The Claremont Journal of International Relations Spring 2014

Volume II Issue II

the

CLAREMONT Journal of International Relations

Spring 2014

Editors-in-Chief

staff

EIC Emeritus Senior Editors

Kyle Roland PZ ‘14 Forrest Fulgenzi PZ ‘17 Lily Lousada PZ ‘14 Sophia Baldwin PZ ‘14 Molly Hickey PZ ‘17 Jaya Williams PZ ‘14

Staff Editors

Sam Fox PZ ‘15 Yoel Garinkol PZ ‘16 Jack Shaked PZ ‘14 Aaron Yang CMC ‘17

Designer

Jaya Williams PZ ‘14

www.claremontjir.com Dear Reader, The Claremont Journal of International Relations is a student run publication that strives to promote discourse and engagement on world affairs. The aim of this forum is to offer diverse opinions and perspectives on numerous aspects of international affairs related issues through the publication of academic articles regarding political theories, foreign policy and global events. We hope to foster open discussion to bridge our academic studies with personal learning outside of the classroom.

Each article in the Claremont Journal of International Relations reflects the opinion of its author(s) and does not represent the Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, its staff, or the Claremont Colleges.

Sincerely, & Kyle Roland and Forrest Fulgenzi Co-Editors-in-Chief

Claremont Journal of International Relations If you have questions, comments, concerns, or want to get involved, please contact claremontjir@gmail.com.

Sponsored by Pitzer College Student Senate

page 38 Molly Hickey | PZ ‘17 The Maasai of Tanzania: A Photo Essay

page 54 Richard Mancuso | CMC ‘16

IN

China’s Weaponization of Space

page 6 Azmi Haroun | PZ ‘15 The Modern Ruination of Aleppo

page 42 page 26 Benjamin Cohen | PO ‘16

Raphael Alterman | PZ ‘15 Russia and EU Foreign Policy Comparative Case Study using Ukraine

Harmony in the Middle East: The Role of Music in Transforming the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

DEX

page 16

Sophia Baldwin | PZ ‘14 Questioning the Legality of Drone Strikes in Pakistan

6

The Modern Ruination of Aleppo Azmi Haroun | Pitzer ‘15 Azmi is currently a Junior at Pitzer College majoring in Political Studies and Middle Eastern Studies. He is passionate about the Arabic language and the cultural and political history of the Middle East. Azmi’s family is Syrian, but he has spent the majority of his life living in Seattle, where you can find him wrapped up in something related to soccer, music or food.

History is repeating itself for ancient Aleppo. Just as in centuries past, Syria’s largest and second most important city is undergoing carnage and warfare. However, this is the worst and most destructive era that Aleppo has experienced in the past millennium because of the annihilating weapons, military strategy and technology utilized by Bashar Al-Assad’s forces and by rebel factions. As a result of this chaos, Aleppo’s diverse and historical community is undergoing sweeping changes. The primary toll of Assad’s brutal pounding of Aleppo is naturally its peoples, but this paper chooses to focus on the reshaping of space in this project because it is crucial to understand how the dynamics of the city will be altered by the losses of historic space. Ancient mosques, churches, and Souks have all

suffered severe if not complete destruction. The once-calm Kurdish outskirts of the city are extremely tense since the Kurds have been unwillingly drawn into the uprising and forced to take sides. The Christian community is similarly stuck in the middle, choosing between an unpredictable lifestyle, death or fleeing to become refugees. A detrimental yet resilient tide of Islamism has emerged within fighting factions and is beginning to influence daily life and politics. Due to the complexity of the situation, there will be several reevaluations of public space in Aleppo with the loss of historic space and population. Because of the overarching ostracism of various sectarian and ethnic groups from the revolution, the preserving, rebuilding and prioritizing of historic space will be in the hands

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7 of the urban Sunni majority. Ordinary Aleppo natives have assumed the role of citizen journalists, teachers and bakers among other professions; these new professionals are creating and recreating the services that now destroyed universities, hospitals and courts once offered.

On the internet, those who are documenting the carnage are creating an online public space where the revolution lives and where the fading of Aleppo’s is showcased. These courageous Syrians will influence how Aleppo’s spaces will function in the future. Lastly, there is the a large refugee community from Aleppo residing in camps in Turkey. Within the camps, the diverse group of refugees has begun to create a community in which a new Aleppo can be envisioned. These refugees hold a piece of the puzzle that makes up Aleppo, and whether this population can return home and rebuild is essential in mapping out Aleppo in the 21st century.

The makeup of each neighborhood in Aleppo during the 18th Century gives a glimpse into the heterogeneous nature of the city. Although neighborhoods vary in wealth and social climate,“…there is no neighborhood inhabited exclusively by a single group, whether Jews or carpenters or upper-class families or Ashraf or Turkman tribesman.”1 Historical quarters that previously housed specific religious groups were mixed by the 18th Century. During that time, only a portion of the Jewish population actually lived in the Jewish quarter, Christians and Muslims accounting for the majority of the rest of the inhabitants. The pattern repeated itself in other areas of Aleppo, where “markets, artisanal workshops, baths, mosques, and other places of worship” were scattered throughout the city.2

The men and women who worked in these locations were similarly dispersed in diverse residential areas. This setting “thrust residents into a milieu of familiarity, shared interests, and collective obligations which, for better or worse, involved them with neighbors.”3 Warmth and communal security that developed in these mixed residential settings. Residents of Aleppo enjoyed this formula, often sharing services and deeds with neighbors in times of need, attending social events and generally keeping informed on their neighbors’ lives and wellbeing. As a popular local saying went, “No one knows you better than God and your neighbor.”4 Coffeehouses were conveniently located in every neighborhood; these local hangouts were characterized by a communal and relaxed vibe. Men of different classes, stature and religion all convened to chat, listen to stories and jokes, and watch plays. No “social occasion passed without the ritual coffee drinking and tobacco smoking.”5 Serving as a public forum for all of these activities, however immoral they seemed, these spaces held performances that “engaged the hearts and minds of the public” and “soothed the emotions.”6 Women too took part in this popular culture; segregation and contrasting social roles did not create different realms of tradition. The music that was performed bore neither any Western influence nor any taste of one specific group in Aleppo. A common musical culture that was upheld. Muslims and non-Muslims frequently performed in mixed ensembles, playing the creations of locals or music from the region. The variations of plays, stories and jokes were “…light, bitingly satirical and frequently obscene.”7 Puppet shows were

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8 used to criticize and ridicule the Ottoman Empire’s failed conquests abroad, to great public applause. The viewers in Aleppo enjoyed the humiliation of their superiors, and they also enjoyed the lewd jokes, proverbial wisdom, rhymes and romance. Some of the retrieved wisdom was naughty yet reflective of the relaxed atmosphere in which locals lived.

One saying goes “Shit on us, neighbors, we’re going to the bath house tomorrow anyway.”8 This sometimes-brash wisdom indicates that the natives maintained a strong sense of social realism and belief in self-help, which was a distinct cultural feature created in these famous spaces. The underlying and most important features of the city were the sites of worship, because these were spheres in which each religious group lived in their own history, scriptures and privacy.

Albeit Aleppo’s population formed a cohesive culture in many social, economic and practical aspects, separate religious structures and ideologies equally contributed to the city’s historical value and authenticity. For the majority of residents, religious experience “…tended to be expressed in acts of worship more than in intellectual reflection.”9 Religious indoctrination often started at a young age, and Muslims sent their boys to Maktabs (Koranic schools) while Christian and Jewish families sent their boys to corresponding parochial schools. During the 18th Century, more than two hundredand-fifty mosques existed, whereas the religious minorities were only granted one place of worship per quarter. This meant that the Christian community worshipped in only four churches, while the Jewish community was restricted one single ancient synagogue. These places of worship were not built strictly

during the Ottoman period; some dated from previous dynasties. The Umayyad Mosque (Great Mosque) of Aleppo was built from an early Roman cathedral and vastly reconstructed during the Ottoman rule. However one of the minarets, which dates from the Mamluke era in 1090, remained intact until 2013. Christian Armenian elites in the 15th Century funded the creation of three churches, all of which were active throughout the Ottoman era and until the present day. The Great Synagogue of the Jewish Al-Bandara district is one of the oldest buildings in Aleppo, having been built in the 9th Century. Not only were the most of these structures centuries old, they allowed residents to take breaks from work and opportunities to socialize. During major religious events, residents could take time off from work particularly during Ramadan, when “happy celebrations, lively street fairs, and a generally relaxed pace of living” prevailed.10 Unfortunately, since death was common during the pre-modern era, these historic institutions allowed each religious group to with receive death through their own traditional rituals. Due to the public and intermingled nature of neighborhood life and work, places of worship typically provided natives with privacy and peace.

Mosques, churches and synagogues were locations where townspeople could also escape the many corrupt doings of the Ottoman authorities and the growing Western commercial and colonial influence in pursuit of morality. Additionally, higher learning in Aleppo at the time pertained to one’s religious affiliation.

The only men in society who were of high enough stature to study and learn to read literature pursued religious careers.

Professional Muslim men of religion “would lead the prayers, preach in the

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9 mosques, run the shari’a courts, instruct the younger generation and do scholarly work on Islam.”11 The same trend developed for Jewish and Christian scholars.

Religious spaces gained value in this era because they evolved into the only institutions that mirrored public libraries, and the book collections were usually the “gifts of generous donors, of colleges, mosques and churches.”12 Another modern day landmark that was founded and widely trafficked in this time was the Al-Hamidiyya College, founded in 1752.

This Koranic school, held about three thousand volumes of literature. Aleppo was forced into modernity by way of the colonial powers, which created internal strife among natives and disrupted the unique dynamics of the city. A tragic instance in which Aleppo and its peoples have recently had to adapt to a loss of historic space was during the expulsion of the Jewish Community throughout twentieth century.

In the transition from Ottoman to European power, it was the historical Jewish community of Aleppo whose eventual migration changed the city’s pulse and spaces. During the ongoing westernization of Aleppo’s urban peoples, the Zionist project in Palestine “isolated the [Syrian] Jews from their non-Jewish neighbors more than in the past, resulting ultimately in their emigration.”13 When the French declared Syria a mandate in 1920, a strong tide of secular Arab nationalism was growing. Arab nationalism was partially a result of anti-colonial and anti-Zionist political aspirations for the region, and sadly Jews in Syria were affiliated with the Zionist movement, even if they distanced themselves from the movement. In 1947, tensions culminated after the UN’s declaration of the partition plan

of Palestine, and riots spread in Aleppo in which angered mobs destroyed synagogues and damaged the ancient Great synagogue. Following Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948, Syria’s borders with Israel remained closed, limiting emigration and internally marginalizing the Syrian Jewish community. From 1948 until 1970, Syria experienced a series of political coups, and the country was in political chaos. The Jewish population of Aleppo had many travel restrictions that restricted movement inside and outside of Syria and in 1964, and “the government took control of Jewish schools, admitting non-Jewish students and hiring Muslim principals.”14 The deterioration of the Syrian Jewish community continued into the 1970s and after the Yom Kippur war of 1973, Hafez Al-Assad’s government was forced to ease restrictions and make concessions. By the late 1980s and into the following decade, Syria’s foreign policy shifted to include the US and other Western powers in its relations. These changes allowed the remaining thousands of Jews to leave the country and by 1995 the Jewish community was fully absent from Aleppo. Due to the political events and contrasting movements in the region, the Jews of Aleppo were caught in the middle. Their contribution to Aleppo’s vibrant communal culture, their influence and connections in Aleppo’s commerce and their shaping of the soul and structure of the city all departed with them. The Great Synagogue, a structure more than a millennium old, was restored in the 1990’s but remains inactive to date. This structure remains an extremely symbolic representation of the city’s divine and inclusive heritage. The vacancy of the Synagogue shaped Aleppo’s modern day dynamics and ironically gave residents a taste of the ghostly ef-

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10 fect of losing a historic element of society. During Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad’s rules, Aleppo underwent a myriad of economic and social policies that alienated and then integrated the city, which again started to affect the city’s culture.

Hafez-al Assad’s rise to power in the 1970s crippled Aleppo’s established urban classes. Implementing mainly socialist policies, Hafez appointed rural citizens to posts that had previously been occupied by educated urban Aleppines.

As a result, there was a an massive influx of rural folk to Aleppo and other major Syrian cities, and these urban centers struggled to adapt socially, culturally and economically. Aleppo’s class structure changed and there was massive resentment of the crippling economic policies as well as the unprecedented social marginalization of the city from the rest of Syria. Insurrection broke out in 1979, when a Sunni army captain separated the 282 Alawi cadets from the others and machine-gunned 83 of them.15 Attacks spread to Baath Party offices and Aleppo became entangled in a civil conflict in which the 15th century Souk and hundreds of mosques constituted the battleground. The Muslim Brotherhood’s militias were fighting this insurgency, and the general population of Aleppo despised the regime as well as the destruction that the unrest brought about.

Due to the situation in the 1980s, the regime and international actors contributed to the restoring and preservation of Aleppo’s ancient architecture and areas.

And in 1986, UNESCO declared the Ancient City of Aleppo, which includes the Citadel as well as the old city, a World Heritage Site.16 The 1990’s saw an increase in corruption and steady under-

development, and when Bashar Al-Assad was elected president in 2000, Syria was hopeful for the reforms he promised. His limited neoliberal policies were a hopeful start, but they “nevertheless lacked the political openness, transparency and pluralism needed to achieve broad development goals.”17 The failure to recover from the horrendous previous decades intensified social and cultural divisions in Aleppo. The crime and illiteracy rates have increased in the past decade, leaving Aleppo with some of the highest rates of both. The effects of political repression, economic stagnation, poverty and corruption were felt throughout all of Syria for decades, and finally, in March 2011 the revolution started.

Despite Aleppo’s historic cultural autonomy and disapproval of hierarchy, the city stayed largely removed from participating in the civil disobedience that spread to neighboring regions. There were many reasons for the hesitation; firstly urban residents did not share the same goals as the Kurdish rural residents who lived on the outskirts of the city. Minorities have been concerned with what lies next for their typically small populaces, and a fear of radical Islamism was definitely present. Additionally, the middle and upper classes of Aleppo “bristled at the idea that they would be led by provincials.”18 In the first six months of the rebellion, 44 had been killed in the Aleppo province, a number ten times smaller than the death tolls of initiating towns like Deraa and Idlib. Residents of Aleppo also considered the possibility of a drawn-out civil war, and the destructive impacts that would have on their remaining culture and history like in eras past.

This inaction led to internal criticism from Syrians involved in the revolution

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11 as well as criticism from Aleppines who were in exile. Finally, during the planned funeral procession of Ibrahim al-Salqini, the Mufti of Aleppo, activists called for a demonstration against the regime in his honor. On September 6th 2011, between twenty and forty thousand Syrians marched the streets protesting the regime and the killing of the local Mufti.19 This marked the beginning of Aleppo’s full-scale involvement in the revolt. In the weeks after the protest, Syrian tanks and forces stormed Aleppo to quell any future action but the movement was unbreakable at this point. The University of Aleppo was now the “university of the revolution” and in the face of the regime’s brutality, students were protesting daily. As the revolution evolved and the international community sat on its hands, Syrians in Aleppo and throughout the country took up arms. Clashes, and thus destruction and casualties became frequent in Aleppo throughout 2012, yet July was the beginning of the city’s most intense period of carnage.

Major rebel advances in July 2012 were met by regime bombardments and reinforcements. Throughout the summer of 2012, the Christian and Kurdish community became immersed in the conflict, due to fighting in their historic quarters.

The majority of the initial clashes were in towns surrounding Aleppo, and the regime did not hesitate to use its air force in order to flatten entire districts. The sheer destruction and prolonged fighting prompted the Christian and Kurdish minorities to side with the regime when convenient, and to side with the rebels when convenient. No one is safe in Aleppo, as approximately 10,000 lives have been lost so far. However in September 2012, something happened that struck

the heart of Aleppo residents, Syrians and the international community. On September 28th 2012, rebel factions were in the third day of their offensive, and the goal was to capture the hilltop citadel. Amidst clashes between the regime forces who were stationed in the citadel and the rebels below, the regime forces set the 15th century Souk ablaze. Aleppo stood still. Centuries of tradition, irreplaceable memories, trade and culture burned away. In the destruction of the Souk, we witnessed “the destruction of a way of life that’s evolved over centuries around one of the Arab world’s architectural treasures.” Ironically, the Souk had never served as a space for fighting, leaders from each historical era sought to expand it, restore it and profit from the wealth of commodities sold. Another unbelievable feat of destruction occurred on April 25th. Although it is impossible to know who committed these acts of destruction, frequently the regime forces are the only ones capable of such magnitude of damage. During fighting near the Grand Mosque in the Old City, opposition activists claim that regime tanks targeted one of the Mosque’s minarets and exploded it. The regime claims that AlQaeda affiliated group, Jahbat Al-Nusra, placed explosives in the minaret and set them off. This Islamic relic, built in the Umayyad period, is on the verge of being fully destroyed now. The destruction of its oldest minaret is a dagger in the heart of every Muslim and non-Muslim of Aleppo. The mosque shaped the portrait of the city, and reminds residents of the longevity of their history and religion. The Grand Mosque represented a space where Muslims of Aleppo could frequently escape the hardships, nonreligious authority and immerse themselves in tradition. However, like the rest

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12 of Aleppo, the Mosque is now serving as a battleground, where any day, any group can permanently halt the cultural pulse of the city. The destruction of churches has been less common, however, as needless to say, the Christian community is at a crossroads in Aleppo. As it stands, history will most likely repeat itself in the sense that it is the Sunni Muslim population who will emerge with the most preserved history and population. Sectarianism has become one of the many results of this incessant war.

