Uten sammenligning (9788245033007)

Red: Iris Nguyen Duy Sunniva Bragdø-Ellenes Inge Lorange Backer Svein Eng Bjørn Erik Rasch

Uten sammen— ligning Festskrift til Eivind Smith 70 år

Red.: Iris Nguyen Duy Sunniva Bragdø-Ellenes Inge Lorange Backer Svein Eng Bjørn Erik Rasch

Uten sammen— ligning Festskrift til Eivind Smith 70 år

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Tabula Gratulatoria Advokatfirmaet Hjort DA Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS Advokatforeningen Akademika Direktør Marianne Andreassen, Stortinget Anders Anundsen Helga Aune Johan Greger Aulstad Ann-Helén Bay Bjørn O. Berg Lars Magnus Bergh Leonard Besselink Arnstein Bjørke Tore Bråthen Karin M. Bruzelius og Inge Lorange Backer Hans Chr. Bugge Henrik Bull Bull & Co Advokatfirma AS Kjell Christiansen Anna Jonsson Cornell Kirsti Coward og Sven Ole Fagernæs Professor Dominique Custos, University of caen Normandy, France Det juridiske fakultet, UiB Det juridiske fakultet, UiT Norges Arktiske Unversitet Det juridiske fakultetet, UiO Fredrik Engelstad Marius Emberland Roald M Engeness, advokat Stein Evju

Aage Thor Falkanger Professor dr. jur. dr. hist. dr. h.c. (mult.)

Spyridon Flogaitis Forsvarsdepartementet Nina Frisak Jesus Fuentetaja [Professor of European and Administrative Law, National Distance Education University (UNED), Spain] Ørn Grahm Hans Petter Graver Gunnar Grendstad Ass. direktør Kyrre Grimstad, Stortinget Ingvill Helland Göller Handelshøyskolen BI, Institutt for rettsvitenskap og styring Handelshøyskolen, Universitetet i Agder Henning Harborg Hanne Harlem og Sam E. Harris Anne Kari Lande Hasle Marit Hatleskog Ola Rambjør Heide Roger Helde Øyvind Henden Páll Hreinsson Erling Johannes Husabø Aanund Hylland Toril Kristiansen Høyland Institutt for rettsvitenskap, Universitetet i Agder Institutt for samfunnsforskning Institutt for statsvitenskap og ledelsesfag, Universitet i Agder

6

Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet Annemor Rygh Kalleberg Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet, kommunalavdelingen Kommuneadvokaten i Bergen Kommuneadvokaten i Oslo Kristiansand tingrett Kritisk juss Ingrid Krøvel-Velle KS Advokatene Bárður Larsen Vivi Lassen Pia Letto-Vanamo & Ditlev Tamm Lovavdelingen Lovdata Per Olaf Lundteigen Gert-Fredrik Malt Bertrand MATHIEU Professeur agrégé des faculté de droi, Conseiller d’Etat (SE), Vice président de l’AIDC Didier MAUS, président émérite de l’Association internationale de droit constituionnel, maire de Samois-surSeine (France) Christian Fredrik Michelet Knut Olav Midgaard Ingunn Elise Myklebust Dekan, professor Jacob Graff Nielsen Marius Gulbranson Nordby Kristin Normann Anna Nylund Norges Juristforbund Oslo tingrett Jean-Baptiste Pointel Regjeringsadvokatembetet Magdalena Richert Ørnulf Røhnebæk, lagdommer, Eidsivating lagmannsrett

TABULA GRATULATORIA

Inger-Johanne Sand Fredrik Sejersted Anne Julie Semb Nils Gunnar Skretting Ingun Sletnes Pernille Pettersen Smith Carsten Smith Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Karl-Peter Sommermann, Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer Elisabeth Gording Stang Tanja Storsul Vibeke Blaker Strand Asbjørn Strandbakken Ida Stuberg Tron Løkken Sundet Tone Sverdrup Helge Syrstad Morten Søberg Karl Harald Søvig Henrik Søvik Björg Thorarensen Stortingspresident Tone Wilhelmsen Trøen Universitetet i Sørøst-Norge, Handelshøyskolen, Institutt for økonomi, markedsføring og jus Universitetsforlaget Marc Verdussen, professor of law (University of Louvain) Tor Egil Viblemo Arno Vigmostad Monica Viken Henrik Wenander, Lund Geir Ulfstein Domstoladministrasjonen ved direktør Sven Marius Urke Prof. Dr. Jacques Ziller, Università di Pavia

Eivind Smith 70 år Eivind Smith ble født 4. desember 1949 og vokste opp i Oslo. Han har viet hele sitt yrkesaktive liv til universitetet. Med det som utgangspunkt har han bidradd til samfunnet omkring, og sammen med de enkelte bidragsyterne har vi gleden av å gi ham dette festskriftet i anerkjennelse av hans innsats.

