts. While Mwonzora managed to make off with the party’s name, its soul and following remains with Chamisa and it goes without saying that the CCC presidential candidate has retained the following of the same democratic change movement that was inaugurated by Tsvangirai in 1999.

Bizarrely, Mwonzora has failed to field a single candidate in local and parliamentary elections, and will run as his party’s only candidate.

Another pretender in the presidential election fray is former Mugabe loyalist and cabinet minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, who belonged to Zanu-PF’s G-40 faction that was aligned to Mugabe’s wife Grace, and whose members fled into exile following the 2017 military coup. Kasukuwere successfully filed nomination papers to run as an independent candidate, but in a case brought against him by a Zanu-PF functionary, the High Court ruled him out of contention. At the time of writing, the South Africa-based Kasukuwere’s appeal was yet to be heard in a constitutional case that has significant implications for the Zimbabwe diaspora’s participation in national elections – a right provided for in the country’s constitution.

Mnangagwa’s spooked reaction to Kasukuwere’s entry into the presidential race betrays his unease with the unfinished factional contestations within Zanu-PF. While the 2017 coup swept Mnangagwa into power and pre-empted Zanu-PF’s elective congress that could have produced a post-Mugabe leadership, the true popularity of the G-40 faction within the ruling party remained an untested factor. This is why Mnangagwa has been rattled by Kasukuwere’s presidential bid. In 2018, Mnangagwa’s sliver of a majority amounted to less than 50,000 votes, and the fear within Zanu-PF is that Kasukuwere could throw Mnangagwa’s re-election hopes into a tailspin if he manages to secure the same number of votes or more.

President Mnangagwa and opposition Citizen’s Coalition for Change (CCC) leader Nelson Chamisa emerge as the main contenders

As the incumbent, Mnangagwa benefits from name recognition, experience, and the support of the ruling Zanu-PF party. He has implemented a modicum of economic reforms since taking office and attempted to open up the country to foreign investment through his “Zimbabwe is open for business” agenda. Key infrastructure projects such as the Beitbridge border post refurbishment, a new terminal at the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport, a roads and highways refurbishment programme, and moves towards establishing a lithium processing plant, have all counted in Mnangagwa’s favour.

But policy inconsistencies and a lack of political will to address political and governance reforms called for by the West have robbed him of traction with European and American investors and left him in the arms of his default bosom buddies – the Chinese, Russians and Belarussians.

Zimbabwe still faces significant economic challenges, including high unemployment, inflation, and a lack of foreign investment. A new exodus of educated young Zimbabweans has gripped the country, bleeding it of finite and essential human resources as they flock to distant lands, including to the former colonial power Britain, where they are taking up jobs predominantly in the health and social care sector. Those left behind and without options are seething with resentment for Mnangagwa's government. Human rights concerns, such as crackdowns on political dissent and the jailing on trumped up charges of prominent opposition politicians such as CCC’s Job Wiwa Sikhala, could also affect Mnangagwa’s reputation and support among certain segments of the population.

In contrast, Chamisa, a charismatic and youthful opposition leader, appeals to the desire for change and promises economic reforms and job creation. His relative youthfulness and dynamic speaking skills enable him to connect with voters and rally support. Chamisa leads the Citizens Coalition for Change and benefits from opposition unity, which consolidates support against the ruling Zanu-PF party. However, his limited political experience compared to Mnangagwa raises concerns about his ability to govern effectively. Chamisa may face challenges in garnering support from a wider range of demographics and regions across the country. Already, he faces criticism over his decision to not formally constitute

his party and by adopting a constitution to institutionalise the opposition party, complete with organisational structures and a professionalised internal governance system.

As it stands, Chamisa is the sole authority within his structureless party, and this apparent centralisation of power in a single personality in the absence of a constitution has invited criticism of dictatorial tendencies in the youthful opposition leader. The CCC leader launched his party’s presidential campaign on July 16 in central Zimbabwe sans a manifesto or policy blueprint. Apart from the rhetoric, there is as yet nothing substantive by which to assess Chamisa’s offer to Zimbabwean voters. He has claimed that his informal approach to party organisation and policy proposition are reflective of his doctrine of “strategic ambiguity”, apparently intended to wrongfoot Zanu-PF and and foil intrusion by state intelligence operatives on behalf of Zanu-PF.

Key CCC figures Tendai Biti and Professor Welshman Ncube, who were finance minister and industry and international trade minister, respectively, under Tsvangirai’s premiership during the 2009-2013 inclusive government, are conspicuous by their absence from Chamisa’s 2023 campaign. Chamisa faces accusations of side-lining founding members of the democratic opposition under Tsvangirai in order to project CCC as an entirely new party of his own making. His closest allies are eloquent upstarts Fadzayi Mahere, a University of Zimbabwe law lecturer who serves as the party’s spokesperson, and her deputy, Gift Ostallos Siziba, who is currently a doctoral studies student.

Zanu-PF's long history of electoral dominance, coupled with lingering

irregularities in the electoral system, pose challenges for Chamisa's campaign and his ability to ensure a fair and transparent election. His party’s campaign rallies are summarily banned by the Zimbabwe Republic Police on flimsy pretexts, while Zanu-PF campaigns freely across the country.

Of significant concern to the opposition are the results of a recent Afrobarometer opinion poll, which found that if elections were held a day after the survey, which was released on July 10, 27 per cent of respondents would vote for Chamisa against 35 per cent for Mnangagwa.

“This means that the CCC leader’s support base has decreased by 6 per cent since June 2022. This marks the first decline in Chamisa’s vote since he became leader of the opposition,” observed Dr Phillan Zamchiya, senior researcher with South Africa’s Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies.

“Also of significance is that Chamisa’s vote used to be far ahead of his party but the gap has closed to 1 per cent. On the other end, the survey shows that Mnangagwa’s support base has increased by 5 per cent since June 2022,” Zamchiya added.

However, the survey also reveals a paradox: although Mnangagwa leads Chamisa in the survey, a majority of respondents (65 per cent) say the country is going in the wrong direction.

“A large majority (69 per cent) say the economy is bad and 62 per cent say the living conditions are bad and this constitutes an equal proportion from both the urban and rural areas. An overwhelming majority (85 per cent) say the government has performed badly in addressing key issues such as unemployment, corruption, the economy and managing the economy,” Zamchiya observed.

The survey also showed that a majority of respondents refused to reveal their voting choices, a fact from which the opposition could draw some comfort in the hope that they could sway these voters to their side on August 23.

“The good news for CCC though is that this base of potential voters is huge enough to swing the vote in their favour and win both at parliamentary and presidential level, that is if they do the right things and the environment becomes relatively free and fair,” Zamchiya said.

Key infrastructure projects such as the Beitbridge border post refurbishment, a new terminal at the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport, a roads and highways refurbishment programme, and moves towards establishing a lithium processing plant, have all counted in Mnangagwa’s favour

The challenge of democratic leadership in Nigeria

in Nigeria,

WHILE the elections of 1999 were generally welcomed both in Nigeria and abroad as a crucial turning point, the optimism in some quarters was more cautious. Considering our long history of military tyranny, it seemed prudent to emphasise the distinction between holding elections and implementing genuine democratisation of structures and systems that had been shaped by totalitarian instincts for almost two decades.

At the time, I was personally of the view that real democratisation would require more than voting; it would require a complete rethinking of how our society was organised. Yet, among the many qualities of democracy, holding free and fair elections is one of the most important.

Without committing what scholars have described as the “fallacy of electoralism”, we can say: no election, no democracy and within that context, Nigerians were right to have embraced the exit of the military and the return of the ballot.

In any case, for the democracy movement at the time, it was a case of anything but the military. The assortment of activists and politicians mainly wanted the military out of power. The politics of taking over power was a secondary consideration. As such, the pro-democracy movement was in no shape to comply with the organisational demands of a nationwide campaign for power.

There were also genuine disagreements over the way forward by key elements of the movement. Some favoured entry into the field to contest for power in the post-military era. Others wanted a continued struggle to realise far-reaching constitutional reforms. While some opted out entirely, preferring to boycott the transition process until their demands for deeper constitutional and structural

changes were implemented.

Thus, when the shape of the 4th Republic emerged, it seemed that those who had worked the most to enthrone democracy were sidelined while those that had been beneficiaries of and collaborators with military regimes took centre stage. In hindsight, it may be said that the pro-democracy movement suffered from a lack of strategic definition in terms of articulating the next phase of the struggle.