In a goal to restore the historic public space that will remain after the revolution, the urban Sunni population in Aleppo will prioritize their cultural spaces, potentially ostracizing increasingly absent and threatened minorities. Since the majority of Aleppo now supports the uprising against Bashar Al-Assad, Kurdish areas on the outskirts of Aleppo have scrapped with rebel forces as a result of different views on the revolution. In early April of 2013, rebel factions and Kurdish insurgent forces agreed to join forces, but just a few weeks later tensions and clashes were renewed. Also in April, Bishop Boulus Yazji, of the Roman Orthodox Church in Aleppo and Bishop John Abraham of the Syriac Orthodox Church in Aleppo were kidnapped by unknown perpetrators. Islamist factions are arguably the most influential and well-trained groups fighting the regime in Aleppo, which poses some problems. These rebels have a vision for future Syria that does not include the coreligionist culture that is rooted in a city like Aleppo, and their fighting is only contributing to the death of Aleppo. This new tension and devastation has created side effects that have

encouraged this sectarian uncertainty and a reevaluation of Aleppo’s crucial spaces.

In the midst of death, shortages of water, food and electricity, many locals of Aleppo have assumed new roles in order to keep the city from dying out completely. These natives are operating on the ground as full time professionals, sometimes with little experience in their new fields. For example, there is a man named Abu Nur who has been reopening schools in liberated areas in Aleppo in order to teach children. The Aleppo University of Architecture was bombed in 2012 when students were taking exams, and over fifty students died. Abu Nur’s residence was personally damaged and his goal has been to restore spaces in which imagination and fantasy can exist, for his young daughters and children their age. Secret bakeries have also opened up in Aleppo, particularly in the liberated areas, where rebel groups sometimes fund them. While a small number of bakeries cannot address the dire and exorbitant need for food, these spaces are nevertheless defining the changing dynamics of Aleppo. The situation changes and worsens everyday, so these individual actors and the services they provide are not guaranteed to make a lasting impact. These individuals are providing services that were previously available through the destroyed Souk, through mosques and churches and throughout the numerous schools and neighborhoods that have been flattened.

Similarly, there are the citizen journalists and activists of Aleppo, who document and share Aleppo’s destruction in risky circumstances. These natives have shown what is left of Aleppo, thus transmitting the city’s new yet fading culture

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13 to the Diaspora and the wider online audience. At the same time, these activists are defining the Aleppine society by utilizing the modern tool of technology so heavily. Natives resisting modernization, authority and imperialism in favor of preserving heritage, customs and lifestyle define Aleppo’s rich history. Perhaps the most important influence in determining Aleppo’s future hubs and lifestyles will be the influx of refugees as well as the departure of historic populations.

Aleppo is swallowing the largest population of internally displaced people in Syria. Throughout the northern city, more than 1.25 million internal refugees have fled to Aleppo, escaping violence and trouble in other areas of Syria. This new population will unquestionably change Aleppo, as refugee populations entering Aleppo in the past have done.

Kurds, Armenians and Palestinians have all recently shaped Aleppo through their plights from their violent situations.

These populations have shaped the economic success, historic religious structures and diversity of Aleppo. Similarly, many of Aleppo’s significant minorities are returning home to their countries or regions, while tens of thousands of Aleppines have fled to Turkey. In one case, thousands of refugees have left for the Turkish city of Gaziantep, which is now conveniently known as “Aleppo in Exile”. In this city, former Aleppo residents have rediscovered their cuisine, dialect, jokes and interactions. With a steadily increasing number of refugees both entering and leaving Aleppo, Aleppo’s remaining historic spaces will hold different value and new communities will direct Aleppo’s legacy.

struction, Aleppo is bleeding. The citizens of Aleppo are taking an unwarranted and gruesome beating at the hands of the brutal regime and through clashes between rebel factions and government forces. World and Aleppine heritage is also at serious risk; historic religious and communal spaces are being devastated as I write this. After drastic political and ideological shifts in the region, Aleppo’s communities altered radically taking with them the city’s identity, space and way of life. Aleppo’s appearance and character will continue to shift. Natives on the ground and on the Web will continue to provide unprecedented efforts to keep the city’s pulse alive and well. Since hundreds of thousands have fled and are either internally displaced or exiled to camps in Turkey, Armenia, Jordan or Iraq their absence or possible renewed presence will reshape or dominate the cultural spaces. Aleppo has become a ghost town, ironic for a world city that is so ancient. Syria does not need any more ruins, or dead cities.

During this continuous period of deClaremont Journal of International Relations | Spring 2014

14 Marcus, Abraham. The Middle East on the eve of modernity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Print. P. 317.

2 Ibid, P. 317 3 Marcus, Abraham. The Middle East on the eve of modernity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century. New York: 1

Columbia University Press, 1989. Print. P. 232 4 Ibid 5 Ibid 6 Ibid, 233 7 Ibid, 235 8 Marcus, 236 9 Ibid, 223 10 Marcus, 224 11 Marcus, 240 12 Marcus, 238 13 Zenner, Walter P. A global community: the Jews from Aleppo, Syria. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000. Print. P. 52 14 Zenner, 52 15 Ajami, Fouad. The Syrian rebellion. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2012. Print.

P. 40 16 Ibid, 42 17 Ekmanian, Harout. “Aleppo in the Syrian Uprising | Near East Quarterly.” Near East Quarterly . Web. 17 May 2013.

18 Ajami, 91 19 Ajami, 189

2013. <http://www.neareastquarterly.com/index php/2012/06/26/aleppo-in-the-syrian-uprising/>.

“Kidnapped Syrian bishops ‘remain captured’ - Middle East - Al Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera English. N.p., 25 Apr. 2013. Web. 17 May 2013. <http://www aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04.html>.

Marcus, Abraham. The Middle East on the eve of mode nity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century. New York: Colu bia University Press, 1989. Print.

Reynolds, James. “ Turkish city becomes Syrian ‘Aleppo in exile’.” BBC. N.p., 7 May 2013. Web. 17 May 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle east-22426334>.

“Syria - The Free Syrian Army.” VICE . 12 Oct. 2012. Web. 17 May 2013. <http://www.vice.com/ground-zero/syria-the free-syrian-army>.

“Syria conflict: Aleppo’s souk burns as battles rage.” BBC. 29 Nov. 2012. Web. 17 May 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk news/world-middle-east-19775530>.

Zenner, Walter P.. A global community: the Jews from Aleppo, Syria. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000.

Additional References Ajami, Fouad. The Syrian Rebellion. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2012. Print.

“Aleppo - Governorate profile March 2013 | ReliefWeb.” ReliefWeb- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA. N.p., 31 Mar. 2013. Web. 17 May 2013. <http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-repu lic/aleppo-governorate-profile-march-2013>.

“Aleppo, before the war - The Washington Post.” Was ington Post. N.p., 20 Mar. 2013. Web. 17 May 2013.<http:/ www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/aleppo before-the-war/2013/02/26/9cf91ac8-804a-11e2-a350 49866afab584_gallery.html#photo=28>.

Beehner, Lionel. “’It Is Our Soul’: The Destruction of Aleppo, Syria’s Oldest City - Lionel Beehner - The Atla tic.” The Atlantic. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 May 2013. <http:/ www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10 it-is-our-soul-the-destruction-of-aleppo-syrias-oldest city/263255/>.

Commins, David Dean. Historical dictionary of Syria.

Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1996. Print.

Del Grande, Gabriele . “Inside Aleppo: Why a Pacifist Teacher Keeps Going to School | TIME.com.” TIME Magazine. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 May 2013. <http://world.time com/2013/04/19/the-illusions-of-aleppo/>.

Ekmanian, Harout. “Aleppo in the Syrian Uprising | Near East Quarterly.” Near East Quarterly . Web. 17 May Spring 2014 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

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Questioning the Legality of Drone Strikes in Pakistan Sophia Baldwin | Pitzer ‘14 Sophia Baldwin is a senior at Pitzer College. She is a Political Studies major from Maui and is particularly interested in East Asian Politics. She’s proficient in both Spanish and Mandarin, and spent fall of 2013 studying abroad in Beijing researching the motivations behind joining the Chinese Communist Party for University students. Next year she will be teaching English in Hong Kong.

Introduction War by necessity is immoral. While one cannot hold another person or country accountable for immoral actions, one can hold another country accountable for actions that are illegal. The rule of law is established to minimize atrocities, like genocide and the death of children. Since June of 2004, the United States has been using armed unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, in Pakistan as part of its counterterrorism strategy.1 The US maintains that these covert operations are perfectly legal under the tenants of domestic and international law.2 With the death toll from drones in Pakistan reaching numbers close to 3,500 (175 children, 535 adults, 2800 “militants”), it is paramount that the rule of law be adhered to in order to minimize further atrocities. 3

A fundamental part of the democratic process is the ability of citizens and elected officials to question the decisions of their executive branch and the military.

Therefore, in the interest of democracy and human rights, the impact of these strikes should be critically examined.

The examination of these drone strikes is all the more critical because of the existing lack transparency surrounding them. The implications of these strikes also raise concerns regarding issues of national sovereignty, and the legitimacy of perceived threats to national security.

The lack of accurate information, combined with the ambiguity of international law results in a complex, but important discussion about the use of drone strikes.

This paper will address that discussion and examine whether or not drones are

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17 legal, as the United States claims. It will do this through a careful analysis of domestic law and public international law.

Background Drones strikes by the US allegedly occur within the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The geographic location of the FATA is in northwest Pakistan extending to the border with Afghanistan4. The area is semi-autonomous, and the border is porous making travel between the two countries relatively easy resulting in the region becoming a haven for radical Islamic jihadists.

The two types of drones used in these areas are the Predator MQ-1B, and the MQ-9 Reaper. The Predator is equipped with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, weighing around one hundred pounds. The Reaper is larger and believed to be more powerful than the Predator.5 The US is estimated to have 7,000 of these drones.6 Since 2004 these drones have killed an estimated 2800-3500 people, 175 of them children, and 535 of them adult civilians.

There have been roughly 49 high level targets killed, and 2885 “militants” killed; although, the numbers are disputed.7 Limitations There are several limitations to this study. The first is the lack of transparency surrounding the program. This makes obtaining information, and judging its credibility difficult. Most of the legal justifications of the drone program by the United States come from primary sources in interviews and speeches.

The second is that legal analysis will be difficult without any legal background.

Therefore this paper may be oversimplified in this regard; although, it will try

very hard not to be. The third is that the use of drones at this magnitude is unprecedented. For this reason, there are no laws or treaties specific to drone usage. This also makes the legal analysis of strikes difficult.

Legal Analysis US Law Prior to 2001, it was illegal for the US president to declare war on another country or a group of enemy combatants without the consent of Congress. In 2001, after the September 11th attacks, executive power was significantly broadened. Under the Authorization of the Use of Military Force resolution (AUMF), “the president’s war-time powers are broadened to all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”8 A further extension of the AUMF is made

by Jeh Johnson, the General of Counsel of the Department of Defense, who states that AUMF can also be used to target “associated forces.”9 According to him, an associated force is the following: 1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside Al-Qaeda, and 2) is a co-belligerent with Al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.10 This was the justification used for war against the Taliban, because they were the affiliated group, in Afghanistan, and even against Saadam Hussein (who was not affiliated with Al-Qaeda).11 Furthermore, the United States continues to use this justification by targeting the Taliban as well as Al-Qaeda members in Pakistan.

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18 Although Harold Koh, the legal advisor under former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and others have defended the legality of drone strikes under US law, the AUMF resolution did not specifically state that the President was authorized to make war against groups that were loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda. Therefore, the first objection to the United States’ drone strike laws that should be raised is that they too liberally interpret groups that aid Al-Qaeda.

In order to argue that the drone strikes are legal under US law one must assume that they are legal under international law; however, if under international law these strikes do not fall under the conventional definition of warfare, they may under US law, constitute assassination; particularly if drone strikes are planned against US citizens in Pakistan. The case of American citizen, Abdulrahmam alAwlaki, who was the sixteen-year-old son of the radical Al-Qaeda imam, Anwar al-Awlaki, is an example.12 Although there is ample evidence that his father aided and abetted al-Qaeda jihadists, there existed little public evidence that Abdulrahmam was actively aiding jihadist plots. Not only that, he was still a minor and an American citizen. With this in mind, it can be argued that the death of Abdulrahmam constitutes assassination under United States law. If the war on Al-Qaeda is not considered legitimate under the current legal framework, then laws of peacetime apply. In a study done

by UPenn Law School, the authors note, “An extrajudicial killing of a government official or agent in peacetime; however, would be lawful only if undertaken in self-defense or defense of others, which is presumably inconsistent with the premeditation of targeted killing.”13

International Law The next portion of this paper will be dedicated to the international, legal analysis of US targeted killings, or drone strikes in Pakistan. In particular, it will cover public international law, or the body of law used to determine the structure and conduct of states, and intergovernmental organizations.14 Within this body of law, it will look at jus ad bellum (laws of war), that involve the justification of war before any armed conflict occurs, and jus in bello that pertains to the acceptable conduct during wartime. Jus in bello falls under the jurisdiction of International Humanitarian Law, and to some extent International Human Rights Law. Jus ad bellum Several themes pertain to jus ad bellum are as follows: sovereignty (right authority), self defense (just cause), proportionality, reasonable hope, and last resort.

Sovereignty (Right Authority) Right authority under the laws of war, suggests that war is only just if waged by a legitimate authority against another legitimate authority.15 Two documents cover this topic in particular. They are the UN Charter, and the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention envisioned two types of armed conflict. The first is between two nation-states, and the second is between a nation-state, and a non-international, non-governmental actor, such as a rebel insurgent group within one’s own country. Harold Koh notes in his speech at Oxford in May of 2013, that the Geneva Convention does not cover transnational non-state actors, and is therefore open to interpretation.

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19 He notes, “September 11th made clear that the term “non-international armed conflicts” can include transnational battles that are between nations [Al-Qaeda and the United States], thus, instead of treating this situation as one in which no law applies because the Geneva Conventions are considered “quaint,” our job is examine the existing laws of war in the context of a “non-international” armed conflict.16 This begs the question, why not create new legislation in order to frame a more legitimate legal argument based around this idea of a transnational non-state actor vs. a nation-state? The UN Charter clarifies this slightly. Article 2(4) outlines the right to legitimate authority. This article prohibits the use of force by one state against another with two exceptions. They are: 1) when the use of force is carried out with the consent of the host state, and 2) when the use of force is in self-defense in response to an armed attack or an imminent threat, and where the host state is unwilling or unable to take appropriate action.17 It would seem that this legal framework applies to transnational non-state actors because it allows for the entrance and attack of one state against a particular group existing in a consenting or helpless nation-state.

The language of this article is somewhat vague, but it provides a skeletal framework for examining the legality of drone strikes in Pakistan.

Under the framework set up by article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the United States can only engage with Al-Qaeda if 1) there is Pakistani consent, and 2) if it is in selfdefense in response to an attack, or if Pakistan is unwilling or unable to remove enemy combatants from within its borders. Some evidence suggests that initially Pakistan secretly gave its consent

to strikes by the United States. Evidence supporting this claim comes from CIA and Pakistani documents leaked to the Washington Post in October of 2013.18 The most recent of these documents was dated in 2011. Since 2011, many Pakistani officials have come out against the drone strikes publicly, most notably in the Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations’ speech made on October 16th, 2013.

Therefore, it would seem that under the first exception of the UN Charter Article 2(4), the United States fails to maintain legality.

With regard to the first part of the second exception, “if it is in self defense in response to an armed attack,” it can be argued that 12 years is too long after an attack to justify a continuing counter attack in self defense. Consequently, the United States uses the concept of anticipatory self-defense. The UN Special Rapporteur notes that “anticipatory self-defense has been offered as a narrow exception, invoked to prevent an attack that is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no other choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”19 If there are new and imminent threats to the United States, these attacks could be justified; however, the intelligence used to decide the severity and urgency of these threats is not made public, making it impossible for outside observers to draw a conclusion as to the legitimacy of these threats. Even Harold Koh argues that, “the administration should release factual evidence on disputed imminent threats in order to show the US acted in self-defense.”20 Until the United States is more transparent with the justification used for its killings and until it is compliant with international law, the United States strikes in Pakistan are still illegal.

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20 The second part of the second exception of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter concerns whether or not Pakistan has been unwilling or unable to take appropriate actions against militant groups that pose a threat to the United States, and operate within its borders. According to the former US ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, Pakistan was both willing and able to take action against Al-Qaeda elements in the northwest provinces for many years. However, the action could not be deemed “appropriate” for several reasons. First, because Pakistani weapons were less sophisticated than US weapons, leading to higher numbers of civilian casualties.