Etter juridisk embetseksamen ved Universitetet i Oslo i 1974 fortsatte Eivind ved Det juridiske fakultet som universitetslektor og universitetsstipendiat, med forvaltningsrett som arbeids- og forskningsfelt. I 1979 forsvarte han for den juridiske doktorgraden avhandlingen Organisasjoner i fiskeriforvaltningen, en studie i grenselandet mellom offentlig rett og privatrett, og i 1986 ble han utnevnt til professor i rettsvitenskap ved Universitetet i Oslo, med særlig plikt til å forelese i offentlig rett. Forvaltningsretten har fortsatt å være et av hans arbeidsområder, og hans nære tilknytning til Torstein Eckhoff – den som fremfor noen har formet norsk forvaltningsrettslig tenkning – kommer til uttrykk ved at han etter Eckhoffs død har videreført hans Forvaltningsrett i mange utgaver gjennom en nennsom og tidsmessig oppdatering, revurdering og omredigering. Blant de spørsmål som han etter hvert særlig har interessert seg for, er uavhengige forvaltningsorganer og kommunalt selvstyre.

Inngangen til 1990-årene markerte det som er blitt Eivinds viktigste innsatsområde i de siste 30 årene: statsforfatningsretten, som han i pakt med internasjonal tekning har utviklet som konstitusjonell rett. Monografien Høyesterett og folkestyret (1993) er et sentralt bidrag til å forstå forholdet mellom domstolene og lovgiverne i det norske samfunnet – en debatt som senere har utviklet seg under overskriften «rettsliggjøring».

Hans fremstilling av norsk konstitusjonell rett i nybrottsarbeidet Konstitusjonelt demokrati (foreløpig fire utgaver, første utgave utgitt 2012) er modellbasert og med sterke komparative innslag – der hvor deskriptive redegjørelser for gjeldende norsk statsrett har preget tidligere fremstillinger av statsforfatningsretten.

Fra doktoravhandlingens rent nasjonale ståsted orienterte Eivind seg tidlig internasjonalt, først mot Frankrike. Han etablerte kontakt med og hentet inn fremstående representanter for fransk offentlig rett og politikk og har fortsatt å dyrke kontakten med Frankrike gjennom tallrike seminarer og konferanser i inn- og utland. Det norske statsrettslige forskningsmiljøet er begrenset, og Eivind har stimulert til nordiske kontakter og samarbeid. Med utgangspunkt i en bred komparativ holdning til konstitusjonelle rettsspørsmål har han trukket frem forskjellige temaer og tradisjoner, enten de har vært knyttet til gamle og etablerte grunnlover eller til grunnlovgiving i moderne stater og

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EIVIND SMITH 70 ÅR

nye statsdannelser. Med sitt store kontaktnett har han lykkes i å bringe til et bredere publikum i Norge konstitusjonelle tradisjonalister, pragmatikere og idealister, slik han gjorde med den nå avdøde amerikanske høyesterettsdommer Antonin Scalia. Et høydepunkt var da den 9. verdenskongressen for konstitusjonell rett ble avholdt i Oslo i 2014, der Eivind var primus motor og visepresident i International Association of Constitutional Law. Han har vært gjesteforsker eller deltatt i bedømmelser ved mange universiteter i forskjellige verdensdeler, og for sitt brede internasjonale arbeid om offentligrettslig forskning er han anerkjent i inn- og utland. Han er æresdoktor ved universitetene i Uppsala, København og Aix-Marseille og tildelt de franske ordnene Officier des Palmes Académiques og Chevalier de l’Ordre National de la Légion d’Honneur.

Ved Institutt for offentlig rett har Eivind i en årrekke vært leder for forskergruppen for konstitusjonelle (norske og komparative) studier og stått for en «konstitusjonell lunsj» utvalgte mandager i hvert semester. Der blir aktuelle konstitusjonelle spørsmål og forskningsprosjekter lagt frem og diskutert i en krets av jurister, statsvitere og andre interesserte utenfor universitetet. Denne møteplassen har sikret at de institusjonelle spørsmålene i statsforfatningsretten, som Eivind med god grunn legger vekt på, får oppmerksomhet i en ellers rettighetsorientert tidsalder.

Eivinds mangeårige virke ved universitetet har bragt ham inn i mange verv knyttet til universitetet og forskningen. Han er medlem av Det norske Videnskaps-Akademi og har vært forskningsleder ved akademiets Senter for grunnforskning. I to perioder har han vært bestyrer for Institutt for offentlig rett ved Universitetet i Oslo, og han har også ledet fakultetets forskningsutvalg. Gjennom hele sin karriere har han veiledet studenter og stipendiater i deres avhandlingsarbeid. På den måten har han skapt grobunn for offentligrettslige forskningsmiljøer også utenfor Universitetet i Oslo. Hans åpne holdning til samfunnsvitenskapene gjorde ham til en mangeårig styreleder for Institutt for samfunnsforskning.

Eivind Smith har ved flere anledninger fått i oppdrag å lede granskingskommisjoner. Han var medlem av Ytringsfrihetskommisjonen, har ledet lovutredningsutvalget som forberedte opplæringslova av 1998, og er mye brukt som rådgiver i offentligrettslige spørsmål, både av politiske partier, Direktoratet for forvaltning og IKT (Difi) og andre. Han har vært leder for Rådet for taushetsplikt og forskning og er nå leder av Partilovnemnda, Hans sakkyndighet er blitt påkalt både i den svenske demokratiutredningen og i ekspertkomiteer i Europarådet.