In the event, the all-consuming haste to get the military out of power also framed some of the troubling birth defects of the 4th Republic, chief among them being the fact that the Constitution – the guiding document of the republic was not generated through a popular democratic

process but by a conclave that edited past constitutions.

Indeed, the 4th Republic commenced before anyone actually saw the Constitution. But at the time, the overriding imperative was to get the military out of power.

Concerns about the provenance of the Constitution were deemed obstructive or churlish worries that could prolong military rule. No one wanted to give the military an excuse to stay a day longer especially when the regime at the time was minded to make a swift exit.

As late Chief Bola Ige, one of the leaders of the Alliance for Democracy and later Attorney General of the Federation, once observed: “What occurred in

Looking back on two decades of democratisation

only civic movements mobilised in the context of larger patriotic interests can overwhelm the forces that wish to return the country to the days of totalitarian rule, argues Kayode Fayemi, a former two-term Governor of Ekiti State in south west Nigeria

Real democratisation requires more than voting

1999 was not a transition from military dictatorship to democracy but from military rule to civilian rule.” By this, he meant that 1999 had not ushered in

democratisation in one blow but rather a phase of demilitarisation that would ultimately lead to democracy.

My own sense of the transition in 1999 was that it had been shaped significantly by the manner of General Sani Abacha’s exit and the arrival of General Abdulsalam Abubakar who eventually handed over to the elected civilian government. The dominance of the ruling party’s hierarchy by retired army generals and civilians with close links to military elites set the tone for party formation and resulted in an authoritarian presidential leadership rather than authentic democratic governance.

I have once argued that, in essence, the nature of the transition did not ensure a transformation of the political culture that would have led to a complete overhaul of our systems and structures; it merely effected a re-arrangement of the political space. The politico-cultural fundamentals that inform the conduct of elites remained the same.

The widespread euphoria that accompanied the exit of the military and the entry of a civilian government prevented a sober appreciation of how entrenched the military had become in all aspects of Nigerian life. Many of the challenges that our democracy is experiencing now cannot be extricated from that complicated history and from the

residue of its military provenance.

Regardless, it is important not to understate or devalue what occurred in 1999. A transition did happen. It is, therefore, far more useful to see the 1999 transition as a case of humble beginnings and baby steps on the way to democratic maturity rather than a false dawn.

It would be grossly inaccurate to say that Nigeria has not made progress since 1999. We live in a far greater conducive climate of freedom than those of us who came of age during military rule can recall. There is generally more respect for civil liberties and human rights.

The demilitarisation of politics has widened the space within which democratic reforms are occurring. Those who are profoundly pessimistic about the Nigerian democratic enterprise continually cite the absence of economic dividends which might serve to “validate” democracy in the eyes of ordinary Nigerians as a major risk to the sustainability of democracy. And there is no question that democracy must deliver concrete development – quantitative and qualitative.

In times past however, the mismanagement of the economy by democratic regimes was cited by military adventurers who seized power from civilian governments. Arguably, the period

Olusegun Obasanjo was the first president of the 4th Republic

between 1983 and 1999 served to dispel the myth that military dictatorships were better economic managers than democratic governments.

More importantly, the reward for democracy is yet more democracy. Proper economic policy which embodies the hopes and aspirations of the people can only be forged in the furnace of a widening democratic space and a revival of the lost democratic art of public conversation. Perhaps the major problem with 1999 and the disenchantment with the pace of change since then is perceptual.

From the outset, the exaggerated expectations of the citizenry, which was encouraged by cheap populism on the part of politicians, was primed to disappointment. The scale of decadence was enormous; the range of structural deficiency and institutional dysfunction was too vast to be remedied by the magical appearance of elected officials. Indeed, many of those elected at the time gravely underestimated the scale of the problem and overestimated their own curative remedies.

What the current challenges that our democracy is experiencing speaks to, is the utmost understanding of democracy as a permanent work in progress. Few statements exemplify this better than the American mantra of making “a more perfect union”.

If the US, a nation forged out of common purpose and common consent, perpetually seeks to make a more perfect union, it is evident that the task of nation building will be far more daunting in a state created without the consent of the people and imposed by colonial power. It is even more dismaying if such a state has not succeeded in re-making itself by re-negotiating the basis of its fundamental national association.

The structural deformities of the Nigerian federation have circumscribed many possibilities for our state and our country as a whole. It is very difficult to sustain good governance at the national level in Nigeria because of the structural fatalities that have held her hostage.

The over-concentration of powers in the federal-centre must yield to decentralisation of power and devolution of authority. Therefore, a fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian federation is an unavoidable step for the creation and sustenance of a participatory,

consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive national governance and one that is based on respect for the rule of law. I am convinced that this can, and will definitely happen in Nigeria and some point in the near future.

The fundamental restructuring of Nigeria will address key questions of political transformation; such issues as the writing of a people’s Constitution and the question of constitutional governance, the fundamental precepts or authorising principles of national togetherness, citizenship and the nationality question, the political economy of federalism, including the allocation of public revenue, security sector governance, human rights, social justice, minority rights, electoral system, type of government (parliamentary, presidential, proportional representation) etc.

In 1999, Nigeria re-established the right to choose its leaders via the ballot. What we must not do is assume a teleological link between elections and democracy. The notion that once you have elections, all else will follow is no doubt a pipe dream that is now obvious to all.

It is also now evident that there is nothing irreversible about democracy in Nigeria. This is why our theory of

change must not assume that democracy is a destination with a clear road map. The deepening of other factors like the economic well-being of the citizens is a necessary enabler of democratic consolidation. Ultimately, developing and strengthening the political culture or the civic community that can stand between populism and dogma is the most critical success factor.

A cursory look at our current electoral journey in the last two decades clearly points to elements of consolidation and deepening of our democracy but other aspects of the journey raise serious concerns about lack of progress. For example, in 2015, we crossed a major turning point with the first alternation of power since 1999. Political science literature regards this as clear evidence of democratic consolidation.

Clearly, the elections management body is improving in the technical aspects of its operations but elections are not simply technocratic, they are inherently political. It is about who gains power, who loses power and a lot happens in that cocktail and a lot of improvement is still required in the general conduct and management of the country’s electoral process.

The current phase of the struggle is

Kayode Fayemi: “residual distrust of power feeds apathy, disinterest and cynical disengagement”

therefore not just about maintaining the sanctity of the ballot. We must banish the idea that governance is something performed by a team of gifted performers or strong men, while the rest of the citizens are spectators or complainers. Thankfully, the culture of critical engagement –especially among the young – is growing in the country.

During the days of military rule, some soldiers declared with more than a touch of hubris that politics is much too important to be left to politicians. By this they meant that the military had the right to be political players since politicians had generally proven inept. Ultimately, the military proved to be no better at politics and governance themselves.

But there is a fundamental truth to the saying that politics is too important to be left to politicians. It is about redefining politics itself, transforming it from a rarefied craft reserved for a select few professional politicians, to the protocols and relationships that undergird personal, communal and social wellbeing.

In other words, politics is the management of human relationships, interactions and aspirations in the service of the common good. It is not something

mysterious that only “politicians” do; it is how citizens operate. Politics is a civic responsibility. It is how we engage with each other. The pursuit of good governance means that politicians can no longer be left to their own devices.

Seen in this light, the mutual estrangement of government and civil society will end. Civil society will continue

Simply put, Nigerians do not trust their governments and this has made it difficult, indeed in some cases, impossible, to build mass citizen movements for a fuller democratic engagement.

Residual distrust of power feeds apathy, disinterest and cynical disengagement. The people distrust their governments but not enough to actively

to express the communal instinct to regulate power but the chronic antagonism that poisons relations between the state and civil society will be replaced by mutual respect and positive tension.

Civic engagement means that the state can access a much larger pool of wisdom and knowledge made available by a new rapport with civil society. In return, participatory governance will become much more practicable across all levels of governance.

Before we arrive at that new rapport between the state and society, we must work hard to address a lingering threat, a carry-over from the days of military rule. The biggest challenge facing us as democrats is to rebuild trust between the state and society. The relationship between both spheres is often needlessly adversarial owing to a lack of trust.

check them and avert excesses of power. Rather, they distrust them so much that they desert the state and many simply do not care enough about the public realm.

This indifference is dangerous for democracy. Democratic institutions cannot survive or be strengthened in a climate of antipathy nor can politicians long retain their legitimacy under such circumstances. If the price of a free society is eternal vigilance, then apathy will carry a severe penalty for our republic.