Second, there exists a deep ambivalence within the Pakistani military regarding “counterterrorist” actions, since many military members have tribal and familial connections to those who would be targeted. Thirdly, it would have been strategically impossible to give the Pakistani government independent drone technology because of the lack of trust between the two countries, and because of the risk of sharing CIA, and satellite surveillance data.21 The legality of strikes in relationship to this tenant of international of law hinges on the idea of appropriate action. Proponents of the US Government position could argue Pakistan is indeed unwilling and unable to take appropriate action. Opponents of the US government position could argue that Pakistan has been more than willing and able to take appropriate actions against insurgents. Ironically, neither side has been successful in eradicating an al-Qaeda presence in Pakistan.

portionate to the attack suffered. Using simple arithmetic one could argue that the almost 4,000 people killed by US drone strikes in Pakistan roughly correspond to the 3,000 deaths by Al-Qaeda on September 11th; however, this calculus is problematic for several reasons. First, the war in Afghanistan, which was declared directly in response to the September 11th attacks, has cost many enemy lives. From 20072011, which is only half of the time period in question, there were 10,000 anti-government forces and over 14,000 civilians killed in Afghanistan, as a result of the United States War on Terror.22 Therefore, the total death toll of enemy combatants far exceeds the death toll on September 11th, calling into question the idea of proportionality. Second, the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks were not Pakistani tribesman, but were largely Saudi nationals. Therefore, one could argue that the truly proportionate response would have been to organize strikes against Saudi nationals who finance Al-Qaeda movements in much poorer countries. As stated in a recent editorial in the Economist:

Proportionality under the laws of war states that violence in war must be pro-

This idea is impractical, however, even if more just.

The most dismaying aspect of Al-Qaeda’s revival is the extent to which its pernicious ideology, now aided by the failures of the Arab Spring continues to spread through madrassas and mosques, and jihadist websites and television channels.

Money still flows from rich Gulf Arabs, supposedly the West’s friends, to finance these activities and worse. More pressure should be brought to bare on their governments to stop this.23

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21 Reasonable Hope The principle of reasonable hope states that a state should not engage in acts of war unless it has a reasonable hope of succeeding in mission.24 Here, again, the legality of drone strikes can be called into question. It is arguable that drone strikes in Pakistan have outraged Pakistanis and other Muslims to the extent that it is inadvertently creating more radicalization, which in turn aids recruitment to organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. As the Economist notes:

The inconvenient truth is that, in the past eighteen months, despite the relentless pummeling it has received, and the defeats it has suffered, Al-Qaeda and its jihadist allies have staged an extraordinary comeback. The terrorist network now holds sway over more territory and is recruiting more fighters than at any time in its twenty five year history.25

The United States would argue that it has succeeded in a narrower mission of eliminating known Al-Qaeda leaders.

Moreover, the Obama administration repeatedly tries to frame its war on terror as fundamentally different than that of Bush ’s. It claims that it is different because there is a clear end date to these strikes; although, it has never publically come out with these dates. This delegitimizes its argument of reasonable hope as well.

The Principle of Last Resort The principle of last resort states that war is only just if all other peaceful methods have been exhausted. Under this

principle the United States would also fail. It is unlikely that negotiations with Al-Qaeda would prove successful. The United States has tried in the past to negotiate with Taliban, which although unsuccessful, were necessary. 26 An attempt should be made in this instance to at least comply with international law.

Jus in bello The next section will be dedicated to jus in bello, or the laws that govern a nation once it has made the decision to go to war. In particular, it will look at the principles of distinction, due process, and the right to surrender.

Distinction The principle of distinction states that a nation engaging in war must be able to make the distinction between militants and civilians, and minimize casualties when possible.27 The US fails under this principle primarily because of the definition it uses to describe someone it considers a “militant”. The US definition includes any male, carrying a weapon within the FATA.28 This definition is far too broad, and encompasses people who are not an imminent threat to US security. This is because one cannot tell the age of a militant based on drone surveillance, meaning that minors are probably often killed. Furthermore, the United States claims that the drones they use usually only target high-level officials.

This is also not true. The United States has two different types of strikes. The first are on known Al-Qaeda operatives.

These are “personality strikes”. The second are “signature” strikes, and are the most common. The intelligence of these strikes are based on “pattern of life” anal-

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22 ysis, which targets people that bare certain defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities are not known.29 These characteristics have not been publicly defined. Until the United States makes the definitions of these characteristics public, it continues to violate international law.

Moreover, the alleged accuracy that drones offer in comparison to other weapons technology is debatable. This is not because the technology is less accurate, but rather because the intelligence behind it is. Recall that the intelligence used to target these enemy combatants comes from the same agency that purportedly had discovered weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It also comes from the same agency that allowed for the detainment, and probable torture of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, 86% of the prisoners originally thought to be Al-Qaeda, actually were not.30 Lastly, there also seems to be a pattern of claims by the US to have targeted the targeted the same high-level suspect. Ilyas Kashmir, and Anwar al-Awlaki are two of the most notable examples. Ilyas Kashmir was targeted and killed twice according to the United States, but the Taliban still maintains he is alive.31 Anwar al-Awlaki, who was discussed earlier, had to be targeted twice before he was successfully killed.32 These mistakes coupled with the documented deaths of innocent civilians therefore further undermine the US credibility in adherence to distinction. 33 Due Process When a drone strike occurs it removes

the right of due process because there is no capture, or attempted capture of these targets.34 Due to the lack of transparency within the program, it is impossible to tell if the alleged target is guilty of his crimes. Therefore, the idea of due processes under jus in bello is not upheld in any sense by the US. It is rare, however, to find due process upheld in any war. Previous to drone strikes, there had been some hope that due process would apply to Guantanamo detainees; however, in the vast majority of Guantanamo cases, this was not had. One notable exception includes the Haitian refugees championed by Harold Koh in the early nineties.35 As mentioned before, he created most of the legal framework for the US drone program under Clinton, which effectively disregards the right to due process.

Right to Surrender Another weakness of the drone program is the fact that militants cannot surrender. James Cartwright, the retired Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, also comes to a similar conclusion. He notes, “To me the weakness in the drone activity is that there is no one on the ground, and the person puts his hands out, he cannot surrender. I have the authority to go after you or not...

What makes it worse is with a Predator, you’re actually watching it. You know when he puts his hands up.”36 It is difficult to know whether the right to surrender applies to the period before an attack or after an attack. Obviously, they completely forfeit the enemy’s right to surrender before an attack, but they do not forfeit Al-Qaeda’s surrender following an attack. A legal but counterproductive solution to this

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23 problem would be to alert enemy combatants that they must surrender or be targeted by a drone strike.

Conclusion After careful examination of international and domestic law, objections to the legality of drone strikes can be raised. Under the AUMF, definitions of associates of Al-Qaeda combatants have been too liberally interpreted to include US citizens, the Taliban, and minors. Under jus ad bellum, or right authority the US fails to adhere to international law for several reasons. First, a transnational non-state actor has yet to be fully defined in the Geneva Convention and the UN Charter. Second, the US does not clearly have Pakistani consent, and the Pakistan has not proved itself completely unwilling, or unable to take necessary action against Al-Qaeda militants. Third, without transparency regarding imminent threats to American lives, the principle of self defense cannot continue to be invoked almost thirteen years after the attacks of September 11th, 2001. With regard to jus in bello, the United States, again, fails to convincingly the principles of international law. First, the United States has failed to use distinction in determining who is an enemy combatant, and second, the right to due process has not been upheld, and third, there has been no right to surrender before an attack.

international community on who is being targeted for drone strikes and why. It also needs to create new legislation concerning drone strike policy, which would include a new definition of non-state transnational actors. The United States needs to invite Al-Qaeda militants to the negotiating table, however far-fetched this may seem in the short run. It also needs to negotiate issues of sovereignty with Pakistan within in a global forum, such as the United Nations. The US also needs to take greater care to avoid civilian casualties, and to accurately report them in accordance to International Human Rights Law. These are steps necessary for the United States to revive its image abroad and to end this longstanding and costly conflict in the Middle East.

Update December 19, 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution on human rights that called for countries using drone strikes to comply with international law. The strongest proponent of this resolution was the delegate from Pakistan. This is the first time the General Assembly has specifically addressed the issue of armed drones. The resolution urges states using drones comply with international law including the UN Charter. Specifically, it argues for the compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality.37

With the immense amount of controversy existing with regard to its operation of drones, it is imperative that the United States make the following changes to its drone policy. The first and most important step is that the United States must provide more detailed information to Congress, the American people, and the Claremont Journal of International Relations | Spring 2014

24 Endnotes Cavallaro, James, Stephan Sonnenberg, Sarah Knuckey, Adelina Acuña, Mohammad M. Ali, Anjali Deshmukh, Jennifer Gibson, Jennifer Ingram, Dimitri Phillips, Wendy Salkin, Omar Shakir, and Christopher Holland. Living Under Drones:A Joint Report by NYU and Stanford Law Schools. Publication. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

2 Koh, Harold H. “How to End the Forever War?” Oxford Union Speech. University of Oxford, London. 12 Dec. 2013.

Speech. 3.

3 “Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” Bureau of Investigative Journalism [London] n.d.: n. pag. Web. <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-pakistan/>.

4 Foust, Joshua. “Targeted Killing, Pro and Con: What to Make of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” The Atlantic. The Atlantic Monthly Group, 28 Sept. 2012. Web. 5 Living Under Drones :A Joint Report by NYU and Stanford Law Schools. Publication. N.p. Print. 127.

6 “Drones by Country: Who Has All the UAVs?” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media Limited, 3 Aug. 2012. Web. 5 Dec. 2013.

7 Living Under Drones :A Joint Report by NYU and Stanford Law Schools. Publication. N.p. Print. 127.

8 Living Under Drones. 118.

9 Living Under Drones. 119.

10 Living Under Drones. 120.

11 “Bush Stands by Al Qaeda, Saddam Link.” CNN. 2005 Cable News Network, 15 June 2005. Web. 16 Dec. 2013.

12 “Who Was Anwar Al-Awlaki?” ABC News. N.p., 30 Sept.

2011. Web. 10 Dec. 2013 13 Banks, William C., and Peter Raven-Hansen. Targeted Killing and Assassination: US Legal Framework. UPenn Law. UPenn Law School, 2003. Web. 12 Dec. 2013.

14 McKeever, Kent. Researching Public International Law. Research Guides RSS. Columbia Law School: Arthur W. Diamond Library Research Guide, 3.

15 McKeever, Kent. Researching Public International Law. Research Guides RSS. Columbia Law School: Arthur W. Diamond Library Research Guide, n.d. Web. 16 Dec. 2013.

16 Koh, Harold H. “How to End the Forever War?” Oxford Union Speech. University of Oxford, London. 12 Dec. 2013.

Speech. 3.

17 UN Charter, 2-4-4 (United Nations). Print.

18 Kutsch, Tom. “Documents Show Pakistan Approved US Drone Strikes.” Al Jazeera English [New York City] 13 Oct. 2013: n. pag. Print.

19 Living Under Drones :A Joint Report by NYU and Stanford Law Schools. Publication. N.p. Print. 108.

20 Koh, Harold H. “How to End the Forever War?” Oxford Union Speech. University of Oxford, London. 12 Dec. 2013.

Speech. 3.

21 Munter, Cameron.Managing International Crisis. Pomona College, Claremont, California. Apr. 2013. Lecture.

22 Rogers, Simon, and Mona Chalabi. “Afghanistan Civilian Casualties.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 12 Apr. 2013. Web. 22 Dec. 2013.

23 Editorial Staff. “The New Face of Terror.” The Economist [London] 28 Sept. 2013: n. pag. Print.

24 Cook, Martin L. “Ethical Issues of Counterterrorism.” Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Markkula Cen1

ter for Applied Ethics. Santa Clara University, Sept. 2001.

Web. 18 Dec. 2013.

25 “The New Face of Terror.” The Economist.

26 U.S., Ap Obama Hamid Karzai Jef 130618 Wblog Taliban Agrees to Join Peace Talks with. “Taliban Agrees to Join Peace Talks with U.S.” ABC News. ABC News Network, n.d. Web. 22 Dec. 2013.

27 Melzer, Nils. Targeted Killings in International Law. London: Oxford Scholarship, 2008. Print.

28 Living Under Drones :A Joint Report by NYU and Stanford Law Schools. Publication. N. Print. 127.

29 Living Under Drones :A Joint Report by NYU and Stanford Law Schools. Publication. Print.

30 “Guantanamo by the Numbers.” American Civil Liberties Union. American Civil Liberties Union, 2013. Web. 22 Dec. 2013.

31 Roggio, Bill. “Top Al-Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in US Drone Strike.” Long War Journal. Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 4 June 2011. Web. 16 Dec. 2013.

32 Mazzetti, Mark. “How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs.” The New York Times. 9 Mar. 2013: n. pag. Print.

33 Serle, Jack, and Alice K. Ross. “November 2013 Update: US Covert Actions in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.” Bureau of Investigative Journalism [London] 3 Dec. 2013: n. pag. Print.

34 “International Law Guarantees the Right to Due Process of Law.” Detention Watch Network. International Detention Coalition, 2012. Web. 22 Dec. 2013 35 Koh, Harold. “Captured by Guantánamo | OpenDemocracy.” OpenDemocracy. N.p., 2005. Web. 22 Dec. 2013.

36 McKelvey, Tara. “Interview With Harold Koh, Obama’s Defender of Drone Strikes.”The Daily Beast [Washington D.C.] 8 Apr. 2012: n. pag. Print.

37 UN General Assembly Adopts Unanimous Resolution against Drones Strikes.” The Nation. The Nation Limited, 19 Dec. 2013. Web. 22 Dec. 2013.

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Harmony in the Middle East: The Role of Music in Transforming the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Benjamin Cohen | Pomona â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;16 Ben is a sophomore at Pomona College double majoring in International Relations and Russian and Eastern European Studies. He is an oboist for the Pomona College Orchestra and a side interest in music inspired him to research its role in conflict resolution and transformation. In the fall, Ben will be taking a break from Claremont to spend the semester in St. Petersburg.

Introduction In cases of intractable, intergroup aggression where two or more groups are so deeply entangled in a conflict that it becomes ingrained in the fabric of the groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; identities, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint a common understanding that can be utilized for resolution. For Israelis and Palestinians, this is an everyday fact of life. The conflict, in which Israelis and Palestinians find themselves in a territorial dispute drawn on ideological, religious, cultural, and psychological lines, has not only divided Israel but also the international community.

Palestinians in Israel and occupied territories are marginalized by policies of containment while Israel faces external security threats from antagonistic Arab

and Islamic neighbors as well as internal threats from rebelling Palestinians.

On a global level, different groups support either side and find themselves pitted against one another. Positions with regard to the conflict can define the state of relations between countries, as seen in the case of the 2006 war against Hezbollah, in which the United States was forced to juggle its foreign policy by supporting Israel but also supplying aid to Lebanon, which had been battered by Israel with American-made bombs.1 The ongoing dispute has dominated discourse on conflict largely because of its far-reaching implications in a geopolitically strategic region for world powers and its intractability. This has been evidenced by the failures of multiple attempts at top-down

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27 conflict resolution using political and governmental avenues. The Israeli-Palestinian case is clearly a situation in which a resolution must be found through other means. One such way could be conflict transformation, in which a “widening of political space that characterizes conflict de-escalation,” as seen in the hourglass model of conflict, serves to elicit “a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships.”2 While engaging Israelis and Palestinians through other modes of communication are often only small-scale and not far-reaching enough to elicit a political turnaround, there are many successful examples of cross-cultural forums for communication between the two groups. One such forum can be found in music. Said to be a universal language that transcends linguistic, cultural, and other social barriers, music “offers a specific potential to enable, catalyze, and strengthen empathetic response…which lies at the core of music’s function within peacebuilding.”3 This paper will examine the role of music in establishing open dialogue and space for understanding between Israelis and Palestinians primarily through the example of Daniel Barenboim and Edward Said’s West-Eastern Divan Orchestra. The orchestra, founded in 1999, brings musicians together from Israel, Palestine, other Arab countries, and Europe to participate in workshops and classical music concerts once or more per year.4 The analysis includes perspectives of the groups’ founders and leaders; the participating musicians; how Israelis, Palestinians, and the international community perceive the group; and comparisons with other music proj-

ects that also seek to provide a space for non-hostile interaction between Israelis and Palestinians.

The paper will first briefly summarize a history of the case, explaining why Israelis and Palestinians are so hostile toward one another, how the conflict has expanded and become internationalized over time, and how previous attempts to resolve the conflict have failed. In the following section, the idea of music as a forum for conflict transformation will be introduced and then supported through examples of this from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict including the WestEastern Divan Orchestra as a main case with the music of Yair Dalal and others as counterexamples. Next, the effectiveness of the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra will be evaluated regarding its role as a means of conflict transformation in Israel and Palestine through its specific and unique approach as a preeminent musical organization designed to promote mutual cultural understanding.

Finally, the last section will outline recommendations for the future with regard to using music in engaging Israelis and Palestinians in hopes of changing norms on a larger scale to promote a wider culture of peace beyond the realm of musical collaboration.