Eivind har i alle år bidradd til å spre sin kunnskap om stats- og forvaltningsrettslige spørsmål. Journalister er sjelden opprådd for svar når Eivind blir spurt. Ikke minst er han en aktiv samfunnsdebattant med vilje til å stå for og på sitt syn. Et eksempel er hans retoriske spørsmål i debatten med menneskerettsaktivister: «Vil de som er imot menneskerettigheter, rekke opp hånden?» På denne måten ga han til kjenne at det er rom for å stille spørsmål også der det er en dominerende ideologi.

EIVIND SMITH 70 ÅR

9

70 år er fremdeles en aldersgrense for professorer og andre stillinger i staten, men ingen grense for faglig aktivitet. Vi regner med at Eivind Smith også i mange år fremover vil bidra til faglig utvikling og offentlig debatt, og ønsker ham all lykke.

Sunniva Bragdø-Ellenes Iris Nguyen Duy Inge Lorange Backer Svein Eng Bjørn Erik Rasch

Innhold Constitutional Reform and its Limits – Some Reflections................................................. 15 Rainer Arnold

Uavhengige forvaltningsorganer i Norge ............................................................................. 37 Inge Lorange Backer

Lokalt sjølvstyre på norsk – fleirnivådemokrati eller hopehavsfelle? ............................... 55 Harald Baldersheim

Maktfordeling og folkestyre i informasjonssamfunnet ...................................................... 81 Jan Fridthjof Bernt

Offentlighetsloven – en villet «halvveislov»? ..................................................................... 109 Erik Magnus Boe

Alminnelig og spesialisert tvisteløsning – i og utenfor domstolene ............................... 127 Sunniva Cristina Bragdø-Ellenes

Proportionalitetsprincipen, regeringsformen och domstolarna ..................................... 151 Thomas Bull

Politisk-administrative skandalesager ................................................................................ 163 Jens Peter Christensen

The Constitution, the Parliament and the processes of cooperative decision-making.

The Belgian experience. ........................................................................................................ 181 Francis Delpérée

«Rettskildelærens grunnlag»: Problemstillingen og en hovedtese .................................. 193 Svein Eng

Stortingets anmodningsvedtak ............................................................................................ 241 Daniel Morken Farstad og Trond Nordby

Trenger Norge en forfatningsdomstol – eller er det bra nok det vi har? ........................ 261 Arne Fliflet

Moderation and Monarchy Mitigate Populists: How Norway’s Constitutional Democracy Endures .............................................................................................................. 279 Tom Ginsburg

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INNHOLD

Om å balansere i politikkens grenseland ........................................................................... 293 Eva Hildrum

Den norske klageordninga ved stortingsval og europeisk rett ........................................ 307 Eirik Holmøyvik

En dom om ekspropriation .................................................................................................. 323 Michael Hansen Jensen

Forfatningens principper...................................................................................................... 333 Helle Krunke

On jurisprudential constitution and European integration............................................. 349 Egidijus Kūris

European values today .......................................................................................................... 375 Massimo Luciani

Environmental Rights and Wrongs: Implementing Environmental Constitutionalism .................................................................................................................. 383 James R. May

Forfatningshistorie og forfatningsrett................................................................................. 399 Dag Michalsen

A brief overview of biolaw ................................................................................................... 417 Synne Sæther Mæhle

Brorskap: Fra ideal til konstitusjonelt prinsipp ................................................................. 433 Iris Nguyên Duy

Involvering av barn og unge i lovgivningsprosesser – noen refleksjoner i anledning Opplæringslovutvalgets arbeid ....................................................................... 455 Jon Christian Nordrum

Excerpt from Traité de droit constitutionnel by Léon Duguit .......................................... 469 Bernard Pacteau

1809, 1814, 1974, 2014: Författningspolitiska vägval i Sverige och Norge .................... 473 Olof Petersson

Mindretallsregjeringer i norsk parlamentarisme i komparativt perspektiv .................. 489 Bjørn Erik Rasch

Dansk almindelig forvaltningsrets inspiration fra Norge ................................................ 509 Karsten Revsbech

INNHOLD

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Regeringsbildningen i Sverige ............................................................................................. 525 Fredrik Sterzel

Kommune- og regionreformen til domstolene?................................................................ 541 Sigrid Stokstad

Gjelder det et forbud mot usaklig forskjellsbehandling ved lovtolking?........................ 563 Marius Stub

Klagesaksbehandling ved omsorgstvang etter velferdslovgivningen.............................. 599 Aslak Syse

Stortinget – statsmakt eller kulisse i et partipolitisk teater?............................................. 623 Michael Tetzschner

Popular sovereignty and independent bodies.................................................................... 645 Kaarlo Tuori

Skråblikk på lovprosessen i Norge ...................................................................................... 669 Arnulf Tverberg

Prejudikatsdomstolens premisser ....................................................................................... 675 Frederik Zimmer

Kampen om demokratiets mening ..................................................................................... 693 Øyvind Østerud

Forfatteromtale ...................................................................................................................... 709

Constitutional Reform and its Limits – Some Reflections Rainer Arnold, University of Regensburg

Constitutions are instruments dedicated as being the basic legal order of a social system such as the State for a regularly indefinite time. Constitutions are necessarily living instruments1 which deploy their normative capacity in order to adapt to changing societal conditions in the long run. As the normative order and the objects to be regulated by this order are in a reciprocal relation, it is indispensable to keep an adequate relation, i.e. an equilibrium between norm and object, while the constitution is in existence.

