Vietnam April 2022 by HistoryNet

Special Delivery Can’t Get Enough Food, Fuel and Ammo

HOMEFRONT The Godfather brings fame to Al Pacino

50 th

A N N I V ER SA RY

Easter Offensive South Vietnamese counterpunch NVA in ’72

Quang Tri Slugfest Fierce fight to retake a war-torn town

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U.S. ‘smart bombs’ devastate Hanoi

U.S. adviser Maj. Gen. James Hollingsworth discusses battle plans with his team in the South Vietnamese airborne division. HISTORYNET.com APRIL 2022

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APRIL 2022

ON THE COVER

Maj. Gen. James Hollingsworth discusses operations of a South Vietnamese airborne unit north of Saigon on April 11, 1972. AP PHOTO; INSET: PARAMOUNT PICTURES/RONALD GRANT ARCHIVE /ALAMY

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THE 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE

In a three-pronged assault on Easter weekend, the North Vietnamese were hoping to hit South Vietnam with a knockout blow. By James H. Willbanks

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6 8 14 18

Feedback Letters Intel April Briefing Reflections Onboard a Babylift Flight Arsenal M60 Machine Gun

THE LONGEST FIGHT

20 21 60 64

Homefront March-April 1972 Battlefront 50 Years Ago in the War Media Digest Reviews Hall of Valor Clyde L. Bonnelycke

The 81-day Easter Offensive struggle for control of Quang Tri turned the place into a city of ruins. By John D. Howard

38 ‘NEVER BEEN BOMBED LIKE THEY ARE GOING TO BE BOMBED’

When North Vietnam attacked the South in the 1972 Easter Offensive, the U.S. responded with thousands of airstrikes against Hanoi. By Carl O. Schuster

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

Beginning in 1968, the Army compiled “Lessons Learned” documents based on findings in after-action reports.

VITAL SUPPORT

Troops behind the scenes and on the front lines supplied the fighting men with the necessities of a successful military operation. By Jon Guttman APRIL 2022

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South Vietnamese forces move through the wreckage of embattled Quang Tri city on July 28, 1972.

MICHAEL A. REINSTEIN CHAIRMAN & PUBLISHER

APRIL 2022 VOL. 34, NO. 6

CHUCK SPRINGSTON EDITOR ZITA BALLINGER FLETCHER SENIOR EDITOR JERRY MORELOCK SENIOR EDITOR JON GUTTMAN RESEARCH DIRECTOR DAVID T. ZABECKI EDITOR EMERITUS HARRY SUMMERS JR. FOUNDING EDITOR BRIAN WALKER GROUP ART DIRECTOR MELISSA A. WINN DIRECTOR OF PHOTOGRAPHY JON C. BOCK ART DIRECTOR GUY ACETO PHOTO EDITOR

WAR-TORN TOWN

Throughout the spring and summer of 1972, the South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese armies fought for control of Quang Tri city in one of the most significant battles during the communists’ Easter Offensive, as recounted in this issue. For more on those battles, visit Historynet.com and search: “Easter Offensive.” Through firsthand accounts and stunning photos, our website puts you in the field with the troops who fought in one of America’s most controversial wars.

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U.S. troops line up to board a Pan Am Boeing 707 during the Vietnam War. Transporting troops was just one of many services Pan Am provided during the war.

Pan Am’s Legacy

The article by Jim Trautman was well-deserved recognition for Pan Am’s service. Little known also is their training of military personnel in celestial navigation and routing in the Pacific. My dad who flew C-54s [fourengine military transport planes] under contract to the Army Transport Command in World War II worked for Pan Am for 44 years. When I was in-country he flew R&R flights on 727s out of Da Nang. He related how one time while waiting for takeoff clearance he saw puffs of dirt flying up, mortar rounds, GIs scurrying for bunkers! As the flight engineer, he told the captain they had a full load of troops, so: Push up the throttles, takeoff power, we’re outta here! Bob Grimshaw DeLand, Florida

Olds’ New Statue Regarding “Air Force Honors Vietnam Aviator Robin Olds,” (Intel, February 2022), about a new statue of Vietnam fighter pilot Col. Robin Olds at the U.S Air Force Academy: Thank you for the article on Col. Olds. I wish you would pass along to your readers the great biography about Olds, Fighter Pilot: The Memoirs of Legendary Ace Robin Olds, by Robin and his daughter Christina Olds. I discovered that I was living about 30 miles from the colonel and shopping in the same grocery store just a few 6

months before his passing. I’ve been fortunate to meet one of his fellow pilots who verified that he was the real deal. Gary Burkholder Yampa, Colorado

Remembering Max Regarding the obituary of Joseph Maxwell “Max” Cleland, a captain in Vietnam who lost three limbs in a grenade explosion and became a U.S. senator from Georgia (Intel, February 2022): I wish to thank you for honoring the memory of a fellow veteran. My wife Pat and I were honored to serve as Max’s northwest Georgia contact persons. We worked on every campaign for Max as secretary of state and U.S. Senate. We became very close friends, and it was Max who convinced me to write my first manuscript on my experiences in Vietnam. After the dedication of the Vietnam War’s memorial (the Wall) local newspapers were featuring stories on local veterans. Max told me, “Now is the time to tell your story.” I began writing down my experiences long hand, free hand on legal tablet pages much like a journal or diary. Max would read them and make comments and I would continue. He wrote the foreword in one of my books. When Max was elected to the U.S. Senate for Georgia, he named me as one of his advisers. David L. Hartline Gaylesville, Alabama Email your feedback on Vietnam magazine articles to Vietnam@historynet.com, subject line: Feedback. Please include city and state of residence.

PAN AM HISTORICAL FOUNDATION

In the February 2022 article on Pan American airlines’ involvement in and support of the U.S. interest in the Vietnam War (“Pan Am’s War,” by Jim Trautman), one important detail was omitted. As a former member of the Air Force Postal and Courier Service, first at Cam Ranh Bay, FEEDBACK then at Tan Son Nhut, I remind you that Pan Am provided another important and significant service: They were one of the two commercial airlines that brought mail from the States to GIs in-country; the other being Flying Tiger. They deserve our thanks and appreciation for that too. Jim Amado Utica, New York

VIETNAM

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Remember Their Service ... Forever Honor Their Courage n 1967, just over 50 years ago, U.S. troops and their allies reached a pinnacle of true heroism that will endure forever. For 77 grueling days, at Ia place called Khe Sanh, they endured one of the Vietnam War’s costliest and most heartbreaking events. Yet, the valor of those who served and sacrificed there forged a bond of brotherhood that still shines bright. Now The Bradford Exchange Mint salutes the spirit of America’s veterans with an exclusive Proof tribute: The Siege of Khe Sanh Proof Coin.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES

he Australian government has committed $6 million to fund a commemorative program that honors Vietnam veterans on the 50th anniversary marking the end of Australian involvement in Vietnam, according to Andrew Gee, Australia’s minister for veterans’ affairs and defense personnel. Commemorations will begin in January 2023—50 years after the Jan. 11, 1973, announcement that Australian combat operations in Vietnam had ended, although some soldiers remained behind to guard the embassy in Saigon until the beginning of July. A total of 60,000 Australians served in Vietnam. The country suffered 521 killed and 3,000 wounded. The 50-year anniversary of the war’s end is “a very important milestone,” Gee said Jan. 12 on The Ray Hadley Morning Show on Australian radio. Gee, whose uncle served at Nui Dat, a base near Saigon, in 1967, stressed that Australians need to show their solidarity with Vietnam veterans in their communities. “The wounds that were inflicted at home still I don’t think have totally healed with many of our Vietnam vets if you talk to them,” he said. Gee recounted a conversation with a Vietnam veteran wounded by fire from an AK-47 assault rifle. The veteran, who can describe the combat events that led to his injuries in detail, said he was excluded from an RSL club (a social club for veterans) on Anzac Day

(Australia and New Zealand’s national day of remembrance) “because Vietnam wasn’t considered a ‘real war’,” Gee said. “There’s so many stories like that— people being spat at on the streets, being abused as they were on their welcome home marches,” Gee said. “It’s a shame, and it’s a shameful chapter in our history. We’ve been trying to put it right in recent years—and I think this [the 50th anniversary] is a really good opportunity for us to try to heal those wounds. …It’s a great opportunity for our country and local communities to show their respect, their appreciation and their gratitude for all that our Vietnam veterans did.” A national commemoration service will take place at the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in Canberra. Other commemorations are being planned all across the country. More details about the events will be made available on Australia’s Department of Veterans Affairs website. “The Australian record in Vietnam is one of success and one of great service in the finest traditions of our armed forces, and all Australians should be proud of them,” Gee said. —Zita Ballinger Fletcher

STUART MACGLADRIE/THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD/FAIRFAX MEDIA VIA GETTY IMAGE

Australia Set to Commemorate War’s End

Australian soldiers just back from Vietnam parade through Sydney on June 6, 1966. Events planned for 2023 will recognize the service of Vietnam vets.

A CON T R OV ER SI A L QU EST ION

A SERIES EXAMINING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES OF THE VIETNAM WAR BY ERIK VILLARD Attrition was an important part of Gen. William Westmoreland’s approach, but never to the exclusion of other methods. Some have portrayed the 1964-68 leader of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam as an unimaginative officer who failed to grasp the complexities of the war. They say Westmoreland fixated on enemy body counts and failed to pursue alternative strategies that would have produced better results. Having researched and written about the Vietnam War for more than 20 years, I am convinced that Westmoreland pursued the most logical and sophisticated strategy that he or any other U.S. commander could follow given the inherent limitations on his authority. In military affairs, attrition is one of several basic approaches nations or leaders can employ to defeat their enemy. In its most basic form, attrition is the process employed to degrade the enemy’s fighting strength, usually by killing troops or destroying military equipment. Commanders can also maneuver their forces to take key terrain, thereby cutting enemy supply lines, capturing important logistical or political centers, and gaining control over people and natural resources. A third approach is to use persuasion—such as psychological warfare and propaganda—to lessen the enemy’s resolve, encourage the surrender of opposing troops, and build popular support for one’s own side. Last, combatants can form alliances to secure additional military resources from friendly nations, exert diplomatic pressure on the enemy and obtain new intelligence sources. During the war, Westmoreland employed all four methods—attrition, maneuver, persuasion and alliances— in varying proportions, based on the resources available and the changing military situation in South Vietnam during his time as MACV commander. Attrition played the dominant role in Westmoreland’s strategy out of necessity. Before the South Vietnamese government could root out Viet Cong insurgents at the hamlet level, a process known as pacification, Westmoreland had to contain and degrade the com-

munist main force units of full-time fighters that would have overwhelmed the South Vietnamese army. At the same time, the MACV commander maneuvered to disrupt communist supply lines and protect key assets like roads and cities. Had he been given permission, Westmoreland would have cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and invaded communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. In the propaganda realm, he supported a robust psychological warfare program to induce enemy defections and supported pacification programs to win the “hearts and minds” of villagers. Westmoreland was also a skilled diplomat and alliance builder who maintained excellent relations with the South Vietnamese and the other nations fighting alongside the Americans. He committed significant resources to training, upgrading and expanding the South Vietnamese armed forces as quickly as the Saigon government could handle the growth and as soon as equipment became available. Given the hand he was dealt, Westmoreland pursued the most appropriate strategy any MACV commander could devise between 1964 and 1968.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

STUART MACGLADRIE/THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD/FAIRFAX MEDIA VIA GETTY IMAGE

Was Westmoreland Fixated on Attrition?

Dr. Erik Villard is a Vietnam War specialist at the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair in Washington D.C.

Gen. William Westmoreland, the top U.S. commander in Vietnam, conducts a press briefing at the Pentagon on Nov. 22, 1967, to discuss recent events on the battlefield.

APRIL 2022

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THE PHOTO

A DARK DAY Weary after a battle in Long Kanh province, about 50 miles northeast of Saigon, Spec. 4 Ruediger Richter of the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, stares into the sky as Sgt. Daniel E. Spencer looks upon a fallen soldier in 1966 while waiting for an evacuation helicopter.

“We seem bent upon saving the Vietnamese from Ho Chi Minh even if we have to kill them and demolish their country to do it. As the native people survey bombed-out villages, women and children burned by napalm, rice crops destroyed, and cities overrun with our military personnel, they are doubtless saying secretly of the Vietcong guerrillas and of the American forces, ‘A plague on both your houses.’” —U.S. Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., speech on Senate floor, Congressional Record-Senate, April 25, 1967 10

ARMY

66% 38,224

MARINES

26% 14,844

U.S. TROOP DEATHS 1955–75 AIR FORCE

4% 2,586

NAVY

4% 2,566

Shared Losses

Deaths by Branch of Service Two thirds of the American deaths in Vietnam came from Army fatalities. The Army, which constituted 67 percent of the American force at peak U.S. strength of 543,400 in April 1969, recorded 66 percent of the 58,220 deaths during the entirety of the war 19551975. The Marines, 15 percent of the force at peak strength, suffered 26 percent of the deaths during the war years overall. SOURCE: DEFENSE CASUALTY ANALYSIS SYSTEM, DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

TOP: PFC. PAUL EPLEY/U.S. ARMY; MCGOVERN: BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES

WORDS FROM THE WAR

VIETNAM

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self-righteous presumption of the nine that they deserved acquittal because they were ‘right’ also fractured a central value of the American democracy.” Sachs served as Maryland attorney general from 1979 to 1987. He then joined a Washington law firm and retired in 2000. —Zita Ballinger Fletcher

Administration Vietnam Service Medal. In 1993 he received the Silver Maritime Award from the Merchant Marine Academy Alumni Association for his overall achievements. In 2007 Black began working for the U.S. Coast Guard National Maritime Center at Martinsburg, West Virginia. He retired in 2021, shortly before his death. —Jon Guttman

MARCINKO: ©FACEBOOK ROGUE WARRIOR RICHARD MARCINKO; SACHS: MARYLAND STATE ARCHIVES; BLACK; FAMILY PHOTO

Richard “Dick” Marcinko, a Navy SEAL in Vietnam and first commanding officer of the illustrious SEAL Team 6, died Dec. 25, 2021, at age 81, in Warrenton, Virginia. Marcinko, born Nov. 21, 1940, in Lansford, Pennsylvania, enlisted in the Navy in 1958 and became a commissioned officer in 1965. He deployed to Vietnam in 1967 as a member of SEAL Team 2. In May 1967, he led the team in a bold assault against the Viet Cong on Ilo Ilo Island in the Mekong Delta, regarded as one of most successful SEAL operations in Vietnam. Marcinko and his platoon worked with U.S. Army Special Forces during the communists’ 1968 Tet Offensive. He was one of two Navy representatives on a task force established to rescue hostages taken by Iran in 1979. After that failed operation, Marcinko was asked to form a special counterterrorism unit that became known as SEAL Team 6, which he led from 1980 to 1983. After retiring from the Navy, Marcinko started a private security firm and flourished as an author, consultant and radio talk show host. In keeping with his colorful personality and reputation for unorthodox methods, Marcinko’s autobiography was titled Rogue Warrior. It became a bestseller. Retired Navy SEAL Eric Olson, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command 2007-11, said in an interview with Navy Times, “He was a spirited rogue for sure, but we are better off for his unconventional service.” —Zita Ballinger Fletcher

Stephen H. Sachs, prosecutor of the Catonsville Nine Vietnam War protesters, died Jan. 12, 2022, at age 87, in Baltimore. Sachs, born in Baltimore on Jan. 31, 1934, graduated from Haverford College in Pennsylvania and served in the U.S. Army 1955-57. He received a law degree from Yale in 1960 and became a law firm partner. In 1967, he was appointed U.S. attorney for Maryland by President Lyndon B. Johnson and rose to fame the next year for prosecuting the Catonsville Nine, a group of Catholic anti-war activists who walked into the Selective Service System office in Catonsville, Maryland, grabbed 378 draft records, took them outside and burned them. All nine were found guilty and sentenced to prison. Although Sachs empathized with the activists, he stressed that their belief in their own righteousness did not justify breaking the law. “Respect for the law is what keeps this country together,” he later said. “So therefore I can’t accept people who violate the law, even if their motives are, to them at least, pure.” In a 2018 op-ed in The Baltimore Sun, Sachs wrote, “The

Vincent Arthur Black II, a U.S. Merchant Marine officer who supported military operations in Vietnam, died July 28, 2021, in Leesburg, Virginia. He was 78. Black, born on Aug. 21, 1942, graduated from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, in 1964 and rose to the rank of captain aboard oil tankers and container ships. During the Vietnam War he served aboard freighters assisting Navy operations and was awarded the Maritime