Yet looking back on two decades of democratisation in Nigeria, it is instructive to note that only civic movements mobilised in the context of larger patriotic interests can overwhelm the forces of impunity. It is the discipline of civic engagement that will keep at bay those who wish to turn back the hands of the clock and return us to the dark days of totalitarian rule.

Dr Kayode Fayemi is currently a Visiting Professor at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London. The above is an abridged version of his presentation at the ALC this July.

The transition in 1999 was shaped significantly by the manner of General Sani Abacha’s exit

Our theory of change must not assume that democracy is a destination with a clear road map

Holding Somalia together

THE unsuccessful attempt to establish a unitary national government in Somalia, coupled with the citizens' aversion to a strong central government based in Mogadishu, has revived the idea of federalism in the country. Following the ousting of Siyad Barre in 1991, Somalia became fragmented with rebel groups controlling different zones based on clan affiliations.

The Somalia National Movement (SNM) from Hargeisa advocated for the secession of Somaliland, claiming historical and colonial disparities between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. This led to the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in 1991, which, although unrecognised, has its own currency and relatively stable governance structure.

In the north eastern part of the country, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) rebel group has governed the region. Amidst chaos and lawlessness, community leaders, armed factions, and former technocrats from the Barre regime formulated a political ideology to establish a federal member state known as Puntland in 1998. Puntland has contributed to relative stability, attracting skilled individuals from the strife-torn southcentral region and promoting economic and infrastructural development.

Despite numerous attempts by Somali elites and international support, building a functioning state in Somalia has remained challenging. The establishment of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in 2004 aimed to pave the way for a permanent federal state through a constitutional referendum and multi-party elections.

Federalisation was expected to empower federal member states to handle state-level administration, revenue management, tax collection and elections. However, apart from Puntland, which predates the Federal Government of Somalia, the establishment of four federal

member states in the south-central region has encountered various challenges of control over their areas of jurisdiction.

The Federal Government of Somalia, primarily based in Mogadishu, has faced significant challenges in extending its authority beyond the capital. The absence of cooperation and ties with Puntland and the self-declared state of Somaliland has further complicated the situation. The current administration is also grappling with conflicts involving Puntland, Somaliland, and South West State, which hold considerable territory from the north to the south west of the country.

These complexities have made it difficult to reach compromises, particularly due to the secession of Somaliland, the semi-autonomous nature of Puntland, and the federal government's struggle to move beyond zones under the protection of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Moreover, all the south-central based Federal Member States have experienced issues related to stagnant administration in specific towns, leading to challenges in delivering effective services

and causing discontent.

The lack of political unity, fragmentation along clan lines, and absence of a single currency, unified national defence force, and coherent foreign and defence policies pose significant challenges. Despite being recognised as one nation by the international community, Somalia remains politically divided, with a risk of further fragmentation and potential redrawing of the map of the Horn of Africa.

The road to a stable and functional state in Somalia requires addressing constitutional crises, ensuring the inclusion of all states, including Somaliland, enhancing cooperation between the Federal Government of Somali and Federal Member States, and compromise among political elites.

The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which was initiated in 2007, has undergone a transition and became ATMIS in April 2022. The mission has begun the process of withdrawing its 22,000-strong forces, with the first 2,000

Given that the country is highly complex and subject to various political, social and historical factors, any proposed strategies to put things right should be carefully evaluated, taking into account the interests and aspirations of all relevant stakeholders, writes Ahmed Ibrahim

This withdrawal of ATMIS raises concerns about the potential worsening of the situation in Somalia

soldiers scheduled for drawing down at the end of June of this year.

This withdrawal raises concerns about the potential worsening of the situation in Somalia, surpassing even the challenges faced in Afghanistan. While the Taliban's objectives were primarily focused on gaining territorial control within Afghanistan, Al-Shabaab, with its absence of territorial boundaries, poses a greater risk by potentially declaring war against neighbouring countries.

Compounding the situation is the absence of robust national security institutions capable of assuming security responsibilities from the ATMIS forces. Despite significant international funding towards the establishment of a functional Somali National Army, political disagreements among Somali clans have hindered progress. Consequently, government forces remain loyal to their respective clans and warlords, lacking cooperation among themselves.

Additionally, the Ethiopian People's Defence Forces (EPDF) have been a close security partner to Somalia since its establishment in exile. They have played a crucial role in combating Islamists and other anti-government elements since 2007, contributing to the reestablishment of the Somali government in Mogadishu.

The EPDF has also provided security support to the relatively stable northern regions, namely Puntland and Somaliland. However, the ongoing political instability and ethnic-based tensions between the Ethiopian government and the ethnic-based

states may eventually impact the existence of the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as the stability of regions such as Puntland and Somaliland.

In light of these developments, it is crucial for stakeholders to address the security vacuum that will be left by the withdrawal of ATMIS forces and work towards establishing inclusive and effective national security institutions. Regional cooperation and diplomatic efforts will be essential to navigate the complex dynamics and prevent further destabilisation in Somalia and the wider region.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the task of establishing a cohesive and functional nation in Somalia poses significant challenges. The international community, including the African Union, has followed a conventional and restrained approach in its interventions, limited by the principles of respecting state sovereignty.

This approach made no impact and,

consequently, it has become imperative to prioritise regional security rather than single state sovereignty and it is time to exert pressure on Somali politicians to make a definitive choice between embracing nationhood or seeking alternative compromises aligned with the desires of the Federal Member States. This may involve recognising entities such as Somaliland or Puntland as independent states.

Alternatively, it is worth contemplating the possibility of pursuing an alternative path, such as aligning Somalia with regional blocs like the East African Community (EAC). This approach could entail the permanent deployment of East African forces in Mogadishu until Somalia is capable of establishing its own stability and self-sufficiency. The objective would be to mitigate the potential risks that Somalia poses to itself, its neighbouring region and the global community.

Despite being recognised as one nation by the international community, Somalia remains politically divided

Ahmed Ibrahim from Somalia is undertaking an MSc in Global leadership and Peacebuilding at the African Leadership Centre in the School of Global Affairs, King’s College London.

Will the AU finally get it right with its $400m Peace Fund?

After over two decades since its establishment, the pan-African fund is about to be put into the use it was intended for. But, as Alfred Ndumo writes, concerns linger about its effectiveness

THE African Union Peace Fund, established in 2002, is on the verge of becoming operational. It was established to fulfil the AU’s longstanding goal of achieving financial independence and, more significantly, to decrease its reliance on external sources when addressing persistent peace and security issues on the continent. While economic self-reliance is commendable, the Fund faces challenges in its institutional structure and relevance to Africa's evolving peace and security landscape.

Seven years ago, African heads of state at the 27th AU Summit in Kigali accepted then President of the African Development Bank Dr Donald Kaberuka's recommendations for financial independence of the pan-African organisation, which included a Peace Fund to cover 25 per cent of peace and security operations. The overarching goal was to provide adequate, predictable, sustainable, and flexible financial resources to the AU, reducing reliance on external support.

For several years, the AU had toyed with several options, including a surcharge on SMS and imposing a levy on hotel stays and air tickets throughout Africa. In the end, a 0.2 per cent levy on eligible imports into AU member states was adopted as the viable way to raise revenue from member states.

Despite making progress, the AU's levy initiative faces significant challenges. Only 17 out of 55 member states have reported their contributions as of 2020, which is a mere 31 per cent of the membership. An enforcement mechanism is urgently needed to ensure effective transmission of the collected funds. Economic crises, limitations of existing tariff laws, and countries with minimal productive

The AU Peace Fund faces challenges in its institutional structure

industries or export sectors need to be immediately looked into so that more countries remit funds collected from the levy.

Nevertheless, member states have already contributed over $279 million to the Fund as of mid-August 2022. The total amount, including voluntary contributions, interest earned, and the transfer of the Legacy Peace Fund, is $321.5 million. The Fund is expected to increase to $400 million by the end of 2023 with further member contributions.

However, disagreements among member states on how contributions should

be assessed persist. Some countries have also called for a proper mechanism for contributing to the Fund, which should be addressed promptly.

The operationalisation of the AU peace fund has been delayed due to the slow

terrorism operations, some UN Security Council members continue to raise operational concerns over accountability and oversight issues and instead prefer to support interventions through bilateral arrangements.

process of establishing its bureaucratic structure. Since January 2018, the AU has been working on creating a governance and management system that will allow the Fund to function independently.

A Board of Trustees was established to ensure strategic coherence and provide oversight. The board comprises five distinguished African individuals appointed by the AU chairperson and two representatives from non-African partners who contribute to the Fund: the European Union and the UN.