Adaptations and changes of the constitutional order during this time are necessary in order to maintain this equilibrium.

Keeping the constitution updated to the major social developments can be done in various ways: the most striking and difficult way is to adopt a new constitution. A further way is the reform of the constitution, the modalities of which are usually foreseen by the constituent power in the text of the existing constitution. The third way is the adaptation of the text by judicial interpretation. The fourth way finally is institutional practice, which can fi ll up and modify the understanding of undetermined constitutional concepts as laid down in a general way by the constitutional provisions. This last form of constitutional law change is close to the emergence of customary law which is, in some systems, only recognized to a restricted degree.2 This contribution focuses on constitutional reform and in particular to its limits, which constitute a basic question of constitutional law. It is indispensable in this context to have also a look at the limits of the constituent power itself as they are limits for the constituted power (the reform power) too.

1 2

See Eivind Smith (ed.), The Constitution as an Instrument of Change (Stockholm; SNS Förlag, 2003).

In Germany the emergence of constitutional customary law is, according to a large opinion, hindered by article 79.1 BL which attributes the ability to modify the constitution to the legislator (complying with the necessary formal requirements, see article 79.2,3 BL) who explicitly modifies or complements the text of the BL. This provision refers to the formal reform of the BL. The normative reach of article 79.1 BL is controversial (see KlausDieter Schnappauf, “Art. 79/1”, in Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed.

Dieter Hoemig and Heinrich A. Wolff (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018).

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RAINER ARNOLD

The following reflections focus on the democratic liberal constitution, which is the only type of legitimate constitution. The ultimate finality of law and the constitution as the basic legal order of a country is to realize justice, which is necessarily based on the values of dignity and freedom of the individual. A text which denies, totally or in part, these values is not a constitution (albeit so called), but a totalitarian statute.

1

The constituent and constituted power: the issue of their limitations

As a first step, it seems necessary to characterize the constituent power and its relation to the legal order (aa). A second reflection relates to supraconstitutional law, the question of its existence and of its binding force as a possible limit of the constituent power (bb). A third consideration deals with the question whether limits of the constituent power also constitute limits for the constituted reform power (cc). Finally, it will be discussed whether and in which way international law forms a limit to the constituent and the constituted reform power (dd). aa The constituted power as a pre-constitutional power – fact and law The question that arises is how far the above-mentioned constitutional changes can go.

Are there matters and concepts that cannot be changed? This question is particularly relevant for the constitutional reform in a formal sense; however, it is also relevant for the other forms of constitutional changes.

For the constitution-making itself, the question of whether and to what extent the constituent power is restricted seems to be easy but it is actually rather difficult. The constituent power, often conceived as a revolutionary power,3 is widely considered to be unlimited.4 However, the constituent power is not without any limitations. First of all, the basic finality of constitution-making, the creation of a basic legal order as a fundament and a framework for the concrete legal order mainly implemented by legislation, is neces-

3 4

See Matthias Herdegen, in Grundgesetz-Kommentar eds. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig, (München: Beck, 2019/8).

See Reinhold Zippelius (ed.), Allgemeine Staatslehre (München: Beck, 2010), 52.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ITS LIMITS – SOME REFLECTIONS

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sarily to achieve justice, which is essentially rooted in human dignity and freedom.5 If a text designated as a constitution does not comply with the basic requirements of justice by denying the principle of freedom and equality and therefore the value of human dignity, it is not a constitution, it is an invalid, totalitarian statute. Its enforcement is not based on legitimacy but on illegitimate force.6 The foundation of a true constitution is exclusively based on justice, which essentially includes human dignity and freedom, equality and rule of law. Constituent power can only be exercised by the people as constitution-making necessarily is an action of self-determination of the individuals as members of the community of the people and therefore a basic expression of freedom.

The justice-based constitution with its liberal democratic orientation is the exclusive type of constitution. This statement is not founded in natural law or in a sort of supraconstitutional law, it is the consequence of the essence of all law–justice.

This corresponds to what Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde says about the definition of constitution-making. It aims at delimitating the political process by creating differentiated institutions and instruments, distributing decision-making to various institutions and introducing mechanisms of cooperation, etc., in order to ensure political rationality and efficiency. Therefore, constitution-making necessarily entails differentiating and

5

6

See Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 8th ed., edited by Eric Wolf and Hans-Peter Schneider as the text of the 3rd ed. of 1932 complemented by handwritten notes of Radbruch’s estate (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler Verlag,1973), 119–121 (“Law is the reality which has the sense to serve for the law value, for the idea of law. The concept of law is therefore aligned with the idea of law. The idea of law can be no other than the justice” p. 119–120); Hans J. Wolff, “Rechtsgrundsätze und verfassunggestaltende Grundentscheidungen als Rechtsquellen”, in: Forschungen und Berichte aus dem öffentlichen Recht,Gedächtnisschrift für Walter Jellinek, Eds. Otto Bachof, Martin Drath, Otto Gönnenwein und Ernst Walz (München: Isar Verlag, 1955), 33–52, in particular 35–37 (on the role of Justice), 39 (on human dignity), 40 (on the universal validity of the relevant general principles as the “basic framework of every legal order”) and 52 (on the binding force of these general principles for the constituent power). See also Wolff ’s subdivision of the principles into general (universal) principles and specific principles of a certain legal order or of a certain cultural area on p. 39 and 40 and passim; Hans Haug, Die Schranken der Verfassungsrevision, Dissertation Zürich (St. Gallen: Zollikofer & Co (print), 1947), 84 (“constitution as a concept of value”), 233 (“…the sovereignty of the state and of the constituent power (“Verfassungsgesetzgebers”) is limited by the sphere of ideality (“Sphäre der Idealität”), of the values which we comprise in the concept of “Justice”; see also Haug’s chapter on “the fundamental rights as limits of the constitutional reform”, 234–236; Brun-Otto Bryde, Verfassungsentwicklung, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1982), 229 (“If we formulate the ‘Grundnorm’ which is presupposed by the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), it could be: “A constitution is valid if it has come into existence in a democratic way and safeguards freedom and human dignity of the citizens”).