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‘FOREVER BURNED INTO MY MEMORY’ AN AIRMAN’S SERVICE ON THE HARROWING 1975 OPERATION BABYLIFT By Albert Monroe The handwriting was on the wall—the nightly TV news showed we were losing the Vietnam War. North Vietnamese forces were closing in on Saigon and military bases in the area. It was only a matter of days before the North’s complete takeover. At Tan Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon, it was cloudy on April 20, 1975. I could only imagine the terror and fear across town near Bien Hoa Air Base, the other major Air Force installation in the area. REFLECTIONS My fear increased as each mortar shell landed and the concussions of exploding rounds shook the ground violently. I always wondered if the next one had my name on it. At that point I had been in the Air Force 16 years. I was a technical sergeant stationed at Travis Air Force Base in California, where two squadrons of C-5A Galaxy troop transports supported airlift missions to Southeast Asia. My job was senior C-5A loadmaster attached to the 22nd Military Airlift Squadron. On April 3, President Gerald Ford had given his approval for Operation Babylift, an evacuation of South Vietnamese orphans, who would be flown on military and commercial aircraft to families in America 14

to escape the communist onslaught. Tan Son Nhut was the evacuation site where thousands of children and many adults boarded planes to start the journey to their new homes in the weeks before Saigon fell on April 30. Two C-5A planes from Travis Air Force Base were scheduled to participate in the evacuation, operating out of Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, on April 4. I was on one of them. The Galaxy is a massive cargo lifter capable of hauling outsized loads. It was still somewhat new, and we continued to work out maintenance issues. The C-5A could airlift many more kids than its smaller cousins, the C-141 Starlifter and C-130 Hercules. Although Tan Son Nhut airport had a lot of ramp space, the Air Force did not want two giant planes—big juicy targets for Viet Cong snipers— on the ground at the same time, so one was scheduled to leave a few hours later than the other. That would give the first plane time to get in and out before the second one, my plane, arrived. There was no air cover support at that time. Headquarters gave us a status report, saying everything was normal. “Good,” I thought to myself. Only 30 minutes after my plane left Clark, headquarters called. We were told to turn around and go back to Clark because there had been an accident in Saigon. We were shocked and wondered what kind of accident. The C-5A occasionally broke down. I thought it was the worst time to have maintenance problems. Landing back at Clark, we were stunned to get the news that the first plane had crashed. What happened? We initially thought it was sabotage. The plane took off from Tan Son Nhut OK but suddenly descended rapidly and crashed 2 miles short of the base in a rice paddy. Could it have been a bomb or surface-to-air missile? A bomb seemed unlikely, as did a SAM unless the enemy had an improved missile. I immediately thought about my comrades on the plane. Some I had just seen four days earlier. Were there any survivors? What about the children? I thought about the older kids—many of whom had survived the horrors of the last decade or so, only to tragically die in a rice paddy that some of them might even have worked in. Our flight was canceled. We found out there were survivors, thank God, even some among the crew members, but we had not been told who they were. Unfortunately, many people did not survive. The crash killed 138 of 314 people—adults and

PHOTO COURTESY ALBERT MONROE

Tech Sgt. Albert Monroe was a crewman on an Air Force transport plane that evacuated South Vietnamese orphans just before Saigon fell in April 1975 so they could go to families in the U.S.

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children—onboard. Many emotions run through your mind in a situation like that. I thought that it could have been me and my plane. You just must somehow bury the tragedy and keep going. War is hell. The Air Force launched an investigation. Experts were sent to look at the crash, but peasants had raided the site by then and snatched everything they could haul away. It took days to determine the cause. The investigation revealed that the ramp sheared off during ascent through 20,000 feet, where the most pressure occurs. Investigators suspected that the ramp locks came loose and the intense pressure caused a rapid decompression. Even so, the ramp should still have held. Safety lights indicated the ramp was locked, but there was a false reading. Not completely sure of what happened, the Air Force decided to ground the C-5 fleet, which severely hampered the evacuation. Other types of planes, however, carried on the airlift and came into Tan Son Nhut one after another. I waited at Clark and then joined up with a C-141 crew. We went into Saigon on April 20 and 21, then again on April 23 for the last time. On all the flights, we were taking out orphan babies, children and some adults. During my first flight into Tan Son Nhut, on April 20, I was nervous and did not know what to expect. I knew things would be hectic, but what I found was more than I could have imagined. There must have been six planes waiting to be loaded and another two taxiing out for takeoff. A huge line had formed Someone near the tarmac. It looked like there were severhad broken al hundred people, mostly women, babies and the line and young children. The C-141 Starlifter carries about 72 in paswas running senger-type seats and about 40 in side-facing straight seats. Every side-facing seat was stored up, and toward our sat everyone on the floor. The Red Cross plane carrying we had prioritized the prospective passengers: the a package. orphan babies, children, then adults. I brought in about 20 kids, babies and their chaperones, sat them on the floor and brought in another 20, repeating this several times. We crammed in as many as we could and secured them with tie-down straps. The chaperones and older kids held some of the babies. One of the loadmaster’s duties is to perform a weight and balance check to make sure the plane’s center of gravity is balanced. With a crew of six and approximately 90 passengers, we were way below our capacity, so there were no weight issues. The loading took about 20 minutes. We then taxied out and got in line for departure. Two planes were already waiting. It was no more than 10 minutes before we were airborne and headed back to Clark, where evacuees would continue on other planes until they reached their destination in the U.S. On the April 23 flight we were warned en route to expect the worst. We were unarmed and depended on only the few Army and Marine personnel still there for our safety. That day will forever be burned into my memory. As we landed at Tan Son Nhut, planes were moving everywhere. There was hardly any space to maneuver. Taxiing in, we opened our cantilever shell doors and positioned the back ramp horizontally to save time. Infants and children were supposed to go first, but when fear sets in, people will do anything to survive. You could feel the tension. Everyone was panicking and scrambling. The Red Cross monitors could not keep the peace. Even the Security Police were being overwhelmed. The scary scene was reminiscent of the movie Titanic when a mad rush followed the order to load the lifeboats. This time, we kept our engines running. The North Vietnamese Army 16

and Viet Cong had closed in on Bien Hoa Air Base. We could hear the hissing of deadly mortars nearby. Our helicopters gave us status reports on the enemy’s location. We were ready to go at a moment’s notice. I was out by the right wing on headset. Looking at the massive crowd, I noticed someone had broken the line and was running straight toward our plane carrying a package of some sort. We had been warned to watch out for saboteurs with bombs or other deadly devices. “Oh my God!” I thought. As the person got closer, I noticed it was a woman who seemed to be heading for the back of the plane. I knew the monitor would turn her around and send her back. To my surprise, she veered and headed straight for me. Over the headset, I screamed, “Someone is approaching me holding something!” A crewman yelled back, “Watch yourself!” Unarmed, I was so scared. Saboteurs came in all types. Then I realized it was not a package she was holding—it was a baby. She stopped in front of me and crying hysterically held out the infant at arm’s length. I backed up, and she moved closer, begging me to take her child. I raised my arms in the air and shook my hands, trying to tell her, “No.” She left, still sobbing. I watched her go back to the line but lost sight of her. I often think about that moment. Looking back, I just should have escorted the woman and her child onto the plane, where maybe they would have been allowed to board. We took on 72 passengers, waited our turn and departed. On the way out we saw rocket flashes as the enemy continued to bomb Bien Hoa. The airlift was a success. Our mission was accomplished. Days later, the North Vietnamese captured the base and eventually Saigon. My squadron suffered several casualties, and I lost some good friends. However, thousands of lives were saved. Ironically, one of the babies we rescued, now an adult, lives and works in Las Vegas, where I reside. V

Albert Monroe is the author of My Unbelievable Journey: The Story of an Air Force Crewman. He served in the Air Force 1963-85 and then worked for Lockheed Martin, teaching satellite operations. Monroe taught political science at the college level for 12 years. A second book, NASA Secrets, the story of the space shuttle, is coming soon. Do you have reflections on the war you would like to share?

Email your idea or article to Vietnam@historynet.com, subject line: Reflections

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Long reach

The adjustable rear sight enabled accurate firing out to 1,200 yards.

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Ammo boxes contained 200 rounds each.

THE M60 GENERAL PURPOSE MACHINE GUN During the late morning hours of July 1, 1970, five 82 mm mortar rounds struck Fire Support Base Ripcord in northern South Vietnam. Small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades followed. Defending the base’s perimeter, Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, engaged North Vietnamese Army troops about 700 yards away. Thus began the 23day battle for Ripcord, one of the last major battles between the U.S. and North Vietnamese armies, which ended when American forces were ordered to evacuate. The fighting sometimes pitted individual American companies against two NVA battalions. The American platoons’ ARSENAL M60 machine guns played a decisive role in those fights. The M60, introduced in 1957, incorporated features of the German MG-42 machine gun and FG-42 assault rifle. It fired over an open bolt, used a disintegrating link belt feed and had a quick-change barrel. The M60 was lighter than the M1919A4 and A6 Browning machine guns it replaced, but early models could be unreliable in Vietnam’s harsh conditions. The barrel change lever tended to catch onto foliage and soldiers’ belts, releasing the barrel without warning. A push-bottom mechanism replaced it, starting in 1966. A fragile component in the trigger mechanism often caused the gun to “run away” when firing. Dirt tended to collect in the gas cylinder, cutting the rate of fire. The gun was also poorly balanced and difficult to carry. Nonetheless, the M60 quickly became one of the war’s iconic weapons. In addition to troop field expedients, many other modifications and improvements were made as the war progressed. Five variants served in Vietnam, equipping virtually every vehicle, armored personnel carrier, tank, helicopter and Navy patrol craft. Widely exported and upgraded since the Vietnam War, it saw combat action well into the 21st century. V 18

Crew: 2-3; gunner, assistant gunner, ammo bearer Weight: 25 lbs. Gun length: 43.5 in. Barrel length: 22 in. Bore diameter: 7.62 mm Round: 7.62-by51 mm Rate of fire (max): 550-600 rounds per minute ROF (combat): 50120 rpm Muzzle velocity: 853 meters (2,800 ft.) per second Range (effective): Tripod 1,100 meters (1,200 yds.); bipod 800 meters (875 yds.)

GREGORY PROCH

By Carl O. Schuster

VIETNAM

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April 10 The best picture Oscar goes to The French Connection, which puts detective Jimmy “Popeye” Doyle (best actor Gene Hackman) on the trail of a Frenchman smuggling heroin into New York. Jane Fonda was best actress for her role as a call girl in Klute, another crime thriller.

March 2 NASA sends Pioneer 10 on a voyage to collect photographs and data from Jupiter during a flyby that takes it closest to the planet in December 1973. The probe then passed Neptune on its way out of the solar system. Its last signal was received on Jan. 23, 2003. March 11 New York folk singer and songwriter Harry Chapin releases his debut album Heads & Tales, which gave him a hit song with “Taxi.” On Dec. 21, 1974, Chapin had the top single with “Cat’s in the Cradle,” from his fourth album, Verities & Balderdash.

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MARCH-APRIL

1972

April 15 Soul singer Roberta Flack has the No. 1 single with “The First Time Ever I Saw Your Face,” written by British singer Ewan MacColl in 1957. Flack’s version got a boost when Clint Eastwood included it in his 1971 movie Play Misty for Me. It was the top single for all of 1972.

March 14 Given an offer they couldn’t refuse, moviegoers flock to The Godfather, based on Mario Puzo’s novel of warring New York crime families in 1945-55, notably the Corleone clan headed by Vito Corleone (Marlon Brando). In 1973 the film won the best actor and best picture awards. 20

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April 16 Apollo l6 launches with astronauts John Young, Charles Duke and Ken Mattingly bound for the moon. They brought back a 26-pound rock, the largest chunk of the moon hauled off during the Apollo program. The splashdown was on April 27. April 17 The Boston Marathon, the oldest annual marathon, founded in 1897, becomes the first to formally establish a women’s division as part of the event, and New Yorker Nina Kuscsik beat seven other women when she crossed the finish line at 3:10:26.

March 22 A week before the formal launch of a massive offensive, North Vietnamese Army forces attack southern Cambodia and South Vietnam’s Mekong Delta BATTLEFRONT in unsuccessful attempts to disrupt the flow of food in South Vietnam’s agricultural heartland. March 30 North Vietnam begins the Nguyen Hue Offensive, also known as the Easter Offensive, as the initial 30,000-40,000 NVA troops cross the Demilitarized Zone and invade South Vietnam’s Quang Tri province in an attack on the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Notably, the fighting featured conventional warfare tank-artilleryinfantry attacks rather than smallscale guerrilla actions. April 5 The NVA’s Easter Offensive expands into the region between Saigon and Cambodia as tens of thousands of tank-and-artillery-supported NVA infantry storm out of sanctuaries in Cambodia to hit Binh Long province on a drive toward Loc Ninh and An Loc. ARVN defenders were quickly overrun or driven back. April 6 In response to the NVA Easter Offensive, 400 U.S aircraft bomb targets in North Vietnam.

April 30 Among demonstrations across the country that begin in mid-April to protest the bombing in Vietnam, 12 nuns at New York’s St. Patrick’s Cathedral lay down in the aisles during Mass to symbolize the war dead. Seven nuns were arrested. Later the church said it would not press charges.

April 13 A rocket-armed AH-1 Cobra piloted by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Barry McIntyre becomes the first helicopter to destroy an enemy tank in combat when it knocks out an NVA T-54 during the Battle of An Loc. April 28 Soviet-supplied “Strela” surface-to-air, man-portable, shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missiles are first used against U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft. From the Easter Offensive thorough the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the weapon downed about 100 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and damaged dozens more. MARCH 2: NASA; MARCH 11: GEMS/REDFERNS/GETTY IMAGES; MARCH 14: PHOTO 12 / ALAMY; APRIL 10: SCREENPROD / PHOTONONSTOP / ALAMY; APRIL 15: GILLES PETARD/REDFERNS/GETTY IMAGES; APRIL 16: NASA; APRIL 17: JOSEPH DENNEHY/THE BOSTON GLOBE VIA GETTY IMAGES; APRIL 30: AP PHOTO

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THE 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION TESTS NIXON’S WAR STRATEGY

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PHOTO CREDITS

By James H. Willbanks

The billowing smoke of a B-52 bomber strike on a North Vietnamese tank column is a welcome sight to South Vietnamese soldiers under attack near Dong Ha in the northern part of the country on April 11, 1972. That spring communist forces launched the largest offensive of the war, hoping it would lead to the collapse of the Saigon government.

PHOTO CREDITS

n March 30, 1972, some 30,000-40,000 North Vietnamese Army regulars streamed southward across the Demilitarized Zone and eastward from Laos in a strike against the recently formed 3rd Infantry Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Over the next month this force in northern South Vietnam would involve three divisions and two dozen independent regiments supported by 200 tanks, long-range 130 mm artillery guns and air defense units. About 60 miles to the south, another North Vietnamese division headed toward Hue. The March 30 attack marked the opening of the North Vietnamese Spring-Summer Offensive of 1972 (Chien dich Xuan he 1972). The offensive consisted of a three-pronged assault that hit South Vietnam in its northern, central and southern regions. The goal was to destroy as many ARVN forces as possible, which would enable the North Vietnamese to occupy key cities and put communist troops in position to threaten Saigon and President Nguyen Van Thieu’s government, according to captured documents and information from NVA prisoners after the invasion. Within two weeks of the initial attack across the DMZ, large battles were being fought on all three major fronts. Before the offensive was over, more than 14 NVA divisions and 26 regiments—totaling more than 130,000 troops and approximately 1,200 tanks and other armored vehicles—were committed to the fight. The North Vietnamese also brought advanced weaponry not used in previous communist offensives.

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North Vietnamese Army artillerymen fire 130 mm guns like those used during the Easter Offensive. The NVA weapons had a longer range than the howitzers used by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

Architect of the Offensive Le Duan (pronounced lay zwan), born in 1907, joined Ho Chi Minh’s Revolutionary Youth League in 1928 and maneuvered through the ranks of the communist movement to become in 1960 the first secretary of the Vietnamese Workers (Communist) Party, a position Ho had occupied since 1956. Ho remained party chairman, a higher position he had held since 1951, but Ho’s failing health enabled Le Duan to increase his power, made complete with Ho’s death in 1969. Le Duan died in office in 1986.