In June 2022, the AU announced that Old Mutual Investment Group in South Africa and Sanlam Investments East Africa in Kenya would be the fund managers. In March 2023, Dagmawit Moges, former Minister of Transport and Logistics in Ethiopia, was appointed Director of the Peace Fund secretariat, responsible for managing its daily administrative operations.

Although the Fund is set to launch soon, concerns linger about its effectiveness. While its goal is to use funds to help with the ongoing crisis in Sudan, support projects in the East African Community, and provide further assistance in the conflict in Somalia, the delayed response to the crisis in Sudan raises doubts about the Fund's ability to provide swift and flexible financing in urgent situations.

Moreover, it remains unclear whether the Fund will be able to cover the current €25 million funding shortfall for the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which heavily relies on military operations.

The challenge of operationalising the Fund persists due to the friction between the AU and UN regarding precedence and operational approaches. Despite the need for support in African counter-

The sharing of responsibilities between the AU and the UN still needs to be solved, particularly about interpreting the AU's 25 per cent contribution. While some members of the UN Security Council insist that the AU should contribute 25 per cent to each of its Peace Support Operation, with the rest being covered by the UN's assessed contributions, the AU believes that the 25 per cent contribution should be allocated to peace and security activities as a whole, in accordance with the principles of the Fund.

This includes mediation, preventive diplomacy, and institutional capacity building rather than solely on peace support operations. Those who oppose the AU's view in the UN Security Council argue that any shortfalls should be sourced from bilateral and multilateral channels.

A resolution must be reached promptly to avoid any detrimental impact on peace and security in Africa. The Fund needs proper leadership to effectively handle the challenges of past, present and future crises.

The focus on institutional modelling has overshadowed the crucial need for situational relevance and responsiveness to the ever-evolving peace and security concerns. A situation leadership model that can react swiftly and efficiently is paramount to tackle the constantly changing conflicts in Africa, and the Fund's developing structure must prioritise this crucial aspect.

To attain financial independence, the Fund needs to improve revenue collection, resolve disputes with external partners, and, most importantly, address leadership gaps. A proactive approach and adaptable leadership are crucial to overcome these challenges and navigate changing circumstances.

Dr Alfred Ndumo, an alumnus of the African Leadership Centre. King’s College London, specialises in peace, security and intelligence issues.

The Fund needs proper leadership to effectively handle the challenges of past, present and future crises

Mauritania: small but mighty

Returning fresh from delivering capacity building workshops on the ground in Mauritania, Azzedine Zikara, Director, Financial Institutions (Mauritania and Sudan) at British Arab Commercial Bank (BACB) explains why Mauritania could offer new opportunities to investors in coming years

BEING one of the smaller economies in Africa, with a GDP of $10 billion, Mauritania can be overlooked by international financial providers, with many unable to balance the perceived risk against potential reward. The country has suffered from political instability, widespread poverty, and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.

Mauritania is one of many African nations whose growth is hampered by the continent’s trade finance gap – estimated at $81 billion by the African Development Bank. As with many similar nations it is in the early stages of diversifying its economic base, relying heavily on commodities exports -Mauritania was the 11th largest exporter of iron ore in 2021 - to drive growth. Yet this entrepreneurial nation with a strong export-based economy and numerous opportunities for economic diversification beginning to come to fruition, may offer fresh possibilities to investors.

Iron ore, amongst other metals, is one of the main exports for Mauritania, worth $1.33 billion annually, while gold exports provide a further $820 million of income. When combined with discoveries in gas, uranium, and hydrogen, Mauritania is not without opportunity for those looking to invest.

Like many frontier markets, the economy is largely focussed on primary natural resources, with less capability in refinery and production. Some of this is due to a lack of skilled labour. Fortunately, opportunity is on the horizon for the iron ore industry. The Societe Nationale Industrielle et Miniere (SNIM), Mauritania’s largest mining company, recently launched an ambitious strategic plan aimed at lifting exports into the global top 10, by doubling iron ore production. Furthermore, Emirates Steel – the UAE’s

largest non-oil company – has signed a preliminary agreement with SNIM to establish a joint venture company to produce iron oxide pellets.

Projects such as this are particularly important for emerging economies, which tend to rely on exporting unrefined primary resources. By entering value-add industries, emerging economies can diversify their offerings on a global stage, while injecting infrastructure, technology, and expertise domestically.

Mining – and iron ore in particular –has also been vulnerable to volatile prices in recent years. In order to remain resilient, Mauritania is focusing on diversification, reinvesting income from its existing commodities trade into new projects and improved infrastructure.

With the recent discovery of an offshore field containing almost 2.26 billion cubic metres of natural gas, Mauritania could be primed to become a major exporter to the gas-dependent EU as the block pivots away from Russian exports.

Furthermore, with the energy transition monopolising climate change talks,

Mauritania could lead in the region on renewables such as hydrogen power. In November 2022, global energy giant BP signed a Memorandum of Understanding to explore green hydrogen opportunities in Mauritania, assessing the commercial and technical details necessary to embark on the project.

A 2022 report sponsored by European Investment Bank, International Solar Alliance and African Union named Mauritania – and neighbouring Morocco –as key players in a North African hub for hydrogen production. The report also found that Africa’s green hydrogen potential stands at around $1.5 trillion – presenting a huge opportunity to Mauritania should it act as a hub.

Hydrogen is not the only renewable power option available to the nation. With an average of just 7 days of rainfall per year, and an abundance of desert Mauritania has significant potential for solar power development. The Mauritanian electricity grid already receives 10 percent of its power from solar energy, with the Sheikh Zayed Solar Power Plant providing 25,409 megawatt hours of clean power.

Iron ore is one of Mauritania’s main exports

Mauritania already aims to increase the share of renewables in its energy mix to 50 percent by 2030, meaning it could well lead the charge on clean energy in North Africa – and export this energy to other countries. Projects such as the Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility, supported by the Green Climate Fund, African Development Bank, and other private sector partners, have already committed around $1 billion to boost the solar capacity of the region.

Other mineral deposits such as uranium present opportunities for the nation. Australian mining company, Aura Energy, has recently entered negotiations with authorities to obtain an operating license for a site in Tiris mining uranium. The site is projected to produce up to 6200 tons of uranium over 15 years.

However, to support such a transition, investment is vital to develop infrastructure, with a particular focus on improving roads and railways in the rural desert. With support from the World Bank, the Mauritanian government is now enlisting the private sector to help upgrade its infrastructure. Collaboration with other nations is also contributing to improvements. For example, in July of 2022, an agreement was signed between the governments of Mauritania and Algeria to construct an improved road link between the two countries, boosting transport connections with its neighbour.

With road networks already under construction – and regional infrastructure improvements taking place in nations such as Cote D’Ivoire and Senegal – capitalising on trade with its immediate neighbours

will allow Mauritania to bolster its export capabilities without high transport costs and other trade barriers. The removal of trade barriers will be supported by the IntraAfrican Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), officially implemented in January 2021, allowing countries to capitalise on the benefits, which include lower tariffs and the removal of other nontariff trade barriers.

The potential opportunities of trade extend into the fishing industry, Mauritania’s fisheries bring in a further $710 million to the economy. Lower transportation costs associated with distance means that, in combination with reduced tariffs, exporting these products to nearby African nations could be more attractive than to Europe – currently the biggest market.

Trading in frontier markets is no simple matter. Perceived risks limit the number of international banks that choose to enter certain areas, specialist banks who operate in the region leverage their on-the-ground market knowledge, and strong relationships with local banks, to facilitate safe and sustainable trade flows.

Banks like BACB also provide capacity building, helping local partners improve their regulatory and compliance processes. In February and March 2023, BACB visited Mauritania, meeting with commercial banks, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank. During the visit, the team organised a training seminar focused on Compliance and Anti-Financial Crime. The event saw representatives from across the Mauritanian financial sector

attend, demonstrating the local desire to level up compliance functions and operate in line with international standards. Held in the capital Nouakchott, in partnership with Banque Nationale du Mauritanie, the training was incredibly well-received by attendees, serving to strengthen understanding of regulatory standards, in turn making trade finance in the region safer and reducing transactional friction for traders operating there.

While risk perception issues still exist, banks such as BACB can leverage their longstanding relationships and expertise in these regions to provide access to global markets, while meeting UK regulatory standards and ensuring compliance at every level. This work helps to build greater appetite for regional trade credit risk, providing access to much needed liquidity and ultimately helping to bridge the trade finance gap.