This is a quite different “Grundnorm” than that of Hans Kelsen’s concept (Reine Rechtslehre, 1st ed., 1934, study edition, ed. by Matthias Jestaedt, Tübingen: Mohr, 2008, 77–86). See also Reinhold Zippelius, Rechtsphilosophie, 6th ed., München: C.H. Beck, 2011), chapter IV (60–130, in particular 96–98 on the legal conception of Man).

Hans J. Wolff (note 9), 35/36 and 52.

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RAINER ARNOLD

limiting power and is therefore incompatible with power accumulation and political arbitrariness.7 A third consideration concerns the essence of the constituting process. This process is pre-constitutional and therefore not governed by norms. It leads to the creation of a norm, the constitution as the basic legal order, and is therefore at the “frontier” between fact and law.8 Fact is the object of the norm; it is the finality of the norm to regulate fact. However, fact influences the content of the norm. This relation exists also between fact and constitution, because the pre-constitutional – and therefore pre-juridical – conditions are determined by fact. As pointed out above, the holder of the constituent power in a liberal democracy is necessarily the people; that this is generally recognized is the result of a historical process that has led to the breakthrough of the idea of popular sovereignty and, with this, of democracy.9 The democratic concept of constitution-making10 is therefore pre-constitutional, a matter of historical-political fact. This fact is reflected by the general conviction in the societies that a constitution has to be shaped and adopted by the people, either directly by referendum or with the intermediation of a constituent assembly, or also by the representatives of the people in Parliament.11 The existence of a number of sham democracies based on formal constitutional documents is not an argument against the recognition of the democratic constitution concept as a universal conviction, which justifies to attribute, due to this fact, the constituent power to the people. A constitution needs to be created only on the basis of the democratic concept; otherwise it would be an organization document, without legitimacy as a constitution.

A similar argumentation applies to the necessary basic contents of the constitution, i.e. to the limits of the constituent power. Today’s individual-concentrated orientation of politics and constitutional law reflects the society’s conviction that human rights and rule of law should be recognized as values inherently connected with democracy.

The constituent power could not eliminate one of these elements from the constitution.

This conviction is also a matter of fact which determines the people’s will of substantive constitution-making. If the people as the holder of the constituent power act, their

7

8 9 10 11

Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Die verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes – Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts”, ed. idem, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie, Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 90–112, 107/108.

The constituent power as a “frontier concept” (“Grenzbegriff ”) is clearly pointed out by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ibid. 90, 98.

See Olivier Beaud, La puissance de l’État (Paris: PUF, 1994), 436–438.

See Udo Steiner, Verfassunggebung und verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966). 18–19.

See Ibid. 93–172.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ITS LIMITS – SOME REFLECTIONS

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“political will” is “shaped by determined intellectual, ethic and cultural perceptions and convictions”.12 This is confirmed by general convictions that have developed at the international level.

It can thus be stated that the factual situation based on a general perception and conviction has a determining impact on emerging law, on the question of the holder of the constituent power and on the basic substance of the constitution.

These reflections are a parallel and complementary argumentation to the above considerations on justice and the connected individual-related values. The justice-related perspective gives the only convincing explanation of the constituent power’s limits but is fully recognized only in the new epoch of constitutionalism since the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, the historical process which has led to the necessary recognition of the today’s constitutional values is important in the context of our argumentation. bb The question of supra-constitutional law It follows from the foregoing considerations that the existence of “supra-constitutional law”13 in the form of natural law in a strict sense that would determine the indispensable contents of the constitution do not exist or at least are difficult to acknowledge as

12 13

Böckenförde, “Die verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes – Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts”, 108.

See for the debate on this issue in France: Louis Favoreu, “Supra-constitutionnalité et jurisprudence de la juridiction constitutionnelle en droit privé et droit public”, in La Constitution et son juge. edited by Louis Favoreu, (Paris: Economica, 2014), 709–716, 710–714, referring to “common principles” recognized by constitutional and other courts of various countries as “supra-constitutional or transnational principles,” which have the function to fi ll in the gaps of the national constitutional text, quite in opposition to George Vedel, Pouvoirs, no. 67 (1993), 79–97, et https://revue-pouvoirs.fr/IMG/pdf/Pouvoirs67_p7997_debat_supraconstit_vedel.pdf). See Louis Favoreu, “Souveraineté et supraconstitutionnalité”, Pouvoirs-debat, Pouvoirs, no. 67 (1993), 71–77, https://revue-pouvoirs.fr/IMG/pdf/ Pouvoirs67_p71-77_debat_supraconstit.pdf See. See also Ariane Vidal-Naquet, “L’expression du pouvoir constituant”, in Droit constitutionnel. Les grandes décisions de la jurisprudence, ed. Michel Verpeaux, Pierre de Montalivet, Agnès Roblot-Troizier and Ariane Vidal-Naquet (Paris: Thémis Droit PUF 2017), 6–13, 11–13; see also idem, La souveraineté du pouvoir constituant, 13–20.