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AP PHOTO; MAP: JON C. BOCK

with ARVN operations and South Vietnamese marine troops. U.S. advisers assisted the ARVN at the corps, division and regimental levels. In South Vietnam’s elite airborne, ranger and marine units, American advisers also served with each battalion. Additionally, there were advisers in all 44 South Vietnamese provinces as part of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program, shortened to CORDS, which worked to gain the support of South Vietnamese living in the countryside. The ARVN forces were backed up by U.S. Army helicopter units, as well as aircraft from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. American forces continued to maintain a large presence in logistical operations to support the South Vietnamese forces. In spring 1972, ARVN units were still recovering from the battles in February and March 1971 when they had made a limited incursion into Laos as part of Operation Lam Son 719, directed at NVA bases and supply depots. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. South Vietnam’s forces continued to be plagued by corruption, poor leadership and politicization of senior officers. They relied heavily on U.S. support and fire-

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y this time, President Richard Nixon had instituted a “Vietnamization” program to turn the conduct of the war over to the South Vietnamese. This program, announced in 1969, was developed to increase ARVN capabilities and bolster Thieu’s government so the South Vietnamese could stand on their own against communist forces. Strengthening ARVN capabilities would permit the eventual withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the senior U.S. headquarters for combat operations, increased the number of military advisers assigned to ARVN forces to improve their quality, a critical function of the Vietnamization program. Although MACV advisers had worked with South Vietnamese units since 1955, the importance of the advisory program increased as the number of American combat units dwindled. By the beginning of 1972, most U.S. ground combat forces had been withdrawn, leaving 136,500 troops on Jan. 31. By the end of March, the number had dropped to 95,500. On April 30, it was only 68,100. Aside from a few remaining infantry battalions, the only Americans on the ground in combat roles were advisers serving

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A U.S. Air Force F-4E Phantom II from the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, part of the American response to the communist attacks, is ready to take off from Da Nang for a bombing mission over North Vietnam on April 7, 1972.

power. It was clear that the South Vietnamese armed forces were a work in progress, and the Nixon administration realized their fighting capabilities had to be improved before the U.S. disengaged completely. Meanwhile, in Hanoi, Communist Party First Secretary Le Duan and his right-hand man, Le Duc Tho, decided the time was ripe for a large-scale offensive to deliver a knockout blow that would end the war on the North’s terms. They did not think the Americans had enough troops left in Vietnam to change the outcome once the offensive was launched and believed public disenchantment with the war in the U.S. would not permit Nixon to commit new troops or combat support to assist the ARVN. Le Duan and Le Duc Tho reasoned that a resounding North Vietnamese military victory would humiliate the president, force his administration to negotiate a peace agreement favorable to communist forces and perhaps even derail the Republican president’s reelection bid in November 1972, putting a Democratic opponent of the war in the White House. If a complete victory could not be achieved, the North Vietnamese believed they might at least seize enough territory to strengthen their position at the Paris peace negotiations. Defense Minister Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, perhaps remembering the military defeat of the 1968 Tet Offensive, urged caution, believing that the time was not right for another major offensive. However, Le Duan opted for a more aggressive strategy. Operational planning for the new offensive was led by Gen. Van Tien Dung. Throughout the latter half of 1971, Hanoi requested and received large quantities of modern weapons from the Soviet Union and Communist China. These included MiG-21 jets, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, Soviet T-54 (and Chinese variant Type-59) tanks, 130 mm guns, 160 mm mortars, 57 mm anti-aircraft guns and heat-seeking, shoulder-fired Strela antiaircraft missiles. War supplies such as spare parts, ammunition, trucks and fuel were shipped to North Vietnam in unprecedented quantities. The North Vietnamese planners thought the initial strikes south of the DMZ— including attacks on Hue and Da Nang, accompanied with pressure on South Vietnamese forces in the A Shau Valley to the west—would force Thieu to send his reserves to protect the northernmost provinces. The second assault, from Cambodia into Binh Long province, northwest of Saigon, would directly threaten the capital city. Then the attack in the Central Highlands would take Kontum and Binh Dinh provinces, splitting South Vietnam in two and potentially causing the collapse of the regime in Saigon.

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Easter Offensive March 30–Sept. 16, 1972

On March 30, 1972, North Vietnamese Army units crossed the Demilitarized Zone in the first phase of a three-pronged assault that struck not only northern South Vietnam but also the central and southern regions. While many towns throughout the country were attacked, the main centers of the fight were Quang Tri in the north, Kontum in the central region and An Loc near Saigon. The communist failed to take Kontum and An Loc. NVA forces captured Quang Tri, but the South Vietnamese, with U.S. assistance, drove them out on Sept. 16.

.S. forces expected some kind of attack after the first of the year, perhaps during the Tet holiday in February 1972. However, Tet passed quietly. Intelligence indicated that an offensive was still in the making, yet there were few indications that it would involve the largest concentration of communist conventional forces assembled thus far. In the March 30 attack, the newly formed ARVN 3rd Division assigned to defend Quang Tri was overwhelmed. Many units fled in panic. By April 2, Easter Sunday, the ARVN 56th Regiment and the bulk of the supporting long-range artillery units at Camp Carroll had surrendered to the APRIL 2022

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Force AC-130 Spectre gunships, the city fell the next day, giving the enemy a direct route down Highway 13 through An Loc and Lai Khe to Saigon, just 65 miles south. After the fall of Loc Ninh, the VC-NVA 5th, 7th and 9th divisions moved south rapidly. Although the 5th and 9th divisions were designated “VC,” they were manned by NVA regulars. The communists quickly overran a two-battalion task force between Loc Ninh and An Loc, then unexplainably paused before moving toward An Loc, which provided time for the city’s defenders to prepare. When the North Vietnamese resumed their advance, they soon surrounded An Loc and blocked Highway 13 south of the city, effectively cutting off the ARVN defenders from ground reinforcement and resupply. Thieu radioed senior ARVN commanders in An Loc that the city would be “defended to the death.” In the early morning on April 13, NVA gunners began shelling An Loc with mortars, rockets and heavy artillery. Shortly after daybreak, the bombardment was followed by a massive infantry attack supported by T-54 and PT-76 tanks. South Vietnamese forces in An Loc, under the command of the ARVN 5th Division, fought the attackers in close urban combat. Bell AH-1G Cobra attack helicopters from a reinforced 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) took on the tanks in An Loc. Additional help came from U.S. Air Force, Navy and

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NVA 308th Division. The rest of the ARVN 3rd Division fell back to the Mieu Giang River, just south of the DMZ. South Vietnamese marines and several new M48A3 tanks set up a hurried defensive line south of the Cua Viet River at Dong Ha, also near the DMZ. The marines initially held back the North Vietnamese trying to cross a bridge from the north side of the river, but ultimately the order was given to destroy it. U.S. Marine adviser Capt. John Ripley and a group of ARVN engineers blew the bridge, forcing the enemy to cross farther west. The delayed NVA crossing provided some breathing room for the defenders at Quang Tri city, but it was a brief respite. The NVA 304th Division and the attached 203rd Tank Regiment crossed the Mieu Giang River at Cam Lo and continued toward Quang Tri, rolling up the South Vietnamese western flank and pushing eastward toward the coast. Brig. Gen. Vu Van Giai, the ARVN 3rd Divi“Use sion commander, used what was left of his unit whatever plus reinforcements from a Vietnamese marine air you brigade and nine ARVN ranger battalions to establish a defensive line paralleling Highway 1 need to turn this thing from Dong Ha south to Quang Tri. By April 8, this force had repulsed several attacks, but around,” poor flying weather precluded much-needed Nixon told air support. Air Force As the ARVN soldiers and Vietnamese maGen. John rines held on tenuously in the north, the NVA W. Vogt. attacked Binh Long province. Following a feint toward Tay Ninh on April 5, the Viet Cong 5th Division, supported by two companies from the 203rd Tank Regiment struck Loc Ninh, 12 miles from the Cambodian border. Defended only by one infantry regiment from the ARVN 5th Division and a squadron from the 1st Armored Regiment, Loc Ninh was quickly surrounded and pummeled by heavy artillery. Despite the efforts of close air support and U.S. Air

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An ARVN M48 tank crew on a defensive line south of the Cua Viet River at Dong Ha engages NVA forces on the north bank on April 5, 1972.

Marine fighter-bombers, as well as AC-130 gunships. Shored up by air support, the ARVN defenders held their ground against the assault—just barely. They had been pushed into an area less than a square mile. Meanwhile, waves of Air Force B-52 bomber strikes took a heavy toll on the attackers and prevented them from massing all their forces against the defenders. As the attack in Binh Long province unfolded, the North Vietnamese launched the third prong of their offensive. In early April, ARVN firebases and outposts north of Kontum in the Central Highlands had come under several probing attacks. In response, B-52s struck suspected staging areas along the Cambodian and Laotian borders. No major attacks in the Highlands materialized, but on April 5 the North Vietnamese struck the two northernmost districts of Binh Dinh province to the east of Kontum province. The defending 40th Regiment of the ARVN 22nd Division fell back in the face of the onslaught. Lt. Gen. Ngo Dzu, the top ARVN commander in central Vietnam, and his U.S. adviser, civilian John Paul Vann, had a decision to make: Send troops from Kontum to reinforce Binh Dinh or keep them in defense of Kontum. On April 12, while they were trying to decide, the NVA attacked Kontum city with a rocket and artillery barrage. Then a tank-supported infantry assault by the NVA 320th Division hit outposts stretching from Kontum to Tan Canh, northwest of the city. The defenders from the ARVN 2nd Airborne Brigade and several ranger battalions were in a desperate situation, but B-52 strikes enabled them to hold on against repeated ground attacks. Elsewhere in the Central Highlands, on April 19, the NVA 2nd Division supported by the 203rd Tank Regiment struck the ARVN 22nd Division at Tan Canh and nearby Dak To. South Vietnam’s U.S.-made M-41 light tanks proved no match for the heavier Soviet-supplied TOP: ARVN soldiers T-54s. When the North Vietnamese sent in rein- face heavy fire as forcements, both Tan Canh and Dak To fell. The they try to advance fighting at Chon road south to Kontum was clear. The NVA, as at An in Thanh, near An Loc Loc, did not press its advantage, again for unknown north of Saigon reasons. Kontum’s defenders had time to prepare during 1972. RIGHT: A trooper with the for the next round. South Vietnamese

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Airborne Division

some time to ith most U.S. combat troops already gets rest while he waits departed, Nixon knew the only major for a helicopter at a U.S. asset available to meet the North landing site in An Loc on April 16, 1972. Vietnamese offensive was air power. Formidable numbers of combat aircraft were already stationed in South Vietnam, at bases in Thailand and on carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Nixon buttressed those numbers on April 9 when he ordered Operation Constant Guard, which sent the equivalent of 15 squadrons of strike aircraft to South Vietnam. He eventually increased the number of carriers in the South China Sea from two to six, which effectively doubled the availability of close air support aircraft. Nixon also ordered additional B-52s to Guam and Thailand for potential use in Vietnam. He told Air Force Gen. John W. Vogt, newly appointed commander of the 7th Air Force: “I want you to get down there [Saigon] and use whatever air you need to turn this thing around…stop this offensive.” This vast air armada pounded the North Vietnamese attackers at An Loc, Kontum and Quang Tri. To stem the flow of reinforcements and supplies to North Vietnamese forces in the South, American aircraft attacked supply lines, logistics facilities and supporting military infrastructure from the DMZ to the 20th parallel, which ruled out strikes on Hanoi and the port at Haiphong, above that line. On April 16, Nixon approved a one-day attack on key logistics nodes in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.

Even with the additional air support, the situation in northern South Vietnam deteriorated. On April 14, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, the ARVN commander in that region, ordered Giai, the ARVN 3rd Division commander, to retake Cam Lo, Camp Carroll and Mai Loc, near Camp Carroll, to reestablish a defensive line in the north. The South Vietnamese troops were worn out, and the counterattack was poorly planned and executed. By April 17, it had failed after advancing less than half a mile. APRIL 2022

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In the middle of a street in Kontum, a major target of the NVA offensive in the Central Highlands, regional militia hunker down in a sandbag bunker, ready to confront the enemy threat. BELOW LEFT: Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, outside his headquarters at Hue, replaced an ineffectual commander in the northern region.

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ith Quang Tri lost and An Loc and Kontum still besieged, Nixon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff removed all restrictions on bombing North Vietnam. On May 8, the president ordered the commencement of Operation Linebacker. In some of the most intense bombing of the entire war, B-52s and fighterbombers pounded Hanoi and Haiphong. Simultaneously, A-7 Corsair II and A-6 Intruder attack planes from USS Coral Sea dropped into Haiphong Harbor 36 Mark 52 1,000-pound electromagnetic aerial mines—which explode when the hull of a metal ship passes over them—in an attempt to cut off supplies arriving by sea. Additional aircraft dropped mines on the smaller ports of Cam Pha and Hoi Gai north of Haiphong, as well as the river estuaries at Thanh Hoa, Vinh, Qung Khe and Dong Hoi. At the same time that aircraft were striking the Hanoi-Haiphong area, 7th Air Force commander Vogt initiated what he described as “the most intensive in-country interdiction campaign of the war” against North Vietnamese supply lines and base areas in the south. The continuous pounding of North Vietnam, the blockade of its major ports and the interdiction campaign hampered the ability of the communist forces in South Vietnam to sustain their offensive. The strengthened air support in the South removed some pressure from the ARVN

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The North Vietnamese continued to hammer Quang Tri from three sides. On April 27, cloud cover again precluded effective close air support, and the NVA 304th Division increased the intensity of its attack. Thousands of South Vietnamese refugees flooded Highway 1, rushing toward Hue. NVA gunners killed many of those fleeing south along what became known as the “Highway of Death.” On May 1, the city of Quang Tri fell. The rest of Quang Tri province came under NVA control two days later. The NVA offensive stalled, and the fighting in northern provinces degenerated into a bloody stalemate. To the south, the fighting continued at An Loc and Kontum. Concerned about North Vietnamese forces inching closer to Saigon, Thieu ordered the ARVN 21st Division in the Mekong Delta to relieve the besieged defenders in An Loc. By this time, the NVA 7th Division was entrenched across the highway south of the town. The ARVN relief column quickly bogged down. An Loc suffered repeated ground attacks and around-the-clock shelling. The ARVN defenders, reinforced with the South Vietnamese 1st Airborne Brigade and aided by their U.S. advisers and U.S. air power, held their ground against overwhelming odds but suffered heavy casualties. During the battle for An Loc, B-52s flew 252 missions. There were also 9,023 tactical airstrikes, including attacks by AC-130 Spectre gunships. In the Central Highlands, hard-pressed South Vietnamese forces also held out against the NVA juggernaut. As at An Loc, air power proved to be decisive. During a three-week period, there were 300 B-52 strikes in support of the Central Highlands’ defenders.

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ground forces. Yet intense fighting persisted throughout summer all over South Vietnam as the NVA continued its ground attacks while pulverizing the defenders with heavy artillery, rockets and mortars. It was clear, however, that the relentless fire of attack helicopters, strike aircraft, AC-130 gunships and B-52s was taking a heavy toll on the North Vietnamese troops. Things began to look up for the South Vietnamese at An Loc and Kontum. With the situation somewhat stabilized in the central and southern regions, Thieu’s top priority was the lost territory in the northern region. The South Vietnamese president replaced Lam, the commander in the north, with Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong. One of the best ARVN generals, Truong energized his men and began preparing a counteroffensive to retake Quang Tri and other enemy-held positions in that area. The new offensive, Lam Son 72, began June 28 with a two-pronged assault across the My Chanh River. The South Vietnamese Airborne Division attacked Quang Tri from the south paralleling Highway 1, while the marines, supported by the 1st Ranger Group and the 7th Armored Cavalry, moved northward to strike from the southeast. At the same time, Truong ordered the 1st Division to secure Hue and his rear area while the 2nd Division conducted operations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces to the south. Backed with air support, Truong’s forces made slow but steady progress. On July 7, the 2nd Airborne Brigade reached the outskirts of Quang Tri, but the North Vietnamese stiffened their defenses with reinforcements. Truong requested additional air support. U.S. aircraft flew nearly 7,500 sorties in July. Despite heavy casualties from the airstrikes, North Vietnamese soldiers doggedly held the territory they had taken. The battle for Quang Tri and surrounding areas became a bloody slugfest. Covered by massive air support, Truong realigned his forces and directed the marines to make the main attack. By Sept. 16, after several weeks of intense urban fighting, the marines retook the city and raised the South Vietnamese flag over the heavily damaged Quang Tri citadel. he recapture of Quang Tri effectively signaled the end of the Easter Offensive. The South Vietnamese forces had also prevailed in An Loc and Kontum. Estimates placed North Vietnamese casualties at more than 100,000 killed. North Vietnam also lost at least half of its large-caliber artillery and tanks. South Vietnamese casualties were approximately 10,000 killed and 33,000 wounded. There were 759

In an April 26, 1972, television address, shown here, President Richard Nixon said South Vietnam’s performance in combat demonstrated that “we can continue our program of withdrawing American forces.”