There are plenty of opportunities on the horizon for Mauritania. And as the market begins to grow, it will likely become increasingly attractive to investors, particularly in the green hydrogen space and wider renewable energy transition. Alongside the growth in intra-African trade, the future is bright for the North African nation.

Providing solutions: mitigating the risks for traders

With specialist markets like Mauritania often categorised as high risk, international banks can play a key role in bringing credibility to crossborder trade flows, guaranteeing and financing international transactions. One way BACB achieves this is by applying strict transaction monitoring procedures. For international banks operating outside North Africa, it can often be challenging to identify their counterparties, build a profile on their operations and take a decision on deals using only the limited information that can be retrieved online.

Specialist trade finance banks, with on-the-ground knowledge, support this process by carrying out risk assessments of their customers – providing a system of checks and controls that reassures all sides of a transaction. By fostering a dialogue with customers, and actively soliciting customers’ queries on how to improve processes and procedures, banks can also help inform local partners on how to improve their profiles, raising them to an international standard.

Azzedine Zikara: Mauritania could offer new opportunities to investors in coming years

20 years of the Maputo Protocol: report reflects on progress and challenges in advancing women's rights

Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition (SOAWR), Equality Now, and Make Every Woman Count jointly released groundbreaking report recently examining the impact and implementation of the Maputo Protocol, a crucial legal instrument for promoting gender equality in Africa

IN commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Maputo Protocol, the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition (SOAWR), Equality Now, and Make Every Woman Count have jointly released a groundbreaking report titled 20 Years of the Maputo Protocol: Where are we now?. The report, available at SOAWR. org, highlights the progress made in Africa towards the ratification, domestication, and implementation of the Protocol, shedding light on key achievements and challenges.

The Maputo Protocol, a crucial legal instrument for the promotion and protection of women's rights in Africa, has played a pivotal role in addressing critical issues affecting women's lives. Serving as a comprehensive legal framework, it promotes women's empowerment and participation while establishing a system of accountability for African countries. By integrating the Protocol's principles into their legal systems, member states ignite a culture of transparency and progress in the promotion of gender equality.

One of the Protocol's significant achievements is its explicit condemnation of harmful practices such as female genital mutilation, child marriage, and violence against women. This sends a clear message that these violations must be eradicated. With 44 out of 55 African Union (AU)

Maputo Protocol 20th anniversary celebrations, July 11 2023. Image source: Equality Now

member states having ratified or acceded to the Protocol, and eight countries having signed but not yet acceded to it as of June 2023, the Maputo Protocol has become one of the most ratified instruments in the AU.

However, the report highlights that while 80 percent of AU member states have ratified or acceded to the Protocol, the full implementation of its provisions remains a work in progress. Some states have submitted reservations to modify the legal effect of certain provisions, posing challenges to its comprehensive implementation. Nevertheless, human rights campaigners agree that allowing reservations is preferable to states not adopting the Maputo Protocol at all.

Rainatu Sow, Director of Make Every Woman Count, emphasised the importance of ratifying the Protocol, stating, ‘The ratification of the Protocol is a crucial step towards achieving gender equality. Ratifying the Maputo Protocol sends a

powerful message that states are committed to protecting and promoting women's rights.’

The report also brings attention to the challenges faced in reporting progress. Only 19 states have submitted their initial reports as required under Article 26(1) of the Protocol, and many reports have experienced significant delays. The SOAWR members, during the report launch, underscored the need for increased training of member states on reporting, strengthened data collection through crosssector collaboration, and improved clarity on reporting deadlines. They also called for the African Commission (ACHPR) to consider extending the reporting time frame.

While progress has been notable, the report reveals that it is not evenly distributed across different areas. Economic and social welfare rights have seen considerable improvement, with over 50 percent of African countries enacting laws mandating equal remuneration for work of equal value and providing extended paid maternity leave. Several countries have also prohibited gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace.

Legislation related to marriage rights has been enacted in AU Member States, addressing issues such as the legal age of marriage and increasing punishments for early, child, and forced marriages. Institutional reforms and awareness campaigns have contributed to the prohibition of child marriage in some countries.

Regarding health and healthcare, the report highlights that nearly all countries have maintained constitutional provisions related to health and healthcare, with six countries enshrining rights related to reproductive healthcare. Legislative reforms and laws combating gender-based violence have supported reproductive health rights, with efforts made to combat practices like female genital mutilation through constitutional reforms, national action plans, and the establishment of support services.

Women's participation in political and decision-making processes has seen progress as well. Ten countries have implemented constitutional provisions

establishing quotas for women's representation in legislatures. National gender or development strategies have integrated approaches to increase women's participation in politics, accompanied by awareness campaigns and initiatives to boost representation.

The report also examines the state of protection for women and girls from violence in armed conflict and the rights of specially protected women's groups. It highlights that AU countries have given attention to these areas, implementing constitutional and institutional reforms to address the issue.

However, despite the progress achieved over the past two decades, challenges persist. African governments are urged to prioritise eliminating harmful traditional practices, gender-based violence, and discrimination against women and girls. Harmonising national laws with the principles outlined in the Maputo Protocol and challenging deeply entrenched societal beliefs are crucial steps towards achieving gender equality.

During the launch ceremony in Nairobi, Kenya, Aisha Jumwa, the Cabinet Secretary for Kenya's Ministry of Public Affairs, Gender, and Affirmative Action, emphasised the significance of the Maputo Protocol, saying, ‘The Maputo Protocol stands at a crucial moment whereby beyond earning recognition as one of the most important and progressive frameworks on women's rights, there is a need for countries to reaffirm their commitments, accelerate efforts, and deploy adequate resources in order to realise the aspirations of all women and girls in Africa. As Kenya, we are keen on ensuring that the provisions of the Maputo Protocol are implemented to their full extent.’

In the report, the SOAWR Coalition calls upon the 11 remaining AU Member States, namely Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Morocco, Niger, Somalia, and Sudan, to renew their commitments and promptly ratify the Maputo Protocol. By doing so, these countries will fulfil their promises to the women and girls in their nations, contributing to a more equitable and prosperous continent.

CORRUPTION: WHERE ARE AFRICA’S BILLIONS?

African soft power

MEMBERS of the African diaspora are connectors between Africa and the world, given the third space they occupy between both geographical spaces. They also add value through several brainsharing initiatives they engage in, which benefit Africa in ways that make a case for brain gain. Through their multiple affiliations, they give back to Africa, beyond their home countries.

The African diaspora refers to the dispersion of people of African descent throughout the world starting with the transatlantic slave trade, which forced the movement of millions of Africans to the Americas, Europe and other parts of the

world. It also encompasses the voluntary migration and the more recent movement of people of African descent within and between different regions induced by conflict and economic hardship on the continent.

Although disparate, the African diaspora has grown to become a significant global force, with people of African descent living in nearly every corner of the world. Overall, they have had a profound impact on the cultural and social history of the world, as well as on the economic and political development of their host countries.

African diaspora communities have also formed distinctive cultural identities

and traditions in music, art, literature, food, dress and other forms of cultural expression which attract admiration and goodwill from their host countries in ways that make them diaspora diplomats for their home countries.

In simple terms, Diaspora Diplomacy (DD) is the use of diaspora communities to promote a country's interests in the international arena. This involves engaging with members of a country's diaspora in a host country or country of residence to leverage their networks, skills and resources to achieve political, economic and social objectives to pursue the advancement of the home country or country of origin.

Contrary to the argument that the African brain drain is a loss to the continent, Nigerians in the US and South Africans in Australia, for example, highlight how members of the African diaspora are becoming foreign policy actors for both their home and host countries, writes Christopher Isike

making their mark: Nigerians in the US

In an article on the subject of DD for The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Jennifer Brinkerhoff noted that it encompassed diasporas as agents in their own right; instruments of other’s diplomatic agendas; and/or intentional or accidental partners with other actors pursuing shared interests. Therefore, DD is not territorially bound and agendas are fluid as they criss-cross several cross-cutting interests between the home and host countries.

Concisely, diasporas straddle five diplomacy objectives that have soft power implications for both their home and host countries: improving the image of their home countries; securing the support of their host countries for policies or interventions targeted at their home countries; influencing perceptions of their host countries within the home countries; facilitating material exchanges between the home and host countries; and supporting

the settlement and integration of their compatriots in the home countries.

For Brinkerhoff, through the many cultural associations they form, diasporas proactively improve the image of their home countries in their host countries or internationally, given the presence of other diasporas in the country of residence. State and private-sector officials in the home country may also target them for this purpose.