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such. However, the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC)14 and of the Constitutional Court of Bavaria15 have pointed out the existence of norms and principles superior to the constitution, in the first phase of their jurisdictions, and have also recognized, with the Radbruch formula, the internal application of general principles from outside16 the national legal order.17 14

15

16

17

Vol. 2, p. 380, 403 (reference to this decision by FCC vol. 49, p. 148, 163–164; vol. 52, 133, 144) referring to “general principles and guiding ideas which have shaped the pre-constitutional overall picture (“vorverfassungsmäßige Gesamtbild”), which the constituent power took as a basis” (vol. 2, p. 403). In the decision vol. 1, p. 14, 32, the FCC, referring to the jurisprudence of the Bavarian constitutional court, confirmed the existence of “constitutional principles which are so fundamental and expressions of pre-constitutional law in such a way that they have binding force also for the constituent power”. As they are “expressions” (that means expressed in the constitution text) of these fundamental pre-constitutional principles, they are superior to other constitutional provisions, which have to be regarded as void if they are incompatible with these fundamental principles (FCC vol. 1, p. 14, 32.). See also the decision of the FCC vol. 3, p. 225, 233 in which the court presupposes that the constituent power is freedom and democracy-oriented, with the consequence that the text of the constitution complies with the mentioned fundamental pre-constitutional principles and “unconstitutional constitutional law” would be nearly impossible. The Bavarian constitutional court referred, in its decision of July 18, 2006, (https://www.bayern. verfassungsgerichtshof.de/media/images/bayverfgh/9-vii-04-entscheidung.pdf) to the supra-positive character of the principle of equality (enshrined in article 14.1 Constitution of Bavaria for the field of elections, which is a specific expression of the general equality principle of article 118.1 Constitution of Bavaria), which is a criterion for the constitutionality of a provision of the Bavarian constitution (that is article 14.4 Constitution of Bavaria regarding the 5% clause as a hurdle for access to Parliament) as a specific expression of the general equality principle enshrined in article 118.1 Constitution of Bavaria.

Bavarian Constitutional Court vol. 2, p. 45, 47; vol. 4, p. 51, 58–59; vol. 11, p. 146, 153; Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, “Art. 60/17”, in: Verfassung des Freistaates Bayern Kommentar, ed.

Josef Franz Lindner, Markus Moestl and Heinrich Amadeus Wolff (München: C.H. Beck, 2009).

The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) whose judgment against the ex-DDR border guards killing refugees seeking to cross the Berlin Wall was confirmed by the FCC by reference to the “conviction of the worldwide legal community” so that the justification by the ex-DDR law was regarded as void for “a manifest and insupportable violation of elementary commandments of justice and of human rights protected by international law. This violation is of such gravity that it is contrary to the legal convictions on value and dignity of the human being which are common to all the peoples. In such a case positive law must step aside in favor of justice” (ibidem, para. 142).

FCC BVerfGE 95, 96–143; http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs19961024_2bvr185194.html/140: “in cases of unsupportable contradiction of positive law to justice the principle of security of law may be considered as less important than the principle of substantive justice”. The court referred to the Radbruch formula (Gustav Radbruch, “gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht”, Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung (SJZ) 1 (1946): 105–108. Reproduced

by Axel Tschentscher (http://www.servat.unibe.ch/rphil/t/10.1_Radbruch_Formel_1945. pdf) from Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 8th ed., ed. Erik Wolf and Hans-Peter Schneider, (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler, 1973), 345–346. See also FCC vol. 3, p. 225, 232–233; vol. 6, p. 132, 198–199; vol. 6, p. 389, 414–415.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ITS LIMITS – SOME REFLECTIONS

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The idea of supra-constitutional law is still alive in the jurisprudence of the constitutional court of Bavaria and is realized through the gradation of the constitutional norms being classified into fundamental principles and inferior norms. The latter are specifications of the principles, which must comply with them. In this way, a certain hierarchy is introduced without abandoning the concept of the constitution’s unity. Because everybody can launch an actio popularis against Bavarian legal norms including the constitutional law for breach of fundamental rights (the right to vote included) as enshrined in the constitution of Bavaria, the question of unconstitutional constitutional law arises from time-to-time. On the federal level, reference to pre-constitutional and supra-constitutional law only appeared during the first years of the constitutional court. What has continued is the review of constitutional amendments under the perspective of the eternity clause of article 79.3 BL. However, the fact that the federal constitutional jurisprudence today is more reserved to invoke quite generally supra-constitutional law seems to be due to the conceptual largeness of the reform-exempted areas of article 1 and 20 BL. Furthermore, the “value part” of the constitution has expressed in writing the basic pre-constitutional convictions and orientations so that the reference to positivized constitutional law is sufficient. A dynamic and effet utile-oriented interpretation of the constitutional values strongly contributes to this approach.