Americans killed in Vietnam during the year 1972. The South Vietnamese celebrated a great victory. They had withstood everything the communists threw against them in some of the heaviest fighting of the war. That victory, however, was achieved with massive amounts of U.S. air support, and the battles had been close. Many ARVN soldiers had fought valiantly against overwhelming odds, but some South Vietnamese military leaders and units had not done well. In the end, the NVA controlled more territory in South Vietnam than before, and Hanoi believed itself in a stronger position at the Paris negotiations. In a TV address on April 26, well before the outcome was certain, Nixon had forecast that when the fighting was over “the Easter South Vietnamese will then have demonstrated Offensive their ability to defend themselves on the ground against future enemy attacks.” He added, “VietnamMARCH 30–SEPT. 16, 1972 ization has proved itself sufficiently that we can conNVA KILLED tinue our program of withdrawing American forces without detriment to our overall goal of ensuring South Vietnam’s survival as an independent counARVN KILLED try.” He announced that over the next two months 20,000 more American troops would be withdrawn. The South Vietnamese victory became one of the U.S. KILLED rationales for complete U.S. withdrawal and Nixon’s “peace with honor.” The Paris negotiations proFULL YEAR 1972 duced an agreement for ending the war in January 1973. On March 29, 1973, MACV cased its colors, and the last American troops departed South Vietnam. Nixon promised Thieu that the United States would support South Vietnam if Hanoi launched new offensives. The South Vietnamese fought on alone, performing well in 1973 in renewed fighting. By the end of 1974, however, the North Vietnamese had rebuilt their forces in the South. As the North Vietnamese became stronger, the South Vietnamese became weaker, lacking the support promised by Nixon, forced to resign in August 1974 during the Watergate scandal. When the NVA launched an offensive the next spring, South Vietnamese forces succumbed in 55 days. Saigon surrendered unconditionally on April 30, 1975. V

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James H. Willbanks is a retired Army lieutenant colonel and decorated Vietnam veteran. He is the author or editor of 21 books on the Vietnam War and other aspects of military history. During the 1972 Easter Offensive, Willbanks, then a captain, was an adviser with a South Vietnamese infantry unit at An Loc. He lives in Georgetown, Texas. APRIL 2022

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THE LONGEST FIGHT THE 81-DAY BATTLE TO DRIVE THE NVA FROM QUANG TRI IN 1972

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By John D. Howard

lose to enemy sanctuaries north of the Demilitarized Zone and in neighboring Laos, Quang Tri province was a constant battleground. North Vietnam’s Communist Party Politburo members called it the “blazing front.” Today the old citadel fortress in Quang Tri city, the capital of South Vietnam’s northernmost province, is a memorial park dedicated to the North Vietnamese Army’s 1975 victory over the so-called “Saigon regime and its imperialist allies.” The town and citadel were restored in the early 1980s when Communist Party Secretary Le Duan designated Quang Tri a “valiant revolutionary city.” It is a popular attraction for school children, aging NVA veterans and foreign tourists. Tour guides extol the heroism of the citadel’s communist defenders during the 1972 Spring-Summer Offensive and decry the tonnage of American bombs dropped, calling it “wanton desecration.” They don’t tell tourists that the NVA overran the citadel on May 1, 1972, and South Vietnam’s marines successfully recaptured it five months later. The attack to oust the NVA from Quang Tri city was the longest single battle of the Vietnam War—lasting 81 days, June 28-Sept. 16, 1972.

PHOTO CREDITS

THE OPENING SALVO of North Vietnam’s offensive occurred on March 30, the Thursday before Easter. Commonly called the Easter Offensive, it was the largest offensive of the war. The communists attacked with conventional large army units aiming for a decisive victory, eschewing the guerrilla and small-unit fighters previously used to draw out the conflict

and wear down the Americans until they tired of the war and left. The protracted conflict strategy was discarded in favor of a “go-for-broke” gamble to decisively defeat the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and topple President Nguyen Van Thieu’s government. NVA forces stormed across the DMZ and out of Laos along Highway 9, heading for the former imperial capital of Hue, the cultural hub of South Vietnam—the first of three assaults in different regions of the country. At dawn on April 3, the NVA attacked firebases in the Central Highlands, a precursor to striking Kontum city with the ultimate goal of severing the country at its midsection. Farther south four days later, in the area around Saigon, the NVA overran Loc Ninh, a well-defended outpost on the CambodiA U.S. Army Cobra attack an border, and encircled An Loc, helicopter hovers over South Vietnamese marines and U.S. only 60 miles from the capital. transported by other The northern NVA juggernaut, advisers helos on May 13, 1972, to a 30,000-40,000 troops from three location where they plan to battle-toughened divisions (the strike enemy forces that captured Quang Tri early in 304th, 308th and 325C), accom- the Easter Offensive. panied by 200 tanks and air defense batteries, struck a thinly stretched brigade of the Vietnamese marine corps and the ARVN 3rd Division. The commander of South Vietnam’s forces in the northern provinces, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, head of the army’s Da Nangbased I Corps, disregarded intelligence reports indicating that enemy had massed large formations across the DMZ and directed a rotation of troops between two 3rd Division firebases

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The Airborne Division traced its lineage back to parachute battalions organized to fight alongside French forces during France’s colonial rule, which ended in 1954 with the establishment of North and South Vietnam. Those airborne units were organized into an ARVN Airborne Group in May 1955, then into a brigade and achieved division status on December 1965. The division was under the direct control of the Joint General Staff. In 1975, the paratroopers kept fighting until the government surrendered on April 30. 32

withdrawal to positions near the town of Dong Ha. South Vietnamese delaying actions provided some respite, and U.S. airstrikes slowed the invaders. However, attempts to establish a cohesive defense were frustrated by I Corps commander Lam’s flurry of conflicting and uncoordinated orders. On April 28, Dong Ha fell. Three days later Quang Tri city was abandoned by disheartened, retreating troops. Highway 1 leading out of town was littered with the flotsam of war as soldiers and civilian refugees fled south. Panic ensued when the NVA fired on the columns. Wounded were left where they fell. Vehicles of every type were abandoned. The leaderless rabble, a mix of soldiers and civilians, streamed into Hue and created chaos with drunken rampages and looting. The South Vietnamese marines retained their discipline and blocked the NVA advance with a steadfast defensive line along the My Chanh River, 15 miles from Hue.

THE EARLY COMMUNIST SUCCESSES reinforced the optimism of Politburo war hawks and marginalized members who had counseled caution. Le Duan, leader of the militant faction, was adamant that the political climate in the United States would prevent a strong response from President Richard Nixon because 1972 was

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Vietnamese Airborne

on March 29. His ill-timed order added to the turmoil when the NVA attacked the next day. The South Vietnamese marines and the 3rd Division manned positions just south of the DMZ and in the western foothills. All were under heavy attack on Easter Sunday, April 2, when a disaster occurred. ARVN Lt. Col. Pham Van Dinh, commander of the 3rd Division’s 56th Regiment, surrendered his entire unit and Camp Carroll, a former U.S. Marine Corps firebase. Dinh made no attempt to destroy large ammunition stocks or disable more than 20 artillery pieces, including four 175 mm guns. Two U.S. Army regimental advisers, Lt. Col. Bill Camper and Maj. Joe Brown, sent a terse radio message stating they were leaving. For security reasons they did not say the 56th Regiment was surrendering en masse. A recently arrived lieutenant colonel, far from the action, sent a frantic order: “Stay at your post!” He did not understand that the judgment of advisers on the ground was to be accepted without question. Camper and Brown disregarded the command, avoided capture and escaped aboard a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook transport helicopter piloted by Capt. Harry Thain, who received a Silver Star for the daring rescue. The loss of Camp Carroll precipitated a general

PREVIOUS: AP PHOTO/J.T. WOLKERSTORFER; AP PHOTO/LO HUNG

South Vietnamese troops turn the twin 40 mm guns of an M42A1 Duster, an anti-aircraft vehicle on an M41 tank chassis, toward North Vietnamese positions along Route 1 on July 22, 1972. A counteroffensive to dislodge the North Vietnamese from Quang Tri was initiated in June.

AKG-IMAGES / ULLSTEIN BILD; MAP: JON C. BOCK

PREVIOUS: AP PHOTO/J.T. WOLKERSTORFER; AP PHOTO/LO HUNG

a presidential election year and the American public was viewed as war weary. That was a gross misreading of the U.S. president. At this point in the war, however, the options for a strong U.S. response were limited. On April 30, 1972, there were 68,100 American troops in Vietnam, down from a high of 543,100 in April 1969. That year the Nixon administration initiated a Vietnamization program, which gradually withdrew U.S. troops while shifting ground combat responsibilities to the South Vietnamese. Only two U.S. combat brigades remained, one in northern South Vietnam and one in the Saigon region, although their main mission was protecting U.S. air bases and logistical facilities. Nixon ruled out reintroducing ground troops but retaliated with air power. He dispatched additional aircraft to Southeast Asia, resumed bombing “up north” and ordered the mining of North Vietnam’s seaports. Eventually, 206 B-52 bombers and more than 800 jet fighters, U.S. Air Force and carrier-based aircraft, were available for the fight. Yet in early May, South Vietnam was in grave peril. The loss of Quang Tri and rioting in Hue convinced Thieu that Lam had to go. The president replaced him with Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the Mekong Delta forces and considered the country’s best soldier. Truong and trusted assistants arrived at I Corps in less than 24 hours. He set about restoring order, improving defenses and planning a counterattack. The new commander set the tone when he moved the I Corps main command from Da Nang to Hue’s citadel, which had been a small forward command post manned by just a few officers and U.S. advisers. Lam visited the post but

A destroyed South Vietnamese M41 tank lies among the ruins of Quang Tri after the city was retaken, The prominence of tanks distinguished the Easter Offensive from most Vietnam combat.

NORTH VIETNAM

308TH NVA DIV

DEMILITARIZED ZONE

ARTILLERY

GULF OF TONKIN

ARTILLERY

DIVISION 325C

MIEU GIANG RIVER

TO LAOS

Cam Lo

CAM LO RIVER

304TH NVA DIV

Camp Carroll

CUA VIET RIVER

Dong Ha Ai Tu Combat Base

ARVN 3RD DIV HQ

Quang Tri

ARTILLERY

THACH HAN RIVER

MY CHANH RIVER To Hue

SOUTH V IETNA M

The Battle for Quang Tri Spring–Summer 1972

Three divisions of the North Vietnamese Army charged into South Vietnam’s Quang Tri province on March 30,1972, the beginning of what became known as the Easter Offensive. Two divisions came across the Demilitarized Zone. A third entered from Laos along Highway 9. Camp Carroll fell on Easter Sunday, April 2. Dong Ha was lost on April 28. And Quang Tri was captured on May 1. After a counteroffensive launched on June 28, South Vietnamese units kicked the NVA out of Quang Tri on Sept. 16.

always returned to his Da Nang headquarters for an afternoon tennis match and dinner at home. Officers assigned to the First Regional Assistance Command, the I Corps advisory team, called Lam “the absentee warlord.” The My Chanh River line needed reinforcement. Truong appealed to Thieu for additional troops. On May 8, the 2nd Airborne Brigade arrived and strengthened the marine line. Two weeks later, the 3rd Airborne Brigade and the division headquarters were flown to Hue. The best units—the Marine Division, the Airborne Division and the ARVN 1st Division—were now under Truong’s command. A stabilized front allowed the general to become more aggressive. Brigade 369 of the South Vietnamese marines initiated a two-battalion airmobile assault in the NVA rear just south of Quang Tri city. Two days later, on May 15, the ARVN 1st Division retook the old U.S. firebase Bastogne, strengthening the western approach into Hue. South Vietnamese troops continued to battle their adversary, and American advisers used U.S. airstrikes with devastating effectiveness. The I Corps counteroffensive to push the enemy back across the DMZ, code named Lam Son 72, went through multiple iterations. Thieu directed Truong to recapture Quang Tri city, the only provincial capital in enemy hands, before advancing farther north. The town had no strategic value, and Truong wanted to bypass it, destroy NVA units and retake lost terrain, but the president’s order condemned the airborne and marine divisions to a bloody urban brawl. Elaborate deception measures were employed to confuse the enemy about APRIL 2022

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LAM SON 72 KICKED OFF on June 28 when marines and paratroopers made a night assault across the My Chanh River. Even though the plan had been compromised, they faced limited resistance. Encouraged, senior ARVN officers expected to secure Quang Tri city in nine days. The projection was wildly off the mark. The advancing troops were aided by B-52 strikes, massive air support, U.S. naval gunfire and an airmobile assault by two battalions of South Vietnamese paratroopers and two battalions of Vietnamese marines, who landed behind the main line of resistance. Even so, the Airborne Division took a week to reach the outskirts of the city. The measured pace gave the enemy time to fortify the citadel. Built in 1824, the fort’s four sides measured 1,640 feet in length and were all protected by a wide moat. The thick brick walls were nearly 30 feet high with a tower at each corner of the square. 34

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the time and location of the attack. A parachute drop and an amphibious landing in the enemy rear were two ruses that were “leaked.” The deceptions, however, weren’t particularly effective because the NVA headquarters in the region received detailed information about the offensive from a spy on the I Corps staff.

The Airborne Division commander, Lt. Gen. Du Quoc Dong, ordered the 2nd Brigade, consisting of three battalions of 2,000-plus paratroopers, to take the town. Col. Tran Quoc Lich assured the general that his brigade would do it quickly and stocked bottles of vintage champagne in anticipation of a victory celebration. Despite those assurances, Lich insisted on a cautious advance. Maj. Le Van Me, an extraordinarily capable officer who commanded the brigade’s lead unit, the 11th Airborne Battalion, knew Lich’s caution had cost his battalion the initiative. Me’s U.S. adviser, Capt. Gail “Woody” Furrow, told another adviser: “We had ’em on the run! We should bypass that town [Quang Tri] and head to the DMZ.” The NVA commander in the region, Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang, knew Thieu would do whatever it took to recover the provincial capital. To ensure a bloody fight, he shifted several infantry regiments into the citadel and used another to construct fortifications inside in the city. Mortars and artillery tubes, particularly Soviet-made 130 mm field guns, were repositioned to provide maximum fire support. The 130 mm guns sent 70-pound projectiles about 17 miles, well beyond the range of the 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers on the South Vietnamese side. NVA artillery and mortars inflicted the bulk of the South Vietnamese casualties. The 2nd Airborne Brigade assault commenced on July 10. Two battalions, the 6th and the 11th, attacked from the south, while the 5th Airborne Battalion made the main thrust from the northeast. The 5th and 6th Airborne battalions, which had arrived on June 25, were understrength from fighting in An Loc from April through mid-June. Capt. Earl Isabell, an adviser with the 5th Battalion, later said: “We were designated the main attack but weren’t given additional troops. We needed several more companies. New recruits had just arrived but were barely trained. Plus, experienced leaders lost in An Loc had not been replaced. We were at a hell of a disadvantage.” The 6th and 11th Airborne battalions gained footholds in the outskirts of the city, but the NVA fought from house to house, giving ground only grudgingly. Progress was measured in yards and buildings seized.

AP PHOTO

As the North Vietnamese Army approaches Quang Tri on April 29, hundreds of inhabitants look for a ride out. The exodus degenerated into a mad rush to Hue. The NVA entered Quang Tri on May 1.

ADN-BILDARCHIV/ULLSTEIN BILD VIA GETTY IMAGES

AP PHOTO

The Marine division’s 1st Battalion launched an airmobile assault about a mile northeast of Quang Tri city the morning of July 11 to stop traffic on Route 560, the communist defenders’ main supply line, paralleling the Thach Han River. The battalion was transported by 34 U.S. Marine Corps helicopters and escorted by six U.S. Army Cobra attack helicopters. The operation was supported by naval gunfire and B-52 strikes but still faced heavy opposition. A hail of small-arms fire and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles greeted the helicopters. One CH-53 Sea Stallion and two CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters carrying South Vietnamese marines were shot down. One chopper inadvertently landed near a well-camouflaged NVA T-54 tank. A Cobra armed with anti-tank missiles knocked out the tank. Maj. Nguyen Dang Hoa, commander of the 1st Battalion, and his adviser, U.S. Marine Capt. Lawrence Livingston, led assaults on July 11 that destroyed NVA fortifications blocking the advance. Livingston was awarded the Navy Cross for his gallantry. The battle continued for three days. By July 14, Route 560 was closed to enemy traffic. The NVA had to find an alternative way to resupply its troops in Quang Tri.