A History of Conflict in Israel and Palestine The engrained antagonism between Israelis and Palestinians that we see today largely originated with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Arising from the horrors of World War II and the Holocaust, Jews and the international community rallied for the creation of a permanent home for the Jewish people,

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28 thereby following in the footsteps of Zionist settlers before them. In so doing, however, the state was established “in a land that had been occupied by Arabs for centuries, at the precise moment when the Arab peoples were emerging from the crucible of Western colonialism and were rediscovering their national destinies,” resulting in a clash of nationalisms.5 These nationalist sentiments have become internalized as manifestations of in-group and out-group dynamics in which the Israeli and Palestinian sides are not only politically opposed to one another in a dispute for territory, but opposed to one another ideologically and psychologically as well. Their identities are tied to their political ambitions and the two are viewed in a zero-sum context of legitimacy as inhabitants of these Middle-Eastern lands.

The invasion of Israel on May 14, 1948

by Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon consequently marked the opening of organized violence in the dispute. The prolongation of this conflict and its often-violent nature is directly related to “the fact that all parties genuinely believe that they are victims of injustice, and that therefore ‘justice’ is on their side.”6 Israeli Jews view their sacred rite to the land as vital to their survival in the wake of the Holocaust and feel that this has only been exacerbated by the unjustly incurred wrath of regional Arab and Islamic forces. Palestinians likewise retain feelings of injustice from structural systems of oppression imposed on their communities by Israel, who in turn is exercising what it believes to be its self-interest. This self-interest is pursued in protecting and defending the Israeli people from terrorism and threats to its existence as

a safe home for the Jewish people.

The conflict has experienced a series of ups and downs in terms of severity, violence, and attempts at resolution.

Wars were fought between Arab neighbors over territory in 1967 and 1973 and significant military crises unfolded in 1956 with Egypt and 2006 with Lebanon, in addition to Palestinian intifadas, or uprisings, that lasted from 19871993 and 2000-2005. This list does not even include the extensive list of individual terrorist attacks, bombings, assassinations, shootings, rocket attacks, and outbreaks of mass violence in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Looking at these events in detail is not completely necessary for understanding the roots of the conflict, but briefly mentioning them in a general sense does add to conceptualizing just how deep and wide the conflict has become in the last 65 years.

There have been many notable attempts to resolve the conflict, but all such endeavors have been undertaken on a governmental level, thereby addressing the administrative and political aspects of the conflict without effectively dealing with recalcitrant attitudes among the general population. The United States has taken a politically elite position as a chief negotiating party between Israeli and Palestinian leaders and in so doing, has strongly advocated for a territorybased resolution. The success of these resolutions, however, have depended on certain sets of political conditions that opened a space for constructive negotiation, only to fail again when political conditions changed and social resistance to reconciliation crumbled the foundations of peace.

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29 After the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was perhaps one of the most willing Israeli leaders to sit down and attempt peace, was assassinated by a radical Israeli in 1995. Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization who participated in multiple rounds of negotiations in his career, died in 2004.

In their absences, “those in command of the Israelis and Palestinians have…filtered right and wrong through a lens of ideological and religious ‘correctness.’”7 In an even more contemporary context, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has shown some renewed willingness to negotiate, especially through increased efforts from Secretary of State John Kerry.

Continued settlement reconstruction in the West Bank, however, has thwarted progress. These settlements have become the most recent major obstacle to reconciliation as the growth of the Orthodox Jewish population and their increasing influence in the Knesset has led to deeper rifts as both Israeli and Palestinian groups dig their heels even deeper into territory they believe is rightfully their own.

Alternative Means to Peace Recent literature on conflict resolution has explored a number of different approaches that focus on the concept of conflict transformation. Through this process, individuals on the group level of the conflict are engaged to proliferate a mutual understanding and conceptualize the conflict as a mutual experience, narrowing the space for violence and antagonism and widening the space for reconciliation and peace. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall define reconciliation as “restoring broken relationships

and learning to live non-violently with radical differences” which is “the ultimate goal of conflict resolution.”8 They identify four areas in reconciliation: accepting the status quo (ending violence), correlating accounts (overcoming polarization), bridging opposites (managing contradiction), and reconstituting relations (celebrating difference).9 These four elements, in concert with one another, can lead to an overall transformation of a large-scale conflict through a number of practices including such things as war-crimes tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, and acknowledgement of past wrongs to cope with residual trauma. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, however, because either side is so entrenched in its territorial claims and fails to recognize the legitimacy of the other side, it seems that starting a reconciliation and conflict transformation process must start on the lowest, individual level.

Baron postulates, that “the key problem is achieving a sense of we-ness between conflicting entities at the intergroup level…grounded in mutual respect, if not acceptance of the others’ aspirations.”10 Formal institutions for reconciliation, then, will only fail if individuals in one group cannot recognize legitimacy in individuals of another group.

Ramsbotham et. al. further their discussion of reconciliation and conflict transformation by introducing the “contact hypothesis” in which greater contact between conflicting parties will broaden the space for resolution. Furthermore, they also discuss the possibility that it is a “redefinition of ‘self/other’ identity constructs” which will lead to a “sense of ‘we,’” like that discussed by Baron, that is the basic necessity for reconciliation and transformation.11 Social entrepreneur-

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30 ship plays a critical role in fostering these ideas. One example from the Israeli-Palestinian case includes a group of activists who started an IT school for Israelis and Palestinians. This largely successful project focused “on an area that crossed cultural lines and was a shared interest of both groups” in addition to providing the participants with a common goal to achieve. 12 There have also been definitive attempts to do so through music, which acts as a stabilizing and bonding agent for peace owing to its universality.

In an interview with Hazzan Jack Kessler, a musician who works with collaborating traditional Jewish and Arab music styles, he remarked that, in an IsraeliPalestinian context, “Music is a much deeper part of the emotional makeup of a population…it can express desires that cannot otherwise be expressed…it can function as a way of getting people to listen to each other.”13 It was a general acceptance of this overriding idea that led Daniel Barenboim, an Argentinianborn, Israeli conductor and pianist, and Edward Said, a Palestinian-born scholar and critical theorist, to collaborate and establish the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra in 1999.

Barenboim, in describing his vision for the project, explained that the orchestra “is, of course, unable to bring about peace. It can however, create the conditions for understanding without which it is impossible even to speak of peace…it may become possible at the very least to accept the legitimacy of the other’s point of view.”14 The structure of an orchestra, in which a large group of musicians must work together under the direction of the conductor to create consistent, moving sounds, can lend itself to facilitating this sense of cooperation through

necessitated communication. Orchestras do embody a sense of hierarchical structure that, as will be discussed later, can inhibit constructive communication between oppressed groups. In the case of this group, the hierarchy has been observed as “musical…not a social one” and that there is just as much collaboration between musicians as there is between Barenboim and musicians.15 The group started as a youth orchestra with the primary goal of fostering communication and understanding but has since grown to become an orchestra of professional caliber that has played worldwide from the West Bank to Lucerne to New York and beyond.16 The workshop is held at least once a year in different locations around the world and includes musicians from Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Spain who participate to rehearse and perform while also discussing Middle-Eastern issues.17 For many of the participants, it is the first time they have ever openly interacted with an Israeli or an Arab. It also gives them the opportunity to work with Daniel Barenboim who is perhaps better known for his previous position as music director of the Chicago Symphony and his current posting as music director of the La Scala Opera House in Milan.18 As a forum for reconciliation, the WestEastern Divan Orchestra has shown significant strides in facilitating this we-ness. In his book Parallels and Paradoxes, Barenboim describes an instance during one of the workshops when one of the Syrian participants shared a music stand with an Israeli cellist. The Syrian told Barenboim that he had never met an Israeli and that an Israeli “represents a negative example of what can happen to…the Arab world,” shared a music

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31 stand with an Israeli cellist. Barenboim observed, however, that:

They were trying to play the same note, to play with the same dynamic, with the same stroke of the bow, with the same sound, with the same expression. They were trying to do something together. It’s as simple as that.

They were trying to do something together, something about which they both cared, about which they were both passionate. Well, having achieved that one note, they already can’t look at each other the same way, because they have shared a common experience. And this is what was really, for me, the important thing about the encounter.19

Such interactions and openings for understanding are not uncommon occurrences in the orchestra. One Arab musician, Nassib al-Ahmadieh, describes how, for him, playing in the orchestra is like going through a transformation. He explains that “trying to understand Israeli suffering with the background I have, it’s like schizophrenia in your head…your inner feelings and your bad memories fight against your rational thoughts.”20 The addition of this new rationality is where the hopefulness for change within an organization such as the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra lies.

At the same time, however, he notes the sometimes-paradoxical experience of performing with the orchestra. The orchestra once performed in Ramallah, a war-torn and oft-disputed city in the West Bank. He remarked that, “going into a land that you think of as Palestine through an Israeli checkpoint to meet other Israelis to make music together

with them for the freedom of Palestine —it’s simply too much to take in all at once.”21 Nevertheless, it is clear that the orchestra provides a zone for reconciliation potential. The fact that such an organization exists in such a troubled region, and that people are openly willing to participate, is an important factor. Sharon Cohen, an Israeli musician who comes from a family with a military background, noted that she had not, before joining the orchestra, “thought of [Arabs] as human beings.”22 The opportunity to use music as a common shared experience serves to disestablish these feelings. Barenboim recognizes the strength it takes to step into a potentially frightening arena with people who are regarded as mutual enemies by saying that, “Every member… shows a remarkable amount of courage, understanding, and vision by taking part in the workshop. I would like to think of them as pioneers in a new way of thinking for the Middle East.”23 A New York Times review of a recent performance at Carnegie Hall summarizes the experience of playing in the orchestra in the form of a critique of musicality. The critic writes, “The concert offered the First, Eighth and Fifth Symphonies in performances that, despite shaky spots, were lithe, textured and natural.”24 The musicians are clearly communicating in a way that they hadn’t before.

Other much smaller groups and musicians have also made contributions to the reconciliation process through their work with musically oriented collaborative projects. The music of Yair Dalal and the Al-Ol ensemble provides one such example. A self-identified “Arab-Israeli Jew” and accomplished oud player and violinist, Dalal was born to Iraqi-Jewish parents in Israel.25 The uniqueness of Da-

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32 lal as a figure in this movement is that his specific identity embodies the idea that you can identify as an Arab, a Jew, and an Israeli, thereby eliminating the sharp divides that typify the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, his mastery of the oud, a traditional Middle-Eastern instrument, and the violin, a characteristic instrument in the musical traditions of Jews and many Jewish immigrants in Israel, also dissolves these divides. He also focuses his composition and arranging on using elemental musical foundations dating to 4000 years ago from the Babylonian era. To him, this is viewed as a period in which Jewish and Arab cultures were intertwined. The use of these common roots in his music serves to support his quest for coexistence.

Peres and Yasser Arafat, both present at the talk and not on speaking terms, purportedly “signed an agreement they hadn’t signed before” backstage after hearing the song.27 In a more contemporary context, Dalal continues to perform and spread a message of peace and coexistence through music and collaboration with Arab and Israeli musicians alike. Olivier Urbain, a scholar of music and conflict, writes, “Yair Dalal’s music allows us to build a better appreciation of the common roots of the peoples in the region, and it gives us hope that they might one day find a way to once again share their ancestral lands.”28 Dalal’s work shows promise for development of a new Israeli identity that can encompass both Arab and Jewish backgrounds.

His musicianship and persona as a performer take on activist dimensions including organizing a “Concert for Peace” with a Persian musician to benefit a conference on the pluralist future of Israel and Palestine and releasing a CD entitled Inshallah Shalom (Inshallah in Arabic means ‘God willing’ and Shalom means peace in Hebrew).26 The interaction with Dalal’s music is not as direct as in the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra but is still inherently interactive when taking into account audience participation through his use of performance and known reputation as a peace activist with a collaborative agenda. At a concert celebrating the one-year anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords, Dalal organized a performance of his song “Zaman el Salam,” or “Time for Peace, which is sung in Hebrew and Arabic. The show included a chorus of 50 Israeli children and 50 Palestinian children accompanied by the Norwegian Philharmonic Orchestra and Dalal on the oud and violin. Shimon

A newer development in the field of music and conflict transformation in Israel and Palestine, a graduate of Yale University founded the Jerusalem Youth Chorus in 2012. The group summarizes its mission as:

...an ensemble of high school students from East and West Jerusalem who are working towards attaining high levels of both collaborative musicianship and empathy for one another. Through music and dialogue, our Palestinian and Israeli students learn skills of communication and trust. These interactions will enable the singers to form friendships with—and an understanding of—those from the other side of their city, and will empower them—both individually and collectively—to become forces for peace within their communities.29

The emphasis on creation of empathy is a direct reference to a key concept in the

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33 usage of music as a tool of conflict transformation. It is believed that, “along with all its other functions and effects, [music] indeed offers a specific potential to enable, catalyze and strengthen empathic response, ability and relationship.”30 Empathy therefore lies at the heart of developing a sense of legitimacy for an out-group within an in-group.

The chorus is still very new and thus its efficacy in successfully establishing this communication and trust is still unclear. The work of an American social entrepreneur in coordinating a musical group under the banner of conflict transformation, however, is indeed a very interesting development. This is evidence that this approach to conflict resolution in the region is becoming internationalized and gaining legitimacy, aside from the international performances of the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra, Dalal, and others.

The group Atzilut is also part of this internationalized process. Headed by Hazzan (the term for a cantor in Jewish houses of worship) Jack Kessler of Philadelphia, the group consists of Jewish and MiddleEastern Arabic musicians and combines the styles. Kessler believes that “We … touch people’s hearts through our music. When hearts change, governments change. We don’t talk politics or make speeches, but because our realm is music, we work together to create peace.”31 In an interview via e-mail with the Hazzan, he responded to a question of how he had personally observed the power of music to gather people together and move them toward a mutual understanding. Kessler wrote that, at a performance at the UN, “the standing ‘o’ we got at the end included the Israeli and Arab diplomats” and that Israeli and Palestinian

student groups often coordinate bringing Atzilut to campus for performances “and in doing so had to communicate with each other where they hadn’t in the past.”32 Through these groups, it is clear that music has a place in the process of conflict transformation and resolution.

In the end, however, these organizations are a part of a larger picture that encompasses a vast system of many moving parts. Their overall effectiveness, then, is dependent on the ability for these efforts to translate into more sweeping structural changes in which both groups really do develop an understanding for one another that doesn’t manifest itself only during musical experiences.

A Critique of the West-Eastern Divan Approach While the musically themed attempts at conflict transformation described in the above section are indeed promising, they are not without fault. Barenboim and the late Said’s West-Eastern Divan Orchestra has been lauded as one glimmer of hope in moving forward in the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The project is indeed monumental in its scope and comprehensive approach but also embodies flaws that potentially threaten the longevity and breadth of a longerterm effect in the conflict transformation process. Firstly, the group’s focus on the classical western music tradition is somewhat discordant with regard to the diversity of the participants. In addition, orchestral hierarchy with an Israeli conductor at the helm, the unavoidable influence of political events and processes in an environment identified as apolitical can undermine the overarching goals of the workshop. A distinct “we-ness” is still developed within the group, however,

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34 with participants identifying strongly with the orchestra as a group classification unto itself, which could propagate into a larger societal context.

Though both sides perpetuate conflict in Israel and Palestine, the current situation overwhelmingly favors Israelis. Israel has invested incredible amounts of liquid and human capital into developing a strong and technologically advanced military while also gaining the favor of the United States, a world superpower, as its strongest support. In turn, the current policy in Israel towards Palestinians is highly restrictive of movement, citizenship rights, and overall social equality. Thus, attempts at conflict resolution should strive to address this inequality and include the oppressed group as a more fundamental aspect in organizational leadership when using bottom-up conflict transformation strategies. The West-Eastern Divan Orchestra was indeed founded by Barenboim, an Israeli, and Said, a Palestinian, but Said has since died and Barenboim, regardless of how open the orchestra is in terms of disestablishing hierarchy, is still the preeminent leader of the group. For players in an orchestra, “the conductor has enormous authority, for he absorbs and defines the musical work.”33 While Barenboim strives to keep the space open and successfully does so as we have seen, his position as an Israeli could be seen as an obstacle to Arab and Palestinian participants who view Israelis as oppressive.

Furthermore, the focus of repertoire on the western classical tradition can advance colonialist sentiment among Arab participants who have a much less Europeanized perspective of the world as compared to Israelis, a large percentage

of whom are descended from Europeans.

On one hand, the musical selections create a neutral space, as it must be accepted that orchestras are found the whole world over but generally adopt the western musical tradition as their foundation.

However, the use of western music and its highly aesthetic qualities have been criticized for “betray[ing] the existential struggle of those living in Palestine.”34 Hazzan Jack Kessler, in his interview, commented on the use of western classical music in the Barenboim project by stating that the orchestra “has something of a disadvantage as it uses western classical music, which is typically performed by ensembles the ethnicity of whose members is of no significance to the music. Also, this music appeals to only people who are aficionados of that genre.”35 In other words, the real mutual understanding coming from a musically inclined conflict transformation approach comes from the appreciation of a shared history in the cultural entity. While western classical music is neutral, it does not strike at the heart of the cultural disparities and intransigence indicative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over-emphasizing the universality of this genre of music can “obscure the very real power asymmetries that inscribe themselves onto musical encounters across differences.”36 The danger, then, is that the musicians will interact on stage and make music with one another, but will not fully gain an appreciation for a deeper, shared experience all can internalize to transcend conflict psychologies.