Diasporas may also seek support for a policy or intervention from and by their host country targeted at the home country. Other scholars such as Thomas Ambrosio have argued this is an enduring feature of American foreign policy as it has historically leveraged diaspora communities in the US to get insights for its foreign policy engagements with their home countries.

For example, the Presidential Advisory

Council on African Diaspora established in December 2022 at the US-Africa Leaders Summit is an indicator of the Biden administration’s efforts to engage and embrace America’s African diaspora. Also, the African Union declaration of the African diaspora as the 6th region of the continent is also part of efforts to engage African diaspora communities and promote diaspora diplomacy.

Soft power generally refers to a state’s ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or force, to “shape the preferences of other states through intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority”, as Joseph Nye puts it in his article for Foreign Policy magazine in 1990.

The African diaspora has become

South Africa has the largest African migrant group in Australia

an increasingly important diplomatic and soft power tool for Africa. Many African countries have recognised the importance of engaging with their diaspora communities to promote their interests and increase their influence. This includes using the diaspora to attract investment, promote tourism, and advocate for policy changes in host countries.

Therefore, as diaspora diplomats, the foreign policy agency of the African diaspora is in the accumulation of soft power points for Africa. This realisation drove me to ask whether the African diaspora can be categorised as a soft power resource for the continent and that is how I started the project of mapping their influence, starting with NigerianAmericans in the US in 2021 and then South African-Australians in Australia in 2022.

I spent eight weeks in the US collecting data from Nigerian-Americans in the top four states – Texas, New York, Maryland and Georgia – where they are largely resident, and four weeks in Australia collecting preliminary data from South African Australians in Western Australia. Of note, both the Nigerian and South African diasporas are the largest African diaspora communities in the US and Australia respectively.

Broadly speaking, Nigeria’s soft power comes from attributes such as its cultural exports, Nollywood, music, dress, food and other indigenous products; its political and iconic personalities such as Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Fela Kuti, Chimamanda Adichie; sporting accomplishments; international peacekeeping and mediation role; delivery of public goods through agencies such as the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS); and its Afrocentric foreign policy and strategy of good neighbourliness.

These soft power resources fall well within the three elemental scales of cultural attraction, political values and foreign policy espoused by Nye. The question I sought to answer was can the Nigerian diaspora be added to this list of soft power resources?

The targeted population of my study were Nigerian-Americans who are high achievers in the fields of science, medicine and engineering, music and film, literature and sports. These are individuals contributing to American progress and

development, and, ipso facto, inadvertently contributing to Nigeria’s soft power credentials.

According to the American Community Survey of 2019, Nigeria is the largest source of African immigration to the US with approximately 376,000 Nigerian immigrants and their children making up the first and second generations. The results of a Rockefeller Foundation-Aspen Institute Diaspora Program (RAD) study of 15 immigrant communities in the US show the Nigerian diaspora is the most educated group in the country, with 61 per cent holding at least a bachelor’s degree compared with 31 per cent of the total foreign-born population and 32 per cent of the US-born population.

Also, Nigerian-Americans are substantially more likely than the general US population to be in the labour force and to work in professional or managerial occupations. They are also among professors in the highest ranked universities in every one of the cities I visited, including top doctors and nurses in the health sector.

Although there is the potential of Nigerian-Americans becoming foreign policy agents for both Nigeria and the US, they have not yet organised themselves enough to enter the US diplomatic agenda. Nigerian-Americans have not used their inbetween advantage for diaspora diplomacy, which can be noticed in close-knit and homogenous diaspora groups in the US such as the Jewish, Indian, Chinese and Irish communities.

In the case of Australia, although Africa has been at the margins of the country’s foreign policy thinking and practice, the African diaspora there has been instrumental in promoting African culture, heritage, and identity through various diplomatic and soft power initiatives. These initiatives have played a crucial role in enhancing the visibility and influence of African communities in Australia.

South Africa has the largest African migrant group in Australia, constituting 42 per cent and made up mostly of white South Africans. Non-white South Africans increasingly migrated to Australia between 2012 and 2022.

The preliminary results of a feasibility study of a broad spectrum of South Africans in Australia, which I undertook

with my research partner, David Mickler of Curtin University in Perth, Australia, show in 2022 that the South African diaspora in Australia has achieved admirable accomplishments. The group is making significant contributions to Australia’s development across critical sectors of mining, agriculture, medicine, IT and higher education.

Many of them are captains of big business, vice chancellors and professors in Australian universities, which means beyond the economic contributions they make they also add ideational value to Australia through the education system. These evoke admiration and goodwill from Australians not only towards South Africans as a people but also towards the South African state. All 23 South Africans I interviewed across the country told me Australians see South Africans as very hardworking, goal-oriented and focused people.

Another related way in which the South African diaspora has exerted its soft power agency in Australia is through the establishment of community organisations and networks, which provide a platform for South Africans to connect with each other and promote their culture and values to the wider Australian society through various channels, including events, social media and community organisations. These organisations have the potential to evolve into ideational and political blocks that can influence Australian politics and foreign policy towards Africa in the same way the Chinese diaspora community does in Australia.

A good example of the South African diaspora's soft power agency in Australia is the annual South African Film Festival, which showcases the best of the country’s cinema. The festival has grown in popularity over the years, attracting a diverse range of people from different backgrounds and cultures.

The Nigerian diaspora in the US and the South African diaspora in Australia have in similar and varying ways been instrumental in promoting African culture, heritage, and identity through various diplomatic and soft power initiatives. These initiatives have not only enhanced the visibility and influence of African communities in both countries but have also contributed to the diversification of the cultural and economic landscape of the US and Australia.

Christopher Isike is Director at the African Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of Pretoria in South Africa.

Prayers said on anniversary of mystery death

Campaigners gather in church 33 years to the day Ethiopian’s body found outside his London home, reports Angela Cobbinah

Amemorial gathering has been held for an Ethiopian man whose mysterious death in London 33 years ago sparked an ongoing campaign for justice.

Mogous Abay was found in the courtyard below his fourth flat on June 30, 1990 after police said he had jumped to his death. His brother Alem Abay disputes this, saying the police investigation was flawed and ignored the possibility that he was a murder victim.

“We hope this evening just for a short while to focus our minds and hearts on the life of Mogous, to speak about two things, about justice for him and about hope for him and for us,” said Father Christopher Cawrse of Holy Cross Church in King’s Cross, who led the prayers.

As part of his campaign to discover the true circumstances surrounding the tragedy, Abay enlisted the church’s help 16 years ago. “Alem wanted to begin this whole motion of trying to get justice for his late brother,” said Fr Cawrse. “Slowly he got a group together to start addressing the issues of his brother’s death and of the perceived injustice of the way the police treated the case.”

He added: “This is familiar to me, the atmosphere it creates, as I lived very close to where [racist murder victim] Stephen Lawrence was killed only two years after Mogous died.”

Standing next to a photograph of his brother, Abay told the gathering that, despite the passage of time, he was determined more than ever to see justice done. “I have survived,” he said. “God has given me the strength to continue the fight and they cannot take that power away from me.”

His Justice for Mogous campaign led to a petition of almost 12,000 signatures presented to 10 Downing Street (seat of the UK government) in 2017. Two years ago, London’s governing body, the Greater London Authority, opened an inquiry into the police’s handling of the case.

Mogous followed his older brother Alem to London in 1979 as a teenager. The two hailed from Tigray province, where their involvement with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front forced them to flee to Sudan before seeking asylum in the UK.

They joined a community of Tigrayan and Eritrean exiles living in the King’s Cross and Bloomsbury area of central London. Mogous found work as an assistant librarian at the School of African and Oriental Studies while studying for a science degree at the City of London Polytechnic, but became home sick and was eventually treated for depression.

His body was found by a neighbour outside the flats near Tottenham Court Road in central London. Two other residents and the caretaker of the block were the first to attend the scene before the arrival of paramedics and the police. However, the only witnesses called to give evidence at the subsequent Coroner’s inquest were three police officers and a pathologist. The hearing, which concluded with an open verdict, was over in less than 15 minutes.

In 1993 Abay decided to challenge the verdict by applying for a judicial review for the inquest to be re-opened. At the time, his lawyer Lincoln Crawford noted the lack of several key witnesses, including a neighbour and the caretaker who in separate statements said there had been no sign of blood around the deceased’s body, contradicting the police who told the inquest there had been.

Additionally, police failed to take any fingerprints from the window from which Mogous, 27, was said to have jumped, and eliminated another important line of inquiry by destroying his clothing. There were also inconsistencies of evidence between the pathologist and the doctor who certified Mogous’ death.