THE 5TH AIRBORNE BATTALION made the main attack on the night of July 11. Preparatory artillery fire and 18 U.S. Air Force sorties softened the citadel’s fortifications. Nevertheless, the NVA defenders stopped the 5th Battalion short of the citadel wall. Friendly losses were 25 dead and more than 100 wounded. A ban on U.S. airstrikes within the city was instituted on July 15 because Thieu wanted Quang Tri recaptured without American assistance. He was perturbed by reports that U.S. air power had saved the day at An Loc and Kontum. Over Truong’s objections, an imaginary circle was drawn around the city. U.S. airstrikes were prohibited within that area. The NVA, not content to remain on the defensive, staged attacks to disrupt the efforts of ARVN units to coordinate their operations. It attacked the 5th Battalion on July 15 and almost overran the command post. For an unexplained reason the attack was halted when success was within the NVA’s grasp. Two days later, a similar attack struck the 6th Battalion, resulting in hand-to-hand combat before the North Vietnamese withdrew. ARVN paratroopers pressed forward, but gains were limited and casualties mounted. The communists spared no resources to support their defense because holding Quang Tri was Hanoi’s top priority. Although Route 560 was blocked, ferries

on the Thach Han River shuttled men, supplies Viet Cong fire anti-aircraft and replacement equipment to the citadel, ensur- guns, purportedly in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces ing that the NVA maintained its numerical advan- in 1972. Anti-aircraft weapons tage. Meanwhile, the Saigon government, scrap- were a threat to the U.S. and fighters that ing the bottom of the personnel barrel, struggled bombers provided vital air support for to keep up with requests for replacements. South Vietnamese troops. The 2nd Airborne Brigade commander was directed to launch another attack. This time the 5th Battalion was reinforced with two additional companies from the elite 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion and a tank platoon. Before the night attack on July 23, a U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantom was permitted to drop a 2,000-pound laser-guided bomb on the citadel’s northeast rampart, allowing the 5th Battalion to surge into the fortress. When daylight came, the U.S. air restriction was again imposed, and the South Vietnamese air force was called upon to help expand the penetration. One plane accidentally dropped three 500-pound bombs amid the paratroopers, killing 45 and seriously wounding 100. The 5th Battalion was forced to withdraw, ending the attack. The two-week fight annihilated the 2nd Airborne Brigade. The 5th Battalion was the hardA ban on est hit. The 600-man unit suffered 98 killed U.S. airstrikes and 400 wounded. The other two battalions within the were in no better shape. Four of six American city was advisers were wounded and hospitalized. instituted The Vietnamese Marine Division relieved because Thieu the Airborne Division on July 27. One U.S. wanted Quang Marine adviser was startled by what he saw at Tri: “The once prosperous city resemTri recaptured Quang bled Berlin in 1945. Artillery and bomb craters without were everywhere. Most structures were comAmerican pletely destroyed. Only the shells of sturdy assistance. buildings were still upright.” Most marines believed they would quickly prevail where the paratroopers had failed. Their optimism was soon dashed when the initial attack floundered after running up against an entrenched, numerically superior force. U.S. Marine Maj. Richard Rothwell, an adviser with the Vietnamese Marine 5th Battalion, blamed part of the problem on the Airborne Division’s failure to secure the marines’ left flank. Several old forts west of Highway 1 were manned by the NVA and said to be firing on APRIL 2022

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THROUGHOUT AUGUST house-to-house fighting and continual artillery barrages caused more South Vietnamese losses. Since March 30, the 15,000-strong Marine Division had suffered 1,358 men killed and 5,500 wounded. Fighting took a similar toll on their U.S. advisers. In early July, the Marine Advisory Unit had to make an urgent request for nine officers to replace casualties. Lan’s repeated pleas for more troops were answered on Sept. 8, when the three battalions of the 1st Ranger Group relieved Marine Brigade 147 north of the city, freeing more battalions for the assault. Lan now had six battalions, four in the south and two in the north, to commit to the task. He drew a boundary through the middle of 36

1954, after a July 1954 treaty ended French control, creating North and South Vietnam. In the following years, the corps was expanded. It was designated the Marine Division in October 1968. Technically part of the navy, the division operated as an independent command directed by the Joint General Staff. When South Vietnam fell on April 30,1975, the marines were still holding their assigned territory.

THE EVENT was big news worldwide, although some American newspapers, citing the casualties and the battered landscape, called it a Pyrrhic victory. An intercepted communist dispatch blamed the NVA loss on American bombing: “The U.S. had schemed to level this area and turn Quang Tri

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TOP: AP PHOTO/NICK UT; TOP LEFT: AP PHOTO/JACQUES TONNAIRE; RIGHT: AP PHOTO

the advancing marine units. Earlier, Me, the 11th Airborne Battalion commander, had stated that the forts were too far away to hinder an advance along the axis used by the marines. Regardless, the I Corps staff failed to assign responsibility for the forts and establish exact boundaries between the two divisions. These were major oversights in conventional warfare’s standard operating procedures, a result of years of small-unit operations and the corps staff rarely operating in a tactical environment. An attack on Aug. 3 also bogged down. Thieu was forced to lift restrictions on U.S. airstrikes within Quang Tri, but that decision made little Vietnamese difference as the battle evolved into duels that Marines pitted South Vietnamese artillery and U.S. airThe Vietnamese marine strikes against NVA artillery. The Marine Divicorps, a descendant of sion simply did not have sufficient forces to overbattalions formed during come the enemy. Brig. Gen. Bui The Lan, the France’s colonial rule, division commander, needed assistance. was organized in October

AP PHOTO

A member of South Vietnam’s Airborne Division shoulders his machine gun to fire on NVA bunkers in house-to-house fighting near the center of Quang Tri on July 16, 1972. The struggle for the city in July also included hand-to-hand combat.

the citadel, placing Brigade 147 in the north and Brigade 258 in the south. The 6th Battalion was directed to attack from the southeast. To draw the enemy’s attention away from Quang Tri, the U.S. 7th fleet organized a fake amphibious landing. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade went through all the motions, including false radio traffic, reconnaissance of landing beaches and embarking 400 ARVN rangers aboard U.S. landing craft. On Sept. 9, naval gunfire, tactical air sorties and a B-52 bomb strike pummeled the beach due east of Quang Tri city. When the bombing stopped, NVA troops moved out of their bunkers to confront the landing forces. They were caught in a barrage of naval gunfire and sustained heavy losses. Amphibious vehicles and U.S. Marine helicopters approached the shoreline but turned back short of the beach. While the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade held the enemy’s attention, the attack on the citadel began. The NVA had responded to the 7th Fleet threat by repositioning some of its artillery, which reduced its fire on the attacking brigades. The South Vietnamese marines still faced a tough fight. Rubble created by the bombardment made excellent defensive positions, and a labyrinth of NVA tunnels withstood some of the fire. On the night of Sept. 9, Lt. Col. Do Huu Tung, commander of the 6th Battalion, sent a reconnaissance patrol into the citadel. The patrol reported scanty opposition, and Tung launched an attack the following evening. By first light on Sept. 11, a company lodgment was established inside the southeast corner of the fortress. Tung rushed more marines in. Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd battalions fought their way to the Thach Han River, closing it off for enemy use. The NVA counterattacked, but the marines held on to their hard-earned gains. To the north, the 3rd and 7th battalions cleared the area of communist forces. On the morning of Sept. 15, the 3rd Battalion forced its way into the citadel. The NVA began a massive artillery bombardment to keep the 3rd Battalion and 6th Battalion apart, but the two units linked up by late afternoon. On Sept. 16, at 12:45 p.m., the South Vietnamese flag was raised over the west gate of the citadel, signifying the end of 138 days of NVA occupation.

TOP: AP PHOTO/NICK UT; TOP LEFT: AP PHOTO/JACQUES TONNAIRE; RIGHT: AP PHOTO

AP PHOTO

Town into a land of death with no place for revolutionary forces.” In South Vietnam, the recovery of the last provincial capital in enemy hands was cause for great rejoicing. On Sept. 20, Thieu visited the Marine Division to congratulate the commander, officers and men. Promotions and decorations were liberally awarded. U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Howard Cooksey, commander of the First Regional Assistance Command, recommended the entire Marine Division for the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation. There is no evidence that the award was officially presented. Minor attacks to eliminate small pockets of resistance continued, but the battle lines between the two armies stabilized. An airborne adviser observed: “They were like two fighters in the 14th or 15th round. They could hardly do anything but hold on to each other.” The South Vietnamese pride in rebuffing the largest offensive of the war was diluted by the terms of the Paris Peace Accords, which were signed on Jan. 27, 1973. The agreement allowed more than 100,000 NVA troops to remain within South Vietnam’s borders, placing the country in an

TOP: After the South Vietnamese retake Quang Tri on Sept. 16, dangers still linger in the rubble as an NVA artillery shell explodes. ABOVE LEFT: On July 15, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, who commanded the successful operation, visited the marine headquarters north of Hue, where captured weapons were on display. RIGHT: The victor’s flag waves over a bunker at Quang Tri’s citadel on Sept. 17.

untenable position. The Thach Han River, 13 miles south of the DMZ border established by the 1954 Geneva Accords, became the new boundary between the two Vietnams. The truce gave the North Vietnamese time to reconstitute their battered army. A hostile U.S. Congress added to South Vietnam’s disadvantage by reducing military aid, and Nixon, battered by the Watergate scandal, resigned in disgrace in August 1974. In early 1975, North Vietnam resumed its military campaign to conquer the South. The old revolutionaries in Hanoi were sure the United States would not intervene. This time they were right. On March 19, 1975, the NVA overwhelmed the ARVN line along the Thach Han River. The defenders fell back, and the enemy immediately occupied Quang Tri city, setting off a chain reaction that swept up cities across South Vietnam. On April 30, 1975, NVA tanks crashed through the gates of Saigon’s presidential palace. The Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist. V

During the 1972 battle for Quang Tri city, John Howard was on his second tour in Vietnam, serving as senior adviser with the 6th Airborne Battalion. He was wounded on July 26, 1972, the day before the Vietnamese marines relieved the Airborne Division. He visited Quang Tri in summer 2011. Howard, a retired brigadier general, lives in Carolina Beach, North Carolina. APRIL 2022

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‘NEVER BEEN BOMBED LIKE THEY ARE GOING TO BE BOMBED’ OPERATION LINEBACKER RAMPED UP THE PRESSURE ON HANOI DURING THE COMMUNISTS’ 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE

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PHOTO CREDITS

By Carl O. Schuster

resident Richard Nixon’s daily briefing on Dec. 20, 1971, reported a buildup of North Vietnamese troops above the Demilitarized Zone and southbound troop movements on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The North Vietnamese air force was moving units south, including the newly established 927th Fighter Regiment, equipped with MiG-21PFM fighter jets. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Thomas Moorer had advised Nixon in November that Hanoi’s air defense units were attacking AC-130 Spectre gunships and B-52 Stratofortess bombers supporting Laotian Maj. Gen. Vang Pao’s forces fighting communist Pathet Lao insurgents. Realizing that Hanoi intended to start an offensive in 1972, Nixon ordered the armed services to reinforce their air power in Indochina. That same day Moorer approved airstrikes against military targets up to the 20th parallel, essentially all targets south of Hanoi and the key port at Haiphong. Nixon and the Joint Chiefs thought the bombing would deter Hanoi from launching an offensive the size of the massive Tet Offensive in 1968. They were wrong.

PHOTO CREDITS

Crews on aircraft carrier USS Constellation move bombs to A-6A Intruders of Attack Squadron VA-165, slated to strike targets in North Vietnam on May 8, 1972. The Pentagon had authorized the attacks on April 1, following the North Vietnamese Army’s invasion of South Vietnam on March 30, the start of what became known as the Easter Offensive.

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offensive, also called the Easter Offensive. The North Vietnamese Army’s plans were completed by October. Le Duan ordered his negotiators to take a hard line in talks with their American counterparts. That ploy had worked with President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, but Nixon was a different leader. Diplomatically, Nixon promised the Soviet Union’s Leonid Brezhnev detente and China’s Mao Zedong U.S. recognition if they pressured Hanoi into earnest negotiations. He visited Beijing on Feb. 21-28 1972, and canceled the peace talks on March 23 due to a lack of progress. Hanoi’s intelligence agents learned China was considering an aid cutoff to North Vietnam in exchange for diplomatic relations with the U.S. Militarily, Nixon increased Hanoi’s costs and losses. He had expanded the bombing on Dec. 25, 1971, allowing strikes up to the 20th parallel. Nixon also liberalized the rules of engagement with strikes on North Vietnam’s airfields and surfaceto-air missile sites that threatened U.S. bomber routes. The days of retaliation only for MiG and SAM attacks on U.S. forces were over. Although the targets remained limited, the operations and tactics were not. The bombing was just one component of Nixon’s plan to end the increasingly unpopular war.

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NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND

7th Air Force The forerunner of the 7th Air Force, the Hawaiian Air Force, was established on Oct. 19, 1940. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941, wrecked the Hawaiian Air Force, which rebuilt, was designated the 7th Air Force on Feb. 5, 1942, and participated in the battles of Midway and Iwo Jima. It was inactivated on June 1, 1949, then activated and inactivated again in the mid-1950s. The 7th Air Force was reactivated at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in South Vietnam on March 28, 1966, and transferred to a base in Thailand on March 29, 1973. It was inactivated on June 30, 1975, and reactivated on Sept. 8, 1986, at Osan Air Base in South Korea.

COMMUNIST PARTY FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN—Hanoi’s actual leader since December 1963, even though Ho Chi Minh was technically the head of government until his death in September 1969—viewed 1972 as an opportune time for a large-scale offensive to conquer South Vietnam. Le Duan believed that America’s antiwar movement would constrain Nixon’s response. Then, if the offensive succeeded as expected, Republican Nixon would be defeated in the November election or at least weakened in negotiations for a peace agreement. Le Duan’s memoirs speak of his preference for Democrats Hubert Humphrey, the 1968 presidential nominee, and George McGovern, who advocated for unconditional withdrawal and became the party’s presidential candidate in 1972. Additionally, Nixon’s not-sosecret communications with Beijing to establish better relations with China, one of North Vietnam’s major patrons, threatened a source of crucial support for Le Duan, which reinforced his need to damage Nixon politically. Having imprisoned most Communist Party members who favored a peace agreement, Le Duan faced little opposition to a new offensive. He calculated that Hanoi had the political will to continue fighting while America did not. In June 1971 he set in motion the Spring-Summer 1972

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North Vietnamese troops get an SA-2 surface-to-air missile ready to launch in the late 1960s. By the time Operation Linebacker began on May 9, 1972, the U.S. had developed a variety of sophisticated measures to counter the SAM threat.

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He believed a carrot and stick approach might draw Hanoi to a peace agreement. The bombing campaign represented the stick. For the carrot, Nixon promised a total withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam, provided Hanoi returned all prisoners of war and agreed to an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina. Previously, the U.S. had refused to withdraw all its forces unless Hanoi did the same. Nixon and Kissinger thought they were offering a good deal and hoped Hanoi would see it the same way. Le Duan did not. He believed South Vietnam was about to fall, rendering Nixon’s “carrot” irrelevant.

LE DUAN LAUNCHED the Easter Offensive’s first phase on March 30, 1972, sending three divisions and supporting units across the DMZ and the Laotian border on their way to Quang Tri. Two days later, April 1 in Washington and April 2 in Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs authorized airstrikes above the 20th parallel, the same day Hanoi launched a corps-level drive toward Saigon. On April 4, the president told national security adviser Henry Kissinger, “The bastards have never been bombed [like] they’re going to be bombed this time,” as recorded on the Nixon tapes. Nixon intensified strikes on North Vietnam’s supply lines and logistics facilities and accelerated the air power buildup in East Asia. The U.S. also increased air support to ground forces in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. On April 9-12, B-52Ds struck the oil facility and rail yard at Vinh, a city between the DMZ and Hanoi. The bombers countered enemy radar with electronic jamming equipment and the largest corridor of chaff (tiny strips of tin foil dropped from the planes to confuse radar) since World War II. Surprised crews in the North Vietnamese air defense system were overwhelmed. The oil facility was destroyed without U.S. losses. Two days later, American aircraft struck oil and rail facilities around Hanoi and Haiphong for the first time since 1968, using B-52s followed by 100 fighter-bombers. The fires burned for two days. Similar raids destroyed weapons storage areas and oil facilities around Haiphong at the cost of two American planes downed by anti-aircraft artillery. Yet Le Duan remained unimpressed. The Easter Offensive continued. Hanoi’s drive on Kontum in the Central Highlands halted on April 23, but that was due more to NVA hesitation than ARVN resistance. On April 30, the Joint Chiefs reported to Nixon that all aircraft were in place to conduct a comprehensive bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

A KC-135 tanker refuels F-4E Phantom II fighters and F-105G Thunderchief fighter-bombers, “Wild Weasels,” equipped with electronics that enable the F-105 to home in on and destroy radars at SAM sites. BELOW: Flight deck hands aboard the Constellation, stationed in the South China Sea, prepare an Intruder of VA-165 for takeoff on April 25, 1972.

Hanoi’s Easter Offensive neared its peak as Kissinger met his North Vietnamese negotiating counterpart, Le Duc Tho, in Paris on May 2. South Vietnamese forces had abandoned their northernmost provincial capital, Quang Tri, the day before. Confident that victory was near, the North’s delegation proved intransigent and, according to Kissinger’s memoirs, insulting. Nixon ordered the Joint Chiefs to present him with options. On May 4, Moorer offered a plan to mine Haiphong Harbor. Nixon approved it immediately. The next day he got a briefing on the plan for a bombing campaign initially titled Rolling Thunder Alpha. Nixon also approved it immediately. The bombing campaign, renamed Operation Linebacker, was significantly different from Rolling Thunder (March 2, 1965-Oct. 31, 1968). Notably, in Rolling Thunder the targets were selected by Johnson and other administration officials based on recommendations from the Air Force and Navy and selected to limit civilian casualties. In contrast, the planning for Linebacker was conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the execution was carried out by the commanders involved. For dramatic effect, Nixon announced the

Linebacker I Objectives

Restrict supplies entering North Vietnam from abroad. Destroy internal stockpiles of military supplies and equipment. Restrict the flow of enemy supplies into South Vietnam. Directive Do everything that can be done to avoid civilian casualties. If this rule was violated, operational commanders were to be informed that they would be held personally accountable.