An inherent inability to separate the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra from the spoiling effect of everyday politics is also a danger to the transformative power of the group. As part of the West-

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35 Eastern Divan Orchestra experience, participants not only engage in music making but also in discussions of their experiences as individuals from a most troubled part of the world. Politicizing the environment, however, threatens to thwart the sense of we-ness the group can achieve. For example, during Israel’s war against Hezbollah (which translated into a larger conflict with Lebanon), the conflict was brought into a polarizing context and created a different environment compared to the usual aspects of the workshop that focus on constructive, open dialogues. In this case, Barenboim was compelled to make a statement and position the orchestra within an anti-war agenda.

Taking the stance exacerbated latent in-group and out-group feelings that undermined the work of the orchestra. Many of the musicians “welcomed the declaration, namely the Jordanians, the single Lebanese player, and the Palestinians from both Israel and the West Bank…but a small group of Jews from Israel was profoundly disturbed by a sentence in the text which gave more space to criticizing the activities of Israel.” 37 While the orchestra provides one forum for developing a collective sense of belonging to an ingroup that encompasses members of many other larger groups that are often in opposition to one another, this scenario inflamed the in-group versus out-group tensions. Druckman, in his work on group loyalty, identified the concept of the “scaling hypothesis” as a method by which “people rate the various groups” to which they belong “along a continuum from positive to negative” and found that people will most strongly identify with national

groups.38 Barenboim’s declaration brought nationalism into the orchestra as the group divided itself along Arab and Israeli lines instead of continuing to emphasize the music and work toward building a more permanent system of trust despite the outside spoiler of war. This stands in contrast to work like Yair Dalal and Atzilut, which continuously advocates for coexistence but does not take political positions.

Barenboim’s position, while in line with a strong understanding and conceptualization of the conflict, comes into conflict with the current political trajectory. By continuing to place himself in a political context, he brings the orchestra into conflict with current policy. During an acceptance speech for an honorary doctorate from the Weizmann Institute in Israel, Barenboim remarked that:

...it is rather a human conflict between two peoples who deeply believe that they have the right to the very same piece of land…there is no point in looking for a compromise but what we need is to develop the capacity to understand and accept the right of the other…it is questionable whether a two-state solution even remains a possibility.39

He thereby infuriated some members of the audience with his concluding assertion. The unfortunate truth is that most of the international community and those within Israel and Palestine do not agree. In order for the members of the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra to truly see one another through a human lens, they must be removed from the political context, which continues

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36 to divide Israelis and Palestinians to this very day.

Recommendations and Conclusion After evaluating the different musical approaches to transforming the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, there are ways to fuse parts of the different approaches to create a more wholesome organization to promote more effective transformation.

The West-Eastern Divan Orchestra’s best assets are that it is a large group with a strong international backing, solid organizational structure, and prominent leadership. The orchestra has the best chance of eliciting a norm cascade through its ability to touch many different people at once – musicians that pass through the workshops potentially will have their perspectives changed forever. At the same time, however, the inclusion of dialogues about life in the Middle East, which become inadvertently politically charged, undermines the permanence of mutual understanding. Life in the Middle East is, in a way, permanently tied to a political context. Participation in a musical group should be an escape from this unpleasant reality.

The inclusion of political discussions should be refined or eliminated from the program in order to focus all attention on making music. The goal is therefore solid and unified – to make music and successfully perform together. This establishes a team mentality that can avoid the slippery slope of in-group versus out-group enmity that still pervades the orchestra.

When external political strife seeks to divide the group, participants can focus on the musical element of their endeavor.

This is perhaps too idealistic, as one cannot just ignore the world around them

when political conditions worsen. When participants leave the workshop, however, they will be unable to avoid facing these realities. They will, instead, have the tools to understand both sides of the conflict after having had the chance to clearly communicate openly with members of other participants whose backgrounds may be entrenched on either side of the issue at hand. Adding a political element blurs the clarity needed for mutual understanding. The dialogues in Barenboim’s orchestra are certainly intended to be constructive but they have definite unintentional consequences.

Furthermore, the work of Yair Dalal shows that it is possible to fuse traditional, common musical elements to create pieces that can wholly demonstrate a possible harmony between Israelis and Palestinians. Using western music is in some way a natural choice because of the orchestral structure Barenboim and Said chose as a foundation for their project.

At the same time, however, the repertoire crowds out a critical point of cultural commonality that can be manipulated to further deepen the effects of conflict transformation in a musical setting.

While perhaps logistically not conducive for a major orchestra, music from Israeli and Arab traditions should be incorporated in the work of the West-Eastern Divan program. Music from this genre should have an equal, if not larger role in programming and workshops compared to western music. On one hand, focusing totally on western music can prepare participants for future careers in major orchestras, which will focus entirely on music from the western classical tradition. The main goal of the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra, however, must remain grounded in the concepts of conflict

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37 transformation and not career preparation. The experience, if kept in a conflict transformation context, will be far more valuable to participants in the long run.

Israelis should know about Arab music traditions and vice versa. This is the most thorough way to ensure that the values of participating in a large musical group, including communication and trust, will ingrain themselves in the musicians. Moreover, it will propagate a deeper cultural communication that is so vital for transforming recalcitrant group attitudes that are integral parts of intractable conflicts.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict encompasses an extremely wide spectrum of political and social dimensions. As such, it has become intractable as Israelis and Palestinians tenaciously hold their own claims as legitimate and supreme over those of the other group. The conflict has not responded to efforts through top-down conflict transformation but bottom-up conflict transformation has the potential to establish a cultural norm of coexistence. This can, in turn, transfer to greater cooperation on a bureaucratic and institutional level, which is required to undo the politically appropriated policies that continue to divide Israelis and Palestinians. Music is one way in which this can happen. While not on large enough of a scale to change all of the conflict dynamics, musical organizations that bridge gaps between Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs, can contribute to what needs to be a wider campaign of fostered intergroup communication.

With music, it may be possible to bring harmony to the Middle East in more ways than one.

References Stoessinger, “The Sixty Years’ War in the Holy Land: Israel and the Arabs.” 2010. p.273 2 Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2011. 14, 31–32.

3 Urbain, Music and Conflict Transformation, 2008. 14.

4 “West-Eastern Divan Orchestra.” 2013.

5 Stoessinger, “The Sixty Years’ War in the Holy Land: Israel and the Arabs,” 2010. 215.

6 Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2011. 12.

7 Baron, “Reconciliation, Trust, and Cooperation: Using Bottom-Up and Top-Down Strategies to Achieve Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 2008. 278.

8 Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2011. 246.

9 Ibid., 247.

10 Baron, “Reconciliation, Trust, and Cooperation: Using Bottom-Up and Top-Down Strategies to Achieve Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 2008. 281.

11 Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2011. 248.

12 Praszkier, Nowak, and Coleman, “Social Entrepreneurs and Constructive Change,” 2010. 346.

13 Correspondence with Hazzan Jack Kessler. Dec. 9, 2013 14 Barenboim, Music Quickens Time, 2008. 59–60.

15 Cheah, An Orchestra Beyond Borders, 2009. 67.

16 “West-Eastern Divan Orchestra.” 2013.

17 Cheah, An Orchestra Beyond Borders, 2009. 1.

18 Beckles Wilson, “The Parallax Worlds of the WestEastern Divan Orchestra,” 2009. 337.

19 Barenboim and Said, Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society, 2002. 10.

20 Cheah, An Orchestra Beyond Borders, 2009.111.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 76.

23 Barenboim, Music Quickens Time, 2008. 71.

24 Tommasini, “West-Eastern Divan Orchestra at Carnegie Hall.” 2013.

25 Urbain, Music and Conflict Transformation, 2008. 202.

26 Brinner, Playing Across a Divide: Israeli-Palestinian Musical Encounters, 2009. 151.

27 Al-Taee, “Voices of Peace and the Legacy of Reconciliation,” 2002. 53–54.

28 Urbain, Music and Conflict Transformation, 211.

29 “Jerusalem Youth Chorus.” 2012.

30 Urbain, Music and Conflict Transformation, 2008. 14.

31 Zuchowski, “Jewish-Arabic Band Atzilut Performs for Peace.” 2013.

32 Correspondence with Hazzan Jack Kessler. Dec. 9 2013.

33 Beckles Wilson, “The Parallax Worlds of the WestEastern Divan Orchestra,” 2009. 335.

34 Ibid., 320.

35 Correspondence with Hazzan Jack Kessler. Dec. 9 2013.

36 Urbain, Music and Conflict Transformation, 2008. 38.

37 Beckles Wilson, “The Parallax Worlds of the WestEastern Divan Orchestra,” 2009. 343.

38 Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty,” 1994. 58.

39 Levy, “The Maestro Who Should Be Our President Opinion.”

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The Maasai of Tanzania Molly Hickey | Pitzer â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;17

The Maasai people are an ethnic group who primarily reside in Kenya and Northern Tanzania. The Maasai are distinctive for their resolute preservation of their culture, way of life, and dress, even as many other ethnic groups in the region have slowly assimilated into contemporary society. Due to their reliance on grazing and farming, the Maasai people often find themselves in conflict with the Tanzanian government with regard to land use and property ownership. Today, the amount of land under Maasai control continues to decrease as national urbanization and the installment of government owned highways split their fields, threatening their rich culture and traditions.

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Russia and EU Foreign Policy: Comparative Case Study using Ukraine Raphael Alterman | Pitzer ‘15 Raphael is currently a junior at Pitzer College with a double major in Politics and Philosophy and a minor in History. He is most interested in U.S political philosophy.

Raphael is from New York City and eventually wants to work as a litigator for legal aid in Brooklyn.

Ukraine is the most important country that lies between the Core 6 EU member states and Russia. Ukraine also is enticing for its 50 Million consumers, vast energy resources and geopolitical security within the post-Soviet space.1 Ukraine’s attractiveness to both the EU and Russia has caused significant tension, gradually at first but drastically in the past months as the Western Ukrainians attempt to throw off the yoke of Russian influence.

This reality makes Ukraine a strong case study for examining Russian and EU foreign policy initiatives and to study how they have interacted. This paper asks the following question: Is Putin’s distinct form of smart power going to forestall the Europeanization of Ukraine?

And if so, what has motivated this shift in foreign influence?

This paper argues that the EU’s soft power initiative in Ukraine is undermined by Russian foreign policy, which has won Russia economic and political favor through smart power. To accurately assess the forces at work we will look at the two foreign policy initiatives, Russia’s and the EU’s, at three levels. This case study on the Ukraine will comparatively assess the influence at work on each level through a qualitative median. The paper will measure each level of foreign policy influence that both countries use through soft or hard power initiatives, a creation by Joseph Nye for effectively measuring global yielding power. In this manner, we will assess the strength of the EU and Russian influences in Ukraine.

The three levels of foreign political

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43 influence are at the cultural ‘commonality’ influence, economic influence, and the foreign and defense policy influence. The first sector, cultural commonality, acts as a measure of influence on the people’s moral values and cultural norms, using such indicators as media and religion.

The second sector examines the extent of economic influence by analyzing all pertinent economic measures such as: mutual trade agreements, economic integration initiatives and the investments of the EU and Russia tied into Ukraine like natural gas reserves and black sea access in Sevastopol. The third sector, looks at influence of foreign and defense policy, which is mostly a question of whether Ukraine will join the Russia’s Eurasian Union in 2015 or alter its democratic backsliding and receive membership into the EU as a strong image of democracy in the post soviet space.

The paper will have four parts. The first part discusses the nature of power in international relations. The second focuses on the EU’s influence on Ukraine at each of the three levels, the third shows Russia’s influence at each of the same three levels. The fourth part concludes that the Russian strategy—through to the west morally unsettling—is more effective due to a skillful combination of soft and hard power, a tactic that the EU is not able or willing to pursue due to a series of key structural limitations.

Part I: The Three Versions of Power Joseph Nye has separated our understanding of power into three categories: hard power, soft power and smart power.2 As Nye defines it, hard power is the utilization of sticks and

carrots in both economic power and military might forcing other states to follow your influence. The carrots represent inducements—the reduction of trade barriers, the offer of an alliance or promise of military protection.

Sticks are threats including the use of coercive democracy, threat of military intervention or economic sanction.3 Adversely, soft power is the investment of money and leadership attraction into the foreign space. This makes countries want to follow that specific political and economic structure which according to Nye comes from three main sources.4 The first is culture and the second is political rights, such as democracy and freedom of speech, and the third source is the legitimacy of foreign policy, whether you act favorably on the world stage.5 Smart power refers to the combination of hard power and soft power policies to underscore the necessity of military bullying while maintaining strong alliances, partnerships and expansion of influence through government legitimacy.6 Nye uses terrorism to discuss this use of power, arguing that combatting terrorism by simply utilizing soft power resources to change the hearts and minds of the Taliban government would be ineffective and requires a hard power component. In developing relationships with the mainstream Muslim world, however, soft power resources are necessary and the overuse of hard power would have damaging effects.7 We can put these measures of power to work in our EU-Russian battle of influence over the Ukraine. The EU cannot continually rely on its soft power initiatives in Ukraine, just as with the Taliban soft power will only provide so

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44 much influence. In the past, their soft power work has been backed militarily by the United States, however American military aid is unlikely in Russia. The US economy is sick from paying for two wars already this century. In addition, Ukraine’s proximity to Russia makes US military involvement unlikely due to the high risk of escalation. Russia, traditionally has been a strong hard power supporter, like in Georgia 2008, but in Ukraine, Putin has finessed his foreign policy initiative with smart power maneuvering adding soft power to the equation. Russia supports reaffirmation of sovereignties, Russian language, and Russian pop culture. Russia’s attempt at smart power seems to be causing a democratic backslide in Ukraine and deEuropeanization that had been forming since the past decade. Speaking with one united voice on matters Ukraine related, and conjuring up a formidable Hard Power policy that can match Russia’s will be crucial, if the EU wants a fighting chance with Ukraine.

Part II: The EU’s Three Sectors The first level, cultural commonality, is a measure of influence on the Ukrainians’ moral values and cultural norms, such as media and national sentiment and religion. The EU cannot impose soft power of this kind due to its formation around the death of traditional cultural connectivity. The EU will not identify with Ukraine over language and history but instead their political values, fair rule of law, free market trade are their cultural norms and values used in other foreign countries.

In general the EU is well known for its ability to entice and attract neighbors

through political magnetization, despite the EUs confused identity.8 Unfortunately, this pole of attraction is only strongest when there is a solidified course towards membership into the “great machine,” and this is not the situation for Ukraine due to the EU’s enlargement fatigue9.

Political instability, like Ukraine’s failure to implement political and economic reforms that were essential in the criteria for being granted membership both for the EU and NATO, have also played a major role in this. The Yanukovych presidency was a testament to this, and even though he has fled, there is still rampant corruption and personal contracts within the elite class in Ukraine preventing the furthered completion of EU/IMF styled political changes. It is true that on a certain extent, this outweighs the influence of foreign policy; Ukraine must decide internally that democracy over corruption is something that they want.

The EU still failed to articulate membership incentives. With membership out of the question, the EU needs a different tool under this cultural influence level to implement in Ukraine.

The problem with European culture, mass media and religion is that they are still separated nationally. Nation specific culture, media and foreign interests remain stronger than that of the EU in totality. This is due to the fundamentally economic nature of the EU’s origin.

Precisely the reason why the EU was created to transcend nationalism and forge civic identity across ethnic and religious lines and nationalist support, the commonality sector will come from Ukraine’s desire to politically and economically resemble and be a part of the strong social democracy in the EU,

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45 however in this particular situation the EU will have a much harder time of this.

The EU is in competition with Russia who can find commonality in language, culture, religion, geography, and history, which in this sector gives them a big advantage, especially with the increase of Putin’s soft power initiatives.

In conclusion, considering the objective of winning Ukrainians’ hearts and minds, helping to achieve good governance, and for all to be effective, Europe must solve its own deeply rooted problems of political balance and identity. In order to counter the Russian growing influence in the Ukraine, EU member states must develop new neighborhood policy instruments relevant and effective for the Ukraine specifically. In this sector of influence it may behoove the EU to combine sticks and carrots, including loans so Ukraine is not reliant on Russia, phasing out of visas for EU travel, developing common infrastructural projects, such as those related to energy efficiency and gas pipeline incentives. While monitoring their political reforms, positive economic reform will equate to more incentives providing reforms both structural positive, and uneasily manipulated back into the grips of corruption.

The EU’s influence in the second sector is also vast. The EU is the world’s largest economy. Most of EU’s soft power lies in the attractiveness of their political, and more enticing to Ukraine, their economic lifestyle. The size of its market and success of economic integration render the EU a magnet. It is by far Ukraine’s most important trade and investment partner. The incentive for further economic integration with Ukraine is the EU’s strongest bargaining tool to

push influence. The Ukraine discussed a deal in 2011 that would implement closer economic integration and comprehensive free trade agreements so long as Ukraine effectively implemented reforms aligning national legislature with EU policy and other like incentives. The talks have suspended this integration due to Ukraine’s inability to stabilize and grow its democratic politics. The regression of democratic progress also haltered the 2011 EU-Ukraine talks.