“There is a real possibility that a different verdict would be returned if there were a proper inquiry into the deceased’s death,” said Crawford as part of his written advice. However, financial support under the government’s legal aid scheme to pursue the case was withdrawn and Abay was unable to proceed.

Alem Abay at his brother's memorial on June 30

Cobalt Red: a regressive, deeply flawed account of Congo’s mining industry

Billed as an exposé, Cobalt Red simply rehashes old stereotypes and colonial

Katz-Lavigne and Espérant Mwishamali Lukobo

COBALT Red: how the blood of the Congo powers our lives, by Siddharth Kara, has been making waves. Released in April and tailored for a non-specialist audience, it has quickly become a New York Times and Publishers Weekly bestseller, as well as a bestseller in Amazon’s African Politics category.

The book centres on the mineral cobalt,

Sarah

currently sought after the world over for the production of high-end batteries. More than 70 percent of the world’s supply originates from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Kara’s project, he says, is to expose the trade’s dirty secrets for all of us to see.

Unfortunately, in doing so Kara has engaged in many unsavoury practices of his own. This book can teach us at least

as much about how to not write a critical book on “modern-day slavery” in Africa as it can about the artisanal mining industry. Its indulgent use of dehumanising rhetoric, lack of research ethics, and ignorance and/ or erasure of local knowledge undermines Kara’s purported mission at every turn.

Cobalt Red is not a ground-breaking exposé, as it has been billed. It is the latest in a long series of White saviour adventure

perceptions of the DRC, write

A cobalt mine in DRC: more than 70 percent of the world’s supply originates from the country

books that the DRC could sorely do without.

The colonial mindset of Cobalt Red makes for a disturbing read. While Kara accurately identifies many of the issues and actors at play, he greatly oversimplifies the analysis into binaries of victims and villains. The Congolese miners are portrayed as helpless and suffering, while most of the other characters possess a generally malevolent agency.

Kara’s consistent depiction of Congolese people as victims is at odds with his emphasis on the importance of Congolese lives. He replicates the dehumanisation he calls out, referring, for instance, to the “subhuman existence”

of miners, or how they “scavenged” for leftover minerals “like birds picking at bones”. Or his description of a woman named Jolie:

“Grief pressed hard against her slender frame. Her wide eyes were sunk deep within her face. The bones in her wrists seemed to stand up above the flesh. Her teeth were clenched like a skeleton’s. The skin on her neck had striated discolorations that appeared like ribbons. She breathed with a raspy cadence, but the voice that emerged was somehow reminiscent of the soft song of a nightingale.”

His overwrought attempts to evoke an emotional response resemble writing on Africa from decades ago. Like Joseph

Conrad did with Heart of Darkness, he reinforces colonial dynamics even as he purports to call attention to them. This form of narrative, as Arundhati Roy explains, commits the very sin it condemns:

“Apolitical (and therefore, actually, extremely political) distress reports from poor countries and war zones eventually make the (dark) people of those (dark) countries seem like pathological victims. Another malnourished Indian, another starving Ethiopian, another Afghan refugee camp, another maimed Sudanese… in need of the white man’s help. They unwittingly reinforce racist stereotypes and reaffirm the achievements, the comforts

COBALT Red is the latest in a long series of White saviour adventure books that the DRC could sorely do without

and the compassion (the tough love) of Western civilisation. They’re the secular missionaries of the modern world.”

This is a spot-on description of the white, colonial gaze of Kara’s book. It makes little difference that Kara himself is not white – people of colour are also capable of inhabiting this mindset. His book recognises the continuities between DRC’s modern mining industry and colonialism, but it fails to see how pathologising Africans was a tool of the colonists as well.

The outsider’s gaze is nowhere more obvious than when Kara makes simplistic comparisons between “our generally safe and satisfied nations” in the West and Congolese people in the DRC. He depicts

the country as a place that does not exist in the modern age.

He notes, for example, that “people from another world awoke and checked their smartphones. None of the artisanal miners I met in Kipushi had ever even seen one.” It’s a passage that smacks of hyperbole. Smartphones are not difficult to find in the DRC, and the idea that many miners have never encountered one doesn’t ring true. Somebody with more local knowledge and experience than Kara would know that some artisanal miners can and do invest in smart phones. Those that don’t have almost certainly seen them around. But few would make the imprudent decision of bringing one to the mining site.

This is just one example of Kara’s failure to understand the lives of artisanal miners, including women, and to recognise that miners have lives beyond the site. People in this region do not just suffer until they die. They also live and experience joy, and research demonstrating the adaptability of informal artisanal miners directly contradicts the tired image of African workers as passive, static victims.

Kara misses (or ignores) all of this because he is intent on portraying the DRC as an unchanging, suffering world out of time. He then injects that narrative with steroids by trying to write a call to arms. The result, as the New York Times described it, is a book that “takes the form of a righteous quest to expose injustice through a series of vignettes of exploitation and misery”.

This describes Kara’s narrative and political strategy well: double down on the pain; let no light in. The suffering in Cobalt Red is relentless. At one point he describes miners as “an ant colony of humans”. Elsewhere he says that:

“An explosion of human beings was crammed inside the enormous digging pit, which was at least 150 meters deep and 400 meters across. More than fifteen thousand men and teenage boys were hammering, shovelling, and shouting inside the crater, with scarcely room to move or breathe.”

Time and time again, Cobalt Red denies Congolese the agency to shape their own futures. It makes Kara’s work heavy with fatalism and inevitability:

“From the moment Diego Cão introduced Europeans to the Kongo in 1482, the heart of Africa was made colony to the world. Patrice Lumumba offered a fleeting chance at a different fate, but the neocolonial machinery of the West chopped him down and replaced him with someone who would keep their riches flowing.”

Despite moments like this of Western guilt, in general Kara’s worldview seems to be that West is best. He recounts a conversation in which a Congolese researcher suggests the situation won’t improve unless companies follow minimum standards, “Just like in America.” Kara chooses to leave that comparison there rather than engage with it. Yet corporate impunity is not a Congo-

REVIEWS

specific problem. Nor is child labour, which also exists in the US. Elsewhere, Kara marvels at how different everything looks after returning from DRC, including vegetables at the grocery store and flush toilets. The dichotomy he creates through exaggerated descriptions reinforces longstanding binaries between “developed” and “underdeveloped,” and is hardly helpful in an analysis of the effects of global capitalism.

By far the most concerning issue with Cobalt Red is Kara’s disregard for ethical research practice, particularly when it comes to safeguarding children. In his book Kara describes a disturbing encounter with a child of about eight or nine. He was questioning her, and the child began to scream after he discovered that she was an orphan:

“My translator tried to calm the situation, but Aimée would not stop screaming. I did not understand what I had done to upset her. Was my presence the cause of her panic? Did I ever stop to think that I might represent a form of violence to a child like her, a forced confrontation with pain?”

The process of reflection that Kara describes is one that should have taken place well before setting foot in the DRC. It should have continued throughout the research, in part by consulting local organisations that work with child miners. But if his description of his own soulsearching is accurate, that did not happen.

This basic lack of ethical reflection and procedural rigour should deeply concern anyone who has endorsed or promoted Kara’s work. It appears that he conducted interviews with vulnerable children without the consent of a parent or guardian, without the necessary psychological support, and without considering the risk to benefit ratio. Despite his stated concern with preventing and exposing the exploitation of children, this very much looks like the exploitation of children. He notes that:

“We would not send the children of Cupertino to scrounge for cobalt in toxic pits, so why is it permissible to send the children of the Congo? We would not accept blanket press statements about how those children were being treated without independently verifying it, so why don’t we do it in the Congo? We would not treat our hometowns like toxic dumping grounds, so why do we allow it in the Congo?”

We’d like to add another question to his list: “we would not accept research being conducted on children and other vulnerable groups in Cupertino unless it passed a stringent ethical review process and came with the most rigorous safeguarding practices. So why do we allow it in the Congo?”

Other clear ethical breaches, such as giving a person’s first name and circumstances, or speculating on their HIV status, are similarly alarming. Academic researchers spend hours drafting their ethics applications, usually undertaking further revisions to finally secure ethics approval. They establish protocols for engaging with vulnerable respondents and sensitive topics, and ensure that both consent and confidentiality provisions are extended to everyone who participates in their research.

It is possible that Kara undertook some of this work, but his book provides no evidence of him having done so. If

anything, his shock at respondents’ distress makes it seem like it’s the very first time he's considered ethical issues at all.