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A B-52G Stratofortress approaches for landing after a bombing mission over North Vietnam during Operation Linebacker. The plane also was used for close air support in South Vietnam. With its radar-directed bombing system, the B-52 could drop loads within 650 yards of friendly troops.

MEANWHILE, the seemingly unstoppable North Vietnamese Army continued to overrun the ARVN soldiers protecting South Vietnamese towns. The NVA was attacking with artillery that had a much longer range than the guns of the ARVN defenders. Meanwhile, heavy rains and low overcast severely inhibited air-support operations. Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, strongly objected to any efforts to divert B-52s away from their support missions for the ground war in the South. B-52 radar-directed bombing was Abrams’ most effective all-weather close-air-support weapon. The bombers’ accuracy had improved over the years, enabling the planes to drop their loads within 650 yards of friendly troops and strike fear in the NVA. In a

change of policy, the Strategic Air Command no longer required B-52 crews to file international flight plans 72 hours before the sortie, taking away the advanced strike warnings that the NVA once received. Nixon accepted his commanders’ recommendation and reluctantly removed B-52s from Linebacker missions to concentrate on bombing NVA forces in South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs and Strategic Air Command planners built Linebacker as a systematic air campaign to dismantle North Vietnam’s transportation network and capacity to support military operations. It was designed to isolate the network’s central hubs in Hanoi and Haiphong by attacking both cities’ defenses, tearing up rail networks and destroying all military facilities and supplies in those areas. In that regard, Linebacker shared

Gen. John W. Vogt

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U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, HISTORYNET ARCHIVES

Crew: Six Engine: Eight Pratt & Whitney J-57-P- 43WB turbojets with 13,750 lbs. thrust Wingspan: 185 ft. Length: 147 ft., 6 in. Takeoff weight: 488,000 lbs. Max. speed: 636 mph Max combat range: 4,000 miles with 10,000 lbs. bombload Altitude (operational ceiling): 50,000 ft. Electronic warfare: AN/ALR-20 radar warning system and jamming equipment Max. bombload: 20,250 lbs. Armament: Four .50-caliber machine guns in tail turret

bombing at 9 p.m. on May 8 to coincide with the launch of the airstrikes at 9 a.m., May 9, in Vietnam. While the president spoke slowly about the war on national television, the Linebacker campaign opened with the Operation Pocket Money. Aircraft from carrier USS Coral Sea laid a combination of 36 magnetic and acoustic mines (detonated by the metal or sound of overhead ships) in Haiphong Harbor’s two main shipping channels. Three destroyers shelled the anti-aircraft artillery positions southwest of Haiphong. When Nixon was assured the planes had cleared North Vietnamese airspace, he announced to his TV audience that mining was underway and all accesses to North Vietnam’s major ports would be mined. The president added that he directed U.S. forces to cut off North Vietnamese rail and communications networks to the maximum possible extent. He stated that the air and naval strikes against North Vietnam would continue.

HISTORY/UNIVERSAL IMAGES GROUP VIA GETTY IMAGES, U.S. AIR FORCE

B-52G Stratofortress Bomber

U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, HISTORYNET ARCHIVES

HISTORY/UNIVERSAL IMAGES GROUP VIA GETTY IMAGES, U.S. AIR FORCE

many features of the Rolling Thunder goals. However, four elements had changed since Rolling Thunder’s conception in late 1964: advances in technology, the increased strength of North Vietnam’s air defenses, the expanded size of its military infrastructure and the determination of America’s political leadership to hit the North hard. No component of Hanoi’s air defense system was excluded from attack. Airfields, command centers, radars, SAM sites and SAM storage facilities were struck. Radars and communications equipment were jammed. Chaff corridors were created to blind the defenders. The American arsenal included jet fighters, on flights code-named “Wild Weasel,” equipped with sophisticated missiles that could detect, home in on and destroy the radar at SAM sites. During the Johnson administration, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara emphasized large numbers of bombing runs, not the striking power of those sorties. Large numbers of flights with small strikes required less preparation, takeoff and recovery times, but gave the North Vietnamese a predictable series of piecemeal raids conducted in sequence. Linebacker’s mass raids with powerful ways to suppress air-defense systems were an entirely different problem for Hanoi. North Vietnam’s official history admits the defenders were not prepared for the size of the strikes or the electronic warfare that supported them. North Vietnamese fighter pilots suffered accordingly. With better air control support, shorter transit-to-target times, the new “loose deuce” fighter formation (two fighters flying together to cover each other) and improved air combat training, U.S. Navy pilots achieved a 6:1 kill ratio. One Navy F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber team, Lt. Randall Cunningham and radar intercept officer Lt. j.g. Willie P. Driscoll, downed three MiG-17s on May 10 to become America’s first aces of the war. The Air Force quickly improved the intelligence and warning support for its pilots. By July, it caught up with the Navy, adding three aces of its own: pilot Capt. Richard S. “Steve”Ritchie and weapons control officers Charles B. Bellevue and Jeffrey S. Feinstein, both captains.

AFTER REVIEWING the first day’s results on May 9, the 7th Air Force commander, Gen. John W. Vogt, decided that all Air Force strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area would employ precision-guided munitions, “smart bombs.” With only six precision-guided systems available in Indochina, Vogt’s decision limited Air Force strikes in that area to one a day, but accuracy and effec-

tiveness markedly improved. TOP: Navy Lt. Randall Vogt recognized that the new technologies Cunningham of Fighter required special training and experience. He Squadron VF-96 shows fellow Constellation crewmen how he initiated the specialization of air wings. The downed three MiG-17s on May 433rd and 435th Tactical Fighter Squadrons 10, 1972. ABOVE: Tran Hanh, became his primary precision-guided strike left, and Pham Ngoc Lan of the 921st Fighter Regiment, units. The 497th Tactical Fighter Squadron the first MiG-17 pilots to score assumed the electronic warfare and chaff cor- aerial victories, examine gun film in 1965. The U.S. ridor mission. The 432nd Tactical Reconnais- camera lost more than 100 aircraft sance Wing focused on air-to-air missions, in 1972 during Linebacker. and the 338th Tactical Fighter Wing hunted SAMs because it had F-105G Thunderchief Wild Weasels and EB-66 Destroyer electronic warfare planes. The specialization paid immediate dividends as crew proficiency and tactics improved almost instantly. The chaff-laying flights, although they required fighter escorts and jamming support, all but negated Hanoi’s SAM threat. SAM sites resorted to launching 30-50 missiles into aerial “engagement boxes” where they expected the U.S. strike aircraft were flying. That wasn’t effective. North Vietnamese successes were limited to attacks on aircraft flying outside chaff protection. APRIL 2022

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Sortie Stats LINEBACKER I MAY 9-OCT. 23, 1972

TOTAL SORTIES

42,000

NAVY/MARINE SORTIES: 23,940 AIR FORCE SORTIES: 18,060 TOTAL BOMB TONNAGE: 155,548

TOTAL U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES

134

COMBAT LOSSES: 104 ACCIDENTS, OTHER NONCOMBAT LOSSES: 30

AIR FORCE LOSSES

COMBAT LOSSES: 51 NONCOMBAT LOSSES: 19

NAVY LOSSES

COMBAT LOSSES: 43 NONCOMBAT LOSSES: 11

Navy A-7E Corsair IIs of VA-195 from carrier Kitty Hawk bomb the Hai Duong railway bridge in North Vietnam on May 10, 1972. The photograph was taken by the rearward-looking strike camera of Lt. Mike Ruth’s Corsair.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE COMBAT LOSSES MIGs

U.S. VICTORS: AIR FORCE: 42 NAVY: 20; MARINES: 1

Anti-aircraft artillery remained a threat, but the increasing availability of precision-guided bombs not only improved strike accuracy but also extended the safe distance from which an attack could be made. Hanoi lost 17 key bridges in Linebacker’s first three weeks. The destruction of rail yards, petroleum tanks and weapons storage facilities quickly followed. Worse from Hanoi’s perspective, replacement supplies were not assured. Chinese and Soviet deliveries dropped by more than 50 percent. Interestingly, neither China nor the Soviet Union protested the mining of Haiphong Harbor, the entry point for 90 percent of Hanoi’s war supplies. The bulk of the other supplies were transported on two single-track rail lines that ran from the Sino-Vietnam border and intersected at a rail junction 20 miles north of Hanoi. The railroad connected to the city via the 1.5-mile-long Paul Doumer Bridge, or Long Bien Bridge, over the Red River. That bridge was destroyed two weeks into Operation Linebacker, The air campaign was complemented by the Navy’s shelling of coastal facilities, radar and anti–aircraft artillery sites, and offshore shipping. On Aug. 27, the 7th Fleet flagship cruiser USS Newport News, the guided missile cruiser USS Provi-

dence and two destroyers shelled Haiphong’s coastal defense positions. Four North Vietnamese torpedo boats responded, only to be sunk without inflicting any damage. Concurrently, U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft hit Hanoi’s supply convoys on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and inside South Vietnam. In transitioning from guerrilla war tactics to traditional combined arms operations for the Easter Offensive, the NVA had acquired the logistical tail that American air power had been organized and trained to strike. By late July, NVA artillery units had to ration daily ammunition allotments because the commanders could rely only on previously stocked supply caches. American intercepts of radio communications indicated supply deliveries were down by 70 percent. NVA casualties mounted. Allied air support devastated units in combat. Some units reported losses exceeding 50 percent of their personnel and equipment.

THE EASTER OFFENSIVE had begun to sputter by late July. Kontum never fell. ARVN forces advanced on Quang Tri to retake the city. Le Duc Tho agreed to resume private talks on Aug. 4. Early discussions went poorly with both sides

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AP/BOB DAUGHERTY

COMBAT LOSSES: 10

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NAVAL AVIATION

MARINE LOSSES

AP/BOB DAUGHERTY

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NAVAL AVIATION

exchanging recriminations. Progress remained elusive. The anti-war movement was gaining momentum, and the presidential election was only 10 weeks away. A frustrated Nixon dropped one of his key conditions—the complete withdrawal of NVA forces from South Vietnam. North Vietnamese negotiators remained intransigent. Nixon ordered the Air Force and Navy to increase strikes around Hanoi and Haiphong. The August monsoon brought heavy rains that inundated most Air Force bases in Thailand and South Vietnam. Conditions over North Vietnam negated the use of precision guidance systems. The 7th Air Force went to two missions a day and returned to dropping “dumb bombs” while reducing the number of jamming, refueling and SAM suppression flights in support of the missions. Chaff flights also had to be reduced. While the weather inhibited North Vietnamese MiG operations as much as it did American flights, the diminished chaff and jamming support resuscitated Hanoi’s SAM force. The Air Force countered with “hunter-killer” teams of F-105G Wild Weasels and F-4s carrying cluster bombs. Sensors on the F-105, the “hunter,” identified the location of SAM radars, and the pilot fired anti-radiation missiles, or ARMs, that forced the shutdown of SAM radars. Then the F-4, the “killer,” destroyed most of the site with a cluster bomb. By late September, however, intelligence reporting indicated that Hanoi had repaired most of its transportation network and fuel storage facilities. Electricity generation and most major highways had also been restored. North Vietnam had exploited the reduced bombing period to rebuild and reconstitute its capacity. On Oct. 8, Hanoi dropped most of its preconditions for a peace agreement. Le Duc Tho no longer required the U.S. to remove the South Vietnamese leadership and replace it with a coalition government that included the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). He also accepted the U.S. proposal for an internationally monitored ceasefire. Le Duc Tho and Kissinger offered a tentative agreement on Oct. 23. Nixon ordered cessation of Linebacker that same day. U.S. combat losses totaled 104 aircraft: 55 downed by anti-aircraft guns, 26 by MiGs, 18 by SAMs and five by actions taken to evade MiG intercepts. Le Duan faced severe criticism for his handling of the war, even with the Communist Party’s “peace faction” imprisoned. The army’s heavy losses had eroded his support. Linebacker had depressed public morale. Le Duan needed to buy time to identify and suppress the new opposition

and, most of all, reduce the casualties and damage. Mao had told him the Americans would leave soon. The Oct. 23 agreement contained that requirement. Once the Americans were gone, Le Duan would reconsider his options.

President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai make a toast in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Feb. 21, 1972. Nixon believed he could persuade China and the Soviet Union to put pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate a peace agreement in Paris.

LINEBACKER I, as it came to be known, marked the world’s first widespread deployment of precision-guided weapons, high-tech electronic warfare and air defense suppression (the Wild Weasels). However, even though American air power had driven Le Duan to seek a peace agreement, Linebacker I had not proved as effective as initially assessed. It inflicted more damage on North Vietnam’s warfighting capacity in four months than Rolling Thunder had in 3½ years, but Hanoi retained a significant combat capacity. Intelligence indicated that the NVA had stockpiled more than six months of food, fuel and ammunition in caches across Cambodia and in its South Vietnam enclaves before launching the Easter Offensive. With its railroads and ports largely shut down, North Vietnam moved supplies by trucks and ferries. In August, truck convoys started importing 10,000 tons of supplies monthly from China. Air defense command and control networks became more robust, dispersed and redundant. Supply shortages did not stop the Easter Offensive. The offensive ended because air power inflicted heavy NVA troop casualties and equipment losses among front-line units in the South. Vogt, the 7th Air Force commander, studied those reports and lessons learned from the campaign. The studies proved to be valuable after South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu’s refusal to sign the October agreement forced negotiations into a new and more difficult round. Nixon assuaged Thieu’s concerns by promising overwhelming U.S. air support if Hanoi violated the cease-fire agreement, but then Le Duan refused to sign the agreement. Before long, B-52s were back over the skies of North Vietnam in what became known as Linebacker II, or the Christmas Bombing Campaign. Linebacker I had set the stage and opened the door for a negotiated peace. Linebacker II would seal the deal. V Carl O. Schuster is a retired Navy captain with 25 years of service. He finished his career as an intelligence officer. Schuster, who lives in Honolulu, is a teacher in Hawaii Pacific University’s Diplomacy and Military Science program. APRIL 2022

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LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

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PHOTO CREDITS

WHAT VIETNAM TAUGHT THE ARMY ABOUT TACTICAL MANEUVERS AND ATTACKS FROM “SAPPER” COMMANDOS

T he experiences of U.S. infantrymen in Vietnam are told in many ways: through personal memoirs, media accounts, oral histories— and the government’s own reports. Historian Chris McNab mined those reports to produce The U.S. Army Infantryman Vietnam Pocket Manual, which reprints declassified primary documents such as field manuals, weapons manuals, intelligence analyses and after-action reports, including those with “lessons learned” sections. This article features two lessons-learned sections, with introductions by McNab.

he Vietnam War, and the diligent efforts of archivists, has left us with a vast archive of U.S. Army infantry after-action reports, many of which conclude with a “lessons learned” section that summarized the tactical knowledge acquired from the particular operation. The following report was part of a broader compilation of these reports. The explanatory document that introduces the report explains that it “is the first of the 1968 special series of numbered Operations Reports—Lessons Learned. It contains a summary of selected items based on information reported in Operational Reports—Lessons Learned and Combat After Action reports submitted during 1967.” Information collected in documents such as these would be distributed to front-line units and training formations back in the States, hopefully to improve the survivability of those new to Vietnam operations. In the extracts below, there are interesting discussions about various tactical challenges, particularly those relating to winkling out the enemy from rocky cave complexes (common in mountainous areas).

PHOTO CREDITS

A 1st Cavalry Division firebase on high ground in the A Shau Valley of northern South Vietnam provides 105 mm howitzer support on Aug. 12, 1968, to infantrymen fighting in the valley below. Attacks on fire support bases led to improved base security measures summarized in “lessons learned” reports.

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From “Operations Report— Lessons Learned 1-68: Summary of Lessons” (1968) SECTION 1: MANEUVER TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 1. ITEM: Pursuit, battlefield sweep and evacuation of the wounded. (670698)

OBSERVATION: Each situation must be analyzed carefully to determine the sequence of the actions to be taken. If at all possible, reinforcements should be inserted to pursue the enemy and to otherwise exploit the situation. Moreover, immediate action must be taken either by the US unit in contact or by the reinforcing unit, as the case may be, to conduct an immediate sweep of the battlefield. Obviously, the seriously wounded must be evacuated from the battlefield by the fastest method in order to prevent further loss of lives. To accomplish all of these things in the

proper order or simultaneously requires careful judgment and coordination by the commanders involved.