However, in the academic debate, the recourse to supra-constitutional or natural law is often rejected for the vagueness of this concept.18 cc External limits of the constituent power External limits of the constituent power result from international law binding on the State,19 either treaty law, customary law or general principles of international law, which remain binding also in the case where a new constitution is adopted. Since the State in its quality of subject of international law remains intact also in the case of the adoption of the new constitution, its obligation to observe international law continues to exist 18

19

See Eivind Smith, “Old and Protected? On the “Supra-Constitutional Clause in the Constitution of Norway”, Israel Law Review Vol. 44 (2011), 368–388; Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 71–82; Arnaud Le Pillouer, “Le pouvoir de révision”, in: Traité international de droit constitutionnel, Suprématie de la Constitution, 3rd ed., ed. Michel Troper and Dominique Chagnollaud (Paris: Dalloz, 2012), 33–65, in particular 56–64; Claude Klein, Le pouvoir constituant, in: Traité international de droit constitutionnel, Suprématie de la Constitution, 3rd ed., ed. Michel Troper and Dominique Chagnollaud (Paris: Dalloz, 2012), 5–31, in particular 26–28; Bertrand Mathieu and Michel Verpeaux, Droit constitutionnel (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004), 232–233; Dietrich Murswiek, Die verfassunggebende Gewalt nach dem Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1978), 223–224. See also Böckenförde, “Die verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes” (note 5), 108–110.

See Reinhold Zippelius, Allgemeine Staatslehre.Politikwissenschaft, 16th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2010), 56–63.

22

RAINER ARNOLD

and is binding also on the people of this State exercising the constituent power. International law issues which have relevance for the internal sphere of the State, in particular human rights, have binding force also during the process of constitution-making. With a new constitution, neither human rights nor human dignity could be eliminated or essentially relativized on the internal level.20 Although an international treaty has binding force on the subject of international law from the outside, it may either have, inside the State, a rank inferior to the constitution (yet superior to ordinary legislation, as for example according to article 55 of the French constitution) or a rank equivalent to ordinary law, as it is the case in Germany on the basis of article 59.2 BL. However, these constitutional mechanisms are applicable only to State institutions governed by the constitution (constituted powers) but are not relevant for the extra-constitutional constituent power, which however remains under the obligation of existing international treaties, although it is not under the regime of the constitution. If a State bound by an international treaty disappears, e.g. by incorporation into another State (as it was the case with the ex-DDR), the rules of State succession are relevant.21 Without reference to international treaties, basic values of international order such as human rights have obtained the quality of customary law, which is imposed on every existing or emerging subject of international law. In addition, from this side the constituent power and with this, the reform power is limited.

As a further aspect, the above reflection of the impact of fact on law and especially on the creating process of constitutional law, i.e. on the constituent power, is also of importance for the international level. The emergence of numerous human rights guarantees reflects the universal conviction that the dignity and freedom of the individual has to be protected. External sovereignty of a State is limited by this basic requirement of the international community. The fact that violations in this respect are more than frequent is a deplorable fact but does not hinder that the idea of human rights is a basic conviction of the free world community. What has been stated for the limits of the constituent power with reference to the State is also valid for the limits imposed by international law.

Furthermore, the values recognized by the supranational law of the European Union, which have to be common within the European Union as well as within the member States cannot be neglected by the State’s constituent power.22 These restrictions are not only based on a sociological, cultural or civilization-related obligation, they

20 21 22

See Yaniv Roznai Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, 82–102.

See Markus Krajewski, Voelkerrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017), 150–152.

See Yaniv Roznai Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, 86–89.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ITS LIMITS – SOME REFLECTIONS

23

are of a normative nature, which is inherent in the contemporary constitution-making process. Of course, the limits resulting from supranational law are only binding on the constituent powers of the member States. The binding force results from the principle of EU law primacy over the national legal order, over national ordinary as well as constitutional law. The member State as such has to comply with the supranational obligations, which implies the binding force of these obligations also on the constituent power. The member State as the subject of the EU legal order does not change when it creates a new constitution. Therefore constitution-making has to observe the supranational obligation to comply with the common values as determined by EU law. No reservation based on the national identity of the constituent power would be possible. dd The limits of the constituent power as limits for the constituted power The power to reform the constitution is a constituted power. The constituent power has established the institutional system of the State and determined the values on which the State is based. Within this constitutionally founded order, the reform power can deploy its function; it is therefore a constituted power derived from the constituent power. The constitution can foresee modalities how to exercise the reform power and even, since for example Art. 79.3 German BL does draw up substantive limits; however, the written limits are not necessarily exhaustive and must be supplemented.23 The constituent power has transformed itself into the constituted power by the establishment of a constitution. However, the constituent power continues to exist and can only “revive” by a revolutionary act and oust the constituted power.24 Limits which are imposed even on the original constituent power must also be considered as limits of the constituted reform power notwithstanding the fact that these limits are expressed by the written text of the constitution or not.

What is a necessary content of the constitution cannot be abolished by reform of the constitution. In other words, what is binding for the constituent power is binding also for the reform power.