Nye reminds us that economics can be used as hard power through harsh sanctions or soft power, by wooing with wealth.10 While Europe is sitting back and waiting for their wooing of wealth to send Ukraine running, Russia is coming up on the rise, using some hard power economic sanctions to keep influence within post soviet space high which will be discussed in part III. The EU should be helping economically in ways that also don’t support the shaky young democratic government in Kiev. For example, the huge Ukrainian Agricultural sector could use the consumers in the European markets for greater economic success.11 The problem is the EU is very strict on economic openness and political integration being a dual process.12 The bottom line is that if Ukraine is truly willing to embrace a path of Europeanization and social democracy, the EU can help to achieve it while keeping Ukraine outside of membership. What will really counteract the Russian influence, however, is a united European Union with a single foreign policy initiative plan for Ukraine.13 Without a unified voice, Europe makes it easier for Russia to pressure Ukraine with its economic integration initiatives, which has the potential to lead the EU to lose all sway in the country.

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46 The foreign policy and defense policy domain is the final level of influence.

Ukraine is important to the EU as the last piece of the security puzzle buffering the core 6 from Russia’s newly forming CIS. This was the main interest the West had with Ukraine, and why NATO membership was ever an option, despite security relations that have dominated US-Ukrainian agenda even after the war in Georgia. The inability to lead in this sector has been a symptom of a divided EU and especially looking at Ukraine.

Until recently, only the US and Poland wanted Ukraine on a NATO membership fast-track program, while NATO members, Germany, Italy and France, were much more weary of confronting Moscow politically.14 At the foreign and defense policy level of influence, the EU is weak in comparison to the US’s feared military strength, but here US military strength cannot help the EU. Putin does not trust the US. Any US military in Ukraine will prompt Putin to fight harder to keep it under his sphere of influence.15 The problem with excluding the US is that the EU is not independent in using military force as a tool of foreign relations.

The EU is not a hard power, meaning that every EU foreign and security policy pointed at Ukraine was exclusively a soft power initiative. Partnerships and cooperation agreements may be enough for developing the cultural commonalities described at the first level and maybe even in parts of the economic level of influence, but not for others.

This level is about hard power, and the EU has tried to finesse soft power policy in this situation unsuccessfully. This is no match for Russia’s hard power in this category which boosted Russian confidence in Ukraine and attractiveness

as a strong role model. This is especially true in Ukraine where elites maintain visceral respect for “hard power” politics as it is what has provided them elite status in the first place. The EU can no longer afford its overly vague foreign policy initiatives towards Ukraine.

Part III: Russia and Ukraine The end of the Cold War resulted in heightened Western influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia, in the face of the US, lost power both globally and in its own region of influence. Since his election in 2000, Putin has revived Russian Foreign policy. Putin actively embraced the integration of post-Soviet spaces as a cornerstone of his foreign policy initiative. Putin strongly rejects the EU foreign policy initiative as a façade for real EU strategic interests in expanding its economic sphere into Eastern Europe. His distrust of the West is abundant but it showed him the importance of using soft power. Crucial to the height of Russian influence in the neighborhood is promoting its own cultural connectedness, proving Russian political culture and social identity more attractive than the EU’s. The propaganda that spread through Russian media outlets against Western political doctrine directly relates to this. Russia’s ability to use this successfully in Ukraine will be the ultimate test.

There are significant cultural connections between Russia and Ukraine. This will make soft power influence in this cultural connectivity sector favor the Russians.

Russian myth dictates that Ukraine is essential in the foundation of the Russian nation. Unlike the EU, who avoided nationalist approaches to this level of

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47 influence, Putin revels in it.16 There are four major components to promoting Russian cultural ties to influence political loyalty. The four categories are: Little Russian (Malorossia), Russian language and media connection, The Russian Orthodox Church, and the promotion of ‘sovereign democracy’.

Russian historians take great pains in noting the importance and inclusivity of Ukraine to Russia in their past. Nikolai Gogol and Vladimir Dahl both influential Ukrainian writers of past addressed their works to Malorossia or Little Russia and wrote in Russian and Ukrainian.17 Putin can also use national propaganda like this, to give legitimacy to the claims that EU attempts to separate Ukraine from Russia is a crime.18 Roy Medvedev reiterates in a paper submitted to Russia in Global affairs, “One cannot simply take a scalpel and cut off the territorial, economic, cultural, historical and religious life of Ukraine from the common economic cultural and information space that still exists and then attach it to the EU, the eastern part of which is still in formation, this kind of survey might end up in death due to loss of blood.”19 The Russian media and language also promote the nationalist soft power tactics Russia is using for influence at the first level. Russian language emerges from time to time in Ukrainian media headlines, usually a more common theme around Ukrainian election time to influence voters.20 Since 2012 there have been talks around making Russia the second official language of Ukraine, this would be huge for cultural influence and loyalty but the growing youth population speaks Ukrainian in the large majority which will make it increasingly more difficult.21

Still, Russia skillfully uses language to regain post soviet nostalgia by supporting the Russian language exports in Ukraine’s media, through movies, TV shows, entertainment, and more and more in the news. The Russian speaking Simpsons is played in Ukraine and very popular. 22There are Russian TV stations in Ukraine, there are Russian Literature professors at Ukrainian institutions.

Many Ukrainian journalists receive their information in Russian.23 There is no hint of any of this soft power initiative coming from the European Union. The Russian Orthodox Church also plays a role in the cultural connectedness soft power in Putin’s repertoire. In post-communist Russia, the political and the spiritual are reinforced in each other; so naturally, the church plays a big role in loyalty to Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church wields soft power in post-soviet space in two main ways: 1) they act as an private institution with authority in Russian society separate from government and 2) the institution is a wide network of hundreds of Russian Orthodox parishes around the world that serves as the main consolidation force for all generations and “waves” of the millions-strong global Russian diaspora.24 The last nationalist soft power tactic Russia is using for influence at the first level is a form of sovereign democracy to compete with the magnetic pull towards Europeanness due to its attractive political design. The Kremlin describes Russian Sovereignty as a coinage that conveys two messages: “first, that Russia’s regime is democratic and, second, that this claim must be accepted, period. Any attempt at verification will be regarded as unfriendly and as meddling in Russia’s domestic affairs.”25 This is crucial to Putin’s plans

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48 for a state-dominated authoritarian capitalist system based on Russian values.

Putin wants to make citizens proud to not listen to lectures by the “hypocritical west.”26 Human rights are the perfect example, Putin believes the current Constitution of Human Rights is a piece of western legislative propaganda that holds and strengthens a Western run global playing field. Recreating this ideology in the post-Soviet spaces will make the reaffirmation of Putin’s authoritative nature easier to rally behind. The hope for this influence in Ukraine’s appeal to tough authority will override the popular EU structure.

Russia has been developing alternative economic models to compete with the EU but the magnetic pull in Ukraine from EU economic soft power has been mostly unrivaled. Unfortunately even the EU’s soft power cannot hold against Moscow’s use of hard and soft power together at the economic level.27 Russia’s actions in Ukraine’s energy sector clearly show Russia’s use of hard power tactics. There is a clear interdependence between Ukraine and Russia. There is a copious amount of gas in Ukraine, but this gas is exported by the corrupt energy sector heads for profit, this requires Ukraine’s government to get its natural gas and oil elsewhere. They import 80% of their energy from Russia, ergo the dependence.28 Putin has used this economic power over Ukraine to acquire political favor in this vicious cycle. The Black Sea Fleet, that sits in Sevastopol, Crimea that aided in the recent Russian annexation of Crimea and now further into Eastern Ukraine, was formerly allowed to maintain headquarters in Crimea for the next 25 years, for a 30% price reduction on that years gas prices.29 At

the same time Putin is building a Nord Stream Pipeline that will effectively surpass Western Ukraine to provide the EU with the natural gas, which needed a favorable Crimea to successfully place the gas line in place—another hard power foreign policy incentive.30 Through a network of commercial and political relations with governments and companies, Russian behavior in the past decade has successfully enhanced their circle of influence around post-Soviet space, most directly in the Ukraine, overshadowing European economic soft power. All of this was to entice Ukraine into the Commonwealth of Independent States, which would significantly strengthen its power and size. The Western minded Kyiv have pleaded with Russia to renegotiate the contracts signed

by Tymoshenko in 2009, but Russia will only agree to this as a hard power initiative to gain more commercial or political sway in exchange.31 This could be anything from the combination of the company Naftohaz with Gazprom or allowing more Russian control on gas pipelines and reserves through Ukraine.32 There has been economic deflation in Ukraine since 2008. As a result, the EU has been less interested by their membership process, and EU countries remain divided, Putin is forcing his own influence, making integration into the CIS look appealing all at the same time within Ukraine. In the last few months Putin has annexed Crimea and forcefully taken back places in Ukraine where the people are overwhelmingly Russian. It is clear that Ukraine integration is of the utmost priority in the current CIS customs union, becoming the Eurasian Union in January 2015, which means this inte-

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49 gration has a time limit if Putin wants to present a strong united post-Soviet image, and Putin’s recent “hard power” actions represent this feeling of haste.33 The population is split between economic incentives with EU free trade markets and Russia’s Common Economic Space, but Russia is working as a top priority to make his economic space look more appealing to Ukraine.34 Another note that will economically draw favor to Russia over the EU is that Russia is purely interested in internal political and economic integration. Putin does not concern himself with internal political struggle, a hallmark of the messier EU’s economic and political system.35 The Ukrainian elites will see Russian integration as a better means of securing their personal wealth and power, particularly in light of the political unrest of the past months. The number of Russian loans to the Ukraine has increased as Russian banks expand their businesses and influence there. As of 2011 Russia already represented 11% of banking assets in Ukraine.36 In comparison European banks in Ukraine are vulnerable and have been faltering ever since the Eurozone crisis of 2008. At that time Ukraine was a low priority for those struggling institutions, and was not given the attention a fragile emerging democracy needs to thrive, particularly with a “negative” influence of such strength close by and ready to pounce. If the EU wants Ukraine, it is going to need to reassert itself with strong soft power economic initiatives and back them up by requiring Ukraine to make positive changes in governance and human rights. Now, especially, is the perfect time to act, with Western Ukraine anxious over Russia’s intentions after its use of military force in Crimea and its

overtures that Eastern Ukraine may be next. If ignored and undecided, Ukraine may find favor in the Customs Union and not with the EU and NATO. The Russian strategy in Ukraine is simple and to the point—it rebinds the frayed Soviet states back to a strong Russian epicenter through the CIS Customs Union and later, the Eurasian Union. This strategy has been successfully employed to regain eight members including Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and others of the like, but Putin has been vocal in stating how important Ukraine is to the success of the project as a whole.37 Russia has added economic coercion to military threats in order to get Ukraine on board as another hard power tool.38 The military power play is still in Putin’s foreign policy basket of tricks. Georgia, in August 2008, is a prime example of Russia’s willingness to exercise its military strength against former Soviet states. Putin’s success in Georgia and the West’s weak response gave him the confidence to invade and annex Crimea and threaten Eastern Ukraine. Putin can use the strong cultural identity shared in the CIS to recreate what has traditionally been Western depictions of security and human rights. In Ukraine, the Yanukovych-led government shared a political interest with Russia over the EU. This non-Western setting at the core of the CIS countries led others to adopt similar ideas. Ukrainian elites understand that business success in Russia is not controlled by free markets but driven by networking, which also draws them closer to integration with Russia rather than the EU.39 In recent years we have seen the hardening of Russian relations with Ukraine, as the latter’s integration

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50 into the EU progressed. For example, the special gas prices the Russians charge Ukraine is no longer so special, and the Russian favor of the Ukrainians comes at the expense of a membership agreement into a Eurasian union. Hardening relations with Ukraine is Putin’s hard power coercion into a membership agreement. It worked for Belarus, and now Putin has focused all of his attention on Ukraine. Nevertheless, his military actions in Crimea, a response to the ouster of his puppet Yanukovych, suggest that the economic incentives have not been enough to coerce Ukraine into membership. In conclusion, Russia has developed, in foreign policy and defense relations, a much smarter and more effective influence of power, and one that has the opportunity to wrest Ukraine away from the West and recess it back into Russian hegemony.

Part IV: Looking Forward Russia has developed an ambitious foreign policy agenda towards Ukraine, a strategy that combines coercion with compensation: smart power a la Putin.

While the US is the only true military power in the West that rivals Russian military hard power, it currently cannot afford to involve its strained military in another conflict abroad that isn’t directly in the national interest. At the same time, European soft economic power has diminished since the 2008 financial crisis, which weakened the EU’s economic incentives while Russia strengthened hers. Russia has done considerably well in applying soft power within the void left by the EU, making itself a crucial economic partner for countries like Ukraine, which were abandoned to some degree by the EU. With negative

economic growth, very little military research and development, and no real identity to provide the Eastern Bloc countries, Europe is a weak superpower at present—one that needs to lean on the US to be both the voice of the West on foreign policy and the prime military actor globally.

It is clear that if the EU wants to maintain a strong role in the Eastern Bloc, particularly in Ukraine, there will need to be a dramatic reversal of this trend. Speaking with one voice in foreign policy matters and adopting a real foreign policy that transcends talks about possible Ukrainian membership in the EU are both imperative in this initiative.

With Russia’s fervor to secure Ukraine’s membership in the Eurasian bloc, the EU should stop shaming the political backslide in Ukraine and provide more proactive tools for handling it. The EU should also ignore Ukraine’s threats to join CIS if the Ukraine does not receive military funding from the EU for its key gas pipelines and strategic positioning. It is a fact that Europeanization initiatives in Ukraine have not been in line with the State’s interest and changing these would go a long way in regenerating Europeanization and the development of a Western free market economy and social democracy in Ukraine. Maintaining relations with Ukraine is vital to maintaining hope for Europeanization in Ukraine. By promoting bottom-up democracy with a focus on educating the populous and further developing a civil society, the EU can gain some leverage and begin to diminish Russian influence. Hopefully this will inspire Ukraine to build an effective pro-Western democracy. Economically, the United States can play a significant role by

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51 providing alternative sources of oil and liquefied natural gas both to the EU and Ukraine, further diminishing Russian economic power in the region.

In contrast, the Russian foreign policy approach of combining hard and soft power in its backyard at a time when the European economic crisis and the United States’ distractions in the Middle East have left a power void there, has thus far yielded tangible results, particularly in Ukraine. Russian top-down cultural propaganda might have no appeal to Western nations, but in the post-Soviet space, it has worked well, providing a sense of national identity and belonging, as the EU never could, and simultaneously increasing Russian economic influence.

It is precisely because of their shared culture and history that Russia’s soft power initiatives have been able to strengthen its political ties to Ukraine.

This common identity and the potential for mutual economic prosperity—one that will be distinctly Russian—may ultimately prove compelling. All of these initiatives favor a Russian appeal in Ukraine and the formation of a Eurasian Union formation rather than further outstretching the EU into the Eastern and Central European countries under the ENP policy.

Endnotes Bogomolov & Lytvynenko Nye, Future of Power 3 Nye Future of Power 4 Nye, Presentation at Harvard on Power 5 Ferguson, Niall The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, pg 24 6 Nye, Get Smart 7 Nye, Get Smart 8 Bindi & Angelescu The Foreign Policy of the EU: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World Chapter 8 9 Bindi & Angelescu The Foreign Policy of the EU: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World Chapter 8 10 Nye, The Future of Power 11 Neighborhood Europeanization through ENP: The Case of Ukraine 12 Bindi & Angelescu The Foreign Policy of the EU: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World Chapter 8 13 Langbein & Wolczuck Convergence without membership? The impact of the European Unionin the neighborhood: Evidence from Ukraine 14 Averre Competeing Rationalities: Russia, The EU and the ‘Shared Neighborhood’ 15 Kagan, “Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order” 16 Kuzio, Taras, “Russias Growing Influence in Ukraine Economics and Energy.

17 Bogomolov & Lytvynenko pg 4 18 Bogomolov & Lytvynenko pg 5 19 Medvedev “A Splinted Ukraine”, Russia in Global Affairs 20 Bogomolov & Lytvynenko pg 11 21 Bogomolov & Lytvynenko pg 12 22 Bogomolov & Lytvynenko pg 08 23 http://www.russia-direct.org/content/russian-orthodoxchurch-icons-russias-soft-power 24 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/14/AR2006071401534.html 25 Popescu & Wilson Russian and European Neighborhood policies compared.

26 Chatham House Report ‘Soft Power’? The Means and Ends of Russian Soft Power. Pg 4 27 Chatham House Report ‘Soft Power’? The Means and Ends of Russian Soft Power. pg 5-6 28 http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo14441/fs2011-3052. pdf

29 Chatham House Report ‘Soft Power’? The Means and Ends of Russian Soft Power. pg 4-5 30 Pirani 2011 Moscow Kyiv Gas Tension Rise 31 Kuzio “Russias Growing Influence in Ukraine: Economics and Energy” 32 Euractiv, “Putin promotoes Eurasian Union at EU” June 2012 33 Pogrebinsky, “Russia-Ukraine: Putin Yanukovych meeting in Moscow” 34 Rukavishnikov, “Russia’s soft power in the Putin epoch 35 Aslund, “Ukraine Capitalism in One Family” 36 Bogomolov & Lytvynenko 37 Popescu & Wilson the limits of enlargment Lite: European and Russian neighborhood policies compared.