2. ITEM: Combat in rock complexes. (67X071) DISCUSSION: The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, during Operation Thayer II [in central South Vietnam, October 1966-February 1967], conducted sustained combat operations in mountainous terrain containing numerous rock complexes. The following is based on the brigade’s experiences: A. Operations within rock complexes. Combating the enemy within a cave is extremely difficult. Since the enemy inhabits the cave, he knows where the passages lead and has the advantage of interior lines of communication in his reinforcing capability. Additionally, he has a defense plan based on a detailed reconnaissance, knowing well in advance what avenues of approach must be used by his opponents. The attacker has no way to make a reconnaissance except by fire. Although the advantage is on defense, there are several advantages that accrue to the attacker. The attacker has the initiative and freedom to choose where and when to strike. Secondly, the attacker has a significant psychological advantage in that the defender harbors a great fear of being entombed alive. The final result depends mostly on the quality of the individuals fighting the engagement. B. Organization of rock com-

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BETTMAN/GETTY IMAGES, AP

Excerpted from The U.S. Army Infantryman Pocket Manual, edited by Chris McNab, Casemate Publishers, 2021

In preparation for blasting closed an enemy cave entrance in the Phu Cat mountains of the Central Highlands, soldiers in the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, form a line to pass explosives up to the opening in January 1967.

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DISCUSSION: The 4th Infantry Division reports that there is a built-in conflict as to what action should be taken immediately upon the enemy attempting to withdraw in the dense jungle near the Cambodian Border. The ideal situation would be to have a landing zone in the immediate proximity of the contact area through which reinforcements could be inserted to initiate an aggressive exploitation or pursuit. Simultaneously, the US unit in contact should evacuate its wounded and dead and initiate an immediate sweep of the battlefield. However, in dense jungle landing zones are not readily available in the vast majority of cases. As soon as the situation permits, and in the absence of a landing zone, the US unit must cut a landing zone out of the jungle foliage to evacuate the wounded. The normal time required to cut such a landing zone is about 15 hours, but may often extend to 24 hours and, on occasion, may exceed 36 hours. During this period, the enemy is making a maximum effort to evacuate his wounded, documents, weapons and other items of equipment from the battle area. In many cases, he is able to physically remove his dead before a sweep of the battlefield can be accomplished.

BETTMAN/GETTY IMAGES, AP

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plex fighting teams. A typical rock complex fighting team consists of three to four men led by an experienced non-commissioned officer. The point man leads the way and provides security to the front. The second man in line, normally the leader, provides observation and security to the flanks. The rear man secures the rear and becomes the guide in case a rapid withdrawal is necessary. The point man should carry a large flashlight to investigate cracks and crevices. This light must be cautiously used as it will often draw enemy fire. Training and practice in the attack of a rock complex are absolute necessities for successful accomplishment of the mission. C. Use of hand grenades within rock formations. All types can be effectively used at rock formations entrances, but once the team is underground the fragmentation type hand grenades are not practicable. If thrown, the effect on friend and foe alike is chaotic. D. Use of demolition within the underground rock complex. The most effective method of underground rock complex destruction is through the utilization of demolitions. Great quantities of explosives, nearly 75 tons, were required to destroy the underground rock complexes which were found in the brigade’s area of operations. Transportation of the explosives was a most difficult logistical problem. Maximum use was made of small satchel charges by tossing them into the cave entrance then exploding the charge with a claymore firing device. E. Use of individual weapons within an underground rock complex. Due to the size of the M60 machine gun and noise it created, it was impossible to use the weapon in the caves. The identical problem exists with the M14 rifle. The XM16E1proved to be somewhat better than either of the other two weapons due to its light weight and compact size; however, as with all weapons with high muzzle velocity, ricochets were so frequent and so dangerous that our soldiers were reluctant to use them. The best weapon by far proved to be the caliber .45 automatic pistol. As the ranges at which most kills were made were in the neighborhood of a few feet, there was little need for accuracy. The tremendous stopping power of the caliber .45 pistol at close ranges more than once literally blew the enemy down as well as killing him. OBSERVATION: A. The psychological effect on the enemy can be exploited by using a small portable loud-speaker encouraging the enemy to come out or be buried alive. A rock complex can be attacked through many openings by using small elements (less than fire team size) operating independently but with a common mission. Little use can be made of demolitions, or fragmentation grenades once a team is within the cave as the explosives have an equal effect on both friend and enemy. The demolitions, and fragmentation grenades affect the eardrums. Therefore, the battle within the cave rock complex returns to the most primitive of fights; man against man, using pistols at ranges of two and three feet. Here control and leadership is difficult and the will of the individual becomes the dominant factor. B. The technique of rock complex fighting requires detailed planning and violent execution similar to the technique developed by the US Army for destruction of a fortified area. The main difference in the attack of a cave complex and the attack of a fortified area lies in the intelligence field for in a cave complex a reconnaissance is impossible. C. Hand grenades can be employed by troops outside the caves but once inside only non-fragmentation grenades can be used, such as white phosphorous and CS [tear gas], and these must be used with extreme caution. The best technique is to employ them

TOP: Dead and wounded soldiers are taken from the battlefield in March 1965. Experiences in the field helped improve evacuation procedures. ABOVE: A 25th Infantry Division fighter moves through the jungle to help seal off a cave entrance in January 1967.

around corners or down in crevices. D. When underground rock complex destruction is required a great quantity of explosives will be necessary to break the vast amount of rocks that support the cave and the entrance. The transportation problem was solved by using a CH-47 helicopter with a 100 foot sling which transported the explosives directly to the rock complex entrance where the demolition was to take place. The explosives were emplaced and exploded. The technique used was to throw the small satchel charge device into the rock complex while a soldier stood by with a claymore firing device. No sooner did the charge fall to the ground than it was exploded with the firing device preventing the enemy from tampering with it. E. Since the caliber .45 pistol has an extremely low muzzle velocity and a very heavy slug, there is little chance of a ricochet hitting the firer. The big disadvantage is the report from the pistol which at times will stun the firer, momentarily preventing a good second shot. For future operations of this nature silencers would be useful. APRIL 2022

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From “Lessons Learned—Defense Against Sapper Attacks” (1969) 1. Day and night recon patrols. Defending units should prepare and implement as extensive a patrol plan as possible. Recognizing that infantry resources at a fire base or fixed installation seldom meet the basic needs of the commander, it remains imperative that a continuous effort be made to detect the sapper during either the reconnaissance or the movement to contact. The size of the friendly recon patrol will naturally have to be based upon the enemy threat in the area. The distance the patrol travels from the fire base or installation will also be contingent upon knowledge of enemy activity. It should be emphasized, however, that friendly patrols need not necessarily operate at great distance from the base, because sapper recon elements invariably attempt to get close to the objective area, and sapper forces must be positioned within but a few hundred meters of the perimeter wire many hours before the assault begins. The mission of early detection can therefore normally be accomplished by small screening parties operating in the immediate area around the fire base or installation. In this regard, an analysis of the historical example will show that two or three small patrols conducted by friendly forces just prior to dusk along a line some 200 meters outside the wire would have uncovered the enemy force at a time when he was most vulnerable. 2. Deception and counterintelligence. It will be noted that the sapper bases his plan of attack on detailed knowledge of defensive installations and patterns normally followed throughout the day and night. Commanders should therefore develop plans to deceive the enemy and hinder his reconnaissance. Such plans should include provisions for false bunkers and gun positions, movement of key installations from time to time, variation in patrol schedules, and the emplacement of dummy anti-intrusion devices to augment the actual devices around the perimeter. Effective deception and counterintelligence measures are products of the imagination, usually the result of thorough knowledge of sapper techniques combined with the promulgation of ever-changing ideas designed to confuse the enemy. One of the major deficiencies noted in the study of past sapper attacks was the constant use of the same locations for listening posts. An imaginative commander prepares plans for dummy listening posts as well as for posts that are never in the same location two nights in a row. 3. Anti-intrusion devices. A unit programmed to occupy a fire support base or a fixed installation can never emplace enough anti-intrusion devices. Defense plans must provide for continuous improvement of those devices which exist and progressive augmentation thereof. Mines and booby traps affixed to trip wires must be carefully plotted in the interest of safety. However, the trip flare is a device which can and should be used in great numbers and in those locations where the enemy is not likely to expect them. A trip flare emplaced on high ground overlooking the defensive pe50

rimeter or on avenues of approach well away from the perimeter will cause the sapper immeasurable difficulty. He expects a pattern of wires, booby traps and trip flares in the general vicinity of the perimeter. If he discovers or trips a flare hundreds of meters from the objective area, he will be forced to proceed with even greater caution than he normally does. The principal factor in this technique involves constant and continuous improvement of the defensive position. This is a platitude all too frequently ignored because of limited personnel resources and the press of other business. Nevertheless, the commander who adheres to this principle and expands his detection devices as far as available resources will permit will seldom be subjected to the assault phase of a sapper attack. 4. Troop alertness. It is a known fact that the VC/NVA will wait until boredom on the part of friendly forces causes the guard to be lowered. There is little that can be said relative to the requirement to insure that listening posts and personnel on the perimeter are alert at all times. This is a command function, and it is up to the commander to develop supervisory techniques designed to motivate the men. Practice alerts and a system of continuous inspections (particularly during the early morning hours) seem to produce favorable results. 5. Illumination of defended area. One of the keys to an effective defense against sapper attacks is illumination. The sapper is trained to operate in the dark, and once he penetrates the perimeter wire, he relies on confusion among the defenders and their inability to differentiate between the defender and the attacker. Thus, periodic illumination (at varied intervals) will assist in the detection of approaching sappers, and continuous illumination once the assault has begun will work to the benefit of the defending forces. In many fire bases throughout the XXIV Corps area there is one 81mm mortar tube prepared at all times for immediate illumination of the objective area. 6. Deconstruction of the enemy after the assault has begun. If the sapper is successful in reaching the perimeter wire without being detected, he is still extremely vulnerable during that period when he is attempting to penetrate the wire. It is here that effective fire from the perimeter guards will pay the greatest dividends. As soon as any member of the perimeter detects an attempt to penetrate the wire, the area should be illuminated, and every effort should be made to destroy the enemy during the process of penetration. In this regard, extensive use of tangle foot between external and internal perimeter wires

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CHRISTOPHER JENSEN/GETTY IMAGES

oth the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong had elite sapper units within their ranks. These soldiers were specialists in assaulting and breaking through American defensive perimeters, such as those around a firebase, infantry headquarters, fortified hamlet or other protected target, often using heavy weaponry such as rocket launchers, bangalore torpedoes [explosive-filled tubes], mines, heavy mortars and flamethrowers. The size of the sapper units ranged from independent squads of just a handful of men through to entire battalions and regiments. The following document, produced in 1969 by the headquarters of XXIV Corps [operating in northern South Vietnam] illustrates how seriously the threat from the sappers was taken and also gives a window into U.S. defensive tactics in Vietnam.

CHRISTOPHER JENSEN/GETTY IMAGES

A destroyed bunker sits empty on Aug. 2, 1970, at an outpost used by Green Berets at Kham Duc in northern South Vietnam. The post was overrun in May 1968. A bunker was the “worst place to be during a sapper attack.”

will keep the sapper in the kill zone for a longer period of time. 7. Use of bunkers. The bunker is the worst place to be during a sapper attack. Although a well-constructed bunker can sustain a direct hit by an 82mm mortar round, the sapper is trained to fire his RPG [rocket-propelled grenade]at the apertures of the bunker, thus preventing the defender from participating in FPL [final protective line] fires. It should be axiomatic that only critical bunkers (such as FDC’s [fire direction center] and communications bunkers) remain occupied when mortar fire begins to hit the objective, and even these bunkers should be protected by a guard stationed in a foxhole outside the installation, and another in the entrance. A well prepared foxhole in the vicinity of the bunker becomes a far more effective fighting position than the bunker itself and is less likely to be a target for crew served weapons and small arms employed by the attacking force. A soldier occupying a foxhole will not normally sustain injury from incoming mortar fire unless his position receives a direct hit. 8. Reaction force and internal firing. Every defensive position, regardless of how small, should have a reaction force, whose mission is to assault the enemy elements that have penetrated the wire. This force need not be particularly large. It should, however, be capable of assembling rapidly and moving to predesignated positions within the perimeter. The reaction

force should be rehearsed to insure that every man knows his job. Additionally, specified individuals in the defending force should be designated to fire at targets within the wire. Sappers pay little attention to activity of individuals within the perimeter unless those individuals are blocking their movement to their assigned objective. They can be eliminated by effective internal fire. 9. Use of signals. Some provisions should be made to alert everyone within the perimeter, as well as listening posts outside the perimeter, of the fact that a penetration has been made. Almost all historical examples indicate that a significant percentage of the defending force was unaware of a penetration until it was too late. Signals should be simple and easy to employ by all members of the command. Visual signals, such as a red flare, are perhaps the most effective means available because of the noise and confusion that exist during the initial phases of the assault. 10. Miscellaneous. The following additional recommended techniques should be considered by the defending commander: A. “Telltales” should be used extensively around the outside of the perimeter. These include the raking of sand strips so that footprints will show up and the arrangement of trees and bushes in such a manner that their disturbances by the sapper recon parties will be detected by friendly screening patrols. B. Units should be directed to save C ration cans and affix them to wire and bushes to serve as warning devices. C. Sapper attacks should be expected along the least likely avenues of approach—through swamps, blown timber, and trash dumps. Defensive positions should therefore provide for adequate observation of these avenues and the construction of additional obstacles to augment the natural ones. D. Within the defensive perimeter internal wire systems should be constructed (progressively, as time permits) around artillery pieces and critical installations. The ultimate objective should be a checkerboard network of internal perimeters which will force the enemy into a pocket if he succeeds in penetrating the external perimeter. E. Personnel stationed along the perimeter who suspect the presence of the enemy should be advised to use hand grenades and M-79 [grenade launcher gun] fire until such time as the enemy is definitely identified. Sapper recon parties occasionally probe a perimeter to test alertness of the defending force and locate individual firing positions. V

Chris McNab is a writer and editor who specializes in military history. One of his research interests is the evolution of modern maneuver warfare. APRIL 2022

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PHOTO CREDITS

VITAL SUPPORT NONCOMBAT UNITS WERE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

owever much combat troops dominated the news during the Vietnam War, the grunts knew they owed much to the vast armada of support troops who backed them up. The battlefield heroism performed in the rainforests and the highlands would have been impossible without the weapons and ammunition to fight, or the food to sustain those who fought. All of those supplies had to be shipped or flown over thousands of miles to the main bases, then distributed by truck or aircraft to the scattered posts where they were most needed. Before that work could be done, the main base facilities had to be established, built up by Army engineers or the legendary Navy construction battalions, abbreviated CBs, or more colloquially, the Seabees. Those facilities had to be periodically maintained and repaired. Trucks were universally fair game in Vietnam, whether they were communist-run vehicles dodging a variety of

PHOTO CREDITS

A CH-46 Sea Knight of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron HMM-262 prepares to relay supplies from Khe Sanh to one of the base’s outlying posts on Feb. 22, 1968. Those supplies were the lifeblood of the base in northern South Vietnam that had been under siege since Jan. 21.

By Jon Guttman

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PHOTO CREDITS

No matter your role in support staff, there was no place in-country where an armed Viet Cong couldn’t seek you out.

PHOTO CREDITS

Vital Support U.S. air-dropped ordnance on the Ho Chi Minh Trail or American haulers who were subjected to frequent ambush and often defended their own vehicles with makeshift armor and gun positions. Airplanes and helicopters also often came under fire while transporting “beans and bullets” from a firebase to some platoon in the boonies. Even the clerk typists were appreciated when payday arrived…or the tour of duty ended and the service member was signing up for a ride on the Freedom Bird. Despite the disparaging names that combat troops had for the rear echelon soldiers, Vietnam was distinguished by not having much of a rear echelon. Whether you were a clerk, a cook or a supply sergeant, there was no place from Khe Sanh to Saigon where mortar fire or some Viet Cong with a bag of explosives couldn’t find you. V

PHOTO CREDITS

A Seabees of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 11 build frames for hundreds of tentlike huts in a Marine camp at Quang Tri Combat Base near the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam. The tenting was later replaced with corrugated sheet metal roofing. B In one of the few roles available for women in the Army, outside of nursing, Spec.4 Ester M. Gleaton worked as a clerk typist in the Women’s Army Corps Detachment at Long Binh, near Saigon, from 1968 to 1969. C Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 53 repave a road with asphalt at Vinh Dai in northern South Vietnam. D At Dong Ha, also in the northern part, Seabees of NMCB-11 repair and relay matting on a parking apron damaged by enemy mortar fire. E NMCB-11 Seabees construct an approximately 165-foot suspension bridge.