It seems likely that Cobalt Red’s clear pursuit of the “greater good” has made it easier for people to turn a blind eye to these issues. The book has been sold as an exposé, and as Kara himself says during an interview with Joe Rogan, “I was the first outsider to get into this mine.” If this was all new information then it would be easier to forgive Kara for trying to maximise his impact, even if that meant taking a shortcut or two. Who wouldn’t accept that “for the greater good”?

That sense of self-importance, however, is a fundamental misrepresentation of the true state of knowledge. It demonstrates only a belief in one’s own marketing. In reality, most of Cobalt Red covers issues which have already been written about at length. The first high-profile report about cobalt in Congo was published in 2016 by Amnesty

Child labour is not a Congo-specific problem. It also exists in the US

International and a Congolese organisation, Afrewatch. Since then, a steady stream of articles and exposés have come about the so-called “dark side” of the rush for Congolese cobalt, particularly with regard to the often-shocking conditions in which these are mined, including by child miners.

European explorers in Africa are notorious for ‘discovering’ things which were already well known and documented by Africans. This is largely how Kara approaches the Congo and cobalt. He effectively wipes the slate clean, pretending to have discovered things that are already well known. His main “contribution” is to repackage things within a simplistic

and sensationalist script regarding Africa and the Congo. At a time when many specialists have been trying their best to decolonise knowledge about Africa, Kara’s book instead pushes in exactly the opposite direction. Cobalt Red represents continuity of the colonial mindset, the colonial gaze, and colonial ethics.

Ironically, a Congolese ambassador in the US told Kara straight up that he should let local people fight their own battles. As Kara recounts the conversation, the ambassador “did not think a foreigner should be the one to make such a case on behalf of his people. He felt instead that the people of the Congo needed to speak

for themselves about what was happening in their country, and he suggested that if I really wanted to help, I should go back and assist local researchers in doing so.”

It’s good advice, yet Kara failed to heed it. He is compelled to personally shed light on “a darker truth”, one “that cannot be fathomed”. A truth that – we must be clear – has already been openly written and spoken about for years by Congolese, regional, and international organisations!

None of this is benign. Blinkered in his pursuit of the greater good, it is clear that Kara failed to sufficiently think through –or to see as something that matters – the implications of producing this sort of book. His core assumption is that generating attention will have positive effects, but the sensationalism of his narrative could just as easily have negative consequences.

It could reinforce disempowered images of artisanal miners; make it more difficult for researchers to access cobaltmining areas; and prompt increased security to prevent information from flowing from the cobalt mines. Kara exhibits little awareness of the fact that simplistic and sensationalist accounts make it more difficult to conduct good research in the future. Raising “awareness” of complex problems is not always and automatically a positive outcome.

As we finished reading this book, we were left with one pressing thought: Kara was obviously able to secure good access to mine sites and interviewees. But he did so by breaking ethical rules that should be in place to protect vulnerable groups, and children in particular.

Ironically, there are close parallels between that and breaking the rules that seek to prevent the trade of unethical cobalt. Kara’s deeply problematic book puts him in a category much closer to the unscrupulous purchasers of cobalt than he would probably like to admit. Cobalt Red’s White saviourist, colonial gaze exacerbates the negative, overgeneralised global perceptions of Congolese artisanal miners and of the DRC, and further silence the voices of Congolese scholars, activists, citizens, and miners.

Sarah Katz-Lavigne is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp, working on the Driving Change project on the participation of small-scale producers in the transnational regulation of cobalt and 3TG mineral supply chains in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Espérant Mwishamali Lukobo is an independent researcher from the Democratic Republic of Congo

This review is republished with the kind permission of openDemocracy, an independent media platform and news website based in the United Kingdom

Ogoni films put Shell in the dock

Case for the prosecution set out in documentaries about the executions that followed 1990s protests in Nigeria against the oil giant

TWO haunting films emerging out of the battle against the Anglo-Dutch multinational Shell are grabbing attention 27 years after the hanging of nine men exposed the injustice created by the oil industry in Ogoniland, southeast Nigeria.

The most well-known of those executed was Ken Saro-Wiwa, a popular Nigerian author and broadcaster who led a protest movement against the contamination of fisheries and farmlands by oil spills and gas flaring in Ogoniland, a kingdom in the Niger Delta where Shell had been extracting oil since the 1950s. Written and directed by Majiye Uchibeke, I Am More Dangerous Dead focuses on Saro-Wiwa’s efforts to expose the environmental crisis that left the Ogoni people impoverished and sick while enriching the Nigerian government.

The 25-minute film shows archive footage of Saro-Wiwa leading 300,000 strong peaceful protests against Shell in 1993, which eventually forced the company to shut down its Ogoniland operations. In 1995, he and eight other activists were rounded up and convicted of the killing of four local chiefs following a trial that the then UK premier John Major denounced as “fraudulent … followed by judicial murder”.

Chilling and poignant in equal measure, the film recently won second prize Best Short Film Award at the International Nature Film Festival in Gödöllő, Hungary, and the Bronze Tilapia Award for Social Impact at the Tiete International Film Awards in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Last month it was screened at the prestigious Student World International Film Festival in California after being

selected from 13,000 submissions.

Assistant producer Winifred A Adebayo said: “This is a very important film that allows Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni eight to take their rightful place as the first climate justice activists of modern times. They paid the ultimate price with their lives in a case that made a mockery

of justice and continues to cast a long shadow over the actions of Nigeria’s then military government and Royal Dutch Shell, which still seeks to evade any responsibility for the eco-side the mining operations have had on the Niger Delta and its people.”

Outside of Nigeria, the names of

A scene from I Am More Dangerous Dead

the other executed men remain largely unknown. The feature-length Esther and the Law is a corrective to this, highlighting the case of Barinem Kiobel, a local state government commissioner who played no part in the protests but was nevertheless arrested. As his wife, Esther, doggedly seeks justice for him from her home in Dallas Texas, where she settled after fleeing Nigeria, there are intermittent clips of her sitting forlornly in the dock alongside Saro-Wiwa.

Her more than two decades fight took her and three women whose husbands had also been hanged – Victoria Bera, Blessing Eawo and Charity Levula – to a court in the Netherlands. During the hearing, three men testified that Shell and the Nigerian government had given them money and offered them other bribes in order to incriminate her husband and the other accused. This supports the claims of Amnesty International – the film’s main sponsor – that Shell’s requests for help in handling the Ogoniland protests led to a brutal government crackdown, culminating in the arrests and executions. However, in 2020 the court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Shell had been involved.

Directed by Tatjana Scheltema, the film’s premier in London in July was

followed by a panel discussion where Esther Kiobel told the audience: “What keeps me going is that my husband is innocent and that deadly diseases are still going on in Ogoniland. The pollution is everywhere, there is oil in the rivers and people can’t go to farm.”

Although Shell remains locked out of Ogoniland, its ageing pipelines still crisscross the area. “Nothing has changed in 27 years,” said Lazarus Tamana, who has taken over Saro-Wiwa’s mantle as leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. “There continue to be oil spills and if Shell were a responsible corporate citizen they would be checking their pipes and repairing them.”

He added: “We are not here for just today, we are here tomorrow and for the future and we will exhaust all avenues available to us to secure justice. The next step will be the International Criminal Court.”

In 2009 Shell agreed to an out of court settlement of $15.5 million to five of the Ogoni Nine families, including Saro-Wiwa’s. The conglomerate has also faced a series of ongoing court claims for reparations over polluted farmland and fisheries, although only seven communities have won compensation, with 34 remaining.

A scene from the film I Am More Dangerous Dead showing Ken Saro-Wiwa

Angela Cobbinah

Testimonials from some of our online subscribers:

We wish to compliment the Africa Briefing Magazine for its insight and value added stories from the Last Frontier. From a Scandanavian view the quality of material presented on time gives us the edge for investment and business purposes. Keep up the good work. Jon Marius Hoensi MD Marex Group, Norway.

I write in conjunction with JIC Holdings and its CEO, Mark Anthony Johnson, to commend Africa Briefing on its coverage of the important political, economic and social news and events in Africa. Its coverage of a wide range of topics is very impressive. I look forward to future editions. David

W

Gouldman, Consultant, JIC Holdings, United Kingdom.

Africa Briefing is an interesting new project. The publication helps fill the gap in business and economyfocused African journalism. Africa Briefing combines a good news sense with crisp copy to the reader rapid immersion into what is important in economies across the continent.

James

Schneider, Editorial Director,

New African Magazine, London, UK