38 Pogrebinsky, “Russia-Ukraine: Putin Yanukovych meeting in Moscow” 1

2

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52 Additional References Aslund, Anders. “Ukraine: Capitalism in One Family” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, Ukraine at Crossroads’, Ottawa, March 7-8, 2012 Averre Derek (2009). Competing Rationalities: Russia, The EU and ‘Shared Neighborhood”, Europe-Asia Studies 61:10, 1689-1713 Bogomolov Alexander & Lytynenko Oleksandr. “A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine”, Russia and Eurasia Programme, January 2012, Chatham House Briefing Paper Chatham House Report. “Soft Power? The Means and Ends of Russian Influence”, March 2011 Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. New York: Penguin Books, 2004 Gawrich A. et al. (2010) “Neighborhood Europeanization through ENP: the case of Ukraine”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 48 (5): 1209-1235 Ganzle, Stefan (2009). EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Analysis, Europe-Asia Studies, 61:10, 1715-1734 Haukkala, Hiski (2008). The Russian Challenge to EU Normative Power: The Case of European Neighborhood Policy, The International Spector: Italian Journal of Affairs, 43:2, 35-47

Popescu Nicu & Wilson Andrew. “The Limits of Enlargement-LITE: European and Russian power in the troubled Neighborhood,” European Council on Foreign Relations Report, June 2009 Popescu Nicu & Wilson Andrew. “Russian and European neighborhood policies compared,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9:3, 317-331 Trenin, Dimitri. Presentation at Harvard University, “Post-Imperium A Eurasian Story,” October 5 2011.

Web Articles Euractiv. “Putin promotes Eurasian union at EU summit” June 05, 2012.

New Europe Online. “Ukraine could face sanctions over Tymoshenko”, May 13 2012.

Progrebinsky, Mikhail “Russia-Ukraine: Putin and Yanukovych meeting in Moscow,” Valdai Discussion Club. May 23 2012.

Economist. “Responding to Mr Putin.” The Economist.

The Economist Newspaper, 22 Mar. 2014. Web. 28 Mar. 2014.

Economist. “Limp Wrist Diplomacy?” The Economist.

The Economist Newspaper, 21 Mar. 2014. Web. 28 Mar. 2014.

Kagan, Robert. “Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.” New York, 2003.

Kuzio, Taras “Russia’s Growing Influence in Ukraine: Economics and Energy,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 83 May 2, 2012 Langbein Julia & Wolczuck Kataryna (2012): Convergence Without Membership? The impact of the European Union in the neighborhood: evidence from Ukraine, Journal of European Public Policy, 19:6 863 881 Medvedev, Roy. “A Splinted Ukraine”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 003 Vol. 5, 2007, pages: 194-213 Nye, Joseph Jr. “The Future of Power” 2011, Public Affairs, New York.

Nye, Joseph Jr. “Get Smart. Combining Hard Power with Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009 Nye, Joseph Jr., Presentation at Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, “The Future of Power,” February 15 2012.

Pirani, S. “Moscow-Kyiv gas contract tensions rise,” Gas Matters, September 2011.

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54

China’s Weaponization of Space Richard Mancuso | CMC ‘16 Richard Mancuso is a sophomore at Claremont McKenna College studying Philosophy and Economics.

In 2007, the international community was surprised to watch as a weather satellite orbiting Earth exploded into millions of pieces, spreading dangerous debris throughout space.1 China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon, or ASAT, in the form of a ground-based laser was to blame.2 Despite the risk posed to satellites deployed from around the world by the newly created debris, the intentions behind such a belligerent action seemed to promise an end result that could be even more destructive and unpredictable. In the words of senior Chinese military officer, Yao Yunzhu, “...Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime,” and “...a space superpower [is] not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one.”3

China’s rise as a powerful regional and global economic, political, and military power is imminent.4 Its rise is explained by the realist notion that states in an anarchic system vie for power in a zero-sum game. In the words of Mearsheimer, “...The mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize [sic] its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.”5 But along with such expansion comes the desire to enter new arenas from which China can more effectively project power in the balance of power with the United States.

One arena is space, which is already militarized,6 but is quickly moving

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55 towards being weaponized7 by a number of countries; most notably, the United States and China.8 Not only do China’s military forces already rely heavily on space assets, but the anti-satellite test described above indicates further prospects for developing a wide range of weapons capabilities, both space and ground-based, with the purpose of mitigating enemy military capabilities by targeting the space assets of other countries. For instance, “...It now seems clear that China’s intended approach is to continue to develop ground-based kinetic kill vehicles...as well as lasers and a variety of jammers and other electromagnetic spectrum disruption hardware.”9 These actions and stated intentions, coming from the world’s most populated country and second largest economy, are perceived as aggressive by the United States as well as the international community.10 Although countless scholars have prescribed international responses, many have failed to provide a comprehensive explanation for why China is engaging in such actions and if/when they will utilize such technology. A number of motivations could be to blame, but most likely, is China’s desire for regional hegemony. This paper will delve deeper into the domestic causes of China’s drive for hegemony through space, present a series of potential triggers for conflict involving space weapons, and provide an explanation for why the realm of space provides a unique and attractive opportunity for China to achieve its end goal.

Realism in the Context of China’s Rise in Space The realist paradigm assumes that

states, the actors in an anarchic international system, are vying for power in a zero-sum game.11 Furthermore, classical realists maintain that interest lies in power and that states are self-interested rational actors, which means that all states have a static set of interests and priorities.12 Neorealists, also known as structural realists, believe that actors in the international arena compete for power in a self-help system. They do not believe, however, that domestic considerations play into the outcome of international politics whatsoever. They argue that states are unitary rational actors, or “black boxes,” so their view is largely limited in this sense since they maintain that all actors will behave nearly identically. Neoclassical realists provide a more practical model since they permit the inclusion of domestic-level variables into the calculation of how states will act.

The arguments presented in this paper will assume a neoclassical realist paradigm as it takes into account elements such as nationalism, differences in ideology, regional variation in interests, and domestic economics.

Specifically, China’s rise to its current status can be explained in the context of neoclassical realism. Driven by rapid economic growth, China is increasingly projecting more power over its region but, “States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: to prevent other geographical areas from being dominated by other great powers.”13 Thus, China will attempt to dominate the Asian sphere and drive out the United States, whom they currently believe has a great deal of influence in the region due to strong political, economic, and military relationships and presences.14 Mearsheimer argues

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56 such a drive will eventually conflict with goals of the United States and result in war.15 Charles Glaser argues that other sources of tension such as that between Taiwan and China could have adverse implications for the United States due to its close relationship with Taiwan, citing that such a war would have the potential for nuclear escalation.16 Some argue that China’s rise is misunderstood by realists and is, in fact, peaceful. A scholar from Nanjing University in China maintains that, “China is nurtured by a long tradition of Confucianism, which sees human relations as essentially interconnected and advocates harmony in such relations.”17 Their analysis does not take into account, however, that China’s internal structure is not conducive to such a rise. As Barry Buzan and Michael Cox state, “China cannot make the claim that its internal structure necessarily supports peaceful rise, yet [it] has made its rhetorical commitment to peaceful rise quite explicit. That combination puts a premium on whether or not China will be able to persuade others that its peaceful rise is something other than a temporary manoeuvre [sic] in a longer game of the art of war.”18 This points to a discrepancy between stated intentions and actions, a theme that will arise again later in this paper.

Dr. Ruan Zongze, Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies, sums up the characteristics of China’s rise nicely; “From a Chinese perspective, 2013 appears to bear similarities to 1913...

One century ago marked ‘the rise of the West, and the fall of the East...’ Today, the opposite is happening, with money, power and influence flowing away from

America and the West and into Asia.”19 This trend demonstrates a redistribution of power from the United States toward China as two of the world’s superpowers become increasingly dependent upon one another, particularly in the realm of economics. China’s military budget is now nearly $200 billion, and includes funding for a new aircraft carrier, new warships, and new fighter jets.20 Such a rapid increase in military expenditures, no doubt, indicates China’s intentions to balance against the most powerful and advanced military in the world—that of the United States.

China’s Search for Regional Hegemony “China’s ultimate goal appears to be to asset its regional supremacy and achieve co-equal (if not dominant) status as a global power.”21 Although the broader projection of power by means of enhanced military capability is China’s eventual goal with the weaponization of space, there are a number of domestic level considerations that provide insight as to why China is now pursuing such capabilities that it did not prior to the onset of the twenty-first century.

Domestic Considerations 1) Economic Growth: It is no secret that China’s economy is one of the fastest growing in the world. A number of economists, in fact, maintain that China may overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy in a matter of just a few years.22 Along with such rapid growth comes great technological advancement as well as an increase in the monetary resources available to the Chinese government

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57 and military. According to a report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, “China’s rising economy has...enabled it to boost its military capabilities, raising the prospects that China could use that power to project its interests globally, which could bring it into conflict with the United States and its allies.”23 China’s military and telecommunications capabilities have come to rely on valuable space assets that it believes must be protected.24 These space assets are, in many cases, a lynchpin for the economy of an advanced nation, since telecommunications, GPS, and military communications and operations rely heavily upon them. The increase in its monetary supply means that the Chinese military has even more resources available to develop new technology such as ground and space-based ASATs. Although not a direct or sole cause of aggression in space, a very strong and still growing economy serves as a solid prerequisite for such actions; it is necessary but not a sufficient cause in and of itself.

2) Nationalism: China has a history of fanning nationalist sentiment amongst its people.25 Given recent events and engagements in which China has been involved, such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island disputes, such sentiment has been on the rise. Online trends corroborate this trend, as more pro-nationalist discussion is occurring in the context of China.26 People in China are enraged about dispute over a territory they believe is rightly theirs and are becoming angry with anyone who believes or defends those who believe otherwise.27 In another instance, the Southern Week-

end, a Chinese publication that is known to censor its publications, was the subject of a recent protest advocating the elimination of censorship. But counterprotest in response to those protesting the Southern Weekend for engaging in censorship, demonstrated the intense amount of traditional nationalism that still exists in China. During both the protests of the Southern Weekend and the anti-Japanese protests last year, conservative Chinese individuals hoisted flags of Mao Zedong, a beacon of tradition and conservatism for nationalists in China.28 The rising sense of nationalism that has resulted from events unrelated to, but exacerbated by, the United States sets the stage for an attempt by China to assert itself as the hegemon of the Asian region.

Further, the fanning of nationalism in China is often used to distract citizens from important issues concerning social, economic, and political unrest.

Scholars in the post-Cold War Era coined such theories about the idea that nationalism held the potential to increase the likelihood of conflict, notably by, “...the use of nationalism to divert attention from the state’s inability to meet societal demands for security, economic development, and effective political institutions.”29 The incident explained above involving the Southern Weekend is an example of how counter protestors associated with the Chinese Communist Party used nationalist images and messages to quash ideas about free speech and the elimination of censorship. In response to the protests, the Chinese Communist Party forced another news provider, The News, to publish an editorial attacking the actions of the protestors and editorial staff at the

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58 Southern Weekend.30 Such an increasing dependence on nationalism as a source of domestic political and social stability in China has ultimately had an adverse impact on relations with countries in Asia as well as developed nations around the world, including the United States.

As one scholar stated:

...within two years China had managed to sour relations with virtually every Asian country and every advanced industrial nation. The source of all this strident Chinese diplomacy is..its..new diplomacy [which] reflects the regime’s spiraling domestic confidence and its increasing dependence on nationalism for domestic stability.31

3) Ideology: Another aspect of Chinese political culture that is related to the fanning of nationalism is China’s distinct ideology. Unlike western states, China continues to embrace a set of political values that is vastly different. The resulting society is one that, although has moved toward economic liberalization, is still subject to authoritarian rule, a lack of basic civil rights, and outright governmental control of the economy and nearly all aspects of society. Such societal characteristics are vastly different from those values held by the United States and the European Countries with which it is closely aligned. These differences result in an inherent tension between the societies of China and the United States.

These tensions between China and the U.S. have been exacerbated when blunders occur, such as the accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the collision of a

U.S. surveillance plane with a Chinese fighter jet in 2001. In both instances, China seized the opportunity to make a point; nationalists bombarded White House email accounts and hackers took down the website for the U.S. embassy in Beijing.32 China views an ideological component as part of its rise. It believes that the future of its security relies heavily upon the enforcement of its ideology in the region which it wishes to maintain control.33 A strong nationalist sentiment, as described above, proves that the people of China are behind its ideology and recent involvement of the United States in the Asian region with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the deployment of aircraft carriers for the purpose of offshore balancing, has made the tension between Western ideology and its own even more apparent to China.

Triggers The “Domestic Considerations” explained above have set the stage for a rising China that is strong—militarily, economically, and politically. The existence of space weapons in China’s arsenal as proven by their ASAT test in 2007, and their willingness and intention to further develop them for offensive use explicitly against the United States as mentioned in PLA White Paper documents, sets the stage for conflict. A trigger, however, is necessary to reassure China that going up against the strongest military in the world is worthwhile and that a favorable outcome for them is achievable. Space weapons would provide China with the opportunity to level the playing field and provide such reassurance.

Further, the current political climate in the Asian region tilts in China’s favor as there

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59 are a number of disputes which could potentially escalate providing China with an excuse to assert itself as a regional hegemon. Currently, the three most prominent regional interests for China concern Taiwan Reunification, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Disputes, and the elimination of perceived containment policies set in place by the United States. Any single scenario or a combination of these interests could provide China with the necessary cover to justify the future use of space weapons to reassert itself as the regional hegemon.

1) Taiwan Reunification: Since mainland China lost control of Taiwan to the Kuomintang in 1952, a state of tension between the two nations has existed; China wishes to reunify with Taiwan.34 During the Reagan administration, the United States supplied Taiwan with F-5 fighter jets, and more recently, has entertained the possibility of supplying Taiwan with a fleet of upgraded F-16 fighter jets.35 China has threatened an unfavorable response if the United States agrees to such a deal because they believe the United States is providing Taiwan with the necessary means to challenge China militarily:36

Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China’s conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States’ ability to intervene.37

Although angered in the past over Tai-

wan’s unwillingness to reunify, China has yet to take action in the Taiwan Strait, primarily because a strong military presence of the United States in the region indicates that the United States is not willing to be manipulated by China and that it would likely intervene were there to be an outbreak of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.38 With the advent of space weapons, however, calculations on China’s part could change. Once China perceives that it has the capability to temporarily disable or weaken United States space-based assets, China gains the ability to delay U.S. intervention in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.39 The United States has expressed concern about such a scenario. The Pentagon stated:

China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active Chinese ASAT capability... [and that, in the event of a conflict between China and the U.S. regarding Taiwan,] the PLA would attempt to weaken U.S. or other third party’s resolve by demonstrating the capabilty to hold at risk—or actually striking—high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or negate an adversary’s superiorities. Chinese journals provide some evidence of the PLA’s intent to use asymmetrical means to complicate U.S. aircraft carrier battle group operations in support of Taiwan.40

In the event that China decides it would like to be proactive about reunifying with Taiwan, the deployment of space weapons to counter the United States seems to be the most feasible way, on China’s part, to accomplish such a task. Ultimately, a

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60 challenge of such caliber would assert China as the dominant military power in the world until the United States took countermeasures to harden space assets.

Some argue, however that (1) a recent betterment of ties between Taiwan and China through instances of trade have made it no longer in either country’s best interest to go to war with one another for the purposes of reunification.

Further, (2) the lack of commitment from the United States to Taiwan as demonstrated by their failure to agree to the F-16 deal mentioned above and their statement that in the instance of a war between Taiwan and China they would not commit to either side, could be used to argue that China no longer fears U.S. involvement in such a conflict. In response to (1), “The PRC has made clear that it intends cross-Strait economic and cultural ties to promote progress toward eventual unification.”41 Such a statement suggests that the reason China is appeased in the status quo is because it believes there may be a chance a reunification through an increase in cultural and economic ties.

Meanwhile, sentiment in support of independence remains strong in Taiwan and, “the PRC is developing military capabilities to give it the ability to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms.”42 The potential for conflict, particularly in the event that the costs associated with it are reduced through the utilization of space-based weapons technology, therefore, is not precluded by argument (1).

The arguments made above are also applicable as a response to (2) in that China may still be biding its time until it can become sure that cultural and economic integration will not be successful as a means of reunification.

Examining yet another facet of the Taiwan Reunification scenario, even if one supports the argument that current ties and interdependence between Taiwan and China mean that war is no longer likely, it is important to remember that, for China, the issue of reunification is one directly related to the maintenance of integrity and a nationalist identity.