PREVIOUS SPREAD: BETTMANN/CORBIS. THIS SPREAD: U.S. NAVY SEABEE MUSEUM; ESTHER M. GLEATON COLLECTION, WOMEN IN MILITARY SERVICE FOR AMERICA MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, INC.; U.S. NAVY SEABEE MUSEUM; U.S. NAVY SEABEE MUSEUM; U.S. NAVY SEABEE MUSEUM

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PATRICE HABANS/PARIS MATCH VIA GETTY IMAGES; PATRICE HABANS/PARIS MATCH VIA GETTY IMAGES; AP PHOTO

PHOTO CREDITS

Vital Support

PATRICE HABANS/PARIS MATCH VIA GETTY IMAGES; PATRICE HABANS/PARIS MATCH VIA GETTY IMAGES; AP PHOTO

PHOTO CREDITS

F Armorers load 20 mm rounds on Lt. Cmdr. William Bowes’ A-7E Corsair II of Attack Squadron VA-94 aboard the aircraft carrier Coral Sea in 1972. G Crewmen push 500-pound bombs across the Coral Sea ’s deck to arm the squadron’s A-7Es on missions to destroy key points in North Vietnam’s transportation and supply network. H Billowing parachutes deliver ammunition and other supplies to the 173rd Airborne Brigade in War Zone C, an area bordering Cambodia with a heavy Viet Cong presence, on Feb. 25, 1967, during Operation Junction City. The operation was initiated to clear out enemy forces and to find and destroy the Viet Cong headquarters, an endeavor that was unsuccessful.

Battlefield heroism in the highlands and rainforests would have been impossible to sustain without weapons, ammunition and food.

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Vital Support

I A Marine truck loads another vehicle onto a U.S.-bound transport ship at Da Nang on April 23, 1971. Vehicles in good working order were essential to the war effort. J Hungry American troops operating far from their base get sandwiches and drinks from a mobile PX. K While one Marine prepares soup, others rest or work on protection for their dug-in kitchen at Khe Sanh in March 1968.

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Join hosts Claire and Alex as they explore—week by week— the people and events that have shaped the world we live in.

THE LAST JAPANESE HOW MANY TIMES SOLDIER HAS THEFROM DESIGN WORLD OF THE WAR U.S.IIFLAG SURRENDERED CHANGED? IN THIS YEAR 27, 31, 36 or 40?

- 1945 - 1947 VIE-220400-002 Military Historical Tours 1-3SQ.indd 1 - 1950 - 1974 For more,search visitDAILY QUIZ For more, WWW.HISTORYNET.COM/ at HistoryNet.com. MAGAZINES/QUIZ

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HistoryNet.com ANSWER: 1974. PRIVATE TERUO NAKAMURA, A TAIWANESE NATIONAL,27. ENLISTED IN THE JAPANESE ARMY IN 1943. ANSWER: THE CURRENT DESIGN HAS BEEN IN HE HELD OUT ON 1960 MORTAI IN INDONESIA HE WAS CAPTURED PLACE SINCE WHEN THE FLAGUNTIL WAS MODIFIED IN DECEMBER 1974. EARLIER THAT YEAR, HIRO ONODA, WHO TO INCLUDE HAWAII, THE 50th STATE. HELD OUT IN THE PHILLIPINES, FINALLY SURRENDERED.

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A soldier in the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) reads his mail while on an operation in the Michelin rubber plantation between Saigon and Cambodia in 1969. Fellow cavalryman Dennis Blessing drew on more than 200 letters home in writing his war memoirs.

around 10 percent of the corresponding age group—only about 3 million Americans of all military services served in-country in land forces, flew air missions over Vietnam or sailed in the country’s surrounding waters during those years. By 2019, it was estimated that about 775,000 of those 3 million “in-country vets” were still alive. Since then, an average of about 400 have died each day. Capturing and preserving the first-person accounts of their Vietnam service must be a national priority. Vietnam War veterans themselves can help in that effort by writing memoirs recounting their service, as Dennis D. Blessing Sr., a combat veteran of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), has done with his concise but engaging new book, Vietnam in My Rearview: Memoir of a 1st Cavalry Combat Soldier,

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COURTESY PEN & SWORD BOOKS

In the late 1990s, prompted by the popularity of the film Saving Private Ryan and the push to build the World War II Memorial on the National Mall in Washington, the realization that America’s World War II generation was rapidly disappearVietnam in My ing entered the nation’s collective consciousness. Rearview: Memoir of a 1st Cavalry In virtual panic mode, multiple efforts eruptCombat Soldier, ed via websites and other media to capture the 1966-1967 wartime stories and accounts of surviving veterBy Dennis D. ans before it was too late. Today, a Blessing, Sr. MEDIA generation or more later, the focus McFarland & Co., DIGEST on preserving veterans’ memories 2021 inevitably has shifted to another vanishing warrior cohort—those who fought our war in Vietnam. Although approximately 9 million Americans served worldwide on active duty in U.S. military forces during the Vietnam War era (1954-75)—

VETERAN’S BOOK SHOWS IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM MEMOIRS

1966-1967. Importantly, the author begins his account with a very revealing point. There is no “single” Vietnam War experience representing all who served, as Blessing notes: Somewhere, sometime…someone, no doubt, will say: “This guy got it all wrong!” Each American soldier’s experience in this war was different, whether you were humping through the jungle or one of the multitudes of support forces, each of us has his own story…After 54 years since my time in Vietnam I may not have everything exactly right, but this is my story as remembered with the help of my 212 letters home…Writing this book gave me an opportunity to tell the full story of what it was like for me to serve as a combat soldier in an infantry unit in Vietnam…[and]…has helped me in some ways to come to terms with a war I often found hard to understand. That insightful observation—that no two Vietnam veterans’ experiences were, nor could ever be, exactly the same—is the most profoundly important point that readers should take away from Blessing’s well-written memoir. Aided by his 212 letters home, thankfully preserved, Blessing has published an excellent account of his tour as a combat infantry “grunt” with the 1st Cav. The book provides a snapshot, naturally viewed through his personal lens, of his unit during his 1966-67 tour. Blessing has done an admirable job of taking readers on his personal “Vietnam War tour.” The very minor errors found by this Vietnam vet in no way detract from his well-written narrative. What he recalled as “Flagstaff ” beer was “Falstaff.” His explanation of “left shoulder vs. right shoulder” unit patches was very clear and concise, but he unfortunately got them

reversed. The current unit of assignment patch is worn on the left shoulder, while the patch of the unit where one served in combat is worn on the right, not vice versa. However, those are insignificant errors and easily ignored. The book stands as an articulate and compellingly written example of what Vietnam War vets ought to be striving for: recording their experiences, stories, thoughts and, eventually, efforts to come to terms with the war, their service in it and how it affected their postwar lives. Blessing included a 15-page glossary of about 300 common terms. Some of them, as all Vietnam vets will recall, come from the Vietnamese language, frequently used by American service members. His list ranges from “Artillery Forward Observer” through “Beaucoup Dinky Dau” (really crazy) and “Sinh Loi” (sorry ’bout that) to “‘Yards” (GI slang for Montagnard tribespeople). So, come on, Vietnam War vets! Follow Blessing’s outstanding example. Pick up your pens or stubby pencils or computer keyboards and start recording your own Vietnam War experiences… before it’s too late! —Jerry Morelock

A Showcase for War’s Jeeps, Tanks, Trucks and Artillery tor, Doyle proudly owns 10 Vietnam-era vehicles and received the 2015 Bart Vanderveen Award from the Military Vehicle Preservation Association. He has written more than 100 books on U.S. military vehicles. The wealth of material in this book is divided into three major sections. The first two are dedicated to wheeled tactical vehicles and tracked combat vehicles. The last section is devoted to artillery and heavy weapons—specifically, self-propelled (drivable) weapons and towed weapons. The author supplements a wide variety of archival photos with detailed historical information, including the development processes behind certain weapons and vehicles. The photographs are accompanied by thorough captions. Doyle also includes charts on engine data and general statistics that will no doubt be useful to researchers. Willys/Ford M170 The book’s most outstanding feafield ambulance ture is its array of images. Jeep en-

COURTESY PEN & SWORD BOOKS

This excellently illustrated book is a guide to American vehicles and heavy weapons used by the Army and Marines Corps between 1965 and 1973 when ground combat units were in Vietnam. Vehicles & Heavy Weapons of the Vietnam War is the first in a series on Vietnam War weapons, vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels used by U.S. forces. Author David Doyle is no stranger to Vietnam War vehicles. A military vehicle collec-

Vehicles & Heavy Weapons of the Vietnam War

By David Doyle Pen & Sword Military, 2021

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thusiasts are sure to enjoy the section on wheeled vehicles with its many photos of hardy vehicles featuring classic designs by manufacturers including Willys, Ford and Chrysler. Readers who collect military vehicles or share the same war history obsessions and admiration for military machines as this reviewer will possibly covet them. Additionally, there are stunning photos of tanks, with a favorite of this reviewer being the

M67A2 Flame Tank, illustrated by photos from the Patton Museum demonstrating the tank’s roaring flames in action. Vehicles & Heavy Weapons of the Vietnam War is a useful tool for military history researchers, scholars of the Vietnam War or simply those who have enthusiasm for rugged military vehicles and weaponry. —Zita Ballinger Fletcher

Blackhorse Regiment Rode Steeds of Steel to the Rescue

By Donald C. Snedeker AUSA/Casemate, 2021

Tanks and armored personnel carriers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment roll into Cambodia in April 1970.

scores of individual Blackhorse troopers, replete with photographs, drawings (by former trooper John Pretti), maps and documents. Altogether, the stories provide a vivid picture of almost every aspect of life for the 25,000 men who served in the regiment, a mechanized unit equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers. In his effort to provide the fullest possible picture of life in Vietnam for the Blackhorse men, Snedeker includes chapters on weather conditions in the war zone, South Vietnamese troops, civilians (primarily Donut Dollies and locals who worked at base camps) and the physical conditions of the jungles, rice paddies, plantations and roads. There is also a chapter on the folks at home, primarily families, wives and sig-

BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES

Blackhorse Tales: Stories of 11th Armored Cavalry Troopers at War

Every unit sent to Vietnam deserves an official historian like Don Snedeker, who has served in that capacity for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for more than 30 years. Snedeker’s previous book, The Blackhorse in Vietnam, is a comprehensive history of the regiment from the time it arrived in-country in September 1966 to spring 1972 when it was deactivated during the drawdown of U.S. forces. Snedeker, an officer in the Blackhorse Regiment after he arrived in Vietnam in December 1969, continues to put his three decades of work as the unit’s historian to good use in his new book, Blackhorse Tales, which he calls a “companion volume” to the previous work. In this exhaustively researched book, Snedeker tells the stories of

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nificant others—not to mention one on pets and other animals the troops encountered in Vietnam, including monkeys, goats, lizards, snakes and chickens. The heart of the book is a collection of combat tales told to Snedeker over the years by former Blackhorse troopers and fleshed out with his extensive knowledge of the regiment’s history. Those accounts are woven into the narrative and contained in a 2022 Tours: series of what Snedeker calls combat “vignettes.” The first deals with events the II, III, and IV-Corps - (March 6-20, 2022) night of June 19, 1967, during OpI-Corps - Emphasis on Northern I-Corps - (March 6-22, 2022) eration Akron when two Blackhorse Marine Reconnaissance - (March 20 - April 3, 2022) squadrons fought alongside an Aus5th Infantry Division & Lam Son 719 - (March 20 - April 3, 2022) tralian Task Force, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division and the South VietI-Corps - Emphasis on Southern I-Corps - (May 1-15, 2022) namese 18th Infantry Division in a II, III, and IV-Corps - (Sept. 4-18, 2022) battle with a Viet Cong regiment near Marine Corps Epic Battles Tour - (Sept. 4-19, 2022) Saigon at a rubber plantation south of Bien Hoa. Others chronicle the fateful cross1-877-231-9277 (toll free) ing of the Dong Nai River on April WWW.VietnamBattlefieldTours.com 25, 1968, during the post-Tet offensive; the Aug. 8-13, 1968, fighting north of Saigon; an all-day battle against a large enemy force in April 1969 as part of Operation Montana Raider in dense jungle near Tay Ninh City; and the 2nd Squadron’s fight near the Ho Bo Woods in the Saigon area during late April 1971. Snedeker concentrates heavily on the positive aspects of the Blackhorse Regiment’s service, making Blackhorse Tales an unabashed paean to the Vietnam War veterans of the unit. He writes of the “sort of mystique” BY about the Blackhorse as it was “equal parts ‘riding-to-the rescue’ horse cavalry and ‘no-mission-too-difficult’ The story of a soldier who served two combat tours modern cavalry.” It was made up in Vietnam with the famed of men, he says, who “rode to war” First Infantry Division on “modern day steeds of steel and “THE BIG RED ONE.” VIE-220400-003 Vietnam Battlefield Tours.indd 1 aluminum.” They “were all part of He received four the same brotherhood of war” and Purple Hearts after being wounded on four gained a “lifetime membership in this separate occasions while brotherhood.” involved in some of the The Blackhorse, he writes, was “diflargest operations of ferent from the others who we fought the Vietnam War. 36 CHAPTERS / 40+ PHOTOS alongside in Vietnam. In a good way. In a very good way.” BOOK AND E-BOOK AVAIL ABLE AT AMAZON.COM —Marc Leepson

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HISTORIC TRIO OF SILVER STARS By Doug Sterner

In World War I, the U.S. Army established the Citation Star, which in 1932 became the Silver Star, its third highest award for combat heroism. The Silver Star was authorized for the Navy and Marine Corps in August 1942. In World War I and early World War II, Marines serving in the Army could be awarded the Silver Star by the Army. Since the end of World War II, 141 Marines earned an Army Silver Star. Most were awarded during the Korean War when Marine and Army units had combined operations. Since that time, just 17 Marines have received a Silver Star from the Army. One warrior is possibly the only person awarded a Silver Star from the Navy as a Marine who went on to receive an Army Silver Star as a soldier. On Jan. 19, 1968, 28-year-old Sgt. Clyde L. Bonnelycke was a HALL OF Marine sergeant serving as a platoon sergeant with Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine VALOR Division, supporting a vastly outnumbered Marine unit near the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam. The Marines were pinned down by small-arms and automatic weapons fire from numerous fortified positions. Bonnelycke charged about 30 yards through fire-swept terrain to reach an enemy bunker. Ignoring the hail of fire surrounding him, the sergeant attacked the bunker and threw a grenade into it, enabling his platoon to continue its attack and defeat the enemy. For his actions that day, Bonnelycke was nominated for a Silver Star. Before his award was approved, Bonnelycke completed his tour and returned home to Tacoma, Washington, in summer 1968 and accepted his discharge after more than 10 years in the Marine Corps. Civilian life didn’t 64

Doug Sterner, an Army veteran who served two tours in Vietnam, is curator of the Military Times Hall of Valor database of U.S. valor awards.

U.S. ARMY

CLYDE L. BONNELYCKE

suit him, and after a few weeks of rest he enlisted again, this time in the Army. He volunteered for another tour in Vietnam—but the Army wanted him in the 3rd Infantry Division in Germany. While he was there, the Navy Department, which had been looking for Bonnelycke to present the Silver Star, finally tracked him down. But Bonnelycke wasn’t satisfied. “I wanted to go back where the fighting was at,” he said. After numerous requests for reassignment, Bonnelycke got his wish and returned to Vietnam in 1969 as an Army sergeant in a platoon of Company C, 2nd Battalion (Airmobile), 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). His platoon was ambushed on July 13, 1969, in Tay Ninh province, northwest of Saigon bordering Cambodia. Numerous men were wounded. Realizing there was no firebase near enough to provide cover for a counterattack, Bonnelycke moved to his wounded machine gunner and picked up the weapon. Laying a base of fire, he enabled his platoon to mount an attack. When his ammunition was gone, he seized several grenades and silenced an enemy bunker with accurate throws. His actions allowed five platoon members to be evacuated and enabled his unit to break the enemy ambush. Those heroics resulted in an Army Silver Star, adding to the one Bonnelycke received wearing a Marine uniform. But he still wasn’t done. One month later on Aug. 12, Bonnelycke’s base came under an intense rocket, mortar and ground attack. Now a staff sergeant commanding an Army platoon, Bonnelycke left the safety of his bunker and went to one that had suffered a direct hit. Pulling wounded men to safety, he raced to the berm and fired a machine gun until he was out off ammunition. Bonnelycke then made his way to another gun and continued firing. Disregarding his wounds, he returned to the berm while firing on the enemy and helped carry wounded men to safety—actions that led to a second Silver Star from the Army. Today Bonnelycke, who retired as a master sergeant on May 1, 1988, after 10 years as a Marine and 19 years of Army service, lives in Lytle, Texas. Along with his three Silver Stars, he has four Bronze Stars and two Purple Hearts. I interviewed him and said I could find no record of any other man receiving Silver Stars while serving with the Marine Corps and then the Army. His reply was simply: “Really? Can I hand the phone to my wife and have you tell her that?” I did. V

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