23

24

See Chistoph Wittekindt, Materiell-rechtliche Schranken von Verfassungsänderungen im deutschen und französischen Verfassungsrecht, Peter Lang: Frankfurt am Main, 2000, p. 94, 102–104. Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. I, C.H. Beck: München, 1977, p. 124–125; 127–128. Th is is denied by Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, Duncker & Humblot: München und Leipzig,1928, p. 91, a consequence from his understanding of the constituent power as “the political will, whose might or authority is able to make the concrete overall decision (“Gesamtentscheidung”) on the kind and form of the own political existence, hence to determine the existence of the political unit as a whole”, p. 95–96. This decisionist view has to be clearly rejected; it is quite contrary to the liberal democratic foundation of every true constitution.

Stern (note 28), p. 126–127.

24

2

RAINER ARNOLD

The limits of constitutional reform

a The question of limits as a manifest problem of the formal constitutional reform The question of limits of the constitutional reform clearly arises for the field of formal constitutional reform. However, the same question is relevant also for other types of constitutional change: for interpretation aiming at adapting the constitution text to major social changes or aiming at complementing the written text by making unwritten principles and norms manifest, or for the emergence of customary law, and also for the substantive constitutional reform, which is carried out by a transfer of national competences to supranational institutions. These other fields cannot be treated here in more depth; focus has to be laid on the formal reform limits. b Written and unwritten limits of constitutional reform The question of the constitutional reform limits is twofold:25 (a) are there written limitations in the constitutional text and how to interpret them? (b) are there unwritten reform limitations, in addition to the written ones or even without any reference to the written text?

The constitutions show a greater variety of reform limits: there are countries with short formulations of such limits, others with much more detailed indications and countries whose constitutions do not have any express reform limit.26 Article 79.3 of the German Basic Law (BL), the so-called intangibility or eternity clause (Ewigkeitsklausel), excludes from the formal reform of the constitution “the principles of Articles 1 and 20” as well as the structure of the Federation divided into member States and, as a matter of principle, the cooperation of the member States in the field of legislation. Federalism is mentioned three times in this limitation norm: as a structural system, as requiring legislative cooperation with the Federation and quite generally as a guarantee of the “Federal State” as one element of Article 20 BL.

25

26

It is certainly rather difficult to distinguish constitutional reform and exercise of constituent power in particular in the case of the so-called “total revision” (Gesamtänderung) of the constitution as this is foreseen for the reform of the fundamental principles of the existing constitutional order in Austria (see Austrian Constitution, Art. 44.3 B-VG), or in the case of a Totalrevision, as in Switzerland (see Swiss Constitution, Art. 192-194 of the ???).

Is this a new constitution or a far-reaching reform of the existing constitution? A further question is whether a reform, which goes beyond the written or unwritten reform limits, is a new constitution or only an unconstitutional constitutional reform, a notion which is well known in the German legal discussion. These questions cannot be deepened here.

However, it will be remarked that the limits of the constituent power and of the constituted power are widely the same under the perspective of the concept explained below.

See the comprehensive list of written reform limits in: Yaniv Rouznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, 236–274.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ITS LIMITS – SOME REFLECTIONS

25

Article 79.3 BL is interpreted in a strict sense27 and in the spirit of the time when the BL was created. This test does not take into account the character of the constitution as a living instrument. The argumentation of the FCC seems doubtful and should be rethought. It is also disputable that modifications of the principles of articles 1 and 20, which are “inherent in the system” (systemimmanent)28 should be admitted provided that the fundamental structure of these two articles would not be modified. This position is too far-reaching and not compatible with the protection character of this intangibility clause.

It seems nonetheless that the core elements of the German constitution or at least most of them are protected against reform as they are expressed by the two mentioned articles. The interpretation of the rather restricted terms in the intangibility clauses in France29 and Italy30 shows a tendency to extend the protection to the basic elements of the constitutional order.

3

The structure of the constitutional order: general and specific essential elements, necessary and unnecessary specifications, “neutral” elements

Constitutional reform shall not touch the essentials of the constitution. It is widely accepted that only the constituent power and not the reform power can really change the essentials, i.e. the fundament of an existing constitution.31 However, this can only be said for the specific, not for the general essential elements of a constitution. The latter are not even at the disposal of the constituent power. In order to reflect upon this, it seems necessary to consider the structure of the constitutional order.

The constitutional order is composed of norms, which can be rules and principles.

They are in part written, in part unwritten.

27

28 29 30 31

See Reinhold Zippelius and Thoms Würtenberger, Deutsches Staatsrecht, 33rd ed.

(München: C.H. Beck, 2018), 52–54, 53. Klaus-Dieter Schnapauff, “Art. 79/4”, in Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepulik, ed. Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, 12th ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 583–585.

FCC vol. 30, p. 24–25.

See Bertrand Mathieu and Michel Verpeaux, Droit constitutionnel (Paris: PUF, 2004), 226 See Giuseppe De Vergottini, Diritto Costituzionale, 9th ed. (Milano: Wolters Kluwer/ CEDAM, 2017), 212.

See Yaniv Roznai Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, 39–70 on “Implicit Constitutional Unamendability”; see also for example Giuseppe De Vergottini, Diritto costituzionale comparator, 10th ed. (Milano: Wolters Kluwer Italia/ CEDAM, 2019), 288–290.

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