“Besides economic performance the Chinese Communists have little else to bolster their mandate for power than nationalism and the maintenance of national stability and integrity. So from the perspective of state-society relations, the Chinese Communist Party must demonstrate effectiveness and resolve on the Taiwan issue.”43 This means that there may still remain a likely possibility that China acts contrary to its self interest in the instance of interdependence in order to preserve a more grandiose self interest—national stability and integrity in China’s own mind.

2) Containment by the United States: China perceives current U.S. military policies in the region as containment.

The United States’ provision of arms to Taiwan, as explained above, is seen as a form of threatening U.S. presence in the region.44 Similarly, the United States maintains strong military alliances with both South Korea and Japan and has military bases with military personnel numbers of 37,354 and 87,182, respectively.45 Dr. Ruan Zongze, Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies, stated that Japan was responsible for increasing tensions in the East China Sea and that, “‘America’s pivot [toward Asia] is sending the wrong message’ to its allies, encouraging them to ‘become more bellicose and provocative.’ ‘If Japan’s aggression is

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61 unchecked, he warned, Japan could be a threat to territory all around the region.’”46 Such statements from scholars within China demonstrate China’s propensity to believe that the United States and its allies are responsible for its woes in the Asian region. The countries to whom the United States lends support create a problem for China, now more than ever, because China is currently engaged in a dispute with Japan over territorial rights to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Along with the stationing of forward deployed troops at United States bases located in South Korea and Japan, the United States also has a nuclear aircraft carrier stationed near China in Japan.47 The resulting massive projection of power in what China believes is its sphere of influence by a Western force and the world’s hegemon, creates a security dilemma. The United States substantiates its arguments for the position of troops and carriers with the claim that it must protect its own interests in the region; meanwhile, China sees that same actions as encroaching on its own interests in the region. Although the United States has maintained a substantial military posture in the region since the conclusion of World War II, it is China’s recent rise combined with the development space weapons that may cause them to take action against what they believe are unfavorable policies of containment instituted by the United States. Again, the deployment of space weapons by China could provide them with the ability to drain the capabilities of U.S. forces and assets stationed in the region.

3) Senkaku/Diaoyu Disputes: The final, and perhaps most probable, potential trigger for China’s utilization of currently

possessed space weapons capabilities are the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island disputes.

As tensions increase, the potential for conflict between China and Japan over territorial claims becomes a real possibility. “Rhetoric from military figures has become particularly splenetic. One Chinese general declared last week that the Chinese military could win a war over the Diaoyu islands in half an hour. Col. Liu Mingfu of China urged Australia to distance itself from the US and Japan, saying ‘America is the global tiger and Japan is Asia’s wolf, and both are now madly biting China.’”48 Regardless of whether or not China followed through immediately on any threat implied by this statement, it still demonstrates that tensions continue to escalate and that U.S. involvement remains a key component for China when considering the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute. There is one sticking point, however, between the possibility of a conflict between solely China and Japan; that is, “the terms of the U.S.-Japanese alliance commit the Americans to come to Japan’s defense if anyone attacks the Senkakus—a message reinforced by a U.S. delegation that traveled to both Tokyo and Beijing a few months ago.”49 The terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance is, thus, one of the primary reasons why conflict has not arisen; China understands that what could have been a small, contained conflict would likely result in an all out war with the involvement of the United States. Similar to the scenario described above with Taiwan, China could utilize space weapons the level the playing field and reduce the likelihood of involvement by the United States by neutralizing its military communications, missile, or GPS capabilities using jamming or laser technology prior to conducting any military operation.

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62 Why Space?

The next logical question that follows is: if China were to decide to go to war over any of the triggers described above, why would they utilize space weapons or why is the weaponization of space necessary to do so? The answer to this question is two-fold: (1) there is currently no solidified space hegemon in the sense that no country has weaponized space and gained the ability to deny other countries the same goal, and (2) space weaponization is a more efficient and attainable means to achieve any end goal that involves the United States militarily.

1) No Current Hegemon: Space provides a unique opportunity for any other military power, or potential challenger to U.S. hegemony on the ground via traditional military force. Although the United States currently has the most assets in space and the control that comes with it, its assets are vulnerable and un-hardened.50 This leaves a soft point of attack open on satellites that are responsible for nearly all of the United States’ military capabilities. Given that, “No state relies on space power and space support more than the U.S.,” space would provide China with the ability to incapacitate the United States military either for a period of time or permanently.51 The Chinese military would then have a period of time with which it could use to get ahead until the United States implements alternative means of directing and coordinating military operations. Even if such a window of opportunity is small, the perception by the international community that China had the military ability and technological prowess to temporarily hinder United States military capabilities via attacks on space

assets would likely result in a massive blow to the United States’ credibility as the hegemon or as an influencer in the Asian region. Furthermore, absent the engagement in a specific military operation, China could deploy space weapons or even parasitic satellites to gain unparalleled superiority in space.

The resulting “Space Hegemony” would make it easier to move toward becoming the global hegemon, because “The side that prevails will have a clear path to domination of the international system.”52 2) Efficient & Attainable: Second, space weapons technology offers a more efficient and attainable means of challenging the strongest military in the world. The advancement of technology around the world and in China, including that necessary for satellites and other space technology, means that complicated tasks and communications can occur almost instantly from anywhere in the world.53 With the advent of space weapons, the battlefield can be forever changed as, “Space forces likewise should have the capacity to deny ground, sea, and air base anti-space activities from space.”54 In the case of China, it would have the ability to deploy a space-based weapon to neutralize United States’ military space assets, at a fraction of the cost of traditional warfare both monetarily and in terms of casualties.55 The Feasibility and Timeframe of Such Scenarios It is important to recognize that any of the aforementioned scenarios are dependent on China’s ability to possess an anti-satellite weapon that is able to

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63 target military communications and GPS satellites either currently or in the near future. Although whether or not China currently possesses such capabilities is questionable, the intent still remains. “...

China successfully engaged one of its own derelict satellites in space. This was an extraordinarily provocative action.

Moreover, its use of an MRBM (which the PRC produces in mass) to propel the kill vehicle indicates a potential ASAT weapons capability sufficient to target the entire U.S. low earth orbit inventory.”56 But the majority of the U.S. Military’s communications satellites are in geosynchronous orbit, which is much higher. However, China is known to have been working towards the successful development of ASAT capabilities that would be able to target satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Various new agencies and scholars agree that such technology is not far off.57 But regardless of the current capabilities possessed

by China, their drive to produce space weapons with such capabilities sends a signal that is perceived by the international community, “The ASAT test brought to public attention the fact that China could execute capabilities that undermine or complicate U.S. access to space in the event of a conflict.”58

particular vulnerability to attacks.”59 The United States has not hardened any of its space assets as it, “...simply has no defense against such a capability.”60 Given such a glaring hole in the security of United States’ satellites, China is presented with the perfect opportunity to achieve it’s end goal of asserting itself as the regional hegemon of Asia by posing a credible threat to, in the least, the perception of the United States as a strong military power. However, such an outcome is only possible provided China can complete the development of its ASATs that target satellites in geosynchronous orbit. But ultimately, given the historical military and technology prowess of the United States as the world’s dominant superpower, such a window of opportunity remains small, because the United States will likely respond soon and implement both defensive and offensive measures to protect its satellites.

Another common issue raised by individuals who hear of the potential for China to target U.S. space capabilities is: “Does the United States not have defensive measures to ensure the safety of its military satellites?” Though there may be some redundancy of satellites as a form of a backup in the instance of failure, “The reliance of the United States on space assets for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communication; navigation; and positioning creates a Claremont Journal of International Relations | Spring 2014

64 Endnotes Shirley Kan, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Tes,” CRS Report for Congress, 23 April 2007, p. 1, fas.org/sgp/crs/ row/RS22652.pdf.

2 Vago Muradian, “China Tried to Blind U.S. Sats with Laser,” Defense News, 25 September 2006.

3 Edith M. Lederer, “China’s WEF Envoy Sees Space Weaponizing,” The Associated Press, 26 January 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/26/AR2007012600725_pf.html.

4 John Mearsheimer, “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All,” The Australian, 18 November 2005, mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/P0014.pdf.

5 Mearsheimer, p. 1.

6 Space militarization: “Space has been militarized since the earliest communication satellites were launched.

Today, militaries all over the world rely on satellites for command and control, communication, monitoring, early warning, and navigation with the Global Positioning System. Therefore, ‘peaceful uses’ of outer space include military uses, even those which are not at all peaceful—such as using satellites to direct bombing raids or to orchestrate a ‘prompt global strike’ capability, which is ‘the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.’” -- (“Outer Space: Militarization, weaponization, and the prevention of an arms race,” Reaching Critical Will, http://www. reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/criticalissues/5448-outer-space.)

7 Space weaponization has a number of different definitions. Here are two: “A device based on any physical principle, specially designed or modified, to injure or to kill a person, irreparably damage or destroy an object, or render any place unusable.” -- Philip Baines, Canadian Diplomat - (Michael Krepon, “What is a Space Weapon?” Arms Control Work, 18 March 2010, http:// krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2665/what-is-aspace-weapon.) AND “Destructive systems that operate in outer space after having been launched directly from Earth or parked in orbit.” -- Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information - (Michael Krepon, “What is a Space Weapon?” Arms Control Work, 18 March 2010, http:// krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2665/what-is-aspace-weapon.)

8 Marcia S. Smith, “China’s Space Program: An Overview,” CRS Report for Congress, 21 October 2003, pp. 5-6, defense.gov/pub/20030730chinaex.pdf.

9 Amy Chang, “Indigenous Weapons Development in China’s Military Modernization,” U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, p. 17, 5 April 2012.

10 Baohui Zhang, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.China Military Space Relationship: The Prospect for Arms Control,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, March/April 2011, p. 311.

11 Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, New York, Alfred A. Knop, 1948), p. 4.

12 Morgenthau, 4.

13 Mearsheimer, 3.

14 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, Sep/Oct 2012, pp.48-58.

1

Mearsheimer, 3.

Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2, March/April 2011, pp. 8091, web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/ Glaser.pdf.

17 China’s Peaceful Rise: A Cultural Alternative. Wang Shouren, Zhao Wenshu 18 Barry Buzan and Michael Cox, “China and the US: Comparable Cases of ‘Peaceful Rise’?” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 27 February 2013, .

19 Benjamin Carlson, “China’s insider: ‘China’s rise is not America’s demise’,” Global Post, 25 January 2013, http:// www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/ china/130124/china-japan-tensions-Senkaku-Islandsconflict-zone-ruan-zongze 20 Carlson.

21 Dolman, 11.

22 Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, 4 March 2013, p.1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf.

23 Morrison, 39.

24 William C. Martel and Toshi Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 21-22.

25 Professor Minxin Pei’s lecture on China’s Rise.

26 Benjamin Carlson, “China’s insider: ‘China’s rise is not America’s demise’,” Global Post, 25 January 2013, http:// www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/ china/130124/china-japan-tensions-Senkaku-Islandsconflict-zone-ruan-zongze.)

27 Zhongqi Pan, “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 1 March 2007, pp. 71-92.

28 Helen Gao, “Land of Many Nationalisms,” Dissent, Vol. 60, No. 2, Spring 2013, p. 30, 35.

29 Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter 1998-1999, pp. 114-146, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/2539340.

30 Helen Gao, “A Press Renaissance? The Legacy of China’s ‘Southern Weekend,’” The Atlantic, 11 January 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2013/01/a-press-renaissance-the-legacy-of-chinas-southern-weekend/267081/.

31 Robert S. Ross, “Chinese Nationalism and Its Discontents,” Maritime Security Asia, 26 October 2011, http:// maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/maritime-security-asia/ chinese-nationalism-and-its-discontents/.

32 Jayshree Bajoria, “Nationalism in China: Anti-West Sentiment,” Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April 2008, http://www.cfr.org/china/nationalism-china/p16079#p3.

33 Professor Minxin Pei’s lecture on China’s Rise.

34 “On the CCP’s White Paper “The Taiwan Issue and China’s Reunification”—There Only Is an Issue of China, Not an Issue of Taiwan,” Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 35, No. 4, July-August 2002, pp. 74-75.

35 J.R., “Arms sales to Taiwan: Fighter-fleet response,” The Economist, 1 May 2012, http://www.economist.com/ blogs/banyan/2012/05/arms-sales-taiwan.

36 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should 15

16

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65 the United States Abandon Taiwan?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4, Fall 2011, p. 26.

37 Glaser, 6.

38 Tucker and Glaser, 33.

39 Jeffrey Lewis, “What if Space Were Weaponized,” Center for Defense Information,” July 2004.

40 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” 28 July 2003, p. 46, http://www. defense.gov/pubs/2003chinaex.pdf.

41 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military And Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012,” 2012, http:// www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.

42 “Annual Report to Congress: Military And Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012,” p. 16.

43 Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001, pp. 5-40, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ christensenvol25no4.pdf.

44 J.R., “Arms sales to Taiwan: Fighter-fleet response.”

45 Office of the Deputy under Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline,” http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/ BSR2012Baseline.pdf.

46 Carlson.

47 “USS George Washington (CVN 73),” United States Navy, http://www.navy.mil/local/cvn73/.

48 Carlson.

49 Christian Caryl, “Handle with Care,” Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/21/handle_with_care_abe_japan?page=0,1.

50 Joan Johnson-Freese, Michael Sommer, and Veronika Vis-Sommer, “The Chinese in space: The third man in the fourth battlefield?” Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2004, pp. 201-204.

51 Everett Dolman, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September 2010, p. 3, http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1676919.

52 Dolman, 1.

53 Johnson-Freese, Sommer, Vis Sommer, pp. 201-204.

54 Dolman, 23.

55 Ibid, 13.

56 Dolman, 3.

57 William Lowther, “China to test new anti-satellite weapon: report,” Taipei Times, 18 October 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/10/18/2003545460.

58 Chang, 16.

59 Ibid, 17.

60 Dolman, 3.

Additional References Kan, Shirley. “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test.” CRS Report for Congress (23 April 2007). pp. 1-6.

Muradian, Vago. “China Tried to Blind U.S. Sats with Laser.” Defense News. 25 September 2006.

Mearsheimer, John. “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All.” The Australian (18 November 2005).

Smith, Marcia S. “China’s Space Program: An Overview.”

CRS Report for Congress (21 October 2003). pp. 1-6, Chang, Amy. “Indigenous Weapons Development in China’s Military Modernization.” U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission Staff Research Report (5 April 2012).

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York, New York: Alfred A. Knop, 1948.

Glaser, Charles. “Will China’s Rise lead to War?” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011).

Buzan, Barry and Cox, Michael. “China and the US: Comparable Cases of ‘Peaceful Rise’?” Chinese Journal of International Politics (27 February 2013).

Carlson, Benjamin. “China’s insider: ‘China’s rise is not America’s demise’.” Global Post (25 January 2013).

Morrison, Wayne M. “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States.” Congressional Research Service (4 March 2013). p.1.

Martel, William C. and Yoshihara, Toshi. “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race.” The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2003). Vol. 26. No. 4. pp. 21-22.

Gao, Helen. “Land of Many Nationalisms.” Dissent (Spring 2013). Vol. 60. No. 2. p. 30-35.

Professor Minxin Pei’s lecture on China’s Rise in Gov 70H Bajoria, Jayshree. “Nationalism in China: Anti-West Sentiment.” Council on Foreign Relations (23 April 2008).

“On the CCP’s White Paper “The Taiwan Issue and China’s Reunification”—There Only Is an Issue of China, Not an Issue of Taiwan.” Chinese Law and Government (July-August 2002). Vol. 35. No. 4. pp. 74-75.

Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy and Glaser, Bonnie. “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” The Washington Quarterly (Fall 2011). Vol. 34. No. 4. p. 26.

Lewis, Jeffrey. “What if Space Were Weaponized.” Center for Defense Information (July 2004).

Brown, Harold and Prueher, Joseph W. and Segal, Adam.

“Chinese Military Power.” Council on Foreign Relations (2003). p. 9.

“USS George Washington (CVN 73),” United States Navy

Lederer, Edith M. “China’s WEF Envoy Sees Space Weaponizing.” The Associated Press (26 January 2007).

Caryl, Christian. “Handle with Care.” Foreign Policy (21 February 2013).

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66 Johnson-Freese, Joan and Sommer, Michael and VisSommer, Veronika. “The Chinese in space: The third man in the fourth battlefield?” Journal of Public Affairs (2004). Vol. 4. No. 2. pp. 201-204.

Dolman, Everett. “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment.” (September 2010). pp. 1-32.

Mulvenon, James. “Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test.” China Leadership Monitor (20 November 2007).

Anderson, Dr. Eric C. and Engstrom, Mr. Jeffrey G. “China’s Use of Perception Management and Strategic Deception.” (November 2009). pp. 7-8.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Annual Report to Congress: Military And Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2003.” (28 July 2003). http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2003chinaex.pdf.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Annual Report to Congress: Military And Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012.” (2012). http:// www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.

Lowther, William. “China to test new anti-satellite weapon: report.” Taipei Times (18 October 2012). http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/10/18/2003545460.

Office of the Deputy under Secretary of Defense. “Department of Defense Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline.” http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/ BSR2012Baseline.pdf.

J.R. “Arms sales to Taiwan: Fighter-fleet response.” The Economist (1 May 2012). http://www.economist.com/ blogs/banyan/2012/05/arms-sales-taiwan.

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